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PROPERTY OF
University of
Michiğan
Libraries,
i ig17
ARTES SCIENILA VERITAS
E.A. Benians,
Cambridge Historical Series.
EDITED BY G. W. PROTHERO, LITT.D.
HONORARY FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
SCANDINAVIA
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,
C. F. CLAY, MANAGER.
London: AVE MARIA LANE, E.C.
Urlasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.

Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS.
New York: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
(All Rights reserved.]
SCANDINAVIA
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF DENMARK,
NORWAY AND SWEDEN
FROM 1513 TO 1900
BY
R. NISBET BAIN
Author of "The Daughter of Peter the Great," "Charles XII and
. the collapse of the Swedish Empire," etc., etc.
Cambridge :
At the University Press.
1905
Di
H6
.B16
-Cop. 2
Cambridge:
· PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
29025
ΤΟ
MY FATHER
GENERAL PREFACE.
The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern
Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about
the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one
or two cases the story commences at an earlier date : in the case
of the colonies it generally begins later. The histories of the
different countries are described, as a rule, separately; for it is
believed that, except in epochs like that of the French Revolution
and Napoleon I, the connection of events will thus be better under-
stood and the continuity of historical development more clearly
displayed.
The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to
understand the nature of existing political conditions. “The roots
of the present lie deep in the past”; and the real significance of
contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes
which have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes
it possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in
considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of
modern research. It is hoped therefore that the series will
be useful not only to beginners but to students who have already
acquired some general knowledge of European History. For
those who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography
appended to each volume will act as a guide to original sources
of information and works more detailed and authoritative.
Considerable attention is paid to political geography; and
each volume is furnished with such maps and plans as may
be requisite for the illustration of the text.
G. W. PROTHERO.
PREFACE.
*HE political history of Scandinavia is the history of the
frustration of a great Baltic Empire. That process of
concentration and amalgamation which, in the course of the
fifteenth century, resulted in the formation of national mon-
archies throughout Europe, was anticipated, nearly a hundred
years earlier, in the North, by the union of the three northern
kingdoms beneath the sceptre of Margaret of Denmark. The
Union of Kalmar, imperfect and unstable enough while it
lasted, had its best chance of permanency at the very moment
when it was about to break up for ever. At the beginning
of the sixteenth century, Denmark and Norway were, practi-
cally, one state; and the differences between Denmark and
Sweden seemed in a fair way of being amicably adjusted,
when a great crime, “The Stockholm Massacre," converted
what had hitherto only been political divergence into national
hatred. Henceforward Denmark and Sweden drifted hope-
lessly apart. From the beginning of the sixteenth to the end
of the eighteenth century this hatred manifested itself in
no fewer than eleven fierce wars, which diverted the best
energies of both nations from their natural channels with
enormous resultant waste; and this, too, at the very time when
LU
Preface
vii
VI
the hegemony of a united Scandinavia might, with compara-
tive ease, have been extended over all the Baltic lands from
the Weser to the. Vistula. No insuperable obstacle stood in
the way of such a hegemony. The collapse of two great
mediæval organisations, the Hansa and the Teutonic Order,
opened to any compact, homogeneous, modern state with
a predominant sea-power more than one door of entrance into
headless Germany, anarchic Poland, and barbarous Moscovy.
Sweden was such a state. What might not have been effected
by Sweden and Denmark together, two sister kingdoms with
the same religion, similar institutions, and practically the same
language, when, notwithstanding their mutually obstructive
and destructive rivalry, one of them, Sweden, actually suc-
ceeded in establishing, for a time, an Empire of the first rank,
an Empire only destroyed by the banded might of Eastern
and Central Europe after a twenty years' struggle? .
The present volume is, mainly, an attempt to describe the
rise of the Scandinavian Kingdoms to political eminence, and
their corresponding influence on European politics generally.
But the whole story has also its own peculiar dramatic interest,
for it is the chronicle of the ambitions and the achievements of a
long series of exceptionally great men, master-magicians of state-
craft, who wrought marvels with the feeblest material resources.
The history of Sweden in particular, from the middle of the
sixteenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century, is a
record of surpassing individual genius which seems almost
to turn aside, or, at least, suspend for a time, the operation
of natural laws. Unfortunately, this heroic process of empire-
building on flimsy foundations, if it elicited, most certainly -
S
viii
Preface
also exhausted the vital forces of Scandinavia. This fact,
I think, explains the tardy development of the unusually
manifold and brilliant Scandinavian literature. The national
energy and intellect were wholly. absorbed by urgent material
necessities; there was no leisure in that period of storm and
stress for “the amusement of letters."
Naturally, in writing a history of Scandinavia, I have
drawn, for the most part, from native sources. But, occasion-
ally, I have found it necessary to resort to Slavonic authorities
to bridge over gaps or to reconcile contradictions. Thus the
Polish Wars of Gustaðus II and Charles X have been studied
from the Polish as well as from the Swedish point of view;
and for the proper understanding of the Great Northern War
I am not a little indebted to the later volumes of Solovey's
great “Istoriya Rossii.” Swedish and Danish documents are,
of course, mutually supplementary and corrective.
R. NISBET BAIN.
September, 1904.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
PREFACE
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
CHAP.
144
258
290
Introduction . . . . . . . .
II. Christian II of Denmark, 1513-1532 . .
III. Gustavus Vasa of Sweden, 1523–1560. .
IV. The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 ..
Vo The Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-1560 .
VI. The Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 . .
VII. Christian IV of Denmark, 1588–1648 . . .
VIII. Gustavus Adolphus and Axel Oxenstjerna, 1611-
1644
177
IX. Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-1660. . 218
X. The Danish Revolution and Peter Griffenfeld,
1660-1676 · · · · · · ·
XI. Charles 4
Charles XI of Sweden, 1660–1697 . . .
XII. Charles XII of Sweden and the Great Northern
War, 1597-1721 . . . . . . 310
XIII. The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III, 1721-
1792 · · ·
XIV. Sweden, 1792-1814 . . .
XV. Denmark, 1721–1814 .
XVI. Denmark since 1814 .
417
XVII. Sweden and Norway since 1814 .
432
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . .
444
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . 449
MAPS.
To illustrate the land-wars between Sweden
and Denmark . . . . . at end
To illustrate Charles X.'s passage of the
Little Belt . . . . . .
The Advance of Russia towards the North-
West . . . . . . . .
The Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and
Lauenburg . .
Scandinavia, 1658–1815 . . . .
·
·
398
·
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
woningen for
The salient features of early northern history first emerge
dimly from the mists of antiquity about the middle of the
eighth century. The southernmost branch of the Scandina-
vian family, the Danes, referred to by Alfred a century later
(circa 890), as occupying Jutland, the islands and Scania, was,
in 777, strong enough to defy the Frankish empire by harbour-
ing its fugitives. North of Scania we find, about the same
time, the two closely connected nations of the Swedes and
Goths, the former inhabiting the region round Lake Mälare,
and the latter extending south of Lakes Wener and Wetter
to Scania and the sea; while, westward of the Goths, the
numerous "Fylker," or clans of the Norröner or Nordmænd,
had long since expelled the aboriginal Finns from the fjords
and valleys of southern Norway. Favourable. circumstances
gave the Danes the lead in Scandinavia. They held the richest
and therefore the most populous lands, and geographically
they were nearer than their neighbours to western civilisation.
Christianity was first preached in Denmark by Ebo of Rheims
(822) and by Ansgar (826-865); but it was not till after the
subsidence of the Viking raids (which, beginning with the
ravaging of Lindisfarne in 793, virtually terminated with the
establishment of Rollo in Normandy, 911, using up the best
energies of Scandinavia for 120 years), that Adaldag, arch-
bishop of Hamburg, could open a new and successful mission.
Q
BAIN
Introduction
[CH.
This resulted in the erection of the bishoprics of Sleswick,
Ribe, and Aarhus (circa 948), though the real conversion of
the country must be dated from the baptism of King Harold
Bluetooth (960). Forty years later King Olaf I Trygvessön es-
tablished Christianity in Norway by force of arms (circa 1000),
though it was not till half-a-century after that date that King
Sverker I (1134-1155) gave militant paganism its death-blow
in Sweden.
Meanwhile, the Danish monarchy was attempting to ag-
grandise itself at the expense of the Germans, the Wends,
who then occupied the Baltic littoral as far as the Vistula, and
the other Scandinavian kingdoms. Harold Bluetooth (940-986)
subdued German territory south of the Eider, extended the
Danevirke, Denmark's great line of defensive fortifications,
first erected by his father Gorm, to the south of Sleswick, and
planted the military colony of Jomsborg at the mouth of the
Oder. Part of Norway was first seized after the united Danes
and Swedes had defeated and slain King Olaf Trygvessön at
the great battle of Svolde (1000); and, between 1028 and 1035,
Canute the Great added the whole kingdom to his own; but
the union did not long survive him. Equally short-lived was
the Danish dominion in England, which originated in a great
Viking expedition of King Sweyn I to replenish his depleted
exchequer, and had important social consequences for Den-
mark, inasmuch as Canute the Great, impressed by the superior
civilisation of the West, promoted Christian culture in his
Scandinavian dominions by introducing foreign clerics. He
was also the first to found monasteries in Denmark. Canute
moreover greatly strengthened the monarchy by establishing
the Vederlag, or Danehof, originally an assembly of magnates,
lay and clerical, bound to the king by oath, who, in return
for certain privileges, engaged to render him military service.
Gradually the Vederlag came to include all the great landed
proprietors, and so grew into a Rigsforsanıling, or National
Assembly.
1]
Denmark under the Valdemars
3
11
The period between the death of Canute the Great and
the accession of Valdemar I (1035-1157) was a troublous
time for Denmark. The kingdom was harassed almost in-
cessantly, and more than once partitioned by pretenders to
the throne, who did not scruple to invoke the interference of
the neighbouring monarchs, and even of the heathen Wends,
who established themselves for a time on the southern islands.
Yet, throughout this chaos one thing made for future stability,
and that was the growth and consolidation of a national
Church, which culminated in the erection of the archbishopric
of Lund (circa 1104) and the consequent ecclesiastical indepen-
dence of Denmark. The third archbishop of Lund, Absalon
(1128-1201), was Denmark's first great statesman. His genius
materially assisted Valdemar I (1157–1181) and Canute VI
(1182-1202) to reestablish the Danish monarchy. The most
pressing danger came from the Wends, who, after long years
of strife, were utterly routed by Absalon on the isle of Rügen
(1184), which was added to Denmark. The policy of Absalon
was continued on a still vaster scale by Canute VI's younger
brother and ultimate successor, Valdemar II (1202-1241),
who, already, as duke of Sleswick, had valiantly defended
the southern boundaries of the realm against the Germans,
and, by the conquest of Holstein, extended the limits of
Denmark to the Elbe. As king, Valdemar II, taking advan-
tage of German anarchy, raised Denmark to the rank of a
great power, subduing all the German and Wendish territories
on the shores of the Baltic; whilst by the famous crusade of
1219 he even conquered Esthonia, a useless and costly pos-
session to distant Denmark. And then this vast empire
suddenly collapsed. Valdemar's vassal, Count Henry of
Schwerin, surprised his master at Lyö (1223) and carried him
captive to Germany, whence he emerged only by the surrender
of all his German conquests and the payment of a heavy
ransom. An attempt to recover his empire was frustrated
by the crushing defeat of Bornhöved (1227); and henceforth
I-2
.. Introduction:
.4
[CH.
Valdemar, no longer “the Victorious," devoted himself ex-
clusively to internal administration and judicial reforms, well
deserving the epithet “Legislator” bestowed upon him by
his grateful subjects.
... The period of the Valdemars marks a turning-point in
Danish history. The ancient patriarchal system was merging
into a more complicated development of separate estates. The
monarchy, now dominant, and far wealthier than before, rested
upon the support of the great nobles, many of whom held
their lands by feudal tenure, and constituted the royal Raad or
Council. The clergy, fortified by royal privileges, had also
risen to influence; but celibacy and independence of the civil
courts tended to make them more and more of a separate caste.
Education was spreading. Numerous Danes, lay as well as
clerical, regularly frequented the University of Paris, with bene-
ficial results. There were signs too of the rise of a vigorous
Bourgeoisie, due to the development of the natural resources
(chiefly fisheries and cattle-rearing) and the foundation of
guilds, the oldest of which, the Edslag of Sleswick, dates from
the middle of the twelfth century. The Bonder, or yeomen,
were prosperous and independent, with well-defined rights.
Danish territory extended over 68,000 sq. kilms., or nearly
double its present area; the population was about 700,000 ;
and 160,000 men and 1400 ships were available for national
defence.
Sweden and Norway also were beginning to feel the
benefit of a centralised monarchical government. In the
former country the Swedes and Goths were united under
· Sverker I (1134); and for the next hundred years each of the
two nations supplied the common king alternately. Eric IX
(1150-60) organised the Swedish Church on the model pre-
valent elsewhere, and undertook a crusade against the heathen
Finlanders, which marks the beginning of Sweden's over-sea
dominion. Under Charles VII, the archbishopric of Upsala
was founded (1.164); but the greatest medieval statesman of
Sweden and Norway
Sweden was Earl Birger, who practically ruled the land from
1248 to 1266. To him is attributed the foundation of Stock-
holm; but he is best known as a legislator, and his wise reforms
prepared the way for the abolition of serfdom.
After the death, at the battle of Stiklastad (1030), of Olaf II,
who completed the Christianising of Norway begun by Olaf I,
that kingdom passed for a time under the Danish sceptre, but,
in 1035, Olaf's exiled son, Magnus the Good, was summoned
from Russia to ascend his father's throne. He was succeeded
by his son Harold Haardraade, whose family reigned till 1130.
Then ensued a long period of civil discord, resulting for a time
in absolute anarchy, till order was restored by King Haco IV,
who was crowned by a papal legate in 1246, and did much for
the Church during his long reign (1217–63). Under him
Iceland and Greenland were incorporated with Norway. Haco's
son, Magnus, was obliged to retrocede the Hebrides and Man
to Scotland; but his wise internal administration did much to
heal the wounds of the kingdom, and as a legislator (hence
his epithet Lagaböte) he was not inferior to Valdemar II or
Earl Birger.
Denmark, meanwhile, had sunk low indeed. On the death
of Valdemar II a period of disintegration ensued. Valdemar's
sön, Eric Plovpenning, succeeded him as king; but his brother
and near kinsfolk, also received huge appanages, and family
discords led to civil wars. Through the whole of the 13th
and part of the 14th century the struggle raged between the
Danish kings and the Sleswick dukes; and of six monarchs
no fewer than three died violent deaths. Superadded to these
troubles was a prolonged, if intermittent, struggle for supremacy
between the Popes and the Crown, and, still more serious, the
beginning of a breach between the kings and the nobles, which
had important constitutional consequences. The prevalent
disorder had led to general lawlessness, in consequence of
which the royal authority had been widely extended ; and a
strong opposition gradually arose which protested against the
Introduction
[CH.
aistopher II (iderably reducines, and
abuses of this authority. In 1282 the nobles extorted from
King Eric Glipping the first Haandfæstung or charter, which
made the Danehof, or Great Council, a regular and legitimate
branch of the administration, and gave guarantees against
further usurpations. Christopher II (1319–1332) was con-
strained to grant another charter considerably reducing the
prerogative, increasing the privileges of the upper classes, and
at the same time reducing the burden of taxation. But
aristocratic license proved as mischievous as royal incom-
petence; and on the death of. Christopher II the whole
kingdom was on the verge of dissolution. Eastern Denmark
was in the hands of one magnate; another magnate held
Jutland and Fünen in pawn; the dukes of Sleswick were
practically independent of the Danish Crown; the Scanian.
provinces had (1332) surrendered themselves to Sweden.
It was reserved for another Valdemar to reunite and con-
solidate the scattered members of his ancestral heritage. This
prince, the youngest son of Christopher II, chosen king in 1340,
possessed, on his accession, little more than north Jutland as
the dower of his wife Helvig, daughter of Duke Valdemar
of Sleswick; yet on this slender foundation his genius and
statecraft gradually raised the most powerful state in Scandi-
navia. Before the end of 1346 he had recovered Zealand,
and, by 1348, the greater part of Fünen and Jutland. In
1360 the anarchical condition of Sweden enabled him to
win back the Scanian provinces; and he had already (1346)
advantageously sold Esthonia to the German Order. All his
efforts aimed at the establishment of a strong monarchy; and
the pacification sworn at the Danehof held at Kalundborg in
1360 was the keystone of the newly-erected kingdom. The
last fifteen years of the reign of Valdemar IV were devoted
to a policy of conquest. In 1361 he subdued the rich island
of Gothland, and thus came into collision with the powerful
Hanse League. In the middle of the 13th century, the privi..
leges which had been conceded to Lübeck alone were likewise
The Union of Kalmar
extended to the so-called Wendish towns', whose unscrupulous
competition had hampered Danish trade and prevented the
development of an energetic. merchant class, which might have
proved a counterpoise to the nobility. The League naturally
regarded the conquest of Gothland as an act of war. At a
Hansetag held at Cologne in 1367, seventy of the towns
concerted to attack Denmark, and succeeded in extorting, by
the Treaty of Stralsund, 1370, humiliating conditions of peace
from Valdemar, though ultimately he contrived to render
illusory many of the advantages so gained. He was also able,
shortly before his death in 1375, to recover the greater part of
Holstein.
With Valdemar IV the male line of Sweyn Estridsson
became extinct; but it was reserved for Valdemar's daughter,
Margaret, queen of Haco VI, of Norway, to bring about a
union of the three northern kingdoms, temporary indeed, but
pregnant with consequences which were profoundly to influence
the history of Scandinavia for centuries. The way had already
been prepared for such a confederation by the first union
between Sweden and Norway in 1319, when the three-year-
old Magnus, son of the Swedish royal duke Eric and of the
Norwegian princess Ingeborg, who had inherited the throne
of Norway from his grandfather Haco V, son of Magnus
Lagaböte, was in the same year elected king of Sweden like-
wise. This arrangement was known as the Convention of
Oslo. A long minority weakened the royal influence in both
countries; and Magnus lost his kingdoms before his death.
Norway he was forced to surrender to his son, Haco VI, in
1343; and the Swedes, irritated by his misrule, superseded
him by his own nephew, Albert of Mecklenburg, in 1365, but
not before he had carried through the unpopular marriage of
his son Haco with Margaret, the Danish king's daughter (1363).
In Sweden, moreover, the feeble monarch's partialities and
i Rostock, Greifswald, Wismar, and Stralsund.
. Introduction
[ch.
necessities led directly to the rise of a powerful landed aristo-
cracy enriched by his indiscriminate favours, and indirectly to
the growth of popular liberties. Forced by the unruliness of
the magnates in his latter days to lean upon the middle classes,
he summoned, in 1359, the first Swedish Riksdag, or Parlia-
ment, on which occasion representatives from the towns were
invited to appear before the king along with the nobles and
clergy. His successor, Albert, was compelled to go a step
further, and, in 1371, to give the first Swedish Konungaför-
säkran, or, as we should say, take the first coronation oath.
Margaret's first act after her father's death was to procure
the election as king of Denmark, under her own regency, of
her infant son Olaf, who had already (1380) succeeded his
father, Haco VI, as king of Norway. Olaf himself died, how-
ever, in 1387; and in the following year (1388) Margaret, who
had ruled both kingdoms in his name, was chosen regent of
Norway and Denmark. In 1388, responding to the invitation
of the Swedes, she defeated their king, Albert of Mecklenburg,
at the battle of Falköping, and drove him into exile. There-
upon, at a convention of the representatives of the three
northern kingdoms, held at Kalmar, Margaret's great nephew,
Eric of Pomerania, a youth of fifteen, was elected the common
king, although Margaret continued to hold the reins of govern-
ment till her death. Simultaneously an agreement, the so-called
Union of Kalmar, was arrived at for the closer union in future,
under a common monarch, of the three realms, each of which
was, nevertheless, to retain its independence'.
In any case Denmark was bound to be the gainer, and
the only gainer, by the Union of Kalmar. Her population was
double that of the two other kingdoms combined, besides being
far less scattered; and her adventurous nobility welcomed a
political compact which led the way to fat benefices and rich
emoluments. Neither Margaret nor her successors observed
1 The actual deed embodying the terms of union never got beyond the
stage of an unratified draft.
1]:
Changes in Denmark
the stipulation that in each country only natives should hold
land and high office; and it is remarkable that, while many
Danish and even German nobles received fiefs and sinecures
in Sweden and Norway, the converse very seldom occurred.
· Nevertheless during Margaret's lifetime the system worked
fairly well. The great queen inherited her father's genius, and
was an ideal despot. The Danehoffer, or national assemblies,
fell into abeyance; membership of the Rigsraad, or Senate,
became a mere state decoration; and court officials, acting as
superior clerks, superseded the ancient dignitaries. On the
other hand, law and order were well maintained; the license of
the nobility was sternly repressed; and many of the alienated
royal domains were recovered by the Crown. Margaret also
succeeded in regaining the greater part of Sleswick by barter
or purchase. Her pupil and successor, Eric of Pomerania, was
unequal to the burden of empire. He was violent where she
had been strong, and speedily embroiled himself not only with
his neighbours but with his own subjects. The Hanse League,
whose political ascendency had been shaken by the Union,
though it still retained its commercial privileges, enraged by
Eric's efforts to bring in the Dutch as rivals, as well as by
the establishment of the Sound tolls, materially assisted the
Holsteiners in their twenty-five years' war with Denmark
(1410-1435); but they were twice repulsed from Copenhagen.
Meanwhile Eric himself was deposed (1439) in favour of his
cousin, Christopher of Bavaria, who terminated the long Sles-
wick struggle by conferring the Duchies upon Count Adolphus
of Holstein and his heirs.
The deposition of Eric of Pomerania marks another
turning-point in Danish history. It was the act not of the
people but of the Rigsraad, or Council of State, which had
inherited the authority of the ancient Danehof, and after the
death of Margaret grew steadily in power at the expense of
the Crown. As the government thus grew more and more
aristocratic, the position of the peasantry steadily deteriorated.
10
[CH.
Introduction
It is under Christopher that we first hear, for instance, of the
Vornedskab, or patriarchal control of the landlords in the
Danish islands over their tenants, a system which degenerated
into rank slavery. In Jutland also, after the repression, in
1441, of a jacquerie, caused by the intolerable oppression of
the landowners, something very like serfdom was introduced.
On the death of Christopher without heirs, the Rigsraad,
after conferring with Duke Adolphus of Sleswick, elected his
nephew, Count Christian of Oldenburg, king; but Sweden
preferred Karl Knutsson, who reigned as Charles VIII, while
Norway finally combined with Denmark at the Conference of
Halmstad, 1450. This double election practically terminated
the Union, though an agreement was come to that the survivor
of the two kings should reign over all three kingdoms. Norway
subsequently threw in her lot definitively with Denmark; and
indeed by this time that ancient kingdom was incapable of
standing alone. Dissension resulting in interminable civil
wars had, even before the Union, exhausted the limited re-
sources of the poorest of the three northern realms; and her
ruin was completed by the ravages of the Black Death, which
wiped out two-thirds of her population. The Hanse League,
inoreover, powerful everywhere, was absolutely dominant in
Norway; and its great ernporium at Bergen had become, ever
since the middle of the fourteenth century, the principal centre
for the export trade of Scandinavia. Unfortunately, too, for
Norway's independence, the native gentry had gradually died
out, and were succeeded by immigrant Danish fortune-hunters;
native burgesses there were none, and the peasantry were
mostly thralls; so that, if we except the clergy, headed by the
archbishop, there was no patriotic class to stand up for the
national liberties, especially as the first unional kings were
Germans whose interests lay elsewhere and who had nothing
in common with the people.
Far otherwise was it with the wealthier kingdom of Sweden.
Here the Church and part of the nobility were favourable to the
Norway and Sweden
II
1
Union; but the vast majority of the people hated it as a foreign
usurpation. The national party was represented by the three
great Riksföreståndere, or governors, of the Sture family, Sten,
Svante, and Sten the younger, who successively defended
the independence of Sweden against the Danish kings, and
kept the national spirit alive. Matters were still further com-
plicated by the continued interference of the Hanse League
in the struggle; and both Christian I (1448–1481) and his
successor Hans (1481-1513), whose chief merit it is to have
founded the Danish fleet, were, during the greater part of their
reigns, only nominally kings of Sweden. On the other hand
Sleswick-Holstein now became a component part of the Danish
realm ; for, on the death of Duke Adolphus of Holstein in
1460, the nobility of the Duchies elected Christian I as their
lord, on condition that the two Duchies should remain eternally
united. Hans, Christian I's successor, also received in fief the
territory of Ditmarsch from the Emperor, but, in attempting to
subdue his new possession, suffered a crushing defeat (1500),
which led to a successful rebellion in Sweden, and a long and
ruinous war with Lübeck, terminated by the Peace of Malmö,
1512, on terms advantageous to Denmark. It was during this
war that a strong Danish fleet dominated the Baltic, for the
first time since the age of the Valdemars. In the following
year (1513) Hans died, and was succeeded by his son
Christian II, with whose epoch-making reign the modern
period of Scandinavian history may be said to begin.
CHAPTER II.
CHRISTIAN IT OF DENMARK, 1513-1532.
in
IMMEDIATELY after the death of King Hans at Aalborgshus,
his son Christian demanded a formal oath of homage and fealty
from the Rigsraad assembled there. The demand was just
and reasonable. When Christian was still six years old (1487)
the Rigsraad had solemnly promised him the succession to
the throne, and this promise had been confirmed in 1497; he
had received a similar assurance from the Norwegian Raad two
years later; while in Sweden, in 1499, allegiance had been
sworn to him personally at Stockholm, and he had made his
royal circuit through the land. The union of the three
northern kingdoms seemed therefore about to be revived in .
his person..
The new king was no ordinary mortal. As viceroy of
Norway (1506-1512) he had already displayed a singular
capacity for ruling under exceptionally difficult circumstances.
He had vigorously upheld the royal authority, substituted
trustworthy Danish for shifty Norse dignitaries, and repressed
rebellion with pitiless severity ; but he had also curtailed the
extravagant privileges of the Hanse League at Bergen and other
places, to the distinct benefit of his Norwegian subjects.
Patriotism, insight, courage, statesmanship, energy—these great
qualities were indisputably his; but unfortunately they were
vitiated by obstinacy, suspicion, and a sulky craſtiness beneath
CH. 11] Christian II and Dyveke 13
which simmered a very volcano of revengeful cruelty. Another
peculiarity, more fatal to him in that aristocratic age than any
other, was his fondness for the common people. A curious
accident which befell the young prince in 1507 or 1509 made
this peculiarity predominant. :
. One day the king's Norwegian chancellor, Archbishop
Eric Valkendorf, strolling through Bergen, was attracted by
two women in a baker's booth, one of them a sprightly matron,
and the other a young girl of extraordinary loveliness. He
stopped and spoke to the matron, who struck him as more than
usually intelligent. She was a Dutchwoman, Sigbrit by name;
and the daughter was called Dyveket. The chancellor, knowing
that “the king was in the highest degree an admirer of beauty,”
informed Christian of his adventure; and Dyveke was invited
to a ball which the king gave to the burgesses of the town.
Christian fell in love with the Dutch beauty at first sight, and
danced with her all the evening; “but in that dance," caustically
remarks the old chronicler, Arild Hvitfeld, "he danced away
the three kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.” The
same night Dyveke became the king's mistress. He thereupon
established both mother and daughter in a commodious stone
house at Oslo“, and, on the death of his father, took them both
with him to Copenhagen. .
Such then was the prince who, in July 1513, met the
brilliant assembly which had been summoned to Copenhagen
to confirm his succession and receive his royal pledges in
exchange. The gathering was numerous and splendid. It
comprised the Danish Rigsraad and nobility, the greater part
of the Norwegian Rigsraad headed by Archbishop Valkendorf,
nine members of the Swedish Riksråd, and deputies from the
Wendish towns and the cities of Holland, Zealand, and Friesland.
An uneasy feeling prevailed at this Herredag. Everyone felt
that a new era had begun, that a vigorous personality had seized
1 Little dove.
.
?: Christiania now covers the site of Oslo.
14
TCH.
Christian II, 1513-1532
the reins of power, that they had to do with a ruler who had
already shown in Norway that he was not afraid of enforcing
his authority to the uttermost. Every class had its own especial
misgivings. The clergy resented his violation of their privileges
in Norway, where, disregarding the remonstrances of the arch-
bishop, the Pope, and his own father, he had long kept Karl,
bishop of Hamar, confined in a dungeon: for this offence he
had to receive absolution before he could be crowned. The
nobility dreaded a closer connexion between the sovereign and
the non-noble classes; while the lower estates looked up to the
“eagle from the Norse mountains," who was their natural pro-
tector against the violence of the lesser birds of prey, the flocks
of noble hawks, who, in the words of the famous old " eagle
song " composed some ten years later :
“Would drive the wee birdies from out of the wood,
And tear out their feathers and down."
No wonder then if the Herredag of 1513 met in an
atmosphere of suspicion; no wonder if its resolutions were for
the more part protective and provisional. To begin with, the
Swedish delegates could not be prevailed upon to accept
Christian as king. “We have,” they said, "the choice between
peace at home and strife here, or peace here and civil war at
home, and we prefer the former.” A decision as to the
Swedish succession was therefore postponed. For the sake of
peace it was also agreed that both the Hanse and the Dutch
towns should enjoy free trade with Sweden. But the fiercest
debates turned upon the joint charter to be granted by the
king to his Danish and Norwegian subjects. Christian finally
agreed to increase the authority of the Danish gentry over their
peasants, and to exclude the mercantile classes from the higher
offices of state, except in Norway, where Danes of all classes,
and even aliens like Sigbrit's brother Herman, then command-
ant of the fortress of Bergenhus, held some of the principal
posts. Moreover the two Rigsraads insisted that the Crowns
117
The King's marriage
of both kingdoms were elective, not hereditary, expressly re-
serving to themselves a free choice of Christian's successor
after his death. The concluding paragraph of the charter
declared that the document was a contract between king and
people, and provided explicitly that if the king transgressed
the charter and subsequently refused to listen to the “re-
monstrances?” of the Rigsraads, they should be at liberty to
adopt preventive measures accordingly.
Thus at last Christian II was acknowledged as sovereign,
if with somewhat restricted powers, in all the northern lands
except Sweden. As yet the eagle had not swept down upon
the hawks. On the contrary, during the vexatious negotiations
with the Raads, Christian had shown singular self-restraint.
But he had already formed vast plans for the future, including
the subjection of Sweden, the humiliation of the Hansa, and
the establishment of Copenhagen as the chief emporium of
the Baltic. But in the background was the cardinal question
of the succession, which was to be the keystone of the whole
future edifice. Lest his uncle, Duke Frederick of Holstein
(whose homage Christian had received on October 18, 1513,
on very onerous conditions), should inherit the throne, the new
king must marry. Dyveke was enough for his happiness, but
not enough for his ambition.
Shortly after his accession Christian II had successfully
negotiated a marriage with a princess of the House of Habsburg.
It was the proudest match that any Scandinavian king had
hitherto contracted. The bride was Isabella of Burgundy,
the granddaughter of the Emperor. Maximilian, now in her
thirteenth year. Such a union would necessarily strengthen the
king's position; and its very conception points to far-reaching
aims on his part. The marriage contract was drawn up at
Linz by the Emperor and the king's representative, Godske
Ahlefeld, bishop of Sleswick. The bride's dowry was fixed at
1 Lit. " Instructions” (Undervisning).
16
Christian II, 1513-1532 [CH.
250,000 gulden, a large sum for those times. On Sunday,
June 11, 1514, the same day as that on which Christian II
was crowned at Copenhagen, he was married by proxy to the
princess at Brussels; but, in view of the bride's youth, her
journey to Denmark was postponed till the following year, and
in 1515 Archbishop Valkendorf was sent with a fleet to the
Netherlands to bring her home. Meanwhile, however, tidings
of the king's liaison with Dyveke had reached the court of
Brussels; and there were some painful negotiations on the
subject between the archbishop and the chancellor of the
Netherlands, Queen Isabella's old tutor, who subsequently
ascended the papal throne as Adrian VI. Only with difficulty
could Christian be induced even to make believe to put
Dyveke away. On August 9, after a tempest-tossed voyage,
Isabella landed on Danish soil; and the royal wedding took
place three days later.
The girl-queen was no beauty, but her gentleness and
amiability quickly won all hearts. At first, she did not please
a consort old enough to be her father. The liaison with
Dyveke continued, and caused much ill-feeling both in
Denmark and the Netherlands. In the spring of 1516 arrived
ambassadors both from the Emperor and from Brussels, in-
sisting upon Dyveke's summary expulsion from the realm ;
whereupon Christian, in sheer defiance, dismissed and sent
home the young queen's Dutch waiting-women, and placed
his mistress and her mother in a mansion at Copenhagen,
close at hand. A year later (1517) Dyveke died at Elsinore
under suspicious circumstances which point to foul play. She
is supposed to have eaten some poisoned cherries sent to her
by Torben Oxe, governor of Copenhagen, a man of shady
antecedents, whose advances she seems to have rejected. At
the end of the same year Christian took his revenge. Oxe was
arrested by his order, and, after a form of trial so irregular that
it can hardly be called a trial at all, was condemned to be
beheaded. That the king should thus dare to lay hands upon
:
117
Influence of Sigbrit
Nc
17
a nobleman of bad character was resented by Oxe's peers as a
deliberate outrage. Every effort was made to save him. The
whole Rigsraad, with the bishops, the papal legate, and the
queen herself at its head, pleaded on their knees for the
privileged prisoner; but Christian was inexorable, and the same
day Oxe was decapitated. The mountain eagle had at last
caused his sharp talons to be felt. The execution of Torben
Oxe, well deserved if illegally brought about, marks a significant
change in Christian's policy. Hitherto he had favoured the
nobles: from henceforth his chief counsellor in affairs of State
was Dyveke's mother, Sigbrit. This extraordinary woman, of
whom we know only that her father's name was Villom and
that she came from Amsterdam, must have been a born
administrator and a commercial genius of the first order.
Christian II had recognised her ability from the outset. He
first appointed her controller of the Sound tolls, and ultimately
committed to her the whole charge of the finances. In this
position she displayed inexhaustible energy and absolute pro-
bity; but her hatred of the nobility, to whom she attributed the
death of her daughter, induced her to endeavour by all means
to supplant the king's ordinary advisers- by protégés of her own.
Nearly every unpopular measure was attributed to the influence
of Sigbrit, “the foul-mouthed Dutch sorceress who hath be-
witched the king.” Moreover, a bourgeoise herself, it was
Sigbrit's constant policy to elevate, the middle classes and
extend their influence at the expense of the aristocracy. She
soon became the soul of a middle-class inner council which
competed with the Rigsraad itself. Kings and princes cor-
responded with her on state affairs; and, when the queen,
a year after Dyveke's death, bore her first son, Sigbrit, who
acted as midwife on the occasion, was made Mistress of the
Robes.
Meanwhile Christian was preparing for the inevitable war
with Sweden. Since 1513 great events had taken place in that
country. Jacob Ulfsson, the aged archbishop of Upsala, had
BAIN
18
ICH.
Christian II, 1513-1532
resigned in favour of Gustavus Trolle, who was duly elected by
the cathedral chapter and recommended to the Pope by the
governor of Sweden, Sten Sture, on condition that the new
archbishop first did him homage. Unfortunately these two
masterful young men (Trolle was twenty-seven, Sture only
twenty-three), who represented respectively the highest ecclesi-
astical and the highest civil authority in Sweden, had inherited
a bitter family feud. To do him justice, the governor was
ready to be reconciled with his adversary for the sake of their
common country; but the archbishop loved power above all
things, and to obtain it he had already entered into secret
correspondence with Christian II. The old quarrel between
them broke out afresh on the return of Trolle from Rome.
He refused to do homage till all his enemies had been punished;
whereupon the governor, who in the meantime was soliciting
the Crown from the Pope with some prospect of success,
besieged him (1516) in his stronghold at Stäke. Christian II,
who had already taken measures to isolate Sweden politically
by a catena of alliances with England, Scotland, Russia, and
the Baltic free towns, now hastened to the relief of the be-
leaguered archbishop with 4000 mercenaries, but was defeated
by Sture and his peasant levies at Vedla, and forced to return
to Denmark. By the end of the year Stäke was taken and
razed to the ground; and Sture ordered the archbishop to
be imprisoned in a' monastery at Vesterås. A Riksmöte, or
National Assembly, held at Stockholm in 1517 had already
declared unanimously that Sweden would never recognise
Trolle as archbishop because he had defied the governor and
brought the enemy into the land. The war with Denmark
was now vigorously renewed. On Midsummer Day, 1518,
Christian II appeared before Stockholm and landed an army,
but was again defeated by Sten Sture at Brännkyrka, on which
occasion the Swedish standard was borne by the governor's
young kinsman, Gustavus Vasa. A fruitless six weeks' blockade
of the capital ensued, but was terminated by a two years' truce.
II
His attempts on Sweden
19
Thus Christian had failed a second time.” He now had
recourse to a characteristically sinister expedient. First he
invited the Swedish governor to meet him on board his ship;
but Sture, yielding to the entreaties of the magistrates of
Stockholm, refused to trust himself in the king's hands.
Christian rightly regarded this open distrust as a gross insult,
and, had he at once denounced the truce, he would have been
well within his rights. Instead of that he offered to meet the
governor on land (and consequently under Sture's own pro-
tection), on condition that Gustavus Vasa and some other
Swedish nobles were delivered up to him as hostages till he
returned. The hostages were duly sent: the governor hastened
to the appointed tryst and waited two days in vain. Then he
learnt that Christian had set sail for Denmark with the hostages
as his prisoners, after declaring the truce to be at an end.
Full of the shame of a second defeat Christian returned to
Copenhagen.
An attempt of the papal legate, Arcimboldus—then on a
tour through Scandinavia selling indulgences for the building
of St Peter's at Romemto mediate between the two countries
at a Riksdag held at Arboga in December 1518, completely
failed, the whole assembly declaring that they would never
negotiate with a man who had falsely broken solemn compacts
which the very heathen respected. At the same meeting
Arcimboldus formally deposed Archbishop Trolle in favour of
himself, and induced the chapter of Upsala to petition the
Pope to confirm his own election. The legate then set out
for Denmark, but was met on the way by the unpleasant
intelligence that King Christian had confiscated all his property,
including the rich harvest of indulgence-money he had reaped,
and issued an order for his arrest. The discomfited legate
contrived to escape to Lübeck, where he found a papal bull
against Sten Sture and his adherents nailed up on all the
church doors. His own secretary, Didrik Slagheck, had re-
vealed all his doings in Sweden to Sigbrit, and thereupon
2--2
20
CH.
Christian II, 1513-1532
entered the king's service. Christian himself sent a strong
accusation against Arcimboldus to the Pope; but the legate
ultimately emerged triumphant from these complications, and
died in high honour as archbishop of Milan, his native
place.
Christian II had never for a moment abandoned the
intention of subduing Sweden. He was making ready for a
winter campaign both by sea and land with forces sufficient to
overcome all resistance. Both Denmark and Norway were
heavily taxed to pay for the large army of mercenaries which
the king had collected from every quarter. German lands-
knechts made up the bulk of the infantry, which also included
2000 Scots and 2000 Frenchmen. At Epiphany, 1520, the
main army broke up from Helsingborg. It carried with it a
papal bull excommunicating Sten Sture, and laying Sweden
under an interdict for the outrages inflicted on Archbishop
Trolle. This bull, which the temporal power was called upon
to execute, was duly fastened on all the church doors on their
way. In the border province of Västergötland Sten Sture had
taken up a strong position near Börgerund on Lake Aasunden;
and there, on January 19, the two armies clashed. At the
very first onset Sture was placed hors de coinbat by a bullet,
which killed his horse and wounded him in the thigh. His
peasant levies thereupon fled to the wild, mountainous region
of Tiveden, where they made another stand but were routed
and dispersed (Feb. 1). The mortally wounded governor took
to his sledge and posted towards Stockholm, but expired on
the ice of Lake Mälare, two days later, in his twenty-seventh
year. His sudden death threw everything into confusion.
None durst step into his place. A few of the most loyal
partisans of his family rallied, indeed, round his young widow,
Christina Gyllenstjerna, who held the fortress of Stockholm
and would not hear of surrender; but even the stoutest friend
of the Stures, Sten's chancellor Matthias, bishop of Strengnäs,
regarded further resistance as hopeless and began to negotiate
21
in Council Upsala, men, the
Invasion of Sweden
21
with the Danish commanders, while Archbishop Trolle, now
released from prison, worked indefatigably for Christian II.
Meanwhile, ravaging and burning in its progress through
the heart of Sweden, the Danish army, unopposed, was ap-
proaching Upsala, where the members of the Swedish Riksråd,
or Council of State, had already assembled. The ten senators,
in the name of their country and countrymen, consented to
render homage to Christian II on condition that the Danish
generals, who had full powers to act for the king, promised a
full indemnity for the past and guaranteed that Christian should
rule Sweden according to Swedish law and custom. This con-
vention was confirmed by the king and the Danish Rigsraad
on March 31; but it should be observed that the promised
indemnity was only in general terms, and made no reference
to the offences against the Church and Archbishop Trolle.
Christina Gyllenstjerna, however, refused to recognise it, and
exhorted the peasantry to rise in defence of the national
liberties which the gentry and the clergy had thus betrayed.
The Swedish yeomen accordingly flew to arms; and the
Danish victors were suddenly confronted by a formidable
popular rising. At Balundsås (March 29) the royal troops suf-
fered a severe defeat; whilst on Good Friday (April 6) a strong
rustic host, assisted by a force of burgesses from Stockholm,
attacked the main Danish army near Upsala. The battle
which ensued was the bloodiest of the whole war. Three of
the four Danish generals were wounded; the Danebrog, or
Danish standard, was more than once in danger; and only by
a supreme effort were the valiant yeomen at length beaten off,
leaving on the field thousands of dead, whom their own
countryman, Archbishop Trolle, allowed to rot without burial
because they had heretically assisted his enemies. Christian
himself, at the beginning of May, had arrived with the Danish
fleet and invested Stockholm by land and sea; but Christina
Gyllenstjerna resisted stoutly for more than four months. Not
till September 7 would the spirited lady consent to negotiate;
22
TCH.
Christian II, 1513-1532
and even then, well aware of the character of Christian and
apprehensive of the malign influence of her deadly foe Arch-
bishop Trolle, she took care to exact beforehand an amnesty of
the most explicit and absolute character, which was, moreover,
to be retrospective and cover all the acts of hostility committed
by her husband and herself and their partisans. As it was
of even more importance to the king to get possession of
Stockholm than for the besieged to surrender it, Christian
agreed without reservation to the lady's terms.
On the same day the burgomaster surrendered the keys to
Christian II, whereupon he made his state entry into the city.
The surrender of the capital paralysed all further resistance.
Christian, after a brief visit to Denmark, returned to Stockholm
in October, bringing with him his new favourite, Dr Didrik
Slagheck; and the whole Råd, the nobility and deputies from
all the towns and country places, were summoned to Stockholm
to attend his coronation and do him homage. On November i
the representatives of the nation swore fealty to Christian as
hereditary sovereign, notwithstanding that the law of the land
distinctly provided that the Swedish Crown should be elective.
But Christian's mercenaries, armed to the teeth, stood round
the hill of Brunkeberg, where the act of homage took place;
and none durst plead the ancient law. And now at last the
long desired goal was reached. In Sweden, at any rate,
Christian was absolute. On Sunday, November 4, he was
anointed by Gustavus Trolle in Stockholm cathedral, and
took the usual coronation oath, by which he swore, with his
hand on the Bible, to defend the Church and her privileges,
love truth and justice, rule the realm through native-born
Swedes alone, and abide by the laws of the land. After the
coronation numerous Danes and Germans were knighted, the
king causing a herald to proclaim' that, on this occasion, the
Swedes could not be considered because they had fought
against him. Then, to impress them still more with his night
and majesty, he allowed himself to be invested, before the
11]
Christian as King of Sweden
23.
High Altar, with the Order of the Golden Fleece by Johan
Sacket, the Emperor's special envoy. The next three days were
given up to banqueting and other festivities; but on Wednesday,
November 7, “an entertainment of another sort began.”
On that day all the senators in Stockholm, and a goodly
company of all classes, including Christina Gyllenstjerna and
some other ladies, were summoned to the great hall of the
palace. At 1 o'clock the king entered and sat down on the
judgment seat, whereupon Archbishop Trolle advanced, and,
reminding Christian of his coronation oath whereby he had
sworn to defend the Church and her privileges, demanded the
summary punishment of all his personal enemies of the Sture
family and their adherents as heretics, inasmuch as they had
laid violent hands upon himself and sundry, of his fellow
bishops, destroyed his stronghold of Stäke, and allowed mass
to be sung in Sweden during his imprisonment, contrary to
canonical prescription. Dame Christina instantly stepped
forward and protested that the alleged acts of violence against
the archbishop could not be imputed to her late husband and
his friends, inasmuch as they were publicly sanctioned by a
national assembly, all of whose members had declared them-
selves responsible therefor; and, in proof of her statement, she
produced the mandate of the Riksmöte of 1517. Neither the
king nor the archbishop seems to have had the least idea of
the existence of this mandate, which was now read aloud and
found to be signed by no fewer than five bishops and almost
all the senators present, and to be issued in the name of the
Swedish nation. It was as if a bomb-shell had fallen in the
midst of the assembly. Exclamations, excuses, protests and
explanations broke forth on every side.
Christian thereupon discreetly withdrew to his private room,
whither he presently summoned his captains to a secret confer-
ence. The result of this conference was quickly apparent. At
dusk a band of Danish soldiers, with lanterns and torches, broke
into the great hall, and carried off several carefully selected
24
CH.
Christian II, 1513–1532
persons; by 10 o'clock the same evening the remainder of the
guests were safely under lock and key in separate apartments :
all these persons had been marked down on the archbishop's
proscription list. On the following day (Nov. 8)a council of
ecclesiastics, held at the palace, under the presidency of Trolle
himself, who thus acted as judge in his own cause, solemnly
pronounced the proscribed to be manifest heretics for resist-
ing the archbishop's interdict. At 12 o'clock that night the
bishops of Strängnäs and Skara, who were not even named in
Trolle's list, though they had signed the mandate of 1517,
were led out by Didrik Slagheck into the great square and
beheaded without even being allowed to see a priest. “He
would slay their souls as well as their bodies,” cried the
indignant crowd. Fourteen noblemen, three burgomasters,
fourteen town-councillors, and about twenty common citizens
of Stockholm were then drowned or decapitated with similar
expedition. The executions continued throughout the following
day. In all, about eighty-two people are said to have been
thus murdered. The bodies were left in the square till the
following Saturday, when they were all thrown in a heap and
burnt. Among the slain was Gustavus Vasa's father, Eric
Johansson. Christian revenged himself upon the dead as well
as upon the living, for Sten Sture's body was dug up and
burnt, as well as the body of his little child, who had been
born during the interdict. Dame Christina and many other
Swedish noble ladies were sent prisoners to Denmark.
It has well been said that the manner of this atrocious deed
was even more détestable than the deed itself. Even if the
Stockholm massacre had been “the sudden impulse of a
tyrant savagely impatient of the constitutional obstacles thrown
in his way by a free people," it might find some sort of psycho-
logical excuse. It is the dishonesty of the deed which makes
it so hideous. Christian suppressed his political opponents
under the pretence of defending an ecclesiastical system which
in his heart he despised. Even when it became necessary to
25
11]
The Stockholm massacre
make excuses for his crime, we see the same doublemindedness.
Thus, while in a proclamation to the Swedish people he re-
presented the massacre as a measure necessary to avoid another ·
papal interdict, in his apology to the Pope for the decapitation
of the two innocent bishops he described it as an unauthorised
act of vengeance on the part of his own people. Yet Christian
does not deserve the whole burden of blame. Archbishop
Trolle undoubtedly seized this opportunity unscrupulously to
gratify his private vengeance; while Didrik Slagheck had never
ceased urging his new master to proceed with the utmost rigour
against traitors who were at the same time heretics. Slagheck
was immediately rewarded with the vacant see of Skara, and,
on the king's departure to Denmark in December, was left
behind as stadtholder of Sweden with a council in which
Archbishop Trolle held a prominent place. The king's return
through Sweden was marked by fresh massacres, Christian's
last victims being the abbot and monks of Nydala.
It was with his brain teeming with great designs that
Christian II returned to his native kingdom. “One of the
gates of Lübeck is now taken,” he cried, after the surrender of
Stockholm. “Soon shall my dogs bark before Gottorp.”
That the welfare of his dominions was dear to him there can
be no doubt. Inhuman as he could be in his wrath, in
principle he was as much a humanist as any of his most
enlightened contemporaries. But he would do things his own
way, and, deeply distrusting the Danish nobles with whom he
shared his power, he sought helpers from among the wealthy
and practical middle classes of Flanders. In June, 1521, he
paid a sudden visit to the Netherlands. He had already had
tidings of the Swedish popular rising under Gustavus Vasa,
but thought that such a petty affair might safely be left to his
lieutenants. Holstein and Lübeck, however, were still to be
dealt with. To bring them also beneath the yoke was now the
chief aim of his policy. Christian's arrival in the Netherlands
caused a great sensation. He was welcomed as one of the
26
CH.
Christian II, 1513-1532
greatest of European princes. In Italy it was whispered that
the mighty king had concluded a league with the Emperor
against France; and, out of consideration for Charles V, the
papal court was disposed to look indulgently upon recent
events at Stockholm. Christian himself persuaded his young
kinsman to surrender to him Holstein, including Ditmarsch
and Hamburg, as a fief, and to recognise his claims upon
Lübeck and other German towns. The king remained in the..
Low Countries for some months. He visited most of the large
cities and was much impressed by their superior culture. He
took into his service many Flemish artisans, and made the
personal acquaintance of Quentin Matsys and Albrecht Dürer,
the latter of whom was frequently the king's guest and painted
his portrait. Christian also entertained Erasmus, with whom
he discussed the Reformation. It was in a conversation with
Erasmus that Christian let fall this characteristic expression :
"Mild measures are of no use; the remedies that give the
whole body a good shaking are the best and surest.”
Never had King Christian seemed so powerful as on his
return to Denmark on September 5, 1521; and, with the
confidence of strength, he at once proceeded recklessly to
inaugurate the most sweeping reforms. Soon after his return
home Christian issued his great Landelove, or Code of Law,
for the most part founded on Dutch models, which testifies in
a high degree to the king's sense of enlightenment and progress,
and in some respects, notably in the extension of state control,
anticipates some late nineteenth century theories. Some of
these statutes, notably the provisions for the better education
of the lower and the restriction of the political influence of the ,
higher clergy, and the stern prohibitions against wreckers and
“the evil and unchristian practice of selling peasants as if they
were brute beasts,” testify to the influence of humanism; but,
on the whole, the new code visibly favoured the aggrandise-
ment of the royal authority. The jurisdiction of the bishops
was as good as abolished; and the union with Rome was
Domestic reforms.
27
considerably relaxed. In the towns, too, the election of the
burgomasters and council was virtually placed in the hands of
the royal bailiffs. The old trade-guilds were retained, but the
rules of admittance thereto made easier; and trade combina-
tions of the richer burghers for the purpose of buying up all
wares, to the detriment of the smaller tradesmen, were sternly
forbidden.
These reforms were, on the whole, excellent, but unfortun-
ately they suggested the standpoint not of an elected ruler,
but of a monarch by right divine. Some were even in direct
contravention of the charter. The privileged classes regarded
the new code with consternation; and the conservative in-
stincts of many of the burgesses and peasants were revolted by
its novelty. In some places the peasants, misunderstanding
the ordinance which, in case of gross tyranny, permitted them
to change their masters, deserted their parishes in scores;
while in other places they clamoured to have the old laws
· back again. Christian's attempt (in 1521) to promote market-
gardening by leasing the whole of the isle of Amager, near
Copenhagen, to 584 Dutch families, was also deeply resented;
and in general the old Scandinavian feeling of independence
was deeply wounded by this meddling with both the habits
· and prejudices of his subjects. Sweden too was now in open
revolt; and both Norway and Denmark were taxed to their
utmost limits to raise an army for the subjection of the sister
kingdom. Under the pretence of a free-will offering an income-
tax of 33 per cent. was now imposed on the clergy; and a
· similar charge was levied on personal property generally.
Foreign complications were now superadded to these do-
mestic troubles. With the laudable and patriotic object of
releasing Danish trade from the grinding yoke imposed upon it
by the Hansa, and making Copenhagen the great emporium of
the north, Christian had arbitrarily raised the Sound tolls, and
seized a number of Dutch ships which presumed to evade
the tax. Thus his relations with the Netherlands were at least
28 Christian II, 1513–1532 [CH.
unfriendly, while with Lübeck and her allies he was now
openly at war. The king's commercial policy must in any
case have led to a rupture sooner or later; but it was no secret
in Lübeck that Christian II meant not only to exclude her
from the Baltic trade, but also claimed the suzerainty exercised
over her by the Valdemars two centuries before. In August
1522 à large Lübeck fleet, reinforced by ten ships fitted out
by Gustavus Vasa, plundered Bornholm, burnt Elsinore, and
entered into negotiations with Duke Frederick of Holstein,
who had naturally been incensed by Christian's endeavours to
seize his Duchy.
Finally, Christian's own subjects rose against him. On
December 21, 1522, a number of the Jutland bishops and
senators met in conference at Viborg. They posed as the
defenders of the old constitution, yet they began with a flagrant
breach of it by neglecting to advise or confer with the king
before defying his authority, as expressly provided by the
charter of July 22, 1513; and, when Christian attempted con-
ciliation by inviting them to attend a Rigsdag at Aarhus, where
all complaints were to be considered and all abuses redressed,
they, fearful and suspicious, renounced their allegiance and
offered the crown to Duke. Frederick (Jan. 20, 1523). They
were encouraged to persevere in this act of, rebellion by
their knowledge of the king's overwhelming difficulties, but
they were unprepared for his sudden and complete collapse.
Christian could still depend on the capital, on the great com-
mercial town of Malmö, and on the people of Sjælland ; and
his great admiral, Sören Norby, held Finland and Gothland at
his disposal ; but at the crisis of his fate a strange paralysis,
seemed to fall upon him. It was as if he had exhausted in ten
years the store of energy which was to have served him for a
lifetime. Instead of rallying all his resources for a determined
struggle, he first lost valuable time in useless negotiations, and
then, accompanied by his queen, his three little children,
mother Sigbrit (who had to be carried on board in a chest)
11]
His flight from Denmark
29
and a few devoted adherents, he took ship to seek help abroad
instead of trusting in the fidelity of his own subjects. On
May 1, 1523, he landed at Veere in Zealand.
Meanwhile the duke of Holstein (March 26) had received
the homage of all Jutland at Viborg as Frederick I, and that of
the Duchies on April 14. By that time Fünen was already
won, and a Lübeck fleet conveyed the new king's chief general,
Johan Rantzau, and his young son Duke Christian, to Sjælland.
Henrik Gjö, whom Christian had left in command of Copen-
hagen, unable to prevent the landing, retired within the fortress,
which Rantzau invested from the land side, while the Lübeck
fleet blockaded it. Malmö, across the Sound, was the only
other place which held out for Christian long after the rest of
the kingdom had sworn fealty to Frederick I at Roskilde
(Aug. 3, 1523). The charter, which Frederick signed on this
occasion, made the Rigsraad about equal to the king in power ;
indeed, as Frederick generally resided at Gottorp, the Council
of State became practically his co-regent. In return for the
new sovereign's concessions, the Rigsraad promised to elect
one of his sons king after his death.
Frederick I was an easy-going, somewhat parsimonious
prince of simple tastes and homely habits; but he had the
good sense to surround himself with capable men of action,
chief among whom were Rantzau and his adroit and supple
chancellor Wulfgang von Utenhof.. His position being, from
the first, a delicate one, his policy was necessarily a policy of
cautious and, on the whole, successful compromise. All im-
mediate danger was removed by the surrender of Copenhagen
and Malmö in the earlier part of 1524, and by Frederick's
recognition as king in Norway (Nov. 24, 1524), on which
occasion he granted the Norwegians a special charter ac-
knowledging the kingdom to be elective. Abroad Christian II
continued to be a perpetual menace; and thus Frederick was
compelled to seek the support of Lübeck and Sweden, both of
them, at best, uncertain allies whom only the fear of Christian
30 .
Christian II, 1513-1532
TCH.
able Sören ania, stimulatangerous ris
kept together. Moreover his dependence on the upper classes,
who had raised him to the throne, speedily made this German
king unpopular with the lower classes in Denmark, who now
began to regret Christian II, and to regard him as their natural
protector. In 1525 there was a dangerous rising of the peasants
and burgesses in Scania, stimulated by Christian's admiral, the
indefatigable Sören Norby, who for many years dominated the
Baltic from the island of Gothland, and made himself equally
formidable to Denmark and Sweden by his piracies. This
rebellion was suppressed by Johan Rantzau; but, in 1531,
a far more serious peril threatened King Frederick's throne.
Christian II suddenly appeared in Norway in person.
The earlier years of Christian II's exile had been a period
of unrelieved misery. He was coldly received in the Netherlands,
could not obtain the payment of the arrears of his wife's dowry,
150,000 gulden, which would have relieved him from his more
pressing difficulties, and lived for a time at Lier, in Brabant,
the place assigned to him as his residence, in such poverty that
he was obliged to sell his wife's jewels and his children's play-
things to buy them bread. He amused his enforced leisure by
translating the Old Testament into Danish from the version of
Luther, whose acquaintance he had made at Wittenberg in 1524.
Then his faithful wife died; and his three children were taken
from him to be educated in the Roman faith. Only after the
Peace of Cambray (1529) did his prospects brighten. It was
well known in Germany that the common people both in
Jutland and the Danish islands had had enough of aristocratic
rule during the last six years, and that their hearts were turning
once more towards the old king, who, at any rate, had been ,
good to them. Moreover Frederick I's conversion to Luther-
anism had alienated from him the Danish burgesses and the
Norwegians generally; and when Christian, in 1530, after
negotiating with the Catholic hierarchy in Norway, had solemnly
undertaken, in two interviews with Charles V, to restore the
Catholic faith in Scandinavia, his Imperial kinsman advanced
11]
Christian's return
31
him the funds for a fresh enterprise. Christian was thereupon
absolved from his past offences by a papal legate, and pro-
ceeded, with something of his former energy, to collect an
army of 10,000 men.
On October 24, 1531, he sailed with his army from Medem-
blik in Holland; but henceforth misfortune persistently dogged
his footsteps. A tempest scattered his fleet; and it was with
only some five thousand men that he reached Hestnæs. Yet
the situation in Norway was, at first sight, not unfavourable.
Many of the leading Norwegian prelates, including the arch-
bishop, Olaf Ingebregtsson, openly declared for him; and he
was also joined by Archbishop Gustavus Trolle, Senator Ture
Jönsson, and other eminent Swedish refugees. On January 5,
1532, the senators of southern Norway issued a manifesto in
his favour, recognising him as king and his eldest son as his
successor. But he failed to secure the important fortresses
of Akershus and Bohus; and his invasion of Sweden was
frustrated by the vigorous defensive measures of Gustavus
Vasa. Surprised and vexed at such an unexpected display of
force, Christian turned fiercely upon Senator Ture, who had
represented Sweden to be friendly and defenceless. “You.
have betrayed me all along, Herr Ture,” cried he. “You told
me, for certain, there were no men at arms in Sweden. What
be these then? Old women, eh?” “But however that may
have been," adds an old chronicler, “it is certain that a few
days later Herr Ture was found lying headless one morning in
the street of Kunghäll.” This characteristic piece of ferocity
was Christian's last act of power. On July 1, 1532, at Oslo, he
was forced to surrender to Frederick's plenipotentiary, Bishop
Knud Gyldenstjerne, who had been sent to Norway with a
large Dano-Hanseatic fleet and army. By the Convention of
Oslo it was stipulated that Christian, under a safe-conduct,
should be conveyed to Copenhagen, there to negotiate per-
sonally with his uncle. Under the pretext that Gyldenstjerne
· had exceeded his instructions, the solemn compact was broken;
32 Christian II, 1513–1532 (CH. II
and Christian, on his arrival in Denmark, was imprisoned at
Sönderborg Castle. Four Danish noblemen were appointed
his guardians.
At first the king was entertained liberally in light and
spacious apartments in the Blue Tower ; but, after he had
succeeded in opening communications with the outer world
through his favourite dwarf, his confinement became more
rigorous. On the death of Frederick I and the outbreak
of the “Count's War” in 1533, he was literally "immured”
in his room, and orders were given to cut him down if the
castle were attacked. An old soldier was now his sole com-
rade; and the deep dints still visible in the stone floor show
how the unhappy king used to take exercise by walking
for hours round and round his table. For seven long years
this solitary confinement lasted. Even after the Peace of
Speyer (1544), whereby Charles V had stipulated that his
kinsman should at least have liberty to hunt and fish, these
necessary diversions were barbarously denied him for ten
years longer, because the pride of his daughters, all three of
them actually reigning princesses, would not allow them to
relinquish their “hereditary rights.” In the beginning of 1549
Christian was transferred to the castle of Kalundborg, and here .
he was allowed a chaplain and a small sum of money to
dispense in alms. He died in January, 1559, aged seventy-
seven years, nearly twenty-seven of which were spent in solitary
confinement. Indisputably a man of genius, the melancholy
failure of Christian II was due rather to moral deficiencies
than to overweening ambition. Want of self-restraint, the
cardinal vice of his character, speedily isolated him in the
midst of capable counsellors and a loyal people. Yet, when
all is said, he remains one of the most imposing and pathetic
figures in Scandinavian history; and his very crimes are for-
gotten in the severity of his punishment.
CHAPTER III.
GUSTAVUS VASA OF SWEDEN, 1523-1560.
We have seen that the fortunes of Christian II foundered,
in 1531, on the vigorous resistance opposed to him by Gustavus
Vasa on the Norwegian frontier ; yet, only eight years before,
when young Gustavus, solely supported by the Swedish
peasantry, first took up arms against the mighty ruler of three
kingdoms, a miracle alone seemed capable of making the
adventure a success.
Gustavus Eriksson, the greatest constructive statesman of
a dynasty of empire-makers, was born at his mother's estate
of Lindholm, on Ascension Day, 1496. He came of a family
which had shone conspicuously in fifteenth century politics,
though it generally took the anti-national side. His father,
Erik Johansson of Rydboholm, “a merry and jocose gentļe-
man,” given to boisterous practical joking, but, like all the
Vasas, liable to sudden fierce gusts of temper, was an honour-
able exception to the family tradition, supporting as he did
Sten Sture; and he was also one of the senators who voted for
the deposition of Archbishop Trolle at the Riksdag of 1517,
for which act of patriotism he lost his head in the Stockholm
massacre. Gustavus's mother, Cecilia Månsdotter, was closely
connected with the Stures by marriage; and the heroic dame,
Christina Gyllenstjerna, was her half-sister.
Gustavus's youthful experiences impressed him with a life-
long distrust of everything Danish. In his eighteenth year he
BAIN
34
Gustavus Vasa, 1523–1560
.
was sent to the court of his cousin, Sten Sture, to complete
his education. He had there the opportunity not only of
exercising himself in deeds of chivalry, but also of learning the
first principles of statesmanship in daily intercourse with the
most eminent Swedes of the day. We have already seen how,
together with five other noble youths, he was delivered as a
hostage to King Christian, who treacherously carried him
prisoner to Denmark. Yet here the royal trickster over-
reached himself: this very act of precaution saved Gustavus
from the fate of his kinsmen. Gustavus was detained for
twelve months in the island fortress of Kalö on the east coast
of Jutland, but contrived to escape to Lübeck, in September,
1519. There he found an asylum till May, 1520, when, the
magistrates conniving at his escape, he chartered a sloop, to
Kalmar, one of the few Swedish fortresses which held out
against Christian II. It was while hunting in the neighbour-
hood of Räfsnäs, on Lake Mälare, one of his father's estates,
that the news of the Stockholm massacre was brought to him
by a peasant fresh from the capital, who told him, at the
same time, that a price had been set upon his own head. In
his extremity Gustavus saw only one way of deliverance : he
resolved to appeal for help to the sturdy yeomen of the Dales.
Dalarna, or “the Dales," is the name given to that portion
of central Sweden which lies in the basin of the Dal, and
round about the chain of lakes formed by that river and its
confluents. It is a rugged, mountainous, sylvan region, rich
in minerals; and its inhabitants, Dalkarlarne, or "the Dales-
men,” are to this day the sturdiest and most capable race in
the kingdom. From the earliest times they had played a leading
part in Swedish history, always ready at a day's notice to rise
in defence of their own and the national liberties, under
leaders fortunate enough to win their confidence. Moreover
they had steadily supported the governors of the Sture family,
and were the protagonists in all the battles fought against the
Danish invaders. It was in this nursery of patriotism that
111]
Gustavus in the Dales
35
young Gustavus Eriksson now hoped to find an asylum and
an army.
On St Catherine's Day, November 25, 1520, he rode forth
from Räfsnäs on his hazardous quest. Dismounting at the
first farm-house he came to, he donned a peasant costume
and a round Dale-hat, and set off on foot with an axe over his
shoulder. Feeling his way along, he took service with an old
college friend, Anders Persson of Rankhytta, who, for all his
sympathy, durst not assist him, but sent him on to Squire
Arendt Persson of Arnflykt, who, eager to win King Christian's
favour and the advertised reward, betrayed his guest to the
nearest Danish bailiff. Gustavus was saved from capture only
by the prompt assistance of Arendt's wife, Barbara, who sent
him off in a sledge. But the alarm had already been given ;
and the fugitive was hunted like a wild beast, sometimes
hiding in trusses of hay, at other times sleeping under forest
trees. Wearied out and half starved, he came at length to
Rättvik on Lake Siljan, in the very heart of the Dales, and
here, amidst a patriotic population, he imagined he could
come forward boldly. But neither here nor in the adjacent
mining centre of Mora could he rouse the peasantry to arms.
They protected him, indeed, against his pursuers, but refused
to follow him. They had no confidence in the solitary young
fugitive. They were weary of the long war; and the terrible
overthrow at Upsala (p. 21) was still fresh in their memories.
Not even the tidings of the Stockholm massacre could over-
come their apathy. All Gustavus's eloquence was in vain :
his mission seemed to be an utter failure.
Then it was that Christian himself unwittingly helped his
rival. During his return journey to Denmark through Sweden,
in 1520–21, he did two things which touched the Swedish
yeomanry to the quick. At Nyköping, on December 1o, 1520,
an order was issued that all the peasants should deliver up
their bows and cross-bows; and at the same time a fresh
tax was imposed on agricultural produce, to be levied in kind.
3.-2
36
CH.
Gustavus Vasa, 1523-1560
The same month in which the first of these ordinances
was proclaimed the farmers of East Småland rose in revolt.
The tidings spread rapidly to the Dales; and with it came .
the rumour that King Christian meant to ride his Eriksgatta?
through Sweden, and had ordered a gallows to be erected at /
every manor-house beforehand. Alarmed by these reports, the
Dalesmen sent several swift runners through the forests after
Gustavus to bring him back. Travelling day and night they
overtook him and easily persuaded him to return to Mora.
Thither the chief men of the surrounding districts assembled,
in the beginning of January, 1521, elected Gustavus “ Lord
and Captain of the Dales and the Commonwealth of Sweden,"
and swore fealty and obedience to him. The rising was
popular; and, by Lent, Gustavus had four hundred armed
men about him. The necessary funds for fresh operations
were obtained by plundering the German chapmen of Koffar-
berget; and his forces soon swelled to fifteen hundred men.
All the southern Dales now joined him; and the inhabitants
of the neighbouring province of Helsingland were invited to
cooperate. The men of Helsingland, however, would give
no definite answer, but preferred to bide their own time and
await events; whereas the men of Gestrikland, the coast
province of the Dales, joyfully acceded to Gustavus, who
thereby obtained possession of Gefle, the chief port of the
district. It was shortly after this that companies of gentlemen,
who had escaped from the Danes, began to come to him; and
their numbers increased daily.
Hitherto the Danish government at Stockholm had thought
it sufficient to admonish the Dalesmen to return to their
obedience, but severer measures now seemed necessary; and
in April a force of six thousand men, consisting of Danes,
Germans, Scotch, and French mercenaries, set out from the
neighbouring fortress of Vesterås to quell the rising. Arch-
i Lit. " the circuit through the land." The old custom of the Swedish
kings to ride through the land to administer summary justice.
111]
The War of Liberation
37
bishop Trolle and Didrik Slagheck were two of the leaders.
They encamped south of the river Dal, at Brunbäck ferry;
while from the other side advanced a numerous peasant host
under Peder Svensson. On perceiving the superiority of the
enemy, Bishop Beldenak, the most astute of the Danish pre-
lates, asked the Swedish lords how such a large number of
men could find sustenance. He was told that the common
people of Sweden were not used to delicacies. "They drink
little but water, and, when hard put to it, are quite content
with bark bread” “Well," replied Beldenak, “they who can
eat wood and drink water, will not yield to the Devil himself,
much less to mere men. My brethren, let us be off at once."
The retreat began ; but the Dalesmen followed hot upon the
heels of the invaders, and compelled them to stand and fight.
After a severe struggle, the Danes were defeated and fell back
upon Vesterås. Encouraged by this success, Gustavus (April
29, 1521) advanced against Vesterås itself. It was not his in-
tention to engage the enemy there; but Slagheck's impetuosity
precipitated another contest. No sooner did the Swedes
appear than he ordered his cavalry to charge; and they fell
forthwith upon the peasant squadrons, hoping to trample them
down. But the peasants stood firm and received the horsemen
with outstretched pikes. Every attempt to break their serried
ranks failed ; and the Danish cavalry were finally driven back
with the loss of four hundred men and all their artillery-a
great gain for Gustavus, who had no guns. A few weeks
later Christian's generals considered it safest to return to
Stockholm.
By the end of April Gustavus was master of the Dales,
Gestrikland, Vestmanland, and Nerike, in other words of all
central Sweden except the province of Upland, doubly im-
portant from its proximity to the capital and its inclusion of
the archiepiscopal city of Upsala. Upsala was captured by
a peasånt host, under Lars Eriksson and Lars Olsson, in the
beginning of May; and three weeks later Gustavus presented
38
Gustavus Vasa, 1523-1560 . [CH.
hop; anh
ting himself w
himself before the cathedral chapter, and asked the canons
whether he was to regard them as Swedes or Danes. The
canons thereupon craved leave to consult the archbishop; and
Gustavus not only consented to this but himself wrote to the
deadly enemy of his house, exhorting him to forget family
feuds in the interest of their common country. Trolle's only
reply to this eirenicon was an unsuccessful attempt to surprise
Gustavus at Upsala. A few weeks later Gustavus himself was
strong enough to undertake the siege of Stockholm. But
it was now that his real difficulties began. In the open field
he had carried everything before him, but nearly all the strong
places were in the hands of the Danes; and, as Gustavus
had no other means of reducing them except by famine, which,
in the case of Stockholm and other sea-girt fortresses was an
almost hopeless task for lack of a fleet, progress in this war
of sieges was necessarily slow. It must also not be forgotten
that Gustavus's forces were mostly undisciplined peasants,
obliged from time to time to return home to till their fields
and reap their crops, leaving still rawer recruits in their places.
So poor indeed was he in regular troops that the accession of
sixty landsknechts from Dantzic, in July, was considered a
notable reinforcement.
Fortunately the dissensions of his enemies somewhat re-
lieved his difficulties. It had become evident that the Danish
stadtholder, Didrik Slagheck, was unequal to the situation ;
and his coadjutors, Archbishop Trolle and Bishop Beldenak,
hated and despised the brutal blunderer. After the defeat of
Vesterås, they complained of his incompetence to Christian II,
and even induced their colleague, for form's sake, to go to
prison for a short time, so that their government might be
less unpopular. Trolle then proclaimed himself governor of
Sweden, and summoned a so-called Riksdag of reconciliation
to meet at Stockholm ; but the scheme fell through. Much
more effective was the “General Assembly of all classes,"
simultaneously convoked by Gustavus, which met at Vadstena
.
ulement.
III]
The War of Liberation
39
on August 21, and greatly strengthened his hands by encourag-
ing “ The Lord-Governor of the Swedish Commonwealth” to
continue as he had begun, and promising him their utmost
support. The war of liberation was now prosecuted with fresh
energy. In the course of 1520 and 1521 nearly all the Swedish
fortresses were recovered ; but the siege of Stockholm, ably
defended by Didrik Slagheck's capable brother, Henrik, and
repeatedly reinforced and reprovisioned from the sea by Sören
Norby, still dragged wearily on.
At length Gustavus, perceiving that his own resources were
unequal to reducing the place, applied for aid to Lübeck,
which was equally interested in opposing the Imperial policy of
Christian II. He could not have chosen a more favourable
time. Lübeck, well aware of Christian's intrigues against her
during his secret visit to the Netherlands, was actually preparing
for war; and her old rival, Dantzic, who had similar grievances
against the Danish king, took the same side. On March 15,
1522, both cities agreed to assist Gustavus; and, on May 30,
ten warships, with numerous German landsknechts and horse-
men on board, left Travemünde and arrived at Söderköping
on June 7. Stockholm was now completely blockaded; and,
after the repulse of a determined attempt to relieve it, in
November, by the indefatigable Sören Norby, the surrender
of the city could be only a question of time.
Meanwhile Christian himself had quitted Denmark; and
the news of his flight had no sooner reached Sweden than
Gustavus, in the beginning of June, summoned a Riksmöte, or
National Assembly, to Strengnäs, consisting not merely of
senators, prelates, and nobles, but of representatives from the
towns and country parishes. The first business of the assembly
was to fill the places in the Råd, or Senate, rendered vacant by
the Stockholm massacre. A couple of days later (June 6, 1523),
Canon Knut of Vesterås delivered a Latin oration in which he
demonstrated the necessity of electing a king, and, at the same
time, declared that none was so worthy of that high office as
40 Gustavus Vasa, 1523-1560 [CH.
" the Governor Herr Gustavus Eriksson.” Knut's proposition
was received with unanimous applause; only Gustavus himself,
raised objections; and there can be no question that he was
thoroughly sincere.. He was weary, he said, of the heavy
burden he had already taken upon himself, and begged to
be relieved of it. Let them elect one of the older senators,
and he would be the first to render him homage and obedience.
But everyone recognised that Gustavus was indispensable, and
they persisted in their entreaties till he yielded. Then, in the
name of the Most Holy Trinity, Gustavus Eriksson was
proclaimed “King of the Swedes and Goths.” The election
was duly notified by the Senate “to all men who love and
seek the truth.” In this document, a copy of which was sent
to the principal European potentates, Christian II's conduct
in Sweden and the reason of his expulsion were set forth
clearly and circumstantially. At the same time Archbishop
Trolle was outlawed and forbidden to return to Sweden.
Yet, at the very assembly. which elected him king,
Gustavus learnt, as he himself expressed it, that the office
of ruler “hath more gall than honey in it.” The deputies
from Lübeck present at the Riksmöte demanded of the newly
elected king the renewal and enlargement of their privileges
in return for the assistance they had rendered to him against
Christian II. The privileges thus claimed practically placed
the whole trade of Sweden, toll-free, in the hands of the
Hansa. Gustavus saw only too well the detriment which
would thence ensue to the realm, but he was helpless. The
sum he owed to Lübeck for ships and muniments of war was.
considerable; and he had no means of repaying it. Moreover,
further help from Lübeck was required in order to take
Stockholm; and the plenipotentiaries of that powerful city
threatened that, if their demands were not promptly complied
with, they would make their own terms with Gustavus's com-
petitor, Frederick I, the new king of Denmark, who had
already offered them all their old privileges in the three
111]
Economical difficulties
41
northern kingdoms. With an aching heart the young king
felt compelled to agree to conditions so rigorous that some
of his own councillors refused to sign the treaty. On June 10,
1523, a royal brief conceded all the demands of Lübeck.
The day after the close of the Riksmöte, June 20, 1523,
Stockholm opened her gates to Gustavus. Twice in three
years the Swedish capital had endured the privations of a long
siege. Most of the houses were in ruins or tenantless; and
the numbers of the taxpaying burgesses had sunk in four
years from 1200 to 308. To repair the loss Gustavus resorted
to an expedient not uncommon in those times. Burgesses
selected from every town in Sweden were ordered forthwith
to repair to Stockholm and reside permanently there, under
heavy penalties in case of disobedience. The strong fortress
of Kalmar had surrendered shortly before Stockholm; and, by
the end of 1523, all Finland was also subdued by Gustavus's
generals, Erik and Ivar Fleming. The war of liberation being
now over, the foreign mercenaries were superfluous; but, as
Gustavus had no money to pay them off, he was obliged to
send them to Lübeck to be discharged there by the city
authorities. In return for this service, however, the Lübeckers
demanded such an enormous sum of money that Gustavus
could pay off a first instalment of it only by selling the spare
chalices; monstrances, and other treasures of the Swedish
churches and monasteries.
This was only the beginning of those economical difficulties
with which Gustavus had to contend from the beginning to
the end of his reign, difficulties which frequently threatened
completely to overwhelm even his strenuous energy and dogged
perseverance. The financial position of the Crown was the
most important of all the problems demanding solution, for
upon that everything else depended. By releasing his country
from the tyranny of Denmark Gustavus had made the free,
independent development of Sweden a possibility. It was for
him to realise that possibility. First of all, order had to be
ac
42
CH.
Gustavus Vasa, 1523-1560
evolved from the chaos in which Sweden had been plunged by
the disruption of the Union; and the shortest, perhaps the
only way thereto was to restore the royal authority, which had
been in abeyance during ninety years. But an effective,
reforming monarchy must stand upon a sound financial basis ;
and to establish such a basis was, under the circumstances,
an herculean “task. For the usual revenues of the Crown,
always inadequate, were so diminished that they did not cover
half the daily expenses of government, and left no surplus
whatever for the payment of the grinding national debt-
another heritage of the Union. New taxes could be imposed
only with extreme caution while the country was still bleeding
from the wounds of the long war; and, in any case, the limits
of taxation, in so poor a country as Sweden, would very
speedily be reached. It was clear that extraordinary ex-
pedients must, sooner or later, be adopted. Men were wanted
even more than money. The lack of capable, trustworthy
administrators in Sweden, just when they were most required,
was grievous.
The whole burden of government weighed exclusively on
the shoulders of the new king, a young man of seven-and-
twenty. He had to see to everything personally, and act on
information which he could trust none to collect but himself.
Half his time was taken up in travelling from one end of
the kingdom to the other, and doing purely clerical work for
want of competent assistance. Gustavus was, in very deed,
not merely Sweden's king, but Sweden's most overworked
servant. His officers did literally nothing without first con-
sulting him; and his care extended to everything, from the
building of a smithy to the construction of a fleet, from the
translation of the Scriptures to the reformation of the Church. .
We can form some idea of his difficulties when we learn that,
. in 1533, he could not send an ambassador to Lübeck because
not a single man in his council knew German. On another
occasion he was unable to write a letter in German to
III]
The Swedish Peasantry
.:
43
Christian III because there was nobody at hand to whom
he could dictate it. It was the lack of native talent which
compelled Gustavus frequently to employ the services of
foreign adventurers like Berent von Mehlen, John von Hoja,
Konrad von Pyhy, and Georg Norman, not because they were
the best, but because they were the only tools he could lay
his hands upon. Under these circumstances a strong monarchy
was indispensable to the development of liberty and inde-
pendence in Sweden; and it was not the least anxious of
Gustavus's many anxieties that he had constantly to be on
the watch lest a formidable democratic rival should encroach
on his prerogative. That rival was the Swedish peasantry as
embodied in its most thoroughgoing representatives, the Dales-
men of central Sweden.
The position of the Swedish peasantry was absolutely
unique. For the last hundred years they had been a leading
factor in the political life of the country; and perhaps in no
other contemporary European state could so self-reliant and
self-respecting a class of yeomen have been found. Again
and again, first under Engelbrekt and subsequently under the
Stures, they had defended their own and the national liberties
against foreign foes. But, if their services had been great,
their pretensions were still greater. They were as obstinate
and unruly in quiet times as they were brave and trustworthy
in times of peril. They prided themselves on having “set
King Gus in the high seat,” but they were quite ready to
unseat him if his rule were not to their liking; and there were
many things with which the Dalesmen were by no means
content. Naturally, after such a revolution, there were
anomalies in Sweden which could not immediately be rectified,
and should therefore have been borne with patience; but this
the peasantry had not sense enough to see, and they freely
blamed the king for not doing impossibilities. This state of
things was responsible for the numerous peasant risings with
which Gustavus had to contend.
44 Gustavus Vasa, 1523–1560 [CH.
The first of these rebellions occurred in the second year of
his reign. - On April 19, 1525, the Dalesmen met at Tuna
to consider the causes of complaint they had against the king,
and sent him a letter dated May 1, in which they frankly
spoke their minds. They began, somewhat ungenerously, by .
reminding him of the time when he “wandered an outlaw
in the woods," of how they had helped him to drive all.
his enemies out of the land, and placed him on the throne,
“whereupon the king had made light of good Swedish men,
and invited Germans and Danes into the land.” And how
had he kept his royal oath? After an unchristian sort he had
taxed churches and monasteries, and taken away all the trea-
sures which had been devoted to God's service. They had
already “exhorted him with letters and humble reminders," at
the same time begging him “to get them a better value for
their wares; but the longer they waited the worse they came
off.” This they could put up with no longer. If the king
would not listen to their complaints they would no longer keep
the oath of allegiance they had sworn to him. “We perceive
therefore,” they concluded, “that you mean clean to destroy
us poor Swedish men, which, with God's help, we will prevent;
so take note hereof and act accordingly!”
Gustavus received this letter at Vesterås, whither he had
summoned a national assembly in May, to receive his abdica-
tion if they were not satisfied with his rule. The prayers and
promises of the Estates prevailed upon him to withdraw his
abdication; and he sent a letter of remonstrance to the Dales-
men, declaring he could never believe that they seriously
meant to withdraw their allegiance, and warning them not to
provoke him too far. Gustavus would not use force against
his own people if argument could prevail ; besides, at that
very time, he had need of every soldier he possessed, for the
fortress of Kalmar, which he had entrusted to Berent von
Mehlen, had rebelled against him, and it took him the whole
summer to reduce it to obedience. Shortly after its surrender .
111] The rebellions of the Peasantry 45
the Dalesmen at last listened to reason; and, when the king,
in October, came to Tuna, they confessed they had been
misled by scoundrels and begged his forgiveness.
Thus the first Daluppror, as it is called, ended peaceably
enough. Much more serious was the second Daluppror which
broke out two years later. In the interval Gustavus had been
obliged to seize more Church property to satisfy his financial
needs, and had, at the same time, unmistakeably favoured the
“new teaching,” which had already found its way into Sweden.
The essentially Catholic peasantry were outraged by this policy;
and they attributed the almost total failure of the crops in
1526 to the wrath of Providence against the ungodly king.
The Dalesmen, as usual, had their own particular grievances,
although, since the pacification of 1525, Gustavus had carried
his policy of conciliation so far as even to consult them on
sundry affairs of State before deliberating with his Council.
Nevertheless, when in March, 1527, an impostor, calling
himself Nils Sture, the eldest son of Sten Sture and Christina
Gyllenstjerna, appeared in the Dales, two-thirds of the popula-
tion were ready to lay down their lives for him. They styled
him “Daljunkar” or the Squire of the Dales. Their credulity
went so far as to credit his statement that “King Gustavus
had rejected the Christian faith, and become a Lutheran and
a heathen"; and, in the twelve articles of complaint which the
Dalesmen forth with despatched to the king, the introduction
of "Luthery” and the spoliation of churches and monasteries
occupied a prominent place. Gustavus replied that he knew
nothing about “Luthery." He had only commanded that
God's Word and Gospel were to be preached so that the clergy
should no longer deceive the simple folk; and said that it was
only the priests and monks, “who did not wish their deceptions
to be known," who had falsely spread the report that he wanted
to introduce a new faith. “It amazes me,” he continues, "that
the good men of the Dales should trouble themselves about
matters which they do not understand at all, and which do not
46
Gustavus Vasa, 1523–1560
concern them”; and he invited them to send their deputies
to Vesterås to take counsel with him and his Råd. This letter
seems to have made some impression upon the Dalesmen; but
their reply contained very little of the dutiful submission of
subjects. They now categorically demanded that “no new
faith or Luthery” should be introduced, that henceforth at
court “there should not be so many foreign and outlandish
customs with laced and brocaded clothes," and that the king
“should burn alive, or otherwise do away with, all who ate
flesh on Friday and Saturday." This was too much for even
the patience of Gustavus. He was “not going to be lectured
by them,” he answered, as to how he was to clothe his body-
guards and servants; he preferred to model himself upon other
potentates, such as kings and emperors, so that they may see
that we Swedes are no more swine and goats than they are."
The deputies from the Dales duly conferred with the king
at Vesterås, in June, 1527; and the interview at least convinced
them of the imposture of the Daljunkar, for by the king's
command a letter was read aloud to them from Dame Christina,
in which she utterly repudiated the Daljunkar. On their
return home the Dalesmen confronted the Daljunkar with a
copy of this letter, and asked for an explanation. The impostor
had the effrontery to reply that "his mother would not acknow-
ledge him because he was born before her marriage.” “Then
it was,” says a contemporary chronicler, “that a mist fell from
the eyes of such of the Dalesmen as still had some sense left,
so that they understood that such a saying was an insult to so
noble and virtuous a lady.” The Daljunkar, perceiving that
his cause was lost, fled to Norway. Yet the Dalesmen still re-
mained stubborn and restless; and the king's officials reported
that “they could scarce speak a couple of words to them without
being threatened with a flogging.” At last Gustavus was driven
to give them a lesson : it was intolerable that a single class
should dictate to the whole kingdom. So, after his long-
delayed coronation had been celebrated, with the usual cere-
111] The rebellions of the Peasantry 47
monies, at Upsala in January, 1528, he crossed the border of
the Dales at the head of 14,000 men. Forty to fifty men from
every parish had already been summoned to meet him, in a
general assembly at Tuna, on February 26, to enquire into
the cause of the recent disturbances. The ringleaders also
had been persuaded to attend under a promise of a "free, sure
and Christian safe conduct to and from the Landsting.” This
promise was broken. When the people had assembled, the
royal troops were marshalled around them, the guns were
pointed at the throng, and the chief abettors and counsellors
of the Daljunkar were singled out and executed on the spot.
“When the others saw that blood began to flow they had
quite another song to sing. Fearing for their lives, they fell a
howling and crying, dumped down on their knees, begged and
prayed the king for God's sake to spare them, and promised
amendment.' And, after a very long consultation, they were
assured of his pardon and forgiveness, and did him homage.
So this time King Gustavus brought the Dalesmen back to
meekness and obedience."
But it was not for long. In less than three years the
Dalesmen were again in arms against the king, this time to
protect the bells of their churches. We have already seen
on what onerous terms Gustavus purchased the assistance
of Lübeck. Swedish trade had become a monopoly of the
Hansa. Nor was this all. In order to pay off the money sub-
sequently borrowed from the wealthy city the unhappy king
was driven to the most desperate expedients. In the beginning
of 1529 Lübeck still claimed 68,681 Lübeck marks, which
were to be paid off in four years, besides a separate item of
8689 marks. The balance seemed to Gustavus unusually
high, but he acknowledged his liability; and at the end of
1529 a fourth part of it was discharged. In 1530, however,
nothing could be paid; and at the end of that year an am-
bassador from Lübeck appeared at Stockholm with remon-
strances and menaces. The king immediately summoned a
48 Gustavus Vasa, 1523-1560 [CH.
council at Örebo, which determined that a resolution, passed
the year before, for taking a bell from every church, chapel, and
monastery in the town, should be extended to the country:
every parish church was now to surrender a bell, and, if it had
but one, it must be redeemed at half its value. Royal com-
missioners were sent to all the country districts to levy the tax;
and, so successful was it, that Gustavus was able to pay off no
less than 30,318 marks in 1531, and 10,983 more in 1532. · But
the imposition caused disturbances in some parts of the country;
and again it was the Dales which openly resisted the royal
ordinance. The inhabitants of Leksand, Ål, and Gagnef beat
the royal commissioners, and refused to part with their bells;
while the men of Tuna not only took theirs back again, but, at
the beginning of March, 1531, sent Gustavus a letter which
Gustavus himself declared to be little better than an act of
rebellion. Moreover, when he invited them to attend a general
assembly, which he had summoned to Upsala, they had the
presumption, on April 12, 1531, to send out writs of their own
for a rival Riksmöte to meet at Arboga. But the time, had
gone when the Dalesmen could summon parliaments. Gustavus
ordered his governors to suppress the writ from the Dales; and
the Upsala Assembly authorised him to collect all the out-
standing bills. The Dalesmen thereupon offered to pay 2000
marks in lieu of their bells; and this compromise was gratefully
accepted by the king.
But by far the most formidable of the popular risings, during
the reign of Gustavus, was the one known as Dackefejden?,
which resulted in a regular civil war that shook the throne
and was suppressed only with the utmost difficulty. Like the
Bell-Rising, it was mainly due to the religious conservatism of
the people. But it is remarkable that the Dalesmen, so far
from taking part in Dacke's rebellion, sent 2000 men against
him.
In the year 1539 Gustavus, who had now thoroughly com-
i Dacke's War.
49
111]
Dacke's War
nitted himself to the policy of spoiling the Church for the
benefit of the State, sent his "visitors” through the provinces
of Vestergötland, Vermland, Östergotland, and Småland, to
carry out his ecclesiastical reforms', and, at the same time,
appropriate all the superfluous church vessels and furniture.
The “visitors," interpreting their powers most liberally, swept
no less than 142,000 oz. of silver plate into the royal treasury
during the years 1539-1541. One can imagine with what
feelings the peasantry beheld the consecrated plate and other
treasures plucked out of the churches, the jewels torn off the
rich vestments and altar-cloths flung into waggons and carried
off. On the top of these spoliations came fresh decrees for-
bidding the export of cattle under pain of death, and order-
ing a house-to-house visitation of the taxable yeomen (April
1541). This was more than the people would endure; and
in the beginning of 1542 they rose in rebellion under a
yeoman of Bleking, Nils Dacke by name, who, unable to pay a
heavy fine in commutation of the death penalty for murdering
a royal bailiff, had joined a band of border freebooters.
In May, 1542, Dacke invaded the south-east part of Småland,
besieged the lord-lieutenant of Vestergötland in the fortress
of Bergqvara, and on July 24 compelled him to surrender
and return to his own province. A first attempt of Gustavus
to attack Dacke from three different quarters only led to an
armistice for three years—a sufficiently humiliating confession of
failure on the king's part. By this armistice the Smålanders
undertook, on condition of free forgiveness, to remain quiet and
present their grievances to Gustavus in the regular way. What
they complained of most were the heavy taxes, the plundering
of the churches, the abolition of the old church customs, and
the oppressive measures of the royal governors. As usual,
Gustavus carefully considered the complaints of the Smålanders,
and in a long circular letter, issued on December 30, 1542,
endeavoured, very astutely, to make them see things from his
i See Chapter vi.
BAIN
50 Gustavus Vasa, 1523–1560 [CH.
own point of view. But Dacke was not disposed to submit so
easily. His pride had been puffed up by a letter he had
received in November, 1542, from Albert, duke of Mecklen-
burg, who claimed the Swedish throne as the nephew, by
marriage, of Christian II, offering to assist the Smålanders to
drive Gustavus out of Sweden. Dacke left this offer open for .
the present, shrewdly preferring to make terms with the king
if possible; but at the beginning of 1543 he broke the truce
with Gustavus by ravaging the central provinces of Sweden.
Again the royal armies were sent out against him; and, on the
·shores of Lake Åsunden, after an hour's hard fight, in the course
of which Dacke was seriously wounded, his forces were scat-
tered. Småland was then reduced to obedience; and Dacke
himself was caught and shot in Rödeby Wood in August, 1543.
The Dackefejden was the last rebellion with which Gustavus had
to cope. Henceforth he was strong enough to maintain what
he had established, and finish what he had begun.
Gustavus's foreign policy for the first twelve years of his
reign aimed at little more than self-preservation. Only by the
aid of Lübeck had he been able to secure the independence of
Sweden; and Lübeck, in return, exploited Sweden, as Spain, at
a later day, was to exploit her American colonies. Till the
Lübeck yoke was shaken off, Sweden's natural development
was hampered in every direction; and Gustavus's private corre-
spondence shows how he chafed beneath it. By the time the
greater part of the Lübeck debt was paid off, in 1531, the
relations between the former allies were strained to breaking
point; but the fear of the common foe, “unkind King Christian,”
prevented an actual rupture, although the Lübeckers, irritated
by the granting of privileges to their rivals, the Dutch towns,
openly complained that King Gustavus had “begun as an angel,
but ended as a devil.” But the moment of deliverance was at
hand. The imprisonment of Christian II (August 9, 1532), the
death of King Frederick I eight months later (April 9, 1533),
and the simultaneous triumph of the aggressive democratic
111]
The aggrandisement of Liibeck
51
Lutheran faction at Lübeck, now brought about a revolution
in Scandinavian politics which was distinctly to the advantage
of Sweden.
The new burgomaster of Lübeck, Jürgen Wullenwever,
an ambitious and capable statesman, was inspired with the
audacious idea of dominating Scandinavia. Circumstances
apparently favoured him. Sweden seemed to be entirely de-
pendent on Lübeck, while in Denmark something very like
anarchy prevailed. The strife between the old and the new
doctrine had there divided the nations into two hostile camps;
the throne was vacant; and the union with Norway and the
Duchies was of the loosest description. In June, 1533, a
Herredag had assembled at Copenhagen to elect a new
monarch. The choice lay between Frederick I's two sons,
Duke Christian, who was devoted to Protestantism, and Duke
Hans, a boy of twelve, whom the Catholic majority wished to
set upon the throne. As however neither party could agree,
the election was postponed till the following summer, so that
the Norwegian Rigsraad might also be consulted. It was at
this juncture that Wuļlenwever intervened. He was in favour
of Duke Hans; but, when the young prince refused the crown,
and the Danish Rigsraad formed a defensive alliance with Prince
Christian (who had, in June, been elected duke of Holstein
and Sleswick) and invited the Dutch towns to accede there-
to, Wullenwever, relying on the strong sympathy of the lower
orders in Denmark for the captive Christian II, negotiated with
Christian's young kinsman, Count Christopher of Oldenburg.
A treaty was now signed (May, 1534) between the count and
Lübeck, nominally for the purpose of restoring Christian II,
though, as a matter of fact, his name was to serve only as a
rallying cry for his numerous Danish supporters, chief among
whom were Ambrosius Bogbinder, ex-burgomaster of Copen-
hagen, and Jörgen Kock, burgomaster of Malmö. Four months
before the conclusion of this alliance Gustavus Vasa had been
compelled, by the insolence of Lübeck, to form a defensive
4--2
52
TCH.
Gustavus Vasa, 1523–1560
alliance with the provisional Danish government (February 2,
. 1534). In March, 1533, ambassadors from Lübeck had come
to Stockholm to propose an alliance against the Dutch; but
the proposal was rejected. In the course of the summer the
Lübeckians laid an embargo on the property of Gustavus at
Lübeck, to enforce payment of the remainder of the debt; and
Gustavus retaliated by confiscating all the ships and wares of
Lübeck in Sweden, imprisoning the Lübeck merchants, and
abolishing all her commercial privileges. A few months later
began the war known in northern history as Grevens Fejde,
“The Count's War,” the count in question being Christopher
of Oldenburg.
It was on June 22, 1534, that Count Christopher was con-
veyed, by a Lübeck fleet, to, Skovshoved in Sjælland. Copen-
hagen willingly opened her gates to him; Sjælland followed suit;
Malmö had been on his side from the first. In six weeks the
count was the master of eastern Denmark, which he ruled as
governor in the name of Christian II. In Jutland, on the
other hand, a Herredag assembled at Ry, elected Duke Christian
king in July, 1534; and, although Christopher's troops, sup-
ported by the peasants, took Aalborg and defeated the Jutish
nobility at Svenstrup (Oct. 1534), the armies of Christian, who
had, as duke of Holstein, made peace with Lübeck in Novem-
ber, ably led by Johan Rantzau, succeeded, by the end of the
year, in reconquering all Jutland. Count Christopher was
powerless to help his friends on the other side of the Belt, as
Gustavus Vasa was attacking him vigorously in Scania ; and,
even with the assistance of his ally, Duke Albert of Mecklen-
burg, Christopher was no match for the Swedish king. In
January, 1535, Gustavus routed the two princes at Helsing-
borg; and all Scania, with the exception of Malmö, Landscrona,
and Varberg, submitted to Denmark. In March, 1535, Duke
Christian was proclaimed king of Denmark at Viborg as
Christian III; the count of Hoja, Christopher's best general,
was defeated and slain at Öxnebjerg in Fünen, by Rantzau, in
The Count's War
53
June, 1535: while the combined Danish-Swedish-Prussian
navy, under Peter Skram, drove one great Lübeck fleet to seek
protection beneath the guns of Copenhagen, and annihilated
another in Svendburg Sound. Fünen having been subdued
and severely punished, Christian III crossed over to Sjælland
and began the siege of Copenhagen (July, 1535). But the end
of the war was now at hand. Such a harvest of disasters had
made the policy of the war party in Lübeck exceedingly un-
popular; the old patrician council regained its sway; and
Wullenwever was forced to resign. In the winter of 1535
negotiations were opened with Denmark, which led to the
Peace of Hamburg (Feb. 1536), whereby Lübeck recognised
Christian III as king, in return for the confirmation of her
privileges. By this time only Varberg and Copenhagen still
held out against Christian III. Both cities expected help from
the Count Palatine Frederick, who had married Christian II's
daughter Dorothea, and whose claims upon Denmark were
supported by Charles V. But the war with Francis I, in 1536,
prevented the Emperor from actively helping his nephew; and
on July 29, 1536, after a heroic resistance of twelve months,
Copenhagen surrendered. Thereafter the war smouldered out.
“Grevens Fejde” was much more than a mere contest for
the Danish throne. In the first place it marks the end of the
hegemony of Lübeck in Scandinavia. The skilful diplomacy
of the wealthy city had contrived to save appearances by the
Peace of Hamburg; but her supremacy was gone for ever.
Scandinavians were now to rule in their own waters. In the
second place “Grevens Fejde" meant the political eclipse of
the lower and middle classes in Denmark, who, for the most
part, had taken the part of Count Christopher; and finally, as
we shall see presently (cap. v), it was the ruin of the Catholic
Church in Denmark-Norway. To Sweden the war was an
unmixed benefit. It led at once to an armistice with Lübeck,
mediated by Christian III, and ultimately (Aug. 28, 1537) to
a five years' truce, Lübeck consenting to abandon her ancient
54
Gustavus Vasa; 1523–1560 TCH.
privileges and renounce her claims for arrears of debt in return
for the right to trade toll-free with the four ports of Stockholm,
Kalmar, Söderköping, and Abo. To such meagre proportions
had her ancient monopolies in Sweden now shrunk. Thus
the external coercion which for centuries had fettered the
free development of Swedish trade was at last and for ever
removed.
Another immediate consequence of “Grevens Fejde" was
to strengthen the friendly relations between Sweden and
Denmark, which culminated in an offensive and defensive
alliance (Peace of Brömsebro, Sept. 15, 1541). A common
fear of Charles V brought about this miracle; and the alliance
thus formed was consolidated by two separate defensive
alliances between France and the northern kingdoms. The
Franco-Swedish treaty, the first link in a long chain of alliances
between the two countries, was signed at Sceaux on July 11,
1542, each of the high contracting parties agreeing, on this
occasion, to help the other, in case of need, with 25,000 men
and 50 war-ships. Gustavus's apprehensions with regard to
Charles V were set at rest by the Peace of Brussels, 1550,
concluded by the ablest of his foreign servants, Georg Norman;
and simultaneously his old ineradicable suspicions of Denmark
revived. He expresses his real sentiments towards the sister
state in a letter to Sten Lejonhufvud, governor of Kalmar, in
the middle of 1545. “We advise and exhort you to the utmost
of our ability," writes the king, "to.put no hope or trust in
the Danes, or their sweet scribbling, inasmuch as they mean
nothing at all by it except how best they may deceive and
betray us Swedes.” Such instructions were not calculated to
promote confidence between Swedish and Danish negotiators
in the future.
Denmark, too, had her own grievances against Sweden;
chief among which was the settlement of the Swedish Crown
upon the descendants of Gustavus, the old dream of a Scandi-
navian union under a Danish king still haunting the court
111] Gustavus's suspicion of Denmark 55
of Copenhagen. A fresh cause of dispute was generated
in 1548; when King Christian III's daughter was wedded to
Duke Augustus of Saxony. On that occasion, apparently by
way of protest against the decree of the Riksdag of Vesterås
(Jan. 15, 1544) declaring the Swedish throne hereditary in
Gustavus's family, the Danish king caused to be quartered on
his daughter's shield not only the three Danish lions and the
Norwegian lion with the axe of St Olaf, but also “the three
crowns” of Sweden. Gustavus, naturally suspicious, was much
perturbed by the innovation, and warned all his border officials
to be watchful and prepare for the worst. In 1557 he even
wrote to the Danish king protesting against the placing of the
three crowns in the royal Danish seal beneath the arms of
Denmark, and not, as heretofore, alongside them; and he bitterly
reminded Christian that he owed his actual possession of the
three lions and the axe of St Olaf to the assistance recently
rendered to him by the three Crowns. Christian III replied that
the three crowns signified not Sweden in especial, but the three
Scandinavian kingdoms, and that their insertion in the Danish
shield was only a reminiscence of the Union, an explanation
which Gustavus petulantly characterised as "en bloumeradt
sken!.” Nevertheless during the lives of Gustavus I and
Christian III the relations between Denmark and Sweden con-
tinued to be pacific.
So much cannot be said of Gustavus's relations with his
eastern neighbour Russia. Frontier disputes were here the
cause of quarrel. Gustavus had avoided negotiation for fear
lest the boundaries should be regulated on the basis of the
ancient Peace of Nöteborg (1323), according to which Sweden
should have relinquished a portion of her eastern frontier.
This tergiversation on the part of the Swedes led to a war in
Finland in 1556, limited to an ineffectual siege of Nöteborg by
the Swedes, and an equally unsuccessful attack upon Viborg
by the Russians. Gustavus's fear of Moscovy was very real,
1 Lit. "a blooming fráud.”
56
[CH.
Gustavus Vasa, 1523-1560
and contrasts oddly with the hearty contempt of the later
Swedish kings for that power. He attributed to the Tsars the
design of establishing a universal monarchy round the Baltic,
similar to "the tyranny of the Turks in Asia and Africa”; and
his letter to Ivan IV, conveyed by a private envoy, Canon
Knut, of Abo, who was sent on June 1, 1556, to Moscow to
solicit peace, was almost abject in expression'. The manner
of the Grand Duke of Moscovy's reply was offensive enough;
but he declared his willingness for peace, and desired that
Swedish plenipotentiaries should forthwith be sent to Moscow. -
In March, 1557, a treaty was signed there, extending the
truce to March 25, 1597, and stipulating that commissioners
should meet on July 20, 1559, to regulate the frontier according
to the provisions of the Treaty of Nöteborg.
In the last year of Gustavus's life an event occurred which
was to have far-reaching consequences and profoundly affect
the political development of Sweden. The ancient military
Order of the Sword, founded in 1202 for the purpose of con-
verting Livonia, and amalgamated, since 1237, with the more
powerful Order of the Teutonic Knights, had, by the secularisa-
tion of the latter Order into the Dukedom of Prussia (1525),
become suddenly isolated in the midst of hostile Slavonians.
It needed but a jolt to bring down the crazy anachronism; and
the jolt came in 1558 when the long-threatened war with Russia
burst forth, and a flood of savage Moscovites poured over the
land, capturing Narva and Dorpat, and threatening the whole
province with destruction. In his despair, the last Master of
the Order, Gotthard von Kettler, applied in 1559 to the nearest
friendly, civilised potentate, Duke John of Finland, Gustavus's
second son, for a loan on the security of two or three castles. At
first Gustavus was disinclined to intervene, but the ambitious
competition of Denmark and Poland forced his hand. The latter
power had already (Sept. 15, 1559) signed a convention with
Kettler and the archbishop of Riga, engaging to assist the
i Sipovsky: Rodnaya Starina, 11. 168.
III
.
Last days of Gustavus
57
Order in return for a cession of territory; while Denmark, by a
treaty signed on September 26 in the same year, undertook to
protect the diocese of Ösel and Wick, in return for the right
to nominate the bishop. The first bishop so nominated was
King Frederick II's brother, Duke Magnus, who took possession
of the island in April, 1560. Gustavus was not blind to the
dangers which might accrue therefrom to Sweden, and in the
spring of 1560 he also opened negotiations with Kettler in
order to mediate a peace with Russia.
With the outlying European powers Sweden had still but
little intercourse. During the Russian war, indeed, an em- ..
bassy had been sent to England to persuade Queen Mary to
break off the recently formed (1553) commercial relations with
Russia by way of Archangel; but, as Sweden had nothing
sufficiently lucrative to offer in return, the attempt failed.
On the other hand, a commercial treaty was made with
Anne, governor of East-Friesland, in 1556, and with France in
1559.
The incessant labour, the constant anxiety, which were the
daily portion of Gustavus Vasa during the seven-and-thirty
years of his reign, told at last upon even his splendid energy
and magnificent constitution. In his later years we frequently
hear him complain that he is no longer the man he was.
“God knows," he writes in 1556, “that personally we have
done our utmost; and rest and quiet are what we now long for,
inasmuch as we are getting weary and weak in head, eyes, and
elsewhere, so that we are no longer able to bear such heavy
work as we, for the good of the commonalty of Sweden, have
had and borne these many years.” In the spring of 1560,
sensible of an ominous decline of his powers, Gustavus sum-
moned his last Riksdag. It was in the midst of the people he
loved so well that the dying king desired to express his last
wishes, and give an account of his stewardship. On June 16,
1560, the Assembly, in which every class of the community
was duly represented, met at Stockholm. Ten days later,
upported by his sons, Gustavus greeted the Estates in the
58
[CH.
Gustavus Vasa, 1523-1560
great hall of the palace. . He began by thanking them for
obeying his summons, and then took a retrospect of his reign,
reminding them of the misery of the kingdom during the
Union, and its deliverance from “that unkind tyrant, King
Christian," whom God alone had punished and expelled.
“For," continued he, “all of us, high and low, master and
servant, young and old, ought never to forget His divine help
and deliverance. What indeed was I that I could think of
driving out so mighty a monarch, who was not only the ruler
over three kingdoms, but the friend of the powerful Kaiser
Karl, called the Fifth, and of the chief princes of Germany ?
But God did the work and made me His miracle-man, through
whom His almighty power should be made manifest against
King Christian, as also it hath been manifested, these forty
years and more, both in temporal and spiritual things.” And
then he compared himself to another king, King David, whom
God had taken from the sheepfolds to make him a ruler over
His people. He knew very well, he concluded, that he was
not perfect; and therefore he begged the Estates, as became
faithful servants, to forgive him for all the faults and short-
comings of his government. Then the king, after exhorting
them to be obedient to his sons, and live together in peace
and harmony, commended them to God's protection and dis-
missed them with his blessing. Four days later the Riksdag
passed a resolution confirming the hereditary right of Gustavus's
eldest son, Prince Eric, to the throne. The old king's last
anxieties were now over, and he could die in peace. On
September 29, 1560, "after he had fought a good fight in
patience and silence, he gave up the ghost between seven and
eight of the clock in the forenoon.”
Gustavus was thrice married. His first wife, Catherine of
Saxe-Lauenburg, bore him, in 1533, his eldest son Eric. This
union was neither long nor happy; but the blame of its infelicity
is generally attributed to the lady, whose abnormal character
was reflected and accentuated in her unhappy son. Much
more fortunate was Gustavus's second marriage, a year after
III
Personality of Gustavus
59
the death of his first consort, with his own countrywoman,
Margaret Lejonhufvud, who bore him five sons and five
daughters, of whom three sons, John, Magnus, and Charles,
and one daughter, Cecilia, survived their childhood. Queen
Margaret died in 1551 ; and, a twelvemonth later, Gustavus
wedded her niece, Catherine Stenbock, a handsome girl of
sixteen, who survived him more than sixty years. To his
second and third consorts Gustavus was invariably a devoted
husband.
Gustavus's outward appearance in the prime of his life is
thus described by a contemporary : “He was of the middle
height, with a round head, light yellow hair, a fine long beard,
sharp eyes, a small straight nose, well shaped lips, ruddy
countenance, a reddish brown body, elegant but somewhat
large hands, pretty strong arms, a stout frame, small feet, and
a body as fitly and well-proportioned as any painter could have
painted it. He was of a sanguine-choleric temperament, and,
when untroubled and unvexed, a bright and cheerful gentleman,
easy to get on with ; and, however many people happened to
be in the same room with him, he was never at a loss for an
answer to every one of them.” Learned he was not, but he
had a naturally bright and clear understanding, an unusually
good memory, and a marvellous capacity for taking pains.
He was also very devout, and his morals were irreproachable.
On the other hand, Gustavus had his full share of the family
failings of irritability and suspiciousness, the latter quality
becoming almost morbid under the pressure of adverse circum-
stances. His energy, too, not infrequently degenerated into
violence. But the Swedes, at any rate, should be very lenient
towards the faults of the great monarch who devoted every
moment of his manhood to their welfare. As Snoilsky has
well said', partially quoting from Gustavus himself, he was
God's miracle-man, who built up the realm of Sweden from
base to roof, and gave his people a Protestant fatherland
against their will.
i Svensko Bilden, 1.
CHAPTER IV.
THE HEGEMONY OF DENMARK, 1536-1588.
-
R
WHILE Gustavus Vasa was laying the foundations of the
modern Swedish state, the Danish monarchy under Christian III
and Frederick II had risen to the rank of a great power.
In the summer of 1536 the civil war which had devastated
Denmark for the last two years was terminated by the con-
vention of July 29, 1536, between Christian III and the
gallant defenders of Copenhagen; and on August 6 the vic-
torious king held his entry into the capital of his realm.
“Grevens Fejde,” now happily over, marked a turning-point in
Danish history. The king and the nobility had triumphed
over the burgesses and the common people; the new Church
and the new Faith had prevailed over the old Church and its
aristocratic patrons; and finally the monarchy had won the
day at the expense of the Rigsraad, or Senate. It was clear
to everyone that such a victory inevitably involved the fall of
Romanism and the aggrandisement of the monarchy: the only
question was whether this political transformation should be
effected by legal or revolutionary means. Originally both the
king had desired, and the people had expected, a compromise.
A few days after the taking of Copenhagen, a Rigsdag was
summoned to Copenhagen for October 15. On the same day
“his Majesty's preachers and servants of the Word in Sjælland,
Scania, and Jutland,” presented to the king a petition in which
they desired the appointment of superintendents in every
diocese, with a sort of upper-superintendent who was to have
CH. IV] Anti-Catholic coup d'état 61
authority over the affairs of religion in general, and together
with other learned men draw up regulations for Church cere-
monies and discipline. But the strong pressure exercised
upon the king by his German counsellors and the leaders
of the army prevented anything like the gradual, moderate,
and orderly reformation which was at first anticipated. The
large army, assembled in and around Copenhagen, was cla-
mouring for its arrears of pay; and there was no money in
hand wherewith to meet the demand. The king was already
heavily in debt to his Holsteiners; and the onerous taxes
which had been imposed on the Danes in June and July
had fallen far short of the royal requirements. Moreover it
soon became evident that the bishops and senators assembled
at Copenhagen either could not or would not assist the king
with ready money.
In these circumstances the idea of making Christian master
of the situation by a coup d'état rapidly gained ground. Once
let the temporal power of the bishops be abolished-it was
argued—and their immense estates seized, and the king would
have ample means wherewith to satisfy all the claims upon
hiin. Gustavus Vasa had already set the example in the
sister kingdom; and Christian III, with a victorious army
behind him, was in an infinitely stronger position than Gus-
tavus Vasa had ever been in. With the utmost secrecy the
preparations for the projected coup d'état were carried out.
On the afternoon of August 11 the chiefs of the army as-
sembled at the castle. Some of the most thoroughgoing
captains proposed to imprison all the senators in town, and
all the bishops in the country; but the king prudently refused
to risk the incalculable consequences of such an extreme act
of violence; and finally a compromise was arrived at. Arch-
bishop Torben Bille, Bishop Joakim Rönnov, of Roskilde, and
Olof Munk, coadjutor of Ribe, were to be arrested that same
night; while the temporal senators were to be compelled to
consent to the deposition of the bishops and the confiscation of
62 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536–1588 [CH.
their goods by the Crown. The plan was quickly and energeti-
cally executed. The same night Bishops Bille and Munk were
arrested; and Rönnov, who had hidden himself in a loft, was
secured next day. The gates of the city were then closed;
troops were concentrated round the castle; and the temporal
senators, together with the venerated Ove Bille, bishop of
Aarhus, were forced to appear at the castle at 8 o'clock next
morning, and there compelled to sign a letter of surrender,
which declared that, inasmuch as the realm of Denmark could
not be ruled save by a sovereign and a temporal regimen,
therefore the government should be in the hands of the king
and the temporal Senate; and no bishop was henceforth to
have any jurisdiction in any diocese of the realm without
the sanction of an cecumenical Council, and the consent of
the king, the Senate, the nobility, and the people. The
Senate pledged itself, moreover, not to hinder the lawful
preaching and promulgating of the holy Gospel and God's
pure Word; and agents were despatched all over the kingdom
to seize the remaining bishops and take possession of the
episcopal castles. Obviously a man of action, a soldier, must
have been the author of this swift and audacious act of
authority; and Danish historians generally attribute it to the
Holsteiner, Johan Rantzau, Christian III's chief general.
Rantzau himself superintended the execution of the royal
mandate in Jutland, before proceeding to Gottorp, from whence,
as stadtholder, he was to administer the Duchies and guard the
southern frontier. Whatever we may think of the morality of
this coup d'état, it was, at any rate, a financial success; for in
the month of September the king was able to pay off the
greater part of the army.
In the middle of October the Rigsdag assembled at Copen-
hagen. It was the largest assembly which had ever been seen
in Denmark, consisting of no fewer than 1,200 representatives
of the nobility, burgesses, and peasantry. On the other hand,
the Rigsraad had sadly shrunk. Before “Grevens Fejde” that
IV] Growth of royal authority in Denmark 63
august body had numbered fifty members; now it was reduced
to nineteen, the clergy, since the imprisonment of the prelates,
being naturally unrepresented. Nevertheless, weakened and
depleted though it was, the Rigsraad was still strong enough
to maintain its political superiority, as is evident from the
character of the royal Haandfæstning, or charter of October 30.
That this document should bear the impress of the victorious
party's interpretation of the new constitution was only natural.
Thus, in contrast to the charters of the last three kings, the
charter of 1536 emphasises the hereditary right of the reigning
family to the throne. The realm of Denmark is indeed to
remain a free elective monarchy; but, at the same time, the
king's lieges are bound over, on the king's demise, to hold
all their castles for his eldest son, or, in case of his dying
before his father, for the king's second son or his guardians.
If there were no sons, the king and the Rigsraad were jointly
to elect a successor to the throne. Thus the Crown was now
made hereditary, and the danger of an interregnum obviated.
The royal authority was still further strengthened by the
omission of those clauses in King Frederick I's charter which
released subjects from their allegiance to the king in case
he refused to listen to remonstrances from the Rigsraad against
breaches of the charter, and empowered the Rigsraad, with
the king's sanction, to amend the charter. On the other
hand, we find in the charter of 1536 no limitation of the
political power and influence of the Rigsraad and the nobility.
Evidently the document was meant to be a compromise be-
tween the two highest authorities in the State, and, at the
same time, a guarantee of the inviolability of both... The
king was to rule the land conjointly with the Rigsraad and
nobility; the members of the Rigsraad were to have the ex-
clusive right to the fiefs of the Crown; no foreigner was to
be admitted into the Raad, or receive grants of land from the
Crown without the Raad's consent.
On the same day the Rigsdag adopted a recess, which,
64 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 [CH.
after having been recited in public in the Gammel Torv,
or old market-place, was signed and sealed by the king, the
Raad, and representatives of the peasantry. This remarkable
document vividly reflects the emotions of the times. It is no
dry and formal piece of legal phraseology, but a passionate
exposition of all the calamities which had afflicted the land
during the recent civil war, and, at the same time, a sug-
gestion of the means whereby peace and reconciliation might
be restored. First, all the signatories to this document, the
king, the Raad, the nobility, and the commonalty, solemnly
engage for ever to renounce all envy, hatred, suspicion, and mis-
trust, and unite to defend the fatherland against the Emperor,
King Christian II, and their adherents. The king, moreover,
promises to dispense equal justice to all according to law and
equity; and the people, in their turn, promise complete loyalty
and obedience to the king. Then comes the real kernel of
the recess, which was nothing more or less than the abolition
of Catholicism, and the establishment of a national Protestant
Church? The recess also contained sundry administrative
provisions, and acknowledged Christian III's infant son, Prince
Frederick, heir to the throne.
King Christian's charter contained the following significant
paragraph concerning Norway: “Inasmuch as the realm of
Norway is so reduced both in power and wealth, and the
inhabitants thereof are not able by themselves to maintain
a sovereign and king, and the said realm is nevertheless
for all time united to the Crown of Denmark, and the greatest
part of the Raad of the realm of Norway, especially Arch-
bishop Olaf, who is now the chief leader in that kingdom,
hath twice within a short time fallen away from the kingdom
of Denmark... now therefore we have promised the Rigsraad
of Denmark that, if Almighty God should so dispose that the
said realm of Norway shall return again to our dominion...
then it shall hereafter be and become subject to the Crown
i For details see Chapter vi.
'
[V]
Subjection of Norway
65
of Denmark like as are our other lands, to wit, Jutland, Fünen,
Sjælland or Scania, and hereafter shall not be or be called a
kingdom apart, but a dependency of the Danish realm and
Crown for all time.” This political annihilation was to be the
punishment of the ancient kingdom of Norway for supporting,
as it had every right to do, the cause of Christian II. It was
not the king, but the Danish Rigsraad, which insisted on the
insertion of this merciless clause in the new charter. Never-
theless this provision remained a dead letter. Norway never
became “a dependency of the realm of Denmark.” Its
nobility did not sit in the Danish Rigsraad; its estates were
not represented in the Danish Rigsdag; it retained its own
laws and its own judicial administration; homage was done
to the Danish kings at Oslo as heretofore; and, in all state
documents, Norway was referred to as a kingdom apart. For
the royal house would not surrender its hereditary right to
Norway; and King Christian received the Norwegian crown
not by election but as his lawful inheritance. On the other
hand, Norway from henceforth became a milch-cow for the
Danish nobility, who appropriated the most lucrative fiefs and
monopolised the civil and ecclesiastical administration during
the first century after the Reformation. The subjection of
Norway was, however, not completed without a brief struggle.
The archbishop of Oslo had attempted to introduce Christian
II's son-in-law, the Count Palatine Frederick, into Norway;
and it was therefore necessary, in September 1536, to despatch
a small fleet and two hundred men to reinforce Eske Bille, the
Danish commandant of the fortress of Bergenhus, till a larger
and better armed fleet could be sent in the following spring.
By the time it arrived all active opposition was already over.
The archbishop had fled to the Netherlands with most of his
adherents; and after a few weeks' siege his commandant sur-
rendered the fortress of Stenvigsholm. All the Norwegian
bishops thereupon did homage to Christian III, and resigned
their benefices. Hans Reff, bishop of Oslo, went still further.
BAIN
66 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 [CH.
After a visit to Copenhagen he returned to Norway as the
first evangelical superintendent of the dioceses of Oslo and
Hamar. He was, however, the only renegade among the
Danish-Norwegian Catholic prelates.
The danger which, in the summer of 1536, had threatened
King Christian III from the Count Palatine and his cousin,
Kaiser Charles V, was thus happily averted; and subsequent
complications were provisionally obviated by a three years'
truce concluded at Brussels, which nevertheless left open the
claims of Christian II's family to the crowns of Denmark
and Norway. Peace was also concluded with the cities of
Rostock and Wismar, which had supported rebellious Copen-
hagen; and Christian III and his counsellors were now, at
last, in a position to heal the ravages caused by the late war.
Although there is no extant record of the general con-
dition of Denmark immediately after the civil war, indications
are not wanting that the whole social fabric was out of joint
and in a state bordering upon dissolution. For more than
two years the land had been ravaged and plundered ; with the
exception of the East-Danish provinces across the Sound,
where the peasantry had stayed at home, and only the chief
fortresses had been the objects of attack, there was scarcely
a place in the kingdom on which the war had not set its
mark. More than sixty manor-houses had been burnt to the
ground; every castle and fortress had been besieged; all the
towns had been sucked dry by the unpaid soldiery quartered
upon them; and this latter plague was to continue during the
greater part of King Christian's reign. The Halslösning (or
commutation of the death penalty), rigidly extorted from the
peasantry of the forty-nine rebellious counties of Jutland and
many other provinces, as the price of their lives, had crushed
the flower of the Danish yeomanry toʻthe ground. Last but not
least, the heavy taxes imposed during the war for maintaining
the mercenaries had well-nigh ruined the towns. Everywhere
there was unspeakable misery, still further aggravated by
i
Iv]
Wretched condition of Denmark
67
t. A sted to soften fristian III thed high
the prevailing lawlessness, another consequence of the war.
Crimes of violence were of everyday occurrence; there were
not labourers enough to till the soil ; many landed proprietors
had naught but the bare land left. In addition to these
calamities, the civil war had produced a deep-rooted mutual
hatred and jealousy between the various classes of society,
which no number of charters or recesses could remove in
a moment. A strong hand, an impartial and conciliatory
temper, were needed to soften these animosities; and it is the
imperishable merit of King Christian III that he was equal to
the task. He was no party king. Raised high above all
classes, he was ready to render equal justice to all.
Twelve months after the imprisonment of the bishops,
Christian and his consort, the beautiful Dorothea of Saxe
Lauenburg, were crowned at Vor Frue Church at Copen-
hagen, August 12, 1537. The coronation and anointing were
performed by Johann Bugenhagen, who had arrived in Den-
mark shortly before to set the affairs of the Church in order.
Simultaneously a Herredag, or Assembly of Notables, was
summoned to the capital, to take in hand the needed work
of legislation; and the result of its laudably prompt delibera-
tion was a recess in twenty-eight chapters, which was to be
the starting-point of a long series of statutes culminating in
the great recess of 1558. One consequence of the eccle-
siastical reforms, referred to below (cap. vi), was the foundation
of the university of Copenhagen. Since 1531 Denmark had
had no university. The few who felt the need of higher edu-
cation went to Wittenberg, Basel, or Paris. But the triumph of
the Reformation necessarily called for the establishment of
a native high-school where the men of the new Faith might be
trained for their high calling. There was abundance of native
talent ready to hand; but the motive power in this, as in every
other project of reform, was undoubtedly Johann Bugenhagen,
whose vigorous initiative, enthusiasm, and energy quickly over-
came all difficulties. On September 9, 1537, in Vor Frue
5—2
'68 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588. [CH.
Church, in the presence of the Rigsraad and the magistracy
of Copenhagen, Christian III declared the university to be
reestablished.
The circumstances under which Christian III ascended the
Danish throne naturally exposed Denmark to the danger of
oreign domination. It was the nobility and estates of the
Duchies which had placed at Christian's disposal almost un-
limited means for the conquest of the land; it was German
and Holstein noblemen, and especially those of the Rantzau
family, who had led his armies and directed his diplomacy.
No wonder that the young king felt bound to reward the men
who had stood at his side in the hour of danger. It was
equally natural that a mutual confidence between a king who
had conquered his kingdom, and a people who had stood in
arms against him, could not be attained in an instant; and
consequently we find that the first six years of Christian III's
reign saw a contest between opposing forces, represented respec-
tively by the Danish Rigsraad and the German counsellors,
both of whom sought to rule " the pious king” exclusively.
So early as the Rigsdag of 1536, however, the Danish party
won a signal victory by obtaining the insertion in the charter
of the provisions stipulating that only native-born Danes
should fill the three great offices of high steward, chancellor,
and lord high constable, and that no foreigner should have
a place in the Rigsraad, or receive fiefs or castles without the
consent of the Raad. Yet, during the earlier years of his
reign, the king's German councillors continued paramount.
Chief among them were the Saxon, Wolfgang von Utenhof,
and the king's brother-in-law, Duke Albert of Prussia, who
had been his mainstay during the critical time of “Grevens
Fejde.” Their policy was to confirm and increase the royal
authority, both in the kingdom and the Duchies, by the
formation of a purely royalist party independent alike of the
Rigsraad and the Holsteiners. Other favourite councillors
were Johan and Melchior Rantzau. They aimed at the in-
IV] Triumph of the Danish Party 69
dependence of Sleswick-Holstein and its simply personal union
with the monarchy. This strong German and Holstein in-
fluence was, however, more than counterpoised, in the long
run, by the Rigsraad, whose most notable members were the
chancellor, Johan Friis, a patriotic, highly gifted, prudent and
moderate statesman; the able diplomatist, Eske Bille, whose
devotion to Catholicism and the fallen bishops impaired neither
his loyalty nor his usefulness, and the lord high constable,
Erik Banner, a warm friend of the Reformation.
The ultimate triumph of the Danish party dates from 1539.
Previously to this the king had given great offence to the
patriotic by placing foreigners in positions of trust and im-
portance, contrary to the law of the land ; but when, in the
beginning of 1539, the disputes between Gustavus Vasa and
Christian III threatened to pass into actual hostilities, and
Denmark's relations with the Emperor and the Count Palatine
Frederick, Christian Il's son-in-law, grew equally unsatisfactory,
the king saw the necessity of removing the last trace of dis-
content in the land, not only by appointing Danish magnates,
hitherto set aside, to the highest military positions in the
kingdom, but also by readmitting into the Raad men long pro-
scribed, like Anders Bille, Jakob Hardenberg, and Erik Bolle.
The death of Melchior Rantzau in 1539, and of Wolfgang von
Utenhof in 1542, still further benefited the Danish party. The
banished partisans of Christian II were now also allowed to
return to Denmark; and one of them, the Norwegian admiral
Kristoffer Trondsen, was to render his new sovereign notable
service. The complete identification of the Danish king with
the Danish people was accomplished at the Herredag of
Copenhagen, 1542, when the nobility and gentry of Denmark
voted Christian a twentieth part of all their property to pay
off his heavy debt to the Holsteiners and Germans.
It was in the most difficult circumstances that Christian III
had fought his way to the full possession of the kingdom of
Denmark; and, when at last he had reached his goal, fresh
70 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 (CH.
difficulties sprang up in his path. His right to the realm was
openly disputed by the children of Christian II, supported by
the Emperor and the regent of the Netherlands ; in North
Germany those princes who had interfered in the affairs of
Scandinavia were his bitterest enemies; he had secret op-
ponents in Lübeck and the other Hanse towns; and in Sweden
reigned a king who regarded every political combination of
Denmark with suspicion. Yet, despite every obstacle, Chris-
tian III and his counsellors succeeded in carrying out a wise
and reasonable policy, which aimed exclusively at the preserva-
tion of peace, the security of the dynasty, and the freedom of
the Evangelical Church.
The great political antithesis, which in the first half of the
sixteenth century divided Europe into two hostile camps,
exercised a decisive influence upon Denmark's foreign policy
during the earlier years of Christian III's reign. For the first
time in her history, Denmark was forced actively to participate
in European politics in consequence of the determination of
Charles V to support the hereditary claims of his nieces to
the Scandinavian kingdoms. This hostile policy naturally drew
Christian III towards France and the German Protestant
princes, and compelled him to preserve friendly relations with
Gustavus of Sweden. The three years' truce with the Emperor
and the Netherlands gave Denmark a welome respite; but
neither of the parties to it regarded it as anything but a truce.
The surrender of Copenhagen had caused Charles V to post-
pone his plan of placing the Count Palatine Frederick and
Dorothea, the daughter of Christian II, on the Danish throne
by force of arms; but he had never abandoned it, and he
steadily refused to allow Christian III any title but that of
Duke of Holstein.
A compact with the German Evangelical princes was
therefore the pivot of King Christian's policy. It was cemented
by the Union of Brunswick, April 9, 1538, whereby it was
stipulated that, if any one of the parties to the Union were
IV)
Foreign policy of Christian III
71.
attacked by a power having the obvious intention of re-
introducing Catholicism into its territories, the other parties
should hasten to the assistance of the state so attacked with 3000
infantry or 1000 cavalry, or provide £40,000 in lieu thereof.
The Union was to last for nine years; and the German princes
expressly promised assistance to the Danish king in case of
attack. Negotiations were also opened with Francis I; but
nothing came of them. Meanwhile the three years' truce was
drawing to an end; and negotiations for its prolongation were
begun. But the political situation was now less favourable to
Denmark. The Emperor's superior policy had succeeded in
dividing the Schmalkaldic League. By the Convention of
Frankfort, in March 1537, Charles had made some conces-
sions to the Protestants, and had, at the same time, won over
Landgrave Philip of Hesse. This was so far injurious to
Christian III as it improved the prospects of the Count Elector
Frederick and his wife Dorothea. In the spring of 1541 a
Danish embassy, headed by Chancellor Utenhof, attended the
Reichstag at Regensburg; but the utmost that King Christian
could obtain was a prolongation of the truce with the Nether-
lands till November 1, 1541. This meagre result induced
Christian III to conclude the Peace of Brömsebro with Gustavus
Vasa (p. 54), and the Treaty of Fontainebleau (Nov.-29, 1541)
with Francis I. Each of the high contracting parties to the
latter treaty bound himself to help the other in time of war.
Denmark further engaged, in case of necessity, to close the
Sound and place 1000 men and six vessels at the disposal of
France within three months, France promising 2000 men and
twelve ships within four months.
King Christian now felt so secure that, in November, 1541,
he could reject an offer on the part of the Emperor for the
prolongation of the truce. In 1542 war was actually declared.
A Danish contingent joined the Franco-Cleves army which
invaded Brabant in July; the Sound was closed against Dutch
vessels; and a fleet of twenty-six sail cruised in the North Sea.
ved
72 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 [CHI
>
.
After a fruitless attempt on the part of Hamburg to mediate
between the belligerents, a Danish fleet of forty ships, with
10,000 men on board, set sail for the Netherlands to break the
dykes and capture the Isle of Walcheren, but was scattered by
a tempest and did nothing. On the other hand, the skilful
dispositions of Johan Rantzau on the Holstein frontier pre-
vented an invasion from Germany. But the greatest effect was
produced by the closing of the Sound. This was, after all, the
most effective weapon in King Christian's hand, for it excluded.
the Dutch towns from the Baltic, and thereby threatened them
with ruin. On the other hand, all Christian's allies proved
faithless or useless. The Protestant prinees, in direct con-
travention of the Union of Brunswick, refused him assistance
under the pretext that the war was not a religious war, and had
been provoked by the king himself. Gustavus Vasa had need
of all his forces to crush Dacke's rebellion (p. 49). Francis I,
instead of sending the stipulated 100,000 gulden to pay the
soldiers of Christian, mendaciously accused him of not fulfilling
his obligations, and, when pressed, became abusive. The
patent faithlessness of the French king strengthened the peace
party in Denmark; and, as the Netherlands were equally de-
sirous of peace, the Emperor invited Denmark to offer terms at
the Reichstag to be held at Speier in February, 1544. Thither
accordingly a Danish embassy was sent. Its great object was
to obtain a definitive peace with the Emperor, based on his
abandonment of the claims of the children of Christian II.
It succeeded completely. By the treaty of May 23, 1544,
it was agreed that Christian III should renounce the French
alliance, and open the Sound. Both parties undertook not
to assist each other's enemies. In a secret article, moreover,
the Emperor promised never to begin another war for the sake
of the Count Palatine and his wife. The conditions of peace
must be regarded as a diplomatic victory for Denmark.
The Peace of Speier could not but increase the credit of
the monarchy at home; but the still greater advantage of
Iv]. Confiscation of monastic property 73
financial stability accrued to it from the enormous increase
of the royal revenue consequent upon the confiscation of the
property of the Catholic Church. The recess of 1536 had
decreed that all the property of the bishops should pass to
the Crown for the support of the monarchy and the common
weal. The total value of the bishops property cannot be
exactly determined. Only as regards the see of Odense do
we know that, shortly before its confiscation, it had an annual
income of 16,000 bushels of corn. But the property of the
bishops was far less considerable than the property of the
religious houses. Short work had been made of these even
before 1536. All, the monasteries of the Mendicant Friars
had been seized by the towns; and of the fifty-four abbeys
twenty-two were now governed by temporal superiors. The
recess had determined that these, together with the cathedral
chapters, should remain as they were “till the king and the
Rigsraad, with the help of various wise and learned men,
had otherwise disposed concerning them.” Nevertheless their
secularisation had continued rapidly without any special au-
thority. By 1540 thirty-seven monasteries had already been
granted away; and on the death of Christian III only ten
still stood under clerical supervision.
The confiscation of monastic property benefited the Crown
in two ways. The old Church had indeed frequently rendered
the State considerable financial aid; but such voluntary assist-
ance was, from the nature of the case, casual and arbitrary.
Now, however, the State derived a fixed and certain revenue
from the confiscated lands; and the possession of immense
landed property at the same time enabled the Crown advan-
tageously to conduct the administration. The gross revenue
of the State is estimated to have risen threefold. Before the
Reformation the revenue from land amounted to 400,000
bushels of corn; after the confiscations of Church property it
rose to 1,200,000 bushels. And here we come to the strong
point of Christian III's government. It was epoch-making in
74 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 [CH.
the matter of administration. Order, method, consistency, and
economy are discernible in every direction. A capable official
class was also formed; and it proved its efficiency under the
strictest supervision. Particular attention was paid to the
navy. Ship-building was prosecuted with great energy during
the first ten years of the king's reign. In 1550 the royal fleet
numbered at least thirty vessels, and was largely employed as
a maritime police in the Baltic and North Seas, where piracy
still prevailed largely.
The most important domestic event during the latter part
of the reign of Christian III was the partition of the Duchies
between the king and his brothers, Duke Hans and Duke
Adolphus, both of whom had been educated at the Prussian and
Hessian courts. On the outbreak of the war with the Emperor
in 1543, however, they had been summoned home to partici-
pate in the administration of Sleswick-Holstein. Subsequently,
at the Landtag of Reusberg, 1544, Christian consented to
divide the Duchies with them. The territory of the three
princes lay scattered partly in North Sleswick, partly in
Holstein, and were henceforth called the Gottorp, Sönderborg,
and Haderslev divisions after their respective fortresses. As
regards foreign affairs the dukes undertook to act in common
with Denmark.
The foreign policy of Christian III's latter days was regu-
lated by the Peace of Speier. He carefully avoided all foreign
complications, for fear of financial embarrassment, and culti-
vated the amity of the Emperor. He steadily refused to assist
the Protestant princes in the Schmalkaldic War of 1546,
ostensibly because it was a purely political affair, really because
he still resented their shameful desertion of him during his
own recent war with the Emperor. Of great importance to
the royal Danish house was the marriage of Christian's
daughter, Anna, in 1548, to Duke Augustus of Saxony, the
brother of the famous Elector Maurice. It also marked a
change of policy. Christian's refusal to participate in the
IV] Last years of Christian III 75
Schmalkaldic War had produced a coolness between him and
his brother-in-law, the duke of Prussia ; henceforth Saxon
influence was to predominate at Copenhagen. When the
dignity of Elector, after the fall of Maurice at the battle of
Sievershausen, 1553, fell to Duke Augustus, King Christian
and the margrave of Brandenburg intervened as mediators in
the contest between the Emperor and Saxony; and a Danish
embassy, headed by Peter Okse, contributed essentially to the
conclusion of peace. After 1554 German politics became
more tranquil; and now it was that the Danish king began
to reap the fruits of his wise and cautious policy. Everywhere
he was respected and deferred to. In 1556 the Lower Saxon
Circle would even have elected him their chief leader; but
Christian declined the honour on the grounds of age and
infirmity. He also continued on the best of terms with the
new Emperor, Ferdinand I.
Both in his private and public life, Christian III found an
energetic coadjutor in his ambitious and high-spirited consort, :-
Dorothea. Like her husband she had warmly adopted the
cause of the Reformation; her influence over the king was
considerable; and it was mainly due to her that the royal
house of Denmark now assumed an unprecedented magni-
ficence and exclusiveness. She was also not without political
capacity; but her haughty, overbearing disposition was resented
not merely by the leading Danish statesmen, but also by her
own son, Prince Frederick, the heir to the throne.
On New Year's Day, 1559, King Christian III expired.
His calm and peaceful death was symbolical of his whole
life. Though not perhaps a great, he was, in the fullest sense
of the word, a good ruler. A strong sense of duty, a deep
but unpretentious piety, and a cautious but by no means
pusillanimous common-sense, had marked every action of his
patient, laborious, and eventful life. But the work he left
behind him is the best proof of his statesmanship. He found
Denmark in ruins; he left her stronger and wealthier than she
had ever been before.
76 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 [CH.
The new king, Frederick II, was born at Haderslevhus on
July 1, 1534. His mother, Dorothea of Saxe-Lauenburg, was
the elder sister of Catherine, the first wife of Gustavus Vasa,
and the mother of Eric XIV. The two little cousins, born
the same year, were destined, always and everywhere, to be ·
lifelong rivals: as young men they were to woo the same
women; as young monarchs they were to begin the first of
the ten fratricidal wars between two nations whom blood,
religion, language, and common interests ought to have closely
united.
When Christian III had conquered Denmark, Prince
Frederick, at the age of two, was proclaimed successor to
the throne at the Rigsdag of Copenhagen (Oct. 30, 1536);
and homage was done to him at Oslo, for Norway, in 1548.
The choice of his governor, the patriotic historiographer,
Hans Svaning, was so far fortunate as it ensured the devotion
of the future king of Denmark to everything Danish ; but
Svaning, if a good patriot, was a poor pedagogue, and the
wild and wayward lad suffered all his life from the defects
of his early training. In his eighteenth year the prince was
committed to the care of a Hofmeister, Ejlev Hardenberg,
at the fortress-castle of Malmöhus; and here he fell in love
with the niece of his Hofmeister, Anna Hardenberg, an event
not without influence on his future career. In April, 1558,
he saw his father for the last time at Koldinghus. Imme-
diately afterwards Christian III fell seriously ill; but, although
well aware of the gravity of the king's condition, and repeatedly
summoned to the sick man's bedside by his mother, Frederick
delayed his departure from Malmöhus so long that he was
little more than half way towards Copenhagen when the end
came. In the funeral oration spoken over Frederick himself,
thirty years later, his dilatoriness on this occasion was attri-
buted to contrary winds; it was much more probably due to
his deep resentment at the efforts of his parents to remove
out of his reach, before he ascended the throne, the lady to
whom he had already solemnly pledged his troth. This,
wild and Y training. Lof a Hofmeisnd here he
IV]
Frederick II
77
indeed, they failed to do; and his devotion to Anna Harden-
berg was no doubt the cause of the failure of the numerous
matrimonial negotiations made on his behalf during the first
twelve years of his reign. After the hands of Elizabeth of
England, Mary of Scotland, and Renata of Lorraine, grand-
daughter of Christian II, had successively been sought for him
in vain, the royal family and the Rigsraad grew anxious about
the succession. In November, 1571, Frederick received a
visit, no doubt prearranged, from his aunt Elizabeth, duchess
of Mecklenburg, who brought with her her daughter Sophia,
a girl of fourteen; and to her the king was married on July 20,
1572. This union, despite the fact that the groom was three-
and-twenty years older than the bride, was extremely felicitous.
Frederick is one of the few kings of the house of Oldenburg
who had no illicit liaison. From first to last he was absolutely
loyal to his young wife, who bore him four daughters and
three sons, of whom the eldest boy, Christian, succeeded him.
: The reign of Frederick II falls into two well-defined divi-
sions, (1) a period of war, 1559–1570, and (2) a period of
peace, 1570-1588. The period of war began with the Dit-
marsch expedition.
Ditmarsch is that district of western Holstein which lies
between the Elbe and the Eider, and is bounded on the west
by the North Sea. From the first half of the tenth century
it had belonged to the counts of Stade, but passed under the
suzerainty of the archbishops of Bremen, forming a sort of
independent peasant-republic, ruled originally by an assembly
of yeomen, but from 1447 by a popularly elected council
of forty-eight members. The counts of Holstein made fre-
quent fruitless attempts to conquer the valiant yeomen; and,
even when the district was incorporated with the duchy of
Holstein, and made a Danish fief by the Emperor Frederick III,
the Ditmarschers still maintained their independence. Their
most memorable exploit was in 1500, when a thousand Dit-
marschers, under Wolf Isebrandt, annihilated, near Hemming-
78 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 [CH.
stedt, a large combined Danish-Holstein army, on which
occasion the Dannebrog, or Danish standard, was captured,
and King Hans barely escaped with his life. The Reformation
occasioned dissensions among the Ditmarschers; and danger
from without became urgent when Duke Adolphus of Holstein,
Christian III's brother, took it upon himself to subdue the
defiant yeomen who would submit to no over-lord. Vainly
had Adolphus urged his royal brother to take part in the
expedition, and on the death of the king in 1559 he resolved
to undertake it alone. But the Danish stadtholder in the
Duchies, Henrik Rantzau, warned Frederick II of the plan,
and moved the Danish king, together with his brother, Duke
Hans, to cooperate. With an army of 20,000, under the
veteran Johan Rantzau, the two princes marched into Dit- .
marschland, which, after a valiant resistance, worthy of the
heroic traditions of the people, was compelled to surrender.
The princes then divided the land between them ; but the
inhabitants were permitted to retain their ancient laws, privi-
leges, and semi-independent form of government.
Equally triumphant was Frederick in his war with Sweden,
though here the contest was much more severe. The tension
which had prevailed between the two kingdoms during the
last years of Gustavus Vasa had perpetually threatened a
rupture; but it was not till the accession of Gustavus's eldest
son, Eric XIV, that the struggle, known in northern history
as the Scandinavian Seven Years' War, actually burst forth.
There were many causes of quarrel between the two ambitious
young monarchs. The Danish king persisted in retaining
the three crowns in his escutcheon; and Eric. retaliated by
quartering the arms of both Denmark and Norway in his
own. Sweden's policy of conquest in Esthonia, which had
formerly been under Danish rule, also excited bitterness and
envy in Denmark. Repeated efforts to adjust differences
foundered upon mutual distrust; and in the beginning of
1563 an event took place which precipitated hostilities.
IV] The Scandinavian Seven Years' War 79
In accordance with his communication to the Riksdag of
Arboga (cap. vi), in April, 1561, Eric, shortly after his corona-
tion, had undertaken his long-meditated journey to England as
the suitor of Queen Elizabeth ; but contrary winds drove him
back to his own kingdom, and the journey was postponed
till the following year. June, 1562, saw him still in Sweden ;
and by that time Eric had begun to doubt the possibility of
winning Elizabeth's hand. His fancy' now turned more and
more in the direction of Mary of Scotland. Accordingly he
sent an embassy to Scotland to prepare the way, without,
however, renouncing absolutely the English match; and simul-
taneously he opened matrimonial negotiations with a third
lady, Christina of Hesse, of whom he soon received such good
reports that he despatched a splendid embassy to Hesse to
conclude the contract. This embassy, on reaching Copen-
hagen, was detained by King Frederick, who wished, for
political reasons, to prevent the Hessian marriage. Despite
Eric's protests, the embassy was still further detained ; and
this openly hostile act was speedily followed by another. Two
Danish squadrons were sent into the German Ocean and the
Baltic Sea respectively, to seize any vessel carrying muniments
of war to or from Sweden. Eric promptly retaliated by
despatching a fleet of nineteen sail, under Jakob Bagge, into
the Baltic, ostensibly to convey an embassy to Rostock,
there to meet the Hessian princess, but really “to see what
the Danish fleet would do if it were met upon the open sea."
The two fleets encountered each other on Whit Monday,
May 30, off Bornholm; and the Swedes captured the Danish
admiral with his flag-ship and two other vessels. .
A peace congress, which assembled at Rostock, was
rendered abortive by Denmark's formal declaration of war.
Lübeck, moreover, already bound to Denmark by a defensive
alliance dated June 13, 1563, alarmed by the progress of the
Swedes in Livonia, and irritated by Eric's refusal to allow the
Hanse League to trade with Narva, to the detriment of his
· 80 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 ch.
recently acquired port of Reval, also declared war against Eric;
and on October 5 Poland acceded to the anti-Swedish league.
Sweden was left to her own resources; but these, thanks to the
care of Gustavus Vasa, were by no means inconsiderable. Her
regular army, on the outbreak of the war, numbered 18,000
infantry and 5000 cavalry; and the fleet was in excellent
condition. Early in August, 1563, Frederick II, at the head
of an army of 28,000 men, invaded Halland from Scania,
and captured the strong fortress of Elfsborg, after a few
weeks' bombardment, thereby altogether cutting Sweden off
from the North Sea. An attempt on the part of Eric to take
the Danish fortress of Halmstad in October not only failed,
but his retreating army was overtaken by the Danes at Mared,
and defeated. On the sea nothing decisive took place; but
the Swedish fleet of eighteen sail, under Bagge, sustained
with honour the attack of the combined Danish-Lübeck fleet
of thirty-three sail off the Isle of Öland. The campaign of
1564 was, on the whole, favourable to the Swedes. They
conquered the Norwegian border-provinces of Jämtland and
Herjedal, and even held the whole province of Trondhjem
for a time. In Livonia, too, they captured the fortresses of
Hapsal, Leal, and Löde, and drove the Danes almost entirely
from the mainland. At sea there were two great battles, in
the first of which, fought between Gothland and Öland 30 May,
the Swedish flag-ship was blown up and the admiral captured ;
while in the second, fought off the northern point of Öland,
at the beginning of August, the Swedes were victorious.
The war on land was marked by extraordinary ferocity,
due partly, no doubt, to the increasing bitterness of national
hatred, but primarily to the barbarous methods of Eric XIV,
whose own conduct of the war in the Scandinavian peninsula
was peculiar, his exploits consisting in the superintendence
of the slaughter of defenceless prisoners whom his generals
had captured. Nearly all Eric's instructions. to his com-
manders contained orders “to defile, slay, burn, spoil, and
IV)
Progress of the War
81
put to say strong amous King of 156
ravage foot by foot”-orders too often literally executed. The
Danes naturally retaliated, sparing neither women nor children,
and committing atrocities “of which neither Turks nor heathen
were ever accused.” In the campaign of 1565 the Swedish
fleet was everywhere victorious. King Eric had done his best
to make his navy strong and efficient; and on May 3 his
admiral put to sea with no fewer than fifty ships. After
destroying a small Lübeck squadron, he proceeded to the
Sound, where he levied tolls upon 250 merchant-vessels, and
thence sailed towards Lübeck. On June 4 he encountered
the gallant Danish admiral, Herluf Trolle, off Bukov, between
Rostock and Wismar, and defeated him, Trolle dying a few
weeks afterwards of his wounds. On July 7 the Swedes won
a still bloodier victory between Bornholm and Rügen, and for
the remainder of the year were the masters of the Baltic, the
Danish admiral not venturing to put to sea again. But the
Danes were more than compensated for these reverses at sea
by their victories on land. On October 20 Daniel Rantzau
defeated a Swedish army far larger than his own at Axtorna;
while, in Livonia, the Swedes lost the important fortress of
Pernau.
A fresh attempt to mediate a peace, during the campaign
of 1565, by the French envoy at Copenhagen, Charles Dançay,
having failed, the war was energetically resumed early in 1556.
Again the Swedes were victorious on the sea and unfortunate
on land. Klas Horn put to sea with sixty-eight sail, scoured
the Baltic without meeting a foe, once more levied tolls on the
merchantmen passing through the Sound, and finally defeated
the Danish-Lübeck fleet off Öland on July 26. The defeated
fleet retired to Visby, and was there almost totally destroyed
by a terrible storm, which the Swedish fleet safely weathered
on the high sea. While the genius of Klas Horn thus enabled
the Swedes to dominate the Baltic, the genius of Daniel
Rantzau baffled all the efforts of the Swedish generals. After
ravaging the province of Vestergötland, Rantzau defeated at.
BAIN
82 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536–1588 [CH.
Alungsås a Swedish army which attempted to bar his retreat,
and encamped near Elfsborg. Eric XIV, as a last expedient,
now sent Klas Horn against him ; but the great naval hero
died of the plague before he could take the command, and
Rantzau, after fresh victories and devastations, went into
winter quarters in Scania. The campaign of 1567 was equally
inconclusive. Two expeditions against the Norwegian fortress
of Akershus failed utterly; and in Scania the Swedish general,
Henrik Klasson, was badly beaten at Runafer, February 3.
Against these reverses, however, could be set the conclusion,
in the same month, of a defensive alliance between Sweden
and Russia. In the autumn the Danish commander, Daniel
Rantzau, penetrated into the heart of Östergötland, burning
and ravaging without meeting with any resistance. On January
15, 1568, he also surprised the Swedish camp at Norrby,
scattering the army and capturing the military chest and all the
artillery. By this time, however, the Swedes had assembled
a numerous army. They followed hard upon the heels of the
far outnumbered Rantzau, who succeeded, nevertheless, in
reaching the Danish border unscathed, after a masterly three
weeks' retreat, scarcely less glorious than a signal victory.in
the field.
The deposition of King Eric (see cap: v1), in September,
1568, led to negotiations which resulted in a treaty signed,
indeed, at Roskilde, Nov. 18, 1568, but repudiated as intolerable
by the new king of Sweden, John III; while a Riksdag, held at
Stockholm, declared that, instead of money, the Danish king
should get "powder, lead, and pikes.” The war, therefore,
was resumed. A Danish attack on Reval, in July 1569, failed ;
but, on the other hand, the fortress of Varberg, which had
remained in the hands of the Swedes for the last four years,
was retaken (Dec. 4) by the Danes, who paid dearly for it by
the loss of Daniel Rantzau, shot dead beneath its walls. As
now the fortress of Elfsborg continued to be held by the
Danes, Sweden was completely cut off from the Baltic; and
IV]
End of the Seven Years' War
83.
it also had become evident during the summer that she was
no longer the mistress of the Baltic. Both countries, however,
were growing weary of a war which had degenerated into a
barbarous devastation of border provinces; and in July, 1570,
they accepted the mediation of the Emperor, and a peace
congress assembled at Stettin, which resulted in the Peace of
Stettin, 13 Dec. 1570. According to this treaty, the Danish
king was to renounce all claims upon Sweden; and the Swedish
king was equally to renounce all his pretensions to the Ņor-
wegian-Danish provinces and the island of Gothland. The
Swedes were also to pay 150,000 riksdalers in exchange for
the surrender of Elfsborg. The question of "the three crowns"
was to be settled by arbitration. The diocese of Reval-Osel
was to be divided between Denmark and Sweden. On the
whole the peace was decidedly disadvantageous to Sweden.
In especial, the sum to be paid for the redemption of Elfsborg
weighed heavily on a state already impoverished by a seven
years' war; and, in order to raise it, the peasantry, “and the
towns still unburnt,” had to surrender no less than a tenth of
all their gold, silver, copper, tin, and cattle.
During the course of this seven years' war, Frederick II
had narrowly escaped the fate of his cousin, Eric XIV. The
war was as unpopular in Denmark as it was popular in Sweden;
and the closing of the Sound against foreign shipping, in order
to starve out Sweden, had exasperated the maritime powers
and all the Baltic states. Yet, despite foreign complications,
despite the growing disaffection of the nobility, who more than
once threatened to depose him, Frederick II, even after the
almost total destruction of his fleet off the isle of Gothland,
steadily pursued the policy he had set before himself of domi-
nating Scandinavia. On New Year's Day, 1570, indeed, his
difficulties seemed so overwhelming that he threatened to
abdicate; but the Peace of Stettin came in time to reconcile
all parties; and, though Frederick had now to relinquish his
ambitious dream of reestablishing the Union of Kalmar, he
6-2
84 The Hegemony of Denmark, 1536-1588 [CH.
had at least succeeded in maintaining the supremacy of Den-
mark in the north, and favourably impressing his contem-
poraries. Thus the French minister at Copenhagen, Charles
Dançay, expresses his amazement at the ease with which
Frederick maintained a standing army which would have
taxed the resources of any other sovereign of those times,
and represented the Danish alliance to his court as a thing
of real value.
After the peace, Frederick's policy became still more im-
perial. He now aspired to the dominion of all the seas which
washed the Scandinavian coasts, and before he died he suc-
ceeded in suppressing the pirates who so long had haunted
the Baltic and the German Ocean, and compelled all foreign
ships to strike their topsail to Danish men-of-war, as a token
of his right to rule the northern seas; moreover, Frederick
erected the stately fortress of Kronborg, to guard the narrow
channel of the Sound. Favourable political circumstances,
no doubt, contributed to this general acknowledgment of Den-
mark's maritime greatness. The power of the Hansa had
gone; the Dutch were enfeebled by their contest with Spain ;
England's sea-power had yet to be created; Spain, still the
greatest of the maritime nations, was exhausting her resources
in the vain effort to conquer the Dutch. Yet more even than
to felicitous circumstances, Denmark owed her short-lived
greatness to the group of statesmen and administrators whom
Frederick II succeeded in gathering around him. For Frederick
possessed the truly royal gift of discovering and employing
great men irrespective of personal preferences, and even of
personal injuries. Thus, Peder Oxe, who, as lord high
steward from 1567 to 1575, saved the land from bankruptcy,
and enriched the exchequer without imposing a single onerous
tax, was entrusted with his office though he had been the
king's most determined adversary. We may also mention the
great chancellor, Johan Friis; his successor, the wise and noble
Niels Kaas; the highly gifted Kristofer Valkendorf; the heroic
Death of Frederick II
85
and saintly Herluf Trolle, the greatest admiral and the best
beloved nobleman of his age; and, finally, Daniel Rantzau,
the Turenne of Denmark. With the assistance of these men
and their fellows, Frederick succeeded in raising his kingdom
to the rank of a great power, prosperous at home and re-
spected abroad. Never before had Denmark been so well
governed, never before had she possessed so many political
celebrities nobly emulous for the common good. Frederick
himself, with infinite tact and admirable self-denial, gave free
scope to ministers whose superiority in their various depart-
ments he frankly recognised, rarely intervening personally
unless absolutely called upon to do so. It is unanimously
agreed that his influence, always great, was never so irresistible
as at his own table. Ever the most gracious and amiable
of hosts, and a peace-maker by nature, banquets were the
occasions generally chosen by him for the smoothing away of
difficulties, and the converting of hatreds into friendships.
It was characteristic of the manners of his court that after
dinner he would remove the last barrier in the way of general
conviviality, by exclaiming, “The king is not at home!" Yet
he was always able to stop the frolic at the right time, with
the words, “The king has come home again.” And it
should be remarked that, while his son and successor, Chris-
tian IV, had frequently to be carried senseless from board to
bed by his body-guards, Frederick II could always carry off a
carouse with ease and dignity, though there can be but little
doubt that his love of wine accelerated his end. He died at
Antvorskob, on April 4, 1588, in the 52nd year of his reign,
universally regretted. No other Danish king was ever so
beloved by his people.
CHAPTER V.
THE REFORMATION IN SCANDINAVIA, 1520-1560.
The period embraced by the last three chapters roughly
coincides with the rupture between the new Scandinavian
states and the ancient Church which led to the establishment
of Lutheranism in northern Europe, a rupture mainly due to
political causes. There was no inherent necessity for Danes,
Swedes, and Norwegians to change their form of faith. The
bulk of the people, at least in the first instance, and especially
in Sweden and Norway, were by no means disposed to look to
Wittenberg rather than to Rome for spiritual guidance. On
the contrary, only external pressure, strenuously and persistently
applied, enabled the Reformation ultimately to prevail. At a
later day, indeed, when a new generation of Scandinavians,
trained up in Lutheranism from its cradle, was confronted by
an aggressive and alien Catholic reaction, we find, abundantly,
the ardent explosive zeal of convinced converts ready to sacri-
fice everything for the pure Gospel"; but originally, as we
shall see, it was far too frequently not the word of the preacher,
but the sword of the civil arm, which converted the people to
the new teaching. It will be convenient briefly to summarise
the whole process in the present chapter, beginning with
Denmark as being not only the leading Scandinavian state
of the period, but also the first, owing to her geographical
position, to encounter the impact of the German Reformation.
CH. V] Abuses of Catholicism in Denmark 87
The devotion of the bulk of the Scandinavian people
to the ancient Church indicates that, on the whole, that
Church had faithfully discharged her duty ; but, in the course
of centuries, many inveterate abuses had impaired her efficiency.
Here, as everywhere, worldliness had become one of the most
salient vices of a society which was nothing if not unearthly.
Bishops were appointed with very little regard to their spiritual
qualifications. The avarice of the papal Curia had accentuated
this abuse. Since Christian I's journey to Rome in 1479 the
Danish kings had, for a pecuniary consideration, acquired
the right of investiture over many of the cathedral chapters;
and henceforth posts in the royal chancellery became the
stepping-stones to deaneries and canonries. The bishops
themselves tenderly regarded the interests of their nephews
and cousins; and this royal and episcopal nepotism led to the
introduction of many unworthy persons into the ranks of
the hierarchy. Characteristic of the times is a letter to
Christian II from his envoy at Rome promising the papal
consent to the erection of a new cathedral chapter at Odense,
under the patronage of the king, in return for a gratification
of 2000 ducats for himself and the cardinal who had the
matter in hand. “Myself, and the other gentlemen who get
fiefs in the Church," wrote the Danish agent on this occasion,
“will so repay your Grace therefor, that your Grace shall be
put to no charge whatever thereby.” Another ancillary abuse,
marking a further development of aristocratic greed, was the
gradual exclusion of the middle-class element from its due
share of Church preferment. The charter of Frederick I
provided that only native-born noblemen should be made
bishops and prelates, though doctors, and other learned men,
might exceptionally hold canonries.
Towards the end of the fifteenth century the Church had
acquired an enormous amount of property in Denmark, either
by purchase or testanientary disposition, all of which was
absolutely lost to the State. A great deal of land was also set
88
TCH,
Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60
apart for the payment of masses for the dead, and the conse-
quent support of altars and altar-priests. Thus in the cathedral
of Roskilde alone, there were fifty such altars with as many
officiating priests. Such an accumulation of land under the
dead hand was equally injurious to the Crown, the nobility, and
the yeomanry. Many of the prelates, too, lived like temporal
magnates, far more occupied with the cares of State than with
the cure of souls, and, in the worse cases, entirely given up
to hunting, gambling, and dissipation. Thus of Bishop Niels
Stygge of Borglum it was said that, as a monk, he had lived a
rigorously ascetic life, but that as bishop "he spent his time
in sports and games, wanton jests, cards and dice, or ofttimes
diverted himself with the twirling of darts when he was tired of
games: otherwise he was never happy unless surrounded by
harlots and jesters, jugglers and sycophants."
From the prelates this deterioration spread to the lower
clergy. Many priests lived so openly with their “dejer”
(doxies), that the irregularity almost ceased to be a scandal.
We find bishops, in their charges, prohibiting priests from
holding christening feasts in their houses, or solemnly church-
ing their concubines. The mendicant friars were becoming
a nuisance. They regularly partitioned the various dioceses
among themselves when they went on term, as they called their
begging quest, and brought home waggon-loads of alms from
far and near. Most of the convents had become refuges for
the unmarried daughters of the aristocracy. Yet there was a
bright side to the picture. The people at large were devoutly
disposed; and the Church satisfied their religious cravings.
At no later period of Danish history can she so truly be said
to have been their mother as she was then. She was the first
to welcome them when they came into the world, and she
sent them forth on their last journey reassured by her promises
and comforted by her sacraments. Her impressive and touch-
ing ceremonies familiarised the people with the sublime and
consolatory thought that there was something higher and better
v] Popularity of the ancient Church, 89
than the world around them. In the summer the priests and
deacons, followed by their parishioners, proceeded, with cross
and banner, from village to village, praying for a bountiful
harvest, blessing house and home, flocks and herds, fields and
orchards. Every season was consecrated by the Church, and
had its own special significance. Never before had pilgrimages
been so numerous and so frequent as at the beginning of the
sixteenth century. Many young nobles journeyed to the Holy
Land, to wash away their sins in the waters of Jordan, after
encountering strange adventures by the way, like Mogens
Gyldenstjerne, for instance, who, in 1522, took part in the
defence of Rhodes against the Turks. The shrine of St Peter
at Rome, and the shrine of St James at Compostella, were
favourite resorts of Danish pilgrims; the Danish-born St Severin,
archbishop of Köln, was especially honoured at Halmstrup
in Sjælland ; and the Blessed Virgin drew thousands of wor-
shippers to her lowly church at Karup in the midst of the
Jutland heaths. Of the sick and poor the ancient Church
had always taken especial care; and the half spiritual, half
temporal hospices in the chief cities, known as the Houses
of the Holy Ghost, were in many places converted into
monasteries of the Augustinian rule, and placed in communi-
cation with the parent monastery at Rome. Private charity
assisted the efforts of the Church. Thus, to:take but a single
typical instance, the rich burgess and doctor of medicine,
Klaus Denne, devoted his whole fortune to the foundation of
St Anne's Hospital in Copenhagen, "for sick and poor men
who are wont to lie about the streets and lanes, and can find
no shelter in their sickness.”
Moreover within the Church herself there were reformatory
movements. The superior of the Gray Friars at Odense,
Laurence Brandsen, introduced “the strict observance" into
the houses subject to him; and he was supported by Queen
Dorothea, and, after her death, by Queen Christina, who
adopted St Francis of Assisi as her patron saint, and founded
· 90 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [CH.
convents in Copenhagen and Odense. Many of the bishops
endeavoured to improve and multiply the church services, and
utilised the newly invented art of printing for that purpose.
A beginning was made by Karl Rönnov, bishop of Odense,
who had a corrected and revised breviary printed in 1483 at
Lübeck for use in his diocese; and many other prelates
followed his example.
Humanism, meanwhile, was making its way into Denmark,
and amongst the clergy it found many disciples. The most
notable of these men was Paulus Eliae or Heliae. Born at
Varberg, about 1480, of a Danish father and a Swedish inother,
he was educated at Skara and became a monk in the Carmelite
monastery at Elsinore. Here he met with a learned Dutch
humanist, Frans Wormsen, who profoundly influenced him.
Eliae was impressed by the decline of the Church, and in
1517 he issued a Latin dissertation severely animadverting
upon the sale of indulgences and other abuses. He took
the standpoint of Erasmus and became a zealous moralist,
greeting Luther, on his first appearance, with enthusiasm as a
fellow-worker. The parting of ways came later when Luther
deliberately broke with the Church. In 1519 Christian II
appointed Eliae professor of theology in connexion with the
recently reconstituted university of Copenhagen, and, at the
same time, summoned Mathias Gabler and Martin Reinhart
from Wittenberg, the first to teach Greek, and the second
theology. The latter was permitted to preach in German at
the church of St Nicholas; and thus it came about that
Lutheranism was first taught in Denmark. On his return from
Sweden in 1521 Christian II sent Reinhart back to Wittenberg
to induce Andreas Karlstadt, or Luther himself, to come to
Denmark to assist him in his projected reforms. By this
time, however, Luther had already been excommunicated, and
shortly afterwards disappeared inside the Wartburg. Reinhart
never returned ; and, though Karlstadt accepted the royal
invitation and came to Copenhagen, he speedily quitted it
v] - Policy of Christian II and Frederick I 91
in disgust when he was forbidden to preach against the
Pope.
Christian himself always subordinated religion to politics,
and was Papist or Lutheran according to circumstances. He
began by forbidding the university to condemn Luther, but
after the Stockholm Massacre he was anxious to stand well with
both Pope and Emperor, though, to the last, he treated the
Church more like a foe than a friend, elevating and deposing
archbishops and bishops at will, flinging canons into prison,
and unblushingly despoiling the richer dioceses of their pro-
perty, in defiance alike of Pope and statute book. He re-
tained, indeed, the Catholic form of church worship, and,
though constantly at war with the Curia, never seems to have
questioned the papal supremacy. On the flight of Christian II
and the election of Frederick I, the Church recovered her
jurisdiction; and everything was placed on the old footing.
In all ecclesiastical matters the Pope was to be the ultimate
arbiter ; but every appeal was to be subject to the previous
consent of the Danish prelates. Moreover, for the more effec-
tual extirpation of heresy, it was provided by the royal charter
of 1524, imposed upon the king by the dominant Catholic
magnates, that no heretic disciple of Luther should be permit-
ted “to preach or teach, privily or openly, anything contrary
to the faith of the Holy Church, our most holy father the
Pope, or the Church of Rome"; and that all such preachers
should “be punished with loss of life and goods, wherever
they may be found in our realm.” Moreover the prelates en-
deavoured still further to strengthen their position by making
a solemn alliance and compact with the temporal members
of the Rigsraad on June 28, 1524, whereby the whole Senate
undertook, in confirmation of the royal charter, to visit all
enemies of the holy Christian faith with imprisonment and the
other penalties provided by the canon law.
But the prelates were soon to discover that the coopera-
tion of the nobility was but a feeble support. The greatest
92 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [CH.
dignitary in the land, the lord high steward Mogens Göie,
openly declared himself a Lutheran. Many of his peers joined
him; and, though the majority of the Rigsraad, during King
Frederick's lifetime, still held to the old Church, the wealth and
splendour of the bishops excited the cupidity and rapacity of
the poorer members of the aristocracy, and widened the breach
already existing between the temporal and spiritual estates.
The newly elected and still insecure German king, who had
no desire to quarrel with his Danish bishops so long as danger
threatened him from abroad, at first remained neutral; but in
the autumn of 1525 the current of Lutheranism began to run
so strongly in Denmark as to threaten to whirl away every
opposing obstacle. This novel and disturbing phenomenon
was mainly due to the zeal and eloquence of the ex-monk,
Hans Tausen, who had been sent by his prior, in 1523, to
complete his theological education at Wittenberg, and returned
to the Johannite monastery at Viborg in Jutland a convinced
Lutheran. All Viborg was soon converted by his preaching ;
and, when the monks closed the cathedral doors against him,
his followers burst them open, and Tausen proceeded to defy
his bishop from the pulpit. The fame of his eloquence soon
spread to Copenhagen; and in the autumn of 1526 the king,
who was really a crypto-Lutheran, took Tausen under his pro-
tection, appointed him his chaplain, and permitted him to
preach the new doctrine. In the following year Frederick
went a good step further. By the Odense recess (Aug. 20)
both confessions were placed on a footing of equality in
Denmark, the bishops being too divided and timorous to offer
an effectual united resistance.
The three ensuing years were especially favourable for the
Reformation, as during that time the king had unlooked for
opportunities for filling the vacant episcopal sees of Sjælland
and Fünen with men of his own choice; while the agitation
against the old Church was sensibly promoted by the open
encouragement given by the court to the Lutheran preachers.
O Copende pulpit Pen, and Tasdral do
v] Progress of the Reformation in Denmark 93
In March, 1529, the aged bishop of Fünen, Jens Andersen
Beldenak, resigned in favour of his coadjutor, the royal
nominee, Knud Gyldenstjerne, who thus got possession of the
see, though canonically he was no bishop, as he was never
confirmed by the Pope, nor even by the Danish archbishop,
whose own election remained unconfirmed by the Roman
Curia : both prelates therefore were absolutely dependent on
the king, as he intended them to be. A few weeks after
Beldenak's resignation died Lage Urne, bishop of Roskilde ;
and, as his successor, the king appointed Jacob Rönnov.
But, before being nominated and recommended to the cathedral
chapter, he was obliged to give the king the most positive
assurance of his loyalty. At the same time, he undertook
" that, if anyone comes into the diocese of Roskilde, whether
in town or country, who would preach the Holy Gospel clearly
and plainly, as it can be proved from Holy Scripture, or if
the priests or monks in the diocese wish to marry,” he would
not allow them violently and unjustly to be attacked; but, if
any should bring accusation against them therefor, he would
cite accuser and accused before the king and the Rigsraad.
This startling violation of his own solemnly sworn charter
demonstrates that King Frederick had all along intended to
establish a purely national Church at the first convenient op-
portunity.
Rönnov having complied with these revolutionary demands,
Frederick proceeded to nominate and confirm him as bishop
of Roskilde, and thereupon sent him to the chapter, who,
naturally, could not but elect him. On presenting himself
subsequently to the king with his certificate of election, the
king confirmed the choice of the chapter as if he were
the head of the Church. From the Catholic point of view,
Rönnov was, of course, no bishop at all; and his own mis-
givings on this head led him secretly to apply for a regular
consecration to Jörgen Skodborg, who, since his expulsion
from the archiepiscopal see of Lund (which Frederick had
94
[CH.
Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60
conferred upon Aage Jepsen), had received regular confirma-
tion and consecration at Rome, where he was now residing,
and was thus Rönnov's proper metropolitan. But Rönnov
got little comfort from the archbishop in partibus, who simply
counselled him to apply direct to the Pope for confirmation, a
thing which Rönnov prudently refrained from doing during
King Frederick’s lifetime.
The king himself continued steadily to pursue his self-pre-
scribed path. Thus in 1532, when Archbishop Aage Jepsen,
dissatisfied with his ambiguous position, resigned the see of
Lund, the king bestowed it upon Torben Bilde, who was
obliged beforehand to sign an undertaking similar to that of
Rönnov, binding him to tolerate the evangelical preachers, and
to allow his clergy to marry. Simultaneously Frederick gave
the Reformers every encouragement, even conniving at their
excesses, especially at Malmö, the first town in Denmark where
the Reformation, in the course of '1529, completely triumphed,
and where the two burgomasters, Jorgen Kock and Jep Nielsen,
both pronounced Lutherans, outraged the feelings of their
Catholic fellow-citizens with perfect impunity. The reforma-
tory movement in Denmark was naturally promoted by Sleswick-
Holstein influence. Frederick's eldest son, Duke Christian,
had, since 1527, resided at Haderslev, where he collected
round him Lutheran teachers from Germany, and made his
court the centre of the propaganda of the new doctrine.
Copenhagen at first remained neutral, most of the magistrates
there looking askance at the Reformation, till the inflammatory
sermons of Hans Tausen, in the St Nicholas Church, dissolved
their indifference and set the whole city in an uproar. The
Catholics found an able and courageous defender in Bishop
Rönnov, who openly withstood Tausen; yet the Reformation
continued to gain ground in the capital, and, indeed, when
monks and priests were insulted in the street, and Catholic
churches were invaded and desecrated by fanatical mobs, it
required no little courage to profess the old faith.
v] Catholics and Protestants in Denmark 95
When the Catholics appealed to the king to enforce the
paragraphs of his charter which proscribed heretical teaching,
Frederick adroitly but disingenuously evaded the point by
declaring that he had only permitted the preaching of the
Gospel, which surely could not be regarded as heretical.
Then the prelates demanded a free and open discussion; and
the king at last complied with their wishes by summoning
a Herredag to Copenhagen in the summer of 1530. Twenty
of the best Protestant preachers assembled here under the
leadership of Tausen and his colleague Sadolin, whilst the
Catholics were principally represented by Paulus Eliae. There
was a good deal of violent preaching on the part of the
Lutherans, which led to further disturbances, but no formal
public disputation, neither side being able to agree as to
the conditions or the judges of the controversy. The king
tried to please each party in turn, with the usual result of
offending both. He encouraged the preachers to testify so
far as they could prove their contentions from Holy Scripture,
but, on the other hand, he felt obliged to pay some regard to
the four Catholic bishops of Jutland, who were still powerful
both in their own dioceses and in the Rigsraad. The Odense
recess, therefore, remained unrepealed, contrary to the ex-
pectations of the preachers; and, so long as it continued in
force, the spiritual jurisdiction of the bishops, and, conse-
quently, their authority over the preachers, who were for
establishing a new doctrine and forcibly expelling the Catholic
priests from their churches, remained valid.
Frederick's double-dealing was due partly to his dread of
alienating the still dominant aristocracy by a too flagrant breach
of the charter, especially as Christian II was still a hostile force
to be reckoned with; and partly from a monarch's natural dis-
like of the revolutionary agitations of the Lutherans, which
threatened to break all bounds. The Danish preachers were
no longer content with liberty of preaching. They now came
forward as “free priests,” and claimed the right to administer
96
[CH.
Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60
the sacraments, solemnise marriages, and ordain the clergy,
contrary to the law and in despite of the legislature; for even
the royal authorisation to preach the Gospel could not make
canonical priests of them. As a matter of fact, the old and
the new religion could not subsist side by side in a city like
Copenhagen, which was now dominated by the preachers;
yet the king and Bishop Rönnov, before quitting it on
August 2, 1530, enjoined a compromise whereby the canons
of Vor Frue Kirke, the chief church in Copenhagen, were to
be permitted to read, sing and say Latin masses, as they had
done heretofore, whilst the evangelical preachers were also to
be free to preach God's Word and say the Danish mass in the
same church on Sundays. The magistrates of Copenhagen
vehemently protested against this absurd ordinance, and
warned Frederick that the only result of it would be a dan-
gerous riot with which the magistrates might be unable to
cope. The king left this warning unheeded. The consequence
was that on December 27, 1530, a mob, led by the burgomaster
Ambrosius Bogbinder, burst into the church, hewed down all
the sacred images, destroyed the beautifully carved choir stalls,
and were only ejected towards the evening by the personal
intervention of Hans Tausen. By command of the king the
church was then closed. The inevitable ecclesiastical crisis
was postponed only by the superior stress of two urgent
political events-Christian II's invasion of Norway (p. 31), and
the outbreak, in 1533, of “Grevens Fejde” (pp. 52, 53).
The ultimate triumph of so devoted a Lutheran as Chris-
tian III sealed the fate of the Catholic Church in Denmark.
That it should, nevertheless, have been necessary for the vic-
torious king to proceed against the bishops and their friends
in the Rigsraad, by way of a coup d'état (p. 61), is sufficient
proof that the Catholic party was still considered formidable.
It was upon the now helpless and imprisoned bishops and the
Catholic senators that the new king threw the whole blame
for the dire misfortunes which had visited the land during
v] The Lutherising Recess of 1536 97
the Civil War. Hence the vindictive character of the recess
adopted by the Rigsdag of 1536, which enacted that the
bishops should for ever forfeit their temporal and spiritual
authority; that the existing episcopate itself should be
abolished; and that other Christian bishops, or superinten-
dents, should be set in their places to teach and preach
the holy Gospel and God's Word to the people. Moreover,
that the Crown of Denmark might be enabled to defend the
realm against foreign and domestic enemies, all the property
of the bishops and prelates was transferred for ever to the
Crown, for the good of king and commonwealth. The king
was also henceforth to have the right of presentation to all
prelatures and other benefices hitherto possessed by the
bishops. The monks were free to quit their cloisters; but
those who preferred to remain were to have God's Word
preached to them. The recess very cautiously avoids com-
mitting itself to any sweeping ecclesiastical change; but it is
easy to read between the lines the desire of its framers gradually
to abolish Catholicism; and it left it to the king, the Rigsraad,
and "learned and reasonable men thereto appointed,” to take
whatever further measures might be deemed necessary.
Shortly after the close of the Rigsdag at which the recess
was adopted, eighteen members of the Evangelical party, in-
cluding Tausen and Sadolin, and eight leading Catholics, were
summoned to a conference at Odense, which was continued at
Haderslev; and a Church ordinance in Latin, based upon the
canons of Luther, Melanchthon, and Bugenhagen, of an es-
sentially practical and, on the whole, conciliatory character,
was drawn up. Christian sent it in 1537 to Wittenberg. On
being returned with Luther's approval, it was carefully super-
vised at a Herredag held at Copenhagen. by the German
reformer, Johann Bugenhagen, who had come to Denmark, at
the express invitation of the king, in July, 1537, and was at
once entrusted with the organisation of the newly-established
Danish Church. As a final result of his labours, a Lutheranised
BAIN
98 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [cH..
revision of the ordinance of Haderslev was by him submitted
to the Rigsraad, which, while approving of it in general, at the
same time suggested that the clergy should be directed to
deal indulgently with those backsliders who would not at
once receive the sacraments--a pretty plain hint that the old
Church still had adherents in government circles whose feelings
were worth considering. Finally, the king promulgated the
new Church ordinance independently of the Raad on Sep-
tember 2, 1537.
On the same day the new superintendents or bishops—for
the latter designation ultimately prevailed—were consecrated in
Vor Frue Kirke by Bugenhagen, who himself had only priest's
orders. This was a notable breach with traditional practice,
involving the loss of the apostolical succession by the Danish
episcopate. This is the more remarkable, as there was strong
contemporary feeling on this very point; and the apostolical
succession need not have been lost, inasmuch as the Norwegian
Catholic bishop, Hans Reff, who had embraced the evangelical
teaching, might very well have consecrated the new bishops.
But the audacity of the Danish reformers prevailed; and the
king, as the new head of the Church, gladly supported them.
The seven superintendents who were consecrated on Septem-
ber 2 had all worked zealously for the cause of the Reformation.
The archbishopric was abolished; but the see of Sjælland seems
to have assumed a sort of primacy from the first. The new
Jutland bishops were also Danes; but the bishopric of Ribe
was given to a German, Hans Vandal, who could not conduct
visitations in his diocese without the aid of an interpreter. In
1542 he was succeeded by Tausen, who in the meantime had
been appointed professor of theology at Copenhagen and
Roskilde. The difficulties encountered by these new superin-
tendents led to a revision of the Church ordinance at the
Herredag of Odense, June 14, 1539, which was further am-
plified by the so-called Articles of Ribe in 1542, which laid
down stricter rules for the ordination of priests Thus the
99
Tenacity of Catholic practices
work of reformation was finally consolidated ; and the con-
stitution of the Danish Church has practically continued the
same to the present day.
· Naturally enough, Catholicism could not wholly or imme-
diately be dislodged by the teaching of Luther. It had struck
deep roots into the habits and feelings of the people; and
traces of its survival were everywhere distinguishable a whole
century after the triumph of the Reformation. Despite the
rigorous inquisitorial visitations of the superintendents, sacred
images continued to be adored, candles to be lit before the
altars of the Virgin, and rosaries to be freely used; while crowds
of pilgrims frequented Torum, Edensted, Bistrup, Karup, and
other favourite shrines. Catholic practices were also observed
in many places; and it is said that the nuns at Maribo kept to
their strict rule as late as 1564. Not till the old generation
had completely died out can the Reformation be said to
have become truly national. Catholicism lingered longest in
cathedral chapters. Here were to be found men of talent and
ability, proof against the .eloquence of Hans Tausen or Peder
Plad, and quite capable of controverting their theories—men
like Eliae, for instance, indisputably the greatest Danish
theologian of his day, a critic and a scholar, whose voice
was drowned amidst the clash of conflicting creeds. Most of
these crypto-Catholics had been obliged to submit to the
Church ordinance, but they continued to argue against the
Reformation, and openly refused to receive the sacraments in
the Lutheran form. To the last their influence over the higher
and more cultivated classes was considerable; and even in the
public disputations, authorised from time to time, notably
those of 1543 and 1544, on the mass and the sacraments, they
more than held their own against the assaults of the Lutheran
controversialists.
In Norway the Reformation was accepted with comparative
apathy. In the half German town of Bergen, Danish and
German Lutherans had been busy during the twenties; but
7—2
100 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [CH.
the people were indifferent, and the king was inclined at first
to leave the old Church ceremonies and customs alone. Thus
the lower Catholic clergy provisionally retained their cures;
and even so late as the death of Christian III (1559) the
Reformation here had not gained much ground. The new
superintendents, indeed, did their best to enforce the new
Church ordinances, and in the towns they met with some
success; but in the country parts progress was slow. There
was, moreover, a great lack of pastors; and sufficient schools
could not be founded for want of means. In some dioceses
barely half of the vacant cures could be filled; many churches
had to be pulled down and many parishes enlarged—an un-
happy state of affairs in a country so vast, rugged, and difficult
of access. Thus the Reformation was at first spiritually de-.
trimental to Norway. It created no literature; it did little for
education; it excited no enthusiasm. Nay, at first, Danish
pastors refused to risk their lives among the wild population
for the miserable stipends which had sufficed for the wants of
the Catholic priests. Even Peder Plad, who interested himself
in Norway, complained that the people were like sheep without
a shepherd. The result was a curious blending of old and
new. On Sundays Lutheranism was preached in the churches,
and the catechism was taught in the schools; but on the old
saints' days the people made pilgrimages to the ancient shrines;
and the Blessed Virgin and the saints were appealed to in all
times of distress and danger.
If in Norway the Reformation was received with indiffer-
ence, in Iceland it encountered downright hostility. The two
Catholic bishops of Skalholt and Holar, Ogmund Palsson and
Jon Aresen, refused to submit to the new Church ordinance.
But, when Ogmund, owing to the infirmity of age, was obliged
to have a coadjutor, the choice of the government fell upon
Gissur Einersen, a crypto-Lutheran, who was ordained bishop
by Peder Plad in 1540, and returned to Iceland the same
summer. He found the whole island in an uproar. The
TO
v] Resistance of Iceland to the Reformation 101
Danish governor, Didrik of Minden, whilst on a visit to
Bishop Ogmund, had been murdered for incivility by the
retainers of his aged host; and the Althing, or Diet, had not
only pronounced the bishop innocent, but patriotically rejected
the new Church ordinance. The opposition was led by the
Catholic bishops; and it was resolved at Copenhagen to use
force. Christopher Hvitfeld was accordingly sent to Iceland
with a body of troopers; and Bishop Ogmund was seized and
carried to Denmark, where he died in 1542. The Church
ordinance was then enforced ; and the one remaining Catholic
bishop, Jon Aresen, submitted. The Reformation made little
progress till the death of Gissur Einersen in 1548; whereupon
the Lutherans elected as his successor Martin Einersen, while
the Catholics chose Abbot Sigurd of Thykkvabo. Bishop
Aresen now issued from his retirement, warmly supported the
abbot, and used the opportunity to re-enthrone Catholicism
in Iceland. When therefore Christian III confirmed the
election of the Lutheran candidate, Aresen raised the standard
of revolt, appealed for help to Pope and Kaiser, and declared
from the high altar of his church, in full canonicals and
surrounded by his clergy, that he would rather die than be
false to Holy Church. He then seized and imprisoned his
rival, Bishop Martin, administered the vacant see of Skalholt,
restored all the monasteries, and, at the Althing of 1550,
expelled the royal governor Laurids Mule, and drove him
from the island. Unfortunately for himself, the old bishop
could not use his victory with moderation. In attempting to
subdue by force of arms Dade Gudmundson, the one man in
the island who still resisted him, he was defeated, captured,
handed over to the Danish authorities, and by them beheaded
together with his sons, November 7, 1550. In 1551 a Danish
fleet arrived and restored order ; the Althing swore allegiance
to Christian III and his son; and the Reformation met with no
further open resistance in Iceland, though it assumed a peculiar
national character which it has preserved to the present day.
102
Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [CH.
In Sweden the Reformation was far less a popular, and far
more a political movement than it had been in Denmark,
despite the fact that the last three Swedish archbishops had
been violently anti-national. We know but little of the con-
dition of the Church of Sweden at the final rupture of the
Union of Kalmar. That some of the prelates were men of
learning and ability is indisputable; but, on the other hand, it
is equally clear that many of the lower clergy were very
ignorant. Bishop Johannes Magni, writing in 1525, says
there were very few priests who could preach the Word of
God to the people, or read the Scriptures, much less expound
them. Nor was their morality of a very apostolic character.
In 1523, for instance, we hear of a chaplain of the governor,
Sten Sture, striking one of his colleagues dead with a battle-
axe; “manslayers and drunkards” were not uncommon among
the parish priests; and the rule of celibacy was so generally
infringed, that it was usual for the bishops to impose a tax
upon those priests who desired to keep concubines or will
away their property to their children. Nevertheless there is
no reason for assuming that the spiritual condition of the
Church in Sweden was any worse than it was elsewhere, or
that reformation from within was impossible. In favourable
circumstances the Swedish Church might have recovered
herself without a rupture with Rome, for she had not yet
forfeited the affections of the people; but the circumstances
were not favourable. To begin with, she was leaderless. At
the beginning of the Reformation all the episcopal sees but
two were vacant. The archbishop, Gustavus Trolle, was an
outlawed exile; the bishops of Skara and Strengnäs had
perished in the Stockholm Massacre; the bishops of Vesterås
and Abo had both died in 1522 ; Ingemar, bishop of Vexio,
was old and decrepit. The sole champion of the Church in
the higher hierarchy was Hans Brask, bishop of Linköping,
a true patriot and an experienced statesman, but of a native
caution accentuated by the timidity of old age. His position
v] Gustavus's Negotiations with the Pope 103
was somewhat strengthened when Gustavus Vasa, in 1522 and
1523, filled up the vacant sees of Skara, Strengnäs, and
Vesterås, especially as the energetic Petrus Jacobi, formerly
chancellor and one of the warmest adherents of the Stures,
had been appointed to the latter see; but, towards the end
of 1523, Gustavus, always morbidly suspicious of the Sture
influence, fastened a quarrel upon Chancellor Peder, as he
was generally called, and superseded him in the see of Vesterås
by Petrus Magni, a monk' of Vadstena, just then at Rome on
a mission from his monastery. The archiepiscopal dignity was
finally conferred (Sept. 1523) on the papal legate Johannes
Magni, a man of middle-class Swedish pařentage, born at
Linköping in 1488, and formerly a student at Louvain under
Pope Adrian VI, who had sent him home from Rome, “to
extirpate the Lutheran errors and confirm the faithful.” A
plausible, well-meaning ecclesiastic, he had easily won Gustavus's
favour by a show of compliance, but he was far too pliable a
character to hold the primacy successfully in a period of acute
crisis.
But it was not enough that the new bishops should be
elected by the cathedral chapters: their election required
confirmation by the Pope; and serious difficulties at once
arose, which resulted in Gustavus's definitive breach with the
Papal See. Already, in the middle of June, 1523, immediately
after the election of the king, the Swedish Råd had petitioned
the Pope for a primate better able to promote peace and
harmony than Gustavus Trolle. Three months later the king
himself took the matter in hand, and wrote several letters to
the Pope, begging him to appoint new bishops “who would
defend the rights of the Church without detriment to the
Crown.” He was especially urgent for the confirmation of
Johannes Magni aş archbishop in the place of “that rebellious
and bloodthirsty scoundrel, Gustavus Trolle.” If the Pope
would confirm the election of his bishops, Gustavus promised
in all things to be an obedient son of the Church. Scarcely
104 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [CH.
had this letter been despatched than the king was surprised
by a papal Bull ordering the reinstalment of Gustavus Trolle
forthwith. The action of the Curia on this occasion was
due to its conviction of the imminent triumph of Christian II
and the instability of Gustavus's position. It was a conviction
shared by the rest of Europe; but, none the less, it was another
of the many perhaps unavoidable blunders of the Curia at
this difficult and inscrutable period. Its immediate effect was
the loss of the Swedish Church. Gustavus could not accept
as primate a convicted traitor like Trolle. He protested in the
sharpest language not only to the college of cardinals but to
the Pope himself, that, unless Johannes Magni were recognised
by Rome as archbishop of Upsala, he was determined of his
own royal authority henceforth to order the affairs of the
Church in his realm to the glory of God and the satisfaction
of all Christian men. Still more threatening became his tone
when he learnt that the Pope, setting aside the choice of the
cathedral chapter of Skara, had bestowed that see upon
Giovanni Francesco of Potenza. In a letter dated Novem-
ber 2, 1523, he declared outright that, if the Pope refused
or delayed to confirm the election of his bishops, he would
have them confirmed by the one and only high-priest, Christ
Himself, rather than állow religion in Sweden to suffer by the
negligence of the Papal See. The newly appointed bishop of
Skara he refused to recognise. His Holiness might be quite
persuaded, he said, that he would never allow foreigners to
preside over his churches. But Clement VII, who, in 1523,
succeeded Adrian VI, was immovable. The utmost he would
concede was that Johannes Magni should remain coadjutor of
Upsala till the affair of Archbishop Trolle had been investigated.
Gustavus made no further effort to overcome the obstinacy of
the Pope; his thoughts had already turned in another direction.
The first tidings of Luther which reached Sweden are
contained in a letter written from Rome, in 1518, by Per
Månsson, subsequently bishop of Vesterås; but it was only
1.
Olavus Petri and Laurentius Andreae 105
when native Lutherans began to spread a knowledge of the
new doctrine in Sweden that it attracted public attention.
The first of these propagandists was Olavus Petri. Born
at Örebro in 1497, he was brought up with his brother
Laurentius at a Carmelite monastery in his native place,
completing his education at Wittenberg in 1516-1519, where
he was promoted to the degree of Magister, and made the
personal acquaintance of Luther, whom he accompanied on
one of his visitations through northern Germany. Like his
master he was of an ardent, energetic temperament, certainly
eloquent but no theologian. On returning home he was
ordained a deacon (1520) by Matthias, bishop of Strengnäs,
and became a member of the cathedral chapter. It was
here that he first made the acquaintance of his lifelong
friend, Canon Laurentius Andreae, subsequently archdeacon
of Upsala.
Lars Anderson, as he is called in Swedish, was born in
1482, educated at Rome, and returned to his native land one
of the most learned men of his day. Although fifteen years
the senior of Olavus Petri, he was so far carried away by his
junior's eloquence as to become his disciple, though his calmer
judgment operated as a brake upon the headlong impetuosity
of his young friend. That Petri's enthusiasm frequently ex-
ceeded the bounds of charity the following anecdote sufficiently
proves. His father, a pious Catholic, on his death in 1521,
bequeathed a small piece of land to the Carmelites of his
native place, that masses might be celebrated at his burial.
But Olavus and his brother Laurentius refused to part with
the land even when their bitterly afflicted mother reproached
them for their unfilial conduct. So early as 1523 Olavus was
notorious as an heretical teacher. Gustavus himself seems to
have been neutral or indifferent, till on the occasion of his
election by the Riksdag of Strengnäs, in the same year, he
heard preach some “young men who were Master Olof's
disciples, whereat he was surprised, and yet the same pleased
106 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [CH.
him well.” He had several interviews with Olavus subse-
quently, and, not unnaturally, expressed his amazement when
the young man confidently informed him that the Pope was
Antichrist; but he consulted the older and graver Laurentius
Andreae, who told him how “Doctor Martinus had clipped
the wings of the Pope, the cardinals, and the big bishops,"
which could not fail to be pleasing intelligence to a monarch
who never was an admirer of episcopacy, while the rich
revenues of the Church, accumulated in the course of cen-
turies, were a tempting object to the impecunious ruler of an
impoverished people.
Nevertheless, but for his pressing financial needs, it is
highly improbable that so eminently practical a ruler as
Gustavus Vasa would ever have added to his innumerable
difficulties a struggle with his prelates. With him, as with
Christian II, religious were always subordinated to political
questions. That the reformer had won Gustavus at Strengnäs
was soon patent. A few months later Laurentius Andreae
was made the king's private secretary; by the middle of
1524 he had become archdeacon of Upsala and a senator;
while Olavus Petri, the same year, was appointed recorder
of Stockholm. Master Olof's zeal soon led him, though still
only a deacon, to preach Lutheranism in the chief church of
the capital; but his violence repelled the graver members of
his audience; and, while some applauded, others flung stones
at him. The excesses in the capital of his German associates,
the Anabaptists, Melchior Buntmakare and Knipperdolling,
who egged on the lower classes of the people to attack and
desecrate the Catholic churches, also excited general disgust,
especially in the country parts, where the deeply religious
peasantry threatened to come in force and purge "that corrupt
Gomorrha," as they called Stockholm, of all Lutherans and
heretics. Finally, the king and Andreae intervened; and the
Anabaptists were expelled the kingdom. Gustavus and the
archdeacon were for allowing the new teaching to spread
v] Gustavus favours the new Doctrine 107
quietly and gradually. Their conduct was eminently prudent
throughout, but clearly unfair to the Catholics and disin-
genuous. Thus, in a letter written to the monks of the
monastery of Vadstena, St Bridget's great foundation, Gustavus
expresses himself as hurt at the rumour that “any new, less
Catholic doctrine" is spreading in his kingdom. The monks
must abstain from such frivolous utterances. “Prove all
things and hold to that which is good” was his motto.
If any new doctrine were found in any book published by
Martin Luther or anyone else, such doctrine was not lightly
to be rejected but tested by Holy Scripture. The king
further opined that Martin was much too great to be con-
futed by such simple folks as he and they. When Bishop
Brask besought him to suppress Luther's writings, Gustavus
(June 8, 1524) declared himself in favour of the fullest dis-
cussion of the whole subject, and refused to persecute anyone
for his religious convictions. The bishop, unsupported by the
government, could henceforth only attack “the Lutheran, or
rather the Luciferan heresy,” in pastorals and charges.
On Sexagesima Sunday, 1525, Olavus Petri still further
defied the ecclesiastical authorities by breaking his vow of
celibacy and taking unto himself a wife. Old Bishop Brask
could scarce believe his ears when he heard it. He at once
wrote to the king and the archbishop, charging them to
punish the offender. The archbishop did nothing. The
king replied that he had sent for Master Olof, who declared
himself ready and willing to defend his breach of ancient
custom before any lawful tribunal. Gustavus added that it
seemed strange to him that a man should be banned on ac-
count of marriage which the law of God had never forbidden,
while immoral clerics should remain unblamed by the law of
the Pope. In the same letter the king defended himself
against the charge of employing for state purposes Church
property which had been dedicated to pious uses. Finally
he urged the plea of necessity, in his case a very real one.
108 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [cH.
A fresh step towards the promotion of the new teaching
was the translation of the New Testament into Swedish-as is
generally supposed, by Laurentius Andreae and Olavus Petri-
despite the opposition of Hans Brask. It was published in
1526. Simultaneously Gustavus began a systematic attack
upon the monks and monasteries. At a popular conference
held at Upsala he complained that there were too many
unnecessary priests in the realm. All the monasteries, he
said, were crammed with monks who were little better than
vermin, as they consumed all the kindly fruits of the earth to
the detriment of the people. In January, 1526, he proceeded
from words to deeds, and began the suppression of the religious
houses by sequestrating the monastery of Gripsholm; but the
affair caused such general indignation that Gustavus felt
obliged, in May, to offer some justification of his conduct.
A few months later there was an open rupture between the
king and the archbishop. Johannes Magni had at last con-
vinced himself that the king was incorrigible, while Gustavus
was eager to reject a tool he could no longer use. He began
by frightening the primate by a sudden accusation of treason,
and then sent him as ambassador to Poland, hoping that the
timid old man would never venture back. His hope was
justified. On reaching Dantzig, Magni, congratulating himself
on his escape, wrote to Hans Brask requesting his more
spirited brother of Linköping to take charge of his diocese.
Hans Brask was now completely isolated: single-handed he
had to defend the Church against her oppressors and despoilers.
Of the newly elected bishops, three were still unconfirmed by
the Pope, and the fourth, Petrus Magni, kept in the back-
ground. The burden was far too heavy for the shoulders of
one man; but, in justice to Hans Brask, it should be added
that to the utmost of his ability he fought for his cause and
his convictions, and, well aware that the majority of the
yeomanry were on his side, he braved for a time the wrath of
the king himself. Irritated by this persistent opposition,
The Catholic Martyrs
109
Gustavus abandoned the no longer tenable position of a
moderator, and came openly forward as an antagonist. He
commanded Brask to destroy his printing-press at Söder-
köping, from which he was issuing numerous anti-Lutheran
pamphlets; and, when the indefatigable prelate transferred
his press to Copenhagen, Gustavus forbade him to print and
circulate among the common folk anything not previously
submitted to himself. At a meeting of the Senate at Vadstena
in 1526, two-thirds of the Church's tithes had already been
applied to the payment of the national debt.
Still more significant of Gustavus's anti-ecclesiastical policy
was his treatment of the two rebellious prelates, Peder the
chancellor and Martin Knut Eriksson, who in the middle of
1525 had fled to Norway and placed themselves under the
protection of Olof, the last Catholic archbishop of Trondhjem.
Only after protracted negotiations did Gustavus succeed in ob-
taining their extradition. The unfortunate men were treated
with shameful contumely. First they were set backwards on
broken-down hacks and paraded through the streets of Stock-
holm, the chancellor with a crown of straw on his head and
a filthy wooden sword by his side, and Master Knut wearing
a mitre made of rushes; while buffoons ran alongside, deriding
them and shouting to the crowd that here were the inen who
would rather be traitors than approve the teaching of Dr Martin
Luther. On February 18, 1527, these martyrs of Catholicism
were arraigned for treason before a tribunal consisting of four
spiritual and six temporal senators. The king himself prose-
cuted; and the accused were condemned to the gibbet by the
temporal assessors, after the spiritual judges had disputed the
legality of the tribunal and withdrawn from it. The cruel
sentences were executed forthwith. That two prelates should
have thus been treated like the commonest felons caused
widespread dismay. Yet Bishop Brask wrote to a friend at
Rome, at the end of the same year, that the king's heart was
in the hand of God, “who can always make Saul Paul.”
110 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [CH.
Three months later the old man begins to despair. “If the
Lord shorten not these days,” he wrote to the fugitive primate,
“We have naught to look forward to but the dissolution of the
flesh.” . .
Nor was it only in clerical circles that the king's conduct
was disapproved. We have already seen (p. 45) that the
people at large were violently anti-Lutheran, and prepared to
fight for the old Church and faith. But it was Gustavus's
great good fortune that no capable Catholic leader could be
ſound; and he wisely resolved to complete the work he had'
begun while circumstances favoured him both at home and
abroad. He began by summoning a Riksdag, which met on
June 16, 1527, in the hall of the Black Friars' monastery at
Vesterås. The bishops, well aware of what was coming,
previously held a secret meeting, behind locked doors, in the
church of St Egidius, and bound themselves by oath never to
desert the Pope or tolerate Luther, and to protest beforehand
against any contrary resolutions which might be adopted.
This protest which, in the event, they durst not publish, was
found, fiſteen years later, beneath the floor of Vesterås
cathedral. The same day the Riksdag was opened; and the
worst fears of the prelates were justified. The royal propositions
set forth the needs of the government, and urged the Estates
to consider the best means of satisfying them. Brask, knowing
that the property of the Church was aimed at, declared that
the bishops could relinquish nothing without the permission of
the Holy See; whereupon Gustavus, altogether losing patience,
delivered himself of a passionate harangue, reproaching the
Estates bitterly for their ingratitude and inertia, and concluding
with these words :-"Ye have chosen me to be your king, but
who would be your king under such conditions ? Not the
worst off in hell! So let me tell you straight out that I will
not be your king any longer, and you may choose any good
man you like in my place...... Pay me up the value of the
clods of earth I have here, and what I have spent of my own
v]
The Vesterås Recess and Ordinance
In
upon the kingdom; and I promise you that I'll depart, and
never, so long as I live, return to this noisome, degenerate,
and ungrateful land.” With that he burst into tears and
rushed from the room.
After three days of the utmost confusion and dismay, the
Estate of Peasants, in the complete absence of anything like
counsel and guidance from their natural leaders, manfully
took the initiative and compelled Laurentius Andreae and
Olavus Petri to go up to the castle and implore the king to
return. This of itself was an unconditional surrender; but
Gustavus was determined to make his subjects feel to the
uttermost how indispensable he was to them. Not till the
Estates had sent message after message to him, begging him,
"for God's sake,” to come back to them, did he relent.
When at last, on the fourth day, he reappeared, it was as much
as the Estates could do to abstain from falling down and
kissing his feet. All his demands were instantly and unani-
mously granted, and embodied in the notable document known
as the Vesterås Recess. Paragraph 2 of this document provides
that the surplus revenues of the bishops, cathedral chapters,
and land-owning monasteries, should be transferred to the
Crown, which was also provisionally to take over the bishops'
palaces and castles. Paragraph 3 authorised the nobility to
redeem from the religious houses all the land devoted to pious
uses since 1454, upon which they could make good their
claims. The Church's relations to the State were still further
defined and explained by the Vesterås ordinance. Bishops
and other prelates were never henceforth to apply to Rome
for confirmation ; Peter's pence were henceforth to go to the
Crown instead of to the Pope ; ecclesiastics in temporal matters
were to be amenable to the civil courts alone. Yet the changes
made by the Riksdag of Vesterås were mainly economical and
administrative. There was no modification of Church doctrine,
for the general resolution that God's Word should be preached
plainly and purely was not contrary to the teaching of the
ante-Tridentine Church.
112 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [ch.
Immediately after the departure of the king from Vesterås,
Hans Brask quitted Sweden, to pass the remainder of his days
at the Polish monastery of Landa, where he died in 1539.
The disappearance of the last effective champion of the old
faith was a relief and an assistance to the Reformers. From
the new bishops, nothing, apparently, was to be feared. In
the beginning of January, 1528, they allowed themselves to be
consecrated, without the papal confirmation, by Per Månsson,
bishop of Vesterås, who, although he had been consecrated by
the Pope before his return tº Sweden, now submitted, against
his convictions, to the royal will. The recess of Vesterås was
confirmed and extended by the synod of Örebro, which was
summoned, in February, 1529, for “the better regulation of
Church ceremonies and discipline according to God's Word.”
It provided for the preaching of the new doctrines, declared
the Holy Scriptures to be the sole norm of doctrine, and
placed the religious orders under the jurisdiction of the bishops.
But even now there was no formal protest against Rome; and
the old ritual was retained unaltered, though it was to be
explained as symbolical.
Three months after the synod of Örebro, a rising occurred
which showed how unpopular the Reformation was in the
country at large. It began with the murder, by peasants in
Småland, of one of the king's bailiffs who had seized the
monastery of Nydala. The rebels were encouraged by some
of the most eminent men in Sweden, notably by Senators Ture
Jönsson, Hölger Carlsson, and Magnus Haraldsson, bishop
of Skara, who openly protested against the Vesterås recess,
and aimed at nothing less than deposing the king. Gustavus
was much disquieted. “I fear,” he wrote, “ that this treason
is so great and widespread that we may not know whereto to
betake us." Yet within a month his prudent measures had
averted the danger. The peasants were pacified by a com-
promise made at Broddetorp April 25, 1529, but never kept ;
the bishop and the senators fled first to Denmark and then
v] Gustavus as Head of the Church 113
to Christian II in the Netherlands; and a Riksdag held at
Strengnäs, June 17, reconfirmed the Vesterås recess, and
condemned two of the Småland ringleaders to death.
Henceforth the work of the Reformation continued un-
interruptedly, if gradually. In 1531 a Swedish missal was
published authorising communion in both kinds. The same
year an assembly of bishops and prelates elected Laurentius
Petri, the brother of Olavus, hitherto a professor at Upsala,
the first Lutheran primate of Sweden. Subsequently matters
were much complicated by the absolutist tendencies of Gustavus,
which, in his later years, passed all bounds. His arbitrary
appropriation of the Church's share of the tithes from and
after 1539, and his sequestration of the Church's movable
property during the same year, drew protests even from his
own archbishop and bishops, who rightly regarded these acts
as violations of the Vesterås recess. Gustavus at first retorted.
only with insults and menaces. Then he took offence at
certain references in the sermons of Olavus Petri to blasphemy
and swearing, which he regarded as personal allusions ; he
certainly had the ugly habit of emphasising his speech with
oaths. Olavus Petri made matters worse by openly calling
Gustavus a tyrant and a skinfiint, and by hanging up in the
cathedral pictures of recent parhelia, which he explained as
portents of calamities that the king's sins would bring upon
the land. At last Gustavus's rage burst forth; and both
Olavus Petri and Laurentius Andreae were arraigned before
an extraordinary tribunal, largely composed of foreigners, on a
mysterious and unconvincing charge of hiding their knowledge
of a conspiracy against the king's life: This arraignment has
all the appearance of a vindictive afterthought; yet nevertheless
both Andreae and Petri were on January 2, 1540, actually
condemned to death, though the sentences were commuted
to ruinous fines. Gustavus had already (1539) appointed a
German, Georg Norman, “superintendent and ordinator” over
all the bishops and prelates, with plenipotentiary powers. At
BAIN
114 Reformation in Scandinavia, 1520-60 [CH. V
a subsequent Riksdag held at Vesterås in 1544 the last shreds
of Roman Catholicism were swept away. Even now no definite
confession of faith was formulated ; but the rupture with
Rome had become so complete, in view of Gustavus's uncom-
promising attitude, that Sweden received no invitation to the
Council of Trent, then in session. By the ordinances of 1539
and 1540 Gustavus had already so curtailed the power of the
bishops that they had little of the-dignity left but the name;
and even that he was now disposed to abolish. The bishops
appointed after 1543 were called by him ordinaries or superin-'
tendents, never bishops; and they were appointed directly by
the Crown without even any previous pretence of an election
by the cathedral chapters as hitherto.
Thus the Reformation in Sweden was practically the work
of one overwhelmingly strong man acting contrary to the
religious instincts of the nation for the good of the State. In
the nature of things it could not be so thorough as it was in
Denmark, where the people were less independent, and exposed
directly to German influences. There could be no question
of a return of Denmark to Rome after the Copenhagen recess
of 1536; but in Sweden, even after the Riksdag of Vesterås in
1544; a Catholic reaction was always a possibility. That which
subsequently took place, under pressure from without, was an
event of some political importance, though Gustavus Vasa had
done his work so well that it failed to shake the foundations
of the new national Church.
CHAPTER VI.
THE SONS OF GUSTAVUS VASA, 1560-1611.
5
GUSTAVUS VASA left four sons, Eric, now in his twenty-
seventh year, the only child of his first wife and his appointed
successor, and John, Magnus, and Charles, the children of his
second wife. Of these younger sons, John, created duke of
Finland and governor of that province during his father's
lifetime, was twenty-three; Magnus, duke of Ostergötland, five
years John's junior, grew up insane and was never of much
account; while Charles, duke of Södermanland, was still a boy.
The news of his father's death reached Eric as he was on
the poinť of embarking for England, to press in person his
suit for the hand of Queen Elizabeth. He hastened back to
Stockholm after burying his father, summoned a Riksdag
which met at Arboga, April 13, 1561, and adopted the royal
propositions known as the Arboga articles, April 14, consider-
ably curtailing the authority of the royal dukes in their respective
duchies. Two months later Eric XIV was crowned at Upsala
with unprecedented pomp and splendour, on which occasion
he first introduced the titles of baron and count into Sweden,
by way of adding to the splendour of his court, and attaching
to the Crown the higher nobility, these new counts and barons
receiving lucrative fiefs adequate to the maintenance of their
new dignities.
842
116 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-161. [CH.
King Eric XIV has gone down to posterity as a monster
whose misdeeds are barely excusable on the plea of insanity;
yet there can be no doubt that he exercised a singular charm
over his contemporaries. The French ambassador, Charles
de Dançay, who knew Éric personally, describes him as a
very handsome, well-framed prince, marvellously accomplished,
speaking German, French, and Latin as well as his mother
tongue, a great mathematician and a very good musician. He
also credits him with an alert and critical intelligence, a rare
power of diagnosing character, and a laudable capacity for
taking pains. Eric's own father, a difficult master to please,
also had a high opinion of his son's judgment, and profitably
consulted him on affairs of state. His first act as a ruler, the
limitation of the excessive authority of the royal dukes, whatever
its motives, was undoubtedly a wise one. To an immature,
struggling state like Sweden, a strongly centralised government
was then indispensable. Equally laudable were his efforts to
promote good government by keeping a stringent watch on his
governors and lord-lieutenants, lest they should overstep their
powers; by establishing a high tribunal, Konungens Nämd, as
the organ and definite representative of the Crown; by the
revival of the old practice of sending the judges on circuit at
regular intervals; and by the substitution of a regular course of
administrative procedure for the more cumbrous system of
purely personal government.
Unfortunately in company with these fine qualities were to
be ſound dangerous vices, “childish, womanish emotions,” as
his anxious, far-seeing father used to call them. Yet Eric's
vices were but his father's foibles released from the dominion
of a mastering will, and exaggerated by vanity, licentiousness,
and cowardice. Gustavus had been stern, violent and sus-
picious; Eric was cruel and homicidal, feared all men and
trusted few. From the very beginning of his reign his morbid
suspicion of the upper classes, from "faithless redbeard,” as
he called his half-brother John, downwards, drove him to give
VI]
Göran Persson
117
his absolute confidence to a man of base origin and bad
character, though, it must be admitted, of, superior ability.
This was Göran Persson, the son of a priest who had been
one of the first to contract the still illegal tie of wedlock
under the protection of the Reformers. Born about 1530,
Göran was sent to Germany to complete his studies, returned
home with a certificate from Melanchthon, and obtained a post
at court, where he behaved so badly that he was condemned to
death, though the sentence was subsequently commuted to
perpetual banishment. Instead of leaving the country, how-
ever, he sought refuge with Duke Eric, who took him into his
service despite the warnings of his father. On succeeding to
the throne, Eric made Göran his procurator and secretary; and
from henceforth the priest's son became the king's acknowledged
favourite and indispensable counsellor. It was at his suggestion
that the tribunal known as Konungens Nämd was instituted, a
useful and necessary reform in itself, but frequently employed
by Göran, who officiated therein as public prosecutor, as a sort
of court of Star Chamber for capitally punishing or heavily
fining scores of so-called political offenders cited by him before
it. This powerful upstart was the natural enemy of the nobility,
who suffered much at his hands, though it is very difficult to
determine whether the initiative in these prosecutions pro-
ceeded from him or his master. Göran was also a determined
opponent of Duke John, in whom, from the first, he recognised
his master's most dangerous rival. Ever since the Riksdag of
Arboga the brothers had been on unfriendly terms. Only
with the utmost repugnance had John subscribed the articles
of Arboga; and it was his practical infringement of them which
now brought an open rupture between the king and the duke.
The immediate occasion of John's offence was his independent
action in regard to the Livonian question.
At the time of Gustavus Vasa's death there were two
Livonian deputations in Sweden, one from the Master of the
Sword Order, Gotthard von Kettler, soliciting Sweden's media-
118 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 [CH.
tion in the war with Russia; the other from the Protestant
city of Reval which, threatened at the same time by Russia,
Poland, and the duke Magnus of Denmark, begged for
pecuniary assistance from the Swedish king. Kettler's de-
mands were rejected by Eric XIV as exorbitant, whereupon.
the Master submitted himself to Poland (Treaty of Wilna,
Nov. 28, 1561). Courland and Semigallia, the ancient lands
of the now extinct order, became a Polish fief with Kettler
as its first temporal duke; and he was at the same time
appointed governor of Livonia. This arrangement brought
Sweden and Poland into direct collision in the Baltic provinces ;
for, in March, 1561, Reval, driven to extremities, had volun-
tarily placed itself beneath the protection of the Swedish
Crown. John, as duke of Finland, had hoped to obtain a
share of the spoil of the ancient Order, but, finding himself
disappointed in his expectations, he gladly listened, in July,
1561, to a proposal from Sigismund I of Poland that he should
wed that inonarch's younger sister Catherine. Eric, clearly
foreseeing the dangerous consequences of such a union for
Sweden, forbade his brother to proceed with it, and, at the
same time, commanded Klas Horn, the governor of Reval, to
attack and take Pernau, one of the newly acquired possessions
of Poland in Livonia, naturally supposing that his brother
would now, as a matter of course, cease all negotiations with
a belligerent power. Instead of that, John immediately set.
sail for Dantzic, was married to Catherine Jagellonika at
Wilna, on October 4; 1562, and engaged to advance to the
Polish king 120,000 dalers in exchange for seven castles
situated on the Swedo-Polish frontier.
This unpatriotic act was a flagrant breach of that .para-
graph of the articles of Arboga which forbade the royal
dukes to contract any political treaty without the royal as-
sent; and Eric, suspecting, moreover, from confessions wrung
by torture from one of John's servants, that his brother
actually meditated rebellion, summoned the duke on April 23,
vi] Duke John and the Stures 119
1563, to appear within three weeks in Sweden, to answer to
á charge of treason. The time having elapsed, and John
not appearing, Eric called a Riksdag to Stockholm to judge
his brother; and the Riksdag, after taking evidence, con-
demned John (Jan. 7) to death as a traitor, but, at the
same time, recommended him to the king's mercy. An army
of 10,000 men was incontinently despatched to Finland; but
the only resistance met with was at the capital, Åbo, which
John himself surrendered after a month's siege. He and his
consort, despite solemn promises to the contrary, were thereupon
detained in Gripsholm Castle as prisoners of state. That
John's quasi-treasonable conduct deserved some punishment
there can be little doubt; and public opinion, as represented by
the Riksdag and the nobility, supported Eric. If the king had
only stopped here, all would have been well; but his suspicions,
once aroused, were at the mercy of a morbid imagination; and
his imagination suggested that, if his own brother failed him,
the loyalty of the great nobles, especially the members of
the ancient and illustrious - Sture family, his own near kins-
folk, could not be depended upon. That the Stures had ever
been the most dutiful and pacific subjects of the Vasas counted
for nothing in the mind of such a monomaniac. They were,
he seems to have argued, after the royal family, the nearest to
the throne, and therefore must needs covet it.
The head of the Sture family, at this time, was Senator,
Count Svante, who had married a sister of Gustavus Vasa's
second wife, and had by her a numerous family, of whom two
sons, Nils and Eric, still survived. Eric, a mere youth, had
been in Duke John's service before he entered that of the king.
Nils, now in his twenty-fourth year, had already displayed con-
spicuous ability both as a diplomatist and a soldier. The dark
tragedy known as the Sture murders began with Eric XIV's
strange treatment of this young noble. In 1566 Nils Sture was
summoned to the royal castle of Svartsjö and received with
every mark of favour; yet, on his return to Stockholm, he was
120 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611. [CH.
amazed to hear himself and his second brother, Sten, who had
died gloriously fighting for his country at the naval battle of
Bornholm the year before, publicly proclaimed "traitors, knaves,
and scoundrels” in the market-place. Immediately afterwards
he received a visit from Göran Persson, who, in the king's name,
gave him the choice between “riding into town on a hack with
a straw crown on his head,” or answering to the charges which
Persson, by the king's command, was about to bring against
him. Sture at once demanded to be confronted with his
accusers. He was brought before the new tribunal, Konungens
Nämd, and condemned to death for gross neglect of duty,
though not one of the frivolous charges brought against him
could be substantiated. The death penalty was commuted
into a punishment worse because more shameful than death.
On June 15, 1566, the unfortunate youth, bruised and bleeding
from shocking ill-treatment, was placed upon a wretched hack,
with a crown of straw on his head, and led in derision through
the streets of Stockholm. The following night he was seized
in his bed and carried off to the fortress of Örbyhus. But
forty-eight hours had not elapsed before the command came
that Nils was to be brought back to Stockholm; and, a few
days later, he was appointed ambassador extraordinary and
despatched to Lorraine to resume the negotiations for Eric's
marriage with Princess Renata. The king, on this occasion,
sent Nils Sture word that what had just befallen him was due
to the counsel and machination of wicked men, and at the
same time requested him to acknowledge himself rightly
condemned and to promise not to seek to avenge himself for
“the slight punishment” which the king had mercifully
imposed upon him. Nils Sture refused to give any such
promise; but King Eric, nevertheless, despatched him forth-
with to Lorraine.
Eric XIV must have been well aware that his treatment of
Nils Sture was an outrage which the whole nobility of Sweden
would resent. Moreover he had offended the aristocracy in
vi]
Eric XIV and Kitty Månsdotter
121
1
another way. Instead of seeking a bride from among them,
as his father had twice done, he married, about this time, the
daughter of a common soldier, Karin, or Kitty, Månsdotter.
Eric first made the acquaintance of this young and beautiful
girl some time between 1561 and 1564. In the beginning of
1565 she was received at court as his mistress, and in 1566
bore him a daughter. The king had already requested both
the Riksdag and the Råd to allow him to marry whomsoever
he would, since all his matrimonial negotiations with foreign
princesses had come to nothing. In this request both the
Råd and the Riksdag had acquiesced; but the Råd, consisting
as it did of the magnates of Sweden, was naturally more jealous
of the royal dignity, and added the proviso that his Majesty
should not look lower than the nobility for a consort. ·
Eric, who had determined to make Karin queen of Sweden,
was greatly incensed by the Råd's suggestion, which he re-
garded as little short of treason. He appears, first of all,
to have negotiated with them on the subject. In January,
1567, he extorted from two of the senators, Svante Sture and
Sten Eriksson, a declaration to the effect that, inasmuch as
certain persons, with the view of extirpating Gustavus Vasa's
posterity, had succeeded in thwarting his foreign marriage
projects, it was the king's duty to marry whom he would,
noble or non-noble; and they engaged to assist him to punish
all who should try to prevent his marriage. Simultaneously
Göran Persson was busily employed in collecting proofs of a
general conspiracy of the higher nobility against the king.
A Riksdag was summoned to Upsala, in the middle of May,
1567, to judge between the king and those of the aristocracy
whom he regarded as his personal enemies, including Svante
Sture and his sons, Per Brahe, Gustaf Olsson Stenbock and
his sons Abraham and Eric, Sten Eriksson Lejonhufvud, and
half-a-dozen others. Many of these suspects, while on their
way to the Riksdag, were invited to visit the king at his castle
at Svartsjö. They arrived there in the beginning of May, but
122
[CH.
Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611
were treated as prisoners instead of as guests. Brought before
Konungens Nämd, they were charged with treasonable designs
on such flimsy contradictory hearsay evidence that the court
ultimately sent them to Upsala for further examination, but
not before two of their number had already been condemned
to death.
At Upsala the Riksdag had already assembled ; but it was
noteworthy that scarce twenty of the nobility were present,
and that it consisted almost exclusively of members of the
lower Estates. Eric himself arrived on May 16 in a condition
of incipient insanity. On the 19th he opened Parliament in a
speech which, as he explained, he had to deliver extempore
owing to the “ treachery” of his secretary. It dealt exclusively
with the purely imaginary conspiracy which he believed he had
detected at Svartsjö. Two days later, on May 21, Nils Sture
arrived at Upsala fresh from his ambassade to Lorraine. He
immediately demanded an audience, but was prevented from
seeing Eric by Göran Persson, and thrown into prison. On
the 22nd he contrived to let the king know the result of his
mission, which was favourable to Eric's suit. The same day
Eric had a lucid interval. He wrote to Count Svante, Nils's
father, a letter of reconciliation, deploring the differences
between such near relatives, expressing his utter disbelief of
the charges of treason brought against him by their common
ill-wishers, and promising him that no harm should befall him
and his sons. Count Svante responded in a letter of almost
abject gratitude. On the following morning the king paid a
visit to Count Svante in his prison, fell down on his knees
before him, begged him, for Christ's sake, to forgive him for
his unrighteous conduct, and swore incoherently that he would
be a gracious sovereign to him for the rest of his days. Svante
did his best to pacify the king; and they parted to all
appearance completely reconciled.
It is said that after this interview Eric went for a stroll on
the banks of the river Fyris with one of Göran Persson's friends,
VI]
The Sture Murders.
.
123
and immediately afterwards returned to the castle in an excited
condition. Followed by his drabants, he rushed with a drawn
dagger into Nils Sture's cell, and greeted him with the words,
“So there thou art, thou traitor !” The prisoner, who was
lying on his bed with a little prayer-book in his hands, at once
fell upon his knees, protesting his innocence and begging for
his life; but the king plunged first the dagger and then a dart
into his body, and one of the drabants completed the deed on
the spot. Eric then ordered that all the prisoners in Upsala
Castle, "except Herr Sten," should be killed privately; and the
order was at once carried out by Per Gadd,- the royal provost- ..
marshal, and a band of half-drunken soldiers, who murdered
old Count Sture and his son Eric, with Ivan Ivarsson and
Abraham Gustafsson, brother of the queen-dowager. The re-
maining prisoners, Sten Axelsson and Sten Eriksson, owed their
lives to the uncertainty of the executioners as to which of the two
was meant by “Herr Sten." These murders were perpetrated
so promptly and secretly that it is doubtful whether the Estates,
actually in session at the same place, knew what had been
done when, on May 26, under violent pressure from Göran
Persson, they signed a document declaring that all the accused
gentlemen in Svartsjö and Upsala had acted like traitors and
confirming all sentences already passed or that might be passed
upon them. Thus by threats and violence Persson had at
least contrived to cover his master's crimes with the cloak of
legality.
Meanwhile Eric, after murdering his old tutor Denis
Beurreus, who had attempted to pacify him, wandered, a mere
lunatic, in the district between Upsala and Stockholm. He
was found, on May 27, in the village of Odensala in peasant's
clothes, quite out of his mind, was taken back to Stockholm,
and gradually grew calmer and saner. He now attempted to
atone, so far as he could, for his misdeeds. The two remaining
prisoners were released ; negotiations were opened with the -
relatives of the murdered men; and, when they had agreed to
124 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 [CH.
condone what had been done, Eric, on July 18, 1567, wrote
a letter to Nils Sture's mother, Märta Eriksdotter, explaining
that her son had been overhaštily despatched, that he, the
king, was much displeased " that the slight difference between
them should have been treated in this way,” and proposing "a
Christian reconciliation " between himself and Dame Märta's
family. That Dame Märta, whose masculine force of character
had earned her the title of King Märta, should even have
consented to negotiate at all with the assassin of her husband
and children is not the least amazing part of this amazing
affair. She consented to be appeased, however, only on certain
conditions, one of which was that the “venomous persons ”
who had advised the misdeed should be punished. To this
Eric consented; and Göran Persson, in the course of 1567, was
arrested, tried for peculation and perjury and condemned to
death, but kept in prison pending the king's recovery.
During the greater part of 1567 Eric was so deranged that
a committee of senators was appointed to govern the kingdom.
One of his iļlusions was that he was not king, but his brother
John, whom he now set at liberty. When, at the beginning of
1568, Eric recovered his reason, a reconciliation was effected
between the king and the duke, on condition that John
should recognise the legality of his brother's marriage with
Karin Månsdotter, and her children as the successors to the
Crown. A few weeks later Eric, by the advice of Göran
Persson, who was presently released and accompanied his
master, joined the army in the field, and returned to his
capital apparently restored to health. A month afterwards,
on July 4, he was solemnly married to Karin Månsdotter at
Stockholm, by the primate, old Laurentius Petri. The next
day Karin was crowned queen of Sweden, and her infant son,
Gustavus, proclaimed heir to the throne; but none of the royal
dukes and very few of the nobility were present on the occasion.
Shortly after his marriage Eric issued a circular ordering a
general thanksgiving for his delivery from the assaults of the
vi] Deposition and Murder of Eric. XIV 125
I
Devil. This document, in every line of which madness is
legible, convinced most thinking people that Eric was unfit to
reign. The royal dukes, John and Charles, had already taken
measures to depose him; and in July the rebellion broke
out in Östergötland. Eric at first offered a stout resistance,
and won two victories; but on September 17 the dukes stood
before Stockholm, and Eric, after surrendering Göran Persson
to the horrible vengeance of his enemies, himself submitted
and resigned the crown. On September 30, 1578, John III
was laimed line who thi
was proclaimed king by the army and the nobility; and a
Riksdag, summoned to Stockholm, confirmed the choice and
formally deposed Eric on January 25, 1569.
For the next seven years the ex-king was a source of the
utmost anxiety to the new government. No fewer than three
rebellions, with the object of releasing and reinstating him, had
to be suppressed, and his prison was changed half-a-dozen
times; even in Finland he was considered a danger. So early
as September 13, 1569, King John had induced the archbishop
and bishops to issue an opinion which declared that in the
event of a rising in Eric's favour his life ought not to be
spared. On March 10, 1575, an assembly consisting of the
Råd, the bishops, and some of the leading men among the
clergy of Stockholm, went a step further, and, at John's
request, pronounced a formal sentence of death upon the
deposed monarch. Two years later, on February 24, 1577,
Eric died suddenly in his prison at Örbyhus. It is generally
believed that he was poisoned by his new governor, Johan
Henriksson, a man of notoriously infamous character and the
secretary and intimate of King John, who had placed him in
charge of his unfortunate brother át the beginning of the
month. Eric's son Gustavus, expelled from Sweden by his
jealous uncle, became a homeless wanderer, embraced the
Catholic faith, and died, in 1607, at Kashin in Central
Russia.
We have seen that the same Riksdag which deposed Eric
126 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 [CH.,
recognised John as his successor. On the same occasion
Duke Charles acknowledged his brother as sovereign lord and
king, and Duke Sigismund, his brother's son, as the lawful
heir to the throne; whilst John confirmed the donation of
the duchy of Södermanland to Charles, and recognised his
brother's right of succession to the Swedish throne in case
of the extinction of his own posterity.
The twenty-four years of John III's reign coincide with
the beginnings of two great political movements—Sweden's
territorial expansion and the Catholic reaction.
From the moment when Sweden got a firm footing in
Esthonia by the acquisition of Reval she was forced to adopt
a policy of combat and aggrandisement. To retreat would
have meant the ruin of her Baltic trade, upon which the
national prosperity so much depended. Her next-door neigh-
bours, Poland and Russia, were necessarily her competitors ;
fortunately they were also each other's rivals; obviously her
best policy was to counterpoise them. To accomplish this
effectually she required to have her hands free; and the
composition of the long outstanding differences with Denmark
by the Treaty of Stettin (p. 83), was therefore a judicious act
on the part of King John and his ministers. Equally judicious
was the anti-Russian league with Poland, concluded in 1578.
The war between Russia and Sweden for the possession of .
Livonia, resumed in 1571, had, on the whole, been dis-
advantageous to the Swedes. In January, 1573, the Russians
captured Weissenstein ; in July, 1575, Pernau and Hapsal ;
in 1576 Leal and Lode; and, in the beginning of 1577, a
countless Moscovite host began the siege of Reval, the last
Swedish stronghold in Esthonia. Hitherto Poland's attitude
towards the belligerents had been hesitating and ambiguous;
but when, in the course of 1576, Stephen Báthory, prince of
Transylvania, was elected king of Poland, that great statesman
immediately recognised the necessity of the Swedish alliance;
and Swedes and Poles, acting in concert against the common
N
OTY
vi] Sigismund Vasa elected King of Poland 127.
foe, defeated the Russians at Wenden (October, 1578). While
Stephen thereafter pursued his career of conquest into the very
heart of Moscovy, the Swedes not only recovered most of the
ground they had lost in Esthonia, but made fresh conquests
in Carelia, Ingria, and Livonia, which culminated in the capture
of Narva (September 6, 1581) and other less important fortresses.
The conclusion of a ten years' truce between Stephen and
Ivan the Terrible, through the mediation of the papal legate
Antonio Possevino, January 15, 1582, led to a further truce
of three years between Sweden and Russia made at Pliusa,
August 5, 1582, on a uti possidetis basis. Three years later the
death of Stephen Báthory led to a still closer union between
Sweden and Poland. The numerous competitors for the vacant
throne included four Austrian archdukes, the new Russian Tsar
Theodore, Andrew Báthory, and. Duke Sigismund, King John's
eldest son. After an interregnum of eight months Sigismund
was elected, August 19, 1587, chiefly through the efforts of
the great Polish chancellor, Andrew Zamoyski, and his own
mother, Queen Catherine, after promising to maintain a fleet
upon the Baltic, to build sundry fortresses in the border
provinces against the Tatars, and not to visit Sweden without
the consent of the Polish Sejm or Diet. Sixteen days later
the Articles of Kalmar, signed by both monarchs, regulated the
future relations between the two countries when, in process of
time, Sigismund should succeed his father as king of Sweden.
The two kingdoms were to be perpetually allied, but each of
them was to retain its own laws and customs. Sweden was
also to enjoy her religion, subject to such changes as a General
Council might make; but neither Pope nor Council was to
claim or exercise the right to release Sigismund from his
obligations to his Swedish subjects. During Sigismund's
absence from Sweden that realm was to be ruled by seven
Swedes, six elected by the king and one by Duke Charles.
No new tax was to be levied in Sweden during the king's
absence; and Sweden was not to be administered from Poland.
128 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 [ch.
Any necessary alterations in these articles were only to be made
with the common consent of the king, Duke Charles, the
Riksråd, and the gentry of Sweden.
A week after subscribing these articles young Sigismund
departed to take possession of the Polish throne. He was
expressly commanded by his father to return to Sweden if the
Polish deputation, awaiting him at Dantzic, should insist on
the cession of Esthonia to Poland as á condition precedent to
the act of homage. The Poles proved even more difficult
to satisfy than had been anticipated ; but finally a compromise
was come to whereby the territorial settlement was postponed
till the death of John III; and Sigismund was duly crowned at
Cracow on December 27, 1587.
The earnest endeavour of the Swedish statesmen to bind
the hands of their future king was due to their fear of the
rising flood of the Catholic reaction, which had begun to set
in throughout Europe, and was soon to beat against the shores
of distant Sweden. Till the beginning of 1560 Protestantism
had everywhere been a conquering power. In Germany, with
two exceptions, the leading secular princes professed allegiance
to the Evangelical Confession. Of the six archbishops, two, of
the twenty bishops, twelve, were Protestants. Calvinism had
invaded and established itself in France; England was more Pro-
testant than Catholic; in Scandinavia the new doctrines every-
where prevailed. Poland was vacillating, Bohemia schismatical,
Austria indifferent. The ultimate universal victory of Protest-
antism appeared imminent and inevitable. But now a portent
revealed itself. The ancient Church, suddenly recovering
herself,; displayed a vigour and a power of cohesion as unex-
pected as it was imposing. Shaken to her very base, far more
by internal corruptions than by external assaults, she sagaciously
recognised the necessity of self-correction, and emerged from
the Council of Trent a new and living force inspired by an
invincible belief in her divine proselytising mission. Every-
where she found Protestantism, after a brief existence of
vi] Religious Reaction in Sweden : 129
barely half a century, already in the throes of dissolution. In
England Episcopalians and Presbyterians, in Holland Arminians
and Gomarists, in Germany Lutherans and Calvinists, were
flying at each others' throats. And, before these fiercely
contending parties were well aware of it, more than half the
ground wrested by them from their ancient enemy had been
recovered; and France, Austria, and Poland, with southern and
central Germany, returned to their allegiance to the Holy See.
The northern lands were more difficult to recover, not so
much from any racial peculiarity as from geographical aloofness
and purely political circumstances. Under Eric XIV the
Reformation in Sweden had proceeded on much the same
lines as during the reign of his father, quietly, unobtrusively,
retaining all the old Catholic customs not flagrantly contrary to
the Scriptures. Naturally, after 1544, when the Council of
Trent had formally declared the Bible and tradition to be
equally authoritative sources of all Christian doctrine, the
contrast between the old and the new teaching became more
generally obvious; and in many countries a middle party arose
which aimed at a compromise between extremes by going back
to the Church of the Fathers. One of the foremost spokesmen
of this movement was the distinguished Dutch theologian,
George Cassander, whose views largely influenced King John III.
John was by far the most learned of the Vasas. He had a
taste for philosophical speculation, had made a special study
of patristic literature, and was therefore entitled to have an
opinion of his own in theological matters. His beloved con-
sort, too, was a Catholic, a circumstance which predisposed
him to judge equitably between the two Confessions. As soon
as he had mounted the throne he took measures to bring the
Swedish Church back to “the primitive Apostolic Church and
the Catholic faith," and, in 1574, persuaded a synod assembled
at Stockholm to adopt certain articles framed by himself on
what we should call a High Church basis. Moreover, on the
death of Laurentius Petri in 1573, he passed over the violent
BAIN
130
[CH.
Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611.
.
Protestant, Martinus Olai, bishop of Linköping, and bestowed
the primacy on another Laurentius Petri, an ecclesiastic of
learning and moderation. In February, 1575, a new Church
ordinance, drawn up by the king and his secretary, Petrus
Fecht, was presented to another synod held at Stockholm, and
accepted thereat, but very unwillingly. This ordinance was a
further approximation to the ancient patristic Church, although
formally protesting against auricular confession and communion.
in one kind. In 1576 a new liturgy or prayer-book was issued
by the king, on the model of the Roman missal but with
considerable modifications. To a modern high Anglican it
would seem an innocent manual enough; but the extreme
Protestants in Sweden, headed by Duke Charles, who, in
matters of religion, was somewhat fanatical, at once took the
alarm. The duke refused to allow the new prayer-book to be
used in his duchy; and in Stockholm and Upsala some of the
clergy and professors openly preached against it. That much
of this opposition was purely factitious is plain from the readi-
ness with which the Riksdag, assembled at Stockholm early
in 1577, adopted the new liturgy, only the extreme Protestant
section of the clergy insisting that, if adopted at all, it should
be interpreted in a natural and obvious sense.
The adoption of the ordinance of 1575 and the liturgy
of 1576 greatly encouraged the Catholic party in Europe.
They regarded these measures as steps in the right direction ;
and the celebrated Polish prelate, Cardinal Hosius, who was
in constant communication with the zealous and devout Queen
Catherine, wrote a letter of congratulation to the king. A clever
Norwegian Jesuit, Laurentius Nicolai, popularly known as Klos-
terbasse, was then despatched to Stockholm, and soon gained
such an influence over John by his spirited defence of the new
liturgy, that the king was at last persuaded to send an embassy
to Rome, to open negotiations for the reunion of the Swedish
Church with the Holy See. The Curia now entertained the
highest hopes of reestablishing the dominion of Rome in
VI] John III and the Holy See 131
Scandinavia; and, in order to remove the last scruples of
King John, the Pope sent one of his ablest diplomatists, the
Jesuit Antonio Possevino, to Stockholm. He arrived in
December, 1577, and, after six months of almost incessant
argument with the royal disputant, prevailed upon John to
make his confession to him, receive absolution, and com-
municate according to the Roman Catholic rite.
This is what has overhastily been called King John's con-
version to Catholicism: in reality it was only a first step in that
direction. John consented to embrace Catholicism only under
certain conditions; and those conditions were never fulfilled. He
had insisted throughout that there could be no reunion of the
Swedish Church with Rome, unless Rome conceded communion
in both kinds, a married clergy, the use of the vernacular in
the celebration of mass, and the disuse of holy water, invocations
of the saints, and prayers for the dead. These conditions were
duly forwarded to Rome by Possevino; and, in October, 1578,
the Pope's answer was received, rejecting them altogether.
John was the more displeased at the collapse of his ecclesiastical
policy as his negotiations with Rome had imperilled the
popularity of his new liturgy, of which he was pedantically
proud. Yet his relations with the Holy See were not broken
off ; and Possevino, during a second visit to Sweden (July, -
1579-1580) did what he could for the future of Catholicism
in the north by persuading the king to send young Swedes to
be educated at the Jesuit seminaries at Braunsberg and Olmütz;
by making the monastery of Vadstena, which had survived the
Reformation, a propagandist centre; and by circulating broad-
cast translations of the catechism of the Jesuit Canisius. The
only important result, however, of this first assault of the
Catholic reaction upon Sweden was the formal conversion of
the Crown-Prince Sigismund to the Roman faith.
Disappointed in his hopes of a reunion with Rome, John
redoubled his efforts to impose the new liturgy on the Swedish
nation. Tithes were forbidden to be paid to those priests who
9-2
132
[CH.
Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611.
refused to use it; and the few prelates who wrote and preached
against it were deposed or imprisoned. The malcontents
sought a refuge with Duke Charles in Södermanland, where
he enjoyed almost absolute sovereignty ; and from henceforth
he became the centre of the opposition to the new liturgy, and
indeed to everything distantly resembling crypto-Catholicism.
But the duke and his Protestant friends were a mere minority.
The Stockholm Riksdag of 1582 decreed that the new liturgy
was to be used by all congregations in the realm without
exception ; while the temporal Estates steadily set their faces
against the political usurpations of Duke Charles, and, in the
most emphatic terms, subordinated his jurisdiction to the
paramount authority of the Crown. The relations between
the king and the duke grew still more strained when Charles
ostentatiously absented himself from the wedding of his brother
with Gunilla Bjelke in February, 1585'; and when, in the
following year, in direct violation of the statute of 1582, he
proceeded to appoint Petrus Jonae, whom the king abhorred,
bishop of Strengnäs. For a moment a civil war seemed
inevitable; but at the Vadstena Riksdag of 1587 a com-
promise was arrived at, favourable, on the whole, to the
royal claims. Towards the close of his reign King John's
suspicions of the Riksråd led to a complete reconciliation
with his brother, which was publicly confirmed at the Stockholm
Riksdag of 1590. On this occasion the Estates consented to
a new law of succession, whereby heirs female were to succeed
to the throne on the failure of heirs male; while, in case of
a minority, the regency was to be vested in the sovereign's
nearest and eldest relations. Two and a half years later
(November 17, 1592) John III died. Swedish historians have
been as unfair to him as our own Whig historians have been
to Charles I. Yet John III's ecclesiastical policy was a well-
meant via media between two bitterly antagonistic extremes ;
and he displayed an admirable self-restraint in the teeth of
i Queen Catherine had died fourteen months before.
vi] The Upsala Synod and Decrees 133
irritating and semi-treasonable opposition. His foreign policy,
moreover, was judicious, and by no means unsuccessful.
Immediately after King John's death Duke Charles hastened
to Stockholm, and, together with the Råd, provisionally under-
took the government till the arrival of King Sigismund from
Poland. Both the duke and the Senate agreed in wishing to
preserve" the true Christian religion according to the Augsburg
Confession,” well aware that the Catholic reaction in Europe
placed high hopes on the proselytising tendencies of the new
Catholic king. Naturally, therefore, their first measure was to
summon a synod for the regulation of doctrine and ritual.
The synod assembled at Upsala on February 25, 1593, and
was attended by no fewer than 340 prelates and priests. Its
spirit may be gauged from the choice of its president, Nicolaus
Olai, a comparatively young man, who had been imprisoned
by the late king for his opposition to the new liturgy. On
March 5 the synod agreed upon its confession of faith. Holy
Scripture and the three primitive creeds were to be the rules
of Christian faith ; but the Augsburg Confession was solely
to be taken as rightly interpreting the meaning of Scripture.
On the following day King John's liturgy was rejected, and
the old mass-book, with certain alterations, readopted. On
March 14 the three vacant sees were filled by zealous
Lutherans; the new primate, Abraham Angermannus, in
particular, had been a determined adversary of the Johannine
via media.
That the new king should regard the summoning of the
synod of Upsala without his previous knowledge and consent
as an infringement of his prerogative was only natural, especially
as its decrees were obviously directed against himself. We
cannot therefore be surprised that he refused to give a written
confirmation of the Upsala decrees. The Protestant party
had intended to prevent Sigismund from crossing to Sweden
by keeping back the fleet till he had given them the most
satisfactory assurances on the head of religion ; but this design
134 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 [CH.
was frustrated by the loyalty of Klas Fleming, the governor of
Finland, who, in defiance of Duke Charles's express prohibition,
placed his division of the fleet at the service of Sigismund, who
arrived at Stockholm on September 30, 1593. He was accom-
panied by the papal legate, Germanicus de Malaspina, three
Jesuits, several Catholic priests, and a large and imposing
Polish retinue. A few days after his arrival the duke and the
Råd again demanded an assurance that he would respect
the religious liberties of his Swedish subjects. Sigismund
promised to give such assurance after his coronation; the duke
and the Råd insisted upon having it before that ceremony.
The unseemly wrangle continued for the next four months;
and it was only when the coronation Riksdag, on February 16,
1594, formed a religious union for the maintenance of the pure
evangelical religion and the Upsala decrees, and the duke, who
now had an army behind him, demanded a satisfactory reply
within four-and-twenty hours, that Sigismund finally gave way.
On the same day he declared his approval of the demands
of the Estates, and recognised Abraham Angermannus as
primate.
On February 19 Sigismund was crowned at Upsala; on
which occasion he swore to maintain the Augsburg Con-
fession in Sweden, to employ no person in affairs of state
who did not belong to the state religion, and faithfully to
observe all the ancient laws and liberties of Sweden. Then,
after he had been invested with the regalia, Duke Charles, the
Råd and the nobility, swore fealty to him in the cathedral,
while the lower Estates did homage in the public square. One
striking fact indicates what progress religious intolerance had
made since the days of King John : the Estates now refused
to allow the Catholics liberty of worship; and Sigismund, in
default of a church, was obliged to hire a large house in
Stockholm where mass, according to the Roman rite, was
celebrated by a Swedish Jesuit. No wonder that the bitterness
between the two religious parties, in these circumstances, grew
VI)
Duke Charles declared Regent
135
day by day. While in the court chapel at Drottningholm
Jesuit preachers thundered against the errors of Luther, the
inflammatory sermons of the Protestant pastor, Eric Skippare,
stirred up the populace of Stockholm ; and collisions between
Poles and Swedes, in the streets of the capital, became more
and more frequent. It was with a feeling of relief that the
more moderate men saw Sigismund depart for Poland on
July 14, 1594, leaving the duke and the Råd to rule Sweden
in his absence.
The principal act of the new government was the conclusion
of the Russian war, which had been raging intermittently since
1590. The ambassadors of both powers met together at a
peace congress at Teusin on the river Narva; and peace was
signed on May 18, 1595. By the Peace of Teusin Russia
recognised the right of Sweden to Esthonia and Narva, while
Sweden retroceded the province of Kexholm in Finland to
Russia.
But now the restless ambition of Duke Charles led to
fresh complications. Charles was dissatisfied with the powers
conferred on him by his nephew. He had demanded, and
been refused, the title of regent; and, in the course of 1595,
contrary to the express command of the king, he persuaded
the Råd to summon an extraordinary Riksdag to Söderköping
for the purpose, as he wrote to Sigismund, of giving Sweden a
more stable and regular government in view of the indefinite
absence of the sovereign. The Riksdag met on September 30,
1595 ; and on October 7 the duke asked their opinion as
to how the government might best be carried on during
Sigismund's residence in Poland. Other questions relating to
religious matters were subsequently submitted to the Estates.
The Riksdag responded with the decree of October 22, 1595,
which was issued jointly by the Råd and the Estates. By this
statute the duke was formally declared regent; but he was to
act conjointly with the Råd. The same statute has the
mournful distinction of initiating religious persecution in
136 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 [CH.
Sweden. All the Catholic congregations, hitherto tolerated
without question, were henceforth to be abolished ; all Catholic
priests were to leave the country within six weeks ; Catholic
laymen might reside in the realm, but were disqualified from
holding official appointments. In December, 1595, the duke
proceeded to the great convent of Vadstena, which had done
so much for the religious and moral welfare of Sweden, expelled
the nuns without warning, and confiscated their property. His
agents naturally exceeded their master in brutality. Charles
had empowered the archbishop and bishops to conduct a
general visitation of the realm ; and the new primate, by way
of carrying out the ducal commands, proceeded to use his
pastoral staff as if it were a bludgeon. In the course of his
“ visitation" we hear of men flogged till they bled, of women
and children ducked and soused, and of Christian worshippers,
whose only fault was a natural love of the familiar and beautiful
Catholic ritual,"worried and hustled.” Even the duke, mer-
ciless as he was to everything Catholic, was obliged to intervene
and remind Dr Abraham Angermannus that he was not a public
executioner but an archbishop; while the visitations were pro-
visionally suspended.
As for the men whom King Sigismund had left behind
him to rule the provinces, the duke treated them as public
enemies, driving them from their offices and expelling them
from the realm. The most powerful of them, Klas Fleming,
governor of Finland, openly defied him by refusing to re-
cognise the decrees of the Söderköping Riksdag, even before
he knew that Sigismund had rejected it, and continuing
to hold the Finnish army at the king's disposal. The duke
would have made open war upon Fleming; but the Råd refused
to punish the governor of Finland for being more loyal to his
sovereign than they were themselves. Technically the duke's
procedure was treasonable enough, yet, for all that, it was both
statesmanlike and patriotic. The whole position was anomalous.
Sigismund was the rightful king of Sweden, yét the political
VI)
Civil War in Sweden
137
and religious interests of a Catholic prince who was at the
same time king of Poland were absolutely incompatible with the
welfare of Sweden. The duke recognised this cardinal fact
from the first, and was justified in opposing to the utmost his
royal nephew's reactionary policy. As, however, each party
was fully convinced of the righteousness of its own cause, it
was obvious that only the arbitrament of battle could decide
between them.
The struggle began when Sigismund, in the beginning of
January, 1597, vested the government in the Råd alone, and
forbade the assembling of a Riksdag already summoned by
the duke. None the less the Riksdag met at Arboga on
February 22, 1597, though, significantly enough, only a single
senator, Count Axel Lejonhufvud, appeared there to represent
the Råd. With the utmost difficulty (but for the steady
support of the peasantry it would have been impossible)
Charles succeeded in inducing the Estates to confirm the
statutes of the previous Riksdag of Söderköping, conferring
the government on him alone. The duke's success was
followed by the flight of the senators of the royal party, and
the outbreak of a civil war in Finland, which was held for
the king by Klas Fleming and his successor Arvid Eriksson
Stålarm. At the end of July, 1598, Sigismund himself, with
an army of 5000 men, landed at Kalmar. The fortress at
once opened its gates to him; the gentry of Småland and
Vestergötland flocked to his standard; and the capital received
him gladly. The Catholic world watched his progress with
the most sanguine expectations. Sigismund's success in Sweden
was regarded as only the beginning of greater triumphs. Secure
of Sweden, he was next to reduce both Denmark and the
Hanse towns to the papal obedience; while the port of Elfsborg
on the west coast of Sweden was to be ceded to Spain, to
serve her as a starting point for a fresh attack upon Protestant
England. But it was not to be. After fruitless negotiations
with his uncle, Sigismund advanced with his army from Kalmar,
138 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 [CH.
but was defeated by the duke at Stångebro, September 25.
Three days afterwards, a compact was made between them
at Linköping, whereby Sigismund surrendered the five fugitive
senators to the duke, and agreed that the points in dispute
between them should be submitted to a Riksdag at Stockholm.
Instead, however, of proceeding to Stockholm as arranged, he
took ship for Dantzic, after secretly protesting to the two papal
proto-notaries who accompanied him that the Linköping agree-
ment had been extorted from him and was therefore invalid.
The duke received the news of the king's flight with the
utmost amazement. He was now convinced that the assurances
of a prince who thus trified with his promises were worth-
less, and that to break with him absolutely was the only safe
course to adopt. An assembly of notables held at Jönköping,
February 5, 1599, concurred with him, and authorised him,
as “hereditary reigning prince,” to reduce the fortress of
Kalmar and the Grand Duchy of Finland to obedience by
force of arms. Kalmar surrendered on May 12; and, on
July 24, a Riksdag summoned to Stockholm formally deposed
Sigismund as a papist, oath-breaker, and enemy of the realm.
His son Wladislaw was, however, to be recognised as king if
he were sent to Sweden, within twelve months, to be educated
in the national faith. Finland was subdued by the beginning
of October, 1599; but Charles's victory was stained by the
execution of all the Finnish leaders caught with arms in their
hands. Among them was Johan Fleming, the innocent son of
the duke's old adversary, Klas Fleming, whose execution can
be attributed only to personal vengeance.
On December 14, 1599, Charles summoned the Estates to
assemble at Linköping on February 24, 1600. The first act
of the Riksdag was to condemn to death the five senators who
had been surrendered by Sigismund to Charles at Stångebro ;
and they were executed in the market-place of Linköping on
March 20, the duke remaining inexorable to every petition
for mercy. On the previous day a decree of the Riksdag
VI)
The War with Poland
: 139
declared that Sigismund and his posterity had forfeited the
Swedish throne, and, passing over Duke John, the second son
of John III, a youth of ten, recognised the duke as their
sovereign under the title of Charles IX. In case of his death,
his son Gustavus Adolphus was to succeed him, with reversion
to Duke John in case of the extinction of Gustavus's male
line.
Another important measure passed by the Linköping
Riksdag, at the suggestion of Charles, was the establishment
of a regular army: each district was henceforth to provide and
maintain a certain number of infantry and cavalry. This reso-
lution was largely due to the rumours of imminent war which
were reaching Sweden from across the Baltic. The power most
to be feared was Poland, whose monarch had just been de-
prived of his Swedish inheritance. The Linköping Riksdag
had sent an ultimatum to the Polish Sejm, the only answer to
which was the incarceration of the Swedish ambassadors; and
Charles prepared at once for the worst. Esthonia, where
Sigismund had many partisans, was first secured ; Karl Horn
was appointed stadtholder; and Charles himself, with 9000
men, arrived at Reval on August 9, 1600. Receiving no
satisfactory answer from Sigismund's commander in Livonia,
Charles invaded that province; and, by March, 1601, the
whole country, except Riga and Kokenhausen, was in his
possession. At the end of May a Landtag held at Reval
resolved upon union with Sweden. But in the beginning of
1602 the tide turned. The loss of Livonia had roused the
Polish Diet from its lethargy; and the Grand Hetman, Jan
Chodkiewicz, Poland's greatest general, speedily recovered
fortress after fortress, and routed the Swedes at Weissenstein,
September 15, 1604. In August, 1605, Charles IX, with an
army of 16,000 men, again assumed the offensive and advanced
against Riga. Chodkiewicz, who had only 5000 men at his
disposal, entrenched himself at Kirkholm, two miles south-east
of Riga, and was there attacked by the over-confident Swedish
140 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611. [CH.
king, who was utterly defeated by the Grand Hetman's superior
tactics, with the loss of no fewer than 8000 men.
The defeat of Kirkholm was the more serious as the pre-
tender, known as the first false Demetrius, who was placed on
the Moscovite throne by the influence of Poland, in June, 1605,
now openly declared himself the enemy of Sweden. But the
Swedish Estates liberally supported their king; and Charles
prepared to encounter the twofold enemy with indomitable
energy. The opportune assassination of Demetrius, May 17,
1606, relieved the Swedish monarch of much anxiety; while the
domestic troubles which agitated Poland, after the death of the
chancellor Zamoyski, prevented Sigismund from immediately
reaping the fruits of the victory of Kirkholm. In June, 1607,
the Swedish general, Mansfeld, recovered the fortress of
Weissenstein, and, in the following year, captured the Livonian
fortresses of Dunemünde, Kokenhausen, and Fellin; but all
these places were recovered by Chodkiewicz in the course of
1608 and 1609. Then Russia once again became the centre
of gravity of the Swedo-Polish struggle. In 1606 a second
false Demetrius, like his predecessor supported by the Poles,
had risen against Tsar Vasily Shuisky, defeated him in 1608
at Bolkov, and encamped at Tushino near Moscow.
A well-grounded fear lest "the whole Russian nation should
become the thralls of the Polacks” moved Charles IX in the be-
ginning of 1608 to offer Vasily his assistance; and in November
of the same year a convention was concluded between Russia
and Sweden at Great Novgorod, confirmed by a formal treaty
of alliance at Viborg, February 28, 1609. Nine months later a
Polish army advanced against Smolensk. It was Sigismund's
intention to profit by the anarchy of Moscovy by seizing the
Russian crown himself; but Jakob De la Gardie, the Swedish
commander, anticipated him by entering Moscow on March 12,
1610. In the beginning of June De la Gardie attempted to
relieve Smolensk, which the Poles were still besieging, but was
so badly beaten at Klutshino, June 24, 1610, by the Crown
VI.
The Partition of Moscovy
141
Hetman Zolkiewski, that, to save the remainder of his army,
he was forced to abandon Vasily and quit Moscovy. The fate
of Vasily was now sealed. The victorious Zolkiewski marched
against Moscow; Vasily was dethroned ; and Sigismund's son
Wladislaw was proclaimed Tsar. But a Polish Gosudar was an
abomination to the orthodox Moscovites. A few months later
a popular rising broke out against Wladislaw; and in the course
of 1611 Moscovy seemed to be on the verge of dissolution.
In these circumstances Sweden's policy towards Russia was
bound to change its character. Hitherto Charles had aimed
at supporting the weaker against the stronger Slavonic power;
but, now that Moscovy seemed about to disappear from among
the nations of Europe, Swedish statesmen naturally began to
seek some compensation for the expenses of the war before
Poland had had time to absorb everything. A beginning was
made by the siege and capture of Kexholm in Russian Finland
(March 2, 1611); and on July 16 De la Gardie stormed
Great Novgorod, and concluded a convention with the magis-
trates of that wealthy city, whereby Charles IX's son was to be
recognised as Tsar of Moscovy.
Compared with his foreign policy, the domestic policy of
Charles IX was comparatively unimportant. It aimed at
confirming and supplementing what had already been done
during his regency. Not till March 6, 1604, after Duke John
had formally renounced his rights to the crown, did Charles IX
begin to style himself king. The first deed in which the
title appears is dated March 20, 1604. Two days later the
new succession edict appeared, vesting the crown in Charles's
male descendants with reversion to Duke John and his heirs
male. In the case of the total extinction of the male line, the
crown was to be inherited by the eldest unmarried princess.
The Estates, at the same time, declared that they would
recognise none as king who was of a different religion from
themselves. Any heir to the throne who fell away from
142 Sons of Gustavus Vasa, 1560-1611 [CH.
“God's pure Word,” as represented by the Augsburg Con-
fession, or married a wife professing any false religion, or
married without the consent of the Estates, or accepted another
kingdom, was thereby to forfeit his rights to the Swedish
throne. None belonging to any but the established religion
was to hold any office or dignity in Sweden; and every recusant
was to be deprived of his estates and banished the realm.
On March 15, 1607, Charles IX was at length crowned
king at Upsala. The coronation Riksdag which met on that
occasion is memorable for the attempt of the king to reconcile
the two great Protestant sects, the Lutherans and the Calvinists.
Charles IX was statesman enough to perceive that, if Pro-
testantism were to prevail against the common foe, it must
combine its forces. Inclining to Calvinism himself, and with
sufficient theological learning skilfully to defend his views,
even against such dialecticians as Olaus Martini, the new
Lutheran primate, he stoutly opposed the efforts of the
Estates to make the ultra-Lutheran decrees of the synod of
Upsala the sole rule of faith for the State Church; and, when
the Estates, nevertheless, persisted in their intention, he de-
clared, in one of his too frequent outbursts of rage, that he
doubted their sincerity in offering him the crown, and would
never consent to be their make-shift. Menaced by the threat
of abdication, the Estates formally agreed to a compromise.
Both the Upsala decrees and the Augsburg Confession were to
be cited in the royal coronation oath as the bases of the faith
of the Swedish Church ; but the concession was robbed of all
its value by the addition of the words : “so far as they are
grounded upon God's Word and the prophetic and apostolic
Scriptures.".
Four and a half years after his coronation Charles IX
died at Nyköping (October 30, 1611), in the 61st year of his
age. As a ruler he is the link between his great father and
his still greater son. Hè consolidated the work of Gustavus
VI]
Death of Charles IX
143
Vasa, the creation of a great Protestant state: he prepared
the way for the erection of the Protestant empire of Gustavus
Adolphus. Swedish historians have been excusably indulgent
to the father of their greatest ruler. Indisputably Charles was
cruel, ungenerous, and vindictive; yet it is impossible not to
respect a man who seems, at all hazards, strenuously to have
endeavoured to do his duty, as he understood it, during that
most difficult of periods, a period of political and religious
transition, and who, despite his fanaticism, possessed many of
the qualities of a wise and courageous statesman. The Swedish
nobility, whom he depressed and persecuted, were no doubt
justified in regarding him as a tyrant; but the Swedish people
frankly trusted and cheerfully obeyed a monarch beneath
whose protection they felt happy and secure, and who loved
his country, in his own rough way, above all else.
CHAPTER VII.
CHRISTIAN IV OF DENMARK, 1588–1648.
The death of Frederick II on April 4, 1588, placed Denmark
in an altogether unexpected situation. The succession to the
throne was indeed assured, for already, in his father's lifetime,
Prince Christian had been elected king; but he had not
yet completed his eleventh year, and no provision had been
made for a regency. Under these circumstances the Rigsraad
assumed the government in Christian's name; and on April 15
a circular letter was issued placing the executive authority
in the hands of the chancellor, Niels Kaas, the lord high
admiral, Peder Munk, and the two senior senators.
The foreign policy of the regents was cautiously expectant.
Neutrality at all hazards was its watchword. Its fear of the
Spanish Armada, which had induced it to post small observa-
tion squadrons off the Norwegian and Danish coasts, passed
away with the destruction of the great fleet in 1588; and evasive
answers were invariably returned to the suggestions of James VI
and Henry IV that Denmark should accede to the Evangelical
Union and close the Sound against the Dutch. Especially
anxious was the Danish government to avoid irritating Sweden.
But great changes were now at hand. On ‘August 17, 1596, the
young king, now in his nineteenth year, signed his Haandfeest-
ning, or charter, in the presence of the Raad, and thus came
into his full rights as king of Denmark. Three years previously,
at the Landtag of Flensborg, September 1, 1593, the Estates of
CH. VII] Position of Denmark in 1596 145
Holstein and Sleswick had acknowledged him as their sovereign
duke.
The realm which Christian IV was to govern had undergone
great changes within the last generation. To all appearance
the Danish state was now more powerful than it had ever been
before. The detachment of Sweden had been more than com-
pensated for by the absorption of Norway; and the vast extent
of territory, the large increase of population, which Norway
brought to the whole monarchy, enabled it for another gene-
ration to retain the rank of a great power. Towards the
south the boundaries of the Danish state remained unchanged.
Levensaa and the Eyder still separated Denmark from the Holy
Roman Empire. Sleswick was recognised as a Danish fief
in contradistinction to Holstein, which owed vassalage to the
Emperor. The "kingdom” stretched as far as Kolding and
Skodborg, where the “duchy” began; and this duchy, since
its amalgamation with Holstein by means of a common Land-
tag, and especially since the union of the dual duchy with the
kingdom on almost equal terms in 1533, was, in some respects,
a semi-independent state. The complicated relations between
the kingdom and the duchies were to have far-reaching con-
sequences, and become the source of great danger to the unity
of the state in the future.
Denmark moreover, like Europe in general, was politically
on the threshold of a transitional period. During the whole
course of the sixteenth century the monarchical form of govern-
ment was in every country, with the single exception of Poland,
rising on the ruins of feudalism. The great powers of the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were to be the strong,
highly centralised, hereditary monarchies, like France, Spain,
and Sweden. There seemed to be no reason why Denmark
also should not become a powerful state under the guidance of
a powerful monarchy, especially as the sister state of Sweden
was developing into a great power under apparently identical
conditions. Gustavus Vasa, when he reconstituted the realm,
IO
BAIN
146
CH.
Christian IV, 1588–1648
was obstructed by a feudal system of the same sort as the
Danish; the changes he effected were very similar to those
effected by Christian III; and the royal authority in Sweden
was limited and hampered, just as it was in Denmark, by an
aristocratic senate. Yet, while Sweden was surely ripening into
the dominating power of northern Europe, Denmark had as
surely entered upon a period of uninterrupted and apparently
incurable declension. What was the cause of this anomaly?
Something of course must be allowed for the superior and
altogether extraordinary genius of the great sovereigns of the
house of Vasa; yet the causes of the collapse of Denmark lay
far deeper than this. They may roughly be summed up under
two heads: the weakness of an elective monarchy, and the
absence of that public spirit which is based on the intimate
alliance of ruler and ruled. Whilst Gustavus Vasa had leaned
upon the Swedish peasantry, in other words upon the bulk of
the Swedish nation, which was, and continued to be, an integral
part of the Swedish body-politic, Christian III on his accession
had crushed the middle and lower classes in Denmark and
reduced them to political insignificance. Yet it was not the
king who benefited by this blunder. The Danish monarchy
continued to be elective; and an elective monarchy at that
stage of the political development of Europe was a mischievous
anomaly. It signified in the first place that the Crown was
not the highest power in the state, but was subject to the
aristocratic Rigsraad. The Rigsraad was the permanent owner
of the realm and the crown-lands; the king was only their
temporary administrator. If the king died before the election
of his successor, the Raad stepped into the king's place; and,
even while he was alive, it decided all disputes between him
and his subjects. Moreover an elective monarchy implied that
at every fresh succession the king was liable to be bound by
a new charter. The election itself might, and did, become a
mere formality ; but the condition-precedent of election, the
acceptance of the charter, invariably limiting the royal autho-
rity, remained a reality.
VII] Dominance of the Nobility in Denmark 147
Again, the king was the ruler of the realm, but over a very
large part of it he had but a slight control. The crown-lands
and the towns were under his immediate jurisdiction, and the
crown-lands had grown considerably in value since the Re-
formation ; but by the side of the crown-lands lay the estates
of the nobility, which already comprised about one-half of the
superficial area of Denmark, and were in many respects in-
dependent of the central government both as regards taxation
and administration. In a word, the monarchy had to share its
dominion with the nobility; and the Danish nobility in the six-
teenth century was one of the most exclusive and self-seeking
aristocracies in Europe. In the Middle Ages the kingdom had
been divided into provinces; but now other and far deeper lines
of demarcation, parallel lines, the lines of caste distinction,
were superseding the old local jealousies. Such a development
brought along with it serious political and social perils. And,
still worse, the Danish nobility, unlike the Swedish, which,
under the genial stimulus of Gustavus Adolphus, became the
prolific nursery of a whole series of statesmen and generals;
unlike even the Polish nobility, which, under the salutary dis-
cipline of disaster, was still capable of producing heroes and
regenerators like Koniecpolski and Stephen Czarniecki-the
Danish nobility, I say, was already far advanced in decadence.
Hermetically sealing itself against any intrusion from below, it
deteriorated by close and constant intermarriage; and it was
already, both morally and intellectually, below the level of the
rest of the nation. It was a bad sign, for instance, that Tycho
Brahe, the one aristocrat of genius in Denmark, should be
looked down upon by his peers because he had so far freed
himself from the privileges of caste as to marry a commoner.
Yet this aristocracy, whose claim to consideration was based not
upon its own achievements but upon the length of its pedigrees,
insisted upon an amplification of its privileges which endan-
gered the economical and political interests of the state and
the nation. The time was close at hand when a Danish
10--2
148
TCH.
Christian IV, 1588-1648
1
magnate was to demonstrate to the world that he preferred
the utter ruin of his country to any abatement of his own
personal dignity.
All below the king and the nobility were generally classified
together as “subjects.” Of these lower orders the clergy stood
first in the social scale. As a spiritual estate, indeed, it had
ceased to exist at the Reformation. Since then, too, it had
become quite detached from the nobility, which ostentatiously
despised the teaching professions. The clergy recruited itself,
therefore, from the class next below it, and looked more and
more to the Crown for help and protection as it drew apart
from the gentry, who, moreover, as dispensers of patronage,
lost no opportunity of appropriating church-lands and cutting
down tithes.
The burgesses had not yet recovered from the disasters of
“Grevens Fejde”; but, while the towns had become more
dependent on the central power, they had at the same time
been released from their former vexatious subjection to the
local magnates. Within the estate of burgesses itself, too, a
levelling process had begun. The old municipal patriciate,
which used to form the connecting link between the bourgeoisie
and the nobility, had disappeared; and a feeling of common
civic fellowship had taken its place. All this tended to enlarge
the political views of the burgesses as a separate estate, and
was not without its influence on the future. Yet, after all, the
prospects of the burgesses depended mainly on economical con-
ditions; and in this respect there was a decided improvement,
due to the increasing importance of money and commerce all
over Europe, especially as the steady decline of the Hanse
towns immediately benefited the trade of Denmark-Norway.
There can indeed be no doubt that the Danish and Norwegian
merchants at the end of the sixteenth century flourished ex-
ceedingly, despite the intrusion and competition of the Dutch
and the dangers to neutral shipping arising from the frequent
wars between England, Spain, and the Netherlands.
VII] Peasantry.-Character of Christian IV 149
At the bottom of the social ladder lay the peasant estate,
whose condition had decidedly deteriorated. Only in one
respect had it been benefited by the peculiar conditions of the
sixteenth century: the rise in the price of corn, without any
corresponding rise in the land-tax, must have largely increased
its material prosperity. Yet the number of peasant proprietors
had diminished, while the obligations of the peasantry gene-
rally had increased ; and, still worse, their obligations were
vexatiously indefinite, varying from year to year and even from
month to month. They weighed especially heavily on the so-
called Ugedagsmand, who were forced to work two or three
days a week on the demesne lands. This increase of villenage,
tending as it did to reduce householders to the level of inenials,
morally depressed the peasantry, and widened still further the
breach between the yeomanry and the gentry. Politically its
consequences were disastrous. While in Sweden the free and
energetic peasant was a salutary power in the state, which he
served with both sword and plough, the Danish peasant was
sinking to the level of a bondsman.
Such then was the condition of things in Denmark when
Christian IV ascended the throne. Where so much was
necessarily uncertain and fluctuating, there was room for an
almost infinite variety of development. Much depended on
the character and personality of the young prince who had now
taken into his hands the reins of government, and for half a
century was to guide the destinies of the nation.
Christian IV, on his accession, was nineteen and a half
years old. He had developed rapidly. A year before he
had seemed a mere child ; now he was a man of stately and
commanding appearance. He had grown up agile and athletic,
always extraordinarily energetic and tenacious. His writing and
his sketches testify to a sure hand and a sense of form. Every-
thing decorative and ornamental attracted him. He was a
good linguist, speaking, besides his native tongue, German,
Latin, French and Italian Naturally cheerful and hospitable,
150
Christian IV, 1588-1648
he delighted and shone brilliantly in lively society ; but he was
also passionate and irritable, with the strong sensual inclinations
of a plethoric and life-loving temperament. Yet he was not
without the elements of many noble virtues. He possessed
unconquerable courage, a vivid sense of duty, an indefatigable
love of every sort of work, and all the inquisitive zeal, all the
inventive energy, of a born reformer. Want of self-control
ruined all these fine qualities. He was of the stuff of which
great princes are made, yet he never attained to greatness.
His own pleasure, whether it took the form of love or ambition,
was always his first consideration. In the heyday of his youth
his exuberant high spirits and passion for adventure enabled
him to surmount every obstacle with élan. But, in the decline
of life, the bitter fruits of his lack of stability became miserably
obvious; and he sank into the grave a weary and broken-hearted
old man.
Christian's marriage had been decided upon during his
minority. The bride was Anne Catherine, a daughter of
Joachim Frederick, margrave of Brandenburg; and the wedding
was celebrated at Haderslevhus on November 27, 1597. The
queen died fourteen years later, after bearing Christian six
children. The king was speedily and frequently unfaithful
to her, but four years after her death he privately wedded a
handsome young gentlewoman, Christina Munk, by whom he
had no fewer than twelve children. This connexion was
disastrous indeed to Denmark.
The early years of the young king were largely devoted to
pleasure; and his court was one of the most joyous and mag-
nificent in Europe. Yet his superabundant energy also found
time for work of the most various and comprehensive descrip-
tion. To begin with, a whole series of domestic reforms was
originated. The harbours of Copenhagen, Elsinore, and other
towns were enlarged; a postal system for the whole of Denmark
was established in 1624; many decaying towns were abolished
and many new ones founded under more promising conditions,
chicen died folat Haderstave of Br
VII] Domestic Reforms of Christian IV
151
including Christiania, which grew up in August, 1624, on the
ruins of the ancient city of Oslo. Some of these places were
to serve as staples and fortresses at the same time, like Glück-
stadt, built among the marshes of the Elbe to rival Hamburg
and defend Holstein. Various attempts were also made to
improve trade and industry by abolishing the still remaining
privileges of the Hanseatic towns, by promoting a wholesale
immigration of skilful and well-to-do Dutch traders and handi-
craftsmen into Denmark under most favourable conditions, by:
opening up the rich fisheries of the Arctic seas, and by esta-
blishing joint-stock chartered companies, such as the Danish
East India Company with its headquarters at Tranquebar,
founded in 1616; the Danish Ceylon Company of 1618, which
was to expel the Portuguese from the island; the Icelandic
Company of 1619, and the West India Company of 1625; yet
most of them ended in failure, due mainly to want of foresight,
insufficient capital, and the disasters befalling the Dano-Dutch
shipping. Copenhagen especially benefited by Christian IV's
commercial policy. He enlarged and embellished it, and pro-
vided it with new harbours and fortifications; in short, did his
best to make it the worthy capital of a great empire.
On the national defences Christian IV'also bestowed much
care. Ancient fortresses were repaired and enlarged; new ones
were constructed under the direction of Dutch engineers. In
the fleet he was still more interested. Some of the new war-ships
were built after his own designs; and he had many foreign ship-
builders in his employment. Whereas in 1596 the Danish navy
had consisted of but twenty-two vessels, in 1610 the number
had risen to sixty. The formation of a nationál army was
attended with greater difficulties, inasmuch as both the military
capacity and the willingness of the people to contribute towards
the maintenance of armaments had sensibly declined since the
Middle Ages. This was due to the superior attraction of
peaceful pursuits and the progressive costliness of modern
warfare. War had everywhere become a technical pursuit ;
152
Christian IV, 1588–1648
ICH
and the bulk of the army consisted of mercenaries led by
professional officers. Christian also was obliged to depend
upon hired troops, supported by native levies recruited for the
most part from the peasantry on the crown domains, the gentry
in this, as in many other respects, exhibiting a disgraceful back-
wardness.
But it was in the foreign policy of the government that the
royal influence was most perceptible. Unlike Sweden, Denmark
had remained outside the great religious-political movements
which were the outcome of the Catholic reaction; and the
peculiarity of her position made her rather hostile than friendly
to the other Protestant states. The possession of the Sound
enabled her to close the Baltic against the western powers;
the possession of Norway carried along with it the control of
the rich fisheries, which were Danish monopolies and therefore
a source of irritation to England and Holland. Denmark,
moreover, was above all things a Scandinavian power; and
her interests and her ambition were confined to Scandinavia.
While the territorial expansion of Sweden in the near future
was a matter of necessity, Denmark had not only attained but
exceeded her national limits. Aggrandisement southwards, at
the expense of the vast German Empire, was becoming every
year more difficult; and in every other direction she had
nothing more to gain. Nay, more, Denmark's possession of the
Scanian provinces deprived Sweden of her proper geographical
frontiers.
Clearly it was Denmark's wisest policy to remain closely
allied with Sweden, especially as Sweden's political interests
were almost identical with her own. The wisest statesmen
of both countries so strongly recognised the necessity of such
an alliance that at the Peace Congress of Stettin (1570) an
arrangement had been made whereby the two Senates were
to meet periodically to compose any differences which might
arise between them. But neither Charles IX nor Christian IV
was disposed to listen to pacific counsels. Both kings were,
VII]
The Kalmar War
153
ambitious and sensitive; and there were many causes of dis-
agreement between them, chief among which were Sweden's
endeavours to secure possession of Lapmark and other districts
of northern Norway, and so gain access to the Arctic fisheries.
Charles IX's pretensions increased continually. On his coro-
nation he took the title of “King of the Lapps of Nordland”;
and the privileges conceded by him to the citizens (mostly
Dutch colonists) of the newly founded city of Gothenburg
included the right to trade and fish in the disputed districts.
But Christian IV also was by no means disposed to be accom-
modating; and the desire. of revenge was bound up with hope
of conquest and the lust of glory. Only very reluctantly did
the Danish Raad yield to his urgency. In January, 1611, he
overbore their opposition by declaring that, if they would not
aid him against Sweden, he would wage war on his own account
as duke of Sleswick and Holstein. This decided the matter;
and on April 4 Christian signed his formal declaration of war.
Christian's plan of campaign was to attack Kalmar, the
chief eastern fortress of Sweden, and occupy the southern pro-
vince of Småland as a first step towards the conquest of the
whole of Sweden. He relied as much upon the discontent of
the Swedes as upon the valour of his army. The fleet was to
co-operate by blockading the Swedish coast and keeping his
own communications open. On May 6 he crossed the border
with 6000 men, and two days later stood before Kalmar. On
May 27 the town was taken and plundered; but the fortress
stubbornly held out. On June 11 Charles IX, with a vastly
superior force of 12,000 men, hastened to Kalmar. A fortnight
later Charles's son, Gustavus Adolphus, then a youth of sixteen,
achieved his first feat of arms by capturing and destroying the
Scanian fortress of Kristianopel; and on July 7 the Swedish
fleet, under Hans Bjelkenstjerna, reprovisioned the fortress.
Christian's German generals began to despair ; but Christian
himself refused to budge, and success rewarded his doggedness.
On July 17 Charles IX attempted to crush him by force of
154
Tch.
Christian IV, 1588–1648
king at their heads of the Danish nobilit nally saved by
numbers; and a combined attack was made upon the Danish
camp from the Swedish camp and the fortress. The battle
raged furiously all day. More than once the fate of the Danes
hung upon a hair ; but the situation was finally saved by
a magnificent charge of the Danish nobility with the young
king at their head. The Swedes were finally routed; and the
glory of the day belonged indisputably to Christian IV. Four
days later the principal Danish fleet arrived. The fortress
was, now still more closely invested; and on August 4 the
new commandant of Kalmar, Krister Some, surrendered it to
Christian IV for an estate in Holstein and 1000 dollars. The
fall of Kalmar was followed by the voluntary surrender of the
adjacent isle of Öland. Success made Christian IV imperious
and hard. The entire conquest of Sweden now seemed to him
only a matter of time. He dated his letters from “Our castle
of Kalmar”; and when Charles IX, deeply moved by the loss of
the fortress, sent his youthful rival a challenge to single combat,
Christian sarcastically advised him to seek the safe seclusion
of a warm fireside. On September 11 Christian returned to
Sjælland; and the greater part of his army went into winter
quarters. But the campaign was not yet over. - In the first
week of October Gustavus Adolphus recovered Öland. At
the end of the same month Charles IX died at Nyköping
Castle. Gustavus Adolphus was proclaimed king of Sweden.
Gustavus Adolphus, with two other wars already on his
hands, earnestly desired peace with Denmark. From the first
his attitude was conciliatory. He omitted from his title the
words “King of the Lapps," and offered terms of peace on
the basis of the retrocession of Kalmar. But Christian rejected
these overtures; and the beginning of the second campaign was
also favourable to the Danes.
On May 13, 1612, Elfsborg, the most important southern
fortress of Sweden, was captured; and early in June Öland.was
retaken. But Christian failed to capture the fortress of Jönköping
as a first step towards occupying central Sweden, and returned to
VII] End of the Kalmar War 155
Copenhagen in August. By this time the western powers had
grown uneasy at the continuance of a war so mischievous to
their trade. In the summer of 1611 the States General had
sent plenipotentiaries to Denmark and Sweden to mediate a
peace, but without result. When the ambassadors reproached
Christian for warring against a fellow-Protestant, he lightly
retorted, “non agitur de religione sed de regione.” Where
the States General failed, James I of England succeeded; but
not before the combatants had been convinced of the useless-
ness of prolonging the struggle. Finally, through the efforts of
Robert Anstruther, the plenipotentiaries of both powers met at
Knäred in Halland; and there, on January 20, 1613, peace was
signed. In all essential points Sweden gave way. She renounced
her claims to the isle of Ösel and to Lapmark, conceded to the
king of Denmark the right of placing the three crowns in his
escutcheon, and engaged to pay one million rix-dollars in six
equal instalments, hypothecating in the meantime the fortress
of Elfsborg and the towns of Gothenburg, Old and New Lödöse.
All other conquests on both sides were to be restored ; and
Sweden's immunity from the Sound tolls was especially recog-
nised for the first time. Thus Denmark, once more and for
the last time, had vindicated her right to be regarded as the
greatest Scandinavian power. If Christian IV had not suc-
ceeded in subduing Sweden, he had certainly humbled her.
The relatively enormous war-indemnity in particular was a
most grievous burden. By the time the last instalment of
250,000 rix-dollars had been paid (and Christian IV would
accept nothing but ready money), all the Swedish royal silver
plate had disappeared in the mint, and the whole country
was swept clean of cash.
Yet Denmark derived no essential benefit from the
Kalmar War,” which left behind it an intense feeling of hos-
tility between the two kindred people of Scandinavia. Before
the Kalmar War there had still been the possibility of a peace-
ful union; and all classes of both kingdoms had viewed the
156
[CH.
Christian IV, 1588-1648
outbreak of hostilities with apprehension. But the Elfsborg
indemnity filled every Swedish home with bitter hatred of the
Danes; perpetual recurring toll and boundary disputes fed this
smouldering animosity; and when, in 1617, Gustavus Adolphus
acquired Ingria, and the same year conquered Pernau in Livo-
nia (cap. VIII), Christian IV perceived that the dominion of the
northern seas, which he regarded as the most precious jewel in
his crown, was about to pass away from him. Moreover a
common distrust of Denmark now began to draw the Nether-
lands and Sweden together. Oldenbarneveld regarded Sweden
as an advantageous counterpoise to Denmark in the Baltic;
and Sweden gladly seized the opportunity of securing the
amity and assistance of the Netherlands. In 1614 Gustavus
Adolphus joined the Dutch-Lübeck alliance, which was virtu-
ally an anti-Danish league.
Thus Denmark became more than ever separated from the
other Protestant powers; and, as Christian IV at first steadily
refused to contract any alliance with his co-religionists, the
Catholic powers began to have hopes of him. Spain even sent
an embassy to Copenhagen in 1619; but, though Christian
rejected her overtures, he was inclined for a time to listen to
proposals for an alliance from Sigismund of Poland, till North
Germany offered him a nearer and more convenient field for
his ambition. His object was twofold—first to obtain the
control of the great German rivers, the Elbe and the Weser,
as a means of securing his dominion of the northern seas; and
secondly to acquire the secularised German bishoprics as ap-
panages for his younger sons. Now the acquisition of these
very bishoprics was one of the burning questions of the day.
The Catholic party hoped to recover them in the near future;
nearly every North German prince of any importance, includ-
ing the dukes of Holstein, also coveted them; while Gustavus
Adolphus watchfully observed every step of his rival's policy
south of the Elbe, and offered both the Hanse towns and
the German princes his protection against Denmark. Equally
VII]
The Thirty Years' War
157
disquieted were the Netherlands by Christian's attempts to
dominate the Elbe and the Weser, for a Danish prince in
possession of the see of Bremen would be as great an obstacle
to their trade as the Sound tolls.
Meanwhile great events were happening in Germany, which
were to be decisive of the future of Europe. In May, 1618,
the Bohemian Estates rose against their Habsburg king,
Ferdinand; and, in August, 1619, they elected in his stead
the Elector Palatine Frederick V. The Thirty Years' War
now began. It soon became evident that, in vigour, capacity,
and power of cohesion, the Catholics were far superior to the
Protestants. Very, few of the German Evangelical princes sup-
ported the new king of Bohemia ; and Frederick himself was
not the man to rally a drooping cause. The battle of the
White Mountain converted him into an outlawed fugitive; and
his domains were confiscated by the Emperor. The war now
dwindled down to mere raiding, feebly fed by intermittent
Dutch subsidies. Christian IV was profoundly impressed by
this upheaval. He was not without sympathy for his nephew,
the ex-king of Bohemia, but for once he listened to the
advice of his Raad to wait the issue of events. Nevertheless
he skilfully profited by the alarm of the German Protestant
towns and princes to secure the coadjutorship to the see of
Bremen for his son Duke Frederick (September, 1621), a step
followed in November by a similar arrangement as to Werden;
while Hamburg, by the compact of Steinburg (July, 1621), was
induced to acknowledge the Danish overlordship of Holstein.
But the Catholics were also zealous at the work of ap-
propriation. In February, 1623, the Palatinate was bestowed
by the Emperor upon Maximilian of Bavaria, in direct violation
of the Imperial constitution, thereby giving the Catholics a
majority in the Electoral College. Simultaneously the troops
of Spain and the League drew nearer to the Lower Saxon
Circle; and a Catholic was elected bishop of Osnabrück.
With his eye steadily fixed upon the coveted bishoprics,
ge the Danishealous at the was bestowe
158
Christian IV, 1588-1648
CH.
Christian now felt strongly inclined, for purely political reasons,
to champion the cause of the North German Protestants ;
and in July, 1623, with the help of subsidies tardily granted
by the Raad, he began to levy troops on behalf of the Lower
Saxon Circle, concentrating his forces at Rensborg, while a
so-called defensive alliance was arranged with the princes of
that Circle. He still, indeed, professed to be neutral, but his
neutrality was rapidly becoming an armed neutrality. Tilly's
victory over Christian of Brunswick in July, 1623, the hesita-
tion of the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, and, above
all, his critical relations with Sweden during 1623, combined,
however, to make him hold his hand for a time.
But now a great change took place in the European situation.
James I at last abandoned his fruitless negotiations with Spain
and contracted an alliance with France, an alliance cemented
by the marriage of the Prince of Wales with Henrietta Maria,
the French king's daughter. Almost simultaneously (April,
1624) Cardinal Richelieu entered the French ministry; and
from that moment the house of Habsburg had a new and
irreconcilable enemy to face. To secure the co-operation of
the northern powers, Robert Anstruther was despatched to
Denmark and James Spence to Sweden. Spence's vague
representations failed to convince the far-seeing statesman-
ship of Gustavus Adolphus; but Anstruther easily persuaded
Christian IV. What weighed most with Christian was the fear
lest Gustavus Adolphus should supplant him as the leader of
the German Protestants. The Rigsraad earnestly dissuaded
him from departing from his neutrality before he was certain of
money and active assistance from his allies; and at first Christian
listened to his counsellors. But finally impatience, ambition, an
over-sanguine confidence, and, above all, jealousy of Sweden,
induced him recklessly to plunge into a war against the com-
bined forces of the Emperor and the League, without any
adequate guarantees of co-operation from abroad. His imme-
diate allies, the North German princes and towns, proved more
VII]
Christian invades Germany 159
than usually unreliable and parsimonious. At a congress held
at Lauenberg under his presidency some measures were indeed
taken for the defence of the Lower Saxon Circle (Lauenburg
recess, March 25, 1625), while the Lüneburg Kreistag elected
him its chief; but the Elector of Brandenburg would give no
promise of assistance, and the Brunswick Kreistag, which met
in May.to fix the respective military contingents of the allies,
consented to war only by a bare majority, to which Christian
himself contributed two votes.
On May 9, 1625, Christian IV quitted Denmark for the
front. At Steinburg, in southern Holstein, he mustered his
troops, consisting mainly of Germans, for, as he was waging
war as duke of Holstein, no regular levies had been made in
Denmark. He had at his disposal from fifteen to twenty
thousand infantry and four to five thousand cavalry, irre-
spective of the troops of the Lower Saxon Circle. The king
himself was generalissimo; Duke Johan Ernst of Saxe-Weimar
commanded the cavalry; and General Johan Philip Fuchs, an
old soldier of fortune," with a keener eye for difficulties than
for the means of overcoming them,” led the infantry. On
June 7 Christian crossed the Elbe and marched to Hameln,
occupying all the fortresses along the river. Unexpected
difficulties accumulated during his march. The army was
undisciplined, and ill-provided with artillery; and the officers
could not be paid because the stipulated contributions from
the Circles were not forthcoming. Tilly, who had watched
Christian's advance from his own quarters in the diocese of
Paderborn, himself crossed the Weser at Höxter on July 18;
and the Danish division, reconnoitring in the district, retired
before him. And now, just when vigorous action was essential
to Christian's success, a great misfortune befell him. On July 20,
while riding on the ramparts of Hameln, then under repair, his
horse stumbled and flung him into a deep hole. He was picked
up and carried back to Werden unconscious. A month later
he insisted upon resuming the command; but his energy was
160 Christian IV, 1588–1648 [ch.
considerably impaired for the rest of the campaign. Meanwhile
Tilly, advancing rapidly, captured Hameln and other fortresses.
Niemburg on the Weser was the first obstacle to his victorious
advance; and when Christian, in the middle of September,
relieved the place, Tilly retired to the south-eastern part of the
Lower Saxon Circle. But the old Walloon was no longer the
only enemy. A Bohemian nobleman, Albrecht Eusebius von
Waldstein, or Wallenstein, now volunteered to raise another
army for the Emperor; and by the autumn of 1625 he had
already occupied the dioceses of Magdeburg and Halberstadt.
Christian IV was still in the Lower Saxon Circle with his
headquarters at Rotenburg. The clouds had begun to clear.
Ernest of Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick had joined him ;
and the States General had invited France and the Protestant
princes to a congress at the Hague for the purpose of forming
a general alliance. The congress proved a failure, as France,
Sweden, Brandenburg, and Saxony ignored the invitation; but,
on the other hand, a treaty was signed between Denmark,
England, and the Netherlands; and the western powers pro-
mised considerable subsidies if Christian IV would maintain
an army of from thirty-five to thirty-eight thousand men against
the Emperor. Christian IV was now quite alive to the diffi-
culties of the situation, and doing his utmost to meet them.
Troops were at last levied in Denmark proper; a line of fortifi-
cation was begun between Lübeck and Hamburg to protect the
southern Danish frontier; and the Estates of Brunswick were
induced to vote a military contingent. Negotiations had also
been opened at Brunswick with Tilly and Wallenstein, but in
February, 1626, they were broken off. And now fresh disap-
pointments came thick and fast. The Netherlands sent a few
troops instead of money; but England's promises remained
unfulfilled. The duke of Holstein, too, refused to co-operate;
and George, duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, openly joined the -
Emperor.
Nevertheless Christian IV resolved to open the campaign
VII.)
The Battle of. Lutter
: 161
of 1626 by assuming the offensive. John Ernest of Saxe-
Weimar was sent westward to open communications with the
Netherlands and procure the election of Christian's second
son, Frederick, to the vacant bishopric of Osnabrück, in both
of which enterprises he succeeded, besides drawing off Tilly
from Brunswick to Paderborn. Fuchs and Mansfeld mean-
while marched westward to Silesia, to join hands with Gabriel
Bethlen, prince of Transylvania; but this hazardous enter-
prise was frustrated by Wallenstein's victory over Mansfeld
at Rosslau (April 15), whereupon Christian recalled John
Ernest from the west to reinforce Fuchs and Mansfeld.
Tilly, meanwhile, relieved from the pressure of John Ernest,
had driven Christian of Brunswick out of Hesse, and himself
advanced against Brunswick. On August 2 he captured
Göttingen and turned northward against Northeim ; where-
upon Christian, having meanwhile recalled Fuchs from the
east, resolved to attack Tilly. After relieving Northeim on
August 11, he advanced southwards towards Thuringia, with
the intention of preventing the junction of Tilly with a division
of Wallenstein's army, but failing to do so retired, pursued
in his turn, and, on August 27, 1626, was utterly routed by the
Imperialist general at Lutter in the difficult mountainous region
of the Bärenberg. Tilly's troops thereupon overran the greater
part of Werden and Brunswick.
Still more serious were the political consequences of the de-
feat of Lutter. The weak bands which hitherto had connected
the Lower Saxon towns and princes with Christian IV were
instantly snapped asunder; of all his allies only the dukes
of Mecklenburg remained faithful to him. It is greatly to the
honour of Christian IV that, in the midst of these adversities,
he displayed no lack of courage and energy. He prevailed
upon the Rigsraad to grant additional subsidies, despatched
Paul Rosenkrantz to England and France for help, and signed
a fresh treaty of alliance with Gabriel Bethlen. Yet these extra-
ordinary efforts had but poor results. Very little money was
BAIN
Į Į
162
Christian IV, 1588-1648
received from England and France; and the auxiliary corps,
under Colonel Morgan, sent by Charles I, proved altogether
inadequate. The ensuing campaign of 1627 was one of un-
mitigated disaster. An expedition to Silesia and Hungary
failed utterly; Christian lost two of his best generals, Ernest
of Mansfeld and John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, in the same
year; and a vital blow was struck at his resources when the
irresistible tide of war burst at last over Danish territory.
At midnight on July 25 Tilly forced the passage of the Elbe
at Bleckede, and by the beginning of August he was in Holstein.
A general panic ensued. The king summoned the Rigsraad
in haste to Kolding; and that body sanctioned the levying of
12,000 infantry and the arming of the whole male population
between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five. But these desperate
expedients were all too late. At the end of August Wallenstein,
after effecting a junction with Tilly at Büchen in Lauenburg,
took the supreme command and invaded Sleswick. The
Danish cavalry fled before him, leaving the defence of the
isolated fortresses to English, Scotch, and French mercenaries.
In a couple of days northern Sleswick was a reeking wilderness.
Amidst the general confusion Christian himself lost his head,
abandoned Jutland to its fate, and never rested till he had
reached the safe seclusion of Dalum Minster, near Odense.
Like the locusts of Apollyon, Wallenstein's mercenaries
swooped down upon Jutland, ravaging, burning, and plundering
the defenceless country. Denmark itself seemed paralysed.
From the first the Raad had been against the war; and its
disastrous issue was the Raad's best justification. The king
was blamed not only for the military disasters, but for the
ravaging of Jutland; sharp notes passed between him and
his senators; the nobility showed ominous signs of disloyalty ;
and the distribution of the subsidies, grudgingly granted to
him in May, 1628, was administered by commissioners in-
dependent of the Crown. Abroad the outlook was not
encouraging. Tilly, in the course of the autumn and winter,
VII] Progress of the War 163
had conquered all that remained to be conquered in the Lower
Saxon Circle; and the war now proceeding between England
and France deprived Denmark of her last hope of assistance
from the West. No wonder that the house of Habsburg now
began to dream of a universal empire. At Vienna and Madrid
the most extravagant projects were entertained. All the Pro-
testant sees were to be Catholicised; Sleswick was to become a
fief of the Empire; while Jutland was to be sold to Spain. An
Imperial fleet was to dominate the Baltic with the double object
of menacing Denmark and assisting Poland against Sweden;
while the trade of the Dutch was to be transferred to the Han-
seatic towns. Wallenstein, to whose fantastic imagination nothing
seemed impossible, received from the Emperor, in the course
of 1628, the title of “Captain-General of the Oceanic and Baltic
Seas,” together with the forfeited duchies of Mecklenburg as an
appanage. Negotiations were also entered into with the duke
of Gottorp for making his port of Frederiksstad a naval station
for the Spanish fleet.
. But the very magnitude of the Habsburg plans benefited
Denmark by alarming the other Protestant powers for their
own safety. Christian IV, who had by this time recovered
his usual energy and gained some slight advantages at sea,
was provided by the Dutch with muniments of war sufficient,
to enable the fortresses of Krempe and Glückstadt to hold
out against Wallenstein; and on January 1, 1628, an alliance
was signed with Sweden, whereby Gustavus Adolphus pledged
himself to assist Denmark with a fleet in case of need. In
February, 1628, Wallenstein, to gain a footing on the Baltic,
sent General Hans Georg von Arnim to besiege the Hanseatic
city of Stralsund, which had refused to admit an Imperial
garrison. Stralsund appealed to Denmark and Sweden for
help; and each power despatched an auxiliary corps. Simul-
taneously Christian led an expedition against Pomerania and
captured Usedom and Wolgast, thus compelling Wallenstein
to abandon the siege of Stralsund in order to recover these
I I---2
164
[CH.
Christian IV, 1588–1648
places; while the intervention of Gustavus Adolphus confronted
Wallenstein with fresh difficulties. In these circumstances the
Emperor became more inclined to make peace with Denmark;
and a congress was accordingly opened at Lübeck in January,
1629. The terms of the Imperial plenipotentiaries presented
on March 2 were outrageous. They demanded nothing less
than the cession of the duchies, the surrender of Jutland to
the Elector of Saxony, the abandonment of the North German
bishoprics, the payment of the expenses of the war, and the
closing of the Sound against all the enemies of the house of
Habsburg. Subsequently, however, secret negotiations were
opened by Wallenstein with Christian's delegates; and on
May 27 a treaty was ratified whereby Jutland and the duchies
were restored to Denmark, Christian IV undertaking in return
to renounce the North German dioceses, and to abstain alto-
gether from interference in German affairs.
The Peace of Lübeck was hailed in Denmark with general
satisfaction. The four years' war had ended more favourably
than anyone had dared to hope; all danger for the future seemed
· averted; no cession of territory had been made; no war-indem-
nity demanded. In his relief Christian IV ordered a medal to
be struck with the inscription: “Tandem bona causa triumphat!”.
though it would have been equally difficult to explain what the
good cause was or how it had triumphed. Yet the war had
seriously injured the country. Even those provinces which had ·
· not been occupied by the enemy had suffered severely from the
levying of taxes and the quartering of troops; while Jutland was
so impoverished that fiscally it was likely to remain unproduc-
tive for some time to come. The material damage was accom-
panied by a still more alarming moral retrogression. In many
places downright anarchy prevailed; the laws were no longer
respected, the authorities no longer obeyed. Moreover the
almost general cowardice, slackness, and imbecility of the gentry
during the war had justly provoked against them the anger
and the hatred of the burgesses and peasants. Never since
TYT
VII] Christina Munk and Vibeke Kruse 165
"Grevens Fejde” had the tide of indignation against the privi-
leged classes risen so high and raged so fiercely. So strong
was this feeling of outraged patriotism that, in the course of
1629, delegates from the Jutland towns met at Viborg, and
again at Ry; and a petition was presented to the king urging
him to help the towns and the peasantry to their rights again,
and to take measures for promoting the national defence irre-
spective of the privileges of the nobility.
Unfortunately this truly national movement, which might
have been the beginning of better things, had no result ;
everything points to the melancholy fact that at this crisis
Christian IV was a broken man. His energy was temporarily
paralysed by accumulated misfortunes. Not only his political
hopes, but his domestic happiness had suffered shipwreck. In
the course of 1628 he discovered a scandalous intrigue of his
wife, Christina Munk, with one of his German officers, the
Rhinegrave Otto Ludwig von Salm; and when he put her away
the lady revenged herself by giving private political information
to the Swedish resident at Elsinore, and endeavoured to cover
up her own disgrace by only too successfully conniving at
an intrigue between Vibeke Kruse, one of her discharged
maids, and the king. In January, 1630, the rupture became
final ; and Christina and her mother retired to their estates in
Jutland. Meanwhile Christian openly acknowledged Vibeke as
his mistress; and she bore him a numerous family, upon whom
he wasted large sums of money. Vibeke's children were of
course the natural enemies of the children of Christina Munk;
and the hatred between the two families was not without in-
fluence on the future history of Denmark.
Nor was the measure of Christian's wretchedness even yet
filled up. In October, 1631, he lost his mother, Queen Sophia,
who had always been a financial support as well as an affec-
tionate parent; while in August, 1633, his youngest son, Duke
Ulric, by far the most promising of the Danish princes, was
assassinated in Silesia. And at this very time Denmark was
166
1
Christian IV, 1588–1648
.
CHvisited by one national calamity after another. In September,
1629, Frederick II's splendid castle of Kronborg was destroyed
by fire; the next few years were memorable for a series of
epidemics ; and in October, 1634, a terrible storm devastated
the south-west coasts of Jutland. And all this time the country
was groaning beneath a hitherto unprecedented load of taxa-
tion. Between 1600 and 1614 fourteen separate subsidies,
amounting to 1,900,000 rix-dollars, had been levied; and
during the years 1629–1643 no fewer than thirty-five subsi-
dies, amounting to 3,900,000 rix-dollars, were imposed in the
proportion of two-thirds to Denmark and one-third to Norway.
Of this amount 2,500,000 rix-dollars were applied to the main-
tenance of a standing army. In Denmark proper the peasantry
paid about three-fourths, and the clergy and the towns the rest
of this relatively enormous impost. Nevertheless, between 1629
and 1643 the monarchy gained both in popularity and influence.
During that period Christian obtained the control of the foreign
policy of Denmark as well as of the Sound tolls, and, towards
the end of it, he hoped to increase his power still further with
the assistance of his sons-in-law, who now came prominently
forward.
Even after his divorce from Christina Munk, Christian IV
dearly loved his seven daughters by her, despite their growing
hatred of his children by Vibeke Kruse; and he was at some
pains to provide the former with suitable husbands who should
share their splendour and increase his own authority. All these
young “countesses” had one feature in common, an inordinate
idea of their superior dignity as the king's daughters, and a
determination to enjoy the privileges attached to that dignity
to the very uttermost at their country's expense. Of their hus-
bands only two deserve especial mention, Korfits Ulfeld and
Hannibal Sehested. Ulfeld, the son of the respected chancellor,
Jacob Ulfeld, was born in 1606; Hannibal Sehested was three
years younger. Both of them received abroad the best education
that the age could offer them ; both of them entered the royal
7
vi] Hannibal Sehested and Korfits Ulfeld 167
service on their return home; and to each of them a daughter
of the king, while still a child, was solemnly betrothed, Leonora
Christina to Ulfeld and Christiana to Sehested. Ulfeld's age
gave him the advantage of his brother-in-law. His marriage
took place in 1636, Sehested's six years later, whereupon both
took their seats in the Rigsraad. Sehested was entrusted with
missions abroad. His lucid intellect, brilliant social gifts, and
consummate tact made him an ideal diplomatist; nor did his
cynicism, inveterate sensuality, and all-embracing egotism stand
in the way of his advancement. In 1642 he was made stadt-
holder of Norway, and in that capacity displayed administrative
ability of a high order. Ulfeld, the most striking personality at
the Danish court, was at first mostly employed at home. In
all superficial graces and mental accomplishments he far out-
shone his compeers. Yet, if his parts were brilliant, his nature
was base; and his ambition, avarice, and absolute lack of honour
and conscience were to convert him at no distant day into a
traitor and a scoundrel. But now, with a wife by his side who
was at once the most beautiful, the most talented, the most
courageous, and the most unscrupulous of the king's daughters,
he was the natural leader of the royal sons-in-law; and his ap-
pointment in 1643 to the dignity of lord high steward made
him at the same time the first minister of the Crown.
Even at the lowest ebb of his fortunes Christian IV had
never lost the hope of retrieving them; and between 1629 and
1643 the European situation presented infinite possibilities to
speculative politicians with a taste for adventure. The Thirty
Years' War was losing more and more of its original character
of a war of religion. Political considerations overbore all other.
The growing tension between the two Protestant Scandinavian
powers threatened a speedy rupture; and Catholic France had
extended the hand of friendship to Gustavus Adolphus. The
whole struggle, in fact, was merging into a trial of strength
between the houses of Bourbon and Habsburg. A statesman
at Copenhagen, like Griffenfeld for instance, would have made
168
ſch.
Christian IV, 1588-1648
his opportunities and profited by them. Unfortunately, with all
his gifts, Christian IV was no statesman. He was incapable of
a consistent policy, and preferred playing with half-a-dozen con-
tradictory projects to steadily adopting any one of them. Thus
he would neither conciliate Sweden, henceforth his most dan-
gerous neighbour, nor guard himself against her by a definite
system of counter-alliances. In a word, his whole diplomatic
system was pettifogging and tortuous. Despite the Peace of
Lübeck, he still hoped to recover his influence in North
Germany, especially on the Elbe. His attempt, in 1630, to
enforce the Compact of Steinburg, whereby Hamburg had
acknowledged the sovereignty of Holstein in 1621, led indeed
to the humiliation of the Hanse town, but at the same time
alienated Christian from all his contingent allies, who resented
the imposition of tolls upon the Elbe trade by Denmark.
Meanwhile Sweden, by the acquisition of Livonia and the
Prussian littoral, was becoming a dangerous rival in the
Baltic; and with ever-increasing bitterness Christian watched
the steady development of her power. Moreover, despite all
his efforts to prevent it, Gustavus Adolphus in 1630 landed
in Germany actively to participate in the great European
struggle.
To say nothing of its world-wide significance, the interven-
tion marks a turning-point in Scandinavian history. Gustavus
Adolphus had practically supplanted Christian IV. The exten-
sion of the Swedish dominion along the Baltic threatened the
very heart of Denmark. The hegemony of the North was to be
fought out on the battlefields of Germany. It was therefore with
a secret feeling of relief that Christian, two years later, received
the news of his great rival's death at Lützen, though his tears of
sympathy, on first hearing the tidings of that tragedy, were per-
fectly sincere. For the position of Sweden in Germany seemed
weaker than before, and the position of Denmark stronger. On
the other hand, Axel Oxenstjerna, who now controlled the des-
tinies of Sweden, rightly regarded his country as primarily a
VII]
Christian's hostility to Sweden
169
in Novem conceded some minoring in fa
Scandinavian power; and his policy was therefore more acutely
anti-Danish than his great master's had been.
Christian IV now bent all his efforts towards minimising the
influence of Sweden in Germany by mediating in favour of the
Emperor, and contrived to glean some minor advantages. Thus
in 1633 the Emperor conceded the Elbe tolls to him for four
years; and in November, 1634, the Estates of Bremen elected
his son, Duke Frederick, archbishop of Bremen. Encouraged
by these successes, but still more alarmed by the progress of the
Swedes, Christian, at the same time that he offered his mediation,
concluded a secret compact with the Emperor against Sweden.
In the spring of 1637 a congress, under the mediation of
Denmark, met at Hamburg; and on December 15, 1641, pre-
liminaries were drawn up, subsequently to be submitted to a
definitive peace congress which was to assemble at Münster and
Osnabrück in March, 1642. Christian's position as the arbiter
of the peace of Europe was imposing enough, but so far from
bringing him any corresponding political advantages it only
embroiled him with Sweden. And yet to hinder the expan-
sion of Sweden's power south of the Baltic was indubitably
the correct policy for Denmark. Sweden in those days was
an aggressive power; her leading statesmen were restless and
ambitious, and they knew they could always count upon
the strong anti-Danish feeling of the Swedish people. The
domination of the North was the object they set before them ;
and only Denmark. barred the way. Well aware of this,
Christian IV should have avoided what we now call “a policy
of pin-pricks,” which irritates without disabling; but this, unfor-
tunately, was just the sort of policy he pursued by preference.
Still more reprehensible was his neglect of the most
ordinary diplomatic precautions. With a war with Sweden on
the threshold, it should have been his first duty to provide
Denmark with serviceable allies; and the most obvious of
such allies were the United Provinces, whose treaty with
Sweden expired in 1629, and whose resentment at the ruinous
170 Christian IV, 1588–1648 [CH.
tolls levied by the Swedish government in all the ports of
Livonia, Prussia, Pomerania, and Mecklenburg was then at its
height. Denmark thus possessed an unrivalled opportunity of
supplanting Sweden as the ally of the Dutch; and the Rigsraad
again and again counselled such an approximation. Unfortu-
nately the king, intent on smaller momentary advantages, not
only neglected the far weightier matter of the Dutch alliance,
but proceeded to irritate the United Provinces by his diplomatic
coquetries with Spain. Sehested was sent to Madrid in August,
1640; and by his raising of the Sound tolls—the income thence
derived rising from 230,000 to 600,000 rix-dollars in a couple
of years—Christian IV forfeited the amity of the United Pro-
vinces at the most critical period of his career. So strong
was the Dutch animus against Denmark during 1640 that a
rupture seemed imminent; and in September the alliance
between Holland and Sweden was renewed for fifteen years,
an alliance tacitly directed against Denmark.
In Sweden Christian IV's toll policy was still more bitterly
resented. By the Peace of Knäred Swedish subjects had been
guaranteed exemption from the Sound tolls; but Christian refused
to extend this privilege to the newly acquired Swedish provinces,
or to Swedish merchandise carried in Dutch ships. He also
refused to allow muniments of war to pass through the Sound
at the very time when Sweden's metal industry and the manu-
facture of arms and powder supplied her with some of her most
lucrative exports. All these vexations and grievances had long
convinced Swedish statesmen that a war with Denmark was
only a question of time; and in the spring of 1643 it seemed
to them that the time had come. They were now able for the
first time to attack Denmark from the south as well as from the
east; the Dutch alliance promised to secure them at sea; and
—what was most important-an attack upon Denmark would
prevent her from utilising the impending peace negotiations to
the prejudice of Sweden, for a belligerent could not mediate.
In May Axel Oxenstjerna laid the matter before the
V11] Torstensson's Invasion of Jutland 171
Riksråd; and it was agreed that war should begin if the Danish
Rigsraad, upon due representations being made to them, failed
to induce Christian to change his policy. The same day orders
were sent to Lennart Torstensson, then in the heart of Moravia,
to march to the Baltic coast, cross the Holstein frontier, penetrate
as far as possible into Jutland, and provide for a simultaneous in-
vasion of Fünen and Sjælland. A sharp note was then directed
to the Danish Raad; but nobody in Denmark regarded it in the
light of an ultimatum. By the end of September Torstensson
received his instructions. After arranging a truce with the
Imperial commander Gallas, he set out on his march north-
wards. On December 12 he had crossed the border; and
within a week all Holstein, except the fortresses of Glückstadt
and Krempe, was in his possession. By January 9, 1644, he
had penetrated into North Jutland; a Danish force of 5.000
men, encamped at Snöghoj, surrendered after a few days'
cannonade; and by January 20 the whole peninsula was
occupied and the islands threatened. This totally unexpected
attack, conducted from first to last with consummate ability and
lightning-like rapidity, caused a terrible panic in Denmark.
From Jutland, still mindful of the horrors of sixteen years
before, there was a general exodus; everyone who could fly,
fled. Nor was this all. A fresh danger now appeared on
Denmark's political horizon. Frederick III, duke of Holstein-
Gottorp, purchased neutrality by surrendering his fortresses
to the enemy. The first step in the fatal approximation of
Holstein to Sweden had been taken.
· Fortunately, in the midst of almost universal helplessness
and confusion, there was still one man who knew his duty and
had the courage to do it, and that man was Christian IV. In
his sixty-sixth year he once more displayed something of the
magnificent energy of his triumphant youth. Night and day he
laboured to levy armies and equip fleets. The forces at his
disposal amounted to about 6000 horse and 20,000 foot; and
in the Christmas week of 1643 he set off for Fünen to take
172
CH.
Christian IV, 1588-1648
supreme command. Fortunately, too, the Swedish government
delayed hostilities in Scania till February, 1644, so that, when
Gustavus Horn crossed the eastern border, he found the Danes
prepared to meet him; and, though he quickly captured Lund
and Helsingborg, the incomparably more important Malmö
resisted him. In the eastern provinces, indeed, the war was
from first to last of the usual brutal guerilla type, a war of
harrying, burning, and plundering; but the islands, the cradle
of the monarchy, remained intact. Torstensson was unable to
cross over to Fünen; an Imperial commissioner appeared at
Copenhagen to negotiate an alliance with Denmark; and the
United Provinces, divided between alarm at the triumphs of
Sweden and a desire for revenge upon Denmark, long hesitated
between peace and war. At length the representations of the
Swedish envoy, Ludvig de Geer, prevailed; and in April, 1644,
an auxiliary fleet, under Admiral Martin Thijssen, sailed from
Holland to assist Torstensson to transport his troops to Fünen.
But Christian's fleet was ready for it; and on May 16 the
squadrons encountered each other between Sild and Rönnö on
the west coast of Sleswick. Though superior to the Danish,
Thijssen's fleet, after a hard fight, was compelled to retire; and
eight days later it was so badly beaten by Admirals Ove Gjedde
and Pros Mund that it returned to Holland. On June 1 the
Swedish fleet of forty sail, under Klas Fleming, sailed from
Stockholm to Kiel to convey Torstensson and his troops to
Sjælland. Christian IV, with a somewhat superior fleet, quitted
Copenhagen to seek the enemy on June 29. The two fleets
encountered each other off Kolberger Heide in the south-east
portion of Kiel Bay on July 1, on which occasion Christian IV
displayed a heroism which endeared him ever afterwards to the
Danish nation, and made his name famous in song and story.
As he stood on the quarter-deck of the Trinity a cannon close
by was exploded by a Swedish bullet, and splinters of wood
and metal wounded the king in thirteen places, blinding one
eye, damaging his right ear, and flinging him to the deck. But
VII]
Heroism of Christian IV
173
he was instantly on his feet again, cried with a loud voice that
it was well with him, and set everyone an example of duty by
remaining on deck till the fight was over. Darkness at last
separated the contending fleets; and, though the battle was a
drawn one, the Danish fleet showed its superiority by blockading
the Swedish ships in Kiel Bay.
In Jutland also things began to look more hopeful. In the
middle of July the Imperialists, under Gallas, marched into
Holstein. Torstensson's position seemed to be critical. But
again the tide turned. On July 30 the Swedish fleet, favoured
by the wind, emerged from Kiel Bay; the Danish admiral,
Peder Galt, neglected a favourable opportunity of attacking it,
and the Swedes escaped to Bornholm. Peder Galt was incon-
tinently tried and shot for his stupidity, but that did not mend
matters. On land, too, Christian's hopes were disappointed.
Gallas retreated to the south-east; Torstensson at once pursued
him; and in the beginning of September Jutland was reoccupied
by the Swedes. Meanwhile, owing to the untiring exertions of
Ludvig de Geer, another Dutch fleet of twenty-two sail left
Holland; and a thrill of dismay passed through Denmark when
the fortress of Kronborg, which was supposed to dominate the
narrow waters of the Sound, proved powerless to arrest the
progress of the Dutch ships, which, on August 9, passed Elsinore
unscathed. By the end of September the Dutch and Swedish
fleets, together forty sail, had united, and on October 13 this
Imperial armament encountered the Danish admiral, with only
seventeen ships, between Femern and Laaland, and, after a
stubborn fight, annihilated his squadron.
Denmark's military resources were now exhausted; there
was no hope of any further assistance from the Emperor; and
all negotiations in other directions proved fruitless. In these
desperate circumstances Christian IV gladly accepted the
proffered mediation of France and the United Provinces, both
of them anxious to release the Swedish armies for further
service in Germany; and a peace congress was opened on
174
Tch.
Christian IV, 1588-1648
February 8, 1645, at Brömsebro on Kalmar Sound, near the
Dano-Swedish frontier. The negotiations were protracted till
August 13, when a peace was signed whereby Sweden acquired
definitively the islands of Ösel and Gothland, the provinces of
Jemteland and Herjedal, and Halland for thirty years. The
freedom from the Sound tolls was also extended to Sweden's
Baltic provinces. On the same day, by the Treaty of
Kristianopel, very considerable reductions in the Sound and
the Norwegian tolls were conceded to the Dutch.
The Peace of Brömsebro was the first of the long series of
treaties, extending down to our own days, which mark the
progressive shrinkage of Danish territory into an irreducible
minimum. Sweden's appropriation of Danish soil had begun;
and at the same time Denmark's power of resisting the encroach-
ments of Sweden was correspondingly reduced. The Danish
national debt, too, had risen enormously, while the sources of
future income and consequent recuperation had diminished or
disappeared. The Sound tolls, for instance, in consequence of
the treaties of Brömsebro and Kristianopel, had sunk from
400,000 to 140,000 rix-dollars; and the Elbe tolls, by a special
agrcement with Hamburg, 1645, had been abandoned altogсther.
The political influence of the Crown, moreover, despite the
energy and heroism displayed by Christian IV during the war,
had inevitably been weakened, inasmuch as the foreign policy,
for which the king was mainly responsible, had suffered total
shipwreck. The conduct of foreign affairs therefore now began
to glide out of his hands. It was a significant symptom of the
decline of the royal authority when Christian, in August, 1645,
resigned his exclusive right to fill up vacancies in the Rigsraad;
henceforth he was to choose from among eight nominees prc-
· sented to him by the Raad itself.
The last years of the dejected monarch were still further
embittered by sordid differences with his sons-in-law, especially
with the most ambitious of them, Korfits Ulfeld. Christian
'attributed the naval collapse of 1644 to the remissness of Ulfeld;
V11] Rupture between Christian and Ulfeld
175
and the unlucky result of the peace negotiations, during which
Ulfeld was the chief Danish negotiator, embittered Christian
still further against him. When the Treaty of Brömsebro was
signed, there was a violent scene between the king and Ulfeld;
yet, when Ulfeld offered his resignation, the king durst not
accept it. Personal grievances still further exacerbated what was
originally a political quarrel, for, during and after the war, the
long simmering ill-will between Christina Munk's children and
the children of Vibeke Kruse, whose influence remained un-
impaired, flamed up anew, especially when Vibeke's daughter,
Elizabeth Sophia, was affianced to Major-General Klaus
Ahlefeld. Matters proceeded to such lengths that Christian
felt justified in detaining Christina Munk (February, 1646)
in her Jutland manor-house, and depriving her of the control
of her property. This last step was regarded by the nobility in
general as a violation of the charter; and all the king's sons-in-
law thereupon combined against him. In December the rupture
was patched up; and Ulfeld, acute enough to perceive that an
alliance with the Netherlands was the best counterpoise against
Sweden, obtained the king's consent to depart, as ambassador
extraordinary, to the Hague to bring about more friendly rela-
tions between the two countries. A defensive alliance, indeed,
owing to divergent opinions in the Netherlands and to Swedish
intrigues, he was unable to accomplish ; but, after protracted
negotiations, he succeeded in obtaining a treaty (February, 1647)
regulating the long-pending toll question.
The results of his embassy by no means corresponded to their
costliness, and, when he returned to Denmark in July, 1647, he
found the king profoundly irritated against him, and his rival,
Hannibal Sehested, in almost exclusive possession of the royal
confidence. Ulfeld, supported by the Raad and the nobility, who
resented the elevation of Vibeke's children, and objected to the
whole commercial and fiscal policy of the king, was emboldened
openly to resist both his father-in-law and his brother-in-law,
and triumphed completely. Broken by age, illness, misfortunes
176
CH. VII
Christian IV, 1588–1648
and excesses, the old king finally gave way on every point.
His last dream of aggrandising the royal power had failed
utterly. The aristocracy, the Rigsraad, the faction of the sons-
in-law had triumphed. Christian IV never recovered from the
shock of this last humiliation. On February 21, 1648, at his
earnest request, the dying monarch was carried in a litter from
Frederiksborg to his beloved Copenhagen, where he expired a
week later in his 71st year. Rarely has a life which opened
with such brilliant promise ended in such dismal and unmiti-
gated failure. Christian's cardinal defect was to overvalue his
own abilities and the resources of his country; and he paid the
penalty of his miscalculation to the very last farthing. Yet his
manly figure, standing boldly out as it does against a murky
background of almost universal egotism and cowardice, looks
bright and heroic by the contrast.
CHAPTER VIII.
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS AND AXEL OXENSTJERNA,
1611-1644.
WHEN Charles IX died at Nyköping on October 30, 1611,
he left his country environed with dangers. The Danes held
the two chief fortresses of Sweden, and the heart of the land
lay open before them; the disruption of Russia had forced
upon Sweden a policy of conquest over-seas, with altogether
inadequate resources ; and victorious Poland, already in posses-
sion of Moscow, was preparing to expel the intrusive Swedes
from her Baltic provinces. The grievous burden of empire
now rested on the shoulders of a youth of seventeen, whose
title to the throne, if not disputed, was at least disputable. Yet
the dying monarch rightly judged that he was leaving his
affairs in better hands than his own. Ille faciet were the
prophetic words with which, on his death-bed, he indicated
to his counsellors his eldest son as his successor.
Gustavus Adolphus was born at Stockholm Castle on
December 9, 1594. From the first he was carefully nurtured,
to be the future prop of Protestantism, by his austere father.
Gustavus was well grounded in the classics, and his linguistic
accomplishments were extraordinary. He may be said to have
grown up with two mother-tongues, Swedish and German ; at
twelve he had mastered Latin, Italian, and Dutch, and he
learnt subsequently to express himself in Spanish, Russian, and
Polish. But his practical father took care that he should grow
BAIN
I 2
178 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
up a prince, not a pedant. So early as his ninth year he was
introduced to public life; at thirteen he received petitions and
conversed officially with the foreign ministers; at fifteen he
administered his duchy of Vestmannland and opened the
Örebro Riksdag with a speech from the throne ; indeed from
1610 he may be regarded as his father's co-regent. In all
martial and chivalrous accomplishments he was already an
adept; and when, a year later, he succeeded to supreme power,
his superior ability was as uncontested as it was incontestable,
while a singularly winning exterior and a peculiar charm of
manner, the index of a noble heart, predisposed all men in
his favour.
For the first six weeks after the death of Charles IX there
was an interregnum in Sweden. Some doubt existed as to
who was the lawful king. It is true that by the decree of the
Norrköping Riksdag, which transferred the right of succession
to the line of Duke Charles, Gustavus was the legitimate heir
to the throne; yet, by the natural law of descent, setting aside
Sigismund and his line, Duke John of Östergötland, the son
of John III, was the rightful heir. Charles IX himself had
maintained in his last will that the duke's natural right
stood higher than any parliamentary decree. The matter was
settled by the Nyköping Riksdag of 1611, which assembled
on December 10. John himself opened Parliament, and, six
days later, publicly surrendered the government to Gustavus
Adolphus, at the same time bestowing his benediction on the
young king, and exhorting him to govern the realm according
to God's Word and the law of Sweden—a picture of kinsmanlike
goodwill, as edifying as it was unusual in the Vasa family. On
January 6, 1612, Gustavus Adolphus dismissed the Estates,
after signing a royal assurance whereby the liberty and property
of the subject were eſſectually secured against royal tyranny in
the future, the privileges of the gentry were confirmed, and
the political influence of the Råd was increased at the expense
both of the Crown and the people. Henceforth the king was
VIII]
Gustavus's War with Russia
179
not to declare war, conclude peace, alter old or make new
laws, without the knowledge or consent of the Råd and the
Riksdag. The Råd, moreover, was also to control the im-
position of tolls and taxes and to decide when the Riksdag
was to be summoned. It was fortunate that the well-defined
prerogatives of an hereditary monarchy and the sturdy inde-
pendence of the lower Estates effectually counterpoised the
authority of the patricians, and saved Sweden from the almost
inevitable abuses of an oligarchy from which Denmark was
already beginning to suffer.
The first act of the young king was to terminate the
fratricidal struggle with Denmark-Norway. He had made
plain his pacific dispositions a few days after his succession
by omitting from his royal title the words, "King of the Lapps
of Nordland,” whereby his father had given such offence to
the Danes; but it was not till a couple of years later that the
struggle was terminated by the Peace of Knäred (January 28,
1613, (p. 155).
Simultaneouslyanother war, also an heritage from Charles IX,
had been proceeding in the far distant regions round Lakes
Ilmen, Peipus, and Ladoga, with Great Novgorod as its centre.
It was not, however, like the Danish war, a national danger,
but a political speculation meant to be remunerative and com-
pensatory. We have already seen (p. 141) how Jacob De la
Gardie, the Swedish commander in those parts, occupied Great
Novgorod in the summer of 1611. Sword in hand, he com-
pelled the citizens of the richest city in Moscovy to accept the
suzerainty of Sweden, and acknowledge Duke Charles Philip,
Gustavus Adolphus's brother, as their Tsar. Already Swedish
statesmen began to imagine a trans-Baltic dominion extending
from Lake Ilmen northwards to Archangel, and eastwards to
Vologda.
The spontaneous election of Michael Romanov as Tsar
of Moscovy by the Russian clergy and people in February,
1613, dissipated this dream of empire. Gustavus himself
12-2
180 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
ultimately recognised its futility, though at first he was dis-
posed to retain Great Novgorod and unite it with Sweden,
as Lithuania had been united to Poland. But even this
modified ambition had soon to be abandoned. In vain did
the Swedes, in the course of 1612, conquer one.Ingrian fortress
after another; Pskov, the most important stronghold in those
parts, regarded by Sweden, Russia, and Poland alike as the
key of Livonia, steadily resisted them; the Russians began to
concentrate their forces west of Lake Peipus; and, by the end
of 1613, De la Gardie felt insecure in Great Novgorod itself.
The conclusion of the Danish war, however, released large
bodies of troops for service in the Baltic provinces; and in the
summer of 1614 Gustavus himself arrived at the seat of war.
At Narva he joined the division which had succeeded on
September 10 in recapturing Gdov from the Russians. De la
Gardie's position, meanwhile, had been secured by his victories
over the Moscovites at Bronitsi and Staraya Russa; but the
campaign as a whole proved abortive. On July 8, 1615,
Gustavus a second time crossed the seas, and, on the 30th,
stood before Pskov; but, though a breach was made in the
walls, every effort to take the stubbornly defended fortress
failed; and in the middle of October Gustavus was forced to
raise the siege and retire to Finland. It was on this occasion
that what may be regarded as the first Finnish Landtag was
held at Helsingfors (January, 1616).
By this time Swedish statesmen had become convinced of
the impossibility of partitioning reunited Moscovy; while Mos-
covy (perpetually harried in the west by the Polacks, in the
south by the Tatars, and in the north by myriads of free-
booters, the outcrop of the national misery) recognised the
necessity of buying off the invincible Swedes by some cession
of territory. The new Tsar had already invited the good offices
of England; and a peace congress was opened at the village
of Dederina. The negotiations were protracted over eighteen
months, and only came to a conclusion when the Swedish
VIII]
The Peace of Stolbova
181
delegates openly threatened an immediate resumption of hos-
tilities. Finally, on February 27, 1617, peace was signed at
Stolbova. Moscovy ceded to Sweden the provinces of Kexholm
and Ingria, including the fortress of Nöteborg on the Neva (the
subsequent Schlüsselburg), the key of Finland. Russia further-
more renounced all claims upon Esthonia and Livonia, and
paid a war-indemnity of 20,000 rubles. In return for these
concessions Sweden surrendered Great Novgorod, and ac-
knowledged Michael Romanov as Tsar of Moscovy. The
Peace of Stolbova denotes the high-water mark of Sweden's
progression eastwards. Gustavus had succeeded in excluding
Moscovy from the Baltic. “I hope to God,” he declared
to the Stockholm Riksdag of 1617, when he announced the
conclusion of peace, “that the Russians will feel it a bit
difficult to skip over that little brook.” He recognised, indeed,
the latent strength of the vast Russian empire, and warned his
subjects that, if only the Russians learnt justly to appreciate
their own resources, and succeeded in recovering their lost
territory, they would become a menace to Europe. But at
the same time he undoubtedly underestimated the danger of
attempting forcibly to cut Russia off from her natural means
of communication with the western world; and he never
realised how impossible it was for a nation numbering scarce
a million, even when armed with the weapons of a superior
civilisation, permanently to gag and bind a neighbouring
nation of more than thirty millions. Sweden was far too
feeble for such a Herculean task. Her hold upon the Baltic
provinces could never be more than a prolonged military
occupation: the only wonder is that she resisted for so long
the immense and ever-increasing pressure from within, which
was bound, sooner or later, to burst asunder the flimsy barriers
of her artificial empire and hurl her back upon her native
peninsula.
Thus the second of the two wars inherited from his father
had been terminated by Gustavus. The long-outstanding
182 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
feud with his last and most obstinate adversary, the Polish
Republic, still remained. But first his presence was required
in Sweden itself.
Although the whole reign of Gustavus Adolphus is a long
chain of almost imperceptibly interlinking wars, during which
the king was necessarily absent from his country, her welfare
was always his chief care; and the same period which saw the
extension of the Swedish empire abroad saw also the peaceful
development of the Swedish constitution at home. In this,
as in every other matter, Gustavus himself took the initiative.
Nominally the Senate remained the dominant power in the
State ; but gradually all real authority was transferred to the
Crown. Various were the causes of this salutary change.
The Swedish nation owed to the monarchy its unity and
independence, and consequently regarded its kings with
gratitude and a devotion which could find excuses even for
the crimes of Eric XIV and the cruelties of Charles IX.
What then must have been its enthusiasm for Gustavus, whose
character presented that most rare and noble combination of
strength and gentleness, and whose alert genius was perpetually
opening up new paths of prosperity in every direction ? It was
only natural that the Riksråd should speedily lose its ancient
character of a grand council representing the semi-feudal
landed aristocracy, and become instead a bureaucracy holding
the chief offices of state by the appointment and at the will of
the king.
This change operated insensibly throughout the reign of
Gustavus. During the king's frequent absences abroad, a
committee of the Råd, consisting of the great officers of
state and the chiefs of the various “ Kollegier,” or public
departments, regularly assembled in the capital, and con-
ducted the administration, subject only to the royal authority
and the consent and co-operation of the Riksdag. In the
constitution of 1634 we find the whole system in complete
working order. The Riksdag also is now changing its character,
VIII]
Constitutional changes in Sweden
183
and becoming a legally recognised power in the State. This,
of itself, marks a momentous turning-point in Swedish history.
Whilst in every other European country, except England, the
ancient popular system of representation by Estates was about
to disappear altogether, in Sweden, under Gustavus Adolphus, it
had grown an integral portion of the constitution. The first
step in this direction was taken by the Riksdag ordinance of
1617, which converted a turbulent and haphazard mob of
“ Riksdag men," "huddling together like a flock of sheep or
drunken boors," into a dignified national assembly, meeting
and deliberating according to rule and order. The king,
surrounded by the princes of the blood, the great officers of
state and the senators, now addresses from the throne the
Estates solemnly convened together in the Rikssal. One of
the nobility (first called the Landtmarskalk, or Marshal of the
Diet, in the Riksdag ordinance of 1626) is elected by the
king as the spokesman of the first Estate, whilst the primate
generally acts as the spokesman of the three lower Estates.
The king then submits to the consideration of the Estates
“the royal propositions,” or matters for debate, upon which
each Estate proceeds to deliberate in its own separate chamber.
The replies of the Estates are duly delivered to the king at
another session in congress. Such was henceforth to be the
Riksdag's rule of procedure. Differences of opinion between
the king and the Estates were adjusted by mutual discussion;
but if the Estates differed amongst themselves, each Estate
had to defend its opinion before the king, or “his Majesty
might accept whichever (opinion) seemeth him best."
Yet the Riksdag was not merely a deliberative assembly.
The “Konungaförsäkran," or royal assurance given by every
Swedish king on his accession, guaranteed the collaboration
of the Estates in the work of legislation, and they were also
to be consulted in all questions of foreign policy. The king
possessed the initiative; but the Estates had the right of
objecting to the measures of the government at the conclusion
184 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
of the Riksdag. It is in Gustavus's reign, too, that we first
hear of the “Hemliga Utskott,” or Secret Committee, for
the transaction of extraordinary affairs, which was elected by
the Estates themselves, and provided with full credentials.
The constitution of the Riddarhus, or Upper House, was
fixed by the Riddarhusordning of 1626, which divided the
nobility into three classes, deliberating in common. Most of
the eleven Riksdagar held by Gustavus Adolphus were almost
exclusively occupied in finding ways and means for supporting
the grievous and ever-increasing burdens of the Polish and
German wars. Naturally it was very difficult for the Estates
to maintain their independence in the face of a government
controlled by a monarch of surpassing genius and boundless
popularity. Their very affection and admiration for one who
was, in the fullest sense of the word, the father of his people,
blinded them to every other consideration but the necessity
of supporting him in his most ambitious and hazardous enter-
prises. For to the eternal honour of the Swedish people be it
said, that from first to last they showed a magnanimity, a
public spirit, a religious and patriotic zeal, which shrank from
no sacrifice, however costly. Even the stubborn obstacle of
class egotism was swept away by the impetuous current of
enthusiasm when the gentry at the second Riksdag of 1627
voluntarily abandoned many of their most cherished privileges
for the common good, and, for a time, it was agreed that all
classes should be taxed alike.
It was but natural that great men should arise and flourish
in the genial and stimulating atmosphere which surrounded
Gustavus Adolphus; and it is not the least of that monarch's
many great qualities that he always knew where to lay his hand
on those best qualified to assist him in his great designs.
Conspicuous amongst these illustrious fellow-workers, hardly
inferior to the king himself in native genius and nobility, was
the grand chancellor, Oxenstjerna.
Axel Oxenstjerna, whose name is so identified with his
VIII]
Axel Oxenstjerna
185
country's history during the most critical period of her exist-
ence that the history of his life for half a century is, at the
same time, the history of Sweden, was born at Fänö in Upland,
on June 16, 1583. His family, which could trace its descent
back to the beginning of the thirteenth century, had inter-
married with both the Danish and Swedish royal houses.
After his father's death in 1597 his prudent mother sent him
to the German universities. Latin he learnt so thoroughly
that he expressed himself as fluently in that language as in his
mother-tongue, and far more elegantly. But theology, from
the first, was his favourite study; and he devoted himself to it
with as much ardour as if he were about to take holy orders.
In 1602 he was recalled to Sweden by Charles IX, who, quickly
discerning his worth, employed him on several diplomatic
missions, raised him to the dignity of Riksråd when he was
but twenty-six years old (1609), and appointed him the
guardian of his children, and the head of the regency which
was to govern during his son's minority. The first act of
Gustavus Adolphus was to appoint him Riks-Canceller, or
Imperial chancellor; and from henceforth he became the
motive-power of the whole machinery of state, and the inde-
fatigable and indispensable counsellor of his royal friend and
master, each supplying to the other the qualities in which he
knew himself to be deficient. The impetuous monarch some-
times grew impatient with the judicial prudence of the minister.
“If my heat did not put a little life into your coldness, we
should all freeze up!” exclaimed Gustavus on one occasion.
“And if my coldness did not assuage your Majesty's heat,"
replied the chancellor, “we should all burn up!” Whereupon
the king laughed, and admitted that indeed he had too little
patience and too much temper. Rarely has the world seen an
example of such perfect harmony between two great men of
equal though widely different genius.
If Axel Oxenstjerna was Gustavus Adolphus's first coun-
sellor, the second was indisputably Johan Skytte, a man of
186 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
unusual talent just falling short of genius. He had begun his
career as Gustavus's tutor, but, exchanging pedagogy for di-
plomacy, distinguished himself so greatly that he was ennobled,
made a senátor, and finally (1629). appointed governor-general
of Livonia. His fluent pen, perfect command of Latin, and
rhetorical skill, made him invaluable as an ambassador.
James I was so impressed by his Ciceronian eloquence on
the occasion of his special embassy to England in 1617 that
he knighted him on the spot.
The other prominent members of the government were
Gabriel Gustafsson Oxenstjerna, the chancellor's brother, and
Gabriel Bengtsson Oxenstjerna, his nephew; Klas Fleming,
the creator of the Swedish navy ; Sten Bjelke, of whom Gustavus
said that he knew of none more capable of filling Axel Oxen-
stjerna's place; and the acute and judicious John Casimir,
Count Palatine of Zweibrücken, the brother-in-law of the king.
Adler Salvius belongs to a somewhat later day. Finally,
several foreigners of distinction were attracted into the ser-
vice of the newly arising great power, men such as Ludvig
Cammerarius, who represented Sweden at the Hague, then
the centre of European diplomacy, Hugo Grotius, Van Dyck
and Rutgers, Sadler von Salneck, the Englishman Spencer,
and many more.
The wars with Russia and Denmark had been almost
exclusively Scandinavian wars; the Polish war was of world-
wide significance. It was, in the first place, a struggle for the
Baltic littoral, upon the possession of which the future prosperity
of both states depended; and this struggle was intensified by
the knowledge that the Polish Vasas, as represented by
Sigismund and his son Wladislaw, denied the right of
Gustavus to the Swedish throne, which they claimed by right
of primogeniture. Gustavus, moreover, regarded the Polish
war as a war of religion. This is plain from his instructions
to the plenipotentiaries, whom he sent to the abortive congress
of Knäred in the beginning of 1619, to contract, if possible, an
sismund ledge thanded; ansion o
VIII] Resumption of the War with Poland 187
offensive and defensive alliance with the Danes against “the
king of Poland, as a principal and dangerous member of the
popish league.” The two Scandinavian kings are there repre-
- sented as the two chief pillars on which the evangelical religion
reposes; while their disunion and ill-will is regarded as likely
to open a door of entrance in the North to the Pope and his
league, and so bring about the destruction of Denmark and
Sweden alike. There is much of unconscious exaggeration in
this. As a matter of fact, the Polish Republic was no danger
whatever to Protestantism. All dissenters in Poland, except
the Unitarians, were allowed fuller liberty of worship than they
enjoyed elsewhere. King Sigismund's obstinate insistence
upon his right to the Swedish crown was, after all, the most
serious impediment to the conclusion of a war of which the
Polish nation was already growing weary. Apart from Sigis-
mund's Jesuit entourage, no responsible Pole dreamed of
aggrandisement in Scandinavia ; Gustavus, whose imagination
was easily excited by religious ardour, magnified the influence
of the Jesuits in Poland, and saw dangers where only difficulties
existed.
On the death of Charles IX the existing truce between
Poland and Sweden was renewed from year to year, while
Sigismund was fighting the Moscovites, and Gustavus Adol-
phus the Danes. Repeated attempts were made to convert
these truccs into a permanent peace; and the senates of
both nations exchanged frequent notes on the subject. But
Gustavus refused to negotiate directly with a prince who
would allow him no higher title than that of duke of Söder-
manland; and the war, after an interval of six years, was
resumed. It began on the Swedish side with an unsuccessful
descent upon Dünamünde. Three years later, when Poland
was involved in a desperate struggle with the Turks on the
Danube, and their northern frontier was consequently denuded
of troops, Gustavus, after Sigismund had again scornfully
rejected liberal offers of peace in which even the title of king
188 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
of Sweden was conceded to him, resolved to attack Riga as
the first step towards conquering Livonia. In July, 1621, a
Swedish fleet of 150 sail, with Gustavus and 14,000 men on
board, sailed from Elfsnabb harbour; at Pernau the king was
joined by Jakob De la Gardie with 5000 Finnish levies; and
on August 13 Riga was invested, and, after a valiant de-
fence, surrendered (September 15) to the Swedish king.
On October 3 Mittau, the capital of the friendly duchy of
Courland, was occupied; and then the advanced season com-
pelled Gustavus to quarter his troops for the winter in the
conquered districts. His brother, Duke Charles Philip, a
youth of great promise, died of dysentery at Narva, on
January 25, 1622, a week after the king's departure; indeed
so great had been the ravages of sickness during the cam-
paign of 1621 that the Swedish army had to be reinforced
by no fewer than 10,000 men, and even then it could do but
little.
A truce was thereupon concluded, and hostilities were
suspended till the summer of 1625; when Gustavus, having
reorganised and greatly strengthened his army, sailed first to
South Livonia, where he took the fortress of Kokenhausen,
invaded Lithuania, and captured the fortress of Birse. Mean-
while his generals, Jakob De la Gardie and Gustavus Horn,
had subdued the whole of eastern Livonia up to the river
Ewst, including Dorpat; but the Ewst was to mark the limit
of the Swedish advance; and Horn, who attempted to take
Dünaburg, was badly beaten beneath the walls of that fortress
by Gonsiewski. During the winter the Swedish host suffered
terribly from want of food, the close surveillance of three
small Polish armies, and the incursions of the Cossacks.
Early in January, 1626, the king crossed the frozen Dwina,
and attacked the nearest Polish camp at Wallhof, scattering
the whole army, after slaying a fifth part of it without losing
a single man himself, and capturing six hundred waggons
of provisions and military stores. This victory, remarkable
VIII] The War transferred to the Vistula
189
besides as Gustavus's first pitched battle, completed the con-
quest of Livonia.
As, however, it became every year more difficult to sup-
port an army in the Dwina district, Gustavus now resolved
to transfer the war to the Prussian provinces of Poland with a
view to securing the control of the Vistula, as he had already
secured the control of the Dwina, hoping that the great
Protestant city of Dantzic and the Protestant Elector of
Brandenburg, George William, who held East Prussia as a
fief from Poland, would assist him in his enterprise against
a Catholic state. But Dantzic derived her enormous wealth
mainly from her toll-free trade with her nominal suzerain
Poland, besides enjoying the most absolute religious and
political liberty. She therefore could only lose by an alliance
with a military monarchy like Sweden. George William of
Brandenburg seemed, at first sight, a much more likely ally.
He was Gustavus's brother-in-law; and, to say nothing of their
common Protestantism, the political interests of the little
aspiring North German state seemed to be identical with
those of Sweden. But Sweden, not yet a great power, though
in the way to become one, was far away over the sea, while
close at hand stood George William's suzerain, King Sigismund,
who threatened to deprive his vassal of his fief if he entered
into any negotiations with the Swedish usurper. These threats
had a decisive influence upon the naturally cautious George
William, and made him “the historical type of political in-
stability.”
At the end of June, 1626, the Swedish flect, with 14,000
men on board, anchored in front of the chain of sand dunes
which separates the Frische Haff from the Baltic. In the
narrow inlet leading into the Haff lay Pillau, the only Baltic
harbour then accessible to ships of war, from whence, with
a fleet commanding the principal arm of the Vistula, near
Dantzic, tolls could be levied on the whole trade of Prussia.
The possession of this important point was indispensable to
190 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [ch.
the success of Gustavus's enterprise; but unfortunately, lying
as it did in East Prussia, it belonged to Brandenburg, a friendly
power. Gustavus told the commandant that he did not want
a handful of his brother-in-law's land, but he must provisionally
hold the little place among the dunes so "to have his back free.”
There could be no question of resistance; Pillau was at once
occupied; tolls were forthwith levied there; and Königsberg,
shortly afterwards, was scared into an unconditional neutrality.
To all the representations of the Elector Gustavus was abso-
lutely deaf. “Don't talk to me of your treaty with Poland,”
said he; "in war time all treaties are dumb." July was
employed in conquering the bishopric of Ermeland. The
surrender of Elbing and Marienburg placed Gustavus in
possession of the fertile and easily defensible delta of the
Vistula, which he treated as a permanent conquest, making
Axel Oxenstjerna its first governor-general. Communications
between Dantzic and the sea were cut off by the erection of
the first of Gustavus's famous entrenched camps at Dirchau ;
but the mighty city-republic, relying on its position and its
garrison of 7500 men, openly contested Gustavus's dominion
of the Vistula. From the end of August, 1626, the city was
blockaded, and in the meantime Polish irregulars, under the
Capable Stanislaus Koniecpolski, began to harass the Swedes.
But the object of the campaign, a convenient basis of
operations, was already won; and in October the king de-
parted to Sweden to get reinforcements. He relurned in May,
1627, with 7000 men, which raised his forces to 14,000,
against which Koniecpolski could oppose only 9000. But
the Polish general did wonders with his scanty resources, and
defeated and scattered a large band of auxiliaries, whom
Gustavus had hired in North Germany, as soon as they
had crossed the border. Dantzic, too, defied all the efforts
of the Swedes to capture her fortified outposts; and Gustavus,
in the course of the year, was twice dangerously wounded,
and so disabled that he could never wear armour again.
VIII] Gustavus out-genevalled by Koniecpolski 191.
During the winter of 1627-28, the States General, anxious
for commercial reasons for the conclusion of the war, at-
tempted to mediate between the belligerents, but in vain.
Sigismund obstinately denied Gustavus the royal title; and
Gustavus would not consent to a dishonourable peace. More-
over he had already taken two important steps which pledged
him to plunge still further into the general European war. In
the beginning of 1628 he had signed a treaty with Denmark
for the common defence of the Baltic, and, shortly afterwards,
he had sent Oxenstjerna with reinforcements to Stralsund, now
hardly pressed by Wallenstein. Gustavus had made extensive
preparations for the ensuing campaign. He brought back with
him from Sweden reinforcements amounting to 12,000 men,
and took the field with 33,000. But once again, though far
outnumbered, and ill-supported by his own government,
Koniecpolski showed himself a superior strategist. He en-
trenched himself so impregnably at Mewe that the king did
not venture to attack him, but led his army against Dantzic,
whose fleet he all but annihilated at Weichselmünde. But
now torrential rains made further operations impossible. Only
at the beginning of August was Gustavus able to move against
Poland proper; and again Koniecpolski frustrated his efforts
by entrenching himself impregnably at Gaudenz, and holding
the whole Swedish army at bay for six weeks. Finally, on
September 10, Gustavus broke up his camp and returned to
Prussia ; the whole autumn campaign had proved å failure and
cost him 5000 men.
During the ensuing campaign of 1629, Gustavus had to
contend against the combined forces of Koniecpolski and
an auxiliary corps of 10,000 Wallenstein mercenaries under
Johan von Arnim. The Polish commander now showed the
Swedes what he could do with adequate forces. At Stuhm,
on June 29, in a rearguard action, he defeated Gustavus,
who lost most of his artillery and narrowly escaped capture.
A more vigorous prosecution of the war might now have rid
192 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
Polish Sejm bf following Poland an
the Republic of her troublesome northern enemy once for
all; but the Polish Sejm never grasped the significance of
the situation, and, instead of following up their victory, they
accepted the proffered mediation of England and France.
The result was the conclusion of the six years' truce of
Altmark, whereby Sweden was permitted to retain possession
provisionally of her Livonian conquests together with Elbing,
a considerable portion of the delta of the Vistula, Braunsberg
in West, and Pillau and Memel in East Prussia. Still more
important than these territorial acquisitions was the permission
conceded to Gustavus of levying tolls at Pillau, Memel, Dantzic,
Labiau, and Windau, from which he derived in 1629 alone no
less than 500,000 rix-dollars, a sum equivalent to the whole of
the extraordinary subsidies granted to him by the Riksdag.
Thus Sweden held the control of all the principal trade routes
of the Baltic up to the very confines of the Reich ; and the
increment of revenue resulting from this commanding position
was of material assistance to Gustavus in the still greater
enterprise on which his heart and his ambition were now
equally bent.
What were the motives which induced Gustavus Adolphus
to intervene directly in the Thirty Years' War? The king
himself, in his correspondence with Axel Oxenstjerna, tells us
plainly it was the fear lest the Emperor should acquire the
Baltic ports and proceed to build up a sea-power dangerous
to Scandinavia. For the same reason Gustavus rejected the
chancellor's alternative plan of waging a simply defensive war
against the Emperor by means of the fleet, with Stralsund as
his base. He was convinced by the experience of Christian IV
that the enemy's harbours could be wrested from them only by
a successful offensive war on land; and, while quite alive to the
risks of such an enterprise in the face of two large armies,
Tilly's and Wallenstein's, each of them larger than his own,
he argued that the vast extent of territory, and the numerous
garrisons which the enemy were obliged to maintain, more than
VIII Motives of Gustavus's intervention 193
neutralised his numerical superiority. Moreover the Emperor's
predominance was largely a matter of prestige; and a lost
battle, Gustavus argued, “would make his affairs bad enough.”
Then, too, the Imperial commissioners at Lübeck had already
placed him under the ban of the Empire; and as war was, in
any case, inevitable, it was better, he contended, that the seat
of it should be anywhere but in Sweden, whose long coast-line
and numerous harbours made it very difficult to prevent
invasion. Merely to blockade all the German ports with
the Swedish fleet was equally impossible. The Swedish fleet
was too weak for that : it would be safer to take and fortify the
pick of them. In Germany itself, if once he got the upper
hand, he trusted he would not find himself without resources.
It is no enthusiastic crusader, but an anxious and far-seeing,
if somewhat speculative statesman, who thus opens his mind
to us. No doubt religious considerations largely influenced
Gustavus. He had the deepest sympathy for his fellow-
Protestants in Germany; he regarded them as God's peculiar
people, himself as their divinely appointed deliverer; and the
humble but sure expectation of God's extraordinary assistance
in the good cause was a primary factor in all his calculations.
But his first duty was to Sweden; and, naturally and rightly, he
viewed the whole business from a predominantly Swedish point
of view. Lutherans and Calvinists in Germany were to be
delivered from a “soul-crushing tyranny,” but they were to
be delivered by a foreign if friendly power; and that power
claimed as her reward the hegemony of Protestant Europe, :
and all the political privileges naturally belonging to that
exalted position.
Throughout the years 1628–29 unceasing and elaborate
preparations were made in Sweden for an adventure the
like of which the world had never yet seen. A nation
numbering a million and a half of souls was arming itself
for a contest with the greatest military power in the world,
whose armies, amounting at the lowest estimate to 150,000
BAIN
194 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
men, were commanded by generals supposed to be unconquer-
able because they had never been conquered. When the war
was resolved upon, the full effective strength of the Swedish
army was but 50,000 men, though ultimately it was brought up
to 76,000, while Axel Oxenstjerna subsequently raised an ad-
ditional army in Prussia of about 20,000. In striking contrast
with Christian IV, Gustavus had done everything in his power
to minimise risks. He was not the man to think of taking
the second step before he had taken the first. The jealousy
of Holland, the anarchy of England, the haughtiness of France,
had compelled him to abandon his original plan of a combina-
tion of the western powers against the house of Habsburg ;
while the fears of the North German princes prevented the
formation of any Protestant league. But the emissaries of the
Swedish king had sought for allies so remote as the Khan
of the Crimea, and the Cossack Republic on the Dnieper; his
diplomatic agents had thwarted the diplomatists of the Emperor
at the Divan of the Sublime Porte; and negotiations had even
been entered into with the prince of Transylvania, the republic
of Venice, and the Swiss cantons. But his chief reliance was
upon his own country, and his own country did not fail him.
The secret committee of the Riksdag granted him subsidies
for three years in advance, on the sole condition that the war
should, so far as possible, be conducted beyond the borders
of Sweden ; the Swedish gentry furnished him with a staff of
officers, men like Johan Banér, Lennart Torstensson, Åke
Tott, Niels Brahe, Gustavus Horn, and Gustavus Vrangel,
who were soon to be reckoned amongst the greatest captains
of that or any other age; while the hardy yeomen of Sweden
and Finland formed the nucleus and the leaven of that inter-
national army which was gathering around his standard.
On May 19, 1630, Gustavus solemnly took leave of the
Estates of the realm assembled at Stockholm. He appeared
before them holding in his arms his only child and heir, the
little Princess Christina, then in her fourth year, and tenderly
VIII
Gustavus's farewell to Sweden
19
195
12t generallying that he people.
committed her to the care of his loyal and devoted people.
Gustavus seems to have had a foreboding that he should
never see Sweden again. “It generally happens," he said
with his usual homely simplicity, “that the pitcher goes so
often to the well that at last it breaks; and so, at last, it may
befall me, inasmuch as I who have so many times shed my
blood for the welfare of Sweden, and hitherto, through God's
gracious protection, have been spared, must at last give up
[my spirit]." Then, conscious that his motives might be
misinterpreted, he solemnly took the Estates to witness, as he
stood there, " in the sight of the Almighty,” that he had begun
hostilities “out of no lust for war, as many will certainly devise
and imagine,” but in self-defence and to deliver his fellow-
Christians from oppression. Finally he gave the Estates his
benediction, and commended them to God's protection. When
he ceased speaking there were tears in every eye, but the
predominant feeling was one of hope and confidence as be-
came men embarking on a great enterprise with high reso-
lutions.
On June 17, 1630, the Swedish fleet set sail; on Midsummer
Day it cast anchor off Cape Perd on the isle of Rügen ; and
two days later the whole army, 16,000 strong, was disembarked
at Peenemünde. Gustavus's plan was to take possession of
the mouths of the Oder Haff, and, resting upon Stralsund in
the west and Prussia in the east, penetrate into Germany. In
those days rivers were, what railways now are, the great military
routes; and Gustavus's German war was a war waged along
river lines. The opening campaign was to be fought along
the line of the Oder. After fortifying Christian IV's trenches
at Peenemünde, Gustavus compelled Bogislav IV, duke of
Pomerania, to become his ally. Stettin, the capital of Pomer-
ania, and the key of the Oder line, was the most important
strategic point in the immediate theatre of the war; and its
possession was therefore indispensable to Gustavus. Bogislav,
already allied with Wallenstein, preferred to remain neutral.
13—2
196 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [ch.
But, in the middle of July, a Swedish fleet and army appeared
before Stettin ; the inhabitants received "the gentle, gracious
master” in the simple grey military uniform as a friend and
deliverer; and Bogislav reluctantly placed his capital and his
duchy at the absolute disposal of the Swedish king. After
converting Stettin into a first-class fortress and a base for
further operations, Gustavus proceeded to clear Pomerania of
the piebald Imperial host composed of every nationality under
heaven, and officered by Italians, Irishmen, Bohemians, Croats,
Danes, Spaniards, and Walloons. Gustavus's army has often
been described by German historians as an army of foreign
invaders: in reality it was far more truly Teutonic than the
official defenders of Germany at that period. Conti, the Im-
perialist commander-in-chief, soon showed that he had not
learnt the art of war under Wallenstein in vain. Posting his
lieutenant, Savelli, at Peene to cut off the Swedes' communica-
tions with Stralsund, he established himself in two impregnable
camps at Garz and Greiffenhagen on Oder, and compelled
Gustavus to stand on the defensive. Thus the king had
driven a wedge between the various Imperialist divisions, but
could move no further himself.
Still more serious than Gustavus's military difficulties
were the political. Whatever the German people might have
felt--and, whenever they could freely express their sentiments,
they welcomed him gladly-the German princes, not one of
whom could look beyond his petty personal interests, naturally
regarded their would-be deliverer as a foreign intruder.
Only those who had nothing to lose, fugitives and exiles,
or the landless younger sons of princely houses, showed any
disposition to join him. As to the two leading princes of
North Germany, John George, Elector of Saxony, and George
William, Elector of Brandenburg, the former most carefully
avoided committing himself to anything resembling an alliance
with Gustavus, while the latter, immediately after the occupation
of Stettin, sent his ambassador, Wilmersdorf, to the king of
VIII] Magdeburg declares for Gustavus 197
Sweden, to induce him to turn back, or, at least, go no further,
at the same time offering his mediation with the Emperor.
“What might not the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony
have accomplished !” cried Gustavus bitterly. “Would to
God that we could nowadays find a Maurice of Saxony !”
Suddenly the hopes of Gustavus were revived by the news
of two important and favourable events. The Emperor, yield-
ing to the threats and the entreaties of the Kurfürstentag of
Regensburg, and secretly but energetically worked upon by
the League and its foreign supporters, dismissed Wallenstein
August 13, 1630, and reduced his army to 60,000 men; while,
almost simultaneously, Magdeburg, the greatest city of the
Lower Saxon Circle, openly declared for the Swedish king.
At last Gustavus had found a powerful and voluntary ally in
Germany. From a strategical point of view, Magdeburg, as
the strongest fortress of North Germany, was of the highest
importance to him, commanding, as it did, the passage across
the Elbe, for at that time there was no bridge over the river
north of Magdeburg. It was, as Gustavus expressed it, a sally
port for the invasion of south-western Germany, the territory
of the Catholic League, where he recognised that the struggle
must be fought out. Magdeburg undertook to hold the Elbe
fords open for the king; and, in return for this essential service,
Gustavus promised to protect the city at his own cost, and
never abandon it. Unable to go to Magdeburg himself, he
sent thither one of the most trustworthy of his German officers,
Didrik von Falkenberg, to organise the defence and form a
new Swedish army corps. Falkenberg arrived at Magdeburg
in October, disguised as a chapman, by which time the city
was already closely invested by the Imperial troops.
Gustavus first proposed to relieve Magdeburg by way of
Dömitz on Elbe, the chief fortress of Mecklenburg, after
clearing the duchy of the Imperialists. The storms of autumn, -
which prevented the co-operation of the Swedish fleet, together
with the superiority of the Imperialist generals in North
198 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
mps at Garlops at his disposa host, this proved
Germany, nullified this plan; whereupon Gustavus attempted to
open the Oder route to Magdeburg by attacking the Imperialist
entrenched camps at Garz and Greiffenhagen in Pomerania.
With 40,000 excellent troops at his disposal, opposed to the
half-starving, half-naked remnants of Conti's host, this proved
an easy task. Greiffenhagen was stormed on Christmas Eve,
1630, whereupon Garz was destroyed and abandoned by the
Imperialists themselves, who retreated towards Frankfort on
Oder, hotly pursued by the Swedes as far as Küstrin.
At the beginning of 1631 Gustavus's hands were strength-
ened by the conclusion of a definite alliance with France at
Bärwalde, January 13. Richelieu, who at first had regarded
Gustavus as a mere Scandinavian condottierė, who might be
induced to fight the battles of France in Germany at so much
a head, had recognised at last that the Swedish king was in a
position to prescribe rather than accept conditions, and must,
in every respect, be treated as an equal. The fruitless negotia-
tions at Dresden and Münich, during the summer, had con-
vinced the French diplomatist of the impossibility of uniting
Protestants and Catholics against the Emperor ; whilst the sub-
sequent reconciliation between the Emperor and the League
necessitated a political counterpoise in North Germany which
could only be found in the Swedes. The treaty was concluded
for five years, its objects being to keep the northern seas open
and restore the status quo ante bellum in Germany. France
contracted to pay Sweden an annual subsidy of 400,000 rix-
dollars; and Gustavus undertook to maintain in Germany an
army of 26,000 men. Richelieu's action was more than justified
by the abortive issue of the Protestant congress at Leipsic,
which met in February, 1631, under the presidency of the
Saxon Elector George Frederick, to, reconcile Lutherans and
Calvinists, and form a middle party in Germany, but separated
after a three months' discussion without coming to any con-
clusion.
But, while the German Protestants were “debating and
VIII
The Siege of Magdeburg
199
demonstrating,” Gustavus was acting. On hearing that Tilly,
at the head of 24,000 men, was advancing upon Frankfort
on Oder to unite with Hannibal von Schaumburg, Gustavus
broke up from Küstrin, and made a second attempt to relieve
Magdeburg by way of Mecklenburg, capturing on his way the
strong fortress of Demmin. Tilly at once quitted the line of
the Oder to bar Gustavus's way to the Elbe, and this he
succeeded in doing, for the king shut himself up in an
entrenched camp at Schwedt on Oder, and remained there
till March, when Tilly himself departed for Magdeburg, which
had in the meantime been closely blockaded by Pappenheim.
Gustavus thereupon advanced against the important fortress of
Frankfort, which he took unexpectedly by storm on Palm
Sunday afternoon, April 15, thus securing possession of the
line of the Oder. Magdeburg now became the focus of the
whole campaign: its immediate possession was equally indis-
pensable to each of the combatants. Only with Magdeburg
in his hands could Tilly hope to exclude Gustavus from
southern and western Germany; while to Gustavus the city
was not merely the key of the situation but-his one faithful
and courageous ally who must be delivered at all hazards.
His royal word was pledged to Magdeburg : to relieve her was
to him as much a matter of honour and conscience as of
military and political expediency.
The city was now in extremities. The garrison was already
living from hand to mouth; ammunition was running short; all
the outworks had been abandoned. Courier after courier was
sent to Gustavus by the despairing commandant. Unfortunately
Gustavus's movements were hampered by the timidity of the
Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony. Without their support
and assistance it was impossible for him to march to the relief
of the beleaguered city with an army but half the size of Tilly's;
to have done so would have been to risk for the sake of a
single town the whole future of German Protestantism. What
he required of the Electors was a free passage through their
200 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH..
territories and the union of their forces with his; and till these
objects were secured his hands were tied. But the Electors
were deaf to all his entreaties; and Gustavus was forced to cut
the diplomatic tangle with the sword. On May 14, 1631, he
dictated at the gates of Berlin a treaty whereby the Elector of
Brandenburg agreed to pay monthly subsidies for the support
of the Swedish army, and surrender his two principal-fortresses,
Küstrin' and Spandau, till Magdeburg had been relieved. But
with the Elector of Saxony nothing could be done. He refused
not only to co-operate with Gustavus, but even to permit him
to cross the Elbe at Wittenberg, the nearest way to Magdeburg ;
and, as the Saxon army was numerically as large as the Swedish,
Gustavus could not extort compliance. All that the king could
do was solemnly to hold the Elector responsible for any harm
that might befall Magdeburg, and take the one route still re-
maining open--the circuitous route by way of the Havel in a
northerly direction. But by this time the fate of Magdeburg
was already decided. On May 20, the same day on which
John George had closed his gates to Gustavus, the most
prosperous and populous city of North Germany had become
a heap of smoking ruins. The cathedral and about one.
hundred houses alone escaped the flames. Unwillingly stormed
by Tilly, who did what little he could to save the women and
children from his barbarous hordes, the city was accidentally
fired by some of Pappenheim's marauders; and a strong gale
blowing at the time did the rest. Like Napoleon at Moscow,
Tilly himself was the immediate loser by this unexpected
catastrophe. Magdeburg was to have been a basis for further
operations as well as a storehouse for his half-famished troops.
Want and hunger compelled him, a fortnight after its fall, to
retreat southwards in the direction of Thuringia.
. Meanwhile Gustavus, still too weak to meet the foe in the
open field, had entrenched himself at Werben, at the confluence
of the Havel and Elbe, whence he could defy the superior
forces of the Imperialists, and safely await the inevitable
stroines.
VIII] . Saxony joins Gustavus
201
accession of the Protestant princes. For the position of these
princes was becoming every day more untenable. The Emperor
had rejected their petitions, pronounced the Leipsic congress
illegal, commanded them to disband their troops, and ordered
the reinforcements returning from Italy, under Fürstenberg
and Altringer, after the Peace of Chierasco (1631), to execute
the sequestration decrees against the South German Protestants.
Self-preservation, therefore, drove the German princes, one by
one, to seek protection in the Swedish camp at Werben,
especially after Tilly had made his abortive attacks upon it
in the course of the autumn. Landgrave William of Hesse-
Cassel led the way, and he was speedily followed by William
and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar : all of these now entered the
Swedish service. The Elector of Saxony still persisted in
attempting to maintain an impossible neutrality; but, when
the Emperor ordered Tilly to invade Saxony from the north,
while Fürstenberg and Tiefenbach co-operated with him from
the south and east, John George saw himself compelled either
to abandon his lands to plunder, or implore Gustavus for
assistance, and submit to his dictation. He chose the latter
humiliation. A courier was instantly despatched to Gustavus;
the Swedish and Saxon armies effected their junction at Düben;
and on September 12 a treaty was signed between the king
and the Elector, whereby the latter placed himself absolutely
at the disposal of the former. Thus, at last, Gustavus's chief
object was won. He was no longer a foreign intruder but the
recognised leader of the Protestant party in Germany.
The war now assumed an altogether different character.
Numerically equal to his opponents, Gustavus abandoned the
fortified camp system, and took the open field. Events de-
veloped rapidly. On both sides it was recognised that a
decisive action was at hand. Tilly, after combining with
Fürstenberg, had ravaged Saxony up to Leipsic, which, warned
by the fate of Magdeburg, opened its gates to him. But here
his course was stayed, for, at a council of war held at Düben,
tc. The war equal to his op hook the
202 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
Gustavus decided to march against him forthwith. The
septuagenarian Tilly would have avoided an engagement if
possible; but his staff persuaded him to stand firm, and he
awaited Gustavus on the wide plain of Breitenfeld north of
Leipsic. The two armies encountered on September 17, 1631,
the Imperialists numbering about 32,000, the combined Swedish-
Saxon army about 41,000 men. The battle, which lasted from
early morning to sunset, was most bitterly contested. The Saxon
contingent, indeed, which was placed on the extremne left, with
their Elector at their head, "took to their heels by companies”
at the first onset of Fürstenberg's pikemen, dangerously exposing
the Swedish left, which was saved from destruction only by a
masterly manoeuvre of Gustavus Horn, who reformed his whole
front in the heat of the engagement. On the Swedish right
the impetuous charge of Pappenheim's 5000 cavalry was ar-
rested by the steady fire of the Swedish and Finnish regiments;
and, on attempting a flank movement, Pappenheim was seven
times repulsed and finally scattered by Johan Banér. The battle
was decided by the king capturing Tilly's artillery and turning
it against the Spanish tertiaries which composed his centre.
These unconquerable battalions stood like a wall till sunset,
when they formed a square round their wounded general and
marched unbroken from the battlefield. But an army Tilly no
longer possessed. No fewer than 7000 of the Imperialists fell
on the field of battle; 5000 prisoners were incorporated with the
Swedish army; several thousands of stragglers were massacred
by the country-folk. The booty captured was immense, and
included the military chest of the League, which was plundered
systematically.
The first battle of Breitenfeld marks a turning-point in the
history of the Thirty Years' War. It settled the fate of the
Restitution Edict, and dissipated, once for all, the dream of a
united Catholic Germany. Protestantism regained once more
the confidence it had lost during the reverses of the last ten
years; and its future existence in the Empire was assured. On
VIII
First Battle of Breitenfeld
203
contemporaries the victory produced an overwhelming impres-
sion. At Vienna pious Catholics could not at first believe that
“God had all at once turned Lutheran.” To Gustavus it was
the fulfilment of his most audacious hopes: the only question
now was, In what way should he utilise his advantage ? Should
he invade the Austrian crown-lands, and dictate peace to
Ferdinand II at the gates of Vienna? or should he pursue
Tilly westwards and crush the League at its own hearth and
home? The matter was debated at a council of war held at
Halle a week after the battle. Axel Oxenstjerna and Gustavus
Horn were for the first alternative, but Gustavus decided in
favour of the second. His decision has been greatly blamed.
Oxenstjerna himself, nineteen years later, expressed his deep
regret, in full senate, at this the one great mistake of his great
master; and more than one modern historian has argued that,
if Gustavus had done in 1631 what Napoleon did in 1805 and
1809, there would have been a Fifteen instead of a Thirty
Years' War. But, on the other hand, it should be borne in
mind that in the days of Gustavus Vienna was by no means so
essential to the existence of the Habsburg monarchy as it was
in the days of Napoleon; and even Gustavus could not afford
to allow so dangerous an opponent as Tilly time to recover
himself. The Saxon army, with such a leader as the Saxon
Elector, would have been no match for the veteran Walloon;
and Gustavus, with rare diplomatic sagacity, had already de-
cided upon sending John George against the hereditary estates
of the Emperor, and thus hopelessly compromising him with
the court of Vienna, while he himself set out for the Rhine
lands at the head of his victorious army. His march was a
triumphal progress. Joyfully welcomed as a deliverer by all
the Protestant cities, he met with no resistance till he came to
Marienberg on Main, which was taken by storm and yielded
such an enormous booty that the Swedish soldiers measured
their gold by the hatful. After resting a whole month in the
rich Würzburg district, Gustavus continued his onward march
204 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna LCY
hemia cously the ing the Palecember
[CH.
" to conjoin the Main with the Rhine," as he expressed it.
Frankfort on Main opened her gates at the first threat; and
the Swedish host marched through. At Oppenheim Gustavus
crossed the Rhine, and on December 20 he entered Mainz in
triumph, after clearing the Palatinate of its Spanish garrisons.
Simultaneously the Elector of Saxony and Arnim invaded
Bohemia, and in the beginning of November occupied Prag.
The front of the combined Protestant armies now extended
from the Rhine to the Moldau.
At Mainz, the most important strategical position in western
Germany, Gustavus established his winter quarters in an cn-
trenched camp capable of holding 20,000 men. His position
was unprecedented and extraordinary, and has been well
compared to that of Napoleon at Erfurt. All the Protestant
princes and nobles of Germany, all the leading diplomatists
of Europe, flocked to the court of the Swedish king, in
“the golden city on the Rhine." His plan was to form a
“Corpus Evangelicorum,” or Union of all the Protestant
princes, under the protection and leadership of Sweden, which
was to be guaranteed the possession of the German Baltic
coast, to complete that Baltic empire which he regarded as
the basis of her future stability. France, as much surprised
by the Swedish victories of 1631 as she was to be by the
Prussian victories in 1866, and alarmed for her own influence
in Germany, now attempted to bring about an understanding
between Gustavus and the Catholic League of southern Ger-
many, with which she was also allied ; but, when Gustavus
refused to surrender his conquests until the princes of the
League had disarmed, Maximilian of Bavaria, the leader of
the League, broke off the negotiations and renewed his al-
liance with the Emperor. This of itself was tantamount to a
declaration of war.
As the most effectual means of bringing about the general,
peace he so earnestly desired, Gustavus now proposed to take
the field with an overwhelming numerical superiority. He
VIII)
Triumphal progress of Gustavus
205
never, indeed, reached his proposed maximum of 200,000;
yet so numerous were the newly enlisted recruits that the
Swedish nucleus of his forces dwindled down to a fifth; and,
besides the royal army, he could form three independent army
corps under Gustavus Horn, Johan Banér, and Åke Tott, to
say nothing of his co-operating German auxiliaries. The signal
for Gustavus to break up from the Rhine was the sudden
advance of Tilly from the Danube against Gustavus Horn,
whom he compelled to evacuate the bishopric of Bamberg.
Proceeding by way of Frankfort to Nürnberg, where he was
received enthusiastically, Gustavus pursued Tilly into Bavaria,
forced the passage of the Danube at Donauwörth and the
passage of the Lech in the face of Tilly's strongly entrenched
camp at Rain, and pursued the flying host to the fortress of
Ingolstadt, where Tilly died of his wounds a fortnight later.
Turning aside from Ingolstadt, Gustavus liberated and gar-
risoned the long-oppressed Protestant cities of Augsburg and
Ulm, and, thence proceeding into Bavaria, occupied Münich
in May, 1632. He was now at the height of his power; and
Germany lay at his feet. His dominion extended from the
Alps to the Arctic Ocean. The Alpine passes were in his
hands. Italy was trembling at the prospect of another northern
invasion. But, while still in Bavaria, the clouds which were to
eclipse his glory had already appeared upon the horizon. -
After the collapse of Tilly and the League, the Emperor, in
his extremity, had appealed once more to the disgraced Wallen-
stein to save him; and once more Wallenstein had stamped an
army out of the earth. In the very week in which Gustavus
had entered Münich, the great dictator had chased John
George from Prag and manoeuvred the Saxons out of Bohemia.
Then, armed as he was with plenipotentiary powers, both
military and political, he offered the Elector of Saxony peace
on his own terms. Gustavus suddenly saw himself exposed
to unheard-of peril. He saw not only his southern plan of
campaign annihilated, but his most important and most
206 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
unstable ally exposed to an almost irresistible temptation. If
Tilly had made John George such an offer as Wallenstein was
now empowered to make, the Elector would never have become
Gustavus's ally: would he remain Gustavus's ally now ? Hastily
quitting his quarters in Upper Swabia, whither he had gone to
crush a dangerous Catholic rising, Gustavus hastened towards
Nürnberg on his way to Saxony, but, finding that Wallenstein
and Maximilian of Bavaria had united their forces, which now
amounted to 60,000 men, to which, for the moment, he could
oppose only 18,000, he was constrained, for his own safety
as well as to save Nürnberg from the fate of Magdeburg, to
abandon the attempt to reach 'Saxony and remain where he
was. Both armies, therefore, confronted each other at Nürn-
berg, whose colossal walls and bastions furnished Gustavus
with a point of support of the first order. He quickly con-
verted the town into an entrenched and fortified camp, from
the walls and bastions of which 300 cannon gaped upon the
enemy. Wallenstein followed the king's example, and en-
trenched himself on the western bank of the Redwitz in a
camp twelve English miles in circumference, including in its
immense sweep rivers, towns, and forests. His object was to
pin Gustavus fast to Nürnberg and cut off his retreat north-
wards. Throughout July and August the two armies faced
each other immovably, voluntarily exposing themselves to all
the hardships of a regular siege in order to tire each other out.
At last, when the distress in Nürnberg had grown so great
that people died of hunger in the streets, Gustavus, who had
in the meantime summoned to him the army corps of
Oxenstjerna, Gustavus Horn, Banér, and the dukes of Saxe-
Weimar, led out his forces and offered battle, which Wallenstein
obstinately declined. A fortnight later, after an unsuccessful
attempt on August 24 to storm Alte Veste, the key of Wallen-
stein's position, the Swedish host retreated southwards.
For the second time Gustavus had plainly been out-
manoeuvred. He intended to draw Wallenstein after him by
VIII
Battle of Lützen
207
threatening the Austrian crown-lands; but again Wallenstein
showed his superiority as a strategist by invading. Saxony with
the intention of collecting the whole Imperial army into another
entrenched camp on the Elbe. Seeing his line of retreat again
menaced, Gustavus immediately returned, by forced marches,
from the Danube to the Elbe, crossed the Thüringerwald on the
night of October 22 and 23, and, after uniting with Bernard of
Weimar, proceeded to Erfurt, where he saw his consort, Maria
Eleonora, for the last time. Wallenstein, meantime, after
savagely devastating Saxony, to force the Elector to abandon
his alliance with the Swedes, had sent Pappenheim away to
the Rhine with 10,000 men, and prepared to go into winter
quarters at Lützen, under the impression that Gustavus was
about to do the same. The king, thereupon, resolved to
surprise his enemy, and hastened in full battle array, by way of
Weissenfels, towards Lützen. On the afternoon of Novem-
ber 5 he overtook Wallenstein as he was crossing the Rippach;
and a rearguard action, favourable to the Swedes, ensued.
Indeed, but for nightfall, the scattered forces of the duke of
Friedland might have been routed. During the night, how-
ever, Wallenstein succeeded in collecting and marshalling his
forces, and sent an express to call back Pappenheim.
On November 6, at daybreak, while an autumn mist still
lay over the field, the battle began. The king, as usual, .com-
manded the Swedish right wing, and began the attack simul-
taneously with Niels Brahe, the only Swedish general present.
It was obviously Gustavus's plan to drive Wallenstein away from
the Leipsic road, north of which he had posted himself, and
thus, in case of success, to isolate, and subsequently, with the
aid of the Saxons in the Elbe fortresses, annihilate him. The
king succeeded in driving the enemy from the trenches and
capturing his cannon; but Niels Brahe was less fortunate, and
fell, mortally wounded. The same fate befell Pappenheim, the
Murat of the Thirty Years' War, as, with his usual élan, he
flung himself upon the Swedes at the head of his horsemen.
208 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
What happened after that is mere conjecture, for a thick mist
now obscured the autumn sun; and the battle became a colossal
mêlée, the details of which are indistinguishable. It was in the
midst of that awful obscurity that Gustavus met his death-
how or where is not absolutely certain; but it seems that he
lost his way in the darkness as he was leading the Småland
horse to the assistance of his infantry, and was despatched, as
he lay severely wounded on the ground, by a hostile horseman.
The sudden appearance of his riderless steed first told the
Swedes that their leader was dead, and inspired them forthwith
with a furious lust for vengeance which carried everything
before it, and made Lützen one of the bloodiest battles of
the Thirty Years' War. Finally Wallenstein was compelled
to evacuate the battlefield and retreat southwards; but the
victors were too much exhausted to pursue him.
For a moment Sweden reeled beneath the shock of this
terrible catastrophe. In the flower of his age and vigour-he
was but thirty-eight—the great monarch had been cut off; and
his successor was a girl six years old. The Emperor and the
Catholics openly rejoiced; Sweden's friends, nay Sweden's own
statesmen, feared that Gustavus's work had finished with him.
But it was only for a moment. The world was quickly to
perceive that the hero-king had bequeathed to his country not
only a difficult task, but also the men capable of performing it.
Foremost among these illustrious pupils was the chancellor
Axel Oxenstjerna. Indispensable even while Gustavus was
still alive, all eyes turned instinctively towards him now that
Gustavus was dead. He did not seek preeminence; it was
thrust upon him by the unanimous voice of his country.
Overwhelmed as he was personally by the great calamity, not
for an instant did he lose his presence of mind. Recognising
that his proper place was in Germany, to keep Sweden's allies
in heart and control Sweden's foreign policy, all the threads of
which were in his hands, he exhorted the government at home
to be steadfast and united. The news of the king's death,
VIII] Oxenstjerna as “Legate-plenipotentiary” 209
which reached Sweden a month after the event, naturally
caused the utmost consternation ; but it also evoked a noble
outburst of courageous public spirit, and a determination “to
pursue the war against the Emperor and all his adherents, till
the policy of his late Majesty of blessed memory hath been
consummated, and a sure peace obtained.” The Råd there-
upon appointed the chancellor “legate-plenipotentiary of the
Swedish crown in the Roman Empire and with all our armies,”
and summoned a Riksdag, which (February 1, 1633) did
homage to the child queen and appointed the five great
officers of state ad interim regents. A second Riksdag as-
sembled in June, 1634, and sanctioned a new constitution
(July 29), which gave Sweden a strong and well-ordered
administration with its centre in the crown and Råd, and its
executive distributed among the Kollegier or departments of
state. But the constant and indispensable adviser of the
home government was the absent chancellor; every novel or
difficult point was at once submitted to and generally decided
by him; and for the next twelve years he was undoubtedly
the real ruler of Sweden.
Abroad in Germany the urgent difficulties of a situation,
always hovering on the verge of the desperate, taxed even his
genius and courage to the uttermost. It is difficult to admire
enough the unshakeable firmness, the many-sided, all-sufficing
ability of Axel Oxenstjerna at this crisis, which made him
the one great principle of cohesion amidst a score of jarring
wills and contrary ambitions, ready at the first stroke of
misfortune to fly asunder. To him both warriors and states-
men invariably appealed as their natural and infallible arbiter.
Less original but more sagacious than the king, he had a
firmer grasp of the realities of the situation. Gustavus would
not only have magnified Sweden, he would have transformed
the German Empire. Oxenstjerna wisely abandoned these
vaulting ambitions. His country's welfare was his sole ob-
ject. All his efforts were directed towards procuring for the
BAIN
14
210 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
Swedish Crown adequate compensation for its sacrifices; and
he worked for this object with a patience, a tenacity, a dis-
interestedness which extorted the admiration of friends and
foes alike. Richelieu, baffled by an astuteness superior to his
own, declared that the Swedish chancellor was “an inex-
haustible source of well-matured counsels.” Mazarin said that
if all the diplomatists of Europe were in a boat together, they
would unhesitatingly entrust the rudder to Oxenstjerna. It
was a fortunate thing for Sweden that her destinies, at the
crisis, were in the hands of so great a statesman.
The situation was already sufficiently alarming. The Swedish
armies held, it is true, the best half of Germany; but they
were composed, for the most part, of foreign mercenaries, and
the differences between the Swedish generals and their
confederates, the German princes, threatened to burst into
open discord now that the restraining presence of the great
king was withdrawn. Moreover a continuation of the war
demanded fresh sacrifices, which the Riksdag was unable or
unwilling to make. It was only the audacious firmness of the
Swedish chancellor which succeeded in saving appearances
and sustaining Sweden's newly won reputation as a great
power. Few but himself perceived on what flimsy foundations
it rested. His first act was to summon a meeting of the
representatives of sixty South German states at Heilbronn
(March, 1633), which resulted in the formation on April 23 of
the so-called Evangelical Union, with Oxenstjerna himself as
its director. The Union was to raise and maintain another
army in South Germany, in the Protestant interest. A subse-
quent most dangerous mutiny of the officers of the Swedish
army was appeased by the distribution of fiefs in Germany,
under the Swedish Crown, to the value of about 5,000,000 rix-
dollars. Simple to austerity in his own tastes, the Swedish
chancellor recognised the political necessity of impressing his
allies and confederates by an almost regal show of dignity; and
at the abortive congress held at Frankfort in March, 1634, for
2 II
VIII] Battle of Nördlingen
the purpose of forming a union of all the German Protestants,
Oxenstjerna appeared in a carriage drawn by six horses, with
German princes attending him on foot.
Not the least of Oxenstjerna's many cares was the supreme
direction of Sweden's numerous armies in Germany, on the
Weser and the Upper Rhine, in Swabia and Silesia, amounting
together to about 120,000 men. The war at this period,
owing to the wilful inaction of Wallenstein, a difficulty over-
come by his assassination (Feb. 25, 1634), was conducted
slackly and with varying success. In June, 1633, the Swedes,
by the victory of Oldendorf, cleared Westphalia of the Im-
perialists; but, on Sept. 6, 1634, a terrible disaster befell them
at Nördlingen, where the army of Gustavus Horn and Bernard
of Saxe-Weimar was virtually wiped out by the new Imperialist
commander-in-chief, Gallas, losing 6000 killed and wounded
and 6000 prisoners.
Even more serious than the military were the moral and
political consequences of this disaster. The nimbus of invinci-
bility with which the arms of Sweden had hitherto been
invested instantly vanished; and both foes and confederates
ventured to treat her as they had never treated her before.
The Elector of Saxony at once took the opportunity of re-
opening negotiations with the Emperor, and concluded a
separate peace with him at Prag (May, 1635). By the end
of the same year Hesse-Cassel was Sweden's sole remaining
ally in North Germany, while Poland and Denmark simul-
taneously assumed a threatening attitude. In a fit of panic,
the Swedish home government, against the express advice of
the indignant chancellor, bought a twenty-six years' truce
(Treaty of Stuhmsdorf, Sept. 12, 1635) with Poland, by re-
linquishing, at this very time when they were most wanted, the
Prussian tolls, secured by Gustavus Adolphus in the fruce of
Altmark six years beforem-tolls nine times as lucrative as all
the Swedish and Finnish tolls put together. Isolated amidst
failing friends and active foes, Oxenstjerna sought to gain time
14–2
212 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [ch.
by cautiously opening negotiations for a closer alliance with
France. Well aware that Richelieu needed the Swedish
armies as much as he himself needed French money, he
resolutely refused to bind his hands in the future for the sake
of some slight present relief, though he went all the way to
Compiègne personally to meet Louis XIII and Richelieu, and
was received there with the utmost distinction, Louis XIII
even addressing him as “mon cousin.” A fresh subsidy treaty
with France, signed at Wismar in 1636, meanwhile relieved
his temporary pecuniary embarrassments; and presently the
good sword of Johan Banér somewhat retrieved the military
prestige of Sweden.
Appointed commander-in-chief by Oxenstjerna after the
rout of Nördlingen, and finding South Germany hopelessly
lost, Banér bent all his efforts to reestablish the influence of
Sweden in the north. After quelling a dangerous mutiny in
the long-disorganised army, and receiving reinforcements, he
invaded Saxony, whose weathercock Elector, now the ally of
the Emperor, was threatening Pomerania. This attack recalled
him to the defence of his own territories; and on Oct. 4,
1636, with only 16,000 men, Banér routed the Saxon army,
23,000 strong, at Wittstock, compelling them to retreat with
the loss of 7000 men. This victory obliterated the impres-
sion of the Nördlingen disaster, and restored the supremacy
of the Swedes in northern Germany. But since the Peace
of Prag the war had entirely changed its character. Religious
questions had fallen into the background; and the intervening
powers, France and Sweden, now only aimed at obtaining
an adequate compensation for their past sacrifices, so as to
be able to withdraw honourably from the contest. But so
many important interests were involved, and the Protestants
were so hopelessly divided, that peace seemed to be further
off than ever. Moreover the victory of Wittstock gave the
Swedes only a temporary respite. Banér was too weak to
follow up his success; and the Imperial forces were concen-
VIII]
Victories of Johan Banér
213
hrough L. qurable Erfurt, lazca ready by
trated from all parts of Germany to crush the victor, whose
position soon became extremely critical. He was beleaguered
on all sides by hostile armies; and only if he succeeded
in breaking through the iron circle enclosing him ever more
narrowly was a more durable triumph conceivable.
In mid-winter Banér took Erfurt, laid siege to Leipsic, and
was about to storm it (a breach had already been opened)
when, under pressure from the combined Imperial forces, he
was obliged to entrench himself within a fortified camp at
Torgau. Thence, for four months, he defied the enemy's
fourfold larger army, and lived on the surrounding country.
Meanwhile his colleague, Gustavus Vrangel, after capturing
Frankfort and Berlin from the now hostile Elector of Branden.
burg, was compelled by Marazini's superior forces to fall back
into Pomerania. Thus everywhere it was only with the utmost
· difficulty that the Swedes could keep the enemy at bay. In
June, 1637, Banér at last quitted Torgau for fear of being cut
off by four Imperialist armies advancing simultaneously against
him from the north, west, south, and south-east. With only
14,000 to oppose to 60,000, he first attempted to fight his way
back to Pomerania and there join Vrangel. He crossed the Elbe
and Oder without opposition, and was preparing to cross the
Warthe also at Landsberg, when he suddenly encountered the
combined forces of Gallas and Marazini, who had cut him off
by taking the shorter route. The little Swedish army, caught
between the rivers Oder and Warthe, in the face of over-
whelming numbers, now seemed hopelessly lost. But Banér
did not lose his head. Outwitting the enemy by feigning a
retreat into Poland, he suddenly doubled back, crossed the
Oder without losing a man, joined Vrangel, and was saved.
All Europe, expecting his imminent destruction, was amazed
by such a combination of luck and audacity. After this
masterly retreat, one of the most brilliant exploits in the
military history of Sweden-Banér himself used to say of it that
Gallas had got him into the sack but forgotten to pull the
214 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
strings—the Swedish general was entrusted with the defence of
Pomerania, now Sweden's last possession on German soil.
Driven back to the sea with an exhausted, famished army,
constantly harassed by vastly superior forces, Banér neverthe-
less doggedly defended his dangerous post of honour all
through the winter of 1637 and the spring of 1638, till Gallas's
army, worn out by want and sickness, was compelled to retire,
whereupon Baner followed close upon his heels and established
himself in Mecklenburg.
Never had the position of Sweden been so desperate as
during these two years. Her material resources seemed ex-
hausted; her military resources were reduced to a single army
corps. But Banér's iron grip upon Pomerania never once
relaxed; and in the meantime the crisis passed away. Hence-
forward Sweden, as a military power, was safe; very shortly
she was to be triumphant. Encouraging signs of the growing
exhaustion of the Imperialists were also not wanting. More-
over, under pressure from the chancellor, the Swedish Estates
made a supreme effort and again opened their purses; fresh
subsidies were simultaneously obtained from France; and
Banér, provided at last with adequate reinforcements, was
able to assume the offensive. In the winter of 1638 he
quitted his quarters in Mecklenburg, advanced to Meissen,
and in the spring of 1639 defeated the Imperialists in a pitched
battle at Chemnitz. Then, after advancing to the gates of
Prag, he turned westwards, drove Hatzfeld before him into
Franconia, and, returning to Bohemia, went into winter quarters
there and sucked the country dry. For the first time the
Habsburg crown-lands were to feel the full burden of the
war. Nor was this all. Banér's victories enabled the French
armies simultaneously to advance to the Rhine, conquer Elsass,
and invade Swabia; and in May, 1640, a French army corps,
under Guébriant, united with Banér's forces at Erfurt, so that
the Swedish commander was now at the head of 36,000 men.
In January, 1641, he suddenly appeared before Regensburg,
VIII] Reestablishment of Sweden's supremacy 215
where the Emperor and the Reichstag were assembled, only a
sudden thaw, which flooded the Danube, saving them from falling
into his hands. The desertion of the Weimar princes, and
the rapid rallying of all the Imperialist forces, compelled him,
however, to hurry back towards Saxony, with the enemy hard
upon his heels. Thence he directed his march northwards
to Halberstadt, where, on May 1o, 1641, Sweden's greatest
general died of exhaustion in his forty-fifth year.
His successor, Lennart Torstensson, found the long-suffering
army in an acute state of mutiny and misery ; but his
authority and firmness speedily restored order, and he was
destined to lead them to even greater feats of arms than those
of Banér. But it was Banér who had borne all the burden
and heat of the day; it was his victories which had broken the
strength of the Imperialists and made his successor's triumphs
comparatively easy. Moreover the political situation of Sweden
had now distinctly improved. Saxony, after the defeats of
Wittstock and Chemnitz, was powerless ; the new Elector of
Brandenburg, Frederick William, who succeeded his father in
1641, had concluded a truce with Sweden; and in 1638 the
subsidy treaty with France had been renewed. After reorganising
his army in its new.quarters in the Altmark, Torstensson, in
the spring of 1642, invaded Silesia, stormed the fortress of
Gross-Glogau, defeated the Imperialists at Scheidnitz, and
captured that fortress together with Olmütz. Too weak to
press on to Vienna, he prudently retraced his steps, taking
the Oder fortresses of Kosel and Oppeln on his way, and on
Nov. 2, 1642, forced the Imperialists to fight the second
battle of Breitenfeld under unfavourable conditions, de-
feating them with a loss of 5000 killed and wounded and
4500 prisoners. A month later Leipsic surrendered. The
victory of Breitenfeld completely reestablished the military
supremacy of Sweden, which she had lost since the defeat of
Nördlingen. Thenceforth, to the end of the war, she was to
be the aggressor, while the Emperor could, only with the utmost
216 Gustavus Adolphus & Axel Oxenstjerna [CH.
difficulty, defend even his hereditary lands. In the spring of
1643 Torstensson again invaded Moravia and relieved Olmütz.
He was projecting an advance upon Vienna when; at the
command of Oxenstjerna, he set off for the other end of
Europe to execute the chancellor's designs against Denmark,
and accomplished the brilliant feat of arms which extorted the
humiliating Peace of Brömsebro from Christian IV (pp. 171–
174). Henceforth, for the next twenty-five years, Sweden was
justly regarded as the greatest military power in Europe..
It now remains for us to cast a glance at what was not the
least difficult of the Swedish chancellor's manifold cares--his
domestic administration.
During his absence in Germany the policy of the other
regents had often been vacillating to the verge of cowardice;
but on his return all branches of the administration awoke
to new life. This is especially observable in the attitude of
the government towards the Estates of the realm. The
chancellor, a born aristocrat, with all the virtues but some of
the prejudices of his class at its best, distrusted popular
government, especially during the German war, which was a
heavy drain upon the limited resources of a poor country.
He especially doubted the expediency of consulting the Es-
tates too often on questions of foreign policy, and he preferred
to negotiate with the representatives of the various provinces
through carefully selected delegates, local assemblies being, in
his opinion, more manageable than Riksdags. Yet he never
ruled over the heads of the people as the contemporary French
ambassador at Stockholm more than once suggested. During
the ten years of his administration he summoned no fewer than
five Riksdags; and on every occasion his authority proved amply
sufficient to quell the impatient murmurings of the Estates
at the grievousness of the public burdens. It is undeniable
that Oxenstjerna soinewhat favoured his own order at the
expense of the lower Estates; and, while the by no means
unreasonable complaints of the peasant deputies were some-
VIII] Ošenstjerna's Domestic Administration 217
times severely rebuked as savouring of sedition, the gentry had
their privileges not only confirmed but increased. Yet, though
the chancellor occasionally carried through economical ques-
tions with a very high hand, he invariably took the opinion of
the Estates in all important matters. The whole administration,
moreover, assumed a more stable and regular character than it
had ever had before. Oxenstjerna always presided at the
frequent meetings of the Råd; his strong hand and watchful
eye influenced every branch of the administration; and anything
like slackness, disorder, or venality was impossible during his
sway. Many useful reforms, too, were inaugurated. A com-
mittee of experienced jurists was appointed to improve and sim-
plify the course of legal procedure; trade and industry, especially
the fabrication of iron and copper wire, were vigorously promoted
and flourished exceedingly so long as Sweden held control
of the estuaries of all the principal rivers of Germany. The
regular army was reorganised and raised to 40,000 men, an
enormous force for a nation with a population of only 1,500,000 ;
while the fleet in 1640 consisted of no fewer than forty men-of-
war and forty galleys with 1300 guns, besides the skärgårdsflotta,
or skerry-flotilla of 150 galleys for special service among the
fiords of Sweden and Finland. Despite the inevitable jealousy
of his numerous personal and political enemies, the authority
of the great chancellor to the very end of the queen's minority
continued undiminished. His crowning work was the Peace of
Brömsebro, for which the young Queen Christina promptly
rewarded him with a countship and the rich estate of Södra
Möra. But the day of his supremacy was now over. A new
era had begun in which the grey-haired statesman was to take
a lower place.
CHAPTER IX.
SWEDEN AS AN IMPERIAL POWER,
1644-1660.
CHRISTINA, who inherited her father's sceptre in her
eighteenth year (Dec. 8, 1644), seemed born to rule a great
Empire. From the moment when she took her seat at the
head of the council-board she impressed her veteran coun-
sellors with the conviction of her superior-genius. In many
things she resembled her still revered father. She possessed
his blonde hair, ample forehead, hooked nose, and large, blue
eyes. Like him she was naturally eloquent, acute, provident,
courageous, energetic, equally devoted to art and science, and
infinitely more learned. With an astounding inemory, a lively
curiosity, and quick apprehension, her love of knowledge knew
no bounds. She would rise at five in the morning, to converse
for a couple of hours with Descartes in her library; and she
delighted to listen to the disputations of Vossius, Salmasius,
and Schefferus, all of them her protégés and pensioners. Her
collection of books was renowned throughout Europe. Latin
she had thoroughly mastered; the Greek classics she could
read in the original; French and Italian she spoke better than
her mother-tongue; while astronomy and mathematics were her
favourite recreations. Yet she was much more of an Amazon
than a pedant. Athletic exercises irresistibly appealed to her:
In all Sweden there was not a more skilful hunter or a more
daring rider; she could remain in the saddle for ten hours at
CH. Ix] Character of Christina 219
a time without fatigue. Indeed her whole temperament was
masculine rather than feminine. Axel Oxenstjerna himself said
of her when she was only fifteen, “Her Majesty is not like
women-folk, but is stout-hearted and of a good understanding,
so that if her Majesty be not corrupted we have good hopes of
her."
Unfortunately these brilliant and commanding qualities
were vitiated by a strange combination of defects generally
considered incompatible: a cold callousness and a hot, im-
perious temper. It is hardly too much to say that Christina
was, perhaps, the most heartless sovereign who ever sat upon
a throne. Other monarchs have been as selfish, but the most
egoistical of them have at least loved someone or something.
Christina seems to have cared for absolutely nobody but
herself. Her own sex she hated and despised with an intensity
which was scarcely sane; yet her pride—pride of intellect even
more than pride of station-revolted at the idea of affectionate
submission to any member of the opposite sex. Marriage she
regarded as an insupportable yoke; and, though her hand was
sought for by almost every important prince in Europe, she
resolutely remained single to the last. Favourites she had in
abundance, and she sometimes permitted herself a freedom of
intercourse with them which the French ambassador, Chanut,
considered highly indecorous; but her habitual aloofness was
an insuperable barrier to the least attempt at familiarity on
their part; never, for a moment, was the most highly favoured
of them permitted to forget that, after all, he was only a sub-
ject. On the other hand she dispensed her largess with a prodi-
gality utterly regardless of the necessities of the State. Indeed
contempt for public opinion was. perhaps the most salient, as
it was the most offensive form which her pride and egoism
assumed. She seemed to consider Swedish affairs as far too
petty to occupy her full attention; while her unworthy treat-
ment of the great chancellor, Axel Oxenstjerna, was mainly
due to her jealousy of his extraordinary reputation, and to the
220 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
uneasy conviction that, so long as he was alive, his influence
must be at least equal to her own. Hence her growing dislike
of the aged statesman, a dislike which she gradually extended
to every member of his numerous family. Recognising that
he would be indispensable so long as the war lasted, she used
every effort to bring it to an end; and her impulsive inter-
ference seriously hampered the diplomacy of the chancellor,
and materially reduced the ultimate gains of Sweden.
The German war was gradually dying of exhaustion. Even
the Emperor, with his superior resources, could barely defend
his hereditary domains. In the spring of 1645, Torstensson,
with an army of 15,000 men, invaded Bohemia, proposing, in
conjunction with George Rakoczy, prince of Transylvania, to
extort a peace at the gates of Vienna, whilst Turenne pre-
vented the Bavarians from assisting the Emperor by crossing
the Rhine. On March 6 Torstensson routed Hatzfeld at Jan-
kovich, south-east of Prag, capturing Hatzfeld himself with six
of his generals, all his artillery, and 4000 men-a crushing
victory which opened the way to Vienna. Torstensson actually
penetrated to the Danube, and captured the bridge-head
facing the city; but the bridge had been burnt, and, with only
10,000 men, he was too weak to storm the place. In the
summer he was joined by Rakoczy with 25,000 undisciplined
Transylvanians; but that prince speedily made his own terms
with the Emperor, after infecting the army of his Swedish ally ·
with the plague, so that Torstensson was obliged to abandon his
plans against Vienna, and go into winter quarters in Bohemia.
In December, broken down with fatigue and racked with gout,
he resigned his command to a younger colleague, Karl Gustaf
Vrangel, who proceeded westwards, and, in August, 1646,
united his forces with those of Turenne. Disagreements
between the two commanders resulted in a barren campaign;
and, in 1647, each of them went his own way with next to
no result. Reuniting again in the spring of 1648, they
ravaged Bavaria, defeated the Imperialists at Züsmarshausen,
IX)
221
the famaded Bo While anos
77
Opening of Peace Negotiations
and pressed forward to the Inn; while another Swedish army,
under Königsmark, invaded Bohemia and sacked Prag, on
which occasion the famous Mäsogothic manuscript, Codex
Argenteus, was sent to Upsala amongst the spoils of war.
Shortly afterwards the Count Palatine, Charles Gustavus,
superseded Königsmark, and was about to march westwards
to join Vrangel when the tidings came that peace had at last
been concluded.
The negotiations for terminating the Thirty Years' War
had begun as far back as December, 1641, at Hamburg, when
it was arranged that a general peace congress should meet, in
March, 1642, at Osnabrück and Münster. Sweden was to nego-
tiate with the Emperor at the former, and France to negotiate
with him at the latter place, so as to avoid all disputes as to
precedence between the representatives of the two confederate
powers; while the little intermediate town of Lengerich was
fixed upon as a place for mutual consultation. Venice and the
Pope were the intermediaries between France and Germany,
while Sweden negotiated with the Emperor direct. These
preliminaries were not confirmed, however, till March, 1643;
and the general congress was not opened till April, 1645,
Torstensson's successes finally compelling the reluctant Emperor
to treat. Representatives from every European state assembled
at the congress, the Catholics frequenting Münster, the Pro-
testants Osnabrück. The Swedish plenipotentiaries were
senator Johan Oxenstjerna, the chancellor's son, and Adler
Salvius. From the first the relations between them were
strained. Young Oxenstjerna, haughty and violent, claimed,
by right of birth and rank to be “caput legationis," and
regarded the incomparably abler Salvius as a middle-class
upstart. The chancellor at home naturally took his son's
part, while Salvius was warmly supported by Christina, who
privately assured him of her exclusive favour, and encouraged
him to hold his own. So acute did the quarrel become that
there was a violent scene in full Senate between the queen
222 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
and the chancellor; and, though even Christina durst not
proceed to extremities against the Oxenstjernas, she urged
Salvius to accelerate the negotiations, against the judgment
of the chancellor, who hoped to get more by holding out
longer.
Sweden's original demands were Silesia (she held most
of the fortresses there), Pomerania, which had been in her
possession for nearly twenty years, and a war-indemnity
of twenty millions of rix-dollars; but, after three years of
negotiations, a compromise was arrived at, and on October
24, 1648, the treaty generally known as the Peace of West-
phalia was signed simultaneously at Osnabrück and Münster.
By this convention Sweden obtained (1) Upper Pomerania,
with the islands of Rügen and Usedom, and a strip of Lower
Pomerania on the right bank of the Oder, including the towns
of Stettin, Garz, Damm, and Gollnow, and the isle of Wollin,
with right of succession to the rest of Lower Pomerania in case
of the extinction of the house of Brandenburg; (2) the town
of Wismar with the districts of Poel and Neukloster ; (3) the
secularised bishoprics of Bremen and Verden; and (4) 5,000,000
rix-dollars. The German possessions were to be held as fiefs
of the Empire; and in respect thereof Sweden was to have a vote
in the Reichstag, and to "direct" the Lower Saxon Circle alter-
nately with Brandenburg. Full civil and religious liberty was,
at the same time, conceded to the German Protestants, the pro-
visions of the Peace of Augsburg being now, for the first time, ex-
tended to the Calvinists. France and Sweden moreover became
joint guarantors of the treaty with the Emperor, and were
entrusted with the carrying out of its provisions, which was
practically effected by the execution-congress of Nürnberg,
June, 1650.
It must be confessed that Sweden's reward for the exertions
and sacrifices of eighteen years was meagre, nay almost paltry.
Her newly won possessions were both small and scattered,
though, on the other hand, she had now obtained the practical
IX) Sweden's gains by the Peace of Westphalia 223
control of the three principal rivers of North Germany--the
Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser-and reaped the full advantage of
the tolls levied on those great commercial arteries. The jealousy
of France and the impatience of Christina were the chief causes
of the inadequacy of her final recompense. Yet, though the
immediate gain was small, she had not dissipated her blood
and her treasure altogether in vain. Her vigorous intervention
in the Thirty Years' War had saved the cause of religious
liberty in Europe; and this remains, to all time, her greatest
historical exploit. Henceforth, till her collapse, seventy years
later, she was the recognised leader of continental Pro-
testantism. A more questionable benefit was her rapid
elevation to the rank of a great, an imperial power, an
elevation which imposed the duty of remaining a military
monarchy armed cap-à-pied for every possible emergency.
Everyone recognises now that the poverty and the sparse
population of Sweden unfitted her for such a tremendous
destiny. It was like investing a dwarf in the armour of a
giant. But in the middle of the seventeenth century the
incompatibility was by no means so obvious; and besides, to
extend the metaphor, if Sweden was politically a dwarf, she
was at least a sturdy dwarf in the midst of cripples and para-
lytics. All her neighbours—Denmark, Germany, Poland, and
Moscovy—were either decadent or exhausted states; and France,
the most powerful of the western powers, was her firm ally.
For the moment Sweden held the lead. Everything de-
pended on the policy of the next few years. Careful statesman-
ship might mean permanent dominion, but there was not much
margin for blundering. Unfortunately, just at this crisis, her
destiny was in the hands of the most capricious and incalculable
of women. The longer Christina ruled, the more anxious for
the future fate of her empire grew the men who had helped to
build it up. It is true that her country owes her something.
In the beginning of her reign she seems to have taken a lively
interest in both the material and the spiritual prosperity of
224 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
Sweden. She gave fresh privileges to the towns; she en-
couraged trade and manufactures, especially the mining
industries of the Dales; in 1649 she issued the first school-
ordinance for the whole kingdom ; she erected new gymnasia
at Hernösand and Gothenburg; she encouraged foreign
scholars to settle in Sweden; and native science and literature,
under her liberal encouragement, flourished as they had never
flourished before. In one respect, too, she showed herself
wiser than her wisest counsellors. The Senate and the Estates,
naturally anxious about the succession to the throne, had
repeatedly urged her Majesty to marry, and had indicated her
cousin, Charles Gustavus, as her most befitting consort.
Wearied at last by their importunities, determined to put an
end to them once for all, and, at the same time, desirous to
compensate her cousin for the loss of her half-promised hand,
she resolved to have him proclaimed her successor. “After
all, Krona' is a pretty girl too,” she said laughingly. Accord-
ingly, when the Riksdag of 1649 renewed its matrimonial
petition, Christina surprised the Senate next day (Feb. 24) by
announcing her decision. The senators protested warmly, but
the queen persisted in her resolution and prevailed, though
only with the utmost difficulty could Oxenstjerna, who dis-
trusted Charles Gustavus, be persuaded to consent thereto.
Christina was undoubtedly right in thus obviating the danger
of a disputed succession in the near future; and her firmness
claims both our admiration and respect. At the following
Riksdag, 1650, the throne was declared hereditary in Charles
Gustavus and his heirs male.
Christina's anxiety to settle the succession was intimately
connected with a secret resolution to resign the crown. In
the summer of 1651 a committee of the Riksdag was actually
summoned to receive her abdication; but the urgent sup-
plications of a deputation of the Senate and the Estates,
1 Krona, a crown, feminine in Swedish.
IX)
Prodigality of Christina
225
Y
headed by the aged chancellor, induced the queen to re-
consider her resolution. Yet, though she yielded for a time
to the entreaties of her subjects, she never really abandoned
the idea of abdication. Many were the causes which pre-
disposed her to what was after all anything but an act of
self-renunciation. First, she could not fail to remark the
increasing discontent with her arbitrary and wasteful ways.
Upon her numerous favourites, especially upon the hand-
some and brilliant trifler, Count Magnus Gabriel De la
Gardie, and, after his disgrace in 1653, upon her French
physician, Pierre Michon Bourdelot, and the Spanish ambas-
sador, Antonio Pimentelli, who is supposed to have under-
mined her religious faith, she scattered gifts in money and
land with such reckless prodigality that the revenue of the
State was seriously impaired. Within ten years she created
17 Counts, 46 Barons, and 428 lesser nobles; and, to provide
these new peers with adequate appanages, she sold or nort-
gaged crown property representing an annual income of
1,200,000 rix-dollars. Most of these beneficiaries, whom
she also raised to the highest offices of the State, were
insignificant and even worthless persons who had done
nothing to deserve their emoluments. This extravagance was
carried so far that at last it became difficult to decide what did
and what did not belong to the Crown; and the queen had to
make her donations of land subject to the proviso that she had
not already bestowed them on someone else. .
Towards the end of her reign the general discontent with her
government became loud and menacing; and in 1650 the storm
burst. At the Riksdag held in that year a deputation from the
lower Estates presented to the queen “a protestation for the
restitution of crown property,” in which the dilapidated state
of the kingdom and the usurpations of the excessively privi-
leged nobility were painted in the darkest colours. The queen
received the deputation graciously, though she would not
pledge herself to anything ; but the question of the restitution
BAIN
15
226 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
of the alienated crown-lands had at least been raised, and was
not allowed to fall out of sight again. Still more significant
was the so-called Messenian conspiracy. In November, 1651,
Arnold Messenius, a son of the recently ennobled royal histo-
riographer, Arnold Johan Messenius, wrote a virulent squib
against the queen and the nobility, and, in the frankest
language invited the heir to the throne to place himself at the
head of a rebellion. The Messenii, father and son (though
the former protested his ignorance and innocence), were seized
forthwith, tried, condemned, and executed two days after the
passing of the sentence. The hasty process and the cruel
judgment cast a dark shadow over Christina's memory, though
she speedily repented of her harshness, and, for the sake of the
implicated families, forbade any further investigations. But
the whole affair was a blow to her vanity, showing her, as it
did, that a large section of her subjects detested her. She
might, indeed, have regained her popularity by taking the
popular side and opposing the aggrandisement of the aristo-
cracy; but this would have been a reversal of her previous
policy, to which her pride would not submit.
Signs are also not wanting that Christina was growing weary
of the cares of government; while the importunity of the Råd
and the Riksdag on the question of her marriage was a constant
source of irritation. In retirement she could devote herself ex-
clusively to art and science; and the opportunity of astonishing
the world by the unique spectacle of a great queen, in the prime
of life, voluntarily resigning her crown, strongly appealed
to her vivid imagination. Each of these motives may have
contributed something to her otherwise inexplicable conduct;
anyhow it is certain that towards the end of her reign she
behaved as if she were determined to do everything in her
power to make herself as little missed as possible. From 1651,
when she first publicly announced her intention of resigning the
crown, there was a noticeable change in her behaviour. Her
prodigality now knew no bounds. She cast away every regard
IX] Abdication and last years of Christina 227
for the feelings and the prejudices of her people. She osten-
tatiously exhibited her contempt for revealed religion, especially
the Protestant form of it. Her foreign policy was flighty to the
verge of foolishness. She contemplated an alliance with Spain,
a state quite outside the orbit of Sweden's influence, the first-
fruits of which were to have been an invasion of Portugal.
She openly snubbed the Senate by never attending its de-
liberations, and utterly neglected affairs in order to plunge
into a whirl of costly dissipations with her foreign favourites.
At last, when the situation had become impossible, and
even the chancellor admitted that if the step were to be taken
at all it should be taken at once, a Riksdag was summoned to
Upsala, in May, 1654, to receive the queen's abdication. The
solemn act took place on June 6, 1654, at the castle of
Upsala, in the presence of the Estates and the great dignitaries
of the realm. After surrendering the regalia, and divesting
herself of her royal robes, the queen slowly descended to
the last step of the throne, and thence delivered a parting
address to the Senate and the Estates, with that natural dignity
which was always at her command. Both she and her hearers
were deeply affected. On the afternoon of the same day her
cousin was crowned king in the cathedral under the title of
Charles X Gustavus. Shortly afterwards Christina quitted
Sweden. She had forfeited the affections of her subjects
long before she abandoned them.
Christina's departure from Sweden resembled a flight. She
travelled in masculine attire, under the name of Count Dohna,
to Brussels and thence to Italy. At Innsbruck she openly
joined the Catholic Church, and was re-christened Alexandra.
In 1656, and again in 1657, she visited France, on the
second occasion ordering the assassination of her major-domo,
Monaldischi, a mysterious crime still unexplained. Twice she
returned to Sweden (in 1660 and 1667) in the vain hope of
recovering the succession, finally settling at Rome, where she
died, on April 19, 1689, poor, neglected, and forgotten.
15-2
228 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644–60 [CH.
The new king, the eldest son of John Casimir, Count
Palatine of Zweibrücken, and Catharine, the sister of Gustavus
Adolphus, was born at Nyköping Castle, on November 8, 1622.
He owed much to the careful training of an excellent mother,
and after studying at Upsala made the usual grand tour. In
1640 he returned to Sweden, eager to place his abilities at the
service of his adopted country. Oxenstjerna offered him a high
place in the army; but the young man, modestly declining to
command till he had learnt to obey, entered, as a volunteer,
the army of the great Torstensson, from whom he learnt the
art of war. In 1646-1647 we find him at Christina's court
as her suitor ; but the fastidious queen, who could not look
without laughing at the thickset little man with the long black
locks, who, even at twenty-five, was the fattest member of her
court, unable to return his love, at least gratified his ambition
by appointing him (Jan. 1648) generalissimo of her armies on
the continent. The conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia
prevented him from winning the military laurels he so ardently
desired, but, as the Swedish plenipotentiary at the execution-
congress of Nürnberg, he had an unrivalled opportunity of
learning diplomacy, in which science he speedily became a
past master. As the recognised heir to the throne, his position
on his return to Sweden was not without danger, for the
growing discontent with the queen turned the eyes of
thousands upon him as possible deliverer. He therefore
withdrew to the isle of Oland, and there, far from the
intrigues of the court, patiently bided his time till the abdi-
cation of Christina called him to the throne in his thirty-
second year.
A strong hand was needed to repair the dilapidation, and
correct the abuses, of the last reign. To begin with, the State
was on the verge of bankruptcy. Its revenue in those days
was mainly derived from crown property; and Christina's reck-
less dealings with that national asset had not only depleted the
exchequer, but struck at the very root of Sweden's resources.
IX
Character of Charles X
229
There was not enough money to pay the salaries of the chief
officials and provide for the wants of the royal household.
And the financial difficulty had superinduced a serious political
agitation. Throughout the land, noble and non-noble faced
each other in fierce antagonism. The general discontent was
growing louder every day; and the mass of the Swedish people
was penetrated by a justifiable fear that the external greatness
of their country might in the long run be purchased with the
loss of their civil and political liberties. In a word, the natural
equilibrium of Swedish society was seriously threatened by the
preponderance of the nobility; and the people at large looked
to the new king to redress the balance. A better arbiter
between the various Estates than Charles X it would have
been difficult to find. It is true that, primarily a soldier, his
whole ambition was directed towards military glory; but he was
also an unusually sharp-sighted politician, with no abstract
theories to misguide him, and no prejudices in favour of birth
or ancestry. It was his firm belief that only by force of arms
could Sweden retain the dominion which by force of arms she
had won; but he also grasped the fact that there must be no
disunion at home if she were to be powerful abroad. Person-
ally persuaded of the superiority of a strong monarchy to every
other form of government, he was equally opposed to aristocratic
and to popular pretensions. “I should be a big fool,” he said
on one occasion, “if I fancied I could rule a democratised
people”; while his contempt for “the puppet kings of Sparta,"
and “the Greek republics who ate each other up,” was un-
bounded. But he rejected the idea of an oligarchy with equal
energy; and once, when his friend Per Brahe showed him a
treatise by Professor Gyldenstolpe exalting the attributes of the
nobility, and differentiating them from the other subjects of
the Crown, Charles dashed the book against the wall with the
blunt remark that it might suit their Excellencies, but it
would not do for him at all.
The beginning of his reign, therefore, was devoted to the
230 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
healing of domestic discords, and the rallying of all the
forces of the nation round his standard for a new policy
of conquest. First of all he contracted a political mar-
riage (Oct. 24, 1654) with Hedwig Leonora, the daughter of
Frederick III, duke of Holstein-Gottorp, by way of securing a
future ally against Denmark—a momentarily prudent measure,
but infinitely mischievous in the long run by intensifying the
unnatural hatred which already divided the sister nations of
Scandinavia. As regarded his own people, Charles laid it
down as a rule, from which he never swerved, that a sovereign
should have neither favourites ņor enemies among his own
subjects. He took counsel of all alike, treated Axel Oxenstjerna,
his most inveterate antagonist, with filial respect, and, when the
aged chancellor died on August 28, 1654, appointed the most
capable of his sons, Count Eric, chancellor in his stead.
The two great pressing national questions, war and the resti-
tution of the alienated crown-lands, were duly considered at the
Riksdag which assembled at Stockholm in March, 1655. The
war question was decided in three days by a secret committee,
selected by and presided over by the king himself, who easily
persuaded the delegates that a war with Poland was necessary
and might prove very advantageous to the State ; but long and
acrimonious were the debates on the subject of the aids and
subsidies to be granted to the Crown for military purposes.
The king proposed that the holders of crown property should
either pay an annual sum of 200,000 rix-dollars, to be allowed
for out of any further crown-lands subsequently falling in to
them, or should surrender a fourth of the expectant property
itself to the estimated amount of 600,000 rix-dollars. After
some murmuring at the indignity of being taxed at all, the
nobility yielded to pressure from above; but they attempted to
escape as cheaply as possible by stipulating that November 6,
1632, the day of Gustavus Adolphus's death, should be the
extreme limit of any retrospective action on the part of the
Crown in regard to alienated crown property, and that the
Ix] Injustice of Charles's Polish War 231
present subsidy should be regarded as “a perpetual ordinance"
unalterably to be observed by all future sovereigns-in other
words that there should be no further restitution of alienated
crown property. Against this interpretation of the subsidy
bill, the already over-taxed lower Estates protested so ener-
getically that the marshal of the Diet had to suspend the
session of the houses ; and the king had to intervene person-
ally, not to quell the Commons, as the Råd had insisted, but
to compel the nobility to give way. He proposed that the
whole matter should be thoroughly investigated by a special
committee before the meeting of the next Riksdag, and that in
the meantime a contribution should be levied on all classes
proportionately. This equitable arrangement was accepted by
the Estates; and on June 25, 1655, the Riksdag broke up.
The Polish War on which Charles X had resolved to
embark has been justified by more than one Swedish historian
as a political necessity, the second unavoidable step, in fact,
in the policy of conquest inaugurated by Gustavus Adolphus,
with the object of uniting all the Baltic lands under Swedish
rule by way of a bulwark against Sweden's enemies. Polish
historians naturally take another and a very different view.
In their eyes the Swedish invasion was a flagrant breach of
international law, an inexcusable rupture with a pacific neigh-
bour. On the whole, the Polish historians seem to be in the
right. There can be little doubt that the love of glory and
the spirit of adventure were the chief motives of Charles X,
when, in 1655, he kindled the flames of a war which was
speedily to embrace the whole of northern Europe. The
usual justification that Sweden was obliged by her situation
to anticipate the hostility of jealous neighbours will scarcely
bear investigation. At Charles X's accession in 1655 those
jealous neighbours were at least not adversaries, and might
have been converted into the allies of the new great power
which, if she had mulcted some of them of territory, had at least
compensated them for the loss with the by no means con-
232 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
temptible gift of religious liberty. At Charles X's death, five
years later, we find Sweden herself bled to exhaustion point,
surrounded by a broad belt of desolated territory, and regarded
with ineradicable hatred by every adjacent state. To sink in
five years from the position of the champion of Protestantism
to that of the common enemy of every Protestant power was
a degradation not to be compensated by any amount of military
glory. Nor is this all. The imposing figure of Charles X has
so long been exclusively regarded from its military, heroic side,
that we are apt to lose sight of its political aspect. Charles X
was not only a great soldier, he was also a great statesman ;
but his statesmanship was of a baser alloy than that of Axel
Oxenstjerna. He contributed, more than any other contem-
porary diplomatist, to lower the political morality of his age,
and he was the originator of those infamous partition projects
which culminated in the obliteration of the Polish republic at
the end of the eighteenth century. His own differences with
Poland were insignificant and easily adjustable. He could
have obtained peace practically on his own terms had not
his sense of justice been blinded by his lust of conquest.
But, whatever may be thought of the morality of the Polish
War, it must be admitted that the occasion could not have
been better chosen. The immense but headless and amor-
phous Polish republic was just then in the throes of one of
those chronic catastrophes to which a more highly vitalised
organism must inevitably have succumbed. A seven years' war
of unexampled ferocity with her rebellious Cossacks, which had
cost her millions of gulden, thousands of lives, the loss of the
Ukraine, and the devastation of the best third of her territories,
had become merged in a fresh war with the Moscovite who
had occupied her exhausted and unresisting eastern provinces,
and captured the hitherto impregnable fortress of Smolensk
after a siege of only seventeen days. Humbled to the dust,
demoralised, panic-stricken, economically on the verge of
ruin, with a king, John Casimir Vasa, whose blunders and
1x] Political situation favourable to Sweden 233
misfortunes had deprived him of the respect and confidence of
his subjects, Poland seemed an easy prey to the first aggressor ;
and Charles X resolved to win a cheap triumph by attacking
her forthwith, and wresting from her what still remained of her
Baltic provinces, to prevent them from falling into the hands
of Russia.
The political situation in Europe was highly favourable
for such an undertaking. None of Sweden's numerous
enemies was just then in a position to injure her; and
Charles X's skilful diplomacy did its utmost to allay the
uneasiness provoked by the rumour of his far-reaching plans.
But if he had no opponents, he also had no allies. France
would not assist an enterprise from which she could derive no
profit; and both Oliver Cromwell and the Elector Frederick
William of Brandenburg, whom the Swedish king tried to
win at the outset, preserved an expectant neutrality. But
Charles X's own resources were by no means contemptible.
At the rumour of the impending war thousands of seasoned
desperadoes, ex-soldiers of fortune of the Thirty Years' War,
rallied with alacrity to his standard ; and, by the time war was
declared, he had at his disposal 50,000 men, and 50 war-ships.
But he trusted as much to intrigue as he did to arms. Poland
itself had already been well manipulated by a whole-army of
well-paid spies; and, by the king's side, to guide his steps
and point out the nakedness of his mother-country, stood the
fugitive Polish vice-chancellor, Hieronymus Radziejowski, the
first of that long line of traitors who did more to ruin Poland
than all her enemies put together. The king of Sweden's plan
was to attack Poland from three sides simultaneously. One
army, under Magnus De la Gardie, was to advance from the
east and occupy Lithuania, another, under Arvid Vittenberg,
was to proceed from Hither Pomerania into Great Poland,
while the king himself, after effecting his junction with De la
Gardie, was to seize Polish Prussia. On July 10 Charles
quitted Sweden, after abruptly rejecting equitable conditions
234 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
of peace presented to him by an extraordinary Polish embassy
sent to Stockholm at the last moment to offer him his own
terms; and when, on the same day, Charles hoisted sail, and
one of the senators asked him, “Where shall we next meet?”
he replied with haughty self-assurance, “At Warsaw."
Hostilities had already begun with the occupation of
Dünaburg in Polish Livonia by the Swedes (July 1, 1655);
and on July 4 Vittenberg's army advanced through the marshy
basin of the Nitze to the Uszez, where lay in an almost im-
pregnable position 15,000 hastily mustered and dispirited
Polish levies under Christopher Opalinski. This general, at
the first invitation from his outlawed countryman, concluded
a convention (July 25) with Vittenberg, whereby the Palatin-
ates of Posen and Kalisz placed themselves beneath the
protection of the Swedish king. Thereupon the Swedes
crossed the Notec, entered Warsaw without opposition, and
occupied the whole of Great Poland. Too weak to offer any
resistance, John Casimir fled to Silesia. The whole republic
now seemed to be in the throes of dissolution; nearly every
province was in the possession of a different enemy. The
Moscovites, still advancing from the east, leisurely occupied
Wilna and Minsk; and a vast Cossack host from the south
sat down before Lemberg. The princely Protestant house
of Radziwill, by the Compact of Kiejdani (Aug. 28), made
common cause with the Swedes on condition that they should
drive the Russians out of Lithuania. It seemed as if the
ruin of Catholic Poland had at length been compassed by the
unnatural union of orthodox Moscovites, schismatical Cossacks,
Calvinists and Lutherans.
Meanwhile the king of Sweden, after effecting his junction
with De la Gardie, pressed on towards Cracow, the defence of
which had been entrusted to the valiant and capable Stephen
Czarniecki. For nearly two months he held the Swedish army
at bay beneath the walls of the Coronation City, when, seeing
no prospect of assistance, he capitulated on his own terms,
IX]
National rising in Poland
235
and was allowed to march out with all the honours of war.
The fall of Cracow extinguished the last hope of the boldest
Poles. The Hetmans, threatened in the south by the Cossacks,
hastened to surrender to the less barbarous Swedes. The
republic ceased to exist. The fugitive king, John Casimir,
from his exile at Glogau, vainly implored the diplomatic inter-
vention of France and Austria. He succeeded, however, in
detaching the Cossacks and Tatars, grown jealous of the
successes of the Moscovites, from the league against him ;
and, before the end of the year, an extraordinary reaction
had begun in Poland itself. On October 18 the Swedes in-
vested the fortress monastery of Czechstochowa, the Lourdes
of Poland; but the place was heroically defended by the prior,
Augustin Kordecki; and, after a seventy days' siege, the be-
siegers were compelled to retire with great loss.
. This success, so astounding that it was popularly attributed
to divine intervention, sent a thrill through Poland, and elicited
a burst of popular enthusiasm which spread through all ranks
of the population, and gave the war a national and religious
character. The tactlessness of Charles X, the rapacity of his
generals, the barbarity of his mercenaries, his ostentatious
protection of Calvinists like the Radziwills and Arians like
Jacob Niemcewicz, added fuel to the general combustion ;
while his refusal to legalise his position by summoning the
Sejm, his negotiations for the partition of the very state he
affected to befriend, and the ruinous contributions levied upon
the nobility and gentry, awoke the long slumbering public
spirit of the country. The first visible sign of this general
reaction was the Confederation of Tyszowiec (Dec. 29, 1655)
formed by the Hetmans, Stanislaus Potocki and Lankoronski,
for the defence of "the king, the Faith, and freedom.” Another
simultaneous confederation in Lithuania, under Sapieha and
Gasiowski, besieged and captured the leader of the Lithuanian
Calvinists, Janus Radziwill, in his fortress of Tykocin, where he
died on the last day of the year. Thus when, in the beginning
236 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60
of 1656, John Casimir returned from his Silesian exile, he was
able to attract all the patriotic elements in the country to his
standard. · In April, 1656, he entered Lemberg in triumph,
and, at a solemn service held in the cathedral, placed himself
and his country beneath the protection of the Blessed Virgin.
The Polish army was then reorganised; and Stephen Czarniecki
was appointed its commander-in-chief.
By this time Charles X had discovered that it was easier
to defeat the Poles than to conquer Poland. Difficulties
multiplied around him at every step. His chief object, the
conquest of Prussia, was still unaccomplished; and a new foe,
the Elector of Brandenburg, alarmed by the ambition of the
Swedish king, opposed its accomplishment. A rapid march
upon Königsberg, where he besieged the Elector, and com-
pelled him, at the point of the sword, to become his ally
and vassal (Treaty of Königsberg, Jan. 17, 1656), averted the
more pressing danger; but the tidings of the national rising
in Poland itself, and the return of the Polish king, now im-
peratively demanded his presence in the south. Accordingly
in January, 1656, Charles X broke up from Königsberg at
the head of 15,000 men. For weeks he scoured the intermin-
able, snow-covered plains of Poland, pursuing and defeating
Czarniecki whenever he could bring that adroit guerilla chieftain
to an engagement, and penetrating as far as Jaroslaw in Galicia,
by which time he had lost two-thirds of his little army with no
apparent result. His retreat from Jaroslaw, with the fragments
of his host, amidst three converging armies, in a marshy forest
region, intersected in every direction by well-guarded rivers,
was one of his most brilliant achievements. More than once,
notably at the passage of the San, absolute ruin seemed in-
evitable; but his genius, his audacity, and the superiority of
his artillery, combined to save him; and, in the beginning of
April, he was back again at Warsaw. After him, like a deluge,
swept the Polish forces, exterminating all the small Swedish
garrisons in their way, and recovering province after province.
IX]
Battle of Warsaw
237
On June 21, Vittenberg, after an heroic resistance, which
reduced his forces from 4000 to 510, was forced to surrender
Warsaw itself to the Polish king. Charles X was powerless
to relieve it. Poverty had all along been a drag upon his
triumphal car; and all around him the political horizon was
visibly darkening. A Dutch fleet had entered the Baltic to
relieve Dantzic; and the court of Vienna was urging the
Moscovite against him. He was obliged to look around for
serviceable allies, and his glance fell upon Frederick William
of Brandenburg, who promised, by the Treaty of Marienburg,
June 25, 1656, to aid him instantly with 4000 men, and ulti-
mately, if necessary, with the whole of his forces in return
for promises of Polish territory. On July 18-20 the com-
bined Swedes and Brandenburgers, 18,000 strong, after a three
days' battle defeated John Casimir and Czarniecki's army of
100,000 at Warsaw, and reoccupied the Polish capital; but
this brilliant feat of arms was altogether fruitless, and the
subsequent victories of the indefatigable Czarniecki at Radom
and Rawa, and the suspicious attitude of Frederick William,
compelled the Swedish king at last to open negotiations with
the Polish republic through the French ambassador, Des
Lumbres. The Poles, however, encouraged by the manifest
difficulties of the Swedes, naturally reſused their terms; and the
war was resumed.
In the beginning of November John Casimir entered Dant-
zic, whereupon Charles concluded an offensive and defensive
alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg (Treaty of Labiau,
Nov. 20) whereby it was agreed that Frederick William and
his heirs should henceforth possess the full sovereignty of
East Prussia. This was an essential modification of Charles's
Baltic policy; but the alliance of the Elector had now become
indispensable under almost any terms. Another proof of
Charles's desperate position was his treaty with Francis
Rakoczy, prince of Transylvania, Dec. 16, 1656, who was
attracted to the Swedish alliance by the promise of all
238 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644–60 [CH.
Poland's south-eastern provinces. In the spring of 1657,
Rakoczy, with a horde of 60,000 semi-barbarians, joined the
17,000 Swedish veterans near Sandomir; but the solitary
success of the raid was the capture of the fortress of Bresc
Litewsk; and, on the departure of the king, Rakoczy was
driven headlong out of Poland by Czarniecki. Meanwhile
Sweden's Baltic provinces had been suffering all the horrors
of a Moscovite invasion. Tsar Alexius, who would not share
with Sweden a booty he had reserved for himself, ravaged
Ingria, Carelia, and Livonia in the course of 1656, inflicting
incalculable misery on the country folks, but failing to capture
any important fortress. Fortunately in December, 1658, the
Tsar consented to a truce of three years, which enabled the
Swedish king to turn his arms against yet another foe who had
suddenly declared war against him. This foe was Denmark.
In Denmark the death of Christian IV (p. 176) had been
followed by a four months' interregnum. Not till July 6, 1648,
did his son and successor, Frederick III, receive the homage of
his subjects, and only after he had signed a Haandfæstning, or
charter, by which the already diminished royal prerogative was
still further curtailed. The new king was regarded by the
Rigsraad and the nobility generally with suspicion. It had
been doubtful at first whether he would be allowed to inherit
his ancestral throne; but, if the Senate feared him much, they
feared the party of Christina Munk still more; and Frederick
himself removed their last scruple by unhesitatingly accepting
the conditions imposed upon him by them. Frederick III
was a reserved, enigmatical prince, who spoke little and wrote
less—a striking contrast to Christian IV. But, if he lacked the
brilliant qualities of his impulsive, jovial father, he possessed in
a high degree the compensating virtues of moderation, sobriety,
and self-control. He was, indeed, a prudent, circumspect
prince, highly educated, even learned, with considerable
political experience, and a latent reserve of courage ; and by
his side stood his energetic and masterful consort, Sophia
ix] Fall of “Son-in-law” Party in Denmark 239
Amelia, the daughter of Duke George of Brunswick-Lüne-
burg, whose ambition it was to vindicate the authority of the
Crown against the usurpations of Korfits Ulfeld and his wife
Leonora Christina, the former of whom was rightly regarded
by Frederick III as the spokesman of the oligarchs, while the
latter, as being the daughter of the late king, all but disputed
the precedence of the new queen as the first lady in the
land.
This antagonism, which began, on the very day of
Frederick III's recognition as king, with an unseemly wrangle
between the queen and Leonora Christina, was complicated
by the revelation of an alleged plot (ultimately proved to be
false, but believed at the time to be true) on the part of a
former mistress of Ulfeld, to poison the royal family; and
culminated in the flight of Ulfeld and his wife from Denmark
to Holland on July 14, 1651, to avoid being summoned before
the Rigsraad at the instance of the king on only too well-
grounded charges of peculation and other high misdemeanours.
A few weeks previously Hannibal Sehested, the next most
prominent son-in-law of Christian IV, had been brought before
the Senate on a similar charge, and, after freely confessing his
offence, had compromised matters by resigning his senator-
ship, and surrendering appropriated property of the value of
£400,000, in return for which submission he received a royal
letter of pardon. The disgrace and effacement of the two
wealthiest and most capable of the Danish magnates, signified,
in the first instance, the political collapse of the long dominant
“Son-in-law Party,” and an increase of the royal power and
prestige at the expense of the aristocracy. But it was to have
other and far-reaching consequences, especially affecting the
foreign policy of Denmark. Down to 1651, Ulfeld, as minister
for foreign affairs, had controlled that policy; after 1651
Frederick III was alone responsible for it. Fear and hatred
of Denmark's hereditary eastern enemy, Sweden, and the never
abandoned hope of recovering the lost provinces, animated
240 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
king and people alike. There was no difference of opinion as
to the aim of Denmark's policy, but as to the means and the
proper time for action no two opinions agreed; and un-
fortunately it was the king who decided at the last moment,
and decided disastrously. It was Denmark's crowning mis-
fortune that she possessed at this difficult crisis no statesman
of the first rank, no one even approximately comparable with
such competitors as Charles X, Eric Oxenstjerna, or the
Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg. If Griffenfeld
had been born a generation earlier, he, and be alone, might
successfully have steered his country through her difficulties;
for the whole situation, with its complications and entangle-
ments, would have given full play to his extraordinary supple-
ness and perspicacity. As it was, Denmark had to depend on
Frederick III alone; and unfortunately Frederick III was not
the man to take a clear view of the political horizon, or even
to recognise his own and his country's limitations.
The succession of Charles X was rightly regarded in Den-
mark as a fresh source of danger. It was felt that tempera-
ment and policy would combine to make Charles an aggressive
warrior-king: the only uncertainty was, in which direction
would he turn his arms first. His invasion of Poland came as a
distinct relief to the Danes, though even the Polish war was full
of latent peril for Denmark, inasmuch as Sweden's successes
would at the very least mean fresh embargoes on the eastern
Baltic trade, and a consequent diminution of the Sound tolls.
Moreover the triumphal progress of Charles in Poland, and
especially his levying of tolls upon the shipping in the Baltic
ports, had aroused the Netherlands and caused them to
abandon the pacific policy hitherto followed by the Grand
Pensionary, Jan de Witt. In May, 1656, a strong Dutch fleet
appeared in Danish waters to maintain the freedom of the
Baltic; and in August a Danish squadron was sent to assist
the Dutch to defend Dantzic against the Swedes. Simul-
taneously an embassy from Tsar Alexius, who had already
7
12
1x] Frederick III declares war against Sweden 241
broken with Sweden and invaded Ingria, arrived at Copenhagen
with the offer of an offensive and defensive alliance, the Tsar
promising not to conclude peace with Sweden till the latter
had restored to Denmark all her former territory. From that
moment Frederick III was resolved upon a rupture at the first
convenient opportunity; and that too despite the tidings of the
Convention of Elbing (Sept. 1, 1656) between Sweden and the
Netherlands, whereby Charles X astutely disarmed the hostility
of the Dutch by placing them in the position of the most
favoured nation. Disappointed by the Netherlands, it was
to the Emperor, Sweden's natural enemy, that Frederick III
now had recourse. The intermediary was Count Rebolledo,
the Spanish minister at Copenhagen; and in the beginning of
December an extraordinary embassy was sent by the Danish
government to Vienna, to negotiate an alliance. But in
Vienna the peace party proved to be in the ascendant; while
a simultaneous embassy to the Netherlands, with a similar
object, foundered on the reserved and cautious neutrality of
the Grand Pensionary.
With no immediate prospect of foreign allies, a wary and
expectant policy was incumbent upon the Danish government;
but unfortunately Frederick III was now, more than ever,
bent upon war, while the nation was, if possible, even more
bellicose than the king. The Rigsdag, which assembled at
Odense on February 23, 1657, willingly granted considerable
subsidies for mobilisation and other military expenses, leaving
it to the government to decide whether the impending war
was to be offensive or defensive. The Estates of Norway
and the Landtag of the Duchies proved equally complaisant;
and in March there was some improvement in the political
situation abroad. Franz von Lisola, the Austrian ambassador
at John Casimir's court, hastened to Vienna to throw all the
weight of his influence into the scales of war, and persuaded
the new Emperor, Leopold I, to send an army corps to help
the Poles against the Swedes, and declare his willingness to
BAIN
242 Sweden as CUS
an Imperial Power, 1644–60 [ch.
contract a defensive alliance with Denmark, provided that the
war was kept as far as possible from German territory to avoid
a breach of the Peace of Westphalia. This very qualified
promise of support was decisive. On April 15, Frederick III
desired, and on April 23 he received, the assent of the
majority of the Senate to a declaration of war against Sweden.
The apparently insuperable difficulties of Sweden in Poland,
and the disinclination of the Danish government to waste its
costly armaments in a mere demonstration, were the real
causes of this gratuitous rupture with the greatest military
power in Europe. In the beginning of May the still pending
negotiations with Sweden were broken off; and on June 1,
1657, Frederick III signed the manifesto justifying a war
which was never formally declared. Denmark, ill equipped at
home and unsupported abroad, had lightly taken a step which
was to bring her to the very verge of ruin.
It was with extreme satisfaction that Charles X received
the tidings of the rupture. The hostile action of Denmark
enabled him honourably to emerge from the hopeless and now
inglorious Polish imbroglio, and win fresh laurels in unwasted
regions nearer home; and he was certain of the zealous support
of his people, with whom a Danish war was always popular.
He had learnt from Torsstensson that Denmark was most
vulnerable if attacked from the south, and, imitating the
strategy of his master, he fell upon her with a velocity which
paralysed resistance. At the end of June, 1657, at the head
of 8000 seasoned veterans, he broke up from Bromberg in
Prussia, and, marching rapidly through Pomerania and Meck-
lenburg, reached the borders of Holstein on July 18. During
his march he sent for Korfits Ulfeld, then residing at Barth in
Pomerania, who gladly seized this opportunity of gratifying his
vengeance and his ambition at the same time, by entering the
service of his country's deadliest foe, for the express purpose
of humiliating his sovereign and enriching himself. A Danish
army had already invaded Sweden's German possessions,
IX]
Charles X invades Denmark
243
captured the fortress of Bremervörde, and gained some other
trifling successes, when the alarming intelligence of the un-
expected arrival of the Swedish king in Holstein forced it to
retreat; and the retreat speedily became a panic when a slight
skirmish north of Hamburg convinced the Danes of the
superiority of the Swedish troops. The Danish army there-
upon dispersed, the infantry being sent to reinforce the fortresses
of Glückstadt and Krempe, while the cavalry fled precipitately
to the new fortress of Fredriksodde recently erected to guard
the Little Belt. Thus the Danish first line of defence had
completely broken down. The duchy of Bremen was quickly
recovered by the Swedes, who in the early autumn swarmed
over Jutland and firmly established themselves in the Duchies.
Finally the duke of Gottorp, for the first time, openly joined
the enemies of Denmark (Treaty of Kiel, Sept. 10).
The cowardice of the Danish troops and the incompetence
of their commanders had opened the way of Charles X into
the very heart of the Danish realm ; but the fortress of
Fredriksodde, a quite unlooked-for obstacle, held his little
army at bay from the middle of August to the middle of
October; while the Danish fleet, her one effective arm, after
a stubborn two days' battle (Sept. 12–14) between Moen and
Falster, compelled the Swedish fleet to abandon its projected
attack on the Danish islands, and put into Wismar for repairs.
The position of the Swedish king was now becoming critical.
In July an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded
between Denmark and Poland; and in the same month an
Austrian army entered Poland, compelled the Swedes to
abandon Cracow, and even threatened Prussia. Still more
ominously, the Elector of Brandenburg, perceiving Sweden to
be in difficulties, joined the league against her by contracting
alliances with John Casimir (Treaty of Wehlau, Sept. 1657)
and with Denmark (Treaty of Copenhagen, Oct. 20). The
formation of this powerful league against him induced Charles
to abandon his original intention of partitioning Denmark, and
U
16_2
244 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
accept the proffered mediation of Cromwell and Mazarin, both
of whom desired peace between the two Scandinavian king-
doms, the former because he feared a rapprochement between
Denmark and the Catholic powers, the latter because he
desired to employ the arms of Sweden in Germany against the
house of Habsburg. The negotiations foundered, however,
upon the refusal of Sweden to refer the points in dispute to a
general peace congress, and upon the rising hopes of Denmark,
which expected much from the assistance of Brandenburg and
Poland, and anticipated, not unreasonably, that the fortress of
Fredriksodde, with its 6000 defenders, could easily wear out
the little army of 4000 besiegers who had already wasted
three months outside its walls.
But now a fresh catastrophe occurred. On the night of
October 23–24 the Swedish commander, Gustavus Vrangel
(under urgent orders from the king, who had gone to Wismar
to be nearer the fleet and, if possible, make a descent upon
Copenhagen, a design frustrated, as we have seen, by the vic-
tory of the Danes off Moen) stormed and took Fredriksodde,
capturing the whole garrison with all its guns and stores in
an hour and a half. This calamity had far-reaching conse-
quences in Denmark, where it was attributed to the nobility
and gentry who comprised the larger part of the garrison, and
were openly accused not only of pusillanimity but of treachery
and treason; but it did not crush the spirit of the Danish
government, which still had no thought of surrender. Ad-
ditional fortifications were thrown up round Copenhagen; and
vigorous measures were taken for putting Fünen in a state of
defence. Finally, in January, 1658, a triple alliance was formed
against Sweden by the Emperor, the Elector of Brandenburg,
and the king of Poland, who agreed to put at least 23,000 men
in the field against the common foe. But, before the tidings
of this new alliance had reached Copenhagen it was already
too late to save Denmark; for meanwhile the king of Sweden
had also found a confederate in the powers of nature, and the
IX] The Passage of the Little Belt 245
struggle between the two Scandinavian kingdoms was already
over.
After the capture of Fredriksodde Charles X began to
make preparations for conveying his troops over to Fünen in
transport vessels ; but soon another and cheaper expedient
presented itself. In the middle of December, 1657, began
the great frost which was to be so fatal to Denmark. In a few
weeks the cold had grown so intense that even the freezing of
an arm of the sea, with so rapid a current as the Little Belt,
became a conceivable possibility; and henceforth meteoro-
logical observations formed an essential part of the strategy of
the Swedes. On January 28, 1658, Charles X arrived at
Haderslev in Jutland, by which time the wind had begun to
blow steadily from a cold quarter; and it was estimated that in
a couple of days the ice of the Little Belt would be firm enough
to bear even the passage of a mail-clad host. It was proposed
to make for that part of Fünen where a broad tongue of land,
on which lay the manor of Iversnæs, projects into the Belt,
and where the little isle of Brandsö, midway between Fünen
and Jutland, might be a support. On January 29 Charles X
moved his headquarters to the village of Hejls, almost opposite
the island. He had collected around him 12,000 men; and
the passage was fixed for the following day. The Danes were
not unaware of their enemy's design. But the mobilisation of
their army on the west coast of Fünen and the lesser isles was
not yet completed; and, as most of the troops were concentrated
between Meddelfast and Strib, to prevent a passage where the
Belt was narrowest, only about 4000 men were left at Iversnæs,
for the most part raw recruits.
The cold during the night of January 29 was most severe;
and early in the morning of the 30th the Swedish king gave
the order to start. Brandsö was occupied without resistance;
and then the march proceeded over the ice to the broad Bay
of Tybring, the horsemen dismounting where the ice was
weakest, and cautiously leading their horses as far apart as
246 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
possible by their bridles, till the most dangerous spot was
passed, when they swung into their saddles again, closed their
ranks, and made a dash for the shore. The Danish troops,
extending from Iversnæs to Föns, Skog, or Wood, were quickly
overpowered and captured; and the whole of Fünen was won
with the loss of only two companies of cavalry which dis-
appeared under the ice while fighting with the Danish left
wing. An attempt, however, to capture four Danish ships of
war in Nyborg Firth was frustrated by the presence of mind
of Captain Peter Bredal, who by pumping water over the
vessel's sides made them inaccessible, and ultimately succeeded
in withdrawing them beyond the range of the Swedish guns.
This, however, was the one bright point in an Egyptian
darkness of pusillanimity and disaster. Pursuing his irresistible
march, Charles X, with his eyes fixed steadily on Copenhagen,
resolved to cross the frozen Great Belt as he had already
crossed the frozen Little Belt. After some hesitation, he
adopted the advice of his chief engineer officer, Eric Dahlberg,
who acted as pioneer throughout, and chose the more cir-
cuitous route from Svendborg, by the islands of Langeland,
Laaland and Falster, in preference to the direct route from
Nyborg to Korsör, which would have been across a broad,
almost uninterrupted expanse of ice. Yet this second adventure
was not embarked upon without much anxious consideration.
It was late on the evening of February 9 that Dahlberg
returned to head-quarters from a preliminary tour of inves-
tigation. “I am certain, with God's help,” said he, “that
I can safely convey your Majesty and the army over to
Laaland.” A council of war, which met at two o'clock in the
morning, was instantly summoned; and Dahlberg's proposal
was laid before the generals, who at once dismissed it as
criminally hazardous. Even the king wavered for a moment;
but, Dahlberg persisting in his opinion, Charles overruled the
objections of Vrangel and the other commanders. On the
night of February 5 the transit began, the cavalry leading
ix] The Passage of the Great Belt 247
the way through the snow-covered ice, which quickly thawed
beneath the horses' hoofs so that the infantry which followed
after had to wade through half an ell of sludge, fearing every
moment lest the rotting ice should break beneath their feet.
At three o'clock in the afternoon, Dahlberg leading the way,
the army reached Grimsted in Laaland without losing a man ;
and the keys of Nakskov, the one fortress of the island, were
surrendered to the traitor Korfits Ulfeld, who did his best to
convince his countrymen that resistance was hopeless. On
February 8 Charles X reached Falster, where he bestowed
Langeland upon Ulfeld and his descendants. On the lith
the Swedish king stood safely on the soil of Sjælland, where
he was presently joined by Vrangel and the rest of the army.
Not without reason did the medal struck to commemorate
"the glorious transit of the Baltic Sea” bear the haughty
inscription : Natura hoc debuit uni. An exploit unique in
history had indeed been achieved.
Upon the Danish government the effect of this unheard-of
achievement was crushing. Frederick III at once sent his
ambassadors to Charles X at Vordingborg in Sjælland to sue
for peace. Yielding to the persuasions of the English and
French ministers, Charles finally agreed to be content to
mutilate instead of annihilating the prostrate Danish monarchy;
but his conditions were so hard that the Danish plenipoten-
tiaries durst not accept them; and negotiations were reopened,
on February 16, at Taastrup parsonage, between Roskilde and
Copenhagen. The preliminaries were signed on the 18th,
whereby Denmark consented to cede the three Scanian pro-
vinces, the island of Bornholm, and the Norwegian provinces
of Badhus and Trondhjem; to transfer 2000 cavalry and 2000
infantry to Sweden ; to renounce all anti-Swedish alliances; to
prevent, as far as possible, all war-ships hostile to either power
from passing through the Sound and the Belt; to exempt
Swedish vessels, even when carrying foreign goods, from all
tolls; and, most humiliating of all, to restore all his estates and
248 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [ch.
dignities to the traitor Korfits Ulfeld, who had actually been
one of the two Swedish negotiators. On the other hand-and
this was looked upon as a great concession-Denmark and
the duke of Gottorp were to be left to settle their disputes
between themselves. The Taastrup Convention, with a few
trifling modifications, was confirmed by the Peace of Roskilde
(Feb. 26, 1658).
The conclusion of peace was followed by a remarkable
episode. Frederick III expressed the desire to make the
personal acquaintance of his conqueror; and Charles X con-
sented to be King Frederick's guest for three days (March 3-5)
at the castle of Frederiksborg. Splendid banquets lasting far
into the night, private and intimate conversations between two
princes who had only just emerged from a life-and-death
struggle, seemed to point to nothing but peace and friendship
in the future; and complimentary salvos were fired from the
Kronborg as Charles X embarked on the ship which was to
convey him to the ancient Danish provinces on the other side
of the Sound, which now belonged to him. It is also certain
that during the next few months Charles had no intention of
picking a fresh quarrel with Denmark: Austria and Poland
were rather the foes with whom he was preparing to cope.
But it is equally true that he meant to utilise the presence of
his army in Denmark to extort from that kingdom still further
concessions; and the negotiations proceeding at Copenhagen
for a closer alliance between the two Scandinavian states were
conducted on the part of the Swedes in a spirit which pointed
only too plainly to a desire completely to subject the weaker to
the stronger power. Moreover the difficulties of the situation
were complicated by the determined efforts of Austria and
the Netherlands to prevent any conjunction of Sweden and
Denmark; while domestic difficulties in Denmark itself, where
the ill-will of the unprivileged Estates against the gentry was
growing more and more vehement, and the king was suspected
of encouraging the popular discontent in order to make himself
IX]
Charles X resolves to destroy Denmark 249
T
absolute, imposed the utmost caution upon the Danish govern-
ment.
All through March and April, 1658, the negotiations were
protracted without coming any nearer to a solution, till Charles X,
fearful of the intervention of foreign powers, grew anxious and,
at last, menacing. On April 22, indeed, he ordered Vrangel
to transport the Swedish troops from Sjælland to Fünen; but
Vrangel was not to budge from the latter island or from
Fredriksodde till he had received further orders. On the 23rd
Charles formally abandoned the idea of an alliance with Den-
mark, but imperiously requested a definite answer to the fresh
demands he had raised during the course of the negotiations;
and the uneasy Danish government submissively yielded on
every point. In May it conceded to the duke of Holstein-
Gottorp and his heirs male absolute sovereignty over the ducal
part of Sleswick. In June it agreed to surrender the island of
Hven and the Norwegian province of Romsdal to Sweden,
and at the same time consented to assist Sweden to exclude
all foreign ships of war from the Baltic. But these tardy
concessions came too late. Impatient of tergiversation in a
conquered and humiliated foe, Charles, at a council held at
Flensborg, at the end of June, resolved to attack Denmark
once more, and, this time, obliterate her from the map of
Europe.
Swedish historians have emphasised the want of straight-
forwardness of the Danish plenipotentiaries, and their un-
willingness to “stand side by side with Sweden in brotherly
concord," as if the Danes were not fully justified in endeavour-
ing to obtain the best terms they could from their despoiler;
and it should never be forgotten that, however she may have
hesitated, Denmark actually gave way on all points at last.
On an impartial review of the facts, it seems quite evident that
no fear of foreign intervention, no resentment against Denmark's
natural unwillingness to accept a “Scandinavianism” invented
and interpreted by her extortionate conqueror, but military
250 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
cil held at Ship his cavalrcopenhagen.
ambition and greed of conquest, moved Charles X to what,
divested of all its pomp and circumstance, was an outrageous
act of political brigandage. The final resolution was taken at
a council held at Gottorp on July 7. On July 18 Vrangel
received orders to ship his cavalry from Kiel to Korsör in
Sjælland, and march straight upon Copenhagen. On August 6
the king himself embarked at Kiel; and on the following day the
Swedish fleet ran into Korsör harbour. Without any reason-
able cause, without warning, without a declaration of war, in
defiance of all international equity, Charles X prepared to
despatch an inconvenient neighbour.
Terror was the first feeling produced at Copenhagen by the
landing of the Swedes at Korsör. Well-informed persons had
suspected that something was amiss, but none had anticipated
the possibility of such a sudden, such a brutal attack; and
everyone knew that the capital was very inadequately fortified
and garrisoned. Fortunately for Denmark, Frederick III, who
had never been deficient in courage, and who now saw his
realm, his crown, his liberty, and the future of his House in
jeopardy, rose at once to the level of the emergency, and
displayed a vigour, a heroism, which astonished even those
who knew him best. "I will die in my own nest,” were the
memorable words, borrowed from the Book of Job, with which
he rebuked those craven councillors who advised him to seek
safety in flight. On August 8 representatives from every class
in the capital, summoned to meet the king next morning at
the castle, urged the necessity of a vigorous resistance and
adequate sacrifices; and the burgesses of Copenhagen protested
their unshakable loyalty to the king, and their determination
to defend Copenhagen to the last. The fate of the whole
monarchy now depended upon the constancy of the capital.
The Danes had only three days' warning of the approaching
danger to their capital; and its vast, and, in many places, in-
complete and dilapidated line of defence, had at first but
2000 regular defenders. But the government and the people
Ix7
Siege of Copenhagen
251
displayed a memorable and exemplary energy. The suburbs
beyond the walls were voluntarily abandoned and destroyed ;
the ramparts were repaired by gangs of officers and men,
working night and day under the personal supervision of the
king and queen; bullets were cast, cattle were driven in from
the surrounding country, money was freely contributed; the
roll of the recruiting drums was heard at the corner of every
street; and hundreds of peasants, tempted by the promise of
freedom from feudal service, flocked to the colours. By the
beginning of September 7000 men were under arms.
It was on August 11, 1658, that Charles X stood before.
Copenhagen with his army. Clouds of smoke from the
burning suburbs were the first thing which met his eye as he
surveyed the position from Valby Hill, and made it clear that
he must expect a vigorous resistance. Abandoning his original
intention of carrying the place by assault, he began a regular
siege, and detached Vrangel with 3000 men to take the castle
of Kronborg, which dominated the northern entrance of the
Sound. Frederick III had strictly charged the commandant,
Colonel Paul Bunfeld, to blow the fortress into the air rather
than surrender it. He disobeyed his sovereign's command by
capitulating without any serious attempt at resistance. The
fall of Kronborg was the last act in the drama of Denmark's
humiliation; and its consequences were speedily visible when
the guns of the fortress were turned against Copenhagen. But
in the capital itself there was no thought of surrender; and,
before the end of October Copenhagen received effectual
assistance from abroad.
The tidings of the second Swedo-Danish War had produced
a violent commotion in the Netherlands. By the treaty of
7649 the States General were bound to help Denmark in case
of attack; but far more operative than any treaty obligations
was the lively fear of Denmark's annihilation, and the con-
sequent establishment of the Swedish empire in the north to
the detriment of Dutch trade. The old grudge against the
252 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH.
master of the Sound tolls was completely forgotten. To save
Denmark was now the sole consideration of the Dutch states-
men; and the States General at once despatched a fleet of
forty war-vessels and twenty-eight transports, with an army
of 2200 men and ample provisions on board, under Wassenaer,
to the relief of Copenhagen. On October 23 the Dutch fleet
cast anchor a little north of Elsinore; on the 29th it ran the
gauntlet of the guns of Kronborg in safety, and on the same
day attacked the Swedish fleet of forty-four sail in the Sound,
defeating it after a severe six hours' contest, and compelling it
to retire to Landskrona. The same afternoon the transports
with the provisions and reinforcements ran into Copenhagen
harbour. On the following day Charles X raised the siege,
and retired to an entrenched camp a mile and a half from
the Danish capital. In the course of the next few weeks
the province of Trondhjem was recovered by the Danes.
Bornholm was lost through a revolt of its inhabitants; there
was a serious rising in Scania ; Thorn in Prussia was stormed
by a combined host of Poles, Brandenburgers, and Austrians
under the Elector Frederick William and Montecuculli; while
Czarniecki burst into Holstein (Sept. 22) and compelled the
diminutive Swedish army there to fall back upon Fredriksodde.
By the end of December the whole of Jutland was recovered
for Denmark; and on January 21, 1659, a new alliance for the
continuation of the war was signed at Ribe between Denmark
and Brandenburg. The relative positions of the belligerents
were now reversed; and it was the turn of the Swedish states-
men to be anxious.
Nevertheless Charles X had not yet abandoned the hope of
capturing Copenhagen, a success which would enable him to
prescribe conditions of peace instead of receiving them. An
assault was gallantly made on the night of February 10-11,
1659, but was repulsed at all points with the loss of 1500
killed and wounded. Even now the Swedish king did not
abandon his plans. He rooted himself still more firmly on
IX]
Intervention of the Western Powers
253
the Danish islands, reckoning besides on the help of England,
whose fleet of 43 sail with 2000 guns, under Montague,
entered the Sound in April, 1659. The sudden intervention
of England was due to the so-called Guarantee Treaty signed
between France and the new Protector Richard Cromwell, in
January, 1659, for the purpose of bringing about peace between
Sweden and all her enemies (except the house of Habsburg,
against whom Mazarin, the prime mover in the affair, wished
to employ the Swedish armies), and at the same time com-
pelling the Netherlands to accede to the political system of
the two other western powers. The Dutch government, fearful
of a breach with England in case it continued the war with
Sweden, was now desirous of peace, provided that an equili-
brium were established in the North, and, at the same time,
the interests of the Dutch Baltic trade were secured. The first
result of these diplomatic negotiations was the treaty known as
the first Hague Concert (May II, 1659) whereby England,
France, and the Netherlands agreed to co-operate in order to
terminate the war between Denmark and Sweden, on the basis
of the Treaty of Roskilde. The situation was still further
complicated by the presence in the same waters of two Dutch
fleets and an English fleet. Meanwhile the negotiations had
been transferred to the Hague; where, on July 14, 1659, the
second Hague Concert was signed, by the terms of which
England and the Netherlands contracted to employ their fleets
to compel either, or both, of the Scandinavian kings to accept
the conditions of the first Hague Concert within a fortnight. But
Mazarin, unwilling to use actual force against a contingent ally
like Sweden, refused to accede to the second Hague Concert.
The first effect of this external pressure was to irritate and
bring together both belligerents; but fresh negotiations proved
abortive. On August 26 Montague's fleet returned to England;
and Wassenaer was recalled by the States General for economi-
cal reasons, leaving De Ruyter's fleet behind to co-operate with
the Danes. A combined attack from Kiel and Kolding, made
254 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [CH..
by the Dutch, Polish, Austrian, and Danish troops upon the
small Swedish army-corps of 5000 men still in Fünen, resulted
in the victory of Nyborg (Nov. 14, 1659) and the unconditional
surrender of the whole force on the following day. The moral
and political consequences of this victory were considerable.
The Danish government no longer felt itself bound by the
Hague Concerts; while Charles X vainly sought a reconciliation
with his most dangerous enemy, the United Provinces, by
proposing a partition between them of the Danish dominions.
Finally negotiations were reopened with Denmark, the Swedish
king proposing to exercise pressure upon the Danes by a
simultaneous winter campaign in Norway. Such an enterprise
necessitated fresh subsidies from his already impoverished
people, and obliged him, in December, 1659, to cross over
to Sweden to meet the Estates whom he had summoned to
Gothenburg. The lower Estates murmured at the imposition
of fresh burdens; and Charles had need of all his adroitness to
persuade them that his demands were reasonable and necessary.
At the very beginning of the Riksdag, in Jan. 1660, it was
noticed that the king was ill; but he spared himself as little in
the council chamber as in the battle-field, till death suddenly
overtook him on the night of February 13, 1660, in his thirty-
eighth year. The abrupt cessation of such an inexhaustible
fount of enterprise and energy was a distinct loss to Sweden;
and signs are not wanting that, in his latter years, Charles had
begun to feel the need and value of repose. Had he lived
long enough to overcome his martial ardour, and develop
and organise the empire he helped to create, Sweden might
perhaps have remained a great power to this day. Even so,
she owes her natural frontiers in the Scandinavian peninsula
to Charles X.
The regency appointed to govern Sweden during the
minority of Charles XI, who was but four years old on his
father's death, at once opened negotiations with all Sweden's
enemies. The Peace of Oliva, May 3, 1660, made under French
IX]
The Peace of Copenhagen
255
mediation, put an end to the long feud with Poland, and, at
the same time, ended the quarrel between Sweden on the one
side, and the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg on the
other. By this peace Sweden's possession of Livonia, and
the Elector of Brandenburg's sovereignty over Prussia, were
alike confirmed; and the king of Poland renounced all claim
to the Swedish crown. As regards Denmark, the Peace of
Oliva signified the desertion of her three principal allies, Poland,
Brandenburg, and the Emperor, and thus compelled her to
reopen negotiations with Sweden direct. The differences
between the two states were finally adjusted by the Peace of
Copenhagen, May 27, 1660, which confirmed the chief points
of the Treaty of Roskilde with the important modifications
that Sweden now surrendered the province of Trondhjem
and the isle of Bornholm, and released Denmark from the
obligation of excluding hostile fleets from the Baltic. Grievous
as was the loss of the fertile and populous Scanian provinces,
which had belonged to Denmark from time immemorial,
humiliating as was the establishment of the duke of Gottorp
as a sovereign prince within the confines of the Danish
kingdom, the Peace of Copenhagen came as a relief in a
long series of disasters and humiliations, and, at any rate,
confirmed the independence of the Danish state.
But if Denmark had emerged from the war with her dignity
and independence unimpaired, she had tacitly surrendered the
dominion of the North to her Scandinavian rival. Sweden was
now not only a military power of the first magnitude, but also
one of the largest states in Europe, possessing about twice as
much territory as modern Sweden. Her area embraced nearly
16,800 geographical square miles, a mass of land 7000 square
miles larger than the modern German empire. Yet the
Swedish empire was rather a geographical expression than a
state with natural and national boundaries. Modern Sweden
is bounded by the Baltic: during the seventeenth century
the Baltic was merely the bond between her various widely
256 Sweden as an Imperial Power, 1644-60 [ch.
dispersed dominions. All the islands in the Baltic, except the
Danish group, belonged to Sweden. The estuaries of all the
great German rivers, except the Niemen and the Vistula,
debouched in Swedish territory, within which also lay two-
thirds of Lake Ladoga and one-half of Lake Peipus. Stock-
holm, the capital, lay in the very centre of the empire, whose
second greatest city was Riga on the other side of the sea.
Yet this vast empire contained but half the population of
modern Sweden. Even after the acquisition of the Scanian
and Baltic and German provinces, the total population of
seventeenth century Sweden was only 2,500,000, or about
140 souls to the square mile; and more than half of it con-
sisted of distinct and clashing nationalities, Finns, Esthonians,
Letts, Lapps, Slavs, and Germans. Nay, far from possessing
natural boundaries, Sweden's new frontiers were of the most
insecure description, inasmuch as they were anti-ethnographi-
cal, parting asunder races which naturally went together, and
behind which stood powerful neighbours of the same stock
ready at the first opportunity to reunite them. This was the
case not only in her German provinces, but in Livonia, where
her boundary, running along the Polish border, cut the land of
the Letts into two equal parts, and in Ingria, where thousands of
Russians dwelt within her borders. There was no unity in the
Swedish empire but the unity of the State; and that unity was
only upheld by force of arms. The one durable benefit which
Sweden derived from her military triumphs was her own natural
boundaries and her national unity within the Scandinavian
peninsula itself. When her territorial conquests on the other
side of the Baltic vanished, as they were bound to vanish,
Sweden proper stood behind the great collapsing envelope,
safe within her proper confines.
Yet evanescent as it was, the creation of the Swedish
empire was not without its salutary effects on the national
character. Politically it was a mistake; but the effort to
maintain such an empire intact stimulated a strenuousness,
IX)
Greatness of Sweden
257
a vigilance, a sense of duty, a spirit of enterprise and self-
sacrifice, which produced a whole series of monarchs, statesmen,
and heroes, the like of which the world has seldom seen. Had
Sweden been able from the first to live within her natural
boundaries, her material prosperity might perhaps have been
far greater, and her material sufferings far less; but her history
would have lacked that quality of greatness which always waits
upon true heroism, and morally she herself would have been
the poorer.
BAIN
IT
CHAPTER X.
THE DANISH REVOLUTION AND PETER
GRIFFENFELD, 1660-1676.
“DENMARK,” says Hannibal Sehested, "went back because
her nobility grew unwarlike, and preferred disaster and terri-
torial diminution to any curtailment of their privileges." It
was therefore only a just retribution that the Danish nobility
should emerge from the war impotent and discredited, hated
by the other classes and feared by none. The Rigsraad, the
focus of aristocratic authority, suffered a proportionate loss of
dignity and power. Henceforth it had little to say for itself,
and, while feeling the necessity of reform without daring to
initiate it, drifted helplessly towards its ruin. On the other
hand, Copenhagen, proudly conscious of its intrinsic impor-
tance and of its inestimable services during the war, now
openly claimed to have a voice in public affairs. Still higher
had risen the influence of the crown. The courage and
resource displayed by Frederick III in the extremity of the
national danger had won for the 'least expansive of monarchs'
an extraordinary popularity.
The first to experience the consequences of the change in
the political atmosphere were Korfits Ulfeld and Leonora
Christina. Ulfeld's treason had been rewarded by Charles X
with the countship of Solvitsborg in Bleking; but the discon-
tented intriguer, imagining himself neglected, apparently began
intriguing against his new master, and, in May 1659, he was
CH. x] Hans Nansen and Hans Svane
259
erick, had allowed th to remain at hard to enla
imprisoned and condemned to death. The Swedish regents,
on July 7, amnestied him; and he returned to Copenhagen
to make his peace with his lawful sovereign, who promptly
arrested and imprisoned him and his consort. This step
was dictated as much by political motives as by a desire of
personal vengeance. It would have been highly imprudent
if Frederick III, on the eve of a life and death contest with
the nobility, had allowed their natural leader, who was also
his most dangerous enemy, to remain at large.
For Frederick III had now determined to enlarge the
royal power at the expense of the nobility. The events of the
war had tended to ripen his absolutist plans, though it cannot
certainly be said how far he originally intended to go. One of
his chief counsellors at this time was his secretary Christopher
Gabel, a man with no ancestral prejudices to prevent him from
going all lengths in his own and the king's interests. Of still
greater importance were his colleagues Burgomaster Hans
Nansen and Bishop Hans Svane. Nansen, born in Flensborg
in 1598, had begun life as a trading-skipper, travelled far
and wide, amassed a considerable fortune, and, in 1644, was
elected burgomaster of Copenhagen. He was a self-made man
in the best sense of the word, a shrewd practical fellow, not
without a tincture of letters, a persuasive speaker, personally
courageous, very determined, yet withal wary and circumspect,
and decidedly ambitious. In him Frederick III could reckon
upon a devoted adherent, ready to answer for the uncom-
promising loyalty of the citizens of Copenhagen. The primate,
Hans Svane, born in 1606, was himself the son of a burgo-
master. After studying theology and oriental languages abroad,
he returned to Copenhagen with a great reputation for learning,
and, in 1655, was appointed bishop of Sjælland. He also was
a man of strong character, resolute alike in speech and action,
with all a high-churchman's veneration for the monarchy, with
all an able commoner's dislike and suspicion of an incompetent
and unjustly privileged aristocracy.
17--2
260
[CH.
.
The Danish Revolution
On September 1o, 1660, the Rigsdag, which was to re-
pair the ravages of the war and provide for the future, was
opened with great ceremony in the Riddersal of the castle of
Copenhagen. One hundred noblemen were present, besides
the bishops, and the representatives of the towns. The first
bill laid before the Estates by the government was to impose
an excise tax on the principal articles of consumption, together
with subsidiary taxes on cattle, poultry, stamped paper, &c.,
in return for which the abolition of all the old direct taxes was
promised. The nobility at first claimed exemption from taxa-
tion on behalf of themselves and their soccagers, while the
clergy and burgesses insisted upon an absolute equality of
taxation. There were sharp encounters between the presidents
of the contending orders; but the position of the Lower
Estates was considerably prejudiced by the dissensions of its
various sections. Thus the privileges of the bishops, and of
the cities of Copenhagen and Kristianshavn, profoundly irri-
tated the lower clergy and the unprivileged lesser towns, and
made a cordial understanding impossible till Hans Svane
and Hans Nansen, who now openly came forward as the
leaders of the reform movement, proposed that the privileges
which divided the non-noble Estates should be abolished. In
accordance with this proposal, the two Lower Estates, on
September 16, subscribed a memorandum addressed to the
Rigsraad, declaring their willingness to renounce their privi-
leges, provided the nobility and the University did the same,
which was tantamount to a declaration that the whole of the
clergy and burgesses had made common cause against the
nobility. The opposition so formed took the name of the
“Conjoined Estates.” The presentation of the memorial of
the Conjoined to the Rigsraad provoked an outburst of indig-
nation. The Senate made the cause of the nobility its own ;
and its chief spokesman, Otto Krag, asked the bearers of the
memorial if they really imagined that there ought to be no
distinction between a gentleman and a boor. But the nobility
reform
a bill pral self-govion of a
x] Beginning of the Revolution : 261
soon perceived the necessity of complete surrender. On Sep-
tember 30 the First Estate abandoned its former standpoint,
and renounced its privileges with one unimportant reservation.
The struggle now seemed to be over; and the financial ques-
tion having also been settled, the king, had he been so minded,
might have dismissed the Estates. But the still more important
question of reform was now raised. On September 17 the
burgesses introduced a bill proposing the establishment of a
new constitution including local self-government in the towns,
the abolition of serfdom, and the formation of a national army.
It fell to the ground for want of adequate support; but another
proposition, the fruit of secret discussion between the king and
his confederates, which placed all fiefs under the control of the
crown as regards taxation, and provided for selling and letting
them to the highest bidder, was accepted by the Estate of
Burgesses on September 25. The significance of this ordi-
nance lay in the fact that it shattered the privileged position
of the nobility in the State by abolishing its exclusive right to
the possession of fiefs. What happened next is not quite clear.
Our sources fail us, and we are at the mercy of doubtful
rumours and more or less unreliable anecdotes. We have
a vision of intrigues, mysterious conferences, threats and
bribery, dimly discernible through a mist of shifting tradition.
The first glint of light is a letter, dated September 23, from
Frederick III to Svane and Nansen, authorising them to
communicate the arrangements already made to reliable men,
and act quickly, as “if the others gain time they may possibly
gain more.” The first step was to make sure of the captain
of the city train-bands : of the garrison of Copenhagen the
king had no doubt. The second step was to provide against
defection; and this was done at a meeting of the Sjælland
clergy at Roskilde on October 4, when Dean Peder Villadsen,
Svane's right hand, persuaded the clergy to give their repre-
sentatives at Copenhagen unlimited powers. The headquarters
of the conspirators was the bishop's Palace near Vor Frue
262
[CH.
The Danish Revolution
Church, between which and the court messages were passing
continually, and where the document to be adopted by the
Conjoined Estates took its final shape.
On October 8, at the Copenhagen town-hall, the two burgo-
masters, Hans Nansen and Kristoffer Hansen, proposed that
the realm of Denmark should be made over to the king as an
hereditary kingdom, without prejudice to the privileges of the
Estates; whereupon they proceeded to Brewers' Hall, and in-
formed the Estate of Burgesses there assembled of what had
been done. A fiery oration from Nansen dissolved some feeble
opposition; and, simultaneously, Bishop Svane carried the
clergy along with him at the House of Assembly in the Silke-
gade. The so-called Instrument, now signed by the Lower
Estates, offered the realm to the king and his house as an
hereditary monarchy, by way of thank-offering, mainly for his;
courageous deliverance of the kingdom during the war; and
the Rigsraad and the nobility were urged to notify the resolu-
tion to the king, and desire him to maintain each Estate in its
due privileges, and to give a written counter-assurance that the
revolution now to be effected was for the sole benefit of the
State. Rumours of what had happened spread rapidly through
the town. On the following day Senator Otto Krag and Hans
Nansen had their memorable encounter on Castle Bridge, when
Krag pointed to the fortress-prison of the Blue Tower and
asked the burgomaster if he knew what it was, whereupon
Nansen, by way of answer, raised his hand towards the alarm-
bell in the steeple of Vor Frue Church, which could at any
moment call the burgesses to arms in defence of the king and
their privileges against the tyranny of the nobles.
Events now moved forward rapidly. On October 10 a
deputation from the clergy and burgesses proceeded to the
Council House, where the Raad were deliberating, to demand
an answer to their propositions. After a tumultuous scene
the Raad rejected the Instrument altogether; whereupon the
deputies proceeded to the palace, and were graciously received
x]
Introduction of Absolutism
263
by the king, who promised them an answer next day. The
same afternoon the guards in the streets and on the ramparts
were doubled; on the following morning the gates of the
city were closed, a boom was thrown across the harbour,
powder and bullets were distributed among the city train-
bands, who were bidden to be in readiness when the alarm-bell
called them, and cavalry was massed in the environs of the
city. Simultaneously orders were sent to all the chief military
officers in the country to be on their guard and adopt all
such measures as might be necessary to prevent domestic
disorder or foreign interference. The same afternoon the
king sent a message to the Rigsraad urging them to declare
their views quickly, as he could no longer hold himself re-
sponsible for what might happen. After a feeble attempt at
a compromise, the Raad gave way. On October 13 it signed
a declaration to the effect that it associated itself with the other
Estates in the making over of the kingdom, as an hereditary
monarchy, to His Majesty and his heirs. male and female,
provided that the kingdom remained undivided, and the privi-
leges of all the Estates continued unimpaired.' The same day
the king received the official communication of this declaration,
and the congratulations of Hans Hansen and Hans Svane.
Thus the ancient constitution was transformed; and Denmark
became a monarchy hereditary in Frederick III and his
posterity.
But, though hereditary sovereignty had been introduced,
the laws of the land had not been abolished. The monarch
was now an unfettered over-lord, but he had by no means been
absolved from his obligations towards his subjects. Hereditary
sovereignty per se was not held to signify unlimited dominion,
still less absolutism. On the contrary, the magnificent gift of
the Danish nation to Frederick III was made under express
conditions. The "Instrument” drawn up by the Lower Estates
implied the retention of all due privileges; and the king, in
accepting the gift of an hereditary crown, did not repudiate
264
CH.
The Danish Revolution
the implied inviolability of the privileges of the donors. These
were, to a large extent, the sentiments of many of the promoters
of the Revolution, especially of the burgesses of Copenhagen,
who had emancipated the crown from the influence of the
nobility, the better to secure their own privileges. Unfortu-
nately everything was left so vague, that it was an easy matter
for the ultra-royalists to ignore the privileges of the Estates,
and even the Estates themselves.
On October 14, a committee of four senators, four nobles,
three bishops and six burgomasters, was summoned to the
palace, to organise the new government. The discussion
mainly turned upon two points, (1) whether a new oath of
homage should be taken to the king, and (2) what was to be
done with the Haandfæstning, or royal charter. The first
point was speedily decided in the affirmative: as to the second
there was considerable difference of opinion. Bishop Svane
spoke vehemently in favour of leaving everything to the king's
good pleasure; ultimately it was decided that he should be
released from his oath and the charter returned to him; but
a rider was added suggesting that His Majesty should, at the
same time, promulgate a recess providing for his own and his
people's welfare. Thus the idea of dictating a new constitution
to the king was abandoned. Supreme authority was placed in
his hands; and he was to be the official mediator between the
Estates. Yet Frederick III was not left absolutely his own
master; for the provision regarding a recess, or new con-
stitution, showed plainly enough that such a constitution was
expected, and, once granted, would of course have limited
the royal power.
"It now only remained to execute the resolutions of the com-
mittee. On October 17, the charter, which the king had sworn
to observe twelve years before, was solemnly handed back to
him at the palace, in the presence of the delegates, Frederick III
thereupon promising to rule as a Christian king to the satis-
faction of all the Estates of the Realm. On the following day,
x]
-
The Act of Homage
265
the king, seated on the topmost step of a lofty tribune sur-
mounted by a baldaquin, erected in the midst of the principal
square of Copenhagen, received the public homage of his
subjects of all ranks in the presence of an immense concourse,
on which occasion he again promised to rule “as a Christian
- hereditary king and gracious master," and, “as soon as possible,
to prepare and set up” such a constitution as should secure to
his subjects a Christian and indulgent sway. Then everyone,
in order of precedence, kissed and shook the hands of the king
and queen, the ceremony concluding with a grand banquet at
the palace. After dinner the queen and the clergy withdrew;
but the king remained. An incident now occurred which
made a strong impression on all present. With a brimming
beaker in his hand, Frederick III went up to Hans Nansen,
drank with him, and drew him aside. Presently they were
joined by Hannibal Sehested; and the three men conversed
together in a low voice for some time, till the burgomaster,
succumbing to the influence of his potations, fumbled his
way to his carriage with the assistance of some of his civic
colleagues. Whether Nansen, intoxicated by wine and the
royal favour, consented on this occasion to sacrifice the privi-
leges of his order and his city, it is impossible to say ; but it
is significant that from henceforth we hear no more of the
“recess” or representative constitution which the more liberal
of the leaders of the lower orders had hoped for when they
released Frederick III from the obligations of the Haand-
fæstning. The Estates continued in session, indeed, till the
beginning of December, when the deputies went home of their
own accord; but, though they voted a whole series of new
taxes, they got no privileges in return. Even before they had
dispersed, a new act of homage was rendered to the king
(Nov. 15) at the palace by those who had not been present
at the former act; on which occasion the royal family assumed
an attitude of dignified hauteur, and there was neither hand-
kissing, nor hand-shaking, nor banquet. Nevertheless nobody
266
The Danish Revolution 12
[CH.
outside court circles had the remotest conception that the
Estates of the Realm were not to meet again in Denmark for
close upon two hundred years.
How or when it first occurred to Frederick III to follow
up his advantage, we do not know. But we can follow pretty
plainly the stages of the progress from a limited to an ab-
solute monarchy. By an Act dated January 10, 1661, entitled
“Instrument, or pragmatic sanction, of the king's hereditary
right to the kingdoms of Denmark and Norway," and circu-
lated throughout the country for general subscription, it was
declared that all the prerogatives of majesty, and "all regalia
as an absolute Sovereign Lord,” had been made over to the
king by the signatories. Yet, even after the issue of this
Instrument, there was nothing, strictly speaking, to prevent
Frederick III from voluntarily conceding to his subjects, as
a royal gift, some share in the administration. Unfortunately
the king was bent only upon still further emphasising the
plenitude of his power. In March 1661 he consulted his
trusted Sleswick jurists on the subject; and they advised him
to promulgate a lex regia perpetua. But, at Copenhagen, the
king's advisers were simultaneously framing other drafts of a
Lex Regia, both in Latin and Danish; and the one which
finally won the royal favour and ultimately became the famous
Kongelov, or “King's Law.”
This document was in every way unique. In the first place
it is remarkable for its literary excellence. Compared with the
barbarous macaronic jargon of the contemporary official lan-
guage, it shines forth as a masterpiece of pure, pithy, and original
Danish. Still more remarkable are the tone and tenour of this
Royal Law. The Kongelov has the highly dubious honour
of being the one written law in the civilised world which
fearlessly carries out absolutism to its last consequences. The
monarchy is declared to owe its origin to the surrender of the
supreme authority by the Estates to the king. The main-
tenance of the indivisibility of the realm, and of the Christian
x] The Kongelov and Peter Schumacher 267 .
faith according to the Augsburg Confession, and the obser-
vance of the Kongelov itself, are now the sole obligations
binding upon the king. The supreme spiritual authority also
is now claimed; and it is expressly stated that it becomes none
to crown him; the moment he ascends the throne, crown and
sceptre belong to him by right. Moreover, paragraph 26 de-
clares guilty of lèse-majesté whosoever shall in any way usurp or
infringe the king's absolute authority.
The Kongelov is dated and subscribed November 14, 1665,
but was kept a profound secret, only two initiated persons
knowing of its existence until after the death of Frederick III.
Of these two persons, one was Christopher Gabel, already
mentioned as the king's chief counsellor during the Revolution.
Gabel's elevation had a political as well as a personal signi-
ficance. For the first time a man of the middle classes had
been raised to the highest position in the State, which meant
that the new system was non-aristocratic in principle, and
would in future seek its instruments among the bourgeoisie.
Yet Gabel's supremacy was contested and insecure; and his
future successor was already at hand to supersede him, when
necessary, in the person of the author and custodian of the
Kongelov, Secretary Schumacher.
Peter Schumacher, Denmark's one great statesman since
the Middle Ages, was born at Copenhagen, on August 24,
1635, of a wealthy trading family connected by numerous ties
with the leading civic, clerical, and learned circles in the
Danish capital. As a child he was preternaturally precocious.
His tutor, Jens Vorde, who prepared him, in his eleventh year,
for the University, praises his extraordinary gifts, his mastery
of the classical languages, his almost disquieting diligence, which
needed restraint rather than incitement. The brilliant way in
which he sustained his preliminary examination won him the
friendship of the examiner, Bishop Jasper Brokman, at whose
palace, which now became his second home, he first met
Frederick III. The king was struck by the lad's bright grey
268
Tch.
The Danish Revolution
eyes and pleasant humorous face; and Brokman, proud of his
pupil, made him translate a chapter from a Hebrew Bible first
into Latin and then into Danish, for the entertainment of the
scholarly monarch. In 1654, young Schumacher went abroad
for eight years to complete his education at the continental
universities. From Germany he proceeded to the Nether-
lands, staying at Leyden, Utrecht, and Amsterdam, and passing
from thence in 1657 to Queen's College, Oxford, at which
place he resided three years. The epoch-making events which
occurred in England while he was at Oxford profoundly
interested him, and, coinciding as they did with the Revolution
in Denmark, which threw open a career to the middle
classes, convinced him that his proper sphere was politics.
In the autumn of 1660, Schumacher visited Paris shortly after
Mazarin's death, when the young Louis XIV first seized the
reins of power. He seems to have been profoundly impressed
by the administrative superiority of a strong centralised mon-
archy in the hands of an energetic monarch who knew his
own mind; and, in politics, France ever afterwards was his
model European state. The social charm and polite culture
of French society also attracted him; and he appropriated its
quintessence in an incredibly short time. The last year of his
travels was spent in Spain, where he added a thorough know-
ledge of the Castilian language and literature to his other
accomplishments. On the other hand, his travels, if they
enriched his mind, at the same time relaxed his character.
From the levity of his correspondence, it is probable that at
this time he was a somewhat indiscriminate admirer of the fair
sex; and he certainly brought home with him easy morals as
well as exquisite manners.
On his return to Copenhagen, in 1662, Schumacher found
the monarchy firmly established on the ruins of the aristocracy,
and eager to buy the services of every man of the middle
classes who had superior talents to offer. Conscious of his
ability, and determined to make his way in this new “Pro-
Lands Gabely weeper,
protection and recordnities of apove of literae same time conso-
Ihracter, his head about the videnlő
x]. Administrative Reform 269
mised Land," the young adventurer contrived to secure the
protection of Gabel, and, in 1663, was appointed the royal
librarian and record-keeper, in which double capacity he had
unrivalled opportunities of appealing to the best side of
Frederick III's character, his love of literature and learning.
A romantic friendship contracted about the same time with
the king's bastard, Count Ulrik Frederick Gyldenlove, conso-
lidated his position. In 1665 Schumacher obtained his first
political post as the king's secretary, and the same year
composed the Kongelov. In 1666 we find him secretary in
the chancellery. He was now a personage at court, where he
won all hearts (including the hearts of more than one married
lady) by his amiability and gaiety; and in political matters his
influence was beginning to be felt.
Meanwhile the monarchy had had time effectually to
organise a new and complete system of government. The
administration was based upon what was then called the
collegiate system; in other words it was a bureaucracy consisting
of the various Kollegier, or departments of state, each with its
president and assistant secretaries. The most important and
dignified of these departments was the Statskollegium, which
took over the legislative authority of the now defunct Rigsraad,
besides the direction of foreign affairs. Yet the status of the
colleges was vague and insecure, all real power being in the
hands of the king, who was not even obliged to follow the
advice or suggestion of the colleges. Another new institution
was the Gehejmeraad, or Privy Council, in which the king was
supposed to transact business, though he generally preferred to
consult its individual members separately according to his
good pleasure. The programme of equality, the original “ plat- -
form” of the new absolutism, was limited to taxation and the
admission of all three Estates to the highest administrative and
judicial functions; and this equalisation of the nobility, clergy,
and burgesses explains the undoubted popularity of the
Revolution at the time when it took place. These common
270
The Danish Revolution.
TCI.
privileges were promulgated on June 24, 1661, as a free gift
from the crown.
That the nobility should have regarded the extension of
their peculiar privileges to the lower orders unfavourably, was
only natural; and there can be no doubt that, during the
earlier years of the new absolutism, the majority of the Danish
nobility was in secret opposition to the usurping government.
Of this feeling the monarchy was well aware; and its nervous
apprehension of a possible aristocratic reaction made it pecu-
liarly sensitive to the faintest semblance of treason. Frede-
rick III's treatment of Korfits Ulfeld and his wife may be
taken as a typical instance of his attitude towards the nobility
generally. Ulfeld and Leonora Christina were, in the summer
of 1660, conveyed to Hammershus in Bornholm, as prisoners
of state. Their captivity was severe to brutality; and they
were only released (in Sept. 1661) on the most humiliating
terms. Maddened with rage and shame, the fallen magnate,
who in the meantime had fled the country, henceforth dreamed
of nothing but revenge, and in the course of 1662, during his
residence at Bruges, so far forgot himself as to offer the Danish
crown to the Elector of Brandenburg, proposing to raise a
rebellion in Denmark for that purpose. Frederick William
betrayed Ulfeld's treason to Frederick III. The panic-stricken
Danish government at once impeached the traitor; and on
July 24, 1663, he and his children were degraded, his property
was confiscated, and he was condemned to be beheaded and
quartered. He escaped from the country, but the sentence
was actually carried out on his effigy; and a pillory was erected
on the ruins of his mansion at Copenhagen. Every society has
the right to defend itself against the treachery of its members;
and for years Ulfeld had striven to injure his country and even
destroy its independence. His condemnation, therefore, was
perfectly just. His death at Basel, in February 1664, was a
distinct relief to the Danish court.
The Revolution of 1660 was certainly beneficial to Norway,
x]
Status of Norway after the Revolution 271
With the disappearance of the Rigsraad, which, as representing
the Danish crown, had hitherto exercised sovereignty over
both kingdoms, Norway ceased to be a subject principality.
The sovereign hereditary king stood in exactly the same rela-
tions to both kingdoms; and thus, constitutionally, Norway
was placed on an equality with Denmark, united with but
not subordinate to it. It is pretty clear that the majority of
the Norwegian people hoped that the Revolution would give
them an administration independent of the Danish govern-
ment; but these expectations were not realised. Till the
cessation of the union in 1814, Copenhagen continued to be
the headquarters of the Norwegian administration; both king-
doms had common departments of state; and the common
chancellery continued to be called the Danish chancellery.
Norway did not even obtain a university of her own till 1811.
On the other hand, the condition of Norway was now greatly
improved. In January, 1661, a Land Commission was ap-
pointed to investigate the financial and economical conditions
of the kingdom; the fiefs were transformed into counties;
the gentry was deprived of its immunity from taxation; the
public officials were paid fixed salaries; and in July, 1662, the
Norwegian towns received special privileges, including the mono-
poly of the lucrative timber trade. Epoch-making for Norway
was the governor-generalship (1664-1679) of Frederick Ulric
Gyldenlöve, an ardent reformer and an administrator of con-
siderable ability, who laid the foundations of the Norwegian
fleet, and would have re-organised the finances on a far more
enlightened basis, but for the obstruction which his plans met
with at Copenhagen.
Denmark's foreign policy, from 1660 to 1670, was cautious
and expectant. Europe, since 1658, had been divided into
two hostile camps. In that year the anti-Imperial Rhenish
Union had been formed between France, Sweden, and several
of the North German princes; and when, in 1661, Louis XIV
personally took over the government of France, he proposed
272
CH.
The Danish Revolution
to use the Union for his own political purposes. The natural
opponents of France were the Emperor and Spain, who had
formed a counter-league ; and it was the object of both com-
binations to attract the neutral powers into their respective
orbits. The Danish government, distracted by contrary opinions,
long remained irresolutely neutral. Hannibal Sehested and
Gabel were for an alliance with France as being the only
power from whom considerable subsidies were to be expected,
and as the best guarantee against an attack from Sweden. By
the Treaty of Paris (July 1663) Denmark finally acceded to
the Union of the Rhine, thereby obtaining a promise of help
from France in case she was attacked by Sweden while her
troops were engaged in the French interest in Germany. The
Anglo-Dutch War of 1665 still further complicated matters.
Sweden, chagrined at the Franco-Danish rapprochement, had, in
1665, contracted an alliance with England; and Charles II
desired to secure Denmark also as a confederate against the
Dutch, and thus form a triple alliance between Great Britain
and the Scandinavian powers. It was a difficult situation for
Denmark, uncertain as she was which of the two coalitions
would prevail, especially as her new ally, France, was closely
bound to the Netherlands; and there was a fresh shifting of
alliances when France, in June 1666, declared war against
England. But the Peace of Breda (1667) terminated hostili-
ties; and, in the following year, a Triple Alliance was formed
between England, Sweden, and the Netherlands as a counter-
poise to the growing influence of Louis XIV, an alliance to
which Denmark resolutely refused to accede in the hope of
supplanting Sweden as the Scandinavian ally of France.
All this time young Schumacher's influence had been
steadily increasing. On the death of Frederick III (Feb. 9,
1670) he was the most trusted of the royal counsellors. He
alone was aware of the existence of the new throne of walrus
ivory embellished with three silver life-size lions, and of the new
regalia, wrought by the royal goldsmith, Paul Kurtz, both of
*
Accession of Christian V
273
which treasures he had, by the king's command, concealed in
a vault beneath the royal castle. Frederick III had also
confided to him a sealed packet containing the Kongelov, which
was to be delivered to his successor alone; and Schumacher
was bound by oath to disclose the secret to no one else.
The new king, Christian V, who ascended the throne in his
twenty-fourth year, resembled his grandfather rather than his
father. He had the popular manners, the warlike and athletic
tastes, and the preference for all things Danish, which had dis-
tinguished Christian IV. He was also naturally good-natured
and kind-hearted, but, possessing neither intellect nor character,
he was very much at the mercy of his environment. A weak
despot with an exaggerated opinion of his dignity and his
prerogatives—such was Christian V, and his inherent instability
and vanity were to do the monarchy infinite harm. Almost
his first act on ascending the throne was publicly to insult his
consort, the amiable Charlotte Amelia of Hesse Cassel, by
introducing into court, as his officially recognised mistress,
Amelia Moth, a girl of sixteen, the daughter of his former
tutor.
Ministerial changes were the speedy and inevitable conse-
quences of the advent of a new king. A struggle for power
now began to rage around the throne. The fall of Gabel, its
first outcome, was brought about by a combination between
Schumacher, Gyldenlöve, and Frederick Ahlefeld. All three
of them stood high in the royal favour. Schumacher had been
recommended to his son by Frederick III on his death-bed.
“Make a great man of him but do it slowly," said Frederick,
who thoroughly understood the characters both of his son and
of his minister. Christian V was moreover deeply impressed
by the trust which his father had shown in Schumacher, by
confiding to him, and him alone, the care of the new throne,
the new regalia, and the Kongelov. When therefore, on Feb-
ruary 9, 1670, Schumacher acquitted himself of his charge,
Christian V bade all those about him withdraw, and, after
ΒΛΙΝ
18
274
[CH.
The Danish Revolution
being closeted a good hour with Schumacher, appointed him his
“ Obergeheimesekretær." The second member of the trium-
virate, Gyldenlöve, won the young king's heart by plunging
him into a whirl of riotous amusements. The monarch and
the royal bastard had the same rough tastes and loose morals
-Gyldenlöve had already divorced two wives and was angling
for a third-and, indulgent as the gentler Schumacher ever
was to the vices of his superiors, the diversions of his sovereign
soon threatened to become so scandalous that he courageously
remonstrated with Christian V on the impropriety of his
conduct. Frederick Ahlefeld, the stadholder of the Duchies,
owed his influence to his diplomatic experience and ability.
Ahlefeld, Gyldenlöve, and Schumacher divided amongst
them the administration of the realm ; but, from the first,
Schumacher was the motive-power of the new government;
and in proportion as his superior insight and many-sidedness
became more and more conspicuous, his two colleagues fell
naturally, if insensibly, into the background. Early in 1670 he
was appointed secretary of the newly created Privy Council; in
May he received the titles of Excellency and Privy Councillor;
and, in July of the same year, he was ennobled under the name
of Griffenfeld, deriving his title from the gold griffin with out-
spread wings, which surmounted his escutcheon. Seldom has
any man united so many and such various gifts in his own
person—a playful wit, a vivid imagination, oratorical and literary
eloquence, and, above all, a profound knowledge of human
nature both male and female, of every class and rank from the
king to the commonest citizen. We may take, as a specimen of
this, the different way in which he treated his two royal masters.
He had captivated the accomplished Frederick III by his
literary graces and ingenious speculations; he won the obtuse
and ignorant Christian V by saving him trouble, by acting and
thinking for him, and, at the same time, making him believe
that he was thinking and acting for himself. Moreover,
his commanding qualities were coupled with a pronounced
Ascendency of Griffenfeld
275
organising talent which made itself felt in every department of
the State, and with a marvellous adaptability to the incessant
permutations of politics, which made him an ideal diplomatist.
Fourteen days after Christian V's accession, the Kongelov -
was read aloud in the Privy Council, so that it was no longer
a secret. On June 7, 1671, the king was anointed in the
chapel of the palace of Fredriksborg, by way of symbolising
the new autocrat's humble submission to the Almighty; but.
a coronation was deemed superfluous, and the king placed
the crown upon his own head. Before the anointing, Hans
Vandal, bishop of Sjælland, recited the Kongelov, and, at the
same time, delivered an oration in which he declared that the
king was God's immediate creation, His vice-regent on earth,
and that it was the bounden duty of all good subjects to serve
and honour the celestial majesty as represented by the king's
terrestrial majesty. On May 25, 1671, the dignities of Count -
and Baron were introduced into Denmark, "to give lustre” to
the court; and at the same time a rank-ordinance graduated all
degrees of honour. A few months later (Oct. 1671) the Order -
of the Danebrog was instituted as a fresh means of winning
adherents by marks of favour. Griffenfeld was the originator
of these new institutions. To him monarchy was the ideal
form of government, and as such could not be too highly
exalted. But he had also a political object. The aristocracy -
of birth, despite its reverses, still remained the élite of society;
and Griffenfeld, the son of a burgess as well as the protagonist
of monarchy, was its most determined enemy. The new -
baronies and countships, owing their existence entirely to the
crown, and bestowable solely on the wealthy, whose estates
henceforth were to be entailed, introduced a strong solvent
into aristocratic circles. For, a line of cleavage being thus -
drawn between the ordinary gentry and a new order of titled
magnates, the esprit de corps of the aristocracy, as the first
estate of the realm, was bound to suffer. Griffenfeld knew
his own times excellently well. A parvenu and an adventurer
18–2
276
[CH.
The Danish Revolution
.
himself, he thoroughly understood the part that upstart ambi-
tion would be likely to play in Danish society, and he justly
calculated that in future the first at court would be the first
- everywhere else. Very few of the old Danish nobility accepted
the new countships and baronies; most of the new nobles were
- Holsteiners and other foreigners. The bureaucracy, not the
aristocracy, was henceforth to be the chief estate in Denmark.
Much was also done to promote trade and industry; and
here Griffenfeld had the powerful co-operation of Gyldenlöve.
The first result of their joint labours was the revival of the
Kammerkollegium, or Board of Trade, and the abolition of
some of the most harmful monopolies which had weighed so
heavily on the middle classes, although the mercantile system
prevalent in those days was an insuperable bar to the intro-
duction of free trade.
The higher administration was also reformed with the view
of making it more centralised and efficient. The collegiate
system was retained, but its imperfections were remedied; and
all departments of state were provided with new standing rules
and regulations. What was still more important, the cardinal
defect of the new government—the want of a supreme adminis-
trative board, in which the king could transact at least the most
important affairs—was supplied by the establishment on May 1,
1670, of the Genejmeraad, or Privy Council, of seven members,
consisting of the heads of the various departments of state,
and the stadholders of Norway and the Duchies. In the
same year the provincial administration was also thoroughly
reformed; and the positions and duties of the various
magistrates, who now also received fixed salaries, were for
the first time exactly defined. But what Griffenfeld could
create, Griffenfeld could dispense with. A man of his volatile,
imaginative genius was bound sooner or later to feel fettered
and impeded by the slow and heavy machinery of ordinary
government. It was not long before he began to encroach
upon the jurisdiction of the various "colleges” by private
x] Griffenfeld's Foreign Policy. 277
conferences with their chiefs, many of them his own nominees ;
and he carried this irregular practice to such lengths, that
departmental government in Denmark came almost to a
standstill. On the other hand it is indisputable that, under
the single direction of a master-mind, the State was able to
concentrate and utilise all its resources as it had never
done before. Though never unmindful of his own honour
and glory, Griffenfeld devoted himself heart and soul to the
service of his king and country. He reached the apogee of his
greatness in November 1673, when he was created a count,
a Knight of the Elephant, and Imperial Chancellor: in the
course of the next few months he contrived to obtain the
control of every branch of the government.
In the three last years of his administration, Griffenfeld had
little leisure to complete the work of domestic reform, but gave
himself up entirely to the conduct of the foreign policy of
Denmark. It is difficult to form a clear idea of his foreign
policy, first because his influence was perpetually crossed by
opposite tendencies; in the second place because the force
of circumstances compelled him again and again to shift his
standpoint; and, finally, because personal considerations largely
intermingled with his public policy, and made it more elusive
and ambiguous than it need have been. Still its salient
outlines are fairly discernible. Briefly Griffenfeld aimed at
restoring Denmark to the rank of a great power. She was to
recover her prestige in the European family; she was to hold
her own once more in the midst of contending influences.
He proposed to accomplish this by carefully nursing her
resources for some years to come, and in the meantime
securing and enriching her by alliances which would bring in
large subsidies while imposing a minimum of obligations.
Such a conditional and tentative policy, on the part of a
second-rate power, in a period of universal tension and
turmoil, was most difficult; but Griffenfeld did not regard it
as impossible, and it must be admitted that if anyone were
capable of making it succeed, he was the man.
278 : The Danish Revolution [ch.
The first postulate of such a policy was peace, especially
peace with Denmark's nearest and therefore most dangerous
neighbour, Sweden ; and Griffenfeld was prepared to go very
far indeed in order to terminate the secular antagonism be-
tween the two Scandinavian states; although, on the other
hand, his policy, always speculative, did not absolutely exclude
the ultimate possibility of enlarging Denmark's territories at
the expense of Sweden. The second postulate of his policy
was a sound financial basis, which he expected the wealth
of France to supply in the shape of subsidies to be spent
on armaments. Above all things, therefore, Denmark was to
beware of making enemies of France and Sweden at the same
time. An alliance, on fairly equal terms, between all these
powers, would, in these circumstances, be the consummation
of Griffenfeld's “system”; an alliance with France to the ex-
clusion of Sweden, would be the next best policy, for, with the
help of France, Denmark might win something from Sweden;
but an alliance between France and Sweden, without the
admission of Denmark, was the contingency to be avoided
at all hazards. Personal considerations were, naturally, not
absent from these calculations. Griffenfeld's disinclination
to war, unless absolutely necessary, was heightened by the
suspicion that, in case of war, his influence over the king
would pass to the generals; whereas, so long as the struggle
was purely diplomatic, it would be fought not with the sword
but with the pen, his pen. Yet, even from this point of view,
he cannot fairly be blamed; for, well aware that the king was
a fool and the generals untried, he held that military disaster,
if Denmark ventured to cope single-handed with a military
monarchy like Sweden, was highly probable; in which case
his whole system, demanding, as it did, so much careful adjust-
ment and delicate poising, would disappear in the crash, and
himself along with it, to the disgrace of the monarchy and
the ruin of Denmark.
Griffenfeld's difficulties were increased by the instability of
the European situation, depending as it did on the intrigues of
Difficult position of Denmark 279
Louis XIV. Resolved to conquer the Netherlands, the French
king proceeded, first of all, to isolate her by dissolving the
Triple Alliance. This he accomplished by attracting both
England and Sweden, the two chief members of the alliance,
within his orbit. Charles II was won over in 1670; and, in
April 1672, a treaty was concluded between France and Sweden,
whereby the latter power pledged itself, in return for sub-
sidies, to assist Louis XIV by 'attacking those German states
which might help the Netherlands, on condition that France
should not include Denmark in her system of alliances without
the consent of Sweden. This treaty, which was immediately
followed by a supplementary treaty between England and
Sweden, showed that Sweden weighed more in the French
balances than Denmark. In June 1672, a French army
invaded the Netherlands; whereupon the Elector of Branden-
burg, already allied with the United Provinces, contracted an
alliance with the Emperor Leopold, to which Denmark was
invited to accede; and almost simultaneously, the States
General began to negotiate for a renewal of the recently
expired Dano-Dutch alliance.
In these circumstances it was as difficult for Denmark to
remain neutral as it was dangerous for her to make a choice.
An alliance with France would subordinate her to Sweden; an
alliance with the Netherlands would expose her to an attack
from Sweden. The king and the generals were all for war;
but Griffenfeld succeeded in restraining the impetuosity of
Christian V. The Franco-Swedish alliance left him no choice
but to accede to the opposite league, for he saw at once that
the ruin of the Netherlands would disturb the balance of power
in the North by giving an undue preponderance to England and
Sweden. But Denmark's experience of Dutch promises in the
past was not reassuring; so, while negotiating at the Hague for
a renewal of the Dutch Alliance, he at the same time (autumn
1672) sent Christoffer Lindenov to Stockholm to feel his way
towards a commercial treaty with Sweden. Lindenov's mission
280
[CH.
The Danish Revolution
proved abortive, but, as Griffenfeld had anticipated, it effec-
tually accelerated the negotiations at the Hague, and frightened
the Dutch into unwonted liberality. In May 1673, a treaty
of alliance was signed by the ambassador of the States General
at Copenhagen, whereby the Netherlands pledged themselves
to pay Denmark large subsidies in return for the services of
10,000 men and twenty war-ships, which were to be held in
readiness in case the United Provinces were attacked by another
enemy besides France. Thus, very dexterously, Griffenfeld had
succeeded in obtaining his subsidies without sacrificing his
neutrality.
His next move was to attempt to detach Sweden from
France. In April 1673, Jens Juel, who shared Griffenfeld's
pacific views, and was scarcely inferior to him in diplomatic
talent, was despatched to Stockholm to affect a “simulated
friendship”; but again Sweden showed not the slightest in-
clination for a serious rapprochement. Denmark was thus
compelled to accede to the anti-French league formed by the
Emperor Leopold, which she did by the Treaty of Copenhagen,
January 1674, thereby engaging to place an army of 20,000
men in the field when required; but here again Griffenfeld
safeguarded himself to some extent by stipulating that this
provision was not to be operative till the Netherlands had
ratified the foriner treaty, or till the allies were attacked by
a fresh enemy. Nevertheless, from that moment, Denmark
had made her choice; and her extensive military preparations
demonstrated that she was ready to fight. On June 30, 1674,
the long unratified Dutch treaty was signed at the Hague;
and Denmark's entry into the grand coalition was an accom-
plished fact. In return for subsidies Denmark was now
pledged to keep an army of 16,000 men at the disposal of the
allies, though exempted from active participation in the war
so long as France was not joined by other powers.
Her exemption was soon determined. The shifty Elector
of Brandenburg suddenly executed another volte-face, and ac-
x]
:
Negotiations with Gottorp
281
ceded to the anti-French alliance. Louis XIV countered this
unexpected blow by calling upon his Swedish ally to fulfil her
obligations; and, in December 1674, a Swedish army under
Karl Gustav Vrangel invaded Prussian Pomerania Denmark
was now bound to intervene as a belligerent, but Griffenfeld
endeavoured to postpone this intervention as long as possible;
and Sweden's anxiety to avoid hostilities with her southern
neighbour materially assisted him to postpone the evil day. In
the beginning of December, 1674, Charles XI sent Count Niels
Brahe on a pacific mission to Copenhagen ; and Griffenfeld
spun out the negotiations by proposing terms to the Swedish
envoy which he well knew the Swedish government would
never accept. On the other hand, he listened favourably to
Count Brahe's suggestions of a matrimonial alliance between
Christian V's sister, Ulrica Leonora and Charles XI. He only
wanted to gain time, and he gained it.
There was, however, another thing which held Denmark
back—the negotiations with Gottorp, which had proceeded un-
interruptedly for the last three years, and aimed at an exchange
whereby the duke was to cede to the king his part of Sleswick
in return for the reversion of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst.
In April 1675, the Danish government, growing alarmed at
Duke Christian Albert's new alliance with Sweden, suddenly
changed its tone, and treated the duke as an enemy. In June
Christian V visited the Duchies; on the 17th he entertained
Christian Albert as his guest at Flensborghus; and, at a subse-
quent interview at Rensborg, he would have arrested the duke
but for the representations of Griffenfeld. The chancellor's
conduct at this time is mysterious. At Rensborg, on June 19,
he spent some hours negotiating with the Holstein minister,
Kielmann, concerning the Oldenburg exchange, on which
occasion he stipulated for the surrender to himself, on very
advantageous terms, of the county of Steinhorst in Holstein by
way of forming a Reichsgrafschaft to maintain his newly secured
dignity of Reichsgraf. At his trial Griffenfeld maintained that
282
The Danish Revolution
[CH.
these negotiations were meant to throw dust in the enemy's
eyes; and, as he previously informed Christian V of the
Steinhorst concession, the possibility of treason is excluded.
Anyhow the exchange negotiations proved abortive, the utmost
concessions from Gottorp falling far below the minimum Danish
demands. Then came the tidings of the Swedish defeats at
Rathenow and Fehrbellin, which encouraged the Danish
ministers to apply the pressure of fear. On June 26, the duke
of Gottorp was arrested at Rensborg, and compelled by the
treaties of June 28 and July 1o to concede all the Danish
claims, including the surrender of his forces and fortresses
to the Danish government, and the abandonment of all his
alliances with foreign powers. There was some talk at Rens-
borg of proceeding against the Swedophil city of Hamburg in
a similar way; but the Elector of Brandenburg protested, and
so the plan came to nothing. It was on this occasion that
Griffenfeld took a “gift” from Hamburg of 10,000 rix-dollars,
in very peculiar circumstances, yet not before he had ob-
tained the king's consent to it.
War was now at the very doors. By the Concert of the
Hague the allies had agreed that the Netherlands were to
declare war against Sweden; and a concerted plan of operations
was drawn up, according to which Denmark was to attack
Sweden's North German possessions. Yet still the Danish
government postponed the attack; and this postponement was
undoubtedly due to Griffenfeld. The fleet, he said, was not
ready; but its unreadiness was the effect rather than the cause
of his backwardness. His motives are obscure because they
were mixed, and vacillating because the whole situation
changed from week to week. Here again personal considera-
tions are plainly discernible. Griffenfeld's first wife, Kitty
Nansen, a grand-daughter of the great burgomaster, whom he
had married in November 1670 (she brought him half a
million), died two years later, leaving him a little daughter.
The blow was a severe one, for Griffenfeld, naturally affec-
x] Connubial projects of Griffenfeld 283
tionate, had dearly loved his wife though she was twenty-one
years his junior. Now, however, he was intent on a second
marriage. This time, the chancellor aimed very high, hesitat-
ing between a Holstein lady, the princess Louise Charlotte
of Augustenburg, and a French lady, Charlotte Amélie de
Tremouille, princess of Taranto, a connexion of the Danish
queen-consort, of whom he really seems to have been ena-
moured. Perhaps the most startling proof of Griffenfeld's
European influence at this period is the warm interest taken in
the Tremouille affair by no less a personage than Louis XIV,
who, for, political reasons, did his very utmost to promote
the match. Strong pressure was brought to bear upon the
young lady from the highest quarters; but Mademoiselle de
Tremouille absolutely refused to look at a lover “who was
not born." As, moreover, Griffenfeld himself had already
somewhat abruptly broken off his negotiations with the princess
of Augustenburg, he ultimately lost both ladies.
To the last, he endeavoured to avoid a rupture with France
even if he broke with Sweden. When in the summer of 1675,
the Elector Frederick William forced his hand, and compelled
Denmark to intervene as a belligerent against Sweden, Griffen-
feld would have occupied the bishopric of Bremen, not as
a permanent possession but by way of security for Scania,
which, he hoped, Sweden might be induced to surrender in
exchange for the Bremen bishopric, artfully calculating, at the
same time, on the support of France, which was far more
interested in Sweden as a German than as a Scandinavian
power. It is impossible to withhold our admiration from this
super-subtle balancing of contingencies; and, had Griffenfeld's
policy succeeded, Denmark might have recovered her ancient
possessions to the south and east comparatively cheaply. But
again Griffenfeld was overruled. The king and the Danish
generals agreed with the Elector of Brandenburg that the
principal attack should be directed against Swedish Pomerania.
This decision proved to be not only a political but a personal
284
[CH.
The Danish Revolution
defeat for Griffenfeld. Christian V, eager for war, chafing at
a policy of prolonged inaction, and resenting bitterly the
domination of an intelligence far superior to his own, on
August 21 sent his chancellor “fifteen points" expressing in
unmeasured terms his royal displeasure at Griffenfeld's whole
policy, accusing him besides of presumption and peculation,
and warning him to be more careful in the future.
The war which ensued is described elsewhere (cap. XI):
here we have only to consider its bearing on the diplomacy of
Denmark and the fate of the chancellor. When hostilities
began, Griffenfeld naturally desired them to be prosecuted
vigorously; yet even now he had not abandoned the hope of
winning political results by diplomatic methods. He still
clung to his idea of exchanging whatever territory might be
won from Sweden in Germany for some or all of her Scanian
provinces; he still resolved to retain the amity of France, and
did his utmost to persuade Louis XIV that Denmark was likely
to prove a more profitable ally than Sweden, and that the latter
power ought to be made "to pay the score.” Even Christian V,
when it was too late, regretted the subsequent breach with
France; but the ministers of the allies at Copenhagen, suspicious
of a policy they could no longer understand, and fearing lest
Griffenfeld's close intimacy with the French minister, Terlon,
might be the first step towards a peace with Sweden, resolved
to overthrow him. Unfortunately Griffenfeld himself uncon-
sciously lent them a helping hand. There can be no doubt
that the possession of extraordinary power, along with the
boundless, almost blasphemous adulation to which it gave rise,
had at last disturbed the mental harmony and equilibrium
of this most highly gifted nature. In the midst of more than
princely power and splendour, he was becoming dangerously
isolated. His old friends, slighted or ignored, had fallen away,
and he had made no new ones; all his colleagues had become
jealous rivals, especially Ahlefeld, whom he had gone out of his
way to offend. Gyldenlöve was absent in Norway; the generals
The Fall of Griffenfeld
285
hated the chancellor as a persistent procrastinator ; the nobility
he had hopelessly alienated; the king, to whom he was
barely civil, and whose kindly warning he had neglected, now
regarded him with deep distrust. The most dangerous of his
innumerable enemies was Duke John Adolphus of Plön, who
had entered the Danish army as generalissimo in January
1676; and it was this man's ungrounded fears of Griffenfeld's
Swedophil policy which precipitated the crisis.
In February, 1676, the struggle with Griffenfeld, the struggle
for the king's confidence, began. It was some time, however,
before the chancellor suspected the danger that threatened
him. Only in the beginning of March does he seem to have
become seriously uneasy, and by that time the consent of the
king to his imprisonment had already been obtained. Early
on March 11, Griffenfeld proceeded as usual to the royal apart-
ments, but was met at the entrance of the guardroom by General
Arenstorf who demanded his sword in the king's name, and
conducted him to the citadel a prisoner. On the same day his
residence was thoroughly searched ; and Christian V, summon-
ing all the foreign ministers to his presence, informed them
that weighty reasons had compelled him to secure the person
of the chancellor. Henceforth he would be his own foreign
minister.
So far nothing can be said against the conduct of Chris-
tian V and his new counsellors. The fallen chancellor had
certainly made use of his exceptional position to enrich him-
self; and his whole policy must, at the first blush, have
appeared obscure, ambiguous, and hazardous to those who
did not possess the clue to the perhaps purposely tangled
skein. Had he been dismissed from office, Christian V's
behaviour would, in the circumstances, have at least been
excusable. But it was the intention of Griffenfeld's enemies
not merely to punish but to destroy him. A very careful
examination of his papers, lasting nearly six weeks, made it
clear that he had broken his oath to the king by selling
286
[CH.
The Danish Revolution
offices and keeping back letters; but, on the other hand,
the official report declared that there was nothing in the
chancellor's past conduct to support a charge of lèse-majesté,
or high treason. Disappointing as this investigation was to
Griffenfeld's enemies, it had nevertheless provided them with
a deadly weapon against the fallen statesman. In one of his
diaries (intended of course for no eye but his own) Griffenfeld
had imprudently noted that on one occasion Christian V, in
a conversation with a foreign ambassador, had “spoken like
a child.” This entry was communicated to the king; and,
while still smarting under the affront, Christian V was easily
persuaded by the duke of Plön to strengthen the hands of
the prosecution by employing in the case Otto Mauritius, a
German jurist of dubious character and questionable ante-
cedents, subsequently convicted of forgery. It was the business
of Mauritius, a mere creature of the duke of Plön and a
master of forensic chicane, to obtain a capital sentence against
Griffenfeld by any means whatever. A second and still more
rigorous investigation was begun, including an examination of
the accused, but still nothing like treason could be brought to
light; and it may be added that, even with the much fuller
information now at our disposal, any such charge is absolutely
unsustainable. Nevertheless Griffenfeld's adversaries, knowing
that the king was with them, felt sure of a conviction; and, to
make assurance doubly sure, the ex-chancellor was tried not by
the Höjesteret, or Supreme Court of Justice, the usual tribunal
in such cases, but by an extraordinary tribunal of seven
dignitaries, none of whom was particularly well disposed
towards the accused.
On May 3 the trial began. The prosecution charged
Griffenfeld with simony, bribery, oath-breaking, malversation,
and, finally, lèse-majesté, and demanded that he should lose
his honour and goods, that his escutcheon should be broken
asunder, and that he himself should either be torn in pieces
by horses, or hanged and quartered. The accused conducted
x] The Trial of Griffenfeld 287
his own defence under every imaginable difficulty. For forty-
six days before his trial, he had been closely confined in
a deep dungeon without lights, books, or writing materials.
Even legal assistance was denied him. Nevertheless he proved
more than a match for the forensic ability arrayed against him;
and again and again Mauritius, wincing beneath the lash of the
ex-chancellor's pungent wit, had to implore the protection of
the court. His first defensive plea, though failing satisfac-
torily to rebut all the charges of bribery and malversation, is
in a high degree dignified and manly. Even at this distance
of time it is impossible to read it without a feeling of respect
and sympathy. The court was equally impressed thereby; and,
for a moment, the question of Griffenfeld's condemnation or
acquittal hung upon a hair. But Mauritius, in his counterplea,
not only laid stress upon the unfortunate entry in the diary, but
did not shrink from bringing pressure to bear upon the judges
by hinting at the royal displeasure if they were too lenient.
It was only now that Griffenfeld seems to have perceived
that, with the king for his enemy, his case was desperate
indeed. Up to this point, conscious of his inestimable ser-
vices to the monarchy, the idea of the ingratitude of the
monarch had never entered into his calculations. But now,
abandoning all hope of justice, though still indignantly repu-
diating the charge of treason, he made a pathetic appeal to
Christian V for mercy. “I appeal,” he said, “to the inborn
grace and gentleness of my most gracious Sovereign Lord.
I am as clay in his hands. Let him do with me as he will;
I submit myself simply and wholly to his good pleasure. I
beseech my most gracious Sovereign not to. cast aside and
break in pieces the work of his own hands. How can his
hands root up the plant which his royal father planted, which
he himself hath watered, and whereof God hath given the
increase, and which now will wither and fade clean away
before the breath of foul and poisonous slander, if he himself
let not a gracious ray of mercy shine upon it.” Then the
288
CH.
The Danish Revolution
voting began. Nine of the ten judges condemned the accused
to degradation and decapitation; but the tenth, Christian Skeel,
though a personal enemy of Griffenfeld's, not only refused to
sign the sentence, but remonstrated in private with the king
against its injustice. And indeed its injustice was flagrant.
The primary offence of the ex-chancellor was the taking of
bribes, which no twisting of the law could convert into a capital
offence, while the charge of treason had not been substantiated.
It has been said in excuse for the king and his counsellors
that they acted under the pressure of a sudden panic. There
is absolutely no evidence whatever to justify such an excuse.
It is clear, however, that Griffenfeld's enemies felt some
anxiety even after their victory. Mauritius even went so far
as to suggest that torture should be applied to the convict
in order to extract something more from him ; but to this
Christian V would not consent. The execution was fixed for
the 6th of June. The scaffold was erected in front of the castle
church. On the top of it a black cloth had been thrown over
a heap of white sand; close beside stood a coffin, and the
countly escutcheon of the condemned man, taken from his
pew in the church of the Holy Spirit, where its splendour
had given great offence. Soldiers formed a cordon round the
scaffold. At seven o'clock in the morning the ex-chancellor
was conducted by two priests to the place of execution. He
exchanged a few words with those nearest to him, and pro-
tested his innocence loudly enough for everyone to hear him.
He refused to have his eyes bound, and, after taking off his
peruke, bade the headsman strike boldly the moment he un-
folded his hands. He then knelt down for a few moments on
the cloth in silent prayer; after which he let his hands fall, and
extended his head stiffly to receive the stroke of the descending
sword. But now the royal adjutant, Hans Schach, stepped
forward, and cried : “Hold! there's a pardon !” The unhappy
man was stunned by the suddenness of the shock. “God
forgive you! I was so ready to die,” he exclaimed. On hearing
Captivity of Griffenfeld 289
that the sentence was commuted to life-long imprisonment, he
declared that the pardon was harder to bear than the punish-
ment, and desired instead to be made a common soldier.
Schumacher now disappears from history. For the next two-
and-twenty years Denmark's greatest statesman lingered out
his life in a lonely state prison, first in the fortress of Copen-
hagen, and finally at Munkholm in Trondhjem fiord. He
died at Trondhjem on March 12, 1699.
In condemning Griffenfeld, the Danish monarchy still more
emphatically condemned itself. It showed itself incapable of
treasuring the palladium of a great minister; and from hence-
forth great ministers were denied it. The Bernstorffs of the
future were eminent diplomatists; Struensee was a superior
person ; but we find nothing in any of them approaching
even remotely to the subtle and manifold genius of Griffen-
feld. The Danish nationality was to suffer even more than
the Danish monarchy from the fall of the man who, with all
his shortcomings, was patriotic to the core, and even aimed
at elevating his beloved native language to the dignity of a
diplomatic medium. For the next century and a half German
influences were to prevail more and more in Denmark; the
German tongue was to usurp the place of the native language;
and the court of Copenhagen was to become as Teutonic in
speech and manners as the court of Hanover. Of the imme-
diate nemesis which followed hard upon the overthrow of
Griffenfeld, and dragged Ienmark down once more into the
slough of disaster and disgrace, we shall speak in the following
chapter.
BAIN
19
CHAPTER XI.
CHARLES XI OF SWEDEN, 1660-1697.
IN 1660, after five years of incessant warfare with half
Europe, Sweden had at length obtained peace, and, with it,
the opportunity of organising and developing her newly-won
empire. Unfortunately the regency which was to govern her
during the next fifteen years was quite unequal to the diffi-
culties of a situation which would have taxed the resources
of the greatest statesmen. Its nominal head was the queen-
mother, Hedwig Leonora, a dull, respectable woman, who voted
mechanically with the majority; its ruling spirit was Magnus
Gabriel De la Gardie, Christina's old favourite, now imperial
chancellor. All the regents were arch-conservative aristocrats,
pronounced enemies of the most necessary reforms, who leaned
for support upon the equally conservative Riksråd or Council
of State. Unity and vigour were scarcely to be expected from
a many-headed administration composed of men of mediocre
talents, whose vacillating opinions speedily gave rise to fiercely
contending factions. There was the high aristocratic party,
with a leaning towards warlike adventure, headed by De la
Gardie, and the party of peace and economy, led first by :
Count Gustaf Bonde, and, after his death, by the liberal
and energetic Johan Gyllenstjerna. After a severe struggle,
De la Gardie's party finally prevailed; and its triumph was
marked by that general decline of personal and political
'morality which has given to this regency its unenviable noto-
CH. XI] The Franco-Swedish Alliance 291
riety. Sloth, carelessness, procrastination speedily infected
every branch of the administration, destroying all discipline,
extinguishing all zeal, and leading to a general neglect of
business and a disregard of the most obvious duties. Another
characteristic trait of this high-aristocratic government was its
almost boundless greed and extravagance, which led to a gross
political corruption unknown before, and made Sweden the
obsequious hireling of that foreign power which had the longest
purse.
The beginning of this shameful “subsidy policy” was
the Treaty of Fontainebleau, 1661, by a secret paragraph of
which Sweden, in exchange for a considerable sum of money,
undertook to support the French candidate on the first va-
cancy of the Polish throne. The complications ensuing from
Louis XIV's designs on the Spanish Netherlands led to a
bid for the Swedish alliance, both from the French king and
his adversaries. After much hesitation on the part of the
Swedish government, the anti-French faction prevailed; and,
in April, 1668, Sweden acceded to the Triple Alliance, which
aimed at arresting the triumphal progress of Louis XIV by
threatening an armed mediation in favour of Spain, and check-
mated the French king by bringing about the Peace of Aix-la-
Chapelle. For the next four years Sweden remained true to
the principles of the Triple Alliance; but in 1672 Louis XIV
succeeded in isolating the Dutch Republic, and regaining his
ancient ally. By the Treaty of Stockholm, April 14, 1672,
Sweden became, for the next ten years, a "mercenarius
Galliæ," pledging herself, in return for 400,000 crowns per
annum in peace, and 600,000 in war time, to attack, with
16,000 men, those German princes who might be disposed to
assist Holland. The French treaty was the last political act
of the regency. Eight months later, on December 18, 1672,
Charles XI, in the presence of a Riksdag summoned to
Stockholm for the purpose, received the sceptre from his
guardians.
19--2
292
[CH.
Charles XI of Sweden, 1660–1697
Charles XI was born in the palace at Stockholm on
November 24, 1655. His father, Charles X, had left the
care of his son's education to the regents; and in this, as
in every other respect, they grossly neglected their duty.
The consequence was that when Charles XI, at the age of
seventeen, attained his majority, he was ignorant of the very
rudiments of statecraft and almost illiterate, while a vivid
consciousness of his own deficiencies made him shy, dumb,
and awkward in the presence of persons of education and
distinction. Yet, from the first, the hardy little sharp-featured
youth, with the small keen eyes, and the beautiful long black
hair, his one natural ornament, seems to have been generally,
liked. Those nearest to him had great hopes of him. He was
known to be truthful, upright, and God-fearing; if he had
neglected his studies, it was to devote himself entirely to
manly sports and exercises; in the pursuit -of his favourite
pastime, bear-hunting, he had already given proofs of the most
splendid courage; and neither the meaner nor the softer vices
had the least hold upon him.
During the first few years of Charles XI's reign things
continued very much in the old groove. The prevalent discord
and laxity rather increased than diminished; and the financial
distress grew so acute that not money enough could be found
to satisfy the most pressing needs of the State. The members
of the government absented themselves more and more fre-
quently from business in their country houses; and the young
king, finding little pleasure in affairs of state, which he had
never been trained to understand, spent most of his time in
what he called "exersisiam corporis.” Meanwhile the political -
situation in Europe was on the verge of a crisis. The
unexampled successes of Louis XIV in his Dutch war had
excited the alarm of every statesman who saw a danger to the
European equilibrium in the preponderance of France; and,
though De la Gardie and his friends bore an old grudge
against the Dutch Republic for its commercial chicaneries, and
xi] The Swedes invade Pomerania 293 ..
hoped, with the aid of France, to burst the fetters which still
impeded Swedish trade, they had no desire to see the United
Provinces utterly crushed for the sole advantage of the other great
maritime power, England. But, above all things, De la Gardie
wished to avoid being dragged into a war for which he knew
Sweden was unprepared. When therefore, after the formation
of the anti-French league, Louis XIV called upon Sweden
to fulfil her obligations and actively assist him, the Swedish
chancellor offered his mediation instead. This was accepted
by all the belligerents; and a peace congress was opened at
Cologne in May, 1673, only to prove abortive in the course
of 1674; while simultaneously Charles II of England was
compelled by his Parliament to make a separate peace with
Holland.
Of all the allies of France, obtained after so much
trouble and expense, Sweden now alone remained. Louis XIV
therefore sent more and more peremptory demands for Swe-
den's active aid, and he allowed Feuquières, his ambassador
at Stockholm, to hold out hopes of increased subsidies if
Sweden instantly invaded the lands of their common enemy,
in this case the Elector of Brandenburg. Thus, at last, the
shrinking Swedish government was compelled to take the
decisive plunge; and before the end of the year the aged
field-marshal, Gustaf Vrangel, at the head of 13,000 men,
invaded the Uckermark, preceded by the great reputation
which had clung to the Swedish arms ever since the. Thirty
Years' War. The Elector, engaged in fighting the French on
the Rhine, urged his allies to open action against Sweden;
but the traditional fear of Sweden's military prowess still held
back the diplomatists assembled at the Hague. In the course
of May, 1675, the Swedish army advanced into the Mark of
Brandenburg, and in the beginning of June occupied the line
of the Havel from Alt-Brandenburg to Rathenow with a view
to cross the Elbe and join the Hanoverians in an attack upon
the Elector at Halberstadt. But, in the meantime, Frederick
294 Charles XI of Sweden, 1660-1697 [CH.
1
William himself, at the head of 16,000 men, surprised and
drove back a Swedish division at Rathenow, and following
up his advantage again defeated the Swedes at Fehrbellin,
on June 18, whereupon the whole Swedish army, now reduced
by sickness and desertion to 7000 men, hastily retreated to
Demmin. The Fehrbellin affair was a mere skirmish, the
actual casualties amounting to less than 600 men, but it rudely
divested Sweden of her nimbus of invincibility, and was the
signal for a general attack upon her. Before the year was
out the Emperor, the United Provinces, and Denmark had
declared war against her. De la Gardie, arrogant in prosperity,
grew querulous and irresolute as difficulties began to accumu-
late; and the eyes of the young king were suddenly opened both
to the magnitude of the danger and the criminal neglect of his
counsellors. With indefatigable energy he at once attempted
to grapple with the situation, ignoring altogether the weak
and divided Riksråd, and relying solely upon secretaries of his
own choice, honest, able men like Eric Lindskjöld and Johan
Gyllenstjerna, who instinctively rallied round the sole remaining
prop of the sinking state. The popular ill-will against the
regents found expression at the coronation Rigsdag which
met at Upsala in the autumn of 1675, and appointed a special
commission to enquire into their whole conduct, De la Gardie's
enemies in the Råd even going the length of accusing him
of high treason.
Meanwhile Sweden's empire seemed to be everywhere
crumbling away. Pomerania and the bishopric of Bremen
were overrun by the Brandenburgers, Austrians, and Danes;
and the Swedish troops, everywhere outnumbered, took refuge
in the nearest fortresses. Charles XI, conscious that every-
thing now depended on the command of the sea, waged an
almost desperate struggle with sloth, corruption, and incom-
petence, in order adequately to equip the fleet, so as not only
to relieve the German provinces, but also to prevent the union
of the Dutch and Danish fleets in the Baltic. But, in spite of
XI]
The Dano-Swedish War.
295
all his exertions, the Swedish fleet could not put to sea till the
beginning of October; and it returned home in a crippled
condition without venturing to seek the enemy. Amidst uni-
versal anarchy the young king, barely twenty years of age, in-
experienced, ill-served, snatching at every expedient, and almost
sinking beneath a superhuman burden of responsibility, was
working night and day in his newly formed camp in Scania,
arming the nation for its mortal struggle, but hampered and
harassed at every step by apathy, incompetence, and desti-
tution.
During the winter of 1676 no effort was spared to equip the
fleet; and in May twenty-five ships of the line and nine frigates
with two thousand guns put to sea under the command of a
valiant but inexperienced landsman, Lorenz Creutz. On June 1
Creutz encountered the combined Dano-Dutch, fleet off the
southern point of the isle of Öland. At the very beginning of
the battle, his flagship blew up with all on board ; the panic-
stricken Swedish fleet was scattered; and the Danes, now
masters of the Baltic, were able, in June, 1676, to transport
their main army, 16,000 strong, under Christian V in person,
over to Scania, while Gyldenlöve simultaneously invaded
Vestergötland from Norway. The small Swedish army re-
treated into Småland; and the enemy occupied nearly the
whole of Scania, whose inhabitants, Danes in sentiment as
well as in language, received the invaders gladly, and, forming
into irregular bands, under the name of Snapphaner, "nobblers,”
waged a savage guerilla war against the Swedes. On August 15
Christian V and the duke of Plön stormed the fortress of
Kristianstad; but a Danish division of 3000 men detached to
capture Halmstad, the capital of Halland, and cooperate with
Gyldenlöve, was suddenly attacked at Fyllebro, on August 17,
by Charles XI and his commander-in-chief, Helmfeld; and the
young king's valour and Helmfeld's superior strategy were
rewarded by a complete victory. Only six hundred of the
Danes escaped; the rest were slain or captured.
296 Charles XI of Sweden, 1660–1697 [CH.
During the next six weeks Charles XI remained in camp
at Syllinge in North Halland awaiting reinforcements; on
October 6, 1676, at the head of 16,000 men, he crossed
the Scanian frontier to seek the foe. The Danes could not
however be brought to fight; and there ensued weeks of
marching and counter-marching across the Scanian plains,
during which the Swedes suffered severely from cold, want,
and sickness. At length, at the beginning of December, 1676,
the two armies encamped on opposite sides of the river Lydde,
or Käflinge, for more than three weeks, the Danes having the
best part of Scania, a friendly country, to draw upon for
unlimited supplies, while the Swedes, half starving in their
boygy camp, were perpetually harassed by the ever watchful
Snapphaner. When the Swedish army had dwindled down
to 8500 men, Charles XI's position became untenable; and
there was nothing for it but to fight or retreat. He chose
the former alternative, and at midnight on December 4 con-
ducted his host over the frozen Lydde, with the object of
gaining possession of the Helgonaback, a table-land north of
the city of Lund, and the key of the whole position. But
the Danes were also on the alert, and a race at once ensued
between the Swedish right and the Danish left, led by their
respective kings in person, for the coveted position. Both
armies reached the top almost simultaneously just as the
rising sun cast its first rays over the snow-covered plain.
After a ferocious contest, Charles XI, fighting at the head of
his horse-guards, put the Danes to flight, and pursued them
to the Lydde, where many hundreds of them were drowned.
Meanwhile the Swedish left and centre, overborne by numbers,
were sustaining a losing fight with the Danish centre and right,
till the king, informed of their plight, hurried back to their
assistance, and cut his way through the Danish host, followed
at some distance by some squadrons of cavalry. He was just
in time to convert what seemed a defeat into a brilliant victory.
The Danish army was practically annihilated; and only a few
xi] The Battles of Lund and Malmö 297
horsemen succeeded, under cover of the darkness, in reaching
the fortress of Landskrona.
The battle of Lund was, relatively to the number engaged,
one of the bloodiest engagements of modern times. More than
half the combatants (8357, of whom 3000 were Swedes) actually.
perished on the battle-field. In striking contrast with the
Danish generals, whose incompetence and irresolution amply
justified Griffenfeld's doubts of them, all the Swedish com-
manders showed remarkable ability ; but the chief glory of
the day indisputably belongs to Charles XI. As a Danish
historian has said, “He had trampled his enemies under his
feet in the most literal sense of the word.” This great victory
restored to the Swedes their self-confidence and prestige.
The campaign of 1677 was a repetition of the campaign
of 1676, inasmuch as victory followed hard in Charles XI's
footsteps, and deserted Sweden everywhere else. Twice in
that year (off Femern in June, and in the Kjögebugt in July)
the Swedish fleet was badly beaten by the great Danish
admiral, Nils Juel. On the other hand Christian V lost 5000
men in a vain attempt to storm the fortress of Malmö; and, on
July 15, Charles XI with 9000 men routed 12,000 Danes
near the same place. This proved to be the last pitched
battle of the war, the Danes never again venturing to attack
their once more invincible enemy in the open field.
In Germany meanwhile the Swedes had lost everything.'
The fortress of Stettin was captured by the Elector of Bran-
denburg in December, 1677; Stralsund fell on October 15,
1678; and Greifswald, Sweden's last possession on the con-
tinent, on November 5. A defensive alliance with Sobieski,
concluded on August 4, 1677, was rendered entirely inoperative
by the annihilation of Sweden's sea-power, and by the difficul-
ties of the Polish king, already embarrassed by a war with the
Turks. In Sweden itself, hostilities dwindled down to a war of
sieges, the chief event being the recovery by the Swedes of the
fortress of Kristianstad on August 4, 1678.
298 Charles XI of Sweden, 1660-1697 [CH.
The grand coalition against France was now in process
of dissolution. A congress had begun to sit at Nimeguen in
March, 1677; and in the beginning of April, 1678, Louis XIV
dictated the terms of a general pacification. One of his princi
cipal conditions was Sweden's complete restitution. A strong
Sweden in northern Europe was necessary to his plans; and he
held himself bound by his promises to his solitary ally. As
however it was quite another question how Sweden's enemies,
especially Denmark and Brandenburg, would regard these hard
conditions, Louis XIV insisted that Sweden should rid her-
self of her enemies by making "some small cession"; but
this Charles XI and his ministers positively refused to do.
Louis XIV thereupon took it upon himself to conclude peace
on Sweden's account, regardless of the Swedish king's wishes
and protests. It was this “insufferable tutelage” which inspired
Charles XI for the rest of his life with a personal dislike of the
mighty ruler of France. On August 10, 1678, at Nimeguen,
peace was concluded between France and Holland; on Feb-
ruary 6, 1679, between the Emperor, the Empire, and Louis
XIV; on February 7, between the Emperor, the Empire, and
the king of Sweden. By the latter treaty Sweden obtained full
restitution of her territory on the basis of the Treaty of Osna-
brück. On the same day peace was also concluded at Celle,
between France and Sweden on the one side, and the princes
of the house of Brunswick-Lüneburg on the other, Louis XIV
ceding, on behalf of Sweden, to the Lüneburg princes, three
small strips of territory belonging to the duchy of Verden.
The Elector of Brandenburg tried hard to retain his Pomeran-
ian conquests; but it was of no avail that he humbled himself
before Louis XIV. French troops invaded Cleves; and the
Elector was obliged to submit. On June 29 peace was finally
concluded at St Germain, between France and Sweden on the
one side and Brandenburg on the other, whereby Frederick
William undertook to retrocede to Sweden all the Pomeranian
territory conquered by him, except a small strip on the right
Johan Gyllenstjerna
xi]
299
bank of the Oder, which Sweden had obtained by the Stettin
recess of 1653.
The negotiations between Sweden and Denmark were
transferred to Lund in June, 1679; and Christian V implored
Louis XIV to allow him to retain his conquests. But the
French king was inexorable; and on September 2 Denmark
was forced, by the Peace of Fontainebleau, to make complete
restitution to Sweden. To save appearances, the negotiations,
at Lund were continued, and on October 7 concluded by a
treaty of alliance between the three northern kingdoms for their
mutual defence—really the only wise and natural system for
Scandinavia. This remarkable and unforeseen consummation
was due to the Swedish statesman, Johan Gyllenstjerna, who
both during and after the war was Charles XI's chief counsellor.
The alliance was cemented by the marriage of the Danish
princess, Ulrica Leonora, to Charles XI in May, 1680. A few
weeks later Gyllenstjerna died suddenly at Landskrona, but not
before he had opened the eyes of Charles XI to the dangerous
position of Sweden, bankrupt at home, and dependent for her
political existence abroad on the casual and contemptuous
patronage of a victorious foreign potentate. “If we are to
maintain our independence,” said Gyllenstjerna, “we must
henceforth depend upon ourselves.” In his opinion, a strong
centralised monarchý, established on a sound financial basis,
was now the one hope of Sweden; and he urged his young
master to accomplish this great work with the cooperation
of the Riksdag. In Charles XI Gyllenstjerna found an apt
and unwavering pupil. The bitter five years' war had made
a man of him, and brought to light his many great qualities,
an unerring common-sense, a heroic perseverance, an unlimited
capacity for taking pains, while his splendid courage and
ardent patriotism had attracted all hearts to him. Charles XI
felt that he could now draw upon the confidence and liberality
of his subjects to an almost unlimited extent, and he pro-
ceeded to do so without a moment's delay.
300 Charles XI of Sweden, 1660–1697 [CH.
!
In October, 1680, the Riksdag assembled which was to
mark a new era in Swedish history. From the first the
strong royalist tendency of the Assembly was unmistakable,
while the party of the Råd was divided and leaderless. More-
over the court had taken the precaution of ridding itself of its
most formidable opponents by sending them away on distant
foreign missions. Nothing in the royal propositions, or bills,
gave the faintest inkling of the impending revolution. They
simply alluded, in the most general terms, to the necessity
of increasing the national armaments and readjusting the
finances. But in fact the plans of the court had been carefully
prearranged: the king was to remain behind the scenes, while
his partisans in the Riksdag brought forward the necessary
projects of reform as if on their own initiative. The strife
between the royalists and the magnates was first kindled on
October 6 by the sudden emergence of the question of the
responsibility of the late regency for the dilapidation of the
realm; and after fierce debates it was decided that the regents
should be tried before a grand commission of thirty-six persons
selected by Charles XI himself (Oct. 20). Almost immediately
afterwards the question of Reduktion, or the recovery of the
alienated crown-lands, was brought before the Riksdag, on the
motion of the peasants, who had long memories for aristocratic
abuses; and on October 23 a joint memorandum of the three
lower estates on the subject was duly presented to the king.
Had the Råd and the Riddarhus been wise, they would have
tried to avert a complete overthrow by voluntarily offering to
surrender a portion of their inordinate possessions and privi-
leges; but they were too irresolute and divided to come to
any decision, and in the meantime the blow descended. The
matter was debated with great acrimony in the Riddarhus
on October 29, but, despite the fact that no vote could be
taken because of the stubborn opposition of the magnates, the
marshal of the Diet, who had won over the lesser gentry by
the promise of concessions to its poorer members, declared
xi]
Riksdag makes Charles XI absolute
301.
the Reduktion project carried. In the Riksdagbeslut, or Decree;
usual at the end of the session, we find careful directions for
the carrying out of the Reduktion, which is described, with un-
conscious irony, as a special subsidy of the nobility, an ex-
pression of self-sacrificing affection for king and fatherland.
By this decree there reverted to the crown all countships,
baronies, domains, manors, and other estates, producing an
annual rent of more than 600 dalers s.m. (£70).
Not content with placing the property of his subjects at the
disposal of the king, the estates now proceeded to surrender
their liberties to him likewise. In the beginning of December
they presented to him a memorandum opining that the Riksråd
ought to share the responsibility of the incriminated ex-regents,
which was equivalent to saying that all the magnates should
stand or fall together; whereupon Charles XI enquired of the
Riksdag whether he was still bound by the constitution of
1634, which made the Råd an essential part of the adminis-
tration. After a few days' deliberation, the Riksdag replied
that the king was not bound by any particular constitution;
but only by the law and statutes. Nay, more, they added that
he was not even obliged to consult the Råd, but was to be
regarded as a sovereign lord, responsible to God alone for his
actions, and requiring no intermediary between himself and his
people. In other words the Riksdag deliberately gave its sanction
to the introduction of absolute government into Sweden. The
Råd thereupon acquiesced in its own humiliation by meekly
accepting a royal brief changing its official title from Riksråd
(Council of State) to Kungligaråd (Royal Council)—a visible
sign that the senators were no longer the king's colleagues but
his servants.
Thus Sweden, as well as Denmark, had become an abso-
lute monarchy, but with this important difference, that the
right of the Swedish people in Parliament assembled' to be
consulted on all important matters was recognised and acted
upon. The Riksdag, completely overshadowed by the throne,
302 Charles XI of Sweden, 1660–1697 [ch.
was henceforth to do little more than register the royal decrees,
but nevertheless it continued to exist as part of the machinery
of government. Moreover this transfer, of authority was, in
appearance, a voluntary act. Neither force nor fraud had been
employed to bring it about. Charles XI was incapable of
the devious underhand ways of Frederick III. The people,
knowing him to be their best friend, trusted him implicitly,
and cooperated with him cheerfully from first to last.
The Riksdag of 1682, summoned, like its predecessor, to
provide ways and means for increasing the national armaments
and paying off the national debt, completed the work of the
Riksdag of 1680. The question of armaments was left entirely
to the king : in case of war he was to provide as he thought
best for the safety of the realm. As to the financial question,
the nobility unanimously proposed a substantial subsidy pay-
able by every class; but the three lower estates proposed a fresh
“Reduction," whereupon the Riddarhus, greatly embittered,
appealed to the king to protect them from utter destruction.
Both parties impatiently awaited the royal decision; and it came
as usual in the form of a question, which transferred the whole
matter to another sphere: How far was the king empowered
by the law of the land to bestow fiefs, or, in case of urgent
national distress, to take them back again? The noble and
the non-noble estates gave different answers to this question.
The former declared, unreservedly, that the king could give or
take as he pleased; the latter denied the king's right to give
away any crown property absolutely. Charles XI thereupon
drew up an answer of his own, following, on the whole, the
opinion of the nobility, which document was subscribed by
the estates as if it had been their own opinion. It practically
declared that the “Reduction ” question was exclusively the
king's affair; in other words it made his Majesty the disposer
of his subjects' temporal property. - Presently this new auto-
cracy extended to the king's legislative authority likewise, for,
in reply to a further question, how far he had the right to
xi] The Reforms of Charles XI 303
make laws and statutes, all four estates, by virtue of a common
declaration, signed on December 9, 1682, confirmed him not
only in the possession of the legislative authority enjoyed by
his predecessors, but even conceded to him the right of in-
terpreting and amending the common law. .
Thus the great revolution was effected, and absolutism was
firmly established in Sweden. We shall see how this absolutism
finally overreached itself, and fell in consequence of its own ex-
cesses. Yet at the time it was undoubtedly a benefit. It was
the outcome of a political necessity. It delivered Sweden from
an aristocratic government whose ambition was sharply opposed
to the natural development of the country; it saved the ancient
Swedish yeomanry from becoming the thralls of the gentry;
and, finally, it enabled Charles XI to complete his great work
of national reconstruction. The process was twofold. First
the alienated crown-lands had to be recovered; and then, on
the ruins of the old order of things, a new political system
was to be raised and consolidated. To find a parallel to so
revolutionary a change we must go back to the days of
Gustavus Vasa; and then, as now, it is one man, the king, who
conducts and superintends the stupendous. task. Everywhere
the stern, uncompromising character of the reformer is reflected
in his work. Wherever we turn, we find traces of a severity
which not infrequently becomes hardness, and of a justice only
very occasionally tempered by mercy. Yet there is nothing
petty, personal, or vindictive in this searching inquisition.
Jealous as he was of his royal authority, Charles XI was far
too just, and we may add too religious, to condescend to
tyranny.
The Grand Committee appointed to enquire into the
alleged maladministration of the late regency terminated its
labours on May 27, 1682. It decided that the regents, the Råd,
and the various Colleges, or state departments, were responsible
for the dilapidation of the realm, by reason of their extra-
vagance; and the compensation due by them to the crown was
304 Charles XI of Sweden, 1660-1697 [CH.
assessed by a subsequently appointed Liquidation Committee
at 4,000,000 dalers (£500,000). What is known in Swedish
history as Stora Reduktionen, the great reduction or recovery
of crown property, was then proceeded with-a task which
occupied Charles XI for the remainder of his life. No doubt
this calling in of the property of the crown was both necessary
and equitable; but, inasmuch as one claim quickly gave rise to
half-a-dozen others, the inquisition gradually assumed enormous
proportions, till at last every class of the community was more or
less affected by it, while the rigour with which the king enforced
it ruined thousands of families. That his mode of procedure
was arbitrary in the extreme is undeniable. He constituted
himself the sole judge of what did and what did not belong
to the State, and, undeterred by the ever-increasing murmurs
of the sufferers, and the openly expressed hatred of the aristo-
cracy, he proceeded resolutely towards his goal. On the other
hand he was no respecter of persons. Some of the hardest
blows fell, not upon political adversaries, but upon near rela-
tives, devoted friends, and faithful servants, nay upon many
who had been the first to advocate the Reduction in the
secret hope of profiting by it themselves.
The Reduction was originally entrusted to a commission of
twelve noble deputies, but, in 1682, it was converted into a
permanent department of state, under the direct control of the
king. It acted on the principle that all private landed estate
might be called in question, inasmuch as some time or other it
must have belonged to the crown; and the burden of proof of
ownership was assumed to lie not with the crown which made
the claim, but with the actual owner of the property, who of
course found establishment of such proof more and more diffi-
cult the further back he had to go for it. Another axiom of
Charles XI was that the rights of the crown overruled all rights
arising from custom or prescription; and the application of this
axiom naturally gave rise to endless forensic investigations,
which resulted in a feeling of general insecurity. Moreover,
XI]
The Great “ Reduction"
305
with the view of accelerating the calling-in of landed estates, in
the spring of 1683, “Reduction Commissioners,” with dicta-
torial powers, were sent from place to place. Thus, year after
year, the Reduction proceeded amidst the increasing uneasiness
of all who had anything to lose. The estates most easily re-
covered were the fifteen countships and the twenty-six baronies,
to which the right of the crown was indisputable, which yielded
an additional annual revenue of 200,000 dalers s.m. (about
£24,000). The amount of revenue accruing to the crown
from the whole Reduction it is impossible to estimate even
approximately. According to the report of the Reduction
Commnission of 1697, the crown recovered, between 1680 and
1697, property yielding an annual rental of, roughly speaking,
1,940,000 dal. s.m. (£113,162), of which Sweden proper con-
tributed one-fifth; but to this we must add about £102,000 in
ready money, and about £1,166,000 obtained by compromise,
special arrangement, and improvements.
The Reduction, vast as it was, represents only a part of
Charles XI's gigantic activity. The constructive part of his
administration was equally thoroughgoing, and entirely bene-
ficial. Here too everything was due to his personal initiative,
though he freely employed, and indeed speedily wore out, a
whole series of capable and intelligent statesmen. Yet he
spared himself least of all, and sacrificed ease, comfort, and
convenience to the duties of his high calling. By means of
the most careful management and the most rigid economy,
he contrived to reduce the national debt from 44,000,000
dal. s.m. (£2,567,000) to 11,500,000 (£700,000); but it took
him seventeen strenuous years to accomplish this, and during
the difficult process the estates had repeatedly “to hold the
king up” by granting him substantial additional subsidies.
At the Riksdag of 1690, however, Charles XI was able to
dispense with these extraordinary aids, and, thanks to the pro-
ceeds of the Reduction, he could now meet ordinary expenditure
out of ordinary revenue.
BAIN
20
306 Charles XI of Sweden, 1660–1697 [CH.
The national armaments, on which Sweden's external secu-
rity and international preeminence mainly depended, naturally
engaged the attention of a monarch who was also a soldier.
Charles XI reestablished on a broader basis the so-called
Indelningsverk introduced by Charles IX and Gustavus
Adolphus-a system of military tenure whereby the national
forces were bound to the soil. Thus there was the rusthåll
tenure, under which the tenants, instead of paying rent, were
obliged to equip and maintain a cavalry soldier and horse, while
the so-called Knekthållarer provided duly equipped foot-soldiers.
Moreover these indelning soldiers were also provided with
holdings on which they lived in time of peace. Formerly
ordinary conscription had existed alongside this indelning, or
distribution system, but it had proved inadequate as well as
highly unpopular; and Charles XI in 1682 came to an agree-
ment with the peasantry whereby an extended indelning system
was to be substituted for general conscription. By this means
Sweden obtained a standing army of 38,000 men, besides the
25,000 enlisted troops employed in the defence of her foreign
provinces. The navy, of even more importance to Sweden
than her army, if she were to maintain the dominion of
the Baltic, was entirely remodelled; and, the recent war having
demonstrated the unsuitability of Stockholm as a naval station,
the construction of a new arsenal on a gigantic scale was
simultaneously begun at Carlscrona. This twofold task was
entrusted to Hans Vachtmeister, who, after a seventeen years'
struggle against all manner of difficulties, succeeded in pro-
viding Sweden with a fleet of forty-three three-deckers, manned
by 11,000 men, and armed with 2648 guns, and one of the
finest arsenals in the world.
· Space fails me to tell of the remaining labours of Charles XI,
which would require a whole chapter to themselves. Briefly,
they aimed at centralisation and efficiency, and were equally
minute and sweeping. Finance, commerce, industry, judicial
procedure, church government, education, even art and
XI]
Benedict Oxenstjerna
307
science-everything, in short-emerged recast from his shaping
hand.
Foreign affairs, usually the favourite occupation or amuse-
ments of autocrats, were the one department with which
Charles XI, conscious of his own shortcomings, had the good
sense never to meddle. Down to 1680 they had been in the
charge of Johan Gyllenstjerna, on whose death in 1680 the king
entrusted them to Count Benedict Oxenstjerna, a cautious,
elderly diplomatist of great experience, who had represented
Sweden with distinction at the peace congress of Nimeguen
(1678). Oxenstjerna's appointment marks a revolution in
Swedish diplomacy. While his predecessor Gyllenstjerna had
sought the security of Sweden in pan-Scandinavian unity, as a
first step towards a triple alliance between Sweden, Denmark,
and France, Oxenstjerna regarded Denmark as Sweden's natural
enemy, and France as a dangerous and most undesirable
friend. Not without reason he suspected Louis XIV of
aiming at universal monarchy, and was therefore inclined to
approach those powers most interested in resisting French
aggression, Holland, England, and the Emperor. Oxenstjerna
effected this dangerous change of system with singular skill.
On October 10, 1681, the important guarantee Treaty of the
Hague was signed between Sweden and the Republic, which,
ostensibly an additional guarantee of the Peace of Nimeguen,
was secretly directed against France, being, in fact, the first
step towards that policy of equilibrium afterwards so success-
fully pursued by William of Orange. A diplomatic competition
between France and the allies immediately ensued. Louis XIV
tried hard to dissolve the guarantee treaty by luring back his
ancient confederate, Sweden; but Charles XI and his chan-
cellor grew more instead of less hostile. In 1682 and 1683
Sweden won over the Emperor and Spain; but, on the other
hand, England, Brandenburg, and Denmark acceded to France:
A crisis seemed at hand when, early in 1683, Charles XI
abruptly dismissed the French ambassador, Bazin; and a
French fleet appeared in the Sound to cooperate with the
20--2
308 Charles XI of Sweden, 1660-1697 [CH.
Danish navy against the half-finished arsenal of Carlscrona.
Charles XI hastened to the coast; in July an auxiliary
Dutch fleet anchored off Elfsborg—and the danger was over.
Louis XIV had attempted to frighten Charles XI and failed;
and the truce of Regensburg secured for a time the peace
of Europe.
The next few years still further increased the influence
of Sweden, and strengthened the hands of the allies. The
Elector of Brandenburg, alarmed at the increasing high-
handedness of Louis XIV, and anticipating the outbreak
of a general European war, in the course of 1686 deserted
France; and on July 9, 1686, Austria, Spain, Sweden, and
Bavaria formed the League of Augsburg, nominally for the
defence of their German possessions. Louis XIV, protesting
against the league as being practically a declaration of war,
began to make extensive military preparations; and in 1688
the struggle began which was to convulse the greater part of
Europe for a whole decade. Previously to the outbreak of
hostilities, Louis XIV once more, but in vain, had solicited
the assistance of Charles XI; and a peace congress met at
Altona to endeavour to settle the differences between Denmark
and Holstein-Gottorp, which threatened a rupture between
Sweden and Denmark, Louis XIV encouraging Christian V
to resist the pressure of Sweden, while Charles XI as
stoutly supported his kinsman the duke of Gottorp. Only
when William of Orange, now king of England, threatened
Christian V with an attack from the combined fleets of
England and Holland, did Denmark give way. On June 30,
1689, by the Peace of Altona, the duke of Gottorp was
reinstated in all his ancient rights. Thus the danger of war
had again passed away; and Charles XI could return his
half-drawn sword to its sheath. More than once during the
ten years' struggle between France and the allies, he was
strongly tempted to add to his military laurels, but the feeling
that his first duty was to his country restrained him; and, while
fulfilling his obligations to his allies, he succeeded in pre-
X1]
Character of Charles XI
309
serving his neutrality to the end. Oxenstjerna, meanwhile,
foreseeing the exhaustion of the belligerents, endeavoured
to bring about a general peace. In the beginning of 1697
Sweden's mediation was officially accepted by the allies; and
the great congress of Ryswick began its work.
Charles XI did not live to see the conclusion of the last
peace congress over which Sweden was to preside. So early
as the summer of 1696 the state of his health had caused
great anxiety. Since the death of his beloved consort, Queen
Ulrica Leonora, in July, 1693, he had been visibly a broken
man; and the shadows seemed to grow darker around him
as his strenuous life drew towards its premature close. A
total failure of the crops, followed by pestilence and famine,
visited Sweden during 1696 and 1697; and these calamities
were the last tidings which reached the ears of the dying
king, who expired on April 5, 1697, in his forty-first year.
After Gustavus Vasa and Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XI
was perhaps the greatest of all the kings of Sweden. His
modest, homespun figure has indeed been unduly eclipsed
by the brilliant and colossal shapes of his heroic father and
his meteoric son; yet, in reality, Charles XI is far worthier
of admiration than either Charles X or Charles XII. He was in
an eminent degree what neither of them ever was, a great master-
builder. He found Sweden in ruins, and, deliberately, con-
scientiously, indefatigably, devoted his whole life to laying
the solid foundations of a new order of things, which, in its
essential features, has endured to the present day. Nay, more,
the exploits of Charles XII would have been impossible but
for the bracing moral discipline which the whole Swedish
nation underwent at the hands of his father. The generation
which grew up to manhood beneath the ubiquitous eye of the
strenuous, God-fearing Charles XI, imbibed a sense of duty
and a habit of obedience, the like of which can only be found
(and that but for a short period) in Puritan England, and the
fruits of which manifested themselves during the reign of his
son in a self-sacrificing devotion unexampled in history.
CHAPTER XII.
CHARLES XII OF SWEDEN AND THE
GREAT NORTHERN WAR, 1697-1721.
CHARLES XI had carefully provided against the contingency
of his successor's minority; and the five regents appointed by
him entered upon their functions immediately after his death.
The regents, if not great statesmen, were at least practical.
politicians, who had not been trained in the austere school of
Charles XI in vain; during the seven months in which they
held sway no blunder was made, and no national interest was
neglected. At home the Reduction was cautiously pursued,
while abroad the successful conclusion of the great peace
congress at Ryswick was justly regarded as a signal triumph
of Sweden's pacific diplomacy. The young king, a lad of
fifteen, was daily present in the council; and his frequent
utterances on every subject, except foreign affairs, showed, we
are told, a maturity of judgment far beyond his years. He
had been carefully educated by excellent tutors under the
watchful eyes of both parents. His extraordinary courage and
strength of character had, from the first, profoundly impressed
those about him, though his dogged obstinacy occasionally
tried them to the uttermost. His wise and loving mother was
at great pains to develop his better nature by encouraging
betimes those noble qualities, veracity, courtesy, piety, and a
sense of honour and fair play, which were to distinguish him
throughout life, while his precocious manliness was not a
Character of Charles XII 311
little stimulated by the rude but bracing moral atmosphere to
which he was accustomed from his infancy. Intellectually he
was very highly endowed. His natural parts were excellent;
and a strong bias in the direction of abstract thought, and
mathematics in particular, was noticeable at an early date.
His memory was astonishing. He could translate Latin into
Swedish or German, or Swedish or German into Latin at
sight, and on his campaigns not unfrequently dispensed
with a key while inditing or interpreting ciphered despatches.
Charles XI personally supervised his son's physical training.
He was taught to ride before he was four, and at eight was
quite at home in the saddle. He brought down his bear at a
single shot when only eleven, an incident which his father
records in his private diary with evident satisfaction. In his
later years it is always “with my son Carl” that Charles XI
goes his rounds, reviewing troops, inspecting studs, foundries,
dockyards, and granaries. Thus the boy was gradually initiated
into all the minutiæ of administration. For the science of war
he had from the first a marked preference. As he grew older
he took an active part in the misnamed sham fights in which
Charles XI delighted, and which were often very serious
affairs, plunging into the thickest of the mêlée with a reckless-
ness which would have endangered his life but for his wariness
and coolness. I am inclined to think that the influence of
Charles XI over his son was far greater than is commonly
supposed, and that it accounts for much in Charles XII's
character which is otherwise inexplicable, such, for instance, as
his precocious reserve and taciturnity, his dislike of everything
French, and his inordinate contempt for purely diplomatic
methods. Yet, on the whole, his early training was admirable;
and, if only the young prince had been allowed the opportunity
of gradually gaining experience, and developing his naturally
great talents, for the next few years, beneath the guidance
of his guardians, as Charles XI had intended, Sweden might
still have been a great power. Unfortunately a sudden though
312
[CH.
Charles XII of Swedenz
noiseless revolution was now to break down every safeguard,
and make the young monarch absolute master of his country's
fate.
On Saturday, November 6, 1697, the Swedish Riksdag
assembled at Stockholm; and, on the following Monday, the
Estate of Nobles, jealous of the authority of the regents,
and making sure of the grateful liberality of a young prince
unexpectedly released from the bonds of tutelage, sent a
deputation to the king inviting him to take over the govern-
ment of the realm. Charles received the delegates graciously,
but suggested that on so important a matter the Senate should
first be consulted. Accordingly, an hour later, a delegation
of seventy-four noblemen, headed by their marshal, waited upon
the Senate. The Senate and the regents, weakly determining
not to lag behind the nobility in their devotion to the crown,
waited upon the king forthwith; and Chancellor Oxenstjerna,
acting as spokesman, begged his Majesty to gladden the
hearts of his subjects by graciously assuming supreme power.
Only when Charles had expressed his willingness to concur
with the desires of his faithful subjects were the three lower
estates of the realm formally acquainted with the action of
the nobility, and invited to cooperate. The lower estates
proved to be as obsequious as the gentry, for a joint de-
putation of all four estates thereupon proceeded incontinently
to the palace; and in answer to their earnest solicitations,
Charles declared that he could not resist their urgent appeal,
but would take over the government of the realm “in God's
name."
A short period of suspense ensued, followed by bitter
disappointment. The Riksdag was dissolved after a three
weeks' session; and a humble petition of the nobility for a
remission of their burdens was curtly rejected. The sub-
sequent coronation was marked by portentous novelties, the
most significant of which was the king's omission to take
the usual coronation oath, which was interpreted to mean that
XII]
Fears of a hard reign”, 313
he considered himself under no obligation to his subjects.
The government now took more and more of an autocratic
complexion. The French minister, D’Avaux, describes Charles
at this period as even more imperious in public than his father.
Anti-monarchical strictures, however respectful or indirect, were
promptly and cruelly punished. Many people -began to fear
“a hard reign.” Yet, though individual self-seeking might be
disappointed, the general opinion of the young king was
favourable. His conduct was evidently regulated by strict
principle and not by mere caprice. His refusal to countenance
torture as an instrument of judicial investigation, on the
ground that “confessions so extorted give no sure criteria
for forming a judgment,” showed him to be more humane as
well as more enlightened than the majority of his council,
which had defended the contrary opinion. His intense appli-
cation to affairs is noted by the English minister, Robinson,
who informed his court that there was every prospect of a
happy reign in Sweden, provided his Majesty were well served,
and did not injure his health by too much work.
While Charles XII was thus serving his political ap-
prenticeship at home with exemplary diligence, the political
horizon abroad was darkening in every direction; and a league
of apparently overwhelming strength had already been formed
for the partition of Sweden.
The passionate desire of an exiled nobleman for vengeance
and restitution was the primary cause of the war which was to
devastate half Europe for nearly a generation. Ten years
previously Johan Reinhold Patkul had proceeded from Riga
to Stockholm as the spokesman of a deputation of Livonian
gentry, to protest against the rigour with which the Reduction
was being carried out in his native province. The ability with
which he pleaded his cause favourably impressed Charles XI,
but his representations were disregarded; and the offensive
tone of a subsequent petition, which, in his wrath he addressed
to the king, three years later, involved him in a 'trial for
314
Charles XII of Sweden
CH.
high-treason. To save himself he fled to Switzerland; was
condemned in contumaciam to lose his head; and his property
was confiscated. In 1698, after vainly petitioning the new
king, Charles XII, for pardon, he entered the service of the
Elector of Saxony, with the double object of injuring Sweden
and recovering his property.
We must be very cautious in speaking of the patriotism
of Patkul. He acted exclusively on behalf of his noble caste,
whose interests were identical with his own. Naturally enough
he had no desire to remain a beggared exile for the rest of
his life; but it was impossible for him to return to Livonia
so long as Livonia belonged to Sweden. Of the indepen-
dence of Livonia he had no thought. He simply wished
to wrest it from one power in order to give it to another.
To a feudal nobleman the aristocratic republic of Poland was
obviously the most desirable suzerain for Livonia. There need
be no fear of a “Reduction” in a commonwealth of aristocrats
who refused to recognise either popular rights or sovereign
authority. As a German, too, he naturally preferred the rule
of a German prince; and the flighty, indolent, and luxurious
Augustus, Elector of Saxony and king of Poland, was, from
Patkul's point of view, an ideal ruler. Accordingly, in the
course of 1698, the Livonian appeared at the court of
Augustus, and for the next six months bombarded the
Elector with projects and arguments for the dismemberment of
Sweden, whose government he urged was now in the hands
of an immature youth of seventeen. He proposed a league
between Saxony, Denmark, and Brandenburg, to which the
Tsar, Peter the Great, was to be invited to accede; but Patkul,
apprehensive lest Russia “should snatch the roast from our
spit, beneath our very eyes," insisted that Peter should be
content with Ingria and Carelia, while Augustus was to secure
Livonia, nominally for Poland, really for himself. Branden-
burg was to be tempted by Pomerania, and Denmark by
part of Bremen and Verden.
XII]
The League against Sweden
315
Augustus, whose one idea was to aggrandise his electorate,
listened eagerly to the eloquent and energetic Livoniàn; and
negotiations, conducted with the utmost secrecy, were at once
begun in singularly favourable circumstances. In Denmark,
Frederick IV, who succeeded his father Christian von
August 25, 1699, had excellent reasons for hating and fearing
Sweden. For the last twenty years it had been the fixed
policy of Swedish statesmen actively to support the dukes
of Gottorp against Denmark; and Sweden's possessions in
North Germany enabled her to invade Denmark from the
south whenever she thought fit to do so, in which case
Gottorp would infallibly render her valuable assistance. Thus
the closer the union between Sweden and Gottorp, the more
it behoved the Danish government to burst the iron chain
which her neighbours had cast around her, especially after
the marriage of Charles XII's favourite sister, Hedwig Sophia,
to Frederick IV, duke of Gottorp (1698), for whom the young
king at once conceived a strong affection. The Danish states-
men therefore gladly responded to Patkul's proposals; and,
only a month after his accession, Frederick of Denmark con-
cluded an offensive alliance against Sweden with Augustus II
(Sept. 25, 1699), Augustus undertaking to invade Livonia in
January or February of the ensuing year, while Frederick
· undertook to attack the Swedes simultaneously from Sleswick
and from Norway.
This compact, however, was to be binding on neither party.
unless the Tsar acceded to it within three or four months.
Patkul took care there should be no doubt about that. He
set out at once for Moscow, and arrived there (Sept. 1699)
simultaneously with an extraordinary Swedish embassy sent
by Charles XII to renew the Peace of Kardis with Russia.
The Tsar, to whom the regeneration of his country was
a religion, could not resist the temptation of acquiring the
coveted sea-board on the Baltic at apparently slight risk;
and he displayed on this, as on so many similar occasions,
316
CH.
Charles XII of Sweden
a calculating duplicity which is even more revolting than his
outbursts of savagery, though in this respect it must be ad-
mitted he was no worse than his double-faced mentor and
comrade, Augustus II. He not only assured the Swedish
envoys that he would strictly observe all his treaties with.
Sweden, but protested that if Augustus dared to take Riga
he would take it back from him. But at the very same
time, at a secret conference at Preobrazhensk, a partition
treaty was signed (November 21, 1699) between Russia,
Denmark, and Saxony, whereby Augustus undertook to begin
hostilities against Sweden by attacking Riga, while Peter
promised to cooperate by invading Ingria as soon as his recent
treaty of peace with the Sublime Porte had been officially
confirmed. Of the three parties to this nefarious compact,
neither Russia nor Saxony had the slightest cause of quarrel
with the power so to be despoiled.
During the remainder of 1699 both Sweden and Denmark-
Norway vigorously prepared for war. A Danish army, 17,800
strong, assembled in Holstein; while Charles XII equipped
his fleet and mobilised a Swedish army-corps which was to
penetrate into Holstein from Pomerania and Wismar. At this
juncture western Europe was startled by the intelligence that
the Saxons had invaded Livonia, but, unfortunately for them,
they were repulsed from Riga; and the blow which was to have
paralysed Sweden and compelled her to divert to the eastward
the forces she required on her western front, failed utterly.
The young king was now able to turn against his nearest enemy,
Denmark. But in the meanwhile the Livonian invasion was
the signal for Frederick IV also to begin hostilities against the
duke of Gottorp; and his generals speedily demolished the
newly erected fortifications in the Duchy, and laid siege to the
Gottorp fortress of Tönning. But Tönning successfully held
out; the advance of a Swedo-Lüneburg army compelled the
Danes to march southwards to meet it; and the hostile armies
faced each other without daring to risk a general engagement.
X11]
Charles XII's first exploits
317
It was in another quarter that the decisive blow was to
be struck. The bulk of the Danish troops had been sent
to Holstein; but the Danish feet of twenty-nine ships was
considered quite strong enough to prevent the Swedes from
making a descent upon Sjælland and the capital. Unfortu-
nately the timidity of the Danish admiral Gyldenlöve now
sacrificed Denmark's one advantage. William III, anxious to
localise and if possible end the northern war which, on the eve
of the determination of the Spanish Succession, was highly in-
convenient to the western powers, had sent a combined Anglo-
Dutch squadron to the Sound to put pressure upon Denmark,
who, in view of her onslaught upon Gottorp, was regarded
by the maritime powers as the aggressor. The combined
squadron was inferior to the Danish fleet; yet Gyldenlöve
permitted it to pass through the Sound (June, 1700) unmolested,
contenting himself with taking up a position whence, as he
supposed, he could prevent its union with the Swedish fleet
of thirty-eight ships of the line approaching from Carlscrona.
But the daring of the young Swedish king, who forced his
nervous and protesting admiral to attempt the passage of the
eastern channel of the Sound, the dangerous Flintèrend,
hitherto reputed to be unnavigable, traversed the plan of the
Danish admiral. On July 6 a portion of the Swedish feet
actually passed through the Flinterend, and combined with the
Anglo-Dutch squadrons in the neighbourhood of Landscrona.
The Danish admiral thereupon sailed back to Copenhagen
to cover the city from the sea-side; while Charles XII, on
August 4, protected by the three fleets, effected a landing at
Humleback in Sjælland, a few miles north of Copenhagen.
For a moment the Swedish king hoped to accomplish what
his grandfather, fifty years before, had vainly attempted—the
destruction of the Dano-Norwegian monarchy by capturing its
capital. But, for once, prudential considerations prevailed. It
would have taken time to transport siege artillery; the English
and Dutch admirals not only refused to cooperate with Charles,
318
u nweren
Charles XII of In
.
Sweden
w
but threatened to attack his fleet if he persisted in his design;
and Frederick IV, alarmed at the danger of his capital, hastily
abandoned all his claims against Gottorp. In these circum-
stances Charles XII gave way; and the short and bloodless
war was concluded by the Peace of Travendal, August 18,
1700. By this treaty Frederick IV conceded full sovereignty
to the duke of Gottorp, with the right of maintaining an
army and building fortresses, and paid him an indemnity of
200,000 rix-dollars, pledging himself besides to commit no
hostilities against Sweden in the future, and, in particular, to
furnish no assistance to Augustus II. The triumph of Charles,
if not as complete as he desired, was at least remarkable. In
a few weeks he had disarmed one of his three antagonists, and
begun his military career in a manner which excited universal
admiration. But the main advantage of this brilliant début
was that it enabled him to give his undivided attention to the
defence of his eastern borders, which had already been overrun
by the semi-barbarous hordes of Tsar Peter.
On the same day that the Peace of Travendal was signed,
Peter heard from. Ukraianets, his envoy at Stambul, that the
peace with the Porte had been ratified; and on the following
- day his army received marching orders. Peter decided, first
of all, to attack the fortress of Narva, the key of Ingria, whence
he could more easily join hands with Augustus, who was
still operating before Riga. The Russian army, about 40,000
strong, appeared before Narva on Oct. 3, 1700; but, owing to
general disorganisation and the difficulties of transport, it was
not till Oct. 30 that the siege guns were able to open fire.
On Nov. 27, Sheremetev, who had been detached to observe
the enemy, brought tidings of the approach of the Swedish
king with "an immense army”; and, the same night, Peter, "to
whose nature unreflecting courage, the tendency needlessly to
expose himself to danger, was absolutely foreign, convinced that
his presence might be more profitable elsewhere,” abandoned
his raw levies, leaving a foreigner, the Duc de Croy, in command.
XII] The Battle of Narva 319
It was true that Charles XII was approaching; but his
“immense army” consisted of barely 8000 men. On Octo-
ber 6 he had reached Pernau, with the intention of first
relieving Riga, but, hearing that Narva was in great straits, he
decided to turn northwards against the Tsar. After - a five
weeks' sojourn at Wesenburg, to collect his forces, he set
out for Narva, on November 13, against the advice of all his
generals, who feared the effect on untried troops of a week's
march through a wasted land, along boggy roads guarded by
no fewer than three formidable passes, which a little engineer-
ing skill could easily have made impregnable. Fortunately
the two first passes were unoccupied; and the third, Pyhäjoggi,
which Sheremetev attempted to defend with 6000 men, was
captured by Charles in person, at the head of 400 horsemen.
On the 19th of November the little army reached Lagena, a
village about nine miles from Narva, whence it signalled
its approach to the beleaguered fortress, and early on the
following morning it advanced in battle array. The attack
on the Russian fortified camp began at two o'clock in the
afternoon, in the midst of a violent snow-storm; and by
nightfall the whole position was in the hands of the Swedes.
On the 21st the scattered remnant of the Russian troops, who
still outnumbered the Swedes, three to one, surrendered uncon-
ditionally. The triumph was as cheap as it was crushing; it
cost Charles less than 2000 men.
After Narva Charles XII stood at the parting of the ways.
His best advisers urged him to turn all his forces against the
fugitive, panic-stricken Moscovites; to go into winter quarters
amongst them, and live at their expense; to fan into a flame
the smouldering discontent caused by the Petrine reforms
(which exploded a little later in the revolt of the Cossacks and
the Astrakhan rebellion); and so to disable Moscovy as to make
her incapable of meddling with any but semi-barbarous Asiatics
for some time to come. Fortunately for the Tsar, Charles's
determination promptly to punish the treachery of Augustus
320 Charles XII of Sweden [CH.
prevailed over every other consideration. In one respect his
first victory had been very mischievous, inspiring him as it did
with an unjustifiable disdain of his great rival, Peter. In
December the Swedish army went into winter quarters around
Dorpat; and Charles fixed his head-quarters at Lais Castle,
midway between Dorpat and Lake Peipus, so as to be able to
commence hostilities against his third enemy in the early spring.
Meanwhile, an event occurred which completely changed
the face of European politics. In November, 1700, died
Charles II of Spain, bequeathing the whole of the possessions of
the Spanish monarchy to Philip of Anjou, the second grandson
of Louis XIV, who thereupon openly repudiated the partition
compact which he had made with the maritime powers, and
declared his intention of putting his grandson into the full
possession of his rights. A war between France and the
maritime powers was now only a question of time; and both
sides looked to Sweden for assistance. The competing French
and Imperial ambassadors appeared in the Swedish camp,
while the English and Dutch ministers were equally busy at
Stockholm. The chancellor, Benedict Oxenstjerna, saw in
this universal bidding for the favour of Sweden a golden
opportunity of ending “ this present lean war, and making his
Majesty the arbiter of Europe”; but Charles met all the
representations of his ministers with a dogged, disconcerting
silence. At last the urgent appeal of Baron Lillieroth, his
minister at the Hague, who stated that both William III and the
grand pensionary Heinsius were uneasy at the unnecessary pro-
longation of the northern war, and desirous of knowing the real
sentiments of his Majesty, drew from him the reluctant reply,
“It would put our glory to shame if we lent ourselves to the
slightest treaty accommodation with one who hath so vilely
prostituted his honour.” This obvious reference to Augustus
convinced the diplomatists of western Europe that nothing
was to be expected from the king of Sweden till he had
avenged himself on the Elector of Saxony.
xii] Charles justified in neglecting Péter 321
It is easy from the vantage point of two centuries to
criticise Charles XII for neglecting the Moscovites to pursue
the Saxons; but, at the beginning of the eighteenth century,
his decision was natural enough. The question was, which of
the two foes was the most dangerous; and Charles had every
reason to think the civilised and martial Saxons far more
formidable than the imbecile Moscovites. He was also justified
in hating Augustus more than his other enemies. The hostility
of Denmark on account of Gottorp was perfectly intelligible.
Equally intelligible was the hostility of Moscovy. How could
Moscovy be anything but hostile so long as Sweden held old
Moscovite territory, and barred her from the sea? But there
was no excuse at all for the hostility of the Elector of Saxony.
Yet he had been the first to listen to Patkul; he had been the
prime mover in the league of partition; he had deceived Sweden
up to the very last moment with lying assurances of amity.
As Charles XII wrote to Louis XIV, the conduct of Augustus
had been so abominable as to deserve the vengeance of God,
and the contempt of all honest people. Charles rightly felt
that he could never trust Augustus to remain quiet even if he
made peace with him. To leave such a foe in his rear, while
he plunged into the heart of Moscovy, would have been
hazardous indeed. From this point of view Charles's whole
Polish policy, which has been blamed so long and so loudly-
the policy of placing a nominee of his own on the Polish
throne in lieu of Augustus-takes quite another complexion :
it was a policy not of overvaulting ambition, but of prudential
self-defence.
First, however, Charles had to clear Livonia of the invader.
This he accomplished on July 8, 1701, when he transported his
army from Riga across the Dwina, on flat-bottomed barges,
in the face of 30,000 Russians and Saxons strongly entrenched
on the opposite shore at Dunamünde, routing them in a two
hours' engagement, and following up his victory by occupying
the duchy of Courland, then a Polish fief, which he at once
BAIN
21
322
[CH.
Charles XII of Sweden
converted into a Swedish governor-generalship. All the Swedish
fortresses on the Dwina were then recaptured; the land was
purged of Saxons and Russians in every direction; and Charles
went into winter-quarters in western Courland around Würgen,
from the middle of September to the end of December,
1701.
Charles's proximity to the Polish border had greatly dis-
turbed Augustus; and, at his request, Cardinal Radziejowski,
the primate of Poland, had written to the Swedish monarch,
reminding him that Poland was at peace with Sweden; for-
bidding him, in the name of the republic, to cross the frontier,
and offering to mediate between the two monarchs. Charles's
reply excluded every hope of negotiation. He bluntly de-
manded the deposition of Augustus, threatening, in case of
non-compliance, to punish the foe himself. After this it is not
surprising that a reaction in favour of Augustus began in
Poland itself; and Patkul, who in 1702 had exchanged the
Saxon for the Russian service, did all in his power to induce
the republic to join the anti-Swedish league. A peace was
patched up between Poland and Russia; a Russian army
corps was sent to support Augustus, with whom the Tsar now
concluded a fresh offensive and defensive alliance; and it
became clear that, excepting the powerful Lithuanian family
of Sapieha, which in September, 1701, placed itself under
Swedish protection, the majority of the Polish aristocracy
was still on the side of the king actually in possession.
But Augustus had very little stomach for further fighting.
During the winter of 1701 he had knocked at the door of every
European court for assistance; and the maritime powers in
particular had employed their good offices on his behalf.
William III even went so far as to write to Charles XII
personally, urging him to make peace at once on his own terms.
· William had just succeeded in forming the Grand Alliance of
the Hague (Sept. 1701) which bound the neutral powers to
resist to the uttermost the pretensions of Louis XIV; and the
Y
T
X11] The Campaign of 1702. 323
Grand Alliance was as eager to obtain the co-operation of the
Swedish hero as was Louis XIV, who also spared no pains
to win over Charles to his side. But Charles resolutely went
his own way. In January, 1702, he established himself at
Bielovice in Lithuania, and, after issuing a proclamation
declaring that the “Elector of Saxony” had forfeited the
Polish throne, set out for Warsaw, which he reached on
May 14. The cardinal-primate was then sent for and com-
manded to summon a Sejn, for the purpose of deposing
Augustus. A fortnight later Charles quitted Warsaw, to
seek “the Elector of Saxony," and on July 2, with only
10,000 men, utterly defeated the combined Poles and Saxons
at Clissow. Three weeks later, Charles, with only a cane
in his hand, stood before the fortress of Cracow, which
he captured by an act of almost fabulous audacity. Thus,
within four months of the opening of the campaign, the Polish
capital and the coronation city were both in the possession
of the Swedes.
For the next two months Charles remained inactive at
Cracow, awaiting reinforcements, and regarding impassively
the chaotic condition of the unhappy Polish republic, which,
with Lithuania wrapped in the flames of civil war, with
jacqueries ravaging Red Russia and the Ukraine, and Swedes
and Saxons blackmailing every province of what purported to
be an independent country at peace with them both, seemed
to be on the verge of dissolution. It is due to Augustus to
say that, after Clissow, he made every effort to put an end
to the war. But his offers were not even considered, Charles
opposing an obstinate silence to every demonstration of the
futility and hazardousness of persisting in his Polish dethroni-
sation project. By this time, too, he had conceived a passion
for the perils and adventures of warfare. Henceforth it was
the life he loved best. His character was hardening, and
he deliberately adopted the most barbarous expedients for
converting the Augustan Poles to his views. Such commands
21-2
324
TCH.
Charles XII of Sweden
as “ravage, singe, and burn all about, and reduce the whole
district to a wilderness !”_"sweat contributions well out of
them!”_"rather let the innocent suffer than the guilty escape'!"
-became painfully frequent in the mouth of the young
commander, not yet twenty-one, who was far from being
naturally cruel.
The campaign of 1703 was remarkable for Charles's victory
over the Saxons at Pultusk (April 21), and for the long
siege of Thorn, which occupied the Swedish king for eight
months, but cost him only fifty men, after which he went
into winter-quarters round Heilberg, in the diocese of
Ermeland. Meanwhile his Polish partisans had succeeded in
forming a General Confederation, under the protection of the
Swedish general Rehnskjöld, which assembled at Warsaw in
January, 1704, and was energetically manipulated by Count
Arvid Horn, Charles's special envoy, who persuaded it to
depose Augustus. But months of fruitless negotiation ensued
before Augustus's successor could be fixed upon, Augustus
himself complicating matters by seizing the Sobieskis, the most
acceptable candidates, in Imperial territory, and locking them
up in the fortress of Pleissenburg. Charles finally cut the
knot himself by selecting the Palatine of Posen, Stanislaus
Leszczynski, a young man of blameless antecedents, respectable
talents, and ancient family, but certainly without sufficient
force of character or political influence to sustain himself on
such an unstable throne. Nevertheless, with the assistance
of a bribing fund and an army corps, Count Horn succeeded
in procuring the election of Stanislaus on July 2, 1704, by
a scratch assembly of half-a-dozen Castellans and a few score
of the lesser nobility.
The insecurity of the new king was demonstrated to all
the world when Augustus, taking advantage of a sudden
raid of Charles's southwards, recaptured Warsaw (Aug. 26),
1 Charles XII: Egenh. Bref. pp. 160, 162, 201.
x11] Campaigns of 1705 and 1706 325
Stanislaus escaping by circuitous routes to Rehnskjöld's camp
in Great Poland. But Augustus's triumph was of short
duration. In October Charles again routed the Saxons at
Punitz, and, after chasing them as far as Glogau, returned
to Poland and pitched his camp at Ravitz on the Saxon
frontier, completely cutting Augustus off from Poland. There
he remained for eight months, using every effort firmly to
establish Stanislaus. A coronation Diet was summoned to
Warsaw in July, 1705; an attempt to disperse it by an army of
10,000 Saxons was frustrated by the Swedish general, Nieroth,
with 2,000 men; the difficulty about the regalia, which had
been carried off to Saxony, was surmounted by Charles himself
providing his nominee with a new crown and sceptre: and,
finally, Stanislaus was crowned king, with great splendour, on
September 24, 1705.
The first act of the new king was to conclude an alliance
between Sweden and the Polish republic, on the basis
of the Peace of Oliva, whereby Poland engaged to assist
Sweden against the Tsar. Late in the autumn Charles set
off to encounter General Ogilvie, a Scotsman, whom the
indefatigable Patkul had picked up at Vienna, and engaged
to serve the Tsar for five years. Ogilvie had invaded Lithuania
with 20,000 Russians, and occupied the fortress of Grodno.
At the beginning of January, 1706, Charles appeared before
Grodno, and there blockaded the whole Russian army for two
months, to the terror of the Tsar, who implored his "good
brother” Augustus to make a diversion in the West. Augustus
thereupon sent Schulenburg with 20,000 Saxons and Russians
to attack the little Swedish army under Rehnskjöld, which
had been left behind to secure Poland and watch Saxony,
but Rehnskjöld suddenly assumed the offensive and routed
Schulenburg at Fraustadt, a feat which well merited the
marshal's bâton bestowed upon him by his grateful master.
Charles himself was pursuing Ogilvie, who had contrived to
escape from Grodno, and was making for Kiev, where the Tsar
326 Charles XII of Sweden' [CH.
was anxiously awaiting him. The sudden break-up of the ice
on the Niemen prevented the Swedes from crossing, and gave ·
Ogilvie a start of some days which Charles was unable to make
good. He abandoned the pursuit at Pinsk, where he allowed
his exhausted soldiers a month's rest; then speeding west-
wards, he joined Rehnskjöld at Strykow in Great Poland, and,
on August 5, 1706, crossed the Vistula and entered Saxony.
At this very time the war of the Spanish Succession was
approaching a crisis. The belligerents were so evenly balanced
that the slightest deflection of the political scales meant fatal
disaster for one of them. It is true that Marlborough had
crushed Villeroi at Ramillies, not long before Charles's irruption
into Saxony, while Eugene, shortly after it, had rescued Italy
from the French by the victory of Turin; but the subsequent
successes of Villars and Vendôme in Germany, and of Berwick
in Spain, showed that the resources of Louis XIV were still
far from being exhausted. The sudden apparition of the king
of Sweden and his “blue boys” in the heart of the Empire
fluttered all the western diplomatists. The Allies, in particular,
at once suspected that Louis XIV had bought the Swedes.
Marlborough was forth with sent from the Hague to the castle
of Alt-Ranstadt, near Leipsic, where Charles had fixed his
head-quarters, “to endeavour to penetrate the designs” of the
king of Sweden. He soon convinced himself that western
Europe had nothing to fear from Charles, and that no bribes
were necessary to turn the Swedish arms from Germany to
Moscovy.
Five months later (Sept. 1707) Augustus was forced to
sign the Peace of Alt-Ranstadt, whereby he not only re-
signed the Polish crown but engaged to renounce every anti-
Swedish alliance, and to hand over all deserters, especially
Patkul. A month afterwards Patkul was condemned by a
court-martial at Casimir to be quartered alive, and endured
his well-merited punishment heroically. Nevertheless, humi-
liating as it was to Augustus, the Peace of Alt-Ranstadt
XII] Charles XII's Quarrel with the Emperor 327
brought no advantage to Sweden, no compensation for the
heavy expenses of the last six years, and was therefore politically
condemnable. Charles's departure from Saxony was delayed
for twelve months by a quarrel with the Emperor, against whom
he had many just causes of complaint. The religious question
presented the most difficulty. The court of Vienna had
treated the Silesian Protestants with tyrannical severity, in
direct contravention of the Treaty of Osnabrück, of which
Sweden was one of the guarantors; and Charles demanded
summary and complete restitution so dictatorially that the
Emperor prepared for war. But political considerations pre-
vailed. Charles's presence in central Europe seriously hampered
the movements of the Allies ; and the fear lest Charles might
be tempted to assist France, the traditional ally of the Swedish
monarchy, finally induced the Emperor to satisfy all his demands,
the maritime powers at the same time agreeing to guarantee the
provisions of the Peace of Alt-Ranstadt. Nothing now pre-
vented the king of Sweden from turning his victorious arms
against the Tsar; and on August 23, 1707, he evacuated
Saxony at the head of the largest host he ever commanded,
consisting of 24,000 horse and 20,000 foot, two-thirds of whom
were veterans.
It was high time that Charles XII should hasten eastwards,
for two of Sweden's four Baltic provinces were already lost.
With the mechanical persistence of some vast, sluggish, but
overwhelming force of nature, irresistibly breaking down every
artificial barrier in its way, the Russians had at length succeeded
in forcing their way to the sea. Impoverished and devastated,
denuded of troops, Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia had but
a poor chance of stemming the Moscovite flood. Three little
handfuls of half-starving ragamuffins, dignified by the name
of army-corps, could not seriously hope to defend against a
tenfold odds a frontier extending from Lake Ladoga to Lake
Peipus, from Lake Peipus to the Dwina, and from the
Dwina to the Gulf of Riga. Only beneath the walls of the
328
TCH.
Charles XII of Sweden
fortresses did the invader meet with any prolonged resistance;
and the fortresses themselves, ill-provisioned, under-manned,
half in ruins, would have surrendered at the first summons
had they not been defended by veteran soldiers of heroic
antecedents. Deliberately, warily, Peter advanced, feeling his
way step by step, taking the minimum of risk, retreating
without hesitation whenever it was necessary, but never idle,
never discouraged, retrieving losses in one direction by fresh
gains in another. Repulsed from Livonia by the gallant
Schliffenbach in the summer of 1701, he was back again in
the early spring of 1702, ravaging both Ingria and Livonia,
driving the Lilliputian Swedish armies before him ; and in the
autumn his perseverance was rewarded by the capture of the
fortress of Nöteberg, now Schlüsselburg, the key of Ladoga.
In 1703 he took the fortress of Nyen at the head of the Gulf
of Finland; and a fortnight later, a little lower down the Neva,
on the island of Jenisaari, were laid the foundations of a
Russian fortress which the Tsar called after himself. By the
end of the same year all Ingria was in his hands. Emboldened
by these successes, Peter, in 1704, simultaneously laid siege to
Dorpat, the central fortress of Livonia, and Narva, the bulwark
of Sweden's eastern frontier. Dorpat fell after a determined
resistance of six weeks, which cost Peter 5000 men. The
Swedish Senate, which, after the fall of Nyen, had received
permission from Charles XII to reinforce the Baltic provinces,
too late made strenuous efforts to save Narva, which, after
a heroic resistance of six months, was stormed on August 7,
1704, three thousand Russians perishing in the breach. During
1705 the Swedes were too feeble to do more than prevent the
Russian Ladoga fleet from entering the · Baltic, while three
expeditions undertaken against Petersburg failed utterly. Riga
was saved only by the genius of General Adam Levenhaupt,
who won a whole series of astonishing victories over the com-
bined Russians, Poles, and Saxons, who outnumbered him by
two to one; the most notable of these conflicts were the battle
XII] Peter's endeavours to pacify Charles 329
of Jakobstadt in 1704, and that of Gemauerhof, on June 16,
1705. Levenhaupt then fell back upon Riga ; and during. 1706
and 1707.the Baltic provinces were spared any further invasion,
for the intelligence that at last Charles was advancing against
him sufficed to recall the Tsar to the defence of his own
dominions.
It was with undisguised apprehension that Peter watched
the advance of the invincible king of Sweden. Every diplo-
matic means of reconciliation had been exhausted beforehand.
In January, 1706, through the Dutch resident, Van der Hulst,
Peter had promised the western powers 30,000 of his best
troops to be employed against Louis XIV, if only they would
mediate a peace for him with Sweden. He repeated the offer
at the end of the same year through A. A. Matvyeev, his
minister at London. On both occasions his overtures were
rejected. The Allies evidently did not believe in the efficiency
of the Moscovite troops. Matvyeev was next instructed to
bribe Godolphin, Harley, and the other English ministers; but
they proved inaccessible. Peter had better hopes at first of
the omnipotent Marlborough. The negotiations with the duke
were conducted by the Dutchman Huyssens, one of the Tsar's
confidential agents; and Marlborough seems to have stipulated
for a principality in Russia. Peter offered him the choice
between Kiev, Vladimir, and Siberia; and in case he actually
brought about a peace with Sweden, he was to have besides
an annual pension of 50,000 thalers, "a rock ruby, such as no
European potentate possesses,” and the Order of St Andrew
in brilliants. The magnitude of Peter's fears may be gauged
by the modesty of the conditions that he proposed. He was now
prepared to surrender all his acquisitions, Narva included, except
the mouth of the river Neva, and a strip of land on each side of
it--so he euphemistically termed Petersburg and its cordon
of dependent fortresses. Charles, well aware that the posses-
sion of the Neva was vital, demanded the unconditional
retrocession of all conquests together with an adequate war
330
CH.
Charles XII of Sweden
indemnity; but Peter was resolved to perish rather than abandon
his “Paradise," as he called Petersburg. The Tsar was equally
unsuccessful at Paris, Rome, and Vienna. His Baltic conquests
had alarmed both the maritime and the German powers, who
feared that Russia's aggrandisement would, as the Swedish
ministers suggested, expose the rest of Europe “to the danger
of a Scythian invasion.” Prince Eugene, to whom the Tsar
offered the Polish throne, declined the dangerous gift. Peter
now saw himself thrown entirely on his own resources. His
measures were promptly taken. At a council of war, held
at the little village of Mereczko, it was resolved not to meet
Charles in the open field, but to retire before him, devastating
the surrounding country, and only offering resistance at the
passage of the rivers he might have to cross. The gentry and
peasantry were ordered to bury their corn in pits or in the
woods, and drive their live stock into the trackless morasses,
so as to deprive the advancing foe of sustenance.
Delayed during the autumn months in Poland by the tardy
arrival of reinforcements from · Pomerania, it was not till
November, 1707, that Charles XII was able to take the field.
The respite was of incalculable importance to the Tsar, who,
at the very time of the Swedish advance from the west had
suddenly to cope with a dangerous Bashkir rising on the Volga,
followed by a rebellion of the Don Cossacks. So hardly
pressed was he as to be forced to employ barbarians against
barbarians, Calmucks against Bashkirs, for want of regular
troops. On Christmas Day, 1707, Charles reached the Vistula,
which he crossed on New Year's Day, 1708, though the ice
was in a dangerous condition. Peter had intended to entrench
himself behind the Memel at Grodno; but Charles, advancing
with incredible swiftness, snatched the fortress from his very
grasp, and after a brief rest at Smorganie, proceeded towards
Moscow by way of Minsk and Smolensk. The superior strategy
of the Swedes enabled them to cross the first two considerable
rivers, the Berezina and the Drucz, without difficulty ; but on
XII]
The Battle of Holowczyn
331
reaching the Wabis Charles found the enemy posted on the
opposite side, near the little town of Holowczyn, in an
apparently impregnable position, and evidently bent upon
barring his passage. But his experienced eye instantly detected
the one vulnerable point in the six mile long Russian line;
on July 4 he hurled all his forces against it; and after a fierce
engagement, lasting from daybreak to sundown, the Russians
retired with the loss of 3000 men.
The victory of Holowczyn, memorable besides as the last
pitched battle won by Charles XII, opened up the way to
the Dnieper; and four days later Charles reached Mohilev,
where he stayed till August 6. The Swedish army now
began to 'suffer severely, bread and fodder running short,
and the soldiers subsisting almost entirely on captured
bullocks. Peter, who would not risk another general engage-
ment, slowly retired before the invaders, burning and
destroying everything in his path, till at last the Swedes had
nothing but a charred wilderness beneath their feet, and an
horizon of burning villages before their eyes. Moreover the
Moscovites now displayed a boldness which amazed the Swedes,
attacking more and more frequently and obstinatély every
week, with ever increasing numbers. By the time the Russian
frontier was reached at Miczanowicz, on September 20, it was
plain to Charles himself that Moscow was inaccessible. At
a council of war held at Tatarsk, Rehnskjöld prudently
advised the king to await the arrival of Levenhaupt, who was
advancing from Riga with reinforcements and seven hundred
waggons of stores, and then to proceed along the Dwina to
Livonia, and go into winter-quarters in his own lands, so as to
be able to renew the war advantageously the following year.
But Charles, to whom the idea of a retreat was intolerable,
determined to march southwards instead of northwards, and
join his forces with those of the rebel Hetman of the
Dnieperian Cossacks, Ivan Mazepa, who had placed his fruitful
and unravaged dominions in the Ukraine at Charles's disposal,
332
Charles XII of Sweden [ch.
and promised to join him with 100,000 light horsemen and
be his guide. But not a moment was to be lost : Baturin, the
Hetman's stronghold and treasury, was already threatened by
the Moscovites, and must be saved at all hazards. Charles
was readily persuaded to embark on a fresh adventure; and to
it everything else was sacrificed. Levenhaupt, hampered by
his caravan, and sorely harassed by the Moscovites, was left
to follow the king as best he could.
And now began that last march of the devoted Swedish
army from Mohilev, through the forests and morasses of
Severia and the endless steppes of the Ukraine, which was to
be a long drawn-out agony punctuated by a constant succession
of disasters. The first blow fell in the beginning of October,
when the unhappy Levenhaupt joined Charles with the débris
of the army he had saved from the not inglorious rout of
Lesna, where the Tsar with fourfold odds had intercepted
and overwhelmed him after a two days' battle. “We had
hoped,” says an eye-witness," that he would have brought us
food, drink, and clothes; but he came empty-handed, and
utterly bewildered at the sudden change of fortune.” And
Levenhaupt had been sacrificed in vain ; for when, on Novem-
ber 8, Mazepa at last joined Charles, at the little Severian
town of Horki, he came not as the powerful “Dux militum
Zaporowiensium et utram ripam Borysthenis incolentium,” but
as a ruined man with little more than his horse-tail standard,
and 1300 personal adherents. The Tsar, outmarching the
exhausted Swedes, had already (Nov. 13) captured and
destroyed Baturin; and when Charles, a week later, passed it
by, all that remained of the Cossack capital was "a heap of
smouldering mills and ruined houses, with burnt, half-burnt,
and bloody corpses” scattered all around.
The very elements now began to fight against the perishing
but still unconquered host. The winter of 1708 was the
severest that Europe had known for a century. So early as the
beginning of October the cold was intense; by November 1
XII]
The March to Pultawa
333
fire-wood would not ignite in the open air, and the soldiers
warmed themselves over huge bonfires of straw; but it was
not till the vast open steppes of the Ukraine were reached that
the unhappy Swedes experienced all the rigour of the icy
Scythian blast. By the time the army arrived at the little
Ukrainian fortress of Hadjach, in January, 1709, wine and
spirits froze into solid masses of ice; birds on the wing
fell dead; saliva congealed on its passage from the mouth
to the ground. Hideous were the sufferings of the soldiers.
“You could see,” says an eye-witness, “some without hands,
some without feet, some without ears and noses, many creeping
along after the manner of quadrupeds.” “Nevertheless," says
another narrator, “though earth, sky, and air were now against
us, the king's orders had to be obeyed and the daily march
made.” Never had Charles XII seemed so superhuman as
during these awful days. It is not too much to say that his
imperturbable equanimity, his serene bonhomie, kept the host
together. His military exploits were prodigious. At Cerkova
he defeated 7000 Russians with 400, and at Opressa 5000
Russians with 300 men. His soldiers believed him to be divinely
inspired and divinely protected. But, though he cheerfully
shared their hardships, it is to be feared that he lightly regarded
their sufferings. “This winter has been very cold," he wrote
to his sister Ulrica, “and the frost has almost seemed to be
severe, inasmuch as several of the enemy as well as of our own
people have been frozen to death, or lost part of their hands,
feet, and noses. Yet, for all that, this winter has been a merry
winter too. For, though some have been unlucky, we have
always managed to find a little pastime. This was neither
brutality nor bravado, but the determination to make light of
his risks—an habitual trait in the character of Charles XII.
The frost broke at the end of February, 1709; and then the
spring floods put an end to all active operations for some
months. The Tsar set off for Voronets, to inspect his Black
Sea fleet, while Charles encamped at Rudiszcze, between the
334 : Charles XII of Sweden [CH.
avalry. Se from 418 Don. By th:
Prol and the Wosskla, two tributaries of the Don. By this time
the Swedish army had dwindled from 41,000 to 20,000 able-
bodied men, mostly cavalry. Supplies, furnished for a time by
Mazepa, were again running short. All communications with
Europe had long since been cut off. To gain time Charles
resolved to capture the fortress of Pultawa, make it a base for
subsequent operations, and there await the reinforcements he
expected from Poland and Sweden. The siege began in May,
but soon had to be converted into a blockade for want
of gunpowder; and on the other side of the river lay
80,000 watchful but still cautious Moscovites. On June 17
Charles's foot was pierced by a bullet, which placed him hors
de combat. No sooner did Peter hear of the accident than
he threw the greater part of his forces over the river, but took
the precaution to entrench them (June 19–25). On June 26
Charles held a council of war, at which it was resolved to
attack the Russians in their entrenchments on the following
day. The Swedes joyfully accepted the chances of battle to
escape from slow starvation and manifold misery, and, advanc-
ing with irresistible élan, were at first successful on both wings.
Then one or two tactical blunders were committed; and the Tsar, .
taking courage, enveloped the little band in a vast semicircle
bristling with the most modern guns, the invention of a French
engineer, Le Metre, which fired five times to the Swedes' once,
and literally swept away the Royal Guards, the heart and soul
of the army, before they could grasp their swords. After a
bitter struggle the Swedish infantry was well-nigh annihilated,
while the 14,000 cavalry, exhausted and demoralised, surren-
dered two days later at Perewoloczna on the Dnieper. Charles
himself, with 1500 horsemen, took refuge in Turkish territory.
“Now, by God's help, the foundation-stone of St Petersburg
is laid once for all,” wrote Peter. to Apraksin, when the
struggle was over. At the end of the year, on his return
to “the Holy Land," he ordered a church dedicated to
1 i.e. St Petersburg.
XII
The Battle of Pultawa
335
St Sampson to be built there, to commemorate the victory of
Pultawa.
The catastrophe of Pultawa was not, as has commonly been
supposed, a mortal blow to the Swedish empire, though its
immediate effect was to neutralise all Charles's previous advan-
tages and revive the hostile league against him. Even before
the battle, Augustus of Saxony, foreseeing the impending cala-
mity, had already (June 28) signed at Dresden a convention
with Frederick IV of Denmark directed against Sweden, but
expressly excluding her German provinces from its operation,
so as to reassure the Emperor and the maritime powers, who
were not disposed to part with the Danish and Saxon mer-
cenaries actually fighting their battles against France. The
avowed object of this convention was to restore the equili-
brium of the North, and confine Sweden“ within her legitimate
boundaries”; but two secret articles provided for the territorial
aggrandisement of Augustus at the expense of the Polish
republic, and the reduction of the duke of Gottorp to his ·
former subservience to Denmark. The two kings then pro-
ceeded to Berlin to attempt to win over the king of Prussia
to the new league; but not even the promise of the Polish
province of West Prussia could tempt Frederick I to depart
from his cautious neutrality. Then came the tidings of Pultawa,
and, in an instant; the authority of King Stanislaus vanished
like a dream at the first touch of reality. The vast majority.
of the Poles hastened to repudiate him, and make their peace
with Augustus; and Leszczynski, henceforth a mere pensioner of
Charles XII, accompanied Krassau's army corps in its retreat
to Swedish Pomerania.
But with the recovery of Poland the allies had to be
content. Much had been hoped from the co-operation of
the Tsar; but unfortunately Peter was so puffed up by his
great victory that he was now disposed to assist his con-
federates not more, but far less, than heretofore. He renewed,
indeed, hiş anti-Swedish alliance with Augustus (Treaty of
336
TCH..
Charles XII of Sweden
Thorn, Oct. 7, 1709) at Yaroslav, on June 10, 1710; but
shrewdly guessing that Denmark would now seize her oppor-
tunity and attack Sweden in any case, he refused to waste any
money upon her. As he had anticipated, Denmark was only
too glad to join the anti-Swedish league for nothing (Treaty
of Copenhagen, Oct. 22, 1709). Frederick IV, against the
advice of his wisest counsellors, had resolved to attack
Sweden at the very time when the Tsar was harrying the
remnant of her Baltic provinces. The temptation to shake
off, once for all, the galling, crippling supremacy of a secular
foe proved irresistible. Success was taken for granted. It
was thought that "nothing now was left of the lion but his
claws.” . But Sweden was once more to shew the world that
a military state whose martial traditions and strong central
organisation enabled her to mobilise troops more quickly than
her neighbours, was not to be overthrown by a single disaster.
Despite her terrible losses in Russia, she could still oppose
16,400 well-disciplined troops to the Danish invader; and these
troops were commanded by Count Magnus Stenbock, the last
but not the least of the three great Caroline captains'. Her
fleet, too, was a little stronger than the fleet of Denmark-
Norway; and besides her garrisons in Stralsund, Wismar,
Bremen, Verden, and other places, she had, as we have seen,
an army-corps of gooo men in Pomerania. On November 12,
1709, 15,000 Danes landed in Scania, at Raa, south of
Helsingborg; a Norwegian army-corps, advancing from the
north-west, was to co-operate simultaneously. At first the
Swedes were too weak to offer any resistance, and allowed the
Danes to advance into the heart of Scania ; but the non-
appearance of the Norwegian auxiliary corps compelled the
Danish commander to retreat, and on March 10 he was
attacked and routed by Stenbock at Helsingborg, whereupon
the Danes hastily evacuated Sweden. Yet, failure though it
1 The other two were Rehnskjöld and Levenhaupt.
Diplomatic Struggle at the Porte
337
x11]
was, the short Scanian campaign had been of material assist-
ance to the Tsar. It had prevented the Swedish government
from sending help to its hard-pressed eastern provinces, and
thus given Peter a free hand in that direction. Riga was
starved into surrender on July 15, 1710; in the two following
months fell Pernau and Reval, and with them all the Swedish
dominions south of the Gulf of Riga. Finland was also invaded,
and the fortress of Viborg was captured in June.
But alarming news from the south suddenly interrupted
the Tsar's career of conquest in the north. On receiving the
tidings of Pultawa, Peter Tolstoi, the Moscovite ambassador
at Stambul, imprudently demanded the instant extradition of
Charles and Mazepa, who had been received with royal
honours and hospitably entertained by the pasha of Bender.
But the Turks, thoroughly alarmed at the unexpected triumph
of the Russians, began making extensive military preparations
with extreme haste; and Tolstoi's subsequent attempt in August,
1709, to bribe the Grand Mufti with 10,000 ducats and a
thousand precious sables, so as to procure the surrender of the
fugitives, failed. Nor was Charles XII idle. For the first time in
his life he was obliged to have recourse to diplomacy; and his
pen now proved almost as formidable as his sword. His agents
at Stambul, Poniatowski, Funck, and Neugebauer, proved fully
a match for Tolstoi ; and 80,000 ducats which the king had
inherited from Mazepa (who had died on March 10, 1710),
together with 100,000 thalers received from Holstein, provided
him with the indispensable bribing fund. The struggle between
the Swedish and the Russian ministers at Stambul now became
acute. At first Tolstoi prevailed ; and in November, 1709, the
Russo-Turkish truce was renewed. But in January, 1710,
Poniatowski succeeded in privately delivering into the Sultan's
own hands a memorial by Charles XII, in which the cupidity
of the grand vizier, Ali Pasha, and the designs of the Moş-
covites, were drastically delineated; and in June, 1710, Ali
was superseded by Neuman-Köprili, whose first act was to lend
BAIN
22
338
CH.
Charles XII of Sweden
Charles 400,000 thalers without interest. Köprili, however,
was too pacific both for Charles and for the Janissaries, who
now clamoured to be led against the Moscovite, so he also
was supplanted by Baltaji Mehemet Pasha. In October the
Tsar, anxious to know the worst, categorically demanded
whether the Porte wanted peace or war. The Porte responded
by throwing Tolstoi into the Seven Towers; and the grand
vizier set out for the frontier at the head of a large army.
On March 8, 1710, war was openly declared against "the
enemies of the name of Christ” at Moscow; and, some days
later, Peter joined the army. His preparations were manifestly
inadequate, but he relied to a great extent on a general rising
of the orthodox Christians in the Turkish dominions to prevent .
the grand vizier from crossing the Danube before he himself
reached the Dniester. All his calculations fell through. By the
time he arrived at Jassy (July 5, 17.10) he realised that he must
rely entirely on his own limited resources. The question of
supplies now became so pressing that all strategical conside-
rations had to be subordinated thereto. On the rumour that
an immense quantity of provisions had been hidden by the
Turks in the marshes of Fulchi, near Braila, Peter crossed the
Pruth, and proceeded in search of them through the forests
on the banks of the Sereth. But on July 17 the advance-
guard reported the approach of the grand vizier; and the
whole army hurried back to the Pruth, fighting rear-guard
actions all the way. On July 19 the Moscovites, now reduced
to 38,000 men, entrenched themselves; and the same evening
190,000 Turks and Tartars, with 300 guns, appeared and
beleaguered them on both sides of the Pruth. Peter was now
absolutely at the mercy of the grand vizier. Had Baltaji
remained where he was for a week, he could have starved the
Moscovites into surrender without losing a man or firing a
shot. “But,” as Charles XII well expressed it," he seemed to
have more regard for the conservation of the enemy's army
than for the advantage of the Ottoman Porte”; and in consi-
:...
.
x11] Return of Charles XII from Turkey 339
deration of the sum of 250,000 rubles he allowed the Tsar and
his army to escape; Peter undertaking by the Peace of the
Pruth (July 22, 1711) to demolish the fortresses of Azov and
Taganrog, to withdraw his troops for ever from Poland, and to
allow the king of Sweden a free passage to his own domains.
Two days before the Russian army departed, Charles XII,
who had provided the grand vizier with a plan of campaign
beforehand, arrived on the banks of the Pruth to see the
coup-de-grâce duly administered, and only then received the
unwelcome news that peace was already concluded. Even
now he did not abandon the struggle. Skilfully taking advan-
tage of the Tsar's delay in demolishing Azov and evacuating
Poland, he procured the dismissal of two more grand viziers,
and induced the Porte to declare war against Russia a second
and a third time (Nov. 1711 and Nov. 1712). But the Porte
had no more money to spare; and, the Tsar making a show of
submission, the Sultan began to regard Charles as a trouble-
some guest. On February 1, 1713, he was attacked by the
Turks in his camp at Bender, and made prisoner after a
contest which reads more like an extravagant episode from
some heroic folk-tale than an incident of sober eighteenth
century history. Four months later the Peace of Adrianople
(June 24, 1713), mediated by the maritime powers, adjusted
all the outstanding differences between Russia and the Porte.
Charles lingered on in Turkey fifteen months longer in the
hope of obtaining a cavalry escort sufficiently strong to enable
him to restore his credit in Poland. Disappointed of this last
hope, and moved by the despairing appeals of his sister Ulrica
and the Senate to return to Sweden while there was still a
Sweden to return to, he quitted Demotika on September 20,
1714, and after traversing Austria-Hungary, and making a long
detour by Nürnberg and Cassel, to avoid the domains of the
Elector of Saxony, he arrived unexpectedly at midnight, on
November 11, at Stralsund, which, excepting the city of
Wismar, was now all that remained to him on German soil.
22—2
340
[ch.
Charles XII of Sweden
.
It was to an entirely new political world that Charles XII
returned. The war of the Spanish Succession was over;
France, Sweden's traditional ally, was a factor that no longer
counted in the European concert; the well-disposed Queen
Anne was dead; the friendly Tory administration had dis-
appeared ; and the Hanoverian prince who sat on the English
throne, so recently the deferential mercenary of the Swedish
crown, was now the head of a new league to dismember
Sweden, or rather (for Sweden was already dismembered) to
compel her consent to the amputation. For the ruin of his
empire Charles himself was largely but not entirely respon-
sible. He had obstinately rejected the numerous advantageous
offers of mediation or alliance repeatedly made to him by the
maritime powers and by the king of Prussia in 1712, rather
than consent to the smallest cession of Swedish or even Polish
territory; in 1713 he had sacrificed the gallant Stenbock by
imposing upon him and his 12,000 men the impossible task
of reconquering Poland, and at the same time protecting
Sweden's German possessions against the combined Russians,
Danes, and Saxons; and in 1714 he had scouted the friendly
overtures both of Louis XIV and the Emperor, so that, when
peace was finally concluded between France and the Empire
at the congress of Baden, Swedish affairs were, by common
consent, left out of consideration. After Stenbock's surrender
at Tönning on May 16, 1713, the Swedish empire, deprived
of its last prop, had collapsed. By the end of 1714 the Tsar
had completed the conquest of Finland; and in the spring
of 1715 the new king of Prussia, Frederick William I, had
also begun hostilities against Sweden, while England-Hanover
had assumed a threatening attitude.
Pure rapacity was the sole cause of this shameful conduct
on the part of the two Protestant powers who pretended to
be Charles's allies, and from whom he had a perfect right to
expect, if not active assistance, at least neutrality. Prussia had
all along been playing a waiting game, and as soon as the
XII]
The League of Partition
341
Swedish empire began to crumble away she made haste to
enlarge her own domains out of its ruins. Still more dis-
reputable, if possible, was the conduct of England-Hanover,
for, though nominally at peace with Sweden, and indeed very
unwilling to provoke a quarrel with her, the Whig ministry
was obliged to support the foreign monarch of their choice;
and a British fleet was sent to the Baltic to co-operate, to a
limited extent, with the Ianes and Russians against Charles,
under the pretext of protecting British trade from the Swedish
privateers. The treaties of Copenhagen, May 2, 1715, between
Hanover and Denmark, and of May 17, between Denmark and
Prussia, had already arranged all the details of the projected
partition. Wolgast and Stettin were to fall to the share of
Prussia; Rügen and Pomerania north of the Peene, to Denmark;
and the duchies of Bremen and Verden to Hanover, which was
to pay Denmark, their conqueror and present holder, 600,000 rix-
dollars for this transfer. Charles naturally protested against
this iniquitous traffic in stolen property, of which he was the
real owner; whereupon Hanover formally declared war against
him (Oct. 1715). Thus at the end of 1715 Sweden, now fast
approaching the last stage of exhaustion, was at open war with
England-Hanover, Russia, Prussia, Saxony, and Denmark. For
twelve months Charles XII defended Stralsund with desperate
valour; but the hostile forces were overwhelming, and on
December 23, 1715, the fortress, now little more than a
rubbish-heap, surrendered, Charles having effected his escape
to Sweden two days before.
At this, the very darkest hour of his fortunes, the sudden
discord of his numerous enemies seemed to offer Charles XII
one more chance of emerging from his difficulties. It
had become evident to all the members of the anti-Swedish
league that till Charles XII had been attacked and con-
quered in the heart of his own realm the war might drag on
indefinitely. But, when it came to the execution of this plan
of invasion, insuperable obstacles presented themselves. To
342
Charles XII of Sweden
(CH.
begin with, Denmark and Saxony, and Hanover and Denmark,
jealous of each other, were also incurably suspicious of the
Tsar; yet, without Peter's active co-operation, Charles was
practically unassailable. And now, at the beginning of 1716,
Peter seemed to justify their suspicions by his high-handed
interference in purely German affairs. It was bad enough
when, at the end of January, he punished Dantzic, a free
city, for trading with Sweden, even going the length of seizing
all the Swedish vessels in the harbour ; but when, on April 19,
by the Treaty of Dantzic, he solemnly guaranteed Wismar and
Warnemünde to the disreputable Duke Leopold of Mecklen-
burg, who married his niece, the Tsarevna Catherine Ivanovna,
the same day, the prospect of seeing Mecklenburg a Russian
outpost infuriated George I and Frederick IV.
Nevertheless, at a meeting between Peter and the Danish
king at Altona on June 3, the invasion of Scania, where
Charles XII had established himself in an entrenched camp
defended by 20,000 men, was definitely arranged. On July 17
Peter arrived with his galley squadron at Copenhagen ; and
30,000 Russian and 23,000 Danish troops began to assemble
in Sjælland, in order to make the descent under cover of the
English, Danish, and Russian fleets. But July passed by, and
still the Danes held back. Even when the British admiral,
Norris, proposed a recognisance in the direction of Carlscrona,
they raised objections. In mid-August Peter cruised off the
Scanian coast to examine the lie of the land, and discovered
that the Swedes had very strongly entrenched themselves. A
bullet from one of their batteries actually pierced the yacht on
which he flew his flag. Peter was naturally cautious, and his
caution had been intensified by the terrible punishment with
which his one act of temerity had so promptly been visited five
years before, on the banks of the Pruth. Charles XII, he
argued, always formidable, would be doubly dangerous at bay
in the midst of his own people. Moreover Peter was growing
more and more suspicious of his allies; and their prolonged
XII]
Georg Heinrich von Görtz
343
delay in attacking the common foe seemed to point to secret
negotiations or at least some understanding with Sweden. He
submitted his doubts to two councils of Russian ministers
and generals on September 12 and 16; and they unanimously
advised him to postpone the descent to the following year.
This resolution was subsequently communicated to the Danish
and Hanoverian governments. Such was the real cause of the
sudden and mysterious abandonment of the Scanian expedi-
tion, which had such important political results. Its immediate
consequence was to create so deadly an enmity between the
Tsar and George I, who regarded Peter's action as a deliberate
act of treachery calculated to promote Russian designs in
North Germany, that even the discovery of a supposed Jacobite
plot at the beginning of 1717 (in which Charles XII was at
first erroneously supposed to be implicated), leading to the
arrest of the Swedish minister Gyllenborg at London, failed
to bring about any rapprochement between the two sovereigns.
On the contrary, henceforth both England-Hanover and Russia
seriously endeavoured to come to terms with Sweden.
Thus Charles XII was at last in a position to play off his
two most formidable enemies against each other; and for
the second time in his career he had recourse to diplomacy.
His chief instrument was the notorious Holsteiner, Baron Georg
Heinrich von Görtz, who had been one of the first to visit
him on his arrival at Stralsund, and emerged from his presence
chief minister, or “grand vizier” as the Swedes preferred to
call the bold and crafty satrap, whose absolute devotion to the
Swedish king took no account of the intense wretchedness
of the Swedish nation. Görtz, himself a man of uncommon
audacity, seems to have been fascinated by the heroic element
in Charles's nature, and was determined, if possible, to save
him from his difficulties. He owed his extraordinary influence
to the fact that he was the only one of Charles's advisers who
believed, or pretended to believe, that Sweden was still far
from exhaustion, or, at any-rate, had a sufficient reserve of
344
Tch.
Charles XII of Sweden
power to give support to a high-spirited, energetic diplomacy.
This was Charles's own opinion. His fatal optimism utterly
disregarded actual facts. His unshakeable belief in the justice,
and consequently in the ultimate triumph, of his cause (for,
after all, the war was defensive and he wanted only his own),
formed an essential part of his religion. But misfortune had
so far depressed him to the level of common-sense, that he
was now willing to negotiate—but on his own terms. He
was willing to relinquish a portion of the duchies of Bremen
and Verden in exchange for a commensurate part of Norway,
due regard being had to the differences of soil and climate.
Thus Charles's invasions of Norway, in 1716 and 1718, were
mainly due to political speculation. It was obvious that,
with large districts of Norway actually in his hands, he could
make better terms with the provisional holders of his ultra-
marine domains. But the exchange of a small portion of
Bremen-Verden for something much larger elsewhere was the
utmost concession he would make. This was an altogether
inadequate basis for negotiation. . Anyone but Görtz would
have thrown the whole business up in despair. Yet he cheer-
fully plunged into the adventure, and wasted on what was
obviously a hopeless quest an amount of finesse and savoir-
faire which would have made the fortune of half-a-dozen
ordinary diplomatists.
Görtz first felt the pulse of the English ministry, which
rejected the Swedish terms as excessive; whereupon he turned
to Russia. Formal negotiations were opened at Lofö, one of
the Åland islands (May 23, 1718); Görtz being the principal
Swedish and Vice-Chancellor Osterman the principal Russian
commissioner. Peter, in view of the increasing instability
of the league of partition, sincerely desired peace with Sweden.
He was firmly resolved, indeed, to keep the bulk of his
conquests; Finland he would retrocede, but Ingria, Livonia,
Esthonia, and Carelia, with Viborg, must be surrendered. If
Charles consented, the Tsar undertook to compensate him
X11] The Negotiations with Russia 345
in whatever other direction he might choose. The Russian
plenipotentiaries were instructed to treat the Swedish nego-
tiators with the utmost courtesy, and to assure them that
it was not merely a peace but an alliance with the king
of Sweden that the Tsar desired. Two things were soon
evident to the keen-witted Osterman—that Görtz was hiding
the Russian conditions from Charles, and that the majority
of the Swedes were altogether opposed to the Russian
negotiations, rightly judging that nothing obtained elsewhere
could compensate for the loss of the Baltic provinces. He
opined that there was little chance of a peace unless, at least,
Reval was retroceded.
Twice the negotiations were interrupted, in order that
Görtz and Osterman might consult their principals. In October,
Osterman, in a private report to the Tsar, accurately summed
up the whole situation. The negotiations, he said, were
entirely Görtz's work. Charles seemed to care little for his
own interests so long as he could fight or gallop about: in
the circumstances it might fairly be argued that he was not
quite sane. Sweden's power of resistance was nearly at break-
ing point. Every artisan and one out of every two peasants
had already been taken for soldiers. She could not fight
much longer. Osterman strongly advised that additional
pressure should be brought to bear by a devastating raid in
Swedish territory. There was, however, a chance that Charles
might break his neck, or be shot in one of his adventures.
Such an ending, continued the vice-chancellor, “if it happened
after peace had been signed, would release us from all our
obligations; and if it happened before, would be equally bene-
ficial to us by dividing Sweden between the Holstein and
Hessian factions, both of whom are eager to save Sweden's
German, and therefore willing to cede her Baltic, possessions,
and bid against each other for our favour.”
Osterman's anticipations were strikingly realised. A few
weeks later, at the end of October, 1718, Charles invaded
346.
TCH.
Charles XII of Sweden
southern Norway; the Danish army retired before him, and,
on November 18, he began the siege of the fortress of
Fredericksten. The commandant made a stout defence; but,
on December 8, the Swedes captured the little fort of Gylden-
löve, and from thence steadily carried forward their approaches
against the main fortress in the face of a violent cannonade.
On December 11, when they had come within 280 paces of
Fredericksten, Charles XII, who was leaning against the
parapet of the foremost trench, looked over it, and the same
instant was struck through the temple by a shot from the
fortress, and died on the spot'.
The news reached the Aland islands on Christmas Day,
1718; and the congress was suspended to await events. The
irresolution of Charles's nephew, the young duke of Holstein,
the legitimate heir to the Swedish throne, sealed the fate of
a party already detested in Sweden because of its identification
with Görtz, who was arrested the very day after Charles's death,
and executed for high treason in February, 1719. In March,
Charles's one surviving sister, the Princess Ulrica Leonora,
was elected queen by the Riksdag, on condition that she sur-
rendered “sovereignty.” Immediately afterwards the negotia-
tions at Lofo were resumed. But the Swedish plenipotentiaries
now declared that they would rather resume the war than
surrender the Baltic provinces; and when, in July, a Russian
fleet proceeded to the Swedish coast and landed a raiding
force, which destroyed property to the value of thirteen millions
of rubles, the Swedish government, far from being intimidated,
broke off all negotiations with Russia. On September 17
the Aland congress was dissolved ; and pacific overtures were
made instead to England-Hanover, Prussia, and Denmark. By
the Treaties of Stockholm, February 20, 1719, and February 1,
1720, Hanover obtained the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden
for herself, and Stettin and district for her confederate, Prussia.
1 The more or less preposterous legends that he was murdered by a
traitor have long since been exploded.
XII] End of the Great Northern War 347
By the Treaty of Fredericksborg, July 3, 1720, peace was
also signed between Denmark and Sweden; Denmark retroced-
ing Rügen, Further Pomerania as far as the Peene, and Wismar
to Sweden, in exchange for an indemnity of 600,000 rix-dollars;
while Sweden relinquished her exemption from the Sound tolls,
and her protectorate over Holstein-Gottorp; Great Britain
and France guaranteeing to Denmark her Sleswick possessions
by the treaties of July 26 and August 18, 1720.
The prospect of coercing Russia by means of the British
fleet had alone induced Sweden to consent to such sacrifices;
but, when the last demands of England and her allies had
been complied with, she was left to come to terms as best
she could with the Tsar. The efforts which England made
at Vienna, Berlin, and Warsaw, in the course of 1720-21,
to obtain by diplomatic methods some mitigation of Russia's
terms in favour of Sweden, proved fruitless, chiefly owing to
the stubborn neutrality of Prussia; and, though a British
fleet was despatched to the Baltic, to protect Sweden's coasts,
it looked on helplessly when the Russian bands again de-
scended upon the unhappy country in the course of 1720,
and destroyed two towns, forty-one villages, and 1026 farms.
“We may not have done much harm to the enemy," wrote
Peter to Yaguzhinsky on this occasion, “but, thank God, we
have done it under the very noses of their defenders, who
were unable to prevent it.” In her isolation and abandon-
ment, Sweden had now no choice but to reopen negotiations
with Russia at Nystad in May, 1720. She still pleaded hard
for Livonia and Viborg; but a third Russian raid, in which
three towns and 506 villages were destroyed, accelerated the
negotiations; and, on August 30, 1721, by the Peace of
Nystad, Sweden ceded all her Baltic provinces (and, with
them, the hegemony of the North) to Russia, receiving, in
return, an indemnity of two million thalers, free-trade in the
Baltic, and a solemn undertaking of non-interference in her
domestic affairs.
CHAPTER XIII.
ATTY
THE HATS AND CAPS, AND GUSTAVUS III OF
SWEDEN, 1721-1792.
It was not the least of Sweden's misfortunes, after the
great Northern War, that the new constitution, which was to
compensate for all her past sacrifices, should contain within
it the elements of many of her future calamities. Early in
1720 Ulrica Leonora was permitted to abdicate in favour of
her husband, the prince of Hesse, who was elected king under
the title of Frederick I; and Sweden was at the same time
converted into the most limited of monarchies. All power was
vested in the people as represented by the Riksdag or Diet,
consisting as before of four distinct Estates, nobles, priests,
burgesses, and peasants, sitting and deliberating apart. The
conflicting interests and mutual jealousies of these four in-
dependent Parliaments made the work of legislation exception-
ally difficult. No measure could become law till it had obtained
the assent of three at least of the four Estates; but this pro-
vision, which seems to have been designed to protect the lower
orders against the nobility, produced ills far greater than those
it professed to cure. Thus measures might be passed by
a bare majority in three Estates, when a real and substantial
majority of all four Estates in congress might be actually
against it. Or, again, a dominant faction in any three of the
Estates might enact laws highly detrimental to the interests
of the remaining Estate-a danger the more to be apprehended,
CH. XIII] The new Swedish Constitution 349
as in no other country in Europe were class distinctions so
sharply defined as in Sweden.
The Swedish nobility possessed the usual aristocratic privi-
leges, of which freedom from taxation and the exclusive right
to the higher offices of state were the chief. The head of:
each noble family had the right to sit in the Upper House;
but most of these hereditary legislators, too needy to reside
in the capital during the season of the Riksdag, derived
a considerable income from the sale of their fullmakts, or
proxies, to the highest bidder.
The order of clergy deservedly enjoyed a political influence
out of all proportion to its limited numbers, for it was by far
the best educated and least servile body in the kingdom. Yet
the hard-worked Swedish hierarchy was so ill paid that the
poorest gentlemen rarely thought of the Church as a pro-
fession. The bishops, too, were not lords spiritual, as in
England, but simply the first among equals in their own
Estate. The burgesses, again, were burgesses in the most literal
acceptation of the word, merchants and traders, with the
exclusive right of representing in the Diet the boroughs where
they traded. But this right, whilst manifestly adding to the
political importance of the order of burgesses, naturally ac-
centuated the distinction between gentlemen and commoners.
The peasantry also could only be represented in the Diet
by peasants; and the practice of excluding the members of
this order from most of the special committees, in which the
chief business of the session was done, minimised their power
of influencing the course of public affairs.
Each Estate was ruled by its talman, or speaker, who was
elected at the beginning of each Diet, but the archbishop
was ex officio the talman of the clergy. The Landtmarskalk,
or Speaker of the House of Nobles, presided when the Estates
mėt in congress, and also, by virtue of his office, in the
Secret Committee. This famous body, which consisted of
50 nobles, 25 priests, 25 burgesses, and, very exceptionally,
ssion whic affairs, or speale archbi
350 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
25 peasants, practically possessed, during the session of the
Diet, not only the supreme executive, but also the supreme
judicial and legislative functions. It prepared all bills for the
Riksdag, created and deposed all ministries, controlled the
foreign policy of the nation, and claimed, and often exercised,
the right of superseding the ordinary courts of justice. During
the parliamentary recess, however, the executive remained in
the hands of the Råd or Senate.
It will be obvious that there was no room in this republican
constitution for a constitutional monarch in the modern sense
of the word. The crowned puppet who possessed a casting-
vote in the Råd, of which he was the nominal president, and
who was allowed to create peers at his coronation, was rather
a state decoration than a sovereign.
At first this cumbrous and complicated machinery of
government worked tolerably well under the firm but cautious
control of the chancellor, Count Arvid Bernhard Horn.
Under his prudent and pacific administration the work of
restoration proceeded rapidly. In his anxiety to avoid em-
broiling his country abroad, Horn reversed the traditional
foreign policy of Sweden by keeping France at a distance,
and drawing near to Great Britain, for whose liberal institu-
tions he professed the highest admiration. Thus a twenty
years' war was succeeded by a twenty years' peace, during
which the nation recovered so rapidly from its wounds that
it began to forget them. A new race of politicians was
springing up. Since 1719, when the influence of the few
great territorial families had been merged in a multitude of
needy gentlemen, the first Estate had become the nursery,
and afterwards the stronghold, of an opposition at once noble
and democratic, which found its natural leaders in Count Carl
Gyllenborg, Daniel Niklas von Höpken, and Count Calrl
Gustaf Tessin. These men and their followers were nevest
weary of ridiculing the timid caution of the aged statesman
who sacrificed everything to perpetuate an inglorious peace,
...

XIII]: Rise of the Hats and Caps 351
and derisively nicknamed his adherents Night-Caps (a term
subsequently softened into Caps), themselves adopting the
sobriquet Hats. These epithets instantly caught the public
fancy. The nickname Night-cap seemed exactly to suit the
drowsy policy of a peace-loving dotard; while the three-
cornered hat, worn by officers and gentlemen, as happily hit
off the manly self-assertion of the Opposition ; and, when the
Estates met in 1738, these party badges were in general use.
That Riksdag was to mark a turning-point in Swedish history.
The Hats carried everything before them; and the aged Horn
was finally compelled to retire from a scene where for three-
and-thirty years he had played a leading part. The Senate
was then purged of Caps; Gyllenborg gained at last the
long-coveted post of chancellor ; Tessin was sent to Paris as
ambassador; the long and disastrous dominion of the Hats
had begun.
The foreign policy of the Hats was a return to the tradi-
tional alliance between France and Sweden. When Sweden
descended to her natural position as a second-rate power, the
French alliance became a luxury too costly for her straitened
means. Horn clearly perceived this; and his cautious neutrality
was therefore the wisest statesmanship. But the politicians who
had ousted Horn thought differently. To them prosperity
without glory was a worthless possession. They aimed at
nothing less than restoring Sweden to her former proud
position as a great power. France naturally hailed with
satisfaction the rise of a faction which was content to be her
armour-bearer in the North; and the rich golden streams which
flowed continuously from Versailles to Stockholm during the
next two generations was the political life-blood of the Hat
party.
The first blunder of the Hats was the hasty and ill-advised
war with Russia. The European complications, consequent
upon the almost simultaneous deaths of the Emperor Charles VI
and Anne, empress of Russia, seemed to favour their adven-
352 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
against he Diet
Lever. The
turous schemes; and, despite the frantic protests of the Caps, a
project for the invasion of Russian Finland was rushed through
the premature Riksdag of 1740. On July 20, 1741, war was
formally declared against Russia on the most frivolous pre-
texts. A month later the Diet was dissolved; and the
Hat Landtmarskalk, Carl Emil Levenhaupt, set off for
Finland to take command of the army. The first blow was
not struck till six months after the declaration of war, and
it was struck by the enemy, who utterly routed General
Vrangel at Willamstrand, and captured and destroyed that
frontier fortress. Nothing else was done on either side for
six months more; and then Levenhaupt made a “tacit truce"
with the Russians through the mediation of the French
ambassador at St Petersburg. By the time that this “tacit
truce” had come to an end, the Swedish forces were so de-
moralised that the mere rumour of a hostile attack made them
retire panic-stricken before purely imaginary invaders to Hel-
singfors ; and before the end of the same year all Finland was
in the hands of the Russians. The fleet, from which great
things had been expected, was disabled from the first by
a terrible epidemic, and throughout the war was little more
than a floating hospital.
To face another Riksdag with such a war as this upon.
their consciences was a trial from which the Hats naturally
shrank; but, to do them justice, they showed themselves
better parliamentary than military strategists. A motion for an
enquiry into the conduct of the war was skilfully evaded by
obtaining precedence for the succession question (Queen
Ulrica Leonora had lately died childless, and King Frederick
was old); and negotiations were then opened with the new
Russian empress, Elizabeth, who agreed to restore the greater
part of Finland if her cousin, Adolphus Frederick of Holstein,
were elected successor to the Swedish crown. The Hats
eagerly caught at the opportunity of recovering the Grand
Duchy, and their own prestige along with it. By the Peace
X111] Adolphus Frederick and Louisa Ulrica 353
of Abo (May 7, 1743) the terms of the empress were accepted;
and only that small part of Finland which lay beyond the
Kymmene was retained by Russia.
The new crown-prince of Sweden was remotely connected
with the ancient dynasty, his grandfather's grandmother having
been the sister of the great Gustavus. Personally he was
altogether insignificant, being chiefly remarkable as the willing
slave of a beautiful and talented but imperious consort, whom
he also owed to his adopted country. That consort was- Louisa
Ulrica, Frederick the Great's sister, whom Tessin, now chancel-
lor, conducted from Berlin to Stockholm, where she speedily
gathered around her a brilliant circle. Her friendship naturally
became the prize for which both the factions contended. The
Russian faction, as the Caps henceforth became, looked for
certain support from Russia's protégés; but the French tastes
and sympathies of the Voltairean princess drew her at first
towards the French faction, whose brilliant leader, Count
Tessin, became her closest friend, and the governor of her
first-born son, Gustavus. But the friendship was shattered
irretrievably when, in the course of 1750, Tessin, alarmed at
the growing cordiality between Russia and Denmark, skilfully
interposed, and arranged a betrothal between his little pupil
and the Danish princess-royal, despite the parents of the
infant bridegroom, who protested in vain against a family
alliance with the hereditary foe of the house of Holstein.
In March, 1751, old King Frederick died. His slender
prerogatives had gradually dwindled down to vanishing point.
Latterly he had become too decrepit even to affix his sign-
manual to official documents; and, at his own request, a
“name-stamp," with the royal signature engraved therein, had
been månufactured to assist him in his purely mechanical
duties. Adolphus Frederick would have given even less
trouble than his predecessor, but for the ambitious promptings
of his masterful consort; yet it must be admitted that the
Estates seemed bent upon going out of their way to mortify
BAIN
23
354 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
the mildest of princes. They disputed his right to appoint
his own household or to create peers; they declared that
all state appointments were to go by seniority; they threatened
to use the “name-stamp” if his Majesty refused to append
his sign-manual to official documents; and they practi-
cally denied the king and queen the right of educating
their own children by arbitrarily dismissing all the crown-
prince's tutors and governors, and appointing others whose
political sentiments were acceptable to the majority of the
Riksdag. An attempted revolution, planned by the queen
and a few devoted young noblemen in 1756, was easily and
remorselessly crushed; and, though the unhappy king did not,
as he anticipated, share the fate of Charles Stewart, he was
humiliated as never monarch was humiliated before. Royalty
must indeed have been in evil case when “most humble
and most dutiful subjects” could venture to remind their
“most mighty and most gracious sovereign" that kings in
general are the natural enemies of their subjects; that in
“free states” they merely exist on sufferance; that, because
they are occasionally invested with pomp and dignity, "more
for the honour of the realm, than for the sake of the person
who may occupy the chief place in the pageant,” they must
not therefore imagine that “they are more than men, while
other men are less than worms"; that as “the glare and
glitter” of a court tends to puff them up with the idea that
they are made of finer stuff than their fellow-creatures, they
would do well occasionally to visit the peasant's lowly hut,
and there learn that it is because of the wasteful extravagance
of a court that the peasant's loaf is so light and his burden
so heavy--and so on through a score of paragraphs. This
“instruction" was solemnly presented to his Majesty by the
marshal of the Diet and the talmen of the three lower
Estates; and he was requested to present it, with his own
hand, to the prince's new governor.
The same year which beheld this great domestic triumph
coalition), prokussia. would give little generally assumed t
X111] The Cap triumph of 1765 355
of the Hats, saw also the utter collapse of their foreign
“system.” At the instigation of France they had plunged
recklessly into the Seven Years' War; and the result was
ruinous. The French subsidies, which might have sufficed
for a six weeks' demonstration (it was generally assumed that
the king of Prussia would give little trouble to a European
coalition), proved quite inadequate; and, after five unsuccessful
campaigns, the unhappy Hats were glad to make peace, and
ignominiously withdraw from a little war which had cost the
country 40,000 men and £2,500,000. When the Riksdag met
in 1760, the indignation against the Hat leaders was so violent
that an impeachment seemed inevitable; but once more the
superiority of their parliamentary tactics prevailed, and when,
after a session of twenty months, the Riksdag was brought to
a close by the mutual consent of both the exhausted factions,
the Hat government was bolstered up for another four years.
But the day of reckoning could not be postponed for ever;
and when the Estates met again in 1765 it brought the Caps
into power at last. Their leader, Ture Rudbeck, was elected
marshal of the Diet over Axel af Fersen, the Hat candidate, by
a large majority; and, out of the hundred seats in the Secret
Committee, the Hats succeeded in getting only ten.
The Caps struck at once at the weak point of their oppo-
nents by ordering a budget report to be made; and it was
speedily found that the whole financial system of the Hats had
been based upon reckless improvidence and wilful misrepresen-
tation, and that the only fruit of their long rule was an enormous
addition to the national debt, and a depreciation of the note
circulation to one-third of its face value. This revelation led
to an all-round retrenchment, carried into effect with a drastic
thoroughness which has earned for this Parliament the name
of the “Reduktion Riksdag.". The Caps succeeded in trans-
ferring £250,000 from the pockets of the rich to the empty
exchequer, reducing the debt by £575, 179, and establishing
some sort of equilibrium between revenue and expenditure.
: 23—2
356 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
.
They also introduced a few useful reforms, the most remark-
able of which was the liberty of the press. But their most
important political act was to throw in their lot definitively with
Russia, so as to counterpoise the influence of France. Sweden
was not then, as now, quite outside the European Concert.
Although no longer a great power, she had still many of the
responsibilities of a great power; and, if the Swedish alliance
had considerably depreciated in value, it was still a marketable
article. Sweden's peculiar geographical position made her
practically invulnerable for six months out of the twelve, while
her Pomeranian possessions afforded her an easy ingress into
the very heart of the moribund Empire, and her Finnish
frontier was not many leagues from the Russian capital.
A watchful neutrality, not venturing much beyond defen-
sive alliances and commercial treaties with the maritime
powers, was therefore Sweden's safest policy; and this the
older Caps had always recognised and followed out. But
when the Hats became the armour-bearers of France in the
North, a protector strong enough to countervail French in-
fluence became the cardinal exigency of their opponents, the
younger Caps; so, without more ado, they flung themselves
into the arms of Russia, overlooking the fact that even a pacific
union with Russia was more to be feared than a martial
alliance with France. For France was too distant to be
dangerous. She sought an ally in Sweden, and it was her ·
endeavour to make that ally as strong as possible. But it was
as a future prey, not as a possible ally, that Russia regarded
her ancient rival in the North. The iron sceptre of Peter the
Great was in the vigorous grasp of Catharine II; and it was
the life-long ambition of that unscrupulous princess to degrade
all her neighbours to the rank of tributary principalities. In
the treaty that partitioned Poland there was a secret clause
which engaged the contracting powers to uphold the Swedish
free constitution as the swiftest and surest means of sub-
verting Swedish independence; and an alliance with the
XY
XIII]
Abdication of Adolphus Frederick
357
credulous Caps, “the Patriots” as they were called at St
Petersburg, guaranteeing their constitution, was the necessary
corollary to this secret understanding. Thus, while the French
alliance of the warlike Hats had destroyed the prestige of
Sweden, the Russian alliance of the peaceful Caps threatened
to destroy her very existence.
Fortunately the domination of the Caps was not long.
The general distress occasioned by their drastic reforms had
found expression in swarms of pamphlets which bit and stung
the Cap government, under the protection of the new press
laws. The Senate retaliated by an Order in Council (which
the king refused to sign) declaring that all complaints against
the measures of the last Riksdag should be punished with
fine and imprisonment. On December 9, 1768, the king,
followed by the crown-prince, entered the “Sacred College,"
as Gustavus, the prime mover in the whole affair, ironically
called the Senate; and the prince read a short message, on
behalf of his father, - urging the Råd to convoke an extra-
ordinary Riksdag, as the speediest method of relieving the
national distress, solemnly declaring that, in case of a refusal,
he would abdicate and hold the Senate responsible for the
evils of an interregnum. The. Senate obstinately refusing to
comply with the royal wishes, Adolphus Frederick accordingly
abdicated; and, from December 15 to December 21, Sweden
was without a regular government. On December 17 a de-
putation from most of the public offices, headed by their
presidents, marched in solemn procession to the palace, where
they demanded an audience of the Senate, and declared that
they could no longer exercise their functions without violating
the constitution. They then waited upon the ex-king, and
humbly thanked him for his fatherly sympathy with his suffer-
ing people. Their example was followed on the 19th by the
magistracy of Stockholm. Still the Senate, strong in the
support of the Russian and Danish ministers, showed no sign
of wavering. But when the Treasury refused to part with
358 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
· a single shilling more, when the commander of the guard
appeared in the council-chamber, and declared he could no
longer answer for his troops, the stubborn resistance of the
Caps was broken at last, and, at the eleventh hour, they re-
luctantly gave way. On December 19 it was resolved to con-
voke the Estates for April 19, 1769. Two days later Adolphus
Frederick reappeared in the council-chamber and resumed
the crown.
Both parties now prepared for the elections which were to
decide whether the nation preferred to be governed by a king
or a name-stamp. On the eve of the contest there was a
general assembly of the Hats at the French embassy, where
the Comte de Modène furnished them with 6,000,000 livres,
but not till they had signed in his presence an undertaking
to reform the constitution in a monarchical sense. Still more
energetic on the other side, the Russian ambassador, Oster-
man, became the treasurer as well as the councillor of the
Caps, and scattered the largesse of the Russian empress with a
lavish hand; and so lost to all sense of patriotism were the
Caps, that they openly threatened all who dared to vote against
them with the Moscovite vengeance, and fixed Norrköping,
instead of Stockholm, as the place of meeting for the Riksdag,
as being more accessible to the Russian fleet, which was being
fitted out at Cronstadt to assist them in case of need. But
it soon became evident that the Caps were playing a losing
game; and, when the Riksdag met at Norrköping on April 19,
they found themselves in a minority in all four Estates.
The first act of the Riksdag was to move a humble address
of thanks to the king, “because he had not shut his ears to
the bitter cry of the nation," and to the crown-prince for
his patriotic zeal. The Caps had short shrift; and the joint
note which the Russian, Prussian and Danish ministers pre-
sented to the Estates, protesting, in menacing terms, against
any “reprisals” on the part of the triumphant faction, only
hastened the fall of the government. The Cap Senate
The Reaction Riksdag
359
resigned en masse to escape impeachment, and an exclusivelyh
Hat ministry took its place. On June i the “Reaction Riks
dag,” as it is generally called, removed to the capital; and it
was now that the French ambassador and the crown-prince
called upon the new senators to redeem their promise as to
a reform of the constitution, which they had made before the
elections. But when, at the fag-end of the session, they half-
heartedly brought the matter forward, the Riksdag suddenly
seemed stricken with paralysis. Impediments multiplied at
every step; the cry was raised, “The constitution is in danger”;
and on January 30, 1770, the Reaction Riksdag, after a barren
ten months' session, rose amidst chaotic confusion without
accomplishing anything.
Gustavus sought consolation in a long-projected visit to
Paris, which he reached on February 4, 1771. The young
Hyperborean took both the town and the court by storm,
and shone in the brilliant firmament of French society as
a star of the first magnitude. But this “delightful dream,”
as Gustavus himself has called it, had a rude awakening. On
March 1, 1771, a special courier from Stockholm reached
Paris with the news of the death of King Adolphus Frederick,
which was duly communicated to Louis XV. Count Creuti,
the Swedish ambassador at Paris, subsequently received from
the French minister of foreign affairs a memorandum whereby
France undertook to pay the outstanding subsidies to Sweden
unconditionally, at the rate of one-and-a-half million of livres
annually, commencing from January, 1772; and Vergennes,
one of the great names of French diplomacy, was to be sent
to circumvent the designs of Russia at Stockholm, as he had
previously circumvented them at Stambul. On March 25
Gustavus quitted Paris. He had previously been advised by
the Swedish Senate to pay a conciliatory visit to his uncle,
Frederick the Great; and he was received with great distinction,
if with little cordiality, at Potsdam. Frederick seems already
to have foreseen a rival in his nephew, and bluntly informed

360 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
him that, in concert with Russia and Denmark, he had
guaranteed the integrity of the existing Swedish constitution,
and was prepared to defend it by force of arms. "If there
were Swedes in Sweden," said the veteran statesman, “they
would soon agree to bury their differences; but foreign cor-
ruption has so perverted the national spirit that harmony is
impossible”; and he advised the young monarch to play the
part of mediator and abstain from violence.
Meanwhile, in Sweden itself, the arrival of the new king :
was impatiently awaited. The elections on the demise of the
crown had resulted in a partial victory for the Caps, especially
among the lower orders; but in the Estate of the Peasants
the majority was merely nominal, while the mass of the
nobility was dead against them. Nothing could be done,
however, till the arrival of the king; and everyone felt that
with Gustavus an entirely incalculable factor had entered into
Swedish politics. Born on January 24, 1746, he was now in
his twenty-fifth year; and his universally recognised abilities
inspired equal hope and fear. On June 6, 1771, the amiable
young monarch entered his capital, and was received with
a burst of enthusiasm which encouraged him honestly to
endeavour to reconcile the jarring factions by inducing the
leaders to form a composition committee to adjust their
differences. Unfortunately the Caps and their foreign sup-
porters regarded this intervention as a ruse on the king's
part to save the Hat Senate from well-merited punishment;
and when, in the meantime, the Cap nominees, after a severe
struggle, had been elected talmen of the three lower Estates,
their tone became so dictatorial that the king secretly borrowed
£200,000 from Holland, on the security of the promised
French subsidies, to carry through the election of the Hat
nominee, Baron Lejonhufvud, as marshal of the Diet, by way
of counterpoise. Thereupon the Caps became more con-
ciliatory; and a compromise was arrived at, according to which
five Hats were voluntarily to retire from the Senate in favour
X111] The struggle of the factions 361
of five Caps, the Caps undertaking in return not to reopen
, the vexed question of the legality of the last Riksdag.
Gustavus could now meet the Estates with a light heart;
and on June 21, 1771, he formally opened his first Parliament
in a speech which awakened strange and deep emotions in
all white heard it. It was the first time for nearly a century
that ano'wedish king had addressed a Swedish Riksdag from
the throne in its native language. Old men, who still re-
membered Charles XII with fond regret, exclaimed that they
might die in peace now that they had heard Gustavus III.
Unfortunately, this new-born enthusiasm evaporated in
less than a week. A few days later, the Cap majority in
the lower Order, disregarding article XII of the composition
which stipulated that in future each Estate should select at
least a third of its delegates to the Secret Committee from
the minority, sent up to the Committee none but Caps; where!
upon the nobility retaliated by electing forty-six Hats, and
only four Caps. The commoner majority in the Riksdag
speedily showed its hand. A special commission was ap-
pointed to draft a new coronation oath, which contained three
downright revolutionary clauses. The first aimed at making
abdications in the future impossible, by binding the king to
reign uninterruptedly. The second obliged him to abidez-Hot-
by the decision of all the. Estates together, as heretofore, but
by that of the majority only, with the view of enabling
the actually dominant lower Estates to rule without, and even
in spite of, the nobility. The third clause required his Majesty,
in all cases of preferment, to be guided not "principally," as
heretofore, but “solely” by merit, thus striking at the very
root of aristocratic privilege by placing noble and non-noble
on precisely the same footing. It was clear that the ancient
strife of Hats and Caps had become merged in a conflict of
classes; and the situation was still further complicated by the
ominous fact that the non-noble majority was also the Russian
faction,

362 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
fouacon Februaryed by their the Senate ed in o
All through the summer, autumn, and winter of 1771
the Estates wrangled over the clauses of the coronation oath.
A sincere attempt of the king to mediate between them
foundered on the suspicion and obstinacy of the burgesses ;
and on February 24, 1772, the nobility yielded from sheer
weariness. Elated by their triumph, the non-no!mc Cap
majority proceeded to attack the Senate, the last str Jaghold
of the Hats, and on April 25 succeeded in ousting their
opponents. It was now for the first time that Gustavus,
reduced to the condition of a roi fainéant, began to consider
the possibility of a revolution; of its necessity there could be
no doubt. Under the sway of the now dominant faction,
Sweden, already the vassal, could not fail speedily_to become
the prey of Russia. She was on the point of being absorbed :
in that northern system, the invention of the Russian chan-
cellor, Panin, which that patient statesman had made it the
ambition of his life to realise. Only a swift and sudden coup
d'état could save the independence of a...country-isolated from
the rest of Europe by a hostile-league. At this juncture
Gustavus's enemies unconsciously supplied him with the very
instrument he was in search of, in the person of Colonel
Magnus Sprengtporten, a Finnish nobleman of determined
character, who had incurred the hatred of the Caps by his
extreme royalist opinions, and, seeing nothing but ruin before
him, privately approached the king with a project of_a_revolt
against the tyranny of the Estates, which was to begin in
Finland, where Sprengtporten's regiment was stationed. He
undertook to seize the fortress of Sveaborg by a coup de
main, which would entail the speedy submission of the whole
Grand Duchy; and, Finland once secured, Sprengtporten
ad to amharity for Sweden. meet the line and his
proposed to embark for Sweden, meet the king and his
friends near Stockholm, and surprise the capital by a night
attack, when the Estates were to be forced, at the point of
the bayonet, to accept a new constitution from the untram-
melled king. Gustavus warmly approved of the project, but
XIII]
Sprengtporten and Toll
363
advised the utmost secrecy until che project was well ma-
tured.
Matters had reached this stage when the plot was mysteri-
ously disclosed; and the conspirators were reluctantly rein-
forced by a confederate who in audacity and ability far excelled
them all. This was an ex-ranger from Scania, named Johan
Christopher Toll, also a victim of Cap oppression, who had
come up to the capital to seek a career, wormed the plot out of
Sprengtporten's younger brother George, and boldly demanded
a share in it. George advised Magnus that such a dangerous
man as Toll should be put out of the way at once, or made
a confederate; and the latter alternative was at once adopted
by the elder Sprengtporten. Toll proposed that a second
revolt should break out in the province of Scania, to confuse
the government the more, and undertook personally to secure
the southern fortress of Christianstad. After some debate,
Toll's proposal was dovetailed into the original plot. It was
now arranged that, a few days after the Finnish revolt had
begun, Christianstad should openly declare against the govern-
ment.' Prince Charles, the eldest of the king's brothers, was
thereupon hastily to mobilise the garrisons of all the southern
. fortresses, for the ostensible purpose of crushing the revolt at
Christianstad; but, on arriving before the fortress, he was
to make common cause with the rebels, and march upon the
capital from the south, while Sprengtporten and his Finns
attacked it simultaneously from the east. Neither Sprengt-
porten, nor Toll knew exactly what to make of Gustavus. His
character formed the one doubtful quantity in all their calcu-
lations. Was a refined fribbler, of anything but a martial
temperament, the natural leader of a military revolt which
might at any moment become a sanguinary civil war? They
resolved to leave as little as possible to chance by surrounding
the young king with resolute helpers, and keeping him in the
background till the very last moment, “when,” as Sprengt-
porten put it, “we must thrust a sword into his hand, and
trust him to use it."
364 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
and, on ing his spes which
The first step was taken two days after the coronation
(May 31, 1772), when Toll set out for Scania to reconnoitre
and prepare the way. He reached the fortress on June 21,
gained at once one of the officers of the garrison, Captain
Abraham Hellichius, and, on August 6, after receiving a letter
from Prince Charles, announcing his speedy arrival, succeeded,
by sheer bluff, in winning the fortress, which forthwith shut
its gates in the face of the Cap leader, Ture Rudbeck, whom
the government, warned of the impending rebellion by the
English minister, Goodrich, had sent in hot haste to the south
as high commissioner.
Meanwhile, in Finland, Sprengtporten had been equally
successful. On August 6 he reached Helsingfors; on the 14th
he conveyed his soldiers by sea to Sveaborg; on the 16th he
surprised the garrison, and persuaded the officers, most of
whom were Hats, to join him; and, in a week, the whole of
Finland lay at the feet of the intrepid colonel. By August 13,
Sprengtporten was ready to re-embark for Stockholm, but
contrary winds delayed him; and, in the meantime, events
had occurred in the Swedish capital which rendered his pre-
sence there unnecessary.
The high commissioner Rudbeck, who arrived at Stockholm
on August 16, was the first to break the news of the insur-
rection in the south. At a cabinet council, instantly sum-
moned, the majority opined that the king should at once
be arrested. But Senator Funck pointed out that, as they
had no proof of his Majesty's complicity, such a step might
be too hazardous. Later in the day a courier from Prince
Charles arrived with an official account of the outbreak (and
a secret letter for the king sewn in his saddle), whereupon,
at a second cabinet council, Rudbeck's regiment was sum-
moned to the capital, to reinforce the garrison. The con-
tingency so much dreaded by Sprengtporten had actually
arrived. Gustavus found himself isolated in the midst of
enemies. Sprengtporten lay weatherbound in Finland ; Toll
was five hundred miles away; the Hat leaders were in hiding
,
X111]
Preparations for Revolution :
365
at their country houses. The king's resolution was at once taken.
He would strike the decisive blow himself without waiting for
the arrival of Sprengtporten. Gustavus acted with military
promptitude. On the evening of the 18th all the officers in
the capital whom he thought he could trust received his
secret instructions to assemble in the great square facing the
arsenal on the following morning. Gustavus had already won
· over the burgher cavalry organised by the Secret Committee
to patrol the streets every night. The king had volunteered
to accompany them on their rounds; and a couple of nights
had sufficed the fascinating young monarch to convert them
into ardent royalists..
At ten o'clock, on August 19, Gustavus mounted his horse,
and rode straight to the arsenal. On the way his adherents
joined him in little groups, as if by accident, so that by the
time he reached his destination he had about two hundred
officers in his suite. It had been arranged beforehand that,
if the king returned to the palace on foot, all the officers in
· his train should follow and assist him to carry out the re-
volution ; but, if he remounted, it would be a sign that the
whole affair had been abandoned. When then the parade
was over, the king turned to his suite, and remarked loud
enough for everyone to hear, "As all these gentlemen go on
foot, I may as well do the same”; whereupon he walked back
to the palace with his escort. On-reaching the palace-yard
the king entered the guard-room. The doors were then
closed, and Gustavus unfolded his plans. With all the energy
which the emergency demanded he painted in vivid colours
the unhappy situation of the country. In this extremity, he
said, he turned to his faithful bodyguards. He would have
them know that he abhorred despotism as much as any man,
and now, as heretofore, regarded it as the greatest honour to
be the first citizen of a free and uncorrupted people. “If,"
cried he in conclusion, "you will follow me as your forefathers -
followed Gustavus Vasa and Gustavus Adolphus, I will venture
366 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
ora
in
..
.
.
.
my life-blood for the safety and honour of my country.” The
king then dictated the new oath of allegiance to one of his
chamberlains; and everybody signed it without hesitation. It
absolved them from their allegiance to the Estates, and bound
them solely to obey their lawful king, Gustavus III. The
soldiers in the parade-ground of the palace followed the ex-
ample of their officers.
While all this was going on in the guard-room, the Senate,
in another part of the palace, had already been arrested by
Captain Aminoff and thirty of the guard. The Secret Com-
mittee, which was holding its last session at the Riddarhus,
dispersed panic-stricken on hearing... of.. the arrest of the
Senate; Governor-General Rudbeck was arrested while at
dinner, under a royal warrant; and the fleet, moored along
the quays of the Skeppsholm, was secured by Admiral Ters-
meden. The king had fixed his provisional headquarters
in the artillery yard; and it was here that he first bound
a white handkerchief round his left arm as a mark of re-
cognition, and bade all his friends do the same. In less than
an hour the whole city had donned the white handkerchief.
After a visit to the Skeppsholm, to distribute money among
the sailors, Gustavus made the tour of the city. Wherever
he appeared he was surrounded by enthusiastic crowds who
hailed him as their deliverer. It was not so much a political
revolution as a national festival.
During the night all the watches remained at their posts.
The English and Russian ministers are said to have made
a fruitless attempt to stir up the fleet to a counter-revolution;
and it was found necessary to place a guard round those
ministers' banks. Fortunately perfect tranquillity prevailed.
On the evening of August 20 heralds perambulated the
city proclaiming that the Estates were to meet in the Rikssaal
at four o'clock on the following day; every deputy absenting
himself would be regarded as the enemy of his country and
his king. Extraordinary and elaborate precautions were taken.
-
-
-
XI11]
The Revolution of 1772
367
All the principal thoroughfares were lined with battalions
of the guards. The Rikssaal itself was surrounded by a park
of artillery. One hundred grenadiers stood behind the guns
with lighted matches. It was customary for the four Orders
to assemble in their respective halls, and thence proceed
in state to the Rikssaal, the land-marshal and the three
talmen heading their respective Orders with their maces
borne before them. This time-honoured procession was now
forbidden; and the terrified mob of Riksdagsmen crept, by
twos and threes, into their places between rows of glittering
bayonets. A few minutes after the Estates had assembled, the
king, in full regalia, appeared, and taking his seat on the throne,
delivered that famous philippic, one of the masterpieces of
Swedish oratory, in which he reproached the Estates for their
unpatriotic yenality and licence in the past. .
It was nearly two hundred and fifty-years since a
Swedish Parliament had received such a reprimand from the
throne. Gustavus Vasa, at the Riksdag of Vesterås in 1527,
had indeed trounced the Estates roundly in language of
brutal frankness; but those who listened to bluff King Gus
were well aware that they could endure his reproaches with-
out humiliation, because, at the bottom of his heart, he
respected them as his valiant companions in arms. It was
a castigation such as an angry father might administer to
a beloved and wayward son: the pain is forgotten the moment
the rod ceases to strike. Much more galling was the lecture
which Gustavus III addressed to his Parliament. He was
scrupulously temperate in tone, but his very forbearance was
intolerable. His audience could not avoid the conviction that
their king regarded them either as dupes or traitors. It was
the sort of rebuke which an indignant but indulgent master
might inflict upon a trusted servant who has abused his con-
fidence, and whom he finally overwhelms with the humiliation
of an undeserved forgiveness. The new constitution was then
recited to the Estates, and accepted by them unanimously; the
368 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.'
.. king, at the same time, swearing to and subscribing a new
coronation oath; whereupon Gustavus, rising and reverently
removing his crown, ordered a Te Deum to be sung to thank
Divine Providence "for knitting together...once more the old
bands between king and people.” The assembly then dis-
persed.---
The new constitution converted a weak and. disunited
republic into a strong but limited monarchy, in which the
balance of power inclined, on the whole,-to...the side of the
monarch. The Riksdag could assemble only when summoned
by him; he could dismiss it whenever, he thought fit; and its
deliberations were to be confined exclusively to the propositions
which he might think fit to lay before it. But these very
extensive powers were subjected to many important checks.
Thus, without the previous consent of the Estates, no new
law.could be imposed, no old law abolished, no offensive war
undertaken, no extraordinary war subsidy levied. The Estates
alone could tax them themselves, they had the absolute control
of the Bank of_Sweden, and the inalienable right of con-
trolling the national expenditure. Thus the Parliament held the
purse; and this seemed a sufficient guarantee both of its in-
dependence and its frequent convention. The Senate, not
the-Riksdag, was the chief loser by the change; and, inasmuch
as henceforth the senators were to be appointed by the king,
and to be responsible to him alone,.a-Senate -in opposition
to the crown was barely conceivable.
“It may emphatically be said,” observes the judicious
Russian historian, Solovev, “that the tidings of the Swedish
Revolution was the most unpleasant contretemps in foreign
affairs which Catharine II had hitherto encountered.” She
saw in it the triumph of her arch-enemy, France, with the
prolongation of the costly Turkish war as its immediate
result, to say nothing of innumerable future complications.
The Russian chancellor, Panin, regarded "the unfortunate
affair” as of the greatest importance to Russia, and likely to
.
XIII)
The Riksdag of 1778
369
be “very dangerous” in its consequences. But the absence
of troops on the Finnish border, and the bad condition of
the frontier fortresses of Vilmanstrand and Fredrikshamn
constrained the Empress, already occupied with the Polish
speculation which was to compensate her for her losses in
the south, to listen to Gustavus's pacific assurances, and stay
her hand for the present, especially as Frederick II also
counselled moderation. But she took the precaution of con-
cluding a fresh secret alliance with Denmark, in which the
Swedish Revolution of 1772 was significantly described as
“an act of violence," constituting a casus foederis, which
justified both powers in seizing the first favourable oppor-
tunity for intervention to restore the Swedish constitution
of 1720.
The period elapsing between 1772m and 1786 was often
alluded to by Gustavus III as his "happy years." They were
marked by salutary domestic measures, such as the abolition
of judicial torture, reintroduced after the death of Charles XII,
the re-establishment of the freedom of the press, the regulation
of the finances, and reforms sweeping but necessary in the army,
navy, and judicature. In Liljecrantz, Liljestråle, Count Carl
Sparre, Ehrensvärd, Trolle, and Toll, Gustavus found able
and devoted co-operators; so that, when the king summoned
the Estates to assemble at Stockholm on September 30, 1778
(the anticipated birth of an heir to the throne was the ostensi-
ble cause of their convocation), he could give a brilliant ac-
count of his six years' stewardship. Never was a parliament
more obsequious or a king more gracious. “There was no
room for a single No during the whole session.” Everyone had 1
come thither to approve and to applaud. For the first time for
fifty_years_the_course_of Swedish _politics ran-smoothly in its
natural channel. There was scarcely-a-glimpse of a legitimate
parliamentary opposition. Nevertheless, little as he suspected
'it, the Riksdag of 1778 had roughly shaken the popularity
which Gustavus III so ardently desired. Short as the session
BAIN
24
370. The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
had been, it was quite long enough to open the eyes of the
deputies to the fact that their political supremacy had departed.
They had changed places with the king. He was now
indeed their sovereign lord; and, for all his gentleness, the
jealousy with which he guarded, the vigour with which he
enforced the prerogative, plainly showed that he meant to
remain so. Even the few who were prudent and patriotic
enough to acquiesce in the change by no means liked it;
while the many who were neither prudent nor patriotic looked
back with wistful eyes upon the past, when the emissaries of -
France and Russia, with their pockets stuffed full with livres
and roubles, waylaid Swedish Riksdagsmen in the very lobbies
of Parliament, when every member had his money value,
and a judicious trimmer might make his fortune by a single
well-timed vote. But it was not till after eight years more
that actual trouble began. The Riksdag-of-1-477-8--had been
obsequious.;_the_Riksdag of 1786--was mutinous. Many and
various were the causes of this reaction-love of change;
disappointment, for, naturally, the Revolution could not satisfy
everyone; a succession of phenomenally.bad-harvests, which
sensibly increased the burden of taxation.;--the-deplorable
results of Gustavus's one serious-blunder,--the-attempt to
make-the-distillation-of_spirits a-government_monopoly; the
scandalous_simony_which marked the ecclesiastical admi-
nistration of... his... vicar-general, the facile and easy-going
Schröderheim; and, above all, the_discontent of the gentry
when once they fairly grasped the fact that they-had obtained
no adequate compensation for the loss of their political in-
fluence. The consequence, was that nearly all the royal
propositions were either-rejected outright, or-so-modified that
Gustavus himself withdrew them; and, when he dismissed the
Estates, the speech from the throne held out no prospect of.
their speedy reconvocation.
The Riksdag_of1786 marks a turning-point in the history
of Gustavus III. Henceforth we observe. a determination on
--
--
-----
X111] Gustavus tends towards Absolutism
371
his part to rule without a Parliament; a passage, cautious and
gradual, yet unflinching, from semi-constitutionalism-to-semi-
absolutism. New men of his own choosing, intelligent enough
to appreciate his designs, and audacious enough to execute
them, now take the place of his officially responsible ministers. I
Toll, the resolute and inscrutable, hitherto kept in the back-
ground, now emerges into prominence and power. Ruuth,
· a protégé of Toll's, takes charge of the finances. The unpopular
4. Schröderheim disappears to make way for Olaf Wallqvist, the
eloquent and masterful bishop of Wexiö, and for the reticent
and dangerous prebendary Nordin-both of them “the willing
tools of despotism,” but also statesmen of the first rank. Now
too appear that dashing adventurer, Gustavus. Armfelt, the
“Alcibiades of the North,” whom Gustavus picked up at Spa
in 1780, and the diplomatists, Franz Taube, Hans af Fersen,
and Henrik von Essen, all ultra-royalists of brilliant talents.
It is a debatable question whether a man of Gustavus's
genius could or could not have found means of ruling constitu-
tionally to the end; anyhow he never seriously tried to do so.
It is an equally debatable question whether the independence
of Sweden could have been secured by any other means than
the temporary semi-absolutism which Gustavus finally adopted.
Swedish historians of the Fryxell type, ignorant as they were i
of Russian history, have ludicrously underestimated the reality
and imminence of the danger to which Sweden was always
exposed from her eastern neighbour. Gustavus, never blind
to that danger, exhausted all his unusual powers of blandish-
ment to avert it by flattering and mollifying Catharine, whose
genius he sincerely admired; but the time came (it may be
dated from the menacing letter which he received from her, at
Venice, in 1784) when he could no longer doubt that Russia
must be beaten on the battlefield before she would consent
to let go the hold upon Sweden which the Caps had given
hef. He fortified himself provisionally by fresh subsidy con-
ventions with France (Treaties of Versailles, July 1 and 17,

24—2
372 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
.
1784), and bided his opportunity, which came when, at the
end of 1787, Catharine II found herself unexpectedly involved
in a second war with Turkey, for which she was quite un-
prepared, though she had done everything to provoke it.
Gustavus at once began to arm, and, in April,-sent a-military
envoy to St Petersburg to provoke a rupture by categorically
demanding an explanation of the purely imaginary Russian
armaments in Finland. The pacific assurances Gustavus re-
ceived from the anxious and desponding empress seriously
embarrassed him, for his own constitution prohibited him
from beginning an offensive war. But he had now gone too
far to retreat, and after almost extorting the reluctant approval
of the Senate by a mendacious assurance that Russia was
mobilising 200,000 men on the shores of the Baltic, he took
the decisive step. On Midsummer Day he embarked for
Finland, arriving at Helsingfors on July 8, 1788.
The army which now quitted Sweden was superior in
numbers and equipment to any host which Sweden had put
into the field since the Thirty Years' War. Nothing short of
a miracle seemed able to save the Russian capital. For the
first time in her life Catharine II was completely taken by
surprise. Though repeatedly warned of the designs of her
restless neighbour, she had always ridiculed them. “Do you
really think this madman will attack me?” she asked her
private secretary, Khrapovitsky, incredulously. But inter-
cepted despatches from Poland suddenly opened the eyes of
the empress to her danger; and almost simultaneously a note
from Gustavus himself fell upon the court of St Petersburg
like a bombshell. Never since the foundation of the empire
had a Russian monarch received such an insolent and dicta-
torial missive. The French ambassador at St Petersburg
declared that the Padishah himself would not have dared to
address such language to the meanest of his Pashas. If
Gustavus had just won six pitched battles, he could not have
offered Catharine peace on more humiliating terms; he de-
X111] The Declaration of Anjala 373
manded the cession of Carelia and Livonia to Sweden, the
restoration of the Crimea to Turkey, and the instant disband-
ment of the Russian forces.
Catharine was beside herself with rage. She protested that
Peter the Great had made a great mistake in building the
Russian capital so near to Sweden. But her courage rose
with her difficulties, and her military preparations were pushed
on with the most determined energy. Nevertheless her hasty
levies would have proved but a sorry defence had not a mutiny
in the Swedish army paralysed all the efforts of Gustavus. The
majority of the Swedish officers had already conspired to stop
by any means a war which, if successful, would infallibly in-
crease the royal power and prestige, and proportionately diminish
their own. The first step was taken at Hussula on July 31,
when the Finnish regiments revolted, and compelled Gustavus
to retreat to Liikala. From Liikala, on August 9, the rebels
addressed a note to the empress, apologising for beginning a
war “with the motives of which they had not been sufficiently
acquainted,” suggesting that the surest guarantee for a durable
peace was the creation of a complete and independent Finland,
and begging for a speedy reply in order that “the repre-
sentatives of the nation” might decide whether they should
lay down their arms or not. Catharine, much too wary to
compromise herself by an open alliance with a possibly in-
significant clique of conspirators, simply commended the good
intentions of “the Finnish Nation," and hinted at the
assembling of a Finnish Landtag, under Russian protection,
to settle preliminaries. The army meanwhile had further
retreated within Swedish territory to Anjala ; and there the
leaders proceeded to draw up a declaration justifying their
conduct on the ground that, being citizens as well as soldiers,
they were bound to protest against an unconstitutional war.
This document they had the effrontery to send to the king,
not by an adjutant, in the usual way, but by an itinerant
peasant postman.
374 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus 111 [CH.
All this time Gustavus was virtually a prisoner on board
his yacht, the Amphion, at Kymmenegård, with no power to
check the progress of the mutiny. Yet honour forbade his flying
from Finland ; and any negotiation with the empress he rightly
regarded as "an act of political suicide.” His one remaining
hope was that the Danes might declare war against him. A
Danish invasion would imperatively require his presence in
Sweden, and therefore justify his departure from Finland; and
he was clear-sighted enough to perceive that such a contingency
“would open the eyes of the Swedes to the reality of their
danger, and rally the people round the throne.” When there-
fore the news reached him that the Danes, at the instigation
of Russia, had actually declared war against Sweden, he ex-
claimed, “We are saved !" and set out at once for Stockholm,
leaving his brother Charles commander-in-chief in his stead.
At the little seaport of Lovisa he met the delegates of the
Anjala conspirators with their declaration. Gustavus returned
the document unopened, with the curt message, “I do not
treat with rebels." He already saw his way to his ultimate
triumph.
On September 24, 1788, 12,000 Danes, under the prince
of Hesse, crossed the Swedish border, and advanced rapidly
and unopposed through Bohuslän upon Gothenburg, occupy-
ing en route the fortresses of Venersborg and Elfsborg. The
destruction of Gothenburg, the commercial capital of Sweden,
meant the ruin of half the kingdom. Yet the panic-stricken
commandant, openly declaring resistance to be impossible, was
preparing for flight, and the Danes were but a day's march
from the defenceless city, when at midnight, on September 25,
a solitary horseman presented himself at the gates, and loudly
demanded admission. It was Gustavus, who, a few days after
his arrival in Sweden, had hastened to the Dales, as Gustavus
Vasa had done before him, and, after appealing successfully
to the patriotism and loyalty of the peasantry, and raising two
brigades of 6000 men, had ridden 250 miles in forty-eight
XIII
Gustavus at Gothenburg
375
hours, to put heart into the garrison by announcing the arrival
of reinforcements. The face of things completely changed.
Fresh earthworks were thrown up; the ramparts were planted
with fresh cannon; a corps of 1200 volunteers was raised from
among the citizens; the local militia and the first companies
of the Dalesmen kept pouring in day after day; so that, in
less than a week, the king had a garrison of 7000 men at
his disposal, and was able to reject with dignity a summons
from the Danes, two days later, to surrender the city.
Fortunately he was no longer acting alone. Great Britain
and Prussia, both alarmed by Russian ambition, had warmly
approved and secretly encouraged Gustavus's warlike diversion;
and, when Russia had retaliated by inducing Denmark to in-
vade Sweden, under the terms of the Treaty of Copenhagen,
the neutral powers felt bound to interfere on behalf of the
king of Sweden, who was really doing their work in the north.
They were not disposed, it is true, to go the length of an
actual war with Russia; but they were quite determined that
Sweden should not be sacrificed. The initiative was taken
by the Hon. Hugh Elliot, the British minister at Copenhagen;
on November 5, at the Danish headquarters at Uddevalla,
a convention was signed for the evacuation of Sweden; and
a fortnight later not a single Danish soldier remained on
Swedish soil. The-Danes-disposed of, Gustavus -had his
hands free to set his house in order. His first step was
to convoke a Riksdag. So long as the temper of the nation
was uncertain, so long as a Riksdag might afford Sweden’s.
foreign foes an opportunity of interfering in her domestic
affairs, the king had resolutely closed- his ears--against-the
chorus-of-timid-counsellors, who had implored him to summon
the Estates. But now_that he was sure of his people he
hesitated-no longer; and on December 8, 1788, a royal pro-
clamation, issued from Gothenburg, invited the Estates of
the realm to assemble at Stockholm on the 26th of January
following
376
The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
From the first, the temper of the four Orders was unmis-
takeable. Of the 950 gentlemen who sat in the Riddarhus
during this Riksdag,--more than 700 were so-called “patriots," i.e.
those who defended the Anjala treason. On the other hand, the
three-lower-Orders-were heart and soul.with Gustavus. It was
only natural that the burgesses and the peasantry should
compare their own patriotic..conduct, during the last three
. months, with the cowardice, and treachery of their noble
colleagues; and such a comparison naturally led to the re-
flection that a military caste which so shamefully shirked its
easy. obligations was unworthy of “its inordinate privileges.”
Moreover the sincere admiration which the lower Orders felt
for the courage and patriotism of the king was nourished by
a growing belief in his inherent superiority, and a not irra-
- tional hope that he would reward the services, of his faithful
commoners while he chastened-the insolence of his presump-
tuous nobility. The hostility of the non-noble classes to the
aristocracy expressed itself freely in countless scurrilous lam-
poons and ballads, which described the well-born officers as
poltroons and the paid spies of Russia.
The salient features of this momentous and dramatic
Riksdag can only be indicated in the barest outline. The
day after its formal opening, on February 2, Gustavus urgently
demanded a Secret Committee of Supply. The three Lower
Estates at once elected their delegates; but the Riddarhus
proved so refractory that Gustavus, after waiting a fortnight,
summoned the Estates to meet in congress. Then in a ful-
minating oration he bitterly upbraided the nobility for their
unpatriotic obstruction, ordering them to withdraw to their
separate chamber, and there apologise to their marshal whom
they had grossly insulted. The same afternoon he laid
before the delegates of the three lower Orders “An Act
tof Union and Security," which substituted for the existing
constitution_an almost-purely monarchical- form of govern-
ment, expressly reserving, indeed,_the-power of-the-purse-to
VII
X111] The Act of Union and Security 377
the Estates, but giving the king an absolutelyfree_hand in
foreign affairs.
• Though Gustavus bid high for the support of the Com-
moners (clauses_2-4-of-the-new constitution-actually-breaking
down completely, and once-for-alt, the distinction between
noble and non-noble), the Talmen of the priests and burgesses
lacked the courage to submit such a revolutionary measure to
their respective Estates; and Gustavus was compelled personally
to introduce his new constitution to the Estates in congress.
He prepared the way by an act of authority sufficient to
overawe the refractory and persuade the lukewarm. On the
evening of February 16 the burgher guards of Stockholm
arrested the prorninent members of the noble opposition,
twenty-one in number; and on the following-morning-Gustavus,
introduced to the assembled Estates the Act of Union and
Security, which he described as a measure absolutely. indis-
pensable to their common welfare. Thrice he solemnly asked
the Estates whether they accepted it or not? An_energetic
and unanimous “Aye!” from the burgesses and peasants,
completely drowning the mingled "Ayes.” and “Noes” of the
clergy, and the-louet dissent of the majority-of-the nobility,
was the immediate response. It was all so quickly done that
nobody had time to protest; but at the last moment, in
response to a touching appeal from his friend Adlerbeth,
Gustavus vouchsafed the nobility some little time for further
deliberation. That he considered their assent a mere super-
fluity is evident from the fact that two days later the three
lower-Estates, without waiting for the decision-of-the-nobility,
signed and sealed the “Act-of-Union and Security”_in_the
king's presence, which, being-approved by_a.majority_of_the
Estates, thus became law.
Ways and means for carrying on the war were next con-
sidered. The lower Estates readily agreed to guarantee the
national debt, and to vote subsidies sufficient to cover all
expenses (including the cost of the war) till the next Riksdag,
378 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III [CH.
that through April 27 repairential chair, and appof fixing the
i.e. for an indefinite period; but the Riddarhus would only
grant the subsidies for two years. Since in all subsidy .
questions the consent of all four Estates was indispensable,
the king, at the risk of his life (it must never be forgotten
that throughout he had no regular military force at his
disposal), on April 27 repaired unattended to the Riddarhus,
took his seat in the presidential chair, and appealed to the
nobles_this-once to waive their strict right of fixing the
amount and period of the war tax, and patriotically to follow
the example of their non-noble brethren. He then twice put
the question : “Do the nobility and gentry grant the subsidy
till the next. Riksdag?" and smilingly ignoring altogether a
perfect tempest of "Noes !” declared with imperturbable
composure that the “Ayes” had it, ordered the resolution of
the House to be entered in its minutes, and sent off a
deputation to the three lower Estates- to inform them of the
result.
On the following day, April 28, this stormy Riksdag was
“blown out,” to the inexpressible relief of the king's friends,
who expected every moment to hear of his assassination. On
May 11 a royal decree abolished the historic Råd, or Senate,
after an existence of 600 years; and on June 3. Gustavus,
triumphant at home, left Stockholm for the seat of war. The
Anjala conspirators had already been arrested and put on
their trial, and the Act of Union and Security made further
freason impossible.
The campaign of 1789 was honourable to the Swedish
arms. On June 1, 10,000 Russians had invaded north Fin-
land, but were driven back by General Stedingk at Porosalmi
(June 13), while Gustavus himself, at the head of the
southern army, defeated the Russians at Ultismalm (June 28),
thus relieving the pressure upon Stedingk, who won a fresh
victory at Parkumäki (July 21). The rival fleets encountered
each other off the island of Oland, when an engagement
ensued (July 26) which would have ended in a brilliant Swedish
X111] The Battles of Viborg ånd Svensksund
379
victory but for the unaccountable remissness of Captain
Liljehorn, who failed to support the admiral, Duke Charles,
at the critical moment. Equally indecisive was a fierce two
days' battle between the Swedish galley fleet, under K. A.
Ehrensvärd, and two Russian fleets off Svensksund, south-west
of Fredrikshamn (Aug. 24).
All through the winter of 1789-'90 Gustavus laboured
to make his fleets overpoweringly predominant, so as to be
able to end the war by one decisive blow. His plan was,
under cover of the ship fleet, and with the cooperation of the
land army, to attack St Petersburg itself with the galley fleet,
the attention of the enemy being distracted by a simultaneous
movement against the province of Savolaks. On May 10, 1790,
Gustavus, after defeating the Russians on land at Valkiala,
took command of the galleys, and five days later destroyed a
Russian galley fleet in Fredrikshamn harbour. Duke Charles,
with the ship fleet, subsequently (June 3—5) drove the Russian
men-of-war away from Cronstadt, to the great alarm of Catharine,
who heard the cannonade in her palace; whereupon the two
Swedish fleets entered the Gulf of Viborg. They penetrated,
however, too far, were surrounded by vastly superior forces,
and only cut their way out to sea with the utmost difficulty
and the loss of one-fourth of their effective strength (Battle
of the Viborg Gauntlet, July 3).
After this mishap Gustavus retired to Svensksund, where
he received reinforcements which raised his fleet to 190 vessels
with crews amounting to 14,000 men. Thereupon he resumed
the struggle, and on 9-10 July, won the most glorious naval
victory ever gained by the Swedish arms, the Russians losing
one-third of their fleet and 7000 men.
A month after the victory of Svensksund-peace was signed
--between Sweden and Russia-at-the, little village of Värälä
(Aug. 14, 1790). Only eight months before, Catharine had
haughtily declared that “the odious and revolting aggres-
siveness” of the king of Sweden would be "forgiven” only
380 The Hats and Caps, and Gustavus III (CH. XIII
if he “testified his repentance" by agreeing to a peace con-
firming the treaties of Ăbo and Nystad, granting a general
and unlimited amnesty to all rebels, and consenting to a
guarantee by the Swedish Riksdag (as it would be im-
prudent to confide in his good faith alone ") for the obser-
vance of peace in the future. The Peace of Värälä saved
Sweden from any such humiliating concessions. The increas-
ing difficulties of Catharine, and the shuffling of Gustavus's
allies, Great Britain and Prussia, had convinced both sovereigns
of the necessity of adjusting their differences without any
foreign intervention. On October 19, 1791, Gustavus went
still further, and took the bold but by no means imprudent
step of concluding an eight years' defensive alliance with the
empress, who thereby bound herself to pay her new ally
annual subsidies amounting to 300,000 roubles.
Mutual respect and, still more, a common antagonism
to revolutionary France united these two great rulers in their
declining years. Gustavus now aimed at forming a league of
princes against the Jacobins: and every other consideration
was subordinated thereto. His profound knowledge of popular
assemblies enabled him, alone among contemporary sovereigns,
accurately to gauge, from the first, the scope and bearing of the
French Revolution. But he was hampered by poverty and the
jealousy of the other European powers, and, after showing
once more his unrivalled mastery over masses of men at the
brief Gefle Riksdag Jan. 22-Feb. 24, 1792, he fell a victim
to a wide-spread aristocratic conspiracy. Shot in the back by
Anckarström at a midnight masquerade at the Stockholm
Opera House on March 16, 1792, he expired on the 29th.
Although he may be charged with many foibles and extrava-
gances, Gustavus III was indisputably one of the greatest
sovereigns of the eighteenth century. Unfortunately his_genius
never had full scope, and his opportunity came too late.
CHAPTER XIV.
· SWEDEN, 1792-1814.
THE first act of Duke Charles was to set aside the last
codicil made by Gustavus III on his death-bed, whereby he
had associated Armfelt and other personal friends with his
brother in the regency. The regicides were treated with com-
parative indulgence. Anckarström, indeed, was put in irons,
whipped through the town on April 19, 20, and 21, and
beheaded on the 27th, after previously losing his right hand;
but Horn, Ribbing, Liljehorn, and Ehrensvärd, all of whom
richly deserved the same fate, were, only expelled the kingdom,
while Pechlin, the prime mover in the conspiracy, was im-
prisoned in the fortress of Varberg, where he died in 1796.
The clemency shown to the murderers of their idolised master
naturally incensed the leading Gustavians; and they rightly
attributed this miscarriage of justice, as well as their own
supersession, to the influence of Reuterholm, the bosom friend
of the duke-regent, who had recalled him to Sweden imme-
diately after the death of the late king, given him a seat in the
Council and blindly submitted to his dictation.
Gustaf Adolf Reuterholm, born in 1756, was the son of
the anti-Gustavian senator, E. K. Reuterholm. His bound-
less vanity and vindictive jealousy during his four years of
administration speedily earned for him deep and universal
hatred. His abolition of the press-censorship (July 11, 1792),
382
CH.
Sweden, 1792–1814
a measure issued a week after his return to Sweden, was not
so much a concession to the spirit of the age, as a trans-
parent attack upon the whole Gustavian system, and was
immediately followed by the wholesale removal of the leading
Gustavians, who included amongst them the best talent of the
country.
It was a melancholy period, full of combustible material,
and rich in singular contrasts, a leaden age succeeding, as it
has well been said, an age of gold. The upper circles bitterly
complained that the young king was surrounded by crypto-
Jacobins; while the middle classes, deprived of the stimulating
leadership of the anti-aristocratic “Prince Charming,” and be-
coming more and more inoculated with French political ideas,
drifted into an antagonism not merely to hereditary nobility,
but to hereditary monarchy likewise. Everything was vacil-
lating and uncertain ; and the general instability was reflected
even in foreign affairs, now that the master-hand of Gustavus III
was withdrawn. The renewed efforts of Catharine II to inter-
vene in Sweden's domestic affairs were indeed energetically
repulsed, but without tact or discretion, so that the good
understanding which had existed between the two countries
since the Peace of Värälä was seriously impaired, especially
when Reuterholm's proclivities induced him to adopt what
was generally considered an indecently friendly attitude towards
the government at Paris. Despite the execution of Louis XVI
(Jan. 21, 1793), Sweden, in the hope of obtaining considerable
subsidies, recognised the new French Republic; and secret
negotiations for contracting a fresh alliance were actually
begun in May of the same year, till the menacing protests of
Catharine, supported as they were by all the other European
powers, finally induced Sweden to suspend them.
The negotiations with the French regicides exacerbated the
hatred which the Gustavians already felt for the duke's "Jacobin"
counsellors. Smarting beneath their grievances and seriously
believing that not only the young king's crown, but his very
xiv] Persecution of the Gustavians 383
life, was in danger, they formed a conspiracy, the soul of which
was Gustavus Armfelt, to overthrow the government of the duke-
regent, with the aid of a Russian fleet, supported by a rising
of the Dalecarlians. Armfelt's chief intermediary at Stock-
holm was his mistress, the frivolous but amiable Magdalena
Rudensköld, through whom he hoped to persuade the young
king to write a letter to Catharine II, inviting her cooperation.
The government discovered the plot by opening Armfelts
letters. Armfelt himself succeeded in eluding the squadron
sent to seize him, and escaping to Russia; but the other
conspirators were arrested in Sweden at the end of 1792,
and put upon their trial. Armfelt, Ehrensvärd, and Magdalena
Rudensköld were condemned to death; and even Toll and
the king's governor, Count Nils Gyldenstolpe, against whom
nothing definite could be proved, were treated with the utmost
severity. The death-sentences were indeed remitted in the
cases of Ehrensvärd and Magdalena Rudensköld, but the
unfortunate lady was pilloried in the great square of Stockholm,
to the intense indignation of the public, who regarded her
degrading punishment as a mean act of vengeance on the part
of a rejected lover, it being notorious that the duke-regent
had solicited the lady's favours in vain some years before.
The whole proceeding, indeed, was injurious to the reputation
of the government; and it was significantly remarked that
those who had simply intrigued for a change in the adminis-
tration had been treated far more rigorously than the assassins
of the late king.
The one bright side of this gloomy and sordid period was
the rapprochement between the Scandinavian kingdoms during
the revolutionary wars. Thus on March 27, 1794, a neutrality
compact was formed between Denmark and Sweden; and their
united squadrons patrolled the North Sea to protect their
merchantmen from the British cruisers. This approximation
between the two governments was happily followed by friendly
feelings between the two nations; under the pressure of
384
[CH.
Sweden, 1792–1814
a common danger, the consciousness of the kinship of the two
Scandinavian peoples awoke for the first time on both sides
of the Sound, and their secular national hatred, began to yield
to sentiments of amity and fraternity. But Reuterholm, not
content with the support of Denmark, presently resumed his
coquetry with the French Republic, which was officially re-
cognised by the Swedish government on April 23, 1795. In
return Sweden obtained a subsidy of £56,000 ; and a treaty
between the two powers was actually signed on Sept. 14, 1795.
At home the Swedish government, which had at first
been semi-Jacobin, ended as ultra-reactionary. The cause of
this change of front was an insignificant riot in Stockholm,
which so alarmed Reuterholm that he signed an edict threaten-
ing all printers who published anything relating to the con-
stitutions of the French Republic or the United States of
America with the loss of their privileges. In March, 1795,
he followed this up by closing the Swedish Academy as the
nursery of revolution, because A. G. Silfverstolpe, in his in-
augural address, had ventured to disapprove of Gustavus III's
coup d'état of 1789. An attempt to regain the friendship of
Russia, which had broken off diplomatic relations with Sweden,
was made in 1795, when Reuterholm did his utmost to
promote a marriage between the young king and the empress's
granddaughter Alexandra. In August, 1796, the duke-regent
and Reuterholm visited St Petersburg for the purpose; nego-
tiations for a new Russo-Swedish alliance were set on foot;
and the betrothal was actually fixed for September 22, when
the whole arrangement foundered on the obstinate refusal of
Gustavus IV to allow his destined bride liberty of worship ac-
cording to the rites of the Greek orthodox church. The festivities
were broken off; on October i the Swedish guests quitted the
Russian capital; and the grief and shame of such a rebuff
undoubtedly accelerated the death of Catharine II, who ex-
pired suddenly on November 17, 1796. A fortnight earlier, on
November 1, 1796, in accordance with the will of Gustavus III,
XIV]
Accession of Gustavus IV
385
the young king, now in his, eighteenth year, took the govern-
ment into his own hands.
Gustavus IV had been very carefully educated, and had
grown up serious and conscientious, and with a deep sense of
duty. Of his severe Lutheran orthodoxy we have already had
a characteristic specimen. Unfortunately, if his heart was
sound, his brain was incredibly narrow; and from early child-
hood he had displayed a haughtiness and an obstinacy which
disconcerted the best efforts of admirable tutors, though
nobody seems to have even suspected that serious mental
derangement lay at the root of his abnormal piety. On the
contrary, there were many who prematurely congratulated
themselves on the fact that Sweden had now no disturbing
genius, but an economical, God-fearing, commonplace monarch
to deal with. Gustavus's prompt dismissal of the generally
detested Reuterholm added still further to his popularity.
The old Gustavians came trooping back, joyous and confident.
Toll was placed at the head of the war office, with a seat in
the Council ; Samuel af Ugglas, one of Gustavus III's ablest
officials, was created a count and governor-general of Stock- ·
holm; Fersen, Taube, and Ehrenheim controlled foreign
affairs; nearly all those implicated in the so-called Armfelt
conspiracy were pardoned and employed; while Armfelt him-
self, though he did not return to Sweden till 1801, enjoyed
from the first the king's entire confidence.
On October 31, 1797, Gustavus married Frederica Dorothea
of Baden, a marriage which might have led to a war with
Russia but for the fanatical hatred of the French Republic
shared by the Emperor Paul and Gustavus. IV, which served
as a bond of union between them. Indeed, the king's
horror of Jacobinism was morbid in its intensity, and drove
him to adopt all sorts of reactionary measures and to post-
pone his coronation for some years, so as to avoid calling
together a Riksdag, till the disorder of the finances, caused
partly by the continental war and partly by the almost total
BAIN
25
386 .. Sweden, 1792–1814. [CH.
failure of the crops in 1798 and 1799, compelled him to
summon the Estates to Norrköping in March, 1800. On
April 3 the king was crowned; and four days later, on the
occasion of the public homage, the nobility were compelled at
last to adopt Gustavus III's detested Act of Union and
Security, chiefly, it is said, through Toll's threat, in case of
their non-compliance, to reveal the names of all the persons
suspected of complicity in the murder of Gustavus III, a list
of whom he had in his possession. Toll, indeed, with his usual
adroit audacity, succeeded in overawing the mutinous First
Estate throughout this Riksdag, while the lower Estates, ably
manipulated by the skilful old Gustavian wire-pullers, Wallqvist,
Nordin, and Håkansson, were effusively loyal. Thus the
Riksdag, which was “blown out” on June 14, 1805, con-
sented to the redemption of £4,750,000 of the national
debt, with the assistance of the Bank of Sweden, though
ultimately the scheme could only be carried through after
Wismar had been mortgaged to the duke of Mecklenburg
for £ 292,000.
Shortly after the Riksdag rose, a notable change took place
in Sweden's foreign policy. In December, 1800, Denmark,
Sweden, and Russia acceded to a second Armed Neutrality
of the North, directed against Great Britain. We shall see
how the British government retaliated on Denmark; as for
Sweden, the arsenal at Carlscrona was saved from the fate of
Copenhagen only by the assassination of the emperor Paul,
which was followed by another change of system in the North.
Hitherto Sweden had kept aloof from continental complica-
tions; but the arrest and execution of the Duc D’Enghien in
1804 inspired Gustavus IV, who was just then visiting his wife's
relations at Baden not far from the opening scene of the out-
rage, with a detestation of Bonaparte which blinded him to
every prudential consideration, and ultimately took the form of
religious mania. Thus he saw in the new French emperor the
“Beast” of the Apocalypse whom he himself was divinely
XIV]
Gustavus IV and Napoleon
387
appointed to overthrow; and, when a general coalition was
formed against Napoleon, he was one of the first to join it
(Dec. 3, 1804), pledging himself to send an army-corps to co-
operate with the English and Russians in driving the enemy
out of Hanover and Holland. Though without the slightest
military capacity, and even deficient in personal courage,
Gustavus proposed to conduct the enterprise in person; but
becoming involved in a senseless quarrel with Frederick
William II, he remained inactive in Pomerania instead of
sending the promised contingent to assist the Russians in
Hanover; and when, at last (Dec. 1805), he led his 6000 men
towards the Elbe district, the Third Coalition had already been
dissipated by the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz.
In 1806 a rupture between Sweden and Prussia was pre-
vented only by Napoleon's assault upon the latter power ;
whereupon Gustavus, instead of taking advantage of this un-
looked-for opportunity of cooperating against the common
enemy, returned to Sweden, leaving his troops idle in Pomerania
and Lauenburg. Napoleon now tried to win over Sweden;
but Gustavus rejected every overture. On January 28, 1807,
Mortier invaded Swedish Pomerania and blockaded Stralsund,
which was so ably defended by Hans von Essen and Armfelt,
that, on April 1, the French retired with the loss of 1300 men.
But not for long. After the crushing victory of Friedland,
Napoleon detached Brune, with 30,000 men, against Swedish
Pomerania ; and Stralsund capitulated on August 20. The
Swedish army of 13,000 men, which had retired to Rügen, now
seemed irretrievably lost. It was saved however by the tact
and subtlety of Toll, now in supreme command, who cajoled
the French marshal into a convention, whereby the Swedish
army, with all its muniments of war, was permitted to return
unmolested to Sweden (September 7, 1807). For this exploit
Toll received his marshal's bâton.
At Tilsit the emperor Alexander had undertaken to com-
pel “Russia's geographical enemy," as Napoleon designated
25-2
388
[ch.
Sweden, 1792–1814
Sweden, to accede to the newly-established Continental System.
Gustavus IV naturally rejected all the proposals of Alexander
to close the Baltic against the English; but he took no
measures to defend Finland against Russia, though during
the autumn of 1807 it was notorious that the Tsar was pre-
paring to attack the Grand Duchy. On February 21, 1808,
a Russian army crossed the Finnish border, without any
previous declaration of war. On April 2 the king ordered
a general levy of 30,000 men; but, while two army-corps
under Armfelt and Toll, together with a British contingent of
10,000 men under Moore, were stationed in Scania and on the
Norwegian border, in anticipation of an attack from Denmark,
which, at the instigation of Napoleon, had simultaneously de-
clared war against Sweden, the little Finnish army was left
altogether unsupported.
The beginning of the Finnish campaign was anything
but glorious, although the army in Finland, with dwindling
strength but unbroken courage, sustained the unequal struggle
with the Russian colossus. The commander-in-chief, Vilhelm
Klingspor, giving up everything for lost, retreated northwards to
Uleåborg; and the impregnable fortress of Sveaborg surrendered
without striking a blow. The latter event is indeed the most
miserable and painful episode in the military history of
Sweden. The gigantic creation of Gustavus III's patriotism
and Ehrensvärd's genius, built upon granite in the midst of
inaccessible islands, with a garrison of more than 6000 men,
2000 guns, inexhaustible stores, and 110 war galleys in the
harbour, which should have been the bulwark of the Grand
Duchy and the rallying-point of the whole Finnish army, was
surrendered (May 3), after losing five men, by its cowardly
commandant K. O. Cronstedt, although the besiegers had
only 10,000 men and 46 pieces of artillery. After such a
collapse the heroism of the northern army, though it more
than redeemed the honour of Finland, could not save her
independence. The principal heroes of this struggle, which
XIV] Deposition of Gustavus IV
389
Runeberg has immortalised in Fänrik Ståls Sägner, were Karl
Johan Adlercreutz, Georg Karl von Döbeln, J. A. Cronstedt,
and Johan August Sandels. For fully five months (May-
Sept. 1808) these gallant officers, with only 12,000 men, kept
at bay the Russian forces, which were gradually augmented
from 16,000 to 55,000 men, winning no fewer than six pitched
battles, of which the most notable were Revolaks (April 27),
Lappo (July 14), lasting thirteen hours, and Juutas (Septem-
ber 13), which compelled the Russians to grant the armistice
of Lochteå (September 29). Unsupported as they were by the
home government, the gallant Finns were compelled at last to
yield to superior numbers; and, by the Convention of Olkijoki
(Nov. 19), Klercker, the commander-in-chief, surrendered to
the Russians all the land east of the Kemi, and retired to
Torneå.
By this time not merely the independence of Finland, but
the very existence of Sweden herself was at stake, for, in ac-
cordance with a compact made with Napoleon for the partition
of Sweden, the Emperor Alexander was preparing to attack
Stockholm from the north and east, while the Danes cooperated
frorn the west. The crisis was acute; the king clearly had lost
his head. His violence had alienated his most faithful sup-
porters, while his obstinate incompetence paralysed the national
efforts. To remove a madman by force was the one remaining
expedient; and this was successfully accomplished by a con-
spiracy of officers of the western army, headed by Adlersparre,
the Anckarsvärds, and Adlercreutz, who marched rapidly from
Scania to Stockholm. On March 13, 1809, seven: of the
conspirators broke into the royal apartments in the palace un-
announced, seized the king, and conducted him to the château
of Gripsholm ; Duke Charles was easily persuaded to accept
the leadership of a provisional government which was pro-
claimed the same day; and a Riksdag, hastily summoned,
solemnly approved of the revolution. On March 29, Gustavus,
in order to save the crown for his son, voluntarily abdicated;
390
[CH.
Sweden, 1792–1814
but on May 1o the Estates, dominated by the army, declared
that not merely Gustavus but his whole posterity had forfeited
the throne. On June 5 the duke-regent was proclaimed king
under the title of Charles XIII, after accepting the new liberal
constitution, which was ratified by the Riksdag the same day.
In December Gustavus IV and his family were transported to
Germany, ultimately settling in Switzerland, where the unhappy
king died on February 7, 1837.
The new king was at best a useful stop-gap, in no way
likely to interfere with the free course of the liberal revolution
which had placed him on the throne. Peace was what the
exhausted nation now required; and negotiations had already
been opened at Fredrickshamn. The Russians demanded the
cession of Finland, the Åland Islands, and all Vesterbotten
between the rivers Kalix and Kemi. Even now Sweden could
not submit to such humiliating terms; hostilities were resumed,
and 8000 men were despatched from Stockholm to Ratan,
a place some miles north of Ume, near which lay the main
Russian army under Sergius Kamenski. Taking advantage of
the cautious and dilatory tactics of the Swedish commanders,
Kamenski defeated them at Sävarsbruk (Aug. 19, 1809) and
again at Ratan, compelled them to re-embark, and then
pursued his triumphant march through north Sweden to Pite.
After this fiasco, which would not have happened if the greatest
Swedish strategist, Döbeln, who was actually on the spot, had
been employed or at least consulted, the Swedish government
yielded to the inevitable; and peace was obtained by the
sacrifice of Finland, the Aland Islands, “the foreposts of
Stockholm,” as Napoleon rightly described them, and Ves-
terbotten as far as the rivers Torneå and Muonio (Treaty of
Fredrickshamn, Sept. 17, 1809). Peace was also concluded
with Denmark at Jönköping (Dec. Io, 1809), and with France
at Paris (Jan. 6, 1810), Sweden getting back Pomerania on
condition that she closed her ports against all British goods.
On December 24, 1809, the question of the succession to
ris (Jan. 6. closed her portsuestion of
24, 1809, theorts against all Britiomerania on
XIV] The murder of Count Fersen 391
the throne was revived by the sudden illness of the king; and
the Gustavians, who had never ceased their agitation in favour
of Prince Gustavus, son of Gustavus IV, despite the election
by the Riksdag of Prince Charles Augustus of Augustenburg,
endeavoured to prolong and divide the Riksdag, in the hope
of getting the new constitution repealed. Charles Augustus
arrived in Sweden in January, 1810. His amiability and
manifest nobility of character soon made him highly popular
everywhere except in the high aristocratic circles, where the
Gustavians were strongest; between him and the powerful
Fersen family in particular there was considerable tension.
The sudden death of the prince while reviewing the Scanian
troops at Qvidinge (May 28, 1810) was regarded as a national
calamity; and its immediate effect was to inflame the worst
passions of the already intensely hostile political parties. To
Adlersparre and the military revolutionary faction it was a
terrible blow; and, in the not ungrounded fear that the
Gustavians might seize the opportunity of bringing about a
counter revolution in favour of Prince Gustavus, they descended
to the most infamous expedients, even employing the baser
portion of the Stockholm press to spread abroad the rumour
that Charles Augustus had been poisoned by the Fersens, not-
withstanding the fact that three of the most eminent doctors
in Scandinavia, after a careful and conscientious autopsy, had
pronounced the death to be due to natural causes.
The popular excitement was raised to frenzy by the publi-
cation of a fable in verse entitled “The Ravens,” which plainly
enough indicated Count Hans Axel af Fersen and his sister,
the Countess Piper, as the late crown-prince's murderers. On
the occasion of the state funeral, on June 20, 1810, Count Hans
Axel af Fersen, who, in virtue of his office of earl-marshal,
occupied a conspicuous position in the cortège, was dragged
from his carriage and literally worried to death by the mob,
while the troops on guard, whose officers had received secret
instructions not to meet force by force in case of a popular
392
CH.
Sweden, 1792–1814
disturbance, looked on while the battered and bleeding earl-
marshal was slowly done to death, without raising a hand to
save him. The mystery which surrounds this hideous massacre
of the noblest of the Gustavians is still impenetrable. The
crime is said to have been the unforeseen result of a deliberate
design on the part of the military party to insult and terrorise
the high aristocracy in the person of its leader, Count Fersen,
by means of the rabble who, as usual, got out of hand and
exceeded the wishes of its instigators. But the mysterious
official instructions given to the troops beforehand, and their
consequent apathy, arouse still darker suspicion of a premedi-
tated assassination in the highest quarters.
A new heir to the throne had now to be chosen, The
king and the Senate were in favour of the late crown-prince's
brother, Christian Frederick of Augustenburg; and Napoleon,
who was at once informed of their wishes, declared that he had
no objection to the candidate. But a large part of the Swedish
army, in view of future complications with Russia, were in
favour of electing a soldier, preferably a French marshal; and
of all the French marshals, Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo,
was most popular in Sweden because of the kindness he had
shown to the Swedish prisoners during the late war with
Denmark. The matter was decided by one of the Swedish
couriers, Baron Karl Otto Mörner, who, entirely on his own
initiative, offered the succession to the Swedish crown to
Bernadotte. Bernadotte hastened to communicate Mörner's
offer to Napoleon, who treated the whole affair as an absurdity
with which it was beneath his dignity to meddle. Bernadotte
thereupon informed Mörner (June 27, 1810) that he would
not refuse the honour if he were duly elected. Although the
Swedish government, amazed at Mörner's effrontery, placed
him under arrest on his return to Sweden, the candidature
of Bernadotte gradually gained favour in Sweden ; and on
August 21, 1810, he was elected crown-prince by all four
Estates. The most probable explanations of this fairy-tale
XIV]
Bernadotte crown-prince of Sweden
393
election are Sweden's old affection for France, the hope of re-
gaining Finland with Napoleon's assistance, and the universal
belief in the statesmanlike and soldierly qualities of the prince
of Ponte Corvo. On November 2 Bernadotte made his solemn
entry into Stockholm, and on the 5th he received the homage
of the Estates, and was adopted by Charles XIII under the
name of Charles John.
The new crown-prince was very soon the most popular
and the most powerful man in Sweden. The infirmity of the
old king, and the dissensions in the council of state, placed
the government, and especially the control of foreign affairs,
almost entirely in his hands; and he boldly adopted a policy
which was directly antagonistic to the wishes and hopes of the
old school of Swedish statesmen, but perhaps the best adapted
to the circumstances. Finland he at once gave up for lost.
He knew that Russia would never voluntarily relinquish the
Grand Duchy, while Sweden could not hope to retain it per-
manently, even if she reconquered it. But the acquisition of
Norway might make up for the loss of Finland; and Charles
John argued that it might be an easy matter to persuade the
anti-Napoleonic powers to punish Denmark for her loyalty to
France by wresting Norway from her. Napoleon he rightly
distrusted, though at first he was obliged to submit to the
emperor's dictation. Thus on November 13, 1810, the
Swedish government was forced to declare war against Great
Britain, though the British government was privately in-
formed at the same time that Sweden was not a free agent,
and that the war would be a mere demonstration. But the
pressure of Napoleon became more and more intolerable,
culminating in the occupation of Swedish Pomerania by
French troops in January, 1812. The Swedish government
thereupon concluded a secret convention with Russia (Treaty
of Petersburg, April 5, 1812), undertaking to send 30,000 men
to operate against Napoleon in Germany, in return for a
promise from Alexander guaranteeing to Sweden the possession
394
ICH.
Sweden, 1792–1814
of Norway. Too late Napoleon endeavoured to outbid
Alexander by offering to Sweden Finland, all Pomerania, and
Mecklenburg, in return for Sweden's active cooperation against
Russia.
The Örebro Riksdag (April-August, 1812), remarkable
besides for its partial repudiation of Sweden's national debt
and its reactionary press laws, introduced general conscription
into Sweden, and thereby enabled the crown-prince to carry
out his ambitious policy. In May, 1812, he mediated a peace
between Russia and Turkey, so as to enable Russia to use
all her forces against France (Peace of Bucharest); and on
July 18, at Örebro, peace was also concluded between Great
Britain on one side, and Russia and Sweden on the other.
These two treaties were in effect the corner-stones of a fresh
coalition against Napoleon, and were confirmed on the out-
break of the Franco-Russian War by a conference between
Alexander and Charles John at Abo, August 30, 1812, when
the Tsar undertook to place an army-corps of 35,000 men at
the disposal of the Swedish crown-prince, for the conquest of
Norway. Annexed to this convention was a secret article, or
“ family compact,” by which each sovereign guaranteed to the
other the possession of his territories.
The Treaty of Abo, and indeed the whole of Charles
John's foreign policy in 1812, provoked violent and justifiable
criticism among the better class of politicians in Sweden.
The immorality of indemnifying Sweden at the expense of
a weaker friendly power was obvious; and, while Finland was
now definitively sacrificed, Norway had still to be won. More-
over, Great Britain and Russia very properly insisted that
Charles John's first duty was to the anti-Napoleonic coalition,
the former power vigorously objecting to the expending of
her subsidies on the nefarious Norwegian adventure before
the common enemy had been crushed. Only on his very
ungracious compliance did Great Britain also promise to
countenance the union of Sweden and Norway (Treaty of
che mike and sted to age ana
xiv] War between Norway and Sweden 395
Stockholm, March. 3, 1813); and on April 23 Russia gave
her guarantee to the same effect. After the defeats of Gross-
Görschen and Bautzen it was the Swedish crown-prince who
put fresh heart into the Allies; and, at the Conference of
Trachenberg, he drew up the general plan for the campaign,
which began after the expiration of the Truce of Poischwitz.
Though undoubtedly sparing his Swedes unduly, to the just
displeasure of the Allies, Charles John, as commander-in-chief
of the northern army, successfully defended the approaches to
Berlin against Oudinot in August and against Ney in Sep-
tember; but after Leipsic he went his own way, determined at
all hazards to cripple Denmark and secure Norway.
The Norwegians, however, objected to a forced union with
a hostile neighbour of a different language and social com-
plexion. Their pride and their patriotism naturally revolted at
the prospect of being transferred from one potentate to another
like a mere province; and they insisted that, if their lawful
monarch, King Frederick, had released them from their
allegiance, they had an inalienable right to dispose of their
own destinies. The proclamation issued by the Swedish crown-
prince, promising them a constitution and the privilege of
self-taxation, was therefore ignored; and, when their popular
stadholder, the Danish Prince Christian Frederick, urged them
to rise in defence of their independence, they responded as
one man. On April 10, 1814, representatives of the nation
met at Eidsvold iron-works, a few miles north of Christiania.
In this assembly, 82 out of 112 members were against union
with Sweden; a very liberal constitution, on the basis of the
French constitution of 1791, was drawn up; and on May 17
Christian Frederick was elected king of Norway. But Charles
John was not the man to relinquish a crown for which he had
already sacrificed all Sweden's German possessions; and, as
the Norwegians rejected the mediation of the great powers
and mobilised their army, he invaded Norway forthwith. The
brief struggle was never for a moment doubtful; and, after a
396
1
Sweden, 1792-1814
..
(CHcampaign of a few weeks, the convention of Moss, August 14,
1814, provided for the suspension of hostilities and the sum-
moning of a national assembly or Storthing, Charles John
engaging to recognise the Eidsvold constitution, with such
modifications as the union of the two kingdoms rendered
necessary.
At the Storthing assembled at Christiania on October 7,
Christian Frederick abdicated; and negotiations were entered
into with Sweden for a constitutional union. On October 20
the Storthing, convinced of the futility of further resistance,
voted the union by seventy-two votes against five. The
Eidsvold constitution was then revised, point by point. Fifty
of its 110 paragraphs were retained unaltered; the rest were
amended or omitted. On November 4 the new constitution
was completed. Norway was declared to be a free and inde-
pendent kingdom, united to Sweden under a common king,
the crown being hereditary in Prince Charles John and his
descendants. The executive authority was invested in the
king, assisted by a responsible council of state. The king
was empowered to appoint a viceroy or stadholder, was re-
cognised as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, which
were not to be employed abroad without the consent of the
Storthing, and was, in conjunction with the Swedish and Nor-
wegian councils of state, to be the intermediary with foreign
powers. The nation was to be represented in the Storthing,
a one-chamber Parliament elected triennially and assembling
every year at Christiania. One-fourth of its members, on the
opening of each session, were to form by election an Upper
House or Lagthing, the remaining three-fourths constituting
the Lower House or Odelsthing; but the division was only to
take place when the Storthing resolved itself into a legislative
or revisional assembly, and neither of the two things was to
veto the other. The Storthing alone. had the right to levy
taxes. The legislative authority was to be exercised by the
king and the Storthing conjointly, but the king (excepting
XIV] The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 397
in the case of a proposed modification of the fundamental
law, when the veto was to be absolute) was to have only a
suspensive veto; and a resolution adopted by three regular
Storthings in succession was to become law independently of
the royal sanction. Unfortunately the distinction between the
cases when the royal veto was to be suspensive and when
absolute was so loosely drawn as to leave room for serious
differences of opinion between the crown and the legislature.
CHAPTER XV.
DENMARK, 1721-1814.
The last ten years of the reign of Frederick IV were de-
voted to the nursing and development of the resources of the
country, which had suffered only less severely than Sweden from
the effects of the great Northern War. The court, seriously
pious, did much for education. No fewer than 240 national
schools were built during the period; missionaries were de-
spatched to Finmark and the East Indies; and Hans Egede,
the apostle of Greenland, was effectually supported. A wise
economy also contributed to reduce the national debt within
manageable limits, despite the immense damage done by the
great fire of Copenhagen in 1728, which reduced two-thirds
of the capital to ashes. In the welfare of the peasantry
Frederick IV took a deep interest. In 1722 serfdom was
abolished in the case of all peasants born after his accession;
but the effect of this humane and highly popular reform was
considerably impaired by the simultaneous issue of a militia
ordinance, to enable landed proprietors to provide the neces-
sary army recruits from among their tenants.
The first act of Frederick's successor, Christian VI (1730-
1746), was to abolish this national militia as being “an in-
tolerable burden”; yet the more pressing agrarian difficulties
were not thereby surmounted as had been anticipated. The
price of corn continued to fall; the migration of the peasantry
CH. XV] Christian VI and Frederick V 399
assumed alarming proportions; and at last, “to preserve the
land,” as well as increase the defensive capacity of the country,
the national militia was reestablished by the decree of Feb-
ruary 4, 1733, which at the same time bound to the soil all
peasants between the ages of nine and forty. Reactionary
as this measure was, it enabled the agricultural interest, on
which the prosperity of Denmark mainly depended, to tide
over one of the most dangerous crises in its history; but
certainly the position of the Danish peasantry was never
worse than during the reign of the religious and benevolent
Christian VI. On the other hand, no other Danish king
had such a regard for the intellectual and spiritual welfare
of his subjects. The University, which had perished in the
conflagration of 1728, was rebuilt on a far more imposing scale
in 1732; and its new and more liberal charter was a great in-
provement on the old one. The other learned schools were
reformed by the ordinance of April 17, 1739; and the long-
neglected Danish language recovered its rights and was hence-
forth diligently cultivated. But the king was bent upon making
his subjects good Christians, even more than good citizens. At
the same time we find an almost unexampled tolerance pre-
vailing (by which the Calvinists chiefly benefited), due to the
intervention of the king during the violent but stimulating
polemics between the ultra-orthodox Danish hierarchy and
German pietism, which had now penetrated into Denmark
and won a footing at court. Good as he was, Christian VI
himself did not go the way to become personally popular. The
shy, sickly, and mildly-melancholy monarch, with his pious in-
valided consort, Queen Sophia Magdalena, lived the life of an
industrious recluse in his many splendid palaces, rarely showing
himself to his people, whom he kept at a distance by placing
chained posts and vigilant guards before his doors.
Under the peaceful reign of his son and successor, Frede-
rick V (1746-66), still more was done for commerce, industry,
and agriculture. To promote Denmark's carrying trade, treaties
400
[CH.
Denmark, 1721-1814
were made with the Barbary States, Genoa, and Naples; and
the East Indian Trading Company flourished so exceedingly
that it was able to erect a costly equestrian statue of the king in
front of the Amalienborg palace. Manufactories and industries
were materially assisted by loans, subsidies, and monopolies,
and a rigorous protective system which included no fewer than
150 different kinds of wares. On the other hand the condition
of the peasantry was even worse under Frederick V than it had
been under Christian VI, the Stavnsbaand, or regulation, which
bound all males to the soil, being made operative from the age
of four. Yet signs of a coming amelioration were not want-
ing. The theory of the physiocrats, that trade and industry
could take care of themselves, but that agriculture must be
helped in every possible way, now found powerful advocates in
Denmark; and after 1755, when the press censorship was
abolished so far as regarded political economy and agriculture,
a thorough discussion of the whole agrarian question became
possible. A commission, appointed in 1757, worked zealously
for the repeal of many agricultural abuses; and several great
landed proprietors, notably A. G. Moltke and J. H. E.
Bernstorff, introduced hereditary leaseholds and abolished the
servile tenure. Social questions were also freely discussed.
Immediately after his accession Frederick V had publicly
declared that he would not allow the intellectual life of his
subjects to be in any way restricted; and the Academy of
Sorö, reestablished by Christian VI and richly endowed by
Holberg, became the centre of the new liberalism.
Foreign affairs were left in the capable hands of Count
J. H. E. Bernstorff, who aimed at restoring Denmark to her
former rank of a great power, and had a watchful eye for the
dangers likely to arise from the aggrandisement of Prussia and
Russia. Only once during the reign of Frederick V was
peace imperilled. On the death of the Russian empress
Elizabeth, 1762, her nephew Peter, who was also duke of
Holstein-Gottorp, succeeded her; and the keynote of his
xv7
Christian VII
401
whole policy was hostility to Denmark. Even his idol,
Frederick the Great, could not restrain him; and no sooner
had he disengaged Russia from the complications of the Seven
Years' War than he directed all his forces against the secular
enemy of his Holstein duchy. Denmark, although deserted
by all her allies, resolutely sent a fine fleet of thirty-six men-
of-war into the Baltic, far superior to anything the Russians
could oppose to it, and at the same time despatched 40,000
men to Mecklenburg to prevent the invasion of Holstein. The
Danish and Moscovite armies came within striking distance,
when the revolution at St Petersburg, which placed Catharine II
on the throne, changed the whole situation. The Russian ad-
vance was stayed; and ultimately, by the compact of 1773, the
house of Gottorp, represented by the grand-duke Paul, agreed
to the incorporation of Sleswick with Denmark, and ceded its
portion of Holstein in exchange for Oldenburg and Del-
menhorst.
The first four absolute kings of Denmark had laboured for
the welfare of their people according to their lights; and, if
none of them had been great men, all of them had at least
been good rulers. Christian VII, who succeeded his father in
1766, had neither the wish nor the capacity to rule. He was
kind-hearted and not without natural wit, but, shamefully neg-
lected in his childhood, he had grown up beneath the tyranny
of a brutal and ignorant governor, amidst the vilest environ-
ment, a timid, capricious, and hopelessly debauched semi-
imbecile. That his motives were respectable is evident from
his efforts on behalf of the down-trodden peasantry, whom he
ineant entirely to emancipate, beginning by abolishing serfdom
among all the crown-tenants in the county of Copenhagen. But
before very long symptoms of madness, though never officially
recognised, were observable in the unfortunate prince; and
shortly after his return from a foreign tour in 1768, during
which, strange to say, he impressed society both in Paris and
London most favourably, lie was clearly incapable of governing.
- 26
BAIN
402
[CH.
Denmark, 1721-1814
oon ma where he who servick-IT
Christian had been accompanied on this tour by a young
German doctor, Johan Frederick Struensee, who had connexions
at court, and had been warmly recommended to him. Struensee
was born at Halle in 1731. His father, subsequently super-
intendent-general of Sleswick-Holstein, was a rigid pietist; but
young Struensee, who settled down in the sixties as a doctor at
Altona, where his superior intelligence and elegant manners
soon made him fashionable, revolted against the narrowness of
his father's creed, became a fanatical propagandist of the atheism
of the Encyclopedia, and, while preaching the new gospel of
social reform and enlightenment, scandalised his contempo-
raries by the frank licentiousness of his private life. But he
was a clever doctor, and, having somewhat restored the king's
health and gained his affection, was retained as court-physician
and accompanied Christian VII back to Copenhagen, contrary
to the advice of the sagacious Bernstorff, who took the right
measure of the shallow, unprincipled adventurer. It had always
been Struensee's ambition to play a great part in the world
and realise his dreams of reform. From the banished Count
Rantzau-Ascheberg and other Danish friends of dubious
character he had gathered that the crazy, old-fashioned Dano-
Norwegian state, misruled by an idiot, was the fittest subject
in the world for the experiments of a man of superior ingenuity
like himself; and he proceeded to worm his way to power with
considerable astuteness.
First he reconciled the king and queen, for he calculated,
shrewdly enough, that if the king was to be his tool the queen
must needs be his friend. Nor was it long before the queen
became much more than his friend. At first Caroline Matilda
had disliked Struensee, whose reputation was flagrantly bad, but
she was speedily captivated by his indisputable superiority. The
unfortunate girl (she was scarce eighteen), who two years before
had, for purely political reasons, been mated with a crapulous
lunatic, to live with whom on any terms of intimacy was in-
evitable degradation, could not fail to be deeply impressed by
Ascendency of Struensee
403
XV]
the interesting and highly gifted young doctor, whose tact and
consideration speedily and completely won her susceptible
heart; and though, as a matter of fact, Struensee remained
cold, he was nevertheless libertine enough to debauch the
queen in order to promote his own interests. By January of
1770 he was notoriously her lover ; a successful vaccination of
the baby crown-prince against small-pox, in May, still further
increased his influence; and when, in the course of the year,
the king sank into a condition of mental torpor, Struensee's
authority became paramount. Bernstorff now alone stood in
his way, and Bernstorff was got rid of by a royal letter of Sep-
tember 15, 1770. Previously to this, Bernstorff's enemy and
Struensee's friend, the exiled disreputable Count Rantzau-
Ascheberg, was recalled to court; and with him came another
Altona acquaintance of Struensee's, Enevold Brandt, who had
also been living abroad under a cloud, but now came back to
help the aspiring doctor to look after the imbecile king.
If ever there was an opportunity for constructive states-
manship in Denmark-Norway, it was in the autumn of 1770.
Domestic affairs were in anything but a satisfactory state. The
national debt still stood at seventeen millions. In order to
reduce it, crown property had to be sold on an enormous scale;
and the pressure of taxation was already so severe that one
leading statesman declared that air and water were now the
only articles which remained untaxed. Moreover the evil
effects of over-protection were beginning to be felt. Many
industrial sources of revenue were drying up; the prices of
most of the necessaries of life were steadily rising, woollen,
cotton and silk goods in particular being almost unobtainable ;
and an uneasy feeling prevailed that the fifty years' peace which
the Danish state had enjoyed since the great Northern War
had been unattended by the prosperity which might very
reasonably have been expected. But, if the situation was
difficult, the general discontent excited by the old order of
things, and the general desire for reform in nearly every direc-
26_2
404
[CH.
Denmark, 1721-1814
tion, were encouraging symptoms which might have been made
the stepping-stones to a new and better system of government.
This did not escape the quick eye of Struensee; and he
chose the moment when he overthrew Bernstorff to introduce
an obviously useful reform by abolishing the press censorship
(September 14, 1770) as a preliminary measure. His friend
Rantzau-Ascheberg about the same time took his seat in the
Council of State; but for the present Struensee himself kept
discreetly in the background, though from henceforth he was
the wire-puller of the whole political machine. But he soon
grew impatient with his puppets. In December the Council of
State was abolished; and Struensee, who hitherto had held the
modest post of Royal lector, appointed himself “Maître des
requêtes.” It was now his official duty to present to the king
all the reports from the various departments of state; and,
Christian VII being scarcely responsible for his actions,
Struensee naturally dictated to him whatever answers he
pleased. His next proceeding was to make a clean sweep of
all the heads of departments and to abolish the Norwegian
stadholdership. Henceforth the Cabinet, with himself as its
motive power, was to be the one supreme authority in the
State. Yet there was one exception. However high an opinion
Struensee had of his own capacity, he could not but recognise
that his ignorance of diplomatic routine and international
affairs disqualified him from controlling the Danish foreign
office, so he entrusted that department to Count Osten. It
was perhaps the most prudent thing he ever did, but he thereby
incurred the undying animosity of his former protector Count
Rantzau-Ascheberg, who had, in petto, reserved that lucrative
post for himself.
Having thus concentrated all power in his own hands,
Struensee could devote himself entirely to the work of reform.
The ambition of inscribing his name among the most illustrious
representatives of the new era of enlightenment weighed much
with him, but there also can be no doubt that he really meant
hy
.
xv]
The Struensee Reforms
405
to do good. He felt that it was his mission to regenerate the
benighted Danish and Norwegian nations, but unfortunately he
had made up his mind to regenerate them in his own way, on
purely abstract principles, without the slightest regard for native
customs and predilections, which in his eyes were of course mere
prejudices. As, moreover, he knew not a word of Danish, he
could not but be ignorant in many important respects of the
real wants and the actual condition of the two kingdoms he
had taken in hand. It must not be supposed that the Struensee
reform was an isolated phenomenon in Danish history, sharply
contrasting with what immediately preceded and succeeded it.
The Pietism of the earlier part was in some respects the fore-
runner of the philanthropy of the latter part of the eighteenth
century; and humane principles had already filtered through the
whole social and political fabric of Denmark. When, therefore,
Struensee appointed a commission to lighten the burdens and
promote the benefit of the peasantry, when he established
foundling hospitals, when he abolished capital punishment for
theft and the employment of judicial torture, he was only fol-
lowing in the footsteps of his predecessors, although his mode
of proceeding was more energetic and thoroughgoing than
theirs had been. The same remark applies to his praiseworthy
endeavours to raise the efficiency and dignity of the public
service by doing away with such demoralising abuses as per-
quisites, “lackeyism," or the appointment of great men's
domestics to lucrative public posts, and the like.
In all these necessary and beneficial reforms there was
nothing revolutionary. Unfortunately reform was not so much
a principle as a hobby, a mania, with Struensee. On one
occasion he casually observed that the whole State was so full
of faults that he would not leave one stone of it upon another.
And he was as good as his word. The mere fact that a
venerable institution still existed was a sufficient reason, in
his eyes, for doing away with it. Changes which a prudent
and careful minister might have effected in a decade or a
406
CH.
Denmark, 1721-1814
.
generation, Struensee pushed through in less than a fortnight
or a month. To give some idea of his febrile activity, it may
be mentioned that between March 29, 1771, and January 16,
1772-the ten months during which he held absolute sway-
he issued no fewer than 1069 revolutionary cabinet orders, or
more than three a day. In order to be sure of obedience he
dismissed wholesale the staffs of all the public departments,
substituting for old and experienced officials nominees of his
own, in many cases untried men who knew little or nothing of
the country they were supposed to govern. It may be added
that most of the abruptly discharged civilians received neither
compensation nor retiring pension.
The Dictator's manners were even worse than his methods.
He habitually adopted a tone of insulting superiority, all the
more irritating as coming from an ill-informed foreigner ; and
there were occasions when he seemed to go out of his way to
shock the most sacred feelings of the most respectable classes
of the community. Thus, as if to show his contempt for
religion and public worship, Struensee, with revolting cynicism,
converted the chapel of the great Frederick Hospital, and
the chaplains' apartments adjoining it, into wards for diseases
of the most loathsome type, and dismissed the chaplains
as unnecessary. Nor was this all. His system of retrench-
ment, on which he particularly prided himself, was in the last
degree immoral and hypocritical, for, while reducing the
number of the public officials or clipping down their salaries
to starvation point, he squandered thousands upon balls,
concerts, and masquerades, and other agréments of the court,
and induced the king to present him and his friend Brandt
with 60,000 rix-dollars apiece. Other Danish monarchs, it is
true, had before now liberally rewarded their faithful ministers,
but at least they knew what they were about. There is some-
thing peculiarly revolting in the spectacle of Struensee misusing
his power over the imbecile king in order to put money into
his own pocket.
xv] Struensee the Dictator of Denmark 407
Still, in spite of all his blunders and brutalities, it is pretty
evident that for a short time at least middle-class public
opinion was, on the whole, favourable to the new minister,
or, at least, disposed to give him a chance. Hatred of
the aristocracy was still a living force in Denmark, and the
liberated Danish press acclaimed the reforms, especially the
agrarian reforms, of Struensee. Had he been wise and modest
enough to cultivate this germinating popularity, he might per-
haps have been able to defy any combination of the dispossessed
bureaucrats and the discontented landed proprietors. But
Struensee's contempt for the Danish people was almost in-
credible. He cared not a jot whether they approved or dis-
approved of his reforms, and as to making any effort to master -
their language, he regarded the very idea of such a thing as the
height of absurdity. From first to last he was content to be
regarded as a sort of saturnine providence, dispensing ordi-
nances from a remote and awful distance. He was never
visible except in the royal box at the theatre, or when he was
out riding with the king and queen. But what most incensed
the people against him was the way in which he put the king
completely on one side; and this feeling was all the stronger
as, outside a very narrow court circle, nobody seems to have
had any idea that Christian VII (who was carefully exhibited
to the public during his very few and ever rarer lucid
intervals) was really mad at all. The opinion prevailed that
his will had been weakened, if not crushed, by habitual ill-
usage; and this opinion was confirmed by the publication of
the cabinet order of July 14, 1771, appointing Struensee
“Gehejme Kabinetsminister," with authority to issue cabinet
orders which were to have the force of royal ordinances, even
if unprovided with the royal sign-manual.
Nor were Struensee's scandalous relations with the queen
less offensive to a nation which had a traditional veneration
for the royal house of Oldenburg, while Caroline Matilda's
peculiarly shameless and unfeminine conduct in public brought
408
[CH.
Denmark, 1721-1814
the kingdom into contempt. The society which daily gathered
round the king and queen, of a sort happily not often seen
even at the worst courts, excited the derision of the foreign
ambassadors. An involuntary eye-witness has remarked, “We
had a sort of resemblance to servants in a good house sitting
down to table in the absence of the master and mistress."
The unhappy king was little more than the butt of his en-
vironment, and once, when he threatened his keeper, Brandt,
with a flogging for some impertinence, Brandt, encouraged by
Struensee and the queen, actually locked Christian VII in his
room and beat him with his fists till he begged for mercy.
Things were at their worst during the winter of 1771. Struensee,
who had in the meantime created himself a count, now gave
full rein to his licentiousness and brutality. If, as we are
assured, he publicly snubbed the queen, we may readily
imagine how he treated common folk. Before long the people
had an opportunity of expressing their disgust openly. In the
summer of 1771 Caroline Matilda was delivered of a daughter,
who was christened Louisa Augusta ; and a proclamation com-
manded that a “Te Deum” in honour of the event should be
sung in all the churches; but so universal was the belief that
the child was Struensee's that, at the end of the ordinary
service, the congregation rose and departed en masse, leaving
the clergy to sing the “Te Deum” by themselves.
The general ill-will against Struensee and the queen, which,
smouldering all through the autumn of 1771, had been greatly
encouraged by unmistakeable signs of poltroonery on his part,
found expression at last in a secret conspiracy against him,
headed by Rantzau-Ascheberg; General Eichstadt, the chief of
the dragoon regiment responsible for the safety of the court;
the queen-dowager, Juliana Maria ; her son Prince Frederick;
and the prince's secretary, the theologian and historian, Ove
Höegh-Guldberg. Early in the morning of January 17, 1772,
Struensee, Brandt, and the queen were arrested in their respec-
tive bedrooms; and the “liberation of the king," who was
Xv] Fall and execution of Struensee 409
driven round Copenhagen by his deliverer in a gold carriage,
was received with universal rejoicing. The chief charge against
Struensee was that he had usurped the royal authority in con-
travention of the Kongelov. He defended himself with consider-
able ability, and, at first, confident that the prosecution would
not dare to lay hands on the queen, he denied that their
liaison had ever been criminal. But, on hearing that she also
was a prisoner of state, his courage evaporated, and he was
base enough to betray her. On April 25 both Struensee and
Brandt were condemned first to lose their right hands and then
to be beheaded; their bodies were afterwards to be drawn and
quartered. Sentence of death was the least that Struensee had
to expect. He had undoubtedly been guilty of lèse-majesté
and gross usurpation of the royal authority, both capital
offences according to paragraphs 7 and 26 of the Kongelov, to
say nothing of his debauching the queen. Brandt also had
forfeited his head by using personal violence towards the king.
The sentences were carried out in all their ghastly details on
April 28, Brandt suffering first.
The queen, who had been conveyed to the Kronborg
fortress on January 17, was confronted with Struensee's con-
fession on March 9. Hitherto, to save her lover, she had
strenuously denied their guilty intimacy, but now she was
obliged to admit the truth of what, from the evidence of
her own waiting-women, was indeed only too obvious. On
April 6 an extraordinary tribunal of thirty-five members pro-
nounced the dissolution of her marriage with the king. It
was the original intention of the Danish government to im- .
prison her for life at Aalborghus; but her brother, George III,
warmly supported by public opinion in England, which refused
to believe in the guilt of the unfortunate young English
princess, intervened peremptorily on her behalf, and a British
man-of-war conveyed her to her brother's Hanoverian elec-
torate. Only five and a half years before, at the age of fifteen,
she had made her triumphal entry into Copenhagen; now, not
410
Denmark, 1721-1814
[CH.
yet twenty-one, her career was already over. She died at Celle
on May 10, 1775.
For the next twelve years Ove Höegh-Guldberg practically
ruled Denmark. The administration continued to be carried
on by means of cabinet orders signed by the idiotic king.
It was inevitably a reactionary period, yet, on the whole, bene-
ficial. Struensee's hasty, ill-digested projects of reform had
produced something very like chaos, while his cheap cosmo-
politanism had contemptuously trampled upon everything
national and patriotic. It was Guldberg's mission to rectify
matters and repair the damage done. He did his utmost for
the Danish language and nationality; even in the army, largely
composed of Germans, the German word of command was
abolished; and by the ordinance of 1776 all government
offices and appointments were reserved for Danish-born sub-
jects. Most of Struensee's fledglings were naturally dismissed;
and a far greater man than Struensee, Andreas Bernstorff, the
nephew of J. H. E. Bernstorff, as minister of foreign affairs,
gave strength and dignity to the new administration. Still, the
tendency of this government of old women and young parsons,"
as Gustavus III unkindly called it, was undeniably ultra-con-
servative. The liberty of the press was considerably restricted
though the censorship was not actually reintroduced; and, as
to the agrarian question, Guldberg frankly declared that “the
yoke of the peasantry cannot be cast off without shaking the
State to its very foundations." Still, on the whole, the Guld-
berg period was decidedly prosperous. The commerce of
Denmark during the American War of Independence increased
considerably; and the Mediterranean carrying trade fell almost
entirely into her hands while Great Britain was at war with
nearly all the other maritime powers. The impediments laid
in the way of the neutral states by England and the other
belligerents induced Derimark in 1780 to accede to the so-
called Armed Neutrality of the North (the work of the Russian
vice-chancellor, Nikita Panin), for the maintenance of the prin-
XV7
The Reventlow Reforms
411
ciple, "a free ship makes the cargo free,” the main contentions
of which were at last virtually recognised by Great Britain,
France, and Spain. In the same year Bernstorff, who had in-
curred the resentment of Russia by negotiating separately with
Great Britain, was compelled to retire; but in 1784 he was
recalled by the crown-prince Frederick, whose first act on
taking his seat in the Council of State, at the age of sixteen,
on April 4, was to dismiss the Guldberg ministry.
A fresh and fruitful period of reform now began, lasting till
nearly the end of the century, and only interrupted by the brief
but costly war with Sweden in 1788 (pp. 374-5). The emanci-
pation of the peasantry was now the burning question of the day,
and the whole matter was thoroughly ventilated. Bernstorff
and the crown-prince were the most zealous advocates of the
peasantry in the Council of State; but the honour of bringing
the whole peasant question within the range of practical politics
undoubtedly belongs to H. D. Reventlow, in whom emanci-
pation found a most courageous and persevering advocate.
In August, 1786, he induced the crown-prince to appoint a
commission "fully to determine the respective rights of the
proprietors and the peasants, for the common benefit of them-
selves and the State." A vigorous polemic ensued. The
conservatives warmly protested, and not altogether from in-
terested motives; but the government was not to be deterred
by their objections. The ordinance of June 8, 1787, decreed
that in future all leaseholds should give the farmer full posses-
sion, and that no tenant should be expelled except after legal
process. At the same time all the old barbarous punishments,
which the squires were authorised to inflict at will upon their
tenants, were abolished. The ordinance of June 20, 1788,
went still further by abolishing the Stavnsbaanit, or custom of
binding the peasantry absolutely to their birthplace, and the
Udskrivningsret of the proprietors, which enabled them to force
holdings on their tenants.
Nor was the reforming principle limited to the abolition of
412
[CH.
Denmark, 1721-1814
serfdom. In 1788 the corn trade was declared free; the Jews
received civil rights; and the negro slave trade was forbidden.
In 1796 a special ordinance reformed the whole system of
judicial procedure, making it cheaper and more expeditious;
while the toll-ordinance of February 1, 1797, still further ex-
tended the principle of free trade. Moreover, until two years
after Bernstorff's death in 1797, the Danish press enjoyed a
larger freedom of speech than the press of any other absolute
monarchy in Europe, so much so that at last Denmark became
suspected of favouring Jacobin views. It is also undeniable
that, after the outbreak of the French Revolution, public
discussion in Denmark assumed a new character, practical
questions being more and more neglected, while the existing
constitution and the state religion were freely, not to say offen-
sively, criticised. Finally, in September, 1799, under strong
pressure from the Russian emperor Paul, who also demanded
Denmark's accession to the second coalition against France,
and provisionally closed all Russian ports against Danish
vessels, the Danish government forbade anonymity, and in-
troduced a limited censorship, which effectually prevented
public political discussion.
Denmark's obsequiousness to Russia went further still.
To avoid a conflict with Great Britain, Bernstorff had always
insisted that Denmark ought not to allow her trading ships to
be convoyed; but the new government was persuaded by the
Tsar to join a second Armed Neutrality League (1800) which
Russia had just concluded with Prussia and Sweden. Great
Britain retaliated by laying an embargo on the vessels of the
three neutral powers, and by sending a considerable fleet to the
Baltic under the command of Parker and Nelson. Surprised
and unprepared though they were, the Danes, nevertheless, on
April 2, 1801, offered a gallant resistance; but their fleet was
destroyed, their capital bombarded, and, abandoned by Russia,
they were compelled to submit to a disadvantageous peace.
Nevertheless “the brilliant commercial period,” as Danish
Denmathe new ed Neutralisia and
XV7
Denmark and Napoleon
413
historians call the generation which elapsed between the out-
break of the North American War of Independence and the
catastrophe of 1807, still continued ; and Denmark got her fair
share of the great advantages which the war gave to neutral
powers. But after the Peace of Tilsit there could be no
further question of neutrality. Napoleon had determined that,
if Great Britain refused to accept Russia's mediation, Denmark,
Sweden, and Portugal were to be forced to close their harbours
to her ships and declare war against her. It was the intention
of the Danish government to preserve its neutrality to the last,
although, on the whole, it preferred an alliance with Great
Britain to a league with Napoleon, and was even prepared for
a breach with the French emperor if he pressed her too
hardly. The army had therefore been assembled in Holstein,
and the crown prince-regent was with it. But the British
government did not consider Denmark strong enough to resist
France; and, besides that, the Danish government was very
unpopular in England because of its claims in respect of
Danish and Norwegian vessels seized by the British cruisers.
The British government accordingly sent a fleet, with 30,000
men on board, to the Sound to compel Denmark, by-way of
security for her future conduct, to unite her fleet with the
British fleet. Denmark was offered an alliance, the complete
restitution of her fleet after the war, a guarantee of all her
possessions, compensation for all expenses, and even territorial
aggrandisement.
Dictatorially presented as they were, these terms were
liberal and even generous; and it cannot be doubted that, if
a great statesman like Bernstorff had been at the head of affairs
in Copenhagen, he would have accepted them, even if with a
wry face. But the prince-regent, if a good patriot, was a poor
politician, and invincibly obstinate. When therefore in August,
1807, the British fleet under Gambier arrived in the Sound,
and an extraordinary British plenipotentiary hastened to Kiel to
place the British demands before the crown-prince, Frederick
414
CH.
Denmark, 1721-1814
not only refused to negotiate but ordered the Copenhagen
authorities to put the city in the best state of defence possible.
Taking this to be tantamount to a declaration of war, on
August 16 the British army landed at Vedback; and shortly
afterwards the Danish capital was invested. Anything like an
adequate defence was hopeless from the first, and a few bold
sorties produced not the slightest effect; but, Copenhagen stili
refusing to surrender, a bombardment began which lasted from
September 2 till September 5, and ended with the capitulation
of the city and the surrender of the fleet intact, the prince-
regent having neglected to give orders for its destruction.
After the abduction of the fleet, Great Britain offered
Denmark the choice between an alliance, neutrality, or war.
In the first case the British government's former promises were
to hold good; but, if Denmark insisted upon war, it threatened
to wrest Norway from her. Overbearing to brutality as this
treatment undeniably was, the more clear-sighted of the Danes
recognised the hopelessness of a struggle with Great Britain ;
but the prince-regent regarded only one course as open to a
man of honour. He rejected every attempt at negotiation,
and, on November 4, declared war against Great Britain. This
brought upon Denmark a few months later a war with Sweden
also; but the Danish government hoped, with the help of a
French army-corps of 24,000, under Bernadotte, to compensate
itself for the loss of the fleet by conquering Scania. But the
projected Scanian invasion came to nothing, as the British,
having complete command of the sea, easily prevented the trans-
port of troops, while the Spanish contingent in Bernadotte's
army rebelled against its officers, and was shipped to England
on British men-of-war. Denmark was therefore driven to con-
clude peace with Sweden in 1809 by the Treaty of Jönköping.
The war with Great Britain continued ; and its immediate
result was the ruin of the flourishing Danish carrying trade.
Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities no fewer than 600
Danish ships were seized, and as many again were lost during
xv] War with Great Britain 415
the ensuing year. But the patriotism and public spirit of the
Danes were now thoroughly aroused; and private persons ener-
getically assisted the government to create a new fleet. To
construct men-of-war was out of the question, but many gun-
boats and other small war-vessels were quickly built; and these,
in conjunction with innumerable privateers, did excellent ser-
vice, and captured British merchantmen literally by thousands,
the prizes seized between 1810 and 1812 bringing in no less
than £3,500,000. Nor was this all. In 1811 Denmark joined
the Continental System, under which no ship coming from or
touching at a British port was allowed to enter any Danish
harbour, while the importation of any goods of British origin
was strictly prohibited. Naturally it was only with a supreme
effort that the country could sustain such a ruinous and
exhausting war; and, while it lasted, the note circulation of
Denmark fell in 1812) to one-fourteenth of its face value.
Moreover, in the duchies the French alliance, for commercial
reasons, was highly unpopular, as Napoleon's prohibition of
imports made the lucrative trade with Germany well-nigh
impossible, and landed property in Sleswick-Holstein fell 75
per cent. in value. A feeling arose in the duchies that they
were being sacrificed to the interests of the Danish crown; and
separatist tendencies were evoked, exhibiting themselves in
indifference as to the fate of Norway and satisfaction at the
victories of the Allies.
On the deposition of Gustavus IV in 1809 (p. 389) there
had been some talk of electing as his successor Frederick VI
(the prince-regent had become king of Denmark on the death
of Christian VII on March 10, 1808); but, as Frederick
could only promise Sweden a constitution, while refusing that
privilege to Norway, the more liberal-minded Prince Christian
Augustus of Augustenburg was elected successor to the Swedish
throne in his stead. On the sudden death of the prince in
1810, Frederick VI's election was again taken into con-
sideration, and a reunion of the three northern kingdoms
416
[CH. XV
Denmark, 1721–1814
seemed possible; but at the last moment Frederick again
proved to be impracticable, and Bernadotte was chosen crown-
prince of Sweden. He made it his first object to endeavour
to win Norway, and, as Napoleon refused to help him, he con-
cluded an alliance with Russia, who promised her cooperation,
Great Britain and Prussia ultimately acceding to the proposal
of separating Norway from Denmark (see chap. xiv).
The obstinate adhesion of Frederick VI to the French
alliance was largely responsible for this disruption project.
Even so late as February, 1813, when he made pacific overtures
to Great Britain, the negotiations stranded on his refusal to
surrender Norway even in exchange for ample compensation.
elsewhere. He was therefore obliged to cling still closer to
France, though Napoleon's despotic friendship had been al-
most as injurious as British hostility to Denmark's trade; and
Denmark was consequently involved in the French emperor's
collapse. After the Battle of Leipsic, Bernadotte, now Prince
Charles John of Sweden, invaded Holstein ; and, though the
Danish army gallantly held its own at Sehested, and the military
resources of the country were considerable, Frederick VI lost
heart and accepted the conditions of the Allies. By the Peace
of Kiel, January 14, 1814, he surrendered Norway to the king
of Sweden, receiving, by way of compensation, a sum of money
and Swedish Pomerania with Rügen, which were subsequently
to be transferred to Prussia.
CHAPTER XVI.
DENMARK SINCE 1814.
THE position of Denmark in 1814 was one of great diffi-
culty. By the loss of Norway the population of the monarchy
had been reduced one-third ; and the compensation offered by
the Peace of Kiel proved illusory. Trade was ruined, the
capital impoverished, the exchequer empty. Loyalty to the
Napoleonic alliance had isolated the little kingdom ; the govern.
ment's abrupt change of policy at the conclusion of peace made
it highly unpopular; and recent events in Norway had em-
bittered nearly every European power against the king. Not
till Denmark had unreservedly acceded to the new coalition
against Napoleon, after his return from Elba, did a better
feeling abroad begin to prevail. The last Russian troops
evacuated Holstein at the beginning of 1815; Great Britain,
Austria, and Prussia then enforced the cession of Swedish
Pomerania to Denmark; and Denmark, as previously arranged,
surrendered Swedish Pomerania and Rügen to Prussia in
exchange for the duchy of Lauenburg and two million rix-
dollars. An agreement was also arrived at (1819) between
Denmark and Norway, whereby the latter kingdom's quota of
its old national debt was fixed at three million rix-dollars.
On the establishment of the German Bund (June 18, 1815)
Frederick VI acceded thereto as duke of Holstein and Lauen-
burg, but refused to allow Sleswick to enter the Bund, on the
ground that it was an essential part of the Danish realm. The
sixteen years between the Peace of Kiel and 1830 were almost
absolutely free from political agitation. Even Dr Jacob Dampe's
BAIN
27
418
Denmark since 1814
[ch.
isolated and severely punished advocacy of an utterly impracti-
cable free constitution, in 1820, excited but a languid interest,
while the German Bund looked coldly on similar constitutional
efforts on the part of Holstein and Sleswick. Economically
the period 1814-1830 was a gloomy one. · The relinquish-
ment of Norway necessitated considerable reductions of ex-
penditure; but the economies actually practised fell far short
of the requirements of the diminished kingdom and its depleted
exchequer; while the agricultural depression induced by the
enormous fall in the price of corn and other cereals all over
Europe caused fresh demands to be made upon the State, and
added ten million rix-dollars to the national debt before 1835.
An improvement began, however, in 1820, and continued
steadily through the thirties.
The last ten years of Frederick VI's" reign were also re-
markable for the revival of political life. This was especially
the case in the duchies, in consequence of the French Revolu-
tion of 1830. The principal spokesman for these new liberal
ideas was the Frisian, Uwe Jens Lornsen, who advocated the
complete administrative separation of Sleswick-Holstein from
Denmark, while retaining a common sovereign. The move-
ment was suppressed by the imprisonment of Lornsen (Nov.
1830). But the Danish government itself now felt the necessity
of doing something; and, by the ordinance of May 28, 1831,
confirmed by the ordinance of May 15, 1834, provincial con-
sultative assemblies were established for Jutland, the Islands,
Sleswick, and Holstein. These assemblies were to be elected
for six years, and to meet biennially. They were to choose
their own presidents; and summaries of their proceedings
were to be printed in the official gazette. All Bills relating
to taxation and property were to be submitted to them, and
they were to have a voice in fiscal matters generally. The
first elections were held in 1834-5; and from eighty-three to
eighty-seven per cent of the landed proprietors, to whom the
suffrage was limited, took part in them.
elections have alerty were cial sazeit of theirere to ch
XVI)
Christian VIII and the Duchies
419
On December 3, 1839, Frederick VI died in his 72nd year.
In spite of his amiability and his earnest regard for the personal
happiness of his people, the more enlightened Danes naturally
regarded a monarch who firmly believed in the divine right of
kings as a serious drag upon the free political development of
the nation ; but they built high hopes upon his successor,
Christian VIII (1839-1848), a highly educated, intellectual
man, who, during his regency in Norway, a generation earlier,
had been famous for his enlightened views. But the former
“giver of constitutions” disappointed his admirers by his
steady rejection of every liberal project. Administrative re-
form “was the only reform he would promise.” Nevertheless
the agitation for a free constitution both in Denmark and the
duchies "continued to grow in strength in spite of press perse-
cutions and other repressive measures. The rising national
feeling in Germany also stimulated the separatist tendencies
of the duchies; and “Sleswick-Holsteinism,” as it now began
to be called, evoked in Denmark the counter-movement known
as Ejder- or Ejderilansk-politik, i.e. the policy of extending
Denmark to the Eyder, and obliterating German Sleswick, in
order to save Danish Sleswick from being absorbed by Germany.
This would also have involved the separation of Sleswick and
Holstein, which had been united from time immemorial.
During the following years “Sleswick-Holsteinism” and
“ Eyderdanism” faced each other as rival, mutually exacerbating
forces. In the ducal Diets an overwhelming majority openly
advocated the three so-called Sleswick-Holstein fundamental
postulates : (1) the duchies are independent states; (2) the
duchies are united states; (3) the duchies are subject to
the Salic Law. So hostile, indeed, to the Danish nationality
was the majority in the Sleswick Diet, that, in November,
1842, Peter Lorenzen, the leader of the Danish ministry,
was excluded from the house for attempting to address
the assembly in his mother-tongue. The king sympathised
neither with “Sleswick-Holsteinism" nor with “Eyderdanism.'
27-2
420
Denmark since 1814. [CH..
A single indivisible state, as nearly as possible in its existing
form, was what he preferred; but the strong patriotic feeling
in Denmark, supported as it was by the Liberals, compelled
him at last to intervene. On July 8, 1846, he issued a
circular declaring that the order of succession as regarded
Denmark, Sleswick, and Lauenburg was identical; but he re-
served his decision in the more doubtful case of Holstein.
At the same time he stated explicitly that he had no intention
of interfering with the independence of Sleswick or with its
union with Holstein. As might have been expected, this
circular caused great satisfaction in the kingdom and extra-
ordinary bitterness in the duchies, where both the Diets
protested against it. Thus the issue of the circular brought
the king into collision with the Sleswick-Holstein party, and
simultaneously drew him towards the Danish national-liberals.
In the last years of his reign he was occupied with the plan
of a common constitution for the whole monarchy, as the best
means of holding it together ; but he died on January 20,
1848, before any definite conclusion had been come to.
The new king, Frederick VII (1848-1863), had little know-
ledge of state affairs, and lacked both moral and intellectual
stability, but his natural parts were good; as crown-prince he
had mixed freely with the lower classes, and his bonhomie
and accessibility made him very popular. A week after his
accession, January 28, 1848, he promulgated the liberal con-
stitution which had been drafted by his father, whereby the
kingdom and the duchies were provided with a joint parlia-
ment. The project pleased neither the Danes nor the Sleswick-
Holsteiners. The former, not unreasonably, protested against
800,000 Sleswick-Holsteiners being placed on terms of political
equality with 1,300,000 Danes; whilst the duchies refused to
be merged in the Danish monarchy, and petitioned the king
for a united Sleswick-Holstein Diet, and Sleswick's incorpora-
tion in the German Bund. These demands led to a counter-
agitation of the Eyderdansk party at Copenhagen, which
27
XVI] Frederick VII and the War of 1848 421
culminated in the famous procession of 10,000 citizens to
the palace of Christiansborg (March 21), and the presentation
of a monster petition to the king. Yielding to necessity,
Frederick assured the deputation that he would ever be the
faithful leader of the Danish people in the path of liberty
and honour; and on the following day an Eyderdansk
ministry was formed under the presidency of Count A. V.
Moltke. Immediately afterwards the Sleswick-Holstein deputies
were, in their turn, received in audience, and informed that
Sleswick could not be incorporated with the German Bund;
and that, while its liberties should be guaranteed by the
possession of its own provincial assembly or Landtag, “its
indissoluble union with Denmark must be cemented by a
common free constitution.” Holstein, on the other hand,
as an independent “Forbundstaat,” should have a separate
free constitution.
Meanwhile open rebellion had broken out in Holstein on
March 23. A provisional government was formed for the
purpose of securing the rights of Sleswick-Holstein, and the
next day the rebels surprised the fortress of Rendsborg; but
their further advance was checked by the Danish victories at
Bov and Flensborg on April 9. Prussia now intervened.
The duke of Augustenburg had hastened to Berlin to win the
support of Frederick William IV; and that monarch gladly
seized the opportunity of regaining his own lost prestige by
placing himself at the head of the popular Sleswick-Holstein
movement. The Bundestag at Frankfort followed Prussia's
lead; and the result was an invasion of Sleswick by Prussian
and North German troops, who, after the battle of Sleswick,
April 23, occupied the whole duchy except Dybböl and Als.
Denmark now appealed to the guarantors of the union
with Sleswick. Great Britain and Russia, fearing that the
acquisition of the Sleswick-Holstein duchies might lead to
the establishment of a strong German sea-power, intervened
diplomatically on her behalf; while Sweden-Norway sent an
422
Denmark since 1814
[CH.
army-corps to Fünen, which was not, however, to engage in
hostilities unless the Danish crown-lands were attacked. In
May a Russian note brought about the evacuation of Jutland
by the German troops; and in August, at Malmö, Great
Britain and Sweden mediated an armistice between Denmark
and Prussia, under the terms of which the duchies were to be
evacuated by both the German and Danish troops, and ruled
ad interim by Sleswick-Holstein commissioners.
This provisional government weighed so heavily upon the
Danish population, that in February, 1849, Denmark de-
nounced the armistice, successfully invaded the duchies, and
thereby forced Prussia, by the subsequent Peace of Berlin
(July 2, 1850), practically to abandon the duchies to their own
resources. Denmark was thus left free to deal with the matter
in her own way. In the spring of 1849 the provisional govern-
ment had been superseded by a Holstein stadholdership,
which endeavoured, after the peace, to extend its sway over
Sleswick; and, as a first step in that direction, the Sleswick-
Holstein army, reorganised by Prussian officers and largely
reinforced by German volunteers, invaded South Sleswick, but
was routed at Isted and driven back. Holstein was recovered
with the aid of Austria, who regarded the Sleswick-Holstein
movement unfavourably and demanded through the Bund,
where she now predominated, the withdrawal of the Holstein
stadholdership and the dissolution of the Holstein army.
The duchies yielded to force; and on February 1, 1851, the
government of Holstein was provisionally taken over by three
commissioners, Prussian, Austrian, and Danish respectively.
Denmark, meanwhile, had been engaged in providing her-
self with a parliament on modern lines. The constitutional
rescript of January 28, 1848, had been withdrawn in favour of
an electoral law for a national assembly, of whose 152 members
thirty-eight were to be nominated by the king and to form
an Upper Chamber (Landsting), while the remainder were
to be elected by the people and to form a popular chamber
2
Xvi] The Conventions of 1851 and 1852 423
(Folketing). The so-called Bondevenlige, or philo-peasant party,
which objected to the king's right of nomination and pre-
ferred a one-chamber system, now separated from the Centre
or National Liberals on this very point. But the National
Liberals triumphed at the general election ; fear of reactionary
tendencies finally induced the Radicals to accede to the wishes
of the majority; and on June 5, 1849, the new constitution
received the royal sanction.
At this stage Denmark's foreign relations prejudicially
affected her domestic politics. The Liberal Eyderdansk party
was inclined to divide Sleswick into three distinct administra-
tive districts or belts; a purely Danish, a purely German,
and a mixed district, according as the various nationalities
predominated (language rescripts of 1851); but German sen-
timent was opposed to any such settlement, and the great
continental powers, especially Russia, whom Denmark could
not afford to offend, also looked askance on the Danish
constitution as far too democratic The Eyderdansk pro-
gramme consequently foundered on the opposition of Europe,
and a Conservative ministry, under Bluhme, took office
(1852), prepared to offer the necessary guarantees in order
to arrive at an understanding with the powers. The final
agreement with Austria and Prussia was embodied in the
new constitutional decree of January 28, 1852, whereby the
kingdom, Sleswick, Holstein, and Lauenburg, were each to
have local self-government for their separate affairs, besides
a common constitution for common affairs; the political union
between Sleswick and Holstein was to cease; but, on the
other hand, Sleswick was not to be incorporated with the
kingdom. The common ultra-conservative constitution was
to be a matter of arrangement between the Rigsdag and the
Landtags of the duchies. In the exchange of notes between
Denmark and the German great powers, which preceded the
promulgation of the constitution, and together with it formed
the so-called “conventions of 1851 and 1852," it was expressly
424
[сн.
Denmark since 1814
stipulated that no part of the common monarchy should be
subordinated to any other part, and that Sleswick should not
be incorporated with Denmark. The above-mentioned con-
stitutional decree of January 28 was accepted by the German
great powers and the Bund as a satisfactory basis for the
framing of the Danish constitution; and Holstein was there-
upon restored to Denmark.
Austria and Prussia were now willing to participate in
the European recognition of the integrity of the Danish mon-
archy, and especially in the new order of succession to the
throne, already approved of by Russia. By the Treaty of
London of May 8, 1852, it was agreed that, in view of the
impending extinction of the male line of the Oldenburg
dynasty, Prince Christian of Lyksborg, who had married
Christian VIII's niece, Louisa of Hesse, should ascend the
Danish throne on the death of Frederick VII, and that the
succession should be vested in his heirs male. The Sleswick-
Holstein pretender, the duke of Augustenburg, in considera-
tion of the Danish government purchasing his Sleswick estates,
had already solemnly engaged that neither he nor his fainily
would ever undertake anything which might disturb the tran-
quillity or the succession of the Danish monarchy.
On the 2nd of October, 1855, was promulgated the new
common constitution, which for two years had been the object
of a fierce contention between the Conservatives and the
Radicals. It led at once to foreign complications. Eleven
separatist members of the new common Rigsraad protested
at its very first session against the new constitution as sub-
versive of the conventions of 1851 and 1852, on the following
grounds. It had been drawn up by the Danish Rigsdag
alone; it unduly favoured the representation of the Danish
population; the duchies were consequently subordinated to
Denmark. The Holstein Estates adopted and emphasised
these complaints; the Bund supported the duchies, and de-
clared (Feb. 11, 1858) that it could not recognise the common
XVI]
Carl Hall's Constitution
425
constitution of October 2, 1855, as binding upon Holstein
and Lauenburg. On November 28 the Danish government
partially gave way. The common constitution was repealed
in respect to Holstein and Lauenburg, but was declared to
be binding upon the rest of the monarchy. Nevertheless no
understanding satisfactory to Denmark could be arrived at with
Holstein; and meanwhile, in Germany, a strong movement for
national unity began, which embraced the Sleswick-Holstein
demands with enthusiasm. The Bund, encouraged by Austria
and Prussia, supported the agitation despite the protests of the
Danish government. In the Sleswick Estates also the majority
was now violently anti-Danish, whilst a correspondingly bitter
feeling against Germany arose in Denmark. The Danish
premier (1857-1863) Carl Christian Hall, the talented founder
and leader of the great middle-class National Liberal Party,
misled by encouragement from England and France during
an exchange of notes with the German powers, as well as by
the warm sympathy of Charles XV of Sweden, and convinced,
at last, of the impossibility of an agreement with the Holstein
Estates as to the common organisation of the monarchy,
issued, on March 30, 1863, a royal proclamation detaching
Holstein, as far as possible, from the common monarchy. The
duchy was to have her separate army and budget, whilst the
legislative authority, in all common affairs, should be equally
divided between the king and the Holstein Estates. Later
in the year he went further still by proposing a common
constitution for Denmark and Sleswick, based on a two-
chamber system, which he succeeded in carrying through the
Rigsdag, in the autumn of 1863. The Council of State con-
firmed it by forty votes to sixteen, on Nov. 13, 1863.
Two days later Frederick VII died; and Prince Christian
of Lyksborg ascended the throne as Christian IX. The new
common-constitution bill had not yet received the royal signa-
ture, and the new king hesitated to-sanction it in the face of a
protest from Prussia ; but the insistence of Hall, supported as
.
426
CH.
Denmark since 1814
it was by a strong popular agitation, induced him to submit;
and on November 18 the bill became law. The death of
Frederick VII had materially weakened the position of
Denmark. Nobody had questioned his right to the collective
Danish monarchy, whereas Denmark's enemies now even
attempted to evade the Treaty of London by which the
rights of Christian IX were established. Moreover, despite his
solemn covenant in 1852, the duke of Augustenburg now
transferred his “rights” to his son Prince Frederick, who
immediately caused himself to be proclaimed Frederick VIII,
duke of Sleswick-Holstein; the German Bund, which had
never recognised the Treaty of London, sympathised with the
pretender; and Bismarck, who in the autumn of 1862 had
become premier of Prussia, and desired a war with Denmark
in order to strengthen the Prussian government in its dispute
with the Chamber of Deputies, to demonstrate the superiority
of the newly organised Prussian army, and to pave the way
for Prussia's eventual occupation of the duchies, adopted an
ambiguous attitude towards the Treaty of London, contending
that its validity depended upon Denmark's observance of the
“conventions of 1851-52.” In December, Russia, Great
Britain and France urged the Danish government to withdraw
the November constitution. Hall resigned (Dec. 24) rather
than comply; and, while the succeeding Monrad ministry was
endeavouring to find a mode of withdrawal both dignified and
constitutional, Holstein was occupied by the troops of the
Bund, and the pretender proclaimed himself duke.
Bismarck, thereupon, taking advantage of Austria’s fear of
the effect of the Holstein revolution on the lesser German
states, induced the court of Vienna to join him in occupying
Sleswick till the November constitution had been withdrawn
and the conventions of 1851-2 enforced, at the same time pro-
visionally recognising the Treaty of London and the integrity
of the Danish monarchy. The project of the two great
powers was thrown out by the Bund, but they persisted in
XVI)
The War of 1864. .
427
carrying it through, whilst Bismarck skilfully contrived that the
Danish government should · not have sufficient time legally
to withdraw the November constitution. He had the less
difficulty in accomplishing this as the European situation was
now distinctly unfavourable to Denmark. Russia was under
obligations to Prussia for her assistance during the late Polish
insurrection; and Napoleon III, chagrined by England's rejec-
tion of his scheme for taking common action against Russia in
the Polish affair by means of a European congress, refused,
in his turn, the British plan of a joint intervention in favour
of Denmark. Norway-Sweden, which, in 1853, had hovered
on the verge of an offensive and defensive alliance with
Denmark, was glad of the pretext of the November constitu-
tion to remain strictly neutral, so that Denmark lay at the
mercy of the two great German powers.
A peremptory summons to the Danish government to with-
draw the November constitution within two days," a summons
which the Danes could not be expected to obey, was the signal
for the attack. On February 1, 1864, the combined Austrians
and Prussians crossed the Eyder; and thus began the disas-
trous campaign which was interrupted by the armistice of
May 9. Meanwhile, at the invitation of the British govern-
ment, a congress of all the signatories of the Treaty of London,
together with the representative of the Bund, had assembled
in London, to terminate, if possible, the German-Danish
quarrel. The conference lasted from April 20 to June 25,
1864, without any result. Denmark rejected the proposal of
a purely personal union with the duchies; and neither party
could agree as to the delimitation of Sleswick, the illusory
hope of aid from Great Britain and Russia being the secret
of the fatal obstinacy of the Danish government. Negotiation
failing, war was resumed on June 26. The issue was a fore-
gone conclusion. The island-fortress of Als was quickly lost;
all Jutland was occupied; and the isolated Danish government
was obliged to sue for peace, which was finally concluded at
428
Tch.
· Denmark since 1814
Vienna (Oct. 30, 1864). All three duchies were irretrievably
lost.
In the Peace of Prague, which terminated the Austro-
Prussian War of 1866 and led to the incorporation of the
duchies with Prussia, Napoleon III procured the insertion
of paragraph V, whereby the northern districts of Sleswick were
to be reunited to Denmark when the majority of the popu-
lation, by a free vote, should so desire it. The Danish
Sleswickers, who wished for reunion with Denmark, placed
great hopes upon this paragraph; but, when Prussia at last
thought fit to negotiate with Denmark on the subject, she laid
down conditions which the Danish government could not
accept, especially as regarded the guarantees to be given for
the free use of their language by the German-speaking subjects
of the districts to be retroceded. Finally in 1878, by a
separate agreement between Austria and Prussia, paragraph V
was altogether rescinded.
The salient feature of Danish politics of late years has been
the struggle between the two Tings, the Folketing, or Lower
House, and the Landsting or Upper House of the Riksdag.
This contest began in 1872, when a combination of all the
Radical parties, known as “the United Left,” passed a vote
of want of confidence against the government and rejected
the budget. Nevertheless the ministry, supported by the
Landsting, refused to resign; and the crisis became acute
when, in 1875, Jakob Brönnum Estrup became prime minister.
This courageous statesman, the son of the historian, Hector
Estrup, was born at Sorö, April 16, 1825, and first entered
parliament in 1864. In the following year he accepted the
post of minister of the interior in the Friis cabinet, and in
this capacity did more than any other Danish statesman to
repair the havoc of the war by promoting railway construction
and generally developing the national resources. Indeed from
1864 to 1869 he was indisputably the most popular minister
of the day. Ill health compelled him to resign in 1869; but
xvi] Jakob Brönnum Estrup 429
on June 11, 1875, he returned to office and formed the
administration which was to govern Denmark for the next
eighteen years under exceptionally difficult, not to say dan-
gerous circumstances. Perceiving that the coming struggle
would be essentially a financial one, he retained the ministry
of finance in his own hands; and, strong in the support of
the king, the Landsting, and a considerable minority in the
country itself, he devoted himself to the double task of estab-
lishing the political equality of the Landsting with the Folketing
and strengthening the national armaments, so that, in the event
of a war between the European great powers, Denmark might
be in a position successfully to defend her neutrality.
The Left was willing to vote thirty millions of crowns for
extraordinary military expenses, exclusive of the fortifications
of Copenhagen, on condition that the amount should be
covered by a property- and income-tax; and, as the elections
of 1875 had given them a majority of three-fourths in the
popular chamber, they spoke with no uncertain voice. But
the Upper House steadily supported Estrup, who was dis-
inclined to accept any such compromise. As an agreement
between the two houses on the budget proved impossible,
a provisional financial decree was issued on April 12, 1877,
which the Left stigmatised as a breach of the constitution.
On November 8 an agreement was arrived at between the
Rigsdag and the government as to the budget for the current
financial year; and the difficulties of the ministry were some-
what relieved by a split in the Radical party, still further
accentuated by the elections of 1879, which enabled Estrup
to carry through the army and navy defence bill and the new
military penal code by leaning alternately upon one or the
other of the divided Radical groups.
After the elections of 1881, which brought about the re-
amalgamation of the various Radical sections, the Opposition
presented a united front to the government, so that, from 1882
onwards, legislation was almost at a standstill. The elections
430
Denmark since 1814
[CH.
of 1884 showed clearly that the nation also was now on the
side of the Radicals, eighty-three out of the 102 members of
the Folketing belonging to the Opposition. Even the capital,
which had hitherto been solidly Conservative, elected social
democrats and Radicals in four out of its nine electoral districts.
Still Estrup remained at his post. He had underestimated the
force of public opinion, but he was conscientiously convinced
that a Conservative ministry was necessary for Denmark at this
crisis. When therefore the Rigsdag rejected the budget, he
advised the king to issue another provisional financial decree.
Henceforth, so long as the Folketing refused to vote supplies,
the ministry regularly adopted these makeshifts; and, despite
the loud protests of the Lower House, the war minister,
Bahnson, completed the fortifications of Copenhagen with the
money so obtained. In 1886 the Left, having no constitu-
tional means of dismissing the Estrup. ministry, resorted for
the first time to negotiation ; but it was not till April 1, 1894,
that the majority of the Folketing could arrive at an agreement
with the government and the Landsting as to a budget which
should be retrospective and sanction the employment of the
funds so irregularly obtained for military expenditure. The
whole question of the provisional financial decrees was ulti-
mately regularised by a special resolution of the Rigsdag; and
the retirement of the Estrup ministry in August, 1894, was the
immediate result of the compromise.
In spite of the composition of 1894, the animosity between
Folketing and Landsting continues to characterise Danish
politics, and the situation has been complicated by the division
of both Right and Left into widely divergent groups. The elec-
tions of 1895 resulted in an undeniable victory of the extreme
Radicals; and the budget for 1895-6 was passed only at the last
moment by a compromise between the two parties. The session
of 1896-97 was remarkable for a rapprochement between the
ministry and the “Left Reform Party,” caused by the secession
of the “Young Right," which led to an unprecedented event
XVI)
Danish politics, 1894-1900
431
in Danish politics—the voting of the budget by the Radical
Folketing and its rejection by the Conservative Landsting in
May, 1897; whereupon the ministry resigned in favour of the
moderate Conservative Hörring cabinet, which induced the
Upper House to pass the budget. The elections of 1898 were
a fresh defeat for the Conservatives, and in the autumn session
of the same year, the Folketing, by a crushing majority of 85 to
12, rejected the military budget as unnecessary in the existing
state of foreign politics. The ministry was saved by a mere
accident,the expulsion of Danish agitators from North Sles-
wick by the German government, which evoked a passion
of patriotic protest throughout Denmark and united all parties.
There was even a demonstration in the capital in front of
the German Embassy; and the war minister declared in the
Folketing, during the debate on the military budget (Jan. 1899),
that the armaments of Denmark were so far advanced that any
great power must think twice before venturing to attack her.
The chief event of the year 1899 was the great strike of
40,000 artisans, which cost Denmark fifty million crowns,
and brought about a reconstruction of the cabinet in order
that the popular director of the new Danish Fire Insurance
Company, Herr Bramsen, generally recognised as a specialist
in industrial matters, should arbitrate, on the part of the
government, as minister of the interior. He succeeded
(Sept. 2-4) in bringing about an understanding between
workmen and employers. The year 1900 was also remarkable
for the further disintegration of the Conservative party still in
office (the Sehested cabinet superseded the Hörring cabinet
on April 27), and the almost total paralysis of parliament
caused by the interminable debates on the question of taxation
reform. Of sixty-nine bills laid before the Rigsdag from
October, 1900, to the end of January, 1901, only one was
passed.
CHAPTER XVII.
SWEDEN AND NORWAY SINCE 1814.
CHARLES XIII died on February 5, 1818, and was succeeded
by Bernadotte under the title of Charles XIV John. The new
king devoted himself to the promotion of the material de-
velopment of the country; the Göta canal absorbing the
greater portion of the twenty-four million dalers voted for
the purpose. The external debt of Sweden was gradually extin-
guished, the internal debt considerably reduced, and the budget
showed an average annual surplus of 700,000 dalers. With
returning prosperity the necessity for political reform became
urgent in Sweden. The antiquated Riksdag, where the privileged
Estates predominated, while the cultivated middle class was
practically unrepresented, had become an insuperable obstacle
to all free development; but, although the Riksdag of 1840
itself raised the question, the king and the aristocracy refused
to entertain it. Yet the reign of Charles XIV was on the
whole most beneficial to Sweden; and, if there was much just
cause for complaint, his great services to his adopted country
were generally acknowledged and appreciated. Abroad he
maintained a policy of peace based mainly on a good under-
standing with Russia.
Oscar I (1844-59), born at Paris in 1799, had been care-
fully educated, as became the heir to the Swedish throne. As
crown-prince he had disapproved of many of his father's
reactionary measures, and stood aloof from .politics. Shortly
Y
CH. XVII] Swedish Reform Bill, 1863 433
after his accession (March 4, 1844) he laid several projects of
reform before the Riksdag; but the Estates would do little
more than abolish the obsolete marriage and inheritance laws
and a few commercial monopolies. As the financial situation
necessitated a large increase of taxation, there was much
popular discontent, which culminated in riots in the streets of
Stockholm (March, 1848). Yet, when fresh proposals for
parliamentary reform were laid before the Riksdag in 1849,
they were again rejected by three out of the four Estates.
As regards foreign politics, Oscar I was strongly anti-German.
On the outbreak of the Dano-Prussian War of 1848–9, Sweden,
as we have seen, sympathised warmly with Denmark; hundreds
of Swedish volunteers hastened to Sleswick-Holstein ; and the
Riksdag voted two million dalers for additional armaments.
It was Sweden, too, that mediated the truce of Malmö (Aug. 26,
1848), which helped Denmark out of her difficulties. During
the Crimean War Sweden remained neutral, although public
opinion was decidedly anti-Russian, and sundry politicians re-
garded the conjuncture as favourable for regaining Finland.
Oscar I died on July 8, 1859, and was succeeded by his son
Charles XV, who had, since 1857, acted as regent during his
father's illness. A highly educated and accomplished monarch,
with lofty ideals and charming manners, he speedily endeared
himself to his people, and succeeded, with the invaluable
aid of the minister of justice, Baron Louis Gerhard de Geer,
in at last accomplishing the much-needed reform of the con-
stitution. The way had been prepared in 1860 by a sweeping
measure of municipal reform; and in January, 1863, the
government brought in a reform bill, by the terms of which
the Riksdag was henceforth to consist of two chambers, the
Upper House being a sort of aristocratic Senate, while the
members of the Lower House were to be elected triennially
by popular suffrage. The new constitution was accepted by
all four Estates in 1865, and promulgated on January 22, 1866.
On September 1, 1866, the first elections under the new system
BAIN
28
434 · Norway and Sweden since 1814
[CH.
were held; and on January 19, 1867, the new Riksdag met for
the first time. With this one great reform Charles XV had
to be content; in all other directions he was hampered more
or less by his own creation. The Riksdag refused to sanction
his favourite project of a reform of the Swedish army on the
Prussian model, for which he laboured all his life, partly from
motives of economy, partly from an apprehension of the king's
martial tendencies.
In 1864 Charles XV had endeavoured to form an anti-
Prussian league with Denmark; and after the defeat of Den-
mark he projected a Scandinavian union, in order, with the
assistance of France, to oppose Prussian predominance in the
north-a policy which naturally collapsed with the overthrow
of the French empire in 1870. He died on September 18,
1872, and was succeeded by his brother, the duke of Gothland,
who reigned as Oscar II. The new king was as intent as his
predecessor upon army reform. But the agrarian party now
dominating the Riksdag (whose rage for economy went the
length of cutting down the civil list and refusing to vote
money for the coronation, so that the king had to be crowned
at his own expense) was in no mood to meet Oscar II's wishes.
For the first fifteen years of the new reign, therefore, the
armament question agitated the Riksdag and the nation.
Money was voted indeed for the reorganisation of the navy
(an object especially dear to a sailor king) and the amelioration
of the artillery in 1875; but ministry after ministry failed
to carry through the whole government programme in the face
of the determined opposition of parliament till 1885, and even
then serious concessions had to be made to the agrarians.
The new law, which came into force on Jan. 1, 1887, established
universal conscription in Sweden for the first time. In 1888
the agrarians succeeded in imposing protective duties on corn
and other goods; and in 1892 the threatening attitude of
Norway induced the Boström ministry to introduce a new bill
· for the further strengthening of the Swedish army. In 1894
XVII] Differences between Sweden & Norway 435
TTT
the number of the members of the Upper Chamber was in-
creased to 150, and that of the Lower Chamber to 250; and
the further extension of the somewhat exclusive electorate was
also considered, although neither the government nor the
Riksdag was prepared to adopt universal suffrage.
But it was the Norwegian question which now overshadowed
all others. Ever since the Union of 1815, Norway had per-
sistently endeavoured to obtain absolute political equality with
Sweden, even at the risk of a rupture. Now any slackening of
the Union meant the weakening of the royal authority, the
chief prop of the Union, which being vested in a semi-foreign
dynasty imposed upon Norway by force, could not be very
popular there. Moreover the Act of Union itself was, in some
points, so ambiguously worded, that both parties, with a little
ingenuity, could interpret it their own way. The first anti-
monarchical step was taken in 1821, when the Storthing
abolished the Norwegian nobility, despite the protest of the
king, but for whose energetic intervention it would also have
repudiated the payment of Norway's covenanted share of the
old Danish national debt. Under Oscar I, who conceded to
Norway a national flag and coat-of-arms and founded the Nor-
wegian Order of St Olof, there was little friction between the
crown and the Norwegians; but the first Storthing of Charles XV
abolished the office of viceroy, which from 1814 to 1827 had
been held exclusively by Swedes, on the ground that it was
an anomalous dignity, to the great indignation of the Swedes,
who regarded the proceeding as a high-handed breach of the
Union. Indeed an actual conflict between the two countries
was avoided only by the king's refusal to confirm the decree
of the Storthing. A counter-proposal from the Swedish
Riksdag for a revision of the Union was disregarded by the
Storthing till 1865, when the whole question was submitted
to the consideration of a joint revision committee, whose
recommendations were however ultimately rejected by the
Storthing in 1870.
28-2
436 Norway and Sweden since 1814 [CH.
After the accession of Oscar II (Sept. '18, 1872), the
attitude of the Norwegian parliament became more con-
ciliatory. It even voted the expenses of the coronation at
Throndhjem (July 18, 1873), in return for which act of liber-
ality the king consented to the abolition of the viceroyalty.
The Storthing also agreed to a Zollverein with Sweden in
1874, and acceded to the Scandinavian currency convention
in 1875, and to the Scandinavian bill of exchange conven-
tion in 1880. But since 1880, when the Norwegian Radicals
came into power, the conflict between the two states has
been incessant. The first dispute turned upon the so-called
“Staatsraadssag." So early as 1871 the Storthing had demanded
that the extra-parliamentary Staatsraader, or members of the
Council of State-in other words, the Norwegian ministry-
should have access to parliament and participate in its debates,
a demand which Oscar I rejected as contrary to the Act of
Union. The matter was again brought forward in 1877, but
Oscar II also interposed his veto. The struggle was soon
complicated by the intrusion of fresh points of difference,
notably the question of the “pure” Norwegian flag, i.e. the
Norwegian flag minus the symbol of the Union.
On May 17, 1880, the Storthing for the third time passed
its resolution concerning the “Staatsraadssag," the Radicals
maintaining that, according to the letter of the constitution,
the king could no longer interpose his suspensive veto, and
consequently the resolution had become law; whilst the Right
and the government insisted that, this being an alteration of the
constitution itself, the royal veto was absolute. Accordingly
the king was advised to withhold his sanction to the bill ;
whereupon the Radical leader, Johan Sverdrup, retaliated by
declaring that his resolution on the “Staatsraadssag" had
become an inviolable statute, since the Storthing had thrice
passed it by the statutory majority required in such cases.
The government refused, however, to promulgate the so-called
statute; and the result was an extraordinary popular agitation
he “purettesh points ple was s
XVII] The “Staatsraadssag” question 437
in Norway, and a violent rupture between the constantly in-
creasing anti-Swedish Radical party, which depended principally
on the peasants, and the Conservatives, who were friendly to
the government and strongest in the towns. Moreover the
armament question about this time added fresh fuel to the
flames. Universal conscription had been adopted in 1876;
but, when the government subsequently introduced a measure
for reorganising the army, it met with the most determined
opposition from the Radical party.
In 1880 the Conservative leader, Frederick Stang, who for
the last thirty-five years had acted as a mediator between the
irreconcilables of both parties, and greatly contributed to
the material welfare of the country, resigned in favour of his
colleague, Christian August Selmer, on whom now devolved
the unenviable task of fighting an almost unanimous and
violently mutinous Storthing in the name of the-government.
On dismissing the Storthing, in June 1882, the king informed
the house that the highest legal authorities had confirmed
him in his opinion of the correctness of his attitude in the
Staatsraad question; and he concluded by urging every true
· patriot to support him in his efforts to maintain the law.
Such an appeal was useless at a time when the country was
agitated from end to end; and the elections held the same
year resulted in a further triumph for the Radicals, who now
held no fewer than 82 of the 114 seats in the Storthing. They
immediately proceeded to exercise their power by impeaching
the ministry (April, 1880) for having advised the king to
interpose his veto in the Staatsraad affair; and after a nine
months' session the Rigsret, or highest political tribunal, where
a Radical majority were now sitting as judges in their own
·cause, declared that Selmer and most of his colleagues had
forfeited their offices. The king, on the other hand, acting
by the advice of the most eminent jurists of both countries,
declared that the judgment of the Rigsret was contrary to the
letter of the constitution as well as an infringement of his
438 Norway and Sweden since 1814 [CH.
prerogative, while, to save his dignity, he privately requested
the Norwegian ministers to send in their resignations, which
he immediately accepted. He then made two further attempts
to rule the country with the aid of the Conservatives, but was
obliged at last (June 23, 1883) to send for the leader of the
Radical majority, Johan Sverdrup, at the same time giving way
on the Staatsraad question.
Under the Sverdrup administration (1884–1889) there was
a lull in Norwegian politics. The king, prudently yielding to
the unmistakeable will of the nation, gave his sanction to most
of the bills so long in suspense; and great hopes were enter-
tained by the progressive party of Sverdrup who, by his energy,
courage, and eloquence, had succeeded after a struggle of
nearly thirty years in forming the first “Left-Cabinet” in Norway.
But the responsibilities of office at last opened the eyes of the
liberal leader to the danger of dissolving the Union by pressing
the radical demands too far; his views gradually assumed a
more conservative tinge; and after the split of the Radical
party in 1887, on the Church organisation question, into "the
national Left” and “the pure Left,” Sverdrup was even glad to
accept assistance from his old adversaries of the Right, which,
under the able leadership of Emil Stang, the son of Frederick
Stang, had again become a power in the State. At the general
election of 1888 the Right secured fifty-one seats, while of
the sixty-three members of the Left only twenty-six supported
Sverdrup. He resigned office on July 12, 1889, in favour of
Stang, who, with the assistance of the moderate. Left, succeeded
in passing most of his predecessor's measures. He refused,
however, to commit himself to universal suffrage, as being
a hazardous experiment with a one-chamber system.
Unfortunately Norway's inveterate distrust of Sweden, a
distrust natural enough, perhaps, in the smaller and weaker
of two confederated states, but none the less unjustifiable and
unprofitable, continued to assert itself on the slightest pretext,
with the inevitable result of provoking reprisals from Sweden.
Y.
XVII] The separate Consulate question 439
There is something to be said, no doubt, for the contention
of Norway that her relatively enormous trading fleet (which is
much larger than that of Sweden) entitles her to a separate
consular service; but this in itself apparently reasonable claim
was only the prelude to a further demand for a separate foreign
office. Sweden obviously could not allow Norway to negotiate
independently with foreign powers at the risk of imperilling the
political existence of the dual state. To deny the possibility of
such a contingency is deliberately to shut one's eyes to plain
facts. The treasonable coquetting with Russia of ultra-Radicals
like Björnson and Ullman, who have gone so far as actually to
propose the virtual cession of two ice-free ports to that power,
is eloquent of Norway's suicidal tendencies. With Russia at
her very door, an independent Norway would be far more
dangerous to Sweden than an independent Ireland would ever
be to Great Britain. Nor can it be fairly said that Sweden has
not endeavoured to meet half-way the views of her sister state
as regards foreign representation. Thus, on the opening of the
Storthing in February, 1891, King Oscar, in his speech from
the throne, announced that a project would be laid before the
parliaments of both countries, providing that all important
foreign or other common affairs should be discussed in each
of the respective Councils of State in the presence, mutatis
mutandis, of three of the ministers from the other country. The
Radicals, not content with this, moved that Norway should
have the absolute control of her relations with foreign powers.
Stang, on refusing to accept a motion which was tantamount to
the break-up of the Union, was defeated by four votes; and on
March 5, 1891, a second Radical Ministry was formed under
Johannes Steen, the leader of "the pure Left."
The conflict with the unionist party was now resumed with
ever-increasing violence; and, at the general election of 1891,
when the Left returned sixty-five members against forty-nine of
the Right, an independent foreign office and an independent
consular service were the chief items of the Radical programme.
:
440 Norway and Sweden since 1814 [CH.
When the new Storthing was opened in February, 1892, the
aspect of affairs was so threatening that a civil war between the
two countries appeared inevitable; and Swedish statesmen and
the Swedish press openly proclaimed the necessity of drawing
the sword. The intervention of the king prevented matters
from proceeding to extremities; and, after the Radical cabinet
had been dismissed in 1893, and a Conservative administration
had vainly attempted to govern in 1894, Oscar II fell back
upon a coalition ministry, which was formed in 1895 under
Professor Hagerup. Simultaneously a Union committee, con-
sisting of statesmen of both countries, was formed to settle the
differences between them ;, but the uncompromising attitude of
the Norwegian delegates rendered anything like an agreement
impossible; and on January 29, 1898, the Committee was dis-
solved. By this time the two countries again appeared to be
rushing towards civil war. The resolutions of the Storthing
in the session of 1896-1897 had been distinctly anti-Swedish.
On the king refusing to sanction the bill for the introduction
of “a pure Norwegian flag,” the Storthing refused to increase
the appanages of the king and the crown-prince, voted a very
paltry contribution to the Stockholm Jubilee Exhibition by
a majority of ten votes only (July 6, 1896), and, a few weeks
later, even attempted to make an anti-dynastic demonstration
out of the Nansen festivities. Naturally all domestic legislation
suffered in consequence of political disputes, while the debates
on the military budget were of sinister augury for the future,
the Storthing doubling the amount demanded by the govern-
ment for military purposes, with the obvious intention of
controlling its distribution.
The general election in the autumn of 1897 still further
strengthened the Radicals, who now possessed the statutory
majority of two-thirds indispensable for introducing constitu-
tional reforms. On February 17, 1898, Hagerup's Conservative
ministry was superseded by an ultra-Radical cabinet under
Johannes Steen ; while the professional agitator and republican,
XVII] The "pure Norwegian flag” question 44 I
Viggo Ullmann, was elected president of the Storthing. On
April 21 a bill introducing universal suffrage, which doubled
the electorate, was passed; and on May 3 a direct attack
was made upon the Union by a motion, subsequently post-
poned, which provided for the separate representation of
Norway in all negotiations with foreign powers. In the
middle of May, moreover, 16,000,000 crowns were voted
for the construction of war-ships and the building of fort-
resses, a measure which was regarded in Sweden as a direct
menace. In the autumn session the extreme Left reintroduced
the irritating question of “the pure Norwegian flag”; and
virulent attacks were made upon the Swedish government for
its perfectly legitimate declaration that the consular and
diplomatic unity of both countries must be regarded as a
condition precedent to any reform of the Act of Union. The
indignation caused in Sweden by the adoption of the new flag
law of the Storthing in November, 1898, was exacerbated when
King Oscar, while withholding his sanction to the measure,
permitted its official publication, justifying his action by an
appeal to par. 79 of the Norwegian constitution. Public
opinion and the national press in Sweden energetically de-
manded that the Swedish minister of foreign affairs, Count
Douglass, should refuse to notify the unconstitutional decree
of the Storthing to the powers, thus branding “the pure
Norwegian flag” as an illusory emblem without any political
significance. Indeed the agitation nearly led to a cabinet crisis
in Sweden.
On January 23, . 1899, King Oscar, whose long failing
health broke down utterly beneath the strain of the unional
conflict, entrusted the regency of the realm to the crown-
prince Gustavus, a notoriously uncompromising opponent of
the Norwegian claims. The first official act of the prince-
regent was to reject the demand of the Storthing that Norway
should be represented separately at the Hague convention.
This rebuff naturally intensified the long-existing aversion of
442 Norway and Sweden since 1814 [CH.
the Norwegians to the prince, and was the occasion of dis-
graceful hostile demonstrations against him during his residence
at Christiania in March. Immediately after his return to the
Swedish capital, where he was received with an ovation, the
rumour spread that the Norwegian government was secretly
arming against Sweden, and that the new projected loan of
fifty million crowns, sanctioned on March 12, ostensibly for
railways, was really for military purposes. The alacrity, more-
over, with which the. Storthing unanimously voted (May 25)
the military budget of 11,500,000 crowns, increased these
suspicions, which naturally were not allayed by the violent
anti-unional and anti-dynastic speeches of Ullmann and Blehr
(a member of the ministry) on the occasion of the national
festival of May 17. Fortunately, on May 11, King Oscar
again resumed his authority, and the influence of the great
peacemaker was quickly felt. At the session of the Swedish-
Norwegian Councils of State of October 11, 1899, at which the
crown-prince was also present, Oscar II, while expressing his
deep regret at the disturbing effect of the Storthing's flag-
resolution, declared that the statute of June 20, 1844, which
had added the unional symbol to the Norwegian commercial
flag, should cease and determine on December 15, 1899, and
that the change should be duly notified to the foreign powers.
Moreover this concession was emphasised by the simultaneous
retirement of the Swedish minister of foreign affairs, Count
Douglass, the most steady opponent of the Norwegian claim
throughout. A separate consular service for Norway has since
(1903) been conceded.
Apart from the conflict with Norway, the history of Sweden
since 1894 is relatively unimportant, and can be summarised
in a few words. Her domestic policy turns principally on
tariffs and commercial questions, warmly debated between the
agrarian protectionists and the free-traders. The agrarians,
in their own interests, support the unional policy of the
government, and steadily vote the ever-increasing military-
XVII] Conservatism of the Riksdag 443
budgets in view of contingent troubles with the sister state.
The strong Conservative element in the Riksdag, moreover,
has led it to regard with disfavour every liberal project of
constitutional and electoral reform, so that, practically, the
Swedish Radicals have had little opportunity of making them-
selves heard. Something like a sensation was caused by the
election to the Riksdag of the first socialist deputy, Branting,
in 1896; and general indignation was caused in January, 1899,
when it became known that the king and the prime minister
Boström had favourably received the bearers of a monster
Radical petition, with 363,638 signatures, in favour of the
introduction of universal suffrage. Both houses of the Riks-
dag, on the first day of the session of 1899 (Jan. 18), marked
their displeasure of this step by enthusiastically applauding the
denunciations of their respective presidents against the Radical
agitators who, they urged, would lend a helping hand to the
Norwegian rebels by overthrowing the Swedish constitution.
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To illustrate the land-wars between Sweden and
..Denmark.

11
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Printed by Permission of The Oxford University Press
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INDEX.
Abo, Peace of (1743), 353 ; (1812),
394
Absalon, Archbishop, 3
Adaldag, Archbishop, I
Adlercreutz, K. J., 389
Adlersparre, General, 389
Adolphus, Duke of Holstein, 78
Adolphus Frederick, King of
Sweden, 352-354 ; abdication,
357-358; death, 359
Adrian VI, Pope, 16, 103, 104
Adrianople, Peace of (1713), 339
Ahlefeldt, Frederik, 273, 274, 284
Ahlefeldt, Godske, 15
Ahlefeldt, Klaus, 175
Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of (1668),
Åland, Congress of (1718–19), 344-
Albert, Duke of Mecklenburg, 50,
52
Albert, Duke of Prussia, 68
Albert, King of Sweden, 7, 8
Alexander , Emperor of Russia,
387–389, 393, 394 .
Alexandra, Grand Duchess, 384 -
Alexius, Tsar of Moscovy, 238,
240
Ali, Pasha, 337
Altona, Peace of (1689), 308
Alt-Ranstadt, Peace of (1707), 326
Aminoff, Captain, 366
Anckarström, J., 380
Angermannus, Abraham, 133, 134,
136
Anjala, Confederation of (1788),
Anne, Empress of Russia, .351
Anne, Queen of England, 340
Anne Catharine, Queen of Den- .
mark, 150
Ansgar, Saint, I
Anstruther, Robert, 155, 158
Apraksin, Russian Admiral, 334
Arboga, Articles of (1561), 115
Arcimboldus, 19, 20
Aresen, Jan, 100, 101
Armfelt, G. M., 371, 383, 385, 387,,
388
Arnim, H. G. von, 163
Arnim, J. von, 191
Augsburg, League of (1686), 308
Augustus II, King of Poland, 314-
316, 320-326, 335
Axtorna, Battle of (1565), 81
. 291
346
Baden, Congress of (1714), 340
Bagge, J., 79, 80
Banér, J., 194, 202, 205, 206, 212–
214; death, 215
Banner, E., 69
Bärwald, Treaty of (1631), 198
Bazin, diplomatist, 307
Beldenak, Bishop, 37, 38, 93
Berlin, Treaty of (1631), 200;(1850),
422
Bernadotte, Marshal. See Charles
XIV, King of Sweden
Bernard, Duke of Saxe-Weimar,
201, 211
Bernstorff, A., 410, 411
Bernstorff, J. H. E., 400, 402, 403
Bille, Anders, 69
Bille, Eske, 69
373
BAIN
450
Index
Bille, Ove, 62
356, 358, 368-369, anti-Swedish
Birger, Jarl, 5
plans; 372–373, war with Gus-
Bismarck, Otto von, Prince, 426, 427 tavus III; 379, 382-384, later
Bjelke, Gunilla, 132
Swedish policy ; 401
Bjelke, Sten, 186
Catharine, first Queen Consort of
Bjelkenstjerna, Hans, 153
Gustavus Vasa, 58
Björnson, B., 439
Catharine, second Queen Consort
Blehr, Norwegian Minister, 442 of Gustavus Vasa, 59
Bluhme, Danish Minister, 423 Catharine, Queen Consort of John III
Bogbinder, A., 51, 96
of Sweden, 118, 127
Bogislav IV, Duke of Pomerania, Catharine, Ivanovna, 342
195
Celle, Peace of (1678), 298
Bolle, Eric, 69.
Charles V, Emperor of Germany,
Bonde, Gustaf, 290
26, 30, 32, 53-54, Danish policy;
Börnhoved, Battle of (1227), 3
58, 66, war with Christian III,
Boström, Swedish Minister, 443 70-72
Bourdelot, P. M., 225
Charles VI, Emperor of Germany,
Bov, Battle of (1848), 421
351
Brahe, Nils, 194, 207, 281
Charles II, King of England, 293
Brahe, Per, 229
Charles II, King of Spain, 320
Bramsen, Danish Minister, 431 Charles VII, King of Sweden, 4 '
Brandesen, L., 89
Charles VIII, King of Sweden, 10
Brandt, Enevald, 403, 408, 409 Charles IX, King of Sweden, 115,
Brännkyrka, Battle of (1518), 18 125, 126, 128, 130, 132 ; violent
Branting, Swedish Socialist, 443 Protestantism, 133 ; declared
Brask, Hans, Bishop, 102, 103, Regent, 135; 136, defeats Sigis-
107-109, III
· mund, 138; elected King, 139;
Breda, peace of (1667), 272
Russian policy, 140-141; death
Bredal, Peter, 246
and character 142-144, 152, war
Breitenfeld, Battle of (1631), 202 ;. with Denmark, 153-154; 177,
(1642), 215
185, 306
Brokman, Jasper, 267, 268
Charles X, King of Sweden, 221,
Brömsebro, Peace of (1541), 54 ; 224; accession, 227; character,
(1645), 174
228–229; war with Poland, 231-
Brune, Marshal, 387
238, 240, 242, passage of the
Brunswick, Union of (1538), 70 Belts, 245-247; negociations with
Brussels, Peace of. (1550), 54
Denmark, 248–249 ; second war
Bucharest, Peace of (1812), 394 with Denmark, 250-254; death,
Bugenhagen, Johann, 67, 97, 98 254 ; 255, 258
Bukov, Battle of (1565), 81
Charles XI, King of Sweden, 254,
Bunfeld, Paul, 251
281; early years and character,
Buntmakare, M., 106
291-292; 294, 295, victory of
Lund, 296–297; 298, 299, 300,
Canute the Great, King of Den reforms, 301-304; administration,
mark, 2
305-307; foreign policy, 307–
Canute VI, King of Denmark, 3 309, 310, 311, 313, 314
Caroline Matilda, Queen of Den- Charles XII, King of Sweden, 309,
mark, 402-409
early years and character, 310-
Cassander, George, 129
311; first measures, 312–313;
Catharine II, Empress of Russia, war with Denmark, 316-317; at
Index
451
308
Narva, 318-319; 320, 321, Polish
campaigns, 322–326; 327, 329,
Russian campaigns, 330-334; in
Turkey, 337-339; 340, 341, 342-
343, defence of Scania ; 344-345,
Åland conference; 346, death
Charles XIII, King of Sweden,
363-364, revolution of 1772 ; 374,
379, 381, 389-390, accession; 393,
adopts Bernadotte, 432
Charles XIV, King of Sweden,
elected Crown Prince, 392–393;
campaigns against Napoleon, 394-
395; war with Norway, 395-396,
414, 416, 432
Charles XV, King of Sweden, 425,
433, accession ; 434-5, Norwegian
politics
Charles Augustus, Prince of Au-
gustenburg, 391
Charles Frederick, Duke of Holstein,
346
Charles John, Crown Prince of
Sweden. See Charles XIV
Charles Philip, son of Charles IX
of Sweden, 179, 188
Charlotte Amelia, Queen of Den-
mark, 273
Chemnitz, Battle of (1639), 214
Chierasco, Peace of (1631), 201
Chodkiewicz, Jan, 139, 140
Christian, Duke of Brunswick, 158,
бо
Christian I, King of Denmark, 1o,
II, 87
Christian II, King of Denmark,
character, 12–13; liaison with Dy.
veke, 13-14; election, 14-15; 16,
war with Sweden, 18-21; crowned
King of Sweden, 22–23; Stock-
holm massacre, 24-25; visit to
Netherlands, 25-26; code of laws,
26–27 ; foreign policy, 27–28;
flight from Denmark, 28-29; 30,
invasion of Norway, 30–31; death,
32; 33-36, 38, 40, 58, 66, dealings
with the Curia, 87, 90, 91, 96,
104, 106, 112
Christian III, King of Denmark,
29, 51, 53, 55; religious coup
d'état, 60-61; 63-65, 67-69;
foreign policy, 70-72 ; 74-75; 94,
religious policy, 96-100, 146
Christian IV, King of Denmark,
accession, 144; character, 149–
150; first war with Sweden, 152-
154, 156; German policy, 157–
159; war with the Emperor, 159
-164; 165, 166, foreign policy, 167
-170; second war with Sweden,
171-174; 175, 176, 194, 238
Christian V, King of Denmark,
character, 273; 274, 275, 279,
284–288, Griffenfeld ; 295, 297,
Christian VI, King of Denmark,
398, 399
Christian VII, King of Denmark,
character, 401; madness, 402–
407; 415.
Christian VIII, King of Denmark,
elected King of Norway, 395; 396,
415, 419
Christian IX, King of Denmark,
424-426
Christian Albert, Duke of Holstein,
281, 282
Christina, Princess of Hesse, 79
Christina, Queen of Sweden, 194,
209, 217; accession, 218-219;
defects, 219-220; 221, 222; extra-
vagances, 224-225; 226, abdica-
tion and death, 227
Christopher, Count of Oldenburg,
51, 52
Christopher, King of Denmark, 6,
9, 10
Clement VII, Pope, 104
Clissow, Battle of (1702), 323
Cologne, Congress of (1673), 293
Copenhagen, Treaty of (1657), 243;
(1660), 255; (1673), 280; (1674),
280; (1709), 336; (1715), 341;
(1720), 347
Creutz, Lorenz, 295
Creutz, Count, 359
Cromwell, Oliver, Lord Protector,
neutrality in Dano-Swedish War,
233; mediates between Denmark
and Sweden, 244
452
Index
Cromwell, Richard, Lord Protector,
253
Cronstedt, J. A., 389
Cronstedt, K. O., 388
Croy, Duc de, 318
Czarniecki, Stephen, 147, 234, 236-
- 238, 252
Enghien, Duc d', 386
Erasmus, Desiderius, 26
Eric, Glipping, King of Denmark,
6
Eric, of Pomerania, King of Den-
mark, 8, 9
Eric, Plovpenning, King of Den-
mark, 5
Eric IX, King of Sweden, 4
Eric XIV, King of Sweden, 76,
war with Denmark, 78-83; 115,
character, 116-117; 118, 119,
Sture murders, I 20-123; madness,
123-125; murder of, 125, 129
Essen, Henrik von, 371, 387
Estrup, Hector, 428
Estrup, Jakob Brönnum, 428-430
Eugene, Prince, 326, 330
Evangelical Union (1633), 210
Dacke, Nils, 48-50
Dahlberg, Eric, 246, 247
Daljunkar, 45, 46
Dampe, Jakob, 417
Dançai, Charles de, 81, 84, 116
D'Avaux, 373
De Geer, Ludvig, 172, 173
De Geer, Louis Gerhard, 433
De la Gardie, Jakob, 140, 141, 179,
180, 188
De la Gardie, Magnus Gabriel, 225,
233, 234, 290, 292, 294
Demetrius, Tsar of Moscovy, 140
Denne, Klaus, 89
De Ruyter, Admiral, 253
De Wit, Jan, 240
Didrik, of Minden, 101
Döbeln, Georg Carl von, 389, 390
Dorothea, Queen of Denmark, 67,
75
Douglass, Count, 441, 4+?
Dresden, Treaty of (1709), 335
Dunamünde, Battle of (1701), 321
Dürer, Albrecht, 26
Dyveke, mistress of Christian II,
13-15; death, 16
Ebo, of Rheims, I
Ehrenheim, 385
Ehrensvärd, K. A., 369, 379
Eichstadt, General, 408
Eidsvold, Constitution of (1814),
395
Einersen, G., 100, 101
Elbing, Convention of (1656), 241
Eliae, Paulus, go, 95, 99
Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, 352-
353, restitutes Finland ; 400,
death
Elizabeth, Queen of England, 77,
wooed by Eric XIV, 79
Elliot, Hugh, 375
Falkenberg, Didrik von, 197
Falköping, Battle of (1388), s
Fecht, Petrus, 130
Fehrbellin, Battle of (1675), 294
Femern, Battle of (1677), 297
Ferdinand I, Emperor of Germany,
75.
Ferdinand II, Emperor of Germany,
203
Fersen, Frederick Axel af, 355
Fersen, Hans Axel af, 371, 385;
murder, 391; 392
Feuquières, 293
Fleming, Eric, 41
Fleming, Ivar, 40
Fleming, Johan, 138
Fleming, Klas, 134, 136-138
Fleming, Klas, the Younger, 172,
186
Flensborg, Battle of (1848), 421
Fontainebleau, Treaty of (1541), 71;
(1661), 291; (1679), 299
Francis I, King of France, 71, 72
Francis I., Rakóczy, Prince of Tran-
sylvania, 237, 238
Frankfort, Congress of (1634), 210
Fraustadt, Battle of (1704), 325
Frederica Dorothea, Queen of Swe-
den, 385
Frederick, Count Palatine, 65, 70
272, Matthias, 90e of Transyl-
Index
453
- Frederick III, Duke of Holstein, Frederick William IV, King of
171, 230, 243, 249, 255
Prussia, 421
Frederick IV, Duke of Holstein, Fredrikshamn, Battle of (1790), 379
315
Fredrikshamn, Treaty of (1720),
Frederick V, King of Bohemia, 347; (1809), 390
157
Friis, Johan, 69, 84
Frederick I, King of Denmark, 29, Fuchs, Johan Philip, 159, 161
30, 40; religious policy, 91-96 Funck, Senator, 337, 364
Frederick II, King of Denmark, 76; Fürstenberg, General, 201, 202
war with Ditmarsh, 77-78; war
with Sweden, 78–83 ; 84, 85 Gabel, Christopher, 259, 267, 269,
Frederick III, King of Denmark,
157, 169, 238, 239, foreign policy, Gabler, Matthias, 90
239,240; 241, 242, 247, 248,
Gabriel Bethlen, Prince of Transyl-
defence of Copenhagen, 250–252, vania, 161
258, 259, Danish revolution, 261 Gallas, Count, 173, 211, 213, 214
263; introduces absolutism, 263, Galt, Peter, 173
267; 269, 270, 273, 274, 302 Gambier, Adiniral, 413
Frederick IV, King of Denmark, Gemauerhof, Battle of (1705), 329
315-316, league against Charles George, Duke of Brunswick, 160
XII; 318, 335, 2nd league against George I, King of England, 342, 343
Charles ; 342, 398
George Rakóczy, Prince of Transyl-
Frederick V., King of Denmark, vania, 220
399-400, administration
George William, Elector of Branden-
Frederick VI, King of Denmark, burg, 189, 196
395, 411, 413-416, Napoleonic Giovanni Francesco, of Potenza, 104
wars; 417–419, internal adminis Gjedde, Ove, 172
tration
Gjö, Henrik, 29
Frederick VII, King of Denmark, Godolphin, Earl of, 329
420, 421, 424-426, Sleswig Göie, Mogens, 92
Holstein difficulty
Gonsiewski, 188
Frederick I, King of Prussia, 335, Görtz, Georg Heinrich von, cha-
336
racter, 343-344; negociates with
Frederick II, King of Prussia, 355, Russia, 345–346.
Seven Years'. War; 359, 360,
Grevens Fejde (1534-1536), 50–53
anti-Swedish policy; 369
Griffenfeld, Peder, early years, 267
Frederick I, King of Sweden, 349, ~269, 272, 273; predominance,
accession ; 352, death, 353
274–275 ; reforms, 276–277 ;
Frederick, Prince of Denmark, 408 foreign policy, 277–282; 283, 284,
Frederick William, Elector of Bran fall, 285; trial, 286,287; sen-
denburg, 215, 233, 236, relations tence, 288; death, 289
with Charles X ; 237, 240, 244, Grotius, Hugo, 186
252, 270, Danish policy; 279 Guébriant, General, 214
281, anti-French policy; 283, Gustavus Í, Vasa, King of Sweden,
293, 294, war with Sweden; 298, 18, 19; early years, 33-34; in
the Dales, 34-35; war of libera-
Frederick William I, King of Prussia, tion, 36–39; election, 39–40 ;
economical difficulties, 41-42;
Frederick William II, King of peasant rebellions, 44-49; 51, 52,
Prussia, 387
55, 56; last years, character, 57–

308
340
29-3
454
Index
59; 103, 106, 107; religious
policy, 108–111; 114-116, 145,
146, 367
Gustavus II, Adolphus, King of
Sweden, first exploits, 153-154;
155-6, 158, 163, 164, 168; early
years, 177-178; war with Russia,
179-181; 185; war with Poland,
187-192 ; Thirty Years' War,
193–207; death, 208; 306
Gustavus III, King of Sweden, 353,
357, 359-364; revolution of 1772,
365–371; first war with Russia,
372–375; revolution of 1789,
376-378; second war with Russia,
378-379; death, 380; 381, 382,
410
Gustavus IV, King of Sweden, 384;
character, 385; 386, 387, 388;
deposition, 389-390
Gustavus, son of Eric XIV, 124,
125
Gustavus, son of Gustavus IV, 391
Gustavus, son of Oscar II, 441, 442
Gyldenlöve, Ulric Frederick, 269,
271, 273, 274, 276, 284, 295, 317
Gyldenstjerne, Knud, 31, 93
Gyldenstjerne, Mogens, 89
Gyldenstolpe, Nils, Count, 383
Gyllenborg, Carl, 343, 350, 351
Gyllenstjerna, Christina, 20-23, 33
Gyllenstjerna, Johan, 290, 294, 299,
Hansen, Christopher, 262
Hardenberg, Anne, 76, 77
Hardenberg, Jakob, 69
Harley, Robert, 329
Harold, Bluetooth, King of Den-
mark, 2
Harold, Haardraade, King of Nor-
way, 5
Hatzfeldt, General, 214, 220
Hedwig Leonora, Queen Consort of
Charles X, 230, 290
Hedwig Sophia, Duchess of 'Hol-
stein, 315
Heilbronn, Union of (1633), 210
Heinsius, Grand Pensionary, 320
Heliae. See Eliae
Helmfeld, General, 295
Helsingborg, Battle of (1710), 336
Henry IV, King of France, 144 .
Höegh-Guldberg, Ove, 408-411
Hoja, Johan von, 43, 52
Hölger, Carlsson, 112
Holowczyn, Battle of (1708), 331
Höpken, Daniel Niklas von, 350
Horn; Arvid Bernard, 324, 350,
- 351
Horn, Gustavus, 172, 188, 194, 202,
203, 205, 206, 211
Horn, Karl, 139
Horn, Klas, 81, 82, 118
Hörring, Danish Minister, 431
Hosius, Cardinal, 130
Hulst, van der, 329
Huyssens, 329
Hvitfeld, Christopher, rol
307
Haco, Lagaböte, King of Norway, 5
Haco IV, King of Norway, 5
Haco V, King of Norway, 7
Haco VI, King of Norway, 7
Hagerup, Norwegian Minister, 440
Hague, Concert of the (1659), 253
Hague, Guarantee Treaty of (1659),
Hague, Treaty of the (1674), 280;
(1681), 307
Håkansson, Swedish Minister, 386
Hall, Carl Christian, 425, 426
Halmstadt, Conference of (1450), 10
Halmstadt, Battle of (1676), 295
Hamburg, Peace of (1536), 53
Hans, King of Denmark, 11, 77, 78
253
Ingebregtsson, Olaf, 31
Isabella, Queen of Denmark, 15,
16
Isebrandt, Wolf, 77
Ivan IV; Tsar of Moscovy, 56, 127
Jakobstadt, Battle of (1704), 329
James I, King of England, 144,
158
Jepsen, Aage, 94
Johannes, Magni, 102, 103, 108
Johansson, Eric, 33
John, son of John III, King of
Sweden, 139, 141, 178
Index
455
Königsberg, Treaty of (1656), 236
Königsmarck, Count : 221
Kordecki, Augustin, 235
Krag, Otto, 260, 262 :
Krassov, General, 335
Kristianopel, Treaty of (1644), 174
Kruse, Vibeke, 165, 166, 175
186
· John III, King of Poland, 297
John III, King of Sweden, 56, 82,
115-119, 124, 125, accession,
126; 128, 129; his via media,
129-130; " conversion," 131-
132; death and character, 132-
133
John Adolphus, Duke of Plön, 285,
286
John Casimir, Count of Zweibrücken,
John Casimir, King of Poland, 232,
234-237, 243, 244
John Ernest, Duke of Saxe-Weimar,
159, 161, 162
John George, Elector of Saxony,
196, 198, 200, 201, 203-206
Jonae, Petrus, 132
Jönköping, Treaty of (1809), 390
Jönsson, Ture, 31
Juel, Nils, 297
Juel, Jens, 280
Juliana Maria, Queen of Denmark,
408
Labiau, Treaty of (1656), 237
Lappo, Battle of (1808), 389
Lars Anderson. See Laurentius
Andreae
Laurentius Andreae, early years,
105; 1065 108, III, 113
Laurentius Petri, 105, 113, 124
Leipsic, Battle of. See supra,
Breitenfeld
Lejonhufvud, Axel, 137
Lejonhufvud, Baron, 360 ,
Le Metre, 334
Leopold I, Emperor of Germany,
280
Leopold, Duke of Mecklenberg, 342
Lesna, Battle of (1708), 332
Levenhaupt, Adam, victories, 328–
329; 331, 332
Levenhaupt, Carl Emil, 352
Liljecrantz, 369
Liljehorn, P., 379, 381
Lillieroth, Baron, 320
Lindenov, Christopher, 279
Lindskjöld, Eric, 294
Lisola, Franz von, 241
Lochteå, Armistice of (1808), 389
London, Treaty of (1852), 424
Lorenzen, Peter, 419
Lornsen, Uwe Jens, 418
Louis XIII, King of France, 212
Louis XIV, King of France, 268,
271, foreign policy, 1660–1670;
279, 281, 282, 283, befriends
Griffenfeld ; 284, 291-293, 298,
dictates to Charles XI; 307-308,
. 321-323, efforts to win Charles
XII; 320, 326, 329, 340, abandons
Sweden
Louis XV, King of France, 359
Louis XVI, King of France, 382
Louisa Augusta, Princess of Den-
mark, 408

Kaas, Nils, 84, 144
Kalmar, Union of (1397), 8
Kalmar War (1611-1613), 153-155
Kamenski, Sergius, 390
Karin, Queen Consort of Eric XIV,
121, 124
Karlstad, Andreas, 90
Kettler, Gotthard von, 56, 117, 118
Khrapovitsky, 372
Kiejdani, Treaty of (1655), 234
Kiel, Treaty of (1656), 243; (1814),
Kirkholm, Battle of (1605), 139-
140
Kjögebugt, Battle of (1677), 297
Klasson, Henrik, 82
Klercker, General, 389
Klingspor, Vilhelm, 388
Kluchino, Battle of (1610), 140
Knäred, Peace of (1613), 155
Kock, Jörgen, 51
Kolberger Heide, Battle of (1644),
172
Koniecpolski, Stanislas, 147, 190,
i 191
-416
456
Index
8
Messenius, Arnold Johan, 226
Michael, Tsar of Moscovy, 179–181
Modène, Comte de, 358
Moltke, A. G., 400
Moltke, A. V., 421
Monrad, Danish Minister, 426
Montague, Admiral, 253
Montecuculli, General, 252
Mörner, Carl Otto, 392
Mortier, Marshal, 387
Mosem, Treaty of (1557), 56
Moss, Convention of (1814), 396
Moth, Amelie, 273
Mule, Laurids, 101
Mund, Pros, 172
Munk, Christina, 150, 165, 175,
238
Munk, Peder, 144
Münster, Congress of (1645), 221
Louisa Charlotte, Princess of Au-
gustenburg, 283
Louisa Ulrica, Queen of Sweden,
353
Lübeck, Peace of (1537), 53; (1629),
164
Lund, Battle of (1676), 296–297
Lund, Peace of (1679), 299
Luther, Martin, 90, consulted by
Christian II; 97, 99, 104, first
heard of in Sweden; 106-107,
favoured by Gustavus Vasa; 109
Lutter, Battle of (1626), 161
Liitzen, Battle of (1632), 207
Magnus, Duke of Denmark, 118
Magnus, Duke of Östergotland, 115
Magnus, Haraldsson, 112
Magnus the Good, King of Nor-
way, 5
Malaspina, Germanicus de, 134
Malmö, Armistice of (1848), 422
Malmö, Battle of (1679), 297
Malmö, Peace of (1512), 11
Mansfeld, Ernest von, 160-162
Marazini, General, 213
Margaret, Queen Consort of Gus.
tavus I, 59
Margaret, Queen of Denmark, Nor.
way and Sweden, 7-9.
Marienburg, Treaty of (1656), 237
Marlborough, John, Duke of, 326,
329
Märta, Eriksdotter, 124
Martin, Eriksson, 109
Martini, Olaus, 142
Mary, Queen of England, 57
Mary, Queen of Scotland, 77, 79
Matthias, Bishop of Strengnäs, 20
Matvyeev, A. A., : 329
Mauritius, Otto, 286, 287
Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, 157,
204, 206
Mazarin, Cardinal, 210, 244, 253,
Nansen, Frithof, 440
Nansen, Hans, 259-263, 265
Nansen, Kitty, 282
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French,
386, 387, 389, 390, 392–394, 413,
415, 416
Napoleon III, Emperor of the
French, 427, 428
Narva, Battle of (1700), 319
Nelson, Horatio, Earl, 412
Neugebauer, 337
Neuman-Köprili, 337, 338
Ney, Marshal, 395
Nicolai, Laurentius, 130
Nieroth, Swedish General, 325
Nimeguen, Congress of (1677), 298
Norby, Sören, 28, 30, 39
Nordin, Prebendary, 371, 386
Nördlingen, Battle of (1634), 211.
Norman, Georg, 43, 54, 113
Norris, Admiral, 342
Nöteborg, Peace of (1323), 55
Nürnberg, Execution-Congress of
(1650), 222
Nyborg, Battle of (1659), 254
Nystad, Treaty of (1721), 347
Odense Recess . (1526), 92
Ogilvie, General, 325
Olaf I, King of Norway, 2
AAA
268
Mazepa, Ivan, 331, 332, 334, 337
Mehemet Baltaji, Pasha, 338, 339
Mehlen, Berent von, 43, 44
Melanchthon, Philip, 97, 117
Messenius, Arnold, 226
Index
457
Olaf II, King of Norway, 5
Olaf, Master. See Olavus Petri
Olai, Martinus, 130
Olai, Nicolaus, 133
Öland, Battle of (1563), 80; (1566),
81; (1676), 295; (1789), 378
Olavus Petri, 105-108, III, 113
Oldenbarneveldt, 156
Oldendorf, Battle of (1633), 211
Oliva, Peace of (1660), 255
Olkijoki, Convention of (1808), 389
Opalinski, Christopher, 234
Oscar I, King of Sweden, 432, 433,
435
Oscar II, King of Sweden, 434,
436, 437, 439–443
Oslo, Convention of (1532), 31
Osnabrück, Congress of (1645), 221
Osten, Count, 404
Osterinan, Andrei, 344, 345
Oudinot, Marshal, 395
Oxe, Peder, 75, 84
Oxe, Torben, 16, 17
Oxenstjerna, Axel, hostility to Den-
mark, 168–169; 171; early years,
184-185; 190-192, 194, 203, 206,
208; legate plenipotentiary, 209–
211; 214, 216, 217, 219-222, 224,
225, 227; death, 230
Oxenstjerna, Benedict, foreign po-
licy, 307–309; 312, 313, 320
Oxenstjerna, Eric, 230, 240
Oxenstjerna, Gabriel Bengtsson, 186
Oxenstjerna, Gabriel Gustafsson, 186
Oxenstjerna, Johan, 221, 222
Palsson, Ogmund, 101 ..
Panin, Nikita Ivanovich, 368, 410
Pappenheim, Count, 199, blockades
Magdeburg ; 200, 202, at Breiten-
feld ; 207
Paris, Treaty of (1663), 272; (1810),
390
Parker, Sir Hyde, 412
Parkumäki, Battle of (1789), 378
Patkul, Johan Reinhold, 313, brings
about Great Northern War, 314-
315; 322, 325, execution ; 326
Paul, Emperor of Russia, 385, 412
Pechlin, Baron, 381
Peder, Chancellor. See Petrus
Jacobi
Persson, Göran, 117, 120-122, 124,
• 125
Peter I, Emperor of Russia, 314-
315, duplicity, 316; at Narva,
318–319; 320, 326, conquers Baltic
Provinces, 327-328; 329, 330, war
in Ukraine, 330-332; 333-335,
337, campaign of Poltava, 338–
339; 340, 342-345, 347
Peter III, Emperor of Russia, 401
Petersburg, Treaty of (1812), 393
Petri, Laurentius, 129
Petri, Laurentius, the Second, 130
Petrus Jacobi, 103, 109
Petrus Magni, 103
Philip, Landgraf of Hesse, 75
Philip of Anjou, 320
Pimentelli, Antonio, 225
Piper, Countess, 391
Plad, Peder, 99, 100
Pliusa, Truce of (1582), 127
Plön, Duke of, 295
Poischwitz, Truce of (1813), 395
Poltava, Battle of (1709), 334
Poniatowski, Stanislas, 337
Porosalmi, Battle of (1789), 378
Possevino, Antonio, 127, 131
Potocki, Stanislaus, 235 .
Prague, Peace of (1635), 2017
(1866), 428
Presbrazensk, Treaty of (1699), 316
Pruth, Peace of the (1711), 339
Pultusk, Battle of (1703), 324
Punitz, Battle of (1704), 325
Pyhy, Konrad von, 43
Radziejowski, Hieronymus, Car-
dinal, 233, 322
Radziwill, Janus, 235
Rakóczy, Francis. See Francis
Rakóczy, George. See George
Rantzau, Daniel von, 81, 82, 85
Rantzau, Heinrich von, 78
Rantzau, Johan von, 29, 30, 52, 62,
68, 72, 78
Rantzau, Melchior von, 68, 69
Rantzau - Ascheberg, Count, 402–
404, 408
458
Index
Rathenow, Engagement of (1675),
294
Rebolledo, Count, 241
Reff, Hans, 65, 98
Rehnskjöld, Marshal, 324-326, 331
Reinhart, Martin, 90
Renata of Lorraine, 120
Reusberg, Compact of (1544), 74
Reuterholm, E. K., 381
Reuterholm, Gustaf Adolf, 381, 382,
384, 385
Reventlow, H. D., 411
Revolaks, Battle of (1808), 389
Rhine, Union of the (1658), 271,
272
Ribbing, Adolf Ludwig, 381.
Ribe, Articles of (1542), 98
Ribe, Treaty of (1659), 252
Richelieu, Cardinal, 158, 198, al
liance with Gustavus Adolphus;
210, opinion of Oxenstjerna; 212
Rollo, I
Rönnov, Jakob, 93, 94, 96
Rönnov, Joakim, 61
Rönnov, Karl, go '
Roskilde, Peace of (1658), 248
Rudbeck, Ture, 355, 364, 365
Rudenskjöld, Magdalena, 383
Runafer, Battle of (1567), 82
Ryswick, Congress of (1697), 309
Sadolin, 97
Saint Germain, Peace of (1679),
298
Salm, Otto Ludwig von, 165
Salvius, Adler, 186, 221, 222
Sandels, Johan August, 389
Säversbruck, Battle of (1809), 390
Sceaux, Treaty of (1542), 54
Schach, Hans, 288
Schaumburg, Hannibal von, 199
Scheidnitz, Battle of (1642), 215
Schliffenbach, General, 328
Schuhmacher, Peter. See Griffen-
feld
Schulenburg, General, 325
Sehested, Christiania, 167
Sehested, Hannibal, 166, 167, 170,
175, 239, 258, 265, 272
Selmer, Christian August, 437
Sheremetev, Field-marshal, 318, 319
Sigbrit, 13, 14, 17, 19, 28
Sigismund II, King of Poland, 118
Sigismund III, King of Poland and
Sweden, 127, election to Polish
throne; 128, 131, 133-135, elec-
tion to Swedish throne; 137, 138,
flight from Sweden; 156, 187,
189, 191., war with Gustavus.
Adolphus
Silfverstolpe, A. G., 384
Skeel, Christian, 288
Skodborg, Jörgen, 93
Skram, Peder, 53
Skytte, Johan, 185, 186
Slagheck, Didrik, 19, 24, 25, 37,
38
Slagheck, Henrik, 39
Solovev, Sergyei, 368
Sophia, Queen of Denmark, 77,
165
Sophia Amelia, Queen of Denmark,
239
Sophia Magdalena, Queen of Den-
mark, 399
Sparre, Carl, Count, 369
Speier, Peace of (1544), 72
Spence, James, 158
Sprengtporten, George, 363
Sprengtporten, Magnus, 362, 364.
Stålarm, Arvid, 137
Stang, Emil, 438
Stang, Frederik, 437
Stångebro, Battle of (1599), 138 .
Stanislaus II, King of Poland, 324,
election; 325, 335, flight to Sweden
Stedingk, Bogislaw, 378
Steen, Johannes, 440
Steinburg, Compact of (1621), 168
Stenbock, Magnus, 336, 340
Stephen Báthory, King of Poland,
126, 127
Stettin, Congress of (1570), 152
Stettin, Peace of (1570), 83
Stockholm, Articles of (1574), 129
Stockholm Massacre (1520), 24
Stockholm, Treaty of (1672), 291;'
(1720), 346; (1813), 395
Stolbova, Peace of (1617), 181
Stralsund, Treaty of (1370), 7
Index
459
Struensee (Johan Friedrich), early
career, 402; dictatorship, 403-
408 ; fall, 409
Stuhmsdorf, Treaty of (1635), 211
Sture, Eric, 119
Sture, Nils, 119, 120, 122-124
Sture, Sten, Governor of Sweden,
18-20, 24, 33, 34
Sture, Svante, 119, 121-123
Svane, Hans, 259–263
Svaning, Hans, 56
Svensksund, ist battle of (1789),
379
Svensksund, 2nd battle of (1790),
379
Sverdrup, Johan, 436, 438
Sverker I., King of Sweden, 2, 4
Sweyn I., King of Denmark, 2
Taastrup, Peace of (1658), 247
Taube, Evert, 371, 385
Tausen, Hans, 92, 94-97, 99
Terlon, French Minister, 284
Tersmeden, Admiral, 366
Tessin, Carl Gustaf, 350, 351, 353
Teusin, Peace of (1595), 135
Thijssen, Martin, 172
Thorn, Treaty of (1709), 336
Tilly, Count, 158, 160, at Lutter,
161; 162, 163, 192, 199–201,
at Breitenfeld, 202 ; 205
Toll, John Christopher, 363, 364,
369, 371, 383, 385-388
Tolstoi, Peter, 337
Torstensson, Lennart, 171-173, 194,
215, 216, 220
Tott, Ake, 194, 205
Trachenberg, Conference of (1813),
Ugglas, Samuel af, 385
Ukrainets, 318
Ulfeld, Jakob, 166
Ulfeld, Korfits, 166-167, character ;
174, 175, 239, 242, betrays Den-
mark; 247-248, serves Sweden;
258–259, expelled from Denmark;
270
Ulfeld, Leonora Christina, 167, 239,
258, 259, 270
Ulfsson, Jacob, 17
Ullmann, Viggo, 439, 441, 442
Ulric, Duke, son of Christian IV,
165
Ulrica, Leonora, Queen Consort of
Charles XI, 281, 299, 309
Ulrica, Leonora, Queen of Sweden,
sister of Charles XII, 333, 339,
346, accession; 349, abdication;
352
Upsala, Battle of (1520), 21
Urne, Lage, 93
Utenhof, Wolfgang von, 29, 68, 69,
Utismalm, Battle of (1789), 378
Vachtmeister, Hans, 306
Valdemar I, King of Denmark, 3
Valdemar II, King of Denmark,
2, 3
Valdemar IV, King of Denmark,
- 6, 7
· Valkendorf, Archbishop of Bergen,
395
Travendal, Peace of (1700), 318
Tremouille, Charlotte Amélie de,
283
13, 14, 16
Valkiala, Battle of (1700), 370
Valkendorf, Christopher, 84 -
Vandal, Hans, 98
Värälä, Peace of (1790), 379
Vasily, Shuisky, Tsar of Moscovy,
140, 141
Vendôme, Marshal, 326
Vergennes, French Minister, 359
Versailles, Treaty of (1784), 371
Viborg, Treaty of (1609), 140
Viborg Gauntlet, Battle of (1790),
379
Vienna, Peace of (1864), 428
Villadsen, Peder, 261
Villars, Marshal, 326
Villeroi, Marshal, 326
Trent, Council of, 129
Trolle, Henrik af, 369
Trolle, Herluf af, 81, 85
Trolle, Gustaf af, 18, 19, 21-23, 25,
31, 33, 37, 38, 102-104
Trondsen, Christopher, 69
Ture, Jönsson, 112
Turenne, Field marshal, 220
460
Index
Vittenberg, Arvid, 233, 234, 237
Wallenstein, Albrecht Eusebius,
William, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel,
201
Wilna, Treaty of (1561), 118
Wittstock, Battle of° (1636), 212
Wladislaw IV, King of Poland,
138, 141
Wrangel, Gustaf, 194, 213, cam-
paigns of 1646–47, 220; 244, pas-
sage of the Belts, 246–247; 250,
281, defeated at Rathenow and
Fehrbellin, 293–294
Wullenwever, Jiirgen, 51, 52
Yaguzhinsky, Paul, 347
Zamoyski, Andrew, 127, 140
Zolkiewski, Grand Hetman, 141
Zusmarshausen, Battle of (1648), 220
Duke of Friedland, 160-161, cam-
paign against Danes; 162, 163-4,
negociates with Danes; 191, 192,
195, 205-206, campaign of Nürn-
berg; at Lützen, 207–208
Wallhof, Battle of (1626), 188
Wallqvist, Olaf, 371, 386
Warsaw, Battle of (1656), 237
Wassenaer, Admiral, 253
Wehlau, Treaty of (1657), 243
Weissenstein, Battle of (1604), 139
Wenden, Battle of (1578), 127
Westphalia, Peace of (1648), 222
William III, King of England,
307-308, 317, 320, 322
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS,

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Extracts from the Reviews.
Prof. Hume Brown's "History of Scotland.”
The Athencum.-" The promise of Prof. Hume Brown's first volume is
more than fulfilled in the second. The author's thorough knowledge of
the sources, his gift of lucid condensation, and fine sense of proportion
have made this comparatively short work the most complete and satis-
factory history of Scotland which we possess. His pages are not over-
crowded with details, and the reader's interest is secured from beginning
to end by the admirable way in which he is led to find, in the conflict
of political and social forces, the gradual evolution of the national
destiny."
The Times.—"Mr Hume Brown's learning and accuracy are as great as
ever and his conclusions are clear and definite. Every page of the book
shows that Mr Brown is a careful and patient investigator. He is always
scientific alike in manner and in method, and he can condense the results
of weeks of patient work into fine, clear and lucid lines. He can resist all
temptations to wander from the path which he has marked out for himself;
his book is invariably consistent in treatment, and its divisions show a due
sense of proportion. He has produced a work which will render im-
measurably easier the attempt to understand the difficult and involved story
of seventeenth century Scotland.”
Manchester Guardian.—“Bids fair to be by far and away the best
extant compendium of Scottish history. Here we have a calm and
judicious verdict on all, based on a thorough examination of a vast mass of
evidence. A thoroughly good piece of work, which we can heartily
recommend as singularly trustworthy, and eminently readable."
Prof. Grant's “ French Monarchy."
The Spectator.-"This is a clear, thoughtful, readable, and most useful
history of the Monarchy in France, from the consolidation of its power
under Louis XI to the many causes of its downfall with Louis XVI."
The Pilot.—“The series to which these volumes are contributed
belongs to the utilitarian school of history. It is not designed for the
entertainment of those who merely desire, with the story-teller's audience,
to know what happened,' but is intended rather to assist those more
serious persons who are anxious to understand the nature of existing
political conditions. Such readers will find much to interest them in these
clear, impartial pages.”
[7241 n over
Cambridge Historical Series.
Major Hume's “ Spain."
The Speaker,-"Major Hume's volume is in all respects worthy of the
great reputation which he has won as an expert in the domain of Spanish
history... Major Hume's knowledge is as complete as possible, and to a
perfect mastery of his material he adds an impartiality and luminous insight
which are exceedingly rare. ... His wide and deep acquaintance with the
immense literature of his subject, his singular grasp of detail, and his cold
lucidity have enabled him to present us with an historical handbook,
convincing, brilliant and final in its kind. This is no dry chronicle; but
a vivid and picturesque transcript of events."
Dr Stillman's “Union of Italy.”
The Times.—"Few men are better qualified by personal knowledge,
by political sympathies, or by direct contact with events than Mr W. J.
Stillman to write a history of modern Italy.... His volume is, especially in
its later chapters, a history largely written from sources of knowledge not
yet fully accessible to the outside world.” .
Sir J. G. Bourinot's “Canada."
Daily Chronicle. -" It would scarcely be possible to find a man in the
Dominion better suited to play the part of its historian than the author of
this volume....As a textbook of Canadian history Sir John Bourinot's work
is admirable."
Sir H. H. Johnston's " Africa."
The Times.-"Sir Harry Johnston has devoted both industry and
ability to its performance, and deserves the thanks of future students for the
result. This history...presents within handy compass an extremely valuable
expanded index of African history as a whole.... As a textbook of African
study his book supplies a want which has been generally felt, and should be
in proportion warmly welcomed.”
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whelming material unskilfully put together. On the contrary, he is clear
and connected, and succeeds in holding the reader's attention throughout."
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equal educational value for its size has appeared for many years past.”
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