HARE
ELECTION
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
A 958,093
JN
961
.H28
1873
!

ARTES
318171
VERITAS
LIBRARY
SCIENTIA
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
PLURIBUS UNUM
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TCEBOR
SI-QUÆRIS-PENINSULAM-AMŒNAM
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IN
961
.H28
1873
i
THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
3
*
LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET
AND CHARING CROSS.
THE
ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PARLIAMENTARY AND MUNICIPAL.

A Treatise.
GENERAL LIBRA
Jniversity.
BY THOMAS HARE,
BARRISTER-AT-LAW,
FOURTH EDITION.
ADAPTING THE PROPOSED LAW TO THE BALLOT, WITH APPENDICES ON THE
PREFERENTIAL AND THE CUMULATIVE VOTE.
LONDON:
LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER.
1873.
27 0196 S
TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
SIR JAMES WIGRAM,
FROM WHOM THE AUTHOR HAD DURING MANY YEARS
THE ADVANTAGE OF HEARING THE MAXIMS OF THAT EQUITY
WHICH IS INSEPARABLY CONNECTED WITH MORALS,
AND TO WHOSE FRIENDSHIP AND KINDNESS
HE IS LARGELY INDEBTED.
F
~.3
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
THE issue of another edition has become necessary, not only
to introduce such alterations as shall adapt the proposed
electoral law to the Ballot Act, but also to make known the
progress of the representative principle in actual practice,
and in theoretical development. In both, the greatest ad-
vances have been made in the United States. The experi-
ments in Harvard College, Massachusetts, and in the Tech-
nological Institute at Boston, show that a preferential choice.
from competing claims to distinction, may form a highly
instructive part of the historical and political education in our
schools; while the recent election in Illinois, of the Upper
House by the old, and the Lower by a proportional system,
contrasts their results.
In our own country the preferential and proportional
method of election has been twice brought before the House
of Commons: first on Mr. Mill's amendment to the Reform
Bill (29th May, 1867), and again on the motion for the
second reading of Mr. Morrison's Bill (10th July, 1872).
When in 1869 the House of Commons appointed a Com-
mittee to inquire into the modes of conducting elections, with
a view to provide further guarantees for their purity, tran-
quillity, and freedom, the event was hailed as an opportunity
of subjecting the proposed method to an exhaustive inquiry,
and bringing prominently forward the anticipated results.
Evidence was therefore tendered to the Committee for the
purpose of showing how greatly the temptations to corruption
a 2
vi
PREFACE.
would be reduced, tranquillity assured, and electoral freedom
extended by proportional representation. The Committee,
however, requested their chairman to reply that the object
of their inquiry did not extend to a consideration of the
subject under any other than the existing conditions, and
they declined to accept the evidence. It is greatly to be
regretted that at a period of transition in the history of repre-
sentative government they should have considered that so
comprehensive a reference was satisfied by an inquiry thus
superficial, and thought that the evils of corruption, violent
manifestations of discontent, and restricted power of selection,
had no deeper sources than the imperfect machinery of the
polling booth. It would be scarcely thought compatible
with scientific investigation if one charged to inquire how the
public health in a city might be best promoted, should decline
to look into the sources and purity of the water or the com-
pleteness of the drainage, and regard himself as confined to
the "existing conditions," assume the existing diseases to be
inevitable, and try to discover nothing more than the medi-
cines that could be resorted to as antidotes.
The Ballot Act, whether it be regarded as a fruit of the
inquiry of the Committee, or as the result of a foregone con-
clusion, has now become law; and all the rules and forms
heretofore proposed as to voting, which were in any respect
incompatible with it, have been altered or expunged.' The
author has not, however, thought it necessary to withdraw
any of the speculative observations which he ventured to
make in former editions with regard to secrecy in political
action. Secrecy is no obstacle to any part of the scheme; on
the contrary, in many points of view it may render its adop-
tion still more desirable or even necessary; but a frank
manifestation of all opinions is more in conformity with the
ideal of healthy national life.
1 A few words implying arrangements inconsistent with secrecy, which
escaped attention, are pointed out in the errata.
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.
THE criticism of seven years on this method of relieving
electors from the artificial restraints which impede the free-
dom of action in representative institutions may be summed
up in a few words,-that it is too complicated to be practical,
-that it is hostile to our local system,-and that it would
admit of abuse from party organization. If the first objection
were true it would be insurmountable: the second would
be an obstacle to the adoption of the method. If the last had
any foundation, in its exposure to party influence it would
still deserve a comparison with our present system. Apart
from these supposed objections, -a system which would bring
home to every elector the feeling of actual and personal
responsibility,—convert what are now only majorities into
unanimous constituencies, and mischievous and demoraliz-
ing contests into efforts of honourable emulation,-in which
all moral and intellectual elements would have their direct
expression and just force, and the corruption that remained
would be confined within such natural and inevitable limits
as to take from it nearly all its political and most of its per-
sonal evil,—has met with very general approbation.
First, as to the alleged complexity. The system, while it
gives to every elector the most ample choice of candidates,
makes a vote effectual in the election of one only. It is
therefore necessary to provide for the probability that men of
great popularity and eminence will have a large number of
viii
PREFACE.
votes, many of which would be thrown away, if means were
not given to the electors of transferring them to another
candidate, in case the first they have named be elected with-
out their aid. Accordingly, the form of the voting-paper,¹
without making it compulsory on the voter to name more
than one candidate, yet permits him to insert a second name
under the first, a third under the second, and so on,-at
his discretion, and according to the measure of his sympathy,
his desire to show a concurrence of opinion, or to manifest his
respect or appreciation. Those who come to the examination
of this scheme for the first time will probably be amazed to
learn, that—so far as there is anything to be done by the
voter-this is the whole extent of the complexity from which
so many politicians have shrunk.
Many of the epithets used in describing this proposal
would appear intended less to invite attention than to turn
away inquiry. Legal phraseology has been borrowed to
cloud with its abstractions the simple act of writing the
name of one candidate under another, that the vote may
be transferred to the second, if the candidate named first
should have votes enough without it. It has been called a
" contingent remainder," and an "estate tail" in a vote! It
may be left to the electors of the kingdom to judge between
those who seek for them this vast augmentation of their
electoral power, and those who tell them that a vote for a
second person to be used on the contingency of the first not
requiring it, is beyond their understanding. I would remark,
however, that if any voter can be found to whom it is not
intelligible, the use of the contingent vote by others will do
him no harm. Every power which he has under the present
system is scrupulously reserved to him, except that (which
may indeed have its value in the eyes of those who are skilful
in wielding ignorance) of drowning the voices of other people.
A vote is to be given to the candidate placed second on
¹ Page 124.
PREFACE.
ix
the paper, if the first has enough votes without it,-but how
many are enough ?-and how is that to be known? The
simple course is to ascertain how many persons vote, and to
try how many votes each member to be elected would have
if the votes were equally divided. On the morning which
follows the election day, the entire number of votes would
be known. If 658,000 people had voted, and there were
658 members, 1000 would be enough (or be the quotient or
quota) for each member; and if any candidate had more
than 1000, the excess beyond that number would be trans-
ferred to the successive candidates named on the voting-
papers. I suppose that no inspector of a national school
would allow a child of ten years old to be reckoned as en-
titling it to head-money out of the public grant who is not
able to divide the number of the voters by 658, and thus
obtain the quota. But even this achievement in arithmetic
is not required from any elector. It is an operation to be
performed by registrars, to whom the numbers are reported.
It is then necessary to determine which of the voting-
papers shall be taken to make up the member's quota, and
which shall go to the next candidates. It is of little import-
ance to the voters, but may be of much consequence to the
candidates placed lower on the papers. The papers might be
drawn by lot, but I have preferred a series of simple rules,
in which the appropriation is made to depend on locality,
and on the number of alternatives the voting-paper dis-
plays. These rules are to be applied by the registrars, and
any voter to whom they might appear perplexing need not
trouble himself with them. It is only necessary to satisfy
him that the rule is impartial and just. The voter has
nothing to do necessarily but to look to his own voting-
paper. It will be deposited in his town.
time refer to it, and see by the endorsement to which of his
favourite candidates it has been appropriated. This will be
proved by his name being found among the constituency of
He may at any dele
H
PREFACE.
that candidate; and the fidelity of the disposition will be
tested by tables showing that the votes severally appropriated
make up the total polled. The telegraph and the railway are
not of less public utility because few who use them are
masters of the science of mechanics and the laws of electricity.
The alleged impracticability of the method has recently met
with an unexpected and conclusive refutation. Mr. Lytton,
Secretary of Legation at Copenhagen, judging that there
was no subject of internal polity, which the inquiries of our
ministers abroad could elucidate, so fraught with conse-
quences deeply affecting the public prosperity, and none,
moreover, in which the institutions of free states had gathered
such small improvement in the progress of civilization-in
July, 1863, laid before the government at home a paper on
the mode of electing the Rigsraad, or Supreme Legislative
Council of what was then the United Kingdom of Denmark
and the Duchies. This method, which was first adopted in
1855, at the instance of Mr. Andre, Minister of Finance,
Mr. Lytton discovered to be almost identical with that which,
after several more imperfect embodiments of the same leading
idea, has been propounded in this Treatise. He regarded
the existence and operation, for eight years, of an electoral
system, which had theretofore been considered in England as
a theory only, to be a very remarkable event in the history of
representative institutions. "If," Mr. Lytton says, "the ques-
tion, Will it work?' can be eliminated, the more important
question, What will be the result of its working?' will be
entitled to increased attention." With a rare appreciation
of the essential elements of the scheme, and of their bearing
under different political conditions, Mr. Lytton explains the
extent to which it was capable of application in the election
of the Rigsraad. Of the eighty members which composed
6
1
1 Reports of Her Majesty's Secretaries of Embassy and Legation on the
Manufactures, Commerce, &c., of the Countries in which they reside. No. 7.
Presented to both Houses by Command. 1864.
PREFACE.
xi
that body twenty were nominated by the Crown for twelve
years, and the remaining sixty were elected for eight years;
thirty being chosen indirectly by the provincial assemblies,
and thirty directly by the people. The system of quotas was
adopted in both, the popular vote extending to the thirty elected
directly. This limited application of the method, moreover, was
for the election of an assembly whose ordinary sittings were
only two months in every second year, and the membership
of which conferred no great accession of dignity or influence,
and opened but a very small, if any, field for political rivalry
or effort.
A seat in it had so little to invite activity or
tempt ambition, that Mr. Andræ found it necessary to pro-
vide in his law for the case of a candidate who, after having
been duly elected, should decline the seat. Even a simple
declaration of candidature, it was said, would be distasteful;
and it is the practice for those who desire the election of a
particular person, to ascertain privately beforehand that he
will not disappoint the electors. This condition of the
national mind, and the antipathies of race in the Duchies,
which were all the time on the point of breaking out into
open war, together with the restricted measure in which the
popular voice would be thus collected, caused the experiment
to be made under circumstances as unfavourable as can well
be conceived. A part of the kingdom repudiated the con-
stitution, not owing to any opinion as to the mode of election,
but from hatred of the union; and this reduced the directly
elected representatives to twenty-two. A scheme, therefore,
devised to abate the fierceness of electoral conflicts among
people of great political activity, to moderate the bitterness
of struggles by which parties labour for the extinction of
each other, and to regulate and hold within reasonable
bounds the force of passions that, pursuing with intense
desire objects of personal and party ambition, too often
threaten to sweep away in their resistless torrent the virtues,
the moralities, and even the decencies of life, came thus, in
xii
PREFACE.
a partial degree, into use amongst a people in whom the
common current of political feeling and effort is so sluggish
that an artificial stimulus must be employed to overcome
its inert character. Yet, notwithstanding these hindrances,
election by this method is effected without difficulty; it has
facilitated the introduction to the national legislature of men.
of the highest character and intelligence, and is working out
a corresponding improvement in the constituent bodies.
Secondly, of the effect of the method on local elections.
The system which really destroys the wholesome influences of
locality is that which has long been, and still seems to be,
most in favour with popular reformers,-grouping some
boroughs, disfranchising others, here severing cities and
counties, and there adding a score of villages to some small
borough. The component parts are rather repelled than
attracted by such undesired combinations. It is proposed to
amend this anomalous patchwork, and allow the country
spontaneously and without any arbitrary rule, to recover its
natural subdivisions,-to recognize no right to any monopoly of
electoral privilege, and in the place of disfranchisement to en-
franchise not less than four hundred towns which are now
shut out from any local action; and the proposed amendment
is alleged to be destructive of the local character of our elec-
toral system! To give the widest scope and inducement for
local combination is to delocalize!
The apprehension of a disregard to localities is probably
owing to the fact that the first step in the method is to add
together all the votes given in the kingdom in order to com-
pute the quota. Thence it is imagined that the whole king-
dom is in some manner made one electorate, whereas, in
truth, the computation is nothing more than a momentary
operation to arrive at a common measure of the constituencies
without any purpose of blending them together.
A doubt has, indeed, been expressed by one who has given
much attention to the plan,-whether it is consistent with
PREFACE.
xiii
the maintenance of local distinctions, or with the identification
of particular representatives with particular groups of voters.
In the present edition, the eighth chapter, which treats of the
duties of the returning officers, has been considerably ex-
panded,¹ in order that it may be better seen that none of the
legal subdivisions of the constituency are effaced, nor any of
the visible landmarks of the electoral field swept away; and
that, on the contrary, as the surge of our national life rolls
deeper and wider, such legal subdivisions will be multiplied,
and many new landmarks added to the old. It will be seen
that the identification of particular representatives with par-
ticular groups of voters is promoted and secured to an extent
and with a completeness hitherto unknown.
A London merchant, on the register in Devonshire, may
vote for a candidate for the City, and a Scotch merchant in
London may vote for a candidate for Glasgow,-how is that
consistent with the integrity of localities? It is true that
any elector, however humble in rank, or feeble in influence,
may pass by the candidates for his own constituency, and
propose, instead of them, any other candidate he might prefer,
but this is nothing more than his ancient common-law right.
Every elector may now propose and vote for whom he pleases.
This method enables him, however, to do much more,-and it
is to this additional power that some of our politicians object,
and against which they raise the cry that "localities are in
danger." It enables the elector to put his vote in writing,
and makes it possible that the vote, although without effect in
his own constituency, may help the return in some other
place of the candidate for whom it is given. Yet it does this
without any control over or interference with the voters of
such other constituency. There may not be enough voters in
it to make up the quota, or not enough given for that candi-
date, and the distant vote may therefore serve to complete
it, not impeding but assisting everywhere the majority,
¹ Pages 164-174.
xiv
PREFACE.
A
-the greatest number that can agree together,-in the work
of electing their local member. Without such a power, it
would be commonly useless, and even absurd, for an ordinary
elector to propose a new candidate against the nominee of the
clique or caucus of the borough; but this power, which vindi-
cates his individual right, most of our politicians shrink from
giving him. It would, they fear, make the voter too free. He
is not to be trusted without the bridle and the bit. Extend
the suffrage,-make the constituency more numerous, but do
not trust them out of harness. "All our schemes of election
management may be defeated, if every voter had such ex-
tensive means of comparison and choice, and if no small cabal
could affect the general result."
With the integral political rights of counties, cities, bo-
roughs, and corporate bodies, the constitution of this king-
dom, and the public life and habits of its people, are insepa-
rably interwoven. This method of election contains very
much which would promote the development of such centres
of action, and impart to them a purer and nobler spirit,
nothing that would weaken their force. Can it be supposed
that the moment the electors are allowed a freedom of choice
they will all immediately be seized with a desire to vote for
some distant candidates with whom they are unacquainted,
rather than for those whom they know,-who are near to
them, whose addresses they have heard, and who have per-
sonal recommendations to the favour and respect of the town
and neighbourhood? Local and corporate associations are
highly and justly prized. From them the state derives
benefits analogous to those which the close fellowship and
community of the domestic and family relation afford to the
individual. These natural ties are not so fragile that they
disappear as soon as they cease to be forcibly kept alive by
positive law. It argues but a small belief in the regard of
our people for local action to suppose that they must be
imprisoned within their constituency to be kept true to it.
PREFACE.
XV
If we consider the mental effect on the observers, of nearly
every kind of competition the result of which is doubtful, we
shall find there is every reason to conclude that local interest,
activity, and effort will be stimulated by an election in this form
to a greater degree than heretofore, and will be of a far more
wholesome character. Many more candidates will be every-
where put in nomination. The measure of local regard for
each candidate the votes will display,-the anticipated evolu-
tion of varieties of preference, the desire of the more public-
spirited inhabitants that the choice of the majority may light
on the best, or on him they think so,-will" present the situa-
tion of suspense and pleasurable engrossment" in great
force. This aspect of the subject has been treated in another
place, and, interesting as it is, I forbear to dwell upon it.
2
The third objection, that a party "ticket " would be used,
and party organization become omnipotent, is scarcely more
than an offset of the last,-that the method delocalizes. If,
indeed, it created one electorate,-if every member were
chosen for the whole kingdom, and by no county or town in
particular,-each party might safely produce a printed ticket
for its own followers, and be certain that, to the extent to
which they adhered to that ticket, the candidates named upon it,
one after the other, would make up their quotas or majorities,
until the whole strength of the party is exhausted, and it can
elect no more. Supposing, also, party devotion to be thus
blind and indiscriminate,-that every voter chose to be either
a Tory, a Whig, or a Radical, they might vote either for
the T., W., or the R. ticket in blank, and leave it to the
leaders of their parties to fill up the names according to the
number of quotas which each could muster. Yet see how
alien all this management is to our habitual action,-how
irreconcileable with our forms of political life! Our pro-
1 Bain, The Emotions and the Will.
2 Representation of every Locality and Intelligence. Fraser's Magazine,
April, 1860, p. 536.
xvi
PREFACE.
vinces are not the merely passive and stolid reflex of the
opinions of the capital. The people of Liverpool or of Man-
chester would not set aside their eminent merchants or manu-
facturers for the nominees of a London club; nor would the
inhabitants of Devon, or Warwick, or Edinburgh, or Glasgow,
submit to such dictation. No county or borough would
consent to use such tickets if they had not been consulted in
the selection of any of the names. Even if the kingdom were
a single electorate (voting by quotas) no party would dare to
ignore, on the contrary, each party would invite the co-opera-
tion of local eminence and the power which it carries with it.
A single electorate, voting by this method, and using party
tickets, would still have no resemblance whatever to the
“American ticket." That "ticket" is got up to enable the
numerical majority to hold together in one unbroken, compact
mass, and crush the minority. It is politically a life-and-
death struggle:-it admits of no balancing, no wavering,—
no hesitating or half support. The stronger party will
emerge in safety,—the weaker will perish.
A single electorate and the use of tickets by party sup-
porters, voting in quotas, by the contingent method, would,
alone, be a vast improvement. The strength of each party
would be measured by the popularity of its principles,—each
party would place its best men foremost in a gradation of
supposed merit,-and each would select and nominate its very
best to attract the support of the independent electors, while
the latter would have before them a choice of the superior
men of every party.
The proposed method, however, is not that of a single
electorate. The representatives of the United Kingdom
would be chosen by seven or eight hundred distinct constitu-
encies, acting separately and apart, and it would become the
endeavour of the most intelligent persons of every constitu-
ency to prevent it from being stultified by giving the major
part of its votes to a candidate who would throw discredit
PREFACE.
xvii
upon it.
The voting paper in every constituency would be
different, and no uniform ticket could be safely used. Every
candidate will require his name to be placed first, or first
after some one certain of being elected, or it will probably
be of no use to him. The intercalation of any candidate who
fails would prevent the vote from being used for any lower
name, and may deprive it of any influence on the election.
Parties may, indeed, adopt the use of printed voting papers,
leaving blanks at the head, or near it, for the local candidates,
and inserting below the names of other principal candidates
of their side. The extent of the use of these papers, or
"tickets," would measure the popular sympathy with the
party whose opinions it expressed, and would give them the
moral weight of such adherence. It is a mode of gathering
a knowledge of popular opinion and sentiment which is every
way desirable; and it would have no other than a salutary
effect on the particular election.
In an earlier stage of the method it was proposed to re-
duce the number of candidates, and arrive at an equal quota for
those who were elected, by giving a proportionate value to
every contingent vote, and computing the total of such
values as the measure of support each candidate had received.
This was open to the objection that it gave inordinate weight
to numbers acting by means of party papers or tickets, and the
suggestion was for that reason withdrawn.' The plan proposed
for the city of Frankfort is liable to the same objection.
2
The principle always kept in view has been that in form-
ing the representative assembly of the nation, full play should
be given to the expression of all opinions and sentiments, that
they may be admitted to the test and scrutiny of discussion.
The electors are the dispersed inhabitants of an extensive and
1 Pages 187, 188. See also Appendix C. This is the difficulty alluded
to by Mr. Mill in his Considerations on Representative Government, p. 158,
2nd ed. It has been obviated by excluding a contingent vote from any
effect on the election, until it is taken to make up a quota or comparative
majority.
2 Appendix B., p. 299.
b
xviii
PREFACE.
populous kingdom, possessing knowledge and powers of
thought infinitely varied and diffused; and to expect that the
electoral forms of a rude and illiterate age will gather for the
national benefit the fruit of this expanded intelligence, is as
reasonable as to suppose that the vast manufacturing results of
this day could be produced by the primitive loom and the
hammer. To succeed in this work it is indispensable that
every elector should have the widest field of choice, and the
most extensive sphere for co-operation. It is by comparison
that the standard of excellence is raised. "As we eliminate
comparison we fall into dead acquiescence." It is by the
co-operation of kindred and sympathetic minds that great ends
are accomplished. In the kingdom there is a range wide
enough for that accord which can be rarely obtained in any
single constituency. "The essence of liberty is the simul-
taneous manifestation and action of all rights, all interests,
all social elements and forces." We follow the true guiding
of experience when we found our conclusions of the probable
actions of men from the motives by which they are commonly
guided it is thus that the science of political economy has
been evolved; and in the improvement of representative insti-
tutions we must pursue the same method.
As electoral action is freed, most of the evils which now
accompany it will disappear. A seat in Parliament, as an
avenue to social estimation, as well as to political power and
rank, will still be an object of intense ambition; and the rich
candidate will as surely use his money to bribe, as the crafty
and fluent candidate will use his tongue to delude. Penal
laws cannot reach the latter, and only aggravate the demorali-
zation occasioned by the former. But in casting off the legal
shackles, this moral disorder is dealt with as physical maladies
are encountered. Its virulence is abated,-as many of its
causes as are capable of removal are got rid of; and, above
all, the contagion is prevented from spreading to those who
are in health.¹ Personal representation equalizes the pecuni-
¹ See pp. 106-109, n.
PREFACE.
xix
ary value of every vote, and reduces it to its minimum.
Three fourths of the temptation is thus swept away, and,
what is even far better, no man can sell more than his own
vote he cannot at the same time, by turning the scale, sell
his town, or affect the representation of the rest of his con-
stituency. Nor would any candidate thenceforward be
driven to call evil good, and praise conduct as virtuous and
patriotic which he knows to have been selfish and corrupt.
1
The
Personal representation encourages every man to do the
best that is in him, and leaves him without excuse if he does
not; and it therefore in the highest degree tends to promote
individual effort. “The general public opinion is formed and
modified by what the mind of each individual contributes
towards it: it represents the sum or balance of the abstract
moral principles of the persons forming the community.
state can only hear advice, or yield to suasion, or imbibe the
spirit of genuine improvement through the medium of the
individuals of whom it is composed." It was a remark of
De Tocqueville that the rulers of our time sought only how
to use men in order to effect great things. "I wish," he
said, "they would try a little more to make great men,—that
they would set less value upon the work, and more upon the
workman." Every detail of this scheme converges to one
central point, that of making the exercise of the suffrage a
step in the elevation of the individual character, whether it
be found in a majority or a minority. I disclaim for it, there-
fore, the title of a representation of minorities. M.
Morin, to whose labours in Geneva I refer elsewhere, has
better comprehended its object, and I presume to quote his
description of it. "Il est vrai que M. Hare poursuit un but
plus élevé que la représentation des minorités et que si celle-ci
est obtenue, dans son système, ce n'est qu'indirectement. En
conséquence, ce qui paraît une défectuosité, considéré au point
de vue des minorités, peut n'en être pas une, lorsqu'on se
place à celui de l'auteur. M. Hare se propose avant tout
2 Appendix A. p. 295; and see p. 255, n.
1 Gladstone.
XX
PREFACE.
d'affranchir l'électeur du joug des partis et de le relever à ses
propres yeux. Pour cela, il le place en face de lui-même
pendant l'acte important qu'il est appelé à accomplir et le rend
partiellement responsable de la composition de la législature.
Ce n'est donc pas sans motifs plausibles que M. Hare se pré-
sente comme fauteur de la représentation personnelle, plutôt
que de celle des minorités. La lecture de son traité conduit
facilement à la persuasion que le pays qui façonnerait son
organisation électorale, d'après de telles idées, s'assurerait les
bienfaits d'un corps législatif, composé d'hommes capables et
estimés, en même temps qu'il élèverait le niveau moral de la
population.
"" 1
2
The political education afforded to our people by the occa-
sional opportunity of concurring in or opposing the election
of one or two representatives, has been compared with that
conferred by the town autonomy of the Greek cities-as of
Athens, where the Demos met at short intervals, and exer-
cised the office both of parliament and government, and
questions of foreign policy and domestic administration were
constantly argued. Certainly, with our present system the
comparison is humiliating enough; but if the constitution
would open to every voter a scope for thought and reflection
as wide as his intellectual and moral horizon, if it gave
him a choice from among all who by their candidature show
that they aspire to public distinction, the political school
of the "every-day Englishman" would surpass in value that
of the citizen of Athens in its proudest time.
The long
procession of history, and the phenomena of a progressive
civilization, the accumulated records of human action,-
the influence of Christianity, the opening portals of natural
science, afford endless themes for instruction, bearing on the
policy and complicate arrangements of social life in modern
times, of which the Greek orators or statesmen could not
dream. The subjection of a theorem, moreover, to the calm
¹ Page 17.
2 Freeman's History of Federal Government, p. 40.
PREFACE.
xxi
deliberation of the closet is a more instructive process than
its reception from lips however eloquent.¹
After all, the end is "good government,"-but that includes
the moral and intellectual development of the men and
women to be governed. Institutions are good which call them
habitually to perform such public functions as tend to
awaken a true conception of their real interests and duties
in respect to their households, their neighbourhood, the state,
and the brotherhood of nations; and lead them to realize
their endowments of conscience and intellect, the gifts by
which God has fixed their high place in the order of creation,
and in the great inheritance of humanity. But a government
is not good which, as to numbers of its people, contemplates no
more than protection from an external violence,-which allows
them no voice in the choice of their legislators, or in framing
the laws by which they are to be ruled, and which disdains
any appeal to them in its consultations on the public welfare.
Such a government differs from natural society only inasmuch
as the individual is guarded by the civil power instead of his
own strong arm. It fails to cultivate the higher qualities of
his nature, to foster a love of country, a regard for public duty,
or even a just self-respect. What it bestows is but the atten-
tion of the kind master to his horse or his dog. It misses
even the poor end at which it aims. The classes usurping all
power cannot confer even the physical and material comfort
of which they boast. Where the right is absent, the corre-
sponding duty or responsibility will not be felt. The classes
treated as inferior beings, will discard the higher obligations of
civil life and throw upon those who have assumed the charge
of their destinies, the blame, if not the consequences, of their
moral weakness and degradation,-thence our load of pauper-
ism, our catalogue of crime. The wise parent admits his
children to his counsels, and makes them partners of his
labours and his hopes, not from caprice or by fits and starts,
¹ See pp. 253, 251.
xxii
PREFACE.
but gradually and impartially, as education bears its fruit,
and intellect is matured. The nation is but a greater family.
If the choice be wide and free, the examination of the list of
candidates, by an intelligent elector, with the practical object
of placing on his voting paper the names of the most
worthy of a seat in Parliament, would be an intellectual exer-
cise of no mean value, bringing home to him important truths
and noble aims. The thoughts it is calculated to awaken in
his mind, and the discussion among his family and friends
to which it is likely to give rise, would be sources of more
than transitory benefit. He may give effectual support to the
local candidate, and at the same time render a moral tribute
to others. Few exercises would be more instructive than
that of gathering information and forming an estimate of
the character of candidate after candidate,—weighing their
labours, their public claims from achieved service, or the
hopes inspired by youthful promise,—with the looked for
pleasure of being able to offer an unsolicited testimony to
merit and an unexpected homage to worth. This is no
visionary expectation. Experience teaches us that it is an
ordinary impulse, when the mind is not distorted by prejudice.
"The judgment and criticism we pass freely upon our fellow-
creatures, and their ways and performances, are a common
gratification, partaking of the freedom of thought itself.
Whatever good qualities strike our minds, or impress the
community we live in, are sure to be sought after with
especial ardour, whilst those that are in bad odour are kept
in subjection. The contemplation of superior greatness is a
fund of delight." Aspiration is generally higher than know-
ledge, and multitudes of less education and narrower intelli-
gence will gladly associate their votes with those of the more
eminent and distinguished of their age.
99 1
It would probably become habitual with intelligent voters,
to preserve a copy of the voting paper, making in it, from
1 Bain, The Emotions and the Will.
PREFACE.
xxiii
time to time, such alterations as the withdrawal of old and
the introduction of new candidates, the progress of opinion
and of events, might occasion. It will thus be a political
register, and the act of framing it anew at each election will
be an instructive lesson. The admission or rejection of every
name may involve a conclusion on the domestic, social, or
international questions of which he may be the type or
exponent. The precipitancy with which the mind approves
or rejects the claims which are put before it, and the caution.
it uses in sifting, weighing, and examining them, is the touch-
stone of the order of intelligence. "Where the consciousness
is not awake except under a very broad difference, we consider
the mental constitution the opposite of intellectual. In
whatever department of impressions the nicest sensibility to
difference prevails, in that department will reside, in all
in all pro-
bability, the intellectual aptitude of the individual." The
mere act of voting may thus be made the basis of a study
widely diffusing a knowledge of the principles of social
polity. "If the human mind grow dwarfish and enfeebled,
it is ordinarily because it is left to deal with commonplace
facts, and never summoned to the effort of taking the span
and altitude of broad and lofty disclosures. The under-
standing will gradually bring itself down to the dimensions
of the matters with which alone it is familiarized, till having
long been accustomed to contract its powers, it shall lose well-
nigh the ability to expand. The laws of the body are those
of the mind. Exercise and excitement strengthen and ener-
gize-indolence and habits of insensitiveness, contract, debili-
tate, and at length kill.” 2
1
Everything which in political life liberates and increases
the scope and influence of enlightened judgment and culti-
vated reason, is of inestimable service also to those who
occupy the higher places in social rank, and possess in the
greatest measure the advantages of education and leisure.
1 Id.
2 Id.
xxiv
PREFACE.
"2
It is to the state "that sovereign intellect naturally betakes,
and here that it unfolds itself: not only does it give scope
and space to the highest energies of the human understanding,
it is also directly the parent, and the object, of some of the
noblest feelings which belong to our nature, and, these too,
such as operate on the most comprehensive scale." It was
long ago said that "the main thing which social changes can
do for the improvement of the higher classes is gradually to
put an end to all unearned distinction, that the only road
open to honour and ascendancy be that of personal qualities.
Rank and wealth set out with the most favourable auspices,
and stand on the vantage-ground of competition. They will
more certainly retain their position in the race, as they
themselves eschew, and endeavour to purge political life of
all that is vile and base; put forward their highest order of
minds for public duties and public honours, and do their
utmost to prevent seats in Parliament, or great offices or
functions, from being made the appanage of triflers or
weak men. It is not wise to stand contentedly by, as
some would seem to advise, and wait the behest of public
opinion to be communicated by the newspapers. Such apathy
is perilous. It is true, as Lord Grey has said, that "to be
in constant conflict with evil in some shape or other is
obviously the condition appointed by Providence for men
and nations, and the moment that struggles for improvement
cease, corruption and decay commence."3 Society, notwith-
standing the wider diffusion of material prosperity, has yet a
vast accumulation of political, moral, and physical evils to
vanquish and sweep away.
"Civilization is yet very young;
the world is very far from having measured the extent of the
career which is before it." The great embodiment of the
national life, the State itself, should be, in its popular action,
like the awful seat of justice, as far as possible free from
1 Gladstone.
2 Mill.
3 Parliamentary Government, &c., by Earl Grey, p. 113, n.
PREFACE.
XXV
every corrupting taint, and every degrading element, that it
may attract to its service and duties the most enlightened
and the purest minds. Instead of excluding large classes
from the franchise, they should rather be invited to its exer-
cise; but the invitation should be accompanied with the
inseparable condition that every elector shall, in the act of
voting, show both his capacity and his worth, and be enabled
gradually to rise to the importance and dignity of the func-
tion with which he is intrusted.
I have collected in an Appendix to this edition, extracts
showing the efforts that have been made to introduce this
system in different parts of the world, and the large degree of
support they have met with, notwithstanding its novelty.
The progress of the idea among the more profound writers on
political subjects is not less remarkable. If it has yet been
adopted only in one northern kingdom,-if in the other free
states of Europe, and the great Anglo-Saxon communities of
the Southern Seas and the New World it has been hitherto a
subject of barren discusssion, it must be remembered that the
powers of statesmen are limited; whilst effort for improvement
is still the duty of all who possess any portion of political
power. "A great ruler cannot shape the world after his
own pattern. He is condemned to work in the direction of
existing and spontaneous tendencies, and has only the dis-
cretion of singling out the most beneficial of these. Yet
though a pilot cannot steer in opposition to wind and tide,
the difference is great between a skilful pilot and none at all.
Improvements of the very first order, and for which society
is completely prepared, which lie in the natural course and
tendency of human events, and are the next stage through
which mankind will pass, may be retarded indefinitely for
want of a great man, to throw the weight of his individual
will and faculties into the trembling scale."
February, 1865.
INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION.
THE subject of political representation now assumes an aspect
entirely different from that which it presented in the dis-
cussions that preceded the Act of 1832. The question was
then between a partial representation, the inequalities of
which were in their general effects balanced by many com-
pensating influences, and a scheme which, dispensing with
most of such influences, made the representation more direct
and real, and established it on a wider basis. That Act,
which was the offspring of a political compromise, extended
the application of the representative principle, without ex-
cluding, and not intending to exclude, many imperfections
and irregularities. The anomalies which remained were
chiefly owing to the attempt to give effect to two principles
which the arrangements of our electoral system made it
impossible to reconcile,-the representation of interests and
the representation of persons. Some constituencies were
retained, framed or modified, upon the supposition that they
would, in all circumstances, support what were conceived to
be special interests. The idea of the constituency as the
constituted exponent of an interest having been once received,
excluded the idea of personal representation within that
constituency, and therefore led to the consequence,-that if
persons not governed by the prevailing interest found their
way within the prescribed limits, it was necessary, in pursuit
of the representation of interest, to exclude such intruders, as
INTRODUCTION.
xxvii
far as it could be done, from the electoral power. As the
law, however, did not, and could not, adopt, as an electoral
qualification, a test of fidelity to the special interest con-
templated, it is not found possible to exclude from the
constituency some who are guided by other motives, and form
an antagonistic class. The electoral bodies which are re-
garded as the exponents of special interests are thus exposed
to internal conflicts, which render their action more or less
uncertain.
In the mobile and susceptible condition of population and
society at this day, it is impossible not to observe the purely
speculative character of all conclusions founded upon what the
permanent interests of the inhabitants of a particular district
may be,-upon what they will themselves consider them to
be, or upon what their majority may resolve. In a revision
of our electoral system, all those who would found the
Parliamentary strength of interests or classes upon the basis.
of constituencies formed for their support, should consider
with what degree of safety they can rely upon a body of
electors within any certain area remaining permanently faith-
ful to the principles by which they may be at present guided.
So long as any definite or indefinite number of persons shall
be attached to those principles by the force of mental associa-
tion or material interest, their support may be reckoned upon;
but if it be a further condition of rendering this support, that
such persons shall be so numerous within any geographical
limit as to preponderate and overpower all opposing forces
within it, the security to be derived from their attachment
is certainly not strengthened. The sources of permanent sup-
port are weakened by the introduction of a condition which
does not increase sympathy,—which may be impracticable,-
and which is of no value unless it can be used as a means of
disregarding or setting at defiance the opinions of a minority.
The territorial condition must be one of two things,-a source
of strife if it succeeds,—or a cause of weakness if it fails. It
xxviii
INTRODUCTION.
is deserving of the most profound consideration of all who
desire to perpetuate any definite political principle, whether it
is possible to insure it for a geographical ascendancy; and
whether there are any means of promoting its maintenance so
certain and lasting as would be found in a consistent adoption
of the sole and simple principle of personal representation.
In framing the constitution, there has been little of that
kind of aid which physical science derives from experiment.
Government is necessarily established before the question of
circumscribing its powers can arise,—and powers once pos-
sessed are not often willingly given up. Every step by which
a class has been admitted to a new participation in power
has
been either a concession or a conquest; and the moment of
gaining it has been a time of action, and not of speculation.
It may have been so far experimental as to have arisen from
the sense of some prominent defect in the existing institutions
calling for amendment. "Many minds, long ages, and
various events have contributed to the advance" of our
representative institutions. The successive labourers worked
under the unconscious influence of the idea of representation,
-though "only seeking to remedy the injustice of some par-
ticular case, or prevent the recurrence of some particular
evil." But, "when the idea of any institution becomes
distinctly apprehended, we may proceed with a firmer step
and more assured success towards its full development. We
have the guidance of a principle; we have the clue to what
had appeared a tangled maze. Our notions may be termed
theoretical, but the theory is a condensation of all the practi-
cality of the past." The full display of the principle of
representation" is as much the function of the future, as the
origination and progress of the principle has been the
achievement of the past. We have here our test of the
venerable and the obsolete; of the use and the abuse; of
1 Westminster Review, vol. i., p. 10, N.s.
INTRODUCTION.
xxix
what is to be abolished, and what retained. We have a
guiding star for the work of reformation."
6
In considering the process of interesting greater numbers
in the constitution by investing them with political rights, we
meet with the fact that the proportionate interest felt by the
constituency appears to diminish as the numbers of the con-
stituency increase. It is found that in the larger constituen-
cies about fifty-five per cent., and in the smaller ones about
ninety-two per cent., of the electors recorded their votes on
the occasion of contests at the same general election. This
divergence from representation is still more apparent when the
active elements,-the fifty-five per cent.,-are further re-
duced by taking from them the minority, the voice of which
is extinguished, and which consists of about two-thirds,—
leaving the numbers actually represented in the larger con-
stituency as about thirty-three per cent. The unrepresented
portion is not only great in numbers; but there is no doubt.
that in many populous boroughs it also contains the largest
portion of the educated classes, of those to which, in every
view of representative institutions, it is desirable that full
weight should be given. It is therefore of paramount im-
portance to discover, and if possible remove, the causes which
tend practically to exclude from representation so extensive
and valuable a part of the electoral element; and this is now
of especial urgency, as every step in the extension of political
privileges, whilst it has the effect of changing the class in
which power resides, increases at the same time the disturbing
causes that interfere with and are evidently obstacles to true
representation.
A perfect representation is plainly inconsistent with the
exclusion of minorities; but the subject of representation
would be very inadequately conceived, if it were regarded as
a mere question between majorities and minorities. The
formation of electoral majorities and minorities is no more the
¹ Id., p. 17.
2 Edinburgh Review, vol xcv., pp. 279, 280.
XXX
INTRODUCTION.
In
natural means of arriving at political representation than it
would be a natural result of any other association that it
should be divided into two parties, one perpetually labouring
to counteract the wishes of the other. The order and the
occupations of mankind,—the distribution of population, and
the supply of its necessities, are all provided for by physical
and moral laws operating on the diversities of nature and of
character which are found amongst men. These differences
preserve the harmony and the vitality of social life.
political sentiment there is not less variety than in the other
motives of human conduct; and abstractedly it would be no
more likely that the political opinions of the electors of a
borough should fall into two or three antagonistic divisions,
than that they should be composed of twenty, fifty, or a hun-
dred distinct views or conceptions. The dissimilarity would
be much more probable than the similarity. Opinion and
action in politics would be as various as opinion and action in
other sciences, if there were not causes that enter into political
bodies, and create a disturbed and unhealthy movement, pro-
voking antagonistic divisions.
On the occasion of adverse desires in a society composed of
many free agents, the majority must necessarily decide; but
in the formation of a representative body, the purpose is that
the body thus to be created, and not the constituent body, is
to be intrusted with the power of decision. If that were the
function of the constituent body, there would be no necessity
for appointing the representative. It is, consequently, by the
majority of the representative body that the decision must be
pronounced. It is that majority which speaks for the whole,
and is irresistible. It may be likened to an engine of enor-
mous power which crushes all opposing forces. The election
is the process by which this engine is constructed; but it is
not necessary to the efficiency of the engine that the same
overpowering force should have been employed in the process
of its construction. It is when the engine is formed that we
INTRODUCTION.
xxxi
require its power to be exercised; whilst the engine is being
made,—it is the engine we want, and not the power.
The conduct of men may be actuated by two different
motives, one, the desire to do that which is believed to be
right, the other, the desire to do that which shall be
attended with direct success. A parliamentary representative
is to be chosen by two or three thousand electors, and opinions
and interests are greatly divided ;-two questions may present
themselves to every elector,-the one,-who is the person
best fitted by character and talent to fill an office in the
duties of which the interests of the nation, to an incalculable
extent, may be involved,-and the other, who will my co-
electors be most likely to choose? In other words,—what is
right, and what will succeed?
It may be answered, that abstract right, when considered
by a prudent man, resolves itself into a question of expediency
and practicability, that it is a case of compromise;—and
that, therefore, the second question is that which such a man
is justified in asking. It is true that in all political action
we must consider what is expedient and practicable. This is
the well-known and just defence of party action. Singly,
one man can do little, and yet, by combining his efforts with
others having similar objects, he may accomplish much. But
it is necessary to consider under what conditions an individual
is placed when he is called upon to yield up his own opinions.
of rectitude and prudence. To what extent is the will at
liberty? That which is a free concession amongst persons
who have associated voluntarily, to pursue the same objects
and the same means, -as the partners or shareholders in a
company, or the members of a particular society, may be,
and most commonly is, entirely different, when the persons
collected together are infinitely various in character, dispo-
sition and object, and their association is compulsory and not
voluntary. In such a case the question ceases to be of the
nature of a compromise, and becomes one of mastery. Instead
xxxii
INTRODUCTION.
of yielding to the opinion of others with whom the elector has
been led to associate by the existence of some mutual basis of
sympathy or harmony, he is, in the case supposed, obliged,
in order to succeed, to give up his own opinions to those who
form the most numerous portion of his co-electors, the greater
number being, as one of the conditions of nature, the lower in
capacity, and he is obliged also to take into account all the
disturbing and corrupting influences which may prevail. He
is,—to refer again to the analogy of party,-in the position
that a member of Parliament would be in,-if, instead of
attaching himself to the party with which he sympathises and
is content to act, he found himself indissolubly bound to a
section, say of fifty other members whom he has had no
part in selecting, and unable to take any step in which he
cannot persuade the majority of the fifty to concur. If he
does not remain inactive, his objects must be lowered to, and
measured by, theirs. This condition is parallel to that of the
elector who is forced to act on the answer to the second
question, instead of the first and true one.
The necessity of obtaining a majority involves the necessity
of creating a party, adopting a party name, and putting
forward some party tenet, or dogma, to all of which the
majority must lend itself. It is not usually the political tenet
which has caused the party, but the party which has created
the tenet. In none of these things, any more than in the
choice of their representative, can the members of the majority
usefully ask themselves what they ought to do,-the only
practical question is, what will be successful? Thus, the pro-
cess of creating the majority demoralises most of those who
compose it it demoralises them in this sense, that it excludes
the action of their higher moral attributes, and brings into
operation the lower motives. They are compelled to disre-
gard all individuality, and, therefore, all genuine earnestness
of opinion, to discard their political knowledge, their deli-
berate judgment,-their calm and conscientious reflection,-
INTRODUCTION.
xxxiii
all must be withdrawn or brought down to a conformity with
those who possess the least of these qualities.¹ The same
injurious influences, in a measure, operate on the minorities,
whenever they make a decided stand for the purpose of con-
testing a seat. The most intelligent will have submitted to
the most numerous, except that, in the minorities, the greater
apprehension of defeat may have led the more numerous
classes within it to raise their standard of choice in order to
increase their hopes of success.
Whilst this process of deterioration is going on throughout
those who compose the active parties, a result even more
fatal to the design of true representation is produced on
another large, intelligent, and more scrupulous class of
persons, who feel no disposition to make themselves the
instruments of giving effect to the views of others with whom
they have no common object or sympathy. These, therefore,
take no part in the business of choosing those who are
nominally to represent them. We find, as it has been
observed, that, in the large constituencies, nearly half of the
electors are, for all useful purposes, in the same position as if
they were disfranchised.
A system which forms the electoral body into adverse
parties,―arrayed under formal names which are themselves
exaggerations calculated to excite hostility where none really
exists,—has thus the effect of preventing the expression of the
true and individual opinions of the members who compose
either party. It lowers the force of thought and conscience,
reduces the most valuable electoral elements to inaction,—and
converts the better motives of those who act, into an effort for
success and a mere calculation of the means of accomplishing
it. It is not therefore surprising that we hear of the in-
firmities of representative institutions, and that many persons.
should be unable to look forward without terror to the aggra-
1 It is by no means uncommon to hear persons state that they vote for a
particular candidate, not from any appreciation of his merits, but to ex-
clude some other candidate to whom they are more averse.
с
xxxiv
INTRODUCTION.
vation of their more obvious evils by any large extension of
some of the causes which produce them.
If these consequences be inevitable,--if in the progress of
constitutional government we are exposed to the danger of
excluding from their just share in representation the more
educated and intelligent classes, and of paralysing in
political life the action of the infinite varieties of disposition
and sentiment which are found in society,-if there be no
means of making representation a reality,-the infirmity of
the institution must be borne. It is useless to lament that
for which no remedy can be found. It must be accepted as
the lot, and part of the discipline, of humanity. But, at
least, every effort of the understanding should be brought to
bear on the question, whether the representative system be
not capable of more perfect development than it has yet
received. No time perhaps was ever more favourable to the
inquiry. The inconsistencies and anomalies of the existing
system have been long felt, and successive governments have
addressed themselves to its improvement. The patriotism of
every class has been challenged, and at no former period has
so general a disposition been evinced to abandon long-cherished
traditions and opinions, and adopt such a revision of the
representative system as may appear most likely to be con-
ducive to the public good.
If, after the construction of the representative body shall
have received the aid of all that thought which the im-
portance of the subject imperatively demands, it be held
impossible to render it a perfect expression of the sense of the
people, or more than of the will of a multitude of detached
majorities, that should be recorded as a fact, and received as a
distinct constitutional principle. If it be a necessity of
government that a multitude of petty majorities,-for petty
they must be compared with the nation,-shall exclusively
elect the representative assembly, let it be the declared and
acknowledged form of the constitution. It is due to the more
INTRODUCTION.
XXXV
+
thoughtful and scrupulous of the electoral body, as well as to
the minorities, and not more to them than to the precepts of
truth and justice, that the principle should be distinctly pro-
pounded, and it is very different from the principle of true
representation,—that not the representatives of the people or
of all those who possess the suffrage,-but, representatives
chosen by the resolved and active majorities of certain
arbitrarily-formed electoral bodies,-are to be consulted in
making the laws. The whole people may be bound to obey
the laws thus made, but that does not make the nominees of
a part the representatives of all. It may be claimed as a
homage to what is just and true, that it be not falsely im-
puted to any class of persons that they are represented by
men whose views and opinions are utterly repugnant to their
own. The member elected in every constituency may be
returned as representing so many as shall vote for him, but
not as representing those who do not vote for him, or who
oppose him. The democracies of former times asserted their
power, but did not assert an untruth. The necessity of
obedience to the law, wherever the power of making it may
reside, is easily seen: if it be concluded that there is a
necessity for depositing the power in the combined majorities,
the nation must bow to that authority,-but there can be no
necessity that our institutions should be founded on an
untruth or a fiction. They should stand on substance and
reality. Let the representation be declared to be what it
truly is, and not what it is not.
It will be observed, that the causes which operate to render
the franchise valueless or ineffectual to large and intelligent
classes, are causes peculiar to an advanced state of civilisation;
and we may properly seek, in the increased knowledge which
accompanies social progress, the means of removing the
impediments to representation which it discovers. Repre-
sentation itself is a matter of daily occurrence, and common
necessity. It is the vicarious performance of duties which
xxxvi
INTRODUCTION.
}
cannot be personally executed. It intervenes in commerce, in
jurisprudence, in education, and in a thousand other forms.
In a multitude of circumstances people are compelled to place
themselves and their interests in the hands of others. The
exercise of individual judgment and deliberation suffices for all
these purposes; and if, in the choice of their parliamentary
representatives, the electors were freed from the embarrassing
restrictions by which their action is incumbered, there is not
reason to doubt that they would employ the same care and
caution as that with which they select persons to fill other
fiduciary or vicarious offices.
The object of this Treatise¹ is to show that the attainment
of a perfect system of personal representation is not opposed
by any difficulties inherent in the subject; and that such a
system is not only consistent with the due and just repre-
sentation of every class and interest in the kingdom, as well
as of the public which comprises all, but that it affords the
most permanent and certain mode of representing and ex-
pressing the special views and opinions of all interests and
classes; and that it also goes very far to remove, even if it
does not entirely obviate, all the sinister influences which
have been hitherto found to prevail in the collection of the
suffrages of the electors. It will be seen that personal repre-
sentation, to be perfectly carried out, must be founded upon
the basis of individual independence; that such independence
1 The author first published the principle of the suggestions contained
in this Treatise soon after the general election of 1857, in a pamphlet in-
tituled The Machinery of Representation (Maxwell, Bell Yard). A note to
the same pamphlet, and, subsequently, a second edition, was published in
the same year, the details being materially altered, and brought much
nearer their present shape. The communications which the author from
time to time received, led him to believe that the scheme had excited
interest in the minds of many who had given much thought to this and
kindred subjects; and that it was generally considered to stand in need of
development more in the way of showing its practicability, than of proving
the value of the objects which it was directed to attain.
INTRODUCTION.
xxxvii
may be obtained without departing from any of our tradi-
tional forms of electoral incorporation,—and that it even
affords peculiar facilities for giving greater scope and expan-
sion to such local and traditional combinations. The electoral
arrangements which are proposed require no operation that
cannot readily be executed by instruments which the adminis-
trator will always have at his command; and they prescribe
no duty, which any person of ordinary capacity is not com-
petent to perform. It is only necessary to resort to those
common aids which education and science now afford,-the
knowledge of letters, which was not implied in times when
the election was made by a show of hands, and the means
of rapid conveyance and transport, which were not possessed
by former generations.
With a view to avoid any expressions which might be
vague or indeterminate, to render the proposal definite and
precise, and enable its practicability to be readily and dis-
tinctly considered, the whole scheme has been wrought into
the form of a supposed electoral law, the clauses of which are
distributed amongst the several chapters,-following the re-
spective branches of the subjects to which they relate, and in
which are explanations of the principle, the purpose, and the
operation of every clause. A table has also been introduced,
showing the entire law, and referring to the pages in which
every clause will be severally found.
If, by the means which are here proposed, or by any which
are better and wiser, an electoral system can be established,
which, in the work of forming a representative body, shall
succeed in calling into action all the thought and intellect of
the nation, the effect would be to create a new object of in-
quiry and study, extending over a field of which we know not
the bounds. All attempts to engage society in political con-
flicts for abstract principles would be thenceforth vain, and
statesmen would seek to build their fame on something more
xxxviii
INTRODUCTION.
solid and durable than party triumphs. A representation of
all intelligences, founded upon a wisely-regulated franchise,
cannot be dangerous; it would contain within it breadth,
symmetry, cohesion, and durability, all the elements of
strength and safety, and would possess, moreover, a capacity
and a disposition for social improvement, without any limit
but that of the human faculties.
Gosbury Hill, Kingston-on-Thames,
January, 1859.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
THE REPRESENTATION OF MAJORITIES, MINORITIES, AND
INDIVIDUALS.
Foundation of the power, page 1—and definition of majority, 2-Composi-
tion, 3-Burke, 1, 6-Guizot, 2, 7, 12-Calhoun, 3, 5, 19, 20—Conven-
tional character, 3-Absolute government of numerical majority, 3-
Its abuse, 6, 20-Suffrage insufficient to form constitutional government,
4-Distinction of numerical from concurrent or constitutional majority, 5
-Extinction in the representative body of the less popular parties by the
detached action of local majorities, 7-Minorities in this country, 8-
Supposed compensative representation, 9-Its injustice, impolicy, and
danger, 10-Collection of the diversities of opinion of many, instead of
the record of the preponderance of one of two or three opinions, 12-
National loss in excluding the intelligence of all the minorities, 12—
Three-cornered constituencies, or restricted vote, 12-Cumulative Vote,
13-Objections, 15-Ancient powers of knights and burgesses, and
analogy of the jury, 16-Speeches of Mr. Bright, 17-Protection to
Minorities and individuals in the power to form other new constitu-
encies, 21-Free interchange of political force, 21, 22.
CHAPTER II.
CONSTITUENCIES BY VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
Association of individual electors of different constituencies, page 23-Its
basis a community of sentiment, 24-Registrars, 24, 25-Relative magni-
tude of voluntary constituencies, 25-Average number of electors, 26—
Mode of ascertaining the quota, 25, 26-Extent of the field for collecting
kindred opinions, 27, 28-Facilities of intercourse, 27-Educational
franchise, 28—Defects of the form suggested, 29—Unsuitableness of the
*
xl
CONTENTS.
geographical principle, 30-Increased scope for electoral action, 31-
Representation of interest, 32-Inadequacy of the county representation,
33—The agricultural interest, 34—Manufactures, shipping, trade, 35—
Absence of representation of the working classes, 36, 37-Contrast of the
system of personal representation with its opposite, 30, 40.
CHAPTER III.
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
Reform Act of 1832, page 41-Double process of giving representation to
boroughs and creating boroughs for the purpose of representation, 41-
Natural order in forming communities, 42-Artificial divisions, 43, 47,
48-Burke, 42, 48-Projected reform by grouping some boroughs and
disfranchising others, 44-Disposition to voluntary association in guilds,
fraternities, companies, &c., 46, 47-Its operation to be encouraged in
forming electoral divisions, 47-The Crown the essential basis of legis-
lative construction, 49-Provision for such reconstruction from time to
time, 50-Immediate need of it, 52-Effect on the public spirit and
emulation of majorities, 54-Guizot, 53-Early access to political life of
men of talent, 56.
66
CHAPTER IV.
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
Duke of Richmond's plan in 1780, page 58-Reform Act of 1832, 59-Ex-
amples of Electoral districts, Ayr, Finsbury, Exeter, 59-Equality or
permanency of geographical divisions impossible, 61-All involve the
extinction of minorities, 62-Establishment of a self-acting scale, 62—
Apportionment of representatives to the several states in America, 63-
'Gerrymandering," 64-Proportional system, 65-Geographical equality
of this system, C5—Compared with that of contributory boroughs, 66—
Efforts to pack the constituencies anticipated, 67-Majorities pronouncing
on questions of peace or war, 68-Examples, 70-Comparison of classes
likely to be represented in voluntary constituencies and in the smaller
boroughs, 71, 73.
CHAPTER V.
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Vastness of political science, page 74-Traditional method of selecting
legislators now unsuitable, 75-Legal and practical obstacles to candi-
dates, 76-Contrast between the former and present mode of choice, 77
-Traditional responsibility, 77-The Reform Bill and its necessity, 79-
CONTENTS.
xli
Change of leaders, 80-Montesquieu, 80-Principle of order to be sought
and evolved, 81-State of Society, 81-Activity and combination of the
vicious elements, and misleading of the rest, 83-Helplessness of the
more upright and intelligent electors, $5-Demoralizing character of
election contests, 87-National and individual deterioration under the
new system, 88-Absence of volition and responsibility, 90, 92-The
individual conscience must be aided and invoked, 92-Restoration of
personal responsibility, 93-A corporate conscience non-existent, 94-
Individuality needed, 91-Announcement of candidature and deposit,
95-Example of a gazetted list of candidates, 97-Expiring traditions
to which the House is indebted, 98.
CHAPTER VI.
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
Necessity and right of electors to the most extensive range of choice, page
99-Principle of the Commons' resolution of 1769, relating to Wilkes,
100-Impediments to candidates, 100.
I. Expense of elections, 101-Educated classes not necessarily wealthy, 101
-National disposition for public labours, 102-Contemporaneous labours
in Parliament and in professions, 102-Wealth not a security for cha-
racter, ability, or conscientious action, 103-Its demagogism. 104-Burke,
101-The selection of the worthiest the interest of all, 105-Limit of
necessary expense, 105-Bribery, 106-Causes of its prevalence, 107—
Hardship of exposing to it the poorer voters, 108-Reduced to its mini-
mum, 109-Voluntary and disinterested support, 111.
II. Introduction to constituents, 112-Canvassing, 112-Its demoralizing
character, 113-A concurrence of sympathies contrasted, 113.
III. Incapabilities created by law, official persons, 114-Debate on the
Indian Council, 114-Exceptional exclusions only justified by necessity,
115-Persons in holy orders, 116-The injustice and mischief of their
exclusion, 117-Returning officers, 119-Presumptuous legislation ou
matters of individual judgment, 119.
CHAPTER VII.
THE ACT OF VOTING.
Documentary voting substituted for oral, page 121-Option of voting for
one, or contingently for one of several candidates, 121-No single vote for
more than one representative, 123-Voting paper, 124-The act necessa-
rily deliberate, 126-Grote, 126-Burke, 126-Nature and sources of
knowledge of candidates by electors, 128-Personal and public informa-
tion, 129-Encouragement to inquiry, 130-Manifestation and recogni-
tion of superiorities, 132--Nurture of love of country, 134-Contact of
xlii
CONTENTS.
intelligences, 135-Attraction of sympathy, 137-The ballot compared
with this system, 139-Practical difficulty of effectual concealment with-
out falsehood, 143-Necessity of faith or trust, 146-Christian principle
of individuality, 148-Special consecration of the national act of electing
representatives, 149.
CHAPTER VIII.
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
General duties, page 152-Number and distribution of polling-places, 153—
Residential registration, 153-Poll-clerks and polling places, 151—Ten-
dering, receiving, and entering votes, 155-Tabular book of the poll-
clerk, 156—and of the Registrars, 156-Appropriation of votes, 159-
Where a candidate has more than the quota, 160-One candidate for
several constituencies, 163-Certificate and transmission to the registrars
of the unappropriated voting papers, 164-Example in a supposed Aber-
deen case, 161-Ashburton, 166-Return of candidates having local
majorities, 167—Computation of local majorities, 168-Supposed Norwich
case, 169—Appropriation of votes from other constituencies, 170—to
other constituencies, 172—Subsequent disposition of unappropriated
votes, 173.
CHAPTER IX.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
General functions, page 175-Registrars' fund, 176—Officers and clerks of
registrars, 177-Appropriation of votes polled for the same candidates in
different constituencies, 180-Preservation of family, territorial and tradi-
tional connection, 182-Process when no more quotas can be made up,
183-by eliminating the candidates having the smallest number of first
and contingent votes, 185-or on unappropriated votes only, 185—or
those having votes of less relative value computed by their position, 186—
or by selecting comparative majorities, 187-Method of selection adopted,
188-Suggested alternative of transfer, 189-no candidate having a
quota and no local majority, 192—Mr. Morrison's Bill, 193, 196—Quota
applicable to a system rigidly local, 197, 200—Occasional vacancies, 200.
CHAPTER X.
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
Several constituencies represented by one member, page 201-Multiple
return of titular member for any number of constituencies, 203–Opera-
tion of such law, 204-Distribution of members to constituencies, 204—
CONTENTS.
xliii
Personal representation independent of the extent of the suffrage, 201—
Tests of electoral capacity, 204-Guizot, 205-Capacity independent of
place, 206-Town and country inhabitants, 206-Difficulties in asserting
the rights of the latter, 207--Burke, 207-Conduct of proprietary classes,
208-Mr. Bright, 207, 208-Imaginary antagonism, 208-Importance of a
just county representation, 209-Metropolitan constituencies, 210-Their
failure in representation, 213-Remedy, 214-Effect of individual electoral
independence, 215-Defective judgment drawn off, 215-Scotch, Irish,
county, and local preferences of some voters in metropolitan and other
constituencies, 218-Individual independence consistent with local and
territorial interests, but not è converso, 217-Distinct action of localities
preserved, 218-Examples of Liverpool and North Cheshire, 219.
CHAPTER XI.
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
Relation of constitution to government, page 221-Calhoun, 222—Pascal,
222-Guizot, 223–Burke, 223-Inevitable abuse of a sole depository of
power, 224-Despotism of a multitude, 226-Concurrent consent, 228-
British constitution, 228-Appeal to conscience and necessity, 229--Con-
stitutional principle as opposed to mere physical power, 231-Concurrent
interests and opinions in representative constitution, 232-Party govern-
ment, 235—Means of perpetuating it, 237-Result, 238-Public opinion,
239-Its imperfect, false, or delusive declaration, 241-Public meetings,
241-Illustration in April, 1848, 242-The press, 244-Its function in
forming public opinion or expressing it, 248-The House of Commons
its proper exponent, 250—Ancient democratic law to ascertain public
opinion, 251-Importance of decision, 253-Oratory less effectual than
reading, 253-Stability of the position of individual statesmen, and of
the general government, 251-Operation in political life of an enlarged
range of causes, 256-Frequent elections with convenience and safety,
257.
CHAPTER XII.
THE SUFFRAGE.
Personal representation a subject apart from the suffrage, page 258-Qualifi-
cation dependent on locality is unjust, 258-Principle of Mr. Locke King's
Bill, 258-Equality of county and borough suffrage nccessary, 259-
Natural rights, 260- Burke, 260-Tests of electoral capacity, 263-Man-
hood; its legal, physiological, and statistical definitions, 263-Other
qualifications or tests, 265-Proper conditions of such tests, 266-Accessi-
bility, universality, and practicability of application, 266 — Indirect
xliv
CONTENTS.
election, 267, 270-Suffrage to be treated as a valuable right, 271-
Amendment of the registration system, 272-Removal of disfranchise-
ments in respect of office, 273-Special facilities for voting by deposit of
voting papers in special cases, 274-Voting by seamen, travellers, &c.,
274-by British subjects in the colonies, 275-Women's suffrage, 275.
CHAPTER XIII.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
Reasons for increasing the functions and powers of local governing bodies
277, 279-Defects of the Municipal Corporation Act, 279--Arbitrary
restriction of voters to particular wards, 279-" Gerrymandering," 279-
Impolicy of arbitrary qualifications of candidates, 280-282-Elections
of a third every third year, 282-Absence of direct representation of
property, 283-285-Form of proprietary voting-paper, 285-Indirect
election of the Board of Works, 286-A metropolitan corporation, 286-289
-Conclusion, 290.
APPENDIX A.
Switzerland: Association Réformiste, Geneva.
MM. Ernest Naville,
Roget, and Morin, 292-Classification of Systèmes Empiriques, 293-
and Systèmes rationnels, 291-La liste libre, 295.
APPENDIX B.
Method proposed in 1863 in Frankfort, page 298.
APPENDIX C.
Valuation of first and contingent votes, formerly proposed, but subsequently
withdrawn (see p. 186), page 301.
APPENDIX D.
Report of Mr. Lytton of the application of the system in Denmark,
page 302.
APPENDIX E.
Mr. Droop's method of reducing the dividend and thereby the quota, page
305.
CONTENTS.
xlv
APPENDIX F.
Parliament of New South Wales-Report of the Committee of the Legis-
lative Council on the Bill for the election of the Upper House, page 307
-Debate on the Bill in the Council, 310-in the Legislative Assembly,
317.
APPENDIX G.
Parliament of Victoria-Debate on cumulative voting when more than two
members, page 323.
APPENDIX H.
Discussions in Frankfort in 1861, 1863, 1864, page 328.
APPENDIX I.
France-M. Louis Blanc, page 340.
APPENDIX K.
Holland and Belgium-International Social Science Congress, Amsterdam-
M. Robin-Jacquemyns, page 344.
APPENDIX L.
United States of America, page 347-Senate report, 349-Illinois constitu-
tion, 349-Mr. Sterne, 350-New York Charter, 350.
APPENDIX M.
The preferential and proportional vote, page 351-Experiment in the Tech-
nological Institute, Boston, 351-in the nomination of Overseers of
Harvard College, 355.
APPENDIX N.
Memorandum of the history, working, and results of the cumulative vote,
page 359-Birmingham School Board Election, 363-Marylebone, Lam-
beth, and Sheffield, 364.
APPENDIX 0.
Progress of the study of the representative principle, page 372-Italy
374-5-Experience in Illinois, 375-Practical contrast of majority
representation, in the Upper, and proportional, in the Lower House,
376–379.
TABLE OF THE CLAUSES
OF THE
PROPOSED ELECTORAL LAW.*
I. For the computation by the General Registrars of the aggregate number
of votes polled at every general election, and of the number which
form the quota
page 25
III. For publication of the quota, and for certifying the same to the
returning officers ..
25
IV. For the return of every candidate for whom a quota of votes shall be
given
31
V. For creating and reconstructing electoral divisions from time to time,
by Order in Council
..
50
65
VI. For making a quota or comparative majority of votes necessary for the
return of every member
VII. For the entry of the names of all candidates, and making the pre-
scribed deposit, with the Registrars in London, Edinburgh, or
Dublin
95
VIII. For the publication of the names of all candidates in the London,
Edinburgh, and Dublin Gazettes
96
IX. For regulating the order in which the names of candidates shall be
inserted in the Gazettes
96
X. For abolishing the liability of the candidates, for booths, clerks, and
election expenses
106
XI. For abolishing disabilities in respect of any office held at the time of
election ..
116
XII. For repealing the statutes excluding priests and deacons
XIII. For enabling returning officers to appoint substitutes
XIV. For regulating the form of the vote
118
119
··
124
XV. For securing uniformity in the day of election
153
XVI. For empowering the returning officers to take and hire parochial and
other buildings for the purpose and day of the election
* Clauses II., XXVII., XXIX., XXX., and XXXI. have been withdrawn.
154
PROPOSED ELECTORAL LAW.
xlvii
XVII. For certifying to the Registrars the aggregate number of votes
polled in every constituency, and for determining the cases in which
the returning officer may make an immediate return
•
161
XVIII. For directing the order of appropriation of the voting papers. 161
XIX. For regulating the order of appropriating the excess of votes beyond
those required for any candidate
161
XX. For the transmission of the remaining voting papers to the Regis-
trars
162
XXI. Nor prescribing the duties of the returning officers in cases where
one person is a candidate for several constituencies
.. 163
XXII. For the deferred return of members by the returning officers upon
receiving the Registrars' certificates, and for the computation of the
local majorities
166
XXIII. For the certifying by the Registrars to the returning officers, of
the quota having been completed
179
XXIV. For defining the rules, and the order, of appropriation of votes
polled for the same candidate in different constituencies.
180
XXV. For ascertaining and declaring the number of votes polled for every
candidate having less than the quota.--for certifying to the returning
officers the names of candidates having the comparative majorities, and
for the return of such candidates as members..
188
XXVI. For the appropriation of every remaining voting paper to the candi-
date having a quota or comparative majority, who shall stand highest
thereon respectively
192
194
XXVIII. For admitting, by a resolution of the House, a member elected
by a quota, or comparative majority, and not returned
XXXII. For admitting an additional return of titular representatives 203
XXXIII. For regulating the number of members to be returned by every
constituency
...(216) 219
V


ERRATA.
Preface, p. ix, dele, 4 lines from the bottom, from "It will," to "candidate,"
p. x.
P. 73, last line, for natural, read national.
85, line 21, for selected, read suspected.
162, line 4, for endorsed, read shown by the number.
168, line 5, from bottom, for unsuccessful, read successful.
176, last line but one, dele "Clauses XXIX., XXX., XXXI.”
THE
ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES, &c.
CHAPTER I.
THE REPRESENTATION OF MAJORITIES, MINORITIES, AND
INDIVIDUALS.
THE position which majorities and minorities of the people
should respectively occupy in representative government has,
within a few years past, been frequently considered. The
title or claim of majorities to be exclusively regarded and
obeyed must have its foundation either in agreement or in
force. The power of acting by a majority, so far as it
depends on an agreement, Mr. Burke observes, "must be
grounded on two assumptions, first, that of an incorporation
produced by unanimity; and, secondly, an unanimous agree-
ment that the act of a mere majority (say of one) shall pass,
with them and with others, as the act of the whole." He
adds: "If men dissolve their ancient incorporation, in order
to regenerate their community, in that state of things each
man has a right, if he pleases, to remain an individual. Any
number of individuals, who can agree upon it, have an un-
doubted right to form themselves into a state apart and
wholly independent. If any of these is forced into the
fellowship of another, this is conquest, and not compact.
On every principle which supposes society to be in virtue of
a free covenant, this compulsive incorporation must be null
and void." M. Guizot, treating of the same subject, points
1 Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs. 3rd ed., p. 103. 2 Id., p. 105.
B
2
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
out the inconsistency of the claim of the majority to absolute
power, with another principle, sometimes asserted, which
affirms a right in every individual to be governed only by
those laws to which he has given his assent,' unless the latter
be accompanied with a right in the minority to withdraw
themselves from the state. He adds, "dans l'idée de majorité
entrent deux éléments très différents; l'idée d'une opinion
qui est accréditée, et celle d'une force qui est prépondérante.
Comme force, la majorité n'a aucun droit que celui de la force
même qui ne peut être, à ce titre seul, la souveraineté légitime.
Comme opinion la majorité est-elle infaillible? Sait-elle et
veut-elle toujours la raison, la justice, qui sont la vraie loi et
confèrent seules la souveraineté légitime? L'expérience dé-
pose du contraire. La majorité en tant que majorité, c'est-à-
dire en tant que nombre, ne possède donc la souveraineté légi-
time, ni en vertu de la force qui ne la confère jamais, ni en
vertu de l'infaillibilité qu'elle n'a point.'
"2
The majority in the sense which expresses the major or
greater power has ever been purely conventional, some civil
institutions requiring it to be composed of a greater and some
of a less number of voices. It may be, either a majority con-
sisting of the more numerous of two bodies supporting
respectively two contrary propositions, or of the more numer-
ous of several bodies supporting respectively several distinct
propositions. If ten propositions, or, which is the same
thing, ten candidates be offered to the choice of fifty persons,
that they may select one of the ten, six of the fifty persons
might form the majority, and the voices of forty-four have no
1 Histoire des Origines du Gouvernement Représentatif, vol. i., p. 106.
Paris, 1851.
2 Id., p. 107. Sir George Cornewall Lewis has collected the reasons
given for the rule that the decision of the majority shall govern, and re-
marks that they are exhausted in Barbeyrae's translation of Puffendorf, in
which the rule is simply founded on this;-"parce qu'il n'y a presque
point d'autre expédient pour terminer les affaires."-Essay on the Influence
of Authority in Matters of Opinion, § 246, new ed. London, Parker, 1849.
AND INDIVIDUALS.
3
weight. If there be no law-as in our electoral system there
is no law-which requires a moiety, or any definite pro-
portion of the entire body, including both the present or
active and the absent or inactive members to form an effectual
majority, the six must prevail, and yet the excluded candidates,
or propositions, might perfectly express the sentiments of
those who put them forward; and, moreover, may even be in
harmony with the opinions of the most part of the fifty
voters, and who are thus silenced by the six. An attempt
has been made in a few recent borough elections to prevent
the division of parties or interests amongst several candidates,
by subjecting them to the difficult, cumbrous, and often
illusory trial of a preliminary ballot. Under the prevailing
systems, some means of giving unity to party action becomes,
indeed, indispensable unless the result be abandoned to
accident or chance. In America it has led to that species of
political movement known by the appellation of the "caucus."1
It is, in fact, the method by which a few clever and adroit
persons substitute their dictation for that of the leadership
which, in earlier times, was conceded to territorial power,
high birth, or natures fitted to command. The misfortune
is that the qualities which are best adapted to succeed by
intrigue, cajolery, and pandering to mean desires and appe-
tites are far more common and degrading than those which
formerly compelled submission, if they did not always inspire
confidence.
With regard to the character of government by a numerical
majority, where there is no constitutional provision for giving
due weight to the minority, it is useful to listen to re-
publican statesmen. Mr. Calhoun, who occupied at different
times some of the highest offices in the government of the
United States, and who studied American institutions with
1 For the origin of this word, see Pickering's Vocabulary, Boston, 1816;
Webster's Dictionary, New York, 1828. On the operation of the caucus,
Tremenheere, Constitution of the United States, p. 223.
4
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
the aid of long experience, employed his latest hours and his
most elaborate efforts, in a work designed as a warning
against the dangers of that absolutism which would result
from committing the destinies of the country to the uncon-
trolled government of the numerical majority. The right of
suffrage, he says, is, indeed, the indispensable and primary
principle; "but it would be a great and dangerous mistake
to suppose, as many do, that it is of itself sufficient to form
constitutional governments."¹ "To this erroneous opinion,"
he adds, "may be traced one of the causes why so few
attempts to form constitutional governments have succeeded;
and why, of the few which have, so small a number have had
a durable existence. It has led not only to mistakes in the
attempt to form such governments, but to their overthrow,
when they have, by some good fortune, been correctly formed.
So far from being of itself sufficient-however well guarded
it might be, and however enlightened the people—it would,
unaided by other provisions, leave the government as absolute
as it would be in the hands of irresponsible rulers, and with
a tendency, at least as strong, towards oppression and abuse
of its powers.
"The more extensive and populous the
country, the more diversified the condition and pursuits of
its population; and the richer, more luxurious, and dissimilar
the people, the more difficult it is to equalise the action of
the government, and the more easy for one portion of the
community to pervert its powers to oppress and plunder the
other."3
"The dominant majority for the time," he repeats,
"would have the same tendency to oppression and abuse of
power, which, without the right of suffrage, irresponsible
rulers would have. No reason, indeed, can be assigned why
the latter would abuse their power, which would not apply
112
1 A Disquisition on Government, and a Discourse on the Constitution and
Government of the United States, by John C. Calhoun. Edited by R. C.
Cralle, p. 13. Charleston, 1851.
2 Id., P. 13.
3 Id., p. 16.
AND INDIVIDUALS.
5
LO
f
with equal force to the former. The dominant majority for
the time would, in reality, through the right of suffrage, be
the rulers-the controlling, governing, and irresponsible
power, and those who make and execute the laws would,
for the time, in reality be but their representatives and
agents." And he proceeds to show that the abuse of the
power which would thus be acquired, could only be counter-
acted by giving to each division, or interest, through its
appropriate organ, a concurrent voice.2 The majority which
is formed by this concurrence he calls the constitutional
majority, in contradistinction to that which is obtained by
treating the whole community as a unit, having but one
common interest. "The first and leading error," he says,
“which naturally arises from overlooking the distinction re-
ferred to, is to confound the numerical majority with the
people, and this so completely as to regard them as identical.
This is a consequence that necessarily results from consider-
ing the numerical as the only majority. All admit, that a
popular government, or democracy, is the government of the
people; for the terms imply this. A perfect government of
the kind would be one which would embrace the consent of
every citizen, or member, of the community; but as this is
impracticable, in the opinion of those who regard the nu-
merical as the only majority, and who can perceive no other
way by which the sense of the people can be taken, they are
compelled to adopt this as the only true basis of popular
government, in contradistinction to governments of the aristo-
cratical or monarchical form. Being thus constrained, they
are, in the next place, forced to regard the numerical majority
as, in effect, the entire people; that is, the greater part as
the whole; and the government of the greater part as the
government of the whole."3
The work being adapted to a republican form of govern-
ment, contains observations on a political organism, by the
1 Id.,
p. 22.
2 Id., p. 25.
3 Id., p. 27.
6
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
concurrence and veto of different bodies, which happily is, in
this country, provided for by a different constitution; but all
the remarks on the error of so dealing with numbers as to
extinguish interests, is equally applicable to the constitution
of the House of Commons. The danger of a popular body,
unbalanced by the introduction of elements other than those
which have their origin in a triumphant numerical force, is
stated, with equal confidence, by Mr. Burke. He says,-
"Of this I am certain, that, in a democracy, the majority of
the citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions
upon the minority, whenever strong divisions prevail in that
kind of polity, as they often must; and that oppression of
the minority will extend to far greater numbers, and will be
carried on with much greater fury, than can almost ever be
apprehended from the dominion of a single sceptre.'
Those who contend that neither good government nor indi-
vidual liberty is necessarily secured by a suffrage which com-
mits the government absolutely to the numerical majority, do
not, therefore, argue that there must not be a resort to arith-
metic. It is impossible to suppose a popular form of govern-
ment in which the votes must not be counted. The problem
of constitutional organism is, in what manner the individuals
composing the entire community are to be classed so that
no opinions or interests shall be unheard, or extinguished, in
representation.
Most of the advocates for the amendment of our system of
representation seem content with, or to despair of obtaining
anything better than, a division of the country into certain
districts or localities.2
1 Reflections on the French Revolution, &c., p. 186. See Mill, Considera-
tions on Representative Government, c. vi. (Note to 3rd ed.)
2 Lord Grey, in the last edition of his work on Parliamentary Govern-
ment (pp. 299-213), has suggested that the votes of graduates of colleges
and universities, and of workmen in trades, to be incorporated for the pur-
pose, might be taken without regard to localities, but still, as I gather, by
majorities, and not in unanimity, as here proposed. (Note to 3rd ed.)
AND INDIVIDUALS.
7
If it were not a low and unbecoming view of political
parties to liken them to enemies in a hostile camp, a case
might be imagined of the division of the electors generally
into two classes: one satisfied with the condition of things,
apprehensive of the consequences of change, and ready to
oppose all experiments the utility of which is not manifest;
and the other uneasy in their position, imagining that social
alterations might be made which would ameliorate their condi-
tion, and who are not deterred by the apprehension of conse-
quences which they do not see or admit. Supposing there
were a contest between these classes, a struggle, not of arms,
but of the peaceable forces which are brought to bear in the
operation of representative institutions, and the proportion in
which these classes is found in every locality be, for the pur-
pose of argument, taken as two to three, the majority of every
constituency would, of course, elect a representative of the
more numerous class. If five constituencies be taken as the
entire number, there would be in the representative assembly
five members for the party of progress and none for the party
of preservation; whilst, in justice, the majority and minority
ought to stand in the constituted assembly in the same pro-
portion as in their constituents, that is, three against two. It
is clear, as a matter of strategy, that by the defeat in every
constituency of the detached minorities, the less numerous
class have no means of meeting their adversaries in the repre-
sentative council, but are previously cut off in detail.
"Le but du gouvernement représentatif est de mettre
publiquement en présence et aux prises les grands intérêts,
les opinions diverses, qui se partagent la société et s'en dis-
putent l'empire, dans la juste confiance que, de leurs débats,
sortiront la connaissance et l'adoption des lois et des mesures
qui conviennent le mieux aux pays en général. Ce but n'est
atteint que par le triomphe de la vraie majorité, la minorité
constamment présente et entendue. Si la majorité est dé-
placée par artifice il y a mensonge. Si la minorité est
8
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
d'avance hors de combat, il y a oppression. Dans l'un ou
l'autre cas, le gouvernement représentatif est corrompu.”¹
In the general election of 1852, the aggregate number of
votes polled by the majorities where the seats were contested
was 291,118, whilst the minorities polled 199,994. These
numbers may, with sufficient accuracy, be treated as repre-
sented by three and two; and if the same calculation be
extended to the whole of the constituencies, and taken as
expressing the silent and suppressed differences of opinion
where no contest was attempted, it would appear that
500,000 electors are not represented, except, by a sort of
fiction of law, their opinions are supposed to be expressed by
other means. If liberalism be triumphant in one consti-
tuency, conservatism, it is answered, is triumphant in
another. The argument is as untenable as the principle is
dangerous. It is not the fact that the opinions suppressed
by the electoral voice at one place are expressed in those of
another. It has been truly said that "the separation of
parties according to localities does not even approach com-
pleteness. The number of localities in which any given
opinions prevail are not proportioned to the general preva-
lence of those opinions. Large political parties are widely
scattered and intermixed throughout the country.' This
supposed system of balances and counteractions is the ignis
fatuus of the politicians of this century, and the source of
jealousies and wranglings without end. It recedes as they
pursue it. No sooner do they imagine that its elements are
caught and fixed upon their canvas than they are gone like a
dissolving view. The discovery or the opening up of some
unexpected mineral wealth creates a town on a barren moor.
Commerce establishes a thriving port where stood the hovels.
of a few fishermen. A rapidly-increasing population over-
flows the boundaries of the city. The ease and rapidity of
1 Guizot, Gouvernement Représentatif, vol. ii., p. 259.
2 Edinburgh Review, vol. c., p. 229.
"2
AND INDIVIDUALS.
9
locomotion open to the middle classes of the towns the advan-
tages and the pleasures of rural life. The more agreeable
sites of a country, rich in natural beauties, are being covered
with the dwellings of classes who were formerly a town popu-
lation. On the shores of our island coast, wherever they can
be approached, on every hill-side and in every valley from
which can be beheld
"The many-twinkling smile of ocean,"
the builder is constantly engaged in the construction of dwell-
ings replete with comfort, if not remarkable for architectural
beauty. Numerous residences, many almost of palatial cha-
racter, have in several places, in less than half a century,
formed, what in earlier times would have deserved and re-
ceived the name of cities, but are now hardly recognised as
municipalities. The rate of progress of the first forty years
of that period was as nothing to that of the last ten years;
and probably the progress of the last ten years will be incon-
ceivably outstripped by that of the ten which are to come.
Industry, education, the progress of civilisation, and the dif
fusion of higher tastes and enjoyments, all contribute to
defeat every attempt to attach special interests or objects to
specific districts. The lines of distinction between the town.
and country population become more and more faint, and are
constantly shifting their places. To form a constitution on
such a foundation is to build on sand.
Let it be supposed, however, that it were possible to suc-
ceed in accomplishing that which the changes in society
forbid, the system would be founded upon injustice, and, there-
fore, could not be permanent. To contend that, although the
opinion and sympathies of a minority are set at defiance in
one place, it is a sufficient justification for this state of things
that persons, whose opinions correspond with those of that
minority, may form a majority in some other place, and that
they then succeed in suppressing the voices of those whose
10
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
As-
opinions are in harmony with the victorious party elsewhere,
is to set up one great evil as a compensation for another.
"Can it," inquires the writer last quoted, " be seriously argued
that to balance one great mischief against another, is as well
and as safe a mode of proceeding as an endeavour to avert
both?" Political action, instead of being the result of a steady
and legitimate adaptation of means to an end, is converted into
a game of chance, a speculation in which the failure upon one
card is to be compensated by success upon another, and, by
the sacrifice of the active and cordial assistance and adherence
of two-thirds of the people, we even profess to gain no more
than the same relative power for each of two or more parties,
which they may have obtained without such sacrifice.
suming, however, that the equivalent result, as a matter of
party warfare, were in this manner obtained, the purpose of
constitutional and representative government would be as far
off as ever.
The purpose of such a government is not satis-
fied by dividing the nation into two parties, and converting
the area of legislation into a battle-field. It is not necessary
here to discuss the merits of party government, it is enough
to say, that in the vast field of modern legislation, in the
adaptation of our ancient institutions to a new state of society,
and in providing for new emergencies, a multitude of political
and social problems come to be solved with which party has
nothing to do, and into which the introduction of party
elements and considerations is not only useless, but is abso-
lutely pernicious. It is obvious that the tendency of a system
of government founded on numerical majorities alone, is to
absorb all differences into one issue-a contest for power.
The extension of knowledge and the progress of civilization
open the door of inquiry, prompt activity of thought, encourage
diversities of opinion, and thus lead the way to social improve-
ment; but the benefit of this progress in the composition of a
representative assembly is excluded when every variety of
opinion and shadow of thought is expurgated-thrown aside
AND INDIVIDUALS.
11
as so much lumber, in order that both sides may come unen-
cumbered to the trial of strength which is to determine
the single issue the possession of power. Such a result
would be impossible if full play were given to the partialities
which arise from individual character and sympathy, for
these would be in constant rebellion against the tyranny
of faction, and would moderate its influence even amongst those
who might be subject to it. Every man, according to the
degree in which he is intellectual, and possesses public spirit,
would bring his talent and weight to the public aid, in the
business of concentrating in the representative assembly a
selection of the best minds of the nation, and the statesmen
who shall have been proved by experience to be trustworthy ;
and the deposit of official power, from time to time, would be
safely left to an assembly thus constituted, under the con-
ditions which our parliamentary system imposes.
In the selection or choice of representatives we require the
aid of the multitude of electors whose votes are rendered
useless, and whose judgment is thus rejected. Instead of
damping and extinguishing their patriotic zeal by destroying
that hope of the utility of exertion which can alone keep it
alive, every disposition to political action on the part of every
worthy and sensible citizen should be encouraged and assisted.
By making elections nothing but a question of adhesion
to one of two or three parties, the standard of merit and
qualification in the candidate is lowered to a bare question of
party tests.
It has been seen that about half a million of voters are in
this country incapable of securing a representation by any act
of their own. The public loss is surely not trifling. To
what a multitude of subjects of public and private interest.
have the thoughts and studies of large numbers amongst that
half million of voters been directed! If we go through many
of the streets and squares of the metropolitan boroughs, and
form our conclusions of the intellectual rank of the inhabit-
12
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
ants from their probable education and means of acquiring
knowledge, and when we know that of these thousands would
in vain approach the hustings to give expression to their
views or opinions, it is impossible to look on the nominal
representation of the metropolis as other than a mockery of
the name. Yet the House of Commons has been truly
described as "a place where minorities, heresies, oppositions,
remonstrances, and protests of all sorts are to be represented
and entitled to a hearing, and it is intended to comprehend,
and not to exclude them.'
""
"Le but du système représentatif, dans ses éléments
généraux, comme dans tous les détails de son organisation, est
de recueillir, de concentrer toute la raison qui existe éparse
dans la société, et de l'appliquer à son gouvernement."1
If our present method of obtaining this concentration of the
national reason be considered with analogy to operations
connected with the material world, the comparison at once dis-
plays its unscientific character. Two-fifths of the intelligence
of the country is lost in the process. It is a waste of
material which would have been a reproach to any operation
in physical science in its rudest day; even if the material so
lost were only of the average value of that of which the
constituencies are composed; but it is far more lamentable:
it is considered that the material thus lost comprises a very
large proportion of the best moral and intellectual elements of
society, whilst the process of local condensation to which the
numerical majorities owe their success has done much to
extinguish independent thought, convert men into machines,
and thereby deteriorate the result of the votes by which the
supposed representative assembly has been actually chosen.
The first and greatest practical attempt which was made, at
least in this country, to remedy this defect in representative
institutions was the provision introduced by Lord John
Russell in the bill of 1854. It was proposed that, in cities
1 Guizot, Gouvernement Représentatif, vol. ii., p. 253.
AND INDIVIDUALS.
13
and boroughs returning three members, no elector should
vote for more than two, which would have the effect of
permitting a minority of two-fifths of the constituency to
return one member. This, called the "restricted vote," is said
to have been suggested by Mr. Praed in 1832. It admits,
and indeed requires in most cases, an organisation of
parties. Suppose eighty-four voters, of whom, say, fifty-one
are supporters of the ministry, and thirty-three of the opposi-
tion, and that there are four candidates, A, B, and C, of the
ministerial party, and D of the opposition. It might be
supposed that the minority would succeed in returning D;
but this would be prevented by the majority dividing them-
selves into three distinct bodies of seventeen each, one of
which shall vote for A and B, another for B and C, and the
third for A and C. The consequence would be, that each of
the three ministerial candidates would have thirty-four votes,
and all would be returned, and the thirty-three voices of the
minority would be silenced.' In the discussions in the House
of Commons on the Reform Bill, in 1867, the cumulative
vote, originally suggested by Mr. Marshall in 1857, was
proposed for adoption by Mr. Lowe, but was rejected by a
large majority. Subsequently, in the House of Lords, the
restricted vote was adopted by a majority in proportion
nearly the same as that which opposed the cumulative vote in
the Commons.3 On the return of the bill to the Lower
House the amendment was accepted, and the principle was
thus embodied in the Reform Act of that year. Three years
2
4
later the principle received a further practical extension by
the introduction of the cumulative vote for the election of the
School Boards. In the sessions of 1870 and 1871 attempts
5
1 See Appendix N.
2 Hansard, Parl. Deb., vol. clxxxviii., pp. 1068-1120.
3 The speech of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (Hansard, clxxxix., p. 465)
refers to the abuse of the power of majorities in remarkable examples,
4 Hansard, Id., pp. 1125–1179.
5 Appendix N.
14
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
were made to repeal these provisions, and thus put an end to
the opportunities they give for a better representation of the
various sentiments and opinions of the electoral body. In the
former year the restricted vote, simply on the ground of the
justice of the basis on which it stands, although it has
practically less to recommend it than any of the other methods
by which the extinction of minorities is sought to be averted,
was retained by the vote of 183 members in a House of 358,
notwithstanding the weight of the Government was thrown
into the opposite scale. On a motion in the latter year for the
second reading of a bill that proposed to withdraw the clause
as to the cumulative voting, of nine members who took part in
the debate, only one, besides the mover, supported the second
reading, and he stated that he did so because our ancestors
had always been content with the old clumsy system of
representation by majorities; and he believed proportional
representation was contrary to the habits and sentiments of
the people." It was rejected without a division.
Nothing is perhaps more remarkable than that the attempts
to retrace the steps that have been made towards rendering
the representative bodies comprehensive and not exclusive in
their character, should all emanate from members of the
Liberal party, which is understood to insist upon equality in
political freedom, without partiality in favour of person or of
place. The abolition of the restricted vote was put forward
as a pretended vindication of electoral rights, while by
delivering the electoral power of every community over to
the majority, it would practically disfranchise a third or more
of the electors. Its promoters argue that if two members, say
for Manchester or Birmingham, vote with one party, and one
with the other, those great towns have not their due weight in
the government, but are partially neutralised, and reduced in
parliamentary force to a level with the smallest borough.
This, however, is to forget the people who form the aggregate
1 Appendix N, p. 361 (§ 8).
AND INDIVIDUALS.
15
or corporate bodies known as Birmingham or Manchester, and
to require that the individual interests and wishes of a third or
more of them shall be sacrificed to the name by which the
community is designated,—to an abstract conception which has
no existence apart from the living beings whom it describes or
indicates. The true way of reconciling the corporate influence
of these great centres of industry with that of the individuals
who inhabit them, is a fair distribution of seats, no longer
assuming, as the present arrangement practically does, that
one voter in Bury St. Edmunds is to be recognised as worth ten
voters in Birmingham, or that the Irish and Scotch con-
stituencies are reasonably treated, when "the inhabitants of
Portarlington have 132 times as much representation as the
inhabitants of Glasgow." It will be well to compare the
result upon the electoral power which Birmingham, for
example, could gain by the reactionary efforts in favour of
exclusive majority representation, supposing they were suc-
cessful, with that which it would acquire by a just system
of proportional representation. In the meantime it is surely
desirable to secure the means of gathering the fullest expres-
sion possible of the views of all the inhabitants of our greater
cities and districts, trusting that thereby their corporate interest
and dignity will be best served and sustained.
1
2
It is possible that some of those who desire the repeal of
the restrictive and the cumulative vote may be less offended
by their effect on reducing the nominal power of the city
or county than by their attack on the exclusive dominion of
the local majority. In this light it is a painful symptom
of the arbitrary and intolerant character of majorities. It
affords an illustration of the principle which has been quoted
from the work of Mr. Calhoun, a principle which all history
corroborates, that government by numbers is not less insatiable
of power, and certainly not more scrupulous of the claims
1 "Proportional Representation," by Milicent Garrett Fawcett, Macmillan's
Magazine, Sept., 1870, p. 376.
See Mr. Morrison's Bill, infra, p. 196, u.
16
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
of those who are without its pale, than any other absolute,
uncontrolled, and irresponsible authority. Looking at the
place which representative institutions are apparently destined
to fill in the government of mankind, it becomes of the
highest importance to consider whether means cannot be
found to eradicate the vice in their constitution which deprives
the state of the benefit of the judgment-it is to be feared of
a large number-of the most calm and dispassionate, as well
as of the most instructed and thoughtful of its people. The
problem is, how to render representation in fact what it is in
name,—to make it universally truthful, and to give to the
best elements in every constituency their best and most
perfect expression.
The founders of our parliamentary system,-if that appel-
lation can be justly conferred upon any particular men in any
age, did not contemplate, and could not provide, for the
difference of political opinion to be evolved in the progress of
civilisation. Yet, on the other hand, they certainly did not
contemplate a state of things in which the will of a vast pro-
portion of those whom they entrusted with the franchise
would be wholly disregarded. It is remarkable that the writs
require the returning officers to send the knights and bur-
gesses to Parliament "with full and sufficient powers;"¹-a
form of expression which students of common law know is
inconsistent with the existence of a body some of whom
repudiate the person whom the others have nominated, and
refuse to concur in investing him with such powers.
probable that the idea of the constitution and unanimity of
the jury entered into the conception of its framers.
It is
The restricted vote, in the Reform Act of 1867, is, no doubt,
open
to several objections. It operates very partially in reaching
only a few constituencies; in the far greater number it leaves
the evil untouched. Whilst the law recognises, in a measure,
1 Brady, Histor. Treat., Lond., 1777, p. 54. Hallam's Middle Ages, Eng.
Const., c. 8, part 3.
AND INDIVIDUALS.
17
the injustice of extinguishing the opinions of minorities, it at
the same time declares to the minorities in most constituencies
that, however entitled to respect they might be from their
intelligence or their aggregate numbers, still they are not,
individually, large enough to be protected. Even in the
constituencies to which it applies a minority considerably more
in number than one-third of the entire constituency may, it
has been scen, be defeated by a skilful organisation of the
majority. The cumulative system is also susceptible of
organisation, and in its present unguarded form is open to
great uncertainty, and subject to a vast waste and fruitless
expenditure of electoral energy, as is hereafter shown.¹ Both
belong to what M. Ernest Naville has, in his examination of
the several methods of electoral action, styled the "empirical,"
as distinguished from the "scientific" systems." It is indeed
impossible to know how much of the hostility to the restricted
vote in these discussions, has been really owing to objections
entertained to the principle of proportional representation, and
how much to the partial extent, and the infirmity of the
remedies that have been chosen. That these are the main
causes of the opposition instinctively suggest itself on con-
sidering the language of Mr. Bright, its most eminent opponent
in the debate on the Lord's amendment. He studiously
admonished his hearers that the restricted vote was no
"portion of a grand scheme to give to every person in the
country, whether one of a minority or one of a majority, a repre-
sentation in this House." He cautioned those who did not
value it as a correction of a democratic measure, not to be
misled by supposing it to "approximate to or be an admission
of the principle of a plan in which everybody would be repre-
sented, and such things as majorities and minorities never
known." A description more truly characteristic of what is
1
¹ See Appendix N, infra, pp. 359-372.
2 Appendix A, infra, p. 293.
3 Hansard's Parl. Deb., vol. clxxxix., pp. 1126, 1127.
18
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
here proposed had not proceeded from any pen or tongue, and
not a word implies that the speaker thought it undesirable if
it were possible; not the smallest intimation that he was
adverse to giving every considerable section of opinion in the
nation, whether it be more or less centred in any particular
locality, its just expression in the national council. On the
contrary there are to be found in Mr. Bright's speeches the
most powerful arguments for the necessity and duty of
exercising individual thought, the strongest appeals to the
intellect and conscience of every elector, addressed to them as
persons capable of meditation in silence, and not to con-
glomerate masses who can only act upon one another through
external signs. To the people of Birmingham, on the eve of
the election, he says:-"Bear in mind that you are now
going to make a machine more important than any that is
made in the manufactories of Birmingham-you are going to
make a parliament that shall legislate directly for the United
Kingdom, and indirectly for two hundred millions of men-a
parliament that will levy taxes in the United Kingdom, and in
India, to the amount of £110,000,000, and a parliament that,
when it once takes its seat in Westminster, is all-important
for all these things; and every member you send is a part of
that grand machine, and every elector throughout the United
Kingdom who shall vote at the coming contest is partly the
manufacturer of that stupendous machine whose power no man
could measure. The force of this exhortation is lost if it
fails to lead those whom it reaches to recall facts, and thereupon
to awaken reflection in their minds-that faculty which is the
exclusive possession of each individual brain. In this process
everyone must work alone; though the physical force of a
hundred or a thousand arms may be combined to accomplish a
mechanical result, there can be no common cerebral action of so
many heads to solve a problem in moral science, any more than
to invent a steam engine or write 'Paradise Lost.' Those who
thus address the people know that if their advice be fruitful
""
AND INDIVIDUALS.
19
it must be through its influence in leading every voter at the
election to do what in his own judgment he shall conclude to
be best and wisest. The counsel is not to find out what the
majority will do and blindly follow it. Everyone would feel
that it would be of small use to ponder over any solution of
social or economical problems, in order to select, for the busi-
ness of government, those in whom he could most perfectly
trust, if after all his study his conclusion could not be acted
upon unless more than half of his constituency, by some-
thing in the nature of a miracle, arrived at precisely the
same conclusion. When we would stimulate thought and
inquiry as a guide to action, we intend the action to be
directed by the thought, and not by some accident inde-
pendent of it.
All systems by which hundreds or thousands of persons
who are not associated by any pervading harmony of mind.
or feeling, but are gathered together by the mere accident of
living in the same district or town, are led or forced, on pain
of political extinction, always to agree in the choice of their
representatives, are inconsistent with the free exercise of
individual will, guided by those diversities of thought and
sentiment upon which men form their various estimates of
character; and their subjection to such compulsion tends to
the mental and moral deterioration both of the electors and
the elected. They degrade men from the rank of living and
individually thinking and responsible beings, and treat them
only as so many mechanical units making up a certain party.
"I always feel," says Dr. Walker, in his election sermon,
“when I put my hand into the ballot box, that I am being
used by somebody, I know not whom, for some purpose I
know not what."1 The principle," says Mr. Calhoun, "by
which constitutional governments are upheld, is compromise,
that of absolute governments is force." By giving full, and
1 66 Machinery of Politics," &c., American Law Review, Jan., 1872.
Boston.
20
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,
no more than full weight to opposing and conflicting interests,
a salutary check is interposed to all precipitate resolutions.
They render deliberation a matter not of choice but of
necessity; they make all change a subject of compromise,
which materially begets moderation: they produce tempera-
ments preventing the sore evil of harsh, crude, unqualified
reformations, and rendering all the headlong exertions of
arbitrary power for ever impracticable." How are those who
form their opinions upon considerations which the majority
do not appreciate, to bring about this compromise? They
must have the power of exercising a volition of their own.
Without this, neither reason, entreaty, nor persuasion, can be
relied upon.
The basis of union and permanence, in the
ordinary partnerships by which the commercial transactions
of the world are carried on, is the necessity of mutual atten-
tion, forbearance, and respect. If this be not rendered by
one to the other, the partnership is dissolved. That it is
not so dissolved, is because the feebler judgment yields to the
stronger, the cautious is encouraged by the more impetuous,
the more impetuous is tempered by the cautious, and each
character and person derives improvement and profit from the
combination. The progress of physical science has advanced
by observation of the laws which apply to things under our
sight, and the application of the same laws to bodies of
greater magnitude which are otherwise beyond our vision
and comprehension. It reasons from the lesser to the greater.
So in political life; an element which is potent, and pre-
serves harmony in the smaller sections of society, may be
brought to bear on its larger combinations. Let electors,
whether they consist only of the "tens or twenties scattered
in vast communities, and whose votes are now utterly
without influence in any one place," or whether they com-
1
1 Parl. Hist., vol. cxxii., p. 1184. This claim on behalf of voters of the
learned professions distributed throughout the country was put forward
in a petition presented by Lord Harrowby.
AND INDIVIDUALS.
21
pose any of the various sections of society who look to moral,
rather than to purely political doctrines; or, whatever may be
their causes of dissent, be permitted, when occasion arises, to
dissolve the union which the place of residence or some other
accident has created between them and the other members of
the constituency on which their votes are registered, and let
them add their votes, if they desire, to those of some other
constituency, but so as not to interfere in the smallest degree
with the just weight of the majority in such other consti-
tuency. They may thus become partners with other electors.
with whom they have more sympathy. Eminent judges, in
administering the law, have, when they looked at the losses
and evils which commonly accrue to partners from suddenly
and angrily severing the connection, considered the union as
having some analogy to another, for better and for worse.
There is, however, no such indissoluble bond uniting together
the dwellers in every borough. They may be told to be, if
they can, unanimous in the choice of a representative; but if
an elector cannot agree with the majority on one side of a
parish boundary, there would be no necessary breach of the
order, or even of the courtesies of society, if he be permitted
to unite himself with a number of his fellow-countrymen on
the other side. He is not precluded from choosing his
friends or associates beyond the boundaries of his own
borough, and there does not seem to be any sound reason
why he should not be allowed, with a like freedom, to seek else-
where his fellow-constituents. If the legal obstacles in the
way of this exercise of individual volition were removed, and
the elector were enabled to add his vote to the votes of any
other of his countrymen, agreeing with him in sympathy and
opinion, and sufficient to form a constituency, it is obvious
that, so far as representation is concerned, the question as to
minorities would cease, for the minorities would be absorbed.
An age which has achieved the freedom of commercial inter-
course in spite of the pretensions of local protection and
22
MAJORITIES, MINORITIES, AND INDIVIDUALS.
monopoly, may not unreasonably hope to find advocates for
the free interchange and communication, as well of political
action as of political thought, against the far less plausible
and more insolent claims of dominant inhabitants of arbitra-
rily selected and privileged boroughs and districts to a mono-
poly of the great right of national representation.
The purpose of this work is to show how practically small
in form is the change that would suffice to liberate the elector
from the bonds that now tie him to the other voters of the
borough in which he happens to dwell, whereby his action is
absolutely fettered to theirs, however weak, ignorant, or cor-
rupt they may be,-how perfectly such a change would be in
accordance with the letter and spirit of our constitution, and
how trivial are the arguments against it, when thoroughly
weighed. By such means, the unrepresented minority would
be reduced to the smallest limits, and include only those im-
practicable tempers, for whose satisfaction it is neither possible
nor desirable to provide.
23
CHAPTER II
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND
UNANIMITY.
}
In the last chapter every constituency or electoral college has
been regarded in the light of a partnership, the members of
which are engaged in a great undertaking that requires all
their individual as well as their joint skill and energy, and in
which none should be even sleeping partners, much less
partners repudiating and protesting against the acts of the
rest, and yet unable to extricate themselves. It has been
said that, in order to express the various opinions of those who
form minorities, they should be permitted, not by dissent to
impede the free action of the majority of the society or part-
nership with which the accidents of life, and the frame of our
electoral system, has connected them; but, leaving all such
free action of the majority untouched, to come out of that
society or partnership, and form another society and another
partnership, with the members of which they entertain opinions
in common. The hypothesis, that they
The hypothesis, that they can thus for the time
sever their connection with the constituency in which they
are registered, is necessarily founded upon the assumption
that they are able to find kindred opinions elsewhere than
with the majority of that constituency. If such kindred
opinions, held by sufficient numbers, cannot be found, the
severance would be useless, and their voices, as at present,
are necessarily extinguished.
24
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY
The severance, it is to be observed, is only for the time.
The partnership may begin and end with the election. The
objections to concurrence with the majority of the constituency
which are strong at one election may have no existence at the
next. The very circumstance that every elector is free, will
tend to procure respect for his opinions from every other
elector, and will therefore be a motive for attempting the
selection of a representative who shall command the general
respect.
The election of a representative by a combination of minori-
ties supposes a community of sentiment in those who com-
bine, or, in other words, unanimity of choice in such a con-
stituency. In order to render this arrangement possible, it is
necessary to prescribe what shall be the extent or numbers of
the new constituency which is thus to be created, and to
ascertain in what manner its members can be enabled to
coalesce.
An electoral body, formed of the detached members of
various constituencies, ought to correspond in magnitude with
the average of such other constituencies; and this is obtained
by taking as the basis the number of votes polled at each
general election.
It is proposed that a registrar of voters be appointed
for each of the three kingdoms, who may not only super-
intend the business of local registration, but be charged
with the duty of collecting and computing the number and
quotient of voters, and-where votes from more than one
constituency are contributed towards the election of the same
candidate the arrangement of the votes according to the
names of the candidates indicated in the voting papers. At
the conclusion of the poll in the several constituencies, a
telegraphic despatch from every returning officer might com-
municate to the general registrar of the kingdom the number
of voters that had polled; and these numbers being added
together and the aggregate number divided by the number of
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
25
representatives to be chosen,' the product or quotient will be
the maximum number of the constituency sufficient to secure.
the election of a member.
It will be convenient at this point to begin the draft of the
proposed ELECTORAL LAW, with the clauses which specify
the manner in which the quota or number of votes sufficient
for the election of a member is to be ascertained and made
known at every general election. They point out portions of
the duties of the returning officers and registrars, and would
fall within that part of the Treatise which describes those
duties, but they are necessary in this place for the elucidation
of that which follows. It may be assumed that at this stage
of the election the registrars and their clerks assemble
together, for a few days, at a central point-for which some
town in Derbyshire, or the south of Yorkshire, may be more
suitable than London.
Section I. The registrars at every general election, as soon as they shall
have received the reports of the returning officers of the various constituencies
in England, Scotland, and Ireland (to be transmitted to them as hereinafter
mentioned), showing the number of votes polled in every constituency, shall
compute and ascertain the total number of votes polled at such election,
and shall divide such total number by 654, rejecting any fraction of the
dividend which may appear after such division, and the number of the said
quotient found by such division shall be the quota or number of votes
entitling the candidates respectively, for whom such quota shall be
given, to be returned at the said general election as members to serve in
Parliament.
III. The registrars, as soon as practicable after the said quota has been
found as aforesaid, shall make and jointly sign a declaration setting forth
the total number of votes forming the aforesaid dividend, and the quotient
1 Instead of forming this quotient by taking the total number of votes as
the dividend, the dividend may be formed by adding together only the
votes polled by so many of the candidates highest on the poll as shall be
sufficient to fill the House. The effect of this variation, which by diminish-
ing the quota would be in many respects an improvement, is shown in a
note to Chapter IX., in the remarks on Clause XXV. of the proposed
electoral law.
26
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY
of the same, and shall thereby certify that the said quotient is, by virtue of
this Act, the quota of electors at the general election for the
Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (specifying the
Parliament then summoned, and for which such election is made); and
shall also, with all practicable speed, transmit a copy of such certificate to
every returning officer, and cause the same to be published in the London,
Edinburgh, and Dublin Gazettes, respectively.¹
The registries of the United Kingdom contained, in the
year 1857, the names of 1,227,274 voters. This may afford
a datum for estimating a probable quotient. When the
sympathies of all who are disposed to employ any measure of
thought on political duties shall be so strongly appealed to,
the number of voters exercising their franchise will doubtless
exceed anything we have hitherto known. Still the votes
polled will fall considerably short of the votes registered. To
explain the calculation, the voters who poll at a general
election, under this system, are supposed to be equal to the
number on the registry in 1857, and this total is supposed
to be divided by 654, the number of members in the House,"
and the quotient is 1876. The quotient necessarily varies as
the numbers of the voters vary, and the quotient, so varying,
will be always the number of voters, who, belonging to what
constituencies they may, but being unanimous in their choice,
may be permitted to elect a representative.
The difficulties which will immediately suggest themselves
are,—how this unanimity is to be obtained amongst persons
of infinite variety of character and temperament, and how a
scheme of such a nature is to be worked out? Doubtless, if
there were but one or two, or a few of these bodies of 1876
voters, or whatever may be from time to time the number of
the quota, it would be impossible to secure unanimity; but
the difficulty vanishes when the minorities amount to half a
1 The above laws, I. and III., are substituted for laws I., II., and III. in
the first edition.
It has since been restored to 658, but it is not necessary to alter the
original calculation.
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
27
million, and not only half a million, but when they far exceed
the entire number of any minorities now existing, by the
operation of numberless affinities and repulsions, which, in a
state of liberation, will dissolve the present majorities.
Opinions which approve themselves, and sympathies which
are common to any considerable number of minds,—and it is
chiefly these with which we have to deal,-will form round
different centres, whilst the parts, or atoms, actually incapable
of cohesion, would be reduced to their minimum.
It will be found, upon consideration, that it is not more
difficult for the State to provide for its people the means of
combining, for the purpose of representation, all the elements
which make up its intelligence and judgment, infinitely dis-
persed and varied as these appear to be,-than it is by the
simple mechanism of the Post-Office, that vast contrivance,
at once a cause and an effect of civilization, to perform its
wondrous daily task of interchanging knowledge and thought,
and thereby instructing and enriching society. In our own
day, the facilities of intercourse have brought almost into.
contact with one another those who dwell at opposite quarters
of the empire, and have produced effects which our ancestors
could never have anticipated or imagined. Full of interest
are those inquiries, which show the connection between
external things and mental progress, and trace the influence.
on human institutions, of literature and its allied and hand-
maid arts. The amazement of Atahualpa, when he saw that
a few mysterious lines, without speech, conveyed, from one
to another of his stern conquerors, their words and thoughts,
exhibits the untaught condition of a perishing race. In
other regions, and more cultivated minds, letters had long
sown the seeds of enterprise and freedom, but had not always
preserved its fruits. They afforded to the world but a twi-
light gleam. The brighter rays shone but in a few solitary
or isolated spots, until a student-artisan taught to stamp by
one block or type many repetitions of the same thought, and
28
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY
thereby opened wide the doors of knowledge. It remains,
still, instead of the signs by voice and hand,-the means of ex-
pression in the rude assemblies of old, in which writing was
an unusual accomplishment even for the noble, to substitute
the vehicle of letters, and by them to transport and concen-
trate, in the choice of legislators, the stores of wisdom and
virtue that are scattered throughout the land, extracting
them, like the precious ore from quartz or sand, by the
powerful sympathies and affections which God has implanted
in our nature, and which it is for man either to let die, or
call into healthy or baneful luxuriance. In gathering the
electoral will, we seek for the expression of every thoughtful
and earnest mind, and of all pure, lofty, and patriotic re-
solves,-
"Warm from the soul, and faithful to its fires."
In the following pages it will be shown that this is no
vain hope, and that, to render the exercise of the parliamentary
franchise an act in which the highest moral and intellectual
power of every elector may be excited and employed, is no
impracticable attempt.
In treating of the representation of minorities, on a prin-
ciple of unanimity amongst those who are so represented, it
will be observed that the course proposed is very different
from, and almost the opposite to, that suggested in the address.
presented to Lord Palmerston, towards the end of the year
1857, on the subject of making an educational franchise a
part of the anticipated Reform Bill. The address was entitled
to high respect, as bearing the signature of many eminent.
men; but it is believed that the greater number of those who
signed it, intended to express nothing more than their ad-
herence to the principle of giving a just weight to education,
and that they did not intend to intimate any adoption of, or
preference for, the details of the scheme adverted to in the
address. The form in which it was proposed that the educa-
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
29
tional franchise should be conferred was, indeed, unfortunate;
and, perhaps, in that respect, a great cause was never more
unhappily marred by injudicious advocacy. An educational
franchise must be considered in two phases,-first, the
suffrage; secondly, the combinations to give effect to the
suffrage. The justice of the claim of suffrage on the ground
of scientific and literary distinction,-not for any special ad-
vantage to those who claim it, but that the people at large
may have the aid of all contemporary knowledge in the
business of their government,-will be adverted to in a sub-
sequent chapter. The electoral combinations for giving effect
to the suffrage, appear to have been the main subject of the
address; and these, it was proposed, should be territorial, to
avoid, as it was said, the danger of subjecting them to the
influences of any particular class or profession. The appre-
hension that the learned bodies, if left to themselves, un-
fettered by territorial limitations, might make an improper
choice, or, perhaps, submit to sinister influences, evinced less
confidence than might have been expected in the discretion of
those whose claim rested on the ground that they were more
discreet than the general members of constituencies of which
they formed a part. But the very apprehension was, in
truth, one of little depth. If one of any of the learned pro-
fessions were chosen by the members of his profession, he
would, probably, be amongst the most distinguished of their
number; and he who is a master in one science, as a general
rule, approaches with more care and circumspection those
departments of knowledge which he has not made his study
than the man whose mind has never received any such special
direction. Profound knowledge of one branch of science is
no unfit preparation for the study of others, whilst it is a
guard against that superficiality which is the bane of political
discussion.
Passing from the reason assigned for the arrangement, to
the territorial constitution which was proposed, it is difficult
30
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY
to avoid the conclusion that a division of electors throughout
the kingdom into two classes, the learned and the unlearned,
would place the classes which assumed the pre-eminence in a
position impossible to be maintained. An institution which
might too often have the misfortune of exhibiting to mankind.
the practical distinction between learning and wisdom, would
be little calculated to promote either. It would be always
exposed to the most powerful engine of assault which can
exist in a civilised age,-that of ridicule. It is not, however,
on such objections that it is useful here to dwell. A territorial
arrangement must operate by majorities. But the circum-
stance that the educated classes formed the minorities in the
detached constituencies, was the cause of the application for a
separate representation; and yet the minorities of the electors,
thus permitted to sever themselves from the majorities, would,
in their turn, be extinguished; and the very inconvenience.
which led to the severance would, at the utmost, be but little
more than half cured. Indeed, if the educated classes to be
thus formed into distinct territorial constituencies, should be
composed of men of independent minds, taking their own
distinct and varied views of public affairs, and determined to
act for themselves, instead of being led by a few of their
number, they would be likely to bring forward more candi-
dates than appear in a borough in which differences are sup-
pressed. This would be the natural tendency of a highly-
instructed constituency; and in such an event, it might
happen that a small part of the aggregate number of the
educated electors within the territorial division would impose
their views upon the rest.
The adoption of the principle that a quota of electors, by
unanimity in their choice, may return a representative, would,
with the aid of other arrangements of a mechanical kind, and
of no difficulty, enable every individual elector,-who shall
consider the choice that the majority of the constituency in
which he happens to be registered is disposed to make, as the
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
31
result of corruption or of intrigue to which he will not lend
himself, or who shall entertain opinions with which those of
their favourite candidate do not harmonise, or who shall
consider that a better or a wiser selection can be made, and
that with such a belief it is his duty to make it,—to exercise
his vote according to his own judgment. The principle
might be embodied in and made effectual by the following
law:-
IV. Every candidate, whose name is contained in the list of candidates
hereinafter mentioned, for whom the full quota of votes shall be polled
(subject to any qualification or disqualification otherwise imposed by law),
shall be returned as a member to serve in Parliament, in manner herein-
after mentioned.
It will, of course, be immediately perceived, that this law
would have consequences far more extensive even than the
admission of the voices and opinions of an aggregate of
minorities, numbering half a million of electors, great as those
consequences would be. The admission and concentration of
all those whom the numerical majorities, when dominant,
exclude, in truth involves the representation of all opinions.
It is because the simple expression of the numerical majority,
under a system of equality in suffrage and district, would
deprive all classes, except the most numerous, of any weight
in the House of Commons, that the framers of our representa-
tive system exhaust themselves in ingenious contrivances to
parcel the electors into such divisions that some may neutralise
others, and thus reduce to its minimum the evil which they
apprehend. More than to diminish the evil effects which
must result from the extinction of all political power, except
that of the poorer classes, they seem scarcely to hope. The
object should rather be, to exclude no legitimate influences,
and to give such a scope and direction to all political energy,
that every elector, in his sphere, and according to his know-
ledge, may labour to obtain the maximum of good. If every
elector be made to see and feel that he is personally respon-
32
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY
sible for what he does, what he attempts, or what he omits to
do, something will be done, at least, to make him deliberate
before he acts; and when a man begins seriously to reflect on
what he is to do, much is already gained.
The same machinery which permits the minorities in every
constituency to exercise their franchise, by uniting their votes
with those of others wherever they find sympathy, will also
accomplish other objects, of no less importance. It will
permit all the smaller boroughs and constituencies, or any
portion of them, to form similar unions, and will put an end
to all questions of disfranchisement; and it will, moreover,
afford to every class, and every interest, in the country, the
means of being adequately represented in the Legislature.
The subject of the representation of counties, cities, and
boroughs, will be considered in subsequent chapters.' On the
representation of distinct classes and interests, something may
be said in this place.
All those who deem it of paramount importance that the
great interests of the country should be adequately repre-
sented,-whatever their different views may be as to those
interests being homogeneous or antagonistic,-should seriously
address themselves to the consideration whether there is any
geographical distribution of seats which can hereafter, with
anything approaching to accuracy, or with a probability of
duration, procure for any distinct interest an effectual repre-
sentation; a representation which, if it be obtained at all,
will not be overwhelmed by a majority of representatives
from other adverse-or, at least, unsympathetic-constituen-
cies. In examining this question, they should consider, not
only the present parliamentary system, but what it is likely to
become in the progress of events, which, even if amongst us
it went no further than the operation of existing causes, will
increase the electoral body under the present law, by adding
to the lower and less instructed voters, in a far greater propor-
1 Ch. III., IV., and X.
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
33
tion than to the classes who have greater opportunities of
knowledge, and more leisure for thought. They might then
usefully proceed to consider whether any machinery exists, or
has been proposed to them, which can so effectually secure the
protection of every interest, as by giving to those who are
attached to every species of property and industry the power
of voluntary association. The distinctive interests commonly
regarded as the broadest, are those of the landed and
commercial classes. The county constituencies were sup-
posed to be the strongholds of the former, and the borough
constituencies of the latter. The ulterior view of the general
subject of representation-by which the county franchise is
regarded as intended to provide, not so much for the repre-
sentation of the inhabitants of the counties, or of places not
within the limits of boroughs, as for the purpose of giving
weight to the landed and agricultural interest, has shorn the
county population of two-thirds of its political weight. The
hypothesis that the county electors did not represent them-
selves, but were the agents, or retainers, of the landowners,
has placed them in such a position of inferiority as to give to
66,000 electors in the county no more weight in the State
than 22,000 electors in a borough. In the last chapter,
mention has been made of the social changes which have
opened the country to the population of the towns, and of the
amount of the intelligence and wealth which has thus been
transferred from the cities and boroughs to the counties. If,
in pursuit of the fancied, but most mistaken, interests of the
landowners, the attempt to keep up the geographical distinc-
tion between the representation of the boroughs and counties.
be obstinately persevered in, and be successful, the electoral
1
1 In an article in Fraser's Magazine, in April 1860, entitled "Representa-
tion of every Locality and Intelligence," I have gathered from a valuable
paper by Mr. Newmarch, a summary of the Statistics showing this disparity.
In counties each member represents also £730,000 of annual income; in the
boroughs there is a member to every £280,000.—Fraser's Magazine, 1860,
P. 540.
D
34
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY
elements that might be derived from a population which thus
partakes both of the rural and the urban character,―elements
not surpassed in value by that of any class in the country,-
would be, for the most part, sacrificed. They would be lost
to the boroughs, and not gained by the counties. To secure,
or preserve, a selfish and an invidious power-which, after
all, will escape their grasp,-the landowners, if they were
betrayed into such a course, would have excluded from the
representation a conservative force of great value, daily aug-
mented in strength and importance, and to the growth of
which there is no conceivable limit.
The more extensive, the more numerous and varied the
ramifications of any interest, the less should it trust, and the
less does it need to trust, to any geographical limitations, and
the more may it safely rely on its inherent strength. The
landed interest under a free system could not be dependent on
the county constituencies. It has its branches in every city
and borough in the kingdom. Its interests are identified.
with those of large numbers of the inhabitants of London.
Not only in Belgravia, or Tyburnia, or May-fair, but with the
clergy, the lawyers, with Westminster, with Finsbury, with
many of the professional classes, the wealthy manufacturers,
the principal merchants, the chief tradesmen. Again, in the
census of 1851, about 300,000 persons are returned as
farmers, nearly all of whom would probably be voters under a
system which recognised their equality with the voters in the
boroughs. The numbers who reside in cities and boroughs,
and who have connections and interests with the same great
class, are incalculable by any data which these tables afford,
but their numbers must be enormous. In the place of a fatal
policy, which seeks-through geographical limits and arbi-
trary distinctions, by unequal apportionments of political
power, and by creating or adhering to unreasonable and
invidious inequalities of capacity and franchise, to secure
some remnants of their preponderance, the landowners and
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
35
the agricultural interest might safely rely, under a free and
equal system of representation, on the elements of their just,
and legitimate, and unquestionable strength. A distribution
of electoral bodies, which would give to every voter the power
of adding his vote to those of other electors, with whom he
might more perfectly agree in interest and opinion, would, it
may be safely predicated, give to the agricultural interest a
weight and influence greater than can be attained by the most
ingeniously-constructed territorial system they can devise.
It would be a weight and influence obtained without any
sacrifice of the claims of others. In principle and practice it
would be perfectly unassailable, inasmuch as it would be
determined, like that of all other bodies, by the measure of the
numbers, intelligence, and property which it comprehends.
A similar reasoning will apply to every other class of
interest, great or small. The various manufacturing, the
mining, the shipping interests, might severally be the framers
of their own constituencies, and be thoroughly and satisfac-
torily represented in the national councils. The population
of the manufacturing, commercial, or maritime towns, in
which the operations of any of these departments of industry
are chiefly carried on, is too miscellaneous to be the organ
of any common principle having relation to such special
interests. There might have been a time when Norwich or
Exeter was ready to advocate, above all others, the real or
supposed interests of the woollen, and Newcastle or Liverpool
those of the shipping trades; but these times have passed.
In the present century, although especial interests may acci-
dentally obtain an exponent of their views in the persons of
some of their body who have chanced to find their way into
the House, they cannot generally obtain any such represen-
tation except by tampering with and corrupting the voters of
limited constituencies. No interest, in truth, is provided
with any proper or legitimate means of securing at all times
its due weight and representation in the legislature. The
36
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY
possession of such weight, or the existence of such represen-
tation, are matters left to the determination of chance or
accident. This is surely not a basis on which a great repre-
sentative system should rest.
Another interest remains-and which, not less than any,
if not more than all, deserves consideration-the interest of
the working classes. To the honour of the age be it said,
that the history of the world does not present a time in which
the labours of the wise, the great, and the wealthy, were
directed with more persevering energy to promote the social
benefit of the great masses who are engaged in the manual
occupations of life. Some there are in the House of Com-
mons who address themselves to such questions in the spirit
of an enlightened philanthropy. But neither science nor
philanthropy can reach the depths of the knowledge painfully
won in the daily life and experience of the man or woman.
It is unnecessary to advert to the cases in which the doctrines
of political economy and considerations of morality and duty,
when their several provinces are not sufficiently distinguished,
seem to conflict. "The want," says the economist, "will
produce the supply." "What," replies the moralist, "if the
want be not felt, but is yet one which it is a proof of the
degradation of our nature not to feel? The wants which tend
to produce a supply are of two kinds-instinctive and artificial.
The former seeks after that, a desire of which has been im-
planted in us by nature,-the latter, after that which we have
been taught to desire by experience. The light must enter
into the darkness, ere the darkness can know that is without
light, and open its heart to desire and embrace it." The
questions in which the working, or, as it has been proposed
to call them, the wage classes, are deeply interested, become
daily more and more developed, as the increase of the popu-
lation and the progress of material wealth and civilizing
influences render the condition of society more complicated.
1 Guesses at Truth, 2nd series, p. 351.
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
37
New subjects for consideration incessantly arise. Legislation
has dealt at different times more or less superficially and
partially with the hours of female and infantine labour, the
education of children, the application of endowments for the
aid or relief of poverty; the imposition of public taxes to
avert destitution; with sanitary necessities, with friendly
societies, and the investment of savings; and there is still
probably none of these subjects on which the existing legislation
is not capable of great amendment. The laws that govern
the tenure and conveyance of interests of smaller value in
real property, especially of cottages, and of the dwellings of
the labouring classes in towns, require extensive modifica-
tion and improvement; and open a large field of civil re-
formation, in which the wealthier proprietors may have no
sympathy, even if it be not altogether opposed to their pre-
judices. There is much that touches the condition of the
poorer classes which persons in a different social sphere can
hardly feel or know. Subjects of still deeper permanent
importance appear in the distance. The progress of the co-
operative movement is likely to affect extensively the condition
of labour, and the relations between the employer and the
employed. A consideration of what is due to the vast masses
of the working population leads inevitably to the conclusion
that they ought to have the power of placing in the House.
some persons in whom they have confidence, and who are
able to view all such questions from their side, who have been
brought up with them, and know experimentally where and
how their condition needs amelioration. A representative
assembly of the Commons, without this element, is grossly
defective.
Nothing exemplifies more clearly the maxim, that all in-
justice rebounds upon its authors, than the claims of the
working classes for representation in times of popular excite-
ment. Their class having been unwisely and improperly
excluded, they then demand such a construction of the fran-
38
OF CONSTITUENCIES BY
chise, and of electoral divisions, as will tend to throw all
power into their hands, every class but their own being
numerically overpowered. It may be hoped that the friends
of good government will avail themselves of a period of tran-
quillity to place the representation on such a basis of justice
as shall make it thenceforth unassailable.
In the state of society at which we have arrived, the vest-
ing in every elector of a power to act, if such be his will,
without any trammel created by the particular section of
voters to which he is nominally annexed, is the keystone of
parliamentary reform. It is by this means that the utmost
facility and inducement will be afforded to every elector to
exercise his judgment in making the best and wisest choice.
"That the service of our country is no chimerical, but a real
duty," are the words of a great constitutional philosopher.
When a political system promotes and encourages the associ-
ation of minds having common pursuits and common sym-
pathies, and when these associations are necessarily so exten-
sive that they can be governed by no narrow or selfish motives,
and by nothing less comprehensive than a desire to further
the moral or material welfare of large numbers of men, the
union becomes necessarily the occasion of exciting generous
sentiments, and to the degree in which the object of the
association is pure and wise, to that degree are its members
elevated above all ignoble and selfish objects. All good
influences will be aided and all evil ones discouraged, not as
results directly aimed at, but as the indirect and natural
consequence of a wholesome state of political existence; just
as the cultivation of a pure mind, and application to honest
objects, is a better protection for virtue than all the repressive
laws that can be made to extirpate vice. Full scope will be
given to every generous sentiment by which men may be drawn
together. Devotion to a great principle-regard for an
illustrious name-affection for an ancient house-admiration
of worthy deeds-attachment to a particular neighbourhood-
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
39
love of country or of class-community of feeling-harmony of
taste-may all form so many occasions of concord, and create
innumerable circles, binding together in society all varieties of
rank and station, with an attraction of such power that malig-
nant influences will find no place, and the occupation of the
demagogue will be gone. Inclination will thus be brought to
the aid of duty. When no elector can, by the reflection that
any exertion on his part would be vain, if not mischievous, ast
injuring the cause he desires to support, excuse his inaction to
his conscience, he will then be sensible of the obligation which
the service of his country imposes upon him. It is beyond.
the power of law to compel men to unite for a common pur-
pose, and labour in it with energy of will, unless it be one in
which their nature prompts them to agree. An electoral
body, composed of the most heterogeneous and antagonistic
materials, bound together by law, and told that they must
act together, and find one person who can reflect the most
dissimilar things, can be compared to nothing better than the
melancholy spectacle of subdued and torpid natures, which is
sometimes exhibited by the animal showman, in a cage, in the
streets. With equal truth, or irony, one is called the "happy
family," where every instinct is quelled; and the other the
"independent constituency," where every man's action depends,
not upon himself, but in most cases on those to whom, of all
others, he would be least willing to trust either his honour
or his purse.
The indifference of hopelessness, and the
languor of debility, are occasionally varied by fits of spasmodic
animation when they are roused by those who extract a
miserable profit from the exhibition. Is it too much to say,
that instead of on one side constructing schemes which shall
perpetuate a stereotyped expression of political sentiment, and,
on another, contriving how it may be counteracted, by secret
voting that may shroud every elector in a veil of obscurity,
statesmen might more wisely employ themselves in discover-
ing, in that great laboratory of science in which we find all we
40
OF CONSTITUENCIES, ETC.
know of man's nature and of the elements of his moral health,
the means of dissipating the unwholesome miasma, and clearing
the tainted atmosphere which now envelop political life?
The two following chapters will explain the position in
which majorities would be placed, in relation with unanimous
constituencies—the respective provinces of the two principles,
and their essential harmony.
41
f
CHAPTER III.
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF
ELECTORS.
In the ancient and historical form of our constitutional sys-
tem, the right, or privilege of nominating representatives in
Parliament, was given,-or, it may be more correct to say,
accrued to the various detached and distinct communities in
the then existing divisions of counties, cities, or boroughs, in
consequence and as an incident of that previous existence. In
the remodelling of the electoral system in 1832, a course in
many respects the reverse of this was pursued. Districts, or
boroughs, were then created, or unions of such communities
formed, without any other basis of connection than that of
electing representatives. The representation was not given
to the town simply because it was a town containing inhabit-
ants who ought to be represented, for the Reform Bill recog-
nised no such right; but the borough was created, or its
limits extended to the surrounding parishes,-a union of
boroughs formed, or counties divided into sections, in order
to create an artificial basis of representation. We are now,
it may be hoped, unembarrassed by many of the difficulties
which impeded the labours of 1832, and enabled to view the
entire subject in different aspects. The experience of a
quarter of a century does not encourage the extension of a
system of arbitrary divisions, constructed entirely for electoral
purposes. A representative system, resting on such a basis,
42
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND
can scarcely be otherwise than a source of discord. It is
without landmarks. It has not its origin in that stream of
events which has disposed material things in an order wherein
all are the more inclined to acquiesce because they have not
seen it disturbed or controlled by any visible hand. The
example of other countries, as well as of our own, teaches us
that, if an arbitrary division for electoral or other purposes is
formed to-day, there will not be wanting reasons for its recon-
struction to-morrow. On the other hand, these political
incorporations which grow out of the constantly operating
causes by which all human associations, like material things,
are dissolved and reorganised, are found to have the deepest
roots. "By preserving the method of nature in the conduct
of the State, in what we improve, we are never wholly new ;
in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete. By adher-
ing in this manner, and on those principles, to our forefathers,
we are guided, not by the superstition of antiquarians,
but by the spirit of philosophic analogy."
“Our political
system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with
the order of the world, and with the mode of existence
decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts,
wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, mould-
ing together the great mysterious incorporation of the human
race, the whole at one time is never old, or middle-aged, or
young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy,-moves
on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renova-
tion, and progression."2
The people of this country have always evinced great reluc-
tance to be arbitrarily parcelled out, formed into sections, and
divided by metes and bounds, to correspond with a theory,
and they have commonly cast aside, at the first opportunity,
such artificial limits. The advocates of equal electoral divi-
sions, who look to a new geographical distribution as the only
means of accomplishing their object, will have to surmount
¹ Burke, Reflections, &c., p. 49.
2 Id., p. 48.
CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
43
great prejudices before they succeed in dividing the country
like a chess-board. Many of these prejudices are deeply
rooted in historical causes, and deserve the respect, rather
than the contempt, of the legislator. "To be attached to the
sub-division, to love the little platoon we belong to in
society, is the first principle, the germ, as it were, of public
affections. It is the first link in the series by which we pro-
ceed towards a love to our country and to mankind."
"We
begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation
is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods, and
our habitual provincial connections. These are inns and
resting-places; such divisions of our country as have been
formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of authority, are
so many little images of the great country in which the heart
finds something which it can fill. The love to the whole is
not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. Perhaps it
is a sort of elemental training to those higher and more large
regards, by which alone men come to be affected, as with
their own concern, in the prosperity of a kingdom.'
"But
no man ever was attached by a sense of pride, partiality, or
real affection, to a description of square measurement. He
will never glory in belonging to the Chequer, No. 71, or to
any other badge ticket." Few, probably, have been known
to manifest any degree of pride from their political incorpora-
tion with Marylebone, Finsbury, or any other arbitrary metro-
politan section.
1
""
The glaring anomalies and inconsistencies of a system
which enables a great number of the members of the House
of Commons to be elected by towns insignificant in wealth
and population when compared with other places, often in
their immediate neighbourhood, which are without such
powers-a system which cannot now be defended on the
grounds which were formerly urged in its support—renders
some extensive alteration indispensable, if the representation
¹ Id., p. 290.
1
44
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND
is to be placed on a rational or satisfactory basis. It has been
a common thing for the representatives of such places, and
the advocates of the system under which they hold their pri-
vileges, to refer to the smaller boroughs, as favourably con-
trasted with the metropolitan and other larger constituencies,
by the more independent tone which their members are able
to assume. Those who know they are indebted for their seats
to influences which personally affect themselves and the
electors, and in which any public principles enter but in a
very small degree, are of course more free in their public
conduct. They know that they have other securities for
their seats than a servile adoption of any popular cry. The
preservation of the last remnant of political independence in
France, in the early part of the eighteenth century, was the
vested interest of the principal members of the provincial
parliaments in their offices, and which was due to such offices
being vendible, and therefore partaking of the security of
individual property. It is stated to have been once somewhat
coarsely said by an independent member-that what he had
bought he would also sell. It must be allowed, however, that
so far as regards the national interests, even the effects of
this independence are often to be preferred to the slavish sub-
serviency of the delegate of some of the more numerous
electoral divisions.
In order to raise the more populous of the unrepresented
and inadequately represented towns to their just position, two
plans have been suggested-first, the combination of several
of the smaller boroughs into single electoral districts, or as it
is called, the formation of groups of contributory boroughs;
and, secondly, and which with many writers seems to be the
favourite course, the disfranchisement of many of the smaller
towns at present represented. The latter course, the disfran-
chisement of boroughs at present in the possession of the
electoral privilege, all forming parts of the great body of the
people, in their degree equally valuable and necessary to the
CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
45
national life, in order to render the representation of that
body more perfect, would appear to be a strange kind of pro-
gress towards the political perfection at which reformers pro-
fess to aim. You have, by your artificial restraints, prevented
the blood from freely circulating, and caused in one part of
the body a diseased or unhealthy action-and the remedy of
these physicians is, to amputate the limb! Surely, instead
of this mutilation, instead of leaving the body politic a
maimed, a disfigured, and dismembered frame, the physician
of the State should rather seek to restore and give strength
and vigour to that free circulation, to the want of which the
peccant humours owe their origin.
In favour of the formation of groups of contributory
boroughs, there is much more to be said. The consideration
of this subject is reserved to the next chapter, which treats
of the method by which the electors of small towns or dis-
tricts may contribute with other electors to form a consti-
tuency. For the present it is sufficient to suggest the
question, whether the advocates of the system of contribu-
tory boroughs connected together by reason of their conti-
guity, and acting by the aggregate majority of their electors,
have satisfied themselves that it is impossible to leave the
question of incorporation to the voluntary choice of the
individual electors? This impossibility should, in common
justice, be proved, before any group is permanently incorpo-
rated without any regard to the will of the electors, from
time to time, within it. It must be asked,-what insur-
mountable necessity arises from the circumstance that the
town A. is half a dozen miles, or an hour's ride, from the
town B., that the towns A. and B. must necessarily agree to-
gether in the choice of a representative; whilst it is at least
equally possible that there may be less sympathy between
many of the electors of A. and the electors of B. than be-
tween them and others in distant towns, or in the metropolis?
If the accident of geographical propinquity, or any other
46
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND
cause, creates this necessity,-whether for moral or physical
reasons,—it must be submitted to; but if there be no moral
or physical necessity for such a combination, it certainly
cannot be the duty of a wise legislator artificially to create it.
It is not his province to raise legal or technical obstacles,
having no foundation in natural causes, to the free action of
mankind.
Nothing is more remarkable in the early history of this
country than the disposition to form guilds and associations.
Our archives contain records of these forms of political
existence. The association produced strength. It was the
threefold cord which withstood oppression, and was too
stubborn to be easily broken. These societies became an
offence to arbitrary princes. Sir Francis Palgrave has
remarked, that so early as the reign of Richard the Second,
when that monarch was asked by the Commons to restrain
alienations of land to ecclesiastics, he went still further than
the petition demanded, and extended the restriction to lay
guilds and fraternities. The king, he observes, was jealous
of the strength and independence of such voluntary bodies,
and they were ordered to make returns into Chancery of their
regulations and bye-laws. He says, that there are now in the
Tower a great number of these returns, and that the Statute
of Mortmain, of the 15th of Richard II. (cap. 5), was
intended to hold in check the guilds and corporations,-which
included all the ancient trading companies, who were
acquiring that political influence which not long afterwards
deprived the king of his crown."
In later times, the guilds and fraternities assumed a mixed
character, and became partly civil and partly ecclesiastical.
They sought to combine the objects of mutual assistance and
support in temporal necessities with the consolations of
religion. If the rolls of some of these city fraternities were
perused, they would astonish many who regard the want of
1 Evid. Report on Mortmain, July 1844, p. 10. Lucas, Secularia, pp. 18, 19.
CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
47
sympathy between different classes, at this day, as a necessary
state of things. In them, high and noble names are com-
bined, in one society, with the citizen and the artificer.
They afford examples of the manner in which the claims of
the great brotherhood of humanity were understood by many
of the proudest of other days. The property of many of these
bodies, which had always been looked upon with favour by
the Crown, was brought within the Acts which gave to the
king the property of other fraternities at the Reformation;
but it was, probably, felt to be of a secular character, and
much of it was granted either freely, or on easy terms, to
several of the London parishes which now hold it. All these
are proofs of the prevalent spirit of association. This spirit
has taken a different direction, according to the hue of the
age. It was the same spirit which led the larger communities,
the cities and boroughs, to solicit and obtain incorporation,
and its attendant powers. It has been always active amongst
us, from that time to the present. Witness the great under-
takings which have been accomplished by the combination of
individual power, without other aid from the State than that
which sanctions and adopts the proceeding. Nothing has
been too great, or too small, to be beyond its reach-from
making a road leading only to a poor hamlet, to gaining, in
other realms, an imperial dominion, which the proudest con-
queror might have envied.
It is to this voluntary and natural disposition to associate,
to which full scope should be given in forming our electoral
divisions. It is thus that, when we amend, we build in the
old style. If this be permitted, the huge agglomerations of
voters combined in some modern boroughs, the wide expanse
of acres added to some ancient ones, and the legal bonds by
which many boroughs, having otherwise no connexion with
each other, are tied together, will be gradually dissolved; and
the communities will assume, without any legislative inter-
ference, their natural and convenient form. It has been
48
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND
pertinently asked,-" Why Islington, with its hundred thou-
sand inhabitants, should covet a junction with Saffron-hill and
Hatton-garden, Ely-rents, or Glasshouse-yard ?-why Blooms-
bury and Lincoln's-inn should court the alliance of Clerken-
well, or Clerkenwell hang on to Finsbury ?" The electoral
amendment which would be most in accordance with the
historical forms of social progress in this country, would be
that which would enable every locality, every community, and
every great or ancient association having a distinct corporate
existence, and the ordinary conditions that imply permanency,
to form a constituency, or electoral nucleus, capable of being
represented in Parliament. It will be only necessary to
provide, by a general law, that the relative weight of every
new constituency in the representative assembly shall be
precisely that of its relative magnitude and importance.
In the mode of effecting,-in the construction of the repre-
sentative branch of our constitution,-such necessary amend-
ments as are from time to time called for by the expanding force
of population, wealth, and social changes, every step should
have a reference to, and connection with, the other branches
of that constitution. It should flow naturally from, and be
consonant with, a monarchical form of government. Upon
this point it is useful again to listen to the authority so often
cited in these pages.
He said
He
“Mr. Burke was represented as arguing in a manner which
implied that the British constitution could not be defended,
but by abusing all republics, ancient and modern.
nothing to give the least ground for such a censure.
never abused all republics. He has never professed himself a
friend or an enemy to republics or monarchies in the abstract.
He thought that the circumstances and habits of every
country, which it is always perilous, and productive of the
greatest calamities, to force, are to decide upon the form of its
government. There is nothing in his nature, his temper, or
his faculties, which should make him an enemy to any
CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
49
republic, modern or ancient.
Far from it. He has studied
the form and spirit of republics very early in life; he has
studied them with great attention, and with a mind un-
disturbed by affection or prejudice. He is indeed convinced
that the science of government would be poorly cultivated
without that study. But the result in his mind from that
investigation has been and is, that neither England nor
France, without infinite detriment to them, as well in the
event as in the experiment, could be brought into a republican
form; but that everything republican, which can be introduced
with safety into either of them, must be built upon a mo-
narchy; built upon a real, not a nominal monarchy, as its
essential basis; that all such institutions, whether aristocratic
or democratic, must originate from the Crown, and in all
their proceedings must refer to it; that by the energy of that
mainspring alone those republican parts must be set in
action, and from thence must derive their whole legal effect
(as amongst us they actually do), or the whole will fall into
confusion. These republican members have no other point
but the Crown in which they can possibly unite. This is the
opinion expressed in Mr. Burke's book. He has never varied
in that opinion since he came to years of discretion.”¹
It is through the constant exercise of the authority of the
Crown, to the prerogative of which it belongs to confer
corporate powers-that the creation of electoral bodies can
most effectually keep pace with the rapidity of internal
changes. The census of 1851 is, in many places, no guide to
the state of the country, or of its population in 1858. It is
only in the localities where these alterations in the face of
society, and in the condition of the neighbourhood, are actually
going on, that their extent can be fully appreciated. It is
from the people who are themselves affected by such altera-
tions, that any application for separate or local incorporation
should emanate. It is not the business of a central power to
¹ Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, p. 46. 3rd ed. 1791.
E
50
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND
initiate, on their behalf, the proceedings necessary to obtain a
new constitution. It would be, moreover, highly incon-
venient, that the Parliament should be required to interpose
its powers on every occasion. The principle by which such
local divisions are to be constituted, separated, or recon-
structed, should be settled once for all, and then applied
through the constitutional exercise of the royal prerogative, as
the established laws are administered through the judicial
authority of the Crown.
A law under which new electoral divisions might be formed,
as occasion should require, is suggested in the following out-
line of the fifth clause of the proposed electoral law :-
V. Any borough, and any parish or district or division of a parish or other
parochial division, and any ward or other division of a city, town, or borough,
and any hundred, wapentake, or other division of a county, and any body,
college, or society incorporate, may, in pursuance of a resolution agreed to by
a majority of the electors in such community, at a meeting convened and
held after due notice, apply to her Majesty in Council, by petition, signed by
the chairman of such meeting, praying that such borough, parish, division,
or body, may be empowered to return a member to represent the same in
Parliament, and that a writ for such purpose may be issued accordingly at
future general elections; and such petition shall state who it is proposed
shall be the returning officer, and where it is proposed that such election
shall take place, and what hall or public building it is proposed to provide
for the same, and the situation of the other polling-places, if any, which it
is proposed to provide, and in what manner it is proposed that the expenses
of such elections, and of the registration and record of voters, and other the
incidental expenses of such separate representation shall be borne; and
upon the hearing of the said petition, of which not less than three months'
notice shall be given in the London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Gazettes
respectively; and also upon the hearing of any person or persons, who may
apply and be admitted to be heard in opposition to the petition, under such
regulations as shall be made in that behalf,-if it shall appear to Her
Majesty in Council to be proper to accede to the prayer of the petition, and
to grant to such borough, parish, division, or body, a charter of incorporation
(if the same be not already incorporated), it shall be lawful for Her Majesty
in Council to order that at all future general elections a writ shall be issued
for the summoning of such borough, parish, division, or body, to return a
member to serve in Parliament, and to prescribe who shall be the returning
officer, and any other special rules which may appear to be necessary for the
due exercise of such powers; and the said borough, parish, division, or body
CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
51
shall thereupon be empowered to make such return accordingly; but no such
order shall confer any right of suffrage on any person who would not, by the
general laws affecting the suffrage, be entitled to the same; and a copy of
the petition, and of any counter-petition, and of the order made thereupon,
shall, within three months after the making thereof, respectively, be laid
before Parliament if then sitting, or if not, within the same time after the
commencement of their ensuing session.
In explanation of the foregoing clause, it will be observed,
that—
It leaves the initiative of all proceedings to obtain a separate
representation, to the local or provincial divisions or corporate
bodies, themselves.
It must be taken in connection with the clause,—the prin-
cipal subject of the ensuing chapter,-which would equalise
the number of electors necessary for all constituencies, and
give to all their due and appropriate weight, and it would not,
therefore, affect the number of members.
It does not confer on any person the suffrage, but assumes
the right of suffrage, in every case, to be previously settled
by law.
It is also assumed, that, in acting under this power, rules
for the guidance of the proceedings would be prescribed by
an Order in Council, and that they would be such as would
guard against any decision upon an application, on which
every party really interested had not been heard. The Council,
it is assumed, would consider the circumstances of the locality,
or of the body making the application; the extent to which
the objects of any incorporated institution, which might so
apply, were of a public character; competency to provide for
the distinct expenses of the registrations, elections, and
returns, which would be cast upon them; and generally,
whether any public or national object, or any advantage
affecting any considerable class or section, would be gained
by acceding to the prayer of the petition. The bias would,
probably, be to confer the power of making a distinct return,
where it is desired by any sufficient body of electors, and
52
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND
7.
where it could be granted without prejudice to others. The
Council would lay before Parliament their rules of proceeding,
the applications made to them, and the decisions thereon,
with the grounds of such decisions. In administering this
law, the Council would have the aid of, and would safely be
guided by, public opinion, as it might be elicited by any dis-
cussion of their proceedings. The question would always be
one purely of an administrative character, not affecting any
political party, and one in which party feelings could hardly
enter.
A corresponding provision should be made for relieving
any constituency, local or corporate, of the necessity of making
a separate return,—and thereby exonerating them from the
additional charges which it would occasion,-upon a petition
to her Majesty in Council, setting forth the decay or diminu-
tion of the numbers of such constituency, or other sufficient
cause.
A self-acting law, of the kind which has been proposed, or
some other of an equivalent effect, is absolutely necessary to
provide for the fluctuations that are a consequence of the
immense activity of modern life, unless Parliament is to be
constantly engaged in the labour, and embarrassed by the
jealousies, of a reformation of its own constitution.¹
1 In a note to the pamphlet in which the scheme of personal representation
was first rudely suggested, the author referred to upwards of a hundred
English towns, every one of which contained at the last census more than
4000 inhabitants. They were: Bedfordshire-Leighton-Buzzard, Luton
Berks-Newbury. Cambridgeshire-Ely, March, Whittlesea. Cheshire-
Altringham, Birkenhead, Congleton, Crewe, Nantwich, Runcorn, Tranmere.
Cornwall-Camborne, Falmouth, Penzance, Redruth. Cumberland-Mary-
port, Penrith, Wigton, Workington. Derbyshire-Belper, Chesterfield. Devon
Bideford, Brixham, Exmouth, Teignmouth, Torquay. Durham-Barnard
Castle, Bishop Auckland, Darlington, Hartlepool. Essex-Barking, Chelms-
ford, Halstead, Stratford. Hampshire--Cowes, Gosport. Hertfordshire—
Bishop Stortford, Hitchin, Ware. Kent-Ashford, Dartford, Deal, Margate,
Ramsgate, Sheerness, Tunbridge Wells. Lancashire-Accrington, Burnley,
Chorley, Colne, Eccles, Haslingden, Leigh, Middleton, Ormskirk, Over
Darwen, Prescot, Southport, Staleybridge, St. Helen's, Todmorden, Ulverstone.
CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
53
“Toute institution immobile est vicieuse, parce qu'elle finit
par constituer un privilége en contradiction avec l'état réel de
la société.”1 "Si au lieu d'attribuer nominément et à jamais
les droits électoraux à tel ou tel bourg, les lois Anglaises les
avaient confiés à toute ville dont la population s'élèverait à
telle limite (ou dont le revenu serait de tel taux), la repré-
sentation, au lieu de se corrompre, aurait suivi les déplace-
ments et les progrès de la véritable capacité politique. Nous
pourrions multiplier les exemples, et prouver de mille maniè-
res, qu'il n'est bon, ni d'avoir un seul signe légal de la capa-
Leicestershire-Hinckley, Loughborough, Melton-Mowbray. Lincolnshire—
Gainsborough, Horncastle, Louth, Spalding. Middlesex-Brentford, Chelsea.
Kensington. Monmouthshire-Chepstow, Tredegar. Northamptonshire—
Daventry, Kettering, Wellingborough. Northumberland-Alnwick, Hexham.
Notts-Mansfield, Worksop. Salop-Oswestry, Wellington. Somerset-
Yeovil. Staffordshire - Burton-on-Trent, Leek, Wednesbury. Suffolk-
Beccles, Lowestoft, Woodbridge. Surrey-Croydon, Kingston, Richmond.
Sussex-Worthing. Warwickshire-Leamington, Nuneaton, Rugby. Wilts—
Bradford, Trowbridge, Warminster. Worcestershire - Bromsgrove, Stour-
bridge. Yorkshire Barnsley, Bingley, Dewsbury, Doncaster, Goole,
Keightley, Otley, Rotherham, Selby, Skipton, Sowerby-bridge. There is,
however, no reason for excluding towns containing less than 4000 inha-
bitants.
In a note in the Star newspaper, relating to 'South Durham, the writer
observes, that by far the largest town community in that county not
separately represented in Parliament, is the seaport town of Hartlepool. A
portion of this town is an ancient municipal borough, with a population of
between 9,000 and 10,000 persons. Another portion of the seaport, com-
monly called West Hartlepool,' is under the local government of a Town
Improvement Commission, incorporated by a private Act, obtained in the
year 1854. The present population of the entire community is estimated at
between 24,000 and 25,000,- that of Darlington, at between 12,000 and
13,000. In the year 1851, when the census of the municipal borough of
Stockton was taken, the borough boundaries inclosed only a group of
buildings in the centre of the town. By an Act passed in the following year
(1852), the boundaries were made coextensive with the town, and the result
has been to inclose a town's population superior to Darlington, by at least
1000 persons." These facts illustrate the impracticability of founding a
durable representative constitution upon any present geographical divisions.
It is only preparing the occasion for a new struggle.
¹ Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 214.
54
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND
cité électorale, ni de mettre ce signe hors de l'atteinte des
vicissitudes de la société.":
It would be necessary to fix the numbers of the population,
or the rated value of property, or some other measure, on
attaining which any borough or local division should be
entitled to elect a representative, if such election were to add
an additional member to the representative body; but when,
under the operation of another rule, the aggregate number of
members can never be exceeded, and the relative and propor-
tionate weight of every constituency is preserved, whatever
may be its mutations, the constitution is relieved from the
necessity of prescribing any measure, whether of number, or
value, or other denomination. It may then be left wholly to
the option of any body of electors proposing to form them-
selves into a separate constituency, and having reasonable
grounds for doing so, to take proceedings for that purpose.
The application for the privilege would be some evidence that
the constituency deserved it; for nothing would be gained but
the power of being represented in their corporate character
by some man chosen by the majority, and between whom and
the electoral body the connection of member and constituent
may be a source of mutual gratification.
With our present experience of the apathy which is com-
monly manifested in political matters by great multitudes of
the most intelligent classes-especially in their own particular
districts-it is difficult to realise the expansion of individual
energy and corporate spirit which a free political system
would be likely to call forth; or to estimate the amount of
the beneficial influence it would be calculated to exercise both
on the character of the electors and the elected. It would
bring out in all its force that spirit of zealous endeavour,
honourable emulation, and just pride, which both creates
majorities and renders them beneficial to society. Instead of
extinguishing all but themselves, they stimulate the exertions
¹ Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., pp. 236, 237.
CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
55
of the minorities. They do not quench, but fan the generous
flame. In the successful struggle of the majority to elect the
man whom they regard as the most distinguished of the com-
petitors, the minority may be vanquished without disgrace,
and retire with all the honours of a capitulation, the terms of
which they have been able to dictate. It is an Isthmian
triumph. It has brought out what is vigorous and powerful,
and encouraged or provoked to some effort even the weaker
and the more feeble, and the nation rises stronger and purer
from the contest.
The effect of the free action of every member of an electoral
division, in elevating the motives and objects which govern
the general choice, is no vain imagination, unless all those
feelings by which men were formerly attached, or were sup-
posed to be attached to their country,-to their native or
adopted town,—to their place of education,—or to the special
society of which they form a part, are now extinct, and that
we are reduced to a miserable personality, in which no man
regards aught but himself. But the feeling is not extinct.
The man, whose virtue or whose genius has conferred honour
upon his country and his age, is still thought to shed some
reflected ray upon the persons and places he was more nearly
connected with. Universities claim a merit from having
given to the world men of exalted worth. There is still a
pride in companionship with the good and great. To give
full scope to these better sentiments in political life, the
electors of the kingdom must be extricated from the ties which
indissolubly bind together the instructed with the ignorant,
the pure with the corrupt, the good with the evil, those
morally living with those morally dead, and which swamp all
high hopes, and almost all high desires, in "that great
Serbonian bog," where all are confounded together. Once
set free, all the better elements existing in this great people
would be brought into action, and encouraged to employ their
most earnest thoughts and energies in assisting to gather and
56
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND
surround the throne with the best and wisest counsellors
which their times afford. When the present rude and undis-
criminating method of election has ceased, and the names of
the most distinguished men in every walk of life are laid
before the electors, it will not be easy to make even the
humblest voter turn aside to the inferior claims of more ob-
scure men, unless they are brought before him with better
recommendations than now suffice to determine his choice.
It has been a subject of great and just regret, that one
consequence of the abolition of the close boroughs has been,
in a great measure, to impede the access to parliament of a
class of able men, who by their aid were enabled to devote
themselves, and were gradually disciplined, to political labours.
The complaint is admitted to have some foundation, even by
those who had no confidence in the proprietors of the close
boroughs as the examiners of rising ability or the arbiters of
political success. The law which is here proposed would
enable every University and College, every Inn of Court, and
every collection of learned or professional men, having a
corporate union, to be distinctly represented. It will open to
all such bodies an honourable rivalry in an object which will
at once confer dignity on themselves, and promote the public.
good. It will be their especial office and laudable pride to
bring forward the men in whom they observe the highest
qualifications. They will supply in at least an equally
effectual, and, in a far more satisfactory manner, that avenue
for talent, which the existing system has closed. The judg-
ment of small and highly-qualified bodies of men, in selecting
as candidates for public life those amongst themselves, or
within the range of their observation, who have displayed re-
markable abilities or qualities of mind, is more to be relied on
than the operation of the uncontrolled will of any single indi-
vidual, especially when the choice so made, in order to be
effectual, requires the confirmation and approval of a con-
siderable number of their countrymen. We may hesitate to
CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
57
give credit to the opinion of the patron of a borough as to
the eminent talents which recommend his nominee. The
choice is apt to be attributed less to ability than to favour.
When, however, we find the members of a college, or of a
learned or other distinguished association putting forward, if
not unanimously, yet with a very general concurrence of
opinion, a man of whom they have personal knowledge, and
whose character has made a powerful impression upon them,
and confidently seeking a confirmation of their verdict from a
large body of voters, it will not be unreasonable to place
some reliance on the merits of him to whom such testimony
is borne. The desire of success will afford the strongest
inducement to the introduction of the best competitor. The
increase of the number of constituencies, especially of con-
stituencies numerically small, and having peculiar qualifica-
tions, would in many cases facilitate the entry into public life
of men able and willing to employ themselves in the political
service of their country, but whose merits are not widely
known. Such an one might thus address himself at first to
a comparatively small body of electors, perhaps favourably
disposed towards him by companionship, appreciation of
character or effort, by neighbourhood or traditional respect,
and through the judgment and discrimination of this narrower
circle, he may ultimately acquire that reputation which will
secure for him the suffrages of larger constituencies or a
national fame.
58
CHAPTER IV.
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
THE formation of electoral districts has been a subject of dis-
cussion from almost the earliest time at which the question of
parliamentary reform began to be agitated. Various plans
have been suggested for forming such districts or divisions.
In the year 1780, the Duke of Richmond propounded, in the
House of Lords, a comprehensive scheme of reform, in a bill
which the brief record of that day states occupied an hour and
a half in reading. This measure, after declaring the right of
suffrage to be in male persons of twenty-one, went on to
prescribe that a list should be taken in every parish of the
number of voters, and returns of them made to the Lord
Chancellor. "The numbers to be told-up, and divided by
558 (the number of members then in the house), and the
quotient to be the number by which one member of parliament
was to be elected. Every county to be divided into as many
districts as they contain quotients of this nature, and these
districts to be called boroughs."
The course adopted in the Reform Act of 1832, is so well
known that it will be unnecessary to do more than refer to a
few of its features. As an alternative to avoid the disfran-
chisement of some small boroughs, the area of such boroughs
for parliamentary purposes was extended to much of the sur-
rounding country,-embracing, in some cases, a circuit of
1 Parl. Hist., vol. xxi., p. 687.
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
59
many miles. Of this the borough of Shaftesbury may be
taken as an example, which was made to include thirteen
surrounding parishes. In other cases, several towns, sometimes
with their adjoining parishes, contributed to form a district of
boroughs, and were empowered to return one member. In
the Ayr district, for example,-Ayr, with portions of two
adjoining parishes, having, in 1851, 17,624 inhabitants,-
Campbeltown, 6880 inhabitants,-Inverary, 1064 inhabit-
ants,-Irvine, and part of an adjoining parish, 7534 inhabit-
ants,—and Oban, with part of an adjoining parish, 1742
inhabitants, were formed into such a constituency. In the
case of a very large population, as in the metropolis, a district
was formed by combining groups of contiguous parishes into a
borough returning two members, as Finsbury. In other
cases, where the neighbourhood of an ancient borough had
become populous, the surrounding population was taken
within the precincts of the parliamentary borough, as Exeter,
a city of 34,317 inhabitants, which, for parliamentary pur-
poses, was made to include parts of the parishes of Topsham,
Heavitree, St. Thomas, and Alphington, containing together
6371 inhabitants. The principles involved in these forms of
division or annexation exhaust all that has been proposed by
reformers in this country. The plan of the Duke of Rich-
mond is perhaps the nearest approach to that which was
adopted in France by the National Assembly, and there
founded on the several bases of territory, population, and con-
tribution; the territorial basis being created by a division
into departments, communes, and cantons.
The annexation of several agricultural parishes to a borough
in their centre, as in the case of Shaftesbury, would seem to be
a recognition of the fact that the alleged distinction between
the interests of the borough and the county electors is but
imaginary; for, if any real distinction existed, injury would
have been done to one or the other. It would have been an
injustice to hamper the action of either set of electors by
60
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
attaching them to the other. It may possibly be said that
the borough electors are, in the cases of towns situated like
Shaftesbury, only another class of county electors, and that the
addition of the county electors to the borough was of no other
importance than that of giving them another polling-place,
and a larger share in the election of a member. All such
considerations are in truth but solemn trifling. The parade of
distinct interests and distinct objects in the country and the
town it is to be feared is now rarely used, except to blind
the eyes of the public, and perplex the question of repre-
sentation.
The addition of populous suburbs to the constituency of a
city or borough, already possessing no more than its share in
the general representation, is certainly a mode of removing the
discrepancy between the electoral privileges of the inhabitants
of the city and the suburb; but when a suburb, containing a
thousand voters, is added to a city which already contains four
thousand, it is very difficult to say in what sense the represen-
tation is improved. If anything be gained by the thousand
new electors,—any power of infusing their opinions into the
representative body,--it must be so much taken from the four
thousand old electors. The representation must have been
made less a reflex of their opinions. "Au lieu de dénaturer
les droits politiques en les exténuant, sous prétexte de les
répandre, qu'il y ait partout des libertés locales, garanties par
des droits réels."
"1
Such annexations to boroughs, or extensions of the franchise
to surrounding districts, are, however, still gravely proposed
as amendments. They may remove an inequality between
the inhabitants of two contiguous places, leaving the greater
anomalies and inequalities which extend over the kingdom
untouched; but this is to divert the amendment which
pretends to make, and should make, the representation more
perfect, to another, a distinct, and a far inferior, object,—the
1 Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 263.
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
61
mere abolition of a local discrepancy,-an alteration which, it
is seen, may even render the actual representation less perfect.
Instead of resting satisfied with the removal of mere local
irregularities, or inequalities, the object should be to create a
general congruity, in which every part of the political edifice
is adapted to its true purpose.
There are insurmountable objections to an electoral division
founded solely on a geographical or territorial basis, and not
corrected by some balancing movement, which answers to the
fluctuations of society. In addition to the difficulty of ar-
riving, even in the outset, at anything like equality in such a
division, it has constantly to be reconstructed.
The shifting
centres of population and industry will every year disarrange
and disturb it. No session of Parliament would ever pass
without claims being urged for a new Reform Bill,-claims
which, upon the principle of the divisions supposed to have
been already made, are necessarily well founded, and entitled
to attention. No one who duly estimates the importance of
the ordinary labours of the Legislature, will be inclined to
interrupt them by sowing the seeds of such perennial contests.
It is sometimes said, that merely a proximate, and not a
mathematical, equality is sought for. Political justice is not
so rigid as to demand the same measure of constitutional right
for every corner of the kingdom. It is not like the law of
nature, inflexible and impartial. It admits of inequality and
injustice, on the condition that it be not too great, or too
glaring. But who are to be the victims; and will they or
ought they to be content with their fate? Would not such
contentment, on the principles upon which the reform is
carried out, be the mark of a servile disposition? A founda-
tion adopted on the supposition that it is just, and which,
after all, proves to be only an approximation towards justice,
will render any settlement that rests upon it necessarily
transitory and short-lived. If we begin with perfect accuracy,
it secures, at least, a longer period before the scheme will
62
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
require material alteration; but if we set out with a system
loosely and unfairly constructed, we begin with that which
is already condemned, and has advanced some steps towards
its end.
A defect in all geographical or territorial systems, from
that of the Duke of Richmond downwards,-greater in its
practical consequences than all the other inconveniences which
attend them, great as some of the latter are-is that they, in
their result, separate every part of the kingdom into two main
divisions, one somewhat more, and the other somewhat less
numerous; and they not only do not provide for, but they
absolutely exclude from the Legislature, the representation of
the opinions, feelings, or desires, of the less numerous of these
divisions. It destroys the minorities, and in so doing seriously
weakens and deteriorates the representation, even of the
majorities. "Un système électoral qui, d'avance, annulerait,
quant à la formation de l'assemblée délibérante, l'influence et
la participation de la minorité, détruirait le gouvernement
représentatif, et serait aussi fatal à la majorité elle-même
qu'une loi qui, dans l'assemblée délibérante, condamnerait la
minorité à se taire."
In the establishment of what may be called a sliding or
self-acting scale,-by which the additions to population that
constantly occur, and the new communities that grow up,
silently enter and take their place in the constitution, and for
whose admission the communities that are stationary or decay,
as silently make room, by a general and fundamental law,
operating without any jerk or effort, preserving all parts with-
out repletion and without void,-we are instructed by the
experience of the United States, a people from whose institu-
tions we have much to learn, both for example and for warn-
ing. It is that one part of their system which has never
failed to work harmoniously and well.
If the American constitution had not fixed, as a funda-
¹ Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 260.
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
63
mental law, the proportion of every state in the House of
Representatives, and had not made that proportion to vary
with the relative population of the several states, without the
necessity of recurring from time to time to the federal legis-
lature, it would have left the constitution open to internal
contests, dangerous to the Union. The number of members
in the House of Representatives was fixed at one for every
228th part of the population, to be determined at the census
which is taken every ten years, a fractional number in any
state exceeding one-half of the quotient entitling that state to
an additional member. The federal law of the 5th June, 1842
(c. 47), requires the division for electoral purposes of every
state into so many parcels of contiguous territory as shall
be equal to the number of representatives. This method of
distribution is the temptation of the party which happens to
be in power to form the districts in the manner which shall
be most useful in consolidating their votes and diminishing
the electoral power of the opposite party. In the United
States this has become an art, and is known as 'gerry-
mandering." The name is peculiar to America, but the
contrivance itself is a familiar one in France, and it is not
unknown in England. In this country, indeed, the inequali-
ties of representative distribution surpass the art of the
"gerrymander." Statistics collected by late writers and
speakers are absolutely startling in what they reveal.
Mrs. Fawcett remarks that "at the general election of
1868 ten successful candidates polled 159,650 votes; ten
other successful candidates were returned by 1873 votes;
and ten unsuccessful candidates polled 83,217 votes.
Mr. Blennerhasset observes that "there are eight constituencies,
viz. Portarlington, Dungarvan, Mallow, Downpatrick, Ennis-
"1
2
113
¹ See an article in the American Law Review, Boston, January, 1872,
"The Machinery of Politics and Proportional Representation." Reprinted
by the Representative Reform Association, 27, Villiers Street.
2 See Mr. Morrison's Speech, House of Commons, 10 July, 1872.
³ Macmillan's Magazine, Sept., 1870, p. 376.
64
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
1
killen, Kinsale, New Ross, and Youghal, with about 2000
electors between them, and a population under 40,000, which
have together the same amount of representation as the four
greatest constituencies in Ireland-Cork County, Dublin City,
Down, and Mayo, with their 40,000 registered voters and
1,200,000 of population." It is idle to speak of such a state
of things as a mere anomaly of historical growth, and to
dismiss it as of no importance. It is offensive to the common
understanding, and to uphold it as tolerable, and as something
which it is not worth while to disturb or correct, is essentially
demoralizing to the public conscience. It is to treat all
government as a game of chance, having no stable ground or
sound foundation on which to rest, but ever dependent on the
chapter of accidents. It saps the foundation of effort for
political or social improvement, by depriving it of all logical
hope of success through constitutional action. The late
explanation of an eminent speaker, that "the nation has
outgrown the state," has doubtless much truth; but it cannot
be wise, even if it were long possible, thus to ignore the
national growth. The only safe course is to render the
political weight of every local constituency dependent upon
and variable according to the number of the registered electors
within it who go to the poll. We thus adopt a rule of
mathematical precision, which is self-correcting, and yields to
no party exigencies. It is found by dividing the number
of votes given in the three kingdoms, at the general election,
by the number of members required to constitute the House,
the quotient forming a quota of votes entitling every candidate
for whom that number shall be given to be returned as a
member. Different methods of supplying the numbers which
are then wanting, from the candidates standing next on the
voting papers, are pointed out later,³ and a method of selection
when the quotas cease, has been embodied in Clause XXV.
2
1 Speech, House of Commons, 10 July, 1872.
Clause IV., p. 31.
3 See Chap. IX.
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
65
of the proposed electoral law, for the direction of the
Registrars in appropriating the remainder of the voting
papers.
The fourth clause of the proposed electoral law has pre-
scribed the number of votes which shall be sufficient for the
return of any member,—and the following clause defines the
number which shall be insufficient.
VI. No person shall be returned as a member to serve in Parliament, at
any general election, for whom there shall not be polled the full quota or
number of votes, to be ascertained from time to time as hereinbefore pre-
scribed, or one of the comparative majorities of votes to be determined-
from time to time as hereinafter directed.
In effecting the greatest moral object that society is called
upon to undertake, the formation of a legislative assembly,
-a rational standard of association is thus substituted for a
traditional one. Instead of an arbitrary geographical divi-
sion, which the migrations of population will constantly dis-
turb, the proposed equality of division would be affected by
no commercial or social changes which the face of the country
might undergo. It affords the means of giving to the
counties, and to all the larger, as well as to the smaller towns,
their due weight in the Legislature, by a rule at all times
arithmetically correct, and admitting of no invidious distinc-
tions between the inhabitants of the metropolis, or of the pro-
vinces. It places upon an equality the gentleman in Devon-
shire with the gentleman in Yorkshire, the merchant in
Liverpool with the merchant in Yarmouth, the tradesman in
Cornhill and in Calne, the artizans on the Trent and on the
Tees. The relative weight of the larger, as well as of the
smaller constituencies, is accurately measured and reconciled
with the general representative system.
The operation of a system of electoral divisions composed
of an unanimous quota of votes, may be compared with the
operation of a system of contributory burghs, founded on
F
66
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
the principle of election by majorities, according to the exist-
ing law. Take the Ayr district, and suppose that there are
1039 voters, viz.,-
In Ayr.
""
>>
Campbeltown
Inverary
Irvine
Oban
500
200
35
230
74
It is possible that a majority of the electors of Ayr, or
even every elector of Ayr, may be entirely unrepresented.
The inhabitants of the four other towns may form the majo-
rity, and leave the town of Ayr without any share or voice in
the representation. The same may, of course, happen to
Campbeltown, Irvine, or any of the other towns. Nothing
but securing a majority of the electors of the five towns can
assure to any of the towns, or any of the electors in them,
the election of their representative. If an unanimous quota
of votes, wherever found, be made sufficient to return a repre-
sentative, not one of the towns, or one of the electors in any
town, could be, owing to the votes of the rest, without a
representative. The member for Ayr would be elected by
the majority of the electors of Ayr. Instead of being re-
stricted to the other four towns, and compelled to consult
their respective local prejudices, or succumb to their jealousies
or intrigues, every burgh in the district might look for the
residue of the quota required by the candidate whom they
chose, throughout the entire kingdom of Scotland; and if
that be not enough, throughout the United Kingdom. Their
position may be likened to that of a merchant, to whom the
facility of locomotion has opened all the great marts of com-
merce; and who is no more confined, as he had previously
been, to the scantily-furnished stores of three or four neigh-
bouring market-towns.
It is a necessary part of the proposed system that the quota
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
67
of votes must be made up, or if not, that at least a compara-
tive majority must be attained; but that is nothing more than
a necessary consequence of the principle, that towns of small
importance, or containing comparatively few electors, cannot
have the same corporate weight in the public councils as those
which are inhabited by more numerous constituencies. Besides
the relative corporate weight of the borough, there will be
the uniformity of the individual weight of every vote, which
becomes the same, whether the elector reside in Campbeltown
or Camberwell.
Many objections will, no doubt, be raised to a scheme which
insures success to every candidate who receives a certain quota
of votes. There are parties, and leaders of parties, who have
other plans and other objects. They appear to consider it
their interest, or the interest of their class, that the electors
should, in some constituencies, be counted by thousands, and
in others by hundreds, or tens,-here huddled together in
mobs, there made up of a narrow clique,-here in huge
masses,there in petty clusters,-masses which may be led
by clamour, clusters which may be bought for money.
system which is merely rational and consistent, and treats the
franchise and its exercise as sacred things, is likely to find
many opponents and little favour. The discourses which
have been heard since the amendment of the Reform Act has
been agitated, lead to the suspicion that in constructing any
future measure there will be attempts on all sides to frame a
system which shall pack the electors, so as to expose them
especially to the operation of such forces as each party
imagines that it has most at its command.
A highly-gifted member of the lower house has recently, as
the firsts fruits offered-and no unfit tribute-for the blessing
of restored health, again devoted his political efforts to that
cause which he has always advocated,—the cause of peace.
There is no greater or nobler mission. In such a theme the
language of indignation at the follies and the crimes of men
68
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
may well be pardoned. It is a repetition of the sad story
which foretold that-
CC
'Might only shall be admired,
And valour and heroic virtue called.
To overcome in battle, and subdue
Nations, and bring home spoils with infinite
Man-slaughter, shall be held the highest pitch
Of human glory."
It is possible that since war has originated in cabinets and
been sustained by loans, its true causes would often appear
more deserving of contempt and reprobation from having lost
that glow of heroism shed upon the deeds of those who per-
sonally executed what they planned, and shared in the suffer-
ings and privations caused by the struggle. It cannot be
doubted that low and selfish motives have entered into
the business of government, and led to great calamities.
Parties in this country have not been backward in exposing
the faults of each other, but to regard such mean objects as
the especial inheritance of any particular class is unjust. The
proportions of good and evil existing in one class differ pro-
bably very little from those of all the rest. The class in
which the government of this country has been chiefly vested
may point with some confidence to records proving that if
they have not been superior, they have at least been equal to
the rulers of any other land, and that they have never been
wanting in the full measure of the virtues of their race and
age.
Where, however, in history, where in modern experience, is
there ground for the belief that if the kingdom were parcelled
into equal electoral divisions, and the majority in every divi-
sion called upon to pronounce for peace or war—that it would
follow that peace would be more certainly preserved? Let us
recall the latest impressions, which, as individuals, we have
all gathered of the opinions of the more numerous classes in
recent times, and reflect whether war with Russia or war with
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
69
China would not have been entered upon with equal readiness,
applauded with equal vehemence, and probably prolonged even
more vindictively and more fiercely, if it had been left to a
ballot of such electoral districts. It is said that this would
not be so, for the poorer classes are those from which our
soldiers and sailors are taken,-it is they who suffer in the
conflict, and it is they who are still more impoverished by the
prostration of industry which attends it. It is, indeed, true
that they are the victims; but to suppose that, therefore,
their passions will be restrained, that they will learn for-
bearance, that they will resist the specious arguments of men
who know how to make the worse appear the better cause,
that they will foresee the retroactive efforts of extravagant
expenditure, the exhaustion which is to succeed unprofitable
effort, the economical consequences which follow a vast outlay
in destruction-is to suppose that the majorities have sud-
denly risen to the height of this great argument, and have be-
come temperate, moderate, and wise. That such a consummation
is the wish and hope of some who desire to place all political
power in the hands of the greater number is not to be
doubted; but is the expectation reasonable—is there the
shadow of a hope of its realisation? Are the numerical
majorities which govern the United States remarkable for
their concern at the horrors of war,-for their solicitude to
avoid national quarrels,-for their anxiety to preserve peace,
-for their forbearance towards other countries,-for their
respect of the claims of weaker neighbours,-for their ten-
derness of all aggression ?¹
1 These pages were published before the beginning of the American
civil war, but the Author cannot now let them pass without protesting
against the injustice of attributing to the American form of popular
government, either the severities of the war or the persistence with which
it is prosecuted. There has been no act of cruelty, however deplorable,
which is not equalled and surpassed in the exploits of the armies of
Europe; and notwithstanding the evidences of indomitable spirit displayed
by the South, if the Federal government had not engaged in a struggle,
70
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
It will be remembered, that the general election of 1857
afforded the advocates of the Chinese war a signal triumph.
It was not alone the voice of small constituencies; some of
the largest were even more remarkable for the manner in
which they received and rewarded peaceful counsels. Whether
in the late war with Russia the vital and material treasures of
the nation have been vainly spent to sustain upon a throne
an effete dynasty, to uphold the symbol of a cruel and in-
tolerant creed, and perpetuate a social condition inimical to
civilization; or whether it was the act of that deep and pro-
found wisdom-that insight which is foresight-that study
of history, which is philosophy teaching by example—that
long experience of the dealings of nation with nation, which in
humbler stations is gathered from the conduct of man to man,
and which may enable statesmen of the highest order to gaze
almost with prophetic eye into the future, and see to guard
against other, perhaps distant, but more fatal evils-are
questions which this age will scarcely solve; but there is no
doubt that in this country the multitude, so far as they were
heard, approved the sacrifice. Whether that sacrifice was
made to the balance of power, to national interests, national
pride or rivalry, or whether to the genius of war, there is no
denying that the holocaust was freely offered, and that the
altar was thronged with votive worshippers. A discourse in
which peace and justice were displayed as the true wisdom of
nations as of men, might have been heard with delight and
applauded with enthusiasm, but that temporary emotion affords
only slender reason for the hope that the lesson is the more
deeply engraved on the popular mind.
Hosanna' now-to-morrow, 'crucify,'
The changeful burden still of their rude lawless cry."
however long and bitter, rather than yield up so large a portion of the
territory of the Union, it would have set an example of political moderation
which neither monarchies nor aristocracies have hitherto displayed.-[Note
to 3rd Ed.]
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
71
Some misgiving may well be felt even in the mind of the
orator and teacher himself, whether there will in electoral
majorities be any sure anchorage for the doctrines that lead to
peace and tranquillity, when he observes that of the many
assemblies which have since met, all ready to grasp the
electoral power he would give them, how few have accepted
its higher and holier uses.
It is by a concentration of the political strength of the
advocates of peace-of all those who believe it to be inconsistent
neither with the dignity nor the security of a great people,
and that it may be safely built on a policy-open, frank, and
just towards all, that they will acquire their due weight.
They may rely on that theory which has, "if any theory has
—borne the wear of time, and seen empires rise and set, the
eternal theory that Truth is better than Falsehold, and that
man was made to be upright." This kingdom contains forty
thousand ministers of the gospel of peace; perhaps, of all
these, not a hundred have had in the existing system any
opportunity of giving such votes as expressed their abhorrence
of unjust wars—perhaps not one has by his vote produced the
smallest effect on the result of any election-nor would their
votes have any more weight in the most perfect system of
geographical divisions which any Reform Bill has put forward.
On the other hand, there are many who, rejecting all
electoral divisions, desire to preserve some of the small
boroughs as the avenues for the representation of special
interests. In a tabular statement, showing the population of
the represented boroughs, beginning at the most, and ending
at the least populous, the twelve last places are:-Arundel,
Honiton, Ashburton, Lyme Regis, Thetford, Totnes, Harwich,
Dartmouth, Evesham, Wells, Reigate, and Richmond, which
may be taken as fair examples. What classes, it may be
asked, do the electors of these boroughs represent, of what
opinions are they the exponents, what interests do they
1 Westminster Review, vol. xiii., N.s., p. 417.
72
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
protect? What have these unfortunate voters done, that
they should be put forward in so prominent a place as the few
men whose judgment in the choice of legislators may be more
safely trusted than that of the great body of their country-
men? It is a position which is almost certain to expose their
wisdom to doubt, and their virtue to danger. In several of
these towns, so far as they appear to have any decided
opinions, the majority appear favourable to the ballot, as,
perhaps, might naturally be expected. All the representatives.
of those boroughs who are deserving of their high trust,
would, no doubt, be elected under a different system. High
rank, accompanied by character, talent, industry, and patriot-
ism, is sure to be esteemed and welcomed. People look to
an aristocracy of some kind for those whom they are ready to
regard as their natural leaders. But it is difficult to see in
what respect any particular class or interest in the nation.
would suffer, if the twelve boroughs above named ceased as
such to exist. It would be a curious speculation to take the
political history of any of the smaller boroughs, and, following
the votes of its representatives for the last half century, to
ascertain what distinctive opinions or feelings the action of its
electors has been the means of imparting to the legislature.
If it be the object of any party to preserve the small
boroughs, either with or without the ballot, for the purpose
of securing what they may deem the advantage of reserving
some seats which shall be accessible to pecuniary influences, a
more honest, and a not less effectual course, would be at once
to propose that a certain number of seats should be put up to
auction, and that the State should have the benefit of the
purchase-money.
It is not, however, any part of the system now proposed, to
deprive any of these boroughs of their just weight in the
political system of the country. On the contrary, as in the
case of the contributory boroughs before referred to, every
¹ See Westminster Review, vol. i., N.s., p. 26.
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
73
elector they contain will have his electoral privileges for every
good purpose largely extended. Like the other electors of the
kingdom, instead of being confined within the narrow bound-
aries of their respective boroughs, they will be enabled to seek
for concurrent views and opinions in the kingdom at large.
Modern facilities and habits of locomotion have gone far "to
remove national and provincial antipathies, and bind together
all the branches of the human family. In the seventeenth
century, the inhabitants of London were, for almost every
practical purpose, farther from Reading than they now are
from Edinburgh, and farther from Edinburgh than they now
are from Vienna." It is probable that many, if not most
of the voters, will add their votes to those of their townsmen
and neighbours, especially when the chief causes of jealousy
and discord are taken away. Contiguity of place produces
a tendency to union. It will always assert its influence.
¹
It is certain to affect more or less the conduct, and control
the ties of social and political life,—but it is not, therefore,
necessary that it should tyrannize over them. The destruc-
tion of a city in China affects us less than a broken limb
happening before our eyes. It is a happy provision that our
sympathies are most excited where they are most useful.
But in the wider relations of national life, it is desirable that
we should be governed less by impulse and more by reason-
less by merely proximate, and more by general and universal
causes. It is better to trust to the qualities of the person,
than to the contiguity of place. Geographical limits, made
the sole basis of political action and association, is not the
development of a power, but the aggravation of a (natural) national
incapacity.
Macaulay, Hist. of England, vol. i., p. 379.
74
1
CHAPTER V.
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
IN forming the representative body, to which, co-ordinately
with the other branches of Parliament, is committed the power.
of government and legislation, it is undeniable that it would
be wise to invite by every suitable inducement, and to gather
together with every possible diligence and care, such minds
as are by constitution, experience, or study, the best fitted to
deal with the subjects which, at this day, come within the
range of political action. The election confers no quality
that the elected did not before possess-none other than
"nature and education, and their habits of life, have made
them. Capacities beyond these the people have not to give.
Virtue and wisdom may be the objects of their choice, but
their choice confers neither the one nor the other on those
upon whom they lay their ordaining hands. They have not
the engagement of nature-they have not the promise of
revelation-for any such powers.
""
Political science is, perhaps, of all studies, the most diffi-
cult, from the boundless variety of its phenomena. The
apparent simplicity of much that is upon the surface leads us
to think that we comprehend it; and the depth and com-
plexity of what is beneath and behind, which eludes our
sight, seem to mock our attempts to penetrate its secrets.
"If there be not a true understanding of what constitutes
social development, there must necessarily be grave mistakes
A
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
75
made in checking these changes and fostering those. If there
be lack of insight respecting the mutual dependence of many
functions, which, taken together, make up the national life,
unforeseen disasters will ensue from not perceiving how an
interference with one will affect the rest. If there be no
knowledge of the natural consensus at any time subsisting in
the social organism, there will, of course, be impossible
attempts to achieve ends which do not consist with its passing
phase of organisation. Clearly, before any effort to regulate
the myriad multiform changes going on throughout society
can be rationally made, there must be an adequate compre-
hension of how these changes are really caused, and in what
way they are related to each other, how this perplexed web of
phenomena hangs together, how it came thus, and what it is
becoming. That is to say, there must be an adequate ac-
quaintance with social science, the science involving all
others,—the science standing above all others in subtlety
and complexity, the science which the highest intelligence
alone can master."¹
It is but too obvious that the traditional method of filling
the House of Commons,-suitable as it was in earlier times,
when a few master minds directed all public affairs, and the
people came together, not to reason, but simply to confirm
what their leaders had done, or proposed to do, is unsuited to
this day. The subjects which now arise, and in which the
public both feel and take the deepest interest, are almost
infinitely various, and require to be approached with great
preparatory knowledge. The growth of populous cities—the
conquests of science in the material world, the activity of
commercial intercourse, the progress of mental develop-
ment,-all tend to create, daily, new questions and new
problems, which it requires more than merely empirical
knowledge to solve. On one side, it is proposed that political
science should be systematically taught, and a measure of
1 Westminster Review, vol. xii., N.s., p. 469.
76
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
1
proficiency distinguished by a diploma. Others turn from
the task in despair, and conclude that the vast range of the
study places it, as a whole, beyond the intellectual grasp of
any single mind, and that it is, therefore, vain to seek for
greater qualities than we find in our daily path." All, how-
ever, will probably agree that the country should collect the
best materials which it possesses in the construction of its
great representative assembly. Instead of this being at-
tempted, the House of Commons, though nominally open to
every subject, is yet surrounded by barriers, practical and
legal, which tend, in their general character, to exclude the
greatest number of those whose aid it would, upon that prin-
ciple, be desirable to invite, and to facilitate the admission of
those whom it would be desirable to exclude.
The obstacles are of a character which may be described as
both practical and legal; practical, inasmuch as the cost and
manner of elections impose difficulties which many, probably
far the largest number, of those who possess the highest
qualifications, are unable to overcome, and conditions to which
they are naturally unwilling to submit; legal, inasmuch as
large numbers of persons are disqualified by the arbitrary
restrictions of positive law.
It is proposed in this chapter, after pointing out the cir-
cumstances in which our present methods of selection differ
from those of former times, and remarking on the necessity
of introducing a governing principle of a better nature, to
treat of the increased facilities which may be provided, for
obtaining in the House of Commons the services of the most
highly qualified persons, and thereby giving effect to such
better principle; and in the next chapter, to suggest the
abolition of the practical and legal obstacles in the way of all
such persons, of whatever class.
The difference, or rather, as it may not incorrectly be
¹ Journal of the Statistical Society, vol. xx.,
p. 121.
2 Blakey, History of Political Literature, vol. i., p. 299. Lond., 1855.
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
77
termed, the contrast between the position of the country,
with reference to the election of members of the House of
Commons at the present time, and that in which it formerly
stood, ought to be considered with much attention.
The natural process in a rude age would be the selection in
every borough of persons in the town or neighbourhood,
known to the burgesses, and willing to undertake a business
which usually involved, of necessity, much expense and in-
convenience. It is found, in fact, to have been very frequently
avoided. As the institution advanced in importance, the
great men of the county or locality became accustomed to
point out to the freeholders and burgesses the persons whom
they should choose, and their recommendations were com-
monly attended to. These leading men were themselves a
part of, or intimately connected with, the higher aristocracy.
They felt a personal responsibility in making the selection,—
a responsibility which increased with the importance of the
office. It was not a responsibility to the people, but to the
party, or perhaps the faction, in the country with which they
were connected or identified. They were answerable for the
judicious exercise of this, as of all other influences which they
possessed. Unwise or unskilful conduct in the business of
his party would then, as now, cost a man more or less of its
respect. Responsibility is not less real, because its sanctions
are conventional. In pointing out to the freeholders or the
burgesses the members whom they were to choose, they were
under an obligation to select men fitted for the purpose,
whatever that purpose might be. It might not then have
been thought a duty to select men who were qualified to
make laws or to act for themselves, or to discuss political
questions. The questions for discussion were few, and such
as they were, the leaders of the party or the faction probably
intended to decide for themselves; but whatever interests,
great or small, they thought it their duty to consider in the
matter of selection, that duty they performed. The great
78
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
rebellion, it has been well observed, did not so much divide
the country in support of any antagonistic and abstract prin-
ciples, as range the contending forces on the side of the great
leaders whose influence prevailed in the different parts of the
kingdom.
The revolution brought a vast addition of earnestness into
the business of choosing representatives. The great parties
in the State began then to assume modern forms. The
struggle for power became more intense, and electioneering
was converted into an art. But throughout the whole of this
period, it must not be forgotten that all elections were
governed by persons acting under a sense of the importance
and responsibility of their work. By importance, it is not
meant that they necessarily felt the serious public interests.
which the task involved. The importance and responsibility
were regarded with a view to party strength and party confi-
dence. Upon the management of these forces appeared to
depend, at one time, the overthrow of a dynasty; at other
times, certainly depended the overthrow of a minister. The
objects of the leaders in any part of the country, in labouring
in either cause, might have been their own profit or aggran-
disement; but in order to succeed in these objects, however
selfish, they were obliged to select the best instruments to
strengthen and concentrate their power. Their own relative
importance in the court and the country might depend on the
success with which they brought up the combatants in the
great field of political warfare. The growing activity of the
press, the general diffusion of information, made it necessary,
in later times, to collect a different class of men. The
necessities of debate called for talent. Those who influenced
the elections, whether for counties or boroughs, gave their
attention more and more to this species of political action.
Whether a borough was owned or governed by a whig or a
tory,-whether bought to support an East Indian or a West
Indian interest, or whatever special or general object its
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
79
patron had in view, in order to succeed in that object he was
compelled to choose the most suitable instrument which could
be had. The result of this competitive pursuit, possibly
more of selfish than of national objects, was yet to produce.
an assembly composed, for the most part, of superior men.
It was the sure operation of those adequate causes, which, to
use the words of Mr. Burke, filled the House of Commons
with much of that which the country possessed," illustrious
in rank, in descent, in hereditary and in acquired opulence, in
cultivated talent, in military, civil, naval, and politic dis-
tinction."
The state of society silently underwent a change. The
system which produced these results had fulfilled its purpose.
It could not be perpetuated, the middle classes which grew
up were not prepared to yield unreasoning obedience to here-
ditary leaders or ancient names. If the few possessed a sacred
and prescriptive right to speak and act for the many, it was a
right not easy of proof, and not to be admitted without proof.
They bore about them no marks indicative of the divine
origin of their claim, and no muniments were found to sup-
port their pretensions. The old chronicles of the people told
that their forefathers, while yet in the German forests, had
used to be consulted by their chiefs,-that the Plantagenets
had summoned their ancestors to the royal councils, and
that the haughtiest of the succeeding monarchs had then
found no security but in laws which the deputies of the people
had confirmed. They demanded that the representation
should be what it professed to be. They were not satisfied
that the government had attained, or was in the road to, per-
fection. They were acute and severe critics of its evils and
anomalies, and were not content with arriving occasionally,
and by indirect courses, at objects which they insisted should
be sought for incessantly and directly. In forming a repre-
sentative assembly they preferred a homely and clumsy reality
to a splendid and not unsuccessful show. Their demands
80
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
were conceded, and the vessel of the state has been borne
safely through a period which has seen the wreck of many
other constitutions.
The picture unfortunately has another side. The powerful
patron, the guiding hand that ruled the election, and sup-
pressed all other influences,-could form no part of a system
in which the representation is to be personal. But with the
indicating mind is gone all sense of responsibility for the
choice which is made. There is no obligation on any voter to
bow to the choice of another. Every man is as well entitled
as another to be the leader; and where every man is equally
entitled to be chief, there can be no usurpation and no rebel-
lion. A community so situated is reduced to a state of
natural society so far as relates to duty or function. They
remain in a state of civil society in all other respects, for the
laws are present to enforce its obligations; but, as to the
right of voting for parliamentary representatives, the principle
is, that every man shall do what is right in his own eyes.
Viewed on this side, the electoral principle is anarchic. In
this diffusion of forces which were heretofore concentrated, it
becomes of paramount importance to purify the sources from
whence they derive their energy.
"Il ne faut pas beaucoup de probité pour qu'un gouverne-
ment monarchique ou un gouvernement despotique se main-
tiennent ou se soutiennent. La force des lois dans l'un, le bras
du prince toujours levé dans l'autre, règlent et contiennent tout.
Mais, dans un État populaire, il faut un ressort de plus, qui est
la VERTU.
66
Les politiques grecs, qui vivoient dans le gouvernement
populaire, ne reconnoissoient d'autre force qui pût le soutenir,
que celle de la vertu. Ceux d'aujourd'hui ne nous parlent
que de manufactures, de commerce, de finances, de richesses,
et de luxe même.
(C
Lorsque cette vertu cesse, l'ambition entre dans les cœurs
qui peuvent la recevoir, et l'avarice entre dans tous. Les
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
81
désirs changent d'objets; ce qu'on aimoit, on ne l'aime plus ;
on étoit libre avec les lois, on veut être libre contre elles;
chaque citoyen est comme un esclave échappé de la maison de
son maître; ce qui étoit maxime, on l'appelle rigueur; ce
qui étoit règle, on l'appelle géne; ce qui étoit attention, on
l'appelle crainte.” 1
It is necessary to examine closely the operation of the
principle of representation under the system now inaugurated,
and if it be possible, to discover in what guidance, wisdom
and safety are to be found. This inquiry involves some
investigation of the state of popular life and manners
amongst us.
2
The natural tendency to association, common to society, has
been the subject of remark in a former page. The places in
which people meet, and their habits and employments, form
the features of social life. At the present time it is im-
possible not to remark the great number of public-houses and
beer-shops. There is no doubt, that these houses of enter-
tainment are places of great resort. It must not be thought
that this is mentioned as a social reproach. It is due to
many causes: much to the uninviting character of the vast
number of dwellings in cities and towns, not of the labourers.
alone, but even of the smaller tradesmen. The mind yearns
for some relief from sights and sounds ever sordid and ever
discordant. Much, also, is due to climate, which permits.
little social intercourse of any prolonged kind, except under
the protection of warmed and covered buildings. An eminent.
statesman, in one of his addresses on national subjects, lately
remarked upon the difference between our modern life and
public life in Greece and Rome, where the people conversed
1 De l'Esprit des Lois, liv. iii., chap. 3.
2 In one borough, Kidderminster, in 1852, of 494 parliamentary voters,
109 were publicans and beer retailers, and the licensed houses of this kind
in the town were 150. Of these establishments it would therefore appear,
that about forty were not of sufficient value to place their occupants on the
register.-Times, April 15, 1857.
G
82
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
in the open air, and under more favoured skies. With us it is
unquestionable, that much of the time which the lower classes
can spare from daily toil and necessary rest is spent in seeking
ease and enjoyment in the houses which are thus provided for
their use. It is there that they meet society of congenial
habits and tastes. Another feature of English life, especially,
is its domestic character. This feature is predominant in the
classes somewhat above the lower, and is more and more
brought out as the depressing conditions of existence are
removed. As a man advances in his pecuniary circumstances,
he gradually becomes less gregarious,—his house assumes an
air of comfort,-furniture of mean appearance is exchanged.
for what is more elegant, his rooms are embellished with
engravings or paintings that bring before his eyes some scene
or tale touching a hidden chord, and awakening thoughts,
deeper and higher than the counter, the workshop, or the desk
has ever prompted; he loves his home, as his home becomes
lovely, his enjoyments, though intensified, are brought more
within the narrow circle of his family and select friends.
The refining process of society thus proceeds, and the coarser
elements are left behind. They are left behind, because their
capacity for better enjoyments has not been cultivated, and
perhaps even the desire for them has in many been chilled
and extinguished by adverse circumstances.
There are also many clubs and associations. Of these are
the numerous benefit clubs-the Odd Fellows, Foresters, and
other societies, embodied under various names and rules, and
having many good purposes. In all these bodies there are
some men who have gained an influence over others, to which
they consciously or unconsciously, more or less, submit. The
multitude thus form innumerable knots, linked and tied by
the countless affinities and tastes which attract men to their
fellows.
In every borough, in every electoral district, in every com-
munity, some men will be found with penetration enough to
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
GO
83
discover the weaknesses, the follies, and the vices of their
neighbours, and who are both skilful and unscrupulous
enough to make them subservient to their own ends. These
men are keen in the discovery of fit companions and tools for
their purposes.
"Noscitur a sociis" is a proverb. They
form connecting links with another class of men which had
grown up before the time of the Reform Bill, and has since
ripened and increased with great fecundity-a class of election
agents. The election agent is in habitual communication
with the cleverest and the most unscrupulous of those who are
either themselves leaders, or know how to tempt or cajole the
most influential members of the various little knots or clubs
which meet in the parlours and tap-rooms of every public-house
in the borough or district. The intercourse between the
agents and the intermediate parties is kept up by many
reciprocal services, by assistance in business, introduction to
offices and employments, under railway companies, in muni-
cipal and parish offices, and in other occupations in life, loans
of small sums of money, and in infinite variety of favours of
greater or less value. By this connection a machinery is
ready at all times to cast a web over a very considerable
number of the voters of the borough or district, including, of
course, a large number of the inhabitants who have no votes.
It is time enough to make a distinction between the two classes
when the net is to be drawn.
We now come to the candidate. A general election is
anticipated, and the aspirants for parliamentary distinction are
brought into communication with the local agents. The
candidate may be the director of a joint-stock bank, having
a large credit given him by his brother directors; he may be
an embarrassed man, seeking, by a desperate effort, to retrieve
his affairs; he may be a roué requiring a change in his
method of dissipation; he may be a second or third-rate
lawyer, hoping that the chances of parliamentary subserviency
may open a road to promotion which the legitimate labours of
84
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
1
his profession are unlikely to afford; or he may be a wealthy
man, moved by "a wish to garnish an acquired fortune with a
little bit of ornamental dignity, or to lay the foundation of a
successful career of tuft hunting." Money, however, finds
its way to the hands of the agents-money which has appa-
rently nothing to do with the expenses of the election, and
does not even come, by any direct or traceable means, from
the candidate. It happens, however, that the parlours and
tap-rooms become wonderfully animated. More refreshments
are consumed; and less is said about the payment. These
convivialities have ostensibly nothing to do with the election.
There is no mention of any such thing; they are all in the
way of good-fellowship, and are matters into which nobody
has any business to inquire. The time comes when the
signal is to be given, and the curtain drawn. The election is
at hand the approach of a first-rate liberal or a conservative
of the purest water has been darkly announced. Perhaps an
address, inviting the distinguished individual to offer himself
for the representation of the electoral district, is got up,
presented, and graciously responded to; but whatever be the
course adopted, when the word is given by the chief agents
to their inferior auxiliaries, a simultaneous concert bursts
forth in praise of the candidate elect, and if the game has
been played with anything like skill and liberality, he has
already made such progress towards success as to render it
very difficult for any adversary to displace him. The various
steps have been taken silently, and apparently without any
plan or contrivance. Nobody knows how the candidate first
came to be thought of. Nobody knows, of course, how the
mantle happened to fall upon him, but the remarkable con-
currence of opinion amongst so many persons, having no
visible connection one with another, is to the simple-minded
electors no small proof of his merits. It is easy to purchase
the needful quantity of laudation and bluster. The hidden
1 Quarterly Review, vol. cii., p. 58.
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
85
source of all this activity is known only to two or three, or at
most a few of the initiated, who convert other men into their
unconscious tools. "The corrupt lead the blind, and the
blind lead one another." The candidate is instructed in
what he should say, and more perfectly still in what he must
not say. The proper insignia of party, whether liberal or
conservative, the popular shibboleth, are settled and made
the most of; and, unless the candidate be encountered by an
adversary with more funds or better tactics, he embarks with
every chance of success. In a general scramble for votes,
with no trusted leader, it is not surprising that the most
cunning and the most impudent should gather the greatest
share.¹
If, it may be asked, any of the electors, especially the
more intelligent, be not satisfied with the candidates who
have presented themselves, why do they not bring forward
others? Why do they suffer themselves to be led or cajoled
by a section or clique? To this question there are many
answers: first, the machinery by which the candidates have
been placed where they are, has been carefully concealed.
The foul play may be (selected) but it is not known, and suspect.
cannot be proved. Secondly, it is well known, that when
the ground is once occupied, all attempts to introduce other
candidates are nearly hopeless, and, if made, are sure to
cover him who makes them with obloquy. He is branded
as a traitor to the cause of his party. He is told that it will
divide the interest, and let in an opponent. It is clear, in
fact, that every additional candidate-every step which would
thus appear to afford a wider field for the choice of the
electors-actually tends to defeat its own purpose, and more
"than
42.
1 "Better the Whartons and Delavals," is indignantly said,
mediocrity and meanness returned by jobbery and machinery." Id., p.
The description given by an American writer of the arts of electioneering
practised under their institutions, and quoted by Mr. Tremenheere (Con-
stitution of the United States, p. 130), shows that they are of an analogous
kind under similar circumstances.
£6
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
and more to extinguish the voices of the electoral body, by
throwing the election into the hands of the few who, by the
absence of all scruples, are held most compactly together.
Thirdly, if he persisted in bringing forward another candi-
date, he would probably be met with the proposals of the
fairest aspect; he would be invited to submit his candidate
to a preliminary ballot, in which not only his more formi-
dable adversary, but some others, should also be submitted for
the choice of the party, and in which the phalanx of his chief
opponents are, by their previous arrangements, assured of an
easy victory. Fourthly, if he still persisted in bringing
another candidate to the poll, the language of invective
would be exhausted to stigmatize the conduct of one who
should thus, instead of submitting to party, think fit to act
for himself. His personal quiet and repose would be de-
stroyed, and the neighbourhood, for a year or two at the
least, would be too hot to hold him. And, fifthly, not only
is the business of leading an opposition at an election one for
which few men have at once time, talent, and disposition;
but no man can bring forward an opposing candidate without
subjecting him to considerable expense; and, before a man
will undertake such charges, there must be more hope of
ultimate success than the possession of senatorial qualities, of
ever so high an order, would in such a case give. It is
obvious, that the practical difficulties in the way of the
escape of individual electors, by any efforts of their own,
from the power of an organised network of corruption, are
insuperable.
There have been, since as well as before 1832, some
boroughs, in which other means of direction and guidance.
have been preserved,'-as there were before that time, as well
¹ See Parliamentary Government, &c., by Earl Grey, p. 19. The
question of adhesion to the landlord is in these boroughs generally not a
question merely of a little more or less rent, but whether the tenant is to
abandon the business in which he has been brought up, and the connection
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
87
as since, counties and boroughs in which elections were scenes
of moral degradation more disgusting than any of the metro-
politan fairs which, within the last few years, have been put
down as intolerable. The political leaders of those days had
prepared the way for a system of corruption, which is now
less open and barefaced, but more extensive, systematic, and
effectual. Poets and painters have given permanence to
the memory of the orgies of former times, which sapped
the foundations of morality, by showing that persons of
the highest station were ready to sacrifice morals to expe-
diency. It was a maxim then, as now, that all is fair in
electioneering,—the result being, that people whose probity
was unquestionable, lost all their strictness on the occasion of
a dissolution. "Men," says Southey, "who at other times
regard it as a duty to speak truth, and think their honour
implicated in their word, scruple not at asserting the grossest
and most impudent falsehoods, if thereby they can obtain a
The system
momentary advantage over the hostile party."
was only a fit accompaniment of the age of drinking, duelling,
cock-fighting, and like brutalising habits. To it was sacri-
ficed as well female delicacy as manly truth and honour.
An idiot laugh was echoed by the crowd, as a high-born
dame, in rank of the noblest, in beauty glorious as a vision,
profaned the heavenly gift, cast aside the modesty of her sex,
and yielded to a filthy caress, to buy a vote.
[ י,
The effect of electoral contests before 1832, which, from
the number of close boroughs, were, of course, much less
numerous, tended to demoralise a portion of the constituency,
and the inhabitants of the places where they occurred; but,
at the same time, they generally ended by placing in the
House the most eminent men of the day. The system since
It is
which he has formed, for some new and untried sphere or avocation.
one of vital importance, and no secrecy would give the voter independence.
They would be held responsible for one another to the patron.
1 Quarterly Review, vol. cii., pp. 43, 46.
$8
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
1832 vastly increases the number of electors who are sub-
jected to moral or mental degradation, or both, and at the
same time, with a few exceptions, fills the representative
assembly with an inferior class of men,-men who have not
been compelled to pass through the tests which, in the
former period, were generally effectual barriers in the way
of those who had nothing to recommend them but the com-
mand of ready money or audacity. Extending the suffrage
under the present system, extends the demoralising influences,
as it increases the necessity for a skilful organisation. The
price of a vote, or the inducement to vote, may become very
small; it may be no more than suffices for a day's debauch;
but the organisation must then be more perfect, as more
complicated management is necessary in the government of
a large manufactory, than in the conduct of a single work-
shop. This may be confidently predicted,-that if our
electoral bodies are to be all concluded by the votes of their
majorities, and if the ballot is to be introduced, whereby the
profit of the managers and club-leaders can be made de-
pendent on their success, all means of punishing or detecting
bribery being abandoned,-wealth and luxury increasing, and
the power and influence of the House of Commons also at the
same time increasing, we have not yet sounded anything.
approaching to that depth of corruption, and consequent
degradation, which we shall surely reach.
The reformers of 1832 cannot be supposed to have been
ignorant of the disposition of the mass of mankind, a dis-
position amounting to a law of nature, to follow where it is
led, whether the way be good or evil. It is the few who will
always conduct the many. "An immense majority of men
must always remain in a middle state, neither very foolish
nor very able, neither very virtuous nor very vicious, but
slumbering on in a peaceful and decent mediocrity, adopting
without much difficulty the current opinions of the day,
making no inquiry, exciting no scandal, causing no wonder,
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
89
?
just holding themselves on a level with their generation, and
noiselessly conforming to the standard of morals and know-
ledge common to the age and country in which they live."1
Left to themselves they will willingly-every one according
to the tendencies created by his moral or physical condition
-adopt as their guide and model him whom they may
happen to regard as the most distinguished or the most
admirable. There is not the shadow of doubt that, other
things being the same, the man of high rank or noble descent
would be chosen by the vast majority; and, probably, the
same grounds of pre-eminence would eclipse in their eyes
many other virtues and qualities which they are less able to
appreciate. This is not necessarily sycophancy. There is
nothing to deprecate in the habit of yielding respect to a
nobility which bears the stamp of the highest authority of
the State in which we live-the recognised fountain of
honour. "It is, indeed, one sign of a liberal and benevo-
lent mind to incline to it with some sort of partial propensity.
He feels no ennobling principle in his own heart who wishes
to level all the artificial institutions which have been adopted
for giving a body to opinion and permanence to fugitive
esteem." Of this result we may at least be certain, that a
leader will appear, and if he be not discovered in the palace,
he will issue from some lower degree of life, and if no better
be found, he will be taken even from the beer-shop. The
reformers of 1832 might not unreasonably have hoped that
in the future public action for the public good, the better
influences would appear and assert their power; but it was
not possible for the Reform Bill to set up other leaders in
the place of those it dethroned. The oligarchical spirit was
expelled from the temple dedicated to the use of a free
people; but no sooner was it cleansed than it became the
habitation of a legion of other spirits, more vile than those
which were cast out. It behoves the Legislature, while
1 Buckle's History of Civilisation, vol. i., p. 162.
90
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
there is yet time, to commence the purification of the temple
which has been thus defiled, lest we realise the other part
of the Gospel parallel, and our last state be worse than our
first.
There is not at present one legal or practical security, that
the so-called representative of any borough or district shall
possess a single quality fitting him for the high trust com-
mitted to his care. He has not been chosen for any special
attainments, for there has been no test or examination; or for
his superiority to others, for there has been no comparison.
Much value has of late been attributed to administrative
talent, and much importance has been attached to the exclu-
sion from offices, in the public service, of persons who have
not proved themselves to possess a certain positive amount of
capacity, and even a superiority to others in comparative
excellence. But in conferring the awful power of legislation,
"which any man may well tremble to give or to receive,"
there is less of actual precaution and scrutiny, and absolutely
none of the tests of competitive excellence, which are required
in the appointment of an exciseman.
To delineate the election, for which the machinery has been.
prepared by the election agents in the manner referred to,
would be an attempt to trespass on the province of the satirist.
It is enough to say, that by reducing, as our system necessarily
does, the literate and the ignorant, the high-minded and the
corrupt, to one dead level, it probably ends in the return, as a
member for a wealthy and populous borough, of some man
whom it is a pure fiction to describe as its representative ; and
if it were to be considered other than as a fiction, it would be,
as to half of the inhabitants, a mockery and an insult. We
find several very considerable classes of electors, who have
little or no will in the matter." "Those who recognise, in
any adequate degree, the importance of honestly exercising
their judgments in the selection of legislators, and who give
conscientious votes, mostly form but a minority; and the
(6
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
91
election usually hangs less upon their wills, than upon the
indirect and illegitimate influences which sway the rest."¹
The fault or the misfortune of an unworthy choice is
primarily due to the absence of responsibility. There is no
single elector on whom the opprobrium falls, and a disgrace
which is shared with an entire electoral district is no disgrace.
at all. The borough, or the district, is not under responsi-
bility to one of the greatest controlling powers on earth,-the
sense of fame and estimation. The share of infamy that is
likely to fall to the lot of each individual in public acts is
small indeed; the operation of opinion being in the inverse
ratio to the number of those who abuse power. Their own
approbation of their own acts has to them the appearance of
a public judgment in their favour. It is the sense of indi-
vidual "fame and estimation," or, in other words, of individual
and personal responsibility, that it is absolutely necessary to
restore; and this individual responsibility cannot be restored
unless the individual electors have, each and every of them,
that power which the old patron or political leader had, of
looking around, and selecting as his representative that man
whom he believes to be the best suited for the office; and this
cannot be if his power of choice be restricted to the two, three,
or four persons who may think proper to present themselves,
and solicit his suffrage.
No society, whether it be domestic, civil, or military, can
prosper, unless all those who compose it have, not only their
appropriate duties, but means and opportunity to perform
them. The business of a nation can be conducted by no
other mystery. It is of so much importance that the prin-
ciple of personal responsibility in the performance of electoral
duties should be realised, that it may be useful to exhibit its
active operation in the other affairs of life, in which men are
compelled to feel a real concern. In questions of property,
the most ingenious endeavours are made to protect a man
1 Westminster Review, vol. xii., p. 461.
92
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
from being affected by the act of his neighbour without his
own consent. For example,-as a town increases in size, a
landed proprietor grants to a builder the lease of a field, on
which he is to erect a number of houses, and keep them in re-
pair for a term of years, and if he omits to repair, he is to be sub-
ject to ejectment. Fifty houses are built, and sold to as many
different people. The owner of No. 50 permits his house to
fall into decay, and the owner of No. 1 finds that he is liable to
lose his house for the default of his neighbour. This happened
a few years ago to the inhabitants of a large part of Somers
Town. It is a state of things which people naturally regard
as intolerable. Lawyers dissuade their clients from purchasing
houses unless they have an independent lease directly from
the landowner. It is one of those cases against which Lord
St. Leonards, in his familiar epistles on the law of property,
has, no doubt, guarded his readers. Yet the owner of the
house No. 1 is not more clearly deprived of his property by
the conduct of the owner of No. 50, than one voter may be
deprived of his power of choosing a representative by a com-
bination of a few other voters. The situation of a shareholder
in a joint-stock bank has been thought one of great hardship
when he finds himself ruined by the directors; and the con-
stant resort to the protection of a limited liability—are all so
many protests in favour of the principle of individual respon-
sibility.
It may be thought a gigantic undertaking to bring home.
personal responsibility to every individual of a million of
electors; but that must be done if every individual of the
million is to have a will and a voice. The other multiform
duties of individuals, of family and social life, notwithstanding
all the infirmities of our nature, which the divine and the moralist
reprove,―are performed with sufficient exactness to preserve
the general tranquillity. Why should this great social duty
be alone out of the pale of morals, and be thought one which
anybody may trifle with, disregard, or violate? The same
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
93
sense of duty which assists and accompanies the performance
of the other acts of life must be attached to the act of voting.
The indispensable conditions are-to render the duty of every
man as perceptible to his understanding as it can be made,
and to remove every obstacle in the way of its performance.
The opening to every elector of the power of performing his
electoral duty is the first and prime necessity, in order to re-
establish the sense of personal responsibility, or the empire of
conscience, in electoral action. No man will feel a conscien-
tious obligation to undertake a duty which he believes to be
beyond his resources to accomplish. Conscience, as a motive
of action, is too dull rather than too sensitive. It is not the
habit of mankind to strain all their resources in order to bring
their conduct within the dominion of conscience. It is well
if they can be led to act in obedience to conscience, when the
means are ready and the dictate clear. Lamentable will be
the error of those legislators-unhappy the condition of that
people—who think, and form their constitutional laws on the
belief, that government by representative institutions can be
safe or permanent without the aid of conscience. It may be
more or less enlightened; but be it clear or dim, it must be
the guide; and that it may have its full force, it should be
brought home to the knowledge and conviction of every elector
that his vote is entirely within his own control; that he has
the power of giving it in favour of the man he deems the
worthiest of his age, and that when given it cannot be with-
out effect. The judgment of the whole electoral body of the
kingdom must be made up of the aggregate of the judgment
of every individual, and the conscience of the whole electoral
college must be the contribution of the separate consciences
every individual. There is not a person in Lambeth, from
the archbishop to the poorest labourer, who is not answerable
for his own acts, according to the measure of the ability which
God giveth. To the prophetic declaration, that every man
shall suffer for his own sin, both faith and reason are alike
of
94
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
submissive. In physical evils there may be a community of
suffering-but moral responsibility is only individual.¹ The
parish of Lambeth or the borough of Lambeth has no moral
responsibility. A soul is not a corporate thing. There is no
corporate conscience.
In order, then, to give to individuality that free agency
which is the mother of responsibility, every voter must have
1
66
En effet, plus l'individualité est développée chez quelqu'un, plus le
sentiment de sa responsabilité a grandi, et à ce développement dans le
sentiment de sa responsabilité, correspond un développement parallèle de sa
conscience. Atténuez, effacez l'individu; absorbez-le dans la masse; il
obeira de plus en plus à des instincts, à des impulsions, et se rapprochera de
plus en plus de la machine. Chargez-vous de ses affaires, il deviendra de
moins en moins apte à s'en occuper."-Le Christianisme et l'Esprit
Moderne, par Arbouisse Bastide, p. 158. "A man," observes Mr. Maurice,
will not really be intelligible to you if, instead of listening to him, and
sympathizing with him, you determine to classify him."
66
"L'intelligence de chacun peut fleurir, tandis que son individualité se
dessèche et meurt. Ni la pensée dans tout son essor, ni les passions dans tout
lour excès, ne la développent ui ne la manifestent. Avec tout cela, on peut
n'avoir aucun caractère à soi. L'âme ne reçoit son nom propre, sa per-
sonnalité vraie, que de la conscience, confident trop négligé, autorité trop
méconnue, mais qu'il faut toujours écouter quand on ne veut pas livrer son
moi à des influences fortuites et étrangères, quand on veut vivre de sa propre
vie, quand on veut être soi-même."-L'Education, la Famille et la Société,
par A. Vinet, p. 402.
66
L'état de notre époque se caractérise par deux traits en apparence
contradictoires: le relâchement de l'unité sociale par la prédominance
toujours plus avouée de l'égoïsme, et la pente toujours plus forte des
consciences à s'abdiquer pour se livrer au torrent de ce qu'on appelle
l'opinion publique ou l'esprit du siècle. Ainsi, les progrès de l'individualisme
d'une part, de l'autre l'extinction graduelle de l'individualité, voilà, par
l'action d'une même cause, le double abîme, ou plutôt les deux abîmes
creusés l'un dans l'autre, où nous sommes précipités. Qui nous retiendra
sur ce rapide penchant ? Si quelqu'un le sait, qu'il le dise."-Id., 408. See
also, on this subject, the article on "Civilization," Mill's Dissertations and
Discussions, vol. i., pp. 161—205, a paper which was first published in 1833.
These are warnings and protests, from different schools of thinkers, against
the increasing prevalence and operation of a general and uniform opinion
and sentiment derived from a common authority or source, and gradually
enveloping individual thought and action in its powerful and inextricable
folds.
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
95
the most enlarged field of choice, and the most unfettered
means of exercising it.
A method of effecting these objects has been partly stated,
and remains to be further explained. The first condition
obviously is, that every elector, when he is called upon to
exercise his franchise, should be perfectly informed of the
extent of the choice before him. When it becomes his duty
to select a representative, he must be told who are willing to
accept the trust, that, amongst them, he may choose the man
whom he shall deem the fittest to be entrusted. No proposi-
tion can be more simple or undeniable than that, properly
to exercise a discretion, it is necessary to know what discre-
tion one has to exercise. The names of all
The names of all persons who may
offer themselves for the political service of their country may
be collected under a law, of which the following is an out-
line:
VII. Upon or at any time after a dissolution of Parliament, until the
time appointed for polling at the ensuing election, every person offering
himself as representative in Parliament at such election, shall signify the
same, in writing, to one of the said Registrars, viz.—if he be a candidate for
the representation of any constituency or constituencies in England, to the
Registrar in London; and if he be a candidate for the representation of any
constituency or constituencies in Scotland, to the Registrar in Edinburgh;
and if he be a candidate for the representation of any constituency or con-
stituencies in Ireland, to the Registrar in Dublin; and every candidate
shall, in such writing or declaration, state for what constituency or con-
stituencies he offers himself as a candidate; and shall also state whether he
holds any, and if any, what office, either under the Crown or in the public
service; and he shall also, on the delivery of such declaration, pay to the
Registrar the sum of [£50]; and the said candidate shall not, by declaring
himself a candidate as aforesaid, become therefore liable to bear or pay any
further expenses, either general or local, incidental to the election.
The names of all those who may offer themselves for the
political service of their country having been thus collected-
without, in any measure, interfering with the individual and
special efforts which any man may think proper to adopt, for
the purpose of communicating with the particular boroughs
96
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
or constituencies to which he presents himself,-the next step
is to bring the names of all the candidates in one view before
the electors. It is thus that the nation, in the greatest of all
national actions, will adopt means analogous to those which
have powerfully contributed to the progress of education, of
art, and of science, by concentrating their productions, and
submitting them all to the test of the widest comparison.
be
The promulgation of the names of the candidates may
regulated by the two following clauses; in which, as in pre-
scribing all the other functions of the Registrars, their duties
may be so clearly defined, that nothing be left to their discre-
tion. Every step would be governed by the rigid impartiality
of anterior and positive law.
VIII. The Registrars for England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively,
shall, on every week-day, commencing the first day after a dissolution of
Parliament, on which any candidate delivers such declaration, and makes
such payment as aforesaid, and continuing until the day appointed for the
general election,-prepare a list of the names of all who shall have declared
themselves candidates to represent any constituency or constituencies in
Parliament, and shall have made the said payment, stating in such list the
respective constituencies for which they are respectively candidates; and
the Registrar in London shall cause such list as aforesaid of the candidates
for English constituencies to be published in the London Gazette, or a
supplement thereto; and the Registrar in Edinburgh shall cause such list
of candidates for Scotch constituencies to be published in the Edinburgh
Gazette, or a supplement thereto; and the Registrar in Dublin shall cause
such list of candidates for Irish constituencies to be published in the Dublin
Gazette, or a supplement thereto; and the said Registrars respectively shall
transmit copies of the said lists daily to the returning officers of the said
constituencies respectively, who shall cause copies thereof to be printed and
published, for the use of the electors of their respective constituencies, and
sold at a price not exceeding one penny for every complete list.
IX. The names of all the said candidates shall be inserted in the said
gazetted list in the following order: viz., as to all persons who have there-
tofore had seats in Parliament, in the order of the respective length of the
periods for which they have been members thereof, beginning with the
candidate who shall have sat the longest, and ending with the candidate
who shall have sat the shortest, period of time in Parliament; and as to
new candidates, according to their age, as the same shall be stated in the
declaration delivered to the Registrars as aforesaid, beginning with the
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
97
oldest, and ending with the youngest, of such new candidates; and where
any such length of time, or age, shall be the same as to two or more candi-
dates, or shall be doubtful or not stated, then, according to an alphabetical
arrangement of the surnames of such candidates as to whom such particulars
shall be so equal or doubtful or not declared, and which alphabetical
arrangement of names as to new candidates shall be placed after the other
names in the said lists.
The working of these laws will be brought more distinctly
into view by placing before the eye part of a supposed London
Gazette, containing the names of the candidates for English
constituencies. It might appear thus:-
GENERAL REGISTRAR'S OFFICE FOR ENGLAND.
day of
1859.
The persons whose names are set forth in the Schedule hereto, have
declared themselves respectively to be candidates for the representation of
the constituencies respectively set opposite to their said names, in the next
Parliament, being the
Parliament of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, and have complied with the regulations required
by the Act
(Signed)
Registrar.
THE SCHEDULE ABOVE REFERRED TO.
Sir Charles Merrik Burrell, Bart
George Granville Vernon Harcourt, Esq.
Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B., K.G.
Hon. Henry Cecil Lowther
Sir John Owen, Bart.
Right Hon. Lord John Russell
Right Hon. Edward Ellice
Right Hon. Sir James Robert George Graham, Bart..
William Miles, Esq.
Shoreham.
Oxfordshire.
Tiverton.
Westmoreland.
Pembroke.
London.
Coventry.
Carlisle.
East Somerset.
[The Schedule will then proceed in the order specified in Clause IX., with
the names of all the candidates who have been previously members of the
House, in their order,—and then with the names of the new candidates, also
in the order pointed out in the same law.]
H
98
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Nothing that has been said of the utter insufficiency of our
traditional system of election for the new circumstances of
society in which we are placed, must be understood as being
said in forgetfulness of the illustrious names which the House
of Commons still enrols amongst its members. To deny
that tribute to it would be not less absurd than presumptuous.
No age is, perhaps, wholly without its distinguished men;
and no one can doubt that this age has its share unless he
obstinately closes his eyes against all evidence. Eminence is
far more difficult to attain than in any former age,—but that
eminence is still attainable we have brilliant examples. It is
no slight testimony to the truth of the principle-that when
the disturbing causes are removed the fittest representatives
will be commonly chosen,-that, amidst all the existing diffi-
culties, some men of the highest order yet find their way to
Parliament, and command the attention and respect of con-
stituencies, fitful though that regard and respect may be.
It must not be forgotten, that there is scarcely a man, how-
ever distinguished, whose exclusion from Parliament has not
been at some time attempted; scarcely a man whose ad-
mission, notwithstanding a life-long public service, has not,
at some time or other, been doubtful. Neither must it be
forgotten-especially upon observing the distinguished names
which would appear at the head of a table, prepared accord-
ing to the scheme that has been suggested-how much the
existing representative assembly owes to the traditional system
which prevailed in times anterior to the Reform Bill, and
which is now either departing, or no more.
1
99

GUNCRAL Lidhe,
University
WOHIONS
CHAPTER VI.
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH THE NUMBER OF
CANDIDATES.
In forming an assembly, consisting of nearly seven hundred
of those persons in whom the people "may discern that pre-
dominant proportion of active virtue and wisdom, taken
together and fitted to the charge, such as in the great and
inevitable mixed mass of human imperfections and infirmities
is to be found," every element of society requires to be laid
under contribution. The State cannot afford to reject the
services of any class, especially of any highly instructed
class, amongst its sons. Observers of the progress of society
have remarked that the more general expansion of literature
and diffusion of knowledge, invaluable as they are, do not
enlarge the proportionate number of men of great eminence;
and that, in the production of such men, nature vindicates
her exclusive prerogative. Civilisation multiplies in a vast
degree those who read and deliberate, whilst it does not pro-
duce any greater number of leading minds. It should be a
fundamental principle that all possible facilities should be
given to persons of every class to offer themselves as candi-
dates for the representation of any portion of their fellow-
subjects. This principle is the only just foundation of the
resolution of the House of Commons, which, on the 3rd of
May, 1783, expunged from the journals all the declarations,
orders, and resolutions relating to the election of Mr. Wilkes,
World
100
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
and declared the previous resolution of the 17th of February,
1769, that had "affirmed his incapacity to sit in that Parlia-
ment, subversive of the rights of the whole body of the
electors of the kingdom." The expurgatory resolution has
been supported on the technical ground of the omission, in
the resolution of 1769, of the imputed criminality which was
the cause of the expulsion; but it does not rest on so narrow
a basis. Every law which prevents the electors of the king-
dom from choosing any man whom they may consider the
most fit to represent them, is in effect the adoption of a prin-
ciple antagonistic to and subversive of their rights. It may
possibly be justified by expediency; but the cases in which
that justification can be established are very rare, and would
almost entirely disappear under such a system of representa-
tion as is here contemplated, in which every member would
be chosen by a quotient or nearly a quotient of the electoral
body, all the electors having, at the same time, a field of
choice bounded only by the intellect, the activity, or the
political ambition of the age in which they live.
The impediments in the way of candidates, and which, to
an incalculable extent, diminish the number from amongst
whom representatives must be chosen, may be classed under
three principal heads: First, pecuniary, or obstacles inter-
posed by the expenses, which are either lawful and inevitable,
or otherwise generally regarded as necessary to success;
secondly, those occasioned by the peculiarities and difficulties.
of the manner of communication between the candidate and
the electors; and thirdly, the grounds of exclusion created
by positive law.
In this kingdom a large number of persons qualified for
political life by their studies and habits of thought, possess
but small or very moderate fortunes. Of these many would.
be found who would not only willingly, but eagerly, devote
themselves to parliamentary and legislative labours, without
1 Blackstone's Com., vol. i., book i., c. 2, p. 163; Christian's Ed., (n. 16.)
MYOU
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
101
remuneration or reward. No country in the world is more
rich in the classes willing to bestow their time and attention
on public business. It is one of the wholesome fruits of our
civil institutions, which, from parliament to the magistracy,
and the jury, have called upon every order of the people to
perform their several parts and duties in the business of the
State. It is a remarkable proof of the extent to which we
must have departed from those natural habits that adapt,
with such wonderful accuracy, the means to the end, when
not only is there small sign of any endeavour to call into
activity all the latent energy and talent in the country, but
rejecting and throwing aside, with a careless indifference, the
materials which are ready to our hands, there are classes
amongst us which seek to convert political labours into a
trade, and seriously propose the payment of members of
parliament by stipends from the State. Whether cases may
not arise, of the possession or supposed possession of special
qualifications by individuals who are personally in circum-
stances which incapacitate them from devoting their time to
such public labours without some remuneration, and whether
in such cases the constituency which they serve may not
with propriety contribute to their support, is a different
question. Such a payment would be scarcely distinguishable
from those cases in which the public have paid the debts, or
provided for the permanent maintenance, of the families of
distinguished public servants. Wholly different in principle
and effect, would be any system calculated to make all par-
liamentary duties venal. There is great reason to apprehend
that it would deteriorate the character of the representative
body, as well as diminish the respect with which it is viewed
by the public.2
1 In an able article in the Westminster Review, on "Party Government,"
the writer does not appear to go farther than such a case as that above
supposed, vol. xiii., N.S., p. 427. See also Parl. Deb., vol. cxlix., p. 1034.
2 On this point, see Mill, Considerations on Representative Government,
102
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
The performance of parliamentary duties is proved not to
be inconsistent with the contemporaneous prosecution of the
most laborious avocations. A vigorous performance of the
general business of life imparts earnestness to every occupa-
tion, and it is as belonging to that business that parliamentary
duties are best executed. The constant meddling of a body
of men, paid for making laws, and acting under the notion.
that they are bound to do something for their salaries, would
in this country be intolerable; not to speak of the far more.
serious evil, in the diminution of that respect with which the
House of Commons is now regarded. That professional
labours of the most unremitting kind may be prosecuted
without neglecting the duties of Parliament, is shown by the
example of lawyers in extensive practice, and is proved by the
amount of work-legislative, judicial, and of other kinds-
which men like Lord Eldon, and others, before and since his
time, have been able to accomplish. Few men would be
found, whose services are of any value to the State, who
would not be able to afford them without abandoning their
other business and occupations.
If, on the other hand, the nation be served by its repre-
sentatives without pecuniary reward, it should not require
from them any pecuniary sacrifices which a prudent or an
honest, and, it may be added, a comparatively poor man, ist
not in a condition to make. The representative house is the
House of the Commons. The Commons are composed of all
classes, rich and poor. The doors should be opened, to the
extreme width of their portals, to admit the best and worthiest;
and every impediment which clogs and obstructs their entry,
is a mischief which ought to be swept away.
c. 10, p. 217, 2nd ed. The rejection of the Bill which proposed the payment
of salaries to certain peers, for the performance of their judicial duties in the
House of Lords, was regarded with much (and not unreasonable) satisfac-
tion by many, on similar grounds.
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
103
It is greatly to be feared that an opinion, or belief, exists,
and is widely spread amongst the higher and influential
classes, that by rendering parliamentary elections expensive,
they confine the choice of the electors to persons of wealth;
and that, in this restriction, there is some chance of security,
which would not otherwise be obtained. The ready assent to
the clause for legalising the payment of travelling expenses
to county voters, was, there is no doubt, due to this feeling.
It was not adopted from any regard for the voters: the kind-
ness was intended to be shown to the wealthy candidate, for
whom, in such cases, they would necessarily vote, rather than
for him who should be indisposed to expend some thousands
of pounds, and possibly embarrass himself and his family in
the contest.¹ It is impossible to give credit to an affectation
of regard to the hard case of a county voter living at a dis-
tance, and unable to pay the expense of coming to the poll,
when it proceeds from the mouths of those who have not yet
discovered the hardship of excluding the resident inhabitant,
for whom Mr. Locke King has for several years vainly been
seeking the franchise. If the aristocratical elements in the
different political parties be actuated by a feeling such as this,
they are under the influence of an error, than which none
will be more fatal to their chief objects. Even if they suc-
ceeded in excluding all but the wealthy, the result would be
only to raise up against themselves the most dangerous of all
rivals. It is the wealthy demagogue, who, by availing him-
self of all the aids which money can give to indulge the follies
or the vices of the electors, will command success. The
making of political power, the monopoly or the spoil of the
1 So long as the candidate himself, and the customs of the world seem to
regard the function of a member of Parliament less as a duty to be dis-
charged than as a personal favour to be selected, no effort will avail to
implant in an ordinary voter the feeling that the election is also a matter of
duty, and that he is not at liberty to bestow his vote on any other considera-
tion than that of personal fitness."-Mill, Considerations on Representative
Government, c. 10.
104
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
rich, under such a system as ours, will afford no security to
the possessors either of wealth or of hereditary rank. By
the infinitely various channels of acquiring wealth, the latter
are exposed to an incessant irruption of fresh enemies, ready
to avenge "the outrages of a rival pride, and exalt their
wealth to what they consider its natural rank and estimation."
Even if they were only opposed by fortunes of less recent
acquisition, a political philosopher has told them, that "there
are always, in that description, men whose fortunes, when
their minds are once vitiated by passion or by evil principle,
are by no means a security against their taking their part
against the public tranquillity. We see to what low and
despicable passions of all kinds many men in that class are
ready to sacrifice the patrimonial estates, which might be
perpetuated in their families with splendour, and with the
fame of hereditary benefactors to mankind, from generation
to generation. Do we not see how lightly people treat their
fortunes when under the influence of the passion of gaming?
The game of ambition or resentment will be played, by many
of the rich and great, as desperately, and with as much blind-
ness to the consequences, as any other game.
Nor can
rank alone be relied upon as a protection. "Turbulent dis-
contented men of quality, in proportion as they are puffed up
with personal pride and arrogance, generally despise their
own order. One of the first symptoms they discover of a
foolish and mischievous ambition is a profligate disregard of a
dignity which they partake with others." "Confounded by
the complication of distempered passions, their reason is dis-
turbed, their views become vast and perplexed; to others in-
explicable, to themselves uncertain. They find on all sides
bounds to their unprincipled ambition in any fixed order of
things. But in the fog and haze of confusion all is enlarged,
and appears without any limit. When men of rank sacrifice
all ideas of dignity to ambition without a distinct object, and
¹ Appeal, &c., p. 134.
,1
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
105
1
work with low instruments and for low ends, the whole com-
position becomes low and base." Experience teaches that
none of these factitious aids can supply the want or fill the
place of wisdom or integrity, and that these qualities are as
likely to be found under circumstances fitted to call them
forth in one rank or condition as in another. The true
interests of all classes, the highest as well as the lowest, would
be best consulted by opening the avenues to the House of
Commons, and collecting within it the best that the nation
possesses of ability and character. This may be prevented,
but will never be assisted, by adding conditions which insure
neither the one nor the other. The prudent man, indisposed
to risk his patrimony on a game of chance, too conscientious
not to respect the claims of family, and the regard which he
owes to those who are dependent upon him,-is entitled to
greater confidence than one who is reckless of his own fortune,
or is trafficking with that of others; yet by rendering political
competition a source always of indefinite, and often of ruinous,
expense, the latter is admitted, and the former excluded.
2
The charges, which it is absolutely necessary that a candi-
date should incur, ought not to exceed a sum sufficient to
prevent any trifling or idle experiment, whereby the lists of
candidates might be encumbered with the names of persons
who can have no rational expectations of being usefully placed
in nomination. For this it is proposed to provide, by re-
quiring a preliminary payment to the Registrar, which shall
exonerate the candidate from all liability in respect of any
further expenses, except such as he may voluntarily incur.
Such voluntary expenses will of course, as now, vary according
to the peculiar circumstances of every candidate. They will
probably be in the inverse ratio of his political eminence and
distinction. Men of high character and reputation, and those
whose political conduct and discretion have been tested and
1 Reflections, &c., p. 70.
2 Clause VII., p. 95, ante. The sum there suggested is £50.
106
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
proved by experience, would stand in need of no more than
that announcement of their names which the Gazetted list
would publish. A man of less distinction might require
something more; possibly the charges of some public meet-
ings, and of advertisements or printed addresses, declaring
his general views on political questions. This, perhaps,
would be less necessary, if the candidate were a person of
any mark in literature or science, and had in his previous
career become known to the public. Those who would pro-
bably be compelled to spend most, would be the persons who
have the least to recommend them besides their money.
The following clause would relieve the candidates from all
necessary expenses, except the payment which it is proposed
shall be made to the Registrars :-
X. All expenses of the erection or hire of hustings, booths, or polling-
places, and the wages of clerks and officers, and the travelling expenses of
the clerk in conveying the voting papers, where the same shall be necessary,
to the office of the Registrar, so far as respects all existing constituencies,
shall be borne by the several constituencies respectively, and shall be paid
out of the county, borough, or parochial rates, or other funds, upon which
the registration expenses have heretofore been or shall hereafter lawfully be
charged; and as to all constituencies which shall hereafter be constituted,
all such expenses shall be borne and paid in such manner as shall be
directed by the order of Her Majesty in Council, constituting the same; and
the sect. 71 of the stat. 2 Will. 4, c. 45; sect. 40 of the stat. 2 Will. 4, c. 65;
and sect. 88 of the stat. 2 Will. 4, c. 88, are repealed.
It has been well said that the remedy for bribery, under
whatever form of temptation, is to be found, not in penal
laws, but in taking from one side the disposition to give, and
from the other the willingness to receive bribes. It must be
sought for in a consideration of the motives which ordinarily
and
govern the conduct of mankind. The causes of bribery,
especially those causes to which most of its virulence and
nearly all its public evils are owing, are not difficult to dis-
cover; and once discovered, it will be found that they are not
difficult to remove, so far as they stand in the way of the
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
107
candidature and success of the men whose access to the House
it is most desirable to promote; and so far also as it affects the
electoral power and influence of those voters who desire to act
honestly. They proceed from the same vice in the electoral
system which deprives it of the salutary influences of honour
and conscience. They are mainly caused by the bond which
the law creates, and by which every constituency is insepa-
rably connected together. The success of the candidate is
forced to depend, not upon the votes of a competent and
adequate number of his fellow-countrymen, but upon the
votes of the electors who are placed within a small geogra-
phical limit. What is the necessary consequence? It is,
that a certain number of votes, within that limit and no
other, are made absolutely indispensable. The electors of
the district or borough are first nominally or really divided
into two parties, by the process of crushing all the minor
differences and distinctions of thought and opinion. The
hopes of each candidate depend upon the triumph of the party
to which he belongs. They may, probably, from their con-
nexions or reputation, reckon upon many votes being freely
given to them. We will suppose the voters to be in number
2000, and of these, the class which has had no voice in
bringing either candidate to the borough, having no sympathy
with either, and, therefore wholly indifferent, and taking no
part in the election to be 400. One candidate may, from the
result of his canvass, expect 600, and another about 500 of
the votes which are given spontaneously. There remain the
residuum of 500, to be worked upon by appealing to their
cupidity, their hopes, or their fears. Are not the causes of
bribery, of intimidation, and of every other evil influence,
plainly developed? We have given to the votes of a com-
paratively few of the electoral body, and these the very
worst and the very poorest,-the worst who are not always
the poorest, and the poorest who are far from being the worst,
-a highly artificial value. It is a value to which no market
108
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
price can be assigned. It is not measured by the general
value of a vote; it is the special and inestimable value of
those particular votes,-votes for which no others can be
substituted, for the want of which the support of all the
wisdom of a senate cannot compensate. It is the pretium
affectionis. Like the uncertain and fabulous value of a
matchless painting, or work of art; or like the passion of
love, which fills the mind and renders the creature of its regard
the sole object in the world worthy of desire,-the voices of
the small number of electors, on whose support the candi-
dates may rely for their success, become more and more
priceless, as the event becomes more and more critical and
capricious. If the system-which is the result of accident-
had been framed for the very purpose of giving full scope
and encouragement to corruption, to provide opportunities
for tempting and gratifying the needy and the base, it is
scarcely possible to imagine that it could more effectually
have completed the design. It is in the highest degree un-
just towards the poorer electors to expose them to such influ-
ences as these. It cannot be expected that a small tradesman
or artificer, labouring with difficulty to procure a subsistence
for himself and his family, can reject a gift which is, perhaps,
equal to his honest gains for a month. He sees no example
of that self-abnegation on the part of men around him, much
more wealthy than himself. It is not in the nature of things
that he should rise above the temptations to which his neigh-
bours generally succumb.
If the vote of every elector throughout the kingdom had,
at all times, the same weight and the same value as a free
electoral system would give to it, all these overpowering
temptations would necessarily cease. No arbitrary or arti-
ficial importance would attach to the vote of any particular
man; and any elector who would put a price upon his vote
must deliberately seek a market in which he can dispose of it.
The number of the bribed would be reduced to the compara-
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
109
tively few in whom the disposition to be corrupt is owing
if not to an innate depravity, at least to an indifference to, or
a want of, conception of the public good, accompanied by a
disregard of their own character in the estimation of their
neighbours.
It is not to be supposed that corrupt motives and objects
will be wholly extinguished in the political conduct of any
class of men by any system of things. So long as a seat in
the representative assembly of this country shall be one of the
highest distinctions which the people can confer-and long
may that continue to be so-there will be found men ready
to make great pecuniary sacrifices to reach it. In every
county or town, no doubt some men will be found ready to
sell their votes; and no commodity is so vile that it has not
factors and dealers engaged in the traffic. If a wealthy and
obscure candidate has to collect two thousand votes by this
means, he is not likely to pay any considerable sum for each
vote; and the members who thus obtain their seats, whether
they owe their wealth to success in trade or speculation, or to
inheritance, will probably have had advantages of experience.
or of leisure which will render them not inferior in sagacity
to the average of those who now fill the House, and they are
not likely to act less on their independent judgment. A
member elected by these means, if he be actuated by a gene-
rous ambition, may still show by his public conduct that
he is not unworthy of the position he has gained, and may
at a future election deserve and obtain the support of in-
dependent men. In the mean time, in representing those
alone who have voted for him, he neither prevents nor in-
terferes with the representation of any earnest or virtuous
elector; and the evil of bribery has been thus reduced to
its minimum.¹
1 If we suppose 100 members to find their way into the House, at every
general election, at the aggregate cost of half a million, and the other 558 to
be elected by the spontaneous support of their constituents, undisturbed
110
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
The operation of the same system which would go so far
to extinguish bribery, would also go equally far to put an end
to every kind of intimidation, and other unjust and improper
influences. The entire disease derives the whole of its ma-
lignity from the same cause-the fact that certain particular
votes, and these votes only, are made indispensable, and are,
therefore to be obtained per fas et nefas.
To the same cause
all the sacrifices of truth, of justice, of honour, and of decency,
are due. Nothing is so sacred that it may not be trampled
upon in a struggle which waxes more intense as it draws
towards its end. The candidates become like gamblers,
spurred on by the recollection of what they have already
lost, and ready to peril all that they still possess upon the
last stake. Such struggles serve but as excitements to mor-
bid satiety. A Duke of Norfolk is reported to have said,
that to stand a contested election for Yorkshire and win it by
one, was the greatest enjoyment in life; a sentiment, which,
we are told, is " thoroughly English, and to be relished only
by freemen!" With all admiration for those manly enjoy-
ments which are a feature of English life, it may be permitted
to an Englishman to say, that there are some things too
serious to be made a game. Those who have degraded the
tone of political morals, treated the most solemn duty of
social life as a sport, and delighted in the satire of represent-
ation exhibited by the spectacle of the political extinction of
2
by the votes which have been bought, the public evil would be com-
paratively insignificant. The persons who have accepted payment for their
votes will probably, in view of the national interests, have exercised their
powers by voting for members as competent as they would be likely under
any circumstances to have chosen. The main current of political life has at
the same time been purified. In every constituency the corrupt element has
been drawn off, and the better electors are no longer injured or deprived of
their just influence by the conduct of the worse. In the words of a social
philosopher, it is then "only the worst people who fall into the worst
ways."
2 Quarterly Review, vol. cii., p. 32.
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
111
twenty thousand voices, have certainly done their part in
teaching the people to abuse their political powers and
despise minorities. Be sure that the sins of a nation, and
of a class, will find them out.
Great as would be the national gain, from the extinction of
the corrupt and illegitimate influences which now preside at
elections, the benefit of the proposed system would be infinitely
more extensive, in bringing into action all the better and more
generous motives. It would not only depose vice, but it
would set up virtue in its place. The support which is
rendered to a candidate, by the admirers of his character and
political principles, instead of being as it now is, from its
absolute necessity, regarded as a favour of inestimable personal
value, which the candidate is scarcely ever considered suffici-
ently to repay,—will become a voluntary and disinterested
service. The electors will know that their support is not
necessarily indispensable, and that the candidate may be
returned by the votes of other constituencies; and this know-
ledge at once reduces the artificial and conventional value of
that support to its just dimensions. The candidate and the
electors are, by the present system, placed in a false position.
Many of the electors are made to be mercenary in their conduct,
by the very fact that their individual aid is of the greatest
moment, whilst, if that were not so, they would voluntarily
render to the candidate the same, or more hearty, assistance,
from their attachment to his sentiments and opinions. The
judges who sit in our Courts of Equity, and have occasion
rigidly to scrutinise the motives and conduct of men, frequently
meet with examples of the difficulty of blending together two
motives, one generous and the other venal. The lower impulse
is invariably destructive of the higher. Respect, admiration,
and attachment, are unbought homage. The zeal and in-
dustry which, if it had not been diverted from its natural
course, would have been freely devoted to uphold some public
principle, is, owing to the price attached to it, perverted to
112
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
private and selfish objects. If any man doubted the conse-
quences of grafting upon a holy impulse a venal motive, he
might try in his family the experiment of repaying the offices
of affection by pecuniary reward, and learn how the tribute of
filial duty may be converted into a mercenary service. You
cannot serve God and Mammon.
The manner in which candidates are often required, espe-
cially at the first, to enter into a communication with their
constituents, a manner which is not likely to be altered for the
best under any of the changes which are popularly urged,-
forms the second of the practical class of obstacles. Enough
has been already said on the nature of the preliminary intro-
duction, which too commonly takes place, and is becoming
general. Supposing that stage to be passed, the process of
canvassing forms an insurmountable difficulty to many men.
It is not, necessarily, from any fastidious taste that this objec-
tion is felt; though, even if that were so, it is not wise by
making such a method of introduction commonly necessary,
to exclude the services of one who might, nevertheless, prove
qualified to be a public benefactor. A man of a well-consti-
tuted mind shrinks from affecting what he does not feel,-
from concealing any particular opinion that might be un-
popular, from pretending to assign undue weight to matters
which he knows to be trivial,-from, in fact, inaugurating his
entrance into public life, by acting a part which is not his own.
He is under the necessity of resorting to underhand and dis-
ingenuous contrivances,-to humiliating solicitations and mean
compliances. It is impossible to read the narratives of the
skill and success of men accomplished in the art of can-
vassing, without feeling that the affectation of friendship,
cordiality, and regard,-which are set to work on the sim-
plicity and credulity of the voter, to cajole and surprise him
of his vote, has a family resemblance to the tricks which,
when employed by humbler performers for the purpose of
depriving a servant-maid of her earnings, or a countryman of
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
113
his purse, are considered to be fitly rewarded by a sojourn in
the oakum-yard or on the treadmill.
All these petty degradations are but the interludes of the
play which the candidate is required to go through. He is
to utter whatever may be the shibboleth of the hour. Instead
of a candid examination of public affairs, he must deal with
every subject in such a manner as to suit the prepossessions
of his hearers. Rare are the cases, and eminent must be the
man, who dares to appear as he is, and speak as he thinks on
public questions, before those whom he addresses, and hopes
to enlist in his support. Perhaps scarcely any young politi-
cian, at the entrance of his career, could venture upon such
candour ;-supposing, of course, a time in which nomination
boroughs do not exist. He must be initiated into political life
by a discipline in deception. He must often, to please some
men, approve of—or, at least, countenance-bigotry; and if
he does not positively encourage, he is obliged to wink at, cor-
ruption, intemperance, and deceit; or shut his eyes to what
he knows is taking place. In addition to this, he may be
driven to competition in promises which he is aware cannot
be performed. The whole process is demoralising, and tends
to exclude some of the best men, and the most scrupulous and
trustworthy order of minds. "Happy is he who holds
that, for a public man, the first condition of capacity to serve
his country is an unsullied conscience, and who, when he seest
national advantages seemingly contingent upon his own moral
contamination, trusts that God will raise up instruments to
secure for his country all necessary goods of earth, and refuses
to sell wisdom though it be for rubies."
The liberation of individual electors from a compulsory
union with others would enable a candidate to discard all
mean and dishonest compliances, and frankly to express his
sentiments, whatever they may be, relying with confidence.
that the kingdom contains electors enough who agree and
1 Gladstone, The State, &c., vol. i., P. 127.
I
114
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
:
sympathize with him, and that he may dispense with the votes
of those who do not.
The choice of the electors is not only restricted by the
practical difficulties which thus exclude the vast majority of
those who might otherwise be candidates, but it is also further
restricted by legal grounds of exclusion. Special Acts of
Parliament, all of which are of a date subsequent to the
Revolution, incapacitate the holders of a great number of
offices from sitting in Parliament. These provisions might
have been useful, as temporary measures, to meet a temporary
evil-a system of representation avowedly rotten, which placed
the electoral power in a few hands-but they are utterly un-
suited and obstructive when they are allowed to encumber the
action of a numerous and free constituency.
2
The late debate on the propriety of excluding the members
of the Indian Council from seats in Parliament afforded satis-
factory evidence of the progress of public opinion on this
subject. Nearly every member who addressed the House on
that occasion, except the minister who had the conduct of the
bill, and could scarcely be expected to abandon the clause,
either opposed, or doubted the propriety of, the exclusion;
and Lord Stanley expressed himself in the most guarded
manner, referring to the exclusion of classes as a fact, and to
the policy as a supposition; and he relied chiefly on the
special and novel circumstances of the Indian Council. Lord
John Russell affirmed the general and true principle, that
"without a strong necessity, they would not say to the
1 See 1 Black. Com., p. 175. The following list comprises the principal
disabling statutes before the Reform Bill:-5 W. & M. c. 7, s. 57;
11 & 12 W. 3, c. 2, ss. 150, 151; 6 Ann. c. 7, s. 25; 41 Geo. 3, c. 52;
3 Geo. 4, c. 55, s. 14; 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 21; 10 Geo. 4, c. 62. Several
others have been passed since. It has been common to introduce such
clauses in Acts for administrative purposes. It displays a cheap dis-
interestedness, at no cost but that of the rights of the electors, and possibly
of the efficiency of Parliament,—a cost which is not felt.
2 Parl. Deb., vol. cli., p. 785.
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
115
electors, 'Here is a man you desire to elect, but there is a law
which restrains you from so doing."" Lord Grey has also
pointed out the advantage of having in Parliament the aid of
men engaged in official life.'
C
It can scarcely admit of doubt, that, on principle, no
person should be excluded from the House of Commons
on the ground of any official employment, unless there be
an absolute incompatibility between the respective duties—
as, for example, it would be impossible that a clerk of the
House should be at the same time a member, from the im-
possibility of one man being at the same time both master
and servant. The judges of the common law are said to be
excluded because they sit in the Lords' house; which does
not apply to the judges in Chancery. It is a mistake to
reason upon the fact of a judicial officer having in his
personal capacity a seat in the legislature, in which he only
takes a part with many others, as if it were open to the
objection of combining and confusing the legislative and
judicial power. The person may officiate in both capaci-
ties without any blending of the power. Lord Eldon would
at all times have felt as clearly his duties in the House of
Lords as in the Court of Chancery, and never could have
confounded one with the other. The administration of the
laws affecting public liberty may distinguish the position of
the judges of the superior courts from all other persons, but
the distinction is by no means clear.
A general and uniform principle should be adopted as to
every public officer not excluded by evident and strong neces-
sity. If, after the possession of office had been declared and
known, a numerous and free constituency choose him as their
representative, there ceases to be any foundation on public
grounds for the policy which would exclude him. Nothing
but the absolute inconsistency of the several duties should be
¹ Parliamentary Government, p. 172, 1st ed.: p. 301, 2nd ed.
2 Westminster Review, vol. 13, N.s., p. 418.
116
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
admitted as sufficient. The House has ample power to
compel the attendance of its members for the performance
of their parliamentary duties; and if that attendance should
interfere with their official labours, it will be for those who
superintend the latter duties to complain. The public would
approve and applaud the act of any minister, who for such
just cause, and fearless of any slander of his motives, should
dismiss a public officer, notwithstanding his position in the
House. Considerations of this nature are too minute to be
made the basis of general legislation. They must, like the
current of events, be left to the solution of time and circum-
stance. Parliamentary annals furnish an example of a Cornet
of the Guards, who, deprived of his commission for his oppo-
sition to the minister, became, therefore, not less useful to the
people, and found no scanty indemnity both in honour and in
fame.
XI. All enactments, whether general or special, which incapacitate any
person from being elected or from sitting in Parliament, or which impose
any penalty or penalties for so doing, on the ground that such person holds
any office or offices which he held at the time of his election, and stated in
his declaration to the Registrar,¹ are repealed.
2
Another excluded class are persons in holy orders. The
circumstances under which the statute establishing this
restriction was, little more than fifty years ago, carried
through Parliament by a minister whom history has not
placed in any very elevated position amongst statesmen, are
well known. The most attentive perusal of the debates will
fail to discover the shadow of a reason for the exclusion.
The bishop of Rochester adverted to what he thought the
only ojection; the unbecoming nature of our electioneering
system, which, as has been stated, would form more or less a
difficulty to all scrupulous men, "the means by which candi-
dates were obliged to seek admittance into the lower House,
such as opening houses of entertainment, and truckling to
¹ Clause viii., p. 96.
2 41 Geo. 3, c. 63.
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
117
every voter." These obstacles are wholly taken away, when
every vote is converted into a spontaneous tribute to the
qualities and attainments of the person for whom it is given.
The prelate, in his speech, repudiated the notion of any in-
compatibility between the studies or duties of a divine, and
those of a representative of the people. He pointed to the
names of Usher, Pearson, and Barrow, as examples to the
contrary, and urged, that divinity, as a science, was intimately
blended with the principles of political justice, of morality,
and the laws of nature and nations. The bill was character-
ised by Lord Thurlow as a bill of disfranchisement. It was,
in truth, an attack on the rights of every elector in the
kingdom. Lord Eldon, who supported it, like a skilful
advocate, ingeniously endeavoured to divert the argument
and rest the question upon another issue, by introducing a
discourse of great learning to prove the indelibility of orders,
a point which had nothing whatever to do with the matter in
discussion. The only true explanation of this remarkable
and unjustifiable law is that which was given by the imme-
diate object of it. Horne Tooke said, "deacons and priests
had sat in Parliament for more than a century, but at last
one got in who opposed the minister of the day, and then
Parliament determined that there should no more be any
deacons and priests admitted amongst them."
Nothing abstractedly could appear more unreasonable than
the exclusion of a set of men whose education and functions ne-
cessarily point their attention to the greatest subjects that can
occupy the thoughts of men, and whose habits and duties
moreover bring them into communication with every phase
of society, and especially with the poor, whose interests
require the closest, the most attentive, and the most prac-
tical consideration. That the effect of local isolation, of too
1 Parl. Hist., vol. xxxv., p. 1547.
2 Lord Holland's Memoirs of the Whig Party, vol. i., p. 180. See 1 Black.
Com., p. 175, n. (37); Christian's_Ed., Lond., 1809.
118
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH
exclusive an application to the same train of thought, and a
want of acquaintance with secular affairs produce, in many
cases, narrow views of men and things, may be admitted,
although it is, perhaps, too strongly expressed in the well-
known apophthegm of Lord Clarendon; but this forms no
ground for the exclusion of the class, and has never been put
forward as being so. It must be always recollected that the
present proposal is to require about 2000 electors for every
member, and if 2000 electors concurred in the choice of a
minister of religion, he is not likely to be amongst the least
gifted of his order.
In the great questions which arise in Parliament affecting
religion and the Church, it would be in the highest degree
desirable that one or two ministers of every persuasion should
be present, and enabled to take part in their discussion,
rather than that all such matters should be left to laymen
ambitious of a dilettante degree in divinity. The more
exaggerated types of every theological doctrine will be found,
not amongst its ordinary teachers, but amongst its heated
neophytes. These are the men who embitter discussion,
exasperate differences, and regard all moderation as treachery
to their cause. The true principle of representation, con-
sistently applied, would enable every religious body, clerical
or lay, to put forward as their organ whomsoever they may
deem to be the best fitted for the office. Interest and feeling
will alike prompt them to select the most able and accom-
plished exponent of their opinions to fill the important trust.
The tone and temper of 'the lower House, in dealing with
subjects in which the relations between public law and
national worship are in controversy, would be in no slight
measure improved, if, without lessening all becoming zeal, the
presence and example of the Christian minister should, to
that zeal, add some portion of charity.
XII. The statute 41 Geo. 3, c. 63, and sect. 9 of the stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 7,
are repealed.
THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
119
In order to remove every impediment, technical or other-
wise, to the possible election of any man whom the quotient
of the electors may choose, the case of returning officers
should be provided for. These would together form a body
of five or six hundred persons, or perhaps more, all of them
of some eminence in their localities. The materials of which
the representative assembly is composed, are "of ten thousand
times greater consequence than all the formalities in the
world."
XIII. If any person who, by virtue of his office, may be the returning
officer in any election, should be a candidate at such election, it shall be
lawful for such returning officer to appoint an assessor to act in his stead,
and the said appointment, when confirmed by the Lord Lieutenant of the
county in which such constituency shall be situated, or by the sheriff of the
said county or city, or by any three magistrates for the same county, city,
or borough, shall be effectual, and the certificate or return of such assessor
shall be valid, as if the same were made by such returning officer.
The accumulation of exclusions which has been so incon-
siderately created or allowed, is not excused or palliated by
saying we have nevertheless done very well. The repeated
amendments which almost every legislative Act requires, and
a vast amount of costly experience, prove that many things
are done very ill. In administrative subjects much of our
legislation egregiously fails. New machinery is constantly
erected to effect the same or some of the same objects, for
which old machinery is already applicable, and then the
double powers are left to conflict with and impede each other;
and the expenses of the establishment go on increasing far
beyond what is needful, and out of all proportion to the work
which is accomplished. It is impossible to calculate the mis-
chief occasioned by the loss of any useful legislative element
which is shut out.
All such prospective and exceptional legislation, dictated,
as it is vainly imagined, by a far-sighted wisdom, and in-
¹ Reflections, &c., p. 58.
120
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH, ETC.
tended to produce, by some recondite operation, a contingent
good, is an attempt to accomplish objects which exceed the
powers, and are beyond the province of legislators. If they
have any immediate effect whatever, it must be that they
produce inconvenience, and therefore peril, with scarcely the
remotest probability of effecting any good. It partakes of that
meddling legislation, of which our statute-book is a remark-
able monument, that presumed to teach men the manner in
which almost every action of life should be performed. The
Parliament thought it knew better than the people themselves
where they should live, and what rents they should pay-
what labourers they should hire, and what wages they should
pay-how they should make, and measure, and wear their
clothes-how they were to pack their fish,' how their beer
was to be brewed, and the barrels made to put it in²—what
they should pay for their candles, and how their beds and
bolsters should be stuffed-a legislation which permitted its
subject to be neither the regulator of his own actions nor the
keeper of his own conscience.
2 35 Hen. 8, c. 8.
1 22 Edw. 4, c. 2.
3 11 Hen. 6, c. 12.
4 11 Hen. 7, c. 19: 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 23.
121
CHAPTER VII.
THE ACT OF VOTING.
IN nearly every scheme of electoral amendment that has been
suggested, one part of the proposal has been to substitute a
documentary form of tendering and receiving the vote, in the
place of the oral form. In the present plan it is proposed
that the vote shall be given in the shape of a document, to be
deliberately prepared and signed, and (except in some special
cases, which will be the subject of a distinct chapter) per-
sonally delivered by every voter at his proper polling-place.
It will be remembered, that the system now suggested
contemplates the necessity of a certain quota or number of
votes for every candidate, and renders more than that number
unnecessary. If, therefore, a popular candidate should receive,
as is most likely to be the case, the suffrages of a very much
larger number of electors than the number of the quota, it
would follow that the excess of votes would be lost, if means
were not provided for enabling the electors to transfer their
votes, on that contingency, to some other candidate. The
plan, therefore, would be incomplete, if it did not enable
every elector to provide for such a contingency, and enable
the vote to be transferred, as the elector shall direct,-if he
shall think proper to give any such direction,-from one
candidate to another, until it reaches a candidate whom the
¹ This has been adopted for the Universities by the stat. 24 & 25 Vict.,
c. 53. (Note to the 3rd ed.)
122
THE ACT OF VOTING.
elector has named, who shall require the vote to make up his
quota, and with whom the vote therefore rests. In order to
give to the elector the option and the means of thus trans-
ferring his vote, the form of the document must enable him
to vote, as he now can, for the single candidate, whom he
may select, or to go on further, and provide for as many
contingencies as he may think proper, within the scope which
the gazetted lists allow him. It will be found that such a
power is not only convenient and necessary for its immediate
object, but that it is calculated to be of vast benefit in other
respects, especially that of bringing to the duty of voting re-
flection, judgment, and moderation.¹
In setting out the form of the voting-paper, it is scarcely
necessary to state that no vote can be ultimately effectual for
more than one candidate. The inconsistencies and absurdities
of our system of election, both for parliamentary and local
councillors, have been lately pointed out. They have been
the growth of chance and accident, and caused by the inevit-
able absence of any presiding design. The number of mem-
bers for whom one vote may be given, on a parliamentary
election, varies, in different places, from one to four. What-
ever the franchise may be, whatever may be the direction in
which it is extended, it should be a canon of the reform, that
when the franchise is conferred,--the right of assisting in
the appointment of a representative once given to any indi-
vidual, the value of his single vote, wherever be his dwell-
ing, or his property, shall be the same as that of every other
vote. There is nothing in the accidental circumstance that
an elector resides, or has property, in a county, or city, or
town represented by a plurality of members, which should
1 In a paper on the University Election Act, in Macmillan's Magazine,
Feb. 1862, p. 298, I have shown that an addition to that measure, rendering
each vote available for no more than one candidate, and giving the con-
tingent form of vote as above explained, would have made the scheme
perfectly just, and (with some minor improvements) complete.
2 Edinburgh Review, vol. c., p. 226.
THE ACT OF VOTING.
123
entitle him to vote for more candidates than if he lived in a
place which returned only one member. There is sufficient.
reason for giving a great community more weight in the
Legislature than a small one; but there is no reason why a
single elector, dwelling in the great community, should have
more or less weight than a single elector in the small one.
A delusion is, in truth, fostered in many minds, by the
present mode of election, which gives to one in London votes
for three candidates and in Finsbury or Birmingham for
two, as if it were a larger privilege than that of those who
in smaller boroughs can vote for one only, while the real
electoral power at present is plainly far less in the greater
constituency. It should always be borne in mind that it is
the number of voters who can elect a representative, and not
the number of votes which any one can give, that is the true
test of electoral weight. One of the first objections com-
monly uttered by those who have but superficially looked at
the proposed system is that persons who are accustomed to a
vote, which may contribute to elect several candidates, will
not consent to be reduced to a vote that can elect but one.
What they have to be persuaded of is, that the certain and
unerring force which they may employ in the choice of one
representative invests every single vote with incalculably
more electoral power than any multiplication of the votes on
individual electors will confer without it. This gain to the
electors of a self-governed nation was forcibly expressed by
the late Prevost-Paradol :-" Proportional Representation is
to our mind as evident and almost as important an improve-
ment upon the majority system of representative government
now in vogue, as the application of steam has been to indus-
1
2
1 It is part of the same delusion which has given more popular pro-
minence to the cumulative than to the single vote. See Appendix N,
$$ 8, 9, 10, infra, p. 161.
2 This will be found demonstrated by facts and figures, Appendices M
and N, infra, pp. 351, 359.
124
THE ACT OF VOTING.
trial pursuits." It may help to reconcile some to the rule
which gives them an effectual voice in the election of no
more than one member, if they know that in the United
States no vote can be given for more than one member of the
House of Representatives.
The law regulating the form of voting may be thus ex-
pressed :-
XIV. Every vote shall be given on a document setting forth the name
of the candidate for whom it is given; and if the vote be intended, in the
events provided for by this Act, to be transferred to any other candidate
or candidates, then the names of such other candidate or candidates must
be added in numerical order, viz. :
County, Division of the County, City, or Borough of
The bearer of this voting paper records his vote for the candidate
named first in the subjoined list, or in the events provided for by Statute
for the other candidates successively, in their numerical
order, viz. :-
4
LO
5
te
1
3
8
10
9
CO
6
7
In the first, or if the elector approves of more than one
candidate, then in the succeeding blank spaces opposite the
several numbers on a form similar to the above the elector
Article in the Journal des Débats, Feb. 18th, 1870.
THE ACT OF VOTING.
125
will insert the name or names which he adopts. The candi-
dates for his particular constituency will be made known to
him, as now, by such written or personal addresses as those
candidates may think proper to make; and, in addition to
that which he has now, he will have a schedule before
him,' containing the names, not only of the candidates for his
own particular constituency, but of the candidates for all the
other constituencies in the kingdom. This list it is entirely
at the option of the elector to make use of or not; in his
determination as to that, he may be guided by his education,
by his knowledge, by his opportunities-by the interest which
he takes in public matters, in the well-being of his town, or
in the welfare of his country. In every step the object of
conforming in all respects to the Ballot Act has been kept
in view; but in the form of the voting paper some variation
from that prescribed in the Act is necessary. It need not,
however, impair in any degree that secrecy which is its car-
dinal purpose. The method here suggested certainly gives
scope for the exercise of infinitely more thought and intelli-
gence than there has hitherto been room for in parliamentary
or municipal elections, but it leaves the illiterate voter all the
facilities he now has; and it is hard upon a self-governing
nation to circumscribe the use of the knowledge and dis-
cretion of the entire community until all electoral action is
reduced to his level. Entering as we have now done on
¹ P. 97, ante. In order to show the variety and elasticity of application
of which this principle is capable, an alternative may be introduced for
the use of voters who, having perfect confidence in one candidate, wish to
place their votes at his disposal, if not needed for his own election, or for
the election of the other candidate or candidates they have named. A form
may be used with this addition-"If this voting paper shall not be appro-
priated when the names of all the candidates obtaining the quota of votes
shall be declared, this vote shall then be recorded in favour of such candi-
date as the said
above named shall signify to the Registrar, as
by this Act provided." See p. 189, infra, n. Some may think this open to
the danger of consolidating power in single hands; others that it is a
wise "revival of authority."
126
THE ACT OF VOTING.
the noble task of universal education, the state may surely
offer more encouragement to its children than is involved in
this mean estimate of the confidence which should be reposed
in them. The names of the candidates might be inserted in
numerical order, or the numbers placed opposite to the names
if already inserted, instead of the mark prescribed by the
Ballot Act, in their order of preference. It has not been
thought absolutely necessary to limit the number of candi-
dates which shall be named on each paper. It is a question
which at present may be left open, observing only, that if
the use of too long a list were found to lead to the insertion
of many names carelessly, after the few more distinguished
candidates at the head of the voting paper, the voter might
be permitted to include all or any of the candidates for places
within his county, and a certain number only of those
outside. Such a restriction should not, however, be adopted
unless experience proved its necessity. The illiterate voters
may be assisted in having the mark added for single, or the
numbers if for several, candidates, as the Act prescribes.
In striving to render the act of voting a solemn and de-
liberate act, we pursue an object which the greatest, the best,
and the most scrutinising minds, who have directed their
thoughts to political subjects, have always regarded as of
paramount importance. It has been the prevailing idea, that
political security and happiness depend on the degree in
which the votes of a free community:-the delivery of
the popular judgment could be "surrounded with the best
securities for rectitude, and the best preservatives against
haste, passion, or private corruption." Mr. Burke proclaims
the foundation of the same great principle-" All persons
possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and
awfully impressed with an idea that they act in trust, and
that they are to account for their conduct in that trust to one
great master, author, and founder of society. This principle
1 History of Greece, vol. iv., p. 209.
ן
THE ACT OF VOTING.
127
ought to be more strongly impressed upon the minds of those
who compose the collective sovereignty, than upon those of
single princes.
* 1
The power given to the electors, first by the information
which the gazetted lists afford to them of the persons who
are candidates for the representation throughout the kingdom,
and, secondly, by the opportunity the voting papers afford of
separating, distinguishing, and bringing out every form and
shadow of political opinion, will give an immeasurable increase
of force and strength to the true representative principle; and
it will, at the same time, wholly extinguish the operation of
the pseudo-principle of representation under which nations.
have suffered, and by which they are obstructed in their pro-
gress towards settled constitutional government. "In the
present state of our knowledge," a late writer has observed,
"politics, so far from being a science, is one of the most back-
ward of all the arts;" and certainly nothing can well be
imagined more resembling a condition of barbarism than a
parliamentary election. Five, ten, or twenty thousand men,
comprising every diversity of education, of thought, of moral
quality, and of mental endowment, are called together to elect
one or two persons to represent them. If they were only, as
in old times, delegates, to grant "a tenth or a fifteenth" for a
foreign war, the representation might be sufficient; but a
representation so created at this day, with all the varied
questions which are opening and agitating mankind, is a
simple impossibility, and the name is a delusion. We are
rejecting the aid of letters and the facilities of locomotion,
ignoring the popular intelligence, and obstinately resolving
to subject ourselves to the same difficulties as our ancestors
struggled with when they had no roads to travel on, when
not one in a hundred had learnt to read, and not one in a
¹ Reflections, &c., p. 138. See Mill, Considerations on Representative
Government. Ch. II., iii.
2 Buckle's History of Civilisation, vol. i., p. 458.
128
THE ACT OF VOTING.
thousand nad any book or manuscript to read, if he had learnt.
It is plain that as the intelligence of the country has advanced,
we have been receding from anything like a real representa-
tion, because it has become every year less possible for the
rude forms of an earlier age to convey the varieties of ex-
pression that have in modern times been called into existence.
It is no answer to say, that if we have not had representation,
we have had something that has done as well,—if it has not
been actual it has been "virtual." The question is, whether
we are to proceed towards a system of representation, or
towards something else-not representation, but a substitute
for it. It is a question which every one should present to
himself before he begins to reason on the subject of parlia-
mentary reform, as the whole tenor of his argument will be
necessarily governed by the answer.
66
1
The fundamental law of election, M. Guizot states to be
que les électeurs fassent ce qu'ils veulent, et sachent ce
qu'ils font." In the intelligent performance of the act of
voting, the elector will necessarily have some preparatory
knowledge, some inclination of mind, some train of thought,
or some calculation of interest, disposing him to prefer one or
more persons to others. The causes of the disposition are of
course almost infinite. It would be useful, if it were possible,
to consider them, and their operation upon every class of
mind.
The conclusions which are founded upon personal know-
ledge-that is, by knowledge acquired by intimate personal
acquaintance and contact, must be very rare-so rare, that
with reference to the great body of the electors of the king-
dom, they are scarcely deserving of consideration. Know-
ledge of this kind of course exists somewhere as to every man,
but can extend only to a small circle. In that extent this
knowledge as to new candidates will of course be of great
value. In a former page, the effect of giving a separate
¹ Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 247.
THE ACT OF VOTING.
129
"Pour
electoral existence to every university, college, inn of court,
scientific association, or other body possessing especial advan-
tages in point of instruction or knowledge, has been adverted
to as an encouragement to such bodies to put forward and
recommend their most highly qualified members.'
trouver et obtenir les hommes les plus capables, il faut obliger
ceux qui croient ou qui prétendent l'être, à prouver leur
capacité, à la faire reconnaître et proclamer par les hommes
qui, à leur tour, sont capables de porter un jugement sur ce
fait-là, c'est-à-dire, sur la capacité individuelle de quiconque
aspire à être député. Ainsi se constate le pouvoir légitime,
et c'est ainsi que, dans le fait de l'élection philosophiquement
considérée, ce pouvoir est pris par ceux qui le possèdent, et
accepté par ceux qui le reconnaissent." 2
It is probable that to introductions by the smaller con-
stituencies, especially where they are composed chiefly of
highly instructed persons, many candidates would be in-
debted for their entrance into public life. There are great
numbers in the country who would receive such testimony
with respect. Many would act upon recommendations
coming from bodies or single persons with whom they sym-
pathize, and whom they could trust. This kind of informa-
tion, although it originates in personal knowledge, is not, as
to the electors to whom it is addressed, more than "hearsay,"
but as such they will, as all persons dealing with such evi-
dence must do, attribute to it the degree of weight which
they believe to be due to the quarter from whence it comes.
Reliance on the advice or the testimony of others in whom
the electors may confide is no improper guidance. Every-
thing that contributes to establish a basis of political faith
or trust, introduces a valuable element, and one which
deserves to be cultivated rather than discouraged.
It is also material to observe on this point, that, whilst the
present system induces a candidate-except in the case of a
2 Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 254.
1 ¹ Supra, p. 56.
K
130
THE ACT OF VOTING.
majority so compact as to be enabled wholly to despise and
contemn the minority-to suppress and conceal some of his
opinions, lest he might lose votes by his candour, in the pro-
posed method of introduction every candidate will be encou-
raged to express himself fully and distinctly, in order that he
may be perfectly comprehended by minds in sympathy with
his own.
Such candid explanations will have both an affir-
mative and a negative effect. Every elector will learn with
more exactness who are those with whom he can more en-
tirely agree, and with whom he totally disagrees. The en-
couragement afforded on all sides to truth will immensely
increase the value of the evidence as to the real character and
opinions of all who present themselves.
When population was scanty, and most of the burgesses
chose their townsmen or neighbours, their knowledge of them
might have been personal; though even then it is propable
that familiar knowledge of the chosen member had little
place. At present, the knowledge which the elector has of
the member must for all practical purposes be gathered by
other means. He may see his face occasionally-there may
be a shake of the hand at the canvass--he may have spoken.
a dozen words to him in the market-place-there may be an
annual dinner and harangue-perhaps an address at opening
a mechanics' institute or a ragged school. He may read in
the newspaper an occasional interlocutory observation in the
House-perhaps a set speech. He finds his name in the list
of those who voted for or against this or that measure, but of
any knowledge of his habits of thought, disposition, or mental
qualities, the elector has none which he may not, with the
same attention, gather in the daily or weekly press, con-
cerning the members for any other constituency. What the
electors in general know of any public man, at this day, is
derived not from any observation of his words and conduct,
which they have been able personally to make or to witness,
but of what they read and gather from that ubiquitous litera-
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131
ture which penetrates and throws light on all the important
transactions of life. We find in every town, in all political
conversation, except at the approach of an election, that far
more is thought and known, or discussed, of the conduct of
those who have been from time to time ministers, than is
thought or discussed respecting the conduct of their particular
member. The attention is impressed by the more prominent
objects in the political world, and dwells but little on the
minor ones. In perusing the gazetted lists, with a view of
framing their voting papers, every elector would be able to
form his judgment as well of the merits of one as of another
candidate, according as he had earned distinction in Parlia-
ment or elsewhere; or if, unknown to the world, according
to his appreciation by other persons who are known and
trusted.
Some electors
may have neither time nor means to do more
than they now do—give their vote for one or other of the
candidates for their own borough; and in giving that vote
they may resolve to rely, not upon any view of the parlia-
mentary conduct of the candidate, but upon personal charac-
ter, as the same has come under their own observation. Sup-
pose the case of two candidates for a country constituency,
and the elector to reason thus:- "I have been over the
estates of these two gentlemen. I find, on one of them, that
the farms are not high-rented; but I find, also, that they are
very badly farmed. No draining has been done. All the
buildings are in an ill condition, and have only been patched
up for many years past. Most of the labourers' cottages
were pulled down thirty or forty years ago, to lessen the
poor rates, and the men and boys, and women when they
are employed, have to walk three miles or more every night
and morning, to the next parish, where they live, huddled to-
gether in the back lane. On the other property they say the
rents have been raised, and some of the tenants complain
they are a little too high; but then there has been a vast
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132
deal of money spent upon the farms, and they get twice or
three times as much from them as they used to do. The
labourers have constant employment, and, wherever cottages
have been wanted, good roomy ones have been built. They
have all good gardens, and there are schools for the labourers'
children. I know little of what is meant by Tory, or Whig,
or Radical, but the man who seems to manage his own
business best, and attends to the good of his fellow-creatures,
is the man I should rather trust, and for whom I shall vote."
It is easy to suppose the same kind of reasoning to take
place in a manufacturing or a maritime town, and to be caused
by like contrasts, of the conduct of different employers of
labour. When no triumph can be gained, by forcing the
electors to sacrifice all individual opinions to make up great
majorities, and when all pressure of that nature is taken away,
men will begin to think independently, and not be led by
clamour. They will be governed much more by practical
tests, and less by abstract and barren generalities. Those
who witness and appreciate every noble effort which a man
may make for the good of his neighbours or his country will
be found active in his favour, and will make for him a suffi-
cient, an independent, and probably an enthusiastic consti-
tuency.
The gazetted lists will present to the electors of the king-
dom a roll of names, containing a large proportion of the
most eminent men in it; for, when the obstacles which now
impede the entry into Parliament are removed, there are few
who will feel within themselves any competency for its labours,
and have opportunities of engaging in them, who will not
make the tender of their services. In the number will doubt-
less be found much of the dross of conceit, of self-sufficiency,
and of folly; but the lists will also contain the pure ore of
wisdom and virtue, if it exist, and it is hard to believe that
any generation is left destitute of those qualities. There will
be the most that the nation possesses,-of high endowment,—
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133
of the knowledge of men, gleaned by laborious study,—of
science, rendering the material world subservient to the uses
of man, of literature, opening the understanding and enrich-
ing thought, of art, conferring dignity and grace; many of
these, combined with historic fame and ancient lineage, and
together comprehending all the moral and intellectual worth,
which the love of country and of mankind, and the desire for
honourable distinction, can call to light.
The whole of this magnificent field of choice would be open
to the electors of the kingdom. The capacity of selection, and
the disposition to select from such materials, would be in-
finitely various; but the field, like the bounteous lap of nature,
is free to all who have the intelligence and the industry to
extract its treasures. Like nature, it would be barren and
sterile only to the ignorant and the indolent-those who know
not the wealth that it contains, or are without the industry
and energy to profit by it. The pious, the learned, the
scientific, the enterprising, and the philanthropic of every
variety and degree, will all find a sympathetic expression
amongst the candidates before them. There is a tendency in
every sort of superiority to become nucleus gathering about
them kindred minds and characters. "Il
Il y a un certain rap-
port, un certain lien entre la capacité d'être (un bon député
ou autre chose) et la capacité de reconnaître celui qui possède
la capacité d'être. Ceci est un fait dont dépose à chaque in-
stant le spectacle du monde. Le brave se fait suivre de ceux
qui sont capables de s'associer à sa bravoure. L'habile se fait
obéir de ceux qui sont capables de comprendre son habileté.
Le savant se fait croire de ceux qui sont capables d'apprécier
sa science. Toute supériorité a une certaine sphère d'attrac-
tion, dans laquelle elle agit et groupe autour d'elle des in-
fériorités réelles, mais en état de sentir et d'accepter son
action."
a
A representative assembly, chosen under a system thus free
1 Guizot. Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 254.
134
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and expansive, would be a reflex of the feeling and intelligence
of the people. Gradually elevated in character by the con-
stant operation of the process of comparison which is so
powerful in every department of science, by the introduction
of the most distinguished men, and by the elimination of the
inferior, it would become a national Walhalla, worthy to form
a branch of that parliament which, having its origin in the
depth of past ages where all records are shadowy and doubt-
ful, has gathered strength and dignity in its course, down to
our own days, and become the great model of constitutional
government, and the envy or admiration of all civilised
nations.
In reviving and calling forth periodically, at short intervals,
all proud and generous feelings connected with our country
and race,-turning the attention of every thoughtful man on
such occasions to the consideration of all that is excellent in
the age in which he lives, we nourish that love of country in
which a nation's unity and strength are found. Such love is
of no sudden growth. It must proceed from the sense that
our country contains something deserving of our affection, and
gather its force from circumstances round which the feelings
cling. "If our love for our country is to be sincere, without
ostentation and affectation, it cannot be produced immediately
by instruction and directions, like a branch of scientific know-
ledge. It must rest, like every other kind of love, on some-
thing unutterable and incomprehensible.
Love may be
fostered; it may be influenced by a gentle guidance from
afar but if the youthful mind becomes conscious of this, all
the simplicity of the feeling is destroyed; its native gloss is
brushed off. Such, too, is the case with the love of our country.
Like the love for our parents, it exists in a child from the
beginning; but it has no permanency, and cannot expand, if
the child is kept, like a stranger, at a distance from his
country. No stories about it, no exhortations, will avail as a
substitute: we see our country, feel it, breathe it in, as we do
:
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135
nature. Then history may be of use, and after a time, re-
flection, consciousness. But our first care ought to be for
institutions, in which the spirit of our country lives, without
being uttered in words, and takes possession of men's minds
involuntarily. For a love derived from precepts is none."¹
The representation in its theory, or in any worthy view
of it, should be of all that is best and most instructed, omit-
ting, as far as the separation is possible, all that is ignorant
and vicious. The representative embodiment is to be of man,
approaching, as near as his infirmity of thought and will per-
mits him to approach, that which a lofty imagination has
pictured of his pristine dignity, when,—
In their looks divine
The image of their glorious Maker shone,
Truth, wisdom, sanctitude, severe and pure
(Severe, but in true filial freedom placed),
Whence true authority.
The design is to represent the qualities with which man is
divinely gifted, the noble heritage of his nature, not their
absence and negation. Such an assembly should present "the
awful image of the virtue and wisdom of a whole people col-
lected into a focus." The first introduction of representatives
to constituents may be viewed as the contact of two intel-
ligences,―a higher and a lower. How is this contact to be
obtained? It must be by the higher descending to and looking
down to the lower, or the lower searching for and raising its
views to the higher. It is easier for the superior intelligence to
make itself intelligible to the lower, than for the lower to ascend
to and appreciate the excellence of the higher order of mind.
But as the latter is more difficult, so also is it an infinitely more
wholesome and beneficial exercise in human and social pro-
gress. Consider the opposite tendencies of two conditions of
things—one in which the great mass of society remains the
passive subject of any attacks which misdirected talent may
¹ Passow, in note to Guesses at Truth, 2nd Ser., p. 365.
136
THE ACT OF VOTING.
level against it, helpless itself to move until some hand be
held out, and at the mercy of accident, whether it be that of
a true friend or a concealed and insidious foe; prepared to be
the unconscious victim of that perverted ability which is
always hovering over it, ready to seize upon and turn its
follies into a wicked profit;-the other, in which the same
society is awakened to the value of what is truly good, by
being insensibly forced to a comparison between the great and
the mean.
In the table which exhibits the chief names that
enlighten and adorn their times, they will see-
66
Life rising still on life, in higher tone."
Can there be a doubt in which condition there will be found
that upward look, and that endeavour to appreciate excellence,
which is a step towards excellence itself? It is the people
who must search for and learn where knowledge and virtue
are to be found. They do not come to them unsought-the
counterfeit only will be thrust into their hands, and in taking
it they embrace "the false Duessa," and must, in the end,
endure the odious sight of her deformity. Philosophy
cannot raise the bulk of mankind to her level, therefore if
she is to become popular she must descend to theirs. This
she cannot do without a twofold grave injury. She will
debase herself and will puff up her disciples."
66
The habit of scrutinizing with attention the conduct of
public men, and of forming an estimate of their relative
merits, on an examination of the lists which the gazettes
furnish, will naturally dispose the minds of men towards
political moderation, and render them tolerant of differences,
which they now regard as impassable objections. As our
views widen, our sympathies increase and multiply; all
things become more precious, and in all we find good.
Merits will appear, where people had before seen only ad-
versaries. It is party which begets party. When an elector
addresses himself to the task of forming on his voting-paper a
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137
list sufficient to compose an entire representative assembly,
he becomes a mediator, rather than a partisan. He becomes
less narrow, and more catholic in his opinions and preposses-
sions. One whom he before looked upon as an opponent,
though possibly a distinguished one, he now comes to regard
as a valuable auxiliary. In a late contest for the City there
were few, if any, that voted against one of the former mem-
bers, when asked whether in the present dearth of states-
men they really wished to exclude from the House one of the
small number deserving of the name, who did not answer
that their wish was only to exclude him from the representa-
tion of London, and not from Parliament. Under the pro-
posed system his name would have appeared on most of the
voting-papers; and the preference of others, if expressed,
would have been shown only by the place which it occupied
on the voting-papers.
As the extensive capacity of expression, and the interesting
nature of the act of voting, comes to be felt, increased atten-
tion will be directed to it. Instead of that indifference to
political action which prevails so extensively that in large
constituencies only about half of the electors now take any
part in elections, there is every reason to expect that much
time would be given to the details necessary for the prepara-
tion of the voting-paper. This result can scarcely be doubted,
when we consider the degree in which political subjects form,
in this country, topics of thought and conversation. The
system attains the object to which M. Guizot points as so
desirable, that of placing "l'électeur dans une position telle
que son jugement personnel, sa propre volonté, soient non
seulement libres, mais provoqués à se produire tels qu'ils sont
en effet."¹ The attraction presented to each elector by the
power of giving effect in his vote to his especial and cherished
opinions and feelings, will, when he comes to appreciate it,
animate him with a new spirit of incalculable power. Con-
1 Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 217.
138
THE ACT OF VOTING.
siderations of duty will intervene with all their force. Every
man will feel that he is personally responsible for his own
error, or his own neglect. His understanding must teach
him how to act, and his conscience guide him to the per-
formance. It is the sense of individual duty that preserves.
every household in order and harmony. Each member of the
household has his especial function, and knows that he is
responsible for the manner in which he performs, and for his
neglect if he omits it. If this were not so, all united action.
would cease; there would be no diligence, and no subordina-
tion. We may imagine the case of a family, in which no
servant has power to act without the concurrence of a
majority of his fellow-servants, and where but a few of them
can agree together as to what they ought to do. In such an
establishment there could be no certainty of the performance
of any duty; for every one might cast the blame upon the
others, and the household would be involved in inextricable
confusion. The reasoning is the same of the multitude of
families and persons who form the nation. As the individual
restraints and sanctions become more feeble, certain breaches
of duty and of justice are made the subject of municipal law.
But all blame, and all punishment for error or misconduct in
the family or in the State, assume the existence of a power
to do right. If a man be prevented by others from perform-
ing a duty,—if he be precluded from doing it by a force
which he has not himself assisted to create, and which he
has no power to overcome, he must, in justice, be absolved
from the blame of leaving the duty unperformed.
A system which first destroys individual freedom of action,
and with it the higher inducements which connect action
with duty, necessarily introduces and tolerates baser motives.
Men tempt and are tempted by each other. One covets and
seeks a public function for selfish purposes, by venal means,
and another, for like ends, helps him to obtain it. The
evil spreads. There ceases to be any belief in uprightness of
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139
purpose. The only confidence left is of that miserable kind
which relies solely upon that being done which it is the
interest of another to do.
"Thus vice the standard reared; her arrier-ban
Corruption called, and loud she gave the word,
Mind, mind yourselves! why should the vulgar man,—
The lacquey, be more virtuous than his lord?
Enjoy the span of life! 'tis all the gods afford.”
The restraints imposed by penal laws are but a feeble and
insufficient protection. The degradation spreads widely and
becomes inveterate when the moral restraint is gone, and rich
and poor, great and small, lend themselves to the same ini-
quity. There is no Ithuriel upon whose touch the insidious
temptation starts up discovered and surprised. There is no
spear of celestial temper to lay bare these foul cabals. We
have no hope but in removing the causes which have tainted
political life, and thereby striving to re-establish on its seat
that faith in one another which we have overthrown and
lost; to search through our land for men either worthy to
lead, or to embody and represent all that is best and noblest
amongst us, and having found such-for we need not doubt
that such can be found; to give them our just reverence and
implicit trust, a reverence and trust which no man gives
but by his own free consent,-which none can be forced to
confer.
A system which asserts for itself the power of preventing
every
influence by which one man, or set of men, can control
the acts of others, is necessarily brought into comparison with
the ballot, which is put forward as a remedy for such evils.
The advocates of the ballot cannot be supposed to have an
attachment to the ballot for its own sake, and they will only
contend for its introduction so long as it shall appear to them
the most perfect scheme of electoral liberation. Many persons
are misled by the use, in countries in which that system has
been adopted, of the term "appeal to the ballot-box," and
140
THE ACT OF VOTING.
similar expressions, as if it implied that it was a palladium
of liberty; the fact being that the term only refers to the
popular election as the ultimate authority, by describing one
of its prominent features, as we, on such occasions, say "ap-
peal to the hustings." No greater idea of specific virtue is
attached to the machine called the "ballot-box" than we do
to the wooden platform called "the hustings." The secrecy
which the advocates of the former amongst us chiefly desire,
is for the most part, and in all countries really free, regarded
as of the smallest importance.
The difference and contrasts between the system here pro-
posed, which may be called the system of individual inde-
pendence,—and that of the ballot, are these:
The ballot proposes to give to every voter a perfect free-
dom to vote for any of the two or three candidates who may
think proper to present themselves. The system of individual
independence offers him a freedom of choice, not only of
the two or three, but probably of two or three thousand
candidates.
It may possibly be said, that one is freedom of choice, the
other the extent of choice, which the ballot does not pretend
to enlarge, and that therefore it is no defect in that system
that it fails to do so. This may logically be an answer.
It
is, nevertheless, a proper subject of comparison between the
two systems.
The ballot proposes to extinguish bribery and put an end
to intimidation, by depriving every person disposed to bribe
or intimidate of the means of knowing how the elector has
voted. The system of individual responsibility proposes to
put an end to bribery and intimidation by taking away all
the artificial and pecuniary value of the vote.
The ballot cannot extinguish bribery. It is almost in-
evitable that in a country like England, so rich in rewards
for political services, a system which places bribery out of the
reach of detection, and gives it impunity, will extend the
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141
practice to an incalculable degree. Why should it not do
so? The organisation for controlling elections we see is at
hand. What is to prevent a candidate from stipulating that
his payment shall depend on his success. He need not
inquire who votes for him or who does not. It is sufficient
that all the leaders know that their reward depends upon
their skilful and resolute conduct in placing a certain candi-
date at the head of the poll. It is not possible to conceive
anything more desperate, or more unprincipled, than such a
contest may become. The system of individual independence
preserves a record of every vote, with the name of the elector
by whom it is given, and it prevents any struggle, by de-
priving every elector both of the motive and power of con-
quering or overruling the will of another by the force of a
majority.
The ballot proposes to protect the conscience of the elector,
when that conscience is called into action by a predominant sense
of the superior merit of any candidate. In the larger consti-
tuencies only fifty-five per cent. of the voters, at the utmost,
interfere at all, and have, therefore, any conscientious motive
one way or the other. The system of individual inde-
pendence calls the conscience into action in the case of every
elector, by making him feel that he has a personal interest
and power, which he cannot misuse or neglect, without know-
ing that he has failed in his duty.
1
The ballot proposes to secure the uncontrolled exercise of
1 Mr. Kinglake lately, at Bridgewater, mentioned the benefit that accrued
to a voter who had lost his employment by his vote, and had procured,
through his aid, a better situation at Woolwich. It suggests the value of
investigating all such cases, and of procuring, by agency easily found,
ample indemnity to every one who may be in danger of suffering from such
a cause. Not only would the voter have the sympathy of all persons of his
own opinion, but all would be anxious to receive him for their own sakes,—
every landlord and every master knowing the inestimable value of a
conscientious tenant or workman. It would at once be individual profit,
economical advantage, and political amelioration, without the degradation
of the ballot.
142
THE ACT OF VOTING.
the volition of the elector, by protecting him from the influence
of his fears. The system of individual independence en-
courages him to act by giving his sympathies and opinions,
and through them his volition, scope and operation as ex-
tensive as the moral and intellectual condition of his age
shall afford, and thus calls every high and generous motive
into exercise.
The ballot proposes, by enabling the voter to conceal his
vote, to exclude the operation of that extraneous and im-
proper control over him, which is the symptom of a vicious
state of political morality. The system of individual in-
dependence addresses itself to the disease itself, as the most
certain and effectual method of removing the symptom; it
puts an end to the temptation of exercising an improper
control over the conscience of any, by appealing to and giving
freedom of action to the consciences of all.
The ballot, moreover, proposes to prevent not only direct
and open intimidation, but that tacit discouragement of the
free action of electors, which is the result of partiality in
dealing, of the giving, or withdrawal, of custom,-or of the
extension, or privation of other advantages, according as the
opinions of the electors are, or are not, in accordance with
those of the persons who have such advantages to bestow or
to withhold. Upon this point the pretensions of the ballot
must be more closely examined.
The argument in favour of the concealment of the political
action of every individual-whatever that action may be-in
order that his temporal interests may not be affected, should
be stated in all its force, that it may be fairly considered. It
is undeniable that, throughout our political system, the
manifestation of public opinion, in county, city, and borough
meetings, and in open gatherings of people on all occasions,
is looked upon as one of the features of the free political life
existing amongst us. A mistaken importance may be attri-
buted to these manifestations, but they have, no doubt, for
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143
more than a century, constituted a method of mutual and
national consultation and encouragement in the pursuit of
public ends. The advocates of the ballot would, probably,
say that they do not object to public meetings, for a man who
wished to conceal his political opinions would not be obliged
to attend them; and if he did attend them, he would be
perfectly at liberty to applaud any opinion, however he may
dislike it, and afterwards to compensate himself by voting the
contrary way. The ballot, therefore, they would say, has
nothing in it antagonistic to public meetings. We demand,
say they, that the temporal interests of every man shall be
protected from injury resulting from his opinions. No man
has anything to do with the religion, the politics, or the
morality of another. No man has a right, authoritatively, to
determine what the religion, the politics, or the morals of
another shall be; and what he cannot authoritatively de-
termine, we demand that he shall be prevented, as far as
possible, from influencing. All these things every man has a
right to choose for himself. We demand for every man that
none of his temporal advantages, of any kind, shall be
restricted, or diminished, owing to prejudices which others
may have against his religion, his politics, or his morals.
A man may have prejudices in favour of Christianity, or of
some special confession,-in favour of peace, of a general
system of national education, or of free trade,--or in favour of
a strict code of morals, and he may inculcate such doctrines,
by his mouth or his pen; but he has no right to con-
sider any of such things in the choice of bis friends, his
tradesmen, his tenants, or his servants. For none of these
opinions is one man answerable to another, and he usurps
a right which does not belong to him who, beyond argu-
ment, attempts to exercise any influence or control on such
points.
The reply to this may be,--that although it is true every
man is accountable only to a higher judge for his religion, his
144
THE ACT OF VOTING.
politics, and (except in so far as municipal law interferes) his
morals,—although all these things are matters for his private
judgment, and that judgment is free,-yet it does not follow
that all religions, politics, and morals are equally right. Every
man is entitled to be his own physician, but he has no
intuition of the medicines which he should use or avoid. He
is entitled to exercise his judgment, but there is certainly a
right and a wrong judgment. One drug may be healing and
another hurtful. So in religion; he is not responsible to man
for his choice, but the choice is not therefore indifferent.
There is a true, and there are false religions, and the conse-
quences of error may be tremendous. In politics, one way
may
lead to general tranquillity and the public good; another
way may lead to public misery or suffering, to anarchy or to
tyranny. In morals, there is a good and an evil code. It
may be true that no man is gifted with the power of pro-
nouncing which is right and which is wrong; but it is of
paramount importance that every man should make up his
mind on all these subjects to the best of his understanding,
and, having done so, that he should act upon his conclusion
in all earnestness and sincerity. If this be so, we do not
know how to act on your principle of avoiding or excluding
the exercise of all influence. We believe this Christian
confession to be a divine truth, which offers temporal and
eternal happiness to man, and we propagate it with all our
power; we believe that these rules of national conduct will
promote the well-being of the people and of mankind, and we
promote their ascendancy to the utmost of our means; we
believe that a rigid self-denial, and the restraint of passions
and desires, are the basis of morals, and we encourage them
as far as we are able. If we did not thus labour for what we
conceive to be the good of our fellow-creatures, we should, as
it appears to us, fail in our duty, and convert life into a cold
converse of intellect, without affection or sympathy. We
should become mere dialecticians, and not men.
We are, by
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145
the operation of these motives, led to form our friendships and
our society for the most part amongst those with whom we
have opinions, and feelings, and sympathies, in common. It
is against this tendency, say the advocates of the ballot, that
we are resolved to struggle. We will deprive you of the
means of displaying such partialities, by concealing from you,
as far as we can, the opinions of your neighbours. We
cannot, indeed, conceal their religion, if they profess any, for
they cannot go to their churches or chapels in a mask. We
cannot, perhaps, altogether conceal every departure from
what you deem morality, for few of the actions of life can be
done under a mask,-but as to politics, at least we can defy
your penetration; the ballot will prevent you from knowing
how any man may vote. He shall be allowed to vote under
a mask. Be it so, is the answer. We shall still be able to
discover the political opinions of those around us, and from
those opinions we shall infer their votes. This will be
impossible, is the reply, for we enable every man to wear the
guise of agreeing with you, notwithstanding his vote may be
given in support of opposite principles. You will not know
by whom the votes were given which belie the previous
assurances that you received. You may suspect' your friends
of abusing your confidence, and falsifying their professions.
The man who dines at your table, and most eagerly expresses.
his concurrence in your sentiments, may be one whose act
contradicts his language. When we have established the
ballot, you will cease to believe the political declarations of any
of your neighbours, and, in the general distrust of everybody,
political friendship will be at an end. No man will value or
regard a political promise. It will cease to be asked for.
All attention, all efforts, and all reward will be directed to the
result of the ballot.¹
¹ In the Chapter (X.) on The Mode of Voting, in Mr. Mill's Considerations
on Representative Government (p. 197, et seq., 2nd ed.), the question of the
ballot, together with the spirit it would foster, is considered in its latest
aspects, in regard to our present political condition. (Note to 3rd ed.)
L
146
THE ACT OF VOTING.
In the representative system, M. Guizot observes :-" Il
est vrai, et par le fait nécessaire, que la liberté, la vérité et
l'erreur, les volontés perverses et les volontés légitimes, en
un mot, le bien et le mal qui co-existent et se combattent dans
la société comme dans l'individu, pourront également se pro-
duire; c'est la condition de ce monde; c'est le fait même de
la liberté. Mais à cela deux garanties; l'une se trouve dans
la publicité de la lutte; c'est pour le bien la meilleure chance.
de succès; car ce ne sont pas les hommes qui ont inventé
l'analogie du bien avec la lumière, du mal avec les ténèbres;
cette idée commune à toutes les religions du monde, est le
symbole de la première des vérités.” ¹
2
The peace and security and strength of social and of in-
dividual life depend upon our trust and our trustworthiness.
Everything that tends to sap the confidence of man in his
fellows, is like an insidious poison in the system,—a worm at
the root of every good thought and action. Faith is not a
mere theological virtue. It is not a mere metaphysical term.
It is enforced as emphatically, though not with the same
authority, by the economist as by the divine. Without it
there can be none but selfish desires,-nothing but low
expectations. It is the golden cord that binds will to duty.
Shakespeare has painted in living colours the growth of dark
suspicions, which first torture and then madden the wretched
husband who distrusts his wife's fidelity. Fenelon has shown
us the dismal picture of a tyrannical and avaricious prince,
isolated in his palace, his only hope of safety in the bolts and
bars that secure his chamber, fearing everything, and having
everything to fear, the curse of his subjects and of himself
who had lost all trust in his servants and his ministers. A
novelist of our day has delineated in a tale the miserable con-
dition of a man without belief in goodness or truth or natural
¹ Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 151.
2 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, vol. i., pp. 134, 135, 136; vol. ii.,
p. 449.
**
THE ACT OF VOTING.
147
affection, having a heart which covetousness had hardened,
rejecting alike the offices of kindness and the claims of
charity,―a voluntary outcast from his species. These ex-
hibit to us life as in a mirror, and show that to faith is
assigned, in the moral world, something like that mighty
office and power which are, in the physical world, fulfilled by
the law of gravitation. It is faith alone that can hold the
thoughts, the passions, and the actions of man in their due
relation and concord with himself, his fellows, and the objects
of his existence. "The foundation of domestic happiness is
faith in the virtue of woman. The foundation of political
happiness is faith in the integrity of man. The foundation of
all happiness, temporal and eternal, is faith in the goodness,
the righteousness, the mercy, and the love of God."
In the action of voting, instead of destroying the remnant
of belief in the fidelity of man to man, the true reformation
would be to restore our faith in political honesty, by ex-
tinguishing, as far as human means can effect it, the tempta-
tions to selfishness, hypocrisy, and untruth. In that action,
the only rule is that prescribed by the apostle for the govern-
ment of the conscience, "let every man be fully persuaded in
his own mind." The full persuasion the elector must enter-
tain that his country has not, like a cruel and careless step-
mother, left him surrounded with difficulties and obstacles in
the performance of his duty; but has, with the maternal
solicitude of a loving parent, carefully provided for him every
means which she could devise for assisting him to perform
that duty and he must have this further persuasion that,
recognising the maternal care and solicitude of his country, he
has, on his part, in the same loving spirit, returned her kind-
ness and her attention by performing the duty to the best of
his power,—in selecting those whom he believes will best and
most honestly serve her.
In insisting upon the absolute necessity of disentangling
1 Guesses at Truth, 2nd Ser., p. 318.
148
THE ACT OF VOTING.
CC
individuals from the artificial bands which our political system
has cast about them, the question of what has been called the
independence of individuality" should be viewed on every
side. Many thoughtful minds regarded with great dread the
destruction of a system sanctioned by long tradition, whereby
the choice of representatives was left to the dictation of a few,
and the establishment of a method of election which allowed
every man to be his own master and guide. They foresaw the
evils which have since been felt. One of the most profound
thinkers of late times, reasoning on such a change, thus puts
the argument:"It is in no way necessary, for the sake of
becoming free, to pull down the whole edifice of society, with
all its time-hallowed majestic sanctities, and to scatter its
stones about in singleness and independence on the ground.
Yet assuredly it would not be more absurd to call such a
multitude of scattered independent stones a house, than to
suppose that a million, or twenty millions, of independent
human beings, each stickling for his independence, and carry-
ing out this principle through the ramifications of civil and
domestic life, can coalesce into a nation or a state. There is
need of mortar-there is need of a builder-yes, of a master
builder there is need of dependence, coherence, subordination
of the parts to the whole, and to each other."1
Doubtless there must be the working plan,-there must be
cohesion of material,-but what is the true cement, and where
is the master builder? It had been proved too sadly to man-
kind that their rulers had no divine inspiration to guide them
in their office, and that they worked with the untempered
mortar of the follies, the passions, and the vices of the
people. Three thousand probationary years passed over the
world,—the times of history or historic fable,—
Thebes and Pelops' line,
And the tale of Troy divine.
The long ages of trial for the heroes and mighty princes who
1 Guesses at Truth, 2nd Ser., p. 267.
THE ACT OF VOTING.
149
led and governed men,-all were found wanting. The pagan
world bowed to the truth as spoken by Olympian Jove, that
the highest court of justice, the court of the last appeal,-
was not an external authority, but resided in the conscience.
The evangelical prophet opened his mission, when he an-
nounced the fulness of time, by the precept, "Cease ye from
man." All record, sacred and profane,-all revelation, lead
to the recognition that there is but one power able to arrest
evil, and bind mankind together. By that divine energy and
word, a people of strangers, scattered over untravelled regions.
of the east, became entitled to the apostolic epithet and name
of living stones of a spiritual house, acceptable to Him, the
only Builder and Maker. No mortar for such a work,-no
imperishable cement for the edifice of the state, or any other
institution of man, is to be found that does not dwell in the
individual conscience. All goodness, all religion is personal,
or it is nothing. "The aim of Christianity is not to stifle
the germs of individual character, and to bring down all man-
kind to a dead level. It, on the contrary, fosters and de-
velops the central principle of individuality in every man,
and frees it from the crushing burthen with which the lusts
of the flesh and the vanities of life overlay it." 1
A discourse which insists on the sacred nature of the act of
voting may be fitly concluded by a suggestion on the manner
of celebrating its performance. The ancient customs of the
kingdom connect religion with its most important events and
transitions. The coronation is accompanied by a humble
recognition of the sovereignty of God over all, and a prayer
that he would grant unto the earthly sovereign the spirit of
wisdom and government,--to restore the things gone to de-
cay, maintain the things that are restored, reform what is
amiss, and confirm what is in good order,―to be merciful and
not too remiss,—to execute justice and forget not mercy,—
judge with righteousness, reprove with equity, and accept no
1 Guesses at Truth, 2nd Ser., p. 24.
150
THE ACT OF VOTING.
man's person,―abase the proud and lift up the lowly,-
punish the wicked and protect and nourish the just;—and it
ends with a benediction that supplicates for the sovereign a
faithful senate, wise and upright counsellors and magistrates,
a loyal nobility, and a dutiful gentry; a pious, learned, and
useful clergy; an honest commonalty, and the universal
love and reverence. These supplications are echoed, it may
be at other times and in other forms of expression, by every
Christian minister and congregation. The service should
have a suitable parallel on the day of the election of the
representative assembly, which should be set apart through-
out the kingdom for the business of the election alone. A
special service might be appointed by the Church,—and all
other persuasions invited, according to their several manners,
to solemnise the public act, and seek for it the divine blessing.
In so doing, we "act on the only received and uniformly
continued sense of mankind. That sense not only, like a
wise architect, hath built up the august fabric of states, but
like a provident proprietor, to preserve the structure from
profanation and ruin, as a sacred temple, purged from all the
impurities of fraud, and violence, and injustice, and tyranny,
hath solemnly and for ever consecrated the commonwealth,
and all that officiate in it. This consecration is made, that all
who administer in the government of men, in which they
stand in the person of God himself, should have high and
worthy notions of their function and destination; that their
hope should be full of immortality; that they should not look
to the paltry pelf of the moment, nor to the temporary and
transient praise of the vulgar, but to a solid permanent ex-
istence, in the permanent part of their nature, and to a
permanent fame and glory, in the example they leave as a rich
inheritance to the world." .
"Every sort of moral,
every sort of civil, every sort of politic institution, aiding the
rational and natural ties that connect the human under-
standing and affections to the divine, are not more than
THE ACT OF VOTING.
151
necessary in order to build up that wonderful structure, man,
whose prerogative it is to be, in a great degree, a creature of
his own making, and who, when made as he ought to be
made, is destined to hold no trivial place in the creation.
But whenever man is put over men, as the better nature
ought ever to preside, in that case more particularly he
should, as nearly as possible, be approximated to his perfec-
tion."
"" 1
The proposal for such a consecration of the national work
cannot be strange in the ears of the people, for it is in ac-
cordance with the spirit of their common prayer for the High
Court of which the representatives are a part,-that all things
may be so ordered and settled by their endeavours upon the
best and surest foundations, that peace and happiness, truth
and justice, religion and piety, may be established among us
for all generations.
¹ Reflections, &c., p. 137.
152
CHAPTER VIII.
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
3
THE duties on the returning officer, so far as they are
affected by the proposed law, will be,-upon a dissolution of
Parliament, to receive daily from the registrar of electors
the "Gazette," containing the names of candidates,' and to
direct the publication and distribution of copies at such
places as shall be most accessible to the electors. On the day
of the election to receive, through the agency of the polling-
clerks whom he will appoint, the voting papers; and, at
its close, to report to the registrar the number of votes
which have been polled,2 and after receiving the declaration
of the quota to make the return to the writ of the due
election of the candidate or candidates for the constituency
for which he officiates. In some cases, as in large consti-
tuencies, he may be able to make that return without the
assistance of the registrars; in other cases, as in small or
very divided constituencies, he will not be able to make it
until the voting papers have been sorted by the registrars.
Other and subordinate duties, such as that of finally collect-
ing, arranging, and binding up all the voting papers of his
constituency, for future reference and verification if required,
are mentioned elsewhere. The day of election throughout
1 See Clauses VIII. and IX., pp. 96, 97, and see Form of the Gazetted
List, p. 97.
3 Clause III.
4 Clauses XXIII., XXV.
2 Clause I.
4
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
153
the kingdom should be the same. The convenience of
persons having votes as well in counties as in a borough, or
corporate constituency, may be provided for in a manner
hereafter suggested.
XV. The same day shall, at every general election, be appointed for the
poll, throughout the kingdom, and shall be specified in the writ; but such
day shall not be less than
days, nor more than
days after
the date of the said writ (which writ shall be framed and expressed in such
manner and form as is necessary for carrying this Act into effect), and the
respective sheriffs and returning officers shall, on receipt of the writ and
the precept, respectively, forthwith make proclamation, and give notice of
the day of such poll, and of the respective polling-places at which the same
will be taken, within the limits of their respective counties, boroughs, or
districts, and for their respective constituencies.
The votes should be taken at polling places opened in every
parish, and if the parish be very large and populous, at several
places in the same parish. If it be populous, but not of any
wide extent, a larger staff of clerks at one place might be
sufficient.
It is plain that a system of registration, having any pre-
tensions to be adapted to its true purposes, facilitating the
business of the election, distinguishing between those whose
qualifications have ceased and those which continue,-between
the living and the dead,―must be a registration effected by
different means, having for its basis the residence of the voter,
and not the place of qualification only.¹ It is in no way
necessary that expense should be incurred in the erection of
polling-booths. There are few parishes in the kingdom
which do not contain some building applicable to a public
use, as, for example, a school-room, which, without incon-
venience, could be used for one day. If, in a few remote
places, such a room or building could not be found, there
would be no difficulty in hiring some room in a public or
¹ See "Defects on the Existing Law of Registration," &c., by W. Albert
James, 1859, pp. 42, 43, 44.
154
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
even a private house for the short period during which it
would be required.
In the cases of parish school-rooms, or National or British
schools, a small payment of a guinea or two for the hire of
the room for a day would often be thankfully added to the
subscriptions by which the institution is sustained. In order
to obviate all doubts which trustees and others may entertain
as to their powers for so harmless an enlargement of the
purposes of the edifice, a compulsory power might very pro-
perly be given to the returning officer to use the building for
a single day. It may be thus expressed :-
XVI. The returning officer for every electoral district is empowered, at a
general election, to take and use as a polling-place to be occupied for that
purpose during the day of election, but no longer, upon giving seven days'
notice of his intention to that effect, any room or rooms of competent space
in any school-house or other building supported wholly or in part by any
public or parochial funds, or by any perpetual endowment, or which has
been built or is supported wholly or in part by any grant under the control
of the Committee of Council for Education; and he shall pay a reasonable
sum for the hire of such room or place, together with the full cost of
repairing any injury or damage which may be occasioned to the premises or
the furniture thereof by the said use, such hire and damages, in the event
of the returning officer and the managers or trustees or owners of the said
premises differing about the same, to be settled by two justices of the peace,
one to be chosen by the returning officer, and the other by the said trustees,
managers, or owners.
The schoolmasters of the National and British Schools who
would be liberated for the day from their duties, would form
a class in which very intelligent clerks would be found to
assist in the reception of the votes: they are not often so
well paid as to make the remuneration for their extra services
on that day unacceptable. The pupil teachers would in many
cases also be competent and useful assistants; nor would at-
tention to duties of this nature be in any case undeserving of
regard as an element of education. Every vote, it will be
remembered, is expressed on a document, which remains as a
record, and there is no room for error on the part of the
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS. 155
clerk, which is not easy of correction. The process of
receiving the voting papers was pointed out with much detail in
former editions. These are now, for the most part, superseded
by the Ballot Act. As an additional provision, it is proposed
that there shall be a tabular book kept at the poll by a clerk,
having nothing to do with any other than the first name on
the voting paper, and entering, as the voting paper comes to
his hands, the number indorsed upon it in his book under that
name. This tabular book is composed of a series of columns
ruled vertically, one of which is appropriated to every candi-
date first named in any of the voting papers delivered to him.
The form may be as follows:-
Borough of
Polling Place [A.]
CLERK.

W. Pitt.
H. St. John.
W. Fortescue.
F. Campbell.
G. Methuen.
12
182
2
4
3
HO
5
6
7
9
33
15
28
10
16
13
11
17
14
20
18
27
21
19
22
26
23
32
24
25
29
30
31
6
3
13
2
со
8
1
The names at the head of the several columns in the above
table represent those of supposed candidates, and the numbers
underneath the several names are the numbers on the back of
¹ The Ballot Act has adopted the substance of the last clause as to the use
of school-rooms, enabling them, however, to be taken free of charge (S. 6).
T. Osborne.
156
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
the voting papers. By adding up the number of votes given
for each candidate, as is done at the foot of every column in
the above table,-the state of the poll at that particular
polling place would be known at any moment. If a certain
number of lines were ruled horizontally across the tabular
book, and each number written on one line, as soon as each
column was full the number of votes shown in it would be
ascertained even without the labour of counting. The com-
putation of the entire result, when the register and voting
papers are brought to the place of election, at which the
returning officer or his assessor officiates, would be purely
mechanical, and the work of a few minutes.
[In a modification of this system, in which it is proposed
that the votes for the 298 constituencies of England and
Wales should be transmitted to an Enumeration Office in
London, to be under the superintendence of the Clerk of the
Crown, and presided over by the chief officers of State, the
following tabular form of record and publication is suggested.
It is here introducel as suitable and convenient for the use of
the registrars, in a later stage of the computation, under the
system now proposed:-

Christian or
First Names.
Surnames.
Thomas Dyke Acland.
Hugh Edward
Adair
•
Rt. Hon. Sir C. B.
Edward
Adderley
Ackroyd
Ralph Shuttleworth
Allen
William Shepherd
Allen
Weston Cracroft
Amcotts
&c. &c.
&c.
Totals of Votes in each
Constituency
}
Abingdon.
Andover.
Anglesea.
Ashton-under-Lync.
Aylesbury.
Banbury.
Barnstaple, &c.
Total of Votes
to each
Candidate.

DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS. 157
The names of the constituencies, as well as the surnames of
the candidates, to be printed in alphabetical order, and in the
last column to the right the total number of votes given to
each candidate to be entered, and in the lowest line the total
number of votes given in each constituency.'
Under this modification the returning officers have only to
receive and transmit the votes. Mr. Dobbs, after adopting
as a basis that each elector shall have one vote, and must vote
in the constituency where he resides, but that he may vote for
any candidate in the kingdom, proceeds," The votes of each
part of the United Kingdom are now conveyed to the Enume-
ration Offices in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin. Take
London. As soon as the poll closes, the deputy returning
officer, in the presence of the public, covers and seals the slit
in the lid of his box. He then writes on a form the number
of voting cards he has deposited in it; each clerk counts in
the stamps in his register, and enters the amount on the form.
The two numbers, if one clerk, or the number entered by the
deputy and the total of the different clerks' number, should
agree. Under no circumstances may a deputy open the box,
or allow it to be opened. He is responsible for the con-
veyance of the box and written form to the chief returning
officer of the constituency, who is waiting their arrival at an
appointed place. As they come in, they are opened in the
presence of the chief officer, and of such deputies, magistrates,
election agents, and electors as may choose to be present, and
transferred into one box sufficiently large to contain them,
which, when it has received the contents of all the boxes, is
locked and sealed. It is then delivered into the custody of
the post officer who gives receipt, and thereupon the Post
Office becomes responsible for its safe delivery at the Enume-
ration Office in London. The chief returning officers through-
out the kingdom add up the totals entered on the forms, and
send the forms in a packet by post, telegraphing the total to
the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, who, on receiving the
1 General Representation, &c., by Archibald E. Dobbs. Longmans,
1872. 2nd edition.
158 DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
totals from all the constituencies in England and Wales,
publishes the sum as the total number of electors who have
polled therein, and, dividing it by 493, the number of English
and Welsh seats, declares the quotient, omitting fractions, to
be the English quota. On receiving the totals from Scot-
land and dividing by 60, and from Ireland dividing by 105,
he declares the quotient to be the quota for Scotland and
Ireland respectively."
"" 1
The latter provision assumes that the number of members
for each of the three kingdoms is fixed. The system proposed
in this treatise avoids any such prescribed limit, treating
England, Scotland, and Ireland, precisely alike. The state-
ment of the method thus suggested will, however, show that
the application of the preferential and proportional system is
not dependent on any adherence to one particular process,
that it may be effected in various forms, and under different
adaptations of electoral machinery.
It may appear that it is entering into an unnecessary degree
of detail to undertake the explanation of these minor arrange-
ments of the business of the election; but, in truth, a closer
consideration will show that there is no step which it is not
important to make clear. Upon the establishment of a
rational system of representation, vast interests are depending.
It is not possible to conceive any subject affecting the temporal
welfare of mankind of greater importance. The almost uni-
versal disposition is to turn aside from such considerations, with
the despairing cry that it is impossible to make the repre-
sentation pure and faithful. It should therefore be shown
that there is no difficulty in establishing a better state of
things. In what is proposed there is much less complexity
than is daily encountered and overcome by the purest me-
chanical arrangements in the clearing-house of the London
bankers, or in the General Post Office. In explaining by a
¹ Ib., pp. 10-14, 21. § 4. Of the Transmission of the Votes; and § 5.
Of the Enumeration of the Votes. § 8. Of the use of the Tabular Form.
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS. 159
written narrative, the process of operation, every sort of ma-
chinery has an appearance of complexity. This would be
immediately felt by any one who should endeavour, in words,
to explain to another, who had not seen it, the operation of
Jacquard's loom, or of the steam engine. An attempt is,
however, made to bring the proceedings of an election of
representatives,—such as it ought to be amongst an intelligent
and free people in a civilized age,—as vividly as possible before
the eyes of every reader.
2
We have reached the stage of the proceeding at which the
voting papers, some containing many and some few names,
or a single name,' have been taken at the polling places.
These, with the tabular books of the polling clerks, are col-
lected at the town or county hall, or other central place,
where the returning officer presides. If there should be
several polling places, they must be severally distinguished
by a name or mark,-as by letters A, B, &c., so that, in
sorting the voting papers, those received at the several polling
places be always taken in consecutive order. In large con-
stituencies, where the town hall or other chief point of con-
centration is ready of access from all the polling places, it
would be desirable that the votes and tabular books should be
collected several times during the day, that the process of
sorting may be going on contemporaneously with the other
business of the election. In such constituencies, it will soon
be found that favourite candidates have votes exceeding in
number their required quota, and which votes will therefore
become available for the next candidate (if any) named in the
voting papers.
It is probable that the voting papers will sometimes contain.
the name of a person on the gazetted lists, who has not
offered himself as a candidate for the particular constituency
to which the duties of the returning officer exclusively refer,
but whom, notwithstanding the voter has, by selecting for the
¹ Page 124.
2 Page 157.
160 DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
first place on his paper, proposed as a fit person to represent
it. Where any such names occur first on the voting paper,
the business of the returning officer will be to forward them
to the registrar. The returning officer is to confine his
attention (except as to such transmission) to the voting
papers in which the name of a candidate, or of the several
candidates, for his particular constituency stand at the head,-
that is, are named successively, one or two, or any successive
number, according to the voters' peculiar predilection, down
to the point at which he introduces the name of one on the
list who is not a candidate for his special constituency. As
soon as such other name intervenes, a further combination is
introduced, which brings the appropriation within the de-
partment of the registrar.
Suppose the case of several thousand voters, and one or two
candidates for the constituency, having each more than the
quota required. The returning officer ascertains, first, who
have the majorities, counting on this occasion only the voting
papers in which the candidate has the first votes, -he then
separates the 1840, or 2000, or whatever the quota may be,
last polled for the candidate who has the majority, and causes
his name, where it stands at the head of the other papers, to
be cancelled. The second name on those papers then becomes
the first, and the voting papers making up the quota for the
second candidate are taken, and his name cancelled on the
remaining papers, bringing a third name forward to the first
place, and so on, until the name of one who is a candidate
elsewhere occurs, or until the quota can no longer be made.
up; and the returning officer then forwards the remaining
voting papers to the registrar.
These duties may be prescribed by the rules¹ or laws
which follow :-
1 These clauses would with more propriety form rules of the same law,
but they have been made distinct clauses for the greater convenience of
reference.
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS. 161
1
XVII. The returning officer of every constituency shall, at the close of
the poll, and as soon as is practicable after the voting papers have been
collected, ascertain and certify to the registrar the aggregate number of votes
which has been polled by the constituency of which he is such returning
officer, and he shall then ascertain and declare the number of voters which
has been polled in the same constituency for the several candidates re-
spectively, counting for such purpose only the votes for the candidates
whose names are placed at the head of or first on the respective voting
papers; and when the returning officer shall have received from the
registrars their declaration of the quota of voters at such general election as
aforesaid, if one or more candidate or candidates shall have so polled in
such constituency the quota or quota of votes, then the said returning officer
shall (after setting apart the said quota or quotas as hereinafter directed)
forthwith return the candidate or candidates for whom the majorities or
greater numbers of voters of the said constituency shall have polled (he or
they having such quota or quotas as aforesaid) as the member or members
to serve in Parliament for such constituency.
2
XVIII. The candidate, whose name is placed first in the voting papers of
the constituency for which he is a candidate, shall be the candidate for
whom the votes in such voting papers respectively shall be taken; and if
the quota of such candidate shall not be made up by such votes, then the
votes in the voting papers of the same constituency in which he shall be
placed second, and then third, and so on successively, shall be taken for him
in case all the names standing higher in any such voting paper shall have
been cancelled as hereinafter directed.
The next law prescribes the order in which every voting
paper is to be appropriated.
XIX. All the votes on voting papers in which any candidate is named
alone shall be appropriated to him; and if such votes be less in number
than the quota, then the votes on voting papers in which he is named first,
or first after any cancelled name or names shall be so appropriated, and if
such votes shall exceed in number the quota required, the number of the said
quota and no more (except as otherwise hereinafter provided) shall be
appropriated to such candidate, and such quota shall be made up by
taking-first, the voting papers that contain the uncancelled name of no
other candidate; and next, the voting papers that contain the uncancelled
names of one, two, or other number of candidates, successively, taking
always the voting papers respectively containing a smaller, before those
containing a larger number of such uncancelled names; and when it shall
appear that two or more of such voting papers contain an equal number of
1 Clause I., p. 25.
2 Clause III., P. 25.
ΝΙ
162 DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
uncancelled names of candidates, then the quota shall be made up of the
votes polled for the said candidate, beginning at the last so polled which
shown by
are otherwise equal as aforesaid, and so on to the earlier of such votes in the
ber order of their reception as (indorsed) on the said voting papers;¹ and for the
purpose of recording the said order, and of ascertaining which shall be
taken to form the quota in case there shall be more than one polling place,
the polling places shall be distinguished by consecutive letters or marks;
and the votes appearing by such indorsement to have been last received at
every polling place consecutively, according to the said distinguishing
numbers or marks, shall be first taken pari passu; but so much of the
foregoing rule of appropriation as directs that the voting papers containing the
smaller shall be taken before those containing the larger number of names, shall
be subject always to the provisions regarding locality and association contained
in Clause XXIV. of this Act; and as soon as the quota of votes to be
attributed to any candidate shall be thus ascertained, the voting papers
making up the said quota shall be set apart by the returning officer (or by
the registrar, as the case may be); and thereupon the name of the said
candidate shall be cancelled on all the remaining voting papers, by being
stamped across the same by a stamp of a form to be settled and provided by
the registrars, and furnished by them to the returning officer for such use.
The duties of the returning officer in the appropriation of
the voting papers are now at an end, and he has only to
transmit the remainder to the registrar.
XX. The returning officers, after setting apart the number of voting
papers which make up the quota, or respective quotas, of the candidate or
candidates (if any) so returned as aforesaid, shall, as soon as possible after
the close of the poll, transmit the remainder of the said voting papers; and
if no candidate has obtained the said quota and been returned as aforesaid,
then they shall transmit the whole of the said voting papers to the registrars
respectively, by the hands of one of the sworn poll-clerks, or some other
competent messenger, accompanied by a certificate of the names of the
candidates for whom such votes are given, and the number of votes given
to every candidate respectively, counting only the candidates first named, or
first named after the cancelled name or names in the said voting papers,
together with the total number of voting papers so transmitted, and the
number of registered electors who have not polled at such election.
It is necessary to provide also for other new circumstances.
The increase of constituencies by the admission of several
hundred towns at present unrepresented, and perhaps of many
ancient as well as modern corporations, of a public character,
1 See p. 156.
་
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS. 163
-universities and colleges,-to the right of returning repre-
sentatives, will probably create many more constituencies than
there are, or can be members in the House. All, or many of
the contributory boroughs, also, instead of having one member
to four or five towns, may apply for an order enabling them
to act severally. Candidates will, therefore, frequently offer
themselves for more than one constituency. The candidate
for Ayr may be candidate also for Campbeltown and Irvine.
If Trinity College, or Lincoln's Inn, had power to make a
separate return of a representative, the candidate for Trinity
College, of which he may be a distinguished member, might
be also a candidate for his county, or a town adjacent to
his estate; and the candidate for the Society of Lincoln's
Inn might be a candidate also for the metropolis or for any
parish in the metropolis, according as the metropolitan com-
munity should prefer to form aggregate or separate electoral
bodies. In all cases in which one person might happen to
be a candidate for more than one constituency, it would only
be the returning officer for the first constituency, which he
specifies in his notice to the registrar,' and which is stated in
the Gazette,² who could, immediately after the close of the
poll, return him. If this were otherwise, there might be a
conflict in the action of two constituencies. If his quota be
made up in the first constituency, he cannot be returned in
the second³ until after his votes in that constituency shall
have been forwarded to the registrar, and the result certified.
If his quota be not made up on the first constituency, his
votes will of course be also transmitted by that returning
officer to the registrar.
XXI. Where one person is a candidate for the representation of more
than one constituency, all the voting papers on which he is placed No. 1,
which are polled in the constituencies other than the first for which he is
1 P. 97.
2 P. 97.
3 He may titularly represent the second or other constituencies. See
Chap. X.
164 DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
described in the gazetted list as a candidate, shall be forwarded by the
returning officers to the registrars as aforesaid, notwithstanding they may
exceed in number the quota.
The powers and duties of the returning officer thus differ
in cases where the number of votes polled by the constituency
affords the quota to one or more of the candidates, and in the
cases of the smaller constituencies, or where great differences of
sentiment prevail, and the total number of votes given, or given.
for any particular candidate, is insufficient to complete the quota.
In the first case he will return the candidates having the majo-
rities, supposing each to make up at least the quota,—as duly
elected, and will transmit the surplus votes to the registrar;
and in the latter cases he will transmit the whole of the voting
paper to the registrar, without doing more than certifying the
numbers polled for every candidate, awaiting the certificate of
the registrar as to the fact of any of the candidates having or
not having his quota supplied by votes from other places.
Aberdeen may be taken as an example of one of the first-
class constituencies. At the last election there were two can-
didates; and supposing that to be the case, and that under a
system such as that which has been suggested some of the
voters give a preference to, and place at the head of their
voting papers the names of, some candidates for other places,
the computation of numbers at the close of the poll might
stand as it is represented in the following certificate and
letter, in which the returning officer of the city of Aberdeen
is supposed to communicate the result to the registrar at
Edinburgh.
Aberdeen,
1859.
Sir, I certify that, at a poll this day taken for a member to serve in
Parliament for the city of Aberdeen, 1,850 of the electors of the said city
have given their votes for William Henry Sykes, Esq., and that the said
number of votes forms a majority of the electors of the said city, or is a
greater number thereof than has polled for any other candidate.
I also certify, that the said William Henry Sykes having, as aforesaid,
more than the number of 1,840 votes, which number of 1,840 is the quota of
votes specified in the certificate, signed by the Registrars of voters for
England, Scotland, and Ireland, and contained in the London Gazette,
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
165
dated the
I have made my return to her Majesty's
writ to the effect that the said William Henry Sykes has been duly elected
a member to serve in Parliament for the said city.
I also certify, that I have caused 1,840 voting papers of the said 1,850
polled for the said William Henry Sykes, taken in the order prescribed by
Sect. 19 of the Act, to be sealed under my official seal, and the same are
retained by me; and that the name of the said William Henry Sykes
having been cancelled on the remaining 10 voting papers, the same re-
spectively have been appropriated to the candidates respectively secondly
named therein, and that, after such appropriation, it appears that the votes
not polled for the said William Henry Sykes, and beyond the quota
necessary for his return as aforesaid, are 2,588 in number, and that the same
have been respectively given to, and are now appropriated for, the other can-
didates hereinafter named according to the numbers stated opposite to their
names respectively, viz. :—
of
John Farley Leith, Esq.
Lord Elcho
•
Henry James Baillie, Esq.
Hon. Arthur Gordon
Edward Ellice, Jun., Esq.
Colonel Robert Ferguson.
Robert Campbell, Esq.
Alexander Dunlop, Esq.
•
1549
483
250
225
•
48
30
2
1
And I acquaint you that I have transmitted to you, by the hands
>
one of the poll-clerks appointed and duly sworn to
officiate at the said election, the said 2,588 voting papers.
I also certify, that it appears that 119 registered electors of the said city
have not voted at the poll this day.
I have, &c.,
To the Registrar for Scotland.
Returning Officer for the City of Aberdeen.
It will be observed that the names in the above certificate,
other than that of Mr. Leith, are the names of gentlemen
who are supposed not to have been candidates for Aberdeen,
but to have been candidates elsewhere, and for whom some.
Aberdeen voters have thus indicated their preference by giving
unsolicited votes.
The certificate of the returning officer in the case of the
166 DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
smaller constituencies would be in a still more simple form,
thus:
Ashburton,
1859.
Sir, I certify that at a poll this day taken for a member to serve in
Parliament for the borough of Ashburton, the votes of 220 electors for the
said borough were polled for the several candidates hereinafter named, being
the candidates first named in the voting papers respectively, viz. :—
George Moffat, Esq.
Sir James Weir Hogg, Bart.
Charles Seale Hayne, Esq.
John Hardy, Esq.
James Taylor, Jun., Esq.
George Pott, Esq.
•
Henry Thoby Prinsep, Esq.
John Gregory, Esq.
And I have transmitted to you by the hands of
150
22
14
10
8
8
7
1
>
one of
the poll-clerks appointed and duly sworn to officiate at the said election, the
said 220 voting papers.
I also certify, that it appears that sixteen registered electors of the said
borough have not voted at the poll this day.
I have, &c.,
Returning Officer of the Borough of Ashburton.
To the Registrar for England.
Another provision with respect to the duties of the return-
ing officers will be that which relates to the returns they will
be required to make of members for their several consti-
tuencies,—not founded upon their own calculations of the
number of votes, but upon the casting up of the votes in the
offices of the registrars, in which the votes polled in other
constituencies are brought in aid. In these cases the certifi-
cates of the registrars will be the evidence and the authority
on which the returning officers will necessarily act.
XXII. Upon the receipt by the returning officer of the certificate of the
registrar, that the quota of votes of any candidate for whom a vote or
votes has or have been given in the constituency of which he is such re-
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
167
turning officer, has been completed, or that such candidate has obtained a
comparative majority, as hereinafter mentioned, and if the member, or full
number of members which the same constituency is entitled to elect, shall
not have been returned, then the said returning officer shall, if such candi-
date has polled a majority or greater number of votes of such constituency
than any other candidate, and any of such votes shall have been appropriated
to him according to the rules hereinafter prescribed, return such candidate so
certified to him, or so many of such candidates as shall complete the
number of members which the said constituency is entitled to elect, as duly
elected to serve in Parliament; and if the candidate or candidates having
a majority or greater number of votes in such constituency shall not have
obtained the quota or comparative majority, as aforesaid, then the said
returning officer shall so return such or so many of the said candidates,
not exceeding the number the said constituency is entitled to elect, as
shall be certified by the registrar to have obtained the quota or comparative
majority, and who shall have polled in the said constituency such highest
or higher number of votes, exclusive of the candidate or candidates who
have so failed in obtaining the said quota or comparative majority; and in
the ultimate computation of such majority or greater number of votes polled
for any candidate in a particular constituency (who has obtained the quota
or comparative majority as aforesaid), the returning officer thereof shall not
regard the cancellation of the names of any such candidate on the voting
papers thereof, owing to such votes being in excess of the quota of such
candidate, but shall, in computing such majority or greater number of votes
of the particular constituency, count such votes, whether the same be or be
not cancelled as aforesaid, both for the candidate or candidates whose name
or names has or have been so cancelled, and for the candidate or candidates
to whom they have been appropriated; and shall also add thereto all other
votes of the same constituency which shall be appropriated to him or them
under Clause XXVI. of this Act.
The effect of this law may be illustrated by supposing, in
the above case of Aberdeen, that the registrars had certified
that Mr. Leith, Mr. Baillie, Lord Elcho, and Mr. Ellice had,
and that no other of the candidates had, obtained the full
complement of votes. Mr. Leith would then be returned as
the second member. Assuming that Aberdeen were entitled
to return a third member, that the other successful candidates
were Lord Elcho, Mr. Baillie, and Mr. Ellice, and that none
of the 250 votes given for Mr. Baillie had been appropriated
to him, his quota being completed without their aid, by voters
of the constituency to which he had offered himself, or the
168
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
neighbouring constituencies who, according to Law XXIV.,
had a prior right to have their votes appropriated to him;
and supposing that the whole, or part, of the 483 Aberdeen
votes given for Lord Elcho had been appropriated to him, the
residue of his quota being made up by his supporters in other
places, he would be the third member entitled to be returned.
for Aberdeen.
Many other results may be supposed, to show the working
of the system. Thus Lord Elcho, Mr. Baillie, Mr. Ellice,
and the candidates mentioned as having a smaller number of
Aberdeen votes, may all be elected by the constituencies for
which they are candidates, and their names being there-
upon cancelled on the Aberdeen voting papers, those votes will
be given to the next candidate named on each paper. If such
next candidate be Mr. Gordon (although it is of course im-
probable that all of them would be given to one person) the
number of Aberdeen votes for Mr. Gordon would be raised
from 225 to 1,039, and might, with his votes elsewhere,
entitle him to be returned for Aberdeen. It would not follow
in either of the cases last supposed, that, because the number
of Aberdeen votes which are actually appropriated to Lord
Elcho or Mr. Gordon may be few, the number of Aberdeen
voters who have placed their names on their voting papers
may not be very much more numerous. Many of the voters
of that city who have voted for other candidates, successful
or unsuccessful, whether they were candidates for Aberdeen
or for other constituencies, may have placed the names of Lord
Elcho or Mr. Gordon also on their voting papers, and these
votes in the ultimate computation, as directed by the foregoing
clause, and by a subsequent clause (XXVI.) will be reckoned
as votes polled for the two unsuccessful candidates. Many of
the votes given for Mr. Leith, Mr. Baillie, and others, might
have contained also the name of Colonel Sykes, and many of
the votes polled for Colonel Sykes might have contained also
the names of Lord Elcho, Mr. Leith, and Mr. Gordon, and
ان کے یہ ہیں
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS. 169
therefore, although as to the first votes the state of the poll
appears as it is above set out by the returning officer, yet on
the ultimate declaration of the poll it is not impossible (al-
though improbable) that Colonel Sykes and the other success-
ful candidates, whoever they may be, had as many as 4,388
votes each. It would occupy a large space to describe all the
possible results of the free manifestation of thought and senti-
ment which would be the consequence of the liberation and
conscientious employment of the electoral forces which are
now latent, and wasted or mischievously exercised.
It will be observed that the latter part of Clause XXII.
which prescribes the ultimate method to be employed by the
returning officers in computing the local majorities, is designed
further to indicate and develop the especial preferences of
local and special constituencies. In giving to every con-
stituency its proper share or material weight in the actual
composition of the representative body, it has been necessary
to equalize the force of every vote by appropriating it to one
candidate only. When the representive body is completed
there is no longer any reason for refusing to any elector the
full manifestation of the confidence he has expressed in the
representatives of his choice, or for withholding from any
member the moral influence which will naturally flow from
the multiplied number, as well as the character of his con-
stituents and supporters. The operation of this final method
of computation may be further illustrated thus:-Suppose
Norwich to return three members, and that there are six can-
didates, A to F, whose votes, counting not only those at the
head, but also the second, third, and all successive votes given
for any of them on the Norwich voting papers (so long as the
name of a non-candidate for that city does not intervene),
stand as follows:
A.
3,500
D.
1,500
Ᏼ .
3,000
E.
1,200
C.
2,500
F.
1,000
170 DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
The Norwich voters are here supposed to have voted some
perhaps for one of their candidates, some for two, some for
three or more. Some voters may even have inserted all
the names in the order of their preference. In the business
of appropriation, according to Law XIX., taking the quota at
2,000, the first votes given to A will be reduced to that
number, and the surplus of the first votes distributed to the
next names on the various papers. The same process will
take place with B, distributing the surplus of his first votes.
and any others which B may have acquired from the distribu-
tion of A's surplus, in like manner. But 4,000 Norwich
voters are now exhausted, and in doing this, perhaps a large
portion of the papers on which the names of C, D, E, and
F stood, may have been exclusively appropriated to A or
B, and served to complete the number required for their
return.
Now it may be that C, D, and E are candidates of much
local popularity, but without any considerable fame beyond
the walls of the city, whilst F might be a person of an
eminent political, scientific, or literary reputation, or a Nor-
folk gentleman regarded by some of the citizens as one of the
worthies of their county. F, from these causes might have
numerous votes in Norfolk, in the metropolis, in the universities,
or in other parts of the kingdom, and thus be returned, although
no more than 500, or a smaller number, of the citizens of
Norwich had given him their first votes, or their second or third
votes after A or B. It then becomes the duty of the returning
officer under the foregoing clause-on receiving the registrar's
certificate that F has, and that C, D, and E have not, obtained
a quota or comparative majority-to return F as well as A and
B as members for the city of Norwich.
It is probable in the supposed case of Norwich, as in that
of Aberdeen, that many of the voters for the non-candidates
who have failed, may have placed the names of some of the
three successful candidates in a lower place on their voting
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
171
papers, and the ultimate declaration of the state of the Nor-
wich poll may, therefore, show that each of the three success-
ful candidates, A, B, and F, has a considerably larger number
of Norwich supporters than appears in the first statement of
the poll, given above.
The portion of the above law which makes it one condition
of the return of a candidate for a particular constituency that
some of the votes thereof shall not only have been tendered,
but actually appropriated to him, when coupled with the
provisions of Clause XXIV., which regulate the appropriation
of votes, according to the neighbourhood or nature of the
different constituencies, constitute a further security that the
members shall have an intimate and personal relation with
the special constituencies by which they are severally elected.
The votes so appropriated must be those of the constituencies
for which they were candidates, and those who are nearest to,
and most likely to be connected with, and interested in, the
same localities.
A word may here be added to remove any impression
which a superficial view of the supposed result of the
Norwich election may create, that some injustice has been
done to C, D, and E, or their supporters, by the election of
F. The cardinal principle is, that no vote can be appro-
priated to, or affect the return of, more than one member;
and, therefore, when the votes for A and B are appropriated,
the whole, or a large part, of those given for C, D, and E,
being on the same papers, would by that means be exhausted.
None of them could be used to aid the return of more than
one person. And as to the Norwich votes on which either
C, D, or E were placed first, it may be assumed to the credit
of those voters that they have sufficient knowledge of their
contemporaries, and sufficient interest in political affairs, not
to confine their appreciation to those candidates exclusively,
but to have provided other alternatives in their voting papers,
according to which their votes will be ultimately appropriated
172 DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
to some member of like principle or character who may be
chosen by the majorities or minorities of other consti-
tuencies.
The state of the Norwich poll, however, is not likely to be
fully represented in the above table. Some citizens of
Norwich might be natives of other parts of England, or of
Scotland, or Ireland, and be influenced by sentiments in
favour of candidates connected with such other places, or
may have especial predilections overruling any local feeling,
and desire to give such a direction to their votes as shall
contribute to the return of candidates other than those who
have offered themselves to the city of Norwich. Thus, in
addition to the votes given for the candidates A to F, as
above stated, suppose there are first, or first uncancelled,
votes of citizens of Norwich for―
G
H
I
22
17
16
K
L
M
12
4
2 +3
The registrars, having only to acquaint the returning officers
of the ultimate result of the appropriation, will, under
Clause XXV., inform them which of the candidates G, H, I, K,
L, M, have, and which have not, obtained the necessary quota
or comparative majority; but whether they have or not been
thus successful, the Norwich return will not be affected, for
A, B, and F are the successful candidates to whom the
greatest number of the Norwich voters have given their
primary and effectual support.
The discretion which some of the Norwich voters are thus
supposed to have exercised, in setting a higher regard on
general, national, intellectual, or social predilections, than on
those which are governed simply by locality, cannot be a just
subject of complaint by any of their fellow-citizens, for the
voters so acting have done nothing which abridges or invades
in the smallest degree the political power of the other inha-
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS. 173
bitants of Norwich, but, on the contrary, have in fact in-
creased that power; for, in proposing for the choice of the
electors of Norwich several other candidates, and voting for
them instead of the Norwich candidates, those minorities of
electors have, in fact, abdicated their power of influencing
the Norwich return, and left the election entirely in the
hands of the other citizens. At the same time, though
powerless at Norwich, these small minorities are not neces-
sarily so elsewhere. They may have had an important influ-
ence in assisting to complete the number of votes required
for their favourite candidates, as is seen by looking at the fact
which has been supposed to have taken place at this election,
where a few of the voters of many other and perhaps remote
constituencies, including possibly some natives of Norwich, who
in distant places retain their affection for the place of their
birth, have given to the 1,000 electors of Norwich-it may be
of wider intelligence, higher intellectual range, or more com-
prehensive sympathies-the means of placing F in the posi-
tion of one of the chosen candidates for that city.
One other hypothesis will suffice to explain the electoral
position of such of the Aberdeen and Norwich voters, in the
cases supposed, as may have placed the names of unsuccessful
candidates at the head of their voting papers. None of these
votes can be at first appropriated to any candidate whose name
is placed lower on the paper; because, until the general
election is over, it cannot be known whether the first-named
candidate might not be one of those who succeed, and to
whose success that vote may contribute. Under a subsequent
law (Clause XXVI.) all votes in this condition will be appro-
priated to the highest successful candidate on each voting
paper. If the highest successful candidate of the voting
paper of an Aberdeen or Norwich voter be an Aberdeen or
Norwich member, the returning officer will reckon him
among that constituency; but however that may be, the voter
becomes part of the constituency of the member whose name
174 DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
stands highest on his paper, and in whom he has thus ex-
pressed greater confidence than in any other with regard to
whom he has been able to obtain the concurrence of a suffi-
cient number of his constituents. It is thus next to impos-
sible for any elector, except his sympathies be very narrow,
-to fail of being represented by some one whom he has
nominated for that purpose.
175
CHAPTER IX.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
THE establishment of registrars of electors in London, Edin-
burgh, and Dublin, who may promote uniformity of action
by the officers appointed to frame the local registers, and
attend to their constant correction, forming a constant
medium of communication in this important matter, would
be of vast advantage, even if their duties ended there.¹ They
1 The Select Committee of the House of Lords thus reported (26th June
1860), "The present system of registration is very imperfect, aud fails to
make effectual provision either for placing on the register all who are
entitled to vote, or for removing from it names improperly placed there.
Whatever approach to accuracy there is in the existing register seems
to be mainly due to the voluntary agency of political associations."
In a pamphlet on registration, by Mr. W. A. James, the author says:-" A
thorough improvement of the system generally, and a new arrangement of
the registers, may be made conducive to many reforms in the present mode
of completing parliamentary elections. There is no reason why the provi-
sions for registration should not afford every protection to the rights of
individual electors, and entail no trouble or annoyance, or why the register
should not be accurate and perfect. It is simply a matter of business
detail, in which few difficulties are presented, and these such as may be
overcome. Much practical experience has been gained, which was wanting
at the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, and may be brought to bear in
constructing and perfecting machinery which shall effect all the results
desired. Any reform to be satisfactory must not be a mere patching up of
the present system by amending it in isolated defective parts, but deal
comprehensively with the whole, and in a manner in keeping with the
change of circumstances time has introduced." "The facilities derived
from a vast network of railways and steam-navigation, the rapid inter-
change of intelligence by the electric telegraph, numerous post-office
176
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
may yet perform other very important functions in facilitating
the action of voters, saving the expense and labour of travel-
ling, and affording the means of receiving the votes of electors
unable to attend personally. On these points, and others
which are not necessarily connected with the scheme of repre-
sentation which it is the chief purpose of the present treatise
to submit, something will be said in a subsequent page.
1
Some portion of the duties of the registrars, in respect of
this system of forming the representative assembly, has been
necessarily mentioned elsewhere. They are to superintend all
the local and other registers of electors, ascertain and certify
the quota of voters at general elections, and conduct the
occasional elections." They are to receive the names of the
candidates, and the payments suggested, which will form a
fund to be called the "Registrars' Fund," applicable to the
support of the establishment, and the expense of performing
its various duties ;3 and they are to publish the lists of the
candidates in the respective Gazettes, and transmit copies to
the various constituencies."
.3
The registrars, in their duties of sorting and appropriating
the votes which are forwarded to them from the various con-
stituencies, will be strictly governed by prescribed rules,
calculated most perfectly to give effect to the will of every
individual elector, as expressed on his voting paper.
The returning officers at the general election which is now
supposed to be in progress will in many of the larger consti-
C
reforms, the advantages of book-postage and registered letters, the perfected
system for the registration of deaths, and a hundred other like improve-
ments, were unknown when the Registration Clauses' were under dis-
cussion. All these may be brought to bear practically upon the business
of registration, and tend to its perfection." (P. C1.) That the registration of
electors should be allowed to remain in its present state is a lamentable
proof of the utter insincerity of public men on Parliamentary Reform.
1 Clauses I, and III.
3 Clause VII.
(2 Clauses XXIX., XXX., and XXXI?) e
4 Clauses VIII. and IX.
le
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
177
tuencies, have been enabled to make their returns of mem-
bers; and in those places it will be only the excess of, or
unappropriated, voting papers that will be transmitted to the
registrars. The completed returns will have greatly reduced
the aggregate number of voting papers of which the results
are undetermined,-the number unappropriated, however,
would be still large. In addition to these there would be the
whole of the votes given in the smaller constituencies, which
have not singly sufficient electors to make up a quota, and in
others, where a sufficient number had not concurred in
doing so.
A large amount of clerical or mechanical labour will, of
course, be necessary in dealing with the mass of documents
thus brought to the offices of the registrars, and an extensive.
space must necessarily be occupied as office room for the few
days during which the sorting and appropriation of the voting
papers are in progress; but neither will probably be greater
than is employed daily at the General Post-office.
The registrars will have a small permanent establishment
of experienced clerks attached to their several offices. They
will, on the occasion of a general election, have the assistance
of the poll-clerks from the local constituencies, by whom the
lists are brought from the returning officers, and of whom all
the more efficient may be retained during the business of the
appropriation of votes. Of these clerks there will be 400 or
500, or more. They may be further assisted by a sufficient
number of clerks of character and experience, permitted to
attend, at extra remuneration, for two or three days, from
other public offices. The services of the several classes of
clerks thus employed will be paid from the "Registrars'
Fund."
At the point to which the election is now supposed to have
reached, the registrars have before them the certificates
of the various returning officers, and the voting papers
which have accompanied them. Their duties, and the
N
178
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
laws by which those duties are to be regulated, have now to
be stated.
1
Some of the registrar's clerks being provided with tables of
the names of the candidates arranged alphabetically, at the
head of distinct columns, like the tabular book before de-
scribed, the number of votes expressed on the returning
officers' certificates to have been given for every candidate
may be called over, and speedily entered under the names of
the respective candidates, thereby showing how many votes.
every candidate has received, according to those certificates.
This process, when completed-which it would probably be
in an hour or two,-will show that many candidates who
have been returned as elected by the constituencies which
they named first in the gazetted list,2 have received votes in
other constituencies. This will doubtless be the case to a
great extent with all men of high character and eminence.
In all such cases, the names of the members so previously
returned will be cancelled upon the voting papers in which
their names are repeated, in the manner directed by Section
XIX.
The registrars have then to address themselves to the cases
in which no returns of members have been made. The num-
bers of votes expressed in the certificates of the returning
officers have now ceased to be guides, as to many candidates;
for by displacing the names of the members who have been
already returned, the names of other candidates are brought
forward to the first place on many of the voting papers,
which will make so many additions to the votes now to be
counted for such other candidates. The extent of this alter-
ation will be readily ascertained by the use of the tabular
books which have been mentioned. Every clerk having the
charge of the voting papers of a constituency will in a few
minutes ascertain the numerical variation effected in those
1 Page 157.
2 See Clause XXI.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
179
papers by the cancellation of the first names upon a certain
portion of them, and can report the result of such alteration,
that is to say, what additions are thereby made to the
votes given for other candidates. Additions will continue to
be made in like manner as the other quotas are completed,
and thus the name of every candidate having the quota
will soon be ascertained. The completion of such quotas
must then be certified by the registrars to the returning
officers of the several constituencies, where votes for such
candidates have been polled.
XXIII. The registrars respectively, as soon as it appears by the voting
papers appropriated to the respective candidates (according to the rules
herein contained), that the quota of votes has been polled for any candidate,
shall forthwith transmit a certificate of that fact to the returning officers for
the respective constituencies in which votes have been polled for such candi-
date or candidates, stating therein the number of votes of every constituency
respectively which have been appropriated to make up such quota.
The duty of the registrars, as well as of the returning
officers, with regard to setting apart the voting papers.
appropriated to every candidate, as soon as the appropriation
has been finally made, and also with regard to the cancella-
tion of the names of the same candidates, wherever they
occur, on the remaining voting papers, has already been pre-
scribed.¹ The same clause also points out the order in which
the voting papers shall be taken, up to the point at which
they cease to be under the jurisdiction of the returning
officers. It is now necessary to prescribe other rules as to
the order in which the votes shall be appropriated to the
candidates, in cases which cannot be dealt with by any parti-
cular returning officer, because the representation of two or
more constituencies is involved. In these arrangements,-
after disposing of the votes of the particular constituency or
constituencies for which a candidate has offered himself,-it
is important that there should, in the subsequent appropria-
tion, be a prescribed order to be followed without possibility
Clause XIX., p. 161.
180
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
of deviation, that the result may of necessity be accepted
without the possibility of complaint.
It should be observed that the proposed law is now framed
in contemplation of the cases of candidates who are found to
have, amongst the unappropriated voting papers of different
constituencies, more than the quota of votes; and the simple
point to be determined is, which of such votes shall be
actually and finally appropriated to the several candidates
having such excess of votes, and which of such votes shall
go over to another candidate standing lower on the voting
paper.
XXIV. The registrars shall, in the appropriation of the votes, proceed
according to the following rules :—
A. If the candidate be a candidate for the representation of several con-
stituencies, and shall not have been returned as a member for the
constituency that appears by the gazetted list to be the first con-
stituency for which he has declared himself a candidate, there shall be
taken for him,
1, the votes polled for him in such first-named constituency;
2, then the votes polled for him in the second and third-named and other
following constituencies, for which he has so offered himself con-
secutively;
3, then the votes polled for him in the remainder of the constituencies of
the United Kingdom in the order hereafter mentioned.
B. If the quota of any candidate be not made up of votes polled for him in
the constituency or constituencies for which he has, as appears by the
gazetted list, offered himself as a candidate, then,
(a) If he be a candidate for a county or a division of a county, or other
district, comprising within its geographical limits any borough or
other local constituency, there shall be taken for him,
1, the votes polled for him in the constituencies comprised within such
geographical limits in the alphabetical order of the names of such
borough or local constituencies; and
2, then the votes polled for him in the boroughs or local constituencies
nearest to any part of the external boundary of the said geographical
limit successively, in the order of their proximity, so far as they shall
be included within an area of [twenty] miles from such boundary ;
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
181
3, then the votes polled for him in other local constituencies, in their
alphabetical order;
4, then the votes polled for him in the constituencies of the universities,
colleges, and other bodies, not restricted to geographical limits, in their
alphabetical order :
(b) If he be a candidate for a local constituency, but not for any county or
division of a county, or other district, having within its geographical
limits any borough or local constituency, there shall be taken for
him,
1, the votes polled for him in the county or division of a county, in which
the local constituency for which he is a candidate shall be situated, in
the order of the proximity of the locality in which such votes are
registered;
2, then the votes polled for him in the remainder of the local constituencies
in their alphabetical order;
3, then the votes polled for him in the constituencies of the universities,
colleges, and other bodies not restricted to geographical limits, in their
alphabetical order.
(c) If he be a candidate for any university, college, or other body, not
restricted to geographical limits, there shall be taken for him,
1, the votes polled for him in all other like constituencies not restricted to
geographical limits, in their alphabetical order;
2, then the votes polled for him in the local constituencies, in their
alphabetical order.
Provided always, that the votes polled by electors of constituencies of Eng-
land, Scotland, or Ireland, respectively, shall be first taken for the re-
spective candidates for whom the same are polled, who are candidates
for constituencies in the kingdom in which such votes are polled, and
then the votes polled in any of the same kingdoms, for candidates for
constituencies in the other kingdoms respectively, in the order in
which the same are above expressed, and subject to the rules of
appropriation herein contained. And in order to carry out regularly
and invariably the said rules, the registrars shall before every general
election prepare, revise, and jointly sign, tables showing the relation
of every local constituency, in respect of proximity to the other con-
stituencies, within the respective limits aforesaid, and also showing the
alphabetical order of each class of the said several constituencies in
England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively, and the votes shall then
be taken in the order expressed in such tables.
The Rule B., which may perhaps be modified and rendered
more complete, is designed to give due effect to all local
182
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
attachments and legitimate influences arising from family,
traditional, territorial, or other causes.
It will give to every
landed proprietor the opportunity of connecting himself, or
preserving his relation politically with the district in which
his estates are chiefly situated, by enabling him to select a
constituency embracing that portion of the country. There
is no sound reason for any jealousy of such natural connec-
tions, on the contrary, they are capable of being made the
sources of some of the most inestimable of social benefits,-
and which more than compensate for their occasional abuse,-
an abuse which, there is reason to hope, will be constantly
less and less frequent, and will cease altogether as interest
and duty become obviously in harmony, and every proprietor
feels that his influence depends upon the existence of an
attached, a populous, and an instructed neighbourhood.
The voting papers liberated from the claim of one candi-
date, as his quota is completed, become votes for the next
candidate who is mentioned upon them, and, being appro-
priated to him, will go to make up his quota. The same
process of completion and cancellation will go on, according
to the rules which have been stated,-hour by hour, with
great rapidity, until the time comes when the remaining
voting papers,—still taking only the names of the candi-
dates which from time to time are thus made to stand first in
every paper, do not furnish enough to make up the quota
for any remaining candidate.
The process has been simply
that of sorting the voting papers and arranging them under the
several names which appear uncancelled at the head of every
paper; and as each new quota has been completed and set
apart, and a member thereupon returned, the name of such
member has been cancelled on all other voting papers except
those which are thus set apart.
At this stage of the election,-as a quota is no longer
found for any candidate, and as no voting paper can be
appropriated to any name standing below the first, so long as
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
183
the first is still unchosen and there is a possibility of his
being elected, it becomes necessary to introduce another
rule for ascertaining on which of the remaining candidates
the choice of the remaining electors has fallen. Let it be
supposed that 1,227,274 voters (the whole number on the
register in 1857, as before stated) had polled at a general
election, that number being divided by 654, the quota would
be 1,876; and let it also be supposed that by the process of
appropriation of votes, up to this stage of the election, 300
candidates have received the quota and been returned. In
this state of things 354 members are still wanting to com-
plete the House; and as the election of 300 members has
Lecessarily disposed of 562,800 votes, every elector of that
number being represented by the man whom he has chosen,
--there remain 664,474 votes unappropriated, and which are
applicable to the election of the 354 members yet to be
elected. Let it also be supposed that there were originally
1,800 candidates, -somewhat less than three for every seat,
and therefore that of these candidates 1,500 still remain
whose success or failure is undetermined.
To obtain as nearly as possible an equal quota for all, it is
necessary to adopt a process for eliminating the names of the
candidates having the smaller number of votes. This was first
done by cancelling their names, one by one, and thus raising
on every voting paper the next name in succession to the place
of the cancelled candidate, and thereby at each step bringing
some other and uncancelled candidate nearer to the attainment
of the quota. Following out this idea, it was, in the first edition
of this work, proposed, at this stage of the election, to cancel
on the voting papers, first the name of every candidate who had
not, on the unappropriated voting papers, a number of votes,
including both actual or contingent votes, amounting to the
quota; and if (as was most probable) the appropriation made
after that process should still fail to complete the House, then
to compute the number of all actual and contingent votes for
184
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
each of the remaining candidates on the unappropriated voting
papers, and take out, one by one, those who had the smallest
number, until none but the required number of favourite, and
therefore selected, candidates should remain.
The term elimination" may be used to describe the
method by which the excluded candidates are withdrawn. If
no more than a hundred are to be chosen out of a thousand,
however the process be conducted, nine hundred must be eli-
minated. Whether we begin at the least popular names and
proceed upwards, cancelling the names until the hundred
only are left, or begin by electing the highest on the poll,
and descend until the hundred shall be chosen, and the re-
maining nine hundred excluded, the result, if the name at the
head of every voting paper be alone regarded, will be the
same; but if the principle of contingent voting, the only
method yet suggested for preventing uncertainty of action.
and an incalculable waste of the electoral power, be adopted,
and the cancellation of each name be followed by giving the
vote immediately to the next name on the voting paper, the
result may be very different. It is convenient, therefore, to
distinguish these methods by describing the upward process
as one of elimination, and the downward process as one of
selection. The result of discussion as well as of the experience
gained in the tentative application of this system of voting, in
the United States, and gathered also from the operation of
the cumulative vote in this country, has led the author to re-
turn, with little variation, to the method of eliminating the
candidates having the smallest number of votes, suggested in
his earlier publications on this subject, notwithstanding the
greater apparent complexity which had induced him to omit it
in the later editions of the treatise. It is, however, desirable
that each process should be stated and considered, the better
¹ Appendix M, infra.
2
2 Treatise on the Election of Representatives, &c., 1st ed. (1859), pp.
214-218. Journal of the Statistical Society, September, 1860, pp. 351–2.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
185
to test the comparative merits of the method of appropriation
which has been ultimately adopted, and which is now proposed,
as a rule not only superior to any other method which has yet
been suggested, but possessing every quality that is practically
needful.
1. The elimination of the candidates having less of public
support, may commence with the candidate having the smallest
number of votes actual or contingent,-or, in other words,
the candidate whose name is mentioned on the smallest
number of voting papers, whether at their head or in any
other position upon them; and this being ascertained, by
cancelling the name of such candidate throughout the voting
papers; then that of the next candidate in like circumstances,
and so on until only so many are left as shall complete the
House.
This process gives an undue weight to mere aggregate
numbers, or to the multitude as compared with the few,-a
preponderance which is the great danger of popular govern-
ment. This effect
This effect is immediately seen when it is considered,
that, by counting every name on every voting paper for the
purpose of determining which candidate is the least popular
that the elimination may begin by excluding him,—the effect
of each paper is multiplied in the ratio of the number of names
which it contains, and thereby a multiplied force is given to
the combinations of large bodies of voters, or of parties, which
would enable them, by the use of prepared or printed lists of
candidates, to overpower the deliberate voices of the less nume-
rous classes, and the more thoughtful electors. Although the
party nominees could not be elected until their votes severally
reached the quota, or placed them at the head of the poll,
their success would indirectly, and scarcely less effectually, be
promoted by the cancellation of the names of other candidates
who were put forward by smaller numbers of voters, and who
were, therefore, the first to be excluded.
2. Instead of computing the number of repetitions of each
186
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
name on all the voting papers, which perhaps for the most
part remain with the local returning officers, it was in the
first edition of this work proposed to diminish the labour of
computation, by including in it none but the unappropriated
voting papers after the first part of the election had been com-
pleted-namely, only the 664,474 remaining votes in the
stage of the particular election now supposed. This, however,
would be inequitable to the extent in which it gave an undue
weight to the unappropriated over the appropriated voting
papers. If, for example, one of the unappropriated voting
papers should have upon it thirty uncancelled names, and it be
referred to and counted thirty times on the computation which
is to determine what candidates are to be excluded, it has
obviously a far greater force than any appropriated paper,
which, on the return of the candidate nominated upon it,-
although there might have been fifty names below,—had been
immediately allotted as one of the quota of the elected mem-
ber, and thereafter referred to no more.
3. Every computation of actual and contingent votes which
gives them an equal value, or which, in other words, permits
a vote that may be in the middle or at the bottom of a list of
thirty, forty, or fifty names, to have the same numerical
weight in the election or rejection of a candidate that is given
to the vote which the same elector has placed at the head of
his voting paper, is radically inconsistent with the principle
which it is the design of this system to embody,-that of
giving to no vote more than a single voice, and that this
voice should be the expression of the highest and most deli-
berate preference of the elector. The name which is placed
first on every paper is that of the candidate for whom the
elector votes. The subsequent names, however they may, for
a contingent purpose, express relative preferences, are not to
be regarded so long as a prior name remains uncancelled,
and is capable of being chosen. If, therefore, the same
weight be given to the name which is, say, the tenth, on the
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
187
voting paper of A, as is given to the name which is first on
the voting paper of B, positive injustice is done by disregard-
ing the will of B, to a far greater degree than the will of A
can be said to be obeyed. The very moderate or faint appre-
ciation of one is balanced against the highest expression of
the preference of the other. To moderate this consequence
it was first suggested that the value of every vote, for the
purpose of determining the order of elimination, should be
computed by its position on the voting paper. The compu-
tation would be very laborious, but that being a merely
mechanical difficulty, would be overcome. A more serious
objection is, that it is open to the vicious operation already
referred to, of enabling numbers to obtain, by organization,
an undue preponderance.
4. The method proposed in the last edition of this work
was that of selection. It has been supposed that there are at
this stage of the election, 664,474 unappropriated votes, and
1,500 unchosen candidates, which, if the votes were equally
divided, would afford 442 for every candidate. They would
be very unequally divided. Some names would probably not
appear at the head of any of the voting papers, and some at
the head of very few, and it will follow that some candidates
will have many more than 442 votes. By merely sorting the
voting papers, and placing together all those which have at
their head the name of the same candidate, the number of
actual votes for every candidate might be readily counted.
The same process would be followed as to the candidate having
the next greatest number, and so on, until the remaining 354
members had been thus selected. This method was recom-
mended by its greater simplicity, and its tendency, therefore,
to remove the objection that the proposed system of election was
too complicated for its purpose. It is, however, in one impor-
tant respect eminently defective. The result is that all the
voting papers which have been appropriated to so many of the
supposed 1,500 candidates as come after the 354, that by the
188
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
latest distribution have acquired the comparative majorities,
are wholly thrown away and ineffectual, however many sub-
sequent and contingent votes there may be on such voting
papers, below the unsuccessful candidate named at the head
of each paper. One great purpose of the electoral system of
a self-governing nation is to elicit from the voter, and encou-
rage him to put forward, all the resources of his thought and
knowledge in the choice of legislators in whom he has the
most perfect confidence; and it is of essential importance that
he should not be deterred from doing this by any apprehension
that owing to the obscurity or the unpopularity of the candi-
date whom individually he knows and would trust, his vote
would be lost if he ventured to place the name of such candi-
date at the head of his paper. This method of selecting the
remaining candidates according to their comparative majorities,
regarding only the names at the head of the voting papers,
notwithstanding its simplicity, has therefore been abandoned.
5. The method which it has been resolved to pursue, as
combining greater advantages than any other, is to reduce the
number of candidates remaining at this stage of the election,
by taking out the names of all those who have the smallest
number of actual votes, that is, who are named at the head of
the smallest number of voting papers, and appropriating each
vote to the candidate standing next in order on each paper,
until only so many candidates are left as shall be sufficient
to fill the House.
The process may be embodied in the following law :-
XXV. When the votes shall have been appropriated to all the candidates
who have obtained the quota of votes respectively, according to the fore-
going rules, the registrars shall then cancel their names on the unappro-
priated voting papers, and shall sort and arrange the whole of the unap-
propriated voting papers, allotting them to the remaining candidates whose
names are after such cancellation at the head of the same voting papers
respectively, and shall compute the number of votes which have been given
for the respective candidates whose names remain at the head of the
respective voting papers as last aforesaid; and shall make and publish in
the London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Gazettes, a declaration of the names

THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
189
of the candidates who have obtained the quota, and the number of votes
polled for every remaining candidate, computed as aforesaid;¹ and shall
then cancel the name of such one of the last-mentioned candidates as shall
stand at the head of the smallest number of voting papers, and appropriate
the same voting papers to the remaining candidate or candidates whose
name or names stand next on such voting papers respectively, and so on,
repeating such cancellation of the name remaining at the head of the
smallest number of voting papers successively, and the reappropriation of
such voting papers to the next candidate thereon respectively, until the
number of candidates is equal to the number of members remaining to be
elected; and thereupon the registrars shall declare and publish, as afore-
said, the names of such remaining candidates as have obtained the quota,
and also of such of them, if any, as have obtained comparative majorities
less than the quota, and so many of the said remaining candidates as
shall, together with the candidates who have previously obtained the quota
of votes as aforesaid, be sufficient to make up the whole number [654] of
members to be chosen, shall, upon the receipt of the registrar's certificate,
be returned as members to serve in Parliament, by the returning officers of
the constituencies of which they have respectively polled a majority or
majorities of votes as hereinbefore provided;² and if, upon such distribution
by the registrars, it shall appear that two or more of such candidates
having comparative majorities as aforesaid less than the quota, have polled
an equal number of votes, and cannot both or all be returned as members
1
If the plan suggested by Mr. Dobbs (General Representation, &c.,
Longmans, 1872, 2nd edit.) be adopted, empowering the candidate to
transfer his surplus or deficient votes, where the elector shall indicate
his wish to that effect, by using a special or transferable voting paper
(see p. 124, ante), the following provision might be here introduced:-
[The registrars shall then collect the unappropriated voting papers
whereon the electors have directed that the same shall be transferable,
and shall compute and publish, as aforesaid, the total number thereof,
and the names of the candidates authorised to transfer the same, and the
number they are respectively empowered to transfer; and shall appro-
priate such votes to and among the candidates in such manner and
proportion as shall be directed in writing, signed and attested in the
presence of one of the said registrars or his deputy, by the respective
candidates empowered as aforesaid, within (24 hours) from such publica-
tion; and the registrar shall then publish as aforesaid, the names of the
candidates, if any, who have obtained the quota by such last-mentioned
appropriation; and the names of the candidates still having less than the
quota, and the number of voting papers at the head whereof they respec-
tively stand.]
2 Clause XXII., p. 166.

190
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
as aforesaid, then preference shall be given to the said candidates in the
order of their priority in the gazetted lists of candidates prepared as here-
inbefore provided, and if the said candidates shall be on different gazetted
lists, then in the order of their priority if they had been upon the gazetted
list for the same part of the United Kingdom; and to the end aforesaid the
registrars shall, with all practical speed, certify to the returning officers of
the constituencies in which the said votes have been polled for any of the
said remaining candidates, the number of votes appropriated to them from
each constituency, excluding, where two or more candidates shall have
been equal, and cannot both or all be returned, the name or names of the
candidates who have not the preference in the order of priority as afore-
said; and if they be still equal, preference shall be given to a candidate
for a constituency in Ireland before one for Scotland or England, and to a
candidate for a constituency in Scotland before oue in England, and to a
candidate for a smaller before one for a larger constituency; and the regis-
trars shall also, as soon as possible, certify to the returning officers of the
constituencies in which the said votes have been polled, the names of all
the candidates who have failed to obtain a quota of votes, or a number suffi-
cient to form one of the said comparative majorities, or being equal to one of
such majorities have been excluded as not having the priority as aforesaid,
signifying that in consequence thereof such candidates cannot be returned
at that election as members to serve in Parliament.
In the last edition of this treatise, a clause was introduced
for appropriating the votes of electors that had been ineffec-
tual owing to having the names of unsuccessful candidates at
the head of their voting papers, by assigning them as part of
the constituency of any member whom they had named lower
on the voting paper, in order to compensate them in some
measure for the loss. It was argued that if the voter were
not represented by the man whom he would above all desire,
because he could not procure a sufficient concurrence of opi-
nion or sentiment for his election, he is yet represented by the
man who stands highest in his favour for whom that concur-
rence can be obtained: that the variation in the numbers of
the constituencies which the ultimate appropriation of votes
might introduce, derogated in no degree from the true prin-
ciple of representation. "A is not the less perfectly represented
by Z because B and C have likewise chosen Z to represent
1 Clause IX., p. 93.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
191
them. We do not refuse to confide our interests to a parti-
cular counsel or attorney because his eminence in character
and ability has led a great number of other persons to appoint
him as their counsel or attorney also. We rather expect his
power to be of service to us, will be greater from that very
cause." But it is clear, nevertheless, that the elector though
thus represented, has not that due representative force to
which he is entitled so far as it can be given to him, and which
is far more perfectly secured in the manner now indicated.
If we suppose nothing more than the most ordinary degree
of acquaintance with the names of a few public men, or even
of one, coupled with that degree of interest in public affairs
which would induce the voter to be at the pains of exercising
his franchise, it is probable that under such a law every
elector in the kingdom who may take the trouble to vote, will
be represented by a candidate whom he has especially named
and selected. An unrepresented voter will be a rare excep-
tion. By fixing on any candidate of high and general repu-
tation, the elector will be morally certain of securing him, if
no other, as his representative in the national councils; and
where the elector does not rely exclusively on one name, but
introduces different names, as so many alternatives, the
system affords a practical application of that principle of com-
promise, the adaptation of the will, the pretensions, and the
conduct to circumstances, the yielding something of which
we are less tenacious to secure that on which we set a still
higher value,—which is of such potent influence and incalcu-
lable value in political as well as in social life. The voter
expresses in effect his wish to be represented by the second
person named on his paper if he cannot be by the first,-by
the third if he cannot be by the second, and so on. Instead
of crushing the opinions or sentiments of any elector, it leads
him by a gentle and unresisted constraint to blend and har-
monise them with those of others, until a voluntary unanimity
is attained.
192
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
It is unnecessary to repeat the clause formerly introduced,¹
for the verification of the declared results of the poll, and for
the preservation of, and means of reference to the voting papers
subsequent to the election. Provisions for all these purposes
are to be found in the rules appended to the Ballot Act.
The secrecy of the vote now renders most of the suggestions
on this point, in the preceding editions, inapplicable.
It is proper finally to provide for the possibility of a can-
didate being elected by a sufficient number of voters to make
up the quota, and who yet may not be in a position on the
poll of any particular constituency to entitle him to require
that the returning officer shall return him as elected by it.
Suppose, for example, that there were 700 different constitu-
encies, and a candidate had three votes in every constituency,
he might have the quota, or a comparative majority, but not
a majority in any place. The supposed state of things is of
course highly improbable, but there ought to be no possible
defect in the operation of machinery designed to act per-
petually, and under all circumstances. If any cases should
arise, such as has been supposed, it may be left to be dealt
with by the House, upon a form of proceeding which the
candidate, or any of the electors interested, may be allowed to
imitate.
XXVIII. When it shall appear by a certificate of the registrars that any
candidate has polled such a number of votes as shall amount to the quota,
or to a comparative majority, and he shall yet not be returned by any
returning officer as a member to serve in Parliament; and such candidate,
or any of the electors by whom he has been chosen, shall present a petition
to the House of Commons stating such facts, and praying that he may be
admitted as a representative, it shall be lawful for the House, upon hearing
the said certificate of the registrar, to declare, by resolution, that the said
candidate has been duly elected as a member of the said House, and that
he shall be designated as an additional representative of the three consti-
tuencies in which he shall have polled a greater number of votes than in
any other three constituencies, and if such numbers in so many several con-
1 Sect. XXVIII., p. 197, 3rd ed.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
193
stituencies should be equal, then that he shall be designated representa-
tive of such three constituencies as shall contain the greatest number of
registered electors; and such declaration shall have the same effect as if
he had been duly returned under the writ as aforesaid.
In the above electoral law it has not been thought neces-
sary thus far to depart from the form originally adopted to
show in what way proportional representation might be
established, or to borrow the more succinct phraseology in
which rules of a like or analogous purport have been ex-
pressed in subsequent adaptations of the principle. With a
view, however, to the practical introduction of the system, it
is of great importance to show how much the form of an
electoral law for that object may be simplified as well as
abridged. The labours of other minds in England and in
America, bringing to the task their varied experience in the
work of legislation, have succeeded in framing in fewer words
rules which effect substantially the same object. One ex-
ample is given in the four simple rules which suffice for
expressing what was to be done, on the nomination of over-
seers of Harvard University.' The Proportional Represen-
tation Bill of the last session embodied every essential con-
dition in the three following clauses:-
2
"10. The following provisions shall have effect with reference to a poll:
(i.) Each elector shall have one vote only:
(ii.) The votes shall be given by voting-papers delivered by the electors
in person:
(iii.) The voting-paper of an elector shall be deemed to have been
given for the candidate first named thereon, but the elector may,
if he think fit, designate one or more other candidates to
whom in succession, in the designated order of priority, he de-
sires that his vote should be transferred, in the event of its not
1 See Appendix M, p. 351, infra.
2 Prepared and brought in by Mr. Morrison, Mr. Auberon Herbert, Mr.
Fawcett, and Mr. Thomas Hughes. Ordered by the House of Commons to
be printed, 28th Feb., 1872. Motion for the second reading, 10th July,
1872. Hansard, Parl. Deb., vol. ccxii., pp. 890-926. The form of the
voting paper, in the third schedule of this Bill, is substantially the same as
that given in p. 124, ante.
194
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
being required to be used for the return of any prior candidate.
The number of candidates named on a voting-paper, including
the candidate first named, must not be greater than the number
of vacancies:
(iv.) A candidate, in order that he may be returned at an election, must
(subject as herein-after in this Act expressly provided) have
given for him a number of voting-papers herein-after in this Act
referred to as the "quota ") to be found by dividing the total
number of voting-papers given at the election by the number of
vacancies to be filled at the election (the fraction, if any, remain-
ing from the division being disregarded) :
(v.) A voting-paper shall be filled up in writing by the elector at the
polling booth, provided that the returning officer shall, at the
request of an elector who states that he is unable to write, fill up
the voting-paper of such elector as he directs:
(vi.) Every voting-paper shall be void which cither-
(a.) Contains the names of more candidates than there are
vacancies, or
(b.) Contains any mark by which the elector can be identified;
and a void voting-paper shall not be counted or deemed to have
been given.
11. After the close of a poll the voting-papers shall be dealt with by the
returning officer as follows:
(i) He shall cause the voting-papers to be collected, and shall ascer-
tain the total number of voting-papers, exclusive of void voting-
papers and of voting-papers on which no candidate is legibly
named. His decision as to whether a voting-paper is void or a
name is illegible shall be final, subject to reversal on a petition:
(ii.) He shall ascertain and declare the quota necessary for the return of
a member:
(iii.) He shall arrange the voting-papers given for the several candidates
in separate parcels, and shall in the parcel of each candidate sort
his voting-papers according to the numbers of names upon them,
placing at the top those voting-papers in which no other candi-
date is designated, and then those in succession in which the
fewest other candidates are designated, and placing last those in
which the greatest number of other candidates are designated :
(iv.) He shall proceed to make one or more scrutinies (as the case may
require) according to the provisions herein-after in this Act
contained:
(v.) He shall give to each candidate, on application by him or his agent,
two orders of admission to the place where a scrutiny is to be
made, and each such order shall entitle the bearer to be present
at the ascertaining of the number of voting-papers, and of the
quota, and at any scrutiny.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
195
12. The first scrutiny shall be made in the following manner :
(i.) The total number of voting-papers given for each candidate shall be
counted in the order in which they are arranged, and shall be
recorded; and every candidate whose voting-papers equal or
exceed the quota shall be declared elected:
(i.) When a candidate is declared elected, his voting-papers shall be
dealt with as follows:
(a.) His voting-papers used in making up his quota shall be set
aside as exhausted:
(.) His voting-papers counted after his quota was reached
shall be deemed to be unused :
(iii.) An unused voting-paper of an elected candidate shall be trans-
ferred to and be deemed to have been given for the unelected
candidate (if any) first designated thereon, and shall be counted
to him after and in addition to the voting-papers (if any) ori-
ginally given for him; and any candidate whose voting-papers
are by this means raised to the quota shall be declared elected,
and his voting-papers shall be dealt with as voting-papers of an
elected candidate.
The unused voting-papers transferred to a candidate may be counted to
him in any order in which they happen to be taken.
13. A second or other scrutiny shall (if necessary) be made in the fol-
lowing manner:
(i.) The lowest candidate on the preceding scrutiny shall be excluded
and declared not elected; and, if there still remain more caudi-
dates than vacancies, all the voting-papers of the excluded can-
didate shall be deemed to be unused, and shall, with the unused
voting-papers (if any) remaining from the preceding scrutiny,
be respectively transferred to and counted for the first of the
remaining candidates (if any) designated thereon, and any can-
didate so obtaining the quota shall be declared elected, and his
voting-papers shall be dealt with as voting-papers of an elected
candidate:
(ii.) The same process of excluding the lowest candidate on the pre-
ceding scrutiny, and of transferring unused voting-papers, shall
be repeated so often as may be necessary until all the vacancies
are filled by the election of candidates obtaining the quota of
voting-papers, or there remain no more candidates than vacancies:
(iii.) When there remain no more candidates than vacancies, all the
remaining candidates shall be declared elected, whether they
have obtained the quota or not:
(iv.) In case two or more candidates have equal numbers of voting-
papers in a scrutiny, that one of them shall be deemed to be the
lowest who had the fewest votes on the first scrutiny, and if they are
still equal the returning officer shall have a casting vote or votes."
Uor M
196
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
It is true that the division of England and Wales into
sixty-nine constituencies,¹ acting independently of one an-
other, rendered unnecessary several of the provisions required
where, as in the method herein contemplated, the existing
constituencies would not only be much increased in number,
but are so far connected that the electoral weight of the votes
is measured by the same numerical standard, and individual
voters may transfer themselves from one local constituency to
another.
In the Proportional Representation Bill, from which the
foregoing clauses are extracted, the number of members to be
returned at the next general election by the several con-
1 They are specified in the first Schedule. The principle of division was
to give distinct representation to the larger towns, and include the smaller
in the counties. It allots to the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and
London, 5 members, and to cities and boroughs as follows:-Plymouth
and Devonport, 3; Bristol, 4; Portsmouth and Southampton, 4; Green-
wich, 4; Newcastle-on-Tyne, Tynemouth, and North Shields, 6; Wolver-
hampton, Wednesbury, and Walsall, 7; Lambeth, 8; Southwark, 4;
Birmingham, 7; Kingston-upon-Hull, 3; Leeds, 6; Sheffield, 5; Brad-
ford, 3; Halifax, Huddersfield, and Dewsbury, 4; Liverpool, 11; Man-
chester and Salford, 11; City of London, 4; Finsbury, 9; Mary-le-bone,
10; Tower Hamlets, 8; Hackney, 8; Westminster and Chelsea, 11. The
Schedule then distributes the county seats, exclusive of the foregoing
boroughs, thus:-Bedfordshire, 3; Berkshire, 4; Buckinghamshire, 4;
Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, 5; Cheshire, 12; Cornwall, 8;
Cumberland and Westmoreland, 6; Derbyshire, 8; Devonshire, 10; Dor-
setshire, 4; Durham, 13; Essex, 10; Gloucestershire, 8; Hampshire and
the Isle of Wight, 8; Herefordshire, 3; Hertfordshire, 4; Kent, 15; Lan-
cashire, Northern Division, 6; Lancashire, North-Eastern Division, 7;
Lancashire, South-Eastern Division, 16; Lancashire, South-Western Divi-
sion, 9; Leicestershire, 6; Lincolnshire, 9; Middlesex, 6; Monmouthshire,
4; Norfolk, 9; Northamptonshire and Rutlandshire, 6; Northumberland,
5; Nottinghamshire, 7; Oxfordshire, 4; Shropshire, 5; Somersetshire, 10;
Staffordshire, 11; Suffolk, 7; Surrey, 11; Sussex, 9; Warwickshire, 6;
Wiltshire, G; Worcestershire, 7; Yorkshire, North Riding, 6; Yorkshire,
East Riding, and York, 4; Northern Division of West Riding of Yorkshire,
6; Eastern Division of West Riding of Yorkshire, 6; Southern Division of
West Riding of Yorkshire, 9; North Wales, consisting of the counties of
Anglesea, Carnarvon, Denbigh, Flint, and Montgomery, 10; South Wales,
consisting of the counties of Brecon, Cardigan, Carmarthen, Glamorgan,
Pembroke, and Radnor, 16.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
197
stituencies in England and Wales, to which part of the
United Kingdom it exclusively applied, are set forth in the
schedule; but the numbers are to be subject to alteration
according to the population at every decennial census. Such
a distribution of seats was objected to in the debate, on the
ground that the number of registered voters, and not popu-
lation, should form the standard. The argument at once
suggests the question whether the principle which is at the
basis of the system advocated in this treatise might not be
well introduced into any measure for a just apportionment of
political power, however rigidly local the electoral districts
may be framed. The election of members for Birmingham
may be confined to the voters for Birmingham, and that for
Warwickshire to the county voters, by whatever measure the
number of members they are respectively entitled to elect
shall be ascertained. The subject of exclusive local action in
its general character and results is treated in an earlier
chapter,' but the possibility and advantage of measuring
the political power of localities by a rational method-a
method dependent on the part their inhabitants are willing
or disposed to take in public affairs-should not be passed
over while we are adverting to this recent and practical attempt.
to establish proportional representation, and the objections
which it elicited.
It cannot be too often repeated that the constant statement
that the author has neglected or ignored the local character.
of representation is entirely a mistake. He has sought, on
the contrary, to develop the activity of our local system
more completely than ever,2 making local divisions, as else-
where said, "facilities and not fetters" of political action.
He proposes for this purpose first, to determine the number
¹ Chap. III.
2 See p. 52, n.
M. Morin understood this care of localities, and con-
eludes his examination of the system by saying, "L'intérêt général et
l'intérêt local paraissent heureusement associés."
198
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
1
of members every county, city, or borough may return,
not by the number of its electors on the register, but by
the number of those electors who take the trouble to vote
at the election. It is the same in effect as if the whole
nation, all the adult and trusted of the people to whom the
suffrage is given, had been summoned to meet on some
great central plain, and the business of the assembly is then
and there determined by those who obey the summons and
attend, and not by those who are absent; in fact, every elector
who does not go to the poll is absent from the great national
conclave, and it is but just that he should be so regarded.
This principle of the system might have formed part of the
proposed measure of the last session, or might be adopted in
any future Reform Bill. It cannot be doubted that it would
operate as a powerful appeal to the public spirit and patriotism
of every voter, to be careful not by his abstention to diminish
the fair political influence of his town or county. It would
in fact put all the people of Britain as it were on their mettle
that they may not fall behind others in the performance of
their electoral duties, and lose that influence in the state
which is its consequence.
In working out the details of that phase of this system
which equalizes and adjusts the comparative power of every
voter, to whatever constituency he belongs, and liberates him
at the same time from every restriction which at present
abridges his opportunities of association with others of like
sympathies, two things have been contemplated; first, this
equality of numbers making up the quota sufficient to return
a member, and which the foregoing explanation will show to
be applicable to constituencies however rigidly localized; and
secondly, the enlarged and vast extension of the field open to
the individual elector by enabling him to carry his vote to
the aid of those with whom he agrees, and whose candidate
he would desire to see elected, whether within or without
¹ See pp. 25-31; and Sect. XXXIII., p. 219.
1
1
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
199
the local boundary of his own constituency, and thus open to
every voter full scope and exercise for his predilections, whether
of birth or neighbourhood—from community of interest,
thought, or opinion, or from any other governing sentiment
-an opportunity which under the proportional system it must
be remembered may be used as a means of help, but not of
conflict or defeat. If a voter whose residence and qualification
is in London, but whose early associations are with Cornwall
or Devonshire, should prefer to preserve his connection with
and vote in the county rather than in the city, he would in
no degree interfere with the electoral power of the county
voters. He might come to the aid of a minority or add one
to the majority who vote for a county candidate; but when it
is no longer a struggle on one side to exclude the other, the
addition would be felt as purely beneficial in its tendency, as
increasing the aggregate county influence without diminishing
that of any party or section in it. The election with the
proportional system is no longer a strife for mastery, but an
exercise in which all are stimulated to do their best, allowing
their neighbours to do the same. This character of the
system, however, is not generally realised in the popular
mind, and therefore it is desirable to show that the provisions
introduced to effect the second of these objects are entirely
distinct from those which relate to the first, and that the
second may be omitted while the first is adopted.
Instead, therefore, of prescribing, as in the Proportional
Representation Bill, that the number of members to be
returned by the several constituencies in the schedule should
be found by dividing the population, as ascertained at the
census from time to time, by the number of members to be
returned for England and Wales, and assigning to each so
many members as the constituency contains entire multiples
of the quotient, or even of making the number of registered
1
¹ Sect. VII. Other boroughs were to be withdrawn from the counties and
added to those enumerated in the note (p. 196) as soon as they should con-
tain a population equal to three multiples of the quotient.
200
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
electors the dividend, as was contended for in the debate, the
Clause XXXIII. of the Act, the draft of which is herein.
given,' might be conveniently substituted, and by its self-
acting force may reasonably be expected to have a far better
effect than the penal denunciations of the Solonic table,"
awakening voluntary effort, and rendering compulsion
needless.
3
The method formerly proposed for supplying occasional
vacancies of seats, owing to the acceptance of office, resigna-
tion, or death of members, or other causes, is since the Ballot
Act no longer possible. The clauses for this purpose are
therefore omitted. The occurrence of these accidents has
been mentioned by some writers as an objection to propor-
tional representation. It is quite possible to regard them as
increasing its advantages. Various adaptations of the sys-
tem for the purpose of supplying such vacancies have been
proposed. Perhaps, a better method than any other would
be to allow them to continue until the number reaches four
or five, and then to vest the election in the House itself,
under the same proportional system, which would enable
any considerable party to introduce any known or rising
politician, in whom it has confidence or hope. Such an
opportunity of bringing into the national assembly, and
thereby to prominent and public notice, minds of especial
eminence or promise, who had not sought, or not obtained,
the popular suffrage, would sometimes be of no small value.
1 ¹ P. 219. 2 See pp. 251, 252, infra. 3 Appendix M, p. 353.
201
CHAPTER X.
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
1
A SYSTEM which anticipates the progress of the nation, and
admits of the formation of new constituencies, as the occasion
and desire shall arise, must also contemplate, as has been
already observed, the existence of many more constituencies
than there can be members,-and, therefore, that one member
may represent several constituencies. This is substantially
the case at present in the contributory boroughs. The
member for Ayr, for example, may be called with indifferent
accuracy the member for Campbeltown or Irvine. So, in the
proposed system, it would be unimportant, in point of nomen-
clature, whether a member who had been returned for several
constituencies should, in the ordinary appellation by which he
is addressed in the House, be styled as the member for one
rather than the other, although it would be reasonable that
he should be usually referred to as the representative of that
constituency for which he had also been especially a candidate.
Throughout the frame of this scheme it has been an object
to create and maintain a connection between the member and
the constituents, which shall be due to no selfish or sordid
cause, but be solely owing to the estimation by the one of
the virtues of the other. Under the existing system of
majorities, every elector may throw upon others the blame of
a contemptible choice.
"Thou canst not say I did it," may
1 See pp. 50-54, 56.
202
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
1
be the answer to every remonstrance. But the case will be
very different when every elector may personally acquire
respect, or incur disgrace, by the selection which he makes.
In addition to what is merely personal, another powerful
feeling of an elevating character, which has already been
spoken of,¹ will be called forth. A collective or corporate
feeling of pride is brought into existence,-for, although men
readily discover reasons for not ascribing to themselves any
part of the ignominy that attaches to an act which is dis-
graceful to the body they belong to, yet they are always
prompt to claim a share of the credit their community may
have gained, and which they commonly appreciate at the
utmost of its worth, Dispositions such as these are moral
levers. In them we have presented to us a field, both for
merit and praise, boundless as the imagination; the civic
honours which the people may confer on their more worthy
countrymen, by placing them in the front ranks of the Com-
mons of the kingdom, have no limits but the public apprecia-
tion of high desert and of the value of such a reward. In the
proposed system of election the return of the same member
may be double or multiple. The majority in every consti-
tuency will confer upon their chosen candidate the title of
representative for their particular body; but as the purely
political object ceases when the quota is made up, the majority,
in placing one member rather than another in the first place,
will commonly have no motive but the laudable one of show-
ing the nation that they delight to honour one of its worthiest
The prevailing sentiment will be that which we ob-
serve to govern the members of ancient institutions and
learned and scientific bodies, in nominating as their chan-
cellors, their rectors, or their presidents, the eminent persons
of their time. There is no borough, or electoral community,
which may not be titularly represented by the most dis-
tinguished men, without, in any degree, interfering with their
sons.
1 P. 56.
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES. 203
further representation by the members to whom their votes
have been specifically appropriated. The spontaneous testi-
mony of public admiration thus offered will not, because it
is an unsolicited tribute to high qualities, adding only to the
moral influence of him to whom it is given,-be therefore less
honourable to the givers than to the receiver. In a time
when every effort is devoted to the acquisition of material
riches, nothing is without its worth that confers extrinsic
dignity or power. We are too prosaic to clothe
"The olive wreath, the ivied wand,
The sword in myrtles drest,"
with the symbolic value given to them by a more imaginative
people in an earlier age; but we have not yet lost the esti-
mation of what is great, and no means should be neglected.
which our institutions can offer of giving prominence to true
worth, and impressing upon it the seal of the general appro-
bation. That "virtue is its own reward" is for the individual a
sublime truth, but for society it would be a niggard maxim.
We cannot afford to part even with the faint and reflected
gleams of human glory. Divinely taught wherein true
heroism consists, we may restore again our long-forgotten
shrines of hero-worship, and find something better and
nobler than an universal idolatry of money. When we have
undone the fetters of our electoral bodies,-shaken off, so far
as any human arrangements can do so, all that is mercenary
and degrading, and given them health and elasticity,-the
free spirit, no longer enslaved by the lower desires and appe-
tites, will ever rise and soar towards that which shall be
more and more excellent; and the law should encourage a
disposition in every constituency to nominate as their repre-
sentative him whom they regard as the highest living model
of worth.
XXXII. A candidate shall be entitled to be, and shall be returned as a
member for any constituency in which a majority of votes has been polled
201
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
for him, notwithstanding that under section XVIII. or section XXIV. all
the votes actually appropriated to him shall have been polled in another
constituency or other constituencies; and in such case the constituency for
which he is by this law declared to be entitled to be returned, and the votes
whereof are appropriated to other candidates, shall be entitled to return
one other member for every candidate so clected, in addition to the number
which is to be returned for it under section XXXIII. next hereinafter con-
tained.
The effect of the law may be illustrated by supposing that
James Watt had been a candidate for Birmingham, and that
Glasgow, remembering the "frown severe" with which she
had beheld his earlier exertions, desired to testify her sense
of the debt the marvellous city of the Clyde owed to one who
was, almost by inheritance, the tutelary genius of that river,
by placing him in the front rank as her representative.
James Watt might have been at the head of the poll, and
returned for Glasgow as well as for Birmingham, whilst
Glasgow would have, in addition, her complement of repre-
sentatives under the general rule expressed in the succeeding
law.
It is important in so great a national work as the election
of a representative assembly, to secure the aid of all the
better feelings and higher motives,-to bind the representative
and the constituent by the ties of mutual respect and attach-
ment, and thus render names subservient to things. With
this view the designation of members is a subject of no slight
moment. It is the sign, as well as the result of the intimate
connection of the members with the various constituencies
dispersed throughout the length and breadth of the land.
The names by which the members are severally designated
constitute the marks or imprint in the Parliament of the
distinct vitality and force of every part of Britain. Still, all
these distinct sources from which the members receive their
appellation and derive their function and authority, are to be
regarded, to use the words of Bacon, as lines and veins rather
than as sections and separations. Or, to borrow an illustra-
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES. 205
tion from physiology, they may be likened to the nervous
centres whence the human frame is supposed to receive its
impulse and power of harmonious action. It is the people,
and not the surface of the earth, or the constructions which
man has heaped upon it, which must be represented. The
principle of personal representation is the great political
doctrine of modern times.¹
Every project for the distribution of seats, and indeed
every actual distribution, has professed to have regard to the
number of voters in the constituency. All schemes, except
that of the Duke of Richmond, have proposed a distribution
more or less grossly disproportionate, or if not, of divisions
more or less arbitrary. It is obvious that a just and natural
distribution throughout the kingdom of the sources of political
power requires, as its basis, that the same rights of suffrage
should exist in every part of the kingdom. A consideration
of the great question of the suffrage is reserved for a subse-
quent chapter. It is sufficient here to remark, that a right
of suffrage, extensive and impartial, is, as Mr. Calhoun says,
"the indispensable and primary principle," and that in con-
ferring it, in the language of M. Guizot:-"Le gouvernement
représentatif considère quel est l'acte auquel vont être appelés
les individus; il examine quelle est la capacité nécessaire.
pour cet acte; il appelle ensuite les individus qui sont pré-
sumés posséder cette capacité, tous ceux-là, et ceux-là seuls.
Il cherche ensuite la majorité parmi les capables. C'est ainsi,
en fait, qu'on a presque toujours procédé partout, même quand
on a cru agir en vertu de la souveraineté du peuple. Jamais
on ne lui a été vraiment fidèle; on a toujours exigé, pour les
actes politiques, certaines conditions, c'est-à-dire, les signes.
d'une certaine capacité. On s'est trompé en plus ou en moins,
et l'erreur est grave, soit à exclure des capables, soit à appeler
des incapables. Mais on a obéi au principe du droit mesuré
selon la capacité, même quand on professait le principe du
1 Buckle's History of Civilisation. 2 Disquisition, &c., p. 13.
206 THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
droit dérivé de la simple qualité d'homme."¹ It may be
assumed that in any law regulating the suffrage, to the extent
in which it is given, it will be founded on the supposition of
capacity; and to the extent to which it is restricted, it will
be restricted on the supposition of incapacity. Any states-
man who shall attempt to carry an electoral law on a narrower
basis than this-even if any party combinations should give
him a temporary success,-will most assuredly prepare the
way for future political difficulties. If a standard of capacity
be once adopted-whatever be its elements-the next question
for the consideration of statesmen in this country is,—whether
any ground exists for disturbing this general standard of
capacity by exceptional privileges or restrictions dependent
on the place in which the individual elector resides? It is
only in a social condition which is become highly artificial
that such a question could be seriously proposed. No one
will gravely argue that the residents of one district of the
United Kingdom, when subjected to the same tests, are so
inferior in capacity or character to those who reside in
another district, that a different and exceptional standard of
electoral capacity should be adopted. No reasons for such a
difference, founded on intellect, opinion, disposition, or any
other conceivable quality, are applicable to the people of these
islands within any specific geographical or other line. The
same general standard applies to the Englishman in Cornwall
and in Cornhill. None will probably deny that in scientific
acumen and courageous enterprise the county may fearlessly
sustain a comparison with the city.
Those who would refuse to the inhabitants of the country
districts their equal title to electoral power, will, when sub-
jected to close scrutiny, be found to be a class of small
weight or influence. The remarks of a leader of the
reformers on this subject are significant. He observed :-"I
know no good reason why the franchise in counties should
1 Gouv. Rep., vol. i., p. 110.
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
207
not be as extensive as in boroughs; but there appears to have
been an understanding of late years, that the next step
with regard to the county suffrage shall be short of that, and
I shall not quarrel with any measure on that ground."¹ It
is true, that the inhabitants of the towns who have agitated
the subject of parliamentary reform, not only have not
thought it desirable to advocate the interests of those who
reside in the counties, but have given little support to the
principle of residential equality. The people residing beyond
the limits of towns and boroughs have comparatively small
means of combining to forward their own claims. "The
very nature of a country life, the very nature of landed pro-
perty, in all the occupations and all the pleasures they afford,
render combination and arrangement (the sole way of pro-
curing and exerting influence) in a manner impossible
amongst country people. Combine them by all the art you
can, and all the industry, they are always dissolving into
individuality. Anything in the nature of incorporation is
almost impracticable amongst them. Hope, fear, alarm,
jealousy, the ephemerous tale that does its business and dies
in a day,―all these things, which are the reins and spurs by
which leaders check or urge the minds of followers, are not
easily employed, or hardly at all, amongst scattered people.
They assemble, they arm, they act with the utmost difficulty
and at the greatest charge. Their efforts, if ever they can
be commenced, cannot be sustained. They cannot proceed
systematically."" It might have been expected, by a
foreigner unacquainted with the working of our representa-
tive institutions, that the landed proprietors, who are in at
condition to make themselves heard in Parliament, would
have been the efficient protectors of their neighbours, the
inhabitants of the country, that they would have indig-
nantly repelled any insinuation of mental or physical inferi-
1 Mr. Bright. Speech at Birmingham, Oct. 27, 1858.
2 Reflections, &c., p. 286.
208 THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
ority, and demanded for them, at least, an equality of political
rights. He would be surprised to learn, that, so far from
finding advocates in their territorial and natural chieftains,
it is from some of them that the attempt to confer upon the
inhabitants of counties a franchise, nominally of an equal, but
really of a greater, amount than that existing in the towns,
has met with the greatest opposition. Mr. Bright gave
utterance to what a correct sense of truth prompted, when he
characterised the indifference to the rights of the county inha-
bitants, as an "understanding," and with an equal sense of
justice he informs them beforehand, that it is not his province
to become their champion. An "understanding
" every
lawyer knows is a covert expression, generally introduced
when one person wishes to impose upon another terms which
have not been agreed upon between them. One party is
sufficient for an understanding, but two are required to an
agreement. The understanding has not yet been ratified by
the persons whose political equality it menaces.
It will be said, that the distinction between the electoral
standard in the boroughs and in the counties is founded not
on any inferiority in capacity or in any consideration of
danger in the opinions or dispositions of the people in the
country districts, but on the constitutional necessity of guard-
ing in this manner the interests of the proprietors of the
land. The argument, of course, assumes-first, that there
exists in the country an antagonism between the proprietors.
and those who are occupiers, and not proprietors, of houses or
lands; and secondly, that the constitution affords no adequate
protection to the proprietary class, except by the exclusion as
far as possible of county voters who are not proprietors. In
the long discussions on representation which took place before
the Reform Bill, the antagonistic bodies were supposed to be
the landed and the mercantile classes; and it is a doctrine of
1 "There is one great and eternal distinction arising from the nature of
things, which no wisdom can annihilate and no artifice disguise; and that
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES. 209
a very recent date, which places the landed proprietors and
rural population in supposed hostility to each other. In
truth, the antagonism is perfectly imaginary. By giving
health and activity to all the fibres which grow out of interests
in land, and which stretch their roots deeply and widely, and
take more or less hold on every class in society, the proprie-
tors of land will always find that their true interests and
just rights are too firm to be shaken. It may, indeed, be
possible for the great proprietors of land to insist upon up-
holding a system which will sever all these multitudinous
ties, and leave them isolated and exposed.
It may well be hoped that when our representative insti-
tutions shall come under revision, there will be found in their
places in both houses of Parliament some at least of the
hereditary leaders of the yeomanry of the kingdom, demand-
ing for them, as county inhabitants, individually and collec-
tively, the same measure of political justice as shall be given
to the inhabitants of the towns.
The fidelity and adequacy of the county representation is
one of the chief points on which every one who may take a
part in the business of parliamentary reform, with a single-
minded view to the establishment of a system universally just
and true, ought resolutely to insist. The title of the county
inhabitants to an equal representation to those of the towns,
according to their numbers, measured by the same rule, is
alike indefeasible and undeniable. Cheshire, with its 16,000
electors, increased by the extension of the suffrage perhaps to
20,000, would unquestionably be entitled to return ten
members, if every constituency of 2000, on the average,
returned one member. Yorkshire, with its 56,000 electors,
increased to 70,000 by the extension of the franchise, would,
on the same rule, be entitled to thirty-five members; and so
is the distinction between the landed and mercantile interests!"—Oldfield's
Representative History, vol. i., p. 163. London, 116,
Р
210 THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
with the rest of the counties. What is the objection to this
demand? There should be no shrinking on any side from
principles of indisputable justice. It is the duty-and duty
is always true policy-of the ministry who may conduct the
affairs of the State,-of the peers, who are, by tradition and
constitution, hereditary guardians of justice and liberty,—of
every member of the lower House who can rise above mere
party attachment, to insist upon this measure of justice for
those whose position do not enable them to combine for the
purpose of demanding it. If, in the discussions to arise, they
shall be led by rectitude of principle to the conception of
political wisdom, they will insist upon perfect and equal
rights for the dwellers in the counties, regulated by the same
measure, to the uttermost fraction,-abating not one jot or
tittle from what is conceded to those who live in towns,—
and demanding nothing more. If their demands be tainted
with a desire to secure a monopoly, or an unjust partition of
influence or power, they deserve to fail; but, in requiring
equality, their position is impregnable. The English people,
from the impromptu-crowd which gathers in the street, to
the most august court in the land, are lovers of fairness and
justice, and they will scorn the sophistry which shall attempt
distinctions between their countrymen, founded upon the
difference of the spot on which they may happen to live.
An equal measure of justice must be extended to the
towns. On this point, the metropolis seems to appal even
some of the most extreme reformers. On calculating its vast
population, and the corresponding share which it may claim.
in the representative assembly, the agitation for reform, like
fear, "recoils at the sound itself has made." An extensive
metropolitan representation, framed as it has hitherto been,
may well be dreaded; but, constructed on a system which is
freed from the ties of parish or boundary, it might be the
strength and anchor of the constitution, if such a character or
office could be attributed to any part of the kingdom rather
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES. 211
than to another. A true representative reflex of all the better
elements which are found in the metropolis, should present a
body of men as illustrious as any in the world.
Of what does the metropolis consist? It contains the
abode of the sovereign, and of the regal house and household,
and of all who compose the court and council of the Queen.
It contains the mansions of an ancient and powerful nobility,
and their numerous connexions and dependents. In it are all
the chief military and civil departments of the army, the
navy, the ordnance, and the control of their vast equipments;
the public treasury, the mint, and the multitude of offices
which are concerned with the receipt of the revenues of the
kingdom from foreign and inland trade, and all the subjects of
taxation, and for the appropriation and liquidation of the
principal and interest of a public debt equal in amount to the
value of the fee-simple of the dominions of some not insignifi-
cant monarchs,-and with the collection and audit of the
public accounts of the empire. In the metropolis are the
chief stewardships of the great estates of the crown and its
palatinates. In it reside all the functionaries connected with
the imperial Parliament,-the secretaries, councils, and officers
engaged in communications between the government and its
dependencies, the Canadas, Australasia, Africa, and the
Indies, and with foreign nations. In it are the immense
establishments of the Post-office, the great triumph of civilisa-
tion, sowing, daily and hourly, with its myriad hands, the
seeds of public and private intelligence gathered from every
part of the habitable globe. In the metropolis are the seats.
of the Courts of Equity and Law, and to it are brought all
appeals, in the last resort, from every territory and colony.
Here reside the bar, and the other professors of legal science
concerned in the supreme administration of justice, and in the
settlement and transfer of most of the great properties in the
kingdom. In this detail is comprehended but a few of the
multitude of conditions and occupations engaged on the affairs.
212 THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
of the empire. There is the Bank of England, and the
other companies and firms of bankers, whose money transac-
tions represent no small portion of the dealings and commerce
of every quarter of the earth. Here are the managers,
directors, and staff of the principal associations which, by
ships and railways, conduct the intercourse of the people of
all nations. There are classes almost beyond the possibility
of recapitulation,-merchants, shipowners, brokers, manufac-
turers of an infinite variety of fabrics,-traders, capitalists,
composed of companies and individuals, having ramifications
of business with every port, inland town, market, and village.
Here are associations, academies, and museums, for the pro-
motion of learning, and science, in all their developments.
Ireland sends its brilliant imagination and its romantic
bravery; Scotland, its keen intellect and its untiring persever-
ance. The metropolis attracts to itself much that the king-
dom produces of high talent or superior energy; it gathers
together the diversities of gifts with which nature endows
her most favoured sons. Here the learning of Johnson, the
erudition and wisdom of Burke, the genius of Reynolds, of
Lawrence, of Flaxman, and Chantrey, found their home.
Here the eloquence of Erskine, of Copley, and of Brougham,
had their appropriate theatre. It is here that Wren achieved
his triumphs; and here it may be given to Scott to realise
his conception of what Gothic architecture is capable. Davy
brings hither from Cornwall his researches in chemistry;
Stephenson, from Northumberland, his applications of me-
chanics; Herschel, from Somersetshire, his astronomical ob-
servations. Here, Abernethy, and Cooper, and Brodie, held
their daily levees. From the rapidity of communication and
of travel, the metropolis has now robbed the old provincial
capitals of much of their lustre. It is the dwelling of the
gentry of the kingdom. Hither thousands, whose skill and
industry have been crowned with success, retire, and bring
their acquired wealth, and find repose in contemplating that
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES. 213
progress in the labour of which they have ceased actively to
participate, and in the society of kindred minds. From the
metropolis flows that comprehensive literature, the seemingly
ever-increasing and inexhaustible stores of which are daily
poured forth in article and volume, to feed and guide the realm
of thought.
Foreigners should behold in the representation of this
mighty community a condensed picture of the greatness of
our country, and be compelled to recognise in it a triumphant
display of the dignity and virtue of its institutions. Instead
of this, the product which our political chemistry extracts
from this abundant wealth of material is so immeasurably
small that it may well create the deepest alarm in the mind
of any statesman, looking to the future, and beholding the
shoals into which the representative institutions, even in a
highly-intelligent age, may be permitted to drift. With an
accidental exception or two, we are unable to refer to the
metropolitan constituencies as having given to the senate any
members to whom the nation can point, not to say with pride,
-but with even the shadow of satisfaction, as illustrating a
single ennobling feature of the national character. Under a
system which forces every man either to submit to political
extinction or to make one of a majority, in which he utterly
sacrifices all that in which he differs from the rest in judg-
ment or opinion, it cannot be otherwise. An electoral com-
munity formed of thousands of persons, including every
diversity of thought, intelligence, education, and feeling, is
driven together, and told,-what is, in effect, a cruel irony,-
to elect a representative. If it be only that the person chosen
is to support this or that minister,-or this or that dogma
which the majority in its caprice or its ignorance has set up,
the representation may be enough,-but if it be to exercise.
a judgment on all the subjects which at this day become
matters of legislation, then it may be confidently said, that
no fable, legend, or allegory, has personified a creature capable
214 THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
The crowd of electors is
apply some test, which
of adequately representing such a heterogeneous combination
of men.
The result is inevitable.
persuaded by the more cunning to
affords no more proof of the fitness of the candidate for a
legislator than if they had taken him by weight or measure,
--something which the most ignorant man may answer. The
small degree in which he differs from the lowest and com-
monest order of mind amongst them may be his recommenda-
tion. The chance of any candidate of a higher order of
intelligence is so small, that no man will waste his fortune
upon it; and the very considerable number of components of
the electoral body, who, with delight, would have chosen a
superior man, have no opportunity of judging by comparison,
or of making a better selection.
It can hardly admit of doubt that, if our statesmen would
offer to the metropolitan electors the opportunity of adopting,
in the metropolitan constituencies alone, the system proposed
in this treatise, it would be regarded as an incalculable boon
by a very large number of the intelligent inhabitants; pro-
bably by almost all, excepting those who are able by the present
arrangements to acquire some profit, or some undue advantage
over their fellow-voters. Let us suppose that all the eighteen.
members are to be elected at one poll, and that the candidates
are not liable to be charged with any election expenses be-
yond a deposit of £50 apiece. There would be probably
not less than forty or fifty candidates, including men of emi-
nence in science and literature, in political life, in the army
or navy, and at the head of various departments of manufac-
ture and trade. Every elector would have this vastly in-
creased extent of choice, and selection, and in the method of
contingent voting may place on his voting paper the names of
all, or any, that he may approve of, rejecting as many as he
pleases. The whole number of votes being divided by eighteen
will give the quota, and the excess being struck off from
the more popular candidates would be carried to the next
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES. 215
names. The deficient votes would be dealt with in like
manner, and thus the sympathies of all would be awakened
and called into exercise.¹ The electors in the metropolis,
emancipated from the trammels by which they are now
restricted, and having before them a field of choice, including
many men amongst their contemporaries whose names they
have been accustomed to admire or venerate, would gather
together members certainly not less eminent than those of
any other constituency in the kingdom. In an equal system
of suffrage in counties and boroughs-and of individual inde-
pendence—it is probable that the county electors between the
Humber, the Mersey, and the Tees-or the county electors
south of the Severn, would be entitled to nearly the same
number of members as the electors of the metropolis; and a
competition between the metropolis, the north, and the south,
to be represented in the state by the most distinguished of
contemporaneous statesmen, would impart a new and incalcu-

(
The author pointed out this method in his evidence given before the Select
Committee of the House of Lords on the Franchise (Report, June 26, 1860).
See also the Journal of the Social Science Association,' April 10, 1865. The
practical objection to an application of this system to the metropolis alone, of
course, is the immediate effect it would have in transferring power from one
party to another. It must in justice be accompanied by a redistribution of
seats, giving to the metropolis its due number of members, and thus full
sentation both to Liberals and Conservatives.
repre-
The division of the capital into new boroughs, as Finsbury, Marylebone, &c..
has not the justification that it preserves the bonds of neighbourhood, local
sympathy and intercourse which exist in provincial towns. These ties are
scarcely known in the metropolitan localities. It was desired that the School
Board should contain ladies practically acquainted with the education of girls,
yet of 38,000 surplus votes for Miss Garrett in Marylebone, none could go to
make up the 100 wanting for Mrs. Grey in Chelsea. It is absurd enough that
the seat of Mr. Gladstone in Parliament, for whom 100,000 electors would have
voted if they could, is made to depend upon a majority of the voters of Oxford
University, of South Lancashire, or of Gravesend. But it is, if possible, still
more absurd that the 6,000 electors south of Oxford Street, who vainly struggled
to be represented by Mr. Mill, could not be reinforced by any of the vast number
of voters at the north of the same street who would have rejoiced to lend their
aid. Note to 4th edition.
216 THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
lably higher tone of life to our national politics. A few
thousand electors might still make choice of men who could
do them no honour, but the system thus affords a kind
safety-valve, by which deficiency of judgment or public spirit
is drawn off,-for every quota that makes a mean selection is
thus prevented from lowering the tone and character of any
other constituency, which such a number of voters is now
able to do; and the objects of their choice will find their
proper level.
Another condition of the population of London, and one
which may be expected to operate to an immense extent in a
system of individual independence, must also be taken into
account. At the census of 1851, of 1,395,000 persons above
twenty years of age, then in London, 588,000 were born in
other parts of England, including every English county,
14,000 in Wales, 26,000 in Scotland, and 89,000 in Ireland.
It is a habit of mankind to cling tenaciously to early associa-
tions. A native of Scotland or Ireland, or of a distant county,
whom a profession or a trade has drawn to London, retains
still his attachment to his birthplace. His sympathies are
with it, as his mind dwells on the memories of home, and of
youth or early manhood. Not in London alone would the
attachment to country and early associations operate. It would
be found throughout the kingdom, especially in all the great
centres of industry. Lancashire contained, at the same census,
378,000 persons not born within that county. Of these,
26,000 had their birthplaces in Scotland, and 190,000 in Ire-
land. Of the inhabitants of Yorkshire, about 8,000 were born
in Scotland, and 43,000 in Ireland. In Wales, there were 2,200
from Scotland, and upwards of 20,000 from Ireland. Scotland
contained 75,000 born in Ireland, and 45,000 in England.
The extent to which the means of travelling have been facili-
tated within the last few years will operate, in a degree which
has never before been felt, to preserve the connection between
individuals and the places of their more cherished associations,
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES. 217
and from which, notwithstanding their business may employ
them at a distance, they can scarcely be said now to be per-
manently removed. Under a system of individual independ-
ence, full scope would be given to every local attachment,-
a regard which, if it exists at all, must be of free and spon-
taneous growth. Scotland would not complain of neglected.
interests, for every Scotchman, wherever his lot in life had
cast him, would, in the choice of his representative, turn with
filial love to the land of his sires. Ireland would complain
of no cold disregard, for it would find friends in every spot
in which the warm-hearted and unchanging faith of her
sons, and the exquisite loveliness of her daughters, had won
affection.
It is obvious that causes arising out of country, of pro-
perty, and of every species of actual or possible association,
would all operate materially on the votes which would be
given in the metropolis and in other populous cities. To a
large number of persons, the success of the local candidate.
would be a matter of less importance than that of some candi-
dates for distant places, in which they may feel a greater interest.
The desire and temptation to achieve a party triumph would
be encountered by feelings and motives more wholesome and
genuine. Instead of local interests being neglected, they
will receive, by the accession of voluntary strength from
without, greatly increased impulse and power; the impedi-
ments which merely local jealousies create being at the same
time softened or removed.
It will be seen that the system of individual independence
is consistent with the most perfect devotion to local objects,
whilst, on the other hand, a geographical or territorial sys-
tem is perfectly inconsistent with individual independence.
The geographical system constrains every man's will, and
destroys all personal independence. On the other hand, the
power of voting for whom he thinks proper, permits every
man to make the place in which he lives, or in which hist
218 THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
property is situated, the first object of consideration. Local
obligations can go no further than this full liberty extends,
-unless it be really meant that the duty of protection is
attached, not to men but to inorganic nature, as to the soil
or the houses; or to unsentient life, the woods and forests,
and other productions of the vegetable kingdom. It is only
on the supposition that these existences are to control the
human will, that there can be any necessity for adhering to
an electoral system forcibly bound by territorial limits.
A system of individual independence is not only consistent
with every territorial view which the elector may entertain,
but the method of election which is here proposed does not
permit an elector of one constituency to interfere with the
electors of another. The distinct and independent action of
every constituency is perfectly preserved. No elector for
Marylebone can interfere with the electors for Warwickshire,
nor the elector of Warwickshire with those of Marylebone.
An elector of Marylebone may vote for a candidate who may
be a candidate for the county of Warwick, and the votes of
electors of Marylebone may furnish a quota who may return
him, but not for Warwickshire. Nothing but a majority in
that county could return him as a member for it, as the fact
of a return of the candidate by votes from Marylebone, in the
case supposed, when he had no sufficient majority in War-
wickshire, would be the same thing in effect as if he had been
at the first a candidate for Marylebone. It would be that
borough he would be returned to represent, and not War-
wickshire.
The adoption of a rule giving to every unanimous quota
of votes the power of electing a representative, would operate
in fact as a perfect and self-adjusting system of electoral
division, at all times corresponding with the fluctuations of
population and wealth. One of the suggested provisions¹is
directed to the object of admitting the separation of the larger
1 Clause V., p. 50.
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES. 219
into smaller constituencies; but after this has been done so
far as this is likely to be sought, there will no doubt still
remain counties, cities, and towns, the inhabitants of which
will not desire or consent to any division. Liverpool, for
example, would probably insist upon remaining-and there
is no reason why it should not remain-an entire and un-
divided constituency. It now contains 17,333 voters, and is
increasing in magnitude. The electors of Liverpool, even if
the quota were largely increased, might still be sufficient in
number to return seven or eight members. It is impossible
to foresee the extent of the changes, or the development which
any of the great centres of population may undergo. Under
a system in which political weight is perpetually regulated
by the magnitude and importance of the community, there is
no reason for preserving an arbitrary limit prescribed under
an obsolete condition of things, and the nominal representa-
tion may be determined by, and correspond with, the real
position of the electors.
XXXIII. Every constituency which is, or shall hereafter be entitled to
return a member or members to serve in Parliament, shall be summoned by
writ to return so many members as shall be equal to the quotient of the
number of the electors of the same constituency, who shall vote at the
election thereby directed to be made, divided by the number of the quota
for the time being declared and certified according to sections I. and III.,
hereinbefore contained, and one member for every fractional part of such
dividend; and in cases where the number of such electors shall be less than
such quota, one member, and no more,-except in cases falling within section
XXXII., herein before contained; and it shall not be necessary to specify in
the writ otherwise than as aforesaid, the number of members to be returned
by any constituency.
The operation of this law will be explained by supposing
that in North Cheshire, after an extended franchise, there
should be 11,000 voters, and that the quota be 2,000. The
number of electors, divided by the quota, gives a quotient of
five, and a fractional number, which will make it the duty of
the sheriff to return five, and one for the fractional number,
220 THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
making together six members for North Cheshire. The
arrangement of the number of members to be returned for
every constituency, under a system regulated by its magnitude,
whilst it gives to every locality an effectual and substantial
representation, becomes, so far as relates to form, no more
than a question of nomenclature.
The contest in which the nation will, so long as the present
system continues, be periodically and more or less fiercely
engaged, with reference to the relative importance and right
of counties, cities, and towns, and other constituencies, to
return severally one or more members, and to the propriety
of disfranchising boroughs, the only fault of whose inhabit-
ants is, that nature has not placed them on a seaboard, or on
some great stream of communication, or enriched them with
mineral treasure, is worthy of the times when laws were
made to enable one city or class to exercise privileges hostile
to another, and when the statute of Kilkenny was in force.
It will not continue for an hour after our leading statesmen
and public men shall be able to perceive that there is no more
wisdom in incumbering our political institutions with the
difficulties, and deteriorating them by the rude and barbarous
practices of bygone ages, than there would be in rejecting
the aid of modern science in the performance of any other
operation.
221
CHAPTER XI.
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
THE American statesman, whose "Disquisition on Govern-
ment" has been referred to, observes that all history and
experience testify that the same predominance of the indi-
vidual over the social feelings which makes government.
indispensable to preserve society, produces also on those who
administer the government a strong tendency to abuse its
powers. "Liberty," he says, "is little more than a name
under all governments of the absolute form, including that of
the numerical majority, and can have only a secure and
durable existence under those of the concurrent or constitu-
tional form." It is only a constitution, by whatever name
it may be called, which can prevent an abuse of power.
"Having its origin in the same principle of our nature,
constitution stands to government as government stands to
society, and as the end for which society is ordained would be
defeated without government, so that for which government
is ordained would, in a great measure, be defeated without
constitution. But they differ in this striking particular.
There is no difficulty in forming government. It is not
even a matter of choice whether there shall be one or not.
¹ Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 60. See Niebuhr, Hist. Rome, (Hare and
Thirlwall's Trans.), vol. ii., p. 298, Camb., 1832, where there are several
illustrations from ancient and modern history; Buckle, Hist. Civilization,
vol. i., p. 71.
222
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
Like breathing, it is not permitted to depend on our volition.
Necessity will force it on all communities in some one form
or another. Very different is the case as to constitution.
Instead of a matter of necessity, it is one of the most difficult
tasks imposed on man to form a constitution worthy of the
name; while, to form a perfect one,-one that would com-
pletely counteract the tendency of government to oppression
and abuse, and hold it strictly to the great ends for which it
is ordained, has thus far exceeded human wisdom, and
possibly ever will." "The question involves difficulties,
which, from the earliest ages, wise and good men have
attempted to overcome. For this purpose many devices
have been resorted to, suited to the various stages of intelli-
gence and civilisation, through which our race has passed. The
only materials which the early ages afforded for the construc-
tion of constitutions, were applied with consummate wisdom
and skill. To their successful application may be fairly
traced the subsequent advance of our race in civilisation and
intelligence, of which we now enjoy the benefits. For, with-
out a constitution, something to counteract the strong
tendency of government to disorder and abuse, and to give
stability to political institutions,—there can be little progress
or permanent improvement."
The writer who, in our own times, has combined the cha-
racters of the laborious historian, the practical statesman, and
the calm philosopher, divides power into that which exists de
facto, and that which is de jure: not the jus of the lawyers,
founded on the accidents of history,—but that which rests on
immutable principles of truth and justice. He cites the
words of Pascal, "La multitude qui ne se réduit pas à
l'unité est confusion. L'unité qui n'est pas multitude est
tyrannie." This, says M. Guizot, "est l'expression la plus
2
1 Disquisition, &c., p. 8.
2 The causes of the practical failures of M. Guizot are perhaps nowhere
more candidly weighed than by M. Lanfrey (Etudes et Portraits Politiques,
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
223
belle et la définition la plus précise du gouvernement repré-
sentatif. La multitude, c'est la société l'unité, c'est la
vérité-c'est l'ensemble des lois de justice et de raison qui
doivent gouverner la société. Si la société reste à l'état de
multitude, si les volontés isolées ne se réunissent pas sous
l'empire de règles communes, si elles ne reconnaissent pas
également la justice et la raison, si elles ne se réduisent pas
elles-mêmes à l'unité, il n'y a pas société, il y a confusion.
L'unité qui n'est pas sortie du sein de la multitude, qui lui a
été violemment imposée par un ou plusieurs, n'importe le
nombre, en vertu d'un droit à eux personnel, est une unité
fausse et arbitraire; c'est la tyrannie. Le but du gouverne-
ment représentatif est d'empêcher à la fois la tyrannie et la
confusion, de ramener la multitude à l'unité en la provoquant
à la reconnaître et à l'accepter elle-même."¹
Mr. Burke adverts to the error of the theorists who sophis-
tically confound the right of the people with their power.
"The body of the community, whenever it can come to act,
can meet with no effectual resistance; but, till power and
right are the same, the whole body of them has no right
inconsistent with virtue, and the first of all virtues, prudence.
Men have no right to what is not reasonable, and to what is
not for their benefit." One of the first motives to civil
society, and which becomes one of its fundamental rules, is,
that no man should be judge in his own cause. By this,
each person has at once divested himself of the first funda-
mental right of uncovenanted man, that is, to judge for him-
self, and to assert his own cause. He abdicates all right to be
his own governor.
He inclusively, in a great measure, aban-
112
Paris, 1864). It was "l'esprit de conservation à outrance, qui exigeait
l'inertie en système."- Nous sommes dans la charte, la charte est notre
forteresse."-"C'est bien l'image exacte de ce système fermé, sans expansion,
sans avenir, et sans issue. On ne songeait pas que tout forteresse appelle
un siége." Pp. 352, 353. Du Régime Parlementaire.
Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. i., p. 94.
Reflections, &c., p. 92.
224
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
dons the right of self-defence, the first law of nature. Man
cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state
together. That he may obtain justice, he gives up his right
of determining what it is in points the most essential to him.
That he may secure some liberty, he makes a surrender in
trust of the whole of it."1
The question of the ultimate deposit of political power is
presented by the European statesman in its philosophical,
and by the Transatlantic statesman in its practical shape,-
"Comment garantir à la société que le pouvoir absolu en fait,
auquel toutes les relations sociales viennent nécessairement
aboutir, ne sera que l'image, l'expression, l'organe du pouvoir
absolu en droit, seul légitime, et qui n'est déposé nulle part
sur la terre? C'est là le problème du gouvernement.
"2 How,
asks Mr. Calhoun, is the tendency of government to oppres-
sion and abuse "to be counteracted,-how can those who are
invested with the powers of government be prevented from
employing them as the means of aggrandising themselves,
instead of using them to protect and preserve society ?”³
3
The answer to these questions, as they are the conclusions
from facts, first assumes a negative form, by showing that as
no selection of one, or of a class, be it few or many, consti-
tutes any security from oppression, so the vesting of power in
the greater number-in the numerical majority-is at least.
equally a despotism in principle; and a despotism which
is more hopeless from the numbers of which it is composed,
and the assistance and countenance of a multitude which
creates its own standard of morals, and is blind to what is
base, when it serves the popular object. When the contest
is reduced to one of numbers-to a question of numerical
majority-the conflict between the two parties "tends neces-
1 Reflections, &c., p. 88.
4
2 Gouv. Rep., vol. i., p. 120.
3 Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 8. Sce Mill, Considerations on Rep. Gov.,
chap. vi.
4 Niebuhr, History of Rome (Iare and Thirlwall, Tr.), vol. ii., p. 407.
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
225
sarily to settle down into a struggle for the honours and emo-
luments of the government, and each, in order to obtain an
object so ardently desired, will in the process of the struggle
resort to whatever measure may seem best calculated to effect
this purpose.
The adoption, by the one, of any measure,
however objectionable, which might give it an advantage,
would compel the other to follow its example. In such case,
it would be indispensable to success to avoid division and
keep united; and hence, from a necessity inherent in the
nature of such governments, each party must be alternately
forced, in order to insure victory, to resort to measures
to concentrate the control over its movements in fewer and
fewer hands, as the struggle became more and more violent.
This, in process of time, must lead to party organization,
and party caucuses and discipline, and these, to the conver-
sion of the honours and emoluments of the government into
means of rewarding partisan services, in order to secure the
fidelity and increase the zeal of the members of the party.
The effect of the whole combined, even in the earlier stages
of the process, when they exert the least pernicious influ-
ence, would be to place the control of the two parties in the
hands of their respective majorities; and the government
itself virtually under the control of the majority of the domi-
nant party for the time, instead of the majority of the whole
community, where the theory of this form of government
vests it. Thus, in the very first stage of the process, the
government becomes the government of a minority, instead
of a majority,-a minority, usually, and, under the most
favourable circumstances, of not much more than one-fourth
of the whole community.'
1 "It has come to this, that one man, Caleb Claptrap, for example, who has
a certain influence with three other men, selects the man who, for the space
of four years, if elected, is to divide 120 millions of dollars amongst his
friends and their friends."-American-Whig Review, vol. xvi.,
xv jp 175. New
York, 1852.
226
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
"But the process, as regards the concentration of power,
would not stop at this stage. The government would gra-
dually pass from the hands of the majority of the party into
those of its leaders, as the struggle became more intense, and
the honours and emoluments of the government the all-
absorbing objects. At this stage, principles and policy would
lose all influence in the elections; and cunning, falsehood,
deception, slander, fraud, and gross appeals to the appetites
of the lowest and most worthless portions of the com-
munity, would take the place of sound reason and wise
debate. After these have thoroughly debased and corrupted
the community, and all the arts and devices of party have
been exhausted, the government would vibrate between the
two factions (for such will parties have become) at each suc-
cessive election. Neither would be able to retain power
beyond some fixed term; for those seeking office and patron-
age would become too numerous to be rewarded by the offices
and patronage at the disposal of the government; and these
being the sole objects of pursuit, the disappointed would, at
the next succeeding election, throw their weight into the
opposite scale, in the hope of better success at the next turn
of the wheel. These vibrations would continue until confu-
sion, corruption, disorder, and anarchy, would lead to an
appeal to force,—to be followed by a revolution in the form
of the government. Such must be the end of the govern-
ment of the numerical majority; and such, in brief, the pro-
cess through which it must pass, in the regular course of
events, before it can reach it.
"This transition would be more or less rapid, according to
circumstances. The more numerous the population, the more
extensive the country, the more diversified the climate, pro-
ductions, pursuits, and character of the people, the more
wealthy, refined, and artificial their condition; and the greater
the amount of revenues and disbursements, the more unsuited
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
227
would the community be to such a government, and the more
rapid would be the passage.
,1
It is not by instituting a higher power to control the
government, and those who administer it, that the tendency
to abuse can be counteracted. "This would be but to change
the seat of authority, and to make this higher power, in
reality, the government, with the same tendency to pervert
its powers into instruments of aggrandizement. Nor can it
be done by limiting the powers of government, so as to make
it too feeble to be made an instrument of abuse; for passing
by the difficulty of so limiting its powers, without creating a
power higher than the government itself to enforce the
observance of the limitations, it is a sufficient objection that
it would, if practicable, defeat the end for which government
is ordained, by making it too feeble to protect and preserve
society."2
Absolute and rightful power,-the power de jure,—is
divinely given, and attributable to none,-" la souveraineté de
droit," says M. Guizot, "n'appartient à personne, parce que
la connaissance pleine et continue, l'application fixe et imper-
turbable de la justice et de la raison n'appartiennent pas à
notre nature imparfaite."3
The lessons of experience having shown that absolute
power can be safely reposed in no single authority, the ques-
tion recurs, how the government must be constructed to
counteract its tendency to abuse? "There is but one certain
mode in which this result can be secured, and that is by the
adoption of some restriction or limitation, which has so effec-
tually prevented any one interest, or combination of interests,
from obtaining the exclusive control of the government, as to
render hopeless all attempts directed to that end.
There is,
again, but one mode in which this can be effected, and that
is, by taking the sense of each interest or portion of the
¹ Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 42.
3 Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. i., p. 93.
2 Id., p. 9.
228
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
community, which may be unequally and injuriously affected
by the action of the government, separately, through its own
majority, or in some other way, by which its voice may be
fairly expressed; and to require the consent of each interest,
either to put or to keep the government in action. This,
too, can be accomplished only in one way, and that is, by
such an organism of the government, and, if necessary for
the purpose, of the community also, as will, by dividing and
distributing the power of government, give to each division
or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent
voice in making and executing the laws, or a veto in their
execution. It is only by such an organism that the assent of
cach can be made necessary to put the government in motion;
or the power made effectual to arrest its action when put in
motion; and it is only by the one or the other that the dif-
ferent interests, orders, classes, or portions, into which the
community may be divided, can be protected, and all conflict
and struggle between them prevented, by rendering it impos-
sible to put or to keep it in action, without the concurrent
consent of all."
" 1
It is upon an application of these truths that the constitu-
tion of this kingdom rests,-a constitution we may yet be
permitted to describe, as "in theory the most beautiful of
any-in practice the most approved,"—and, may it still be
our trust," in duration the most permanent."2 It does
not, indeed, owe its foundation to any original and scientific
conception of the necessity of such a balance and distribution
of power.
"Les gouvernements ne se font pas plus à priori
et en vertu des préceptes que les grands poëmes."
labours, now conflicting and now combined, of divers
ranks, classes, and interests, have erected the British Parlia-
ment, and composed it of three constituent parts—“ the
King, the Lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons ;
1 Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 25.
—
The
2 1 Black. Com., p. 217.
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
229
parts, of which each is so necessary, that the consent of all
three is required to make any new law that shall bind the
subject."
It is by the action of these co-ordinate authorities that
unity, the combination of the power and the right, is sought.
Nothing human is infallible; but, from their joint and
harmonious concurrence in any public act, the people have
the greatest security which the institutions of man can
afford, that the measure will be conformable to the laws of
truth and justice. If they differ, the difference involves the
necessity of an appeal to reason, guided by the individual
conscience. The sovereignty of right resides in no man or
collection of men, but dwells, says M. Guizot, "Dans sa vie
intérieure, dans ses rapports avec lui-même, si je puis ainsi
parler, comme dans sa vie extérieure, dans ses rapports avec
ses semblables, l'homme qui se sent libre et capable d'action,
entrevoit toujours une loi naturelle de son action. Il recon-
naît quelque chose qui n'est pas sa volonté, et qui doit
régler sa volonté. Il se sent raisonnablement ou moralement
obligé à quelque chose; il voit ou il sent qu'il y a quelque
chose qu'il doit faire ou ne pas faire. Ce quelque chose, c'est
la loi supérieure à l'homme et faite pour lui, la loi divine. La
vraie loi de l'homme ne vient pas de l'homme; il la reçoit, il
ne la fait pas.
Alors même qu'il s'y soumet, elle n'est pas
sienne, elle est extérieure et supérieure à lui.
"L'homme ne se soumet pas toujours; en sa qualité de
force libre et de nature imparfaite, il n'obéit pas toujours à
sa loi. Il porte en lui d'autres mobiles d'action que cette loi
suprême, et quoiqu'il sente le vice de ces mobiles, souvent il
y cède. Mais, obéie ou non, la loi suprême de l'homme est
toujours là; il n'y peut songer sans reconnaître qu'elle est
placée au dessus de lui.
se
“Voilà donc l'individu toujours en présence d'une règle,
d'une règle qu'il n'a pas faite, et qui l'oblige, et qui ne l'aban-
1 1 Black. Com., p. 160.¸
230
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
donne jamais. S'il entre ou se trouve en société avec ses
semblables, quelle autre règle aura-t-il que celle là? La
société humaine serait-elle une abdication de la nature hu-
maine? non l'homme, dans la société, doit rester et reste
effectivement ce qu'il est ; et comme la société n'est qu'une
collection d'individus, la loi suprême de la société doit être
celle qui a droit de régir les individus eux-mêmes.
:
“Voilà donc la vraie loi du gouvernement trouvée. C'est
la même loi qui oblige les individus. Et comme pour l'indi-
vidu, la vraie loi est souvent obscure, et que l'individu même
quand il la connaît bien, ne la sait pas toujours, de même
pour le gouvernement, quel qu'il soit, la vraie loi, qui a
toujours à passer par l'esprit de l'homme, toujours borné et
passionné, n'est ni toujours connue ni toujours obéie. Il est
done impossible d'attribuer à un homme ou à plusieurs, la
souveraineté de droit, car ce serait supposer qu'ils savent et
veulent dans tous les cas, ce que veulent la justice et la raison.
Supposition inadmissible, à raison de l'imperfection radicale.
de notre nature.”¹
The possibility that the union of constitutional power with
the law of reason and justice may not be attained, after the
discussion to which differences between the co-ordinate powers
would necessarily give rise, is a possibility which positive law
cannot contemplate, for it is unable to create any power
above the constitution. The concessions which may be
necessary to be made by any of the three co-ordinate powers
to the other, are left to the direction of the individual con-
science, and the imperious demands of necessity. Human
law cannot abrogate the divine, and, therefore, no member of
any of the three powers, from the sovereign downwards, can
be required to disregard the dictates of conscience; but, on
the other hand, necessity compels all to submit to the con-
sequences, be they what they may, which may follow either
1 Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. i., p. 92.
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
231
""
obedience or neglect of conscience.¹ Publicity of debate, free
discussion, the extraneous and powerful help of the press, all
tend to the concurrent determination of disputed questions;
and thus to realise the idea of Pascal,-"il provoque la
multitude à se réduire à l'unité et il fait sortir l'unité du sein
de la multitude." "When something must be done, and
when it can be done only by the united consent of all,-the
necessity of the case will force to a compromise."
"On all
questions of acting, necessity, where it exists, is the over-
ruling motive; and where, in such cases, compromise among
the parties is an indispensable condition to acting, it exerts
an overruling influence in predisposing them to acquiesce in
some one opinion or course of action. Experience furnishes
many examples in confirmation of this important truth:
among these, the trial by jury is the most familiar.”2
It cannot, however, be for a moment forgotten, that the
equality of power in the three co-ordinate branches of the
Parliament-sacred as the constitutional principle may be-
is still but a principle. The rights of the sovereign, which
stand alone, are the symbol and safeguard of every lesser
right; but they rest upon law, and not upon force. The
dignity of the peerage forms a graduated hierarchy round the
throne, rendering it more difficult to approach without rever-
ence the earthly embodiment of justice, of freedom, and of
honour; and their hereditary privileges,3 by a parity of right,
1 These consequences, as they respect the sovereign, are discussed by
Blackstone (Com., vol. i., p. 211). As they regard the House of Lords,
perhaps the events which followed its resistance to the Reform Bill, and the
ground on which the resistance was overcome,-" that," as Earl Grey said,
"otherwise the government would be in fact an oligarchy," will afford an
illustration. See also pp. 18-20.
2 Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 65.
3 There are not wanting those who speak of hereditary legislators as an
institution which the progress of society is destined to abrogate. The
friends of the constitution may be allowed to hope that such opinions may
not hereafter derive strength from the course taken by the House in ex-
cluding a peer created for life,-a course justly described in one of their
Lordship's protests as "an unauthorised extension of the privileges of the
232
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
preserve its peaceful succession and descent. The whole
combination of degrees, whilst it wisely gratifies, also sets
bounds to the restless and insatiate cravings of human
ambition, and forms a protection to man against his passions.
These rights and privileges, again, rest upon law, and not
upon force. The third estate-the representative body-
stands in the place of those who are, in number and physical
power, beyond comparison greater than the two other estates,
and without whom the two other estates could have no exist-
ence. The will of the great constituent body, when defini-
tively expressed, and after every opportunity shall have
been given to the people of considering and revising the de-
termination, must be obeyed.
It follows, then, from the vast powers with which the re-
presentative body is necessarily invested, that in its construc-
tion every avenue should be opened by which the sense of
right, of justice, of prudence,--the dictates of the inward
law, can find expression within it. If it should err in its.
course,—if it should fail in arriving at that unity which em-
bodies at once power, reason, and justice, the people cannot
rely on the internal strength of the other two estates, for any
permanent resistance to what it may demand,-nor does even
the theory of the constitution justify any such reliance. The
representative body should, therefore, be regarded, for the
purpose of determining on its construction, as if it were the
House, not resting on any parliamentary precedent, and in derogation of the
just prerogative of the Crown." Parl. Deb., vol. cxl., p. 1311. The step
was supported by the expression of what certainly seem but mean ideas of
that in which personal dignity consists, and of what constitutes the heritage
of an illustrious name. The whole argument against the admission of Lord
Wensleydale to his seat may be described with sufficient respect by saying
it was not worthy of the peers from whom it came. The resistance to any
expansion of the Lower House in 1828 and 1830 bears no little resemblance
to that in the Upper House in 1856.-See Mill's Considerations on Repre-
sentative Government, chap. xiii., on the Constitution of a Second Chamber.
(Note to 3rd ed.)
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
233
sole power, which from the force of circumstances, and its
means of arresting the operations of government, it may at
any time in a great measure practically become. In order to
complete that constitutional security which depends on a real
and not on a nominal partition of power, the representative
body should be composed of every distinct variety and com-
bination of thought, of sentiment, of feeling, of opinion, and
of interest which exist in the constituent multitude. All
these diversities form so many pillars to support and give
unity to the constitutional edifice. If the representative body
be the creature of numerical majorities, the constitution will
be ultimately drawn into the vortex to which governments by
such majorities are exposed. In such a case, Mr. Calhoun
cautions the minority, not "to indulge the folly of supposing
that the party in possession of the ballot box and the physical
force of the country could be successfully resisted by an appeal
to reason, truth, justice, or the obligations imposed by the
constitution." If these could be relied on, he observes,
government might be dispensed with. The end of the
contest between the majority and the minority would be “the
subversion of the constitution, either by the undermining
process of construction, where its meaning would admit of
possible doubt,—or by substituting in practice what is called
party usage, in place of its provisions;-or, finally, when no
other contrivance would subserve the purpose, by openly and
boldly setting them aside. By the one or the other, the re-
strictions would ultimately be annulled, and the government
be converted into one of unlimited powers."
1
A representative body composed, not of the nominees of
the numerical majorities, but of the actual representatives of
all varieties of disposition and interest which make up society
-none being suppressed, would form within itself an assembly
in which the majority must necessarily be concurrent, and
comprehend the elements to which Mr. Calhoun attributes,
1 Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 33.
234
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
not unreasonably, so much virtue. Under such a form of
composition, every division of the constituents, "in order to
advance its own peculiar interests, would have to conciliate
all others, by showing a disposition to advance theirs; and
for this purpose, each would select those to represent it whose
wisdom, patriotism, and weight of character, would command
the confidence of the others. Under its influence, and with
representatives so well qualified to accomplish the object for
which they were selected, the prevailing desire would be, to
promote the common interests of the whole; and, hence, the
competition would be, not which should yield the least to
promote the common good, but which should yield the most.
It is thus that concession would cease to be considered a
sacrifice, would become a free-will offering on the altar of
the country, and lose the name of compromise. And herein
is to be found the feature, which distinguishes governments
of the concurrent majority so strikingly from those of the
numerical. In the latter, each faction, in the struggle to
obtain the control of the government, elevates to power the
designing, the artful, and unscrupulous, who in their devotion
to party,—instead of aiming at the good of the whole,—aim
exclusively at securing the ascendancy of party. When
traced to its source, this difference will be found to originate
in the fact, that, in governments of the concurrent majority,
individual feelings are, from its organism, necessarily enlisted
on the side of the social, and made to unite with them in
promoting the interests of the whole, as the best way of pro-
moting the separate interests of each; while in those of the
numerical majority, the social are necessarily enlisted on the
side of the individual, and made to contribute to the interest
of parties, regardless of that of the whole. To effect the
former, to enlist the individual on the side of the social
feelings to promote the good of the whole, is the greatest
possible achievement of the science of government; while, to
enlist the social on the side of the individual, to promote the
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
235
interest of parties at the expense of the good of the whole, is
the greatest blunder which ignorance can possibly commit.
"To this, also, may be referred the greater solidity of
foundation on which governments of the concurrent majority
repose. Both, ultimately, rest on necessity; for force, by
which those of the numerical majority are upheld, is only
acquiesced in from necessity; a necessity not more imperious,
however, than that which compels the different portions, in
governments of the concurrent majority, to acquiesce in com-
promise. There is, however, a great difference in the motive,
the feeling, the aim which characterise the act in the two
cases. In the one, it is done with that reluctance and hostility
ever incident to enforced submission to what is regarded as
injustice and oppression; accompanied by the desire and
purpose to seize on the first favourable opportunity for resist-
ance-but in the other, willingly and cheerfully, under the
impulse of an exalted patriotism, impelling all to acquiesce in
whatever the common good requires."
"" 1
In this kingdom, a system, peculiarly national, sometimes
called "Parliamentary," and at other times "Party Govern-
ment," has grown up. Its essential feature is the predomi-
nance of a compact party, of which the ministers of the crown
are a portion, and which is encountered in the House of
Commons by another compact party, who expect to succeed it
in
power, on a detection and exposure of any error into which
it may fall,—on the discovery and adoption of some tenet of
greater popularity, or by the more skilful employment of
parliamentary forces. So little difference has been understood
to exist between the two parties, other than that which is
founded on the possession or expectation of power, that an
orator who adverted to the party out of office as
"His
Majesty's opposition," was applauded as the author of a feli-
citous appellation. It was a conflict of two hostile bodies,
ever ending, and ever to be recommenced, which, but for its
1 Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 70.
236
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
vicissitude, might, without irreverence, be compared to those
occupations of a perpetually renewed warfare, with which the
Scandinavian paradise tempted the heroes of Odin,—
A round of listless joy, and weary strife.
As the system advanced towards maturity it became sub-
jected to rules of indefinite stringency,-requiring, in order
to secure majorities, that abnegation of individual opinion and
perfect external harmony, to which majorities of electors are
now reduced, in order to insure success. In the progress of
general knowledge, it was found that innumerable subjects
which had not been anticipated, became matters for parlia-
mentary discussion, and some of the restrictions on differences
of opinion were relaxed. Open questions," were admitted
to be lawful. The later parliamentary theory and practice on
the subject cannot be better described than it has recently
been by a statesman thoroughly experienced in it.
"When I
first entered Parliament, the House of Commons was divided
into two camps. A leader guarded both; a leader whom no
man questioned, and whom every man on his side followed.
All the trouble was in his hands. His party acquiesced in
everything he thought best, and, five minutes after hist
decision was announced to them, they were heart and soul
engaged in it, clamorous that it was the only one that could
be arrived at. This was a great advantage in some respects,
for it saved a world of thought. But in the House of
Commons of the present day we have a different state of
things. The House is divided into many parties, or, rather,
no party-and why? Because the country is divided into
many parties, or no party. At the time the House was
divided into two camps, the country was divided into two
camps also. One man was blue, another yellow. Each had
his own lawyers, and there was the sharpest line of demar-
cation between the two. The mass of people now judging for
themselves, find some good on one side, some on another, and
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
237
they will not yield themselves blindly to the lead of any one
man or party in the State. Now, there is great complaint
of this throughout the country. Men are disturbed and
unsettled by it, and they are devising means whereby the
country and Parliament may be again divided into two camps.
But, instead of lamenting the existence of such a state of
things, and devising means to restore what I believe will
never be restored again, I think we had better look our
difficulties in the face. I don't lament the change. Many
of the old public men in the House of Commons regret it
enormously; they are bewildered by it; and they are perhaps
right in their regret as public men, because it increases the
trouble and difficulty of public men. But all they have lost
in comfort the country has gained in public good. The
result is this, that the impulsion comes from below-that the
country, instead of being partisans, are now become a calm,
reasoning jury; and it is necessary, now that they are to
constitute the jury, that they should be capable of deciding
upon the arguments laid before them. The more great
measures are passed by consent, and party bitterness is
extinct, the more necessary it becomes that we in the country
should understand the contemporaneous political opinions we
are called upon to decide."¹
If the representation is to be constructed with the view of
perpetuating party government, two considerations arise,-
first, the method of effecting the object, secondly, what
would probably be the result?
The division of every constituency into two bodies, each
distinguished by a political dogma, and ignoring or suppress-
ing every opinion which these dogma do not comprise, is
1 Mr. Sidney Herbert, Address on opening the Warminster Athenæum,
Oct. 1858.-Times. I may be allowed to express my gratification at having
collected, and presented in this place, these words of truth and soberness,
proceeding from the lips of one of the best and greatest men of our time,
who has since passed from among us, leaving to his country his wise
counsels, and his pure example. (Note to 3rd ed.)
238
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likely to create a representative body also divided into two
parties. In order thus to procure a representation of opinions
not popular with the majorities, constituencies must be
created which are not popular,—or which, being popular, can
be led by corruption. For these purposes the county repre-
sentation may be made as full as it can be in point of
members, as restricted as possible in point of suffrage.
Every effort may be made in the closer counties to keep land
out of the market, and arrest the progress of building and
building societies. The borough suffrage may be widened to
any extent, and the ballot introduced, in order to obtain, by
a wholesale corruption of the poor and ignorant, a direct in-
fluence for property. We may hope that there are few who
could look forward with any complacency to such a scheme.
It is indeed impossible to hear, without pity at their igno-
rance, or disgust at their hypocrisy, the warnings of pro-
minent party men against improvements in our electoral
system, founded on appeals to the condition of the United
States, when every reader of their history knows that it is to
the overwhelming power of party, pushed onwards by a
covetous greed of the profits of party, and subduing all indi-
vidual conscience and action, that the evils of political life in
that country are owing.
What would be the result of a contrivance to render party
organization omnipotent in elections in this country? An
attempt to foretel the future would be presumptuous. We
have seen the struggles made to gain electoral majorities.
We know the nature of man,-we can scarcely doubt,-that
an abject submission to the occasional will of the greatest
number in any assembled multitude, will "extinguish in those
who serve them all moral principle, all sense of dignity, all
use of judgment, and all consistency of character." "When
the leaders choose to make themselves bidders at an auction
of popularity, their talents in the construction of the state
will be of no service. They will become flatterers instead of
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239
legislators; the instruments, not the guides of the people.
If any of them should happen to propose a scheme of liberty,
soberly limited and defined with proper qualifications, he will
be immediately outbid by his competitors, who will produce
something more splendidly popular. Suspicions will be
raised of his fidelity to his cause. Moderation will be stig-
matized as the virtue of cowards; and compromise as the
prudence of traitors; until, in hopes of preserving the credit
which may enable him to temper and moderate on some
occasions, the popular leader is obliged to become active in
propagating doctrines and establishing powers which will
afterwards defeat any sober purpose at which he ultimately
might have aimed.” ¹
The office of the House of Commons, as the exponent of
public opinion, is of vast importance, and deserves the
utmost attention. In that assembly, public opinion should
be gathered and expressed with clearness and certainty. It
should be registered there with an accuracy resembling that
of the thermometer; and that can only be when the House
collects and receives all varieties of opinion from without.
There is nothing else connected with the ience of govern-
ment which it is of equal importance in a free state that the
minister should always be able to ascertain. Any defect in
the representative constitution which leads the minister or
the people to look elsewhere for the manifestation of public
opinion is fraught with the gravest dangers. Public opinion
is a sea over which a well-taught pilot may navigate in safety;
but, to the uninformed, it is the "gulf profound"
Where armies whole have sunk.
It is strewed with the wrecks of governments. The rarest
and most necessary qualification of a statesman is "the faculty
of discerning what the nation really desires and thinks; of
distinguishing between the intelligent and the unintelligent
¹ Reflections, &c., p. 361.
240
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
public opinion,--between the orators and the organs that
have weight, and those that have none,-between the voice.
which is influential and the voice which is only loud ;—in a
word, between the popular pronunciamento, which it
would be weakness and wickedness to listen to, and that
which it would be unpardonable to disregard, and idle to
dream of opposing. The task demands no little care, and no
ordinary tact; it belongs to a sagacity partaking of the
character of an instinct, which some men of very moderate
genius have in perfection,-of which others of far loftier
intellect are entirely destitute. It requires singular accuracy
of judgment and acuteness of perception; a practical
acquaintance with every rank and class of the community,
or that intuitive insight which, with some men, appears to
supply its place; and a mental ear so fine, sensitive, and
subtle, as to be able (so to speak) to hear the language of the
silent, as well as that of the outspoken and the noisy, and to
discriminate between the tones of resolute earnestness, and
those of mere bustling loquacity." Without this rare dis-
cernment, he "is for ever steering between two dangers that
of opposing a stolid and insensible defiance to the real and
serious demands of the popular will, and that of yielding a
weak obedience to the noisy outcries of a worthless, insignifi-
cant, and powerless few, and incurring thereby the infinite
disgust of the influential, but silent and contented class." If
the House of Commons be not the actual, as well as the con-
stitutional organ of public opinion, the nation is left open to
the attacks and the enterprises of irresponsible persons, who
are thereby encouraged to usurp its office. It is impossible
to estimate the mischief to which a misconception of public
opinion may lead. The tendency in the mind to believe
what it desires to think, is expressed in the proverb, that
"the wish is father to the thought." It is not less inclined
to fancy that the opinions of others assimilate to its own.
1 Edinburgh Review, vol. xcv., p. 234.
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241
There is, again, a disposition in most minds to exaggerate
any circumstance or action which they have themselves
witnessed, or in which they have borne a part. A sort of
imaginary importance or glory is acquired by being able to
narrate something out of the common. We are, perhaps,
told of a numerous and influential public meeting in London,
attended by merchants, bankers, traders, and persons of all
classes; and the concurrence of their opinions on some
agitated subject is dwelt upon as a great fact. If during the
hour that this meeting was held we had gone to the banks,
to the merchants' and brokers' offices, -the exchanges,-the
docks, the shops of the principal tradesmen, we should
probably have found all the ordinary work of the establish-
ments going on, and few or none of the active heads of any
business absent from their usual posts. We are told of the
names of many who were present, but such an array is easily
made imposing; and if examined, it would very likely appear
to have been, besides those who led the movement,-only a
few of the senior members of firms, in the business of which
they are no longer regularly or personally engaged, and who
are gratified with celebrity in the public journals,—a few
others desiring, or glad of an excuse for, an hour or two of
relaxation; a number of unemployed persons in easy circum-
stances, to whom the opportunity of hearing speeches on a
popular topic is a pastime, or a harmless kind of dissipation;
-and the idle, who, when not kept at home by the rain, are
always ready to make up a crowd. The men of business,
upon whose industry and labour the wealth of the nation
depends, are unconcerned, and take no interest in the matter.
Of course, it may be otherwise; but the public has little or
no evidence one way or the other; it may be deluded, either
by those who exaggerate, or those who disparage the value
of the expression. It may be misled by the statement
that a great manifestation had been made, and be induced
to imitate it elsewhere; and thus a comparatively few
R
242
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
persons may give to their own notions the semblance of
the popular voice.
One example of a declaration of public opinion has occurred
to this generation. The political convulsions on the Con-
tinent ten years ago caused great excitement amongst the
poorer classes in England, and an urgent demand arose for
changes in the representative system. The claim was
asserted in the calm and constitutional form of addressing
Parliament by petition; and in order to give it further
weight, a public meeting on Kennington Common was re-
solved upon. The belief of the intensity of feeling on the
points in question, caused great apprehension to be felt by the
more wealthy classes; who remembered that a few years.
earlier even the Duke of Wellington had been led by appre-
hensions of disturbance to advise the King not to attend an
entertainment in the city of London. On the appointed day
business was suspended. The petitioners assembled in great
numbers,' and the opponents of the movement occupied the
public buildings and halls north of the Thames. Nothing
occurred to provoke any collision,-nor was there evidence
that any outrage was intended. The exaggerations of
the statements with regard to the popular expression which
had been dispersed, and excited so much terror, were very
remarkable. The petition, which was for annual parliaments,
universal suffrage, equal electoral districts, and the payment
of members, was presented by Mr. Feargus O'Connor, a
gentleman of great earnestness and undoubted personal in-
tegrity. He stated, and justified the statement by letters
he had received, that the petition was signed by 5,706,000
persons. The Committee on Public Petitions ascertained
and reported that the signatures were 1,975,496, that
many consecutive sheets were in the same handwriting, and
many signatures fictitious. The meeting on Kennington
1 April 10, 1848.

THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
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་
|
Common, where half a million were said to have assembled,
was shown never to have exceeded at any time 23,000 in
number.
In a case which could thus be subjected to accurate measure-
ment, we find an example of the error to which the Govern-
ment and the public are exposed in the reception of state-
ments relating to the general feeling or opinion when it is
gathered from mere assertion and rumour. If the nominal
representative body do not truly represent the people, or if it
represent only a majority of numbers out of which all dis-
tinctive individuality, which is the essence of character and
opinion, has been extracted in the process of its formation,
public opinion will be necessarily sought for by other means,
however imperfect or deceptive.
Amongst the causes enumerated by Mr. Calhoun as con-
tributing to make monarchies the most prevalent and usually
the most durable governments, he mentions, as the leading
one, their greater capacity of improvement. When,-he
observes, the hereditary form is well defined, it identifies
the interests of the Sovereign and the subject, excludes the
suspicion and hostility incident to insecurity, and creates the
strong feelings of paternity on one side, and loyalty on the
other. When, he adds,-the hereditary principle is ex-
tended to other families, and a powerful body of nobles
surround the Sovereign, they oppose a strong resistance to
his authority, and he to theirs, tending to the advantage
and security of the people. Such governments settle down
on some fixed rules of action, by which increased protection.
and security are acquired by all; and thus, under the en-
lightened monarchies of Europe, the people have made such
1
"The ruin of the ancient democracies was, that they ruled as you [the
French National Assembly] do, by occasional decrees, psephismuta. This
practice soon broke in upon the tenor and consistency of the laws; they
abated the respect of the people towards them, and totally destroyed them
in the end."-Burke, Reflections, &c., p. 305. See the Psephisms contrasted
with the respect for law, in Lucas's Secularia, pp. 16, 17.

244
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66 It
great advances in power, intelligence, and civilization."
remains to be seen, whether they will continue to retain their
advantages, under the great and growing influence of public
opinion, and the new and imposing form which popular
government has assumed.” "To comprehend more fully the
force and bearing of public opinion-and to form a just esti-
mate of the changes to which, aided by the press, it will
probably lead, politically and socially, it must be considered
in connexion with the causes that have given it an influence
so great, as to entitle it to be regarded as a new political
element." 2
The more prominent of the causes referred to,
are the discoveries and inventions of the last few centuries;
printing, the compass in navigation, gunpowder in war, the
application of mechanical and chemical laws to the arts of
production, and of steam to machinery, facilitating travel and
transportation by land and water. Hence the increase and
diffusion of knowledge; an impulse to progress and civilization
heretofore unexampled, accompanied by unprecedented mental
energy and activity, to all which causes, public opinion, and
its organ the press, owe their joint and powerful influence.
"Already they have attained a force in the more civilized.
portions of the globe, sufficient to be felt by all governments,
even the most absolute and despotic. But, as great as they
now are, they have as yet attained nothing like their maxi-
mum force. It is probable, that not one of the causes which
have contributed to their formation and influence, has yet
produced its full effect; while several of the most powerful
have just begun to operate, and many others, probably of
equal, or even greater force, yet remain to be brought to
light." When they have produced their full effect, “they
will give a force to public opinion, and cause changes, political
and social, impossible to be anticipated. Their final bearing,
time only can decide; but, that they would improve the con-
dition of man, it would be impious to doubt." "The first effect
1 Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 85.
2 Id., p. 87.
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245
of such changes on long-established governments will be, to
unsettle the opinions and principles in which they originated,
and which have guided their policy, before those which the
changes are calculated to form and establish are fairly de-
veloped and understood. The governments of the more
advanced and civilized portions of the world are now in the
midst of this period of transition. It has proved, and will
continue to prove, a severe trial to existing political institu-
tions of every form. Those governments which have not the
sagacity to perceive what is truly public opinion,—to dis-
tinguish between it and the mere clamour of faction, or shouts
of fanaticism, and the good sense and firmness to yield
timely and cautiously to the claims of the one,- and to resist,
promptly and decidedly, the demands of the other, are doomed
to fall. Few will be able successfully to pass through this
period of transition, and these not without shocks and modi-
fications, more or less considerable. It will endure until the
governing and the governed shall better understand the ends
for which government is ordained, and the form best adapted
to accomplish them, under all the circumstances in which
communities may be respectively placed."
The press must at this day be regarded as an important
political element, and has not, without great truth and signi-
ficance, claimed for itself the title of the "fourth estate." It
exercises two functions, one of which it performs much more
perfectly than the other. It creates the public opinion of
which it is the exponent, and professes to expound that which
it has created. The press, taken in its largest meaning, is the
lever of the mind. It cannot eradicate the desires or the
passions of mankind; but, with this limit to its power, it is
hardly possible to exaggerate its importance, or its value in
education,-in producing salutary changes on the condition.
of society,-in exploding political errors,-in promoting the
social and benevolent, as opposed to the individual and selfish
feeling,—and thereby bringing public opinion to a sound and
+
246
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
1
wholesome state. When we come to observe its other func-
tion, that of expressing and making known the opinion which
the public have formed, we begin chiefly to consider the
periodical press, a very powerful part, but not the whole,-
and we immediately perceive how insufficient for such an
office are the materials of which it can be in possession. Of
the many millions of persons composing the nation, how few
think it necessary to divert their attention from their ordinary
pursuits, even to make up their minds on most of the public
questions which arise; how few, again, distinctly express
their opinions, how few communicate them to the press.
The press has no statistical or other means of ascertaining the
opinions of the vast and silent mass. "It is strange that all
our institutions are to be at the mercy of one authoritative
voice, and that of the utterances of that voice there should not
be as much as one authorised reporter."2 If every one of the
2,866 persons who were in the census described as "authors
and literary men," divided the kingdom amongst them, and
devoted themselves to the business of gathering the opinions
of the people on the immense number and variety of subjects
connected with the public welfare, they would fail to ascertain
any true public opinion. Their numbers would be unequal
to grapple with the multitude of people and of questions:
they would find comparatively few to respond to their inter-
rogatories; and the catechism would be upon matters as to
which the vast majority had as yet formed no creed or opinion.
In fact, however, literary men are not engaged in such a
profitless inquiry. They have a more elevated function.
It
1 Mr. Henry Taylor, in The Statesman (p. 56), London, 1836,-observes
on the fact, that most men put off making up their minds, even on matters
affecting themselves, until they have to act, write, or speak respecting
them.
2 Sir James Stephen. I may refer also to the well-known and curious
inquiry of Mr. Kinglake, in his work on the Invasion of the Crimea,
of the manner in which public opinion has been supposed to be sounded
and urged on. Vol. ii., pp. 74-86.
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
247
has been observed,' that formerly the debates in the House of
Commons guided, strengthened, and ruled public opinion;
but that they do so no longer, because the speakers are antici-
pated, and public questions better and more completely treated
in the articles contained in periodical literature. It is to the
press, it is said, "that we must look for the formation of the
great mass of public opinion on political and social questions,
and it is of importance to watch with the greatest care any
defects capable of remedy which diminish the good influence
the press exercises; and if any one can contribute to improve
the strength of the press for good, and to diminish it when it
tends towards evil, he can confer no greater benefit upon the
community at large.'
2
All, or nearly all important subjects, will necessarily be
discussed in the press, before they are considered in the Legis-
lature; for the Legislature is a limited body with a definite
purpose, whilst the press is illimitable in diffusion, and bound-
less in capacity. It is in its great office, as the vehicle of
public instruction, that the inestimable value of the press con-
sists. As the universal repertory of ever-multiplying facts,
and of the reasoning to which they may lead, it has become
the indispensable daily food of civilisation. It is only in the
event of its reporting, or assuming as fact, that which is not
fact, and of its reasoning on such false representation or
assumption, that it may mislead. Such errors must be as
prejudicial to the progress of political, as of every other
science. They are more dangerous in political science, from
the difficulty of testing them,-the infinite varieties of capa-
city amongst those who are more or less engaged on the sub-
ject,—and the passions which interfere to disturb inquiries so
much more largely in moral than in physical science. It is
¹ Mr. Sidney Herbert, in the address already quoted, p. 237.
2 The most important questions here raised have been considered in Mr.
Mill's Dissertations and Discussions, 1859. See article on Civilization,
vol. i. (Note to 3rd ed.)
248
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
very possible for a writer, who has a strong feeling or bias on
any particular subject, honestly to believe and represent that
which is his own opinion to be the opinion of the public. As
a supposed organ of public opinion, the press is at all times
imperfect, and may become dangerous.
The danger would result from trusting any body of men,
however high in character, to wield a machine of such vast.
power as "public opinion." In forming public opinion we
have seen that the press is the most potent of material gifts
which has been vouchsafed to man. Diverse and antagonistic
views and interests may all invoke its aid, and be heard before
the great court of reason and conscience. But when the press
assumes to declare public opinion, it ceases to be the advocate
and takes the office of judge. In preparing itself for this
high function, it is assailed by all the disturbing causes of
party and private influence and interest, which bias the con-
duct and corrupt the judgment of mankind. It is also import-
ant not to forget, with reference to the public journals, that
they must necessarily be conducted on mercantile principles.
They must be remunerative or they cannot long continue.¹
1
If what is called public opinion were always the opinion
of the whole community, the press would, as its organ, be an
effective guardian against the abuse of power, and supersede
the necessity of the concurrent majority; just as the right of
suffrage would do, where the community, in reference to the
action of government, had but one interest. But such is not
the case.
On the contrary, what is called public opinion,
instead of being the united opinion of the whole community,
is, usually, nothing more than the opinion or voice of the
strongest interest or combination of interests, and not unfre-
quently, of a small but energetic and active portion of the
whole. Public opinion, in relation to government and its
policy, is as much divided and diversified as are the interests
1 See this point succinctly stated in a short note to Mr. Wingrove Cooke's
History of Party, vol. iii., p. 613.
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
249
of the community; and the press, instead of being the organ
of the whole, is usually but the organ of these various and
diversified interests respectively, or rather of the parties grow-
ing out of them. It is used by them as the means of con-
trolling public opinion, and of so moulding it as to promote
their peculiar interests, and to aid in carrying on the warfare
of party.”
As the instrument of party warfare, it contri-
butes greatly to increase party excitement, and the violence
and virulence of party struggles, and, in the same degree, the
tendency to oppression and abuse of power. Instead, then,
of superseding the necessity of the concurrent majority, it
increases it by increasing the violence and force of party feel-
ings,-in like manner as party caucuses and party machinery;
of the latter of which, indeed, it forms an important part."1
The opinion which is declared by the press to be that of
the public is very likely to become so if the declaration be
believed, however unhappy or evil may be the course to which
¹ Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 77. "The present vitiated state of the
public taste admits of no neutrality; no lukewarmness. The mangling of the
public and private character of political men, the debasing of the motives of
action of the loftiest and purest to a level with the meanest, the fomenting of
party rage and party hate, these are the dishes that are devoured with most
avidity. At this day no politician cares for the boldness, frankness, or
integrity of an individual editor. He buys a paper because it is an agent of
his party, to promote or to preserve its elevation. Whenever an editor
undertakes to think for himself or differently from party dictation, the party
ceases to sustain him. The editors do but imitate our leading politicians,
who themselves imitate the lawyers. They handle all political questions
like fee'd advocates, and consider themselves as standing in that attitude
before the country; and, as such, feel justified in making the most of the
cause in which they are enlisted, good or bad. All this is most pernicious,
when we consider the immense influence they exercise over public opinion
and public morals. Though a politically debased public press is rather the
consequence than the cause of a vitiated state of public morals, yet such is
the influence of the press in augmenting such a state of morals, that
nothing is better deserving an anxious care than the preserving it pure,
independent, and respectable, and the removing from our institutions
everything that bears upon it with a contrary tendency."-Conservative
Essays, Legal and Political, by S. S. Nicholas, of Louisville, Kentucky,
pp. 473, 474. Philadelphia, 1863.
L
250
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it leads. People yield their assent and concurrence to what
seems to them inevitable. If it should happen to become the
opinion of an apparent majority, and be adopted by those in
power, it proceeds with a vastly accelerated rapidity, over-
whelming all opponents. "The negative power is always
far weaker, in proportion to its appearance, than the positive.
The latter having the control of the government, with all its
honours and emoluments, has the means of acting on and
influencing those who exercise the negative power, and of
enlisting them on its side, unless it be effectually guarded;
while, on the other hand, those who exercise the negative,
have nothing but the simple power, and possess no means of
influencing those who exercise the positive power." 1
A
It has been lately said, that "political principles are at best
but the product of human reason; while political practice has
to do with human nature and human passions, of which
reason forms but a part; and on this account the proper
business of a statesman is to contrive the means by which
certain ends may be effected, leaving it to the general voice
of the country to determine what those ends shall be."2
House in which every member would sit as the representative
of an unanimous constituency will effectually prevent any
successful counterfeit of the public voice, for he will have
been selected as the most accurate medium for conveying the
opinions of his constituents, not only on the subjects on which
those opinions had been awakened, but on those on which
they were latent, and might be evoked by new and unexpected
circumstances. They agree with him from sympathy or from
deference. The general opinion of the nation,—including
that large body which now silently and passively submits to
disturbing elements and causes, will thus be readily and habi-
tually manifested. The operation of the system in this
respect is so important that it requires especial comment.
1 Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 284.
2 Buckle, Hist. Civilisation, vol. i., p. 475,
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
251
It is from the regular exercise of political functions by
those who are entitled to exercise them, that the steady opera-
tion of the great machine of state can be relied upon. If such
duties be only taken up in times of excitement, its action will
be spasmodic rather than sober and progressive. "A system
of rule under which the sovereign power is dormant and
inert when ordinarily comfortable, and called into action and
made omnipotent only when frantic with misery ;-under
which it abnegates its functions in hours of calm, to resume
them in its moments of passion ;-under which it drops the
reins when the driving is easy and the road is smooth, to
snatch them at those difficult and perilous passages when the
cool and dexterous hand of long experience is especially re-
quired, surely carries its own condemnation on its face."1
And to guard against this irregularity, it has been suggested
that, on any considerable extension of the franchise, it would
be desirable to make its exercise compulsory. The proposal
is directed in effect to the same object as that of the well-
known law of Solon,-coeval with democratic institutions,-
which decreed disfranchisement and dishonour to him who, on
the occasion of a division and tumult in the city, should
stand aloof and take part with neither side. It would natur-
ally be a part of the first conception of a democratic body,
that its action should be like that of ONE man. It is only by
giving it the energy and decision of a single will that a mul-
titude can deal with its internal interests or be dealt with by
strangers as a competent and self-acting body. The more
fitful and irregular its action the more it becomes feeble and
open to intrigue. To the extent in which every individual
will is actually comprehended in any expression which pur-
ports to be that of the general will, to that extent its own
members as well as strangers may depend upon the national
firmness and persistency. It can hardly be doubted, that, if
1 Edinburgh Review, vol. xcv., p. 277.
3 Plut. in Solon, i., 89.
3
2 Id.
252
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
the feeling of the British people upon the late designs of
Russia against Turkey had been perfectly known, these
designs would have been abandoned, and an unhappy war
would have been averted. Mr. Grote, speaking of the law of
Solon, observes that it " seems more in the nature of an em-
phatic moral denunciation, or a religious curse, than a legal
sanction, capable of being formally applied in an individual
case, and after judicial trial." "We may, however," he adds,
"follow the course of ideas under which Solon was induced to
write this sentence on his tables, and we may trace the influ-
ence of similar ideas in later Attic institutions. It is obvious
that his denunciation is confined to that special case in which
a sedition has already broken out: we must suppose that
Kylon has seized the Acropolis, or that Peisistratus, Mega-
klês, and Lycurgus, are in arms at the head of their parti-
sans. Assuming these leaders to be wealthy and powerful
men, which would in all probability be the fact, the consti-
tuted authority-such as Solon saw before him in Attica, even
after his own organic amendments-was not strong enough to
maintain the peace; it became in fact itself one of the contend-
ing parties. Under such given circumstances, the sooner every
citizen publicly declared his adherence to some one of them,
the earlier this suspension of legal authority was likely to
terminate." Mr. Grote does not suggest any reason for
limiting the operation of the law to cases of such extreme
emergency. It would be of efficacy and value in every case
of tumult,-every strong manifestation of adverse opinions,
every standing apart in the public assembly, or every case
arising out of the power which the Solonic constitution gave
to the people in that assembly. Commentators of the law
have considered its principle to be deserving of very wide ex-
tension. It is agreeable to all theory and all experience,
2
1 Grote, Hist. of Greece, vol. iii., p. 190.
2 Aulus Gellius, Noct. Attic., ii., 12; Voy. du Jeune Anacharsis, vol. i.,
p. 111. Paris, 1790.
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
! 253
that in every great question by which a nation can be agitated
or divided, nothing could sooner tend to bring the contest to
an end, than an expression of the general will.
"There is in all parties, between the principal leaders in
Parliament and the lowest followers out of doors, a middle
sort of men, who, by the spirit of that middle situation, are
the fittest for preventing things from running to excess. But
indecision, though a vice of a totally different character, is the
natural accomplice of violence. The irresolution and timidity
of those who compose this middle order, often prevent the
effect of their controlling situation. The fear of differing
with the authority of leaders on the one hand, and of contra-
dicting the desires of the multitude on the other, induces
them to give a careless and passive assent to measures in
which they never were consulted: and thus things proceed,
by a sort of activity of inertness, until whole bodies, leaders,
middle men, and followers, are all hurried, with every ap-
pearance, and with many of the effects, of unanimity, into
schemes of politics, in the substance of which no two of them
were ever fully agreed, and the origin and authors of which
in this circular mode of communication, none of them find it
possible to trace." "The sober part give their sanction, at
first through inattention and levity; at last they give it
through necessity. A violent spirit is raised, which the presid-
ing minds, after a time, find it impracticable to stop at their
pleasure, to control, to regulate, or even to direct.":
The press not only, it is observed, takes from the states-
man his initiative action, but it supersedes the function of the
orator. "As printing and book-reading increase, the gifts of
public orators will become of little or no value." There is
little doubt, as Parliament shall become composed of men of a
more reflective order of mind, it will be less an arena for the
display of mere extempore crudities. The debates may here-
¹ Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, p. 122.
2 Mr. Sidney Herbert, see p. 237.
254
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
after be the brief expression of condensed thought. Instead
of many of the oral addresses, the habit may be adopted of
embodying and conveying reasons carefully prepared in the
shape of propositions, to be entered on the proceedings of the
House, having some resemblance to the protests in the
Lords. The economy of time, and the improvement in logic
by such a process would be incalculable. It requires a dif
ferent, and, for a deliberative body, a more valuable order of
mind than mere oratory demands. It is more difficult to
convince the understanding by close reasoning and irrefrag-
able proof, than to captivate the mind by vague generalisations
and plausible analogies. The positive is always restricted to
some narrow and rigid limits,-to what is imaginative there.
are no bounds. It is, indeed, impossible to conceive any step
in our progress onwards which will not require an increase
of legislative talent and power,-whether it be to lead, to
guide, or even to retard, where further deliberation may be
necessary.
Another effect of a perfect system of representation, such
as that which has been proposed, would be to strengthen the
executive government. It would give to the ministry that
assurance of the confidence of the people, which none of the
existing machinery can afford. It would probably become
the habit of every intelligent elector to place on his voting-
paper, in addition to the name of his local candidate, the
names of the statesmen he regarded as the most eminent, and
an expression of the general opinion would be thus afforded
which none could despise. The grounds of opposition to the
measures of a cabinet in support of whose members some
hundred thousands of electors had declared their willingness.
to vote, must be far other than selfish or factious, before a
parliamentary majority would unite to displace them, and
thus incur the danger of a step which might be suicidal for
themselves.¹
1 The appropriation of no more than the quota of votes to any member,
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
255
It would also further strengthen the position of every
government, by the perfect security of the seats of all the
principal statesmen in the House from the effect of local or
individual prejudices or enmities. Under the present system,
all the consideration which is due to knowledge, experience,
integrity, and industry, displayed in a laborious life, may be
disregarded, and their possessor excluded from Parliament,
from some accidental offence to a few influential members of
a constituency, or from some petty and miserable pique.
Against all such sinister influences the statesman might,
however numerous his supporters might be, appeared to M. Morin a defect
in the system, which required amendment in its application to Geneva.
"Attribuer," says M. Morin, "le mème nombre de voix à tous les deputés
qui ont obtenu le quantum voulu et les représenter comme n'ayant pas plus
de valeur les uns que les autres aux yeux des votants c'est s'écarter de la
vérité et ne pas exprimer la pensée réelle du corps électoral. Dans un pays
comme l'Angleterre, où le pouvoir est stable dans la personne du souverain,
cette uniformité factice serait probablement sans grand inconvénient; mais
dans une république, il est utile que les députés sachent, en vue de leur
influence ultérieure, qu'ils sont les élus d'une parti plus ou moins notable du
corps électoral.
Cette connaissance est de nature à leur inspirer une
certaine confiance en eux-mêmes, proportionnée à celle qu'on leur a témoignée,
et peut, dans les circonstances très-graves, leur donner la hardiesse et le
courage nécessaires pour détourner l'orage. Dans la vie des peuples il y a
des crises, des occasions solennelles, pour lesquelles, le crédit personnel d'un
deputé, le caractère ferme et décidé d'un citoyen estimé sont comme des
forces, tenues providentiellement en réserve, qu'il y aurait imprudence à
anéantir."-(De la Représentation des Minorités, p. 17.) Neither the public
estimation, nor the self-confidence of the statesman or patriot, would be
diminished by a law which enables a comparatively small number of his
countrymen to elect him. The withdrawal of the excess of votes given to
the more distinguished candidates beyond the quota necessary for their
return, and the appropriation of those votes to other candidates, will in no
respect lessen the weight which the first derive from the extent of support
proffered to them. Not only will the recorded sympathy of a great number
of voters have its moral force in commanding due attention to their opinions
and measures, but the election of other members by their supporters will
generally tend to augment their power in the legislative body, by
strengthening the party to which they belong.
256
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND
under a condition of individual independence, safely appeal
to the electors at large, who will be actuated by no such
narrow motives. The most important interests of a great
people may be set at nought by the jealousies or caprices of
the voters within a certain limited borough,-voters possess-
ing none of the high qualifications above their fellow-men
which could entitle them to pronounce such a veto. It would
no longer be possible for the electors of any particular con-
stituency to ostracise an eminent member of the House.
Every one might fearlessly pursue an independent course of
conduct, satisfied that if he should lose the support of one
portion of his constituents, there was little doubt of his gain-
ing that of others.
The free action of individual minds extending over a vast
population, not cramped or distorted by party or selfish
objects, would bring to the aid of the Government and to
sound political progress, the operation of those large and
general causes, the force of which has hitherto been excluded.
It is found that physical laws,-which in their operation on
single individuals appear so uncertain and capricious,—when
examined in their bearing and effect on large numbers of
persons, 'proceeed with undeviating regularity. The uncer-
tainty which exists of the duration of an individual life ceases
when the lives of a large number of persons are taken into the
account, and companies for the insurance of lives accumulate
large funds by a calculation of profits which they can form
with mathematical accuracy. Not only mortality but crime
is found to be governed by laws which operate with wonder-
ful uniformity, and even inadvertencies happen in a ratio
which corresponds with the repetitions of the act in which
they occur. It is asserted, with no unreasonable confidence,
that statistical knowledge will be hereafter the basis of
history,—and that it will be "as rare to find an historian
who denies the undeviating regularity of the moral world, as
it is now to find a philosopher who denies the regularity of
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
257
the material world." By connecting public events and the
business of the state with the caprices of will and disposition,
and the other disturbing and corrupting causes which are
encouraged to interpose in detached and limited bodies of
electors, the action and fate of the Government, and of its
members, are disturbed by the same causes, and made capri-
cious and uncertain, exhibiting vicissitudes, which, it has been
recently remarked, sometimes bear almost a resemblance to
the condition of ministers under an oriental despotism. The
votes constantly given by one or two millions of persons,
subjected to no disturbing influences of any extensive opera-
tion,-may be expected to preserve such an uniformity of
contemporary character and opinion, as will give general
stability to good government. Instead of shrinking from the
inconvenience and dreading the consequences of frequent par-
liamentary elections,-their frequency would be regarded by
the minister as a source of confidence and strength. It may
be assumed that he will be a man of the highest talent and
character,-able to ameliorate while he also preserves,—and,
therefore, one on whose activity and moderation vast numbers
will be content to rely. His own seat in the House would
be in no danger. He would be re-elected with the tranquil
certainty with which a director of the Bank is replaced. The
result of every general election would be to furnish him with
a faithful index of the progress and existing state of public
opinion. A triennial election would be soon considered as
recurring at too long rather than too short an interval,-for
the minister would find his main support not in any party
arrangements or complications, but in the sense and appro-
bation of the people.
1 See Buckle's History of Civilisation, vol. i., p. 30.
S
258
CHAPTER XII.
THE SUFFRAGE.
THE subject of the suffrage has been reserved, as a matter
which, in one respect only, is necessarily affected by, and
affects, the system of representation suggested in this work.
A provision has been introduced for enabling any district,
town, or parish, to obtain a charter, entitling it to return a
representative,¹—or in another, and perhaps better under-
stood form of expression, to constitute itself one of several
contributory boroughs. The right is proposed to be con-
ferred by an order of the Queen in council, and is designed
to be purely a change in division and arrangement in no
respect affecting the right of suffrage. If a distinction of the
right of suffrage depending on the place of residence be
obstinately adhered to, it might in certain cases be an im-
pediment to the equal operation of such a law,-for a village,
which, having grown into a town, should apply for incor-
poration as a borough, would find itself with a different
suffrage from other boroughs, as it would be framed on the
county franchise. It would not be proper to vest in the
executive government the power of affecting the suffrage.
It may be hoped, however, that when the subject is ex-
amined in all its bearings, every party will agree on the
abolition of distinctions, which are unworthy of the age in
¹ Clause V.
THE SUFFRAGE.
259
which we live, and carry us back to the times of the Norman
villeins or the Saxon thralls. The true principle on which
the bill of Mr. Locke King for a £10 franchise in counties
should be supported is, that it proposes the adoption of the
same electoral standard in the counties as obtains in the
towns: the principle is equality of the suffrage, wherever the
place of residence may be. If any persons delude themselves
with the thought that a concession of a £10 suffrage in the
counties, if it be reduced below that standard in the
boroughs,—will be a final measure, they cannot be too soon
undeceived. If it be made £5 in the boroughs, and £10 in
the counties, they may be assured of this consequence,-a
consequence which may be safely predicted without any pre-
tensions to the spirit of prophecy,-that in the session of
Parliament which follows such an Act, some county member,
who, like Mr. Locke King, is able to regard himself as repre-
senting his county, and not merely a privileged class of its
inhabitants, will ask for leave to bring in a bill reducing the
standard to £5 in the counties. It is a logical, a necessary,
and an inevitable result. It may fail the first time, or the
second, but that which is undeniably just will, at no distant
day, assuredly prevail. By withholding it as long as that can
be done, its adversaries may succeed in producing hostility
and rancour. They may alienate those who otherwise would
be their friends,—but for any purposes of good, their efforts
will be impotent. When other anomalies are removed, many
of the representatives of the counties will perceive the impro-
priety of preserving one which treats the rural inhabitants as
a servile class, stamped by the legislature with the seal of
inferiority. As they ride through the country,-the retired
hamlet, and the antique market-village, they will experience.
an ingenuous shame at beholding men, many of whom, by
long converse with the external world,-
Amid the bounties of the year, the peace
And liberty of nature,—
260
THE SUFFRAGE.
have acquired "the wisdom which works through patience,"
whom they had yet allowed to be excluded from the highest
of civil rights,-rights which are conceded to others far infe-
rior to them morally or physically, in some neighbouring
borough. So much it has been thought necessary to say on
behalf,-not of any particular qualification, but of an
equality of qualification,-not an equality of every man with
every other, which the common sense of mankind has in all
ages repelled,—but an equality of every man of any rank
and class with others of the same rank and class as himself,
-an equality wholly unaffected by the plot of ground which
may constitute his freehold, or be the site of his dwelling.
The proper qualification to be adopted as the test of the
right of suffrage is a question independent of that of its
equality. It deserves much consideration, to what extent
there is any just reason for lowering the general standard of
qualification adopted in the Reform Bill. It would be desir-
able to try the effect of good laws in enabling the great
masses of the people to rise to that standard; but the mis-
fortune is that such laws are obtained slowly, and with diffi-
culty, if obtained at all, in the absence of sufficient members
of the legislative body really interesting themselves for the
poorer of the working classes. It is important to consider
the true principle to be observed in conferring the suffrage.
The question of right may be first considered. "If civil
society be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for
which it is made become his right. It is an institution of
beneficence; and law itself is only beneficence acting by a
rule. Men have a right to live by that rule-they have a
right to justice-as between their fellows, whether their
fellows are in politic function or in ordinary occupation.
They have a right to the fruits of their industry, and to the
means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right
to the acquisitions of their parents,-to the nourishment and
improvement of their offspring,-to instruction in life, and
THE SUFFRAGE.
261
consolation in death. Whatever each man can separately
do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for
himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which
society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in
his favour. In this partnership all men have equal rights,
but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the
partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five
hundred has to his larger proportion. But he has not a
right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint estate;
and as to the share of power, authority, and direction which
each individual ought to have in the management of the
state, that I must deny to be among the direct original rights
of man in civil society; for I have in my contemplation the
civil social man, and no other. It is a thing to be settled by
convention. If civil society be the offspring of convention,
that convention must be its law. That convention must
limit and modify all the descriptions of constitution which
are formed under it. Every sort of legislative, judicial, or
executory power are its creatures. They can have no being
in any other state of things; and how can any man claim,
under the conventions of civil society, rights which do not so
much as suppose its existence ?-rights which are absolutely
repugnant to it?”
"Government is not made in virtue of
natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence
of it, and exist in much greater clearness, and in a much
greater degree of abstract perfection: but their abstract per-
fection is their practical defect. By having a right to every-
thing, they want everything. Government is a contrivance
of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a
right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom.
Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil
society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society
requires not only that the passions of individuals should be
subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in
the individuals, the inclinations of men should be frequently
262
THE SUFFRAGE.
thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought
into subjection. This can only be done by a power out of
themselves; and not, in the exercise of its functions, subject
to that will, and to those passions which it is its office to
bridle and subdue. In this sense the restraints on men, as
well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights.
But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and
circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications, they
cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing
is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle. The
moment you abate anything from the full rights of men, each
to govern himself, and suffer any artificial positive limitation
upon those rights, from that moment the whole organisation.
of government becomes a consideration of convenience. This
it is which makes the constitution of a state, and the due dis-
tribution of its powers, a matter of the most delicate and
complicated skill. It requires a deep knowledge of human
nature and human necessities, and of the things which facili-
tate or obstruct the various ends which are to be pursued by
the mechanism of civil institutions. The state is to have
recruits to its strength, and remedies to its distempers. What
is the use of discussing a man's abstract right to food or to
medicine? The question is upon the method of procuring
and administering them."¹
"The rights of men in governments are their advantages ;
and these are often in balances between differences of good;
in compromises, sometimes between good and evil, and some-
times between evil and evil. Political reason is a computing
principle; adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing,
morally, and not metaphysically or mathematically, true moral
denominations."2
The question with which we are met on the threshold is,
1 Reflections, &c., pp. 89, 90.
2 Id., p. 92. See on this subject Mill's Considerations on Representative
Government, chapters iii. and viii.
THE SUFFRAGE.
263
whether, in conferring the franchise, there should be any test
of capacity,—and, if that be answered in the affirmative, the
next is, what that test of capacity shall be. It has never
been denied, by those who have condescended to enter upon
details, that the first question must be answered in the
affirmative, although that which was at one time the popular
formula, universal suffrage, apparently repudiates any test,
whether of condition, of sex, or of age. The term "6 man-
hood" suffrage, implies that "manhood" is to be the test. It
must be applied by the aid of the lawyer, the physiologist, or
the statistician.
The law gives to one whose father has died without
appointing him a guardian, and who has no mother, and no
property attracting a guardianship by tenure, the power even
before fourteen years of age, of electing a guardian for him-
self; and "as to a guardian after fourteen, it appears, from
the ending of guardianship in soccage at that age, as if the
common law deemed a guardian afterwards unnecessary.
It would probably be about that age at which the definition of
the physiologist would properly attribute the term "man-
hood."2
Other applications of the description are furnished
in statistical classifications of the ages of life.
In the report of the Registrar-General on the census,
printed in 1854, we have the description of two ages of man-
hood:-"The second age or vicenniad (20-40), of which
thirty years is the central point, embraces the early period of
manhood. Growth is completed; weight, stature, and strength
are at their maximum. It is the athletic, poetic, inventive,
beautiful age,—the prime of life. It is the soldier's age.
The apprentice becomes the journeyman, who attains at the
end the highest mechanical skill, and earns the highest
wages. Marriage is contracted, and the man first hears the
name of father from the lips of his children. In bad natures
¹ Co. Lit., 88, b. (n) 16: ed. 1832, by Hargrave and Butler.
2 See Eng. Dict. in voc.
264
THE SUFFRAGE.
and in unfavourable circumstances it is the age of crime, of
passion,-of madness, which breaks out in its wildest forms,
-as well as of wasting maladies.
In the third vicenniad (40-60), of which the middle
point is fifty years, we see men in the highest professions
first attain eminence; the capital which has been expended
in their education returns rapidly; their established character
gives them the confidence of their fellow men; experience
and practice enable them to deal as proficients with the great
interests and questions of the world. They see their children
enter life. The edifices, of which the foundations were laid
before, spring up around them. The prudent, tried, skilful,
inventive man, now often becomes, in England, a master, and
controls establishments in which he was once the clerk, the
workman, the apprentice boy. It may be justly called the
intellectual age, the legislative, the judicial age. The
statesman speaks, and his voice reverberates over an attentive
nation. But the passions and labours of life wear deep
furrows; the health of the workman is shaken in great
cities, and he falls before their pestilences; the heart and the
brain are sometimes overwrought; diseases acquire force, and
the man easily falls their victim."
Positive laws in different countries have adopted other ages
of man as the time at which different rights shall belong to
him. The Roman could acquire no property which was not
immediately lost in the property of the father during his life.
Neither age, nor rank, nor the consular office, nor the honours
of a triumph, could exempt the most illustrious citizen from
the bonds of filial subjection. In our own law the age of
twenty-one has been adopted as the age at which binding
contracts may be made, and at which the rights of property
may be asserted. The constitution has also adopted that age
as one of the tests, but not a sole test, of capacity for the
franchise.
It is obvious, that if what is called "manhood" suffrage
THE SUFFRAGE.
265
"1
were adopted as a qualification," the good of the citizens at
large being," according to the most uncompromising assert-
ers of right," the proper end of civil government, what-
ever its form,-whatever its history or traditional origin,
the question of the age to be adopted, must be determined by
considerations of prudence and convenience. If there could
be any natural solution of the question of right attaching
more forcibly at one time than at another, it would be that
which the Roman law and the patriarchal system exhibited,
and which reserves to the parent that power over the interests
of all his descendants, which nature has conferred, until
nature herself deposes him. "Without fear though not
without danger of abuse, the Roman legislators reposed an
unbounded confidence in the sentiments of paternal love;
and the oppression was tempered by the assurance, that each
generation must succeed in its turn to the awful dignity of
parent and master."2
"14
Another test or condition has also been introduced amongst
us, the possession of certain property, as a freehold, or a
certain social position, as that of paying rates or taxes, or the
occupation of a tenement of a certain value. In the classifi-
cation of citizens,3 Montesquieu observed, "that the great
legislators of antiquity made the greatest display of their
powers, and even soared above themselves." These, being
questions of capacity, must obviously be determined by the
condition of society and the state of education. It is the
business of our legislators to select, amid the examples before
them, that which is the test or qualification best suited to
our country, our age, and our social condition. In considering
the form which it should assume, there are certain principles
of which it is important not to lose sight.
1 Westminster Review, vol. x., p. 195, N. s.
j
2 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. vi., p. 91. Svo ed. 1809.
3 Reflections, &c., p. 272.
' And see Grote's History of Greece, vol. iii., pp. 155-159.
266
THE SUFFRAGE.
The test of capacity should be one which will exclude no
man of ordinary industry and skill in his calling, and ordinary
prudence and self-denial in his conduct. It cannot be neces-
sary that the suffrage should be given to every youth as soon
as he is out of his apprenticeship:-it is not necessary that it
should be given, without regard to property, or to position,
as the head of a family, or to participation in the burdens of
citizenship, at least to one in early manhood, whilst the
character is in process of formation, and the pleasures and
anticipations of life exercise a strong influence on his conduct,
and divert him from more serious thought on subjects not
directly affecting his own career. He does not at that time
of life require it from any regard to liberty or security, for
the possession of the franchise by his seniors of the same
class, having similar interest for themselves and their children,
is a sufficient guard, and every day brings him nearer to the
time when he may himself attain it. The qualification, how-
ever, should be accessible to every man when he acquires a
home, and settles to the fixed occupation for which the pre-
paratory course of his earlier years has fitted him.
It should be applied equally to all classes and conditions,
without regard to employment or situation. If certain
boundaries are fixed, and persons beyond or without such
boundaries are placed under a different law, it may operate as
a perpetual exclusion as to such persons. It may be impos-
sible for a man to change the place in which his business
and connections have formed themselves, and it may therefore
be a mockery to tell him, that if he would take any interest
in the political condition of his country he must go elsewhere.
Another condition of the test should be, that it is of easy
and ready application to large numbers of persons. The
practicability of universal application necessarily causes the
test to be of a rude and general character; but one which
assumes the possession of the fit qualifications of an elector
from his possession of their fruits, is not ill adapted to supply
THE SUFFRAGE.
267
the place of that more accurate and refined examination to
which it is impossible to resort.¹
An alternative which has been sometimes proposed, and
even resorted to, where the numbers to be admitted to the suf-
frage are large, and there are great inequalities of position, is
that of indirect election, or the formation of bodies of electors,
who, when chosen, are to elect the representative. This
system, whether in great or small institutions, is almost in
every case ineffectual for any useful purpose. There is no
object which would not be better fulfilled by a direct choice.
The electoral college of the United States, chosen for the pur-
pose of appointing the President, is a remarkable example of
the entire failure of such a preliminary election to effect that
which its authors propose to themselves. The object was to
form a conclave of the wisest and most unbiassed of the
American citizens,-separated from all the other political
bodies in the state and not connected with any party, having
only one cause of existence, and one object, that of electing as
President the man in whose hands the vast interests and
powers of the republic can be most safely deposited. Such an
unbounded confidence the American people have not reposed
in any college of men. The spirit of the institution is wholly
disregarded in the literal execution of its office. The electors
thus chosen are the mere machines of party. The effect of
the interposition of intermediate electors will be either to
produce such a result, or, if not, to destroy all interest in the
election on the part of the primary voters.
"Or, ce qu'on cherche, c'est le bon député. La capacité
supérieure en appelant à la reconnaîtres toutes les capacités
qui, bien qu'inférieures, sont en rapport naturel avec elle.
the
1 On the educational tests which may be applied, see Chapter VIII., on
Extension of the Suffrage," in Mr. Mill's Considerations on Repre-
sentative Government. The heated discussions in the Ballot debate on the
necessity and method of securing the suffrage to the illiterate voter are a
curious feature in this argument. (Note to 4th ed.)
268
THE SUFFRAGE.
Si au contraire vous commencez par faire élire les électeurs,
qu'arrive-t-il ?—vous avez à accomplir une opération analogue
à la précédente; mais le point de départ est changé, la con-
dition générale est abaissée. Vous prenez pour base la capa-
cité de l'électeur, c'est-à-dire, une capacité inférieure à celle
qu'en définitive vous voulez obtenir; et vous vous addressez
forcément à des capacités encore inférieures, hors d'état de vous
conduire, même sous cette forme, au résultat plus élevé auquel
vous aspirez; car la capacité de l'électeur n'étant que celle
de reconnaître le bon député, il faudrait être en état de com-
prendre celle-ci pour comprendre celle-là, ce qui n'arrive point.
“L'élection indirecte, considérée en elle-même, déroge donc
au principe primitif comme au dernier but du gouvernement
représentatif, et abaisse sa nature.
"L'élection indirecte dérive de la souveraineté du nombre
et du suffrage universel; dans l'impossibilité de faire passer
ces deux principes dans la pratique, on s'est efforcé d'en
retenir quelque ombre. On a violé le principe du gouverne-
ment représentatif, abaissé sa nature et énervé le droit d'élec-
tion pour demeurer, en apparence, conséquent à une erreur.
Qui ne voit en effet qu'un tel système de l'élection directe lui.
conserve seul sa réalité et son énergie? Toute action dont le
résultat est éloigné et incertain inspire peu d'intérêt; et les
mêmes hommes qui concourent avec beaucoup de discernement
et de vivacité au choix de leurs officiers municipaux don-
neront aveuglément et froidement leur suffrage à des électeurs.
futurs que leur pensée ne suit point dans un avenir où ils
interviennent si peu. Ce prétendu hommage à des volontés
trop peu éclairées, pour qu'on leur fasse, dans le choix des
députés, une part plus efficace, n'est au fond qu'une misérable
charlatanerie, une adulation mensongère; et sous une pré-
tendue extension de droits politiques, se cachent la restriction,
la mutilation, l'affaiblissement de ces mêmes droits dans la
sphère où ils existent réellement, et où ils s'exerceraient dans
toute leur plénitude, avec tout leur effet." ¹
1 Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 262.
THE SUFFRAGE.
269
The independence of the representative body thus chosen,
of the real constituent body, the people, is thus set forth by
Mr. Burke:- "There is no way to make a connection between
the original constituent and the representative, but by the
circuitous means which may lead the candidate to apply in
the first instance to the primary electors, in order that, by
their authoritative instructions (and something more perhaps),
these primary electors may force the succeeding bodies of
electors to make a choice agreeable to their wishes. But this
would plainly subvert the whole scheme. It would be to
plunge them back into that tumult and confusion of popular
election, which, by their interposed gradation-elections, they
mean to avoid, and at length to risk the whole fortune of the
State with those who have the least knowledge of it, and the
least interest in it. This is a perpetual dilemma, into which
they are thrown by the vicious, weak, and contradictory
principles they have chosen. Unless the people break up
and level this gradation, it is plain that they do not at all
substantially elect to the assembly; indeed, they elect as
little in appearance as reality.
"What is it we all seek for in an election? To answer its
real purposes you must first possess the means of knowing
the fitness of your man, and then you must retain some hold
upon him by personal obligation or dependence. For what
end are these primary electors complimented, or rather
mocked, with a choice? They can never know anything of
the qualities of him that is to serve them, nor has he any
obligation whatsoever to them. Of all the powers unfit to be
delegated by those who have any real means of judging, that
most peculiarly unfit is what relates to a personal choice. In
case of abuse, the body of primary electors never can call the
representative to an account for his conduct. He is too far
removed from them in the chain of representation."
"As, in the end, all the members of this elective constitu-
tion are equally fugitive, they may be no longer the same
270
THE SUFFRAGE.
persons who had chosen him, to whom he is to be responsible
when he seeks for a renewal of his trust. To call all the
secondary electors to account is ridiculous, impracticable, and
unjust; they may themselves have been deceived in their
choice, as the third set of electors may be in theirs. In your
elections responsibility cannot exist."
The practical and vigorous mind of Major Cartwright
rejected a system in which he saw merely an ingenious refine-
ment, destroying all the force and value of the principle of
representation. Writing of the then Spanish Cortes, he
observes, that, from the successive strainings, "there can be
nothing more likely than that in the end the representative
chosen by the very few who have the final straining may be
one whom a great majority of the collective body would not
have elected. This erroneous practice was recommended by
David Williams to the French at the time of their revolution.
It had before been recommended by Hume." "
¹ Reflections, &c., pp. 277-279.
2
2 Life and Correspondence of Major Cartwright, vol. ii., p. 227. Mr.
Mill, in his Considerations on Representative Government (Chap. IX.,
"Should there be two stages of election?"), has concluded that indirect
election has many disadvantages peculiar to itself, while it has no benefit
which is not attainable by direct election. Lord Grey is not satisfied with
the argument, and compares the case of a poor man [why not a rich man ?],
one of 10,000 voters for a large town, with the same man if he were one of
twenty friends, empowered to appoint a deputy to vote for them in a con-
stituency thus reduced to 500,-when he thinks that the vote would be
more considered and valued by the voter. (Parliamentary Government,
pp. 257-263, 2nd ed.) It is true that our present method of dealing with
such large coustituencies must be felt by every thoughtful person as a
mockery of representation. I pass by what might be said of this method
of diminishing the number of the rich voters; but I confess I should
deprecate most strongly its adoption in the case of the poorer electors. It
would, I think, be the most downward and fatal step that could be taken in
One cannot but imagine the
the progress of representative institutions.
petty intrigues, favouritism, and jealousies of the workshop, the factory, and
the club-room, which such a system would inaugurate. The more cunning
workmen, or foremen, would soon find that a twenty-vote power was of some
value in securing them a certain notice and attention, and would learn how
THE SUFFRAGE.
271
The suffrage should be regarded as a right of value, and one
not thrown heedlessly to any. It should be felt that in con-
ferring it the state adopts all the tests of quality and of worth
that are consistent with placing the suffrage on a broad and
comprehensive basis. The right of taking part in the social
government is so sacred, that the state may be justified in
adopting the precept,"cast ye not your pearls before
swine." Like other rights of value, it would be not too much
to require some proof of appreciation from every man who
would possess it. One of the most valuable improvements
adopted by the Reform Bill was that which established the
register of voters. The more the population increases, the
more important will the register become. Without it, parlia-
it might be turned to account. They would no doubt be successful in over-
coming the inertia or indifference of their fellow-labourers, sufficiently to
secure their own nomination; but when a workman is canvassed by three
or four of his companions for the same petty advantage, the scale is not
likely to be turned by arguments the best fitted to enlighten the under-
standing or improve the character. Nor would the small eminence thus
gained by the deputed voter be generally salutary to himself. He will often
have acquired it by some of those persuasive arts which have no elevating
tendency, while he will be apt to form an exaggerated estimate of the
personal importance conferred by his exceptional privilege. It is the
common habit of most persons to magnify any small measure of distinction
which gratifies self-importance. Circumstances can hardly be conceived
more calculated to create a disposition unfavourable to disinterested action
than the interposition of such intermediate depositories of political power.
They would cut off the primary electors from all direct and necessary
contact and relation with public men of superior intelligence and character,—
narrow instead of enlarging the field from which the voter must seek con-
current sympathies in opinion,-narrow also his direct interest and therefore
his scope of thought on public subjects, which would be one of the main
educational advantages of the franchise. I believe that indirect voting
would seriously detract from the good results of representative government,
and multiply some of its worst evils. If there be any portion of the people
qualified to take a part in political affairs, to whom the state cannot entrust
more than the twentieth of a vote, let us, for the sake of straightforwardness
and honesty, hope that this fraction of suffrage may be given at once
and directly to the elector, aud not through the mediation of another. (Note
to 3rd ed.)
272
THE SUFFRAGE.
66
mentary elections would become a scene of riot and confusion.
When, after the social war, all the burghers of Italy were
admitted free citizens of Rome, and each had a vote in the
public assemblies, it became impossible to distinguish the
spurious from the real voter, and from that time all elections
and popular deliberations grew tumultuous and disorderly,
which paved the way for Marius and Sylla, Pompey and
Cæsar, to trample on the liberties of their country, and at
last to dissolve the commonwealth." The cost of registra-
tion in England and Wales amounts annually to upwards of
£100,000, and notwithstanding the unpaid services of a great
number of overseers and other officers, the machinery is
extremely imperfect. It is not impossible to make the pro-
cess of registration of the voter ancillary to that of his due
identification at the poll. The Registration Act abolished
A
the payment of a shilling imposed by the Reform Act.
small payment, even of two or three pence, might be use-
fully restored, and collected on the annual delivery to the
elector of a ticket containing his name, address, and number
on the register. This might be done on a house to house
visitation by an officer charged with the duty of keeping the
lists constantly accurate, and of withdrawing the names of
deceased persons. A yearly struggle of parties in the regis-
tration courts, for the purpose of expunging the names of
voters, without any regard to their intelligence, their worth,
or their capacity for bringing a deliberate and instructed
judgment to the choice of legislators, is not the least con-
temptible feature of modern political life.
The retention, since the Reform Act, of the laws that dis-
franchise a large number of persons holding offices in the
'Black. Com., vol. i., p. 159. At a meeting of the Ballot Society, Mr.
Pliny Miles, of New York, stated that one of the principal causes of elec-
toral corruption in that city was the want of any register of electors.-
Star, Dec. 31, 1858. See also the note on the registration, p. 175, supra.
THE SUFFRAGE.
273
public service ¹ can only have happened from a remarkable inad-
vertence. The principle and cause of the exclusion was intelli-
gible under the system of restricted electoral rights and close
boroughs, but it is now utterly indefensible. It has probably
done no little towards lowering some of the metropolitan con-
stituencies-especially at the east, north, and south of London
-by excluding an extensive body of respectable and intelligent
householders. It would be an extraordinary condition of things,
if, after establishing a competitive examination, and collecting
a great number of the most able of its people in its service.
the state should go on to deny them that franchise which it
gives to classes far inferior to them in character, education,
and talent. It is absurd to suppose that they would form a
class of electors favourable to an extravagant expenditure of
the public income. There would be few classes more inter-
ested in or anxious for general economy. It is where the
resources of the household are properly husbanded, and not
in the establishment of a spendthrift, that the servants chiefly
look for the due remuneration of steady and honest service.
No class of voters would be less inclined to act corruptly, for
under the system which is here proposed, no class of voters
would have stronger reasons for choosing the best men, and
none would be more impotent for any purpose of mischief,
even if they combined to choose the worst.2
1 Excise, 5 W. & M., c. 20; Customs, 12 & 13 W. 3, c. 91; Post Office.
9 Anne, c. 10; Police, 3 W. 4, c. 19, &c.
2 On this point I am compelled to take a view the very reverse of that
adopted by Lord Grey, who recommends that, instead of removing the pro-
hibition of persons engaged in the revenue from voting, that exclusion
should be made to extend to all who are employed in the permanent civil
service (Parliamentary Government, p. 235, 2nd ed.), and he alludes to the
defeat of the government on the Civil Service Bill of 1857 by the skilfully-
organized agitation of those interested in the measure. (Id., pp. 91, 92.)
An electoral system which so balances the chauces of a candidate as to
place him in a condition in which he may be defeated by two or three votes
being withdrawn from him and given to his adversary, is precisely suited to
the exaction of petty pledges, and especially those by which he may hope
T
274
THE SUFFRAGE.
All persons engaged in maritime employment, and there-
fore necessarily absent, should be allowed, by depositing their
voting papers with the registrars, to exercise their franchise.
The same facility may be afforded to all civil, military, and
naval officers in the public service, absent from the country
on their public duties. Nowhere could more intelligent
and valuable electors be found than these classes would afford.
There does not seem to be any reason why a like privilege
should not be given to English subjects travelling in foreign
countries, or residing there temporarily for mercantile or
other causes.
Such opportunities afforded to an elector of
exercising his national rights would call forth at all times his
interest in and affection for his country. Some modification
of the suffrage might be made in order to give effect to the
opportunities of voting thus afforded. They would be, of
course, applicable to all freehold votes; and as to votes
founded on qualifications which require residence, it might be
made sufficient if any portion of the family of the elector had
resided in the house giving the qualification; without ren-
dering it necessary, in such cases, that he should himself have
been resident within so short a preceding period as is at pre-
sent necessary.
Lord Harrowby, in presenting a petition,¹ in 1852, on the
subject of the representation, remarked that if it were purely
internal, or even confined to national interests, we were "in
danger of neglecting altogether those considerations which
arise out of our colonial connections;" and the question of
the propriety of establishing some connection between our
to gain a few friends, and create no enemies. An abolition of the system
which exposes candidates to such injurious influences is the true remedy.
There can be no more certain proof of the existence of a great vice in any
social institution than the fact that, in order to effect its object or secure its
working, it requires that any class of persons of whom the society is
composed shall be either physically, morally, or politically dwarfed.
Parl. Deb., 27th May, 1852.
THE SUFFRAGE.
275
2
}
!
national and colonial representation has been repeatedly dis-
cussed. A freehold suffrage might afford the means of
keeping up this intercommunication and representation of in-
terests, and sympathies which are even of more importance
than interests. There would be no difficulty in the system,
of which an outline has been here presented, of enabling any
British subject holding a freehold of a prescribed value in the
United Kingdom, and residing in any of her colonies, terri-
tories, or dependencies, to transmit his voting paper, with
evidence of his identity, to the registrars, and of thus exercis-
ing a right of suffrage in the mother country. The colonial
legislatures would, there is little doubt, willingly create
reciprocal rights, and thus the institutions of the mother
country and the colonies without interfering with the
operation of each other-would be intimately blended. The
inhabitant of the colony, as well as he of the mother country,
would feel himself a subject and citizen of the same great
empire, and the associations of the inhabitants of different
hemispheres would be connected by a multitude of new ties,
preserving an unity of feeling which has been hitherto rarely
sustained after a few generations. The rapidity of telegraphic
communication would afford opportunities of action which
were impossible in earlier times.
1
In all cases where a woman is sui juris, occupying a house
1
1 Since the publication of this treatise, the nature and permanency of
the connection between the mother country and her colonics, and their
several duties and responsibilities, have been discussed both by statesmen
and philosophers, nor is the discussion yet exhausted. The practicability
and advantage of creating such personal and abiding ties as are above
suggested would not be undeserving of consideration in that argument.
(Note to 3rd ed.) An objection may be made that this would tend to the
creation of an absentee proprietary. It would, however, be easy to annex
to the electoral privilege when claimed by absentees, a condition securing
the administration of the estate, which forms the qualification, with due
regard to the public interest. It might be that they should be dealt with
as was proposed with regard to estates in mortmain, under the Public
Lands and Commons Bills, of sessions 1871 and 1872. (Note to 4th ed.)

276
THE SUFFRAGE.
or tenement, or possessed of a freehold, or is otherwise in a
position which, in the case of a male, would amount to a
qualification, there is no sound reason for excluding her from
the parliamentary franchise. Since the first publication of
this work, the municipal franchise has been secured to women,
and it is impossible to doubt the speedy abolition of an
anomaly which is so entirely without any justifiable founda-
tion, as their exclusion from the full rights of citizenship.
The suffrage is a matter so distinct from electoral organisa-
tion, that the legislature should deal with the two things in
separate Acts. Blending them together tends to confuse and
embarrass the discussion of both, and is convenient only to
those who would divert the public mind from true conclusions
on the question of representation.
!
277
CHAPTER XIII.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
1
THE progress of population and wealth, the activity of com-
merce and intercommunication, the discovery and employment
of new methods of labour, requiring large combinations of
means and their scientific application, and the changes which
the face of the country is undergoing from these and other
causes, are now constantly requiring the creation for local
purposes of new powers. Every successive year it becomes
more and more difficult for Parliament to deal properly and
beneficially with the innumerable local matters on which
legislation is called for. During the last five-and-twenty
years many public Acts have been passed conferring, under
various conditions, powers of local government which before
that time could only have been obtained by special Acts.
Some of our cities and towns, at this day, having regard to
their wealth and population, and to the intelligence and
culture of their inhabitants, are not inferior to many commu-
nities which in an earlier stage of European history stood in
the rank of independent States. The more closely the con-
dition and wants of society are examined, the more clearly it
Part of this chapter has been borrowed from papers read by the author
before the Social Science Association. (Note to 4th ed.)
278
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
will be seen to be necessary that counties, cities, and towns
should be everywhere entrusted with far more comprehensive
powers for public improvement, and for the promotion of
every beneficent object, educational, moral, and physical,
within their boundaries. It is not necessary to dwell on the
expense of local Bills, or on the impossibility, from their
number and the character of their details, that they can have
that attention in Parliament which their importance requires;
or the extreme difficulty of bringing before Committees the
true facts and bearings of questions on local works, or the
considerations and arguments for or against their allowance or
rejection which ought to prevail-reasons which for the most
part are perfectly well known to the inhabitants of the locality.
The failure of the evidence commonly so given to convey the
true facts in contested matters is now almost proverbial. In
railway legislation it has been remarked that a certain number
of great companies have parcelled out England and Wales
between them, and bring forward schemes in their own
interest, the public interest being wholly lost sight of; and
powers are conceded to them upon evidence justly charac-
terized as unexampled in any other time or place. Experts
of all kinds are called to depose to one thing one day and the
very contrary the next day, their ingenuity being exercised to
distinguish the cases, whenever the contradiction is likely to
be exposed. Gas companies, water companies, and other
bodies seeking special powers, all more or less employ these
means of success. Well-constituted local governing bodies
would determine on the necessary and useful public works
required in the locality, in an inexpensive and far more satis-
factory manner.
The object to be sought is not merely means of accomplish-
ing works for the public advantage when the desire for them
in local governing bodies is sufficiently strong to produce the
effort, but such an organization as shall give to all the latent
forces existing in each community in the shape of aspirations
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
279
for improvement of every kind, their proportionate measure
of political power, and thus overcome inertness and indiffer-
ence, and stimulate and encourage effort. The governing
body should accurately represent the interests of the town
and of all the inhabitants of the town or district, and when
so constituted as to entitle it to public confidence, it may
safely be empowered to frame and adopt laws of limited appli-
cation for establishing public works and effecting improve-
ments within the locality for the general benefit of its
inhabitants; and for such purposes to incorporate in these
powers the Lands Clauses, and Railway Clauses Consoli-
dation Acts, and such other general Acts as may be deemed
necessary, and to impose local rates. These limited statutes,
in order to become law, should be subject to the confirmation
of the Local Government Board, and the assent of the Crown,
through one of the Secretaries of State. It would of course
be competent to these authorities on any question which may
arise on a proposed statute, to require the opinion of legal or
other sufficient advisers.
It is with the constitution of such local governing bodies,
whether in existing municipalities, or county or parochial
boards, that it is the purpose of the present chapter to treat.
A generation has gone by since the passing of the Muni-
cipal Corporation Act of 1835. It was not without a
manifest distrust of its successful operation that its very
framers, if they did not actually propose, at least readily
acquiesced in excluding from the newly-created bodies the
control of the valuable charitable endowments which were
under the government of the old corporations. Its provisions
are certainly unsatisfactory in several important points.
First, it divides the municipalities into wards instead of
enabling the burgesses to group themselves according to
their own discretion. This admits of the employment of that
ingenious party artifice which is known in the United States
as "gerrymandering," or such an arrangement of the bound-
280
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
In
aries of each ward, that on a poll of the ward will enable a
dominant part of the inhabitants to obtain a majority. All
experience tends to prove that the larger the area of the
electoral district, the greater is the interest that is felt, and the
more extensive will be the choice offered to the electors.
the last session of Parliament an attempt was made to afford
facilities for revision of the boundaries of wards. It is not to
be regretted that the apprehension that this would do no
more than expose the electors still more to the gerrymander-
ing artifices, caused the rejection of the measure. The true
remedy in fact is the abolition of the ward system, or at least
of its restrictive provisions, especially now that a practical
method is known, of liberating the electors from such restric-
tions, with far greater convenience for taking the poll than
any divisional system can possibly afford.
Secondly, it introduced certain qualifications of property or
rating as indispensable for those who are to be chosen on the
municipal councils. The object of electoral laws is above all
things to provide for the choice of the most fit and competent
persons for the functions entrusted to them; and to obtain
such persons, the first and most simple condition is, that those
in whom the selection is vested have the widest and most
unfettered choice. It is in the degree in which effectual
means of comparison, with unrestricted powers of selection,
have been gradually opened, that all things necessary for
convenience, comfort, and health, have been developed and
improved in the material world, and we have no better course
to follow in the pursuit of moral benefits, of which good
government is one of no small importance. Clearly the first
thing to be done is, as far as possible, to remove out of the
way every obstacle which does or may unnecessarily obstruct
any elector in making the best choice he is able, according to
his most deliberate judgment, of the persons by whom the
public business of the community in which he lives is to be
managed or administered. The greatest obstacle of course is
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
281
Ignoran
ignorance. Ignorance, perhaps, of what is needful to be done;
ignorance of the persons who would be the fittest to do it, if
they were called upon for the work; of their relative capacity,
integrity, or other qualifying or disqualifying elements, or of
their willingness to undertake it. We cannot expect that diffi-
culties of this nature will be ever wholly removed, although
much may be done, and probably is in progress, for the
education of individuals and of society in the business of self-
government. One step, however, can be immediately taken.
All obstacles, purely artificial, may be got rid of. In a former
chapter I have dwelt on the expediency of abolishing all
arbitrary disqualifications for sitting in the House of Com-
mons. In the matter of local and municipal government, no
qualifications of property, rating, residence, or otherwise,
should be required. The first introduction arbitrarily of a
certain rank or status as indispensable to the person who fills
an elective office, was probably due to the desire to exclude all
below a certain class; and since this feeling has ceased, or has
come to operate less forcibly, the continuance of such arbitrary
distinctions has perhaps been owing to the reasons applicable
to one kind of function, or to certain principles of selection,
having been illogically applied to other functions or methods
of choice, with which they have really nothing in common.
A physician or surgeon, a lawyer, a master of a ship, may be
reasonably required to pass a prescribed examination, for they
are entrusted with the properties or lives of multitudes who
have no sufficient means of judging whether they are qualified
to undertake the tasks upon which they enter, and who stand
in need of some certificate upon which they can rely. There
may be physical grounds for demanding a certain standard of
size and of health for men to be received into the army or the
police. It is right for divers reasons to require proof of some
amount of intellectual cultivation from those who desire to
enter the civil service, but an electoral test of this nature has
not been seriously proposed. When the people, who are too
282
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
numerous to be convened to determine on the details of business
affecting the common weal, are invited to elect representatives
to act in such matters on their behalf,-to impose terms upon
the discretion thus implied, instead of fully trusting them to
make the best choice they are able, is to withdraw with one hand
the power tendered in the other. Not many years ago certain
property qualifications were required in members of the House
of Commons, but these were found to be frequently obstructive,
were commonly evaded, and were ultimately swept away as
intolerable. It is matter almost of astonishment that qualifi-
cations of a like nature should be still insisted upon for alder-
men, members of town councils, and should be even proposed
for other elective offices. The town council of Birmingham
has, however, recently applied to Parliament for their repeal.
If there were anything in such qualifications which implied
the existence of greater knowledge or more public-spirited or
patriotic sentiment, or any kind of superior virtue, some reason
might be urged for their existence, although even in that case
it would be better that the electors should be permitted to act
upon their own judgment of such attainments, but the fact
that a candidate is rated at £20, or £50, or £100 a year, or
owns property to a certain amount in a certain place, affords
not the smallest test of his capacity or fitness to be a member
of a town council, or of a county or parochial board.
3
Thirdly. The provisions, which require one-third of the
Town Councillors,' and of the members of the District and
Metropolitan Board of Works, to go out of office annually,
are inconvenient and unnecessary. It was probably thought
that if the entire body were dissolved like the House of
Commons, at one time, a change of political feeling in the
locality might have the effect of preventing the re-election
of any of them, and the public interests and business of the
town might be suddenly placed in new hands, uninstructed,
¹ 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, s. 31.
2 18 & 19 Vict., c. 120, s. 31.
3 Id., s. 48.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
283
-perhaps regardless of, perhaps hostile to, the proceedings of
their predecessors, and more desirous of proving their incom-
petency than of fairly executing their designs. Against this
mischief, these provisions of the statutes are supposed or in-
tended to guard. It is evident that they are directed to meet
an evil peculiar to a system which places the choice of the
council or board solely in the hands of the majority. If a
scheme had been considered on which every voter or ratepayer
might be certain of being represented, the framers of the
Municipal Corporation Act would have had no reason to fear
that, however the numbers of the majority or the minority
might vibrate, there would still be at all times more than
sufficient voters whose opinions had not been changed,-to re-
elect such a number of the old members as would prevent, even
more effectually than a triennial vacating of office can do, the
evils of any sudden reversal of system or any instability of
purpose.
Fourthly. No provision is made for the direct represen-
tation of the owners of property. The method adopted on
the election of poor-law guardians, of giving a plurality of
votes, based on the amount at which the voter is rated, is no
real security for the due representation of the owners, while
it gives an undue weight to a certain, and perhaps not always
the most enlightened or public-spirited of the middle-class
electors, who occupying places of business or otherwise, are
yet tenants for no more than short terms. It was well that
such a delusive attempt to give weight to property was not
introduced into the Municipal Acts. A representation founded
on status only, as by justices of the peace, would be still
more unsatisfactory, and would be a perpetual source of
jealousy and distrust, but the absence of any distinct repre-
sentation whatever of the proprietary body is clearly a defect.
It is not enough to say that some of the occupiers will be
owners, or will no doubt be influenced by owners. The power
should rest upon reality and not mere hypothesis, and be
284
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
exercised according to legitimate influences only. The Report
of the Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1859 on
the Municipal Franchise mentions one ward in a corporate
town in which the minority of voters represents property of
the value of £26,000 a year, and the majority property of
£4,000 a year; and another in which 302 voters, rated in the
whole at £661, are able to control the elections, where the
entire rating of the ward is £16,000. In a northern town
the Report says, of 5,300 voters, 1,000 pay on £27,000, and
the remaining 4,300 on no more than £7,000. It is possible,
in fact, that there may not be a single owner of property
beyond a tenant from year to year, or at will, in the local
constituency. In the evidence given before the Commons
Committee on Metropolitan Local Government, in 1866, a
witness from Rotherhithe remarked that there was no repre-
sentative of the great proprietors of wharfs and other valuable
property there; and of St. George's in the East it was
observed that the London Dock Company paid nearly half
the rates, and yet had no voice in the local government.
The author in his evidence before the same Committee
referred also to the fact that there are not only great pro-
prietors in the metropolis, as the Marquis of Westminster, the
Duke of Bedford, Lord Portman, and others, but also corpo-
rate bodies, city companies, and other institutions holding
estates for ecclesiastical, municipal, and charitable purposes,
whose representatives should properly be heard in matters
especially relating to the locality. The proprietary votes in
such cases might be given by the various governing or
directing bodies: those in respect of property held for educa-
tional purposes might be given by the School Boards; of
eleemosynary estates,—if for medical charities, by the College
of Physicians, and College of Surgeons, or some recognized
professional authority. It was suggested that of 150 coun-
cillors for London, 50 might be chosen by the owners, and
100 by the inhabitants. Thus if proprietors of property of
the aggregate annual value of £5,000,000 were to vote, the
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
285
votes of owners to the extent of £100,000 a year, would elect
one member. The number of members to be allotted re-
spectively to property and to persons, is the question for
consideration. The former might compose a third, a fourth,
or a fifth of the municipal or governing board. They should
be present for discussion and for mediation, but not to out-
vote or overrule. The definite proportions of the proprietary
and the personal members being fixed, every proprietary vote
would have a weight exactly proportioned to the annual value
at which the estate is rated. A single registry office may
be established in every local government district, for the
proprietary voters within it. A small fee for each estate
would be sufficient to meet the charges of such an establish-
ment. The voting papers could be received at the same
1
The subjoined form of voting paper is borrowed from the Schedule of
the Public Lands and Commons Bill (No. 63), Session 1872. It is a form
suitable, for example, to the election of proprietary representatives on the
Lincoln County Board.
COUNTY OF LINCOLN.-OWNER'S VOTING PAPER.

Name of Owners.
Description of
Property.
Gress
Annual
Value.
Names of Candidates voted for,
in the order of preference.
The Master War-House, farm build-
£545
den and Assist-
inys, and lands,
ants of the Guild
in the parish of
or Fraternity of
the Holy Trinity
and St. Clement,
of Deptford
Strond, in the :
county of Kent.
Goshill,
colnshire.
Lin-
a c f 00 to 1
Abraham Carter.
John Jones.
William Mills.
Frederick Stanhope.
5 James Brenton.
6
༽
George Wilkinson.
Henry Brown.
Thomas Isaacson.
10
11
12
&c.
This vote is to be counted for the candidate first named; and for the other can-
didates respectively, in the order of preference indicated, only in case the first
or prior candidate, or candidates, has, or have, enough votes in value for his, or
their, election without this vote; or, in case he, or they, have not enough votes in
value to be elected. The surplus value of the vote, where a portion only is appro-
priated, to be transferred in the like order of preference.
Signature of Owner, or Seal of Corporation, &c.
286
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
office, to which they might be transmitted by post or other-
wise, without inconvenience. The secret form of ballot would
not be required for the proprietary body. The personal votes
would be given by the secret ballot, as provided for parlia-
mentary elections,' but extending over a narrower area would
be more readily counted.
Fifthly. The system of indirect election introduced into
the constitution of the Metropolitan Board of Works is in-
compatible with its immediate responsibility to the community
at large. That constitution is founded on the Report of the
Commissioners on the Corporation of London, in 1854. The
reason for recommending it seems to have been an apprehen-
sion of the power which must be conferred on a single body
of councillors, and which the Commissioners thought would
be in some way diluted or diminished if divided between
bodies of a primary and a second degree, the second being a
kind of federation of the first. The Commissioners say,-
"If the precedent of the Municipal Corporations Act were
followed absolutely, it would be necessary not only to alter
the constitution of the corporation, but to advance the boun-
daries of the City until they surround the entire metropolis
a process by which 723 acres would be converted into an
area of 78,029 acres, and an assessment of £935,000 into an
assessment of £9,964,000. A change of this magnitude
would, as it seems to us, defeat the main purpose of municipal
institutions. London in its full extent is a province covered
with houses; its diameter from north to south and east to
west is so great, that persons living at its farthest extremities
have few interests in common; its area is so large that each
inhabitant is in general acquainted only with his own quarter,
and has no minute knowledge of other parts of the town.
Hence the two first conditions for municipal government,
minute local knowledge and community of interests, would be
1 See Chap. VII., pp. 124, 125.
2 Pp. 267-270, ante.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
287
wanting. The enormous numbers of the population, and the
vast magnitude of the interests which would be under the care
of the municipal body, would likewise render its administra-
tion a work of great difficulty."
Upon this it may be remarked that the corporate body
elected by the people connected with each parish and district
would naturally form committees to whom the business of the
locality with which they were specially acquainted would be
referred, and in action upon their reports the aggregate body
would have the benefit both of local and general knowledge
aided by paid functionaries wherever necessary.
In the labours of a great Metropolitan Council scope might
be found for the employment of all the varied talents and
genius of a large body of public-spirited men, in which the
acquirements of science, of study, and of travel, and the know-
ledge and experience of practical life, may be enlisted and em-
ployed in promoting the public welfare. Such a Council would
be an admirable school of preparation for the business of the
Imperial Legislature. It cannot be hoped for, under a system
which partitions and divides it into small bodies and sections.
It is not, however, the magnitude alone of the metropolis
which is the supposed objection to its consolidation. The
Commissioners have other reasons both of a special and a
general kind. They say:
"That the bisection of London by the Thames furnishes
an additional reason for not placing the whole town under a
single municipal corporation. All roads, streets, sewers,
gas-pipes, and water-pipes, in short, all means of superficial
or subterraneous communication which run in continuous
lines from north to south, are necessarily stopped by the
river. Many of these are, directly or indirectly, the subject
of municipal control; and therefore a municipal body which
governed the metropolis both north and south of the Thames
would find that the continuity of its operations was, in many
respects, broken off by natural circumstances."
288
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
It is not easy to see why operations on one bank of the
river may not cease, and be resumed or not as occasion shall
require on the other bank, without forming any obstacle to
the vesting of powers in the same body to deal with both.
sides of the stream. The government of Paris is not impeded
by the Seine, nor that of Lyons by the Rhône and Saône.
But the Commissioners, however, conclude:-
"These observations appear to us decisive against the ex-
pediency of placing the whole of the metropolis under a
single municipal corporation, without adverting to those more
general questions of public policy which naturally suggest
themselves in connection with the subject."
This is a statecraft which it is not easy to comprehend.
When any great object is to be accomplished there seems no
better means than to confer upon those to whom its per-
formance is committed the most ample scope and power for
the exercise of their judgment and discretion, and to strengthen
that judgment and discretion by every practical means.
This applies alike to the individual, to the local corporation,
and the Imperial Government. Let the individual have the
most unlimited and unfettered choice of his representatives,
and a sense of personal responsibility in its exercise; the
municipal body, the widest and most unimpeded power of
action, which, by its capacity for good, shall attract and in-
clude the best and most public-spirited mind of the locality;
and let the national Legislature be a concentration of the
result of the intellect and moral as well as the material force
of the kingdom.
Deliver not the tasks of might
To weakness.
Instead of frittering away the municipal constitution by a
multitude of elections for detached and exceptional purposes,
in many of which little interest is severally taken,—an incor-
poration of the whole metropolis under a great council, chosen.
by a perfect representative organization, would invest every
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
289
branch of its administration and its offices and dignities with
a weight and value calculated to make them just objects of
ambition for its most distinguished citizens. There are no
obstacles in the way of such an union and incorporation which
a powerful government might not overcome, nor probably
any which all the more enlightened citizens would not rejoice
at having overcome. It has been conceived by many of the
inhabitants of the metropolis, that the difficulties in the way
of placing the entire city under one municipal constitution are
rather found in objections arising with the Imperial Govern-
ment than with the people. It is thought, whether correctly
or not, that the successive governments have entertained a
jealousy of a body, so powerful as the municipal council of the
metropolis would be, if it concentrated the suffrage of three
millions of people, surrounding the offices of the state. In such
a constitution the dignity of the mayor of the City would be
restored to its ancient, or more than its ancient splendour.
History does not record the existence of any provincial or
municipal officer having jurisdiction over a community of equal
extent, wealth, or intelligence. It might be very possible,
therefore, that governments, feeble in parliamentary force,
would shrink from creating at their doors a rival power of such
magnitude. If the time should come, in which these fears
cease to operate, if a government should exist not tottering
on the crutches of party, but strong in the sympathies and
affections of the people, and of a parliament their faithful
exponent, it may yet be that the City of London,-instead of
being confined within the narrow boundaries, and decked witli
the antique trappings of its early and comparatively infantile
existence,—will assume the position which it has attained
amongst cities, and open its arms to embrace the vast popula-
tion which has gathered around its ancient walls. It is not
by a servile crawling in the paths of our ancestors, but by
following in the spirit of their institutions, that we most fully
show our respect for antiquity.
U
290
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
A prospect of London and our other great cities, as well as
extensive rural districts, governed by municipal and local
councils which, in the manner of their formation, shall every-
where evoke the highest intelligence and public spirit, and,
possessing the public confidence, shall be powerful agents in
all works of social amelioration; and the still larger prospect
of the representative institutions of the kingdom aiding in the
improvement of individual character, and in the elevation of
the whole tone of popular life, may appear Utopian. "I
believe,” observes a living master of our language and of art,
"the quiet admission which we are all of us so ready to make,
that because things have been long wrong it is impossible
they should ever be right, is one of the most fatal sources of
misery and crime from which this world suffers. Cast the
word Utopian out of your dictionary altogether. There is no
need for it. Things are either possible or impossible-you
can easily determine which in any given state of human science.
If the thing is impossible, you need not trouble yourself about
it; if possible, try for it. The Utopianism is not our business,
-the work is." I may conclude with the same counsel from
the mouth of the philosophical statesman, so often cited in
these pages, Mr. Burke,—who, in his speech on economical
reform, said,—"I know it is common for men to say that such
and such things are perfectly right—very desirable, but that,
Those
unfortunately, they are not practicable. No sir, no.
things which are not practicable are not desirable. There is
nothing in the world really beneficial that does not lie within
the reach of an informed understanding and a well-directed
pursuit. There is nothing that God has judged good for us
that He has not given us the means to accomplish, both in the
natural and the moral world. If we cry, like children, for the
moon, like children we must cry on."
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX A,
SWITZERLAND. THE ASSOCIATION RÉFORMISTE OF GENEVA.
It is either in republican countries, or in states in which efforts, more
or less earnest, are made to carry out the principles of national self-
government in their integrity, that the system of proportional and pre-
ferential representation has been most enthusiastically received. In no
nation has the labour of propagating a knowledge of the method, and of the
results which may reasonably be expected from it, been more vigorously
and intelligently undertaken and pursued than in Switzerland. The
Association Réformiste, devoted to this object, was inaugurated in 1865,
with an address from M. Ernest Naville.¹ This was followed by several
productions by the same eminent writer, by MM. Roget and Morin, and
by the establishment of a journal The Réformiste,' especially directed
to the purpose of making known and advocating a just electoral system.
This journal continued in circulation until shortly before the commence-
ment of the late Continental war, when most domestic discussions were for
the time absorbed, and the journal was merged in the 'Indépendence
Suisse. A collected statement of the proceedings of the Society was pub-
lished in the last year, from which the progress of thought on this
subject nearly in every part of Europe and America will be gathered.
An extract from the Reformiste' of the 4th of May, 1869, reviewing the
results of the general election of this kingdom in 1868, concludes with the
following warning, pour les hommes qui veulent s'instruire à la grande
école de l'expérience."
66
1. La lutte exclusive de deux partis, qui résulte forcément du principe
des majorités, fausse la représentation du peuple anglais, et ne permet pas
aux divers éléments de la vie nationale de se manifester.
29. La mesure adoptée pour la représentation des minorités (dont on
ne saurait trop louer l'intention) est en elle-même un palliatif insuffisant
qui ne saurait tener lieu d'une vraie réforme, même dans le cas où la mesure
serait généralisée.
32. Si l'Angleterre n'adopte pas et ne réalise pas sérieusement le principe
de la représentation vraie, elle dérivera de plus en plus vers les écueils
trop connus de cette fausse démocratie qui abaisse les parlements et les
peuples.
The Report presented by M. Ernest Naville to the Association Re-
La Patrie et les Partis. Genève, 1865.
Travaux de l'Association Réformiste de Genève, 1865-1871.
Fruest Naville. Genève et Bâle, H. Georg, Libraire-Editeur.
Recueillis par
APPENDICES.
293

!
formiste, in March, 1871, introduces the question by a review and logical
analysis of the various amendments which were proposed in the rude
electoral machinery of earlier times. Their differences and several results
are thus accurately described :-
"La revue générale du mouvement réformiste dans le monde fait
reconnâitre, à des signes manifestes, les progrès rapides de notre cause.
Cette revue a, de plus, l'avantage de signaler les voies diverses qui se sont
offertes à la pensée des publicistes et des législateurs pour réaliser le
principe de la représentation vraie. Le nombre des travaux a été si
grand que toutes les voies possibles paraissent avoir été signalées et ex-
plorées; et nous avons à recueillir, pour les mettre à profit, les résultats
d'une étude faite dans toutes les parties du globe par des hommes de
toutes les opinions.
"Les plans de réforme proposés supposent tous des colléges élisant
plusieurs députés, parce que pour une élection unique la loi de la majorité
est nécessairement maintenue. Ces plans forment un nombre considé-
rable de procédés divers, mais plusieurs de ces procédés sont de simples
variantes d'un même système, parce qu'ils réalisent, avec quelques modi-
fications de détail, le même principe fondamental.
"Les systèmes peuvent être réunis en deux classes, celle des systèmes
empiriques et celle des systèmes rationnels.
"Systèmes empiriques.
"Les systèmes empiriques cherchent à établir la représentation des
minorités, sans se préoccuper du caractère proportionnel de cette repré-
sentation. Ils sont au nombre de trois :-
"Pluralité simple.-L'électeur dépose dans l'urne le nom d'un seul can-
didat. Sont élus, dans le nombre voulu, les candidats qui ont obtenu le
plus grand nombre de suffrages. Un minimum peut être fixé. Ce système
a été proposé en France depuis longtemps par M. Emile de Girardin, et
en dernier lieu, par M. le Baron de Layre.
"Vote limité.-L'électeur inscrit sur son bulletin un nombre de candidats
moindre que celui des députés à elire, les deux tiers ou les trois quarts
par exemple. Les candidats qui obtiennent le plus grand nombre de
suffrages sont élus. Un minimum peut être fixé. Ce système a été établi
et pratiqué en Angleterre pour les colléges nommant trois députés.
"Vote Cumulatif.-L'électeur dispose d'un nombre de suffrages égal à
celui des députés à élire. Il peut cumuler tous ses suffrages sur un seul
candidat, ou les répartir, à son gré, sur un nombre de candidats quelconque
et dans la proportion qui lui convient. Les candidats qui ont réuni le plus
de suffrages sont élus. Un minimum peut être fixé.
Un minimum peut être fixé. Ce système a été
adopté en Illinois pour la représentation politique, et pratiqué en Angle-
terre pour l'élection des Conseils d'Ecole.
¹ Travaux, &c. Appendix, p. 703.
294
APPENDICES.

"Systèmes Rationnels.
"Les systèmes rationnels ne cherchent pas seulement à accorder une
représentation aux minorités, mais à établir, d'une manière proportionelle,
qui est la seule représentation vraie. Ils sont au nombre de trois :—
son
Représentation personnelle des électeurs.-L'électeur désigne sur
bulletin le candidat qu'il désire en première ligne, puis celui qu'il désire
en seconde ligne, si le premier est élu déjà, et ainsi de suite, en joignant à
son premier et principal suffrage une série de suffrages éventuels. Le
nombre des bulletins divisé par le nombre des candidats à élire détermine
le nombre de suffrages nécessaires pour l'élection (quotient électoral). Un
candidat est élu dès qu'il a réuni le quotient électoral. Chaque bulletin
ne compte que pour un seul candidat, pour le premier d'abord, pour le
second si le premier est élu déjà, et ainsi de suite.
Représentation proportionelle des partis.-Divers partis librement formés,
et en nombre indéterminé, présentent leurs listes de candidats. Les élec-
teurs choisissent le parti auquel ils se rangent, et chaque parti obtient un
nombre de députés proportionnel au nombre de suffrages qu'il a réunis.¹
Suffrage Uninominal.-Chaque candidat publie une liste indiquant,
selon l'ordre de sa préférence, les autres candidats auxquels il veut trans-
mettre les suffrages superflus ou insuffisants qu'il pourra obtenir. L'electeur
désigne le nom d'un seul candidat. Les suffrages superflus (ceux qui
dépassent le quotient électoral), puis les suffrages insuffisants (ceux dont
le nombre est inférieur au quotient), sont transférés selon les listes d'indi-
cation que les candidats ont déposées. Le résultat de l'opération est qu'on
obtient le nombre voulu de députés qui ont tous, directement ou par suite
de transfert, un nombre de suffrages égal au quotient electoral."
"Telle est la classification générale des divers plans de réforme. Je crois
que tous les procédés proposés, soit en Europe, soit en Amérique, se
rattachent à l'un des six systèmes indiqués. La pluralité simple, le vote
limité et le vote cumulatif forment la classe empirique des projets de
réforme; la représentation personnelle, la représentation proportionnelle
et le suffrage uninominal en forment la classe rationnelle.
"L'adoption des systèmes empiriques constitue un succès réel pour
l'œuvre de la réforme, non-seulement parce qu'ils rompent avec le principe
de la majorité, mais parce que leurs défenseurs proclament hautement les
principes de la représentation vraie. Mais ces systèmes restent fort loin
du but qu'il faut atteindre, et en vue duquel on les recommande et les
adopte. En effet, ils offrent tous les caractères suivants :
1 M. Naville adds that he regards "le système de la valeur décroissante des
suffrages," proposed by Messrs. Burnitz and Warentrapp (Appendix B, p. 298,
infra), as merely a variety of this class. The same may be said of a former
suggestion of the author. (Appendix C, p. 301.)
APPENDICES.
295
"Les suffrages qui s'accumulent sur un candidat au-delà du quotient
électoral, et les suffrages qui restent au-dessous de ce nombre, peuvent
être sans influence sur le résultat de l'opération électorale; ce sont des
suffrages perdus.
"L'existence de suffrages perdus est cause que le résultat de l'élection
n'est pas nécessairement proportionnel. Les minorités que l'on cherche à
faire représenter, sans le faire d'une manière rationnelle, peuvent obtenir
trop ou trop peu de députés. La certitude de la justice fait défaut.”
M. Naville then proceeds to show the necessity of an implicit submission
to party leaders and party management in designating the candidates who
are to be put forward and supported, in order to avoid these consequences.
The Report, after stating that the Association had at first "indiqué le
système de la représentation personnelle, en modifiant les plans de MM.
Andræ et Hare par l'idée émise de M. Rivoire, mais le journalisme géne-
vois l'avait signalé comme une nouveauté étrange, très-éloignée de nos
mœurs politiques;" and they therefore recommended la liste libre, taking as
the basis the following method proposed by M. Morin (author of Précis de
l'Histoire Politique de la Suisse) in 1862 :-
"Système électoral proportionnel simplific.
"Art. 1er. La proportionnalité est admise comme base de l'élection au
Grand Conseil.
66
Art. 2. Les listes de candidats remises au bureau central, avant la
distribution des bulletins, ont seules droit à la réparation proportionnelle
des députés.
"Art. 3. Cette répartition s'opère de la manière suivante:
"A. Immédiatement après le dépouillement du scrutin, le bureau arrête,
d'après le nombre des bulletins valables, celui des suffrages indispensables
pour l'élection d'un représentant. Ce dernier nombre, déterminé par le
chiffre des députés à élire dans chaque collége, est 1/44e des bulletins
valables dans l'arrondissement de Genève; 1/38e dans celui de la Rive
gauche; 1/14° dans celui de la Rive droite.
"B. L'importance des listes en concurrence est donnée par le chiffre
des bulletins compactes qu'elles ont réunis, et l'ordre des noms dans ces
listes est déterminé par le nombre des suffrages qu'ils ont obtenus, en tenant
compte des bulletins égrenés ou panachés.
"C. Chacune des listes a droit à autant de députés qu'elle renferme de
fois le nombre de voix nécessaire pour l'élection d'un représentant.
"D. Les noms portés sur plusieurs listes, ayant droit à la répartition,
sont élus d'emblée. Le surplus leur est réparti proportionnellement à leur
force, sans que la part revenant à d'autres groupes soit réduite ou aug-
mentée par ce fait.
"E. Les fractions ne comptent pas.
*C
Art. 4. Si, après la répartition entre les listes du nombre de députés
296
APPENDICES.
auquel elles ont droit, il en reste à nommer, ceux-ci sont élus à la majorité
relative, à condition toutefois qu'elle ne soit pas inférieure au minimum
indispensable pour l'élection d'un député.”
Observations sur le système simplifié.
L'exemple suivant, qui présente au premier coup d'œil une objection
très-spécieuse au système proportionnel, contribuera à mettre en relief la
facilité avec laquelle ce mécanisme résout les questions en apparence les
plus embarrassantes.
Supposons 1000 bulletins valables et 20 députés à élire. Le minimum.
indispensable pour l'élection d'un député est 1000/20, soit 50. Deux listes,
A et B, sont en concurrence.
A réunit 400 bulletins compactes et, par le fait de suffrages égrenés, le
nom qui est en tête a 700 voix.
B compte 600 bulletins pour 19 de ses candidats, mais le 20° n'en a
que 300.
Comme suit:
Candidats.
Liste A.
Candidats.
1
700 suffrages.
1
Liste B.
600 suffrages.
2
400
2
600
>>
3
400
3
600
19
4
400
1
600
5
400
5
600
6
400
6
600
""
""
7
400
7
600
""
8
400
S
GOO
9
400
9
600
3
10
400
10
600
11
100
11
GOO
12
100
12
600
13
400
13
600
""
14
400
1f
600
15
400
15
600
""
16
400
16
600
17
400
17
600
""
18
100
18
600
99
""
19
400
19
600
""
20
400
20
300
"
"
8300
11,700
$300+11,700 font 20,000 voix. Donc les 1000 électeurs ont voté.
Les
400 de la liste A ont voté d'une manière compacte. Entre les votants de
la liste B, 300 se sont séparés des autres, pour un scul nom, et ont porté
leurs voix sur l'un des candidats de la liste A.
APPENDICES.
297
L'importance de celle-ci étant représentée par 400 bulletins compactes,
celle de la liste B est réduite à 300, puisque 300 électeurs seulement l'ont
portée sans y faire de changement.
D'après l'article 3, lettre C du système simplifié, le nombre de députés qui
doit être attribué à la liste A est 400/50, soit 8, et à la liste B 300/50, soit 6.
Donc la liste B, comptant 11,700 votes, aura moins de députés que la listo
A, qui n'en réunit que 8,300. Il y a là une inconséquence, mais elle n'est
qu'apparente.
D'abord les 300 électeurs qui ont abandonné un nom de la liste B, pour
porter leurs voix sur un candidat de la liste A, ont eu probablement la
précaution de remettre au bureau une liste modifiée d'après leurs sympathies.
Cette 3me liste étant entrée en concurrence, elle a droit à la répartition.
Celle-ci doit s'opérer comme suit :
1 nom commun à la liste A et à la 3me, élu d'emblée.
S appartenant à la liste A.
11 communs à B et à la 3me liste, élus d'emblée.
Total 20
La scission entre les votants de la liste B a donc pour résultat d'écarter
le candidat qui en était l'objet, mais il donne un député de plus à la
liste A.
Dans le cas où les électeurs, abandonnant la liste B pour un candidat,
négligeraient de remettre au bureau une 3me liste, voici ce qui se passerait:
La liste A aurait droit à 8 députés,
B
""
""
6
Les 6 noms qui auraient réuni le plus de voix, après les 14 élus, seraient
nommés dans l'ordre de la majorité et pris dans la liste B qui compte le
plus de suffrages.
A aurait donc
et B
8 députés.
12
Total 20
""
résultat un peu plus favorable à B et qui rétablirait la répartition entre les
listes, comme si tous les noms de B comptaient G00 voix et tous ceux de
A 400.
Le système proportionnel simplifié pourvoit donc, par l'addition de
l'article 4, à l'objection soulevée dans l'exemple proposé.
Après avoir réparti entro les diverses opinions qui se sont fait représenter
par des listes, le nombre de députés qui leur revient, le reste appartient
évidemment aux électeurs indépendants, et la majorité peut seule décider
entre eux. C'est ce motif qui nous a porté à introduire la disposition
contenue dans l'article 4, au moyen de laquelle les intérêts des électeurs
indépendants se trouvent complétement sauvegardés.-Pp. 25-29.
298
APPENDIX B.
EXTRACT from Methode bei jeder Art von Wahlen sowohl der
Mehrheit als den Minderherten die ihrer Stärke ent-
sprechende Zahl von Vertretern zu sichern. Dargestellt
von Dr. Gustav Burnitz und Dr. Georg Varrentrapp.
Frankfurt a. M., 1863.
Wir nehmen an, es sei 1 Vertreter zu wählen und es stehen sich drei
Parteien gegenüber, deren die eine über 1500, die zweite über 900, die
dritte über 600 Stimmen gebietet. Hier ist der mit 1500 Stimmen bedachte
Candidat der ersten Partei als der Höchstbestimmte, als der, welchem das
gröszte Masz von Zustimmung zu Theil ward, der Gewählte und zwar der
mit Recht Gewählte. Ist dann eine zweite Wahl vorzunehmen, so wird, bei
geschlossenen Parteiverhältnissen und bei abermals 1500, 900 und 600 für
die verschiedenen Parteicandidaten abgegebenen Stimmen, wiederum der
Candidat der ersten, relativ stärksten Partei der Gewählte sein, und ebenso
in ferneren Wahlgängen, wenn noch weitere Vertreter zu wählen sind.
Ganz dasselbe Ergebnisz wird erzielt, wenn 3, 6, 10 oder mehr Vertreter in
einem Wahlgange ernannt werden; es werden nur die Candidaten der
stärksten Partei aus der Urne hervorgehen; die Minorität wird, gleichviel
ob gröszer oder kleiner, stets und gänzlich unvertreten bleiben.
Es ereignet sich dies, weil man nur die abgegebene Stimmenzahl, nicht
aber die Rangordnung, welche die Partei ihren verschiedenen Candidaten
gibt, im Verhältnisz zur relativen Stärke der einzelnen Parteien beachtet.
Je nachdem ein oder mehrere Vertreter zu wählen sind, gestaltet sich das
Verhältnisz verschieden.
1. Bei jeder durch eine Anzalil von Personen vorzunehmenden Wahl
eines oder mehrerer Vertreter findet bewuszt oder unbewuszt, auch inner-
halb derselben Partei, eine Wertlıschätzung der zur Wahl Empfohlenen, sei
es im Allgemeinen, sei es unter Berücksichtigung eines speciellen zu
erreichenden Zweckes, statt. Diese Werthschätzung tritt bei der Wahl in
zweierlei Weise zu Tage: a) durch die Zahl der dem einzelnen Bewerber
zufallenden Stimmen: b) durch die Rangordnung, welche demselben
Seitens seiner Wähler im Verhältnisz zu den anderen von derselben Partei
aufgestellten Bewerbern zugewiesen wird; diese Rangordnung drückt das
Masz des Werthes aus, welcher dem einen Candidaten vor den anderen.
derselben Partei zufällt, das Masz der Glücksaussicht, welches die Parten
dem einen ihrer Candidaten vor den anderen zu gewähren wünscht
APPENDICES.
299
Nur bei der Wahl eines einzigen Vertreters fallen beide Werthschätzungen
zusammen in einer Wahlziffer.
2. Wo mehrere Vertreter zu wählen sind und mehrere Parteien von
verschiedener Stärke sich gegenüber stehen, gilt es einerseits, die Stärke der
einzelnen Parteien (also die Zahl der den einzelnen Bewerbern von ihnen
zugewendeten Stimmen), andererseits den verschiedenen Werth, welchen
die einzelnen Parteien ihren verschiedenen Candidaten beimessen, klar
darzulegen und in einem richtigen Verhältnisz einander gegenüber zu stellen.
Dies geschieht durch die Wahlziffer, welche sich ergibt, wenn man die
absolute, einem Bewerber zugefallene Stimmenzahl durch die relative
(d. h. durch die ihm auf den verschiedenen Stimmzetteln zu Theil gewor-
dene) Rangzahl dividirt.
Wird dieses Gesetz zur Geltung gebracht, so wird die Mehrheit der
Wähler jedesmal die entsprechende Mehrheit der Vertreter ernennen, aber
auch der Minderheit wird die ihrer Stärke genau entsprechende Zahl von
Vertretern zufallen.
Es möge dies aus etlichen Beispielen erhellen, welche die verschiedenen
vorkommenden Parteiverhältnisse darstellen und an deren Spitze wir das
bereits oben erwähnte Beispiel setzen. Drei Parteien mit je 1500, 900 und
600 Stimmen treten zur Wahlurne und es ergeben sich folgende Resultate:
WAHLZIFFER NACH RANGORDNUNG.
BISHERIGE ZÄHLUNGSWEISE.
Partei A. Partei B. Partei C.
Partei A.
Partel B.
Partei C.
1r B. 1500
900
600
1500
900
600
=1500
= 900
1
1
T=600
2r,, 1500
900
600
1500
900
600
= 750
11
= 300
2
3r
1500
900
600
1500
900
600
""
= 500
= 300
=200
3
3
3
4r, 1500
900
600
1500
900
600
= 375
225
=150
4
4
5r , 1500
900
600
1500
900
600
= 300
= 180
= 120
5
5
5
6г,
1500
900
600
1500
900
600
= 250
=150
=100
6
6
6
7r,
1500
900
600
1500
900
600
= 214
=128
= 85
7
7
7
Sr,, 1500
900
600
1500
900
600
-
187
= 112
75
قل
8
9r
1500
900
600
1500
900
600
= 166
=100
9
= 66
9
9
10r,, 1500
900
600
1500
900
600
= 150
90
10
= 60
10
10
u. S. W.
u. S. W.
300
APPENDICES.
Es würden hiernach
nach der bisherigen
nach
Zählungsweise
der Wahlziffer
bei der Wahl
der der der
Partei Partei Partei
der
Partei
der
Partei
der
Partei
A.
B.
C.
A.
B.
C.
von 6 Vertretern.
6
3
2
1
10
10
5
3
2
»
""
12
12
6
""
""
16
16
8
5
3
"
>"
"9
20
25
20
25
10
6
Vertreter.
13
7
>>
zufallen, Schon für den zweiten Vertreter ergeben die 900 Stimmen,
welche von der zweiten Partei ihrem ersten Candidaten gegeben wurden,
eine höhere Wallziffer, als die von der ersten Partei ihrem zweiten Candi-
1500
daten gegebenen, d. h. 900 ist mehr als ; ebenso ist 600 stärker als
1500
3
2
Stehen sich nur zwei Parteien gegenüber mit z. B. 60 und 38 Stimmen
Stärke, so zeigt sich folgendes Verhältnisz nach den beiden Systemen :
BISHERIGE ZAHLUNGSWEISE.
WAHLZIFFER.
Partei A. Partei B.
Partei A.
1r, Vertreter 60
38
60
Partei B.
38
=3
= 60
=38
1
1
2r
60
39
38
3r
60
38
19
4r
"
60
38
5r
60
A
38
6r
60
""
38
8-18 18 8
60
38
=30
60
2=19
38
= 20
=12.5
3
60
38
15
9.5
60
38
=12
= 7·6
5
60
=
10
38
= 6.3
6
6
7r
60
38
€0
38
= 8.5
= 5.4
7
7
Sr
GO
38
60
38
= 7.5
4.7
8
8
gr
60
38
81-
60
38
= 6.6
= 4.2
9
10r
60
38
60
38
6
= 3.8
10
10
Nach der ersten Stimmenzählung bleibt also die zweite Partei voll-
kommen unvertreten; nach dem System der Wahlziffernberechnung
APPENDICES.
301
erhält sie dagegen bei der Wahl von 3 Vertretern einen, bei 5 Vertretern
2 gegen 3, bei 8 Vertretern 3 gegen 5, bei 10 Vertretern 4 gegen 6, bei
13 Vertretern 5 gegen 8.-Pp. 5-8.
The above examples are followed by others showing the operation of the
system if parties were more numerous, and also exhibiting the effect in the
cases of specific elections referred to.
APPENDIX C.
A METHOD proposed for ascribing to every vote a weight, or
value, for every candidate named, according to the order in
which the name stands upon the voting-paper. It was
subsequently abandoned, for the reasons mentioned in page
187. It will be understood by the following example, ex-
tracted from page 55 of " The Machinery of Representation,"
by Thomas Hare. Maxwell, Bell Yard, 1857. 2nd ed.
"The first table exhibits a supposed number of actual and possible votes
for candidates A, B, and C (counting the first uncancelled votes as the
first possible votes, the second as the second, and so on), and the second
table contains their relative value. The actual and possible votes of C, as
it will be seen, amount in the aggregate to less than those of B and A, and
the name of C would, therefore, be first cancelled. Some of the votes for
C would, perhaps, by the voting papers, be next given to A or B, and the
computation would then be made again, and the lowest on the poll again
struck off, until the process can be no longer continued, and effect is given
to every vote, so far as the elector has enabled that to be done.

1st
Candidates.
2nd
Possible
3rd
Possible
Votes.
Votes.
Votes.
4th
Possible
Votes.
5th
Possible
Votes.
A
1760
1527
1654
1361
8441
B
1620
1816
1022
1230
965
C
1786
1219
1452
726
483
302
APPENDICES.

1st
A
B
C
1760
1st
1620
1st
1786
2nd 1527
2nd 1816
2nd 1249
= 7631
= 908
624/3/20
3rd 1654
3
3rd 1022
3rd 1452
=
5511
3
3403
= 484
3
4th 1364
4th 1230
4th 726
= 341
= 307
= 1811
4
5th 844
5th 965
5th 483
5
1681/
= 193
963
5
5
358418
30
33691
31723
APPENDIX D.
IN the Report of Mr. Lytton, Her Majesty's Secretary of Legation at
Copenhagen, on the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad (Reports
of Secretaries of Embassy, &c., No. 7, presented by command to both
Houses of Parliament, 1864, Parl. Paper), an objection is stated to have
been made to the Danish Electoral Law, that it affords no guarantee for
the representation of majorities and minorities in just and adequate
proportion, in proof of which the following problem had been triumphantly
put forward. If, it was said, three members were to be elected by 600
voters, and there are five candidates, A, B, C, D, and E, for whom votes
are given as follows:-
For A
B
D
}
For A
299
votes.
200
C
votes.
B
For A
101
C
votes.
E
The quotient of the 600 votes, divided by 3, being 200, it follows that A,
who has 299 votes, will be elected, and 99, the surplus, then appropriated to
B, whose name stands next on all those papers. A's name being next
cancelled on the 200 papers in which he is coupled with C and B, those
200 votes are then appropriated to C, whose name stands next on all those
papers, and C, having attained the quota, is thereupon elected. Both the
names of A and C, the elected members, are next cancelled on the 101
papers on which C and E appear, and those 101 votes are given to E, who
is then elected under the 24th section of the Danish Electoral Law, as he
would be under Clause XXV. of the law proposed in this treatise. It
is objected that this result is unjust, because B, who was second in the
APPENDICES.
303
choice of 299 voters, and third in the choice of 200, is excluded, and E,
who was only third in the choice of 101, is elected.
Mr. Lytton has shown by his own argument that the combination
supposed is politically preposterous, and, by a calculation made by M.
Andræ, abstractedly, having regard only to probabilities, next to im-
possible.
I am willing, however, to accept the problem as it is stated by the
opponents of the system, and adopt the result, which I believe is perfectly
reconcilable with the principle which is at the foundation of this method
of voting, and also reconcilable with justice.
The object is to give the elector the means of voting for the candidate
who most perfectly attains his ideal of what a legislator should be, but it
does not contemplate giving him the choice of more than one.
The simple
operation of the principle is seen when it is applied to an election vivâ
voce, without voting papers, as is suggested for municipal elections (pp. 282-3).
A and C would there have polled quotas, and E the comparative majority.
The primary purpose of giving the voter the opportunity of adding to his
paper the second, third, or other names for one of whom his vote is to be
taken on the contingency of the name at the head not requiring it, is not
to add greater weight to his vote, but to prevent it from being thrown away
or lost owing to a greater number of voters than is necessary placing the
same popular candidate at the head of their papers. The purpose is, in fact,
to prevent what would have happened in the case supposed, if provision had
not been made for the contingency, for the result of the above disposition
of the votes would then have been that A alone could have been elected.
Keeping in view this main purpose, to which all other objects are secondary,
and comparatively unimportant, it is immaterial in what order the votes are
counted. I should have stated the problem thus,-600 votes are found to
have been given for A, 200 of these only are appropriated to him. A
further number of 200 votes are next appropriated either to C or to B, de-
pending on the order in which the voting papers bearing A's name at the
head have been liberated by his return, and which depends again, in Den-
mark, upon the order in which the votes issue from the urn, and in the
system here proposed, on the localities or particular constituencies for which
A happened to be a candidate, and which govern the rule of appropriation.
(See Clauses XVIII, XIX., and XXIV.) In whatever order or manner
the votes have been taken, there will remain a majority, or, as I have
named it, a comparative majority, and a minority of 101, or 99. If B
has succeeded in obtaining the quota of 200 in the process, C will have the
majority of 101,-if C has succeeded in obtaining that quota, as in the
case put by Mr. Lytton, B is in the unlucky predicament of having the
votes of his friends exhausted in their successful efforts to elect A and C,
and he is left with the minority of 99,-E being supported by 101 voters,
who have given no vote to B. The first 200 voters, whose voting papers
are appropriated to A, have no ground of complaint, for their votes have
304
APPENDICES.
been attended with entire success, namely, the return of their candidate to
the representative assembly, with all the moral weight of the emphatic ex-
pression of esteem shown by the proffered votes of the whole constituency
of 600. Still less have the second 200 voters, whose votes were appropriated
to C, any reason to complain, for they also have not only elected a favourite
candidate of their own, but, equally with the first 200, they are gratified
by the triumphant success of A. The 99 voters for B have also the latter
satisfaction, and if they have failed to return their next favourite candidate,
it is simply because 101 are more than 99.~;
The complaint of injustice is no doubt made rather in the interest of the
candidate than in that of the electors. Instead of a struggle for mastery in
which 301 may overpower, set at defiance, and extinguish the voices of
299, this method of election promises that cach 200 shall be free to choose
the exponent of their opinions; but it does not promise that any vote,
taken singly, shall aid in the return of more than one candidate. In the
supposed Danish case, the candidate might certainly complain of the ill-
fortune which had brought out of the urn the voting papers of his friends
in an order so wonderfully adverse to his success that, according to the
computation of M. Andræ, it would not happen in one election out of some
millions. If such a case had occurred under the method proposed in this
treatise, B's only ground of complaint would have been that A and C had
offered themselves as candidates to constituencies in which they happened
to be more popular than himself, and in which, unluckily for him, his only
supporters also chiefly dwelt; and the votes of these constituencies having
been appropriated to A and C, that appropriation had exhausted the votes
which, but for their prior possession, would have come to him, B. The
law of appropriation by locality, in fact, redresses any fortuitous injustice or
hardship which a resort to chance or lot may occasion, for although the
circumstances supposed are obstacles to the political success of B, as every
interposition of a superior or more favoured competitor must be, yet it is no
fair ground of complaint.
There is no doubt that if the system of valuation of votes, according to
the position of the candidates on the voting papers were adopted, as in the
Frankfort proposal, Appendix B, and as in Appendix C, pp. 209–302,
that the result would be very different. The supposed poll would then
stand thus:-
A 600
1
B 299
2
C 200
2
D 299
3
E 101
3
600
200
+
=
2163
+
}}
3
101
-
1503
993
333
APPENDICES.
305
It is certain, however, that such a method would open a door for party
organisation and party action of a most formidable kind, by the means of
settled and printed lists, giving an increased amount of influence to
mere numbers acting together, which under the simpler system of regarding
only the first, or first uncancelled name, and of appropriation according to
localities, no party ticket could secure, but which, on the contrary, any
such ticket would rather impair.
It will be interesting, however, to refer to the different result of this case,
as it would be determined if the improved rule for obtaining the quota,
examined in Appendix E, were applied. The last example there put
(p. 307) shows that B would be returned with A and C, without any of the
dangerous consequences of giving overwhelming power to numbers, which
might be feared from the foregoing method of valuation.
APPENDIX E.
AMONG those,-Earl Russell, Mr. Andriæ, Mr, James Garth Marshall,
Earl Grey, and others, who within the last ten years have sought a remedy
for the defects in representative institutions which have made them the
creatures of a number of dispersed majorities,-must be included the name
of Mr. Droop, of Lincoln's Inn, and late Fellow of Trinity College,
Cambridge. Mr. Droop, "on observing the rather peculiar phenomena of
the general election in 1857, directed his attention to the problem how
representatives might be elected who should best represent the whole
constituency, and not merely the majority." Perceiving that I had intro-
duced contingent voting, which was also a part of his scheme, he has
kindly communicated to me his method of appropriation of every vote to
the candidate for whom it is successively designed, and of arriving at a
quota which should be exactly the number of votes that ought to be
retained for each successful candidate in order to ensure his election. The
accurate determination of this quota, Mr. Droop remarks, would require
the solution of an algebraical equation of a high degree, but there is no
difficulty in approximating to it to any required degree of accuracy. One
step of this process may be adopted with great advantage. It is the result
of an observation that the quota proposed to be adopted cannot be greater
than the quotient produced by dividing the aggregate number of votes
polled for the number of candidates to be elected, who stand highest on the
poll, by such last-mentioned number. Thus, if there were 2,000 candidates,
all polling more or less votes, of whom only 654 can be elected, it is not
necessary to take as the dividend the whole number of votes polled by the
2,000, but it is sufficient to take the number of votes polled by the 654
who stand highest on the poll. The quotient thus obtained, which will be
necessarily far smaller in number than that obtained by the process pre-
X
306
APPENDICES.
scribed in the text (Clause I., page 25), is termed the "first-trial " quota.
The excess votes of the candidates having more than the quota will then
be reapportioned among the successive names, and a dividend composed of
the numbers attributed to the [654] highest again divided, and a "second-
trial" quota obtained, and the same process of appropriating the excess
votes, and again computing the successive quotas, repeated, until the uni-
form quota can be no further reduced. This is explained in the following
example-Take the case of 7 candidates, of whom 5 are to be elected
by 200 electors. A receives 37 first votes, B 14, C 31, D 45, E 24, F 19,
G 30. To obtain the first-trial quota, the 5 highest, which are D 45, A 37,
C 31, G 30, and E 24, are added together, and the result, 167, divided by
5=33, which is the first-trial quota. As D's number therefore exceeds
the quota by 12 (45-33) these 12 votes are then distributed to the candi-
dates whose names follow his on the voting papers. C is supposed to stand
next on 3 of the papers, E on 6, G on 3; these votes are added to those
already given to those candidates, and if A's 4 surplus votes (37-33) being
set free belong to B, and C's last vote (34-33) also to B, the 5 highest will
now be found to be, D 33, A 33, C 33, G 33, E 30: these numbers must
again be added together, and the result, 162, divided by 5=32, which is
the second-trial quota. The same process must now be repeated, D's
surplus vote (33—32) given to G, whose name stands next on the voting
paper, A's surplus vote to B, C's to B, G's two last votes (one received from
D) to F, the 5 highest are now, D 32, A 32, C 32, G 32, E 30, added
together = 158 ÷ 5=31, which is the third-trial quota. D's surplus vote
must now be set free, and E's name following on the voting paper, is given
to E, A's to B, C's to B, G's to E, which gives E one surplus vote,-sup-
posing this vote when set free to belong to F, we have now, D 31, A 31,
C 31, G 31, E 31; these five candidates are therefore elected, with a
quota of 31.
In adopting this reduced quota a succession of trials is indispensable; for
the reappropriation of the papers after settling the first-trial quota, may
displace some of the candidates who were at first within the number to be
clected, and bring up in their stead some of the candidates lower on the
poll. Those originally higher will therefore be entitled to require that the
same process shall be continued until the quota is fixed at its lowest point,
and no further substitution can occur. There is really nothing complicated
in this process. It only repeats several times what it was at first proposed to
do once for all. The alteration of a few lines in the Electoral Law would
sufficiently prescribe the course to be taken. A larger number, or perhaps
the whole, of the voting papers would, when arranged, be required to be
transmitted to the Registrars, and the declaration of the ultimate result
would probably have to be deferred a day or two longer.
A very striking illustration of the effect of this mode of computation is
found upon its application to the Danish problem, objected to the system of
Mr. Andriæ Appendix D, p. 302). It would in that case place B in a
APPENDICES.
307
position equal to A and C, by bringing more contingent votes into operation,
without the dangerous consequence of giving greatly increased weight to
mere numbers.
Thus :-
600
3
First trial:-Votes polled =200.
First appropriation,-A, 200;
B, 99;
C, 200;
E, 101.
501
Second trial,-A, 200+C, 200+E, 101
= 167. B, 99.
3
200-16733.
Second appropriation,-A, 167; C, 167; B, 99+33+33=165. E, 101.
499
3
Third trial,-A, 167+C, 167+B, 165= =166. E, 101.
Third appropriation,-A, 166}+C, 166}+B, 166. E, 101.
The result is, that A, C, and B, are elected by an equal quota of votes.
It will be seen, however, that this has been effected at the expense of in-
creasing the minority having no influence on the election, from 99 (as it
stood in the example in Appendix D) to 101.
APPENDIX F.
Parliament of New South Wales.
THE earliest suggestions which are found, for the adoption
of personal representation in this colony, are contained
in the Sydney Morning Herald, of the 26th November
and 4th December, 1861, on the proposal to make the
Upper House of the Colonial Parliament elective, instead
of nominative, as theretofore. Early in the session of 1862
a Bill was brought into the Legislative Council, adapting
the principle to the election of the Upper House. This
Bill was, on the 18th June, 1862, referred to a Select
Committee, of which Mr. Wentworth was chairman. The
Committee made its Report on the 21st of August, 1862.
The following passages relate to this system :-
"As respects the mode of voting, your Committee have given much consi-
deration to the plan now commonly known as that of Mr. Hare, and which has
lately attracted considerable notice among leading political writers in Europe.
308
APPENDICES.
It has been urged on the attention of your Committee, not only by the in-
trinsic merits of the scheme, but from the circumstance that it admits of
being applied to the formation of a Colonial Legislative Council in a much
simpler form than it presents in the original scheme of the author, as
intended for application to the British House of Commons. The mere fact
of its tending to increase the distinctness of character between the two
Houses has been felt to be a strong recommendation. Your Committee are
not disposed to shrink from its adoption merely because it is new and expe-
rimental.
The leading feature of the plan is the representation of all the electors,
in the proportion of the numbers of their respective parties and sections,
instead of the representation merely of the majorities prevailing in each
local electorate, while leaving the defeated minorities wholly without:
t repre-
sentation. Under the usual system, if one interest or prejudice be prevalent
in a majority of the electors in twenty constituencies, twenty members may
be elected to represent those majorities, although the minorities may collec-
tively amount to a number not far short of the successful majorities. A
difference of one vote in each electorate might determine the election, and
twenty votes might thus determine the fate of twenty elections, leaving
thousands of electors, forming the minorities, without a single representa-
tive. This is doubtless an extreme supposition; but the merits of any
system may be fairly illustrated by showing to what it tends when carried
to its utmost length.
66
The system of Mr. Hare provides a remedy; but while it renders this
injustice to minorities impossible, it equally maintains all the just rights of
majorities. It establishes a true representation of the whole society, with
its various interests and opinions represented in due proportion; and the
manner in which this is effected is, when fully explained and understood,
extremely simple. Supposing the number of voters to be 30,000, and the
number of members to be thirty, each 1000 voters (called a quota) is con-
sidered entitled to be represented by one member. Instead of a local
electorate, inhabited by 1000 electors of divided opinion, and comprising a
minority, which, if out-voted in that particular electorate, is left wholly
without representation in the legislature, each member's constituency will
consist of 1000 electors, coinciding in their choice of a representative,
irrespective of their places of residence. For this purpose, the whole
colony will form a single electorate, the electoral districts of the Assembly
being adopted solely for the purpose of more conveniently making
up the roll and polling the votes, but not for the purpose of restricting
the votes of the electors to any special local candidates. This term
""
single electorate" will, however, be apt to lead to a serious misappre-
hension, unless care be taken to observe that under Mr. Hare's system the
effect of a consolidation of many electorates into one is quite the reverse of
that which would result under the present system of voting. Under the
present system, it would merely give the aggregate majority the power of
APPENDICES.
309
defeating the aggregate minority on a wider field, and of sending into the
Council a preponderating number of members to represent one party to the
exclusion of the other. The sub-division of electorates under the present
system thus increases the chance of the occasional prevalence of a weaker
party in one or more local electorates, but it affords a mere chance, uncer-
tain and capricious, whereas Mr. Hare's system insures, without any subdi-
vision whatever, the due and proportionate representation of each party.
Thus, while the colony forms a single electorate as regards territory, each
quota of electors, agreeing in the choice of a member, forms a separate
electorate as regards persons.
"Each elector can thus ensure the return of at least one candidate, by
associating himself with a sufficient number of fellow-electors, wheresoever
resident, to form a quota. But if the vote of each were limited to the
naming of the one candidate he prefers above all the others, it is evident
that more than the quota would often concur in the choice of a popular
candidate, and thus lead to the throwing away of the votes given in excess.
To prevent this, each voter is entitled to name several candidates in the
order of preference, so that if the vote be not required for the first, it may
be used for the second, if not for the second, then for the third, and so on,
to ensure its being made ultimately contributory to the election of some
candidate of his choice. He cannot fail of his object so long as he does
not fail to name on his list some one candidate in whose election he and the
required proportion of other voters concur. Whether the first or last on
his list be the recipient of his vote, his intentions are equally fulfilled.
More so, indeed, if it be the last, for it can only descend to that candidate
when all those higher on his list, and therefore of his earlier preference, have
been already elected by other votes. Nor is this justice to individuals pur-
chased at the expense of any injustice towards leading parties and majo-
rities. Whatever number of quotas are comprised in the ranks of any
party, they can so vote as to obtain a corresponding number of members,
and thus maintain their legitimate proportion of influence in legislation.
The ideal of representative government in the writings of statesmen has
long been the representation of classes and interests in due proportion, so
as to render the legislature a true epitome of the political opinions of
society. Hitherto nothing but an approximation to this ideal has appeared
possible. Mr. Hare's system, for the first time, proposes to make it a
reality.”—[Ordered to be printed, 21 August, 1862; Sydney. J. Richards,
Government Printer.]
The Committee amended, agreed to, and reported, the
Bill. It was read a first time in the Legislative Council, and
on the 4th September, 1862, on the order of the day for the
second reading,
310
APPENDICES.
Mr. HOLDEN said that on account of the share he had taken in preparing
the amended Bill, and his identification with one of the chief principles of the
measure, he had yielded to the desire of several members of the committee to
bring forward the measure. His ambition was limited to securing the result
he desired; and if that result-the passing of a safe and wise measure—
could be obtained by the silent expression of his secret will, he would gladly
relinquish to others the prominent share in the steps taken to accomplish it.
He had been uniformly a supporter of the elective principle, and had advo-
cated it ten years ago in this Chamber. He had, however, felt its difficulties;
and perhaps the delay which had taken place had not been without its
advantages. He believed that the enunciation, in the mean time, of Mr.
Hare's system, had thrown a new light on the subject, and had rendered it
possible to do now what it was impossible to do then. When that system was
first brought to his attention it struck on his mind exactly as it struck on the
mind of John Stuart Mill; and he was not ashamed to identify his own
feelings and ideas with those of that great man. He (Mr. Holden) could
have written and thought and felt exactly in the words in which he (Mr.
Mill) said referring to Mr. Hare's system of representation) that "it solved
the difficulty of representation, and by so doing raised up the cloud which
hung over the future of representative government, and therefore of civiliza-
tion." For he felt that the civilization of mankind was identified with the
success of true, wise, well-constituted representative government, and that
that species of government never had existed yet on the face of the earth.
But he trusted that it would, and might, and should exist; and he trusted
that the first specimen of it might be exhibited in this country. And the
only fear he had about it was, that it might not be so effectual as it would
otherwise be (supposing that this Bill should pass), because of the system
being confined to one House of Legislature, and not being extended to the
other. The hon. member then stated that his measure, though alleged to
be in a spirit of conservatism, was yet truly in accordance with liberal
principles, and showed that his views of the necessity, function, and qualifi-
cation of a Senate, were those expressed by the founders of the American
Republic by Madison and Hamilton, in the Federalist; by Calhoun, by Sir
James Mackintosh, and also by Lord John Russell. The want of a proper
negative power in the constitution of a country compelled the Legislative
power, when established on too wide a basis, to concentrate itself by degrees
into a single Executive. This occurred as an inevitable consequence if the
struggle for place and power between the two parties of the State was more
and more developed, until at length all power was virtually concentrated
in political leaders-ruling as absolutely as any aristocracy. The evil was
augmented instead of lessened, as the community advanced in prosperity.
By rendering the representation more equitable as regarded the interests
of opposing parties, it was made more possible to have universal suffrage
without the dangers which might be apprehended to arise therefrom, and the
division of power secured by such a division of power, promoted a harmoni-
J
1
APPENDICES.
311
ous action between co-existing interests which would not be likely otherwise
to take place, or to continue uninterrupted. Speaking of the mode of voting
adopted in this Bill, Mr. Mill, in his work on Representative Government,
said, “Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be con-
stituted, this one affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications
desirable in the representatives. At present, by universal admission, it is
becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and
character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only persons
who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their
way by lavish expenditure, and who, on the invitation of three or four
tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the two great parties from
their London clubs as men whose votes the party can depend on under all
circumstances. On Mr. Hare's system, those who did not like the local can-
didates would have the power to fill up their voting papers by a selection
from all the persons of national reputation on the list of candidates, with
whose general political principles they were in sympathy. Almost every
person, therefore, who had made himself in any way honourably dis-
tinguished, though devoid of local influence, and having sworn allegiance
to no political party, would have a fair chance of making up the quota; and
with this encouragement such persons might be expected to offer themselves
hitherto undreamt of. Hundreds of able men of independent thought, who
would have no chance whatever of being chosen by the majority of any
existing constituency, have by their writings or their exertions in some field
of public usefulness made themselves known and approved by a few persons
in almost every district of the kingdom; and if every vote that should be
given for them in every place should be counted for their election, they might
be able to complete the number of the quota. In no other way which i
seems possible to suggest would Parliament be so certain of containing the
very elite of the country. Not solely through the votes of minorities would
this system of election raise the intellectual standard of the House of Com-
mons. Majorities would be compelled to look out for members of a much
higher calibre. When the individuals composing the majorities would no
longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either voting for the person brought
forward by their local leaders, or not voting at all; when the nominee of the
leaders would have to encounter the competition not solely of the candidate
of the minority, but of all the men of established reputation in the country
who were willing to serve; it would be impossible any longer to foist upon the
electors the first person who presents himself with the catch-words of the
party in his mouth, and three or four thousand pounds in his pocket. The
majority would insist upon having a candidate worthy of their choice, or they
would carry their votes somewhere else, and the minority would prevail.
The slavery of the majority to the least estimable portion of their number
would be at an end. Had a plan like Mr. Hare's by good fortune suggested
itself to the enlightened and patriotic founders of the American Republic, the
Federal and State Assemblies would have contained many of those dis-
312
APPENDICES.
tinguished men, and democracy would have been spared its greatest reproach,
and one of its most formidable evils. When the Democracy is supreme there
is no One or Few strong enough for dissentient opinions, and injured or
menaced interests to lean upon. The great difficulty of democratic govern-
ment has hitherto seemed to be, how to provide in a democratic society, what
circumstances have provided hitherto in all the societies which have main-
tained themselves ahead of others-a social support-a point d'appui, for
individual resistance to the tendencies of the ruling power; a protection, a
rallying point for opinions and interests which the ascendant public opinion
views with disfavour. For want of such a point d'appui, the older societies,
and all but a few of the modern ones, either fell into dissolution or became
stationary (which means slow deterioration), through the exclusive predomi-
nance of a part only of the conditions of social and mental well-being. The
only quarter in which to look for a supplement or completing corrective to
the instincts of a democratic majority is the instructed minority, but in the
ordinary mode of constituting democracy this minority has no organ; Mr.
Hare's system provides one. The representatives who would be returned to
Parliament by the aggregate of minorities would afford that organ in its
greatest perfection. A separate organization of the instructed classes, even if
practicable, would be invidious, and could only escape from being offensive by
being totally without influence. But if the elite of these classes formed part
of the Parliament by the same title as any other of its members, by repre-
senting the same number of citizens, the same numerical fraction of the
national will, their presence could give umbrage to nobody, while they
would be in the position of highest vantage both for making their opinions
and counsels heard on all important subjects, and for taking an active part
in public business. Their abilities would probably draw to them more than
their numerical share of the actual administration of Government, as the
Athenians did not confide responsible public functions to Cleon or Hyper-
bolus the employment of Cleon at Pylus and Amphipolis was purely excep-
tional but Niceas and Theramenes and Alcibiades were in constant employ-
ment, both at home and abroad, though known to sympathise more with
oligarchy than with democracy. The instructed minority would in the actual
voting count only for their numbers, but as a moral power they would count
for much more in virtue of their knowledge and of the influence it would
give them over the rest. An arrangement better adapted to keep popular
opinion within reason and justice, and to guard it from the various deteriorat-
ing influences which assail the weak side of democracy, could scarcely by
human ingenuity be devised. A democratic people would in this v.
be pro-
vided with what in any other way it would almost certainly miss-leaders of
a grade of intellect and character better than itself. Modern democracy would
have its occasional Pericles, and its habitual group of superior and guiding
minds. With all this array of reasons of the most fundamental character
on the affirmative side of the question, what is there on the negative?
Nothing that will sustain examination when people can once be induced to
:
APPENDICES.
313
bestow any real examination upon a new thing. Those, indeed, if any such
there be, who under pretence of equal justice aim only at substituting the
class ascendancy of the poor for that of the rich, will, of course, be unfavour-
able to a scheme which places both on a level."' The hon. member ad-
dressed himself to the question of the suffrage for the Council roll. He had
been asked why they did not adopt the ballot? He had been anxious for
something of the kind in first drafting his Bill; but it might be said in reply
that Mr. Hare's system was itself so superior that it would not conform to the
ballot, to secret voting in its essence; but still there was so much of the
ballot that there could be no violence, no influence used at the time of
voting, which the ballot sought to avoid. He moved that the Bill be read
a second time.
Mr. PLUNKETT seconded the motion; and after some observations by
Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Merewether, Mr. Brown Russell, and the Attorney-
General, the debate was adjourned.
The above report, omitting the argument on the other
portions of the Bill, is taken from the Sydney Morning
Herald for Thursday the 4th September, 1862. The report
of the discussion on the next day has not come to hand, which
is the more to be regretted, as the Bill appears to have been
opposed by one member, Captain Ward, who would seem from
the subsequent report to have addressed himself especially to
this method of election, and to have contended, 1, that it
would not be a guarantee for the representation of majorities
and minorities in just and equal proportion, putting forward
in support of that argument, substantially the problem sug-
gested in Denmark, in which E with 101 third votes is
elected, while B, with 299 second and 200 third votes, fails
(See Appendix D, p. 302); 2, that mere single voting would
be a better method without the contingent vote; and 3, that
the loss of votes, owing to a large number of electors polling
for the favourite candidates, might be obviated by publication
of the state of the poll from time to time.
Wednesday, 17th September, 1862. The debate was resumed by Mr.
MEREWETHER. He did not admit that popular election of an Upper Cham-
ber was better than a selection by the ministers of the Crown, with proper
restrictions, to prevent á creation of members to carry particular measures.
If the Lower House was the people's Chamber, the Upper should be the
314
APPENDICES.
Chamber of statesmen, composed of public men who had passed through
great political offices and employments. Addressing himself to the election
clauses, &c., he could not refrain from referring to the manner in which his
hon. friend Mr. Butler had misunderstood both Mr. Hare and Mr. Mill on
this subject. The hon. member had complained that the committee had mu-
tilated Hare's scheme by rejecting manhood suffrage. But Mr. Hare's
scheme had nothing to do with manhood suffrage; it was, in fact, devised
for England, where, happily, manhood suffrage did not exist. But Mr.
Hare's scheme was nothing more than a mode of voting applicable alike to
any constituency. He had weighed the Bill under a deep sense of their
responsibility to the future, and he supported it not as a perfect measure, but
as one which it would be wise in them to pass, and as one which they might
pass without prejudice to the future policy of the country.
After discussion on other parts of the Bill,-
Mr. HOLDEN replied.-The first objection of Captain Ward arose from a
misapprehension of the principle and object of the contingent votes. Their
entry on the voting paper was apt to be misunderstood as a departure from
the system of single voting, whereas it was merely an expedient to prevent
the single vote from being thrown away on a candidate who did not require
it. It merely indicated for whom the elector would desire to give his vote,
if on his coming to the poll he were told, "Mr. A., for whom you intend to
vote, is already elected by a full quota, and you are therefore at liberty to aid in
the election of another." It was not a second vote, and should be regarded
as if it were non-existent, or written in invisible ink, until effect was given
to it in consequence of the primary vote not being required. Then it has
all the effect of a primary vote. Such being the case, it was evident that no
candidate whose name was second on any voting paper has any claim what-
ever to consideration on this account if the first-named candidate received
the vote as a part of his quota. It was a mere indication that the elector
would have voted for him if he had not used his vote for another in prefer-
ence. A vote given by an elector to B, because his greater favourite A did
not require it, was as good a vote as the vote of another elector, who
esteemed B as superior to A. Now if these two considerations were borne
in mind, all the objections raised by his hon. friend Captain Ward to the
method of allotting contingent votes, on the ground of supposed injustice to
candidates, fell to the ground. It was wholly the concern of the voter, and
if he had secured the privilege of rendering his vote-his one vote-effec-
tual for some one candidate of his choice, no other candidate was entitled to
complain. Surely nothing could be more ridiculous than that a candidate
should complain of it as a hardship that he is not allowed to derive any ad-
vantage from the votes of electors whose votes had returned another, because
they would have voted for him if they had not voted for that other person.
But although no candidate had any greater right than another to influence
APPENDICES.
315
1
the selection of the voting papers which were to be taken as the surplus
beyond any candidate's quota, general policy required some rules, and these
have been applied. The first rule was to select those on which the greatest
number of contingent votes were entered. The reason of this was obvious.
The greater the number of names entered, the less likely was the vote to be
lost in the election. After this rule had been applied, Mr. Hare had intro-
duced a great number of complicated rules, which he had rejected for the
sake of greater simplicity. All that appeared necessary to him was, to pro-
vide some rule which should preclude any selection of papers by the regis-
trar, through personal or political motives. A political motive could,
indeed, hardly apply, because the question would not be (as now, in ordinary
elections) between candidates of different parties, but those of a second
choice of two electors of the same party, which of two voters for A should
have a second choice, because A did not require both votes. An equality of
chance was the only impartial course to be adopted, and the most convenient
mode of accomplishing this seemed to be the taking the votes in the order
in which they happened to stand on the roll; and, notwithstanding it was
characterised by the hon. and learned Attorney-General as absurd and ridi-
culous, he would venture to abide by it until some wiser and better plan
were suggested; when that were done, he was perfectly ready to consider
and adopt it. The hon. member (Captain Ward) said that under this
system A might be returned and B rejected by a course which had no
greater merit than the system of tossing up. This was a very narrow and
fallacious view of the case. The system was a matter altogether distinct from
the tossing up. True, it might be that in the working of the system, as in
that of any other, a state of facts might result in which there might be a
tie, or two or more parties might have equal claim to that which all could
not by the nature of the case obtain. A resort to some plan equivalent to
tossing up was in such case the only way out of the difficulty. But the
hon. member (Captain Ward) had not been content with criticising the
system of Mr. Hare. He has declared his preference for another. The
system of single voting without quotas and without contingent voting
appears to him preferable. It will, he says, protect minorities better.
Possibly it might do so; but in what manner and at what expense of con-
fusion and injustice towards majorities it might be worth while first to con-
sider. Taking his friend Captain Ward's illustrations in order, he would
answer his objections seriatim. In his first example, he complained that if
1, 2, 3 were taken to make A's quota, A and C would be returned, whereas
if 4, 5, and 6 be taken, A and B would be returned. He (Mr. Holden)
denied that this was any objection, unless either B had some claim superior
to A, or A superior to B. This not being shown, some form of decision by
lot was the just and proper course. If instead of an election by contingent
voting the votes had been taken by 1, 2, and 3 going to the poll first, and 4,
5, and 6-knowing how they had voted-going to the poll afterwards, and
voting for the candidates of their respective second choice, in consequence
316
APPENDICES.
of such knowledge, the candidate whose election was defeated by his not
receiving the vote of 1, 2, or 3 would have no ground of complaint, because
he would have received it had they voted last in order. With regard to the
second example, in which a greater claim was maintained on behalf of the
excluded candidate, on account of his having more primary votes, the fal-
lacy of the objection was equal, though of another kind. It was forgotten
that when the contingent votes were used, they had the same force as pri-
mary votes. The fact that an elector would have voted for A, if A had
wanted his vote, did not render his vote for B less valid, if it were not used
for A. Thus, the return of C, in example two, by contingent votes in excess
of B's primary votes, is quite legitimate. It was not because the vote was
called contingent when placed on the voting paper that it was contingent or
inferior when used. It has then become absolute, and of equal power with
the primary vote. It was the actual vote of one elector. The third
example turned upon the converse fallacy. Here contingent votes were
taken into account which had never taken effect. The objection assumed
that B was entitled to reckon, as influencing his claim to consideration, con-
tingent votes on voting papers actually used for a preceding candidate.
These were only votes which would have been given for B, but have not
been given in fact. They should be, therefore, considered as non-existent
for the purpose of the computation, and the objection would then utterly
vanish. This system of single voting, without the protection of Hare's
adjuncts, was that proposed in the Bill of the Forster Ministry; but as it
was never fully discussed, public attention was not attracted to the objec-
tions to which it was open, although they at that time very clearly pre-
sented themselves to his mind, and he was thereby more prepared to welcome
Mr. Hare's discovery as an escape from them. And his friend Captain
Ward hinted that some better plan than Mr. Hare's contingent voting
might answer all the purpose of this cumbrous system,-this better plan
being, as he understood, a public statement of the number of votes already
polled for candidates. If his honourable friend had said at once that he
proposed to supersede the necessity of a cumbrous system by a system of
voting through the electric telegraph, he could hardly have more astonished
him. If he would show in what manner his suggestion could be practically
carried out, he was willing to relinquish the field to him. The only merit
he claimed for Hare's system was that of doing in the most practicable way
which has hitherto been propounded. But what did the publication pro-
posed involve? First, that by some miracle of intuition all the polling-
officers in the colony were to be aware of the instant at which any candi-
date had acquired a sufficient number of votes in the aggregate to effect his
return. Secondly, that the polling be then simultaneously stopped, and
the fact published, the machinery of election being suspended until all
the electors are duly apprised. When, on this being effected, the election
recommenced, it could only go on until another candidate were elected,
when the polling would again stop, and the same proceedings would be
APPENDICES.
317
repeated until the electors were tired of travelling backwards and forwards
to the poll. If it were practicable to prevent votes being thrown away at
elections by any such publication as his hon. friend suggested, it would
surely have been long ago introduced in connection with the existing
system. It was no part of the avowed policy of the electoral law that
votes should be thrown away. It had only been tolerated, as an evil sup-
posed to be unavoidable, until Mr. Hare's invention had, for the first time,
supplied a remedy.
The second reading was carried by a majority of 11 to 4.
It was passed by the Legislative Council, and read a first
time in the Legislative Assembly. In that House, on the 13th
November, 1862, on the order of the day for the second
reading,—
Mr. WILSON, after addressing himself to the other questions, said he had
heard no one who had risen to speak attempt to defend the principle of one
electorate only, and the only question was, would it be at all tolerable even
under Hare's system?-though it was scarcely to be dreamt of that that
should be adopted here. He believed it to be too complicated for any
person to understand it; so much so, that he did not think there were ten
members in this House and the other who thoroughly understood it. [An
hon. member: "It is very simple."] Possibly it might be; but they had
the declaration of the Master of the Mint, who was no mean authority in
mathematical matters, that it was directly the reverse. For himself, he
would confess that he had not understood much of it when it was first
introduced into the Bill, but afterwards the explanations of the hon. gentle-
man who had proposed it had so mystified him, that he now knew less of it
than before.
Mr. MORRIS, after adverting to the franchise and other subjects, added,
the principle, however, most important in this Bill, whatever franchise might
be adopted, was the principle known as Hare's system-a system of election
by quotas. There had been great prejudices against this system, and it had
been frequently observed by hon. members that they could not understand
the practical working of it. He would explain to the House in a few
minutes that there was no mystery in connection with the practical applica-
tion of this principle. Hare's system was the only one by which represen-
tation according to numbers could possibly be secured. Under that system
a man carried his rights with him, and could exercise his power of voting in
whatever part of the colony he might be at the time of an election. If
the Upper House be composed of members returned for large districts,
it would, after all, be a mere reflex of the majority of the community; and
consequently, out of a community of 100,000 people, it might so happen
that 49,000 were not represented at all. But such a state of things could not
318
APPENDICES.
possibly arise under Mr. Hare's system. He wanted to know why these
49,000 persons were not to be represented? No reason had yet been given
why the majority of the people should have the whole of the representation.
This principle-which many hon. members were fond of exalting of
taxation and law-making by representatives, was practically ignored by the
system at present adopted; the majority alone of the community made the
laws and taxed the people.
Mr. Love did not think there would be any necessity for discussing Hare's
system, because the country was so thoroughly against it; and it was so im-
perfectly understood, that every one believed it would never become the law
of the land. He considered it to be a system that would never work well in
this country; it might look well in theory, but would be impracticable. Too
much power would be left in the hands of the Registrar-General, who could
almost return what members he pleased.
Mr. DALGLEISH, among other observations, said: As to the principles of
this Bill, he disagreed with them all, except the one pertaining to Hare's
system. He believed that no system of representation was so perfect, or so
capable of fully eliciting the will of the people as this which was called
Hare's. It was imposssble to define it fully in a speech, but any hon.
member who carefully examined it would see the truth of what he stated. The
hon. member (Mr. Harpur) had struck the only objection that he saw to the
system, in the suggestion as to two candidates having equal votes. The
effect of this would be to throw the election virtually into the hands of one
person. But the present and any other system was open to the same objec-
tion. Such an occurrence would, however, happen only very rarely. He
did not agree with the drawing by lot as proposed, but would prefer to have
the decision left to some impartial person, uninfluenced by personal consi-
derations, as a returning officer should at all times be. Hare's system, he
repeated, was the only true way of obtaining the will of the people, and by
having the whole colony formed into one great electorate, and all the elec-
tions taking place on the one day, every one could vote, while no person
could possibly vote in more than one electorate. He could not understand
how members of that House could say they preferred the present nominee
Chamber to an elective House under the Hare system. He was told, when
he asked how it was that hon. members could possibly express such an
opinion, that they justified the preference indicated on the ground that, in
the present state of things, there was the "swamping power" to fall back
He could not understand the force of such an argument as that.
upon.
Was it to be supposed, if a ministry, to insure a majority, should suddenly
create a number of new members, that an immediately-succeeding govern-
ment would be disposed to accept such a set of nominations? And if they
should not accept them, what was to be done? Was it not clear that their
only course in such a case would be to increase the number of members of
Council to a very large and indefinite extent, so that the influence of such a
Chamber might be practically nullified.
APPENDICES.
ersity
319
Mr. W. FORSTER, after explaining what had been proposed by a former
ministry, and discussing the general question of the construction of an
Upper Chamber, observed that representation of the average opinions of the
country was assumed to be arrived at under our present system. But how
was it proposed to produce that effect when there was only one electorate
returning six or seven members? [Mr. Harpur: By the progress of truth.]
Whatever faith the hon. member might have in the operation of truth (or
perhaps Providence was meant), it was their duty, as legislators, to have in their
institutions as little liability to error as possible, to prevent injurious and unjust
results. It was a palpable injustice when, in proposing to give the whole
country representation, a small majority of a constituency was given the
power of returning the whole of the members. That was a result we should
endeavour to guard against. He thought a majority of the House would
agree with him that this would be unfair, and not a representative in prin-
ciple at all-only one section was represented, having, it might be, only a
majority of three or four, to the entire disfranchisement of the other, at any
rate, for a certain period. He thought a result like that which must arise in
many instances ought to be guarded against by the institution they were
now endeavouring to perfect. He thought he had demonstrated that if the
principle of large electorates were admitted, they must alter the system of
voting. It was the fear that he and others entertained of this result which
led him to make, in the measure his administration introduced, a provision
by which an elector was allowed to vote for only one candidate. He ad-
mitted that that was an imperfect attempt, and he conceived that Hare's
system, so much spoken of in the present debate, went in the same direction,
but did the thing aimed at in a far more effective and just manner. They had
heard all sorts of denunciations, but not a single argument against that
system. Was it a reason that the House should reject this system, which
had obtained the attention and approval of thoughtful men, including one
honourable member well known to be extreme in his democratic notions,
because certain hon. members informed the House that they did not under-
stand it? Or did it follow that because hon. members did not understand
it the public would not understand it? It was called a conservative measure.
Now, according to his mind, it was one of the most democratic measures
ever proposed; it was a complete innovation upon old established principles.
It was conservative in the sense in which every reform was conservative,
because it seemed to him to conserve justice, being allied with truth and
equity, and thus conserving the very best interests for the people. That it
was conservative in the sense of obstruction, in the sense of the word "tory,"
or the maintenance of obsolete, oligarchical, or anti-democratic notions, he
denied; and no one who thoroughly considered its operations could enter-
tain such an opinion for a moment. They were told that it was unpopular-
that the people out of doors were against it. But the people out of doors had
not considered it; there had been no discussion or expression of opinion on
the part of the public to entitle any hon. member to come to that conclu-
320
APPENDICES.
sion. He thought it was a popular belief in the widest sense, though not in
the superficial sense of being approved of by the people, because they had
given no opinion upon it. But it was popular as being thoroughly demo-
cratic in its theory, and would prove democratic in its practice. It seemed
to be the idea of population carried out in principle; the principle of pro-
portion applied to numbers. In brief, he might say that at its roots were
the axiom that equal numbers should have equal representation. [Mr.
Harpur: Not as embodied in the Bill.] He admitted that the details were
imperfect; he was speaking of the principles of the system. So far as equality
could be attained, the system proposed that each equal portion of electors
should have an equal representation; and could the equity of the system be
better shown? How was it possible to find fault with a system that told off
the community into different sections, giving each a representative in pro-
portion to its numbers? [Mr. Harpur: Stereotyping faction.] This re-
mark contained no argument. Anything might be termed faction. Majorities
in the House, and even the Government themselves, had been termed a
faction, until people were tired of hearing it. This system was a mere me-
chanical provision, if anything like faction could be involved in that. He
believed he had been able to understand the system, after giving it a consi-
derable amount of attention, and he would endeavour to explain to the
House some of the features he had remarked in it, and which he thought
were in its favour. One objection he had heard against the system would
show the manner in which it was treated by honourable members.
It was
said, suppose a case in which 20,000 electors were to return ten members,
and supposing there were forty candidates, each having an equal number
of votes why, such a thing was simply impossible; or if possible it
was provided for by this system. The easiest way of putting the ques-
tion was, by supposing a case of one electorate where there was but one
returning officer. Supposing there were 10,000 votes to be given and ten
members to be returned. The quota was arrived at by a simple sum in
division, the number of electors being divided by the number of persons to
be elected. Thereby was obtained what was called a quota. It was not
arbitrary, but a definite proportion of the electors to the elected. [A voice:
How if less than the quota voted?] And here he took exception to the
phraseology of the Bill-the expressions "primary" and "contingent" not
being at all connected with the Hare system of voting. Strictly speaking,
there was but one vote. He was supposing a case where the electorate was
sufficiently limited to admit of one returning officer officiating. Say there
is a certain number of candidates to be elected-ten, for instance-and
there are 10,000 electors. In such case the quota will be 1000 votes. Well,
the returning officer receives votes up to 1000 for A and B. After that, if
any electors wish to vote for A and B, they are told the votes are not
required, and they then vote for C and D, or, if these candidates have also
obtained the quota, they are carried to E and F, or any others that the
electors approve of. [Mr. Harpur: But the votes are given on paper.] It
APPENDICES.
321
1
is not at all necessary. In this way, in a small electorate, the whole
number to be returned may be elected without the necessity of any great
expense, and without the need of much official machinery. But, of course,
when you came to apply the principle to extensive electorates, then this
official machinery became necessary, just as it was necessary at present. It
was not more liable to abuse than any other system. In all cases you must
necessarily depend on the integrity of individuals, and if they could not
repose confidence to this extent in their officials, the sooner we obtained a
despotism the better. But he (Mr. Forster) had no doubt on this score, and
he saw no difficulty whatever in applying this system, which embraced the
best possible means of securing a representation of opinions. It was argued
that persons might combine to secure the election of particular candidates.
But was there anything improper or undemocratic in that? Suppose the
Wesleyans, or the Roman Catholics, or any other body, desired to elect one
of their own number to represent them, was there anything wrong in their
combining in order to secure that end? He maintained there was not. On
the contrary, he contended it was quite in accordance with the true theory
of representation, which regarded the candidate as the representative of
opinions, and not of mere numbers. The more he considered the Hare
system, the more he admired it as calculated to secure democratic freedom.
He might be told that it destroyed responsibility. It destroyed responsi-
bility to local opinion, perhaps; but it held the representative amenable to
the general opinion of the country; for the holding of his position must
depend on his having gained the confidence and the respect of the common-
wealth of which he formed part. He (Mr. Forster) said, therefore, he had
no hesitation in giving in his adherence to the Hare system-a system
admirable for its simplicity, and one that did honour to its contriver in the
mother-country, and for the introduction of which the honourable gentle-
man who had brought it so prominently under notice here was entitled to
great credit.
Mr. HOSKINS would accept the single electorate, in combination with Hare's
system, which had the advantage of giving effect to every vote.
The pro-
vision for giving five votes to each elector was no part of Hare's system, and
should not have his support.
Mr. LUCAS was in favour of trying Hare's system; and, in so far as he
could understand it, he regarded it as being as simple and easy as the
present system. Nor did he think there was any possibility of a vote being
lost, as had been stated by one hon. member; for every man who voted must
tell for one member at all events; and if he put one name only on the
paper, then it would be the duty of the returning officer to first select those
papers which had one name only on them, so that the vote should not be
lost. The present bill differed somewhat from Hare's system, but he believed
that difference to be an improvement. Under the system the returning
officer collects the number of votes registered, and from that forms his quota.
Thus, if there were 30,000 clectors and thirty to be returned, he formed his
Σ
322
APPENDICES.
quota by dividing the one by the other; but if only 8000 electors voted, the
probability would be that the matter could not be worked out, inasmuch as
no one member would get a quota. According to the bill, however, the
returning officer took the number of votes actually recorded, and divided
them by the number of members to be returned, in order to obtain his
quota. In that way every man would have his vote used, without the pos-
sibility of loss. He believed the system to be a good one, and he would like
to see it tried; and as there was a bill to amend the Municipalities Act now
before the House, he thought a good opportunity was afforded of testing the
working of the system. He would be willing enough to apply it to the
Council elections if the bill were such a one that he could support.
Mr. R. FORSTER would remove from the bill the part relating to Hare's
system, for the simple reason that he did not understand it. It appeared to
be a very ingenious theory, but one that had never been brought into opera-
tion. The Government were bound to see that the bill, with the alterations
proposed, was passed by the Upper House, and was not again sent back to
us.
Mr. HOLT thought that the hon. member for New England (Mr. R.
Forster) might, if he would only take the pains, easily understand Mr. Hare's
system of representation. He would try to explain the matter to the hon.
member. The system would give every elector the opportunity of voting
just as if he knew the state of the poll. He would suppose that there were
twelve hundred electors, and that there were three vacancies; the quota in
that case would be four hundred. He would also suppose that the four
Ministers were the candidates. First of all, the electors would vote for Mr.
Cowper, who ought to be returned on account of his long services. Well,
when the number for Mr. Cowper was made up the elector would give his
vote for the Minister for Lands; and on Mr. Robertson's number being made
up he would give his vote for Mr. Arnold. Every elector had the opportunity
of doing what he would do if the polling booths had glass windows. Al-
though the clauses were drawn up in legal phraseology, they were when
examined easily intelligible. The instructions to the scrutineers were very
complete and explicit. He looked upon this bill as merely a skeleton mea-
sure, and in voting for the second reading it was with an anxious desire to
get this important matter settled. He did not, however, commit himself to
any of the details.
If he thought any bill could be so altered as to make it
a satisfactory measure, as he thought was the case with this bill, he would
support it. There was a good deal in the bill of which he quite approved,
and more especially that clause which contained Hare's invention, as it might
be termed.
Mr. STEWART said that, as to Hare's system, he must admit, from the oppor
tunities he had had of judging, it was his impression that nineteen-twen-
ticths of the community did not and would not, if it was passed, know how
to carry it into effect. He thought the present system, which enabled the
clectors at the close of the poll to know which was the successful candidate,
!
APPENDICES.
323
I
was the best that we could adopt, and with the ballot the elections had been
the most satisfactory that had taken place in the colony.
Mr. DANGAR and Mr. DICK addressed the House, and on a division the
second reading was carried by a majority of 24 against 20.—Sydney Morning
Herald, Friday, November 14th, 1802.
Soon after the debate the Ministry resigned, and the
measure proceeded no further.
APPENDIX G.
Parliament of Victoria, Wednesday, 4th March, 1863.
IN a Bill for the Amendment of the Electoral Law of the
Colony, it was proposed to allow any voter of a consti-
tuency entitled to elect more than two members, to vote
for all the candidates which the constituency could elect,
or cumulate such votes on one or more of the candidates.
The discussion on this clause is fully reported in the
(Melbourne) Argus, Thursday, March 5, 1863, and some-
what more briefly in the (Melbourne) Age of the same day.
Mr. FRANCIS, to raise the discussion on the question, moved an amend-
ment rejecting the clause for cumulative voting, but without therefore
pledging himself to vote against it. He thought that if the clause passed, as
it stood, it would be an instance of too rapid legislation in so young a colony.
He should like to see the principle first accepted elsewhere. He had not heard
of its introduction into the elections of members of the House of Commons.
The proposal of Lord John Russell had not been adopted. It was scarcely
adapted to a constituency returning less than three members, and was in-
applicable to a constituency returning only one. In such a constituency the
successful candidate might receive 1,100 votes, and the next on the poll
might have 1,095. Where, under this clause, would these 1,095 voters find
representation? This led him to think that the clause did not go far enough,
or, that it failed to provide a perfect mode of representing minorities.
He should be glad to hear arguments which would justify the Parliament of
Victoria in being the pioneer in such a legislative experiment.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL said the question had been left an open one by
the Government. When he introduced the bill the matter had not been
fully considered. Hare's book, with the commentaries upon it, had arrived
in the colony while the bill was being draughted. In the legislature of New
324
APPENDICES.
South Wales, a bill had already been introduced by Mr. Wentworth, giving
effect to Hare's system.
He thought it desirable that minorities
should be represented. Take a constituency with 2,100 voters. It seemed
very hard that a moiety of the constituency with one or two votes over should
have the power to send into Parliament a member to represent the whole of
the constituency, when nearly one half of them would not be represented.
It was said that it was wrong to make the experiment now, when it had not
been adopted by the Imperial Parliament. He had great respect for the
House of Commons, but, if the principle was a philosophical one, the fact of
its not being introduced at home was no reason why it should not be tried
here. It was also urged that it was not a perfect principle, but it was use-
less to aim at perfection, for some fraction of the minority must always be un-
represented.
Mr. HEALES objected to the attempted application of the principle to
particular districts only. There was no class of the community to whom he
would give advantages which others could not enjoy. If the power of concen-
trating their votes should be given to the voters of certain districts it would be
unjust, and give one set of voters an unfair advantage over others. He
was opposed, moreover, to the principle of the representation of minorities.
Mr. J. T. SMITH opposed the clause. In the district which he repre-
sented three members were returned, and the effect of the clause would be
injurious to it. Were it divided into three portions, and each part allowed
a member, it might be represented as a whole; but to give an inconsiderable
minority, perhaps not numbering one-twelfth of the whole body of electors,
the privilege of returning a member who would vote in opposition to the other
two, was practically to reduce the representation of the district to a single
member.
Mr. Wood said that if the Legislature once laid down a correct principle
that was a very important thing, even though it were attended with no great
practical results. He was not affected by the argument that this was a small
experiment, applying to four constituencies only. It was for the political
philosopher to lay down a great scheme, and it was for the practical man to
test that scheme. The hon. member for East Bourke had said that minori-
ties did occasionally return representatives, even under the existing system,
by what was commonly called plumping. This was, however, a mere matter
of chance; it could only happen where the majority was divided. The same
hon. member had also told the committee that under the present system
there was a representation of a variety of opinions; that the colony was
divided into various interests-mining, agricultural, and town interests; but
the hon. member seemed to have overlooked the fact that the same class
might be predominant in every instance--that the majority, in every instance,
might hold the same set of political opinions. To take the question of
protection, for example. There might, probably, be a majority in the towns
in favour of protection; and they all knew that in the agricultural consti-
tuencies, the farmers, and probably the labourers, were also in favour of
APPENDICES.
325
protection. In the mining districts, no doubt, there was a majority against
protection. It was clear, however, that even on the question of protection
there would be a majority in favour of protection in two classes of consti-
tuencies, although those two classes might seem, at first sight, to have no
connexion whatever. The result of the present electoral system had been,
that there was a representation of interests, but not a representation of
opinions. He did not think that interests ought to be represented at all.
What, after all, was the representation of interests but the representation of
selfishness? Men's "interests," in the common meaning of the word, im-
plied that a certain number of persons belonging to the same sphere or the
same branch of industry thought their selfish interests would be advanced by
a certain course of legislation being pursued. That was not what ought to
be obtained in the selection of representatives; but if, as was the case, it was
found that the people of the colony held very different opinions, the object
ought to be to get as many as possible of those opinions represented. How
was the truth to be elicited but by hearing different opinions expressed by
those who were best able to put them forth in the Legislature? Every interest
in the colony might be represented, and yet nothing like a majority, or even a
fair proportion, of the opinions of the colony be represented. It had been
asked what practical advantages would follow the adoption of the principle of
the clause? Great advantages would follow it, if it were carried out system-
atically. All classes of opinions, or, at all events, all those opinions which
commanded the assent of any considerable portion of the colony, would be
represented in that House, and all sides of any question would be heard.
Whatever Ministry had been in office, he believed that it had not represented,
in any degree, opinions, and the consequence had been to degrade the
politics of the colony. Instead of being supported on the ground of its
opinions, the Ministry had always been supported on personal grounds or
interests; and either a Ministry or an Opposition, supported on those
grounds, did not tend to raise the character of the Legislature. In the con-
stituencies of Collingwood and St. Kilda, large minorities were defeated on
every contest. The result of all elections had been that the minority was
politically annihilated. This was calculated to lead to political inaction.
The minority, feeling themselves powerless, would decline to take any part in
future elections. This was not a desirable state of things. It was not to
the interest of the colony that a large body of men should be led to feel that
it was useless for them to take any part in political contests. A gentleman
sitting behind him said, "Divide the constituencies." No doubt, in some
cases, one class of political opinions was predominant in one part of a district,
and another class of opinions was predominant in another part of the district.
This, however, was a mere accident; it was one which was not likely to
continue, and above all, it was one upon which no stable system of legislation
ought to be based. The Legislature ought to endeavour to give the minority
a fair share of the representation in every locality. It had been said that the
four constituencies ought to be consulted by their representatives before the
326
APPENDICES.
change. If it were proposed to place them under some disability, it might
be reasonable to ask their opinion, but he really could not see what ground
they had for being consulted, when it was proposed to confer on them a
privilege not extended to other constituencies. Moreover, it was contrary to
the very principle to consult the constituencies, for it was the opinion of the
majority which would have to be asked, while the principle of the clause was
the representation of the minority. He could refer to subjects which had
been agitated from time to time in the colony; and, without disrespect to any
members, he would say that candidates had been driven of necessity occasion-
ally to conceal their opinions, or, at all events, to put a gloss upon them.
(“Oh!"). No doubt there might be a class of persons who had not been driven
to that—who, having no opinions of their own, merely endeavoured to ascer-
tain the opinions of a majority, in order to subscribe to those opinions; and
he admitted that that class of persons had had no violence done to their
opinions. (Laughter.) From time to time a few active persons banded
themselves together to agitate for certain changes in the law. When the
Constitution was inaugurated, many persons were anxious for the repeal of
the clause which authorised a grant of £50,000 a year for religious purposes;
and in almost every constituency where these persons had been at all
successful candidates were driven to say either that they would vote for the
immediate abolition of state aid to religion, or that they would not oppose
the principle, although they thought the grant ought to be continued for
some years longer; and yet all this time there was a very large minority
entirely opposed to the theory. (Hear.) Then, with regard to the land ques-
tion, there had been from time to time a vast amount of agitation, and
persons had been obliged to give up the opinions they entertained, or, at all
events, simulate opinions which they did not hold, in order to be returned.
But it would have conduced more to the character of the Legislature if these
persons had been able to come honestly and openly forward, and say—“We
are opposed to the prevailing theories on the land question; we admit we
are unable, in consequence, to command the support of the majority, but we
appeal to the minority of the constituencies, who, we are sure, agree with
us." (Hear.) Electors would not be driven to take advantage of the clause un-
less they pleased. (Hear.) Theoretically speaking, the chief objection to the
clause was, that it did not apply to the whole colony-that it was limited to
four constituencies. But, if the system worked well, it could be extended.
Constituencies now returning two members could be so enlarged as to return
three; and constituencies at present returning only one member each could be
amalgamated, so that the united electoral district should have three repre-
sentatives. In all countries where legislation had been really progressive,
it had been tentative. An experiment was tried on a small scale, and when
found to work well the principle was extended. (Hear.)
Mr. HIGINBOTHAM, after dealing with the objection that the clause would
give the power of combined action to particular sects of politicians, and the
argument as to the possibility of representing all opinions, expressed him-
APPENDICES.
327
1
self hostile to the proposed measure. If the government had proposed
Hare's system in its entirety, he would gladly have assented to the proposition;
but for other and far more important reasons than the representation of minori-
ties; but it merely suggested the adoption in a mangled form of one feature
of the system applied to four particular constituencies, and for which he had
heard nothing urged which had any weight on his mind.
Mr. DUFFY said that the present clause was copied from the bill pre-
viously introduced by the member for Portland, to whom Mr. Mill had
written to express his gratification that a representation of minorities was
to be attempted. The principle of such a representation was the result of the
best and most philosophical opinions. He adverted to Lord John Russell's
proposal in the bill of 1854, and the interruption to the progress of reform
caused by the Crimean War, and addressed himself especially to the argu-
ments with regard to the force which might be acquired by the professors of
religious or political opinions.
Mr. Woods, admitting that, theoretically, it was correct that minorities
should be represented, said the bill did not carry the principle out. It was
possible that some opinions might not be represented in the House, but this
was an evil which could not be obviated: they must stop somewhere, or else
a minority of one intelligent voter might demand to be represented.
Mr. O'SHANASSY appealed to members, in considering this question on
the high ground from which it deserved to be reviewed, to discard from
their minds all thoughts of the effect of the clause upon local political
parties. If they did so, whatever the present conclusion might be, the
discussion could not be fruitless, for it would tend to educate the community.
After replying to arguments of preceding speakers, he expressed his belief
that the more the question was discussed and examined the more likely it
was that at a future day a full system of representation would be brought
forward by some government possessing the confidence of the country.
He did not know any country in the world in which such a system could be
more judiciously tried than in Victoria, a colony accustomed from its infancy
to the exercise of political privileges. He hoped to see the day when public
opinion would be so enlightened that, no longer seen through the narrow
medium of local or sectarian jealousies, this most equitable scheme would
be adopted with the full approbation of all thinking and right-minded
persons.
Mr. BERRY opposed the clause. If the question of minorities were to
be dealt with, it should be considered in all its bearings, and not upon a
clause by which the principle was introduced in a mangled form. Hare's
proposition was not before the House.
Captain M MAHON regarded the representation of minorities as opposed
to the great principle of constitutional government- the rule of the
majority.
Mr. L. L. SMITH predicted that the adoption of such a clause would lead
to anarchy, like that in America.
328
APPENDICES.
Mr. COHEN and Mr. ORR also opposed it in its principle.
Mr. FRANCIS, having referred to Hare's book, quoted the observations it
contained on the minority clause in the English bill of 1854. (Pp. 14, 15.)
Mr. LEVI supported, and Mr. MCLELLAN, Mr. RAMSAY, and Mr. HOUSTON,
opposed the clause.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL replied.
The clause was ultimately negatived.
APPENDIX H.
THIS system was discussed in Frankfort in 1861, 1863, and
1864. See Die Zeit, 10th December, 1861; Frankfurter
Reform, 15th May, 20th May, 24th May, and 31st May,
1863. The Frankfurter Reform of the 29th January,
1864, contains the following article by Dr. Gustav Getz,
on the application of the system to the elections to the
Legislative body (Gesetzgebenden Versammlung) of the
City of Frankfort.
Zum Wahlgesetz.
Wenn das Dach unseres Hauses in Brand steht, sind wir wenig geneigt,
an die zweckmässigste Einrichtung unseres Wohnzimmers zu denken;
wenn die Geschicke des Gesammt-Vaterlandes einer verlängnissvollen
Entscheidung entgegeneilen, fühlen wir wenig Stimmung für Beschäfti-
gung, mit Localfragen. Dennoch rückt der Zeitpunkt immer näher, an
welchem die Verfassungsfrage und mit ihr ein neues Wahlgesetz auf die
Tagesordnung unserer gesetzgebenden Versammlung kommen werden.
Im Hinblick hierauf haben gerade jetzt die Herren Drs. Varrentrapp und
Burnitz eine Methode veröffentlicht, durch welche sowohl der Mehrheit
als der Minderheit eine ihrer Stärke entsprechende Zahl von Vertretern
gesichert werden soll. Es ist hier nicht der Ort, in mathematische Er-
örterungen einzugehen. Von einer kundigeren Feder soll anderwärts
nachgewiesen werden, dass die am Schlusse des Schriftchens aufgestellten
mathematischen Formeln auf willkürlichen, nur in seltenen Fällen
zutreffenden Annahmen beruhen, dass jedoch in manchen Fällen diese
Methode, nicht wie die beiden Verfasser annahmen, ein mathematisch
exactes, aber ein approximativ befriedigendes Resultat ergibt. Uebrigens
beruht es auf einem Irrthum, wenn diese Methode sich als eine neue
ankündigt. Dieselbe findet sich bereits in dem von den Verfassern
1
APPENDICES.
329
citirten Hare'schen Werke pag. 212 erwähnt (thus, the vote at the head of
the paper as 1 should be equal to 2 second votes, 5 fifth votes, and so on);
freilich ist sie daselbst verworfen, als den Zwecken, die Hare ins Auge
gefaszt hatte und die weit über die blosse Vertretung der Minorität hinaus-
reichen, nicht entsprechend. Wenn die Verfasser sich dennoch zur
Aufstellung ihrer Methode veranlasst sehen und dabei bemerken, das
Hare'sche System habe bisher mehr Gegner als Vertheidiger gefunden, so
ist uns unklar, was so einsichtige Männer mit einer solchen Aeuszerung
bezwecken? Ist unter den Gegnern etwa die grosse Masse derer, welche
alles Neue anzweifeln, verstanden? Auf diese werden sie gewiss keinen
Werth legen. Wollen sie die Stimmen aber wägen und nicht zählen, so
hat vor Allem ein deutscher Staatsmann, dessen Autorität ilmen hochsteht,
R, v. Mohl, das Hare'sche System bald nach seinem Erscheinen geradezu
mit dem Ei des Columbus verglichen. Englische Staatsmänner haben es
thatsächlich gebilligt und fast ganz unverändert in den Colonien, wo die
Verhältnisse einer Neugestaltung günstig waren, einzuführen gesucht.
[The article here adverts to the Bills introduced into the Parliaments of Sydney
and Melbourne.]
Wir wollen den Leser nicht durch andere Beweise ermüden; wir freuen
uns zu sehr, diese beiden Männer nach demselben Ziele hinstreben zu
sehen, als dass wir eine nutzlose Polemik zu provociren gewillt sein
könnten. Für Frankfurt wird ebenso wenig die Einführung ihrer Methode,
als die unabgeänderte Einführung des Hare'schen Systems in's Auge
gefasst werden; aus dem einfachen Grunde, weil sowohl nach ihrer
Methode, als auch bei der Hare'schen, eine verhältnissmässig allzukleine
Anzahl von Personen einen Vertreter ernennen könnte. Bei 3600 Stim-
menden und 90 zu wählenden, könnten nach beiden Wahlarten je 40
Mann, die zu einer Partei vereinigt wären, einen Vertreter durchsetzen.
Bei dieser Sachlage bedarf es der Modificationen, und solche lassen sich
sehr leicht in schützender Weise treffen, wenn man die Gesetzentwürfe
nachahmt, welche in Genf sowohl vom Advokaten Charles Bellamy, als
von Hrn. A. Morin (De la Représentation des Minorités, par A. Morin.
Genève, chez Jules Fick, 1862) vorgeschlagen worden sind. Mit den für
Frankfurt anzubringenden Abänderungen hätte das Wahlgesetz, falls man
die Zahl der städtischen Mitglieder des gesetzgebenden Körpers auf 90
festgesetzt, zu bestimmen:
1. Jedem Wähler steht frei, bei der Wahl für den gesetzgebenden
Körper einen Wallzettel, auf welchem 90 wählbare Bürger verzeichnet
sind, in die verschlossene Stimmurne zu werfen und ist es gestattet, sich
sowohl gedruckter als geschriebener Wahlzettel zu bedienen.
2. Jeder Partei oder Vereinigung von Gesinnungsgenossen steht das
Recht zu, mindestens 3 Tage vor der Wahl einen Wallzettel, auf welchem
90 wählbare Bürger verzeichnet sind, als Wahlvorschlag bei der Stadt-
kanzlei einzureichen.
Nur also eingereichte Wahlzettel (für welche bei der alsbald erfolgenden
330
APPENDICES.
Wahlhandlung von wenigstens 200 Wählern gestimmt worden ist *), haben
Anspruch auf eine dem Zahlenverhältniss aller Abstimmenden ent-
sprechende Zahl von Vertretern.
3. Diese Zahl wird ermittelt wie folgt:
a) Nachdem alle Stimmzettel abgegeben worden sind, setzt das Bureau
die Stimmenzahl fest, welche für die Zutheilung eines Vertreters
erforderlich ist. Diese Normalzahl ist ein 90tel (190) aller Stim-
menden. Brüche werden nicht gerechnet.
b) So oft die Normalzahl in der Zahl der für einen Wahlvorschlag
unabgeändert abgegebenen Stimmzettel enthalten ist, so viele Ver-
treter werden diesem Wahlzettel zugetheilt. Die Zutheilung erfolgt
nach der Reihenfolge, in welcher die Namen der zu Wählenden auf
den Wahlzetteln verzeichnet sind.
c) Namen, welche auf mehreren Wahlvorschlägen verzeichnet sind,
gelten als von selbst gewählt, ohne dass dies die verhältnissmässige
Vertretung der Listen, auf welchen sie stehen, beeinträchtigte.
4. Bleiben nach dieser verhältnissmässigen Zutheilung noch Mitglieder
zu wählen, so werden diese nach der relativen Majorität aller abgegebenen
Stimmen erwählt.
Ein solches Gesetz würde sich an die bisherige Uebung anschliessen,
und nur rechtlich organisiren, was bisher stets thatsächlich stattgefunden
hat; dass nämlich die Mehrzahl mit Parteizetteln, aber immer auch viele
Bürger mit selbst verfassten Zetteln stimmen.
Es gäbe aber nicht jeder kleinen Colonie, vielmehr nur solchen Vereini-
gungen ein Recht auf verhältnissmässige Vertretung, welche wenigstens
200 Bürger für sich hätten. Es lässt keine Stimme verloren gehen, wahrt
vielmehr denen, welche keiner Vereinigung angehören, dasselbe Recht,
welches sie bisher besessen haben. Würden z. B. 3600 Bürger stimmen;
die Partei A hätte einen Wahlvorschlag eingereicht, die Partei B gleich-
falls. Für A hätten 1800, fiir B hätten 900 Wäller gestimmt und 900 sog.
wilde Stimmzettel fänden sich in der Wahlurne: so wäre die Normalzahl
3600 dividirt durch 90 also 40. Die Partei A erhielte ihre 45 erstverzeich-
neten, die Partei B ihre 22 erstverzeichneten Vertreter, und die übrigen
Vertreter, sowie die Suppleanten, würden wie bisher nach der relativen
Majorität aller abgegebenen Stimmen erwählt. Auch an diesem Vorschlag
mag noch manches zu ändern und zu bessern sein. Doch erscheint er uns
als praktisch in Vermeidung aller bisher gerügten Misslichkeiten. Wir
empfehlen ihn desshalb der Prüfung unserer Mitbürger.
G. G.
* Die Zahl 200 ist willkürlich gegriffen. Die eingeschaltete Bestim-
mung fehlt in den Genfer Entwürfen, ist hier aber aus dem oben ange-
führten Grund als Cautel nothwendig.
APPENDICES.
331
Extracts from the Bericht des Ausshusses zur Berathung
über Abänderungen der Verfassung, Friday, February 12,
1864.
Die Wahlart ist die directe. Die Stadt und Sachsenhausen bilden einen
Wahlbezirk. Jeder Wähler gibt einen Zettel mit 84 Stimmen ab. Gewählt
ist, wer 350 Stimmen erhält. Auf jedem Zettel gelten nur drei Namen
und zwar zunächst die drei obersten, dann die folgenden der Reihe nach,
wenn die vorhergehenden bereits 3500 Stimmen auf sich vereinigt haben.
Die Wähler geben ferner in eine zweite Urne einen weiteren Zettel mit
je 60 Namen für die Suppleanten. Diese werden nach relativer Stimmen-
mehrheit sämmtlicher Abstimmenden erwählt und zwar der meistbe-
stimmte als erster Suppleant u. s. w. Werden bei der ersten Abstimmung
nicht sämmtliche S4 Mitglieder für den gesetzgebenden Körper erwählt,
so treten die meistbestimmten Suppleanten als wirkliche Mitglieder in den
gesetzgebenden Körper ein.
DR. E. PASSAVANT.
Friday, March 25, 1864.
M. MAY. Die wichtigste Frage, welche wir zu entscheiden haben, ist
diese: ob die gesammte Bürgerschaft, oder nur eine geschickt operirende
Minderheit hier vertreten sein soll. Hr. Dr. Passavant hat einen Modus
vorgeschlagen, der auch den Minderheiten eine verhältnissmässige Vertre-
tung sichern will, und diesem Princip stimme ich vollständig bei, wenn ich
auch die Modalitäten der Ausführung noch dahin gestellt sein lasse.
Vorerst aber handelt es sich überhaupt nur um die Entscheidung über das
Princip, und ich stelle daher den Antrag:
Bei der Stimmenzählung ist so zu verfahren, dass die Minderheit
eine Vertretung nach der Anzahl ihrer Stimmen im Verhältniss zur
Gesammtzahl der abgegebenen Stimmen finde.
Die Versammlung soll der möglichst treue Ausdruck der Bürgerschaft
sein, und dazu ist es erforderlich, dass die verschiedenen in der Bürger-
schaft waltenden Ausichten ihren Ausdruck auch in der Versammlung
finden. Die indirekte Wahl läszt nur die Ansicht einer Partei zur
Geltung kommen, und das ist der Hauptgrund der geringen Betheiligung
an den Wahlen, denn wer der bekannten Majorität nicht angehört, enthält
sich lieber ganz der Wahl, da er doch nichts erzielen kann.
Dr. KUGLER. Es hat sich eine entschiedene Abneigung gegen die
indirekten Wahlen gebildet, und ihre Miss-stände sind auch nicht zu
verkennen. Nun aber frägt es sich, welche Art der direkten Wahlen den
Vorzug verdient. Es gibt hier drei Wege: 1) nur einen Wahlbezirk--da
wären die indirekten Wahlen noch vorzuziehen; 2) geographisch abge-
steckte Wahlbezirke-was schon besser ist; und endlich 3) freiwillige
Wahlbezirke, das heisst, es wird bestimmt, dass wenn so und so viel
Bürger sich zur Wahl eines Mitgliedes vereinigen, ist es gewählt. Dieser
332
APPENDICES.
Modus allein entspricht der Billigkeit und sichert der Minderheit die ihr
gebührende Vertretung.
Dr. FULD ist gleichfalls für diese freiwilligen Wahlbezirke oder die
verhältnissmässige Vertretung der Bürgerschaft. Wozu haben wir eine
Mehrzahl von Vertretern, wenn es nicht ist, um die verschiedenen, in der
Bürgerschaft waltenden Ansichten zum Ansdruck zu bringen? Hätte nur
die Majorität das Recht auf Vertretung, dann genügte es zu diesem Zweck
vollkommen, nur Einen zu schicken. Es gibt ebenso eine Tyrannei der
Majorität, wie eine Tyrannei der Despoten. Jedes Wahlsystem, welches nur
eine Vertretung der Majorität zulässt, ist eine solche Tyrannei. Der
Ausspruch der Bürgerschaft, das Vorherrschen der wirflichen Majorität der
Bürgerschaft in der Versammlung, und die Vertretung auch der Minder-
heitsansichten, das sind die Bedingurgen eines guten Wahlgesetzes. Diesen
Anforderungen entspricht mit Ausnahme des von Dr. Passavant gestellten
Antrags, keiner der Vorschläge, am wenigsten aber das indirecte Wahlsys-
tem; ebenso gut könnte man sagen, drei Männer sollen sämmtliche Abge-
ordneten wählen. Es ist ein Misstrauensvotum gegen die Bürgerschaft.
Dr. Müller's Vorschlag geht hiervon ab, behält aber die Tyrannei der
Majorität bei und verhindert sogar, dass auch nur, wie bei den indirekten
Wahlen, durch die Gnade der herrschenden Partei Andersdenkende
hereinkämen. Dr. Neukirchs Vorschlag strebt schon darnach, die Minorität
zum Ausdruck zu bringen, allein die Abgränzung von Wahlbezirken ist
ganz wohl ausführbar in einem grösseren Lande, nicht so aber in einer Stadt.
Ferner ist nicht zu übersehen, dass bei den einfachen Bezirkswahlen die
Majorität in der ganzen Bürgerschaft der Minorität unterliegen kann. Nur
Eins ist sicher und gerecht: ein Wallmodus, welcher den verschiedenen
Ansichten eine proportionnelle Vertretung gewährt.
Dr. PASSAVANT. Hier ist das Volk souverän, wir leben in einer demo-
kratischen Republik. Der Grundzug derselben ist, dass das Volk selbst
seine Angelegenheiten führt. So war es in Griechenland, so ist es noch in
den Urkantonen der Schweiz. Nachdem dies unausführbar geworden, hat
man zur Vertretung gegriffen; diese aber soll den Grundgedanken möglichst
wiedergeben, sie soll ein Abbild der Landgemeinde im Kleinen sein. Lässt
man nun blos die Majorität zu, so verschliesst man allen Andern den Mund,
die ehedem, in der allgemeinen Volksversammlung, ihre Meinung geltend
machen konnten, und dazu hat man kein Recht. Es ist dies aber nicht nur
ungerecht, sondern auch unklug, denn es fordert die Unterdrückten heraus,
sich auf anderem Wege die ihnen zukommende Geltung zu verschaffen und
bedroht daher fortwährend die Sicherheit des Staates. Bisher war die Ma-
jorität, den Mangel des Wahlgesetzes fühlend, so vorsichtig gewesen, immer
selbst einige Anhänger der Minorität in die Versammlung zu bernfen; bei
der directen Wahl in nur einem Bezirt wird auch das unmöglich, und der
Minorität bleibt gar keine Vertretung. Die von mir aufgestellten Zahlen
sind nicht wesentlich, es handelt sich zunächst nur um das Princip, dass der
Minderheit cine verhältnissmässige Vertretung zuerkannt werde.
APPENDICES.
333
Dr. MÜLLER. In der Landgemeinde würde immer die Majorität den
Ausschlag geben; da nun aber die Landgemeinde nicht zusammen kommen
kann und eine Vertretung wählen muss, so ist es ganz in der Ordnung,
dass auch die Majorität diese beruft. Die Minorität kann auch in der
Landgemeinde nicht mehr als ihre Ansicht aussprechen, dazu ist ihr jetzt in
der freien Presse das Mittel geboten. Das Hare'sche System der Minder-
heitsvertretung ist so complicirt und künstlich, dass die Wähler es nicht
verstehen werden. Sie sollen 84 Namen aufschreiben, von denen doch nur
3 zällen; das dürften nur Wenige begreifen. Die directe Wall in Einem
Wahlbezirk ist das Einfachste und unsern Verhältnissen Entsprechendste.
Dr. NEUKIRCH. Die indirekte Wahl scheint selbst von Denen aufgegeben,
die sie in der Commission mit aller Energie vertheidigten. Sie gehört nur
in das Arsenal der Reaktion, die auch stets das direkte Wahlsystem durch
das indirekte verdrängt hat. Obwohl ich dieser Hauptfrage gegenüber auf
die von mir beantragten Wahlbezirke nur einen sekundären Werth lege, so
glaube ich doch, dass durch diese Dasjenige, was von anderer Seite erstrebt
wird, am kürzesten zu erreichen sei. Die Erfahrung anderwärts hat
gezeigt, dass nie eine Partei in allen Wahlbezirken durchdringt, und so
würden wir auch hier durch solche Abtheilungen den einflussreicheren
Minderheiten eine Vertretung ermöglichen. Bei nur einem Wallbezirk
würde die Majorität Alles beherrschen.
Dr. Med. FRIEDLEBEN. Es liegt der eigenthümliche Fall vor, dass
ein sogenanntes Majoritätsgutachten eingebracht ist, dessen Vaterschaft
von Allen verläugnet wird. Es hat heute gar keinen Vertheidiger
gefunden. Ein zweiter Vorschlag geht dahin, dass die Minorität in der
Bürgerschaft auch ihre Vertretung finden solle. Wo aber ist diese Mino-
rität? Die Minorität kann nur so weit eine Vertretung verlangen,
als ihre Candidaten mehr Stimmen haben, als gewisse Candidaten der
Majorität. Man sagt: sie müsse doch auch gehört werden. Nun wohl,
die Vertreter der Minderheit in der Constituante haben einzig nur intriguirt,
und die jetzigen Vertreter der Minderheit in dieser Versammlung haben
während der ganzen Debatten über die so wichtige Verfassungsfrage noch
kein Wort gesprochen. Warum geben sie ihre Ansicht nicht kund? Das
Bestreben der Minderheit kann immer nur sein, die Mehrheit zu werden.
Wir haben uns jetzt nur über das Princip auszusprechen. Mit der Annahme
des Princips der direkten Wahlart ist Alles geschehen, was jetzt zu geschehen
hat, und ich beantrage, dass die Bestimmung über die näheren Modalitäten
der Wahl einem besonderen Gesetz vorbehalten bleibe, denn diese Moda-
litäten werden den wechselnden Bedürfnissen und Ansichten gemäss
Veränderungen erleiden, und es ist daher nicht gut, sie in die Verfassung
selbst mit aufzunehmen.
Dr. BRANNFELS. Ich stimme dem ganz bei. Der Anrag des Hrn. Dr. Passa-
vant ist ebensowohl unpraktisch, als unrichtig. Es erleidet keinen Zweifel,
dass wir direkte Wahlen bekommen werden. Wenn nun unser Staat aus
mehreren Provinzen oder Städten bestände, würde es wohl Niemand in den
334
APPENDICES.
Sinn kommen, das Hare'sche System vorzuschlagen. Bis jetzt hat es nur
bei den Antipoden, in Australien und am Cap der guten Hoffnung Eingang
gefunden. In einem grossen Staate ist es gar nicht durchzuführen.
Ueberhaupt, bis wohin soll sich denn die Vertretung der Minorität er-
strecken? Es kann doch nur Diejenige Anspruch darauf haben, welche
sich geltend macht. Die jetzige Majorität in dieser Versammlung ist auch
einmal die Minorität gewesen; sie war aber darum keinesweges mundtodt;
sie hat sich gerührt, die Bürgerschaft überzeugt, und ist schliesslich die
Majorität geworden. Das ist der einzig richtige Weg. Durch die vorge-
schlagenen Versuche werden Sie nicht sowohl zur Vertretung von Parteien,
als nur von Cliquen kommen. Einflussreiche Leute, die eine Anzahl
Stimmen beherrschen, werden ihre Vertreter hereinschicken. Unbedeutende
Minoritäten haben keinen Anspruch auf Vertretung, grössere allerdings
sollten berücksichtigt werden. Man hat zu diesem Zweck Bezirkswahlen
vorgeschlagen, und in der That lehrt auch die Erfahrung, dass in deu
verschiedenen Bezirken die verschiedenen Meinungen leicht die Majorität
erlangen können. Allerdings gibt es für die Bezirke keine natürliche
Abgränzung, diese wird immer willkürlich gezogen sein, allein die ganze
Einrichtung hat grosse Vorzüge. Eine allgemeine Bürgerversammlung
lässt sich nicht ausführen, wohl aber sind Bezirksversammlungen leicht ein-
zuberufen, und vor diesen kann der Candidat seine Ansichten darlegen.
Man hat zu Gunsten des Hare'schen Systems noch hervorgehoben, dass es
eine regere Theilnahme der Bürgerschaft an den Wahlen mit sich bringen
würde; das ist mir aber sehr zweifelhaft, denn es begünstigt die Bildung
im Geheimen werbender Cotterien, während bei den Berzirkswahlen, wo die
Meinungen sich offen gegen einander aussprechen können, die Theilnahme
am meisten angeregt wird. Ich schliesse mich ganz dem Antrag des Hrn.
Dr. Med. Friedleben an, dass für jetzt nur beschlossen werden möge: die
Wahl erfolgt durch unmittelbare Abstimmung in mehreren Bezirken, über
das Nähere bestimmt das Gesetz.
Da noch viele Redner zum Wort angemeldet sind, wird wegen vorgerückter
Stunde die weitere Discussion vertagt.
Friday, April 1st, 1864.
Dr. ENYRIM schlieszt sich dem Antrag des Hrn. Dr. Passavant an.
Wenn der Grundsatz aufgestellt wurde, dass nur die Majorität ein Recht
auf Vertretung habe, so beruht das auf einer Verwechselung der Beschlüsse,
welche von der Vertretung zu fassen sind, mit dieser selbst, welche nur
die Landgemeinde darstellen soll. Unser altes Wahlgesetz war ein ver-
späteter Ausläufer des ständigen Princips und dieses ging von der Vorans-
setzung aus, dass die Interessen und Anschau-ungen in den verschiedenen
Ständen andere seien und alle auf eine gleichmässige Vertretung Auspruch
haben. Diese Voraussetzungen treffen heute nicht mehr zu, allein das
früher so sorgsam gewahrte Recht auf Vertretung der verschiedenen Inte-
ressen und Ansichten besteht auch heute noch und muss seinen Ausdruck
APPENDICES.
335
in dem neuen Wahlgesetz finden, wie es ihn in dem alten gefunden hatte.
Das nun sucht das Hare'sche System zu bewirken, und es ist nach dieser
Seite hin das Ei des Columbus. Um sich gegen die befürchtete Bildung
kleiner Coterien zu schützen, braucht man nur die zu einer Wahl erforder-
liche Stimmenzahl etwas höher anzusetzen, etwa auf 4-500. Man tadelt,
dass dies System so komplicirt, ein Rechenexempel sei: die Gerechtigkeit
ist aber nie einfach, und je mehr unsere Gesetze der Gerechtigkeit nach
allen Seiten zu entsprechen suchen, umso komplicirter werden sie. Es
kommt auch gar nicht darauf an, dass die grosse Masse genau verstehe,
was hinter den Thüren der Wahilcommission vorgeht. Ein etwas schwieriges
Wahlsystem wäre übrigens auch nur ein ganz gutes politisches Erziehungs-
mittel für den Bürger.
Hr. DIETZ ist der Ansicht, dass nach Durchführung der Verfassungsre-
form die Parteifragen sich vermindern werden. Es gibt überhaupt nur
noch zwei Parteien, die Fortschritts und die Stillstandspartei, Auch schon
bei den früheren Wahlen hat es sich stets mehr um die Person als um die
Partei gehandelt. Der Redner erklärt sich zunächst für das Hare'sche
System, in zweiter Linie für die Bezirkswahlen und in dritter für den
Antrag des Hrn. Vogtherr.
Dr. FULD. Ich habe gefunden, dass Diejenigen, welche sich bisher
gegen die proportionellen Wahlen ausgesprochen, ihre Berechtigung
eigentlich anerkannt haben. Zuerst Herr Dr. Braunfels, der sich am
eingehensten und behaglichsten darüber ausgelassen hat. Er hat geltend
gemacht, dass dies System in einem grossen Staate nicht ausführbar sei,
womit aber seine Ausführbarkeit in einem kleinen Staate, wie der unserige,
indirect zugestanden ist. Ferner machte er es ihm zum Vorwurf, dass es
noch nirgends eingeführt sei; allein alles Neue war vorher noch nicht da,
und es kann uns gewiss nur lieb sein, wenn auch wir einmal mit etwas
Gutem zuerst kommen. Man sagt, es würden sich Coterien bilden. Wenn
man die Grenze zwischen Coterie und Partei scharf zu ziehen weiss, so
bestimme man die zu einer Wahl erforderliche Stimmenzahl darnach. Man
erkennt an, dass es Minoritäten gibt, deren Berücksichtigung seitens der
Majorität von der Klugheit und Billigkeit geboten ist, dann muss man
aber diesen Minoritäten auch ein Recht zugestehen und sie nicht von der
blossen Gnade der Majorität abhängig machen. Durch die Bezirkswahlen
wird die Vertretung der Minorität, wie selbst der Majorität, dem blossen
Zufall anheimgegeben. Wenn es der Zweck einer Vertretung ist, nicht
blos Beschlüsse zu fassen, sondern die verschiedenen Ansichten zu hören
und zu prüfen, so bleibt kein anderer Weg, als das Hare'sche System, mit
denjenigen Modificationen, welche die zu ernennende Commission daran
zu machen findet.
Dr. Jur. FRIEDLEBEN. Wenn ich mich dem Antrag auf directe Wahlen
angeschlossen, so geschah es nicht aus dem Grunde, weil ich diese Frage
für eine principielle halte. Die Beispiele von Preussen, Hessen, Nassau
einerseits und von Frankreich anderseits beweisen, dass indirecte Wahlen
1
336
APPENDICES.
eine weit unabhängigere und freisinnigere Vertretung ergeben können, als
die directen. Die Wahl in nur einem Bezirk braucht durchaus nicht, wie
man befürchtet, ein exclusives Ergebniss zu liefern. Wir haben hier
zugleich eine politische und eine Gemeinde-Vertretung. Wenn die Erstere
die Parteien scheidet, führt sie die Letztere wieder zusammen, denn sie
bedingt die Berufung von Männern verschiedener Fähigkeiten. Die poli-
tischen Minoritäten haben als solche gar kein Recht auf Vertretung,
denn die Repräsentation soll nur die öffentliche Meinung zum Aus-
druck bringen, und diese ist in der Majorität gegeben. Wenn man der
Mehrheit Abgeordnete der Minderheit aufdrängt, gründet man eine Ty-
rannei der Minorität. In Bezirkswahlen müsste man noch viel exclusiver
verfahren, als bei der Aufstellung einer Wahlliste für nur einen Bezirk.
Die Zahl unserer Mitglieder könnte allerdings vermindert werden, 60
wären ganz ausreichend. Den Landgemeinden wird die Zusammenlegung
in einen Bezirk nur gut thun, zumal sie fortan das Recht haben werden,
ihre Vertreter aus dem ganzen Staatsgebiet, nicht nur aus ihrer Gemeinde
zu nehmen. Meiner Ansicht nach ist das Hare'sche System unrichtig im
Princip und ungerecht in der Anwendung. Unrichtig, weil es à priori
einen Satz aufstellt, der dem konstitutionellen Staatsrecht widerspricht,
welches der Mehrheit die Leitung der öffentlichen Angelegenheiten
zuweist. Der Volkswille soll entscheiden, das ist aber nicht der Wille der
Minorität. Mit diesem System würden wir einen Rückschritt noch hinter
das Drei-Klassensystem machen; es trägt die Gefahr in sich, die Bürger-
schaft in ganz kleine Coterien zu zerreissen. Wir würden den traurigsten
Missgriff machen, wenn wir dies principlose Princip hier in Frankfurt
annähmen.
Hr. RÜTTEN macht darauf aufmerksam, dass, wie hoch oder niedrig man
auch bei dem Hare'schen System die zu einer Wahl erforderliche Stimmen-
zahl ansetzen möge, es bei geringerer Betheiligung an den Wahlen doch
geschehen könne, dass die vorgeschriebene Anzahl von Abgeordneten gar
nicht zusammenkomme.
Dr. STERN erklärt sich ebenfalls gegen das Hare'sche System. Es
beruht auf dem Missverständniss einer Verwechselung der Minorität mit
den Minoritäten. Der Minorität allerdings muss die Gelegenheit gegeben
sein, sich geltend zu machen, aber sie darf sich nicht in Minoritäten auf-
löfen. Wir würden bei den letzteren keine Gesammtvertretung haben,
sondern nur eine Vertretung von lauter unbedeutenden Fraktionen. Sol-
cher kleiner Gruppen können sich möglicherweise 84 bilden, und wir haben
dann gar keine Vertreter der Gesammtheit mehr. Es ist überhaupt ein System
zu verwerfen, welches die Wahl von einer freien That zu einer Manipula-
tion macht. Die Bezirkswahlen haben den Vorzug, dass sie die Bürger-
schaft zu einer lebhaften Betheiligung an den öffentlichen Angelegenheiten
heranzichen. Sie sind die politischen Bildungsschulen in Preussen. Die
Wahl in nur einem Wahlbezirk ist eine Täuschung. Die 84 Abgeordneten
können nicht freigewählt, noch weniger discutirt werden.
APPENDICES.
337
Dr. VARRENTRAFP. Wenn es etwas Illiberales gibt, so ist es die Behaup-
tung, die Minderheit besitze gar kein Recht, bis sie nicht die Mehrheit
geworden ist. Es ist eben so unhistorisch als unmoralisch, dass eine An-
sicht nicht eher gehört werden solle, als bis sie die Anerkennung der
Mehrheit gefunden hat. Man schneidet damit aller Fortentwickelung,
aller Belehrung eines Besseren den Weg ab. Wenn man ein Solches Princip
durchführt, dann spreche man nur nicht mehr von Freiheit. Ursprüng-
lich kamen die Menschen in der Familie, in der Landgemeinde zusammen
und tauschten ihre Ansichten aus. Als nun dies in Folge ihrer Vermehrung
und Ausbreitung nicht mehr thunlich war, sandten sie Vertreter, und nun
will man sagen: bisher habt ihr das Recht gehabt mitzureden, mitzustim-
men, von heute an hört dies auf und ihr habt nur noch das Recht zu
wählen. Die Vertretung verdient nur dann diesen Namen, wenn sie ein
möglichst treues Bild der Vertretenen selbst ist. Das bezweckt das
Hare'sche System, in dessen Einzelheiten einzugehen überflüssig erscheint,
sobald man das Princip selbst verwirft. Die Zulassung von Vertretern
der Minoritätsansicht aus blosser Gunst, ist ignobel für beide Theile. Ich
erkläre mich für die Beibehaltung der zwei ersten Theile des Passavant'-
schen Antrags und wünsche, dass statt des dritten einfach gesagt werde:
das Gesetz bestimmt den Wahlmodus auf Grund des Hare'schen Systems.
Dr. BRAUNFELS. Das Hare'sche System beruht darin, dass man die
wirklich Wählenden durch die zu Wählenden dividirt und darnach die zur
Wahl erforderliche Stimmenzahl festsetzt. Nun gibt man von vorne
herein zu, dass dies nicht angehe, dass man eine willkürliche höhere Zahl
annehmen müsse, und fällt damit gleich selbst wieder von dem Princip ab.
Wir dagegen sagen, eine Meinung hat nur dann das Recht auf Vertretung,
wenn sie die Mehrheit, sei es im Staate oder in dem Bezirk, besitzt, und
haben dabei die Praris aller Länder für uns. Wenn aber, wie es das
Hare'sche System erstrebt, alle Meinungen vertreten sein sollen, so führte
das zu einer höchst verderblichen Zersplitterung, während doch das Ziel
sein muss, die Ansichten möglichst zu koncentriren. Dr. Varrentrapp
nannte es ignobel für beide Theile, wenn die Majorität freiwillig die
Minorität berücksichtigt; ich finde darin vielmehr einen Beweis des
Vertrauens, der beide Theile ehrt. Die Bezirkswahlen bieten nicht nur
die Möglichkeit, sondern sogar die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass jede nam-
haftere Minoritätsansicht da oder dort zur Geltung kommt.
Dr. KUGLER. Es ist von den Vertheidigern des einen Wahlbezirks
geltend gemacht worden: die Majorität allein habe zu entscheiden, mit der
Wahl sei Alles abgeschlossen, von da ab habe die Minorität nur noch zu
schweigen. Dadurch würde die Vertretung selbst nur noch zu einer
Abstimmungs-maschine. Ich bin anderer Ansicht. Die Bürgerschaft
schickt deshalb viele Vertreter, damit sich hier die verschiedenen
Ansichten aussprechen, dass darüber deliberirt und nicht nur abgestimmt
werde. Jede einigermassen bedeutende, redliche Minorität muss demnach
hier ihren Ausdruck finden. Eine räumliche Bezirksabgränzung bietet
Z
338
APPENDICES.
nicht die entfernteste Sicherheit für ein solches Resultat der Wahlen, diese
ist nur in den freiwilligen Wahlbezirken des Hare'schen Systems zu
finden.
Dr. REINGANUM. Um gleich den Beweis zu geben, dass ich mich nicht
als blosse Wahlmaschine betrachte, erkläre ich, dass mich die ganze
Discussion von meiner ersten Ansicht, nach welcher ein indirectes
Wahlsystem für uns am zuträglichstem wäre, noch nicht abgebracht hat.
Alle die andern vorgeschlagenen Systeme führen dahin, dass die Wahl-
zettel von Parteiausschüssen gemacht, von den Parteigenossen angenommen
werden. Ob ich aber Andere den Wahlzettel entwerfen lasse, oder
Vertrauensmännern die Wahl selbst übertrage, ist ganz dasselbe. In
Kurhessen hat das wiedergewonnene directe Wahlrecht nur einen Demo-
craten, Trabert, in die Kammer gebracht, während die indirecten Wahlen
in Preussen ein ganz anderes Resultat ergeben haben. Das Hare'sche
System will intellektuelle Bezirke. Wenn darnach in Bornheim eine Anzahl
Kinder Gottes sich zusammenthun, haben sie das Recht, das Kind Gottes
zu wählen. Dieses System stiehlt der Majorität ihre Stimmen, um sie der
Minorität zu geben. Wenn Lord Palmerston 20,000 Stimmen hat, worin der
Regierung ein werthvolles Vertrauen ausgesprochen ist, kommt Mr. Hare
und sagt: du branchst nur 1000 Stimmen, die übrigen 19,000 gebe ich
Anderen.¹ Dies System treibt die Zersplitterung zum Excess. Wie soll es
anderseits mit den Bezirken hier werden? Um eine verhältnissmässige Zahl
Bezirke herzustellen, müszte man nicht mehr Quartierwahlen, sondern
Gassenwallen einführen. Man hofft, die Wähler und Candidaten werden
zusammen kommen und sich gegenseitig Kopf und Nieren prüfen. Ich
glaube das nicht; wir haben sehr viele tüchtige Männer, die doch nicht
hintreten und in vorhinein versprechen möchten, wie sie in jeder möglichen
Frage stimmen würden. Dr. Varrentrapp nannte es ignobel, wenn die
Majorität Männer der Minorität freiwillig beruft. Als seine Partei am
Ruder war, hatte sie mehrere Jahre ganz exclusiv gewählt, dann aber
zuerst drei Demokraten mit aufgestellt. Wir sind auch gekommen, und
weder sie noch wir haben das ignobel gefunden. Eine Verminderung der
Mitgliederzahl wäre sehr wünschenswerth, soll dies aber nicht sein, so
möchte ich, um aus allen den Quälereien herauszukommen, vorschlagen, dass
man in drei Wahlgängen jedesmal 28 Mitglieder wählen lasse.
Wegen vorgerückter Zeit wurde die Discussion hier abgebrochen und auf
die nächste Sitzung vertagt.
¹ Dr. Reinganum overlooks the fact that Lord Palmerston would, from
the public declaration of the votes polled, acquire all the moral weight
of the proffer of 20,000 votes, while the appropriation of 19,000 of them to
the other candidates named lower on the papers, so far from lessening that
weight, will probably contribute to the election of nineteen of his supporters,
and add therefore greatly to his power in the representative body. See, on
this point, p. 255, n.
APPENDICES.
339
!
Friday, April 8, 1864.
Die Versammlung geht nunmehr an die Fortsetzung der Verhandlung
über das Wahlgesetz.
Nach einer persönlichen Bemerkung des Hrn. Dietz ergreift Hr. May
das Wort zur Vertheidigung des Hare'schen Systems. Dem Prinzip, dass
der Minorität eine entsprechende Vertretung zukommt, muss Jeder
beistimmen, mag er sich auch mit den Vorschlägen zur Ausführung
desselben nicht einverstanden erklären. Zu den Lasten des Staates, zu
den Steuern, zur Conscription u. s. w. zieht man die Minorität heran, da ist
sie gleichmässig verpflichtet, aber von der Berathung will man sie
ausschliessen, gleich berechtigt soll sie nicht sein. Es wird so grosses
Gewicht darauf gelegt, viele Stimmen zu bekommen; damit geht es aber
doch manchmal eigen zu. Bei den Wahlen zur Gewerbekammer hatten
wir einen Namen auf unserer Liste, der sich auch auf der Liste unserer
Gegner befand, und dieser Einzige wurde demnach einstimmig gewählt.
Ein besonderes Zeichen des Vertrauens hierin zu sehen, wäre vielleicht
sehr unbedacht. Mein Antrag geht dahin, dass man zuvor alle Namen,
die nicht wenigstens 200 Stimmen auf sich vereinigen, als zersplitterte
Wahlen ausscheide, und den andern Parteien die auf sie entfallende
Abgeordnetenzahl nach Verhältniss ihrer Stärke zuschreibe.
Dr. LEYKAUF erklärt sich ebenfalls für das Hare'sche System. Nach dem
Axiom der Gegner derselben hat nur die Majorität das Recht zu herrschen
und demnach auch allein Vertreter in die Versammlung zu senden. Das
Erste ist richtig, das Zweite aber falsch. Die Majorität hat nicht
das Recht, der Minorität das Wort zu verwehren. Das wichtigste Recht
des Bürgers, das Recht des freien Wortes von der Tribüne will man von der
Gnade oder Politik der jeweilig herrschenden Partei abhängig machen.
Das Hare'sche System wird die Theilnahme der Bürgerschaft an den
Wahlen, die so beständig abgenommen hat, auf's Neue beleben.
Dr. SAUERLÄNDER. Die Frage, ob direkte oder indirekte Wahlen, scheint
entschieden, es handelt sich also nur um die näheren Bestimmungen. Die
Wahl in nur einem Bezirk führt zu einer Tyrannei der Majorität. Die
ganze Vertretung wird zu einem blossen Parteiorgan. Die schwächeren
Parteien ziehen sich, um einer sicheren Niederlage auszuweichen, von den
Wahlen zurück, und so erkaltet die Theilnahme für das wichtigste
politische Recht der Bürgerschaft. Auch im Hare'schen System gebietet
die Parteidisciplin die Annahme von Wahllisten, auf denen sich Namen
befinden mögen, die man nicht frei wählen würde. Die Bezirkswallen
empfehlen sich am meisten. Hier ist die Möglichkeit eines lebhaften
politischen Ringens geboten und die Minorität in dem einen hat die
Aussicht des Sieges in dem andern.
Hr. J. RÜTTEN stellt den Antrag, dass die Zahl der städtischen
Abgeordneten auf 72 vermindert werde, doch wird dieser Antrag bis zur
Berathung des betreffenden Gesetzes vertagt.
340
APPENDICES.
Nachdem noch die Hrn. Dr. Neukirch und Dr. Reinganum ihre respec-
tiven Anträge vertheidigt, wird zunächst der von Hrn. Dr. Kugler formulirte
Antrag auf Einführung des Hare'schen Systems, dass nämlich Jeder als
gewählt betrachtet werdeu solle, der eine näher zu bestimmende Zahl der
von sämmtlichen Wählenden abgegebenen Stimmen erhalten hat, zur
Abstimmung gebracht und abgelehut. Sodann wird der allgemeine
Grundsatz: Die Wahlart ist die direkte, mit grosser Stimmenmehrheit
angenommen, und nach Ablehnung der Anträge des Hrn. Dr. Med. Fried-
leben, dass über die Art der Ausführung das Gesetz bestimme, und des
Hru. Dr. Braunfels, dass die Abstimung in mindestens 3 Bezirken stattfinde,
über das Weitere aber das Gesetz bestimme, der Antrag der Hrn. Dr.
Neukirch und G. Hoffmann, dass die Stadt in acht Wahlbezirke
getheilt werde, mit 35 gegen 27 Stimmen genehmigt.
Ferner noch erklärt sich die Versammlung dafür, dass jede der sieben
Landgemeinden einen Wahlkreis für sich bilde, und dass die Abstimmung
in der Stadt wie auf dem Lande eine geheime sein solle, während die
Fragen, ob absolute oder relative Majorität zur Wahl erforderlich sei und ob
Suppleanten gewählt werden sollen, vorerst ausgesetzt bleiben.
APPENDIX I.
THE following extract is from an article from the pen of
M. Louis Blanc, which has had a wide circulation, and
excited much attention in France:-
Le peuple, ce n'est pas la pluralité, c'est l'universalité des citoyens: d'où
vient donc qu'on parle toujours de la souveraineté du peuple, comme si le
PEUPLE était un être simple, unique, immuable, dont on puisse dire ce qu'on
dirait d'un individu: IL veut ceci, II. ne veut pas cela?
Quant à la souveraineté, il serait temps de s'entendre. S'il est vrai que
d'après Hobbes, d'après Rousseau, d'après tous les publicistes qui ont écrit
sur la matière, d'après le dictionnaire, d'après l'usage, elle soit le pouvoir
suprème, celui dont tout relève, il est clair que son essence est d'être absolue.
Mais si, étant absolu, un pareil pouvoir n'était pas incontestablement
juste et regardé avec raison comme infaillible, loin d'être légitime, loin de
constituer un droit, il aurait l'odieux caractère d'un fait écrasant, et la
souveraineté serait infâme. Qu'une iniquité soit commise au nom du souve-
rain, fût-ce à l'égard d'un seul homme, la souveraineté disparaît comme
principe, et ne subsiste plus que comme force. Et, n'est-il pas certain,
n'est-il pas historiquement prouvé qu'un seul homme peut, à un moment
donné, sur une question donnée, avoir raison contre cent mille hommes,
contre un million d'hommes, contre tous les hommes, moins lui ?
Ainsi donc, pour que la souveraineté, dans le sens absolu qu'on attache
APPENDICES.
341
[
à ce mot, fût autre chose qu'une pure abstraction au point de vue du droit,
il faudrait qu'elle répondît en fait à l'idée d'universalité; qu'il y cût unani-
mité d'idées, de sentiment; que toute pression du plus grand nombre sur
le plus petit pût être écartée par la communauté des intérêts et l'harmonie
des volontés. Touchons-nous à la réalisation de ce rêve d'or? Il est sans
fond l'abîme qui nous en sépare.
Que faites-vous donc, vous qui prétendez investir du caractère qui convien-
drait au gouvernement du peuple par lui-même ce qui n'est, et ne saurait être
que le gouvernement d'une partie du peuple par une autre partie? Vous
faussez la notion du droit; vous transportez à la pluralité, qui est exposée
au malheur d'être injuste, le pouvoir de l'universalité, qui ne peut pas être
injuste, parce qu'on ne l'est pas envers soi-même; vous mettez le relatif à
la place de l'absolu; vous mutilez le souverain, et en lui dérobant son nom
pour le donner à ce qui n'est pas lui, vous courez le risque de consacrer la
tyrannie!
Il faut quelque chose qui empêche le droit des plus nombreux de trop
ressembler au droit des plus forts; quelque chose qui serve à distinguer
avantageusement l'état de société, où l'on se compte, de l'état de nature, où
l'on se bat; quelque chose qui protége la liberté contre la substitution pos-
sible du pouvoir d'un chiffre à celui d'un coup de massue; quelque chose
enfin qui fasse que la démocratie cesse d'être un régime de privilége en
faveur du nombre. La majorité doit avoir plus de représentants que la
minorité, fort bien; mais s'ensuit-il, comme dit M. John Stuart Mill, que la
minorité n'en doive pas avoir du tout? Eh bien, c'est pourtant ce qui
arrive sous l'empire du système qui ne permet aux électeurs de voter que
pour le candidat qui se présente dans le district électoral auquel ils appar-
tiennent. Le représentant élu pour le district est celui de la majorité, et le
vote de la minorité se trouve n'avoir pas plus de valeur, l'élection faite, que
si la minorité n'existait pas.
Cela est-il équitable? cela est-il conforme à l'intérêt, bien entendu, de la
société et au principe de l'égalité démocratique? Il y a là manifestement un
mal qui appelle un remède. La conviction que ce mal est considérable, que
ce remède est nécessaire, me fait un devoir de vous exposer le système au
moyen duquel M. Hare a cherché à atteindre ce but important, et éminem-
ment démocratique : LA REPRÉSENTATION PROPORTIONNELLE DES MINORITÉS.
An explanation of the method then follows.
Le mécanisme en est beaucoup moins compliqué qu'on ne serait tenté de
le croire, au premier abord. En réalité, l'opération sur laquelle il repose n'a
rien de plus difficile que le triage des lettres à la grande poste.
Quant à sa portée politique et philosophique, elle doit vous frapper.
Là où il n'y a pas égalité de représentation, on peut poser hardiment en
fait qu'il n'y a pas de démocratie. L'essence de la démocratie, c'est
l'égalité; et partout où les minorités risquent d'être étouffées, que dis-je?
342
APPENDICES.
partout où elles n'ont pas leur influence proportionnelle sur la direction des
affaires publiques, le gouvernement n'est au fond qu'un gouvernement de
privilége, au profit du plus grand nombre. Contre ce mal, le système de
M. Hare fournit un remède.
On répondra peut-être que, dans le mode d'organisation adopté jusqu'à
ce jour, la minorité ne reste jamais sans représentants, parce qu'il arrive que
le parti en minorité dans un collége est en majorité dans un autre, ce qui
tend à rétablir la balance.
Mais une pareille compensation, outre qu'elle n'a rien de certain et rien
d'exact, est évidemment contraire à tous les principes du régime représen-
tatif. L'étouffement de la minorité ici ne cessera pas d'être regrettable
parce qu'il y aura eu étouffement de la minorité ailleurs en sens inverse.
Un mal donné pour correctif à un autre mal ne saurait tenir lieu de remède.
Ce qui importe, c'est que la voix de chaque électeur compte à l'homme de
son choix, du moins autant que possible. Quoi! je nomme Pierre à Paris, et
je dois me tenir pour bien et dûment représenté si Paul est nommé à Bor-
deaux! Passe encore, si le pays n'était divisé qu'entre deux grands partis
se disputant le pouvoir, et en présence dans chaque collége! Mais en
dehors de ces deux partis, je puis appartenir à une opinion dont il me
plairait fort de préparer l'avenir; je puis faire partie d'une minorité éparse
dans le pays, et qui, bien que trop faible pour l'emporter dans un collége
quelconque, serait cependant assez forte pour former une section du corps
électoral, si les membres qui la composent votaient ensemble; je puis enfin
vouloir pour mandataire, d'accord en ceci avec beaucoup d'électeurs
répandus çà et là, un homme sans influence locale, sans relation avec les
partis en vue, sans engagement avec les opinions du jour, mais d'un caractère
élevé et d'un esprit aussi supérieur qu'indépendant. Dans ce cas, je le
demande, à quoi me servira ma qualité d'électeur? Il faudra, ou que je
donne ma voix à un homme qui ne représente mon opinion que très impar-
faitement, et alors mon vote est à moitié perdu, ou que je m'abstienne, et
alors, il est perdu tout à fait.
Il est vrai que le système de M. Hare est loin d'assurer aux minorités
une garantie complète, en ce sens qu'il laisse sans organe parlementaire
toute minorité qui n'atteint pas le nombre minimum de votants requis pour
l'élection d'un député. Ainsi en supposant que la Chambre se compose de
650 membres, et qu'il y ait 6,500,000 électeurs, ce système n'empêcherait
pas toute minorité au dessous du chiffre de 10,000 d'être sans organe dans
la législature. Mais c'est là un malheur inhérent à la nature des choses.
Le nombre des sections électorales est fatalement déterminé par le nombre
des députés à élire. Et, d'autre part, il est assez naturel qu'une opinion ne
pèse dans la balance des destinées publiques, que lorsqu'elle se trouve
avoir acquis un suffisant degré d'importance numérique.
Au reste, je n'entends pas dire que le système de M. Hare soit parfait;
mais ce qui est sûr, c'est qu'il offre des avantages nombreux, et de l'ordre le
plus élevé.
1
APPENDICES.
343
Il assurerait la représentation, proportionnellement au nombre de chaque
section du corps electoral. Toute minorité serait représentée, pourvu qu'elle
se composât d'autant de citoyens qu'il en faudrait pour faire un député, eu
égard au nombre des membres à élire.
Chaque minorité locale pouvant s'unir par ses votes à d'autres minorités
locales éparses dans tout le royaume, et atteindre de la sorte le chiffre voulu
pour l'élection d'un représentant, nulle opinion de quelque importance
numérique ne risquerait d'être réduite au silence, ou désarmée.
Les électeurs n'étant plus forcés, ou de voter pour un candidat de la
localité, alors même qu'ils ne voudraient pas de lui, ou de s'abstenir, et
pouvant donner leur voix aux hommes d'une réputation nationale dont ils
partagent les principes, une place parmi les représentants du peuple serait
réservée aux grands esprits, aux citoyens vraiment illustres, aux caractères
indépendants: il ne serait plus indispensable, pour être élu, de se faire l'in-
strument d'une coterie influente ou l'esclave d'un parti.
Chaque vote aurait toute la valeur qu'il doit et peut avoir.
Chaque membre de la Chambre représenterait un corps électoral, dissé-
miné peut-être, mais unanime.
Par cela même, le représentant et le représenté seraient identifiés l'un
l'autre.
Ce qui serait représenté à la Chambre, ce serait, non plus des pierres,
mais des hommes.
Et toutefois, le principe de la représentation locale serait respecté dans
une juste mesure, puisque dans tout collége où la majorité des votants égale-
rait ou dépasserait le chiffre requis pour l'élection d'un député, il ne tien-
drait qu'à elle d'avoir un représentant local.
Dans chaque collége électoral, la majorité serait nécessairement amenée à
fixer son choix sur le plus digne, parce que son candidat préféré aurait à
soutenir la concurrence, non plus seulement du candidat de la minorité, mais
de tous les hommes distingués sur toute la surface du pays.
Dans la Chambre, les représentants de la majorité ayant devant eux les
organes les plus distingués de chaque ordre d'idées, seraient contraints, pour
les combattre, d'étudier les questions sérieusement et de penser, ce qui
élèverait le niveau de l'intelligence générale.
Enfin, la majorité prévaudrait, la démocratie règnerait; mais en même
temps une issue serait ouverte à chaque opinion dissidente, et un point
d'appui ménagé au droit des minorités: droit non moins respectable dans
sa sphère que celui des majorités dans la sienne, droit sacré, lui aussi, et
qu'un membre fameux de la Convention revendiquait en ces termes, le
28 décembre 1792, aux applaudissements du peuple qui remplissait les
tribunes: "Sidney, mort
Sidney, mort pour le peuple, était de la minorité. Socrate était
de la minorité quand il avala la ciguë, et Caton quand il se déchira les
entrailles."
See, also, note to p. 161, 3rd ed. of Mill's Considerations on Representa-
tive Government, on the opinions by other continental writers.
344
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX K.
Discussions in Holland and Belgium.
THE question at the head of the Amsterdam programme of the International
Congress for the Promotion of Social Science, in 1864, was, "Quels sont les
moyens les plus pratiques, dans un gouvernement représentatif, pour assurer la
liberté des élections et la sincérité des votes."
This method was brought before the Congress by M. Rolin-Jaequemyns,
who thus states the result:-
66
Pour parler franchement, il lui parut que la première impression produite
par son exposé, sur les esprits non prévenus, était un étonnement mêlé de
défiance, et une assez vive tentation de rejeter d'emblée tout le système,
commie entaché d'une nouveauté excessive. Bientôt cependant on discuta.
Peu à peu la discussion, de dédaigneuse qu'elle était, devint sérieuse et
approfondie. Des défenseurs chaleureux et convaincus se présentèrent.
Bref, on finit par trouver que la chose valait au moins la peine d'être
examinée, et l'on nomma une commission chargée de faire un rapport, en
général, sur les solutions proposées ou à proposer en réponse à la première
question du programme, et en particulier sur le mérite du système Hare."
M. Rolin-Jaequemyns has since published a work (De la Reforme
électorale, Muquardt, Bruxelles, 1865), the third chapter of which contains
an able synopsis of this system, and a summary of its advantages (pp. 115-
119). The following are extracts from the latter :-
"1. Diminution des tentations de fraude et de corruption chez les candi-
dats. 2. Une fois l'élection soustraite aux vicissitudes d'une popularité
de clocher, on ne verrait plus, comme de nos jours, les hommes qui repré-
sentent le plus fidèlement, dignement une grande opinion, exclus du parle-
ment par une petite majorité locale. 3. Les déclarations de principe,
habilement équivoques, où l'on exagère la partie de ses opinions qui est de
nature à plaire au grand nombre, où l'on dissimule le reste, ces promesses
que l'on sait impossibles, ces imputations que l'on sait téméraires à l'égard
du candidat opposé,-toute cette mise en scène deviendrait inutile si, au
lieu de s'adresser à un public restreint, on s'adressait aux partisans
inconnus qu'une opinion, franchement avouée, éloquemment défendue, ne
peut manquer de concilier dans le pays entier. 4. Le choix des électeurs
ne serait plus restreint entre deux nuances de candidats, qui souvent leur
sont personnellement inconnus, ou qui leur déplaisent également. Mais ils
seraient appelés à se prononcer avec discernement, entre tous les candidats
possibles, à les classer dans un certain ordre de préférence, et ils seraient
presque assurés que chacune de leurs désignations aurait une valeur réelle.
5. En même temps que le sentiment de la responsabilité et de la dignité
individuelle augmenterait chez l'électeur, il serait entraîné à faire un usage
APPENDICES.
345
de plus en plus grand du principe de l'association en matière politique.
L'influence de l'individu cesserait de s'arrêter aux limites, parfaitement arbi-
traires, d'une circonscription électorale. Du moment qu'une idée, un principe
ou un intérêt sérieux voudraient trouver place au parlement, il leur suffirait de
recruter des adhérents indistinctement parmi toute la masse du corps électoral.
Prenons pour exemple la question du libre-échange. Combien de temps
n'a-t-elle pas tardé à se faire jour! Partout, dans les arrondissements les
plus riches, les plus populeux, elle rencontrait une coalition aveugle de
toutes les industries. Partout les instincts conservateurs conspiraient pour
étouffer à leur naissance des minorités encore imperceptibles. Il a fallu des
années de persévérante énergie pour amener la thèse du libre-échange à être
soutenue à la tribune. Avec le système de M. Hare, cette thèse eût pro-
bablement trouvé, dès le début, un défenseur officiel et convaincu. Il en est
et il en sera de même de toutes les vérités nouvelles, économiques ou autres."
Referring to the work of M. Morin (p. 16, n., and Appendix A, p. 295)
M. Rolin Jaequemyns says:-"Il est permis de croire que son idée, si
elle avait pu être suivie, aurait épargné à sa patrie la sanglante échauffourée
de septembre. Car le système a précisément pour but d'éviter la situation
qui, à Genève, a produit les troubles, savoir: le défaut d'homogénéité entre
le groupe des représentants et le groupe des représentés.”—(P. 9.)
In his first chapter M. Rolin-Jaequemyns discusses the "Projet de loi sur
les fraudes en matière électorale, présenté le 15 novembre 1864, par le Gou-
vernement Belge aux Chambres Législatives," and amongst other things
combats the suggestion which had found some advocates at the Amsterdam
Congress, that it should be made compulsory on every elector to vote. Such
a proposal had also been maintained by M. Eugène Delattre, an advocate of
Paris, in his Devoirs du Suffrage Universel; and by M. Albert Gloss, as
an amendment of the Constitution of the United States (Das Leben in den
Vereinigten Staaten. Leipsig, 1864), which he compares with the Athenian
law (p. 30, and see ante, pp. 251–2). The second chapter examines the
question of the suffrage in a marmer in which it has been rarely treated
(pp. 50-73), and a section treats of the political education of the electors :-
"Des efforts permanents à exercer sur l'électeur pour le mettre à même de
comprendre sa mission (p. 87). The same chapter discusses the pro-
visions necessary for secret voting, which the author seems to think
desirable (pp. 77–82).
I have stated elsewhere (pp. 139-147) some of the grounds on which I
deprecate the introduction of the ballot. There would be nothing absolutely
irreconcilable with the ballot in this method of election, and with little
alteration of the proposed rules, secret votes might be admitted; but I
confess I have no disposition to undertake the adaptation. The aim is to
elevate the moral and intellectual character of the voter, and I think that it
is personally degrading to him to be obliged to shrink from the performance
of this great act of national sovereignty except under a cover, and in darkness.
The workman is of infinitely more value than the work; and if it cannot be
346
APPENDICES.
:
done except under such conditions, it is better that he should not be required
to do it. I have, however, shown that the act of voting can be performed
under conditions which will give it a moral value of so high and sacred a
character that the general opinion of society will as surely protect a voter in
its independent exercise, as it would at this moment guard the sanctity and
virtue of his home from violation by any one, however powerful; even
meteing its indignation by the height of the rank or of the greatness of the
power which is so attempted to be abused. Instead of contriving how we
can best conceal weakness and palliate infirmity, let us rather turn to the
remedy which promises strength.
One part of the new Belgian Projet de Loi is curious. It enacts that the
voter on his way to the bureau is to pass through a passage of six mètres
(about 6 yards) in length, closed in by a door at each end, and two
mètres (abbut 2 yards) in height; that no voter is to approach the table
where the bureau is situated, before his name is called, and that he shall
retire directly he has placed his bulletin in the box.
On this provision, M. Rolin-Jaequemyns remarks,—(p. 82) “Qui croirait
que la mesure proposée en Belgique, en l'an de grâce 1865, pour protéger
les abords du scrutin, était connue et appliquée sous l'ancienne république
romaine? Les savants les plus autorisés (Becker, Rom. Alt. t. ii. pp. 3, 102;
-Rein das Criminalrecht der Römer, pp. 709 et ss.) nous apprennent, textes
en mains, qu'aux abords de chaque centurie, c'est-à-dire, de chaque section
électorale, on avait eu l'idée, précisément pour sauvegarder la liberté du
votant, de construire un pont (pons) ou avenue spéciale, cloisonnée de part
et d'autre, c'est-à-dire un véritable couloir. Ces avenues s'étant trouvées
trop larges, de façon que plusieurs électeurs s'y pressaient à la fois, Marius
les fit rétrécir. Mais il paraît que cette mesure ne fut pas encore suffisante
pour empêcher la violence et la corruption. Car Plutarque nous apprend
que les adversaires de Caton d'Utique, voulant empêcher son élection
comme préteur, se mirent les uns à distribuer de l'argent, les autres à
entraver la remise des votes. Du reste, toute la législation sur les délits et
crimes électoraux chez les Romains est des plus curieuses et, il faut bien
l'ajouter, des plus tristes. Nous y voyons la décadence des mœurs renchérir
sans cesse sur la sévérité impuissante du législateur, depuis les beaux jours
de la République, où l'on se bornait à défendre aux candidats, comme un
acte contraire à leur dignité, d'aller quêter des suffrages sur les marchés et
dans les réunions, jusqu'à l'époque où César établissait, en plein Champ de
Mars, des comptoirs où l'on payait les votants et où Pompée, suarum legum
auctor idem ac subversor (TAC. Ann. t. iii. p. 28), profitait de sa toute-puis-
sance pour faire contre ses adversaires des lois qu'il violait lui-même."
The great lesson surely is, that no penal laws,-no protective machinery,
-no negative contrivances, which may threaten or surround the voter, are
sufficient to inspire or to maintain such a patriotic feeling, or ruling senti-
ment of regard for the public good, as shall be sufficient to overcome the
sinister efforts of influential individuals or classes to convert the powers of
APPENDICES.
347
government into means of personal aggrandisement or profit. It can only
be accomplished by the operation of a new, a positive, and an active prin-
ciple of a higher nature implanted in the mind of the individual voter him-
self. Instead of giving mechanical aid, to secure the uncontrolled perform-
ance of an act which is reduced to one of small importance to himself, let
the act be made as interesting and important as it can be, and give the voter
a scope and freedom which shall awaken the emotions and call into exercise
all the efforts of his moral and intellectual being. I can conceive nothing
with so great a tendency to produce this result, as to place in competition
before the voter, not merely one or two mediocrities, but every quality and
talent existing among his contemporaries calculated to win his respect or
excite his admiration.
་
APPENDIX L.
United States of America.
THE earliest notice of this system in America appeared in the
Philadelphia Inquirer in 1860, in which the plan is thus
introduced :
"Its leading feature is, that a unanimous constituency is necessary to the
election of a representative. Nor is this unattainable, as at first sight it
appears to be.
It is rendered feasible by simply taking away the restraint
which at present limits a voter to a choice between the two local candidates.
"Let us suppose, for the sake of illustration, that there is to be held an
election of Congressmen for this State. There are twenty-five members to
be elected, and half a million of votes will be cast; the quotient, twenty
thousand, shows the number of votes necessary to elect a member. If every
voter is at liberty to select according to his preference from all the candi-
dates in the State, there can be no doubt that the prominent candidates of
either party will secure the requisite twenty thousand votes. In all proba-
bility they will receive more than that number; and this surplus would be
thrown away, were it not for the provision that each vote should be a list of
the members desired by the voter, and in the order of his preference for
them. Thus, if the first member on his list already has the requisite
number, that name should be stricken from the list, and the vote will then
count for the second in order, who is the next choice of the voter, and so on.
The admirable simplicity which characterizes this plan is likely to make us
ignore the wonderful results that would flow from its adoption. Let us
consider what would be gained by its introduction.
"First, it starts out with the fundamental idea, now almost lost sight of in
the abuse of the system, that the representative body should reflect exactly
348
APPENDICES.
the feelings and opinions of the community which it represents. Under
this plan every opinion is represented, and that, too, just in proportion to
the generality with which it is entertained. The only limitation is, that
those holding a given opinion should be sufficiently numerous to entitle
them to at least one representative. That is, in the case of a Congressional
election, twenty thousand in the whole State should be agreed in that
opinion. The majority thus has all the influence which it is strictly entitled
to have, but it cannot exercise the undisputed sway which has hitherto given
it the character of a tyrant. Every measure which it proposed would be
contested inch by inch, and though it would be ultimately carried, it would
only be after it was shorn of all its most obnoxious features, in consequence
of the thorough exposure which it had received.
CL
66
Thoughtful men have at all times endeavoured to secure a due share of
influence to the minority. John C. Calhoun devoted himself to this sub-
ject, and has left a treatise upon it, to explain the mode in which such a
scheme could be realized. But the plan which he proposed is wholly im-
practicable, and is now looked upon only as a monument of his patience
and ingenuity. Every one feels the hardship of a minority, whose voice is
not heard, and whose wishes go for nothing. We have submitted to the
inconvenience because we have not heretofore seen any practical plan sug-
gested for avoiding it. Our ready philosophy has taught us that it would
be better to be poorly represented than not to be represented at all. Fully
aware of the injustice of our condition we have endeavoured to make the
best of it, hoping, with labour and time, to become, in our turn, the majority.
The grand recommendation of this plan is, however, the tendency it would
have to bring forward distinguished men as candidates. An individual of
any note soon becomes known throughout the State, and he will be voted
for in preference to the unheard-of nominee of some petty local convention.
The same reason which induces the bringing forward of men of reputation
also operates to keep them in the position which they have shown them-
selves qualified to occupy. At present the reverse is true. The moment a
man becomes prominent by displaying his ability or integrity, he makes
himself obnoxious to those who rather desire tools to carry out their sinister
designs, than men of character who will obstruct them. Hence, an intrigue
is set on foot to defeat such a man, and always with success. Those in the
community who would sanction his conduct, in case an opportunity was
given them to express their opinion, have no influence whatever. It is all
settled in the primary meetings, where delegates to the convention are
chosen, hostile to him. We all know how these matters are managed.
Some greedy aspirant scours up his confederates to aid him to elect, in the
ward meetings, his favourites to the convention. They are successful,
because respectable citizens will not degrade themselves by frequenting such
dens. When in convention, they nominate a candidate who professes the
political principles of a party, and its members must either vote for him or
throw their vote away. In such an alternative they give him their vote
APPENDICES.
349
rather than his opponent, who is probably no better, and professes the oppo-
site principles."-Philadelphia Inquirer, 22nd Oct., 1860.
Since the termination of the civil war in the States, the subject has
rapidly become more and more prominent throughout the Union. See the
Report of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York on Per-
sonal Representation, 1867. Suggestions on the Revision of the Constitu-
tion of New York, by David Dudley Field, 1867. It was not long before
the agitation assumed a practical form.
In January, 1869, a Bill was introduced in the Senate for the amendment
of the representation of the people in Congress, and was referred to a Com-
mittee, which, in April, 1869, presented their report, setting out at length
the reasons on which they unanimously and strenuously adopted what is
called the cumulative vote. The report dismisses the minority clause
adopted in England, calling it "a rude contrivance which cannot have
extensive application." Speaking of the preferential method the language
of the report is remarkable. It says that it "may be put aside from the
present discussion, because it is comparatively intricate in plan and cum-
brous in detail, because it assails party organization, and because some of its
most important effects cannot be distinctly foreseen. It is so radical in
character, so revolutionary in its probable effects, that prudence will dic-
tate that it should be very deliberately considered, and be subjected to local
experiment and trial, before it shall be proposed for adoption upon a grand
scale by the Government of the United States." The Committee proposed
the following law, for the amendment of the electoral constitution :—“ That
in elections for the choice of representatives to the Congress of the United
States, whenever more than one representative is to be chosen from a State,
each elector of such State shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to
the number of representatives to be chosen from the State, and may give all
such votes to one candidate, or may distribute them equally or unequally
among a greater number of candidates, and the candidates highest in vote
upon the return shall be declared elected." This step in electoral improve-
ment, though not yet extended to the entire Union, has, however, been
adopted by the State of Illinois. The new constitution of that State divides
it into 51 electoral districts, every one having one senator and three repre-
sentatives. In electing three representatives, every elector may cumulate
his three votes on one or more of the candidates. The New York
journal, The Nation (14th July, 1870), describes this as "the first serious
attempt made by a democracy to amend its legislative machinery, and
perhaps for that reason, and in consideration of the magnitude of the
evils it is intended to correct, the most important political reform effected
since Parliament first met." The legislature of the State of Pennsylvania
has, by recent Acts, authorized the application of cumulative voting to the
municipal elections of Councillors in the towns of Bloomsburg and Berwick.
The Chicago Times, of the 21st April, 1870, after giving an account of the
election of the Town Councillors of Bloomsburg, in Pennsylvania, contains
2 A
350
APPENDICES.
•
the following passage:-
'Such was the eminently satisfactory result of the
first election ever held in America according to the free vote. By that
election the practicability of this great and beneficent reform is proven, its
justice and fairness illustrated. It is the small beginning of the most valu-
able political reform that has ever been advocated on this continent. It is
the beginning of an electoral reformation, that is as certain to be made
general in all our elections, federal as well as State and municipal, as that
ours will continue to be a popular form of government." The Alumni of
Harvard College, Massachusetts, under a resolution of the 30th April, 1870,
adopted proportional voting, in its most perfect contingent and preferential
form, for the nomination of ten candidates for their Board of Overseers.
The importance and value of this experiment, as well as of the preparation
for it in the Technological Institute at Boston, is shown in Appendix M on
the "Preferential Vote."
Mr. Simon Sterne, of New York, published in 1871 his work On Re-
presentative Government and Personal Representation (Hippencot and Co.,
Philadelphia). The subsequent labours of Mr. Sterne, and his coadjutors in
the committee of seventy, in their endeavours to form a new charter for the
city of New York, would alone form a valuable contribution to the history
of the present movement. Those labours are rendered unavailing for the
present, owing to the proposed Act having, after passing the State Legisla-
ture, been vetoed by Governor Hoffman. The reasons he has assigned for
thus rejecting a measure for applying the cumulative system to the election
of the aldermen of New York city, are, so far as they are practical and
intelligible, entirely based on the special defects of that system, as hitherto
framed (see Appendix N), and do not apply to a method under which every
one would be independent of party managers. They are set out in p. 159
of a valuable work just published, Minority or Proportional Representation,
its nature, aims, history, processes, and practical operation, by Salem Dutcher,
New York, U.S., Pub. Co., 411, Broome-st., 1872. It is a condensed reper-
tory of the public manifestations on the subject in the United States. The
author may be permitted here to repeat that he has always looked forward
to the reception of this electoral system by the American people with an
anxious hope. It may be a less grateful task to struggle against effete tradi-
tions and implacable prejudices in Europe, but an appeal to the patriotism
of a people who shrink from no sacrifice in pursuit of their ideal of national
greatness, can hardly be in vain. It is to the American Republic that the
eyes of the Old World will turn for a spectacle of what self-government can
accomplish. Its unexampled progress is the marvel of these modern ages.
The rich imagination of Burke, warmed with the theme, recalled to the
view of his hearers the "little speck scarcely visible, a seminal principle
rather than a formed body," which had grown within the life of one man,
into populous and wealthy provinces. If that statesman could have been
gifted with a forward prescience, even his eloquence might well have failed
to picture in appropriate language the mighty federation of the century
then to come. Surpassing all other people in the arts of Peace, as they
APPENDICES.
351
minister to the universal comfort and well-being,-attaining a not less dis-
tinguished though unhappy eminence in the art of War,-a nobler work
remains to them,-that, rising like a strong man in his strength, they shake
off the parasites that prey on the credulity and folly, and pander to the
vices, of the public,—and become the leaders of mankind in the far greater
art of government. It is said to nations as to men, "Better is he that
ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city."
APPENDIX M.
THE PREFERENTIAL VOTE.
The Board of Overseers of Harvard College, Massachusetts, was first
established by an Act of the General Court in 1642; its constitution under-
went variations in 1780, 1810, 1814, 1861, and 1865; in 1869 it was resolved
to nominate the overseers by this method. The first nomination was, at the
instance of Mr. W. R. Ware, the secretary of the Standing Committee of
Electors, preceded by a literary exercise in the Technological Institute of
Boston, calculated to prepare the way for the application of this system.
The manner in which this experiment was carried out shows how greatly
the fulfilment of the political duties of the people may be facilitated, during
their school instruction, and how desirable it is that the state should realize
the importance of introducing into the educational course of its youth, exer-
cises and studies that will assist them in after life in this essential part of
the work of a self-governing community. The following extracts from the
letter of Mr. Ware (1st March, 1871) explain the exercise and its results:-
"In order to avoid, so far as might be, the awkwardness and errors that
were likely to attend a
first performance of their
duties, and to gain an
experience that would
furnish rules of proce-
dure to guide them in
counting the ballots, the
committee subjected the
scheme to the test of a
preliminary experiment.
My own connection with
the Institute of Techno-
logy afforded the desired
opportunity for conduct-
ing a mock election, on a
scale sufficiently large for
the purpose in hand. A
Preference.
Please add to this list of authors any
other names you may prefer, and then
indicate your preference among them
all by writing the figure 1 against
your first choice, 2 against your second
choice, and so on.
1. BACON.
ti
SHAKESPEARE,
3. SCOTT.
4. BYRON.
5.
BURNS.
6.
MACAULAY.
7.
TENNYSON.
8.
THACKERAY.
9.
10.
11.
ballot was accordingly prepared in the annexed form, and the students
in the School of the Institute, nearly two hundred in number, were invited
352
APPENDICES.
to express their preferences among certain English authors who were
nominated as candidates (of whom four were to be selected according to
the principles of Mr. Hare's scheme).
In the casting of the votes three things were noticeable. In the first
place, although no instructions or explanations whatever were given to the
young men beyond those printed at the head of the ballot itself, very few
votes had to be rejected on the score of informality. Out of 150 votes,
144 were correctly made out. In the second place, what errors were com-
mitted were all of one kind, consisting in the indication of two or three
names as the voters' first choice, two or three as second choice, and so on.
In the third place, a large number availed themselves of the permission to
add to their list names not regularly in nomination, the followers of Mr.
Dickens especially rallying handsomely to his support.
The experiment perfectly answered its purpose. The following table
exhibits the application of these principles to the case in hand.
It is
a copy of the Tally, or Register of the Votes cast at the Institute of Tech-
nology.

TALLY.
144 VOTES.
Four to be
Elected.
Quota, 36.
Shake-peare elected.
Shakespeare's surplus
redistributed.
First Count.
Second Count.
Twenty-six scattering
votes redistributed,
No election.
Third Count.
Scott elected.
redistributed.
Milton's votes
Bacon's and Thackeray's
votes redistributed.
Fourth Count.
No election.
Fifth Count.
No election.
redistributed.
Sixth Count.
No election.
Byron's votes
Macaulay's votes
redistributed.
Seventh Count.
No election.
Dickens' votes
redistributed.
Eighth Count.
Tennyson elccted.
Tennyson's surplus
redistributed.
Ninth Count.
Burns elected.
Bacon
Scott
Byron
Burns
I.
4
II.
4
Shakespeare 48 [12] =
115
22
5
27
2522
6 2 8
III.
4
11 :
9
2
11
Macaulay
6
6 3
Tennyson
8
Thackeray
4
**
Dickens
11
•
Milton
27
2
1
Scattering
Lost..
26
४ 4
4
13
1
.
1
26 [26]
Phone d
9
36
2
+11820
: || || :
16
10
16
9
9
12
12
ONE
IV.
4 [4]
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
11
17
4
4 [4]
13
1
14
2│[2]
。
3-:
1
15
10 [10]
16 4 20
414
2 22
28
12 [12]
4 21 7
16
·
: 8: ∞ : || :
: || || : 8:3
30
2 32
10 38 [2] 36
2 18 [18]
: || || :
36
36
:
*
::
2
วง
2
i
ය.
3
•
144
144
144
144
12
26
2
CC
3
co:
· 09
3
1
4
::
144
144
144
144
144
10
12
13
2
It will be observed that the alternate columns, showing the successive
counts, all add up 144, as they should do, counting the double lines as
representing 36. The sum of the figures in the intermediate columns is
equal, as it should be, to the number of the votes redistributed. Facility
for checking and verifying the accuracy of the work is thus afforded at
every stage of the election.
1
APPENDICES.
353
The ballots marked Lost are those which proved on redistribution, not
to contain the names of any of the remaining candidates. The scattering
are those who stood first on one ballot only.
In counting off the quota in order to redistribute the votes of the elected
candidates, the committee counted the votes in the order they were received.
This is a natural and convenient rule, though arbitrary in its nature. Its
effect upon the result is, however, very slight, the destination of only 14
votes being affected by it. Even this number might, of course, if selected
under a different rule, materially change the result of the election, and it
is true that the necessity of adopting an arbitrary rule in counting off the
quotas, introduces an arbitrary and fortuitous element into the scheme.
But it is to be observed that although counting off the votes in a different
order might elect one candidate rather than another, it would not be the
candidate of a different party, but another candidate of the same party.
The element of chance, in fact, though seriously affecting the fortunes of
the candidates, has no terrors for the electors, who are sure in any case to
secure an acceptable representative, and it is to be remembered that it is
in the interests of the electors, not of the candidates, that elections are
carried on.
The objection has been brought against this method of voting, as well as
against the Limited and the Cumulative vote, that it makes no provision
for the filling of vacancies. A vacancy should, under any scheme, be filled
by the action of the special constituency whose candidate retires. But
where this constituency is scattered through the whole body of electors a
special appeal to them is of course impracticable. The experience of the
committee, however, enables us to show that if the original ballots are pre-
served, a vacancy can be filled without holding a new election. By taking
the ballots assigned to the retiring candidate as his quota, and putting
with them those set down as lost, representing the whole number of electors
who are now without a personal representative, a new count can be taken,
which will result in the election of a candidate acceptable to as large a
proportion of the electors as could probably be brought to unite upon any
one."
[Here follows a table showing the redistribution of Shakespeare's ballots
(supposing him to be the retiring candidate) together with the lost ballots,
resulting in the selection of Macaulay.]
Considering that the favourite candidates are already elected, and that
Macaulay narrowly missed election before, this may be regarded as
a felicitous result. The same experiment being tried with the ballots
for overseers, resulted also in the election of the most conspicuous of
the defeated candidates. This last experiment shows, moreover, that,
contrary to the generally received opinion, the system of preferential
voting is applicable to the choice of a single candidate. In such case it
enables the party of the minority to select between two candidates of
354
APPENDICES.
the majority, preventing a mere majority of the majority from dictating
the result.
The advantages claimed for this method of voting may, accordingly,
now be counted up as follows:—
1. It protects the minority from the tyranny of the majority.
2. It protects the minorities and majorities alike from the tyranny of
party chiefs.
3. It permits the utmost freedom of individual action.
4. It secures the most perfect co-operation and organization.
5. It gives every elector a representative after his own heart, whom he
bas actually helped to elect.
6. It gives every representative a constituency who are unanimous in his
support.
7. It gives the representative a certain security in the tenure of his place.
8. It affords a natural and reasonable method of rotation in office.
9. It makes it for the interest of every party to put forward its best men.
10. It makes it worth while for good men to become candidates.
11. It is equally efficient whether one candidate is to be chosen, or a
dozen.
12. It is available in the filling of vacancies as well as in general
elections.
13. It is easy for the elector to cast his vote intelligently.
14. It is not difficult to count the votes with precision and promptness.
15. Hardly a ballot is ultimately thrown away.
16. Every ballot is assigned just as the voter who casts it desires.
It is not easy to say how practicable this scheme would prove in public
affairs. But it would probably work perfectly well in the election of
members of Congress, for instance, though for convenience the larger
States would probably have to be divided in two. The ballots would of
course all have to be counted at a central bureau. But the first sorting
and counting could be done where they were cast. The labour at the
central office would be great, but not greater than is performed any day
in counting or sorting letters in a large post-office. But these con-
siderations belong rather to the general discussion of the question, than to
the special experiment you have asked me to relate.
It is sufficient to say, in conclusion, that although the amicable character
of the contest prevented the Cambridge experiment from testing the scheme
in all these particulars, it was satisfactory as far as it went. An excellent
list of names was presented, representing every class among the Alumni,
one or two of them, at least, giving expression to the wishes of considerable
numbers of persons who on another system of voting would have been
simply outvoted and silenced. The scheme seemed also to have been
successful in effecting a perfect freedom of action on the part of the electors.
They evidently voted with a view to express their real wishes, without any
APPENDICES.
355
arrière pensée as to what other people were likely to do. To those whose
duty it was to inspect the ballots the frankness and sincerity with which
the electors had voted was most striking. Each ballot, differing from every
other, was the exact expression of the personality of the elector who had
cast it. The counting of the votes proved unexpectedly easy, taking only
two or three hours, not nearly so much time as it had taken the committee
the previous year to count the same number of votes under the old system,
that of the Limited Vote, in which each elector sent in five names.
I am, etc.,
WILLIAM R. WARE."
Report on the Nomination of Overseers of Harvard
College.
In compliance with a resolution adopted by the Alumni Association last
Commencement Day, requesting the Standing Committee of the Electors
to prepare and distribute among the Alumni a detailed statement of the
methods and results of the systems of nominations for the Board of Over-
seers which have now for two years been in use, together with a copy of their
tally, or register of votes, the committee beg to present the following
report:-[After stating historically the constitution of the Board, it pro-
ceeds]:-In 1869 the present committee were appointed, a chief part of
the first committee having resigned on becoming members of the Board of
Overseers. At the same time a resolution was adopted "that the Standing
Committee be requested to investigate the system of voting devised by Mr.
Thomas Hare; and, if in their opinion it offers substantial advantages, to
adopt it in the nomination of Overseers." This the committee, being of
opinion that it offered advantages the practical value of which could be
determined only by experiment, thought fit to do. The system in ques-
tion was adopted in 1870, and, by a renewal of the resolution, in 1871.
Last year the resolution directing a third trial of the scheme the present
year was accompanied by the resolution cited above, asking for this
Report.
It was claimed for this method of nominations that it would retain all the
advantages of that in use the two previous years, with others of its own.
It would retain the nomination of a double list of candidates, which had
worked admirably well, and had rendered the election on Commencement
Day a bona fide exercise of the elector's will, not a mere indorsement of a
foregone conclusion. It would also retain the system of nominations
through the post-office, which had served to put the Alumni at a distance
356
APPENDICES.
from Boston into active relations with the College. At the same time it
proposed to give the elector more independence of action and a greater
range of choice in the nominations, and to ensure a list, or double list, more
truly representing the variety of opinions and interests to be found among
the electors. This last point seemed of special importance, since, if an
official nomination list is to be prepared at all, it should plainly be a repre-
sentative one, so variously composed as to afford to every elector at least
one candidate whom he can heartily support. It is the distinctive pecu-
liarity of Mr. Hare's method of voting that it claims to secure for every in-
terest or party a representation exactly proportioned to its numerical
strength.*
The results both last year and in 1870 were such as, on the whole, to
justify these pretensions. The system, in working, fairly fulfilled its pro-
mise, and met the expectations of its friends. The first year there were
about three hundred and sixty ballots received, and each name finally re-
ported by the committee was the unanimous choice of one-tenth of that
constituency, each candidate being nominated by about thirty-six votes.
Among these names were several which were generally recognized as repre-
senting opinions and interests that under another system of nomination
might not have obtained recognition.
In order to effect proportional representation, Mr. Hare's scheme proposes
first to establish a quota, or number of voters entitled to a representative, and then
to divide up the constituency into a number of such quotas, each unanimously,
in favour of a particular candidate. The number of such quotas must of course
equal the number of persons to be elected, and the size of each, or number
requisite for a choice, is obviously to be ascertained by dividing the number of
voters by that of the places to be filled.
"
To effect this division of the constituency into as many equal parts as there
are men to be chosen, without any external constraint, so that every voter
shall find himself in the group he best likes to be in, is the object of Mr. Hare's
system of voting. It is accomplished by a process of balloting exactly imitating
what would happen if all the electors and all the candidates were collected in
a room together. The quota being ascertained, the electors would “rally
around the candidates of their first choice. Some candidates would have a
large following, some a small one. The most popular would be elected at once,
having a full quota, and more. The surplus-the latest comers-would then
seek each the candidate of his second choice, and this might probably suffice to
elect some of those to whom allegiance was thus transferred. The rest of the
candidates would have their own supporters, many or few, but all less than
enough. If now the candidates having the fewest votes, say those with only
a single follower, should withdraw, and then the candidates with two votes,
and so on, their followers would naturally transfer their support to more pro-
APPENDICES.
357
The counting of the votes, which the committee had feared might be
vexatious and laborious, proved unexpectedly easy; not more time being
consumed than in counting the same number of ballots under the other
system the previous year. The success of the scheme in favouring the
independence of the electors was also conspicuous. Each vote, differing
from every other, seemed exactly to reflect the mind of the elector who
cast it.
The same experience was repeated the next year. The results of this
second trial, and the methods by which they were reached, are, in accord-
ance with the request of the Alumni Association, given in detail below.
This is given in a tabular form, as before (p. 352). The following is an
abstract:--
There were 30 candidates who polled more than one vote each, and 20
others who had only one vote apiece. The ballots cast were altogether 355,
which, divided by 12 (the number to be nominated), gave a quotient of 29,
being the quota which was therefore sufficient. There were eleven succes-
sive counts.
I. On the first count, three (Russel, Hilliard, and Salisbury) were nomi-
nated, and their surplus votes, beyond the quota of 29, were distributed.
II. On the second count, none of the candidates had a quota, and the
votes of the 20 candidates who had single votes were then distributed.
minent men, who would thus gradually collect enough supporters to elect
them. Their quotas would fill up. In this way there would presently remain
in the field only just enough candidates to fill the places, all of whom would
have a full quota and be duly elected. The division of the constituency into
equal groups, differing widely in opinion but each unanimous in support of its
own man, would have been accomplished.
This system the committee endeavoured to embody in the following rules,
according to which, as they advertised, the ballots for the nomination of over-
seers would be sorted and counted:-
I. Every candidate who receives one-twelfth of the whole number of ballots
cast is entitled to a nomination.
II. Each elector may send in the names of any number of candidates, all on
one ballot, and shall indicate his preference among them by writing the figure 1
against the name of his first choice, 2 against that of his second choice, and
so on.
III. Each ballot will be counted for the first choice indicated upon it, alone;
the other names being considered as substitutes, to be resorted to, in the order
of the preference indicated, only in case (I.) the person named as the first choice
has enough votes to nominate him without it, or (II.) in case he has not enough
votes to entitle him to a nomination.
IV. The ballots will be counted in the order in which they are received.
1
358
APPENDICES.
III. Hill attained the quota and was nominated. The votes of candi-
dates who had polled no more than 3 were then distributed.
IV. V. counts. No election. Votes of candidates having no more than
9, distributed.
VI. Dana and Shattuck elected by quota. Their surplus together with
the votes of candidates having 10, distributed.
VII. VIII. No quota. The votes of candidates having no more than 13,
distributed.
IX. A quota for Lowell. Votes, where no more than 16, distributed.
X. A quota for Lawrence. The votes of all candidates having no more
than 20 were then distributed.
XI. The eleventh and last count terminated in the nominating of the
four overseers remaining to be chosen : Bacon (28), Sanborn (27), Saltonstall
(26), and Phillips (22). All these were chosen by less than the quota, there
remaining no more ballots to distribute: the 20 that were left not being
given for any of the remaining candidates.
The report then, after discussing the probability of the system ever being
sufficiently understood for public use, adverts to its operation by transmit-
ting the ballot papers through the post-office. This part of the report is
of much value and importance, having regard to the means, and the system
could in this manner afford for securing the representation on the councils
of learned bodies of the members who dwell in various parts of the king-
dom, as, for example, councils of the medical, the legal, or the scholastic
professions. After mentioning the plan by which the election strikes off
all the names of candidates beyond a certain number as under the limited
ballot, the report proceeds to observe that "it seems a little simpler, but
it is likely to involve a great inequality of votes, the favourite candidates
getting many more votes than they need, while the ninth and tenth, per-
haps, have but a handful. This was the case in our own experience of this
system in 1868 and 1869. Mr. Hare's preferential plan is more elaborate,
but it makes sure that nobody shall be nominated without a certain follow-
ing, and that as few votes as possible shall be thrown away.
"Variations of these methods might be suggested, but without gaining any
substantial advantage. In indicating preferences among the candidates,
for instance, instead of marking the order of choice, as in Mr. Hare's plan,
the Cumulative method might be used, and the votes at the disposal of the
elector be all heaped upon the man of his first choice, or be divided among
several candidates, in equal or varying proportions, as he might see fit.
This is, perhaps, not so hard to understand as the other, but it is certainly
more vexatious to the voter. He would find it easier to say which man he
preferred than to say how much he preferred him; a qualitative analysis of
such sentiments being simpler than a quantitative one.
"Under the rules of the Limited Ballot, also the electors might be limited
to four votes in place of five, or to two, to three, or to one. Those who are
fond of arithmetical puzzles may find in the investigation of these different
APPENDICES.
359
cases some curious phenomena. The last case, that in which each elector
casts but a single ballot, is the same as Mr. Hare's scheme, without the
provision for the transfer of surplus votes. In the absence of such a provi-
sion, great inequality and injustice must, under any system, result. In
Illinois, for example, where the Cumulative Vote is now on trial, an agita-
tion for the introduction of some method of transferring votes from candi-
dates who have too many to those of the same party who have too few, is
already begun.
"The only other method likely to be mentioned in this connection is the
Swiss scheme of the Free List, or the Registered Ballot. But this method,
however admirably adapted to party politics, has no application to cases
like our own, where organized parties are not in existence."
(Signed)
WILLIAM M. PRICHARD,
WILLIAM R. WARE,
HORACE H. COOLIDGE,
WILLIAM E. PERKINS,
STEPHEN SALISBURY, JR.,
Standing Committee of the Electors.
BOSTON, May 10, 1872.
APPENDIX N.
MEMORANDUM OF THE HISTORY, WORKING, AND RESULTS OF CUMULATIVE
VOTING.
Some foreign governments, through their ministers in this country,
having applied to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for informa-
tion as to the history, working, and results of Cumulative Voting, a memo-
randum was prepared under the above title, to supply the particulars
thus sought. This paper, showing the relation which the Cumulative
system bears to, and its results in comparison with, the other methods that
have been proposed, is, with some omissions of detail, here given. It is
treated under the following heads :—
1. Single majority representation.
2. Majority representation and the election of representatives for separate
districts.
3. The original proposal of the Cumulative Vote.
4. Its numerical effect.
5. The restricted vote in what are called the three-cornered constitu-
encies, and its numerical effect.
6. The discussion on both systems, and the adoption and maintenance of
the restricted vote in the British Parliament in 1869 and 1870.
360
APPENDICES.
7. The legislative adoption of the Cumulative Vote.
8. The cause of the greater popularity and readier adoption of the
Cumulative Vote than of any other improvement in the frame of the con-
stituency.
9. Cause of popular dissatisfaction with it in practice.
10. Comparison of the numerical effect of the Cumulative Vote and the
Single Vote.
11. Effect of the Cumulative Vote in Birmingham on the representation
of the School Board of the more numerous party.
12. Effect in Marylebone, Finsbury, Lambeth, and Sheffield.
13. Complaints of the operation of the Cumulative Vote in the School
Board election, viz. :—
(A.) Nullity or mischief of permitting minorities to be represented.
(B.) The power it confers on intense or earnest opinion or feeling on
public matters, as opposed to "common sense," acquiescence, or comparative
indifference, and its consequent susceptibility of active organization.
(C.) That it operates not to elicit, but to suppress public opinion.
(D.) That it creates an inducement for too great a number of candidates
to offer themselves, whereby votes are wasted and lost.
14. The loss of votes, together with the necessity for, and the power
acquired by, party organization in the present rude method of applying
the Cumulative system.
And pointed out as amendments:-
15. (I.) Rendering individual voters independent of party organization,
if they desire to be so, and making such organization, where adopted,
purely beneficial.
16. (II.) Preventing the loss of the surplus votes polled for the more
popular candidates.
17. (III.) Preventing the loss of votes polled for unsuccessful candi-
dates.
18, and lastly. The value of the electoral principle which is the basis of
the Cumulative Vote.
[The substance of the memorandum, relating to the first six of the fore-
going heads, will be found in the first chapter of this work.]
7.- The Legislative Adoption of the Cumulative Vote.
The first adoption of the Cumulative Vote for the election of representa-
tive, administrative, or governing bodies in England was, by the passing o
the Elementary Education Act, whereby, touching the election of the
School Boards, it is enacted that " At every such election every voter shall
be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of the members of the
School Board to be elected, and may give all such votes to one candidate,
or may so distribute them among the candidates as he thinks fit."1
1 Stat. 33 & 34 Vict., c. 75, sec. 29.
APPENDICES.
361
8.-Cause of the Readier Adoption of the Cumulative Vote.
The reason of the greater popularity of the Cumulative Vote than that
either of the Restricted Vote or of the Single Vote, which has been else-
where proposed, is that it seems to give more power to the elector than he
has heretofore had, whereas the other methods appear nominally to diminish
that power. The Cumulative rule, expressing: "That every elector shall
be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of the members to be
chosen, and may give all such votes to one, or distribute them among the
candidates as he thinks fit," is favourably contrasted with the law of 1867,
which enacts that, at a contested election for a constituency represented by
three members, no person shall vote for more than two candidates. The
latter gave an opportunity for the somewhat grandiloquent preamble of
the bill introduced to repeal that restriction, which begins, "Whereas it is
expedient to restore to the electors those rights which by the ancient law
and custom of the realm belonged to them, of voting for so many persons
as there are members to be returned," etc.
9.-Cause of Popular Dissatisfaction with it in Practice.
Against the foregoing plausible but really valueless distinction in favour
of the Cumulative Vote, should be set the grounds of dissatisfaction pro-
duced by its results, when, as in the examples that are hereafter given, the
candidates having the support of a large number of electors fail, while
those supported by a small number succeed. This seeming injustice is
entirely due to the cumulative method of computation, and would disappear
if no one could vote for more than a single candidate. It is, in truth,
explained and justified by the perfect fairness of the intention and result
of the system; but popular ignorance and party prejudice are too often
impatient of argument in defence of that which, to a superficial view, may
be made to appear as a hardship. When it is seen that the votes of 3,000
electors have been successful where votes of 13,000 fail (see Section 11), it
may, in the present state of education, be hopeless to expect that the
apologists of the fact will satisfy the defeated party by showing them that
it is due to the greater intensity and force which the 3,000 threw into their
electoral effort (by the concentration of their votes), as compared with the
smaller amount of power which the 13,000 exercised in favour of any single
candidate (by dividing it among many), and that they have the means of
correcting the inequality in their own hands.
10.-Comparison of the Numerical Effect of Cumulative and Single Voting.
If 100 electors, forming one constituency, have 10 votes apiece, it is
obvious that singly and relatively they have the same power, one with the
other—their weight is the same relatively, for the purpose of the election,
as if they had but one vote each. The aggregate number of votes given
is more, and the computation is more laborious, but the result is the same.
362
APPENDICES.
Thus, suppose there were five candidates, and three to be elected
members, and the votes stood:-
Single Votes.
Cumulative Votes.
A.
B.
40
120
37
111
•
C.
16
48
D.
4
12
E.
3
9
100
300
The preferences of every elector and the degree of his preference being,
of course, for the purposes of the above comparison, assumed to be in all
cases precisely the same, it is plain that the amount of electoral power
possessed and exercised by every one is also the same.
The practical question in applying either the Cumulative or the Single
Vote for the purpose of averting the exclusive government of mere
disciplined majorities, is first to consider whether the illusion that the
Cumulative Vote gives the greater power is so ineradicable that it must be
accepted as the preliminary method of reform, or whether it is not possible,
by calling the popular attention to the two methods, and their real effect,
to make the simpler process of the Single Vote equally acceptable, and
thus get rid of the feeling of dissatisfaction which is produced by the
corresponding illusion that the lesser number of voters has overpowered
the greater. It is believed that the equality of the two systems in point of
justice might be made popularly intelligible, and that the greater simplicity
of the Single Vote, and the obvious fairness of its results at the poll, would
give it the preponderance in the public favour.
11.-Effect of the Cumulative Vote in Birmingham on the Representation of the
Popular Party.
The effect of the Cumulative Vote on the large Liberal party in
Birmingham, which for the most part gave its support to fifteen selected
candidates on the late School Board election, was to secure the return of
no more than six of such candidates. The supporters of the fifteen polled
altogether 220,638 votes, of which 96,427 were effectual in electing the
candidates for whom they were given, while a majority of such votes, or no
less than 124,211, were ineffectual, having no operation whatever, owing to
their having been distributed among nine candidates, none of whom had
sufficient votes to be returned. On the other hand, smaller parties, or
minorities of the constituency, by the concentration of their votes on one,
two, or three candidates, succeeded in electing them.
The complete and admirable directions issued by the Education Depart-
APPENDICES.
363
ment, with reference to the method of computation of votes, and the form
in which the results might be returned, directions which were generally
followed by the returning officers, afford the means of considering the
operation of this electoral system in nearly every conceivable point of view.
The following is a copy of the return made by Mr. Hayes, the Town Clerk
of Birmingham, of the election there:-
Ones.
Twos.
Threes.
Fifteens. Total Votes.
Baker
13,037
244
55
7
14,101
Burges
1.190
7,785
500
45
21,925
Chamberlain
13,200
439
100
8
15,090
Collings
13,165
201
39
5
13,873
Cooper
+
12,778
234
71
9
13,873
Crosskey
12,706
154
25
5
13,314
F. S. Dale..
1.340
7.125
152
29
17,465
R. W. Dale
13,229
760
210
6
16,387
Dawson
13,023
643
232
33
17,103
Dixon
13,197
735
214
5
16,897
Elkington..
Evans
Gough
Holland
Hopkins
Kirkwood
G. B. Lloyd
S. S. Lloyd
Melson
Middlemore
O'Sullivan
Radford
Raffles
Sandford
Sargant
Vince..
Wilkinson ..
Wright
•
1.366
6,508
68
"
14,925
475
942
207
34
5,351
•
1,864
6,013
167
69
17,481
12,484
216
73
17
14,359
1,516
6,559
189
S
15,696
315
123
69
339
7,095
12,850
378
115
S
14,642
1,289
7,315
744
237
30,799
978
564
230
328
:
:
:
11,017
13,007
280
79
13
14,332
506
140
100
2,143
35,120
12, 146
94
25
1
12,515
325
52
16
80
2,060
:
:
:
12,526
2,197
199
37
1
13.202
5,973
221
18
15,683
13,119
652
196
5
15,843
1.424
7,259
500
23
:
:
19,829
12,880
416
114
11
15,007
Multiplied by
208,132
1
62,003
4,748
4,387
2
3
15
|
208,132 124,006 14,224
52,305
In fours, 6,114 votes were given; in fives, 14,110; sixes, 2,250; sevens,
4,711; eights, 4,776; nines, 486; tens, 2,920; elevens, 77; twelves, 408;
thirteens, 312; and fourteen, 182; making altogether 435,083.
It is impossible to say that there was any injustice in this result. The
whole number of voters was 29,183. There were 15 candidates to be
364
APPENDICES.
elected, and certainly the 2,143 electors who concentrated all their votes on
Canon O'Sullivan (to say nothing of the other 1,028), being much more
than a fifteenth of the electors, were sufficient in number to be entitled to
one of the fifteen representatives.
12.-Effect of the Cumulative Vote in Marylebone, Finsbury, Lambeth, and
Sheffield.
In the Marylebone election three candidates, for whom from 3,287 to
4,298 electors voted, were excluded, while another candidate, for whom only
1,857 persons voted, was successful. This was effected by 1,043 voters
having given him all their votes, no other candidate, except one, having
half that number of exclusive supporters. The 4 highest and the 7 lowest
of 22 candidates occupy the same position on the poll in both the tables of
Voters and of Votes, but there is much diversity in the position in the two
tables of the 11 candidates who occupy the middle place in the return.
The Marylebone return is chiefly remarkable as exhibiting the conse-
quence of an exceptional interest prevailing in favour of a particular
candidate in causing a surplus of votes. Miss Garrett polled 47,858 votes,
being between three or four times the number of any other candidate.
The return of Mr. Greenwell, the Deputy Returning Officer, states that
in Marylebone, 23,619 voting papers were admitted, and estimates the num-
ber of ratepayers at 58,000. In the following table the names of the 7
successful candidates are in italics :-
Candidates.
Ones. Twos. Threes. Fours. Fives. Sixes. Sevens. Total.

Garrett
Hurley
1,444
852
3,348 8,061 7,116
3,118 3,240 3,060
1,700
450
25,739
47,858
325
204 2,695
13,494
Thorold
Angus..
2,698
2,124 2,223
1,952
235
84
2,870
12,186
3,001
2,304
2,079
1,784
240
90
1,974
11,472
Hutchins
286
364
480
516
180
126
·
7,301
9,253
Dixon..
839
1,882
1,800
1,292
255
72 2,891
9,031
Watson
2,535
1,198
1,287
888
1×0
90 2,177
8,355
Mills
2,620
1,414 1,482
1,184
95
12 1,120
7,927
Powell
2,485
1,428
1,404
1,096
110
48 1,281
7,852
Whelpton
Waterlow
258
474
720
592
170
108
• •
3,437
5,759
661
996
• •
1,062
692
105
54
1,421
4,994
Garvey
Marshall
Guedella
Cremer
Edmunds
Verey
Stanford
• •
Wyld
Dunn
Brewer
Beare ..
•
2,495
822
585
324
55
36
616
4,933
2,395
532
441
384
115
24
777
4,668
425
762
633
460
150
84
• •
2,121
4,635
548
1,240
1,248
692
85
36
553
4,402
221
506
567
556
95
54
1,974
3,973
80
166
258
284
65
24
•
1,253
2,130
110
176
198
164
35
12
791
•
1,486
36
40
54
28
10
12
154
334
37
18
60
44
10
12
77
258
23
26
15
28
21
103
14
10
15
16
7
62
24,066
22,938 27,912 23,152 4,215
1,632
61,250
165,165
Sheffield and Lambeth are to be noticed as examples of the vast losses of
votes cxpended on unsuccessful candidates, whereby several who were
APPENDICES.
365
known to be desirable representatives of classes greatly interested in the
business of the School Boards, were excluded.
THE SHEFFIELD SCHOOL BOARD.
1
2
Ellison, Michael J., Roman Catholic
Wilson, Henry, Churchman
3
Wardlow, Charles, U. M. Free Church
4
Cobby, William, Wesleyan
··
Moore, Thomas, Churchman
··
7
8
9
10
Firth, Mark, New Connection
Cole, Skelton, Wesleyan
··
··
Doncaster, Chas., Society of Friends
Fisher, William, Unitarian
Brown, Sir John, Churchman
11 Holden, R. W., Primitive Methodist
Fairburn, John, Wesleyan
Crossland, James, Churchman
·
12
13
14
15
Eadon, Robert Thomas, Unitariau
Allott, Alfred, Independent
•
UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES.
16
Sissons, William..
17
Rowbotham, Thomas
18
Langley, Batty
19
Peace, Wm. Kirkby
20
21
Wilson, John
22 Hibberd, Emmanuel
Penton, Thomas ..
Bragge, William..
23
24
Bacon, Stephen
25
Robertson, Alexander
26
Collier, John
27
Robertshaw, Jeremiah
28
Jackson, Alfred
29
Hallam, Reuben
30
Hime, Thos. Whiteside
31
Pye-Smith, John William
32
Nadin, Alfred Cutler
33
Jones, Benjamin ..
31
Griffiths, Francis
35
Orton, Thomas
36
Knox, George Walter
37
Burns, John Wild
38
39
Unwin, John
40
Aitchison, David Alexander
Dronfield, William
41
Lester, William Heury
42
Tasker, John
43
Adams, John Edward
14 Emsley, Samuel ..
45 Parkes, David
17,057
..
12,489
11,464
11,372
10,823
10,316
10,315
··
9,762
9,756
9,344
9,303
8,310
7,215
6,947
6,624
6,426
•
6,220
..
5,941
5,680
5,540
4,924
4,734
3,358
3,114
3,049
2,721
2,712
2,664
2,605
2,373
2,326
1,870
1,752
•
1,645
..
1,200
1,106
869
858
837
752
•
642
•
638
581
574
509
2 B
:
366
APPENDICES.
UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES-continued.
46
Foster, Thomas
47
Gillott, James
18
Birch, William
49
Dearden, Henry
..
50 Godson, Thomas..
51
52
53
28+
Cropper, George..
Hall, Frederick William
Goodlad, James ..
54 Prideaux, Thomas
490
349
348
342
322
214
174
158
95
The Sheffield return, by Mr. Yeomans, the Town Clerk, was made with
especial accuracy of detail. The above statement of the result is taken
from the Sheffield and Rotherham Independent.
LAMBETH DIVISION.
Candidates.
Ones. Twos.
Threes. Fours. Fives. Totals.
No. of
Voters.

Elected.
Stiff..
Tresidder
Tilson
McArthur
Few..
Murphy..
Tugwell
Applegarth
··
Kavanagh
White
Selway
Mottershead
Gibbons..
Shaen
1,093
$85
710
1,073
532
692
•
3,312 3,852 236 13,555
2,674 2,751 296 10,050
4,176 5,856 152 3,680
2,538 1,848 204 6,300
4,134 3,444 188
2,124 1,791 180 3,615
423 1,010
22,078 6,818
16,6565,223
14,574 5,524
11,9634,269
2,210
10,508 4,236
8,402 3,119
1,107 148 5,140
7,8282,362
486
1,274
1,470
172
4,280
7,682 2,512
72
121
108
40
4,380
4,724 1,056
309
716
534
72
2,345
3,9761,332
"
580
1,204
807
68
760
3,419 1,620
211
456
360
36
•
2,000
3,463 968
62
166
126
4
1,115
1,073
411
101
192
123
12
490
918
339
7,229 24,130 24,177 1,808 59,920 117,264
13.-Complaints of the Effects of the Cumulative Vote.
The National Education League has issued a pamphlet,' which may be
regarded as its summary of objections. These may be considered under
four heads:-
A.-First, it is argued that the principle on which the Cumulative Vote
rests is fallacious: that minority representation is either a nullity or a mis-
1 The Cumulative Method of Voting: its Nature, Operation, and Effects, as
exhibited in the late School Board Elections. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and
Co. Birmingham: Alex. Day.
APPENDICES.
367
chief: If only proportionate in numbers, the minority will always be out-
voted: That the national policy of recent years, such as freedom of trade
and other great innovations and improvements, would have been frustrated
if Parliament had been elected in batches of nine, eleven, or fifteen. It
insists, in fact, that minorities, though admitted to preliminary discussion,
should be altogether driven from the field of action. It does not admit
that the election is for the choice of a deliberative body, the necessary pre-
sence of whose members, supplied by the best materials for judgment at
the place of legislation, together with their concentrated attention and in-
dividual responsibility, are to be relied on for dealing wisely with the great
and novel problems that constantly arise in the changing conditions of
modern life. It assumes that the constitution of tribunals, the boundaries
of the civil rights of person and property, the system of national defence,
all internal organization for public instruction, national and local taxation,
and the treatment of pauperism, and the conditions of colonial and foreign in-
tercourse, are all to be finally determined by the votes at the hustings, the
person chosen being no more than the bearer of the decree to the house of
delegates. If this be so, the election is an idle ceremony. Appointing
messengers, called representatives, is a clumsy and unnecessary contrivance
maintained at a useless cost. All that is wanted is a clerk at every hustings
to register the decision, and send it by post or telegraph to the central
burcau.
B. Secondly, that it increases the power of party organizations, giving
scope to intensity of feeling or fanaticism, whether of the elector himself or
those who influence him, his power being in the proportion of his personal
earnestness or docility. That it has thus led to voting according to prepared
lists, without any proper discrimination by the public of the individual
merit of those for whom they vote. On the complaint it must be observed
that it was the larger party in Birmingham-the 14,000 who adhered to-
gether-which exhibited the most complete example of voting according to
a list, if that be any reproach. It may fairly be inquired whether the true
ground of this complaint is, not that organization and its consequent influ-
ence have been employed, but that the pre-existing organization has been
partially overpowered. Under the exclusive majority-system, organization
is indispensable to the selection of the party candidates, and their restric-
tion to the necessary number, unless it can be supposed that, by some
miracle of intuition, the whole party is at once led to adopt, without any
differences, the favourite candidates, and that all other than the favourite
list acquiesce and waive their pretensions. The grievance felt by the oppo-
nents of the Cumulative Vote rather is, that it has introduced new and
different organizations not of the whole party, but of sections and classes of
opinion. Of the two consequences, it may be fairly contended that the
organization brought into play by the Cumulative Vote is, in the view of
those who really believe that the people are to be trusted, and the public
opinion should be in truth consulted, far preferable, inasmuch as it gives
368
APPENDICES.
more scope to individuality of thought, and the free representation of indi-
vidual opinion. The vote is given with greater sincerity, and the aggregate
result in moderating or graduating political action is free from the danger
to which order and government are exposed by efforts to give exaggerated
force to enlarge majorities. Dependence on electoral organization, though
not more chargeable to the Cumulative Vote than to the majority system,
is in itself an evil to be encountered by other remedies.
C.—Thirdly, it is to suppress rather than elicit public opinion. The fact
that nearly half the constituencies abstained from voting at the School
Board elections is attributed apparently to two causes, the greater length
of the list of candidates, and the intricacies of the voting paper; the
primary cause of both being, it is said, the form of vote. These combined
causes raised, it is said, insuperable difficulties in the way of the election of
working men, although they did not prevent a candidate in Birmingham,
alleged to be supported by a community mainly composed of Irish labourers
(p. 20), from arriving at the head of the poll. It cannot be meant to be
implied that others were too stupid to understand and too obstinate to be
taught, but rather that they did not care to take the pains. It is a matter
of serious regret that of five candidates of the artisan class in London only
one was elected. Members in a different sphere of life may be well able to
construct and organize a scheme for establishing the necessary Elementary
Schools, but the teaching of experience has never led them to realise the diffi-
culty of inducing or enabling the poor, in their present condition, thoroughly
to appreciate, and still less to prolong, the education of their children; and
it may be long before the means are devised, by the use of endowments or
otherwise, of bridging over the chasm of apathy and ignorance left by ages
of neglect. It is, however, more probable than otherwise that, without the
Cumulative Vote, even the solitary member of that class would have been
excluded. There is no evidence that any voters were kept from the poll by
the form of vote. If it gave expression to every diversity of opinion, it is hard
to see how it could render the electors more apathetic, and the greater
choice of candidates is surely calculated to excite rather than repress effort to
promote the election of one or more of them. Looking forward to the future,
any apparent intricacy in filling up the paper would be better met by some
arrangement to instruct the voters where necessary, than by impairing
the intelligent result of the vote.
D.-Fourthly, that it creates an inducement for too many candidates to
offer themselves, whereby votes are wasted and lost.
The Cumulative method, in common with any other method that en-
courages the development of more varied thought, by giving more perfect
representation to majorities as well as to minorities, necessarily presents in-
ducements for candidates to come forward who, without that encouragement,
would not have appeared. In a multitude of cases these, either from attrac-
tion or aversion, provoke the activity of electors who would not otherwise
have taken the pains to vote. To the extent in which the supernumerary
APPENDICES.
369
candidates attract voters who ordinarily unite with any of the greater poli-
tical parties, they must withdraw so much from the force of the latter, and
add to that of smaller sections of the people. It is true, also, that the accu-
mulative power thus given to minorities is increased by the disposition of
electors, who are thereby more encouraged to "plump," or give their entire
voting power, for particular and favourite candidates, lest they should other-
wise be defeated. The application of the proportional system in a more
perfect form is needed, not a lessening of the number of candidates. The
widening of the electoral choice must be desirable, if the object be true
representation.
14.- The Loss of Votes, together with the Necessity for, and the Power acquired
by, Party Organization in the School Board Elections, and how far such evils
are attributable to the Cumulative Vote.
The double mischief here complained of, and of which examples have
been given, are not created by or peculiar to, although they, perhaps, are
more prominently shown by, Cumulative Voting. They exist, if not in a
more aggravated shape, yet in one which it is more difficult to encounter,
under the prevailing majority system.
First, in regard to the loss of votes, the Cumulative system, as hitherto
applied, is open to the same objections as the majority system, that both the
surplus votes given to candidates who may be highly popular, and the in-
effectual votes given to candidates who fail, are thrown away. The former,
the loss of surplus votes, may, in open voting, be more or less avoided, by
ascertaining and making known at the shortest possible intervals the num-
ber of votes polled for every candidate; but the utmost care would scarcely
prevent considerable loss, and it may afford an opportunity for trickery and
party manoeuvres; and in secret voting it is irremediable, except in a man-
ner hereafter explained (Section 16). The latter infirmity, the loss of votes
from the candidates for whom they are given being unsuccessful, cannot,
under the method in use, be recovered, although this loss, it will be seen
(Section 17), is also susceptible of a remedy.
The Cumulative system does, however, offer the means of preventing a
loss of votes, of which its opponents take no account, that is, the votes of
all those who, disagreeing with the majority in their electoral district, are
now, in Parliamentary elections, outvoted and left without representatives, a
number which cannot ordinarily be taken at less than two-fifths of the whole
electoral body, or 400,000 out of 1,000,000 votes. It is therefore, even in
the rude form in which it has been adopted, a vast economy of electoral power.
Secondly, as to party organization. The utmost which the Cumulative
system has done is to preserve it, and that, as it has been already said, in
an ameliorated form, one better suited to the character of mankind, and
the diversities of sentiment and opinion. Instead of being called "minority"
representation, a truer appellation would be "the better representation of
majorities."
370
APPENDICES.
REMEDIES.
15.-Rendering Individual Voters independent of Party Organization if they
desire it, and making such Organization, where adopted, more purely beneficial.
The system of proportional and preferential voting, practically accom-
plishes the foregoing objects. (Its operation is shown as applied to the
nomination of the Overseers of Harvard College, Cambridge, Massachu-
setts; set out fully in Appendix M, ante, pp. 351, 355.)
16. Secondly. Preventing the Loss of the Surplus Votes Polled for the more
Popular Candidates.
This is effected by adopting the principle of the quotient explained in
the last section; that is, taking either the number of the registered electors
in the constituency, or the number who actually vote at the election, and
dividing it by the number of members to be chosen. Suppose, for example,
that at Birmingham there had been 45,000 electors or persons entitled to
vote, and 15 members to be elected, the quotient would be 3,000. If, then,
it were provided that, when 3,000 voters had polled for any candidate, all
additional votes given for that candidate should be passed on to the next
candidate named in the voting paper who had not already made up his
quotient, the elector would have the means of preserving his votes from
being practically without effect. Instead of taking the number of registered
electors as the number to be divided for the purpose of ascertaining the
electoral quotient or quota, a better plan is-even at the expense of two or
three hours' delay-to ascertain the number who actually vote at the
election, and divide it by the number of members. The quotient is then
smaller, and thus more votes are saved. Thus, at Birmingham, where
only 30,000 vcted, the quotient would not have been more than 2,000, and
the number of effectual votes would have been vastly increased. This
calculation is made for the sake of simplicity, on the hypothesis that every
elector has one vote for one candidate, and no more. Applying it to the
Cumulative form, the figures only differ. For the total of 45,000 electors
substitute 675,000 votes, for the quotient of 3,000 voters 4,500 votes, for the
total of 30,000 electors substitute 450,000 votes, and for the quotient of
2,000 substitute a quotient of 30,000 votes.
17.-Thirdly. Preventing the Loss of Votes Polled for Unsuccessful
Candidates.
The growth of opinion will inevitably bring forward candidates for
legislative and administrative bodies appealing to principles not hitherto
known or recognized, and whom it will be neither possible nor desirable to
exclude. The degree of support given to such candidates will be the most
trustworthy indication that can be had of the course of popular thought.
The more numerous parties-those who form the great Liberal or Con-
APPENDICES.
371
servative majorities-would have no reason to apprehend a reduction of
influence by votes being withdrawn from them, nor would the voter have
cause to fear that his vote will be thrown away by an independent expres-
sion of opinion, if, when the state of the poll is ascertained, and all the
candidates are known for whom votes enough have not been given, the
names of those lower on the poll, beginning at the lowest, be then cancelled
on the voting papers appropriated to them, and the voting paper passed on
to the next candidate the elector has named upon it, who has not already
obtained the quotient. Any voter who wished to prevent his vote from
being transferred would avoid it by inserting no other name than that of
the sole person whom he desires to see elected. Applying this rule to the
Sheffield election, the 95 votes given by 54 voters for Prideaux would be
first redistributed; next, the 158 votes of 95 voters for Goodlad; next, the
174 votes of 89 voters for Hall; next, the 214 votes of 94 voters for Cropper;
and so on, until all the voting papers on which the electors had indicated
such desire had been redistributed, and only the fifteen candidates who, in
the result proved to be successful, would remain. In Marylebone the process
of redistribution of unsuccessful votes would have begun with the 62, then
the 103, then the 258, then the 334, and so on until there were seven left.
In Lambeth this redistribution would no doubt have had the effect of
returning one of the working-class candidates, by combining their 7,682
and 3,062 votes. In all these cases the state of the poll being affected by
every new distribution of votes, the order of every succeeding distribution
may also be affected.
18.-Lastly. The Value of the Electoral Principle of the Cumulative Vote.
The objections to the operation of the system, when examined and
understood, are so many testimonies in favour of its principle. To the just
complaint of the loss of the votes, from being too many or too few, of those
who go to the poll, are added the charges that it has induced multitudes
to abstain from voting, and enabled ignorance to overpower knowledge.
The design of the Cumulative Vote, as well as its true principle, is to
obviate those very evils; and corrected in detail, as it is capable of being, the
application of the principle will be found an effectual means of accomplishing
that design. With arrangements broad enough to afford a sufficiently
extensive choice of candidates, it will enable every voter to be reasonably
certain that his vote shall not be given in vain, or be without a distinct
and appreciable effect on the result of the election. It would thus be a
direct and powerful appeal to the conscience of every one who has any care
for the community in which he lives, not to neglect this public duty. The
universal sense that there is a constitutional outlet for every political
aspiration is the true safeguard against unlawful or violent courses. It
would evoke, and give its due measure to the expression of every sincere
and earnest opinion, formed by any considerable number of the people, on
the measures calculated to promote their moral and material well-being.
372
APPENDICES.
And in the struggle of knowledge against ignorance it recovers the forces
that are wasted and lost under the local majority system. All unselfish,
patriotic, and noble motives are invited and encouraged to enter into the
great moral conflict. The advocates of the exclusive rule of majorities try
to reconcile themselves to it by the figment that it matters not how many
electors are extinguished in one place, because it may happen that some
others who think the same as they do, may succeed in silencing another
body of electors who think differently, in another place. They strike an
imaginary balance of ignorance in one constituency against intelligence in
another. They forget that this is no exchange or substitution of one value
for another, and every exclusion is pure waste. The aggregate intellectual
power of the nation is no more than that of the individuals who compose
it. No identity either in thought or in opportunity of action is found to
compensate in one locality for what is thrown away in another. The local
majority system tends to create governing bodies dependent in a great
measure on hazard or accident, and in the formation of which the deliberate
judgment of half the people is powerless. Yet, if the election pretends,
as it does, to be an intellectual process, appealing to the knowledge and
discretion of the electors, the appeal should be in no case a mockery. The
state owes to every one of its members the best assistance and encourage-
ment it can give him in the performance of his electoral duty, and the
assurance that the labour shall not be fruitless. In a work spread over
the whole country, that of gathering several hundred parts or members to
constitute the great machine of government, in which it is the business of
all to weigh and sift, with keen and logical scrutiny, a multitude of com-
peting elements-to recognize and detect imposture-it is not too much to
say that nothing should be left to chance that can be made certain; that
none should be shut out who can bring to the task the result of study,
experience, or knowledge; and that no portion of the intellect of the
nation should be paralyzed.
Athenæum, 24th May, 1871.
THOS. HARE.
}
APPENDICES.
373
APPENDIX 0.
PROGRESS OF THE STUDY OF THE REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE.
It is not right to pass without notice the fact that there are many who
view with much distrust, if not hostility, all attempts to perfect representa-
tive institutions by making them real instead of merely virtual or nominal.
Of these some are utterly dissatisfied with representative government;
and others, accepting it in the shape which it has commonly assumed,
either find it effectual for all the purposes which they consider important,
or apprehend that any measure which would render it more perfectly
expressive of the general will would be for the worse.
The former class includes those who would return to popular legislation.
Direct Legislation by the People, versus Representative Government, translated
from the original Swiss pamphlets, by Eugene Oswald. London, 1869. Practical
effect has been given to opinions of this nature in Zurich, where a new
constitution has recently been adopted, providing not only that all laws
and all important money grants shall be submitted to the vote of the whole
people—the referendum-but also enabling the same popular assembly to
initiate and make new laws without the intervention of their representative
body. The referendum has also been introduced in other cantons, but not
including, as in this, the power of independent legislation by the popular vote.
Among the former must also be classed those who repudiate all appeal to the
popular voice, whether directly or through representatives.
"It has long
been a cardinal doctrine of the Positivist system that government by the
suffrage, the election of the superior by the inferior, the basing of authority
on the nomination of the majority, is inherently vicious."-Revolution of
the Commune, by Frederick Harrison, Fortnightly Review, May, 1871, p. 571.
The opponents of real representation who fall within the latter of the
two divisions consist; I. of those whoso objections to Cumulative voting
have been considered (see Appendix N, Sec. 13), and who think it not only
right, but an advantage favourable to good government, that the minorities
in every electoral district should have no voice in the election; II. those
who, not enamoured with the results of representative government and
household suffrage, consider that the chances which the restrictions and
anomalies of our existing system offer to the possessors of wealth and
power, to be better safeguards than any accurate expression of popular
thought could be; that in fact the higher order of political intelligence in
the electoral body would be overwhelmed and swept away by the numbers,
stupidity, and corruption arrayed against it; and, III., there are others
who, with Lord Russell, look back on two centuries of parliamentary
government, under great Whig and Tory leaders, as having brought it to
374
APPENDICES.
the utmost perfection that can be achieved, and conclude that "it is difficult
to believe in this age of the world that there are models of government,
still untried, promising a cup of felicity and of freedom which England
has not yet tasted."-Essay on the English Government and Constitution, by
Earl Russell. 1865. Introduction, p. 51.
Against such conclusions all the labours recorded in this work are of
course a protest. It will be enough to leave them to the consideration of
the students of this subject, who will perhaps find in such counter-theories
an explanation of the efforts or courses of political action, whether positive
or negative, to which they lead.
In addition to the progress, both legislative and literary, referred to in
the foregoing pages as having been made in Europe and America in the
last seven years towards the attainment of a just system of electing representa-
tive and governing bodies, the remarkable degree of interest which the
subject has created in Italy, requires especial notice. Some of the first
works published in that country were—
Del Potere Elettorale negli Stati Liberi, Luigi Palma. Milan, 1869.
Teoria della Elezione Politica, Guido Padebetti: Mémoire couronné en
Janvier, 1868, par l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques de Naples,
imprimé en 1870.
La Representanza delle Minoranze nel Parlemento, Ferrario Carlo. Turin,
1870.
Il Suffragio Universale in Italia, par Sidney Sonnino. Firenze, 1870.
Libertà e Democrazia, studi sulla rappresentanza delle minorità. Attilio
Brunialti. Milano, 1871.
Della Libertà e Equivalenza dei Suffragi nelle Elezionè ovvero della Proporzio-
nale Rappresentanza delle Maggioranze e Minoranze. Studio Critico Del'Avv
Francesco Genala. Milano, 1871. This work contains a tabular enumera-
tion of all the publications on the subject heretofore issued, under the heads
of the several countries in which they had appeared: exhibiting the intelli-
gence and the vast industry which the author had brought to the task.
Degli Inconvenienti e dei Pericoli degli attuali sistemi eletorali. Discorso del
Socio Dott Attelio Brunialti. Tipografia Nazionali Paroni, Vicenza, 1871.
In the month of May last, there was founded at Rome the "Associazione
per lo Studio della Rappresentanza Proporzionale." The first meeting was
held on the 10th May, 1872, and attended by the Signori Bonghi, Broglio,
Lazatti, Mamiani, Mancini, Messedaglia, Minghetta, and Perazzi, members
of the Italian Parliament; and Signori Brunialti, Genala, Paddelletti, Sa-
redo, and Allessandro Spada. The programme of the society was issued
in the month of June. Bollettino 1°, Roma, 1872, Stabiliment Cevelli.
Foro Trajano, 37.
Other publications have followed Della Rappresentanza Proporzionale in
Italià, par Sidney Sonnino. Firenze, 1872.
Among the recent works in this country, which have not been mentioned,
or have been but cursorily referred to in the foregoing pages,—are
7
APPENDICES.
375
Speech of J. Stuart Mill, M.P., in the House of Commons, 29th May, 1867.
On Methods of Electing Representatives, by H. R. Droop. London, 1868.
Representative Reform. Report of Committee of Reform League and others
in Mr. Hare's Scheme of Representation. February and March, 1868.
Proportional Representation applied to the Election of Local Governing Bodies,
by H. R. Droop. London, Wildy, 1871.
A Modification of Mr. Hare's Scheme for the Election of Representatives, by
James Thornton Hoskins, B.A., London, Vic. Press, 1871. Second edition.
General Representation, on a complete readjustment and modification of Mr.
Ilare's plan, by Archibald E. Dobbs, M.A. London: Longman, 1872.
Second edition.
Proportional Representation in Large Constituencies, by Walter Baily.
London: Ridgway, 1872.
Sovereignty: Royal and Representative. Westminster Review, July, 1872,
p.1; Redistribution of Political Power, by E. H. Knatchbull Hugessen, M.P.
Macmillan's Magazine, November, 1872, p. 67.
The press of other Continental nations has also contributed to the discus-
sion and propagation of the proposed amendments :-
Representation för minoriteterna genom Val-Lag, Upsala, Kongl. Akad.
Boktryckeriet, 1866.
Die Wahlreform en Europa und Amerika. Zurich, D. Bürkh. 1868.
Unparteiishe Worte zur Zurcherishen Bewegung. Zurich, 1868.
Les Minorités et le Suffrage Universel, par le Baron de Layre. Paris, 1868.
And besides the numerous and valuable works of M. Ernest Naville, referred
to in Appendix A, we must not omit to mention his recent pamphlet,
La Reform Electorale in France. Paris; Didier, 1871.
Since the foregoing pages have been in the press, intelligence has been
received, not only of new efforts in the study and propagation of the prin-
ciples on which representative government must be constituted, if it is to
be true and just, but also of the actual experience which has been gained
of the application of a system of proportional representation in the election
of the House of Representatives in the State of Illinois.
A conference of the Associazione per lo Studio della Rappresentanza
Proporzionale was held in the Accademia dei Georgofili di Firenze, and
was continued by adjournment on the 29th and 30th of June, 1872. A full
report of the discussion-in which the system of exclusive majority repre-
sentation, as especially necessary to be preserved in Italy, having regard to
the respective positions of the Church and State, and to the other circum-
stances of the kingdom, was maintained in argument by Il. Prof. Luchini
against Signori Genala, Pareto, Fontanelli, Brunialti, Ferraris, Sidney
Sonnino, Franchetti, and others, who urged the advantages of the propor-
tional methods-will be found in the Bollettino 2° of the Associazione.
Firenze, co i tipi di M. Cellini. E. C. alla Galileiana, 1872.
376
APPENDICES.
Subsequent conferences were announced: "L'una a Venezia presso
l'Ateneo Veneto nella sera del Dicembre prossimo; L'altra a Genova per
cura della Società di pubbliche letture, nella sera del 5 Gennai, 1873."
Far more instructive than any speculative argument can be, is the report
of the working of even an imperfect proportional system in a populous
state of the Union. The seventh section of the fourth article of the
amended constitution of the State of Illinois provides that "in all elections
to the House of Representatives, each qualified voter may cast as many
votes for one candidate as there are representatives to be elected (viz. three
in each Senatorial district), or may distribute the same, or equal parts
thereof, among the candidates as he shall see fit, and the candidates highest
in votes shall be declared elected." (See p. 349, ante.) This law came into
operation for the first time at the recent election. The comparative strength
of parties was shown in the late Presidential contest. The number of repre-
sentatives to be elected was 153. If each party were to be properly repre-
sented in the House, there would be 85 for the majority, and 68 for the
minority. The Republicans carried 33 districts, and would have had,
under the old system of representation, 99 representatives. The Democrats
carried only 18 districts, and would have had but 54 representatives under
the old system.
The Hon. J. Medill, in a letter to the Cincinnati Commercial (2 Dec.,
1872), thus describes the actual result :-" For the first time in the history
of political organizations, each party is represented from every portion of
the State, and the aggregate representation is exactly in proportion to the
numerical strength of each party. Thus the Republicans have elected 86
members of the House, and the Democrats 67. The Republican vote of the
State was 240,837; the Democratic vote (including O'Conor's) was 187,250.
This would give an average of 2.800 Republican votes cast for each Repub-
lican member, and 2,790 Democratic votes cast for each member of that
persuasion.
What could be more equal or mathematically exact? The majority party
have complete control, but the minority party have just the representation
they are entitled to on principles of equality. Had the House been elected
on the grab-all' method, it would stand, Republican 99, Democrat 54. We
elected our Senate by single districts, and the Republicans carried 33 dis-
tricts and the Democrats but 18. Divide the total Republican vote by the
number of senators elected, and the quotient is about 7,300 votes to each.
Divide the Democratic vote by their senators elected, and their quotient is
10,400. Thus you perceive the Democrats are not nearly represented in the
Senate in proportion to their strength; but in the House, which was elected
on the minority representation plan, they have secured precisely the number
of members they should have on principles of right and justice.
"The practical working of the two systems, viz. the 'grab-all' and the
APPENDICES.
377
proportional, was strikingly exemplified in this county, which is divided
into seven senatorial districts. The Republicans carried 6 of them and the
Democrats only 1; but for the other House, the Democrats elected 8 and the
Republicans 13 members, and that is exactly the number of members each
party was entitled to in proportion to its strength at the polls in this county.
For the first time for many years will the Democrats of this city be re-
presented in the General Assembly by men of their choice and sentiments;
aud for the first time since the Republican party was organized in Illinois
(in 1854) have the Democrats secured a representation from Northern or the
Republicans from Southern Illinois, with rare exceptions. The strongest
and bitterest Democratic districts down in Egypt' have now, for the first
time in the history of existing parties, elected Republicans to the General
Assembly.
"I send you a list of the members elect from all the districts-beginning
with Chicago and ending with Cairo. Mark the number of Republicans
who have been chosen to the House from the Thirty-third to the Fifty-first
District inclusive. These, with two or three exceptions, have heretofore
constituted the Democratic strongholds of our State. Also note the number
of Democrats who have been returned in the districts from the First to the
Twenty-third. (This territory is called 'Canaan' in contradistinction to
'Egypt,' at the opposite end of the State.) From this 'Canaan's fair and
happy land,' Democratic members have, therefore, been as scarce as white
blackbirds.
"Some of the politicians, before the election, predicted that Cumulative
voting would cause so much confusion and mischief that it would have to
be abolished right away. The people, they said, would never comprehend
it, or know how to vote by that method; and the judges of the election,
they predicted, would be unable to count up the votes and make correct
returns. But none of their evil prognostications came to pass. The people
seemed to understand their new power of Cumulative voting, and exercised
it freely. In some instances they elected two Republicans in a Democratic
district, or two Democrats in a Republican district. This was done by
'plumping' for favourite candidates or transferring a part of a vote to a
political opponent on account of his personal merits or popularity. But the
general result did not change the proportional representation of parties.'
The Chicago Times (28th November, 1872) contrasts the result of this
election of representatives, with other elections, especially that of senators,
in which the majority, or as it terms it, the "jug-handle" method has been
retained. Adverting to the statement of Mr. Medill, it observes that, clear
as it is, it still "fails to exhibit with due precision and force the most
remarkable contrast between the new proportional system and the old
'grab-all' system. The Times yesterday directed attention to the fact that
in the new Illinois Congressional delegation, only 250,181 of the 434,252
citizens who sought to gain representation are actually represented, while
378
APPENDICES.
no less than 184,071 of the number seeking representation are actually
unrepresented or misrepresented. The like fact appears no less conspicu-
ously in the election of our State senators. In the seven senatorial districts
in Cook County, 50,355 voters sought to gain representation in the State
senate. Of this number, only 31,935 will be actually represented; leaving
no less than 18,420 wholly unrepresented or misrepresented. The table of
votes, showing the represented and unrepresented voters in each of the
seven senatorial districts, is as follows:-
Districts.
First
Second
Third ..
Fourth
:
•
Fifth
:
Sixth
Seventh
Total
•
•
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Represented.
3,342
6,740
3,995
4,301
6,175
2,663
4,716
31,935
Unrepresented.
2,263
3,077
..
4,109
3,886
:
1,167
2,634
1,281
18,420
"Seven senators to be chosen by 50,355 voters gives 7,193 as the represen-
tative quota. From the table it will be seen that there were two full
quotas of voters, and a surplus of 4,034, making in fact three senatorial
quotas who were unable to choose a single senator, while no more than four
quotas (justly entitled to four senators, but no more) elected all seven of the
senators; taking to themselves a monopoly of the whole senatorial delega-
tion. And this is what 'free and intelligent' American citizens are told
by the professional office-begging politicians is popular representation !
"Some critics of the free vote have expressed fears that it might result
in a great waste of votes.' By 'waste votes' they mean votes that fail to
elect anybody. The 18,420 unrepresented voters shown in the foregoing
table would be described by them as citizens who wasted, or threw away,
their votes. They threw away their votes' because the law arbitrarily
excluded them from the right of representation, and conferred upon four
representative quotas all the representatives (senators) to which seven
quotas were entitled. They threw away their votes' because the law
in order to give a monopoly of the representation to a part of the consti-
tuency disfranchised them in the Senate of Illinois.
،،
But how was it in the choice of representatives, by the same voters, for
the other branch of the Legislature, in which choice the free or cumulative
vote prevailed? How many voters in the seven Cook County districts.
'threw away their votes,' or failed to gain representation, under the opera-
tion of the new system? The following table shows the number of repre-
sented and (apparently) unrepresented voters, in each of the same districts,
under a free vote:-
APPENDICES.
379
Districts.
First
Second
Third ..
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
..
Seventh
Total ..
:
•
:
Represented.
Unrepresented.
4,448
993
7,906
1,799
6,798
204
7,491
1,018
4,945
1,109
3,870
1,520
4,927
834
40,385
7,477
"This table shows that the whole number of voters in the seven Cook
County districts, who sought to be represented in the Lower House of the
Legislature, was 47,862, of which number 40,385 actually gained a repre-
sentative or representatives of their choice. In reality, the number who
actually gained representation was much more than that, and the number
who failed to gain representation much less than 7,477. The column 'un-
represented' in this table is reduced from all the votes given to candi-
dates that were not elected, and is therefore largely made up of voters
who gave only a portion of their three votes to the defeated candidate
and the rest to a successful candidate. All such are, therefore, not unre-
presented, but are actually represented by one representative of their
choice. The actual number of unrepresented would, of course, be only
those voters who gave all their votes to a defeated candidate. It is im-
possible to ascertain the exact number of such, without an examination
of the ballots. It may, however, be fairly presumed that the actual
number of voters in the seven districts who failed to gain representation
would exclude a few more than those who, in the Third, Sixth, and
Seventh Districts, voted plumpers' for Mr. Lowe (204), Mr. Bucking-
ham (600), and Mr. Plowe (324). Assuming this to be the fact, the total
number of voters in an aggregate of 47,862, who, by the use of the free or
cumulative vote, failed to gain representation, was only 1,128.
'
"The comparison, then, of the results of the old and new system, operating
side by side in these seven districts, at the same election, is as follows:-
Old system
New system
C.
Voters
Represented.
31,935
46,734
Voters
Unrepresented.
18,420
1,128
"These facts are recommended to the thoughtful consideration of all men
who believe in popular representative government."
The evident fairness and justice of this distribution of political power
between the great parties in the State would seem to have awakened a
patriotic enthusiasm in the press in favour of proportional representation.
Adverting elsewhere to the results of the election of the Lower House, the
Chicago Times (Nov. 20, 1872) says:-"Such are some of the more than
gratifying results of the 'free vote' upon its first trial in Illinois. Such
380
APPENDICES.
practical demonstrations of the eminent justice of proportional representa-
tion in its actual results speak more convincingly in its favour than whole
volumes of argument would do. Indeed, the happy results of the first
trial of the proportional system upon so extensive a scale render further
argument in its support almost needless. By its results in actual opera-
tion, the proportional system has already established its superior merits
beyond the reach of cavil or doubt."
-
The Chicago Daily Tribune (Nov. 21, 1872), summing up the same results,
concludes "There are a number of defeated candidates who declare
minority representation a humbug, and demand its repeal at the earliest
possible time; but, on the whole, it has worked admirably; it has secured
the great end sought, and has enabled the people, in many instances, to
defeat the objectionable candidates by the election of better men. The
principle of minority representation has been fully vindicated by the
results."
The World adds-" If the work of this 'reformed' House of Representa-
tives makes good the promise given, by the nearly equally balanced state
of parties and the defeat of objectionable candidates at the polls, we may
expect to see the principle which has brought about these results incor-
porated into the various State constitutions."
LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHaring cross.
3
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