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Of the first ten of th
|bly more widely
| than he is to-aay.
|; of his great reviva
º &Jitº AR&R.E.
The public life of
riod of more than f |#
labor, visiting
, and holding
*r the people
Self under the
ſcandidate for
ed in 1824 as
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mºry tougwed ſº
‘inney was at ||
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# State (ºf New Yor an evangel- š .
- neighboring to WTJS E. $n years, and | tº: ū.
Cities Of New En Éɺ (GNY:” – sºrºss Sº # er towns and º º
years, he has purs E. tº j##| as Philadel- *ś.
probably not less e. #: Nºji=# of New Eng- |º].
-—a wºrk charged É \)#|| movement of ſºjº
but somewhat hid É \!/## New School ãº,
men. The generati É • §§§ ecame prom- sº
power has mostly pa 5 §: sºft 'inney's man- Fº
Mr. Finney was bo Fº ºf | Was Without º £
Conn.,-that cradl * \!\! & sºft note or paper ſºſ:
men; but at the age fºW º sºft a time to the ºf:
of emigration bºre ##$ § :* §§§ his seul was §º
ty, N. Y., and two #sº *GSã# reat truths of tº
the wilderness of É. #4. Šºš is: *...ºf # he did not de lºſ.
the fºontier of civili: EHFº:## ilooked upon jºjº
His early advantag ÉÉ, º PiłłºsłNTED BY THE º # idea of their ſº
very limited— conf #ºl Heins of ſºllāī sequent years ºº
School as it then ex. HHI $la, vºw. E.ca, owe.liº # selecting his Nº.
try. At the age o HH & Rºw.”!ºg Hi reaching and ſºlº.
ing and in study at d ÉÉls º: #F# With him in- àſº
||. was in his mind to el Éliſ; º
| he read Latin and Eſſ | his clºldren | Nº.
but his teacher d tense and ex- $ºgº
# ground that he coul strength, he º
| years the work , Jua, ea or a tour --~~~~~~~~~~9 was errange of a church ſº. iº
| years' course. He then went back to Jef. ºld cºngregation, gathered in the old Chat- ſº
ferson county and entered upon the ham Street. Theater, of New York, trans- ºg
Study of law at Adams. formed into a chapel, . A half-dezen or º º
The removal of his family to the new more Free Presbyterian churches sprung up fºtº,
country in his earliest years inad separated ºf this Wºrk in New Yºrk ºf
him from all ºdvantages of religions educa City, and at length the old Broadway Tab- êº tº:
tion. The Sabbath.gºbool was unknown. ernacle Was built, With an immense audi- º
The only preaching that, he heard was an enge rººm, after, Mr. Finney's own plan, Etº
occasional discourse by soone illiterate man, and a Qongregational Church was organ- §ſ
who could not command his respect. This ized, of which he was made pastor. ... kºrº
deficiency was not inade good py the influ- About his lime hºmen and the churches Riº.
cºnce at home. He knew little of the gºld. | –Presbyterian and Congregational-inter- tº
The first copy ina, he over owned or stud. ested in this religious movement felt the º {.. ..
ied he bought as a book of reference in his ºf 8 ºr tº prºfit their views, and gº
study of the jaw ºccuse ſº found is of ºn || the New York ºvangelºst was established ſº,
quoted as an an hority, , , he was ad. 'ead. º: º: º w `. Ol' º º Ž -
er of the choir in the Presbyterian cºntroll | * º º º º: lº º, º §§ * '... ."
till U.S. 8 jºus became à roºt ºr at- ' | aſltl-Si-ºº!' & arose in the country Rºbº
* * º sº º º about the same time, and to a great extent § St.
even upon the prayer-meetings, and thus | cºrried With it the ºn interested in the re. º º:
at length became intensely interested in the 㺠º º ººº º ğſº
testions of life and godliness. | decided spoken upt s great pº
Q After some ºf of great conflict and " guestion. The ºppºsition ºrollied Wii º ğ. $º
darkness, he lockci the door of his office treme and, Violent, and mºbs ºttacked the º
early one morning, and repaired to the . §. dwellings of º º º º Ǻ:
woods a sbort distance from the viºlage, re. Fº wº WęIG pºem, RIl º W }; * jº.
solved to settle the great question before ºted *ill º º . §§
him. At noon he jetºned with an over . º, i. . tion of \; L e; * . pººr.
whelming sense of God's love and a bap. X*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*, fººtº
tism of zeal and fervor and power upon him Finney º *:::::::: Of º al sº
whº ch never seemed to waver during the º W . rº º '; º º h . }º tº
fifty years of bis public life and labor. He #ºp #. * ić. º: hº
# dropped his work in his chosen profession | | Ena ist S f atl in reased in nnec- º
|| almost as suddenly as the sons of Zebedee º'º".Y. i early inc . nev i. ‘. Sº
left their nets at the call of the Master. The Hºhº. º º thºvo . 9. Fºrºy
morning aſter this wonderful experience .º º I Fº .*g TOSUl *:::: sº.
one of the deacops of the church came into tº * ". . sº º º
| fic office to remind Mr. Finney of a suit of Fºº a wide sale in this cºuntry ºf ſºlº
* ... j 1, ; , ; - © g & and in Europe, down to the present time. tº
his in court, which was coming on at two A. m had been fitted up in the Broad- tº
| o'clock in the afternoon. Said Mr. º way H. intended . a theological º
* 4-4 iſ haci § ** * * * * !, A. £ ** { (Nº. (; ,
. . . . ..., | ºur roºm where it was propossiina º
P. #. €nt Out º and with | Mr. Finney should;instruct young men pre: £º
lº. ‘. if Wę ial\tly a | paring for the ministry in the doctrines of ºº).
*— — line Christian faith and in the methods of -- *







































































hº Christian work; *...*. *.º # sº-sº ºn *Ye z *
ºf for the purpºse a Jarge portiºn of the stu- . * -
§:# dents # Lane #; Seminary, near º e lºº. tº: o;
; ºn atí, of which Dr. Lyman #éecher with the late 2: . i. f th -
jºº was the head, being forbidden by the trus: Collège for many weeks.” . same
4 tees to discuss the slavery question, had hospitable boarding-house in this city, Fig.
{} withdrawn from the school in a body, and during one of his revival campaigns
§ſſi commeneed sudy by themselves. Many here, it was our lot to see and hear %
º, of these young men, had been converted much of this extraordinary man. He
* in the revivals in which Mr. Finney had was really a great man in the sense
%
*
i
:
ºſ-
º; labored. Arthur Tappan proposed to Mr. that he had a well-balanced, well-fur-Fºſ.
# Finney to go to Ohio and prepare these 'nished mind, extraordinary decision ºſº
º; young, men for the ministry, offering to of character, natural and acquired ſº
*: meet the whole expense of the enterprise. 'gifts of argumentative oratory, and & º
* | Mr. Fineey hesitated; but while the matter that forcible utterance of alarming sº
º º #. º dº º: ...truths which never failed to bring *º ;
º-s, land, the founder O xer, in Gollege, and " * + 2. ſº
ºf Mr Mahan, pastor of a Presbyterian church down the house upon its knees. But º s
with all this he was often so quaint,
Se:
3.
§ſº
in Cincinnati and trusteegf Hanº Sºminary, so odd, so strained in manner, matter Pºº
reached New York, and laid before Mr. dimethod to largely discount his fºº
ºf Fingº, the Tappans and others their plan iº9. i o, º . Sl sº
..º. to invite the seceding Lane students to |greatness and diminish his usefulness. ãº
tº obertin, organize a neological department, There was, moreover, a sternness of Sºx
§§ and cal; Mr. Finney to the chair of theology. dignity, in his carriage Which lent &gºš
&
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§§
&
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… The plan was approved. The New York |small aid to his evangelistic pulpit ś
men pledged the endowment of eight | work; for the small, Sweet courtesies tº
professorships in Oberlin College. Arthur of life were not much in his line and &
2-
s
-
sº,
. .
*
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* Tappan privately informed Mr Finney that had little to do with his success in re-º * TY---
ſº his own annual income was $100,000, and vival work. In fact, we never knew :**ś :\
º he pledged the whole of it to the enterprise, of a case where the winning of soulsº ºš
ºf as it might be needed, beyond the moderate to Christ had so little assistance from Sº
ſy.` expenses of his farmily. the preacher's winning ways.-New :º)
Thus, in 1835, Mr. Finney went to 9ber- - L. Mºſz-r -
lin, and there during the last - forty years York. Mail. . .
he has pursued his work as professor, , , , , – i. i. 3 T 1. - 1 , ºr * * * : 1 - - , T: if il
presſiºn ºne cºlºgº from is; toº, Finney holds that Christ did not satisfy ſº sº
* -ºº º- &c--> Çı.
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º
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and pastor of the First church from 1836 retributive justic , but only public justice, º s
to 1873 and more than any other maa has by honoring the jaw both in j.is obedience sº
moulded the thought and life of the col- and death, tº as rendering it safe to pardon ºf º,
lege and ihe community. # the sin of any one who would repent and & * > *
Intenseky consecrated to the single pur. believe. He says the old theology was (1) § Yº:
pose of saving men, he , was yet a man of that Christ perfectly obeyed for the elect, tºJ:
most genial nature, and broad sympathies; which obedience is imputed to them, so jºš.
appreciative of all human interess, and j that they have fully obeyed in their sº
| ºilº & Hºrrºr ſº
j power such as few men . peaalty of the la jºst as i. so obedience §
| possessed. i had bºoſ. isºlºred (3) Aſte. º, double 3
These last years of his life have been I alsº tºº sles. are resºred to, c. jºg
"º marked by a quiet and restful cheerful. P.” tº sºon º ten render- sº
A mess as he has laid aside, one after another, , ed. , (4) tº jus; in Šuli sãºg been j Zºº
the responsibilities he has borne so long, ºlder. twice over, the exect are dis-º
§ although, as his frequent contributions to charged as an act of infinite grace. They §
'º our own columns bear witness, he was ever , are saved by grace on principles of jus- *
ready to answer a call for service. At last 'tice, so that there is no grace in our for-5 ºš
he rests from his labors, and his works & giveness, but the whole grace is in the §
follow him.—N.Y. Independent. /3237 obedience and suffering of Christ.' 3 &é- s
p * -->v -
ory, 2 vols. 8vo., 15s. &
-
*
,’
*
Berkeley's (Bishop). Theological and Miscellaneous works,
With Translation of the Notes and Essays, 2 vols. 8vo., 10s. 6d.
Bridge's Theological Works,
l’rincipally Sermons, 5 vols. 8vo., ll. 4s.
;
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sº
W. Tegg and Co., 85, Queen Street, Cheapside, London.
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LE CTU RES
QN
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,
EMBR_A CIN G
3łłurſil (ſêmurruſIIriſt,
THE ATONEMENT, MORAL AND PHYSICAL DEPRAVITY,
NATURAL, MORAL, AND GRACIOUS ABILITY, REPENTANCE, FAITH,
JUSTIFICATION, SANCTIFICATION, &c.
D. Y. THE
REV, CHARLEs G. FINNEY,
PROFESSO R OF TH F O LOGY IN T H E O B E R LIN COLLEGI MTE INSTITUTE, O Ei I Q, A Mi E.R.I.C.A.
Jht milmlr murk fruiti, Éillarſt. Iñi ſãrill IT-III.iiiri hiſ fir luffſir,
D'U FIN G. HIS LATE VISIT TO EN G-LAND.
EDITE AND REVISED, T. . . . . . . . . . IF.C. U CIICl.
|SY T : , 3.
REV. GEORGE REDFORD, D.D., LL.D.,
tº F W Q R C C S T E S.
LONDON :
WILLIAM TEGG AND Co., S5, QUEEN STREET,
C HEAPSID E.
1 S.) 1.
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* * *
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ENTERED AT ST.ATION ERS’ II.A.L. L.
PR E FA C E B Y THE EDITOR.
THE Lectures of the Rev. PROFESSOR FINNEY, which are here
given to the British public, were first delivered to the class of
theological students at the Oberlin College, America, and sub-
sequently published there. They were unknown in this country,
except to a few of the Author's personal friends, until his arrival in
England, about two years since. His name, however, was well
known, and several of his works had been extensively read.
The Editor having had the pleasure and honour of forming a
personal acquaintance with the Author soon after his arrival in this
country, did not long remain ignorant of his Theological Lectures.
After the first hasty perusal of them, he ventured strongly to
recommend their publication, both for the sake of making the
British churches better acquainted with the Author's doctrinal
views, and also on account of the direct benefit which students, and
other inquirers into the theory of gospel doctrines, would be likely
to derive from a work so argumentative, and so unlike all the
works on systematic and dogmatic theology known to the English
schools. After due consultation and deliberation the Author
pressed upon the Editor the work of revision, and placed the
Lectures in his hands, with the request that he would read them
carefully, and suggest such alterations as he might deem desirable
to adapt the work to the English reader; and then submit the
whole to the Author's adoption or rejection.
This task the Editor undertook, and has performed in the best
manner his time and ability would allow. The Author has carefully
A.
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iy PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.
examined every part of his work again, and made such corrections
and alterations as to him seemed needful. The Editor has merely
Performed the part of a friend, in suggesting such improvements as
might make the Author's meaning better understood; but without
interfering with that meaning, and without intending to give it an
unqualified approbation. In fact, the Lectures have been to a
considerable extent re-written by the Author, and in this edition
Proceed as strictly from his own pen, as in the American edition.
There is another important circumstance with which the reader
should be made acquainted, which will enhance the value of this
edition, and render it highly preferable to the American ; it is this:
on the publication of these Lectures they attracted the attention of
many able theologians in America, and were severely attacked by
the periodical press. The Author replied at considerable length to
the most learned and distinguished of his critics, fairly and fully
meeting every objection that had been urged against his views.
The present edition incorporates the substance of these objections
with the replies of the Author.
The Editor, however, would not have ventured to recommend the
publication of these Lectures in this country, if he had not deemed
them, as a whole, eminently deserving the attention and examina-
tion of British theologians. When they first came into his hands,
they struck him as so pleasingly unlike all the other systems of
dogmatic theology and moral philosophy it had ever been his lot to
peruse, so thorough in their grappling with difficulties, and often
so successful in the solution of them; so skilfully adjusted to
modern metaphysical speculations, and so comprehensive of what is
valuable in them; so manifestly the production of a masculine
intellect and independent thinker, that he was not only pleased
with the air of freshness and originality thrown over old themes of
dry and elaborate discussion, but greatly benefited and instructed
by some of the Author's views of important moral and theological
questions. It may not be the same with all the Author's English
readers; but assuredly few will rise from the perusal of the whole
work without confessing that, at least, they have seen some points
in a new and impressive light, have been constrained to think more
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. V
closely of the opinions they hold, and in other respects have been
benefited by the perusal.
As a contribution to theological science, in an age when vague
speculation and philosophical theories are bewildering many among
all denominations of Christians, this work will be considered by all
competent judges to be both valuable and seasonable. Upon several
important and difficult subjects the Author has thrown a clear and
valuable light which will guide many a student through perplexities
and difficulties which he had long sought unsuccessfully to explain.
The Editor frankly confesses, that when a student he would gladly
have bartered half the books in his library to have gained a single
perusal of these Lectures; and he cannot refrain from expressing
the belief, that no young student of theology will ever regret the
purchase or perusal of Mr. Finney's Lectures.
One recommendation he begs respectfully to offer to all readers
whether old or young; it is this: suspend your judgment of the
Author and his theology until you have gone completely through
his work. On many subjects, at the outset of the discussion,
startling propositions may be found which will clash with your
settled opinions; but if you will calmly and patiently await the
Author's explanation, and observe how he qualifies some strong or
novel assertions, you will most probably find in the issue, that you
have less reason than you supposed to object to his statements.
In many respects Mr. Finney's theological and moral system will
be found to differ both from the Calvinistic and Arminian. In fact,
it is a system of his own, if not in its separate portions, yet in its
construction; and as a whole is at least unique and compact; a
system which the Author has wrought out for himself, with little
other aid than what he has derived from the fount itself of heavenly
truth, and his own clear and strong perception of the immutable
moral principles and laws by which the glorious Author of the
universe governs all his intellectual creatures.
There is one circumstance that will recommend the volume, and
ought to recommend it, to impartial inquirers who are not bound
to the words of any master save their divine One; it is, that the
Author in his youth was trained in none of the theological schools
A 2
vi PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.
of his country, and had imbibed, therefore, no educational prefer-
ence for one system more than another. He had been disciplined
to argumentation, logic, and the laws of evidence, in a very differ-
ent arena; and had advanced in the science of the Law before
he had felt the truth of Christianity, or thought of studying its
doctrines. His views, therefore, will be found more deserving of
attention and examination, from the fact of his mental independence
in the formation of them.
Should the work be read in a calm, devout, unprejudiced and
liberal spirit, there can be no doubt that the reader will derive both
pleasure and instruction. The earnestness, single-mindedness, deep
piety, and eminent usefulness of the Author, both as a preacher
and lecturer, justly entitle this production of his pen to the candid
and patient investigation of English divines.
Apart from the peculiarities which will be observed, and the
critical objections to which some will deem his theology justly
liable, there can be no doubt that many will find in it a treasure of
inestimable worth, a key to many perplexing enigmas, and a power-
ful reinforcement of their faith in the Christian verities. With at
least the hope that such will be the effects of its publication in
England, the Editor has cheerfully contributed his humble aid, and
now commits the work to the blessing of Him by whose Word of
Truth its real value must be finally tested.
G. R.
Worcester, 1851.
PR E FA C E B Y THE AUTH 0 R.
1. To a great extent, the truths of the blessed gospel have been hidden
under a false philosophy. In my early inquiries on the subject of religion,
I found myself wholly unable to understand either the oral or written
instructions of uninspired religious teachers. They seemed to me to re-
solve all religion into states either of the intellect or of the sensibility,
which my consciousness assured me were wholly passive or involuntary.
When I sought for definitions and explanations, I felt assured that they
did not well understand themselves. I was struck with the fact that
they so seldom defined, even to themselves, their own positions. Among
the words of most frequent use I could find scarcely a single term
intelligibly defined. I inquired in what sense the terms “regeneration,”
“faith,” “repentance,” “love,” &c., were used, but could obtain no answer,
at which it did not appear to me that both reason and revelation revolted.
The doctrines of a nature, sinful per se, of a necessitated will, of inability,
and of physical regeneration, and physical Divine influence in regenera-
tion, with their kindred and resulting dogmas, embarrassed and even
confounded me at every step. I often said to myself, “If these things
are really taught in the Bible, I must be an infidel.” But the more
I read my Bible, the more clearly I saw that these things were not
found there upon any fair principles of interpretation, such as would be
admitted in a court of justice. I could not but perceive that the true
idea of moral government had no place in the theology of the church ;
and, on the contrary, that underlying the whole system were the assump-
tions that all government was physical, as opposed to moral, and that
sin and holiness are rather natural attributes, than moral, voluntary acts.
These errors were not stated in words, but I could not fail to see that
they were assumed. The distinction between original and actual sin,
and the utter absence of a distinction between physical and moral
depravity, embarrassed me. Indeed, I was satisfied either that I must be
an infidel, or that these were errors that had no place in the Bible. I
was often warned against reasoning and leaning to my own under-
standing. I found that the discriminating teachers of religion were
driven to confess that they could not establish the logical consistency of
their system, and that they were obliged to shut their eyes and believe,
when revelation seemed to conflict with the affirmations of reason.
But this course I could not take. I found, or thought I found, nearly
all the doctrines of Christianity embarrassed by the assumptions above-
named. But the Spirit of God conducted me through the darkness, and
delivered me from the labyrinth and fog of a false philosophy, and set
my feet upon the rock of truth, as I trust. But to this day I meet with
those who seem to me to be in much confusion upon most of the practi-
cal doctrines of Christianity. They will admit, that sin and holiness
must be voluntary, and yet speak of regeneration as consisting in any-
thing but a voluntary change, and of Divine influence in regeneration;
as anything but moral or persuasive. They seem not at all aware of
viii PREFACE.
What must follow from, and be implied in, the admission of the existence
of moral government, and that sin and holiness must be free and
Voluntary acts and states of mind. In this work I have endeavoured to
define the terms used by Christian divines, and the doctrines of Chris-
tianity, as I understand them, and to push to their logical consequences
the cardinal admissions of the more recent and standard theological
writers. Especially do I urge, to their logical consequences, the two admis-
sions that the will is free, and that sin and holiness are voluntary acts of
mind.
I also undertake to show that the freedom of the will is a first truth of
reason, and that sin and holiness must be voluntary. I will not presume
that I have satisfied others upon the points I have discussed, but I have
succeeded at least in satisfying myself. I regard the assertion, that the
doctrines of theology cannot preserve a logical consistency throughout, as
both dangerous and ridiculous.
2. My principal design in publishing on Systematic Theology at first,
was to furnish my pupils with a class or text book, wherein many points
and questions were discussed of great practical importance, but which
have not, to my knowledge, been discussed in any system of theological
instruction extant. I also hoped to benefit other studious and pious
minds.
3. I have written for those who are willing to take the trouble of
thinking and of forming opinions of their own on theological questions.
It has been no part of my aim to spare my pupils or any one else the
trouble of intense thought. Had I desired to do so, the subjects dis-
cussed would have rendered such an attempt abortive.
4. There are many questions of great practical importance, and ques-
tions in which multitudes are taking a deep interest at present, that
cannot be intelligently settled without instituting fundamental inquiries
involving the discussion of those questions that lie at the foundation of
morality and religion.
5. I am too well acquainted with the prejudices of the great mass of
professing Christians, and with their unwillingness to be at the pains of
studying elementary truths and of judging for themselves, to expect that
this book will soon find favour with the majority of them. Still I am
aware, that a spirit of inquiry into the fundamental and elementary truths
of religion, and of all Science, is abroad, and is waking up more and more
in the church. There is a deep and growing demand for explanation in
regard to the subjects discussed in this work. Especially is this true of
ministers and leading laymen and women. This book is a humble at-
tempt to meet this demand. My object has been to simplify and explain.
The book has no literary merit, and claims none.
6. The book is highly metaphysical. This however is owing to the
nature of the subject. The subject is, “Mind in its relations to Moral
Law.” Hence the discussion, to be anything to the purpose, must be me-
taphysical. To avoid metaphysics in such a discussion were to waive
my subject, and to write about something else.
7. Most of the subjects of dispute among Christians at the present
day are founded in misconceptions upon the subjects discussed in this
volume. If I have succeeded in settling the questions which I have
discussed, we shall see, that in a future volume most of the subjects of
disagreement among Christians at the present day can be satisfactorily
adjusted with comparative ease.
PREFACE. IX
8. What I have said on “Moral Law” and on the “Foundation of Moral
Obligation” is the key to the whole subject. Whoever masters and un-
derstands these can readily understand all the rest. But he who will not
possess himself of my meaning upon these subjects, will not understand
the rest.
9. Let no one despair in commencing the book, nor stumble at the
definitions, thinking that he can never understand so abstruse a subject.
Remember that what follows is an expansion and an explanation by way
of application, of what you find so condensed in the first pages of the
book. My brother, sister, friend—read, study, think, and read again.
You were made to think. It will do you good to think; to develope your
powers by study. God designed that religion should require thought, in-
tense thought, and should thoroughly develope our powers of thought.
The Bible itself is written in a style so condensed as to require much
intense study. Many know nothing of the Bible or of religion, because
they will not think and study. I do not pretend to so explain theology
as to dispense with the labour of thinking. I have no ability and no
wish to do so.
10. If any of my brethren think to convince me of error, they must
first understand me, and show that they have read the book through, and
that they understand it, and are candidly inquiring after truth and not
“striving for masteries.” If my brother is inquiring after truth, I will,
by the grace of God, “hear with both ears, and then judge.” But I
will not promise to attend to all that cavillers may say, nor to notice what
those impertinent talkers and writers may say or write who must have
controversy. But to all honest inquirers after truth I would say, hail
iny brother | Let us be thorough. Truth shall do us good.
11. This work, as was expected, has been freely criticised and
reviewed in the United States. Several periodicals have highly com-
mended it, and others have condemned it. Of the commendations, I
have said nothing in this edition. To the reviews condemnatory, I
have replied, and my replies will be found either in the body of the
work or in the Appendix. To these replies, I beg leave to call the reader's
particular attention, and hope he will give them an attentive reading.
No answer has ever been made to any of them. The reader will see why.
It will be seen that reference is had in the body of the work to Mahan's
Moral, Philosophy. That author objected only to my views of the
ground of obligation. I have introduced a very brief critique upon
his views, and given a laconie reply to his strictures on my own.
After the most attentive consideration of all that has been written, I
have seen no cause to change my views upon any point of doctrine con-
tained in the American edition of this work. This volume is therefore
the same as to doctrine as were the two volumes of the former edition.
I have, however, for the sake of perspicuity, omitted considerable of
the discussions contained in those volumes, and have written and intro-
duced several new lectures in this. In some places I have amplified,
and explained, and in others abridged ; so that considerable changes
in the form of the work have been introduced.
It is my earnest hope, that reviewers in this country may not follow
the example of those American reviewers to whom I have replied, and
which replies will be found in this volume. Those reviewers did In Ot
take pains to understand the work they reviewed, as the reader win see,
The Princeton reviewer stated in the outset the necessity of reading
X PREFACE.
the work through, and omitting no part or sentence, as a condition of
understanding it, and yet unfortunately he immediately betrayed his
ignorance of the work. Dr. Duffield, as I was informed, read my reply
to Princeton, and acknowledged its conclusiveness, but thought he could
prove my book to be highly heretical. Of his attempt the reader will
judge. I am not aware that any complaint has been made that I either
misunderstood or unfairly represented my reviewers in any respect.
12. It will be seen that the present volume contains only a part of a
course of Systematic Theology. Should the entire course ever appear
before the public, one volume will precede, and another succeed the
present one. I published this volume first, because it contains all the
|Points upon which I have been supposed to differ from the commonly
received views. As a teacher of theology, I thought it due to the church
and to the world, to give them my views upon those points upon which
I had been accused of departing from the common opinions of Christians.
13. It is not my intention to set myself before the British public as a
teacher of my ministerial brethren ; but since my orthodoxy has been
extensively called in question in England, as well as in America, and
since I have spent some months in propagating what I hold to be the
gospel, in different parts of this country, it is no more than justice that
this work should be put within your reach, that all may understand my
views who will study for themselves.
14. I beg that no false issues may be made by any one. The question
is not, what is English or American orthodoxy. It is not what have
been the views of any uninspired man or set of men, but what is true
in theology. The question is not, whether this volume accords with the
past or present views of the church, but does it accord with the word of
God.
15. I have not yet been able to stereotype my theological views, and
have ceased to expect ever to do so. The idea is preposterous. None
but an omniscient mind can continue to maintain a precise identity of
views and opinions. Finite minds, unless they are asleep or stultified by
prejudice, must advance in knowledge. The discovery of new truth will
modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process
with finite minds in any world. True Christian consistency does not
consist in stereotyping our opinions and views, and in refusing to make
any improvement lest we should be guilty of change, but it consists in
holding our minds open to receive the rays of truth from every quarter
and in changing our views and language and practice as often and as fast,
as we can obtain further information. I call this Christian consistency,
because this course alone accords with a Christian profession. A Chris-
tian profession implies the profession of candour and of a disposition to
know and to obey all truth. It must follow, that Christian consistency
implies continued investigation and change of views and practice corre-
sponding with increasing knowledge. No Christian, therefore, and no
theologian should be afraid to change his views, his language, or his
practices in conformity with increasing light. The prevalence of such a
fear would keep the world, at best, at a perpetual stand-still, on all sub-
jects of science, and consequently all improvements would be precluded.
Every uninspired attempt to frame for the church an authoritative
standard of opinion which shall be regarded as an unquestionable exposi-
tion of the word of God, is not only impious in itself, but it is also a tacit
assumption of the fundamental dogma of Papacy. The Assembly of
PREFACE. xi
Divines did more than to assume the necessity of a Pope to give law to
the opinions of men ; they assumed to create an immortal one, or rather
to embalm their own creed, and preserve it as the Pope of all generations:
or it is more just to say, that those who have adopted that confession of
faith and catechism as an authoritative standard of doctrine, have absurdly
adopted the most obnoxious principle of Popery, and elevated their con-
fession and catechism to the Papal throne and into the place of the Holy
Ghost. That the instrument framed by that assembly should in the
nineteenth century be recognized as the standard of the church, or of an
intelligent branch of it, is not only amazing, but I must say that it is
highly ridiculous. It is as absurd in theology as it would be in any other
branch of science, and as injurious and Stultifying as it is absurd and
ridiculous. It is better to have a living than a dead Pope. If we must
have an authoritative expounder of the word of God, let us have a living
one, so as not to preclude the hope of improvement. “A living dog is
better than a dead lion ; so a living Pope is better than a dead and
stereotyped confession of faith, that holds all men bound to subscribe to
its unalterable dogmas and its unvarying terminology.
16. I hold myself sacredly bound, not to defend these positions at all
events, but on the contrary, to subject every one of them to the most
thorough discussion, and to hold and treat them as I would the opinions
of any one else ; that is, if upon further discussion and investigation I see
no cause to change, I hold them fast: but if I can see a flaw in any one
of them, I shall amend or wholly reject it, as a further light shall demand.
Should I refuse or fail to do this, I should need to blush for my folly and
inconsistency, for I say again, that true Christian consistency implies pro-
gress in knowledge and holiness, and such changes in theory and in practice
as are demanded by increasing light.
On the strictly fundamental questions in theology, my views have not,
for many years, undergone any change, except as I have clearer apprehen-
sions of them than formerly, and should now state some of them, perhaps,
in some measure, differently from what I should then have done.
THE AUTHOR.
London, 27th March, 1851.
CONTENTS.
LECTURE I.
PAGE
Various classes of truths, and how the
mind attains to a knowledge of them
LECTURE II.
MoR A L G ov ERNMENT.
Definition of the term law *
Distinction between physical and moral
law . e º e s tº e
The essential attributes of moral law .
Subjectivity—Objectivity º
Liberty, as opposed to necessity
Fitness - -
Universality. ë º *
Impartiality . & t º e
Justice º e e * e Q
Practicability
Independence . * tº a
Immutability . º & º º
Unity . º e º º e
Equity . º t &
Expediency e & & e
Exclusiveness . e e tº
LECTURE III.
MoRAl GoverNMENT—Continued.
Definition of the term government
Distinction between moral and physical
government e •
The fundamental reason of moral go-
Vernment . * º e © º
Whose right it is to govern º *
What is implied in the right to govern
Point out the limits of this right
What is implied in moral government
Moral obligation º º º
The conditions of moral obligation .
Remarks . º & º e
LECTURE IV.
MoRAL GovERNMENT.—Continued.
Man a subject of moral obligation
Extent of moral obligation & *
Shown by an appeal to reason, or to
natural theology, to what acts and
states of mind moral obligation
cannot directly extend . º c
Shown to what acts and states of mind
moral obligation must directly ex-
tend . • º e - e
To what acts and mental states moral
obligation indirectly extends . e
l
| 9
20
21
23
24
26
ib.
27
34
$b.
35
36
LECTURE W.
FounDATION OF MoRAL OBLIGATION.
PAGE
What is intended by the foundation of
moral obligation . e * . 42
The extent of moral obligation . . ib.
Remind you of the distinction between
the ground and conditions of obli-
gation . e e e e . ib.
Points of agreement among the prin-
cipal parties in this discussion . ib.
Wherein they disagree 46
That the sovereign will of God is not
the foundation of moral obligation . 46
The theory of Paley e d . 50
The utilitarian philosophy . . . 52
LECTURE WI.
Fou NDATION OF MoRAL OBLIGATION. FALSE
TIIEORIES.
The theory that regards right as the
foundation of moral obligation . 54
LECTURE VII.
Found ATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. FALSE
THEORIES.
The theory that the goodness or moral
excellence of God is the ſoundation
of moral obligation º tº . 65
LECTURE WIII.
FounDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. FALSE
THEORIES.
The philosophy which teaches that
moral order is the foundation of mo-
ral obligation - º º º
The theory that maintains that the
nature and relations of moral beings
is the true foundation of moral obli-
gation . e º te . . 83
The theory that teaches that moral
obligation is founded in the idea of
duty . º - º e º
That philosophy which teaches the
complexity of the foundation of
moral obligation º º . . 87
82
84
CONTENTS.
X #11
LECTURE IX.
Found ATION of OBLIGATION.
PAGE
Another form of the theory that affirms
the complexity of the foundation of
moral obligation ; complex however
only in a certain sense 90
LECTURE X.
Foun DATION OF OBLIGATION.
The intrinsic absurdity of various
theories e © - º . 99
LECTURE XI.
Summing up . º e º 103
LECTURE XII.
Foun DATION of MoRAL OBLIGATION.
PRACTICAL BEARINGS OF THE DIFFERENT
' Tſh EURIES.
The theory that regards the sovereign
will of God as the foundation of
moral obligation º e . 115
The theory of the selfish school
The natural and necessary results of
utilitarianism . 4. º º º
LECTURE XIII.
Obedience cannot be partial in the PAGE
sense that the subject ever does or
can partly obey and partly disobey
at the same time . & & . ib.
Can the will at the same time make
opposite choices 2 . . +º . . ib.
The choice of an ultimate end is, and
must be, the supreme preference of
the mind . © º tº . ib.
An intelligent choice must respect
ends or means. º e . . 136
No choice whatever can be made in-
consistent with the present choice
of an ultimate end - º . ib.
Inquiry respecting the strength or in-
tensity of the choice º . ib.
The law does not require the constant
and most intense action of the will . ib.
An intention cannot be right and honest
in kind, and deficient in the degree
of intensity . e º e . 137
Examination of the philosophy of the
question, whether sin and holiness
consist in supreme, ultimate, and
opposite choices or intentions. . 141
Objections to the foregoing philosophy
considered . tº - * . 149
This philosophy examined in the light
of the Scriptures . - e . 152
LECTURE XY.
MoRAL Gover NMENT.-Continued.
In what sense we have seen that obe-
dience to moral law cannot be par-
tial e º e e e . 154
In what sense obedience to moral law
can be partial tº -> e . 155
The government of God accepts nothing
as virtue but obedience to the law of
God . e º - * > . ib.
There can be no rule of duty but moral
law º º tº e º ... ib.
Nothing can be virtue or true religion
but obedience to the moral law . ib.
Nothing can be virtue that is not just
what the moral law demands. That
is, nothing short of what it requires
can be in any sense virtue . . ib.
Uses of the term justification . 157
Fundamentally important inquiries re-
specting this subject º & . 158
Remarks . e * tº © . 164
LECTURE XVI.
MoRAL Gover NMENT.-Continued.
What constitutes obedience to moral
law. º e e e . 165
Just rules of legal interpretation . 166
That actual knowledge is indispensa-
ble to moral obligation shown from
scripture e tº & . 168
In the light of the above rules, inquire
what is not implied in entire obedi-
PRACTICAL BEA RINGS AND TENDENCY
RIGHTARIANISM.
The philosophy which teaches that
the divine goodness or moral excel-
lenge is the foundation of moral
obligation g - º e e
The theory which teaches that moral
order is the foundation of moral
obligation . e e & e
The practical bearings of the theory
that moral obligation is founded in
the nature and relations of moral
agents . º - º tº º
The theory which teaches that the
idea of duty is the foundation of
moral obligation . e º e
The complexity of the foundation of
moral obligation º e º º
The practical bearings of what is re-
garded as the true theory of the
foundation of moral obligation, viz.
that the highest well-being of God
and of the universe is the sole foun-
dation of moral obligation 132
LECTURE XIV.
MoRAL Gover NMENT—Continued.
What constitutes obedience to moral
law . • * & º & . 135
ence to the law of God . & ... ib.
xiv.
CONTENTS,
LECTURE XVII.
MoRAL GoverNMENT.-Continued.
* * PAGE
What is implied in obedience to the
moral law * º * . 18]
Call attention to certain facts in men-
tal philosophy, as they are revealed
in consciousness tº * . 182
Point out the attributes of that love
which constitutes obediense to the
law of God 185
Voluntariness iö.
Liberty . tº 186
Intelligence tº e ib.
Virtuousness ib.
Disinterestedness 187
Impartiality 188
Universality º & 189
LECTURE XVIII.
ATTRIBUTEs of LovE.
Efficiency ... l 90
Penitence . . 92
Faith © . . 93
Complacency . 19.4
LECTURE XIX.
ATTRIBUTES of LovE—Continued.
, 198
. 20 !
Opposition to sin
Compassion.
LECTURE XX.
ATTRIBUTES of LovE—Continued.
Mercy . e g e e . .204
Justice . e . 206
Veracity . . 210
LECTURE XXI.
ATTRIBUTEs of LovE—Continued.
Patience . & g . 212
Meekness. gº , 215
Long-suffering . e & * , 216
Humility . * . 217
T,ECTURE XXII.
ATTRIBUTES OF LovE–Continued.
Self-denial. 2 | 8
Condescension Ç 221
Candour . g º * g 223
Stability . º tº * . . ib.
Kindness º * * e . 224
Severity 225
LECTURE XXIII.
ATTRIBUTEs of LovE—Continued.
Holiness, or Purity . . . . . 228
Modesty . * tº *. . . 230
Sobriety . tº & º . 231
PAGE.
Sincerity . . . . * 232
Zeal 233
Unity. * 234
Simplicity . ſº 235
LECTURE XXIV.
ATTRIBUTEs of LovE—Continued.
Gratitude 235
Wisdom 237
Grace ib.
Economy 238
LECTURE XXV.
MoRAL Govern MENT.
Revert to some points that have been
settled . g i- e . . 240
Show what disobedience to moral law
cannot consist in . & . 241
What disobedience to moral law
must consist in 2.43
LECTURE XXVI.
MoRAL Government.
What constitutes disobedience . . 246
What is not implied in disobedience
to the law of God . ib.
LECTURE XXVII.
ATTRIBUTE OF SELFISHN Ess.
What constitutes disobedience to
moral law ſº & g . 25 l
What is implied in disobedience to
moral law º * * . . ib.
Attributes of Selfishness. Voluntari-
In eSS 253
Liberty ib.
Intelligence ið.
Unreasonableness 254
Interestedness 255
Partiality 256
Impenitence 258
Unbelief ib.
LECTURE XXVIII.
ATTRIBUTEs of SELFISHNESS—Continued.
Efficiency tº & g * . 259
Opposition to benevolence or to virtue 262
Cruelty * g e § . . 264
Injustice e 265
LECTURE XXIX.
ATTRIBUTEs of SELFISHNESS—Continued.
Oppression . dº 267
Hostility & sº * . .269
Unmercifulness . * e . . 270
Falsehood, or lying. 272
Pride ge iº tº º ið.
CONTENTS.
XV
LECTURE XXX.
ATTRIBUTES of SELFISHNESS—Continued.
PAGE
Enmity tº & $ e . . 274
Madness * g tº t . 27.5
Impatience s g g te 276
Intemperance e e * . 278
Moral recklessness . ë . . 280
Unity . . . . . . 281
LECTURE XXXI.
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNEss–Continued.
Egotism . gº & te * . 283
Simplicity . © * e . . 285
Total moral depravity implied in
selfishness as one of its attributes. 286
The scriptures assume and affirm it . 290
Remarks e & * e . .297
LECTURE XXXII.
MoRAL Gover NMENT—Continued.
A return to obedience to moral law
is and must be, under every dis-
pensation of the divine government,
the unalterable condition of Salva-
tion & { } e e . . 302
Under a gracious dispensation, a re-
turn to full obedience to moral law
is not dispensed with as a condition
of salvation, but this obedience is
secured by the indwelling spirit of
Christ received by faith to reign in
the heart . * * a . 303
LECTURE XXXIII.
MoRAL GoverNMENT—Continued.
What constitutes the sanctions of law 307
There can be no law without sanctions 308
In what light sanctions are to be re-
garded . e * tº . . ib.
The end to be secured by law, and
the execution of penal sanctions .. 309
By what rule sanctions ought to be
graduated . * we & ... ib.
God’s law has sanctions e . . ió.
What constitutes the remuneratory
sanctions of the law of God , 310
The perfection and duration of the
remuneratory sanctions of the law
of God . º & & tº we
What constitutes the vindicatory
sanctions of the law of God ... ib.
Duration of the penal sanctions of
the law of God * tº . . ib.
Inquire into the meaning of the term
infinite * e e * . 31 l
Infinites may differ indefinitely in
amount . * * & . . ib.
I must remind you of the rule by
which degrees of guilt are to be
estimated . º tº ſe , 3 l 2
That all and every sin must from its
very nature involve infinite guilt
in the sense of deserving endless
punishment . * * tº ſº
Notwithstanding all sin deserves end-
less punishment, yet the guilt of
different persons may vary indefi-
nitely, and punishment, although
always endless in duration, may and
ought to vary in degree, according
to the guilt of each individual .
That penal inflictions under the go-
vernment of God must be endless
Examine this question in the light of
revelation & * * * e
LECTURE XXXIV.
ATONEyſen T.
I will call attention to several well
established governmental principles
Define the term atonement . tº
I am to inquire into the teachings of
natural theology, or into the a pri-
ori affirmations of reason upon this
subject . º *
The fact of atonement * &
The design of the atonement tº e
Christ's obedience to the moral law
as a covenant of works, did not
constitute the atonement . e
The atonement was not a commercial
transaction . * tº e G
The atonement of Christ was intend-
ed as a satisfaction of public justice
His taking human nature, and obey-
ing unto death, under such circum-
stances, constituted a good reason
for our being treated as righteous .
LECTURE XXXV.
ExT E N T o F A To N E MENT.
For whose benefit the atonement was
intended . e e * g
Objections answered . & # tº
Remarks on the atonement . e
LECTURE XXXVI.
HUMAN GoverNMENT.
The ultimate end of God in creation
Providential and moral governments
are indispensable means of securing
the highest good of the universe .
Civil and family governments are indis-
pensable to the securing of this end,
and are therefore really a part of the
providential and moral government
of God & tº
Human governments are a necessity of
human nature &
This necessity will continue as long as
human beings exist in this world
PAGE
312
313
314
317
319
322
ib.
326
330
iö.
331
ib.
340
3.45
3.48
354
ið.
Human governments are plainly re-
cognized in the Bible as a part of
the moral government of God
ib.
xvi
CONTENTS.
PAGE
It is the duty of all men to aid in the
establishment and support of human
government . * * *
It is absurd to suppose that human
governments can ever be dispensed
. 354
with in the present world * ... ib.
Objections answered § . 355
Inquire into the foundation of the
right of human governments . . 360
Point out the limits or boundary of
this right . te e ib.
LECTURE XXXVII.
HUMAN GOVERNMENTs—Continued.
The reasons why God has made no
form of civil government universally
obligatory & & g
The particular forms of state govern-
ment must and will depend upon
the virtue and intelligence of the
people . • e 4. * ©
That form of government is obligatory,
that is best suited to meet the ne-
cessities of the people
Revolutions become necessary and ob-
ligatory, when the virtue and intelli-
gence or the vice and ignorance of
the people demand them ge $
In what cases human legislation is valid,
and in what cases it is null and void
In what cases we are bound to disobey
human governments e 3.
Apply the foregoing principles to the
rights and duties of governments and
subjects in relation to the execution of
the necessary penalties of law
LECTURE XXXVIII.
MoRAL DEPRAVITY -º
Definition of the term depravity
Point out the distinction between phy-
sical and moral depravity * &
Of what physical depravity can be pre-
dicated ſº gº o © tº
Of what moral depravity can be pre-
dicated . * & © & e
Mankind are both physically and
morally depraved . g * e
Subsequent to the commencement of
moral agency and previous to rege-
neration the moral depravity of man-
kind is universal . & •º *
The moral depravity of the unregene-
rate moral agents of our race, is
total . e te
LECTURE XXXIX.
MoRAL DEPRAVITY-Continued.
Proper method of accounting for the
universal and total moral depravity
of the unregenerate moral agents of
OUII ral Cé tº tº * tº *
. 361
ib.
. 370
374
. 375
377
PAGE
Moral depravity consists in, selfishness,
or in the choice of self-interest, self-
gratification, or self-indulgence, as an
end. . * º iº & , 378
Dr. Wood's view of physical and moral
depravity examined tº º . ib.
Standards of the Presbyterian Church
examined . tº & tº . 882
LECTURE XL.
MoRAL DEPRAVITY –Continued.
Further examination of the arguments
adduced in support of the position
that human nature is in itself sinful 387
LECTURE XLI.
MoRAL DEPRAVITY-Continued.
The proper method of accounting for
moral depravity . g * * . 394
Pres. Edwards's views examined , 398
Summary of the truth on this subject. 400
Remarks . . 40 l
LECTURE XLII.
REGENERATION.
The common distinction between re-
generation and conversion * . 405
I am to state the assigned reasons for
this distinction ſº g * . 4 16
I am to state the objections to this
distinction . * g 406
What regeneration is not 408
What regeneration is . * . ib.
The universal necessity of regenera-
tion º # * . . 410
Agencies employed in regeneration ib.
Instrumentalities employed in the
work . * e © © . 412
In regeneration the subject is both
passive and active . º * 4 13
What is implied in regeneration ib.
LECTURE XLIII.
REGENERATION.—Continued.
Philosophical theories of regenera-
tion . tº wº © * . 414
The different theories of regeneration
examined g g e e ið.
Objections to the taste scheme 4 16
The divine efficiency scheme 416
Objections to the divine efficiency 419
The susceptibility scheme 421
Theory of a divine moral suasion 425
Objections to this theory ib.
Remarks . te º gº g 426
LECTURE XT,IV.
REGENERATION.—Continued.
Evidences of regeneration * . 427
Introductory remarks . ié.
CONTENTS.
xvii
Wherein the experience and outward
life of saints and sinners may agree
Remarks e e & c º
LECTURE XLV.
REGENERATION.—Continued.
Wherein saints and sinners or de-
ceived professors must differ . .
LECTURE XLVI.
REGENERATION.—Continued.
In what saints and sinners differ
What is it to overcome the world ! .
Who are those that overcome the
world ! e e º º e
Why do believers overcome the
world : tº o
LECTURE XLVII.
REGENERATION.—Continued.
Wherein saints and sinners differ
LECTURE XLVIII.
NATURAL ABILITY.
Show what is the Edwardean notion
of ability . † º
This natural ability is no
all º e & te t
What, according to this school, con-
stitutes natural inability . . •
This natural inability is no inability
at all . e º - º
Natural ability is identical with free-
dom or liberty of will . tº º
The human will is free, therefore men
have ability to do all their duty
LECTURE XLIX,
MoRAL ADILITY.
ability at
What constitutes moral inability ac-
cording to the Edwardean school .
Their moral inability consists in real
disobedience, and a natural inabi-
lity to obey º © - º
This pretended distinction between
natural and moral inability is non-
sensical & t & * *
What constitutes moral ability ac-
cording to this school © ©
Their moral ability to obey God is
nothing else than real obedience,
and a natural inability to disobey .
LECTURE L.
INABILITY.
What is thought to be the funda-
mental error of the Edwardean
school on the subject of ability
State the philosophy of the scheme of
inability; about to be considered
The claims of this philosophy .
PAGE LECTURE LI.
428 G R A C I o Us A BI L ITY.
435 - tº
What is intended by the term . ©
This doctrine as held an, absurdity .
In what sense a gracious ability is
possible . e e ſº
439 LECTURE EII.
THE NOTION OF INABILITY.
Proper mode of accounting for it .
450
454 LECTURE LIII.
56 REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE.
4 What repentance is not, and what
457 it is º º e e tº
What is implied in it . &
What impenitence is not
What it is . e * ( ) © e
Some things that are implied in it .
466 | Some evidences of it e e
LECTURE LIV,
FA 1 TH AN D UN BE LIE F.
480 What evangelical faith is not
What it is . e º º
481 What is implied in it . e
What unbelief is not . º º
482 | What it is, What is implied in it
* | Conditions of both faith and unbelief
o | The guilt and desert of unbelief .
483 º, e
Natural and governmental conse-
ib quences of both faith and unbelief
484 LECTURE LV,
JUSTIFICATION.
What justification is not . e º
What it is . º º º
Conditions of gospel justification
486
LECTURE LVI.
490 SANCTIFICATION.
An account of the recent discussions
491 that have been had on this subject
492 LECTURE LVII.
SANCTIFICATION.
ib. Remind you of some points that have
been settled in this course of study
Definition of the principal terms to
be used in this discussion . tº
LECTURE LVIII.
493 ~
SANCTIFICATION.
495 | Entire Sanctifieation is attainable in
496 this life e e
PAGE
500
501
506
512
522
523
525
526
i5.
528
532
533
534
538
539
541
543
544
546
547
548
592
593
598
xviii CONTENTS.
LECTURE LIX.
SANCTIFICATION.
PAGE
Entire sanctification is attainable in
this life © gº 598
LECTURE LX.
SANCTIFICATION.
Bible argument . * © . 604
LECTURE LXI.
SANCTIFICATION.
Paul entirely sanctified . gº . 619
LECTURE LXII.
SANCTIFICATION.
Condition of its attainment g 629
LECTURE LXIII.
SANOTIFICATION.
Condition of its attainment—continued 635
Relations of Christ to the believer . 637
LECTURE LXIV.
SANCTIFICATION.
Relations of Christ to the believer—
continued & *
tº tº 645
LECTURE LXV.
SANOTIFICATION.
Relations of Christ to the believer—
continued * & . 655
LECTURE LXVI.
SANCTIFICATION.
Relations of Christ to the believer—
continued 665
LECTURE LXVII.
TIFICATION.
Relations of Christ to the believer—
continued º te e . 675
LECTURE LXXI.
SANCTIFICATION.
Objections—continued
LECTURE LXXII.
SANCTIFICATION.
Objections—continued
LECTURE LXXIII.
SANOTIFICATION. .
Remarks
LECTURE LXXIV.
ELECTION e gº * º *
LECTURE LXXV.
REPROBATION
LECTURE LXXVI.
DIVINE Sove REIGNTY
LECTURE LXXVII.
PURPOSEs of GoD .
L E O TU R.I. LXXVIII.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTs.
Notice the different kinds of certainty
What is not intended by the perse-
verance of the saints e *
LECTURE LXXIX.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS PROVED .
T.ECTURE LXXX.
PERSEVERANCE of SAINTs.
Further objections considered .
L E O T U R E LXXXI.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTs.
Consideration of the principal argu-
ments in support of the doctrine
L E C T U R E LXXXII
PERSEVERANCE of SAINTs.
Perseverance proved
APPENDIX.
Reply to “Princeton Biblical Re-
pertory” & &
gº
Reply to Dr. Duffield
PAGE
733
783
836
840
843
875
LECTURE LXVIII.
SANOTIFICATION.
Objections answered & º . 684
LECTURE LXIX.
SANCTIFICATION.
Tendency of the denial that Christians
have valid grounds of hope that
they should obtain a victory over
sin in this life . e q. . 7 || 6
LECTURE LXX.
SANCTIFICATION.
7
2
5
Objections—continued .
89 |
90 l
9 || 6
962
SYSTEM AT I C T H E O LOGY.
LECTURE I.
HOW WB ATTAIN TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN TRUTHS.
ALL teaching and reasoning take certain truths as granted. That the
unequivocal, a priori affirmations of the reason are valid, for all the truths
and principles thus affirmed, must be assumed and admitted, or every
attempt to construct a science, of any kind, or to attain to certain know-
ledge upon any subject, is vain and even preposterous. As I must
commence my lectures on moral government by laying down certain moral
postulates, or axioms, which are, d priori, affirmed by the reason, and
therefore self-evident to all men, when so stated as to be understood, I
will spend a few moments in stating certain facts belonging more appro-
priately to the department of psychology. Theology is so related to
psychology, that the successful study of the former without a knowledge of
the latter, is impossible. Every theological system, and every theological
opinion, assumes something as true in psychology. Theology is, to a great
extent, the science of mind in its relations to moral law. God is a mind
or spirit: all moral agents are in his image. Theology is the doctrine of
God, comprehending his existence, attributes, relations, character, works,
word, government providential and moral, and, of course, it must embrace
the facts of human nature, and the science of moral agency. All theologians
do and must assume the truth of some system of psychology and mental
philosophy, and those who exclaim most loudly against metaphysics, no less
than others.
There is a distinction between the mind's knowing a truth, and knowing
that it knows it. Hence I begin by defining self-consciousness.
Self-consciousness is the mind's recognition of itself. It is the noticing of,
or act of knowing itself. Its existence, attributes, acts, and states, with
the attributes of liberty or necessity which characterize those acts and states.
Of this I shall frequently speak hereafter.
THE REVELATIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.
Self-consciousness reveals to us three primary faculties of mind, which
We call intellect, sensibility, and will. The intellect is the faculty of
knowledge; the sensibility is the faculty or susceptibility of feeling; the
will is the crecutive faculty, or the faculty of doing or acting. All
thinking, perceiving, intuiting, reasoning, opining, forming motions or
ideas, belong to the intellect.
l;
2 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Consciousness reveals the various functions of the intellect, and also of
the sensibility and will. In this place, we shall attend only to the functions
of the intellect, as our present business is to ascertain the methods by
which the intellect arrives at its knowledges, which are given to us in self-
COllSCIOUISI) eSS.
Self-consciousness is, itself, of course, one of the functions of the
intellect; and here it is in place to say, that a revelation in conscious-
mess is science, or knowledge. What consciousness gives us we know.
Its testimony is infallible and conclusive, upon all subjects upon which
it testifies.
Among other functions of the intellect, which I need not name, self-
consciousness reveals the three-fold, fundamental distinction of the sense,
the reason, and the understanding.
OF THE SENSE.
The sense is the power that perceives sensation and brings it within
the field of consciousness. Sensation is an impression made upon the
sensibility by some object without, or some thought within the mind.
The sense takes up, or perceives the sensation, and this perceived sen-
sation is revealed in consciousness. If the sensation is from Some object
without the mind, as sound or colour, the perception of it belongs to the
outer sense. If from some thought, or mental exercise, the perception is
of the inner sense. I have said that the testimony of consciousness is
conclusive, for all the facts given by its unequivocal testimony. We
neither need, nor can we have, any higher evidence of the existence of a
sensation, than is given by consciousness.
Our first impressions, thoughts, and knowledges, are derived from
sense. But knowledge derived purely from this source would, of neces-
sity, be very limited.
OF THE REASON.
Self-consciousness also reveals to us the reason or the d priori function
of the intellect. The reason is that function of the intellect which
immediately beholds or intuits a class of truths which, from their nature,
are not cognizable either by the understanding or the sense. Such, for
example, as the mathematical, philosophical, and moral axioms, and
postulates. The reason gives laws and first principles. It gives the
abstract, the necessary, the absolute, the infinite. It gives all its affirma-
tions by a direct beholding or intuition, and not by induction or reasoning.
The classes of truths given by this function of the intellect are self-evident.
That is, the reason intuits, or directly beholds them, as the faculty of sense
intuits, or directly beholds, a sensation. Sense gives to consciousness the
direct vision of a sensation, and therefore the existence of the Sensation
is certainly known to us. The reason gives to consciousness the direct
vision of the class of truths of which it takes cognizance ; and of the
KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN TRUTHS. 3
existence and validity of these truths we can mo more doubt, than of
the existence of our sensations.
Between knowledge derived from sense and from reason there is a differ-
ence : in one case, consciousness gives us the sensation : it may be
questioned whether the perceptions of the sense are a direct beholding of
the object of the sensation, and consequently whether the object really
exists, and is the real archetype of the sensation. That the sensation
exists we are certain, but whether that exists which we suppose to be the
object and the cause of the sensation, admits of doubt. The question
is, does the sense immediately intuit or behold the object of the sensation.
The fact that the report of sense cannot always be relied upon, seems to
show that the perception of sense is not an immediate beholding of the
object of the sensation ; Sensation exists, this we know, that it has a cause
we know ; but that we rightly know the cause or object of the sensation,
we may not know.
But in regard to the intuitions of the reason, this faculty directly beholds
the truths which it affirms. These truths are the objects of its intuitions.
They are not received at second hand. They are not inferences nor in-
ductions, they are not opinions, nor conjectures, nor beliefs, but they are
direct knowings. The truths given by this faculty are so directly seen
and known, that to doubt them is impossible. The reason, by virtue of
its own laws, beholds them with open face, in the light of their own
evidence.
OF THE UNIDERSTANDING .
The understanding is that function of the intellect that takes up, clas-
sifies and arranges the objects and truths of sensation, under a law of
classification and arrangement given by the reason, and thus forms motions
and opinions, and theories. The motions, opinions, and theories of the
understanding, may be erroneous, but there can be no error in the d priori
intuitions of the reason. The knowledges of the understanding are so
often the result of induction or reasoning, and fall so entirely short of a
direct beholding, that they are often knowledges only in a modified and
restricted sense.
Of the imagination, and the memory, &c., I need not speak in this place.
What has been said has, I trust, prepared the way for saying that the
truths of theology arrange themselves under two heads.
I. Truths which need proof.
II. Truths which need no proof.
I. Truths which need proof.
First. Of this class it may be said, in general, that to it belong all truths
which are not directly intuited by some function of the intellect in the
light of their own evidence.
Every truth that must be arrived at by reasoning or induction, every
truth that is attained to by other testimony than that of direct beholding.
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KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN TRUTHS. 5
ask for evidence that God is to be believed. But such is the nature of
mind, as constituted by the Creator, that no moral agent needs proof
that God's testimony ought to be received. Let it be once settled that
God has declared a fact, or a truth, and this is, with every moral agent,
all the evidence he needs. The reason, from its own laws, affirms the per-
fect veracity of God, and although the truth announced may be such that
the reason, a priori, can neither affirm, or deny it, yet when asserted by God,
the reason irresistibly affirms that God's testimony ought to be received.
These truths need proof in the sense that it needs to be shown that they
were given by a divine inspiration. This fact demonstrated, the truths
themselves need only to be understood, and the mind necessarily affirms
its obligation to believe them. -
Under this head I might notice the probable or possible truths; that
is, those that are supported by such evidence as only shows them to be
probable or possible, but I forbear.
My present object more particularly is to notice—
II. Truths which need no proof.
These are d priori truths of reason, and truths of sense: that is,
they are truths that need no proof, because they are directly intuited or
beheld by one of these faculties.
The d priori truths of reason may be classed under the heads of first
truths: self-evident truths which are necessary and universal: and self-evident
truths not necessary and universal.
1. First truths have the following attributes.
(1.) They are absolute or necessary truths, in the sense that the reason
affirms that they must be true. Every event must have an adequate cause.
Space must be. It is impossible that it should not be, whether any thing
else were or not. Time must be, whether there were any events to succeed
each other in time or not. Thus necessity is an attribute of this class.
(2.) Universality is an attribute of a first truth. That is, to truths of
this class there can be no exception. Every event must have a cause,
there can be no event without a cause.
(3.) First truths are truths of necessary and universal knowledge. That is,
they are not merely knowable, but they are known to all moral agents, by a
mecessary law of their intellect.
That space and time are, and must be, that every event has and must
have a cause, and such like truths, are universally known and assumed
by every moral agent, whether the terms in which they are stated have
ever been so much as heard by him, or not. This last is the characteristic
that distinguishes first truths from others merely self-evident, of which we
shall soon speak.
(4.) First truths are, of course, self-evident. That is, they are universally
directly beheld, in the light of their own evidence,
(5.( First truths are truths of the pure reason, and of course truths of
certain knowledge. They are universally known with such certainty as
to render it impossible for any moral agent to demy, forget, or practically
6 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
overlook them. Although they may be denied in theory, they are always,
and necessarily, recognized in practice. No moral agent, for example, can,
by any possibility, practically deny, or forget, or overlook the first truths
that time and space exist and must exist, that every event has and must
have a cause.
It is, therefore, always to be remembered that first truths are universally
assumed and known, and in all our teachings, and in all our inquiries we
are to take the first truths of reason for granted. It is preposterous to
attempt to prove them, for the reason that we necessarily assume them as
the basis and condition of all reasoning.
The mind arrives at a knowledge of these truths by directly and
necessarily beholding them, upon condition of its first perceiving their
logical condition. The mind beholds, or attains to the conception of, an event.
Upon this conception it instantly assumes, whether it thinks of the assump-
tion or not, that this event had, and that every event must have, a cause.
The mind perceives, or has the notion of body. This conception neces-
sarily developes the first truth, space is and must be.
The mind beholds or conceives of succession; and this beholding, or
conception, necessarily developes the first truth, time is, and must be.
As we proceed we shall notice divers truths which belong to this class,
some of which, in theory, have been denied. Nevertheless, in their practi.
cal judgments, all men have admitted them and given as high evidence of
their knowing them, as they do of knowing their own cxistence.
Suppose, for example, that the law of causality should not be, at all
times or at any time, a subject of distinct thought and attention. Suppose
that the proposition in words, should never be in the mind, that “every
event must have a cause,” or that this proposition should be denied. Still the
truth is there, in the form of absolute knowledge, a necessary assumption,
an d priori affirmation, and the mind has so firm a hold of it, as to be
utterly unable to overlook, or forget, or practically deny it. Every mind
has it as a certain knowledge, long before it can understand the language
in which it is expressed, and no statement or evidence whatever can give
the mind any firmer conviction of its truth, than it had from necessity at
first. This is true of all the truths of this class. They are always, and
necessarily, assumed by all moral agents, whether distinctly thought of or
not. And for the most part this class of truths are assumed, without being
frequently, or at least without being generally, the object of thought or
direct attention. The mind assumes them, without a distinct consciousness
of the assumption. For example, we act every moment, and judge, and
reason, and believe, upon the assumption that every event must have a
cause, and yet we are not conscious of thinking of this truth, nor that we
assume it, until something calls the attention to it.
First truths of reason, them, let it be distinctly remembered, are always
and necessarily assumed, though they may be sclélom thought of They
are universally known, before the words are understood, by which they may
be expressed ; and although they may never be cypressed in a formal
KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN TRUTHS. 7
proposition, yet the mind has as certain a knowledge of them as it has of
its own existence,
All reasoning proceeds upon the assumption of these truths. It must
do so, of necessity. It is preposterous to attempt to prove first truths to
a moral agent; for, being a moral agent, he must absolutely know them
already, and if he did not, in no possible way could he be put in possession
of them, except by presenting to his perception the chronological condition
of their developement, and in no case could any thing else be needed, for
upon the occurrence of this perception, the assumption, or developement,
follows by a law of absolute and universal necessity. And until these
truths are actually developed, no being can be a moral agent.
There is no reasoning with one who calls in question the first truths of
reason, and demands proof of them. All reasoning must, from the nature
of mind and the laws of reasoning, assume the first-truths of reason as cer-
tain, and admitted, and as the d priori condition of all logical deduction
and demonstration. Some one of these must be assumed as true, directly
or indirectly, in every syllogism and in every demonstration.
In all our future investigations we shall have abundant occasion for
the application and illustration of what has now been said of first truths
of reason. If, at any stage of our progress, we light upon a truth of this
class, let it be borne in mind that the nature of the truth is the preclusion,
or, as lawyers would express it, the estopple of all controversy.
To deny the reality of this class of truths, is to deny the validity of our
most perfect knowledge. The only question to be settled is, does the truth
in question belong to this class 2 There are many truths which men, all
same men, certainly know, of which they not only seldom think, but which,
in theory, they strenuously deny.
2. The second class of truths that need no proof are self-evident truths,
possessing the attributes of necessity and universality.
Of these truths, I remark—
(1.) That they, like first truths, are affirmed by the pure reason, and not
by the understanding, nor the sense.
(2.) They are affirmed, like first truths, a priori; that is, they are
directly beheld or intuited, and not attained to by evidence or induction.
(3.) They are truths of universal and necessary affirmation, when so
stated as to be understood. By a law of the reason, all same men must
admit and affirm them, in the light of their own evidence, whenever
they are understood. -
This class, although self-evident, when presented to the mind, are
not, like first truths, universally and necessarily known to all moral
agents.
The mathematical axioms, and first principles, the a priori grounds
and principles of all science, belong to this class.
(4.) They are, like first truths, universal in the sense that there is
no exception to them.
(5.) They are necessary truths. That is, the reason affirms, not merely
8 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
that they are, but that they must be, true; that these truths cannot but
be. The abstract, the infinite, belong to this class.
To compel other minds to admit this class of truths, we need only to
frame so perspicuous a statement of them as to cause them to be distinctly
perceived or understood. This being done, all sound minds irresistibly
affirm them, whether the heart is, or is not, homest enough to admit the
conviction.
3. A third class of truths that need no proof, are truths of rational
intuition, but possess not the attributes of whiversality and necessity.
Our own existence, personality, personal identity, &c., belong to this
class. These truths are intuited by the reason, are self-evident, and given,
as such, in consciousness; they are known to self, without proof, and can-
not be doubted. They are at first developed by sensation, but not inferred
from it. Suppose a sensation to be perceived by the sense, all that could
be logically inferred from this is, that there is some subject of this sensa-
tion, but that I exist, and am the subject of this sensation, does not
logically appear. Sensation first awakes the mind to self-consciousness;
that is, a sensation of some kind first arouses the attention of mind to
the facts of its own existence and personal identity. These truths are
directly beheld and affirmed. The mind does not say, I feel, or I think,
and therefore I am, for this is a mere Sophism; it is to assume the existence
of the I as the subject of feeling, and afterwards to infer the existence of
the I from the feeling or sensation.
4. A fourth class of truths that need no proof are sensations. It has
been already remarked, that all sensations given by consciousness, are
self-evident to the subject of them. Whether I ascribe my sensations
to their real cause may admit of doubt, but that the sensation is real
there can be no doubt. The testimony of the sense is valid, for that which
it immediately beholds or intuits, that is, for the reality of the sensation.
The judgment may err by ascribing the sensation to the wrong cause.
But I must not proceed further with this statement; my design has
been, not to enter too minutely into nice metaphysical distinctions, nor
by any means to exhaust the subject of this lecture, but only to fix atten-
tion upon the distinctions upon which I have insisted, for the purpose of
precluding all irrelevant and preposterous discussions about the validity
of first and self-evident truths. I must assume that you possess some
knowledge of psychology, and of mental philosophy, and leave to your
convenience a more thorough and extended examination of the subject
but hinted at in this lecture.
Enough, I trust, has been said to prepare your minds for the intro-
duction of the great and fundamental axioms which lie at the foundation
of all our ideas of morality and religion. Our next lecture will present
the nature and attributes of moral law. We shall proceed in the light
of the d priori affirmations of the reason, in postulating its nature and its
attributes. Having attained to a firm footing upon these points, we shall
be naturally conducted by reason and revelation to our ultimate conclusions,
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 9
LECTURE II.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
I. DEFINITION OF LAW.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND MORAL LAW.
III. ATTRIBUTES OF MORAL LAW.
I. In discussing this subject, I must begin with defining the term Law.
Law, in a sense of the term both sufficiently popular and scientific for
my purpose, is A RULE of ACTION. In its generic signification, it is ap-
plicable to every kind of action, whether of matter or of mind—whether
intelligent or unintelligent—whether free or necessary action.
II. I must distinguish between Physical and Moral Law.
Physical law is a term that represents the order of sequence, in all
the changes that occur under the law of necessity, whether in matter or
mind. I mean all changes, whether of state or action, that do not con-
sist in the states or actions of free will. Physical law is the law of force,
or necessity, as opposed to the law of liberty. Physical law is the law
of the material universe. It is also the law of mind, so far as its states
and changes are involuntary. All mental states or actions, which are
not free and sovereign actions of will, must occur under, and be subject
to, physical law. They cannot possibly be accounted for, except as they
are ascribed to the law of necessity or force.
Moral law is a rule of moral action with sanctions. It is that rule to
which moral agents ought to conform all their voluntary actions, and is
enforced by sanctions equal to the value of the precept. It is the rule
for the government of free and intelligent action, as opposed to necessary
and unintelligent action. It is the law of liberty, as opposed to the law of
necessity—of motive and free choice, as opposed to force of every kind.
Moral law is primarily a rule for the direction of the action of free
will, and strictly of free will only. But secondarily, and less strictly, it is
the rule for the regulation of all those actions and states of mind and body,
that follow the free actions of will by a law of necessity. Thus, moral law
controls involuntary mental states and outward action, only by securing
conformity of the actions of free will to its precept.
III. I must call attention to the essential attributes of moral law.
1. Subjectivity. It is, and must be, fin idea of reason, developed in the
mix1d of the subject. It is an idea, or conception, of that state of will,
or course of action, which is obligatory upon a moral agent. No one can
be a moral agent, or the subject of moral law, unless he has this idea
developed ; for this idea is identical with the law. It is the law developed,
or revealed within himself; and thus he becomes “a law to himself,” his
own reason affirming his obligation to conform to this idea, or law.
2. Objectivity. Moral law may be regarded as a rule of duty, prescribed
10 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
by the supreme Lawgiver, and extermal to self. When thus contemplated,
it is objective; when contemplated as a necessary idea or affirmation of
our own reason, we regard it subjectively, or as imposed upon us by God,
through the necessary convictions of our own minds. When contemplated
as within ourselves, and as the affirmation of our own reason we predicate
of it subjectivity; but when thought of as a law declared and enforced
by the will of God, it is contemplated as distinct from our own necessary
ideas, and predicate of it objectivity.
3. A third attribute is liberty, as opposed to necessity. The precept
must lie developed in the reason, as a rule of duty — a law of moral
obligation — a rule of choice, or of ultimate intention, declaring that
which a moral agent ought to choose, will, intend. But it does not,
must not, can not possess the attribute of necessity in its relations to the
actions of free will. It must not, cannot, possess an element or attribute
of force, in any such sense as to render conformity of will to its precept,
unavoidable. This would confound it with physical law.
4. A fourth attribute of moral law, is fitness. It must be the law of
nature, that is, its precept must prescribe and require, just those actions
of the will which are suitable to the mature and relations of moral beings,
and nothing more nor less; that is, the intrinsic value of the well-being of
God and of the universe being given as the ground, and the nature and
relations of moral beings as the condition of the obligation, the reason
hereupon necessarily affirms the intrinsic propriety and fitness of choosing
this good, and of consecrating the whole being to. its promotion. This
is what is intended by the law of mature. It is the law or rule of action
imposed on us by God, in anddº the nature which he has given us.
5. A fifth attribute of moral law is universality. The conditions and
circumstances being the same, it requires, and must require, of all moral
agents, the same things, in whatever World they may be found.
6. A sixth attribute of moral law is, and must be, impartiality. Moral
law is no respecter of persons—knows no privileged classes. It demands
one thing of all, without regard to anything, except the fact that they are
moral agents. By this it is not intended, that the same course of outward
conduct is required of all; but the same state of heart in all—that all
shall have one ultimate intention—that all shall consecrate themselves to
one end—that all shall entirely conform, in heart and life, to their mature
and relations.
7. A seventh attribute of moral law is, and must be, justice. That
which is unjust cannot be law.
Justice, as an attribute of moral law, must respect both the precept and
the sanction. Justice, as an attribute of the precept, consists in the requi-
sition of just that, and no more, which is in exact accordance with the
nature and relations of the ruler and the subject.
Justice, as an attribute of the sanction, consists in apportioning rewards
and punishments, to the merit of obedience on the one hand, and to the
guilt of disobedicnce on the other.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 11
Sanctions belong to the very essence and nature of moral law. A law
without sanctions is no law ; it is only counsel, or advice. Sanctions
are the motives which the law presents, to secure obedience to the pre-
cept. Consequently, they should always be graduated by the importance
of the precept; and that is not properly law which does not promise,
expressly or by implication, a reward proportionate to the merit of obedience,
and threaten punishment equal to the guilt of disobedience. Law cannot
be unjust, either in precept or sanction ; and it should always be remem-
bered, that what is unjust, is not law, cannot be law. It is contrary to the
true definition of law. Moral law is a rule of action, founded in the nature
and relations of moral beings, sustained by sanctions equal to the merit of
obedience, and the guilt of disobedience.
8. An eighth attribute of moral law is practicability. That which the
precept demands must be possible to the subject. That which demands a
natural impossibility is not, and cannot be, moral law. The true definition
of law excludes the supposition that it can, under any circumstances,
demand an absolute impossibility. Such a demand could not be in accordance
with the nature and relations of moral agents, and therefore practicability
must always be an attribute of moral law. To talk of inability to obey
moral law, is to talk nonsense.
9. A ninth attribute of moral law is independence. It is founded in
the self-existent nature of God. It is an eternal and necessary idea of
the divine reason. It is the etermal Self-existent rule of the divine conduct,
the law which the intelligence of God prescribes to himself. Moral law,
as we shall see hereafter more fully, does not, and cannot originate in
the will of God. It originates, or rather, is founded in his eternal, self-
existent nature. It etermally existed in the divine reason. It is the idea
of that state of will which is obligatory upon God upon condition of his
natural attributes, or, in other words, upon condition of his nature. As a
law, it is entirely independent of his will just as his own existence is. It
is obligatory also upon every moral agent, entirely independent of the will
of God. Their nature and relations being given, and their intelligence
being developed, moral law must be obligatory upon them, and it lies not
in the option of any being to make it otherwise. Their nature and rela-
tions being given, to pursue a course of conduct suited to their nature
and relations, is necessarily and self-evidently obligatory, independent of
the will of any being.
10. A tenth attribute of moral law is immutability. Moral law can
never change, or be changed. It always requires of every moral agent a
state of heart, and course of conduct, precisely suited to his nature and
relations. Whatever his nature is, his capacity and relations are: entire
conformity to just that nature, those capacities and relations, so far as he
is able to understand them, is required at every moment, and nothing
more nor less. If capacity is enlarged, the subject is not thereby rendered
capable of works of supererogation—of doing more than the law demands;
for the law still, as always, requires the full consecration of his whole being
12 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to the public interests. If by any means whatever, his ability is abridged,
moral law, always and necessarily consistent with itself, still requires
that what is left—nothing more or less—shall be consecrated to the same
end as before. Whatever demands more or less than entire, universal,
and constant conformity of heart and life, to the nature, capacity and re-
lations of moral agents, be they what they may, is not, and cannot be, moral
law. To suppose that it could be otherwise, would be to contradict the
true definition of moral law. If therefore, the capacity is by any means
abridged, the subject does not thereby become incapable of rendering full
obedience; for the law still demands and urges, that the heart and life
shall be fully conformed to the present, existing mature, capacity, and
relations. Anything that requires more or less than this, whatever else it
is, is not, and cannot be, moral law. To affirm that it can, is to talk non-
Sense. Moral law invariably holds one language. It never changes the
spirit of its requirement. “Thou shalt love,” or be perfectly benevolent,
is its uniform and its only demand. This demand it never varies, and
never can vary. It is as immutable as God is, and for the same reason.
To talk of letting down, or altering moral law, is to talk absurdly. The
thing is naturally impossible. No being has the right or the power to do
so. The supposition overlooks the very nature of moral law. Should the
natural capability of the mind, by any means whatever, be enlarged or
abridged, it is perfectly absurd, and a contradiction of the nature of
moral law, to say, that the claims of the law are either elevated or
lowered. Moral law is not a statute, an enactment, that has its origin or
its foundation in the will of any being. It is the law of mature, the law
which the nature or constitution of every moral agent imposes on him-
self, and which God imposes upon us because it is entirely suited to our
nature and relations, and is therefore naturally obligatory upon us. It is
the unalterable demand of the reason, that the whole being, whatever
there is of it at any time, shall be entirely consecrated to the highest good
of universal being, and for this reason God requires this of us, with all
the weight of his authority. It cannot be too distinctly understood,
that moral law is nothing more nor less, than the law of mature revealed
in the necessary ideas of our own reason, and enforced by the authority
of God. It is an idea of that which is fit, suitable, agreeable to our
nature and relations for the time being, that which it is reasonable for
us to will and do, at any and every moment, in view of all the cir-
cumstances of our present existence,—just what the reason affirms, and
what God affirms, to be suited to our nature and relations, under all the
circumstances of the case.*
* It has been said, that if we “dwarf,” or abridge our powers, we do not thereby
abridge the claims of God ; that if we render it impossible to perform so high a service as
we might have done, the Lawgiver, nevertheless, requires the same as before, that is, that
under such circumstances he requires of us an impossibility;-that should we dwarf,
or completely derange, or stultify our powers, he would still hold us under obligation
to perform all that we might have performed, had our powers remained in their integrity.
To this I reply,
MORAI, (; OVFRNMENT. 13
11. An eleventh attribute of moral law is unity. Moral law proposes but
one ultimate end of pursuit to God, and to all moral agents. All its
requisitions, in their spirit, are summed up and expressed in one word,
That this affirmation assumes, that moral law and moral obligation are founded in
the will of God;—that his mere will makes law. This is a fundamental mistake. God
cannot legislate in the sense of making law. He declares and enforces the common law
of the universe, or, in other words, the law of nature. This law, I repeat it, is nothing
else than that rule of conduct which is in accordance with the nature and relations of
moral beings. The totality of its requisitions are, both in its letter and its spirit,
“Thou shalt love, &c., with all thy heart, thy soul, thy might, thy strength.” That is,
whatever there is of us, at any moment, is to be wholly consecrated to God, and the good
of being, and nothing more nor less. If our nature or relations are changed, no matter by
what means, or to what extent, provided we are still moral agents, its language and spirit
are the same as before, “Thou thalt love with all thy strength,” &c.
I will here quote from the “Oberlin Evangelist,” an extract of a letter from an
esteemed brother, embodying the substance of the above objection, together with my
reply.
“One point is what you say of the claims of the law, in the “Oberlin Evangelist,”
vol. ii. p. 50 :—‘the question is, what does the law of God require of Christians
of the present generation, in all respects in our circumstances, with all the igno-
rance and debility of body and mind which have resulted from the intemperance
and abuse of the human constitution through so many generations?” But if
this be so, then the more ignorant and debilitated a person is in body and mind
in consequence of his own or ancestors' sins and follies, the less the law would
require of him, and the less would it be for him to become perfectly holy
— and, the nearer this ignorance and debility came to being perfect, the
nearer would he be to being perfectly holy, for the less would be required of
him to make him so. But is this so Can a person be perfectly sanctified,
while particularly that “ignorance of mind,” which is the effect of the intemper-
ance and abuse of the human constitution, remains 2 Yea, can he be sanctified at
all, only as this ignorance is removed by the truth and Spirit of God ; it being a
moral and not a physical effect of sinning 2 I say it kindly, here appears to me,
at least, a very serious entering wedge of error. Were the effect of human
depravity upon man simply to disable him, like taking from the body a limb,
or destroying in part, or in whole, a faculty of the mind, I would not object ; but to
say, this effect is ignorance, a moral effect wholly, and then say, having this igno-
rance, the law levels its claims according to it, and that with it, a man can be
cntirely sanctified, looks not to me like the teachings of the bible.”
1. I have seen the passage from my lecture, here alluded to, quoted and com-
mented upon, in different periodicals, and uniformly with entire disapprobation.
2. It has always been separated entirely from the exposition which I have given of
the law of God in the same lectures; with which exposition, no one, so far as I know, has
seen fit to grapple.
3. I believe, in every instance, the objections that have been made to this paragraph,
were made by those who profess to believe in the present natural ability of sinners to
do all their duty.
4. I would most earnestly and respectfully inquire, what consistency there is, in
denominating this paragraph a dangerous heresy, and still maintaining that men are at
present naturally able to do all that God requires of them 2
5. I put the inquiry back to those brethren,_By what authority do you affirm, that
God requires any more of any moral agent in the universe, and of man in his present
condition, than he is at present able to perform 2
6. I inquire, does not the very language of the law of God proye to a demonstration,
that God requires no more of man than, in his present state, he is able to perform 2 Let us
14 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
love or benevolence. This I only announce here. It will more fully
appear hereafter. Moral law is a pure and simple idea of the reason.
It is the idea of perfect, universal, and constant consecration of the whole
hear its language : “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all
thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. Thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thyself.” Now here, God so completely levels his claims, by the very wording of
these commandments, to the present capacity of every human being, however young or
old, however mained, debilitated, or idiotic, as, to use the language or sentiment of Prof.
Hickok, of Auburn Seminary, uttered in my hearing that, “if it were possible to conceive
of a moral pigmy, the law requires of him nothing more, than to use whatever strength
he has, in the service and for the glory of God.”
7. I most respectfully but earnestly inquire of my brethren, if they believe that God
requires as much of men as of angels, of achild as of aman, of a half-idiot as of a Newton 2
I mean not to ask whether God requires an equally perfect consecration of all the powers
actually possessed by each of these classes; but whether in degree, he really requires the
same, irrespective of their present natural ability ?
8. I wish to inquire, whether my brethren do not admit that the brain is the organ of
the mind, and that every abuse of the physical system has abridged the capacity of the
mind, while it remains connected with the body ? And I would also ask, whether my
brethren mean to maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of present natural ability
to comply with all the requirements of God, and also the fact that God now requires of
man just the same degree of service that he might have rendered if he had never sinned,
or in any way violated the laws of his being P And if they maintained these two positions
at the same time, I further inquire, whether they believe that man has naturally ability
at the present moment to bring all his faculties and powers, together with his know-
ledge, into the same state in which they might have been, had he never sinned 2 My
brethren, is there not some inconsistency here 2
The fact is, you contradict yourselves. Your positions are precisely as follow :-
(l.) Man is able perfectly to keep all the commandments of God.
(2.) God requires of man just that service in kind and degree, which would have
been possible to him had he never sinned.
(3.) But man has sinned, abused, and crippled his powers, in so much that, to render
the kind and degree of service which God demands of him, is a natural impossibility.
9. In the paragraph above quoted, the brother admits, that if a man by his own act
had deprived himself of any of his corporeal faculties, he would not thenceforth have
been under an obligation to use those faculties. But he thinks this principle does not hold
true, in respect to ignorance ; because he esteems ignorance a moral, and not a natural
defect. Here I beg leave to make a few inquiries :
(1.) Should a man wickedly deprive himself of the use of his hand, would not this be
a moral act 2 No doubt it would.
(2.) Suppose a man by his own act should make himself an idiot, would not this be
a moral act 2
(3.) Would he not in both cases render himself naturally unable, in the one case to
use his hand, and in the other his reason ? Undoubtedly he would. But how can it be
affirmed, with any show of reason, that in the one case his natural inability discharges
him from obligation, and not in the other—that he is still bound to use his reason, but
not his hand? Now the fact is, that in both these cases the inability is natural.
(4.) I ask, if a man willingly remained in ignorance of God, whether his ignorance
would constitute a moral inability ? If a moral inability, he can instantly overcome it,
by the right exercise of his own will, for nothing can be a moral inability that cannot be
be instantaneously removed by our own volition. But can the present ignorance of
mankind be instantaneously removed by an act of volition on the part of men, and their
knowledge become as perfect as it might have been had they never sinned 2 If not, why
call ignorance a moral inability, or a moral effect ' The fact is that ignorance is often the
MORAI, GOVERNMENT. 15
being, to the highest good of being. Just this is, and nothing more nor
less can be, moral law; for just this, and nothing more nor less, is a state
natural effect of moral delinquency. Neglect of duty occasions ignorance; and this igno-
rance, while it remains, constitutes a natural inability to perform those duties of which
the mind is ignorant ; and all that can be required is, that from the present moment,
the mind should diligently engage in acquiring what knowledge it can, and perfectly
obey, as fast as it obtains the light. If this is not true, it is utter nonsense to talk about
natural ability as being a sine quâ non of moral obligation. And I would kindly, but
most earnestly, ask my brethren, by what rule of consistency they maintain, at the same
breath, the doctrine of a natural ability to do whatever God requires, and also insist that
he requires men to know as much, and in all respects to render him the same kind and
degree of service as if they never had sinned, or rendered themselves in any respect
naturally incapable of doing and being, at the present moment, all that they might have
done and been, had they never, in any instance, neglected duty
10. This objector appears to be strongly impressed with the consideration, that if
a man's ignorance can be any excuse for his not doing, at present, what he might have
done, but for this ignorance, it will follow, that the less he knows the less is required of
him, and should he become a perfect idiot, he would be entirely discharged from moral
obligation. To this I answer : Yes, or the doctrine of natural ability and the entire
government of God, are a mere farce. If a man should annihilate himself, would not he
thereby set aside his moral obligation to obey God 2 Yes truly. Should he make himself
an idiot, would he not thereby annihilate his moral agency ; and of course his natural
ability to obey God & Will my New School brethren adopt the position of Dr. Wilson
of Cincinnati, as maintained on the trial of Dr. Beecher, that “moral obligation does
not imply ability of any kind 2’” The truth is, that for the time being, a man may de-
stroy his moral agency, by rendering himself a lunatic or an idiot ; and while this lunacy
or idiotcy continues, obedience to God is naturally impossible, and therefore not required.
But it is also true, that no human being can deprive himself of reason and moral
agency, but for a limited time. There is no reason to believe, that the soul can be
deranged or idiotic, when separated from the body. And therefore moral agency will in
all cases be renewed in a future, if not in the present state of existence, when God will hold
men fully responsible for having deprived themselves of power to render him all that
service which they might otherwise have rendered. But do let me inquire again, can my
dear brethren maintain, that an idiot or a lunatic can be a moral agent 2 can they
maintain that a being is the subject of moral obligation any farther than he is in
a state of sanity ? Can they maintain, that an infant is the subject of moral obli-
gation, previous to all knowledge And can they maintain, that moral obligation can,
in any case, exceed knowledge 2 If they can and do—then, to be consistent, they must
flatly deny that natural ability is a sine quá non of moral obligation, and adopt the
absurd dogma of Dr. Wilson, that “moral obligation does not imply any ability what-
ever.” When my brethren will take this ground, I shall then understand and know
where to meet them. But I beseech you not to complain of inconsistency in me, nor
accuse me of teaching dangerous heresy, while I teach nothing more than you must
admit to be true, or unequivocally admit in extenso, the very dogma of Dr. Wilson,
quoted above.
I wish to be distinctly understood. I maintain, that present ignorance is present
natural inability, as absolutely as that the present want of a hand is present natural
inability to use it. And I also maintain, that the law of God requires nothing more of any
human being, than that which he is at present naturally able to perform, under the
present circumstances of his being. Do my brethren deny this 2 If they do, then they
have gone back to Dr. Wilson's ground. If they do not, why am I accounted a heretic
by them, for teaching what they themselves maintain 2
ll. In my treatise upon the subject of entire sanctification, I have shown from the
16 SYSTEMIATI(" THE() L() (; Y.
of heart and a course of life exactly suited to the nature and relations
of moral agents, which is the only true definition of moral law,
12. Equity is another attribute of moral law. Equity is equality. That
only is equitable which is equal. The interest and well-being of every
sentient existence, and especially of every moral agent, is of some value in
comparison with the interests of others, and of the whole universe of
creatures. Moral law demands that the interest and well-being of every
member of the universal family shall be regarded by each according to its
relative or comparative value, and that in no case shall it be sacrificed or
wholly neglected, unless it be forfeited by crime. The distinction, allowed
by human tribunals, between law and equity, does not pertain to moral law,
nor does nor can it strictly pertain to any law. For it is impossible that
that should be law, in the sense of imposing obligation, of which equity is
not an attribute. An inequitable law cannot be. The requirements of
law must be equal. A moral agent may, by transgression, forfeit the
protection of law, and may come into such governmental relations, by
trampling on the law, that moral law may demand that he be made a
public example—that his interest and well-being be laid upon the altar,
and that he be offered a sacrifice to public justice, as a preventive of
crime in others. It may happen also that sacrifices may be demanded
by moral law of innocent beings, for the promotion of a greater amount
of good than that sacrificed by the innocent. Such was the case with the
atonement of Christ, and such is the case with the missionary, and with all
who are called by the law of love to practice self-denial for the good of
others. But let it be remembered, that moral law never requires nor allows
any degree of Self-denial and self-sacrifice that relinquishes a good of
greater value than that gained by the sacrifice. Nor does it in any case
demand nor permit that any interest, 11ot forfeited by its possessor, shall
be relinquished or finally neglected, without adequate ultimate compensa-
Bible, that actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation, and that the legal
maxim, “ignorance of the law excuses no one,” is not good in morals.
12. Professor Stuart, in a recent number of the Biblical Repository, takes precisely
the same ground that I have taken, and fully maintains, that sin is the voluntary trans-
gression of a known law. And he further abundantly shows, that this is no new or
heterodox opinion. Now Prof. Stuart, in the article alluded to, takes exactly the same
position in regard to what constitutes sin that I have done in the paragraph upon which
so much has been said. And may I be permitted to inquire, why the same sentiment
is orthodox at Andover, and sound theology in the Biblical Repository, but highly hetero-
dox and dangerous at Oberlin
13. Will my brethren of the new school, to avoid the conclusiveness of my reason-
ings in respect to the requirements of the law of God, go back to old schoolism, physical
depravity, and accountability based upon natural inability, and all the host of absurdities
belonging to its particular views of orthodoxy 2 I recollect that Dr. Beecher expressed his
surprise at the position taken by Dr. Wilson, to which I have alluded, and said he did
not believe that “many men could be found, who could march up without winking to
the maintenance of such a proposition as that.” But to be consistent, I do not see but
that my brethren, with or “without winking,” are driven to the necessity, either of
“marching up" to maintaining the same proposition, or they must admit that the
objectionable paragraph in my lecture is the truth of God.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 17
tion. As has been said, every interest is of Some comparative value ; and
ought to be so esteemed and treated, Moral law demands, and must de-
mand, that it shall be so regarded by all moral agents to whom it is known.
“THOU shALT LovE THY NEIGHBOUR AS THYSELF " is its unalterable lan-
guage. It can absolutely utter no other language than this, and nothing
can be moral law which holds any other language. Law is not, and
cannot be, an arbitrary enactment of any being or number of beings.
Unequal LAw is a misnomer. That which is unequal in its demands, is
not and cannot be, law. Law must respect the interests and the rights of
all, and of each member of the universal family. It is impossible that it
should be otherwise, and still be law.
13. Expediency is another attribute of moral law.
That which is upon the whole most wise is expedient, that which is
upon the whole expedient is demanded by moral law. True expediency
and the spirit of moral law are always identical. Expediency may be in-
consistent with the letter, but never with the spirit of moral law. Law in
the form of commandment is a revelation or declaration of that course which
is expedient. It is expediency revealed, as in the case of the decalogue,
and the same is true of every precept of the Bible, it reveals to us what is
expedient. A revealed law or commandment is never to be set aside by
our views of expediency. We may know with certainty that what is re-
quired is expedient. The command is the expressed judgment of God in
the case, and reveals with unerring certainty the true path of expediency.
When Paul says, “All things are lawful unto me, but all things are not
expedient,” we must not understand him as meaning that all things in the
absolute sense were lawful to him, or that anything that was not expedient
was lawful to him. But he doubtless intended, that many things were
inexpedient that are not expressly prohibited by the letter of the law,
that the spirit of the law prohibited many things not expressly forbidden
by the letter. It should never be forgotten that that which is plainly
demanded by the highest good of the universe is law. It is expedient.
It is wise. The true spirit of the moral law does and must demand it.
So, on the other hand, whatever is plainly inconsistent with the highest
good of the universe is illegal, unwise, inexpedient, and must be pro-
hibited by the spirit of moral law. But let the thought be repeated,
that the Bible precepts always reveal that which is truly expedient, and
in no case are we at liberty to set aside the spirit of any commandment
upon the supposition that expediency requires it. Some have denounced
the doctrine of expediency altogether, as at all times inconsistent with the
law of right. These philosophers proceed upon the assumption that the
law of right and the law of benevolence are not identical but inconsistent
With each other. This is a common but fundamental mistake, which leads
me to remark that
Law proposes the highest good of universal being as its end, and re-
quires all moral agents to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this
end. Consequently, expediency must be one of its attributes. That which
C
18 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
is upon the whole in the highest degree useful to the universe must be
demanded by moral law. Moral law must, from its own mature, require just
that course of willing and acting that is upon the whole in the highest
degree promotive of the public good, in other words, that which is upon
the whole in the highest degree useful, and therefore expedient. It has
been strangely and absurdly maintained that right would be obligatory
if it necessarily tended to and resulted in universal and perfect misery.
Than which a more nonsensical affirmation was never made. The affirm-
ation assumes that the law of right and of good-will are not only distinct,
but may be antagonistic. It also assumes that that can be law that is
not suited to the mature and relations of moral agents. Certainly it will
not be pretended that that course of willing and acting that necessarily
tends to, and results in, universal misery, can be consistent with the nature
and relations of moral agents. Nothing is or can be suited to their nature
and relations, that is not upon the whole promotive of their highest well-
being. Expediency and right are always and necessarily at one. They
can never be inconsistent. That which is upon the whole most expedient
is right, and that which is right is upon the whole expedient.
14. Ecclusivenesss is another attribute of moral law. That is, moral law
is the only possible rule of moral obligation. A distinction is usually
made between moral, ceremonial, civil, and positive laws. This distinction
is in some respects convenient, but is liable to mislead and to create an im-
pression that something can be obligatory, in other words can be law, that
has not the attributes of moral law. Nothing can be law, in any proper
sense of the term, that is not and would not be universally obligatory upon
moral agents under the same circumstances. It is law because and only
because, under all the circumstances of the case, the course prescribed is
fit, proper, suitable, to their natures, relations, and circumstances. There
can be no other rule of action for moral agents but moral law, or the law
of benevolence. Every other rule is absolutely excluded by the very mature
of moral law. Surely there can be no law that is or can be obligatory
upon moral agents but one suited to, and founded in their nature, relations,
and circumstances. This is and maust be the law of love or benevolence.
This is the law of right, and nothing else is or can be. Every thing else
that claims to be law and to impose obligation upon moral agents, from
whatever source it emanates, is not and cannot be a law, but must be
an imposition and “a thing of nought.”
ON GOVERNMENT. 19
L E C T U R E III.
ON GOVERNMENT.
I. TERM GoverNMENT DEFINED.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MoRAL AND PHYSICAL GOVERNMENT.
III. FUNDAMENTAL REASON OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.
IV. WHOSE RIGHT IT IS TO GOVERN. g
V. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN THE RIGHT TO GOVERN.
VI. LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO GOVERN.
VII. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN MoRAL GOVERNMENT.
VIII. MoRAL OBLIGATION DEFINED.
IX. CoNDITIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
I. Government defined.
The primary idea of government, is that of direction, guidance, control,
by, or in accordance with, rule or law. This seems to be the generic signifi-
cation of the term government; but it appears not to be sufficiently broad
in its meaning, to express all that properly belongs to moral government.
This leads me,
II. To distinguish between moral and physical government.
All government is, and must be, either moral or physical ; that is, all
guidance and control must be exercised in accordance with either moral or
physical law; for there can be no laws that are neither moral nor physical.
Physical government, is control, exercised by a law of necessity or force, as
distinguished from the law of free will, or liberty. It is the control of
substance, as opposed to free will. The only government of which substance,
as distinguished from free will, is capable, is and must be physical. This
is true, whether the substance be material or immaterial, whether matter
or mind. States and changes, whether of matter or mind, that are not
actions of free will, must be subject to the law of necessity. In no other
way can they be accounted for. They must therefore belong to the
department of physical government. Physical government, them, is the
administration of physical law, or the law of force.
Moral government consists in the declaration and administration of
moral law. It is the government of free will by motives as distinguished
from the government of substance by force. Physical government presides
over and controls physical states, and changes of substance or constitution,
and all involuntary states and changes. Moral government presides over
and controls, or seeks to control, the actions of free will ; it presides
over intelligent and voluntary states and changes of mind. It is a govern-
ment of motive, as opposed to a government of force—control exercised,
or sought to be exercised, in accordance with the law of liberty, as opposed
to the law of necessity. It is the administration of moral as opposed to
physical law.
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ON GOVERNMENT. 21
(2.) Moral order depends upon the harmonious action of all our powers,
as individuals and as members of society.
(3.) No community can perfectly harmonize in all their views and
feelings, without perfect knowledge, or, to say the least, the same degree
of knowledge on all subjects on which they are called to act.
(4.) But no community ever existed, or will exist, in which every
individual possesses exactly the same amount of knowledge, and where the
members are, therefore, entirely agreed in all their thoughts, views, and
opinions.
(5.) But if they are not agreed in opinion, or have not exactly the same
amount of knowledge, they will not, in every thing, harmonize, as it respects
their courses of conduct.
(6.) There must, therefore, be in every community, some standard or rule
of duty, to which all the subjects of the community are to conform themselves.
(7.) There must be some head or controlling mind, whose will shall be
law, and whose decision shall be regarded as infallible, by all the sub-
jects of the government.
(8.) However diverse their intellectual attainments are, in this they
must all agree, that the will of the lawgiver is right, and universally the
rule of duty.
(9.) This will must be authoritative, and not merely advisory.
(10.) There must of necessity be a penalty attached to, and incurred by,
every act of disobedience to this will.
(11.) If disobedience be persisted in, exclusion from the privileges of
the government is the lowest penalty that can consistently be inflicted.
(12.) The good, then, of the universe imperiously requires, that there
should be a moral governor.
IV. Whose right it is to govern.
We have just seen, that necessity is a condition of the right and duty
to govern—that the highest well-being of the universe demands, and is
the end of moral government. It must, therefore, be his right and duty
to govern, whose attributes, physical and moral, best qualify him to secure
the end of government. To him all eyes and hearts should be directed,
to fill this station, to exercise this control, to administer all just and
necessary rewards and punishments. It is both his right and duty to
govern. - -
That God is a moral governor, we infer—
1. From our own consciousness. From the very laws of our being, we
naturally affirm our responsibility to him for our conduct. As God is our
creator, we are naturally responsible to him for the right exercise of our
powers. And as our good and his glory depend upon our conformity to
the same rule, to which he conforms his whole being, he is under a moral
obligation to require us to be holy, as he is holy.
2. His natural attributes qualify him to sustain the relation of a moral
governor to the universe.
22 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
3. His moral character also qualifies him to sustain this relation.
4. His relation to the universe as Creator and preserver, when con-
sidered in connexion with the necessity of government, and with his
nature and attributes, confers on him the right of universal government.
5. His relation to the universe, and our relations to him and to each
other, render it obligatory upon him to establish and administer a moral
government over the universe.
6. The honour of God demands that he should administer such a
government.
7. His conscience must demand it. He must know that it would be
Wrong for him to create a universe of moral beings; and then refuse or
neglect to administer over them a moral government, since government is
a necessity of their nature and relations.
8. His happiness must demand it, as he could not be happy unless he
acted in accordance with his conscience.
9. If God is not a moral governor he is not wise. Wisdom consists
in the choice of the best ends, and in the use of the most appropriate
means to accomplish those ends. If God is not a moral governor, it is
inconceivable that he should have had any important end in view in the
creation of moral beings, or that he should have chosen the best or any suit-
able means for the promotion of their happiness as the most desirable end.
10. The conduct or providence of God plainly indicates a design to exert
a moral influence over moral agents.
11. His providence plainly indicates that the universe of mind is
governed by moral laws, or by laws suited to the nature of unoral
agents.
12. Consciousness recognizes the existence of an inward law, or rule of
action, together with a knowledge of the moral quality of actions.
13. This inward moral consciousness, or conscience, is proof con-
clusive of the existence of a rule of duty which is obligatory upon us.
Indeed, this consciousness is only the mind's direct beholding this law, as
affirmed by the reason. This rule implies a ruler, and this ruler must be God.
14. If God is not a moral governor, our very nature deceives us.
15. If God is not a moral governor, the whole universe, so far as we
have the means of knowing it, is calculated to mislead mankind in respect
to this fundamental truth.
16. If there is no such thing as moral government, there is, in reality,
mo such thing as moral character ; but we as certainly know that we have
moral character, as that we exist.
17. All mations have believed that God is a moral governor.
18. Our nature is such, that we must believe it. The conviction of
our moral accountability to God, is in such a sense the dictate of our moral
nature, that we cannot escape from it.
19. We must disapprove the character of God, if we ever come to a
knowledge of the fact that he created moral agents, and then exercised over
them no moral government.
ON GOVERNMENT. 23
20. The connection between moral delinquency and suffering is such
as to render it certain that moral government does, as a matter of fact,
exist.
21. The Bible, which has been proved to be a revelation from God, Con-
tains a most simple and yet comprehensive system of moral government.
22. If we are deceived in respect to our being subjects of moral govern-
ment, we are sure of mothing.
V. What is implied in the right to govern.
J. From what has just been said, it must be evident, that the right to
govern, implies the necessity of government, as a means of securing an in-
trinsically valuable end.
2. Also that the right to govern, implies the duty, or obligation to
govern. There can be no right, in this case, without corresponding obli-
gation; for the right to govern is founded in the necessity of government,
and the necessity of government imposes obligation to govern.
3. The right to govern, implies obligation, on the part of the subject, to
obey. It cannot be the right, or duty, of the governor to govern, unless it
is the duty of the subject to obey. The governor and subject are alike
dependent upon government, as the indispensable means of promoting the
highest good. The governor and the subject must, therefore, be under
reciprocal obligation, the one to govern, and the other to be governed, or
to obey. The one must seek to govern, the other must submit to be
governed.
4. The right to govern, implies the right and duty to dispense just and
necessary rewards and punishments—to distribute rewards proportioned
to merit, and penalties proportioned to demerit, whenever the public in
terest demand their execution.
5. It implies the right and duty, to use all necessary means to secure
the end of government, as far as possible.
6. It implies obligation, on the part of the subject, cheerfully to ac-
quiesce in any measure, that may be necessary, to secure the end of
government, and in case of disobedience, to submit to merited punishment,
and also, if necessary, to aid in the infliction of the penalty of law.
7. It implies the right and obligation of both ruler and ruled, to consecrate
themselves to the promotion of the great end of government, with a single
and steady aim.
8. It implies obligation, both on the part of the ruler and the ruled, to be
always ready, and when occasion arises, actually to make any personal and
private sacrifice demanded by the higher public good—to cheerfully meet
any emergency, and exercise any degree of self-denial, that can, and will,
result in a good of greater value to the public, than that sacrificed by
the individual, or by any number of individuals, it always being understood,
that present voluntary sacrifices shall have an ultimate reward.
9. It implies the right and duty to employ any degree of force, which
is indispensable to the maintenance of order, the execution of wholesome
24 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
laws, the suppression of insurrections, the punishment of rebels and disor-
ganizers, and sustaining the supremacy of moral law. It is impossible that
the right to govern should not imply this; and to deny this right, is to
deny the right to govern. Should an emergency occur, in which a ruler
had no right to use the indispensable means of securing order, and
the Supremacy of law, the moment this emergency occurred, his right to
govern would, and must, cease : for it is impossible that it should be his
right to govern, unless it be at the same time, and for the same reason, his
duty to govern. For it is absurd to say, that it is his right and duty
to govern, and yet, at the same time, that he has not a right to use the
indispensable means of government. It is the same absurdity, as to say,
that he has, and has mot, the right to govern, at the same time. If it be
asked, whether an emergency like the one under consideration is possible,
and if so, what might justly be regarded as such an emergency, I answer,
that should circumstances occur under which the sacrifice necessary to
sustain, would overbalance the good to be derived from the prevalence of
government, this would create the emergency under consideration, in which
the right to govern would cease.
VI. Point out the limits of this right.
The right to govern is, and must be, just co-extensive with the necessity
of government. We have seen, that the right to govern is founded in the
necessities of moral beings. In other words, the right to govern is founded
upon the fact, that the highest good of moral agents cannot be secured, but
by means of government,
It is a first truth of reason, that what is good or valuable in itself,
should be chosen for its own sake, and that it must therefore be the duty
of moral agents to aim at Securing, and so far as in them lies, to use the
means of securing, the highest good of the universe, for its own sake, or
on account of its intrinsic value. If moral government is the only means
by which this end can be secured, then government is a necessity of the
universe, thence a duty. Dut under this head, to avoid mistake, and to
correct erroneous impressions, which are sometimes entertained, I must
show what is not the foundation of the right to govern. The boundary
of the right must, as will be seen, depend upon the foundation of the right.
The right must be as broad as the reason for it. If the reason of the right
be mistaken, then the limits of the right cannot be ascertained, and must
necessarily be mistaken also.
1. Hence the right to govern the universe, for instance, cannot be
founded in the fact, that God sustains to it the relation of Creator. This
is by itself no reason why he should govern it, unless it needs to be
governed—unless some good will result from government. Unless there is
some necessity for government, the fact that God created the universe can
give him no right to govern it.
2. The fact that God is the owner and sole proprietor of the universe is
no reason why he should govern it. Unless either his own good or the good
ON GOVERNMENT. 25
of the universe, or of both together, demand government, the relation of
owner cannot confer the right to govern. Neither God, nor any other being,
can own moral beings, in such a sense as to have a right to govern them,
when government is wholly unnecessary, and can result in no good whatever
to God, or to his creatures. Government, in such a case, would be perfectly
arbitrary and unreasonable, and consequently an unjust, tyrannical and
wicked act. God has no such right. No such right can, by possibility, in
any case exist.
3. The right to goverm cannot be founded in the fact, that God possesses
all the attributes, matural and moral, that are requisite to the administration
of moral government. This fact is no doubt a condition of the right; for
without these qualifications he could have no right, however necessary
government might be. But the possession of these attributes camot confer
the right independently of the necessity of government : for however well
qualified he may be to govern, still, unless government is necessary, to
securing his own glory and the highest well-being of the universe, he has no
right to govern it. Possessing the requisite qualifications is the condition,
and the necessity of government is the foundation of the right to govern.
More strictly, the right is founded in the intrinsic value of the interests
to be secured by government, and conditionated upon the fact, that govern-
ment is the necessary means of securing the end.
4. Nor is the right to govern conferred by the value of the interests
to be secured, nor by the circumstance of the necessity of government
merely, without respect to the condition just above mentioned. Did not
God's natural and moral attributes qualify him to sustain that relation
better than any one else, the right could not be conferred on him by any
other fact or relation.
5. The right to govern is not, and cannot be, an abstract right based on
mo reason whatever. The idea of this right is not an ultimate idea in such
a sense, that our intelligence affirms the right without assigning any reason on
which it is founded. The human intelligence cannot say that God has a right
to govern, because he has such a right ; and that this is reason enough, and
all the reason that can be given. Our reason does not affirm that govern-
ment is right because it is right, and that this is a first truth, and an ultimate
idea. If this were so, then God's arbitrary will would be law, and no bounds
could possibly be assigned to the right to govern. If God's right to govern
be a first truth, an ultimate truth, fact, and idea, founded in no assignable
reason, then he has the right to legislate as little, and as much, and as
arbitrarily, as unnecessarily, as absurdly, and injuriously as possible; and
no injustice is, or can be done; for he has, by the supposition, a right to
govern, founded in no reason, and of course without any limit. Assign any
other reason, as the foundation of the right to govern, then the value of the
interests to be secured, and conditionated upon the necessity of govern-
ment, and you may search in vain for any limit to the right. But the
moment the foundation and the condition of the right are discovered, we
see instantly, that the right must be co-extensive with the reason upon
26 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
which it is founded, or in other words, must be limited by, and only by the
fact, that thus far, and no farther, government is necessary to the highest
good of the universe. No legislation can be valid in heaven or earth—no
enactments can impose obligation, except upon the condition, that such
legislation is demanded by the highest good of the governor and the
governed. Unnecessary legislation is invalid legislation. Unnecessary
government is tyranny. It can, in no case, be founded in right. It
should, however, be observed, that it is often, and in the government of
God universally true, that the Sovereign, and not the subject, is to be the
judge of what is necessary legislation and government. Under no govern-
ment, therefore, are laws to be despised or rejected because we are unable
to see, at once, their necessity, and hence, their wisdom. Unless they are
palpably unnecessary, and therefore unwise and unjust, they are to be
respected and obeyed as a less evil than contempt and disobedience, though
at present we are unable to see their wisdom. Under the government of
God there can never be any doubt, and of course any ground, for distrust
and hesitancy, as it respects the duty of obedience.
VII. What is implied in moral government.
1. Moral government implies a moral governor.
2. It implies the existence of moral law.
3. It implies the existence of moral agents as the subjects of moral
government.
4. It implies the existence of moral obligation to obey moral law.
5. It implies the fact of moral character, that is, of praise or blame-
worthiness in the subjects of moral government. A moral agent must be
under moral obligation, and one who is under moral obligation must have
moral character. If he complies with obligation he must be holy and praise-
worthy, if he refuse to comply with moral obligation he must be sinful and
blame-worthy.
VIII. Moral obligation.
Obligation is a bond, or that which binds. Moral obligation is oughtness.
It is a responsibility imposed on the moral agent by his own reason, and
by the authority of God. God reveals obligation to and through the reason.
The idea of obligation, or of oughtness, is an idea of the pure reason.
It is a simple, rational conception, and, strictly speaking, does not admit of
a definition, since, there are no terms more simple by which it may be
defined. Obligation is a term by which we express a conception or idea
which all men have, as is manifest from the universal language of men.
All men have the ideas of right and wrong, and have words by which these
ideas are expressed, and, perhaps, no idea among men more frequently
reveals itself in words than that of oughtness or obligation. The term
cannot be defined, for the simple reason that it is too well and too univer-
sally understood to need or even to admit of being expressed in any
language more simple and definite than the word obligation itself.
ON GOVERNMENT.
2
7
IX. The conditions of moral obligation.
There is a distinction of fundamental importance between the condition
and the ground of obligation, which has been overlooked by some writers,
and of course they have confused the whole question of obligation. The
ground of obligation is the consideration which creates or imposes obligation,
the fundamental reason of the obligation. Of this I shall inquire in its
proper place, in the course of which inquiry I shall have occasion to notice
some instances of the confusion just alluded to, arising out of confounding
the ground and the conditions of obligation. At present I am to define
the conditions of obligation. But I must in this place observe that there
are various forms of obligation. For example, obligation to choose an
ultimate end of life as the highest good of the universe; obligation to choose
the necessary conditions of this end, as holiness, for example; and obli-
gation to put forth executive efforts to secure this end. The conditions
of obligation vary with the form of obligation, as we shall fully perceive
in the course of our investigations.
A condition of obligation in any particular form is a sine qua non of
obligation in that particular form. It is that, without which, obligation in
that form could not exist, and yet is not the fundamental reason of the
obligation. For example, the possession of the powers of moral agency is
a condition of the obligation to choose the highest good of being in general,
as an ultimate end, or for its own sake. But the intrinsic value of this
good is the ground of the obligation. This obligation could not exist
without the possession of these powers; but the possession of these powers
cannot of itself create the obligation to choose the good in preference to
the ill of being. The intrinsic difference between the good and the ill of
being is the ground of the obligation to will the one rather than the other.
I will first define the conditions upon which all obligation depends, and
without which obligation in no form can exist, and afterwards proceed to
point out the conditions of distinct forms of obligation.
1. Moral agency is universally a condition of moral obligation. The
attributes of moral agency are intellect, sensibility, and free will.
(1.) Intellect, includes, amongst other functions which I need not
name, reason, conscience, and self-consciousness. As has been said on a
former Occasion, reason is the intuitive faculty or function of the intellect.
It gives by direct intuition the following among other truths: the absolute
—for example, right and wrong; the necessary—space exists; the infinite
—space is infinite; the perfect—God is perfect—God's law is perfect, &c.
In short, it is the faculty that intuits moral relations and affirms moral
obligation to act in conformity with perceived moral relations. It is that
faculty that postulates all the d priori truths of science whether mathe-
matical, philosophical, theological, or logical.
Conscience is the faculty or function of the intellect that recognizes the
conformity or disconformity of the heart and life to the moral law as it
lies revealed in the reason, and also awards praise to conformity, and blame
28 SYSTEMATIC TIEOLOGY.
to discomformity to that Yaw. It also affirms that conformity to the moral
law deserves reward, and that disconformity deserves punishment. It also
possesses a propelling or impulsive power, by which it urges the conformity,
and denounces the nonconformity of will, to moral law. It seems, in a
certain sense, to possess the power of retribution.
Consciousness is the faculty or function of self-knowledge. It is the
faculty that recognizes our own existence, mental actions, and states,
together with the attributes of liberty or necessity, belonging to those
actions or states.
“Consciousness is the mind in the act of knowing itself.” By
consciousness I know that I am—that I affirm that space is, that I also
affirm that the whole is equal to all its parts—that every event must have
a cause, and many such like truths. I am conscious not only of these
affirmations, but also that necessity is the law of these affirmations, that I
cannot affirm otherwise than I do, in respect to this class of truths. I am
also conscious of choosing to sit at my desk and write, and I am just as
conscious that liberty is the law of this choice. That is, I am conscious
of necessarily regarding myself as entirely free in this choice, and affirming
my own ability to have chosen not to sit at my desk, and of being now
able to choose not to sit and write. I am just as conscious of affirming
the liberty or necessity of my mental states as I am of the states them-
selves. Consciousness gives us our existence and attributes, our mental
acts and states, and all the attributes and phenomena of our being, of
which we have any knowledge. In short, all our knowledge is given to us
by consciousness. The intellect is a receptivity as distinguished from a
voluntary power. All the acts and states of the intellect are under the
law of necessity, or physical law. The will can command the attention
of the intellect. Its thoughts, perceptions, affirmations, and all its
phenomena are involuntary, and under a law of necessity. Of this we
are conscious. Another faculty indispensable to moral agency is—
(2.) Sensibility. This is the faculty or susceptibility of feeling. All
sensation, desire, emotion, passion, pain, pleasure, and, in short, every
kind and degree of feeling, as the term feeling is commonly used, is a
phenomenon of this faculty. This faculty supplies the chronological con-
dition of the idea of the valuable, and hence of right and wrong, and of
moral obligation. The experience of pleasure or happiness developes the
idea of the valuable, just as the perception of body developes the idea of
space. But for this faculty the mind could have no idea of the valuable,
and hence of moral obligation to will the valuable, nor of right and Wrong,
nor of praise and blame-worthiness.
Self-love is a phenomenon of this department of the mind. It consists
in a constitutional desire of happiness, and implies a corresponding dread
of misery. It is doubtless through, or by this constitutional tendency that
the rational idea of the intrinsic value of happiness or enjoyment is at first
developed. Animals, doubtless, have enjoyment, but we have no evidence
that they possess the faculty of reason in the sense in which I have
ON GOVERNMENT. 29
defined the term. Consequently they have not, as we suppose, the rational
conception of the intrinsic worth or value of enjoyment. They seek enjoy-
ment from a mere impulse of their animal nature, without, as we suppose,
So much as a conception of moral law, obligation, right or wrong.
But we know that moral agents have these ideas. Self-love is consti-
tutional. Its gratification is the chronological condition of the develope-
ment of the reason's idea of the intrinsically valuable to being. This
idea developes that of moral law, or in other words, the affirmation that
this intrinsic good ought to be universally chosen and sought for its own
Sake.
The sensibility, like the intellect, is a receptivity or purely a passive, as
distinguished from a voluntary faculty. All its phenomena are under the
law of necessity. I am conscious that I cannot, by any direct effort, feel
when and as I will. This faculty is so correlated to the intellect that
when the intellect is intensely occupied with certain considerations, the
sensibility is affected in a certain manner, and certain feelings exist in the
sensibility by a law of necessity. I am conscious that when certain
conditions are fulfilled, I necessarily have certain feelings, and that when
these conditions are not fulfilled, I cannot be the subject of those feelings.
I know by consciousness that my feelings and all the states and phenomena
of the sensibility are only indirectly under the control of my will. By
willing I can direct my intellect to the consideration of certain subjects, and
in this way alone affect my sensibility, and produce a given state of feel-
ing. So on the other hand, if certain feelings exist in the sensibility
which I wish to suppress, I know that I cannot annihilate them by directly
willing them out of existence, but by diverting my attention from the
cause of them, they cease to exist of course and of necessity. Thus,
feeling is only indirectly under the control of the will.
(3.) Moral agency implies the possession of free-will. By free-will is
intended the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in every instance,
in compliance with moral obligation. Free-will implies the power of
originating and deciding our own choices, and of exercising our own
sovereignty, in every instance of choice upon moral questions—of deciding
or choosing in conformity with duty or otherwise in all cases of moral
obligation. That man cannot be under a moral obligation to perform an
absolute impossibility, is a first truth of reason. But man's causality, his
whole power of causality to perform or do anything, lies in his will. If he
cannot will, he can do nothing. His whole liberty or freedom must consist
in his power to will. His outward actions and his mental states are con-
nected with the actions of his will by a law of meeessity. If I will to
move my muscles, they must move, unless there be a paralysis of the nerves
of Voluntary motion, or unless some resistance be opposed that overcomes
the power of my volitions. The sequences of choice or volition are always
under the law of necessity, and unless the will is free, man has no freedom;
and if he has no freedom he is not a moral agent, that is, he is incapable
of moral action and also of moral character. Free-will then, in the above
*A*) O'IOGIHL. OILVINGIRLSXS 09:
st osta Aſun aq, Jo put pop Jo 3ulaq-IIaw alſ, 1814, 23p3|Aoux{ alſ, sailºt
-up Kutussooou pub SK8ATe ‘otojalaun ‘uonbånſdo [Rioſ 'anſea oſsulinuſ siſ
Joj at Buſsoouſo ubiq, osta 3UTInot sº pua up sº aſ Buſsoorio Joj : atlap A3-ſtas
st stil, otºluntax Aubotsuſuul od on aſ 2A(22.1ad I SSalur “pua album[n up
so q osoogo on out Joj alqissoduſ SI I not to aqenſe.A SITEoſsuinuſ st
ooſotto Jo nooſqo pasodoud aun taluatiw Ao(ISI I Inun ‘pita Iſſelta2 b asnya, Io
asooqo on 5uo LA to qušII sº aſ abun AOUI hottubo I aſqunſes ATIBoſsuntſ si
5utunautos qutu Aoux I Inun ‘pua angtunin up sº uosoqo aq. Aſqissod uſeo
Joſqx noun do “pua tub Aotº outteo I puta aún Aous I Intin supou all
IIIA on tone3;[do laptºn aq hottuto I subatu b IO pua (18 sº launſa paſſ A
aq asnut 5uſq.StoAa ‘s quill, 'spud to supout hoodsal snutt adſotto IV
‘uaSOUL) Bulaq Jo
Kq.[OA sp oatiaš IIonuſ Kul on IIas] spuaultuoo Hoſt(A hutu Itosur ul ‘ssas
-sod usnu hooſqo abu.J., 'aoſotto Jo hoaſqo (IB axeſ sutu I UASOIF) Bulaq Jo
Kunlow q stapual hutſ, ‘puta anulunſu (IB st: ‘IIIA on patſubal U18 I (IoIIIA lºtſ,
III Burunautos o Alaotad isntu I ‘IIIA on uonuºmiqo KUT UIUB upo I alojaq
‘Āſponsolaruſsip Jo astus (LAo shi to ‘nt IIIA on not juo,IA pub alºn U8A
oq, to pooj; alth IIIA on huāll si qu yetu Bapſ atti Jo luauladola Aap all.I. (g)
‘ox{t's us\o sur loſ aſqºnſº att, IIIA on tPoint:51Lqo Jo IIonbū [[I]t all L (8)
'aſſumpt. A AIRoſsuſ,thuſ aun Jo bapt to uondaoted au.I. ( )
—saidull sºul,
'ssounuñno Jo tapſ atu adola Aap on su suoup)2.1 pp.tout uno Jo aspalAOUM
qonui os to ‘n//h) SI [Ione#IIqo Tutotu Jo uomption putobos v 'z.
‘ĀhūIqIssoduſ (tº
utopiad on Utop ºf Iqo Tapun aq. On JLasultſ lullûu Utto quašu Iulou out uaULL
‘Utophismbat JetIn Ullas ÅIdutoo on tPoint:31Iqo Jo UtoputII.UU8 alth Jo Utoppūoo
Ålessaoaſt tº sſ ‘tionIsImbal Aut. In A KIdutoo on Shuliau Jo Uonutu.IU's auth
Jo SSausmorosuo O spun op on Anniſqº spºt Buttu.IIIb Jo Snojostloo sº all
asnboaq ‘alman] uſ pop Koqo put httadat on Utonušūqo SIU Ultuu lua hottuto
a H AI Jo KhIIIqissoduſ all U.IIIb and hottuba all asnuoaq ĀIduis ‘ttonušūqo
sitſ, topun od on JLaSUITU U.IIIſt, 1outubo aſ ‘Uluğu Ua Ao ajil slu a MII ol puu
‘aſſ sed. SIU Jo shot aul IIB opun on UonušIIqo stu ‘U.UUg Utºo to stu.IIIſu
Utøtti out ‘aţdrugzo IOI uout 5HTO Jo UOIntt(IITſu attl Jo UOImpuloo ATussaaau
tº SI ‘IIIA on Sntſ, osnja. On 10 “utonºšIIqo [BIOU uniM aduuploo.ou ul IIIA
On 10A0d Jo ‘SI 18th ‘IIIA all, Jo UIopae.j alſ, 5uſtuſ|[Ju Jo SSausmorosuod
'sutoninuſ pub
såuſtaaj Kul uſ Kinnum(0A to 32.1] lott Up I quTIn 3uttu.IU 8 Jo tug I su Sulu A
uſ oalſ tug I nutſ, 3uttu.IIIjt, Jo Suoſosttoo su utu I ‘op I until as Ataulo
‘uonmuſ Jo Sunmin 01 p.Ibáo.1 UII ‘U.IIIb houltuo I http uomutu.IUu au, Jo up
I so ‘uonº!Iqo (b.Lou Jo oottºsuſ Klaxo uſ op I quiUA UIOU. Kuttalaup IIIA
ppmoo I hºun uonguſtuſº alſ, Jo Snojosuoo su utu I IIIA eul Jo Suonou au, Jo
onnai.Init, tº St Kitaqi jetú (Ionetti.IIIſ, strostal alth seaſº VIIBoombaum su isn'ſ
q os ‘Khūſqisuas Jo Souths out Jo put ‘ttosual ou. Jo Suomuluuluu au, Jo and
- Int, up SI Knºssooot! utú uomulu.(IUp [Buonut alſº saxis ssausmorosuoo SW
'UonušIIqo Tullout
Jo ‘ostnoo Jo ‘pub ‘Kouaſſe Tºtotu Jo uomipuoo p aq ºsmut ‘esues peugop
ON GOVERNMENT. 31
valuable in itself, and the affirmation that it ought to be chosen for its
own sake, that is, impartially and on account of its intrinsic value. It is
impossible that the ideas of right and wrong should be developed until the
idea of the valuable is developed. Right and wrong respect intentions,
and strictly nothing else, as we shall See. Intention implies an end in-
tended. Now that which is chosen as an ultimate end, is and must be
chosen for its own sake or for its intrinsic value. Until the end is ap-
prehended, no idea or affirmation of obligation can exist respecting it.
Consequently, no idea of right or wrong in respect to that end can exist.
The end must first be perceived. The idea of the intrinsically valuable
must be developed. Simultaneously with the developement of the idea of
the valuable the intelligence affirms, and must affirm obligation to will
it, or, which is, strictly speaking, the same thing, that it is right to will
it, and wrong not to will it.
It is impossible that the idea of moral obligation, or of right and wrong,
should be developed upon any other conditions than those just specified.
To affirm the contrary were absurd. Suppose, for instance, it should be
said that the idea of the intrinsically valuable is not necessary to the
developement of the idea of moral obligation, and of right and wrong. Let
us look at it. It is agreed that moral obligation, and the ideas of right
and wrong respect, directly, intentions only. It is also admitted that all
intentions must respect either means or ends. It is also admitted that
obligation to will means, cannot exist until the end is known. It is also
admitted that the choice of an ultimate end implies the choice of a thing
for its own sake, or because it is intrinsically valuable. Now. from these
admissions, it follows that the idea of the intrimsically valuable is the
condition of moral obligation, and also of the idea of moral obligation. It
must follow also that the idea of the valuable must be the condition of
the idea that it would be right to choose, or wrong not to choose, the
valuable. When I come to the discussion of the subject of moral depravity,
I shall endeavour to show that the idea of the valuable is very early de-
veloped, and is among the earliest, if not the very first, of human intel-
lections. I have here only to insist that the developement of this idea
is a sine qué non of moral obligation. It is, then, nonsense to affirm
that the ideas of right and wrong are developed antecedently to the idea
of the valuable. It is the same as to say that I affirm it to be right to
will an end, before I have the idea of an end ; or which is the same
thing, of the intrinsically valuable, or wrong not to will an end when
as yet I have no idea or knowledge of any reason why it should be
willed, or, in other words, while I have no idea of an ultimate end. This
is absurd.
Let it be distinctly understood them, that the eonditions of moral
obligation, in the universal form of obligation to will the highest well-
being of God and of the universe, for its own sake, are—
1. The possession of the powers, or faculties, and susceptibilities of a
moral agent.
‘ĀbOTOGIHL OILVINGILSXs 39.
tú estios aq.I. Jos s libou ain iſopus, uodn ‘pua ayuunun autos almoos on
Sliogo (II da apºlu att, so an Asnq Imo 5uſoq Jo pooš Isotºpt att, almoas
but ‘ssottiſou almoos on Shiopia to suoniloa o Annoaxa quo) Trid on Utonºmiqo
Jo stion ſpuoo oll ºno quod on poooo.Id Aou I ‘ssourdduu Jo Sugaul Klessogou
b St. SSouſou Jo aoualsTNo ouſ, Osootto on uomºſqo Jo ULIOJ alſh uſ OSIt pub
‘tu.IO) [usio.Aſun s] uſ uonušūqo Jo Suonpuoo oth pottgap Aou BuſAbH
'slop 9auno).co (1,40ſ md on uompſh)00 ſo suoy!!pu00 ‘g
'ssoulddull Jo onluA oſsuſ.Thuſ aun [o] quid SIX3 pm.00 Utombo, SRI)
Jo hunoooº to ssatutorſ IIIA on UIonušūqo out 10K ‘ssauſddu (I Jo Sugout all, St
SSouTIOU Juul asoddus ‘Utopht:3plao att] onto.to you pluoo uomuto.1 postooted
9II, 39A ‘lsixa not pluoo uomtönqo ouſ, uomelal poAlao.10d stun Ioj qugſ
'uomºſqo att, Jo utonºption u si SSoutddeq on SSouſou Jo uonblat peaſaotod
9th Anq ‘ssould duu Jo ampus onsulanuſ out, sI ‘ssoulddeu Jo Streatu b sg
‘ssatiſLou Jo aotransixa out, IIIA on Uonušūqo att, Jo puno.15 au.L. Subout pub
tionſ.pudo Álussonati u su p5uillºw to uosual [u]ttoruupung out, sº ‘ssottſddeuſ
Jo on IUA opsuſ,thuſ oth on aouatajal mount A SSouſſot Jo oouðlsºa out IIIA
o] stionušildo OSoduſ not pinoo aouanspºo Shi Jo uonpuoo g st; SSoutddull on
SSouſou Jo (Ionuţa.I au.L 'tuto SITQ uſ uonušildo Jo UIonſputoo all AIduſs
qnd punoli; oth not si tropºſal oth Jo (IoIndooled ou.L "ootions[Ma Italin IIIA
on tPontin[(10 oun Jo Utonſpuoo u aq. 1stU puta aún on Subou osaun Jo UOntºlat
où, Jo Itoudao.tod aun ‘sp.IOA taujo UI 'suompuloo out, O.I.B asaun hºun
uondoolad all todu pattonmoutoo aq ºsmuſ ‘oldulb ke Ioj ‘shuaju [biotu IIB Jo
puu pop Jo SSatutou auth ‘pua sºuth Jo Suonpuloo au) esoouſo on uomºuldO
"Utop|Ae-JL0s aſ "Snut SIULL ‘pua 01büII][n
up sº ‘āuſaq Jo poo; Isau5HT alth Osooto 0) uonbåldo Jo Suonpuoo [BSIOAItin
aul Seu ‘nt uſ poliduſ SI up IIB UniM ‘Kouaºu [Baout 18th UIAAOUs Apbottº
a.Abū I putº Oul atmoos on Unio] ind Sltoge IO STIon IIoM 3AnnoaXa pub—pua
qbul Buſinoas Jo Subout put Suonpuoo att, Jo aoſolio oun—pua omutumn up
Jo Jootio out, ZIA 'suomob S.IIIA alſ, Jo Sassblo oatun Shoodso.1 UIonbåIIqo quuſ,
AOUIs on KTInj Janjgalau UOIseo.90 a Metſ [[Gus a AA puo albuTúIn SIU[] §utanoos
JO SUBatu put stronſpuoo oll on onbºat (IoIIIA UonušIIqo Jo SULIOJ optoads Jo
spuſ,UKuu are arouſ, lug stion ſpuoo autus oth SKBAIB sºul pub ‘JIUIn a SAEATB
pub lesia Mun Si tuto) spun up uomuługo 'ompºs oſsuſ.Thuſ Shi toy dutieq Jo pooš
[8Staartin aun IIIA on to ‘unoquëau Imo put pop eMoI on ‘huaLOAouaq eq 0) uon
-Böſſo a ‘I ‘ULIoſ IBSIAAum s] uſ uomºndo Jo Suonpuoo aun paugop o Abū I
‘Utau, UiOdin KIO) bāIIqo eq ‘An IIIq
-Issod Kut Ka ‘punoo launo ou put, ‘Aeſ Iſottº aq. 1snut amnutt aſſaul Jo AgI aul,
‘Abi Tuotagºp G on 100ſqms aq KhIssaoatt Jo Tsutu Kaū ‘ombu Tuatapºp 6
3USSassocł att, Aou Shueñu le.Iotu quu, AgI outes alth Topun 5ulaq Jo asues
alth uſ shueñu [B.IOUI aq ūns hou plmoo Kaū ‘st qt uuun as Araú10 Augoubg.
StoAod osaul Jo Uonuţa.I.100 auth allow to ‘ele Kaul Jºllºw UIOJ juelagſp
ÁIIBoſpb.I sonſliqûdeosns put Sua Mod aul atow “elojø.toul “10tſ) : oinagul Jo
AgI aun sº ABI pºtout qutu hou] out, Stooptoso uontesse sºul, Kouosº [ºtou
on KIBssadou ou ST KIIIQISItos Tuul popuoluoo ÁIp.msqb uø9q Sull I
3UOIA pub quâII Jo ‘uonºšūqo
[0,Lou Jo ‘aţaunſbA aun Jo Stºopſ out Jo quoulodola Aap aun to ‘lºſſy"I '8
99. "JLNGHIVINXIGHAO © TV 8 OW
'sitoga uşns Jo Anglºu puu ‘Anisseoeu
‘Amūſqlssod au) saunssu pupul eun ssolun aspxe houltuouslsap our pub ‘Aspe
ušisap au ssalun spºo houltuo asunoo Jo pub ‘looſqo (Ioun atmoos on ußisap
ūIA (Intoſ ºnd ‘aq \suu put “ate “pataquouot ºr aq. ‘shou a Miluoaxe hug|
'uosono loafio alth amoos lºw 5uſsootto oth Ioulous on pluja. InounſA
pub ‘a.In Jult oſsuſ.Inuy sp Jo asupoaq ‘ll asnja.I lott put ‘old’en [PA Io pooš
eul ‘asootto on uomusumo lapum si to ‘nušno IIIA att, Tºun “juſtin attles ath
SI IOIUA to ‘aţūthms ‘ug ‘huāll sº aſ 18th Sul.IIIb liostol out, “Whissooat sun
ăuţūInssV loaſao aul almoos on aotouto atu Jo Kouapuan att, Jo StoAmoodso.Itſ
Åla.[I]tta loaſao att] asnjet to esoouto Sulu IIIA alth ootoua ayuunun on plušal
UI asſus (IAo s] to 11 SunUIIA lo noaſao alſ, 3U obſºluto S.IIIA out, Auo
SI iſ noaſqo Sly aunoas on usisop (In A Ultoj qual lott SI 30ſouo albutnIn
*I amoes on panulmoluo put atmºssod pub ‘Ālussooou all on Ulaas alu
slob (Ions buſh (Ionipuoo uodu dooxo ‘JI olnoos on shot a \nuooxa Into) and on
UonušIIqo utu Jo osodiud b Alduſ 11 Jo aoſolio Ital aul Saop ION ‘ll atmoes
IIIA hr 5uſsoouto asnboaq hou put ‘extus us\o Shi Joj alqenſu A STIBoſsuinuſ
eq, asootto on uomeşIIqo aun SULTUR unspot ou.L. "I loaſal to ooutſt
-Ula snul III w au.L laulo all to Musa otto Buſsootto Jo Khussaoatt tº tapuu
st ‘sootunstuno.uo unns up ‘puttu all L 'aldissolul KIIT Imett SI asto SIII] uſ
aotta.[auſputſ ‘li asujet to asootto ind hottuto II puttu au, Aq pasſaolad st
‘(aldtuexa Ioj ‘āulaq Jo pooš aul sº) allºute A.VIIºISUU,nuſ aq ol sa.Alaotad pulu
aul IIoIUA hoaſlo alth Utoll A\ u'àIsop Ians Aub IIIA (Intoſ and hou SI ‘sſ mutil
: Joaſho help uſundo to a.Inoas on pau5Sep 1.Ioſſo Ug hott St ‘antūA oſsulunul
s]] Ioſ IO ‘axies ULAO shi Toj Joaºto Ult, Jo aorous aul to ‘aomotio album In
'ULloy Tºtſ” (II IIonºſo Jo (Ionºptio) b 10tt
st ‘expºs UAo sp.to; hoaſqo ut, Jo 30ſotto out to ‘aoroſio altunn Jo KhHun oun
18th a \tasqo on ‘Iowa Wou ‘Atte).Iodult sº I Tujast pub “Vitºsseoalſ ‘aqissod
aub sgow a spnooxa Ions abun Joſiaſt to uomisoddus oth Osſº put ‘ujisap
au, pub prio att, upoq Jo adualsTNo otl) asoddinsold puu puto atuos amoa's
on ußisap uppy unio] ind ate st; tıons alb shou o Annoaxa ‘axiasqo jug
‘panels e.toUI sº UIOIntºſao Jo stion ſpuoo pub
spuno.13 and treawlaquonounsºp att] Butpunojūoo tuouſ pollusal setſ (IoIsnjū00
natiº Aous on pub ‘pastuaid olau SI helix Jo stronºstill sº sooutºsuſ
Augui obgott on uorspooo axeti IIBTIS ow ‘paaoold as SW ‘IIonußIIqo oth Jo
uosbal penuatuºpunj to puno.15 aul Jou si iſ qud ‘tutoſ to Aſă But IIonešūqo Jo
eouanspºa on on penuossa sº uplus uomºśildo Jo uompuoo e SI Buſq.Sury
‘ulaq, axiglu ol (IonešIIq0 OUI aq (IB) altatD “asm
on Joaq on uaas ate Kaū, JI to ‘sn on aſqissoduſ 3.18 siloſſo (Ions J 10 stuo
Jo slioga Kuu Ka panouloid aq on pool mott soop trasolio plio alſ, JI sloga
qons Jo Angun pub ‘Anisseoatl pasoddns ‘ĀlūIIIssod out todn pationſ.pnoo
aq isnut pua up amoes on s] toga asnnooxa Intoſ ºnd on uomºſqo utatin
Aq painoos aq on pariśisap puto oth Jo ooſolio Burnsixa tº osoddins S&AIB
'shoe axºnoaxa se pattätsap ‘stronito A 'Slog pigwamo uombosuoo pub stionſ[0A
qoadset ‘poonstapun aſ aq. ‘ûome3HTo Jo suitoſ osau.L (topºldo Jo Stuloſ
asaq, Jo stionſpaoo au) augap on ATuo parliaoûoo uſe I quasaid 16 lapſsttoo
uoos [Ibus I slog 10 stionIIoA oxnnoaxa osalſ, o] spuanzo IIonºſqo (IoIIIA
(I
34 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
REMARIXS.
1. If God’s government is moral, it is easy to see how sin came to exist;
that a want of experience in the universe, in regard to the nature and
natural tendencies and results of sin, prevented the due influence of Sanctions.
2. If God's government is moral, we see that all the developements of
sin are enlarging the experience of the universe in regard to its nature and
tendencies, and thus confirming the influence of moral government over
virtuous minds.
3. If God's government is moral, we can understand the design and
tendency of the atonement; that it is designed, and that it tends to re-
concile the exercise of mercy, with a due administration of law.
4. If God's government is moral, we can understand the philosophy of
the Spirit's influences in convicting and sanctifying the soul; that this
influence is moral, persuasive, and not physical.
5. If the government of God is moral, we can understand the influence
and necessity of faith. Confidence is indispensable to heart obedience
in any government. This is emphatically true under the divine government.
6. If God's government is moral, we can see the necessity and power of
Christian example. Example is the highest moral influence.
7. If God's government is moral, his matural or physical omnipotence is
no proof that all men will be saved ; for salvation is not effected by physical
power.
8. If God’s government is moral, we see the importance of watchfulness,
and girding up the loins of our minds.
9. If God's government is moral, we see the necessity of a well-instructed
ministry, able to wield the motives necessary to sway mind.
10. If God's government is moral, we see the philosophical bearings,
tendencies, and power of the providence, law, and gospel of God, in the
great work of man's Salvation.
LECTURE IV.
MORAL OBLIGATION.
I. MAN A SUBJECT OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
II. ExTENT OF MORAI, OBLIGATION.
I. Man is a subject of moral obligation.
This is a first truth of reason. A first truth, be it remembered, has
this invariable characteristic, namely, all moral agents know it, by a neces-
sity of nature, and assume its truth, in all their practical judgments,
whatever their philosophical theories may be. Take, for example, the
affirmation, or assumption, that every event must have had an adequate
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 35
cause. This is a first truth; all men know it, and, in all their practical
judgments, assume it, whatever their theorizings may be.
Now who does not know, with the same certainty, that men possess the
attributes of moral agents; to wit, intellect, (including reason, conscience,
and consciousness,) sensibility, and free will. Every moral agent does know,
and cannot but know this. That man has intellect and sensibility, or the
powers of knowing and feeling, has not, to my knowledge, been doubted.
In theory, the freedom of the will in man has been denied. Yet the
very deniers have, in their practical judgment, assumed the freedom of
the human will, as well, and as fully, as the most staunch defenders of
human liberty of will. Indeed, nobody ever did or can, in practice, call
in question the freedom of the human will, without justly incurring the
charge of insanity. By a necessity of his mature, every moral agent
knows himself to be free. He can no more hide this fact from himself,
or reason himself out of the conviction of its truth, than he can speculate
himself into a disbelief of his own existence. He may, in speculation,
deny either, but in fact he knows both. That he is, that he is free, are
truths equally well known, and known precisely in the same way, namely,
he intuits them—sees them in their own light, by virtue of the constitu-
tion of his being. I have said that man is conscious of possessing the
powers of a moral agent. He has also the idea of the valuable, of right
and of Wrong: of this he is conscious. But nothing else is necessary to
constitute man or any other being a subject of moral obligation, than the
possession of these powers, together with sufficient light on moral subjects
to develope the ideas just mentioned.
Again. Man, by a law of necessity, affirms himself to be under moral
obligation. He cannot doubt it. He affirms absolutely, and necessarily,
that he is praise or blame-worthy as he is benevolent or selfish. Every
man assumes this of himself, and of all other men, of sound mind. This
assumption is irresistible, as well as universal.
The truth assumed then, is a first truth, and not to be called in
question. But if it be called in question, in theory, it still remains and
must remain, while reason remains, a truth of certain knowledge from the
presence of which there is, and can be, no escape. The spontaneous,
universal, and irresistible affirmation that men, of sound mind, are praise
or blame-worthy, as they are selfish or benevolent, shows beyond contra-
diction, that all men regard themselves, and others, as the subjects of
moral obligation.
II. Extent of moral obligation.
By this is intended, to what acts and states of mind does moral
obligation extend? This certainly is a solemn and a fundamentally
important question.
In the examination of this question I shall,
1. Show by an appeal to reason, or to matural theology, to what acts
and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly extend.
ly 2
36 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
2. To what acts or states of mind moral obligation must directly extend.
3. To what acts and mental states moral obligation must indirectly
extend.
I. I am to show by an appeal to reason, or to matural theology, to what
acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly eartend.
1. Not to external or muscular action. These actions are connected
with the actions of the will, by a law of necessity. If I will to move my
muscles, they must move, unless the nerves of voluntary motion are
paralyzed, or some resistance is offered to muscular motion, that over-
powers the strength of my will, or, if you please, of my muscles. It is
generally understood and agreed that moral obligation does not directly
extend to bodily or outward action.
2. Not to the states of the sensibility. I have already remarked, that
we are conscious, that our feelings are not voluntary, but involuntary
states of mind. Moral obligation cannot, therefore, directly extend to
them.
3. Not to states of the intellect. The phenomena of this faculty, we
also know, by consciousness, to be under the law of necessity. It is
impossible that moral obligation should extend directly to any involuntary
act or state of mind.
4. Not to unintelligent acts of will. There are many unintelligent
wolitions, or acts of will, to which moral obligation cannot extend, for
example, the volitions of maniacs, or of infants, before the reason is at
all developed. They must, at birth, be the subjects of volition, as they
have motion or muscular action. The volitions of somnambulists are also
of this character. Purely instinctive volitions must also come under
the category of unintelligent actions of will. For example: a bee lights
on my hand, I instantly and instinctively shake him off. I tread on a
hot iron, and instinctively move my foot. Indeed, there are many actions
of will, which are put forth under the influence of pure instinct, and
before the intellect can affirm obligation to will or not to will. These
surely cannot have moral character, and of course moral obligation cannot
extend to them.
II. To what acts and states of mind moral obligation must directly
earlend.
1. To ultimate acts of will. These are, and must be, free.
Intelligent acts of will, as has been before observed, are of three classes.
1. The choice of some object for its own sake, i. e. because of its own
nature, or for reasons found exclusively in itself, as, for example, the
happiness of being. These are called ultimate choices, or intentions.
2. The choice of the conditions and means of securing the object of
ultimate choice, as, for example, holiness, as the conditions or means of
happiness. 3. Volitions, or executive efforts to secure the object of
ultimate choice. Obligation must extend to these three classes of the
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 37
actions of the will. In the most strict and proper Sense it may be said,
that obligation extends directly, only to the ultimate intention. We
learn, from consciousness, that the choice of an end necessitates (while
the choice of the end exists) the choice of the known conditions and
means of securing this end. I am free to relinquish, at any moment, my
choice of an end, but while I persevere in the choice, or ultimate in-
tention, I am not free to refuse the known necessary conditions and
means. If I reject the known conditions and means, F, in this act,
relinquish the choice of the end. The desire of the end may remain,
but the actual choice of it cannot, when the will knowingly rejects the
known necessary conditions and means. In this case, the will prefers to
let go the end, rather than to choose and use the necessary conditions
and means. In the strictest sense the choice of known conditions and
means, together with executive volitions, is implied in the ultimate in-
tention or in the choice of an end.
When the good or valuable, per se, is perceived, by a moral agent, he
instantly and necessarily, and without condition, affirms his obligation to
choose it. This affirmation is direct and universal, absolute, or without
condition. Whether he will affirm himself to be under obligation to
put forth efforts to secure the good must depend upon his regarding such
acts as necessary, possible, and useful.
The obligation, therefore, to put forth ultimate choice, is in the strictest
sense direct, absolute, and universal.
Obligation to choose holiness, (as the holiness of God) as the means
of happiness, is indirect in the sense that it is conditioned. 1. Upon the
obligation to choose happiness as a good per se; and, 2. Upon the know-
ledge that holiness is the necessary means of happiness.
Obligation to put forth executive volitions is also indirect in the
sense that it is conditioned; 1. Upon obligation to choose an object as
an end; and, 2. Upon the necessity, possibility, and utility of such
actS.
It should here be observed, that obligation to choose an object for its
own sake, implies, of course, obligation to reject its opposite; and obliga-
tion to choose the conditions of an intrinsically valuable object for its own
sake, implies obligation to reject the conditions or means of the opposite
of this object. Also, obligation to use means to secure an intrinsically
valuable object, implies obligation to use means, if necessary and possible,
to prevent the opposite of this end.
For example. Obligation to will happiness, for its intrinsic value, im-
plies obligation to reject misery, as an intrinsic evil. Obligation to will
the conditions of the happiness of being, implies obligation to reject the
conditions of misery. Obligation to use means to promote the happiness
of being, implies obligation to use means, if necessary and practicable,
to prevent the misery of being.
Again, the choice of any object, either as an end, or a means, implies
the refusal of its opposite. In other words, choice implies preference,
38 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
refusing is properly only choice in an opposite direction. For this reason,
in speaking of the actions of the will, it has been common to omit the
mention of milling, or refusing, since such acts are properly included in the
Categories of choices and volitions. It should also be observed that choice,
or willing, necessarily implies an object chosen, and that this object should
be such that the mind can regard it as being either intrimsically, or
relatively valuable, or important. As choice must consist in an act, an
intelligent act, the mind must have some reason for choice. It cannot
choose without a reason, for this is the same as to choose without an object
of choice. A mere abstraction without any perceived or assumed, intrinsic,
or relative importance, to any being in existence, cannot be an object of
choice, either ultimate or executive. The ultimate reason which the mind
has for choosing is in fact the object of choice; and where there is no
reason there is no object of choice.
2. I have said, that moral obligation respects in the strictest sense, and
directly the intention only. I am now prepared to say still further, that
this is a first truth of reason. It is a truth universally and necessarily
assumed, by all moral agents, their speculations to the contrary, in any
wise, notwithstanding. This is evident from the following considerations.
(1.) Very young children know and assume this truth universally.
They always deem it a sufficient vindication of themselves, when accused of
any delinquency, to say, “I did not mean to,” or if accused of short coming,
to say, “I meant or intended to have done it—I designed it.” This, if
true, they assume to be an all-sufficient vindication of themselves. They
know that this, if believed, must be regarded as a sufficient excuse to
justify them in every case.
(2.) Every moral agent necessarily regards such an excuse as a perfect
justification, in case it be sincerely and truly made.
(3.) It is a saying as common as men are, and as true as common, that
men are to be judged by their motives, that is, by their designs, intentions.
It is impossible for us not to assent to this truth. If a man intend evil,
though, perchance, he may do us good, we do not excuse him, but hold
him guilty of the crime which he intended. So if he intend to do us good,
and, perchance, do us evil, we do not, and cannot condemn him. For this
intention and endeavour to do us good, we cannot blame him, although it
has resulted in evil to us. He may be to blame for other things connected
with the affair. He may have come to our help too late, and have been to
blame for not coming when a different result would have followed; or he
may have been blameable for mot being better qualified for doing us good.
He may have been to blame for many things connected with the transaction,
but for a sincere, and of course hearty endeavour to do us good, he is not
culpable, nor can he be, however it may result. If he homestly intended
to do us good, it is impossible that he should not have used the best means
in his power, at the time : this is implied in honesty of intention. And
if he did this, reason cannot pronounce him guilty, for it must judge him
by his intentions.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 39
(4.) Courts of criminal law have always in every enlightened country
assumed this as a first truth. They always inquire into the quo an”,
that is, the intention, and judge accordingly.
(5.) The universally acknowledged truth that lunatics are not moral
agents and responsible for their conduct, is but an illustration of the fact
that the truth we are considering, is regarded, and assumed, as a first truth
of reason.
2. We have seen that the choice of an end implies, and, while the
choice continues, necessitates the choice of the known conditions and
means of the end, and also the putting forth of volition to secure the
end. If this is true, it follows that the choice of the conditions and
means of securing an end, and also the volitions put forth as executive
efforts to secure it, must derive their character from the ultimate choice or
intention, which gives them existence. This shows that moral obligation
extends, primarily and directly, only to the ultimate intention or choice of
an end, though really, but less directly, to the choice of the conditions and
means, and also to executive volitions.
But I must distinguish more clearly between ultimate and proximate
intentions, which discrimination will show, that in the most strict and
proper sense, obligation belongs to the former, and only in a less strict
and proper sense to the latter.
An ultimate end, be it remembered, is an object chosen for its own sake.
A proximate end is an object chosen as a condition or means of securing
an ultimate end.
An ultimate end is an object chosen because of its intrinsic nature and
value.
A proximate end is an object chosen for the sake of the end, and upon
condition of its relation as a condition or means of the end.
Example:—A student labours to get wages, to purchase books, to obtain
an education, to preach the gospel, to save souls, and to please God.
Another labours to get wages, to purchase books, to get an education,
to preach the gospel, to secure a salary, and his own ease and popularity.
In the first supposition he loves God and souls, and seeks, as his ultimate
end, the happiness of souls, and the glory and gratification of God. In
the last case supposed. he loves himself supremely, and his ultimate end is
his own gratification, Now the proximate ends, or immediate objects of
pursuit, in these two cases, are precisely alike, while their ultimate ends
are entirely opposite. Their first, or nearest end is to get wages. Their
next end is, to obtain books, and so we follow them, until we ascertain their
ultimate end, before we learn the moral character of what they are doing.
The means they are using, i. e. their immediate objects or proximate ends
of pursuit, are the same, but the ultimate ends, at which they aim, are
entirely different, and every moral agent, from a necessary law of his own
intellect, must, as soon as he understands the ultimate end of each, pro-
nounce the one virtuous, and the other sinful, in his pursuits. One is
selfish and the other benevolent. From this illustration it is plain, that
*A*)OTOGIHAL OILVINGILSXS Op.
oup J angſ pounbat aq Ālūbuosbal Autu stionou Hous otoyotal) pub pottett
isn'ſ solouagunuoo on uodu daoxo 'Aoſio] isnu tomob prºmo out ºffſ
st lºw aq, Jº Aussaoan Jo Aulu Ka ‘IIIA all, Jo stopop alſ, IPA Pokoutloº
3uted quun stuosuo all L pot) Jo p.10A out uſ ‘polymbºl to Jo 9te osol.I.
'suomob Appoq to ‘plus\no on Auoalipuſ spuense (Ioneſiſſio Ibiotti ºutſ.L '6
Jooid poon on smoſostoo ool on totu Itº “pauſuſſixa Apueſt estlos
oup uſ IIIA Jo shoe Yuastianuſ Iſu ol Āmoottpuſ spuarxo uopºldo mºll, ‘I
—KUs on paludo.[d AOU. S. KUA ou.L
...thissooou Jo Abt b. Āq ‘āuſſoa, alſoxo gun slooſus osoul on
shuānoun pun uonuome oth Bunootſp Aq ATuo pooupoid on tºo 5ttſlø3&I IIºw
aq, Āq paſtoutloo Anoatinuſ Kuo si 'snojosuoo utu I ‘AMIITsuos on L (8)
'lounoue to nooſans alto Ulodn
‘Muſun put asuald I su uonuomu Kut hoolſp put IOInuoo upo I ºutſ, smoſostoo
uu I IIIA equ Jo Ionuoo all, taptul Alloa. In osſu si looHonuſ alſ.I. (8)
‘IIIA Attl Jo
unsuous aun autobioso on apmuşutu huaſoſums Jo uomonthsqo Ibolsatid ouds
pasodianuſ on alaup ssaluu ‘a Mou hsnu Solosutu Kui put ‘asoul on IIIA I
‘IIIA alp Jo Ionuoo oth topum ‘Anoolſp 'alu Spoq on Jo soloshut all L ( I)
'Aussooau Jo Aup tº Aquonuouſ ombuntu unºw poloatſuoo otb ‘Anſúſsues pub
qoallonuſ oup Jo somns oup oste pub ‘tionou pubMano upw toulošol 'suomºloa
a.Annooxa pub subatu Jo oogotia ott, ‘prus Apue.IIb uaoq Sull I ºbt[L
—xptutual I peoul SIU[] lapuſ)
'spualra ſilloo.upuy u0))))/h)00 p.tout Sølvis 1917tout pup Spop 10 ſºn OI, III
‘Ulonepſonia tattling paau ol aſq191 out Jo all ſiloop oſſi Kisnoraqo Ooh SI SIULL
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st out ‘uuojuad on aſquuu SI ou ‘IIb tongu “Tou A ‘pot) to ablatast Utoplod
O) spuanui atto JI ‘putti launo oth (IO OS ’oy . Appallu (all UniM Klannp8
pamptutuoo Unºt out, ‘ātūIIIA to ‘ûontroluſ Snontoon UHLA 's Tutu 'lau
Ianju Isuſ on ‘uutu OA tº uo IOOI Ubut tº JI, 5urop aun sa ‘soluldſtos eul Aq
paprešol SKBAIB SI ‘ātūIIIA au.L 'aoûampaqo Sg paptuša. SI job plus\mo ou
“Utophuanui huài, 's lulu ‘putul ău IIll AA tº lou aq. olotl II ingſ -aouaibago
se pandaoot, sº I puttu 5uſIIIA p aq ataul JI to ‘nušil sl Ulonuanui att, JI
'uoſhualuſ aul Sloadsat olat[A Kia A3 alaſq. aul Jo IIIds at L tutºv '9
& KIO)tāqqo aq axol. Atulumosuſ pluod Aoti Toj IIIA pooš od 1suul
a.AOI SIULL ABI aul Jo 5uſtLIIIm] out, sº axol hºun plus Kult, aq moultuo aſ
‘SUtomob p.18Ahno put ‘stronoua ‘shūšuoun on Athoa Iſp spuanxo I JI ‘Aluo
Suonuomuſ hoodso. Alloa.Up nou Saop At aroq A out, Jo IIIds att, JI ‘anth eq
notubo suſ, AON ...axoſ, ‘plow oud uſ paluſuſ sſ Aul oth ITV tutăv 'g
'o) , "paldooob SI q. ‘tion
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sazlūā009, Alpaſlduſ To Kissaid Xa taunto 'alotA &to Ae alaig aul, ºf
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uſujū0 on Sutºtu Jo asn alſ. On ‘Āſhootſp ssal inq ‘spuan No Oslº Utonºštúo quun
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hoodset ‘utonºëIIqo putout “ostmoo Jo “put ‘te)outputo Tºtout ‘8uppods Kuopins
MORAT, GOVERNMENT. 41
contingencies, just named, intervene, so that outward action does not follow
the choice or intention, the Bible accepts the will for the deed, invariably.
“If there be a willing mind, it is accepted according,” &c.
3. Moral obligation extends, but more indirectly, to the states of the
sensibility, so that certain emotions or feelings are required as outward
actions are, and for the same reason, namely, the states of the sensibility
are connected with the actions of the will, by a law of necessity. But when
the sensibility is exhausted, or when, for any reason, the right action of the
will does not produce the required feelings, it is accepted upon the principle
just named.
4. Moral obligation, indirectly, extends also to the states of the intellect;
consequently the Bible, to a certain extent, and in a certain sense, holds
men responsible for their thoughts and opinions. It everywhere assumes
that if the heart be constantly right, the thoughts and opinions will corre-
spond with the state of the heart, or will ; “If any man will do his will
he shall know the doctrine whether it be of God.” “If thine eye be
single thy body shall be full of light.” It is, however manifest, that the
word of God every where assumes that, strictly speaking, all virtue and
vice belong to the heart or intention. Where this is right, all is regarded
as right; and where this is wrong, all is regarded as wrong. It is upon
this assumption that the doctrine of total depravity rests. lt is undemiable
that the veriest sinners do many things outwardly, which the law of God
requires. Now unless the intention decides the character of these acts,
they must be regarded as really virtuous. But when the intention is found
to be selfish, then it is ascertained that they are sinful notwithstanding their
conformity to the letter of the law of God.
The fact is, that moral agents are so constituted that it is impossible for
them not to judge themselves, and others, by their subjective motives or
intentions. They cannot but assume it, as a first truth, that a man's
character is as his intention is, and consequently, that moral obligation
respects, directly, intention only.
5. Moral obligation then indirectly extends to every thing about us,
over which the will has direct, or indirect control. The moral law, while,
strictly, it legislates over intention only, yet in fact, in a sense less
direct, legislates over the whole being, inasmuch as all our powers are
directly or indirectly connected with intention, by a law of necessity.
Strictly speaking, however, moral character belongs alone to the intention.
In strict propriety of speech, it cannot be said that either outward action,
or any state of the intellect, or sensibility, has a moral element or quality
belonging to it. Yet in common language, which is sufficiently accurate
for most practical purposes, we speak of thought, feeling, and outward
action as holy or unholy. By this, however, all men really mean, that the
agent is holy or unholy, is praise or blame-worthy, in his exercises and
actions, because they regard them as proceeding from the state or attitude
of the will.
42 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE W.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
IN the discussion of this question, I will—
I. STATE WHAT IS INTENDED BY THE FOUNDATION, OR GROUND of OBLI-
GATION.
IJ. REMIND YOU of THE DISTINCTION, ALREADY PoſNTED ouT, BETWEEN
THE GROUND AND CONDITIONS OF ORI,IGATION.
III. CALL ATTENTION TO THE POINTS OF GENERAL AGREEM NT AMONG
VARIOUS CLASSES OF PHILOSOPHIERS AND THEOLOGIANS.
IV. SHEW WHEREIN THEY INCONSISTENTLY, DISAGREE.
W. PoſNT ouT THE INTRINSIC ABSURDITY OF THE VARIOUS CONFLICTING
THE ORIES.
VI. LASTLY. SHOW THE PRACTICAL TENDENCY OF THE WARIOUS THEORIES.
I. State what is intended by the foundation, or ground of obligation.
I shall use the terms ground and foundation, as synonymous. Obligation
must be founded on some good and sufficient reason. Be it remembered,
that moral obligation respects moral action. That moral action, is volum-
tary action. That properly speaking, obligation respects intentions only.
That still more strictly, obligation respects only the ultimate intention.
That ultimate intention or choice, which terms I use as synonymous, con-
sists in choosing an object for its own Sake, i. e. for what is intrinsic in the
object, and for no reason that is not intrinsic in that object. That every
object of ultimate choice, must, and does possess that in its own nature, the
perception or knowledge of which necessitates the rational affirmation, that it
ought to be universally chosen, by moral agents, for its own sake, or, which
is the same thing, because it is what it is, or, in other words still, because
it is intrinsically valuable to being, and not on account of its relations.
The ground of obligation, then, is that reason, or consideration, intrinsic
in, or belonging to, the nature of an object, which necessitates the rational
affirmation, that it ought to be chosen for its own sake. It is that reason,
intrinsic in the object, which thus creates obligation by necessitating this
affirmation. For example, such is the nature of the good of being, that it
necessitates the affirmation, that benevolence is a universal duty.
II. I must remind you of the distinction, already pointed out, between
the ground and conditions of obligation.
I will not repeat, but refer the reader to this distinction, as defined in a
former lecture.*
III. Call attention to the points of general agreement among various
classes of philosophers and theologians.
I shall not fill my pages with quotations from authors, showing in what
* Lecture iii. p. 27–34.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 43
there is a general agreement, as this would occupy much space, and besides
I regard it as wholly unnecessary, since every intelligent reader, will, upon
the bare statement of those points, see, at a glance, that thus far moral
agents must agree. In Saying that in the points I am about to name,
there is, and must be, a general agreement, I do not mean that the various
authors, who have written upon this subject, have been consistent through-
out, and that they have taught nothing inconsistent with those generally
and necessarily admitted truths. What I intend is, that upon those points
men have held and affirmed alike, although they have often inconsistently
held and stated opposing theories. To their inconsistencies we shall
attend in due season. Our object just now is to state the points of general
agreement.
1. They agree that in the most strict and proper sense, moral obligation
extends to moral actions only.
2. That, strictly speaking, involuntary states of mind are not moral actions.
3. That intentions alone are, properly, moral actions.
4. That, in the most strict and proper sense, ultimate intentions, alone,
are moral actions.
5. They agree in their definition of ultimate intention, namely that it
is the choice of an object for its own sake, or for what is intrinsic in the object.
That ultimate choice, or intention, must find its reasons exclusively in the
object chosen, and not in the relations of the object to something else.
6 In their definition of the ground of obligation, namely, that it is
that reason or consideration intrinsic in the object of ultimate choice, which
necessitates the affirmation of obligation to choose it, for this reason, i. e.
for its own sake.
7. That while, in the strictest sense, obligation respects only the ulti-
mate intention, yet, that, in a less strict and proper sense, obligation
extends to the choice of the conditions and means of securing an intrinsically
valuable end, and also to executive acts put forth with design to secure
such end. Hence—
8. They agree, that there are different forms of obligation. For
example, obligation to put forth ultimate choice. To choose the known
necessary conditions and means. To put forth executive volitions, &c.
9. They agree, that there are conditions of obligation.
10. That a condition is a sine quá non of obligation, but not the ground,
or fundamental reason of the obligation. For example, susceptibility for
happiness must be a condition of obligation, to will and endeavour to pro-
mote the happiness of a being. But the intrinsic value of the happiness to
the being, is and must be the ground of the obligation. For mere suscep-
tibility for happiness would of itself no more impose obligation to will
happiness; than susceptibility for misery would impose obligation to will
misery.
11. They agree, that different forms of obligation, must have different
conditions. For example, moral agency, including the possession of the
requisite powers, together with the developement of the ideas of the intrin-
44 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
sically valuable, of obligation, of right and wrong, are conditions of obligation
in its universal form, namely obligation to will the good of being in general
for its own sake. t
12. They must agree, that obligation to will the existence of the con-
ditions and means to the above end, and to put forth executive efforts to
Secure that end, have not only the conditions above named, but obligation
in these forms must be conditional, also, upon the knowledge that there
are conditions and means, and what they are, and also that executive
efforts are necessary, possible, and useful.
13. That any thing may be a condition, as distinct from a ground of
obligation, in a given form, which is a sine quá mon, and yet not the
fundamental reason of obligation, in that form.
14. They also agree that the well-being of God, and of the universe,
of sentient existences, and especially of moral agents, is intrinsically
important, or valuable, and that all moral agents are under obligation to
choose it for its own sake.
15. That entire, universal, uninterrupted consecration to this end, is
the universal duty of all moral agents.
16. That this consecration is identical with disinterested benevolence.
17. That this consecration is really demanded by the law of God,
as revealed in the two great precepts laid down by Christ, and that this
benevolence, when perfect, is in fact a compliance with the entire spirit
of the law.
18. That this is always right in itself, and consequently is always duty
and always right, and that in all possible circumstances; and, of course,
that no obligation inconsistent with this can ever, in any case, exist.
19. That reason and revelation agree in this; that the law of benevo-
lence is the law of right; and that it is the law of nature, and of course,
that no moral law, inconsistent with this, can exist.
20. That holiness, or obedience to moral law, or, in other words still,
that disinterested benevolence is a matural, and of course necessary con-
dition of the existence of that blessedness which is an ultimate or intrinsic
good to moral agents.
21. That it ought to be chosen for that reason, i.e. that is a sufficient
l'éâlSOIl.
22. Of course, that the ground of obligation to choose holiness, and
to endeavour to promote it in others, as a condition of the highest well-
being of the universe, is the intrinsic mature of that good or well-being,
and that the relation of holiness to this end is a condition of the obliga-
tion to choose it, as a means to this end.
23. That truth, and conformity of heart and life, to all known and prac-
tical truths, are conditions and means of the highest good of being.
24. Of course, that obligation to conform to such truths is universal, be-
cause of this relation of truth, and of conformity to truth, to the highest good.
25. That the intrinsic value of the good must be the ground, and the
relation only a condition, of the obligation.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 45
26. That God's ultimate end, in all he does, or omits, is the highest
well-being of himself, and of the universe, and that, in all his acts and
dispensations, his ultimate object is the promotion of this end.
27. That all moral agents ought to do the same, and that this comprises
their whole duty.
28. That the intrinsic value of the end creates, or imposes, and of course,
is the ground of the obligation to choose it, and endeavour to promote
it, for its own sake.
29. That hence, this intention or consecration to this intrinsically and
infinitely valuable end, is virtue, or holiness, in God and in all moral agents.
30. That God is infinitely and equally holy in all things, because he
does all things for the same ultimate reason, namely, to promote the
highest good of being.
31. That all God's moral attributes are only so many attributes of love
or of disinterested benevolence; that is, that they are only benevolence
existing and contemplated in different relations.
32. That creation and moral government, including both law and gospel,
together with the infliction of penal sanctions, are only efforts of bene-
volence, to secure the highest good.
33. That God has but one ultimate end; of course, but one object of ulti-
mate choice. Of course, but one ground of obligation ; and this obligation
is imposed upon him through his own reason by the intrinsic and infinite
value of the good of universal being.
34. That he requires, both in his law and gospel, that all moral agents
should choose the same end, and do whatever they do, for its promotion :
that is, that this should be the ultimate reason for all they do.
35. Consequently, and of course, that all obligation resolves itself into
an obligation to choose the highest good of God, and of being in general,
for its own sake, and to choose all the known conditions and means of
this end, for the sake of the end.
36. That the intrinsic value of this end is the ground of this obligation,
both as it respects God and all moral agents in all worlds.
37. That the intrinsic value of this end, rendered it fit, or right, that
God should require moral agents, to choose it, for its own Sake, and of
COUll'S62.
3S. That its intrinsic value, and not any arbitrary sovereignty, was, and
is, his reason for requiring moral agents to choose it for its own sake.
39. That its known intrinsic value would, of itself, impose obligation on
moral agents, to choose it, for its own sake, even had God never required
it; or, if such a supposition were possible, he had forbidden it.
Observe, then, it is agreed and must be agreed, by a necessary law of
the universal reason, that disinterested benevolence is a universal and an
invariable duty. That this benevolence consists in willing the highest
good of being, in general, for its own sake, or, in other words, in entire
consecration to this good as the end of life. That the intrinsic value of
this good does, of its own mature, impose obligation upon all moral agents,
46 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to will it for its own sake, and consecrate the whole being, without inter.
mission, to its promotion.
Now it is self-evident, and is agreed, that moral character belongs to the
ultimate intention, and that a man's character is as the end is for which
he lives, and moves, and has his being. The present inquiry respects this
end ; it is, therefore, all-important. What is virtue 2 It consists in con-
secration to the right end; to the end to which God is consecrated. This
end, whatever it is, is, and must be, by virtue of its own nature, the ground
of obligation. That is, the mature of this end is such as to compel the
reason of every moral agent to affirm, that it ought to be chosen for its
own sake. It is agreed that this end is the good of being, and that there-
fore disinterested benevolence, or good will, is a universal duty.
Now, with these universally admitted facts, distinctly kept in mind, let
us proceed to the examination of the various conflicting and inconsistent
theories of the ground of obligation.
IV. I am to show wherein they, inconsistently, disagree.
1. I will first consider the theory of those who hold that the sovereign
will of God is the ground, or ultimate reason, of obligation. They hold
that God's sovereign will creates, and not merely reveals, and enforces,
obligation. To this I reply,–1. That those who hold this also admit, as
has been said, that moral law legislates directly our voluntary action only,
—that moral obligation respects, primarily and strictly, the ultimate inten-
tion—that ultimate intention consists in choosing its object, for its own
sake—that ultimate intention must find its reasons exclusively in its object
—that the intrinsic mature and value of the object must impose obligation
to choose it for its own sake—that therefore this intrinsic value is the
ground and the only possible ground of obligation to choose it for its own
sake. They also admit, that it would be our duty to will the highest good
of God and of the universe, even did God not will that we should, or were
he to will that we should not. How utterly inconsistent, them, is the asser-
tion, that the sovereign will of God is the ground of obligation. Obligation
to do what? Why to love God and our neighbour. That is, as is ad-
mitted, to will their highest good. And does God's will create this obliga-
tion 2 Should we be under no such obligation, had he not commanded it?
Are we to will this good, not for its own value to God and our neighbour,
but because God commands it? The answer to these questions is too
obvious to need so much as to be named. But what consistency is there
in holding that disinterested benevolence is a universal duty, and at the
same time that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of obligation.
How can men hold, as many do, that the highest good of being ought to
be chosen for its own sake—that to choose it for its own sake is disinter-
ested benevolence—that its intrinsic value imposes obligation to choose it
for its own sake, and that this intrinsic value is therefore the ground of
obligation, and yet that the will of God is the ground of obligation ?
Why, if the will of God be t'e ground of obligation, then disinterested
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 47
benevolence is sin. If the will of God does of itself create, and not merely
reveal obligation, then the will, and not the interest and well-being of God,
ought to be chosen for its own sake, and to be the great end of life. God
ought to be consecrated to his own will, instead of his own highest good.
Benevolence in God, and in all beings must be sin, upon this hypothesis.
A purely arbitrary will and sovereignty in God is, according to this theory,
of more value than his highest well-being, and that of the whole universe.
But observe,
Moral obligation respects ultimate intentions, or the choice of an end.
The foundation, or fundamental reason for choosing a thing, is that which
renders it obligatory to choose it.
This reason is the thing on which the choice ought to terminate, or the
true end is not chosen.
Therefore the reason and the end are identical.
1. If, then, the will of God be the foundation of obligation, it must also
be the ultimate end of choice.
But it is impossible for us to will or choose the divine willing as an
ultimate end. God's willing reveals a law, a rule of choice, or of inten-
tion. It requires something to be intended as an ultimate end, or for its
own intrinsic value. This end cannot be the willing, commandment,
law, itself. This is absurd and impossible. Does God will that I should
choose his willing as an ultimate end ? This is ridiculously absurd. It
is a plain contradiction to say that moral obligation respects, directly, ulti-
mate intention only, or the choice of an end, for its own intrinsic value,
and yet, that the will of God is the foundation, or reason of the obligation.
This is affirming at the same breath that the intrinsic value of the end
which God requires me to choose, is the reason, or foundation of the obli-
gation to choose it, and yet that this is not the reason, but that the will of
God is the reason.
Willing can never be an end. God cannot will our willing as an end.
Nor can he will his willing as an end. Willing, choosing, always, and
necessarily, implies an end willed entirely distinct from the willing, or
choice, itself. Willing, cannot be regarded, or willed, as an ultimate end,
for two reasons:—
(1.) Because that on which choice or willing terminates, and not the
choice itself, must be regarded as the end.
(2.) Because choice or Willing is of no intrinsic value and of no relative
value, aside from the end willed or chosen.
2. The will of God cannot be the foundation of moral obligation in
created moral agents. God has moral character, and is virtuous. This
implies that he is the subject of moral obligation, for virtue is nothing
else than compliance with obligation. If God is the subject of moral
obligation, there is some reason, independent of his own will, why he
Wills as he does, some reason, that imposes obligation upon him to will
as he does. His will, then, respecting the conduct of moral agents, is not
the fundamental reason of their obligation; but the foundation of their
48 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
obligation must be the reason which induces God, or makes it obligatory
on him, to will in respect to the conduct of moral agents, just what he does.
3. If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he could,
by Willing it, change the nature of virtue and vice, which is absurd.
4. If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he not
only can change the nature of virtue and vice, but has a right to do so;
for if there is nothing back of his will that is as binding upon him as upon
his creatures, he has a right, at any time, to make malevolence a virtue,
and benevolence a vice. For if his will is the ground of obligation, then
his will creates right, and whatever he wills, or might will, is right simply,
and only because, so he wills.
5. If the will of God be the foundation of moral obligation, we have no
Standard by which to judge of the moral character of his actions, and can-
not know whether he is worthy of praise or blame. Upon the supposition
in question, were God a malevolent being, and did he require all his crea-
tures to be selfish, and not benevolent, he would be just as virtuous and
worthy of praise as now, for the supposition is, that his sovereign will
creates right, and of course, will as he might, that would be right, simply
because he willed it.
6. If the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, he has
no standard by which to judge of his own character, as he has no rule, but
his owu will, with which to compare his own actions.
7. If the will of God is the foundation of "moral obligation, he is not
himself a subject of moral obligation. But,
8. If God is not a subject of moral obligation, he has no moral cha.
racter; for virtue and vice are nothing else but conformity or non-con-
formity to moral obligation. The will of God, as expressed in his law, is
the rule of duty to moral agents. It defines and marks out the path of
duty, but the fundamental reason why moral agents ought to act in con-
formity to the will of God, is plainly not the will of God itself.
9. The will of no being can be law. Moral law is an idea of the
divine reason and not the willing of any being. If the will of any being
were law, that being could not, by natural possibility, will wrong, for
whatever he willed would be right, simply and only because he willed it.
This is absurd.
10. But let us bring this philosophy into the light of divine revelation.
“To the law and to the testimony: if it agree not therewith, it is because
it hath no light in it.”
The law of God, or the moral law, requires that God shall be loved
with all the heart and our neighbour as ourselves. Now it is agreed by
the parties in this discussion, that the love required is not mere emo-
tion, but that it consists in choice, willing, intention—i.e., in the choice
of something on account of its own intrinsic value, or in the choice
of an ultimate end. Now what is this end ? What is that which we are
to choose for its own intrinsic value 2 Is it the will or command of
God 2 Are we to will as an ultimate end, that God should will that
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 49
we should thus will? What can be more absurd, self-contradictory, and
ridiculous than this? But again: what is this loveing, willing, choosing, in-
tending, required by the law 2 We are commanded to love God and our
neighbour. What is this—what can it be, but to will the highest good or
well-being of God and our neighbour? This is intrinsically and infinitely
valuable. This must be the end, and nothing ean possibly be law that
requires the choice of any other ultimate end. Nor can that, by any
possibility, be true philosophy, that makes anything else the reason or
foundation of moral obligation,
But it is said that we are conscious of affirming our obligation to
obey the will of God, without reference to any other reason than his will;
and this, it is said, proves that his will is the foundation of obligation.
To this I reply, the reason does indeed affirm that we ought to will
that which God commands, but it does not and cannot assign his will as
the foundation of the obligation. His whole will respecting our duty,
is summed up in the two precepts of the law. These, as we have seen,
require universal good-will to being, or the supreme love of God and the
equal love of our neighbour—that we should will the highest well being
of God and of the universe, for its own sake, or for its own intrinsic value.
Reason affirms that we ought thus to will. And can it be so self-contra-
dictory as to affirm that we ought to will the good of God and of the
universe, for its own intrinsic value ; yet not for this reason, but because
God wills that we should will it? Impossible ! But in this assertion,
the objector has reference to some outward act, some condition or means
of the end to be chosen, and not to the end itself. But even in respect to
any act whatever, his objection does not hold good. For example, God
requires me to labour and pray for the salvation of souls, or to do anything
else. Now his command is necessarily regarded by me as obligatory, not
as an arbitrary requirement, but as revealing infallibly the true means or
conditions of securing the great and ultimate end, which I am to will for
its intrinsic value. I necessarily regard his commandment as wise and
benevolent, and it is only because I so regard it, that I affirm, or ean
affirm, my obligation to obey him. Should he command me to choose, as
an ultimate end, or for its own intrinsic value, that which my reason
affirmed to be of no intrinsic value, I could not possibly affirm my obliga-
tion to obey him. Should he command me to do that which my reason
affirmed to be unwise and malevolent, it were impossible for me to affirm
my obligation to obey him. This proves, beyond controversy, that reason
does not regard his command as the foundation of the obligation, but only
as infallible proof that that which he commands is wise and benevolent in
itself, and commanded by him for that reason.
If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he might
command me to violate and trample down all the laws of my being, and to
be the enemy of all good, and I should not only be under obligation, but
affirm my obligation to obey him. But this is absurd. This brings us to
the conclusion that he who asserts that moral obligation respects the choice
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MORAL GOVERNMENT. 51
“Thou shalt love thyself supremely, and God and thy neighbour subordi-
mately;” or, more strictly, “Thou shalt love thyself as an end, and God and
your neighbour, only as a means of promoting your own interest.”
(5.) If this theory be true, all the precepts in the Bible need to be
altered. Instead of the injunction, “Whatever you do, do it heartily unto
the Lord,” it should read, “Whatever you do, do it heartily unto yourself.”
Instead of the injunction, “Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or what-
soever ye do, do all to the glory of God,” it should read, “Do all to secure
your own interest.” Should it be said that this school would say, that the
meaning of these precepts is, Do all to the glory of God to secure your own
interest thereby, I answer ; This is a contradiction. To do it to or for the
glory of God is one thing; to do it to secure my own interest is all entirely
different and opposite thing. To do it for the glory of God, is to make his
glory my end. But to do it to secure my own interest, is to make my own
interest the end.
(6.) But let us look at this theory in the light of the revealed conditions
of salvation. “Except a man forsake all that he hath he cannot be my
disciple.” If the theory under consideration be true, it should read; “Ex-
cept a man make his own interest the Supreme end of pursuit, he cannot
be my disciple.” Again, “If any man will come after me, let him deny
himself and take up his cross,” &c. This, in conformity with the theory
in question, should read; “If any man will come after me, let him not
deny himself, but cherish and supremely seek his own interest.” A multi-
tude of such passages might be quoted, as every reader of the Bible
knows.
(7.) But let us examine this theory in the light of scripture declarations.
“It is more blessed to give than to receive.” This, according to the
theory we are opposing, should read, “It is more blessed to receive than to
give.” “Charity (love) seeketh not her own.” This should read, “ Charity
seeketh her own.” “No man (that is, no righteous man) liveth to himself.”
This should read, “Every (righteous) man liveth to himself.”
(S.) Let this theory he examined in the light of the spirit and example of
Christ. “Even Christ pleased not himself.” This should read, if Christ
was holy and did his duty : “Even Christ pleased himself, or, which is the
same thing, sought his own interest.”
“I seek not mine own glory, but the glory of him who sent me.” This
should read, “I seek not the glory of him who sent me, but mine own glory.”
But enough ; You cannot fail to see that this is a selfish philosophy, and
the exact opposite of the truth of God.
But let us examine this philosophy in the light of the admission, that
moral obligation respects ultimate intention only. I ought to choose the
good of God and my neighbour for its own intrinsic value; that is, as an
ultimate end, and yet not as an ultimate end for its intrinsic value, but
only as a means of promoting my own interest This is a plain contradie-
tion. What! I am to love, that is, will good to God and my neighbour as
an ultimate end, or for its own sake, merely to promote my own happiness,
E 2
52 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
3. I will in the meat place consider the utilitarian philosophy.
This maintains that the utility of an act, or choice renders it obligatory.
That is, utility is the foundation of moral obligation ; that the tendency of
an act, choice, or intention, to Secure a good or valuable end, is the founda-
tion of the obligation to put forth that choice or intention. Upon this
theory I remark—
(1.) That utilitarians hold, in common with others, that it is our duty
to will the good of God and our meighbour, for its own sake; and that the
intrinsic value of this good creates obligation to will it, and to endeavour to
promote it; that the tendency of choosing it, to promote it, would be
neither useful nor obligatory, but for its intrinsic value. How, then, can
they hold that the tendency of choosing to Secure its object, instead of the
intrinsic value of the object, should be a ground of obligation. But—
(2.) It is absurd to say, the foundation of the obligation to choose a
certain end is to be found, not in the value of the end itself, but in the
tendency of the intention to secure the end. The tendency is valuable or
otherwise, as the end is valuable or otherwise. It is, and must be, the
value of the end, and not the tendency of an intention to Secure the end,
that constitutes the foundation of the obligation to intend.
(3.) We have seen that the foundation of obligation to will or choose any
end as such, that is, on its own account, must consist in the intrinsic value
of the end, and that nothing else whatever can impose obligation to choose
any thing as an ultimate end, but its intrinsic value. To affirm the con-
trary is to affirm a contradiction. It is the same as to say, that I ought to
choose a thing as an end, and yet not as an end, that is, for its own sake,
but for some other reason, to wit, the tendency of my choice to secure that
end. Here I affirm at the same breath, that the thing intended is to be
an end, that is, chosen for its own intrinsic value, and yet not as an end or
for its intrinsic value, but for an entirely different reason, to Wit, the tendency
of the choice to Secure it.
(4.) But we have also seen that the end chosen and the reason for the
choice are identical. If utility be the foundation of moral obligation, them
utility is the end to be chosen. That is, the tendency of the choice to
secure its end is the end to be chosen. This is absurd.
(5.) But the very announcement of this theory implies its absurdity. A
choice is obligatory, because it tends to secure good. But why secure good
rather than evil? The answer is, because good is valuable. Ah! here
then we have another reason, and one which must be the true reason, to
wit, the value of the good which the choice tends to secure. Obligation to
use means to do good may, and must, be conditionated upon the tendency
of those means to secure the end, but the obligation to use them is founded
solely in the value of the end.
Butlet us examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God.
What say the scriptures 2
(1.) The law. Does this require us to love God and our neighbour, be-
cause loving God and our neighbour tends to the well-being either of God,
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 53
our neighbour, or ourselves? Is it the tendency or utility of love that
makes it obligatory upon us to exercise it 2 What! will good, not from
regard to its value, but because willing good will do good | But why do
good 2 What is this love? Here let it be distinctly remembered, that the
love required by the law of God is not a mere emotion or feeling, but
willing, choosing, intending, in a word, that this love is nothing else than
ultimate intention. What, then, is to be intended as an end or for its own
sake 2 Is it the tendency of love, Grthe utility of ultimate intention, that
is the end to be intended ? It must be the latter, if utilitarianism is true.
According to this theory, when the law requires supreme love to God,
and equal love to our neighbour, the meaning is, not that we are to will,
choose, intend the well-being of God and our neighbour for its own sake or
because of its intrinsic value; but because of the tendency of the intention
to promote the good of God, our neighbour, and ourselves. But suppose
the tendency of love or intention to be what it may, the utility of it
depends upon the intrinsic value of that which it tends to promote. Suppose
love or intention tends to promote its end, this is a useful tendency only be-
cause the end is valuable in itself. It is nonsense them to say that love to
God and man, or an intention to promote their good is required, not because
of the value of their well-being, but because love tends to promote their
well-being.
But the supposition that the law of God requires love to God and man,
or the choice of their good, on account of the tendency of love to promote
their well-being, is absurd. It is to represent the law as requiring love,
not to God and our neighbour as an end, but to tendency as an end. The
law in this case should read thus : “Thou shalt love the utility or tendency
of love with all thy heart,” &c.
If the theory under consideration is true, this is the spirit and meaning
of the law: “Thou shalt love the Lord and thy neighbour, that is, thou shalt
choose their good, not for its own sake or as an end, but because choosing
it tends to promote it.” This is absurd ; for, I ask again, why promote it
but for its own value 2
Again, this theory is absurd, because if the law of God requires ultimate
intention, it is a contradiction to affirm that the intention ought to termi-
nate on its own tendency as an end.
(2) Again, let us examine this theory in the light of the precepts of the
gospel. “Do all to the glory of God.” The spirit of this requirement, as
is admitted, is: Intend, choose the glory of God. But why choose the
glory of God? Why, if utilitarianism be true, not because of the value of
God's glory, but because choosing it tends to promote it. But again, I
ask why promote it, if it be not valuable? And if it be valuable, why not
will it for that reason 2
(3.) But it is said that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do
many things, on the ground, that those things are useful, or tend to pro-
mote good.
I answer, that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do many things
54 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
upon condition of their tendency to promote good, but that we never
affirm obligation to be founded on this tendency, Such an affirmation
would be a downright absurdity. I am under an obligation to use the
means to promote good, not for the sake of its intrinsic value, but for the
sake of the tendency of the means to promote it ! This is absurd.
I say again, the obligation to use means may and must be conditionated
upon perceived tendency, but never founded in this tendency. Ultimate
intention has no such condition. The perceived intrinsic value imposes
obligation without any reference to the tendency of the intention.
(4.) But suppose any utilitarian should deny that moral obligation respects
ultimate intention only, and maintain that it also respects those volitions
and actions that sustain to the ultimate end the relation of means, and
therefore assert that the foundation of moral obligation in respect to all
those volitions and actions, is their tendency to secure a valuable end.
This would not at all relieve the difficulty of utilitarianism, for in this case
tendency could only be a condition of the obligation, while the fundamental
reason of the obligation would and must be, the intrinsic value of the end
which these may have a tendency to promote. Tendency to promote an
end can impose no obligation. The end must be intrinsically valuable and
this alone imposes obligation to choose the end, and to use the means to
promote it. Upon condition that anything is perceived to sustain to this
end the relation of a necessary means, we are, for the sake of the end alone,
under obligation to use the means.
LECTURE VI.
FOUNDATION OF MOIRAL ODLIGATION.
4. RIGHTARIANISM.–I now pass to the consideration of the theory that
regards right as the foundation of moral obligation.
In the examination of this philosophy I must begin by defining terms.
What is right? The primary signification of the term is straight. When
used in a moral sense it means fit, suitable, agreeable to the nature and
relations of moral agents. Right, in a moral sense, belongs to choice,
intention, and is an intention straight with, or conformed to, moral law. The
inquiry before us is, what is the ground of obligation to put forth choice or
intention. Rightarians say that right is the ground of such obligation.
This is the answer given to this question by a large school of philosophers
and theologians. But what does this assertion mean? It is generally
held by this school, that right, in a moral sense, pertains primarily and
strictly, to intentions orly. They maintain, as I do, that obligation per-
tains primarily and strictly to ultimate choice or intentions, and less
strictly to executive volitions, and to choices of the conditions and means
of securing the object of ultimate choice. Now in what sense of the term
right do they regard it as the ground of obligation.
Right is objective and subjective. Right, in the objective sense of the
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 55
term, has been recently defined to consist in the relation of intrinsic fitness
existing between ultimate choice and its object.* For example, the nature
or intrinsic value of the highest well-being of God and of the Universe,
creates the relation of intrinsic fitness between it and choice, and this
relation, it is insisted, creates, or is the ground of, obligation.
Subjective right is synonymous with righteousness, uprightness, virtue.
It consists in, or is an attribute of, that state of the will, which is con-
formed to objective right, or to moral law. It is a term that expresses the
moral quality, element, or attribute of that ultimate intention which the
law of God requires. In other words still, it is conformity of heart to the
law of objective right, or, as I just said, it is more strictly the term that
designates the moral character of that state of heart. Some choose to
regard subjective right as consisting in this state of heart, and others insist
that it is only an element, attribute, or quality of this state of heart, or of
this ultimate intention. I shall not contend about words, but shall show
that it matters not, so far as the question we are about to examine is con-
cerned, in which of these lights subjective right is regarded, whether as
consisting in ultimate intention conformed to law, or, as being an attribute,
element, or quality of this intention.
The theory under consideration was held by the ancient Greek and
Roman philosophers. It was the theory of Kant, and is now the theory
of the transcendental school in Europe and America. Cousin, in manifest
accordance with the views of Kant, states the theory in these words ; “Do
right for the sake of the right, or rather, will the right for the sake of the
right. Morality has to do with the intentions.”—(Enumciation of Moral
Law—Elements of Psychology, p. 162.) Those who follow Kant, Cousin,
and Coleridge state the theory either in the same words, or in words that
amount to the same thing. They regard right as the foundation of moral
obligation. “Will the right for the sake of the right.” This, if it has any
meaning, means; will the right as an ultimate end, that is, for its own sake.
Let us examine this very popular philosophy, first, in the light of its own
principles, and secondly in the light of revelation.
The writer, first above alluded to, has professedly given a critical defini-
tion of the exact position and teaching of rightarians. They hold, accord-
ing to him, and I suppose he has rightly defined the position of that school,
that objective right is the ground of obligation. We shall see, in another
lecture, that subjective right, or righteousness, can never be a ground of
moral obligation. We will here attend to the critieally defined position of
the rightarian who holds that the relation of intrinsie fitness existing be-
tween choice and an intrinsically valuable object, is the ground of obligation
to choose that object. -
Now observe—
(1.) This same writer holds that, strictly speaking, obligation pertains
only to the ultimate choice or intention.
(2.) He also strenuously maintains, that the reason for ultimate choice
* Mahon's Moral Philosophy.
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‘pallasse sºul Ian LLA attles sºul, stun sº Aou ºng 'suomula, JISUILIJuſ Tſoul
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MORAL GOVERNMENT. 57
a universal truth, that the character of the choice itself, is the sole ground
of obligation. So, as we shall see in its proper place, he has affirmed
Sundry other universal, contradictory, and exclusive grounds of obligation.
But let us now attend to the assertion just above quoted, namely, that
the mature of the object of choice, the mature of the choice itself, with their
intrinsic relations, together, form the ground of obligation. Here, as is
almost universal with this writer, the ground is confounded with the con-
dition of obligation. Had he said that in affirming obligation to choose
an ultimate object, as the good of being, for example, the intelligence re-
gards the mature of the object, the nature of the choice, and their intrinsic
relations, as conditions of the affirmation of obligation, he would have
stated a truth. But to represent these three as together comprising the
ground of the obligation, is, not only absurd in itself, but as emphatically
as possible contradicts what he has elsewhere so repeatedly and critically
affirmed, namely, that ultimate choice must always and necessarily find
the ground of its obligation, in its object and in nothing extraneous to it.
But let us attend to the intrinsic absurdity of the above statement of
rightarianism. The statement is, that the mature of ultimate choice, and
the nature of its object, the good of being, for example, with their intrinsic
relations to each other, form a ground of obligation to choose—what?
the choice—the object ; and their intrinsie relations? No, but simply and
only to choose the good for its own sake, or Solely for the sake of what is
intrinsic in it.
Now observe, it is, and must be agreed, and is often affirmed by this
writer, that ultimate choice is the choice of an object for its own sake, or
for what is intrinsic in the olject itself. That the ground of obligation to
put forth ultimate choice, must, in every case, be intrinsic in the object of
choice.
Now the olject of choice in this case is the good of being, and not the
nature of the choice, and of the good of being, together with the intrinsic
relation of rightness existing between them. The form of the obligation
discloses the ground of it. The form of the obligation is to choose the good
of being, i. e. the object of choice, for what is intrinsic in it. Then, the
ground of the obligation must be, the intrinsic nature of the good, i.e. of
the object of choice. The nature of choice, and the intrinsic relations of
the choice, and the good, are conditions, but not the ground, of the obliga-
tion. Had this writer only kept in mind his own most critical definition
of ultimate intention, his often repeated assertions that the ground of ob-
ligation must be, in every case, found intrinsically in the object of ulti-
mate choice, and in nothing extraneous to it, he never could have made
the statement we have just examined. We shall be obliged to advert in
another place, to a large number of contradictory statements, on this
subject, by this same author.
The duty of universal disinterested benevolence is universally and neces-
sarily affirmed and admitted. But if the rightarian be the true theory then
disinterested benevolence is sin. According to this scheme, the right, and
58 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
not the good of being is the end to, and for which, God and all moral agents
ought to live. According to this theory, disinterested benevolence can
never be duty, can never be right, but always and necessarily wrong. I
do not mean that the advocates of this theory see and avow this conclu-
sion. But it is wonderful that they do not, for nothing is more self.
evident. If moral agents ought to will the right for the sake of the
right, or will good, not for the sake of the good, but for the sake of the
relation of rightness existing between the choice and the good, then to
will the good for its own sake is sin. It is not willing the right end. It
is Willing the good and not the right as an ultimate end. These are
opposing theories. Both cannot be true. Which is the right to will, the
good for its own sake, or the right. Let universal reason answer.
But let us examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God.
(1.) In the light of the moral law. The whole law is expressed by the
great Teacher thus: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,
and with all thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy strength; and
thy neighbour as thyself.” Paul says: “ All the law is fulfilled in one
word—-love: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.” Now it is ad-
mitted by this philosophy, that the love required by the law is not a mere
emotion, but that it consists in willing, choice, intention ; that it consists
in the choice of an ultimate end, or in the choice of something for its
own sake, or, which is the same thing, for its intrinsic value. What is this
which the law requires us to will to God and our neighbour? Is it to will
something to, or respecting, God and our neighbour, not for the sake of the
intrinsic value of that something to them, but for the sake of the relation of
rightness existing between choice and that something? This were absurd.
Besides, what has this to do with loving God and our neighbour 2 To will
the something, the good, for example, of God, and our neighbour, for the
sake of the relation in question, is not the same as to love God and our
neighbour, as it is not willing their good, for its own sake. It is not will-
ing their good out of any regard to them, but solely out of regard to the re-
lation of fitness existing between the willing and the object willed. Sup-
pose it be said, that the law requires us to will the good, or highest blessed-
ness of God and our neighbour, because it is right. This is a contradic-
tion and an impossibility. To will the blessedness of God and our neigh-
bour, in any proper sense, is to will it for its own sake, or as an ultimate
end. But this is not to will it because it is right. To will the good of God
and our neighbour for its own sake, or for its intrinsic value, is right. But
to will it, not for the sake of its intrinsic value to them, but for the sake of
the relations in question, is not right. To will the good because it is good, or
the valuable because it is valuable, is right, because it is willing it for the
right reason. But to will it, not for its value, but for the sake of the re-
lation of fitness between the willing and the object, is not right, because
it is not willing it for the right reason. The law of God does not, cannot,
require us to love right more than God and our neighbour. What! right
of greater value than the highest well being of God and of the universe 2
MORAL GOVERNMENT 59
Impossible. It is impossible that the moral law should require anything
else than to will the highest good of universal being as an ultimate end,
i. e. for its own sake. It is a first truth of reason, that this is the most
valuable thing possible or conceivable; and that could by no possibility be
law, that should require anything else to be chosen as an ultimate end.
According to this philosophy, the revealed law shoud read: “Thou shalt
love the right for its own sake, with all thy heart and with all thy soul.”
The fact is, the law requires the supreme love of God, and the equal love
of our neighbour. It says nothing, and implies nothing, about doing right
for the sake of the right. Rightarianism is a rejection of the divine re-
vealed law, and a substituting in its stead an entirely different rule of moral
obligation: a rule that deifies right, that rejects the claims of God, and
exalts right to the throne.
(2.) “Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to
the glory of God.” Does this precept require us to will the glory of God
for its intrinsic or relative value, or for the sake of the relation of intrinsic
fitness between the willing and its object? The glory or renown of God,
is of infinite value to him, and to the universe, and for this reason it
should be promoted. The thing required here is doing, an executive act.
The spirit of the requisition is this ; Aim to spread abroad the renown or
glory of God, as a means of securing the highest well-being of the uni-
verse. Why? I answer : for the sake of the intrinsic value of this well-
being, and not for the sake of the relation of fitness existing between the
willing and the object.
(3) “Do good unto all men, as ye have opportunity.” Here again, are
we required to do the good, for the sake of the good, or for the sake of
the relation of rightness, between the doing and the good. I answer: we
are to do the good for the sake of the good.
(4.) Take the commands to pray and labour for the salvation of Souls.
Do such commandments require us to go forth to will or do the right
for the sake of the right, or to will the salvation of souls for the intrinsic
value of their salvation P When we pray and preach and converse, must
We aim at right, must the love of right, and not the love of God and of
Souls influence us P. When I am engaged in prayer, and travail night and
day for souls, and have an eye so single to the good of souls and to the
glory of God, and am so swallowed up with my subject as not so much as
to think of the right, am I all wrong? Must I pray because it is right,
and do all I do, and suffer all I suffer, not from good-will to God and man,
but because it is right º' Who does not know, that to intend the right for
the sake of the right in all these things, instead of having an eye single to
the good of being, would and must be anything rather than true religion ?
(5.) Examine this philosophy in the light of scripture declarations.
“God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoso-
ever believeth in him, might not perish, but have everlasting life.” Now,
are we to understand that God gave his Son, not from any regard to the
good of souls for its own sake, but for the sake of the right P Did he will
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..: lºt oth Jo asſes all IQſ toul IIb ontºn 115II alſ, oci , , ; au511 oth Jo
axles all Ioſ IIB op ‘op 2A IoMooshbūAA , ...: ligati Kun II* (InPA quâul eup oAoi
Tſutis noti.I, ,, . Snt[] pºol pſu.o.A ‘prus (Ioaq set sº ‘At'ſ au.I, Kudosopud
SIII, paidopt aſ JI ‘peal aſqiq all pluow oštúbus Alangugu AoET ( )
& UIOUIn on a MOL U10,1]
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extes oup to aušſt oth pollºw soju IIB U Shures att, oatſ put ‘SIAlluru pub
‘sonsode pub slaudoid pHCI & Sºnos on 3AOI (IoII sinos Ioſ to ‘huāIt alſ, jo
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& SImos out Jo asſes out, Joj put ‘eſqissod
stmos Jo uomºAIps on topuoſ on aſp on to ‘AlīāII ou Jo asſes oup to qušpt
aúl IOJ &Ip 01 u0S SIU 9A3 au picſ & JuſãII où, Jo asſes att, Ioj qušil aun
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 61
also knows that obedience to his parents is a necessary means to this end.
If he does not know these things, it is impossible for him to be a moral
agent, or to make any intelligent affirmation at all; and if he has any idea
of obedience, it is, and must be, only such as animals have who are actuated
wholly by hope, fear and instinct. As well might we say, that an ox or a
dog, who gives indication of knowing in some sense, that he ought to obey
us, affirms moral obligation of himself, as to say this of a child in whose
mind the idea of the good, or valuable to being is not developed. What
does moral obligation respect ultimate intention only ; and does ultimate
intention consist in the choice of something for its own intrinsic value, and
yet is it true that children affirm moral obligation before the idea of the
intrinsically valuable is at all developed 2 Impossible ! But this objection
assumes that children have the idea of right developed before the idea of
the valuable. This cannot be. The end to be chosen must be apprehended
by the mind, before the mind can have the idea of moral obligation to
choose an end, or of the right or wrong of choosing or not choosing it.
The developement of the idea of the good or valuable, must precede the
developement of the ideas of right and of moral obligation.
Take this philosophy on its own ground, and suppose the relation of right-
mess existing between choice and its object to be the ground of obligation,
it is plain that the intrinsically valuable object must be perceived, before
this relation can be perceived. So that the idea of the intrinsically valuable
must be developed, as a condition of the existence of the idea of the
relation in question.
The law of God, then, is not, and cannot be, developed in the mind of a
child who has no knowledge or idea of the valuable, and who has, and can
have, no reference to the good of any being, in obedience to his parents.
It is one thing to intend that, the intending of which is right, and quite
another to intend the right as an end. For example, to choose my own
gratification as an end, is wrong. But this is not choosing the wrong, as
an end. A drunkard chooses to gratify his appetite for strong drink, as
an end, that is, for its own sake. This is wrong. But the choice does not
terminate on the wrong, but on the gratification. The thing intended is
not the wrong. The liquor is not chosen, the gratification is not intended,
because it is Wrong, but notwithstanding it is wrong. To love God is
right, but to suppose that God is loved because it is right, is absurd. It
is to suppose that God is loved, not from any regard to God, but from a
regard to right. This is an absurdity and a contradiction. To love or will
the good of my neighbour, is right. But to will the right, instead of the
good of my neighbour, is not right. It is loving right instead of my neigh-
bour ; but this is not right.
(1.) But, it is objected, that I am conscious of affirming to myself that I
ought to will the right. This is a mistake. I am conscious of affirming
to myself, that I ought to will that, the willing of which is right, to wit, to
Will the good of God and of being. This is right. But this is not choos-
ing the right as an end.
62 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
But it is still insisted, that we are conscious of affirming, obligation
to will, and do, many things, simply and only because it is right thus to
will, and do, and in view of this rightness.
To this I reply, that the immediate reason for the act, thought of at the
time, and immediately present to the mind, may be the rightness of the
act, but in such cases the rightness is only regarded by the mind as a
condition and never as the ground of obligation. The act must be ultimate
choice, or the choice of conditions and means. In ultimate choice surely,
the mind can never affirm, or think of the relation of rightness between
the choice and its object, instead of the intrinsic value of the object, as the
ground of obligation. Nor can the mind think of the relation of rightness
between the choice of conditions and means, and its object, as the ground
of the obligation to choose them. It does, and must, assume the value of
the end, as creating both the obligation to choose, and the relation in
question. The fact is, the mind necessarily assumes, without always
thinking of this assumption, its obligation to will the good, for its own sake,
together with all the known conditions and means. Whenever therefore it
perceives a condition, or a means of good, it instantly and necessarily
affirms obligation to choose it, or, which is the same thing, it affirms the
rightness of such choice. The rightness of the choice may be, and often is
the thing immediately thought of, but the assumption is, and must be, in
the mind, that this obligation, and hence the rightness, is created by the
nature of the object to which this thing sustains the relation of a condition
Ol' & 1 \leallS.
(2.) But it is said again, “I am conscious of affirming to myself that I
ought to will the good of being, because it is right.” That is, to will the
good of being, as a means, and the right as an end which is making right
the supreme good, and the good of being a means to that end. This is
absurd. But to say, that I am conscious of affirming to myself my obliga-
tion to love or will the good of God and my neighbour, because it is right,
is a contradiction. It is the same as to say, I Ought to love, or intend the
good of God and my neighbour, as an ultimate end, and yet not to intend
the good of God and my neighbour, but intend the right.
(3.) But it is said, that “I ought to love God in compliance with, and
out of respect to my obligation ; that I ought to will it, because and for
the reason that I am bound to will it.” That is, that in loving God and
my neighbour, I must intend to discharge or comply with my obligation;
and this, it is said, is identical with intending the right. But ought my
snpreme object to be to discharge my duty—to meet obligation instead of
willing the well-being of God and my neighbour for its own sake 2 If my
end is to do my duty, I do not do it. For what is my obligation ? Why,
to love, or will the good of God and my neighbour, that is, as an end, or
for its own value. To discharge my obligation, then, I must intend the
good of God and my neighbour, as an end. That is, I must intend that
which I am under an obligation to intend. But I am not under an obliga-
tion to intend the right, because it is right, nor to do my duty because it is
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 63
duty, but to intend the good of God and of my neighbour, because it is good.
Therefore, to discharge my obligation, I must intend the good, and not the
right—the good of God and my neighbour, and not to do my duty. I say again,
to intend the good, or valuable, is right; but to intend the right is not right.
(4.) But it is said, that in very many instances, at least, I am conscious
of affirming my moral obligation to do the right, without any reference to
the good of being, when I can assign no other reason for the affirmation of
obligation than the right. For example, I behold virtue, I affirm spon-
taneously and necessarily, that I ought to love that virtue. And this, it is
Said, has no reference to the good of being. Is willing the right for the
sake of the right, and loving virtue, the same thing? But what is it to
love virtue? not a mere feeling of delight or complacency in it 2 It is
agreed that moral obligation, strictly speaking, respects the ultimate in-
tention only. What, then, do I mean by the affirmation that I Ought to
love virtue 2 What is virtue 2 It is ultimate intention, or an attribute of
ultimate intention. But what is loving virtue 2 It consists in willing its
existence. But it is said that I affirm my obligation to love virtue as an
end, or for its own sake, and not from any regard to the good of being.
This is absurd, and a contradiction. To love virtue, it is said, is to will its
existence as an end. But virtue consists in intending an end. Now, to
love virtue, it is said, is to will, intend its existence as an end, for its own
sake. Then, according to this theory, I affirm my obligation to intend the
intention of a virtuous being as an end, instead of intending the same end
that he does. This is absurd ; his intention is of no value, is neither
naturally 'good nor morally good, irrespective of the end intended. It is
neither right nor Wrong, irrespective of the end chosen. It is therefore
impossible to Will, choose, intend the intention as an end, without re-
ference to the end intended. To love virtue, them, is to love or will the
end upon which virtuous intention terminates, namely, the good of being,
or, in other Words, to love virtue, is to will its existence, for the sake of the
end it has in view, which is the same thing as to will the same end.
Virtue is intending, choosing an end. Loving virtue is willing that the
Virtuous intention should exist for the sake of its end. Take away the end,
and who would or could will the intention ? Without the end, the Virtue,
or intention, would not and could not exist. It is not true, therefore, that
in the case supposed, I affirm my obligation to will, or intend, without any
reference to the good of being.
(5.) But again, it is said, that when I contemplate the moral excellence
of God, I affirm my obligation to love him solely for his goodness, without
any reference to the good of being, and for no other reason than because it
is right. But to love God because of his moral excellence, and because it
is right, are not the same thing. It is a gross contradiction to talk of
lowing God for his moral excellence, because it is right. It is the same as
to say, I love God for the reason that he is morally excellent, or worthy,
Yet not at all for this reason, but for the reason that it is right. To love
God for his moral worth, is to will good to him for its own sake upon
* \{)OTOGIHL OILVINGINESXS #9
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ol pallajold st ºutſ] buo aſſi SI quâû (toq. ‘AlīāIt aul Jo asſes alth IO) inſt ‘pua
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out UIUNùùt S11 Altuo on buotºlu sooã ptutu out, ‘UTINYºut spun pandope Bul.Abū
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upsettſ tº ſtoln south II, Ju JoW., “IO ... yuji, ou, Jo asſus oth top huāll OCI,
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paysalanusup huun Kuop on Utøtu ladutoo smu Kouansisttoo 'uonušIIqo Jo
punolā all AIDUsta Aſun St 11:51, ºbul Ulluſt. Auttonssttoouſ isotti ſaun 'spun Uſe
5utputinsul Alou and 'll Osootio on snu) aušiſ sº ni uospel spin Ioj puu atop
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...]I*II SI SIU[] osmºoq ‘aottoliaoxo lutotu SIU log pop a NOI on pumoq alu a W laun
to ‘uonapuuoſ on SI utiºn huun tuuluu ‘Utonušūqo Tutou Jo uomupunoy aun st
pop Jo aouellaoxo (b.toUI all ºutſ. Altoolſ, aul Jo Sanudo Ape oun p[nous KUAA
à uoneşti(10 IBIOtu Jo uomºpunoy oun SI hušit mºth poll Aoun ootus ‘uonºrſgo
Uplotti Jo IIontºpumoſ aul SI por) Jo ouallaoxa Iulouſ alſ, yºu] tuuju subut,
-huāll pſmous ‘aſ abodo. I ‘AlīAA 'uonuomuſ albumpm ubt[] aste §utunatuos
loadsal Autu Utom:5 ſqo [ºtout 18tſ, outnsst. IIB Kallſ, & Suonoaſqo asaun
pitºloſ Būq subjunquild pinous Kūs ‘poxist at Alqūuospa.I Kºtu pºng
'poo Jo 5ttſoq-IIow out to ‘unlow Tºtout out, Jo peoisut ‘huāu
on pluńal outaiſius oxbu on ‘pua onetumn up se huāIt aul IIIA on spinušū
s! aſ osngo9q ūlī0A (BIOU STI IIIA on qugſ ‘11 SøAtasap ou jeun uompuoo
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 6.5
But enough of this cold and loveless philosophy. As it exalts right
above all that is called God, and subverts all the teachings of the Bible, it
cannot be a light thing to be deluded by it. But it is remarkable and
interesting to see Christian rightarians, without being sensible of their
inconsistency, so often confound this philosophy with that which teaches
that good-will to being constitutes virtue. Numerous examples of it occur
everywhere in their writings, which demonstrate that rightarianism is
with them only a theory that “plays round the head but comes not near
the heart.”
LECTURE VII.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
DIVINE MORAL EXCELLENCE THEORY.
5, I NOW ENTER UPON THE DISCUSSION OF THE THEORY, THAT THE
GooDNESS, OR MORAL ExCEI.LENCE, OF GOD IS THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL
OBLIGATION.
To this philosophy I reply,
1. That its absurdity may be shown in several ways.
(1.) Let it be remembered, that moral obligation respects the choice of
an ultimate end.
(2.) That the reason of the obligation, or that which imposes obligation,
is identical with the end on which the intention ought to terminate. If,
therefore, the goodness of God be the reason, or foundation of moral obli-
gation, then the goodness of God is the ultimate end to be intended. But
as this goodness consists in love, or benevolence, it is impossible that it
should be regarded or chosen, as an ultimate end ; and to choose it were
to choose the divine choice, to intend the divine intention as an ultimate
end, instead of choosing what God chooses, and intending what he intends.
Or if the goodness or moral excellence of God is to be regarded, not as
identical with, but as an attribute or moral quality of benevolence, then,
upon the theory under consideration, a moral agent ought to choose a
quality or attribute of the divine choice or intention as an ultimate end,
instead of the end upon which the divine intention terminates. This is
absurd. -
(3.) It is impossible that virtue should be the foundation of moral obliga-
tion. Virtue consists in a compliance with moral obligation. But obliga-
tion must exist before it can be complied with. Now, upon this theory,
obligation cannot exist until virtue exists as its foundation. Then this
theory amounts to this: virtue is the foundation of moral obligation;
therefore virtue must exist before moral obligation can exist. But as
virtue consists in a conformity to moral obligation, moral obligation must
F
"X%)OTOGIHL OILWWIGILSXS 99
‘asſus us\0 S]] log
‘looſqo juq osootſ or sº uontºlºto out, adjou.) Jo Jooſto [boy]uapi otſ, eq
J[as] isnu talunull UAO s]] Jo uosbat Ka ‘os00uo 0) uomº Ito Sorbolo (loſt|A
hull.J. oxles UAO sqi doſ Suſq, Tauno Auu Osootto on IIonußiſto Jo plmolā
t; aq. ubo Suſul auto ou “pataquatua, hy aq ‘to, I ‘Ulonoſpel)too below SIU,
log on gosſus (LAO syſ loſ ostexpun out, Jo Tutu put ‘pood isotſäRI SIU IIIA
on tPontóngo osodiuſ aouellaoxa Iulouſ stu sooCI ‘uonušūqo Jo puuot; b od
houligo lj ‘hou J & asſus (IAO sp.to) oottoliaoxa Iºtout sºul IIIA on uombºſido
asodtuſ pop Jo aottollaoxa Iulou oup seoGI pue out, St JIJs] eduo IIooxo
IBIOut splbäol Atooun slu.L ºptio aul Jo Utonſputoo tº su Āluo eduoſlooxo
lutout to SSoulou put ‘pua alſ, su ssaupassalq splöö, Äloat[] oottoloaouaq
ou L JUIoIL30x0 AIUBIOUI sº at asnboaq inq asſus nyo S] loj you ‘osio.Aſtin
oth Jo pooš att] put p003 spºt IIIA on to ‘pua onetunin ut. St. To ‘axles UAO
s] Ioj ‘pot) Jo aoutoſlooxa Iutout eq, IIIA on topſo 'sn Souauol Atoolſ, SIII]
qugſ ‘pua SITU) on ITU put [mos out 5uno Aap uſ ‘axus UIAAO S]I IOJ as 10Aſun
aúl puu pop Jo Bulaq IIoA isolţāſū all 5UTILIA III SSISUIoo eatioſo Aattoq
ÅIquTuapun ºuts SI adulolo Aouaq polseloruſsip 'onth si Atoatſ, sºul JI
‘āuſaq-IIAA SITI
Jo onlūA aſsuſ thuſ oth 5ulaq S.WuMTu quin ‘uospat Ithu ºutputy oth od outlºo
qnq ‘ssaupassaſq souliſt pub [on]ot sit IIIA on UIonuândo Imo Jo uonſputo.)
oup pub ‘ssaupassaſſi [unlou usad SIII IIIA on tongjildo STI Jo Ulosuo I KIB
-puoods tº aq asnu ann.IIA stEI 'asootto on sm salmbol 1, 18th puto outes oun
asoollo on Umu aimbal snut AUI [ptolu St. ‘sn UI UtopyväIIqo Jo (Ionºpunoj
aul ad hottuto I ‘aq outteo II (IoIUIA ‘Utill uſ uomºſqo (b.Lotu Jo Uonºpunoj
aúl Tou SI onlūA S.pop JI splito A Uſe UI Ibonuſabi pub ouo SI AAUI [B.IOUI
nuum ‘UOsual eduis out, to] ‘Shuaije IV.IOUT IIB UniM pub spliOAA IIb ul outes
aul aq. 1sutu Itoſhtāqqo Iulotu Jo (Ioutputloſ alſ, ‘Utºp qugſ 'ssaupassaſq
Tennob Stu IIIA on ‘uong3!Iqo all, Jo uonpuoo to Ulosual Katpuooes e ATuo og
asnutt onlıIA SRI put pooš aſqissod tº se aſ ātūIIIA toy uosbat Tayuatuppung
aul aq ºsmut STIn Joshi III aſqunſex SI I JI and JIAS] U aſquuſbA stpooš
asnboaq ‘AIoans ‘ATIAA & IIAo utt[] [al]t'ſ poº) on pooš IIIA Atlas ºng & IIIA
-pooš to ‘aoua IOAattoq onuſ oſquaſosal oxol SIU, SI AMIBIOU pub uomulsióal
Jo aſed aul UITILA AnoRIns hou ate ‘ĀlūITISuos ou. Jo Guatuouaud atau pub
puttu Jo Sonths Atºlum(OAUI Bulaq Suonotua loj ‘Aouaouldtuoo Jo uonoue atou
tº aq outtgo I & asſotaxa on UIOIlešHao up topum Sn SKBI onlūA sq qopus,
‘a AOI buſ, Jo ULIO) to oln, bū ol Q sº yºu.A. & OS aq IIbo ºr asuas helpA uſ
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an]]]A se pub ‘uongpúnoj syſ SB annuIA Jo oouanspa sno Aald au. Anotplay
1spa 10u pinoo uomºśIIqo so ‘spiOA launo uſ ; (Ionºpunoy Sli su penspa
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Mou uopºldo IBIOUI launſou alojalou.L. is so ubo annula alojaq aspxe
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 67
If the divine moral excellence is the ground of obligation to choose,
then this excellence must be the object of this choice, and disinterested
benevolence is never right, but always wrong.
2. But for the sake of a somewhat systematic examination of this subject,
I will—
(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence is.
(2.) That it cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.
(3.) Show what moral worth or good desert is.
(4.) That it cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.
(5.) Show what relation virtue, merit, and moral worth sustain to moral
obligation. -
(6.) Answer objections.
(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence is.
Virtue, or moral excellence, consists in conformity of will to moral law.
It must either be identical with love or good-will, or it must be the moral
attribute or element of good-will or benevolence.
(2.) It cammot be the foundation of moral obligation.
It is agreed, that the moral law requires love ; and that this term
expresses all that it requires. It is also agreed that this love is good-
will, or that it resolves itself into choice, or ultimate intention. It must,
then, consist in the choice of an ultimate end. Or, in more common
language, this love consists in the supreme devotion of heart and soul, to
God and to the highest good of being. But since virtue either consists in
choice, or is an attribute of choice, or benevolence, it is impossible to will
it as an ultimate end. For this would involve the absurdity of choosing
choice, or intending intention, as an end, instead of choosing that as an end
upon which virtuous choice terminates. Or, if virtue be regarded as the
moral attribute of love or benevolence, to make it an ultimate end would
be to make an attribute of choice an ultimate end, instead of that on
which choice terminates, or ought to terminate. This is absurd.
(3.) Show what moral worth, or good desert is, -
Moral worth, or good desert, is not identical with virtue, or obedience to
moral law, but is an attribute of character, resulting from obedience.
Virtue, or holiness, is a state of mind. It is an active and benevolent
state of the will. Moral worth is not a state of mind, but is the result of
a state of mind. We say that a man's obedience to moral law, is valuable
in such a sense that a holy being is worthy, or deserving of good, because
of his virtue, or holiness. But this worthiness, this good desert, is not
a state of mind, but, as I said, it is a result of benevolence. It is an attri-
bute or quality of character, and not a state of mind.
(4) Moralworth or good desert cannot be the foundation of moral obligation,
(a.) It is admitted, that good, or the intrinsically valuable to being,
must be the foundation of moral obligation. The law of God requires the
choice of an ultimate end. This end must be intrinsically valuable, for it
is its intrinsic value that imposes obligation to will it, Nothing, them, can
F 9
68 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
be the foundation of moral obligation but that which is a good, or intrim-
sically valuable in itself.
(b.) Ultimate good, or the intrinsically valuable, must belong to, and
be inseparable from, sentient existences. A block of marble cannot enjoy,
or be the subject of, good. That which is intrinsically, good to moral
agents, must consist in a state of mind. It must be something that is
found within the field of consciousness. Nothing can be to them an
intrinsic good, but that of which they can be conscious. By this, it is not
intended, that everything of which they are conscious, is to them an ulti-
mate good, or a good in any sense ; but it is intended, that that cannot be
to them an ultimate, or intrinsic good, of which they are not conscious.
Ultimate good must consist in a conscious state of mind. Whatever con-
duces to the state of mind that is necessarily regarded by us as intrinsically
good or valuable, is to us a relative good. But the state of mind alone is
the ultimate good. From this it is plain, that moral worth, or good desert,
cannot be the foundation of moral obligation, because it is not a state of
mind, and cannot be an ultimate good. The consciousness of good desert,
that is, the consciousness of affirming of ourselves good desert, is an ulti-
mate good. Or, more strictly, the satisfaction which the mind experiences,
upon occasion of affirming its good desert, is an ultimate good. But
neither the conscious affirmation of good desert, nor the satisfaction Oc-
casioned by the affirmation, is identical with moral worth or good desert.
Merit, moral worth, good desert, is the condition, or occasion, of the affir-
mation, and of the resulting conscious satisfaction, and is therefore a good,
but it is not, and cannot be an ultimate, or intrinsic good. It is valuable,
but not intrinsically valuable. Were it not that moral beings are so con-
stituted, that it meets a demand of the intelligence, and therefore produces
satisfaction in its contemplation, it would not be, and could not reason-
ably be regarded as a good in any sense. But since it meets a demand
of the intelligence, it is a relative good, and results in ultimate good.
(5.) Show what relation moral excellence, worth, merit, desert, sustain to
moral obligation.
(a.) We have seen, that neither of them can be the foundation of moral
obligation ; that neither of them has in it the element of the intrinsic, or
ultimate good, or valuable ; and that, therefore, a moral agent can never be
under obligation to will or choose them as an ultimate end.
(b.) Worth, merit, good desert, caunot be a distinct ground, or founda-
tion, of moral obligation, in such a sense as to impose obligation, irrespec-
tive of the intrinsic value of good. All obligation must respect, strictly,
the choice of an object for its owu sake, with the necessary conditions and
means. The intrinsic value of the end is the foundation of the obligation
to choose both it and the necessary conditions and means of securing it.
But for the intrinsic value of the end there could be no obligation to will
the conditions and means. Whenever a thing is seem to be a necessary
condition or means of securing an intrinsically valuable end, this perceived
relation is the condition of our obligation to will it. The obligation is, and
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 69
must be, founded in the intrinsic value of the end, and conditionated upon
the perceived relation of the object to the end. The intelligence of every
moral agent, from its nature and laws, affirms, that the ultimate good and
blessedness of moral beings is, and ought to be, conditionated upon their
holiness and good desert. This being a demand of reason, reason can
never affirm moral obligation to will the actual blessedness of moral
agents, but upon condition of their virtue, and consequent good desert, or
merit. The intelligence affirms, that it is fit, suitable, proper, that virtue,
good desert, merit, holiness, should be rewarded with blessedness. Bless-
edness is a good in itself, and ought to be willed for that reason, and moral
agents are under obligation to will that all beings capable of good may be
worthy to enjoy, and may, therefore, actually enjoy blessedness. But they
are not under obligation to will that every moral being should actually
enjoy blessedness, but upon condition of holiness and good desert. The
relation that holiness, merit, good desert, &c., sustain to moral obligation,
is this: they supply the condition of the obligation to will the actual
blessedness of the being or beings who are holy. The obligation must be
founded in the intrinsic value of the good we are to will to them. For it
is absurd to say, that we are, or can be, under obligation to will good to
them for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, and yet that the obligation
should not be founded in the intrinsic value of the good. Were it not for
the intrinsic value of their good, we should no sooner affirm obligation to
will good to them than evil. The good or blessedness is the thing, or end,
we are under obligation to will. But obligation to will an ultimate end
cannot possibly be founded in anything else than the intrinsic value of the
end. Suppose it should be said, that in the case of merit, or good desert,
the obligation is founded in merit, and only conditionated on the intrinsic
value of the good I am to will. This would be to make desert the end
willed, and good only the condition, or means. This were absurd.
(c.) But again : to make merit the ground of the obligation, and the
good willed only a condition, amounts to this : I perceive merit, whereupon
I affirm my obligation to will—what? Not good to the deserving because
of its value to him, nor from any disposition to see him enjoy blessedness for
its own sake, but because of his merit. But what does he merit? Why,
good, or blessedness. It is good, or blessedness, that I am to will to him,
and this is the end I am bound to will; that is, I am to will his good,
or blessedness, for its own intrinsic value. The obligation, then, must be
founded in the intrinsic value of the end, that is, his well-being, or bless-
edness, and only conditionated upon merit.
(6.) I am to answer objections.
(a.) It is objected, that, if virtue is meritorious, if it merits, deserves
anything, this implies corresponding obligation, and that merit, or desert,
must impose, or be the ground of, the obligation to give that which is
merited. But this objection is either a mere begging of the question, or it is
sheer logomachy. It assumes that the words, desert and merit, mean
What they cannot mean, Let the objector remember, that he holds that
70 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
obligation respects ultimate intention, that ultimate intention must find the
grounds of its obligation exclusively in its object. Now, if desert or merit
is a ground of obligation, them merit or desert must be the object of the
intention. Desert, merit, must be willed for its own sake. But is this
the thing that is deserved, merited 2 Does a meritorious being deserve
that his merit or descrt should be willed for its own sake 2 Indeed, is this
what he deserves 2 We understandingly speak of good desert, the desert
of good and of evil; can a being deserve that his desert shall be chosen
for its own sake. If not, then it is impossible that desert or merit should
be a ground of obligation; for be it remembered, that whatever is a
ground of obligation ought to be chosen for its own sake. But if good
desert deserves good, it is self-evident that the intrinsic value of the good
is the ground, and merit only a condition, of obligation to will the actual and
particular enjoyment of the good by the meritorious individual. Thus
merit changes merely the form of obligation. If an individual is wicked,
I Ought to will his good as valuable in itself, and that he should comply
with the necessary conditions of happiness, and thereupon actually enjoy
happiness. If he is virtuous, I am to will his good still for its intrinsic
value ; and, since he has complied with the conditions of enjoyment, that he
actually enjoy happiness. In both cases, I am bound to will his good, and
for the same fundamental reason, namely, its intrinsic value. Neither the
fact nor the ground of obligation to will his good is changed by his virtue; the
form only of the obligation is changed. I may be under obligation to will
evil to a particular being, but in this case I am not bound to will the evil
for its own sake, and, therefore, not as an end or ultimate. I ought some-
times to will the punishment of the guilty, not for its own sake, but for
the sake of the puplic good; and the intrinsic value of the good to be pro-
moted, is the ground of the obligation, and guilt or demerit is only a con-
dition of the obligation in that form. If merit or desert be a ground of
obligation, them merit or desert ought to be chosen for its own sake. It
would follow from this, that ill desert ought to be chosen for its own sake,
as well as good desert. But who will pretend that ill desert ought to be
willed for its own sake 2 But if this is not, cammot be so, then it follows,
that desert is not a ground of obligation, and that it is not an object of
ultimate choice, or of choice at all, only as a means to an end.
(b.) It is asserted, in support of the theory we are examining, that the
Bible represents the goodness of God as a reason for loving him, or as a
foundation of the obligation to love him.
To this I answer,
(i.) The Bible may assign, and does assign the goodness of God as a
reason for loving him, but it does not follow, that it affirms, or assumes,
that this reason is the foundation, or a foundation of the obligation. The
inquiry is, in what sense does the Bible assign the goodness of God as a
reason for loving him 2 Is it that the goodness of God is the foundation
of the obligation, or only a condition of the obligation to will his actual
blessedness in particular 2 Is his goodness a distinct ground of obligation
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 71
to love him 2 But what is this love that his goodness lays us under
an obligation exercise to him 2 It is agreed, that it cannot be an
emotion, that it must consist in willing something to him. It is said
by some, that the obligation is to treat him as worthy. But I ask,
worthy of what? Is he worthy of anything 2 If so, what is it? For
this is the thing that I ought to will to him. Is he merely worthy
that I should will his worthiness for its own sake 2 This must be,
if his worthiness is the ground of obligation, for that which is the
ground of obligation to choose must be the object of choice. Why, he
is worthy of blessing, and honour, and praise. But these must all be em-
braced in the single word, love . The law has for ever decided the point,
that our whole duty to God is expressed by this one term. It has been
common to make assertions upon the subject, that involve a contradiction
of the Bible. The law of God, as revealed in the two precepts, “ Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thy-
self,” covers the whole ground of moral obligation. It is expressly and
repeatedly taught in the Bible, that love to God and our neighbour, is the
fulfilling of the law. It is, and must be, admitted, that this love consists in
willing something to God and our neighbour. What, them, is to be willed
to them 2 The command is, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”
This says nothing about the character of my neighbour. It is the value of
his interests, of his well-being, that the law requires me to regard. It does
not require me to love my righteous neighbour merely, nor to love my
righteous neighbour better than I do my wicked neighbour. It is my neigh-
bour that I am to love. That is, I am to will his well-being, or his good,
with the conditions and means thereof, according to its value. If the law
contemplated the virtue of any being as a distinct ground of obligation, it
could not read as it does. It must, in that case, have read as follows: “If
thou art righteous, and thy neighbour is as righteous as thou art, thou shalt
love him as thyself. But if he is righteous and thou art not, thou shalt
love him, and not thyself. If thou art righteous, and he is not, thou shalt
love thyself, and not thy neighbour.” How far would this be from the gloss
of the Jewish rabbies so fully rebuked by Christ, namely, “Ye have heard
that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt love thy Ineighbour,
and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies; bless
them that curse you ; do good to them that hate you ; and pray for them
that despitefully use and persecute you. For if ye love them that love
you, what thank have ye? Do not even the publicans the same 2" The
fact is, the law knows but one ground of moral obligation. It requires us
to love God and our neighbour. This love is good-will. What else ought we
to will, or can we possibly will to God and our neighbour, but their highest
good, or well-being, with all the conditions and means thereof 2 This is
all that can be of any value to them, and all that we can, or ought to, will
to them under any circumstances whatever. When we have willed this to
them, we have done our whole duty to them. “Love is the fulfilling of the
law.” We owe them nothing more, absolutely. They can have nothing
72 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
more. But this the law requires us to will to God and our neighbour, on
account of the intrinsic value of their good, whatever their character may
be, that is, this is to be willed to God and our neighbour, as a possible good,
whether they are holy or unholy, simply because of its intrinsic value.
But while the law requires that this should be willed to all, as a possible
and intrinsic good, irrespective of character; it cannot, and does not require
us to will that God, or any moral agent in particular, shall be actually
blessed, but upon condition that he be holy. Our obligation to the unholy,
is to will that they might be holy, and perfectly blessed. Our obligation
to the holy is to will that they be perfectly blessed. As has been said,
virtue only modifies the form, but does not change the ground, of obligation.
The Bible represents love to enemies as one of the highest forms of virtue:
“God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners,
Christ died for us." But if love to enemies be a high and a valuable form
of virtue, it must be only because the true spirit of the law requires the
same love to them as to others, and because of the strong inducements not
to love them. Who does not regard the virtue of the atonement as being
as great as if it had been made for the friends, instead of the enemies, of
God? And suppose God were supremely selfish and unreasonably our
enemy, who would not regard good-will exercised toward him as being as
praiseworthy as it now is. Now, if he were unjustly our enemy, would
not a hearty good-will to him in such a case be a striking and valuable
instance of virtue 2 In such a case we could not, might not, will his
actual blessedness, but we might and should be under infinite obligation to
will that he might become holy, and thereupon be perfectly blessed. We
should be under obligation to will his good in such a sense, that should he
become holy, we should will his actual blessedness, without any change in
our ultimate choice or intention, and without any change in us that would
imply an increase of virtue. So of our neighbour: we are bound to will
his good, even if he is wicked, in such a sense as to need no new intention
or ultimate choice, to will his actual blessedness, should he become holy.
We may be as holy in loving a sinner, and in seeking his salvation while
he is a sinner, as in Willing his good after he is converted and becomes a
saint. God was as virtuous in loving the world and seeking to save it
while in sin, as he is in loving those in it who are holy. The fact is, if
we are truly benevolent, and will the highest well-being of all, with the
conditions and means of their blessedness, it follows of course, and of
necessity, that when one becomes holy we shall love him with the love
of complacency; that we shall, of course, will his actual blessedness, seeing
that he has fulfilled the necessary conditions, and rendered himself worthy
of blessedness, It implies no increase of virtue in God, when a sinner
repents, to exercise complacency toward him. Complacency, as a state of
will or heart, is only benevolence modified by the consideration or relation
of right character in the object of it. God, prophets, apostles, martyrs,
and saints, in all ages, are as virtuous in their self-denying and untiring
labours to save the wicked, as they are in their complacent love to the
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 73
saints. This is the universal doctrine of the Bible. It is in exact accord-
ance with the spirit and letter of the law. “Thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thyself;” that is, whatever his character may be. This is the doctrine
of reason, and accords with the convictions of all men. But if this is so,
it follows that virtue is not a distinct ground of moral obligation, but only
modifies the form of obligation. We are under obligation to will the
actual blessedness of a moral being, upon condition of his holiness. We
ought to will good or blessedness for its own value, irrespective of character;
but we ought to will the enjoyment of it, by an individual, in particular,
only upon condition of his holiness. Its intrinsic value is the foundation
of the obligation, and his holiness changes not the fact, but form, of the
obligation, and is the condition of the obligation to will his actual enjoyment
of perfect blessedness in particular. When, therefore, the Bible calls on
us to love God for his goodness, it does not and cannot mean to assign the
fundamental reason, or foundation of the obligation to will his good ; for it
were absurd to suppose, that his good is to be willed, not for its intrinsic
value, but because he is good. Were it not for its intrinsic value, we should
as soon affirm our obligation to will evil as good to him. The Bible assumes
the first truths of reason. It is a first truth of reason, that God’s well-
being is of infinite value, and ought to be willed as a possible good what-
ever his character may be ; and that it ought to be willed as an actual
reality upon condition of his holiness. Now the Bible does just as in this
case might be expected. It asserts his actual and infinite holiness, and
calls on us to love him, or to will his good, for that reason. But this is not
asserting nor implying that his holiness is the foundation of the obligation
to will his good in any such sense as that we should not be under obligation
to will it with all our heart, and Soul, and mind, and strength, as a possible
good, whether he were holy or not. It is plain that the law contemplates
only the intrinsic value of the end to be willed. It would require us to
will the well-being of God with all our heart, &c., or as the supreme good,
whatever his character might be. Were not this so, it could not be moral
law. His interest would be the supreme and the infinite good in the
sense of the intrinsically and infinitely valuable, and we should, for that
reason, be under infinite obligation to will that it might be, whether he
were holy or sinful, and upon condition of his holiness, to will the actual
existence of his perfect and infinite blessedness. Upon our coming to
the knowledge of his holiness, the obligation is instantly imposed, not
merely to will his highest well-being as a possible, but as an actually
existing, good.
(ii.) Again. It is impossible that goodness, virtue, good desert, merit,
should be a distinct ground or foundation of moral obligation in such a
sense as to impose or properly to increase obligation. It has been shown
that neither of these can be an ultimate good and impose obligation to
choose itself as an ultimate end, or for its intrinsic value.
But if goodness or merit can impose moral obligation to will, it must
be an obligation to will itself as an ultimate end. But this we have seem
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MORAL GOVERNMENT. -- 75
for this reason we are under infinite obligation to will its existence. The
intrinsic value of the good, to which it sustains the relation of a means,
is the ground, and the relation only a condition, of the obligation to will
it, not as an ultimate, but as a relative good. But the objector will have
it that the moral excellency is a distinct ground of obligation. If so,
then it ought to be willed, not only as a condition, or means, of good, but
for its own sake. But this we have seen cannot be. The fact is, that
we necessarily assume its relations to the good of being, when we affirm
obligation to will it.
3. But it is said that favours received impose obligation to exercise grati-
tude; that the relation of benefactor itself imposes obligation to treat
the benefactor according to this relation.
Answer: I suppose this objection contemplates this relation as a
virtuous relation, that is, that the benefactor is truly virtuous and not
selfish in his benefaction. If not, then the relation cannot at all modify
obligation.
If the benefactor has in the benefaction obeyed the law of love, if he has
done his duty in sustaining this relation, I am under obligation to exercise
gratitude toward him. But what is gratitude 2 It is not a mere emotion
or feeling, for this is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and, strictly speaking,
without the pale both of legislation and morality. Gratitude, when spoken
of as a virtue and as that of which moral obligation can be affirmed, must
be an act of will. An obligation to gratitude must be an obligation to will
something to the benefactor. But what am I under obligation to will to a
benefactor, but his actual highest well-being 2 If it be God, I am under
obligation to will his actual and infinite blessedness with all my heart and
with all my soul. If it be my neighbour, I am bound to love him as my-
self, that is, to will his actual well-being as I do my own. What else can
either God or man possess or enjoy, and what else can I be under obliga-
tion to will to them 2 I answer, nothing else. To the law and to the
testimony; if any philosophy agree not lierewith, it is because there is no
light in it. The virtuous relation of benefactor modifies obligation, just as
any other and every other form of virtue does, and in no other way.
Whenever we perceive virtue in any being, this supplies the condition
upon which we are bound to will his actual highest well-being. He has
done his duty. He has complied with obligation in the relation he
sustains. He is truthful, upright, benevolent, just, merciful, no matter what
the particular form may be in which the individual presents to me the
evidence of his holy character. It is all precisely the same so far as my
obligation extends. I am, independently of my knowledge of his character,
under obligation to will his highest well-being for its own sake. That
is, to will that he may fulfil all the conditions, and thereupon enjoy perfect
blessedness. But I am not under obligation to will his actual enjoyment
of blessedness until I have evidence of his virtue. This evidence, however
I obtain it, by whatever manifestations of virtue in him or by whatever
means, supplies the condition upon which I am under obligation to will his
76 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
actual enjoyment or highest well-being. This is my whole obligation. It
is all he can have, and all I can will to him. All objections of this kind,
and indeed all possible objections to the true theory and in support of the
one I am examining, are founded in an erroneous view of the subject of
moral obligation, or in a false and anti-scriptural philosophy that contra-
dicts the law of God, and sets up another rule of moral obligation.
Again, if gratitude is a moral act, according to this objector, it is an
ultimate intention, and as such must terminate on its object, and find its
reasons or ground of obligation exclusively in its object. If this is so, then
if the relation of benefactor is the ground of obligation to exercise gratitude,
gratitude must consist in willing this relation for its own sake, and not at all
in Willing anything to the benefactor. This is absurd. It is certain that gra-
titude must consist in willing good to the benefactor, and not in willing the
relation for its own sake, and that the ground of the obligation must be the
intrinsic value of the good, and the relation only a condition of the obliga-
tion in the particular form of willing his enjoyment of good in particular.
It is now said, in reply to this, that the “inquiry is not, what is gratitude 2
but, why ought we to exercise it?” But the inquiry is after the ground of
the obligation; this, it is agreed, must be intrinsic in its object; and is it
impertinent to inquire what the object is? Who can tell what is the
ground of the obligation to exercise gratitude until he knows what the
object of gratitude is, and consequently what gratitude is 2 The objector
affirms that the relation of benefactor is a ground of obligation to put forth
ultimate choice. Of course, according to him, and in fact, if this relation
is the ground of the obligation, it is, and must be, the object chosem for its
own sake. To exercise gratitude to a benefactor, then, according to this
teaching is, not to will any good to him, nor to myself, nor to any being in
existence, but simply to will the relation of benefactor for its own sake.
Not for his sake, as a good to him. Not for my sake as a good to me, but
for its own sake. Is not this a sublime philosophy 2
4. But it is said that, in all instances in which we affirm moral obligation,
we necessarily affirm the moral excellence or goodness of God to be the
foundation or reason of the obligation.
Answer: This is so great a mistake, that in no instance whatever do we
or can we affirm the moral excellence of God to be the foundation of obliga-
tion, unless we do and can affirm the most palpable contradiction. Let it
be remembered : 1. That moral obligation respects ultimate intention.
2. That ultimate intention is the choice of an end for its intrinsic value.
3. That the ground or reason of our obligation to intend an end is the
intrinsic value of the end, and is really identical with the end to be chosen,
4. That moral excellence either consists in ultimate intention or in an
attribute of this intention, and therefore cammot be chosen as an ultimate
end. 5. That moral obligation always resolves itself into an obligation to
will the highest well-being of God and the universe for its own intrinsic
value. 6. Now, can reason be so utterly unreasonable as to affirm all these,
and also that the ground or reason of the obligation to will the highest
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 77
well-being of God and the universe for its own intrinsic value is not its
intrinsic value, but is the divine moral excellence?
5. But it is also insisted that when men attempt to assign a reason why
they are under moral obligation of any kind, as to love God, they all agree
in this, in assigning the divine moral excellence as the reason of that obli-
gation. I answer —
(1.) There is, and can be, but one kind of moral obligation.
(2.) It is not true that all men agree in assigning the moral excellence
of God as the foundation or fundamental reason of the obligation, to love
him, or to will his good for its own sake. I certainly am an exception to
this rule.
(3.) If any body assigns this as the reason of the obligation, he assigns
a false reason, as has just been shown.
(4.) No man, who knew what he said, ever assigned the goodness of God
as the foundation of the obligation to will his good as an ultimate end, for
this is, as we have often seen, a gross contradiction and an impossibility.
(5.) The only reason why any man supposes himself to assign the good-
ness of God as the foundation of the obligation to will good to him is, that
he loosely confounds the conditions of the obligation to will his actual
blessedness, with the foundation of the obligation to will it for its own sake,
or as a possible good. Were it not for the known intrinsic value of God's
highest well-being, we should as soon affirm our obligation to will evil as
good to him, as has been said.
(6.) Again : if the divine moral excellence were the foundation of moral
obligation, if God were not holy and good, moral obligation could not exist
in any case.
(7) God's moral obligation cannot be founded in his own moral excel-
lence, for his moral excellence consists in his conformity to moral obligation,
and this fact implies the existence of moral obligation, prior, in the order
of nature, to his moral excellence, as was said before.
(S.) The fact is, the intrinsic and infinite value of the well-being of
God and of the universe, is a first truth of reason, and always and neces-
sarily taken along with us at all times. That moral excellence or good
desert is a naturally necessary condition of their highest well-being is also
a first truth, always and necessarily taken along with us whether we are
conscious of it or not. The natural impossibility of willing the actual
existence of the highest well-being of God and the universe of moral agents
but upon condition of their worthiness, is a self-evident truth. So that no
man can affirm his obligation to will the actual highest well-being of God
and of moral agents but upon condition of their moral excellence, any more
than he can affirm his obligation to will their eternal well-being but upon
condition of their existence.
That every moral agent ought to will the highest well-being of God and
of all the universe for its own sake, as a possible good, whatever their
characters may be, is also a first truth of reason. Reason assigns and can
assign no other reason for willing their good as an ultimate end than its
78 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
intrinsic value; and to assign any other reason as imposing obligation to
will it as an end, or for its own sake, were absurd and self-contradictory.
Obligation to will it as an end and for its own sake, implies the obligation
to will its actual existence in all cases and to all persons when the indis
pensable conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are seem to be fulfilled
in God, and therefore upon this condition reason affirms obligation to will
his actual and highest blessedness for its own sake, the intrinsic value
being the fundamental reason of the obligation to will it as an end, and
the divine goodness the condition of the obligation to will his highest
blessedness in particular. Suppose that I existed and had the idea of
blessedness and its intrinsic value duly developed, together with an idea
of all the necessary conditions of it; but that I did not know that any
other being than myself existed, and yet I knew their existence and blessed-
ness possible; in this case I should be under obligation to will or wish
that beings might exist and be blessed. Now suppose that I complied
with this obligation, my virtue is just as real and as great as if I knew
their existence and willed their actual blessedness, provided my idea of its
intrinsic value were as clear and just as if I knew their existence. And
now suppose I came to the knowledge of the actual existence and holiness
of all holy beings, I should make no new ultimate choice in willing their
actual blessedness. This I should do of course, and, remaining benevolent,
of necessity; and if this knowledge did not give me a higher idea of the
value of that which I before willed for its own sake, the willing of the real
existence of their blessedness would not make me a whit more virtuous
than when I willed it as a possible good without knowing that the con-
ditions of its actual existence would ever, in any case, be fulfilled.
The Bible reads just as it might be expected to read, and just as we
should speak in common life. It being a first truth of reason that the
well-being of God is of infinite value, and therefore ought to be willed for
its own sake—it also being a first truth that virtue is an indispellsable
condition of fulfilling the demands of his own reason and conscience, and
of course of his actual blessedness, and of course also a condition of the
obligation to will it, we might expect the Bible to exhort and require us to
love God or will his actual blessedness and mention his virtue as the
reason or fulfilled condition of the obligation, rather than the intrinsic
value of his blessedness as the foundation of the obligation. The founda-
tion of the obligation, being a first truth of reason, needs not to be a
matter of revelation. Nor needs the fact that virtue is the condition of
his blessedness, nor the fact that we are under no obligation to will his
actual blessedness but upon condition of his holiness. But that in him this
condition is fulfilled needs to be impressed upon us, and therefore the Bible
announces it as a reason or condition of the obligation to love him, that
is, to will his actual blessedness.
God's moral excellence is naturally, and rightly, assigned by us as a con-
dition, not the ground, of obligation to receive his revealed will as our
law. Did we not assume the rectitude of the divine will, we could not
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 79
affirm our obligation to receive it as a rule of duty. This assumption is a
condition of the obligation, and is naturally thought of when obligation to
obey God is affirmed. But the intrinsic value and importance of the
interest he requires us to seek, is the ground of the obligation.
Again: it is asserted that when men would awaken a sense of moral
obligation they universally contemplate the moral excellence of God as
constituting the reason of their obligation, and if this contemplation
does not awaken their sense of obligation nothing else can or will. I
811SW €T-
The only possible reason why men ever do or can take this course, is
that they loosely consider religion to consist in feelings of complacency in
God, and are endeavouring to awaken these complacent emotions. If they
conceive of religion as consisting in these emotions, they will of course
conceive themselves to be under obligation to exercise them and to be
sure they take the only possible course to awaken both these and a sense
of obligation to exercise them. But they are mistaken both in regard to
their obligation and the nature of religion. Did they conceive of religion
as consisting in good-will, or in willing the highest well-being of God and
of the universe for its own sake, would they, could they, resort to the process
in question, that is, the contemplation of the divine moral excellence, as
the only reason for willing good to him, instead of considering the infinite
value of those interests to the realization of which they ought to consecrate
themselves 2
If men often do resort to the process in question, it is because they love
to feel and have a self-righteous satisfaction in feelings of complacency in
God, and take more pains to awaken these feelings than to quicken and
enlarge their benevolence. A purely selfish being may be greatly affected
by the great goodness and kindness of God to him. I know a man who is
a very niggard so far as all benevolent giving and doing for God and the
World are concerned, who, I fear, resorts to the Very process in question,
and is often much affected with the goodness of God. He can bluster and
denounce all who do not feel as he does. But ask him for a dollar to
forward any benevolent enterprize and he will evade your request, and ask
you how you feel, whether you are engaged in religion, &c.
It has been asserted that nothing can add to the sense of obligation thus
excited.
To this I answer, that if the obligation be regarded as an obligation to
feel emotions of complacency in God, this is true. But if the obligation
be contemplated, as it really is, an obligation to will the highest well-being
of God for its own sake, the assertion is not true, but, on the colntrary,
affirms an absurdity. I am under obligation to will the highest well-being
of God and of the universe as an ultimate end, or for its own intrinsic
value. Now according to this philosophy, in order to get the highest view
of this obligation, I must contemplate, not the intrinsic value of those
infinite interests that I ought to will, but the goodness of God. This is
absurd. The fact is, I must prize the value of the interests to be willed,
80 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and the goodness of God as a reason for willing actual blessedness to him
in particular.
But it may well be asked, why does the bible and why do we, so often
present the character of God and of Christ as a means of awakening a sense
of moral obligation and of inducing virtue? Answer—
It is to lead men to contemplate the infinite value of those interests
which we ought to will. Presenting the example of God and of Christ, is
the highest moral means that can be used. That God's example and man's
example is the most impressive and efficient way in which he can declare
his views and hold forth to public gaze the infinite value of those interests
upon which all hearts ought to be set. For example, nothing can set the
infinite value of the soul in a stronger light than the example of God the
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost has done.
Nothing can beget a higher sense of obligation to will the glory of the
Father and the salvation of Souls, than the example of Christ. His example
is his loudest preaching, his clearest, most impressive, exhibition, not
merely of his own goodness, but of the intrinsic and infinite value of the
interest he sought and which we ought to seek. It is the love, the care,
the self-denial, and the example of God, in his efforts to secure the great
ends of benevolence, that hold those interests forth in the strongest light,
and thus beget a sense of obligation to seek the same end. But let it be
observed, it is not a contemplation of the goodness of God that awakens
this sense of obligation, but the contemplation of the value of those interests
which he seeks, in the light of his pains-taking and example; this quickens
and gives efficiency to the sense of obligation to will what he wills. Sup-
pose, for example, that I manifest the greatest concern and zeal for the
salvation of Souls, it would not be the contemplation of my goodness that
would quicken in a by-stander a sense of obligation to save souls, but my
zeal, and life, and spirit, would have the strongest tendency to arouse in
him a sense of the infinite and intrinsic value of the soul, and thus quicken
a sense of obligation. Should I behold multitudes rushing to extinguish
a flaming house, it would not be a contemplation of their goodness, but the
contemplation of the interests at stake, to the consideration of which their
zeal would lead me, that would quicken a Sense of obligation in me to
hastem to lend my aid.
Again : it is asserted that moral action is impracticable upon any other
principle.
(1.) What does this mean? Does it mean that there can be no obliga-
tion unless the goodness of God be regarded as the foundation of moral
obligation ? If so, the mistake is radical,
(2.) Or does it mean that action can have no moral character whatever,
unless it be put forth in view of the fact or upon the assumption that the
goodness of God is the foundation of moral obligation ? If this be the
meaning, the mistake is no less radical.
Thus we see that it is grossly absurd and self-contradictory for any one
to maintain that moral obligation respects the ultimate intention or choice
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 81
of an end for its own intrinsic value, and at the same time assert that the
divine moral excellence is the foundation of moral obligation. The fact is,
it never is, and never can be the foundation of moral obligation. Our
whole duty resolves itself into an obligation to will the highest good or
well-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate end. Faith, grati-
tude, and every phase of virtue, resolves itself into this love or good-will,
and the foundation of the obligation to will this end for its own sake, can
by no possibility be any other than its own intrinsic value. To affirm that
it can is a most palpable contradiction. The moral law proposes an end to
be sought, aimed at, chosen, intended. It is the duty of the divine Being,
as well as of every other moral agent, to consecrate himself to the promo-
tion of the most valuable end. This end cannot be his own virtue. His
virtue consists in choosing the end demanded by the law of his own reason.
This end cannot be identical with the choice itself; for this would be
only to choose his own choice as an ultimate end. But again, it is impos-
sible that God should require moral agents to make his own virtue an
ultimate end.
If it be said that the law requires us to will God’s good, blessedness, &c.,
because or for the reason that he is virtuous, I ask: What can be intended
by this assertion ? Is it intended that we are bound to will his good, not
because it is valuable to him, but because he is good? But why, I ask
again, should we will good rather than evil to him 2 The only answer must
be, because good is good or valuable. If the good is to be willed because
it is valuable, this must be the fundamental reason or foundation of the
obligation to will it; and his goodness is and can be only a secondary
reason or condition of the obligation to will good to him in particular, or
to will his actual blessedness. My intelligence demands, and the intelli-
gence of every moral being demands, that holiness should be the unalterable
condition of the blessedness of God and of every moral agent. This God’s
intelligence must demand. Now his complying with this condition is a
changeless condition of the obligation of a moral agent to will his actual
blessedness. Whatever his character might be, we are under obligation
to will his blessedness with the conditions and means thereof, on account
of its own intrinsic value. But not until we are informed that he has met
this demand of reason and conscience, and performed this condition, and
thus rendered himself worthy of blessedness, are we under obligation to
will it as a reality and fact,
Revelation is concerned to impress the fact that he is holy, and of course
calls on us, in view of his holiness, to love and worship him. But in
doing this, it does not, cannot mean that his holiness is the foundation
of the obligation to will his good as an ultimate end.
Our obligation, when viewed apart from his character, is to will or wish
that God might fulfil all the conditions of perfect blessedness, and upon
that condition, that he might actually enjoy perfect and infinite satisfaction.
But seeing that he meets the demands of his own intelligence and the
intelligence of the universe, and that he voluntarily fulfils all the necessary
G
82 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
conditions of his highest well-being, our obligation is to will his actual and
most perfect and etermal blessedness.
But here it is said, as was noticed in a former lecture, that we often, and
indeed generally, affirm our obligation to love God in view of his moral
excellence, without any reference to the good or well-being of God as an
end ; that his goodness is the foundation of the obligation, and that in
affirming this we have no respect to the value of his blessedness, and that
indeed his well-being or blessedness is not so much as thought of, but that
his holiness or goodness is the only object of thought and attention. To
this I answer: if we really affirm obligation to love God, we must affirm,
either that we ought to feel complacency in him, or that we ought to will
something to him. It is admitted that the obligation is to will something
to him. But if God is good, holy, what ought we to will to him? Why
certainly something which is valuable to him, and that which is most
valuable to him. What should this be but his actual, perfect, infinite,
eternal blessedness? It is certainly nonsense to say, that a moral agent
affirms himself to be under obligation to love God without any reference to
his well-being. It is true that moral agents may be consciously and deeply
affected with the consideration of the goodness of God, when they affirm
their obligation to love him. But in this affirmation they do and must
assume the intrinsic value of his blessedness as the foundation of the
obligation, or they make no intelligent affirmation whatever. They really
do affirm, and must, affirm that they ought to will good to God, assuming
the intrinsic value of the good to him, or they would just as soon affirm
obligation to will evil as good to him.
I am obliged to repeat much to follow the objector, because all his
objections resolve themselves into one, and require to be answered much in
the same Way.
LECTURE VIII.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
6. THEORY OF MORAL ORDER.
7. THEORY OF NATURE AND RELATIONS.
8. THEORY THAT THE IDEA OF DUTY IS THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL
OBLIGATION,
9. CoMPLEX THEORY.
6. I now come to consider the philosophy which teaches that moral order
is the foundation of moral obligation.
But what is moral order? The advocates of this theory define it to be
identical with the fit, proper, suitable. It is, them, according to them,
synonymous with the right. Moral order must be, in their view, either
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 83
identical with law or with virtue. It must be either an idea of the fit, the
right, the proper, the suitable, which is the same as objective right; or it
must consist in conformity of the will to this idea or law, which is virtue.
It has been repeatedly shown that right, whether objective or subjective
cannot by any possibility be the end at which a moral agent ought to aim,
and to which he ought to consecrate himself. If moral order be not
synonymous with right in one of these senses, I do not know what it is ;
and all that I can say is, that if it be not identical with the highest well-
being of God and of the universe, it cannot be the end at which moral
agents ought to aim, and cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.
But if by moral order, as the phraseology of some would seem to indicate,
be meant that state of the universe in which all law is universally obeyed,
and, as a consequence, a state of universal well-being, this theory is only
another name for the true one. It is the same as willing the highest well-
being of the universe with the conditions and means thereof.
Or if it be meant, as other phraseology would seem to indicate, that
moral order is a state of things in which either all law is obeyed, or in
which the disobedient are punished for the sake of promoting the public
good;—if this be what is meant by moral order—it is only another name
for the true theory. Willing moral order is only willing the highest good
of the universe for its own sake, with the condition and means thereof.
But if by moral order be meant the fit, suitable, in the sense of law,
physical or moral, it is absurd to represent moral order as the foundation of
moral obligation. If moral order is the ground of obligation, it is identical
with the object of ultimate choice. Does God require us to love moral
order for its own sake? Is this identical with loving God and our neigh-
bour 2 “Thou shalt will moral order with all thy heart, and with all thy
soul!” Is this the meaning of the moral law 2 If this theory is right,
benevolence is sin. It is not living to the right end.
7. I will meat consider the theory that maintains that the mature and
relations of moral beings are the true foundation of moral obligation.
(1.) The advocates of this theory confound the conditions of moral
obligation with the foundation of obligation. The nature and relations
of moral agents to each other, and to the universe, are conditions of
their obligation to will the good of being, but not the foundation of the
obligation. What! the nature and relations of moral beings the foundation
of their obligation to choose an ultimate end. Then this end must be their
nature and relations. This is absurd. Their nature and relations, being
What they are, their highest well-being is known to them to be of infinite
and intrinsic value. But it is and must be the intrinsic value of the end,
and not their nature and relations, that imposes obligation to will the
highest good of the universe as an ultimate end.
(2.) If their nature and relations be the ground of obligation, then
their mature and relations are the great object of ultimate choice, and
should be willed for their own sakes, and not for the sake of any good result.
G 2
84 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
ing from their natures and relations. For, be it remembered, the ground of
obligation to put forth ultimate choice must be identical with the object
of this choice, which object imposes obligationſ by virtue of its own nature.
(3.) The natures and relations of moral beings are a condition of obliga-
tion to fulfil to each other certain duties. For example, the relation of
parent and child is a condition of obligation to endeavour to promote each
other's particular well-being, to govern and provide for, on the part of the
parent, and to obey, &c., on the part of the child. But the intrinsic value
of the good to be sought by both parent and child must be the ground, and
their relation only the condition, of those particular forms of obligation.
So in every possible case. Relations can never be a ground of obligation
to choose unless the relations be the object of the choice. The 'ſarious
duties of life are executive and not ultimate acts. Obligation to perform
them is founded in the intrinsic nature of the good resulting from their
performance. The various relations of life are only conditions of obli-
gation to promote particular forms of good, and the good of particular
individuals.
If this theory is true, benevolence is sin. Why do not its advocates see
this?
Writers upon this subject are often falling into the mistake of confound-
ing the conditions with the foundation of moral obligation. Moral agency
is a condition, but not the foundation of obligation. Light, or the know-
ledge of the intrinsically valuable to being, is a condition, but not the
foundation of moral obligation. The intrinsically valuable is the foundation
of the obligation; and light, or the perception of the intrinsically valuable, is
only a condition of the obligation. So the mature and relations of moral
beings is a condition of their obligation to will each other's good, and so is
light, or a knowledge of the intrinsic value of their blessedness; but the
intrinsic value is alone the foundation of the obligation. It is, therefore,
a great mistake to aſſirm “that the known nature and relations of inoral
agents is the true foundation of moral obligation.”
-8. The meat theory that demands attention is that which teaches that
moral obligation is founded in the idea of duty.
According to this philosophy, the end at which a moral agent ought to
aim, is duty. He must in all things “aim at doing his duty.” Or, in
other words, he must always have respect to his obligation, and aim at
discharging it.
Then disinterested benevolence is, and must be, sin. It is not living to
the right end.
It is plain that this theory is only another form of stating the rightarian
theory. By aiming, intending, to do duty, we must understand the
advocates of this theory to mean the adoption of a resolution or maxim, by
which to regulate their lives—the formation of a resolve to obey God—to
serve God—to do at all times what appears to be right—to meet the
demands of conscience—to obey the law—to discharge obligation, &c. I
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 85
have expressed the thing intended in all these ways because it is common
to hear this theory expressed in all these terms, and in others like them.
Especially in giving instruction to inquiring sinners, nothing is more com-
mon than for those who profess to be spiritual guides to assume the truth
of this philosophy, and give instructions accordingly. These philosophers,
or theologians, will say to sinners: Make up your mind to serve the Lord :
resolve to do your whole duty, and do it at all times; resolve to obey God
in all things—to keep all his commandments; resolveto deny yourselves–
to forsake all sin—to love the Lord with all your heart and your neighbour
as yourself. They often represent regeneration as consisting in this reso-
lution or purpose.
Such-like phraseology, which is very common and almost universal
among rightarian philosophers, demonstrates that they regard virtue or
obedience to God as consisting in the adoption of a maxim of life. With
them, duty is the great idea to be realized. All these modes of expression
mean the same thing, and amount to just Kant's morality, which he
admits does not necessarily imply religion, namely; “act upon a maxim at
all times fit for law universal,” and to Cousin's, which is the same thing,
namely, “will the right for the sake of the right.” Now I cannot but
regard this philosophy on the one hand, and utilitarianism on the other, as
equally wide from the truth, and as lying at the foundation of much of the
spurious religion with which the church and the world are cursed. Utili-
tarianism begets one type of selfishness, which it calls religion, and this
philosophy begets another, in some respects more specious, but not a whit
the less selfish, God-dishonouring and soul-destroying, The nearest that
this philosophy can be said to approach either to true morality or religion,
is, that if the one who forms the resolution understood himself he would
resolve to become truly moral instead of really becoming so. But this is
in fact an absurdity and an impossibility, and the resolution-maker does not
understand what he is about, when he supposes himself to be forming or
cherishing a resolution to do his duty. Observe: he intends to do his
duty. But to do his duty is to form and cherish an ultimate intention,
To intend to do his duty is merely to intend to intend. But this is not
doing his duty, as will be shown. He intends to serve God, but this is
not serving God, as will also be shown. Whatever he intends, he is
neither truly moral nor religious, until he really intends the same end that
God does; and this is not to do his duty, nor to do right, nor to comply
with obligation, nor to keep a conscience void of offence, nor to deny
himself, nor any such-like things. God aims at, and intends, the highest
well-being of himself and the universe, as an ultimate end, and this is
doing his duty. It is not resolving or intending to do his duty, but is
doing it. It is not resolving to do right for the sake of the right, but it is
doing right. It is not resolving to serve himself and the universe, but is
actually rendering that service. It is not resolving to obey the moral law,
but is actually obeying it. It is not resolving to love, but actually loving
his neighbour as himself. It is not, in other words, resolving to be
86 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
benevolent, but is being so. It is not resolving to deny self, but is actually
denying self. +
A man may resolve to serve God without any just idea of what it is to
serve him. If he had the idea of what the law of God requires him to
choose, clearly before his mind—if he perceived that to serve God, was
nothing less than to consecrate himself to the same end to which God
consecrates himself, to love God with all his heart and his neighbour as
himself, that is, to will or choose the highest well-being of God and of the
universe, as an ultimate end—to devote all his being, substance, time,
and influence to this end —I say, if this idea were clearly before his
mind, he would not talk of resolving to consecrate himself to God—resolv-
ing to do his duty, to do right—to serve God—to keep a conscience void
of offence, and such-like things. He would see that such resolutions
were totally absurd and a mere evasion of the claims of God. It has been
repeatedly shown, that all virtue resolves itself into the intending of an
ultimate end, or of the highest well-being of God and the universe. This
is true morality, and nothing else is. This is identical with that love to
God and man which the law of God requires. This then is duty. This
is serving God. This is keeping a conscience void of offence. This is
right, and nothing else is. But to intend or resolve to do this is only to
intend to intend, instead of at once intending what God requires. It is
resolving to love God and his neighbour, instead of really loving him ;
choosing to choose the highest well-being of God and of the universe, instead
of really choosing it. Now this is totally absurd, and when examined to
the bottom will be seen to be nothing else than a most perverse postpone-
ment of duty and a most God-provoking evasion of his claims. To intend
to do duty is gross nonsense. To do duty is to love God with all the heart,
and our neighbour as ourselves, that is, to choose, will, intend the highest
well-being of God and our neighbour for its own sake. To intend to do duty,
to aim at doing duty, at doing right, at discharging obligation, &c. is to
intend to intend, to choose to choose, and such-like monsense. Moral
obligation respects the ultimate intention. It requires that the intrin-
sically valuable to being shall be willed for its own sake. To comply with
moral obligation is not to intend or aim at this compliance as an end, but
to will, choose, intend that which moral law or moral obligation requires
me to intend, namely, the highest good of being. To intend obedience
to law is not obedience to law, for the reason that obedience is not that
which the law requires me to intend. To aim at discharging obligation is
not discharging it, just for the reason that I am under no obligation to
intend this as an end. Nay, it is totally absurd and nonsensical to talk of
resolving, aiming, intending to do duty—to serve the Lord, &c. &c. All
such resolutions imply an entire overlooking of that in which true religion
consists. Such resolutions and intentions from their very nature must
respect outward actions in which is no moral character, and not the ulti-
mate intention, in which all virtue and vice consist. A man may resolve
or intend to do this or that. But to intend to intend an ultimate end, or
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 87
to intend to choose it for its intrinsic value, instead of willing and at once
intending or choosing that end, is grossly absurd, self-contradictory, and
naturally impossible. Therefore this philosophy does not give a true defi-
mition and account of virtue. It is self-evident that it does not conceive
rightly of it. And it cannot be that those who give such instructions, or
those who receive and comply with them, have the true idea of religion in
their minds. Such teaching is radically false, and such a philosophy leads
only to bewilder, and dazzles to blind.
It is one thing for a man who actually loves God with all his heart and
his neighbour as himself, to resolve to regulate all his outward life by the
law of God, and a totally different thing to intend to love God or to intend
his highest glory and well-being. Resolutions may respect outward action,
but it is totally absurd to intend or resolve to form an ultimate intention.
But be it remembered, that morality and religion do not belong to outward
action, but to ultimate intentions. It is amazing and afflicting to Witness
the alarming extent to which a spurious philosophy has corrupted and is
corrupting the church of God, Kant and Cousin and Coleridge have
adopted a phraseology, and manifestly have conceived in idea, a philosophy
subversive of all true love to God and man, and teach a religion of maxims
and resolutions instead of a religion of love. It is a philosophy, as We
shall see in a future lecture, which teaches that the moral law or law of
right, is entirely distinct from and may be opposite to the law of benevo-
lence or love. The fact is, this philosophy conceives of duty and right as
belonging to mere outward action. This must be, for it cannot be confused
enough to talk of resolving or intending to form an ultimate intention.
Let but the truth of this philosophy be assumed in giving instructions to
the anxious simmer, and it will immediately dry off his tears, and in all
probability lead him to settle down in a religion of resolutions instead of a
religion of love. Indeed this philosophy will immediately dry off, (if I
may be allowed the expression,) the most genuine and powerful revival of
religion, and run it down into a mere revival of a heartless, Christless,
loveless philosophy. It is much easier to persuade anxious sinners to
resolve to do their duty, to resolve to love God, than it is to persuade them
really to do their duty, and really to love God with all their heart and
with all their soul, and their neighbour as themselves.
9. We now come to the consideration of that philosophy which teaches
the complexity of the foundation of moral obligation.
This theory maintains that there are several distinct grounds of moral
obligation; that the highest good of being is only one of the grounds of
moral obligation, while right, moral order, the mature and relations of
moral agents, merit and demerit, truth, duty, and many such like things,
are distinct grounds of moral obligation ; that these are not merely condi-
tions of moral obligation, bnt that each one of them can by itself impose
moral obligation. The advocates of this theory, perceiving its inconsistency
88 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
with the doctrine that moral obligation respects the ultimate choice or
intention only, seem disposed to relinquish the position that obligation
respects strictly only the choice of an ultimate elid, and to maintain that
moral obligation respects the ultimate action of the will. By ultimate
action of the will they mean, if I understand them, the will's treatment
of every thing according to its intrinsic nature and character ; that is,
treating every thing, or taking that attitude in respect to every thing known
to the mind, that is exactly suited to what it is in and of itself. For example,
right ought to be regarded and treated by the will as right, because it is right.
Truth ought to be regarded and treated as truth for its own sake, virtue as
virtue, merit as merit, demerit as demerit, the useful as useful, the beautiful
as beautiful, the good or valuable as valuable, each for its own sake; that in
each case the action of the will is ultimate, in the sense that its action
terminates on these objects as ultimates; in other words, that all those
actions of the will are ultimates that treat things according to their nature
and character, or according to what they are in and of themselves.—See
Moral Philosophy. Now in respect to this theory I would inquire —
(1.) What is intended by the will's treating a thing, or taking that atti-
tude in respect to it that is suited to its nature and character? Are there
any other actions of will than volitions, choice. preference. intention,--are
not all the actions of the will comprehended in these ? If there
are any other actions than these, are they intelligent actions 2 If, so
what are those actions of will that consist neither in the choice of ends
mor means, nor in volitions or efforts to secure an end ? Can there be
intelligent acts of will that neither respect ends nor means ? Can there
be moral acts of will when there is no choice or intention 2 If there is
choice or intention, must not these respect an end or means ? What then
can be meant by ultimate action of will as distinguished from ultimate
choice or intention 2 Can there be choice without there is an olject of
choice 2 If there is all object of choice, must not this olject be chosen
either as an end or as a means ? If as an ultimate end. how does this
differ from ultimate intention ' If as a means, how can this be regarded
as an ultimate action of the will 2 What can be intended by actions of
will that are not acts of choice uor volition 2 I can conceive of no other.
But if all acts of will must of necessity consist in Willing or milling, that is
in choosing or refusing, which is the same as Willing one way or another, in
respect to all objects of choice apprehended by the mind, how can there
be any intelligent act of the will that does not consist in, or that may not
and must not, in its last analysis be resolvable into, and be properly considered
as the choice of an end, or of means, or in executive efforts to secure
an end ? Can moral law require any other action of will than choice
and volition 2 What other actions of will are possible to us? What-
ever moral law does require, it must and can only require choices and
volitions. It can only require us to choose ends or means. It cannot
require us to choose as an ultimate end any thing that is not intrinsically
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 89
worthy of choice—nor as a means any thing that does not sustain that
relation.
(2.) Secondly, let us examine this theory in the light of the revealed
law of God. The whole law is fulfilled in one word-love.
Now we have seen that the will of God cannot be the foundation of moral
obligation. Moral obligation must be founded in the nature of that which
moral law requires us to choose. Unless there be something in the
nature of that which moral law require us to will that renders it worthy or
deserving of choice, we can be under no obligation to will or choose it.
It is admitted that the love required by the law of God must consist in an
act of the will, and not in mere emotions. Now, does this love, willing,
choice, embrace several distinct ultimates ? If so, how can they all be
expressed in one word—love? Observe, the law requires only love to God
and our neighbour as an ultimate. This love or willing must respect and
terminate on God and our neighbour. The law says nothing about willing
right for the sake of the right, or truth for the sake of the truth, or beauty
for the sake of beauty, or virtue for the sake of virtue, or moral order for its
own sake, or the nature and relations of moral agents for their own sake;
nor is, nor can any such thing be implied in the command to love God and
our neighbour. All these and innumerable other things are, and must be,
conditions and means of the highest well-being of God and our Heighbour.
As such, the law may, and doubtless does, in requiring us to will the
highest well-being of God and our neighbour as an ultimate end, require
us to will all these as the necessary conditions and means. The end
which the revealed law requires us to will is undeniably simple as opposed
to complex. It requires only love to God and our neighbour. One word
expresses the whole of moral obligation. Now certainly this word cannot
have a complex signification in such a sense as to include several distinct
and ultimate objects of love, or of choice. This love is to terminate on
God and our neighbour, and Inot on abstractions, nor on inanimate and
insentient existences. I protest against any philosophy that contradicts
the revealed law of God, and that teaches that anything else than God and
our neighbour is to be loved for its own sake, or that anything else is to
be chosen as an ultimate end than the highest well-being of God and our
neighbour. In other words, I utterly object to any philosophy that makes
anything obligatory upon a moral agent that is not expressed or implied in
perfect good will to God, and to the universe of sentient existences. “To
the word and to the testimony; if any philosophy agree not therewith,
it is because there is no light in it.” The revealed law of God knows but
one ground or foundation of moral obligation. It requires but one thing,
and that is just that attitude of the will toward God and Gūr Heighbºur that
accords with the intrinsic value of their highest well-being; that God's
moral worth shall be willed as of infinite value, as a condition of his own
well-being, and that his actual and perfect blessedness shall be wiłied fºr
its own sake, and because, or upon condition, that he is worthy; that our
neighbour's moral worth shall be willed as an indispensable condition of
90 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
his blessedness, and that if our neighbour is worthy of happiness, his
actual and highest happiness shall be willed. The fact is, that all ultimate
acts of will must consist in ultimate choices and intentions, and the
revealed law requires that our ultimate choice, intention, should terminate
on the good of God and our neighbour, thus making the foundation of
moral obligation simple, moral action simple, and all true morality to be
summed up in one word—love. It is impossible, with our eye upon the
revealed law, to make more than one foundation of moral obligation; and it
is utterly inadmissible to subvert this foundation by any philosophisings
whatever. This law knows but one end which moral agents are under
obligation to seek, and sets at nought all so-called ultimate actions of will
that do not terminate on the good of God and our neighbour. The ulti-
mate choice with the choice of all the conditions and means of the highest
well-being of God and the universe, is all that the revealed law recognizes
as coming within the pale of its legislation. It requires nothing more and
nothing less.
But there is another form of the complex theory of moral obligation that
I must notice before I dismiss this subject. In the examination of it I
shall be obliged to repeat some things which have been in substance said
before. Indeed, there has been so much confusion upon the subject of the
nature of virtue, or of the foundation of moral obligation, as to render it
indispensable in the examination of the various false theories and in remov-
ing objections to the true one, frequently to repeat the same thought in differ-
ent connections. This I have found to be unavoidable, if I would render
the subject at all intelligible to the common reader,
LECTURE IX.
FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION.
9. COMPLEX THEORY.
I PAss now to the consideration of another form of the theory that
affirms the complexity of the foundation of moral obligation ; complex,
however, only in a certain sense.
This philosophy admits and maintains that the good, that is, the
valuable to being, is the only ground of moral obligation, and that in every
possible case the valuable to being, or the good, must be intended as an
end, as a condition of the intention being virtuous. In this respect it
maintains that the foundation of moral obligation is simple, a unit. But it
also maintains that there are several ultimate goods or several ultimates or
things which are intrinsically good or valuable in themselves, and are
therefore to be chosen for their own sake, or as an ultimate end ; that to
choose either of these as an ultimate end, or for its own sake, is virtue.
It admits that happiness or blessedness is a good, and should be willed
for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, but it maintains that virtue is an
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 91
ultimate good; that right is an ultimate good; that the just and the true
are ultimate goods; in short, that the realization of the ideas of the reason,
or the carrying out into concrete existence any idea of the reason, is an
ultimate good. For instance: there were in the Divine Mind from eternity
certain ideas of the good or valuable; the right, the just, the beautiful,
the true, the useful, the holy. The realization of these ideas of the divine
reason, according to this theory, was the end which God aimed at or in-
tended in creation; he aimed at their realization as ultimates or for their
own sake, and regarded the concrete realization of every one of these ideas
as a separate and ultimate good : and so certain as God is virtuous, so
certain it is, says this theory, that an intention to realize these ideas for
their own sake, or for the sake of the realization, is virtue. Therefore the
intention on our part to realize these ideas for the sake of the realization
is virtue. Then the foundation of moral obligation is complex in the sense
that to will either the good or valuable, the right, the true, the just, the
virtuous, the beautiful, the useful, &c., for its own Sake, or as an ultimate
end, is virtue; that there is more than one virtuous ultimate choice or in-
tention. Thus any one of several distinct things may be intended as an
ultimate end with equal propriety and with equal virtuousness. The soul
may at one moment be wholly consecrated to one end, that is, to one ulti-
mate good, and sometimes to another, that is, sometimes it may will one
good, and sometimes another good, as an ultimate end, and still be equally
virtuous.
In the discussion of this subject I will,
(1.) State the evact question to be discussed. -
(2.) Define the different senses of the term good.
(3.) Show in what sense of the term good it can be an ultimate.
(4.) That satisfaction or enjoyment is the only ultimate good.
(1.) The exact question. It is this: In what does the supreme and
ultimate good consist 2
(2.) The different senses of the term good.
(a.) Good may be natural or moral. Natural good is synonymous with
valuable. Moral good is synonymous with virtue. Moral good is in a
certain sense a natural good, that is, it is valuable as a means of natural
good; but the advocates of this theory affirm that moral good is valuable
in itself.
(b.) Good may be absolute and relative. Absolute good is that which
is intrinsically valuable. Relative good is that which is valuable as a
means. It is not valuable in itself, but valuable because it sustains to
absolute good the relation of a means to an end. Absolute good may
also be a relative good, that is, it may tend to perpetuate and augment
itself.
(c.) Good may also be ultimate. Ultimate good is that intrinsically
Valuable or absolute good in which all relative good, whether natural or
moral, terminates. It is that absolute good to which all relative good sus-
tains the relation of a means or condition.
92 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(3.) In what sense of the term good it can be an ultimate.
(a.) Not in the sense of moral good or virtue. This has been so often
shown that it needs not to be repeated here. I will only say that virtue
belongs to intention. It is impossible that intention should be an ultimate.
The thing intended must be the ultimate of the intention. We have seen
that to make virtue an ultimate, the intention must terminate on itself, or
on a quality of itself, which is absurd.
(b.) Good cannot be an ultimate in the sense of relative good. To sup-
pose that it could, were to suppose a contradiction ; for relative good is
not intrinsically valuable, but only valuable on account of its relations.
(c.) Good can be an ultimate only in the sense of the natural and
absolute, that is, that only can be an ultimate good which is naturally and
intrinsically valuable to sentient being. And we shall soon inquire
whether anything can be intrinsically valuable to them but enjoyment,
mental satisfaction, or blessedness.
I come now to state the point upon which issue is taken, to wit:—
(4.) That enjoyment, blessedness, or mental satisfaction, is the only
ultimate good.
(a.) It has been before remarked, and should be repeated here, that the
intrimsically valuable must not only belong to, and be inseparable from,
sentient beings, but that the ultimate or intrinsic absolute good of moral
agents must consist in a state of mind. It must be something to be found
in the field of consciousness. Nothing can be affirmed by a moral agent
to be an intrinsic, absolute, ultimate good, but a state of mind. Take away
mind, and what can be a good per se; or, what can be a good in any sense 2
(b.) Again, it should be said that the ultimate and absolute good can
not consist in a choice or in a voluntary state of mind. The thing
chosen is, and must be, the ultimate of the choice. Choice can never be
chosen as an ultimate end. Benevolence them, or the love required by
the law, can never be the ultimate and absolute good. It is admitted that
blessedness, enjoyment, mental Satisfaction, is a good, an absolute and
ultimate good. This is a first truth of reason. All men assume it. All
men seek enjoyment either selfishly or disinterestedly, that is, they seek
their own good supremely, or the general good of being. That it is the
only absolute and ultimate good, is also a first truth. But for this there
could be no activity—no motive to action—no object of choice. Enjoy-
ment is in fact the ultimate good. It is in fact the result of existence and
of action. It results to God from his existence, his attributes, his activity,
and his virtue, by a law of necessity. His powers are so correlated that
blessedness cannot but be the state of his mind, as resulting from the
exercise of his attributes and the right activity of his will. Happiness,
or enjoyment results, both naturally and governmentally, from obedience to
law both physical and moral. This shows that government is not an end,
but a means. It also shows that the end is blessedness, and the means
obedience to law.
The ultimate and absolute good, in the sense of the intrinsically valu-
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94 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
goods and ends to be chosen for their own sake? These may be objective
or subjective. Objective right, truth, justice, &c., are mere ideas, and
cannot be good or valuable in themselves. Subjective right, truth, justice,
&c., are synonymous with righteousness, truthfulness, and justmess. These
are virtue. They consist in an active state of the will, and resolve them-
selves into choice, intention. But we have repeatedly seen that intention.
can neither be an end nor a good in itself, in the Sense of intrinsically
valuable.
Again: Constituted as moral agents are, it is a matter of consciousness
that the concrete realization of the ideas of right, and truth, and justice, of
beauty, of fitness, of moral order, and, in short, of all that class of ideas,
is indispensable as the condition and means of their highest well-being,
and that enjoyment or mental satisfaction is the result of realizing in the
concrete those ideas. This enjoyment or satisfaction then is and must be
the end or ultimate upon which the intention of God must have terminated,
and upon which ours must terminate as an end or ultimate.
Again : The enjoyment resulting to God from the concrete realization
of his own ideas must be infinite. He must therefore have intended it
as the Supreme good. It is in fact the ultimate good. It is in fact the
Supremely valuable.
Again: If there is more than one ultimate good, the mind must
regard them all as one, or sometimes be consecrated to one and sometimes
to another—sometimes wholly consecrated to the beautiful, sometimes to
the just, and then again to the right, then to the useful, to the true, &c.
But it may be asked, Of what value is the beautiful, aside from the enjoy-
ment it affords to sentient existences? It meets a demand of our being,
and hence affords satisfaction. But for this in what sense could it be
regarded as good? The idea of the useful, again, cannot be an idea of
an ultimate end, for utility implies that something is valuable in itself to
which the useful sustains the relation of a means and is useful only for that
Tě8,SOI).
Of what value is the true, the right, the just, &c., aside from the
pleasure or mental satisfaction resulting from them to sentient exist-
ences 2 Of what value were all the rest of the universe, were there no
sentient existences to enjoy it?
Suppose, again, that everything else in the universe existed just as it
does, except mental satisfaction or enjoyment, and that there were
absolutely mo enjoyment of any kind in anything any more than there
is in a block of granite, of what value would it all be? and to what, or to
whom, would it be valuable? Mind, without susceptibility of enjoyment,
could neither know nor be the subject of good mor evil, any more than
a slab of marble. Truth in that case could no more be a good to
mind than mind could be a good to truth; light would no more be a
good to the eye, than the eye a good to light Nothing in the universe
could give or receive the least satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Neither
natural nor moral fitness nor unfitness could excite the least emotion
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 95
or mental satisfaction. A block of marble might just as well be the subject
of good as anything else, upon such a supposition.
Again : It is obvious that all creation, where law is obeyed, tends to
one end, and that end is happiness or enjoyment. This demonstrates
that enjoyment was the end at which God aimed in creation.
Again: It is evident that God is endeavouring to realize all the other
ideas of his reason for the sake of, and as a means of, realizing that of
the valuable to being. This, as a matter of fact, is the result of realizing
in the concrete all those ideas. This must then have been the end
intended.
But again: The Bible knows of but one ultimate good. This, as has
been said, the moral law has for ever settled. The highest well-being of
God and the universe is the only end required by the law. Creation
proposes but one end. Physical and moral government propose but one
end. The Bible knows but one end, as we have just seen. The law and
the gospel propose the good of being only as the end of virtuous intention.
“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbour as thyself.” Here
is the whole duty of man. But here is nothing of choosing, willing,
loving, truth, justice, right, utility, or beauty, as an ultimate end for their
own sakes. The fact is, there are innumerable relative goods, or conditions,
or means of enjoyment, but only one ultimate good. Disinterested bene-
volence to God and man is the whole of virtue, and every modification of
virtue resolves itself in the last analysis into this. If this is so, well-
being in the sense of enjoyment must be the only ultimate good. But
well-being, in the complex sense of the term, is made up of enjoyment
and the means and sources or conditions of enjoyment. Conformity to
law universal, must be the condition and enjoyment; the ultimate end,
strictly and properly speaking.
It is nonsense to object that, if enjoyment or mental satisfaction be
the only ground of moral obligation, we should be indifferent as to the
means. This objection assumes that in seeking an end for its intrimsie
value, we must be indifferent as to the way in which we obtain that end.
That is, whether it be obtained in a manner possible or impossible, right
or wrong. It overlooks the fact that from the laws of our own being it is
impossible for us to will the end without willing also the indispensable,
and therefore the appropriate, means; and also that we cannot possibly
regard any other conditions or means of the happiness of moral agents
as possible, and therefore as appropriate or right, but holiness and
universal conformity to the law of our being. Enjoyment or mental
satisfaction results from having the different demands of our being met.
One demand of the reason and conscience of a moral agent is that hap-
piness should be conditionated upon holiness. It is therefore maturally
impossible for a moral agent to be satisfied with the happiness or enjoyment
of moral agents except upon the condition of their holiness.
But this class of philosophers insist that all the archetypes of the ideas
of the reason are necessarily regarded by us as good in themselves. For
96 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
example: I have the idea of beauty. I behold a rose. The preception
of this archetype of the idea of beauty gives me instantaneous pleasure.
Now it is said, that this archetype is necessarily regarded by me as a good.
I have pleasure in the presence and perception of it, and as often as I call
it to remembrance, This pleasure, it is said, demonstrates that it is a
good to me; and this good is in the very nature of the object, and must be
regarded as a good in itself. To this I answer, that the presence of the
rose is a good to me, but not an ultimate good. It is only a means or
source of pleasure or happiness to me. The rose is not a good in itself.
If there were no eyes to see it and no olfactories to smell it, to whom could
it be a good? But in what sense can it be a good except in the sense that
it gives satisfaction to the beholder 2 The satisfaction, and not the rose,
is and must be the ultimate good. But it is inquired, Do not I desire the
rose for its own sake? I answer, Yes; you desire it for its own sake, but
you do not, cannot choose it for its own sake, but to gratify the desire.
The desires all terminate on their respective objects. The desire for food
terminates on food ; thirst terminates on drink, &c. These things are so
correlated to these appetites that they are desired for their own sakes.
But they are not and Gammot be chosen for their own sakes or as an ulti-
mate end. They are, and must be, regarded and chosen as the means of
gratifying their respective desires. To choose them simply in obedience
to the desire were selfishness. But the gratification is a good and a part
of universal good. The reason, therefore, urges and demands that they
should be chosen as a means of good to myself. When thus chosen in
obedience to the law of the intelligence, and no more stress is laid upon
the gratification than in proportion to its relative value, and when no
stress is laid upon it simply because it is my own gratification, the
choice is holy. The perception of the archetypes of the various ideas
of the reason will, in most instances, produce enjoyment. These arche-
types, or, which is the same thing, the concrete realization of these ideas,
is regarded by the mind as a good, but not as an ultimate good. The
ultimate good is the satisfaction derived from the perception of them.
The perception of moral or physical beauty gives me satisfaction. Now
moral and physical beauty are regarded by me as good, but not as ultimate
good. They are relative good only. Were it not for the pleasure they
give me, I could not in any way connect with them the idea of good.
Suppose no such thing as mental satisfaction existed, that neither the per-
ception of virtue nor of natural beauty, nor of any thing else, could produce
the least emotion, or feeling, or satisfaction of any kind. In this case, a
rose would no more be regarded as a good, than the most deformed object
in existence. All things would be equally indifferent to such a mind.
There would be the idea and its archetype, both in existence and exactly
answering to each other. But what them 2 The archetype of the perfec-
tion of beauty would no more be a good, to such a mind, than would the
archetype of the perfection of deformity. The mental eye might perceive
order, beauty, physical and moral, or any thing else ; but these things
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 97
would no more be a good to the intellect that perceived them than their
opposites. The idea of good or of the valuable could not in such a case
exist, consequently virtue, or moral beauty, could not exist. The idea of
good, or of the valuable, must exist before virtue can exist. It is and must
be the developement of the idea of the valuable, that developes the idea of
moral obligation, of right and wrong, and consequently, that makes virtue
possible. The mind must perceive an object of choice that is regarded as
intrinsically valuable, before it can have the idea of moral obligation to
choose it as an end. This object of choice cannot be virtue or moral
beauty, for this would be to have the idea of virtue or of moral beauty
before the idea of moral obligation, or of right and wrong. This were a
contradiction. The mind must have the idea of some ultimate good, the
choice of which would be virtue, or concerning which the reason affirms
moral obligation, before the idea of virtue, or of right or wrong, can exist.
The developement of the idea of the valuable, or of an ultimate good must
precede the possibility of virtue or of the idea of virtue. of moral obligation,
or of right and wrong. It is absurd to say that virtue is regarded as an
ultimate good, when in fact the very idea of virtue does not and cannot
exist until a good is presented, in view of which, the mind affirms moral
obligation to will it for its own sake, and also affirms that the choice of it
for that reason would be virtue.
The reason why virtue and moral excellence or worth, have been supposed
to be a good in themselves, and intrinsically and absolutely valuable, is,
that the mind necessarily regards them with satisfaction. They meet a
demand of the reason and conscience; they are the archetypes of the
ideas of the reason, and are therefore maturally and necessarily regarded
with satisfaction, just as when we behold natural beauty, we necessarily
enjoy it. We maturally experience a mental satisfaction in the contempla-
tion of beauty, and this is true, whether the beauty be physical or moral.
Both meet a demand of our nature, and therefore we experience satisfaction
in their contemplation. Now it has been said, that this satisfaction is
itself proof that we pronounced the beauty a good in itself. But ultimate
good must, as we have said, consist in a state of mind. But neither
physical nor moral beauty is a state of mind. Apart from the satisfaction
produced by their contemplation, to whom or to what eam they be a good?
Take physical beauty for example, apart from every beholder, to whom or
to what is it a good? Is it a good to itself? But, it cannot be a subject
of good. It must be a good, only as, and because, it meets a demand of
our being, and produces satisfaction in its contemplation. It is a relative
good. The Satisfaction experienced by contemplating it, is an ultimate
good. It is only a condition of ultimate good.
So virtue or holiness is morally beautiful. Moral worth or excellence is
morally beautiful. Beauty is an attribute or element of holiness, virtue,
and of moral worth, or right character, But the beauty is not identical
with holiness or moral worth, any more than the beauty of a rose, and the
rose are identical. The rose is beautiful. Beauty is one of its attributes,
| 1
98 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
So virtue is morally beautiful. Beauty is one of its attributes. But in
neither case is the beauty a state of mind, and, therefore, it cannot be an
ultimate good. The contemplation of either, and of both, naturally begets
mental satisfaction, because of the relation of the archetype to the idea of
our reason. We are so constituted, that beholding the archetypes of certain
ideas of our reason, produces mental satisfaction. Not because we affirm
the archetypes to be good in themselves; for often, as in the case of physical
beauty, this cannot be, but because these archetypes meet a demand of our
mature. They meet this demand, and thus produce satisfaction. This
satisfaction is an ultimate good, but that which produces it is only a
relative good. Apart from the satisfaction produced by the contemplation
of moral worth, of what value can it be 2 Can the worthiness of good, or
the moral beauty, be the end proposed by the lawgiver? Or must we not
rather, seek to secure moral worth in moral agents, for the sake of the good
in which it results? If neither the subject of moral excellence or worth,
nor any one else, experienced the least satisfaction in contemplating it—
if it did not so meet a demand of our being, or of any being, as to afford
the least Satisfaction to any sentient existence, to whom or to what would
it be a good 2 If it meets a demand of the nature of a moral agent, it
must produce satisfaction. It does neet a demand of our being, and there
fore produces satisfaction to the intelligence, the conscience, the sensibility.
It is therefore necessarily pronounced by us to be a good.
We are apt to say, that moral worth is an ultimate good; but it is only
a relative good. It meets a demand of our being, and thus produces
satisfaction. This satisfaction is the ultimate good of being. At the very
moment we pronounce it a good in itself, it is only because we experience
such a satisfaction in coutemplating it. At the very time we erroneously
say, that we consider it a good in itself, wholly independent of its results,
we only say so, the more positively, because we are so gratified at the time,
by thinking of it. It is its experienced results, that is the ground of the
affirmation.
4. It cannot be too distinctly understood, that right character, moral
worth, good desert, meritoriousness, cannot be, or consist im, a state of mind,
and, therefore, it is impossible that it should be an ultimate good or intrin-
sically valuable. By right character, moral Worth, good desert, meritori-
ousness, &c., as distinguished from virtue, we can mean nothing more
than that it is fit and proper, and suitable to the nature and relation of
things, that a virtuous person should be blessed. The intelligence is
gratified when this character is perceived to exist. This perception pro-
duces intellectual satisfaction. This satisfaction is a good in itself. But
that which produces this satisfaction, is in no proper sense a good in itself.
Were it not for the fact that it meets a demand of the intelligence, and
thus produces satisfaction, it could not so much as be thought of, as a good
in itself, any more than anything else that is a pure conception of the
reason, such, for instance, as a mathematical line.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 99
LECTURE X.
FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION.
V. POINT OUT THE INTRINSIC ABSUIRDITY OF THE WARIOUS CONFLICTING
THEORIES.
The discussion under this head has been in a great measure anticipated,
as we have proceeded in the examination of the theories to which we have
attended. But before I dismiss this subject, I will, in accordance with
a former suggestion, notice some more instances in which the conditions
have been confounded with, and mistaken for, the ground of obligation,
which has resulted in much confusion and absurdity. The instances
which I shall mention are all to be found in the same author,” whose
rightarian views we have examined. He fully admits, and often affirms,
that, strictly speaking, ultimate intentions alone are moral actions. That
an ultimate intention must necessarily, and always, find the ground of its
obligation exclusively in its object, and in nothing not intrinsic in its
object. This he postulates and affirms, as critically as possible. Yet,
strange to tell, he goes on to affirm the following, as exclusive grounds of
obligation. For the sake of perspicuity I will state his various propositions
without quoting them, as to do so would occupy too much space.
1. Strictly speaking, ultimate intentions alone are moral actions.#
2. Ultimate intentions consist in choosing an object for its own Sake, or
t
*
for what is intrinsic in that object, and for no reason not intrinsic in it.:
3. Ultimate intentions must find their reasons, or the grounds of obliga-
tion, exclusively in their objects. Ş
4. The foundation of obligation must universally be intrinsic in the
object of choice. This is his fundamental position. Thus far we agree.
5. Foundation of obligation, is not only what is intrinsie, but also in the
relations of its object." But this contradicts the last ascertion,
6. All obligation is founded exclusively in the relations of our being
to another.” Here, a mere condition of obligation, to fulfil to those around
us certain forms of duty, is confounded with, and even asserted to be, the
sole ground of obligation. We have seen in a former lecture, that the
various relations of life, are only conditions of certain forms of obligation,
while the good commected with the performance of these duties, is the
ground of all such forms of obligation. Here he again contradicts No. 4.
7. Again, he asserts that the affirmation of obligation by the moral
faculty, is the ground of obligation.H. Here again a condition is asserted to
the ground of obligation. The affirmation of obligation by the reason is,
be no doubt, a sine qué non of the obligation, but it cannot be the ground of
it. What, has the moral faculty no reason for affirming obligation to choose
the good of being, but the affirmation itself? Is the affirmation of obliga-
* Mahan's Moral Philosophy. Ibid. pp. 55, 124. : Ibi sãºiáſ, 135.
§ Ibid. pp. 55, 56. | Ibid. pp. 56, 81, 85. * Ibid., pp. 85, 142.
** Ibid., pp. 23, 143. tf Ibid. p. 23.
H 2
100 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
tion to choose, identical with the object of that choice 2 Another contra
diction of No. 4.
8. Again, he says, the foundation of obligation is found exclusively in
the relation of choice to its object.* Here again a condition is confounded
With, and asserted to be, the exclusive ground of obligation. Contradiction
again of No. 4.
9. Again, he says that the foundation of obligation is found exclusively
in the character of the choice itself.f But the character of the choice is
determined by the object on which it terminates. The nature of the object
must create obligation to choose it for its own sake, or the choice of it is
not right. Here, it is plain, that a condition is again asserted to be the
universal ground of obligation. Were it not right to choose an object,
for its own sake, the choice of it would have no right character, and there
could be no obligation. But it is as absurd as possible to make the cha-
racter of the choice the ground of the obligation. This also contradicts No. 4.
10. Again, he affirms, that the idea of duty is the exclusive ground of
obligation. This theory we have before examined. Here it is plain, that
a condition is made the exclusive ground of obligation. If we had not the
idea of duty, We, of course, should not have the idea of obligation, for, in
fact, these ideas are identical: but it is totally absurd to say that this idea
is the ground of obligation. This also contradicts No. 4.
11. Again, he asserts, that the relation of intrinsic fitness, existing
between choice and its object, is the exclusive ground of obligation, $ This
theory we have examined, as that of the rightarian. All I need say
here is, that this is another instance in which a condition is made the
sole ground of obligation. Did not this relation exist, the obligation could
not exist, but it is impossible, as has been shown, that the relation should
be the ground of this obligation. This also contradicts No. 4. He says,
again—
12. That obligation is sometimes founded, exclusively, in the moral
character of the being to whom we are under obligation." To this theory
we have alluded; I only remark here, that this is another instance of con-
founding a condition with the ground of certain forms of obligation. This
we have seen in the preceding pages. This contradicts No. 4.
13. That the ground of obligation is found, partly in the nature of
choice, partly in the nature of the object, and partly in the relation of
fitness existing between choice and its object.| Here, again, a condition is
made the universal ground of obligation. Were not choice what it is, and
good what it is, and did not the relation of fitness exist between choice and
its object, obligation could not exist. But, we have seen, that it is im-
possible that anything but the intrinsic nature of the good should be the
ground of the obligation. This contradicts No. 4.
14. Agaiº, he affirms, that the ground of obligation is identical with the
reason, ºr:ednsideration, in view of which the intellect affirms obligation :
* Māº Moral Philosophy, pp. 79, 86. + Ibid. p. 76. i Ibid. pp. 62. 63.
§ Ibid. p. 86. | Ibid. pp. 106, 107, 108. * Ibid. p. 86.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 101
but this cannot be true. The vast majority of cases, in which we are con-
scious of affirming obligation, respect executive acts, or volitions, and in
nearly all such cases the consideration in the immediate view of the mind,
when it affirms the obligation, is some other than the ultimate reason, or
ground of the obligation, and which is only a condition of obligation in
that particular form. For example, the revealed will of God, the utility
of the act, as preaching the gospel, or the rightness of the act, either of
these may be, and often is, the reason immediately before the mind, and
the reason thought of at the time, the question of duty is settled and the
affirmation of obligation to perform an act of benevolence is made. But
who does not know, and admit, that neither of the above reasons can be
the ground of obligation to will or to do good 2 The writer who makes the
assertion we are examining, has elsewhere and often affirmed that, in all
acts of benevolence, or of willing the good of being, the intrinsic nature of
the good is the ground of the obligation. It is absurd to deny this, as we
have abundantly seen. The facts are these : we necessarily assume our
obligation to will, and do good for its own sake. This is a necessarily-
assumed and omnipresent truth with every moral agent. We go forth with
this assumption in our minds; we therefore only need to know that any
act, or course of action on our part, is demanded to promote the highest
good; and we therefore, and in view thereof, affirm obligation to perform
that act, or to pursue that course of action. Suppose a young man to be
inquiring after the path of duty in regard to his future course of life: he
seeks to know the will of God respecting it; he inquires after the pro-
babilities of greater or less usefulness. If he can get clear light upon
either of these points, he regards the question as settled. He has now
ascertained what is right, and affirms his obligation accordingly. Now,
should you ask him what had settled his convictions, and in view of what
considerations he has affirmed his obligation, to preach the gospel, for
example, he would naturally refer either to the will of God, to the utility
of that course of life, or, perhaps, to the rightness of it. But would he, in
thus doing, assign, or even suppose himself to assign, the fundamental
reason or ground of the obligation ? No, indeed, he cannot but know that
the good to be secured by this course of life, is the ground of the obligation
to pursue it; that but for the intrinsic value of the good, such a course of
life would not be useful. But for the intrinsic value of the good, God
would not will that he should pursue that course of life: that but for the
intrinsic value of the good, such a course would not be right. God's willing
that he should preach the gospel; the utility of this course of life, and of
course its rightness, all depend upon the intrinsic value of the good, to
which this course of life sustains the relation of a means. The will of God,
the useful tendency, or the rightness of the course, might either or all of
them be thought of as reasons in view of which the obligation was affirmed,
while it is self-evident that neither of them can be the ground of the obli-
gation. In regard to executive acts, or the use of means to secure good,
we almost never decide what is duty by reference to, or in view of the
I O2 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
fundamental reason, or ground of obligation which invariably must be the
intrinsic nature of the good, but only in view of a mere condition of the
obligation. Whenever the will of God reveals the path of usefulness, it
reveals the path of right and of duty, and is a condition of the obligation in
the sense that, without such revelation, we should not know what course to
Dursue to secure the highest good. The utility of any course of executive
acts is a condition of its rightness, and, of course, of obligation to pursue
that course. The ultimate reason, or ground of obligation to will and do
good, is, and must be, in the mind, and must have its influence in the
decision of every question of duty; but this is not generally the reason
thought of, when the affirmed obligation respects executive acts merely. I
Say, the intrinsic mature of the ultimate end, for the sake of which the
executive acts are demanded, must be in the mind as the ground of the
obligation, and as the condition of the affirmation of the obligation to put
forth executive acts to secure that end, although this fundamental reason
is not in the immediate view of the mind, as the object of conscious attem-
tions at the time. We necessarily assume our obligation to will good for
its own sake; all our inquiries after diverse forms of obligation, respect
ways, and means, and conditions, of securing the highest good. Whatever
reveals to us the best ways and means, reveals the path of duty. We
always affirm those best ways and means to be the right course of action,
and assign the utility, or the rightness, or the will of God, which has
required, and thus revealed them, as the reasons in view of which we have
decided upon the path of duty. But, in no such case do we ever intend to
assign the ultimate reason, or ground, of the obligation ; and if we did, we
should be under an evident mistake. In every affirmation of obligation,
we do, without noticing it, assume the first truths of reason—our own liberty
or ability; that every event must have a cause ; that the good of universal
being ought to be chosen and promoted because of its intrinsic value; that
whatever sustains to that good the relation of a necessary means, ought to be
chosen for the sake of the good; that God's revealed will always discloses
the best ways and means of securing the highest good, and therefore reveals
universal law. These first truths are at the bottom of the mind in all
affirmations of obligation, and are, universally, conditions of the affirmation
of obligation. But these assumptions, or first truths, are not, in general, the
truths immediately thought of when obligation to put forth executive acts
is affirmed. It is, therefore, a great mistake to say that whatever con-
sideration is in the immediate view of the mind at the time, is the ground
of the obligation.
15. With respect to obligation to will the good of being, he asserts—
(I.) That happiness is the only ultimate good.”
(2.) That all obligation to will good, in any form, is founded exclu-
sively in the intrinsic value or nature of the good. To this I agree.
(3.) Again, he asserts repeatedly, that susceptibility of good is the sole
* Mahan's Moral Philosophy, pp 114, 115. # Ibid. p. 97.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 103
ground of obligation to will good to a being.” Here, again, it is plain that
a mere condition is asserted to be the universal ground of obligation to will
good. Were there no susceptibility of good, we should be under no obliga-
tion to will good to a being, but susceptibility for good is of itself no better
reason for willing good than evil to a being. If susceptibility were a ground
of obligation, then a susceptibility of evil would be a ground of obligation to
will evil. This has been abundantly shown. This contradicts Nos. 4 and 3.
(4.) Again: holiness, he asserts, is a ground of obligation to will good to
its possessor. We have seen that holiness is only a condition of obligation, in
the form of willing the actual enjoyment of good by a particular individual,
while in every possible instance, the nature of the good, and not the cha.
racter of the individual, is the ground of the obligation. This contradicts
Nos. 4 and 2.
(5.) He affirms that holiness is never a ground of obligation to will good
to any being; and that so far as willing the good of any being is concerned,
our obligation is the same, whatever the character may bef This as flatly
as possible contradicts what he elsewhere affirms. The several positions of
this writer contradict his fundamental position, and also each other, as
flatly as possible. They are but a tissue of absurdities.
Some writers have held that the moral perfection of moral agents is the
great end of creation, and that to which all such agents ought to consecrate
themselves, and of course that the intrinsic nature of moral perfection is the
ground of obligation. To this I reply,
It is true that the mind of a moral agent cannot rest and be satisfied
short of moral perfection. When that state is attained by any mind, so far
as respects its own present state, that mind is satisfied, but the satisfaction,
and not the moral perfection, is the ultimate good. Moral perfection results
in happiness, or mental satisfaction, and this satisfaction is and must be
the ultimate good.
Observe, I do not say that our own happiness is the great end at which
we ought to aim, or that the intrinsic value of our own enjoyment is the
ground of obligation. But I do say that the highest good, or blessedness
of the universe, is the ultimate good, and its nature or intrinsic value is
the ground of obligation.
LECTURE XI.
SUMMING UP.
I HAVE now examined, I believe, all the various theories of the ground of
obligation. I have still further to remark upon the practical influence of
these various theories, for the purpose of showing the fundamental
importance of a right understanding of this question. The question lies
at the very foundation of all morality and religion. A mistake here is
fatal to any consistent system either of moral philosophy or theology. But
* Mahan's Moral Philosophy, pp. 106, 107, l l 5, 116, 122. 't Ibid. pp. 102, 107.
† Ibid. p. 111.
10.4 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
before I dismiss this part of the subject, I must sum up the foregoing dis-
cussion, and place, in a distinct light, the points of universal agreement
among those who have agitated this question, and then state a few plain
corrolaries that must follow from such premises. I think I may say that
all parties will, and do, agree in the following particulars. These have
been named before, but I briefly recapitulate in this summing up. The
points of agreement, which I now need to mention, are only these—
1. Moral obligation respects moral actions only.
2. Involuntary states of mind are not, strictly speaking, moral actions.
3. Intentions alone are, strictly speaking, moral actions.
4. Still more strictly, ultimate intentions alone are moral actions.
5. An ultimate choice or intention is the choice of an object for its own
sake, or for what is intrinsic in the nature of the object, and for nothing
which is not intrinsic in such object.
6. The true foundation of obligation to choose an object of ultimate
choice is that in the mature of the object, for the sake of which the reason
affirms obligation to choose it.
7. Ultimate choice or intention is alone right or wrong, per se, and all
executive acts are right or wrong as they proceed from a right or wrong
ultimate intention.
Now, in the above premises we are agreed. It would seem that a
moderate degree of logical consistency ought to make us at one in our
conclusions. Let us proceed carefully, and see if we cannot detect the
logical error that brings us to such diverse conclusions.
From the above premises it must follow—
1. That the utility of ultimate choice cannot be a foundation of obliga-
tion to choose, for this would be to transfer the ground of obligation from
what is intrinsic in the object chosen to the useful tendency of the choice
itself. As I have said, utility is a condition of obligation to put forth an
executive act, but can never be a foundation of obligation, for the utility of
the choice is not a reason found exclusively, or at all, in the olject of choice.
2. From the above premises it also follows, that the moral character of
the choice cannot be a foundation of obligation to choose, for this reason is
not intrinsic in the object of choice. To affirm that the character of choice
is the ground of obligation to choose, is to transfer the ground of obligation
to choose, from the object chosen to the character of the choice itself; but
this is a contradiction of the premises.
3. The relation of one being to another cannot be the ground of obliga-
tion to will good to that other, for the ground of obligation to will good to
another must be the intrinsic mature of the good, and not the relations
of one being to another. Relations may be conditions of obligation to seek
to promote the good of particular individuals; but in every case the nature
of the good is the ground of the obligation.
4. Neither the relation of utility, nor that of moral fitness or right, as
existing between choice and its object, can be a ground of obligation, for
both these relations depend, for their very existence, upon the intrinsic
importance of the object of choice; and besides, neither of these relations
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 105
is intrinsic in the object of choice, which, according to the premises, it
must be to be a ground of obligation.
5. The relative importance or value of an object of choice, can never be
a ground of obligation to choose that object, for its relative importance is
not intrinsic in the object. The relative importance, or value, of an object
may be a condition of obligation to choose it, as a condition of securing an
intrinsically valuable object, to which it sustains the relation of a means,
but it is a contradiction of the premises to affirm that the relations of an
object can be a ground of obligation to choose that object.
6. The idea of duty cannot be a ground of obligation; this idea is a con-
dition, but never a foundation, of obligation, for this idea is not intrinsic in
the object which we affirm it our duty to choose.
7. The perception of certain relations existing between individuals can-
not be a ground, although it is a condition of obligation, to fulfil to them
certain duties. Neither the relation itself nor the perception of the rela-
tion, is intrinsic in that which we affirm ourselves to be under obligation to
will or do to them; of course, neither of them can be a ground of obligation.
8. The affirmation of obligation by the reason, cannot be a ground,
though it is a condition of obligation. The obligation is affirmed, upon the
ground of the intrinsic importance of the object, and not in view of the
affirmation itself.
9. The sovereign will of God, is never the foundation, though it often
is a condition, of certain forms of obligation. Did we know the intrinsic
or relative value of an object, we should be under obligation to, choose it,
whether God required it or not.
The revealed will of God is always a condition of obligation, whenever
such revelation is indispensable to our understanding the intrinsic or
relative importance of any object of choice. The will of God is not in-
trinsic in the object, which he commands us to will, and of course cannot,
according to the premises, be a ground of obligation.
10. The moral excellence of a being can never be a foundation of obliga
tion to will his good, for his character is not intrinsic in the good we ought
to will to him. The intrinsic value of that good must be the ground of
the obligation, and his good character only a condition of obligation to will
his enjoyment of good in particular.
11. Good character can never be a ground of obligation to choose
anything which is not itself; for the reasons of ultimate choice must, according
to the premises, be found exclusively in the object of choice. Therefore,
if character is a ground of obligation to put forth an ultimate choice, it
must be the object of that choice.
12. Right can never be a ground of obligation, unless right be itself the
object which we are under obligation to choose for its own sake.
13. Susceptibility for good can never be a ground, though it is a
condition, of obligation to will good to a being. The susceptibility is not
intrinsic in the good which we ought to will, and therefore cannot be a
ground of obligation. -
106 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
14. It also follows from the foregoing premises that no one thing can be
a ground of obligation to choose any other thing, as an ultimate; for the
reasons for choosing anything, as an ultimate, must be found in itself, and
in nothing extraneous to itself.
15. From the admitted fact, that mone but ultimate choice or intention
is right or wrong per se, and that all executive, volitions, or acts, derive
their character from the ultimate intention to which they owe their exist-
emce, it follows:–
(a.) That if executive volitions are put forth with the intention to secure
an intrimsically valuable end, they are right; otherwise, they are wrong.
(b.) It also follows, that obligation to put foth executive acts is con-
ditioned, not founded, upon the assumed utility of such acts. Again—
(c.) It also follows, of course, that all outward acts are right or wrong,
as they proceed from a right or wrong intention.
(d.) It also follows that the rightness of any executive volition or outward
act depends upon the supposed and intended utility of that volition, or act.
Then utility must be assumed as a condition of obligation to put them
forth, and, of course, their intended utility is a condition of their being
right.
(e.) It also follows that, whenever we decide it to be duty to put forth any
outward act whatever, irrespective of its supposed utility, and because we
think it right, we deceive ourselves, for it is impossible that outward acts
or volitions, which from their nature are always executive, should be either
obligatory or right, irrespective of their assumed utility, or tendency to pro-
mote an intrinsically valuable end. *
(f) Not only must all such acts be supposed to have this tendency, but
they must proceed from an intention, to secure the end for its own sake, as
conditions of their being right.
(q.) It follows also, that it is a gross error to affirm the rightness of an
executive act, as a reason for putting it forth, even assuming that its
...tendency is to do evil rather than good. With this assumption no
executive act can possibly be right. When God has required certain
executive acts, we know that they do tend to secure the highest good, and
that, if put forth to secure that good, they are right. But in no case,
where God has not revealed the path of duty, as it respects executive acts,
or courses of life, are we to decide upon such questions in view of the right-
mess, irrespective of the good tendency of such acts or courses of life; for
their rightness depends upon their assumed good tendency.
Objections.—1. But to this doctrine it has been objected, that it amounts
to the papal dogma, that the end sanctifies the means. I will give the
objection and my reply.—See Appendia. Reply to the Princeton Review.
2. That if the highest good, or well-being of God and of the universe,
be the sole foundation of moral obligation, it follows that we are not
under obligation to will anything except this end, with the necessary con-
ditions and means thereof. That everything but this end, which we are
bound to will, must be willed as a means to this end, or because of its
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 107
tendency to promote this end. And this, it is said, is the doctrine of
utility.
To this I answer—
The doctrine of utility is, that the foundation of the obligation to will
both the end and the means is the tendency of the willing to promote the
end. But this is absurd. The doctrine of these discourses is not, as utili-
tarians say, that the foundation of the obligation to will the end or the
means is the tendency of the willing to promote that end, but that the
foundation of the obligation to will both the end and the means, is the
intrinsic value of end. And the condition of the obligation to will the
means is the perceived tendency of the means to promote the end.
Again, the objection that this doctrine is identical with that of the
utilitarian is urged in the following form —
“The theory of Professor Finney, in its logical consequences, necessarily
lands us in the doctrine of utility, and can lead to no other results. The
affirmation of obligation, as all admit, pertains exclusively to the intelligence.
The intelligence, according to Professor Finney, esteems nothing whatever
as worthy of regard for its own sake, but happiness, or the good of being.
Nothing else is esteemed by it, for its own sake, but exclusively as ‘a
condition or a means to this end. Now, if the intelligence does not regard
an intention for any other reason than as a condition or a means, in other
words, if for no other reason does it care whether such acts do or do not
exist at all, how can it require or prohibit such acts for any other reason 2
If the intelligence does require or prohibit intentions for no other reasons
than as a condition or a means of happiness, this is the doctrine of
utility, as maintained by all its advocates.” “
To this I reply, 1. That I do not hold that the intelligence demands the
choice of an ultimate end, as a condition or a means of Securing this end,
but exactly the reverse of this. I hold that the intelligence does “care “
whether ultimate choice or intention exists, for an entirely different reason,
than as a condition or means of securing the end chosen. My doctrine
is, and this objector has often asserted the same, that the intelligence
demands the choice of an ultimate end for its own sake, and not because
the choice tends to secure the end. What does this objector mean 2 Only
so far back as the next page he says, in a distinct head –“ The advocates
of this (his own) theory agree with Professor Finney in the doctrine that the
good of being is an an ultimate reason for ultimate intentions of a
certain class, to wit, all intentions included in the words, willing the
good of being.” + Thus he expressly asserts that I hold, and that he
agrees with me, that the good of being is an ultimate reason for all
ultimate intentions included in the words, willing the good of being. Now,
What a marvel, that on the next page, he should state as an objection, that
I hold that the reason does not demand the choice of the good of being
for its own sake, but only as a condition of securing the good. We
agree that an ultimate reason, is a ground of obligation, and that the nature
* Mahan's Moral Philosophy, pp. 98, 99. t Ibid. p. 97.
108 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
of the good renders it obligatory to choose it for its own sake; and yet this
objector strangely assumes, and asserts, that the nature of the good does not
impose obligation to choose it for its own sake, and that there is no reason
for choosing it, but either the rightness or the utility of the choice itself.
This is passing strange. Why the choice is neither right nor useful, only
as the end chosen is intrinsically valuable, and for this value demands
choice. He says, “Whenever an object is present to the mind, which, on
account of what is intrinsic in the object itself, necessitates the will to act,
two or more distinct and opposite acts are always possible relatively to such
object. That act, and that act only can be right, which corresponds with
the apprehended intrinsic character of the object.””
Now, just fifteen lines below, he states that there is no reason whatever
for choosing an object, but the intrinsic nature or the utility of the choice
itself. Marvellous. What, almost at the same breath, affirm that no
choice, but that which consists in choosing an object for its own sake, can
be right, and yet that no object should be chosen for its own sake, and that
the intelligence can assign no reason whatever, for the choice of an object,
except the rightness or utility of the choice itself. Now, he insists, that if
I deny that the rightness of the choice is the ground of the obligation to
choose the good of being, I must hold that the utility of the choice is the
ground of the obligation, since, as he says, there can be no other reasons
for the choice. Thus I am, he thinks, convicted of utilitarianism
But he still says, f “In consistency with the fundamental principles of
this theory, we can never account for the difference which he himself
makes, and must make, between ultimate intentions and subordinate
executive volitions. Both alike, as we have seen above, are, according
to his theory, esteemed and regarded by the intelligence, for no other
reasons than as a condition or a means of happiness. Yet he asserts that
the obligation to put forth ultimate intentions is affirmed without any
reference whatever to their being apprehended as a condition or a means
of happiness; while the affirmation of obligation to put forth executive
acts is conditioned wholly upon their being perceived to be such a con-
dition or means. Now how can the intelligence make any such difference
between objects esteemed and regarded, as far as anything intrinsic in the
objects themselves is concerned, as absolutely alike "f
To this I reply, that the forms of obligation to put forth an ultimate and
an executive act, are widely different. The intelligence demands that the
good be chosen for its own sake, and this choice is not to be put forth as am
executive act, or with design, to secure its object. Obligation to put forth
ultimate choice is, therefore, not conditioned upon the supposed utility of
the choice. But an executive act is to be put forth with design to secure
its ends, and therefore obligation to put forth such acts is conditioned upon
their supposed utility, or tendency to secure their end. There is, then, a
plain difference between obligation to put forth ultimate and executive acts.
* Mahan's Moral Philosophy, p. 98. f Ibid. pp. 100, 101.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 109
What difficulty is there, then, in reconciling this distinction with my views,
stated in these lectures 2
3. It is said “that if the sole foundation of moral obligation be the
highest good of universal being, all obligation pertaining to God would
respect his susceptibilities and the means necessary to this result. When
we have willed God's highest well-being with the means necessary to that
result, we have fulfilled all our duty to him.”
To this I reply; certainly, when we have willed the highest well-being
of God and of the universe with the necessary conditions and means
thereof, we have done our whole duty to him: for this is loving him with all
our heart, and our neighbour as ourselves. Willing the highest well-being
of God, and of the universe, implies worship, obedience, and the per-
formance of every duty, as executive acts. The necessary conditions of the
highest well-being of the universe are, that every moral being should be
perfectly virtuous, and that every demand of the intelligence and of the
whole being of God and of the universe of creatures be perfectly met, so
that universal mind shall be in a state of perfect and universal satisfaction,
To will this is all that the law of God does or can require.
4. It is objected, “That if this be the sole foundation of moral obliga-
tion, it follows, that if all the good now in existence were connected with
sin, and all the misery connected with holiness, we should be just as well
Satisfied as we now are.”
I answer: this objection is based upon an impossible supposition, and
therefore good for nothing. That happiness should be commected with sin,
and holiness with misery, is impossible, without a reversal of the powers and
laws of moral agency. If our being were so changed that happiness were
naturally connected with sin, and misery with holiness, there would, of
necessity, be a corresponding change in the law of nature, or of moral law:
in which case, we should be as well satisfied as we now are. But no such
change is possible, and the supposition is inadmissible. But it has been
demanded,—
“Why does not our constitution demand happiness irrespective of holi-
mess? and why is holiness as a condition of actual blessedness an unalter-
able demand of our intelligence P Why can neither be satisfied with mere
happiness, irrespective of the conditions on which it exists, as far as moral
agents are concerned 2 Simply and exclusively, because both alike regard
Something else for its own sake besides happiness.”
The exact point of this argument is this: our nature demands that holi-
mess should exist in connection with happiness, and sin with misery:
now, does not this fact prove that we necessarily regard holiness as valuable
in itself, or as an object to be chosen for its own sake 2 I answer, no. It
only proves that holiness is regarded as right in itself, and therefore as the
fit condition and means of happiness. But it does not prove, that we
regard holiness as an object to be chosen for its own Sake, or as an ulti-
* Mahan's Moral Philosophy, p. 104,
1 10 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
mate, for this would involve an absurdity. Holiness, or righteousness, is
only the moral quality of choice. It is impossible that the quality of a
choice should be the object of the choice. Besides, this quality of righte-
ousness, or holiness, is created by the fact, that the choice terminates on
some intrinsically valuable thing besides the choice itself. Thus, if our
reason did affirm that holiness ought to be chosen for its own sake, it would
affirm an absurdity and a contradiction.
Should it be still asked, why our nature affirms that that which is right
in itself is the fit condition of happiness, I answer, certainly not because
we necessarily regard holiness, or that which is right in itself, as an object
of ultimate choice or intention, for this, as we have just seen, involves an
absurdity. The true and only answer to the question just supposed is, that
such is our mature, as constituted by the Creator, that it necessarily affirms
as it does, and no other reason need or can be given. The difficulty with the
objector is, that he confounds right with good, and insists that what is right
in itself is as really an olject of ultimate choice, as that which is a good in
itself. But this cannot be true. What is right 2 Why, according to this
objector, it is the relation of intrinsic fitness that exists between choice and
an object intrinsically worthy of choice. This relation of fitness, or right-
mess, is not and cannot be the object of the choice. The intrinsic liature
or value of the object creates this relation of rightness or fitness between
the choice and the olject. But this rightness is not, cannot be, an object
of ultimate choice. When will writers cease to confound what is right in
itself with what is a good in itself, and cease to regard the intrinsically right,
and the intrimsically valuable, as equally objects of ultimate choice P The
thing is impossible and absurd.
5. But it is said, that a moral agent may sometimes be under obligation
to will evil instead of good to others. I answer:—
It can never be the duty of a moral agent to will evil to any being for
its own sake, or as an ultimate end. The character and governmental
relations of a being may be such that it may be duty to will his
punishment to promote the public good. But in this case good is the
end willed, and misery only a means. So it may be the duty of a
moral agent to will the temporal misery of even a holy being to promote
the public interests. Such was the case with the sufferings of Christ. The
Father willed his temporary misery to promote the public good. But in all
cases when it is duty to will misery, it is only as a means or condition of
good to the public, or to the individual, and not as an ultimate end.
6. It has been said, “I find an unanswerable argument against this
theory, also, in the relations of the universal intelligence to the moral
government of God All men do, as a matter of fact, reason from the
connection between holiness and happiness, and sin and misery, under that
government, to the moral character of God. In the Scriptures, also, the
same principle is continually appealed to. If the connection was a
necessary one, and not dependent upon the divine will, it would present
no more evidence of the divine rectitude, than the principle that every
MORAL GOVERNMENT, J I l
event has a cause, and all that is said in the Scriptures about God's
establishing this connection, would be false. Virtue and vice are in their
own nature absolute, and would be what they now are, did not the
connection under consideration exist.”
(1.) This objection is based upon the absurd assumption, that moral law
would remain the same, though the nature of moral agents were so changed
that benevolence should naturally and necessarily produce misery, and
selfishness produce happiness. But this is absurd. Moral law is, and must
be, the law of nature. If the natures of moral agents were changed, there
must of necessity be a corresponding change of the law. Virtue and vice
are fixed and unchangeable only because moral agency is so.
(2.) The objection assumes that moral agents might have been so
created as to affirm their obligation to be benevolent, though it were a
fact that benevolence is necessarily connected with misery, and selfishness
with happiness. But such a reversal of the nature would necessarily
either destroy moral agency, and consequently moral law, or it would
reverse the nature of virtue and vice. This objection overlooks, and indeed
contradicts, the nature, both of moral agency and moral law.
(3.) We infer the goodness of God from the present constitution of
things, not because God could possibly have created moral agents, and
imposed on them the duty of benevolence, although benevolence had been
necessarily connected with misery, and selfishness with happiness : for no
such thing is, or was, possible. But we infer his benevolence from the fact,
that he has created moral agents, and subjected them to moral law, and thus
procured an indefinite amount of good, when he might have abstained from
such a work. His choice was between creating moral agents and not
creating, and not between creating moral agents with a nature such as they
now have, or creating them moral agents, and putting them under the
same law they now have, but with a mature the reverse of what they now
have. This last were absurd, and naturally impossible. Yet this objection
is based upon the assumption that it was possible.
7. It is said, that if any moral act can be conceived of which has not
the element of Willing the good of being in it, this theory is false. As an
instance of such an act, it is insisted that revealed veracity as really
imposes obligation to treat a veracious being as worthy of confidence, as
susceptibility for happiness imposes obligation to will the happiness of such
a being.
To this I reply,–
1. That it is a contradiction to say, that veracity should be the ground of
an obligation to choose anything whatever but the veracity itself as an ulti-
mate object, or for its own sake; for, be it remembered, the identical object,
whose nature and intrinsic value imposes obligation, must be the object
chosen for its own sake. This veracity imposes obligation to—what? Choose
his Veracity for its own sake? Is this what he is worthy of 2 O no, he is
* Mahan's Moral Philosophy, p. 109.
112 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
worthy of confidence. Then to treat him as worthy of confidence is not
to will his veracity for its own sake, but to confide in him. But why
confide in him 2 Let us hear this author himself answer this question —
“There are forms of real good to moral agents, obligation to confer
which rests exclusively upon moral character. That I should, for example,
be regarded and treated by moral agents around me as worthy of con-
fidence, is one of the fundamental necessities of my nature. On what
condition or grounds can I require them to render me this good? Not on
the ground that it is a good in itself to me. Such fact makes no appeal
whatever to the conscience relatively to the good of which I am speaking.
There is one and only one consideration that can, by any possibility, reach
the conscience on this subject, to wit, revealed trust-worthiness. No claim
to confidence can be sustained on any other ground whatever.”
Indeed, but how perfectly manifest is it that here a condition is confounded
with, or rather mistaken for, the ground of obligation. This writer started
with the assertion that confiding in a being had not “the element of willing
good in it.” But here he asserts that confidence is a good to him, which
we are bound to confer, and asserts that the ground of the obligation to
confer this good, is not the intrinsic value of the good, but his revealed
veracity. Here then, it is admitted, that to confide in a being has “the
element of willing good in it.” So the objection with which he started is
given up, so far as to admit that this confidence is only a particular form
of “good willing,” and the only question remaining here is, whether the
nature of the good, or the revealed veracity, is the ground of the obligation
“ to confer this form of good.” This question has been answered already.
Why “confer" good rather than evil upon him 2 Why, because good is
good and evilis evil. The intrinsic value of the good is the ground, and his
veracity only a condition, of obligation to will his particular and actual
enjoyment of good. He says, “no claim to confidence can be sustained
on any other ground than that of revealed veracity.” I answer, that no
such claim can be sustained except upon condition of revealed veracity.
But if this confidence is the conferring of a good upon the individual, it is
absurd to say that we are bound to confer this good, not because it is of
value to him, but solely because of his Veracity. Thus, this objector has
replied to his own objection.
But let us put this objection in the strongest form, and suppose it to be
asserted that revealed veracity always necessitates an act of confidence, or
its opposite, and that we necessarily affirm obligation to put forth an act of
confidence in revealed Veracity, entirely irrespective of this confidence, or
this veracity, sustaining any relation whatever to the good of any being in
existence. Let us examine this. We often overlook the assumptions and
certain knowledges which are in our own minds, and upon which we make
certain affirmations. For example, in every effort we affirm ourselves under
obligation to make, to secure the good of being, we assume our moral agency
* Mahan's Moral Philosophy, pp. 107, l08.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 113
and the intrinsic value of the good to being; and generally these assump-
tions are not thought of, when we make such affirmations of obligation.
But they are in the mind: their presence then, is the condition of our mak-
ing the affirmation of obligation, although they are not noticed, nor thought
of at the time. Now let us see if the affirmation of obligation to put forth
an act of confidence, in view of revealed truth or revealed veracity, is not
conditioned upon the assumption that the revealed truth or veracity, and
consequently confidence in it, does sustain some relation to, and is a
condition of, the highest good of being. Suppose, for example, that I
assume that a truth, or a veracity, sustains no possible relation to the good of
any being in existence, and that I regard the truth or the veracity revealed,
as relating wholly and only, to complete abstractions, sustaining no relation
whatever to the good or ill of any being; would such a truth, or such a
Veracity, either mecessitate action, when revealed to the mind, or would the
intellect affirm obligation to act in view of it? I say, no. Nor could the
intelligence so much as conceive of obligation to act in this case. It could
neither see nor assume any possible reason for action. The mind in this
case must be, and remain, in a state of entire indifference to such a truth
and such veracity. Although the fact may be overlooked, in the sense of
not thought of, yet it is a fact, that obligation to confide in truth and in
revealed veracity is affirmed by reason of the assumption which lies in the
intellect, as a first truth, that to confide in, or to be influenced by, truth
and Veracity, is a condition of the highest good of being, and the value of
the good is assumed as the ground, and the relation of the truth and the
Veracity, and of the confidence as the condition of the obligation. Faith,
or confidence in an act, as distinguished from an attribute, of benevolence,
is a subordinate and not an ultimate choice. God has so constituted the
mind of moral agents, that they know, by a necessary law of the intelli-
gence, that truth is a demand of their intellectual, as really as food is of
their physical nature; that truth is the natural aliment of the mind, and
that conformity of heart and life to it is the indispensable condition of our
highest well-being. With this intuitive knowledge in the mind, it maturally
affirms its obligations to confide in revealed veracity and truth. But
suppose the mind to be entirely destitute of the conception that truth, or
confidence in truth, sustained any relation whatever to the good of any
being;-suppose truth was to the mind a mere abstraction, with no practical
relations, any more than a point in space, or a mathematical line; it
seems plain that no conception of obligation to confide in it, or to act in
view of it, could possibly exist in this case. If this is so, it follows that
obligation to confide in truth, or in revealed veracity, is conditioned upon
its assumed relations to the good of being. And if this is so, the good to
Which truth sustains the relation of a means, must be the ground, and the
relation only the condition, of the obligation.
But to silence all debate, the objector appeals to the universal con-
SC101lsllêSS :-
“I now adduce against the theory of Professor Finney, and in favour of
I
114 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the opposite theory, the direct and positive testimony of universal con-
sciousness. Let us suppose, for example, that the character of God, as
possessed of absolute omniscience, and Veracity, is before the mind, on the
one hand, and his capacity for infinite happiness, on the other. I put it
to the consciousness of every intelligent being, whether God’s character
for knowledge and veracity does not present reasons just as ultimate for
esteeming and treating him as worthy, instead of unworthy of confidence,
as his susceptibilities for happiness do for willing his blessedness, instead
of putting forth contradictory acts 2"—Moral Philosophy, p. 106.
Yes, I answer. But why does not this objector see that susceptibility
for happiness is not the ground, but only a condition, of obligation to will
the happiness of a being. Susceptibility for happiness, is in itself, no
better reason for willing happiness. than susceptibility for misery is for
Willing misery. It is the nature of happiness that constitutes the ground,
while susceptibility for happiness is only a condition of the obligation to
will it, to any being. Without the susceptibility happiness were impossible,
and hence there could be no obligation. But, the susceptibility existing,
we are, upon this condition, under obligation to will the happiness of such
a being for its own sake. The writer who makes this objection, has repeat-
edly fallen into the strange error of assuming and affirming that suscept:-
bility for happiness is a ground of obligation to will happiness, and here he
reiterates the assertion, and lays great stress upon it, and appeals to the
universal consciousness in support of the proposition, that “revealed
Veracity presents reasons just as ultimate, for esteeming and treating a
Veracious being as worthy of confidence, as susceptibilities for good do for
willing good.” Yes, I say again : but neither of these presents ultimate
reasons, and, of course, neither of them is a ground of obligation. Why
does not this writer see that, according to his own most solemn definition of
an ultimate act, this esteeming and treating a veracious being as worthy of
confidence, cannot be ultimate acts? According to his own repeated showing,
if veracity be a ground of obligation, that obligation must be to choose
weracity for its own sake. But he says, the obligation is to esteem and
treat him as worthy of confidence, and that this is “ a real good which we
are bound to render to him.” What, the whole point and force of the
objection is that this esteeming and treating are moral acts, that have no
relation to the good of auy being. This is strange. But stranger still,
his veracity is not only a condition, but the ground, of obligation to render
this good to him. We are to will his good, or to do him good, or to render
to him the good which our confidence is to him, not because it is of any
value to him, but because he is truthful.
It is perfectly plaim that vast confusion reigns in the mind of that writer
upon this subject, and that this objection is only a reiteration of the
theory that moral excellence is a ground of obligation, which we have seen
to be false.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 1 15
LECTURE XII.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
VI. LASTLy, SHow THE PRACTICAL TENDENCY OF THE WARIOUS THEORIES.
IT has already been observed that this is a highly practical question, and
one of surpassing interest and importance. I have gone through the
discussion and examination of the several principal theories, for the purpose
of preparing the way to expose the practical results of those various
theories, and to show that they legitimately result in some of the most
soul-destroying errors that cripple the church and curse the world. I have
slightly touched already upon this subject, but so slightly, however, as to
forbid its being left until we have looked more stedfastly, and thoroughly,
into it.
l. I will begin with the theory that regards the sovereign will of God as
the foundation of moral obligation.
One legitimate and necessary result of this theory is, a totally erroneous
conception both of the character of God, and of the nature and design of
his government. If God's will is the foundation of moral obligation, it
follows that he is an arbitrary sovereign. He is not under law himself,
and he has no rule by which to regulate his conduct, nor by which either
himself or any other being can judge of his moral character. Indeed,
unless he is subject to law, or is a subject of moral obligation, he has and
can have, no moral character; for moral character always and necessarily
implies moral law and moral obligation. If God's will is not itself under
the law of his infinite reason, or, in other words, if it is not conformed to
the law imposed upon it by his intelligence, then his will is and must be
arbitrary in the worst sense, that is, in the sense of having no regard to
reason, or to the nature and relations of moral agents. But if his will is
under the law of his reason, if he acts from principle, or has good and
benevolent reasons for his eonduct, then his will is not the foundation of
moral obligation, but those reasons that lie revealed in the divine intelli-
gence, in view of which it affirms moral obligation, or that he ought to will
in conformity with those reasons. In other words, if the intrinsic value of
his own well-being and that of the universe be the foundation of moral
obligation : if his reason affirms his obligation to choose this as his ultimate
end, and to consecrate his infinite energies to the realization of it; and if
his will is conformed to this law, it follows-
(1.) That his will is not the foundation of moral obligation.
(2.) That he has infinitely good and wise reasons for what he wills, says,
and does.
I 2
*
1 16 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(3.) That he is not arbitrary, but always acts in conformity with right
principles, and for reasons that will, when universally known, compel the
respect and even admiration of every intelligent being in the universe.
(4.) That he has a moral character, and is infinitely virtuous.
(5.) That he must respect himself.
(6.) That he must possess a happiness intelligent in kind, and infinite in
degree.
(7.) That creation, providential and moral government, are the necessary
means to an infinitely wise and good end, and that existing evils are only
unavoidably incidental to this infinitely wise and benevolent arrangement,
and, although great, are indefinitely the less of two evils. That is, they
are an evil indefinitely less than no creation and no government would
have been, or than a different arrangement and government would have
been. It is conceivable, that a plan of administration might have been
adopted that would have prevented the present evils; but if we admit that
God has been governed by reason in the selection of the end he has in
view, and in the use of means for its accomplishment, it will follow that
the evils are less than would have existed under any other plan of adminis-
tration ; or, at least, that the present system, with all its evils, is the best
that infinite wisdom and love could adopt.
(8.) These incidental evils, therefore, do not at all detract from the
evidence of the wisdom and goodness of God; for in all these things he is
not acting from caprice, or malice, or an arbitrary sovereignty, but is
acting in conformity with the law of his infinite intelligence, and of course
has infinitely good and weighty reasons for what he does and suffers to be
done—reasons so good and So weighty, that he could not do otherwise
without violating the law of his own intelligence, and therefore committing
infinite sim.
(9.) It follows also that there is ground for perfect confidence, love, and
submission to his divine will in all things. That is : if his will is not
arbitrary, but conformed to the law of his infinite intelligence, then it is
obligatory, as our rule of action, because it reveals infallibly what is in
accordance with infinite intelligence. We may always be entirely safe in
obeying all the divine requirements, and in submitting to all his dispensa-
tions, however mysterious, being assured that they are perfectly wise and
good. Not only are we safe in doing so, but we are under infinite obliga-
tion to do so; not because his arbitrary will imposes obligation, but because
it reveals to us infallibly the end we ought to choose, and the indispensable
means of securing it. His will is law, not in the sense of its originating
and imposing obligation of its own arbitrary sovereignty, but in the sense
of its being a revelation of both the end we ought to seek, and the means
by which the end can be secured. Indeed this is the only proper idea of
law. It does not in any case of itself impose obligation, but is only a
revelation of obligation. Law is a condition, but not the foundation, of
obligation. The will of God is a condition of obligation, only so far as
MORAL GOVERNMENT. II 7
it is indispensable to our knowledge of the end we ought to seek, and
the means by which this end is to be secured. Where these are known,
there is obligation, whether God has revealed his will or not.
The foregoing, and many other important truths, little less important
than those already mentioned, and too numerous to be now distinctly
noticed, follow from the fact that the good of being, and not the arbitrary
will of God, is the foundation of moral obligation. But no one of them is
or can be true, if his will be the foundation of obligation. Nor can any
one, who consistently holds or believes that his will is the foundation of
obligation, hold or believe any of the foregoing truths, nor indeed hold or
believe any truth of the law or gospel. Nay, he cannot, if he be at all
consistent, have even a correct conception of one truth of God's moral
government. Let us see if he can.
(1) Can he believe that God's will is wise and good, unless he admits
and believes that it is subject to the law of his intelligence. Certainly he
cannot ; and to affirm that he can is a palpable contradiction. But if he
admits that the divine will is governed by the law of the divine intelli-
gence, this is denying that his will is the foundation of moral obligation.
If he consistently holds that the divine will is the foundation of moral obli-
gation, he must either deny that his will is any evidence of what is wise
and good, or maintain the absurdity, that whatever God wills is wise and
good, simply for the reason that God wills it, that if he willed the directly
opposite of what he does, it would be equally wise and good. But this is
an absurdity palpable enough to confound any one who has reason and
moral agency.
(2.) If he consistently holds and believes that God's sovereign will is the
foundation of moral obligation, he cannot regard him as having any moral
character, for the reason, that there is no standard by which to judge of his
willing and acting; for, by the supposition, he has no intelligent rule of
action, and, therefore, can have no moral character, as he is not a moral
agent, and can himself have no idea of the moral character of his own
actions; for, in fact, upon the supposition in question, they have none.
Any one, therefore, who holds that God is not a subject of moral law, im-
posed on him by his own reason, but, on the contrary, that his sovereign
will is the foundation of moral obligation, must, if consistent, deny that he
has moral character; and he must deny that God is an intelligent being,
or else admit that he is infinitely wicked for not conforming his will to
the law of his intelligence ; and for not being guided by his infinite reason,
instead of setting up an arbitrary sovereignty of will.
(3.) He who holds that God's sovereign will is the foundation of moral
obligation, instead of being a revelation of obligation, if he be at all con-
sistent, can neither have nor assign any good reason either for confidence
in him, or submission to him. If God has no good and wise reasons for
what he commands, why should we obey him 2 If he has no good and
wise reasons for what he does, why should we submit to him 2
Will it be answered, that if we refuse, we do it at our peril, and, there-
1 18 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
fore, it is wise to do so, even if he has no good reasons for what he does
and requires? To this I answer that it is impossible, upon the Supposition
in question, either to obey or submit to God with the heart. If we can
See no good reasons, but, on the other hand, are assured there are no good
and wise reasons for the divine commands and conduct, it is rendered for
ever naturally impossible, from the laws of our nature, to render anything
more than feigned obedience and submission. Whenever we do not under-
stand the reason for a divine requirement, or of a dispensation of divine
Providence, the condition of heart-obedience to the one and submission to
the other, is the assumption, that he has good and wise reasons for both.
But assume the contrary, to wit, that he has no good and wise reasons for
either, and you render heart-obedience, confidence, and submissiom impos-
sible. It is perfectly plain, therefore, that he who consistently holds the
theory in question, can neither conceive rightly of God, nor of anything
respecting his law, gospel, or government, moral or providential. It is im-
Possible for him to have an intelligent piety. His religion, if he have any,
must be sheer superstition, inasmuch as he meither knows the true God,
nor the true reason why he should love, believe, obey, or submit to
him. In short, he neither knows, mor, if consistent, can know, anything of
the nature of true religion, and has not so much as a right conception of
What constitutes virtue.
But do not understand me as affirming, that mone who profess to hold
the theory in question have any true knowledge of God, or any true
religion. No, they are happily so purely theorists on this subject, and so
happily inconsistent with themselves, as to have, after all, a practical judg-
ment in favour of the truth. They do not see the logical consequences of
their theory, and of course do not embrace them, and this happy incon-
sistency is an indispensable condition of their salvation. There is no end
to the absurdities to which this theory legitimately conducts us, as might
be abundantly shown. But enough has been said, I trust, to put you on
Your guard against entertaining fundamentally false motions of God and of
his government, and, consequently, of what constitutes true love, faith,
obedience, and submission to him.
(4.) Another permicious consequence of this thory is, that those who
hold it will of course give false directions to inquiring sinners. Indeed, if
they be ministers, the whole strain of their instructions must be false.
They must, if consistent, not only represent God to their hearers as an
absolute and arbitrary sovereign, but they must represent religion as con-
sisting in submission to arbitrary sovereignty. If sinners inquire what
they must do to be saved, such teachers must answer in substance, that
they must cast themselves on the sovereignty of a God whose law is
solely an expression of his arbitrary will, and whose every requirement and
purpose is founded in his arbitrary sovereignty. This is the God whom
they must love, in whom they must believe, and whom they must serve
with a willing mind. How infinitely different such instructions are from
those that would be given by one who knew the truth. Such an one would
MORAL GOVERNMENT, 119
represent God to an inquirer as infinitely reasonable in all his require-
ments, and in all his ways. He would represent the sovereignty of God
as consisting, not in arbitrary will, but in benevolence or love, directed by
infinite knowledge in the promotion of the highest good of being. He
would represent his law, not as the expression of his arbitrary will, but as
having its foundation in the self-existent nature of God, and in the nature
of moral agents; as being the very rule which is agreeable to the nature
and relations of moral agents; that its requisitions are not arbitrary, but
that the very thing, and only that, is required which is in the nature of
things indispensable to the highest well-being of moral agents; that God's
will does not originate obligation by any arbitrary fiat, but, on the con-
trary, that he requires what he does, because it is obligatory in the nature
of things; that his requirement does not create right, but that he requires
only that which is naturally and of necessity right. These and many such
like things would irresistibly commend the character of God to the human
intelligence, as worthy to be trusted, and as a being to whom submission is
infallibly safe and infinitely reasonable.
But let the advocates of the theory under consideration but consistently
press this theory upon the human intelligence, and the more they do so,
the less reason can it perceive either for submitting to, or for trusting in,
God. The fact is, the idea of arbitrary sovereignty is shocking and revolt-
ing, not only to the human heart, whether unregenerate or regenerate, but
also to the human intelligence. Religion, based upon such a view of
God's character and government, must be sheer superstition or gross
fanaticism.
2. I will meat glance at the legitimate results of the theory of the selfish
school.
This theory teaches that our own interest is the foundation of moral
obligation. In eonversing with a distinguished defender of this philo-
sophy, I requested the theorist to define moral obligation, and this was the
definition given : “It is the obligation of a moral agent to seek his own
happiness.” Upon the practical bearing of this theory I remark,-
(1.) It tends directly and inevitably to the confirmation and despotism of
sin in the soul. All sin, as we shall hereafter See, resolves itself into a
spirit of self-seeking, or into a disposition to seek good to self, and upon
condition of its relations to self, and not impartially and disinterestedly. This
philosophy represents this spirit of self-seeking as virtue, and only requires
that in our efforts to secure our own happiness, we should not interfere
with the rights of others in seeking theirs. But here it may be asked,
when these philosophers insist that virtue consists in willing our own happi-
ness, and that, in seeking it, we are bound to have respect to the right and
happiness of others, do they mean that we are to have a positive, or merely
a negative regard to the rights and happiness of others? If they mean
that we are to have a positive regard to others’ rights and happiness, what
is that but giving up their theory, and holding the true one, to wit, that
120 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the happiness of each one shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic
value, for its own sake? That is, that we should be disinterestedly benevo-
lent? But if they mean that we are to regard our neighbour's happiness
negatively, that is, merely in not hindering it, what is this but the most
absurd thing conceivable 2 What I need not care positively for my
neighbour's happiness, I need not will it as a good in itself, and for its own
value, and yet I must take care not to hinder it. But why? Why,
because it is intrinsically as valuable as my own. Now, if this is assigning
any good reason why I ought not to hinder it, it is just because it is
assigning a good reason why I ought positively and disinterestedly to will
it; which is the same thing as the true theory. But if this is not a suffi-
cient reason to impose obligation, positively and disinterestedly, to will it,
it can never impose obligation to avoid hindering it, and I may then
pursue my own happiness in my own way without the slightest regard to
that of any other.
(2.) If this theory be true, sinful and holy beings are precisely alike, so
far as ultimate intention is concerned, in which we have seen all moral
character consists. They have precisely the same end in view, and the
difference lies exclusively in the means they make use of to promote their
own happiness. That sinners are seeking their own happiness, is a truth
of consciousness to them. If moral agents are under obligation to seek
their own happiness as the supreme end of life, it follows, that holy beings
do so. So that holy aud sinful beings are precisely alike, so far as the
end for which they live is concerned ; the only difference being, as has
been observed, in the different means they make use of to promote this
end. But observe, no reason can be assigned, in accordance with this
philosophy, why they use different means, only that they differ in judg-
ment in respect to them; for, let it be remembered, that this philosophy
denies that we are bound to have a positive and disinterested regard to our
neighbour's interest; and, of course, no benevolent considerations prevent
the holy from using the same means as do the wicked. Where, therefore,
is the difference in their character, although they do use this diversity of
means ? I say again, there is none. If this difference be not ascribed to
disinterested benevolence in one, and to selfishness in the other, there
really is and can be no difference in character between them. Accord-
ing to this theory nothing is right in itself, but the intention to pro-
mote my own happiness; and anything is right or wrong as it is
intended to promote this result or otherwise. For let it be borne in mind
that, if moral obligation respects strictly the ultimate intention only, it
follows that ultimate intention alone is right or wrong in itself, and all
other things are right or wrong as they proceed from a right or wrong
ultimate intention. This must be true. Further, if my own happiness
be the foundation of my moral obligation, it follows that this is the ultimate
end at which I ought to aim, and that nothing is right or wrong in itself,
in me, but this intention or its opposite ; and furthermore, that every-
thing else must be right or wrong in me as it proceeds from this, or from
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 12I
an opposite intention. I may do, and upon the supposition of the truth
of this theory, I am bound to do, whatever will, in my estimation, promote
my own happiness, and that, not because of its intrinsic value as a part of
universal good, but because it is my own. To seek it as a part of universal
happiness, and not because it is my own, would be to act on the true
theory, or the theory of disinterested benevolence; which this theory
denies.
(3.) Upon this theory I am not to love God supremely, and my neighbour
as myself. If I love God and my neighbour, it is to be only as a means of
promoting my own happiness, which is not loving them, but loving myself,
supremely.
(4.) This theory teaches radical error in respect both to the character and
government of God; and the consistent defenders of it cannot but hold
fundamentally false views in respect to what constitutes holiness or virtue,
either in God or man. They do not and cannot know the difference
between virtue and vice. In short, all their views of religion cannot but
be radically false and absurd.
(5.) The teachers of this theory must fatally mislead all who consistently
follow out their instructions. In preaching they must, if consistent,
appeal wholly to hope and fear, instead of addressing the heart through
the intelligence. All their instructions must tend to confirm selfishness.
All the motives they present, if consistent, tend only to stir up a zeal
within them to secure their own happiness. If they pray, it will only be
to implore the help of God to accomplish their selfish ends.
Indeed, it is impossible that this theory should not blind its advocates
to the fundamental truths of morality and religion, and it is hardly con-
ceivable that one could more efficiently serve the devil than by the inculca-
tion of such a philosophy as this.
3. Let us in the next place look into the natural and, if its advocates
are consistent, necessary results of utilitarianism.
This theory, you know, teaches that the utility of an action or of a
choice, renders it obligatory. That is, I am bound to will good, not for
the intrinsic value of the good; but because willing good tends to produce
good—to choose an end, not because of the intrinsic value of the end, but
because the willing of it tends to secure it. The absurdity of this theory
has been sufficiently exposed. It only remains to notice its legitimate
practical results.
(1.) It naturally, and, I may say, necessarily diverts the attention from
that in which all morality consists, namely, the ultimate intention. In-
deed, it seems that the abettors of this scheme must have in mind only
outward action, or at most executive volitions, when they assert, that the
tendency of an action is the reason of the obligation to put it forth. It
Seems impossible that they should assert that the reason for choosing an
122 SYSTEMIATIC THEOLOGY.
ultimate end should or could be the tendency of choice to secure it. This
is so palpable a contradiction, that it is difficult to believe that they have
ultimate intention in mind when they make the assertion. An ultimate
end is ever chosen for its intrinsic value, and not because choice tends to
secure it. How, them, is it possible for them to hold that the tendency of
choice to secure am ultimate end is the reason of an obligation to make
that choice 2 But if they have not their eye upon ultimate intention, when
they speak of moral obligation, they are discoursing of that which is strictly
without the pale of morality. I said in a former lecture, that the obligation
to put forth volitions or outward actions to secure an ultimate end, must
be conditionated upon the perceived tendency of such volitions and actions
to secure that end, but while this tendency is the condition of the obli-
gation to executive volition, or outward action, the obligation is founded in
the intrinsic value of the end to secure which such volitions tend. So that
utilitarianism gives a radically false account of the reason of moral obliga-
tion. A consistent utilitarian therefore cannot conceive rightly of the
nature of morality or virtue. He cannot consistently hold that virtue con-
sists in willing the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an
ultimate end or for its own sake, but must, on the contrary, confine his
ideas of moral obligation to volitions and outward actions, in which there
is strictly no morality, and withal assign an entirely false reason for these,
to wit, their tendency to secure an end, rather than the value of the end
which they tend to secure.
This is the proper place to speak of the doctrine of expediency, a doc-
trime strenuously maintained by utilitarians, and as strenuously opposed by
rightarians. It is this, that whatever is expedient is right, for the reason,
that the expediency of an action or measure is the foundation of the
obligation to put forth that action, or adopt that measure. It is easy to
see that this is just equivalent to saying, that the utility of an action or
measure is the reason of the obligation to put forth that action or adopt
that measure. But, as we have seen, utility, tendency, expediency, is only
a condition of the obligation, to put forth outward action or executive
volition, but never the foundation of the obligation, — that always
being the intrinsic value of the end to which the volition, action, or
measure, sustains the relation of a means, I do not wonder that right-
arians object to this, although I do wonder at the reason which, if
consistent, they must assign for this obligation, to wit, that any action or
volition, (ultimate intention excepted,) can be right or wrong in itself,
irrespective of its expediency or utility. This is absurd enough, and flatly
contradicts the doctrine of rightarians themselves, that moral obligation
strictly belongs only to ultimate intention. If moral obligation belongs
only to ultimate intention, them nothing but ultimate intention can be
right or wrong in itself. And every thing else, that is, all executive
volitions and outward actions must be right or wrong, (in the only sense in
which moral character can be predicated of them,) as they proceed from a
right or wrong ultimate intention. This is the only form in which right-
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 123
arians can consistently admit the doctrine of expediency, viz., that it
relates exclusively to executive volitions and outward actions. And this
they can admit only upon the assumption, that executive volitions and
outward actions have strictly no moral character in themselves, but are
right or wrong only as, and because, they proceed necessarily from a right
or wrong ultimate intention. All schools that hold this doctrine, to wit,
that moral obligation respects the ultimate intention only, must, if con-
sistent, deny that any thing can be either right or wrong per se, but
ultimate intention. Further, they must maintain, that utility, expediency,
or tendency to promote the ultimate end upon which ultimate intention
terminates, is always a condition of the obligation to put forth those
volitions and actions that sustain to this end the relation of means. And
still further, they must maintain, that the obligation to use those means
must be founded in the value of the end, and not in the tendency of the
means to secure it; for unless the end be intrinsically valuable, the ten-
dency of means to secure it can impose no obligation to use them.
Tendency, utility, expediency, them, are only conditions of the obligation
to use any given means, but never the foundation of obligation. An action
or executive volition is not obligatory, as utilitarians say, because, and for
the reason, that it is useful or expedient, but merely upon condition that it
is so. The obligation in respect to outward action is always founded in
the value of the end to which this action sustains the relation of a means,
and the obligation is conditionated upon the perceived tendency of the
means to secure that end. Expediency can never have respect to the
choice of an ultimate end, or to that in which moral character consists, to
wit, ultimate intention. The end is to be chosen for its own sake. Ulti-
mate intention is right or wrong in itself, and no questions of utility,
expediency, or tendency, have any thing to do with the obligation to put forth
ultimate intention, there being only one ultimate reason for this, namely, the
intrinsic value of the end itself. It is true, then, that whatever is expedient
is right, not for that reason, but only upon that condition. The inquiry
then, is it expedient 2 in respect to outward action, is always proper ;
for upon this condition does obligation to outward action turn. But in
respect to ultimate intention, or the choice of an ultimate end, an inquiry
into the expediency of this choice or intention is never proper, the obli-
gation being founded alone upon the perceived and intrinsic value of the
end, and the obligation being without any condition whatever, except the
possession of the powers of moral agency, with the perception of the end
upon which intention ought to terminate, namely, the good of universal
being. But the mistake of the utilitarian, that expediency is the foun-
dation of moral obligation, is fundamental, for, in fact, it cannot be so in
any case whatever. I have said, and here repeat, that all schools that hold
that moral obligation respects ultimate intention only, must, if consistent,
maintain that pereeived utility, expediency, &c., is a condition of obli-
gation to put forth any outward action, or, which is the same thing, to use
any means to secure the end of benevolence. Therefore, in practice or in
124 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
daily life, the true doctrine of expediency must of necessity have a place.
The railers against expediency, therefore, know not what they say nor
whereof they affirm. It is, however, impossible to proceed in practice
upon the utilitarian philosophy. This teaches that the tendency of an
action to secure good, and not the intrinsic value of the good, is the foun-
dation of the obligation to put forth that action. But this is too absurd
for practice. For, unless the intrinsic value of the end be assumed as the
foundation of the obligation to choose it, it is impossible to affirm obligation
to put forth an action to secure that end. The folly and the danger of
utilitarianism is, that it overlooks the true foundation of moral obligation,
and consequently the true nature of virtue or holiness. A consistent
utilitarian cannot conceive rightly of either.
The teachings of a consistent utilitarian must of necessity abound with
pernicious error. Instead of representing virtue as consisting in disin-
terested benevolence, or in the consecration of the soul to the highest good
of being in general, for its own sake, it must represent it as consisting
wholly in using means to promote good:— that is, as consisting wholly
in executing volitions and outward actions, which, strictly speaking, have
no moral character in them. Thus consistent utilitarianism inculcates
fundamentally false ideas of the nature of virtue. Of course it must teach
equally erroneous ideas respecting the character of God—the spirit and
meaning of his law—the nature of repentance—of sin–of regeneration—
and, in short, of every practical doctrine of the Bible.
LECTURE XIII.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
PIRACTICAL BEARINGS OF DIFFERENT THEORIES
4. Practical bearings and tendency of rightarianism.
It will be recollected that this philosophy teaches that right is the
foundation of moral obligation. With its advocates, virtue consists in will-
ing the right for the sake of the right, instead of willing the good for the
sake of the good, or, more strictly, in willing the good for the sake of the
right, and not for the sake of the good; or, as we have seen, the foundation
of obligation consists in the relation of intrinsic fitness existing between
the choice and the good. The right is the ultimate end to be aimed at
in all things, instead of the highest good of being for its own sake. From
such a theory the following consequences must flow. I speak only of
consistent rightariansm.
(1.) The law of benevolence undemiably requires the good of being to be
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 125
willed for its own sake. But this theory is directly opposed to this, and
maintains that the good should be chosen because it is right, and not
because of the mature of the good. It overlooks the fact, that the choice
of the good would not be right, did not the nature of the good create the
obligation to choose it for its own sake, and consequently originate the
relation of fitness or rightness between the choice and the good.
But if the rightarian theory is true, there is a law of right entirely
distinct from, and opposed to, the law of love or benevolence. The advo-
cates of this theory often assume, perhaps unwittingly, the existence of
such a law. They speak of multitudes of things as being right or wrong
in themselves, entirely independent of the law of benevolence. Nay, they
go so far as to affirm it conceivable that doing right might necessarily tend
to, and result in, universal misery ; and that, in such a case, we should
be under obligation to do right, or will right, or intend right, although
universal misery should be the necessary result. This assumes and affirms
that right has no necessary relation to Willing the highest good of being
for its own sake, or, what is the same thing, that the law of right is not only
distinct from the law of benevolence, but is directly opposed to it ; that a
moral agent may be under obligation to will as an ultimate end that which
he knows will and must, by a law of necessity, promote and secure univer-
sal misery. Rightarians sternly maintain that right would be right, and
that virtue would be virtue, although this result were a necessary conse-
quence. What is this but maintaining that moral law may require moral
agents to set their hearts upon and consecrate themselves to that which
is necessarily subversive of the well-being of the entire universe 2 And
what is this but assuming that that may be moral law that requires a
course of Willing and acting entirely inconsistent with the nature and rela-
tions of moral agents? Thus virtue and benevolence not only may be
different but opposite things; of course, according to this, benevolence may
be sin. This is not only opposed to our reason, but a more capital or
mischievous error in morals or philosophy eam hardly be conceived.
Nothing is or can be right, as an ultimate choice, but benevolence.
Nothing is or can be moral law but that which requires that course of will-
ing and acting that tends to secure the highest well-being of God and the
universe. Nothing can be moral law but that which requires that the
highest well-being of God and of the universe should be chosen as an
ultimate end. If benevolence is right, this must be self-evident. Righta-
rianism overlooks and misrepresents the very nature of moral law. Let
any one contemplate the grossness of the absurdity that maintains, that
moral law may require a course of Willing that necessarily results in uni-
versal and perfect misery. What then, it may be asked, has moral law to
do with the nature and relations of moral agents, except to mock, insult, and
trample them under foot P Moral law is, and must be, the law of nature,
that is, suited to the nature and relations of moral agents. But can that
law be suited to the nature and relations of moral agents that requires a
course of action necessarily resulting in universal misery 2 Rightarianism
126 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
them, not only overlooks, but flatly contradicts, the very nature of moral
law, and sets up a law of right in direct opposition to the law of
mature.
(2.) This philosophy tends maturally to fanaticism. Conceiving as it does
of right as distinct from, and often opposed to, benevolence, it scoffs or
rails at the idea of inquiring what the highest good evidently demands.
It insists that such and such things are right or wrong in themselves,
entirely irrespective of what the highest good demands. Having thus in
mind a law of right distinct from, and, perhaps, opposed to benevolence,
what frightful conduct may not this philosophy lead to ? This is indeed
the law of famaticism. The tendency of this philosophy is illustrated in
the spirit of many reformers, who are bitterly contending for the right,
which, after all, is to do nobody any good.
(3.) This philosophy teaches a false morality and a false religion. It exalts
right above God, and represents virtue as consisting in the love of right
instead of the love of God. It exhorts men to will the right for the sake
of the right, instead of the good of being for the sake of the good, or for
the sake of being. It teaches us to inquire, How shall I do right? instead
of, How shall I do good 2 What is right? instead of, What will most
promote the good of the universe 2 Now that which is most promotive of
the highest good of being, is right. To intend the highest well-being of
God and of the universe, is right. To use the necessary means to promote
this end, is right; and whatever in the use of means or in outward action
is right, is so for this reason, namely, that it is designed to promote the
highest well-being of God and of the universe. To ascertain, then, what
is right, we must inquire, not into a mere abstraction, but what is intended.
Or if we would know what is duty, or what would be right in us, we must
understand that to intend the highest well-being of the universe as an
end, is right and duty ; and that in practice every thing is duty or right
that is homestly intended to secure this. Thus and thus only can we
ascertain what is right in intention, and what is right in the outward life.
But rightarianism points out an opposite course. It says: Will the right
for the sake of the right, that is, as an end ; and in respect to means,
inquire not what is manifestly for the highest good of being, for with this
you have nothing to do ; your business is to will the right for the sake
of the right. If you inquire how you are to know what is right, it does
not direct you to the law of benevolence as the only standard, but it directs
you to an abstract idea of right, as an ultimate rule, having no regard to
the law of benevolence or love. It tells you that right is right, because it
is right; and not that right is conformity to the law of benevolence, and right
for this reason. The truth is that subjective right, or right in practice,
is only a quality of disinterested benevolence. But the philosophy in
question denies this, and holds that, so far from being a quality of benevo-
lence, it must consist in willing the good for the sake of the right. Now
certainly such teaching is radically false, and subversive of all sound morality
and true religion.
AíORAL GOVERNMENT. 127
(4.) As we have formerly seen, this philosophy does not represent virtue
as consisting in the love of God, or of Christ, or our neighbour. Consist-
ency must require the abettors of this scheme to give fundamentally false
instructions to inquiring sinners. Instead of representing God and all
holy beings as devoted to the public good, and instead of exhorting sinners
to love God and their neighbour, this philosophy must represent God and
holy beings as consecrated to right for the sake of the right; and must
exhort sinners, who ask what they shall do to be saved, to will the right
for the sake of the right, to love the right, to deify right, and fall
down and worship it. There is much of this false morality and
religion in the world and in the church. Infidels are great sticklers for
this religion, and often exhibit as much of it as do some rightarian pro-
fessors of religion. It is a severe, stern, loveless, Godless, Christless
philosophy, and nothing but happy inconsistency prevents its advocates
from manifesting it in this light to the world. I have already, in a former
lecture, shown that this theory is identical with that which represents the
idea of duty as the foundation of moral obligation, and that it gives the
same instructions to inquiring simmers. It exhorts them to resolve to do
duty, to resolve to serve the Lord, to make up their minds at all times to
do right, to resolve to give their hearts to God, to resolve to conform in
all things to right, &c. The absurdity and danger of such instructions
were sufficiently exposed in the lecture referred to.” The law of right,
when conceived of as distinct from, or opposed to, the law of benevolence,
is a perfect straitjacket, an iron collar, a smare of death.
This philosophy represents all war, all slavery, and many things as wrong
per se, without insisting upon such a definition of those things as neces-
sarily implies selfishness. Any thing whatever is wrong in itself that
includes and implies selfishness, and nothing else is or can be. All War
waged for selfish purposes is wrong per se. But war waged for benevolent
purposes, or war required by the law of benevolence, and engaged in with
a benevolent design, is neither wrong in itself, nor wrong in any proper
sense. All holding men in bondage from selfish motives is wrong in itself,
but holding men in bondage in obedience to the law of benevolence is not
wrong but right. And so it is with every thing else. Therefore, where
it is insisted that all war and all slavery, or any thing else is wrong in
itself, such a definition of things must be insisted on as necessarily implies
selfishness. But consistent rightarianism will insist that all war, all
slavery, and all of many other things, is wrong in itself, without regard
to its being a violation of the law of benevolence. This is consistent with
such philosophy, but it is most false and absurd in fact. Indeed, any
philosophy that assumes the existence of a law of right distinct from, and
possibly opposed to, the law of benevolence, must teach many doctrines
at war with both reason and revelation. It sets men in chase of a philo-
sophical abstraction as the Supreme end of life, instead of the concrete
* See ante. p. 84,
128 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
reality of the highest well-being of God and the universe. It preys upon
the human soul, and turns into solid iron all the tender sensibilities of our
being. Do but contemplate a human being supremely devoted to an
abstraction, as the end of human life. He wills the right for the sake of
the right. Or, more strictly, he wills the good of being, not from any
regard to being, but because of the relation of intrinsic fitness or rightness
existing between choice and its object. For this he lives, and moves, and
has his being. What sort of religion is this 2 I wish not to be under-
stood as holding, or insinuating, that professed rightarians universally, or
even generally, pursue their theory to its legitimate boundary, and that
they manifest the spirit that it naturally begets. No. I am most happy
in acknowledging that with many, and perhaps with most of them, it is so
purely a theory, that they are not greatly influenced by it in practice.
Many of them I regard as the excellent of the earth, and I am happy to
count them among my dearest and most valued friends. But I speak of
the philosophy, with its natural results when embraced, not merely as a
theory, but when adopted by the heart as the rule of life. It is only in
such cases that its natural and legitimate fruits appear. Only let it be
borne in mind that right is conformity to moral law, that moral law is the
law of nature, or the law founded in the nature and relations of moral
agents, the law that requires just that course of willing and action that
tends naturally to secure the highest well-being of all moral agents, that
requires this course of willing and acting for the Sake of the end in which
it naturally and governmentally results—and requires that this end shall
be aimed at or intended by all moral agents as the Supreme good and the
only ultimate end of life;—I say, only let these truths be borne in mind,
and you will never talk of a right, or a virtue, or a law, obedience to which
necessarily results in universal misery ; nor Will you conceive that such a
thing is possible.
5. The philosophy that comes meat under review is that which teaches
that the divine goodness, or moral ercellence, is the foundation of moral
obligation.
The practical tendency of this philosophy is to inculcate and develope a
false idea of what constitutes virtue. It inevitably leads its advocates
to regard religion as consisting in a mere feeling of complacency in God.
It overlooks, and, if consistent, must overlook the fact that all true morality
and religion consist in benevolence, or in Willing the highest well-being of
God and the universe as an ultimate end. It must represent true religion
either as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or as consisting in Willing the
goodness or benevolence of God as an end; either of which is radical
error. This scheme does not, and cannot, rightly represent either the
character of God, or the mature and spirit of his law and government. In
teaching, it presents the benevolence of God, not as an inducement to
benevolence in us, that is, not as a means of leading us to consider and
adopt the same end of life to which God is consecrated, but as being the
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 129
end to which we are to consecrate ourselves. It holds forth the goodness
of God, not for the sake of setting the great end he has in view strongly
before us, and inducing us to become like him in consecrating ourselves to
the same end, to wit, the highest good of being; but it absurdly insists
that his goodness is the foundation of our obligation, which is the same
thing as to insist that we are to make his goodness the ultimate end of life,
instead of that end at which God aims, and aiming at which constitutes
his virtue. Instead of representing the benevolence of God as clearly
revealing our obligation to be benevolent, it represents his benevolence as
being the foundation of obligation. Obligation to what? Not to will good,
certainly ; for it is a gross contradiction, as we have repeatedly seen, to
say that I am under obligation to will good to God, as an ultimate end, or
for its own sake, yet not for this reason, but because God is good. This
philosophy, if consistent, must present the goodness of God as a means
of awakening emotions of complacency in God, and not for the purpose of
making us benevolent, for it does not regard religion as consisting in bene-
volence, but in a love to God for his goodness, which can be nothing else
than a feeling of complacency. But this is radical error. The practical
bearings of this theory are well illustrated in the arguments used to support
it, as stated and refuted when examining its claims in a former lecture.
The fact is, it misrepresents the character, law, and government of God,
and, of necessity, the nature of true religion. It harps perpetually on the
goodness of God as the sole reason for loving him, which demonstrates
that benevolence does not, and consistently cannot, enter into its idea of
virtue or true religion.
There is, no doubt, a vast amount of spurious, selfish religion in the
world growing out of this philosophy. Many love God because they regard
him as loving them, as being their benefactor and particular friend. They
are grateful for favours bestowed on self. But they forget the philosophy
and theology of Christ, who said; “If ye love them that love you, what
thank have ye? Do not even sinners love those that love them 2" They
seem to have no idea of a religion of disinterested benevolence. Many of
those who hold this view regard religion as consisting in involuntary emo-
tions and affections, and seem disposed to love God in proportion as they
imagine him to regard them as his especial favourites. They regard his
fancied partiality to them as an instance of particular goodness in him. They
want to feel emotions of complacency in God, in view of his particular regard
to them, rather than to sympathize with his universal benevolence.
6. The next theory to be noticed is that which teaches that moral order
is the foundation of moral obligation.
The practical objection to this theory is, that it presents a totally wrong
end as the great object of life. According to the teachings of this school,
moral order is that intrinsically valuable end at which all moral agents
ought to aim, and to which they are bound to consecrate themselves. If
R
130 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
by moral order the highest good of being is intended, this philosophy is
only another name for the true one. But if, as I suppose is the fact, by
moral order no such thing as the highest good of God and the universe is
intended, then the theory is false, and cannot teach other than pernicious
error. It must misrepresent God, his law and government, and of course
must hold radically false views in respect to the nature of holiness and sin.
It holds up an abstraction as the end of life, and exalts moral order above
all that is called God. It teaches that men ought to love moral order
with all the heart, and with all the soul. But the theory is sheer monSense,
as was shown in its place. Its practical bearing is only to bewilder and
confuse the mind. The idea that benevolence is true religion, can have
no practical influence on a mind that has consistently embraced this theory
of moral order. Any philosophy that obscures this idea of benevolence,
and confuses the mind in respect to the true end of life, is fatal to virtue
and to Salvation.
Again : The theory must overlook or deny the fact that moral obligation
respects the ultimate intention ; for it seems impossible that any one pos-
sessing reason can suppose, that moral order can be the end to which moral
beings ought to consecrate themselves. The absurdity of the theory itself
was sufficiently exposed in a former lecture. Its practical bearings and
tendency are only to introduce confusion into all our ideas of moral law
and moral government.
7. We meat come to the theory that moral obligation is founded in the
nature and relations of moral agents.
The first objection to this theory is, that it confounds the conditions
of moral obligation with its foundation. The nature and relations of
moral beings are certainly conditions of their obligation to will each other's
good. But it is absolutely childish to affirm that the obligation to will
each other's good is not founded in the value of the good, but in the
nature and relations of moral beings. But for the intrinsic value of their
good, their mature and relations would be no reason at all why they should
will good rather than evil to each other. To represent the nature and
relations of moral agents as the foundation of moral obligation, is to
mystify and misrepresent the whole subject of moral law, moral government,
moral obligation, the mature of sin and holiness, and produce confusion in
all our thoughts on moral subjects. What but grossest error can find a
lodgment in that mind that consistently regards the nature and relations
of moral beings as the foundation of moral obligation ? If this be the
true theory, then the nature and relations of moral agents is the ultimate
end to which moral agents are bound to consecrate themselves. Their
nature and relations is the intrinsically valuable end which we are bound
to choose for its own sake. This is absurd. But if this philosophy mis-
represents the foundation of moral obligation, it can consistently teach
absolutely nothing but error on the whole subject of morals and religion.
If it mistakes the end to be intended by moral agents, it errs on the fun-
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 131
damental principle of all morals and religion. As all true morality and
true religion consist exclusively in willing the right end, if this end be
mistaken, the error is fatal. It is, then, no light thing to hold that moral
obligation is founded in the nature and relations of moral beings. Such
statements are a great deal worse than nonsense—they are radical error
on the most important subject in the world. What consistency can there
be in the views of one who holds this theory 2 What ideas must he have
of moral law, and of everything else connected with practical theology?
Instead of willing the highest good of God and of being, he must hold
himself under obligation to will the nature and relations of moral beings as
an ultimate end.
8. The next theory in order is that which teaches that the idea of duty
is the foundation of moral obligation.
But as I sufficiently exposed the tendency and practical bearings of this
theory in a former lecture, I will not repeat here, but pass to the consider-
ation of another theory.
9. The comple.city of the foundation of moral obligation.
In respect to the practical bearings of this theory, I remark,+
(1.) The reason that induces choice is the real object chosen. If, for
example, the value of an object induce the choice of that object, the valuable
is the real object chosen. If the rightness of a choice of an object induce
choice, then the right is the real object chosen. If the virtuousness of an
object induce choice, then virtue is the real object chosen.
(2) Whatever really influences the mind in choosing must be an object
chosen. Thus if the mind have various reasons for a choice, it will choose
various ends or objects,
(3.) If the foundation of moral obligation be not a unit, moral action or
intention cannot be simple. If anything else than the intrinsically valuable
to being is, or can be, the foundation of moral obligation, then this thing,
whatever it is, is to be chosen for its own sake. If right, justice, truth,
virtue, or anything else is to be chosen as an end, then just so much regard
must be had to then, as their nature and importance demand. If the good
or valuable to being be an ultimate good, and truth, and justice, and virtue
are also to be chosen each for its own sake, here we meet with this difficulty,
namely, that the good or valuable is one end to be chosen, and right another,
and virtue another, and truth another, and justice another, and the beauti-
ful another, and so on. Now if this be so, moral obligation cannot be a
unit, nor can moral action be simple. If there be more ultimate considera-
tions than one that ought to have influence in deciding choice, the choice
is not right, unless each consideration that ought to have weight, really has
the influence due to it in deciding choice. If each consideration has not
its due regard, the choice certainly is not what it ought to be. In other
K 2
132 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
words, all the things that ought to be chosen for their own sakes are not
chosen. Indeed, it is self-evident that, if there is complexity in the ultimate
end or end to be chosen, there must be the same complexity in the choice, or
the choice is not what it ought to be ; and if several considerations ought to
influence ultimate choice, then there are so many distinct ultimate ends.
If this is so, then each of them must have its due regard in every case of
virtuous intention. But who them could ever tell whether he allowed to
each exactly the relative influence it ought to have 2 This would confound
and stultify the whole subject of moral obligation. This theory virtually
and flatly contradicts the law of God and the repeated declaration that
love to God and our neighbour is the whole of virtue. What! does God
say that all the law is fulfilled in one word—love, that is, love to God and
our neighbour? and shall a Christian philosopher overlook this, and insist
that we ought to love not only God and our neighbour, but to will the
right, and the true, and the just, and the beautiful, and multitudes of such
like things for their own sake? The law of God makes and knows only
one ultimate end, and shall this philosophy be allowed to confuse us by
teaching that there are many ultimate ends, that we ought to will each for
its own sake 2
10. Ilastly, I come to the consideration of the practical bearings of what
I regard as the true theory of the foundation of moral obligation, namely,
that the intrinsic mature and value of the highest well-being of God and of
the universe is the sole foundation of moral obligation.
|Upon this philosophy I remark—
1. That if this be true, the whole subject of moral obligation is perfectly
simple and intelligible; so plain, indeed, that “the wayfaring man, though
a fool, cannot err therein.”
(1) Upon this theory, moral obligation respects the choice of an ultimate
end.
(2.) This end is a clear, simple unit.
(3.) It is necessarily known to every moral agent.
(4.) The choice of this end is the whole of virtue.
(5.) It is impossible to sin while this end is sincerely intended with all
the heart and with all the soul.
(6.) Upon this theory, every moral agent knows in every possible
instance what is right, and eam never mistake his real duty.
We may state it thus—
His duty is to will this end with all the known conditions and means
thereof. Intending this end with a single eye, and doing what appears to
him, with all the light he can obtain, to be in the highest degree calculated
to secure this end, he really does his duty. If in this case he is mistaken
in regard to what is the best means of securing this end, still, with a
benevolent intention, he does not sin. He has dome right, for he has
intended as he ought, and acted outwardly as he thought was the path of
duty, under the best light he could obtain. This, then, was his duty. He
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 133
did not mistake his duty; because it was duty to intend as he intended,
and under the circumstances, to act as he acted. How else should he have
acted ?
(7.) This ultimate intention is right, and nothing else is right, more or
less.
(8.) Right and wrong respect ultimate intention only, and are always
the same. Right can be predicated only of good will, and wrong only of
selfishness. These are fixed and permanent. If a moral agent can know
what end he aims at or lives for, he can know, and cannot but know, at all
times, whether he is right or wrong. All that upon this theory a moral
agent needs to be certain of is, whether he lives for the right end, and
this, if at all honest, or if dishonest, he really cannot but know. If he
would ask, what is right or what is duty at any time, he need not wait for
a reply. It is right for him to intend the highest good of being as an
end. If he honestly does this, he cannot mistake his duty, for in doing
this he really performs the whole of duty. With this honest intention, it
is impossible that he should not use the means to promote this end,
according to the best light he has ; and this is right. A single eye to the
highest good of God and the universe, is the whole of morality, strictly
considered; and, upon this theory, moral law, moral government, moral
obligation, virtue, vice, and the whole subject of morals and religion are
the perfection of simplicity. If this theory be true, no honest mind ever
mistook the path of duty. To intend the highest good of being is right
and is duty. No mind is honest that is not steadily pursuing this end.
But in the honest pursuit of this end there can be no sin, no mistaking
the path of duty. That is and must be the path of duty that really
appears to a benevolent mind to be so. That is, it must be his duty to act
in conformity with his honest convictions. This is duty, this is right. So,
upon this theory, no one who is truly honest in pursuing the highest good
of being, ever did or can mistake his duty in any such sense as to commit
sin. I have spoken with great plainness, and perhaps with some severity,
of the several systems of error, as I cannot but regard them, upon the
most fundamental and important of subjects; not certainly from any want
of love to those who hold them, but from a concern, long cherished and
growing upon me, for the honour of truth and for the good of being. Should
any of you ever take the trouble to look into this subject, in its length and
breadth, and read the various systems, and take the trouble to trace out
their practical results, as actually developed in the opinions and practices
of men, you certainly would not be at a loss to account for the theological
and philosophical fogs that so bewilder the world. How can it be otherwise,
while such confusion of opinion prevails upon the fundamental question of
morals and religion ?
How is it, that there is so much profession and so little real practical
benevolence in the world 2 Multitudes of professed Christians seem to
have no conception that benevolence constitutes true religion; that nothing
else does; and that selfishness is sin, and totally incompatible with religion.
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MORAL GOVERNMENT. 135
LECTURE XIV.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
I. IN WHAT SENSE OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW CANNOT BE PARTIAL.
In discussing this question I must—
1. Show what constitutes obedience to moral law.
2. That obedience cannot be partial in the sense that the subject ever
does, or can, partly obey, and partly disobey, at the same time.
1. What constitutes obedience to moral law.
We have seen in former lectures, that disinterested benevolence is all
that the spirit of moral law requires, that is, that the love which it requires
to God and our neighbour is good-willing, willing the highest good, or well-
being of God, and of being in general, as an end, or for its own sake ; that
this willing is a consecration of all the powers, so far as they are under the
control of the will, to this end. Entire consecration to this end must of
course constitute obedience to the moral law. The next question is : Can
consecration to this end be real, and yet partial in the sense of mot being
entire, for the time being 2 This conducts us to the second proposition,
namely,–
2. That obedience cannot be partial in the sense that the subject ever does,
or can, partly obey, and partly disobey, at the same time.
That is, consecration, to be real, must be, for the time being, entire and
universal. It will be seen, that this discussion respects the simplicity of
moral action, that is whether the choices of the will that have any degree
of conformity to moral law, are always, and necessarily, wholly conformed, or
wholly,discomformed to it. There are two distinct branches to this inquiry.
(1.) The one is, Can the will at the same time make opposite choices?
Can it choose the highest good of being as an ultimate end, and at the
same time choose any other ultimate end, or make any choices whatever,
inconsistent with this ultimate choice 2
(2.) The second branch of this inquiry respects the strength or intensity
of the choice. Suppose but one ultimate choice can exist at the same
time, may not that choice be less efficient and intense than it ought to be 2
Let us take up these two inquiries in their order.
(1) Can the will at the same time choose opposite and conflicting ultimate
ends 2 While one ultimate end is chosen can the will choose anything
inconsistent with this end? In reply to the first branch of this inquiry I
observe,
(a.) That the choice of an ultimate end is, and must be, the Supreme
breference of the mind. Sin is the supreme preference of self-gratification,
Holiness is the supreme preference of the good of being. Can then two
supreme preferences co-exist in the same mind 2 It is plainly impossible
136 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to make opposite choices at the same time, that is, to choose opposite and
conflicting ultimate ends. tº
(b.) All intelligent choice, as has been formerly shown, must respect
ends or means. Choice is synonymous with intention. If there is a
choice or intention, of necessity something must be chosen or intended.
This something must be chosen for its own sake, or as an end, or for the
sake of something else to which it sustains the relation of a means. To
deny this were to deny that the choice is intelligent. But we are speaking
of no other than intelligent choice, or the choice of a moral agent.
(c.) This conducts us to the inevitable conclusion—that no choice what-
ever can be made inconsistent with the present choice of an ultimate end.
The mind cannot choose one ultimate end, and choose at the same time
another ultimate end. But if this caunot be, it is plain that it cannot
choose one ultimate end, and at the same time, while in the exercise of
that choice, choose the means to secure some other ultimate end, which
other end is not chosen. But if all choice must necessarily respect ends
or means, and if the mind can choose but one ultimate end at a time, it
follows that, while in the exercise of one choice, or while in the choice of
one ultimate end, the mind cannot choose, for the time being, anything
inconsistent with that choice. The mind, in the choice of an ultimate
end, is shut up to the necessity of willing the means to accomplish that
end ; and before it can possibly will means to secure any other ultimate
end, it must change its choice of an end. If, for example, the Soul choose
the highest well-being of God and the universe as an ultimate end, it
cannot while it continues to choose that end, use or choose the means to
effect any other end. It cannot, while this choice continues, choose self-
gratification, or anything else, as an ultimate end, nor can it put forth any
volition whatever known to be inconsistent with this end. Nay, it can put
forth no intelligent volition whatever that is not designed to secure this
end. The only possible choice inconsistent with this end is the choice of
another ultimate end. When this is done, other means can be used or
chosen, and not before. This, them, is plaim, to wit, that obedience to moral
law cannot be partial, in the sense either that the mind can choose two
opposite ultimate ends at the same time, or that it can choose one ultimate
end, and at the same time use or choose means to secure any other ultimate
end. It “cannot serve God and mammon.” It cannot will the good of
being as an ultimate end, and at the same time will self-gratification as an
ultimate end. In other words, it cannot be selfish and benevolent at the
same time. It cannot choose as an ultimate end the highest good of being,
and at the same time choose to gratify self as an ultimate end. Until
self-gratification is chosen as an end, the mind cannot will the means of
self-gratification. This disposes of the first branch of the inquiry.
(2) The second branch of the inquiry respects the strength or intensity
of the choice.
May not the choice of an end be real and yet have less than the required
strength or intensity 2 The inquiry resolves itself into this: can the mind
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 137
honestly intend or choose an ultimate end, and yet not choose it with all
the strength or intensity which is required, or with which it ought to
choose it? Now what degree of strength is demanded ? By what criterion
is this question to be settled 2 It cannot be that the degree of intensity
required is equal to the real value of the end chosen, for this is infinite.
The value of the highest well-being of God and the universe is infinite.
But a finite being cannot be under obligation to exert infinite strength.
The law requires him only to exert his own strength. But does he, or
may he, not choose the right end, but with less than all his strength 2 All
his strength lies in his will ; the question, therefore, is, may he not will it
honestly, and yet at the same time withhold a part of the strength of his
will 2 No one can presume that the choice can be acceptable unless it be
honest. Can it be honest, and yet less intense and energetic than it ought
to be 2
We have seen in a former lecture that the perception of an end is a
condition of moral obligation to choose that end. I now remark that, as
light in respect to the end is the condition of the obligation, so the degree
of obligation cannot exceed the degree of light. That is, the mind must
apprehend the valuable as a condition of the obligation to will it. The
degree of the obligation must be just equal to the mind's honest estimate
of the value of the end. The degree of the obligation must vary as the
light varies. This is the doctrine of the Bible and of reason. If this is
so, it follows that the mind is honest when, and only when, it devotes its
strength to the end in view, with an intensity just proportioned to its
present light, or estimate of the value of that end.
We have seen that the mind cannot will anything inconsistent with a
present ultimate choice. If, therefore, the end is not chosen with an
energy and intensity equal to the present light, it cannot be because a part
of the strength is employed in some other choice. If all the strength is
not given to this object, it must be because some part of it is voluntarily
withholden. That is, I choose the end, but not with all my strength, or I
choose the end, but choose not to choose it with all my strength. Is this
an honest choice, provided the end appears to me to be worthy of all my
strength 2 Certainly it is not honest.
But again : it is absurd to affirm that I choose an ultimate end, and yet
do not consecrate to it all my strength. The choice of any ultimate end
implies that that is the thing, and the only thing, for which we live and
act; that we aim at, and live for nothing else, for the time being. Now
what is intended by the assertion, that I may honestly choose an ultimate
end, and yet with less strength or intensity than I ought? Is it intended
that I can honestly choose an ultimate end, and yet not at every moment
keep my will upon the strain, and will at every moment with the utmost
possible intensity? If this be the meaning, I grant that it may be so. But
I at the same time contend, that the law of God does not require that the
will, or any other faculty, should be at every moment upon the Strain, and
the whole strength exerted at every moment. If it does, it is manifest
| 38 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
that even Christ did not obey it. I insist that the moral law requires
nothing more than honesty of intention, and assumes that homesty of
intention will and must secure just that degree of intensity which, from
time to time, the mind in its best judgment sees to be demanded. The
Bible everywhere assumes that sincerity or honesty of intention is moral
perſection ; that it is obedience to the law. The terms sincerity and
perfection in scripture language are synonymous. Uprightness, sincerity,
holiness, honesty, perfection, are words of the same meaning in Bible
language.
2. Again : it seems to be intuitively certain that if the mind chooses its
ultimate end, it must in the very act of choice consecrate all its time, and
strength, and being, to that end ; and at every moment, while the choice
remains, choose and act with an intensity in precise conformity with its
ability and the best light it has. The intensity of the choice, and the
strenuousness of its efforts to secure the end chosen, must, if the intention
be sincere, correspond with the view which the soul has of the importance
of the end chosen. It does not seem possible that the choice or intention
should be real and honest unless this is so. To will at every moment with
the utmost strength and intensity is not only impossible, but, were it
possible to do so, could not be in accordance with the soul's convictions of
duty. The irresistible judgment of the mind is, that the intensity of its
action should not exceed the bound of endurance ; that the energies of
both soul and body should be so husbanded, as to be able to accomplish
the most good upon the whole, and not in a given moment.
But to return to the question —does the law of God require simply
uprightness of intention? or does it require not only uprightness, but also
a certain degree of intensity in the intention 2 Is it satisfied with simple
sincerity or uprightness of intention, or does it require that the highest
possible intensity of choice shall exist at every moment 2 When it requires
that we should love God with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the
mind, and with all the strength, does it mean that all our heart, Soul,
mind, and strength, shall be consecrated to this end, and be used up, from
moment to moment, and from hour to hour, according to the best judgment
which the mind can form of the necessity and expediency of strenuousness
of effort 2 or does it mean that all the faculties of soul and body shall be
at every moment on the strain to the uttermost 2 Does it mean that the
whole being is to be consecrated to, and used up for, God with the best
economy of whith the soul is capable? or does it require that the whole
being be not only consecrated to God, but be used up without any regard
to economy, and without the Soul's exercising any judgment or discretion
in the case ? In other words, is the law of God the law of reason, or of
folly 2 Is it intelligible and just in its demands? or is it perfectly unin-
telligible and unjust 2 Is it a law suited to the nature, relations, and cir-
cumstances, of moral agents 2 or has it no regard to them 2 If it has no
regard to either, is it, can it be, moral law, and impose moral obligation ?
It seems to me that the law of God requires that all our power, and
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 139
strength, and being, be honestly and continually consecrated to God, and
held, not in a state of the utmost tension, but that the strength shall be
expended and employed in exact accordance with the mind's honest judg:
ment of what is at every moment the best economy for God. If this be
not the meaning and the spirit of the law, it cannot be law, for it could be
neither intelligible nor just. Nothing else can be a law of nature. What!
does, or can the command, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all
thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy strength,”
require that every particle of my strength, and every faculty of my being,
shall be in a state of the utmost possible tension ? How long could my
strength hold out, or my being last, under such a pressure as this 2 What
reason, or justice, or utility, or equity, or wisdom, could there be in such a
commandment as this 2 Would this be suited to my nature and relations?
That the law does not require the constant and most intense action of the
will, I argue for the following reasons:—
1. No creature in heaven or earth could possibly know whether he
ever for a single moment obeyed it. How could he know that no more
tension could possibly be endured 2
2. Such a requirement would be unreasonable, inasmuch as such a
state of mind would be unendurable.
3. Such a state of constant tension and strain of the faculties could be
of no possible use.
4. It would be uneconomical. More good could be effected by a
husbanding of the strength.
5. Christ certainly obeyed the moral law, and yet nothing is more
evident than that his faculties were not always on the strain.
6. Every one knows that the intensity of the will’s action depends and
must depend upon the clearness with which the value of the olject chosen
is perceived. It is perfectly absurd to suppose that the will should, or
possibly can act at all times with the same degree of intensity. As the
mind's apprehensions of truth vary, the intensity of the will's action must
vary, or it does not act rationally, and consequently not virtuously. The
intensity of the actions of the will, ought to vary as light varies, and if it
does not, the mind is not homest. If homest, it must vary as light and
ability wary.
That an intention cannot be right and homest in kind and deficient in
the degree of intensity, I argue—
1. From the fact that it is absurd to talk of an intention right in kind,
while it is deficient in intensity. What does rightness in kind mean? Does
it mean simply that the intention terminates on the proper object? But
is this the right kind of intention, when only the proper object is chosen,
while there is a voluntary withholding of the required energy of choice? Is
this, can this, be an honest intention ? If so, what is meant by an honest
intention ? Is it homest, can it be homest, voluntarily to withhold from
God and the universe what we perceive to be their due 2 and what we are
conscious We might render? It is a contradiction to call this honest. In
140 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
what sense then may, or can, an intention be acceptable in kind, while
deficient in degree ? Certainly in no sense, unless known and voluntary
dishonesty can be acceptable. But again let me ask, what is intended by
an intention being deficient in degree of intensity ? If this deficiency be
a sinful deficiency, it must be a known deficiency. That is, the subject of
it must know at the time that his intention is in point of intensity less
than it ought to be, or that he wills with less energy than he ought; or, in
other words, that the energy of the choice does not equal, or is not agree-
able to, his own estimate of the value of the end chosen. But this implies
an absurdity. Suppose I choose an end, that is, I choose a thing solely on
account of its own intrinsic value. It is for its value that I choose it. I
choose it for its value, but not according to its value. My perception of
its value led me to choose it; and yet, while I choose it for that reason, I
voluntarily withhold that degree of intensity which I know is demanded by
my own estimate of the value of the thing which I choose This is a
manifest absurdity and contradiction. If I choose a thing for its value,
this implies that I choose it according to my estimate of its value. Hap-
piness, for example, is a good in itself. Now, suppose I will its existence
impartially, that is, solely on account of its intrinsic value; now, does not
this imply that every degree of happiness must be willed according to its
real or relative value 2 Can I will it impartially, for its own sake, for and
only for its intrinsic value, and yet not prefer a greater to a less amount of
happiness P This is impossible. Willing it on account of its intrinsic value
implies willing it according to my estimate of its intrinsic value. So, it
must be that an intention cannot be sincere, homest, and acceptable in
kind, while it is sinfully deficient in degree. I will introduce here with
some alteration and addition what I have elsewhere stated upon this sub-
ject. I quote from my letter in the Oberlin Evangelist upon the following
proposition —
Moral character is always wholly right or wholly wrong, and never
partly right and partly wrong at the same time.
“I must again remind you of that in which moral character consists, and
occupy a few moments in repeating what I have already said, that moral
character belongs solely to the ultimate intention of the mind, or to choice,
as distinguished from volition. The law of God requires supreme disin-
terested benevolence; and all holiness, in the last analysis, resolves itself
into some modification of Supreme, disinterested benevolence, or good-
willing. Benevolence, or good-willing, is synonymous with good-intending,
or intending good. Now, the true spirit of the requirement of the moral
law is this—that every moral being shall choose every interest according to
its value as perceived by the mind. This is holiness. It is exercising
supreme love or good-will to God, and equal love or good-will to our
neighbour.”
This is a choice or intention, as distinguished from a volition. It is also
an ultimate intention, as distinguished from a proximate intention.
Choice is the selection of an ultimate end. Wolition is produced by
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 14 l
choice, and is the effort of the will to accomplish the end chosen. An
ultimate object of choice, is that which is intended or chosen for its own
sake, or as an ultimate end, and not something chosen or intended as a
means to accomplish some other and higher end. A proximate end is that
which is chosen or intended, not as an ultimate end, but as a means to an
ultimate end. If I choose an end, I, of course, put forth those volitions
which are requisite to the accomplishment of that end. Holiness, or virtue,
consists in the supreme ultimate intention, choice, or willing of the highest
well-being of God and the highest good of his kingdom. N othing else than
this is virtue or holiness.
As holiness consists in ultimate intention, so does sin. And as holiness
consists in choosing the highest well-being of God and the good of the
universe, for its own sake, or as the Supreme ultimate end of pursuit; so
sin consists in willing, with a supreme choice or intention, self-gratification
and self-interest. Preferring a less to a greater good, because it is our
own, is selfishness. All selfishness consists in a supreme ultimate intention.
By an ultimate intention, as I have said, is intended that which is chosen
for its own sake as an end, and not as a means to Some other end. When-
ever a moral being prefers or chooses his own gratifieation, or his own
interest, in preference to a higher good, because it is his own, he chooses
it as an end, for its own sake, and as an ultimate end; not designing it as
a means of promoting any other and higher end, nor because it is a part of
universal good. Every sin, then, consists in an act of Will. It consists in
preferring self-gratification, or self-interest, to the authority of God, the
glory of God, and the good of the universe. It is, therefore, and must be,
a supreme ultimate choice, or intention.
Sin and holiness, then, both consist in supreme, ultimate, and opposite
choices, or intentions, and cannot, by any possibility, co-exist.
But for the sake of entering more at large into the discussion of this
question, I will—
1. Examine a little in detail the philosophy of the question, and—
2. Bring the philosophy into the light of the Bible,
And in discussing the philosophy of the question, I would observe, that
five suppositions may be made, and so far as I can see, only five, in respect
to this subject.
1. It may be supposed, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in
the same mind.
2. It may be supposed, that the same act or choice may have a complex
character, on account of complexity in the motives which induce it.
3. It may be supposed, that an act or choice may be right, or holy in
kind, but deficient in intensity or degree. Or—
4. That the will, or heart, may be right, while the affections, or emotions,
are wrong. Or—
5. That there may be a ruling, latent, actually existing, holy preference,
or intention, co-existing with opposing volitions.
Now, unless one of these suppositions is true, it must follow that moral
142 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
character is either wholly right or wholly wrong, and never partly right and
partly wrong at the same time.
And now to the examination.
1. It may be supposed, that Selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in
the same mind.
It has been shown that selfishness and benevolence are supreme, ulti-
mate, and opposite choices, or intentions. They cannot, therefore, by any
possibility, co-exist in the same mind.
2. The next supposition is, that the same act or choice may have a
complex character, on account of complexity in the motives. On this let
me say :—
(1.) Motives are objective or subjective. An objective motive is that
thing external to the mind that induces choice or intention. Subjective
motive is the intention itself.
(2.) Character, therefore, does not belong to the objective motive, or to
that thing which the mind chooses; but moral character is confined to the
subjective motive, which is synonymous with choice or intention. Thus
we say a man is to be judged by his motives, meaning that his character is
as his intention is. Multitudes of objective motives or considerations, may
have concurred directly or indirectly in their influence, to induce choice or
intention; but the intention or subjective motive is always necessarily
simple and indivisible. In other words, moral character consists in the
choice of an ultimate end, and this end is to be chosen for its own sake,
else it is not an ultimate end. If the end chosen be the highest well-being
of God and the good of the universe—if it be the willing or intending to
promote and treat every interest in the universe, according to its perceived
relative value, it is a right, a holy motive, or intention. If it be anything
else, it is sinful. Now, whatever complexity there may have been in the
considerations that led the Way to this choice or intention, it is self-evident
that the intention must be one, simple, and indivisible.
(3.) Whatever complexity there might have been in those considerations
that prepared the way to the settling down upon this intention, the mind in a
virtuous choice has, and can have, but one ultimate reason for its choice, and
that is the intrinsic value of the thing chosen. The highest well-being of God,
the good of the universe, and every good according to its perceived relative
value, must be chosen for one, and only one reason, and that is the intrinsic
value of the good which is chosen for its own sake. If chosen for any other
reason, the choice is not virtuous. It is absurd to say, that a thing is good and
valuable in itself, but may be rightly chosen, not for that but for some other
reason—that God's highest well-being and the happiness of the universe
are an infinite good in themselves, but are not to be chosen for that
reason, and on their own account, but for some other reason. Holiness,
then, must always consist in singleness of eye or intention. It must con-
sist in the supreme disinterested choice, Willing, or intending the good of
God and of the universe, for its own sake. In this intention there cannot
be any complexity. If there were, it would not be holy, but sinful. It is,
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 143
therefore, sheer nonsense to say, that one and the same choice may have a
complex character, on account of complexity of motive. For that motive
in which moral character consists, is the Supreme ultimate intention, or
choice. This choice, or intention, must consist in the choice of a thing as
an end, and for its own sake. The supposition, then, that the same choice
or intention may have a complex character, on account of complexity in the
motives, is wholly inadmissible.
If it be still urged, that the intention or subjective motive may be com-
plex—that several things may be included in the intention, and be aimed
at by the mind—and that it may, therefore, be partly holy and partly sinful
—I reply :—
(4.) If by this it be meant that several things may be aimed at or
intended by the mind at the same time, I inquire what things?—It is
true, that the supreme, disinterested choice of the highest good of being,
may include the intention to use all the necessary means. It may also
include the intention to promote every interest in the universe, according
to its perceived relative value. These are all properly included in one
intention ; but this implies no such complexity in the subjective motive,
as to include both sin and holiness.
(5.) If by complexity of intention is meant, that it may be partly disin-
terestedly benevolent, and partly selfish, which it must be to be partly
holy and partly sinful, I reply, that this supposition is absurd. It has
been shown that selfishness and benevolence consist in Supreme, ultimate,
and opposite choices or intentions. To suppose, then, that an intention
can be both holy and sinful, is to suppose that it may include two supreme,
opposite, and ultimate choices or intentions, at the same time; in other
Words, that I may supremely and disinterestedly intend to regard and pro
mote every interest in the universe, according to its perceived relative
value, for its own sake; and at the same time, may supremely regard my
own self-interest and self gratification, and in some things supremely intend
to promote my selfish interests, in opposition to the interests of the universe
and the commands of God. But this is naturally impossible. An ultimate
intention, then, may be complex in the sense, that it may include the
design to promote every perceived interest, according to its relative value;
but it cannot, by any possibility, be complex in the sense that it includes
selfishness and benevolence, or holiness and sin.
3. The third supposition is, that holiness may be right, or pure in kind,
but deficient in degree. On this, I remark:—
(1) We have seen that moral character consists in the ultimate intention.
(3.) The supposition, therefore, must be, that the intention may be
right, or pure in kind, but deficient in the degree of its strength. *
(3.) Our intention is to be tried by the law of God, both in respect to
its kind and degree.
(4.) The law of God requires us to will, or intend the promotion of
every interest in the universe, according to its perceived relative value, for
its own sake; in other words, that all our powers shall be supremely
144 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and disinterestedly devoted to the glory of God, and the good of the
lihl Vel'Sé.
(5.) This cannot mean, that any faculty shali at every moment be kept
upon the strain, or in a state of utmost tension, for this would be incon-
sistent with natural ability. It would be to require a natural impossibility,
and therefore be unjust.
(6.) It cannot mean that at all times, and on all subjects, the same
degree of exertion shall be made ; for the best possible discharge of duty
does not always require the same degree or intensity of mental or corporeal
eXertlon.
(7.) The law cannot, justly or possibly, require more, than that the
whole being shall be consecrated to God—that we shall fully and honestly
will or intend the promotion of every interest, according to its perceived
relative value, and according to the extent of our ability.
(8.) Now the strength or intensity of the intention must, and ought, of
necessity, to depend upon the degree of our knowledge or light in regard
to any object of choice. If our obligation is not to be graduated by the
light we possess, then it would follow, that we may be under obligation to
exceed our natural ability, which cannot be.
(9.) The importance which we attach to objeets of choice, and con-
sequently the degree of ardour or intenseness of the intention, must depend
upon the clearness or obscurity of our views, of the real or relative value of
the objects of choice.
(10.) Our obligation cannot be measured by the views which God has of
the importance of those objects of choice. It is a well-settled and generally-
admitted truth, that increased light increases responsibility, or moral obli-
gation. No creature is bound to will any thing with the intenseness or
degree of strength with which God wills it, for the plain reason, that no
creature sees its importance or real value, as He does. If our obligation
were to be graduated by God's knowledge of the real value of objects, we
could never obey the moral law, either in this world or the world to come,
nor could any being but God ever, by any possibility, meet its demands.
(11.) Nor can our obligation be measured by the views or knowledge
which angels may have of the intrinsic or relative value of the glory of God,
the worth of souls, and the good of the universe.
(12.) Nor can the obligation of a heathem be measured by the know-
ledge and light of a Christian.
(13.) Nor the obligation of a child by the knowledge of a man.
(14.) The fact is, that the obligation of every moral being must be
graduated by his knowledge.
(15.) If, therefore, his intention be equal in its intensity to his views
or knowledge of the real or relative value of different objects, it is right.
It is up to the full measure of his obligation ; and if his own homest judg-
ment is not to be made the measure of his obligation, then his obligation
can exceed what he is able to know ; which contradicts the true nature of
moral law, and is, therefore, false.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 145
(16.) If conscious honesty of intention, both as it respects the kind and
degree of intention, according to the degree of light possessed, be not
entire obedience to moral law, then there is no being in heaven or earth,
who can know himself to be entirely obedient ; for all that any being can
possibly know upon this subject is, that he honestly wills or intends, in
accordance with the dictates of his reason, or the judgment which he has
of the real or relative value of the object chosen.
(17.) If something more than this can be required, them a law can be *
binding farther than it is prescribed, or so published that it may be known,
which is contradictory to natural justice, and absurd. f
(18.) No moral being can possibly blame or charge himself with any
default, when he is conscious of homestly intending, willing, or choosing,
and acting, according to the best light he has : for in this case he obeys
the law, as he understands it, and, of course, cannot conceive himself to be
condemned by the law.
(19.) Good-willing, or intending is, in respect to God, to be at all times
supreme, and in respect to other beings, it is to be in proportion to the
relative value of their happiness, as perceived by the mind. This is always
to be the intention. The volitions, or efforts of the will to promote these
objects, may vary, and Qught to vary indefinitely in their intensity, in
proportion to the particular duty to which, for the time being, we are called.
(20.) But further, we have seen that virtue consists in willing every
good according to its perceived relative value, and that nothing short of
this is virtue. But this is perfect virtue for the time being. In other
words, virtue and moral perfection, in respect to a given act, or state of
the will, are synonymous terms. Virtue is holiness. Holiness is upright-
ness. Uprightness is that which is just what, under the circumstances, it
should be ; and nothing else is virtue, holiness, or uprightness. Virtue,
holiness, uprightness, moral perfection—when we apply these terms to any
given state of the will—are synonymous. To talk, therefore, of a virtue,
holiness, uprightness, justice—right in kind, but deficient in degree—is to
talk sheer nonsense. It is the same absurdity as to talk of sinful holiness,
an unjust justice, a wrong rightness, an impure purity, an imperfect per-
fection, a disobedient obedience.
(21.) The fact is, virtue, holiness, uprightness, &c., signify a definite
thing, and never anything else than conformity to the law of God. That
which is not entirely conformed to the law of God is not holiness. This
must be true in philosophy, and the Bible affirms the same thing. “Who-
soever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty
of all.” The spirit of this text as clearly and as fully assumes and affirms
the doctrine under consideration, as if it had been uttered with that design
alone.
(22.) God has no right to call that holy which is defective in degree,
(23.) Unless every perceived interest is, for the time being, willed or
intended according to its relative value, there is no virtue. Where this
intention exists, there ean be no sin.
146 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
4. The next supposition is, that the will, or heart, may be right, while
the affections or emotions are wrong. Upon this I remark:
(1.) That this supposition overlooks the véry thing in which moral
character consists. It has been shown that moral character consists in the
Supreme ultimate intention of the mind, and that this supreme, dis-
interested benevolence, good-Willing, or intention, is the whole of virtue.
Now this intention originates volitions. It directs the attention of the
mind, and, therefore, produces thoughts, emotions, or affections. It also,
through volition, produces bodily action. But moral character does not lie
in outward actions, the movements of the arm, nor in the volition that
moves the muscles; for that volition terminates upon the action itself. I
will to move my arm, and my arm must move by a law of necessity.
Moral character belongs solely to the intention that produced the volition,
that moved the muscles, to the performance of the outward act. So inten-
tion produces the volition that directs the attention of the mind to a given
object. Attention, by a natural mecessity, produces thought, affection, or
emotion. Now thought, affection, or emotion, are all connected with
volition, by a natural necessity ; that is—if the attention is directed to an
object, corresponding thoughts and emotions must exist, as a matter of
course. Moral character no more lies in emotion, than im outward action.
It does not lie in thought, or attention. It does not lie in the specific
volition that directed the attention; but in that intention, or design of the
mind, that produced the volition, which directed the attention, which,
again, produced the thought, which, again, produced the emotion. Now
the supposition, that the intention may be right, while the emotions or
feelings of the mind may be wrong, is the same as to say, that outward
action may be wrong, while the intention is right. The fact is, that moral
character is, and must be, as the intention is. If any feeling or outward
action is inconsistent with the existing ultimate intention, it must be so in
spite of the agent. But if any outward action or state of feeling exists, in
opposition to the intention or choice of the mind, if cannot, by any possi-
bility, have moral character. Whatever is beyond the control of a moral
agent, he cannot be responsible for. Whatever he cannot control by
intention, he cannot control at all. Everything for which he can possibly
be responsible, resolves itself into his intention. His whole character,
therefore, is, and must be, as his intention is. If, therefore, temptations,
from whatever quarter they may come, produce emotions within him incon-
sistent with his intention, and which he cannot control, he cannot be
responsible for them.
(2.) As a matter of fact, although emotions, contrary to his intentions,
may, by circumstances beyond his control, be brought to exist in his mind;
yet, by willing to divert the attention of the mind from the objects that
produce them, they can ordinarily be banished from the mind. If this is
done as soon as in the nature of the case it can be, there is no sin. If it
is not done as soon as in the nature of the case it can be, then it is
absolutely certain that the intention is not what it ought to be. The
MORAL GOVERNMENT. J47
intention is to devote the whole being to the service of God and the good
of the universe, and of course to avoid every thought, affection, and
emotion, inconsistent with this. While this intention exists, it is certain
that if any object be thrust upon the attention which excites thoughts and
emotions inconsistent with Our Supreme ultimate intention, the attention of
the mind will be instantly diverted from those objects, and the hated
emotion hushed, if this is possible. For, while the intention exists,
corresponding volitions must exist. There cannot, therefore, be a right
state of heart or intention, while the emotions, or affections, of the mind
are sinful. For emotions are in themselves in no case sinful, and when
they exist against the will, through the force of temptation, the Soul is not
responsible for their existence. And, as I said, the supposition overlooks
that in which moral character consists, and makes it to consist in that over
which the law does not properly legislate ; for love, or benevolence, is the
fulfilling of the law.
But here it may be said, that the law not only requires benevolence, or
good-willing, but requires a certain kind of emotions, just as it requires the
performance of certain outward actions, and that therefore there may be a
right intention where there is a deficiency, either in kind or degree, of right
emotion : To this I answer —
Outward actions are required of men, only because they are connected
with intention, by a matural necessity. And no outward action is ever
required of us, unless it can be produced by intending and aiming to do it.
If the effect does not follow our honest endeavours, because of any antago-
mistic influence, opposed to our exertions, which we cannot overcome, we
have, by our intention, complied with the spirit of the law, and are not to
blame that the outward effect does not take place. Just so with emotions,
All we have power to do, is, to direct the attention of the mind to those
objects calculated to secure a given state of emotion. If, from any exhaus-
tion of the sensibility, or from any other cause beyond our control, the
emotions do not arise which the consideration of that subject is calculated to
produce, we are no more responsible for the absence or weakness of the
emotion, than we should be for the Want of power or weakness of motion in
our muscles, when We Willed to move them, provided that weakness was
involuntary and beyond our control. The fact is, we cannot be blame-
worthy for not feeling or doing that which we cannot do or feel by intending
it. If the intention then is what it ought to be for the time being, nothing
can be morally wrong.
5. The last supposition is, that a latent preference, or right intention,
may co-exist with opposing or sinful volitions. Upon this I remark:—
That I have formerly supposed that this could be true, but am now con-
vinced that it cannot be true : for the following reasons:
(1.) Observe, the supposition is, that the intention or ruling preference
may be right—may really exist as an active and virtuous state of mind
While, at the same time, volition may exist inconsistent with it. y
(2.) Now what is a right intention ? I answer: Nothing short of this—
L Q
148 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Willing, choosing, or intending the highest good of God and of the universe,
and to promote this at every moment, to the extent of our ability. In
other Words—right intention is supreme, disinterested benevolence. Now
what are the elements which enter into this right intention?
(a.) The choice or willing of every interest according to its perceived
intrinsic value.
(b) To devote our entire being, now and for ever, to this end. This is
right intention. Now the question is, can this intention co-exist with a
Volition inconsistent with it? Volition implies the choice of something,
for some reason. If it be the choice of whatever can promote this
Supremely benevolent end, and for that reason, the volition is consistent
With the intention ; but if it be the choice of something perceived to be
inconsistent with this end, and for a selfish reason, then the volition is
inconsistent with the supposed intention. But the question is, do the
Volition and intention co-exist? According to the supposition, the will
chooses, or wills, something, for a selfish reason, or something perceived to
be inconsistent with supreme, disinterested benevolence. Now it is plainly
impossible, that this choice can take place while the opposite intention
exists. For this selfish volition is, according to the supposition, sinful or
selfish ; that is, something is chosen for its own sake, which is inconsistent
with disinterested benevolence. But here the intention is ultimate. It
terminates upon the object chosen for its own sake. To suppose, then,
that benevolence still remains in exercise, and that a volition co-exists
with it that is sinful, involves the absurdity of supposing, that selfishness
and benevolence can co-exist in the same mind, or that the will can choose,
or will, with a supreme preference or choice, two opposites at the same
time. This is plainly impossible. Suppose I intend to go to the city of
New York as soon as I possibly can. Now, if, on my way, I will to loiter
needlessly a moment, I necessarily relinquish one indispensable element of
my intention. In willing to loiter, or turn aside to some other object for
a day, or an hour, I must, of necessity, relinquish the intention of going
as soon as I possibly can. I may not design finally to relinquish my
journey, but I must of necessity relinquish the intention of going as soon
as I can. Now, virtue consists in intending to do all the good I possibly
cam, or in willing the glory of God and the good of the universe, and intend-
ing to promote them to the extent of my ability. Nothing short of this
is virtue. If at any time, I will something perceived to be inconsistent
with this intention, I must, for the time being, relinquish the intention,
as it must indispensably exist in my mind, in order to be virtue. I may
not come to the resolution, that I will never serve God any more, but I
must of necessity relinquish, for the time being, the intention of doing my
utmost to glorify God, if at any time I put forth a selfish volition. For a
selfish volition implies a selfish intention. 1 cannot put forth a volition
intended to secure an end until I have chosen the end. Therefore, a holy
intention cannot co-exist with a selfish volition.
It must be, therefore, that in every sinful choice, the will of a holy being
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 149
must necessarily drop the exercise of supreme, benevolent intention, and
pass into an opposite state of choice; that is, the agent must cease, for
the time being, to exercise benevolence, and make a selfish choice. For,
be it understood, that volition is the choice of a means to an end; and of
course a selfish volition implies a selfish choice of an end.
Having briefly examined the several suppositions that can be made in
regard to the mixed character of actions, I will now answer a few objec-
tions; after which, I will bring this philosophy, as briefly as possible, into
the light of the Bible.
Objection. Does a Christian cease to be a Christian, whenever he com-
mits a sin P I answer:
1. Whenever he sins, he must, for the time being, cease to be holy.
This is self-evident.
2. Whenever he sins, he must be condemned. He must incur the
penalty of the law of God. If he does not, it must be because the law of
God is abrogated. But if the law of God be abrogated, he has no rule of
duty; consequently, can neither be holy nor sinful. If it be said that the
precept is still binding upon him, but that, with respect to the Christian,
the penalty is for ever set aside, or abrogated, I reply—that to abrogate
the penalty is to repeal the precept ; for a precept without penalty is no
law. It is only counsel or advice. The Christian, therefore, is justified
no longer than he obeys, and must be condemned when he disobeys; or
Antinomianism is true. *
3. When the Christian sins, he must repent, and “ do his first Works,”
or he will perish.
4. Until he repents he cannot be forgiven. In these respects, then,
the sinning Christian and the unconverted sinner are upon precisely the
same ground.
5. In two important respects the sinning Christian differs widely from
the unconverted sinner :
(1.) In his relations to God. A Christian is a child of God. A sinning
Christian is a disobedient child of God. An unconverted sinner is a child
of the devil. A Christian sustains a covenant relation to God; such a
covenant relation as to secure to him that discipline which tends to reclaim
and bring him back, if he wanders "away from God. “If his children
forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments : if they break my
statutes and keep not my commandments; then will I visit their trans-
gression with the rod, aud their imiquity with stripes. Nevertheless my
loving-kindness will I not utterly take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness
to fail. My covenant will I not break, nor alter the thing that is gone out
of my lips.” Ps. lxxxix. 30—34.
(2.) The sinning Christian differs from the unconverted man, in the
state of his sensibility. In whatever way it takes place, every Christian
knows that the state of his sensibility in respect to the things of God, has
undergone a great change. Now it is true, that moral character does not
lie in the sensibility, nor in the will's obeying the sensibility. Neverthe
150 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,
less our consciousness teaches us, that our feelings have great power in pro-
moting wrong choice on the one hand, and in, removing obstacles to right
choice on the other. In every Christian's mind there is, therefore, a
foundation laid for appeals to the sensibilities of the soul, that gives truth
a decided advantage over the will. And multitudes of things in the ex-
perience of every Christian, give truth a more decided advantage over his
will, through the intelligence, than is the case with unconverted sinners.
Obj. Can a man be born again, and them be unborn ? I answer :
1. If there were anything impossible in this, then perseverance would
be no virtue.
2. Nome will maintain, that there is anything naturally impossible in
this, except it be those who hold to physical regeneration.
3. If regeneration consist in a change in the ruling preference of the
mind, or in the ultimate intention, as we shall see it does, it is plain, that
an individual can be born again, and afterwards cease to be virtuous.
4. That a Christian is able to apostatize, is evident, from the many’
warmings addressed to Christians in the Bible.
5. A Christian may certainly fall into sin and unbelief, and afterwards
be renewed, both to repentance and faith.
Obj. Can there be no such thing as weak faith, weak love, and weak
repentance 2 I answer:
1. If you mean comparatively weak, I say, yes. But if you mean weak,
in such a sense as to be sinful, I say, no. Faith, repentance, love, and
every Christian grace, properly so called, does and must consist in an act
of will, and resolve itself into some modification of supreme, disinterested
benevolence. I shall, in a future lecture, have occasion to show the philo-
sophical nature of faith. Let it suffice here to say, that faith necessarily
depends upon the clearness or obscurity of the intellectual apprehensions
of truth. Faith, to be real or virtuous, must embrace whatever of truth is
apprehended by the intelligence for the time being.
2. Various causes may operate to divert the intelligence from the objects
of faith, or to cause the mind to perceive but few of them, and those in
comparative obscurity.
3. Faith may be weak, and will certainly and necessarily be weak in
such cases, in proportion to the obscurity of the views. And yet, if the
will or heart confides so far as it apprehends the truth, which it must do to
be virtuous at all, faith cannot be weak in such a sense as to be sinful;
for if a man confides so far as he apprehends or perceives the truth, so far
as faith is concerned he is doing his whole duty.
4. Faith may be weak in the sense, that it often intermits and gives
place to unbelief. Faith is confidence, and unbelief is the withholding
of confidence. It is the rejection of truth perceived. Faith is the recep-
tion of truth perceived. Faith and unbelief, them, are opposite states of
choice, and can by no possibility co-exist.
5. Faith may be weak in respect to its objects. The disciples of our
Lord Jesus Christ knew so little of him, were so filled with ignorance and
MORAT, GOVERNMENT. 151
the prejudices of education, as to have very weak faith in respect to the
Messiahship, power, and divinity of their Master. He speaks of them as
having but little confidence, and yet it does not appear that they did not
implicitly trust him, so far as they understood him. And although
through ignorance, their faith was weak, yet there is no evidence, that
when they had any faith at all they did not confide in whatever of truth
they apprehended.
Obj. But did not the disciples pray, “Increase our faith ?" I answer,
Yes. And by this they must have intended to pray for instruction ; for
what else could they mean? Unless a man means this, when he prays for
faith, he does not know what he prays for. Christ produces faith by en-
lightening the mind. When we pray for faith we pray for light. And
faith, to be real faith at all, must be equal to the light we have. If appre-
hended truth be not implicitly received and confided in, there is no faith,
but unbelief. If it be, faith is what it ought to be, wholly unmixed
with sin.
Obj. But did not one say to our Lord, “Lord, I believe, help thou my
unbelief ;” thus implying, that he was in the exercise both of faith and
unbelief at the same time 2 I answer, yes, but—
1. This was not inspiration.
2. It is not certain that he had any faith at all.
3. If he had, and prayed understandingly, he meant nothing more than
to ask for an increase of faith, or for such a degree of light as to remove his
doubts in respect to the divine power of Christ.
Olj. Again, it is objected that this philosophy contradicts Christian
experience. To this I reply,
That it is absurd to appeal from reason and the Bible to empirical con-
sciousness which must be the appeal in this case. Reason and the Bible
plainly attest the truth of the theory here advocated. What experience is
then to be appealed to, to set their testimony aside 2 Why, Christian ex-
perience, it is replied. But what is Christian experience? How shall we
learn what it is 2 Why surely by appealing to reason and the Bible. But
these declare that if a man offend in one point, he does and must for
the time being violate the spirit of the whole law. Nothing is or can be
more express than is the testimony of both reason and revelation upon this
subject. Here, then, we have the umequivocal decision of the only court
of competent jurisdiction in the case, and shall we befool ourselves by
appealing from this tribunal to the court of empirical consciousness? of
what does that take cognizance? Why, of what actually passes in the
mind; that is, of its mental states, These we are conscious of as facts.
But we call these states Christian experience. How do we ascertain that
they are in accordance with the law and gospel of God? Why only by an
appeal to reason and the Bible. Here, then, we are driven back to the
court from which we had before appealed, whose judgment is always the same.
Obj. But it is said, this theory seems to be true in philosophy, that is,
the intelligence seems to affirm it, but it is not true in fact.
152 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Answer. If the intelligence affirms it, it must be true, or reason deceives
us. But if the reason deceives in this, it may also in other things.
If it fails us here, it fails us on the most important of all questions. If
reason gives false testimony, we can never know truth from error upon any
moral subject. We certainly can never know what religion is or is not,
if the testimony of reason can be set aside. If the reason cannot be
safely appealed to, how are we to know what the Bible means ? for it is
the faculty by which we get at the truth of the oracles of God 2
These are the principal objections to the philosophical view I have taken
of the simplicity of moral action, that occur to my mind. I will now briefly
advert to the consistency of this philosophy with the scriptures.
1. The Bible every where seems to assume the simplicity of moral
action. Christ expressly informed his disciples, that they could not serve
God and mammon. Now by this he did not mean, that a man could not
serve God at one time and mammon at another; but that he could not
serve both at the same time. The philosophy that makes it possible for
persons to be partly holy and partly sinful at the same time, does make
it possible to serve God and mammon at the same time, and thus flatly
contradicts the assertion of Our Saviour.
2. James has expressly settled this philosophy, by saying, that “Who-
soever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty
of all.” Here he must mean to assert, that one sin involves a breach of
the whole spirit of the law, and is, therefore, inconsistent with any degree
of holiness existing with it. Also, “Doth a fountain send forth at the
same place sweet water and bitter? Can the fig-tree, my brethren, bear
olive-berries 2 either a vine, figs 2 so can no fountain both yield salt-water
and fresh,” James iii. 1 1, 12. In this passage he clearly affirms the
simplicity of moral action; for by the “the same place” he evidently
means, the same time, and what he says is equivalent to saying, that a
man cannot be holy and sinful at the same time.
3. Christ has expressly taught, that nothing is regeneration, or virtue,
but entire obedience, or the renunciation of all selfishness. “Except a
man forsake all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple.”
4. The manner in which the precepts and threatenings of the Bible are
usually given, show that nothing is regarded as obedience, or virtue, but
doing exactly that which God commands.
5. The common philosophy, that maintains the co-existence of both sin
and holiness in the mind, at the same time, is virtually Antinomianism.
It is a rejection of the law of God as the standard of duty. It maintains,
that something is holiness which is less than supreme disinterested bene-
volence, or the devotion, for the time, of the whole being to God. Now any
philosophy that makes regeneration, or holiness, consist in any thing less
than just that measure of obedience which the law of God requires, is
Antinomianism. It is a letting down, a rejection of the law of God.
6. The very idea of sin and holiness co-existing in the same mind, is an
absurd philosophy, contrary to scripture and common sense. It is an
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 153
overlooking of that in which holiness consists. Holiness is obedience to
the law of God, and nothing else is. By obedience, I mean entire obedience,
or just that which the law requires. Any thing else than that which the
law requires is not obedience and is not holiness. To maintain that it is,
is to abrogate the law.
I might go to great lengths in the examination of scripture testimony, but
it cannot be necessary, or in these lectures expedient. I must close this
lecture, with a few inferences and remarks.
1. It has been supposed by some, that the simplicity of moral action,
has been resorted to as a theory, by the advocates of entire Sanctification in
this life, as the only consistent method of carrying out their principle. To
this I reply –
(1.) That this theory is held in common, both by those who hold and
those who deny the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life.
(2.) The truth of the doctrine of entire sanctification does not depend at all
upon this philosophical theory for its support; but may be established by
Bible testimony, whatever the philosophy of holiness may be.
2. Growth in grace consists in two things —
(1.) lay the stability or permanency of holy, ultimate intention.
(2.) In intensity or strength. As knowledge increases, Christians will
maturally grow in grace, in both these respects.
3. The theory of the mixed character of moral actions, is an eminently
dangerous theory, as it leads its advocates to suppose, that in their acts of
rebellion there is something holy, or, more strictly, that there is some holi-
ness in them, while they are in the known commission of sin.
It is dangerous, because it leads its advocates to place the standard of
conversion, or regeneration, exceedingly low; to make regeneration, repent-
ance, true love to God, faith, &c., consistent with the known or conscious
commission of present sin. This must be a highly dangerous philosophy.
The fact is, that regeneration, or holiness, under any form, is quite another
thing than it is supposed to be, by those who maintain the philosophy of
the mixed character of moral action.
4. There can scarcely be a more dangerous error than to say, that while
we are conscious of present sin, we are or can be in a state acceptable to God.
5. The false philosophy of many leads them to adopt a phraseology
inconsistent with truth; and to speak as if they were guilty of present sin,
when in fact they are not, but are in a state of acceptance with God.
6. It is erroneous to say that Christians sin in their most holy exercises,
and it is as injurious and dangerous as it is false. The fact is, holiness
is holiness, and it is really nonsense to speak of a holiness that consists
with sin.
7. The tendency of this philosophy is to quiet in their delusions those
whose consciences accuse them of present sin, as if this could be true, and
they, notwithstanding, in a state of acceptance with God.
154 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE XV.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
I, IN WHAT SENSE OBEDIENCE To MoRAL LAW CAN BE PARTIAL.
II. THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD ACCEPTS NOTHING AS VIRTUE BUT OBE-
DIENCE TO MORAL LAW.
I. IN WHAT SENSE OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW CAN BE PARTIAL.
In discussing this subject I must—
1. Remind you of the Sense in which it has been shown that obedience can
mot be partial ; and—
2. Show the sense in which it can be partial.
1. In what sense we have seem that obedience to Moral Law cannot be
partial.
(].) Not in the sense that a moral agent can at the same time be selfish
and benevolent. That is, a moral agent cannot choose as an ultimate end
the highest Well-being of God and of the universe, and, at the same time
choose an opposite end, namely his own gratification. In other words,
he cannot love God Supremely and his neighbour as himself, and at the
same time love himself supremely, and prefer his own gratification to the
good of God and his neighbour. These two things, we have seen, cannot be.
(2.) We have seen, that a moral agent cannot homestly choose the well-
being of God and the universe, as an ultimate end, that is, for and on
account of its intrinsic value, and yet withhold the degree of intensity of
choice, which he sees the value of the end demands, and which he is able
to render. In other words, he cannot be homest in knowingly and inten-
tionally withholding from God and man their dues. That is, he cannot
be honestly dishonest.
(3.) We have seen, that homesty of intention implies the esteeming and
treating of every being and thing, known to the mind according to its
mature and relations, and every interest, according to its estimated relative
importance, and our ability to promote it.
(4.) We have seen that neither of the following suppositions can be true.
(a) It cannot be true, that an act or choice may have a complex charac.
ter, on account of complexity in the motives that induce it.
(b.) It cannot be true, that the will or heart may be right, while the
emotions and affections are wrong, in the sense of sinful.
(c.) It cannot be true, that a ruling, latent, but actually existing, holy
preference or intention, may co-exist with opposing volitions.
These things, we have seen, cannot be ; and, therefore, that the following
is true, to wit, that obedience to moral law cannot be partial, in the sense
that a moral agent can partly obey, and partly disobey, at the same time;
that he cannot be both holy and unholy in the same act ; that he cannot at
the same time serve both God and mammon. This certainly is the
doctrine both of natural and revealed theology. This summing up of
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 155
what was taught in the last lecture, conducts us to the second inquiry,
namely,–
2. In what sense obedience to moral law can be partial.
And here I would observe, that the only sense in which obedience to
moral law can be partial is, that obedience may be intermittent. That is,
the subject may sometimes obey, and at other times disobey. He may at
one time be selfish, or will his own gratification, because it is his own, and
without regard to the well-being of God and his neighbour, and at another
time will the highest well-being of God and the universe, as an end, and
his own good only in proportion to its relative value. These are opposite
choices, or ultimate intentions. The one is holy; the other is sinful. One is
obedience, entire obedience, to the law of God; the other is disobedience,
entire disobedience, to that law. These, for aught we can see, may succeed
each other an indefinite number of times, but co-exist they plainly cannot.
II. The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to the
law of God.
But it may be asked, Why state this proposition ? Was this truth ever
called in question ? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, though
apparently so self-evident, that to raise the question may reasonably excite
astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably nine-tenths of the
nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold sentiments that are
entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct denial of it. They maintain
that there is much true virtue in the world, and yet that there is no one
who ever for a moment obeys the law of God; that all Christians are
virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not one on earth obeys
the moral law of God; in short, that God accepts as virtue that which, in
every instance, comes short of obedience to his law. And yet it is
generally asserted in their articles of faith, that obedience to moral law is
the only proper evidence of a change of heart. With this sentiment in
their creed, they will brand as a heretic, or as a hypocrite, any one who
professes to obey the law; and maintain that men may be, and are pious,
and eminently so, who do not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which
every one knows to be generally held by those who are styled orthodox
Christians, must assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty, besides
the moral law ; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply obedience to
any law. In this discussion I shall,—
1. Attempt to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the
moral law; and,
2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this law,
and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as virtue or
true religion.
1. There can be no rule of duty but the moral law.”
Upon this proposition I remark,+
* See ante, p. 18.-Exclusiveness.
156 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the law
of mature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of God,
but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the course
of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and relations. It is
unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature and relations. To
deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. But if this is right,
mothing else can be right. If this course is obligatory upon us, by virtue
of our nature and relations, no other course can possibly be obligatory
upon us. To act in conformity with our mature and relations, must be
right, and nothing, either more or less, can be right. If these are not
truths of intuition, then there are no such truths.
(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should he
do it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in his
arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can he alter it, or introduce any
other rule of right among moral agents. Cam God make anything else
right than to love him with all the heart, and our neighbour as ourselves?
Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of faith has
superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is not made
void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from its very
nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law; and love or
obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been said on a
former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can be, obligatory
on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his mature and
relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this. Nor can any
being render anything more than this obligatory. Indeed, there cannot
possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral law. There can be no
other standard with which to compare our actions, and in the light of which
to decide their moral character. This brings us to the consideration of the
second proposition, namely,–
2. That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral
law.
By this two things are intended :—
(1.) That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law.
(2.) That nothing can be virtue, but just that which the moral law
requires.
That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law,
will appear, if we consider-
(a.) That virtue is identical with true religion :
(b.) That true religion cammot properly consist in anything else, than
the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law :
(c.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the law,
and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God.
“Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.” “Though I speak with
the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity (love), I am
become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the
gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 157
though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not
charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor,
and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity (love), it
profiteth me nothing.” (1 Cor. xiii.)
Love is repeatedly recognized in the Bible, not only as constituting true
religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every form of true religion
is only a form of love or benevolence.
Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of selfishness
to benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to obedience to it.
Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth and
the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and Christ.
Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when we come
to consider them in detail, is only a modification of love. God is love.
Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is only love, or the state
of mind which moral law requires alike of him and of us. Benevolence
is the whole of virtue in God, and in all holy beings. Justice, truthfulness,
and every moral attribute, is only benevolence viewed in particular relations.
Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands.
That is, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense, virtue.
A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to
God by Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ's account,
is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of full or entire
obedience at any moment; that the gospel has somehow brought men, that
is, Christians, into such relations, that God really accepts from them an
imperfect obedience, something far below what his law requires; that
Christians are accepted and justified while they render at best but a partial
obedience, and while they sin more or less at every moment. Now this
appears to me, to be as radical an error as can well be taught. The subject
naturally branches out into two distinct inquiries:–
(1) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to disobey,
the moral law at the same time 2
(2.) Can God in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and
full obedience to the moral law 2
The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding lee-
ture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral law
cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey, and partly
disobey, at the same time.
We will now attend to the second question, namely,–
Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and full
obedience to the moral law 2 Or, in other words, Can he accept anything
as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full obedience, or
all that the law requires?
The term justification is used in two senses.
(a.) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless :
(b.) In the sense of pardon, acceptanee, and treating one who has
simmed, as if he had not sinned.
158 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that
Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and accepted, and
treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by coming short of ren-
dering that obedience which the moral law demands. They do not pretend
that they are justified at any moment by the law, for that at every moment
condemns them for present sin ; but that they are justified by grace, not
in the sense that they are made really and personally righteous by grace,
but that grace pardons and accepts, and in this sense justifies them when
they are in the present commission of an indefinite amount of sin ; that
grace accounts them righteous while, in fact, they are continually sinning;
that they are fully pardoned and acquitted, while at the same moment
committing sin, by coming entirely and perpetually short of the obedience
which, under the circumstances, the law of God requires. While volun-
tarily withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is accepted, and
the sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God accepts what the
sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he voluntarily withholds.
This is no caricature. It is, if I understand them, precisely what many
hold. In considering this subject, I wish to propose for discussion the
following inquiries, as of fundamental importance.
(1.) If a present partial obedience can be accepted, how great a part may
be withholden and we be accepted P
(2.) If we are forgiven, while voluntarily withholding a part of that which
would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do
not repent, and forgiven, while in the act of committing the sin for which
we are forgiven 2
(3.) What good can result to the sinner, to God, or to the universe from
forgiving impenitence, or sin which is persisted in 2
(4.) Has God a right to pardon present sin, and of course sin unrepented
Of 2
(5.) Have we a right to ask him to forgive present sin, while unrepented
of 2
(6.) Must not confession of present sin, and of course sin unrepented of,
be base hypocrisy %
(7.) Does the Bible recognize or proclaim the pardon of sin, under such
circumstances 2
(S.) Does the Bible recognize any justification in sin 2
(9.) Can there be such a thing as partial repentance of sin” That is,
does not repentance imply present full obedience to the law of God?
(10) Must not that be a gross error, that represents God as pardoning
and justifying a sinner in the present voluntary commission of sin 2
(11.) Can there be any other than a voluntary sin Ż
(12.) Must not present sin be sin unrepented of 2
Let us now attend to these questions in their order.
(1.) How much sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every
moment, come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be
accepted and justified ?
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 1.59
This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully
withhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how great a
part may we withhold 2 If we may love God with less than all our hearts,
and our neighbour less than ourselves, and be accepted, how much less than
supreme love to God, and equal love to our neighbour, will be accepted 2
Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our
neighbour will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our neigh-
bour? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not what
is required 2 If the least degree of love to God will be accepted, then we
may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be accepted. We may
love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be in a state of acceptance
with God. We may love God a little, and our neighbour a little, and our-
selves more than we love God and all our neighbours, and yet be in a
justified state. Or shall we be told that God must be loved supremely 2
But what is intended by this? Is supreme love a loving with all the
heart? But this is full and not partial obedience; yet the latter is the
thing about which we are inquiring. Or is supreme love, not love with all
the heart, but simply a higher degree of love than we exercise toward any
other being 2 But how much greater must it be 2 Barely a little 2 How
are we to measure it? In what scale are we to weigh, or by what standard
are we to measure, our love, so as to know whether we love God a little
more than any other being 2 But how much are we to love our neighbour,
in order to our being accepted? If we may love him a little less than our-
selves, how much less, and still be justified ? These are certainly questions
of vital importance. But such questions look like trifling. Yet why
should they If the theory I am examining be true, these questions must
not only be asked, but they must admit of a satisfactory answer. The
advocates of the theory in question are bound to answer them. And if they
cannot, it is only because their theory is false. Is it possible that their
theory should be true, and yet no one be able to answer such vital questions
as these just proposed ? If a partial obedience can be accepted, it is a
momentous question, how partial, or how complete must that obedience be 2
I say again, that this is a question of agonizing interest. God forbid that
We should be left in the dark here.
But let us look at the second question.
(3.) If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that which
would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do not
repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin for which we
are forgiven 2
The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this
World, yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always withhold
a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the very act of com-
mitting this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding God and their neigh-
bour, God accepts their persons and their services, fully forgives and
justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present and pertinacious
rebellion | Receiving to favour a God-defrauding wretch! Forgiving a
160 SYSTEMATIC T1-II) () L() G.Y.
sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in 2 Yes, this must be, if it
be true that Christians are justified without present full obedience. That
surely must be a doctrine of devils, that represents God as receiving to
favour a rebel who has one hand filled with weapons against his throne.
(3.) But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe,
by thus pardoming and justifying an unsanctified Soul? Can God be
honoured by such a proceeding P Will the holy universe respect, fear, and
honour God for such a proceeding 2 Does it, can it, commend itself to the
intelligence of the universe?
Will pardon and justification save the sinner, while he yet continues to
withhold a part, at least, of his heart from God, while he still cleaves to
a part of his sins 2 Can heaven be edified, or hell confounded, and its
cavils silenced, by such a method of justification ?
(4.) But again : Has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of ?
Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a
question which we have no right to agitate. Butlet me inquire : Has God,
as a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily 2 Is there not some course
of conduct which is suitable to him Has he not given us intelligence on
purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the propriety of his public
acts 2 Does he not invite and require Scrutiny ? Why has he required
an atonement for sin, and why has he required repentance at all ? Who
does not know that no executive magistrate has a right to pardon sin
unrepented of 2 The lowest terms upon which any ruler can exercise
mercy, are repentance, or, which is the same thing, a return to obedience.
Who ever heard, in any government, of a rebel's being pardoned, while he
only renounced a part of his rebellion ? To pardon him while any part of
his rebellion is persevered in, were to Sanction by a public act that which
is lacking in his repentance. It were to pronounce a public justification
of his refusal to render full obedience.
(5.) But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the sin
of withholding a part of our heart from him 2
God has no right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire him to for-
givens, while we keep back any part of the condition of forgiveness. While
we persist in defrauding God and our neighbour, we cannot profess penitence
and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy. And shall God forgive us
while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even profess repentance? To ask for
pardon, while we do not repent and cease from sin, is a gross insult to God.
(6.) But does the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while
unrepented of 2
Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is represented as
pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully forsaken. No such
passage can be found. The opposite of this always stands revealed
expressly or impliedly, on every page of divine inspiration.
(7.) Does the Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin 2
Where is such a passage to be found 2 Does not the law condemn sin,
in every degree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 16 I
whose heart the vile abomination is found 2 If a Soul can sin, and yet not
be condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely, if
the law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most
unequivocally teaches this: “If any man keep the whole law, and yet
offend in one point, he is guilty of all.” What is this, but asserting, that
if there could be a partial obedience, it would be unavailing, since the law
would condemn for any degree of sin ; that partial obedience, did it exist,
would not be regarded as acceptable obedience at all? The doctrine, that
a partial obedience, in the sense that the law is not at any time fully
obeyed, is accepted of God, is sheer antinomianism. What a sinner
justified while indulging in rebellion against God!
But it has been generally held in the church, that a sinner must intend
fully to obey the law, as a condition of justification ; that, in his purpose and
intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short of perfection of aim
or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is intended by this
language 2 We have seem in former lectures, that moral character belongs
properly only to the intention. If, then, perfection of intention be an
indispensable condition of justification, what is this, but an admission, after
all, that full present obedience is a condition of justification 2 But this is
what we hold, and they deny. What then can they mean 2. It is of
importance to ascertain what is intended by the assertion, repeated by them
thousands of times, that a sinner cannot be justified but upon condition,
that he fully purposes and intends to abandon all sin, and to live without
sin; unless he seriously intends to render full obedience to all the com-
mands of God. Intends to obey the law What constitutes obedience to
the law 2 Why, love, good-willing, good-intending. Intending to obey
the law is intending to intend, willing to will, choosing to choose ! This
is absurd .
What then is the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition of
justification ? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only an intend-
ing to intend, but intending what the law requires to be intended, to wit,
the highest well-being of God and of the universe. Fully intending this,
and not fully intending to intend this, is the condition of justification. But
fully intending this is full present obedience to the law.
But again: it is absurd to say that a man can intend fully to obey the
law, unless he actually fully intends what the law requires him to intend.
The law requires him fully to intend the highest well-being of God and of
the universe. And unless he intends this, it is absurd to say that he can
intend full obedience to the law ; that he intends to live without sin. The
supposition is, that he is now sinning, that is, for nothing else is sin,
voluntarily withholding from God and man their due. He chooses, wills,
and intends this, and yet the supposition is, that at the same time he
chooses, wills, intends, fully to obey the law. What is this but the
ridiculous assertion, that he at the same time intends full obedience to the
law, and intends not fully to obey, but only to obey in part, voluntarily
withholding from God and man their dues.
M
162 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
But again, to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in
him 2 Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless the
law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while there is a
particle of sim in him, is too plaim to need proof. But can he be pardoned
and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel sense, while sin, any degree
of sin, remains in him 2 Certainly not. For the law, unless it be
repealed, and antinomianism be true, continues to condemn him while
there is any degree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say, that he
can both be pardoned, and at the same time condemned. But if he is all
the time coming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in
which the law is not uttering its curses against him. “Cursed is every
one that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the
law to do them.” The fact is, there never has been, and there never can
be, any such thing as sin without condemnation. “Beloved, if our own
heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart;" that, is, he much more
condemns us. “But if our heart condemn us not, then have we confi-
dence towards God.” God cannot repeal the law. It is not founded in
his arbitrary will. It is as unalterable and unrepealable as his own nature.
God can never repeal nor alter it. He can, for Christ's sake, dispense
with the execution of the penalty, when the subject has returned to full
present obedience to the precept, but in no other case, and upon no other
possible conditions. To affirm that he can, is to affirm that God can
alter the immutable and eternal principles of moral law and moral
government.
(8.) The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial repent-
ance of sin 2 That is, does not true repentance imply a return to present
full obedience to the law of God 2
In considering this question, I will state, briefly—
(i.) What repentance is not.
(ii.) What it is.
(iii.) What is not implied in it.
(iv.) What is.
I shall in this place only state these points briefly, leaving their full
consideration to their appropriate place in this course of instruction.
(i) What repentance is not.
(a.) It is not a phenomenon of the intelligence. It does not consist in
conviction of sin, nor in any intellectual views of sin whatever.
(b.) It is not a phenomenon of the sensibility. It does not consist in a
feeling of regret, or remorse, or of sorrow of any kind or degree. It is
not a feeling of any kind.
(ii) What it is.
The primary signification of the word rendered repentance is, to reflect,
to think again, but more particularly to change the mind in conformity
with a second thought, or in accordance with a more rational and intelli-
gent view of the subject. To repent is to change the choice, purpose,
intention. It is to choose a new end,—-to begin a new life, to turn from
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 163
self-seeking to seeking the highest good of being, to turn from Selfishness
to disinterested benevolence,—from a state of disobedience to a state of
obedience.
(iii.) What is not implied in it.
(a.) It does not imply the remembrance of all past sin. This would be
implied if repentance consisted, as some seem to suppose, in sorrowing
over every particular sin. But as repentance consists in returning or
turning to God, from the spirit of self-seeking and self-pleasing to the
spirit of seeking the highest well-being of God and the universe, no such
thing as the remembrance of all past sin is implied in it.
(b.) It does not imply a continual Sorrowing for past sin; for past sin is
mot, cannot be, ought not to be, the subject of continual thought.
(iv.) What is implied in it.
(a.) An understanding of the nature of sin, as consisting in the spirit of
self-seeking, or in selfishness. This is implied, as a condition upon which
repentance can be exercised, but it does not constitute repentance. Re-
pentance is the voluntary turning which follows the intellectual illumination
or understanding of the nature of sin.
(b.) A turning from this state to a state of consecration to God and the
good of the universe.
(c.) Sorrow for past sin when it is remembered. This, and the following
particulars, are implied in repentance as necessarily following from it.
(d.) Universal, outward reformation.
(e.) Emotions of hatred of sin.
(f) Emotions of self-loathing on account of sin.
Certainly, if repentance means and implies anything, it does imply a
thorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists in
turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former lecture,
that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist, at the same time, in the
same mind. They are the Supreme choice of opposite ends. These ends
cannot both be chosen at the same time. To talk of partial repentance as
a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to overlook the very nature of
repentance. What a man both turn away from, and hold on to sin at
the same time 2 Serve God and mammon at one and the same time ! It
is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed both by reason and by Christ.
(9.) The ninth inquiry is: must not that be a gross error that represents
God as pardoning and justifying a sinner in the present wilful commission
of sin P I answer, yes,
(i.) Because it is antinomianism, than which there is scarcely any form
of error more God-dishonouring.
(ii) Because it represents God as doing what he has no right to do, and,
therefore, as doing what he cannot do, without sinning himself.
(iii.) Because it represents Christ as the minister of sin, and as justifying
his people in their sins, instead of Saving them from their sins.
(iv.) Because it represents God as making void, instead of establishing
the law through faith.
M &
164 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(v.) Because it is a prolific source of delusion, leading multitudes to
think themselves justified, while living in known sin. But perhaps it will
be objected, that the sin of those who render but a partial obedience, and
whom God pardoms and accepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the
tenth inquiry —
(10.) Can there be any other than voluntary sin 2
What is sin 2 Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires
benevolence, good-willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not willing,
but consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing contrary to the
commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists in choosing,
willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary; that is, it must be intelligent and
voluntary. It consists in Willing, and it is nonsense to deny that sin is
voluntary. The fact is, there is either no sin, or there is voluntary sin.
Benevolence is willing the good of being in general, as an end, and, of
course, implies the rejection of Self-gratification, as an end. So sin is
the choice of self gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies the
rejection of the good of being in general, as an end. Sin and holiness,
naturally and necessarily, exclude each other. They are eternal opposites
and antagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of the other in
the heart. They consist in the active state of the will, and there can be
no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice.
(11.) Must not present sin be sin unrepented of ?
Yes, it is impossible for one to repeat of present sin. To affirm that
present sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is overlooking
hoth the nature of sin, and the mature of repentance. Sin is selfish
willing; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent willing. These
two states of will, as has just been said, cannot possibly co-exist. Whoever,
then, is at present falling short of full obedience to the law of God, is
voluntarily simming against God, and is impenitent. It is nonsense to say,
that he is partly penitent and partly impenitent; that he is penitent so far
as he obeys, and impenitent so far as he disobeys. This really seems to
be the loose idea of many, that a man can be partly penitent, and partly
impenitent at the same time. This idea, doubtless, is founded on the
mistake, that repentance consists in sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of
the sensibility. But we have seen that repentance consists in a change of
ultimate intention,--a change in the choice of an end,-a turning from
selfishness to supreme disinterested benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly
impossible for one to be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the same
time ; inasmuch as penitence and impenitence consist in Supreme opposite
choices.
So then it is plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the govern-
ment of God, but present full obedience to his law.
REMIARRS.
1. If what has been said is true, we see that the chureh has fallen into a
great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present sinlessness is
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 165
a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in this life. If the doctrine of
this lecture be true, it follows that the very beginning of true religion in
the soul, implies the renunciation of all sin. Sin ceases where holiness
begins. Now, how great and ruinous must that error be, that teaches us
to hope for heaven, while living in conscious sin; to look upon a sinless
state, as not to be expected in this world; that it is a dangerous error to
expect to stop sinning, even for an hour or a moment, in this world; and
yet to hope for heaven And how unreasonable must that state of mind
be, that can brand as heretics those who teach, that God justifies no one,
but upon condition of present sinlessness lº
2. How great and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated
upon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one may
be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission of more
or less sin. This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all the uni-
versalism that ever cursed the world.
3. We see that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die in
his sin, he must sink to hell.
4. We see, that whenever a Christian sins he comes under condem-
nation, and must repent and do his first works, or be lost.
L E C T U R E XV I.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
WHAT IS NOT IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE To MoRAL LAW.
I. I will state briefly what constitutes obedience.
II. What is not implied in it.
I. What constitutes obedience to moral law.
We have seen, that all the law requires is summarily expressed in
the single word, love; that this word is synonymous with benevolence;
that benevolence consists in the choice of the highest well-being of God
and of the universe, as an end, or for its own sake; that this choice is an
ultimate intention. In short, we have seen, that good-will to being in
general is obedience to the moral law. Now the question before us is,
what is not implied in this good-Will, or in this benevolent ultimate inten-
tion ? I will here introduce, with some alteration, what I have formerly
said upon this subject.
Since the law of God, as revealed in the Bible, is the standard, and the
only standard, by which the question in regard to what is not, and what is,
implied in entire Sanctification, is to be decided, it is of fundamental
importance, that we understand what is, and what is not, implied in entire
obedience to this law. It must be apparent to all, that this inquiry is of
prime importance. To settle this question is one of the main things to be
* Their present sinlessness is not the ground, but only a sine quá non, of gospel justi-
fication.—See post, subject, “Justification.”
166 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
attended to in this discussion. The doctrine of the entire sanctification
of believers in this life can never be satisfactorily settled until it is under-
stood. And it cannot be understood, until it is known what is, and what
is not, implied in it. Our judgment of our own state, or of the state of
others, can never be relied upon, till these inquiries are settled. Nothing
is more clear than that, in the present vague unsettled views of the
church upon this question, no individual could set up a claim of having
attained this state, without being a stumbling-block to the church. Christ
was perfect, and yet so erroneous were the motions of the Jews, in regard
to what constituted perfection, that they thought him possessed with a
devil, instead of being holy, as he claimed to be. It certainly is impossible,
that a person should profess to render entire obedience to the moral law,
without being a stumbling-block to himself and to others, unless he and
they clearly understand what is not, and what is, implied in it. I will
state then, what is not implied in entire obedience to the moral law, as I
understand it. The law, as epitomized by Christ, “Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy
mind, and with all thy strength, and thy neighbour as thyself,”—I under-
stand to lay down the whole duty of man to God, and to his fellow crea-
tures. Now, the questions are, what is mot, and what is, implied in
perfect obedience to this law 2 Vague notions, in regard to the proper
answer to be given to these questions, seem to me to have been the origin
of much error. To settle these questions, it is indispensable that we have .
distinctly before our minds just rules of legal interpretation. I will, there-
fore, lay down some first principles, in regard to the interpretation of law,
in the light of which, I think, we may safely proceed to settle these
questions.
RULE 1. Whatever is inconsistent with natural justice is not, and cannot
be, moral law.
2. Whatever is inconsistent with the nature and relations of moral
beings, is contrary to natural justice, and, therefore, cannot be moral law.
3. That which requires more than man has matural ability to perform,
is inconsistent with his mature and relations, and, therefore, is inconsistent
with natural justice, and, of course, is not moral law.
4. Moral law, them, must always be so understood and interpreted, as to
consist with the nature of the subjects, and their relations to each other
and to the lawgiver. Any interpretation that makes the law to require
more than is consistent with the nature and relations of moral beings, is
the same as to declare that it is not law. No authority in heaven or on
earth can make that law, or obligatory upon moral agents, which is incon-
sistent with their nature and relations.
5. Moral law must always be so interpreted as to cover the whole
ground of natural right or justice. It must be so understood and ex-
plained, as to require all that is right in itself, and, therefore, immutably
and unalterably right.
6. Moral law must be so interpreted, as not to require any thing more
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 167
than is consistent with natural justice, or with the nature and relations of
moral beings.
7. Moral law is never to be so interpreted as to imply the possession
of any attributes, or strength, or perfection of attributes which the sub-
ject does not possess. Take for illustration the second commandment,
“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” Now the simple meaning of
this commandment seems to be, that we are to regard and treat every
person and interest according to its relative value. We are not to under-
stand this commandment as expressly or by implication, requiring us to
know, in all cases, the exact relative value of every person and thing in
the universe; for this would imply our possession of the attribute of
omniscience. No mind, short of an omniscient one, can have this know-
ledge. The commandment, then, must be so understood, as only to
require us to judge with candour of the relative value of different interests,
and to treat them according to their value, and our ability to promote their
good, so far as we understand it. I repeat the rule, therefore; moral law
is never to be so interpreted as to imply the possession of any attribute, or
any strength and perfection of attributes, which the subject does not
possess.
8. Moral law is never to be so interpreted as to require that which is
naturally impossible in our circumstances. Example:—The first com-
mandment, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,” &c.,
is not to be so interpreted, as to require us to make God the constant and
sole object of our attention, thought, and affection ; for this would not only
be plainly impossible in our circumstances, but manifestly contrary to our
duty.
9. Moral law is never to be so interpreted as to make one requirement
inconsistent with another. Example: if the first commandment be so
interpreted as to require us to make God the only object of thought,
affection, and attention, then we cannot obey the second commandment
which requires us to love our neighbour. And if the first commandment
is to be so understood, that every faculty and power is to be directed solely
and exclusively, to the contemplation and love of God, then love to all
other beings is prohibited, and the second commandment is set aside. I
repeat the rule, therefore ; commandments are not to be so interpreted, as
to conflict with each other.
10. A law requiring perpetual benevolence must be so construed, as to
consist with, and require, all the appropriate and essential modifications of
this principle, under every circumstance; such as justice, mercy, anger at
sin and simners, and a special and complacent regard to those who are
virtuous.
11. Moral law must be so interpreted, as that its claims shall always
be restricted to the voluntary powers, in such a sense, that the right action
of the will shall be regarded as fulfilling the spirit of the law, whether the
desired outward action, or inward emotion, follow or not. If there be a
willing mind, that is, if the will or heart is right, it is and must, in justice,
168 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
be accepted as obedience to the spirit of moral law. For whatever does
not follow the action of the will, by a law of necessity, is naturally impos-
sible to us, and, therefore, not obligatory. To attempt to legislate directly
over the involuntary powers, would be inconsistent with natural justice.
You may as well attempt to legislate over the beating of the heart, as
directly over any involuntary mental actions.
12. In morals, actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation.
The maxim, “ignorantia legis mon excusat” (ignorance of the law excuses
no one), applies in morals to but a very limited extent. That actual
knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation, will appear—
(1.) From the following scriptures;
James iv. 17 : “Therefore, to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth
it not, to him it is sin.” Luke xii. 47, 48: “And that servant, which
knew his lord’s will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to
his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and
did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.
For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required ; and
to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more.”
John ix. 41 : “Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind ye should have no sin:
but now ye say, We see, therefore your sin remaineth.” In the first and
second chapters of the epistle to the Romans, the apostle reasons at large
on this subject. He convicts the heathen of sin, upon the ground that they
violate their own consciences, and do not live according to the light they have.
(2.) The principle is everywhere recognized in the Bible, that an
increase of knowledge increases obligation. This impliedly, but plainly,
recognizes the principle that knowledge is indispensable to, and commen-
Surate with, obligation. In sins of ignorance, the sin lies in the state of
heart that neglects or refuses to be informed, but not in the neglect of what
is unknown. A man may be guilty of present or past neglect to ascertain
the truth. Here his ignorance is sin, or rather, the state of heart that
induces ignorance, is sin. The heathem are culpable for not living up to
the light of nature; but are under no obligation to embrace Christianity,
until they have the opportunity to do so.
13. Moral law is to be so interpreted, as to be consistent with physical
law. In other words, the application of moral law to human beings, must
recognize man as he is, as both a corporeal and an intellectual being ; and
must never be so interpreted as that obedience to it would violate the laws
of the physical constitution, and prove the destruction of the body.
14. Moral law is to be so interpreted as to recognize all the attributes
and circumstances of both body and soul. In the application of the law of
God to human beings, we are to regard their powers and attributes as they
really are, and not as they are not.
15. Moral law is to be so interpreted as to restrict its obligation to the
actions, and not to extend them to the nature or constitution of moral
beings. Law must not be understood as extending its legislation to the
nature, or requiring a man to possess certain attributes, but as prescribing
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 169
a rule of action, suited to the attributes he at present possesses. It is not
the existence or possession of certain attributes which the law requires, or
that these attributes should be in a certain state of perfection; but the
right use of all these attributes as they are, is what the law is to be inter-
preted as requiring.
16. It should be always understood, that the obedience of the heart to
any law, implies, and includes general faith, or confidence in the lawgiver;
but no law should be so construed as to require faith in what the intellect
does not perceive. A man may be under obligation to perceive what he
does not ; that is, it may be his duty to inquire after and ascertain the
truth. But obligation to believe with the heart, does not attach until the
intellect obtains perception of the things to be believed.
Now, in the light of these rules let us proceed to inquire —
II. What is not implied in entire obedience to the law of God.
1. Entire obedience does not imply any change in the substance of the
soul or body : for this the law does not require ; and it would not be
obligatory if it did, because the requirement would be inconsistent with
natural justice, and, therefore, not law. Entire obedience is the entire
consecration of the powers, as they are, to God. It does not imply any
change in them, but simply the right use of them.
2. It does not imply the annihilation of any constitutional traits of
character, such as constitutional ardour or impetuosity. There is nothing,
certainly, in the law of God that requires such constitutional traits to
be annihilated, but simply that they should be rightly directed in their
exercise.
3. It does not imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional
appetites, or susceptibilities. It seems to be supposed by some, that the
constitutional appetites and susceptibilities, are in themselves sinful, and
that a state of entire conformity to the law of God implies their entire
annihilation. And I have often been astonished at the fact, that those who
array themselves against the doctrine of entire conformity to the law of
God in this life, assume the sinfulness of the constitution of man. And I
have been not a little surprised to find, that some persons who, I had
supposed, were far enough from embracing the doctrine of physical moral
depravity, were, after all, resorting to this assumption, in order to set aside
the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life. But let us appeal to the
law. Does the law any where, expressly or impliedly, condemn the con-
stitution of man, or require the annihilation of any thing that is properly a
part of the constitution itself? Does it require the annihilation of the
appetite for food, or is it satisfied merely with regulating its indulgence P
In short, does the law of God any where require any thing more than the
consecration of all the powers, appetites, and susceptibilities of body and
mind to the service of God 2
4. Entire obedience does not imply the annihilation of natural affection,
or natural resentment. By natural affection I mean, that certain persons may
170 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
be naturally pleasing to us. Christ appears to have had a natural affection
for John. By natural resentment I mean, that, from the laws of our being,
we must resent or feel opposed to injustice or ill-treatment. Not that a
disposition to retaliate or revenge ourselves is consistent with the law of
God. But perfect obedience to the law of God does not imply that we
should have no sense of injury and injustice, when we are abused. God
has this, and ought to have it, and so has every moral being. To love your
neighbour as yourself, does not imply, that if he injure you, you should feel
no sense of the injury or injustice, but that you should love him and do
him good, notwithstanding his injurious treatment.
5. It does not imply any unhealthy degree of excitement of the mind.
Rule 13 lays down the principle that moral law is to be so interpreted as
to be consistent with physical law. God's laws certainly do not clash with
each other. And the moral law cannot require such a state of constant
mental excitement as will destroy the physical constitution. It cannot
require any more mental excitement than is consistent with all the laws,
attributes, and circumstances of both soul and body, as stated in Rule 14.
6. It does not imply that any organ or faculty is to be at all times
exerted to the full measure of its capacity. This would soon exhaust and
destroy any and every organ of the body. Whatever may be true of the
mind, when separated from the body, it is certain, while it acts through a
material organ, that a constant state of excitement is impossible. When
the mind is strongly excited, there is of necessity a great determination of
blood to the brain. A high degree of excitement cannot long continue,
without producing inflammation of the brain, and consequent insanity. And
the law of God does not require any degree of emotion, or mental excite-
ment, inconsistent with life and health. Our Lord Jesus Christ does not
appear to have been in a state of continual mental excitement. When he
and his disciples had been in a great excitement for a time, they would
turn aside, “ and rest a while.”
Who that has ever philosophized on this subject, does not know that the
high degree of excitement which is sometimes witnessed in revivals of
religion, must necessarily be short, or that the people must become
deranged 2 It seems sometimes to be indispensable that a high degree of
excitement should prevail for a time, to arrest public and individual atten-
tion, and draw off people from other pursuits, to attend to the concerns of
their souls. But if any suppose that this high degree of excitement is
either necessary or desirable, or possible to be long continued, they have
not well considered the matter. And here is one grand mistake of the
church. They have supposed that the revival consists mostly in this state
of excited emotion, rather than in conformity of the human will to the law
of God. Hence, when the reasons for much excitement have ceased, and
the public mind begins to grow more calm, they begin immediately to say,
that the revival is on the decline; when, in fact, with much less excited
emotion, there may be vastly more real religion in the community.
Excitement is often important and indispensable, but the vigorous actings
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 171
of the will are infinitely more important. And this state of mind may
exist in the absence of highly excited emotions.
7. Nor does it imply that the same degree of emotion, volition, or intel-
lectual effort, is at all times required. All volitions do not need the same
strength. They cannot have equal strength, because they are not produced
by equally influential reasons. Should a man put forth as strong a volition
to pick up an apple, as to extinguish the flames of a burning house?
Should a mother, watching over her sleeping nursling, when all is quiet
and secure, put forth as powerful volitions, as might be required to Smatch
it from the devouring flames? Now, suppose that she were equally devoted
to God, in watching her sleeping babe, and in rescuing it from the jaws
of death. Her holiness would not consist in the fact, that she exercised
equally strong volitions, in both cases; but that in both cases the volition
was equal to the accomplishment of the thing required to be done. So
that persons may be entirely holy, and yet continually varying in the
strength of their affections, emotions, or volitions, according to their circum-
stances, the state of their physical system, and the business in which they
are engaged.
• All the powers of body and mind are to be held at the service and dis-
posal of God. Just so much of physical, intellectual, and moral energy
are to be expended in the performance of duty, as the nature and the
circumstances of the case require. And nothing is further from the truth
than that the law of God requires a constant, intense state of emotion and
mental action, on any and every subject alike.
8. Entire obedience does not imply that God is to be at all times the
direct object of attention and affection. This is not only impossible in the
nature of the case, but would render it impossible for us to think of or
love our neighbour as ourselves: Rule 9.
The law of God requires the supreme love of the heart. By this is
meant that the mind's supreme preference should be of God—that God
should be the great object of its supreme regard. But this state of mind
is perfectly consistent with our engaging in any of the necessary business
of life—giving to that business that attention, and exercising about it all
those affections and emotions, which its nature and importance demand.
If a man love God supremely, and engage in any business for the pro-
motion of his glory, if his eye be single, his affections and conduct, so far
as they have any moral character, are entirely holy when necessarily engaged
in the right transaction of his business, although, for the time being,
neither his thoughts nor affections are upon God; just as a man, who is
intensely devoted to his family, may be acting consistently with his
supreme affection, and rendering them the most important and per-
fect service, while he does not think of them at all. It is said, in my
lecture on the text, “Make to yourself a new heart, and a new spirit:"—
“The moral heart is the mind's supreme preference. The natural, or
fleshy, heart propels the blood through all the physical system. Now
there is a striking analogy between this and the moral heart. And
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MORAL GOVERNMENT. I 73
in a state of great excitement, and at other times, in a state of great
calmness. And here let me refer to Christ, as we have his history in the
Bible, in illustration of the positions I have already taken. For example,
Christ had all the constitutional appetites and susceptibilities of human
nature. Had it been otherwise, he could not have been “tempted in all
points like as we are ;” nor could he have been tempted in any point as we
are, any further than he possessed a constitution similar to our own.
Christ also manifested natural affection for his mother and for other
friends. He also showed that he had a sense of injury and injustice, and
exercised a suitable resentment when he was injured and persecuted. He
was not always in a state of great excitement. He appears to have had
his seasons of excitement and of calm–of labour and rest—of joy and
sorrow, like other good men. Some persons have spoken of entire obedience
to the law, as implying a state of uniform and universal calmness, and as
if every kind and degree of excited feeling, except the feeling of love to
God, were inconsistent with this state. But Christ often manifested a
great degree of excitement when reproving the enemies of God. In short,
his history would lead to the conclusion that his calmness and excitement
were various, according to the circumstances of the case. And although
he was sometimes so pointed and severe in his reproof, as to be accused of
being possessed of a devil, yet his emotions and feelings were only those
that were called for, and suited to the occasion.
10. Nor does it imply a state of continual sweetness of mind, without
any indignation or holy anger at sin and sinners.
Anger at sin is only a modification of love to being in general. A
sense of justice, or a disposition to have the wicked punished for the
benefit of the government, is only another of the modifications of love.
And such dispositions are essential to the existence of love, where the
circumstances call for their exercise. It is said of Christ, that he was
angry. He often manifested anger and holy indignation. “God is angry
with the wicked every day.” And holiness, or a state of obedience, instead
of being inconsistent with, always implies, the existence of anger, whenever
circumstances occur which demand its exercise. Rule 1 ().
11. It does not imply a state of mind that is all compassion, and no
sense of justice. Compassion is only one of the modifications of love.
Justice, or willing the execution of law and the punishment of sin, is
another of its modifications, God, and Christ, and all holy beings, exercise
all those dispositions that constitute the different modifieations of love,
under every possible circumstance.
12. It does not imply that we should love or hate all men alike, irre-
spective of their value, circumstances, and relations. One being may have
a greater capacity for well-being, and be of much more importance to the
universe, than another. Impartiality and the law of love require us not
to regard all beings and things alike, but all beings and things according to
their mature, relations, circumstances, and value.
13. Nor does it imply a perfect knowledge of all out relations. Rule 7.
174 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Now such an interpretation of the law as would make it necessary, in order
to yield obedience, for us to understand all our relations, would imply in
us the possession of the attribute of omniscience; for certainly there is not
a being in the universe to whom we do not sustain some relation. And a
knowledge of all these relations plainly implies infinite knowledge. It is
plain that the law of God cannot require any such thing as this; and that
entire obedience to the law of God, therefore, implies no such thing.
14. Nor does it imply perfect knowledge on any subject. Perfect know-
ledge on any subject, implies a perfect knowledge of its nature, relations,
bearings, and tendencies. Now, as every single thing in the universe
Sustains some relation to, and has some bearing upon, every other thing,
there can be no such thing as perfect knowledge on any one subject, that
does not embrace universal or infinite knowledge.
15. Nor does it imply freedom from mistake on any subject whatever.
It is maintained by some that the grace of the gospel pledges to every man
perfect knowledge, or at least such knowledge as to exempt him from any
mistake. I cannot stop here to debate this question, but would merely say,
the law does not expressly or impliedly require infallibility of judgment in
us. It only requires us to make the best use we can of all the light we
have. .*
16. Nor does entire obedience imply the knowledge of the exact relative
value of different interests. I have already said, in illustrating Rule 7,
that the second commandment, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,”
does not imply that we should, in every instance, understand exactly the
relative value and importance of every interest. This plainly cannot be
required, unless it be assumed that we are omniscient.
17. It does not imply the same degree of knowledge that we might have
possessed, had we always improved our time in its acquisition. The law
cannot require us to love God or man, as well as we might have been able
to love them, had we always improved all our time in obtaining all the
knowledge we could, in regard to their nature, character, and interests. If
this were implied in the requisition of the law, there is not a saint on
earth or in heaven that does, or ever can perfectly obey. What is lost in
this respect is lost, and past neglect can never be so remedied, that we
shall ever be able to make up in our acquisitions of knowledge what we
have lost. It will no doubt be true to all etermity, that we shall have less
knowledge than we might have possessed, had we filled up all our time in
its acquisition. We do not, cannot, nor shall we ever be able to, love God
as well as we might have loved him, had we always applied our minds to
the acquisition of knowledge respecting him. And if entire obedience is to
be understood as implying that we love God as much as we should, had we
all the knowledge we might have had, then I repeat it, there is not a saint
on earth or in heaven, nor ever will be, that is entirely obedient.
18. It does not imply the same amount of service that we might have
rendered, had we never sinned. The law of God does not imply or suppose,
that our powers are in a perfect state; that our strength of body or mind is
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 175
what it would have been, had we never sinned. But it simply requires us
to use what strength we have. The very wording of the law is proof con-
clusive, that it extends its demand only to the full amount of what strength
we have. And this is true of every moral being, however great or small.
The most perfect developement and improvement of our powers, must
depend upon the most perfect use of them. And every departure from
their perfect use, is a diminishing of their highest developement, and a
curtailing of their capabilities to serve God in the highest and best manner.
All sin then does just so much towards crippling and curtailing the powers
of body and mind, and rendering them, by just so much, incapable of
performing the service they might otherwise have rendered.
To this view of the subject it has been objected, that Christ taught an
opposite doctrine, in the case of the woman who washed his feet with her
tears, when he said, “To whom much is forgiven, the same loveth much.”
But can it be that Christ intended to be understood as teaching, that the
more we sin the greater will be our love, and our ultimate virtue? If this
be so, I do not see why it does not follow that the more sin in this life, the
better, if so be that we are forgiven. If our virtue is really to be improved
by our sins, I see not why it would not be good economy both for God and
man, to sin as much as we can while in this world. Certainly, Christ meant
to lay down no such principle as this. He undoubtedly meant to teach,
that a person who was truly sensible of the greatness of his sins, would
exercise more of the love of gratitude than would be exercised by one who
had a less affecting sense of ill-desert.
19. Entire obedience does not imply the same degree of faith that might
have been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin.
We cannot believe anything about God of which we have neither
evidence nor knowledge. Our faith must therefore be limited by our
intellectual perceptions of truth. The heathen are not under obligation to
believe in Christ, and thousands of other things of which they have no
knowledge. Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith than in
a Christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more and greater
faith than in a child. And perfection in an angel would imply much greater
faith than in a man, just in proportion as he knows more of God than man
does. Ilet it be always understood, that entire obedience to God never
implies that which is naturally impossible. It is naturally impossible for
us to believe that of which we have no knowlege. Entire obedience implies,
in this respect, nothing more than the heart’s faith or confidence in all the
truth that is perceived by the intellect.
20. Nor does it imply the conversion of all men in answer to our prayers.
It has been maintained by some, that entire obedience implies the offering of
prevailing prayer for the conversion of all men. To this I reply,–
(1.) Then Christ did not obey, for he offered no such prayer.
(2.) The law of God makes no such demand, either expressly or im-
pliedly.
(3.) We have no right to believe that all men will be converted in answer
176 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to our prayers, unless we have an express or implied promise to that
effect.
(4.) As, therefore, there is no such promise, we are under no obligation
to offer such prayer. Nor does the non-conversion of the world imply,
that there are no saints in the world who fully obey God’s law.
21. It does not imply the conversion of any one for whom there is not
an express or implied promise in the word of God. The fact that Judas
was not converted in answer to Christ's prayer, does not prove that Christ
did not fully obey.
22. Nor does it imply that all those things which are expressly or im-
pliedly promised, will be granted in answer to our prayers; or, in other
Words, that we should pray in faith for them, if we are ignorant of the
existence or application of those promises. A state of perfect love implies
the discharge of all known duty. And nothing strictly speaking can be
duty, of which the mind lias no knowledge. It cannot, therefore, be our
duty to believe a promise of which we are entirely ignorant, or the applica-
tion of which to any specific object we do not understand.
If there is sin in such a case as this, it lies in the fact, that the soul
neglects to know what it ought to know. But it should always be under-
stood that the sin lies in this neglect to know, and not in the neglect of
that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience is inconsistent with
any present neglect to know the truth : for such neglect is sin. But it is
not inconsistent with our failing to do that of which we have no knowledge.
James says: “He that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is
sin.” “If ye were blind,” says Christ, “ye should have no sin, but because
ye say, We see, therefore your sin remaineth.”
23. Entire obedience to the divine law does not imply, that others will
of course regard our state of mind, and our outward life, as entirely con-
formed to the law.
It was insisted and positively believed by the Jews, that Jesus Christ was
possessed of a wicked, instead of a holy spirit. Such were their motions of
holiness, that they no doubt supposed him to be actuated by any other
than the Spirit of God. They especially supposed so on account of his
opposition to the current orthodoxy, and to the ungodliness of the religious
teachers of the day. Now, who does not see, that when the church is, in a
great measure, conformed to the world, a spirit of holiness in any man
would certainly lead him to aim the sharpest rebukes at the spirit and life
of those in this state, whether in high or low places? And who does not
See, that this would naturally result in his being accused of possessing a
wicked spirit? And who does not know, that where a religious teacher
finds himself under the necessity of attacking a false Orthodoxy, he will
certainly be hunted, almost as a beast of prey, by the religious teachers of
his day, whose authority, influence, and orthodoxy are thus assailed 2
The most violent opposition that I have ever seen manifested to any
person, has been manifested by members of the church, and even by some
ministers of the gospel, towards those who, I believe, were among the most
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 177
holy persons I ever knew. I have been shocked, and wounded beyond
expression, at the almost fiendish opposition to such persons which I have
witnessed. I have several times of late observed, that writers in newspapers
were calling for examples of Christian perfection or entire Sanctification, or,
which is the same thing, of entire obedience to the law of God. Now I
would humbly inquire, of what use is it to point the church to examples,
so long as they do not know what is, and what is not, implied in entire
obedience to moral law 2 I would ask, are the church agreed among them-
selves in regard to what constitutes this state 2 Are any considerable
number of ministers agreed among themselves, as to what is implied in a
state of entire obedience to the law of God 2 The church and the ministry
are in a great measure in the dark on this subject. Why then call for
examples 2 No man can profess to render this obedience, without being
sure to be set at nought as a hypocrite or a self-deceiver.
24. Nor does it imply exemption from Sorrow or mental suffering.
It was not so with Christ. Nor is it inconsistent with our sorrowing for
our own past sins, and sorrowing that we have not now the health, and
vigour, and knowledge, and love, that we might have had, if we had sinned
less; or sorrow for those around us—Sorrow in view of human sinfulness, or
suffering. These are all consistent with a state of joyful love to God and
man, and indeed are the natural results of it.
25, Nor is it inconsistent with our living in human society—with
mingling in the scenes, and engaging in the affairs of this world, as some
have supposed. Hence the absurd and ridiculous notions of papists in
retiring to monasteries, and convents—in taking the veil, and, as they say,
retiring to a life of devotion. Now I suppose this state of voluntary exclu-
sion from human society, to be utterly inconsistent with any degree of
holiness, and a manifest violation of the law of love to our neighbour.
26. Nor does it imply moroseness of temper and manners. Nothing is
further from the truth than this. It is said of Xavier, than whom, perhaps,
few holier men have ever lived, that “he was so cheerful as often to be accused
of being gay.” Cheerfulness is certainly the result of holy love. And entire
obedience no more implies moroseness in this world than it does in heaven.
In all the discussions I have seen upon the subject of Christian holiness,
Writers seldom or never raise the distinct inquiry: What does obedience to
the law of God imply, and what does it not imply? Instead of bringing
everything to this test, they seem to lose sight of it. On the one hand,
they include things that the law of God never required of man in his pre-
sent state. Thus they lay a stumbling-block and a snare for the saints, to
keep them in perpetual bondage, supposing that this is the way to keep
them humble, to place the standard entirely above their reach. Or, on
the other hand, they really abrogate the law, so as to make it no longer
binding. Or they so fritter away what is really implied in it, as to leave
nothing in its requirements, but a sickly, whimsical, inefficient senti-
mentalism, or perfectionism, which in its manifestations and results,
appears to me to be anything but that which the law of God requires,
N
178 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
27. It does not imply that we always or ever aim at, or intend to do
our duty. That is, it does not imply that the intention always, or ever,
terminates on duty as an ultimate end. §
It is our duty to aim at or intend the highest well-being of God and the
universe, as an ultimate end, or for its own sake. This is the infinitely
valuable end at which we are at all times to aim. It is our duty to aim at
this. While we aim at this, we do our duty, but to aim at duty is not
doing duty. To intend to do our duty is failing to do our duty. We do
not, in this case, intend the thing which it is our duty to intend. Our
duty is to intend the good of being. But to intend to do our duty, is only
to intend to intend.
28. Nor does it imply that we always think at the time of its being duty,
or of our moral obligation to intend the good of being. This obligation is
a first truth, and is always and necessarily assumed by every moral agent,
and this assumption or knowledge is a condition of his moral agency. But
it is not at all essential to virtue or true obedience to the moral law, that
moral obligation should at all times be present to the thoughts as an object
of attention. The thing that we are bound to intend is the highest good of
God, and of being in general. The good, the valuable, must be before the
mind. This must be intended. We are under moral obligation to intend
this. But we are not under moral obligation to intend moral obligation, or
to intend to fulfil moral obligation, as an ultimate end. Our obligation is a
first truth, and 11ecessarily assumed by us at all times, whether it is an
object of attention or mot, just as causality or liberty is.
29. Nor does it imply that the rightness or moral character of bene-
volence is, at all times, the object of the mind's attention. We may intend
the glory of God and the good of our neighbour, without at all times think-
ing of the moral character of this intention. But the intention is not the
less virtuous on this account. The mind unconsciously, but necessarily,
assumes the rightness of benevolence, or of willing the good of being, just
as it assumes other first truths, without being distinctly conscious of the
assumption. First truths are those truths that are universally and neces-
sarily known to every moral agent, and that are, therefore, always and
necessarily assumed by him, whatever his theory may be. Among them,
are the law of causality—the freedom of moral agents—the intrinsic value
of happiness or blessedness—moral obligation to will it for or because of
its intrinsic value — the infinite value of God's well-being, and moral
obligation to will it on that account—that to will the good of being is duty,
and to comply with moral obligation is right—that selfishness is wrong.
These and many such like truths are among the class of first truths of
reason. They are always and necessarily taken along with every moral
agent, at every moment of his moral agency. They live in his mind as
intuitions or assumptions of his reason. He always and necessarily affirms
their truth, whether he thinks of them, that is, whether he is conscious of
the assumption, or not. It is not, therefore, at all essential to obedience
to the law of God, that we should at all times have before our minds the
virtuousness or moral character of benevolence.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. - 179
30. Nor does obedience to the moral law imply, that the law itself
should be, at all times, the object of thought, or of the mind's attention.
The law lies developed in the reason of every moral agent in the form of
an idea. It is the idea of that choice or intention which every moral
agent is bound to exercise. In other words, the law, as a rule of duty, is a
subjective idea always and necessarily developed in the mind of every
moral agent. This idea he always and necessarily takes along with him,
and he is always and necessarily a law to himself. Nevertheless, this law
or idea, is not always the olject of the mind's attention and thought. A
moral agent may exercise good-will or love to God and man, without at the
time being conscious of thinking, that this love is required of him by the
moral law. Nay, if I am not mistaken, the benevolent mind generally
exercises benevolence so spontaneously as not, for much of the time, even
to think that this love to God is required of him. But this state of mind
is not the less virtuous on this account. If the infinite value of God’s well-
being and of his infinite goodness constrains me to love him with all my
heart, can any one suppose that this is regarded by him as the less
virtuous, because I did not wait to reflect, that God commanded me to love
him, and that it was my duty to do so?
The thing upon which the intention must or ought to terminate is the
good of being, and mot the law that requires me to will it. When I will
that end, I will the right end, and this willing is virtue, whether the law
be so much as thought of or not. Should it be said that I may will that
end for a wrong reason, and, therefore, thus willing it is not virtue ; that
unless I will it because of my obligation, and intend obedience to moral
law, or to God, it is not virtue ; I answer, that the objection involves an
absurdity and a contradiction. I cannot will the good of God and of being
as an ultimate end, for a wrong reason. The reason of the choice and the
end chosen are identical, so that if I will the good of being, as an ultimate
end, I will it for the right reason.
Again : to will the good of being, not for its intrinsic value, but because
God commands it, and because I am under a moral obligation to will it, is
not to will it as an ultimate end. It is willing the will of God, or moral
obligation, as an ultimate end, and not the good of being, as an ultimate
end. This willing would not be obedience to the moral law.
Again : It is absurd and a contradiction to say, that I can love God,
that is, will his good out of regard to his authority, rather than out of
regard to the intrinsic value of his well-being. It is impossible to will God's
good as an end, out of regard to his authority. This is to make his
authority the end chosen, for the reason of a choice is identical with the
end chosen. Therefore, to will anything for the reason that God requires
it, is to will God's requirement as an ultimate end. I cannot, therefore,
love God with any acceptable love, primarily, because he commands it. God
never expected to induce his creatures to love him, or to will his good, by
commanding them to do so. “The law,” says the apostle, “was not made
N 2
180 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
for a righteous man, but for simmers.” If it be asked, then, “Wherefore
serveth the law 2" I answer—
(1.) That the obligation to will good to God exists antecedently to his
wequiring it.
(2.) He requires it because it is naturally obligatory.
(3.) It is impossible that he, being benevolent, should not will that we
should be benevolent.
(4.) His expressed will is only the promulgation of the law of nature.
It is rather declaratory than dictatorial.
(5.) It is a vindication or illustration of his righteousness.
(6.) It sanctions and rewards love. It cannot, as a mere authority,
beget love, but it can encourage and reward it.
(7.) It can fix the attention on the end commanded, and thus lead to a
fuller understanding of the value of that end. In this way, it may convert
the soul.
(8.) It can convince of sin, in case of disobedience.
(9.) It holds before the mind the standard by which it is to judge itself,
and by which it is to be judged.
But let it be kept in constant remembrance, that to aim at keeping the
law as an ultimate end is not keeping it. It is a legal righteousness, and
not love.
31. Obedience to the moral law does not imply, that the mind always,
or at any time, intends the right for the sake of the right. This has been
so fully shown in a former lecture, that it meed not be repeated here.
32. Nor does it imply, that the benevolent mind always so much as
thinks of the rightness of good willing. I surely may will the highest
well-being of God and of men as an end, or from a regard to its intrinsic
value, and not at the time, or at least at all times, be conscious of having
any reference to the rightness of this love. It is, however, none the less
virtuous on this account. I bellold the infinite value of the well-being of
God, and the infinite value of the immortal soul of my neighbour. My
soul is fired with the view. I instantly consecrate my whole being to this
end, and perhaps do not so much as think, at the time, either of moral
obligation, or of the rightness of the choice. I choose the end with a single
eye to its intrinsic value. Will any one say that this is not virtue 2–that
this is not true and real obedience to the law of God 2
33. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that we should practically
treat all interests that are of equal value according to their value. For
example, the precept, “Love thy meighbour as thyself," cannot mean that I
am to take equal care of my own soul, and the soul of every other human
being. This were impossible. Nor does it mean that I should take the
same care and oversight of my own, and of all the families of the earth.
Nor that I should divide what little of property, or time, or talent I have,
equally among all mankind. This were—
(1.) Impossible,
MORAL GOVERNMENT, 181
(2.) Uneconomical for the universe. More good will result to the
universe by each individual's giving his attention particularly to the promo-
tion of those interests that are within his reach, and that are so under his
influence that he possesses particular advantages for promoting them.
Every interest is to be esteemed according to its relative value; but our
efforts to promote particular interests should depend upon our relations and
capacity to promote them. Some interests of great value we may be under
no obligation to promote, for the reason that we have no ability to promote
them, while we may be under obligation to promote interests of vastly
less value, for the reason, that we are able to promote them. We are to
aim at promoting those interests that we can most surely and extensively
promote, but always in a manner that shall not interfere with others
promoting other interests, according to their relative value. Every man
is bound to promote his own, and the salvation of his family, not because
they belong to self, but because they are valuable in themselves, and
because they are particularly committed to him, as being directly within
his reach. This is a principle everywhere assumed in the government of
God, and I wish it to be distinctly borne in mind, as we proceed in our
investigations, as it will, on the one hand, prevent misapprehension, and,
on the other, avoid the necessity of circumlocution, when we wish to express
the same idea; the true intent and meaning of the moral law, no doubt, is,
that every interest or good known to a moral being shall be esteemed
according to its intrinsic value, and that, in our efforts to promote good, we
are to aim at securing the greatest practicable amount, and to bestow our
efforts where, and as it appears from our circumstances and relations, we
can accomplish the greatest good. This ordinarily can be done, beyond all
question, only by each one attending to the promotion of those particular
interests which are most within the reach of his influence.
LECTURE XVII.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN obFDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW.
It has been shown that the sum and spirit of the whole law is properly
expressed in one word—love. It has also been shown, that this love is
benevolence or good willing; that it consists in choosing the highest good
of God and of universal being for its own intrinsic value, in a spirit of entire
consecration to this as the ultimate end of existence. Although the whole law
is fulfilled in one word—love, yet there are many things implied in the
state of mind expressed by this term. It is, therefore, indispensable to a
right understanding of this subject, that we inquire into the characteristics
or attributes of this love. We must keep steadily in mind certain truths
of mental philosophy. I will, therefore—
182 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
I. Call attention to certain facts in mental philosophy which are revealed
to us in consciousness: and— ſº
II. Point out the attributes of that love which constitutes obedience to
the law of God ; and, as I proceed, call attention to those states of the
intelligence and of the sensibility, and also to the course of outward conduct
implied in the existence of this love in any mind, implied in it as neces-
Sarily resulting from it, as an effect does from its cause.
I. Call attention again to certain facts in mental philosophy as they are
revealed in consciousness.
1. Moral agents possess intellect, or the faculty of knowledge.
2. They also possess sensibility, or sensitivity, or in other words, the
faculty or susceptibility of feeling.
3. They also possess will, or the power of choosing or refusing in every
case of moral obligation.
4. These primary faculties are so correlated to each other, that the intellect
or the sensibility may control the will, or the will may, in a certain sense,
control them. That is, the mind is free to choose in accordance with the
demands of the intellect which is the law-giving faculty, or with the desires
and impulses of the sensibility, or to control and direct them both. The
will can directly control the attention of the intellect, and consequently its
perceptions, thoughts, &c. It can indirectly control the states of the
sensibility, or feeling faculty, by controlling the perceptions and thoughts
of the intellect. We also know from consciousness, as was shown in a former
lecture, that the voluntary muscles of the body are directly controlled by
the will, and that the law which obliges the attention, the feelings, and the
actions of the body to obey the decisions of the will, is physical law, or the
law of necessity. The attention of the intellect and the outward actions
are controlled directly, and the feelings indirectly, by the decisions of the
will. The will can either command or obey. It can suffer itself to be
enslaved by the impulses of the sensibility, or it can assert its sovereignty
and control them. The will is not influenced by either the intellect or
the sensibility, by the law of necessity or force; so that the will can always
resist either the demands of the intelligence, or the impulses of the sem-
sibility. But while they cannot lord it over the will, through the agency of
any law of force, the will has the aid of the law of necessity or force by
which to control them.
Again: We are conscious of affirming to ourselves our obligation to obey
the law of the intellect rather than the impulses of the sensibility; that to
act virtuously we must act rationally, or intelligently, and not give ourselves
up to the blind impulses of our feelings.
Now, inasmuch as the love required by the moral law consists in choice,
willing, intention, as before repeatedly shown ; and inasmuch as choice,
willing, intending, controls the states of the intellect and the outward
actions directly, by a law of necessity, and by the same law controls the
feelings or states of the sensibility indirectly, it follows that certain states of
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 183
the intellect and of the sensibility, and also certain outward actions, must be
implied in the existence of the love which the law of God requires. I say,
implied in it, not as making a part of it, but as necessarily resulting from
it. The thoughts, opinions, judgments, feelings, and outward actions must
be moulded and modified by the state of the heart or will.
Here it is important to remark, that, in common language, the same
word is often used to express either an action or attitude of the will, or a state
of the sensibility, or both. This is true of all the terms that represent what
are called the Christian graces or virtues, or those various modifications of
virtue of which Christians are conscious, and which appear in their life and
temper. Of this truth we shall be constantly reminded as we proceed in
our investigations, for we shall find illustrations of it at every step of our
progress.
Before I proceed to point out the attributes of benevolence, it is
important to remark, that all the moral attributes of God and of all holy
beings, are only attributes of benevolence. Benevolence is a term that
comprehensively expresses them all. God is love. This term expresses com-
prehensively God's whole moral character. This love, as we have repeatedly
seen, is benevolence. Benevolence is good-willing, or the choice of the highest
good of God and the universe, as an end. But from this comprehensive
statement, accurate though it be, we are apt to receive very inadequate
conceptions of what really belongs to, as implied in, benevolence. To say that
love is the fulfilling of the whole law; that benevolence is the whole of true
religion; that the whole duty of man to God and his neighbour, is expressed
in one Word, love—these statements, though true, are so comprehensive as to
need with all minds much amplification and explanation. Many things are
implied in love or benevolence. By this is intended, that benevolence needs
to be viewed under various aspects and in various relations, and its nature
considered in the various relations in which it is called to act. Benevolence
is an ultimate intention, or the choice of an ultimate end. But if we sup-
pose that this is all that is implied in benevolence, we shall egregiously err,
Unless we inquire into the nature of the end which benevolence chooses,
and the means by which it seeks to accomplish that end, we shall under-
stand but little of the import of the word benevolence. Benevolence has
many attributes or characteristics. These must all harmonize in the selec-
tion of its end, and in its efforts to realize it. By this is intended that
benevolence is not a blind, but the most intelligent, choice. It is the choice
of the best possible end in obedience to the demand of the reason and of
God, and implies the choice of the best possible means to secure this end.
Both the end and the means are chosen in obedience to the law of God,
and of reason. An attribute is a permanent quality of a thing. The
attributes of benevolence are those permanent qualities which belong to its
Very nature. Benevolence is not blind, but intelligent choice. It is the
choice of the highest well-being of moral agents. It seeks this end by
means suited to the nature of moral agents. Hence wisdom, justice, mercy,
truth, holiness, and many other attributes, as we shall see, are essential
184 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
elements, or attributes, of benevolence. To undersand what true benevolence
is, we must inquire into its attributes. Not everything that is called love
has at all the nature of benevolence. Nor has all that is called benevolence
any title to that appellation. There are various kinds of love. Natural
affection is called love. The affection that exists between the sexes is also
called love. Our preference of certain kinds of diet is called love. Hence
we say we love fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, &c. Benevolence is also called
love, and is the kind of love, beyond all question, required by the law of
God. But there is more than one state of mind that is called benevolence.
There is a constitutional or phrenological benevolence, which is often
mistaken for, and confounded with, the benevolence which constitutes virtue.
This so called benevolence is in truth only an imposing form of selfish-
mess; nevertheless it is called benevolence. Many of its manifestations are
like those of true benevolence. Care, therefore, should be taken, in giving
religious instruction, to distinguish accurately between them. Benevolence,
let it be remembered, is the obedience of the will to the law of reason
and of God. It is willing good as an end, for its own sake, and not to
gratify self. Selfishness consists in the obedience of the will to the impulses
of the sensibility. It is a spirit of self-gratification. The will seeks to
gratify the desires and propensities, for the pleasure of the gratification.
Self-gratification is sought as an end, and as the Supreme end. It is pre-
ferred to the claims of God and the good of being. Phrenological, or con-
stitutional benevolence, is only obedience to the impulse of the sensibility—
a yielding to a feeling of compassion. It is only an effort to gratify a desire.
It is, therefore, as really selfishness, as is an effort to gratify any constitu-
tional desire whatever.
It is impossible to get a just idea of what constitutes obedience to the
divine law, and what is implied in it, without considering attentively the
various attributes or aspects of benevolence, properly so called. Upon this
discussion we are about to enter. But before I commence the enumeration
and definition of these attributes, it is important further to remark, that the
moral attributes of God, as revealed in his works, providence, and word,
throw much light upon the subject before us. Also the many precepts of
the Bible, and the developements of benevolence therein revealed, will
assist us much, as we proceed in our inquiries upon this important subject.
As the Bible expressly affirms that love comprehends the whole character
of God—that it is the whole that the law requires of man—that the end of
the commandment is charity or love—we may be assured that every form of
true virtue is only a modification of love or benevolence, that is, that every
state of mind required by the Bible, and recognized as virtue, is, in its last
analysis, resolvable into love or benevolence. In other words, every virtue
is only benevolence viewed under certain aspects, or in certain relations.
In other words still, it is only one of the elements, peculiarities, charac-
teristics, or attributes of benevolence. This is true of God’s moral attributes.
They are, as has been said, only attributes of benevolence. They are only
the essential qualities that belong to the very nature of benevolence which
MORAL GOVERNMENT. | 85
are manifested and brought into activity wherever benevolence is brought
into certain circumstances and relations. Benevolence is just, merciful, &c.
Such is its nature, that in appropriate circumstances these qualities, together
with many others, will manifest themselves in executive acts.” This is and
must be true of every holy being.
II. I will now proceed to point out the attributes of that love which con-
stitutes obedience to the law of God.
As I proceed I will call attention to the states of the intellect and of the
sensibility, and also to the courses of outward conduct implied in the exist-
ence of this love in any mind—implied in its existence as necessarily
resulting from it by the law of cause and effect. These attributes are—
1. Woluntariness. That is to say, it is a phenomenon of the will. There
is a state of the sensibility often expressed by the term love. Love may,
and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a mere feeling or
emotion. The term is often used to express the emotion of fondness or
attachment, as distinct from a voluntary state of mind, or a choice of the
will. This emotion or feeling, as we are all aware, is purely an involuntary
state of mind. Because it is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and of course
a passive state of mind, it has in itself no moral character. The law of
God requires voluntary love or good-will, as has been repeatedly shown.
This love consists in choice, intention. It is choosing the highest well-
being of God and the universe of sentient beings as an end. Of course
voluntariness must be ome of its characteristics. The Word benevolence
expresses this idea.
If it consist in choice, if it be a phenomenon of the will, it must control
the thoughts and states of the sensibility, as well as the outward action.
This love, then, not only consists in a state of consecration to God and the
universe, but also implies deep emotions of love to God and man. Though
a phenomenon of the will, it implies the existence of all those feelings
of love and affection to God and man, that necessarily result from the con-
secration of the heart or will to their highest well-being. It also implies
all that outward course of life that necessarily flows from a state of will
* A recent writer has spoken contemptuously of “being,” as he calls it, “sophisticated
into believing, or rather saying, that faith is love, justice is love, humility is love.” I would
earnestly recommend to that and kindred writers, the study of the thirteenth chapter of the
first Corinthians. They will there find a specimen of what they please to call Sophistry.
If it is “sophistry,” or “excessive generalization,” as other writers seem to regard it, to
represent love as possessing the attributes which comprise the various forms of virtue, it
surely is the “generalization” and “Sophistry” of inspiration. Generalization was the great
peculiarity of Christ’s preaching. His epitomizing all the commandments of God, and
resolving the whole of obedience into love, is an illustration of this, and in no other way
could he have exposed the delusion of those who obeyed the letter, but overlooked and
outraged the spirit of the divine commandments. The same was true of the apostles, and
so it is of every preacher of the gospel. Every outward act is only the expression of an
inward voluntary state of mind. To understand ourselves or others, we must conceive
clearly of the true spirit of moral law, and of heart-obedience to it.
186 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
consecrated to this end. Let it be borne in mind, that where these feelings
do not arise in the sensibility, and where this course of life is not, there the
true love or voluntary consecration to God and the universe required by the
law, is not. Those follow from this by a law of necessity. Those, that is,
feelings or emotions of love, and a correct outward life, may exist without
this voluntary love, as I shall have occasion to show in its proper place;
but this love cannot exist without those, as they follow from it by a law of
necessity. These emotions will vary in their strength, as constitution and
circumstances vary, but exist they must, in some sensible degree, whenever
the will is in a benevolent attitude.
2. Liberty is an attribute of this love. The mind is free and spon-
taneous in its exercise. It makes this choice when it has the power at
every moment to choose self-gratification as an end. Of this every moral
agent is conscious. It is a free, and therefore a responsible, choice.
3. Intelligence. That is, the mind makes choice of this end intelligently.
It not only knows what it chooses, and why it chooses, but also that it
chooses in accordance with the dictates of the intellect, and the law of
God; that the end is worthy of being chosen, and that for this reason the
intellect demands that it should be chosen ; and also, that for its own
intrinsic value it is chosen.
Because voluntariness, liberty, and intelligence are matural attributes of
this love, therefore, the following are its moral attributes.
4. Wirtue is an attribute of it. Virtue is a term that expresses the moral
character of benevolence; it is moral rightness. Moral rightness is moral
perfection, righteousness, or uprightness. The term marks or designates
its relation to moral law, and expresses its conformity to it.
In the exercise of this love or choice, the mind is conscious of upright-
mess, or of being conformed to moral law or moral obligation. In other
words, it is conscious of being virtuous or holy; of being like God; of
loving what ought to be loved, and of consecration to the right end.
Because this choice is in accordance with the demands of the intel-
lect, therefore, the mind in its exercise, is conscious of the approbation of
that power of the intellect which we call conscience. The conscience
must approve this love, choice, or intention.
Again : Because the conscience approves of this choice, therefore, there
is and must be a corresponding state of the sensibility, There is and must
be in the sensibility a feeling of happiness or satisfaction, a feeling of com-
placency or delight in the love that is in the heart or will. This love, them,
always produces self-approbation in the conscience, and a felt satisfaction
in the sensibility, and these feelings are often very acute and joyous,
insomuch that the soul, in the exercise of this love of the heart, is some-
times led to rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory. This state of
mind does not always and necessarily amount to joy. Much depends in
this respect on the clearness of the intellectual views, upon the state of the
sensibility, and upon the manifestation of Divine approbation to the soul.
But where peace, or approbation of conscience, and consequently a peaceful
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 187
state of the sensibility are not, this love is not. They are connected with
it by a law of necessity, and must of course appear on the field of con-
Sciousness where this love exists. These, then, are implied in the love
that constitutes obedience to the law of God. Conscious peace of mind,
and conscious joy in God must be where true love to God exists.
5. Disinterestedness is another attribute of this love. By disinterested-
ness, it is not intended that the mind takes no interest in the object loved,
for it does take a supreme interest in it. But this term expresses the
mind's choice of an end for its own sake, and not merely upon condition
that the good belongs to self. This love is disinterested in the sense that
the highest well-being of God and the universe is chosen, not upon con-
dition of its relation to self, but for its own intrinsic and infinite value. It
is this attribute particularly that distinguishes this love from selfish love.
Selfish love makes the relation of good to self the condition of choosing it
The good of God and of the universe, if chosen at all, is only chosen as a
means or condition of promoting the highest good of self. But this love
does not make good to self its end ; but good to God and being in general,
is its end.
As disinterestedness is an attribute of this love, it does not seek its own,
but the good of others. “Charity (love) seeketh not her own.” It grasps
in its comprehensive embrace the good of being in general, and of course,
of necessity, seeures a corresponding outward life and inward feeling. The
intellect will be employed in devising ways and means for the promotion of
its end. The sensibility will be tremblingly alive to the good of all and of
each, will rejoice in the good of others as in its own, and will grieve at the
misery of others as in its own. It “will rejoice with them that do rejoice,
and weep with them that weep.” There will not, cannot be envy at the
prosperity of others, but unfeigned joy, joy as real and often as exquisite as
in its own prosperity. Benevolence enjoys everybody's good things, while
selfishness is too envious at the good things of others even to enjoy its own.
There is a Divine economy in benevolence. Each benevolent soul not only
enjoys his own good things, but also enjoys the good things of all others so
far as he knows their happiness. He drinks at the river of God's pleasure.
He not only rejoices in doing good to others, but also in beholding their
enjoyment of good things. He joys in God's joy, and in the joy of angels
and of Saints. He also rejoices in the good things of all sentient existences.
He is happy in beholding the pleasure of the beasts of the field, the fowls
of the air, and the fishes of the sea. He sympathizes with all joy and all
suffering known to him ; nor is his sympathy with the suffering of others a
feeling of unmingled pain. It is a real luxury to sympathize in the woes
of others. He would not be without this sympathy. It so accords with
his sense of propriety and fitness, that, mingled with the painful emotion,
there is a sweet feeling of self-approbation; so that a benevolent sympathy
With the Woes of others is by no means inconsistent with happiness, and
With perfect happiness. God has this sympathy. He often expresses and
otherwise manifests it. There is, indeed, a mysterious and an exquisite
188 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
luxury in sharing the woes of others. God and angels, and all holy beings
know what it is. Where this result of love is not manifested, there love
itself is not. Envy at the prosperity, influence, or good of others, the
absence of sensible joy in view of the good enjoyed by others, and of
sympathy with the sufferings of others, prove conclusively that this love
does not exist. There is an expansiveness, an amplemess of embrace,
a universality, and a Divine disinterestedness in this love, that necessarily
manifests itself in the liberal devising of liberal things for Zion, and in the
copious outpourings of the floods of sympathetic feeling, both in joys
and sorrows, when suitable occasions present themselves before the mind.
6. Impartiality is another attribute of this love. By this term is not
intended, that the mind is indifferent to the character of him who is happy
or miserable ; that it would be as well pleased to see the wicked as the
righteous eternally and perfectly blessed. But it is intended that, other
things being equal, it is the intrinsic value of their well-being which is
alone regarded by the mind. Other things being equal, it matters not to
whom the good belongs. It is no respecter of persons. The good of being
is its end, and it seeks to promote every interest according to its relative
value. Selfish love is partial. It seeks to promote self-interest first, and
secondarily those interests that sustain such a relation to self as will at
least indirectly promote the gratification of self. Selfish love has its
favourites, its prejudices, unreasonable and ridiculous. Colour, family,
mation, and many other things of like mature, modify it. But benevolence
knows neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, white nor black,
Barbarian, Scythiam, European, Asiatic, African, nor American, but accounts
all men as men, and by virtue of their common manhood, calls every man
a brother, and seeks the interest of all and of each. Impartiality, being an
attribute of this love, will of course manifest itself in the outward life. and
in the temper and spirit of its subject. This love can have no fellowship
with those absurd and ridiculous prejudices that are so often rife among
mominal Christians. Nor will it cherish them for a moment in the sensi-
bility of him who exercises it. Benevolence recognizes no privileged classes
on the one hand, mor proscribed classes on the other. It secures in the
sensibility an utter loathing of those discriminations, so odiously manifested
and boasted of, and which are founded exclusively in a selfish state of the
will. The fact that a man is a man, and not that he is of our party, of our
complexion, or of our town, state, or nation—that he is a creature of God,
that he is capable of virtue and happiness, these are the considerations that
are seized upon by this divinely impartial love. It is the intrinsic value of
his interests, and not that they are the interests of one connected with self,
that the benevolent mind regards.
But here it is important to repeat the remark, that the economy of
benevolence demands, that where two interests are, in themselves con-
sidered, of equal value, in order to secure the greatest amount of good,
each one should bestow his efforts where they can be bestowed to the
greatest advantage. For example: every man sustains such relations that
MORAL GOVERNMENT. } 89
he can accomplish more good by seeking to promote the interest and hap-
piness of certain persons rather than of others: his family, his kindred,
his companions, his immediate neighbours, and those to whom, in the
providence of God, he sustains such relations as to give him access to
them, and influence over them. It is not unreasonable, it is not partial,
but reasonable and impartial, to bestow our efforts more directly upon
them. Therefore, while benevolence regards every interest according to
its relative value, it reasonably puts forth its efforts in the direction where
there is a prospect of accomplishing the most good. This, I say, is not
partiality, but impartiality; for, be it understood, it is not the particular
persons to whom good can be done, but the amount of good that can be
accomplished, that directs the efforts of benevolence. It is not because
my family is my own, nor because their well-being is, of course, more
valuable in itself than that of my neighbours' families, but because my rela-
tions afford me higher facilities for doing them good, I am under particular
obligation to aim first at promoting their good. Hence the apostle says:
“If any man provide not for his own, especially for those of his own house-
hold, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” Strictly
speaking, benevolence esteems every known good according to its intrinsic
and relative value; but practically treats every interest according to the
perceived probability of securing on the whole the highest amount of good.
This is a truth of great practical importance. It is developed in the
experience and observation of every day and hour. It is manifest in the
conduct of God and of Christ, of apostles and martyrs. It is everywhere
assumed in the precepts of the Bible, and everywhere manifested in the
history of benevolent effort. Let it be understood, them, that impartiality,
as an attribute of benevolence, does not imply that its effort to do good
will not be modified by relations and circumstances. But, on the contrary,
this attribute implies, that the efforts to secure the great end of benevo-
lence, to wit, the greatest amount of good to God and the universe, will
be modified by those relations and circumstances that afford the highest
advantages for doing good.
The impartiality of benevolence causes it always to lay supreme stress
upon God’s interests, because his well-being is of infinite value, and of
course benevolence must be supreme to him. Benevolence, being impartial
love, of course accounts God's interests and well-being, as of infinitely
greater value than the aggregate of all other interests. Benevolence
regards our neighbour's interests as our own, simply because they are in
their intrinsic value as our own. Benevolence, therefore, is always Su-
preme to God and equal to man.
rººf
7. Universality is another attribute of this love. Benevolence chooses
the highest good of being in general. It excludes mone from its regard;
but on the contrary embosoms all in its ample embrace. But by this it is
not intended, that it practically seeks to promote the good of every indi-
vidual. It would if it could ; but it seeks the highest practicable amount
of good. The interest of every individual is estimated according to its in-
190 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
trinsic value, whatever the circumstances or character of each may be. But
character and relations may and must modify the manifestations of benevo-
lence, or its efforts in seeking to promote this end. A wicked character,
and governmental relations and considerations, may forbid benevolence to
seek the good of some. Nay, they may demand that positive misery shall
be inflicted on some, as a warning to others to beware of their destructive
ways. By universality, as an attribute of benevolence, is intended, that
good-will is truly exercised towards all sentient beings, whatever their
character and relations may be ; and that, when the higher good of the
greater number does not forbid it, the happiness of all and of each will be
pursued with a degree of stress equal to their relative value, and the pros-
pect of securing each interest. Enemies as well as friends, strangers and
foreigners as well as relations and immediate neighbours, will be enfolded
in its sweet embrace. It is the state of mind required by Christ in the
truly divine precept, “I Say unto you, Love your enemies, pray for them
that hate you, and do good unto them that despitefully use and persecute
you.” This attribute of benevolence is gloriously conspicuous in the
character of God. His love to sinners alone accounts for their being
to-day out of perdition. His aiming to secure the highest good of the
greatest number, is illustrated by the display of his glorious justice in the
punishment of the wicked. His universal care for all ranks and conditions
of sentient beings manifested in his works and providence, beautifully and
gloriously illustrates the truth, that “his tender mercies are overall his works.’
It is easy to see that universality must be a modification or attribute of
true benevolence. It consists in good-willing, that is, in choosing the highest
good of being as such, and for its own sake. Of course it must, to be
consistent with itself, seek the good of all and of each, so far as the good of
each is consistent with the greatest good upon the whole. Benevolence
not only wills and seeks the good of moral beings, but also the good of
every sentient existence, from the minutest animalcule to the highest order
of beings. It of course produces a state of the sensibility tremblingly alive
to all happiness and to all pain. It is pained at the agony of an insect, and
rejoices in its joy. God does this, and all holy beings do this. Where
this sympathy with the joys and Sorrows of universal being is not, there
benevolence is not. Observe, good is its end; where this is promoted by
the proper means, the feelings are gratified. Where evil is witnessed, the
benevolent spirit deeply and necessarily sympathizes.
LECTURE XVIII.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW of GoD.
Efficiency is another attribute or characteristic of benevolence. Be-
nevolence consists in choice, intention. Now we know from consciousness
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 191
that choice or intention constitutes the mind's deepest source or power of
action. If I honestly intend a thing, I cannot but make efforts to accom-
plish that which I intend, provided that I believe the thing possible. If I
choose an end, this choice must and will emergize to secure its end. When
benevolence is the supreme choice, preference, or intention of the soul, it
is plainly impossible that it should not produce efforts to secure its end. It
must cease to exist, or manifest itself in exertions to secure its end, as soon
as, and whenever the intelligence deems it wise to do so. If the will has
yielded to the intelligence in the choice of an end, it will certainly obey
the intelligence in pursuit of that end. Choice, intention, is the cause of
all the outward activity of moral agents. They have all chosen some end,
either their own gratification, or the highest good of being; and all the busy
bustle of this world's teeming population, is nothing else than choice or
intention seeking to compass its end.
Efficiency, therefore, is an attribute of benevolent intention. It must,
it will, it does emergize in God, in angels, in Saints on earth and in heaven.
It was this attribute of benevolence, that led God to give his only begotten
Son, and that led the Son to give himself, “that whosoever believeth in
him should not perish, but have everlasting life.”
If love is efficient in producing outward action, and efficient in producing
inward feelings; it is efficient to wake up the intellect, and set the world
of thought in action to devise ways and means for realizing its end. It
wields all the infinite natural attributes of God. It is the mainspring that
moves all heaven. It is the mighty power that is heaving the mass of
mind, and rocking the moral world like a smothered volcano. Look to the
heavens above. It was benevolence that hung them out. It is benevo-
lence that sustains those mighty rolling orbs in their courses. It was
good-will endeavouring to realize its end that at first put forth creative
power. The same power, for the same reason, still energizes, and will coln.
tinue to energize for the realization of its end, so long as God is benevo-
lent. And O ! what a glorious thought, that infinite benevolence is wielding,
and will for ever wield, infinite natural attributes for the promotion of
good. No mind but an infinite one can begin to conceive of the amount
of good that Jehovah will secure. O blessed, glorious thought ! But it
is, it must be a reality, as surely as God and the universe exist. It is
no vain imagination ; it is one of the most certain, as well as the most
glorious, truths in the universe. Mountains of granite are but vapour in
comparison with it. But will the truly benevolent on earth and in heaven
sympathize with God? The power that emergizes in him, energizes in
them. One principle animates and moves them all, and that principle is
love, good-will to universal being. Well may our souls cry out, Amen, go
on, God-speed the work; let this mighty power heave and wield universal
mind, until all the ills of earth shall be put away, and until all that can be
made holy are clothed in the garments of everlasting gladness.
Since benevolence is necessarily, from its very nature, active and effi-
cient in putting forth efforts to secure its end, and since its end is the highest
192 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
good of being, it follows that all who are truly religious will, and must, from
the very nature of true religion, be active in endeavouring to promote the
good of being. While effort is possible to a Christian, it is as matural to
him as his breath. He has within him the very main-spring of activity, a
heart set on the promotion of the highest good of universal being. While
he has life and activity at all, it will, and it must, be directed to this end.
Let this never be forgotten. An idle, an inactive, inefficient Christian is a
misnomer. Religion is an essentially active principle, and when and while
it exists, it must exercise and manifest itself. It is not merely good desire,
but it is good-willing. Men may have desires, and hope and live on them,
without making efforts to realize their desires. They may desire without
action. If their will is active, their life must be. If they really choose
an ultimate end, this choice must manifest itself. The sinner does and
must manifest his selfish choice, and so likewise must the saint manifest
his benevolence.
9. Penitence must be a characteristic of benevolence, in one who has
been a sinner. Penitence, as we have briefly said, and shall more fully
illustrate hereafter, is not a phenomenon of the sensibility, but of the will.
Every form of Virtue must, of necessity, be a phenomenon of the will, and
not of the intellect, or of the sensibility alone. This word is commonly
used also to designate a certain phenomenon of the sensibility, to wit,
sorrow for sin. This sorrow, though called penitence, is not penitence
regarded as a virtue. Evangelical penitence consists in a peculiar attitude
of the will toward our own past sins. It is the Will's continued rejection
of, and opposition to, our past sins—the Will's aversion to them. This
rejection, opposition, and aversion, is penitence, and is always a peculiarity
in the history of those benevolent minds that have been sinners. This
change in the will, most deeply and permanently affects the sensibility. It
will keep the intelligence thoroughly awake to the mature, character, and
tendencies of sim, to its unspeakable guilt, and to all its intrinsic odious.
mess. This will, of course, break up the fountains of the great deep of
feeling; the sensibility will often pour forth a torrent of sorrow in view of
past sin; and all its loathing and indignation will be kindled against it
when it is beheld. This attribute of benevolence will Secure confession
and restitution, that is, these must necessarily follow from genuine repent-
ance. If the soul forsakes sin, it will of course make all possible reparation,
where it has done an injury. Benevolence seeks the good of all, of
course it will and must seek to repair whatever injury it has inflicted on
any.
Repentance will, and must, secure a God.justifying and self-condemning
spirit. It will take all shame and all blame to self, and fully acquit God
of blame. This deep self-abasement is always and necessarily a character-
istic of the true penitent; where this is not, true repentance is not.
It should, however, be here remarked, that feelings of self-loathing, of
self-abasement, and of abhorrence of sin, depend upon the view which the
intelligence gains of the mature, and guilt, and aggravation of sin. In a
MORAL GOVERNMENT. | 93
sensible and manifested degree, it will always exist when the will has
homestly turned or repented; but this feeling I have described gains
strength as the soul, from time to time, gains a deeper insight into the
mature, guilt, and tendencies of sin. It is probable that repentance, as an
emotion, will always gain strength, not only in this workſ but in heaven.
Can it be that the saints can in heaven reflect upon their past abuse of the
Saviour, and not feel their sorrow stirred within them 2 Nor will this
diminish their happiness. Godly sorrow is not unhappiness. There is a
luxury in the exercise. Remorse cannot be known in heaven, but godly
sorrow, I think, must exist among the Saints for ever. However this may
be in heaven, it certainly is implied in repentance on earth. This attribute
must, and will, secure an outward life conformed to the law of love. There
may be an outward morality without benevolence, but there cannot be
benevolence without corresponding purity of Outward life.
10. Another characteristic or attribute of benevolence is Faith. Evan-
gelical faith is by no means, as some have supposed, a phenomenon of the
intelligence. The term, however, is often used to express states both of
the sensibility and of the intellect. Conviction, or a strong perception of
truth, such as banishes doubt, is, in common language, called faith or belief,
and this without any reference to the state of the will, whether it embraces
or resists the truth perceived. But, certainly, this conviction cannot be
evangelical faith. In this belief, there is no virtue; it is essentially but the
faith of devils. The term is often used, in common language, to express a
mere feeling of assurance, or confidence. Faith, to be a virtue, must be a
phenomenon of the will. It must be an attribute of benevolence or love.
Faith, as an attribute of benevolence, is that quality that inclines it to
trust in veracity and truth as the necessary condition of securing the good
of being. It is a first truth, that truth, and obedience to truth, are eon-
ditions of the good of being. Hence, in the very act of becoming bene-
volent, the will embraces and commits itself to truth. The reason also
affirms the Veracity of God. Hence, in becoming benevolent, the mind
commits itself to the Veracity of God. Benevolence, be it remembered, is
an intelligent choice, in obedience to the law of God. Of course its very
mature implies confidence in God. Such is its nature that it will, of course,
embrace and be influenced by the revealed will of God, and receive this
revealed will as law, in all its efforts to secure its end. This quality
reveals itself in specific acts. There is an important distinction between
faith, as an attribute of benevolence, and faith as a volition, or special act,
The first is the cause of the last. Faith, as an attribute, is a quality that
belongs to the mature of benevolence. This quality reveals itself in par-
ticular acts, or in embracing and commiting itself to the testimony and
Will of God, in resting in the promises and declarations of God, and in
the word and work of Christ. It trusts in God, this is its nature. As has
been said, in the very act of becoming benevolent, the mind commits itself
to truth, and to the God of truth. It obeys the law of the intellect in the
act of choosing the good of being, as an ultimate end. The intellect affirms
O
194 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the Veracity of God, and the relations of this veracity and of truth to the
good of being. Hence confidence in God belongs to the very nature of
benevolence. As confidence in God is an attribute of benevolence, it will,
of course, employ the intellect to ascertain the truth and will of God, and
put forth appropriate expressions of confidence, in specific acts, as new
truths shall be discovered. Particular acts of confidence in God, or in
others, or in particular truths, are executive acts, and efforts to secure the
end of benevolence. It also implies that state of the sensibility which is
called faith. Both the state of the intellect and the state of the sensibility
just expressed are implied in faith, though neither of them makes any
part of it. Faith always begets a realizing state of the sensibility. The
intellect sees the truth clearly, and the sensibility feels it deeply, in pro-
portion to the strength of the intellectual perception. But the clearest
possible perception, and the deepest possible felt assurance of the truth, may
consist with a state of the utmost opposition of the will to truth. But this
cannot be trust, confidence, faith. The dammed in hell, no doubt, see the
truth clearly, and have a feeling of the utmost assurance of the truth of
Christianity, but they have no faith.
Faith, then, must certainly be a phenomenon of the will, and must be a
modification, or attribute, of benevolence. It is good-will or benevolence
considered in its relations to the truth of God. It is good-will to God,
manifested by confiding in his veracity and faithfulness. It cannot be too
distinctly borne in mind, that every modification or phase of virtue is only
benevolence, existing in certain relations, or good will to God and the
universe, manifesting itself in the various circumstances and relations in
which it is called to act.
11. Complacency in holiness or moral excellence, is another attribute of
benevolenge. This consists in benevolence contemplated in its relations
to holy beings.
This term also expresses both a state of the intelligence and of the
sensibility. Moral agents are so constituted, that they necessarily approve
of moral worth or excellence; and when even sinners behold right
character, or moral goodness, they are compelled to respect and approve it,
by a law of their intelligence. This they not unfrequently regard as
evidence of goodness in themselves. But this is doubtless just as common
in hell as it is on earth. The veriest sinners on earth or in hell, have, by
the unalterable constitution of their nature, the necessity imposed upon
them, of paying intellectual homage to moral excellence. When a moral
agent is intensely contemplating moral excellence, and his intellectual
approbation is emphatically pronounced, the natural, and often the neces-
sary result, is a corresponding feeling of complacency or delight in the
sensibility. But this being altogether an involuntary state of mind, has
no moral character. Complacency, as a phenomenon of will, consists in
willing the highest actual blessedness of the holy being in particular, as a
good in itself, and upon condition of his moral excellence.
This attribute of benevolence is the cause of a complacent state of the
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 195
sensibility. It is true, that feelings of complacency may exist, when com-
placency of will does not exist. But complacency of feeling surely will
exist, when complacency of will exists. Complacency of will implies com-
placency of conscience, or the approbation of the intelligence. When
there is a complacency of intelligence and of will, there must follow, of
course, complacency of the sensibility.
It is highly worthy of observation here, that this complacency of feeling
is that which is generally termed love to God and to the saints, in the
common language of Christians, and often in the popular language of the
Bible. It is a vivid and pleasant state of the sensibility, and very notice-
able by consciousness, of course. Indeed, it is perhaps the general usage
now to call this phenomenon of the sensibility, love, and for want of just
discrimination, to speak of it as constituting religion. Many seem to Sup-
pose that this feeling of delight in, and fondness for, God, is the love
required by the moral law. They are conscious of not being voluntary in
it, as well they may be. They judge of their religious state, not by the
end for which they live, that is, by their choice or intention, but by their
emotions. If they find themselves strongly exercised with emotions of love
to God, they look upon themselves as in a state well-pleasing to God. But
if their feelings or emotions of love are not active, they of course judge
themselves to have little or no religion. It is remarkable to what extent
religion is regarded as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and as consisting
in mere feelings. So common is it, indeed, that almost uniformly, when
professed Christians speak of their religion, they speak of their feelings, or
the state of their sensibility, instead of speaking of their conscious con-
secration to God, and the good of being.
It is also somewhat common for them to speak of their views of Christ,
and of truth, in a manner that shows, that they regard the states of the
intellect as constituting a part, at least, of their religion. It is of great
importance that just views should prevail among Christians upon this
momentous subject. Virtue, or religion, as has been repeatedly said, must
be a phenomenon of the will. The attribute of benevolence which we are
considering, that is, complacency of will in God, is the most common light
in which the Scriptures present it, and also the most common form in which
it lies revealed on the field of consciousness. The Scriptures often assign
the goodness of God as a reason for loving him, and Christians are con-
scious of having much regard to his goodness in their love to him ; I mean
in their good-will to him. They will good to him, and ascribe all praise
and glory to him, upon the condition that he deserves it. Of this they
are conscious. Now, as was shown in a former lecture, in their love or
good Will to God, they do not regard his goodness as the fundamental
reason for Willing good to him. Although his goodness is that, which, at
the time, most strongly impresses their minds, yet it must be that the
intrinsic value of his well-being is assumed, and had in view by them, or
they would no sooner will good than evil to him. In willing his good
they must assume its intrinsic value to him, as the fundamental reason
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MORAL GOVERNMENT, 197
we are strongly conscious. We are also conscious of willing his actual
blessedness upon condition that he is good. This reason we maturally
assign to ourselves and to others. But in this we may overlook the fact,
that there is still another, and a deeper, and a more fundamental reason
assumed for willing his good, to wit, its intrinsic value. And this reason
is so fundamental, that we should irresistibly affirm our obligation to will
his good, upon the bare perception of his susceptibility of happiness,
wholly irrespective of his character.”
Before I dismiss this subject, I must advert again to the subject of com-
placent love, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and also as a phenomenon
of the intellect. If I mistake not, there are Sad mistakes, and gross and
ruinous delusions, entertained by many upon this subject. The intellect,
of necessity, perfectly approves of the character of God where it is appre-
hended. The intellect is so correlated to the Sensibility, that, where it
perceives in a strong light the divine excellence, or the excellence of the
divine law, the sensibility is affected by the perception of the intellect, as
a thing of course and of necessity, so that emotions of complacency and
delight in the law, and in the divine character, may and often do glow and
burn in the sensibility, while the will or heart is unaffected. The will
remains in a selfish choice, while the intellect and the sensibility are
strongly impressed with the perception of the Divine excellence. This
state of the intellect and the sensibility are, no doubt, often mistaken for
true religion. We have undoubted illustrations of this in the Bible, and
similar cases of it in common life. “Yet they seek me daily, and delight
to know my ways, as a nation that did righteousness, and forsook not the
ordinance of their God : they ask of me the ordinances of justice, they
take delight in approaching to God.” Isaiah lviii. 2. “And, lo, thou art
unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice, and can
play well on an instrument: for they hear thy words, but they do them
not.” Ezek. xxxiii. 32.
Nothing is of greater importance, than for ever to understand, that
religion is always and necessarily a phenomenon of the will ; that it always
and necessarily produces outward action and inward feeling; that, on
account of the correlation of the intellect and sensibility, almost any and
every variety of feeling may exist in the mind, as produced by the percep-
tions of the intellect, whatever the state of the will may be ; that unless
we are conscious of good-will, or of consecration to God and the good of
being—unless we are conscious of living for this end, it avails us nothing,
whatever our views and feelings may be.
And also, it behoves us to consider that, although these views and feelings
may exist while the heart is wrong, they will certainly exist when the
heart is right; that there may be feeling, and deep feeling, when the heart
is in a selfish attitude, yet, that there will and must be deep emotion and
strenuous action, when the heart is right. Let it be remembered, that
* Let the foregoing be read in connection with the lecture on the Moral Excellence of
God being the Foundation of Obligation.
198 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
complacency, as a phenomenon of the will, is always a striking characteristic
of true love to God; that the mind is affected and consciously influenced,
in Willing the actual and infinite blessedness of God, by a regard to his
goodness. The goodness of God is not, as has been repeatedly shown, the
fundamental reason for the good will, but it is one reason or a condition,
both of the possibility of willing, and of the obligation to will, his blessed-
ness in particular. It assigns to itself and to others, his goodness as the
reason for Willing his good, rather than the intrinsic value of good; because
this last is so universally, and so necessarily assumed, that it thinks not of
mentioning it, taking it always for granted, that this will, and must be
understood.
LECTURE XIX.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN ENTIRE oped IENCE TO THE LAW of GoD.
12. Opposition to sin is another attribute or characteristic of true love
to God.
This attribute is simply benevolence contemplated in its relations to sin.
This attribute certainly is implied in the very essence and mature of
benevolence. Benevolence is good-willing, or willing the highest good of
being as an end. Now there is nothing in the universe more destructive
of this good than sin. Benevolence cannot do otherwise than be for ever
opposed to sin, as that abominable thing which it necessarily hates. It is
absurd and a contradiction to affirm, that benevolence is not opposed to
sin. God is love or benevolence. He must, therefore, be the unalterable
opponent of sin–of all sin, in every form and degree.
But there is a state, both of the intellect and of the sensibility, that is
often mistaken for the opposition of the will to sin. Opposition to all sin
is, and must be, a phenomenon of the will, and on that ground alone it
becomes virtue. But it often exists also as a phenomenon of the intellect,
and likewise of the sensibility. The intellect cannot contemplate sin
without disapprobation. This disapprobation is often mistaken for oppo-
sition of heart, or of will. When the intellect strongly disapproves of, and
denounces sin, there is naturally and necessarily a corresponding feeling
of opposition to it in the sensibility, an emotion of loathing, of hatred, of
abhorrence. This is often mistaken for opposition of the will, or heart.
This is manifest from the fact, that often the most notorious sinners mani-
fest strong indignation in view of oppression, injustice, falsehood, and
many other forms of sin. This phenomenon of the sensibility and of the
intellect, as I said, is often mistaken for a virtuous opposition to sin,
which it cannot be unless it involve an act of the will.
But let it be remembered, that virtuous opposition to sin, is a charac-
teristic of love to God and man, or of benevolence. This opposition to
sin cannot possibly co-exist with any degree of sin in the heart. That is,
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 199
this opposition cannot co-exist with a sinful choice. The will cannot, at
the same time, be opposed to sin and commit sin. This is impossible, and
the supposition involves a contradiction. Opposition to sin as a phenome-
mon of the intellect, or of the sensibility, may exist; in other words, the
intellect may strongly disapprove of sin, and the sensibility may feel
strongly opposed to certain forms of it, while, at the same time, the will
may cleave to self-indulgence in other forms. This fact, no doubt, ac-
counts for the common mistake, that we can, at the same time, exercise a
virtuous opposition to sin, and still continue to commit it.
Many are, no doubt, labouring under this fatal delusion. They are
conscious, not only of an intellectual disapprobation of sin in certain
forms, but also, at times, of strong feelings of opposition to it. And yet
they are also conscious of continuing to commit it. They, therefore, con-
clude, that they have a principle of holiness in them, and also a principle
of sin, that they are partly holy and partly sinful, at the same time. Their
opposition of intellect and of feeling, they suppose to be a holy opposition,
when, no doubt, it is just as common in hell, and even more so than it is on
earth, for the reason that sin is more maked there than it generally is here.
But now the inquiry may arise, how is it that both the intellect and the
sensibility are opposed to it, and yet that it is persevered in 2 What
reason can the mind have for a sinful choice, when urged to it neither by
the intellect nor the sensibility ? The philosophy of this phenomenon
meeds explanation. Let us attend to it.
I am a moral agent. My intellect necessarily disapproves of sin. My
sensibility is so correlated to my intellect, that it sympathizes with it, or
is affected by its perceptions and its judgments. I contemplate sin. I
necessarily disapprove of it, and condemn it. This affects my sensibility.
I loathe and abhor it. I nevertheless commit it. Now how is this to be
accounted for 2 The usual method is by ascribing it to a depravity in the
will itself, a lapsed or corrupted state of the faculty, so that it perversely
chooses sin for its own sake. Although disapproved by the intellect, and
loathed by the sensibility, yet such, it is said, is the inherent depravity of
the will, that it pertinaciously cleaves to sin notwithstanding, and will con-
tinue to do so, until that faculty is renewed by the Holy Spirit, and a holy
bias or inclimation is impressed upon the will itself.
But here is a gross mistake. In order to see the truth upon this sub-
ject, it is of indispensable importance to inquire what sin is.
It is admitted on all hands, that Selfishness is sin. Comparatively few
seem to understand that selfishness is the whole of sin, and that every
form of sin may be resolved into selfishness, just as every form of virtue
may be resolved into benevolence. It is not my purpose now to show that
selfishness is the whole of sin. It is sufficient for the present to take the
admission, that selfishness is sin. But what is selfishness 2 It is the
choice of self-gratification as an end. It is the preference of our own
gratification to the highest good of universal being. Self-gratification is
the Supreme end of selfishness. This choice is sinful. That is, the moral
200 SYSTEMLATIC THEOLOGY.
quality of this selfish choice is sin. Now, in no case, is or can sin be
chosen for its own sake, or as an end. Whenever any thing is chosen to
gratify self, it is not chosen because the choice is sinful, but notwithstand-
ing it is sinful. It is not the sinfulness of the choice upon which the
choice fixes, as an end, or for its own sake, but it is the gratification to be
afforded by the thing chosen. For example: theft is sinful. But the
will, in an act of theft, does not aim at and terminate on the sinfulness of
theft, but upon the gain or gratification expected from the stolen object.
Drunkenness is sinful, but the inebriate does not intend or choose the
sinfulness, for its own sake, or as an end. He does not choose strong
drink because the choice is sinful, but notwithstanding it is so. We choose
the gratification, but not the sin, as an end. To choose the gratification
as an end is sinful, but it is not the sin that is the object of choice. Our
mother Eve ate the forbidden fruit. This eating was sinful. But the
thing that she chose or intended, was not the sinfulness of eating, but the
gratification expected from the fruit. It is not, it cannot in any case be
true, that sin is chosen as an end, or for its own sake. Sim is only the
quality of selfishness. Selfishness is the choice, not of sim as an end, or
for its own sake, but of self-gratification ; and this choice of self-gratifica-
tion as an end is sinful. That is, the moral quality of the choice is sin.
To say that sin is, or can be, chosen for its own sake, is untrue and absurd.
It is the same as saying that a choice can terminate on an element,
quality, or attribute, of itself; that the thing chosen is really an element
of the choice itself. This is absurd.
But it is said, that sinners are sometimes conscious of choosing sin for
its own sake, or because it is sin; that they possess such a malicious state
of mind, that they love sin for its own sake that they “roll sim as a
sweet morsel under their tongue;” that “ they eat up the sins of God's
people as they eat bread;" that is, that they love their own sins and the
sins of others, as they do their necessary food, and choose it for that
reason, or just as they do their food. That they not only sin themselves
with greediness, but also have pleasure in them that do the same. Now
all this may be true, yet it does not at all disprove the position which I
have taken, namely, that sin never is, and never can be chosen as an end,
or for its own sake. Sin may be sought and loved as a means, but never
as an end. The choice of food will illustrate this. Food is never chosen
as an ultimate end ; it never can be so chosen. It is always as a means.
It is the gratification, or the utility of it, in some point of view, that con-
stitutes the reason for choosing it. Gratification is always the end for
which a selfish man eats. It may not be merely the present pleasure of
eating which he alone or principally seeks. But, nevertheless, if a selfish
man, he has his own gratification in view as an end. It may be that it is
not so much a present, as a remote gratification he has in view. Thus he
may choose food to give him health and strength to pursue some distant
gratification, the acquisition of wealth, or something else that will gratify him.
It may happen that a sinner may get into a state of rebellion against
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 201
God and the universe, of so frightful a character, that he shall take
pleasure in willing, and in doing, and saying, things that are sinful, just
because they are sinful and displeasing to God and to holy beings. But,
even in this case, sin is not chosen as an end, but as a means of gratifying
this malicious feeling. It is, after all, self-gratification that is chosen as an
end, and not sin. Sin is the means, and self-gratification is the end.
Now we are prepared to understand how it is that both the intellect and
sensibility can often be opposed to sin, and yet the will cleave to the
indulgence. An inebriate is contemplating the moral character of drumk-
enness. He instantly and necessarily condemns the abomination. His
sensibility sympathizes with the intellect. He loathes the sinfulness of
drinking strong drink, and himself on account of it. He is ashamed, and
were it possible, he would spit in his own face. Now, in this state, it
would surely be absurd to suppose that he could choose sin, the sin of
drinking, as an end, or for its own sake. This would be choosing it for au
impossible reason, and not for no reason. But still he may choose to con-
tinue his drink, not because it is sinful, but notwithstanding it is so. For
while the intellect condemns the sin of drinking strong drink, and the
sensibility loathes the sinfulness of the indulgence, nevertheless there still
exists so strong an appetite, not for the sin, but for the liquor, that the will
seeks the gratification, notwithstanding the sinfulness of it.
So it is, and so it must be, in every case where sin is committed in the
face of the remonstrances of the intellect and the loathing of the sensibility.
The sensibility loathes the sinfulness, but more strongly desires the thing
the choice of which is sinful. The will in a selfish being yields to the
strongest impulse of the sensibility, and the end chosen is, in no case,
the sinfulness of the act, but the self-gratification. Those who suppose
this opposition of the intellect, or of the sensibility, to be a holy principle,
are fatally deluded. It is this kind of opposition to sin, that often mani-
fests itself among wicked men, and that leads them to take credit for
goodness or virtue, not am atom of which do they possess. They will not
believe themselves to be morally and totally depraved, while they are
conscious of so much hostility to sim within them. But they should under-
stand, that this opposition is not of the will, or they could not go on in sin;
that it is purely an involuntary state of mind, and has no moral character
whatever. Let it be ever remembered, then, that a virtuous opposition
to sin is always and necessarily an attribute of benevolence, a phenomenon
of the will; and that it is naturally impossible, that this opposition of will
should co-exist with the commission of sin.
As this opposition to sin is plainly implied in, and is an essential attri-
bute of benevolence, or true love to God, it follows, that obedience to the
law of God cannot be partial, in the sense that we both love God and sin
at the same time.
13. Compassion for the miserable is also an attribute of benevolence, or
of pure love to God and man. This is benevolence viewed in its relations
to misery and to guilt.
202 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
There is a compassion also which is a phenomenon of the Sensibility.
It may, and does often exist in the form of an emotion. But this emotion
being involuntary, has no moral character in itself. The compassion which
is a virtue, and which is required of us as a duty, is a phenomenon of the
Will, and is of course an attribute of benevolence. Benevolence, as has
been often said, is good willing, or willing the highest happiness and well-
being of God and the universe for its own sake, or as an end. It is
impossible, therefore, from its own nature, that compassion for the misera-
ble should not be one of its attributes. Compassion of will to misery is
the choice or wish that it might not exist. Benevolence wills that happi-
mess should exist for its own sake. It must therefore, wish that misery
might not exist. This attribute or peculiarity of benevolence consists in
wishing the happiness of the miserable. Benevolence, simply considered, is
willing the good or happiness of being in general. Compassion of will is a
willing particularly that the miserable should be happy.
Compassion of sensibility is simply a feeling of pity in view of misery.
As has been said, it is not a virtue. It is only a desire, but not willing;
consequently does not benefit its olject. It is the state of mind of which
James speaks:–James ii. 15, 16 : “If a brother or sister be naked, and
destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be
ye warmed and filled ; notwithstanding ye give them not those things
which are needful to the body, what doth it profit?” This kind of com-
passion may evidently co-exist with selfishness. But compassion of heart
or will cannot; for it consists in willing the happiness of the miserable
for its own Sake, and of course impartially. It will, and from its very
mature must, deny self to promote its end, whenever it wisely can, that is,
when it is seem to be demanded by the highest general good. Circum-
stances may exist that render it unwise to express this compassion by
actually extending relief to the miserable. Such circumstances forbid that
God should extend relief to the lost in hell. But for their character and
governmental relations, God's compassion would no doubt make immediate
efforts for their relief.
Many circumstances may exist in which, although compassion would
hasten to the relief of its object, yet, on the whole, the misery that exists
is regarded as the less of two evils, and therefore, the wisdom of benevolence
forbids it to put forth exertions to save its object.
But it is of the last importance to distinguish carefully between compassion,
as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or as a mere feeling, and compassion
considered as a phenomenon of the will. This, be it remembered, is the
only form of virtuous compassion. Many, who, from the laws of their
mental constitution, feel quickly and deeply, often take credit to them-
selves for being compassionate, while they seldom do much for the down-
trodden and the miserable. Their compassion is a mere feeling. It says,
“Be ye warmed and clothed,” but does not that for them which is needful.
It is this particular attribute of benevolence that was so conspicuous in
the life of Howard, Wilberforce, and many other Christian philanthropists.
MORAL GOVERNMENT, 203
It should be said, before I leave the consideration of this attribute, that
the will is often influenced by the feeling of compassion. In this case, the
mind is no less selfish in seeking to promote the relief and happiness of its
object, than it is in any other form of selfishness. In such cases, self-gratifi-
cation is the end sought, and the relief of the suffering is only a means.
Pity is stirred, and the sensibility is deeply pained and excited by the
contemplation of misery. The will is influenced by this feeling, and makes
efforts to relieve the painful emotion on the one hand, and to gratify the
desire to see the sufferer happy on the other. This is only an imposing
form of selfishness. We, no doubt, often witness displays of this kind of
self gratification. The happiness of the miserable is not in this case
sought as an end, or for its own sake, but as a means of gratifying our own
feelings. This is not obedience of will to the law of the intellect, but
obedience to the impulse of the sensibility. It is not a rational and intel-
ligent compassion, but just such compassion as we often see mere animals
exercise. They will risk, and even lay down, their lives, to give relief to
one of their number, or to a man who is in misery. In them this has no
moral character. Having no reason, it is not sin for them to obey their
sensibility, nay, this is a law of their being. This they cannot but do
For them, them, to seek their own gratification as an end is not sin. But
man has reason; he is bound to obey it. He should will and seek the
relief and the happiness of the miserable, for its own sake, or for its intrin-
sic value. When he seeks it for no higher reason than to gratify his feel-
ings, he denies his humanity. He seeks it, not out of regard to the sufferer,
but in self-defence, or to relieve his own pain, and to gratify his own
desires. This in him is sim.
Many, therefore, who take to themselves much credit for benevolence,
are, after all, only in the exercise of this imposing form of selfishness.
They take credit for holiness, when their holiness is only sin. What is
especially worthy of notice here, is, that this class of persons appear to
themselves and others, to be all the more virtuous, by how much more
manifestly and exclusively they are led on by the impulse of feeling. They
are conscious of feeling deeply, of being most sincere and earnest in obey-
ing their feelings. Every body who knows them can also see, that they
feel deeply, and are influenced by the strength of their feelings, rather than
by their intellect. Now, so gross is the darkness of most persons upon this
subject, that they award praise to themselves and to others, just in propor-
tion as they are sure, that they are actuated by the depth of their feelings,
rather than by their sober judgment.
But I must not leave this subject without observing, that when compas-
sion exists as a phenomenon of the will, it will certainly also exist as a
feeling of the sensibility. A man of a compassionate heart will also be a
man of compassionate sensibility. He will feel and he will act. Never-
theless, his actions will not be the effect of his feelings, but will be the
result of his Sober judgment. Three classes of persons suppose themselves,
and are generally supposed by others, to be truly compassionate. The one
204 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
class exhibit much feeling of compassion ; but their compassion does not
influence their will, hence they do not act for, the relief of suffering.
These content themselves with mere desires and tears. T hey say, Be ye
warmed and clothed, but give not the needed relief. Another class feel
deeply, and give up to their feelings. Of course they are active and ener-
getic in the relief of suffering. But being governed by feeling, instead of
being influenced by their intellect, they are not virtuous, but selfish.
Their compassion is only an imposing form of selfishness. A third class
feel deeply, but are not governed by blind impulses of feeling. They take
a rational view of the subject, act wisely and emergetically. They obey
their reason. Their feelings do not lead them, neither do they seek to
gratify their feelings. But these last are truly virtuous, and altogether
the most happy of the three. Their feelings are all the more gratified by
how much less they aim at the gratification. They obey their intellect,
and, therefore, have the double satisfaction of the applause of conscience,
while their feelings are also fully gratified by seeing their compassionate
desire accomplished.
LECTURE XX.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW of GoD.
14. Mercy is also an attribute of benevolence. This term expresses a
state of feeling, and represents a phenomenon of the sensibility. Mercy
is often understood to be synonymous with compassion, but then it is not
rightly understood.
Mercy, considered as a phenomenon of the will, is a disposition to pardon
crime. Such is the nature of benevolence, that it will seek the good even
of those who deserve evil, when this can be wisely done. It is “ready to
forgive,” to seek the good of the evil and unthankful, and to pardon when
there is repentance. It is good will viewed in relation to one who deserves
punishment. Mercy, considered as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensi.
bility, is a desire for the pardon or good of one who deserves punishment.
It is only a feeling, a desire; of course it is involuntary, and has, in itself,
no moral character.
Mercy will, of course, manifest itself in action, and in effort to pardon,
or to procure a pardon, unless the attribute of wisdom prevent. It may
be unwise to pardon, or to seek the pardon of a guilty one. In such cases,
as all the attributes of benevolence must necessarily harmonize, no effort
will be made to realize its end.
It was this attribute of benevolence, modified and limited in its exercise
by wisdom and justice, that emergized in providing the means, and in
opening the way, for the pardon of our guilty race.
As wisdom and justice are also attributes of benevolence, mercy can
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 205
never manifest itself by efforts to secure its end, except in a manner and
upon conditions that do not set aside justice and wisdom. No one attri-
bute of benevolence is or can be exercised at the expense of another, or
in opposition to it. The moral attributes of God, as has been said, are
only attributes of benevolence, for benevolence comprehends and expresses
the whole of them. From the term benevolence we learn, that the end
upon which it fixes is good. And we must infer, too, from the term itself,
that the means are unobjectionable ; because it is absurd to suppose that
good would be chosen because it is good, and yet that the mind that makes
this choice should not hesitate to use objectionable and injurious means to
obtain its end. This would be a contradiction, to will good for its own
sake, or out of regard to its intrinsic value, and then choose injurious
means to accomplish this end. This cannot be. The mind that can fix upon
the highest well-being of God and the universe as an end, can never consent
to use efforts for the accomplishment of this end, that are seen to be incon-
sistent with it, that is, that tend to prevent the highest good of being.
Mercy, I have said, is the readiness of benevolence to pardon the guilty.
But this attribute cannot go out in exercise but upon conditions that con-
sist with the other attributes of benevolence. Mercy viewed by itself would
pardon without repentance or condition ; would pardon without reference
to public justice. But viewed in connection with the other attributes of
benevolence, we learn that, although a real attribute of benevolence,
yet it is not and cannot be exercised, without the fulfilment of those
conditions that will Secure the consent of all the other attributes of
benevolence. This truth is beautifully taught and illustrated in the
doctrine and fact of atonement, as We shall see. Indeed, without con-
sideration of the various attributes of benevolence, we are necessarily all
in the dark, and in confusion, in respect to the character and govern-
ment of God; the spirit and meaning of his law; the spirit and mean-
ing of the gospel ; our own spiritual state, and the developements of
character around us. Without all acquaintance with the attributes of love
or benevolence, we shall not fail to be perplexed—to find apparent discre-
pancies in the Bible and in the divine administration—and in the mami-
festation of Christian character, both as revealed in the Bible, and as
exhibited in common life. For example: how universalists have stumbled
for want of consideration upon this subject | God is love Well, without
considering the attributes of this love, they infer that if God is love, he
cannot hate sin and sinners. If he is merciful, he cannot punish sinners
in hell, &c. Unitarians have stumbled in the same way. God is merciful;
that is, disposed to pardon sin. Well, then, what need of an atonement?
If merciful, he can and Will pardon upon repentance without atonement.
But we may inquire, if he is merciful, why not pardon without repentance?
If his mercy alone is to be taken into view, that is, simply a disposition to
pardon, that by itself would not wait for repentance. But if repentance is,
and must be, a condition of the exercise of merey, may there not be, nay,
must there not be, other conditions of its exercise 2 If wisdom and public
206 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
justice are also attributes of benevolence, and conditionate the exercise of
mercy, and forbid that it should be exercised but upon condition of repent-
ance, why may they not, nay, why must they not, equally conditionate its
exercise upon such a satisfaction of public justice, as would secure as full
and as deep a respect for the law, as the execution of its penalty would do?
In other words, if wisdom and justice be attributes of benevolence, and
conditionate the exercise of mercy upon repentance, why may and must
they not also conditionate its exercise upon the fact of an atonement? As
mercy is an attribute of benevolence, it will naturally and inevitably direct
the attention of the intellect to devising ways and means to render the
exercise of mercy consistent with the other attributes of benevolence.
It will employ the intelligence in devising means to secure the repentance
of the sinner, and to remove all the obstacles out of the way of its free and
full exercise. It will also secure the state of feeling which is also called mercy,
or compassion. Hence it is certain, that mercy will secure efforts to procure
the repentance and pardom of simmers. It will secure a deep yearning in
the sensibility over them, and emergetic action to accomplish its end, that is,
to Secure their repentance and pardon, This attribute of benevolence
led the Father to give his only-begotten and well-beloved Son, and it led
the Son to give himself to die, to secure the repentance and pardon of
sinners. It is this attribute of benevolence that leads the Holy Spirit to
make such mighty and protracted efforts to secure the repentance of sin-
ners. It is also this attribute that emergized in prophets, and apostles,
and martyrs, and in Saints of every age, to Secure the conversion of the
lost in sin. It is an amiable attribute. All its sympathies are sweet, and
tender, and kind as heaven.
15. Justice is another attribute of benevolence.
This term also expresses a state or phenomenon of the sensibility. As
an attribute of benevolence, it is the opposite of mercy, whem viewed in its
relations to crime. It consists in a disposition to treat every moral agent
according to his intrinsic desert or merit. In its relations to crime, the
criminal, and the public, it consists in a tendency to punish according to
law. Mercy would pardon—justice would punish for the public good.
Justice, as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, is a feeling that
the guilty deserves punishment, and a desire that he may be punished.
This is an involuntary feeling, and has no moral character. It is often
strongly excited, and is frequently the cause of mobs and popular commo-
tions. When it takes the control of the will, as it often does with sinners,
it leads to what is popularly called lynching, and a resort to those sum-
mary methods of executing vengeance which are so appalling.
I have said that the mere desire has no moral character. But when the
will is governed by this desire, and yields itself up to seek its gratification,
this state of will is selfishness under one of its most odious and frightful
forms. Under the providence of God, however, this form of selfishness,
like every other in its turn, is overruled for good, like earthquakes, torna-
does, pestilence, and war, to purify the moral elements of society, and
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 207
scourge away those moral nuisances with which communities are sometimes
infested. Even war itself is often but an instance and an illustration
of this.
Justice, as an attribute of benevolence, is virtue, and exhibits itself in
the execution of the penalties of law, and in support of public order, and
in various other ways for the well-being of mankind.
There are several modifications of this attribute. That is, it may and
must be viewed under various aspects, and in various relations. One of
these is public justice. This is a regard to the public interests, and Secures
a due administration of law for the public good. It will in no case suffer
the execution of the penalty to be set aside, unless something be done to
support the authority of the law and of the lawgiver. It also secures the
due administration of rewards, and looks narrowly after the public interests,
always insisting that the greater interest shall prevail over the lesser; that
private interest shall never set aside or prejudice a public one of greater
value. Public justice is modified in its exercise by the attribute of mercy.
It conditionates the exercise of mercy, and mercy conditionates its exercise.
Mercy cannot, consistently with this attribute, extend a pardon but upon
conditions of repentance, and an equivalent being rendered to the govern-
ment. So, on the other hand, justice is conditionated by mercy, and
cannot, consistently with that attribute, proceed to take vengeance when
the highest good does not require it, and when punishment can be dispensed
with without public loss. Thus these attributes mutually limit each other's
exercise, and render the Whole character of benevolence perfect, symme-
trical, and heavenly.
Justice is reckoned among the sterner attributes of benevolence; but it
is indispensable to the filling up of the entire circle of moral perfections.
Although solemn and awful, and sometimes inexpressibly terrific in its
exercise, it is nevertheless one of the glorious modifications and manifesta-
tions of benevolence. Benevolence without justice would be anything but
morally lovely and perfect. Nay, it could not be benevolence. This attri-
bute of benevolence appears conspicuous in the character of God as revealed
in his law, in his gospel, and sometimes as indicated most impressively by
his providence.
It is also conspicuous in the history of inspired men. The Psalms
abound with expressions of this attribute. We find many prayers for the
punishment of the wicked. Samuel hewed Agag in pieces; and David's
Writings abound in expressions that show, that this attribute was strongly
developed in his mind; and the circumstances under which he was placed,
often rendered it proper to express and manifest in various ways the spirit
of this attribute. Many have stumbled at such prayers, expressions, and
manifestations as are here alluded to. But this is for want of due con-
sideration. They have supposed that such exhibitions were inconsistent
With a right spirit. Oh, they say, how unevangelical How un-Christ-like
How inconsistent with the sweet and heavenly spirit of Christ and of the
gospel' But this is all a mistake. These prayers were dictated by the
208 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Spirit of Christ. Such exhibitions are only the manifestations of one of the
essential attributes of benevolence. Those sinners deserved to die. It was
for the greatest good that they should be made a public example. This the
spirit of inspiration knew, and such prayers, under such circumstances, are
Only an expression of the mind and will of God. They are truly the spirit
of justice pronouncing sentence upon them. These prayers and such-like
things found in the Bible, are no vindication of the spirit of famaticism and
denunciation that so often have taken shelter under them. As well might
famatics burn cities and lay waste countries, and seek to justify themselves
by an appeal to the destruction of the old world by flood, and the destruction
of the cities of the plain by fire and brimstone. -
Retributive justice is another modification of this attribute. This con-
sists in a disposition to visit the offender with that punishment which he
deserves, because it is fit and proper that a moral agent should be dealt
with according to his deeds. In a future lecture I shall enlarge upon this
modification of justice.
Another modification of this attribute is commercial justice. This
consists in Willing exact equivalents, and uprightness in business and
all Secular transactions.
There are some other modifications of this attribute, but the foregoing
may suffice to illustrate sufficiently the various departments over which this
attribute presides.
This attribute, though stern in its spirit and manifestations, is never-
theless one of prime importance in all governments by moral agents,
whether human or divine. Indeed, without it government could not exist.
It is vain for certain philosophers to think to disparage this attribute, and
to dispense with it altogether in the administration of government. They
will, if they try the experiment, find to their cost and confusion, that no
one attribute of benevolence can say to another, “I have no need of thee."
In short, let any one attribute of bellevolence be destroyed or overlooked,
and you have destroyed its perfection, its beauty, its harmony, its propriety,
its glory. You have, in fact, destroyed benevolence; it is no longer bene-
volence, but a sickly, and inefficient, and limping sentimentalism, that has
no God, no virtue, no beauty, nor form, nor comeliness in it, that when we
See it we should desire it.
This attribute stands by, nay, it executes law. It aims to secure com-
mercial honesty. It aims to secure public and private integrity and
tranquillity. It says to violence, disorder, and injustice, Peace, be still,
and there must be a great calm. We see the evidences and the illustra-
tions of this attribute in the thunderings of Sinai, and in the agony of
Calvary. We hear it in the wail of a world when the fountains of the great
deep were broken up, and when the windows of heaven were opened, and
the floods descended, and the population of a globe were swallowed up.
We see its manifestations in the descending torrent that swept over the
cities of the plain ; and lastly, we shall forever see its bright, but awful and
glorious displays, in the dark and curling folds of that pillar of smoke
MORAL GOVERNNENT. 209
of the torment of the damned, that ascends up before God for ever and
€ Wer.
Many seem to be afraid to contemplate justice as an attribute of belle-
volence. Any manifestation of it among men, causes them to recoil and
shudder as if they saw a demon. But let it have its place in the glorious
circle of moral attributes; it must have—it will have—it cannot be other-
wise. Whenever any policy of government is adopted, in family or state,
that excludes the exercise of this attribute, all must be failure, defeat, and
ruin.
Again: Justice being an attribute of benevolence, will prevent the
punishment of the finally impenitent from diminishing the happiness of
God and of holy beings. They will never delight in misery for its own
sake; but they will take pleasure in the administration of justice. So
that when the smoke of the torment of the damned comes up in the sight
of heaven, they will, as they are represented, shout “Alleluia! the Lord
God Omnipotent reigneth;” “Just and righteous are thy ways, thou King
of saints ’’
Before I pass from the consideration of this topic, I must not omit to
insist, that where true benevolence is, there must be exact commercial
justice, or business homesty and integrity. This is as certain as that bene-
volence exists. The rendering of exact equivalents, or the intention to do
so, must be a characteristic of a truly benevolent mind. Impulsive bene-
volence may exist; that is, phrenological or constitutional benevolence,
falsely so called, may exist to any extent, and yet justice not exist.
The mind may be much and very often carried away by the impulse of feel-
ing, so that a man may at times have the appearance of true benevolence,
while the same individual is selfish in business, and overreaching in all
his commercial relations. This has been a wonder and an enigma to many,
but the case is a plain one. The difficulty is, the man is not just, that is,
not truly benevolent. His benevolence is only an imposing species of
Selfishness. “He that hath an ear to hear, let him hear.” His benevo-
lence results from feeling, and is not true benevolence.
Again : Where benevolence is, the golden rule will surely be observed.
“Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.”
The justice of benevolence cannot fail to secure conformity to this rule.
Benevolence is a just state of the will. It is a willing justly. It must
them, by a law of necessity, secure just conduct. If the heart is just, the
life must be.
This attribute of benevolence must secure its possessor against every
species and degree of injustice; he cannot be unjust to his neighbour's
reputation, his person, his property, his soul, his body, mor indeed be
unjust in any respect to man or God. It will and must secure confession
and restitution, in every case of remembered wrong, so for as this is practica-
ble. It should be distinctly understood, that a benevolent or a truly religious
man cannot be unjust. He may indeed appear to be so to others; but he
'annot be truly religious or benevolent, and unjust at the same time. If
lº
210 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
he appears to be so in any instance, he is not and cannot be really so, if
he is at the time in a benevolent state of mind. The attributes of selfish-
mess, as we shall see in the proper place, are the direct opposite of those
of benevolence. The two states of mind are as contrary as heaven and
hell, and can no more co-exist in the same mind, than a thing can be and
not be at the same time. I said, that if a man truly, in the exercise of
benevolence, appears to be unjust in any thing, he is only so in appearance,
and not in fact. Observe ; I am speaking of one who is really at the time
in a benevolent state of mind. He may mistake, and do that which would
be unjust, did he see it differently and intend differently. Justice and
injustice belong to the intention. No outward act can in itself be either
just or unjust. To say that a man, in the exercise of a truly benevolent
intention, can at the same time be unjust, is the same absurdity as to say,
that he can intend justly and unjustly at the same time, and in regard to
the same thing; which is a contradiction. It must all along be borne
in mind, that benevolence is one identical thing, to wit, good-will, willing
for its own sake the highest good of being, and every known good according
to its relative value. Consequently, it is impossible that justice should
not be an attribute of such a choice. Justice consists in regarding and
treating, or rather in willing, every thing just agreeably to its nature, or
intrinsic and relative value and relations. To say, therefore, that present
benevolence admits of any degree of present injustice, is to affirm a palpa-
ble contradiction. A just man is a Sanctified man, is a perfect man, in
the sense that he is at present in an upright state.
16. Vera city is another attribute of benevolence.
Veracity, as an attribute of benevolence, is that quality that adheres to
truth. In the very act of becoming benevolent, the mind embraces truth,
or the reality of things. Then Veracity must be one of the qualities of
benevolence. Veracity is truthfulness. It is the conformity of the will to
the reality of things. Truth in statement is conformity of statement to
the reality of things. Truth in action is action conformed to the nature
and relations of things. Truthfulness is a disposition to conform to the
reality of things. It is willing in accordance with the reality of things.
It is willing the right end by the right means. It is willing the intrin-
sically valuable as an end, and the relatively valuable as a means. In
short, it is the willing of every thing according to the reality or facts in
the case.
Veracity, them, must be an attribute of benevolence. It is, like all the
attributes, only benevolence viewed in a certain aspect or relation. It can
not be distinguished from benevolence, for it is not distinct from it, but
only a phase or form of benevolence. The universe is so constituted that
if every thing proceeded and were conducted and willed according to its
nature and relations, the highest possible good must result. Veracity
seeks the good as an end, and truth as a means to secure this end. It
wills the good, and that it shall be secured only by means of truth. It
wills truth in the end, and truth in the means. The end is truly valuable,
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 21 l
and chosen for that reason. The means are truth, and truth is the only
appropriate or possible means.
Truthfulness of heart begets, of course, a state of the sensibility which
we call the love of truth. It is a feeling of pleasure that spontaneously
arises in the sensibility of one whose heart is truthful, in contemplating
truth; this feeling is not virtue, it is rather a part of the reward of truth-
fulness of heart.
Veracity, as a phenomenon of the will, is also often called, and properly
called, a love of the truth. It is a willing in accordance with objective
truth. This is virtue, and is an attribute of benevolence. Veracity, as an
attribute of the divine benevolence, is the condition of confidence in Him as
a moral governor. Both the physical and moral laws of the universe evince,
and are instances and illustrations of the truthfulness of God. Falsehood.
in the sense of lying, is naturally regarded by a moral agent with disappro-
bation, disgust, and abhorrence. Veracity is as necessarily regarded by
him with approbation, and, if the will be benevolent, with pleasure. We
necessarily take pleasure in contemplating objective truth, as it lies in idea
on the field of consciousness. We also take pleasure in the perception and
contemplation of truthfulness, in the concrete realization of the idea of
truth. Veracity is morally beautiful. We are pleased with it just as we
are with natural beauty, by a law of necessity, when the necessary con-
ditions are fulfilled. This attribute of benevolence secures it against every
attempt to promote the ultimate good of being by means of falsehood.
True benevolence will no more, can no more, resort to falsehood as a mealls
of promoting good, than it can contradict or deny itself. The intelligence
affirms, that the highest ultimate good can be secured only by a strict
adherence to truth. The mind cannot be satisfied with anything else.
Indeed, to suppose the contrary is to suppose a contradiction. It is the
same absurdity as to suppose, that the highest good could be secured only
by the violation and setting aside of the nature and relations of things.
Since the intellect affirms this unalterable relation of truth to the highest
ultimate good, benevolence, or that attribute of benevolence which we
denominate Veracity or love of the truth, can no more consent to falsehood,
than it can consent to relinquish the highest good of being as an end.
Therefore, every resort to falsehood, every pious fraud, falsely so called,
presents only a specious but real instance of selfishness. A moral agent
cannot lie for God; that is, he cannot tell a sinful falsehood, thinkilug and
intending thereby to please God. He knows, by intuition, that God cannot
be pleased or truly served by a resort to lying. There is a great difference
between concealing or withholding the truth for benevolent purposes, and
telling a Wilful falsehood. An innocent persecuted and pursued man, has
taken shelter under my roof from one who pursued him to shed his blood.
His pursuer comes and inquires after him. I am not under obligation to
declare to him the fact that he is in my house. I may, and indeed ought
to withhold the truth in this instance, for the wretch has no right to know
it. The public and highest good demands that he should not know it. He
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212 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
only desires to know it for selfish and bloody purposes. But in this case I
should not feel or judge myself at liberty to state a known falsehood. I
could not think that this would ultimately conduce to the highest good.
The person might go away deceived, or under the impression that his
victim was not there. But he could not accuse me of telling him a lie. He
might have drawn his own inference from my refusing to give the desired
information. But even to secure my own life or the life of my friend, I am
not at liberty to tell a lie. If it be said that lying implies telling a false-
hood for selfish purposes, and that, therefore, it is not lying to tell a false.
hood for benevolent purposes, I reply, that our nature is such that we can
no more state a wilful falsehood with a benevolent intention, than we can
commit a sin with a benevolent intention. We necessarily regard falsehood
as inconsistent with the highest good of being, just as we regard sin as in-
consistent with the highest good of being, or just as we regard holiness and
truthfulness as the indispensable condition of the highest good of being.
The correlation of the will and the intellect forbids the mistake that wilful
falsehood is, or can be, the means or condition of the highest good.
Universal Veracity, then, will always characterize a truly benevolent man.
While he is truly benevolent, he is, he must be, faithful, truthful. So far
as his knowledge goes, his statements may be depended upon with as much
Safety as the statements of an angel. Veracity is necessarily an attribute
of benevolence in all beings. No liar has, or can have, a particle of true
virtue or benevolence in him.
LECTURE XXI.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE To MoRAL LAW.
17. Patience is another attribute of benevolence.
This term is frequently used to express a phenomenon of the sensibility,
When thus used, it designates a calm and unruffled state of the sensibility
or feelings, under circumstances that tend to excite anger or impatience of
feeling. The calmness of the sensibility, or patience as a phenomenon of
the sensibility, is purely an involuntary state of mind, and although it is a
pleasing and amiable manifestation, yet it is not properly virtue. It may
be, and often is, an effect of patience as a phenomenon of the will, and
therefore an effect of virtue. But it is not itself virtue. This amiable
temper, may and often does, proceed from constitutional temperament, and
from circumstances and habits.
Patience as a virtue must be a voluntary state of mind. It must be an
attribute of love or benevolence; for all virtue, as we have seen, and as the
Bible teaches, is resolvable into love or benevolence. The Greek term,
upomone, so often rendered patience in the New Testament, means perse-
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 213,
verance under trials, continuance, bearing up under afflictions or privations,
steadfastness of purpose in despite of obstacles. The word may be used in
a good or in a bad sense. Thus a selfish man may patiently, that is, perse.
veringly pursue his end, and may bear up under much opposition to his
COll]"S6.
This is patience as an attribute of selfishness, and patience in a bad
sense of the term. Patience in the good sense, or in the sense in which I
am considering it, is an attribute of benevolence. It is the quality of
constancy, a fixedness, a bearing up under trials, afflictions, crosses, Perse-
cutions, or discouragements. This must be an attribute of benevolence.
Whenever patience ceases, when it holds out no longer, when discourage.
ment prevails, and the will relinquishes its end, benevolence ceases, as a
matter of course. &
Patience as a phenomenon of the will, tends to patience as a phenome-
non of the sensibility. That is, the quality of fixedness and steadfastness
in the intention naturally tends to keep down and allay impatience of
temper. As, however, the states of the sensibility are not directly under
the control of the will, there may be irritable or impatient feelings, when
the heart remains steadfast. Facts or falsehoods may be suggested to the
mind which may, in despite of the will, produce a ruffling of the sensibility,
even when the heart remains patient. The only way in which a tempta-
tion, for it is only a temptation while the will abides firm to its purpose, I
say, the only way in which a temptation of this kind can be disposed of, is
by diverting the attention from that view of the subject that creates the
disturbance in the sensibility. I should have said before, that although
the will controls the feelings by a law of necessity, yet, as it does not do so
directly, but indirectly, it may and does often happen, that feelings corre-
sponding to the state of the will do not exist in the sensibility. Nay, for a
time, a state of the sensibility may exist which is the opposite of the state
of the will. From this source arise many, and indeed most, of our tempta-
tations. We could never be properly tried or tempted at all, if the feelings
must always, by a law of necessity, correspond with the state of the will.
Sin consists in willing to gratify our feelings or constitutional impulses, in
opposition to the law of our reason. But if these desires and impulses
could never exist in opposition to the law of the reason, and, consequently,
in opposition to a present holy choice, then a holy being could not be
tempted. He could have no motive or occasion to sin. If our mother
Eve could have had no feelings of desire in opposition to the state of her
will, she never could have desired the forbidden fruit, and of course would
not have simmed. I wish now, then, to state distinctly what I should
have said before, that the state or choice of the will does not necessarily so
control the feelings, desires, or emotions, that these may never be strongly
excited by Satan or by circumstances, in opposition to the will, and thus
become powerful temptations to seek their gratification, instead of seeking
the highest good of being. Feelings, the gratification of which would be
opposed to every attribute of benevolence, may at times co-exist with
214 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
benevolence, and be a temptation to selfishness ; but opposing acts of will
cannot co-exist with benevolence. All that can be truly Said is, that as the
will has an indirect control of the feelings, desires, appetites, passions, &c.,
it can suppress any class of feelings when they arise, by diverting the
attention from their causes, or by taking into consideration such views and
facts as will calm or change the state of the sensibility. Irritable feelings,
or what is commonly called impatience, may be directly caused by ill
health, irritable nerves, and by many things over which the will has no direct
control. But this is not impatience in the sense of sin. If these feelings
are not suffered to influence the will; if the will abides in patience; if
such feelings are not cherished, and are not suffered to shake the integrity
of the will; they are not sin. That is, the will does not consent to them,
but the contrary. They are only temptations. If they are allowed to con-
trol the will, to break forth in words and actions, then there is sin; but
the sin does not consist in the feelings, but in the consent of the will, to
gratify them. Thus, the apostle says, “Be ye angry, and sin not : let
not the sun go down upon your wrath.” That is, if anger arise in the
feelings and sensibility, do not sin by suffering it to control your will.
Do not cherish the feeling, and let not the sun go down upon it. For
this cherishing it is sin. When it is cherished, the will consents and
broods over the cause of it; this is sin. But if it be not cherished, it is
not sin.
That the outward actions will correspond with the states and actions of
the will, provided no physical obstacle be opposed to them, is a universal
truth. But that feelings and desires cannot exist contrary to the states or
decisions of my will, is not true. If this were a universal truth, tempta-
tion, as I have said, could not exist. The outward actions will be as the
will is, always; the feelings generally. Feelings corresponding to the
choice of the will, will be the rule, and opposing feelings the exception. But
these exceptions may and do exist in perfectly holy beings. They existed in
Eve before she consented to sin, and had she resisted them, she had not
sinned. They doubtless existed in Christ, or he could not have been tempted
in all points like as we are. If there be no desires or impulses of the sen-
sibility contrary to the state of the will, there is not properly any temptation.
The desire or impulse must appear on the field of consciousness before it is
a motive to action, and of course before it is a temptation to self-indulgence.
Just as certainly then as a holy being may be tempted, and not sin, just
so certain it is that emotions of any kind, or of any strength, may exist in
the sensibility without sin. If they are not indulged, if the will does not
consent to them, and to their indulgence or gratification, the soul is not
the less virtuous for their presence. Patience as a phenomenon of the will
must strengthen and gird itself under such circumstances, so that patience
of will may be, and if it exist at all, must be, in exact proportion to the
impatience of the sensibility. The more impatience of sensibility there is,
the more patience of will there must be, or virtue will cease altogether. So
that it is not always true, that virtue is strongest when the sensibility is
MORAL GOVERNEMNT. 215
most calm, placid, and patient. When Christ passed through his greatest
conflicts, his virtue as a man was undoubtedly most intense. When in his
agony in the garden, so great was the anguish of his sensibility, that he
sweat as it were great drops of blood. This, he says, was the hour of the
prince of darkness. This was his great trial. But did he sin 2 No,
indeed. But why? Was he calm and placid as a summer's evening? As
far from it as possible.
Patience, then, as an attribute of benevolence, consists, not in placid
feeling, but in perseverance under trials and states of the sensibility that
tend to selfishness. This is only benevolence viewed in a certain aspect.
It is benevolence under circumstances of discouragement, of trial, or temp-
tation. “This is the patience of the Saints.”
Before dismissing the subject of patience as an emotion, I would observe
that, the steadfastness of the heart tends so strongly to secure patience, that
if an opposite state of the sensibility is more than of momentary duration,
there is strong presumption that the heart is not steadfast in love. The
first risings of it will produce an immediate effort to suppress it. If it
continues, this is evidence that the attention is allowed to dwell upon the
cause of it. This shows that the will is in some sense indulging it.
If it so far influences the will as to manifest itself in impatient Words
and actions, there must be a yielding of the will. Patience, as an attribute
of benevolence is overcome. If the sensibility were perfectly and directly
under the control of the will, the least degree of impatience would imply
sin. But as it is not directly, but indirectly under the control of the will,
momentary impatience of feeling, when it does not at all influence the
will, and when it is not at all indulged, is not sure evidence of a sinful state
of the will. It should always be borne in mind, that neither patience nor
impatience, in the form of mere feeling, existing for any length of time,
and in any degree, is in itself either holy on the one hand, or sinful on the
other. All that can be said of these states of the sensibility is, that they
indicate, as a general thing, the attitude of the will. When the will is for
a long time steadfast in its patience, the result is great equanimity of
temper, and great patience of feeling. This comes to be a law of the
sensibility, insomuch that very advanced Saints may, and doubtless do, ex-
perience the most entire patience of feeling for many years together. This
does not constitute their holiness, but is a sweet fruit of it. It is to be
regarded rather in the light of a reward of holiness, than as holiness itself.
18. Another attribute of benevolence is Meekness.
Meekness, considered as a virtue, is a phenomenon of the will. This
term also expresses a state of the sensibility. When used to designate a
phenomenon of the sensibility, it is nearly synonymous with patience. It
designates a Sweet and forbearing temper under provocation. Meekness,
a phenomenon of the will, and as an attribute of benevolence, is the
opposite both of resistance to injury and of retaliation. It is properly and
strictly forbearance under injurious treatment. This certainly is an
attribute of God, as our existence and our being out of hell plainly demon-
216 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
y
strate. Christ said of himself that he was “meek and lowly in heart;” and
this surely was no vain boast. How admirably, and how incessantly did
this attribute of his love manifest itself! The fifty-third chapter of Isaiah
is a prophecy exhibiting this attribute in a most affecting light. Indeed,
scarcely any feature of the character of God and of Christ is more strikingly
exhibited than this. It must evidently be an attribute of benevolence.
Benevolence is good-will to all beings. We are naturally forbearing
toward those whose good we honestly and diligently seek. If our hearts
are set upon doing them good, we shall naturally exercise great forbearance
toward them. God has greatly commended his forbearance to us, in that,
while we were yet his enemies, he forbore to punish us, and gave his Son
to die for us. Forbearance is a sweet and amiable attribute. How affect-
ingly it displayed itself in the hall of Pilate, and on the cross. “He is led
as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before its shearers is dumb, so
he opened not his mouth.”
This attribute has in this world abundant opportunity to develope and
display itself in the saints. There are daily occasions for the exercise
of this form of virtue. Indeed, all the attributes of benevolence are called
into frequent exercise in this school of discipline. This is indeed a suit-
able world in which to train God's children, to develope and strengthen
every modification of holiness. This attribute must always appear where
benevolence exists, and wherever there is an occasion for its exercise.
It is delightful to contemplate the perfection and glory of that love
which constitutes obedience to the law of God. As occasions arise, we
behold it developing one attribute after another, and there may be many
of its attributes and modifications of which we have as yet no idea whatever.
Circumstances will call them into exercise. It is probable, if not certain,
that the attributes of benevolence were very imperfectly known in heaven
previous to the existence of sin in the universe, and that but for sin many
of these attributes would never have been manifested in exercise. But the
existence of sin, great as the evil is, has afforded an opportunity for
benevolence to manifest its beautiful phases, and to develope its sweet
attributes in a most emchanting manner. Thus the divine economy of
benevolence brings good out of So great an evil.
A hasty and unforbearing spirit is always demonstrative evidence of a
want of benevolence, or of true religion. Meekness is, and must be, a
peculiar characteristic of the saints in this world, where there is so much
provocation. Christ frequently and strongly enforced the obligation to
forbearance. “But I say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever
shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if
any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy
cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him
twain.” How beautiful!
19. Long-suffering is another attribute of benevolence.
This attribute is hardly distinguishable from meekness or forbearance.
It seems to be an intense form of forbearance ; or it is forbearance exer-
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 217
cised long and under great suffering from persecution and unreasonable
opposition. God's forbearance is lengthened out to long-suffering. Christ's
forbearance, also, was and is often put to the severest trial, and is length-
ened out to most affecting long-suffering. This is an intense state or form
of benevolence, when it is most Sorely tried, and, as it were, put upon the
rack. The prophets, and Christ, and the apostles, the martyrs, and
primitive saints, and many in different ages of the church, have given
forth a glorious sepcimen and illustration of this sweet attribute of love.
But for the existence of sin, however, it is probable and perhaps certain,
that no being but God could have had an idea of its existence. The same,
no doubt, may be said of many of the attributes of divine love. God has
intended to exhibit strongly this attribute in himself, and in all his Saints
and angels. The introduction of sin, excuseless and abominable as it is,
has given occasion for a most thorough developement, and a most affecting
manifestation of this attribute of love. It is a Sweet, a heavenly attribute.
It is most opposite to the spirit and maxims of this world. It is the
very contrast of the law and the spirit of honour, as it appears in this
world. The law of honour says, If you receive an injury or an insult,
resent it sharply, and retaliate it fully. This gentle spirit says, If you
receive many insults and injuries, do not resent them, nor retaliate, but
bear and forbear even to long-suffering. “If thine enemy hunger, feed
him ; if he thirst, give him drink.”
20. Humility is another modification or attribute of love.
This term seems often to be used to express a sense of unworthiness, of
guilt, of ignorance, and of nothingness, to express a feeling of ill-desert.
It seems to be used in common language to express sometimes a state of
the intelligence, when it seems to indicate a clear perception of our guilt.
When used to designate a state of the sensibility, it represents those
feelings of shame and unworthiness, of ignorance, and of nothingness, of
which those are most deeply conscious who have been enlightened by the
Holy Spirit, in respect to their true character.
But as a phenomenon of the will, and as an attribute of love, it consists
in a willingness to be known and appreciated according to our real character.
Humility, as a phenomenon either of the sensibility or of the intelligence,
may co-exist with great pride of heart. Pride is a disposition to exalt self,
to get above others, to hide our defects, and to pass for more than we are.
Deep conviction of sin, and deep feelings of shame, of ignorance, and of
desert of hell, may co-exist with a great unwillingness to confess and be
known just as we are, and to be appreciated just according to what our real
character has been and is. There is no virtue in such humility. But
humility, considered as a virtue, consists in the consent of the will to be
known, to confess, and to take our proper place in the scale of being. It
is that peculiarity of love that wills the good of being so disinterestedly,
as to will to pass for no other than we really are. This is an honest, a
sweet, and amiable feature of love. It must, perhaps, be peculiar to those
who have sinned. It is only love acting under or in a certain relation, or
218 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
in reference to a peculiar set of circumstances. It would, under the same
circumstances, develope and manifest itself in all truly benevolent minds.
This attribute will render confession of sin to God and man natural, and
even make it a luxury. It is easy to see that, but for this attribute, the
Saints could not be happy in heaven. God has promised to bring into
judgment every work and every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether
it be evil. Now while pride exists, it would greatly pain the soul to have
all the character known. So that, unless this attribute really belongs to
the Saints, they would be ashamed at the judgment, and filled with confusion
even in heaven itself. But this sweet attribute will secure them against
that shame and confusion of face that would otherwise render heaven
itself a hell to them. They will be perfectly willing and happy to be
known and estimated according to their characters. This attribute will
secure in all the saints on earth that confession of faults one to another,
which is so often enjoined in the Bible. By this it is not intended, that
Christians always think it wise and necessary to make confession of all
their secret sins to man. But it is intended, that they will confess to those
whom they have injured, and to all to whom benevolence demands that they
should confess. This attribute secures its possessor against spiritual pride,
against ambition to get above others. It is a modest and unassuming state
of mind.
LECTURE XXII.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOWE.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW of GoD.
21. Self-denial is another attribute of love.
If we love any being better than ourselves, we of course deny ourselves
when our own interests come in competition with his. Love is good-will.
If I will good to others more than to myself, it is absurd to say that I
shall not deny myself when my own inclimations conflict with their good.
Now the love required by the law of God, we have repeatedly seen to be
good will, or Willing the highest good of being for its own sake, or as an end.
As the interests of self are not at all regarded because they belong to
self, but only according to their relative value, it must be certain, that
Self-denial for the sake of promoting the higher interests of God and of the
universe, is and must be a peculiarity or attribute of love.
But again. The very idea of disinterested benevolence, and there is
no other true benevolence, implies the abandonment of the spirit of self-
seeking, or of Selfishness. It is impossible to become benevolent, without
ceasing to be selfish. In other words, perfect self-denial is implied in
beginning to be benevolent. Self-indulgence ceases where benevolence
begins. This must be. Benevolence is the consecration of our powers to
the highest good of being in general as an end. This is utterly incon-
MORAL GOVERNMENT. * 219
sistent with consecration to self-interest or self-gratification. Selfishness
makes good to self the end of every choice. Benevolence makes good to
being in general the end of every choice. Benevolence, then, implies
complete self-denial. That is, it implies that nothing is chosen merely
because it belongs to self, but only because of its relative value, and in
proportion to it.
I said there was no true benevolence, but disinterested benevolence; no
true love, but disinterested love. There is such a thing as interested love
or benevolence. That is, the good of others is willed, though not as an
end, or for its intrinsic value to them, but as a means of our own happiness,
or because of its relative value to us. Thus a man might will the good of
his family, or of his neighbourhood, or country, or of anybody, or anything
that sustained such relations to self as to involve his own interests. When
the ultimate reason of his willing good to others is, that his own may be
promoted, this is selfishness. It is making good to self his end. This a
sinner may do toward God, toward the church, and toward the interests of
religion in general. This is what I call interested benevolence. It is
willing good as an end only to self, and to all others only as a means of
promoting our own good.
But again : when the will is governed by mere feeling in willing the
good of others, this is only the spirit of self-indulgence, and is only inter-
ested benevolence. For example : the feeling of compassion is strongly
excited by the presence of misery. The feeling is intense, and constitutes,
like all the feelings, a strong impulse or motive to the Will to consent to
its gratification. For the time being, this impulse is stronger than the
feeling of avarice, or any other feeling. I yield to it, and them give all the
money I have to relieve the sufferer. I even take my clothes from my
back, and give them to him. Now in this case, I am just as selfish as if I
had sold my clothes to gratify my appetite for strong drink. The gratifi-
cation of my feelings was my end. This is one of the most specious and
most delusive forms of selfishness.
Again ; when one makes his own salvation the end of prayer, of alms-
giving, and of all his religious duties, this is only selfishness and not true
religion, however much he may abound in them. This is only interested
benevolence, or benevolence to self.
Again : from the very nature of true benevolence, it is impossible that
every interest should not be regarded according to its relative value.
When another interest is seen by me to be more valuable in itself, or of
more value to God and the universe than my own, and when I see that, by
denying myself, I can promote it, it is certain, if I am benevolent, that I
shall do it. I cannot fail to do it, without failing to be benevolent. Two
things in this case must be apprehended by the mind.
(1.) That the interest is either intrimsically or relatively more valuable
than my own.
(2.) That, by denying myself, I can promote or secure a greater good to
being, than I sacrifice of my own. When these two conditions are fulfilled,
220 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
it is impossible that I should remain benevolent, unless I deny myself, and
seek the higher good. tº
Benevolence is an honest and disinterested consecration of the whole
being to the highest good of God and of the universe. The benevolent
man will, therefore, and must, homestly weigh each interest as it is
perceived in the balance of his own best judgment, and will always give
the preference to the higher interest, provided he believes, that he can by
endeavour, and by self-denial secure it.
That self-denial is an attribute of the divine love, is manifested most
gloriously and affectingly in God's gift of his Son to die for men. This
attribute was also most conspicuously manifested by Christ, in denying
himself, and taking up his cross, and suffering for his enemies. Observe.
It was not for friends that Christ gave himself. It was not unfortunate
but innocent sufferers for whom God gave his Son, or for whom he gave
himself. It was for enemies. It was not that he might make slaves of them
that he gave his Son, nor from any selfish consideration whatever, but
because he foresaw that, by making this sacrifice himself, he could secure
to the universe a greater good than he should sacrifice. It was this attri-
bute of benevolence that caused him to give his Son to suffer so much. It
was disinterested benevolence aome that led him to deny himself, for the
sake of a greater good to the universe. Now observe: this sacrifice would
mot have been made, unless it had been regarded by God as the less of two
natural evils. That is, the sufferings of Christ, great and overwhelming as
they were, were considered as an evil of less magnitude than the eternal
sufferings of sinners. This induced him to make the sacrifice, although for
his enemies. It mattered not whether for friends or for enemies, if so be he
could, by making a less sacrifice, secure a greater good to them. When I
come to consider the economy of benevolence, I may enlarge upon this
topic.
Let it be understood, that a self-indulgent spirit is never, and can never
be, consistent with benevolence. No form of self-indulgence, properly so
called, can exist where true benevolence exists. The fact is, self-denial
must be, and universally is, wherever benevolence reigns. Christ has
expressly made whole-hearted self-denial a condition of discipleship ; which
is the same thing as to affirm, that it is an essential attribute of holiness
or love; that there cannot be the beginning of true virtue without it.
Again : much that passes for self-denial is only a specious form of self.
indulgence. The penances and self-mortifications, as they are falsely called,
of the superstitious, what are they after all but a self-indulgent spirit? A
popish priest abstains from marriage to obtain the honour, and emoluments,
and the influence of the priestly office here, and eternal glory hereafter. A
nun takes the veil, and a monk immures himself in a monastery ; a hermit
forsakes human Society, and shuts himself up in a cave; a devotee makes
a pilgrimage to Mecca, and a martyr goes to the stake. Now if these
things are done with an ultimate reference to their own glory and happi-
ness, although apparently instances of great self-denial, yet they are, in
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 221
fact, only a spirit of self-indulgence and self-seeking. They are only follow-
ing the strongest desire of good to self. They are obviously instances of
choosing good to self, as the Supreme and final end.
There are many mistakes upon this subject For example; it is common for
persons to deny self in one form, for the sake of gratifying selfin another form.
In one man avarice is the ruling passion. He will labour hard, rise early,
and sit up late, eat the bread of carefulness, and deny himself even the
necessaries of life, for the sake of accumulating wealth. Every one can see,
that this is denying self in one form merely for the sake of gratifying self
in another form. Yet this man will complan bitterly of the self-indulgent
spirit manifested by others, their extravagance and want of piety.
One man will deny all his bodily appetites and passions for the sake of a
reputation with men. This is also an instance of the same kind. Another
will give the fruit of his body for the sin of his soul; will sacrifice every-
thing else to obtain an eternal inheritance, and be just as selfish as the man
who sacrifices to the things of time his soul and all the riches of eternity.
But it should be remarked, that this attribute of benevolence does and
must secure the subjugation of all the propensities. It must, either Sud-
denly or gradually, so far subdue and quiet them, that their imperious
clamour must cease. They will, as it were, be slain, either suddenly or
gradually, so that the sensibility will become, in a great measure, dead to
those objects that so often and so easily excited it. It is a law of the sensi-
bility—of all the desires and passions, that their indulgence developes and
strengthens them, and their denial suppresses them. Benevolence consists
in a refusal to gratify the sensibility, and in obeying the reason. Therefore
it must be true, that this denial of the propensities will greatly suppress them :
while the indulgence of the intelleet and of the conscience will greatly
develope them. Thus selfishness tends to stultify, while benevolence tends
greatly to strengthen the intellect. *
22. Condescension is another attribute of love.
This attribute consists in a tendency to descend to the poor, the ignorant,
or the vile, for the purpose of securing their good. It is a tendency to seek
the good of those whom Providence has placed in any respect below us, by
stooping, descending, coming down to them for this purpose. It is a
peculiar form of self-denial. God the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit, manifest infinite condescension in efforts to secure the well-being of
sinners, even the most vile and degraded. This attribute is called by
Christ lowliness of heart. God is said to humble himself, that is, to con-
descend when he beholds the things that are done in heaven. This is true,
for every creature is, and must for ever, be infinitely below Him in
every respect. But how much greater must that condescension be, that
comes down to earth, and even to the lowest and most degraded of earth's
inhabitants, for purposes of benevolence. This is a lovely modification of
benevolence. It seems to be entirely above the gross conceptions of infi-
delity. Condescension seems to be regarded by most people, and especially
by infidels, as rather a weakness than a virtue. Sceptics clothe their ima-
222 SYSTEMATIC TILEC) LOGY.
gimary God with attributes in many respects the opposite of true virtue
They think it entirely beneath the dignity of God to come down even to
notice, and much more to interfere with, the concerns of men. But hear
the word of the Lord: “Thus saith the High and Lofty One, who inhabiteth
eternity, whose name is Holy : I dwell in the high and holy place; with
him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the
humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones.” And again, “Thus
saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne and the earth is my footstool,
where is the house that ye build unto me? and where is the place of my
rest ? For all those things hath my hand made, and all those things have
been, saith the Lord. But to this man will I look, even to him that is
poor and of a contrite spirit, and that trembleth at my word.” Thus the
Bible represents God as clothed with condescension as with a cloak.
This is manifestly an attribute both of benevolence and of true greatness.
The matural perfections of God appear all the more wonderful, when we
consider, that he can and does know and contemplate and control, not only
the highest, but the lowest of all his creatures; that he is just as able to
attend to every want and every creature, as if this were the Sole object
of attention with him. So his moral attributes appear all the more lovely
and engaging when we consider that his “tender mercies are over all his
works,” that not a sparrow falleth to the ground without him " that he
condescends to number the very hairs of the heads of his servants, and
that not one of them can fall without him. When we consider that no
creature is too low, too filthy, or too degraded for him to condescend to,
—this places his character in a most ravishing light. Benevolence is
good-will to all beings. Of course one of its characteristics must be con-
descension to those who are below us... This in God is manifestly infinite.
He is infinitely above all creatures. For him to hold communion with
them is infinite condescension.
This is an attribute essentially belonging to benevolence or love in all
benevolent beings. With the lowest of moral beings it may have no other
developement, than in its relations to sentient existences below the rank
of moral agents, for the reason, that there are no moral agents below them
to whom they can stoop. God's condescension stoops to all ranks of sen-
tient existences. This is also true with every benevolent mind, as to all
inferiors. It seeks the good of being in general, and never thinks any
being too low to have his interests attended to and cared for, according to
their relative value. Benevolence cannot possibly retain its own essential
mature, and yet be above any degree of condescension that can cffect the
greatest good. Benevolence does not, cannot know any thing of that
loftiness of spirit that considers it too degrading to stoop any where, or to
any being whose interests need to be, and can be, promoted by such condescen-
sion. Denevolence has its end, and it cannot but seek this, and it does
not, cannot think anything below it that is demanded to secure that end.
O the shame, the infinite folly and madness of pride, and every form of
Selfishness How infinitely unlike God it is Christ could condescend
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 223
to be born in a manger; to be brought up in humble life; to be poorer than
the fox of the desert, or the fowls of heaven ; to associate with fishermen ;
to mingle with and seek the good of all classes; to be despised in life, and
die between two thieves on the cross. His benevolence “endured the
cross and despised the shame.” He was “meek and lowly in heart.” The
Lord of heaven and earth is as much more lowly in heart than any of his
creatures, as he is above them in his infinity. He can stoop to any thing
but to commit sin. He can stoop infinitely low.
23. Candour is another attribute of benevolence.
Candouris a disposition to treat every subject with fairness and honesty;
to examine and weigh all the evidence in the case, and decide according
to testimony. It is a state of mind which is the opposite of prejudice.
Prejudice is prejudgment. It is a decision made up with but partial
information. It is not a mere opinion. It is a committal of the will.
Candour is that quality of benevolence that holds the intellect open to
conviction. It is that state of the will in which all the light is sought
upon all questions, that can be obtained. Benevolence is an impartial, a
disinterested choice of the highest good of being—not of some of them,
—not of self—but of being in general. It inquires not to wbom an
interest belongs, but what is its intrinsic and relative value, and what is
the best means of promoting it. Selfishness, as we shall see, is never
candid. It never can be candid. It is contrary to its very nature.
Benevolence can not but be candid. It has no reasons for being otherwise.
Its eye is single. It seeks to know all truth for the sake of doing it. It
has no by-ends, no self-will or self-interest to consult. It is not seeking
to please or profit self. It is not seeking the interest of some favourite.
No, it is impartial, and must be candid.
It should always be borne in mind, that where there is prejudice, bene-
volence is not, cannot be. There is not, cannot be such a thing as homest
prejudice. There may be an honest mistake for want of light, but this
is not prejudice. If there be a mistake, and it be honest, there will be,
and must be, a readiness to receive light to correct the mistake. But
where the will is committed, and there is not candour to receive evidence,
there is, and there must be, selfishness. Few forms of sin are more odious
and revolting than prejudice. Candour is an amiable and a lovely attribute
of benevolence. It is captivating to belhold it. To see a man where his
own interest is deeply concerned, exhibit entire candour, is to witness a
charming exhibition of the spirit of love. What can be more abhorrent to
benevolence than the prejudices which are sometimes manifested, by pro-
fessedly good men, against other men. They seem unwilling to believe
any thing good of those against whom they are prejudiced. The great
zeal for what they regard as Orthodoxy, is often nothing more nor less
than most revolting prejudice. This is often too manifest to require proof.
Every one can see, in many cases, that this zeal is not a benevolent, but
a selfish one.
24. Stability is another attribute of benevolence. This love is not a
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MORAL GOVERNMENT. 22.5
decidedly and detestably selfish state of mind. Love always manifests a
tender regard for the feelings and well-being of its object; and as benevo-
lence is universal love, it will and must manifest the attribute of gentleness
and kindness toward all, except in those cases where either the good of the
individual, or of the public, shall demand a different treatment. In such
cases it will be love, and only love, that leads to different treatment; and
in no case will benevolence treat any, even the worst of beings, more
severely than is demanded by the highest good. Benevolence does every
thing for one reason; it has but one end, and that is the highest good of
being in general. It will and must treat all kindly, unless the public good
demands a different course. But it punishes, when it does punish, for the
same reason that it forgives, when it does forgive. It gives life, and takes
it away; it gives health and sickness, poverty and riches; it smiles and
frowns; it blesses and curses, and does, and says, and omits, gives and
withholds every thing for one and the same reason, to wit, the promotion
of the highest good of being. It will be gentle or severe, as occasions arise
which demand either of these exhibitions. Rindness is its rule, and
severity is its exception. Both, however, as we shall soon see, are equally
and necessarily attributes of benevolence.
The gentleness and kindness of God and of Christ are strikingly mami-
fested in providence and in grace. Christ is called a lamb, no doubt
because of the gentleness and kindness of his character. He is called the
good shepherd, and represented as gently leading his flock, and carrying
the lambs in his bosom. Many such affecting representations are made
of him in the Bible, and he often makes the same manifestations in his
actual treatment, not only of his servants, but also of his enemies. Who
has not witnessed this? and who cannot testify to this attribute of his
character, as having been a thousand times affectingly manifested in his
own history 2 Who can call to mind the dealings of his Heavenly Father
without being deeply penetrated with the remembrances, not only of his
kindness, but of his loving kindness, and tender mercy, and of its exceed-
ing greatness? There is a multitude of tender representations in the
Bible, which are all verified in the experience of every saint. “As the
eagle stirreth up her nest, fluttereth over her young, spreadeth abroad her
wings, taketh them, beareth them on her wings: so the Lord alone did
lead him, and there was no strange god with him.” This lovely attribute
will and must always appear where benevolence is. It is important, how-
ever, to remark, that constitutional temperament will often greatly modify
the expression of it. “Charity is kind,”—this is one of its attributes;
yet, as I just said, its manifestations will be modified by constitution,
education, &c. A manifest absence of it, in cases where it would be
appropriate, is sad evidence that benevolence is wanting.
20. Severity is another attribute of benevolence. “Behold,” says the
apostle, “the goodness and severity of God.” They greatly err who
uppose that benevolence is all softness under all circumstances. Severity
is not cruelty, but is love manifesting strictness, rigour, purity, when
Q
226 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
occasion demands. Love is universal good-will, or willing the highest good
of being in general. When, therefore, any one, or any number, so conduct
themselves as to interfere with and endanger the public good, severity is
just as natural, and as necessary to benevolence, as kindness and forbear-
ance, under other circumstances. Christ is not only a lamb, but a lion.
He is not only gentle as mercy, but stern as justice; not only yielding as
the tender bowels of mercy, but as inflexibly sterm as infimite purity and
justice. He exhibits the one attribute or the other, as occasion demands.
At one time we hear him praying for his murderers, “Father, forgive
them, for they know not what they do.” At another time we hear him
say, by the pen of an apostle, “If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ,
let him be accursed.” At another time we hear him, in the person of the
Psalmist, praying for vengeance on his enemies: “Reproach hath broken
my heart, and I am full of heaviness, and I looked for some to take pity,
but there was mome, and for comforters, but I found nome. They gave me
gall for my meat, and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink. Let
their table become a Smare before them, and that which should have been
for their welfare, let it become a trap. Let their eyes be darkened, that
they see mot, and make their loins continually to shake. Pour out thine
indignation upon them, and let thy wrathful anger take hold upon them.
Let their habitation be desolate, and let mone dwell in their tents. Add
iniquity (punishment) to their iniquity, and let them not come into thy
righteousness. Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not
be written with the righteous.” Many such like passages might be quoted
from the records of inspiration, as the breathings of the Spirit of the God
of love.
Now, it is perfectly manifest, that good-will to the universe of being
implies opposition to whatever tends to prevent the highest good. Benevo-
lence is, and must be, severe, in a good Sense, towards incorrigible sinners,
like those against whom Christ prays in the psalm just quoted.
The term severity is used Sometimes in a good, and sometimes in a bad,
sense. When used in a bad Sense, it designates an unreasonable state of
mind, and of course, a selfish state. It then represents a state which is
the opposite of benevolence. But when used in a good sense, as it is when
applied to God and Christ, and when spoken of as an attribute of benevo-
lence, it designates the sternness, firmness, purity, and justice of love,
acting for the public good in cases where sin exists, and where the public
interests are at stake. In such circumstances, if severity were not developed
as an attribute of benevolence, it would demonstrate that benevolence
could not be the whole of virtue, even if it could be virtue at all. The
intelligence of every moral being would affirm, in such circumstances,
that if severity did not appear, something was wanting to make the character
perfect, that is, to make the character answerable to the emergency.
It is truly wonderful to witness the tendency among men to fasten upon
some one attribute of benevolence, and overlook the rest. They, perhaps,
have been affected particularly by the manifestation of some one attribute,
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 227
which leads them to represent the character of God as all summed up in
that attribute. But this is fatally to err, and fatally to misrepresent God.
God is represented in the Bible as being slow to anger, and of tender
mercy; as being very pitiful : long-suffering; abundant in goodness and
truth; keeping mercy for thousands; forgiving iniquity, transgression, and
sin; but as also visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and
that will by no means clear the guilty; and as being angry with the
wicked every day. These are by no means contradictory representations.
They only express the different qualities of benevolence, and represent it
as manifesting itself under different circumstances, and in different rela-
tions. These are just the attributes that we can see must belong to
benevolence, and just what it ought to be, and must be, when these
occasions arise. Good-will to the universe ought to be, and must be, in
a good sense, severe where the public Weal demands it, as it often does.
It is one of the most shallow of dreams, that the Divine character is all
softness and sweetness, in all its manifestations and in all circumstances.
Sin has “emkindled a fire in the Divine anger that shall set on fire the
foundations of the mountains, and shall burn to the lowest hel].” Severfly
is also always, and necessarily, an attribute of benevolence in good angels,
and in good mem. When occasions arise that plainly demand it, this
attribute must be developed and manifested, or benevolence must cease.
It is, indeed, impossible that good-will to the whole should not manifest
severity and indignation to the part which should rebel against the
interests of the whole. Benevolence will seek the good of all, so long as
there is hope. It will bear and forbear, and be patient, kind, meek even
to long-suffering, while there is not a manifestation of incorrigible wicked-
ness. But where there is, the lamb is laid aside, and the lion is deve-
loped ; and his “wrathful anger” is as awful as his tender mercies are
affecting. Innumerable instances of this are on record in this world's
history. Why, then, should we seek to represent God's character as all
made up of one attribute 2 It is, indeed, all comprehensively expressed in
one word, love. But it should be for ever remembered, that this is a word
of vast import, and that this love possesses, and, as occasions arise, developes
and manifests, a great variety of attributes; all harmonious, and perfect,
and glorious. This attribute always developes itself in the character of
holy men, when occasions offer that demand it. Behold the severity of
Peter in the case of Amanias and Sapphira. Witness the rebuke adminis-
tered by Paul to Peter, when the latter dissembled and endangered the
purity of the church. Witness also his severity in the case of Elymas the
sorcerer; and hear him say to the Galatians, “I would that they who
trouble you were even cut off,"—and many such like things in the conduct
and spirit of holy men. Now, I know that such exhibitions are sometimes
regarded as un-Christlike, as legal, and not evangelical. But they are
evangelical. These are only manifestations of an essential attribute of
benevolence, as every one must see, who will consider the matter. It very
often happens that such manifestations, whatever the occasion may be, are
Q Q
228 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
denounced as the manifestations of a wicked spirit, as anger, and as sinful
anger. Indeed, it seems to be assumed by many, that every kind and
degree of anger is sinful, as a matter of course. But so far is all this
from the truth, that occasions often, or at least sometimes, arise, that call
for such manifestations; and to be any otherwise than indignant, to mani-
fest any other than indignation and severity, were to be and manifest any-
thing but that which is demanded by the occasion.
I know that this truth is liable, in a selfish world, to abuse. But I
know also that it is a truth of revelation; and God has not withheld it for
fear of its being abused. It is a truth of reason, and commends itself to
the intuitions of every mind. It is a truth abundantly manifested in the
moral and providential government of God. Let it not be denied Lor
concealed; but let no one abuse and pervert it.
LECTURE XXIII.
A TTRIBUTES OF LOW E.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW of GoD.
27. Holiness is another attribute of benevolence.
This term is used in the Bible, as synonymous with moral purity. In a
ceremonial sense it is applied to both persons and things; to make holy and
to sanctify are the same thing. To sanctify and to consecrate, or set apart
to a sacred use, are identical. Many things were, in this sense, sanctified,
or made holy, under the Jewish economy. The term holiness may, in
a general sense, be applied to anything whatever which is set apart to
a sacred use. It may be applied to the whole being of a moral agent, who
is set apart to the service of God.
As an attribute of benevolence, it denotes that quality which leads it to
seek to promote the happiness of moral agents, by means of conformity to
moral law.
As a moral attribute of God, it is that peculiarity of his benevolence
which secures it against all efforts to obtain its end by other means than
those that are morally and perfectly pure. His benevolence aims to secure
the happiness of the universe of moral agents, by means of moral law and
moral government, and of conformity to his own subjective idea of right.
In other words, holiness in God is that quality of his love that secures
its universal conformity, in all its efforts and manifestations, to the Divine
idea of right, as it lies in eternal developement in the Infinite Reason. This
idea is moral law. It is sometimes used to express the moral quality, or
character of his benevolence generally, or to express the moral character of
the Godhead.
It sometimes seems to designate an attribute, and sometimes a quality
of all his moral attributes.
MORAL GOVERNMLENT. 229
Holiness is, doubtless, a characteristic, or quality of each and all of his
moral attributes. They will harmonize in this, that no one of them can
consent to do otherwise than conform to the law of moral purity, as
developed and revealed in the Divine Reason.
That holiness is an attribute of God is everywhere assumed, and fre-
quently asserted in the Bible.
If an attribute of God, it must be an attribute of love; for God is love.
This attribute is celebrated in heaven as one of those aspects of the divine
character that give ineffable delight. Isaiah saw the Seraphim standing
around the throne of Jehovah, and crying one to another, “Holy! holy!
holy!" John also had a vision of the worship of heaven, and says “They
rest not day nor might, saying, Holy! holy! holy! Lord God Alumighty.”
When Isaiah beheld the holiness of Jehovah, he cried out “Woe is me ! I
itm undone. I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of
a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of
hosts " God's holiness is infinite, and it is no wonder that a perception
of it should thus affect the prophet.
Finite holiness must for ever feel itself awed in the presence of infinite
holiness. Job says, “I have beard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but
now mine eye seeth thee: wherefore I abhor inyself, and repent in dust
and ashes.” There is no comparing finite with infinite. The time will
never come when creatures can with open face contemplate the infinite
holiness of Jehovah without being like persons overcome with a harmony
too intensely delightful to be calmly borne. Heaven seems not able to
endure it without breaking forth into strains of inexpressible rapture.
The expressions of Isaiah and Job do not necessarily imply that, at the
time they were in a sinful state, but their expressions no doubt related to
whatever of sin they had at any time been guilty of. In the light of
Jehovah's holiness they saw the comparative pollution of their character,
taken as a whole. This view will always, doubtless, much affect the
Saints.
This must be, and yet in another sense they may be, and are, as holy, in
their measure as He is. They may be as perfectly conformed to what light
or truth they have, as he is. This is doubtless what Christ intended when
he said, “Be ye perfect, even as your, Father which is in heaven is perfect.”
The meaning is, that they should live to the same end, and be as entirely
consecrated to it as he is. This they must be, to be truly virtuous or holy
in any degree. But when they are so, a full view of the holiness of God would
confound and overwhelm them. If any one doubts this, he has not con-
sidered the matter in a proper light. He has not lifted up his thoughts, as
he needs to do, to the contemplation of infinite holiness. No creature,
however benevolent, can witness the divine benevolence without being
overwhelmed with a clear vision of it. This is no doubt true of every
attribute of the divine love. However perfect creature-virtue may be, it is
finite, and, brought into the light of the attributes of infinite Virtue, it will
appear like the dimmest star in the presence of the sun, lost in the blaze of
230 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,
his glory. Let the most just man on earth or in heaven witness, and have
a clear apprehension of, the infinite justice of Jehovah, and it would no
doubt fill him with unutterable awe. So, could the most merciful Saint on
earth, or in heaven, have a clear perception of the divine mercy in its
fulness, it would swallow up all thought and imagination, and, no doubt,
overwhelm him. And so also of every attribute of God. Oh! when we
speak of the attributes of Jehovah, we often do not know what we say.
Should God unveil himself to us, our bodies would instantly perish. “No
man,” says he, “can see my face and live.” When Moses prayed, “Show
me thy glory,” God condescendingly hid him in the cleft of a rock, and
covering him with his hand, he passed by, and let Moses see only his back
parts, informing him that he could not behold his face, that is, his unveiled
glories, and live.
Holiness, or moral harmony of character is, them, an essential attribute
of disinterested love. It must be so from the laws of our being, and from
the very nature of benevolence. In man it manifests itself in great purity
of conversation and deportment, in a great loathing of all impurity of flesh
and spirit. Let no man profess piety who has not this attribute developed.
The love required by the law of God is pure love. It seeks to make its
object happy only by making him holy. It manifests the greatest abhor-
rence of sin and all uncleanness. In creatures it pants, and doubtless ever
will pant and struggle, towards infinite purity or holiness. It will never
find a resting place in such a sense as to desire to ascend no higher. As
it perceives more and more of the fulness and infinity of God's holiness,
it will no doubt pant and struggle to ascend the eternal heights where God
sits in light too intense for the strongest vision of the highest cherub.
Holiness of heart or of will, produces a desire or feeling of purity in the
sensibility. The feelings become exceedingly alive to the beauty of holiness
and to the hatefulness and deformity of all spiritual, and even physical
impurity. This is called the love of holiness. The sensibility becomes,
ravished with the great loveliness of holiness, and unutterably disgusted with
the opposite. The least impurity of conversation or of action exceedingly
shocks one who is holy. Impure thoughts, if suggested to the mind of a
holy being, are instantly felt to be exceedingly offensive and painful.
The soul heaves and struggles to cast them out as the most loathsome
abominations.
28. Modesty is another attribute of love.
This may exist either as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or of the will,
or of both.
As a phenomenon of the sensibility, it consists in a feeling of delicacy,
or shrinking from whatever is impure, unchaste ; or from all boasting,
vanity, or egotism ; a feeling like retiring from public observation, and
especially from public applause. It is a feeling of self-diffidence, and is the
opposite of self-esteem and self-complacency. It takes on, as a mere
feeling, a great variety of types; and when it controls the will, often gives
its subject a very lovely and charming exterior. But when this is only a
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 231
phenomenon of the sensibility, and manifests itself only as this feeling
takes control of the will, it does not rise to the dignity of virtue, but is only
a specious and delusive form of selfishness. It appears lovely because it is
the counterfeit of a sweet and charming form of virtue.
As a phenomenon of the will, and as an attribute of benevolence, it is
that quality which preserves it from Ostentation and display, and disposes
it to pursue an opposite course. It is nearly allied to humility. It is a
state of heart the opposite of an egotistical spirit. It seeks not personal
applause or distinction. It is the unostentatious characteristic of benevo-
lence. “Love seeketh not its own, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself
unseemly.” Benevolence seeketh not its own profit, nor its own honour.
It seeks the good of being, with a single eye, and it is no part of its design
to set off self to advantage. Hence modesty is one of its lovely character-
istics. It manifests itself very much as the feeling of modesty manifests
itself, when it takes control of the will, so that often it is difficult to
distinguish modesty as a virtue, or as an attribute of religion, from that
modesty of feeling which is a peculiarity of the constitution of some, and
which comes to control the will.
True piety is always modest. It is unassuming, unostentatious, anti-
egotistical, content to seek with a single eye its object—the highest good of
being. In this work it seeks not public notice or applause. It finds a
luxury in doing good, no matter how unobserved. If at any time it seeks to
be known, it must be entirely disinterested in this. It is not the person,
but the act that it exhibits, and that only for the sake of example. It seeks
to be known only to make “manifest that its deeds are wrought in God,”
and to stimulate and encourage others to good works. Modesty as a virtue
shrinks from Self-display, from trumpeting its own deeds. It is prone to
“esteem others better than self;” to give the preference to others, and
hold self in very moderate estimation. It aims not to exhibit self, but God
and Christ. After Paul had said, “I laboured more abundantly than they
all ;” he adds, “yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me.”
This form of virtue is sometimes conspicuous in men and women whom
the providence of God has placed in high stations, so that they are exposed
to the public gaze. They seem never to aim at the exhibition or exaltation
of self; they never appear flattered by applause, nor to be disheartened by
censure and abuse. Having this attribute largely developed, they pursue
their way, totally regardless both of the praise and the censure of men.
Like Paul, they can say, “With me it is a very small thing that I should
be judged of you, or of man's judgment.” It seeks only to commend itself
to God, and to the consciences of men,
29. Sobriety is another attribute of benevolence.
Sobriety, as a virtue, is the opposite of levity. There is, as every one
knows, a remarkable difference in the constitutional temperament of differ-
ent persons, in regard to levity and sobriety, considered as tendencies of
the sensibility. Sobriety, considered as a constitutional peculiarity, when
existing in an excessive degree, is often attributable to a diseased state of
232 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the organs of life, and is then not unfrequently termed hypochondriasis.
In other instances, it seems motto result from, or to indicate, ill health, but
is a peculiarity not to be accounted for by any philosophy of ours.
Sobriety, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, often results from con-
viction of sin and fear of punishment, and from worldly troubles, and,
indeed, from a multitude of causes.
But Sobriety, considered as a virtue, and as a characteristic or attribute
of benevolence, consists in that solemn earnestness which indicates an
honest intention to pursue to the utmost the highest good of being.
Sobriety is not synonymous with moroseness. It is not a sour, fault-
finding, censorious spirit. Neither is it inconsistent with cheerfulness—I
mean the cheerfulness of love. It is the contrast of levity, and not of cheel-
fulness. It has no heart for levity and folly. It cannot brook the spirit of
gossip and of giggling. Sober earnestness is one of the essential attributes
of love to God and souls. It camnot fail to manifest this characteristic,
because benevolence supremely values its object. It meets with many
obstacles in attempting to secure it. It too deeply prizes the good of being,
and sees too plainly how much is to be done, to have any time or inclina-
tion for levity and folly. God is always serious and in earnest. Christ
was always serious and in earnest. Trifling is an abomination to God,
and equally so to true and enlightened benevolence.
But let it never be forgotten that sobriety, as an attribute of benevolence,
has nothing in it of the nature of moroseness and peevishness. It is not
melancholy. It is not sorrowfulness. It is not despondency. It is a
sober, homest, earnest, intense state of choice or of good will. It is not an
affected, but a perfectly natural and serious, earnestness. Benevolence is
in earnest, and it appears to be so by a law of its own 11ature. It can laugh
and weep for the same reason, and at the same time. It can do either
without levity on the one hand, and without moroseness, melancholy, or
discouragement, on the other. Abraham fell on liis face and laughed,
when God promised him a son by Sarah. Put it was not levity. It was
benevolence rejoicing in the promise of a faithful God.
We should always be careful to distinguish between sobriety as a mere
feeling, and the sobriety of the heart. The former is often easily dissipated,
and succeeded by trifling and levity. The former is stable as benevolence
itself, because it is one of its essential attributes. A trifling Christian is a con-
tradiction. It is as absurd as to speak of a light and foolish benevolence.
These are of a piece with a sinful holiness. Benevolence has, and must
have, its changeless attributes. Some of them are manifest only on par-
ticular occasions that develope them. Others are manifest on all occasions,
because every occasion calls them into exercise. This attribute is one of
that class. Benevolence must be seriously in earnest on all occasions. The
benevolent soul may and will rejoice with those who rejoice, and weep with
those who weep. He may be always cheerful in faith and in hope, yet he
always has too great business on hand, to have a heart for trifling or for folly.
30. Sincerity is another attribute of benevolence.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 233
Sincerity is the opposite of hypocrisy. The terms sincerity and per-
fection seem, as used in the Bible, to be nearly synonymous. Sincerity, as
an attribute of benevolence, implies whole-hearted honesty, singleness of
aim, true uprightness of purpose. Where this attribute is, there is a con-
sciousness of its presence. The Soul is satisfied that it is really and truly
whole-hearted. It cannot but respect its own honesty of intention and of
purpose. It has not to affect sincerity—it has it. When the soul has
this attribute developed, it is as deeply conscious of whole-heartedness, as
of its own existence. It is honest. It is earnest. It is deeply sincere. It
knows it, and never thinks of being suspected of insincerity, and of course
has no reason for affectation.
This also is one of those attributes of benevolence that are manifest on
all occasions. There is a manifestation of sincerity that carries conviction
along with it, in the spirit and deportment of the truly benevolent man. It
is exceedingly difficult so to counterfeit it that the deception shall not be
seen. The very attempt to counterfeit sincerity will manifest hypocrisy to
a discerning mind. There is a cant, a put-on seriousness, a hollow, shallow
long-facedness, that reveals a want of sincerity; and the more pains men
take to cover up insincerity, the more surely it reveals itself. There is a
simplicity, an unguardedness, a transpareney, a right up and down frankness,
an open-heartedness in such sincerity, that at once commends it and gives
it power. It tells the whole story, and carries with it, on its very face, the
demonstration of its homesty. Sincerity is its own passport, its own letter
of commendation. It is as transparent as light, as honest as justice, as
kind as mercy, and as faithful as truth. It is all lovely and praiseworthy.
It needs no hoods nor gowns, nor canonicals, nor ceremonials, to set it off;
it stands on its own foundation. It walks abroad unsuspecting, and gene-
rally unsuspected of, hypocrisy. It lives in open day-light and courts no
concealment. It inhabits love as its dwelling place ; and where benevo-
lence is, there is its rest.
31. Another attribute of benevolence is Zeal. Zeal is not always a
phenomenon of the will; for the term often expresses an effervescing state of
the sensibility. It often expresses enthusiasm in the mere form of excited
feeling. It is also often an attribute of selfishmess. The term expresses
intensity in the pursuit of an object, whether used of the will or of the
emotions, whether designating a characteristic of selfishness or of benevo-
lence. Benevolence is an intense action of the will, or an intense state of
choice. The intensity is not uniform, but varies with varying perceptions
of the intellect. When the intellectual apprehensions of truth are clear,
when the Holy Spirit shines on the soul, the aetings of the will become
proportionably intense. This must be, or benevolence must cease alto-
gether. Benevolence is the homest choice of the highest good of being,
and, of course, it has no sinister or bye-ends to prevent it from laying just
that degree of stress upon the good of being, which its importance seems to
demand. Benevolence consists in yielding the will up unreservedly to the
demands of the intelligence, when the intelligence is enlightened as to the
234 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
ground of moral obligation. Nothing else is benevolence. Hence it follows,
that the intensity of benevolence will, and must, vary with varying light.
When the light of God shines strongly upon the soul, there is often a con-
suming intensity in the action of the will, and the soul can adopt the
language of Christ, “The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up.”
In its lowest estate, benevolence is zealous. That is, the intellectual
perceptions never sink so low as to leave benevolence to become like a
stagnant pool. It must be a fountain, flowing forth. It is never lazy,
never sluggish, never inactive. It is aggressive in its nature. It is essential
activity in itself. It consists in choice, the supreme choice of an end—and
in consecration to that end. Zeal, therefore, must be one of its essential
attributes. A lazy benevolence is a misnomer. In a world where sin is,
benevolence must be aggressive. In such a world it cannot be conservative.
It must be reformatory. This is its essential nature. In such a world as
this, a conservative, anti-reform benevolence is sheer selfishness. To baptize
anti-reform and conservatism with the name Christianity, is to steal a robe
of light to cover the black shoulders of a fiend. Zeal, the zeal of benevo-
lence, will not, cannot rest while sin is in the world. God is represented
as clothed with zeal as with a cloak ; and after making some of his exceed-
ing great and precious promises, he concludes by saying, “The zeal of the
Lord of hosts will perform this.”
32. Unity is another attribute of benevolence.
Benevolence or love has but one end. It consists in one choice, one
ultimate intention. It is always one and indivisible. It possesses many
attributes or characteristics; but they are all only so many phases of one
principle. Every modification of virtue, actual or conceivable, may be, and
must be, resolvable into love, for in fact, it is only a modification of love
or benevolence. It is easy to see, that an honest choice of the highest good
of being as an end, will sufficiently and fully account for every form in
which virtue has appeared, or ever can appear. The love or good-will of
God is a unit. He has but one end. All he does is for one and the same
reason. So it is, and must be, with love or benevolence in all beings. God's
conduct is all equally good and equally praiseworthy.
(1.) Because he always has one intention.
(2.) Because he always has the same degree of light.
With creatures this light varies, and consequently they, although benevo-
lent, are not always equally praiseworthy. Their virtue increases as their
light increases, and must for ever do so, if they continue benevolent. But
their end is always one and the same. In this respect their virtue never
varies, while their benevolence continues. They have the same end with
God.
It is of great importance that the unity of virtue should be understood,
else that which really constitutes its essence is overlooked. If it be Sup-
posed, that there can be various sorts of virtue, this is a fatal mistake; the
fact is, virtue consists in whole-hearted consecration to one end, and that
end is, as it ought to be, and must be, the highest well-being of God and of
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 235
the universe. This, and nothing else, more nor less, is virtue. It is one
and identical in all moral agents, in all worlds, and to all eternity. It can
never be changed. It can never consist in anything else. God, if he is
himself unchangeable, could not alter its nature, nor one of its essential
attributes. The inquiry, and the only inquiry is, for what end do I live?
To what end am I consecrated ? Not merely, how do I feel, and what is
my outward deportment? These may indicate the state of my will. But
these cannot settle the question? If a man knows anything, it must be that
he knows what his supreme intention is. That is, if he considers at all,
and looks at the grand aim of his mind, he cannot fail to see, whether
he is really living for God and the universe, or for himself apart.
If God is love, his virtue or love must be itself a unit. If all the law is
fulfilled in one word; if love is the fulfilling of the law; then all virtue
must resolve itself into love ; and this unity is, and must be, an attribute
of benevolence.
33. Simplicity is another attribute of benevolence.
By simplicity is intended singleness without mixture. It has, and can
have, but one simple end. It does not, and cannot, mingle with selfishness.
It is simple or single in its aim. It is, and must be, simple or single in all
its efforts to secure its end. It does not, cannot, attempt to serve God and
mammon. But, as I have dwelt at length upon this view of the subject in
a former lecture, I need not enlarge upon it here.
LECTURE XXIV.
A T TIRIB U T E S OF LO W E.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW of GoD.
34. Gratitude is another characteristic of love.
This term also designates a state of the sensibility, or a mere feeling of
being obliged to another, or benefited by him. This feeling includes an
emotion of love and attachment to the benefactor who has shown us favour.
It also includes a feeling of obligation, and of readiness to make such re-
turns as we are able, to the being who has shown us favour. But, as a
mere feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, gratitude has no moral
character. It may exist in the sensibility of one who is entirely selfish.
For selfish persons love to be obliged, and love those who love to oblige
them, and can feel grateful for favours shown to themselves, and desire
or wish to make a return.
Gratitude, as a virtue, is only a modification or an attribute of benevo-
lence or of good-will. It is that quality of benevolence that disposes it to
acknowledge a favour, and to make suitable returns; to will and endeavour
to promote the particular good of a benefactor. It always assumes of course
the intrinsic value of the good willed, as the fundamental reason for willing
it, But it always has particular reference to the relation of benefactor,
236 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
as a secondary or additional reason for willing good to him in particular.
This relation cannot be the foundation of the obligation to love or will the
good of any being in the universe ; for the obligation to will his good
would exist, if this relation did not exist, and even if the relation of perse-
cutor existed in its stead. But gratitude, always assuming the existence of
the fundamental reason, to wit, the intrinsic value of the well-being of its
object for its own sake, has, as I have just said, particular reference to the
relation of benefactor; so particular reference to it, that, if asked why he
loved or willed the good of that individual, he would naturally assign this
relation as a reason. He would, as has been formerly shown, assign this
as the reason, not because it is, or can be, or ought to be, the fundamental
reason, much less the exclusive one, but because the other reason lies in the
mind as a first truth, and is not so much noticed on the field of conscious-
ness at the time, as the secondary reason, to wit, the relation just refer-
red to.
This attribute of benevolence may never have occasion for its exercise in
the Divine mind. No one can sustain to him the relation of benefactor.
Yet, in his mind, it may, and no doubt does, exist in the form of good-will
to those who are the benefactors of others, and for that reason: just as finite
minds ought to be affected by that relation. He has even gone much
farther than this, and has been pleased to say, that good done to our fel-
low men he will graciously consider and reward as good done to himself.
This identification of good dome to his creatures with good dome to him and
for his glory, raises benevolence to the highest conceivable point of dignity
and honour.
That love will ever have an opportunity to develope all its attributes, and
manifest all its loveliness, and take on every possible peculiarity, is more
than we can know. Its loveliness can never be known nor conceived of by
finite minds, except so far as occasions develope its charming attributes.
Our love of gratitude to God finds abundant occasions of developement in
all finite minds, and especially among simmers of our race. Our ill-desert
is so infinite, and God’s goodness, mercy, and long-suffering are so infinite,
and so graciously manifested to us, that if we have any attribute of bene-
volence largely developed, it must be that of gratitude. Gratitude to God
will manifest itself in a spirit of thanksgiving, and in a most tender and
anxious regard to his feelings, his wishes, and all his commandments.
A grateful soul will naturally raise the question on all occasions, Will this
or that please God? There will be a constant endeavour of the grateful
soul to please him. This must be ; it is the matural and inevitable result
of gratitude. It should be always borne in mind, that gratitude is good-
will, modified by the relation of benefactor. It is not a mere feeling of
thankfulness, but will always awaken that feeling. It is a living, emergizing
attribute of benevolence, and Will and must manifest itself in corresponding
feeling and action.
It should also be borne in mind, that a selfish feeling of gratitude or
thankfulness often exists, and imposes upon its subject, and often upon
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 237
*-
those who witness its manifestations. It conceals its selfish foundation and
character, and passes in this world for virtue; but it is not. I well recollect
weeping with gratitude to God years previous to my conversion. The
same kind of feeling is often, no doubt, mistaken for evangelical grati-
tude.
Benevolence is an all-comprehending, impartial principle. The bene-
volent soul regards all interests as his own, and all beings as parts of him-
self, in such a sense, as to feel obligations of gratitude for favours bestowed
on others as well as on himself. Gratitude, as an attribute of benevolence,
recognizes God as a benefactor to self in bestowing favours on others.
Benevolence, regarding all interests as our own, acknowledges the favours
bestowed upon any and upon all. It will thank God for favours bestowed
upon the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air, and for “opening his
hand and supplying the wants of every living thing.”
35. JP isdom is another attribute of benevolence.
Wisdom is that quality of benevolence that disposes it to be directed by
knowledge. Its manifestation in life and action is that of love directed
by discretion, evidently for this reason, that hereby it becomes more efficient
for good. Wisdom, therefore, must mingle with benevolence, and take
the direction of its zeal and activity. It chooses the best and most valuable
end, and the most appropriate means of obtaining it. It is like all the
other attributes, only benevolence viewed in a certain relation, or Only a
particular aspect of it.
Wisdom is a term that expresses the perfectly intelligent character of
love. It represents it as not a blind and unintelligent choice, but as being
guided only by the highest intelligence. This attribute, like all the others,
is perfect in God, in an infinitely higher sense than in any creature. It
must be perfect in creatures, in such a sense as to be sinless: but can in
them never be perfect, in such a sense as to admit of no increase.
The manifold displays of the divine wisdom in creation, providence, and
grace, are enough, when duly considered, to overwhelm a finite mind.
An inspired apostle could celebrate this attribute in such a strain as this:
“O the depths of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!
how unsearchable are lis judgments, and his ways past finding out.” The
wisdom of the Saints appears in their choice of an end. They choose
invariably the same end that God does, but do not, for want of knowledge,
always use the best means. This, however, is not a sinful defect in them,
provided they act according to the best light they have or can obtain.
Wisdom is a term that is often and justly used to express true religion,
and to distinguish it from everything else: it expresses both benevolence,
or good-Will, and the intelligent character of that choice, that is, that the
choice is dictated by the intelligence, as distinguished from selfish choice,
or choice occasioned by the mere impulses of feeling.
36. Grace is another attribute of benevolence.
Grace is that quality of benevolence that disposes it to bestow gratuitous
favour, that is, favour on the undeserving and on the ill-deserving.
238 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Grace is not synonymous with mercy. It is a term of broader meaning.
Mercy is a disposition to forgive the guilty. Grace expresses not only a
willingness to pardon, or exempt from penalty, but to bestow other favours
of a positive character.
Mercy might pardon; but unless great grace were bestowed, our pardon
would by no means secure our salvation.
Grace does not wait for merit as a condition of bestowing favour. It
causes its sun to shine on the evil and on the good, and sends its rain upon
the just and the unjust.
Grace in the saints manifests itself in acts of beneficence to the most
unworthy, as well as to the deserving. It seeks to do good to all, whether
meritorious or not. It seeks to do good from a love to being. It rejoices
in opportunities to bestow its gratuities upon all classes that need them.
To grace, necessity or want is the great consideration. When we come to
God, his grace is delighted with the opportunity to supply our wants.
The grace of God is a vast oceam without shore, or bound, or bottom. It
is infinite. It is an ever overflowing ocean of beneficence. Its streams
go forth to make glad the universe. All creatures are objects of his
grace to a greater or less extent. All are not objects of his saving grace,
but all are, or have been, the recipients of his bounty. Every simmer that
is kept out of hell, is sustained every moment by grace. Every thing that
any one receives who has ever Simmed, which is better than hell, is received
of grace.
Repentance is a condition of the exercise of mercy; but grace is exer.
cised in a thousand forms, without any reference to character. Indeed, the
very term expresses good-will to the undeserving and ill-deserving. Surely
it must have been a gracious disposition, deep and infinite, that dovised
and executed the plan of salvation for simmers of our race. A sympathy
with the grace of God must manifest itself in strenuous and self-denying
efforts to secure, to the greatest possible number, the benefits of this sal-
vation. A gracious heart in man will leap forth to declare the infinite
riches of the grace of God, in the ears of a dying world. No man certainly
has or can have a sympathy with Christ who will or can hesitate to do his
utmost to carry the gospel, and apply his grace, to a perishing world.
What shall the gracious disposition of Christ prepare the way, prepare
the feast; and can they have any sympathy with him, who can hesitate to
go or send to invite the starving poor 2 If Christ both lived and died to
redeem men, is it a great thing for us to live to serve them? No, indeed:
he only has the spirit of Christ who would not merely live, but also die
for them.
37. Economy is another attribute of benevolence.
This term expresses that peculiarity of benevolence that makes the best
use, and the most that can be made, of every thing to promote the public
good. This attribute appears at every step in the works and government
of God. It is truly wonderful to see how every thing is made to conduce
to one end; and nothing exists or can exist in the universe, which God
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 239
will not overrule to some good account. Even “the wrath of man shall
praise him, and the remainder of wrath he will restrain.” A most divine
economy is every where manifest in the works and ways of God. If he is
love, we might expect this. Nay, if he is love, it is impossible that this should
not be. He lives only for one end. All things were created, and are ruled
or overruled by him. All things then, must, directly or indirectly, work
together for good. He will secure some benefit from everything. Nothing
has occurred, or will occur, or can ever occur to all eternity, that will not
in some way be used to promote the good of being. Even sin and punish-
ment will not be without their use. God has created nothing, nor has
he suffered anything to occur, in vain. Sin, inexcusable and ruinous as
it is, if left to work out its natural results, is not without its use. And
God will take care to glorify himself in sinners, whether they consent or
not. He says, “He has created all things for himself, even the wicked
for the day of evil.” That is, he created no man wicked, but he created
those who have become wicked. He created them not for the sake of
punishing them, but knowing that they would become incorrigible simmers,
he designed to punish them, and by making them a public example, render
them useful to his government. He created them, not because he delighted
in their punishment for its own sake, but that he might make their deserved
punishment useful to the universe. In this sense, it may be truly said,
that he created them for the day of evil. Foreseeing that they would
become incorrigible sinners, he designed, when he created them, to make
them a public example.
God's glorious economy in overruling all events for the public benefit,
is affectingly displayed in the fact, that all things are made to work to-
gether for good to them who love God. All beings, saints and sinners,
good and evil angels, sin and holiness; in short, there is not a being nor
an event in the universe, that is not all used up for the promotion of the
highest good. Whether men intend it or not, God intends it. If men do
not design it, no thanks to them, whatever use God may make of them. He
will give them, as he says, according to their endeavours or intentions;
but he will take care to use them in one way or another for his glory. If
men will consent to live and die for his glory and the good of being, well;
they shall have their reward. But if they will not consent, he will take
care to dispose of them for the public benefit. He will make the best use
of them he can. If they are willing and obedient, if they sympathize
with him in promoting the good of the universe, well. But if not, he can
make them a public example, and make the influence of their punishment
useful to his kingdom. Nothing shall be lost, in the sense that God will
not make it answer some useful purpose. No, not even sin with all its
deformities and guilt, and blasphemy with all its desolating tendencies,
shall be suffered to exist in vain. It will be made useful in innumerable
ways. But no thanks to the sinner; he means no such thing, as that
his sin shall thus be made useful. He is set upon his own gratification,
regardless of consequences. Nothing is further from his heart than to do
240 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
good, and glorify God. But God has his eye upon him ; has laid his
plans in view of his foreseen wickedness; and so surely as Jehovah lives,
so surely shall the sinner, in one way or another, be used up for the glory
of God, and the highest good of being.
Economy is necessarily an attribute of benevolence in all minds. The
very nature of benevolence shows that it must be so. It is consecration to
the highest good of being. It has no other end. Now all choice must
respect means or ends. Benevolence has but one end; and all its activity,
every volition that it puts forth, must be to secure that end. The intellect
will be used to devise means to promote that end. The whole life and
activity of a benevolent being is, and must be, a life of strenuous economy
for the promotion of the one great end of benevolence. Extravagance, self.
indulgence, waste, are necessarily foreign to love. Everything is devoted to
one end. Everything is scrupulously and wisely directed to secure the
highest good of God and being in general. This is, this must be, the
universal and undeviating aim of every mind, just so far as it is truly bene-
volent. “He that hath an ear to hear, let him hear.”
There are many other attributes of benevolence that might be enume-
rated and enlarged upon, all of which are implied in entire obedience to
the law of God. Enough has been said, I hope, to fix attention strongly
upon the fact, that every modification of virtue, actual, conceivable, or
possible, is only either an attribute or manifestation of benevolence ; and
where benevolence is, there all virtue is, and must be, and every form in
which virtue does or can exist, must develope itself as its occasions shall
QT1Sé.
LECTURE XXV.
M O R. A. L G O V E R N M E N T.
WHAT constitutes DISOBEDIENCE To MoRAL LAW.
In discussing this question, I will,
I. Revert to some points that have been settled.
II. Show what disobedience to the moral law cannot consist in.
III. What it must consist in.
I. Revert to some points that have been settled.
l. That moral law requires love or benevolence, and that this is the sum
of its requirements.
2. That benevolence is good-will to being in general. In other words,
that it consists in the impartial choice of the good of being, as an end, or
for its own sake.
3. That obedience to moral law is a unit, or that it invariably consists in
disinterested benevolence. That consecration to the highest good of being,
is virtue, and comprehensive of the whole of virtue.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 241
4. That feeling and outward action are only results of ultimate intention,
and in themselves are neither virtue nor vice.
5. That all choice and volition must terminate upon some object, and
that this object must be chosen as an end, or as a means.
6. That the choice of anything as a means to an end is, in fact, only
carrying into execution the ultimate choice, or the choice of an end.
7. That the mind must have chosen an end, or it cannot choose the
means. That is, the choice of means implies the previous choice of an end.
8. That moral character belongs to the ultimate intention only, or to the
choice of an end.
9. That virtue, or obedience to moral law, consists in choosing in accord-
ance with the demands of the intellect, in opposition to following the feelings,
desires, or impulses of the sensibility.
10. That whatever is chosen for its own sake, and not as a means to an
end, is and must be chosen as an end.
11. That the mind must always have an end in view, or it cannot choose
at all. That is, as has been said, the will must have an object of choice,
and this object must be regarded as an end, or as a means.
12. That the fundamental reason for choosing an end, and the end
chosen, are identical. That is, the fundamental reason of the obligation to
choose a thing, must be found in the nature of the thing itself, and this
reason is the end or thing chosen. For example: if the intrinsic value of
a thing be the foundation of the obligation to choose it, the intrinsically
valuable is the end or thing chosen.
II. Show in what disobedience to moral law cannot consist.
1. It cannot consist in malevolence, or in the choice of evil or misery as
an ultimate end. This will appear, if we consider,
(1.) That the choice of an end implies the choice of it, not for no reason,
but for a reason, and for its own intrinsic value, or because the mind prizes
it on its own account. But moral agents are so constituted, that they can-
not regard misery as intrinsically valuable. They cannot, therefore, choose
it as an ultimate end, nor prize it on its own account.
(2.) To will misery as an ultimate end, would imply the choice of
universal misery, and every degree of it, according to its relative amount.
(3.) The choice of universal misery as an end, implies the choice of all
the means necessary to that end.
(4.) The end chosen is identical with the reason for choosing it. To
say that a thing can be chosen without any reason, is to say that nothing is
chosen, or that there is no object of choice, or that there is actually no
choice. Misery may be chosen to assert our own sovereignty; but this
Were to choose self gratification, and not misery, as an ultimate end. To
choose misery as an ultimate end, is to choose it, not to assert my own
sovereignty, nor for any other reason than because it is misery,
(5.) To choose an end is not to choose without any reason, as has been
said, but for some reason. -
R
242 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(6.) To choose misery as an end, is to choose it for the reason that it is
misery, and that misery is preferred to happiness, for its own sake, which
is absurd. Such a supposition overlooks the very mature of choice.
(7.) To will misery as a means is possible, but this is not malevolence,
but might be either benevolence or selfishness.
(8.) The constitution of moral beings renders malevolence, or the willing
of misery for its own sake, impossible. Therefore disobedience to moral
law cannot consist in malevolence.
2. Disobedience to moral law cannot consist in the constitution of Soul
or body. The law does not command us to have a certain constitution, nor
forbid us to have the constitution with which we came into being.
3. It cannot consist in any unavoidable state, either of the sensibility or
of the intelligence ; for these, as we have seen, are involuntary, and are
dependent upon the actings of the will.
4. It cannot consist in outward actions, independent of the design with
which they are put forth, for these, we have seen, are controlled by the
actions of the will, and, therefore, can have no moral character in themselves.
5. It cannot consist in inaction : for total inaction is to a moral agent
impossible. Moral agents are necessarily active. That is, they cannot
exist as moral agents without choice. They must, by a law of necessity,
choose either in accordance with, or in opposition to, the law of God. They
are free to choose in either direction, but they are not free to abstain from
choice altogether. Choose they must. The possession of free-will, and
the perception of opposing objects of choice, either exciting desire, or
developing the rational affirmation of obligation to choose, render choice
one way or the other inevitable. The law directs how they ought to choose.
If they do not choose thus, it must be because they choose otherwise, and
not because they do not choose at all.
6. It cannot consist in the choice of moral evil, or sim, as an ultimate
end. Sim is but an element or attribute of choice or intention, or it is
intention itself. If it be intention itself, them to make sin an end of
intention, would be to make intention or choice terminate on itself, and the
sinner must choose his own choice, or intend his own intention as an end :
this is absurd,
If sin is but an element or attribute of choice or intention, them to suppose
the sinner to choose it as an end, were to make choice or intention terminate
on an element or attribute of itself, to suppose him to choose as an end
an element of his own choice. This also is absurd and a contradiction.
The nature of a moral being forbids that he should choose sin for its own
sake. He may choose those things the choosing of which is sinful, but it
is not the sinfulness of the choice upon which the intention terminates.
This is naturally impossible. Sin may be chosen as a means of gratifying
a malicious feeling, but this is not choosing it as an end, but as a means.
Malevolence, strictly speaking, is in itself impossible to a moral agent.
That is, the choice of moral or natural evil for its own sake, contradicts the
nature of moral agents, and the nature of ultimate choice, and is therefore
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 243
impossible. In common language we may charge them with malevolence;
but, strictly speaking, the evil is not the end, but the gratification of the
malicious feeling of the selfish being is the end.
7. Disobedience to moral law cannot consist in Self-love. Self-love is
simply the constitutional desire of happiness. It is altogether an in-
voluntary state. It has, as a desire, no moral character, any more than has
the desire of food. It is no more sinful to desire happiness, and properly
to seek it, than it is wrong to desire food, and properly to seek that,
III. What disobedience to moral law must consist in.
1. It must consist in choice or ultimate intention, for moral character
belongs strictly only to ultimate intention.
2. As all choice must terminate on an end, or on means, and as the
means cannot be chosen until the end is chosen, and but for its sake, it
follows that disobedience to the moral law must consist in the choice of
some end, or ends, inconsistent with its requisitions.
3. We have seen that misery, or natural evil, cannot be chosen as an end
by a moral agent. So this cannot be the end chosen. -
4. We have seen also that moral evil, or sin, cannot be chosen as an
ultimate end.
5. Disobedience to God’s law must consist in the choice of self-gratifica-
tion as an end. In other words, it must consist essentially in committing
the will, and through the will committing the whole being, to the indulgence
of self-love, as the supreme and ultimate end of life. This is selfishness.
In other words, it is seeking to gratify the desire of personal good, in a
manner prohibited by the law of God.
It consists in choosing self-gratification as an end, or for its own sake,
instead of choosing, in accordance with the law of the reason and of God,
the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate end. In
other words still, sin or disobedience to the moral law, consists in the con-
secration of the heart and life to the gratification of the constitutional and
artificial desires, rather than in obedience to the law of the intelligence.
Or, once more, sin consists in being governed by impulses of the Sensibility,
instead of being governed by the law of God, as it lies revealed in the
Tě8 SO]].
That this is sin, and the whole of sin, viewed in its germinating prin-
ciples, will appear, if we consider —
1. That this state of mind, or this choice, is the “carmal mind,” or the
minding of the flesh, which the apostle affirms to be “ enmity against
God.”
2. It is the universal representation of scripture, that sin consists in the
spirit of self-seeking.
3. This spirit of self-seeking is always in the Bible represented as the
contrast or opposite of disinterested benevolence, or the love which the law
requires. “Ephraim bringeth forth fruit to himself,” is the sum of God's
charges against sinners.
R 2
244 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
4. Selfishness is always spoken of in terms of reprobation in the Bible.
5. It is known by every moral agent to be sinful.
6. It is, in fact, the end which all unregenerate men pursue, and the
only end they pursue.
7. When we come to the consideration of the attributes of selfishness, it
will be seen that every form of sin, not only may, but must resolve itself
into selfishness, just as we have seen that every form of virtue does and
must resolve itself into love or benevolence.
8. From the laws of its constitution, the mind is shut up to the neces.
sity of choosing that, as an ultimate end, which is regarded by the mind as
intrinsically good or valuable in itself. This is the very idea of choosing an
end, to wit, something chosen for its own sake, or for what it is in and of
itself, or, because it is regarded by the mind as intrinsically valuable to self,
or to being in general, or to both.
9. The gratification or happiness of being is necessarily regarded by the
mind as a good in itself, or as intrinsically valuable.
10. Nothing else is or can be regarded as valuable in itself, or finally, but
the good of being.
11. Moral agents are, therefore, shut up to the necessity of willing the
good of being, either partially or impartially, either good to self, or good to
being in general. Nothing else can possibly be chosen as an end or for its
own sake. Willing the good of being impartially, we have seen, is virtue.
To will it partially is to will it, not for its own sake, except upon condition
of its relation to self. That is, it is to will good to self. In other words, it
is to will the gratification of self as an end, in opposition to willing the
good of universal being as an end, and every good, or the good of every
being, according to its intrinsic value.
12. But may not one will the good of a part of being as an end, or for the
sake of the intrinsic value of their good 2 This would not be benevolence,
for that, as we have seen, must consist in Willing good for its own sake, and
implies the willing of every good, and of the highest good of universal
being. It would not be selfishness, as it would not be willing good to, or
the gratification of, self. It would be sin, for it would be the partial love
or choice of good. It would be loving some of my neighbours, but not all
of them. It would, therefore, be sin, but not selfishness. If this can be,
then there is such a thing possible, whether actual or mot, as sim that does
not consist in selfishness. But let us examine whether this supposition
would not resolve itself into selfishness.
To say that I choose good for its own sake, or because it is valuable to
being, that is, in obedience to the law of my reason, and of God, implies
that I choose all possible good, and every good according to its relative
value. If, then, a being chooses his own good, or the good of any being
as an ultimate end, in obedience to the law of reason, it must be that
he chooses, for the same reason, the highest possible good of all sentient
being.
The partial choice of good implies the choice of it, not merely for its
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 245
own sake, but upon condition of its relations to self, or to certain particular
persons. Its relations conditionate the choice. When its relations to self
conditionate the choice, so that it is chosen, not for its intrinsic value,
irrespective of its relations, but for its relations to self, this is selfishness.
It is the partial choice of good. If I choose the good of others besides
myself, and choose good because of its relations to them, it must be either—
1. Because I love their persons with the love of fondness, and will
their good for that reason, that is, to gratify my affection for them, which
is selfishness; or—
2. Because of their relations to me, so that good to them is in some
way a good to me, which also is selfishness; or—
3. Upon condition that they are worthy, which is benevolence ; for if
I will good to a being upon condition that he is worthy, I must value the
good for its own sake, and will it particularly to him, because he deserves
it. This is benevolence, and not the partial choice of good, because it is
obeying the law of my reason. If I will the good of any being, or number
of beings, it must be for some reason. I must will it as an end, or as a
means. If I will it as an end, it must be the universal or impartial choice
of good. If I will it as a means, it must be as a means to some end. The
end cannot be their good for its own sake, for this would be willing it as
an end, and not as a means. If I will it as a means, it must be as a
means of my own gratification.
Again: If I will the good of any number of beings, I must do it in
obedience to the law either of my intelligence and of God, or of my sensi-
bility. But, if I will in obedience to the law of my intelligence, it must
be the choice of the highest good of universal being. But if I will in
obedience to the law or impulse of my sensibility, it must be to gratify my
feelings or desires. This is selfishness.
Again : As the will must either follow the law of the reason and of God,
or the impulses of the sensibility, it follows that moral agents are shut up
to the necessity of being selfish or benevolent, and that there is no third
way, because there is no third medium, through which any object of choice
can be presented. The mind can absolutely know nothing as an object of
choice, that is not reeommended by one of these faculties. Selfishness,
then, and benevolence, are the only two alternatives.
Therefore, disobedience to the moral law must essentially consist in
Selfishness, and in selfishness alone.
It has been said, that a moral agent may will the good of others for its
own sake, and yet not will the good of all. That is, that he may will the
good of some for its intrinsic value, and yet not will universal good. But
this is absurd. To make the valuable the object of choice for its own sake,
without respect to any conditions or relations, is the same as to will all
possible and universal good : that is, the one necessarily implies and
includes the other. It has been asserted, for example, that an infidel
abolitionist may be conscious of willing and seeking the good of the slave
for its own sake, or disinterestedly, and yet not exercise universal benevo-
246 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
lence. I reply, he deceives himself, just as a man would, who should say,
he chooses fruit for its own sake. The fact is, he is conscious of desiring
fruit for its own sake. But he does not and cannot choose it for its own
Sake. He chooses it in obedience to his desire, that is, to gratify his
desire. So it is, and must be, with the infidel abolitionist. It cannot be
that he chooses the good of the slave in obedience to the law of his intelli-
gence and of God; for if he did, his benevolence would be universal. It
must be, them, that he chooses the good of the slave, because he desires it,
or to gratify a constitutional desire. Men naturally desire their own hap-
piness, and the happiness of others: this is constitutional. But when, in
obedience to these desires, they will their own or others' happiness, they
seek to gratify their sensibility or desires: this is selfishness.
Let it be remembered, then, that sin is a unit, and always and necessarily
consists in selfish ultimate intention, and in nothing else. This intention
is sin; and thus we see that every phase of sin resolves itself into selfish-
mess. This will appear more and more, as we proceed to unfold the subject
of moral depravity.
LECTURE XXVI.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
WHAT IS NOT IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE To MoRAL LAW.
In this discussion, I will
I. State briefly what constitutes disobedience.
II. Show what is not implied in it.
I. What constitutes disobedience.
We have seem that all sin or disobedience to moral law is a unit, and
that it consists in selfishness, or in the choice of self-gratification as an end;
in other words, that it consists in committing the will to the impulses of
the sensibility, to the desires, emotions, feelings, and passions, instead of
committing it to the good of being in general, in obedience to the law of
the reason, or to the law of God as it is revealed in the reason. Selfish-
mess is the intention to gratify self as an end. It is the preference of self.
interest to other and higher interests.
II. What is not implied in disobedience to the law of God.
I. It does not necessarily imply an intention to do wrong. The thing
intended in selfishness is to gratify self as an end. This is wrong; but it
is not necessary to its being Wrong, that the wrongness should be aimed at
or intended. There may be a state of malicious feeling in a moral agent
that would be gratified by the commission of sin. A sinner may have
knowingly and intentionally made war upon God and man, and this may
have induced a state of the sensibility so hostile to God, as that the sinner
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 247
has a malicious desire to offend and abuse God, to violate his law, and
trample upon his authority. This state of feeling may take the control
of the will, and he may deliberately intend to violate the law, and to do
what God hates, for the purpose of gratifying this feeling. This, however,
it will be seen, is not malevolence, or willing either matural or moral evil,
for its own sake, but as a means of self-gratification. It is selfishness,
and not malevolence.
But in the vast majority of instances, where the law is violated and
sin committed, the wrong of the doing is no part of the sinner's aim
or intention. He intends to gratify himself at all events. This in-
tention is wrong. But it is not an intention to do wrong, nor is the wrong
in any case the end upon which the intention terminates. There is a
great mistake often entertained upon this subject. Many seem to think
that they do not sin unless they intend to sin. The important truth, that
sin belongs only to the ultimate intention, than which nothing is more true
or more important, has been perverted in this manner. It has been
assumed by some that they had not done wrong, nor intended wrong,
because they were conscious that the wrong was not the end at which they
aimed. “I did not intend the wrong,” say they, “and therefore I did not
sin.” Now here is a fatal mistake, and a total perversion of the great and
important truth, that sin and holiness belong only to the ultimate intention.
2. Disobedience to the moral law does not imply that wrong, or sin, or
in other Words, disobedience is ever intended as an end, or for its own sake.
Gross mistakes have been fallen into upon this subject. Simmers have been
represented as loving sin, and as choosing it for its own sake. They have
also been represented as having a natural and constitutional craving or
appetite for sin, such as carnivorous animals have for flesh. Now, if this
craving existed, still it would not prove that sin is sought or intended for
its own sake. I have a constitutional desire for food and drink. My
desires terminate on these objects, that is, they are desired for their own
Sake. But they never are, and never can be chosen for their own sake, or
as an end. They are chosen as a means of gratifying the desire, or may be
chosen as a means of glorifying God, or of both. Just so, if it were true
that simmers have a constitutional appetency for sin, the sin would be
desired for its own sake, or as an end, but could never be chosen except as
a means of self-gratification.
But again. It is not true that sinners have a constitutional appetency
and craving for sin. They have a constitutional appetite or desire for
a great mally things around them. They crave food, and drink, and know-
ledge. So did our first parents; and when these desires were strongly excited,
they were a powerful temptation to prohibited indulgence. Eve craved the
fruit, and the knowledge which she supposed she might attain by partaking
of it. These desires led her to seek their indulgence in a prohibited man-
ner. She desired and craved the food and the knowledge, and not the sin
of eating. So, all sinners have constitutional and artificial appetites and
desires enough. But not one of them is a craving for sin, unless it be the
248 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
exception already named, when the mind has come into such relations
to God, as to have a malicious satisfaction in abusing him. But this is not
natural to mam, and if it ever exists, is only brought about by rejecting
great light, and inducing a most terrible perversion of the sensibility. But
such cases are extremely rare; whereas, it has been strangely and absurdly
maintained that all sinners, in consequence of the fall of Adam, have
a sinful constitution, or one that craves sin, as it craves food and drink.
This is false in fact, and absurd in philosophy, and wholly inconsistent with
scripture, as we shall see, when we make moral depravity the special sub-
ject of attention. The facts are these : men have constitutional desires,
appetites, and passions. These are not sinful in themselves; they all
terminate on their respective objects. Selfishness, or sin, consists in
choosing the gratification of these desires as an end, or in preferring their
gratification to other and higher interests. This choice or intention is
sinful. But, as I have said, sin is not the object intended, but self-grati-
fication is the end intended.
Again: that disobedience to the law of God does not imply the choice of
sin, or the wrong for its own sake, has been shown in a former lecture. But
I must so far repeat as to say, that it is impossible that sin should be
chosen as an end. Sin belongs to the ultimate intention. It either con-
sists in, and is identical with, selfish intention, or it is the moral element
or attribute of that intention. If it be identical with it, them to intend sin
as an end, or for its own sake, were to intend my own intention as an end.
If sin be but the moral element, quality, or attribute of the intention, then
to intend sin as an end, I must intend an attribute of my intention as an
end. Either alternative is absurd and impossible.
3. Disobedience to moral law does not imply, that the wrongness or sin-
fulness of the intention, is so much as thought of at the time the intention
is formed. The sin not only need not be intended, but it is uot essential
to sin, that the moral character of the intention be at all taken into consi-
deration, or so much as thought of at the time the intention is formed. The
simmer ought to will the good of being. This he knows, and if he be a
moral agent, which is implied in his being a sinner, he cannot but assume
this as a first truth, that he ought to will the good of being in general, and
not his own gratification, as an end. This truth he always and necessarily
takes with him, in the form of an assumption of a universal truth. He
knows, and cannot but know, that he ought to will the good of God and of
the universe, as an end, instead of willing his own good as an end. Now,
this being necessarily assumed by him as a first truth, it is no more
essential to sin, that he should think at the time that a particular intention
is or would be sinful, than it is essential to murder, that the law of caus-
ality should be distinctly before the mind, as an object of attention, when
the murderer aims the fatal weapon at his victim. Murder consists in a
selfish intention to kill a human being. 1 point a pistol at my neighbour's
head with an intention to gratify a spirit of revenge or of avarice, or some
such desire, by taking his life. I am, however, so exasperated, or so intent
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 249
on self-gratification, as not to think of the law of God, or of God himself,
or of my obligation to do otherwise. Now, am I hereby justified ? No,
indeed. I no more think of that law of causality which alone will secure
the effect at which I aim, than I do of my obligation, and of the moral
character of my intention. Nevertheless, I assume, and cannot but
assume, these first truths at the moment of my intention. The first
truths of reason are those, as has been repeatedly said, that are necessarily
known and assumed by all moral agents. Among these truths are those
of causality, moral obligation, right, wrong, human free agency, &c. Now,
whether I think of these truths or not at every moment, I cannot but
assume their truth at all times. In every endeavour to do anything, I
assume the truth of causality, and generally without being conscious of
any such assumption. I also assume the truth of my own free agency,
and equally without being conscious of the assumption. I also assume
that happiness is a good, for I am aiming to realize it to myself. I assume
that it is valuable to myself, and cannot but assume that it is equally
valuable to others. I cannot but assume also, that it ought to be chosen
because of its intrinsic value, and that it ought to be chosen impartially,
that is, that the good of each should be chosen according to its relative or
intrinsic value. This is assuming my obligation to will it as an end, and
is also assuming the rightness of such willing, and the wrongness of its
opposite.
Now every moral agent does, and must, and this fact constitutes him a
moral agent, assume all these, and divers other truths, at every moment
of his moral agency. He assumes them all, one as really and as much
as the other, and they are all assumed as first truths; and in the great
majority of instances, the mind is not more taken up with the consciousness
of the assumption, or with attending to those truths, as a subject of
thought, than it is with the first truths, that space exists and is infinite,
that duration exists and is infinite. It is of the highest importance, that
this should be distinctly understood—that sin does not imply, that the
moral character of an act or intention should be distinctly before the mind,
at the time of its commission. Indeed, it is perfectly common for sinners
to act thoughtlessly, as they say, that is, without reflecting upon the
moral character of their intentions. But hereby they are not justified.
Indeed, this very fact is often but an evidence and an instance of extreme
depravity. Think you that an angel could sin thoughtlessly? Could he
form a selfish intention without reflection, or thinking of its wickedness?
Sinners, in sinning thoughtlessly, give the highest evidence of their des-
perate voluntary depravity. A sinner may become so hardened, and his
conscience so stupified, that he may go on from day to day without think-
ing of God, of moral obligation, of right or Wrong ; and yet his sin and
his guilt are real. He does and must know, and assume all these truths
at every step, just as he assumes his own existence, the law of causality,
his own liberty or free agency, &c. None of these need to be made the
object of the mind's attention: they are known and need not to be learned.
250 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
They are first truths, and we cannot act at all without assuming them.
They are in the reason. *
4. Disobedience to moral law does not necessarily imply an outwardly
immoral life. A sinner may outwardly conform to every precept of the
Bible, from Selfish motives, or with a selfish intention, to gratify himself,
to secure his own reputation here, and even his salvation hereafter. This
is sin; but it is not outward immorality, but, on the contrary, is outward
morality.
5. Disobedience to moral law does not necessarily imply feelings of
enmity to God or to man. The will may be set upon self-indulgence, and
yet as the sinner does not apprehend God's indignation against him, and
his opposition to him, on that account, he may have no hard feelings, or
feelings of hatred to God. Should God reveal to him his abhorrence of
him on account of his sins, his determination to punish him for them,
the holy Sovereignty with which he will dispose of him; in this case, the
sinner might, and probably would, feel deeply malicious and revengeful
feelings towards God. But sin does not consist in these feelings, nor
necessarily imply them.
6. Sin, or disobedience to moral law, does not imply, in any instance, a
sinful nature; or a constitution in itself sinful. Adam and Eve sinned.
Holy angels sinned. Certainly in their case, sin or disobedience, did not
imply a sinful nature or constitution. Adam and Eve, certainly, and holy
angels also, must have sinned by yielding to temptation. The constitu-
tional desire being excited by the perception of their correlated objects,
they consented to prefer their own gratification to obedience to God, in
other words, to make their gratification an end. This was their sin. But
in this there was no sin in their constitutions, and no other tendency to
sin than this, that these desires, when strongly excited, are a temptation
to unlawful indulgence.
It has been strangely and absurdly assumed, that sin in action implies a
sinful nature. But this is contrary to fact and to sound philosophy, as well
as contrary to the Bible, which we shall see in its proper place.
As it was with Adam and Eve, so it is with every sinner. There is not,
there cannot be, sin in the nature of the constitution. But there are con-
stitutional appetites and passions, and when these are strongly excited, they
are a strong temptation or inducement to the will, to seek their gratifica-
tion as an ultimate end. This, as I have said, is sin, and nothing else is
or can be sin. It is selfishness. Under its appropriate head, I shall show
that the nature or constitution of sinners has become physically depraved
or diseased, and that as a consequence, the appetites and passions are more
easily excited, and are more clamorous and despotic in their demands; and
that, therefore, the constitution of man in its present state, tends more
strongly than it otherwise would do, to sin. But to affirm that the con-
stitution is in itself sinful, is worse than nonsense; it is contradicting God's
own definition of sin. It is to stultify the whole question of morality and
religion. But this we shall more fully see in a future lecture.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 251
LECTURE XXVII.
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.
In the discussion of this question, I must—
I. Remind you of what constitutes disobedience to moral law.
II. Show what is implied in it.
I. What constitutes disobedience to moral law Ż
1. We have seen that disobedience to moral law consists always in Selfish-
2. Selfishness consists in the ultimate choice of our own gratification.
3. An ultimate choice is the choice of an end, or the choice of Some-
thing for its own sake, or for its own intrinsic value.
4. The choice of our own gratification as an ultimate end, is the prefer-
ence of our own gratification, not merely because gratification is a good,
but because, and upon condition, that it is our own gratification, or a good
to self.
5. Selfishness chooses and cares for good only upon condition that it
belongs to self. It is not the gratification of being in general, but self-
gratification upon which selfishness terminates. It is a good because it belongs
to self, or is chosen upon that condition. But when it is affirmed, that
selfishness is sin, and the whole of sin, we are in danger of misconceiving
the vast import of the word, and of taking a very narrow and superficial
and inadequate view of the subject. It is, therefore, indispensable to raise
and push the inquiry, What is implied in selfishness? What are its cha-
racteristics and essential elements? What modifications or attributes does
it develope and manifest, under the various circumstances in which in the
providence of God it is placed 2 It consists in the committal of the will to
the gratification of desire. The apostle calls it “fulfilling the desires of the
flesh and of the mind.” What must be implied in the state of mind which
consists in the committal of the whole being to the gratification of self as
an end ? What must be the effect upon the desires themselves, to be thus
indulged 2 What must be the effect upon the intellect, to have its high
demands trampled under foot 2 What must be the developements of it in
the outward life? What must be the effect upon the temper and spirit, to
have self-indulgence the law of the soul? This leads to the investigation of
the point before us, namely—
II. What is implied in disobedience to moral law 3
The inquiry, it will be seen, naturally divides itself into two branches.
The first respects the moral character of selfishness, the second respects
the attributes of selfishness. We will attend to these two inquiries in their
order, and—
1. What is implied in the fact, that selfishness is a breach of moral law?
252 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Why is selfishness blame-worthy 2 Why is not a spirit of self-seeking in
mere animals or brute beasts, as much a breach of moral law as is the
same spirit in man 2 If this spirit of self-seeking in man is sin, what is
implied in this fact? In other words, what conditions are necessary to
render a spirit of self-seeking a breach of moral law 2 These conditions,
Whatever they are, must be implied in disobedience to moral law. This
brings us to the direct consideration of the things that belong to the first
branch of our inquiry.
(l.) Disobedience to moral law implies the possession of the powers of
moral agency. These have been so often enumerated as to render any
enlargement upon this point unnecessary, except to say, that it is impos-
sible for any but a moral agent to violate moral law. Mere animals may do
that which the moral law prohibits in moral agents. But the moral law
does not legislate over them ; therefore, those things in them are not sin,
not a violation of moral law.
(2.) It implies knowledge of the end which a moral agent is bound to
choose. We have seen that the moral law requires love, and that this love
is benevolence, and that benevolence is the disinterested and impartial
choice of the highest good of God and of being in general, as an end. Now
it follows, that this end must be apprehended, before we can possibly
choose it. Therefore, obligation to choose it implies the perception or know.
ledge of it. Disobedience to moral law, them, implies the developement in
the reason of the idea of the good or valuable to being. A being therefore
who has not reason, or the ideas of whose reason on moral subjects are not
at all developed, cannot violate the law of God; for over such the moral
law does not extend its claims.
(3.) It implies the developement of the correlatives of the ideas of the
good or the valuable, to wit, the ideas of moral obligation to will or choose
it for the sake of its intrinsic value, and also the ideas of right and wrong.
When the idea of the valuable to being is once developed, the mind is so
constituted, that it cannot but instantly or simultaneously affirm its obliga-
tion to will it as an end, and every good according to its perceived relative
value.
(4.) Disobedience, &c., also implies the developement of the correlative
of the ideas of right and wrong, namely: the ideas of praise or blame-
worthiness, or of merit and demerit. This idea, that is, the idea of moral
character, is the correlative of that of right and wrong, in such a sense, that
the idea of right and wrong necessitates and implies the idea of moral
character, or of praise and blame-worthiness. When these conditions are
fulfilled, and not till them, does the spirit of self-seeking, or the choice
of our own gratification as an end, become sin, or constitute a breach of
moral law. It will follow, that no beings are subjects of moral govern-
ment, and capable of disobedience to moral law, but such as are moral
agents, that is, such as possess both the powers of moral agency, and have
these powers in such a state of developement and integrity, as to render
obedience possible. It will follow, that neither the brute animals nor idiots,
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 253
nor lunatics, nor somnambulists, nor indeed any being who is not rational
and free, can disobey the moral law.
2. We come now to the second branch of the inquiry, namely: What is
implied in selfishness, what are its attributes, and what states of the sensi-
bility, and what outward developements, are implied in Selfishness. This,
it will be seen, brings us to the immensely interesting and important task
of contrasting selfishness with benevolence. Formerly we considered the
attributes of benevolence, and also what states of the sensibility and of the
intellect, and also what outward actions, were implied in it, as necessarily
resulting from it. We are now to take the same course with selfishness: and—
(1.) Woluntariness is an attribute of selfishness.
Selfishness has often been confounded with mere desire. But these
things are by no means identical. Desire is constitutional. It is a phe-
nomenon of the sensibility. It is a purely involuntary state of mind, and
can in itself produce no action, nor can it, in itself, have moral character.
Selfishness is a phenomenon of the will, and consists in committing the
will to the gratification of the desires. The desire itself is not selfishness,
but submitting the will to be governed by the desires, is selfishness. It
should be understood, that no kind of mere desire, and no strength of mere
desire, constitutes selfishness. Selfishness commences when the will yields
to the desire, and seeks to obey it, in opposition to the law of the intelli-
gence. It matters not what kind of desire it is ; if it is the desire that
governs the will, this is selfishness. It must be the will in a state of com-
mittal to the gratification of the desire.
(2.) Liberty is another attribute of selfishness.
That is, the choice of self-gratification is not necessitated by desire. But
the will is always free to choose in opposition to desire. This every moral
agent is as conscious of as of his own existence. The desire is not free,
but the choice to gratify it is and must be free. There is a sense, as I
shall have occasion to show, in which slavery is an attribute of selfishness,
but not in the sense that the will chooses, by a law of necessity, to gratify
desire. Liberty, in the sense of ability to make an opposite choice, must
ever remain an attribute of selfishness, while selfishness continues to be a
sin, or while it continues to sustain any relation to moral law.
(3.) Intelligence is another attribute of selfishness.
By this it is not intended, that intelligence is an attribute or phenomenon
of Will, nor that the choice of self-gratification is in accordance with the
demands of the intellect. But it is intended, that the choice is made with
the knowledge of the moral character that will be involved in it. The
mind knows its obligation to make an opposite choice. It is not a mistake.
It is not a choice made in ignorance of moral obligation to choose the
highest good of being, as an end, in opposition to self gratification. It is
an intelligent choice in the sense, that it is a known resistance of the
demands of the intellect. It is a known rejection of its claims. It is a
known setting up of self-gratification, and preferring it to all higher
interests.
254 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(4.) Unreasonableness is another attribute of selfishness.
By this it is intended, that the selfish choice is in direct opposition to
the demands of the reason. The reason was given to rule, that is, to affirm
obligation, and thus announce the law of God. It affirms law and moral
obligation. Obedience to moral law, as it is revealed in the reason, is
virtue. Obedience to the sensibility in opposition to the reason, is sin.
Selfishness consists in this. It is a dethroning of reason from the seat of
government, and an enthroning of blind desire in opposition to it. Selfish-
ness is always and necessarily unreasonable. It is a denial of that divine
attribute that allies man to God, makes him capable of virtue, and is a
sinking him to the level of a brute. It is a denial of his manhood, of his
rational mature. It is a contempt of the voice of God within him, and a
deliberate trampling down the Sovereignty of his own intellect. Shame on
Selfishness It dethrones human reason, and would dethrone the divine,
and place mere blind lust upon the throne of the universe.
The very definition of Selfishness implies that unreasonableness is one
of its attributes. Selfishness consists in the will's yielding itself to the
impulses of the sensibility, in opposition to the demands of the intelli-
gence. Therefore, every act or choice of the will is necessarily altogether
unreasonable. The sinner, while he continues such, never says nor does
one thing that is in accordance with right reason. Hence the Bible says,
that “madness is in their heart while they live.” They have made an
unreasonable choice of an end, and ail their choices of means to secure
their end are only a carrying out of their ultimate choice. They are, every
one of them, put forth to secure an end contrary to reason. Therefore, no
sinner who has never been converted, has, even in a single instance, chosen
otherwise than in direct opposition to reason.
They are not merely sometimes unreasonable, but uniformly, and, while
they remain selfish, necessarily so. The very first time that a sinner acts
or wills reasonably, is when he turns to God, or repents and becomes a
Christian. This is the first instance in which he practically acknowledges
that he has reason. All previous to this, every one of the actions of his
will and of his life, is a practical denial of his manhood, of his rational
nature, of his obligation to God or his neighbour. We sometimes hear
impenitent sinners spoken of as being unreasonable, and in such a manner
as to imply that all simmers are not so. But this only favours the delusion
of simmers by leaving them to suppose that they are not all of them, at all
times, altogether unreasonable. But the fact is, that there is not, and
there never can be, in earth or hell, one impenitent sinner who, in any
instance, acts otherwise than in direct and palpable opposition to his reason.
It had, therefore, been infinitely better for sinners if they had never
been endowed with reason. They do not merely act without consulting
their reason, but in stout and determined opposition to it.
Again : They act as directly in opposition to it as they possibly can.
They not only oppose it, but they oppose it as much, and in as aggravated
a manmer, as possible. What can be more directly and aggravatedly
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 255
opposed to reason than the choice which the sinner makes of an end?
Reason was given him to direct him in regard to the choice of the great
end of life. It gives him the idea of the etermal and the infinite. It
spreads out before him the interests of God and of the universe as of
absolutely infinite value. It affirms their value, and the infinite obligation
of the sinner to consecrate himself to these interests; and it promises him
endless rewards if he will do so. On the contrary, it lays before him the
consequences of refusal. It thunders in his ear the terrible sanctions of
the law. It points him to the coming doom that awaits his refusal to
comply with its demands. But behold, in the face of all this, the sinner,
unhesitatingly, in the face of these affirmations, demands, and threatenings,
turns away and consecrates himself to the gratification of his desires with
the certainty that he could not do greater despite to his own nature than in
this most mad, most preposterous, most blasphemous choice. Why do not
sinners consider that it is impossible for them to offer a greater insult to
God, who gave them reason, or more truly and deeply to shame and
degrade themselves, than they do in their beastly selfishness 2 Total,
universal, and shameless unreasonableness, is the universal characteristic
of every selfish mind.
(5.) Interestedness is another attribute of selfishness.
By interestedness is meant self-interestedness. It is not the disinterested
choice of good, that is, it is not the choice of the good of being in general
as an end, but it is the choice of self-good, of good to self. Its relation to
self is the condition of the choice of this good. But for its being the good
of self, it would not be chosen. The fundamental reason, or that which
should induce choice, to wit, the intrinsic value of good, is rejected as
insufficient; and the secondary reason, namely, its relation to self, is the
condition of determining the will in this direction. This is really making
self-good the supreme end. In other words, it is making self-gratification
the end. Nothing is practically regarded as worthy of choice, except as it
sustains to self the relation of a means of self-gratification.
This attribute of selfishness secures a corresponding state of the sensi-
bility. The sensibility, under this indulgence, attains to a monstrous
developement, either generally, or in some particular directions. Selfish-
ness is the committal of the will to the indulgence of the propensities.
But from this it by no means follows, that all of the propensities will be
indiscriminately indulged, and thereby greatly developed. Sometimes one
propensity, and sometimes another, has the greatest natural strength, and
thereby gains the ascendancy in the control of the will. Sometimes circum-
stances tend more strongly to the developement of one appetite or passion
than another. Whatever propensity is most indulged, will gain the greatest
developement. The propensities cannot all be indulged at once, for they
are often opposed to each other. But they may all be indulged and deve-
loped in their turn. For example, the licentious propensities, and various
other propensities, cannot be indulged consistently with the simultaneous
256 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
indulgence of the avaricious propensities, the desire of reputation and of
ultimate happiness. Each of these, and even all the propensities, may
come in for a share, and in some instances may gain so equal a share of
indulgence, as upon the whole to be about equally developed. But in
general, either from constitutional temperament, or from circumstances,
Some one or more of the propensities will gain so uniform a control of the
will, as to occasion its monstrous developement. It may be the love of
reputation ; and then there will be at least a public decent exterior, more
or less strict, according to the state of morals in the society in which the
individual dwells. If it be amativeness that gains the ascendency over
the other propensities, licentiousness will be the result. If it be alimen-
tiveness, then gluttony and Epicurism will be the result. The result of
selfishness must be, to develope in general, or in particular, the propensities
of the sensibility, and to beget a corresponding exterior. If avarice take
the control of the will, we have the haggard and ragged miser. All the
other propensities wither under the reign of this detestable one. Where
the love of knowledge prevails, we have the scholar, the philosopher, the
man of learning. This is one of the most decent and respectable forms
of selfishness, but is nevertheless as absolutely selfishness as any other
form. When compassion, as a feeling, prevails, we have, as a result, the
philanthropist, and often the reformer ; not the reformer in a virtuous
sense, but the selfish reformer. Where love of kindred prevails, we often
have the kind husband, the affectionate father, mother, brother, sister, and
so on. These are the amiable sinners, especially among their own kindred.
When the love of country prevails, we have the patriot, the statesman,
and the soldier. This picture might be drawn at full length, but with
these traits I must leave you to fill up the outline. I would only add, that
several of these forms of Selfishness so nearly resemble certain forms of
virtue, as often to be confounded with them, and mistaken for them. In-
deed, so far as the outward life is concerned, they are right, in the letter,
but as they do not proceed from disinterestedly bellevolent intention,
they are only specious forms of selfishness.
(6.) Partiality is another attribute of selfishness. It consists in giving
the preference to certain interests, on account of their being either directly
the interests of self, or so connected with self-interest as to be preferred
on that account. It matters not, whether the interest to which the pre-
ference is given be of greater or of less value, if so be it is preferred, not
for the reason of its greater value, but because of its relation to self. In
Some instances the practical preſerence may justly be given to a less
interest, on account of its sustaining such a relation to us that we can
secure it, when the greater interest could not be secured by us. If the
reason of the preference, in such case, be, not that it is self-interest, but
an interest that can be secured while the greater cannot, the preference is
a just one, and not partiality. My family, for example, sustain such
relations to me, that I can more readily and surely secure their interests,
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 257
than I can those of my neighbour, or of a stranger. For this reason I am
under obligation to give the practical preference to the interests of my own
family, not because they are my own, nor because their interests sustain such
a relation to my own, but because I can more readily secure their interests
than those of any other family.
The question in such a case turns upon the amount I am able to secure,
and not on their intrinsic value merely. It is a general truth, that We can
secure more readily and certainly the interests of those to whom we sustain
certain relations; and, therefore, God and reason point out these interests
as particular oljects of our attention and effort. This is not partiality but
impartiality. It is treating interests as they should be treated.
But selfishness is always partial. If it gives any interest, whatever the
preference, it is because of its relation to self. It always, and, continuing
to be selfishness, necessarily, lays the greatest stress upon, and gives the
preference to, those interests the promotion of which will gratify self.
Here care should be taken to avoid delusion. Oftentimes selfishness
appears to be very disinterested and very impartial. For example: here is
a man whose compassion, as a mere feeling or state of the sensibility, is
greatly developed. He meets a beggar, an object that strongly excites his
ruling passion. He empties his pockets, and even takes off his coat and
gives it to him, and in his paroxysm he will divide his all with him, or even
give him all. Now this would generally pass for most undoubted virtue,
as a rare and impressive instance of moral goodness. But there is no
Yirtue, no benevolence in it. It is the mere yielding of the will to the
control of feeling, and has nothing in it of the mature of virtue. In-
numerable examples of this might be adduced, as illustrations of this truth.
It is only an instance and an illustration of selfishness. It is the will seek-
ing to gratify the feeling of compassion, which for the time is the strongest
desire.
We constitutionally desire not only our own happiness, but also that of
men in general, when their happiness in no way conflicts with our own.
Hence selfish men will often manifest a deep interest in the welfare of
those, whose welfare will not interfere with their own. Now, should the
will be yielded up to the gratification of this desire, this would often be
regarded as virtue. For example: a few years since much interest and
and feeling were excited in this country by the cause and sufferings of the
Greeks, in their struggle for liberty ; and since in the cause of the Poles.
A spirit of enthusiasm appeared, and many were ready to give and do almost
anything for the cause of liberty. They gave up their will to the gratifica-
tion of this excited state of feeling. This, they may have supposed, was
Yirtue; but it was not, nor was there a semblance of virtue about it, when
it is once understood, that virtue consists in yielding the will to the law of
the intelligence, and not to the impulse of excited feelings.
Some writers have fallen into the strange mistake of making virtue to
consist in seeking the gratification of certain desires, beeause, as they say,
these desires are virtuous. They make some of the desires selfish, and
S
258 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Some benevolent. To yield the will to the control of the selfish propen-
sities is sin ; to yield the will to the control of the benevolent desires, such
as the desire of my neighbour's happiness and of the public happiness,
is virtue, because these are good desires, while the selfish desires are
evil. Is not this the doctrine taught by Bishop Butler 2 Now this is,
and has been, a very common view of virtue and vice. But it is funda-
mentally erroneous. None of the constitutional desires are good or evil
in themselves; they are all alike involuntary, and all alike terminate on
their correlated objects. To yield the will to the control of any one of
them, no matter which, is sin; it is following a blind feeling, desire, or
impulse of the sensibility, instead of yielding to the demands of the intel-
ligence, as the law affirming power. To will the good of my neighbour,
or of my country, and of God, because of the intrinsic value of those
interests, that is, to will them as an end, and in obedience to the law of
the reason, is virtue; but to will them to gratify a constitutional but blind
desire, is selfishness and sin. The desires terminate on their respective
objects, but the will, in this case, seeks the objects, not for their own sake,
but because they are desired, that is, to gratify the desires. This is
choosing them, not as an end, but as a means of self-gratification. This is
making self-gratification the end after all. This must be a universal truth,
when a thing is chosen merely in obedience to desire. The benevolence of
these writers is sheer selfishness, and their virtue is vice.
The choice of any thing whatever, because it is desired, irrespective of
the demands of the reason, is selfishness and sin. It matters not what it
is. The very statement, that I choose a thing because I desire it, is only
another form of saying, that I choose it for my own sake, or for the sake
of appeasing the desire, and not on account of its own intrinsic value. All
such choice is always and necessarily partial. It is giving one interest the
preference over another, not because of its perceived intrinsic and superior
value, but because it is an object of desire. If I yield to mere desire in
any case, it must be to gratify the desire. This is, and in the case sup-
posed must he, the end for which the choice is made. To deuy this is to
deny that the will seeks the object because it is desired. Partiality con-
sists in giving one thing the preference of another for no gºod reason.
That is, not because the intelligence demands this preference, but because
the sensibility demands it. Partiality is therefore always and necessarily
an attribute of selfishness.
(7.) Impellitence is another modification of selfishness. Perhaps it is
more proper to say, that impenitence is only another name for selfishness.
Penitence, or repentance, is the turning of the heart from selfishness to
benevolence. Impenitence is the heart's cleaving to the commission of
sin under light, or under the pressure of affirmed obligation or, more
properly, cleaving to that, the willing and doing of which is sin. But this
we shall more fully see in another place.
(8.) Unbelief is another modification or attribute of selfishness. Unbelief
is not a mere negation, or the more absence of faith. Faith, as an attri-
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 259
bute of benevolence, is that quality which commits it to truth and to the
God of truth, to veracity as a condition of securing its end. Unbelief, as
an attribute of selfishness, is that quality that withholds confidence, and
refuses to trust in God, or to commit itself to truth. Faith, as an attri-
bute of benevolence, is the quality, in the nature of benevolence, that
causes it to commit itself to truth in specific executive acts. This attri-
bute of benevolence causes it to commit the life and the whole being to be
moulded and influenced by truth. Unbelief, as an attribute of selfishness,
is that quality that causes it to withhold specific acts of confidence in God
and in truth. It is saying—I will take care of my own interests and let
God take care of his. “Who is God that I should serve him 2 and what
profit should I have, if I pray unto Him?” It is that in selfishness which
is the ground of the refusal to commit ourselves to the guidance of God,
and which leads us to trust to our own guidance. It is self-trust, self-
dependence; and what is this but selfishness and self-seeking? Christ
says to the Jews, “How can ye believe which seek honour one of another,
and seek not the honour that cometh from God only 2” This assumes,
that unbelief is a modification of selfishness; that their regard to their
reputation with men, rendered faith, while that self-seeking spirit was
indulged, impossible. They withheld confidence in Christ, because it would
cost them their reputation with men to believe. So every simmer, who ever
heard the gospel and has not embraced it, withholds confidence from
Christ, because it will cost self too much to yield this confidence. This is
true in every case of umbelief. Confidence is withheld, because to yield it
involves and implies the denying of ourselves all ungodliness and every
worldly lust. Christ requires the abandonment of every form and degree
of selfishness. To believe is to receive with the heart Christ's instruction
and requirements; to trust in them,--to commit our whole being to be
moulded by them. Unbelief, then, is only a selfish withholding of this
confidence, this committal. The fact is, that faith implies and consists in
the renunciation of selfishmess; and unbelief is only selfishness, con-
templated in its relations to Christ and his gospel.
LECTURE XXVIII.
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO THE LAW of GoD.
(9.) Efficiency is another attribute of selfishness.
Desire never produces action until it influences the will. It has no
efficiency or causality in itself. It cannot, without the concurrence of the
Will, command the attention of the intellect, or move a muscle of the body.
The whole causality of the mind resides in the will. In it resides the
power of accomplishment.
Agoin: the whole efficiency of the mind, as it respects accouplishment,
S \
*
260 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
resides in the choice of an end, or in the ultimate intention. All action
of the will, or all willing, must consist in choosing either an end, or the
means of accomplishing an end. If there is choice, Something is chosen.
That something is chosen for some reason. To deny this is a denial that
any thing is chosen. The ultimate reason for the choice and the thing
chosen, are identical. This we have repeatedly seen.
Again : We have seen that the means cannot be chosen until the end is
chosen. The choice of the end is distinct from the volitions or endeavours
of the mind to secure the end. But although the choice of an end is not
identical with the subordinate choices and volitions to secure the end, yet
it necessitates them. The choice once made, secures or necessitates the
executive volitions to secure the end. By this it is not intended that the
mind is not free to relinquish its end, and of course to relinquish the use
of the means to accomplish it; but only that, while the choice or intention
remains, the choice of the end by the will is efficient in producing volitions
to realize the end. This is true both of benevolence and selfishness.
They are both choices of an end, and are necessarily efficient in producing
the use of the means to realize this end. They are choices of opposite
ends, and, of course, will produce their respective results.
The Bible represents sinners as having eyes full of adultery, and that
cannot cease from sin; that while the will is committed to the indulgence
of the propensities, they cannot cease from the indulgence. There is no
Way, therefore, for the sinner to escape from the commission of sin, but to
cease to be selfish, While selfishness continues, you may change the form
of outward manifestation, you may deny one appetite or desire for the sake
of indulging another ; but it is and must be sin still. The desire to
escape hell, and to obtain heaven may become the strongest, in which case,
selfishness will take on a mºst sanctimonious type. But if the will is
following desire, it is selfishness still ; and all your religious duties, as you
call them, are only selfishness robed in the stolen habiliments of lowing
obedience to God.
Be it remembered, then, that selfishness is, and must be, efficient in
producing its effects. It is cause : the effect must follow. The whole life
and activity of sinners is founded in it. It constitutes their life, or rather
their spiritual death. They are dead in trespasses and in sins. It is in
vain for them to dream of doing anything good, until they relinquish their
Selfishness. While this continues, they cannot act at all, except as they
use the means to accomplish a selfish end. It is impossible, while the will
remains committed to a selfish end, or to the promotion of self-interest or
self-gratification, that it should use the means to promote a benevolent end.
The first thing is to change the eud, and then the sinner can cease from
outward sin. Indeed, if the end be changed, many of the same acts which
were before sinful will become holy. While the selfish end continues,
whatever a sinner does, is selfish. Whether he eats, or drinks, or labours,
or preaches, or, in short, whatever he does, is to promote some form of
self-interest. The end being wrong, all is, and must be, wrong.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 261
But let the end be changed; let benevolence take the place of selfishness,
and all is right. With this end in view the mind is absolutely incapable
of doing anything or of choosing anything, except as a means of promoting
the good of the universe.
I wish to impress this truth deeply upon the mind, and, therefore, give
the substance of the preceding remarks in the form of definite pro-
positions.
i. All action consists in, or results from, choice.
ii. All choice must respect or consist in the choice of an end or of
means. The mind is incapable of choosing unless it has an object of choice,
and that object must be regarded by the mind either as an end or as a
I'll 628.]].S.
iii. The mind can have but one ultimate end at the same time.
iv. It cannot choose the means until it has chosen the end.
v. It cannot choose one end and use means to accomplish another, at
the same time.
vi. Therefore, while the will is benevolent or committed to the glory of
God and the good of being, it cannot use the means of self-gratification in
a selfish sense, or, in other words, it cannot put forth selfish volitions.
vii. When the will is committed to self-indulgence “it cannot use the
means designed to glorify God and promote the good of men as an end.
This is impossible.
viii. The carnal heart or mind cannot but sin ; “it is not subject to the
law of God, neither indeed can be,” because it is “enmity against God.”
ix. The new or regenerate heart cannot sin. It is benevolence, love to
God and man. This cannot sin. These are both ultimate choices or
intentions. They are from their own nature efficient, each excluding
the other, and each securing, for the time being, the exclusive use of
means to promote its end. To deny this, is the same as to maintain
either that the will cam, at the same time, choose two opposite ends, or
that it can choose one end only, but, at the same time, choose the means
to accomplish another end, not yet chosen. Now either alternative is
absurd. Then holiness and sin can never co-exist in the same mind, at the
same time. Each, as has been said, for the time being, necessarily excludes
the other. Selfishness and benevolence co-exist in the same mind . A
greater absurdity and a more gross contradiction was never conceived or
expressed. No one for a moment ever supposed that selfishness and
benevolence could co-exist in the same mind, who had clearly defined ideas
of what they are. When desire is mistaken on the one hand for benevolence,
and on the other for selfishness, the mistake is matural, that selfishness and
benevolence can co-exist in the same mind. But as soon as it is seen, that
benevolence and selfishness are supreme ultimate opposite choices, the
affirmation is instantaneous and irresistible, that they can neither co-exist,
mor can one use means to promote the other. While benevolence remains,
the mind's whole activity springs from it as from a fountain. This is the
philosophy of Christ. “Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or
262 SYSTEMATHC THEOLOGY.
else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by
his fruit. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth
good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil
things.” Matt. xii. 33, 35. “Doth a fountain send forth at the same place
Sweet water and bitter? Can the fig-tree, my brethren, bear olive berries?
either a vine figs? So can no fountain both yield salt water and fresh.”
James iii. 11, 12. “For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit;
neither doth a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. For every tree is known
by his own fruit: for of thorns men do not gather figs, nor of a bramble
bush gather they grapes. A good man out of the good treasure of his
heart, bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out of the evil
treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is evil; for out of the
abundance of the heart his mouth speaketh.” Luke vi. 43–45.
(10.) Opposition to benevolence or to virtue, or to holiness and true
religion, is one of the attributes of selfishness; this quality belongs to the
mature of selfishness.
Selfishness is not, in its relations to benevolencee, a mere negation.
It cannot be. It is the choice of self-gratification as the supreme and
ultimate end of life. While the will is committed to this end, and bene-
volence, or a mind committed to an opposite end, is contemplated, the will
cannot remain in a state of indifference to benevolence. It must either
yield its preference of self-indulgence, or resist the benevolence which the
intellect perceives. The will cannot remain in the exercise of this selfish
choice, without as it were bracing and girding itself against that virtue,
which it does not imitate. If it does not imitate it, it must be because it
refuses to do so. The intellect does, and must, strongly urge the will to
imitate benevolence, and to seek the same end. The will must yield or
resist, and the resistance must be more or less resolute and determined, as
the demands of the intellect are more or less emphatic. This resistance
to benevolence or to the demands of the intellect in view of it, is what the
Bible calls, hardening the heart. It is obstimacy of will, under the light
and the presence of true religion and the admitted claims of benevolence.
This opposition to benevolence or true religion, must be developed in
specific action, whenever the mind apprehends true religion, or selfishness
must be abandoned. Not only must this opposition be developed, or self.
ishness abandoned, under such circumstances, but it must increase as true
religion displays more and more of its loveliness. As the light from the
radiant sun of benevolence is poured more and more upon the darkness of
selfishness, the opposition of this principle of action must of necessity
manifest itself in the same proportion, or selfishness must be abandoned.
Thus selfishness remaining under light, must manifest more and more
opposition, just in proportion as light increases, and the soul has less the
colour of an apology for its opposition.
This peculiarity of selfishness has always been manifested just in pro-
portion as it has been brought into the light of true religion. This accounts
for all the opposition that has been made to true religion since the world
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 263
began. It also proves that where there are impenitent sinners, and they
retain their impenitence, and manifest no hostility to the religion which
they witness, that there is something defective in the professed piety which
they behold; or at least they do not contemplate all the attributes of a
true piety. It also proves, that persecution will always exist where much
true religion is manifested to those who hold fast their selfishness.
It is indeed true, that selfishness and benevolence are just as much
opposed to each other, and just as much and as necessarily at war with
each other, as God and Satan, as heaven and hell. There can never be a
truce between them ; they are essential and eternal opposites. They are
not merely opposites, but they are opposite efficient causes. They are
essential activities. They are the two, and the only two, great antagonistic
principles in the universe of mind. Each is heaving and energizing like
an earthquake to realize its end. A war of mutual and uncompromising
extermination necessarily exists between them. Neither can be in the
presence of the other, without repulsion and opposition. Each puts forth
all its energy to subdue and overcome the other; and already selfishness
has shed an ocean of the blood of Saints, as well as the precious blood of
the Prince of life. There is not a more gross and injurious mistake, than
to suppose that selfishness ever, under any circumstances, becomes recon-
ciled to benevolence. The supposition is absurd and contradictory ; since
for selfishness to become reconciled to benevolence, were the same thing as
for selfishness to become benevolence. Selfishness may change the mode
of attack or of its opposition, but its real opposition it can never change,
while it retains its own nature and continues to be selfishness.
This opposition of the heart to benevolence often begets deep opposition
of feeling. The opposition of the will engages the intellect in fabricating
excuses, and cavils, and lies, and refuges, and often greatly perverts the
thoughts, and excites the most bitter feelings imaginable toward God and
toward the saints. Selfishness will strive to justify its opposition, and to
shield itself against the reproaches of conscience, and will resort to every
possible expedient to cover up its real hostility to holiness. It will pretend
that it is not holiness, but sin that it opposes. But the fact is, it is not
sin but holiness to which it stands for ever opposed. The opposition of
feeling is only developed when the heart is brought into a strong light,
and makes deep and strong resistance. In such cases, the sensibility
sometimes boils over with feelings of bitter opposition to God, and Christ,
and all good.
The question is often asked, May not this opposition exist in the sensibi-
lity, and those feelings of hostility to God exist, when the heart is in a
truly benevolent state 2 To this inquiry, I would reply: If it can, it must
be produced by infernal or some other influence that misrepresents God,
and places his character before the mind in a false light. Blasphemous
thoughts may be suggested, and, as it were, injected into the mind. These
thoughts may have their natural effect in the sensibility, and feelings of
bitterness and hostility may exist without the consent of the will. The
264 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
will may all the while be endeavouring to repel these suggestions, and
divert the attention from such thoughts, yet Satan may continue to hurl
his fiery darts, and the soul may be racked with torture under the poison
of hell, which seems to be taking effect in the sensibility. The mind, at
such times, seems to itself to be filled, so far as feeling is concerned, with
all the bitterness of hell. And so it is, and yet it may be, that in all this
there is no selfishness. If the will holds fast its integrity; if it holds out
in the struggle, and where God is maligned and misrepresented by the
infernal suggestions, it says with Job, “Although he slay me, yet will I
trust in him.” However sharp the conflict in such cases, we can look back
and say, “We are more than conquerors through him that loved us.” In
such cases it is the Selfishness of Satan, and not our own selfishness, that
kindled up those fires of hell in our sensibility.” “Blessed is the man
that endureth temptation ; for when he is tried he shall receive the crown
of life.”
(11.) Cruelty is another attribute of selfishness.
This term is often used to designate a state of the sensibility. It then
represents that state of feeling which has a barbarous or Savage pleasure
in the misery of others.
Cruelty, as a phenomenon of the will, or as an attribute of selfishness,
consists, first, in a reckless disregard of the well-being of God and the
universe, and Secondly, in persevering in a course that must ruin the souls
of the subjects of it, and, so far as they have influence, ruin the souls of
others. What should we think of a man who was so intent on securing
some petty gratification, that he would not give the alarm if a city were on
fire, and the sleeping citizens in imminent danger of perishing in the
flames 2 Suppose that sooner than deny himself some momentary gratifi-
cation, he would jeopard many lives. Should we not call this cruelty 2
Now there are many forms of cruelty. Because sinners are not always
brought into circumstances where they exercise certain forms of it, they
flatter themselves that they are not cruel. But selfishness is always and
necessarily cruel—cruel to the Soul and highest interests of the subject of
it; cruel to the souls of others, in neglecting to care and act for their
salvation; cruel to God, in abusing him in ten thousand ways; cruel to the
whole universe. If we should be shocked at the cruelty of him who should
see his neighbour's house on fire, and the family asleep, and neglect to
give them warning, because too self-indulgent to rise from his bed, what
shall we say of the cruelty of one, who shall see his neighbour's soul in
peril of etermal death, and yet meglect to give him warming 2
Sinners are apt to possess very good dispositions, as they express it.
They suppose they are the reverse of being cruel. They possess tender
feelings, are often very compassionate in their feelings toward those who
are sick and in distress, and who are in circumstances of any affliction.
They are ready to do many things for them. Such persons would be
shocked, should they be called cruel. And many professors would take
their part, and consider them abused. Whatever else, it would be said, is
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 265
an attribute of their character, surely cruelty is not. Now, it is true that
there are certain forms of cruelty with which such persons are not charge-
able. But this is only because God has so moulded their constitution,
that they are not delighted with the misery of their fellow men. However,
there is no virtue in their not being gratified at the sight of suffering, nor
in their painstaking to prevent it while they continue selfish. They follow
the impulses of their feelings, and if their temperament were such that it
would gratify them to inflict misery on others ; if this were the strongest
tendency of their sensibility; their selfishness would instantly take on that
type. But though cruelty, in all its forms, is not common to all selfish
persons, it is still true that some form of cruelty is practised by every
sinner. God says, “The tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.” The
fact that they live in sin, that they set an example of selfishness, that they
do nothing for their own souls, nor for the souls of others; these are really
most atrocious forms of cruelty, and infinitely exceed all those compara-
tively petty forms that relate to the miseries of men in this life.
(12.) Injustice is another attribute of selfishness.
Justice, as an attribute of benevolence, is that quality that disposes it
to regard and treat every being and interest with exact equity.
Injustice is the opposite of this. It is that quality of selfishness which
disposes it to treat the persons and interests of others inequitably, and a
disposition to give the preference to self-interest, regardless of the relative
value of the interests. The nature of selfishness demonstrates, that injustice
is always and necessarily one of its attributes, and one that is universally
and constantly manifested.
There is the utmost injustice in the end chosen. It is the practical
preference of a petty self-interest over infinite interests. This is injustice
as great as possible. This is universal injustice to God and man. It is the
most palpable and most flagrant piece of injustice possible to every being
in the universe. Not one known by him to exist who has not reason to
bring against him the charge of most flagrant and shocking injustice. This
injustice extends to every act and to every moment of life. He is never,
in the least degree, just to any being in the universe. Nay, he is perfectly
unjust. He cares nothing for the rights of others as such ; and never, even
in appearance, regards them except for selfish reasons. This, them, is, and
can be, only the appearance of regarding them, while in fact, no right
of any being in the universe is, or can be, respected by a selfish mind,
any further than in appearance. To deny this, is to deny his selfishness.
He performs no act whatever but for one reason, that is, to promote his
own gratification. This is his end. For the realization of this end every
effort is made, and every individual act and volition put forth. Remaining
Selfish, it is impossible that he should act at all, but with reference directly
or indirectly to this end. But this end has been chosen, and must be
pursued, if pursued at all, in the most palpable and outrageous violation of
the rights of God and of every creature in the universe. Justice demands
that he should devote himself to the promotion of the highest good of God
266 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and the universe, that he should love God with all his heart, and his
neighbour as himself. Every sinner is openly, and universally, and as
perfectly, unjust as possible, at every moment of his impenitence.
It should, therefore, always be understood, that no sinner at any time is
at all just to any being in the universe. All his paying of his debts, and
all his apparent fairness and justice, are only a specious form of selfish-
mess. He has, and, if a sinner, it is impossible that he should not have,
Some selfish reason for all he does, is, says, or omits. His entire activity is
selfishness, and, while he remains impenitent, it is impossible for him to
think, or act, or will, or do, or be, or say, anything more or less than he
judges expedient to promote his own interests. He is not just. He cannot
be just, nor begin in any instance, or in the least degree, to be truly just,
either to God or mam, until he begins life anew, gives God his heart, and
consecrates his entire being to the promotion of the good of universal being.
This, all this, justice demands. There is no beginning to be just, unless
the sinner begins here. Begin and be just in the choice of the great end
of life, and then you cannot but be just in the use of means. But be
unjust in the choice of an end, and it is impossible for you, in any instance,
to be otherwise than totally unjust in the use of means. In this case your
entire activity is, and can be, nothing else than a tissue of the most
abominable injustice.
The only reason why every simmer does not openly and daily practise
every species of outward commercial injustice, is, that he is so circum-
stanced that, upon the whole, he judges it not for his interest to practise
this injustice. This is the reason universally, and no thanks to any simmer
for abstaining, in any instance, from any kind or degree of injustice in
practice, for he is only restrained and kept from it by selfish considerations.
That is, he is too selfish to do it. His selfishness, and not the love of
God or man, prevents.
He may be prevented by a constitutional or phrenological conscientious-
mess, or sense of justice. But this is only a feeling of the sensibility, and,
if restrained only by this, he is just as absolutely selfish as if he had stolen
a horse in obedience to acquisitiveness. God so tempers the constitution
as to restrain men, that is, that one form of selfishness shall prevail over
and curb another. Approbativeness is, in most persons, so large, that a
desire to be applauded by their fellow-men so modifies the developements
of their selfishness, that it takes on a type of outward decency and appear-
ance of justice. But this is no less selfishness than if it took on altogether
a different type.
MORAL GOVERNMENT, 267
LECTURE XXIX.
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.
WHAT Is IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.
(13.) Oppression is another attribute of Selfishness.
Oppression is the spirit of slaveholding. It is that quality of selfishness
that disposes it, in practice, to deprive others of their rights. It is in the
mature of selfishness to do this for the purpose of contributing to Our OWn
interest or gratification. To define it comprehensively : it is the disposi-
tion, inherent in the very nature of selfishness, to enslave God and all the
universe; to make them all give up their interest, and happiness, and
glory, and seek and live for ours. It is a willingness that all beings
should live to and for us; that all interests should bend and be sacrificed
to ours. It is a practical denial of all rights but our own, and a practical
setting up of the claim that all beings are ours, our goods, and chattels,
our property. It is a spirit that aims at making all beings serve us, and
all interests subserve our own.
This must be an attribute of selfishness. Self-interest is the ultimate
end; and such is the nature of the selfish choice of this end that the whole
life, and activity, and aim, and effort, is to secure this end without any
disinterested regard to the right, or personal liberty, of any being in exist-
ence. The sinner, while he remains such, has absolutely no other end
in view, and no other ultimate motive in any thing he does. Selfishness,
or self-gratification, under some form, is the reason for every volition, action,
and omission. For this end alone he lives, and moves. and has his being.
This being his only end, it is impossible that oppression should not be an
attribute of his intention. The whole of oppression is included in the
choice of this end of life. Nothing can be more oppressive to the whole
universe than for a being to set up his own interest as the sole good, and
account all other interests as of no value, except as they contribute to his
own. This is the perfection of oppression, and it matters not what parti-
cular course it takes to secure its end. They are all equally oppressive. If
he does not seek the good of others for its own sake, but simply as a
means of Securing his own, it matters not at all, so far as his character is
concerned, whether he pamper and fatten his slaves, or whether he starve
them, whether he work them hard or let them lounge, whether he lets
them go maked, or arrays them in costly attire. All is done for one and
but one ultimate reason, and that is to promote self-interest, and not at
all for the intrinsic value of any interest but that of self. If such an one
prays to God, it is because he is unable to command and govern Him by
authority, and not at all out of any true regard to the rights, or character,
or relations of God. He desires and solicits God's services, just because
he cannot get them by force. God's interests and rights are practically
268 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
treated as of no value by every sinner in the universe. They care nothing
for God, except to enslave him ; that is to make him serve them without any
service in return. They have no design to live to and for him, but that he
should live to and for them. They regard all other beings just in the same
manner. If there is, in any instance, the semblance, of a regard to their
interest for its own sake, it is only a semblance, and not a reality. It is
not, and it cannot be, a reality. The assertion, that it is any thing more
than hypocritical pretence, is absurd, and contradicts the supposition that
he is a sinner, or selfish.
There are innumerable specious forms of oppression, that, to a superfi.
cial observer, appear very like a regard to the real interest of the oppressed
for its own sake.
It may be gratifying to pride, to ambition, or to some other feeling of a
slaveholder, to see his slaves well fed, well clad, full fleshed, cheerful,
contented, attached to their master. For the same reason he might feed
his dog, provide him a warm kennel, and an ornament his neck with a
brazen collar. He might show a similar affection to his horse and his
Swine. But what is the reason of all this? Only to gratify himself.
God has so moulded his constitution, that it would give him pain to whip
his slave, or his dog, or his horse, or to see them hungry or neglected.
It would trouble his conscience, and endanger his peace and his soul.
There may often be the appearance of virtue in a slaveholder and in slave-
holding ; but it can absolutely be only an appearance. If it be properly
slaveholding, it is and must be oppression ; it is and must be selfishness.
Can it be that slaveholding is designed to proumote the good of the slave
for its own sake? But this could not be slaveholding.
Should an individual be held to service for bis own benefit ; should the
law of benevolence really demand it; this could no more be the crime
of slaveholding and oppression, than it is murder or any other crime. It
would not be selfishness, but benevolence, and therefore no crime at all,
but virtue. But sclfishness embodies and includes every element of
oppression. Its end, its means, and its every breath, form but an incessant
denial of all rights but those of self. All sinners are oppressors and slave-
holders in heart and in fact. They practise continual oppression, and
nothing else. They make God serve them without wages, and, as He says,
“ they make him to serve with their sins.” God, all men, and all things
and events are, as far as possible, made to serve them without the return
of the least disinterested regard to their interests. Disinterested regard
Why the very terms contradict the supposition that he is a sinner. He
has, he can have, in no instance, any other than Selfish aims in appearing
to care for any one's interest for its own sake.
All unconverted abolitionists are slaveholders in heart, and, so far as
possible, in life. There is not one of them who would not enslave every
slave at the south, and his master too, and all at the north, and the whole
universe, and God himself, so far as he could. Indeed, he does it in
spirit, and, remaining selfish, he cannot but aim to enslave all beings, to
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 269
make them as far as possible contribute to his interest and pleasure,
without the least disinterested regard to their interest in return.
Oppression is an essential attribute of selfishness, and always developes
itself according to circumstances. When it has power and inclination, it
uses the chain and the whip. When it has not power, it resorts to other
means of securing the services of others without disinterested return.
Sometimes it supplicates; but this is only because it is regarded as neces-
sary or expedient. It is oppression under whatever form it assumes. It
is in fact a denial of all rights but those of self, and a practical claiming
of God and of all beings and events as ours. It is, to all intents, the
chattel principle universally applied. So that all sinners are both slaves
and slaveholders; in heart and endeavour, they enslave God and all men ;
and other sinners, in heart and endeavour, enslave them. Every sinner is
endeavouring, in heart, to appropriate to himself all good.
(11.) Hostility, open or secret, is another attribute of selfishness.
Selfishness is a spirit of strife. It is opposed to peace or amity. Self-
ishness, on the very face of it, is a declaration of War with all beings. It
is setting up self-interest in opposition to all other interests. It is a
deliberate intention, prompting to an attempt to seize upon, and subordi-
mate, all interests to our own. It is impossible that there should not be a
state of perpetual hostility between a selfish being and all benevolent
beings. They are mutually and necessarily opposed to each other. The
benevolent are seeking the universal good, and the selfish are seeking
their own gratification without the least voluntary regard to any interest
but that of self. Here is opposition and war, of course and of necessity.
But it is no less true, that every selfish being is at War with every other
selfish being. Each is seeking, and is fully consecrated to, his own interest,
and is at the same time denying all rights but his own. Here is, and
must be, strife and hostility. There is no use in talking of putting away
slavery or war from earth, while selfishness is in it; for they both inhere in
the very nature of selfishness; and every selfish being is, in spirit and
principle, an oppressor, a slaveholder, a tyrant, a warrior, a duellist, a
pirate, and all that is implied in making war upon all beings. This is no
railing accusation, but sober verity. The forms of War and of oppression
may be modified indefinitely. The bloody sword may be sheathed. The
manacle and the lash may be laid aside, and a more refined mode of
oppression and of war may be carried on ; but oppression and war must
continue under some form so long as selfishness continues. It is im-
possible that it should not. Nor will the more refined and specious, and,
if you please, baptized forms of oppression and war, that may succeed
those now practised, involve less guilt, or be less displeasing to God than
the present. No, indeed. As light increases, and compels selfishness to
lay aside the sword, and bury the manacle and the whip, and profess the
religion of Christ, the guilt of selfishness increases every moment. The
form of manifestation is changed, compelled by increasing light and ad-
vancing civilization and Christianization. Oppression and war, although
270 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
so much changed in form, are not at all abandoned in spirit. Nay, they
are only strengthened by increasing light. Nor can it be told with cer.
tainty, whether the more refined modifications of oppression and war that
may succeed, will upon the whole be a less evil to mankind. Guilt will
certainly increase as light increases. Sin abounds, and becomes exceeding
sinful, just in proportion as the light of truth is poured upon the selfish
mind.
Do you ask, then, what shall we do? Shall we do nothing, but let
things go on as they are P I answer, No, by no means. Do, if possible,
ten times more than ever to put away these and all the evils that are
under the Sun. But aim, not only at outward reforms, but also at the
annihilation of selfishness; and when you succeed in reforming the heart,
the life cannot but be reformed. Put away selfishmess, and oppression and
war are no more. But engage in bringing about any other reform, and you
are but building dams of sand. Selfishness will force for itself a channel;
and who can say, that its desolations may not be more fearful and calami-
tous, in this new modification, than before? Attempting to reform selfish-
ness, and teach it better manners, is like damming up the waters of the
Mississippi. It will only, surely, overflow its banks, and change its chan-
nel, and carry devastation and death in its course. I am aware, that many
will regard this as heresy. But God seeth not as man seeth. Man looketh
on the outward appearance, but God looketh on the heart. All the wars
and filthiness of heathemism God winks at, as comparatively a light thing
when put into the scale against the most refined form of intelligent but
heartless Christianity that ever existed.
But to return. Let it be for ever understood, that selfishness is at War
with all nations and with all beings. It has no element of peace in it,
any further than all beings, and all interests, are yielded to the gratification
of self. This is its essential, its unalterable, nature. This attribute can-
not cease while selfishmess remains.
All selfish men, who are advocates of peace principles, are necessarily
hypocrites. They say, and do not. They preach, but do not practise.
Peace is on their lips, but war is in their hearts. They proclaim peace and
good-will to men, while, under their stolen robe of peace, they conceal their
poisoned implements of war against God and the universe. This is, this
must be. I am anxious to make the impression, and lodge it deep in your
inmost hearts, so that you shall always practically hold, and teach, and
regard, this as a fundamental truth, both of natural and revealed religion,
that a selfish man, be he who he may, instead of being a Christian, a man
of peace, and a servant of the Prince of peace, is, in heart, in character, in
spirit, in fact, a rebel, an enemy, a warrior, truly and in fact at war with
God and with all beings.
(15.) Unmercifulness is another attribute of selfishness.
Mercy is an attribute of benevolence; and, as such, has been defined to
be that quality that disposes it to pardon crime. It will, and must, manifest
itself in efforts to secure the conditions upon which crime can be reasonably
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 271
forgiven, if such conditions can be secured. Unmercifulness is that attri-
bute of selfishness that indisposes it to forgive sin ; and, of course, it
manifests itself, either by resisting efforts to Secure its forgiveness, or by
treating such efforts with coldness or contempt. The manner in which
sinners treat the plan of salvation, the atonement of Christ, the means
used by God the Saviour to bring about the pardon of sin, demonstrates
that their tender mercies are cruelty. The apostle charges them with
being “implacable, unmerciful.” Their opposition to the gospel, to revivals
of religion, and to all the exhibitions of his mercy which he has made to
our world, show that unmercifulness is an attribute of their character.
Sinners generally profess to be the friends of mercy. They, with their
lips, extol the mercy of God. But how do they treat it? Do they em-
brace it 2 Do they honour it as something which they favour? Do they
hold it forth to all men as worthy of all acceptation ? Or do they wage an
unreleuting war with it? How did they treat Christ when he came on his
errand of mercy 2 They brought forth the appalling demonstration, that
ummercifulness is an essential attribute of their character. They persecuted
unto death the very impersonation and embodiment of mercy. And this
same attribute of selfishness has always manifested itself under some form,
whenever a developement and an exhibition of mercy has been made. Let
the blood of prophets and apostles, the blood of millions of martyrs—and
above all, let the blood of the God of mercy speak. What is their united
testimony 2 Why, this—that the perfection of unmercifulness is one of the
essential and etermal attributes of Selfishness.
Whenever, therefore, a selfish being appears to be of a merciful disposi
tion, it is, it can be, only in appearance. His feelings may be sensitive,
and he may sometimes, may often, or always yield to them, but this is only
selfishness. The reason, and the only reason why every sinner does not
exhibit every appalling form of ummercifulness and cruelty is, that God has
so tempered his sensibility, and so surrounded him with influences as to
modify the manifestation of selfishness, and to develope other attributes
more prominently than this. Ummerciful he is, and unmerciful he must
be, while he remains in sin. To represent him as other than an unmerciful
wretch, were to misrepresent him. No matter who it is, That delicate
female, who would faint at the sight of blood, if she is a sinner, she
is spurning and scorning the mercy of God. She lets others go down
to hell unpardoned, without an effort to secure their pardon. Shall she be
represented as other than ummerciful? No language can describe the
hardness of her heart. See the cup of salvation is presented to her lips
by a Saviour's bleeding hand. She, nevertheless, dashes it from her, and
tramples its contents beneath her feet. It passes from lip to lip; but she
offers no prayer that it may be accepted ; or if she does, it is only the
prayer of a hypocrite, while she rejects it herself. No, with all her delicacy,
her tender mercies are utter cruelty. With her own hands she crucifies the
Son of God afresh, and would put him to open shame ! O monstrous ! A
Woman murdering the Saviour of the world ! Her hands and garments
272 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
all stained with blood And call her merciful O shame, where is thy
blush 2 e
(16.) Falsehood, or lying, is another attribute of selfishness.
Falsehood may be objective or subjective. Objective falsehood is that
which stands opposed to truth. Subjective falsehood is a heart conformed
to error and to objective falsehood. Subjective falsehood is a state of mind,
or an attribute of selfishness. It is the will in the attitude of resisting
truth, and embracing error and lies. This is always and necessarily an
attribute of selfishness.
Selfishness consists in the choice of an end opposed to all truth, and
cannot but proceed to the realization of that end, in conformity with error
or falsehood, instead of truth. If at any time it seize upon objective truth,
as it often does, it is with a false intention. It is with an intention at war
with the truth, the mature, and the relations of things.
If any sinner, at any time, and under any circumstances, tell the truth,
it is for a selfish reason ; it is to compass a false end. He has a lie in his
heart, and a lie in his right hand. He stands upon falsehood. He lives
for it, and if he does not uniformly and openly falsify the truth, it is
because objective truth is consistent with subjective falsehood. His heart
is false, as false as it can be. It has embraced and sold itself to the greatest
lie in the universe. The selfish man has practically proclaimed that his
good is the supreme good ; may, that there is no other good but his own ;
that there are no other rights but his own, that all are bound to serve him,
and that all interests are to yield to his. Now all this, as I said, is the
greatest falsehood that ever was or can be. Yet this is the solemn practical
declaration of every simmer. His choice affirms that God has no rights,
that he ought not to be loved and obeyed, that he has no right to govern
the universe, but that God and all beings ought to obey and serve the
sinner. Can there be a greater, a more shameless falsehood than all this?
And shall such an one pretend to regard the truth Nay, verily. The
very pretence is only an instance and an illustration of the truth, that
falsehood is an essential element of his character.
If every sinner on earth does not openly and at all times falsify the
truth, it is not because of the truthfulness of his heart, but for some purely
selfish reason. This must be. His heart is utterly false. It is impossible
that, remaining a sinner, he should have any true regard to the truth. He
is a liar in his heart; this is an essential and an etermal attribute of his
character. It is true that his intellect condemns falsehood and justifies
truth, and that oftentimes through the intellect, a deep impression is or
may be made on his sensibility in favour of the truth; but if the heart
is unchanged, it holds on to lies, and perseveres in the practical procla-
mation of the greatest lies in the universe, to wit, that God ought not to
be trusted ; that Christ is not Worthy of confidence; that one's own interest
is the supreme good; and that all interests ought to be accounted of less
value than one's own.
(17.) Pride is another attribute of selfishness.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 273
Pride is a disposition to exalt self above others, to get out of one's proper
place in the scale of being, and to climb up over the heads of our equals or
superiors. Pride is a species of injustice, on the one hand, and is nearly
allied to ambition on the other. It is not a term of So extensive an import
as either injustice or ambition. It sustains to each of them a near relation,
but is not identical with either. It is a kind of self-praise, self-worship,
self-flattery, self-adulation, a spirit of self-consequence, of self-importance.
It is a tendency to exalt, not merely one's own interest, but one's person
above others, and above God, and above all other beings. A proud being
supremely regards himself. He worships and can worship no one but self.
He does not, and remaining selfish, he cannot, practically admit that there
is any one so good and worthy as himself. He aims at conferring supreme
favour upon himself, and, practically, admits no claim of any being in the
universe to any good or interest, that will interfere with his own. He can
stoop to give preference to the interest, the reputation, the authority of no
one, no, not of God himself, except outwardly and in appearance. His
inward language is, “Who is Jehovah, that I should bow down to him 2° It
is impossible that a selfish soul should be humble. Sinners are represented
in the Bible as proud, as “flattering themselves in their own eyes.”
Pride is not a vice distinct from selfishness, but is only a modification of
selfishness. Selfishness is the root, or stock, in which every form of sin
inheres. This it is important to show. Selfishness has been scarcely regarded
by many as a vice, much less as constituting the whole of vice; consequently,
when selfishness has been most apparent, it has been supposed and assumed
that there might be along with it many forms of virtue. It is for this reason
that I make this attempt to show what are the essential elements of selfish-
ness. It has been supposed that selfishmess might existin any heart without
implying every form of sin; that a man might be selfish and yet not proud.
In short, it has been overlooked, that, where selfishness is, there must be
every form of sin ; that where there is one form of selfishness manifested, it
is virtually a breach of every commandment of God, and implies, in fact, the
real existence of every possible form of sin and abomination in the heart.
My object is fully to develope the great truth that where selfishness is, there
must be, in a state either of developement or of undevelopement, every form
of sin that exists in earth or hell; that all sin is a unit, and consists of
Some form of selfishness; and that where this is, all sin virtually is and
must be.
The only reason that pride, as a form of selfishness, does not appearin all
sinners, in the most disgusting forms, is only this, that their constitutional
temperament, and providential circumstances, are such as to give a more pro-
minent developement to some other attribute of selfishness. It is important
to remark, that where any one form of unqualified sin exists, there selfishness
must exist, and there of course every form of sin must exist, at least in
embryo, and waiting only for circumstances to develope it. When, there-
fore, you see an form of sin, know assuredly that selfishness, the root, is
there; and expect nothing else, if selfishness continues, than to see deve-
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274 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
loped, one after another, every form of sin as the occasion shall present
itself. Selfishness is a volcano, sometimes Smothered, but which must
have vent. The providence of God cannot but present occasions upon
Which its lavatides will burst forth and carry desolation before them.
That all these forms of sin exist, has been known and admitted. But it
does not appear to me, that the philosophy of sin has been duly considered
by many. It is important that we should get at the fundamental or generic
form of sin, that form which includes and implies all others, or, more pro-
perly, which constitutes the whole of sin. Such is selfishness. “Let it be
Written with the point of a diamond and engraved in the rock for ever,” that
it may be known, that where selfishness is, there every precept of the law
is violated, there is the whole of sin. Its guilt and ill desert must depend
upon the light with which the selfish mind is surrounded. But sin, the
Whole of sim, is there. Such is the very mature of selfishness that it only
needs the providential occasions, and to be left without restraint, and it will
show itself to have embodied, in embryo, every form of imiquity.
LECTURE XXX.
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHN ESS.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO THE LAW of GoD.
(18.) Enmity against God is also an attribute of selfishness.
Enmity is hatred. Hatred may exist either as a phenomenon of the
sensibility, or as a state or attitude of the will. Of course I am now to
speak of enmity of heart or will. It is selfishness viewed in its relations to
God. That selfishness is enmity against God will appear—
(i.) From the Bible. The apostle Paul expressly says that “the carnal
mind (minding the flesh) is enmity against God.” It is fully evident that
the apostle, by the carnal mind, means obeying the propensities or gratify-
ing the desires. But this, as I have defined it, is selfishness.
(ii.) Selfishness is directly opposed to the will of God as expressed in his.
law. That requires benevolence. Selfishness is its opposite, and there-
fore enmity against the Lawgiver.
(iii.) Selfishness is as hostile to God’s government as it can be. It is
directly opposed to every law, and principle, and measure of his govern-
lment.
(iv.) Selfishmess is opposition to God's existence. Opposition to a
government, is opposition to the will of the governor. It is opposition to
his existence in that capacity. It is, and must be, enmity against the exist-
ence of the ruler, as such. Selfishness must be enmity against the exist-
ence of God's government, and as he does and must sustain the relation of
Sovereign Ruler, selfishness must be enmity against his being. Selfishness
will brook no restraint in respect to securing its end. There is nothing in
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 275
the universe it will not sacrifice to self. This is true, or it is not selfish-
mess. If then God's happiness, or government, or being, come into compe-
tition with it, they must be sacrificed, were it possible for selfishness to
affect it.
(v.) But God is the uncompromising enemy of selfishness. It is the
abominable thing his soul hateth. He is more in the way of selfishness
than all other beings. The opposition of selfishness to him is, and must be,
supreme and perfect.
(vi.) That selfishness is mortal enmity against God, is not left to con-
jecture, nor to a mere deduction or inference. God once took to himself
human nature, and brought Divine benevolence into conflict with human
selfishness. Men could not brook his presence upon earth, and they rested
not until they had murdered him.
(vii.) Again: selfishness is supreme enmity against God. That is, it is
more opposed to God than to all other beings.
(a.) This must be, because God is more opposed to it, and more directly
and etermally in its way. Selfishness must be relinquished, or put itself
in Supreme opposition to God.
(b.) Enmity against any body or thing besides God can be overcome
more easily than against him. All earthly enmities can be overcome by
kindness, and change of circumstances; but what kindness, what change of
circumstances, can change the human heart, call overcome the selfishness
or enmity to God that reigns there 2
(viii.) Selfishness offers all manner and every possible degree of resistance
to God. It disregards God’s commands. It contemns his authority. It
spurns his mercy. It outrages his feelings. It provokes his forbear-
ance. Selfishness, in short, is the universal antagonist and adversary of
God. It can no more be reconciled to God or subject to his law, than it
can cease to be selfishness.
(19.) Madness is another attribute of selfishness.
Madness is used sometimes to mean anger, sometimes to mean intel-
lectual insanity, and sometimes to mean moral insanity. I speak of it now
in the last sense.
Moral insanity is not insanity of the intellect, but of the heart. In-
sanity of the intellect destroys, for the time being, moral agency and account-
ability. Moral insanity is a state in which the intellectual powers are
not deranged, but the heart refuses to be controlled by the law of the
intellect, and acts unreasonably, as if the intellect were deranged. That
madness or moral insanity is an attribute of selfishness, is evident—
(i.) From the Bible. “The heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and
madness is in their heart while they live.”—Eccles. ix. 3.
(ii.) It has been shown that sinners, or selfish persons, act in every
instance, in direct opposition to right reason. Indeed, nothing can be
plainer than the moral insanity of every selfish soul. He chooses to seek
his own interest as an end, and, in so doing, prefers a straw to a universe.
But not only so : he does this with the certain knowledge, that in this way
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276 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
he can never secure his own highest interest. What an infinitely insane
course that must be, first to prefer his own petty gratification to the infinite
interests of God and of the universe, and secondly, to do this with the know-
ledge, that in this way nothing can be ultimately gained even to self; and
that, if the course is persisted in, it must result in endless evil to self, the
very thing which is supremely dreaded ! Sin is the greatest mystery, and
the greatest absurdity, and the greatest contradiction, in the universe.
But madness is an essential element or attribute of selfishness. All
sinners, without any exception, are and must be morally mad. Their
choice of an end is madness. It is infinitely unreasonable. Their pur-
suit of it is madness persisted in. Their treatment of everything that
opposes their course is madness. All, all is madness—infinite. This world
is a moral bedlam, an insane hospital, where sinners are under regimen.
If they can be cured, well ; if not, they must be confined in the mad-house
of the universe for etermity.
The only reason why sinuers do not perceive their own and each other's
madness is, that they are all mad together; and their madness is all of one
type. Hence they imagine that they are same, and pronounce Christians
mad. This is no wonder. What other conclusion can they come to,
unless they can discover that they are mad 2
But let it not be forgotten, that their madness is of the heart, and not
of the intellect. It is voluntary and not unavoidable. If it were unavoid-
able, it would involve no guilt. But it is a choice made and persisted in,
while in the integrity of their intellectual powers, and, therefore, they are
without excuse.
Most sinners are supposed to act rationally on many subjects. But this
is an evident mistake. They do everything for the same ultimate reason,
and are as wholly irrational in one thing as another. There is nothing in
their whole history and life, not an individual thing, that is not entirely
and infinitely unreasonable. The choice of the end is madness; the choice
of means is madness; all, all is madness and desperation of spirit. They
no doubt appear so to angels, and so they do to Saiuts; and were it not so
common and familiar a sight, their conduct would fill the Saints and angels
with utter amazement and horror.
(20.) Impatience is another attribute of selfishness.
This term expresses both a state of the sensibility and of the will. Im-
patience is a resistance of providence. When this term is used to express
a state of the sensibility, it designates fretfulness, ill temper, anger, in the
form of emotion. It is an unsubmissive and rebellious state of feeling,
in regard to those trials that occur under the administration of the provi-
dential government of God.
When the term is used to express a state of the Will, it designates an
attitude of resistance to God's providential dispensations. Selfishness has
no faith in God, no confidence in his wisdom and goodness; and being set
upon self-gratification, is continually exposed to disappointment. God is
infinitely wise and benevolent. He also exercises a universal providence.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 277
He is conducting everything with reference to the greatest good of the
whole universe. He, of course, will often interfere with the selfish projects
of those who are pursuing an opposite end to that which he pursues. They
will, of course, be subject to almost continual disappointment under the
providence of One, who disposes of all events in accordance with a design
at war with their own. It is impossible that the schemes of selfishness,
under such a government, should not frequently be blown to the winds, and
that the selfish person, whoever he may be, should not be the subject of
incessant disappointments, vexations, and trials. Self-will cannot but be
impatient under a benevolent government. Selfishness would of course
have everything so disposed as to favour self-interest and self-gratification.
But infinite wisdom and benevolence cannot accommodate themselves to
this state of mind. The result must be a constant rasping and collision
between the selfish soul and the providence of God. Selfishness must
cease to be selfishness, before the result can be otherwise.
A selfish state of will must, of course, not only sustain crosses and dis-
appointments, but must also produce a feverish and fretful state of feeling,
in relation to the trials incident to life. Nothing but deep sympathy with
God, and that confidence in his wisdom and goodness, and universal provi-
dence, that annihilates self-will, and produces universal and unqualified
submission to him, can prevent impatience. Impatience is always a form
of selfishness. It is resistance to God. It is self will, arraying itself
against whatever thwarts or opposes its gratification. Selfishness must, of
course, either be gratified or displeased. It should always be understood,
that when trials produce impatience of heart, the will is in a selfish attitude.
The trials of this life are designed to develope a submissive, confiding, and
patient state of mind. A selfish spirit is represented in the Bible as
being, under the providence of God, like “a bullock unaccustomed to the
yoke,” restive, self-willed, impatient, and rebellious.
When selfishness or self-will is subdued, and benevolence is in exercise,
We are in a state not to feel disappointments, trials, and crosses. Having
no way or will of our own about anything, and having deep sympathy with,
and confidence in God, we cannot be disappointed in any such sense, as to
vex the spirit and break the peace of the soul.
The fact is, that selfishness must be abandoned, or there is, there can be
no peace for us. “There is no peace to the wicked, saith my God.” “The
wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up
mire and dirt.” An impressive figure this to represent the continually
agitated state in which a selfish mind must be, under a perfectly benevolent
providence. Selfishness demands partiality in providence that will favour
self. But divine benevolence will not bend to its inclinations. This Illust
produce resistance and fretting, or selfishness must be abandoned. Let it
then be borne in mind, that impatience is an attribute of selfishness, and
will always be developed under crosses and trials.
Selfishness will, of course, be patient while providence favours its Schemes,
but when crosses come, then the peace of the soul is broken. -
278 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(21). Intemperance is also a form or attribute of selfishness.
Selfishness is self-indulgence not sanctioned by the reason. It consists
in the committal of the will to the indulgence of the propensities. Of
course some one, or more, of the propensities must have taken the control
of the will. Generally, there is some ruling passion or propensity, the in
fluence of which becomes overshadowing, and overrules the will for its own
gratification. Sometimes it is acquisitiveness or avarice, the love of gain;
sometimes alimentiveness or Epicurianism; sometimes it is amativeness or
sexual love; sometimes philoprogenitiveness or the love of our own chil-
dren; sometimes self-esteem or a feeling of confidence in self; sometimes
one and sometimes another of the great variety of the propensities, is so
largely developed, as to be the ruling tyrant, that lords it over the will and
over all the other propensities. It matters not which of the propensities,
or whether their united influence gains the mastery of the will: whenever
the will is subject to them, this is selfishness. It is the carnal mind.
Intermperance consists in the undue or unlawful indulgence of any pro-
pensity. It is, therefore, an essential element or attribute of selfishness.
All selfishness is intemperance ; of course it is an unlawful indulgence of
the propensities. Intermperance has as many forms as there are constitu-
tional and artificial appetites to gratify. A selfish mind cannot be tempe-
rate. If one or more of the propensities is restrained, it is only restrained
for the sake of the undue and unlawful indulgence of another. Sometimes
the tendencies are intellectual, and the bodily appetites are denied, for the
sake of gratifying the love of study. But this is no less intemperance and
selfishness, than the gratification of amativeness or alimentiveness. Selfish-
mess is always, and necessarily, intemperate. It does not always or generally
develope every from of intemperance in the outward life, but a spirit of
self-indulgence must maniſest itself in the intemperate gratification of some
one or more of the propensities.
Some develope self-indulgence most prominently in the form of intemper.
ance in eating; others in sleeping; others in lounging and idleness; others
are gossippers; others love exercise, and indulge that propensity; others
study and impair health, and induce derangement, or seriously impair the
nervous system. Indeed, there is no end to the forms which intemperance
assumes, arising from the fact of the great number of propensities matural
and artificial, that in their turn seek and obtain indulgence.
It should be always borne in mind, that any form of self-indulgence,
properly so called, is equally an instance of selfishness and wholly incon-
sistent with any degree of virtue in the heart. But it may be asked, are
we to have no regard whatever to our tastes, appetites, and propensities? I
answer, we are to have no such regard to them, as to make their gratifica-
tion the end for which we live, even for a moment. But there is a kind of
regard to them which is lawful, and therefore, a virtue. For example: I
am on a journey for the service and glory of God. Two ways are before
me. One affords nothing to regale the senses; the other conducts me
through variegated scenery, sublime mountain passes, deep ravines; beside
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 279
bubbling brooks, and meandering rivulets; through beds of gayest flowers
and woods of richest foliage: through aromatic groves and forests vocal
with feathered songsters. The two paths are equal in distance, and in all
respects that have a bearing upon the business I have in hand. Now,
reason dictates and demands, that I should take the path that is most
agreeable and suggestive of useful thoughts. But this is not being governed
by the propensities, but by the reason. It is its voice which I hear and
to which I listen, when I take the Sunny path, The delights of this
path are a real good. As such they are not to be despised or neglected.
But if taking this path would embarrass and hinder the end of my journey,
I am not to sacrifice the greater public good for a less one of my own. I
must not be guided by my feelings, but by my reason and homest judgment
in this and in every case of duty. God has not given us propensities to be
our masters and to rule us, but to be our servants and to minister to our
enjoyment, when we obey the biddings of reason and of God. They are
given to render duty pleasant, and as a reward of virtue; to make the
ways of wisdom pleasurable. The propensities are not, therefore, to be
despised, nor is their annihilation to be desired. Nor is it true that their
gratification is always selfish, but when their gratification is sanctioned and
demanded by the intellect, as in the case just supposed, and in myriads of
other cases that occur, the gratification is not a sin but a virtue. It is not
selfishness, but benevolence. But let it be remembered, that the indulgence
must not be sought in obedience to the propensity itself, but in obedience
to the law of reason and of God. When reason and the will of God are not
only not consulted, but even violated, it must be selfishness.
Intemperance, as a sim, does not consist in the outward act of indulgence,
but in the inward disposition. A dyspeptic who can eat but just enough
to sustain life, may be an enormous glutton at heart. He may have a dis-
position, that is, he may not only desire, but he may be willing, to eat all
before him, but for the pain indulgence Occasions him. But this is only
the spirit of self-indulgence. He denies himself the amount of food he
craves in order to gratify a stronger propensity, to wit, the dread of pain.
So a man who was never intoxicated in his life, may be guilty of the crime
of drunkenness every day. He may be prevented from drinking to
inebriation only by a regard to reputation or health, or by an avarieious
disposition. It is only because he is prevented by the greater power of
some other propensity. If a man is in such a state of mind that he would
indulge all his propensities without restraint, were it not that it is impossible,
on account of the indulgence of some being inconsistent with the indulgence
of the others, he is just as guilty as if he did indulge them all. For
example: he has a disposition, that is a will, to accumulate property. He
is avaricious in heart. He also has a strong tendency to luxury, to
licentiousness, and prodigality. The indulgence of these propensities is in-
consistent with the indulgence of avariee. But for this contrariety, he
would in his state of mind indulge them all. He wishes to do so, but it is
280 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
impossible. Now he is really guilty of all those forms of vice, and just as
blameworthy as if he indulged in them.
Again: that selfishness is the aggregate of all sin, and that he who is
selfish, is actually chargeable with breaking the whole law, and of every
form of iniquity, will appear, if we consider,
(i.) That it is the committal of the will to self-indulgence; and of
COUITS6—
(ii.) No one propensity would be denied but for the indulgence of
another.
(iii.) But if no better reason than this exists for denying any propensity,
then the selfish man is chargeable, in the sight of God, with actually in
heart gratifying every propensity.
(iv.) And this conducts to the plain conclusion, that a selfish man is full
of sin, and actually in heart guilty of every possible or conceivable
abomination.
(v.) “He that looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed
adultery with her already in his heart.” He may not have committed the
outward act for want of opportunity, or for the reason, that the indulgence
is inconsistent with the love of reputation or fear of disgrace, or with some
other propensity, Nevertheless, he is in heart guilty of the deed.
Intemperance, as a crime, is a state of mind. It is the attitude of the
will. It is an attribute of selfishness. It consists in the choice or dis-
position to gratify the propensities regardless of the law of benevolence.
This is intemperance ; and So far as the mind is considered, it is the whole
of it. Now, inasmuch as the will is committed to self-indulgence, and
nothing but the contrariety there is between the propensities prevents the
unlimited indulgence of them all, it follows, that every selfish person, or in
other words every sinner, is chargeable in the sight of God with every
species of intemperance, actual or conceivable. His lusts have the reign.
They conduct him whithersoever they list. He has sold himself to self.
indulgence. If there is any form of self-indulgence that is not actually
developed in him, no thanks to him. The providence of God has restrained
the outward indulgence, while there has been in him a readiness to per.
petrate any sin and every sin, from which he was not deterred by some
overpowering fear of consequences.
(22.) Moral recklessness is another attribute of selfishness. Moral reck-
lessness is carelessness, or a state of mind that seeks to gratify self,
regardless of ultimate consequences. It is a spirit of infatuation, a rushing
upon ruin heedless of what may be the final issue.
This is one of the most prominent attributes of selfishness. It is
universally prominent and manifest. What can be more manifest, and
striking, and astonishing, than the recklessness of every simmer ? Self.
indulgence is his motto ; and the only appearance of consideration and
moderation about him is, that he is careful to deny one propensity for the
sake, and only for the Sake, of indulging another. This consideration is
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 281
only a selfish one. It relates wholly to self-interest, and not at all to the
good of being in general. He hesitates not whether he shall indulge him-
self, but sometimes hesitates and ponders, and deliberates in respect to the
particular propensity to be indulged or denied. He is at all times perfectly
reckless as it respects self-indulgence in some form. This is settled.
Whenever he hesitates about any given course, it is because of the strength
of the self-indulgent spirit, and with design upon the whole to realize the
greatest amount of self-indulgence. When sinners hesitate about remain-
ing in sin and think of giving up self-indulgence, it is only certain forms of
sin that they contemplate relinquishing. They consider what they shall
lose to themselves by continuing in sin, and what they shall gain to them-
selves by relinquishing sin and turning to God. It is a question of loss
and gain with them. They have no idea of giving up every form of selfish-
ness; nor do they consider that until they do, they are at every moment
violating the whole law, whatever interest of self they may be plotting to
secure, whether the interest be temporal or eternal, physical or spiritual.
In respect to the denial or indulgence of one or another of the propen-
sities, they may, and indeed cannot but be considerate consistently with
selfishness. But in respect to duty; in respect to the commands and
threatenings of God; in respect to every moral consideration, they are
entirely and universally reckless. And when they appear not to be so, but
to be thoughtful and considerate, it is only selfishness plotting its own
indulgence and calculating its chances of loss and gain. Indeed, it would
appear, when we take into consideration the known consequences of every
form of selfishness, and the sinner's pertinacious cleaving to self-indulgence
in the face of such considerations, that every sinner is appallingly reckless,
and that it may be said that his recklessness is infinite,
(23.) Unity is another attribute of selfishness.
By unity is intended that selfishness, and consequently all sin, is a unit.
That is, there are not various kinds of sin, nor various kinds of selfishness,
mor, strictly speaking, are there various forms of selfishness. Selfishness
is always one and but one thing. It has but one, and not diverse ultimate
ends. The indulgence of one appetite or passion, or another, does not
imply different ultimate ends or forms of selfishness, strictly speaking. It
is only one choice, or the choice of one end, and the different forms are
only the use of different means to accomplish this one end. Strictly speak-
ing, there is but one form of virtue ; and when we speak of various forms,
we speak in accommodation to the general motions of mankind. Virtue, as
we have before seen, is a unit. It always consists in ultimate intention;
and this ultimate intention is always one and the same. It is the choice of
the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an end. This inten-
tion never changes its form, and all the efforts which the mind makes to
realize this end, and which we loosely call different forms of virtue, are
after all only the one unchanged and unchangeable, uncompounded and
indivisible intention, emergizing to realize its one great end. Just so with
selfishmess. It is one choice, or the choice of one and only one end, to wit,
282 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
self-gratification or self-indulgence. All the various, and ever-varying shifts,
and turns, and modes of indulgence, which make up the entire history of the
sinner, imply no complexity in the form or substance of his choice. All
are resorted to for one and only one reason. They are only this one uncom
pounded and uncompoundable, this never varying choice of self-indulgence,
energizing and using various means to realize its one simple end. The
reason why the idea is so common, and why the phraseology of men implies
that there are really various forms of sin and of holiness, is, that they
unwittingly lose sight of that in which sin and holiness alone consist, and
conceive of them as belonging to the outward act, or to the causative
volition put forth by the intention to secure its end. Let it but always be
remembered, that holiness and sin are but the moral attributes of selfish-
mess and benevolence, and that they are each the choice of one end, and
only one ; and the delusion that there are various forms and kinds of sin
and holiness will vanish for ever.
Holiness is holiness, in form and essence one and indivisible. It is the
moral element or quality of disinterested benevolence. Sin is sin, in form
and essence one and indivisible ; and is the moral attribute of selfishmess,
or of the choice of Self-indulgence as the end of life. This conducts us to
the real meaning of those scriptures which assert “that all the law is
fulfilled in one word, love,” that this is the whole of virtue, and comprises
all that we loosely call the different virtues, or different forms of virtue.
And it also explains this, “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet
offend in one point, he is guilty of all.” That is, offending in one point
implies the real commission of all sim. It implies, and is, selfishness, and
this is the whole of sin. It is of the greatest importance, that religious
teachers should understand this, and no longer conceive of sin as original
and actual ; as sins of heart and sins of life ; as sins of omission and com-
mission; as sins of licentiousness and gluttony, intemperance and the like.
Now such notions and such phraseology may do for those who are unable,
or have no opportunity, to look deeper into the philosophy of moral govern-
ment; but it is time that the veil were taken away, and both sin and
holiness laid open to the public gaze.
Let it not be inferred, that because there is but one form or kind of sin,
or of holiness, strictly speaking, that therefore all sin is equally blame-
worthy, and that all holiness is equally praiseworthy. This does not follow,
as we shall see under its proper head. Neither let it be called a con-
tradiction, that I have so often spoken, and shall so often speak, of the
different forms of sin and of holiness. All this is convenient, and, as I
judge, indispensable in preparing the way, and to conduct the mind to the
true conception and apprehension of this great and fundamental truth ;
fnndamental, in the sense, that it lies at the foundation of all truly clear
and just conceptions of either holiness or sin. They are both units, and
eternal and necessary opposites and antagonists. They can never dwell
together or coalesce, any more than heaven and hell can be wedded to each
other.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 283
LECTURE XXXI.
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISODEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.
(24.) Egotism is another attribute of selfishness.
Egotism, when properly considered, does not consist in actually talking
about and praising self; but in that disposition of mind that manifests
itself in self-laudation. Parrots talk almost exclusively of themselves, and
yet we do not accuse them of egotism, nor feel the least disgust toward
them on that account.
Moral agents may be under circumstances that render it necessary to
speak much of themselves. God's character and relations are such, and
the ignorance of men so great, that it is necessary for him to reveal him-
self to them, and consequently to speak to them very much about himself.
The same is true of Christ. One of Christ's principal objects was to make
the world acquainted with himself, and with the nature and design of his
mission. Of course he spake much of himself. But whoever thought of
accusing either the Father or the Son of egotism 2
Real and sinful egotism is a selfish state of the will. It is a selfish dis-
position. Selfishness cannot but manifest egotism. The natural heart is
egotistical, and its language and deportment must be the same.
An egotistical state of mind manifests itself in a great variety of ways;
not only in Self-commendation and laudation, but also in Selfish aims and
actions, exalting self in action as well as in word. An egotistical spirit
speaks of itself and its achievements, in such a way as reveals the assump-
tion, that self is a very important personage. It demonstrates that self is
the end of every thing, and the great idol before which all ought to bow
down and worship. This is not too strong language. The fact is, that
selfishness is nothing short of a practical setting up of the shameless
claim, that self is of more importance than God and the whole universe;
that self ought to be universally worshipped; that God and all other
beings ought to be entirely consecrated to its interests, and to the pro-
motion of its glory. Now, what but the most disgusting egotism can be
expected from such a state of mind as this? If it does not manifest itself
in one way, it will and must in another. The thoughts are upon self; the
heart is upon self. Self-flattery is a necessary result, or rather attribute
of selfishness. A selfish man is always a self-flatterer, and a self-deceiver,
and a self-devotee.
Self may speak very sparingly of self, because reason affirms that self.
praise must provoke contempt. A man may have a spirit too egotistical
to Speak out, and may reveal his superlative disposition to be praised, by
a studied abstinence from self-commendation. Nay, he may Speak of him-
self in terms the most reproachful and self-abasing, in the spirit of Supreme
egotism, to evince his humility and the deep self-knowledge which he
284 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
possesses. Yet this may be hypocritically designed to draw forth admira-
tion and applause. A spirit of self-deification, which selfishness always
is, if it does not manifest itself in words, must and will in deeds. The
great and Supreme importance of self is assumed by the heart, and can-
not but in some way manifest itself. It may, and often does, put on the
garb of the utmost self-abasement. It stoops to conquer; and, to gain uni-
versal praise, affects to be most empty of self.
But this is only a more refined egotism. It is only saying, Come, see
my perfect humility and self-emptiness. Indeed, there are myriads of
Ways in which an egotistical spirit manifests itself, and so subtle and refined
are many of them, that they resemble Satan robed in the stolen habiliments
of an angel of light.
An egotistical spirit often manifests itself in self-consequential airs, and
by thrusting self into the best seat at table, in a stage coach, a railroad
carriage, or into the best state room in a steam boat. In short, it mani-
fests in action what it is apt to manifest in word, to wit, a sense of supreme
self-importance.
The mere fact of speaking of self is not of itself proof of an egotistical
spirit. The thing to be regarded is the maner and manifest design of
speaking of self. A benevolent man may speak much of self because it
may be important to others that he should do so, on account of his rela-
tions. When the design is the benefit of others and the glory of God, it
is as far as possible from the spirit of egotism. A benevolent man might
speak of himself just as he would of others. He has merged his interests
in, or rather identified them with, the interests of others, and, of course,
would naturally treat others and speak of them much as he treats and speaks
of himself. If he sees and censures the conduct of others, and has ever been
guilty of the like, he will censure his own basemess quite as severely as he
does the same thing in others. If he commends the virtues of others, it is
but for the glory of God; and for the very same reason, he might speak of vir-
tues of which he is conscious in himself, that God may have glory. A perfectly
simple-hearted and guileless state of mind might maturally enough mani-
fest itself in this manner. An egotistical spirit in another might, and
doubtless would, lead him to misunderstand such open-heartedness and
transparency of character. There would be, nevertheless, a radical differ.
ence in the spirit with which two such men would speak either of their
own faults or virtues. Paul was so circumstanced as to find it necessary
to speak in vindication of himself, and to publish the success of his own
labours, for the benefit of the church and the glory of God. He was slan-
dered, misrepresented, and his ministry hindered among strangers, by
these false representations. He had no one to speak for him. It was
his duty to disabuse the public mind. He did so, but who can accuse him
of a spirit of egotism 2 Others have often been similarly situated, and
have been subject to the same necessity. They are liable to be misunder-
stood. The most selfish and egotistical will be the first to judge them
by their own spirit. But God will justify them if, in his providence
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 285
necessity is laid upon them to do as Paul did. But, to a truly pious mind,
it is trying to be obliged to speak much of self. If not compelled by cir-
cumstances to do so, it is unnatural to a pious mind to think or speak
much of self. He is too much engrossed with his work to think much of
self, unless peculiar trials place him under a necessity of doing so.
(25.) Simplicity is another attribute of selfishness.
By this term it is intended to express two things, to wit:-
(i.) Singleness, unmixed, or unmingled, and—
(ii) That selfishness is always as intense as under the circumstances
it can be. I will consider these two branches of the subject separately,
and in order.
(i.) Selfishness is simple in the sense of uncompounded or unmixed.
It consists, as we have repeatedly seen, in ultimate choice or intention.
It is the choice of an end, of course the Supreme as well as the ultimate
choice of the soul. Now it must be self-evident that no other and opposing
choice can consist with it. Nor can the mind, while in the exercise of this
choice of an end, possibly put forth any volitions inconsistent with it. Vo-
litions never are, and never can be, put forth but to secure some end, or, in
other words, for some reason. If they could, such volitions would have no
moral character, because there would be no intention. Intelligent volitions
must, of course, always imply intention. It is, therefore, impossible that
benevolent volitions should co-exist with a selfish intention, or that selfish
volitions should co-exist with a benevolent intention. Simplicity, in the
sense of uncompounded or unmixed, must be an attribute of selfishness.
This is evidently the philosophy assumed in the teachings of Christ and
of inspiration. “Ye cannot serve two masters"—that is, certainly, at
the same time—says Christ. And again : “Ye cannot serve God and
Mammon”—that is, of course at the same time. “Can a fountain at the same
place send forth sweet water and bitter"?” says James. Thus we see that
the Bible assumes, and expressly teaches, the philosophy here maintained.
(ii.) Selfishness is always as intense as under the circumstances it can be.
It is a choice. It is the choice of self-indulgence as an ultimate end.
Therefore, if repose is sought, it is only because the propensity to repose
at the time preponderates. If energetic, it is to secure some form of self-
indulgence, which, at the time, is preferred to ease. If at one time it is
more or less intense than at another, it is only because self-gratification at
the time demands it. Indeed, it is absurd to say, that it is more intense
at one time than at another, except as its intensity is increased by the
pressure of motives to abandon it, and become benevolent. If a selfish
man gives himself up to idleness, lounging, and sleeping, it is not for want
of intensity in the action of his will, but because his disposition to self-
indulgence in this form is stronger than in any other. So, if his selfishness
take on any possible type, it is only because of the strength of his disposi-
tion to indulge self in that particular way. Selfishness lives only for one
end, and it is impossible that that end, while it continues to be chosen,
should not have the supreme control. Indeed, the choice of an ultimate
286 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
end implies the consecration of the will to it, and it is a contradiction to
Say, that the will is not true to the end which it chooses, and that it acts less
intensely than is demanded by the nature of the end, and the apprehen-
sions of the mind in regard to the readiest way to realize it. The end is
chosen without qualification, or else not at all as an ultimate end. The
moment anything should intervene that should cause the mind to with-
hold the requisite energy to secure it, that moment it would cease to be
chosen as an ultimate end. That which has induced the will to withhold
the requisite energy, has become the Supreme object of regard. It is pal-
pably absurd to say, that the spirit of self-indulgence should not always be
as intense as will most tend, under all circumstances, to indulge self. The
intensity of the spirit of self-indulgence is always just what it is, and as it
is, because, and only because, self is the most indulged and gratified thereby.
If upon the whole, self would be more indulged and gratified by greater
or less intensity, it is impossible that that should not be. The presence of
considerations inducing to benevolence must either annihilate or strengthen
selfishness. The choice must be abandoned, or its intensity and obstimacy
must increase with, and in proportion to, increasing light. But at every
moment, the intensity of the selfish choice must be as great as is consistent
with its nature, that is, with its being the choice of self-indulgence.
(26.) Total moral depravity is implied in selfishness as one of its attri-
butes. By this I intend that every selfish being is at every moment as
wicked and as blameworthy as with his knowledge he can be. To establish
this proposition, I must,
(i.) Remind you of that in which moral character consists.
(ii.) Of the foundation of moral obligation.
(iii.) Of the conditions of moral obligation.
(iv.) Show the unity of moral obligation.
(v.) The unity of virtue and of vice.
(vi.) How to measure moral obligation.
(vii.) The guilt of transgression to be equal to the degree of obligation.
(viii.) Moral agents are at all times either as holy or as sinful as with their
knowledge they can be.
(ix.) Consequently, total moral depravity is an attribute of selfishness
in the sense that every sinner is as wicked as with his present light he
can be.
(1.) In what moral character consists.
It has been repeatedly shown that moral character belongs only to ulti-
mate intention, or that it consists in the choice of an ultimate end, or the
end of life.
(2.) The foundation of moral obligation.
(a.) Moral character implies moral obligation.
(b.) Moral obligation respects ultimate intention.
(c.) Ultimate choice or intention is the choice of an ultimate end, or
the choice of something for its own sake.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 287
(d.) The foundation of the obligation to choose or intend an end or
something for its own sake, must consist in the intrinsic value of the thing
to be chosen.
(e.) The highest good or well-being of God and of the universe is of
intrinsic and infinite value.
(f) Therefore, the highest well-being of God and of the universe of
sentient beings, is the foundation of moral obligation, that is, this is the
ultimate end to which all moral agents ought to consecrate themselves.
(iii) Conditions of moral obligation.
(a) The powers of moral agency: intellect, sensibility, and free-will.
(b) The existence and perception of the end that ought to be chosen.
(c.) Obligation to will the conditions and means of the good of being,
and to make executive efforts to secure this good, is conditioned as above,
and also upon the knowledge that there are means and conditions of this
good, and what they are, and upon the necessity, possibility, and assumed
utility, of executive efforts.
(iv.) Unity of moral obligation.
(a.) Moral obligation strictly belongs only to the ultimate intention.
(b.) It requires but one ultimate choice or intention.
(c.) It requires universally and only, that every moral agent should, at
all times, and under all circumstances, honestly will, choose, intend the
highest good of being as an end, or for its own intrinsic value, with all the
necessary conditions and means thereof. Therefore moral obligation is a
unit.
(v.) Unity of virtue and vice.
(a.) Virtue must be a unit, for it always and only consists in compliance
with moral obligation, which is a unit.
(b.) It always and only consists in one and the same choice, or in the
choice of one and the same end.
(c.) It has been fully shown that sin consists in selfishness, and that
selfishmess is an ultimate choicee, to wit, the choice of self-gratification as an
end, or for its own sake. -
(d.) Selfishness is always one and the same choice, or the choice of one
and the same end.
(e.) Therefore, selfishness or sin must be a unit.
(f) Or, more strictly, virtue is the moral element or attribute of dis-
interested benevolence or good-willing. And sin or vice is the moral
element or attribute of selfishness. Virtue is always the same attribute of
the same choice. They are, therefore, always and necessarily units.
(vi.) How to measure moral obligation.
(a.) It is affirmed, both by reason and revelation, that there are degrees
of guilt; that Some are more guilty than others; and that the same
individual may be more guilty at one time than at another,
(b.) The same is true of virtue. One person may be more virtuous
than another, when both are truly virtuous. And also the same person
may be more virtuous at one time than at another, although he may be
288 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
virtuous at all times. In other words, it is affirmed, both by reason and
revelation, that there is such a thing as growth, both in virtue and vice.
(c.) It is matter of general belief, also, that the same individual, with
the same degree of light or knowledge, is more or less praise or blame-
worthy, as he shall do one thing or another ; or, in other words, as he shall
pursue one course or another, to accomplish the end he has in view ; or,
which is the same thing, that the same individual, with the same know-
ledge or light, is more or less virtuous or vicious, according to the course
of outward life which he shall pursue. This I shall attempt to show is
human prejudice, and a serious and most injurious error.
(d.) It is also generally held that two or more individuals, having
precisely the same degree of light or knowledge, and being both equally
benevolent or selfish, may, nevertheless, differ in their degree of virtue or
vice, according as they pursue different courses of outward conduct. This
also, I shall attempt to show, is fundamental error,
We can arrive at the truth upon this subject only by clearly understand-
ing how to measure moral obligation, and of course how to ascertain the
degree of virtue and sin. The amount or degree of virtue or vice, or of
praise or blame-worthiness, is and must be decided by reference to the
degree of obligation.
It is very important to remark here, that virtue does not merit so much
praise and reward as vice does blame and punishment. This is the uni-
versal and necessary affirmation of reason, and the plain doctrine of inspi-
ration. The reason is this : virtue is a compliance with obligation. Christ
says, “When you have done all, say, we are unprofitable servants; we have
done what it was our duty to do.” To suppose that virtue is as deserving
of reward as vice is of punishment, were to overlook obligation altogether,
and make virtue a work of Supererogation, or that to which we are under
no obligation. Suppose I owe a hundred dollars; when I pay I only dis-
charge my obligation, and lay my creditor under no obligation to me, except
to treat me as an honest man, when and as long as I am such. This is all
the reward which the discharge of duty merits.
But suppose I refuse to pay when it is in my power; here my desert of
blame, as every body must know, and as the Bible everywhere teaches, is
vastly greater than my desert of praise in the former case. The difference
lies in this, namely, that virtue is nothing more than a compliance with
obligation. It is the doing of that which could not have been neglected
without sin. Hence all the reward which it merits is, that the virtuous
being, so long as he is virtuous, shall be regarded and treated as one who
does his duty, and complies with his obligations.
But vice is violence done to obligation. It is a refusal to do what ought
to be done. In this case it is clear, that the guilt is equal to the obligation,
that is, the measure of obligation is the measure of guilt. This brings us
to the point of inquiry now before us, namely, how is moral obligation to
be measured 2 What is the criterion, the rule, or standard by which the
amount or degree of obligation is to be estimated 2
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 289
And here I would remind you—
(a) That moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of the high-
est well-being of God and the universe ; and,-
(b.) That the conditions of the obligation are the possession of the
powers of moral agency and light, or the knowledge of the end to be
chosen.
(c.) Hence it follows that the obligation is to be measured by the mind's
honest apprehension or judgment of the intrinsic value of the end to be
chosen. That this, and nothing else, is the rule or standard by which the
obligation, and, consequently, the guilt of violating it, is to be measured,
will appear if we consider—
(a.) That the obligation cannot be measured by the infinity of God,
apart from the knowledge of the infinite value of His interests. He is an
infinite being, and his well-being must be of intrinsic and of infinite value.
But unless this be known to a moral agent, he cannot be under obligation
to will it as an ultimate end. If he knows it to be of some value, he is
bound to choose it for that reason. But the measure of his obligation
must be just equal to the clearness of his apprehension of its intrinsic
value.
Besides, if the infinity of God were alone, or without reference to the
knowledge of the agent, the rule by which moral obligation is to be mea-
sured, it would follow, that obligation is in all cases the same, and of course
that the guilt of disobedience would also in all cases be the same. But
this, as has been said, contradicts both reason and revelation. Thus it
appears, that moral obligation, and of course guilt, cannot be measured by
the infinity of God, without reference to the knowledge of the agent.
(b.) It cannot be measured by the infinity of His authority, without
reference to the knowledge of the agent, for the same reasons as above.
(c.) It cannot be measured by the infinity of his moral excellence,
without reference, both to the infinite value of his interests, and of the
knowledge of the agent; for his interests are to be chosen as an end, or for
their own value, and without knowledge of their value there can be no
obligation ; nor can obligation exceed knowledge. -
(d.) If, again, the infinite excellence of God were alone, or without
reference to the knowledge of the agent, to be the rule by which moral
obligation is to be measured, it would follow, that guilt in all cases of
disobedience, is and must be equal. This we have seen cannot be.
(e.) It cannot be measured by the intrinsic value of the good, or well-
being of God and the universe, without reference to the knowledge of the
agent, for the same reason as above.
(f) It cannot be measured by the particular course of life pursued by
the agent. This will appear, if we consider that moral obligation has
directly nothing to do with the outward life. It directly respects the
ultimate intention only, and that decides the course of outward action
or life. The guilt of any outward action cannot be decided by reference to
the kind of action, without regard to the intention, for the moral character
U
290 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
of the act must be found in the intention, and not in the outward act or
life. This leads me to remark that—
(g.) The degree of moral obligation, and of course the degree of the
guilt of disobedience, cannot be properly estimated by reference to the
mature of the intention, without respect to the degree of the knowledge of
the agent. Selfish intention is, as we have seen, a unit, always the same ;
and if this were the standard, by which the degree of guilt is to be mea-
sured, it would follow that it is always the same.
(h.) Nor can obligation, nor the degree of guilt, be measured by the tend-
ency of sin. All sin tends to infinite evil, to ruin the sinner, and from its
contagious nature, to spread and ruin the universe. Nor can any finite mind
know what the ultimate results of any sin may be, nor to what particular
evil it may tend. As all sin tends to universal and eternal evil, if this were
the criterion by which the guilt is to be estimated, all sin would be equally
guilty, which cannot be.
Again : That the guilt of sin cannot be measured by the tendency of sin,
is manifest from the fact, that moral obligation is not founded in the ten-
dency of action or intention, but in the intrinsic value of the end to be
intended. Estimating moral obligation, or measuring sin or holiness, by
the mere tendency of actions, is the utilitarian philosophy, which we have
shown to be false. Moral obligation respects the choice of an end, and is
founded upon the intrinsic value of the end, and is not so much as condi-
tionated upon the tendency of the ultimate choice to secure its end.
Therefore, tendency can never be the rule by which obligation can be
measured, mor, of course, the rule by which guilt can be estimated.
(i.) Nor can moral obligation be estimated by the results of a moral
action or course of action. Moral obligation respects intention, and respects
results no further than they were intended. Much good may result, as
from the death of Christ, without any virtue in Judas, but with much guilt.
So, much evil may result, as from the creation of the world, without guilt
in the Creator, but with great virtue. If moral olligation is not founded
or conditionated on results, it follows that guilt cannot be duly estimated
by results, without reference to knowledge and intention.
(j) What has been said has, I trust, rendered it evident, that moral obli-
gation is to be measured by the mind's honest apprehension or judgment
of the intrinsic value of the end to be chosen, to wit, the highest well-being
of God and the universe.
It should be distinctly understood, that selfishness involves the rejection
of the interests of God and of the universe, for the sake of one's own. It
refuses to will good, but upon condition that,it belongs to self. It spurns
God’s interests and those of the universe, and seeks only self-interest as an
ultimate end. It must follow, them, that the selfish man's guilt is just
equal to his knowledge of the intrinsic value of those interests that he re-
jects. This is undeniably the doctrine of the Bible. I will introduce a
few paragraphs from one of my reported Sermons upon this subject.
(a.) The scriptures assume and affirm it.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 291
Acts xvii. 30, affords a plain instance. The apostle alludes to those
past ages when the heathen nations had no written revelation from God,
and remarks that “ those times of ignorance God Winked at." This does
not mean that God did not regard their conduct as criminal in any degree,
but it does mean that he regarded it as a sin of far less aggravation, than
that which men would now commit, if they turned away when God com-
manded them all to repent. True, sin is never absolutely a light thing ;
but some sins incur small guilt, when compared with the great guilt of
other sins. This is implied in the text quoted above.
I next cite, James iv. 17.—“To him that knoweth to do good, and
doeth it not, to him it is sin.” This plainly implies that knowledge is
indispensable to moral obligation; and even more than this is implied,
namely, that the guilt of any sinner is always equal to the amount of his
knowledge on the subject. It always corresponds to the mind's perception
of the value of the end which should have been chosen, but is rejected. If
a man knows he ought, in any given case, to do good, and yet does not do
it, to him this is sin—the sin plainly lying in the fact of not doing good
when he knew that he could do it, and being measured as to its guilt by
the degree of that knowledge.
John ix. 41.-" Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind, ye should have
no sin: but now ye say, We see; therefore, your sin remaineth.” Here
Christ asserts that men without knowledge would be without sin : and that
men who have knowledge, and sin notwithstanding, are held guilty. This
plainly affirms, that the presence of light or knowledge is requisite to the
existence of sin, and obviously implies that the amount of knowledge pos-
sessed is the measure of the guilt of sin.
It is remarkable that the Bible everywhere assumes first truths. It
does not stop to prove them, or even assert them—but seems to assume,
that every one knows and will admit them. As I have been recently
writing on moral government, and studying the Bible as to its teachings
on this class of subjects, I have been often struck with this remarkable fact.
John xv. 22–24.— If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had
not had sin : but now they have no cloak for their sin. He that hateth
me, hateth my Father also. If I had not done among them the works
which none other man did, they had not had sin; but now have they both
seen and hated both me and my Father,” Christ holds the same doctrine
here as in the last passage cited ; light essential to constitute sin, and the
degree of light constituting the measure of its aggravation.
Let it be observed, however, that Christ probably did not mean to affirm
in the absolute sense, that if he had not come, the Jews would have lite-
rally had no sin; for they would have had some light, if he had not come.
He speaks, as I suppose, comparatively. Their sin, if he had not come,
would have been so much less as not to justify his strong language of con-
demnation.
Luke xii. 47, 48.—“And that servant which knew his lord's will, and
prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with
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MORAL GOVERNMENT. 293
even as it were to heaven, must be brought down to the deepest hell. Guilt
and punishment, evermore, according to light enjoyed, but resisted.
Luke xi. 47–51–4. Woe unto you! for ye build the sepulchres of the
prophets, and your fathers killed them. Truly ye bear witness that ye allow
the deeds of your fathers: for they indeed killed them, and ye build their
sepulchres. Therefore also said the wisdom of God, I will send them
prophets and apostles, and some of them they shall slay and persecute :
that the blood of all the prophets, which was shed from the foundation of
the world, may be required of this generation. From the blood of Abel
unto the blood of Zacharias, which perished between the altar and the
temple: verily, I say unto you, it shall be required of this generation.”
Now here I ask, on what principle was it, that all the blood of martyred
prophets, ever since the world began, was required of that generation ?
Because they deserved it; for God does no such thing as injustice. It never
was known that he punished any people, or any individual, beyond their
desert.
But why, and how, did they deserve this fearful and augmented visitation
of the wrath of God for past centuries of persecution 2
The answer is two-fold : they sinned against accumulated light, and they
virtually endorsed all the persecuting deeds of their fathers, and concurred
most heartily in their guilt. They had all the oracles of God. The whole
history of the nation lay in their hands. They knew the blameless and
holy character of those prophets who had been martyred ; they could read
the guilt of their persecutors and murderers. Yet under all this light,
they go straight on and perpetrate deeds of the same sort, but of far deeper
malignity.
Again: in doing this, they virtually endorse all that their fathers did.
Their conduct towards the Man of Nazareth put intô words would read
thus : “The holy men whom God sent to teach and rebuke our fathers,
they maliciously traduced and put to death; they did right, and we will do
the same thing toward Christ.” Now, it was not possible for them to give a
more decided sanction to the bloody deeds of their fathers. They under-
wrote for every crime—assumed upon their own consciences all the guilt of
their fathers. In intention, they do those deeds over again. They in effect
say, “If we had lived then, we should have done and sanctioned all they
did.”
On the same principle, the accumulated guilt of all the blood and miseries
of slavery since the world began, rests on this nation now. The guilt
involved in every pang, every tear, every blood-drop foreed out by the
knotted scourge—all lie at the door of this generation.
Why? Because the history of all the past is before the pro-slavery men
of this generation, and they endorse the whole by persisting in the practice
of the same system, and of the same wrongs. No generation before us ever
had the light on the evils and the wrongs of slavery that we have : hence
our guilt exceeds that of any former generation of slave-holders; and
moreover, knowing all the cruel wrongs and miseries of the system from
294 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the history of the past, every persisting slave-holder endorses all the crimes,
and assumes all the guilt, involved in the system, and evolved out of it,
since the world began. º
Rom. vii. 13.−“Was then that which is good made death unto me?
God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by
that which is good, that sin by the commandment might become exceeding
sinful.” The last clause of this verse brings out clearly the principle, that
under the light which the commandment, that is, the law, affords, sin
becomes exceeding guilty. This is the very principle, which, we have seen,
is so clearly taught and implied in numerous passages of scripture.
The diligent reader of the Bible knows that these are only a part of the
texts which teach the same doctrine: we need not adduce any more.
(b.) I remark, that this is the rule, and the only just rule, by which the
guilt of sin can be measured. If I had time to turn the subject over and
over—time to take up every other conceivable supposition, I could show
that none of them can possibly be true. No supposition can abide a close
examination except this, that the rule or measure of guilt is the mind's
knowledge pertaining to the value of the end to be chosen.
There can be no other criterion by which guilt can be measured. It is
the value of the end that ought to be chosen, which constitutes sin guilty,
and the mind's estimate of that value measures its own guilt. This is true
according to the Bible, as we have seen ; and every man needs only consult
his own consciousness faithfully, and he will see that it is equally affirmed
by the mind's own intuitions to be right.
(vii.) The guilt of transgression is just equal to the degree of obligation.
(a.) The guilt of sin lies in its being the violation of an obligation.
(b.) It must follow, that the degree of the guilt of violation must be
just equal to the degree of obligation. This, as we have seen, is not true of
virtue, for reasons before stated. But it must be true of vice.
(c.) Moral obligation respects the choice of an end. The amount of the
obligation must be just equal to the mind's apprehension of the intrinsic
value of the end to be chosen. The guilt of transgression is, and must be,
just equal to the amount of the obligation. This conducts us to the
conclusion or truth to be demonstrated, namely :—
(viii.) That moral agents are, at all times, either as holy or as sinful as
with their knowledge they can be.
This will more fully appear, if we consider—
(a.) That moral obligation, strictly speaking, respects ultimate intention
alone.
(b.) That obligation to choose or intend an end is founded in the
apprehended intrinsic value of the end.
(e.) That, when this end is chosen in accordance with apprehended
value, all present obligation is met or complied with, since the choice of
the end implies and includes the choice of all the known necessary con-
ditions and means of this end. Virtue is now complete, in the sense that
it can only be increased by increased light, in regard to the value of the
MORAL GOVERNMENT, 295
end. New relations and interests may be discovered, or the mind may
come to apprehend more clearly the intrinsic value of those partially known
before. In this case, virtue may increase, but not otherwise. It matters
not as to the virtue of the choice, what particular course is taken to realize
this end. The intention is honest. It is, and to be honest, must be
intense according to the mind's apprehension of the intrinsic value of the
end. The mind cannot but act in accordance with its best judgment, in
regard to the use of means to compass its end. Whatever it does it does
for one and the same reason. Its virtue belongs to its intention. The
intention remaining, virtue does not, cannot vary, but with varying light,
This renders it evident, that the virtuous man is as virtuous as with his
present light he can be. Give him more light, and you may increase his
virtue, by causing it to be more intense.
The same must be true of sin or selfishness. We have seen in former
lectures, that malevolence, in the sense of Willing evil for its own Sake, is
impossible; that selfishness is ultimate intention, or the choice of self.
gratification as an end; that the obligation to benevolence is founded in
the intrinsic value of the good of God and the universée that the amount of
obligation is equal to the mind's apprehension or knowledge of the value of
the end ; that sin is a unit, and always consists in violating this obligation
by the choice of an opposite end ; that the guilt of this violation depends
upon, and is equal to, the mind's apprehension of the intrinsic value of the
end it ought to choose.
Selfishness is the rejection of all obligation. It is the violation of all
obligation. The sin of selfishness is then complete : that is, the guilt of
selfishness is as great as with its present light it can be What can make
it greater with present light? Can the course that it takes to realize its
end mitigate its guilt? No: for whatever course it takes, it is for a selfish
reason, and, therefore, in mowise lessens the guilt of the intention. Can
the course it takes to realize its end without more light, increase the guilt
of the sin 2 No : for the sin lies exclusively in having the selfish intention,
and the guilt can be measured only by the degree of illumination or know-
ledge under which the intention is formed and maintained. The intention
necessitates the use of the means ; and whatever means the selfish person
uses, it is for one and the same reason, to gratify himself. As I said in a
former lecture, if the selfish man were to preach the gospel, it would be
only because, upon the whole, it was most pleasing or gratifying to himself,
and not at all for the sake of the good of being, as an end. If he should
become a pirate, it would be for exactly the same reason, to wit, that this
course is, upon the whole, most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at
all for the reason that that course is evil in itself. Whichever course he
takes, he takes it for precisely the same ultimate reason; and with the
same degree of light it must involve the same degree of guilt. If light
increase, his guilt must increase, but not otherwise. The proposition is,
that every selfish being is, at every moment, as blame-worthy as with his
present knowledge he can be. Which of these courses may tend ultimately
296 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to the most evil, no finite being can say, nor which shall result in the
greatest evil. Guilt is not to be measured by unknown tendencies or
results, but belongs to the intention; and its degree is to be measured
alone by the mind's apprehension of the reason of the obligation violated,
namely, the intrinsic value of the good of God and the universe, which
selfishness rejects. Now, it should be remembered, that whichever course
the sinner takes to realize his end, it is the end at which he aims. He
intends the end. If he become a preacher of the gospel for a selfish reason,
he has no right regard to the good of being. If he regards it at all, it is
only as a means of his own good. So, if he becomes a pirate, it is not
from malice, or a disposition to do evil for its own sake, but only to gratify
himself. If he has any regard at all to the evil he may do, it is only to
gratify himself that he regards it. Whether, therefore, he preach or pray,
or rob and plunder upon the high seas, he does it only for One end, that is,
for precisely the same ultimate reason; and of course his sinfulness is com-
plete, in the sense that it can be varied only by varying light. This I know
is contrary to common opinion, but it is the truth, and must be known ; and
it is of the highest importance that these fundamental truths of morality and
of immorality should be held up to the minds of all.
Should the sinner abstain from any course of vice because it is wicked,
it cannot be because he is benevolent, for this would contradict the suppo-
sition that he is selfish, or that he is a sinner. If, in consideration that an
act or course is wicked, he abstains from it, it must be for a selfish reason.
It may be in obedience to phrenological conscientiousness, or it may be
from fear of hell, or of disgrace, or from remorse ; at all events, it cannot
but be for some selfish reason.
(ix.) Total moral depravity is an attribute of selfishness, in the sense,
that every selfish person is at all times just as Wicked and blameworthy as
with his present light he can be.
(a.) He, remaining selfish, can take no other course than to please
himself, and only that course which is, upon the whole, most pleasing to him
for the time being. If he takes one course of outward conduct, rather than
another, it is only to please and gratify himself.
(b.) But if, for this reason, he should take any other outward course
than he does, it would not vary his guilt, for his guilt lies in the intention,
and is measured by the light under which the intention is maintained.
A few inferences may be drawn from our doctrine.
1. Guilt is not to be measured by the mature of the intention; for sinful
intention is always a unit—always one and the same thing—being nothing
more nor less than an intention to gratify self.
2. Nor can it be measured by the particular type of self-gratification
which the mind may prefer. No matter which of his numerous appetites
or propensities the man may choose to indulge, whether for food, or strong
drink, for power, pleasure, or gain, it is the same thing in the end, self-
gratification, and nothing else. For the sake of this he sacrifices every
other conflicting interest, and herein lies his guilt. Since he tramples on
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 297
the greater good of others with equal recklessness, whatever type of self-
gratification he prefers, it is clear, that we cannot find in this type the true
measure of his guilt.
3. Nor, again, is the guilt to be decided by the amount of evil which
the sin may occasion. An agent not enlightened may, by accident, or
even with a good intention, do that which will introduce great evil, and yet
no guilt attach to this agent. In fact, it matters not how much or how
little unforeseen good or evil may result from the deeds of a moral agent,
you cannot determine the amount of his guilt, or of his virtue, from this
circumstance. God may overrule the greatest sin, so that but little evil
shall result from it; or he may leave its tendencies uncounteracted, so that
great evils shall result from the least sin. Who can, tell how much or how
little overruling agency may interpose between any sin, great or small, and
its legitimate results P
Satan simmed in tempting Judas, and Judas sinned in betraying Christ.
Yet God so overruled these sins, that most blessed results to the universe
followed from Christ's betrayal and consequent death. Shall the sins of
Satan and Judas be estimated from the evils actually resulting from them 2
If it should appear that the good immensely overbalanced the evil, does
their sin thereby become holiness—meritorious holiness? Is their guilt
at all the less for God’s wisdom and love in overruling it for gºod 2 It is
not, therefore, the amount of resulting good or evil which determines
the amount of guilt, but the degree of light enjoyed under which the sin
is committed.
4. Nor, again, can guilt be measured by the common opinions of men.
Men associated in society are wont to form among themselves a sort of
public sentiment, which becomes a standard for estimating guilt; yet how
often is it erroneous ! Christ warns us against adopting this standard, and
also against ever judging according to the outward appearance. Who does
mot know that the common opinions of men are exceedingly incorrect 2
It is, indeed, Wonderful to see how far they diverge in all directions from
the Bible standard.
5. The amount of guilt can be determined, as I have said, only by the
degree in which those ideas are developed which throw light upon obliga-
tion. Just here sin lies, in resisting the light, and acting in opposition to
it; and, therefore, the degree of light should naturally measure the amount
of guilt incurred.
REMARKS.
1. We see, from this subject, the principle on which many passages of
scripture are to be explained. It might seem strange that Christ should
charge the blood of all the martyred prophets of past ages on that genera-
tion. But the subject before us reveals the principle upon which this is done,
and ought to be done.
Whatever of apparent mystery may attach to the fact declared in our
text, “The times of this ignorance God winked at,” finds in our subject an
298 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
adequate explanation. Does it seem strange, that for ages God should
pass over, almost without apparent notice, the monstrous and reeking
aboutinations of the heathem world? The reason is found in their ignorance.
Therefore God winks at those odious and cruel idolatries. For all, taken
together, are a trifle, compared with the guilt of a single generation of
enlightened men.
2. One sinner may be in such circumstances, as to have more light and
knowledge than the Whole heathem world. Alas ! how little the heathen
know ! How little compared with what is known by simmers in this land,
even by very young sinners'
Let me call up and question some impenitent sinner of Oberlin. It
matters but little whom—let it be any sabbath-school child.
What do you know about God? I know that there is one God, and
only one. The heathem believe there are hundreds of thousands.
What do you know about God 2 I know that he is infinitely great
and good.—But the heathen think some of their gods are both mean and
mischievous, wicked as can be, and the very patrons of wickedness among
In 1621).
What do you know about salvation ? I know that “ God so loved the
world as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever would believe in
him might live for ever." O, the heathen never heard of that. They
would faint away, methinks, in amazement, if they should hear and really
believe the startling, glorious fact. And that sabbath-school child knows
that God gives his Spirit to convince of sin. He has, perhaps, often been
sensible of the presence and power of that Spirit. But the heathen know
nothing of this.
You, too, lºnow that you are immortal—that beyond death there is still
a conscious unchanging state of existence, blissful or wretched, according
to the deeds done here. But the heathen have no just ideas on this
subject. It is to them as if all were a blank.
The amount of it, them, is, that you know everything—the heathen
almost nothing. You know all you need to know to be saved, to be useful
—to honour God, and serve your generation according to his will. The
heathen sit in deep darkness, wedded to their abominations, groping, yet
finding nothing.
As your light, therefore, so is your guilt immeasurably greater than
theirs. Be it so, that their idolatries are monstrous, guilt in your impeni-
tence, and under the light you have, is vastly more so. See that heathen
mother dragging her shrieking child and casting it into the Ganges See
her rush with another to throw him into the burning arms of Moloch.
Mark see that pile of wood flashing, lifting up its lurid flames toward
heaven. Those men are dragging a dead husband, they heave his sense-
less corpse on that burning pile. There comes the widow, her hair all
dishevelled and flying, gaily decked for such a sacrifice ; she dances on ;
she rends the air with her howls and her wailings; she shrinks, and yet
she does not shrink; she leaps on the pile, and the din of music, with the
MORAL GOVERNMENT, 299
yell of spectators, buries her shrieks of agony : she is gone O, my blood
curdles and runs cold in my veins; my hair stands on end ; I am
horrified with such scenes; but what shall we say of their guilt 2. Ah,
yes, what do they know of God, of worship, of the claims of God upon
their heart and life? Ah, you may well spare your censure of the heathen
for their fearful orgies of cruelty and lust, and express it where light has
been enjoyed and resisted.
3. You see, then, that often a sinner in Some of our congregations may
know more than all the heathen world know. If this be true, what follows
from it, as to the amount of his comparative guilt? This, inevitably, that
such a simmer deserves a direr and deeper damnation than all the heathen
world ! This conclusion may seem startling; but how can we escape from
it? We cannot escape. It is as plaim as any mathematical demonstration.
This is the principle asserted by Christ when he said, “That servant which
knew his lord’s will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to
his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, and did
commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.”
Not long since, an ungodly young man, trained in this country, wrote
back from the Sandwich Islands, a glowing, and perhaps a just description
of their horrible abominations, moralizing on their monstrous enormities,
and thanking God that he had been born and taught in a Christian land.
Indeed he might well have spared this censure of the dark-minded
heathem His own guilt, in remaining an impenitent sinner under all the
light of Christian America, was greater than the whole aggregrate guilt of
all those islands.
So we may all well spare our expressions of abhorrence at the guilty
abominations of idolatry. You are often, perhaps, saying in your heart,
Why does God endure these horrid abominations another day ? See that
rolling car of Juggernaut. Its wheels move axle-deep in the gushing blood
and crushed bones of its deluded worshippers And yet God looks on, and
no red bolt leaps from his right hand to smite such wickedness. They are,
indeed, guilty; but, O, how small their guilt, compared with the guilt of
those who know their duty perfectly, yet never do it! God sees their
horrible abominations, yet does he wink at them, because they are done in
So much ignoranee.
But see that impenitent sinner. Convicted of his sin under the clear
gospel light that shines all around him, he is driven to pray. He knows
he ought to repent, and almost thinks he is willing to, and will try. Yet
still he clings to his sins, and will not give his heart to God. Still he
holds his heart in a state of impenitence. Now mark me;—his sin, in
thus withholding his heart from God under so much light, involves greater
guilt than all the abominations of the heathem world. Put together the
guilt of all those widows who immolate themselves on the funeral pile—of
those who hurl their children into the Ganges, or into the burning arms of
Moloch-all does not begin to approach the guilt of that convicted sinner's
prayer, who comes before God under the pressure of his conscience, and
300 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
prays a heartless prayer, determined all the while to withhold his heart
from God. O, why does this sinner thus tempt God, and thus abuse his
love, and thus trample on his authority ? O, that moment of impenitence,
while his prayers are forced by conscience from his burning lips, and yet
he will not yield the controversy with his Maker, that moment involves
direr guilt than rests on all the heathen world together | He knows more
than they all, yet sins despite of all his knowledge. The many stripes
belong to him—the few to them.
4. This leads me to remark again, that the Christian world may very
well spare their revilings and condemnations of the heathem. Of all the por-
tions of earth's population, Christendom is infinitely the most guilty—Chris-
tendom, where the gospel peals from ten thousand pulpits—where Christ's
praises are sung by a thousand choirs, but where many thousand hearts
that know God and duty, refuse either to reverence the one, or perform the
other All the abominations of the heathem world are a mere trifle com-
pared with the guilt of Christendom. We may look down upon the filth,
and meanness, and degradation of a heathem people, and feel a most polite
disgust at the spectacle—and far be it from me to excuse these degrading,
filthy, or cruel practices ; but how small their light, and consequently their
guilt, compared with our own We, therefore, ask the Christian world to
turn away from the spectacle of heathem degradation, and look nearer
home upon the spectacle of Christian guilt | Let us look upon ourselves.
5. Again : let us not fear to say, what you must all see to be true, that
the nominal church is the most guilty part of Christendom. It cannot for
a moment be questioned, that the church has more light than any other
portion; therefore has she more guilt. Of course I speak of the nominal
church—not the real church, whom its Lord has pardoned, and cleansed
from her sins. But in the nominal church, think of the simmers that live and
riot in their corruption. See that backslider. He has tasted the waters
of life. He has been greatly enlightened. Perhaps he has really known
the Lord by true faith—and then see, he turns away to eat the husks of
earthly pleasure . He turns his back on the bleeding Lamb | Now, put
together all the guilt of every heathen soul that has gone to hell—of every
soul that has gone from a state of utter moral darkness; and your guilt,
backsliding Christian, is greater than all theirs
Do you, therefore, say: may God then have mercy on my soul? So say
we all; but we must add, if it be possible ; for who can say that such guilt
as yours can be forgiven 2 Can Christ pray for you as he prayed for his
murderers—“Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do 2"
Can he plead in your behalf that you know not what you are doing?
Awful! awful | | Where is the sounding line that shall measure the ocean-
depth of your guilt?
6. Again : if our children remain in sin, we may cease to congratulate
ourselves that they were not born in heathenism or slavery ! How often
have I done this How often, as I have looked upon my Sons and
daughters, have I thanked God that they were not born to be thrown into
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 301
the burning arms of a Moloch, or to be crushed under the wheels of Jug-
germaut . But if they will live in sin, we must suspend our self-congratu-
lations for their having Christian light and privileges. If they will not
repent, it were infinitely better for them to have been born in the thickest
pagan darkness, better to have been thrown, in their tender years, into
the Ganges, or into the fires which idolatry kindles, better be any thing
else, or suffer any thing earthly, than have the gospel's light only to shut
it out, and go to hell despite of its admonitions.
Let us not, them, be hasty in congratulating ourselves, as if this great
light enjoyed by us and by our children, were, of course, a certain good to
them ; but this we may do, we may rejoice that God will honour himself,
his mercy if he can, and his justice if he must. God will be honoured,
and we may glory in this. But oh, the sinner, the simmer ' Who can
measure the depth of his guilt, or the terror of his final doom | It will be
more tolerable for all the heathem world together than for you.
7. It is time that we all understood this subject fully, and appreciated
all its bearings. It is no doubt true, that however moral our children may
be, they are more guilty than any other sinners under heaven, if they live
in sin, and will not yield to the light under which they live. We may be,
perhaps, congratulating ourselves on their fair morality; but if we saw
their case in all its real bearings, our souls would groan with agony, our
bowels would be all liquid with anguish, our very hearts within us would
heave as if volcanic fires were kindled there; so deep a sense should we
have of their fearful guilt, and of the awful doom they incur in denying
the Lord that bought them, and setting at nought a known salvation. O,
if we ever pray, we should pour out our prayers for our offspring, as if
nothing could ever satisfy us or stay our importunity, but the blessings of
a full salvation realized in their souls.
Let the mind contemplate the guilt of these children. I could not find
a Sabbath-School child, perhaps not one in all Christendom, who could not
tell me more of God's Salvation than all the heathen world know. That
dear little boy who comes from his sabbath-school knows all about the
gospel. He is almost ready to be converted, but not quite ready; yet that
little boy, if he knows his duty, and yet will not do it, is covered with more
guilt than all the heathen world together. Yes, that boy, who goes alone
and prays, yet holds back his heart from God, and then his mother comes
and prays over him, and pours her tears on his head, and his little heart
almost melts, and he seems on the very point of giving up his whole heart
to the Saviour; yet if he will not do it, he commits more sin in that
refusal, than all the sin of all the heathem world; his guilt is more than
the guilt of all the murders, all the drownings of children, and burnings of
widows, and deeds of cruelty and violence, in all the heathem world. All
this combination of guilt shall not be equal to the guilt of the lad who
knows his duty, but will not yield his heart to its righteous claims.
8. “The heathem,” says an apostle, “sin without law, and shall there-
fore perish without law.” In their final doom they will be cast away from
302 SYSTEMATIC 'THEOLOGY.
God: this will be perhaps about all. The bitter reflection, “I had the
light of the gospel, and would not yield to it; I knew all my duty, yet did
it not"—this cannot be a part of their eternal doom. This is reserved for
those who gather themselves into our sanctuaries and around our family
altars, yet will not serve their own Infinite Father.
9. One more remark. Suppose I should call out a sinner by name—one
of the sinners of this congregation, a son of pious parents, and should call
up the father also. I might say, Is this your son 2 Yes. What testimony
can you bear about this son of yours ? I have endeavoured to teach him
all the ways of the Lord. Son, what can you say? I knew my duty—I
have heard it a thousand times. I knew I ought to repent, but I never
would.
Oh, if we understood this matter in all its bearings, it would fill every
bosom with consternation and grief. How would our bowels yearn and our
bosoms heave as a volcano. There would be one universal outcry of
anguish and terror at the awful guilt and fearful doom of such a sinner
Young man, are you going away this day in your sins 2 Then, what
angel can compute your guilt? O how long has Jesus held out his hands,
yes, his bleeding hands, and besought you to look and live? A thousand
times, and in countless varied ways has he called, but you have refused ;
stretched out his hand, and you have not regarded. Oh, will you not
repent 2 Why not say at once : It is enough that I have sinned so long.
I cannot live so any longer Oh, sinner, why will you live so 2 Would
you go down to hell—ah, to the deepest hell—where, if we would find you,
we must work our way down for a thousand years, through ranks of lost
spirits less guilty than you, ere we could reach the fearful depth to which
you have sunk Oh, sinner, what a hell is that which can adequately
punish such guilt as thine !
LECTURE XXXII.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
I. A RETURN TO OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW IS, AND MUST BE, UNDER
EVERY DISPENSATION OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT, THE UNALTERABLE CON-
DITION OF SAILVATION.
II. UNDER A GRACIOUS DISPENSATION, A RETURN TO OBEDIENCE To MoRAL
LAW IS NOT DISTENSED WITH AS THE CONDITION OF SALVATION, BUT THAT
OBEDIENCE TO LAW IS SECURED BY THE INDWELLING SPIRIT AND GRACE OF
CHRIST,
I. A RETURN TO OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW IS, AND MUST BE, UNDER
EVERY DISPENSATION OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT, THE UNALTERABLE CON-
DITION OF SALVATION.
1. Salvation upon any other condition is naturally impossible. With-
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 303
out holiness salvation is out of the question. But holiness and full obedi.
ence to the moral law are the same thing.
2. The gospel is not a repeal of the law, but designed to establish it.
3. As the moral law is the law of nature, it is absurd to suppose, that
a return to entire obedience to it should not be the unalterable condition
of salvation, that is, that salvation should be possible upon a less condition
than a return, on the part of sinners, to the state of mind required by this
law of nature.
4. The Bible everywhere represents the perfect love required by the
law as indispensable to salvation. It is naturally indispensable.
Perhaps some one will say, that it is true, indeed, that one cannot enter
heaven without first becoming entirely obedient to the divine law, but that
this obedience may first take place immediately after death. I reply,–that
the uniform representation of the Bible is, that men shall be judged accord-
ing to the deeds done in the body, and that the state of mind in which they
enter the eternal world, shall decide their destiny for ever. It is nowhere
so much as hinted in the Bible, that men shall be saved in consequence Or
upon condition of a change that takes place after death. But the opposite
of this is the unvarying teaching of the Bible. If men are not holy here,
they never will be holy. If they are not sanctified by the Spirit and the
belief of the truth in this life, there is no intimation in the Bible that they
ever will be ; but the contrary of this is the plain and unequivocal teaching
of the Bible. The work of regeneration and sanctification is always repre-
sented as being instrumentally effected by the instrumentality and agency
of those means that Christ has provided in this world. “But unto every
one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ.
Wherefore he saith, When he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive,
and gave gifts unto men. Now that he ascended, what is it but that he
also descended first into the lower parts of the earth 2 He that descended
is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that he might fill
all things. And he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some,
evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the
saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ:
till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son
of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness
of Christ.” Eph. iv. 7–13. This passage is only a specimen of
scripture declarations and teachings upon this subject. It unequivocally
teaches the entire sanctification of the whole mystical body, or church of
Christ, in this life, or by the means which he has provided, and which means
relate exclusively to this life.
II. UNDER A GRACIOUS DISPENSATION, A RETURN to FULL OREDIENCE
To MORAL LAW IS NOT DISPENSED WITH As A coSDITION of s \LVATION,
BUT THIS OBEDIENCE IS SECURED BY THE INDWELLING SPIIRIT OF CHRIST
RECEIVED BY FAITH TO REIGN IN THE HEART.
In discussing this proposition I shall endeavour to show,
304 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
1. That salvation by grace does not dispense with a return to full obedience
to law as a condition of salvation, and—
2. That the grace of the gospel is designed to restore sinners to full obedi-
ence to the law. *
3. That the efficient influence that secures this conformity to law is the
Spirit of Christ, or the Holy Spirit received into, and reigning in, the heart,
by faith.
1. Salvation by grace does not dispense with a return to full obedience as
a condition of salvation.
There is a class of scripture texts which have been quoted by antinomians
in support of the doctrine, that salvation is not conditionated upon personal
holiness, or upon a return to full obedience. It has been found very con-
venient, by many who were lovers of sin, and never conscious of personal
holiness, to adopt the idea of an imputed holiness, contenting themselves
with an outward righteousness imputed to them, instead of subunitting by
faith to have the righteousness of God wrought in them. Unwilling to be
personally pious, they betake themselves to an imputed piety. Decause
the scriptures declare, that men are not saved by works of the law, they
infer, that a return to that state of love required by the law, is not even a
condition of salvation. The texts above referred to, are such as these.
“Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the
faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might
be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law : for
by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.”—Gal. ii. 16. This,
and Sundry other passages that hold the same language, are grossly mis-
understood and misapplied by antinomians. They merely declare, that men
are not justified and saved by their own works, which of course they cannot
be, if they have committed even one sin. But they do not intinnate, and
there is no passage rightly understood that does intimate, that men are
saved or justified upon conditions short of personal holiness, or a return
to full obedience to the moral law.
Again : James wrote his epistle to establish this point. Grace cannot
save by dispeusing with personal holiness, or a return to full obedience to
the law. Grace must not only pardon, but secure personal holiness, or the
soul is not fitted, either for the employments or enjoyments of heaven. It
is naturally impossible for grace to save the soul, but upon condition of
entire sanctification.
2. The grace of the gospel was designed to restore to full obedience to the
moral law.
This is abundantly evident from almot every part of the Bible. “And
the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to
love the Lord thy God with all thime heart, and with all thy soul, that thou
mayest live.”—Deuteronomy xxx. 7. “And I will give them a heart to
know me, that I am the Lord ; and they shall be my people, and I will be
their God; for they shall return unto me with their whole heart."—
Jeremiah xxiv. 7. “Behold, the days come, Saith the Lord, that I will
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 305
make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah.
And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his
brother, saying, Know the Lord : for they shall all know me, from the least
of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord: for I will forgive their
iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.”—Jeremiah xxxi. 31–
34. “And I will give them one heart, and I will put a new spirit within
you : and I will take the stomy heart out of their flesh, and will give them
a heart of flesh.”—Ezek. xi. 19. “Then will I sprinkle clean water upon
you, and ye shall be clean : from all your filthiness and from all your idols,
I will cleanse you.”—Ezek. xxxvi. 25. “For, finding fault with them, he
saith, Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, when I will make a new
covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah, not accord-
ing to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day when I
took them by the hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt, because
they continued not in my covenant, and I regarded them not, saith the
Lord. For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel;
After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my laws into their mind,
and write them in their hearts; and I will be to them a God, and they
shall be to me a people; and they shall not teach every man his neigh-
bour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for all shall
know me, from the least to the greatest. For I will be merciful to
their unrighteousness, and their sins and their imiquities will I remem-
ber no more."—Hebrews viii. 8–12. “And he shall bring forth a Son,
and thou shalt call his name JESUS: for he shall save his people from
their sins.”—Matt. i. 21. “And the very God of peace sanctify
you wholly: and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be
preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, Faithful
is he that calleth you, who also will do it.”—1 Thess. v. 23, 24. “For sin
shall not have dominion over you; for ye are not under the law, but under
grace.”—Rom. vi. 14. These, and many other passages of like import,
plainly teach the truth of the proposition we are considering, namely, that
grace was designed to secure personal holiness, and full return to the love
required by the law, and not to dispense With this holiness or obedience, as
a condition of salvation.
3. The efficient influence that secures this return to full obedience to the
law, is the Holy Spirit received to reign in the heart by faith.
That God writes his law in the heart by his indwelling Spirit, is
abundantly taught in the Bible. Writing his law in the heart, is beget-
ting the spirit of love required by the law in the heart.
By his reigning in the heart, is intended his setting up, and continu-
ing his dominion in the heart, by writing his law there, or, as is said just
above, by begetting the love, required by the law, in the heart.
Also by reigning in the heart, is intended, that he leads, guides, and
controls the soul, by enlightening and drawing it into conformity with his
will in all things. Thus it is said, “It is God that worketh in you to will
and to do of his good pleasure.”
N
306 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
By the assertion, that the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of Christ, is received
by faith, to reign in the heart, it is intended, that he is actually trusted in,
or submitted to by faith, and his influence suffered to control us. He does
not guide and control us, by irresistible power or force, but faith confides
the guidance of our souls to him. Faith receives and confides in him, and
consents to be governed and directed by him. As his influence is moral,
and not physical, it is plain that he can influence us no farther than we
have confidence in him ; that is, no farther than we trust or confide in him.
But I must cite some passages that sustain these positions. “That the
blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles, through Jesus Christ;
that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.”—Gal. iii. 14.
“ Until the Spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness be
a fruitful field, and the fruitful field be counted for a forest.”—Isaiah xxxii.
15. “For I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the
dry ground: I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon
thine offspring.”—Isaiah xliv, 3. “But this shall be the covenant which
I will make with the house of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I
will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will
be their God, and they shall be my people.”—Jer. xxxi. 33. “And I will
make an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not turn away from
them, to do them good; but I will put my fear in their hearts, that they
shall not depart from me.”—Jer. xxxii. 40. “And I will pour upon the
house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace
and supplication ; and they shall look upon me whom they have pierced,
and they shall mourn for him as one mourneth for his only son, and shall
be in bitterness for him, as one that is in bitterness for his first-born."—
Zechariah xii. 10. “There is therefore now no condemnation to them
which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.
For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they
that are after the Spirit the things of the Spirit. But ye are not in the
flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now
if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. But if the
Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that
raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his
Spirit that dwelleth in you. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die;
but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.
For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.
For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have
received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit
itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God."—
Rom. viii. 1, 5, 9, 11, 13–16. “Know ye not that ye are the temple of
God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?”—1 Cor. iii. 16. “What?
know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in
you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own 2"—1 Cor. vi. 19.
“But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness,
goodness, faith. If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit.”
*s MORAL GOVERNMENT. 307
—Gal. v. 22, 25. “That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith, that
ye, being rooted and grounded in love.”—Eph. iii. 17. “For by grace are
ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God.”—
Eph. ii. 8. “And be found in him, not having mine own righteousness,
which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the
righteousness which is of God by faith.”—Phil. iii. 9.
These passages abundantly support the position for the establishment of
which they are quoted. It is only necessary to remark here,
1. That the Holy Spirit controls, directs, and sanctifies the soul, not by
a physical influence, nor by impulses nor by impressions made on the
sensibility, but by enlightening and convincing the intellect, and thus
quickening the conscience.
2. The fundamentally important doctrine of an indwelling Christ, that
the Spirit of Christ must be received by faith to reign in the heart, has
been extensively overlooked. “ Christ our Sanctification!” said a minister
to me a few months since. “I never heard of such a thing.” Also said a
Doctor of Divinity to me, “I never heard Christ spoken of as our sanctifi-
cation until the Perfectionists affirmed it.” Indeed, it is amazing to see
how this blessed truth has been overlooked. Christ, by his Spirit, must
actually dwell within and reign over us, and this is an unalterable condition
of Salvation. He is our king. He must be received by faith, to set up and
establish his kingdom in the heart, or salvation is impossible.
LECTURE XXXIII.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
SANCTIONS OF MORAL LAW, NATURAL AND GOVERNMENTAL.
In the discussion of this subject, I shall show—
I. What constitutes the sanctions of law.
II. That there can be no law without sanctions.
III. In what light the sanctions of law are to be regarded.
IV. The end to be secured by law, and the erecution of penal sanctions.
V. The rule by which sanctions ought to be graduated.
I. What constitutes the sanctions of law.
l. The sanctions of law are the motives to obedience, that which is to
be the natural and the governmental consequence or result of obedience and
of disobedience.
2. They are remuneratory, that is, they promise reward to obedience.
3. They are vindicatory, that is, they threaten the disobedient with
punishment.
4. They are natural, that is—
(1.) All moral law is that rule of action which is in exact accordance
with the mature and relations of moral beings.
X 2
308 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(2.) Happiness is to some extent naturally connected with, and the
necessary consequence of, obedience to moral law.
(3.) Misery is naturally and mecessarily connected with, and results
from, disobedience to moral law, or from acting Contrary to the nature and
relations of moral beings.
5. Sanctions are governmental. By governmental sanctions are intended:
(1.) The favour of the government as due to obedience.
(2.) A positive reward bestowed upon the obedient by government.
(3.) The displeasure of government towards the disobedient.
(4.) Direct punishment inflicted by the government as due to disobe-
dience.
6. All happiness and misery resulting from obedience or disobedience,
either natural, or from the favour, or frown, of government, are to be
regarded as constituting the sanctions of law.
II. There can be no law without sanctions.
1. It has been said, in a former lecture, that precepts without Sanctions
are only counsel or advice, and not law.
2. Nothing is moral law, but the rule of action which is founded in the
nature and relations of moral beings. It is therefore absurd to say, that
there should be no matural sanctions to this rule of action. It is the same
absurdity as to say, that conformity to the laws of our being would not pro-
duce happiness, and that disconformity to the laws of our being would not
produce misery. What do we mean by acting in conformity to the laws of
our being, but that course of conduct in which all the powers of our being
will sweetly harmonize, and produce happiness? And what do we mean
by disconformity to the laws of our being, but that course of action which
creates mutiny among our powers themselves, which produces discord instead
of harmony, misery instead of happiness 2
3. A precept, to have the nature and the force of law, must be founded
in reason, that is, it must have some reason for its existence. And it were
unreasonable to hold out no motives to obedience, where a law is founded
in a necessity of our mature.
4. But whatever is unreasonable is no law. Therefore a precept without
a sanction is not law.
5. Necessity is the fundamental condition of all rightful government.
There would be, and could be, no just government, but for the necessities
of the universe. But these necessities cannot be met, the great end of
government cannot be secured, without motives or sanctions : therefore,
that is no government, no law, that has no Sanctions.
III. In what light Sanctions are to be regarded.
1. Sanctions are to be regarded as an expression of the benevolent
regard of the lawgiver for his subjects: the motives which he exhibits to
induce in the subjects the course of conduct that will secure their highest
well-being.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 309
2. They are to be regarded as an expression of his estimation of the
justice, necessity, and value of the precept to the subjects of his government.
3. They are to be regarded as an expression of the amount or strength
of his desire to secure the happiness of his subjects.
4. They are to be regarded as an expression of his opinion in respect to
the desert of disobedience.
The natural sanctions are to be regarded as a demonstration of the
justice, necessity, and perfection of the precept.
IV. The end to be secured by law, and the eacecution of penal sanctions.
1. The ultimate end of all government is blessedness.
2. This is the ultimate end of the precept, and of the Sanction attached
to it.
3. This can be secured only by the prevention of sin and the promotion
of holiness.
4. Confidence in the government is the sine quá non of all virtue.
5. Confidence results from a revelation of the lawgiver to his subjects.
Confidence in God results from a revelation of himself to his creatures.
6. The moral law, in its precepts and Sanctions, is a revelation of God.
7. The execution of penal sanctions is also a revelation of the mind,
will, and character of the lawgiver.
8. The highest and most influential Sanctions of government are those
motives that most fully reveal the true character of God, and the true end
of his government.
V. By what rule sanctions ought to be graduated.
1. We have seen, in a former legture, that moral obligation is founded
in the intrinsic value of the well-being of God and of the universe, and
conditionated upon the perception of its value.
2. That guilt ought always to be measured by the perceived value of the
end which moral beings ought to choose.
3. The Sanctions of law should be graduated by the intrinsic merit and
demerit of holiness and sin.
SANCTIONS OF GOD'S LAW.
I. God's law has sanctions.
II. What constitutes the remuneratory sanctions of the law of God.
III. The perfection and duration of the remuneratory sanctions of the
law of God.
IV. What constitutes the vindicatory sanctions of the law of God.
V. Their duration.
I. God's law has sanctions.
1. That sin, or disobedience to the moral law, is attended with, and
results in, misery, is a matter of consciousness.
2. That virtue or holiness is attended with, and results in happiness, is
also attested by consciousness,
3. Therefore that God's law has natural sanctions, both remuneratory
and vindicatory, is a matter of fact.
310 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
4. That there are governmental sanctions added to the natural, must be
true, or God, in fact, has no government but that of natural consequences.
5. The Bible expressly, and in every variety of form, teaches that God
will reward the righteous and punish the wicked.
II. What constitutes the remuneratory sanctions of the law of God.
1. The happiness that is naturally and necessarily connected with, and
results from, holiness or obedience.
2. The merited favour, protection, and blessing of God.
3. All the matural and governmental rewards of virtue.
III. The perfection and duration of the remuneratory sanctions of the
law of God.
1. The perfection of the natural reward is, and must be, proportioned to
the perfection of virtue.
2. The duration of the remuneratory sanction must be equal to the
duration of obedience. This cannot possibly be otherwise.
3. If the existence and virtue of man are immortal, his happiness must
be endless.
4. The Bible most unequivocally asserts the immortality, both of the
existence and virtue of the righteous, and also that their happiness shall be
endless.
5. The very design and end of government make it necessary that
governmental rewards should be as perfect and unending as virtue.
IV. What constitutes the vindicatory sanctions of the law of God.
1. The misery naturally and necessarily connected with, and resulting
from, disobedience to moral law. Here again, let it be uuderstood, that
moral law is nothing else than that rule of action which accords with the
nature and relations of moral beings. Therefore, the natural vindicatory
sanction of the law of God is misery, resulting from a violation of man's
OWn nature.
2. The displeasure of God, the loss of his protection and governmental
favour, together with that punishment which it is his duty to inflict upon
the disobedient.
3. The rewards of holiness, and the punishment of sin, are described in
the Bible in figurative language. The rewards of virtue are called eternal
life. The punishment of vice is called death. By life, in such a con-
nexion, is intended, not only existence, but that happiness which makes life
desirable, and without which it would be no blessing. By death is intended,
not annihilation, but that misery which renders existence an evil. It is
the opposite of happy existence, called eternal life, and is, therefore,
denominated eternal death.
V. Duration of the penal sanctions of the law of God.
FIRST. Examine the question in the light of natural theology.
SEconDLY. In the light of revelation.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 311
FIRST. In eacamining it in the light of natural theology, I shall,—
1. Inquire into the meaning of the term infinite.
2. Show that infinites may differ indefinitely in amount.
3. Remind you of the rule by which the degrees of guilt are to be esti-
mated.
4. That all and every sin must, from its very nature, involve infinite
guilt, in the sense of deserving endless punishment,
5. That notwithstanding all sin deserves endless punishment, yet the
guilt of different persons may vary indefinitely, and that punishment,
although always endless in duration, may, and must, and ought to, vary in
degree, in proportion as guilt varies.
6. That the duration of penal inflictions under the government of God,
will be endless.
1. Inquire into the meaning of the term infinite.
It literally and properly means not finite, not limited, not bounded,
unlimited, boundless. A thing may be infinite in a particular sense, aud
not in the absolute sense. For example, a line may be of infinite length,
but of finite breadth. Anything which is boundless, in any one sense or
direction, is in that sense or direction infinite. We shall soon illustrate
the truth of these statements.
2. Infinites may differ indefinitely in amount.
(1.) This is the doctrine of Sir Isaac Newton, and of natural and mathe-
matical science, as most persons at all acquainted with this subject know.
(2.) It is a plain matter of fact. For example: suppose that from this
point radiate mathematical lines endlessly in every direction. Let each
two of these limes make an angle of one degree, and let the points be suf-
ficiently numerous to fill up the whole circle. Now as these lines extend
endlessly in every direction, every pair of them form the legs of a triangle,
whose sides extend endlessly, and which has no base, or which has no
bound in one direction. It is self-evident, that the superficial area con-
tained between any two of those radii is infinite in the sense that its Super-
ficial quantity is unlimited. Thus the whole of space is no more than
infinite, in the absolute sense of the term, by which is meant an amount
which admits of no increase in any sense or direction, and yet there is, in
the sense of unlimited in quantity, an infinite amount of space between
every two of those radii.
The same would be true upon the supposition of parallel mathematical
lines of infinite length, no matter how near together: the superfices or
area between them must be infimite in amount. Anything is infinite which
has no whole, which is boundless in any sense. In the sense in which it is
boundless, it is infinite. For example, in the cases supposed, the area
between any two of the radii of the circle, or of the parallel lines, is not
infinite in the sense that it has no bounds in any direction. For it is
312 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
bounded on its sides. But it is infinite in the sense of its superficial
measure or contents. So, endless happiness or misery may be finite in one
sense, and infinite in another. They may be infinite in amount, taking
into view their endlessness, however small they may be in degree. So that
in degree they may, and with finite creatures must be, finite in degree, but
infinite in amount. There is and can be no whole of them, and, therefore,
in amount they are infinite. God's happiness may be, and is, infinite both
in degree and in duration, which amounts to infinite in the absolute sense.
It should be remarked, that practically no creature, nor all creatures
together, will ever have either enjoyed infinite happiness, or endured infinite
misery. Indeed, the period can never arrive in which they will not have
fallen infinitely short of it. They will never have completed endless dura-
tion either in enjoyment or misery. Nor can they approach at all nearer
to it than at first ; so that they can really, in fact, never approach at all
nearer an infinite amount of enjoyment or of suffering, than when they
first began to enjoy or suffer. At any possible period of the future it will
be true that they have only enjoyed or suffered a finite amount, and an
amount infinitely less than infinite, because they have enjoyed or suffered
infinitely less than eternally. Any finite amount they could and would
reach, but an infinite amount they can never so much as approach, because
it has no bound in that direction. Endless happiness can never have been
enjoyed, nor endless misery endured, by any creature. Nay, creatures
must, at any possible period, have fallen infinitely short of it, as an etermity
of bliss or misery is, and always will be, still before them.
3. I must remind you of the rule by which degrees of guilt are to be
estimated.
And here let it be remembered—
(1.) That moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of those in-
terests which moral agents are bound to choose as an end.
(2.) That the obligation is conditionated upon the knowledge of this end,
and—
(3.) That the degree of obligation is just equal to the apprehended intrim-
sic value of those interests which they are bound to choose.
(4.) That the guilt of refusal to will these interests is in proportion, or is
equal to the amount of the obligation, and—
(5.) That consequently, the mind's homest apprehension or judgment of
the value of those interests which it refuses to will, is, and must be, the
rule by which the degree of guilt involved in that refusal ought to be
measured.
4. That all and every sin must from its very mature involve infinite guilt
in the sense of deserving endless punishment.
(1.) Sin implies moral obligation.
(2.) Moral obligation implies moral agency.
(3.) Moral agency implies the apprehension of the end that moral agents
ought to will.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 3.13
(4.) This end is the highest well-being of God and of the universe. This
end, the reason of every moral agent must affirm to be of infinite value,
in the sense that its value is unlimited.
(5.) The idea or apprehension of this end implies the knowledge, that
the intrinsic value of those endless interests must be infinite.
If the idea of God and of the good of being be developed, which is
implied in moral agency, there must be in the mind the idea or first truth,
that the good of God and of the universe is infinitely valuable. The idea
may not have come into so full developement as is possible. Nevertheless,
it is, and must be, in the mind. If this is so, it follows that every refusal
to will the highest well-being of God and of the universe involves infinite
guilt. Every moral agent must be able to affirm, and indeed must affirm
to himself, that the intrinsic value of the happiness of God and the uni-
verse must be boundless, unlimited, infinite. By this affirmation, or by
the apprehension that necessitates this affirmation, his guilt ought to be
measured, if he refuses to consecrate himself to the promotion of those
interests.
5. Notwithstanding all sin deserves endless punishment, yet the guilt of
different persons may vary indefinitely, and punishment, although always
endless in duration, may vary, and ought to vary, in degree, according to
the guilt of each individual offender.
It has been affirmed, that every moral agent has, from the first, as full
and clear an idea of the infinite as is possible for him ever to have. But
what thoughtful mind does not know that this is untrue? What Christian
has not, at times, had so clear an apprehension of the infinity of God's
attributes, as almost to overeome him. At all times he has within him the
affirmation, or idea, that God is infinite, that duration is eternal,—that
happiness and misery are endless. Those ideas he has at all times; but
at Some times these ideas seem to be illuminated, and to mean so much,
that the soul and body both are ready to faint in the presence of them.
The ideas of the reason are, doubtless, capable, in finite minds, of endless
developement. The ideas of the infinite, the eternal, the absolute, the
perfect, and indeed all the ideas of the pure reason, will, I apprehend,
continue to develope more and more to all etermity. They are, no doubt,
capable of such a developement as would at once destroy our earthly
existence. Christians, who have always had their ideas in a state of
partial developement, have sometimes, of a sudden, had so great an
increase of their developement, as to be overcome by them, their bodily
strength gone,—and, for the time, they were unable to realize that they
had had these ideas at all before. This has been true of the idea of the
infinite guilt of sin, the infinite love of God, the omnipresence, the
omnipotence, the infinite holiness, and infinite blessedness of God.
The guilt of different persons may vary indefinitely.—This also may be
true of the same person at different periods of life. Observe: the degree
of guilt depends on the degree of intellectual developement on moral
314 *C.
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
subjects, upon the clearness with which the mind apprehends moral
relations, especially the intrinsic value of those interests which it ought to
choose. These apprehensions vary, as every moral agent is conscious,
almost continually. The obligation to will an end lies in the intrinsic
value of the end. The obligation is greater or less, as the mind's honest
estimate of the value of it is greater or less. Every moral agent knows
that the value of the end is unbounded. Yet some have an indefinitely
larger conception of what infinite or boundless means. Some minds
mean indefinitely more by such language than others do. As light
increases, and the mind obtains enlarged conceptions of God, of the
universe, of endless happiness or misery, and of all those great truths that
cluster around these subjects, its obligation increases in exact proportion to
increasing light, and so does the guilt of Selfishness.
6. That penal inflictions under the government of God must be endless.
Here the inquiry is, what kind of death is intended, where death is
denounced against the transgressor, as the penalty of the law of God?
(1.) It is not merely matural death, for—
(i.) This would, in reality, be no penalty at all. But it would be
offering a reward to sin. If natural death is all that is intended, and if
persons, as soon as they are maturally dead, have suffered the penalty of
the law, and their souls go immediately to heaven, the case stands thus: if
your obedience is perfect and perpetual, you shall live in this world for
ever ; but if you sin, you shall die and go immediately to heaven. “ This
would be hire and salary,” and not punishment.
(ii.) If natural death be the penalty of God's law, the righteous, who are
forgiven, should not die a natural death.
(iii.) If natural death be the penalty of God's law, there is no such thing
as forgiveness, but all must actually endure the penalty.
(iv.) If natural death be the penalty, then infants and animals suffer this
penalty, as well as the most abandoned transgressors.
(v.) If natural death be the penalty, and the only penalty, it sustains no
proportion whatever to the guilt of sin.
(vi.) Natural death would be no adequate expression of the importance
of the precept.
(2.) The penalty of God's law is not spiritual death.
(i.) Because spiritual death is a state of entire sinfulness.
(ii.) To make a state of entire sinfulness the penalty of the law of God,
would be to make the penalty and the breach of the precept identical.
(iii.) It would be making God the author of sin. and would represent
him as compelling the simmer to eommit one sin as the punishment for
another, as forcing him into a state of total and perpetual rebellion, as
the reward of his first transgression.
(3.) But the penal sanction of the law of God is endless death, or that
state of endless suffering which is the natural and governmental result of
sin or of spiritual death.
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 315
Before I proceed to the proof of this, I will notice an objection which is
often urged against the doctrine of endless punishment. The objection is
one, but it is stated in three different forms. This, and every other
objection to the doctrine of endless punishment, with which I am ac-
quainted. is levelled against the justice of such a governmental infliction.
(i.) It is said that endless punishment is unjust, because life is So short,
that men do not live long enough in this world to commit so great a
number of sins as to deserve endless punishment. To this I answer-
(a) That it is founded in ignorance or disregard of a universal principle
of government, viz., that one breach of the precept always incurs the
penalty of the law, whatever that penalty is. *
(b.) The length of time employed in committing a sin, has nothing to
do with its blameworthiness or guilt. It is the design which constitutes
the moral character of the action, and not the length of time required for
its accomplishment.
(c.) This objection takes for granted, that it is the number of sins,
and not the intrinsic guilt of sin, that constitutes its blameworthiness,
whereas it is the intrinsic desert or guilt of sin, as we shall soon see, that
renders it deserving of endless punishment.
(ii.) Another form of the objection is, that a finite creature cannot commit
an infinite sin. But none but an infinite sin ean deserve endless punish-
ment: therefore, endless punishments are unjust.
(a.) This objection takes for granted that man is so diminutive a creature.
so much less than the Creator, that he cannot deserve his endless frown.
(b.) Which is the greater crime, for a child to insult his playfellow, or
his parent? Which would involve the most guilt. for a man to Smite his
neighbour and his equal, or his lawful sovereign :
(e.) The higher the ruler is exalted above the subject in his nature,
character, and rightful authority, the greater is the obligation of the subject
to will his good, to render to him obedience, and the greater is the guilt of
transgression in the subject. Therefore, the fact that man is so infinitely
below his Maker, does but enhance the guilt of his rebellion, and render
him all the more worthy of his endless frown.
(iii.) A third form of the objection is, that sin is not an infinite evil; and
therefore, does not deserve endless punishment.
This objection may mean either, that sin would not produce infinite
mischief if unrestrained, or that it does not involve infinite guilt. It
cannot mean the first, for it is agreed on all hands, that misery must
continue as long as sin does, and, therefore, that sin unrestrained would
produce endless evil. The objection, therefore, must mean, that sin does
not involve infinite guilt. Observe then, the point at issue is, what is the
intrinsic demerit or guilt of sin P What does all sin in its own nature
deserve 2 They who deny the justice of endless punishment, manifestly
consider the guilt of sin as a mere trifle. They who maintain the justice
of endless punishment, consider sin as an evil of immeasurable magnitude,
and, in its own nature, deserving of endless punishment. Proof:—
316 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(a.) Should a moral agent refuse to choose that as an ultimate end which
is of no intrinsic value, he would thereby contract no guilt, because he
would violate no obligation. But should he refuse to will the good of God
and of his neighbour, he would violate an obligation, and of course contract
guilt. This shows that guilt attaches to the violation of obligation, and
that a thing is blameworthy because it is the violation of an obligation.
(b.) We have seem that sin is selfishness, that it consists in preferring self.
gratification to the infinite interests of God and of the universe. We have
also seen that obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of that good which
moral agents ought to will to God and to the universe, and is equal to the
affirmed value of that good. We have also seen that evey moral agent, by
a law of his own reason, necessarily affirms that God is infinite, and that
the endless happiness and well-being of God and of the universe, is of
infinite value. Hence it follows, that refusal to will this good is a violation
of infinite or unlimited obligation, and, consequently, involves unlimited
guilt. It is as certain that the guilt of any sin is unlimited, as that
obligation to will the good of God and of the universe is unlimited. To
deny consistently that the guilt of sin is unlimited, it must be shown, that
obligation to will good to God is limited. To maintain consistently this
last, it must be shown, that moral agents have not the idea that God is
infinite. Indeed, to deny that the guilt of sin is in any instance less than
boundless, is as absurd as to deny the guilt of sin altogether.
Having shown that moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of
the highest well-being of God and of the universe, and that it is always
equal to the soul's knowledge of the value of those interests, and having
shown also, that every moral agent necessarily has the idea more or less
clearly developed, that the value of those interests is infinite, it follows:–
That the law is infinitely unjust, if its penal sanctions are not endless.
Law must be just in two respects.
The precept must be in accordance with the law of mature.
The penalty must be equal to the importance of the precept. That
which has not these two peculiarities is not just, and therefore, is not and
cannot be law. Either, then, God has no law, or its penal sanctions are
endless.
1. That the penal sanctions of the law of God are endless, is evident
from the fact, that a less penalty would not exhibit as high motives as the
nature of the case admits, to restrain sin and promote virtue.
2. Natural justice demands that God should exhibit as high motives to
Aw e
secure obedience as the value of the law demands, and the nature of the
case admits.
3. The moral law, or law of God's reason, must require justice, holiness,
and benevolence, in God; and demands, also, that the penal Sanctions of
his law should be endless ; and if they are not, God cammot be just, holy,
or benevolent.
4. Unless the penal sanctions of the law of God are endless, they are
virtually and really no penalty at all. If a man be threatened with punish-
MORAL GOVERNMENT. 317
ment for one thousand, or ten thousand, or ten millions, or ten hundred
millions of years, after which he is to come out as a matter of justice, and
go to heaven, there is beyond an absolute eternity of happiness. Now,
there is no sort of proportion between the longest finite period that can be
named, or even conceived, and endless duration. If, therefore, limited
punishment, ending in an etermity of bliss, be the penalty of God's law,
the case stands thus: Be perfect, and you live here for ever ; sin, and
receive finite suffering, with an etermity of blessedness. This would be,
after all, offering reward for sin.
5. Death is eternal in its mature. The fact, therefore, that this figure is
used to express the future punishment of the wicked, affords a plain
inference, that it is endless.
6. The tendency of sin to perpetuate and aggravate itself, affords
another strong inference, that the sinfulness and misery of the wicked will
be eternal.
7. The fact, that punishment has no tendency to originate disinterested
love in a selfish mind towards him who inflicts the punishment, also affords
a strong presumption, that future punishment will be eternal.
8. The law of God makes no provision for terminating future punish-
melnt.
9. Sin deserves endless punishment just as fully as it deserves any
punishment at all. If, therefore, it is not forgiven, if it be punished at all
with penal suffering, the punishment must be endless.
10. To deny the justice of eternal punishments, involves the same
principle as a denial of the justice of any degree of punishment.
11. To deny the justice of endless punishment, is virtually to deny the
fact of moral evil. But to deny this, is to deny moral obligation. To
deny moral obligation, is to deny moral agency. But of both moral obliga-
tion and moral agency we are absolutely conscious. Therefore, it follows
to a demonstration, not only that moral evil does exist, but that it deserves
endless punishment.
SECONDLY. Examine this question in the light of revelation.
The Bible, in a great many ways, represents the future punishment of
the wicked as etermal, and never once represents it otherwise. It expresses
the duration of the future punishment of the Wicked by the same terms,
and, in every way, as forcibly as it expresses the duration of the future
happiness of the righteous.
I will here introduce, without comment, some passages of scripture
confirmatory of this last remark. “The hope of the righteous shall be
gladness: but the expectation of the wicked shall perish.”—Prov, x. 28.
“When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish ; and the hope of
unjust men perisheth.”—Prov. xi. 7. “And many of them that sleep in
the dust of the earth shall awake; some to everlasting life, and some to
shame and everlasting contempt.”—Dam. xii. 2. “Then shall he say also
unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting
3.18 SYSTEMATIC TIIEOLOGY.
fire, prepared for the devil and his angels: for I was an hungered, and ye
gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink. And these
shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life
etermal.”—Matt. xxv. 41, 42, 46. “And if thy hand offend thee, cut it
off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two lands
to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched; where their
Worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.”—Mark ix.43, 44. “Whose
fan is in his hand, and he will throughly purge his floor; and will gather
the wheat into his garner; but the chaff he will burn with fire unquench-
able.”—Luke iii. 17. “And besides all this, between us and you there is
a great gulf fixed : so that they which would pass from hence to you, can-
mot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence.”—Luke
xvi. 26. “He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that
believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on
him.”—John iii. 36. “And to you who are troubled, rest with us, when
the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in
flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey
not the gospel of Our Lord Jesus Christ: who shall be punished with ever-
lasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of
his power.”—2 Thess. i. 7–9. “And the angels which kept not their first
estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains,
under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day. Even as Sodom and
Gomorrha, and the cities about them, in like manner, giving themselves
Over to formication, and going after strange flesh, are set forth for an
example, suffering the vengeance of eterial fire. Raging waves of the
sea, foaming out their own shame; wandering stars, to whom is reserved
the blackness of darkness for ever.”—Jude 6, 7, 13. “And the third
angel followed them, saying with a loud voice, If any man worship the
beast and his image, and receive his mark in his forehead, or in his hand,
the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured
out without mixture into the cup of his indignation ; and he shall be
tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and
in the presence of the Lamb : and the smoke of their torment ascendeth
up for ever and ever ; and they have no rest day nor might, who worship
the beast and his image, and whosoever receiveth the mark of his name.”
—Rev. xiv. 9–11. “And the devil that deceived them was cast into the
lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and
shall be tormented day and might for ever and ever.”—Rev. xx. 10. But
there is scarcely any end to the multitude of passages that teach directly,
or by inference, both the fact and the endlessness of the future punishment
of the wicked. But the fuller cousideration of this subject belongs more
appropriately to a future place in this course of instruction ; my object
here being only to consider the penal sanctions of moral law didactically,
reserving the polemic discussion of the question of endless punishment for
a future occasion.
ATONEMENT. 319
LECTURE XXXIV.
ATONEMENT.
We come now to the consideration of a very important feature of the
moral government of God; namely, the atonement.
In discussing this subject, I will—
I. CALL ATTENTION TO SEVERAL WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF
GOVERNMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH OUR INVESTIGATION WILL PROCEED.
II. DEFINE THE TERM ATONEMENT As USED IN THIS DISCUSSION.
III. INQUIRE INTO THE TEACHINGS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY, OR INTO
THE A PRIORI AFFIRM.ATIONS OF REASON UPON THIS SUBJECT,
IV. SHOW THE FACT of ATONEMENT.
V. THE DESIGN of ATONEMENT.
VI. ExTENT OF ATONEMENT.
VII. ANSWER objFCTIONs.
I. I will call attention to several well-established principles of government.
1. We have already seen that moral law is not founded in the mere
arbitrary will of God or of any other being, but that it has its foundation in
the nature and relations of moral agents, that it is that rule of action or of
Willing which is imposed on them by the of law their own intellect.
2. As the will of no being can create moral law, so the will of no being
•can repeal or alter moral law. It being just that rule of action that is
agreeable to the nature and relations of moral agents, it is as immutable as
those natures and relations.
3. There is a distinction between the letter and the spirit of moral law.
The letter relates to the outward life or action; the Spirit respects the
motive or intention from which the act should proceed. For example: the
Spirit of the moral law requires disinterested benevolence, and is all expressed
in one Word-love. The letter of the law is found in the commandments
of the decalogue, and in divers other precepts relating to outward acts.
4. To the letter of the law there may be many exceptions, but to the
Spirit of moral law there can be no exception. That is, the spirit of the
moral law may sometimes admit and require, that the letter of the law shall
be disregarded or violated; but the spirit of the law Ought never to be dis-
regarded or violated. For example: the letter of the law prohibits all
labour on the sabbath day. But the spirit of the law often requires labour
on the Sabbath. The spirit of the law requires the exercise of universal
and Perfect love or benevolence to God and man, and the law of benevo-
lence often requires that labour shall be done on the Sabbath; as admi-
mistering to the sick, relieving the poor, feeding animals; and in short,
Whatever is plainly the work of necessity or mercy, in such a sense that
enlightened benevolence demands it, is required by the spirit of moral law
upon the sabbath, as well as all other days. This is expressly taught by
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ATONEMENT. 321
that the exercise of mercy in setting aside the execution of penalties is a
matter of extreme delicacy and danger. The influence of law, as might
be expected, is found very much to depend upon the certainty felt by the
subjects that it will be duly executed. It is found in experience, to be
true, that the exercise of mercy in every government where no atonement is
made, weakens government, by begetting and fostering a hope of impunity
in the minds of those who are tempted to violate the law. It has been
asserted, that the same is true when an atonement has been made, and that
therefore, the doctrines of atonement and consequent forgiveness tend to
encourage the hope of impunity in the commission of sin, and for this reason,
use dangerous doctrines subversive of high and sound morality. This
assertion I shall notice in its appropriate place.
10. Since the head of the government is pledged to protect and promote
the public interests, by a due administration of law, if in any instance
where the precept is violated, he would dispense with the execution of
penalties, public justice requires that he shall see, that a substitute for the
execution of law is provided, or that something is done that shall as
effectually secure the influence of law, as the execution of the penalty
Would do. He cannot make exceptions to the spirit of the law. Either
the soul that sinneth must die, according to the letter of the law, or a sub-
stitute must be provided in accordance with the spirit of the law.
11. Whatever will as fully evince the lawgiver's regard for his law, his
determination to support it, his abhorrence of all violations of its precepts,
and withal guard as effectually against the inference, that violaters of the
precept might expect to escape with impunity, as the execution of the
penalty would do, is a full satisfaction of public justice. When these con-
ditions are fulfilled, and the sinner has returned to obedience, public justice
not only admits, but absolutely demands, that the penalty shall be set
aside by extending pardon to the offender. The offender still deserves to
be punished, and upon the principles of retributive justice, might be pun-
nished according to his deserts. But the public good admits and requires
that upon the above conditions he should live, and hence, public justice, in
compliance with the public interests and the spirit of the law of love, spares
and pardons him.
13. If mercy or pardon is to be extended to any who have violated law,
it ought to be done in a manner and upon some conditions that will settle
the question, and establish the truth, that the execution of penalties is not to
be dispensed with merely upon condition of the repentance of the offender.
In other words, if pardon is to be extended, it should be known to be upon
a condition not within the power of the offender. Else he may know, that
he can violate the law, and yet be sure to escape with impunity, by fulfilling
the conditions of forgiveness, which are, upon the Supposition, all within
his own power.
13. So, if mercy is to be exercised, it should be upon a coudition that is
not to be repeated. The thing required by public justice is, that nothing
shall be done to undermine or disturb the influence of law. Hence it C&Il-
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ATONEMENT. 323
of revelation as to preclude the supposition, that reason could, d priori,
make any affirmations about it. It has been generally regarded as lying
absolutely without the pale of natural theology, in so high a sense, that,
aside from revelation, no assumption could be made, nor even a reasonable
conjecture indulged. But there are certain facts in this world's history,
that render this assumption exceedingly doubtful. It is true, indeed, that
natural theology could not ascertain and establish the fact, that an atone-
ment had been made, or that it certainly would be made ; but if I am
not mistaken, it might have been reasonably inferred, the true character
of God being known and assumed, that an atouement of some kind would
be made to render it consistent with his relations to the universe, to
extend mercy to the guilty inhabitants of this world. The manifest neces-
sity of a divine revelation has been supposed to afford a strong presumptive
argument, that such a revelation has been or will be made. From the
benevolence of God, as affirmed by reason, and manifested in his works
and providence, it has been, as I suppose, justly inferred, that he would
make arrangements to secure the holiness and salvation of men, and as a
condition of this result, that he would grant them a further revelation of
his will than had been given in creation and providence. The argument
stands thus :—
1. From reason and observation we know that this is not a state of
retribution; and from all the facts in the case that lie open to observation,
this is evidently a state of trial or probation.
2. The providence of God in this world is manifestly disciplinary, and
designed to reform mankind.
3. These facts, taken in connection with the great ignorance and dark-
mess of the human mind on moral and religious subjects, afford a strong
presumption that the benevolent Creator will make to the inhabitants of
this world who are so evidently yet in a state of trial, a further revelation
of his will. Now, if this argument is good, so far as it goes, I see not
why we may not reasonably go still further.
Since the above are facts, and since it is also a fact that when the subject
is duly considered, and the more thoroughly the better, there is manifestly
a great difficulty in the exercise of mercy without satisfaction being made
to public justice; and since the benevolence of God would not allow him on
the one hand to pardon sim at the expense of public justice, nor on the other
to punish or execute the penalty of law, if it could be wisely and con-
sistently avoided, these facts being understood and admitted, it might
maturally have been inferred, that the Wisdom and benevolence of God
would devise and execute some method of meeting the demands of public
justice, that should render the forgiveness of sin possible. That the
philosophy of government would render this possible is to us very manifest,
I know, indeed, that with the light the gospel has afforded us, we much
more clearly discern this, than they could who had no other light than that
of nature. Whatever might have been known to the ancients, and those
who have not the Bible, I think that, when the facts are announced by
Y Q
324 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
revelation, We can see that such a governmental expedient was not only
possible, but just what might have been expected of the benevolence of
God. It would of course have been impossible for us, a priori, to have
devised, or reasonably conjectured, the plan that has been adopted. So
little was known or knowable on the subject of the Trinity of God without
revelation, that matural theology could, perhaps, in its best estate, have
taught nothing further than that, if it was possible, some governmental
expedient would be resorted to, and was in contemplation, for the ultimate
restoration of the sinning race, who were evidently spared hitherto from
the execution of law, and placed under a system of discipline.
But since the gospel has announced the fact of the atonement, it appears
that matural theology or governmental philosophy can satisfactorily explain
it ; that reason can discern a divine philosophy in it.
Natural theology can teach—
1. That the human race is in a fallen State, and that the law of selfish-
ness, and not the law of benevolence, is that to which unconverted men
conform their lives.
2. It can teach that God is benevolent, and hence that mercy must
be an attribute of God. And that this attlibute will be manifested in the
actual pardon of sin, when this can be done with safety to the divine
government.
3. Consequently that no atonement could be needed to satisfy any
implacable spirit in the divine mind ; that he was sufficiently and infinitely
disposed to extend pardon to the penitent, if this could be wisely, benevo-
lently, and safely dome.
4. It can also abundantly teach, that there is a real and a great difficulty
and danger in the exercise of mercy under a moral government, and
supremely great under a government so vast and so enduring as the govern-
ment of God; that, under such a government, the danger is very great,
that the exercise of mercy Will be understood as encouraging the hope of
impunity in the commission of sin,
5. It can also show the indispensable necessity of such an administra-
tion of the divine government as to secure the fullest confidence through-
out the universe, in the sincerity of God in promulging his law with its
tremendous penalty, and of his unalterable adherence to its Spirit, and
determination not to falter in carrying out and securing its authority at
all events. That this is indispenable to the well-being of the universe, is
entirely manifest.
6. Hence it is very obvious to matural theology, that sin cannot be
pardoned without something is done to forbid the otherwise natural infer-
ence, that sin will be forgiven under the government of God upon condition
of repentance alone, and of course upon a condition within the power of the
sinner himself. It must be manifest, that to proclaim throughout the
universe that sin would be pardoned universally upon condition of repent-
ance alone, would be a virtual repeal of the divine law. All creatures
would instantly perceive, that no one need to fear punishment, in any case,
ATONEMENT. 32.5
as his forgiveness was secure, however much he might trample on the
divine authority, upon a single condition which he could at will perform.
7. Natural theology is abundantly competent to show, that God could
not be just to his own intelligence, just to his character, and hence just
to the universe, in dispensing with the execution of the Divine law, except
upon the condition of providing a substitute of such a nature as to reveal
as fully, and impress as deeply, the lessons that would be taught by the
execution, as the execution itself would do. The great design of penalties
is prevention, and this is of course the design of executing penalties. The
head of every government is pledged to sustain the authority of law, by a due
administration of rewards and punishments, and has no right in any
instance to extend pardon, except upon conditions that will as effectually
support the authority of law as the execution of its penalties would do. It
was never found to be safe, or even possible, under any government, to
make the universal offer of pardon to violators of law, upon the bare con-
dition of repentance, for the very obvious reason already suggested, that it
would be a virtual repeal of all law. Public justice, by which every execu-
tive magistrate in the universe is bound, sternly and peremptorily forbids
that mercy shall be extended to any culprit, without some equivalent being
rendered to the government, that is, without something being done that
will fully answer as a substitute for the execution of penalties. This prin-
ciple God fully admits to be binding upon him ; and hence he affirms that
he gave his Son to render it just in him to forgive sin. Rom. iii. 24–26:
“Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in
Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in
his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are
past, through the forbearance of God ; to declare, I say, at this time, his
righteousness; that he might be just, and the justifier of him which be.
lieveth in Jesus.”
8. All mations have felt the necessity of expiatory sacrifices. This is
evident from the fact that all nations have offered them. Hence antipscucha,
or ransoms for their souls, have been offered by nearly every nation under
heaven. (See Buck's Theo. Dic. p. 539.)
9. The wisest heathen philosophers, who saw the intrinsic inefficacy of
animal sacrifices, held that God could not forgive sin. This proves to
a demonstration, that they felt the necessity of an atonement, or expiatory
sacrifice. And having too just views of God and his government, to sup-
pose that either animal, or merely human, sacrifices, could be efficacious
under the government of God, they were unable to understand upon what
principles sin could be forgiven.
10. Public justice required, either that an atonement should be made,
or that the law should be executed upon every offender. By public justice
is intended, that due administration of law, that shall secure in the highest
manner, which the nature of the case admits, private and public interests,
T. and establish the order and well-being of the universe. In establishing
the government of the universe, God had given the pledge, both impliedly
326 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and expressly, that he would regard the public interests, and by a due
administration of the law, secure and promote, as far as possible, public
and individual happiness. *
11. Public justice could strictly require only the execution of law; for
God had neither expressly nor impliedly given a pledge to do anything more
for the promotion of virtue and happiness, than to administer due rewards
to the righteous, and due punishment to the wicked. Yet an atonement,
as we shall see, would more fully meet the necessities of government, and
act as a more efficient preventive of sin, and a more powerful persuasive
to holiness, than the infliction of the legal penalty would do.
12. An atonement was needed for the removal of obstacles to the free
exercise of benevolence toward our race. Without an atonement, the race
of man after the fall sustained to the government of God the relation of
rebels and outlaws. And before God, as the great executive magistrate of
the universe, could manifest his benevolence toward them, an atonement
must be decided upon and made known, as the reason upon which his
favourable treatment of them was conditionated.
13. An atonement was needed to promote the glory and influence of
God in the universe. But more of this hereafter.
14. An atonement was needed to present overpowering motives to
repentance.
15. An atonement was needed, that the offer of pardon might not seem
like connivance at sin.
16. An atonement was needed to manifest the sincerity of God in his
legal enactments.
17. An atonement was needed to make it safe to present the offer and
promise of pardon.
18. Natural theology can inform us, that, if the lawgiver would or could
condescend so much to deny himself, as to attest his regard to his law, and
his determination to support it by suffering its curse, in such a sense as
was possible and consistent with his character and relations, and so far
forth as emphatically to inculcate the great lesson, that sin was not to be
forgiven upon the bare condition of repentance in any case, and also to
establish the universal conviction, that the execution of law was not to be
dispensed with, but that it is an unalterable rule under his divine govern-
ment, that where there is sin there must be inflicted suffering—this would
be so complete a satisfaction of public justice, that sin might safely be
forgiven.
IV. The fact of atonement.
This is purely a doctrine of revelation, and in the establishment of this
truth appeal must be made to the scriptures alone.
1. The whole Jewish scriptures, and especially the whole ceremonial
dispensation of the Jews, attest, most unequivocally, the necessity of
an atonement.
2. The New Testament is just as unequivocal in its testimony to the
ATONEMENT. 327
same point. The apostle Paul expressly asserts, that “without the shed-
ding of blood, there is no remission of sin.”
I shall here take it as established, that Christ was properly “God mani-
fest in the flesh,” and proceed to cite a few out of the great multitude of
passages, that attest the fact of his death, and also its vicarious nature;
that is, that it was for us, and as a Satisfaction to public justice for our sins,
that his blood was shed. I will first quote a few passages to show that the
atonement and redemption through it, was a matter of understanding and
covenant between the Father and the Son. “I have made a covenant
with my chosen, I have sworn unto David my servant. Thy seed will I
establish for ever, and build up thy throne to all generations. Selah."—
Ps. lxxxix, 3, 4, “Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him ; he hath put
him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin he shall
see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall
prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be
satisfied; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for
he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with
the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he hath
poured out his soul unto death ; and he was numbered with the trans-
gressors; and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the
transgressors.”—Isaiah liii. 10, 11, 12. “All that the Father giveth me
shall come to me: and he' that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.
For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of
him that sent me. And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that
of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it
up again at the last day.”—John vi. 37, 38, 39. “I have manifested thy
name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world: thine they
were, and thou gavest them me; and they have kept thy word. I pray
for them : I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given
me; for they are thine. And now I am no more in the world, but these
are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine
own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we
are.”—John xvii. 6, 9, 11.
I will next quote some passages to show, that, if sinners were to be
saved at all, it must be through an atonement. “Neither is there salva-
tion in any other: for there is none other name under heaven given
among men whereby we must be saved.”—Acts iv. 12. “Be it known
unto you therefore men and brethren, that through this man is preached
unto you the forgiveness of sins: And by him all that believe are justified
from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses.”
Acts xiii. 38, 39. “Now we know, that what things soever the law saith,
it saith to them who are under the law; that every mouth may be stopped,
and all the world may become guilty before God. Therefore, by the deeds
of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight : for by the law is
the knowledge of sim,” Rom. iii. 19, 20. Rnowing that a man is not
justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we
328 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of
Christ, and not by the works of the law : for by the works of the law shall
no flesh be justified. I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteous-
ness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain.”—Gal. ii. 16, 21. “For
as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse : for it is
written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are
written in the book of the law to do them. But that no man is justified
by the law in the sight of God, it is evident: for, The just shall live by
faith. And the law is not of faith: but the man that doeth them shall
live in them. For if the inheritance be of the law, until is no more of
promise: but God gave it to Abraham by promise. Wherefore then
serveth the law? It was added because of transgressions, until the seed
should come to whom the promise was made ; and it was ordained by
angels in the hand of a mediator. Now a mediator is not a mediator of
one, but God is one. Is the law, them, against the promises of God 2
God forbid, for if there had been a law given which could have given life,
verily righteousness should have been by the law. Wherefore the law was
our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by
faith,” Gal. iii. 10–12, 18–21, 24. “And almost all things are by the
law purged with blood ; and without shedding of blood is no remission.
It was therefore necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens should
be purified with these ; but the heavenly things themselves with better
sacrifices than these.”
I will now cite some passages that establish the fact of the vicarious
death of Christ, and redemption through his blood. “But he was wounded
for our transgressions, he was bruised for our imiquities : the chastisement
of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed. All we
like sheep have gone astray : we have turned every one to his own way :
and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all.”—Isaiah liii.5, 6.
“Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister,
and to give his life a ransom for many.”—Matt. xx. 28. “For this is
my blood of the new testament which is shed for many for the remission
of sins.”—Matt xxvi 28. “And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the
wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up ; that whosoever
believeth in him should not perish, but have etermal life.”—John iii. 14, 15.
“I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of
this bread, he shall live for ever ; and the bread that I will give is my
flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.”—John vi. 51. “Take
heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock over the which the
Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the church of God, which
he hath purchased with his own blood.”—Acts xx. 28. “Being justified
freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. To
declare, I say, at this time, his righteousness: that he might be just, and
the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus. For when we were yet
without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely
for a righteous man will one die: yet peradventure for a good man some
ATONEMCENT. 329
would even dare to die. But God commendeth his love toward us, in that
while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Much more then, being
now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him.
And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ,
by whom we have now received the atonement. Therefore, as by the offence
of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the
righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of
life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by
the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.”—Rom. iii. 24–26 :
v. 9–11, 18, 19. “Purge out therefore the old leaven, that ye may be a
new lump, as ye are unleavened. For even Christ our passover is sacrificed
for us : for I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received,
how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures.”—1 Cor. v.
7 : xv. 3. “I am crucified with Christ : nevertheless I live ; yet not I,
but Christ liveth in me : and the life which I now live in the flesh I live
by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me.
Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for
us : for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree. That
the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ;
that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.”—Gal. ii.
20; iii. 13, 14. “But now in Christ Jesus ye who sometimes were far
off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. And walk in love, as Christ
also hath loved us, and hath given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice
to God for a sweet smelling savour.”—Eph. ii. 13 ; v. 2. “Neither by
the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into
the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. For if the
blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean,
sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh ; how much more shall the blood
of Christ, who through the etermal Spirit offered himself without spot to
God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God 2
And almost all things are by the law purged with blood ; and without
shedding of blood is no remission. It was therefore necessary that the
patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these, but the
heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ is
not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures
of the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God
for us. Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest
entereth into the holy place every year with blood of others; for then must
he often have suffered since the foundation of the world : but now once in
the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of
himself. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the
judgment: so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many: and unto
them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto
Salvation.”—Heb. ix, 12–14, 22–28. “By the which will we are sanctified
through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all. And every
priest standeth daily ministering and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices,
330 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
which can never take away sins : but this man, after he had offered one
Sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God; from hence-
forth expecting till his enemies be made his footstool. For by one offering
he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.”—Heb. x. 10–l4.
“Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the
blood of Jesus, by a new and living way which he hath consecrated for us
through the vail, that is to say, his flesh,” &c.—Heb. x. 19, 20. Foras-
much as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as
silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from
your fathers ; but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without
blemish and without spot.”—l Pet. i. 18, 19. “Who his own self bare
our sins in his own body on the tree, that we being dead to sins should
live unto righteousness; by whose stripes ye were healed.”—l Pet. ii. 24.
“For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that
he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened
by the Spirit.”—l Peter iii. 18. But if we walk in the light as he is
in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus
Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin.”—l John i. 7. “And ye know
that he was manifested to take away our sins; and in him is no sin.”—
1 John iii. 5. “In this was manifested the love of God toward us,
because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might
live through him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he
loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.”—l John
iv. 9, 10. º
These, as every reader of the Bible must know, are only some of the
passages that teach the doctrine of atonement and redemption by the death
of Christ. It is truly wonderful in how many ways this doctrine is taught,
assumed, and implied in the Bible. Indeed, it is emphatically the great
theme of the Bible. It is expressed or implied upon nearly every page of
Divine inspiration.
V. The next inquiry is into the desigm of the atonement.
The answer to this inquiry has been, already, in part, unavoidably anti-
cipated. Under this head I will show,
1. That Christ's obedience to the moral law as a covenant of works, did
not constitute the atonement.
(1.) Christ owed obedience to the moral law, both as God and man. He
was under as much obligation to be perfectly benevolent as any moral
agent is. It was, therefore, impossible for him to perform any works
of supererogation ; that is, so far as obedience to law was concerned, he
could, neither as God mor as man, do anything more than fulfil its obligations.
(2.) Had he obeyed for us, he would not have suffered for us. Were his
obedience to be substituted for our obedience, he need not certainly have
both fulfilled the law for us, as our substitute, under a covenant of works,
and at the same time have suffered as a substitute, in submitting to the
penalty of the law.
ATONEMENT. 33}
(3.) If he obeyed the law as our substitute, then why should our own
return to personal obedience be insisted upon as a sine quá non of our
salvation ?
(4.) The idea that any part of the atonement consisted in Christ's obeying
the law for us, and in our stead and behalf, represents God as requiring —
(i.) The obedience of our substitute.
(ii.) The same suffering, as if no obedience had been rendered.
(iii.) Our repentance.
(iv.) Our return to personal obedience.
(v.) And then represents him as, after all, ascribing our Salvation to
grace. Strange grace this, that requires a debt to be paid several times
over, before the obligation is discharged
2. I must show that the atonement was not a commercial trans-
action.
Some have regarded the atonement simply in the light of the payment of
a debt; and have represented Christ as purchasing the elect of the Father,
and paying down the same amount of suffering in his own person that
justice would have exacted of them. To this I answer—
(l.) It is naturally impossible, as it would require that satisfaction should
be made to retributive justice. Strictly speaking, retributive justice can
never be satisfied, in the sense that the guilty can be punished as much
and as long as he deserves; for this would imply that he was punished
until he ceased to be guilty, or became innocent. When law is once
violated, the simmer can make no satisfaction. He can never cease to be
guilty, or to deserve punishment, and no possible amount of suffering ren-
ders him the less guilty or the less deserving of punishment; therefore, to
satisfy retributive justice is impossible.
(2.) But, as we have seen in a former lecture, retributive justice must
have inflicted on him etermal death. To suppose, therefore, that Christ
suffered in amount, all that was due to the elect, is to suppose that he
suffered an eternal punishment multiplied by the whole number of the
elect. -
3. The atonement of Christ was intended as a satisfaction of public
justice.
(1.) The moral law did not originate in the divine will, but is founded in
his self-existent and immutable nature. He cannot therefore repeal or
alter it. To the letter of the moral law there may be exceptions, but to
the spirit of the law no being can make exceptions. God cannot repeal
the precept, and just for this reason, he cannot set aside the spirit of the
sanctions. For to dispense with the sanctions were a virtual repeal of the
precept. He cannot, therefore, set aside the execution of the penalty
When the precept has been violated, without something being done that
shall meet the demands of the true spirit of the law. “Being justified
freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom
God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to
declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through
332 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,
the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness :
that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.”
Rom. iii. 24–26. This passage assigns the reason, or declares the design,
of the atonement, to have been to justify God in the pardon of sin, or in
dispensing with the execution of law. -
Isa. xliii. 10–12: “Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him ; he hath
put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he
shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord
shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and
shall be satisfied : by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify
many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a
portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong:
because he hath poured out his soul unto death ; and he was numbered
with the transgressors: and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession
for the transgressors.”
(2.) Public justice requires,—
(i.) That penalties shall be annexed to laws that are equal to the
importance of the precept.
(ii) That when these penalties are incurred, they shall be inflicted for
the public good, as an expression of the lawgiver's regard to law, of his
determination to support public order, and by a due administration of
justice, to secure the highest well-being of the public. A leading design
of the Sanctions of law is prevention ; and the execution of penal sanctions
is demanded by public justice. The great design of sanctions, both remu-
neratory and vindicatory, is to prevent disobedience, and secure obedience
and universal happiness. This is done by such a revelation of the heart
of the lawgiver, through the precept, sanctions, and execution of his law,
as to beget awe on the one hand, and the most entire confidence and love
on the other.
(iii.) Whatever can as effectually reveal God, make known his hatred to
sin, his love of order, his determination to support government, and to
promote the holiness and happiness of his creatures, as the execution of
his law would do, is a full satisfaction of public justice.
(iv.) Atonement is, therefore, a part, and a most influential part, of
moral government. It is an auxiliary to a strictly legal government. It
does not take the place of the execution of law, in such a sense as to
exclude penal inflictions from the universe. The execution of law still
holds a place, and makes up an indispensable part of the great circle of
motives essential to the perfection of moral government. Fallen angels,
and the finally impenitent of this world, will receive the full execution of
the penalty of the divine law. Atonement is an expedient above the letter,
but in accordance with the spirit of law, which adds new and vastly influ-
ential motives to induce obedience. I have said, it is an auxiliary to law,
adding to the precept and sanctions of law an overpowering exhibition of
love and compassion.
(v.) The atonement is an illustrious exhibition of commutative justice,
ATONEMENT. 333
in which the government of God, by an act of infinite grace, commutes
or substitutes the sufferings of Christ for the eternal damnation of
sinners.
(vi.) An atonement was needed, and therefore doubtless designed, to
contradict the slander of Satan. He had seduced our first parents by the
insinuation that God was selfish, in prohibiting their eating the fruit of a
certain tree. Now, the execution of the penalty of his law, would not so
thoroughly refute this abominable slander, as would the great self-
denial of God exhibited in the atonement.
(vii.) An atonement was needed to inspire confidence in the offers and
promises of pardon, and in all the promises of God to man. Guilty, selfish
man finds it difficult, when thoroughly convicted of sin, to realize and
believe, that God is actually sincere in his promises and offers of pardon
and salvation. But whenever the soul can apprehend the reality of the
atonement, it can them believe every offer and promise as the very thing to
be expected from a being who could give his Son to die for enemies.
An atonement was needed, therefore, as the great and only means of
sanctifying sinners—
Rom. viii. 3, 4. “For what the law could not do, in that it was weak
through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh,
and for sin condemned sin in the flesh : that the righteousless of the law
might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.”
The law was calculated, when once its penalty was incurred, to shut the
sinner up in a dungeon, and only to develope more and more his depravity.
Nothing could subdue his sin, and cause him to love, but the manifestation
to him of disinterested benevolence. The atonement is just the thing to
meet this necessity, and subdue rebellion.
(viii.) An atonement was needed, not to render God merciful, but to
reconcile pardon with a due administration of justice. This has been
virtually said before, but needs to be repeated in this connection.
Rom. iii. 22–26. “For all have simmed, and come short of the glory of
God; being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in
Christ Jesus ; whom God has set forth to be a propitiation through faith in
his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are
past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time, his
righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him which
believeth in Jesus.”
I present several further reasons why an atonement in the case of the
inhabitants of this world was preferable to punishment, or to the execution
of the divine law. Several reasons have already been assigned, to which I
will add the following, some of which are plainly revealed in the Bible;
others are plainly inferrible from what the Bible does reveal; and others
still are plainly inferrible from the very nature of the case.
(1.) God's great and disinterested love to simmers themselves was a prime
reason for the atonement.
John iii. 16. “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only
334 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have
everlasting life.”
(2.) His great love to the universe at large must have been another reason,
inasmuch as it was impossible that the atonement should not exert an
amazing influence over moral beings, in whatever world they might exist,
and where the fact of atonement should be known.
(3.) Another reason for substituting the sufferings of Christ in the place
of the eternal damnation of simmers, is, that an infinite amount of suffering
might be prevented. The relation of Christ to the universe rendered his
sufferings so infinitely valuable and influential, as an expression of God's
abhorrence of sin on the one hand, and his great love to his subjects on the
other, that an infinitely less amount of suffering in him than must have
been inflicted on simmers, would be equally, and no doubt vastly more,
influential in supporting the government of God, than the execution of the
law upon thern would have been. Be it borne in mind, that Christ was the
lawgiver, and his suffering in behalf of sinners is to be regarded as the law-
giver and executive magistrate suffering in the behalf and stead of a rebel-
lious province of his empire. As a governmental expedient it is easy to
see the great value of such a substitute; that on the one hand it fully
evinced the determination of the ruler not to yield the authority of his law,
and on the other, to evince his great and disinterested love for his rebellious
Subjects.
(4.) By this substitution, an immense good might be gained, the eternal
happiness of all that can be reclaimed from sin, together with all the
augmented happiness of those who have never simmed, that must result
from this glorious revelation of God.
(5.) Another reason for preferring the atonement to the punishment of
sinners must have been, that sin had afforded an opportunity for the
highest manifestation of virtue in God: the manifestation of forbearance,
mercy, self-denial, and suffering for enemies that were within his own
power, and for those from whom he could expect no equivalent in return.
It is impossible to conceive of a higher order of virtues than are exhibited
in the atonement of Christ.
It was vastly desirable that God should take advantage of such an
opportunity to exhibit his true character, and show to the universe what
was in his heart. The strength and stability of any government must
depend upon the estimation in which the sovereign is held by his subjects.
It was therefore indispensable, that God should improve the opportunity,
which sin had afforded, to manifest and make known his true character,
and thus secure the highest confidence of his subjects.
(6.) Another reason for preferring atonement was, God's desire to lay
open his heart to the inspection and imitation of moral beings.
(7.) Another reason is, because God is love, and prefers mercy when it
can be safely exercised. The Bible represents him as delighting in mercy,
and affirms that “judgment is his strange work.”
Because he so much prefers mercy to judgment as to be willing to suffer
ATONEMENT. 335
as the sinner's substitute, to afford himself the opportunity to exercise
pardon, on principles that are consistent with a due administration of
justice.
(8.) In the atonement God consulted his own happiness and his own
glory. To deny himself for the salvation of sinners, was a part of his own
infinite happiness, always intended by him, and therefore always enjoyed.
This was not selfishness in him, as his own well-being is of infinitely
greater value than that of all the universe besides, he ought so to regard
and treat it, because of its supreme and intrinsic value.
(9.) In making the atonement, God complied with the laws of his own
intelligence, and did just that, all things considered, in the highest degree
promotive of the universal good.
(10.) The atonement would present to creatures the highest possible
motives to virtue. Example is the highest moral influence that can be
exerted. If God, or any other being, would make others benevolent, he
must manifest benevolence himself. If the benevolence manifested in the
atonement does not subdue the selfishness of sinners, their case is hopeless.
(11.) It would produce among creatures the highest kind and degree of
happiness, by leading them to contemplate and imitate his love.
(12.) The circumstances of his government rendered an atonement
necessary; as the execution of law was not, as a matter of fact, a sufficient
preventive of sin. The annihilation of the wicked would not answer the
purposes of government. A full revelation of mercy, blended with such
an exhibition of justice, was called for by the circumstances of the
universe.
(13.) To confirm holy beings. Nothing could be more highly calculated
to establish and confirm the confidence, love, and obedience of holy beings,
than this disinterested manifestation of love to sinners and rebels.
(14.) To confound his enemies. How could anything be more directly
calculated to silence all cavils, and to shut every mouth, and for ever close
up all opposing lips, than such an exhibition of love and willingness to
make sacrifices for sinners?
(15.) A just and necessary regard to his own reputation made him prefer
atonement to the punishment of sinners.
A desire to sustain his own reputation, as the only moral power that
could support his own moral government, must have been a leading reason
for the atonement.
The atonement was preferred as the best, and perhaps only way to
inspire an affectionate confidence in God.
It must have been the most agreeable to God, and the most beneficial to
the universe.
(16.) Atonement would afford him an opportunity always to gratify his
love in his kindness to sinners, in using means for their salvation, in for-
giving and saving them when they repent, without the danger of its being
inferred in the universe, that he had not a sufficient abhorrence for their
sin.
336 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(17.) Another reason for the atonement was, to counteract the influence
of the devil, which was so extensively and powerfully exerted in this world
for the promotion of selfishness. s
(18.) To make the final punishment of the wicked more impressive in
the light of the infinite love, manifest in the atonement.
(19.) The atonement is the highest testimony that God can bear against
Selfishness. It is the testimony of his own example.
(20.) The atonement is a higher expression of his regard for the public
interest than the execution of law. It is, therefore, a fuller satisfaction to
public justice.
(21.) The atonement so reveals all the attributes of God, as to complete
the whole circle of motives needed to influence the minds of moral beings.
(22.) By dying in human nature, Christ exhibited his heart to both
worlds.
(28) The fact, that the execution of the law of God on rebel angels had
not arrested, and could not arrest, the progress of rebellion in the universe,
proves that something more needed to be done, in support of the authority
of law, than Would be done in the execution of its penalty upon rebels.
While the execution of law may have a strong tendency to prevent the
beginning of rebellion among loyal subjects, and to restrain rebels them-
selves; yet penal inflictions do not, in fact, subdue the heart, under any
government, whether human or divine.
As a matter of fact, the law was only exasperating rebels, without con-
firming holy beings. Paul affirmed, that the action of the law upon his
own mind, while in impenitence, was to beget in him all manner of con-
cupiscence. One grand reason for giving the law was, to develope the
nature of sin, and to show that the carnal mind is not subject to the
law of God, neither indeed can be. The law was therefore given that
the offence might abound, that thereby it might be demonstrated, that
without an atonement there could be no Salvation for rebels under the
government of God.
(24.) The nature, degree, and execution of the penalty of the law, made
the holiness and the justice of God so prominent, as to absorb too much of
public attention to be safe. Those features of his character were so fully
revealed, by the execution of his law upon the rebel angels, that to have
pursued the same course with the inhabitants of this world, without the
offer of mercy, might have had, and doubtless would have had, an injurious
influence upon the universe, by creating more of fear than of love to God
and his government.
Hence, a fuller revelation of the love and compassion of God was neces-
sary, to guard against the influence of slavish fear.
4. His taking human nature, and obeying unto death, under such cir-
cumstances, constituted a good reason for our being treated as righteous.
(1.) It is a common practice in human governments, and one that is
founded in the nature and laws of mind, to reward distinguished public
service by conferring favours on the children of those who have rendered
ATONEMENT. 337
this service, and treating them as if they had rendered it themselves.
This is both benevolent and wise. Its governmental importance, its wisdom
and excellent influence, have been most abundantly attested in the expe-
rience of nations.
(2.) As a governmental transaction, this same principle prevails, and for
the same reason, under the government of God. All that are Christ's
children and belong to him, are received for his sake, treated with favour,
and the rewards of the righteous are bestowed upon them for his sake.
And the public service which he has rendered to the universe, by laying
down his life for the support of the divine government, has rendered it
eminently wise, that all who are united to him by faith should be treated
as righteous for its sake.
LECTURE XXXV.
EXTENT OF ATONEMENT.
f
VI. The eatent of the atonement.
In discussing this part of the subject, I must inquire briefly into the
governmental value and bearings of the atonement.
1. It is valuable only as it tends to promote the glory of God, and the
virtue and happiness of the universe. -
2. In order to understand, in what the value of the atonement consists,
we must understand –
(1.) That happiness is an ultimate good.
(2.) That virtue is indispensable to happiness.
(3.) That the knowledge of God is indispensable to virtue.
(4.) That Christ, who made the atonement, is God.
(5.) That the work of atonement was the most interesting and impressive
exhibition of God that ever was made in this world, and probably in the
universe.
(6.) That, therefore, the atonement is the highest means of promoting
virtue that exists in this world, and perhaps in the universe. And that it
is valuable only, and just so far, as it reveals God, and tends to promote
virtue and happiness.
(7.) That the work of atonement was a gratification of the infinite bene-
volence of God.
(8.) It was a work etermally designed by him, and, therefore, etermally
enjoyed.
(9.) The design to make an atonement, together with the foreseen
results which were, in an important sense, always present to him, have
etermally caused no small part of the happiness of God.
(10.) The developement, or carrying out of this design, in the work of
atonement, highly promotes, and will for ever promote, his glory in the
ll IllWel'S6.
Z
338 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(11.) Its value consists in its adaptedness to promote the virtue and hap-
piness of holy angels, and all moral agents who have never simmed. As it
is a mew and most stupendous revelation of God, it must of course greatly
increase their knowledge of God, and be greatly promotive of their virtue
and happiness.
(12.) Its value consists in its adaptedness to prevent further rebellion
against God in every part of the universe. The atonement exhibits God
in such a light, as must greatly strengthen the confidence of holy beings
in his character and government. It is therefore calculated, in the highest
degree, to confirm holy beings in their allegiance to God, and thus prevent
the further progress of rebellion. Let it be remembered, the value of the
atonement consists in its moral power, or tendency, to promote virtue and
happiness. Moral power is the power of motive.
The highest moral power is the influence of example. Advice has moral
power. Precept has moral power. Sanction has moral power. But ex-
ample is the highest moral influence that can be exerted by any being.
Moral beings are so created as to be naturally influenced by the example
of each other. The example of a child, as a moral influence, has power
upon other children. The example of an adult, as a moral influence, has
power. The example of great men and of angels, has great moral power.
But the example of God is the highest moral influence in the universe.
The word of God has power. His commands, threatenings, promises; but
his example is a higher moral influence than his precepts or his threatenings.
Virtue consists in benevolence. God requires benevolence; threatens all
his subjects with punishment if they are not benevolent, and promises
them etermal life if they are. All this has power. But his example, his
own benevolence, his own disinterested love, as expressed in the atone-
ment, has a vastly higher moral influence than his word, or any other of his
manifestations.
Christ is God. In the atonement, God has given us the influence of his
own example, has exhibited his own love, his own compassion, his own self-
denial, his own patience, his own long-suffering, under abuse from eliemies.
In the atonement he has exhibited all the highest and most perfect forms
of virtue, has united himself with human nature, has exhibited these forms
of virtue to the inspection of our senses, and laboured, Wept, suffered, bled,
and died for man. This is not only the highest revelation of God that
could be given to man; but is giving the whole weight of his own example
in favour of all the virtues which he requires of man.
This is the highest possible moral influence. It is properly moral
omnipotence ; that is, the influence of the atonement, when apprehended
by the mind, will accomplish whatever is within the compass of moral
power to effect. Moral power cannot compel a moral agent, nor set aside
his freedom, for this is not an object of moral power; but it will do all that
motive can, in the nature of the case, accomplish. It is the highest and
most weighty motive that the mind of a moral being can conceive. It is
the most moving, impressive, and influential consideration in the universe.
ATONEMENT. 339
Its value may be estimated, by its moral influence in the promotion of
holiness among all holy beings.
1. Their complacent love to God must depend upon their knowledge of
him. tº-
2. As he is infinite, and all creatures are finite, finite beings know him
only as he is pleased to reveal himself. -
3. The atonement has disclosed or revealed to the universe of holy beings,
a class and an order of virtues, as resident in the divine mind, which, but
for the atonement, would probably have for ever remained unknown.
4. As the atonement is the most impressive revelation of God of which
we have any knowledge, or can form any conception, we have reason to
believe, that it has greatly increased the holiness and happiness of all holy
creatures, that it has done more than any other, and perhaps every other,
revelation of God, to exalt his character, strengthen his government, en-
lighten the universe, and increase its happiness.
5. The value of the atonement may be estimated by the amount of good
it has done, and will do, in this world. The atonement is an exhibition of
God suffering as a substitute for his rebellious subjects. His relation to
the law and to the universe, is that which gives his sufferings such bound-
less value. I have said, in a former lecture, that the utility of executing
penal sanctions consists in the exhibition it makes of the true character
and designs of the lawgiver. It creates public confidence, makes a public
impression, and thus strengthens the influence of government, and is in
this way promotive of order and happiness. The atonement is the highest
testimony that God could give of his holy abhorrence of sin; of his regard
to his law; of his determination to support it; and, also, of his great love
for his subjects; his great compassion for sinners ; and his willingness to
suffer himself in their stead; rather, on the one hand, than to punish them,
or, on the other, than to set aside the penalty without Satisfaction being
made to public justice.
6. The atonement may be viewed in either of two points of light.
(1.) Christ may be considered as the lawgiver, and attesting his sincerity,
love of holiness, hatred of sin, approbation of the law, and compassion for
his subjects, by laying down his life as their substitute.
(2.) Or Christ may be considered as the Son of the Supreme Ruler;
and then we have the spectacle of a sovereign, giving his only-begotten
and well-beloved Son, his greatest treasure, to die a shameful and agonizing
death, in testimony of his great compassion for his rebellious subjects, and
of his high regard for public justice.
7. The value of the atonement may be estimated, by considering the
fact, that it provides for the pardon of sin, in a way that forbids the hope
of impunity in any other case. This, the good of the universe imperiously
demanded. If sin is to be forgiven at all under the government of God
it should be known to be forgiven upon principles that will by no means
encourage rebellion or hold out the least hope of impunity, should rebel-
lion break out in any other part of the universe.
Z Q
340 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
8. The atonement has settled the question, that sin can never be for-
given, under the government of God, simply on account of the repentance
of any being. It has demonstrated, that sin can never be forgiven with-
out full satisfaction being made to public justice, and that public justice can
never be satisfied with anything less than an atonement made by God
himself. Now, as it can never be expected, that the atonement will be
repeated, it is for ever settled, that rebellion in any other world than this,
can have no hope of impunity. This answers the question so often asked
by infidels, “If God was disposed to be merciful, why could he not forgive
without an atonement?” The answer is plain ; he could not forgive sin,
but upon such principles as would for ever preclude the hope of impunity,
should rebellion ever break out among free agents in any other part of the
Ul]]]Vé]’Sé.
9. From these considerations it is manifest, that the value of the atone-
ment is infinite. We have reason to believe, that Christ, by his atonement,
is not only the Saviour of this world, but the Saviour of the universe in an
important sense. Rebellion once broke out in heaven, and upon the rebel
angels God executed his law, and sent them down to hell. It next broke
out in this world ; and as the execution of law was found by experience
not to be a sufficient preventive of rebellion, there was no certainty that
rebellion would not have spread until it had ruined the universe, but for
that revelation of God which Christ has made in the atonement. This
exhibition of God has proved itself not merely able to prevent rebellion
among holy beings, but to reclaim and reform relels. Millions of rebels
have through it been reclaimed and reformed. This world is to be turned
back to its allegiance to God, and the blessed atomeinent of Christ has so
unbosomed God before the universe, as, no doubt, not only to save other
worlds from going into rebellion, but to save myriads of our already rebel-
lious race from the depths of an eternal hell.
Let us now inquire for whose benefit the atonement was intended.
1. God does all things for himself; that is, he consults his own glory
and happiness, as the Supreme and most influential reason for all his con-
duct. This is wise and right in him, because his own glory and happiness
are infinitely the greatest good in and to the universe. He made the
atonement to satisfy himself. “God so loved the world, that he gave his
only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but
have everlasting life.” God himself, then, was greatly benefited by the
atonement: in other words, his happiness has in a great measure resulted
from its contemplation, execution, and results.
2. He made the atomement for the benefit of the universe. All holy
beings are, and must be, benefited by it, from its very nature, as it gives
them a higher knowledge of God than ever they had before, or ever could
have gained in any other way. The atonement is the greatest work that he
could have wrought for them, the most blessed, and excellent, and benevo-
lent thing he could have done for them. For this reason, angels are
described as desiring to look into the atonement. The inhabitants of
ATONEMENT. 341
heaven are represented as being deeply interested in the work of atonement,
and those displays of the character of God that are made in it. The
atonement is then no doubt one of the greatest blessings that ever God
conferred upon the universe of holy beings,
3. The atonement was made for the benefit particularly of the in-
habitants of this world, from its very nature, as it is calculated to benefit
all the inhabitants of this world; as it is a most stupendous revelation of
God to man. Its nature is adapted to benefit all mankind. All mankind
can be pardoned, if they are rightly affected and brought to repentance by
it, as well as any part of mankind.
4. The Bible declares that Christ tasted death for every man.
5. All do certainly receive many blessings on account of it. It is
probable that, but for the atonement, none of our race, except the first
human pair, would ever have had an existence.
6. But for the atomement, it seems not possible for creatures to conceive
how man could have been treated with lenity and forbearance ally more
than the fallen angels could be.
7. All the blessings which mankind enjoy, are conferred on them on
account of the atonement of Christ; that is, God could not consistently
wait on sinners, and bless, and do all that the mature of the case admits, to
save them, were it not for the fact of atonement.
8. That it was made for all mankind, is evident, from the fact that it is
offered to all indiscriminately.
9. Sinners are universally condemned for not receiving it.
10. If the atonement is not intended for all mankind, it is impossible for
us not to regard God as insincere, in making them the offer of Salvation
through the atonement.
ll. If the atonement were not intended for all, sinners in hell will see
and know that their salvation was never possible; that no atomement was
made for them ; and that God was imsineere in offering them Salvation.
12. If the atonement is not for all men, no one can know for whom, in
particular, it was intended, without direct revelation. Hence—
13. If the atomement was made only for a part, no man can know
whether he has a right to embrace it, until by a direct revelation God has
made known to him that he is one of that part.
14. If the atomement was made but for a part of mankind, it is entirely
mugatory, unless a further revelation make known for whom in particular it
was made.
15. If it was not made for all men, ministers do not know to whom they
should offer it.
16. If ministers do not believe that it was made for all men, they cannot
heartily and homestly press its acceptance upon any individual, or congre-
gation in the world; for they cannot assure any individual, or congregation,
that there is any atonement for him or them, any more than there is for
Satan.
If to this it should be replied, that for fallen angels no atonement has
343 SYSTEMATIC TIIBO), O(;Y.
been unade, but for Some men an atonement has been made, so that it may
be true of any individual that it was made for him, and if he will truly
believe, he will thereby have the fact revealed, thät it was, in fact, made
for him : I reply, What is a simmer to believe, as a condition of salvation ?
Is it merely that an atonement was made for somebody ? Is this saving
faith P Must he not embrace it, and personally and individually commit
himself to it, and to Christ?—trust in it as made for him 2 But how is
he authorized to do this upon the supposition that the atonement was made
for some men only, and perhaps for him 2 Is it saving faith to believe that
it was possibly made for him, and by believing this possibility, will he
thereby gain the evidence that it was, in fact, made for him 2 No, he must
have the word of God for it, that it was made for him. Nothing else can
warrant the casting of his soul upon it. How then is “he truly to believe,”
or trust in the atonement, until he has the evidence, not merely that it
possibly may have been, but that it actually was, made for him? The mere
possibility that an atonement has been made for an individual, is no ground
of saving faith. What is he to believe? Why, that of which he has proof.
But the supposition is, that he has proof only that it is possible that the
atonement was made for him. He has a right, them, to believe it possible
that Christ died for him. And is this saving faith? No, it is not. What
advantage, then, has he over Satan in this respect. Satan knows that the
atonement was not made for him ; the sinner upon the supposition linows
that, possibly, it may have been made for him ; but the latter has really no
more ground for trust and reliance than the former. He might hope, but
he could not rationally believe.
But upon this subject of the extent of the atonement, let the Bible speak
for itself: “The next day John seeth Jesus coming unto him, and Saith,
Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world.” “For
God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever
believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent
not his Son into the world, to condemn the world: but that the World
through him might be saved.” “And said unto the woman, Now we believe,
not because of thy saying ; for we have heard him ourselves, and know that
this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world.”—John i. 29; iii. 16,
17; iv. 42. “Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all
men to condemnation; even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift
came upon all men upto justification of life.”—Rom. v. 18. “For the love
of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all,
then were all dead : And that he died for all, that they which live should
not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them,
and rose again.”—2 Cor. v. 14, 15, “Who gave himself a ransom for all,
to be testified in due time.” “For therefore we both labour and suffer
reproach, because we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men,
especially of those that believe.”—l Tim. ii. 6; iv. 10. “And he is the
propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the
whole world.”— 1 John ii. 2.
ATONEMENT. 343
That the stonement is sufficient for ali men, and, in that sense, general,
as opposed to particular, is also evident from the fact, that the invitations
and promises of the gospel are addressed to all men, and all are freely
offered salvation through Christ. “Look unto me, and be ye saved, all
the ends of the earth : for I am God, and there is none else.” “Ho !
every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money;
come ye, buy and eat; yea, come, buy wine and milk without money
and without price. Wherefore do ye spend money for that which is not
bread 2 and your labour for that which satisfieth not? hearken diligently
unto me, and eat ye that which is good, and let your soul delight itself in
fatness. Incline your ear, and come unto me : hear, and your soul shall
live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure
mercies of David.”—Isa. xlv. 22 : ly, 1–3. “Come unto me all ye that
are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon
you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart ; and ye shall find
rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.”
“Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell them which are bidden,
Behold, I have prepared my dinner; my oxen and my fatlings are killed,
and all things are ready ; come unto the marriage.”—Matt. xi. 28–30;
xxii. 4. “And sent his servant at supper time to say to them that were
bidden, Come, for all things are now ready.”—Luke xiv. 17. “In the
last day, the great day of the feast, Jesus stood and cried, saying, If any
man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink.”—John. vii. 37. “T3ehold,
I stand at the door, and knock; if any man hear my voice, and open the
door, I will come into him, and will sup with him, and he with me.”
“And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. And let him that heareth say,
Come. And let him that is athirst come. And Whosoever will, let him
take the water of life freely.”—Rev. xxii. 17.
Again : I infer that the atonement was made, and is sufficient, for all
men, from the fact that God not only invites all, but expostulates with them
for not accepting his invitations. “Wisdom crieth without ; she uttereth
her voice in the streets : she crieth in the chief place of concourse, in the
openings of the gates; in the city she uttereth her words, saying, How long
ye simple ones, will ye love simplicity ? and the scorners delight in their
scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn you at my reproof: behold I
will pour out my Spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you.”
—Prov. i. 20–23. “Come now, and let us reason together, saith the
Lord : though your sins be as Scarlet, they shall be white as Snow, though
they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool.”—Isaiah i. 18. “Thus
saith the Lord, thy Redeemer, the Holy One of Israel, I am the Lord thy
God which teacheth thee to profit, which leadeth thee by the way that thou
shouldest go. Oh that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments then
had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the
Sea.”—Isaiah xlviii. 17, 18. “Say unto them, as I live saith the Lord
God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked
turn from his way and live ; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why
344 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
will ye die, O house of Israel?”—Ezek. xxxiii. 11. “Hear ye now what
the Lord Saith : Arise, contend thou before the mountains, and let the hills
hear thy voice. Hear ye, O mountains, the Lord's controversy, and ye
strong foundations of the earth; for the Lord hath a controversy with his
people, and he will plead with Israel. O my people, what have I done
unto thee ? and wherein have I wearied thee ? testify against me.”—
Micah, vi. 1–3. “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets,
and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have
gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under
her wings, and ye would not l”—Matt. xxiii. 37.
Again : the same may be inferred from the professed sincerity of God
in his invitations. “O that there were such an heart in them, that they
Would fear me, aud keep all my commandments always, that it might be
well with them, and with their children for ever !”—Deut. v. 39. “O
that they were wise, that they understood this, that they would consider
their latter end "-Deut. xxxii. 29. “For thou art not a God that hath
pleasure in wickedness; neither shall evil dwell with thee.”—Ps. v. 4.
“Oh that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in
my ways I should soon have subdued their enemies, and turned my
hand against their adversaries. The haters of the Lord should have sub-
mitted themselves unto him : but their time should have endured for ever."
—Ps. lxxxi. 13–15. “O that thou hadst hearkened unto my command-
ments then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the
waves of the sea.”—Isaiah xlviii. 18. “ For I have no pleasure in the
death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God : wherefore turn yourselves,
and live ye.”—Ezek. xviii. 32. “And when he was come near, he belield
the city, and wept over it, saying, If thou hadst known, even thou, at least
in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace | But now they
are hid from thine eyes.”—Luke xix. 41, 4:2. “For God so loved the
world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him
should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent not his Son
into the world to condemn the world ; but that the world through him
might be saved.”—John iii. 16, 17, “ I exhort therefore, that first of all,
supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all
men: for kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet
and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty, For this is good and
acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour; who will have all men to be
saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.”—1. Tim 1–4.
“The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slack
mess; but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish,
but that all should come to repentance.”—2 Peter iii. 9.
Again : the same inference is forced upon us by the fact, that God
complains of sinners for rejecting his overtures of mercy “Because I
have called, and ye refused I have stretched out my hand, and no man
regarded.”—Prov. i. 24. “But they refused to hearken, and pulled away
the shoulder, and stopped their ears, that they should not hear. Yea, they
ATONEMENT. 345
made their hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should hear the law, and
the words which the Lord of hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former
prophets: therefore came a great wrath from the Lord of hosts. There-
fore it is come to pass; that, as he cried and they would not hear: so they
cried, and I would not hear, saith the Lord of hosts.”—Zechariah vii. 11,
12, 13. “The kingdom of heaven is like unto a certain king which made
a marriage for his son. And sent forth his servants to call them that were
bidden to the wedding: and they would not come. Again, he sent forth
other servants, saying, Tell them which are bidden, Behold, I have pre-
pared my dinner; my oxen and my fatlings are killed, and all things are
ready; come unto the marriage. But they made light of it, and went their
ways, one to his farm, another to his merchandise: and the remnant took
his servants, and treated them spitefully, and slew them.”—Matthew XXii.
2, 3, 4, 5, 6. “And sent his servant at Supper-time to say to them that
were bidden, Come; for all things are now ready. And they all With one
consent began to make excuse. The first said unto him, I have bought
a piece of ground, and I must needs go and see it: I pray thee have me
excused. And another said, I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to
prove them: I pray thee have me excused. And another said, I have
married a wife; and therefore I cannot come.”—Luke xiv. 17, 18, 19, 20.
“And ye will not come to me, that ye might have life.”—John v. 40. “Ye
stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the
Holy Ghost: as your fathers did, so do ye.”—Acts vii. 51. “And as he
reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix
trembled, and answered, Go thy way for this time; when I have a con-
venient season I will call for thee.”—Acts xxiv. 25.
Again, the same is inferrible from the fact, that sinners are represented
as having no excuse for being lost and for not being saved by Christ. “And
he saith unto him, Friend, how camest thou in hither, not having a wedding-
garment? And he was speechless.”—Matt. xxii. 12. “ For the invisible
things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being under-
stood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead;
so that they are without excuse.”—Romans i. 20. “And ye will not come
to me, that ye might have life.”—John v. 40. “Now, we know, that what
things Soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law, that
every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may beeome guilty before
God.”—Romans iii. 19.
VII. I now proceed to answer objections.
1. Objection to the fact of atomenent. It is said, that the doctrine of
atomenent represents God as ummerciful. To this I answer,
(1.) This objection supposes that the atonement was demanded to satisfy
retributive instead of public justice.
(2) The atonement was the exhibition of a merciful disposition. It
was because God was disposed to pardon, that he consented to give his
own Son to die as the substitute of sinners.
346 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(3.) The atonement is infinitely the most illustrious exhibition of mercy
ever made in the universe. The mere pardon of sin, as an act of sovereign
mercy, could not have been compared, had it been possible ; with the merciful
disposition displayed in the atonement itself.
2. It is objected that the atonement is unnecessary.
The testimony of the world and of the consciences of all men is
against this objection. This is universally attested by their expiatory
Sacrifices. These, as has been said, have been offered by nearly every
nation of whose religious history we have any reliable account This shows
that human beings are universally conscious of being sinners, and under
the government of a sin-hating God; that their intelligence demands either
the punishment of sinners, or that a substitute should be offered to public
justice; that they all own and have the idea that substitution is conceivable,
and hence they offer their sacrifices as expiatory.
A heathen philosopher can answer this objection, and rebuke the folly
of him who makes it.
3. It is objected, that the doctrine of the atonement is inconsistent with
the idea of mercy and forgiveness.
(1.) This takes for granted, that the atonement was the literal payment
of a debt, and that Christ suffered all that was due to all the sinners
for whom he died, so that their discharge or pardon is an act of justice, and
not of mercy. But this is by no means the view of God which the
nature of the atonement presents. The atonement, as we have seen, had
respect simply to public, and not at all to retributive justice. Christ suf-
fered what was necessary, to illustrate the intention of God, in respect to
sin, and in respect to his law. But the amount of his sufferings had no
respect to the amount of punishment that might have justly been inflicted
on the wicked.
(2.) The punishment of sinners is just as much deserved by them, as if
Christ had not suffered at all.
(3.) Their forgiveness, therefore, is just as much an act of mercy, as if
there had been no atonement. -
4. It is objected, that it is unjust to punish an innocent being instead
of the guilty.
(1.) Yes, it would not only be unjust, but it is impossible with God
to punish an innocent moral agent at all. Punishment implies guilt. An
innocent being may suffer, but he cannot be punished. Christ voluntarily
“suffered the just for the unjust.” He had a right to exercise this self.
denial; and as it was by his own voluntary consent, no injustice was done
to any one.
(2.) If he had no right to make an atonement, he had no right to consult
and promote his own happiness and the happiness of others; for it is said,
that “for the joy that was set before him, he endured the cross, despising
the shame.”
5. It is objected that the doctrine of atonement is utterly incredible.
To this I have replied in a former lecture; but will here again state,
ATONEMENT. 347
that it would be utterly incredible upon any other supposition, than that
God is love. But if God is love, as the Bible expressly affirms that he is,
the work of atonement is just what might be expected of him, under the
circumstances; and the doctrine of atonement is then the most reasonable
doctrine in the universe.
6. It is objected to the doctrine of atonement, that it is of a demoral-
izing tendency.
(1.) There is a broad distinction between the natural tendency of a
thing, and such an abuse of a good thing as to make it the instrument of
evil. The best things and doctrines may be, and often are, abused, and
their natural tendency perverted.
(2.) Although the doctrine of the atonement may be abused, yet its
natural tendency is the direct opposite of demoralizing. Is the manifest-
ation of infinitely disinterested love naturally calculated to beget enmity ?
Who does not know that the natural tendency of manifested love is to
excite love in return ?
(3.) Those who have the most cordially believed in the atonement, have
exhibited the purest morality that has ever been in this world; while the
rejectors of the atonement, almost without exception, exhibit a loose mo-
rality. This is, as might be expected, from the very nature and moral
influence of atonement.
7. To a general atonement, it is objected that the Bible represents
Christ as laying down his life for his sheep, or for the elect only, and not
for all mankind.
(1.) It does indeed represent Christ as laying down his life for his sheep,
and also for all mankind.
1 John ii. 2.- : And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for
ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world.”
John iii. 17.—“ For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn
the world ; but that the world through him might be saved.”
Heb. ii. 9. “But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the
angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour; that he,
by the grace of God, should taste death for every man.”
(2.) Those who object to the general atonement, take substantially the
same course to evade this doctrine, that Unitarians do to set aside the
doctrine of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. They quote those
passages that prove the unity of God and the humanity of Christ, and
then take it for granted that they have disproved the doctrine of the
Trinity and Christ's Divinity. The asserters of limited atonement, in like
manner, quote those passages that prove that Christ died for the elect and
for his Saints, and then take it for granted that he died for none else. To
the Unitarian, we reply, we admit the unity of God and the humanity of
Christ, and the full meaning of those passages of scripture which you
quote in proof of these doetrimes; but we insist that this is not the whole
truth, but that there are still other passages which prove the doctrine of the
Trinity, and the Divinity of Christ. Just so to the asserters of limited atone-
348 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
ment, we reply: we believe that Christ laid down his life for his sheep,
as well as you ; but we also believe that “he tasted death for every man.".
John iii. 16.—“For God so loved the world, that he gave his only
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have
everlasting life.”
8. To the doctrine of general atonement it is objected, that it would
be folly in God to provide what he knew would be rejected ; and that to
suffer Christ to die for those who, he foresaw, would not repent, would be a
useless expenditure of the blood and suffering of Christ.
(1.) This objection assumes that the atonement was a literal payment
of a debt, which we have seen does not consist with the nature of the
atOneInent.
(2.) If sinners do not accept it, in no view can the atonement be useless,
as the great compassion of God, in providing an atonement and offering
them mercy, will for ever exalt his character, in the estimation of holy
beings, greatly strengthen his government, and therefore benefit the whole
universe.
(3.) If all men rejected the atonement, it would, nevertheless, be of
infinite value to the universe, as the most glorious revelation of God that
was ever made.
9. To the general atonement it is oljected, that it implies universal
Salvation.
It would indeed imply this, upon the supposition that the atonement
is the literal payment of a debt. It was upon this view of the atone-
ment, that universalism first took its stand. Universalists taking it for
granted, that Christ had paid the debt of those for whom he died, and
finding it fully revealed in the Bible that he died for all mankind,
maturally, and if this were correct, properly, inferred the doctrine of umi-
versal salvation. But we have seen, that this is not the nature of atone-
ment. Therefore, this inference falls to the ground.
10. It is objected that, if the atonement was not a payment of the debt
of sinners, but general in its mature, as we have mentioned, it secures the
salvation of Ino one.
It is true, that the atonement, of itself, does not secure the salvation
of any one ; but the promise and oath of God, that Christ shall have a
seed to serve him, provide that security.
GENERAL REMARKS ON THE ATON EMIENT.
1. The execution of the law of God on rebel angels must have created
great awe in heaven.
2. Its action may have tended too much to fear.
3. The forbearance of God toward men previous to the atonement of
Christ, may have been designed to counteract the Superabundant tendency
to fear, as it was the beginning of a revelation of compassion.
4. Sinners will not give up their enmity against God, nor believe that
his love is disinterested, until they realize that he actually died as their
ATONEMENT. 349
substitute : the true and heart-belief of this will effectually subdue their
enmity.
5. In this is seen the exceeding strength of unbelief, and of prejudice
against God.
6. But faith in the atonement of Christ rolls a mountain weight of
crushing and melting considerations upon the heart of the sinner.
7. Thus, the blood of Christ, when apprehended and believed in,
cleanses from all sin.
8. God's forbearance toward sinners explained by, and consummated in,
the atonement, must increase the wonder, admiration, love, and happiness
of the universe.
9. The means which he uses to save mankind must produce the same
effect.
10. Beyond certain limits, forbearance is no virtue, but would be mani-
festly injurious, and therefore wrong. A degree of forbearance that might
justly create the impression, that God was not infinitely holy and opposed
to sin, would work infinite mischief in the universe.
11. When the forbearance of God has fully demonstrated his great love,
and done all it can to sustain the moral government of God, without a fresh
display of holiness and justice, he will, no doubt, come forth to the consum-
mation of his moral government, and make parallel displays of justice and
mercy for ever, by setting heaven and hell in eternal contrast.
12. Then the law and gospel will be seem to be one harmonious system
of moral government, developing in the fullest manner the glorious character
of God. -
13. From this may be seen the indispensable necessity of faith in the
atonement of Christ, and the reason why it is, that the gospel is the power
of God unto salvation only to every one that believeth. If the atonement
is not believed in, it is to that mind no revelation at all, and with such a
mind the gospel has no moral power.
14. But the atonement tends, in the highest manner, to produce in the
believer the spirit of entire and universal consecration to God.
15. The atonement shows how solid a foundation the Saints have for
unbroken and eternal repose and confidence in God. If God could make
an atonement for men, Surely it is infinitely unreasonable to suppose that
he will withhold from those that believe anything which could be to them a
real good.
16. We see that selfishness is the great hindrance to the exercise of
faith. A selfish mind finds it exceedingly difficult to understand the atone-
ment, inasmuch as it is an exhibition of a state of mind which is the direct
opposite of all that the sinner has ever experienced. His experience,
being wholly selfish, renders it difficult for him to conceive aright what true
religion is, and heartily to believe in the infinitely great and disinterested
love of God.
17. The atonement renders pardon consistent with the perfect adminis-
tration of justice.
350 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
18. The atonement, as it was made by the lawgiver, magnifies the law,
and renders it infinitely more honourable and influential, than the execu-
tion of the penalty upon simmers would have done.
19. It is the highest and most glorious expedient of moral government.
It is adding to the influence of law the whole weight of the most moving
manifestation of God that men or angels ever saw or ever will see.
20. It completes the circle of governmental motives. It is a filling up
of the revelation of God. It is a revealing of a department of his character,
with which it would seem that nothing else could have made his creatures
acquainted. It is, therefore, the highest possible support of moral govern-
ment.
21. It greatly glorifies God; indeed it does so far above all his other
works and ways.
22. It must be to him a source of the purest, most exalted, and etermal
happiness.
23. It opens the channels of divine benevolence to state-criminals.
24. It has united God in a new and peculiar way to human nature.
25. It has opened a way of access to God, uover opened to any creatures
before.
20. It has abolished natural death, by procuring a universal resurrection:
“For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.” I Cor.
xv. 22.
27. It restores the life of God to the soul, by restoring to man the
influence of the Holy Spirit.
28. It has introduced a new method of salvation and of moral renovation,
and made Christ the head of the new covenant.
29. It has made Christ our surety : “By so much was Jesus made a
surety of a better testament.” Heb. vii. 22.
30. It has arrayed such a public sentiment against relellion, as to crush
it whenever the atonement is fairly understood and applied by the Holy
Spirit.
31. It has procured the offer of pardon to all sinners of our race.
32. It has, no doubt, added to the happiness of heaven.
33. It has more fully developed the nature and importance of the
government of God.
34. It has more fully developed the nature of sin.
35. It has more fully developed the strength of sim.
36. It has more fully developed the total depravity and utter madness
of sinners.
37. It has given scope to the long-suffering and forbearance of God.
38. It has formed a more intimate union between God and man, than
between him and any other order of creatures.
39. It has elevated human nature, and the Saints of God, into the
stations of kings and priests to God.
40. It has opened new fields of usefulness, in which the benevolence of
God, angels, and men may luxuriate in doing good.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 351
41. It has developed and fully revealed the doctrine of the Trinity.
42. It has revealed the most influential and only efficacious method of
government.
43. It has more fully developed those laws of our being upon which the
strength of moral government depends.
44. It has given a standing illustration of the true intent, meaning, and
excellency of the law of God. In the atonement God has illustrated the
meaning of his law by his own example.
45. The atonement has fully illustrated the nature of virtue, and
demonstrated that it consists in disinterested benevolence.
46. It has for ever condemned all selfishness, as entirely an infinitely
inconsistent with virtue.
LECTURE XXXVI.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT.
HUMAN GovERNMENTs A PART OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
In the discussion of this subject I will,—
I. INQUIRE INTO THE ULTIMATE END OF GOD IN THE CREATION OF THE
UNIVERSE.
II. SHOW THAT PROVIDENTIAL AND MORAL GOVERNMENT ARE INDISPENS-
ABLE MEANS OF SECURING THIS END.
III. THAT CIVIL, AND FAMILY GOVERNMENTS ARE INDISPENSABLE To
THE SECURING OF THIS END ; AND ARE, THEREFORE, TRULY A PART OF THE
PROVIDENTIAL AND MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
IV. INQUIRE INTO THE FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT OF HUMAN GOVERN-
MENTS,
V. PoſNT OUT THE LIMITs, or BouxDARIES, of THIS RIGHT.
VI. MARE SEVERAL REMARKS RESPECTING FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, THE
RIGHT AND DUTY OF REVOLUTION, &c.
VII. APPLY THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES TO THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF
GOVERNMENTS AND SUBJECTS, IN RELATION TO THE EXECUTION OF NECESSARY
PENALTIES ; THE SUPPRESSION OF MOBS, INSURRECTIONs, REBELLION ; AND
IN REIATION TO WAR, SLAVERY, SABBATH DESECRATION, &c.
I. The ultimate end of God in creation.
We have seen in former lectures, that God is a moral agent, the self.
existent and supreme; and is therefore himself, as ruler of all, subject to,
and observant of, moral law in all his conduct. That is, his own infinite
intelligence must affirm that a certain course of willing is suitable, fit, and
right in him. This idea, or affirmation, is law to him; and to this his will
must be conformed, or he is not good. This is moral law, a law founded in
the eternal and self-existent nature of God. This law does, and lmllSt,
demand benevolence in God. Benevolence is good-willing. God's intelli.
352 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
gence must affirm that he ought to will good for its own intrinsic value. It
must affirm his obligation to choose the highest possible good as the great
end of his being. If God is good, the highest good of himself, and of the
universe, must have been the end which he had in view in the work of
creation. This is of infinite value, and ought to be willed by God. If
God is good, this must have been his end. We have also seen,-
II. That providential and moral governments are indispensable means of
Securing the highest good of the universe.
The highest good of moral agents is conditionated upon their holiness.
Holiness consists in conformity to moral law. Moral law implies moral
government. Moral government is a government of moral law and of
motives. Motives are presented by providential government ; and pro-
vidential government is, therefore, a means of moral government. Pro-
vidential and moral government must be indispensable to securing the
highest good of the universe.
III. Civil and family governments are indispensable to the securing of
this end, and are, therefore, really a part of the providential and moral
government of God.
In the discussion of this question I will show,
1. That human governments are a necessity of human nature.
2. That this necessity will continue as long as men exist in the present
world.
3. That human governments are plainly recognized in the Bible. as a
part of the government of God.
4. That it is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support
of human government.
5. It is absurd to suppose that human government can ever be dispensed
with in this world.
6. I shall answer objections.
1. Human governments are a necessity of human mature.
(1.) There must be real estate. Human beings have numerous physical
and moral wants that cannot possibly be supplied without the cultivation
and improvement of the soil. Buildings must be erected, &c.
(2.) The land and other things must belong to somebody. Somebody
must have the right, the care, the responsibility, and therefore the avails of
real estate.
(3.) There must, therefore, be all the forms of conveyancing, registry,
and, in short, all the forms of legal government, to settle and manage the
real estate affairs of men,
(4.) Moral beings will not agree in opinion on any subject without
similar degrees of knowledge.
(5.) Hence, no human community exists, or ever will exist, the members
of which will agree in opinion on all subjects.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 353
(6.) This creates a necessity for human legislation and adjudication, to
apply the great principles of moral law to all human affairs.
(7.) There are multitudes of human wants and necessities that cannot
properly be met, except through the instrumentality of human governments.
2. This necessity will continue as long as human beings exist in this
world.
(1.) This is as certain as that the human body will always need suste-
mance and clothing; and that the human soul will always need instruction;
and that the means of instruction will not come spontaneously, without
expense and labour.
(2.) It is as certain as that men of all ages and circumstances will never
possess equal talents and degrees of information on all subjects.
If all men were perfectly holy and disposed to do right, the necessity for
human governments would not be set aside, because this necessity is
founded in the ignorance of mankind, though greatly aggravated by their
wickedness.
(3.) The decisions of legislators and judges must be authoritative, so as
to settle questions of disagreement in opinion, and at once to bind and pro-
tect all parties.
(4.) The Bible represents human governments not only as existing, but
as deriving their authority and right to punish evil-doers, and to protect
the righteous, from God. But—
3. Human governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part of
the moral government of God.
(1.) Dam. ii. 21. “He changeth the times and the seasons: he removeth
kings, and setteth up kings: he giveth wisdom unto the wise, and know-
ledge to them that know understanding.”
Dam. iv. 17, 25. “This matter is by the decree of the watchers, and the
demand by the word of the holy ones; to the intent that the living may
know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it
to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.” “ They
shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of
the field, and they shall make thee to eat grass as oxen, and they shall
wet thee with the dew of heaven, and seven times shall pass over thee,
till thou know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and
giveth it to whomsoever he will.”
Dam. v. 21. “He was driven from the sons of men; and his heart was
made like the beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild asses: they fed
him with grass like oxen, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven ;
till he knew that the Most High God ruleth in the kingdom of men, and
that he appointeth over it whomsoever he will.”
Tom. Niii. 1–7. “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.
For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.
Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God:
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354 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers
are not a terror to good works but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be
afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise
of the same : for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou
do that which is evil, be afraid ; for he beareth not the sword in vain;
for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that
doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath but
also for conscience sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are
God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render,
therefore, to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due ; custom to
Whom custom ; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.”
Titus iii. 1. “Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and
powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work.”
1 Peter ii. 13, 14. “Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for
the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors,
as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and
for the praise of them that do well.”
These passages prove conclusively, that God establishes human govern-
ment, as parts of moral government.
(2.) It is a matter of fact, that God does exert moral influences through
the instrumentality of human governments.
(3.) It is a matter of fact, that he often executes his law, punishes vice,
and rewards virtue, through the instrumentality of human governments.
(4.) Under the Jewish theocracy, where God was king, it was found
indispensable to have not only laws promulged by divine authority, but
also to enforce them by the executive department of government.
4. It is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support of
human government.
(1.) Because human government is plainly a necessity of human beings.
(2.) As all men are in some way dependent upon them, it is the duty of
every man to aid in their establishment and support.
(3.) As the great law of benevolence, or universal good-Willing, demands
the existence of human governments, all men are under a perpetual and
unalterable moral obligation to aid in their establishment and support.
(4.) In popular or elective governments, every man having a right to vote,
every human being who has moral influence, is bound to exert that
influence in the promotion of virtue and happiness. And as human
governments are plainly indispensable to the highest good of man, they
are bound to exert their influence to Secure a legislation that is in accord-
ance with the law of God.
(5.) The obligation of human beings to support and obey human govern-
ments, while they legislate upon the principles of the moral law, is as unalter-
able as the moral law itself.
5. It is absurd to suppose that human governments can ever be dispensed
with in the present world.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT. - 355
(1) Because such a supposition is entirely inconsistent with the nature
of human beings.
(2.) It is equally inconsistent with their relations and circumstances.
(3.) Because it assumes that the necessity of government is founded alone
in human depravity : whereas the foundation of this necessity is human
ignorance, and human depravity is only an additional reason for the existence
of human governments. The primary idea of law is to teach ; hence law
has a precept. It is authoritative, and therefore has a penalty.
(4.) Because it assumes that men would always agree in judgment, if their
hearts were right, irrespective of their degrees of information. But this
is far from the truth.
(5.) Because it sets aside one of the plainest and most unequivocal doc-
trines of revelation.
6. I am to answer objections.
Obj. 1. The kingdom of God is represented in the Bible as subverting
all other kingdoms.
Ans. This is true, but all that can be meant by it is, that the time shall
come when God shall be regarded as the Supreme and universal sovereign
of the universe, when his law shall be regarded as universally obligatory;
when all kings, legislators, and judges shall act as his servants, declaring,
applying, and administering the great principles of his law to all the affairs
of human beings. Thus God will be the supreme sovereign, and earthly
rulers will be governors, kings, and judges under him, and acting by his
authority as revealed in the Bible.
Obj. 2. It is alleged, that God only providentially establishes human
governments, and that he does not approve of their selfish and wicked admi-
mistration; that he only uses them providentially, as he does Satan, for the
promotion of his own designs.
Ans. 1. God nowhere commands mankind to obey Satan, but he does
command them to obey magistrates and rulers.
Rom. xiii. 1. “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; for
there is no power but of God : the powers that be are ordained of God.”
1 Pet. ii. 13, 14. “Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the
Lord's sake: whether it be to the king as supreme; or unto governors, as
unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for
the praise of them that do well.”
2. He nowhere recognizes Satan as his servant, sent and set by him to
administer justice and execute Wrath upon the wicked ; but he does this in
respect to human governments.
Rom. xiii. 2–6. “Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth
the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves
damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.
Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and
thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to thee
for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not
A A 2
356 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the Sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute
Wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not
only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For, for this cause pay ye
tribute also ; for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this
very thing.”
3. It is true indeed that God approves of mothing that is ungodly and
selfish in human governments. Neither did he approve of what was ungodly
and selfish in the scribes and Pharisees; and yet Christ said to his dis-
ciples, “The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat. Therefore, whatso-
ever things they command you, that observe and do; but do ye not after
their works, for they say, and do not.” Here the plain common-sense
principle is recognized, that we are to obey when the requirement is not
inconsistent with the moral law, whatever may be the character or the
motive of the ruler. We are always to obey heartily as unto the Lord, and
not unto men, and render obedience to magistrates for the honour and
glory of God, and as doing service to him.
Obj. 3. It is said that Christians should leave human governments to
the management of the ungodly, and not be diverted from the work of
Saving Souls, to intermeddle with human governments.
Ans. 1. To uphold and assist good government is not being diverted
from the work of saving souls. The promotion of public and private order
and happiness is one of the indispensable means of doing good and saving
Souls.
2. It is nonsense to admit that Christians are under an obligation to obey
human government, and still have nothing to do with the choice of those
who shall govern.
Obj. 4. It is affirmed that we are commanded not to avenge ourselves,
that “Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, saith the Lord.” It is said,
that if I may not avenge or redress my own wrongs in my own person, I
may not do it through the instrumentality of human government.
Ams. 1. It does not follow, that because you may not take it upon your-
self to redress your own wrongs by a summary and personal infliction of
punishment upon the transgressor, that therefore human governments may
not punish them.
2. Because all private wrongs are a public injury; and irrespective of
any particular regard to your personal interest, magistrates are bound to
punish crime for the public good.
3. It does not follow, because while God has expressly forbidden you to
redress your own wrongs, by administering personal and private chastise-
ment, he has expressly recognized the right, and made it the duty of public
magistrates to punish crimes.
Obj. 5. It is alleged, that love is so much better than law, that where
love reigns in the heart, law can be universally dispensed with.
Ans. 1. This supposes that, if there is only love, there need be no rule
of duty; no revelation, directing love in its efforts to secure the end upon
which it terminates. But this is as untrue as possible.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 357
2. This objection overlooks the fact, that law is in all worlds the rule of
duty, and that legal sanctions make up an indispensable part of that circle
of motives that are suited to the nature, relations, and government of moral
beings.
3. The law requires love; and nothing is law, either human or divine,
that is inconsistent with universal benevolence. And to suppose that love
is better than law, is to suppose that love needs no direction from superior
wisdom.
Obj. 6. It is asserted, that Christians have something else to do besides
meddling with politics.
Ans. 1. In a popular government, politics are an important part of reli-
gion. No man can possibly be benevolent or religious, to the full extent
of his obligations, without concerning himself, to a greater or less extent,
with the affairs of human government.
2. It is true, that Christians have something else to do than to go with
a party to do evil, or to meddle with politics in a selfish or ungodly manner.
But they are bound to meddle with politics in popular governments, because
they are bound to seek the universal good of all men ; and this is one
department of human interests, materially affecting all their higher in-
terestS.
Obj. 7. It is said that human governments are nowhere expressly
authorized in the Bible.
Ans. 1. This is a mistake. Both their existence and lawfulness are as
expressly recognized in the above quoted scriptures as they can be.
2. If God did not expressly authorize them, it would still be both the
right and the duty of mankind to institute human governments, because
they are plainly demanded by the necessities of human nature. It is a
first truth, that whatever is essential to the highest good of moral beings
in any world, they have a right to pursue, and are bound to pursue according
to the best dictates of reason and experience. So far, therefore, are men
from needing any express authority to establish human governments, that
no inference from the silence of scripture could avail to render their esta-
blishment unlawful. It has been shown, in these lectures on moral govern-
ment, that moral law is a unit—that it is that rule of action which is in
accordance with the mature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings—
that whatever is in accordance with, and demanded by the nature, relations,
and circumstances of moral beings, is obligatory on them. It is moral law,
and no power in the universe can set it aside. Therefore, were the scriptures
entirely silent (which they are not) on the subject of human governments,
and on the subject of family government, as they actually are on a great
many important subjects, this would be no objection to the lawfulness and
expediency, necessity and duty of establishing human governments.
Obj. 8. It is said that human governments are founded in and sus-
tained by force, and that this is inconsistent with the spirit of the gospel.
Ams. 1. There cannot be a difference between the spirit of the Old and
New Testaments, or between the spirit of the law and the gospel, unless
358 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
God has changed, and unless Christ has undertaken to make void the law
through faith, which cannot be.
Rom. iii. 32. “Do we then make void the law through faith ? God for-
bid : yea, we establish the law.”
2. Just human governments, and such governments only are contended
for, will not exercise force, unless it is demanded to promote the highest
public good. If it be necessary to this end, it can never be wrong. Nay,
it must be the duty of human governments to inflict penalties, when their
infliction is demanded by the public interest.
Obj. 9. It is said, that there should be no laws with penalties.
Ans. This is the same as to say that there should be no law at all; for,
as we have before shown, that is no law which has no penalty, but only
advice.
Obj. 10. It has been said by some persons, that church government is
sufficient to meet the necessities of the world, without Secular or state
governments.
Ans. What! Church governments regulate commerce, make internal
arrangements, such as roads, bridges, and taxation, and undertake to
manage all the business affairs of the world! Preposterous and impossible.
Church government was never established for any such end; but simply
to regulate the spiritual, in distinction from the secular concerns of men—to
try offenders and inflict spiritual chastisement, and never to perplex and
embarrass itself with managing the business and commercial interests of
the world.
Obj. ll. It is said, that were all the world holy, legal penalties would
not be needed.
Ans. Were all men perfectly holy, the execution of penalties would not
be needed ; but still, if there were law, there must be penalties; and it
would be both the right and the duty of magistrates to inflict them, when-
ever the needful occasion should call for their execution. But the state of
the world supposed, is not at hand, and while the world is what it is, laws
must remain, and be enforced.
Obj. 12. It is asserted, that family government is the only form of
government approved of God.
Ans. This is a ridiculous assertion —
1. Because God as expressly commands obedience to magistrates as to
parents.
2. He makes it as absolutely the duty of magistrates to punish crime, as
of parents to punish their own disobedient children.
3. The right of family government, though commanded by God, is not
founded in the arbitrary will of God, but in the highest good of human
beings; so that family government would be both necessary and obligatory,
had God not commanded it.
4. So the right of human government has not its foundation in the
arbitrary will of God, but in the necessities of human beings. The larger
HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 359
the community the more absolute the necessity of government. If in the
small circle of the family, laws and penalties are needed, how much more
in the larger communities of states and nations. Now, neither the ruler of
a family, nor any other human ruler, has a right to legislate arbitrarily, or
enact, or enforce any other laws, than those that are demanded by the
nature, relations, and circumstances of human beings. Nothing can be
obligatory on moral beings, but that which is consistent with their nature,
relations, and circumstances. But human beings are bound to establish
family governments, state governments, national governments, and in
short, whatever government may be requisite for the universal instruction,
government, virtue, and happiness of the world, or any portion of it.
5. All the reasons therefore for family government, hold equally in
favour of the state and national governments.
6. There are vastly higher and weightier reasons for governments over
States and nations, than in the small communities of families.
7. On this, as on many other subjects, God has declared what is the
common and universal law, plainly recognizing both the right and duty of
family and civil governments.
8. Christians therefore have something else to do, than to confound the
right of government with the abuse of this right by the ungodly. Instead
of destroying human governments, Christians are bound to reform and
uphold them.
9. To attempt to destroy, rather than reform human governments, is the
same in principle as is often aimed it, by those who are attempting to
destroy, rather than to reform, the church. There are those who, disgusted
With the abuses of Christianity practised in the church, seem bent on de-
stroying the church altogether, as the means of saving the world. But what
mad policy is this
10. It is admitted that selfish men need, and must feel the restraints of
of law; but yet it is contended that Christians should have no part in
restraining them by law. But suppose the wicked should agree among
themselves to have no law, and therefore should not attempt to restrain
themselves, nor each other by law ; would it be neither the right nor the
duty of Christians to attempt their restraint, through the influence of whole.
Some government?
ll. It would be strange, that selfish men should need the restraints of
law, and yet that Christians should have no right to meet this necessity, by
supporting governments that will restrain them. What is this but ad-
mitting, that the World really needs the restraints of governments—that
the highest good of the universe demands their existence;—and yet, that it
is wrong for Christians to seek the highest good of the world, by meeting
this necessity in the establishment and support of human governments
It is right and best that there should be law. It is even absolutely
necessary that there should be law. Universal benevolence demands it:
can it then be wrong in Christians to have anything to do with it?
360 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
IV. Inquire into the foundation of the right of human governments.
1. Men are moral agents, and are therefore subjects of moral govern-
ment and of moral obligation.
2. They are bound to aim at the same end at which God aims, to wit,
the highest good of universal being.
3. Since human governments are the indispensable means of promoting
the highest good of human beings, they have a right, and it is their duty
to establish and maintain them. The right of human governments must be
founded in the intrinsic value of the good that is to be secured by them,
and conditionated upon the fact that they sustain to the highest good of
human beings, and consequently to the glory of God, through them, the re-
lation of a matural and necessary means to this end.
W. Point out the limits or boundaries of this right.
1. Observe, the end of government is the highest good of human beings,
as a part of universal good. All valid human legislation must propose this
as its end, and no legislation can have any authority that has not the
highest good of the whole for its end.
2. Observe, no being can arbitrarily create law. All law for the govern-
ment of moral agents must be moral law : that is, it must be that rule of
action best suited to their natures and relations. The moral law, or the law
of nature, in other words, the common law of the universe of moral agents,
by which God is, and every moral being ought to be governed, is the only
law that can be obligatory on human beings. All valid human legislation
must be only declaratory of this one only law. Nothing else than this can
by any possibility be law. God puts forth no enactments, but such as are
declaratory of the common law of the universe; and should he do otherwise,
they would not be obligatory. Arbitrary legislation can never be really
obligatory.
3. Human governments may declare and apply the great principle of
moral law to human conduct, and legislate in accordance with the divine
government, so far as this is necessary, but no farther.
4. The right of human government is founded in the intrinsic value of
the good of being, and conditionated upon their necessity, as a means to that
end. They may therefore extend, and ought to extend, their legislation
and control just so far, and no farther, than this necessity goes. This end
is the promotion of the highest good. So far as legislation and control
are indispensable to this end, so far and no farther does the right to
govern extend.
5, Human beings have no right to establish a government upon any
other basis than the moral law. No human constitution or law can be
obligatory upon human beings, any farther than it is in accordance with,
and declaratory of, moral law. All legislation and all constitutions not
founded upon this basis, and not recognizing the moral law as the only law
of the universe, are null and void, and all attempts to establish and enforce
HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 36 I
them are odious tyranny and usurpation. Human beings may form con-
stitutions, establish governments, and enact statutes, for the purpose of
promoting' the highest virtue and happiness of the world, and for the
declaration and enforcement of moral law; and just so far human govern-
ments are essential to this end, but absolutely no farther.
6. It follows, that no government is lawful or innocent that does not
recognize the moral law as the only universal law, and God as the Supreme
Lawgiver and Judge, to whom nations in their national capacity, as well as
all individuals, are amenable. The moral law of God is the only law of
individuals and of nations, and nothing can be rightful government but
such as is established and administered with a view to its support.
LECTURE XXXVII.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT.
VI I propose now to make several remarks respecting forms of govern
ment, the right and duty of revolution, die.
In this lecture I shall show —
1. The reasons why God has made no particular form of civil govern-
ments universally obligatory.
2. The particular forms of civil government must and will depend upon
the intelligence and virtue of the people.
3. That form of government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet the
necessities of the people.
4. Revolutions become necessary and obligatory, when the virtue and
intelligence, or the vice and ignorance, of the people demand them.
5. In what cases human legislation is valid, and in what cases it is null
and void.
6. In what cases we are bound to disobey human government.
1. The reasons why God has made no form of civil government waiver.
sally obligatory.
(1.) That God has nowhere in the Bible given directions in regard to
any particular form of secular government, is a matter of fact.
(2.) That he did not consider the then existing forms of government, as
of perpetual obligation, is certain.
(3.) He did not give directions in regard to particular forms of govern-
mellt,
(i.) Because mo such directions could be given without producing great
revolutions and governmental opposition to Christianity. The governments
of the world are and always have been exceedingly various in form. To
362 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
attempt, therefore, to insist upon any particular form, as being universally
obligatory, would be calling out great national opposition to religion.
(ii) Because no particular form of government, either now is, or ever
has been, suited to all degrees of intelligence, and all states of society.
(iii.) Because the forms of governments need to be changed, with any
great elevations or depressions of Society, in regard to their intelligence and
virtue.
2. The particular forms of state government must, and will, depend
upon the virtue and intelligence of the people.
(l.) Democracy is self-government, and can never be safe or useful except
so far as there are sufficient intelligence and virtue in the community to
impose, by mutual consent, salutary self-restraints, and to enforce by the
power of public sentiment, and by the fear and love of God, the practice
of those virtues which are indispensable to the highest good of any com-
munity.
(2.) Republics are another and less pure form of self-government.
(3.) When there are not sufficient intelligence and virtue among the
people to legislate in accordance with the highest good of the state or
mation, then both democracies and republics are improper and impracticable,
as forms of government.
(4.) When there is too little intelligence and virtue in the mass of the
people to legislate on correct principles, monarchies are better calculated
to restrain vice and promote virtue.
(5.) In the worst states of society, despotisms, either or civil military,
are the only proper and efficient forms of government. It is true, indeed,
that a resort to despotic government is an evil, and all that can be truly
said is, that in certain states of desperate anarchy, despotic government is
the less of two evils.
(6.) When virtue and intelligence are nearly universal, democratic forms
of government are well suited to promote the public good.
(7.) In such a state of society, democracy is greatly conducive to the
general diffusion of knowledge on governmental subjects; and although, in
some respects, less convenient, yet in a suitable state of society, a demo-
cracy is in many respects the most desirable form of government.
(i.) It is conducive, as has been already said, to general intelligence.
(ii.) Under a democracy, the people are more generally acquainted with
the laws.
(iii.) They are more interested in them.
(iv.) This form of government creates a more general feeling of individual
responsibility.
(v.) Governmental questions are more apt to be thoroughly discussed
and understood before they are adopted.
(vi.) As the diffusion of knowledge is favourable to individual and public
virtue, democracy is highly conducive to virtue and happiness.
(8.) God has always providentially given to mankind those forms of
HUMAN GOVERNMENT, 363
government that were suited to the degrees of virtue and intelligence
among them.
(9.) If they have been extremely ignorant and vicious, he has restrained
them by the iron rod of human despotism.
(10.) If more intelligent and virtuous, he has given them the milder
forms of limited monarchies.
(11.) If still more intelligent and virtuous, he has given them still more
liberty, and providentially established republics for their government.
(12.) Whenever the general state of intelligence has permitted it, he has
put them to the test of self-government and self-restraint, by establishing
democracies.
(13.) If the world ever becomes perfectly virtuous, governments will be
proportionally modified, and employed in expounding and applying the
great principles of moral law.
(14.) God is infinitely benevolent, and, from time to time, gives the
people as much liberty as they can bear.
3. That form of government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet
the necessities of the people.
(1.) This follows as a self-evident truth, from the consideration, that
necessity is the condition of the right of human government. To meet
this necessity is the object of government ; and that government is obli-
gatory and best, which is demanded by the circumstances, intelligence, and
morals of the people.
(2.) Consequently, in certain states of society, it would be a Christian's
duty to pray for and sustain even a military despotism ; in a certain other
state of society, to pray for and sustain a monarchy ; and in other states, to
pray for and sustain a republic; and in a still more advanced stage of virtue
and intelligence, to pray for and sustain a democracy ; if indeed a demo-
cracy is the most wholesome form of self-government, which may admit of
doubt. It is ridiculous to set up the claim of a Divine right for any given
form of government. That form of government which is demanded by the
state of society, and the virtue and intelligence of the people, has of neces-
sity the Divine right and Sanction, because it is dictated by reason and the
state and mature of things, and none other has or can have.
4. Revolutions become necessary and obligatory, when the virtue and
intelligence, or the vice and ignorance, of the people, demand them.
(1.) This is a thing of course. When one form of government fails to
meet any longer the necessities of the people, it is the duty of the people to
revolutionize.
(2.) In such cases, it is vain to oppose revolution; for in some way the
benevolence of God will bring it about. Upon this principle alone, can
what is generally termed the American Revolution be justified. The intel-
ligence and virtue of our Puritan fore-fathers rendered a monarchy an
unnecessary burden, and a republican form of government both appropriate
364 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and necessary; and God always allows his children as much liberty as they
are prepared to enjoy.
(3.) The stability of our republican institutions must depend upon the
progress of general intelligence and virtue. If in these respects the nation
falls, if general intelligence, public and private virtue, sink to that point
below which self-control becomes practicably impossible, we must fall back
into monarchy, limited or absolute; or into civil or military despotism;
just according to the national standard of intelligence and virtue. This is
just as certain as that God governs the world, or that causes produce their
effects.
(4.) Therefore, it is the maddest conceivable policy, for Christians to
attempt to uproot human governments, while they ought to be engaged in
sustaining them upon the great principles of the moral law. It is certainly
the grossest folly, if not abominable wickedness, to overlook either in
theory or practice, these plain, common sense and universal truths.
5. In what cases human legislation is valid, and in what cases it is null
and void.
(1.) Human legislation is valid, when called for by the necessities, that
is, by the mature, relations and circumstances of the people.
(2.) Just that kind and degree of human legislation which are demanded
by the necessities of the people are obligatory.
(3.) Human legislation is utterly null and void in all other cases whatso-
ever; and I may add, that divine legislation would be equally null and void,
unless demanded by the nature, relations and necessities of the universe.
Consequently, human beings can never legislate in opposition to the moral
law. Whatever is inconsistent with supreme love to God, and equal love
to our neighbour, can by no possibility be obligatory,
6. In what cases we are bound to disobey human governments
(1.) We may yield obedience, when the thing required does not involve
a violation of moral obligation.
(2.) We are bound to yield obedience, when legislation is in accordance
with the law of nature.
(3.) We are bound to obey when the thing required has no moral character
in itself; upon the principle, that obedience in this case is a less evil
than resistance and revolution. But—
(4.) We are bound in all cases to disobey, when human legislation con-
travenes moral law, or invades the rights of conscience.
VII. Apply the foregoing principles to the rights and duties of govern-
ments and subjects in relation to the ea:ecution of the necessary penalties of
law:—the suppression of mobs, insurrections, rebellion ; and also in relation
to war, slavery, sabbath desecration, dºc.
In discussing this branch of the subject I must—
1. Notice some principles that have been settled.
2. Apply these settled principles to the subjects first named.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 365
(1) Notice some principles that have been settled.
In the preceding lectures it has been shown,
(1.) That all government is a means to an end, and that the end of all
righteous government is, and must be, the highest good of both the ruler
and the ruled.
(2.) We have seen that all law is either moral or physical.
(3.) That all law for the government of free moral agents is, and must
be, moral law.
(4.) That moral law is that rule of willing and acting that is suited to
the natures, relations, and circumstances of moral agents.
(5.) We have seen that the right to govern is founded in the value of the
end to be secured by government, and conditionated—
(i.) Upon the necessity of government as a means to this end, and—
(ii.) Upon the natural and moral attributes of the ruler, and also upon
his ability and willingness so to administer government as to secure the
end of government.
(6.) We have seen that the right to govern implies —
[Let the reader here recur to what is written under this head in Lee-
ture II.]
(7.) We have seem that the right to govern is bounded only, but yet
absolutely, by the necessity of government; that just that kind and degree
of government is lawful which is necessary, as a means of promoting the
highest good of both ruler and ruled : that arbitrary legislation is invalid
and tyrannical legislation, and that in no case can arbitrary enactments
be law.
(S.) We have seen that no unequal or inequitable enactment can be law,
and nothing can by any possibibility be law but the rule, “ Thou shalt love
thy neighbour as thyself.”
(9.) We have seen also that human rulers can justly legislate only in sup-
port of Divine government, but never against it. That no enactment can
by any possibility be law, that contravenes the moral law or law of God.
2. Let us now proceed to apply these immutable and well-established
principles.
(1.) To the rights and duties of government in relation to mobs, riots, &c.
It is plain that the right and duty to govern for the security and promo-
tion of the public interests, implies the right and duty to use any means
necessary to this result. It is absurd to say that the ruler has the right
to govern, and yet that he has not a right to use the necessary means.
Some have taken the ground of the inviolability of human life, and have
insisted to take life is wrong, per se, and of course that governments are to
be sustained without taking life. Others have gone so far as to assert, that
governments have no right to resort to physical force to sustain the authority
of law. But this is a most absurd philosophy, and amounts just to this -
The ruler has a right to govern while the subject is pleased to obey; but if
the subject refuse obedience, why then the right to govern ceases: for it
is impossible that the right to govern should exist when the right to en-
366 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
force obedience does not exist. This philosophy is, in fact, a denial of the
right to use the necessary means for the promotion of the great end for
which all moral agents ought to live. And yet, strange to tell, this phi-
losophy professes to deny the right to use force; and to take life in sup-
port of government on the ground of benevolence, that is, that benevolence
forbids it. What is this but maintaining, that the law of benevolence
demands that we should love others too much to use the indispensable
means to secure their good 2 Or that we should love the whole too much
to execute the law upon those who would destroy all good? Shame on such
philosophy . It overlooks the foundation of moral obligation, and of all mo-
rality and religion. Just as if an enlightened benevolence could forbid
the due, wholesome, and necessary execution of law. This philosophy im-
pertinently urges the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” as prohibiting
all taking of human life. But it may be asked, why say human life? The
commandment, so far as the letter is concerned, as fully prohibits the
killing of animals or vegetables as it does of men. The question is, what
kind of killing does this commandment prohibit? Certainly not all killing
of human beings, for in the next chapter the Jews were commanded to kill
human beings for certain crimes The ten commandments are precepts,
and the Lawgiver, after laying down the precepts, goes on to specify the
penalties that are to be inflicted by men for a violation of these precepts.
Some of these penalties are death, and the penalty for the violation of the
precept under consideration is death. It is certain that this precept was
not intended to prohibit the taking of life for murder. A consideration of
the law in its tenor and spirit renders it most evident that the precept in
question prohibits murder, and the penalty of death is added by the law-
giver to the violation of this precept. Now how absurd and impertinent it
is, to quote this precept in prohibition of taking life under the circum-
stances included in the precept
Men have an undoubted right to do whatever is plainly indispensable to
the highest good of man ; and, therefore, nothing can, by any possi-
bility be law, that should prohibit the taking of human life, when it
became indispensable to the great end of government. This right is every
where recognized in the Bible, and if it were not, still the right would
exist. This philosophy that I am opposing, assumes that the will of God
creates law, and that we have no right to take life, without an express war-
rant from him. But the facts are,
(i.) That God did give to the Jews, at least, an express warrant and
injunction to take life for certain crimes; and,-
(ii.) If he had not, it would have been duty to do so whenever the
public good required it. Let it be remembered, that the moral law is the
law of nature, and that everything is lawful and right that is plainly
demanded for the promotion of the highest good of being.
The philosophy of which I am speaking lays much stress upon what it
calls inalienable rights. It assumes that man has a title or right to life, in
such a sense, that he cannot forfeit it by crime. But the fact is, there are
HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 367
no rights inalienable in this sense. There can be no such rights. When-
ever any individual by the commission of crime comes into such a relation
to the public interest, that his death is a necessary means of securing the
highest public good, his life is forfeited, and to take the forfeiture at his
hands is the duty of the government.
(2.) It will be seen, that the same principles are equally applicable to
insurrections, rebellion, &c. While government is right, it is duty, and
while it is right and duty, because necessary as a means to the great end
upon which benevolence terminates, it must be both the right and the duty
of government, and of all the subjects, to use any indispensable means for
the suppression of insurrections, rebellion, &c., as also for the due adminis-
tration of justice in the execution of law.
(3) These principles will guide us in ascertaining the rights, and of course
the duty of governments in relation to War.
War is one of the most heinous and horrible forms of sin, unless it be
evidently demanded by, and prosecuted in obedience to the moral law.
Observe, war to be in any case a virtue, or to be less than a crime of
infinite magnitude, must not only be honestly believed by those who
engage in it, to be demanded by the law of benevolence, but it must also
be engaged in by them with an eye single to the glory of God, and the
highest good of being. That War has been in some instances demanded
by the spirit of the moral law, there can be no reasonable doubt, since God
has sometimes commanded it, which he could not have done had it not
been demanded by the highest good of the universe. In such cases, if
those who were commanded to engage in War, had benevolent intentions in
prosecuting it as God had in commanding it, it is absurd to say that they
sinned. Rulers are represented as God's millisters to execute wrath upon
the guilty. If, in the providence of God, he should find it duty to destroy
or to rebuke a nation for his own glory, and the highest good of being, he
may beyond question command that they should be chastised by the hand
of man. But in no case is war anything else than a most horrible
crime, unless it is plainly the will of God that it should exist, and unless
it be actually undertaken in obedience to his will. This is true of all, both
of rulers and of subjects who engage in war. Selfish war is wholesale
murder. For a nation to declare war, or for persons to enlist, or in any
way designedly to aid or abet, in the declaration or prosecution of war,
upon any other conditions than those just specified, involves the guilt of
murder.
There ean scarcely be conceived a more abominable and fiendish maxim
than “our country right or wrong.” Recently this maxim seems to have
been adopted and avowed in relation to the war of the United States with
Mexico.
It seems to be supposed by some, that it is the duty of good subjects to
Sympathize with, and support government in the prosecution of a war in
which they have unjustly engaged, and to which they have committed
themselves, upon the ground that since it is commenced it must be pro
368 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
secuted as the less of two evils. The same class of men seem to have
adopted the same philosophy in respect to slavery. Slavery, as it exists
in this country, they acknowledge to be indefensible on the ground of right;
that it is a great evil and a great sin, but it must be let alone as the less of
two evils. It exists, say they, and it cannot be abolished without disturb-
ing the friendly relations and federal union of the States, therefore the
institution must be sustained. The philosophy is this: war and slavery as
they exist in this nation are unjust, but they exist, and to sustain them is
duty, because their existence, under the circumstances, is the less of two
evils.
I Would ask, do these philosophers intend to admit, that the prosecution
of a War unjustly waged is sin, and that the support of slavery in this
country is sim, but that the sin of supporting them is less than would be
the sin of abandoming them, under the circumstances 2 If they mean this,
to be sure this were singular logic. To repent of a sin and forsake it, were
a greater sin than to persist in it!—True and genuine repentance of a sin
is sin, and even a greater sin than that repented of ' Who does not know
that it can never be sin to repent of sin 2 To repent and forsake all sin is
always right, always duty, and can in no case be sin. If war has been
unjustly waged, if slavery or anything else exists that involves injustice
and oppression, or sin in any form, it cannot he sin to abandom it. To
abhor and reject it at once must be duty, and to persevere in it is only to
add insult to injury.
Nothing can Sanctify any crime but that which renders it no crime, but
a virtue. But the philosophers, whose views I am examining, must, if
consistent, take the ground, that since war and slavery exist, although
their commencement was unjust and sinful, yet since they exist, it is no
crime but a virtue to sustain them, as the least of two natural evils. But
I would ask, to whom are they the least of two evils? To ourselves or to
being in general 2 The least of two present, or of two ultimate evils 2
Our duty is not to calculate the evils in respect merely to ourselves, or to
this nation and those immediately oppressed and injured, but to look
abroad upon the world and the universe, and inquire what are the evils
resulting, and likely to result, to the world, to the church, and to the uni-
verse, from the declaration and prosecution of such a war, and from the
support of slavery by a nation professing what we profess; a nation boast-
ing of liberty; who have drawn the sword and bathed it in blood in
defence of the principle, that all men have an inalienable right to liberty;
that they are born free and equal. Such a nation proclaiming such a
principle, and fighting in the defence of it, standing with its proud foot on
the meek of three millions of crushed and prostrate slaves | O horrible !
This a less evil to the world than emancipation, or even than the dismem.
berment of our hypocritical union “O shame, where is thy blush ' "
The prosecution of a war, unjustly engaged in, a less evil than repentance
and restitution ? It is impossible. Honesty is always and necessarily the
best policy. Nations are bound by the same law as individuals. If they
HUMLAN GOVERNMENT. 369
have dome wrong, it is always duty, and honourable for them to repent, con-
fess, and make restitution. To adopt the maxim, “Our country right or
wrong,” and to sympathize with the government, in the prosecution of a
war unrighteously waged, must involve the guilt of murder. To adopt the
maxim, “Our union even with perpetual slavery,” is an abomination so
execrable, as not to be named by a just mind without indignation.
(4.) The same principles apply to governmental sabbath desecration.
The sabbath is plainly a divine institution, founded in the necessities of
human beings. The letter of the law of the sabbath forbids all labour of
every kind, and under all circumstances on that day. But, as has been
said in a former lecture, the spirit of the law of the sabbath, being identical
with the law of benevolence, sometimes requires the violation of the letter
of the law. Both governments and individuals may, and it is their duty,
to do on the sabbath whatever is plainly required by the great law of
benevolence. But nothing more, absolutely. No human legislature can
nullify the moral law. No human legislation can make it right or lawful to
violate any command of God. All human enactments requiring or Sanction-
ing the violation of any command of God, are not only null and void, but they
are a blasphemous usurpation and invasion of the prerogative of God.
(5.) The same principles apply to slavery. No human constitution or
enactment can, by any possibility be law, that recognizes the right of one
human being to enslave another, in a sense that implies selfishness on the
part of the slaveholder. Selfishness is wrong per se. It is, therefore,
always and unalterably wrong. No enactment, human or divine, can
legalize selfishness and make it right, under any conceivable circumstances.
Slavery or any other evil, to be a crime, must imply selfishness. It must
inply a violation of the command, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as
thyself.” If it implies a breach of this, it is wrong invariably and neces-
sarily, and no legislation, or any thing else, can make it right. God
cannot authorize it. The Bible cannot sanction it, and if both God and
the Bible were to sanction it, it could not be lawful. God's arbitrary will
is not law. The moral law, as we have seen, is as independent of his will,
as his own necessary existence is. He cannot alter or repeal it. He
could not sanctify selfishness and make it right. Nor can any book be
received as of divine authority that sanctions selfishness. God and the
Bible quoted to sustain and sanctify slaveholding in a sense implying
selfishness! 'Tis blasphemous ! That slaveholding, as it exists in this
country, implies selfishness at least, in almost all instances, is too plain to
need proof. The sinfulness of slaveholding and war, in almost all cases,
and in every case where the terms slaveholding and war are used in their
popular signification, will appear irresistibly, if we consider that sin is
Selfishness, and that all selfishness is necessarily sinful. Deprive a human
being of liberty who has been guilty of no crime ! Rob him of himself—
his body—his soul—his time, and his earnings, to promote the interest of
his master, and attempt to justify this on the principles of moral law . It
is the greatest absurdity, and the most revolting wickedness.
E B
370 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE XXXVIII. .
MORAL DEPRAVITY.
In discussing the subject of human depravity, I shall,—
I, DEFINE THE TERM DEPRAVITY.
II. PoinT OUT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND MORAL DE-
PRAVITY.
III. SHOW OF WHAT PHYSICAL DEPRAVITY CAN BE PREDICATED.
IV. OF WHAT MORAL DEPRAVITY CAN BE PREDICATED.
V. THAT MANKIND ARE BOTH PHYSICALLY AND MORALLY DEPRAVED.
VI. THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE commencEMENT or MoRAL AGENCY, AND
PREVIOUS TO REGENERATION, THE MORAL DEPRAVITY OF MANKIND IS UNI-
VERSAL.
VII. THAT DURING THE ABOVE PERIOD THE MORAL DEPRAVITY OF MAN-
KIND IS TOTAL.
VIII. THE PROPER METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNIVERSAL TOTAL
TMORAL IDEPRAVITY OF THE UNIRE GENERATE MIORAL AG ENTS OF OUR RAC E.
I. Definition of the term depravity.
The word is derived from the Latin de and pravus. Pravus means
“crooked.” De is intensive. Depravo, literally and primarily, means “very
crooked,” not in the sense of Original or constitutional crookedness, but in
the sense of having become crooked. The term does not imply original
mal-conformation, but lapsed, fallen, departed from right or straight. It
always implies deterioration, or fall from a former state of moral or physical
perfection.
Depravity always implies a departure from a state of original integrity,
or from conformity to the laws of the being who is the subject of depravity.
Thus we should not consider that being depraved, who remained in a state
of conformity to the original laws of his being, physical and moral. But
we justly call a being depraved, who has departed from conformity to
those laws, whether those laws be physical or moral.
II. Point out the distinction between physical and moral depravity.
Physical depravity, as the word denotes, is the depravity of constitution,
or substance, as distinguished from depravity of free moral action. It may
be predicated of body or of mind. Physical depravity, when predicated of
the body, is commonly and rightly termed disease. It consists in a physical
departure from the laws of health ; a lapsed, or fallen state, in which
healthy organic action is not sustained.
When physical depravity is predicated of mind, it is intended that the
powers of the mind, either in substance, or in consequence of their con-
nexion with, and dependence upon, the body, are in a diseased, lapsed,
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 371
fallen, degenerate state, so that the healthy action of those powers is not
sustained.
Physical depravity, being depravity of substance as opposed to depravity
of the actions of free-will, can have no moral character. It may, as we
shall see, be caused by moral depravity; and a moral agent may be blame-
worthy for having rendered himself physically depraved, either in body or
mind. But physical depravity, whether of body or of mind, can have no
moral character in itself, for the plain reason that it is involuntary, and in
its nature is disease, and not sin. Let this be remembered.
Moral depravity is the depravity of free-will, not of the faculty itself, but
of its free action. It consists in a violation of moral law. Depravity of
the will, as a faculty, is, or would be, physical, and not moral depravity.
It would be depravity of substance, and not of free, responsible choice.
Moral depravity is depravity of choice. It is a choice at variance with
moral law, moral right. It is synonymous with sin or sinfulness. It is
moral depravity, because it consists in a violation of moral law, and because
it has moral character. -
III. Of what physical depravity can be predicated.
I. It can be predicated of any organized substance. That is, every
organized substance is liable to become depraved. Depravity is a possible
state of every organized body or substance in existence.
2. Physical depravity may be predicated of mind, as has already been
said, especially in its connexion with an organized body. As mind, in
connexion with body, manifests itself through it, acts by means of it, and
is dependent upon it, it is plain that if the body become diseased, or
physically depraved, the mind cannot but be affected by this state of the
body, through and by means of which it acts. The normal manifestations
of mind cannot, in such case, be reasonably expected. Physical depravity
may be predicated of all the involuntary states of the intellect, and of the
sensibility. That is, the actings and states of the intellect may become
disordered, depraved, deranged, or fallen from the state of integrity and
healthiness. This every one knows, as it is matter of daily experience and
observation. Whether this in all cases is, and must be, caused by the
state of the bodily organization, that is, whether it is always and necessarily
to be ascribed to the depraved state of the brain and nervous system, it is
impossible for us to know. It may, for aught we know, in some instances
at least, be a depravity or derangement of the substance of the mind
itself.
The sensibility, or feeling department of the mind, may be sadly and
physically depraved. This is a matter of common experience. The
appetites and passions, the desires and cravings, the antipathies and repel-
lencies of the feelings fall into great disorder and anarchy. Numerous
artificial appetites are generated, and the whole sensibility becomes a
Wilderness, a chaos of conflicting and elamorous desires, emotions and
passions. That this state of the sensibility is often, and perhaps in some
B B 2
37.2 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
measure, always owing to the state of the nervous system with which it is
connected, through and by which it manifests itself, there can be but little
room to doubt. But whether this is always and necessarily so, no one can
tell. We know that the sensibility manifests great physical depravity.
Whether this depravity belong exclusively to the body, or to the mind, or to
both in conjunction, I will not venture to affirm. In the present state of our
knowledge, or of my knowledge, I dare not hazard an affirmation upon the
subject. The human body is certainly in a state of physical depravity. The
human mind also certainly manifests physical depravity. But observe, phy-
sical depravity has in no case any moral character, because it is involuntary.
IV. Of what moral depravity can be predicated.
1. Not of substance; for over involuntary substance the moral law does
not directly legislate.
2. Moral depravity cannot be predicated of any involuntary acts or states
of mind. These surely cannot be violations of moral law apart from the
ultimate intention; for moral law legislates directly only over free, intelli-
gent choices.
3. Moral depravity cannot be predicated of any unintelligent act of will,
that is, of acts of will that are put forth in a state of idiocy, of intellectual
derangement, or of sleep. Moral depravity implies moral obligation; moral
obligation implies moral agency; and moral agency implies intelligence, or
knowledge of moral relations. Moral agency implies moral law, or the
developement of the idea of duty, and a knowledge of what duty is.
4. Moral depravity can only be predicated of violations of moral law, and
of the free volitions by which those violations are perpetrated. Moral law,
as we have seen, requires love, and only love, to God and man, or to God
and the universe. This love, as we have seem, is good-will, choice, the choice
of an end, the choice of the highest well-being of God, and of the universe
of sentient existences.
Moral depravity is sin. Sin is a violation of moral law. We have seen
that sin must consist in choice, in the choice of Self-indulgence or self.
gratification as an end.
5. Moral depravity cannot consist in any attribute of nature or constitu-
tion, nor in any lapsed and fallen state of mature; for this is physical and
not moral depravity.
6. It cannot consist in anything that is an original and essential part of
mind, or of body: nor in any involuntary action or state of either mind or body.
7. It cannot consist in anything back of choice, and that sustains to
choice the relation of a cause. Whatever is back of choice, is without
the pale of legislation. The law of God, as has been said, requires good-
willing only, and sure it is, that nothing but acts of will can constitute a
violation of moral law. Outward actions, and involuntary thoughts and
feelings, may be said in a certain sense to possess moral character, because
they are produced by the will. But, strictly speaking, moral character
belongs only to choice, or intention.
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 373
It was shown in a former lecture, that sin does not, and cannot consist in
malevolence, properly speaking, or in the choice of sin or misery as an end,
or for its own sake. It was also shown, that all sin consists, and must
consist in selfishness, or in the choice of self-gratification as a final end.
Moral depravity then, strictly speaking, can only be predicated of selfish
ultimate intention.
Moral depravity, as I use the term, does not consist in, nor imply a
sinful nature, in the sense that the substance of the human soul is sinful in
itself. It is not a constitutional sinfulness. It is not an involuntary sin-
fulness. Moral depravity, as I use the term, consists in Selfishness; in
a state of voluntary committal of the will to self-gratification. It is a spirit
of self-seeking, a voluntary and entire consecration to the gratification of
self. It is selfish ultimate intention : it is the choice of a Wrong end of
life; it is moral depravity, because it is a violation of moral law. It is a
refusal to consecrate the whole being to the highest well-being of God and
of the universe, and obedience to the moral law, and consecrating it to the
gratification of self. Moral depravity sustains to the outward life, the rela-
tion of a cause. This selfish intention, or the will in this committed state,
of course, makes efforts to secure its end, and these efforts make up the
outward life of the selfish man. Moral depravity is sinfulness, not of nature
but of voluntary state. It is a sinfully committed state of the will to self-
indulgence. It is not a sinful mature but a sinful heart. It is a sinful
ultimate aim, or intention. The Greek term amartia, rendered sin in our
English Bible, signifies to miss the mark, to aim at the wrong end. Sin
is a wrong aim, or intention. It is aiming at, or intending self-gratification
as the ultimate and supreme end of life, instead of aiming, as the moral law
requires, at the highest good of universal being, as the end of life.
W. Mankind are both physically and morally depraved.
1. There is, in all probability, no perfect health of body among all the
ranks and classes of human beings that inhabit this world. The physical
organization of the whole race has become impaired, and beyond all doubt
has been becoming more and more so since intemperance of any kind was
first introduced into our world. This is illustrated and confirmed by the
comparative shortness of human life. This is a physiological fact,
2. As the human mind in this state of existence is dependent upon the
body for all its manifestations, and as the human body is universally in a
state of greater or less physical depravity or disease, it follows that the
manifestations of mind thus dependent on a physically depraved organiza-
tion, will be physically depraved manifestations. Especially is this true of
the human sensibility. The appetites, passions, and propensities are in a
state of most unhealthy developement. This is too evident, and too much a
matter of universal notoriety, to need proof or illustration. Every person of
reflection has observed, that the human mind is greatly out of balance, in
consequence of the monstrous developement of the sensibility. The appe-
tites, passions, and propensities have been indulged, and the intelligence
374 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and conscience stultified by selfishness. Selfishness, be it remembered,
consists in a disposition or choice to gratify the propensities, desires, and
feelings. This, of course, and of necessity, produces just the unhealthy and
monstrous developements which we daily see: sometimes one ruling passion
or appetite lording it, not only over the intelligence and over the will, but
over all the other appetites and passions, crushing and sacrificing them
all upon the altar of its own gratification. See that bloated wretch, the
inebriate His appetite for strong drink has played the despot. His whole
mind and body, reputation, family, friends, health, time, eternity, all, all
are laid by him upon its filthy altar. There is the debauchee, and the
glutton, and the gambler, and the miser, and a host of others, each in his
turn giving striking and melancholy proof of the monstrous developemenu
and physical depravity of the human sensibility.
3. That men are morally depraved is one of the most notorious facts
of human experience, observation and history. Indeed, I am not aware
that it has ever been doubted, when moral depravity has been understood
to consist in selfishness. -
The moral depravity of the human race is everywhere assumed and
declared in the Bible, and so universal and motorious is the fact of human
selfishness, that should any man practically call it in question—should he,
in his business transactions, and in his intercourse with men, assume the
contrary, he would justly subject himself to the charge of insanity. There
is not a fact in the world more motorious and undeniable than this.
Human moral depravity is as palpably evident as human existence. It is
a fact everywhere assumed in all governments, in all the arrangements of
society, and has impressed its image, and written its mame, upon every
thing human.
VI. Subsequent to the commencement of moral agency, and previous to
regeneration, the moral depravity of mankind is universal,
By this it is not intended to deny that, in some instances, the Spirit of
God may, from the first moment of moral agency, have so enlightened the
mind as to have secured conformity to moral law, as the first moral act.
This may or may not be true. It is not my present purpose to affirm or
to deny this, as a possibility, or as a fact.
But by this is intended, that every moral agent of our race is, from the
dawn of moral agency to the moment of regeneration by the Holy Spirit,
morally depraved, unless we except those possible cases just alluded to.
The Bible exhibits proof of it.
l. In those passages that represent all the unregenerate as possessing
one common wicked heart or character. “And God saw that the wicked-
mess of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the
thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.”—Gen. vi. 5. “This is
an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one
event unto all : yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and
madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead.”
—Eccl. ix. 3. “The heart is deceitful above all things and desperately
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 375
wicked: who can know it *—Jer. xvii. 9. “Because the carnal mind is
enmity against God : for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed
can be.”—Rom. viii. 7.
2. In those passages that declare the universal necessity of regeneration.
“Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee,
Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.”—John iii. 3.
3. Passages that expressly assert the universal moral depravity of all
unregenerate moral agents of our race. “What then 2 are we better
than they 2 No, in no wise: for we have before proved both Jews and
Gentiles, that they are all under sin; as it is written, There is none
righteous, mo, not one : There is none that understandeth, there is none
that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are together
become unprofitable ; there is none that doeth good, no, not one. Their
throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit:
the poison of asps is under their lips: whose mouth is full of cursing and
bitterness: their feet are swift to shed blood : destruction and misery are
in their ways: and the way of peace have they not known : there is no
fear of God before their eyes. Now we know that what things soever the
law saith, it saith to them who are under the law : that every mouth may
be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. Therefore
by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for by
the law is the knowledge of sin.”—Rom. iii. 9—20.
4. Universal history proves it. What is this world's history but the
shameless chronicle of human wickedness?
5. Universal observation attests it. Whoever saw one unregenerate
human being that was not selfish, that did not obey his feelings rather
than the law of his intelligence, that was not under some form, or in some
way, living to please self? Such an unregenerate human being I may
safely affirm was never seen since the fall of Adam.
6. I may also appeal to the universal consciousness of the unregenerate.
They know themselves to be selfish, to be aiming to please themselves, and
they cannot homestly deny it.
VII. The moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race,
is total.
By this is intended, that the moral depravity of the unregenerate is
without any mixture of moral goodness or virtue, that while they remain
unregenerate, they never in any instance, nor in any degree, exercise true
love to God and to man. It is not intended, that they may not perform
many outward actions, and have many inward feelings, that are such as
the regenerate perform and experience : and such too as are accounted
virtue by those who place virtue in the outward action. But it is intended,
that virtue does not consist either in involuntary feelings or in outward
actions, and that it consists alone in entire consecration of heart and life to
God and the good of being, and that no unregenerate sinner previous to
regeneration, is or can be for one moment in this state.
376 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
When virtue is clearly seen to consist in the heart's entire consecration
to God and the good of being, it must be seen, that the unregenerate are
not for ome moment in this state. It is amazing, that some philosophers
and theologians have admitted and maintained, that the unregenerate do
Sometimes do that which is truly virtuous. But in these admissions they
necessarily assume a false philosophy, and overlook that in which all virtue
does and must consist, namely, supreme ultimate intention. They speak
of virtuous actions and of virtuous feelings, as if virtue consisted in them,
and not in the intention.
Henry P. Tappan, for example, for the most part an able, truthful, and
beautiful writer, assumes, or rather affirms, that volitions may be put forth
inconsistent with, and contrary to the present choice of an end, and that
consequently, unregenerate sinners, whom he admits to be in the exercise
of a selfish choice of an end, may and do sometimes put forth right voli-
tions, and perform right actions, that is, right in the sense of virtuous
actions. But let us examine this subject. We have seen that all choice
and all volition must respect either an end or means, that is, that every-
thing willed or chosen, is willed or chosen for some reason. To deny this,
is the same as to deny that anything is willed or chosen, because the
ultimate reason for a choice and the thing chosen are identical. There-
fore, it is plain, as was shown in a former lecture (l,) that the will cannot
embrace at the same time, two opposite ends; and that while but one
end is chosen, the will cannot put forth volitions to secure some other end,
which end is not yet chosen. In other words, it certainly is absurd to say,
that the will, while maintaining the choice of one end, can use means for
the accomplishment of another and opposite end.
Again : the choice of an end, or of means, when more than one end or
means is known to the mind, implies preference. The choice of one end
or means, implies the rejection of its opposite. If one of two opposing
ends be chosen, the other is and must be rejected. Therefore the choice
of the two ends can never co-exist. And, as was shown in a former
lecture—
1. The mind cannot will at all without an end. As all choice and
volition must respect ends, or means, and as means cannot be willed with-
out the previous choice of an end, it follows that the choice of an end is
necessarily the first choice.
2. When an end is chosen, that choice confines all volition to securing
its accomplishment, and for the time being, and until another end is
chosen, and this one relinquished, it is impossible for the will to put forth
any volition inconsistent with the present choice. It therefore follows, that
while sinners are selfish, or unregenerate, it is impossible for them to put
forth a holy volition.
They are under the necessity of first changing their hearts, or their
choice of an end, before they can put forth any volitions to secure any other
than a selfish end. And this is plainly the everywhere assumed philosophy
of the Bible. That uniformly represents the unregenerate as totally
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 377
depraved, and calls upon them to repent, to make to themselves a new
heart, and never admits directly, or by way of implication, that they can
do anything good or acceptable to God, while in the exercise of a wicked
or selfish heart.
When examining the attributes of selfishness, it was shown that total
depravity was one of its essential attributes; or rather, that it was the
moral attribute in these senses, to wit:—
(1.) That selfishness did not, could not, co-exist with virtue or benevo.
lence.
(2.) That selfishness could admit of no volitions or actions inconsistent
with it, while it continued.
(3.) That selfishness was not only wholly inconsistent with any degree
of love to God, but was enmity against God, the very opposite of his will,
and constituted deep and entire opposition of will to God.
(4.) That selfishness was mortal enmity against God, as manifested in
the murder of Christ.
(5.) That selfishness was supreme opposition to God.
(6.) That every selfish being is, and must be at every moment, just as
wicked and blameworthy, as with his light he could be ; that he at every
moment violated all his moral obligations, and rejected and turned from
all the light he had ; and that whatever course of outward life any sinner
pursues, it is all directed exclusively by selfishness; and whether he goes
into the pulpit to preach the gospel, or becomes a pirate upon the high
seas, he is actuated, in either case, solely by a regard to self-interest; and
that, let him do one or the other, it is for the same reason, to wit, to please
himself: so that it matters not, so far as his guilt is concerned, which he
does. One course may, or may not, result in more or less evil than the
other. But, as was then shown, the tendency of one course or the other,
is not the criterion by which his guilt is to be measured, but his apprehen-
sion of the value of the interests rejected for the sake of securing his own
gratification,
LECTURE XXXIX.
MORAL DEPRAVITY.
VIII. Let us consider the proper method of accounting for the universal
and total moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race.
In the discussion of this subject, I will—
1. Endeavour to show how it is not to be accounted for,
2. How it is to be accounted for.
1. How the moral depravity of mankind is not to be accounted for.
In examining this part of the subject, it is necessary to have distinctly
in view, that which constitutes moral depravity. All the error that has
378 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
existed upon this subject, has been founded in false assumptions in regard
to the nature or essence of moral depravity. It has been almost universally
true, that no distinction has been made between moral and physical de-
pravity ; and consequently, physical depravity has been confounded with
and treated of, as moral depravity. This of course has led to vast confusion
and nonsense upon this subject. Let the following facts, which have been
shown in former lectures, be distinctly borne in mind.
That moral depravity consists in selfishness, or in the choice of self.
interest, self-gratification, or self-indulgence, as an end.
Consequently it cannot consist,
(1.) In a sinful constitution, or in a constitutional appetency or craving
for sin. This has been shown in a former lecture, on what is not implied
in disobedience to the moral law.
(2.) Moral depravity is sin itself, and not the cause of sin. It is not
something prior to sin, that sustains to it the relation of a cause, but it is
the essence and the whole of sin.
(3.) It cannot be an attribute of human mature, considered simply as
such, for this would be physical, and not moral depravity.
(4.) Moral depravity is not then to be accounted for by ascribing it to a
mature or constitution sinful in itself. To talk of a sinful nature, or sinful
constitution, in the sense of physical sinfulness, is to ascribe sinfulness to
the Creator, who is the author of nature. It is to overlook the essential
mature of sin, and to make sin a physical virus, instead of a voluntary and
responsible choice. Both sound philosophy and the Bible, make sin to
consist in obeying the flesh, or in the spirit of self-pleasing, or self-indulg-
ence, or, which is the same thing, in Selfishness—in a carnal mind, or in
miliding the flesh. But writers on moral depravity have assumed, that
moral depravity was distinct from, and the cause of sin, that is, of actual
transgression. They call it original sin, indwelling sin, a sinful nature, an
appetite for sin, an attribute of human nature, and the like. We shall
presently see what has led to this view of the subject.
I will, in the next place, notice a modern, and perhaps the most popular
view of this subject, which has been taken by any late writer, who has
fallen into the error of confounding physical and moral depravity. I refer
to the prize essay of Dr. Woods, of Andover, Mass. He defines moral
depravity to be the same as “sinfulness.” He also, in one part of his
essay, holds and maintains, that it is always and necessarily, voluntary.
Still, his great effort is to prove that sinfulness or moral depravity, is an
attribute of human nature. It is no part of my design to expose the incon-
sistency of holding moral depravity to be a voluntary state of mind, and yet
a natural attribute, but only to examine the philosophy, the logic, and
theology of his main argument. The following quotation will show the
sense in which he holds moral depravity to belong to the nature of man.
At page 54 he says:— -
“The word depravity, relating as it here does to man's moral character,
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 379
means the same as sinfulness, being the opposite of moral purity, or
holiness. In this use of the word there is a general agreement. But what
is the meaning of native, or natural? Among the variety of meanings
specified by Johnson, Webster, and others, I refer to the following, as
relating particularly to the subject before us.
“ Native Produced by nature. Natural, or such as is according to
nature; belonging by birth; original. Natural has substantially the same
meaning: ‘produced by nature; not acquired.”—So Crabbe. ‘Of a person
we say, his worth is native, to designate it as some valuable property born
with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon him; but we say of his
disposition, that it is natural, as opposed to that which is acquired by
habit.' And Johnson defines nature to be “the native state or properties
of any thing, by which it is discriminated from others.’ He quotes the
definition of Boyle; 'Nature sometimes means what belongs to a living
creature at its nativity, or accrues to it by its birth, as when We say a man
is noble by mature, or a child is naturally froward.” “This,' he says, “may
be expressed by saying, the man was born so."
“After these brief definitions, which come to nearly the same thing, I
proceed to inquire, what are the marks or evidences which show anything
in man to be natural, or native; and how far these marks are found in
relation to depravity.”
Again, page 66, he says:—
“The evil, them, cannot be supposed to originate in any unfavourable
external circumstances, such as corrupting examples, or insinuating and
strong temptations; for if we suppose these entirely removed, all human
beings would still be sinners. With such a moral nature as they now have,
they would not wait for strong temptations to sin. Nay, they would be
sinners in opposition to the strongest motives to the contrary. Indeed, we
know that human beings will turn those very motives which most power-
fully urge to holiness, into occasions of sin. Now, does not the confidence
and certainty with which we foretell the commission of sin, and of sin
unmixed with moral purity, presuppose a full conviction in us, and a con-
viction resting upon what we regard as satisfactory evidence, that sin, in all
its visible actings, arises from that which is within the mind itself, and
which belongs to our very nature as moral beings 2 Have we not as much
evidence that this is the case with moral evil, as with any of our natural
affections or bodily appetites ?”
This quotation, together with the whole argument, shows that he con-
siders moral depravity to be an attribute of human nature, in the same
sense that the appetites and passions are.
Before I proceed directly to the examination of his argument, that
sinfulness, or moral depravity, is an “attribute of human nature,” I would
premise, that an argument, or fact, that may equally well consist with
either of two opposing theories, can prove neither. The author in question
presents the following facts and considerations in support of his great posi-
tion, that moral depravity, or sinfulness, is an attribute of human nature;
3S0 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and three presidents of eolleges endorse the soundness and conclusiveness
of the argument. He proves his position—
(i.) From the “universality of moral depravity.” To this I answer, that
this argument proves nothing to the purpose, unless it be true, and
assumed as a major premise, that whatever is universal among mankind,
must be a natural attribute of man as such ; that whatever is common to
all men, must be an attribute of human nature. But this assumption is a
begging of the question. Sin may be the result of temptation; temptation
may be universal, and of such a nature as uniformly, not necessarily, to
result in sin, unless a contrary result be seeured by a Divine moral suasion.
This I shall endeavour to show is the fact. This argument assumes, that
there is but one method of accounting for the universality of human sinful.
ness. But this is the question in debate, and is not to be thus assumed as
{{`û tº .
Again : Selfishness is eommon to all unregenerate men. Is selfishness
a natural attribute . We have seen, in a former lecture, that it eonsists in
ehoice. Can choice be an attribute of human nature ?
Again : This argument is just as consistent with the opposite theory, to
wit, that moral depravity is selfishness. The universality of selfishness is
just what might be expected, if selfishness consists in the committal of the
will to the gratification of self. This will be a thing of course, unless the
Holy Spirit interpose, greatly to enlighten the intellect, and break up the
foree of habit, and change the attitude of the will, already, at the first dawn
of reason, eommitted to the impulses of the sensibility. If moral depravity
is to be decounted for, as I shall hereafter more fully show, by ascribing it
to the influence of temptation, or to a physically depraved constitution.
surrounded by the circumstances in which mankind first fºrm their moral
character, or put forth their first moral choices, universality might of course
be expected to be onle of its characteristies. This argument, then, agreeing
early life.” Answer—
(i.) This is just what might be expected upon the opposite theory. If
moral depravity consist in the choice of self-gratification, it would of course
appear in early life. So this argument agrees quite as well with the
opposing theory, and therefore proves nothing. But—
(ii.) This argument is gºod for nothing, unless the following be assumed
as a major premise, and unless the fact assumed be indeed a truth, namely,
“Whatever is developed in early life, must be an attribute ºf human
nature.” But this again is assuming the truth of the point in debate.
This argument is based upon the assumption that a course ºf aetion
common to all men, and commencing at the earliest moment of their moral
agency, can be seek unted for only by ascribing it tº in attribute of nature,
having the same moral character as that which belongs to the aetions
themselves. But this is not true. There may be more than one way of
secounting for the universal sinfulness of human actions from the dawn
(2.) His second argument is, that “ Moral depravity ievelopes itself in
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 381
of moral agency. It may be ascribed to the universality and peculiar
nature of temptation, as has been said.
(3.) His third argument is, that “ Moral depravity is not owing to any
change that occurs subsequent to birth.” Answer –
No, the circumstances of temptation are sufficient to account for it with-
out supposing the nature to be changed. This argument proves Inothing,
unless it be true, that the peculiar circumstances of temptation under which
moral agents act, from the dawn of moral agency, cannot sufficiently
account for their conduct, without supposing a change of nature subsequent
to birth. “What then, does this arguing prove 2"
Again, this argument is just as consistent with the opposing theory, and
therefore proves neither.
(4.) His fourth argument is, “That moral depravity acts freely and
spontaneously.” Answer. The moral agent acts freely, and acts selfishly,
that is, wickedly. This argument assumes, that if a moral agent acts freely
and wickedly, moral depravity, or sin, must be an attribute of his nature.
Or more fairly, if mankind universally, in the exercise of their liberty, act
sinfully, sinfulness must be an attribute of human nature. But what is
sin: Why sin is a voluntary transgressiºn of law, Dr. Woods being
judge. Can a voluntary transgression of law be denominated an attribute
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itself. This argument ther. is gººd fºr nºthing.
(5.) His fifth argument is, “ That mºral depravity is hard to overcºme,
and therefore it must be an attribute of human nature.” Answer—
(i.) If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be overcome at
all, without a change of the human cºnstitution.
(ii.) It is hard to overcome, just as selfishness naturally would be, in
beings of a physically depraved cºnstitution, and in the présence of so many
temptations to self-indulgence.
tiii. If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be overcome
without a change of personal identity. But the fact that it can be overcome
without destroying the consciousness of persºnal identity, proves that it is
not an attribute of human mature.
(6.) His sixth argument is, that “We can predict with certainty. that in
due time it will act itself out.” Answer: Just as might be expected. If
moral depravity consists in selfishness, we can predict with certainty. that
the spirit of self-pleasing will, in due time, and at all times, act itself out.
We ean also prediet, without the gift of prºphecy. that with a constitution
physically depraved, and surrounded with ºbjects to awaken appetite, and
with all the eireumstances in which human beings first fºrm their moral
character, they will seek universally to gratify themselves, unless prevented
by the illuminations of the Holy Spirit. This argument is just as eo
with the opposite theory, and therefore proves neither.
onsistent
3S
382 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
It is unnecessary to occupy any more time with the treatise of Dr. Woods.
I will now quote the standards of the presbyterian church, which will put
you in possession of their views upon this subject. At pp. 30, 31, of the
Presbyterian Confession of Faith, we have the following: “By this sin,
they (Adam and Eve) fell from their original righteousness and communion
with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties
and parts of soul and body. They being the root of all mankind, the guilt
of this sim was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted mature
conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary genera-
tion. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed,
disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do
proceed all actual transgressions.”
Again, pp. 152–154, Shorter Catechism. “Question 22. Did all man-
kind fall in that first transgression ? Ans. The covenant being made with
Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity; all
mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him,
and fell with him in that first transgression.
“Question 28. Into what estate did the fall bring mankind? Ans. The
fall brought mankind into an estate of sin and misery.
“Question 24. What is sinº Ans. Sin is any want of conformity unto,
or transgression of, any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable
Creature.
“Question 25. Wherein consists the sinfulness of that estate whereinto
mam fell ? Ans. The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, con-
sisteth in the guilt of Adam’s first sin, the want of that righteousness
wherein he was created, and the corruption of his nature, whereby he is
utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is spiritually
good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually, which is
commonly called original sin, and from which do proceed all actual
transgressions.
“Question 26. How is original sin conveyed from our first parents unto
their posterity ? Ans. Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto
their posterity by natural generation, so as all that proceed from them in
that way, are conceived and born in sin.”
These extracts show, that the framers and defenders of this confession of
faith, account for the moral depravity of mankind by making it to consist
in a sinful mature, inherited by natural generation from Adam. They re-
gard the constitution inherited from Adam, as in itself sinful, and the
cause of all actual transgression. They make no distinction between
physical and moral depravity. They also distinguish between original and
actual sin. Original sin is the sinfulness of the constitution, in which
Adam's posterity have no other hand than to inherit it by natural genera-
tion, or by birth. This original sin, or sinful mature, renders mankind
utterly disabled from all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all
that is evil. This is their account of moral depravity. This, it will be
seen, is substantially the ground of Dr. Woods.
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 383
It has been common with those who confound physical with moral
depravity, and who maintain that human nature is itself sinful, to quote
certain passages of Scripture to sustain their position. An examination of
these proof texts, must, in the next place, occupy our attention. But
before I enter upon this examination, I must first call your attention
to certain well settled rules of biblical interpretation.
(1) Different passages must be so interpreted, if they can be, as not to
contradict each other.
(2) Language is to be interpreted according to the subject matter of
discourse.
(3.) Respect is always to be had, to the general scope and design of the
speaker or writer.
(4.) Texts that are consistent with either theory, prove neither.
(5.) Language is to be so interpreted, if it can be, as not to conflict with
sound philosophy, matters of fact, the nature of things, or immutable
justice.
Let us now, remembering and applying these plain rules of sound inter-
pretation, proceed to the examination of those passages that are supposed to
establish the theory of depravity I am examining.
Gen. v. 3.−“Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son
in his own likeness and after his own image, and called his name Seth.”
It is not very easy to see, why this text should be pressed into the service
of those who hold that human nature is in itself sinful. Why should it be
assumed that the likeness and image here spoken of was a moral likeness
or image 2 But, unless this be assumed, the text has nothing to do with
the subject.
Again : it is generally admitted, that in all probability Adam was a
regenerate man at the time and before the birth of Seth. Is it intended
that Adam begat a saint or a sinner 2 If, as is supposed, Adam was a
saint of God, if this text is anything to the purpose, it affirms that Adam
begat a Saint. But this is the opposite of that in proof of which the text
is quoted.
Another text is, Job. xiv. 4.—“Who can bring a clean thing out of an
unclean 2 Not one.” This text is quoted in support of the position of the
Presbyterian Confession of Faith, that children inherit from their parents,
by matural generation, a sinful nature. Upon this text, I remark,-
(i.) That all that can be made of it, even if we read it without regard to
the translation or the context, is, that a physically depraved parent will
produce a physically depraved offspring.
(ii.) That this is its real meaning, is quite evident, when we look into the
context. Job is treating of the frail and dying state of man, and manifestly
has in the text and context his eye wholly on the physical state, and not
on the moral character of man. What he intends is; who can bring other
than a frail, dying offspring from a frail, dying parent? Not one. This is
substantially the view that Professor Stuart takes of this text. The utmost
that can be made of it is, that as he belonged to a race of sinners, nothing
38.4 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
else could be expected than that he should be a sinner, without meaning
to affirm anything in regard to the quo modo of this result.
Again : Job XV. 14.—“What is man that he should be clean, and he
that is born of a woman that he should be righteous.”
(1.) These are the words of Eliphaz, and it is improper to quote them as
inspired truth. That Eliphaz uttered this sentiment, let what will be the
meaning, there is no reason to doubt; and there is just as little reason to
receive his doctrines as inspired truth. For God himself testifies that Job's
friends did not hold the truth. But,
(2.) Suppose we receive the text as true, what is its import? Why, it
simply asserts, or rather implies, the umrighteousness or sinfulness of the
whole human race. It expresses the universality of human depravity, in
the very common way of including all that are born of woman. This cer-
tainly says nothing, and implies nothing, respecting a sinful constitution.
It is just as plain, and just as warrantable, to understand this passage as
implying that mankind have become so physically depraved, that this fact,
together with the circumstances under which they come into being, and
begin their moral career, will certainly, (not necessarily,) result in moral
depravity. I might use just such language as that found in this text, and,
naturally enough, express by it my own views of moral depravity; to wit,
that it results from a physically depraved constitution, and the circum-
stances of temptation under which children come into this world, and begin
and prosecute their moral career; certainly this is the most that can be
made of this text.
Again, Psalm li. 5.—“Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did
my mother conceive me.” Upon this I remark,-
(l.) It would seem, if this text is to be understood literally, that the
Psalmist intended to affirm the sinful state of his mother, at the time of
his conception, and during gestation. But, -
(2.) I make a remark that is applicable to all the texts and arguments
that are adduced in support of the theory in question; namely, that to take
this view of the subject, and to interpret these passages as teaching the
constitutional sinfulness of man, is to contradiet God's own definition of
sin, and the only definition that human reason or common sense can receive,
to wit, that “sin is a transgression of the law.” This is, no doubt, the
only correct definition of sin. But we have seen that the law does not
legislate over substance, requiring men to have a certain nature, but over
voluntary action only. If the Psalmist really intended to affirm, that the
substance of his body was sinful from its conception, then he not only
arrays himself against God's own definition of sin, but he also affirms
sheer nonsense. The substance of an unborn child sinful It is im-
possible! But what did the Psalmist mean * I answer: This verse is
found in David's penitential psalm. He was deeply convinced of sin, and
was, as he had good reason to be, much excited, and expressed himself, as
we all do in similar circumstances, in strong language. His eye, as was
natural and is common in such cases, had been directed back along the
MORAL DEPRAVITY, 385
pathway of life up to the days of his earliest recollection. He remembered
sins among the earliest acts of his recollected life. He broke out in the
language of this text to express, not the anti-scriptural and nonsensical
dogma of a sinful constitution, but to affirm in his strong, poetic language,
that he had always been a sinner from the commencement of his moral
existence, or from the earliest moment of his capability of being a sinner.
This is the strong language of poetry. To press this and similar texts
further than this, is to violate two sound rules of biblical interpretation, to
wit:—
(1) That language is to be interpreted according to the subject matter
of discourse. And,-
(2) That one passage is to be so interpreted as not to contradict another.
But to make this text state that sin belongs, or may belong, to the
substance of an unborn infant, is to make it flatly contradict another
passage that defines sin to be a “transgression of the law of God.”
Some suppose that, in the passage in question, the Psalmist referred to,
and meant to acknowledge and assert, his low and despicable origin, and
to say, I was always a sinner, and my mother that conceived me was a
sinner, and I am but the degenerate plant of a strange vine, without
intending to affirm anything in respect to the absolute sinfulness of his
nature.
Again, Psa. lviii. 3. “The wicked are estranged from the womb; they
go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies."
Upon this text I remark-
That it has been quoted at one time to establish the doctrine of a
sinful mature, and at another to prove that infants commit actual sin from
the very day and hour of their birth. But certainly no such use can be
legitimately made of this text. It does not affirm anything of a sinful
nature, but this has been inferred from what it does affirm, that the wicked
are estranged from their birth. But does this mean, that they are really
and literally estranged from the day and hour of their birth, and that they
really “go astray the very day they are born, speaking lies?” This every
one knows to be contrary to fact. The text cannot then be pressed to the
letter. What then does it mean *. It must mean, like the text last
examined, that the wicked are estranged and go astray from the com-
mencement of their moral agency. If it means more than this, it would
contradict other plain passages of Scripture. It affirms, in strong, graphie,
and poetic language, the fact, that the first moral conduct and character of
children is sinful. This is all that in truth it can assert, and it doubtless
dates the beginning of their moral depravity at a very early period, and
expresses it in very strong language, as if it were literally from the hour of
birth. But when it adds, that they go astray speaking lies, we know that
this is not, and cannot be, literally taken, for, as every one knows, chil-
dren do not speak at all from their birth. Should we understand the
Psalmist as affirming, that children go astray as soon as they go at all, and
speak lies as soon as they speak at all, this would not prove that their
, ‘N
C Cº
386 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
nature was in itself sinful, but might well consist with the theory that their
physical depravity, together with their circumstances of temptation, led
them into selfishness, from the very first moment of their moral existence.
Again, John iii. 6. “That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that
which is born of the Spirit is spirit.”
Upon this I remark—
(1.) That it may, if literally taken, mean nothing more than this, that the
body which is born of flesh is flesh, and that that which is born of the
Spirit is spirit; that is, that this birth of which he was speaking was of the
soul, and not of the body. But—
(2.) It may be understood to mean, that that which results from the
mfluence of the flesh is flesh, in the sense of sin; for this is a common
sense of the term flesh in the New Testament, and that which results from
the Spirit, is spirit or spiritual, in the sense of holy. This I understand to
be the true sense. The text when thus understood, does not at all support
the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution, but only this, that the flesh
tends to sin, that the appetites and passions are temptations to sin, so that
when the will obeys them it sins. Whatever is born of the propensities,
in the sense that the will yields to their control, is sinful. And, on the
other hand, whatever is born of the Spirit, that is, whatever results from
the agency of the Holy Spirit, in the sense that the will yields to Him, is
holy.
Again, Eph. ii. 3. “By nature the children of wrath, even as others."
Upon this text I remark—
(1.) That it cannot, consistently with natural justice, be understood to
mean, that we are exposed to the wrath of God on account of our nature.
It is a monstrous and blasphemous dogma, that a holy God is angry with
any creature for possessing a nature with which he was sent into being
without his knowledge or consent. The Bible represents God as angry
with men for their wicked deeds, and not for their nature.
(2.) It is common and proper to speak of the first state in which men
universally are, as a natural state. Thus we speak of sinners before
regeneration, as in a state of nature, as opposed to a changed state, a
regenerate state, and a state of grace. By this we do not necessarily mean,
that they have a mature sinful in itself, but merely that before regeneration
they are universally and morally depraved, that this is their natural, as
opposed to their regenerate state. Total moral depravity is the state that
follows, and results from their first birth, and is in this sense matural, and
in this sense alone, can it truly be said, that they are “by nature children
of wrath.” Against the use that is made of this text, and all this class of
texts, may be arrayed the whole scope of scripture, that represents man as
to blame, and to be judged and punished only for his deeds. The subject
matter of discourse in these texts is such as to demand that we should
understand them as not implying, or asserting, that sin is an essential part
of our mature.
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 387
LECTURE XL.
M O R AL D E P. R. A. W IT Y.
FURTHER ExAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED IN SUPPORT OF THE
PosLTION, THAT HUMAN NATURE IS IN ITSELF SINFUL.
The defenders of the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, or moral
depravity, urge as an additional argument —
That sin is a universal effect of human nature, and therefore human
mature must be itself sinful. Answer,-
This is a mon sequitur. Sim may be, and must be, an abuse of free
agency; and this may be accounted for, as we shall see, by ascribing it
to the universality of temptation, and does not at all imply a sinful consti-
tution. But if sin necessarily implies a sinful nature, how did Adam and
Eve sin 2 Had they a sinful nature to account for, and to cause their
first sin 2 How did angels sin 2 Had they also a sinful nature ? Either
sin does not imply a sinful nature, or a mature in itself sinful, or Adam
and angels must have had sinful natures before their fall.
Again : suppose we regard sin as an event or effect. An effect only
implies an adequate cause. Free, responsible will is an adequate cause in
the presence of temptation, without the supposition of a sinful constitution,
as has been demonstrated in the case of Adam and of angels. When we
have found an adequate cause, it is unphilosophical to look for and assign
another.
Again : it is said that no motive to sin could be a motive or a tempta-
tion, if there were not a sinful taste, relish, or appetite, inherent in the
constitution, to which the temptation or motive is addressed. For example,
the presence of food, it is said, would be no temptation to eat, were there
not a constitutional appetency terminating on food. So the presence of any
object could be no inducement to sin, were there not a constitutional appe.
tency or craving for sin. So that, in fact, sin in action were impossible,
unless there were sin in the nature. To this I reply,–
Suppose this objection be applied to the sin of Adam and of angels.
Can we not account for Eve's eating the forbidden fruit without supposing
that she had a craving for sin 2 The Bible informs us that her craving
was for the fruit, for knowledge, and not for sin. The words are, “And
when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was
pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of
the fruit thereof and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and
he did eat.” Here is nothing of a craving for sin. Eating this fruit was
indeed sinful; but the sin consisted in consenting to gratify, in a pro-
hibited manner, the appetites, not for sin, but for food and knowledge.
But the advocates of this theory say, that there must be an adaptedness in
the constitution, a something within answering to the outward motive or
temptation, otherwise sin were impossible. This is true. But the ques.
C C Q
388 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
tion is, What is that something within, which responds to the outward
motive 2 Is it a craving for sim? We have just seem what it was in the
case of Adam and Eve. It was simply the correlation that existed between
the fruit and their constitution, its presence exciting the desires for food
and knowledge. This led to prohibited indulgence. But all men sin in
precisely the same way. They consent to gratify, not a craving for sin, but
a craving for other things, and the consent to make self-gratification an
end, is the whole of sin.
This argument assumes as true, what on a former occasion we have
seem to be false, namely, that simmers love sin for its own sake. If it
could be true, total depravity would of necessity secure perfect blessedness.
It would be the very state which the mind supremely loves for its own sake.
The sinner could them say, not merely in the language of poetry, but in
sober prose and fact, “Evil, be thou my good.”
The theologians whose views we are canvassing, maintain that the
appetites, passions, desires, and propensities, which are constitutional and
entirely involuntary, are in themselves sinful. To this I reply, that Adam
and Eve possessed them before they fell. Christ possessed them, or he
was not a man, nor, in any proper sense, a human being. No, these
appetites, passions, and propensities, are not sinful, though they are the
occasions of sin. They are a temptation to the will to seek their unlawful
indulgence. When these lusts or appetites are spoken of as the “passions
of sin,” or as “sinful lusts or passions,” it is not because they are sinful in
themselves, but because they are the occasions of sin. It has been asked,
Why are not the appetites and propensities to be regarded as sinful, since
they are the prevalent temptations to sinº I reply,–
(1.) They are involuntary, and moral character can no more be pre-
dicated of them, on account of their being temptations, than it could of
the fruit that was a temptation to Eve. They have no design to tempt.
They are constitutional, unintelligent, involuntary ; and it is impossible
that moral character should be predicable of them. A moral agent is
responsible for his emotions, desires, &c., so far as they are under the direct
or indirect control of his will, and no further. He is always responsible for
the manner in which he gratifies them. If he indulges them in accordance
with the law of God, he does right. If he makes their gratification his
end, he sins.
(2) Again: the death and suffering of infants previous to actual trans-
gression, is adduced as an argument to prove that infants have a sinful
nature. To this I reply,–
(i.) That this argument must assume, that there must be sin wherever
there is suffering and death. But this assumption proves too much, as it
would prove that mere animals have a sinful mature, or have committed
actual sin. An argument that proves too much proves nothing.
(ii) Physical sufferings prove only physical, and not moral, depravity.
Previous to moral agency, infants are no more subjects of moral goverm-
ment than brutes are; therefore, their sufferings and death are to be
MORAL DEPRAVITY, 389
accounted for as are those of brutes, namely, by ascribing them to physical
interference with the laws of life and health.
Another argument for a sinful constitution is, that unless infants have
a sinful mature, they do not need sanctification to fit them for heaven.
Answer –
(1.) This argument assumes, that, if they are not sinful, they must be
holy; whereas they are neither sinful nor holy, until they are moral agents,
and render themselves so by obedience or disobedience to the moral law.
If they are to go to heaven, they must be made holy or must be sanctified.
(2.) This objection assumes, that previous sinfulness is a condition of
the necessity of being holy. This is contrary to fact. Were Adam and
angels first sinful before they were sanctified ? But it is assumed that
unless moral agents are at first sinners, they do not need the Holy Spirit
to induce them to be holy. That is, unless their nature is sinful, they
would become holy without the Holy Spirit. But where do we ascertain
this 2 Suppose that they have no moral character, and that their nature
is neither holy nor sinful. Will they become holy without being enlight-
ened by the Holy Spirit 2 Who will assert that they will 2
(3.) That infants have a sinful nature has been inferred from the insti-
tution of circumcision so early as the eighth day after birth. Circumcision,
it is truly urged, was designed to teach the necessity of regeneration, and
by way of implication, the doctrine of moral depravity. It is claimed,
that its being enjoined as obligatory upon the eighth day after birth, was
requiring it at the earliest period at which it could be safely performed.
From this it is inferred, that infants are to be regarded as morally depraved
from their birth.
In answer to this I would say, that infant circumcision was doubtless
designed to teach the necessity of their being saved by the Holy Spirit
from the dominion of the flesh ; that the influence of the flesh must be
restrained ; and the flesh circumcised, or the soul would be lost. This
truth needed to be impressed on the parents from the birth of their
children. This very significant, and bloody, and painful rite, was well
calculated to impress this truth upon parents, and to lead them from their
birth to watch over the developement and indulgence of their propensities,
and to pray for their sanctification. Requiring it at so early a day was no
doubt designed to indicate, that they are from the first under the dominion
of their flesh, without however affording any inference in favour of the
idea, that their flesh was in itself sinful, or that the action of their will at
that early age was sinful. If reason was not developed, the subjection of
the will to appetite could not be sinful. But whether this subjection of
the will to the gratification of the appetite was sinful or not, the child
must be delivered from it, or it could never be fitted for heaven, any more
than a mere brute can be fitted for heaven. The fact, that circumcision
was required on the eighth day, and not before, seems to indicate, not that
they are sinners absolutely from birth, but that they very early become so,
even from the commencement of moral agency.
390 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Again: the rite must be performed at some time. Unless a particular
day were appointed, it would be very apt to be deferred, and finally not
performed at all. It is probable, that God commanded that it should be
done at the earliest period at which it could be safely dome, not only for
the reasons already assigned, but to prevent its being neglected too long,
and perhaps altogether: and perhaps, also, because it would be less painful
and dangerous at that early age, when the infant slept most of the time.
The longer it was neglected the greater would be the temptation to neglect
it altogether. So painful a rite needed to be enjoined by positive statute,
at Some particular time ; and it was desirable on all accounts that it should
be done as early as it safely could be. This argument, them, for native
constitutional moral depravity amounts really to nothing.
Again : it is urged, that unless infants have a sinful nature, should they
die in infancy, they could not be saved by the grace of Christ.
To this I answer, that, in this case they would not, and could not, as a
matter of course, be sent to the place of punishment for sinners; because
that were to confound the innocent with the guilty, a thing morally impos-
sible with God.
But what grace could there be in saving them from a simful constitution,
that is not exercised in saving them from circumstances that would cer-
tainly result in their becoming sinners, if not snatched from them P In
neither case do they need pardon for sin. Grace is unearned favour—a
gratuity. If the child has a sinful nature, it is his misfortune, and not his
crime. To save him from this nature is to save him from those circum-
stances that will certainly result in actual transgression, unless he is rescued
by death and by the Holy Spirit. So if his nature is not sinful, yet it is
certain that his nature and circumstances are such, that he will surely sin
unless rescued by death or by the Holy Spirit, before he is capable of
sinning. It certainly must be an infinite favour to be rescued from such
circumstances, and especially to have eternal life conferred as a mere
gratuity. This surely is grace. And as infants belong to a race of sinners
who are all, as it were, turned over into the hands of Christ, they doubtless
will ascribe their Salvation to the infinite grace of Christ.
Again: is it not grace that saves us from sinning 2 What then is it but
grace that saves infants from simming, by snatching them away from cir-
cumstances of temptation ? In what way does grace Save adults from
sinning, but by keeping them from temptation, or by giving them grace to
overcome it? And is there mo grace in rescuing infants from circum-
stances that are certain, if they are left in them, to lead them into sin 2
All that can be justly said in either case is, that if infants are saved at
all, which I suppose they are, they are rescued by the benevolence of God
from circumstances that would result in certain and etermal death, and are
by grace made heirs of eternal life. But after all, it is useless to speculate
about the character and destiny of those who are confessedly not moral
agents. The benevolence of God will take care of them. It is nonsensical
to insist upon their moral depravity before they are moral agents, and it is
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 391
frivolous to assert, that they must be morally depraved, as a condition of
their being saved by grace.
We deny that the human constitution is morally depraved,—
(1.) Because there is no proof of it.
(2.) Because it is impossible that sin should be a quality of the substance
of soul or body. It is, and must be, a quality of choice or intention, and not
of substance.
(3.) To make sin an attribute or quality of substance is contrary to God's
definition of sin. “Sin,” says the apostle, “is anomia,” a “transgression
of, or a want of conformity to, the moral law.” That is, it consists in a
refusal to love God and our neighbour, or, which is the same thing, in
loving ourselves Supremely.
(4.) To represent the constitution as sinful, is to represent God, who is
the author of the constitution, as the author of sin. To say that God is
not the direct former of the constitution, but that sin is conveyed by
natural generation from Adam, who made himself sinful, is only to remove
the objection one step farther back, but not to obviate it; for God estab-
lished the physical laws that of necessity bring about this result.
(5.) But how came Adam by a sinful nature ? Did his first sin change
his nature ? or did God change it as a penalty for sim 2 What ground is
there for the assertion that Adam's nature became in itself sinful by the
fall 2 This is a groundless, not to say ridiculous, assumption, and an
absurdity. Sin an attribute of nature A sinful substance Sin a sub-
stance Is it a solid, a fluid, a material, or a spiritual substance 2
I have received from a brother the following note on this subject:—
“The orthodox creeds are in some cases careful to say that Original sim
consists in the substance of neither soul nor body. Thus Bretschneider,
who is reckoned among the rationalists in Germany, says: ‘The symbolical
books very rightly maintained that original sin is not in any sense the sub-
stance of man, his body or soul, as Flacius taught-but that it has been
infused into human nature by Satan, and mixed with it, as poison and wine
are mixed.’
“They rather expressly guard against the idea that they mean by the
phrase “man’s mature,' his substance, but somewhat which is fixed in the
substance. They explain original sin, therefore, not as an essential attri-
bute of man, that is, a necessary and essential part of his being, but as
an accident, that is, somewhat which does not subsist in itself, but as
something accidental, which has come into human nature. He quotes the
Formula Concordantiae as saying: ‘Nature does not denote the substance
itself of man, but something which inheres fixed in the nature or sub-
stance.’ Accident is defined, ‘what does not subsist by itself, but is in
some substance and can be distinguished from it.’”
Here, it seems, is sin by itself, and yet not a substance or subsistence—
not a part or attribute of soul or body. What can it be 2 Does it consist
in wrong action ? No, not in action, but is an accident which inheres fixed
in the nature of substance. But what can it be? Not substance, nor yet
392 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
action. But if it be anything, it must be either substance or action. If it
be a state of substance, what is this but substance in a particular state 2
What a wonder it must be Who ever saw it But it is invisible, for it
is something meither matter nor spirit—a virus, a poison mixed with, yet
distinct from, the constitution. Do these writers think by this subtlety
and refinement to relieve their doctrine of constitutional moral depravity
of its intrinsic absurdity ? If so, they are greatly mistaken; for really they
only render it more absurd and ridiculous.
(6.) I object to the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, that it makes all
sin, original and actual, a mere calamity, and not a crime. For those who
hold that sin is an essential and inseparable part of our nature, to call it a
crime, is to talk nonsense. What a sinful nature the crime of him upon
whom it is entailed, without his knowledge or consent 2 If the mature is
sinful, in such a sense that action must mecessarily be sinful, which is the
doctrine of the Confession of Faith, then sin in action must be a calamity,
and can be no crime. It is the necessary effect of a sinful nature. This
cannot be a crime, since the will has nothing to do with it.
(7.) This doctrine represents sin as a disease, and obedience to law
impossible, until the mature is changed by a sovereign and physical agency
of the Holy Spirit, in which the subject is passive.
(8.) Of course it must remder repentance, either with or without the
grace of God, impossible, unless grace sets aside our reason. If repent-
ance implies self-condemnation, we can never repent in the exercise of our
reason. Constituted as we are, it is impossible that we should condemn
ourselves for a sinful nature, or for actions that are unavoidable. The
doctrine of original sin, or of a sinful constitution, and of necessary sinful
actions, represents the whole moral government of God, the plan of salva-
tion by Christ, and indeed every doctrine of the gospel, as a mere farce.
Upon this supposition the law is tyranny, and the gospel an insult to the
unfortunate.
(0.) This doctrine represents sin as being of two kinds : original or con-
stitutional, and actual—sin of substance, and sin of action ; whereas neither
the Bible, nor common sense acknowledges more than one kind of sin, and
that consists in disobedience to the law.
(10.) This doctrine represents a sinful nature as the physical cause of
actual sim.
(11.) It acknowledges a kind of sin of which no notice will be taken at the
judgment. The Bible everywhere represents the deeds done in the body, and
not the constitution itself, as the only things to be brought into judgment.
(12.) It necessarily begets in simmers a selfjustifying and God-condemning
spirit. Man must cease to be a reasonable being, and give himself up to the
most ridiculous imaginations, before he can blame himself for Adam's sin, as
some have professed to do, or before he can blame himself for possessing
a sinful nature, or for sins that unavoidably resulted from a sinful nature.
(13.) This doctrine necessarily leads its advocates rather to pity and excuse
sinners, than unqualifiedly to blame them.
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 393
(14.) It is difficult, and, indeed, impossible for those who really believe
this doctrine, to urge immediate repentance and submission on the sinner,
feeling that he is infinitely to blame unles she instantly comply. It is a
contradiction to affirm, that a man can heartily believe in the doctrine in
question, and yet truly and heartily blame sinners for not doing what is
naturally impossible to them. The secret conviction must be in the mind
of such an one, that the sinner is not really to blame for being a sinner.
For in fact, if this doctrine is true, he is not to blame for being a sinner,
any more than he is to blame for being a human being. This the advocate
of this doctrine must know. It is vain for him to set up the pretence that
he truly blames sinners for their nature, or for their conduct that was
unavoidable. He can no more do it, than he can honestly deny the neces-
sary affirmations of his own reason. Therefore the advocates of this
theory must merely hold it as a theory, without believing it, or otherwise
they must in their secret conviction excuse the sinner.
(15.) This doctrine naturally and necessarily leads its advocates, secretly
at least, to ascribe the atonement of Christ rather to justice than to grace
—to regard it rather as an expedient to relieve the unfortunate, than to
render the forgiveness of the inexcusable sinner, possible. The advocates
of the theory cannot but regard the case of the sinner as rather a hard one,
and God as under an obligation to provide a way for him to escape from a
sinful nature, entailed upon him in spite of himself, and from actual trans-
gressions which result from his mature by a law of necessity. If all this is
true, the sinner's case is infinitely hard, and God would appear the most
unreasonable and cruel of beings, if he did not provide for their escape.
These convictions will, and must, lodge in the mind of him who really
believes the dogma of a sinful nature. This, in substance, is sometimes
affirmed by the defenders of the doctrine of original sin.
(16.) The fact that Christ died in the stead and behalf of sinners, proves
that God regarded them not as unfortunate, but as criminal and altogether
without excuse. Surely Christ need not have died to atome for the misfor-
tunes of men. His death was to atone for their guilt, and not for their
misfortunes. But if they are without excuse for sin, they must be without
a sinful nature that renders sin unavoidable. If men are without excuse
for sin, as the whole law and gospel assume and teach, it cannot possibly be
that their mature is sinful, for a sinful mature would be the best of all
excuses for sin.
(17.) This doctrine is a stumbling-block both to the church and the world,
infinitely dishonourable to God, and an abomination alike to God and
the human intellect, and should be banished from every pulpit, and from
every formula of doctrine, and from the world. It is a relic of heathen
philosophy, and was foisted in among the doctrines of Christianity by
Augustine, as every one may know who will take the trouble to examine for
himself. This view of moral depravity that I am opposing, has long been
the stronghold of universalism. From it, the universalists inveighed with
resistless force against the idea that sinners would be sent to an eternal
394 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
hell. Assuming the long-defended doctrine of original or constitutional
sinfulness, they proceed to show, that it would be infinitely unreasonable
and unjust in God to send them to hell. What create them with a sinful
mature, from which proceed, by a law of necessity, actual transgressions,
and then send them to an eternal hell for having this nature, and for
transgressions that are unavoidable 2 Impossible ! they say ; and the
human intellect responds, Amen.
(18.) From the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution also, has naturally
and irresistibly flowed the doctrine of inability to repent, and the necessity
of a physical regeneration. These too have been a sad stumbling-block to
universalists, as every one knows who is at all acquainted with the history
of universalism. They infer the salvation of all men, from the facts of
God's benevolence and physical omnipotence God is Almighty, and he
is love. Men are constitutionally depraved, and are unable to repent.
God will not, cannot send them to hell. They do not deserve it. Sin is
a calamity, and God can save them, and he ought to do so. This is the
substance of their argument. And assuming the truth of their premises,
there is no evading their conclusion. But the whole argument is built on
“such stuff as dreams are made of.” Strike out the erroneous dogma of a
sinful mature, and the whole edifice of universalism comes to the ground in
a moment. *
LECTURE XLI.
M O R. A. L. D. E. P. R. A. W IT Y.
We come now to consider—
2. THE PROPER METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR MORAL DEPRAVITY,
The term “moral” is from the Latin mos, manners. The term “de-
pravity,” as has been shown, is from de and pracus, crooked. The terms
united, signify crooked manners, or bad morals. The word &go.grio,
amartia, rendered sim, as has been said, signifies to miss the mark, to aim
at the wrong end, a deviation from the divine law. In this discussion I
JmuSt.,
(1.) Remind you of some positions that have been settled respecting
moral depravity.
(2.) Consult the oracles of God respecting the nature of moral depravity,
or sin.
(3.) Consult the oracles of God in respect to the proper method of
accounting for the existence of sin.
(4.) Show the manner in which it is to be accounted for as an ultimate
fact.
(1.) Some positions that have been settled.
(i.) It has been shown that moral depravity resolves itself into selfish-
IT (BSS.
(ii) That selfishness consists in the supreme choice of self-indulgence.
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 395
(iii.) That self-indulgence consists in the committal of the will to the
gratification of the sensibility, as opposed to obeying the law of the reason,
and of God.
(iv.) That sin, or moral depravity, is a unit, and always consists in this
committed state of the will to self-gratification, irrespective of the par-
ticular form or means of self-gratification.
(v.) It has also been shown, that moral depravity does not consist in a
sinful mature.
(vi.) And, also that actual transgression cannot justly be ascribed to a
sinful constitution.
(vii.) We have also seen that all sin is actual, and that no other than
actual transgression can justly be called sin.
(2.) We are to consult the oracles of God respecting the nature of moral
depravity, or sin.
Reference has often been made to the teachings of inspiration upon this
subject. But it is important to review our ground in this place, that we
may ascertain what are the teachings, and what are the assumptions, of the
bible in regard to the nature of sin. Does it assume that as a truth,
which natural theology teaches upon the subject? What is taught in the
bible, either expressly, or by way of inference and implication, upon this
subject 2
(i.) The Bible gives a formal definition of sin. 1 John iii. 4, “Sin
is a transgression of the law;” and v. 17, “All unrighteousness is sin.”
As was remarked on a former occasion, this definition is not only an
accurate one, but it is the only one that can possibly be true.
(ii.) The Bible everywhere makes the law the only standard of right and
wrong, and obedience to it to be the whole of virtue, and disobedience to
it the whole of sim. This truth lies everywhere upon the face of the Bible.
It is taught, assumed, implied, or expressed, on every page of the Bible.
(iii.) It holds men responsible for their voluntary actions alone, or more
strictly for their choices alone, and expressly affirms, that “if there be a
willing mind, it is accepted according to what a man hath, and not accord-
ing to what he hath not.” That is, willing as God directs is accepted as
obedience, whether we are able to execute our choices or not.
(iv.) The Bible always represents sin as something done or committed,
or wilfully omitted, and never as a part or attribute of soul or body. We
have seen, that the texts that have been relied on, as teaching the doctrine
of constitutional sinfulness, when rightly understood, mean no such thing.
(v.) The Bible assures us, that all sin shall pass in review at the soleumn
judgment, and always represents all sin then to be recognized, as consist-
ing in “the deeds done in the body.” Texts that support these assertions
are too mumerous to need to be quoted, as every reader of the Bible knows.
(3.) We are to consult the Bible in respect to the proper method of
accounting for moral depravity.
(i) We have more than once seem that the Bible has given us the history
of the introduction of sin into our world; and that from the narrative,
396 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
it is plain, that the first sin consisted in selfishness, or in consenting to
indulge the excited constitutional propensities in a prohibited manner. In
other words, it consisted in yielding the will to the impulses of the sensi-
bility, instead of abiding by the law of God, as revealed in the intelligence.
Thus the Bible ascribes the first sin of our race to the influence of tempta-
tion.
(ii.) The Bible once, and only once, incidentally intimates that Adam's
first sin has in some way been the occasion, not the necessary physical cause,
of all the sins of men. Rom. v. 12—19.
(iii.) It neither says nor intimates anything in relation to the manner in
which Adam's sin has occasioned this result. It only incidentally recognizes
the fact, and them leaves it, just as if the quo modo was too obvious to need
explanation.
(iv.) In other parts of the Bible we are informed how we are to account
for the existence of sin among men. For example, James i. 15, “When
lust (‘desire,' sºrtóvuo,) has conceived, it bringeth forth sin.” Here sin is
represented, not as the desire itself, but as consisting in the consent of the
will to gratify the desire.
James says again, that a man is tempted when he is drawn aside of his
own lusts, (27.1099.10.1 “ desires”) and enticed. That is, his lusts, or the
impulses of his sensibility, are his tempters. When he or his will is
overcome of these, he sins.
(v.) Paul and other inspired writers represent sin as consisting in a
carnal or fleshly mind, in the mind of the flesh, or in minding the flesh. It is
plain that by the term flesh they mean what we understand by the sensibility,
as distinguished from intellect, and that they represent sin as consisting in
obeying, minding the impulses of the sensibility. They represent the world,
and the flesh, and Satan, as the three great sources of temptation. It is plain
that the world and Satan tempt by appeals to the ſlesh, or to the sensi-
bility. Hence, the apostles have much to say of the necessity of the destruc-
tion of the flesh, of the members, of putting off the old man with his
deeds, &c. Now, it is worthy of remark, that all this painstaking, on the
part of inspiration, to intimate the source from whence our sin proceeds,
and to apprise us of the proper method of accounting for it, and also of
avoiding it, has probably been the occasion of leading certain philosophers
and theologians who have not carefully examined the whole subject, to take
a view of it which is directly opposed to the truth intended by the inspired
writers. Because so much is said of the influence of the flesh over the
mind, they have inferred that the mature and physical constitution of
man is itself sinful. But the representations of Scripture are, that the
body is the occasion of sin. The law in his members, that warred against
the law of his mind, of which Paul speaks, is manifestly the impulse of the
sensibility opposed to the law of the reason. This law, that is, the impulse
of his sensibility, brings him into captivity, that is, influences his will, in
spite of all his convictions to the contrary.
In short, the Bible rightly interpreted, everywhere assumes and implies,
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 397
that sin consists in selfishness. It is remarkable, if the Bible be read with
an eye to its teachings and assumptions on this point, to what an extent
this truth will appear.
(4.) How moral depravity is to be accounted for. nº
(i.) It consists, remember, in the committal of the will to the gratifica-
tion or indulgence of self—in the will's following, or submitting itself to
be govermed by, the impulses and desires of the sensibility, instead of sub-
mitting itself to the law of God revealed in the reason.
(ii) This definition of the thing shows how it is to be accounted for,
namely; the sensibility acts as a powerful impulse to the will, from the
moment of birth, and secures the consent and activity of the will to procure
its gratification, before the reason is at all developed. The will is thus
committed to the gratification of feeling and appetite, when first the idea of
moral obligation is developed. This committed state of the will is not
moral depravity, and has no moral character, until the idea of moral obliga-
tion is developed. The moment this idea is developed, this committal of
the will to self-indulgence must be abandoned, or it becomes selfishness,
or moral depravity. But, as the will is already in a state of committal, and
has to some extent already formed the habit of seeking to gratify feeling,
and as the idea of moral obligation is at first but feebly developed, unless
the Holy Spirit interferes to shed light on the soul, the will, as might be
expected, retains its hold on self-gratification. Here alone moral character
commences, and must commence. No one can conceive of its commencing
earlier. Let it be remembered, that selfishness consists in the Supreme
and ultimate choice, or in the preference of Self-gratification as an end, or
for its own sake, over all other interests. Now, as the choice of an end
implies and includes the choice of the means, selfishness, of course, causes
all that outward life and activity that makes up the entire history of
Sinners.
This selfish choice is the wicked heart—the propensity to sin—that
causes what is generally termed actual transgression. This sinful choice
is properly enough called indwelling sin. It is the latent, standing, eon-
trolling preference of the mind, and the cause of all the outward and active
life. It is not the choice of sin itself, distinctly conceived of, or chosen as
sin, but the choice of self-gratification, which choice is sin.
Again : It should be remembered, that the physical depravity of our
race has much to do with our moral depravity. A diseased physical system
renders the appetites, passions, tempers, and propensities more elamorous
and despotic in their demands, and of course constantly urging to selfish-
ness, confirms and strengthens it. It should be distinctly remembered that
physical depravity has no moral character in itself. But yet it is a source
of fierce temptation to selfishness. The human sensibility is, manifestly,
deeply physically depraved; and as sin, or moral depravity, consists in
committing the will to the gratification of the sensibility, its physical
depravity will mightily strengthen moral depravity. Moral depravity is
then universally owing to temptation. That is, the soul is tempted to self.
*A*)OTOGIFIL OTLVINCITSXS 869
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MORAL DEPRAVITY. 399
corruption, yea, the total corruption of the heart, without occasion for any
positive influences at all. And that it was thus in fact, that corruption of
nature came on Adam immediately on his fall, and comes on all his
posterity as sinning in him, and falling with him.
“The case with man was plainly this: When God made man at first he
implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind
which may be natural, being the principles of mere human nature; such as
self-love, with those natural appetites and passions which belong to the
nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honour, and pleasure,
were exercised. These, when alone, and left to themselves, are What the
scriptures sometimes call flesh. Besides these, there were superior prin-
ciples, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in
divine love ; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's
righteousness and true holiness; which are called in scripture the divine
nature. These principles may, in some sense, be called supernatural, being
(however concreated or connate, yet) such as are above those principles that
are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably
connected with, mere human nature: and being such as immediately
depend on man's union and communion with God, or divine communica-
tions and influences of God's Spirit, which though withdrawn, and man’s
nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature
still ; man's nature, as such, being entire without these divine principles,
which the scripture sometimes calls spirit, in contradistinction to flesh.
These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain
absolute dominion in the heart; the other to be wholly subordinate and
subservient. And while things continued thus, all was in excellent order,
peace, and beautiful harmony, and in a proper and perfect state. These
divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory
of man's nature. When man sinned and broke God's covenant, and fell
under his curse, these Superior principles left his heart; for, indeed, God
then left him, that communion with God on which these principles de-
pended, entirely ceased ; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook
the house, because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and ineon-
sistent with the constitution God had established, that he should still
maintain communion with man, and continue, by his friendly, gracious, vital
influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and
had incurred God's wrath and curse. Therefore, immediately the superior
divine principles wholly ceased ; so light ceases in a room when the candle
is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woeful cor-
ruption, and ruin; nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior principles
of self-love and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being
alone, and left to themselves, of course beeame reigning principles: having
no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became the absolute
masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a fatal
catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a
state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man immediately set up
400 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as Supreme,
and so they took the place of God. These inferior principles were like fire
in a house; which we say is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful
while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house,
Soon brings all to destruction. Man's love to his own honour, separate
interests, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto
love to God, and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels
him to pursue those objects, without regard to God's honour or law; because
there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence
of which, he seeks those objects as much when against God's honour and
law, as when agreeable to them. God still continuing strictly to require
supreme regard to himself, and forbidding all undue gratification of these
inferior passions; but only in perfect subordination to the ends, and agree-
able to the rules and limits which his holiness, honour, and law prescribe ;
hence, immediately arises enmity in the heart, now wholly under the power
of Self-love; and nothing but war ensues, in a course against God. As
when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pre-
tender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king
necessarily ensues. It were easy to show, how every lust, and depraved
disposition of man's heart, would naturally arise from this privative original,
if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to give an account, how total cor-
ruption of heart should follow on man's eating the forbidden fruit, though
that was but one act of sin, without God putting any evil into his heart, or
implanting any bad principle, or infusing any corrupt taint, and so becoming
the author of depravity. Only God's withdrawing, as it was highly proper
and necessary that he should, from rebel man, and his matural principles
being left to themselves, is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely
corrupt, and bent on sinning against God.
“And as Adam's nature became corrupt, without God’s implanting or
infusing of any evil thing into it; so does the mature of his posterity. God
dealing with Adam as the head of his posterity, as has been shown, and
treating them as one, he deals with his posterity as having all sinned in
him. And therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion, and his vital,
gracious influence from all the members, as they come into existence;
whereby they come into the world mere flesh, and entirely under the
government of natural and inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt,
as Adam did.”—Edwards' Works, pp. 532–538.
To sum up the truth upon this subject in few words, I would say —
1. Moral depravity in our first parents was induced by temptation
addressed to the umperverted susceptibilities of their mature. When these
susceptibilities became strongly excited, they overcame the will ; that is,
the human pair were over-persuaded, and fell under the temptation. This
has been repeatedly said, but meeds repetition in a summing up.
2. All moral depravity commences in substantially the same way.
Proof:—
(1) The impulses of the sensibility are developed, and gradually
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 401
commencing from the birth, and depending on physical developement and
birth.
(2.) The first acts of will are in obedience to these.
(3.) Self-gratification is the rule of action previous to the developement
of reason.
(4.) No resistance is offered to the will's indulgence of appetite, until a
habit of self-indulgence is formed.
(5.) When reason affirms moral obligation, it finds the will in a state of
habitual and constant committal to the impulses of the sensibility.
(6.) The demands of the sensibility have become more and more despotic
every hour of indulgence.
(7.) In this state of things, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, the idea of
moral obligation will be but dimly developed.
(8.) The will of course rejects the bidding of reason, and cleaves to self-
indulgence.
(9.) This is the settling of a fundamental question. It is deciding in
favour of appetite, against the claims of conscience and of God.
(10.) Light once rejected, can be afterwards more easily resisted, until
it is nearly excluded altogether.
(11.) Selfishness confirms, and strengthens, and perpetuates itself by a
natural process. It grows with the sinner's growth, and strengthens with
his strength; and will do so for ever, unless overcome by the Holy Spirit
through the truth.
REMARKS.
1. Adam, being the matural head of the race, would naturally, by the
wisest constitution of things, greatly affect for good or evil his whole pos-
terity.
2. His sim in many ways exposed his posterity to aggravated temptation.
Not only the physical constitution of all men, but all the influences under
which they first form their moral character, are widely different from what
they would have been, if sin had never been introduced.
3. When selfishness is understood to be the whole of moral depravity, its
quo modo, or in what way it comes to exist, is manifest. Clear concep-
tions of the thing will instantly reveal the occasion and manner.
4. The only difficulty in accounting for it, has been the false assumption,
that there must be, and is, something lying back of the free actions of the
will, which sustains to those actions the relation of a cause, that is itself sinful.
5. If holy Adam, and holy angels, could fall under temptations addressed
to their undepraved sensibility, how absurd it is to conclude, that sin in those
who are born with a physically depraved constitution, cannot be accounted
for, without ascribing it to original sin, or to a mature that is in itself sinful.
6. Without divine illumination, the moral character will of course be
formed under the influence of the flesh. That is, the lower propensities
will of course influence the will, unless the reason be developed by the
Holy Spirit, as was said by President Edwards, in the extract just quoted,
D D
402 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
7. The dogma of constitutional moral depravity, is a part and parcel o'
the doctrine of a necessitated will. It is a branch of a grossly false and
heathemish philosophy. How infinitely absurd, dangerous, and unjust, then,
to embody it in a standard of Christian doctrine, to give it the place of an
indispensable article of faith, and denounce all who will not swallow its
absurdities, as heretics. O, shame! - ...
8. We are unable to say precisely at what age infants become moral
agents, and of course how early they become sinners. Doubtless there is
much difference among children in this respect. Reason is developed in
One earlier than in another, according to the constitution and circumstances.
A thorough consideration of the subject, will doubtless lead to the con-
viction, that children become moral agents much earlier than is generally
supposed. The conditions of moral agency are, as has been repeatedly
said in former lectures, the possession of the powers of moral agency,
together with the developement of the ideas of the good or valuable, of
moral obligation or oughtness—of right and wrong—of praise and blame-
worthiness. I have endeavoured to show, in former lectures, that mental
Satisfaction, blessedness or happiness, is the ultimate good. Satisfaction
arising from the gratification of the appetites, is one of the earliest ex-
periences of human beings. This no doubt suggests or developes, at a
very early period, the idea of the good or the valuable. The idea is doubt-
less developed, long before the word that expresses it is understood. The
child knows that happiness is good, and seeks it in the form of self.
gratification, long before the terms that designate this state of mind are
at all understood. It knows that its own enjoyment is worth seeking, and
doubtless very early has the idea, that the enjoyment of others is worth
seeking, and affirms to itself, not in words, but in idea, that it ought to
please its parents and those around it. It knows, in fact, though language
is as yet unknown, that it loves to be gratified, and to be happy, that it
loves and seeks enjoyment for itself, and doubtless has the idea that it
ought not to displease and distress those around it, but that it ought to
endeavour to please and gratify them. This is probably among the first
ideas, if not the very first idea, of the pure reason that is developed, that is,
the idea of the good, the valuable, the desirable; and the next must be
that of oughtness, or of moral obligation, or of right and wrong, &c. I say
again, these ideas are, and must be developed, before the signs or words
that express them are at all understood, and the words would never be
understood except the idea were first developed. We always find, at
the earliest period at which children can understand words, that they
have the idea of obligation, of right and wrong. As soon as these words
are understood by them, they recognize them as expressing ideas already
in their own minds, and which ideas they have had further back than they
can remember. Some, and indeed most persons, seem to have the idea,
that children affirm themselves to be under moral obligation, before they
have the idea of the good; that they affirm their obligation to obey their
parents before they know, or have the idea of the good or of the valuable.
MORAL DEPRAVITY. 403
But this is, and must be a mistake. They may and do affirm obligation to
obey their parents, before they can express in language, and before they
would understand, a statement of the grounds of their obligation. The
idea, however, they have, and must have, or they could not affirm obliga-
tion. It is agreed, and cannot be denied, that moral obligation respects
acts of will, and not strictly outward action. It is agreed, and cannot
be denied, that obligation respects intelligent actions of will. It is also
agreed, and cannot be denied, that all intelligent acts of will, and Such as
those to which moral obligation belongs, must respect ends or means. If,
therefore, one has any true idea of moral obligation, it must respect acts of
will or intentions. It must respect the choice of an end, or of means. If
it respect the choice of a means, the idea of the end must exist. It cannot
justly affirm obligation of anything but choice or intention, for, as a matter
of fact, obligation belongs to nothing else. The fact is, the child knows
that it ought to please its parent, and seek to make its parent happy. This
it knows, that it ought to intend, long before it knows what the word
intention means. Upon this assumption it bases all its affirmations in
respect to its obligation to obey its parents and others that are around it.
It regards its own satisfaction or enjoyment as a good, and seeks it, before
it knows what the words mean that express this state of mind. It also
knows, that the enjoyment of others is a good, and affirms not in Word, but
in idea, that it ought to seek the enjoyment of all. This idea is the basis
upon which all affirmations of obligation rest, and if it be truly an idea of
real obligation, it is impossible that the idea of the good, or of the value of
enjoyment, should not be its base. To assert the contrary, is to overlook
the admitted fact, that moral obligation must respect choice, and the choice
of an end; that it must respect intention. It is absurd to suppose, that a
being can truly affirm moral obligation, in respect to outward action before
he has the idea of the obligation to will, or intend, an end. The idea of an
end may not be developed in words, that is, the word expressive of the idea
may not be understood, but the idea must be in the mind, in a state of
developement, or there can be no affirmation of obligation. The fact is,
there is a logical connection between the idea of the good, and the idea of
moral obligation, of right and wrong, of praise and blameworthiness. These
latter ideas cannot exist without the first, and the existence of that neces-
sitates the developement of these. These are first truths of reason. In
other words, these ideas are universally and necessarily developed in the
minds of moral agents, and indeed their developement is the condition of
moral agency. Most of the first truths are developed in idea, long before
the language in which they are expressed is or can be understood. Thus
the ideas of space, of time, of causality, of liberty of will, or ability, of the
good, of oughtness, or obligation of right and wrong, of praise or blame-
Worthiness, and many others, are developed before the meaning of those
Words is at all understood. Human beings come gradually to understand
the words or signs that represent their ideas, and afterwards, so often
express their ideas in words, that they finally get the impression that they
D D 2
404 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
received the idea from the word, whereas, in every instance, in respect
to the first truths of reason, they had the idea long before they understood,
or perhaps ever heard, the word that represents it, and was coined to ex-
press it.
9. Those persons who maintain the sinfulness of the constitutional appe-
tites, must of course deny, that men can ever be entirely sanctified in this
life, and must maintain, as they do, that death must complete the work of
Sanctification.
10. False motions of moral depravity lie at the foundation of all the
objections I have seen to the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life.
11. A diseased nervous system is a fierce temptation. Some forms of
disease expose the soul to much trial. Dyspeptic and nervous persons need
superabounding grace.
12. Why sin is so natural to mankind. Not because their nature is
itself sinful, but because the appetites and passions tend so strongly to
self-indulgence. These are temptations to sin, but sin itself consists not
in these appetites and propensities, but in the voluntary committal of the
will to their indulgence. This committal of the will is selfishness, and
when the will is once given up to sin, it is very matural to sin. The will
once committed to self-indulgence as its end, selfish actions are in a sense
Spontaneous.
13. The doctrine of original sin, as held by its advocates, must essen-
tially modify the whole system of practical theology. This will be seen
as we proceed in our investigations.
14. The constitution of a moral being as a whole, when all the powers
are developed, does not tend to sin, but strongly in an opposite direction;
as is manifest from the fact that when reason is thoroughly developed by
the Holy Spirit, it is more than a match for the sensibility, and turns the
heart to God.
15. The difficulty is, that the sensibility gets the start of reason, and
engages the attention in devising means of self-gratification, and thus
retards, and in a great measure prevents, the developement of the ideas of
the reason which were designed to control the will.
16. It is this morbid developement that the Holy Spirit is given to
rectify, by so forcing truth upon the attention, as to secure the develope-
ment of the reason. By doing this, he brings the will under the influence
of truth. Our senses reveal to us the objects correlated to our animal
nature and propensities. The Holy Spirit reveals God and the spiritual
world, and all that class of objects that are correlated to our higher nature,
So as to give reason the control of the will. This is regeneration and sanc-
tification, as we shall see in its proper place.
REGENERATION. 405
LECTURE XLII.
REGENERATION.
In the examination of this subject I will—
I. POINT OUT THE COMMON DISTINCTION BETWEEN REGENERATION AND
CONVERSION.
II. STATE THE ASSIGNED REASONS FOR THIS DISTINCTION.
III. STATE OBJECTIONS TO THIS DISTINCTION.
IV. SHOW WHAT REGENERATION IS NOT.
V. WHAT IT IS.
VI. ITS UNIVERSAI, NECESSITY.
VII. AGENCIEs EMPLOYED IN IT.
VIII. INSTRUMENTALITIES EMPIOYED IN IT.
IX. THAT IN REGENERATION THE SUBJECT IS BOTH ACTIVE AND PASSIVE.
X. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN REGENERATION.
XI. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF REGENERATION.
XII. EvilDENCES OF REGENERATION.
I. I am to point out the common distinction between regeneration and
conversion.
1. Regeneration is the term used by some theologians to express the
divine agency in changing the heart.
2. With them regeneration does not include and imply the activity of
the subject, but rather excludes it. These theologians, as will be seen in
its place, hold that a change of heart is first effected by the Holy Spirit
while the subject is passive, which change lays a foundation for the exercise,
by the subject, of repentance, faith, and love.
3. The term conversion with them expresses the activity and turning of
the subject, after regeneration is effected by the Holy Spirit. Conversion
with them does not include or imply the agency of the Holy Spirit, but
expresses only the activity of the subject. With them the Holy Spirit first
regenerates or changes the heart, after which the sinner turns or converts
himself. So that God and the subject work each in turn. God first
changes the heart, and as a consequence, the subject afterwards converts
himself or turns to God. Thus the subject is passive in regeneration, but
active in conversion.
When we come to the examination of the philosophical theories of rege-
neration, we shall see that the views of these theologians respecting regene-
ration result maturally and necessarily from their holding the dogma of
constitutional moral depravity, which we have recently examined. Until
their views on that subject are corrected, no change can be expected in
their views of this subject. I said in a concluding remark, when upon the
subject of moral depravity, that erroneous views upon that subject must
necessarily materially affect and modify one's views upon most of the
questions in practical theology. Let us bear this remark in mind as we
4()6 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
proceed, not only in the discussions immediately before us, but also in all
our future investigations, that we may duly appreciate the importance of
clear and correct views on the subject of practical theology.
II. I am to state the assigned reasons for this distinction.
1. The original term plainly expresses and implies other than the agency
of the subject.
2. We need and must adopt a term that will express the Divine agency.
3. Regeneration is expressly ascribed to the Holy Spirit.
4. Conversion, as it implies and expresses the activity and turning of
the subject, does not include and imply any Divine agency, and therefore
does not imply or express what is intended by regeneration.
5. As two agencies are actually employed in the regeneration and con-
version of a sinner, it is necessary to adopt terms that will clearly teach
this fact, and clearly distinguish between the agency of God and of the
Creature.
6. The terms regeneration and conversion aptly express this distinction,
and therefore should be theologically employed.
III. I am to state the objections to this distinction.
1. The original term yayyoo, gemmao, with its derivatives, may be ren-
dered, (1.) To beget. (2.) To bear or bring forth. (3.) To be begotten.
(4.) To be born, or brought forth.
2. Regeneration is in the Bible the same as the new birth.
3. To be born again is the same thing in the Bible use of the term, as to
have a new heart, to be a new creature, to pass from death unto life. In
other words, to be born again is to have a new moral character, to become
holy. To regenerate is to make holy. To be born of God, no doubt,
expresses and includes the Divine agency, but it also includes and expresses
that which the Divine agency is employed in effecting, namely, making the
sinner holy. Certainly, a sinner is not regenerated whose moral character
is unchanged. If he were, how could it be truly said, that whosoever is
born of God overcometh the world, doth not commit sin, cannot sim, &c. 2
If regeneration does not imply and include a change of moral character in
the subject, how can regeneration be made the condition of salvation ?
The fact is, the term regeneration, or the being born of God, is designed to
express primarily and principally the thing dome, that is, the making of a
sinner holy, and expresses also the fact, that God's agency induces the
change. Throw out the idea of what is dome, that is, the change of moral
character in the subject, and he would not be born again, he would not be
regenerated, and it could not be truly said, in such a case, that God had
regenerated him.
It has been objected, that the term really means and expresses only the
Divine agency; and only by way of implication, embraces the idea of a
change of moral character and of course of activity in the subject. To
this I reply—
REGENERATION. 407
(1.) That if it really expresses only the Divine agency, it leaves out of
view the thing effected by Divine agency.
(2.) That it really and fully expresses not only the Divine agency, but
also that which this agency accomplishes.
(3,) The thing which the agency of God brings about, is a new or
spiritual birth, a resurrection from spiritual death, the inducing of a new
and holy life. The thing dome is the prominent idea expressed or intended
by the term.
(4.) The thing done implies the turning or activity of the subject. It
is nonsense to affirm that his moral character is changed without any
activity or agency of his own. Passive holiness is impossible. Holiness is
obedience to the law of God, the law of love, and of course consists in the
activity of the creature.
(5.) We have said that regeneration is synonymous in the Bible with a
new heart. But sinners are required to make to themselves a new heart,
which they could not do, if they were not active in this change. If the
work is a work of God, in such a sense, that He must first regenerate the
heart or soul before the agency of the sinner begins, it were absurd and
unjust to require him to make to himself a new heart, until he is first
regenerated.
Regeneration is ascribed to man in the gospel, which it could not be, if
the term were designed to express only the agency of the Holy Spirit.
“For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not
many fathers; for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel.”
—1 Cor. iv. 15.
(6.) Conversion is spoken of in the Bible as the work of another than the
subject of it, and cannot therefore have been designed to express only the
activity of the subject of it. (1.) It is ascribed to the word of God.—
“The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul: the testimony of
the Lord is sure, making wise the simple.”—Ps. Nix. 7. (2.) To mam.
“Brethren, if any of you do err from the truth, and one convert him ; let
him know, that he which converteth the sinner from the error of his way
shall save a soul from death, and shall hide a multitude of sins.”—James
v. 19, 20.
(7.) Both conversion and regeneration are sometimes in the Bible
ascribed to God, sometimes to mam, and sometimes to the subject; which
shows clearly that the distinction under examination is arbitrary and theo-
logical, rather than biblical.
(8.) The fact is, that both terms imply the simultaneous exercise of both
human and Divine agency. The fact that a new heart is the thing done,
demonstrates the activity of the subject; and the word regeneration, or the
expression “born of the Holy Spirit,” asserts the Divine agency. The
same is true of conversion, or the turning the sinner to God. God is said
to turn him, and he is said to turn himself. God draws him, and he fol-
lows. In both alike God and man are both active, and their activity is
simultaneous. God works or draws, and the sinner yields or turns Ol'
4.08 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
which is the same thing, changes his heart, or, in other words, is born again.
The sinner is dead in trespasses and sins. God calls on him, “Awake
thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee
light.” Eph. V. 14. God calls; the sinner hears and answers, Here am I.
God says, Arise from the dead. The sinner puts forth his activity, and
God draws him into life; or rather, God draws, and the sinner comes forth
to life.
9. The distinction set up is not only not recognized in the Bible, but is
plaimly of most injurious tendency, for two reasons:—
(i.) It assumes and inculcates a false philosophy of depravity and
regeneration.
(ii.) It leads the sinner to wait to be regenerated, before he repents or
turns to God. It is of most fatal tendency to represent the sinner as under
a necessity of Waiting to be passively regenerated, before he gives himself
to God.
As the distinction is not only arbitrary, but anti-scriptural and injurious,
and inasmuch as it is founded in, aud is designed to teach, a philosophy
false and permicious on the subject of depravity and regeneration, I shall
drop and discard the distinction; and in our investigations henceforth, let
it be understood, that I use regeneration and conversion as synonymous
terms.
IV. I am to show what regeneration is not.
It is not a change in the substance of soul or body. If it were, sinners
could not be required to effect it. Such a change would not constitute a
change of moral character. No such change is needed, as the sinner has
all the faculties and natural attributes requisite to render perfect obedience
to God. All he needs is to be induced to use these powers and attributes
as he ought. The words conversion and regeneration do not imply any
change of substance, but only a change of moral state or of moral character.
The terms are not used to express a physical, but a moral change. Rege-
neration does not express or imply the creation of any new faculties or
attributes of mature, nor any change whatever in the constitution of body
or mind. I shall remark further upon this point when we come to the
examination of the philosophical theories of regeneration before alluded to.
V. What regeneration is.
*
It has been said that regeneration and a change of heart are identical.
It is important to inquire into the scriptural use of the term heart. The
term, like most others, is used in the Bible in various senses. The
heart is often spoken of in the Bible, not only as possessing moral
character, but as being the source of moral action, or as the fountain from
which good and evil actions flow, and of course as constituting the fountain
of holiness or of sin, or, in other words still, as comprehending, strictly
speaking, the whole of moral character. “But those things which proceed
out of the mouth come forth from the heart ; and they defile the man.
REGENERATION. 409
For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, forni-
cations, thefts, false witness, blasphemies.”—Matt. xv. 18, 19. “O
generation of vipers, how can ye, being evil, speak good things 2 for out of
the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of the good
treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things : and an evil man out of
the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things.”—Matt. xii. 34, 35. When
the heart is thus represented as possessing moral character, and as the
fountain of good and evil, it cannot mean,—
1. The bodily organ that propels the blood.
2. It cannot mean the substance of the Soul or mind itself: substance
cannot in itself possess moral character.
3. It is not any faculty or natural attribute.
4. It cannot consist in any constitutional taste, relish, or appetite, for
these cannot in themselves have moral character.
5. It is not the sensibility or feeling faculty of the mind : for we have
seen, that moral character cannot be predicated of it. It is true, and let
it be understood, that the term heart is used in the Bible in these senses,
but mot when the heart is spoken of as the fountain of moral action. When
the heart is represented as possessing moral character, the word cannot be
meant to designate any involuntary state of mind. For neither the sub-
stance of Soul or body, nor any involuntary state of mind can, by any
possibility, possess moral character in itself. The very idea of moral
character implies, and suggests the idea of, a free action or intention. To
deny this, were to deny a first truth.
6. The term heart, when applied to mind, is figurative, and means
something in the mind that has some point of resemblance to the bodily
organ of that name, and a consideration of the function of the bodily organ
will suggest the true idea of the heart of the mind. The heart of the body
propels the vital current, and sustains organic life. It is the fountain from
which the vital fluid flows, from which either life or death may flow,
according to the state of the blood. The mind as well as the body has a
heart which, as we have seen, is represented as a fountain, or as an efficient
propelling influence, out of which flows good or evil, according as the heart
is good or evil. This heart is represented, not only as the source or foun-
tain of good and evil, but as being either good or evil in itself.; as con-
stituting the character of man, and not merely as being capable of moral
character.
It is also represented as something over which we have control, for which
we are responsible, and which, in case it is wicked, we are bound to change
on pain of death. Again: the heart, in the sense in which we are con-
sidering it, is that, the radical change of which constitutes a radical change
of moral character. This is plaim from Matthew xii. 34, 35, and xv. 18,
19, already considered.
7. Our own consciousness, then, must inform us that the heart of the
mind that possesses these characteristics, can be nothing else than the
supreme ultimate intention of the soul. Regeneration is represented in
410 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the Bible as constituting a radical change of character, as the resurrection
from a death in sin, as the beginning of a new and Spiritual life, as consti-
tuting a new creature, as a new creation, not a physical, but a moral or
spiritual creation, as conversion, or turning to God, as giving God the heart,
as loving God with all our heart, and our neighbour as ourselves. Now we
have seen abundantly, that moral character belongs to, or is an attribute of,
the ultimate choice or intention of the soul.
Regeneration them is a radical change of the ultimate intention, and, of
course, of the end or object of life. We have seen, that the choice of an
end is efficient in producing executive volitions, or the use of means to
obtain its end. A Selfish ultimate choice is, therefore, a wicked heart, out
of which flows every evil; and a benevolent ultimate choice is a good heart,
out of which flows every good and commendable deed.
Regeneration, to have the characteristics ascribed to it in the Bible, must
consist in a change in the attitude of the will, or a change in its ultimate
choice, intention, or preference ; a change from selfishness to benevolence;
from choosing self-gratification as the Supreme and ultimate end of life to
the supreme and ultimate choice of the highest well-being of God and of
the universe ; from a state of entire consecration to self-interest, self.
indulgence, Self-gratification for its own sake or as an end, and as the
Supreme end of life, to a state of entire consecration to God, and to the
interests of his kingdom as the Supreme and ultimate end of life.
VI. The universal necessity of regeneration.
1. The necessity of regeneration as a condition of salvation must be
co-extensive with moral depravity. This has been shown to be universal
among the unregenerate moral agents of our race. It surely is impossible,
that a world or a universe of unholy or selfish beings should be happy. It
is impossible that heaven should be made up of selfish beings. It is
intuitively certain, that without benevolence or holiness no moral being
can be ultimately happy. Without regeneration, a selfish soul can by 110
possibility be fitted either for the employments, or for the enjoyments, of
heavcn.
2. The scriptures expressly teach the universal necessity of regenera-
tion. “Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee,
Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.”—John
iii. 3. “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor
uncircumcision, but a new creature."—Gal. vi. 15.
VII. Agencies employed in regeneration.
1. The scriptures often ascribe regeneration to the Spirit of God.
“Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of
water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That
which born of the flesh is flesh ; and that which is born of the Spirit is
spirit.”—John iii. 5, 6. “ Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will
of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.”—John i. 15.
REGENERATION. 411
2. We have seen that the subject is active in regeneration, that regene-
ration consists in the sinner changing his ultimate choice, intention, pre-
ference ; or in changing from selfishness to love or benevolence; or, in
other words, in turning from the supreme choice of self-gratification, to the
supreme love of God and the equal love of his neighbour. Of course the
subject of regeneration must be an agent in the work.
3. There are generally other agents, one or more human beings con-
cerned in persuading the sinner to turn. The Bible recognizes both the
subject and the preacher as agents in the work. Thus Paul says: “I
have begotten you through the gospel.” Here the same word is used
which is used in another case, where regeneration is ascribed to God.
Again : an apostle says, “Ye have purified your souls by obeying the
truth.” Here the work is ascribed to the subject. There are then always
two, and generally more than two agents employed in effecting the work.
Several theologians have held that regeneration is the work of the Holy
Spirit alone. In proof of this they cite those passages that ascribe it to
God. But I might just as lawfully insist that it is the work of man alone,
and quote those passages that ascribe it to man, to substantiate my position.
Or I might assert that it is alone the work of the subject, and in proof of
this position quote those passages that ascribe it to the subject. Or again,
I might assert that it is effected by the truth alone, and quote such pas-
sages as the following to substantiate my position : “Of his own will begat
He us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of his
creatures.”—James i. 18. “Being born again, not of corruptible seed,
but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for
ever.”—l Peter i. 23. The fact is, when Dr. Woods and others insist that
regeneration is the work, or a work of God, they tell the truth, but not the
whole truth. For it is also the work of man and of the subject. Their
course is precisely like that of the Unitarian, who when he would prove
that Christ is not God, merely proves that he was a man. Now we admit
that he was a man, but we hold that he is more, that he is also God. Just
so We hold that God is active in promoting regeneration, and we hold also
that the subject always and necessarily is active in the work, and that
generally some other human agency is employed in the work, in presenting
and urging the claims of God.
It has been common to regard the third person as a mere instrument in
the work. But the fact is, he is a Willing, designing, responsible agent, as
really so as God or the subject is.
If it be inquired how the Bible ean consistently ascribe regeneration at one
time to God, at another to the subject, at another to the truth, at another
to a third person; the answer is to be sought in the nature of the work. The
Work accomplished is a change of choice, in respect to an end or the end of
life. The sinner whose choice is changed, must of course act. The end to
to be chosen must be clearly and forcibly presented : this is the work of the
third person, and of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit takes of the things of
Christ and shows them to the soul. The truth is employed, or it is truth
4 12 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
which must necessarily be employed, as an instrument to induce a change
of choice. See this illustrated in sermons on Important Subjects, Ser-
mon I. On Regeneration.
VIII. Instrumentalities employed in the work.
1. Truth. This must, from the nature of regeneration, be employed in
effecting it, for regeneration is nothing else than the will being duly influ-
emced by truth.
2. There may be, and often are, many providences concerned in enlight-
eming the mind, and in inducing regeneration. These are instrumentalities.
They are means or instruments of presenting the truth. Mercies, judg-
ments, men, measures, and in short all those things that conduce to
enlightening the mind, are instrumentalities employed in effecting it.
Those who hold to physical or constitutional moral depravity must hold,
of course, to constitutional regeneration; and, of course, consistency compels
them to maintain that there is but one agent employed in regeneration,
and that is the Holy Spirit, and that no instrument whatever is employed,
because the work is, according to them, an act of creative power ; that the
very nature is changed, and of course no instrument can be employed,
any more than in the creation of the world. These theologians have
affirmed, over and over again, that regeneration is a miracle ; that there is
no tendency whatever in the gospel, however presented, and whether
presented by God or man, to regenerate the heart. Dr. Griffin, in his
Park Street Lectures, maintains that the gospel, in its natural and neces
Sary tendency, creates and perpetuates only opposition to, and hatred of
God, until the heart is changed by the Holy Spirit. He understands the
carnal mind to be not a voluntary state, not a minding of the flesh, but the
very nature and constitution of the mind; and that enmity against God is a
part, attribute, or appetite of the nature itself. Consequently, he must
deny the adaptability of the gospel to regenerate the soul. It has been
proclaimed by this class of theologians, times without number, that there is
no philosophical connexion between the preaching of the gospel and the
regeneration of sinners, no adaptedness in the gospel to produce that
result; but, on the contrary, that it is adapted to produce an opposite
result. The favourite illustrations of their views have been Ezekiel’s
prophesying over the dry bones, and Christ's restoring sight to the blind
man by putting clay on his eyes. Ezekiel's prophesying over the dry
bones had no tendency to quicken them, they say. And the clay used by
the Saviour was calculated rather to destroy than to restore sight. This
shows how easy it is for men to adopt a permicious and absurd philosophy,
and then find, or think they find, it supported by the Bible, What must
be the effect of inculcating the dogma, that the gospel has nothing to do
with regenerating the sinner 2 Instead of telling him that regeneration is
mothing else than his embracing the gospel, to tell him that he must wait,
and first have his constitution recreated before he can possibly do anything
but oppose God? This is to tell him the greatest and most abominable
REGENERATION. 413
and ruinous of falsehoods. It is to mock his intelligence. What! call on
him, on pain of eternal death, to believe; to embrace the gospel; to love
God with all his heart, and at the same time represent him as entirely
helpless, and constitutionally the enemy of God and of the gospel, and as
being under the necessity of waiting for God to regenerate his nature,
before it is possible for him to do otherwise than to hate God with all his
heart 2
IX. In regeneration the subject is both passive and active.
1. That he is active is plain from what has been said, and from the very
nature of the change.
2. That he is, at the same time, passive, is plain from the fact that he
acts only when and as he is acted upon. That is, he is passive in the
perception of the truth presented by the Holy Spirit. I know that this
perception is no part of regeneration. But it is simultaneous with regene-
ration. It induces regeneration. It is the condition and the occasion of
regeneration. Therefore the subject of regeneration must be a passive
recipient or percipient of the truth presented by the Holy Spirit, at the
moment, and during the act of regeneration. The Spirit acts upon him
through or by the truth : thus far he is passive. He closes with the
truth: thus far he is active. What a mistake those theologians have
fallen into who represent the subject as altogether passive in regeneration
This rids the simmer at once of the conviction of any duty or responsibility
about it. It is wonderful that such an absurdity should have been so long
maintained in the church. But while it is maintained, it is no wonder
that sinners are not converted to God. While the sinner believes this, it
is impossible, if he has it in mind, that he should be regenerated. He
stands and waits for God to do what God requires him to do, and which no
one can do for him. Neither God, nor any other being, can regenerate
him, if he will not turn. If he will not change his choice, it is impossible
that it should be changed. Sinners who have been taught thus, and have
believed what they have been taught, would never have been regenerated
had not the Holy Spirit drawn off their attention from this error, and ere
they were aware, induced them to close in with the offer of life.
X. What is implied in regeneration.
1. The nature of the change shows that it must be instantaneous. It is
a change of choice, or of intention. This must be instantaneous. The
preparatory Work of conviction and enlightening the mind may have been
gradual and progressive. But when regeneration occurs, it must be
instantaneous.
8. It implies an entire present change of moral character, that is, a
change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness. We have seen that it
consists in a change from selfishness to benevolence. We have also seen
that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist in the same mind; that
selfishness is a state of supreme and entire consecration to self; that
414 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
benevolence is a state of entire and supreme consecration to God and the
good of the universe. Regeneration, them, surely implies an entire change
of moral character. º
Again: the Bible represents regeneration as a dying to sin and becoming
alive to God. Death in sin is total depravity. This is generally admitted.
Death to sin and becoming alive to God, must imply entire present holiness.
3. The scriptures represent regeneration as the condition of Salvation in
such a sense, that if the subject should die immediately after regeneration,
and without any further change, he would go immediately to heaven.
Again : the scripture requires only perseverance in the first love, as the
condition of salvation, in case the regenerate soul should live long in the
world subsequently to regeneration.
4. When the scriptures require us to grow in grace, and in the know-
ledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, this does not imply that there is yet sin
remaining in the regenerate heart which we are required to put away only
by degrees. But the spirit of the requirement must be, that we should
acquire as much knowledge as we can of our moral relations, and continue
to conform to all truth as fast as we know it. This, and nothing else, is
implied in abiding in our first love, or abiding in Christ, living and walking
in the Spirit, &c.
LECTURE XLIII.
REGENERATION.
XI. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF REGENERATION.
Different classes of theologians have held very different theories in
regard to the philosophy of regeneration, in accordance with their views
of moral depravity, of intellectual philosophy, moral government, and of
the freedom of the human will. In discussing this subject I will—
1. State the different theories of regeneration that have been held by
different classes of theologians, as I understand them ; and—
2. Eacamine them in their order.
1. The principal theories that have been advocated, so far as my know
ledge extends, are the following:–
(l.) The taste scheme. (2.) The divine efficiency scheme. (3.) The
Susceptibility Scheme. (4.) The divine moral suasion scheme.
2. I will eacamine them in their order.
(1.) The taste scheme.
(i.) This theory is based upon that view of mental philosophy which
regards the mental heart as identical with the sensibility. Moral depravity,
according to this School, consists in a constitutional relish, taste, or craving
for sin. They hold the doctrine of original sim—of a sinful mature or con-
REGENERATION. 415
stitution, as was shown in my lectures on moral depravity. The heart of
the mind, in the estimation of this school, is not identical with choice or
intention. They hold that it does not consist in any voluntary state of
mind, but that it lies back of, and controls voluntary action, or the actions
of the will. The wicked heart, according to them, consists in an appetency
or constitutional taste for sin, and with them, the appetites, passions, and
propensities of human nature in its fallen state, are in themselves sinful.
They often illustrate their ideas of the sinful taste, craving, or appetite for
sin, by reference to the craving of carnivorous animals for flesh. Of
COurSe,
(ii) A change of heart, in the view of this philosophy, must consist in a
change of constitution. It must be a physical change, and wrought by a
physical, as distinguished from a moral agency. It is a change wrought by
the direct and physical power of the Holy Spirit in the constitution of the
soul, changing its susceptibilities, implanting or creating a new taste,
relish, appetite, craving for, or love of, holiness. It is, as they express it,
the implantation of a new principle of holiness. It is described as a
creation of a new taste or principle, as an infusion of a holy principle, &c.
This scheme, of course, holds and teaches that, in regeneration, the subject
is entirely passive. With this school, regeneration is exclusively the work
of the Holy Spirit, the subject having mo agency in it. It is an operation
performed upon him, may be, while he is asleep, or in a fit of derangement,
while he is entirely passive, or perhaps when at the moment he is
engaged in flagrant rebellion against God. The agency by which this
work is wrought, according to them, is sovereign, irresistible, and creative.
They hold that there are of course no means of regeneration, as it is a
direct act of creation. They hold the distinction already referred to and
examined, between regeneration and conversion ; that when the Holy Spirit
has performed the sovereign operation, and implanted the new principle,
then the subject is active in conversion, or in turning to God.
They hold that the soul, in its very nature, is enmity against God; that
therefore the gospel has no tendency to regenerate or convert the soul to
God; but, on the contrary, that previous to regeneration by the Sovereign
and physical agency of the Holy Spirit, every exhibition of God made in
the gospel, tends only to inflame and provoke this constitutional enmity.
They hold, that when the sinful taste, relish, or craving for sin is weak-
ened, for they deny that it is ever wholly destroyed in this life, or while
the soul continues connected with the body, and a holy taste, relish, or
craving is implanted or infused by the Holy Spirit into the constitution of
the soul, them, and not till then, the gospel has a tendency to turn or
convert the sinner from the error of his ways.
As I have said, their philosophy of moral depravity is the basis of their
philosophy of regeneration. It assumes the dogma of original sin, as
taught in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, and attempts to harmonize
the philosophy of regeneration with that philosophy of sin, or moral
depravity.
X*)OTOGIHL OIJ.VINGILSXS 91+
quoroug uu ‘jo no Buſiquo º Kuo staoung. To ‘uodn pasuq SI outoſł0s SHL
'Klootſ to auauos Kouoſogo ouTAIp all L (8)
—‘qxau Iapistloo Sn 1971
‘Ā’inuopſ tutosted Kousap plmoa, uometouañol Ātoolſ, SIII, uodn (Pº)
‘equg oup qiw iux 18 Audosoſºlid e Jo uondulussu ou? sº II (PS)
'onnaddu Jo (Ioneognº.13 aun Io ‘ttoſ, bog
-Inu.[8][as Kuo stºp su'amiya ou ssoullou uſ ooutºtoxosted slopua. "I (’98)
'uonºloueijo.1
uſ popuupluſ ‘annaddu tauopmnsuoo u Jo uonuountiš on Auo out 5uſAI
pite sostolaxa Kou asuo stun (IT Katſuissoduſ Igumaeu e St. oot tº trio'ſ
5ullſey pub ‘Ātussooau KIIbolskild su Osſu origie Masted put ‘otojoq SEA tºſs sº
Asmſ ‘Ālussooot! Kiluois&qd uomutatioão.1 tongu ssaulſon slopua. "I (X)
‘poulture s sºul, alobutu u se lionuloueño.1 sluoso Idol ºf (x)
'antlaueña.IUIn
st lautus Kut, youp “louſ aun Toy aſqisuodso.1 st outoſe pop qtl11 TuopſAe-J[0s Sº
q 'squoso Idol Ātoon, stun Toru A touttulu on up poſsIIdutoooo si pub ‘Soulobo',
Audosolſ|{d stun ºutlaw uſ sistsuoo aſ J. : h uſ Koueñu ou sell pub exissed
si taulus aun JI pop (todu Kouaoua:3atun go outeſq oth SAotuſ, 31 (HIA)
gT AI too [-,-Iodsoã aun
ušnout, no.' uomoñaq oAUTI I snsaſ sittiO tu Joj : stounty Kubu not oA oxbû
19.8 “slutto UI SIO)on.Insuſ putsnoun uo, oxbû oA (3moun 101, Jaujo U089
antiatioja. Itou qutu ‘uonbyuosoidal aſqig aun slopeanuoo OSIB 11 (IIA)
...gap as IIIA KuA Joj ‘nuds Aou e pub quuou Aati e no& ox{BIN, ‘stattuſsoluox13
ATutuolos os pubtutuoo aq, Jo aopismſ aq, UniM atto1stSuoout OSIU S II (IA)
'uonºſauðja. Jo put uſs
Jo unoq (Ionjugap aſqiq aq, UniM quonsisuoouſ ‘Uloos oatuſ ow su ‘sſ I ('A)
‘(Ionunduan Áluo sº U0IIIA quun uſ “Jouleåonſe
hou Ji ‘ĀInsoul 5unsisttoo su us squosaldo.1 ºr ‘Āb N us unIA ‘aoua:3
-Impuſ [m]Agſun on Utomºnd (uo) to onnaddu spumoſuoo Kudosol IIId SIULL ('AI)
‘oouašumptu [njavulun on quasuoo slºw att, UU Aud ‘aqſheddie
aun up soil taxaul ULIS aul, ºuts SI IIIA Jo Job 10 GoIOUIS SIU[] ‘s]sa.Iajuſ JouëIII
on annaddu to 31st, Jo uongognº.13 oun stagatd IIIA oun uouw ºng 'lújavel
‘suonºpuoo uſe].100 UOdn put “Juanxe upºndeo e on ‘st USIUA Jo queukoſtta
aul ‘shoeſqo pub Säuſun upºn too lo) ºnq ‘uis Joy ºut Aeto to ‘usual ‘alsº b
jou sº ‘ssibeds Kudosolitid sºul IIoIIIA Jo Bulabio to usual ‘ansu) at L (III)
'ssetaseq Kualan
aq on no su.In autolios onse] oup Jo Kudosopºtſd eloq A atti Uatu ‘os SI
sºul JI Inguſs SI 30ſouo spun ºun pub ‘uosotto stuonuognº.15-J[as abun ºnq
‘uasoud looſqo to pua aun lou sº us ‘aoyoud Injuts uſ yet]]—uſs top 5uTAulo
To ‘ansen ‘Usila.I [butonn][1stloo OUI SI aroun quūn—‘extus (IAO STI IOJ uðsoud
10U sº us buſ, ‘KhIAbidop It..IOUI uo Satunoeſ out uſ UAOUIS sº I ( II)
'uontºpumoſ ºnoun A as Inoo Jo SI uomºteutaja. Jo
Kudosoljud SIII] ‘puſtu Jo opens Ätenunloa tº uſ to ‘ssaultsglas up Slsistio) pub
‘Āubjunloa Toulošonſe SI AAIABIdap Ieſou ‘u Mous traun StºA se JI Karabid
-ap IBIOUI Uo so.In 109ſ ouſ UI palmjad Kūuoſoſums ueeq SEU aſ 1911J, (I)
—‘Hattuai I ‘uorºblaueña. Jo KIOou] To auauos Sun uodſ)
REGENERATION. 417
heathen philosophy, bearing the same name. This ancient philosophy
denies second causes, and teaches that what we call laws of nature are
nothing else than the mode of divine operation. It denies that the
universe would even exist for a moment, if the divine upholding were
withdrawn. It maintains that the universe exists only by an act of present
and perpetual creation. It denies that matter, or mind, has in itself any
inherent properties that can originate laws or motions; that all action,
whether of matter or mind, is the necessary result of direct divine irre-
sistible efficiency or power; that this is not only true of the natural
universe, but also of all the exercises and actions of moral agents in all
worlds.
The abettors of the divine efficiency scheme of regeneration apply this
philosophy especially to moral agents. They hold, that all the exercises
and actions of moral agents in all worlds, and whether those exercises be
holy or sinful, are produced by a divine efficiency, or by a direct act of
Omnipotence; that holy and sinful acts are alike effects of an irresistible
cause, and that this cause is the power and agency, or efficiency, of God.
This philosophy denies constitutional moral depravity, or original sin,
and maintains that moral character belongs alone to the exercises or
choices of the will ; that regeneration does not consist in the creation of
any new taste, relish, or craving, nor in the implantation or infusion of any
new principles in the soul: but that it consists in a choice conformed to
the law of God, or in a change from selfishness to disinterested benevolence;
that this change is effected by a direct act of Divine power or efficiency, as
irresistible as any creative act whatever. This philosophy teaches, that
the moral character of every moral agent, whether holy or sinful, is formed
by an agency as direct, as sovereign, and as irresistible, as that which first
gave existence to the universe ; that true submission to God implies the
hearty consent of the will to have the character thus formed, and then to
be treated accordingly, for the glory of God. The principal arguments by
which this theory is supported, so far as I am acquainted with them, are as
follow :-
(i) The Bible, its advocates say, teaches it in those texts that teach the
doctrine of a universal and particular providence, and that God is present
in all events; such, for example, as the following:—“The lot is cast into
the lap ; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord.”—Prov. xvi. 33.
“Lord, thou wilt ordain peace for us; for thou also hast wrought all our
works in us.”—Isa. xxvi. 12. “I form the light, and create darkness; I
make peace, and create evil. I the Lord do all these things.”—Isa. xlv. 7.
“And all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing; and he
doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the in-
habitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him,
What doest thou?”—Dan. iv. 35. “Shall a trumpet be blown in the
city, and the people not be afraid 2 shall there be evil in a city, and the
Lord hath not dome it?”—Amos iii. 6. “For of him, and through him,
and to him, are all things; to whom be glory for ever. Amen.”—Rom. xi.
E. E.
"X})OTOGIHAL OILVINGILSMS Slip
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LI–FI III Soulbſ KSL100d.Su Tuoi (114
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“exodu utoly singſ; qoaſted Kia Ao put Jiā pooš Āioxºl uoluloid poadloq Stu
‘Llo nou og poontlo puu ‘nsul UAO Stu Jo KuAt UAU!p SI ou (IoIIA ‘polduo,
SI Ibu Klava ºnq : uvu Nup on unenduan tourett ‘UAo Unºw ponduo, ad hou
-ubo pop log : pop Jo panduo, ulu I ‘pondual SI ou uouſ A Kes trutti out 1971,
ºf I IIA waſ , , suoſhuuluuoqb asaul IIU op on polio Aſtop alu o AA ‘Aus put
‘otubu Ku Ka pattuo Si (LoIUA ‘osnou spun uſ out otojoq publis put outtoo put
: Jou Aoux as tuous spoš Iouno Tanju HIBA put ‘[Bugſ onum oouaou, uinq pub
‘Ālosſuſ abaws put ‘Ātolſmpt, Juluoo pub ‘top.mu Tºols oš IIIAA, eldtubse
to I use tutotu Jo uononpold aun III hueñu oſqnsis3.I.U pub “Judſoujo ‘hoolſp
9ū, Jou sſ otl ºutſ, ULI'Iſu put Áldout Knutpuuqu Sašussud taulo (q)
"sosuo asoun [[8 UT Auoše aſqūSIS3LTI ‘luoroga
‘hoolſp ou? sº pop quu, ‘Taupo Áue up Lou “segussed osaul UT poliduſ IOU
patulujº tourau SI I 3upulou Kus soñussed osaun (IoIUA Jo “Kottage ouTAlp
oul Jo opout omb out, Kuo Sloadsol anssi qu uomsomb on.In out] ºng 'upºn
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o, poquosº aq Ābū 5uſq.(Iowa tſoul A uſ asuas autos not eq 0.Ioun Ioulou A
Jo ‘huo Aa Kia Ao UI Tuosaad ‘osttas autos uſ ‘hou si to ‘sſ pop Toulousy lou
st arºqap uſ uomsomb au.I. 'Autod aun on 5uſunou oxold Koun hºu.L (v)
—: Tabual pſnow I esou? §ulu.tooutoo
‘suapuajap S11 Ka prº sysseus heală Upſt(A uodn pub ‘olumdºtos Álotſ
U10.1) ponſo Áloat[] slui Jo SJOOId alph Jo Itatutoads U SE axias Águ osau.I.
I & ‘00, IIIx qa H-, uatuw JoAo pub to Aa to] KIOI8
eq UIoq A on : 1st III) Snsaſ Ušnolul ‘qū3ts stu uſ 5uisbold-IIAA SI USIUIA
yeun no& up 5up.10A ‘IIIA sput op on XLIOA pooj Ato Ao uſ 10ajiad mo'ſ oxbu
‘Augua Aoo Bunselia.A6 aul Jo poolq aun (13nOJū ‘dealis alſº Jo plattdeus
quališ qaq. ‘snsaſ, p.10 I uno peep, aun uolſ uſuju Južno Iq abun ‘ooted Jo
poo aq, AON, gL II diſrud-, a.msue[d pooš stu Jo op on pub IIIA on
unoq mok uſ unoxios Hous pop s iſ to I, II ºf ‘udgI-., IIIA use SIU Jo
lasunoo aun Janju săuțul IIb unaxllow ou A UIRI Jo osodind aun on 5uſplooob
paybunsopold 3ulaq ‘aouennoùut up poulºgo oatti aa\ osſº tuous uT, '98
REGIENERATION. 419
(iv.) Fourth argument: Prophecy, or the foretelling of future events,
implies it.
This again is assumption without proof. These arguments assume, that
God could not know what future events would be, especially what the free
actions of men would be, unless he produces and controls them by a direct
and irresistible efficiency.
(v.) Fifth argument: The Bible ascribes both the holy and sinful actions
of man to God, and in equally unqualified terms.
This settles nothing of the quo modo, or the sense in which it does so, in
either case.
*(vi) It is admitted, say some, that holy actions are produced by a direct
divine efficiency; and as the Bible ascribes the sinful actions of men to
God in as unqualified terms as holy ones, we have no right to infer a differ-
enee in the quo modo of his doing it.
We are not only allowed, but are bound to infer that his agency is differ-
ent in the one case, from what it is in the other. The Bible has, as we
shall see, settled the philosophy, or the manner in which he produces holy
exercises in moral agents. It also everywhere assumes or affirms, that he
is concerned only providentially in the permission of sin; that sin is an
abuse of his providence, and of the liberty of moral agents.
(vii.) It has been assumed, that it is naturally impossible for God to
create a being that should have the power of originating his own actions.
This is surely an assumption, and of no weight whatever. It certainly
is not an affirmation of reason ; and I cannot see any ground for such an
affirmation. Human consciousness is against it.
(viii.) It has been asserted, that if such a creature existed, he would be
independent of God, in such a sense, that God could neither certainly
control him, nor know what he would do.
This is a mere begging of the question. How can this be known 2 This
argument assumes that even Omniscience cannot know how a free moral
agent would act upon condition of his originating his own choices, inten-
tions, and actions. But why this assumption 2
To this theory I make the following objections —
(i.) It is mere philosophy, and that falsely so called.
(ii.) It is supported, so far as I can see, only by the most unwarrantable
assumptions.
(iii.) Its tendency condemns it.
(a.) It tends to produce and perpetuate a sense of divine injustice. To
create a character by an agency as direct and irresistible as that of the
creation of the world itself, and then treat moral beings according to that
character so formed, is wholly inconsistent with all our ideas of justice.
(b.) It destroys a sense of accountability, or tends to destroy it.
(c.) It contradicts human consciousness. I know it is said, that con-
sciousness only gives our mental actions and states, but not the cause of
them. This I deny, and affirm that consciousness not only gives us our
E E 2
420 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
mental actions and states, but it also gives us the cause of them, especially
it gives the fact, that we ourselves are the sovereign and efficient causes of
the choices and actions of our will. In our passive states we can almost
always recognize the cause of these phenomena. At least we can very
often do so. I am as conscious of Originating in a sovereign manner my
choices, as I am of the choices themselves.
(d.) This theory virtually denies, or rather stultifies, the eternal distinc-
tion between liberty and necessity.
(e.) If this theory were true, with our present consciousness, we cannot
believe it. We cannot but affirm to ourselves, that we are the efficient
causes of our own choices and volitions.
(f) The philosophy in question, really represents God as the only agent,
in any proper sense of that term, in the universe. If God produces
the exercises of moral beings in the manner represented by this philosophy,
then they are in fact no more agents than the planets are agents. If their
exercises are all directly produced by the power of God, it is ridiculous to
call them agents.
(q.) If this theory be true, what we generally call moral beings and moral
agents, are no more so than the winds and the waves, or any other substance
or thing in the universe.
(h.) Again: if this theory be true, no being but God has, or can have,
moral character. No other being is the author of his own actions. He is
the subject, but not the author of his actions. He is the passive subject,
but not the active efficient cause of his own exercises. To affirm moral
character of such a passive subject is truly ridiculous.
(i.) This theory obliges its advocates, together with all other necessita-
rians, to give a false and monsensical definition of free agency. Free
agency, according to them, consists in doing as we will, while their theory
denies the power to will, except as our willings are necessitated by God.
But as we have seen in former lectures, this is no true account of freedom,
or liberty. Liberty to execute my choices is no liberty at all. Choice is
connected with its sequents by a law of necessity ; and if an effect follow
my volitions, that effect follows by necessity, and not freely. All freedom
of will must, as was formerly shown, consist in the sovereign power to
originate our own choices. If I am unable to will, I am unable to do any
thing; and it is absurd and ridiculous to affirm, that a being is a moral or a
free agent, who has not power to originate his own choices.
(j.) If this theory is true, God is more than the accomplice of the devil; for—
(I.) Satan cannot tempt us according to this theory, unless God by a
direct divine efficiency, moves him and compels him to do so.
(II.) Then, we cannot possibly yield to his temptation, except as God
compels us to yield, or creates the yielding within us. This is a blas-
phemous theory surely, that represents God as doing such things. That a
philosophy like this could ever have been taught, will appear incredible to
many. But such is the fact, and such the true statement of the views of
this class of theologians, if I can understand them.
REGENERATION, 421
(k.) But this theory is inconsistent with the Bible, as we have seen.
(l.) It is also inconsistent with itself, for it both affirms and denies
matural ability. Its advocates admit, that we cannot act except as we will,
and affirm that we cannot will, except as our willings are created by a
direct Divine efficiency. How absurd then is it to maintain, that we have
natural ability to do anything All that can truly be said of us, upon the
principles of this theory, is that we have a susceptibility to be acted upon,
and to be rendered the subjects of certain states, immediately and irre-
sistibly created by the power of God. But it is absurd to call this a
natural ability to do our duty.
(m.) If this theory is true, the whole moral government of God is no
government at all, distinct from, and superior to, physical government.
Then the gospel is an insult to men, in two respects, at least:—
(I.) Upon this theory men do not, cannot deserve punishment, nor
require a Saviour from it.
(II.) If they do, the gospel is presented and urged upon their acceptance,
when, in fact, they have no more power to accept it, than they have to
create a world.
(n.) Again : this theory overlooks and virtually denies the fundamentally
important distinction between moral and physical power, and moral and
physical government. All power and all government, upon this theory,
are physical.
(0.) Again : this theory renders repentance, remorse, and self-condem-
nation impossible, as a rational exercise.
(p.) This theory involves the delusion of all moral beings. God not
only creates our volitions, but also creates the persuasion and affirmation
that we are responsible for them, O, shame on such a theory as this
(3.) Let us proceed now to notice the susceptibility scheme.
(i.) What this theory is.
This theory represents, that the Holy Spirit's influences are both physical
and moral; that he, by a direct and physical influence, excites the Suscep-
tibilities of the soul and prepares them to be affected by the truth; that he,
thereupon, exerts a moral or persuasive influence by presenting the truth,
which moral influence induces regeneration.
(ii) Wherein this and the Divine moral suasion theory agree.
(a.) In rejecting the taste and Divine efficiency schemes.
(b) In rejecting the dogma of constitutional moral depravity.
(c.) In rejecting the dogma of physical regeneration; for be it re-
membered, that this theory teaches that the physical influence exerted in
exciting the susceptibilities is no part of regeneration.
(d.) They agree in maintaining the natural ability or liberty of all moral
agents.
(e.) That the constitutional appetites and passions have no moral
character in themselves,
(f) That when strongly excited they are the occasions of sin.
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REGENERATION. 423
have never manifested this want of candour towards those who have called
in question that part of their theory that relates to a physical influence.
(III.) Since the advocates of this theory admit that the Bible teaches
that regeneration is induced by a divine moral Suasion, the point of debate
is simply, whether the Bible teaches that there is also a physical influence
exerted by the Holy Spirit, in exciting the constitutional susceptibilities.
We will now attend to their proof texts. “Then opened he their under-
standing, that they might understand the Scriptures.”—Luke xxiv. 45. It
is affirmed, that this text seems to teach or imply a physical influence in
opening their understandings But what do we mean by such language as
this in common life? Language is to be understood according to the subject-
matter of discourse. Here the subject of discourse is the understanding.
But what can be intended by opening it? Can this be a physical prying,
pulling, or forcing open any department of the constitution ? Such language
in common life would be understood only to mean, that such instruction was
imparted as to secure a right understanding of the Scriptures. Every one
knows this, and why should we suppose and assume that anything more is
intended here 2 The context plainly indicates that this was the thing, and
the only thing, done in this case. “ Then he said unto them, O fools, and
slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken Ought not Christ
to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning at
Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures
the things concerning himself—And said unto them, Thus it is written,
and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third
day.”—Luke xxiv, 25–27, 46. From these verses it appears that he
expounded the Scriptures to them, when in the light of what had passed,
and in the light of that measure of divine illumination which was then
imparted to them, they understood the things which he explained to
them. It does not seem to me, that this passage warrants the infer-
ence that there was a physical influence exerted. It certainly affirms
no such thing. “And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple,
of the city of Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard us; whose heart the
Lord opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of
Paul.”—Acts xvi. 14. Here is an expression similar to that just examined.
Here it is said, “that the Lord opened the heart of Lydia, so that she
attended,” &c.; that is, the Lord inclined her to attend. But how P Why,
say the advocates of this scheme, by a physical influence. But how does
this appear 2 What is her heart that it should be pulled, or forced open 2
and what can be intended by the assertion, “that the Lord opened her
heart?” All that can be meant is, that the Lord secured her attention,
or disposed her to attend, and so enlightened her when she did attend, that
she believed. Surely here is no assertion of a physical influence, nor, so
far as I can see, any just ground for the inference, that such an influence
was exerted. A moral influence can sufficiently explain all the phenomena;
and any text that can equally well consist with either of two opposing
theories, can prove neither.
424 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Again: there are many passages that represent God as opening the
spiritual eyes, and passages in which petitions are offered to God to do this.
It is by this theory assumed that such passages strongly imply a physical
influence. But this assumption appears to me unwarrantable. We are in
the habit of using just such language, and speak of opening each other's
eyes, when no such thing is intended or implied, as a physical influence,
and when nothing more than a moral or persuasive influence is so much as
thought of Why then resort to such an assumption here? Does the
nature of the case demand it 2 This I know is contended for by those who
maintain a consitutional moral depravity. But this dogma has been shown
to be false, and it is admitted to be so by those who maintain the theory now
under consideration. Admitting, then, that the constitution is not morally
depraved, should it be inferred that any constitutional change, or physical in-
fluence is needed to produce regeneration? I can see no sufficient reason
for believing, or affirming, that a physical influence is either demanded or
exerted. This much I freely admit, that we cannot affirm the impossibility
of such an influence, nor the impossibility of the necessity of such an influ-
ence. The only question with me is, does the Bible plainly teach or imply
such an influence 2 Hitherto I have been unable to see that it does. The
passages already quoted are of a piece with all that are relied upon in sup-
port of this theory, and as the same answer is a sufficient reply to them all,
I will not spend time in citing and remarking upon them.
(b.) Again : A physical influence has been inferred from the fact, that
sinners are represented as dead in trespasses and sins, as asleep, &c. &c.
But all such representations are only declaratory of a moral state, a state of
voluntary alienation from God. If the death is moral, and the sleep moral,
why suppose that a physical influence is needed to correct a moral evil?
Cannot truth, when urged and pressed by the Holy Spirit, eſpect the requisite
change 2
(c.) But a physical influence is also inferred from the fact, that truth
makes so different an impression at one time from what it does at another.
Answer:t his can well enough be accounted for by the fact, that sometimes
the Holy Spirit so presents the truth, that the mind apprehends it and
feels its power, whereas at another time he does not.
(d.) But it is said, that there sometimes appears to have been a pre-
paratory work performed by a physical influence pre-disposing the mind to
attend to, and be affected by, the truth. Answer: there often is no doubt
a preparatory work pre-disposing the mind to attend to, and be affected by,
truth. But why assume that this is a physical influence? Providential
occurrences may have had much to do with it. The Holy Spirit may have
been directing the thoughts and communicating instructions in various
ways, and preparing the mind to attend and obey. Who then is warranted
in the affirmation that this preparatory influence is physical? I admit that
it may be, but I cannot see either that it must be, or that there.is any good
ground for the assumption that it is,
REGENERATION. 425
(4.) The last theory to be eacamined is that of a Divine moral suasion.
This theory teaches—
(i.) That regeneration consists in a change in the ultimate intention or
preference of the mind, or in a change from selfishness to disinterested
benevolence; and—
(ii.) That this change is induced and effected by a divine moral influence;
that is, that the Holy Spirit effects it with, through, or by the truth. The
advocates of this theory assign the following as the principal reasons in
support of it.
(a) The Bible expressly affirms it. “Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I
say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot
enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh;
and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.”—John iii. 5, 6, “Being
born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God,
which liveth and abideth for ever.”—l Pet. i. 23. “Of his own will begat
he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of his
creatures.”—James i. 18. “For though ye have ten thousand instructors
in Christ, yet have ye not many fathers: for in Christ Jesus I have begotten
you through the gospel.”—1 Cor. iv. 15.
(b) Men are represented as being sanctified by and through the truth.
“Sanctify them through the truth: thy word is truth.”—John xvii. 17.
“Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you.”—
John xv. 3.
(c.) The nature of regeneration decides the philosophy of it so far as
this, that it must be effected by truth, addressed to the heart through the
intelligence.
(d.) Unless it is so effected, it has no moral character.
(e.) The regenerate are conscious of having been influenced by the truth
in turning to God.
(f) They are conscious of no other influence than light poured upon the
intelligence, or truth presented to the mind.
(j.) When God affirms that he regenerates the soul with or by the truth,
we have no right to infer that he does it in some other way. This he does
affirm ; therefore the Bible has settled the philosophy of regeneration.
That he exerts any other than a moral influence, or the influence of Divine
teaching and illumination, is sheer assumption. -
To this theory the following objections have been made.
(i.) To represent sinners as regenerated by the influence of truth, although
presented and urged by the Holy Spirit, is virtually to deny total depravity.
To this it is answered—
(a.) It does indeed deny constitutional moral depravity, and therefore
constitutional or physical regeneration.
(b.) Adam and the sinning angels were changed or regenerated from
perfect holiness to perfect sinfulness, by motives presented to them, at
least Adam was. Now, if they could be regenerated from entire holiness
to entire sinfulness by a moral influence, or by means of a lie, is it
426 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
impossible that God should convert sinners by means of truth? Has God
so much less moral power than Satan has 2
(c) To this it may be replied, that it is much easier to convert or
regenerate men from holiness to sin, than from sin to holiness.
(I.) This, I answer, seems to reflect upon the wisdom and goodness of
God, in forming the human constitution.
(II.) Should the fact be granted, still it may truly be urged, that the
motives to holiness are infinitely greater than those to sin, so that the
Holy Spirit has altogether the advantage in this respect.
(ii.) If sinners are regenerated by the light of the truth, they may be
regenerated in hell, as they will there know the truth.
(a.) The Bible, I answer, represents the wicked in hell, as being in
darkness, and not in the light of the truth.
(b.) The truth will not be presented and urged home there by the
persuasive Spirit of God.
(c.) The gospel motives will be wanting there. The offer of pardon
and acceptance, which is indispensable to induce repentance and obedience,
will not be made there. Therefore sinners will not be converted in hell.
TIEMARKS.
}
. This scheme honours the Holy Spirit without disparaging the truth
of God.
2. Regeneration by the Holy Spirit through the truth illustrates the
wisdom of God. There is a deep and divine philosophy in regeneration.
3. This theory is of great practical importance. For if sinners are to be
regenerated by the influence of truth, argument, and persuasion, then
ministers can see what they have to do, and how it is that they are to be
“workers together with God.”
4. So also simmers may see, that they are not to wait for a physical
regeneration or influence, but must submit to, and embrace, the truth, if
they ever expect to be saved.
5. If this scheme is true, we can See, that when truth is made clear to
the mind and is resisted, the Holy Spirit is resisted, for this is his work,
to make the mind clearly to apprehend the truth.
6. If this theory is true, sinners are most likely to be regenerated while
sitting under the Sound of the gospel, while listening to the clear
exhibition of truth.
7. Ministers should lay themselves out, and press every consideration
upon the attention of sinners, just as heartily and as freely, as if they
expected to convert them themselves. They should aim at, and expect
the regeneration of simmers, upon the spot, and before they leave the house
of God.
8. Sinners must not Wait for and expect physical omnipotence to
regenerate them.
9. The physical omnipotence of God affords no presumption that all men
will be converted ; for regeneration is not effected by physical power.
Ri GENERATION. 427
10. To neglect and resist the truth is fatal to salvation.
11. Sinners are not regenerated, because they neglect and resist the truth.
12. God cannot do the sinner's duty, and regenerate him without the
right exercise of the sinner's own agency.
13. This view of regeneration shows that the sinner's dependence upon
the Holy Spirit arises entirely out of his own voluntary stubbowmness, and
that his guilt is all the greater, by how much the more perfect this kind of
dependence is.
14. This view of regeneration shows the adaptedness of the law and
Gospel of God to regenerate, sanctify, and save the souls of mem.
15. It also demonstrates the wisdom of appointing such means and
instrumentalities to accomplish their salvation.
16. Physical regeneration, under every modification of it, is a stumbling-
block.
17. Original or constitutional sinfulness, physical regeneration, and all
their kindred and resulting dogmas, are alike subversive of the gospel, and
repulsive to the human intelligence; and should be laid aside as relics of a
most unreasonable and confused philosophy.
LECTURE XLIV.
R.EGENERATION.
XII. Evid ENCES OF REGENERATION.
In the discussion of this subject I will—
1. MAKE SEVERAL INTRODUCTORY REMARKs,
2. SHOW WHEREIN THE EXPERIENCE AND OUTWARD LIFE OF SAINTS AND
SINNERS MAY AGREE.
3. WHEREIN THEY AIUST DIFFER.
1. Introductory remarks.
(1.) In ascertaining what are, and what are not, evidences of regeneration,
We must constantly keep in mind what is not, and what is regeneration;
what is not, and what is implied in it.
(2.) We must constantly recognize the fact, that saints and sinners have
precisely similar constitutions and constitutional susceptibilities, and there-
fore that many things are common to both.
(3.) What is common to both cannot, of course, be an evidence of
regeneration.
(4.) That no state of the sensibility has any moral character in itself.
That regeneration does not consist in, or imply, any physical change what-
ever, either of the intellect, sensibility, or the faculty of will.
(5.) That the sensibility of the sinner is susceptible of every kind and
degree of feeling that is possible to saints.
(6.) The same is true of the consciences of both saints and sinners, and
of the intelligence generally,
428 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,
(7.) That moral character belongs to the ultimate intention.
(8.) That regeneration consists in a change of the ultimate intention.
(9.) That the moral character is as the ultimate intention is.
(10.) The inquiry is, What are evidences of a change in the ultimate
intention ? What is evidence that benevolence is the ruling choice,
preference, intention of the soul ?
This, it would seem, must be a plain question, and must admit of a very
easy and satisfactory answer.
It is a plain question, and demands, and may have, a plain answer. But
so much error prevails as to the mature of regeneration, and, consequently,
as to what are evidences of regeneration, that we need patience, discrimi-
nation, and perseverance, and withal candour to get at the truth upon this
Subject.
2. Wherein the ea perience and outward life of saints and simmers may
agree.
t is plain that they may be alike, in whatever does not consist in, or
necessarily proceed from, the attitude of their will, that is, in whatever is
constitutional or involuntary. For example—
(1.) They may both desire their own happiness. This desire is consti-
tutional, and, of course, common to both Saints and sinners.
(2.) They may both desire the happiness of others. This also is con-
stitutional, and of course common to both Saints and simmers. There is
no moral character in these desires, any more than there is in the desire
for food and drink. That men have a natural desire for the happiness of
others, is evident from the fact that they manifest pleasure when others are
happy, unless they have some selfish reason for envy, or unless the happi-
ness of others is in some way inconsistent with their own. They also
manifest uneasiness and pain when they see others in misery, unless they
have some selfish reason for desiring their misery.
(3.) Saints and sinners may alike dread their own misery, and the misery
of others. This is strictly constitutional and has therefore no moral
character. I have known that very wicked men, and men who had been
infidels, when they were convinced of the truths of Christianity, manifested
great concern about their families and about their neighbours; and, in one
instance, I heard of an aged man of this description who, when convinced
of the truth, went and warned his neighbours to flee from the wrath to
come, avowing at the same time his conviction, that there was no mercy
for him, though he felt deeply concerned for others. Such like cases have
repeatedly been witnessed. The case of the rich man in hell seems to have
been one of this description, or to have illustrated the same truth. Although
he knew his own case to be hopeless, yet he desired that Lazarus should be
sent to warn his five brethren, lest they also should come to that place of
torment. In this case, and in the case of the aged man just named, it
appears that they not only desired that others should avoid misery, but
they actually tried to prevent it, and used the means that were within their
REGENERATION. 429
reach to save them. Now it is plain that this desire took control of their
will, and, of course, the state of the will was selfish. It sought to gratify
desire. It was the pain and dread of Seeing their misery, and of having
them miserable, that led them to use means to prevent it. This was not
benevolence, but selfishness. It no doubt increases the misery of sinners
in hell to have their number multiplied, that is, they being moral agents,
cannot but be unutterably pained to behold the wretchedness around them.
This may, and doubtless will, make up a great part of the misery of devils
and of wicked men, the beholding to all eternity the misery which they
have occasioned. They will not only be filled with remorse, but un-
doubtedly their souls will be unutterably agonized with the misery they
will behold around them.
Let it be understood, then, that as both Saints and sinners constitution-
ally desire, not only their own happiness, but also the happiness of others,
they may alike rejoice in the happiness and safety of others, and in converts
to Christianity, and may alike grieve at the danger and misery of those who
are unconverted. I well recollect, when far from home, and while an im-
penitent sinner, I received a letter from my youngest brother, informing me
that he was converted to God. He, if he was converted, was, as I sup-
posed, the first and the only member of the family who then had a hope of
salvation. I was at the time, and both before and after, one of the most
careless sinners, and yet on receiving this intelligence, I actually wept for
joy and gratitude, that one of so prayerless a family was likely to be saved.
Indeed, I have repeatedly known sinners to manifest much interest in
the conversion of their friends, and express gratitude for their conversion,
although they had no religion themselves. These desires have no moral
character in themselves. In as far as they control the will, the will yielding
to impulse instead of the law of the intelligence, this, is selfishness.
(4.) Saints and simmers may agree in desiring their own sanctification and
the sanctification of others. Both may desire their own sanctification as
the condition of their salvation. They may also desire the sanctification of
others, as the condition of their salvation.
(5.) Saints and silmers may both desire to be useful, as a condition of
their own Salvation.
(6.) They may also desire that others should be useful, as a condition of
their salvation.
(7.) They may both desire to glorify God, as a means or condition of their
own Salvation.
(8.) They may also desire to have others glorify God, as a means of their
Salvation. These desires are natural and constitutional, when the salvation
either of ourselves or others is felt to be important, and when these things
are seen to be conditions of Salvation.
(9.) They may both desire, and strongly desire, a revival of religion and
the prosperity of Zion, as a means of promoting their own salvation, or the
Salvation of their friends. Simmers have often heen known to desire revi-
vals of religion.
&
430 SYSTEMATIC TIIEOI,()(3 Y.
º
(10.) They may agree in desiring the triumph of truth and righteousness,
and the suppression of vice and error, for the sake of the bearings of these
things on self and friends. These desires are constitutional and matural to
both, under certain circumstances. When they do not influence the will,
they have in themselves no moral character; but when they influence the
will, their selfishness takes on a religious type. It them manifests zeal
in promoting religion. But if desire, and not the intelligence, controls
the will, it is selfishness notwithstanding.
(11.) Moral agents constitutionally approve of what is right, and disap-
prove of what is wrong. Of course, both saints and sinners may both
approve of and delight in goodness. I can recollect weeping at an instance
of what, at the time, I supposed to be goodness, while, at the same time, I
was not religious myself. I have no doubt that wicked men, not only often
are conscious of strongly approving the goodness of God, but that they also
often take delight in contemplating it. This is constitutional, both as it
respects the intellectual approbation, and also as it respects the feeling of
delight. It is a great mistake to suppose that sinners are never conscious
of feelings of complacency and delight in the goodness of God. The Bible
represents sinners as taking delight in drawing near to him. “Yet they
seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that did righteous-
mess, and forsook not the ordinance of their God : they ask of me the ordi-
nances of justice ; they take delight in approaching to God.”—ſsa. lviii. 2.
“And lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a
pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument: for they hear thy
words, but they do them not.”—Exek. xxxiii. 32. “For I delight in the
law of God after the inward man.”—Rom. vii. 22.
(12.) Saints and sinners may alike not only intellectually approve, but
have feelings of deep complacency in the characters of good men, sometimes
good men of their own time and of their acquaintance, but more frequently
good men either of a former age, or, if of their own age, of a distant
country. The reason is this good men of their own day and neighbour-
hood are very apt to render them uneasy in their sins; to annoy them by
their faithful reproofs and rebukes. This offends them, and overeomes
their natural respect for goodness. But who has not observed the fact,
that good and bad men unite in praising, admiring, and loving, so far as
feeling is concerned—good men of by-gone days, or good men at a distance,
whose life and rebukes have annoyed the wicked in their own neighbour-
hood 2 The fact is, that moral agents, from the laws of their being, neces-
sarily approve of goodness wherever they witness it. And when not
annoyed by it, when left to contemplate it in the abstract, or at a distance,
they cannot but feel a complacency in it. Multitudes of sinners are con-
scious of this, and suppose that this is a virtuous feeling. It is of no use
to deny, that they sometimes have feelings of love and gratitude to God,
and of respect for, and complacency im, good men. They often have these
feelings, and to represent them as always having feelings of hatred and of
opposition to God and to good men, is sure either to offend them, or to lead
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REGENERATION. 433
do not, and cannot, love lying for its own sake. They lie to gratify, not a
love for falsehood on its own account, but to obtain some object which they
desire more strongly than they hate falsehood. Sinners, in spite of them-
selves, venerate, respect, and fear a man of truth. They just as necessarily
despise a liar. If they are liars, they despise themselves for it, just as
drunkards and debauchees despise themselves for indulging their filthy
lusts, and yet continue in them.
(16.) Both saints and sinners not only approve of, and delight in good
men, when, as I have said, wicked men are not annoyed by them, but they
agree in reprobating, disapproving, and abhorring wicked men and devils.
Who ever heard of any other sentiment and feeling being expressed either
by good or bad men, than of abhorrence and indignation toward the devil?
Nobody ever approved or can approve, of his character; sinners can no more
approve of it than holy angels can. If he could approve of and delight in
his own character, hell would cease to be hell, and evil would become his
good. But no moral agent can, by any possibility, know wickedness and
approve it. No man, Saint or sinner, can entertain any other sentiments
and feelings toward the devil, or wicked men, but those of disapprobation,
distrust, disrespect, and often of loathing and abhorrence. The intellectual
sentiment will be uniform. Disapprobation, distrust, condemnation, will
always necessarily possess the minds of all who know wicked men and
devils. And often, as occasions arise, wherein their characters are clearly
revealed, and under circumstances favourable to such a result, the deepest
feelings of disgust, of loathing, of indignation, and abhorrence of their
wickedness, will manifest themselves alike among Saints and sinners.
(17.) Saints and sinners may be equally honourable and fair in business
transactions, so far as the outward act is concerned. They have different
reasons for their conduct, but outwardly it may be the Same. This leads to
the remark—
(1S.) That selfishness in the sinner, and benevolence in the saint, may,
and often do, produce, in many respects, the same results or manifestations.
For example: benevolence in the saint, and selfishness in the sinner, may
beget the same class of desires, to wit, as we have seen, desire for their own
Sanctification, and for that of others, to be useful, and to have others so;
desires for the conversion of sinners; and many such like desires.
(19.) This leads to the remark, that, when the desires of an impenitent
person for these objects become strong enough to influence the will, he may
take the same outward course, substantially, that the saint takes, in
obedience to his intelligence. That is, the simmer is constrained by his
feelings to do what the Saint does from principle, or from obedience to the
law of his intelligence. In this, however, although the outward manifesta-
tions be the same for the time being, yet the sinner is entirely selfish, and
the Saint benevolent. The Saint is controlled by principle, and the sinner
by impulse. In this case, time is needed to distinguish between them.
The sinner not having the root of the matter in him, will return to his
former course of life, in proportion as his convictions of the truth and
F F
434 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
importance of religion subside, and his former feelings return; while the
Saint will evince his heavenly birth, by manifesting his sympathy with God,
and the strength of principle that has taken possession of his heart. That
is, he will manifest that his intelligence, and not his feelings, controls his will.
(20.) Saints and simmers may both love and hate the same things, but for
different and opposite reasons. For example: they may both love the
Bible ; the saint benevolently, and the sinner selfishly; that is, the saint
loves the Bible for benevolent, and the sinner for selfish, reasons. They
may love Christians for opposite reasons ; the Saint for their likeness to
Christ, the sinner because he considers them the favourites of Heaven, as
his particular friends, or because he, in some way, hopes to be benefited
by them, or from a mere constitutional complacency in goodness. Now
observe ; the Christian may have the same constitutional feelings as the
sinner; and besides these, he may have reasons for his love and conduct
peculiar to the Saint. The Saint and sinner may, for different and opposite
reasons, be interested in, and deeply affected with, the character of God,
with the truth, the sanctuary, and in all the duties of religion, and all the
means of grace. They may alike, but for different reasons, hate infidelity,
error, sin, sinners, selfishness. A selfish simmer may deeply abhor selfish-
mess in others, and even in himself, and still persevere in it.
(21.) Again: selfishness in the sinner, and benevolence in the saint, may
lead them to form similar resolutions and purposes; for example—to serve
God; to avoid all sim; to do all duty; to do right ; to be useful; to per-
severe in well-doing; to live for etermity; to set a good example; to pay
the strictest regard to the Sabbath and to all the institutions of religion;
to do all that in them lies to support religious institutions.
(22.) Saints and sinners may agree in their views of doctrines and of mea-
sures, may be equally zealous in the cause of God and religion ; may be
equally well-informed ; may experience delight in prayer, and in religious
meetings, and in religious exercises generally.
23.) Both may be greatly changed in feeling and in life.
(24.) They may both give all their goods to feed the poor, or to support
the gospel, and send it to the heathen.
(25.) They may both go as missionaries to the heathem, but for entirely
different reasons.
(26.) They may have equal convictions of sin, and their sensibilities may
be similarly affected by these convictions.
(27) They may both have great sorrow for sin, and great loathing of self
on account of it.
(28.) They may both have feelings of gratitude to God.
(29.) They may both appear to manifest all the graces of true saints.
(30.) They may both be very confident of their good estate.
(31.) They may both have new hopes and new fears, new joys and new
sorrows, new friends and new enemies, new habits of life.
(32.) They may both be comforted by the promises, and awed by the
threatenings.
REGENERATION. 435
(33.) They may both appear to have answers to prayer.
(34.) They may both appear and really suppose themselves to renounce
the world. They may really both renounce this world, the Saint for the
glory of God, the sinner that he may win heaven.
(35.) They may both practise many forms of self-denial. The Christian
really denies himself, and the sinner may appear to do so, by denying
certain forms of self-seeking, for the securing of a selfish interest in another
direction.
(36.) They may both have the faith of miracles: “And though I have
the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge ;
and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have
not charity, I am nothing.”—1 Cor. xiii. 2.
(37.) They may both suffer martyrdom for entirely opposite reasons.
“And though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth
me nothing.”—1 Cor. xiii. 3.
(38.) They may be confident of their good estate, and may both die in
triumph, and carry their hope to the bar of God. “Then shall ye begin
to say, We have eaten and drunk in thy presence, and thou hast taught in
our streets. But he shall say, I tell you, I know you not whence ye are :
depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity.”—Luke xiii. 26, 27.
REMIARRS.
1. For want of these and such like discriminations, many have stumbled.
Hypocrites have held on to a false hope, and lived upon mere constitutional
desires and spasmodic turns of giving up the will, during seasons of special
excitement, to the control of these desires and feelings. These spasms
they call their waking up. But no sooner does their excitement subside,
than selfishness again assumes its wonted forms. It is truly wonderful
and appalling to see to what an extent this is true. Because, in seasons
of special excitement they feel deeply, and are conscious of feeling, as
they say, and acting, and of being entirely sincere in following their im-
pulses, they have the fullest confidence in their good estate. They say
they cannot doubt their conversion. They felt so and so, and gave them-
selves up to their feelings, and gave much time and money to promote the
cause of Christ. Now this is a deep delusion, and one of the most com-
mon in Christendom, or at least one of the most common that is to be
found among what are called revival Christians. This class of deluded
souls do not see that they are, in such cases, governed by their feelings,
and that if their feelings were changed, their conduct would be so, of
course; that as soon as the excitement subsides, they will go back to their
former ways, as a thing of course. When the state of feeling that now
controls them has given place to their former feelings, they will of course
appear as they used to do. This is, in few words, the history of thousands
of professors of religion.
2. This has greatly stumbled the openly impenitent. Not knowing
how to account for what they often witness of this kind among professors
F F 2
436 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
of religion, they are led to doubt whether there is any such thing as true
religion. *
Again: many sinners have been deceived just in the way I have pointed
out, and have afterwards discovered that they had been deluded, but could
not understand how. They have come to the conclusion that everybody is
deluded, and that all professors are as much deceived as they are. This
leads them to reject and despise all religion.
3. A want of discrimination between what is constitutional and what
belongs to a regenerate state of mind, has stumbled many. Impenitent
sinners, finding themselves to have what they call certain good desires and
feelings, have either come to the conclusion that they were born again, or
that the unregenerate have at least a spark of holiness in them, that only
needs to be cherished and cultivated, to fit them for heaven.
4. Some exercises of impenitent sinners, and of which they are con-
scious, have been denied for fear of denying total depravity. They have
been represented as necessarily hating God and all good men; and this
hatred has been represented as a feeling of malice and enmity towards God.
Many impenitent sinners are conscious of having no such feelings; but, on
the contrary, they are conscious of having at times feelings of respect,
veneration, awe, gratitude, and affection towards God and good mem.
They are also conscious, that they are often influenced by these feelings;
that, in obedience to them, they sometimes pray and sing praises to God;
that they sometimes manifest a deep veneration and respect for good men,
and show them favour, and do many things for them which they would not
do, did they not feel so deep a respect, veneration, and affection for them.
Of these, and many like things, many impenitent simmers are often com-
Scious. They are also ofton conscious of feeling no opposition to revivals,
but, on the contrary, that they rejoice in them, and feel desirous that they
should prosper, and hope that they shall be themselves converted. They
are conscious of feeling deep veneration and respect, and even affection for
those ministers who are the agents, in the hand of God, of carrying them
forward. To this class of sinners, it is a snare and a stumblingblock to
tell them, and insist, that they only hate God, and Christians, and
ministers, and revivals; and to represent their moral depravity to be such,
that they crave sin as they crave food, and that they necessarily have none
but feelings of mortal enmity against God. None of these things are
true, and this class of sinners know that they are not true. Such repre-
sentations either drive them into infidelity on the one hand, or to think
themselves Christians on the other. But those theologians who hold the
views of constitutional depravity of which we have spoken, cannot con-
sistently with their theory, admit to these sinners the real truth, and then
show them conclusively that in all their feelings which they call good, and
in all their yielding to be influenced by them, there is no virtue ; that their
desires and feelings have in themselves no moral character, and that when
they yield the will to their control, it is only selfishness.
The thing needed is a philosophy and a theology that will admit and
REGENERATION. 437
explain all the phenomena of experience, and not deny human conscious-
ness. A theology that denies human consciousness is only a curse and a
stumbling-block. But such is the doctrine of universal constitutional
moral depravity.
It is frequently true, that the feelings of sinners become exceedingly
rebellious and exasperated, even to the most intense opposition of feeling
toward God, and Christ, and ministers, and revivals, and toward every
thing of good report. If this class of sinners are converted, they are very
apt to suppose, and to represent all sinners as having just such feelings as
they had. But this is a mistake, for many sinners never had those feel-
ings. Nevertheless, they are no less selfish and guilty than the class who
have the rebellious and blasphemous feelings which I have mentioned.
This is what they need to know. They need to understand definitely what
sin is, and what it is not; that sin is selfishness; that selfishness is the
yielding of the will to the control of feeling, and that it matters not at all
what the particular class of feelings is, if feelings control the will, and not
intelligence. Admit their good feelings, as they call them, and take pains
to show them, that these feelings are merely constitutional, and have in
themselves no moral character. If they plead, as they often will, that
they not only feel but that they act out their feelings, and give themselves
up to be controlled by them, then show them that this is only selfishness,
changing its form, and the will consenting for the time to seek the gratifi-
cation of this class of feelings, because they are for the time being the
most importunate and influential with the will; that as soon as another
class of feelings come into play, they will go over to their indulgence, and
leave God and religion uneared for.
The ideas of depravity and of regeneration, to which I have often
alluded, are fraught with great mischief in another respect. Great num-
bers, it is to be feared, both of private professors of religion and of
ministers, have mistaken the class of feelings of which I have spoken, as
common among certain impenitent sinners, for religion. They have heard
the usual representations of the natural depravity of sinners, and also have
heard certain desires and feelings represented as religion. They are
conscious of these desires and feelings, and, also, sometimes, when they are
very strong, of being influenced in their conduct by them. They assume,
therefore, that they are regenerate, and elected, and heirs of salvation.
They are conscious that they often have feelings of great attachment to the
world, and various classes of feeling very inconsistent with their religious
feelings, as they call them ; and that when these feelings are in exercise,
they also yield to them, and give themselves up to their control. But
this they are taught to think is common to all Christians; that all
Christians have much indwelling sin, are much of their time entirely out
of the way, and never altogether right, even for a moment, that they never
feel so much as they are capable of feeling, and often feel the opposite of
what they ought to feel. These views lull them asleep. The philosophy
and theology that misrepresent moral depravity and regeneration thus,
4.38 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
must, if consistent, also misrepresent true religion; and oh! the many
thousands that have mistaken the mere constitutional desires and feelings,
and the selfish yielding of the will to their control, for true religion, and
have gone to the bar of God with a lie in their right hand.
It is a mournful, and even a heart-rending fact, that very much that
passes current for Christian experience is not, and cannot be, an experience
peculiar at all to Christians. It is common to both Saints and sinners. It
is merely the natural and necessary result of the human constitution,
under certain circumstances. Let no man deceive himself by thinking
more highly of himself than he ought to think.
5. Another great evil has arisen out of the false views I have been
exposing, namely —
Many true Christians have been much stumbled and kept in bondage,
and their comfort and their usefulness much abridged, by finding them-
selves, from time to time, very languid and unfeeling. Supposing religion
to consist in feeling, if at any time the sensibility becomes exhausted, and
their feelings subside, they are immediately thrown into unbelief and bond-
age. Satan reproaches them for their want of feeling, and they have
nothing to say, only to admit the truth of his accusations. Having a
false philosophy of religion, they judge of the state of their hearts by the
state of their feelings. They confound their hearts with their feelings,
and are in almost constant perplexity to keep their hearts right, by which
they mean their feelings, in a state of great excitement.
Again: they are not only sometimes languid, and have no pious feelings
and desires, but at others they are conscious of classes of emotions which
they call sin. These they resist, but still blame themselves for having
them in their hearts, as they say. Thus they are brought into bondage
again, although they are certain that these feelings are hated, and not at
all indulged, by them,
Oh, how much all classes of persons need to have clearly defined ideas
of what really constitutes sin and holiness. A false philosophy of the mind,
especially of the will, and of moral depravity, has covered the world with
gross darkness on the subject of sin and holiness, of regeneration, and of
the evidences of regeneration, until the true saints, on the one hand, are
kept in a continual bondage to their false motions; and on the other, the
church Swarms with unconverted professors, and is cursed with many self-
deceived ministers.
REGENERATION. 439
LECTURE XLV.
REGENERATION.
III. WHEREIN SAINTS AND SINNERS, OR DECEIVED PROFESSOBS, MUST
DIFFER.
In discussing this branch of the subject, I will—
1. Make several prefatory remarks.
2. Point out the prominent characteristics of both.
1. Prefatory remarks.
(1.) The Bible represents all mankind as forming two, and but two,
great classes, Saints and sinners. All regenerate souls, whatever be their
attainments, are included in the first class. All unregenerate persons,
whatever be their profession, possessions, gifts, or station, are included in
the second.
(2.) The Bible represents the difference between these two classes as
radical, fundamental, and complete. The Bible does not recognize the
impenitent as having any goodness in them, but uniformly as being dead
in trespasses and in sins. It represents the saints as being dead to sin,
and alive to God, as sanctified persons, and often speaks in such strong
language as almost to compel us to understand it as denying that the Saints
sin at all; or to conclude, that sinning at all, proves that one is not a Saint.
It does take the unqualified ground, that no one is a Saint who lives or
indulges in any sin.
(3.) The Bible represents the difference between saints and sinners as
very manifest and as appearing abundantly in their lives. It requires us to
judge all men by their fruits. It gives us both the fruits of a regenerate,
and of an unregenerate state, and is exceedingly specific and plain upon
this subject.
(4.) In treating this question, I shall endeavour to bear in mind, that I
am inquiring after the evidences of regeneration, and that I am to speak,
not of high and rare attainments in piety, but of its beginnings, and of
things that must exist and appear, where there is even the commencement
of true holiness.
2. I will point out the prominent characteristics of both saints and sinners.
(1.) Let it be distinctly remembered, that all unregenerate persons.
without exception, have one heart, that is, they are selfish. This is their
whole character. They are universally and only devoted to self-interest, or
self-gratification. Their unregenerate heart consists in this selfish dispo-
sition, or in this selfish choice. This choice is the foundation of, and the
reason for, all their activity. One and the same ultimate reason actuates
them in all they do, and in all they omit, and that reason is either pre-
sently or remotely, directly or indirectly, to gratify themselves.
440 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
The regenerate heart is disinterested benevolence. In other words, it is
love to God and our neighbour. All regenerate hearts are precisely similar.
All true Saints, whenever they have truly the heart of the saints of God,
are actuated by one and the same motive. They have only one ultimate
reason for all they do, and suffer, or omit. They have one ultimate inten-
tion, one end. They live for one and the same object, and that is the same
end for which God lives.
Now the thing after which we are inquiring is, what must be the
necessary developements and manifestations of these opposite states of
mind. These opposite states are Supreme and opposite and ultimate
choices; and those opposite choices are ultimate. In whatever the saint
and the sinner respectively engage, they have directly opposite ends in
view. They are states of Supreme devotion to ultimate and opposite ends.
In whatever they do, the Saint, if he acts as a saint, and the sinner, if he
acts as a sinner, have directly opposite ends in view. They do, or omit
what they do, for entirely different and opposite ultimate reasons. Al-
though, as we have seen, in many things their opposite ends may lead them
to attempt to secure them by similar means, and may, therefore, often lead
to the same outward life, in many respects, yet it is always true, that even
when they act outwardly alike, they have inwardly entirely different
ultimate reasons for their conduct. As it often happens, that the Saint in
pursuing the highest good of being in general as an end, finds it necessary
to do many things which the simmer may do to secure his selfish end ; and
as it often happens, that the sinner, in his endeavours to compass his selfish
end, finds it necessary to use the same outward means that the Saint does
in his efforts to secure his end, it requires not unfrequently a good degree
of candour and of discrimination to distinguish between them. And, as
saints and sinners possess the same, or similar, constitutions and constitu-
tional propensities, their desires and feelings are often so much alike, as to
embarrass the superficial inquirer after their true spiritual state. As has
been said, the simmer often, in seasons of strong religious excitement, not
only has desires and feelings resulting from the laws of his constitution,
similar to those that are experienced by the Saints, but he also, for the
time being, gives up his will to follow these impulses. In this case it
requires the micest discrimination to distinguish between the Saint and the
sinner; for at such times they not only feel alike, but they also act alike.
The difficulty, in such cases, is to distinguish between the action of a will
that obeys the intelligence and one that obeys a class of feelings that are so
nearly in harmony with the dictates of the intelligence. To distinguish,
in such cases, between that which proceeds from feeling, and that which
proceeds from the intelligence, requires no slight degree of attention and
discrimination. One needs to be a close observer, and no tyro in mental
philosophy, to make just discriminations in cases of this kind.
Let it be understood, that the fundamental difference between saints and
sinners does not consist in the fact, that one has a sinful mature, and the
other has not, for neither of them has a sinful nature.
REGENERATION. 441
(2) Nor does it consist in the fact, that the Saint has had a physical
regeneration, and therefore possesses some element of constitution which
the sinner has not.
(3.) Nor does it consist in this, that Saints are aiming or intending to do
right, while sinners are aiming and intending to do wrong.
The saint loves God and his neigh- The sinner is selfish, and chooses
bour; that is, chooses or intends their his own gratification as an end.
highest good, for its own sake.
This choice or intention is right, This choice or intention is wrong;
though right is not the ultimate thing but wrong is not the end chosen, or
intended. The good, i.e., the valu- the thing upon which the intention
able to being, and not the right, is that terminates.
upon which the intention terminates.
They are both choosing what they regard as valuable.
The saint chooses the good of being impartially ; that is, he chooses the
highest good of being in general for its own sake, and lays no greater stress
upon his own, than is dictated by the law of his own intelligence. His duty
is to will the greatest amount of good to being in general, and promote the
greatest amount of good within his power. From the relation of things,
every one's own highest well-being is committed to his particular keeping
and promotion, in a higher sense than that of his neighbour is. Next to
his own well-being, that of his own family and kindred is committed to his
particular keeping and promotion, in a higher sense than that of his neigh-
bour's family and kindred. Next the interest and well-being of his im-
mediate neighbourhood and of those more immediately within the sphere
of his influence, is committed to his keeping and promotion. Thus, while
all interests are to be esteemed according to their intrinsic and relative
value, the law of God requires, that we should lay ourselves out more
particularly for the promotion of those interests that lie so much within
our reach, that we can accomplish and secure a greater amount of good, by
giving our principal attention and efforts to them, than could be secured by
our practically treating the interests of every individual, of every family,
and of every neighbourhood, as of equal value with our own. The practical
judgment of all men always was, and necessarily must be, that the law of
God demands, that every one should see to his own soul, and should
provide for his own household, and that the highest good of the whole
universe can best be promoted only by each individual, each family, each
neighbourhood, and each nation, taking care to secure those interests more
immediately committed to them, because more immediately within their
reach. This is not selfishness, if the intention is to secure the highest good
of being in general, and of these particular interests, as a part of the
general good, and because it falls particularly to us to promote these par-
ticular interests, inasmuch as their promotion is particularly within our
reach. The law of God, while it demands that I should will the highest
good of being in general for its own sake, and esteem every interest known
442 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to me according to its intrinsic and relative value, demands also, that as a
pastor of a church, I should give my time, and influence, and energies,
more particularly to the promotion of the good of the people of my own
charge. More good will, upon the whole, result to the world from pastors
taking this course, than by their taking any other. The same is true of
the family relation, and of all the relations of life. Our relations give us
peculiar facilities for securing good, and impose on us peculiar responsi-
bilities. Our relation to our own highest well-being imposes peculiar
responsibilities on us, in regard to our own souls. So of our families, neigh-
bourhoods, &c. It should be well considered then, that the precept, “Thou
shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” does not require every one to pay just
the attention to his neighbour's soul that he does to his own, nor the same
attention to his neighbour's children and family that he does to his own.
He is bound to esteem his neighbour's interest according to its relative
value, and to pursue his own interest, and the interest of his family and
neighbourhood, and nation, in a manner not inconsistent with the interests
of others, but in a manner as highly conducive to the promotion of their
interests, as in his judgment will, upon the whole, secure the greatest
amount of good. If I have a life to live, and a certain amount of time,
and talent, and money, and influence, to lay out for God and souls, I am
bound to use all in that manner that, in my honest judgment, will upon
the whole secure the greatest amount of good to being. I am not, cer-
tainly, to divide the pittance of my possessions among all men of present
and coming generations. Nor am I to scatter my time and talents over
the face of the whole globe. But, on the contrary, benevolence dictates,
that I should lay out my time, and talents, and influence, and possessions,
where and when, and in a way, in my honest estimation, calculated to Secure
to being the greatest amount of good.
I have said thus much, as might seem, by way of preparation; but, in
fact, it is necessary for us to have these thoughts in mind, when we enter
upon the discussion of the question before us; to wit: What are evidences
of a truly benevolent state of mind? For example; suppose we should
enter upon the inquiry in question, taking along with us the assumption,
that true benevolence, that is, the disinterested love of God and our
neighbour, implies that we should not only esteem, but also treat, all other
interests of equal intrinsic value with our own, according to their intrinsic
and relative value. I say, should we, in searching after evidence of dis-
interested benevolence, take along with us this false assumption, where
should we find any evidence of benevolence on earth 2 No man does or can
act upon such a principle. God has never acted upon it. Christ never
acted upon it. Why did God select the particular nation of the Jews, and
confine his revelations to them 2 Why did Christ preach the gospel to the
Jews only, and say that he was not sent, save to the lost sheep of the house
of Israel? Why has God always acted upon this principle of accomplishing the
greatest practicable good under all the circumstances of the case ? He
esteems the good of all, and of each, of his creatures according to its intrinsic
REGENERATION. 443
and relative value, but does good when and as he best can. If the greatest
amount of ultimate good can be secured by choosing Abraham before all
other men, and making him and his posterity the objects of peculiar
effort and spiritual cultivation, and the depositories of the holy oracles,
which he intended should ultimately bless all nations, why then, he does
it. He exercises his own discretion in his efforts to accomplish the greatest
amount of good. Good is his end, and he does all the good he can. In
securing this, he does many things that might appear partial to those who
take but a limited view of things. Just so with all truly benevolent creatures.
Good is their end. In promoting it, their intelligence and the law of God
dictate, that they should bestow their particular efforts, attention, influence,
and possessions upon those particular interests and persons that will, in
their judgment, result in the highest good of being as a whole. The whole
Bible everywhere assumes this as the correct rule of duty. Hence it
recognizes all the relations of life, and the peculiar responsibilities and
duties that grow out of them, and enjoins the observance of those duties.
The relation of husband and wife, of parent and child, of ruler and subject,
and indeed all the relations incident to our highest well-being in this life, are
expressly recognized, and their corresponding obligations assumed by the
inspired writers; which shows clearly, that they understood the law of supreme
love to God and equal love to our neighbour, to imply an obligation to give
particular attention to those interests which God had placed more particu-
larly within the reach of our influence; always remembering that those
interests are to be pursued impartially; that is, in consistency with the
promotion of all other interests, by those to whom their promotion is parti-
cularly committed. For example: I am not to pursue my own good and
that of my family, or my neighbourhood, or my nation, in a manner incon-
sistent with the interests of my neighbour, or his family, or neighbourhood,
or nation. But I am to seek the promotion of all the interests particularly
committed to me, in harmony with, and only as Inaking a part of, the
general interest of being.
Now let it be remembered, that the Saint is benevolent, and all his life as
a saint is only the developement of this one principle ; or his outward and
inward activity is only an effort to secure the end upon which benevolence
fastens, to wit, the highest good of God and of being in general.
The sinner is selfish; all his activity is to be ascribed to an intention to
secure his own gratification. Self-interest is his end. It is easy to see
from what has been said, that, to an outward observer, a benevolent saint
may, and often must, appear to be selfish, and the selfish sinner may and
will appear to be disinterested. The saint pursues his own good and the
happiness and well-being of his family, as a part of universal good, and does
it disinterestedly. The sinner pursues his own gratification, and that of his
family, not as parts of universal good, and disinterestedly, but as his own,
and as the interest of those who are regarded as parts of himself, and whose
interest he regards as identified with his own.
They are both busy in promoting the interests of self and family, and
444 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
neighbourhood, &c. And the difference between them lies in their ultimate
intentions, or the reasons for what they do. º
There is, as I have intimated, special difficulty in ascertaining, for cer.
tainty, which is the Saint and which the sinner, when the sinner's selfishness
is directed to the securing of a heavenly and eternal interest, instead of a
worldly and temporal one. He may, and often does, aim at securing a
heavenly and an etermal interest, both for himself, and family, and friends.
When he does this, his outward manifestations are so very like those of the
true Saint, as to render it difficult, if not impossible, for an observer for the
time being to distinguish accurately between them.
I have compared the Saint and the sinner, in my last lecture, for the
purpose of showing in what respect they may be alike.
I will now, in a few particulars, proceed to contrast them, that it may
appear in what they differ.
(1.) And fundamentally, they are radically opposite to each other in their
ultimate choice or intention. They are supremely devoted to different and
opposite ends. They live to promote those opposite ends.
(2.) The Saint is governed by reason, the law of God, or the moral law; in
other words still, the law of disinterested and universal benevolence is his
law. This law is not only revealed and developed in his intelligence, but
it is written in his heart. So that the law of his intellect is the law of
his heart. He not only sees and acknowledges what he ought to do and
be, but he is conscious to himself, and gives evidence to others, whether
they receive it and are convinced by it or not, that his heart, his will, or
intention, is conformed to his convictions of duty. He sees the path of
duty, and follows it. He knows what he ought to will, intend, and do, and
does it. Of this he is conscious. And of this others may be Satisfied, if
they are observing, charitable, and candid.
(3.) The sinner is contrasted with this in the most important and funda-
mental respects. He is not governed by reason and principle, but by feeling,
desire, and impulse. Sometimes his feelings coincide with the intelligence,
and sometimes they do not. But when they do so coincide, the will does
not pursue its course out of respect or in obedience to the law of the
intelligence, but in obedience to the impulse of the sensibility, which, for
the time being, impels in the same direction as does the law of the reason.
But for the most part the impulses of the sensibility incline him to worldly
gratifications, and in an opposite direction to that which the intelligence
points out. This leads him to a course of life that is too manifestly the
opposite of reason, to leave any room for doubt, as to what his true
character is.
But he also has the law revealed in his intelligence. His head is right,
but his heart is wrong. He knows what he ought to do, and will, and be,
but he is conscious that his heart does not obey his reason. He is con-
scious that the law is in his intelligence, but is not written in his heart.
He knows that he is not in heart what he necessarily affirms that he ought
to be. He knows that he is habitually selfish, and not disinterestedly
REGENERATION. 445
benevolent. Sometimes, as has been said, during seasons of special reli-
gious excitement, when his sensibility and intelligence impel in the same
direction, he thinks his heart and his head agree ; that he is what he knows
he ought to be ; that the law is written in his heart. But as soon as this
excitement subsides, he sees, or may see, that it was not his intelligence
but his sensibility that governed his will; that in the absence of religious
excitement his intelligence has no control of his will ; that he is governed
by impulse and not by principle. This will also be manifest to others. If
during religious excitement they have hoped too well of him, as soon as,
and in proportion as, excitement ceases, they will clearly see, that it was
the impulse of feeling, and not the law of the intelligence that governed
him. They will soon clearly See, that he has not, and had not, the root
of the matter in him ; that his religion was founded in the effervescence
of the ever-varying sensibility, and not in the stable demands of his reason
and conscience. As excitement waxes and wanes, he will be ever fluc-
tuating. Sometimes quite zealous, and active, and talkative, full of feeling,
he will have the appearance of possessing most of the phases of Christian
character in a state of freshness and beauty. And anon his religious
excitement ceases. His tongue is silent on religious subjects. His zeal
abates apace. His, attendance at the prayer and conference meeting is
interrupted, and finally ceases. A Worldly excitement takes possession of
his sensibility. His will is carried of course. Politics, business, annuse-
ment, no matter what, is for the time being his exciting topic; he is car-
ried away with it, and remains in this state carried hither and thither by
worldly engrossments, until another religious excitement renews and con-
firms his delusion and that of his friends, who look upon him as a real
Christian, but prome to backsliding.
(4.) The true saint is distinguished by his firm adherence to all the prim-
ciples and rules of the divine government. He is a reformer from principle,
and needs not the gale of popular excitement, or of popular applause, to
put and keep him in motion. His intellect and conscience have taken the
control of his will, or the will has renounced the impulses of the sensibility
as its law, and voluntarily committed itself to the demands of the reason.
This fact must appear both on the field of his own consciousness, and also
in most instances be very manifest to others. His zeal does not wax and
wane with every breeze of excitement. He is not carried away by every
change in the effervescing sensibility. The law of reason being written in
his heart, he does not at one time appear reasonable, and to be influenced
by conscience and a regard to the law of love, and at another to be infinitely
unreasonable, and to have little or no regard to God or his laws. He fears
and shuns popular excitements, as he does all other temptations. He
loaths and resists them. The excitements of politics, and business, and
amusements, are regarded by him with a jealous eye. He dreads their
influence on his sensibility; and when he feels them, it causes a deep
struggle and groaning of spirit, because the will, adhering to the law of
conscience, stedfastly resists them, Such-like excitements, instead of
446 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
being his element and the aliment of his life, are a grief and a vexation
to him. Instead of living, and moving, and having his being, as it were,
in the midst of them, and by them, he is only annoyed by them. They are
not the moving spring of his activity, but only embarrass his spiritual life.
His spiritual life is founded in the law of the intelligence, and supported
by the light of the Holy Spirit poured upon his intellect through the truth.
He steadily resists the flood-tides of mere feeling on every subject, and
abides by truth, and principle, and moral law, whatever may be the circum-
stances of worldly or religious excitement around him. Be it ever remem-
bered, it is moral law, moral principle, the law of love, and not mere feeling,
that governs him.
(5.) The simmer, or deceived professor, for they are one, is the very opposite
of this. Excitement is his element and his life. He has truly no moral
principle except in theory. He is never truly influenced by truth, law,
reason, but always by excitement of some kind. His activity is based on
this ; hence he is not disturbed and embarrassed in his movements, by
excitements of any kind, any longer than it takes to put down one form of
excitement and take on another. If when he is much interested and
excited and carried away, in one direction, a counter influence or excite-
ment comes in his way, he is taken aback for the time being. He is
disconcerted and embarrassed, perhaps displeased. But you will soon see
him change his course, and follow the new excitement. Excitement is his
life, and although, like a ship at sea, he is thrown into temporary confusion
by a sudden change of the winds and waves, so, like her whose life and
activity are the breezes and the gale, and the ocean wave, he readily
accommodates his sails and his course to the ever-changing breeze and
currents of excitement, in the midst of which he loves to live, and on the
foaming surface of which he is borne along. If you wish to move him,
you must strongly appeal to his feelings. Reason does not, cannot govern
him. 'Tis not enough to say to him, 'Thus saith the Lord. He will admit
the right, but surely will not do it. He will not go that way, unless you
can first make his feelings move in that direction. He holds the truth
only in theory and in unrighteousness. It is not the law of his life, his
heart, his warmest affections and sympathies. Present considerations to
his intelligence; unless they excite his sensibility, and arouse his hopes,
or fears, or feelings in Some direction, you might as well attempt to change
the course of the winds by your words. His imagination must be aroused
and set on fire. His sensibility must be reached, enkindled. The gales
of excitement must be raised, and thc mainspring of his action must be
touched, and directed to impel his will, before you can quicken him into
life. IIis feelings are his law.
(6.) The saint is justified, and he has the evidence of it in the peace of
his own mind. He is conscious of obeying the law of reason and of love.
Consequently he maturally has that kind and degree of peace that flows
from the harmony of his will with the law of his intelligence. He some-
times has conflicts with the impulses of feeling and desire. But unless he
REGENERATION. 447
*
is overcome, these conflicts, though they may cause him inwardly, and,
perhaps, audibly to groan, do not interrupt his peace. There are still the
elements of peace within him. His heart and conscience are at one, and
while this is so he has thus far the evidence of justification in himself.
That is, he knows that God cannot condemn his present state. Conscious
as he is of conformity of heart to the moral law, he cannot but affirm to
himself, that the lawgiver is pleased with his present attitude. But further,
he has also within the Spirit of God witnessing with his spirit, that he is a
child of God, forgiven, accepted, adopted. He feels the filial spirit
drawing his heart to exclaim, Father, Father. He is conscious that he
pleases God, and has God's smile of approbation.
He is at peace with himself, because he affirms his heart to be in unison
with the law of love. His conscience does not upbraid, but Smile. The
harmony of his own being is a witness to himself, that this is the state in
which he was made to exist. He is at peace with God, because he and God
are pursuing precisely the same end, and by the same means. There can
be no collision, no controversy between them. He is at peace with the
universe, in the sense, that he has no ill-will, and no malicious feelings or
wish to gratify, in the injury of any one of all the creatures of God. He
has no fear, but to sin against God. He is not influenced on the one hand
by the fear of hell, nor on the other by the hope of reward. He is not
anxious about his own salvation, but prayerfully and calmly leaves that
question in the hands of God, and concerns himself only to promote the
highest glory of God, and the good of being. “Being justified by faith,
he has peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.” “There is now
no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the
flesh, but after the Spirit.”
(7.) The sinner's experience is the opposite of this. He is under condem-
nation, and seldom can so far deceive himself, even in his most religious
moods, as to imagine that he has a consciousness of acceptance either with
his own conscience or with God. There is almost never a time in which he
has mot a greater or less degree of restlessness and misgiving within. Even
when he is most engaged in religion, as he supposes, he finds himself dis-
satisfied with himself. Something is wrong. There is a struggle and a
pang. He may not exactly see where and what the difficulty is. He does
not, after all, obey reason and conscience, and is not governed by the law
and will of God. Not having the consciousness of this obedience, his con-
science does not smile. He sometimes feels deeply, and acts as he feels,
and is conscious of being sincere in the sense of feeling what he says, and
acting in obedience to deep feeling, But this does not satisfy conscience.
He is more or less wretched after all. He has not true peace. Sometimes
he has a self-righteous quiet and enjoyment. But this is neither peace of
conscience nor peace with God. He, after all, feels uneasy and condemned,
notwithstanding all his feeling, and zeal, and activity. They are not of the
right kind. Hence they do not satisfy the conscience. They do not meet
the demands of his intelligence. Conscience does not approve. He has
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REGENERATION. 449
(9) But right over against this you will find the sinner, or deceived
professor. God's will is not his law; but his own sensibility is his law.
With him it is not enough to know the will of God ; he must also have
his sensibility excited in that direction, before he goes. He does not mean,
nor expect, to avoid every form and degree of iniquity. His heart has not
renounced sim as sin. It has not embraced the will of God from principle,
and of course has not embraced the whole will of God. With him it is a
small thing to commit what he calls little sins. This shows, conclusively,
where he is. If the will of God were his law—as this is as really opposed
to what he calls little, as to what he calls great sins, he would not expect
and intend to disobey God in one thing more than in another. He could
know no little sins, since they conflict with the will of God. But he goes
about to pick and choose among the commandments of God, sometimes
yielding an outward obedience to those that conflict least with his inclina-
tions, and which therefore will cost him the least self-denial, but evading
and disregarding those that lay the axe to the root of the tree, and prohibit
all selfishness. The simmer, or deceived professor, does not in fact
seriously mean, or expect, wholly to obey God. He thinks that this is
common to all Christians. He as much expects to sin every day against
God, as he expects to live, and does not think this at all inconsistent with
his being a real, though imperfect, Christian. He is conscious of indulg
ing in some sins, and that he has never repented of them and put them
away, but he thinks that this also is common to all Christians, and there-
fore it does not slay his false hope. He would much sooner indulge in
gluttony than in drunkenness, because the latter would more seriously
affect his reputation. He would not hesitate to indulge wanton thoughts
and imaginations when he would not allow himself in outward licentious-
ness, because of its bearing upon his character, and, as he says, upon the
eause of God. He will not hesitate to take little advantages of his neigh-
bour, to amass a fortune in this way, while he would recoil from robbing on
the highway, or on the high seas; for this would injure his reputation with
man, and, as he thinks, more surely destroy his soul. Sinners sometimes
become exceedingly self-righteous, and aim at what they call perfection,
But unless they are very ignorant, they soon become discouraged, and cry
out, “O, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of
this death 2". They, however, almost always satisfy themselves with a
mere outward morality, and that, as I have said, not descending to what
they call little sins,
&
G G.
450 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE XLVI.
REGENERATION.
IN WHAT SAINTS AND SINNERS DIFFER.
(10.) Saints are interested in, and sympathize with, every effort to reform
mankind, and promote the interests of truth and righteousness in the earth.
The good of being is the end for which the Saint really and truly lives.
This is not merely held by him as a theory, as an opinion, as a theological
or philosophical speculation. It is in his heart, and precisely for this
reason he is a saint. He is a saint just because the theory, which is
lodged in the head of both saint and sinner, has also a lodgement and a
reigning power in his heart, and consequently in his life. The fact is,
that saints, as such, have no longer a wicked heart. They are “born
again,” “born of God,” and “ they cannot sin, for his seed remaineth in
them, so that they cannot sin, because they are born of God.” “They
have a new heart,” “are new creatures,” “old things are passed away, and
behold all things are become new.” They are holy or sanctified persons.
The Bible representations of the new birth forbid us to suppose that the
truly regenerate have still a wicked heart. The nature of regeneration
also renders it certain that the regenerate heart cannot be a wicked heart.
His heart or choice is fixed upon the highest good of God and the universe
as an end. Moral agents are so constituted, that they necessarily regard
truth and righteousness, as conditions of the highest good of moral agents.
These being necessarily regarded by them as indispensable to the end, will,
and must be considered as important, as the end to which they sustain the
relation of indispensable conditions. As they supremely value the highest
good of being, they will, and must take a deep interest in whatever is
promotive of that end. Hence, their spirit is necessarily that of the re-
former. To the universal reformation of the world they stand committed.
To this end they are devoted. For this end they live, and move, and
have their being, Every proposed reform interests them, and naturally
leads them to examine its claims. The fact is, they are studying and
devising ways and means to convert, Sanctify, reform mankind. Being in
this state of mind, they are predisposed to lay hold on whatever gives
promise of good to man. A close examination will show a remarkable
difference between saints and sinners in this respect. True Saints love
reform. It is their business, their profession, their life to promote it; con-
sequently they are ready to examine the claims of any proposed reform ;
candid and self-denying, and ready to be convinced, however much self.
denial it may call them to. They have actually rejected self-indulgence, as
the end for which they live, and are ready to sacrifice any form of self.
indulgence, for the Sake of promoting the good of men and the glory of
God. It is not, and cannot be natural to them to be prejudiced against
reform, to be apt to array themselves against, or speak lightly of, any
REGENERATION. 451
proposed reform, until they have thoroughly examined its claims, and
found it wanting in the essential attributes of true reform. The natural
bearing or bias of the saint's mind is in favour of whatever proposes to
do good, and instead of ridiculing reform in general, or speaking lightly or
censoriously of reform, the exact opposite is natural to him. It is natural
to him to revere reformers, and to honour those who have introduced even
what proved in the end not to be wholesome reforms, if so be there is
evidence, that they were sincere and self-denying in their efforts to benefit
mankind. The saint is truly and greatly desirous, and in earnest, to reform
all sin out of the world, and just for this reason is ready to hail with joy,
and to try whatever reform seems, from the best light he can get, to bid
fair to put down sin, and the evils that are in the world. Even mistaken
men, who are homestly endeavouring to reform mankind, and denying their
appetites, as many have done in dietetic reform, are deserving of the
respect of their fellow men. Suppose their philosophy to be incorrect, yet
they have intended well. They have manifested a disposition to deny
themselves, for the purpose of promoting the good of others. They have
been honest and zealous in this. Now no true Saint can feel or express
contempt for such reformers, however much mistaken they may be. No ;
his matural sentiments and feelings will be, and must be, the reverse of
contempt or censoriousness in respect to them. If their mistake has been
injurious, he may mourn over the evil, but will not, cannot, severely judge
the homest reformer. War, slavery, licentiousness, and all such like evils
and abominations, are necessarily regarded by the saint as great and sore
evils, and he longs for their complete and final overthrow. It is impossible
that a truly benevolent mind should not thus regard these abominations of
desolation. The cause of peace, the cause of anti-slavery, and that of the
overthrow of licentiousness, must lie near the heart of every truly be-
nevolent mind. I know that sinners often have a certain kind of interest
in these and other reforms. This will be noticed and explained in the
proper place. But whatever is true of sinners under certain circumstances,
it must be always true of Christians, that they hail the cause of peace, of
the abolition of slavery, and of the abolition of every form of sin, and of
every evil, moral and physical, with joy, and cannot but give them a hearty
God-speed. If they see that they are advocated on wrong principles, or
with a bad spirit, or by bad men, and that injurious measures are used to
promote them, the saints will mourn, will be faithful in trying to find out
and to proclaim a more excellent way. Do but keep in mind the fact, that
Saints are truly benevolent, and are really and heartily consecrated to the
highest good of being, and then it will surely be seen, that these things
must be true of real Saints.
The Saints in all ages have been reformers. I know it is said, that
neither prophets, Christ, nor apostles, nor primitive saints and martyrs
declaimed against war and slavery, &c. But they did. The entire in-
structions of Christ, and of apostles and prophets, were directly opposed to
these and all other evils. If they did not come out against certain legalized
G G 2
452 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
forms of sin, and denounce them by name, and endeavour to array public
sentiment against them, it is plainly because they were, for the most part,
employed in a preliminary work. To introduce the gospel as a divine
revelation; to set up and organize the visible kingdom of God on earth;
to lay a foundation for universal reform, was rather their business, than the
pushing forward of particular branches of reform. The overthrow of state
idolatry, the great and universal sin of the world in that age; the labour of
getting the world and the governments of earth to tolerate and receive the
gospel as a revelation from the one only living and true God; the con-
troversy with the Jews, to overthrow their objections to Christianity; in
short, the great and indispensable and preliminary work of gaining for
Christ and his gospel a hearing, and an acknowledgment of its divinity,
was rather their work, than the pushing of particular precepts and doctrines
of the gospel to their legitimate results and logical consequences. This
work once done has left it for later saints to bring the particular truths,
precepts, and doctrines of the blessed gospel to bear down every form of
sin. Prophets, Christ, and his apostles, have left on the pages of inspiration
no dubious testimony against every form of sin. The spirit of the whole
Bible breathes from every page blasting and annihilation upon every
unholy abomination, while it smiles upon everything of good report that
promises blessings to man and glory to God. The saint is not merely
Sometimes a reformer; he is always so. He is necessarily so, if he abide
a Saint. It is a contradiction to say, that a true Saint is not devoted to
reform ; for, as I have said, he is a true Saint just because he is devoted,
heart, and Soul, and life, and all, to the promotion of the good of universal
being.
(ll.) The sinner is never a reformer in any proper sense of the word
He is selfish and never opposed to sin, or to any evil whatever, from any
such motive as renders him worthy the mame of reformer. He sometimes
selfishly advocates and pushes certain outward reforms; but as certain as
it is that he is an unregenerate sinner, so certain is it, that he is not
endeavouring to reform sin out of the world from any disinterested love to
God or to mam. Many considerations of a selfish nature may engage him
at times in certain branches of reform. Regard to his reputation may
excite his zeal in such an enterprize. Self-righteous considerations may
also lead him to enlist in the army of reformers. His relation to particular
forms of vice may influence him to set his face against them. Constitu-
tional temperament and tendencies may lead to his engaging in certain
reforms. For example, his constitutional benevolence, as phrenologists
call it, may be such that from natural compassion he may engage in
reforms. But this is only giving way to an impulse of the sensibility, and
it is not principle that governs him. His natural conscientiousness may
modify his outward character, and lead him to take hold of some branches
of reform. But whatever other motives he may have, sure it is that he is
not a reformer; for he is a simmer, and it is absurd to say that a sinner is
truly engaged in opposing sin as sin. No, it is not sin that he is opposing,
REGENERATION. 453
but he is seeking to gratify an ambitious, a self-righteous, or some other
spirit, the gratification of which is selfishness.
But as a general thing, it is easy to distinguish sinners, or deceived pro-
fessors from saints by looking steadfastly at their temper and deportment in
their relations to reform. They are self-indulgent, and sinners just for the
reason that they are devoted to self-indulgence. Sometimes their self-
indulgent spirit takes on one type, and sometimes another. Of course they
need not be expected to ridicule or oppose every branch of reform, just because
it is not every reformer that will rebuke their favourite indulgences, and call
them to reform their lives. But as every sinner has one or more particular
form of indulgence to which he is wedded, and as saints are devising and
pushing reforms in all directions, it is natural that some sinners should
manifest particular hostility to one reform, and some to another. Whenever
a reform is proposed that would reform them out of their favourite in-
dulgences, they will either ridicule it, and those that propose it, or storm
and rail, or in some way oppose or wholly neglect it. Not so, and so it
cannot be, with a true saint. He has no indulgence that he values when
put in competition with the good of being. Nay, he holds his all and his
life at the disposal of the highest good. Has he, in ignorance of the evils
growing out of his course, used ardent spirits, wine, tobacco, ale, or porter 2
Has he held slaves; been engaged in any traffic that is found to be
injurious; has he favoured war through ignorance; or, in short, has he com-
mitted any mistake whatever? let but a reformer come forth and propose
to discuss the tendency of such things; let the reformer bring forth his
strong reasons; and from the very nature of true religion, the saint will
listem with attention, weigh with candour, and suffer himself to be carried
by truth, heart, and hand, and influence with the proposed reform, if it be
worthy of support, how much soever it conflict with his former habits.
This must be true, if he has a single eye to the good of being, which is the
very characteristic of a saint.
But the sinner, or deceived professor, is naturally a conservative as
opposed to a reformer. He says, Let me alone in my indulgences, and I
will let you alone in yours, provided they in no way interfere with my own.
Consequently, he is in general disposed to distrust, to discountenance, and
to ridicule reforms and those that advocate them. He is uncandid and
hard to convince ; will demand an express, “Thus saith the Lord.” or what is
equivalent to a demonstration, of the wisdom and utility and practicability
of a proposed reform. He will evince in many ways, that his heart is not
predisposed to reforms. He will be eagle-eyed in respect to any faults in
the character or measures of the reformers; he will be eager to detect and
seize upon any error in their logic, and is easily displeased and repelled
with their measures.
In short, sinners will be almost sure to manifest a latent dislike to
reforms. They will dwell much and almost exclusively upon the evils of
revivals of religion, for example; the danger of spurious excitements; of
promoting famaticism and misrule; of encouraging false hopes; and they
454 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
will in various ways manifest a disrelish for revivals of religion, but always
under the pretence of a concern for the purity of the church, and honour of
God. They will be too much taken up with the evils and dangers, ever to
give themselves heartily to the promotion of pure revivals. They act on
the defensive. They have enough to do to resist and oppose what they call
evils, without even trying to show a more excellent way. They in general
take substantially the same course in respect to almost every branch of
reformation, and especially to every reform that can touch their idols.
They are so much afraid of mistakes and evils, that they withhold their
influence, when in fact the difficulty is, they have no heart to the work.
Benvolence has been for thousands of years endeavouring to reform the
world, and selfishness is opposing it. And often, very often, under the
Sanctimonious garb of a concern for the honour of religion, selfishness utters
its sighs and lamentations over the supposed ignorance, mistakes, famaticism,
and injurious measures, of those whose hearts and hands and entire being
are devoted to the work.
(12.) Christians overcome the world. I will here introduce an extract
from a discourse of my own upon this text, reported in the Oberlin
Evangelist :—
“For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world : and this is the
victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.”—John v. 4.
FIRST. What is it to overcome the world 2
(i.) It is to get above the spirit of covetousness which possesses the men
of the world. The spirit of the world is eminently the spirit of covetous-
ness. It is a greediness after the things of the world. Some worldly men
covet one thing, aud some another ; but all classes of worldly men are
living in the spirit of covetousness, in some of its forms. This spirit has
supreme possession of their minds.
Now the first thing in overcoming the world is, that the spirit of cove-
tousness in respect to worldly things and objects, be overcome. The man
who does not overcome this spirit of bustling and scrambling after the
good which this world proffers, has by no means overcome it.
(ii.) Overcoming the world implies, rising above its engrossments. When
a man has overcome the World, his thoughts are no longer engrossed and
swallowed up with worldly things. A man certainly does not overcome
the world, unless he gets above being engrossed and absorbed with its
COI) Cé]"]].S.
Now we all know how exceedingly engrossed worldly men are with some
form of worldly good. One is swallowed up with study; another with
politics; a third with money-getting ; and a fourth, perhaps, with fashion
and pleasure; but each in his chosen way makes earthly good the all-
engrossing object.
The man who gains the victory over the world, must overcome not one
form only of its pursuits, but every form—must overcome the world itself,
and all that it has to present, as an allurement to the human heart.
REGENERATION. 45.5
(iii.) Overcoming the world implies overcoming the fear of the world.
It is a mournful fact that most men, and indeed all men of worldly
character have so much regard to public opinion, that they dare not act
according to the dictates of their consciences, when acting thus would
incur the popular frown. One is afraid lest his business should suffer, if
his course runs counter to public opinion; another fears, lest if he stands
up for the truth, it will injure his reputation, and curiously imagines and
tries to believe, that advocating an unpopular truth will diminish and
perhaps destroy his good influence—as if a man could exert a good influence
in any possible way besides maintaining the truth.
Great multitudes, it must be admitted, are under this influence of
fearing the world; yet some of them, and perhaps many of them, are not
aware of this fact. If you, or if they, could thoroughly sound the reasons
of their backwardness in duty, fear of the world would be among the chief.
Their fear of the world's displeasure is so much stronger than their fear of
God's displeasure, that they are completely enslaved by it. Who does not
know that some ministers dare not preach what they know is true, and
even what they know is important truth, lest they should offend some
whose good opinion they seek to retain 2 The society is weak perhaps, and
the favour of some rich man in it seems indispensable to its very existence.
Hence the terror of this rich man is continually before their eyes, when
they write a sermon, or preach, or are called to stand up in favour of any
truth or cause, which may be unpopular with men of more wealth than
piety or conscience. Alas! this bondage to man Many gospel ministers
are so troubled by it, that their time-serving policy becomes virtually
renouncing Christ, and serving the world.
Overcoming the world is thoroughly subduing this servility to men.
(iv.) Overcoming the world implies overcoming a state of worldly anxiety.
You know there is a state of great carefulness and anxiety which is common
and almost universal among worldly men. It is perfectly natural, if the
heart is set upon securing worldly good, and has not learned to receive all
good from the hand of a great Father, and trust him to give or withhold,
with his own unerring wisdom. But he who loves the world is the enemy
of God, and hence can never have this filial trust in a parental Benefactor,
nor the peace of soul which it imparts. Hence worldly men are almost
incessantly in a fever of anxiety lest their worldly schemes should fail.
They sometimes get a momentary relief when all things seem to go well
but some mishap is sure to befall them at some point soon, so that
scarce a day passes that brings not with it some corroding anxiety.
Their bosoms are like the troubled sea, which cannot rest, whose waters
cast up mire and dirt.
But the man who gets above the world, gets above this state of ceaseless
and corroding anxiety.
(v.) The victory under consideration implies, that we cease to be en-
slaved and in bondage by the world, in any of its forms.
There is a worldly spirit, and there is also a heavenly spirit; and one or
456 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the other exists in the heart of every man, and controls his whole being.
Those who are under the control of the world, of course have not overcome
the world. No man overcomes the world till his heart is imbued with
the spirit of Heaven."
One form which the spirit of the world assumes is, being enslaved to the
customs and fashions of the day.
It is marvellous to see what a goddess Fashion becomes. No heathen
goddess was ever worshipped with costlier offerings or more devout homage,
or more implicit subjection. And surely no heathem deity, since the world
began, has ever had more universal patronage. Where will you go to find
the man of the World, or the woman of the world, who does not hasten to
worship at her shrine 2 But overcoming the world implies, that the spirit
of this goddess-worship is broken.
They who have overcome the world are no longer careful either to
secure its favour or avert its frown, and the good or the ill opinion of the
world is to them a small matter. “To me,” said Paul, “it is a small thing
to be judged of man's judgment.” So of every real Christian ; his care is
to secure the approbation of God ; this is his chief concern, to commend
himself to God and to his own conscience. No man has overcome the
world unless he has attained this state of mind. Scarcely any feature of
Christian character is more striking or more decisive than this, indif.
ference to the opinions of the world.
Since I have been in the ministry I have been blessed with the acquaint-
ance of some men who were peculiarly distinguished by this quality of
character. Some of you may have known the Rev. James Patterson, late
of Philadelphia. If so, you know him to have been eminently distinguished
in this respect. He seemed to have the least possible disposition to secure
the applause of men, or to avoid their consure. It seemed to be of no
consequence to him to commend himself to men. For him it was enough
if he might please God. Hence you were sure to find him in everlasting
war against sin, all sin, however popular, however entrenched by custom, or
sustained by wealth, or public opinion. Yet he always opposed sin
with a most remarkable spirit, a spirit of inflexible decision, and yet of
great mellowness and tenderness. While he was saying the most severe
things in the most severe language, you might see the big tears rolling
down his cheeks.
It is wonderful that most men never complained of his having a bad
spirit, Much as they dreaded his rebuke, and writhed under his strong
and daring exposures of wickedness, they could never say that father
Patterson had any other than a good spirit. This was a most beautiful
and striking exemplification of having overcome the world.
Men who are not thus dead to the world have not escaped its bondage.
The victorious Christian is in a state where he is no longer in bondage to
man. He is bound only to serve God.
SEcoSDLY. We must inquire, who are those that overcome the world 2
REGENERATION. 457
Our text gives the ready answer. “Whatsoever is born of God over-
cometh the world.” You cannot fail to observe, that this is a universal
proposition,-all who are born of God overcome the world—all these, and
it is obviously implied, none others. You may know who are born of God
by this characteristic—they overcome the world. Of course the second
question is answered.
THIRDLy. Our next question is, Why do believers overcome the world 2
On what principle is this result effected 2
I answer, this victory over the world, results as maturally from the
spiritual or heavenly birth, as coming into bondage to the world results
from the natural birth.
It may be well to revert a moment to the law of connection in the latter
case : namely, between coming into the world by natural birth, and bon-
dage to the world. This law obviously admits of a philosophical explana-
tion, at once simple and palpable to every one's observation. Natural birth
reveals to the mind objects of sense, and these only. It brings the mind
into contact with worldly things. Of course, it is natural that the mind
should become deeply interested in these objects, thus presented through
its external senses, especially as most of them sustain so intimate a relation
to our sentient nature, and become the first and chief sources of our happiness.
Hence our affections are gradually entwined around these objects, and
we become thoroughly lovers of this world, ere our eyes have been opened
upon it many months.
Now, alongside of this universal fact, let another be placed of equal im-
portance, and not less universal; namely, that those intuitive powers of the
mind, which were created to take cognizance of our moral relations, and
hence to counteract the too great influence of worldly objects, come into
action very slowly, and are not developed so as to act vigorously, until
years are numbered as months are, in the case of the external organs of
sense. The very early and vigorous developement of the latter brings the
soul so entirely under the control of worldly objects, that when the reason
and the conscience come to speak, their voice is little heeded. As a matter
of fact, we find it universally true that, unless Divine power interpose, the
bondage to the World thus induced upon the soul, is never broken.
But the point which I particularly desired to elucidate was simply this,
that natural birth, with its attendant laws of physical and mental develope-
ment, becomes the occasion of bondage to this world.
Right over against this, lies the birth into the kingdom of God by
the Spirit. By this the soul is brought into new relations, we might rather
say, into intimate contact with spiritual things. The Spirit of God seems
to usher the soul into the spiritual world, in a manner strictly analogous to
the result of the natural birth upon our physical being. The great truths
of the spiritual world are opened to our view, through the illumination of
the Spirit of God; we seem to see with new eyes, and to have a new would
of spiritual objects around us.
458 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
As in regard to natural objects, men not only speculate about them, but
realize them; so in the case of spiritual children do spiritual things become,
not merely matters of speculation, but of full and practical realization also.
When God reveals himself to the mind, spiritual things are seen in their
real light, and make the impression of realities.
Consequently, when spiritual objects are thus revealed to the mind, and
thus apprehended, they will supremely interest that mind. Such is our
mental constitution that the truth of God, when thoroughly apprehended,
cannot fail to interest us. If these truths were clearly revealed to the
wickedest man on earth, so that he should apprehend them as realities,
it could not fail to rouse up his soul to most intense action. He might
hate the light, and might stubbornly resist the claims of God upon his
heart, but he could not fail to feel a thrilling interest in truths that so take
hold of the great and vital things of human well-being.
Let me ask, Is there a sinner, or can there be a simmer on this wide
earth, who does not see, that if God's presence were made as manifest and
as real to his mind as the presence of his fellow men, it would Supremely
engross his soul, even though it might not subdue his heart?
This revelation of God's presence and character might not convert
him, but it would, at least for the time being, kill his attention to the
world.
You often see this in the case of persons deeply convicted; you have
doubtless seen persons so fearfully convicted of sin, that they cared nothing
at all for their food mor their dress. O, they cried out in the agony of their
Souls, what matter all these things to us, if we even get them all, and then
must lie down in hell
But these thrilling and all-absorbing convictions do not necessarily con-
vert the soul, and I have alluded to them here only to show the controlling
power of realizing views of divine truth.
When regeneration has taken place, and the soul is born of God, then
realizing views of truth not only awaken interest, as they might do in an
unrenewed mind, but they also tend to excite a deep and ardent love for
these truths. They draw out the heart. Spiritual truth now takes pos-
session of his mind, and draws him into its warm and life-giving embrace.
Before, error, falsehood, death, had drawn him under their power; now the
Spirit of God draws him into the very embrace of God. Now, he is begotten
of God, and breathes the spirit of sonship. Now, according to the Bible,
“the seed of God remaineth in him,” that very truth, and those movings
of the Spirit which gave him birth into the kingdom of God, continue still
in power upon his mind, and hence he continues a Christian, and as the
Bible states it, “he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” The seed of
God is in him, and the fruit of it brings his soul deeply into sympathy with
his Father in heaven.
Again : the first birth makes us acquainted with earthly things, the
second with God ; the first with the finite, the second with the infinite;
the first with things correlated with our animal nature, the second with
REGENERATION. 459
those great things which stand connected with our spiritual nature, things
so lovely, and glorious as to overcome all the ensnarements of the world.
Again: the first begets a worldly, and the second a heavenly, temper;
under the first, the mind is brought into a snare, under the second, it is
delivered from that snare. Under the first, the conversation is earthly,
under the second, “our conversation is in heaven.” . . . .
He who does not habitually overcome the world, is not born of God. In
saying this, I do not intend to affirm that a true Christian may not some-
time be overcome by temptation; but I do affirm that overcoming the World
is the general rule, and falling into sin is only the exception. This is the
least that can be meant by the language of our text, and by similar decla-
rations which often occur in the Bible. Just as in the passage: “He that
is born of God doth not commit sin, and he cannot sin because he is born of
God.” Nothing less can be meant than this—that he cannot sin habitually
—cannot make sinning his business, and can sin, if at all, only occasionally
and aside from the general current of his life. In the same manner, we
should say of a man who is almost universally truthful, that he is not a liar.
I will not contend for more than this, respecting either of these passages:
but for so much as this I must contend, that the new-born Souls here spoken
of do, all of them, habitually overcome the world. The general fact respect-
ing them is, that they do not sin, and are not in bondage to Satan. The
affirmations of Scripture respecting them must, at least, embrace their
general character.
What is a religion good for that does not overcome the world 2 What is
the benefit of being born into such a religion, if it leave the world still
swaying its dominion over our hearts 2 What avails a new birth, which,
after all, fails to bring us into a likeness to God, into the sympathies of his
family, and of his kingdom, which leaves us still in bondage to the world
and to Satan 2 What can there be of such a religion more than the name 2
With what reason can any man suppose, that such a religion fits his soul
for heaven, supposing it leaves him earthly-minded, sensual, and selfish 2
We see why it is that infidels have proclaimed the gospel of Christ to be
a failure. You may not be aware that of late infidels have taken this
ground, that the gospel of Christ is a failure. They maintain that it pro-
fesses to bring men out from the world, but fails to do so : and hence is
manifestly a failure. Now, you must observe, that the Bible does indeed
affirm, as infidels say, that those who are truly born of God do overcome
the world. This we cannot deny, and we should not wish to deny it. Now,
if the infidel can show that the new birth fails to produce this result, he
has carried his point, and we must yield ours. This is perfectly plain, and
there can be no escape for us.
But the infidel is in fault in his premises. He assumes the current
Christianity of the age as a specimen of real religion, and builds his esti-
mate upon this. He proves, as he thinks,—and perhaps truly proves—that
the current Christianity does not overcome the world.
We must demur to his assuming this current Christianity as real religion.
460 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
For this religion of the mass of nominal professors does not answer the de-
scriptions given of true piety in the word of God. And, moreover, if this
current type of religion were all that the gospel and the Divine Spirit can
do for lost man, them we might as well give up the point in controversy
with the infidel; for such a religion could not give us much evidence of
having come from God, and would be of very little value to man,—so little
as scarcely to be worth contending for. Truly, if we must take the pro-
fessedly Christian world, as Bible Christians, who would not be ashamed
and confounded in attempting to confront the infidel? We know but too
well, that the great mass of professed Christians do not overcome the world,
and we should be confounded quickly if we were to maintain that they do.
Those professed Christians themselves know, that they do not overcome
the world. Of course they could not testify concerning themselves, that
in their own case the power of the gospel is exemplified.
In view of facts like these, I have often been astonished to see ministers
setting themselves to persuade their people, that they are truly converted,
trying to lull their fears and sustain their tottering hopes. Vain effort
Those same ministers, it would seem, must know that they themselves do
mot overcome the world, and equally well must they know that their people
do not. How fatal them to the soul must be such efforts to “heal the hurt
of God's professed people, slightly; crying peace, peace, when there is no
peace l’
Let us sift this matter to the bottom, pushing the inquiry —Do the
great mass of professed Christians really overcome the world 2 It is a fact
beyond question, that with them the things of the world are realities, and
the things of God are mere theories. Who does not know that this is the
real state of great multitudes in the nominal church 2
Let the searching inquiry run through this congregation—What are
those things that set your soul on fire—that stir up your warmest emotions,
and deeply agitate your nervous system 2 Are these the things of earth, or
the things of heaven 2 the things of time, or the things of eternity 2 the
things of self, or the things of God?
How is it when you go into your closets 2 Do you go there to seek and
to find God? Do you, in fact, find there a present God, and do you hold
communion there as friend with friend ? How is this 2
Now you certainly should know, that if your state is such that spiritual
things are mere theories and speculations, you are altogether worldly and
nothing more. It would be egregious folly and falsehood to call you spiri-
tual-minded; and for you to think yourselves spiritual, would be the most
fatal and foolish self-deception. You give none of the appropriate proofs
of being born of God. Your state is not that of one who is personally
acquainted with God, and who loves him personally with supreme affection.
Until we can put away from the minds of men the common error, that
the current Christianity of the church is true Christianity, we can make
but little progress in converting the world. For, in the first place, we
cannot save the church itself from bondage to the world in this life, mor
REGENERATION. 461
from the direst doom of the hypocrite in the next. We cannot unite and
arm the church in vigorous Onset upon Satan's kingdom, so that the world
may be converted to God. We cannot even convince intelligent men of
the world that our religion is from God, and brings to fallen men a remedy
for their depravity. For if the common Christianity of the age is the best
that can be, and this does not give men the victory over the World, what is
it good for P And if it is really of little worth or none, how can we hope
to make thinking men prize it as of great value 2
There are but very few infidels who are as much in the dark as they
profess to be on these points. There are very few of that class of men,
who are not acquainted with some humble Christians, whose lives commend
Christianity and condemn their own ungodliness. Of course they know the
truth, that there is a reality in the religion of the Bible, and they blind
their own eyes selfishly and most foolishly, when they try to believe that
the religion of the Bible is a failure, and that the Bible is therefore a
fabrication. Deep in their heart lies the conviction that here and there
are men who are real Christians, who overcome the world, and live by a
faith unknown to themselves. In how many cases does God Set some
burning examples of Christian life before those wicked, sceptical men, to
rebuke them for their sin and their scepticism—perhaps their own wife or
their children—their neighbours or their servants. By such means the
truth is lodged in their mind, and God has a witness for himself in their
consciences.
(13.) But the sinner does not overcome the world. The world in some form
Overcomes him. Its cares, engrossments, pleasures, business, politics,
influence, in some form, are his master. Nor does he escape from its
dominion over his heart, if he resorts to a nunnery or a monastery, or
betakes himself to the life of an ascetic or of a recluse, and shuts himself
out from human society. The world is still his master, and holds him in a
state of banishment from its domain. Many think they have overcome
the world, merely because the World has so completely overcome them. It
is so completely their master, as to force them to back out of it, to hide
themselves from it. They have not got the World under their feet, but it
has got them into banishment from that field of labour and of usefulness,
where God and reason call them to labour. The world has prevailed to
rout them from their stronghold in Christ, and drive them to take refuge
in monasteries, mummeries, and in caves and dens of the earth. What an
infinite mistake to suppose that this is overcoming the world ! To forsake
our field of labour, to give over our work, to let the world of simmers go
down to hell, and go ourselves into exile from the world, or at the bidding
of the World, be driven completely from the battle field, and hide in caves
and dens, and proclaim ourselves the victors, when in fact we have fled
before, and unbelievingly succumbed to, the enemy, instead of subduing
and overcoming him by faith.
But in general. Sinners do not betake themselves to flight in this way,
but abide in the World, and tamely submit to wear its chains. Let it be
462 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
distinctly understood, that the true difference between saints and sinners
is, that while they both live in the world, both mingle in its scenes, and
engage in its affairs, both have families or not, as the case may be, both
provide for the body, cultivate the soil, or follow some occupation, the Saint
has not a worldly, selfish end in view. He is not enslaved by the world,
but his heart is steadfast, serving the Lord. Whatever he does, he does it,
not for some selfish end, but for God. Does he provide for himself and
his family 2 he does it as a service rendered to God. He regards himself
as the Lord's and not his own. He regards himself as the Lord's steward,
and in whatever employment he is engaged, he accounts it the Lord's
business, and himself as the Lord's servant in transacting it. He is not
his own ; he has no business of his own. The world is not his, nor is
he the world's. He does not bow down to it, nor serve it. He has been
chosen out of the world, and therefore, while employed by his Master in it,
he does all, not for self, but for God.
Not so with the sinner. He counts his business his own. Hence he is
full of cares and anxieties. The losses in business are his losses, and the
profits are his profits. Living and transacting business for the Lord is
only a theory with him. The practical fact with him is, that he is in
bondage to the world. He serves the world, or rather, he serves himself
of the World. The world he serves as a means of self-gratification. The
Saint serves God of, or with, the world ; the sinner, himself. The saint
uses the World as not abusing it; the sinner abuses it, and uses it to gratify
his own lusts. The Saint overcomes the world, because he uses it for God:
the sinner is overcome by the world, because he uses it for himself.
(14.) The true Saint overcomes the flesh This term is sometimes used
in the gospel to signify the sensibility, as distinguished from the intelli-
gence, and at other times in a more literal sense, and signifies the bodily
appetites and passions. The true saint is represented in the Bible as one
who overcomes both his bodily appetites and passions, and also as over-
coming the flesh, in the still wider sense of the sensibility. “This I say
then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For
the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh ; and
these are contrary the one to the other, so that ye cannot do the things that
ye would. But if ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law. Now
the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these ; adultery, fornication,
uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emula-
tions, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness,
revellings, and such like; of the which I tell you before, as I have also told
you in time past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the king-
dom of God. But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering,
gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance : against such there is
no law. And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the
affections and lusts.”—Gal. v. 16–24, “What shall we say then 2 Shall
we continue in sin that grace may abound 2 God forbid. How shall we,
that are dead to sin, live any longer therein f Know ye not, that so many
REGENERATION. 463
of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death 2
Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death; that like as Christ
was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we should
walk in newness of life.”—Rom. vi. 1–4. “There is therefore now no
condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the
flesh, but after the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus
hath made me free from the law of sin and death. For what the law
could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own
Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh :
that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not
after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For they that are after the flesh do
mind the things of the flesh ; but they that are after the Spirit the things
of the Spirit. For to be carnally minded is death ; but to be spiritually
minded is life and peace. Because the carnal mind is enmity against God:
for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then
they that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh,
but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if
any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ
be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life, because
of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the
dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken
your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you. Therefore, brethren,
we are debtors, not to the flesh to live after the flesh. For if ye live after
the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds
of the body ye shall live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God,
they are the sons of God.”—Rom, viii. 1–14.
With the saint it is not merely acknowledged to be a duty to overcome
the flesh, but he actually does overcome, and he is a saint just because he
is delivered from the bondage of the flesh, and introduced into the glorious
liberty of the children of God. Saints no longer mind or obey the flesh.
Their God is not their belly, nor do they mind earthly things. This is
the uniform representation of scripture respecting them. They are not
the slaves of appetite, or passion, or lust, under any form, but they are the
Lord's freemen. This is not only the representation of scripture, but
must of course be true from the nature of regeneration. Regeneration
consists, let it be remembered, in the will's ceasing to be governed by the
propensities of the flesh, and committing itself to the good of being. If
the Bible did not represent the regenerate as overcoming the world and
the flesh, it would not only be inconsistent with itself, but also with matter
of fact. It would not, in such case, recognize the nature of regeneration,
We are now considering, not what is true of the mass of professing Chris.
tians, but what is and must be true of real Saints. Of them it must be
true, that they do overcome the world and the flesh. While they live in
the flesh, they walk not after the flesh; for if they did, they would not be
saints. What is a religion Worth that does not, as a matter of fact, overcome
the flesh 2 The dominion of the flesh is sin, and does not the new birth
464 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
imply a turning away from sin” Let it be for ever understood, that
regeneration implies, not merely the conviction and the theory that the
flesh ought to be overcome, but that it actually is overcome. The regene-
rate “do not sow to the flesh;" “do not live after the flesh;” “do not
mind the flesh ;” “do not war after the flesh ;” “ have crucified the flesh
with its affections and lusts;” “through the Spirit do mortify (kill) the
deeds of the body;” “keep under their bodies, and bring them into sub-
jection.” This not only ought to be, but it must be, the character of a true
Saint.
(15.) The sinner is overcome by the flesh. Self-indulgence is his law.
Some one or more of the phrenological, or constitutional impulses always
control his will. He not only “lives in the flesh, but walks after the flesh.”
He “fulfills the desires of the flesh and of the mind.” He is “carried
away with his own lusts, and enticed.” “His God is his belly,” and “he
minds earthly things.” He “is in bondage to the flesh.” This is his un-
failing characteristic, that he is governed, not by the law of God, but by his
own desires. He is the creature of impulse, and a sinner, just because he
is so. With him to conquer the flesh is matter of duty, of opinion, of
theory, and not of actual performance and experience. He holds that he
ought to overcome, but knows that he does not. He acknowledges the
obligation in theory, but denies it in practice. He knows what he ought
to do, but does it not. He knows what a Christian ought to be, but is
aware that he is not what a Christian ought to be. There seems to be an
infatuation among sinners, those especially that profess to be Christians.
They can profess to be Christians, and yet know and acknowledge that they
are not what Christians ought to be, strangely assuming that a man can be
and is a Christian, who is not what a Christian ought to be: in other words,
that he can be a Christian Without possessing just that which constitutes a
Christian; to wit, a heart conformed to the intellect’s apprehension of duty.
This is just what makes a Christian ; not his seeing and acknowledging what
he ought to be, but his actually doing his duty, his actually embracing and
conforming to the truth. The deceived professor knows, that he is not
free, that he is in bondage to his flesh and his desires, but hopes on,
because he thinks that this is common to all Christians. He sees and
approves the truth, and often resolves to overcome his flesh, but, as in the
seventh of Romans, he “finds a law in his members warring against the
law of his mind, and bringing him into captivity to the law of sin in his
members.” He can resolve, but does not carry out his resolves. When
he resolves to do good, evil is present with him, and conquers him. Of all
this he is conscious, but he has taken up the fatal delusion that this was
Paul's experience at the time he wrote this chapter, and consequently, that
it must be the experience of all Christians. He does not run his eye along
into the eighth chapter, and see the contrast between the experience there
portrayed, and affirmed to be the experience of all Christians. He does
not observe, that the apostle is designing in these two chapters to contrast
a Christian, with a legal and self-righteous experience, but holds on to his
REGENERATION. 465
delusion, and observes not, that the apostle begins the eighth chapter by
the affirmation, that all who are in Christ Jesus are delivered from the
bondage of which he was speaking in the seventh chapter, and no longer
walk after the flesh, but after the Spirit; that the law of the Spirit of life
in Christ Jesus has actually made them free from the law of sin and death,
which is in their members. How strange that these chapters are so mis-
understood and perverted. And how monstrous and how melancholy the
fact, that the great mass of professing Christians, to this day, recognize the
seventh and not the eighth chapter of Romans, as their own experienceſ
According to this, the new birth or regeneration does not break the power
of the propensities over the will. The truth is, and must not be disguised,
that they have not a just idea of regeneration. They mistake conviction
for regeneration. They are so enlightened, as to perceive and affirm their
obligation to deny the flesh, and often resolve to do it, but, in fact, do it
not. They only struggle with the flesh, but are continually worsted and
brought into bondage; and this they call a regenerate state. O ! sad. What
then is regeneration good for 2 What does it avail? The Bible represents
regeneration as a “being born from above,” “being born of God,” and
expressly affirms, that “whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world,”
and affirms, that “whosoever is born of God does not commit sin, and cam-
not sin, because his seed (God's seed) remaineth in him, so that he cannot
sin, because he is born of God;” “that he is a new creature, that old
things are passed away, and that all things are become new ;" “ that he is
alive from the dead;" that he “has crucified the flesh with its affections
and lusts;” that “he is dead to sin, and alive unto God,” and many such
like representations: and yet, infinitely strange to tell, the seventh chapter
of Romans is recognized as a Christian experience, in the face of the whole
Bible, and in opposition to the very nature of regeneration, and the ex
Derience of every true saint. The sinner is a sinner just, and only, because
he knows his duty and does it not. He apprehends the law of the intelli-
gence, but minds the impulses of his sensibility. This is the very character
which the apostle is so graphically portraying in the seventh chapter of
Romans. He could not possibly have given a more graphic picture of a
sinner when he is enlightened, and yet enslaved by his propensities. It is
a full-length portrait of a sinner, enlightened and struggling for liberty,
and yet continually falling and floundering under the galling bondage of
his own lusts. And that this should be considered the experience of a
regenerate heart
Now let it be remembered, that just the difference between saints and
sinners, and especially deceived professors, is expressed and clearly illus.
trated in the seventh and eighth chapters of Romans; and to do this was
the very design of the writer of this epistle. The difference consists in
just this: they both see what they ought to do ; the one does it in fact,
While the other only resolves to do it, but does it not. They both have
bodies, and both have all the constitutional propensities. But the saint
overcomes them all. He has the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.
HI JI
466 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Through him he is delivered from the body of sin and of death, and made
free from the law of sin in his members. He is a conqueror, and more
than a conqueror. The sinner only cries out, “O wretched man that I am,
who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” But he cannot add, “I
thank God through Jesus Christ my Lord,” I am delivered, which is the
evident meaning of the apostle, as appears from what immediately follows,
in the beginning of the eighth chapter. The sinner sees his captivity and
groans under it, but does not escape. They are both tempted. The saint
overcomes through Christ. The sinner is overcome. The sinner is con-
quered, instead of being like the Saint, a conqueror. He cannot exultingly
say with the Saint, “The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath
made me free from the law of sin and death;” but still complains with the
captive, “I see a law in my members warring against the law of my mind,
and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.
O wretched man that I am '''
LECTURE XLVII.
REGENERATION.
WHEREIN SAINTS AND SINNERS DIFFER.
(15.) The saints overcome Satan.
This is expressly taught in the Scriptures. “I write unto you, fathers,
because ye have known Him that is from the beginning. I write unto you,
young men, because ye have overcome the wicked one. I write unto you,
little children, because ye have known the Father,” I John ii. 13. The
wicked are characterized as the “children of the devil;” “as led by him
captive at his will ;” as being “the subjects of Satan, the god of this world,”
and as having Satan ruling in their hearts.
But the saints are represented as being set at liberty from his power, as
being delivered, not from his temptations, but actually saved from his
dominion. The difference between the Saint and the simmer, in this
respect, is represented in the scriptures as consisting, not in the fact that
sinners are tempted, While Saints are not, but in this, that while Satan
tempts both the Saint and the sinner, he actually overcomes the sinner and
the deceived professor, and leads him captive at his will. The true saint,
through faith and strength in Christ, overcomes, and is more than a con-
queror. The saint, through Christ, triumphs, while the simmer yields to
his infermal influence, and is bound fast in his infernal chain.
(16.) The true Saint denies himself. Self-denial must be his characteristic,
just for the reason that regeneration implies this. Regeneration, as we
have seen, consists in turning away the heart or will from the Supreme
choice of self-gratification, to a choice of the highest well-being of God and
of the universe. This is denying self. This is abandoming self-indulgence,
and pursuing or committing the will, and the whole being to an opposite
REGENERATION. 467
end. This is the dethroning of self, and the enthroning of God in the
heart. Self-denial does not consist, as some seem to imagine, in acts of
outward austerity, in an ascetic and penance-doing course of starvation, and
mere legal and outward retrenchment, in wearing plain clothes and using
plain language, or in wearing a coat with one button, and in similar acts of
“will worship and voluntary humility, and neglecting the body;” but self-
denial consists in the actual and total renunciation of Selfishness in the
heart. It consists in ceasing wholly to live for self, and can be exercised
just as truly upon a throne, surrounded with the paraphermalia of royalty,
as in a cottage of logs, or as in rags, and in caves and dens of the earth.
The king upon his throne may live and reign to please himself. He may
surround himself with all that can minister to his pleasure, his ambition,
his pride, his lusts, and his power. He may live to and for himself. Self-
pleasing, self-gratification, self-aggrandizement, may be the end for which
he lives. This is selfishness. But he may also live and reign for God,
and for his people. He may be just as really self-denying on his throne,
and surrounded by the trappings of state and of royalty, as any person in
any other station of life. That is, he may be as really devoted to God, and
render this as a service to God, as well as anything else. No doubt his
temptation is great; but, nevertheless, he may be perfectly self-denying in
all this. He may not do what he does for his own sake, nor be what he is,
nor possess what he possesses for his own sake, but, accommodating his
state and equipage to his relations, he may be as truly self-denying as
others in the humbler walks of life. This is not an impossible, though, in
all probability, a rare case. A man may as truly be rich for God as poor
for him, if his relations and circumstances make it essential to his highest
usefulness that he should possess a large capital. He is in the way of
great temptation ; but if this is plainly his duty, and submitted to for God
and the world, he may have grace to be entirely self-denying in these
circumstances, and all the more commendable, for standing fast under
these circumstances. So a poor man may be poor from principle, or from
necessity. He may be submissive and happy in his poverty. He may
deny himself even the comforts of life, and do all this to promote the good
of being, or he may do it to promote his own interest, temporal or eternal,
to secure a reputation for piety, to appease a morbid conscience, to appease
his fears, or to secure the favour of God. In all things he may be selfish.
He may be happy in this, because it may be real self-denial; or he may be
murmuring at his poverty, may complain, and be envious at others who are
not poor. He may be censorious, and think everybody proud and selfish
who dresses better, or possesses a better house or equipage than he does.
He may set up his views as a standard, and denounce as proud and selfish
all who do not square their lives by his rule. This is selfishness, and these
manifestations demonstrate the fact. A man may forego the use of a coat,
or a cloak, or a horse, or a carriage, or any and every comfort and con-
venience of life. And all this may proceed from either a benevolent or
selfish state of mind. If it be benevolence and true self-denial, it will be
H H 2
468 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
cheerfully and happily submitted to, without murmuring and repining,
Without censoriousness, and without envy towards others, without insisting
that others shall do and be, just what and as he is. He will allow the
judge his ermine, the king his robes of state, and the merchant his capital,
and the husbandman his fields and his flocks, and will see the reasonableness
and propriety of all this, w
But if it be selfishness and the spirit of self-gratification instead of self-
denial, he will be ascetic, caustic, sour, ill-matured, unhappy, severe,
censorious, envious, and disposed to complain of, and pick at the ex-
travagance and self-indulgence of others.
The true Saint, in whatever relation of life, is truly self-denying.
Whether on a throne, or on the dunghill, he neither lives, nor moves, nor
breathes, nor eats, nor drinks, nor has his being for himself. Self is
dethroned. God is enthroned in his heart. He lives to please God, and
not to please himself. And whether he wears the crown and the purple,
the ermine of the judge, or the gown of the counsellor, whether he culti-
Vates the field or occupies the pulpit, whether he is engaged in merchandize,
or whether he opens the ditch or plies a handicraft, whether in affluence or
poverty, it matters not how circumstanced or how employed, as certainly as
he is a true Saint, just so certainly does he not live to or for himself. Of
this he is as conscious as he is of living at all. He may be mistaken by
others, and selfish ones may suppose him to be actuated by selfishness as
they are ; but in this they are deceived. The true Saint will be sure to be
found self-denying, when observed by the spirit of love, and judged by the
law of love. Love would readily perceive, that those things which a
censorious and selfish spirit ascribe to selfishness are to be accounted for in
another way; that they are really consistent with, and indeed instances of
self-denial. The spirit of self-pleasing and of accommodating ourselves to
our circumstances and relations for benevolent reasons, may by a candid
mind be generally readily distinguished from each other. The selfish will
maturally confound them and stumble at them, simply because they have
only the experience of Selfishness, and judge others by themselves. A truly
self-denying mind will maturally also judge others by itself, in such a sense
as to take it for granted, that others are self-denying, unless the manifest
indications strongly urge to all opposite opinion.
A man of truth is not wont to suspect others of lying, without strong
evidence of the fact, and then, although he may be sure that he tells a false-
hood, the man of truth is ready rather to ascribe the falsehood to mistake,
than to call it a lie. So the truly benevolent man is not wont to suspect
others of selfishness without strong evidence. Nor will the truly Self-demy-
ing man readily suspect his brother of selfishness, even in things that,
prima facie, have that appearance. He will rather maturally infer, that his
health, or circumstances, or something consistent with self-denial accounts
for what he does.
Especially does the true Saint deny his appetites and passions. His
artificial appetites he denies absolutely, whenever his attention is called to
the fact and the nature of the indulgence. The Christian is such just
REGENERATION. 469
because he has become the master of his appetites and passions, has denied
them, and consecrated himself to God. The sinner is a sinner just because
his appetites and passions and the impulses of his desires are his masters,
and he bows down to them, and serves them. They are his masters, instead
of his servants, as they are made to be. He is consecrated to them and
not to God. But the saint has ceased to live to gratify his lusts. Has he
been a drunkard, a rake, a tobacco user? has he been in self-indulgent
habits of any kind; he is reformed : old things are past away, and behold
all things are become new. Has he still any habit the character of which
he has either mistaken or not considered ; such as Smoking, chewing, or
snuffing tobacco, using injurious stimulants of any kind, high and unwhole-
some living, extravagant dressing, or equipage, retiring late at night and
rising late in the morning, eating too much, or between meals, or in short,
has there been any form of self-indulgence about him whatever? Only let
his attention be called to it, he will listen with candour, be convinced by
reasonable evidence, and renounce his evil habits without conferring with
flesh and blood. All this is implied in regeneration, and must follow from
its very nature. This also the Bible everywhere affirms to be true of the
saints. “They have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts.” It
should be for ever remembered, that a self-indulgent Christian is a con-
tradiction. Self-indulgence and Christianity are terms of opposition. The
states of mind designated by these two words are opposite states of mind.
This is precisely the difference between a saint and a sinner, that the saint
is self-denying, and the sinner self-indulgent. The saint is the lord and
master of all his appetites and passions. He rules them, and not they him.
Whether he eats or drinks, or whatever he does, he does all for God and
not to gratify himself. The sinner is the slave of his appetites and
passions. It is not in his heart to deny them. Some appetite or pro-
bensity always rules over him. He complains that he cannot abandom
certain indulgences. He is in bondage to his own lusts, and led captive by
them. Seest thou then a self-indulgent professor of religion ? If he be
really so, imagine not that you have found a Christian, but know assuredly,
that you behold a hypocrite; for this is as certain as that he is alive. The
true Saint does not complain that he cannot give up any self-indulgent habit
whatever. He cam, and must, and does, if he be truly regenerate, give up
and forsake every species of mere self-indulgence. Grace has obtained for
him a victory; and instead of his complaining that he cannot conquer his
propensities, he knows that he is more than a conqueror through our Lord
Jesus Christ.
(17.) The sinner does not deny himself. He may not gratify all his
desires, because the desires are often contradictory, and he must deny one
for the sake of indulging another. Avarice may be so strong as to forbid
his indulging in extravagance in eating, drinking, dressing, or equipage. His
love of reputation may be so strong as to prevent his engaging in anything
disgraceful, and so on. But self-indulgence is his law notwithstanding. The
fear of hell, or his desire to be saved, may forbid his outward indulgence in
470 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
any known sin. But still he lives, and moves, and has his being only for
the sake of indulging himself. He may be a miser, and starve and freeze
himself, and deny himself the necessaries of life, yet self-indulgence is his
law. One propensity may lord it over and starve the rest; but it is only
self-indulgence after all. The mum may take the veil; the monk may retire
to the cloister; the miser take his rags; the harlot seek the brothel; the
debauchee his indulgences; the king his throne; the priest his desk; all for
the same ultimate reason, to wit, to gratify self, to indulge each one his
reigning lust. But in every possible case overy sinner, whatever may be his
station, his habits or pursuits, is self-indulgent, and only self-indulgent, and
that continually. Some lusts he may and must control, as they may be
inconsistent with others. But others he knows, and it will be seen that he
does not control. He is a slave. He bows down to his lusts and serves
them. He is enslaved by his propensities, so that he cannot overcome
them. This demonstrates that he is a sinner and unregenerate, whatever
his station and profession may be. One who cannot, because he will not,
conquer himself and his lusts; this is the definition of an unregenerate
simmer. He is one over whom some form of desire, or lust, or appetite, or
passion has dominion. He cannot, or rather will not, overcome it. This
one is just as certainly in sin, as that sin is sim. Do you hear that professor
of religion ? He says he knows that he ought to give up such a lust or
habit, but he cannot give it up. Why, in thus saying, he gives higher evi-
dence of being an unregenerate sinner or a loathsome backslider, than if he
should take his oath of it. O that it were known and constantly borne in
mind, what regeneration is How many thousands of deceived professors
would it undeceive! A self-indulgent regenerate soul is a perfect contradic-
tion, as much so as to speak of a disinterestedly benevolent selfishness, or
of a self-indulgent self-denial, or an unregenerate regeneration, a sinful
holiness, or a holy sinfulness. These things are eternal and necessary
opposites. They never do nor can, by any possibility, be reconciled, or dwell
together in the same heart. With the simmer or selfish professor, self-denial
is a theory, an opinion, an article of faith. But he knows if he will but
admit the conviction, that he does not live for God; that he does not eat
and drink, and dress, and sleep, and wake, and do whatever he does—for
God. He knows he ought to do so, and hopes he does in some measure,
but he knows all the while that the preponderance of his life is self-
indulgent. When this is so, nothing but infatuation can cause him to cling
to his delusion.
(18.) The truly regenerate soul overcomes sin.
Let the Bible be heard upon this subject. “And hereby we do know
that we know him, if we keep his commandments. He that Saith I know
him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in
him.”— 1 John ii. 3, 4. “And every man that hath this hope in him
purifieth himself, even as he is pure. Whosoever committeth sin trans-
gresseth also the law: for sin is the transgression of the law. And ye know
that he was manifested to take away our sins; and in him is no sin. Who-
REGENERATION. 47 l.
soever abideth in him sinneth not : whosoever sinneth hath not seen him,
neither known him. Little children, let no man deceive you: he that doeth
righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous. He that committeth sin,
is of the devil; for the devil sinneth from the beginning. For this purpose
the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the
devil. Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sim; for his seed
remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. In this
the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil; whosoever
doth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother.”
—l John iii. 10. “Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born
of God, and every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is
begotten of him. By this we know that we love the children of God, when
we love God and keep his commandments. For this is the love of God,
that we keep his commandments; and his commandments are not grievous.
For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory
that overcometh the world, even our faith.”—1 John v. 1–4.
These passages, understood and pressed to the letter, would not only teach,
that all regenerate souls overcome and live without sin, but also that sin
is impossible to them. This last circumstance, as well as other parts of
Scripture, forbid us to press this strong language to the letter. But this
much must be understood and admitted, that to overcome sin is the rule
with every one who is born of God, and that sin is only the exception; that
the regenerate habitually live without sin, and fall into sin only at intervals,
so few and far between, that in strong language it may be said in truth
they do not sin. This is surely the least which can be meant by the spirit
of these texts, not to press them to the letter. And this is precisely con-
sistent with many other passages of Scripture, several of which I have
quoted; such as these:—“Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new
creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.”
—2 Cor. v. 17. “ For in Jesus Christ, neither circumcision availeth any-
thing nor uncircumcision; but faith which worketh by love.”—Gal. v. 6.
“For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircum-
cision, but a new creature."—Gal. vi. 15. “There is therefore now no con-
demnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh,
but after the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath
made me free from the law of sin and death. For what the law could not
do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the
likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh : That the
righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the
flesh, but after the Spirit.”—Rom. viii. 1–4. “What shall we say then?
Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid. How shall
we that are dead to sin, live any longer therein 2 Know ye not, that so
many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death?
Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death: that like
as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even
So we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been blanted
472 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of
his resurrection : knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him,
that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not
Serve sim. For he that is dead is free from sin. Now if we be dead with
Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him; knowing that Christ
being raised from the dead, dieth no more ; death hath no more dominion
over him. For in that he died, he died unto sin once; but in that he
liveth, he liveth unto God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be
dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God, through Jesus Christ our Lord.
Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in
the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members as instruments of un-
righteousness unto sin : but yield yourselves unto God, as those that are
alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto
God. For sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the
law, but under grace.”—Rom. vi. 1–14.
There is not a greater heresy and a more dangerous dogma, than that
true Christians actually live a great majority of their days in sin. Such an
opinion is in palpable contradiction of the Bible, and absurd in principle.
Many persons seem to have the idea, and this idea is often dropped,
directly or indirectly implied from the pulpit, that truly regenerate souls
may, and do often live mostly in sim ; that they live by far the greater part of
their time in a backslidden state, so far at least as their heart is concerned;
that they seldom or never truly and fully obey God, and live up to their
duty. Now such representations are not only flatly contrary to the Bible.
but they are a greater smare and stumbling-block than universalism, or
almost any form of heresy that can be named. The fact is, if God is true,
and the Bible is true, the truly regenerate Soul has overcome the world, the
the flesh, and Satan, and sin, and is a conqueror, and more than a con-
queror. He triumphs over temptation as a general thing, and the
triumphs of temptation over him are so far between, that it is said of him
in the living oracles, that he does not, cannot sim. He is not a sinner, but
a saint. He is sanctified ; a holy person; a child and son of God. If at
any time he is overcome, it is only to rise again, and soon return like the
weeping prodigal. “The steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord:
and he delighteth in his way. Though he fall he shall not be utterly cast
down : for the Lord upholdeth him with his hand.”—Psalm XXXvii. 23, 24.
I know that it is natural and common to appeal to experience and obser-
vation, in support of the dogma I am opposing, But how infinitely dam-
gerous and wicked this is What! appeal to supposed facts in history and
Christian experience, to confront and withstand the express assertions of
inspiration ? When God expressly tells us who are Christians, and what
is true of them, does it become us to turn round and say, Nay, Lord, for
we and our neighbours are Christians, and this is not true of us. Who
does not see the guilt and danger of this? And yet it seems to be common
for professors of religion tacitly to assume, if not openly to avow, that true
Christians may and do live, for the greater part of their lives, in sin.
REGENERATION.
4
73
This persuasion seems to be strengthened by the supposed fact, that
David and Solomon lived a greater part of their time in sin. But this is
an unwarrantable assumption. The psalms of David, taking their subject,
and spirit, and dates into view, as well as many other considerations, render
it evident, that he was a highly spiritual man, and that his backslidings
were few and far between, and of but short duration.
The Proverbs, the Song and the Ecclesiastes of Solomon, are sufficient
proof, that most of his days were not spent in sin. Some have supposed
that, inasmuch as the high places were not removed, and that idolatry was
openly practised under a great part of his reign, that therefore he must all
this time have been away from God. But this may be accounted for if we
consider, that the high places and idolatry continued through the reigns of
Some of the pious kings who succeeded him, doubtless for the reason, that
neither he nor they had political power and influence enough to suppress it.
The book of Ecclesiastes gives, on the face of it, the highest evidence of
having been written after his return from a season of backsliding and
Scepticism, for very much of it is only a statement of his sceptical views at
that time. But really there is no sufficient proof that Solomon, who was
manifestly a type of Christ, lived a majority, or anything like a majority,
of his days in sin.
But whatever may have been true of Solomon, and of the Saints of those
comparatively dark days, the New Testament has settled the question, that
now, under the dispensation of the Holy Spirit, whoever is born of God
doth not commit sin. The passages that I have quoted must settle this
point. The sixth and eighth of Romans is the experience of the regene-
rate soul.
In considering the attributes of benevolence, I have shown, that stability
is one of its attributes, to which I would here refer the reader (pages 223
and 224). In respect to the philosophy of Christians overcoming sin, I
would observe, that the Bible assures us, that “whosoever is born of God
does not, cannot sin, because his seed remaineth in him,” that is, God's
seed remaineth in him. “Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin;
for his seed remaineth in him ; and he cannot sin, because he is born of
God.” In 1 Peter i. 23, we are informed, that this seed is “the word of
God.” “Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by
the Word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever.” God has begotten
him (for so the word should be rendered in 1 John iii. 9.) by his word, and
his seed remaineth in him. The truth that overcame his will, and subdued
or regenerated him, remains in him, in such a sense, that it is said he can-
not sin. It is so lodged in his memory, and so pressed upon him by the
indwelling Spirit of Christ, as to secure his habitual obedience; and he is
only sometimes overcome by force of strong temptation, when, for the time,
his attention is drawn away from the truth or seed of God, which after all
is lodged within him. It has a permanent lodgement in his memory,
although it may not be attended to in some moments of strong temptation.
Now, whatever the philosophy of this fact may be, it is a declared fact of
474 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
inspiration that “Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, for his
seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” The
connection in which these words are found, as well as other parts of scrip-
ture, shows that this must respect the general character of regenerate
Souls; that having been subdued by the word and the Spirit of God, and the
seed remaining in them, they cannot consent to live in sin; that they love
God and hate sin so much by virtue of their new and heavenly birth, that
they will not sin, unless it may possibly be, that by force of great tempta-
tion they may fall into occasional sins, and those so seldom, that it can be
Said in general language that they do not, cannot sin.
(19.) The sinner and the deceived professor is the slave of sin. The
Seventh of Romans is his experience in his best estate. When he has the
most hope of himself, and others have the most hope of his good estate,
he goes no further than to make and break resolutions. His life is but a
death in sin. He has not the victory. He sees the right, but does it not.
Sin is his master, to whom he yields himself a servant to obey. He only
tries, as he says, to forsake sin, but does not in fact forsake it, in his heart.
And yet, because he is convicted, and has desires, and forms resolutions of
amendment, he hopes he is regenerated. O, what a horrible delusion
Stop short with conviction, with the hope that he is already a Christian
Alas ! how many are already in hell who have stumbled at this stumbling.
stone !
(20.) The Christian is charitable in his judgments.
This is matural to him by reason of his regeneration. He now loves
everybody, and seeks their good. “Love hopeth all things, and believeth
all things.” It is natural to us to judge charitably of those whom we love,
and whose virtue and happiness we greatly desire. It is also natural for
us to interpret the conduct of others by reference to our own consciousness.
If we are conscious of uprightness of intention, it is natural to ascribe the
conduct of others to upright intentions, unless it be manifest that it is not
so. Not only the Bible forbids rash and censorious judging of the motives
or character of others, but it everywhere assumes, and implies, and teaches
that truly regenerate persons are charitable in their judgments. This is
an attribute of true religion, and there is scarcely anything in which the
difference between saints and sinners is more manifest, than in regard to
this feature of their characters. A truly benevolent mind cannot be cen-
sorious. It is a contradiction to say, that one Who is benevolent can judge,
and think, and speak censoriously of any one. Charity is kind, is courteous,
is forbearing. A ruling disposition to promote the good of any one, cannot
lead or allow us rashly to impeach his motives, to judge him in a manner
more severe than the circumstances of the case compel us to do.
Again: as a regenerate state consists in benevolence or good-will to all
beings, it implies as sacred a regard to the feelings and reputation of our
neighbour, as we have to our own. Therefore a regenerate soul cannot be
a slanderer, a tale-bearer, or a busy-body in other men's matters. A rege-
nerate soul will not, and, remaining regenerate, cannot, take up an evil
REGENERATION. 475
report of a neighbour, and believe it, but upon the strongest evidence.
And when compelled to believe an evil report, he will not give any greater
publicity to it, than the interests of religion seem imperiously to demand.
This must be universally true of a truly benevolent mind. A disposition to
believe evil, and to report it of any one, is totally incompatible with good-
will to universal being, so that, if we see this disposition in a professor of
religion toward any one, we may know that his profession of religion is
vain. “If any man seemeth to be religious and bridleth not his tongue,
but deceiveth his own heart, that man's religion is vain.”
The saint loves his enemies. The things commanded in the gospel are
really true of the saints. They are not only required of all men, but they
are facts in the life and experience of the saints. The Saints really love
their enemies, bless them that curse them, do good to those that hate them,
and pray for them that despitefully use and persecute them.
(21.) The impenitent, whether professors of religion or not, are censorious
in their judgments, and slanderous in their conversation. They are selfish,
and, of course, have ambitious projects and envious feelings, and these
petty interests and projects are continually interfered with by the interests
and projects of others around them. They judge others by themselves.
They know themselves to be hypocritical in their professions, selfish in
their aims, false in their pretences, ambitious in their schemes, envious in
their spirit; and, in short, they are conscious of so much that is wrong,
that they maturally interpret the motives and character of others by their
own. They do not realize, that their censorious speeches and rash and
uncharitable judgments are but a result and a revelation of their hypocrisy.
But their own oath, that they are hypocrites, could not add to the weight
of evidence afforded by their manifest want of charity, as revealed in their
taking up a suspicion, a rumour, and giving it publicity to the dishonour and
injury of their neighbour. I have learned never to confide in a censorious
man or woman. “O my soul, come not thou into their secret ! unto their
assembly, mine honour be not thou united.” They are false, and will
betray Christ to justify self.
(22.) Christians, or truly regenerate souls, experience great and present
blessedness in their religion. They do not seek their own happiness as the
supreme good, but find it in their disinterested efforts to promote the well-
being of others. Their state of mind is itself the harmony of the soul.
Happiness is both a natural result of virtue, and also its governmental
reward. Christians enjoy religion just for the reason, that they are disin-
terested in it, that is, precisely for the reason, that their own enjoyment is
not the end which they seek : and selfish professors do not enjoy their
religion, just for the reason, that their own enjoyment is the end at which
they aim. If I seek the good of being as an end, I am happy for three
Tefl SOITS –
(i.) It results from the approbation of my own conscience.
(ii.) From the smile of God upon my soul, and the conscious communion
and fellowship I have with him ; and—
476 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(iii.) I gain my end upon which my heart is set, and this is a sweet
gratification. Thus I am triply blessed. But if I seek my own happiness
as an end, I fail to obtain it, for three reasons:—
(i.) My conscience, instead of approving, upbraids me.
(ii) God, instead of smiling, either withholds his face altogether from,
or frowns upon me. He withdraws communion and fellowship from me.
(iii.) I do not secure my end, and therefore I am not gratified but
disappointed. Suppose I seek the conversion of a sinner, not from disin-
terested love to his soul, but from a desire to promote my own happiness.
Now, if he is converted, I am not made happy thereby, for three reasons—
(i.) My conscience is not satisfied with my motives.
(ii.) God is not ; therefore, he does not smile upon me.
(iii.) His conversion was not the end I sought, and therefore in his con-
version I am not gratified; that is, I have not attained my end, which was
not the salvation of that soul, but my own happiness. But, if I seek his
Salvation disinterestedly, I am doubly blessed if he is not converted, and
triply blessed if he is:—
(i.) Whether he is saved or not, my conscience approves my intentions
and efforts, and smiles upon my soul.
(ii.) God accepts the will for the deed, and blesses me, as if I had suc-
ceeded. Thus, I am doubly blessed.
(iii.) But, if he is saved, I have gained my end, and thus am gratified.
So, I am triply blessed. A saint is and must be happy in his religion.
He has his temptations, but the Lord delivers him, and makes him blessed.
(23.) The selfish professor—
(i.) Has not true peace of conscience.
(ii.) He has not the smile, communion, and fellowship of God.
(iii.) He is not disinterested, and cannot rejoice in the glory of God, and
the advancement of his kingdom for its own sake, and, therefore, his soul
is not filled with peace and joy in believing. His religion is rather his
task, than his life, and his joy. He is rather religious, because he must
be, than because he may be. He prays because he must, rather than
because he may. With him, religion is rather what it will not do to
neglect, than what he delights in for its own sake. His enjoyment, such
as it is, is only a relf-righteous enjoyment. It is not the soul's har-
mony with itself, with God, and with all the holy, and with the eternal laws
of order. He knows that his religion is not soul-satisfying, but sees so
many professors around him manifesting the same state of mind in which
he knows himself to be, that he thinks that all Christians find religion in
this world rather a task and a burden than a delight, and therefore he is
not disposed to relinquish his hope. He anticipates happiness in future,
but, at present, he knows he is not happy.
(24.) True Saints rejoice to see souls converted and God glorified by any
instrumentality. But hypocrites do not rejoice in this for its own sake, and
are apt to be envious and jealous, unless they, or their friends, or denomina-
tion, are the instruments.
REGENERATION. 477
(25.) Christians would do all they could for God's glory and the world's
conversion, whether it was ever known or rewarded, or not. But sinners
would do little or mothing, except out of respect to applause and reward.
(26.) Christians have the Spirit of Christ.
(i.) Their bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit. “What? know ye
not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which
ye have of God, and ye are not your own 2–1 Cor. vi. 19. “But ye are
not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in
you. Now, if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his.
And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is
life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus
from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall
also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.”—Rom.
viii. 9—11.
(ii.) Their bodies are the temple of Christ. “But ye are not in the
flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now
if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ
be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of
righteousness.”—Rom. viii. 9, 10. “Examine yourselves, whether ye be in
the faith; prove your own selves. Know ye not your own selves, how that
Jesus Christ is in you except ye be reprobates.”—2 Cor. xiii. 5. “To whom
God would make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery
among the gentiles; which is Christ in you, the hope of glory.”—Col. i. 27.
“Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love me, he will keep my
words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and
make our abode with him.”—John xiv. 23. “I am crucified with Christ :
nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which
I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me
and gave himself for me.”—Gal. ii. 20. “That Christ may dwell in your
hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love.”—Eph.
iii. 17.
(27.) Christians have the Spirit of adoption. “For ye have not received
the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of
adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.”—Rom. viii. 15. “And because
ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts,
crying, Abba, Father."—Gal. iv. 6.
(28.) They have the fruits of the Spirit. “But the fruit of the Spirit is
love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, tem-
perance: against such there is no law. And they that are Christ's have
crucified the flesh, with the affections and lusts.”—Gal. v. 22—24.
(29.) Christians are led by the Spirit. “For as many as are led by the
Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.”—Rom. viii. 14. “But if ye be
led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law. If we live in the Spirit, let
us also walk in the Spirit.”—Gal. v. 18, 25.
(30.) They have the Spirit of prayer. “Likewise the Spirit also helpeth
our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but
478 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be
uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of
the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the Saints according to the
will of God.”—Rom. viii. 26, 27.
(31.) They have the law written in their hearts. “Behold, the days
come, Saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of
Israel, and with the house of Judah : not according to the covenant that I
made with their fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand to bring
them out of the land of Egypt; which my covenant they brake, although I
was a husband unto them, Saith the Lord : but this shall be the covenant
that I will make with the house of Israel; after those days, saith the Lord,
I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and
will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no
more every man his meighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know
the Lord : for they shall, all know me, from the least of them unto the
greatest of them, saith the Lord : for I will forgive their iniquity, and I
will remember their sin no more.”—Jer. xxxi. 31–34. This passage the
apostle quotes in Heb. viii. 8–12, and applies to Christians under the
new dispensation. The law that was written upon the tables of stone is
written, by the Holy Spirit, in the hearts of Christians. That is, the spirit
of love demanded by the law, is begotten in their hearts. In other words,
they are truly regenerated, and love God with all their hearts, and their
neighbour as themselves.
I might notice many other particulars in which saints and sinners differ,
but perhaps I have said enough for this course of study. If you return to
the attributes of selfishness and benevolence, you will there find a fuller
developement of this subject. Of course, the manifestation of the attributes
of benevolence is conclusive proof of a regenerate state, for all those attri-
butes are only so many modifications of true religion, and their manifest-
ation is proof of its existence.
So, on the other hand, the attributes of selfishness are only so many
modifications of sin, and their manifestation is proof positive of an unholy
and unregenerate state of mind.
There are many other things that might be said, indeed volumes might
be written upon this subject, in addition to what has appeared. But one
thing is worthy of special remark. Mistaken notions in regard to the
nature of regeneration have led to false methods of estimating the evi-
dences of regeneration. Most persons and most writers seem to appeal
almost exclusively, or at least in a great measure, to the feelings or states
of the sensibility, for evidence of regeneration. Nothing can be more
dangerous and deceptive than this. They, regarding regeneration as a
change in or of the sensibility, look thither of course for the evidences of
the change. The Bible appeals to the life, instead of the feelings, for
evidence of regeneration. It assumes the true philosophy of regeneration,
that it belongs to the will, and that it must, of course, and of necessity,
appear directly and uniformly in the life. So many circumstances influence
NATURAL ABILITY. 479
the feelings that they cannot be depended on. They will effervesce, or be
calm, as circumstances change. But the outward life must, by a law of
necessity, always obey the will. Therefore the appeal can more safely be
made to it than to anything else that lies open to the inspection of human
eyes.
The subject of regeneration may know, and if honest he must know, for
what end he lives. There is, perhaps, nothing of which he may be more
certain than of his regenerate or unregenerate state; and if he will keep in
mind what regeneration is, it would seem that he can hardly mistake his
own character, so far as to imagine himself to be regenerate when he is
not. The great difficulty that has been in the way of the regenerate soul's
knowing his regeneration, and has led to so much doubt and embarrass-
ment upon this subject, is that regeneration has been regarded as belonging
to the sensibility, and hence the attention has been directed to the ever-
fluctuating feelings for evidence of the change. No wonder that this has
led conscientious souls into doubt and embarrassment. But let the subject
of regeneration be disenthralled from a false philosophy, and let it be known
that the new heart consists in supreme disinterested benevolence, or in
entire consecration to God, and then who cannot know for what end he
lives, or what is the supreme preference or intention of his soul? If men
can settle any question whatever beyond all doubt by an appeal to con-
sciousness, it would seem that this must be the question. Hence the Bible
enjoins it as an imperative duty to know ourselves, whether we are Chris-
tians. We are to know each other by our fruits. This is expressly given
in the Bible as the rule of judgment in the case. The question is not so
much, What are the man's opinions 2 as, What does he live for 2 Does he
endeavour to promote true religion, love to God and man 2 Does he
manifest a charitable state of mind 2 Does he manifest the attributes of
benevolence in the various circumstances in which he is placed 2 O, when
shall the folly of judging men more by their opinions and feelings, than
by the tenor of their lives cease ? It seems difficult to rid men of the
prejudice that religion consists in feelings and in experiences, in which
they are altogether passive. Hence they are continually prone to delusion
upon the most momentous of all questions. Nothing can break this spell
but the steady and thorough inculcation of the truth, in regard to the
nature of regeneration.
LECTURE XLVIII.
N A T U R A L A B I L IT Y.
We next proceed to the examination of the question of man's ability or
inability to obey the commandments of God. This certainly must be a
fundamental question in morals and religion; and as our views are upon
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NATURAL ABILITY. 481
according to him, consists in the natural and established connexion between
volition and its effects. Thus he says in another place, “Men are justly
said to be able to do what they can do, if they will. His definition of
natural ability, or natural liberty, as he frequently calls it, wholly excludes
the power to will, and includes only the power or ability to execute our
volitions. Thus it is evident, that natural ability, according to him,
respects external action only, and has nothing to do with willing. When
there is no restraint or hindrance to the execution of volition, when there
is nothing interposed to disturb and prevent the natural and established
result of our volitions, there is natural ability according to this school. It
should be distinctly understood, that Edwards, and those of his school,
hold that choices, volitions, and all acts of will, are determined, not by the
sovereign power of the agent, but are caused by the objective motive, and
that there is the same connexion, or a commexion as certain and as unavoid-
able between motive and choice, as between any physical cause and its
effect : “the difference being,” according to him, “not in the nature of the
connexion, but in the terms connected.” Hence, according to his view,
natural liberty or ability cannot consist in the power of Willing or of choice,
but must consist in the power to execute our choices or volitions. Con-
sequently, this class of philosophers define free or moral agency to consist
in the power to do as one wills, or power to execute one's purposes, choices,
or volitions. That this is a fundamentally false definition of natural
liberty or ability, and of free or moral agency, we shall see in due time.
It is also plain, that the natural ability or liberty of Edwards and his
school, has nothing to do with morality or immorality. Sin and holiness,
as we have seen in a former lecture, are attributes of acts of will only.
But this natural ability respects, as has been said, outward or muscular
action only. Let this be distinctly borne in mind as we proceed.
II. This natural ability is no ability at all.
We know from consciousness that the will is the executive faculty,
and that we can do absolutely nothing without willing. The power or
ability to will is indispensable to our acting at all. If we have not the
power to will, we have not power or ability to do anything. All ability or
power to do resides in the will, and power to will is the necessary condition
of ability to do. In morals and religion, as we shall soon see, the willing
is the doing. The power to will is the condition of obligation to do. Let
us hear Edwards himself upon this subject. Vol. ii. p. 156, he says,
“The will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of the will,
is the proper object of precept or command. That is, such a state or acts
of men's wills, are in many cases properly required of them by commands;
and not only those alterations in the state of their bodies or minds that
are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest ; for it is the
mind only that is properly and directly the subject of precepts or com-
mands; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving commands.
The motions of the body are matters of command only as they are subject
I I
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NATURAL ABILITY. 483
which will be shown in its proper place, I wish it to be distinctly understood
that his natural inability had nothing to do with willing, but only with the
effects of willing. When the natural effect of willing does not follow
volition, its cause, here is a proper natural inability.
IV. This natural inability is no inability at all.
By this is intended that, so far as morals and religion are concerned, the
willing is the doing, and therefore where the willing actually takes place,
the real thing required or prohibited is already done. Let us hear Edwards
upon this subject. Vol. ii. p. 164, he says, “If the will fully complies
and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to
be connected with his volition, the man is perfectly excused ; he has a
matural inability to the thing required. For the will itself, as has been
observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by command,
and other things only indirectly, as connected with the will. If, therefore,
there be a full compliance of will, the person has done his duty; and if
other things do not prove to be commected with his volition, that is not
criminally owing to him.” Here, then, it is manifest, that the Edwardean
motions of natural ability and inability have no connection with moral law
or moral government, and, of course, with morals and religion. That the
Bible everywhere accounts the willing as the deed, is most manifest. Both
as it respects sin and Moliness, if the required or prohibited act of the will
takes place, the moral law and the lawgiver regard the deed as having been
done, or the sin committed, whatever impediment may have prevented the
natural effect from following. Here, then, let it be distinctly understood
and remembered that Edwards's natural inability is, so far as morals and
religion are concerned, no inability at all. An inability to execute our
volitions, is in no case an inability to do our whole duty, since moral obliga-
tion, and of course, duty, respect strictly only acts of will. A natural
inability must consist, as we shall see, in an inability to will. It is truly
amazing that Edwards could have written the paragraph just quoted, and
others to the same effect, without perceiving the fallacy and absurdity of
his speculation—without seeing that the ability or inability about which he
was Writing, had no connection with morals or religion. How could he
insist so largely that moral obligation respects acts of will only, and yet
spend so much time in writing about an ability or inability to comply with
moral obligation that respects outward action exclusively 2 This, on the
face of it, was wholly irrelevant to the subject of morals and religion, upon
which subjects he was professedly writing.
V. Natural inability is identical with freedom or liberty of will.
It has been, I trust, abundantly shown in a former lecture, and is
admitted and insisted on by Edwards,-
1. That moral obligation respects strictly only acts of will.
2. That the whole of moral obligation resolves itself into an obligation
1 I 2
484 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to be disinterestedly benevolent, that is, to will the highest good of being
for its own sake. -
3. That willing is the doing required by the true spirit of the moral
law. .
Ability, therefore, to will in accordance with the moral law, must be
natural ability to obey God. But,
4. This is and must be the only proper freedom of the will, so far as
morals and religion, or so far as moral law is concerned. That must con-
stitute true liberty of will that consists in the ability or power to will, either
in accordance, with or in opposition to the requirements of moral law. Or
in other words, true freedom or liberty of will must consist in the power or
ability to will in every instance either in accordance with, or in opposition
to, moral obligation. Observe, moral obligation respects acts of will. What
freedom or liberty of will can there be in relation to moral obligation,
unless the will or the agent has power or ability to act in conformity with
moral obligation ? To talk of a man's being free to will, or having liberty to
will, when he has not the power or ability, is to talk nonsense. Edwards
himself holds that ability to do, is indispensable to liberty to do. But if ability
to do be a sine quá nom of liberty to do, must not the same be true of Willing 2
that is, must not ability to will be essential to liberty to will? Natural
ability and natural liberty to will, must then be identical. Let this be dis-
tinctly remembered, since many have scouted the doctrine of natural ability
to obey God, who have nevertheless been great sticklers for the freedom of the
will. In this they are greatly inconsistent. This ability is called a natural
ability, because it belongs to man as a moral agent, in such a sense that
without it he could not be a proper subject of command, of reward or
punishment. That is, without this liberty or ability he could not be a
moral agent, and a proper subject of moral government. He must then
either possess this power in himself as essential to his own nature, or must
possess power, or be able to avail himself of power to will in every instance
in accordance with moral obligation. Whatever he can do, he can do only
by willing; he must therefore either possess the power in himself directly
to will as God commands, or he must be able by willing it to avail himself
of power, and to make himself willing. If he has power by nature to will
directly as God requires, or by Willing to avail himself of power, so to will,
he is naturally free and able to obey the commandments of God. Then let
it be borne distinctly in mind, that matural ability, about which so much
has been said, is nothing more nor less than the freedom or liberty of the
will of a moral agent. No man knows what he says or whereof he affirms,
who holds to the one and denies the other, for they are truly and properly
identical.
VI. The human will is free, therefore men have power or ability to do
all their duty.
1. The moral government of God everywhere assumes and implies the
liberty of the human will, and the natural ability of men to obey God.
NATURAL ABILITY. 485
Every command, every threatening, every expostulation and denunciation
in the Bible implies and assumes this. Nor does the Bible do violence to
the human intelligence in this assumption; for,
2. The human mind necessarily assumes the freedom of the human will
as a first truth of reason.
First truths of reason, let it be remembered, are those that are neces.
Sarily assumed by every moral agent. They are assumed always and
mecessarily by a law of the intelligence, although they may seldom be the
direct objects of thought or attention. It is a universal law of the intelli-
gence, to assume the truths of causality, the existence and the infinity of
space, the existence and infinity of duration, and many other truths. These
assumptions every moral agent always and necessarily takes with him,
whether these things are matters of attention or not. And even should
he deny any one or all of the first truths of reason, he knows them to be
true notwithstanding, and cannot but assume their truth in all his practical
judgments. Thus, should any one deny the law and the doctrine of
causality, as Some in theory have done, he knows, and cannot but know,
he assumes, and cannot but assume, its truth at every moment. Without
this assumption he could not so much as intend, or think of doing, or of
any one else doing anything whatever. But a great part of his time, he
may not, and does not, make this law a distinct object of thought or
attention. Nor is he directly conscious of the assumption that there is
such a law. He acts always upon the assumption, and a great part of his
time is insensible of it. His whole activity is only the exercise of his
own causality, and a practical acknowledgment of the truth, which in
theory he may demy. Now just so it is with the freedom of the will, and
with natural ability. Did we not assume our own liberty and ability, we
should never think of attempting to do anything. We should not so
much as think of moral obligation, either as it respects ourselves or others,
unless we assumed the liberty of the human will. In all our judgments
respecting our own moral character and that of others, we always and
necessarily assume the liberty of the human will, or natural ability to obey
God. Although we may not be distinctly conscious of this assumption,
though we may seldom make the liberty of the human will the subject of
direct thought or attention, and even though we may deny its reality, and
strenuously endeavour to maintain the opposite, we, nevertheless, in this
very denial and endeavour, assume that We are free. This truth never
was, and never can be rejected in our practical judgments. All men
assume it. All men must assume it. Whenever they choose in one
direction, they always assume, whether conscious of the assumption or not,
and cannot but assume, that they have power to will in the opposite
direction. Did they not assume this, such a thing as election between two
ways or objects would not be, and could not be so much as thought of.
The very ideas of right and wrong, of the praise and blameworthiness of
human beings, imply the assumption on the part of those who have these
ideas, of the universal freedom of the human will, or of the natural ability
486 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
of men as moral agents to obey God. Were not this assumption in the
mind, it were impossible from its own nature and, laws that it should
affirm moral obligation, right or wrong, praise or blameworthiness of men.
I know that philosophers and theologians have in theory denied the
doctrine of matural ability or liberty, in the sense in which I have defined
it ; and I know, too, that with all their theorizing, they did assume, in
common with all other men, that man is free in the sense that he has
liberty or power to will as God commands. I know that, but for this
assumption, the human mind could no more predicate praise or blame-
worthiness, right or wrong of man, than it could of the motions of a
windmill. Men have often made the assumption in question without
being aware of it, have affirmed right and wrong of human Willing without
seeing and understanding the conditions of this affirmation. But the fact
is, that in all cases the assumption has laid deep in the mind as a first
truth of reason, that men are free in the sense of being naturally able to
obey God: and this assumption is a necessary condition of the affirmation
that moral character belongs to man. -
LECTURE XLIX.
MORAL ABILITY AND INAIBILITY.
I. WHAT CONSTITUTES MORAL INABILITY, ACCORDING TO EDWARDS AND
THOSE WHO HOLD WITH HIM.
II. THAT THEIR MoRAL INABILITY TO OBEY GOD CONSISTS IN REAL DIS-
OBE DIENCE AND A NATURAL INAIBILITY TO OBEY.
III. THAT THIS PRETENDED DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL AND MORAI,
INABILITY IS NONSENSICAL.
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTIES MORAL ABILITY ACCORDING TO THIS SCHOOL.
V. THAT THEIR MoRAL ABILITY To obBy GoD Is NoTHING ELSE THAN
REAL OBEDIENCE, AND A NATURAL INABILITY TO DISOBEY.
I. What constitutes moral inability, according to Edwards aud those who
hold with him.
I examine their views of moral imability first in order, because from their
views of moral inability we ascertain more clearly what are their views of
moral ability. Edwards regards moral ability and inability as identical
with moral necessity. Concerning moral necessity, he says, vol. ii., pp.
32, 33, “And sometimes by moral necessity is meant that necessity of con-
mexion and consequence which arises from such moral causes as the strength
of inclination or motives, and the connexion which there is in many cases
between these and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this
sense that I shall use the phrase moral necessity in the following discourse,
By natural necessity, as applied to men, I mean such necessity as men are
under through the force of natural causes, as distinguished from what are
called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral
MORAL ABILITY. 487
motives and inducements. Thus men placed in certain circumstances are
the subjects of particular sensations by necessity. They feel pain when
their bodies are wounded ; they see the objects presented before them in a
clear light when their eyes are open : so they assent to the truth of certain
propositions as soon as the terms are understood ; as that two and two make
four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one
another; so by a natural necessity men's bodies move downwards when
there is nothing to support them. But here several things may be noted
concerning these two kinds of necessity. 1. Moral necessity may be as
absolute as natural mecessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly con-
nected with its moral cause, as a natural effect is with its natural cause.
Whether the will is in every case necessarily determined by the strongest
motive, or whether the will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or
can ever oppose the strongest present inclination or not ; if that matter should
be controverted, yet I suppose mone will deny, but that, in some cases a
previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented may be so powerful,
that the act of the will may be certainly and indissolubly connected there-
with. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that
there is some difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet
stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore if more were
still added to their strength up to a certain degree, it might make the diffi-
culty so great that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it, for this
plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to sur-
mount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite, and so goes not beyond
certain limits. If a certain man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of
this kind, with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength
are beyond the degrees of difficulty, yet if the difficulty be increased to
thirty, or a humdred, or to a thousand degrees, and his strength not also
increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty.
As therefore it must be allowed that there may be such a thing as a sure
and perfect connexiom between moral causes and effects; so this only is what
I call by the name of moral necessity." Page 35, he says: “What has
been Said of matural and moral necessity may serve to explain what is in-
tended by matural and moral inability, We are said to be naturally unable
to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will, because of some impeding
defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of under-
standing, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral inability consists
not in any of these things, but either in a want of inclination, or the want
of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the
strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be re-
solved into one, and it may be said in one word that moral inability consists
in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to
Will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives or prevalence of
Contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want
of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination in such circum-
stances, and under the influence of such views."
488 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
From these quotations, and much more that might be quoted to the same
purpose, it is plaim that Edwards, as the representative of his school, holds
moral inability to consist, either in an existing choice or attitude of the
Will opposed to that which is required by the law of God, which inclination
or choice is necessitated by motives in view of the mind, or in the absence
of such motives as are necessary to cause or necessitate the state of choice
required by the moral law, or to overcome an opposing choice. Indeed he
holds these two to be identical. Observe, his words are, “Or these may
be resolved into one, and it may be said in one word, that moral inability
consists in opposition or want of inclimation. For when a person is unable
to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, it is the same
thing as his being unable through the want of an inclimation, or the preva-
lence of a contrary inclimation, in such circumstances and under the in-
fluence of such views,” that is, in the presence of such motives. If there
is a present prevalent contrary inclination, it is, according to him : 1. Be-
cause there are present certain reasons that necessitate this contrary
inclination ; and 2. Because there are not sufficient motives present to the
mind to overcome these opposing motives and inclination, and to necessitate
the will to determine or choose in the direction of the law of God. By incli-
nation Edwards means choice or volition, as is abundantly evident from
what he all along says in this connexion. This no one will deny who is at
all familiar with his writings.
It was the object of the treatise from which the above quotations have
been made, to maintain that the choice invariably is as the greatest apparent
good is. And by the greatest apparent good he means, a sense of the
most agreeable. By which he meals, as he says, that the sense of the most
agreeable, and choice or volition, are identical. Vol. ii., page 20, he says,
“And therefore it must be true in some sense, that the will always is as the
greatest apparent good is.” “It must be observed in what sense I use the
term ‘good,' namely, as of the same import with agreeable. To appear
good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable,
or seem pleasing to the mind." Again, pp. 21, 22, he says: “I have
rather chosen to express myself thus, that the Will always is as the greatest
apparent good is, or as what appears most agreeable, than to say that the
will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by What seems most
agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind and the mind's
preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted
on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action, which is the
immediate consequence of the mind's choice, is determined by that which
appears most agreeable, than the choice itself.” Thus it appears that the
sense of the most agreeable, and choice or volition, according to Edwards,
are the same things. Indeed, Edwards throughout confounds desire and
volition, making them the same thing. Edwards regarded the mind as
possessing but two primary faculties—the will and the understanding. He
confounded all the states of the sensibility with acts of will. The strongest
desire is with him always identical with volition or choice, and not merely
MORAL ABILITY. 489
that which determines choice. When there is a want of inclination or
desire, or the sense of the most agreeable, there is a moral inability ac-
cording to the Edwardean philosophy. This want of the strongest desire,
inclination, or sense of the most agreeable, is always owing : 1. To the
presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite desire, choice, &c.;
and 2. To the want of such objective motives as shall awaken this required
desire, or necessitate this inclination or sense of the most agreeable. In
other words, when volition or choice, in consistency with the law of God,
does not exist, it is, 1. Because an opposite choice exists, and is necessi-
tated by the presence of some motive; and 2. For want of sufficiently strong
objective motives to necessitate the required choice or volition. Let it be
distinctly understood and remembered, that Edwards held that motive, and
not the agent is the cause of all actions of the will. Will, with him, is
always determined in its choice by motives as really as physical effects are
produced by their causes. The difference with him in the connexion of
moral and physical causes and effects “lies not in the nature of the connex-
ion, but in the terms commected.”
“That every act of the will has some cause, and consequently (by what
has already been proved) has a necessary connection with its cause, and so
is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is evident by
this, that every act of the will whatsoever is excited by some motive, which
is manifest; because, if the mind, in willing, after the manner it does, is
excited by no motive or inducement, then it has no end which it proposes
to itself, or pursues in so doing : it aims at nothing, and seeks nothing.
And if it seeks nothing, then it does not go after anything, or exert any
inclination or preference towards anything; which brings the matter to a
contradiction; because for the mind to will something, and for it to go after
something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same thing.
“But if every act of the will is excited by a motive, then that motive is the
cause of the act. If the acts of the will are excited by motives, then mo-
tives are the causes of their being excited; or, which is the same thing,
the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of the
will is properly the effect of their motives. Motives do nothing, as motives
or inducements, but by their influence ; and so much as is done by their
influence is the effect of them. For that is the motion of an effect, some-
thing that is brought to pass by the influence of something else.
“And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are
necessarily connected with their motives. Every effect and event being,
as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is the proper
ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest that volition is
necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the will.”—
Vol. ii., pp. 86, 87.
Moral inability, then, according to this school, consists in a want of
inclination, desire, or sense of the most agreeable, or the strength of an
opposite desire or sense of the most agreeable. This want of inclination,
&c., or this opposing inclination, &c., are identical with an opposing choice or
490 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Volition. This opposing choice or inclination, or this want of the required
choice, inclination, or sense of the most agreeable is owing, according to
Edwards, 1. To the presence of such motives as to necessitate the opposing
choice; and 2. To the absence of sufficient motives to beget or necessitate
them. Here then we have the philosophy of this school. The will or
agent is unable to choose as God requires in all cases, when, l. There are
present such motives as to necessitate an opposite choice; and, 2. When
there is not such a motive or such motives in the view of the mind, as to
determine or necessitate the required choice or volition; that is, to awaken
a desire, or to create an inclination or sense of the agreeable stronger
than any existing and opposing desire, inclination, or sense of agreeable.
This is the moral inability of the Edwardeans.
II. Their moral inability to obey God consists in real disobedience and a
matural inability to obey.
1. If we understand Edwardeans to mean that moral inability consists,
(1) In the presence of such motives as to mecessitate an opposite choice;
and,-
(2.) In the want or absence of sufficient motives to necessitate choice
or volition, or, which is the same thing, a sense of the most agreeable, or an
inclination, then their moral inability is a proper matural inäbility.
Edwards says, he “calls it a moral inability, because it is an inability of
will.” But by his own showing, the will is the only executive faculty.
Whatever a man can do at all, he can accomplish by willing, and whatever
he cannot accomplish by Willing he cannot accomplish at all. An inability
to will then must be a natural inability.
We are, by mature, unable to do what we are unable to will to do. Be-
sides, according to Edwards, moral obligation respects strictly only acts of
will, and willing is the doing that is prohibited or required by the moral
law. To be unable to will then, is to be unable to do. To be unable to
will as God requires, is to be unable to do what he requires, and this surely
is a proper, and the only proper natural inability.
2. But if we are to understand this school, as maintaining that moral
inability to obey God, consists in a want of the inclination, choice, desire,
or sense of the most agreeable that God requires, or in an inclination or
existing choice, volition, or sense of the most agreeable, which is opposed
to the requirement of God, this surely is really identical with disobedience,
and their moral inability to obey consists in disobedience. For, be it dis-
tinctly remembered, that Edwards holds, as we have seen, that obedience
and disobedience, properly speaking, can be predicated only of acts of will.
If the required state of the will exists, there is obedience. If it does not
exist, there is disobedience. Therefore, by his own admission and express
holding, if by moral inability we are to understand a state of the will not
conformed, or, which is the same thing, opposed to the law and Will of God,
this moral inability is nothing else than disobedience to God. A moral.
inability to obey is identical with disobedience. It is not merely the cause
MORAL ABILITY. 491
of future or present disobedience, but really constitutes the whole of present
disobedience.
3. But suppose that we understand his moral inability to consist both in
the want of an inclination, choice, volition, &c., or in the existence of an
opposing state of the will, and also,
(1) In the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite choice,
and,-
(2.) In the want of sufficient motives to overcome the opposing state,
and necessitate the required choice, volition, &c., then his views stand
thus: moral inability to choose as God commands, consists in the want of
this choice, or in the existence of an opposite choice, which want of choice,
or, which is the same thing with him, which opposite choice is caused :-
(i.) By the presence of such motives as to necessitate the opposite choice,
and,-
(ii.) By the absence of such motives as would necessitate the required
choice.
Understand him which way you will, his moral inability is real dis-
obedience, and is in the highest sense a proper matural inability to obey.
The cause of choice or volition he always seeks, and thinks or assumes that
he finds, in the objective motive, and never for once ascribes it to the
sovereignty or freedom of the agent. Choice or volition is an event, and
must have some cause. He assumed that the objective motive was the
cause, when, as consciousness testifies, the agent is himself the cause.
Here is the great error of Edwards.
Edwards assumed that no agent whatever, not even God himself, pos
sesses a power of self-determination. That the will of God and of all
moral agents is determined, not by themselves, but by an objective motive.
If they will in one direction or another, it is not from any free and sovereign
self-determination in view of motives, but because the motives or induce-
ments present to the mind, inevitably produce or necessitate the sense of
the most agreeable, or choice.
If this is not fatalism or natural necessity, what is 2
III. This pretended distinction between natural and moral inability is
monsensical.
What does it amount to ? Why this:—
1. This natural inability is an inability to do as we will, or to execute
our volitions.
2. This moral inability is an inability to will.
3. This moral inability is the only natural inability that has, or can
have, anything to do with duty, or with morality and religion ; or, as has
been shown,
4. It consists in disobedience itself. Present moral inability to obey is
identical with present disobedience, with a natural inability to obey !
It is amazing to see how so great and good a man could involve himself
in a metaphysical fog, and bewilder himself and his readers to such a
492 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
degree, that an absolutely senseless distinction should pass into the current
phraseology, philosophy, and theology of the church, and a score of theo-
logical dogmas be built upon the assumption of its truth. This monsensical
distinction has been in the mouth of the Edwardean School of theologians,
from Edwards's day to the present. Both saints and sinners have been
bewildered, and, I must say, abused by it. Men have been told that they
are as really unable to will as God directs, as they were to create them-
selves; and when it is replied that this inability excuses the sinner, we
are directly silenced by the assertion, that this is only a moral inability, or
an inability of will, and, therefore, that it is so far from excusing the
simmer, that it constitutes the very ground, and substance, and whole of his
guilt. Indeed Men are under moral obligation only to will as God
directs. But an inability thus to will, consisting in the absence of such
motives as would necessitate the required choice, or the presence of such
motives as to necessitate an opposite choice, is a moral inability, and really
constitutes the sinner worthy of an “exceeding great and eternal weight "
of damnation Ridiculous ! Edwards I revere ; his blunders I deplore.
I speak thus of this Treatise on the Will, because, while it abounds with
unwarrantable assumptions, distinctions without a difference, and meta-
physical subtleties, it has been adopted as the text-book of a multitude of
what are called Calvinistic divines for scores of years. It has bewildered
the head, and greatly embarrassed the heart and the action of the church
of God. It is time, high time, that its errors should be exposed, and so
exploded, that such phraseology should be laid aside, and the ideas which
these words represent should cease to be entertained.
IV. What constitutes moral ability according to this school.
It is of course the opposite of moral inability.
Moral ability, according to them, consists in Willingness with the cause of
it. That is, moral ability to obey God consists in that inclination, desire,
choice, volition, or sense of the most agreeable, which God requires together
with its cause. Or it consists in the presence of such motives as do
actually necessitate the above-named state or determination of the will.
Or, more strictly, it consists in this state caused by the presence of these
motives. This is as exact a statement of their views as I can make.
According to this, a man is morally able to do as he does, and is necessi-
tated to do, or, he is morally able to will as he does will, and as he cannot
help willing. He is morally able to will in this manner, simply and only
because he is caused thus to will by the presence of such motives as are,
according to them, “indissolubly commected” with such a willing by a law
of nature and necessity. But this conducts us to the conclusion,--
V. That their moral ability to obey God is nothing else than real
obedience, and a matural inability to disobey.
Strictly, this moral ability includes both the state of will required by the
law of God, and also the cause of this state, to wit, the presence of such
INABILITY. 493
motives as necessitate the inclimation, choice, volition, or sense of the most
agreeable, that God requires. The agent is able thus to will because he is
caused thus to will. Or more strictly, his ability, and his inclination or
willing, are idential. Or still further, according to Edwards, his moral
ability thus to will and his thus willing, and the presence of the motives
that cause this willing, are identical. This is a sublime discovery in
philosophy; a most transcendental speculation I would not treat these
notions as ridiculous, were they not truly so, or if I could treat them in
any other manner, and still do them anything like justice. If, where the
theory is plainly stated, it appears ridiculous, the fault is not in me, but in
the theory itself. I know it is trying to you, as it is to me, to connect any-
thing ridiculous with so great and so revered a name as that of President
Edwards. But if a blunder of his has entailed perplexity and error on
the church, Surely his great and good soul would now thank the hand that
should blot out the error from under heaven.
Thus, when closely examined, this long established and venerated fog-
bank vanishes away; and this famed distinction between moral and natural
ability and inability, is found to be “a thing of nought.”
LECTURE L.
INABILITY,
THERE are yet other forms of the doctrine of inability to be stated and
considered before we have done with this subject. In the consideration of
the one before me, I must—
I. STATE WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE THE FUNDANIENTAL ERRORs of
EDWARDS AND HIS SCHOOL ON THE SUBJECT of ABILITY.
II. STATE THE PHILOSOPHY of THE SCHEME OF INABILITY which we
ARE ABOUT TO CONSIDER.
III. CONSIDER ITS CLAIMIs.
I. I am to state what I consider to be the fundamental errors of Edwards
and his school upon the subject of ability.
1. He denied that moral agents are the causes of their own actions. He
started, of course, with the just assumption, that every event is an effect,
and must have some cause. The choices and volitions of moral agents
are effects of some cause. What is that cause 2 He assumes that every
act of will must have been caused by a preceding one, or by the objective
motive. By the reductio ad absurdum, he easily showed the absurdity of
the first hypothesis, and consequently assumed the truth of the last. But
how does he know that the sovereign power of the agent is not the cause?
His argument against self-determination amounts to nothing; for it is, in
fact, only a begging of the whole question. If we are conscious of any.
thing, we are of the rational affirmation that we do, in fact, originate our
own choices and volitions. To call this in question, is to question the
494 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
validity of the intuitions of reason. But if the testimony of this faculty
can deceive us, we can be certain of nothing. But it cannot deceive us,
and no man can practically doubt the intuitions of the reason. All moral
agents do, and always must, in all their practical judgments, assume and
admit the truth of all the rational intuitions. Edwards, as really as any
other man, believed himself to originate and be the proper cause of his
own volitions. In his practical judgment he assumed his own causality,
and the proper causality of all moral agents, or he never could have had so
much as a conception of moral agency and accountability. But in theory,
he adopted the capital error of denying the proper causality of moral agents.
This error is fundamental. Every definition of a moral agent that denies
or overlooks, his proper causality, is radically defective. It drops out of
the definition the very element that we necessarily affirm to be essential to
liberty and accountability. Denying, as he did, the proper causality of
moral agents, he was driven to give a false definition of free agency, as
has been shown. Edwards rightly regarded the choices and volitions of
moral agents as effects, but he looks in the wrong direction for the cause.
Instead of heeding the rational affirmation of his own mind that causality,
or the power of self-determination, is a sine quá mom of moral agency, he
assumed, in theorizing, the direct opposite, and sought for the cause of
choice and volition out of the agent, and in the objective motive ; thus, in
fact, denying the validity of the testimony of the pure reason, and reducing
moral agents to mere machines, and stultifying the whole subject of moral
government, moral action, and just retribution. No wonder that so capital
an error, and defended with so much ability, should have led one of his own
sons into scepticism. But the piety of the president was stronger than
even his powerful logic. Assuming a false major premise, his straightfor-
ward logic conducted him to the dogma of a universal necessity. But his
well-developed reason, and deep piety of heart, controlled his practical
judgment, so that few men have practically held the doctrines of accounta-
bility and retribution with a firmer grasp.
2. Edwards adopted the Lockean philosophy. He regarded the mind as
possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and the will. He
considered all the desires, emotions, affections, appetites, and passions as
voluntary, and as really consisting in acts of will. This confounding of the
states of the sensibility with acts of the will, I regard as another funda-
mental error of his whole system of philosophy, so far as it respects the liberty
of the will, or the doctrine of ability. Being conscious that the emotions,
which he calls affections, the desires, the appetites and passions, were so
correlated to their appropriate objects, that they are excited by the presence
or contemplation of them, and assuming them to be voluntary states of
mind, or actions of the will, he very maturally, and with this assumption,
necessarily and justly concluded, that the will was governed or decided by
the objective motive. Assuming as he did that the mind has but two
faculties, understanding and will, and that every state of feeling and of
mind that did not belong to the understanding, must be a voluntary state
INABILITY. 495
or act of will, and being conscious that his feelings, desires, affections,
appetites and passions, were excited by the contemplation of their cor-
related objects, he could consistently come to no other conclusion than that
the will is determined by motives, and that choice always is as the most
agreeable is.
Had he not sat down to write with the assumption of the Lockean
school of philosophy in his mind, his Treatise on the Will, in anything
like its present form, could never have seen the light. But assuming the
truth of that philosophy, a mind like his could arrive at no other conclusions
than he did. He took upon trust, or assumed without inquiry, an error
that vitiated his whole system, and gave birth to that injurious monstrosity
and misnomer, “Edwards on the Freedom of the Will.” He justly held
that moral law legislates and can strictly legislate only over acts of Will,
and those acts that are under the control of the will. This he, with his
mental developement, could not deny, nor think of denying. Had he but
given or assumed a correct definition of the will, and excluded from its
acts the wholly involuntary states of the sensibility, he never could have
asserted that the will is always and necessarily determined by the objective
motive. Assuming the philosophy of Locke, and being conscious that the
states of his sensibility, which he called acts of will, were controlled or
excited by motives, or by the consideration of their correlated objects, his
great soul laboured to bring about a reconciliation between the justice of
God and this real, though not so called, slavery of the human will. This
led him to adopt the distinction which we have examined between a moral
and a natural imability. Thus, as a theologian, he committed a capital
error in suffering himself to take upon trust another man's philosophy.
Happy is the man who takes the trouble to examine for himself, whatever
is essential to his system of opinion and belief.
II. I am to state the philosophy of the scheme of inability which we are
about to consider.
1. This philosophy properly distinguishes between the will and the
sensibility. It regards the mind as possessing three primary departments,
powers, or susceptibilities, the intelleet, the sensibility, and the will. It
does not always call these departments or susceptibilities by these names,
but if I understand them, the abbettors of this philosophy hold to their
existence, by whatever name they may call them.
2. This philosophy also holds, that the states of the intellect and of the
sensibility are passive and involuntary.
3. It holds that freedom of will is a condition of moral agency.
4. It also teaches that the will is free, and consequently that man is a
free moral agent.
5. It teaches that the will controls the outward life and the attention of
the intellect, directly, and many of the emotions, desires, affections, appe-
tites, and passions, or many states of the sensibility, indirectly.
6. It teaches that men have ability to obey God so far as acts of will
496 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
are concerned, and also so far as those acts and states of mind are concerned
that are under the direct or indirect control of the will.
7. But they hold that moral obligation may, and in the case of man at
least, does extend beyond moral agency and beyond the sphere of ability;
that ability or freedom of will is essential to moral agency, but that freedom
of will or moral agency does not limit moral obligation ; that moral agency
and moral obligation are not co-extensive ; consequently that moral obliga-
tion is not limited by ability or by moral agency.
8. This philosophy asserts that moral obligation extends to those states
of mind that lie wholly beyond or without the sphere or control of the will ;
that it extends not merely to voluntary acts and states, together with all acts
and states that come within the direct or indirect control of the will, but,
as was said, it insists that those mental states that lie wholly beyond the
will's direct or indirect control, come within the pale of moral legislation
and obligation; and that therefore obligation is not limited by ability.
9. This philosophy seems to have been invented to reconcile the doctrine
of original sin in the sense of a sinful mature, or of constitutional moral de-
pravity with moral obligation. Assuming that original sin in this sense is a
doctrine of divine revelation, it takes the bold and uncompromising ground
already stated, namely, that moral obligation is not merely co-extensive with
moral agency and ability, but extends beyond both into the region of those
mental states that lie entirely without the will's direct or indirect control.
10. This bold assertion the abettors of this philosophy attempt to sup-
port, by an appeal to the necessary convictions of men and to the authority
of the Bible. They allege that the instinctive judgments of men, as well as
the Bible, everywhere assume and affirm moral obligation and moral
character of the class of mental states in question.
11. They admit that a physical inability is a bar to or inconsistent with
moral obligation; but they of course deny that the inability to which they
hold is physical.
III. This brings us to a brief consideration of the claims of this philosophy
of inability.
1. It is based upon a petitio principiis, or a begging of the question. It
assumes that the instinctive or irresistible and universal judgments of men,
together with the Bible, assert and assume that moral obligation and moral
character extend to the states of mind in question. It is admitted that the
teachings of the Bible are to be relied upon. It is also admitted that the
first truths of reason, or what this philosophy calls the instinctive and
necessary judgments of all men, must be true. But it is not admitted that
the assertion in question is a doctrine of the Bible or a first truth of reason.
On the contrary both are denied. It is denied, at least by me, that either
reason or divine revelation affirms moral obligation or moral character of
any state of mind, that lies wholly beyond both the direct and the indirect
control of the will. Now this philosophy must not be allowed to beg the
question in debate. Let it be shown, if it can be, that the alleged truth is
INABILITY. & 497
either a doctrine of the Bible or a first truth of reason. Both reason and
revelation do assert and assume, that moral obligation and moral character
extend to acts of will, and to all those outward acts or mental states that lie
within its direct or indirect control. “But further these deponents say not.”
Men are conscious of moral obligation in respect to these acts and states of
mind, and of guilt when they fail in these respects to comply with moral
obligation. But who ever blamed himself for pain, when, without his fault,
he received a blow, or was seized with the tooth-ache, or a fit of bilious
cholic 2
2. Let us inquire into the nature of this inability, Observe, it is admitted
by this school that a physical inability is inconsistent with moral obligation
—in other words, that physical ability is a condition of moral obligation.
But what is a physical inability? The primary definition of the adjective
physical, given by Webster, is, “pertaining to mature, or matural objects.”
A physical inability them, in the primary sense of the term physical, is an
inability of mature. It may be eitber a material or a mental inability, that
is, it may be either an inability of body or mind. It is admitted by the
School whose views we are canvassing, that all human causality or ability
resides in the will, and therefore that there is a proper inability of nature
to perform anything that does not come within the sphere of the direct or
indirect causality of, or control of the will. It is plain, therefore, that the
inability for which they contend must be a proper natural inability, or
inability of nature. This they fully admit and maintain. But this they do
not call a physical inability. But why do they not? Why, simply because
it would, by their own admissions, overthrow their favourite position. They
seem to assume that a physical inability must be a material inability. But
where is the authority for such an assumption? There is no authority for
it. A proper inability of nature must be a physical inability, as opposed to
moral imability, or there is no meaning in language. It matters not at all
whether the inability belongs to the material organism, or to the mind. If
it be constitutional, and properly an inability of nature, it is nonsense to
deny that this is a physical inability, or to maintain that it can be con-
sistent with moral obligation. It is in vain to reply that this inability,
though a real inability of nature, is not physical but moral, because a sinful
inability. This is another begging of the question.
The school, whose views I am examining, maintain, that this inability is
founded in the first sin of Adam. His first sin plunged himself and his
posterity, descending from him by a natural law, into a total inability of
nature to render any obedience to God. This first sin of Adam entañéd 8.
mature on all his posterity “wholly sinful in every faculty and part of soul
and body.” This constitutional sinfulness that belongs to every faculty and
part of Soul and body, constitutes the inability of which we are treating.
But mark, it is not physical inability, because it is a sinful inability,
Important theological distinction —as truly wonderful, Surely, as any of
the subtleties of the Jesuits. But if this inability is sinful, it is important
to inquire, Whose sin is it? Who is to blame for it? Why to be sure, we
R. R.
498 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
are told that it is the sin of him upon whom it is thus entailed by the
matural law of descent from parent to child without his knowledge or con-
sent. This sinfulness of mature, entirely irrespective of, and previous to
any actual transgression, renders its possessor worthy of and exposed to the
wrath and curse of God for ever. This sinfulness, observe, is transmitted
by a matural or physical law from Adam, but it is not a physical inability.
It is something that inheres in, and belongs to every faculty and part of
Soul and body. It is transmitted by a physical law from parent to child. It
is, therefore, and must be a physical thing. But yet we are told that it
cannot be a physical inability, because first, it is sinful, or sin itself; and,
secondly, because a physical inability is a bar to, or inconsistent with, moral
obligation. Here, then, we have their reasons for not admitting this to be
a physical inability. It would in this case render moral obligation an im-
possibility; and, besides, if a bar to moral obligation, it could not be sinful.
But it is sinful, it is said, therefore it cannot be physical. But how do we
know that it is sinful? Why, we are told, that the instinctive judgments of
men, and the Bible everywhere affirm and assume it. We are told, that
both the instinctive judgments of men and the Bible affirm and assume,
both the inability in question and the sinfulness of it: “that we ought to
be able, but are not ;" that is, that we are so much to blame for this
inability of nature entailed upon us without our knowledge or consent by a
physical necessity, as to deserve the wrath and curse of God for ever. We
are under a moral obligation not to have this sinful nature. We deserve
damnation for having it. To be sure, we are entirely unable to put it away,
and had no agency whatever in its existence, But what of that? We are
told, that “moral obligation is not limited by ability;” that our being as
unable to change our mature as we are to create a world, is no reason why
we should not be under obligation to do it, since “moral obligation does not
imply ability of any kind to do what we are under obligation to do!” .
I was about to expose the folly and absurdity of these assertions, but hush!
It is not allowable, we are told, to reason on this subject. We shall deceive
ourselves if we listen to the “miserable logic of our understandings.” We
must fall back, them, upon the intuitive affirmations of reason and the
Bible. Here, them, we are Willing to lodge our appeal. The Bible defines
sin to be a transgression of the law, What law have we violated in inherit-
ing this mature? What law requires us to have a different nature from that
which we possess 2 Does reason affirm that we are deserving of the wrath
and curse of God for ever, for inheriting from Adam a sinful mature?
What law of reason have we transgressed in inheriting this nature?
Reason cannot condemn us, unless we have violated some law which it can
recognize as such. Reason indignantly rebukes such nonsense. Does the
Bible hold us responsible for impossibilities 2 Does it require of us what
we cannot do by willing to do it? Nay, Verily ; but it expressly affirms,
that “if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to what
a man hath, and not according to what he hath not.” The plain
meaning of this passage is, that if one wills as God directs, he has
hereby met all his obligation ; that he has done all that is naturally
INABILITY. 499
possible to him, and therefore nothing more is required. In this passage,
the Bible expressly limits obligation by ability. This we have repeatedly
seen in former lectures. The law also, as we have formerly seen, limits
obligation by ability. It requires only that we should love the Lord
with all our strength, that is, with all our ability, and our neighbour as
ourselves.
Does reason hold us responsible for impossibilities, or affirm our obliga-
tion to do, or be, what it is impossible for us to do and be 2 No indeed.
Reason never did and never can condemn us for our nature, and hold us
worthy of the wrath and curse of God for ever for possessing it. Nothing
is more shocking and revolting to reason, than such assumptions as are
made by the philosophy in question. This every man's consciouslless must
testify.
But is it not true that some, at least, do intelligently condemn them-
selves for their nature, and adjudge themselves to be worthy of the wrath
and curse of God for ever for its sinfulness 2 The framers of the Presby-
terian Confession of Faith made this affirmation in words, at least; whether
intelligently or unintelligently, we are left to inquire. The reason of a
moral agent condemning himself, and adjudging himself worthy of the
wrath and curse of God for ever, for possessing a nature entailed on him by
a matural law, without his knowledge or consent This can never be.
But is it not true, as is affirmed, that men instinctively and necessarily
affirm their obligation to be able to obey God, while they at the same time
affirm that they are not able 2 I answer, 110. They affirm themselves to
be under obligation simply, and only, because deeply in their inward being
lies the assumption that they are able to comply with the requirements of
God. They are conscious of ability to will, and of power to control their
outward life directly, and the states of the intellect and of their sensibility,
either directly or indirectly, by willing. Upon this consciousness they
found the affirmation of obligation, and of praise and blame-worthiness in
respect to these acts and states of mind. But for the consciousness of
ability, no affirmation of moral obligation, or of praise or blame-worthiness,
were possible.
But do not those who affirm both their inability and their obligation, deceive
themselves? I answer, yes. It is common for persons to overlook assump-
tions that lie, so to speak, at the bottom of their minds. This has been
noticed in former lectures, and need not be here repeated.
It is true indeed that God requires of men, especially under the gospel,
what they are unable to do directly in their own strength. Or more strictly
speaking, he requires them to lay hold on his strength, or to avail them-
selves of his grace, as the condition of being what he requires them to be.
With strict propriety, it cannot be said that in this, or in any case, he
requires directly any more than we are able directly to do. The direct
requirement in the case under consideration, is to avail ourselves of, or to
lay hold upon his strength. This we have power to do. He requires us
to lay hold upon his grace and strength, and thereby to rise to a higher
K K 2
500 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
*
knowledge of himself, and to a consequent higher state of holiness than
Would be otherwise possible to us. The direct requirement is to believe, or
to lay hold upon his strength, or to receive the Holy Spirit, or Christ, who
stands at the door, and knocks, and waits for admission. The indirect
requirement is to rise to a degree of knowledge of God, and to spiritual
attainments that are impossible to us in our own strength. We have
ability to obey the direct command directly, and the indirect command
indirectly, That is, we are able by virtue of our nature, together with the
proffered grace of the Holy Spirit, to comply with all the requirements of
God. So that in fact there is no proper inability about it.
But are not men often conscious of there being much difficulty in the
Way of rendering to God all that we affirm ourselves under obligation to
render 2 I answer, yes. But strictly speaking, they must admit their
direct or indirect ability, as a condition of affirming their obligation. This
difficulty, arising out of their physical depravity,” and the power of tempta-
tion from without, is the foundation or cause of the spiritual warfare of
which the Scriptures speak, and of which all Christians are conscious.
But the Bible abundantly teaches, that through grace we are able to be
more than conquerors. If we are able to be this through grace, we are
able to avail ourselves of the provisions of grace, so that there is no proper
inability in the case. However great the difficulties may be, we are able
through Christ to overcome them all. This we must and do assume as
the condition of the affirmation of obligation.
LECTURE LI.
GRACIOUS ABILITY.
I. I WILL SHOW WHAT THOSE WHO USE THIS PHRASEOLOGY MEAN BY A
GRACIO US ABILITY.
II. THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A GRACIOUs ABILITY AS HELD BY THOSE WHO
MAINTAIN IT IS AN ABSUIRDITY.
III. IN WHAT SENSE OF THE TERMIs A GRACIOUs ABILITY Is PossIBLE.
Grace is unmerited favour. Its exercise consists in bestowing that
which, without a violation of justice, might be withheld.
Ability to obey God, as we have seen, is the possession of power adequate
to the performance of that which is required. If, them, the terms are used
in the proper sense, by a gracious ability must be intended that the power
which men at present possess to obey the commands of God, is a gift of
grace relatively to the command ; that is, the bestowment of power adequate
to the performance of the thing required, is a matter of grace as opposed to
justice. But let us enter upon an inquiry into the sense in which this
language is used.
* See distinction between moral and physical depravity, page 370.
G.R.A.CIOUS ABILITY. 501
I. I will show what is intended by the term gracious ability.
The abettors of this scheme hold that by the first sin of Adam, he,
together with all his posterity, lost all natural power and all ability of every
kind to obey God; that therefore they were, as a race, wholly unable to
obey the moral law, or to render to God any acceptable service whatever;
that is, that they became, as a consequence of the sin of Adam, wholly
unable to use the powers of mature in any other way than to sin. They
were able to sin or to disobey God, but entirely unable to obey him ; that
they did not lose all power to act, but that they had power to act only in
one direction, that is, in opposition to the will and law of God. By a
gracious ability they intend, that in consequence of the atonement of Christ,
God has graciously restored to man ability to accept the terms of mercy, or
to fulfil the conditions of acceptance with God; in other words, that by the
gracious aid of the Holy Spirit which, upon condition of the atonement,
God has given to every member of the human family, all men are endowed
with a gracious ability to obey God. By a gracious ability is intended, them,
that ability or power to obey God, which all men now possess, not by virtue
of their own nature or constitutional powers, but by virtue of the indwelling
and gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, gratuitously bestowed upon man
in consequence of the atonement of Christ. The inability, or total loss of
all natural power to obey God into which men as a race fell by the first
sin of Adam, they call original sin, &c., perhaps more strictly, this inability
is a consequence of that original sin into which man fell ; which original
sin itself consisted in the total corruption of man's whole nature. They
hold, that by the atonement Christ made satisfaction for original sin, in
such a sense, that the inability resulting from it is removed, and that now
lmen are by gracious aid able to obey and accept the terms of salvation.
That is, they are able to repent and believe the gospel. In short, they are
able by virtue of this gracious ability to do their duty, or to obey God. This,
if I understand these theologians, is a fair statement of their doctrine of
gracious ability. This brings us,
II. To show that the doctrine of a gracious ability, as held by those who
maintain it, is an absurdity.
The question is not whether, as a matter of fact, men ever do obey God
without the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit. I hold that they do not.
So the fact of the Holy Spirit's gracious influence being exerted in every
case of human obedience, is not a question in debate between those who
maintain, and those who deny the doctrine of gracious ability, in the sense
above explained. The question in debate is not whether men do, in any
case, use the powers of nature in the manmer that God requires, without
the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, but whether they are naturally
able so to use them. Is the fact, that they never do so use them without a
gracious divine influence, to be ascribed to absolute inability, or to the fact
that, from the beginning, they universally and voluntarily consecrate their
502 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
powers to the gratification of self, and that therefore they will not, unless
they are divinely persuaded, by the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, in
any case turn and consecrate their powers to the service of God? If this
doctrine of natural inability and of gracious ability be true, it inevitably
follows:—
1. That but for the atonement of Christ, and the consequent bestow-
ment of a gracious ability, no one of Adam's race could ever have been
capable of sinning. For in this case the whole race would have been, and
remained, wholly destitute of any kind or degree of ability to obey God.
Consequently they could not have been subjects of moral government, and
of course their actions could have had no moral character. It is a first-
truth of reason, a truth everywhere and by all men necessarily assumed in
their practical judgments, that a subject of moral government must be a
moral agent, or that moral agency is a necessary condition of any one's
being a subject of a moral government. And in the practical judgment of
men, it matters not at all whether a being ever was a moral agent, or not.
If by any means whatever he has ceased to be a moral agent, men univer-
sally and necessarily assume, that it is impossible for him to be a subject
of moral government any more than a horse can be such a subject. Sup-
pose he has by his own fault made himself an idiot or a lunatic; all men
know absolutely, and in their practical judgment assume, that in this state
he is not, and cannot be a subject of moral government. They know that
in this state, moral character cannot justly be predicated of his actions.
His guilt in thus depriving himself of moral agency may be exceeding great,
and, as was said on a former occasion, his guilt in thus depriving himself
of moral agency may equal the sum of all the default of which it is the
cause,_but be a moral agent, be under moral obligation in this state of
dementation or insanity, he cannot. This is a first truth of reason, irre-
sistibly and universally assumed by all men. If therefore Adam's pos-
terity had by their own personal act cast away and deprived themselves of
all ability to obey God, in this state they would have ceased to be moral
agents, and consequently they could have sinned no more. But the case
under consideration is not the one just supposed, but is one where moral
agency was not cast away by the agent himself. It is one where moral
agency was never, and never could have been possessed. In the case under
consideration, Adam's posterity, had he ever had any, would never bave
possessed any power to obey God, or to do anything acceptable to him.
Consequently, they never could have sustained to God the relation of sub-
jects of his moral government. Of course they never could have had moral
character; right or wrong, in a moral sense, never could have been predi-
cated of their actions.
2. It must follow from this doctrine of gracious ability and natural in-
ability, that mankind lost their freedom, or the liberty of the human will in
the first sin of Adam; that both Adam himself, and all his posterity would
and could have sustained to God only the relation of necessary, as opposed
to free agents, had not God bestowed upon them a gracious ability.
GRACIOUS ABILITY. 503
We have seen in a former lecture, that natural ability to obey God, and
the freedom or liberty of will, are identical. We have abundantly seen that
moral law and moral obligation respect strictly only acts of will; that
hence, all obedience to God consists strictly in acts of will ; that power to
will in conformity with the requirements of God, is natural ability to obey
him ; that freedom or liberty of will, consists in the power or ability to
will in conformity or opposition to the will or law of God ; that, therefore,
freedom or liberty of will, and natural ability to obey God, are identical,
Thus we see, that if man lost his natural ability to obey God in the first
sin of Adam, he lost the freedom of his will, and thenceforth must for ever
have remained a necessary agent, but for the gracious re-bestowment of
ability or freedom of will.
But that either Adam or his posterity lost their freedom or free agency
by the first sin of Adam, is not only a sheer but an absurd assumption.
To be sure Adam fell into a state of total alienation from the law of God,
and lapsed into a state of supreme selfishness. His posterity have unani-
mously followed his example. He and they have become dead in trespasses
and sins. Now that this death in sin either consists in, or implies the loss
of free agency, is the very thing to be proved by them. But this cannot
be proved. I have so fully discussed the subject of human moral depravity
or sinfulness on a former occasion, as to render it unnecessary to enlarge
upon it here.
3. Again, if it be true, as these theologians affirm, that men have only
a gracious ability to obey God, and that this gracious ability consists in
the presence and gracious agency of the Holy Spirit, it follows that, when
the Holy Spirit is withdrawn from mam, he is no longer a free agent, and
from that moment he is incapable of moral action, and of course can sin
no more. Hence, should he live any number of years after this withdrawal,
neither sin nor holiness, virtue nor vice, praise nor blame-worthiness could
be predicated of his conduct. The same will and must be true of all his
future etermity.
4. If the doctrine in question be true, it follows, that from the moment
of the withdrawal of the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, man is no
longer a subject of moral obligation. It is from that moment absurd and
unjust to require the performance of any duty of him. Nay, to conceive
of him as being any longer a subject of duty; to think or speak of duty
as belonging to him, is as absurd as to think or speak of the duty of a
mere machine. He has, from the moment of the withholding of a gracious
ability, ceased to be a free and become a necessary agent, having power to
act but in one direction. Such a being can by no possibility be capable of
sin or holiness. Suppose he still possesses power to act contrary to the
letter of the law of God: what then? This action can have no moral cha.
racter, because, act in some way he must, and he can act in no other way.
It is nonsense to affirm that such action can be sinful in the sense of blame-
Worthy. To affirm that it can, is to contradict a first truth of reason.
Sinners, then, who have quenched the Holy Spirit, and from whom he is
504 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
wholly withdrawn, are no longer to be blamed for their enmity against God,
and for all their opposition to him. They are, according to this doctrine,
as free from blame as are the motions of a mere machine.
5. Again, if the doctrine in question be true, there is no reason to believe
that the angels that fell from their allegiance to God ever sinned but once.
If Adam lost his free agency by the fall, or by his first sin, there can be
no doubt that the angels did so too. If a gracious ability had not been
bestowed upon Adam, it is certain, according to the doctrine in question,
that he never could have been the subject of moral obligation from the
moment of his first sin, and consequently, could never again have simmed.
The same must be true of devils. If by their first sin they fell into the
condition of uecessary agents, having lost their free agency, they have
never simmed since. That is, moral character cannot have been predicable
of their conduct since that event, unless a gracious ability has been bestowed
upon them. That this has been done cannot, with even a show of reason,
be pretended. The devils, then, according to this doctrine, are not now to
blame for all they do to oppose God and to ruin souls. Upon the suppo-
sition in question, they cannot help it; and you might as well blame the
winds and the Waves for the evil which they sometimes do, as blame Satan
for what he does.
6. If this doctrine be true, there is not, and never will be, any sin in
hell, for the plain reason, that there are no moral agents there. They are
necessary agents, unless it be true, that the Holy Spirit and a gracious
ability be continued there. This is not, I believe, contended for by the
abettors of this scheme. But if they deny to the inhabitants of hell free-
dom of the will, or, which is the same thing, natural ability to obey God,
they must admit, or be grossly inconsistent, that there is no sin in hell,
either in men or devils. But is this admission agreeable, either to reason
or revelation ? I know that the abettors of this scheme maintain, that
God may justly hold both men, from whom a gracious ability is withdrawn,
and devils, responsible for their conduct, upon the ground that they have
destroyed their own ability. But suppose this were true—that they had
rendered themselves idiots, lunatics, or necessary as opposed to free agents,
could God justly, could enlightened reason still regard them as moral
agents, and as morally responsible for their conduct? No, indeed. God
and reason may justly blame, and render them miserable, for annihilating
their freedom or their moral agency, but to hold them still responsible for
present obedience, were absurd.
7. We have seem that the ability of all men of sane mind to obey God,
is necessarily assumed as a first truth of reason, and that this assumption
is, from the very laws of mind, the indispensable condition of the affirma-
tion, or even the conception, that they are subjects of moral obligation ;
that, but for this assumption, men could not so much as conceive the
possibility of moral responsibility, and of praise and blame-worthiness. If
the laws of mind remain unaltered, this is and always will be so. In the
eternal world and in hell, men and devils must necessarily assume their
GRACIOUS ABILITY. 505
own freedom or ability to obey God, as the condition of their obligation to
do so, and, consequently to their being capable of sin or holiness. Since
revelation informs us that men and devils continue to sin in hell, we know
that there also it must be assumed as a first truth of reason, that they are
free agents, or that they have natural ability to obey God.
8. But that a gracious ability to do duty or to obey God is an absurdity,
will further appear, if we consider that it is a first truth of reason, that
moral obligation implies moral agency, and that moral agency implies free-
dom of will; or in other words, it implies a natural ability to comply with
obligation. This ability is necessarily regarded by the intelligence as the
sine quá non of moral obligation, on the ground of natural and immutable
justice. A just command always implies an ability to obey it. A com-
mand to perform a natural impossibility would not, and could not, impose
obligation. Suppose God should command human beings to fly without
giying them power, could such a command impose moral obligation? No,
indeed. But suppose he should give them power, or promise them power,
upon the performance of a condition within their reach, then he might in
justice require them to fly, and a command to do so would be obligatory.
But relatively to the requirement, the bestowment of power would not be
grace, but justice. Relatively to the results or the pleasure of flying, the
bestowment of power might be gracious. That is, it might be grace in God
to give me power to fly, that I might have the pleasure and profit of flying,
so that relatively to the results of flying, the giving of power might be
regarded as an act of grace. But, if God requires me to fly as a matter
of duty, he must in justice supply the power or ability to fly. This would
in justice be a necessary condition of the command, imposing moral obli-
gation.
Nor would it at all vary the case if I had ever possessed wings, and by
the abuse of them had lost the power to fly. In this case, considered
relatively to the pleasure, and profit, and results of flying, the restoring of
the power to fly might and would be an act of grace. But if God would
still command me to fly, he must, as a condition of my obligation, restore
the power. It is vain and absurd to say, as has been said, that in such a
case, although I might lose the power of obedience, this cannot alter the
right of God to claim obedience. This assertion proceeds upon the absurd
assumption that the will of God makes or creates law, instead of merely
declaring and enforcing the law of mature. We have seen in former
lectures, that the only law or rule of action that is, or can be obligatory on
a moral agent, is the law of nature, or just that course of willing and
acting, which is for the time being, suitable to his mature and relations.
We have seen that God's will never makes or creates law, that it only
declares and enforces it. If therefore, by any means whatever, the nature
of a moral agent should be so changed that his will is no longer free to act
in conformity with, or in opposition to, the law of mature, if God would
hold him still obligated to obey, he must in justice, relatively to his require-
ment, restore his liberty or ability. Suppose one had by the abuse of his
506 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
intellect lost the use of it, and become a perfect idiot, could he by any
possibility be still required to understand and obey God 2 Certainly not.
So neither could he be required to perſorm anything else that had become
naturally impossible to him. Viewed relatively to the pleasure and results
of obedience, his restoring power would be an act of grace. But viewed
relatively to his duty or to God's command, the restoring of power to obey
is an act of justice and not of grace. To call this grace were to abuse
language, and confound terms. But this brings me to the consideration of
the next question to be discussed at present, namely,–
III. In what sense a gracious ability is possible.
1. Not, as we have just seem, in the sense that the bestowment of power
to render obedience to a command possible, can be properly a gift of grace.
Grace is undeserved favour, something not demanded by justice, that
which under the circumstances might be withholden without injustice. It
never can be just in any being to require that which under the circum-
stances is impossible. As has been said, relatively to the requirement and
as a condition of its justice, the bestowment of power adequate to the per-
formance of that which is commanded, is an unalterable condition of the
justice of the command. This I say is a first truth of reason, a truth
everywhere by all men necessarily assumed and known. A gracious ability
to obey a command, is an absurdity and an impossibility.
2. But a gracious ability considered relatively to the advantages to result
from obedience is possible.
Suppose, for example, that a servant who supports himself and his family
by his wages, should by his own fault render himself unable to labour and
to earn his wages. His master may justly dismiss him, and let him go
with his family to the poor-house. But in this disabled state his master
cannot justly exact labour of him. Nor could he do so if he absolutely
owned the servant. Now suppose the master to be able to restore to the
servant his former strength. If he would require service of him, as a con-
dition of the justice of this requirement, he must restore his strength so far
at least as to render obedience possible. This would be mere justice. But
suppose he restored the ability of the servant to gain support for himself
and his family by labour. This, viewed relatively to the good of the
servant, to the results of the restoration of his ability to himself and to
his family, is a matter of grace. Relatively to the good or rights of the
master in requiring the labour of the servant, the restoration of ability to
obey is an act of justice. But relatively to the good of the servant, and
the benefits that result to him from this restoration of ability, and making
it once more possible for him to support himself and his family, the giving
of ability is properly an act of grace.
Let this be applied to the case under consideration. Suppose the race
of Adam to have lost their free agency by the first sin of Adam, and thus
to have come into a state in which holiness and consequent Salvation were
impossible. Now, if God would still require obedience of them, he must
GRACIOUS ABILITY. 507
in justice restore their ability. And viewed relatively to his right to com-
mand, and their duty to obey, this restoration is properly a matter of
justice. But suppose he would again place them in circumstances to render
holiness and consequent salvation possible to them —viewed relatively to
their good and profit, this restoration of ability is properly a matter of
grace,
A gracious ability to obey, viewed relatively to the command to be
obeyed, is impossible and absurd. But a gracious ability to be saved,
viewed relatively to salvation, is possible.
There is no proof that mankind ever lost their ability to obey, either by
the first sin of Adam, or by their own sin. For this would imply, as we
have seen, that they had ceased to be free, and had become necessary
agents. But if they had, and God had restored their ability to obey, all
that can be justly said in this case, is, that so far as his right to command
is concerned, the restoration of their ability was an act of justice. But so
far as the rendering of salvation possible to them is concerned, it was an
act of grace.
3. But it is asserted, or rather assumed by the defenders of the dogma
under consideration, that the Bible teaches the doctrine of a natural in-
ability, and of a gracious ability in man to obey the commands of God. I
admit, indeed, that if we interpret scripture without regard to any just
rules of interpretation, this assumption may find countenance in the word
of God, just as almost any absurdity whatever may do, and has done. But a
moderate share of attention to one of the simplest and most universal and
most important rules of interpreting language, whether in the Bible or out
of it, will strip this absurd dogma of the least appearamee of support from
the word of God. The rule to which I refer is this, “ that language is
always to be interpreted in accordance with the subject-matter of dis-
course.”
When used of acts of will, the term “cannot interpreted by this rule,
must not be understood to mean a proper impossibility. If I say, I can-
not take five dollars for my watch, when it is offered to me, every one
knows that I do not and cannot mean to affirm a proper impossibility. So
when the angel said to Lot, “Haste thee, for I cannot do anything until
thou become thither,” who ever understood him as affirming a natural
or any proper impossibility 2 All that he could have meant was, that
he was not willing to do anything until Lot was in a place of safety.
Just so when the Bible speaks of our inability to comply with the com-
mands of God, all that can be intended is, that we are so unwilling that,
without divine persuasion, we, as a matter of fact, shall uot and will not
obey. This certainly is the sense in which such language is used in com-
mon life. And in common parlance, we never think of such language,
when used of acts of will, as meaning anything more than unwillingness, a
state in which the will is strongly committed in an opposite direction.
When Joshua said to the children of Israel, “Ye cannot serve the Lord,
for he is a holy God,” the whole context, as well as the nature of the case,
508 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
shows that he did not mean to affirm a natural, nor indeed any kind of im
possibility. In the same connexion, he requires them to serve the Lord,
and leads them solemnly to pledge themselves to serve him. He undoubt-
edly intended to say, that with wicked hearts they could not render him
an acceptable service, and therefore insisted on their putting away the
wickedness of their hearts, by immediately and voluntarily consecrating
themselves to the service of the Lord. So it must be in all cases where
the term “cannot,” and such-like expressions which, when applied to mus-
cular action, would imply a proper impossibility, are used in reference to
acts of will ; they cannot, when thus used be understood as implying a
proper impossibility, without doing violence to every sober rule of interpret-
ing language. What would be thought of a judge or an advocate at the
bar of an earthly tribunal, who should interpret the language of a witness
without any regard to the rule, “that language is to be understood accord-
ing to the subject-matter of discourse.” Should an advocate in his argu-
ment to the court or jury, attempt to interpret the language of a witness in
a manner that made “cannot,” when spoken of an act of will, mean a proper
impossibility, the judge would soon rebuke his stupidity, and remind him
that he must not talk nonsense in a court of justice; and might possibly
add, that such nonsensical assertions were allowable only in the pulpit. I
say again, that it is an utter abuse and perversion of the laws of language,
so to interpret the Bible as to make it teach a proper inability in man to
will as God directs. The essence of obedience to God consists in willing.
Language, then, used in reference to obedience must, when properly under-
stood, be interpreted in accordance with the subject-matter of discourse.
Consequently, when used in reference to acts of will, such expressions as
“cannot,” and the like, can absolutely mean nothing more than a choice in
an opposite direction. But it may be asked, Is there no grace in all that
is done by the Holy Spirit to make man wise unto salvation 2 Yes, indeed,
I answer. And it is grace, and great grace, just because the doctrine of
a matural inability in man to obey God is not true. It is just because man
is well able to render obedience, and unjustly refuses to do so, that all the
influence that God brings to bear upon him to make him willing, is a gift
and an influence of grace. The grace is great, just in proportion to the
sinner's ability to conply with God's requirements, and the strength of his
voluntary opposition to his duty. If man were properly unable to obey,
there could be no grace in giving him ability to obey, when the bestownent
of ability is considered relatively to the command. But let man be regarded
as free, as possessing matural ability to obey all the requirements of God,
and all his difficulty as consisting in a wicked heart, or, which is the same
thing, in an unwillingness to obey, them an influence on the part of God
designed and tending to make him willing, is grace indeed. But strip
man of his freedom, render him naturally unable to obey, and you render
grace impossible, so far as his obligation to obedience is concerned.
But it is urged in support of the dogma of natural inability and of a
gracious ability, that the Bible everywhere represents man as dependent on
GRACIOUS ABILITY. 309
the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit for all holiness, and consequently
for eternal life. I answer, it is admitted that this is the representation of
the Bible, but the question is, in what sense is he dependent 2 Does his
dependence consist in a natural inability to embrace the gospel and be saved P
or does it consist in a voluntary selfishness—in an unwillingness to comply
with the terms of salvation ? Is man dependent on the Holy Spirit to give
him a proper ability to obey God? or is he dependent only in such a sense
that, as a matter of fact, he will not embrace the gospel unless the Holy
Spirit makes him willing 2 The latter, beyond reasonable question, is the
truth. This is the universal representation of scripture. The difficulty to be
overcome is everywhere in the Bible represented to be the sinner's unwilling-
mess alone. It cannot possibly be anything else; for the willingness is the
doing required by God. “If there is but a willing mind, it is accepted accord-
ing to what a man hath, and not according to what he hath not.”
But it is said, if man can be willing of himself, what need of divine per-
Suasion or influence to make him willing 2 I might ask, suppose a man is
able but unwilling to pay his debts, what need of any influence to make him
willing? Why, divine influence is needed to make a sinner willing, or to
induce him to will as God directs, just for the same reason that persuasion,
entreaty, argument, or the rod, is needed to make our children submit their
wills to ours. The fact therefore that the Bible represents the sinner as
in some sense dependent upon divine influence for a right heart, no more
implies a proper illability in the sinner, than the fact that children are de-
pendent for their good behaviour, oftentimes upon the thorough and timely
discipline of their parents, implies a proper inability in them to obey their
parents without chastisement.
The Bible everywhere, and in every way, assumes the freedom of the will.
This fact stands out in strong relief upon every page of divine inspiration.
But this is only the assumption necessarily made by the universal intelli-
gence of man. The strong language often found in scripture upon the subject
of man's inability to obey God, is designed only to represent the strength of
his voluntary selfishness and enmity against God, and never to imply a
proper natural inability. It is, therefore, a gross and most injurious per-
version of scripture, as well as a contradiction of human reason, to deny the
natural ability, or which is the same thing, the natural free agency of man,
and to maintain a proper natural inability to obey God, and the absurd
dogma of a gracious ability to do our duty. -
REMARKS.
1. The question of ability is one of great practical importance. To deny
the ability of man to obey the commandments of God, is to represent God
as a hard master, as requiring a natural impossibility of his creatures on pain
of eternal damnation. This necessarily begets in the mind that believes it
hard thoughts of God. The intelligence cannot be satisfied with the justice
of such a requisition. In fact, so far as this error gets possession of the mind
510 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and gains assent, just so far it maturally and necessarily excuses itself for
disobedience, or for not complying with the commandments of God.
2. The moral inability of Edwards is a real matural inability, and so it
has been understood by simmers and professors of religion. When I entered
the ministry, I found the persuasion of an absolute inability on the part of
sinners to repent and believe the gospel almost universal. When I urged
sinners and professors of religion to do their duty without delay, I fre-
quently met with stern opposition from sinners, professors of religion, and
ministers. They desired me to say to sinners, that they could not repent,
and that they must wait God's time, that is, for God to help them. It
was common for the classes of persons just named to ask me, if I thought
sinners could be Christians whenever they pleased, and whether I thought
that any class of persons could repent, believe, and obey God without the
strivings and new-creating power of the Holy Spirit. The church was
almost universally settled down in the belief of a physical moral depravity,
and, of course, in a belief in the necessity of a physical regeneration, and
also of course in the belief, that sinners must wait to be regenerated by
divine power while they were passive. Professors also must wait to be
revived, until God, in mysterious sovereignty, came and revived them. As
to revivals of religion, they were settled down in the belief to a great
extent, that man had no more agency in producing them than in producing
showers of rain. To attempt to effect the conversion of a sinner, or to
promote a revival, was an attempt to take the work out of the hands of
God, to go to work in your own strength, and to set sinners and professors
to do the same. The vigorous use of means and measures to promote a
Work of grace, was regarded by many as impious. It was getting up an
excitement of animal feeling, and wickedly interfering with the prerogative
of God. The fact is, that both professors of religion and non-professors
were settled down upon their lees, in carnal security. The abominable
dogmas of physical moral depravity, or a sinful constitution, with a con-
sequent natural, falsely called moral, inability, and the necessity of a
physical and passive regeneration, had chilled the heart of the church, and
lulled sinners into a fatal sleep. This is the matural tendency of such
doctrines.
3. Let it be distinctly understood before we close this subject, that we
do not deny, but strenuously maintain, that the whole plan of Salvation,
and all the influences, both providential and spiritual, which God exerts in
the conversion, Sanctification, and Salvation, of sinners, is grace from first
to last, and that I deny the dogma of a gracious ability, because it robs
God of his glory. It really denies the grace of the gospel. The abettors
of this scheme, in contending for the grace of the gospel, really deny it.
What grace can there be, that should surprise heaven and earth, and cause
“ the angels to desire to look into it,” in bestowing ability on those who
never had any, and, of course, who never cast away their ability—to obey
the requirements of God? According to them all men lost their ability in
GRACIOUS ABILITY. 511
Adam, and not by their own act. God still required obedience of them
upon pain of eternal death. Now he might, according to this view of the
subject, just as reasonably command all men, on pain of etermal death, to
fly, or undo all that Adam had dome, or perform any other natural impos-
sibility, as to command them to be holy, to repent and believe the gospel.
Now, I ask again, what possible grace was there, or could there be, in his
giving them power to obey him 2 To have required the obedience without
giving the power had been infinitely unjust. To admit the assumption,
that men had really lost their ability to obey in Adam, and call this
bestowment of ability for which they contend, grace, is an abuse of lan-
guage, an absurdity, and a denial of the true grace of the gospel not to be
tolerated. I reject the dogma of a gracious ability, because it involves a
denial of the true grace of the gospel. I maintain that the gospel, with
all its influences, including the gift of the Holy Spirit, to convict, convert,
and sanctify the soul, is a system of grace throughout. But to maintain
this, I must also maintain, that God might justly have required obedience
of men without making these provisions for them. And to maintain the
justice of God in requiring obedience, I must admit and maintain that
obedience was possible to man. But this the abettors of this scheme demy,
and maintain, on the contrary, that notwithstanding men were deprived of
all ability, not by their own act or consent, but by Adam, long before they
were born, still God might justly, on pain of eternal damnation, require
them to be holy, and that the giving them ability to obey is a matter of
infinite grace; not, as they hold, the restoring of a power which they had
cast away, but the giving of a power which they had never possessed. This
power or ability, viewed relatively to the command to obey on pain of
eternal death, a gift of grace . This baffles, and confounds, and stultifies
the human intellect. The reason of a moral agent cannot but reject this
dogma. It will, in spite of himself, assume and affirm, the absence of
ability being granted, that the bestowment of an ability, viewed relatively
to the command, was demanded by justice, and that to call it a gracious
ability is an abuse of language.
Let it not be said then, that we deny the grace of the glorious gospel of
the blessed God, nor that we deny the reality and necessity of the influ-
ences of the Holy Spirit to convert and sanctify the soul, nor that this
influence is a gracious one ; for all these we most strenuously maintain.
But I maintain this upon the ground, that men are able to do their duty,
and that the difficulty does not lie in a proper inability, but in a voluntary
selfishness, in an unwillingness to obey the blessed gospel. I say again,
that I reject the dogma of a gracious ability, as I understand its abettors to
hold it, not because I deny, but solely because it denies the grace of the
gospel. The denial of ability is really a denial of the possibility of grace
in the affair of man's salvation. I admit the ability of man, and hold that
he is able, but utterly unwilling, to obey God. Therefore I consistently
hold, that all the influences exerted by God to make him Willing, are of
free grace abounding through Christ Jesus.
512 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE LII.
THE NOTION OF INABILITY.
PROPER METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR IT.
I have represented ability, or the freedom of the will, as a first truth of
reason. I have also defined first truths of reason to be those truths that
are necessarily known to all moral agents. From these two representations
the inquiry may naturally arise, How then is it to be accounted for that so
many men have denied the liberty of the will, or ability to obey God 2
That these first truths of reason are frequently denied is a notorious fact.
A recent writer thinks this denial a sufficient refutation of the affirmation,
that ability is a first truth of reason. It is important that this denial
should be accounted for. That mankind affirm their obligation upon the
real, though often latent and unperceived assumption of ability, there is no
reasonable ground of doubt. I have said that first-truths of reason are
frequently assumed, and certainly known without being always the direct
object of thought or attention; and also that these truths are universally
held in the practical judgments of men, while they sometimes in theory
deny them. They know them to be true, and in all their practical judg-
ments assume their truth, while they reason against them, think they prove
them untrue, and not unfrequently affirm, that they are conscious of an
opposite affirmation. For example, men have denied, in theory, the law of
causality, while they have at every moment of their lives acted upon the
assumption of its truth. Others have denied the freedom of the will, who
have, every hour of their lives, assumed, and acted, and judged, upon the
assumption that the will is free. The same is true of ability, which, in
respect to the commandments of God, is identical with freedom, Men have
often denied the ability of man to obey the commandments of God, while
they have always, in their practical judgments of themselves and of others,
assumed their ability, in respect to those things that are really commanded
by God. Now, how is this to be accounted for 2
1. Multitudes have denied the freedom of the will, because they
have loosely confounded the will with the involuntary powers—with the
intellect and the sensibility. Locke, as is well known, regarded the mind
as possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and the will.
President Edwards, as was said in a former lecture, followed Locke, and
regarded all the states of the sensibility as acts of the will. Multitudes,
may the great mass of Calvinistic divines, with their hearers, have held the
same views. This confounding of the sensibility with the Will has been
common for a long time. Now everybody is conscious, that the states of
the sensibility or mere feelings cannot be produced or changed by a direct
effort to feel thus or thus. Everybody knows from consciousness that the
feelings come and go, wax and wane, as motives are presented to excite
them. And they know also that these feelings are under the law of neces.
THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 513
sity and not of liberty; that is, that necessity is an attribute of these
feelings, in such a sense, that under the circumstances, they will exist in
spite of ourselves, and that they cannot be controlled by a direct effort to
control them. Everybody knows that our feelings, or the states of our
sensibility can be controlled only indirectly, that is, by the direction of our
thoughts. By directing our thoughts to an object calculated to excite
certain feelings, we know that when the excitability is not exhausted,
feelings correlated to that object will come into play, of course and of neces-
sity. So when any class of feelings exist, we all know that by diverting
the attention from the object that excites them, they subside of course, and
give place to a class correlated to the new object that at present occupies
the attention. Now, it is very manifest how the freedom of the will has
come to be denied by those who confound the will proper with the sensi-
bility. These same persons have always known and assumed, that the
actions of the will proper were free. Their error has consisted in not
distinguishing in theory between the action of the proper will, and the
involuntary states of the sensibility. In their practical judgments, and in
their conduct, they have recognized the distinction which they have failed
to recognize in their speculations and theories. They have every hour
been exerting their own freedom, have been controlling directly their at-
tention and their outward life, by the free exercise of their proper will.
They have also, by the free exercise of the same faculty, been indirectly
controlling the states of their sensibility. They have all along assumed
the absolute freedom of the will proper, and have always acted upon the
assumption, or they would not have acted at all, or even attempted to act.
But since they did not in theory distinguish between the sensibility and
the will proper, they denied in theory the freedom of the will. If the
actions of the will be confounded with desires and emotions, as President
Edwards confounded them, and as has been common, the result must be a
theoretical denial of the freedom of the will. In this way we are to account
for the doctrine of inability, as it has been generally held. It has not been
clearly understood that moral law legislates directly, and, with strict pro-
priety of speech, only over the will proper, and over the involuntary powers
only indirectly through the will. It has been common to regard the law
and the gospel of God, as directly extending their claims to the involuntary
powers and states of mind; and, as was shown in a former lecture, many
have regarded, in theory, the law as extending its claims to those states
that lie wholly beyond, either the direct or indirect control of the will.
Now, of course, with these views of the claims of God, ability is and must
be denied. I trust we have seen in past lectures, that, strictly and
properly speaking, the moral law restricts its claims to the actions of the
will proper, in such a sense that, if there be a willing mind, it is accepted
as obedience ; that the moral law and the lawgiver legislate over involun-
tary states only indirectly, that is, through the will ; and that the whole of
virtue, strictly speaking, consists in good-will or disinterested benevolence,
Same minds never practically deny, or can deny, the freedom of the will
I, L.
514 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
proper, or the doctrine of ability, when they make the proper discriminations
between the will and the sensibility, and properly regard moral law as
legislating directly only over the will. It is worthy of all consideration,
that those who have denied ability, have almost always confounded the will
and the sensibility; and that those who have denied ability, have always
extended the claims of moral law beyond the pale of proper voluntariness;
and many of them even beyond the limits of either the direct or the
indirect control of the will.
But the inquiry may arise, how it comes to pass that men have so
extensively entertained the impression, that the moral law legislates
directly over those feelings, and over those states of mind which they know
to be involuntary 2 I answer, that this mistake has arisen out of a want of
just discrimination between the direct and indirect legislation of the law,
and of the lawgiver. It is true that men are conscious of being responsible
for their feelings and for their outward actions, and even for their thoughts.
And it is really true that they are responsible for them, in So far as
they are under either the direct or indirect control of the will. And they
know that these acts and states of mind are possible to them, that is, that
they have an indirect ability to produce them. They, however, loosely con-
found the direct and indirect ability and responsibility. The thing required
by the law directly and presently is benevolence or good-will. This is what,
and all that the law strictly, presently or directly requires. It indirectly
requires all those outward and inward acts and states that are connected
directly and indirectly with this required act of will, by a law of necessity;
that is, that those acts and states should follow as soon as by a matural and
necessary law they will follow from a right action of the will. When these
feelings, and states, and acts do not exist, they blame themselves generally
with propriety, because the absence of them is in fact owing to a want
of the required act of the will. Sometimes, no doubt, they blame them-
selves unjustly, not considering that, although the will is right, of which
they are conscious, the involuntary state or act does not follow, because
of exhaustion, or because of Some disturbance in the established and
matural commection between the acts of the will and its ordinary sequents.
When this exhaustion or disturbance exists, men are apt, loosely and
unjustly, to write bitter things against themselves. They often do the
same in hours of temptation, when Satan casts his fiery darts at them,
lodging them in the thoughts and involuntary feelings. The will repels
them, but they take effect, for the time being, in spite of himself, in the
intellect and sensibility. Blasphemous thoughts are suggested to the
mind, unkind thoughts of God are suggested, and in spite of one's self,
these abominable thoughts awaken their correlated feelings. The will
abhors them and struggles to suppress them, but for the time being, finds
itself unable to do anything more than to fight and resist.
Now, it is very common for souls in this state to write the most bitter
accusations against themselves. But should it be hence inferred that they
really are as much in fault as they assume themselves to be 2 No, indeed.
• THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 515
But why do ministers, of all schools, unite in telling such tempted souls,
You are mistaken, my dear brother or sister, these thoughts and feelings,
though exercises of your own mind, are not yours in such a sense that you
are responsible for them. The thoughts are suggested by Satan, and the
feelings are a necessary consequence. Your will resists them, and this
proves that you are unable, for the time being, to avoid them. You are
therefore not responsible for them while you resist them with all the
power of your will, any more than you would be guilty of murder should a
giant overpower your strength, and use your hand against your will to
shoot a man. In such cases it is, so far as I know, universally true, that
all schools admit that the tempted soul is not responsible or guilty for
those things which it cannot help. The inability is here allowed to be a
bar to obligation; and such souls are justly told by ministers, You are
mistaken in supposing yourself guilty in this case. The like mistake is
fallen into when a soul blames itself for any state of mind whatever that
lies wholly and truly beyond the direct or indirect control of the will,
and for the same reason, inability in both cases is alike a bar to obligation.
It is just as absurd, in the one case as in the other, to infer real responsi-
bility from a feeling or persuasion of responsibility. To hold that men are
always responsible, because they loosely think themselves to be so is
absurd. In cases of temptation, such as that just supposed, as soon as
the attention is directed to the fact of inability to avoid those thoughts
and feelings, and the mind is conscious of the will's resisting them, and of
being unable to banish them, it readily rests in the assurance that it is lot
responsible for them. Its own irresponsibility in such cases appears self-
evident to the mind, the moment the proper inability is considered, and
the affirmation of irresponsibility attended to. Now if the soul maturally
and truly regarded itself as responsible, when there is a proper inability and
impossibility, the instructions above referred to could not relieve the mind.
It would say, To be sure I know that I cannot avoid having these thoughts
and feelings, any more than I can cease to be the subject of consciousness,
yet I know I am responsible notwithstanding. These thoughts and
feelings are states of my own mind, and no matter how I come by them,
or whether I can control or prevent them or not. Inability, you know, is
no bar to obligation; therefore, my obligation and my guilt remain. Woe
is me, for I am undone. The idea, then, of responsibility, when there is
in fact real inability, is a prejudice of education, a mistake.
The mistake, unless strong prejudice of education has taken pos-
session of the mind, lies in overlooking the fact of a real and proper
inability. Unless the judgment has been strongly biassed by education, it
never judges itself bound to perform in possibilities, nor even conceive of
such a thing. Who ever held himself bound to undo what is past, to
recall past time, or to substitute holy acts and states of mind in the place
of past sinful ones? No one ever held himself bound to do this; first,
because he knows it to be impossible ; and secondly, because no one that I
have heard of ever taught or asserted any such obligation; and therefore
L I. 3
516 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. Q
none have received so strong a bias from education as loosely to hold such
an opinion. But sometimes the bias of education is so great, that the
subjects of it seem capable of believing almost anything, however incon-
sistent with the intuitions of the reason, and consequently in the face of
the most certain knowledge. For example, President Edwards relates of
a young woman in his congregation, that she was deeply convicted of
being guilty for Adam's first sin, and deeply repented of it. Now suppose
that this and like cases should be regarded as conclusive proof that men
are guilty of that sin, and deserve the wrath and curse of God for ever for
that sin; and that all men will suffer the pains of hell for ever, except
they become convinced of their personal guilt for that sin, and repent of iv
as in dust and ashes | President Edwards's teaching on the subject of the
relation of all men to Adam's first sin, it is well known, was calculated in a
high degree to pervert the judgment upon that subject; and this sufficiently
accounts for the fact above alluded to. But apart from education, no
human being ever held himself responsible for, or guilty of, the first or any
other sin of Adam, or of any other being, who existed and died before he
himself existed. The reason is that all moral agents naturally know, that
inability or a proper impossibility is a bar to moral obligation and responsi-
bility; and they never conceive to the contrary, unless biassed by a mysti-
fying education that casts a fog over their primitive and constitutional
convictions.
2. Some have denied ability because they have strangely held, that the
moral law requires sinners to be just in all respects what they might have
been had they never sinned. That is, they maintain that God requires of
them just as high and perfect a service as if their powers had never been
abused by sin; as if they had always been developed by the perfectly right
use of them. This they admit to be a natural impossibility ; nevertheless
they hold that God may justly require it, and that sinners are justly bound
to perform this impossible service, and that they sin continually in coming
short of it. To this sentiment I answer, that it might be maintained with
as much show of reason, and as much authority from the Bible, that God
might and does require of all sinners to undo all their acts of sin, and to
substitute holy ones in their places, and that he holds them as sinning
every moment by the neglect to do this. Why may not God as well
require one as the other? They are alike impossibilities. They are alike
impossibilities originating in the sinner's own act or fault. If the sinner's
rendering himself unable to obey in one case does not set aside the right
of God to command, so does it not for the same reason in the other. If
an inability resulting from the sinner's own act cannot bar the right of
God to make the requisition in the one case, meither can it for the same
reason in the other. But every one can see that God cannot justly require
the sinner to recall past time, and to undo past acts. But Why? No
other reason can be assigned than that it is impossible. But the same
reason, it is admitted, exists in its full extent in the other case. It is ad-
mitted that sinners, who have long indulged in sin, or who have sinned at
THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 517
all, are really as unable to render as high a degree of service as they might
have done had they never sinned, as they are to recall past time, or to
undo all their past acts of sin. On what ground, then, of reason or
revelation does the assertion rest, that in one case an impossibility is a bar
to obligation, and not in the other ? I answer, there is no ground whatever
for the assertion in question. It is a sheer and an absurd assumption,
unsupported by any affirmation of reason, or any truth or principle of
revelation.
But to this assumption I reply again, as I have done on a former occasion,
that if it be true, it must follow, that no one on earth or in heaven who has
ever sinned will be able to render as perfect a service as the law demands;
for there is no reason to believe, that any being who has abused his powers
by sim will ever in time or eternity be able to render as high a service as he
might have done had he at every moment duly developed them by perfect
obedience. If this theory is true, I see not why it does not follow that the
Saints will be guilty in heaven of the sin of omission. A sentiment based
upon an absurdity in the outset, as the one in question is, and resulting in
such consequences as this must, is to be rejected without hesitation.
3. A consciousness of the force of habit, in respect to all the acts and
states of body and mind, has contributed to the loose holding of the doctrine
of inability. Every one who is at all in the habit of observation and self-
reflection is aware, that for some reason we acquire a greater and greater
facility in doing anything by practice or repetition. We find this to be true
in respect to acts of will as really as in respect to the involuntary states of
mind. When the will has been long committed to the indulgence of the
propensities, and in the habit of submitting itself to their impulses, there is
a real difficulty of some sort in the way of changing its action. This diffi-
culty cannot really impair the liberty of the will. If it could, it would
destroy, or so far impair, moral agency and accountability. But habit may,
and, as every one knows, does interpose an obstacle of some sort in the way
of right willing, or, on the other hand, in the way of wrong willing. That
is, men both obey and disobey with greatest facility from habit. Habit
strongly favours the accustomed action of the will in any direction. This,
as I said, never does or can properly impair the freedom of the will, or
render it impossible to act in a contrary direction ; for if it could and should,
the actions of the will, in that case, being determined by a law of necessity
in one direction, would have no moral character. If benevolence became a
habit so strong that it were utterly impossible to will in an opposite direc-
tion, or not to will benevolently, benevolence would cease to be virtuous.
So, on the other hand, with selfishness. If the will came to be determined
in that direction by habit grown into a law of necessity, such action would
and must cease to have moral character. But, as I said, there is a real
conscious difficulty of some sort in the way of obedience, when the will has
been long accustomed to sin. This is strongly recognized in the language
of inspiration and in devotional hymns, as well as in the language of ex-
perience by all men. The language of scripture is often so strong upon this
518 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
point, that, but for a regard to the subject-matter of discourse, we might
justly infer a proper inability. For example, Jer. xiii. 23: “Can the
Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots 2 then may ye also do
good, that are accustomed to do evil.” This and similar passages recognize
the influence of habit. “Then may ye who are accustomed to do evil:”
custom or habit is to be overcome, and, in the strong language of the prophet,
this is like clanging the Ethiop's skin or the leopard’s spots. But to under-
stand the prophet as here affirming a proper inability were to disregard one
of the fundamental rules of interpreting language, namely, that it is to be
understood by reference to the subject of discourse. The latter part of the
seventh chapter of Romans affords a striking instance and an illustration of
this. It is, as has just been said, a sound and most important rule of inter-
preting all language, that due regard be had to the subject-matter of dis-
course. When “cannot,” and such like terms, that express an inability are
applied to physical or involuntary actions or states of mind, they express a
proper natural inability ; but when they are used in reference to actions of
free will, they express not a proper impossibility, but only a difficulty aris-
ing out of the existence of a contrary choice, or the law of habit, or both.
Much question has been made about the seventh of Romans in its relation
to the subject of ability and inability. Let us, therefore, look a little into
this passage, Romans vii. 15–23 : “For that which I do, I allow not ;
for what I would, that do I not ; but what I hate, that do I. If then I do
that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good. Now then
it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. For I know that in
me (that is in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing; for to will is present with
me ; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that
I would I do not ; but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do
that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I
find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I
delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in
my members, Warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into
captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.” Now, what did the
Apostle mean by this language? Did he use language here in the popular
sense, or with strictly philosophical propriety 2 He says he finds himself
able to will, but not able to do. Is he then speaking of a mere outward or
physical inability ? Does he mean merely to say, that the established con-
nexion between volition and its sequents was disturbed, so that he could
not execute his volitions 2 This his language, literally interpreted, and
without reference to the subject-matter of discourse, and without regard to
the manifest scope and design of the writer, would lead us to conclude. But
whoever contended for such an interpretation ? The apostle used popular
language, and was describing a very common experience. Convicted sinners
and backslidden saints often make legal resolutions, and resolve upon obedi
ence under the influence of legal motives, and without really becoming be-
nevolent, and changing the attitude of their wills. They, under the influ-
ence of conviction, purpose selfishly to do their duty to God and man, and,
THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 519
in the presence of temptation, they constantly fail of keeping their resolu-
tions. It is true, that with their selfish hearts, or in the selfish attitude of
their wills, they cannot keep their resolutions to abstain fromthose inward
thoughts and emotions, nor from those outward actions that result by a law
of necessity from a selfish state or attitude of the will. These legal resolu-
tions the apostle popularly calls willings. “To will is present with me, but
how to do good I find not. When I would do good, evil is present with me,
so that the good I would I do not, and the evil I would not that I do. If
then I do the evil I would not, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that
dwelleth in me. I delight in the law of God after the inner man. But I
See another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and
bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members,” &c.
Now, this appears to me to be descriptive of a very familiar experience of
every deeply convicted sinner or backslider. The will is committed to the
propensities, to the law in the members, or to the gratification of the im-
pulses of the sensibility. Hence, the outward life is selfish. Conviction
of sin leads to the formation of resolutions of amendment, while the will
does not submit to God. These resolutions constantly fail of securing the
result contemplated. The will still abides in a state of committal to self.
gratification ; and hence resolutions to amend in feeling or the outward life,
fail of securing those results.
Nothing was more foreign from the apostle's purpose, it seems to me,
than to affirm a proper inability of will to yield to the claims of God.
Indeed, he affirms and assumes the freedom of his will. “To will,” he
says, “is present with me ;” that is, to resolve. But resolution is an act
of will. It is a purpose, a design. He purposed, designed to amend. To
form resolutions was present with him, but how to do good he found not.
The reason why he did not execute his purposes was, that they were self-
ishly made; that is, he resolved upon reformation without giving his heart
to God, without submitting his will to God, without actually becoming
benevolent. This caused his perpetual failure. This language, construed
strictly to the letter, would lead to the conclusion, that the apostle was
representing a case where the will is right, but where the established and
natural connexion between volition and its sequents is destroyed, so that
the outward act did not follow the action of the will. In this case all
Schools would agree that the act of the will constitutes real obedience. The
whole passage, apart from the subject-matter of discourse, and from the
manifest design and scope of the Writer, might lead us to conclude, that the
apostle was speaking of a proper inability, and that he did not therefore
regard the failure as his own fault. “It is no more I, but sin that dwelleth
in me. O wretched man that I am,” &c. Those who maintain that the
apostle meant to assert a proper inability to obey, must also admit that he
represented this inability as a bar to obligation, and regarded his state as
calamitous, rather than as properly sinful. But the fact is, he was por.
traying a legal experience, and spoke of finding himself unable to keep
selfish resolutions of amendment in the presence of temptation. His will
520 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
was in a state of committal to the indulgence of the propensities. In the
absence of temptation, his convictions, and fears, and feelings were the
strongest impulses, and under their influence he would form resolutions to
do his duty, to abstain from fleshly indulgences, &c. But as some other
appetite or desire came to be more strongly excited, he yielded to that of
course, and broke his former resolution. Paul writes as if speaking of
himself, but was doubtless speaking as the representative of a class of
persons already named. He found the law of selfish habit exceedingly
strong, and so strong as to lead him to cry out, “O wretched man,” &c.
But this is not affirming a proper inability of will to submit to God.
4. All men who seriously undertake their own reformation find them-
selves in great need of help and support from the Holy Spirit, in conse-
quence of the physical depravity of which I have formerly spoken, and
because of the great strength of their habit of self-indulgence. They are
prome, as is natural, to express their sense of dependence on the Divine
Spirit in strong language, and to speak of this dependence as if it consisted
in a real inability, when, in fact, they do not really consider it as a proper
imability. They speak upon this subject just as they do upon any and
every other subject, when they are conscious of a strong inclination to a
given course. They say in respect to many things, “I cannot,” when they
mean only “I will not,” and never think of being understood as affirming a
proper inability. The inspired writers expressed themselves in the com-
mon language of men upon such subjects, and are doubtless to be under-
stood in the same way. In common parlance, “cannot” often means “will
mot,” and perhaps is used as often in this sense as it is to express a proper
inability. Mem do not misinterpret this language, and suppose it to affirm
a proper inability, when used in reference to acts of will, except on
the subject of obedience to God ; and why should they assign a meaning
to language when used upon this subject which they do not assign to it
anywhere else ?
But, as I said in a former lecture, under the light of the gospel, and with
the promises in our hands, God does require of us what we should be
unable to do and be, but for these promises and this proffered assistance.
Here is a real inability to do directly in our own strength all that is required
of us, upon consideration of the proffered aid. We can only do it by
strength imparted by the Holy Spirit. That is, we cannot know Christ,
and avail ourselves of his offices and relations, and appropriate to our own
souls his fulness, except as we are taught by the Holy Spirit. The thing
immediately and directly required, is to receive the Holy Spirit by faith
to be our teacher and guide, to take of Christ's and show it to us. This
confidence we are able to exercise. Who ever really and intelligently
affirmed that he had not power or ability to trust or confide in the promise
and oath of God?
Much that is said of inability in poetry, and in the common language of
the saints, respects not the subjection of the will to God, but those ex-
periences, and states of feeling that depend on the illuminations of the Spirit
THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 521
just referred to. The language that is so common in prayer and in the
devotional dialect of the church, respects generally our dependence upon
the Holy Spirit for such divine discoveries of Christ, as to charm the soul
into a steadfast abiding in him. We feel our dependence upon the Holy
Spirit so to enlighten us, as to break up for ever the power of sinful habit,
and draw us away from our idols entirely and for ever.
In future lectures I shall have occasion to enlarge much upon the subject
of our dependence upon Christ and the Holy Spirit. But this dependence
does not consist in a proper inability to will as God directs, but, as I have
said, partly in the power of sinful habit, and partly in the great darkness of
our Souls in respect to Christ and his mediatorial work and relations. All
these together do not constitute a proper inability, for the plain reason, that
through the right action of our will which is always possible to us, these
difficulties can all be directly or indirectly overcome. Whatever we can do or
be, directly or indirectly, by willing, is possible to us. But there is no degree
of spiritual attainment required of us, that may not be reached directly or
indirectly by right willing. Therefore these attainments are possible. “If
any man,” says Christ, “will do his will,” that is, has an obedient will, “he
shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God.” “If thine eye be single,”
that is, if the intention or will is right, “thy whole body shall be full of
light.” “If any man love me, he will keep my words, and my Father will
love him, and we will come and make our abode with him.” The scriptures
abound with assurances of light and instruction, and of all needed grace
and help, upon condition of a right will or heart, that is, upon condition of
our being really willing to obey the light, when and as fast as we receive
it. I have abundantly shown on former occasions, that a right state of the
will constitutes, for the time being, all that, strictly speaking, the moral
law requires. But I said, that it also, though in a less strict and proper
sense, requires all those acts and states of the intellect and sensibility
which are connected by a law of necessity with the right action of the will.
Of course, it also requires that cleansing of the sensibility, and all those
higher forms of Christian experience that result from the indwelling of the
Holy Spirit. That is, the law of God requires that these attainments shall
be made when the means are provided and enjoyed, and as soon as, in the
mature of the case, these attainments are possible. But it requires no more
than this. For the law of God can never require absolute impossibilities.
That which requires absolute impossibilities, is not and cannot be moral
law. For, as was formerly said, moral law is the law of mature, and what
law of nature would that be that should require absolute impossibilities 2
This would be a mockery of a law of nature. What! a law of mature requiring
that which is impossible to mature, both directly and indirectly Impossible.
522 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE LIV.
REPENTANCE AND IMIPENITIENCE.
In the discussion of this subject I shall show,
I. WHAT REPENTANCE IS NOT.
II. WHAT IT IS.
III. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN IT.
IV. WHAT IMPENITENCE IS NOT.
V. WHAT IT IS.
VI. SoME THINGS THAT ARE IMPLIED IN JAIPENITENCE.
VII. NOTICE SOME OF THE CHARACTERISTICs of Evid ENCEs of IM-
PENITENCE,
I. I am to show what repentance is not.
1. The Bible everywhere represents repentance as a virtue, and as
constituting a change of moral character; consequently, it cannot be a
phenomenon of the intelligence: that is, it cannot consist in conviction of
sin, nor in any intellectual apprehension of our guilt or ill-desert. All the
states or phenomena of the intelligence are purely passive states of mind,
and of course moral character, strictly speaking, cannot be predicated of
them.
2. Repentance is not a phenomenon of the sensibility: that is, it does
not consist in a feeling of regret or remorse, of compunction or sorrow for
sin, or of sorrow in view of the consequences of sin to self or to others, nor
in any feelings or emotions whatever. All feelings or emotions belong to
the Sensibility, and are, of course, purely passive states of mind, and con-
sequently can have no moral character in themselves.
It should be distinctly understood, and always borne in mind, that
repentance cannot consist in any involuntary state of mind, for it is im-
possible that moral character, strictly speaking, should pertain to passive
States.
II. What repentance is.
There are two Greek words which are translated by the English word,
repent.
1. Metamelomai, “to care for,” or to be concerned for one’s self; hence to
change one's course. This term seems generally to be used to express a
state of the sensibility, as regret, remorse, Sorrow for sin, &c. But some-
times it also expresses a change of purpose as a consequence of regret, or
remorse, or sorrow ; as in Matt. xxi. 29, “He answered and said, I will
not; but afterwards he repented and went.” It is used to represent the
repentance of Judas, which evidently consisted of remorse and despair.
2. Metamoed, “to take an after view ;” or more strictly, to change one's
mind as a consequence of, and in conformity with, a second and more
REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 523
rational view of the subject. This word evidently expresses a change of
choice, purpose, intention, in conformity with the dictates of the intelligence.
This is no doubt the idea of evangelical repentance. It is a phenomenon
of will, and consists in the turning or change of the ultimate intention
from selfishness to benevolence. The term expresses the act of turning ;
the changing of the heart, or of the ruling preference of the soul. It
might with propriety be rendered by the terms “changing the heart.”
The English word “repentance” is often used to express regret, remorse,
sorrow, &c., and is used in so loose a sense as not to convey a distinct
idea to the common mind of the true nature of evangelical repentance.
A turning from sin to holiness, or more strictly, from a state of consecra-
tion to self to a state of consecration to God, is and must be the turning,
the change of mind, or the repentance that is required of all sinners.
Nothing less can constitute a virtuous repentance, and nothing more can
be required.
III. What is implied in repentance.
1. Such is the correlation of the will to the intellect, that repentance
must imply reconsideration or after-thought. It must imply self-reflection,
and such an apprehension of one's guilt as to produce self-condemnation.
That selfishness is sin, and that it is right and duty to consecrate the
whole being to God and his service, are first truths of reason. They are
necessarily assumed by all moral agents. They are, however, often
unthought of, not reflected upon. Repentance implies the giving up of
the attention to the consideration and self-application of these first truths,
and consequently implies conviction of sin, and guilt, and ill-desert, and a
sense of shame and self-condemnation. It implies an intellectual and a
hearty justification of God, of his law, of his moral and providential govern-
ment, and of all his works and ways.
It implies an apprehension of the mature of sin. that it belongs to the
heart, and does not essentially consist in, though it leads to, outward con-
duct; that it is an utterly unreasonable state of mind, and that it justly
deserves the Wrath and curse of God for ever.
It implies an apprehension of the reasonableness of the law and com-
mands of God, and of the folly and madness of sin. It implies an
intellectual and a hearty giving up of all controversy with God upon all
and every point.
It implies a conviction, that God is wholly right, and the sinner wholly
wrong, and a thorough and hearty abandonment of all excuses and apologies
for sin. It implies an entire and universal acquittal of God from every
shade and degree of blame, a thorough taking of the entire blame of sin
to self. It implies a deep and thorough abasement of self in the dust, a
crying out of soul against self, and a most sincere and universal, intellec-
tual, and hearty exaltation of God.
2. Such, also, is the connexion of the will and the Sensibility, that the
turning of the will, or evangelical repentance, implies sorrow for sin as
524 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
necessarily resulting from the turning of the will, together with the
intellectual views of sin which are implied in repentance. Neither con-
viction of sin, nor sorrow for it, constitutes repentance. Yet from the cor-
relation which is established between the intelligence, the sensibility, and
the will, both conviction of sin, and sorrow for it, are implied in evangelical
repentance, the one as mecessarily preceding, and the other as often pre-
ceding, and always and necessarily resulting from repentance. During the
process of conviction, it often happens, that the sensibility is hardened and
unfeeling ; or, if there is much feeling, it is often only regret, remorse,
agony, and despair. But when the heart has given way, and the evangelical
turning has taken place, it often happens that the fountain of the great
deep in the sensibility is broken up, the Sorrows of the soul are stirred to
the very bottom, and the sensibility pours forth its gushing tides like an
irresistible torrent. But it frequently happens, too, in minds less subject
to deep emotion, that the sorrows do not immediately flow in deep and
broad channels, but are mild, melting, tender, tearful, silent, subdued.
Self-loathing is another state of the sensibility implied in evangelical
repentance. This state of mind may, and often does, exist where repent-
ance is not, just as outward morality does. But, like outward morality, it
must exist where true repentance is. Self-loathing is a natural and a
necessary consequence of those intellectual views of self that are implied
in repentance. While the intelligence apprehends the utter, shameful
guilt of self, and the heart yields to the conviction, the sensibility neces-
sarily sympathizes, and a feeling of self-loathing and abhorrence is the
inevitable consequence.
It implies a loathing and abhorrence of the sins of others, a most deep
and thorough feeling of opposition to sin—to all sin, in self and everybody
else. Sim has become, to the penitent soul, the abominable thing which it
hates.
3. It implies a holy indignation toward all sin and all sinners, and a
manifest opposition to every form of iniquity.
Repentance also implies peace of mind. The soul that has full con-
fidence in the infinite wisdom and love of God, in the atonement of
Christ, and in his universal providence, cannot but have peace. And
further, the Soul that has abandoned all sin, and turned to God, is no
longer in a state of warfare with itself and with God. It must have peace
of conscience—and peace with God. It implies heart-complacency in
God, and in all the holy. This must follow from the very nature of
repentance.
It implies confession of sim to God and to mam, as far as sim has been
committed against men. If the heart has thoroughly renounced sin, it has
become benevolent, and is of course disposed, as far as possible, to undo
the wrong it has committed, to confess sin, and humble self on account of
it, before God and our neighbour, whom we have injured. Repentance
implies humility, or a willingness to be known and estimated according to
our real character. It implies a disposition to do right, and to confess our
REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 525
faults to God and man, as far as man has a right to know them. Let no
one who has refused, and still refuses or neglects to confess his sins to God,
and those sins to men that have been committed against them, profess
repentance unto salvation ; but let him remember that God has said, “He
that covereth his sins shall not prosper; but whoso confesseth and forsaketh
them shall find mercy:” and again, “Confess your faults one to another,
and pray one for another, that ye may be healed.”
Repentance implies a willingness to make restitution, and the actual
making of it as far as ability goes. He is not just, and of course is not
penitent, who has injured his neighbour in his person, reputation, property,
or in anything, and is unwilling to make restitution. And he is unwilling
to make restitution who neglects to do so whenever he is able. It is
impossible that a soul truly penitent should neglect to make all practicable
restitution, for the plain reason that penitence implies a benevolent and
just attitude of the will, and the will controls the conduct by a law of necessity.
Repentance implies reformation of outward life. This follows from re-
formation of heart by a law of necessity. It is naturally impossible that
a penitent soul, remaining penitent, should indulge in any known sin. If
the heart be reformed, the life must be as the heart is.
It implies a universal reformation of life, that is, a reformation extending
to all outward sin. The penitent does not, and remaining penitent, cannof,
reform in respect to some sins only. If penitent at all, he must have re-
pented of sin as sin, and of course of all sin. If he has turned to God,
and consecrated himself to God, he has of course ceased from sin, from all
sin as such. Sin, as we have seen on a former occasion, is a unit, and so
is holiness. Sim consists in selfishness, and holiness in disinterested bene-
volence : it is therefore sheer nonsense to say that repentance can consist
with indulgence in some sins. What are generally termed little, as well as
what are termed great sins, are alike rejected and abhorred by the truly
penitent soul, and this from a law of necessity, he being truly penitent.
4. It implies faith or confidence in God in all things. It implies, not
only the conviction that God is wholly right in all his controversy with
sinners, but also that the heart has yielded to this conviction, and has come
fully over to confide most implicitly in him in all respects, so that it can
readily commit all interests for time and etermity to his hands. Repentance
is a state of mind that implies the fullest confidence in all the promises and
threatenings of God, and in the atonement and grace of Christ,
IV. What impenitence is not.
l. It is not a negation, or the mere absence of repentance. Some seem
to regard impenitence as a momentity, as the mere absence of repentance;
but this is a great mistake.
2. It is not mere apathy in the sensibility in regard to sin, and a mere
want of sorrow for it.
3. It is not the absence of conviction of sin, nor the consequent careless-
ness of the sinner in respect to the commandments of God.
526 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
4. It is not an intellectual self justification, nor does it consist in a dis-
position to cavil at truth and the claims of God. These may and often do
result from impenitence, but are not identical with it.
5. It does not consist in the spirit of excuse-making, so often manifested
by sinners. This spirit is a result of impenitence, but does not constitute it.
6. Nor does it consist in the love of sin for its own sake, nor in the love
of sin in any sense. It is not a constitutional appetite, relish, or craving
for sin. If this constitutional craving for sin existed, it could have no
moral character, inasmuch as it would be a wholly involuntary state of
mind. It could not be the crime of impenitence.
V. What impenitence is.
1. It is everywhere in the Bible represented as a heinous sin, as in
Matt. xi. 20–24 : “Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of
his mighty works were done, because they repented not. Woe unto thee,
Chorazin' woe unto thee, Bethsaida for if the mighty works which were
done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented
long ago in Sackcloth and ashes. But I say unto you, it shall be more
tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day of judgment than for you. And
thou Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to
hell; for if the mighty works which have been done in thee, had been done
in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But I say unto you,
that it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom, in the day of judgment,
than for thee." Here, as elsewhere, impenitence is represented as most
aggravated wickedness.
2. Impenitence is a phenomenon of the will, and consists in the will's
cleaving to self-indulgence under light. It consists in the Will's pertinacious
adherence to the gratification of self, in despite of all the light with which
the sinner is surrounded. It is not, as has been said, a passive state nor
a mere negation, nor the love of sin for its own sake ; but it is an active
and obstimate state of the will, a determined holding on to that course of
self-seeking which constitutes sin, not from a love to sin, but for the sake
of the gratification. This, under light, is of course, aggravated wickedness.
Considered in this view, it is easy to account for all the woes and denuncia-
tions that the Saviour uttered against it. When the claims of God are
revealed to the mind, it must necessarily yield to them, or strengthen itself
in sin. It must, as it were, gird itself up, and struggle to resist the claims
of duty. This strengthening self in sin under light is the particular form
of sin which we call impenitence, All sinners are guilty of it because all
have some light, but some are vastly more guilty of it than others.
VI. Notice some things that are implied in impenitence.
As it essentially consists in a cleaving to self-indulgence under light,
it implies,—
1. That the impenitent simmer obstimately prefers his own petty and
momentary gratification to all the other and higher interests of God and
REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 527
the universe; that because these gratifications are his own, or the gratifi-
cation of self, he therefore gives them the preference over all the infinite
interests of all other beings.
2. It implies the deliberate and actual setting at naught, not only of
the interests of God and of the universe, as of no value, but it implies
also a total disregard, and even contempt, of the rights of all other beings.
It is a practical denial that they have any rights or interests to be pro-
moted.
3. It implies a rejection of the authority of God, and contempt for it, as
well as a spurning of his law and gospel.
4. It implies a bidding defiance to God, and a virtual challenge to him
to do his worst.
5. It implies the utmost fool-hardiness, and a state of utter recklessness
of consequences.
6. It implies the utmost injustice and disregard of all that is just and
equal, and this, be it remembered, under light.
7. It implies a present justification of all past sin. The sinner who
holds on to his self-indulgence, in the presence of the light of the gospel,
really in heart justifies all his past rebellion.
8. Consequently present impenitence, especially under the light of the
glorious gospel, is a heart justification of all sin. It is taking sides delibe-
rately with sinners against God, and is a virtual endorsing of all the sins of
earth and hell. This principle is clearly implied in Christ's teaching,
Matt. xxiii. 34–36 : “Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets, and
wise men, and scribes ; and Some of them ye shall kill and crucify ; and
some of them shall ye Scourge in your synagogues, and persecute them from
city to city; that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the
earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of
Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar. Verily, I say
unto you, All these things shall come upon this generation.”
9. Present impenitence, under all the light and experience which the
simmer now has, involves the guilt of all his past sin. If he still holds on to
it, he in heart justifies it. If he in heart justifies it, he virtually recommits
it. If in the presence of accumulated light, he still persists in sin, he
virtually endorses, recommits, and is again guilty of all past sin.
10. Impenitence is a charging God with sin; it is self-justification, and
consequently it coudemns God. It is a direct controversy with God, and a
denial of his right to govern, and of the sinner's duty to obey.
11. It is a deliberate rejection of mercy, and a virtual declaration that
God is a tyrant, and that he ought not to govern, but that he ought to be
resisted.
12. It implies a total want of confidence in God ; want of confidence in
his character and government; in his works and ways. It virtually charges
God with usurpation, falsehood, and selfishness in all their odious forms.
It is a making war on every moral attribute of God, and is utter enmity
against him. It is mortal enmity, and would of course always manifest itself
528 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
in sinners, as it did when Christ was upon the earth. When he poured the
light upon them, they hardened themselves until they were ripe for murder-
ing him. This is the true nature of impenitence. It involves the guilt of
a mortal enmity against God.
VII. Notice some of the characteristics or evidences of impenitence.
1. A manifested indifference to the sins of men is evidence of an impe-
mitent and sinjustifying state of mind. It is impossible that a penitent
soul should not be deeply and heartily opposed to all sin; and if heartily
opposed to it, it is impossible that he should not manifest this opposition,
for the heart controls the life by a law of necessity.
2. Of course a manifest heart-complacency in sin or in sinners is, sure
evidence of an impenitent state of mind. “He that will be the friend of
the world is the enemy of God.” Heart-complacency in sinners is that
friendship with the world that is enmity against God.
3. A manifest want of zeal in opposing sin and in promoting reform-
ation, is a sure indication of all impenitent state of mind. The soul that
has been truly convinced of sin, and turned from sin to the love and service
of God, cannot but manifest a deep interest in every effort to expel sin out
of the world. Such a soul cannot but be zealous in opposing sin, and in
building up and establishing righteousness in the earth.
4. A manifest want of sympathy with God in respect to his government,
providential and moral, is an evidence of impenitence of heart. A peni-
tent soul, as has been said, will and must of course justify God in all his
ways. This is implied in genuine repentance. A disposition to complain
of the strictness and rigour of God’s commandments—to speak of the
providence of God in a complaining manner, to murmur at its allotments,
and repine at the circumstances in which it has placed a soul, is to evince
an impenitent and rebellious state of mind.
5. A manifest want of confidence in the character, faithfulness, and
promises of God, is also sure evidence of an impenitent state of mind. A
distrust of God in any respect cannot consist with a penitent state of
heart.
6. The absence of peace of mind is sure evidence of an impenitent
state. The penitent soul must have peace of conscience, because penitence
is a state of conscious rectitude. It also must have peace with God,
in view of, and through confidence in, the atonement of Christ. Re-
pentance is the turning from an attitude of rebellion against God, to a
state of universal submission to his will, and approbation of it as wise and
good. This must of course bring peace to the soul. When therefore there
is a manifest want of peace, there is evidence of impenitence of heart.
7. Every unequivocal manifestation of selfishness is a conclusive
evidence of present impenitence. Repentance, as we have seen, consists
in the turning of the soul from selfishness to benevolence. It follows of
course that the presence of selfishness, or a spirit of Self-indulgence, is con-
clusive evidence of an impenitent state of mind. Repentance implies the
REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 529
denial of self; the denial or subjection of all the appetites, passions, and
propensities to the law of the intelligence. Therefore a manifest spirit of
self-indulgence, a disposition to seek the gratification of the appetites and
passions, such as the subjection of the will to the use of tobacco, of alcohol,
or to any of the natural or artificial appetites under light and in opposition
to the law of the reason, is conclusive evidence of present impenitence. I
say, “under light, and in opposition to the law of the reason.” Such
articles as those just named, are sometimes used medicinally, and because
they are regarded as useful, and even indispensable to health under certain
circumstances. In such cases their use may be a duty. But they are
more frequently used merely to gratify appetite, and in the face of a secret
conviction that they are not only unnecessary, but absolutely injurious.
This is indulgence that constitutes sin. It is impossible that such indul-
gence should consist with repentance. Such a mind must be in impenitence,
or there is no such thing as impenitence.
8. A spirit of self-justification is another evidence of impenitence. This
manifestation must be directly the opposite of that which the truly penitent
Soul will make.
9. A spirit of excuse-making for neglect of duty is also a conclusive
evidence of an impenitent heart. Repentance implies the giving up of all
excuses for disobedience, and a hearty obedience in all things. Of course,
where there is a manifest disposition to make excuses for not being what
and all God requires us to be, it is certain that there is, and must be an
impenitent state of mind. It is war with God.
10. A fearfulness that implies a want of confidence in the perfect faith-
fulness of God, or that implies unbelief in any respect, is an indication of
an impenitent state of mind.
11. A want of candour upon any moral subject relating to self, also
betrays an impenitent heart. A penitent state of the will is committed to
know and to embrace all truth. Therefore a prejudiced, uncandid state of
mind must be inconsistent with penitence, and a manifestation of prejudice
must evince present impenitence.
12. An unwillingness to be searched, and to have all our words and ways
brought into the light of truth, and to be reproved when we are in error, is
a sure indication of an impenitent state of mind. “Every one that doeth
evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be
reproved. But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may
made manifest, that they are wrought in God.”
13. Only partial reformation of life, also indicates that the heart has not
embraced the whole will of God. When there is a disposition manifested
to indulge in some sin, no matter how little, it is sure evidence of im-
penitence of heart. The penitent soul rejects sin as sin; of course every
kind or degree of iniquity is put away, loathed, and abhorred. “Whoso
keepeth the whole law and yet offends in one point, is guilty of all; ” that is,
if a man in one point unequivocally sins or disobeys God, it is certain that
he truly from the heart obeys him in nothing. He has not an obedient
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530 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
state of mind. If he really had supreme respect to God's authority, he
could not but obey him in all things. If therefore it be found, that a
professor of penitence does not manifest the spirit of universal obedience;
if in some things he is manifestly self-indulgent, it may be known that he
is altogether yet in sim, and that he is still “in the gall of bitterness and in
the bond of imiquity.”
14. Neglect or refusal to confess and make restitution, so far as oppor-
tunity and ability are enjoyed, is also a sure indication of an unjust and
impenitent state of mind. It would seem impossible for a penitent soul
not at once to see and be impressed with the duty of making confession and
restitution to those who have been injured by him. When this is refused
or neglected, there must be impenitence. The heart controls the life by
a law of necessity; when, therefore, there is a heart that confesses and
forsakes sin, it is impossible that this should not appear in outward con-
fession and restitution.
15. A spirit of covetousness, or grasping after the world, is a sure indi-
cation of impenitence. “Covetousness is idolatry.” It is a hungering and
thirsting after, and devotion to this world. Acquisitiveness indulged must
be positive proof of an impenitent state of mind. If any man love the
world, how dwelleth the love of God in him?
16. A want of interest in, and compassion for, sinners, is a sure indica-
tion of impenitence. If one has seen his own guilt and ruin, and has found
himself sunk in the horrible pit and miry clay of his own abominations, and
has found the way of escape, to feel deeply for simmers, to manifest a great
compassion and concern for them, and a zeal for their salvation, is as
natural as to breathe. If this sympathy and Zeal are not manifested, we
may rely upon it that there is still impenitence. There is a total want of
that love to God and Souls that is always implied in repentance. Seest
thou a professed convert to Christ whose compassions are not stirred, and
whose zeal for the salvation of Souls is not awakened 2
you behold a hypocrite.
17. A disposition to apologize for sin, to take part with sinners, or a
want of fulness and clearness in condemning them, and taking sides alto-
gether with God, is evidence of an impenitent state of mind. A hesitancy,
or want of clearness in the mind's apprehension of the justice of God in
condemning sinners to an eternal hell, shows that the eyes have not yet
been thoroughly open to the mature, guilt, and desert of sim, and conse-
quently this state of spiritual blindness is sad evidence of an impenitent heart.
18. A want of moral or spiritual perception, is also an indication of
impenitence. When an individual is seem to have little or no conscience
on many moral questions, can use tobacco, alcohol, and such like things,
under the present light that has been shed on these practices; when self
can be indulged without compunctions, this is a most certain indication of
an impenitent heart. True repentance is infallibly connected with a sem-
sitive and discriminating conscience. When, therefore, there is a seared
conscience, you may know there is a hard and impenitent heart.
Be assured that
REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 531
19. Spiritual sloth or indolence is another evidence of an impenitent
heart. The soul that thoroughly turns to God, and consecrates itself to
him, and wholly commits itself to promote his glory in the building up of
his kingdom, will be, must be, anything but slothful. A disposition to
spiritual idleness, or to lounging or indolence of any kind, is an evidence
that the heart is impenitent. I might pursue this subject to an indefinite
length; but what has been said must suffice for this course of instruction,
and is sufficient to give you the clue by which you may detect the windings
and delusions of the impenitent heart.
I must conclude this discussion with several
REMARKS.
1. Many confound conviction of sin, and the necessarily resulting emotions
of remorse, regret, and sorrow, with evangelical repentance. They give the
highest evidence of having fallen into this mistake.
2. Considering the current teaching upon this subject, and the great
want of discrimination in public preaching, and in writings on the subject
of repentance, this mistake is natural. How few divines sufficiently dis-
criminate between the phenomena of the intelligence, the sensibility, and
the will. But until this discrimination is thoroughly made, great mistakes
upon this subject may be expected both among the clergy and the laity, and
multitudes will be self-deceived.
3. It is of the highest importance for the ministry to understand, and
constantly insist in their teaching, that all virtuous exercises of mind are
phenomena of the will, and in no case merely passive states of mind; that
therefore they are connected with the outward life by a law of necessity,
and that therefore when there is a right heart, there must be a right
life.
4. It is a most gross, as it is a very common delusion, to separate
religion from a pure morality, and repentance from reformation. “What
God,” by an unalterable law of necessity, “has joined together, let not man
put asunder.”
5. It is also common to fall into the error of separating devotion from
practical benevolence. Many seem to be striving after a devotion that is
not piety. They are trying to work their sensibility into a state which they
suppose to be devotion, while they retain selfishness in their hearts. They
live in habitual self-indulgence, and yet observe seasons of what they call
devotion. Devotion is with them mere emotion, a state of feeling, a phe-
momenon of the sensibility, a devotion without religion. This is a grievous
delusion.
6. The doctrine of repentance, or the necessity of repentance as a con
dition of salvation, is as truly a doctrine of natural as of revealed religion.
It is a self-evident truth, that the sinner cannot be saved except he repents.
Without repentance God cannot forgive him ; and if he could and should,
such forgiveness could not save him ; for, in his sins, salvation is naturally
impossible to him. Without just that change which has been described,
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532 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and which the Bible calls repentance, and which it makes a condition of
pardon and Salvation, it is plainly, naturally, and governmentally impossible
for any sinner to be saved.
7. Repentance is naturally necessary to peace of mind in this life.
Until the sinner repents he is at war with himself, and at war with God.
There is a mutiny, and a struggle, and a controversy, going on within him.
His conscience will not be satisfied. Though cast down from the throne
of government and trampled under foot, it will mutter, and sometimes
thunder its remonstrances and rebukes; and although it has not the power
to control the will, still it will assert the right to control. Then there is
war within the breast of the sinner himself, and until he repents he carries
the elements of hell within him ; and sooner or later they will take fire,
and burst upon his soul in a universal and eternal conflagration,
LECTURE LV.
FAITH AND UNEELIEF,
I. WHAT EVANGELICAL FAITH IS NOT,
II. WHAT IT IS.
III. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN IT.
IV. WHAT UNEELIEF Is NOT.
W. WHAT IT IS.
VI. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN UNBELIEF.
VII. CONDITIONs of BOTH FAITH AND UNBELIEF.
VIII. THE GUILT OF UNBELIEF.
IX, NATURAL AND GOVERNMENTAL RESULTS OF EACH.
I. What evangelical faith is not.
1. The term faith, like most other words, has diverse significations, and
is manifestly used in the Bible sometimes to designate a state of the
intellect, in which case it means an undoubting persuasion, a firm con-
viction, an unhesitating intellectual assent. This, however, is not its
evangelical sense. Evangelical faith cannot be a phenomenon of the
intellect, for the plain reason that, when used in an evangelical sense, it is
always regarded as a virtue. But virtue cannot be predicated of intel-
lectual states, because these are involuntary, or passive states of mind.
Faith is a condition of salvation. It is something which we are com-
manded to do upon pain of eternal death. But if it be something to be
done—a solemn duty, it cannot be a merely passive state, a mere intel-
lectual conviction. The Bible distinguishes between intellectual and
saving faith. There is a faith of devils, and there is a faith of Saints.
James clearly distinguishes between them, and also between an antimonian
and a saving faith. “Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being
alone. Yea, a man may say, thou hast faith, and I have works: show me
FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 533
thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works.
Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well ; the devils also
believe, and tremble. But wilt thou know, O vain man, that faith
without works is dead? Was not Abraham our father justified by works,
when he had offered Isaac his son upon the altar 2 Seest thou how faith
wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect 2 And the
scripture was fulfilled which saith, Abraham believed God, and it was
imputed unto him for righteousness; and he was called the friend of God.
Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only.
Likewise also was not Rahab the harlot justified by works, when she had
received the messengers, and had sent them out another way ? For as the
body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also.”—
James ii. 17–26. The distinction is here clearly marked, as it is else-
where in the Bible, between intellectual and saving faith.
One produces good works or a holy life ; the other is unproductive.
This shows that one is a phenomenon of the intellect merely, and does
not of course control the conduct. The other must be a phenomenon of
the will, because it manifests itself in the outward life. Evangelical faith,
then, is not a conviction, a perception of truth. It does not belong to
the intellect, though it implies intellectual conviction, yet the evangelical
or virtuous element does not consist in it.
2. It is not a feeling of any kind ; that is, it does not belong to, and is
not a phenomenon of, the sensibility. The phenomena of the sensibility
are passive states of mind, and therefore have no moral character in them-
selves. Faith, regarded as a virtue, cannot consist in any involuntary state
of mind whatever. It is represented in the Bible as an active and most
efficient state of mind. It works and “works by love.” It produces “the
obedience of faith.” Christians are said to be sanctified by the faith that
is in Christ.
Indeed the Bible, in a great variety of instances and ways, represents
faith in God and in Christ as a cardinal form of virtue, and as the main-
spring of an outwardly holy life. Hence, it cannot consist in any in-
voluntary state or exercise of mind whatever.
II. What evangelical faith is.
Since the Bible uniformly represents saving or evangelical faith as a
virtue, we know that it must be a phenomenon of will. It is an efficient
state of mind, and therefore it must consist in the embracing of the truth
by the heart or will. It is the will's closing in with the truths of the
gospel. It is the soul's act of yielding itself up, or committing itself to
the truths of the evangelical system. It is a trusting in Christ, a commit-
ting the soul and the whole being to him, in his various offices and relations
to men. It is a confiding in him, and in what is revealed of him, in his
word and providence, and by his Spirit.
The same word that is so often rendered faith in the New Testament is
also rendered commit; as in John ii. 24, “But Jesus did not commit
534 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
himself unto them, because h knew all men.” Luke xvi. 11, “If, there-
fore, ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will
commit to your trust the true riches?” In these passages the word ren-
dered commit is the same word as that which is rendered faith. It is a con-
fiding im God and in Christ, as revealed in the Bible and in reason. It is
a receiving of the testimony of God concerning himself, and concerning all
things of which he has spoken. It is a receiving of Christ for just what
he is represented to be in his gospel, and an unqualified surrender of the
will, and of the whole being to him.
III. What is implied in evangelical faith.
1. It implies an intellectual perception of the things, facts, and truths
believed. No one can believe that which he does not understand. It is
impossible to believe that which is not so revealed to the mind, that the
mind understands it. It has been erroneously assumed, that faith did not
need light, that is, that it is not essential to faith that we understand the
doctrines or facts that we are called upon to believe. This is a false
assumption ; for how can we believe, trust, confide, in what we do not
understand 2 I must first understand what a proposition, a fact, a doctrine,
or a thing is, before I can say whether I believe, or whether I ought to
believe, or not. Should you state a proposition to me in an unknown
tongue, and ask me if I believe it, I must reply, I do not, for I do not
understand the terms of the proposition. Perhaps I should believe the
truth expressed, and perhaps I should not; I cannot tell, until I understand
the proposition. Any fact or doctrine not understood is like a proposition
in an unknown tongue; it is impossible that the mind should receive or
reject it, should believe or disbelieve it, until it is understood. We can
receive or believe a truth, or fact, or doctrine no further than we understand
it. So far as we do understand it, so far we may believe it, although we
may not understand all about it. For example : I can believe in both the
proper divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ. That he is both God and
man, is a fact that I can understand. Thus far I can believe. But how
his divinity and humanity are united I cannot understand. Therefore, I
only believe the fact that they are united ; the quo modo of their union I
know nothing about, and I believe no more than I know. So I can under-
stand that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. That the
Father is God, that the Son is God, that the Holy Spirit is God; that these
three are Divine persons, I can understand as a fact, that each possesses
all divine perfection. I can also understand that there is no contradiction
or impossibility in the declared fact, that these three are one in their sub-
stratum of being ; that is, that they are one in a different sense from that
in which they are three ; that they are three in one sense, and one in
another. I understand that this may be a fact, and therefore I can believe
it. But the quo modo of their union I neither understand nor believe :
that is, I have no theory, no idea, no data on the subject, have no opinion,
and consequently no faith, as to the manner in which they are united.
FAITH AND UNEELIEF. 535
That they are three, is as plainly taught upon the face of inspiration as
that Peter, James, and John were three. That each of the three is God,
is as plainly revealed as that Peter, James, and John were men. These
are revealed facts, and facts that any one can understand. That these three
are one God, is also a revealed fact. The quo modo of this fact is not
revealed, I cannot understand it, and have no belief as to the manner of
this union. That they are one God is a fact that reason can neither affirm
nor deny. The fact can be understood, although the how is unintelligible
to us in our present state. It is not a contradiction, because they are not
revealed as being one and three in the same sense, nor in any sense that
reason can pronounce to be impossible. Faith, them, in any fact or doctrine,
implies that the intellect has an idea, or that the soul has an understanding,
an opinion of that which the heart embraces or believes.
2. Evangelical faith implies the appropriation of the truths of the gospel
to ourselves. It implies an acceptance of Christ as our wisdom, righteous-
ness, sanctification, and redemption. The soul that truly believes, believes
that Christ tasted death for every man, and of course for it. It apprehends
Christ as the Saviour of the world, as offered to all, and embraces and
receives him for itself. It appropriates his atonement, and his resurrection,
and his intercession, and his promises to itself. Christ is thus presented
in the gospel, not only as the Saviour of the world, but also to the indi-
vidual acceptance of men. He is embraced by the world no further than
he is embraced by individuals. He saves the world no further than he
saves individuals. He died for the world, because he died for the indi-
viduals that compose the race. Evangelical faith, then, implies the belief
of the truths of the Bible, the apprehension of the truths just named, and
a reception of them, and a personal acceptance and appropriation of Christ
to meet the necessities of the individual soul.
3. It implies the unreserved yielding up of the mind to Christ, in the
various relations in which he is presented in the gospel. These relations
will come under review at another time: all I wish here to say is, that
faith is a state of committal to Christ, and of course it implies that the soul
will be unreservedly yielded to him, in all his relations to it, so far and so
fast as these are apprehended by the intellect.
4. Evangelical faith implies an evangelical life. This would not be
true if faith were merely an intellectual state or exercise. But since, as we
have seen, faith is of the heart, since it consists in the committal of the
will to Christ, it follows, by a law of necessity, that the life will correspond
with faith. Let this be kept in perpetual remembrance.
5. Evangelical faith implies repentance towards God. Evangelical
faith particularly respects Jesus Christ and his salvation. It is an em-
bracing of Christ and his salvation. Of course it implies repentance to-
wards God, that is, a turning from sin to God. The will cannot be submitted
to Christ, it cannot receive him as he is presented in the gospel, while it
neglects repentance toward God; while it rejects the authority of the Father,
it cannot embrace and submit to the Son.
536 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
6. Evangelical faith implies a renunciation of self-righteousness. Christ's
Salvation is opposed to a salvation by law or by self-righteousness. It is
therefore impossible for one to embrace Christ as the Saviour of the Soul,
any further than he renounces all hope or expectation of being saved by
his own works, or righteousness.
7. It implies the renunciation of the spirit of self justification. The
soul that receives Christ must have seen its lost estate. It must have been
convinced of sin, and of the folly and madness of attempting to excuse self.
It must have renounced and abhorred all pleas and excuses in justification
or extenuation of sin. Unless the soul ceases to justify self, it cannot
justify God; and unless it justifies God, it cannot embrace the plan of Sal-
vation by Christ. A state of mind therefore that justifies God and con-
demns self, is always implied in evangelical faith.
8. Disinterested benevolence, or a state of good-will to being, is implied
in evangelical faith ; for that is the committal of the soul to God and to
Christ in all obedience. It must, therefore, imply fellowship or sympathy
with him in regard to the great end upon which his heart is set, and for
which he lives. A yielding up of the will and the soul to him, must imply
the embracing of the same end that he embraces.
9. It implies a state of the sensibility corresponding to the truths be-
lieved. It implies this, because this state of the sensibility is a result of
faith by a law of necessity, and this result follows necessarily upon the
acceptance of Christ and his gospel by the heart.
10. Of course it implies peace of mind. In Christ the soul finds its full
and present salvation. It finds justification, which produces a sense of
pardon and acceptance. It finds Sanctification, or grace to deliver from the
reigning power of sin. It finds all its wants met, and all needed grace
proffered for its assistance. It sees no cause for disturbance, nothing to ask
or desire that is not treasured up in Christ. It has ceased to war with God
—with itself. It has found its resting-place in Christ, and rests in pro-
found peace under the shadow of the Almighty.
11. It implies hope, as soon as the believing soul considers what is con-
veyed by the gospel, that is, a hope of eternal life in and through Christ. It is
impossible that the soul should embrace the gospel for itself, and really accept
of Christ, without a hope of etermal life resulting from it by a necessary law.
12. It implies joy in God and in Christ. Peter speaks of joy as the
unfailing accompaniment of faith, as resulting from it. Speaking of
Christians, he says, 1 Pet. i., 5–9, “Who are kept by the power of God
through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time : wherein
ye greatly rejoice, though now for a season, if need be, ye are in heaviness
through manifold temptations; that the trial of your faith, being much
more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire,
might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory, at the appearing of
Jesus Christ : whom having not seen, ye love; in whom, though now ye
see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable, and full of glory
receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls."
FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 337
13. It implies zeal in the cause of Christ. Faith in Christ implies fel-
lowship with him in the great work of mam's redemption, and of course,
must imply zeal in the same cause for which Christ gave up his life.
14, Evangelical faith must imply a general sympathy with Christ in
respect to the affairs of his government. It must imply sympathy with
his views of sin and of holiness—of sinners and of Saints. It must imply
a deep affection for, and interest in, Christ's people.
15. It must imply a consecration of heart, of time, of substance, and of
all to this great end.
16. It must imply the existence in the soul of every virtue, because it is
a yielding up of the whole being to the will of God. Consequently, all
the phases of virtue required by the gospel must be implied as existing,
either in a developed or in an undeveloped state, in every heart that truly
receives Christ by faith. Certain forms or modifications of virtue may not
in all cases have found the occasions of their developement, but certain it is,
that every modification of virtue will manifest itself as its occasion shall
arise, if there be a true and a living faith in Christ. This follows from the
very nature of faith.
17. Present evangelical faith implies a state of present sinlessness.
Observe : faith is the yielding and committal of the whole will, and of the
whole being to Christ. This, and nothing short of this, is evangelical faith.
But this comprehends and implies the whole of present, true obedience to
Christ. This is the reason why faith is spoken of as the condition, and as
it were, the only condition, of salvation. It really implies all virtue. Faith
may be contemplated either as a distinct form of virtue, and as an attribute
of love, or as comprehensive of all virtue. When contemplated as an at-
tribute of love, it is only a branch of sanctification. When contemplated
in the wider sense of universal conformity of will to the will of God, it is
then synonymous with entire present Sanctification. Contemplated in
either light, its existence in the heart must be inconsistent with present sin
there. Faith is an attitude of the will, and is wholly incompatible with
present rebellion of will against Christ. This must be true, or what is faith 2
18. Faith implies the reception and the practice of all known or per-
ceived truth. The heart that embraces and receives truth as truth, and
because it is truth, must of course receive all known truth. For it is plainly
impossible that the will should embrace some truth perceived for a benevolent
reason, and reject other truth perceived. All truth is harmonious. One
truth is always consistent with every other truth. The heart that truly em-
braces one, will, for the same reason, embrace all truth known. If out of
regard to the highest good of being any one revealed truth is truly re-
ceived, that state of mind continuing, it is impossible that all truth should
not be received as Soon as known,
IV. What unbelief is not.
1. It is not ignorance of truth. Ignorance is a blank; it is the negation
or absence of knowledge. This certainly cannot be the unbelief everywhere
538 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
represented in the Bible as a heinous sin, Ignorance may be a consequence
of unbelief, but cannot be identical with it. We may be ignorant of certain
truths as a consequence of rejecting others, but this ignorance is not, and,
We shall see, cannot be unbelief.
2. Unbelief is not the negation or absence of faith. This were a mere
nothing—a momentity. But a mere nothing is not that abominable thing
which the scriptures represent as a great and a damming sin.
3. It cannot be a phenomenon of the intellect, or an intellectual Scepti-
cism. This state of the intellect may result from the state of mind pro-
perly denominated unbelief, but it cannot be identical with it. Intellectual
doubts or unbelief often results from unbelief properly so called, but unbe-
lief, when contemplated as a sin, should never be confounded with theoretic
or intellectual infidelity. They are as entirely distinct as any two phenomena
of mind whatever.
4. It cannot consist in feelings or emotions of incredulity, doubt, or op-
position to truth. In other words, unbelief as a sin, cannot be a phenomenon
of the sensibility. The term unbelief is sometimes used to express or de-
signate a state of the intellect, and sometimes of the sensibility. It some-
times is used to designate a state of intellectual incredulity, doubt, distrust,
scepticism. But when used in this sense, moral character is not justly
predicable of the state of mind which the term unbelief represents.
Sometimes the term expresses a mere feeling of incredulity in regard to
truth. But neither has this state of mind moral character; nor can it have,
for the very good reason that it is involuntary. In short, the unbelief that
is so sorely denounced in the Bible, as a most aggravated abomination, cannot
consist in any involuntary state of mind whatever.
V. JJThat unbelief is.
The term, as used in the Bible, in those passages that represent it as a
sin, must designate a phenomenon of Will. It must be a voluntary state of
mind. It must be the opposite of evangelical faith. Faith is the will's re-
ception, and unbelief is the Will's rejection, of truth. Faith is the soul's
confiding in truth and in the God of truth. Unbelief is the soul's withhold-
ing confidence from truth and the God of truth. It is the heart's rejection
of evidence, and refusal to be influenced by it. It is the will in the attitude
of opposition to truth perceived, or evidence presented. Intellectual scep-
ticism or unbelief, where light is proffered, always implies the unbelief of
the will or heart. For if the mind knows, or supposes, that light may be
had, on any question of duty, and does not make homest efforts to obtain it,
this can be accounted for only by ascribing it to the will's reluctance to know
the path of duty. In this case light is rejected. The mind has light so far
as to know that more is proffered, but this proffered light is rejected. This
is the sin of unbelief. All infidelity is unbelief in this sense, and infidels
are so, not for want of light, but, in general, they have taken much pains to
shut their eyes against it. Unbelief must be a voluntary state or attitude
of the will, as distinguished from a mere volition, or executive act of the
FAITH AND UNIBELIEF. 539
will. Volition may, and often does, give forth, through words and deeds,
expressions and manifestations of unbelief. But the volition is only a result
of unbelief, and not identical with it. Unbelief is a deeper and more efficient
and more permanent state of mind than mere volition. It is the Will in its
profoundest opposition to the truth and will of God.
VI. JPhat is implied in unbelief.
1. Unbelief implies light, or the perception of truth. If unbelief were
but a mere negation, an absence of faith, a quiescent or inactive state of the
will, it would not imply the perception of truth. But since unbelief consists
in the will's rejection of truth, the truth rejected must be perceived. For
example: the heathen who have never heard of the gospel are not properly
guilty of unbelief in not embracing it. They are indeed guilty of unbelief
in rejecting the light of nature. They are entirely without the light of
the gospel; therefore they cannot reject it. The unbelief so much com-
plained of in the Bible, is not ignorance, but a rejection of truth revealed,
either by the light of nature, or by Providence or inspiration.
2. It implies obstinate selfishness. Indeed it is only one of the attributes
of selfishness, as we have seen on a former Occasion. Selfishness is a spirit
of self-seeking. It consists in the will's committing itself to self-gratifica-
tion or self-indulgence. Now unbelief is only selfishness contemplated in
its relations to the truth of God. It is only the resistance which the will
makes to those truths that are opposed to selfishness. It is the Will's stern
opposition to them. When these truths are revealed to the intellect, the
will must either yield to them and relinquish selfishness, or it must resist
them. Remain indifferent to them it cannot. Therefore, unbelief always
implies selfishness, because it is only selfishness manifesting itself, or acting
like itself, in the presence of truth opposed to it.
3. Unbelief implies a state of present total depravity. Surely there can
be nothing but sin in a heart that rejects the truth for selfish reasons. It
is naturally impossible that there should be any conformity of heart to the
will and law of God, when unbelief, or resistance to known truth, is present
in the Soul.
4. Unbelief implies the rejection of all truth perceived to be inconsistent
with selfishness. The unbelieving soul does not, and, remaining selfish,
cannot receive any truth, but for selfish reasons. Whatever truth is received
and acted upon by a selfish soul, is received for selfish reasons. But this is
not faith. Whatever truth the selfish soul cannot apply to selfish purposes,
it will reject. This follows from the very mature of selfishness.
5. On a former occasion it was shown, that where any one attribute of
selfishness is, there must be the presence of every other attribute, either in
a developed state, or waiting for the occasion of its developement. All sin-
mers are guilty of unbelief, and have this attribute of selfishness developed,
in proportion to the amount of light which they have received. Heathens
reject the light of mature, and simmers in Christian lands reject the light of
the gospel. The nature of unbelief proves that the unbelieving heart is
540 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
not only void of all good, but that every form of sin is there. The whole
host of the attributes of selfishness must reside in the unbeliever's heart,
and only the occasion is wanting to bring forth into developement, and
horrid manifestation, every form of iniquity.
6. The nature of unbelief implies that its degree depends on the degree
of light enjoyed. It consists in a rejection of truth perceived. Its degree
or greatness must depend upon the degree of light rejected.
7. The same must be true of the guilt of unbelief. The guilt must be
in proportion to light enjoyed. But as the guilt of unbelief is to come up
for distinct consideration, I waive the further discussion of it here.
8. Unbelief implies impenitence. The truly penitent soul will gladly
embrace all truth when it is revealed to it. This follows from the nature
of repentance. Especially will the true penitent hail with joy, and embrace
with eagerness the blessed truths of the glorious gospel. This must be
from the very nature of repentance. When unbelief is present in the heart,
there must be impenitence also.
9. Umbelief is enmity against God. It is resistance to truth, and of
course to the character and government of the God of truth.
10. It implies mortal enmity against God. Unbelief rejects the truth
and authority of God, and is, of course, and of necessity, opposed to the
very existence of the God of truth. It would annihilate truth and the
God of truth, were it possible. We have an instance and an illustration of
this in the rejection and murder of Jesus Christ. What was this but
unbelief? This is the nature of unbelief in all instances. All sinners
who hear and reject the gospel, reject Christ ; and were Christ personally
present to insist upon their reception of him, and to urge his demand,
remaining unbelieving, they would of course, and of necessity, sooner mur-
der him than receive him. So that every rejecter of the gospel is guilty of
the blood and murder of Christ.
11. Unbelief implies supreme enmity to God. This follows from the
nature of unbelief. Unbelief is the heart's rejection of and opposition to
truth. Of course, the greater the light, unbelief remaining, the greater
the opposition. Since God is the fountain of truth, opposition to him must
be supreme. That is, it must be greater to him than to all other beings
and things.
12. Unbelief implies a degree of wickedness as great as is possible for
the time being. We have seen that it is resistance to truth ; that it
implies the refusal to receive for benevolent reasons any truth. Entire
holiness is the reception of, and conformity to, all truth. This is, at every
moment, the highest degree of virtue of which the soul for the time being
is capable. It is the entire performance of duty. Sin is the rejection of
the whole truth, this is sin in the form of unbelief. The rejection of all
known truth, or of all truth perceived to be inconsistent with selfishness,
and for that reason, must be present perfection in wickedness. That is, it
must be the highest degree of wickedness of which the soul with its present
light is capable. It is the rejection of the whole of duty. It is a trampling
down of all moral obligation.
FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 541
13. Unbelief implies the charging God with being a liar. “He that
believeth not God hath made him a liar, because he hath not believed the
record that God gave of his Son.” Unbelief is the treatment of truth as
if it were falsehood, and of falsehood as if it were truth. It is the virtual
declaration of the heart, that the gospel is not true, and therefore that the
Author of the gospel is a liar. It treats the record as untrue, and of course
God, the author of the record, as a liar.
14. Unbelief implies lying. It is itself the greatest of lies. It is the
heart's declaration, and that too in the face of light, and with the intel-
lectual apprehension of the truth, that the gospel is a lie, and the Author of
it a liar. What is lying, if this is not?
15. It implies a most reckless disregard of all rights and of all interests
but those of self.
16. It implies a contempt for, and a trampling down of the law and
demands of the intelligence. Intelligence in its relations to moral truths
is only a trouble to the unbeliever. His conscience and his reason he
regards as enemies.
17. But before I dismiss this part of the subject, I must not omit to Say
that unbelief also implies the will's embracing an opposite error and a lie. It
consists in the rejection of truth, or in the withholding confidence in truth
and in the God of truth. But since it is naturally impossible that the will
should be in a state of indifference to any known error or truth that stands
commected with its duty or its destiny, it follows that a rejection of any
known truth implies an embracing of an opposing error.
There are multitudes of other things implied in unbelief; but I cannot
with propriety and profit notice them in this brief outline of instruction. I
have pursued this subject thus far, for the purpose of showing the true and
philosophical nature of unbelief; that whosoever will steadily contemplate
its nature, will perceive, that being what it is, it will and must develope,
as occasions occur in the providence of God, every form of iniquity of
which man is capable, or in other words, that where unbelief is, there is
the whole of sin.
VII. Conditions of both faith and unbelief.
1. The possession of reason. Reason is the intuitive faculty of the soul.
It is that power of the mind that makes those à priori affirmations concern-
ing God, which all moral agents do and must make, from the very nature
of moral agency, and without which neither faith as a virtue, nor unbelief
as a sin, were possible. For example: suppose it admitted that the Bible
is a revelation from God. The question might be asked, why should we
believe it? Why should we receive and believe the testimony of God?
The answer must be, because veracity is an attribute of God, and his word
is to be accredited because he always speaks the truth. But how do we know
this? This we certainly cannot know barely upon his testimony, for the
very question is, why is his testimony worthy of credit. There is no light in
his works or providence that can demonstrate that Veracity is an attribute
542 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
of God. His claiming this attribute does not prove it, for unless his
truthfulness be assumed, his claiming this attribute is no evidence of it.
There is no logical process by which the truth of God can be demonstrated.
The major premise from which the truthfulness of God could be deduced
by a syllogistic process, must itself assume the very truth which we are
seeking to prove. Now there is no way for us to know the truthfulness of
God, but by the direct assumption, affirmation, or intuition of reason. The
same power that intuits or seizes upon a major premise, from which the
truthfulness of God follows by the laws of logic, must and does directly,
irresistibly, necessarily, and universally, assume and affirm the fact, that
God is truth, and that veracity must be an attribute of God.
But for this assumption the intellect could not affirm our obligation to
believe him. This assumption is a first-truth of reason, everywhere, at all
times, by all moral agents, necessarily assumed and known. This is
evident from the fact, that it being settled, that God has declared anything
whatever, there is an end of all questioning in all minds whether it be true
or not. So far as the intellect is concerned, it never did, and never can
question the truthfulness of God. It knows with certain and intuitive
knowledge, that God is true, and therefore affirms universally and neces-
Sarily, that he is to be believed. This assumption, and the power that
makes it, are indispensable conditions of faith as a virtue, or of unbelief as
a vice. It were no virtue to believe or receive anything as true, without
sufficient evidence that it is true. So it were no vice to reject that which
is not supported by evidence. A mere animal, or an idiot or lunatic, is not
capable either of faith or of unbelief, for the simple reason that they do not
possess reason to discern the truth, and obligation to receive it.
2. A revelation in some way to the mind of the truth and will of God
must be a condition of unbelief. Be it remembered, that neither faith nor
unbelief is consistent with total ignorance. There can be unbelief no
further than there is light.
3. In respect to that class of truths which are discerned only upon con-
dition of divine illumination, such illumination must be a condition both of
faith and unbelief. It should be remarked, that when a truth has been
once revealed by the Holy Spirit to the soul, the continuance of the divine
light is not essential to the continuance of unbelief. The truth, once
known and lodged in the memory, may continue to be resisted, when the
agent that revealed it is withdrawn.
4. Intellectual perception is a condition of the heart's unbelief. The
intellect must have evidence of truth as the condition of a virtuous belief
of it. So the intellect must have evidence of the truth, as a condition of a
wicked rejection of it. Therefore, intellectual light is the condition, both
of the heart's faith and unbelief. By the assertion, that intellectual light
is a condition of unbelief is intended, not that the intellect should at all
times admit the truth in theory; but that the evidence must be such, that
by virtue of its own laws, the mind or intellect could justly admit the
truth rejected by the heart. It is a very common case, that the unbeliever
FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 543
denies in words, and endeavours to refute in theory, that which he never-
theless assumes as true, in all his practical judgments.
VIII. The guilt and ill-desert of whbelief.
We have seen, on a former Occasion, that the guilt of sin is condition-
ated upon, and graduated by, the light under which it is committed.
The amount of light is the measure of guilt in every case of sin. This is
true of all sin. But it is peculiarly manifest in the sin of unbelief; for
unbelief is the rejection of light; it is selfishness in the attitude of rejecting
truth. Of course, the amount of light rejected, and the degree of guilt in
rejecting it, are equal. This is everywhere assumed and taught in the
Bible, and is plainly the doctrine of reason.
Light is truth; light received, is truth known or perceived. The first
truths of reason are universally known by moral agents, and whenever the
will refuses to act in accordance with any one of them, it is guilty of
unbelief. The reason of every moral agent intuits and assumes the infinite
value of the highest well-being of God and of the universe, and of course
the infinite obligation of every moral agent to embrace the truth as the
necessary condition of promoting this end. Viewed in this light, unbelief
always implies infinite guilt and blame-worthiness.
But it is a doctrine of mathematics, that infinites may differ. The
meaning of the term infinite is simply the negation of finite. It is bound-
lessness, unlimitedness. That is, that which is infinite is unlimited or bound-
less, in the sense in which it is infinite. But infinites may differ in amount.
For example : the area contained between two parallel lines of infinite
length must be infinite in amount, however near these lines are to each
other. There is no estimating the superficial amount of this area, for, in
fact, there is no whole to it. But we may suppose parallel lines of infinite
length to be placed at different distances from each other ; but in every
case, the enlargement or diminution of the distances between any two
such limes would, accordingly, vary the space contained between them. The
superficial contents would, in every case, be infinite, and yet they would
differ in amount, according to the distances of the lines from each
other.
In every case, unbelief involves infinite guilt in the sense just explained;
and yet the guilt of unbelief may differ, and must differ, in different cases,
indefinitely in amount.
The guilt of unbelief under the light of the gospel must be indefinitely
greater, than when merely the light of nature is rejected. The guilt of
unbelief, in cases where special divine illumination has been enjoyed, must
be vastly and incalculably greater, than where the mere light of the gospel
has been enjoyed, without a special enlightening of the Holy Spirit.
The guilt of unbelief in one who has been converted, and has known
the love of God, must be greater beyond comparison, than that of an
ordinary sinner. Those things that are implied in unbelief show that it
must be one of the most provoking abominations to God in the universe.
544 SYSTEMLATIC THEOLOGY.
It is the perfection of all that is unreasonable, unjust, ruinous. It is
infinitely slanderous and dishonourable to God and destructive to man, and
to all the interests of the kingdom of God.
IX. Natural and governmental consequences of both faith and unbelief.
By natural consequences are intended consequences that flow from the
constitution and laws of mind, by a natural necessity. By governmental
consequences are intended those that result from the constitution, laws, and
administration of moral government.
1. One of the natural consequences of faith is peace of conscience.
When the will receives the truth, and yields itself up to conformity with
it, the conscience is satisfied with its present attitude, and the man becomes
at peace with himself. The soul is then in a state to really respect itself,
and can, as it were, behold its own face without a blush. But faith in truth
perceived is the unalterable condition of a man's being at peace with himself.
A governmental consequence of faith is peace with God:—
(1.) In the sense that God is satisfied with the present obedience of
the soul. It is given up to be influenced by all truth, and this is com-
prehensive of all duty. Of course God is at peace with the soul, so far as
its present obedience is concerned.
(2.) Faith governmentally results in peace with God, in the sense of
being a condition of pardon and acceptance. That is, the penalty of the
law for past sins is remitted upon condition of true faith in Christ. The
Soul not only needs present and future obedience, as a necessary condition
of peace with self; but it also needs pardon and acceptance on the part of
the government for past sins, as a condition of peace with God. But since
the subject of justification or acceptance with God is to come up as a distinct
subject for consideration, I will not enlarge upon it here.
2. Self-condemnation is one of the natural consequences of unbelief.
Such are the constitution and laws of mind, that it is naturally impossible
for the mind to justify the heart's rejection of truth. On the contrary,
the conscience necessarily condemns such rejection, and pronounces judg-
ment against it. -
Legal condemnation is a necessary governmental consequence of un-
belief. No just government can justify the rejection of known truth. But,
on the contrary, all just governments must utterly abhor and condemn the
rejection of truths, and especially those truths that relate to the obedience
of the subject, and the highest well-being of the rulers and ruled. The
government of God must condemn and utterly abhor all unbelief, as a
rejection of those truths that are indispensable to the highest well-being of
the universe.
3. A holy or obedient life results from faith by a natural or necessary law.
Faith is an act of will which controls the life by a law of necessity. It
follows of course that, when the heart receives or obeys the truth, the out-
ward life must be conformed to it.
4. A disobedient and unholy life results from unbelief also by a law of
FAITH AND UNIBELDEF. 545
necessity. If the heart rejects the truth, of course the life will not be con-
formed to it.
5. Faith will develope every form of virtue in the heart and life, as their
occasions shall arise. It consists in the committing of the will to truth
and to the God of truth. Of course as different occasions arise, faith will
secure conformity to all truth on all subjects, and then every modification
of virtue will exist in the heart, and appear in the life, as circumstances in
the providence of God shall develope them.
6. Unbelief may be expected to develope resistance to all truth upon all
subjects that conflict with selfishness; and hence nothing but selfishness in
some form can restrain its appearing in any other and every other form
possible or conceivable. It consists, be it remembered, in the heart's
rejection of truth, and of course implies the cleaving to error. The natural
result of this must be the developement in the heart, and the appearance
in the life, of every form of selfishness that is not prevented by some other
form. For example, avarice may restrain amativeness, intemperance, and
many other forms of selfishness.
7. Faith, governmentally results in obtaining help of God. God may
and does gratuitously help those who have no faith. But this is not a
governmental result or act in God. But to the obedient he extends his
governmental protection and aid.
8. Faith is a necessary condition of and naturally results in, heart-
obedience to the commandments of God. Without confidence in a governor,
it is impºssible hºmestly to give up the whole being in obedience to him.
But implicit and universal faith must result in implicit and universal obe.
dience.
9. Unbelief naturally, because mecessarily, results in heart-disobedience
tº Gol.
10. Faith naturally and necessarily results in all those lovely and
delightful emotions and states of feeling, of which they are conscious
whose hearts have embraced Christ. I mean all those emotions that are
naturally connected with the action of the will, and naturally result from
believing the blessed truths of the gospel.
11. Unbelief naturally results in those emotions of remorse, regret, pain,
and agony which are the frequent experience of the unbeliever.
12. Faith lets God into the soul to dwell and reign there. Faith
receives, not only the atonement and mediatorial work of Christ as a
Redeemer from punishment, but it also receives Christ as king to set up his
throne, and reign in the heart. Faith secures to the soul communion with
God.
13. Unbelief shuts God ºut of the soul, in the sense of refusing his reign
in the heart.
It also shuts the soul out from an interest in Christ's mediatorial work.
This results not from an arbitrary appointment, but is a natural con-
Sequence. Unbelief shuts the Soul out from communion with God.
These are hints at some of the natural and governmental consequences
N N.
54(; SYSTI)MATIC THE() I., ()(;Y.
of faith and unbelief. They are designed not to exhaust the subject, but
merely to call attention to topics which any one who desires may pursue at
his pleasuro. It should be here romarked, that none of the ways, com:
ulandments, or appointments of God are arbitrary. Faith is a naturally
indispensablo condition of salvation, which is the reason of its being made
a governmental condition. Unbelief renders salvation naturally impossible :
it uust, therefore, render it governmentally impossible.
LECTURE LVI.
JUSTIFICATION.
CHRIST is represented in the gospel as sustaining to men three classes
of relations.
l. Those which are purely governmental.
2. Those which are purely spiritual,
3. Those which unite both these.
We shall at present consider him as Christ our justification. I shall
show,
I. WHAT GOSPEL JUSTIFICATION IS NOT.
II. WHAT IT IS.
III. PolNT OUT THE CONDITIONS OF GOSPEL JUSTIFICATION.
IV. SHOW WILAT IS THE FOUNDATION OF GOSTEI, JUSTIFICATION.
I. I am to show what gospel justification is not.
There is scarcely any question in theology that has been encumbered
with more injurious and technical mysticism than that of justification.
Justification is the pronouncing of one just. It may be done in words,
or, practically, by treatment. Justification must be, in some sense, a
governmental act; and it is of importance to a right understanding of
gospel justification, to inquire whether it be an act of the judicial, the
executive, or the legislative department of government; that is, whether
gospel justification consists in a strictly judicial or forensic proceeding, or
whether it consists in pardon, or setting aside the execution of an incurred
penalty, and is therefore properly either an executive or a legislate act.
We shall see that the settling of this question is of great importance in
theology; and as we view this subject, so, if consistent, we must view
Imany important and highly practical questions in theology. This leads me
to Say,+
That gospel justification is not to be regarded as a forensic or judicial
proceeding. Dr. Chalmers and those of his school hold that it is. But
this is certainly a great mistake, as We shall see.
The term forensic is from forum, “a court.” A forensic proceeding belongs
to the judicial department of government, whose business it is to ascertain
the facts and declare the sentence of the law. This department has no
JUSTIFICATION. 547
power over the law, but to pronounce judgemnt, in accordance with its
true spirit and meaning. Courts never pardon, or set aside the execution
of penalties. This does not belong to them, but either to the executive or
to the law-making department. Oftentimes, this power in human govern-
ments is lodged in the head of the executive department, who is, generally
at least, a branch of the legislative power of government. But never is
the power to pardon exercised by the judicial department. The ground of
a judicial or forensic justification invariably is, and must be: universal
obedience to law. If but one crime or breach of law is alleged and
proved, the court must inevitably condemn, and can in no such case
justify, or pronounce the convicted just. Gospel justification is the justifi-
cation of sinners; it is, therefore, naturally impossible, and a most palpable
contradiction, to affirm that the justification of a sinner, or of one who has
violated the law, is a forensic or judicial justification. That only is or can
be a legal or forensic justification, that proceeds upon the ground of its
appearing that the justified person is guiltless, or, in other words, that he
has not violated the law, that he has dome only what he had a legal right
to do. Now it is certainly nonsense to affirm, that a sinner can be pro-
nounced just in the eye of law; that he can be justified by deeds of law,
or by the law at all. The law condemns him. But to be justified judicially
or forensically, is to be pronounced just in the judgment of law. This
certainly is an impossibility in respect to sinners. The Bible is as express
as possible on this point. Romans iii. 20,-" Therefore by the deeds of
the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the
knowledge of sin.”
It is proper to say here, that Dr. Chalmers and those of his school do
not intend that sinners are justified by their own obedience to law, but by
the perfect and imputed obedience of Jesus Christ. They maintain that,
by reason of the obedience to law which Christ rendered when on earth,
being set down to the credit of elect simmers, and imputed to them, the law
regards them as having rendered perfect obedience in him, or regards them
as having perfectly obeyed by proxy, and therefore pronounces them just,
upon condition of faith in Christ. This they insist is properly a forensie
or judicial justification. But this subject will come up more appropriately
under another head.
II. What is gospel justification.
It consists not in the law pronouncing the sinner just, but in his being
ultimately governmentally treated as if he were just, that is, it consists in
a governmental decree of pardom or amnesty—in arresting and setting
aside the execution of the incurred penalty of law—in pardoning and
restoring to favour those who have sinned, and those whom the law had
pronounced guilty, and upon whom it had passed the sentenee of etermal
death, and rewarding them as if they had been righteous. It is an act
either of the law-making or executive department of governument, and is
an act entirely aside from, and contrary to, the forensie or judicial power ov
*
N N 2
548 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
department of government. It is an ultimate treatment of the sinner as
just, a practical, not a literal, pronouncing of him just. It is treating him
as if he had been wholly righteous, when in fact he has greatly sinned.
In proof of this position, I remark,-
1. That this is most unequivocally taught in the Old Testament scrip-
tures. The whole system of sacrifices taught the doctrine of pardon upon
the conditions of atonement, repentance, and faith. This, under the old
dispensation, is constantly represented as a merciful acceptance of the
penitents, and never as a forensic or judicial acquittal or justification of
them. The mercy-seat covered the law in the ark of the covenant. Paul
informs us what justification was in the sense in which the Old Testament
Saints understood it, in Rom, iv. 6–8:—“Even also as David describeth
the blessedness of the man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness
without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and
whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will
not impute sin.” This quotation from David shows both what David and
what Paul understood by justification, to wit, the pardon and acceptance of
the penitent sinner.
2. The New Testament fully justifies and establishes this view of the
subject, as we shall abundantly see under another head.
3. Sinners cannot possibly be justified in any other sense. Upon
certain conditions they may be pardoned and treated as just. But for
sinners to be forensically pronounced just, is impossible and absurd.
IIT. Conditions of justification,
In this discussion I use the term condition in the sense of a sine qué
mon, a “not without which.” This is its philosophical sense. A condition
as distinct from a ground of justification, is anything without which sinners
cannot be justified, which, mevertheless, is not the procuring cause or
fundamental reason of their justification. As we shall See, there are many
conditions, while there is but one ground, of the justification of simmers.
The application and importance of this distinction we shall perceive as we
proceed.
As has been already said, there can be no justification in a legal or
forensic sense, but upon the ground of universal, perfect, and uninterrupted
obedience to law. This is of course denied by those who hold that gospel
justification, or the justification of penitent sinners, is of the nature of
a forensic or judicial justification. They hold to the legal maxim, that
what a man does by another he does by himself, and therefore the law
regards Christ's obedience as ours, on the ground that he obeyed for us.
To this I reply,–
1. The legal maxim just repeated does not apply, except in cases where
one acts in behalf of another by his own appointment, which was not the
case with the obedience of Christ ; and,-
2. The doctrine of an imputed righteousness, or that Christ's obedience
to the law was accounted as our obedieuco, is founded on a most false and
JUSTIFICATION. 549
nonsensical assumption; to wit, that Christ owed no obedience to the law
in his own person, and that therefore his obedience was altogether a work
of supererogation, and might be made a substitute for our own obedience ;
that it might be set down to our credit, because he did not need to obey for
himself.
I must here remark, that justification respects the moral law; and that
is must be intended that Christ owed no obedience to the moral law, and
therefore his obedience to this law, being wholly a work of supererogation,
is set down to our account as the ground of our justification upon condition
of faith in him. But surely this is an obvious mistake. We have seen,
that the spirit of the moral law requires good-will to God and the universe.
Was Christ under no obligation to do this? Nay, was he not rather under
infinite obligation to be perfectly benevolent? Was it possible for him to
be more benevolent than the law requires God and all beings to be 2 Did
he not owe entire consecration of heart and life to the highest good of
universal being 2 If not, then benevolence in him were no virtue, for it
would not be a compliance with moral obligation. It was naturally im-
possible for him, and is naturally impossible for any being, to perform a
Work of supererogation; that is, to be more benevolent than the moral law
requires him to be. This is and must be as true of God as it is of any
other being. Would not Christ have sinned had he not been perfectly
benevolent 2 If he would, it follows that he owed obedience to the law, as
really as any other being. Indeed, a being that owed no obedience to the
moral law must be wholly incapable of virtue, for what is virtue but
obedience to the moral law 2
But if Christ owed personal obedience to the moral law, them his obe-
dience could no more than justify himself. It can never be imputed to us.
Iſe was bound for himself to love God with all his heart, and Soul, and
mind, and strength, and his neighbour as himself. He did no more than
this. He could do no more. It was naturally impossible, then, for him to
obey in our behalf. This doctrine of the imputation of Christ's obedience
to the moral law to us, is based upon the absurd assumptions, (1.) That the
moral law is founded in the arbitrary will of God, and (2 ) That of course,
Christ, as God, owed no obedience to it; both of which assumptions are
absurd. But if these assumptions are given up, what becomes of the doc-
trime of an imputed righteousness, as a ground of a forensic justification 2
“It wanishes into thin air.”
There are, however, valid grounds and valid conditions of justifieation.
1. The Vicarious sufferings or atonement of Christ is a condition of
justification, or of the pardon and acceptance of penitent sinners. It has
been common either to confound the conditions with the ground of justi-
fication, or purposely to represent the atonement and work of Christ as the
ground, as distinct from and opposed to a condition of justification. In
treating this subject, I find it important to distinguish between the ground
and conditions of justification, and to regard the atonement and work of
550 SYSTEMATIC THROLOGY.
Christ not as a ground, but only as a condition of gospel justification. By
the ground I mean the moving, procuring cause; that in which the plan
of redemption originated as its source, and which was the fundamental
reason or ground of the whole movement. This was the benevolence and
merciful disposition of the whole Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
This love made the atonement, but the atonement did not beget this love.
The Godhead desired to save sinners, but could not safely do so without
danger to the universe, unless something was done to satisfy public, not
retributive justice. The atonement was resorted to as a means of recon-
ciling forgiveness with the wholesome administration of justice. A merci-
ful disposition in the Godhead was the source, ground, mainspring, of the
whole movement, while the atomement was only a condition or means, or
that without which the love of God could not safely manifest itself in
justifying and saving sinners.
Failing to make this distinction, and representing the atonement as the
ground of the sinner's justification, has been a sad occasion of stumbling
to many. Indeed, the whole questions of the nature, design, extent, and
bearings of the atonement turn upon, and are involved in, this distinction.
Some represent the atonement as not demanded by, nor as proceeding from
the love or merciful disposition, but from the inexorable wrath of the
Father, leaving the impression that Christ was more merciful, and more
the friend of sinners than the Father. Many have received this impression
from pulpit and written representations, as I well know.
Others, regarding the atonement as the ground as opposed to a condition
of justification, have held the atonement to be the literal payment of the
debt of sinners, and of the mature of a commercial transaction: a quid pro
quo, a valuable consideration paid down by Christ, by suffering the same
amount as was deserved by the whole number of the elect ; thus negativing
the idea of a merciful disposition in the Father, and representing him as
demanding pay for discharging and saving sinners. Some of this class
have held, that since Christ has died, the elect sinner has a right to demand
his justification, on the ground of justice, that he may present the atone-
ment and work of Christ, and say to the Father, “Here is the price; I
demand the commodity.” This class, of course, must hold to the limited
nature of the atomement, or be universalists.
While others again, assuming that the atonement was the ground of
justification in the Sense of the literal payment of the debt of sinners, and
that the scriptures represent the atonement as made for all men, have very
consistently become universalists.
Others again have given up, or never held the view that the atonement
was of the nature of the literal payment of a debt, and hold that it was a
governmental expedient to reconcile the pardon of sin with a wholesome
administration of justice: that it was sufficient for all as for a part of
mankind : that it does not entitle those for whom it was made to a pardon
on the score of justice, but that men are justified freely by grace through
JUSTIFICATION. 551
the redemption, that is in Christ Jesus, and yet they inconsistently persist
in representing the atonement as the gronnd, and not merely as a condition
of justification.
Those who hold that the atonement and obedience of Christ were and are
the ground of the justification of sinners, in the sense of the payment of
their debt, regard all the grace in the transaction as consisting in the
atonement and obedience of Christ, and exclude grace from the act of justi-
fication. Justification they regard as a forensic act. I regard the atone-
ment of Christ as the necessary condition of safely manifesting the
benevolence of God in the justification and Salvation of sinners. A
merciful disposition in the whole Godhead was the ground, and the
atonement a condition of justification. Mercy would have saved without
an atonement, had it been possible to do so. But see my lectures on
Atonement.—Page 319, et seq.
That Christ's sufferings, and especially his death, were vicarious, has been
abundantly shown when treating the subject of atonement. I need not
repeat here what I said there. Although Christ owed perfect obedience
to the moral law for himself, and could not therefore obey as our substitute,
yet simce he perfectly obeyed, he owed no suffering to the law or to the
Divine government on his own account. He could therefore suffer for us.
That is, he could, to answer governmental purposes, substitute his death
for the infliction of the penalty of the law on us. He could not perform
works of supererogation, but he could endure sufferings of supererogation,
in the sense that he did not owe them for himself. The doctrine of sub-
stitution, in the sense just named, appears everywhere in both Testaments.
It is the leading idea, the prominent thought, lying upon the face of the
whole scriptures. Let the few passages that follow serve as specimens of
the class that teach this doctrine :
Lev. xvii. 11. “For the life of the flesh is in the blood ; and I have
given it to you upon the altar, to make an atonement for your souls; for
it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul.”
Isa. liii. 5, 6, 11. “But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was
bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him,
and with his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we
have turned every one to his own way, and the Lord hath laid on him
the iniquity of us all. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall
be satisfied; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many: for
he shall bear their iniquities.”
Matt. XX. 18. “Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto,
but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.”
Matt. xxvi. 28. “For this is my blood of the New Testament, which is
shed for many for the remission of sins.”
John iii. 14. “And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness,
even so must the Son of man be lifted up : 15. That whosoever believeth
in him should not perish, but have etermal life.”
John vi. 51. “I am the living bread which came down from heaven; if
552 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever; and the bread that I will
give is my flesh, which I give for the life of the world.”
Acts XX. 28. “Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock
over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the church
of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood.”
Rom. iii. 24. “Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemp-
tion that is in Christ Jesus. 25. Whom God hath set forth to be a pro-
pitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the
remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God. 26. To
declare, I say at this time his righteousness; that he might be just, and
the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.”
Rom. v. 6. “For when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ
died for the ungodly. 7. For scarcely for a righteous man will one die :
yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. 8. But
God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet simmers,
Christ died for us. 9. Being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved
from wrath through him. 11. And not only so, but we also joy in God,
through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atone-
ment. 18. Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all
men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift
came upon all men unto justification of life. 19. For as by one man's
disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall
many be made righteous.”
1 Cor. v. 7. “For even Christ our passover is sacrified for us.”
1 Cor. xv. 3. “Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures.”
Gal. ii. 20. “I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless, I live; yet not
I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I
live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for
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DO €.
Gal. iii. 13. “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being
made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on
a tree. 14. That the blessing of Abraham might come on the gentiles
through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the Spirit
through faith.”
Eph. ii. 13. “But now, in Christ Jesus, ye who sometimes were far off,
are made migh by the blood of Christ.”
Eph. v. 2. “And walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us, and hath
given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling
savour.”
Heb. ix. 12. “Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own
blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal
redemption for us. 13. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the
ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the
flesh; 14. How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the
eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience
from dead works to serve the living God P 22. And almost all things are
JUSTIFICATION. 553
by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no
remission. 23. It was therefore necessary that the patterns of things in
the heavens should be purified with these ; but the heavenly things them-
selves with better sacrifices than these. 24. For Christ is not entered into
the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true; but
into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us; 25. Nor
yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entereth into the
holy place every year with blood of others; 26. For then must he often
have suffered since the foundation of the world; but now once in the end
of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.
27. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the
judgment; 28. So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many.”
Heb. x. 10. “By the which we are sanctified through the offering of
the body of Jesus Christ once for all. 11. And every priest standeth
daily ministering, and offering oftentimes the same Sacrifices, which can
never take away sins; 12. But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice
for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God; 13. From henceforth
expecting till his enemies be made his footstool. 14. For by one offering
he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified. 19. Having therefore,
brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus; 20. By
a new and living way, which he hath consecrated for us, through the wail,
that is to say, his flesh.”
I Pet. i. 18. “ Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with
corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received
by tradition from your fathers : 19. But with the precious blood of
Christ.”
1 Pet. ii. 24. “Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the
tree, that we being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness ; by whose
stripes ye are healed.”
1 Pet. iii. 18. “ For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for
the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh,
but quickened by the Spirit.”
1 John i. 7. “But if we walk in the light as he is in the light, we have
fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth
us from all sin.”
1 John iii. 15. “And ye know that he was manifested to take away our
sins.”
1 John iv. 9. “In this was manifested the love of God toward us,
because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might
live through him. 10. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that
he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.”
These and many such like passages establish the fact beyond question,
that the vicarious atonement of Christ is a condition of our pardon aud
acceptance with God.
2. Tepentance is also a condition of our justification. Observe, I here
also use the term condition, in the sense of a “not without which,” and not in
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-Instiſ SI ſoutus luanſuod att] put] ‘Inſt; tığnottſ, 1st IIIO Aq 100 pub ‘ūſt) Kd
atow 11 JI sp ‘Threy Aq uondogūsmſ Jo Mºods on populiº Suosiod Jossbº) au.L
‘Aat A uptuouſnug oup od on Studes sºul, 'üongognsuſ Jo Utoppuloo Kuo
oth put: “Uompttoo atti SpA (Inſuſ ‘por) Jo Tuatuºuſoddu Kubinſub Ue Ka ‘qūlū
posoddins Kaul J. St. ‘III*) Kd TonbogInsuſ Jo payltºn oxbul Kaúl, looſqus spun
u0(In Augu Jo Suondaouoo out U 10.1.10 Jo Utomu Ubaq Sull otolp, TUUIn Ibaj
I 'tūraſ Jo Krissaoalt pub a.m.] but at Olu pauſugxo Ápûo.IT, oautſ a AA UOIn
-bogInsmſ Jo (Ionpuoo Toulous ‘osttos outs oup UU ‘SI SIUſ) U Ungu, I 'g
'sagessed arou alonb on alum Jo uombduooo SSološn B 3.10A iſ pub ‘ūonsonb
uſ SIII] [[Bo ubo oUTIq oth Jo Jopual ON aſſig oth uſ quintº put ‘pendiuſ
‘patumssu atoll w \to Ao SI SIULL 'asuos Aub ul poſſInsuſ od outlºo ou ‘pot) on
5uſtum] to oottuluadol Āq Suſs tuoſ, Jo SMU3,04 tours out [I]tun ºutſ, Tuapſ Ao
J[os sſ I UOI3IIa.1 poleoAoi Jo su luan) bt Jo attſ Inoop º AmIn sº SI syll.T.
'aouenuadal ºnotuſA us uopted hottuto pop Jo luouTutoAoš aun ºutin uſehlao
oq isntu I pagnsuſ SI toutus oth ſoviſit ſo aſps alſ, toſ ºvip, tº Jo asuas out,
"X}OTOGIHL OIALVINGILSXS JUSTIFICATION. 555
jºr
This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son,
and believeth on him, may have everlasting life ; and I will raise him up
at the last day.”
John viii. 24. “If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins.
44. Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do :
he was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth ; because
there is no truth in him. 47. He that is of God, heareth God’s words;
ye herefore hear them not, because ye are not of God.”
John xi. 25. “Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life :
he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live ; 26. And
whosoever liveth, and believeth in me, shall never die.”
Acts x. 43. “To him give all the prophets witness, that through his
name, whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins.”
Acts xvi. 31. “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be
saved, and thy house.”
Rom. iv. 5. “But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that
justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.”
Rom. x. 4. “For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every
one that believeth.”
Gal. ii. 16. “Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the
law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ,
that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of
the law; for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.”
2 Thess. ii. 10. “And with all deceivableness of umrighteousness in them
that perish ; because they received not the love of the truth, that they
might be saved. 11. And for this cause God shall send them strong
delusion, that they should believe a lie; 12. That they all might be damned
who believe not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.”
Heb. ii. 6. “Without faith it is impossible to please him; for he that
cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them
that diligently seek him.”
1 John ii. 23. “Whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the
Father ; but he that acknowledgeth the Son hath the Father also.”
1 John V. 10. “He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in
himself; he that believeth not God hath made him a liar, because he
believeth mot the record that God gave of his Son. 11. And this is the
record, that God hath given to us eternal life : and this life is in his Son.
12. He that hath the Son hath life ; and he that hath not the Son of God,
hath not life. 13. These things have I written unto you that believe on
the name of the Son of God ; that ye may know that ye have etermal life,
and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God.”
4. Present sanctification, in the sense of present full consecration to
God, is another condition, not ground, of justification. Some theologians
have made justification a condition of sanctification, instead of making
Sanctification a condition of justification. But this we shall see is an erro-
neous view of the subject. The mistake is founded in a misapprehension
* KQOTOGIHJ, OILVINGIJLSXS 999
‘xſpuoddy aaS plognCI ICI A
's womnoyſ montº's mulla sp.IOMAaj tº uſ a.Inbuſ sn 19 : SI wonvoyſłysmſ quqa (toos
oAbū a M. "Itomboglout's Jo Utompuoo tº Sù (Iontognsuſ Juoso.Idol pub plbäa.
unod ‘Ātu.Inttoo attº Ito inq : UtonbogInsnſ. Jo uompuoo tº oottompaqo quasa.Id
a.[I]tta to ‘uontognottus 11tosold oyſutu Sassuſo osott, Jo toulio N sittiO III
so Aaſtaq on help Utomºpuloo oun uodm Inq ‘ns.Itto Jo IIIds 5UTIOApUI alſº Act
poomput sº aduappoqo (IoIIIA ‘aottompaqo annua quosold Jo uomi.puoo uodn hou
lauſus oth sldaoot putt, Sutopted pot) hºun ºnq ‘ssatismoonušu pannduſ IIe 01
hout 'plouſ supljotoaul Jo SSUI.) lounotty U19'ſ) toy pop put poſoqo islauſ
asnuood Snoolušil Uloul Shunooob por) no,' ‘Auſ slu on huompoſ(O Klaunuo
ajú spun uſ quouout Kutu ºu do Aoti att, ptº “KIIuntUlſtoo IIIs ssal to a tout up
aşInput Vaul IIºnotulu bû] ‘sſ ºutſ, puetſ ſºons&ut pub quºtta.A00 oup ºns.III)
uſ juoſpoqo Anaajuod St. At oth Ka paptuño. Buſoq Iſotſ, Jo on.IIA ſq ‘uſs
on amninuoo Soul out A and ‘tus on 5(USpoo IIotſ, Jo Uonupuloo (todu jou ‘oop.15 slu
&I Staulus saunsuſ por) Jeſú SAOIIoſ I hool.too aq booſqns out, Jo Aaj A spſ JI
‘SI uomognsuſ otoll A isſya Otoſa.Ioun Tsuu put ‘uongognsuſ Jo tuonºptio)
tº SI II asnbooq ATuo toottop|Aa (It sº I 'tiontognsnſ Jo equapi Ao atau e nou
but ‘ttonſ lymh anns to Utomption todoid u si nr Tºul sistſ and puno.15 shot.I
-onitou out) Jou si linity lui (1 Åus I i pognsuſ aq hottuto (outus b ... [oſt|A
quouſ A hutſ, u ,, SI iſſuſ 10th putpu Touttgo tonius, SIU, OS 'uongoſſinsmſ wou Jo
ºpmb owns u Su holl pun: ‘soottop|Aa alth Atalotu Su ssaulſori put; tınſu) attasaid
squoso.Idol aſ ‘otout soop or puy UIoncognsn'ſ Jo Suonºptiod pub spumo.13
aul Uloo. Aloq (IOI) oupsup ou] spumoſuoo [a]llM SIUſ) ato] I IIoneognsuſ
Jo anºns u Jo sootlopſ Ao oſqusuads putſ out, otº Kaū, sº ‘ūnºw ponooúttoo Kittu
-Itu Aur punoj od IIIA &otſ ºutp Klotout ma ‘spumo.13 snoſ.[O]ilatti otſ, otb
asoul huun puolu Subaut Out Kit Kolū 1911, ULTIUp 'soapostuouſ, uſe[d Xa on uodu
polluo Ulou A pub uoſº Alus Jo Stronſpiroo otu SSatutou pub Unguj quuſ, pſes
3upwell Utau A sº “tauno uoba tuſ. A polooutloo put 1s Sātūtīn ūopus up uomisod
to ontºls att, AIIIITIS aſ Āq BºtſItuatu ‘osttas [BoſtIdosopud tº uſ , uomputoo, ution
aúl Osm ,, ‘SAes ou lºsionſ.I.A ouos, a poº) atojaq uongognsnſ. Jo (Ionºp
-uoo aun stuio, “Suptuods Aptodo.[d ‘uoſqAA ‘Alī auſ] on aouanpaqo [guostad
UAO s to Aoſtaq aul Tou SI I, ‘SK88 x 101ſ.IA (tºol.toUTV huòool V UOInbogInsuſ
stu Jo ‘uou pub owns & Jo Osttas oun uſ UIOInſpIOO p aquappaqo quasaïd STI
3uppuru You ‘ssousnoonqāII poinduſ ug Jo ann.I.A. Ág oouthdooob pub ssadog
upu to surghoo SLIUD unIA taxalaq out, Jo Uloſun [Bons.ºut alſ, OSOddus Kouſh
‘Ālbºluoo alſ, uo inq pop (Inſas abutºdoooº Jo “puno.13 you ‘uonpuoo tº su
ssauqou peuostad uodn Ssons annul Ato A KBI Aoun hºun aſſum3uel Jo Osn oil,
tuouſ tubes pino A iſ pop Jo Atl out on lugou Jo Kutunoſuoo Tuoso.[d 3UAId
-up [to he so unre, Buſplºad lou ‘unſuſ oldus uodu utongognsnſ onettonſp
-uoo Kaul ooua H 'ajº Sun III nuouTumb aſqbonobºduſ up se ‘Ulou, Jo
Kugu put “arbi Áras use pIbāat Kotī, ‘Ae SIU on Khutojūoo olnue to ‘pot) on
oouapoqo penugou-alou AA "statio uſ unſuſ Jo Job 1stgoul to pontuonpuoo
uomoustiºn oſsuolo; tº sº pIbáa. Aoun uongogasuſ pub : pop on Uonuloosuoo
go uomooſqus annua sluA aun uſ uvun oste §ultuoulos III issuoo on tongog
nottus asſota Kotiſ, Ioneognours Jo put uOntognsnſ.go Inoq aimyuu on Jo
JZSTIFICATION. 557
To sanctify is to set apart, to consecrate to a particular use. To Sanc-
tify anything to God is to set it apart to his service, to consecrate it to
him. To sanctify one’s self is voluntarily to set one's self apart, to conse-
crate one's self to God. To be sanctified is to be set apart, to be conse-
crated to God. Sanctification is an act or state of being Sanctified, or set
apart to the service of God. It is a state of consecration to him. This
is present obedience to the moral law. It is the whole of present duty,
and is implied in repentance, faith, regeneration, as we have abundantly
See]).
Sanctification is sometimes used to express a permanent state of obe-
dience to God, or of consecration. In this sense it is not a condition of
present justification, or of pardon and acceptance. But it is a condition of
continued and permanent acceptance with God. It certainly cannot be
true, that God accepts and justifies the sinner in his sins. I may safely
challenge the world for either reason or scripture to support the doctrine
of justification in sin, in any degree of present rebellion against God.”
The Bible everywhere represents justified persons as sanctified, and always
expressly, or impliedly, conditionates justification upon sanctification, in
the sense of present obedience to God. 1 Cor. vi. 11; “And such were
some of you : but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified,
in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God.” This is but
a specimen of the manner in which justified persons are spoken of in the
Bible. Also, Rom. viii. 1; “There is therefore now no condemnation to
them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the
Spirit.” They only are justified who walk after the Spirit. Should it be
objected, as it may be, that the scriptures often speak of Saints, or truly
regenerate persons, as needing sanctification, and of Sanctification as some-
thing that comes after regeneration, and as that which the saints are to
aim at attaining, I answer, that when sanctification is thus spoken of, it is
doubtless used in the higher sense already noticed ; to wit, to denote a
state of being settled, established in faith, rooted and grounded in love,
being so confirmed in the faith and obedience of the gospel, as to hold on
in the way steadfastly, unnovably, always abounding in the work of the
Lord. This is doubtless a condition of permanent justification, as has
been Said, but not a condition of present justification.
By Sanctification being a condition of justification, the following things
are intended.
(1.) That present, full, and entire consecration of heart and life to God
and his service, is an unalterable condition of present pardon of past sin,
and of present acceptance with God.
(2.) That the penitent soul remains justified no longer than this full-
hearted consecration continues. If he falls from his first love into the
spirit of self-pleasing, he falls again into bondage to sin and to the law, is
condemned, and must repent and do his “first work,” must return to
* See argument, pp. 155–164.
558 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Christ, and renew his faith and love, as a condition of his salvation. This
is the most express teaching of the Bible, as we shall fully see.
9. Perseverance in faith and obedience, or in consecration to God, is also
an unalterable condition of justification, or of pardon and acceptance with
God. By this language in this connexion, you will of course understand
me to mean, that perseverance in faith and obedience is a condition, not of
Present, but of final or ultimate acceptance and salvation.
Those who hold that justification by imputed righteousness is a forensic
proceeding, take a view of final or ultimate justification, according with
their view of the nature of the transaction. With them, faith receives an
imputed righteousness, and a judicial justification. The first act of faith,
according to them, introduces the sinner into this relation, and obtains for
him a perpetual justification. They maintain that after this first act of
faith it is impossible for the sinner to come into condemnation; that, being
once justified, he is always thereafter justified, whatever he may do; indeed
that he is never justified by grace, as to sins that are past, upon condition
that he ceases to sin; that Christ's righteousness is the ground, and that
his own present obedience is not even a condition of his justification, so
that, in fact, his own present or future obedience to the law of God is, in
no case, and in no sense, a sine quá nom of his justification, present or
ultimate.*
Now this is certainly another gospel from the one I am inculcating. It
is not a difference merely upon some speculative or theoretic point. It is a
point fundamental to the gospel and to salvation, if any one can be. Let
us therefore see which of these is the true gospel.
I object to this view of justification —
1. That it is antinomianism. Observe: they hold that upon the first
exercise of faith, the soul enters into such a relation to Christ, that with
respect to it the penalty of the Divine law is for ever set aside, not only as
* Dr. Duffield, a recent expounder of what, he is pleased to insist, is the only orthodox
view of the subject, says :-‘‘The sacred Scriptures clearly teach, that God, by one gracious
act, once passed, and for ever immutable, releases the sinner who believes, so effectually
and fully from the penalty of the law, that he is removed from under its dominion, and
never more comes into condemnation. Justification is an act of God’s free grace, which
takes immediate effect in this mortal life, and by which the relation of the sinner who be-
lieves on Jesus Christ, is so thoroughly changed to the law, that through the actings of his
faith he passes from under the condemnation, and penalty of the law, and being accepted
as righteous, only for the righteousness of Christ, is adopted into the family of God's
children. It is one act of God, once done and for ever, and begins immediately to pro-
duce its fruits.” Indeed, Christian, what do you think of this One act of faith, then
instantly justified, once and immutable, you can never by any possibility need pardon
again. No, the law has perished as it respects you. Faith has made it void, for that is no
law that has no penalty. Then you can no more sin, for you have no law. “ For where
there is no law, there is no transgression.” “Sin is not imputed where there is no law.”
So if you do sin, your sin is not imputed, and you need no pardon. What an infinite
mistake are Christians labouring under, according to this theory, when they ask for a par-
don of their sins committed after this immutable act of justification. And further : live
as you may, after once believing, you must be saved, your justification is immutable.
What say you to this 2
JUSTIFICATION. 559
it respects all past, but also as it respects all future acts of disobedience ;
so that sin does not thereafter bring the Soul under the condemning sen-
tence of the law of God. But a precept without a penalty is no law.
Therefore, if the penalty is in their case permanently set aside or repealed,
this is, and must be, a virtual repeal of the precept, for without a penalty
it is only counsel, or advice, and no law.
2. But again : it is impossible that this view of justification should be
true; for the moral law did not originate in the arbitrary will of God, and
he cannot abrogate it either as to its precept or its penalty.” He may for
good and sufficient reasons dispense in certain cases with the execution of
the penalty. But set it aside in such a sense, that sin would not incur it,
or that the soul that sins shall not be condemned by it, he cannot—it is
naturally impossible The law is as unalterable and unrepealable, both as
to its precept and its penalty, as the mature of God. It cannot but be, in
the very nature of things, that sin in any being, in any world, and at any
time, will and must incur the penalty of the moral law. God may pardon
as often as the soul sims, repents, and believes but to prevent real condem-
nation where there is sin, is not at the option of any being.
3. But again : I object to the view of justification in question, that it is
of course inconsistent with forgiveness or pardon. If justified by imputed
righteousness, why pardon him whom the law accounts as already and per-
petually, and perfectly righteous? Certainly it were absurd and impossible,
for the law and the law-giver judicially to justify a person on the ground of
the perfect obedience of his substitute, and at the same time pardon him
who is thus regarded as perfectly righteous. Especially must this be true
of all sim committed subsequently to the first and justifying act of faith.
If when once the Soul has believed, it can no more come into condemna-
tion, it certainly can no more be forgiven. Forgiveness implies previous
condemnation, and consists in Setting aside the execution of an incurred
penalty.
4. If the view of justification I am opposing be true, it is altogether out
of place for one who has once believed, to ask for the pardom of sin. It is
a downright insult to God, and apostacy from Christ. It amounts accord-
ing to their view of justification, to a denial of perpetual justification by
imputed righteousness, and to an acknowledgment of being condemned. It
must therefore imply a falling from grace, to pray for pardon after the soul
has once believed. But upon their view falling from grace is impossible.
5. According to this view of justification, all the prayers offered by the
Saints for the pardon of sins committed after their first act of faith, not
even excepting the Lord's prayer, have all been wrong and impious, and
have all been a virtual demial of a fundamental truth of the gospel. Shame
on a theory from which such consequences irresistibly follow ! The soul
cannot be pardoned unless it be condemned ; for pardon is nothing else
than setting aside the condemning sentence of the divine law,
* Dr. Duffield holds that the moral law originated in the sovereign will of God,
and of course he can set it aside. See my review of him in Appendix.
º
* \{)OTOGIHAL OILVIWICIJCSXS O99
Jo Sn Jal Sulaq asſuold tº 1so aba) e.tojøIoun Sn harſ, "I AI “10H
... puto oth
olum suppuans oouapguoo Ino Jo Buſuttidad aun piouſ as JI ‘SITIO Jo Stºſºl
-tud apbut ate ow Io, I, ºf I ºuts Jo Ssau ſujiraoap all uáno.III) polioptºll
aq no & Jo Kub sal : Kup-on polluo si ni alſº “KUtºp tou]out ouo MOLIXo
qngſ, 'gl "pop 3ut AII oup ULOI) ºutſ).Updop UU Jøſſøquin Jo 3.1890 IRA3
Utu no& Jo Kub up aq atau) isal ‘uatula.Iq ‘pool ox{BL , º, I 'pute 9tſ. Olúm
ulgadotſ att, Jo Buropoſal att, pub ‘aortapgſtoo oth 1st) plotſ ow JI '84 OTU
osmoll asoula : osmouſ IIAAo sit IAAO utoS tº Su TsIITIO ang[, ‘9 III (1911
...tansſulu tº apptu Ute Inta
I Jootou A : ItaAbou topum si Motu A ammuato StoAa on poliouold st'A (IoIIIA
put ‘ptuou a Mull 3& Toula, ‘Ladsoã oup Jo odou oup Tuolj KuAt poxout you
aq puu panhas put popunois Uppuſ oup uſ autulutoo as JT , , 'gº, 'I IOO
... uru A tu pop Jo out; at 1 loſt a.Maoat a." Jeſú
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: axius soutuu Kitt [O] (totu III; Jo panelſ or [[ttis a V puv., 66 ºx ºf N
..”I IOI orp IIulis all ‘pollutuoo Unut all
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—: looſans
spun sittasa.Idol alaſq. aul IIoIIIA UI Jattuºtti att, Jo Sa[duitºsa sº a Mes
soãussed 5upwollo] aun loſſ Utomeaſes [UUU puu UIontognsuſ on Utuntu Jo
uonpuoo & St. ‘pile oth on aouaipogo put unpuſ uſ abutºtoxosted Shuasa.Idol
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sºul, aſqKI oſoti A eul unſas Itº it, sº uonuouſismſ Jo Aaſa SIII, and '9
JUSTIFICATION. 561
entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. 11. Let
us labour therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the same
example of unbelief.”
2 Pet. i. 10. “Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make
your calling and election sure ; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall.”
Rev. ii. 10. “Fear none of those things which thou shalt suffer.
Behold, the devil shall cast some of you into prison, that ye may be tried ;
and ye shall have tribulation ten days. Be thou faithful unto death, and I
will give thee a crown of life. 11. He that hath an ear, let him hear
what the Spirit saith unto the churches; He that overcometh, shall not be
hurt of the second death. 17. He that hath an ear, let him hear what
the Spirit saith unto the churches; To him that overcometh will I give to
eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone, and in the stone
a new name written, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it.
26. And he that overcometh, and keepeth my works unto the end, to him
Will I give power over the nations; 27. And he shall rule them with a
rod of iron ; as the vessels of a potter shall they be broken to shivers;
even as I received of my Father.”
Rev. xxi. 7. “He that overcometh shall inherit all things; and I will
be his God, and he shall be my son.”
Observe, I am not here calling in question the fact, that all true saints
do persevere in faith and obedience to the end ; but am showing that such
perseverance is a condition of salvation, or of ultimate justification. The
subject of the perseverance of the saints will come under consideration in
its proper place.—(See “Perseverance.”)
7. The view of justification which I am opposing is contradicted by the
consciousness of the Saints. I think I may safely affirm, that the saints in
all time are very conscious of condemnation when they fall into sin. This
sense of condemnation may not subject them to the same kind and degree
of fear which they experienced before regeneration, because of the confidence
they have that God will pardon their sin. Nevertheless, until they repent,
and by a renewed act of faith lay hold on pardon and fresh justification,
their remorse, shame, and consciousness of condemnation, doin fact, if I am
not much deceived, greatly exceed, as a general thing, the remorse, shame,
and sense of condemnation, experienced by the impenitent. But if it be
true, that the first act of faith brings the soul into a state of perpetual justi-
fication, so that it cannot fall into condemnation thereafter, do what it will,
the experience of the saints contradicts facts, or, more strictly, their con-
sciousness of condemnation is a delusion. They are not in fact condemned
by the moral law as they conceive themselves to be.
8. Christ has taught the saints to pray for forgiveness, which implies that
When they sin they are condemned. There can be no Dardon except there
be condemnation. Pardon, as has been Said, consists in setting aside the
execution of the penalty of law upon the sinner. If therefore the law and
the lawgiver do not condemn him, it is absurd to pray for pardon. The
fact therefore that inspired saints prayed repeatedly for the pardon of sin
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564 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
ing in forgiveness of sin, or in pardom and acceptance. Again, 2 Cor. V.
19, 21. “To wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto
himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them ; and hath committed unto
us the word of reconciliation. For he hath made him to be sin for us, who
knew no sim; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.”
Here again the apostle is teaching only his much-loved doctrine of justifi-
cation by faith, in the sense that upon condition or in consideration of the
death and mediatorial interference and work of Christ, penitent believers in
Christ are forgiven and rewarded as if they were righteous.
IV. Foundation of the justification of penitent believers in Christ. That
is, what is the ultimate ground or reason of their justification.
1. It is not founded in Christ's literally suffering the exact penalty of
the law for them, and in this sense literally purchasing their justification
and eternal salvation. The Presbyterian Confession of Faith affirms as
follows: chapter on Justification, section 3—“Christ by his obedience and
death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, and
did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their
behalf. Yet, inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his
obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for
anything in them, their justification is only of free grace, that both the
exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification
of sinners.” If the framers of this confession had made the distinction
between the grounds and conditions of justification, so as to represent the
gracious disposition that gave the Son, and that accepted his obedience and
satisfaction in their stead, as the ground or moving cause, and the death
and work of Christ as a condition or a means, as “that without which " the
benevolence of God could not wisely justify sinners, their statement had
been much improved. As it stands, the transaction is represented as a
proper quid pro quo, a proper full payment of the debt of the justified. All
the grace consisted in giving his Son, and consenting to the substitution.
But they deny that there is grace in the act of justification itself. This
proceeds upon the ground of “exact justice.” There is them according to
this, no grace in the act of pardon and accepting the sinner as righteous.
This is “exact justice,” because the debt is fully cancelled by Christ. In-
deed, “ Christian, what do you think of this?” God has, in the act of
giving his Son and in consenting to the substitution, exercised all the grace
he ever will. Now your forgiveness and justification are, according to this
teaching, placed on the ground of “exact justice.” You have now only to
believe and demand “exact justice.” One act of faith places your salva-
tion on the ground of “exact justice.” Talk no more of the grace of God
in forgiveness! But stop, let us see. What is to be understood here by
exact justice, and by a real, full satisfaction to his Father's justice? I
suppose all orthodox Christians to hold, that every sinner and every sin,
strictly on the score of justice, deserves etermal death or endless suffering.
Did the framers of this confession hold that Christ bore the literal penalty
JUSTIFICATION. 565
of the law for each of the saints? Or did they hold that by virtue of his nature
and relations, his suffering, though indefinitely less in amount than was
deserved by the transgressors, was a full equivalent to public justice, or
governmentally considered, for the execution of the literal penalty upon the
transgressors? If they meant this latter, I see no objection to it. But if
they meant the former, namely, that Christ suffered in his own person the
full amount strictly due to all the elect, I Say,+
(1.) That it was naturally impossible.
(2.) That his nature and relation to the government of God was such as
to render it wholly unnecessary to the safe forgiveness of sin, that he should
suffer precisely the same amount deserved by sinners.
(3.) That if, as their substitute, Christ suffered for them the full amount
deserved by them, then justice has no claim upon them, since their debt is
fully paid by the surety, and of course the principal is, in justice, discharged.
And since it is undemiable that the atonement was made for the whole
posterity of Adam, it must follow that the salvation of all men is secured
upon the ground of “exact justice.” This, as has been said, is the conclu-
sion to which Huntington and his followers came. This doctrine of literal
imputation, is one of the strongholds of universalism, and while this view
of atonement and justification is held they cannot be driven from it.
(4.) If he satisfied justice for them, in the sense of literally and exactly
obeying for them, why should his suffering be imputed to them as a con-
dition of their salvation ? Surely they could not need both the imputation
of his perfect obedience to them, so as to be accounted in law as perfectly
righteous, and also the imputation of his sufferings to them, as if he had
not obeyed for them. Is God unrighteous? Does he exact of the surety,
first, the literal and full payment of the debt, and secondly, perfect personal
obedience for and in behalf of the sinner 2 Does he first exact full and
perfect obedience, and then the same amount of suffering as if there had
been no obedience 2 And this, too, of his beloved Son 2
(5.) What Christian ever felt, or can feel in the presence of God, that he
has a right to demand justification in the name of Christ, as due to him
on the ground of “exact justice.” Observe, the framers of the Confession
just quoted, studiously represent all the grace exercised in the justification
of sinners, as confined to the two acts of giving his Son and accepting the
substitution. This done, Christ fully pays the debt, fully and exactly
satisfies his Father's justice. You now need not, must not conceive of the
pardom of sin as grace or favour. To do this is, according to the teaching
of this Confession, to dishonour Christ. It is to reject his righteousness
and salvation. What think you of this? One act of grace in giving his
Son, and consenting to the substitution, and all forgiveness, all accepting and
trusting as righteous, is not grace, but “exact justice.” To pray for forgive-
mess, as an act of grace, is apostacy from Christ. Christian | Can you
believe this? No; in your closet, smarting under the sting of a recently
committed sin, or broken down and bathed in tears, you cannot find it in
your heart to demand “exact justice" at the hand of God, on the ground
566 SYSTEMLATIC THEOLOGY.
that Christ has fully and literally paid your debt. To represent the work
and death of Christ as the ground of justification in this sense, is a smare
and a stumbling-block. If this is the true account of it, antinomianism
must be the true gospel, than which a more false and licentious dogma.
never existed. But this view that I have just examined, contradicts the
necessary convictions of every saint on earth. For the truth of this assertion
I appeal to the universal consciousness of saints. Whose business is it to
cry heresy, and sound the alarm of error through the land
2. Our own works or obedience to the law or to the gospel, are not the
ground or foundation of our justification. That is, neither our faith, nor
repentance, nor love, nor life, nor anything done by us or wrought in us, is
the ground of our justification. These are conditions of our justification,
in the sense of a “not without which,” but not the ground of it. We are
justified upon condition of our faith, but not for our faith; upon condition
of our repentance, love, obedience, perseverance to the end, but not for
these things. These are the conditions, but not the reason, ground, or
procuring cause of our justification. We cannot be justified without them,
neither are we or can we be justified by them. None of these things must
be omitted on pain of etermal damnation. Nor must they be put in the place
of Christ upon the same penalty. Faith is so much insisted on in the
gospel as the sine quá mom of our justification, that some seem disposed, or
at least to be in danger of substituting faith in the place of Christ; of
making faith instead of Christ the Saviour.
3. Neither is the atonement, nor anything in the mediatorial work of
Christ, the foundation of our justification, in the sense of the source,
moving, or procuring cause. This, that is the ground of our justification,
lies deep in the heart of infinite love. We owe all to that merciful disposi-
tion that performed the mediatorial work, and died the accursed death to
supply an indispensable condition of our justification and salvation. To
stop short in the act which supplied the condition, instead of finding the
depths of a compassion as fathomless as infinity, as the source of the whole
movement, is to fail in discrimination. The work, and death, and resurrec-
tion, and advocacy of Christ are indispensable conditions, are all-important,
but not the fundamental reason of our justification.
4. Nor is the work of the Holy Spirit in converting and sanctifying the
soul, the foundation of our justification. This is only a condition or
means of bringing it about, but is not the fundamental reason.
5. But the disinterested and infinite love of God, the Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit, is the true and only foundation of the justification and salvation
of sinners. God is love, that is, he is infinitely benevolent. All he does,
or says, or suffers, permits or omits, is for one and the same ultimate
reason, namely, to promote the highest good of universal being.
6. Christ, the second person in the glorious Trinity, is represented in
scripture, as taking so prominent a part in this work, that the number of
offices and relations which he sustains to God and man in it are truly wonder-
ful. For example, he is represented as being : 1. King. 2. Judge. 3. Medi-
JUSTIFICATION. 567
ator. 4. Advocate. 5. Redeemer. 6. Surety. 7. Wisdom. 8. Righteousness.
9. Sanctification. 10. Redemption. 11. Prophet. 12. Priest. 13. Passover,
or Lamb of God. 14. The bread and water of life. 15. True God and
eternal life. 16. Our life. 17. Our all in all. 18. As the repairer of the
breach. 19. As dying for our sins. 20. As rising for our justification.
21. As the resurrection and the life. 22. As bearing our griefs and carry-
ing our sorrows. 23. As he, by whose stripes we are healed. 24. As the
head of his people. 25. As the bridegroom or husband of his church.
26. As the shepherd of his flock. 27. As the door by which they enter.
28. As the way to salvation. 29. As our salvation. 30. As the truth.
31. As being made sin for us. 32. That we are made the righteousness
of God in him. 33. That in him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead.
34. That in him all fulness dwells. 35. All power in heaven and earth are
said to be given to him. 36. He is said to be the true light that lighteth
every man that cometh into the world. 37. Christ in us the hope of glory.
3S. The true vine of which we are the branches. 39. Our brother. 40.
Wonderful. 41. Counsellor. 42. The mighty God. 43. The everlasting
Father. 44. The prince of peace. 45. The captain of Salvation. 46.
The captain of the Lord's host.
These are among the official relations of Christ to his people, and to the
great work of our justification. I shall have frequent occasion to consider
him in some of these relations, as we proceed in this course of study.
Indeed, the offices, relations, and work of Christ, are among the most im-
portant topics of Christian theology.
Christ is our Justification, in the sense that he carries into execution the
whole scheme of redemption devised by the adorable Godhead. To him the
scriptures everywhere direct the eyes of our faith and of our intelligence also.
The Holy Spirit is represented not as glorifying himself, but as speaking of
Jesus, as taking of the things of Christ and showing them to his people, as
glorifying Christ Jesus, as being sent by Christ, as being the Spirit of
Christ, as being Christ himself dwelling in the hearts of his people. But I
must forbear at present. This subject of Christ's relations needs elucida-
tion in future lectures.
REMARIN.
The relations of the old school view of justification to their view of
depravity is obvious. They hold, as we have seen, that the constitution in
every faculty and part is sinful. Of course, a return to personal, present
holiness, in the sense of entire conformity to the law, cannot with them
be a condition of justification. They must have a justification while yet at
least in some degree of sin. This must be brought about by imputed
righteousness. The intellect revolts at a justification in sin. So a scheme
is devised to divert the eye of the law and of the lawgiver from the sinner to
his Substitute, who has perfectly obeyed the law. But in order to make out
the possibility of his obedience being imputed to them, it must be assumed,
that he owed no obedience for himself; than which a greater absurdity
568 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
cannot be conceived. Constitutional depravity or sinfulness being once
assumed, physical regeneration, physical sanctification, physical divine influ-
emce, imputed righteousness, and justification, while personally in the com-
mission of sin, follow of course.
LECTURE LVII.
SANCTIFICATION. l
In discussing this subject I will—
I. GIVE soME Account OF THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS THAT HAve
BEEN HAD UPON THIS QUESTION.
II. REMIND YOU OF SOME POINTS THAT HAVE BEEN SETTLED IN THIS
COURSE OF STUDY.
III. DEFINE THE PRINCIPAL TERMS TO BE USED IN THIS D1scussion.
IV. SHOW WHAT THE REAL QUESTION Now AT Issue Is.
V. THAT ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION IS ATTAINABLE IN THIS LIFE.
VI. PoſNT OUT THE CONDITIONS OF THIS ATTAINMENT.
VII. ANSWER objFCTIONs.
VIII. ConCLUDE WITH REMARKs.
I. I am to give some aecount of the recent discussions that have been had
wpon the subject of entire sanctification in this life.
When lecturing and writing on polemic theology, it is important and
even indispensable, that we should entertain just ideas of the views and
arguments of our opponents. In entering upon the discussion of the ques-
tion before us, it seems impossible to proceed without noticing the recent
discussions that have been had, and without giving you the substance of
the principal things that have been said of late in opposition to our views.
This will prepare the way for a fuller and more intelligent examination of
the question under consideration, than could be otherwise had. I shall
therefore make no apology for introducing in this place a brief history
of the discussions alluded to, although they have so recently appeared in
print.
About the year 1832 or 1833, the sect called Antinomian Perfectionists,
sprang up at about the same time, in several places in New York and New
England. We have in their leading organ, “The Perfectionist,” published
at New Haven, Ct., their articles of belief, or their Confession of Faith, as
it professes to have been carefully prepared and published by request. It
is as follows:–
WHAT WIE BELIEVE.
1. We believe that God is the only rightful interpreter of the Bible, and
teacher of theological truth; hence—
2. We believe that no doctrine can become an article of true faith,
SAINCTIFICATION. 569
which is not recognized by the believer as an immediate revelation to him
from God; yet—
3. We believe that God, “who worketh all in all,” can and does teach
his own truth, through his written word, and through the testimony of his
Sons; therefore— g
4. We believe it is proper that we should state, as witnesses for God,
the fundamental articles of our own faith.
5. We believe “there is none good but one, that is God;” that all the
righteousness in the universe is God’s righteousness.
6. We believe that God's righteousness may be revealed in his creatures,
as a man's spirit is revealed in the motions of his body.
7. We believe that “ the works of the flesh [that is, human nature], are
adultery, uncleanness, envyings, strife, and such like” only.
8. We believe that all attempts to produce better results from human
nature, by instruction and legal discipline, only increase the evil—inasmuch
as they refine aud disguise without removing it.
9. We believe that the Son of God was manifested in human nature for
the purpose of destroying (not reforming), the works of the flesh, and
revealing the righteousness of God.
10. We believe that the righteousness of God was never revealed in
human mature till the birth of Jesus Christ.
1]. We believe that the object of all God’s dealings with the human
race, before the birth of Christ, was not to promote the righteousness of
the flesh, that is, self-righteousness, that is, the perfection of sin ; but to
prepare the way for the manifestation of his own righteousness through
Jesus Christ; hence—
12. We believe that the righteousness of the saints, under the law
before Christ, was only “a shadow of good things to come, and not the
very image of the things,” bearing a relation to the true righteousness of
God, like that of a type to its anti-type.
13. We believe that the servants of God under the law, by submission
to the discipline of the dispensation in which they lived, were prepared for
and became heirs of the righteousness of God, afterward revealed by Jesus
Christ.
14. We believe that “ God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto
himself,”—that the union of human and divine nature in him, made the
righteousness of God accessible to all mem.
15. We believe that Christ is properly called the second Adam, and as
the human race in spirit is one body, that he became, by his incarnation,
“the light that lighteth every man.”
16. We believe that all who are apprized by the gospel of the fact that
the Son of God has come, are thereby called to choose, whether they will
hold the fallen or the risen Adam as their head.
17. We believe that faith alone receives, and unbelief rejects, the bless-
ings given to man by the second Adam ; by faith men awake to a percep-
tion of the truth as it is in Christ ; unbelief is the devil’s dream.
570 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
18. We believe that Christ, as he is in his resurrection and glory, is
given to every member of the human race.
19. We believe that all the faith, righteousness, liberty, and glory of the
risen Son of God, are given to every man.
20. We believe that Christ, in his incarnation was “made under the
law, and that the Christian dispensation did not commence, in any sense,
till he ascended up on high.
21. We believe that none are Christians, in any sense, till they receive
Christ in his resurrection ; hence—
22. We believe that the disciples of Christ, during his personal ministry
in the flesh, were not Christians.
23. We believe that Christ, in the resurrection, is free from sin, from
the law, from all ordinances, and from death: hence, all who are subject to
any of these are not properly called Christians, as not having attained the
hope of their calling.
24. We believe that the history which the Bible contains of the church
after Christ's ascension, commonly called the primitive church, is a history
rather of the latter-day glory of Judaism, than of the commencement of
Christianity.
25. We believe that the apostles and primitive believers, so far as they
were subject to sin, law, and death, were Jews, and not Christians.
26. We believe that Christ plainly and repeatedly promised to his
disciples, that he would come to them a second time, and complete their
salvation within the life-time of some of his immediate followers.
27. We believe that the primitive church, living in the transition
period, from the first to the second coming of Christ, were more or less
partakers of the resurrection, holiness, liberty, and glory of Christ, accord-
ing to their faith.
28. We believe, that at the destruction of Jerusalem, the end of the
Jewish dispensation, Christ came to believers the second time according to
his promise.
29. We believe, that, at the period of the second coming of Christ,
Christianity, or the kingdom of heaven, properly began.
30. We believe, that this was the period of the full developement of
the NEW CovenANT, (Heb. viii.,) which secures to believers perfect and
etermal salvation from sin, full freedom from Written law and human
instruction.
31. We believe, that the whole body of Christ, that is, the church,
attained the perfect resurrection of the spiritual body at his second coming.
32. We believe, that antichrist, at the same period, attained the perfect
resurrection of damnation.
33. We believe, that this was the period of the commencement of the
judgment, (CRISIS, see the Greek,) of this world.
34. We believe, that after this period, the Salvation given to all men in
Jesus Christ, included mothing less than a perfect and etermal salvation
from sin, a perfect redemption from the law and legal instruction—a
SANCTIFICATION. 57.1
perfect resurrection of the spiritual body, and a standing on the plain of
etermity beyond the judgment.”
In the winter of 1836-7, I preached a course of lectures to Christians,
in the church of which I was then pastor, in the city of New York, which
were reported by the editor of the New York Evangelist, and published in
his paper. Soon after they were published in that form, they were pub-
lished in a volume, and went into extensive circulation, both in Europe
and America. Among these lectures were two on the subject of Christian
perfection, or entire sanctification, from Matt. v. 48—“ Be ye therefore
perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.”
In the first of these lectures I endeavoured to show,
1. What perfection the text does not, and what it does require.
2. That this perfection is a duty.
3. That this perfection is attainable in this life.
4. I proceeded to answer objections.
I regarded the perfection demanded by the text as consisting in entire
obedience of heart and life to the law of God. And so I taught. I then
proceeded to show, that this state of obedience is attainable in this life.
The remainder of this and the following lecture were occupied in answer-
ing objections to the doctrine of the first discourse. These lectures were
soon spread before thousands of readers. Whatever was thought of them,
I heard not a word of objection to the doctrine from any quarter. If any
was made, it did not, to my recollection, come to my knowledge.
In the year 1840, President Maham published a small work on the sub-
ject of Christian perfection. Several pieces had previously been published
by him and myself in the “Oberlin Evangelist,” upon the same subject.
Prof. Cowles, about the same time, published a series of articles in the
“Oberlin Evangelist,” upon the subject of the holiness of Christians in
this life, which were, soon after their first appearance, collected and pub-
lished in a small volume. Nearly at the same time I published a course
of lectures in the same paper, which were soon also put into a volume by
themselves. All three of us gave a definition of Christian perfection, or
entire sanctification, amounting in substance to the same thing, making it
to consist in entire consecration to God, and entire obedience to the law,
and supported the attainability of this state in this life, by substantially
the same course of argument. We agreed in stating the attainability of
this state, as the thing which we proposed to prove, and to the proof of
which we shaped our whole course of argument. The attainability of this
state we attempted to establish by many arguments, among which are the
following:—
1. We argued the possibility of attaining this state from the fact, that
God expressly commands it.
2. From the fact that man, by virtue of his moral agency, is maturally
able fully to obey God.
3. From the fact, that provisions are made in the gospel for the entire
sanctification of believers in this life.
572 SYSTEM ATIC THEOLOGY.
4. From the fact, that we are commanded to pray in faith for the entire
sanctification of believers in this life.
5. From the fact, that Christ and the apostles prayed for this.
6. From the fact, that the entire sanctification of believers in this life is
expressly promised in scripture.
Pres. Mahan and myself, especially, urged the attainability of this
state, not only from the foregoing and many other considerations, but also
from the fact, that this state lias been attained, and instanced Paul the
apostle, as an example of this attainment.
Immediately upon the publication of the above-named works, the public
journals opened a battery upon us, strangely, and I must say, unaccountably
confounding our views with those of the antinomian perfectionists. What
analogy was discernible between our views, as set forth in our writings, and
those of the antinomian perfectionists, as expressed in their own formula of
doctrine, as above given, I am utterly at a loss to understand. But it was
insisted, that we were of that School and demomination, notwithstanding the
greatest pains-taking on our part to make the public acquainted with our
views. Many honest ministers and laymen, in this country and in Europe,
were doubtless misled by the course pursued by the public press. Some of
the leading religious journals refused to publish our articles, and kept their
readers in ignorance of our real views. They gave to the public, often-
times, the grossest misrepresentations of our views, and refused to allow
our replies a place in their columns. The result for sometime was a good
deal of misapprehension and alarm, on the part of many Christians who
had been among our warmest friends. Soon after the publication of
President Mahan's work, above alluded to, it was reviewed by Dr. Leonard
Woods, of Andover Theological Seminary. Dr. Woods committed in his
review four capital errors, which laid his review open to a blow of annihila-
tion, which was in due time levelled against it by President Mahan. The
president had defined what he intended by Christian perfection, or entire
Santification, and had also stated what he did not understand it as implying.
He defined it to consist in a state of entire conformity of heart and life to
the law of God, or in consecration of the whole being to God. He very
expressly took issue upon the question of the attainability of this state in
this life, and was at special pains to guard against the true point at issue
being mistaken, and protested against any one's making a false issue.
Dr. Woods noticed this, and his first error consisted in assuming, that the
real point at issue between him and President Mahan was just what he,
Dr. Woods, chose to make it. Hence, secondly, Dr. Woods proceeded to
take issue with the author he was reviewing, not upon the possibility of
attaining the state in question in this life, which was the proposition stated
and defended by his author, but upon the fact of this state having been
attained in this life. This was the doctor's second error. His third error
consisted in the fact, that having made a false issue, he replied to the
arguments of his opponent, as if they had been designed to establish, not
the attainability, but the actual attainment of this state in this life.
SANCTDFCATION. 573
He certainly had a right to controvert, if he chose, the fact of actual
attainment, or to deny any other argument President Mahan used to prove
the attainability of this state. But he had no right, and it was utterly
absurd and unjust, to make a false issue, to take issue upon the fact of
attainment, and represent the president's argument, as adduced to sustain
that position, when in fact it was framed in support of a totally different
position; and this Dr. Woods knew full well.
But the doctor fell into a fourth error as fatal to his object as either of
the preceding. He did not at all define his views of what constitutes
Christian perfection or entire sanctification, nor did he notice his opponent's
definition. We are therefore left to the necessity of inferring what he
understands by entire sanctification or Christian perfection from his course
of argument.
From this we learn, that he founded his argument against the fact of
attainment, which was the point that he aimed to overthrow, upon a grossly
false assumption, in respect to the nature of Christian perfection. The
following are specimens of his course of reasoning : He denied that any
Christian had ever attained to a state of entire sanctification in this life,
because the Bible requires Christians in all their earthly course to grow in
grace. Now it will be seen at once, that this argument is good for nothing,
unless it be assumed, as a major premise, that Christian perfection or entire
sanctification implies the impossibility of further progress in holiness. The
argument in syllogistic form would stand thus:–
“Christian perfection or entire sanctification implies the impossibility of
further progress in holiness. The Bible requires all Christians in all time
to progress in holiness, which implies the possibility of their doing so.
Therefore, no Christian is in this life entirely sanctified.”
The assumption of a grossly false major premise alone gives his argument
the colour of relevancy or plausibility. But suppose any one should pursue
the same course of argument, in respect to total depravity, and insist that
no sinner is ever totally depraved in this life, because the Bible represents
wicked men and seducers as waxing worse and worse; would Dr. Woods,
or those who agree with him, acknowledge the conclusiveness of such an
argument? But if total depravity does not imply, as every one knows that
it does not, the impossibility of further progress in sin, so neither for the
same reason does entire or total sanctification imply the impossibility of
further progress in holiness.
But President Mahan had expressly excluded from his definition of
Christian perfection the idea of its implying a state in which no higher
attainments in holiness were possible. He had insisted that the saints
may not only always in this life grow in holiness, but that they must for
ever grow in grace or holiness as they grow in knowledge. How strange,
them, that Dr. Woods should not only make a false issue, but also proceed
to sustain his position, by assuming as true what his author had expressly
denied There was not even the shadow of disagreement between him
and his opponent, assuming as he did, that Christian perfection implied
574 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the impossibility of further progress in holiness. President Mahan as much
abhorred the idea of the actual or possible attainment of such a state in
this or any other life, as the doctor did himself. The doctor had no right
to represent him as holding to Christian perfection, in any such sense as
that he was controverting. In the face of President Mahan's disavowal of
such a sentiment, the doctor shaped his argument to overthrow a position
which the president never maintained. Having created his own issue, and
supported it by his own assumption, he was pronounced by multitudes to
have gained a complete victory.
Again : Dr. Woods denied that Christian perfection ever was or ever
will be attained in this life, because the Bible represents Christians in all
time as engaged in the Christian warfare. Here again we get at the doctor's
view of Christian perfection ; to wit, that it implies the cessation of the
Christian warfare. But what is the Christian warfare P
The doctor plainly assumes, that it consists in warring with present sin.
Yet he holds all sin to be voluntary. His assumption then that the
Christian Warfare consists in a warfare with present sin, represents the will
as opposing its present choice. Choice warring with choice. But the
Christian warfare implies no such thing. It is a warfare or contest with
temptation. No other warfare is possible in the nature of the case. Christ
was a subject of it. He was tempted in all points as we are, yet without
sin. While our circumstances remain what they will always be in this
world, we shall be subject to temptation, of course, from the world, the
flesh, and Satan. But Christian perfection is not at all incompatible with
the existence of this strife with temptation. This argument of the doctor
was based wholly, like the preceding, upon the begging or assumption of a
totally false major premise. He made an issue between himself aud
President Mahan, when there was none. The president no more held than
he did, that such a state ever was or will be attained in this life, as implies
the cessation of the Christian warfare, properly so called. Thus Dr. Woods
set out without giving his readers any definition of Christian perfection,
and stumbled and blundered through his whole argument, totally mis-
representing the argument of the author whom he reviewed, and sustaining
several of his own positions by sheer assumptions.
The applause with which this review was received by the great mass of
ministers and by many laymen, shows the deep darkness in which this
whole question was and had been for a long time enveloped. We shall see,
in its proper place, that the erroneous view of nearly the whole church:
upon this subject, was the legitimate result of a totally false philosophy of
moral depravity. The review of Dr. Woods was looked upon very exten-
sively as a complete using up of President Mahan's book. It was soon
published, by request, in a separate volume. But the president's answer
appeared in due time, and, so far as I know, was universally regarded
by those who candidly read it, as a complete refutation of Dr. Woods's
review.
The doctor admitted in his review, that entire sanctification was attain-
SANCTDFICATION. 575
able in this life, both on the ground of natural ability, and also because
the gospel has made sufficient provision for this attainment. But with his
assumed definition of entire sanctification, he should not have admitted the
possibility of such attainment. For Surely it is not possible, on the ground
of matural ability, to attain such a state, either in this life or in any other,
that no further advances can be made. Nor has the gospel made provision
to render such attainment possible in this life. Nor is it possible, either
on the ground of natural ability, or through the provisions of grace, to
attain a state in this life, in which the warfare with temptation will cease.
It is difficult to conceive how Dr. Woods, with his ideal of entire sancti-
fication, could admit the possibility of attaining this state in this life.
Certainly there was no consistency in making both the assumption and the
admission. If he assumed the one, he should have denied the other. That
is, if, in his view, entire sanctification implied a state in which there could
be no further advances in holiness, or in which there could be no further
war with temptation, he should have denied the possibility of the attain-
ment in this life, at least.
Nearly at the same time with the review of Dr. Woods, just named, the
presbytery of Troy, New York, by a committee appointed for that purpose,
issued a review of our opinions, and, as I suppose, intended especially as a
reply to my work already alluded to.
The letter or review of the presbytery was published in the “New York
Evangelist," and, I believe, in most of the leading public journals of the
day. I replied, but my reply was not admitted into the columns of the
journals that published the review. This fact seems to demand, that both
the letter of the presbytery and my reply should have a place in this ac-
count of the discussion. I therefore here give them entire.
‘‘ ACTION OF THE TROY PRESBYTERY,
“Statement of Doctrine.
“In the progress of human investigation, it not unfrequently happens,
that truth and error are so connected, that the work of distinction becomes
as indispensable as that of refutation. In this form, error is always the
most dangerous, not only because it is the least likely to be perceived, but
because from its relation, it is liable to share in that confidence which the
mind is accustomed to assign to admitted truth. In this form, also, it is
often, relatively to our perceptions, the same as truth; but the moment this
unnatural union of repellent elements is sundered, both assume their dis-
tinctive and peculiar marks.
“These prefatory thoughts find an ample illustration in the present state
of opinion, in some sections of the church, relative to the doctrine of
‘Christian Perfection.' That all the sentiments of this system are false, it
Would be difficult to show; and as difficult to show their entire truth. The
system is a subtle combination of truth and error. Any partial prevalence
that it may have had, is easily explaimed on this principle. Where the
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SANCTIFICATION. 577
state. It is not contended that it is the state of all Christians, and by
consequence, that none are Christians but those who are perfectly sanctified.
The second involves two relations of time, that is, that this attainment has
been made in the present life, and that it has remained the permanent
state for a period more or less indefinite—a day, a week, a month, a year,
or years. It is not denied that it is a state in which defection is possible ;
hence a Christian in this state may relapse into one of imperfect sanctifi-
cation. Such a phenomenon would be apostacy from perfect to imperfect
holiness, and might be succeeded by a return to the former state. These
relapses and restorations may be of an indefinite number, for they admit
of no necessary limitation but the life of the individuals. They are not
however to be confounded with that theory of moral actions, which regards
each as wholly good or wholly bad, for they contemplate a longer period of
time than is assigned to the production of any given moral act.
“Such is the real question at issue—such is the import of ‘Christian
perfection,' so far as it has any peculiarity. This is the question to be
decided; to argue any other, is to lose sight of the real one—it is to meet
an opponent where there is no debate, but entire agreement.
“2. In the second place it is proposed to inquire—What is truth in
relation to this point?
“It is obvious that the burden of proof lies with him who affirms the
truth of this sentiment. He must moreover direct his proof to the very
thing affirmed, and not to something else. It is easy to carry a question
by stating one proposition and proving another. If the proposition in
debate be established, the discussion is at an end, the doctrine of Christian
perfection must be acknowledged.
“(1.) It may be well, therefore, in the first place, to insist on our logical
rights, and inquire, ‘has the proposition yet been proved 2’ This question
involves a variety of subordinate ones, a brief allusion to which is all that
can be made.
“(i.) It has sometimes been urged, that because perfection in holiness is
attainable in this life, therefore it is actually attained. How much validity
this argument possesses, we shall be able to judge, if we state it in a
syllogistic form. It would be thus: whatever is attainable in this life, is
actually attained in this life; a state of perfect holiness is attainable in this
life; therefore it is actually attained in this life. It must be confessed
that this syllogism has the attribute of logical conclusiveness, but ere we
grant the truth of the inference, it may be well to decide the truth of the
premises. Is the first or major premise true? If so, then every sinner
who hears the gospel, must attain to actual salvation; then not some but
all believers must be perfectly sanctified in the present life: then every
man actually reaches, in the present life, the highest possible intellectual
and moral good of his being. It must be palpable to every discriminating
mind, that this reason takes for granted a false premise; and although con-
formable to the rules of logic, it is liable to prove an untruth; it confounds
the broad distinction between what is merely possible and what is actual.
P P
578 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
“(ii) Again, it is urged in defence of this system, that the gospel
contains adequate provisions for the perfect sanctification of believers in
this life, and therefore some believers are thus sanctified. The logical
formula will place this reasoning in its true light. It will stand thus:
Whatever is possible by the provisions of the gospel in this life, will take
place in this life : the perfect sanctification of some believers in this life is
possible by these provisions; therefore it will take place in this life. This
is a most extraordinary method of reasoning. With some slight changes,
it will prove what even the advocate of perfection will be slow to admit.
In the second or minor proposition, Substitute the word “all” for ‘some,’
and then it proves that all believers are perfectly sanctified in this life.
Again, in place of ‘some’ or ‘all believers,’ insert the words “all men,” then it
proves that all are perfectly sanctified in this life. There must therefore
be some radical difficulty in the first or major proposition. What is that
difficulty It lies in a limitation which is not expressed, but which, the
moment it is seen, Overturns the whole argument. The provisions of the
gospel are sufficient for perfect Sanctification at any time and place, if they
be fully applied, and not otherwise. Their partial or full application con-
templates the action of a rational and voluntary agent. Hence, while
competent, they may fail of this effect, owing to the non-application, and
not to any fault in the provisions themselves. Before therefore this
argument is entitled to the least weight, it must be proved that some
believers, or all, fully appropriate these provisions in the present life. This
being done, them all is clear. This has never yet been done; but it has
been lately assumed, as if it were an undisputed truth. The main argu-
ment of President Maham on Perfection is embarrassed with this very
fallacy.
“(iii.) Again, in support of this scheme, much use has been made of the
commands, promises, and prayers, recorded in the Bible.
“In relation to the commands, it will be sufficient to say, that although
the Bible does command a state of perfect holiness in this life, it does not
follow that the command is in any instance fully obeyed on earth. Before
we can arrive at this conclusion, we must adopt the following principle;
that is, that whatever is commanded in the Bible is actually performed by
the subjects of that command. This would exclude the existence of all
sin from the world; it would prove all men to be holy, without a single
exception; it would establish the perfect sanctification, not of some, but of
all believers. It is certainly a most formidable engine of demonstration,
too potent for an ordinary hand to wield. -
“So also the argument based on the promises of God involves fallacies
of reasoning not less apparent. It is a glorious truth, that God has
promised to all believers a final victory over sin, which undoubtedly will be
accomplished at some period of their history. But does it follow then,
because believers are to be perfectly sanctified at some time and somewhere,
the present life will be the time and place of this perfect sanctification ?
Let a promise be adduced, if it can be, that fixes the period of this event
SANCTIFICATION. 579
to the present life. The divine promises, like the provisions of the gospel,
are couditioned as to the degree of their results, by appropriative acts on
the part of the believer. Hence the fallacy of the argument is apparent,
in that it takes for granted that some believers in the present life do
fully comply with all the conditions contemplated in the promises them-
selves. Without this assumption it proves nothing. Besides, it is not to
be forgotten that the promises are general, addressed alike to all believers;
and hence the rules of reasoning by which they are made to prove the
perfect sanctification of some Christians in the present life, equally prove
that of all in every period of time, past, present, and future. The argu-
ment from promises has no relation to, or limitation by, any specific time.
But two alternatives seem to be possible; either the reasoning must be
abandoned as not valid, or we must admit that every regenerated man is
sinless, and that too from the moment of his conversion.
“Similar defects characterize the arguments drawn from the prayers
which the Bible records, as well as those which it authorizes Christians to
make. It is true that Christ prayed for his disciples in language the most
elevated,— Sanctify them through thy truth.' The same may be said of
the great apostle when he prayed,—“And the very God of peace sanctify
you wholly.' We are directed to pray that God's will may be done on
earth as in heaven; and in general authorized to pray for a perfect victory
over all sin at every time. These are the facts ; now what is the in-
ference 2 The advocate of perfection responds, that some believers are
perfectly sanctified in the present life. These and kindred facts we offer,
to prove this conclusion. Is there, then, between the two a certain con-
nexion 2 If we admit the one, must we logically admit the other ? Facts
speak a very different language. Were those included in the prayer of
Christ thus Sanctified, and that from the moment of its utterance 2 Was
the same true of all the Christians of Thessalonica 2 Has the will of God
yet been done on earth, as perfectly as in heaven? Has every believer
who has hungered and thirsted after righteousness, attained to sinless
perfection in this life? Did not Paul most fervently pray for the salvation
of Israel, and have not thousands of Jews died since, in their sins 2 Did
he not pray that the thorn in his flesh might be removed 2 and was it
removed 2 The grand mistake in this reasoning is, that it fixes what the
nature and terms of prayer do not fix : that is, the time when, and the
place where, the sought blessing shall be obtained. Applied as evidence to
any believer who claims to be wholly sametified, it would prove his sanctifi-
cation an hour, a week, month, or year, before he was thus sanctified, as
really as at the moment in which he professed to have made this high
attainment. Contemplated in its most general form, it would prove that
everything which is a proper object of prayer, and which will be obtained
in some state of being, will actually be obtained in the present life. There
is a vast abyss between the facts and conclusion, which the utmost in.
genuity is unable to remove.
“(iv.) Finally, on this branch of the argument, a variety of proof-texts
P P 2
580 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
has been summoned to the service of this system. A critical examination
of all these is inconsistent with the limits of the present statement. It
will be sufficient to advert to the false principles of interpretation to which
they have been subjected. These are three in number —
“(a.) The first consists in a misapplication of passages; as when Paul
says, “I take you to record this day, that I am free from the blood of all
men —or when Zacharias and Elisabeth are spoken of as ‘walking in all
the commandments and ordinances blameless.”
“(b.) The second consists in regarding certain terms as proofs of perfec-
tion in holiness, which are merely distinctive of Christian character, as
contrasted with the state of the unregenerate. These are such words as
‘holy, Saints, sanctified, blameless, just, righteous, perfect, entire,’ &c. That
these and kindred terms are designed to be characteristic, and not descrip-
tive of the degrees of holiness, is proved by the fact that they are indiscri-
minately appropriated to all Christians, and that in many cases they are
applied, when the context absolutely charges sin upon their subjects.
“(c.) The third false principle consists in interpreting certain passages
in an absolute and unrestricted sense, where evidently they are designed to
have a qualified sense. This error may perhaps be illustrated by a single
passage. Take that remarkable saying of the apostle John : ‘Whosoever
is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him ; and
he cannot sin because he is born of God.” Stronger language or a better
proof-text cannot well be conceived. In an unrestricted sense, it affirms
not only that every regenerated man is sinless, but an impossibility that it
should be otherwise ; it dislodges all sin and moral agency from a converted
mind at a single blow. What will the advocate of perfection do with this
passage 2 Will he acknowledge either or both of these consequences 2 This
can hardly be supposed. How them will he escape them 2 There is but
one way for him ; this lies in placing a restricted and qualified sense upon
the passage, and in a moment all is plain and harmonious. But why
subject so plain a passage to this law of interpretation, and deny it to others
less harmonious and decisive? No reason can be perceived but the one
which grows out of the necessities of a favourite theory. Indeed, there is
logically no stopping place to this system short of the bold affirmation, that
all believers are perfectly sinless from the moment of conversion. Every
argument in its last analysis must terminate in this extraordinary result.
To arrest the inference at any other point is to betray a logical incon-
sistency. Are the advocates of perfection prepared for this bold and
unbiblical doctrine 2 If not, it is time they had reviewed their arguments,
and abandoned principles fraught with such a conclusion. Their weapons
of defence are not less destructive than constructional in their character.
“(2.) Having tried the merits of the positive testimony on this subject,
we remark in the second place, that in the present state of the question, the
position is absolutely incapable of proof. When a man affirms his own
sinless perfection for any given period, as a day, a week, or a year, he
affirms his own infallible knowledge on two points; that is, that at the
SANCTIFICATION. 581
present moment he can recall every moral exercise during that period,
every thought, feeling, desire, purpose, and that he does infallibly judge of
the moral character of each exercise. Will any pretend to this knowledge?
To do so, manifests the last degree of presumption, as well as ignorance,
both of facts and the truths of mental science. Every effort to recall the
whole of our mental exercises for a single day, must always be a failure ;
it can only be partially successful. This shows how little weight is due to
the testimony of a man who asserts his own perfection; he may be honest,
but this is no proof of the truth of his statement. If a case of ‘perfec-
tion' were admitted to be real, still it is impossible, in the present state of
our faculties, to find and predicate certain knowledge of it. The evidences
of Christian perfection,’ are then not only inconclusive, but its main pro-
position is absolutely unknowable to us.
“ (3.) In the third place we remark, that this proposition is disproven
by an amount of evidence that ought to be conclusive. To secure the
greatest brevity of statement, this evidence may be condensed into the fol-
lowing series of propositions:—The Bible records defects in the characters
of the most eminent saints, whose history it gives; it speaks in moderate
terms of the attainments of the pious, when put in contrast with those of
Christ, who hence is an exception to our race; it points the believer to the
heavenly world as the consummation of his hopes, and exemption from all
sin and sorrow; it describes the work of grace as going forward by succes-
sive and progressive stages, and fixes no limit to these stages, antecedent
to the period of death; it speaks of those as being self-deceived who deny
their own sinfulness—“If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves,
and the truth is not in us;’ it represents Christians here as in an imperfect
state— For in many things we offend all [the woºd “all” in the original
qualifies ‘we and not ‘things; ) it exhorts Christians to lowly and humble
views of their own attainments; it declares Christians in the present life
to be under a process of providential discipline, the object of which is to
make them more fully partakers of God’s holiness; the most eminent
Saints that have ever lived since the days of the apostles, have uniformly
expressed a painful consciousness of remaining sin, and spoken of their
attainments in language far different from that of self-confidence; the
higher Christians have risen in holiness, the more deeply have they been
humbled with their own sinful imperfections, owing to a clearer discern-
ment both of God and themselves. These propositions might each of them
be amplified into as many arguments. Taken together, they seem conclu-
sively to set aside the pretensions of any class of men who claim for them-
selves sinless perfection in the present life. We cannot but think, that
however sincere such persons may be, they labour under a most dangerous
delusion. With them we have no controversy; our controversy is with
their system. It appears to us in no other light than that of a system,
totally disconnected with its proposed evidence, demonstrably unknowable by
the present state of our faculties, and in direct contravention to an amount
of proof, biblical and experimental, that must for ever discredit its claims.
582 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
w;
‘‘ RESOLUTIONS.
“1. Resolved, That in the judgment of this Presbytery, the doctrine of
‘Christian perfection' in this life, is not only false, but calculated in its
tendencies, to engender self-righteousness, disorder, deception, censorious-
mess and famaticism.
“2. Resolved, That it is contrary to the Confession of Faith adopted by
the Presbyterian church in the United States. See chap. 12, sec. 2.
“3. Resolved, That it is the duty of all orthodox ministers to acquaint
themselves with this error, and at such times and in such measures as may
seem to them most expedient, to instruct the people on this point.
“4. Resolved. That we view with regret and sorrow, the ground taken
on this subject by the theological professors at Oberlin.
“5. Hesolved, that we hail with joy every improvement in human
opinion that conforms to the Bible, and promises, in its practical tendency,
to decrease the sins, or increase the moral purity, of the church.
“6. Resolved, That the above statement and resolutions be signed by
the Moderator and Stated Clerk, and published in the New York Evangelist,
New York Observer, the Christian Observer, and the Presbyterian.
“Fayette Shipherd requested that his dissent from the above report of
the Committee be appended to it, entered on the records of the Presbytery,
and published with it. All the other members present voted in the affirm-
ative. “THOMAs J. HASWELL, Moderator.
“Troy, June 29, 1841.” “N. S. S. BEMAN, Stated Clerk.
“To TIE TRoy [N. Y.T. PRESBYTERY.
“DEAR BRETHREN,
“Permit me to make a few remarks upon your report on the subject of
Christian perfection. I have read with attention most that has come to
hand upon the subject of your report, and have thought it of little use to
reply, until some opponent of our views should throw his objections into a
more tangible form than any one had hitherto dome. Your report embraces,
in a condensed form, almost all that has been said in opposition to our
views. For this reason, as well as for the reason that I have a high
respect and fervent love for those of your number with whom I am
acquainted, I beg leave to be heard in reply.
“What I have said was prepared for, and should have been published in
the ‘New York Evangelist.’ I wrote to the editor, making the request to
be heard through his columns; to which he made no reply. I still hope
he will not fail to do me, yourselves, and the church the justice to give this
article a place in his columns. The truth demands it.” For no other
reason, I am sure, than to subserve the interests of truth would I say one
* Since changed Editors.
SANCTIFICATION, 583
word. Without further preface, I quote your statement of the real point
at issue. You Say,+
“‘That there is some issue, admits of no doubt. What is it? It is
not, whether by the requirements of the moral law, or the injunctions of
the gospel, men are commanded to be perfectly holy ; not whether men are
under obligations to be thus holy; not whether as moral agents, such a
state is to them a possible state; not whether the gospel system is com-
petent to secure actual perfection in holiness, if its entire resources be
applied ; not whether it is the duty and privilege of the church to rise
much higher in holy living, than it has ever yet done in this world. To
join issue on any, or all of these points, is to make a false issue; it is to
have the appearance of a question without its reality. Some, or all of
these points, form a part of the scheme of ‘Christian perfection;' but
certainly they do not invest it with any peculiar character, for they involve
no new sentiment differing from the ground taken by the great body of
orthodox Christians in every age. It cannot be supposed that their
advocacy has led to the various and fearful solicitudes of learned and pious
men, in regard to the truth and tendency of this system. It must, there-
fore, be fraught with some other element. What is that element 2 The
assertion that Christian men do attain in some cases, during the present
life, to a state of perfect holiness, excluding sin in every form, and that for
an indefinite period may remain in this state.’
“Upon this I remark:—
“ l. You have made a false issue. Proof:—
“(1.) What our position is. It is, and always has been, that entire
Sanctification is attainable in this life, in such a sense as to render its
attainment a rational object of pursuit, with the expectation of attaining it.
“This proposition, it would seem, you admit; but on account of ‘the
various and fearful solicitudes of learned and pious men,' you take it for
granted, there must be a heresy somewhere, and accordingly proceed to
take issue with us, upon one of the arguments we have used in support of
our proposition; and reply to our other arguments, as if they had been ad-
duced by us in Support of the proposition, upon which you have erroneously
made up the issue.
“ (2.) Some of the arguments by which we have attempted to establish
this proposition are—
“ (i.) That men are naturally able to obey all the commandments of God.
“(ii) That this obedience is without qualification demanded of men in
this life. *-
“ (iii.) That the gospel proffers sufficient grace to secure their entire
sanctification in this life; and that nothing is Wanting but appropriative
acts,' on the part of Christians, to realize this result.
“ (iv.) That the entire Sanctification of Christians in this life was made
the subject of prayer by inspired men, and also that Christ taught his
disciples to pray for it.
“(Y.) That this state has actually been attained.
584 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
“These are among our arguments; and as they are the only ones to which
you have professed to reply, I will mention no others.
“(3.) I will put our arguments in the form of syllogisms in their order.
“(i) Whatever is attainable in this life, on the ground of natural ability,
may be aimed at with a rational hope of success. A state of entire Sancti-
fication in this life is attainable, ou the ground of natural ability. There-
fore, it may be aimed at with a rational hope of success.
“Again. Whatever men are naturally able to do in this life, they may aim
at doing, with a rational hope of success. Men are maturally able to do all
their duty, which is to be entirely sanctified. Therefore, they may aim at
entire sanctification with a rational hope of being entirely sanctified.
“You admit both the major and minor premises in these syllogisms.
Can the conclusion be avoided ?
“(ii.) Whatever God commands to be done by men in this life, may be
dome by them. God commands men to be entirely holy in this life.
Therefore a state of entire holiness in this life is possible. You admit
both the major and minor premises. Can the conclusion be avoided ?
“ (iii.) Whatever attainment the gospel proffers sufficient grace to
Secure in this life, may be made. The gospel proffers sufficient grace,
should any one apply its entire resources,’ to secure a state of entire
Sanctification in this life. Therefore this state may be secured, or this
attainment may be made. Here again you admit both premises. Can the
conclusion be denied ?
“ (iv.) Whatever was made the subject of prayer by the Spirit of inspi-
ration may be granted. The entire sanctification of the saints in this life
was prayed for by the Spirit of inspiration. Therefore, Christians may
aim at and pray for this state, with the rational expectation of being en-
tirely sanctified in this life.
“Again. What Christ has made it the universal duty of the church to
pray for, may be granted. He has made it the duty of all Christians to
pray for the entire sanctification of the saints in this life. Therefore, these
petitions may be presented, and Christians may expect to be entirely.sancti-
fiel) in this life. Both premises in these syllogisms are admitted. Are not
the conclusions inevitable 2
“ (v.) Whatever men have done, men can do. Men have been entirely
sanctified in this life. Therefore they may be so sanctified. The minor
premise in this syllogism you deny ; and, strange to tell, you affirm, over
and over again, that this one argument of ours is the main proposition to
be established And you reply to all our other arguments in support of
the main proposition, as if they had been adduced to prove this Now it
would have been equally fair, and just as much in point, so far as our
argument in support of the main proposition is concerned, if you had made
an issue with us on any other argument adduced by us in support of that
proposition—insisted that that was the main question—and replied to our
arguments as if they had been adduced in support of that.
“You misrepresent our logic. Assuming that the fact of actual attain-
SANCTIFICATION. $8.5
ment is the main proposition which we are labouring to establish, and in
support of which we adduce the fact of actual attainment only as an argu-
ment, you misrepresent our reasoning. To put this matter in the clearest
light, I will place side by side, the syllogisms which you put in our mouths,
and our own syllogisms.
“YOUR SYLLOGISMS IMPUTED TO US.
“ 1. Whatever is attainable in
this life, is actually attained in this
life. A state of perfect holiness is
attainable in this life; therefore it is
actually attained.'
“2. ‘Whatever is possible by the
provisions of the gospel in this life,
will take place in this life; the per-
fect sanctification of all believers is
possible by those provisions ; there-
fore it will actually take place in
this life.’
“3. “In relation to the commands
it will be sufficient to say, that al-
though the Bible does command a
state of perfect holiness in the pre-
sent life, it does not follow that the
command is in any instance obeyed
fully on earth. Before we can arrive
at this conclusion, we must adopt the
following principle ; that is, that
whatever is commanded in the Bible
is actually performed by the subjects
of that command.’
“The syllogism would stand thus:
“Whatever is commanded by God,
is actually performed; perfect holi-
mess is commanded; therefore all
men are perfectly holy.
“OUR OWN SYLLOG [SMS.
“1. Whatever is attainable in this
life, may be aimed at, with the ra-
tional hope of attaining it: entire
sanctification is attainable in this
life; therefore the attainment of this
state may be aimed at with a rational
hope of success.
“2. Whatever attainment is possi-
ble, by the provisions of the gospel,
in this life, may be aimed at by those
under the gospel, with a rational
hope of attaining it; the perfect Sanc-
tification of believers is possible by
these provisions; therefore believers
may aim at making this attainment,
with a rational hope of success.
“3. Whatever the Bible commands
to be done in this life, may be dome;
the Bible commands Christians to
be perfect in this life ; therefore they
may be perfect in this life.
“Now, brethren, I ask if you will
deny the major premise, the minor
premise, or the conclusion in either
of the above syllogisms ? You can-
not deny either. I beseech you then
to consider what injustice you have
done to yourselves, to us, your breth-
rem, and to the cause of truth, by
such an evasion and misrepresenta-
tion of our logic.
“(4.) What your logic must be to meet our argument as we have stated it.
If you would state in syllogistic form an argument that shall meet and set
*
*
586 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
aside our reasoning, it must stand thus: That a thing is attainable in this
life, is no proof that it can be attained. This must be assumed as a major
premise, by any one who would answer our logic. But who does not see,
that this amounts to a denial of an identical proposition ? The same as to
say, that a thing being attainable in this life, is no proof that it is attain.
able in this life. But to waive this consideration, and state the argument
as it must stand in syllogistic form ; to meet and refute our logic, it must
stand thus : ‘That a thing is attainable in this life is no proof that it can
be attained. Entire Sanctification is attainable in this, life. Therefore, its
attainability is no proof that it cau be attained.’ Who does not see, that
the major premise is false, and that therefore the conclusion is 2 Now ob-
serve : We admit, that its attainability is no proof that it will be attained.
But we insist, that its attainability is proof that the attainment may be
aimed at, with a rational hope of success.
“Again would you meet our second argument with a syllogism, it must
stand thus: ‘That God commands a state of entire sanctification in this
life, is no proof that such a state is attainable in this life. God does com-
mand a state of entire Sanctification in this life. Therefore the command
is no proof that such a state is attainable.' Brethren, this argument
would have the attribute of logical conclusiveness, if the major premise
were not false. The very same course must be pursued by you, would you
meet and set aside our reasoning in respect to our other arguments. This
is so manifest, that I need not state the syllogisms.
“2. In respect to our inference in favour of the doctrine of entire same-
tification in this life, drawn from the prayers of inspiration, and the fact
that all Christians are commanded to pray for the entire sanctification of
believers in this life, you say as follows:—
“‘Similar defects characterize the arguments drawn from the prayers
which the Bible records, as well as those which it authorizes Christians to
make. It is true, that Christ prayed for his disciples in language the most
elevated : “Sanctify them through the truth.” The same may be said of the
great Apostle, when he prayed : “And the very God of peace Sanctify you
wholly.' We are directed to pray that God's will may be done on earth as
in heaven, and in general authorized to pray for a perfect victory over all
sin at every time. These are the facts. Now, what is the inference 2
The advocate of ‘pefection’ responds—that some believers are perfectly
sanctified in the present life. These, and kindred facts we offer, to prove
this conclusion. Is there then between the two a certain connexion ? If
we admit the one, must we logically admit the other ? Facts speak a very
different language. Were those included in the prayer of Christ thus
Sanctified, and that from the moment of its utterance 2 Was the same true
of all the Christians of Thessalonica 2 Has the will of God yet been dome
on earth as perfectly as in heaven 2 Has every believer who has hungered
and thirsted after righteousness, attained to sinless perfection in this life?
Did not Paul most ſelvently pray for the salvation of Israel, and have not
thousands of Jews since died in their sins 2 Did he not pray that the
SANCTDFICATION. 587
thorn in his flesh might be removed, and was it removed 2 The grand
mistake in this reasoning is, that it fixes what the nature and terms of
prayer do not fix; that is, the time when, and the place where, the Sought
blessing shall be obtained.’
“On this I remark : —
“This appears to me a most remarkable paragraph. Here you quote a
part of 1 Thess. v. 23. ‘And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly,’
and then stop, assuming that nothing can be affirmed in respect to the
time when the apostle prayed that this blessing might be granted. Now,
beloved brethren, why did you not quote the whole passage, when it would
have been most manifest, that the apostle actually prayed for the blessing
to be granted in this life 2 I will quote it, and see if this is not so : “The
very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit,
and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord
Jesus Christ.”
“As the sanctification of the ‘body,’ as well as the soul and spirit, is
prayed for, and that the whole being may be, ‘preserved blameless unto the
coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, how can you say as you do— The
grand mistake in this reasoning is, that it fixes what the nature and the
terms of prayer do not fix, that is, the time when, and place where, the
sought blessing shall be obtained 2' Does not this prayer contemplate the
bestowment of this blessing in this life? Who can reasonably deny it?
Again : You say, ‘We are directed to pray that God's will may be done
on earth as in heaven, and in general authorized to pray for a victory over
all sin at every time.' Now, how can you make this admission, and still
add the assertion just quoted, that ‘prayer does not fix the time when this
blessing is to be expected 2" Certainly, the time when, is, in this prayer,
limited to this life. In order to meet our arguanent, based upon the
prayer of the apostles and the injunction of Christ, to pray for the entire
sanctification of believers in this life, you must argue as follows. Here
again I put the syllogisms into separate columns, that you may see them
in contrast.
** YOUR REASONING TUT IN SYLLOGISTIC ‘‘ OUR SYLLOGISMIS.
FORMI.
“That the Spirit of inspiration “Whatever state was prayed for
prayed for the entire sanctification of by the Spirit of inspiration, Chris-
believers in this life, is no evidence tians may aim at with a rational
that an answer to this prayer may hope of attaining ; the Spirit of
be expected by Saints in this life. inspiration prayed for the entire
Paul, under the spirit of inspiration, Sanctification of Saints in this life.
did pray for the entire sanctification Therefore, Christians may aim at
of the saints in this life. Therefore, this attainment with the expectation
this prayer is no evidence that saints of success.
may aim at being entirely sanctified
in this life, with a rational hope of
being so sanctified.
588
THEOLOGY.
SYSTEMATIC
“YOUR INEASONING PUT IN SYLLOGISTIC
FORMſ.
jº
“Again : That Christ has made
it the universal duty of Saints to
pray for the entire sanctification
of Christians in this life, is no
evidence that they may offer this
prayer, with a rational expectation
of being answered. Christ has made
it the universal duty of Christians
to pray for entire sanctification in
“OUR SYLLOGISMS.
“Again: Whatever state Christians
are required to pray for in this life,
they may pray for with the expecta-
tion of being heard and answered.
Christians are required to pray for
a state of entire Sanctifieation in
this life. Therefore, they may pray
for this attainment with the expec-
tation of being heard and answered
this life. Therefore, this is no in this life.
evidence that they may offer this
prayer with the rational hope of
being heard and answered.
“Now, brethren, whose logic is most conclusive P
“3. In one paragraph of your report, you admit and deny at the same
breath, that entire sanctification is promised in this life. You say—
“‘It is a glorious truth, that God has promised to all believers a final
victory over sin, which undoubtedly will be accomplished in some period of
their history. But does it follow, that because believers are to be perfectly
sanctified at sometime and somewhere, the present life will be the time
and place of this perfect Sanctification ? Let a promise be adduced, if it
can be, that fixes the period of this event to the present life. The divine
promises, like the provisions of the gospel, are conditioned as to the degree
of their results, by appropriative acts on the part of he believer, Hence,
the fallacy of the argument is apparent, in that it takes for granted that
some believers in the present life do fully comply with all the conditions
contemplated in the promises themselves. Without this assumption it
proves nothing.’
“In the first part of this paragraph, you deny that God, anywhere in the
Bible, promises a state of entire sanctification in this life, and request that
one promise be adduced, that fixes this event to the present life. And then
you seem immediately to admit that the blessing is promised, on the con-
dition of “appropriative acts on the part of the believer.’ This you must
intend to admit, inasmuch as you have before admitted, that ‘should a
believer avail himself of all the resources of the gospel, he might make this
attainment.” Certainly you will not pretend to have any authority for
such an admission, unless the promises when fairly interpreted do proffer
such a state to Christians upon condition of “appropriative acts.” How
shall we understand such a denial and admission at the same breath, as this
paragraph contains 2
“But you request that one promise may be adduced that fixes the period
of entire Sanctification to the present life. I might quote many: but as
you ask for only one, I will quote one, and the One, a part of which you
have quoted—l Thess. ii. 23, 24. ‘The very God of peace Sanctify you
SANCTIFICATION. 589
wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved
blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that
calleth you, who also will do it.'
“That this prayer and promise relate to this life, I think cannot consistently
be questioned. The prayer is, that the ‘body,' as well as the ‘spirit and
soul,” be wholly sanctified, and be preserved blameless unto the coming
of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Then the promise—‘Faithful is He that
calleth you, who also will do it.' Does not this relate to this life?
“4. You deny that Christians can know that they are in a state of entire
Sanctification.
“You say, ‘If a case of perfection were admitted to be real, still it is
impossible, in the present state of our faculties, to find and predicate
certain knowledge of it.'
“Here, assuming as you do, that the main proposition respects the fact of
actual attainment, you insist that this fact, did such cases exist, would be
entirely insusceptible of proof. Indeed! Does God command man to do
what he cannot know that he does, even if he does it 2 This would be
passing strange. You admit that God requires men to be entirely sanctified,
condemns them if they are not, but yet deny that they could know that they
obeyed, if they did. This would indeed be a singular requirement—to
command a man on pain of etermal death to do that which he could not
possibly know that he did, even if he did it. This denial of ability to know,
whether we are in a state of entire Sanctification, is a total denial of the
doctrine of matural ability, as I presume it is held by every member of your
body. Does not every one of you, my brethren, hold that natural ability to
obey a command is the sine quá non of moral obligation to obey it? Do
not you hold that a man cannot be under a moral obligation to do what he
cannot understand—to use a power which he does not know himself to
possess—to employ his faculties in any kind or degree of service, which he
cannot know to be his duty 2 Now if a man does all that he is able to know
himself capable of doing, is he under a moral obligation to do anything
more ? But if he is unable to know that he falls short of his duty, does he
fall short of it? Brethren, will you give us light upon this subject? Do
you, will you seriously maintain, that a man is naturally unable to know
whether he obeys the commands of God, and yet, that he is condemned
and liable to be damned for coming short, when he could not know that he
came short? Brethren, will you maintain this?
“5. Your answer to our proof-terts is a very Summary one. It consists
simply in affirming that we have misapplied them—that we regard certain
terms as proofs of perfection, which are only distinctive of Christian
character, and, that we interpret them in an absolute and unrestricted
Sense—without so much as naming one of them. You have, indeed, quoted
one passage, and affirmed that “a better proof-text cannot well be con-
ceived.' But we have never regarded nor quoted it as a proof text at all.
Your disposal of our proof-texts is really a short-hand method of getting
over them. But there was one difficulty in the way of your quoting and
590 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
answering them, which was—that had you quoted them, it would have
appeared to everybody, that they were used by us to prove another pro-
position than that which you were controverting,
“0. Our arguments in support of the fact of attainment you have passed
over almost in silence. At the same time, you have taken our arguments
adduced to prove the practical attainability, and replied to them, as if
adduced to prove the fact of actual attainment. Brethren, we think we
have reason to feel grieved with this. -
“7. You find yourselves obliged to be exceedingly indefinite in regard to
the measure of attainment which Christians may rationally hope to make
in this life. You say, ‘The question is not whether it is the duty and
privilege of the church to rise much higher in holy living than it has ever
yet dome in this World.' Now, brethren, I ask how much higher attain-
ments Christians may make in this world, than they have ever yet made 2
This is, with us, and must be with the church, a question of all-absorbing
interest. Do you answer to this question, that Christians may make
indefinitely higher attainments than they have yet made 2 I ask again, on
what authority is this affirmation made P Do you argue it from the fact,
that the gospel has promised sufficient grace to Christians on condition of
appropriative acts, to secure in them a higher state of holiness than has yet
been attained 2 But if Christians may rationally hope to attain a higher
state of holiness, than has ever yet been attained, by appropriating to
themselves promises which proffer entire sanctification in this life, why
may they not rationally aim at attaining all that the gospel has promised
to them 2 Brethren, will you answer this question ?
“Appended to your report is a resolution, expressing “regret and sorrow
at the ground taken on this subject by the theological professors at Oberlin.'
Will you permit us to reciprocate your regret and sorrow, and express our
deep grief, that the presbytery of Troy have taken such ground upon this
subject, and so misapprehended, and of course misrepresented the argu-
ments of their brethren 2
“I must close this communication with a few
“TEMARKS.
“1. We admit you had a right to take issue with us on the question of
actual attainment, if you were dissatisfied with our course of argument on
that position. But you had no right to represent our argument in support
of another position as you have done. You had no right to represent our
argument in favour of the practical attainability, as having been adduced
in support of the fact of actual attainment. This you have done, and
by so doing, you have done your brethren and the cause of truth great
injustice.
“2. To what I have said in this article, you may reply, that you never
denied the practical attainability of a state of entire sanctification, and
that therefore on that question you have no controversy with us. Why,
them, my brethren, did you not admit that in our main position you agree
SANCTIFICATION. 591
with us, and that you only demy one of the arguments by which we
attempted to support that position ? This, as Christian men, you were
bound to do. But instead of this, you have said nothing about admitting
our main position ; but made the transfer of our arguments to the support
of the one upon which you take issue, and thus represent our logic as
absurd and ridiculous. We shall be happy to discuss the question of
actual attainment with our brethren, when they ingenuously admit, that
the main position we have taken, namely, the practical attainability of a
state of entire sanctification in this life, is a truth of the Bible.
“3. Permit me to ask, my brethren, what opponent or course of argument
might not be rendered ridiculous by the course you have taken, that is, by
stating another proposition than that intended to be supported, and then
representing the whole course of argument as intended to support the
substituted proposition ?
“4. Should you say that your report was not intended as a reply to our
argument, I ask, who has ever argued in support of this doctrine in the
manner you represent 2 Who ever inferred, that because men have
natural power to obey God, therefore they do obey him 2 I have read with
attention almost everything that has come to hand upon this subject, and I
never saw or heard of any such mode of argumentation as that to which
you profess to reply.
“5. Will your presbytery, in reply to what I have written, excuse them-
selves by saying, that their treatment of our argument was an oversight—
that they had supposed us to reason in the way they have represented us as
reasoning? To this I must reply, that you were bound to understand our
argument before you replied to it, in your public or any other capacity.
And especially were you under this obligation, inasmuch as I had twice
written to a leading member of your body, beseeching him, in the bowels
of Christian love, to examine this subject, and to be sure he did it in a
spiritual frame of mind, before he committed himself at all upon the question.
“6. Will you, dear brethren, permit me to ask how long the opposers of
the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life, expect to retain the confi-
dence of the church, and prevent their understanding and believing this
doctrine, by such a course of procedure as this 2 You are no doubt aware,
that your course is not a novel one, but that it has been substantially pur.
sued by several other opposers of this doctrine.
“And now, beloved brethrem in the Lord, do not understand me as entering
into a war of words with you, or as entertaining the least unkind feeling in
my heart towards you. I most cheerfully leave to your deliberate and
prayerful consideration, the remarks I have freely made on your report. I
cannot, however, refrain from saying, that when I saw the name of one
whom I greatly loved, and with whom I had often taken sweet counsel,
attached to that report, my heart felt a kind of spontaneous gushing, and I
almost involuntarily exclaimed, ‘Et tu, Brute!"
“Yours in the bonds of Christian love,
“C. G. FINNEY.”
592 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY
Since these replies were published, nothing worthy, of notice has ap:
peared in opposition to them that has fallen under my observation, but the
policy seems to have been adopted of preventing further inquiry upon the
subject. Nevertheless the agitation of the question in the minds and hearts
of private Christians and of many ministers, is going steadily, and, in
many places, rapidly forward, as I have good reason to know. Indeed it is
manifest, that there is increasing light and interest upon the subject, and
it is beginning, or, I should say, fast coming to be better understood, and
its truthfulness and its importance appreciated. No thanks, however, are
due to some of the leading journalists of the day, if this blessed and
glorious truth be not hunted from the World as a most permicious error.
Nothing could have been more unfair and unjust than the course pursued
by some of them has been. May the blessed Lord bring them to see their
error and forgive them, not laying this sim to their charge.
It may doubtless appear unaccountable to the public in general, both in
this country and elsewhere, that no objection was made to the doctrine of
entire sanctification, when published in the “New York Evangelist,” and
afterwards in the form of a volume, and so extensively circulated, and that
the same doctrine should excite so much alarm when published in the
“Oberlin Evangelist.” It may also appear strange, that such pains should
have been taken to confound our views with those of antinomian per-
fectionists, when every one can see, that there is no more analogy between
their views, as set forth in their Confession of Faith, and our views, than
between them and anything else. This they have all along alleged, and
and consequently have been amongst our bitterest opposers. Perhaps it is
not desirable that the public should be made acquainted with the springs of
influence that have stirred up, and put in motion all this hurricane of
ecclesiastical and theological opposition to Oberlin. It is unpleasant to us
to name and disclose it, and perhaps the cause of truth does not, at present
at least, demand it.
LECTURE LVIII.
SANCTIFICATION.
II. I am to remind you of some points that have been settled in this course
of study.
1. The true intent and meaning of the law of God has been, as I trust,
ascertained in the lectures on moral government. Let this point, if need
be, be examined by reference to those lectures.
2. We have also seen, in those lectures, what is not, and what is im-
plied in entire obedience to the moral law. -
3. In those lectures, and also in the lectures on justification and
repentance, it has been shown that nothing is acceptable to God, as a
SANCTDFICATION. 593
condition of justification, and of consequent Salvation, but a repentance
that implies a return to full obedience to the moral law.
4. It has also been shown, that nothing is holiness short of full obedience,
for the time being, to the moral law.
5. It has also been shown, that regeneration and repentance consist in
the heart's return to full obedience, for the time being, to this law.
6. We have also examined the doctrine of depravity, and seen, that
moral depravity, or sin, consists in selfishness, and not at all in the constitu-
tion of men; that selfishness does not consist in the involuntary appetites,
passions, and propensities, but that it consists alone in the committal of the
will to the gratification of the propensities.
7. We have seen that holiness consists, not at all in the constitution of
body or mind; but that it belongs, strictly, only to the will or heart, and
consists in obedience of will to the law of God, as it lies revealed in the
intellect; that it is expressed in one word, love; that this love is identical
with the entire consecration of the whole being to the glory of God, and to
the highest well-being of the universe; or in other words, that it consists
in disinterested benevolence.
8. We have seen that all true Saints, while in a state of acceptance with
God, do actually render, for the time being, full obedience to all the known
requirements of God; that is, that they do for the time being their whole
duty—all that God, at this time, requires of them.
9. We have seen that this obedience is not rendered independent of
the grace of God, but is induced by the indwelling spirit of Christ received
by faith, and reigning in the heart. This fact will be more fully elucidated
in this discussion than it has been in former lectures. A former lecture
was devoted to it; but a fuller consideration of it remains to be entered
upon hereafter.
III. Define the principal terms to be used in this discussion.
Here let me remark, that a definition of terms, in all discussions is of
prime importance. Especially is this true of this subject. I have observed
that, almost without an exception, those who have written on this subject
dissenting from the views entertained here, do so upon the ground that they
understand and define the terms sanctification and Christian perfection
differently from what we do. Every one gives his own definition, varying
materially from others, and from what we understand by the terms; and
then he goes on professedly opposing the doctrine as inculcated here. Now
this is not only utterly unfair, but palpably absurd. If I oppose a doctrine
inculcated by another man, I am bound to oppose what he really holds. If
I misrepresent his Sentiments, “I fight as one that beateth the air.” I have
been amazed at the diversity of definitions that have been given to the terms
Christian perfection, Sanctification, &c.; and to witness the diversity of
opinion as to what is, and what is not, implied in these terms. One objects
wholly to the use of the term Christian perfection, because, in his estimation,
it implies this, and that, and the other thing, which I do not Suppose are at.
Q Q
594 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
all implied in it. Another objects to our using the term sanctification, be-
cause that implies, according to his understanding of it, certain things that
render its use improper. Now it is no part of my design to dispute about
the use of words. I must however use some terms ; and I ought to be
allowed to use Bible language in its scriptural sense, as I understand it.
And if I should sufficiently explain my meaning, and define the sense in
which I use the terms, and the sense in which the Bible manifestly uses
them, this ought to suffice. And I beg, that nothing more or less may be
understood by the language I use, than I profess to mean by it. Others
may, if they please, use the same terms, and give a different definition of
them, But I have a right to hope and expect, if they feel called upon to
oppose what I say, that they will bear in mind my definition of the terms,
and not pretend, as Some have done, to oppose my views, while they have
only differed from me in their definition of the terms used, giving their
own definition varying materially and, I might say, infinitely from the sense
in which I use the same terms, and them arraying their arguments to prove,
that according to their definition of it, sanctification is not really attainable
in this life, when no one here or anywhere else, that I ever heard of, pre-
tended that, in their sense of the term, it ever was or ever will be, attain-
able in this life, and I might add, or in that which is to come.
Sanctification is a term of frequent use in the Bible. Its simple and
primary meaning is a state of consecration to God. To sanctify is to set
apart to a holy use—to consecrate a thing to the service of God. This is
plainly both the Old and the New Testament use of the term. The Greek
word hagiazo means to sanctify, to consecrate, or devote a person or thing
to a particular, especially to a sacred, use. This word is synonymous with
the Hebrew kaudash. This last word is used in the Old Testament to express
the same thing that is intended by the Greek hagiazo, namely, to consecrate,
devote, set apart, Sanctify, purify, make clean or pure. Hagiasmos, a sub-
stantive from hagiazo, means Sanctification, devotion, consecration, purity,
holiness.
From the Bible use of these terms it is most manifest,-
1. That sanctification does not imply any constitutional change, either of
soul or body. It consists in the consecration or devotion of the constitutional
powers of body and soul to God, and not in any change wrought in the con-
stitution itself.
2. It is also evident from the scriptural use of the term, that sanctification
is not a phenomenon, or state of the intellect. It belongs neither to the
reason, conscience, nor understanding. In short, it cannot consist in any
state of the intellect whatever. All the states of this faculty are purely
passive states of mind; and of course, as we have abundantly seen, holiness
is not properly predicable of them.
3. It is just as evident that Sanctification, in the scriptural and proper
sense of the term, is not a mere feeling of any kind. It is not a desire, an
appetite, a passion, a propensity, an emotion, nor indeed any kind or degree
of feeling. It is not a state or phenomenon of the sensibility, The states
SANCTIFICATION. 595
of the sensibility are, like those of the intellect, purely passive states of
mind, as has been repeatedly shown. They of course can have no moral
character in themselves.
4. The Bible use of the term, when applied to persons, forbids the under-
standing of it, as consisting in any involuntary state or attitude of mind
whatever. -
5. The inspired writers evidently used the terms which are translated by
the English word sanctify, to designate a phenomenon of the will, or a volum-
tary state of mind. They used the term hagiazo in Greek, and kaudash in
Hebrew, to represent the act of consecrating one's self, or anything else to
the service of God, and to the highest well-being of the universe. The term
manifestly not only represents an act of the will, but an ultimate act or
choice, as distinguished from a mere volition, or executive act of the will.
Thus the terms rendered sanctified are used as synonymous with loving God
with all the heart, and our neighbour as ourselves. The Greek hagiasmos,
translated by the word sanctification, is evidently intended to express a state
or attitude of voluntary consecration to God, a continued act of consecration ;
or a state of choice as distinct from a mere act of choice, an abiding act or
state of choice, a standing and controlling preference of mind, a continuous
committal of the will to the highest well-being of God and of the universe.
Sanctification, as a state differing from a holy act, is a standing, ultimate in-
tention, and exactly synonymous or identical with a state of obedience, or
conformity to the law of God. We have repeatedly seen, that the will is the
executive or controlling faculty of the mind. Sanctification consists in the
will's devoting or consecrating itself and the whole being, all we are and
have, so far as powers, susceptibilities, possessions are under the control of
the will, to the service of God, or, which is the same thing, to the highest
interests of God and of being. Sanctification, then, is nothing more nor less
than entire obedience, for the time being, to the moral law.
Sanctification may be entire in two senses: (1.) In the sense of present,
full obedience, or entire consecration to God; and, (2.) In the sense of con-
tinued, abiding consecration or obedience to God, Entire sanctification,
when the terms are used in this sense, consists in being established, con-
firmed, preserved, continued in a state of sanctification or of entire conse-
cration to God.
In this discussion, them, I shall use the term entire sanctification to
designate a state of confirmed, and entire consecration of body, soul, and
spirit, or of the whole being to God—confirmed, not in the sense, (1.) That
a Soul entirely sanctified cannot sin, but that as a matter of fact, he does
not, and will not sin. (2.) Nor do I use the term entire sanctifieation as
implying that the entirely sanctified soul is in no such danger of sinning
as to need the thorough use and application of all the means of grace to
prevent him from sinning, and to secure his continued sanctification. (3.)
Nor, do I mean by entire sanctifieation, a state in which there will be no
further struggle or warfare with temptation, or in which the Christian war-
fare will cease. This certainly did not cease in Christ to the end of life,
Q Q 2
596 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
nor will it with any being in the flesh. (4.) Nor do I use the term as
implying a state in which no further progress in holiness is possible. No
such state is, or ever will be, possible to any creature, for the plain reason,
that all creatures must increase in knowledge; and increase of knowledge
implies increase of holiness in a holy being. The saints will doubtless
grow in grace or holiness to all etermity. (5.) Nor do I mean by the term
entire Sanctification, that the entirely sanctified soul will no longer need the
continual grace and indwelling Spirit of Christ to preserve it from sin, and
to secure its continuance in a state of consecration to God. It is amazing
that such mell as Dr. Beecher and others should suppose, that a state of
entire consecration implies that the entirely sanctified soul no longer needs
the grace of Christ to preserve it. Entire sanctification, instead of imply.
ing no further dependence on the grace of Christ, implies the constant
appropriation of Christ by faith as the sanctification of the soul.
But since entire sanctification, as I understand the term, is identical
with entire and continued obedience to the law of God, and since I have in
lectures on moral government fully shown what is not, and what is, implied
in full obedience to the law of God, to avoid much repetition in this place,
I must refer you to what I have there said upon the topics just named.
IV. Show what the real question now at issue is.
1. It is not whether a state of present full obedience to the divine law is
attainable in this life. For this has, I trust, been clearly established in
former lectures.
2. It is not whether a state of permanent, full obedience has been
attained by all, or by any of the Saints on earth.
3. But the true question at issue is: Is a state of entire, in the sense
of permanent sanctification, attainable in this life.
If in this discussion I shall insist upon the fact, that this state has been
attained, let it be distinctly understood, that the fact that the attainment
has been made, is only adduced in proof of the attainability of this state ;
that it is only one of the arguments by which the attainability of this state
is proved. Let it also be distinctly borne in mind, that if there should be
in the estimation of any one a defect in the proof, that this state has been
attained, still the integrity and conclusiveness of the other arguments in
support of the attainability will not thereby be shaken. It is no doubt
true, that the attainability of this state in this life may be abundantly
established, entirely irrespective of the question whether this state has ever
been attained.
Let me, therefore, be distinctly understood as maintaining the attain-
ability of this state, as the true question at issue ; and that I regard the
fact, that this state has been attained, only as one method of proving, or as
a fact that demonstrates its attainability. Dr. Woods admitted the attain-
ability of a state of entire sanctification in this life, and contested only the
fact of its actual attainment. But he should not have admitted the attain-
ability, with his idea of what is implied in it, as has been shown. For
SANCTIFICATION. 597
example, if, as he supposed, entire Sanctification is a state in which no
further progress in grace or holiness is possible, or in which there is and
can be no Christian warfare or struggle with temptation, he had no right to
admit that any such state as this is attainable in this life. I do not admit,
but utterly deny, that any such state is at all attainable in this life, even if
it is in any state of existence whatever.
But again : While Dr. Woods admitted, that entire sanctification is
attainable in this life, he denied that it is attainable in any practical sense,
in such a sense, that it is rational to expect or hope to make the attain-
ment. He says we may attain it, but holds it to be dangerous error to
expect to attain it. We may or might attain it, but we must not hope to
attain it in this life. But how does he know 2 Does the Bible reveal the
fact that we never shall 2 We shall see.
The true question is, Is a state of entire, established, abiding consecra-
tion to God attainable in this life, in such a sense, that we may rationally
expect or hope to become thus established in this life 2 Are the conditions
of attaining this established state in the grace and love of God, such
that we may rationally expect or hope to fulfil them, and thus become
established, or entirely sanctified in this life? This is undoubtedly the
true and the greatly important question to be settled.
Let no one throw fog and embarrassment over our inquiries, by doing as
Dr. W. has done; that is, by admitting and denying the attainability of
this state at the same breath ; admitting it, to save his orthodoxy with the
uew school, who maintain the doctrine of matural ability, and denying it as
a practical or practicable thing, to save himself from the charge of per-
fectionism. It is certainly a grave and most important question, whether
we may rationally hope or expect, ever in this life, to attain to such an
established state of grace, and faith, and love, or which is the same thing,
to such an established state of entire consecration, as to have done with
slipping, and falling, and simming against the blessed God. Certainly, the
bleeding, yearning, agonized spirit of the saint recently recovered from a
fall, ought not to be tantalized with metaphysical or theological quibbles,
when it asks with agonizing interest, “How long, Lord? Is there no hope
that I can or shall arrive, in this life, at a state in which, through mighty
reigning grace, I shall have done with abusing thee 2" It appears to me
monstrous and barbarous to answer such a soul, as some have done, by
saying to him, You may attain such a state, but it is dangerous error to
expect ever to cease abusing God, while you live in this world.
598 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE LIX.
SAINCTIFICATION.
V. That entire sanctification is attainable in this life.
I will here introduce some things which I have said under this head in
former lectures on this subject.
1. It is self-evident, that entire obedience to God's law is possible on the
ground of natural ability. To deny this, is to deny that a man is able to
do as well as he can. The very language of the law is such as to level its
claims to the capacity of the subject, however great or small that capacity
may be. “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all
thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength.” Here then it is
plain, that all the law demands, is the exercise of whatever strength we
have, in the service of God. Now, as entire sanctification consists in per-
fect obedience to the law of God, and as the law requires mothing more
than the right use of whatever strength we have, it is, of course, for ever
settled, that a state of entire Sanctification is attainable in this life, on the
ground of matural ability.
This is generally admitted by those who are called moderate Calvinists.
Or, perhaps I should say, it generally has been admitted by them, though
at present some of them seem inclined to give up the doctrine of natural
ability, and to take refuge in constitutional depravity, rather than admit the
attainableness of a state of entire sanctification in this life. But let men
take refuge where they will, they can never escape from the plain letter, and
spirit, and meaning of the law of God. Mark with what solemn emphasis
it says, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy
soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength.” This is its solemn
injunction, whether it be given to an angel, a man, or a child. An angel
is bound to exercise an angel's strength ; a man, the strength of a man ;
and a child, the strength of a child. It comes to every moral being in the
universe, just as he is, and where he is, and requires, not that he should
create new powers, or possess other powers than he has, but that such as
his powers are, they should all be used with the utmost perfection and
constancy for God. And to use again the language of a respected brother:
“If we could conceive of a moral pigmy, the law levels its claims to his
capacities, and says to him, ‘Love the Lord thy God with all THY heart,
and with all THY strength.’” And should a man by his own fault render
himself unable to use one of his hands, one eye, one foot, or any power of
body or mind, the law does not say to him, in such a case, use all the
powers and all the strength you might have had, but only use what powers
and what strength remain. It holds him guilty, and condemns him for
that act or neglect which diminished his ability; but it no longer, in any
instance, requires the use of that power of body or mind which has been
destroyed by that act.
SANCTDFICATION. 5.99
For a fuller developement of this truth see Lectures on Ability, in this
course. Also Lectures on Moral Government.
2. The provisions of grace are such as to render its actual attainment in
this life, the object of reasonable pursuit. It is admitted, that the entire
sanctification of the church is to be accomplished. It is also admitted, that
this work is to be accomplished, “through the sanctification of the Spirit
and the belief of the truth.” It is also universally agreed, that this work
must be begun here ; and also that it must be completed before the soul
can enter heaven. This them is the inquiry, Is this state attainable as a
matter of fact before death 2
It is easy to see, that this question can be settled only by a reference to
the word of God. And here it is of fundamental importance, that we
understand the rules by which scripture declarations and promises are to be
interpreted. I have already given several rules, in the light of which we
have endeavoured to interpret the meaning of the law.” I will now state
several plain common-sense rules, by which the promises are to be inter-
preted. The question, in regard to the rules of biblical interpretation, is
fundamental to all religious inquiries. Until the church are agreed to
interpret the scriptures in accordance with certain fixed and undeniable
principles, they can never be agreed in regard to what the Bible teaches.
I have often been amazed at the total disregard of all Sober rules of biblical
interpretation. On the one hand, the threatenings, and on the other the
promises, are either thrown away, or made to mean something entirely
different from that which was intended by the Spirit of God. At present
I will only mention a few plain, common-sense, and self-evident rules for
the interpretation of the promises. In the light of these, we may be able
to settle the inquiry before us, viz., whether the provisions of grace are
such as to render entire and permanent sanctification in this life an object
of reasonable pursuit.
(1.) The language of a promise is to be interpreted by a reference to
the known character of him who promises, where this character is known
in other ways than by the promise itself; for example,
(i.) If the promisor is known to be of a very bountiful disposition, or the
opposite of this, these considerations should be taken into the account in
interpreting the language of his promise. If he is of a very bountiful
disposition, he may be expected to mean all that he seems to mean, in the
language of his promise, and a very liberal construction should be put upon
his language. But if his character is known to be the opposite of bountiful
and generous, and it is known that whatever he promised would be given
with great reluctance, his language should be construed strictly.
(ii) His character for hyperbole and extravagance in the use of language
should be taken into the account in interpreting his promises. If it be
well understood that the promisor is in the habit of using extravagant
language—of saying much more than he means, this circumstance should,
in all justice, be taken into the account in the interpretation of the lan-
* See ante, page 166.
600 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
guage of his promises. But on the other hand, if he be known to be an
individual of great accuracy, and to use language with great circumspection
and propriety, we may freely understand him to mean what he says. His
promise may be in figurative language, and not to be understood literally,
but in this case even, he must be understood to mean what the figure
naturally and fully implies.
(iii.) The question should be considered, whether the promise was made
deliberately, or in circumstances of great, though temporary excitement. If
the promise was made deliberately, it should be interpreted to mean what
it says. But if it was made under great but temporary excitement, much
allowance is to be made for the state of mind which led to the use of such
strong language.
(2.) The relation of the parties to each other should be duly considered,
in the interpretation of the language of a promise; for example, the
promise of a father to a son admits of a more liberal and full construction,
than if the promise were made to a stranger; as the father may be supposed
to cherish a more liberal and bountiful disposition to a son, than towards a
person in whom he has no particular interest.
(3.) The design of the promisor, in relation to the necessities of the
promisee or person to whom the promise is made, should be taken into the
account. If it be manifest, that the design of the promisor was to meet the
necessities of the promisee, then the promise must be so understood as to
meet these necessities.
(4.) If it be manifest, that the design of the promisor was to meet the
necessities of the promisee, then the extent of these necessities should be
taken into the account, in the interpretation of the promise.
(5.) The interest of the promisor in the accomplishment of his design,
or in fully meeting and relieving the necessities of the promisee, should be
taken into the account. If there is the most satisfactory proof, aside from
that which is contained in the promise itself, that the promisor feels the
highest interest in the promisee, and in fully meeting and relieving his me.
cessities, then his promise must be understood accordingly.
(6.) If it is known that the promisor has exercised the greatest self.
denial, and made the greatest sacrifice for the promisee, in order to render it
proper or possible for him to make and fulfil his promises, in relation to
relieving his necessities, the state of mind implied in this conduct should
be fully recognized in interpreting the language of the promise. It would
be utterly unreasonable and absurd, in such a case, to restrict and pare
down the language of his promise, so as to make it fall entirely short of
what might reasonably be expected of the promisor, from those develope.
ments of his character, feelings, and designs, which were made by the
great self-denial he has exercised, and the sacrifices he has made.
(7.) The bearing of the promise upon the interests of the promisor should
also be taken into the account. It is a general and correct rule of inter-
pretation, that when the thing promised has an injurious bearing upon the
interests of the promisor, and is something which he cannot well afford to
SANCTIFICATION. 601
do, and might therefore be supposed to promise with reluctance, the lan-
guage in such a case is to be strictly construed. No more is to be understood
by it than the strictest construction will demand.
(8.) But if on the other hand the thing promised will not impoverish,
or in any way be inimical to the interests of the promisor, no such con-
struction is to be resorted to.
(9.) Whenever the thing promised is that which the promisor has the
greatest delight in doing or bestowing ; and when he accounts it “more
blessed to give than to receive;” and where it is well known, by other reve-
lations of his character, and by his own express and often-repeated
declarations, that he has the highest satisfaction, and finds his own happi-
ness, in bestowing favours upon the promisee, in this case, the most liberal
construction should be put upon the promise, and he is to be understood to
mean all that he says.
(10.) The resources and ability of the promisor to meet the necessities
of the promisee, without injury to himself, are to be considered. If a phy-
sician should promise to restore a patient to perfect health, it might be
unfair to understand him as meaning all that he says. If he so far restored
the patient, as that he recovered in a great measure from his disease, it
might be reasonable to suppose, that this was all he really intended, as the
known inability of a physician to restore an individual to perfect health,
might reasonally modify our understanding of the language of his promise.
But when there can be no doubt as to the ability, resources, and willingness
of the physician to restore his patient to perfect health, then we are, in all
reason and justice, required to believe he means all that he says. If God
should promise to restore a man, to perfect health who was diseased, there
can be mo doubt that his promise should be understood to mean what his
language would import.
(11.) When commands and promises are given by one person to another
in the same language, in both cases it is to be understood alike, unless there
be some manifest reason to the contrary.
(12.) If neither the language, connexion, nor circumstances, demand a
diverse interpretation, we are bound to understand the same language alike
in both cases.
(13.) I have said, we are to interpret the language of law so as to consist
with natural justice. I now say, that we are to interpret the language of
the promises so as to consist with the known greatness, resources, goodness,
bountifulness, relations, design, happiness, and glory of the promisor.
(14.) If his bountifulness is equal to his justice, his promises of grace
must be understood to mean as much as the requirements of his justice.
(15.) If he delights in giving as much as in receiving, his promises
must mean as much as the language of his requirements.
(16.) If he is as merciful as he is just, his promises of mercy must
be as liberally construed as the requirements of his justice.
(17.) If “he delighteth in merey,” if himself says “judgment is his
strange Work,” and mercy is that in which he has peculiar satisfaction, his
602 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
promises of grace and mercy are to be construed, even more liberally than
the commands and threatenings of his justice. The language, in this case,
is to be understood as meaning quite as much, as the same language would
in any supposable circumstances.
(18.) Another rule of interpreting and applying the promises, which has
been extensively overlooked, is this, that the promises are all “yea and
amen in Christ Jesus.” They are all founded upon great and immutable
principles of God's government, and expressive of them. God is no respecter
of persons. He knows nothing of favouritism. But when he makes a
promise, he reveals a principle of universal application to all persons in like
circumstances. Therefore, the promises are not restricted, in their applica-
tion, to the individual or individuals to whom they were first given, but may
be claimed by all persons in similar circumstances. And what God is at
one time, he always is. What he has promised at one time or to one
person, he promises at all times, to all persons, under similar circumstances.
That this is a correct view of the subject, is manifest from the manner in
which the New Testament writers understood and applied the promises of
the Old Testament. Let any person, with a reference Bible, read the
New Nestament with a design to understand how its writers applied the
promises of the Old Testament, and he will see this principle brought
out in all its fulness. The promises made to Adam, Noah, Abraham, the
patriarchs, and to the inspired men of every age, together with the promises
made to the church, and indeed all the promises of spiritual blessings—it is
true of them all, that what God has said and promised once, he always says
and promises, to all persons, and at all times, and in all places, where the
circumstances are similar.
Having stated these rules, in the light of which we are to interpret the
language of the promises, I will say a few words in regard to the question,
when a promise becomes due, and on what conditions we may realize its
fulfilment. I have said some of the same things in the first volume of the
“Oberlin Evangelist.” But I wish to repeat them in this connexion, and
add something more.
(1.) All the promises of sanctification in the Bible, from their very nature,
necessarily imply the exercise of our own agency in receiving the thing pro-
mised. As sanctification consists in the right exercise of our own agency, or
in obedience to the law of God, a promise of Sanctification must necessarily
be conditioned upon the exercise of faith in the promise. And its fulfilment
implies the exercise of our own powers in receiving it.
(2.) It consequently follows, that a promise of sanctification, to be of any
avail to us, must be due at some certain time, expressed or implied in the
promise; that is, the time must be so fixed, either expressly or impliedly,
as to put us into the attitude of waiting for its fulfilment; for if the fulfil-
ment of the promise implies the exercise of our agency, the promise is a
mere mullity to us, unless we are able to understand when it becomes due,
in such a sense, that we may wait for and expect its fulfilment. The
promise of Christ to the apostles, concerning the outpouring of the Spirit on
SAINCTIFICATION. 603
the day of Pentecost, may illustrate my meaning. He had promised, that
they should receive the baptism of the Holy Spirit not many days hence.
This was sufficiently definite to bring them into an attitude of continual
waiting upon the Lord, with the expectation of receiving the fulfilment.
And as the baptism of the Holy Spirit involved the exercise of their own
agency, it is easy to see that this expectation was indispensable to their
receiving the blessing. But had they understood Christ to promise this
blessing at a time so indefinitely future, as to leave them without the daily
expectation of receiving it, they might, and doubtless would, have gone about
their business until some further intimation on his part, that he was about
to bestow it, had brought them into an attitude of waiting for its fulfilment.
(3.) A promise in the present tense is on demand. In other words, it
is always due, and its fulfilment may be pleaded and claimed by the pro-
misee at any time.
(4.) A promise due at a future specified time, is after that time on
demand, and may at any time thereafter be pleaded as a promise in the
present tense.
(5.) A great many of the Old Testament promises became due at the
advent of Christ. Since that time, they are to be considered and used as
promises in the present tense. The Old Testament saints could not plead
their fulfilment to them ; because they were either expressly or impliedly
informed, that they were not to be fulfilled until the coming of Christ. All
that class of promises, therefore, that became due “in the last days,” are to
be regarded as now due, or as promises in the present tense,
6. Notwithstanding these promises are now due, yet they are expressly
or impliedly conditioned upon the exercise of faith, and the right use of the
appropriate means, by us, to receive their fulfilment.
7. When a promise is due, we may expect the fulfilment of it at once
or gradually, according to the mature of the blessing. The promise that
the World shall be converted in the latter day, does not imply that we are
to expect the World to be converted at any one moment of time; but that
the Lord will hasten it in its time, according to the faith and efforts of the
church. On the other hand, when the thing promised may in its nature
be fulfilled at once, and when the nature of the case makes it necessary
that it should be, then its fulfilment may be expected whenever we exercise
faith.
8. There is a plain distinction between promises of grace and of glory.
Promises of glory are of course not to be fulfilled until we arrive in heaven.
Promises of grace, unless there be some express or implied reason to the
contrary, are to be understood as applicable to this life.
9. A promise also may be unconditional in one sense, and conditional
in another; for example, promises made to the church as a body may be
absolute, and their fulfilment be secure and certain, sooner or later, while
their fulfilment to any generation of the church, may be and must be, con-
ditioned upon faith, and the appropriate use of means. Thus the promise
of God, that the church should possess the land of Canaan, was absolute
604 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and unconditional, in such a sense as, that the church, at some period,
would, and certainly must, take possession of that land. But the promise
was conditional, in the sense that the entering into possession, by any
generation, depended entirely upon their own faith and the appropriate use
of means. So the promise of the world’s conversion, and the sanctification
of the church under the reign of Christ, is unconditional in the sense, that
it is certain that those events will at some time occur, but when they will
occur, what generation of individuals shall receive this blessing, is
necessarily conditioned upon their faith. This principle is plainly recog-
mized by Paul in Heb. iv. 6, 11. “Seeing therefore it remaineth that some
must enter therein, and they to whom it was first preached entered not in
because of unbelief; let us labour therefore to enter into that rest, lest
any man fall after the same example of unbelief.”
LECTURE I, X.
S A N C T IF I CAT I O N.
BIBLE ARGUMENT.
I coxſſ, now to consider the question directly, and wholly as a Bible
question, whether entire Sanctification is in such a sense attainable in this
life, as to make its attainment an object of rational pursuit.
1. It is evident from the fact, expressly stated, that abundant means are
provided for the accomplishment of this end. Eph. iv. 15–19. “He that
descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that he
might fill all things. And he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets;
and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting
of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of
Christ; till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of
the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the
fulness of Christ; that we henceforth be no more children tossed to and
fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men,
and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive ; but speaking
the truth in love, may grow up into him in all things, which is the head,
even Christ; from whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted
by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in
the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body, unto the edifying
of itself in love." Upon this passage I remark:—
(1.) That what is here spoken of is plainly applicable only to this life.
It is in this life that the apostles, evangelists, prophets, and teachers,
exercise their ministry. These means therefore are applicable, and so far
as we know, only applicable to this life.
(2.) The apostle here manifestly teaches, that these means are designed
and adequate to perfecting the whole church as the body of Christ, “till
SANCTDFICATION. 605
we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of
God, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.” Now
observe, -
(3.) These means are for the perfecting of the Saints, till the whole
church, as a perfect man, “ has come to the measure of the stature of the
fulness of Christ.” If this is not entire Sanctification, what is 2 That this
is to take place in this world is evident from what follows. For the apostle
adds : “that we henceforth be no more tossed to and fro, and carried about
with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness,
whereby they lie in wait to deceive.”
(4.) It should be observed, that this is a very strong passage in support
of the doctrine, inasmuch as it asserts that abundant means are provided
for the Sanctification of the church in this life. And as the whole includes
all its parts, there must be sufficient provision for the sanctification of each
individual.
(5.) If the work is ever to be effected, it is by these means. But these
means are used only in this life. Entire Sanctification then must take
place in this life.
(6.) If this passage does not teach a state of entire sanctification, such
a state is nowhere mentioned in the Bible. And if believers are not here
said to be wholly sanctified by these means, and of course in this life, I
know not that it is anywhere taught that they shall be sanctified at all.
(7.) But suppose this passage to be put into the language of a command,
how should we understand it? Suppose the saints commanded to be per-
fect, and to “grow up to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ,”
could anything less than entire sanctification be understood by such requi-
sitions? Then by what rule of sober criticism, I would inquire, can this
language, used in this connexion, mean anything less than I have supposed
it to mean 2
2. But let us look into some of the promises. It is not my design to
examine a great number of scripture promises, but rather to show, that
those which I do examine, fully sustain the positions I have taken. One
is sufficient, if it be full and its application just, to settle this question for
ever. I might occupy many pages in the examination of the promises,
for they are exceedingly numerous, and full, and in point. But my design
is at present to examine somewhat critically a few only out of the many.
This will enable you to apply the same principles to the examination of the
Scripture promises generally.
(l.) I begin by referring you to the law of God, as given in Deut. x, 12,
“And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear
the Lord thy God, to walk in all his Ways, and to love him, and to serve
the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul?” Upon this
passage I remark —
(i.) It professedly sums up the whole duty of man to God—to fear and
love him with all the heart and all the soul.
(ii) Although this is said of Israel, yet it is equally true of all men.
606 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
It is equally binding upon all, and is all that God requires of any man in
regard to himself.
(iii.) Continued obedience to this requirement is entire sanctification,
in the sense in which I use those terms.
See Deut. xxx. 6, “And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart,
and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart,
and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live.” Here we have a promise
couched in the same language as the command just quoted. Upon this
passage I remark—
(a.) It promises just what the law requires. It promises all that the
first and great commandment anywhere demands.
(b.) Obedience to the first commandment always implies obedience to
the second. It is plainly impossible that we should “love God, whom we
have not seen,” and “not love our neighbour, whom we have seen.”
(c.) This promise, on its very face, appears to mean just what the law
means—to promise just what the law requires.
(d.) If the law requires a state of entire sanctification, or if that which
the law requires is a state of entire Sanctification, then this is a promise of
entire Sanctification.
(e.) As the command is universally binding upon all and applicable to
all, so this promise is universally applicable to all who will lay hold upon it.
(f) Faith is an indispensable condition of the fulfilment of this promise.
It is entirely impossible that we should love God with all the heart, without
confidence in him. God begets love in man in no other way than by so
revealing himself as to inspire confidence, that confidence which works by
love. In Rules 10 and 11, for the interpretation of the promises, it is
said, that “where a command and a promise are given in the Same lan-
guage, we are bound to interpret the language alike in both cases, unless
there be some manifest reason for a different interpretation.” Now here
there is no perceivable reason why we should not understand the language
of the promise as meaning as much as the language of the command.
This promise appears to have been designed to cover the whole ground of
the requirement.
(g) Suppose the language in this promise to be used in a command, or
suppose that the form of this promise were changed into that of a com-
mand;—suppose God should say as he does elsewhere, “Thou shalt love
the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul:” who would
doubt that God designed to require a state of entire sanctification or con-
secration to himself. How them are we to understand it whem used in the
form of a promise ? See Rules 14 and 15: “If his bountifulness equal
his justice, his promises of grace must be understood to mean as much as
the requirements of his justice.” “If he delights in giving as much as in
receiving, his promises must mean as much as the language of his require-
ments.”
(h.) This promise is designed to be fulfilled in this life. The language
and connexion imply this: “I will circumcise thy heart, and the heart of
SANCTIFICATION. 607
thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy
soul.” This in some sense takes place in regeneration, but more than
simple regeneration seems here to be promised. It is plain, I think, that
this promise relates to a state of mind, and not merely to an exercise.
(i.) This promise as it respects the church, at some day, must be
absolute and certain. So that God will undoubtedly, at some period, beget
this state of mind in the church. But to what particular individuals and
generation this promise will be fulfilled, must depend upon their faith in
the promise.
(j.) Since the promise is as full as the command, and since the law
requires perpetual obedience, we are to understand the promise as pledging
a state of permanent obedience. This also is implied in the language of
the promise. To circumcise the heart, implies establishing the soul in love.
(2.) See Jer. xxxi. 31–34: “Behold, the days come, saith the Lord,
that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the
house of Judah; not according to the covenant that I made with their
fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand, to bring them out of the
land of Egypt, (which my covenant they brake, although I was a husband
unto them, saith the Lord;) but this shall be the covenant that I will make
with the house of Israel: After those days, Saith the Lord, I will put my
law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and I will be their
God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every
man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord ; for
they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them,
saith the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their
sin no more.” Upon this passage, I remark —
(i.) It was to become due, or the time when its fulfilment might be
claimed and expected, was at the advent of Christ. This is unequivocally
settled in Heb. viii. 8–12, where this passage is quoted at length, as
being applicable to the gospel day.
(ii.) This is undeniably a promise of entire sanctification. It is a promise
that the “law shall be written in the heart.” It means that the very
temper and spirit required by the law shall be begotten in the soul. Now,
if the law requires entire sanctification or perfect holiness, this is certainly
a promise of it ; for it is a promise of all that the law requires. To say
that this is not a promise of entire sanctification, is the same absurdity as
to say, that perfect obedience to the law is not entire sanctification ; and
this last is the same absurdity as to say, that something more is our duty
than what the law requires; and this again is to say, that the law is
imperfect and unjust.
(iii.) A permanent state or entire sanctification is plainly implied in this
promise.
(a.) The reason for setting aside the first covenant was, that it was broken:
“Which my covenant they brake.” One grand design of the new covenant
is, that it shall not be broken, for then it would be no better than the first,
(b.) Permanency is implied in the fact, that it is to be engraven in the heart,
608 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(c) Permanency is plainly implied in the assertion, that God will
remember their sin no more. In Jer. xxxii. 39, 40, where the same promise
is in substance repeated, you will find it expressly stated, that the covenant
is to be “everlasting,” and that he will so “put his fear in their hearts,
that they shall not depart from him.” Here permanency is as expressly
promised as it can be.
(d.) Suppose the language of this promise to be thrown into the form of
a command. Suppose God to say, “Let my law be within your hearts, and
let it be in your inward parts, and let my fear be so within your hearts, that
you shall not depart from me. Let your covenant with me be everlasting.”
If this language were found in a command, would any man in his senses
doubt that it meant to require perfect and permanent sanctification ? If
not, by what rule of sober interpretation does he make it mean anything
else, when found in a promise? It appears to be profane trifling, when such
language is found in a promise, to make it mean less than it does when
found in a command. See Rule 17.
(e.) This promise as it respects the church, at some period of its history,
is unconditional, and its fulfilment certain. But in respect to any particular
individuals or generation of the church, its fulfilment is necessarily con-
ditioned upon their faith.
(f) The church, as a body, have certainly never received this new cove-
mant. Yet, doubtless, multitudes in every age of the Christian dispensation
have received it. And God will hasten the time when it shall be so fully
accomplished, that there shall be no need for one man to say to his
brother, “IXnow the Lord, for all shall know him from the least to the
greatest.”
(g.) It should be understood, that this promise was made to the Christian
church, and not at all to the Jewish church. The Saints under the old
dispensation had no reason to expect the fulfilment of this and kindred
promises to themselves because their fulfilment was expressly deferred
until the commencement of the Christian dispensation.
(h.) It has been said, that nothing more is here promised thanre generation.
But were not the Old Testament Saints regenerated 2 Yet it is expressly
said, that they received not the promises. Heb. xi. 13, 30, 40 : “These
all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them
afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed
that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth.” “And these all,
having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise;
God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should
not be made perfect.” Here we see that these promises were not received
by the Old Testament saints. Yet they were regenerated.
(i.) It has also been said, that the promise implies no more than the
final perseverance of the saints. But I would inquire, did not the Old
Testament saints persevere? And yet we have just seen, that the Old
Testament saints did not receive these promises in their fulfilment.
(3.) I will next examine the promise in Iºzek. xxxvi. 25–27 : “Then
SANCTDFICATION. 609
will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean; from all your
filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you. A new heart also
will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take
away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh.
And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes,
and ye shall keep my judgments and do them. Upon this I remark:—
(i.) It was written within nineteen years after that which we have just
examined in Jeremiah. It plainly refers to the same time, and is a promise
of the same blessing.
(ii.) It seems to be admitted, nor can it be denied, that this is a promise
of entire Santification. The language is very definite and full. “Then,”
referring to some future time, when it should become due, “will I sprinkle
clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean.” Mark, the first promise is,
“ye shall be clean.” If to be “clean” does not mean entire Sanctification,
what does it mean 2
The second promise is, “From all your filthiness and from all your idols
will I cleanse you.” If to be cleansed “from all filthiness and all idols,”
be not a state of entire sanctification, what is 2
The third promise is, “A new heart also will I give you, and a new
spirit will I put within you; I will take away the stony heart out of your
flesh, and will give you au heart of flesh.” If to have a “clean heart,” a
“new heart,” a “heart of flesh,” in opposition to a “hetrt of stone,” be not
entire Sanctification, what is 2
The fourth promise is, “I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you
to Walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them.”
(iii.) Let us turn the language of these promises into that of command,
and understand God as saying, “Make you a clean heart, a new heart, and
a new spirit; put away all your imiquities, all your filthiness, and all your
idols; walk iſ my statutes, and keep my judgments, and do them.” Now
what man, in the Sober exercise of his reason, would doubt whether God meant
to require a state of entire Sanctification in such commands as these ? The
rules of legitimate interpretation would demand, that we should so under-
stand him. Rule 5, concerning the interpretation of promises, says, “The
interest of the promisor in the accomplishment of his design, or in fully
meeting and relieving the necessities of the promisee, should also be taken
into the account. If there is the most satisfactory proºf, aside from that
which is contained in the promise itself, that the promisor feels the highest
interest in the promisee, and in fully meeting and relieving his necessities,
then his promise must be understood accordingly.”
If this is so, what is the fair and proper construction of this language,
When found in a promise 2 I do not hesitate to say, that to me it is amaz-
ing, that any doubt should be left on the mind of any man whether, in
these promises, God means as much as in his commands, couched in the
same language; for example, see Ezek. xviii. 30, 31 : “Repent, and turm
yourselves from all your transgressions; so imiquity shall not be your ruin.
Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby ye have transgressed
R R
610 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will ye die, O house
of Israel?" Now, that the language in the promise under consideration,
should mean as much as the language of this command, is demanded by
every sober rule of interpretation. And who ever dreamed, that when God
required his people to put away all their iniquities, he only meant that they
should put away a part of them.
(iv.) This promise respects the church, and it cannot be pretended, that
it has ever been fulfilled, according to its proper import, in any past age of
the church.
(y.) As it regards the church, at a future period of its history, this
promise is absolute, in the sense that it certainly will be fulfilled.
(vi.) It was manifestly designed to apply to Christians under the new
dispensation, rather than to the Jews under the old dispensation. The
sprinkling of clean water, and the outpouring of the Spirit, seem plainly to
indicate, that the promise belonged more particularly to the Christian dis-
pensation. It undemiably belongs to the same class of promises with that
in Jer, XXXi. 31–34 ; Joel ii. 28, and many others, that manifestly look
forward to the gospel-day as the time when they shall become due. As
these promises have never been fulfilled, in their extent and meaning,
their complete fulfilment remains to be realized by the church as a body.
And those individuals, and that generation, will take possession of the
blessing, who understand, and believe, and appropriate them to their
OWI) C3S(2.
(4.) I will next examine the promise in 1 Thess. v. 23, 24 : “And the
very God of peace Sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit,
and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord
Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that calleth you, who also will do it.” Upon
this I remark:—
(i.) It is admitted, that this is a prayer for, and a promise of, entire
sanctification.
(ii.) The very language shows, that both the prayer and the promise
refer to this life, as it is a prayer for the sanctification of the body as well
as the soul; also that they might be preserved, not after, but unto the
coming of our Lord Jesus Christ,
(iii.) This is a prayer of inspiration, to which is annexed an express
promise that God will do it.
(iv.) Its fulfilment is, from the nature of the case, conditioned upon our
faith, as sanctification without faith is naturally impossible.
(v.) Now, if this promise, with those that have already been examined,
does not, homestly interpreted, fully settle the question of the attainability
of entire sanctification in this life, it is difficult to understand how any
thing can be settled by an appeal to scripture.
There are great multitudes of promises of the same import, to which I might
refer you, and which, if examined in the light of the foregoing rules of inter-
pretation, would be seen to heap up demonstration upon demonstration, that
this is a doctrine of the Bible. Only examine them in the light of these
SANCTDFICATION. 611
plain, self-evident principles, and it seems to me, that they cannot fail to
produce conviction.
Having examined a few of the promises in proof of the position, that a
state of entire sanctification is attainable in this life, I will now proceed to
mention other considerations, in support of this doctrine.
3. Christ prayed for the entire sanctification of Saints in this life. “I
pray not,” he says, “that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but
that thou shouldest keep them from the evil.” He did not pray that they
should be kept from persecution or from natural death, but he manifestly
prayed, that they should be kept from sin. Suppose Christ had commanded
them to keep themselves from the evil of the world; what should we under-
stand him to mean by Such a command 2
4. Christ has taught us to pray for entire sanctification in this life:
“Thy will be done on earth as it is done in heaven.” Now, if there is
entire sanctification in heaven, Christ requires us to pray for its existence
on earth. And is it probable that he has taught us to pray for that which
he knows never can be, or will be granted 2
5. The apostles evidently expected Christians to attain this state in this
life. See Col. iii. 12. “Epaphras, who is one of you, a servant of Christ,
saluteth you, always labouring fervently for you in prayers, that ye may
stand perfect and complete in all the will of God.” Upon this passage I
remark,-
(1.) It was the object of the efforts of Epaphras, and a thing which he
expected to effect, to be instrumental in causing those Christians to be
“perfect and complete in all the will of God.”
(2.) If this language does not describe a state of entire, in the sense of
permanent, sanctification, I know of none that would. If “to be perfect
and complete in all the will of God,” be not Christian perfection, what is?
(3.) Paul knew that Epaphras was labouring to this end, and with this
expectation ; and he informed the church of it, in a manner that evidently
showed his approbation of the views and conduct of Epaphras.
6. That the apostles expected Christians to attain this state is further
manifest, from 2 Cor. vii. 1 : “Having therefore these promises, dearly
beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit,
perfecting holiness in the fear of God.”
Now, does not the apostle speak in this passage, as if he really expected
those to whom he wrote, “to perfect holiness in the fear of God?” Ob-
serve how strong and full the language is: “Let us cleanse ourselves from
all filthiness of the flesh and spirit.” If “ to cleanse ourselves from all
filthiness of the flesh, and all filthiness of the spirit, and to perfect holi-
ness,” be not entire sanctification, what is 2 That he expected this to take
place in this life, is evident from the fact, that he requires them to be
cleansed from all filthiness of the flesh as well as of the spirit. This
passage plainly contemplates a state as distinguished from an act of con-
secration or sanctification, that is, it evidently expresses the idea of entire,
in the Sense of continued, sanctification.
R R 2
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SANCTIFICATION. 613
(2.) That Paul did not see any difficulty in the way of God's accom-
plishing this work, is manifest from what he says in the twentieth verse—
“Now unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we
ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us,” &c.
ll. The Bible nowhere represents death as the termination of sin in
the saints, which it could not fail to do, were it true, that they cease not
to sin until death. It has been the custom of the church for a long-time,
to console individuals, in view of death, by the consideration, that it would
be the termination of all their sin. And how almost universal has been
the custom in consoling the friends of deceased Saints, to mention this as
a most important fact, that now they had ceased from sin Now, if death
is the termination of sin in the saints, and if they never cease to sim until
they pass into etermity, too much stress never has been or can be laid upon
that circumstance; and it seems utterly incredible, that no inspired writer
should ever have noticed the fact. The representations of Scripture are all
directly opposed to this idea. It is said, “Blessed are the dead who die
in the Lord, for they rest from their labours, and their works do follow
them.” Here it is not intimated that they rest from their sins, but from
their good works in this life; such works as shall follow, not to curse, but
to bless them. The representations of scripture are, that death is the
termination of the saint's sufferings and labours of love in this world, for
the good of men and the glory of God. But nowhere in the Bible is it
intimated, that the death of a saint is the termination of his serving the
devil.
But if it be true that Christians continue to sin till they die, and death
is the termination, and the only termination of their sin, it seems to me
impossible that the scripture representations on the subject should be what
they are.
12. The Bible representations of death are utterly inconsistent with its
being an indispensable means of sanctification. Death is represented in
the Bible as an enemy. But if death is the only condition upon which
men are brought into a state of entire sanctification, its agency is as im-
portant and as indispensable as the influence of the Holy Ghost. When
death is represented in the Bible as any thing else than an enemy, it is
because it cuts short the sufferings of the saints, and introduces them into
state of etermal glory—not because it breaks them off from communion
with the devil! How striking is the contrast between the language of the
church and that of inspiration on this subject ' The church is consoling
the Christian in view of death, that it will be the termination of his sins
—that he will then cease to serve the devil and his own lusts. The lan-
guage of inspiration, on the other hand, is, that he will cease, not from
wicked, but from good works, and labours and sufferings for God in this
world. The language of the church is, that then he will enter upon a life
of unalterable holiness—that he shall then, and not till then, be entirely
sanctified. The language of inspiration is, that because he is sanctified,
death shall be an entrance into a state of eternal glory.
614 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
13. Ministers are certainly bound to set up some definite standard, to
which, as the ministers of God, they are to insist upon complete conformity,
And now I would ask, what other standard can they and dare they set up
than this? To insist upon any thing less than this, is to turn pope and
grant an indulgence to sin. But to set up this standard, and then inculcate
that conformity to it is not, as a matter of fact, attainable in this life, is as
absolutely to take the part of sin against God, as it would be to insist upon
repentance in theory, and then avow that in practice it is not attainable.
And here let me ask Christians what they expect ministers to preach P
Do you think they have a right to connive at any sin in you, or to insist
upon any thing else as a practicable fact, than that you should abandon
every imiquity ? It is sometimes said, that with us entire sanctification is
a hobby. But I would humbly ask what else can we preach 2 Is not every
minister bound to insist in every sermon that men shall wholly obey God?
And because they will not make a compromise with any degree or form of
sim, are they to be reproached for making the subject of entire obedience a
hobby ? I ask, by what authority can a minister preach any thing less?
And how shall any minister dare to inculcate the duty as a theory, and yet
not insist upon it as a practical matter, as something to be expected of
every subject of God’s kingdom.
14. A denial of this doctrine has the matural tendency to beget the very
apathy witnessed in the church. Professors of religion go on in sin, with.
out much conviction of its wickedness. Sin unblushingly stalks abroad
even in the church of God, and does not fill Christians with horror, because
they expect its existence as a thing of course. Tell a young convert that
he must expect to backslide, and he will do so of course, and with com-
paratively little remorse, because he looks upon it as a kind of necessity.
And being led to expect it, you find him, in a few months after his con-
version, away from God, and not at all horrified with his state. Just so,
inculcate the idea among Christians, that they are not expected to abandon
all sin, and they will of course go on in sin with comparative indifference.
Reprove them for their sin, and they will say, “O, we are imperfect crea-
tures; we do not pretend to be perfect, nor do we expect we ever shall be
in this world.” Many such answers as these will show you at once the
God-dishonouring and soul-ruining tendency of a denial of this doctrine.
15. A denial of this doctrine prepares the minds of ministers to tem-
porize, and wink at great iniquity in their churches. Feeling, as they cer-
tainly must, if they disbelieve this doctrine, that a great amount of sin in
all believers is to be expected as a thing of course, their whole preaching,
and spirit, and demeanour, will be such as to beget a great degree of apathy
among Christians, in regard to their abominable sins.
16. If this doctrine is not true, how profane and blasphemous is the
covenant of every church of every evangelical denomination. Every church
requires its members to make a solemn covenant with God and with the
church, in the presence of God and angels, and with their hands upon the
emblems of the broken body and shed blood of the blessed Jesus, “to ab-
SANCTDFICATION. 615
stain from all ungodliness and every worldly lust, to live soberly, righte-
ously, and godly, in this present world.” Now, if the doctrine of the
attainability of entire Sanctification in this life is not true, what profane
mockery is this covenant It is a covenant to live in a state of entire
sanctification, made under the most Solemn circumstances, enforced by the
most awful sanctions, and insisted upon by the minister of God distributing
the bread and wine. Now what right has any minister on earth to require
less than this 2
And again : what right has any minister on earth to require this, unless
it is a practicable thing, and unless it is expected of him who makes
the vow 2
Suppose, when this covenant was proposed to a convert about to unite
with the church, he should take it to his closet, and spread it before the
Lord, and inquire whether it would be right for him to make such a cove-
nant, and whether the grace of the gospel can enable him to fulfil it 2
Do you suppose the Lord Jesus would reply, that if he made that cove-
nant, he certainly would, and Imust, as a matter of course, live in the
habitual violation of it as long as he lives, and that his grace was not suffi-
cient to enable him to keep it? Would he, in such a case, have any right
to take upon himself this covenant 2 No, no more than he would have a
right to lie to the Holy Ghost.
17. It has long been maintained by Orthodox divines, that a person is
not a Christian who does not aim at living without sin—that unless he aims
at perfection, he manifestly consents to live in sin; and is therefore im-
penitent. It has been said, and I think truly, that if a man does not, in
the fixed purpose of his heart, aim at total abstinence from sin, and at
being wholly conformed to the will of God, he is not yet regenerated, and
does not so much as mean to cease from abusing God. In Barnes' Notes
upon 2 Cor. viii. 1, we have the following:—
“The unceasing and steady aim of every Christian should be perfection
—perfection in all things—in the love of God, of Christ, of man; per-
fection of heart, and feeling, and emotion; perfection in his words, and
plans, and dealings with men ; perfection in his prayers, and in his sub-
mission to the will of God. No man can be a Christian who does not
sincerely desire it, and who does not constantly aim at it. No man is a
friend of God who can acquiesce in a state of sin, and who is satisfied and
contented that he is not as holy as God is holy. And any man who has no
desire to be perfect as God is, and who does not make it his daily and
constant aim to be as perfect as God, may set it down as demonstrably cer-
tain that he has no true religion.”
Now if this so, I would ask how a person ean aim at, and intend to do,
what he knows to be impossible. Is it not a contradiction to say that a man
can intend to do what he knows he cannot do º To this it has been
objected, that if true, it proves too much—that it would prove that no man
ever was a Christian who did not believe in this doctrine. To this
I reply :— --
616 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
w
A man may believe in what is really a state of entire sanctification, and
aim at attaining it, although he may not call it by that name. This I be-
lieve to be the real fact with Christians; and they would much more
frequently attain what they aim at, did they know how to appropriate the
grace of Christ to their own circumstances. Mrs. President Edwards, for
example, firmly believed that she could attain a state of entire consecration.
She aimed at, and manifestly attained it, and yet, such were her views of
constitutional depravity, that she did not call her state one of entire sanctifi-
cation. It has been common for Christians to suppose, that a state of entire
consecration is attainable ; but while they believe in the sinfulness of their
natures, they would not of course call even entire consecration, entire sanctifi-
cation. Mrs. Edwards believed in, aimed at, and attained, entire conse-
cration. She aimed at What she believed to be attainable, and she could aim
at nothing more. She called it by the same name with her husband, who
was opposed to the doctrine of Christian perfection, as held by the Wesleyan
Methodists, manifestly on the ground of his notions of physical depravity.
I care not what this state is called, if the thing be fully explained and in-
sisted upon, together with the conditions of attaining it. Call it what you
please, Christian perfection, heavenly mindedness, the full assurance of
faith or hope, or a state of entire consecration ; by all these I understand
the same thing. And it is certain, that by whatever name it is called, the
thing must be aimed at to be attained. The practicability of its attain-
ment must be admitted, or it cannot be aimed at.
And now I would humbly inquire, whether to preach any thing short of
this is not to give countenance to sin 2
18. Another argument in favour of this doctrine is, that the gospel,
as a matter of fact, has often, not only temporarily, but permanently and
perfectly overcome every form of sin, in different individuals. Who
has not seem the most beastly lusts, drunkenness, lasciviousness, and every
kind of abomination, long indulged and fully ripe, entirely and for ever
slain by the power of the grace of God? Now how was this dome? Only
by bringing this sin fully into the light of the gospel, and showing the
individual the relation which the death of Christ sustained to that sin.
Nothing is wanting to slay any and every form of sin, but for the mind
to be fully baptized into the death of Christ, and to see the bearings of
one's own sins upon the sufferings, and agonies, and death of the blessed
Jesus. Let me state a fact to illustrate my meaning. An habitual and
most inveterate Smoker of tobacco, of my acquaintance, after having been
plied with almost every argument to induce him to break the power of the
habit and relinquish its use in vain, on a certain occasion lighted his pipe,
and was about to put it to his mouth, when the inquiry was started, Did
Christ die to purchase this vile indulgence for me? The perceived
relation of the death of Christ to this sin instantly broke the power of
the habit, and from that day he has been free. I could relate many other
facts more striking than this, where a similar view of the relation of a
particular sin to the atonement of Christ, has, in a moment, not only
SAINCTIFICATION, 617
broken the power of the habit, but destroyed entirely and for ever, the
appetite for similar indulgences. And in multitudes of cases when the
appetite has not been entirely slain, the will has been endowed with
abundant and abiding efficiency effectually to control it. If the most
inveterate habits of sin, and even those that involve physical consequences,
and have deeply debased the physical constitution, and rendered it a
source of overpowering temptation to the mind, can be, and often have
been, utterly broken up, and for ever slain by the grace of God, why
should it be doubted, that by the same grace a man can triumph over
all sin, and that for ever ?
19. If this doctrine is not true, what is true upon the subject? It is
certainly of great importance that ministers should be definite in their
instructions; and if Christians are not expected to be wholly conformed to
the will of God in this life, how much is expected of them 2 Who can
say, Hitherto canst thou, must thou come, but no farther ? It is certainly
absurd, not to say ridiculous, for ministers to be for ever pressing Chris-
tians up to higher and higher attainments, saying at every step, you can
and must go higher, and yet all along informing them, that they are
expected to fall short of their whole duty, that they can as a matter of fact,
be better than they are, far better, indefinitely better; but still it is not
expected that they will do their whole duty. I have often been pained to
hear men preach, who were afraid to commit themselves in favour of the
whole truth; and who were yet evidently afraid of falling short in their
instructions, of insisting that men should stand “perfect and complete in
all the will of God.” To be consistent they are evidently perplexed, and
well they may be ; for in truth there is no consistency in their views and
teachings. If they do not inculcate, as a matter of fact, that men ought
to do, and are expected to do, their whole duty, they are sadly at a loss to
know what to inculcate. They have evidently many misgivings about
insisting upon less than this, and still they fear to go to the full extent of
apostolic teaching on this subject. And in their attempts to throw in
qualifying terms and caveats, to avoid the iumpression, that they believe in
the doctrine of entire Sanctification, they place themselves in a truly awk-
ward position. Cases have occurred in which ministers have been asked,
how far we may go, must go, and are expected to go, in dependence upon
the grace of Christ, and how holy men may be, and are expected to be,
and must be, in this life. They could give no other answer to this, than
that they can be a great deal better than they are. Now this indefiniteness
is a great stumbling-block to the church. It cannot be according to the
teachings of the Holy Ghost.
20. The tendency of a denial of this doctrine is, to my mind, conclusive
proof that the doctrine itself must be true. Many developements in the
recent history of the church throw light upon this subject. Who does not
see that the facts developed in the temperance reformation have a direct
and powerful bearing upon this question 2 It has been ascertained, that
there is no possibility of completing the temperance reformation, except by
618 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
adopting the principle of total abstinence from all intoxicating drinks.
Let a temperance lecturer go forth as an evangelist, to promote revivals
on the subject of temperance—let him inveigh against drumkenness, while
he admits and defends the moderate use of alcohol, or insinuates, at least,
that total abstinence is not expected or practicable. In this stage of the
temperance reformation, every one can see that such a man could make no
progress; that he would be employed like a child in building dams of sand
to obstruct the rushing of mighty waters. It is as certain as that causes
produce their effects, that no permanent reformation could be effected,
without adopting and insisting on the total abstinence principle.
And now, if this is true, as it respects the temperance reformation, how
much more so when applied to the subjects of holiness and sin. A man
might, by Some possibility, even in his own strength, overcome his habits
of drunkenness, and retain what might be called the temperate use of
alcohol. But no such thing is possible in a reformation from sin. There
is no temperate indulgence in sin. Sin, as a matter of fact, is never over-
come by any man in his own strength. If he admits into his creed the
necessity of any degree of sin, or if he allows in practice any degree of sin,
he becomes impenitent, consents to live in sin, and of course grieves the
Holy Spirit, the certain result of which is a relapsing into a state of legal
bondage to sin. And this is probably a true history of many professed
Christians in the church. It is just what might be expected from the
views and practice of the church upon this subject.
The secret of backsliding is, that reformations are not carried deep
enough. Christians are not set with all their hearts to aim at a speedy
deliverance from all sin, but on the contrary are left, and in many
instances taught, to indulge the expectation that they shall sin as long as
they live. I probably never shall forget the effect produced on my mind
by reading, when a young convert, in the diary of David Brainerd, that he
never expected to make any considerable attainments in holiness in this
life. I can now easily see that this was a natural inference from the theory
of physical sinfulness which he held. But not perceiving this at the time,
I doubt not that this expression of his views had a very injurious effect
upon me for many years. It led me to reason thus: if such a man as
David Brainerd did not expect to make much advancement in holiness in
this life, it is vain for me to expect such a thing.
The fact is, if there be anything that is important to high attainments
in holiness, and to the progress of the work of sanctification in this life,
it is the adoption of the principle of total abstinence from sin. Total
abstinence from sin must be every man's motto, or sin will certainly sweep
him away as with a flood. That camot possibly be a true principle in
temperance, that leaves the causes which produce drunkenness to operate
in their full strength. Nor can that be true in regard to holiness which
leaves the root unextracted, and the certain causes of spiritual decline and
backsliding at work in the very heart of the church. And I am fully con-
vinced that until evangelists and pastors adopt, and carry out in practice,
SANCTDFICATION. 619
the principle of total abstinence from all sin, they will as certainly find
themselves, every few months, called to do their work over again, as a
temperance lecturer would who should admit the moderate use of alcohol.
21. Again, the tendency of the opposite view of this subject shows that
that cannot be true. Who does not know that to call upon sinners to
repent, and at the same time to inform them that they will not, and cannot,
and are not expected to repent, would for ever prevent their repentance?
Suppose you say to a sinner, “You are maturally able to repent ; but it is
certain that you never will repent in this life, either with or without the
Holy Spirit.” Who does not see that such teaching would prevent his
repentance as surely as he believed it? To say to a professor of religion,
“You are naturally able to be wholly conformed to the will of God; but it
is certain that you never will be, in this life, either in your own strength,
or by the grace of God :” if this teaching be believed, it will just as
certainly prevent his sanctification, as the other teaching would the repent-
ance of the sinner. I can speak from experience on this subject. While
I inculcated the common views, I was often instrumental in bringing
Christians under great conviction, and into a state of temporary repentance
and faith. But falling short of urging them up to a point, where they
would become so acquainted with Christ as to abide in him, they would of
course soon relapse again into their former state. I seldom Saw, and can
now understand that I had no reason to expect to see, under the instruc-
tions which I then gave, such a state of religious principle, such steady
and confirmed walking with God among Christians, as I have seen since
the change in my views and instructions.
L E C T U R E L XI.
SANCTIFICATION.
PAUL ENTIRELY SANCTIFIED.
I MIGHT urge a great many other considerations, and as I have said, fill
a book with scriptures, and arguments, and demonstrations, of the attain-
ability of entire Sanctification in this life.
But I forbear, and Will present only one more consideration—a con-
sideration which has great weight in some minds. It is a question of great
importance, whether any actually ever did attain this state. Some who
believe it attainable, do not consider it of much importance to show that it
has actually been attained. Now I freely admit, that it may be attainable,
even if it never has been attained. Yet it appears to me that as a source
of encouragement to the church, it is of great importance whether, as a
matter of fact, a state of entire and continued holiness has been attained
in this life. This question covers much ground. But for the sake of
brevity, I design to examine but one case, and see whether there is not
620 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
reason to believe that, in one instance at least, it has been attained. The
case to which I allude is that of the apostle Paul. And I propose to take
up and examine the passages that speak of him, for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether there is evidence that he ever attained to this state in
this life.
And here let me say that, to my own mind, it seems plain, that Paul
and John, to say nothing of the other apostles, designed and expected the
church to understand them as speaking from experience, and as having re-
ceived of that fulness which they taught to be in Christ and in his gospel.
And I wish to say again and more expressly, that I do not rest the
practicability of attaining a state of entire and continued holiness at all
upon the question, whether any ever have attained it, any more than I
would rest the question, whether the World ever will be converted, upon the
fact whether it ever has been converted. I have been surprised, when the
fact that a state of entire holiness has been attained, is urged as one argu-
ment among a great many to prove its attainability, and that too, merely as
an encouragement to Christians to lay hold upon this blessing—that ob-
jectors and reviewers fasten upon this, as the doctrine of sanctification, as if
by calling this particular question into doubt, they could overthrow all the
other proof of its attainability. Now this is utterly absurd. When, then,
I examine the character of Paul with this object in view, if it should not
appear clear to you that he did attain this state, you are not to overlook the
fact, that its attainability is settled by other arguments, on grounds entirely
independent of the question, whether it has been attained or not ; and that
I merely use this as an argument, simply because to me it appears forcible,
and fitted to afford great encouragement to Christians to press after this
State.
I will first make some remarks in regard to the manner in which the
language of Paul, when speaking of himself, should be understood ; and then
proceed to an examination of the passages which speak of his Christian
character.
1. His character, as revealed in his life, demands that we should under-
stand him to mean all that he says, when speaking in his own favour.
2. The spirit of inspiration would guard him against speaking too highly
of himself. -
3. No man ever seemed to possess greater modesty, and to feel more un-
willing to exalt his own attainments.
4. If he considered himself as not having attained a state of entire sanc-
tification, and as often, if not in all things, falling short of his duty, we may
expect to find him acknowledging this in the deepest self-abasement.
5. If he is charged with living in sin, and with being wicked in anything,
we may expect him, when speaking under inspiration, not to justify, but un-
equivocally to condemn himself in those things, if he was really guilty.
Now, in view of these facts, let us examine those Scriptures in which he
speaks of himself, and is spoken of by others.
(1) I Thess. ii. 10 : “Ye are witnesses, and God also, how holily, and
SANCTIFICATION. 621
justly, and unblameably, we behaved ourselves among you that believe.”
Upon this text I remark:
(i.) Here he unqualiſiedly asserts his own holiness. This language is
very strong, “How holily, justly, and unblameably.” If to be holy, just, and
unblameable, be not entire sanctification, what is 2
(ii.) He appeals to the heart-searching God for the truth of what he says,
and to their own observation ; calling on God and on them also to bear
witness, that he had been holy and without blame.
(iii.) Here we have the testimony of an inspired apostle, in the most un-
qualified language, asserting his own entire sanctification. Was he deceived?
Can it be that he knew himself all the tinie to have been living in sin 2 If
such language as this does not amount to an unqualified assertion, that lie
had lived among them without sin, what can be known by the use of human
language 2
(2) 2 Cor. vi. 3—7 : “Giving no offence in anything, that the ministry
be not blamed ; but in all things approving ourselves as the ministers of
God, in much patience, in afflictions, in necessity, in distresses, in stripes, in
imprisonments, in tumults, in labours, in watchings, in fastings; by pureness,
by knowledge, by long-suffering, by kindness, by the Holy Ghost, by love
umfeigned, by the word of truth, by the power of God, by the armour of right-
eousness on the right hand and on the left.” Upon these verses I remark :
Paul asserts that he gave no offence in anything, but in all things approved
himself as a minister of God. Among other things, he did this, “by pure-
mess, by the Holy Ghost, by love unfeigned,” and “by the armour of right-
eousness on the right hand and on the left.” How could so modest a man
as Paul speak of himself in this manner, unless he knew himself to be in a
state of entire sanctification, and thought it of great importance that the
church should know it 2
(3.) 2 Cor. i. 12: “For our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our con-
Science, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but
by the grace of God, we have had our conversation in the world, and more
abundantly to youward.” This passage plainly implies the same thing, and
was manifestly said for the same purpose—to declare the greatness of the
grace of God as manifested in himself.
(4.) Acts xxiv. 16: “And herein do I exercise myself to have always a
conscience void of offence toward God, and toward men.” Paul doubtless
at this time had an enlightened conscience. If an inspired apostle could
affirm, that he “exercised himself to have always a conscience void of offence
toward God and toward men,” must he not have been in a state of entire
Sanctification ?
(5.) 2 Tim, i. 3: “I thank God, whom I serve from my forefathers with
a pure conscience, that without ceasing I have remembrance of thee in my
prayers might and day.” Here again he affirms that he serves God with a
pure conscience. Could this be, if he was oſten, and perhaps every day, as
Some suppose, violating his conscience 2
(6.) Gal. ii. 20: “I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet
622 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh,
I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for
me.” This does not assert, but strongly implies, that he lived without
sin, and also that he regarded himself as dead to sin in the sense of being
permanently sanctified.
(7.) Gal. vi. 14 : “But God forbid that I should glory, save in the
cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me,
and I unto the world.” This text also affords the same inference as above.
(8.) Phil. i. 21 : “For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain.” Here
the apostle affirms that for him to live was as if Christ lived in the church,
that is, by his doctrine illustrated by his life, it was as if Christ lived again
and preached his own gospel to sinners and to the church; or for him to
live was to make Christ known as if Christ lived to make himself known.
How could he say this, unless his example, and doctrine, and spirit, were
those of Christ 2
(9.) Acts xx. 26: “Wherefore I take you to record this day, that I am
pure from the blood of all men.” Upon this I remark—
(i.) This passage, taken in its connexion, shows clearly the impression
that Paul desired to make upon the minds of those to whom he spake.
(ii.) It is certain that he could in no proper sense be “pure from the
blood of all men,” unless he had done his whole duty. If he had been
sinfully lacking in any grace, or virtue, or labour, could he have said this 2
Certainly not.
(10.) I Cor. ii. 16, 17: “Wherefore, I beseech you, be ye followers of
me. For this cause have I sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved
son, and faithful in the Lord, who shall bring you into remembrance of
my ways which be in Christ, as I teach everywhere in every church.” I
remark—
(i.) Here Paul manifestly sets himself up as an example to the church.
How could he do this if he were living in sin 2
(ii.) He sent Timotheus to them to refresh their memories in regard to
his doctrine and practice; implying that what he taught in every church he
himself practised.
(11.) I Cor. xi. 1 : “Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ.”
Here Paul commands them to follow him “as he followed Christ;” not so
far as he followed Christ, as some seem to understand it, but to follow him
because he followed Christ. How could he, in this unqualified manner,
command the church to copy his example, unless he knew himself to be
blameless 2
(12.) Phil. iii. 17, 20: “Brethren, be followers together of me, and
mark them which walk so as ye have us for an ensample. For our conver-
sation is in heaven, from whence we also look for the Saviour, the Lord
Jesus Christ.” Here again, Paul calls upon the church to follow him, and
particularly to notice those that copied his example, and assigns as the
reason, “for our conversation is in heaven.”
(13.) Phil. iii. 9 : “Those things, which ye have both learned and re.
SANCTIFICATION. 623
ceived, and heard, and seen in me, do; and the God of peace shall be
with you.” The Philippians were commanded to “do those things which
they had learned, and received, and seen in him.” And then he adds,
that if they “do those things, the God of peace shall be with them.” Now
can it be, that he meant that they should understand anything less, than
that he lived without sin among them 2
I will next examine those passages which are supposed by some to imply
that Paul was not in a state of entire Sanctification.
(14.) Acts xv. 36–40: “And some days after, Paul said unto Barnabas,
Let us go again and visit our brethren in every city where we have preached
the word of the Lord, and see how they do. And Barnabas determined to
take with them John whose surname was Mark. But Paul thought not
good to take him with them, who departed from them from Pamphylia,
and went not with them to the work. And the contention was so sharp
between them, that they departed asunder one from the other ; and so
Barnabas took Mark, and sailed to Cyprus; and Paul chose Silas, and
departed, being recommended by the brethren unto the grace of God.”
Upon this passage I remark—
(i.) This contention between Paul and Barnabas arose out of the fact,
that John, who was a nephew of Barnabas, had once abruptly left them in
their travels, it would seem, without any justifiable reason, and had returned
home.
(ii.) It appears that the confidence of Barnabas in his nephew was
restored.
(iii.) That Paul was not as yet satisfied of the stability of his character,
and thought it dangerous to trust him as a travelling companion and fellow
labourer. It is not intimated, nor can it fairly be inferred, that either of
them sinned in this contention.
(iv.) Being men of principle, neither of them felt it to be his duty to
yield to the opinion of the other.
(v.) If either was to be blamed, it seems that Barnabas was in fault,
rather than Paul, inasmuch as he determined to take John with him, with-
out having consulted Paul. And he persisted in this determination until
he met with such firm resistance on the part of Paul, that he took John and
sailed abruptly for Cyprus; while Paul choosing Silas as his companion,
was recommended by the brethrem to the grace of God, and departed. Now
certainly there is nothing that we can discover in this transaction, that
Paul, or any good man, or an angel, under the circumstances, needs to have
been ashamed of. It does not appear, that Paul ever acted more from a
regard to the glory of God and the good of religion, than in this transaction.
And I would humbly inquire, what spirit is that which finds sufficient
evidence in this case to charge an inspired apostle with rebellion against
God? But even admitting that he did sim in this case, where is the
evidence that he was not afterwards sanctified, when he wrote the epistle 2
for this was before the writing of any of his epistles.
(15.) Acts xxiii. 1–5: “And Paul, earnestly beholding the council,
624 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
said, Men and brethren, I have lived in all good conscience before God
until this day. And the high priest Amanias commanded them that stood
by him to Smite him on the mouth. Then said Paul unto him, God shall
Smite thee, thou whited wall; for sittest thou to judge me after the law,
and commandest me to be smitten contrary to the law 2 And they that
stood by said, Revilest thou God's high priest? Then said Paul, I wist
not, brethren, that he was the high priest: for it is written, Thou shalt not
speak evil of the ruler of thy people.” In this case sinful anger has been
imputed to Paul; but, so far as I can see, without any just reason. To
my mind it seems plain, that the contrary is to be inferred. It appears,
that Paul was not personally acquainted with the then officiating high
priest. And he manifested the utmost regard to the authority of God in
quoting from the Old Testament, “Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler
of thy people; ” implying, that notwithstanding the abuse he had received,
he should not have made the reply, had he known him to be the high
priest.
(16.) Rom, vii. from the fourteenth to the twenty-fifth verse, has by
many been supposed to be an epitome of Paul's experience at the time he
wrote the epistle. Upon this I remark:—
(i.) The connexion and drift of Paul's reasoning show, that the case of
which he was speaking, whether his own or the case of some one else, was
adduced by him to illustrate the influence of the law upon the carnal mind.
(ii.) This is a case in which sin had the entire dominion, and overcame
all his resolutions of obedience.
(iii.) That his use of the singular pronoun, and in the first person,
proves nothing in regard to the point, whether or not he was speaking of
himself, for this is common with him, and with other Writers, when using
illustrations.
(iv.) He keeps up the personal promoun, and passes into the eighth
chapter; at the beginning of which, he represents himself, or the person of
whom he is speaking, as being not only in a different, but in an exactly
opposite state of mind. Now, if the seventh chapter contains Paul’s
experience, whose experience is this in the eighth chapter? Are we to
understand them both as the experience of Taul ? If so, we must under-
stand him as first speaking of his experience before, and them after he was
sanctified. He begins the eighth chapter by saying, “There is therefore
now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after
the flesh, but after the Spirit; ” and assigns as a reason, that “The law of
the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and
death.” The law of sin and death was that law in his members, or the
influence of the flesh, of which he had so bitterly complained in the seventh
chapter. But now, it appears, that he has passed into a state in which he is
made free from this influence of the flesh,_is emancipated and dead to the
world and to the flesh, and in a state in which “there is no condemna-
tion.” Now, if there was no condemnation in the state in which he then
was, it must have been, either because he did not sin, or, if he did sin.
SAINCTIFICATION. 625
because the law did not condemn him ; or because the law of God was
repealed or abrogated. Now, if the penalty of the law was so set aside in
his case, that he could sin without condemnation, this is a real abrogation of
the law. For a law without a penalty is no law, and if the law is set aside,
there is no longer any standard, and he was neither sinful nor holy. But
as the law was not, and could not be set aside, its penalty was not and
could not be so abrogated, as not to condemn every sin. If Paul lived
without condemnation, it must be because he lived without sin.
To me it does not appear as if Paul speaks of his own experience in the
Seventh chapter of Romans, but that he merely supposes a case by way of
illustration, and speaks in the first person, and in the present tense, simply
because it was convenient and suitable to his purpose. His object mani-
festly was, in this and in the beginning of the eighth chapter, to contrast
the influence of the law and of the gospel—to describe in the seventh
chapter the state of a man who was living in sin, and every day condemned
by the law, convicted and constantly struggling with his own corruptions,
but continually overcome, and in the eighth chapter to exhibit a person
in the enjoyment of gospel liberty, where the righteousness of the law was
fulfilled in the heart by the grace of Christ. The seventh chapter may
well apply either to a person in a backslidden state, or to a convicted per-
son who had never been converted. The eighth chapter can clearly be
applicable to none but to those who are in a state of entire sanctification.
I have already said, that the seventh chapter contains the history of one
over whom sin has dominion. Now, to suppose that this was the experience
of Paul when he wrote the epistle, or of any one who was in the liberty of
the gospel, is absurd, and contrary to the experience of every person who
ever enjoyed gospel liberty. And further, this is as expressly contradicted
in the sixth chapter as it can be. As I said, the seventh chapter exhibits
one over whom sin has dominion; but God says, in the sixth chapter and
fourteenth verse, “For sin shall not have dominion over you; for ye are
not under the law, but under grace.” I remark finally upon this passage,
that if Paul was speaking of himself in the seventh chapter of Romans,
and really giving a history of his own experience, it proves nothing at all
in regard to his subsequent sanctification : for—
(i.) If this was his experience at the time he wrote the epistle, it
Would prove nothing in regard to what afterwards occurred in his own
experience.
(ii) The eighth chapter shows conclusively, that it was not his experience
at the time he wrote the epistle. The fact that the seventh and eighth
chapters have been separated since the translation was made, as I have
before said, has led to much error in the understanding of this passage.
Nothing is more certain, than that the two chapters were designed to
describe not only different experiences, but experiences opposite to each
other. And that both these experiences should belong to the same person
at the same time, is manifestly impossible. If therefore Paul is Speaking
in this commexion of his own experience, we are bound to understand
S S
626 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the eighth chapter as describing his experience at the time he wrote the
epistle; and the seventh chapter as descriptive of a former experience.
Now, therefore, if any one understands the seventh chapter as describing
a Christian experience, he must understand it as giving the exercises of
one in a very imperfect state; and the eighth chapter as descriptive of
a soul in a state of entire sanctification. So that this epistle, instead of
militating against the idea of Paul's entire sanctification, upon the suppo-
sition that he was speaking of himself, fully establishes the fact that he was
in that state. What do those brethren mean who take the latter part of
the seventh chapter as entirely disconnected from that which precedes and
follows it, and make it tell a sad story on the subject of the legal and sinful
bondage of an inspired apostle? What cannot be proved from the Bible in
this way 2 Is it not a sound and indispensable rule of biblical interpre-
tation, that a passage is to be taken in its connexion, and that the scope
and leading intention of the writer is to be continually borne in mind, in
deciding upon the meaning of any passage? Why then, I pray, are the
verses that precede, and those that immediately follow in the eighth
chapter, entirely overlooked in the examination of this important passage?
(17.) Phil. iii. 10–15. “That I may know him, and the power of his
resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable
unto his death; if by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the
dead. Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect;
but I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am appre-
hended of Christ Jesus, Brethren, I count not myself to have apprehended :
but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and
reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark
for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us therefore
as many as be perfect, be thus minded : and if in anything ye be otherwise
minded, God shall reveal even this unto you.” Upon this passage I
remark:— 4
(i.) Here is a plain allusion to the Olympic games, in which men ran for
a prize, and were not crowned until the end of the race, however well they
might run.
(ii) Paul speaks of two kinds of perfection here, one of which he claims
to have attained, and the other he had not. The perfection which he had
not attained, was that which he did not expect to attain until the end of
his race, nor indeed until he had attained the resurrection from the dead.
Until then he was not, and did not expect to be perfect, in the sense that
he should “apprehend all that for which he was apprehended of Christ
Jesus.” But all this does not imply that he was not living without sin,
any more than it implies that Christ was living in sin when he said, “I
must walk to-day and to-morrow, and the third day I shall be perfected.”
Here Christ speaks of a perfection which he had not attained.
Now it is manifest, that it was the glorified state to which Paul had not
attained, and which perfection he was pressing after. But in the fifteenth
verse, he speaks of another kind of perfection, which he professed to have
SAINCTIFICATION. 627
attained. “Let us therefore,” he says, “as many as be perfect, be thus
minded ;” that is, let us be pressing after this high state of perfection
in glory, “if by any means we may attain unto the resurrection of the
dead.” The figure of the games should be kept continually in mind, in
the interpretatation of this passage. The prize in those races was the
crown. This was given only at the end of the race. And besides, a man
was “not crowned except he ran lawfully,” that is, according to rule.
Paul was running for the prize, that is, the crown, not, as some suppose,
for entire sanctification, but for a crown of glory. This he did not expect
until he had completed his race. He exhorts those who were perfect, that
is, those who were running lawfully or according to rule, to forget the things
that were behind, and press to the mark, that is, the goal, for the prize, or
the crown of glory, which the Lord, the righteous judge, who was witnessing
his race to award the crown to the victor, would give him at that day.
Now it is manifest to my mind, that Paul does not in this passage, teach
expressly nor impliedly, that he was living in sin, but the direct opposite—
that he meant to say, as he had said in mally other places, that he was
unblameable in respect to sin, but that he was aspiring after higher attain-
ments, and meant to be satisfied with nothing short of eternal glory.
Again, Phil. iv. 11–13: “Not that I speak in respect of want : for I
have learned, in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content. I know
both how to be abased, and I know how to abound : everywhere, and in all
things, I am instructed, both to be full and to be hungry, both to abound
and to suffer need. I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth
me.” Here Paul undoubtedly meant to affirm, not merely his abstract
ability to do all his duty, but that he had learned by experience, that as a
matter of fact and reality, he found himself able to do all things required
of him.
In relation to the character of Paul, let me say :—
(a.) If Paul was uot sinless, he was an extravagant boaster, and such
language used by any minister in these days would be considered as the
language of an extravagant boaster.
(b.) This setting himself up as an example so frequently and fully, with-
out any caution or qualification, was highly dangerous to the interests of the
church, if he was not in a state of entire Santification.
(e.) It was as wicked as it was dangerous.
(d.) His language in appealing to God, that in life and heart he was
blameless, was blasphemous, unless he was really what he professed to be:
and if he was what he professed to be, he was in a state of entire sanctifi-
cation.
(e.) There is no reason for doubting his having attained this state.
(f) It is doing dishonour to God, to maintain, under these circumstances,
that Paul had not attained the blessing of entire sanctification.
(g.) He nowhere confesses sin after he became an apostle, but invariably
justifies himself, appealing to man and to God, for his entire integrity and
blamelessness of heart and life.
s S 2
628 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(h) To accuse him of sin in these circumstances, without evidence, is
not only highly injurious to him, but disgraceful to the cause of religion.
(i.) To charge him with sin, when he claims to have been blameless, is
either to accuse him of falsehood or delusion.
(j) To maintain the sinfulness of this apostle, is to deny the grace of
the gospel, and charge God foolishly. And I cannot but inquire, why is
this great effort in the church to maintain that Paul lived in sin, and was
never wholly sanctified till death 2
Two things have appeared wonderful to me—
1. That so many professed Christians should seem to think themselves
highly honouring God in extending the claims of the law, and yet denying
that the grace of the gospel is equal to the demands of the law.
2. That so many persons seem to have an entirely self-righteous view of
the subject of Sanctification. With respect to the first of these opinions,
much pains has been taken to extend to the utmost the claims of the law
of God. Much has been said of its exceeding and infinite strictness, and
the great length, and breadth, and height, and depth of its claims. Mul-
titudes are engaged in defending the claims of the law, as if they greatly
feared that the purity of the law would be defiled, its strictness and
spirituality overlooked, and its high and holy claims set aside, or frittered
down somehow to the level of human passion and selfishness. But while
engaged in their zeal to defend the law, they talk, and preach, and write,
as if they supposed it indispensable, in order to sustain the high claims of
the law, to deny the grace and power of the gospel, and its sufficiency to
enable human beings to comply with the requisitions of the law. Thus
they seem to me, unwittingly, to enter the lists against the grace of Christ,
and with the utmost earnestness and even vehemence, to deny that the
grace of Christ is sufficient to overcome sin, and to fulfil in us the
righteousness of the law. Yes, in their zeal for the law they appear to
me either to overlook, or flatly to deny, the grace of the gospel.
Now let the law be exalted. Let it be magnified and made honourable.
Let it be shown to be strict, and pure, and perfect, as its Author; spread
its claims over the whole field of human and angelic accountability; carry
it like a blaze of fire to the deepest recess of every human heart ; exalt it
as high as heaven ; and thunder its authority and claims to the depths of
hell; stretch out its line upon the universe of mind; and let it, as it
well may, and as it ought, thunder death and terrible damnation against
every kind and degree of iniquity. Yet let it be remembered for ever, that
the grace of the gospel is co-extensive with the claims of the law. Let no
man, therefore, in his strife to maintain the authority of the law, insult the
Saviour, exercise unbelief himself, or fritter away and drown the faith of
the church, by holding out the profane idea, that the glorious gospel of the
blessed God, sent home and rendered powerful by the efficacious applica-
tion of the Holy Spirit, is not sufficient to fulfil in us “the righteousness
of the law,” and cause us “to stand perfect and complete in all the will of
God.”
SANCTIFICATION. 629
With respect to the second thing which appears Wonderful to me,
namely, that so many seem to have an entirely self-righteous view of the
doctrine of sanctification, let me say, that they seem afraid to admit, that
any are entirely and perfectly sanctified in this life, lest they should flatter
human pride, seeming to take it for granted, that, if any are entirely
sanctified, they have whereof to glory, as if they had done something, and
were in themselves better than others. Whereas, the doctrine of entire
sanctification utterly abhors the idea of human merit, disclaims and repu-
diates it as altogether an abomination to God, and to the Sanctified soul.
This doctrine, as taught in the Bible, and as I understand it, is as far as
possible from conniving in the least degree at the idea of anything matu-
rally good in Saints or sinners. It ascribes the whole of salvation and
sanctification from first to last, not only till the soul is sanctified, but at
every moment while it remains in that state, to the indwelling Spirit, and
influence, and grace of Christ.
L E C T U R E L XII.
SANCTIFICATION.
VI. POINT OUT THE CONDITIONS OF THIS ATTAINMENT.
1. A state of entire sanctification can never be attained by an indifferent
waiting of God's time.
2. Nor by any works of law, or works of any kind, performed in your
own strength, irrespective of the grace of God. By this I do not mean,
that, were you disposed to exert your natural powers aright, you could not
at once obey the law in the exercise of your matural strength, and continue
to do so. But I do mean, that as you are wholly indisposed to use your
natural powers aright, without the grace of God, no efforts that you will
actually make in your own strength, or independent of his grace, will ever
result in your entire sametification.
3. Not by any direct efforts to feel right. Many spend their time in
vain efforts to force themselves into a right state of feeling. Now, it
should be for ever understood, that religion does not consist in a mere
feeling, emotion, or involuntary affection of any kind. Feelings do not
result from a direct effort to feel. But, on the contrary, they are the
spontaneous actings of the mind, when it has under its direct and deep con
sideration the objects, truths, facts, or realities, that are correlated to these
involuntary emotions. They are the most easy and matural state of mind
possible under such circumstances. So far from its requiring an effort to
put them forth, it would rather require an effort to prevent them, when the
mind is intensely considering those objects and considerations which have
a natural tendency to produce them. This is so true, that when persons
are in the exercise of such affections, they feel no difficulty at all in their
exercise, but Wonder how any one can help feeling as they do. It seems
630 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to them so natural, so easy, and, I may say, so almost unavoidable, that
they often feel and express astonishment, that any one should find it diffi-
cult to exercise the feelings of which they are conscious. The course that
many persons take on the subject of religion, has often appeared wonderful
to me. They make themselves, their own state and interests, the central
point, around which their own minds are continually revolving. Their
Selfishness is so great, that their own interests, happiness, and Salvation,
fill their whole field of vision. And with their thoughts and anxieties, and
whole souls, clustering around their own salvation, they complain of a hard
heart, that they cannot love God, that they do not repent, and cannot
believe. They manifestly regard love to God, repentance, faith, and all
religion, as consisting in mere feelings. Being conscious that they do not
feel right, as they express it, they are the more concerned about them--
selves, which concern but increases their embarrassment, and the difficulty
of exercising what they call right affections. The less they feel, the more
they try to feel—the greater efforts they make to feel right without suc-
cess, the more are they confirmed in their selfishness, and the more are
their thoughts glued to their own interests; and they are, of course, at a
greater and greater distance from any right state of mind. And thus their
selfish anxieties beget ineffectual efforts, and these efforts but deepen their
anxieties. And if, in this state, death should appear in a visible form
before them, or the last trumpet sound, and they should be summoned to
the solemn judgment, it would but increase their distraction, confirm, and
almost give omnipotence to their selfishness, and render their sanctifi-
cation morally impossible. It should never be forgotten, that all true
religion consists in voluntary states of mind, and that the true and only
way to attain to true religion, is to look at and understand the exact thing
to be dome, and them to put forth at once the voluntary exercise required.
4. Not by any efforts to obtain grace by works of law. In my lecture on
faith, in the first volume of the Evangelist, I said the following things —
(1.) Should the question be proposed to a Jew, “What shall I do that
I may work the work of God?” he would answer, Keep the law, both
moral and ceremonial, that is, keep the commandments.
(2.) To the same inquiry an Arminian would answer, Improve common
grace, and you will obtain converting grace, that is, use the means of grace
according to the best light you have, and you will obtain the grace of
salvation. In this answer it is not supposed, that the inquirer already has
faith; but that he is in a state of unbelief, and is inquiring after converting
grace. The answer, therefore, amounts to this; you must get converting
grace by your impenitent works; you must become holy by your hypocrisy;
you must work out sanctification by sim.
(3.) To this question, most professed Calvinists would make in substance
the same reply. They would reject the language, while they retained the
idea. Their direction would imply, either that the inquirer already has
faith, or that he must perform some works to obtain it, that is, that he
must obtain grace by works of law.
SANCTIFICATION. 631
A late Calvinistic writer admits that entire and permanent sanctification
is attainable, although he rejects the idea of the actual attainment of such a
state in this life. He supposes the condition of attaining this state or the
way to attain it, is by a diligent use of the means of grace, and that the
saints are sanctified just so far as they make a diligent use of the means of
sanctification. But as he denies, that any saints ever did or will use all
the means with suitable diligence, he denies also, of course, that entire
sanctification ever is attained in this life. The way of attaining it, accord-
ing to his teaching, is by the diligent use of means. If them this writer
were asked, ‘what shall I do that I may work the works of God?”—or, in
other words, what shall I do to obtain entire and permanent Sanctification ?
his answer, it seems, would be : “Use diligently all the means of grace,”
that is, you must get grace by works, or, with the Arminian, improve com-
mon grace, and you will secure sanctifying grace. Neither an Arminian,
nor a Calvinist, would formally direct the inquirer to the law, as the ground
of justification. But nearly the whole church would give directions that
would amount to the same thing. Their answer would be a legal, and
not a gospel answer. For whatever answer is given to this question, that
does not distinctly recognize faith as the condition of abiding holiness in
Christians, is legal. Unless the inquirer is made to understand, that this
is the first, grand, fundamental duty, without the performance of which all
virtue, all giving up of sin, all acceptable obedience, is impossible, he is
misdirected. He is led to believe, that it is possible to please God without
faith, and to obtain grace by works of law. There are but two kinds of
works—Works of law, and works of faith. Now, if the inquirer has not the
“faith that works by love,” to set him upon any course of works to get it,
is certainly to set him to get faith by works of law. Whatever is said to
him that does not clearly convey the truth, that both justification and
sanctification are by faith, without works of law, is law, and not gospel.
Nothing before or without faith, can possibly be done by any one, but
works of law. His first duty, therefore, is faith; and every attempt to
obtain faith by unbelieving works, is to lay works at the foundation, and
make grace a result. It is the direct opposite of gospel truth.
Take facts as they arise in every day's experience, to show that what I
have stated is true of almost all professors and non-professors. Whenever
a sinner begins in good earnest to agitate the question, “What shall I do
to be saved 2" he resolves as a first duty, to break off from his sins, that is,
in unbelief. Of course, his reformation is only outward. He determines
to do better—to reform in this, that, and the other thing, and thus prepare
himself to be converted. He does not expect to be saved without grace
and faith, but he attempts to get grace by works of law. The same is true
of multitudes of anxious Christians, who are inquiring what they shall do
to overcome the world, the flesh, and the devil. They overlook the fact,
that “this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith,” that it
is with “the shield of faith” they are “to quench all the fiery darts of the
wicked.” They ask, Why am I overcome by sin 2 Why can I not get
632 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
above its power? Why am I thus the slave of my appetites and passions,
and the sport of the devil? They cast about for the cause of all this
Spiritual wretchedness and death. At one time, they think they have dis-
covered it in the neglect of one duty; and at another time in the neglect of
another. Sometimes they imagime they have found the cause to lie in yield-
ing to one temptation, and sometimes in yielding to another. They put forth
efforts in this direction, and in that direction, and patch up their righteous-
ness on one side, while they make a rent in the other side. Thus they
spend years in running round in a circle, and making dams of sand across
the current of their own habitudes and tendencies. Instead of at once
purifying their hearts by faith, they are engaged in trying to arrest the
overflowing of the bitter waters of their own propensities. Why do I sin 2
they inquire ; and casting about for the cause, they come to the sage con-
clusion, It is because I neglect such a duty, that is, because I do sin. But
how shall I get rid of sin 2 Answer: By doing my duty, that is, by ceasing
from sin. Now the real inquiry is, Why do they neglect their duty 2 Why
do they commit sin at all 2 Where is the foundation of all this mischief?
Will it be replied, the foundation of all this wickedness is in the force of
temptation—in the weakness of our hearts—in the strength of our evil
propensities and habits? But all this only brings us back to the real
inquiry again, How are these things to be overcome 2 I answer, by faith
alone. No works of law have the least tendency to overcome our sins;
but rather to confirm the soul in self-righteousness and unbelief.
The great and fundamental sin, which is at the foundation of all other
sin, is unbelief. The first thing is, to give up that—to believe the word of
God. There is no breaking off from one sin without this. “Whatsoever
is not of faith is sin.” “Without faith it is impossible to please God."
Thus we see, that the backslider and convicted simmer, when agonizing to
overcome sin, will almost always betake themselves to works of law to
obtain faith. They will fast, and pray, and read, and struggle, and out-
wardly reform, and thus endeavour to obtain grace. Now all this is in
vain and wrong. Do you ask, shall we not fast, and pray, and read, and
struggle 2 Shall we do nothing but sit down in antinomian security and
inaction ? I answer, you must do all that God commands you to do : but
begin where he tells you to begin, and do it in the manner in which he
commands you to do it; that is, in the exercise of that faith that works by
love. Purify your hearts by faith. Believe in the Son of God. And say
not in your heart, “ Who shall ascend into heaven, that is to bring Christ
down from above ; or who shall descend into the deep, that is, to bring up
Christ again from the dead. But what saith it? The word is migh thee,
even in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that is, the Word of faith which we
preach.” Now these facts show, that even under the gospel, almost all
professors of religion, while they reject the Jewish notion of justification
by works of law, have after all adopted a ruinous substitute for it, and
suppose, that in some Way they are to obtain grace by their works.
5. A state of entire sanctification cannot be attained by attempting to
SANCTIFICATION. 633
copy the experience of others. It is very common for convicted sinners,
or for Christians inquiring after entire Sanctification, in their blindness, to
ask others to relate their experience, to mark minutely the detail of all
their exercises, and then set themselves to pray for, and make direct efforts
to attain the same class of exercises, not seeming to understand, that they
can no more exercise feelings in the detail like others, than they can look
like others. Human experiences differ as human countenances differ.
The whole history of a man's former state of mind, comes in of course to
modify his present and future experience ; so that the precise train of
feelings which may be requisite in your case, and which will actually occur,
if you are ever Sanctified, will not in all its details coincide with the
exercises of any other human being. It is of vast importance for you to
understand, that you can be no copyist in any true religious experience ;
and that you are in great danger of being deceived by Satan, whenever you
attempt to copy the experience of others. I beseech you therefore to
cease from praying for, or trying to obtain, the precise experience of any
person whatever. All truly Christian experiences are, like human counte-
mances, in their outline so much alike as to be readily known as the
lineaments of the religion of Jesus Christ. But no further than this are
they alike, any more than human countenances are alike.
But here let it be remembered, that sanctification does not consist in
the various affections or emotions of which Christians speak, and which
are often mistaken for, or confounded with, true religion; but that
Sanctification consists in entire consecration, and consequently it is all out
of place for any one to attempt to copy the feelings of another, inasmuch
as feelings do not constitute religion. The feelings of which Christians
speak do not constitute true religion, but often result from a right state of
heart. These feelings may properly enough be spoken of as Christian
experience, for although involuntary states of mind, they are experienced
by true Christians. The only way to secure them is to set the will right,
and the emotions will be a natural result.
0. Not by Waiting to make preparations before you come into this state.
Observe, that the thing about which you are inquiring, is a state of entire
consecration to God. Now do not imagine that this state of mind must
be prefaced by a long introduction of preparatory exercises. It is common
for persons, when inquiring upon this subject with earnestness, to think
themselves hindered in their progress by a want of this, or that, or the
other exercise or state of mind. They look everywhere else but at the
real difficulty. They assign any other, and every other but the true
reason, for their not being already in a state of sanctification. The true
difficulty is voluntary selfishness, or voluntary consecration to self-interest
and self gratification. This is the difficulty, and the only difficulty, to be
OWel'CODAG. .
7. Not by attending meetings, asking the prayers of other Christians, or
depending in any way upon the means of getting into this state. By this
I do not intend to say, that means are unnecessary, or that it is not through
634 SYSTEMATIC THIEOLOGY.
the instrumentality of truth, that this state of mind is induced. But I do
mean, that while you are depending upon any instrumentality whatever,
your mind is diverted from the real point before you, and you are never
likely to make this attainment.
8. Not by waiting for any particular views of Christ. When persons,
in the state of mind of which I have been speaking, hear those who live in
faith describe their views of Christ, them say, Oh, if I had such views, I
could believe ; I must have these before I can believe. Now you should
understand, that these views are the result and effect of faith in the promise
of the Spirit, to take of the things of Christ and show them to you. Lay
hold of this class of promises, and the Holy Spirit will reveal Christ to
you, in the relations in which you need him from time to time. Take
hold, then, on the simple promise of God. Take God at his word. Believe
that he means just what he says ; and this will at once bring you into the
state of mind after which you inquire.
9. Not in any way which you may mark out for yourself. Persons in an
inquiring state are very apt, without seeming to be aware of it, to send
imagination on before them, to stake out the way, and set up a flag where
they intend to come out. They expect to be thus and thus exercised—to
have such and such peculiar views and feelings when they have attained
their object. Now, there probably never was a person who did not find
himself disappointed in these respects. God says, “I will bring the blind
by a way that they know not. I will lead them in paths that they have
not known : I will make darkness light before them, and crooked things
straight. These things will I do unto them, and not forsake them.” This
suffering your imagination to mark out your path is a great hindrance to
you, as it sets you upon making many fruitless, and worse than fruitless
attempts to attain this imaginary state of mind, wastes much of your time,
and greatly wearies the patience and grieves the Spirit of God. While he
is trying to lead you right to the point, you are hauling off from the course,
and insisting, that this which your imagination has marked out is the way,
instead of that in which he is trying to lead you. Amd thus in your pride
and ignorance you are causing much delay, and abusing the long-suffering
of God. He says, “This is the way, walk ye in it.” But you say, no—
this is the way. And thus you stand and parley and banter, while you are
every moment in danger of grieving the Spirit of God away from you, and
of losing your soul. -
10. Not in any manner, or at any time or place, upon which you may
in your own mind lay any stress. If there is anything in your imagination
that has fixed definitely upon any particular mammer, time, or place, or
circumstance, you will, in all probability, either be deceived by the devil,
or be entirely disappointed in the result. You will find, in all these par-
ticular items on which you had laid any stress, that the wisdom of man is
foolishness with God—that your ways are not his ways, nor your thoughts
his thoughts. “For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are his
ways higher than your ways, and his thoughts higher than your thoughts.”
But,-
SANCTLFICATION. 635
11. This state is to be attained by faith alone. Let it be for ever
remembered, that “without faith it is impossible to please God,” and
“whatsoever is not of faith, is sin.” Both justification and sanctification
are by faith alone. Rom. iii. 30 : “Seeing it is one God who shall justify
the circumcision by faith, and the umcircumcision through faith ;” and
ch. v. 1 : “Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God,
through our Lord Jesus Christ.” Also, ch. ix. 30, 31 : “What shall we
say then 2 that the Gentiles, who followed not after righteousness, have
attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith. But
Israel, who followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to
the law of righteousness. Wherefore ? Because they sought it not by
faith, but, as it were, by the works of the law.”
12. But let me by no means be understood as teaching Sanctification by
faith, as distinct from and opposed to sanctification by the Holy Spirit, or
Spirit of Christ, or which is the same thing, by Christ our sanctification,
living and reigning in the heart. Faith is rather the instrument or condi-
tion, than the efficient agent that induces a state of present and permanent
sanctification. Faith simply receives Christ, as king, to live and reign in
the soul. It is Christ, in the exercise of his different offices, and appro-
priated in his different relations to the wants of the soul, by faith, who
secures our sanctification. This he does by Divine discoveries to the soul
of his Divine perfections and fulness. The condition of these discoveries
is faith and obedience. He says, John xiv. 21—23 : “He that hath my
commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me ; and he that
loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will
manifest myself to him. Judas Saith unto him, (not Iscariot,) Lord, how
is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world 2
Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love me, he will keep my
Words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and
make our abode with him.” But I must call your attention to Christ as
our Sanctification more at large hereafter.
LECTURE LXIII.
SANCTIFICATION,
CONDITIONS OF ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION.—Continued.
To ascertain the conditions of entire sanctification in this life, we must
consider what the temptations are that overcome us. When first converted,
we have seen, that the heart or will consecrates itself and the whole being
to God. We have also seen, that this is a state of disinterested benevo-
lence, or a committal of the whole being to the promotion of the highest
good of being. We have also seen, that all sin is selfishness, or that all
sin consists in the will's seeking the indulgence or gratification of self;
that it consists in the Will's yielding obedience to the propensities, instead
63( SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
of obeying God, as his law is revealed in the reason. Now, who cannot see
what needs to be done to break the power of temptation, and let the soul
go free? The fact is, that the department of our sensibility that is related
to objects of time and sense, has received an enormous developement, and
is tremblingly alive to all its correlated objects, while, by reason of the
blindness of the mind to spiritual objects, it is scarcely developed at all in
its relations to them. Those objects are seldom thought of by the carnal
mind, and when they are, they are only thought of. They are not clearly
seen, and of course they are not felt.
The thought of God, of Christ, of sin, of holiness, of heaven, and hell,
excites little or no emotion in the carnal mind, The carnal mind is alive
and awake to earthly and sensible objects, but dead to spiritual realities.
The spiritual world needs to be revealed to the soul. The soul needs to
See and clearly apprehend its own spiritual condition, relations, wants. It
meeds to become acquainted with God and Christ, to have spiritual and
eternal realities made plaim, and present, and all-absorbing realities to the
soul. It needs such discoveries of the etermal world, of the nature and
guilt of sin, and of Christ, the remedy of the soul, as to kill or greatly
mortify lust, or the appetites and passions in their relations to objects of
time and sense, and thoroughly to develope the sensibility, in its relations
to sin and to God, and to the whole circle of spiritual realities. This will
greatly abate the frequency and power of temptation to self-gratification,
and break up the voluntary slavery of the will. The developements of the
sensibility need to be thoroughly corrected. This can only be done by the
revelation to the inward man, by the Holy Spirit, of those great, and
solemn, and overpowering realities of the “spirit land,” that lie concealed
from the eye of flesh,
We often see those around us whose sensibility is so developed, in some
one direction, that they are led captive by appetite and passion in that
direction, in spite of reason and of God. The inebriate is an example of
this. The glutton, the licentious, the avaricious man, &c., are examples of
this kind. We sometimes, on the other hand, see, by some striking provi.
dence, such a counter developement of the sensibility produced, as to slay
and put down those particular tendencies, and the whole direction of the
man's life seems to be changed; and outwardly, at least, it is so. From being
a perfect slave to his appetite for strong drink, he cannot, without the utmost
loathing and disgust, so much as hear the name of his once loved beverage
mentioned. From being a most avaricious man he becomes deeply dis-
gusted with wealth, and spurns and despises it. Now, this has been -
effected by a counter developement of the sensibility; for, in the case
supposed, religion has nothing to do with it. Religion does not consist in
the states of the sensibility, nor in the will's being influenced by the
sensibility; but sin consists in the will's being thus influenced. One
great thing that needs to be done, to confirm and settle the will in the
attitude of entire consecration to God, is to bring about a counter develope-
ment of the sensibility, so that it will not draw the Will away from God.
SANCTIFICATION. 637
It needs to be mortified or crucified to the world, to objects of time and
sense, by so deep, and clear, and powerful a revelation of self to self, and
of Christ to the soul, as to awaken and develope all its susceptibilities in
their relations to him, and to Spiritual and divine realities. This can
easily be done through and by the Holy Spirit, who takes of the things of
Christ and shows them to us. He so reveals Christ, that the Soul receives
him to the throne of the heart, and to reign throughout the whole being.
When the will, the intellect, and the sensibility are yielded to him, he
developes the intelligence and the sensibility by clear revelations of himself,
in all his offices and relations to the soul, confirms the will, mellows and
chastens the sensibility, by these divine revelations to the intelligence.
It is plain, that men are naturally able to be entirely sanctified, in the
sense of rendering entire and continual obedience to God; for the ability
is the condition of the obligation to do so. But what is implied in ability
to be as holy as God requires us to be 2
The ready and plain answer to this question is—
1. The possession of the powers and susceptibilities of moral agents.
2. Sufficient knowledge or light to reveal to us the whole of duty.
3. And also to reveal to us clearly the way and means of overcoming
any and every difficulty or temptation that lies in our way.
The first we all possess. The second we also possess, for nothing strictly
is or can be duty, that is not revealed or made known to us. The third is
proffered to us upon condition that we receive the Holy Spirit, who offers
himself as an indwelling light and guide, and who is received by simple faith.
The light and grace which we need, and which it is the office of the
Holy Spirit to supply, respects mainly the following things —
(1.) Knowledge of ourselves, our past sins, their mature, aggravation,
guilt, and desert of dire damnation.
(2.) Knowledge of our spiritual helplessness or weakness, in conse-
quence of
(i.) The physical depravity or morbid developement of our natures.*
(ii.) Of the strength of selfish habit.
(iii.) Because of the power of temptation from the world, the flesh, and
Satan.
(3.) We need the light of the Holy Spirit to teach us the character of
God, the nature of his government, the purity of his law, the necessity and
fact of atonement.
(4.) To teach us our need of Christ in all his offices and relations,
governmental, spiritual, and mixed.
(5.) We need the revelation of Christ to our souls in all these relations,
and in such power as to induce in us that appropriating faith, without
which Christ is not, and cannot be, our salvation.
(6.) We need to know Christ, for example, in such relations as the
following —
(i.) As King, to set up his government and write his law in our hearts;
* See the distinction between moral and physical depravity, p. 370,
638 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to establish his kingdom within us; to sway his sceptre over our whole
being. As King he must be spiritually revealed and received.
(ii.) As our Mediator, to stand between the offended justice of God and
our guilty souls, to bring about a reconciliation between our souls and God.
As Mediator he must be known and received.
(iii.) As our Advocate or Paracletos, our next or best friend, to plead our
cause with the Father, our righteous and all-prevailing advocate to secure
the triumph of our cause at the bar of God. In this relation he must be
apprehended and embraced.
(iv.) As our Redeemer, to redeem us from the curse of the law, and from
the power and dominion of sin; to pay the price demanded by public justice
for our release, and to overcome and break up for ever our spiritual bondage.
In this relation also we must know and appreciate him by faith.
(v.) As our Justification, to procure our pardon and acceptance with God.
To know him and embrace him in this relation is indispensable to peace of
mind and to release from the condemnation of the law.
(vi.) As our Judge, to pronounce sentence of acceptance, and to award to
us the victor's crown.
(vii.) As the Repairer of the breach, or as the one who makes good to the
government of God our default, or in other words, who, by his obedience
unto death, rendered to the public justice of God a full governmental equi-
valent for the infliction of the penalty of the law upon us.
(viii.) As the Propitiation for our sins, to offer himself as a propitiatory
or offering for our sins. The apprehension of Christ as making an atonement
for our sins seems to be indispensable to the entertaining of a healthy hope
of etermal life. It certainly is not healthy for the soul to apprehend the
mercy of God, without regarding the conditions of its exercise. It does
not sufficiently impress the soul with a sense of the justice and holiness of
God, with the guilt and desert of sin. It does not sufficiently awe the soul
and humble it in the deepest dust, to regard God as extending pardon,
without regard to the sternness of his justice, as evinced in requiring that
sin should be recognized in the universe, as worthy of the Wrath and curse of
God, as a condition of its forgiveness. It is remarkable, and well Worthy of
all consideration, that those who deny the atonement make sin a comparative
trifle, and seem to regard God's benevolence or love as good nature, rather
than, as it is, “a consuming fire” to all the workers of iniquity. Nothing
does or can produce that awe of God, that fear and holy dread of sin, that
self-abasing, God-justifying spirit, that a thorough apprehension of the
atonement of Christ will do. Nothing like this can beget that spirit of self-
renunciation, of cleaving to Christ, of taking refuge in his blood. In these
relations Christ must be revealed to us, and apprehended and embraced by
us, as the condition of our entire Sanctification.
(ix.) As the Surety of a better than the first covenant, that is, as Surety
of a gracious covenant founded on better promises; as an underwriter or
endorser of our obligation: as one who undertakes for us, and pledges him-
self as our security, to fulfil for and in us all the conditions of our salvation.
SANCTDFICATION. 639
To apprehend and appropriate Christ by faith in this relation, is no doubt, a
condition of our entire Sanctification. I should greatly delight to enlarge,
and write a whole course of lectures on the offices and relations of Christ,
the necessity of knowing and appropriating him in these relations, as the
condition of our entire, in the sense of continued sanctification. This would
require a large volume. All that I can do is merely to suggest a skeleton
outline of this subject in this place.
(x.) We need to apprehend and appropriate Christ as dying for our sins.
It is the work of the Holy Spirit thus to reveal his death in its relations to
our individual sins, and as related to our sins as individuals. The soul needs
to apprehend Christ as crucified for us. It is one thing for the soul to regard
the death of Christ merely as the death of a martyr, and an infinitely
different thing, as every one knows, who has had the experience, to appre-
hend his death as a real and veritable vicarious sacrifice for our sins, as
being truly a substitute for our death. The soul needs to apprehend Christ
as suffering on the cross for it, or as its substitute; so that it can say, That
sacrifice is for me, that suffering and that death are for my sins; that
blessed Lamb is slain for my sins. If thus fully to apprehend and to ap-
propriate Christ cannot kill sin in us, what canº
(xi.) We also need to know Christ as risen for our justification. He arose
and lives to procure our certain acquittal, or our complete pardon and accept.
ance with God. That he lives, and is our justification we need to know, to
break the bondage of legal motives, and to slay all selfish fear; to break and
destroy the power of temptation from this source. The clearly convinced
soul is often tempted to despondency and unbelief, to despair of its own ac-
ceptance with God, and it would surely fall into the bondage of fear, were it
not for the faith of Christ as a risen, living, justifying Saviour. In this re-
lation, the soul needs clearly to apprehend and fully to appropriate Christ
in his completeness, as a condition of abiding in a state of disinterested con-
secration to God.
(xii.) We need also to have Christ revealed to us as bearing our griefs
and as carrying our sorrows. The clear apprehension of Christ, as being
made sorrowful for us, and as bending under sorrows and griefs which in
justice belonged to us, tends at once to render sin unspeakably odious, and
Christ infinitely precious to our souls. The idea of Christ our substitute,
needs to be thoroughly developed in our minds. And this relation of
Christ needs to be so clearly revealed to us, as to become an everywhere
present reality to us. We need to have Christ so revealed as to so com-
pletely ravish and engross our affections, that we would sooner die at once
than sin against him. Is such a thing impossible 2 Indeed it is not. Is
not the Holy Spirit able, and willing, and ready thus to reveal him, upon
condition of our asking it in faith ? Surely he is.
(xiii.) We also need to apprehend Christ as the one by whose stripes we
are healed. We need to know him as relieving our pains and sufferings
by his own, as preventing our death by his own, as sorrowing that we might
etermally rejoice, as grieving that we might be unspeakably and etermally
640 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
glad, as dying in unspeakable agony that we might die in deep peace and in
unspeakable triumph.
(xiv.) “As being made sin for us.” We need to apprehend him as being
treated as a sinner, and even as the chief of simmers on our account, or
for us. This is the representation of scripture, that Christ on our account
was treated as if he were a sinner. He was made sin for us, that is, he
was treated as a sinner, or rather as being the representative, or as it were
the embodiment of sin for us. O ! this the soul needs to apprehend—the
holy Jesus treated as a sinner, and as if all sin were concentrated in him,
On Our account We procured this treatment of him. He consented to
take our place in such a sense as to endure the cross, and the curse of the
law for us. When the soul apprehends this, it is ready to die with grief
and love. O how infinitely it loathes self under such an apprehension as
this In this relation he must not only be apprehended, but appropriated
by faith.
(xv.) We also need to apprehend the fact that “he was made sin for us,
that we might be made the righteousness of God in him;” that Christ was
treated as a sinner, that we might be treated as righteous; that we might
also be made personally righteous by faith in him ; that we might be made
the “righteousness of God in him ;” that we might inherit and be made
partakers of God's righteousness, as that righteousness exists and is revealed
in Christ; that we might in and by him be made righteous as God is
righteous. The soul needs to see, that his being made sin for us, was in
order that we might be “made the righteousness of God in him.” It needs
to embrace and lay hold by faith upon that righteousness of God, which is
brought home to saints in Christ, through the atonement and indwelling
Spirit.
(xvi.) We also need him revealed to the soul, as one upon whose
shoulders is the government of the world; who administers the government,
moral and providential, of this world, for the protection, discipline, and
benefit of believers. This revelation has a most sim-subduing tendency.
That all events are directly or indirectly controlled by him who has so
loved us as to die for us; that all things absolutely are designed for, and
will surely result in our good. These and such like considerations, when
revealed to the soul and made living realities by the Holy Spirit, tend to
kill selfishness and confirm the love of God in the soul.
(xvii.) We also need Christ revealed to the inward being, as “head over
all things to the church.” All these relations are of no avail to our sanc-
tification, only in so far forth as they are directly, and inwardly, and
personally revealed to the soul by the Holy Spirit. It is one thing to have
thoughts, and ideas, and opinions concerning Christ, and an entirely
different thing to know Christ, as he is revealed by the Holy Spirit. All
the relations of Christ imply corresponding necessities in us. When the
Holy Spirit has revealed to us the necessity, and Christ as exactly suited
to fully meet that necessity, and urged his acceptance in that relation,
until we have appropriated him by faith, a great work is done. But until
SANCTDFICATION. 641
we are thus revealed to ourselves, and Christ is thus revealed to us and
accepted by us, nothing is done more than to store our heads with notions
or opinions and theories, while our hearts are becoming more and more, at
every moment, like an adamant stone.
I have often feared, that many professed Christians knew Christ only
after the flesh, that is, they have no other knowledge of Christ than what
they obtain by reading and hearing about him, without any special revela-
tion of him to the inward being by the Holy Spirit. I do not wonder, that
such professors and ministers should be totally in the dark, upon the subject
of entire Sanctification in this life. They regard Sanctification as brought
about by the formation of holy habits, instead of resulting from the revela-
tion of Christ to the soul in all his fulness and relations, and the soul's
renunciation of self and appropriation of Christ in these relations. Christ
is represented in the Bible as the head of the church. The church is
represented as his body. He is to the church what the head is to the body.
The head is the seat of the intellect, the will, and in short, of the living
soul. Consider what the body would be without the head, and you may
understand what the church would be without Christ. Put as the church
would be without Christ, so each believer would be without Christ. But
we need to have our necessities in this respect clearly revealed to us by the
Holy Spirit, and this relation of Christ made plaim to our apprehension.
The utter darkness of the human mind in regard to its own spiritual state
and wants, and in regard to the relations and fulness of Christ, is truly
wonderful. His relations, as mentioned in the Bible, are overlooked almost
entirely until our wants are discovered. When these are made known, and
the soul begins in earnest to inquire after a remedy, it needs not inquire in
vain. “Say not in thine heart, who shall ascend up to heaven? that is, to
bring Christ down from above; or who shall descend into the deep? that is,
to bring Christ again from the dead. But what Saith it? The word is
migh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart.”
(xviii.) Christ, as having all power or authority in heaven and earth,
needs also to be revealed to the soul, and received by faith, to dwell in and
rule over it. The corresponding want must of necessity be first known to
the mind, before it can apprehend and appropriate Christ by faith, in this
or any other relation. The Soul needs to see and feel its weakness, its
need of protection, of being defended, and watched over, and controlled.
It needs to see this, and also the power of its spiritual enemies, its beset-
ments, its dangers, and its certain ruin, unless the Almighty One interpose
in its behalf. It needs thus truly and deeply to know itself; and then, to
inspire it with confidence, it needs a revelation of Christ as God, as the
Almighty God, to the Soul, as one who possesses absolute and infinite
power, and as presented to the Soul to be accepted as its strength, and as all
it needs of power.
O how infinitely blind he is to the fulness and glory of Christ, who does
not know himself and Christ as both are revealed by the Holy Spirit.
When we are led by the Holy Spirit to look down into the abyss of our
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642 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
own emptiness—to behold the horrible pit and miry clay of our own habits,
and fleshly, and worldly, and infernal entanglements; when we see in the
light of God, that our emptiness and necessities are infinite ; them, and not
till then, are we prepared wholly to cast off self, and to put on Christ.
The glory and fulness of Christ are not discovered to the soul, until it
discovers its need of him. But when self, in all its loathsomeness and
helplessness, is fully revealed, until hope is utterly extinct, as it respects
every kind and degree of help in ourselves; and when Christ, the all and
in all, is revealed to the Soul as its all-sufficient portion and salvation, then,
and not until them, does the Soul know its salvation. This knowledge is
the indispensable condition of appropriating faith, or of that act of receiving
Christ, or that committal of all to him, that takes Christ home to dwell
in the heart by faith, and to preside over all its states and actions. O, such
a knowledge and such a reception and putting on of Christ is blessed.
Happy is he who knows it by his own experience.
It is indispensable to a steady and implicit faith, that the soul should
have a spiritual apprehension of what is implied in the saying of Christ,
that all power was delivered unto him. The ability of Christ to do all, and
even exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, is what the Soul
needs clearly to apprehend in a spiritual sense, that is, to apprehend it, not
merely as a theory or as a proposition, but to see the true spiritual import
of this saying. This is also equally true of all that is said in the Bible
about Christ, of all his offices and relations. It is one thing to theorize,
and speculate, and opine, about Christ, and an infinitely different thing to
know him as he is revealed by the Holy Spirit. When Christ is fully
revealed to the Soul by the Comforter, it will never again doubt the attain-
ability and reality of entire sanctification in this life.
(xix.) Another necessity of the soul is to know Christ spiritually, as the
Brince of Peace. “Peace I leave with you ; my peace I give unto you,”
said Christ. What is this peace 2 And who is Christ, in the relation of
the Prince of Peace 2 What is it to possess the peace of Christ—to have
the peace of God rule in our hearts 2 Without the revelation of Christ to
the soul by the Holy Spirit, it has no spiritual apprehension of the meaning
of this language. Nor can it lay hold on and appropriate Christ as its
peace, as the Prince of Peace. Whoever knows and has embraced Christ
as his peace, and as the Prince of Peace, knows what it is to have the
peace of God rule in his heart. But none else at all understand the true
spiritual import of this language, nor can it be so explained to them as that
they will apprehend it, unless it be explained by the Holy Spirit.
(xx.) The soul needs also to know Christ as the Captain of Salvation, as
the skilful conductor, guide, and captain of the soul in all its conflicts with
its spiritual enemies, as one who is ever at hand to lead the soul on to
victory, and make it more than a conqueror in all its conflicts with the
world, the flesh, and Satan. How indispensable to a living and efficient
faith it is and must be, for the soul clearly to apprehend by the Holy
Spirit this relation of Captain of Salvation, and Captain of the Lord's
SANCTIFICATION. 643
*
Host. Without confidence in the Leader and Captain, how shall the soul
put itself under his guidance and protection in the hour of conflict? It
Canlı0t.
The fact is, that when the soul is ignorant of Christ as a Captain or
Leader, it will surely fall in battle. If the church, as a body, but knew
Christ as the Captain of the Lord's Host; if he were but truly and
spiritually known to them in that relation, no more confusion would be
seen in the ranks of God's elect. All would be order, and strength, and
conquest. They would soon go up and take possession of the whole
territory that has been promised to Christ. The heathen should soon be
given to him for an inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the world for
a possession, Joshua knew Christ as the Captain of the Lord's host.
Consequently he had more courage, and efficiency, and prowess, than all
Israel besides. Even so it is now. When a soul can be found who
thoroughly knows, and has embraced, and appropriated Christ, he is a host
of himself. That is, he has appropriated the attributes of Christ to
himself; and his influence is felt in heaven, and earth, and hell. -
(xxi.) Another affecting and important relation in which the soul needs
to know Christ, is that of our Passover. It needs to understand, that the
only reason why it has not been, or will not assuredly be, slain for sin is,
that Christ has sprinkled, as our Paschal Lamb, the lintel and door-posts
of our souls with his own blood, and that therefore the destroying angel
passes us by. There is a most deep and sim-subduing, or rather tempt.
ation-subduing spirituality in this relation of Christ to the Soul, when
revealed by the Holy Spirit. We must apprehend our sins as slaying the
Lamb, and apply his blood to our souls by faith—his blood, as being our
protection and our only trust. We need to know the security there is in
this being sprinkled with his blood, and the certain and speedy destruction
of all who have not taken refuge under it. We need to know also, that it will
not do for a moment to venture out into the streets, and from under its
protection, lest we be slaim there.
(xxii.) To know Christ as our Wisdom, in the true spiritual sense, is
doubtless indispensable to our entire, in the sense of continued, sanctifi-
cation. He is our wisdom, in the sense of being the whole of our religion.
That is, when separated from him, we have no spiritual life whatever. He
is at the bottom of, or the inducing cause of all our obedience. This we
need clearly to apprehend. Until the soul clearly understands this, it has
learned nothing to the purpose of its helplessness, and of Christ's spiritual
relations to it.
(xxiii.) Very nearly allied to this is Christ's relation to the soul as its
Sanctification. I have been amazed at the ignorance of the church and of
the ministry, respecting Christ as its Sanctification. He is not its Sanctifier
in the sense that he does something to the Soul that enables it to stand
and persevere in holiness in its own strength. He does not change the
structure of the soul, but he watches over, and works in it to will and to
do continually, and thus becomes its Sanctification. His influence is not
T T 2
644 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
exerted once for all, but constantly. When he is apprehended and em-
braced as the Soul's Sanctification, he rules im, and reigns over the soul in
so high a sense, that he, as it were, developes his own holiness in us. He,
as it were, swallows us up, so enfolds, if I may so say, our wills and our
souls in his, that we are willingly led captive by him. We will and do as
he wills within us. He charms the will into a universal bending to his
will. He so establishes his throme in, and his authority over us, that he
subdues us to himself. He becomes our Sanctification only in so far forth
as we are revealed to ourselves, and he revealed to us, and as we receive
him and put him on. What has it come to this, that the church doubts
and rejects the doctrine of entire Sanctification in this life? Then, it
must be that it has lost sight of Christ as its sanctification. Is not
Christ perfect in all his relations? Is there not a completeness and
fulness in him 2 When embraced by us, are we not complete in him 2
The Secret of all this doubting about, and opposition to, the doctrine of
entire Sanctification, is to be found in the fact, that Christ is not appre-
hended and embraced as our sanctification. The Holy Spirit sanctifies
only by revealing Christ to us as our Sanctification. He does not speak of
himself, but takes of the things of Christ and shows them to us. Two
among the most prominent ministers in the presbyterian church have said
to me within a few years, that they had never heard of Christ as the
sanctification of the soul. O, how many of the ministry of the present
day overlook the true spiritual gospel of Christ!
(xxiv.) Another of Christ's spiritual relations is that of the Redemp-
tion of the soul; not merely as the Tedeemer considered in his govern-
mental relation, but as a present Redemption. To apprehend and receive
Christ in this relation, the Soul needs to apprehend itself as sold under sin;
as being the voluntary but real slave of lust and appetite, except as Christ
continually delivers us from its power, by strengthening and confirming our
wills in resisting and overcoming the flesh.
(xxv.) Christ our Prophet is another important spiritual relation in
which we need to apprehend Christ by the Holy Spirit, as a condition of
entire sanctification. He must be received as the great teacher of our souls,
so that every word of his will be received as God speaking to us. This
will render the Bible precious, and all the Words of life efficient to the
Sanctification of Our Souls.
(xxvi.) As our High Priest, we need also to know Christ. I say we
need to know him in this relation, as really over living and ever sustaining
this relation to us, offering up, as it were, by a continual offering, his own
blood, and himself as a propitiation for our sins; as being entered within
the veil, and as ever living to make intercession for us. Much precious
instruction is to be gathered from this relation of Christ. We need, perish-
ingly need, to know Christ in this relation, as a condition of a right
dependence upon him. I all the while feel embarrassed with the consider-
ation that I am not able, in this course of instruction, to give a fuller
account of Christ in these relations. We need a distinct revelation of him
SANCTIFICATION. 645
in each of these relations, in order to a thorough understanding and clear
apprehension of that which is implied in each and all of the relations
of Christ.
When we sin, it is because of our ignorance of Christ. That is, when-
ever temptation overcomes us, it is because we do not know and avail
ourselves of the relation of Christ that would meet our necessities. One
great thing that needs to be done is, to correct the developements of our
sensibility. The appetites and passions are enormously developed in their
relations to earthly objects. In relation to things of time and Sense, our
propensities are greatly developed and are alive; but in relation to spiritual
truths and objects, and eternal realities, we are naturally as dead as Stones.
When first converted, if we knew enough of ourselves and of Christ
thoroughly to develope and correct the action of the sensibility, and confirm
our wills in a state of entire consecration, we should not fall. In propor-
tion as the law-work preceding conversion has been thorough, and the
revelation of Christ at, or immediately subsequent to, conversion, full and
clear, just in that proportion do we witness stability in converts. In most,
if not in all instances, however, the convert is too ignorant of himself, and
of course knows too little about Christ, to be established in permanent obe-
dience. He needs renewed conviction of sim, to be revealed to himself, and
to have Christ revealed to him, and be formed in him the hope of glory,
before he will be steadfast, always abounding in the work of the Lord.
Before I close this lecture, I must remark, and shall have occasion to
repeat the remark, that from what has been said, it must not be inferred,
that the knowledge of Christ in all these relations is a condition of our
coming into a state of entire consecration to God, or of present sanctifi-
cation. The thing insisted on is, that the Soul will abide in this state in
the hour of temptation only so far forth as it betakes itself to Christ in
such circumstances of trial, and apprehends and appropriates him by faith
from time to time in those relations that meet the present and pressing
necessities of the soul. The temptation is the occasion of revealing the
necessity, and the Holy Spirit is always ready to reveal Christ in the par-
ticular relation suited to the newly-developed necessity. The perception
and appropriation of him in this relation, under these circumstances of
trial, is the sine quá mom of our remaining in the state of entire conse-
cration.
LECTURE LXIV.
SANCTIFICATION.
cond ITIONs of ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION.—CONTINUED.
(xxvii.) We need also to know ourselves as starving souls, and Christ as
the “bread of life,” as “the bread that came down from heaven. We need
to know spiritually and experimentally what it is to “eat of his flesh, and
to drink of his blood,” to receive him as the bread of life, to appropriate him
646 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to the nourishment of our souls as really as we appropriate bread, by diges-
tion, to the nourishment of our bodies. This I know is mysticism to the
carnal professor. But to the truly spiritually-minded, “this is the bread
of God that came down from heaven, of which if a man eat he shall never
die.” To hear Christ talk of eating his flesh, and of drinking his blood, was
a great stumbling-block to the carnal Jews, as it now is to carnal pro-
fessors. Nevertheless, this is a glorious truth, that Christ is the constant
Sustenance of the spiritual life, as truly and as literally as food is the sus-
tenance of the body. But the soul will never eat this bread until it has
ceased to attempt to fill itself with the husks of its own doings, or with
any provision this world can furnish. Do you know, Christian, what it is
to eat of this bread 2 If so, then you shall never die.
(xxviii.) Christ also needs to be revealed to the soul as the fountain of
the water of life. “If any man thirst,” says he, “let him come unto me
and drink.” “I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end. . To
him that is athirst, I will give unto him of the fountain of the water of life
freely.” The soul needs to have such discoveries made to it, as to beget a
thirst after God that cannot be allayed, except by a copious draught at the
fountain of the water of life. It is indispensable to the establishing of the
Soul in perfect love, that its hungering after the bread, and its thirsting for
the water of life, should be duly excited, and that the spirit should pant
and struggle after God, and “cry out for the living God,” that it should be
able to say with truth: “My soul panteth for God as the hart panteth for
the water-brooks; My heart and my flesh crieth out for the living God;”
“My soul breaketh for the longing that it hath after thee at all times.”
When this state of mind is induced by the Holy Spirit, so that the longing
of the soul after perpetual holiness is irrepressible, it is prepared for a reve-
lation of Christ, in all those offices and relations that are necessary to secure
its establishment in love. Especially is it then prepared to apprehend, ap-
preciate, and appropriate Christ, as the bread and water of life, to understand
what it is to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of God. It is then
in a state to understand what Christ meant when he said, “Blessed are
they that do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled.”
They not only understand what it is to hunger and thirst, but also what it
is to be filled; to have the hunger and thirst allayed, and the largest desire
fully satisfied. The soul then realizes in its own experience the truthful.
ness of the apostle's saying, that Christ “is able to do exceeding abundantly
above all that we ask or think.” Many stop short even of anything like
intense hunger and thirst; others hunger and thirst, but have not the idea
of the perfect fulness and adaptedness of Christ to meet and satisfy the
longing of their souls. They therefore do not plead and look for the soul-
satisfying revelation of Christ. They expect no such divine fulness and
satisfaction of soul. They are ignorant of the fulness and perfection of the
provisions of the “glorious gospel of the blessed God;" and consequently
they are not encouraged to hope from the fact, that they hunger and thirst
after righteousness, that they shall be filled; but they remain unfed, unfilled,
SANCTIFICATION. 647
unsatisfied, and after a season, through unbelief, fall into indifference, and
remain in bondage to sin.
(xxix.) The soul needs also to know Christ as the true God, and the
eternal life. “No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, save by the Holy
Spirit.” The proper divinity of Christ is never, and never can be, held
otherwise than as a mere opinion, a tenet, a speculation, an article of creed,
until he is revealed to the inner man by the Holy Spirit. But nothing
short of an apprehension of Christ, as the supreme and living God to the
Soul, can inspire that confidence in him that is essential to its established
Sanctification. The soul can have no apprehension of what is intended by
his being the “eternal life,” until it spiritually knows him as the true God.
When he is spiritually revealed as the true and living God, the way is
prepared for the spiritual apprehension of him as the etermal life.” “As
the living Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have
life in himself.” “In him was life, and the life was the light of men.” “I
give unto them etermal life.” “I am the way, the truth, and the life.” “I
am the resurrection and the life.” These and similar passages the soul
needs spiritually to apprehend, to have a spiritual and personal revelation
of them within. Most professors seem to me to have no right idea of the
condition upon which the Bible can be made of spiritual use to them. They
seem not to understand, that in its letter it is only a history of things
formerly revealed to men; that it is, in fact, a revelation to no man, except
upon the condition of its being personally revealed, or revealed to us in
particular by the Holy Spirit. The mere fact, that we have in the gospel
the history of the birth, the life, the death of Christ, is no such reve-
lation of Christ to any man as meets his necessities; and as will secure
his salvation. Christ and his doctrine, his life, and death, and resur-
rection, meed to be revealed personally by the Holy Spirit, to each and
every soul of man, to effect his salvation. So it is with every spiritual truth ;
without an inward revelation of it to the soul, it is only a savour of death unto
death. It is in vain to hold to the proper divinity of Christ, as a specula-
tion, a doctrine, a theory, an opinion, without the revelation of his divine
nature and character to the soul, by the Holy Spirit. But let the soul know
him, and walk with him as the true God, and then it will no longer ques-
tion whether, as our sanctification, he is all-sufficient and complete. Let
no one object to this, that if this is true, men are under no obligation to
believe in Christ, and to obey the gospel, without or until they are enlight-
ened by the Holy Spirit. To such an objection, should it be made, I would
answer,<-
(a.) Men are under an obligation to believe every truth so far as they
can understand or apprehend it, but no further. So far as they can appre-
hend the spiritual truths of the gospel without the Holy Spirit, so far,
without his aid, they are bound to believe it. But Christ has himself
taught us, that no man can come to him except the Father draw him. That
this drawing means teaching is evident, from what Christ proceeds to say.
For it is written,” said he, “they shall all be taught of God. Every one
648 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
therefore that hath heard and hath learned of the Father cometh unto me.”
That this learning of the Father is something different from the mere oral
or written instructions of Christ and the apostles, is evident from the fact,
that Christ assured those to whom he preached, with all the plainness with
which he was able, that they still could not come to him except drawn, that
is taught, of the Father. As the Father teaches by the Holy Spirit,
Christ's plain teaching, in the passage under consideration is, that no man
can come to him except he be specially enlightened by the Holy Spirit.
Paul unequivocally teaches the same thing. “No man,” says he, “can say
that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Spirit.” Notwithstanding all the
teaching of the apostles, no man by merely listening to their instruction
could so apprehend the true divinity of Christ, as homestly and with spi-
ritual understanding to say, that Jesus is the Lord. But what spiritual or
true Christian does not know the radical difference between being taught of
man and of God, between the opinions that we form from reading, hearing,
and study, and the clear apprehensions of truths that are communicated by
the direct and inward illuminations of the Holy Spirit.
(b.) I answer, that men under the gospel are entirely without excuse for
not enjoying all the light they need from the Holy Spirit, since he is in
the world, has been sent for the very purpose of giving to men all the
knowledge of themselves and of Christ which they need. His aid is freely
proffered to all, and Christ has assured us, that the Father is more willing
to give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him, than parents are to give good
gifts to their children. All men under the gospel know this, and all men
have light enough to ask in faith for the Holy Spirit, and of course all men
may know of themselves and of Christ all that they need to know. They are
therefore able to know and to embrace Christ as fully and as fast as it is
their duty to embrace him. They are able to know Christ in his govern-
mental and spiritual relations, just as fast as they come into circumstances
to need to know him in these various relations. The Holy Spirit, if he is
not quenched and resisted, will Surely reveal Christ in all his relations in
due time, so that, in every temptation a way of escape will be open, so
that we shall be able to bear it. This is expressly promised, 1 Cor. x. J3,
“There hath no temptation taken you but such as is common to man; but
God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are
able, but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may
be able to bear it.” Men are able to know what God offers to teach them,
upon a condition within the compass of their ability. The Holy Spirit
offers, upon condition of faith in the express promise of God, to lead every
man into all truth. Every man is, therefore, under obligation to know and
do the whole truth, so far and so fast as it is possible for him to do so, with
the light of the Holy Spirit.
(xxx.) But be it remembered, that it is not enough for us to apprehend
Christ as the true God and the eternal life, but we need also to lay hold
upon him as our life. It cannot be too distinctly understood, that a par-
ticular and personal appropriation of Christ, in such relations, is indis-
SANCTIFICATION. 649
pensable to our being rooted and grounded, established and perfected in
love. When our utter deficiency and emptiness in any one respect or
direction, is deeply revealed to us by the Holy Spirit, with the correspond-
ing remedy and perfect fulness in Christ, it then remains for the soul, in
this respect and direction, to cast off self, and put on Christ. When this
is done, when self in that respect and direction is dead, and Christ is risen,
and lives and reigns in the heart in that relation, all is strong, and whole,
and complete, in that department of our life and experience. For example,
Suppose we find ourselves constitutionally, or by reason of our relations and
circumstances, exposed to certain besetments and temptations that overcome
us. Our weakness in this respect we observe in our experience. But upon
observing our exposedness, and experiencing something of our weakness,
we begin with piling resolution upon resolution. We bind ourselves with
Oaths and promises, and covemants, but all in vain. When we purpose to
stand, we invariably, in the presence of the temptation, fall. This process
of resolving and falling brings the soul into great discouragement and per-
plexity, until at last the Holy Spirit reveals to us fully, that we are
attempting to stand and to build upon nothing. The utter emptiness and
worse than uselessness of our resolutions and self-originated efforts, is so
clearly seen by us, as to annihilate for ever self-dependence in this respect.
Now the soul is prepared for the revelation of Christ to meet this particular
want. Christ is revealed and apprehended as the soul's substitute, surety,
life, and Salvation, in respect to the particular besetment and weakness of
which it has had so full and so humiliating a revelation. Now, if the soul
utterly and for ever casts off and renounces self, and puts on the Lord Jesus
Christ, as he is seen to be needed to meet his necessity, then all is complete
in him. Thus far Christ is reigning within us. Thus far we know what
is the power of his resurrection, and are made conformable to his death.
But I said, that we need to know and to lay hold upon Christ as our life.
Too much stress cannot be laid upon our personal responsibility to Christ, our
individual relation to him, our personal interest in him, and obligation
to him. To sanctify our own souls, we need to make every department of
religion a personal matter between us and God, to regard every precept of
the Bible, and every promise, saying, exhortation, threatening, and in short,
we need to regard the whole Bible as given to us, and earnestly seek the
personal revelation of every truth it contains to our own souls. No one
can too fully understand, or too deeply feel, the necessity of taking home
the Bible with all it contains, as a message sent from Heaven to him ;
nor can too earnestly desire or seek the promised Spirit to teach him the
true Spiritual import of all its contents. He must have the Bible made
a personal revelation of God to his own soul. It must become his own
book. He must know Christ for himself. He must know him in his
different relations. He must know him in his blessed and infinite ful,
ness, or he cannot abide in him, and unless he abide in Christ, he can
bring forth none of the fruits of holiness. “Except a man abide in me, he
is cast forth as a branch, and is withered.”
650 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Apprehending and embracing Christ as our life implies the apprehension
of the fact, that we of ourselves are dead in trespasses and in sins, that we
have no life in ourselves, that death has reigned, and will eternally reign in
and over us, unless Christ become our life. Until man knows himself to
be dead, and that he is wholly destitute of spiritual life in himself, he will
never know Christ as his life. It is not enough to hold the opinion, that
all men are by mature dead in trespasses and sins. It is not enough to
hold the opinion, that we are, in common with all men, in this condition in
and of ourselves. We must see it. We must know what such language
means. It must be made a matter of personal revelation to us. We must
be made fully to apprehend our own death, and Christ as our life; and we
must fully recognize our death and him as our life, by personally renouncing
self, in this respect, and laying hold on him as our own spiritual and etermal
life. Many persons, and, strange to say, some eminent ministers, are so
blinded as to suppose, that a soul entirely sanctified does not any longer
need Christ, assuming that such a soul has spiritual life in and of himself;
that there is in him some foundation or efficient occasion of continued
holiness, as if the Holy Spirit had changed his nature, or infused physical
holiness or an independent holy principle into him, in such a sense that
they have an independent well-spring of holiness within, as a part of them-
selves. Oh, when will such men cease to darken counsel by words without
knowledge, upon the infinitely important subject of sanctification When
will such men—when will the church, understand that Christ is our
sanctification ; that we have no life, no holiness, no sanctification, except as
we abide in Christ, and he in us; that, separate from Christ, there never
is any moral excellence in any man; that Christ does not change the con-
stitution of man in Sanctification, but that he only, by our own consent,
gains and keeps the heart; that he enthrones himself, with our consent, in
the heart, and through the heart extends his influence and his life to all our
spiritual being; that he lives in us as really and truly as we live in our own
bodies; that he as really reigns in our will, and consequently in our
emotions, by our own free consent, as our wills reign in our bodies? Can-
not our brethren understand, that this is sanctification, and that nothing
else is ? that there is no degree of Sanctification that is not to be thus
ascribed to Christ? and that entire Sanctification is nothing else than the
reign of Jesus in the soul? nothing more nor less than Christ, the resur-
rection and the life, raising the soul from spiritual death, and reigning in it
through righteousness unto eternal life? I must know and embrace Christ
as my life; I must abide in him as a branch abides in the vine; I must
not only hold this as an opinion; I must know and act on it in practice.
Oh, when the ministry of reconciliation all know and embrace a whole
Christ for themselves; when they preach Jesus in all his fulness and
present vital power to the church; when they testify what they have seen,
and their hands have handled of the word of life—then, and not till then,
will there be a general resurrection of the dry bones of the house of Israel.
Amen. Lord, hasten the day !
SAINCTIFICATION. - 651
(xxxi.) We need especially to know Christ as the “All in all.” Col.
iii. 11 : “Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncir-
cumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all and in all.”
Before the soul will cease to be overcome by temptation, it must renounce
self-dependence in all things. It must be as it were self-annihilated. It
must cease to think of self, as having in it any ground of dependence in the
hour of trial. It must wholly and in all things renounce self, and put on
Christ. It must know self as nothing in the matter of spiritual life, and
Christ as all. The Psalmist could say, “All my springs are in thee.” He
is the fountain of life. Whatever of life is in us flows directly from him, as
the sap flows from the vine to the branch; or c- a rivulet flows from its
fountain. The spiritual life that is in us is really Christ's life flowing
through us. Our activity, though properly our own, is nevertheless stimu-
lated and directed by his presence and agency within us. So that we can
and must say with Paul, “yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.” Gal. ii.
20. It is a great thing for a self-conceited sinner to suffer even in his own
view, self-annihilation, as it respects the origination of any spiritual obedi-
ence to God, or any spiritual good whatever. But this must be before he
will learn, on all occasions and in all things, to stand in Christ, to abide in
him as his “ALL.” O, the infinite folly and madness of the carnal mind
It would seem, that it will always make trial of its own strength before it
will depend on Christ. It will look first for resources and help within
itself, before it will renounce self, and make Christ its “all in all.” It
will betake itself to its own wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and
redemption. In short, there is not an office or relation of Christ, that will
be recognized and embraced, until the soul has first come into circum-
stances to have its wants, in relation to that office of Christ, developed by
Some trial, and often by Some fall under temptation; then, and not until, in
addition to this, Christ is clearly and prevailingly revealed by the Holy
Spirit, insomuch that self is put down, and Christ is exalted in the heart.
Sin has so becrazed and befooled mankind, that when Christ tells them,
“without me ye can do nothing,” “ and if any man abide not in me, he is
cast forth as a branch and is withered,” they neither apprehend what or how
much he means, and how much is really implied in these and similar
sayings, until one trial after another fully developes the appalling fact, that
they are nothing, so far as spiritual good is concerned, and that Christ is
“all and in all.”
(xxxii.) Another relation in which the soul must know Christ, before it
will steadily abide in him, is that of “the Resurrection and the Life.”
Through and by Christ the Soul is raised from spiritual death. Christ as
the resurrection and the life, is raised in the soul. He arises or revives
the Divine image out of the spiritual death that reigns within us. He is
begotten by the Holy Spirit, and born within us. He arises through the
death that is within us, and developes his own life within our own being.
Will any one say, “this is a hard saying, who can hear it * Until we know
by our own experience the power of this resurrection within us, we shall
652 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
never understand “the fellowship of his sufferings and be made conform-
able to his death.” He raises our will from its fallen state of death in
trespasses and sins, or from its state of committal and voluntary enslave-
ment to lust and to self, to a state of conformity to the will of God.
Through the intellect, he pours a stream of quickening truth upon the soul.
He thus quickens the will into obedience. By making fresh discoveries to
the Soul, he strengthens and confirms the will in obedience. By thus
raising, and sustaining, and quickening the will, he rectifies the sensibility,
and quickens and raises the whole man from the dead, or rather builds up
a new and spiritual man upon the death and ruins of the old and carnal
man. He raises the same powers and faculties that were dead in trespasses
and sins to a spiritual life. He overcomes their death, and inspires them
with life. He lives in Saints and works in them to will and to do; and
they live in him, according to the saying of Christ in his address to his
Father, John XYii. 21 : “As thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that
they also may be one in us;” and again, ver. 23: “I in them and thou in
me, that they may be made perfect in one.” He does not raise the soul to
spiritual life, in any such sense that it has life separate from him for one
moment. The spiritual resurrection is a continual one. Christ is the
resurrection in the sense that he is at the foundation of all our obedience
at every moment. He, as it were, raises the soul or the will from the
slavery of lust to a conformity to the will of God, in every instance and
at every moment of its consecration to the will of God. But this he does
only upon condition of our apprehending and embracing him in this relation.
In reading the Bible, I have often been struck with the fact, that the
inspired writers were so far ahead of the great mass of professed believers.
They write of the relations in which Christ had been spiritually revealed
to them. All the names, and titles, and official relations of Christ, must
have had great significancy with them. They spoke not from theory, or
from what man had taught them, but from experience, from what the Holy
Spirit taught them. As the risen Christ is risen and lives, and is deve-
loped in one relation after another, in the experience of believers, how
striking the Writings of inspiration appear ! As the necessities of our
being are developed in experience, and as Christ is revealed, as in all new
circumstances and relations, just that and all that we need, who has not
marvelled to find in the Bible, way-marks, and guide-boards, and mile-
stones, and all the evidences that we could ask or desire, that inspired men
have gone this way, and have had substantially the same experiences that
we have. We are often also struck with the fact, that they are so far ahead
of us. At every stage in our progress we seem to have, as it were, a new
and improved edition of the Bible. We discover worlds of truth before
unnoticed by us—come to know Christ in precious relations in which we
had known nothing of him before. And ever, as our real wants are disco-
vered, Christ is seen to be all that we need, just the thing that exactly and
fully meets the necessities of our souls. This is indeed “the glorious
gospel of the blessed God.”
SANCTDFICATION. 653
(xxxiii.) Another precious and most influential relation of Christ in the
affair of our sanctification, is that of the Bridegroom or Husband of the
soul. The individual soul needs to be espoused to Christ, to enterinto this
relation personally by its own consent. Mere earthly and outward mar-
riages are nothing but sim, unless the hearts are married. True marriage
is of the heart, and the outward ceremony is only a public manifestation or
profession of the union or marriage of the souls or hearts. All marriage
may be regarded as typical of that union into which the spiritual soul enters
with Christ. This relation of Christ to the soul is frequently recognized,
both in the Old and the New Testament. It is treated of by Paul as a
great mystery. The seventh and eighth chapters of Romans present a
striking illustration of the results of the soul’s remaining under the law,
on the one hand, and of its being married to Christ on the other. The
seventh chapter begins thus, “Know ye mot, brethren, for I speak to them
that know the law, how that the law hath dominion over a man so long as
he liveth. For the woman who hath a husband is bound by the law to her
husband so long as he liveth; but if her husband be dead, she is loosed
from the law of her husband. So then if, while her husband liveth, she
be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress ; but if her
husband be dead she is free from that law, so that she is no adulteress
though she be married to another man. Therefore, my brethren, ye also
are become dead to the law by the body of Christ: that ye should be
married to another, even to Christ who is raised from the dead, that we
should bring forth fruit unto God.” The apostle then proceeds to show
the results of these two marriages, or relationis of the soul. When married
to the law, he says of it, “For when we were in the flesh, the motions of
sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit
unto death.” But when married to Christ, he proceeds to say, “we are
delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held ; that we
should serve in newness of spirit and not in the oldness of the letter.”
The remaining part of this chapter is occupied with an account of the soul's
bondage while married to the law, of its efforts to please its husband, with
its continual failures, its deep convictions, its selfish efforts, its conscious-
mess of failures, and its consequent self-condemnation and despondency.
It is perfectly obvious, when the allegory with which the apostle com-
mences this chapter is considered, that he is portraying a legal experience,
for the purpose of contrasting it with the experience of one who has attained
to the true liberty of perfect love.
The eighth chapter represents the results of the marriage of the Soul to
Christ. It is delivered from its bondage to the law, and from the power of
the law of sin in the members. It brings forth fruit unto God. Christ has
succeeded in gaining the affections of the soul. What the law could not do
Christ has done, and the righteousness of the law is now fulfilled in the soul.
The representation is as follows: The soul is married to the law, and ac-
knowledges its obligation to obey its husband. The husband requires perfect
love to God and man. This love is wanting, the soul is selfish. This dis.
654 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
pleases the husband, and he denounces death against her, if she does not
love. She recognizes the reasonableness of both the requisition and the
threatening, and resolves upon full obedience. But being selfish, the
command and threatening but increase the difficulty. All her efforts at
obedience are for selfish reasons. The husband is justly firm and impera-
tive in his demands. The wife trembles, and promises, and resolves upon
obedience. But all in vain. Her obedience is only feigned, outward, and
not love. She becomes disheartened and gives up in despair. As sentence
is about to be executed, Christ appears. He witnesses the dilemma. He
reveres, and honours, and loves the husband. He entirely approves his re-
quisition and the course he has taken. He condemns, in most unqualified
terms, the wife. Still he pities and loves her with deep benevolence. He
will consent to nothing which shall have the appearance of disapproving the
claims or the course of her husband. His rectitude must be openly acknow-
ledged. Her husband must not be dishonoured. But, on the contrary, he
must be “magnified and made honourable.” Still Christ so much pities
the wife, as to be willing to die as her substitute. This he does, and the
wife is regarded as dying in and by him her substitute. Now, since the
death of either of the parties is a dissolution of the marriage covenant,
and since the wife in the person of her substitute has died under and to the
law her husband, she is now at liberty to marry again. Christ rises from
the dead. This striking and overpowering manifestation of disinterested
benevolence, on the part of Christ, in dying for her, subdues her selfishness
and wins her whole heart. He proposes marriage, and she consents with
her whole soul. Now she finds the law of selfishness, or of self-gratification,
broken, and the righteousness of the law of love fulfilled in her heart. The
last husband requires just what the first required, but having won her whole
heart, she no longer needs to resolve to love, for love is as matural and spon-
taneous as her breath. Before the seventh of Romans was the language of her
complaint. Now the eighth is the language of her triumph. Before she
found herself unable to meet the demands of her husband, and equally unable
to satisfy her own conscience. Now she finds it easy to obey her husband,
and that his commandments are not grievous, although they are identical
with those of the first husband. Now this allegory of the apostle is not a
mere rhetorical flourish. It represents a reality, and one of the most im-
portant and glorious realities in existence, namely, the real spiritual union
of the soul to Christ, and the blessed results of this union, the bringing forth
of fruit unto God. This union is, as the apostle says, a great mystery;
nevertheless, it is a glorious reality. “He that is joined unto the Lord, is
one spirit.” 1 Cor. vi. 17.
Now until the soul knows what it is to be married to the law, and is able
to adopt the language of the seventh of Romans, it is not prepared to see,
and appreciate, and be properly affected by, the death and the love of Christ.
Great multitudes rest in this first marriage, and do not consent to die and
rise again in Christ. They are not married to Christ, and do not know
that there is such a thing, and expect to live and die in this bondage, crying
SANCTDFICATION. 655
out, “O wretched man that I am 2" They need to die and rise again in
Christ to a new life, founded in and growing out of a new relation to Christ,
Christ becomes the living head or husband of the soul, its surety, its life.
He gains and retains the deepest affection of the Soul, thus writing his law
in the heart, and engraving it in the inward parts.
But not only must the soul know what it is to be married to the law, with
its consequent thraldom and death, but it must also for itself enter into the
marriage relation with a risen, living Christ. This must not be a theory,
an opinion, a tenet; nor mnst it be an imagination, a mysticism, a notion, a
dream. It must be a living, personal, real entering into a personal and
living union with Christ, a most entire and universal giving of self to him,
and receiving of him in the relation of spiritual husband and head. The
spirit of Christ and our spirit must embrace each other, and enter into an
everlasting covenant with each other. There must be a mutual giving of
self, and receiving of each other, a blending of spirits, in such a sense as is
intended by Paul in the passage already quoted: “He that is joined to the
Lord is one spirit.”
My brother, my sister, do you understand this 2 Do you know what both
these marriages are, with their diverse results? If you do not, make no longer
pretence to being sanctified, for you are still in the gall of bitterness and in
the bond of iniquity. “Escape for thy life.”
LECTURE LXV.
SANCTIFICATION.
CONDITIONS OF ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION.—CONTINUED.
(xxxiv.) Another interesting and highly important relation which Christ
sustains to his people is that of Shepherd. This relation presupposes the
helpless and defenceless condition of Christians in this life, and the indis.
pensable necessity of guardianship and protection. Christ was revealed
to the psalmist in this relation, and when on earth he revealed himself to
his disciples in this relation. It is not enough, however, that he should
be revealed merely in the letter, or in words as sustaining this relation.
The real spiritual import of this relation, and what is implied in it, needs
to be revealed by the Holy Spirit, to give it efficiency, and inspire that
universal trust in the presence, care, and protection of Christ that is often
essential to preventing a fall in the hour of temptation. Christ meant all
that he said, when he professed to be the Good Shepherd that cared for his
sheep, that would not flee, but that would lay down his life for them. In
this relation, as in all others, there is infinite fulness and perfection. If
the sheep do thoroughly know and confide in the shepherd, they will follow
him, Will flee to him for protection in every hour of danger, will at all
times depend on him for all things. Now all this is received and professed
656 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
in theory by all professors of religion. And yet how few, comparatively,
Seem to have had Christ so revealed to them, as to have secured the actual
embracing of him in this relation, and a continual dependence on him for
all that is implied in it. Now, either this is a vain boast of Christ, or else
he may be, and ought to be depended upon, and the soul has a right to
throw itself upon him for all that is implied in the relation of Good
Shepherd. But this relation, with all the other relations of Christ,
implies a corresponding necessity in us. This necessity we must see and
feel, or this relation of Christ will have no impressive significancy. We
need, then, in this case, as in all others, the revelation of the Holy Spirit,
to make us thoroughly to apprehend our dependence, and to reveal Christ
in the spirit and fulness of this relation, until our souls have thoroughly
closed with him. Some persons fall into the mistake of supposing, that
when their necessities and the fulness of Christ have been revealed to
their mind by the Spirit, the work is done. But unless they actually
receive him, and commit themselves to him in this relation, they will soon
find to their shame that nothing has been done to purpose, so far as their
standing in the hour of temptation is concerned. He may be clearly
revealed in any of his relations, the Soul may see both its necessities and
his fulness, and yet forget or neglect actively and personally to receive
him in these relations. It should never be forgotten, that this is in every
case indispensable. The revelation is designed to secure our acceptance
of him ; if it does not do this, it has only greatly aggravated our guilt,
without at all securing to us the benefits of these relations. It is amazing
to see how common it is, and has been, for ministers to overlook this truth,
and, of course, neither to practise it themselves, nor urge it upon their
hearers. Hence Christ is not known to multitudes, and is not in many
cases received even when he is revealed by the Holy Spirit. If I am not
greatly mistaken, thorough inquiry would show that error upon this subject
exists to a most appalling extent. The personal and individual acceptance
of Christ in all his offices and relations, as the sine quá mom of entire
sanctification, seems to me to be seldom either understood or insisted on
by ministers of the present day, and of course little thought of by the
church. The idea of accepting for ourselves a whole Saviour, of appropri-
ating to our own individual selves all the offices and relations of Jesus,
seems to be a rare idea in this age of the church. Dut for what purpose
does he sustain these relations 2 Is the bare apprehension of these truths,
and of Christ in these relations enough, without our own activity being
duly excited by the apprehension, to lay hold and avail ourselves of his
fulness? What folly and madness for the church to expect to be saved by
a neglected Saviour ! To what purpose is it for the Spirit to make him
known to us, unless we as individuals embrace him and make him our own?
Let the soul but truly and fully apprehend and embrace Christ in this
relation of Shepherd, and it shall never perish, neither shall any pluck it
out of his hand. The knowing of Christ in this relation secures the soul
against following strangers. Dut thus knowing him is indispensable to
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aúl Uſ Illoq paſtduiſ SI hºtº pub ‘too.(I auth Tasoosip on paau as lºu.J., (2)
‘Job] sitſ, alpinald du
put puattaldūu on Apteaſo pub ‘Aoux on paatt ow hºun saniduſ II ('q)
ºnslatio Aq pub qānottu Uţu (tobot(lite as so qdooxa ‘pot)
Jo moveſ put uopoanoid aun tuolj no hus att, as hell] ‘solidttu II ( )
‘ls trio Jo uonekai spun tu paſſdul SI uTIA ‘ounbūſ on IIow SI iſ m{I
'stale A Tuls out, appsaq pub satnised Utaats onuſ paI aq. ‘pay an Atatus IIIA
aul ‘s quill, aunsed pug pub ‘mo put uſ oš IIIA pub plaudous poor) oun
Jo ssaulnjunraj aui aguaſtad Na (LAO SIII III ozHeol Atoms IIIA aſ Āq Ssaools
supeã pub lood situ slasoosip Apnin otA ah. … ornised pug pub ‘Ano
pug uſ of Iſets pub ‘paxes aq. Ibus all uſ torua uttu Kurt J. out Al loop
on tug I, ...: deats on Jo loop alſ, tut I no.8 outin Kºs I ‘AIlas AIſla A ,
‘spioA mugogußis'Ata A alu uſ hubaru asſulo netu Itº pub ‘Abu A lºtſds AIOB
aun Jo uonetaxal ſettostad aq, tºmottº 'ssoux put soxiaolod AIIbo otlaw ºnq
: xopoulio alp IIb Aq paintupe s poº) Jo ploy 3D on ssaoop Jo Aux to struatu
iono on spatop mutil, “lioduſ temptſds sì bodiquia pub pitalioiddu AIBal
Aaj Aoq har pulp loops uneques Adoxo Jo Juq ‘ubps;1(IO put 191suſta
Kiaxa Jo Kuo mou “pnout aqi tu ‘unnin (IAouiſ-II*A pub tellitug & si
stul, staqqol pub saxoſq, otojoſalu out pub ‘ABA lotuo attlos dm quito on
3undruama Kiams are ‘tioneAſes to adoù las pub ºutſ'ſ U5uottin pub Aq Talue
pun tood on se ns.trio puolia.Idle Apnn put AIIrmºnds on op of A asol.J.
"plaudaus poop att, Jo diſsueſplen3 alſ, amoos on ‘potoºttº XIIBUIOSIad pub
Kiſenaulds aq on spaau Iood out pub popuauaidde Allemagiſts 34 on osſº
spoon spil. daous aq, Āuouſe uomoonoid ptre Alpinoos spug pºte ‘ploy alſ,
salua Inos aun uous qānotu put Aq ‘IOOCI alſ, osſesſ isºtſio (Axxx)
‘palapſsuoo law aq SIT, 1971 asſo lou ºud
‘upſ Aoſtoj II eqs aw plotſdaqs se Uiſt Aotti aw JI "Inson sitſ, 3ultuoas
'X {)OTOGIHL OIJ.VINGIALSAS 899
KuA stun uſ onunuoo 1sutu o AA 'AbA sluſh uſ poooo.Id Sulu o AA lot u\\0
uno Aq KuA stun toluo Tsuu o M ; AbA out) oxiaolod snutt oA qugſ [nos all
so Ats juſt] ‘su Āq poAlaoot 3UIoq slui SI IT KuA alſ, SI TSIII(O ançI sm on
uſt spºol at St. ‘ūnū; 3unuſ Idolddu Ko Utſu asſooat on ‘IsItuſ) Jo doool!
on su Soonpuſ pub said.In a H 'Su o Ats on 1st IIIO on 1 SOAuðI ou ºng 'sm on
Uttain SAOIIs put stillo Jo Söuſtin oun Jo Soyun a H \sittiO on thos alſ, put
“Inos all on ns.tuſ) soonpointly put SIBoAa. IIIds KIOH etII, IIostuſ[I hsi IIIO
Aq inq ‘to Aanet A 5uTulkut Kot to ‘a MoU to ‘ūnūy Āq jou pupi Autº Jo Syllow
Al Jou ‘nuds KIOEI on Aq hou “ouſtloop Ad 10u ‘JIostuluſ asūlūO Kq poAES st
luos ou.I. 'KºM aun, SI ou A JEastulu IsItuſ) SI 11 ºnq : Uonº AIUS STI aq on
but “[nos out uſ (1519.1 on tultſ so Aſooo..I untº , AbA olin, Jøstutt[ s 1s.IIIO
... Kuw aun , hott SI iſ ºnq ‘KuA spun uſ 5(Upſau put 5uſtontto Jo uonnottoo
t; SI unnj : KuA oun hou SI [I] It'ſ "KuA olin, 10u Olu Aoun inq : UtonuAIt's
Jo (Ionlbuoo tº adu Unſuſ Jo Sylto AA unſuſ Jo SLIOA to Aul Jo syllow Jauhou A
‘syllow lodsoš to Itôo otu syllow asoul Toulou.A ‘AbA att, 1ou out syllo AA
...'Yu.A all, ,, Josuru si ou to Jos) , KuA olin, Amin SI SITIO (1009] put
oulºuluſ Aunº A autos su ‘AbA oun Jo Joliotrol odotu b hott SI at ‘aatosqC)
(longAIt's Jo KuAW out OSIt s sittio (TAXXX)
& paou no& Iſu puſ; put ‘plaudous aun A0IIo] no& Tutu ‘aouapi Aa
SITIn Kuup now a Muti put ‘JIostnox loj polanuta nox astu put ‘Utado Loop oup
udas no& OATH & Unrºj K.I loop SIUIn potenua no.8 outſ ‘sual nou ºnq “sel
puy & Utomºlo. SIU, #uſtubisms sitſ uſ poſtduiſ SI ºut A poons topum noA oxº PI
... loop out st: 1s.III.O populouſa.Iddu ALT300 moś oAbū ‘poſeo Aal (Ioaq Sull stun
Utau AA & poſſ) Jo Utonoanoid put InoAt] out, Utto.J US Imo K & Iowa IOI ano
unus puu 'sapuaua Ignitids ano& Jo Khanto Buſhuelatum aun IIB on pasodya
‘ploy at 1 Inoun A JIosino & Ulaas KLIBolo no K axt:EI & IIoneta,\al [un]pluds
put Iultosted SITIn pºu no & Oat H ‘admbuſ on hugh toduſ SI qi alou puy
‘Jø|UI9 O]
hoaſăou lo 133,10] jou isntu I IIIod Ku Yu put : Buntonito uo pandtul si qau A
puauaiddesſtu hou Up I nutſ, a.ms aq isnu I Lolua I qutſ, smopostIOo aq. 1snut
I 'telua Almun isnut I Joséu Āq put to Jonua Ismut I pasſool taxo to
U21103,10] od nuouout atto Ioj to Aou sitſ, la I pop Jo Imo Ag pub aaol att,
Jo almSofoul out on SaMastmo Ioſ SS2008 3uture5 put, ‘Toop spun ºu up 3uttonue
Iſm] put ‘aamob aſqrsuodso. Ibuostad tº Jo Khussaoau alabsuadspur aun
uodu ‘ĀIIboneſiduo put Kinst I put : stun III papiduſ SI 1911A Jo pub “Loop oth
st sittiO Jo ‘hºlids AIoH out, Aq ‘sm on Uonulosa. Luttoslad au Jo Anussooet
oul Oslº put : 10op oup, 1s.IIID U3nOJun axus ‘anoMºj sº pub turq on ssaood
IIb uouſ popnioxa Aſſembu 5uſoq se pop on Suontal mo Jo uomula Aal
[Buſostad a Jo Khussooou aun uodn assuſ on tutău hoàioſ lou isntu I atopſ
'ploudous poor) att, Jo quoddus put uomooloºd qualolua pub passaid oup Jo
‘aouarted No put aſ I UAo (Ioun uſ 'uomºzºat ott aabu Ainuanbosuoo put doop
aq, Āq potoluo to Aoti aabu Koun ºutſ, Joold seppes aun axis Kubu AoEI
'uomenoads ssamml] put ssenteau e ‘Āloon e ‘uouſdo up and s isſuuo
Jo ejpalAoux Iſeul, uomoonoid put drisuelplen3 Stu Uuruto pub ‘ssauploq
unſa tuſu Toboiddt, 1outino ºutſu uſ aouapguoo you o Abū Koul, Kew taunoug
dm portuſſo expu Kalū osmºoq ‘utſu AOILO) to ‘plotſdaus aun Aoux hou
SANCTDFICATION. 659
to the end of life, and to all eternity, as the indispensable condition of our
salvation. “Whither I go ye know, and the way ye know,” said Christ.
“Thomas said unto him, Lord, we know not whither thou goest, and how
can we know the way ?” “Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, and the
truth, and the life; no man cometh unto the Father, but by me. If ye
had known me ye should have known my Father also, and from henceforth
ye know him, and have seen him. Philip Saith unto him, Lord, show us
the Father, and it sufficeth us. Jesus Saith unto him, Have I been so
long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip 2 He that
hath seen me hath seen the Father, and how Sayest thou then, Show
us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the
Father in me?” Here Christ so identifies himself with the Father as to
insist, that he who had seen one had seen the other. When therefore he
says, no man cometh to the Father but by him, we are to understand, that
no man need expect to find the true God elsewhere than in him. The
visible Christ embodied the true Godhead. He is the way to God, for and
because he is the true God, and the etermal life, and Salvation of the Soul.
Many seem to understand Christ in this relation as nothing more than a
teacher of a system of morality, by the observance of which we may be
saved. Others regard this relation as only implying, that he is the way, in
the sense of making an atonement, and thus rendering it possible for us to
be forgiven. Others still understand this language as implying, not only
that Christ made an atonement, and opened up a way of access, through
his death and mediation, to God; but also that he teaches us the great
truths essential to our Salvation. Now all this, in my apprehension, falls
entirely, and I may say, infinitely short of the true spiritual meaning of
Christ, and the true spiritual import of this relation. The above is implied
and included in this relation, no doubt, but this is not all, nor the essential
truth intended in Christ's declaration. He did not say, I came to open the
way, nor to teach the way, nor to call you into the way, but “I am the
way.” Suppose he had intended merely, that his instructions pointed out
the way, or that his death was to open the way, and his teaching point it
out, would he not have said,—What have I so long taught you, and have
you not understood my doctrine 2 Would he not have said, I have taught
you the way, instead of Saying, I am the way 2 The fact is, there is a
meaning in these words, more profoundly spiritual than his disciples then
perceived, and than many now seem capable of understanding. He is
himself the way of Salvation, because he is the Salvation of the soul. He
is the way to the Father, because he is in the Father, and the Father in
him. He is the way to eternal life, because he is himself the very essence
and substance of eternal life. The soul that finds him needs not to look
for eternal life, for it has found it already. These questions of Thomas
and Philip show how little they really knew of Christ, previous to the
baptism of the Holy Spirit. Vast multitudes of the professed disciples of
the present day seem not to know Christ as “the way.” They seem not
to have known Christ in this relation as he is revealed by the Holy Spirit,
U U &
660 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
This revelation of Christ as “the way " by the Comforter is indispensable
to our so knowing him as to retain our standing in the hour of temptation.
We must know, and enter, and walk, and abide in this true and living way
for ourselves. It is a living way, and not a mere speculation.
Do you, my brother, know Christ by the Holy Spirit as the “living
way?” Do you know Christ for yourself, by a personal acquaintance? Or do
you know him only by report, by hearsay, by preaching, by reading, and by
study? Do you know him as in the Father, and the Father as in him? Philip
seemed not to have had a spiritual and personal revelation of the proper
deity of Christ to his own soul. Have you had this revelation ? And
when he has been revealed to you, as the true and living way, have you by
faith personally entered this way? Do you abide steadfast in it? Do you
know by experience what it is to live, and move, and have your very being
in God? Be ye not deceived; he that does not spiritually discern, and
enter this way, and abide in it unto the end, cannot be saved. Do see to
it, then, that you know the way to be sanctified, to be justified, to be saved.
See to it that you do not mistake the way, and betake yourself to some
other way. Remember, works are not the way. Faith is not the way.
Doctrine is not the way. All these are conditions of salvation, but Christ
in his own person, is “the way.” His own life, living in and united to
you, is the way, and the only way. You enter this way by faith; works of
faith result from, and are a condition of, abiding in this way; but the way
itself is the indwelling, living, personally embraced and appropriated
Christ, the true God and the eternal life, Amen, Lord Jesus! the way is
pleasant, and all its paths are peace.
(xxxvii.) Christ is also “the Truth,” and as such he must be appre-
hended and embraced, to securo the soul from falling in the hour of trial.
In this relation many have known Christ merely as one who declared the
truth, as one who revealed the true God and the way of Salvation. This is
all they understand by this assertion of Christ, that he is the truth.
But if this is all, why may not the same with equal truth be said of
Moses, and of Paul, and John ” They taught the truth. They revealed
the true God, so far as holy lives and true doctrine are concerned;
and yet who ever heard of J ohn, or Paul, or Moses, as being the way or
the truth? They taught the way and the truth, but they were neither
the way nor the truth, while Christ is truth. What then, is truth 2
Why, Christ is the truth. Whoever knows Christ spiritually knows the
truth 2 Words aro not the truth. Ideas are not the truth. Both Words
and ideas may be signs or representatives of the truth. But the truth
lives, and has a being and a home in Christ. He is the embodiment and
the essence of truth. He is reality. He is substance, and not shadow.
He is truth revealed. He is elementary, essential, eternal, immutable,
necessary, absolute, self-existent, infinite truth. When the Holy Spirit
reveals truth, he reveals Christ. When Christ reveals truth, he reveals
himself. Philosophers have found it difficult to define truth. Pilato
asked Christ, “What is truth,” but did not wait for an answer. The term is
SANCTIFICATION. 66]
doubtless used in a double sense. Sometimes the mere reflection or repre-
sentation of things in signs, such as words, actions, writings, pictures, and
diagrams, &c., is called truth; and this is the popular understanding of it.
But all things that exist are only signs, reflections, symbols, representa-
tions, or types, of the Author of all things. That is, the universe is only
the oljective representation of the subjective truth, or is the reflection or
reflector of God. It is the mirror that reflects the essential truth, or the
true and living God.
But I am aware that none but the Holy Spirit can possess the mind of
the import of this assertion of Christ. It is full of mystery and darkness,
and is a mere figure of speech to one unenlightened by the Holy Spirit, in
respect to its true spiritual import. The Holy Spirit does not reveal all
the relations of Christ to the soul at once. Hence there are many to
whom Christ has been revealed in some of his relations, while others are
yet veiled from the view. Each distinct name, and office, and relation
needs to be made the subject of a special and personal revelation to the
soul, to meet its necessities, and to confirm it in obedience under all
circumstances. When Christ is revealed and apprehended as the essential,
eternal, immutable truth, and the soul has embraced him as such, as he of
whom all that is popularly called truth is only the reflection, as he of
whom all truth in doctrine, whether of philosophy in any of its branches,
or revelation in any of its departments; I say, when the mind apprehends
him as that essential truth of which all that men call truth is only the
reflection, it finds a rock, a resting-place, a foundation, a stability, a reality,
a power in truth, of which before it had no conception. If this is unintel-
ligible to you, I cannot help it. The Holy Spirit can explaim and make
you see it; I cannot. Christ is not truth in the sense of mere doctrine,
mor in the sense of a teacher of true doctrine, but as the substance or
essence of truth. He is that of which all truth in doctrine treats. True
doctrine treats of him, but is not identical with him. Truth in doctrine is
only the sign, or declaration, or representation of truth in essence, of
living, absolute, self-existent truth in the Godhead. Truth in doctrine, or
true doctrine, is a medium through which substantial or essential truth is
revealed. Dut the doctrine or medium is no more identical with truth
than light is identical with the objects which it reveals. Truth in doctrine
is called light, and is to essential truth what light is to the objects that
radiate or reflect it. Light coming from objects is at once the condition of
their revelation, and the medium through which they are revealed. So
true doctrine is the condition and the means of knowing Christ the essential
truth. All truth in doctrine is only a reflection of Christ, or is a radiation
upon the intelligence from Christ. When we learn this spiritually, we
shall learn to distinguish between doctrine and Him whose radiance it is—
to worship Christ as the essential truth, and not the doctrine that reveals
him—to worship God instead of the Bible. We shall then find our way
through the shadow to the substance. Many, no doubt, mistake and fall
down and worship the doctrine, the preacher, the Bible, the shadow, and
*A*) O'IOGIHAI, OILVINGILSXS Č99
pulu ou I, Sloaſqo Iulton but soos Ánounsºp I ºu 3H [uanyuu to Iguanbul
Jo aouasald aun uſ ‘sº ‘shoeſqo pub Sunn.I.) [un].IIds soos Á1100IIp puſu ou?
qūāti Tūmūlds Jo ouasaid aun uſ [boſs.ſud IIBUIn 113II (80.1 Ssal on SI quân
[un]plºds ‘oſa aún ºut:3to KIIIsau alſ. Iſāno.III] ‘Sloaſato [BOTSATId 1sojutſul
soy[BUI to SIBOAQI ‘AlīāII Ibuntu 10 Tºols&uid 'Ignitids pub [torSAud ‘SAAOUDI
puttu Tumiſſils Klaxo so ‘spupi OA, Jo od on steaddu Kuſeltoo quâr I
...Jootout, huāll ou? ale quit!' I
oup put pop Jo Kolā aun top, ‘uootti otſ, Jo tou ‘uns ou, Jo peau ou o Abū
s]ubliquuſul aun huun ‘pſes SI ºr utoſºsniaſ AoN alſ, JO (, ‘IIb he ssou Libp
ou si utſu u put ‘huāll sº por), “S&us utioſ ºutsil Snolia Augu SIU 01(II
noS pallbo ou.A., “tutu Jo SKUs Toyod out UIQUOIddº Utºo uglu ou loſu w
qqāll uſ Bulla. Ap Su TsIITIO Jo Syſłods [nud ºntºn all, sº opt[A out 294
quouſel slu natu, ‘humour où uo uomulnägstrean SIII III ‘nsLIHO Jo prºs
st II attus oth Jo Ssount[3HQ alſ, axole ‘Iloat at UIOU TH3H E Luſu punorg
pouTIs a tatt, put V, ‘snostatue(I on KUA SIII (to Int's Jo prºs sſ aſ ‘Utöv
... pUIOA aun out hitsu e outoo tub I, ,”ušiſ alſh uſ oxaloq “131I oth
a.Autī ok alſTIAA, ‘Utºu put V .. aſ Jo Juju on 3Abū IIulis Inq ‘ssau Itºp
uſ Muw lotl IIulls out Ilawolloj hutſ, ou plºtoA on Jo quâſ"I out, Ut, I,
‘s `us snsaſ ... pUIOM oul onuſ Uloutoo quun uttu KuoAo unenuſºil (IoIUA ‘LHoII
antil oup su.A juſt.L Atlânt hull, Jo SSounſw Ibad- On Jules sºw inq ‘huāll
help hott Suw of H oxolod luğrul UII (15motun uouſ IIe nutſ, ‘huāll aun
Jossaulx quaq on ‘ssaulA tº Joj autuo outs all.J. ºutloſ StA alugu asotºw
poº) tuo, J Tuas untu tº SpA alou.J., 'You iſ populouaiduoo ssauyºtep oup pub
‘ssouxtapp uſ unauſús huāII oth puty uotu Jo huāll ou? stºw aſ out, pub ‘ajſſ
seA turti u I, ‘uſt Jo S.Wes UTIO'ſ "LHoPI ºn II ain, SI sittiO (IIIAxxx)
‘doxa Ioſ nos untin[A IIoAp on quit] [m] to AOd-IIb pub
tenuosso êul Su Tuol ApS auſAIp pub ‘ātūAII ‘ttos.ſ att] oAlaoat putt, ‘Toop aun
uðdo and ‘Ioop oul tº Bumpuuns put ‘uasil put ‘pogrom.to TsIITIO Jo KIO)s aun
up sad out op qug aduthdoooº loſ Utſu Shuosold pub “situſ) Buruleouoo
slogy all uniw pollutamboº sm Soxtetu outinoop out.L "sittiO Jo aouthsqms
pub uosiod [entiosso ‘āUAI ou as loool inq “outloop out uſ isol lot suul
ſmos all L ºutlu on puſtu on Atºp put 100.11b on popuantu sº ‘todsoã ou!
uſ quântº St, *sūlūO Jo ouſt]oop ou.L uloun on pensajputtu to paſta Aal Kiſe
-IIosted Josuſ isſuu.O petſ to A2u Aoun sºluo Jo out thoop oth ubul launum)
Buſtinou Aous strens.IIIO passajo.Id Jo sapn)nūntu quith ‘uonsenb puo&aq
st I 'ssount[juq aſqugout pub ‘IbuIIona pub Tumuasso uſ snoſtolà spugns
at a totA aas put oko Ino, JH Inq ‘ootſ.Ins sº tuouſ panooga. Kuip tims aq,
drus.IoM put [ood tº qu (IAop It'ſ 10tſ oGI Hastutu uns atti top trus aq, Jo
uomoolyai Uup tº ox{thsºul jou. OCT uttu Ato Aa unauanušilua hutſ, nušil ann
alth pub ‘unn.In Ibntlosso out, putatiolddu on moA saſquue lºuds KIoH out. Unum
“sayºutuo Tušil out, USIUA tuolj uomooup alth uſ KUptons (OOT aslul)
qLA stu', punojūoo lou op 'outloop Jo uomºdulonuoo att, Aq pauaxtomb Khū
-Iqſsues Imok put ‘pottonušHua 100IIonuţ Inok pug mok (tou M autuoop oup
Aq Jo portal, 5uſūl alſ, Joy oupinoop oun asſºns (Il you op 'poaqlad Aptee(I
'uomºſpb.I to uonooga, pItu put haaws out Kuo sº quin Suppreds
put ºn 3.1Q still Hoſt|A Jo ‘ootiºnsqus smokioğ Alqºgouſ ou log tool nou op
SAINCTIFICATION. 663
has an eye, or seeing faculty, which uses the material eye and natural
light, to discern material objects. It is not the eye that sees. It is
always the mind that sees. It uses the eye merely as an instrument of
vision, by which it discerns material objects. The eye and the light are
conditions of seeing the material universe, but it is always the mind that
sees. So the mind directly sees spiritual realities in the presence of
spiritual light. But what is light? What is natural, and what is spiritual
light 2 Are they really identical, or are they essentially different? It is
not my purpose here to enter into any philosophical speculations upon this
subject; but I must observe, that, whatever spiritual light is, the mind,
under certain circumstances, cannot discern the difference, if difference
there is, between them. Was that spiritual or physical light which the
disciples saw on the mount of transfiguration 2 Was that spiritual or
physical light which Paul and his companions saw on their way to Damas-
cus 2 What light is that which falls upon the mental eye of the believer
when he draws so near to God, as not at all to distinguish at the moment
the glory that surrounds him from material light? What was that light
which made the face of Moses shine with such brightness, that the people
were unable to look upon it? And what is that light which lights up the
countenance of a believer, when he comes direct and fresh from the mount
of communion with God? There is often a visible light in his counte-
nance. What is that light which often shines upon the pages of the Bible,
making its spiritual meaning as manifest to the mind, as the letters and
words are 2 In such seasons the obscurity is removed from the spirit of
the Bible, just as really and as visibly, as the rising sun would remove the
obscurity of midnight from the letter. In one case won perceive the letter
clearly in the presence of natural light. You have no doubt, you can have
no doubt, that you see the letters and words as they are. In the other,
you apprehend the spirit of the Bible, just as clearly as you see the letter.
You can no more doubt, at the time, that you see the true spiritual import
of the words, than that you see the words themselves. Both the letter
aud the spirit seem to be set in so strong a light, that you know that you
see both. Now what light is this in which the spirit of the Bible is seen 2
That it is light, every spiritual man knows. He calls it light. He can
call it nothing else. At other times the letter is as distinctly visible as
before, and yet there is no possibility of discerning the spirit of the Bible.
It is then only known in the letter. We are then left to philologize, and
philosophize, and theorize, and theologize, and are really all in the dark,
as to the true spiritual import of the Bible. But when “ the true light
that lighteth every man” shines upon the word, we get at once a deeper
insight into the real spiritual import of the word, than we could have
gotten in a life-time without it. Indeed, the true spiritual import of the
Bible is hid from the learning of this world, and revealed to the babes who
are in the light of Christ. I have often been afflicted with the fact, that
true spiritual light is rejected and contemned, and the very idea of its
existence Scouted by many men who are wise in the wisdom of this world.
664 SYSTEMATIC TIIEOLOGY.
But the Bible everywhere abounds with evidence, that spiritual light
exists, and that its presence is a condition of apprehending the reality and
presence of spiritual objects. It has been generally supposed, that the
natural sun is the source of natural light. Sure it is, that light is a con-
dition of our beholding the oljects of the material universe. But what is
the source of spiritual light? The Bible says Christ is. But what does
this mean? When it is said, that he is the true light, does it mean only,
that he is the teacher of true doctrine 2 or does it mean, that he is the
light in which true doctrine is apprehended, or its spiritual import under-
stood, that he shines through and upon all spiritual doctrine, and causes
its spiritual import to be apprehended, and that the presence of his light,
or, in other words, his own presence, is a condition of any doctrine being
spiritually understood 2 He is no doubt the essential light. That is, light
is an attribute of his divinity. Essential, uncreated light is one of the
attributes of Christ as God. It is a spiritual attribute of course; but it is
an essential and a natural attribute of Christ, and whoever knows Christ
after the Spirit, or whoever has a true, spiritual, and personal acquaintance
with Christ as God, knows that Christ is light, that his being called light
is not a mere figure of speech ; that his “covering himself with light as
with a garment; his enlightening the heavenly world with so ineffable a
light, that no man can approach thereunto and live, that the strongest
seraphim are unable to look with unveiled face upon his overpowering
effulgence. I say, to a spiritual mind these are not mere figures of
speech; they are understood by those who walk in the light, or who walk
in the light of Christ, to mean what they say.
I dwell upon this particular relation of Christ, because of the importance
of its being understood, that Christ is the real and true light who alone
can cause us to see spiritual things as they are. Without his light we
walk in the midst of the most overpowering realities, without being at all
aware of their presence. Like one surrounded with matural darkness, or as
one deprived of sight gropes his way and knows not at what he stumbles,
so one deprived of the presence and light of Christ, gropes his way and
stumbles at he knows not what. To attain to true spiritual illumination,
and to continue and walk in this light, is indispensable to entire sancti-
fication. O, that this were understood | Christ must be known as the
true and only light of the soul. This must not be held merely as a tenet.
It must be understood and spiritually experienced and known. That
Christ is in some undeterminate sense the light of the soul and the true
light, is generally admitted, just as multitudes of other things are admitted,
without being at all spiritually and experimentally understood. But this
relation or attribute of Christ must be spiritually known by experience, as
a condition of abiding in him. John says, “this then is the message which
we have heard of him. that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all.
If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie
and do not the truth. But if we walk in the light as he is in the light, we
have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son
SA NCTIFICATION. 665
cleanseth us from all sin.” This light is come into the world, and if men
do not love darkness rather than light, they will know Christ as the true
light of the soul, and will so walk in the light as not to stumble. ;
I desire much to amplify upon this relation of Christ, but must forbear,
or I shall too much enlarge this course of instruction. I would only en-
deavour to impress you deeply with the conviction that Christ is light, and
that this is no figure of speech. Rest not, my brother, until you truly and
experimentally know him as such. Bathe your soul daily in his light, so
that when you come from your closet to your pulpit, your people shall
behold your face shining as if it were the face of an angel.
LECTURE LXVI.
SAINCTIFICATION.
CONDITIONS OF ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION.—CONTINUED.
(xxxix.) Another relation which Christ sustains to the believer, and
which it is indispensable that he should recognize and spiritually appre-
hend, as a condition of entire sanctification, is that of “ Christ within us.”
“Know ye mot,” says the apostle, “that Jesus Christ is in you, except
ye be reprobates.”—2 Cor. xiii. 5. “But we are not in the flesh, but in
the Spirit, if the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the
Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is
dead because of sin, but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. -
Rom. viii. 9, 10. “My little children, of whom I travail in birth again
until Christ be formed in you."—Gal. iv. 19. “Yet not I, but Christ
liveth in me."—Gal. ii. 20. Now it has often appeared to me, that many
know Christ only as an outward Christ, as one who lived many hundred
years ago, who died, and arose, and ascended on high, and who now lives
in heaven. They read all this in the Bible, and in a certain sense they
believe it. That is, they admit it to be true historically. But have they
Christ risen within them 2 Living within the veil of their own flesh, and
there ever making intercession for them and in them 2 This is quite ano-
ther thing. Christ in heaven making intercession is one thing ; this is a
great and glorious truth. But Christ in the soul, there also living “ to
make intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered,” is another
thing. The Spirit that dwells in the saints is frequently in the Bible repre-
sented as the Spirit of Christ, and as Christ himself. Thus in the passage
just quoted from the eighth of Romans, the apostle represents the Spirit of
God that dwells in the Saints as the Spirit of Christ, and as Christ him-
self—Rom. viii. 9, 10 : “But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if
so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the
Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is
Kº)OTOGIHAI, OILVINGILSXS 999
oùlú XIN , : s\us ausolu alſ, aotta H ASIIIO tuolj (IoIIBJ put subſisſillo
trunuſº) ou.I. utoq, uſualA pattuto) as IIIO hou 3Abu Stossajold Autº IN
'unsuo,I;s spu uodn subal pub ‘aoued
sſu SKoſuo II solusuald sitſ Jo to AIt alph Jo Oslº SITUIp TT 'oaoſ sſ. Jo
uſuluno) aun yu sylulub pub ‘huāII SIU up 5uſoq s] sºul pub ‘SMIBA pub ‘Soaſt
put ‘UU up Slso.I [nos all L ºr uſ ulietto Sul,to Aodia.AO ut; sut ‘Sn III put
ulla luosold sºluo Jo uoniušooet Tunny.IIds sºul, so Alastmo uſ att, oa utú
Su uſ poisotomuſ alotu Atapuguſ so put ‘sa.Alastno on attº ow SB sm on Tuou
st AItal put ‘so Mostmo unº att, ow sº sm UniM quasaïd ATIU21 sº ‘hºlids su
Aq pozſußooo..I aq on spool situo put ‘populouaiddu Kubunitids aq on spoou
ašuujuel sup IIb AON ºuaul uſ put ulaul UniM on pluous all ºpt[] ‘to Ao
Joj uloun unIA opiau pinous ('oùù aun tuouſ subaddu Kuuupuuqu se ‘hºtºs
UAO stu Suw Ulalu A). ‘puas pluow out tutou A 11.11ds out) ºutin “oy ‘Ulouſ, Olull
Jaslulu Asapſubu ol 'oldood slu (I) IAA apoqu stu du Oxtºn put outloo 01 pasſiſt
-oid sºuld noun A unu Jo upoluos up 03 služuouſ] aun haſ not pub uſualA
lo ‘luos all, Jo losolo all uſ turq ūl Ā uoſtumuluoo loos VIIB.Iluutt IIIA q quill
os ‘nsLillo IOI mounty, Nool you put uſunſw (Linn on sº “unmin sºul puolloiddu
on Os spoou [nos ou.I, Utaxuou up uo Tuju Kuo sº islatio Jo uondoouoo ou?
olbúIII (lub ol st; Sn Kq paputoua.Iddu Kittapo OS 34 on spoou ‘Sn III SI SITULO
Juſt louſ otll, 1st IIIO Jo Antids oup Aq populadded pub poompUI SI u011
-Uloosuoo sIul bull ‘potoquotuo.1 to Aa ºr ol luq : pot) on Utomºtoastloo Otſuo
uſ s]sisttoo tuonuognouds onli, isappmā [ºnal,[[ds U Stun Si SSoup (IIIq AbūAA
's] ſquu Klou Jo (tonulu.[0] pontuſ;1,10-Jſes atau tº ‘UOIJ polluso.I put ‘Utſ ponsis
-uoo iſ nutſ, “posoddus VoII, JI so qsuſ ‘uonuognottes quoqu on IA put XIIth
stonstitut Auutu ‘AlīA\ poonstopum atow sºul hut!) O Tiongoglout's aunua
Jo notoos put uonpuoo Auo pub on.In all, sº ..” IIIds oud 9.18 uptºwn , aw
quun osuos ūſ ūons uſ sn on pontun pub Sn uptºnTM Utasi, Islalo ‘paſſion,to pub
patto.III]ap (IbuI plo alſ.L alouſ, Auſ SIU Jo Khitounnu au pausūqºsa pub Uta)
-AILA Buſ Abū st; pub 'sligau Ino uſ auo.III) stu pausúſſºnse pub u2SIUB 3UIAbū
Sb ‘sn uſ 5uruśro, put Utosſt snsaſ su ‘anol AeS plus\uſ up sº tutu Aoust 1sutu
oAA IIBAe Ibn Huds out Jo SI ‘Inoſ AUS plºwano (It st; KIIBoſtols (I Kiotout
do “Usau au, Ionjº TsIITIO Aoux ol, Umos oth Jo aouðibaqo put oollapg|Too
aul sausſ|qb)so pub SUITUUIOO ‘aouasard [gal pub quelsuoo SIU Jo Su 5uſtus
-St. Snu1 pub ‘sm (IIUMA Jºsuru Runsajputtu stE] 'aouaipaqo put unſu) tuo
uodu paybtionſhuoo losutſu Āq SI ‘sn uſ pub qui M se su on Josuyu 5unsapſubu
SIH aotiosold sºul jumptionaldde uno quoqu A sm huounſA SI ou sº sm uſualA
quosold AIlead on Abul situo joiguoo Jo sunou uſ sm uſunsus on ooliosald
paysa) ſubUI SIU pool oa, Juq ‘sm uſun LA TsūtūO Jo oouasaid [ball oup paau
Áſuo jou oAA ºutſil III Šumpſ tº Imo oſmoos on ‘uongloAot pubMUI put ‘[buosted
‘ouſAIp tº Aq popualoiddu KILumpuds aq. 1snut pub ‘aţaſq. aul Jo Suluovan
alſ, si 'soalasino II ate 2A su Su tº Kubot su ‘op as su sappoq uno Sup
- Idºlluſ AInt, put ÁIIbai su ‘su uſunºw asſulo qug ‘ueMºou ul Auto you asſuto
'Aoſa úl ÁIIbntinuoo put. Anounsp dayſ put popuaua,Iddu Atſumºuds
9q 0) speat 198] SIU ºngſ to Aattoq [un]puds Kunin alſ, up slowp ‘nstituo
Jo Anſø(I lºot out to ‘uoul sittio Jo nulds ou.I. attig aun up uoultuoo st
SRI.L SSousnoonqāſī Jo asnboaq aſſi si nitrds oun inq : urs Jo osmooq prep
SANCTIFICATION. 667
children, of whom I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you.”
Have you a spiritual apprehension of what this means ?
(xl.) We must spiritually know Christ as “our strength,” as a condition
of entire sanctification. Says the Psalmist, Ps. xviii. 1 : “I will love
thee, O Lord, my strength ;” and again, Ps, xix. 14 : “O Lord my
strength;” and again, Ps. xxxi. 4: “Pull me out of the net, for thou
art my strength;” and again, Ps. xliii. 2 : “Thou art the God of my
strength :” and again, Ps. lix. 17 : “To thee, O my strength, will I
sing:” and again, Ps. cxliv, 1 : “Blessed be the Lord my strength." In
Is. xxvii. 5: “The Lord says, Let him take hold of my strength, and he
shall make peace with me.” Jeremiah says, ch. xvi. 19: “O Lord, my
strength.” Hab. iii. 9 : “God is my strength.” In 2 Cor. xii. 9, Christ
says to Paul, “My strength is made perfect in weakness.” We are com-
manded to be strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might, that is, to
appropriate his strength by faith. We are exhorted to take hold on his
strength, and doing this is made a condition of making peace with God.
That God is in some sense our strength, is generally admitted. But I fear
it is rare to apprehend the true spiritual sense in which he is our strength.
Many take refuge not in his strength by faith, but in the plea, that he is
their strength, and that they have mone of their own, while they continue
in sin. But this class of persons neither truly understand nor believe,
that God is their strength. It is with all who hold this language and yet
live in sin, an opinion, a tenet, a say-so, but by no means a spiritually
apprehended and embraced truth. If the real meaning of this language
were spiritually apprehended and embraced with the heart, the soul would
no more live in sin. It could no more be overcome with temptation, while
appropriating Christ, than God could be overcome.
The conditions of spiritually apprehending Christ as our strength are,
(a.) The spiritual apprehension of our own weakness, its nature and
degree.
(b.) The revelation of Christ to us as our strength by the Holy Spirit.
When these revelations are truly made, and self-dependence is, there-
fore, for ever anihilated, the soul comes to understand wherein its strength
lies. It renounces for ever its own strength, and relies wholly on the
strength of Christ. This it does not in the antinomian, do-nothing, sit-still
sense of the term ; but, on the contrary, it actively takes hold of Christ's
strength, and uses it in doing all the will of God. It does not sit down
and do nothing, but, on the contrary, it takes hold of Christ's strength, and
sets about every good word and work as one might lean upon the strength
of another, and go about doing good. The soul that understands and does
this, as really holds on to and leans upon Christ, as a helpless man would
lean upon the arm or shoulder of a strong man, to be borne about in some
benevolent enterprise. It is not a state of quietism. It is not a mere
opinion, a sentiment, a fancy. It is, with the sanctified Soul, one of the
clearest realities in existence, that he leans upon and uses the strength of
Christ. He knows himself to be constantly and perseveringly active, in
668 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
ë
thus availing himself of the strength of Christ; and being perfectly weak
in himself, or perfectly emptied of his own strength, Christ's strength is
made perfect in his weakness. This renunciation of his own strength is
not a denial of his matural ability, in any such sense as virtually to charge
God with requiring what he is unable to perform. It is a complete
recognition of his ability, were he disposed to do all that God requires of
him, and implies a thorough and homest condemnation of himself for not
using his powers as God requires. But while it recognizes its natural
liberty or ability, and its consequent obligation, it at the same time clearly
and spiritually sees, that it has been too long the slave of lust ever to
assert or to maintain its spiritual Supremacy, as the master instead of the
slave of appetite. It sees so clearly and affectingly, that the will or heart
is so weak in the presence of temptation, that there is no hope of its main-
taining its integrity, unsupported by strength from Christ, that it renounces
for ever its dependence on its own strength, and casts itself wholly and for
ever on the strength of Christ. Christ's strength is appropriated only upon
condition of a full renunciation of one's own. And Christ's strength is
made perfect in the Soul of man only in its entire weakness; that is, only
in the absence of all dependence on its own strength. Self must be
renounced in every respect in which we appropriate Christ. He will not
share the throne of the heart with us, nor will he be put on by us, except
in so far as we put off ourselves. Lay aside all dependence on yourself, in
every respect in which you would have Christ. Many reject Christ by
depending on self, and seem not to be aware of their error.
Now, let it be understood and constantly borne in mind, that this self.
renunciation and taking hold on Christ as our strength, is not a mere
speculation, an opinion, an article of faith, a profession, but must be one of
the most practical realities in the world. It must become to the mind an
omnipresent reality, insomuch that you shall no more attempt any thing in
your own strength than a man who never could walk without crutches
would attempt to arise and walk without thinking of them. To such a one
his crutches become a part of himself. They are his legs. He as naturally
uses them as we do the members of our body. He no more forgets them,
or attempts to walk without them, than we attempt to walk without our feet.
Now just so it is with one who spiritually understands his dependence on
Christ. He knows he can walk, and that he must walk, but he as naturally
uses the strength of Christ in all his duties, as the lame man uses his
crutches. It is as really an omnipresent reality to him, that he must lean
upon Christ, as it is to the lame man that he must lean upon his crutch.
He learms on all occasions to keep hold of the strength of Christ, and does
not even think of doing any thing without him. He knows that he meed
not attempt any thing in his own strength; and that if he should, it will
result in failure and disgrace, just as really and as well as the man without
feet or legs knows that for him to attempt to walk without his crutch would
ensure a fall. This is a great, and, I fear, a rarely learned lesson with
professed Christians, and yet how strange that it should be so, since, in
SANCTDFICATION. 669
every instance, attempts to walk without Christ have resulted in complete
and instantaneous failure. All profess to know their own weakness and
their remedy, and yet how few give evidence of knowing either.
(xli.) Christ is also the Keeper of the soul; and in this relation he must
be revealed to, and embraced by, each Soul as the condition of its abiding”
in Christ, or, which is the same thing, as a condition of entire Sanctification.
Ps. cxxi. “I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my
help. My help cometh from the Lord, which made heaven and earth. He
will not suffer thy foot to be moved; he that keepeth thee will not slumber.
Behold he that keepeth Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep. The Lord
is thy keeper; the Lord is thy shade upon thy right hand. The sun shall
not smite thee by day, nor the moon by night. The Lord shall preserve
thee from all evil; he shall preserve thy soul. The Lord shall preserve
thy going out, and thy coming in, from this time forth, and even for ever-
more.” This Psalm, with a great many other passages of scripture, repre-
sents God as exerting an efficient influence in preserving the soul from
falling. This influence he exerts, of course not physically or by compulsion,
but it is and must be a moral influence, that is, an influence entirely com-
sistent with our own free agency. But it is efficient in the sense of being
a prevailing influence.
But in this relation, as in all others, Christ must be apprehended and
embraced. The soul must see and well appreciate its dependence in this
respect, and commit itself to Christ in this relation. It must cease from
its own works, and from expecting to keep itself, and commit itself to
Christ, and abide in this state of committal. Keeping the soul implies
watching over it to guard it against being overcome with temptation. This
is exactly what the Christian needs. His enemies are the world, the flesh,
and Satan. By these he has been enslaved. To them he has been con-
secrated. In their presence he is all weakness in himself. He needs a
keeper to accompany him, just as a reformed inebriate sometimes needs
one to accompany and strengthen him in scenes of temptation. The long
established habitudes of the drunkard render him weak in the presence of
his enemy, the intoxicating bowl. So the Christian's long-cherished habits
of self-indulgence render him all weakness and irresolution, if left to him-
self in the presence of excited appetite or passion. As the inebriate needs
a friend and brother to warm and expostulate, to suggest considerations to
strengthen his purposes, so the simmer meeds the Parakletos to warn and
suggest considerations to sustain his fainting resolutions. This Christ has
promised to do ; but this, like all the promises, is conditionated upon our
appropriating it to our own use by faith, Let it then be ever borne in
mind, that as our keeper, the Lord must be spiritually apprehended and
cordially embraced and depended upon, as a condition of entire Sanctifiea-
tion. This must not be a mere opinion. It must be a thorough and honest
closing in with Christ in this relation.
Brother, do you know what it is to depend on Christ in this relation, in
such a sense, that you as naturally hold fast to him, as a child would cling
X {)OTOGIHL OILVINGILSXS ()/.9
atu Jo 9Aux u oſſils (potoABA up ou to I, oxoſtol stuu Aotu Ilusoid on
qug| UIU Jo Isu Kou() upolu A sºulſun ouſ, a Moool IIbus Kaúl Tºul aduapſtio)
§uſtaabMun att] uſ nou inq ‘ottsap put 5uſſoa, daap IIIA “soul 18 to ‘splow
uſ Kuo ulu Houoiddu Jo Jooſt publs Koun oottoH Knigoi e St. ATIbnallyds
popuolia.Iddu Jou are ‘tuaq to ATId put uſ isotonuſ doop sº utoq (InA Allied
-tuks put to Bulloa stu ‘sſ Tutu ‘Utoun [[]]A sazuhudu.'s pub to] stoa, ÁInt?
aſ tutu ozºoi iou op ſoil, Tºn jo suosmos III opſ os uſ uodn 5upuad
-op IIoun to] shunoooº stud, ‘Utopuſot spun uſ ns.tuo popuatoiddu KIIbmiſds
put KIIba, IaMott putſ strums.IIIO possajo.id Kubu jºin huānoun [to]Jo oatu I
'dºtspually popuxa Tsotu put 5uTA pum SIU UI
oottopguoo salm] oup quay Tuaſºn aſſistſ on Supd isopods out, soxſºn sittiO
qa V situ O on poliddu utoq A UIonuțal aun Jo Khilgou put 1.10(IUU Inj oun
Slibaul IIoun on attioll expun on Iłaj Kotīn ºutſ, “tutu Jo a Wu Uſomtu OS UI publis
Áau.L ‘ptiani] ú Jo uomulat out, tu situſ) putouto.tddle on OUB strºns.III) ua Aa
AOIs AoEI i tTonoonoid put druspiloſſ) sitſ uſ sat no& pſnow AOH turq 01
JEastmo' utosoqun u0.8 ptuo. A oouépguoo null A TMA ‘ponſtruTun Alanniosqt aq
on Saoutu,Sunotro Ilu tu no K diſot| Ol KhIIIqb sitſ [Blinº AOUI no K pºp put ‘dītis
-bually stu Jo Injuolls oth Jo poinssº no& ota AA. Josutſu 1stUtöu poniuttuoo
put mo." Uloſt|A outſ to u toſ ool opp On : no K to] aſ I SIU UAop Kel on St. UIºnut
OS mo'ſ poso ou A puto III Aultº Ut, oautſ on Josimo K autºutuſ ‘AON “spital.]
sIII IOI opſ slu (LAop SKRI of I dºtsputoſ.ſ] sitſ Jo q13ttons oth on to ‘Utombſ
-at spun on sayſ; on Sisundulo quTIA ‘OAlasqO spuolij Kultuo isotball Itaún
doſ op Kaū, Until tuouſ, to ATIOpual atotu sloop pub ‘speſin Uaul IIB U UIaul
unſw sazunºdulAs otA oud ‘tuoq Sulooſtoo nutſ, 5upunk taxa III satanuſ Ala MII
u so Itº, OUAA ouo ‘Ālūtellituuſ WIOU pub aoutopguoo sount aul UniM Suorspooo
IIb (lo uopolddu Kutu Kotī, Ittou A atto “pually a Jo Juáil all uſ tutu pluša. On
bluiju Uuaos Kou.I. utoq, Ioj pitãot a tootus soul spu 'Ut qu Kus on lou ‘ATInſ
ontºloaldulb ol Kûuaſoſums asſ.III) Jo uoistiaosopūoo aq, popuouaidde a MºU on
hou Uuaas subſisſillo isoſ.W Ilins outes alſ, soop of I glastutu uſ aouapuuoo
aloiduſ isotti all. IIIA soldſosºp SIU alſdsuſ on suped sound att, Moon as IIIO
... no.8 ontºn UAoux opetti astºu I Toung I Kru Jo preetſ eatu I nutſ, såuſun
IIb 10) ‘spually no.8 paſſed astºu I ºnq : [[loop pto sItſ null w not una&otix
quºtas alſ, Joj ‘Slut Alas not nok IIbo I quojaoua H 'no& pubtuttloo I taxa
-OS]ulia\ op 3& JI ‘spitouſ KUI at a W spueſt sit to aſſi stu UAop Kel uetII &
qelī, ‘sul utt[] uttu ou Untºu a MOI 10180.1+),, . g I—g I Ax ut(of 'puolij e sº
quq loſsutti & St AIolaut Jou sittiO Aotuſ of speau osſu Inos alſ.I. (IIDX)
… Kup quuſ, Tsūſtāb unt on pampuutoa aabu I qorq A nutſ,
dool on 3118 spotſ leſſ, paptºnstad tub pub ‘paaaqaq oAbū I uloua u, Aoust
I , ; SABs osſº [med ‘gº; ‘ſº apnſ—, Italuw aa\o put Aou quoq ‘lawod
put uORuſtuop ‘Alsoſ ºut put AIOI8 aq. ‘anoſ ABS Ino pop as A Auto ap on
-Kof 5uſpoooxa IIIA Atolà stu Jo oouasaid oun atojoq ssantney mok muosoid
on pub ‘āſūIIb) trioſ; no,' doox on aſqu si quun tuſh onum AoN, 3utting
tuouſ mo'ſ deas on aſqb SI ou mºun “satuusse launu. To ‘sauntoo opsode *IJle
3uſItſ tuoſ, now doo-I put “nok III oppºſe IIIA ou put ‘tutu up apple spheun
‘utſu uſ ok HIEA 0s ‘pio'ſ aun Snsaſ situo poalaoal oxbu as SV uometal
SRI) uſ isgrü0 on pop moś oAbū ‘OS JI & Iadoax b Jo peou Inok uoes noA oxapſ
& Joãutp paalooted Jonspruſ aun uſ uot A ‘totſuj u Jo Moou au, to pubu aun on
SANCTIFICATION, 671
sea, driven with the wind and tossed. For let not that man think that he
shall receive anything of the Lord.”. The real, and deep, and abiding affec-
tion of Christ for us, and his undying interest in us personally, must come
to be a living and an omnipresent reality to ours ouls, to secure our own
abiding in faith and love in all circumstances. There is, perhaps, no rela-
tion of Christ in which we need more thoroughly to know him than this.
This relation is admitted in words by almost everybody, yet duly realized
and believed by almost nobody. Yet how infinitely strange, that Christ
should have given so high evidence of his love to, and friendship for us, and
that we should be so slow of heart to believe and realize it! But until this
truth is really and spiritually apprehended and embraced, the soul will find
it impossible to fly to him in seasons of trial, with implicit confidence in
his favour and protection. But let Christ be really apprehended and em-
braced, as a friend who has laid down his life for us, and would not hesitate
to do it again were it needful, and rely upon it, our confidence in him will
secure our abiding in him.
(xliii.) Christ is also to be regarded and embraced in the relation of an
Elder Brother. Heb. ii. 10–18 : “For it became him, for whom are all
things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to
make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings. For both
he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one, for which cause
he is not ashamed to call them brethren ; saying, I will declare thy name
unto my brethren ; in the midst of the church will I sing praise unto thee.
And again, I will put my trust in him. And again, Behold I, and the
children which God hath given me. Forasmuch then as the children are
partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same :
that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that
is, the devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their life.
time subject to bondage. For verily he took not on him the nature of angels;
but he took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it be-
hoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a mereiful
and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation
for the sins of the people: for in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted,
he is able to succour them that are tempted.” Matt. xxviii. 10 : “ Then
said Jesus unto them, Be not afraid : go tell my brethren, that they go
into Galilee, and there shall they see me.” John xx. 17 : “Jesus saith
unto her, Touch me not; for I am not yet ascended to my Father: but
go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father, and
your Father; and to my God, and your God.” Rom. viii. 29 : “For whom
he did foreknow, he also did predestimate to be conformed to the image of his
Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren.” These and
other passages present Christ in the relation of a brother. So he is not
merely a friend, but a brother. He is a brother possessing the attributes of
God. And is it not of great importance, that in this relation we should
know and embrace him " It would seem as if all possible pains were taken
by him to inspire us with the most implicit confidence in him. He is not
ashamed to call us brethren; and shall we refuse or neglect to embrace him
672 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
in this relation, and avail ourselves of all that is implied in it? I have often
thought that many professed Christians really regard the relations of Christ
as only existing in name, and not at all in reality and fact, Am I not a man
and a brother? he says to the desponding and tempted soul. Himself hath
said, A brother is made for adversity. He is the first-born among many
brethren, and yet we are to be heirs with him, heirs of God, and joint heirs
with him of all the infinite riches of the Godhead, “O fools and slow of
heart,” not to believe and receive this brother to our most implicit and
eternal confidence. He must be spiritually revealed, apprehended, and
embraced in this relation, as a condition of our experiencing his fraternal
truthfulness.
Do let me inquire whether many Christians do not regard such language
as pathetic and touching, but after all as only a figure of speech, as a pre-
tence, rather than as a serious and infinitely important fact. Is the Father
really our Father? Then Christ is our Brother, not in a figurative sense
merely, but literally and truly our brother. My brother ? Ah truly, and a
brother made for adversity. O Lord, reveal thyself fully to our souls in
this relation
(xliv.) Christ is the true Vine, and we are the branches. And do we
know him in this relation, as our parent stock, as the fountain from whom
We receive our momentary mourishment and life 2 This union between
Christ and our souls is formed by implicit faith in him. By faith the soul
leans on him, feeds upon him, and receives a constantly sustaining influence
from him. John xv. 1—S: “I am the true vine, and my Father is the
husbandman. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit he taketh away;
and every branch that beareth fruit he purgeth it, that it may bring forth
more fruit. Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto
you. Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of
itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I
ann the vine, ye are the branches : he that abideth in me, and I in him,
the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing. If
a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and
men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned. If ye
abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it
shall be done unto you. Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much
fruit; so shall ye be my disciples.” Now, it is important for us to under-
stand what it is to be in Christ, in the sense of this passage. It certainly
is to be so united to him, as to receive as real and as constant spiritual
support and nourishment from him, as the branch does natural nourish-
mºnt from the vine. “If a man abide not in me,” he says, “he is cast
forth as a branch and is withered.” Now, to be in him, implies such a union
as to keep us spiritually alive and fresh. There are many withered pro-
fessors in the church. They abide not in Christ. Their religion is stale,
They can speak of former experience. They can tell how they once knew
Christ, but every spiritual mind can see, that they are branches fallen off.
They have no fruit. Their leaves are withered, their bark is dried; and
9.19 "NOIJLVOIJHIJ.O.N.VS
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1st I ‘aſºns SIII, ‘O alg aun onuſ Asbó pug paſtoqueñ aq on 1g isn'ſ 3.18 Kaū.
X X
674 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Heb. ix. 14.—“How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through
the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience
from dead works to serve the living God!” 1 Peter i. 19.--" But with the
precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot.”
1 Peter i. 2.-" Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father,
through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the
blood of Jesus Christ.” Rev. i. 5.-‘‘Uuto him that loved us, and washed
us from our sins in his own blood.” When the shedding of Christ's blood
is rightly apprehended and embraced, when his atonement is properly
understood and received by faith, it cleanses the soul from all sim; or
rather, I should say, that when Christ is received as one to cleanse us from
sin by his blood, we shall know what James B. Taylor meant when he said,
“I have been into the fountain, and am clean;” and what Christ meant
when he said, “Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken
unto you.” “Who hath loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own
blood. “Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you and ye shall be clean,
from all your filthiness and from all your idols will I cleanse you. A new
heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you. I will
take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and give you a heart of flesh.”
It is of the last importance that language like this, relating to our being
cleansed from sin by Christ, should be elucidated to our Souls by the Holy
Spirit, and embraced by faith, and Christ truly revealed in this relation.
Nothing but this can save us from sin. But this will fully and effectually
do the work. It will cleanse us from all sin. It will cleanse us from all
our filthiness, and from all our idols. It will make us “clean.”
(xlviii.) “His mame shall be called Wonderful.” No inward or audible
exclamation is more common to me of late years, than the term Wonderful.
When contemplating the nature, the character, the offices, the relations,
the salvation of Christ, I find myself often mentally, and frequently audibly
exclaiming, WONDERFUL My soul is filled with wonder, love, and praise,
as I am led by the Holy Spirit to apprehend Christ, sometimes in one and
sometimes in another relation, as circumstances and trials develope the
need I have of him. I am more and more “astonished at the doctrine of
the Lord,” and at the Lord himself from year to year. I have come to the
conclusion, that there is no end to this, either in time or in etermity. He
will no doubt to all etermity continue to make discoveries of himself to his
intelligent creatures, that shall cause them to exclaim “wonDERFUL (" !
find my wonder more and more excited from one stage of Christian experi-
ence to another. Christ is indeed wonderful, contemplated in every point
of view, as God, as man, as God-man, mediator. Indeed, I hardly know
in which of his many relations he appears most wonderful, when in that
relation he is revealed by the Holy Spirit. All, all is wonderful, when he
stands revealed to the Soul in any of his relations. The soul needs to be
so acquainted with him as to excite and constantly keep awake its wonder
and adoration. Contemplate Christ in any point of view, and the wonder
of the soul is excited. Look at any feature of his character, at any depart.
SANCTIFICATION. - 675
ment of the plan of salvation, at any part that he takes in the glorious work
of man's redemption; look steadfastly at him as he is revealed through the
gospel by the Holy Spirit, at any time and place, in any of his works or
ways, and the soul will instantly exclaim—woxDERFUL | Yes, he shall be
called Wonderful
(xlix.) “Counsellor.” Who that has made Jesus his wisdom, does
not and has not often recognized the fitness of calling him “Counsellor?”
Until he is known and embraced in this relation, it is not natural or
possible for the soul to go to him with implicit confidence in every case of
doubt. Almost everybody holds in theory the propriety and necessity of
consulting Christ, in respect to the affairs that concern ourselves and his
church. But it is one thing to hold this opinion, and quite, another to
apprehend and embrace Christ so spiritually in the relation of counsellor,
as naturally to call him counsellor when approaching him in secret, and
as naturally to turn and consult him on all occasions and in respect to
everything that concerns us; and to consult him too with implicit con-
fidence in his ability and willingness to give us the direction we need.
Thoroughly and spiritually to know Christ in this relation is undoubtedly a
condition of abiding steadfast in him. Unless the soul knows and duly
appreciates its dependence upon him in this relation, and unless it re-
nounces its own wisdom, and substitutes his in the place of it, by laying
hold of Christ by faith as the counsellor of the soul, it will not continue to
walk in his counsel, and consequently will not abide in his love.
(l) The Mighty God. “My Lord and my God,” exclaimed Thomas,
When Christ stood spiritually revealed to him. It was not merely what
Christ said to Thomas on that occasion, that caused him to utter the excla-
mation just quoted. Thomas saw indeed that Christ was raised from the
dead, but so had Lazarus been raised from the dead. The mere fact,
therefore, that Christ stood before him as one raised from the dead, could
not have been proof that he was God. No doubt the Holy Spirit discovered
to Thomas at the moment the true Divinity of Christ, just as the saints in
all ages have had him spiritually revealed to them as the Mighty God, I
have long been convinced, that it is in vain, so far as any spiritual benefit
is concerned, to attempt to convince Unitarians of the proper Divinity
of Christ. The scriptures are as plain as they can be upon this subject,
and yet it is true, that no man can say that Jesus is the Lord but by the
Holy Spirit. As I have said in substance often, the personal revelation of
Christ to the inward man by the Holy Spirit, is a condition of his being
known as the “Mighty God.” What is Christ to any one who does not
know him as God? To such a soul, he cannot be a Saviour. It is
impossible that the soul should intelligently, and without idolatry, commit
itself to him as a Saviour, unless it knows him to be the true God. It
cannot innocently pray to him mor worship him, nor commit the soul to his
keeping and protection, until it knows him as the Mighty God. To be
orthodox merely in theory, in opinion, is nothing to the purpose of salva.
tion. The soul must know Christ as God—must believe in or receive him
X X 2
676 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
as such. To receive him as anything else is an infinitely different thing
from coming and submitting to him as the true, and living, and mighty
God.
LECTURE LXVII.
SANCTIFICATION.
CONDITIONS OF ENTIRIE SANCTIFICATION.—CONTINUED.
(li.) Christ is our Shield. By this name, or in this relation, he has
always been known to the Saints. God said to Abraham, “I am thy
shield.”—Gen. xv. 1. Ps. xxxiii. 20: “The Lord is my shield.” Prov.
xxx. 5: “He is a shield to them that put their trust in him.” A shield
is a piece of defensive armour used in war. It is a broad plate made of
wood or metal, and borne upon the arm and hand, and in conflict presented
between the body and the enemy to protect it against his arrows or his
blows. God is the Christian's shield in the spiritual warfare. This is a
most interesting and important relation. He who does not know Christ in
this relation, and has not embraced and put him on, as one would buckle
on a shield, is all exposed to the assaults of the enemy, and will surely be
wounded if not slain by his fiery darts. This is more than a figure of
speech. No fact or reality is of more importance to the Christian, than to
know how to hide himself behind and in Christ in the hour of conflict.
Unless the Christian has on his shield, and knows how to use it, he will
surely fall in battle. When Satan appears, the soul must present its
shield, must take refuge behind and in Christ, or all will be defeat and
disgrace. When faith presents Christ as the shield, Satan retires van-
quished from the field in every instance. Christ always makes way for
our escape; and never did a Soul get wounded in conflict who made the
proper use of this shield. But Christ needs to be known as our pro-
tection, as ready on all occasions to shield us from the curse of the law,
and from the artillery of the enemy of our souls. Be sure to truly know
him, and put him on in this relation, and then you may always sing of
victory.
(lii.) The Lord is “the Portion” of his people. “I am thy shield and
thy exceeding great reward,” said God to Abraham. As the reward or
portion of the Soul, we need to know and embrace Christ as the condition
of abiding in him. We need to know him as “our exceeding great
portion,”—a present, all-satisfying portion. Unless we so know Christ as
to be satisfied with him, as all we can ask or desire, we shall not of course
abstain from all forbidden sources of enjoyment. Nothing is more indis-
pensable to our entire Sanctification, than to apprehend the fulness there
is in Christ in this relation. When the soul finds in him all its desires
and all its wants fully met, when it sees in him all that it can conceive of
SANCTIFICATION. 677
as excellent and desirable, and that he is its portion, it remains at rest.
It has little temptation to go after other lovers, or after other sources of
enjoyment. It is full. It has enough. It has an infinitely rich and
glorious inheritance. What more can it ask or think? The soul that
understands what it is to have Christ as its portion, knows that he is an
infinite portion; that etermity can never exhaust, or even diminish it in the
least degree; that the mind shall to all eternity increase in the capacity of
enjoying this portion; but that no increase of capacity and enjoyment can
diminish ought of the infinite fulness of the Divine Portion of our souls.
(liii.) Christ is our Hope. 1 Tim. i. 1 : “ Paul, an apostle of Jesus
Christ, by the commandment of God our Saviour, and Lord Jesus Christ,
which is our hope.” Col. i. 27 : “To whom God would make known what
is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the gentiles; which is
Christ in you the hope of glory.” Our only rational expectation is from
him. Christ in us is our hope of glory. Without Christ in us we have
no good or well-grounded hope of glory. Christ in the gospel, Christ on
the cross, Christ risen, Christ in heaven, is not our hope ; but Christ in
us, Christ actually present, living, and reigning in us, as really as he
lives and reigns in glory, is our only well-grounded hope. We cannot be
too certain of this, for unless we despair of Salvation in ourselves or in
any other, we do not truly make Christ our hope. The soul that does not
know, and spiritually know Christ in this relation has no well-grounded
hope. He may hope that he is a Christian. He may hope that his sins
are forgiven, that he shall be saved. But he can have no good hope of
glory. It cannot be too fully understood, or too deeply realized, that
absolute despair of help and salvation in any other possible way, except by
Christ in us, is an unalterable condition of our knowing and embracing
Christ as our hope. Many seem to have conceived of Christ as their
hope, only in his outward relation, that is, as an atoming Saviour, as a
risen and ascended Saviour. But the indispensable necessity of having
Christ within them, ruling in their hearts, and establishing his government
over their whole being, is a condition of salvation of which they have
not thought. Christ cannot be truly and savingly our hope, any farther
than he is received into and reigns in our souls. To hope in merely
an outward Christ is to hope in vain. To hope in Christ with the true
Christian hope, implies —
(a.) The ripe and spiritual apprehension of our hopeless condition with-
out him. It implies such an apprehension of our sims and governmental
relations, as to annihilate all hope of Salvation upon legal grounds.
(b.) Such a perception of our spiritual bondage to sin, as to annihilate
all hope of salvation without his constant influence and strength to keep us
from sin.
(c.) Such a knowledge of our circumstances of temptation, as to empty
us of all expectation of fighting our own battles, or of, in the least
degree, making headway against our spiritual foes, in our own wisdom and
strength,
‘Ā3)OTIOGIH, I, O.I.LVINGILSXS 8.19
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SANCTIFICATION. 6.79
reception to dwell within, and to rule over us. He that truly believes the
gospel, will receive Christ as he is presented in the gospel, that is, for
what he is there asserted to be to his people, in all the relations he sustains
to our souls, as fast as these relations are revealed to him by the Holy
Spirit.
The newly converted soul knows Christ in but few relations. He needs
trials and experience to develope his weakness, and to reveal to him his
multiplied necessities, and thus lead him to a fuller knowledge of Christ.
The new convert embraces Christ, so far as he knows him ; but at first
he knows but little of his need of him, except in his governmental relations.
Subsequent experience is a condition of his knowing Christ in all his
fulness. Nor can he be effectually taught the fulness there is in Christ.
any faster than his trials develope his real necessities. If he embraces all
he understands of Christ, this is the whole of present duty in respect to
him ; but, as trials are in his way, he will learn more of his own necessities,
and must learn more of Christ, and appropriate him in new relations, or he
will surely fall.
(lv.) Christ is also the Rock of our Salvation —
Ps. xix. 14. “Let the words of my mouth, and the meditation of my
heart, be acceptable in thy sight, O Lord, my strength, [margin Rock and
my Redeemer. xxviii. 1. Unto thee will I cry, O Lord my rock; be not
silent to me; lest if thou be silent to me, I become like them that go down
into the pit. XXXi. 2. Bow down thine ear to me, deliver me speedily, be
thou my strong rock, for a house of defence to save me. 3. For thou art
my rock and my fortress; therefore, for thy name's sake, lead me and
guide me.”
It is deeply interesting and affecting to contemplate the relations in
which Christ revealed himself to the Old Testament saints. He is a rock
of Salvation, a strong-hold or place of refuge. In this relation the soul
must know him, and must take hold of him, or take shelter in him.
(lvi.) He is also a Rock cleft from which the waters of life flow. 1 Cor.
X. 14. “And did all drink the same spiritual drink, for they drank of that
spiritual Rock that followed them, and that Rock was Christ.” As such
the soul must know and embrace him.
(lvii.) He is a Great Rock that is higher than we, rising amid the burn-
ing Sands of our pilgrimage, under the cooling shadow of which the soul
can find repose and comfort. He is like the shadow of a great rock in a
weary land. To apprehend Christ in this relation, the soul needs to be
brought into sharp and protracted trials, until it is faint and ready to sink
in discouragement. When the struggle is too severe for longer endurance,
and the soul is on the point of giving up in despair, then when Christ is
revealed as a great rock standing for its defence against the heat of its trials,
and throwing over it the cooling, soothing influence of his protection, it
finds itself refreshed and at rest, and readily adopts the language of a
numerous class of passages of scripture, and finds itself to have apprehended
Christ, as inspired men apprehended and embraced him. It is truly
680 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
remarkable, that in all our experiences, we can find that inspired writers
have had the like ; and in every trial, and in every deliverance, in every
new discovery of our emptiness, and of Christ's fulness, we find the
language of our hearts most fully and aptly expressed in the language of
the living oracles. We readily discover, that inspired men had fallen into
like trials, had Christ revealed to them in the same relations, and had
similar exercises of mind; insomuch, that no language of our own can so
readily express all that we think, and feel, and see.
(lviii.) He is the Rock from which the soul is satisfied with honey.
Ps. lxxxi. 16. “He should have fed them also with the finest of the wheat;
and with homey out of the rock should I have satisfied thee.” The spiritual
mind apprehends this language spiritually, as it is doubtless really intended
to be understood. It knows what it is to be satisfied with honey from the
Rock, Christ. The divine sweetness that often refreshes the spiritual
mind, when it betakes itself to the Rock Christ, reminds it of the words of
this passage of Scripture.
(lix.) He is the Rock or Foundation upon which the church, as the
temple of the living God, is built.
Matt. xvi. 18: “And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and
upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not
prevail against it. Rom. ix. 33: As it is written, ‘Behold, I lay in Sion a
stumbling-stone and a rock of offence; and whosoever believeth on him
shall not be ashamed.” 1 Peter ii. 8. “And a stone of stumbling, and
a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the word, being
disobedient ; whereunto also they were appointed.”
He is a sure foundation. He is an eternal rock, or the rock of ages—
the corner-stone of the whole spiritual edifice. But we must build for
ourselves upon this rock. It is not enough to understand as a tenet, a
theory, an opinion, an article of our creed, that Christ is the rock in this
sense. We must see that we do not build upon the Sand. Matt. vii. 26,
27: “And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them
not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the
sand; And the rain descended, and the floods came, and beat upon that
house; and it fell; and great was the fall of it.”
(lx.) He is the “Strength of our heart.” He is not only our refuge and
strength in our conflicts with outward temptations and trials, in the sense
expressed in Psalm xlvi. 1: “God is our refuge and strength, a very
present help in trouble;” but he is also the strength of our heart and our
portion for ever, in the sense of Psalm lxxiii. 26: “My flesh and my heart
faileth ; but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever.”
He braces up and confirms the whole inner-man in the way of holiness.
What Christian has not at times found himself ready to halt, and faint by
the way. Temptation seems to steal upon him like a charm. He finds his
spiritual strength very low, his resolution weak, and he feels as if he should
give way to the slightest temptation. He is afraid to expose himself out of
his closet, or even to remain within it lest he should sin. He says with
SANCTIFICATION, 681
David, “I shall fall by the hand of Saul.” He finds himself empty, all
weakness and trembling, Were it not that the strength of his heart inter-
poses in time, he would doubtless realize in his experience his worst fears.
But who that knows Christ, has not often experienced his faithfulness
under such circumstances, and felt an immortal awaking, reviving, and
strength, taking possession of his whole being? What spiritual minister has
not often dragged himself into the pulpit, so discouraged and faint as to be
hardly able to stand, or to hold up his head 2 He is so weak that his
spiritual knees smite one against the other. He is truly empty, and feels
as if he could not open his mouth. He sees himself to be an empty wine,
an empty vessel, a poor helpless, strengthless infant, lying in the dust
before the Lord, unable to stand, or go, or preach, or pray, or do the least
thing for Christ. But lo! at this juncture his spiritual strength is
renewed. Christ the strength of his heart developes his own almightiness
within him. His mouth is open. He is strong in faith, giving glory to
God. He is made at once a sharp threshing instrument, to beat down the
mountains of opposition to Christ and his gospel. His bow is renewed in
his hand and abides in strength. His mouth is opened, and Christ fills it
with arguments. Christ has girded him to the battle, and made strong the
arms of his hands, with the strength of the mighty God of Jacob.
The same in substance is true of every Christian. He has his seasons
of being empty, that he may feel his dependence; and anon he is girded
with strength from on high, and an immortal and superhuman strength
takes possession of his soul. The enemy gives way before him. In Christ
he can run through a troop, and in his strength he can leap over a wall.
Every difficulty gives way before him, and he is conscious that Christ has
strengthened him with strength in his soul. The will seems to have the
utmost decision, so that temptation gets an emphatic no without a
moment's parley.
(lxi.) It is through Christ that we may reckon ourselves dead indeed
unto sin, and alive unto God. This we are exhorted and commanded to do.
That is, We may and ought to account or reckon ourselves, through him, as
dead unto sin and alive unto God. But what is implied in this liberty to
reckon ourselves dead unto sin, and alive unto God through Jesus Christ
our Lord 2 Why certainly :—
(a.) That through and in him we have all the provision we need, to
keep us from sin.
(b.) That we may expect, and ought to expect, to live without sin.
(e.) That we ought to account ourselves as having nothing more to do
with sin, than a dead man has with the affairs of this world.
(d.) That we may and ought to lay hold on Christ for this full and
present death unto sin and life unto God.
(e.) That if we do thus reckon ourselves dead unto sin and alive unto
God, in the true spiritual sense of this text, we shall find Christ unto our
souls all we expect of him in this relation. If Christ cannot or will not
sive us from sin, upon condition of our laying hold of him, and reckoning
682 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
ourselves dead unto sin, and alive unto God through him, what right had
the apostle to say, “Reckon yourselves indeed dead unto sin, and alive unto
God through Jesus Christ our Lord P.” What does the apostle tell us to
account or reckon ourselves dead indeed unto sin, and shall ministers
tell us that such reckoning or expectation is a dangerous delusion ?
Now, certainly nothing less can be meant, by reckoning ourselves dead
unto sin and alive unto God through Jesus Christ, than that, through
Christ we should expect to live without sin. And not to expect to live
without sin through Christ is unbelief. It is a rejection of Christ in this
relation. Through Christ we ought to expect to live to God, as much as
we expect to live at all. He that does not expect this, rejects Christ as
his sanctification, and as Jesus who saves his people from their sins.
The foregoing are some of the relations which Christ sustains to us as
to our Salvation. I could have enlarged greatly, as you perceive, upon each
of these, and easily have swelled this part of our course of study to a large
volume. I have only touched upon these sixty-one relations, as specimens
of the manner in which he is presented for our acceptance in the Bible,
and by the Holy Spirit. Do not understand me as teaching, that we must
first know Christ in all these relations, before we can be sanctified. The
thing intended is, that coming to know Christ in these relations is a con-
dition, or is the indispensable means, of our steadfastness or perseverance
in holiness under temptation—that, when we are tempted, from time to
time mothing can secure us against a fall, but the revelation of Christ to
the soul in these relations one after another, and our appropriation of him
to ourselves by faith. The gospel has directly promised, in every tempta-
tion to open a way of escape, so that we shall be able to bear it. The
spirit of this promise pledges to us such a revelation of Christ, as to secure
our standing, if we will lay hold upon him by faith, as revealed. Our
circumstances of temptation render it necessary, that at one time we should
apprehend Christ in one relation, and at another time in another. For
example, at one time we are tempted to despair by Satan's accusing us of
sin, and suggesting that our sins are too great to be forgiven. In this case
we need a revelation and an appropriation of Christ, as having been made
sin for us; that is, as having aloned for our sins—as being our justification
or righteousness. This will sustain the soul's confidence and preserve its
peace.
At another time we are tempted to despair of ever Overcoming our tem-
dencies to sin, and to give up our sanctification as a hopeless thing. Now
we need a revelation of Christ as Our Sanctification, &c.
At another time the soul is harassed with the view of the great subtlety
and sagacity of its spiritual enemies, and greatly tempted to despair on that
account. Now it needs to know Christ as its wisdom.
Again, it is tempted to discouragement on account of the great number
and strength of its adversaries. On such occasions it needs Christ revealed
as the Mighty God, as its strong tower, its hiding place, its munition of rocks.
Again, the soul is oppressed with a sense of the infinite holiness of God,
S.ANCTIFICATION. 683
and the infinite distance there is between us and God, on account of our
sinfulness and his infinite holiness, and on account of his infinite abhor-
rence of sin and simmers. Now the soul needs to know Christ as its right-
eousness, and as a mediator between God and man.
Again, the Christian's mouth is closed with a sense of guilt, so that he
cannot look up, nor speak to God of pardon and acceptance. He trembles
and is confounded before God. He lies along on his face, and despairing
thoughts roll a tide of agony through his soul. He is speechless, and can
only groan out his self-accusations before the Lord. Now as a condition of
rising above this temptation to despair, he needs a revelation of Christ as
his advocate, as his high priest, as ever living to make intercession for him.
This view of Christ will enable the soul to commit all to him in this
relation, and maintain its peace and hold on to its steadfastness.
Again, the soul is led to tremble in view of its constant exposedness to
besetments on every side, oppressed with such a sense of its own utter
helplessness in the presence of its enemies, as almost to despair. Now it
needs to know Christ as the Good Shepherd, who keeps a constant watch
over the sheep, and carries the lambs in his bosom. He needs to know
him as a watchman and a keeper.
Again, it is oppressed with a sense of its own utter emptiness, and is
forced to exclaim, I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good
thing. It sees that it has no life, or unction, or power, or spirituality in
itself. Now it needs to know Christ as the true vine, from which it may
receive constant and abundant spiritual nourishment. It needs to know
him as the fountain of the Water of life, and in those relations that will
meet its necessities in this direction. Let these suffice, as specimens to
illustrate what is intended by entire or permanent sanctification being con-
ditioned on the revelation and appropriation of Christ in all the fulness of
his official relations.
It is not intended, as has been said, that Christ must previously be
known in all these relations before a soul can be samctified at all ; but
that, when tried from time to time, a new revelation of Christ to the soul,
corresponding to the temptation, or as the help of the soul in such circum-
stances, is a condition of its remaining stedfast. This gracious aid or
revelation is abundantly promised in the Bible, and will be made in time,
so that by laying hold on Christ in the present revealed relation, the soul
may be preserved blameless, though the furnace of temptation be heated
seven times hotter than it is wont to be.
In my estimation, the church, as a body—I mean the nominal church—
have entirely mistaken the mature and means or conditions of sanctification.
They have not regarded it as consisting in a state of entire consecration,
nor understood that continual entire consecration was entire Sanctification.
They have regarded sanctification as consisting in the annihilation of the
constitutional propensities, instead of the controlling of them. They have
erred equally in regard to the means or conditions of entire Sanctification.
They seem to have regarded sanctification as brought about by a physical
684 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
cleansing in which man was passive ; or to have gone over to the opposite
extreme, and regarded sanctification as consisting in the formation of habits
of obedience. The old school have seemed to be waiting for a physical
Sanctification, in which they are to be, in a great measure, passive, and
which they have not expected to take place in this life. Holding, as they
do, that the constitution of both soul and body is defiled or sinful in every
power and faculty, they of course cannot hold to entire samctification in this
life. If the constitutional appetites, passions, and propensities are in fact,
as they hold, sinful in themselves, why then the question is settled, that
entire Sanctification cannot take place in this world, nor in the next, except
as the constitution is radically changed, and that of course by the creative
power of God. The new school, rejecting the doctrine of constitutional
moral depravity, and physical regeneration and Sanctification, and losing
sight of Christ as our sanctification, have fallen into a self-righteous view
of sanctification, and have held that sanctification is effected by works, or
by forming holy habits, &c. Both the old and the new school have fallen
into egregious errors upon this fundamentally important subject.
The truth is, beyond all question, that Sanctification is by faith as
opposed to works. That is, faith receives Christ in all his offices, and in
all the fulness of his relations to the soul; and Christ, when received,
works in the soul to will and to do of all his good pleasure, not by a
physical, but by a moral or persuasive working. Observe, he influences
the will. This must be by a moral influence, if its actings are intelligent
and free, as they must be to be holy. That is, if he influences the will to
obey God, it must be by a divine moral suasion. The soul never in any
instance obeys in a spiritual and true sense, except it be thus influenced by
the indwelling Spirit of Christ. But whenever Christ is apprehended and
received in any relation, in that relation he is full and perfect; so that we
are complete in him. For it hath pleased the Father that in him should
all fulness dwell; and that we might all receive of his fulness until we
have grown up into him in all things, “Until we all come, in the unity of
the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto
the measure of the stature of the full less of Christ.”
LECTURE LXVIII.
SAINCTIFICATION.
VII. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED,
To the doctrine we have been advocating it is objected, that the real
practical question is not,
I. Whether this state is attainable on the ground of natural ability; for
this is admitted.
2. It is not whether it is rational to hope to make this attainment, pro-
vided we set our hearts upon making it, and persevere in aiming to attain
it ; for this is admitted.
SANCTDFICATION. - 685
3. It is not whether this state is a rational object of pursuit, provided
any are disposed to pursue it. But,
4. Is it rational for Christians to hope that they shall pursue it, and
shall perseveringly set their hearts upon it 2 Is it rational for Christians
to hope, that they shall so endeavour to attain it, as to fulfil the conditions
of the promises wherein it is pledged 2
To this I reply, that it makes a new issue. It yields the formerly con-
tested ground, and proposes an entirely new question. Hitherto the
question has been, Is this state an object of rational pursuit, provided any
are disposed to pursue it 2 May Christians aim at this attainment with
the rational hope of making it? This point is now yielded, if I understand
the objection, and one entirely distinct is substituted, namely, Is it rational
for Christians to hope, that they shall pursue after this attainment, or
that they shall aim at and set themselves to make this attainment? This,
I say, is quite another question, different from the one heretofore argued.
It is however an important one, and I am quite willing to discuss it, but
with this distinct understanding, that it is not the question upon which
issue has been heretofore taken. This question, as we shall see, calls up
a distinct inquiry. In this discussion I shall pursue the following outline:
J. What constitutes hope 2
. What is implied in a rational hope 2
The grounds of rational hope may vary indefinitely in degree.
Wrong views may inspire an irrational hope.
Wrong views may prevent a rational hope.
Hope is a condition of the attainment in question.
. What the objection under consideration admits.
8. What I understand it to deny.
9. What it amounts to.
10. What it must assume in reference to the provisions of grace.
11. What these provisions are not.
12. What they are.
13. What real grounds of hope there are in respect to the question under
consideration.
14. Consider the tendency of denying that there are valid grounds of
hope in this case.
1. I am to show what hope is.
Hope, in common parlance, and as I shall use the term in this discussion,
is not a phenomenon of Will, nor is it a voluntary state of mind. It
includes a phenomenon both of the intellect and the sensibility. It is a
state of mind compounded of desire and expectation. Desire alone is not
hope. A man may desire an event ever so strongly, yet, if he has no
degree of expectation that the desired event will occur, he cannot justly be
said to hope for it. Expectation is not hope, for one may expect am
event ever so confidently, yet if he does not at all desire it, he cannot be
truly said to hope for it. Hope comprehends both desire and expectation.
There must be some degree of both of these to compose hope.
•
:
686 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
2. What is implied in a rational hope 2
(1.) The desire must be reasonable ; that is, in accordance with reason.
The thing desired must be such as reason sanctions or approves. If the
desire is an unreasonable one, the fact, that there is good ground for ex-
pecting the desired end, will not make the hope rational. The expectation
might in this case be rational, in the sense that there is valid reason for
the expectation. But expectation alone is not hope. A rational hope
must include a rational desire, or a desire in accordance with reason, and a
rational expectation, that is, an expectation in accordance with reason.
(2.) The expectation to be rational must have for its foundation at least
some degree of evidence. Hope may be, and often is, indulged barely on
the ground that the desired event is possible, in the absence of all evidence
that it is likely to occur. Thus we say of one who is at the point of death,
and whose life is despaired of by all but his nearest friends, “where there
is life there is hope.” When events are so greatly desired men are wont
to indulge the hope that the event will occur, even in the absence of all
evidence; that it will occur, and in the face of the highest evidence, that
it will not occur. But such hope can hardly be said to be rational. Hope
to be rational must have for its support, not a bare possibility that the
desired event may occur, but at least some degree of evidence that it will
occur. This is true of hope in general. When an event is conditioned upon
the exercise of our own agency, and upon an agency which we are able,
either in our own strength or through grace to exert, it may be more or
less rational to expect the occurrence of the event in proportion as we more
or less desire it. Hope includes desire : there can be no hope without
desire. There may be a good ground of hope, when there is in fact no
hope. There may be a reason and a good reason for desire, where there is
no desire. There may be and is good reason for sinners to desire to be
Christians, when they have no such desire. Again, there may be good
reason for both desire and expectation, when in fact there is neither. The
thing which it is reasonable to desire may not be desired, and there may be
good reason for expecting that an event will occur, when no such expecta-
tion is indulged. For example, a child may neither desire nor expect to
comply with the wishes of a parent, in a given instance. Yet it may be
very reasonable for him to desire to comply, in this instance, with parental
authority; and the circumstances may be such as to afford evidence, that
he will be brought to compliance, and yet there may be in this case no
hope exercised by the child that he shall comply. There may be then a
rational ground for hope when there is no hope. A thing may be strongly
desired, and yet the evidence that it will occur may not be apprehended :
and therefore, although such evidence may exist, it may not be perceived
by the mind, or the mind may be so occupied with contemplating opposing
evidence, or with looking at discouraging circumstances, as not to appreheud
the evidence upon which a rational hope may be, or might be grounded.
Again, when the event in question consists in the action of the will, in
conformity with the law of the reason, the probability that it will thus act
SANCTIFICATION. 687
depends upon the states of the sensibility, or upon the desires. It may
therefore be more or less rational to expect this conformity of the will to
the law of the intelligence, in proportion as this state of the will is more
or less strongly desired. I merely make this remark in this place ; we
shall see its application hereafter. I also add in this place, that a man
may more or less rationally expect to make the attainment under consi-
deration, that is, to obtain in this life a complete victory over sin, in
proportion as he more or less ardently desires it. This we shall see
hereafter. The indulgence of hope implies existing desire, and as I said,
the hope to be rational must have some degree of evidence, that the thing
hoped for will occur.
3. The grounds of rational hope may vary indefinitely in degree.
I have said, that there may be rational grounds of hope when there is
no hope. A sinner under terrible conviction of sin, and in present
despair, may have grounds and strong grounds of hope, while he has no
hope.
Again, the grounds of hope may be more or less strong, in proportion as
hope is more or less strong. For example, an event which is dependent
upon the exercise of our own agency, may be more or less likely to occur,
in proportion to the strength or weakness of our hope that it will oecur.
Hope is compounded, as we have said, of desire and expectation. An
event dependent upon our agency may be more or less likely to occur, in
proportion as we desire its occurrence, and entertain the confident expecta-
tion that it will occur. In such a case, although the evidence may be really
but slight upon which the expectation is at first founded, yet the very fact,
that the mind has become confident that a strongly desired event will take
place, which event depends upon the emergetic and persevering exercise of
our own agency; I say, the strength of the confidence, as well as the strength
of the desire, may render the event all the more probable, and thus the
grounds of hope may be increased by the increase of hope. For it should
be remembered, that hope is possible and common when there are no good
grounds for it, and the very fact, that a hope at present with slight grounds
does exist, may increase the grounds of rational hope. Suppose, for example,
that an Indian in our western forests, who had never heard the gospel,
should come in some way to have the idea, and the desire, and expectation,
of finding out a way of salvation. Now, before he had this hope, there
could not be said to have been more than slight rational ground for it. But
since he has the idea, the desire, and the expectation, he may from these
facts have a rational ground of hope, that he shall discover a way of salva-
tion. The desire and the expectation may render it highly probable, that
he will in some manner discover the right way.
Again : the rational ground of hope, in respect to at least a certain
class of events, may be greatly increased by the fact, that there is a present
willingness that the desired and expected event should occur, and an en-
deavour to secure it. Hope does not necessarily imply a willingness. For
example, a sinner may desire to be converted, and he may expect that he
688 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
shall be, and yet not at present be willing to be ; that is, he may conceive
rightly of what constitutes conversion or turning to God, and he may, for
the Sake of his own salvation, desire to turn, that is, to turn as a condition
of his own salvation, and he may expect that he shall in future turm ; and
yet he is not by the supposition as yet willing to turn ; for willing is
turning, and if he is willing he has turned already. If the event hoped for
consists in, or is dependent upon, future acts of our own will, the grounds
of hope that the event will occur, may be indefinitely strengthened by the
fact, that we have the present consciousness of not only hoping for its Oe-
currence, but also, that our will or heart is at present set upon it.
Myriads of circumstances may be taken into the account, in balancing
and weighing the evidence for or against the occurrence of a given event.
The event may depend in a great measure upon our desires, and when it
really does depend under God upon our desires, present willingness and
efforts, the grounds of confidence or of hope must vary, as our hopes and
endeavours vary. There may be, as I have said, ground for hope when
there is no hope, and the ground of hope may be indefinitely increased by
the existence of hope. There may be a strong hope and a weak hope;
strong grounds or reasons for hope, or weak grounds of hope. When there
is any degree of present evidence that an event will occur, there is some
ground of rational hope.
4. Wrong views may inspire an irrational hope.
This follows from the mature of hope. A thing may be desired—wrong
views may inspire confidence or beget expectation, when there is not the
slightest ground for expectation. The hope of the Universalist is a
striking instance of this. The same is true of false professors of religion.
They desire to be saved. False views inspire confidence that they are
Christians, and that they shall be saved.
5. Wrong views may prevent a rational hope.
This is also common, as every one knows. A thing may be desired, and
there may be the best grounds for confidence or expectation, which is an
element of hope. But false views may forbid the expectation to be enter-
tained. In this case, one element of hope exists, that is, desire, but the
other, to wit, expectation, is rendered impossible by erroneous views.
Again : expectation may exist, yet false views may prevent desire. For
example, I may expect to see a certain individual whom, from false impres-
sions respecting him, I have no desire to see. It is indispensable to hope,
that the views be such as to beget both desire and expectation.
6. Hope is a condition of the attainment in question.
(1.) The attainment implies and consists in the right future exercise of
our own agency.
(2.) The right future exercise of our own agency, in respect to the state
in question, depends under God, or is conditioned.upon, the previous use of
means to secure that result.
(3.) Those means will never be used unless there is hope; that is, unless
there is both desire and expectation. If therefore any false instruction
SANCTIFICATION. 689
shall forbid the expectation of attaining the state in question, the attain-
ment will not be sought, it will not be aimed at. There may be ever So
good grounds or reasons to expect to make this attainment, yet if these
grounds are not discovered, and the expectation is not intelligent, the at-
tainment will be delayed. There must be hope indulged in this case, as a
condition of making this attainment.
7. What I understand the objection to admit.
(1.) That the state in question is a possible state, or a possible attain-
ment, both on the ground of natural ability and through grace.
(2.) That this attainment is provided for in the promises of the gospel;
that is, that the promises of the gospel proffer grace to every believer suffi-
cient to secure him against sin in all the future, on condition that he will
believe and appropriate them.
(3.) That all the necessary means are provided and brought within the
Christian's reach to secure this attainment, and that there is no insurmount-
able difficulty in the way of this attainment, provided he is willing, and
will use these necessary means in the required manner.
(4.) There is rational ground for hoping to make this attainment, if any
will set their heart to make it.
(5.) Consequently, that this attainment is a rational object of pursuit;
that it is rational to hope to make it, provided we are disposed to make it,
or to aim to make it.
8. What I understand the objection to deny.
That it is rational for any Christian to hope, so to use the means as to
secure the attainment in question ; that is, that no Christian can rationally
hope to exercise such faith, and so to use the means of grace, and so to
avail himself of the proffered grace of the gospel, and so to fulfil the
conditions of the promises, as to receive their fulfilment, and make the
attainment in question in this life. The objection, as I understand it,
denies that we can rationally hope, by present faith and the present use of
our powers, to render it probable, that we shall in future use them aright;
or, in other words, the objection denies that we can, by anything whatever
that we can at present do, gain any evidence, or lay a foundation for any
rational hope that in future we shall obey God; or it denies that our
present desire, or will, or faith, or efforts, have through grace any such
connexion with our future state in this life, as to render it in any degree
probable, that we shall receive the fulfilment of such promises as the
following : 1 Thes, v. 23, 24: “And the very God of peace sametify you
wholly, and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved
blameless unto the coming of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that
calleth you, who also will do it.” It denies, that it is rational for us to
hope, by the improvement of present grace, to secure future grace; that it
is rational for us to expect, by a present laying hold on such promises as
the one just quoted, to secure its present and its future fulfilment to us ;
it denies that it is rational for us to lay hold of such promises as that
just quoted, with the expectation that they will be fulfilled to as ; that is, we
Y Y *
690 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
cannot at present do anything whatever, however much we may will and
desire it, that shall render it in the least degree probable, that these pro-
mises will ever be fulfilled to us in this life. The objection must proceed
upon denying this, for it is certain, that Christians do desire this attain-
ment, and will it too; that is, they will at least that it might be so. If all
Christians do not hope for it, it is because they regard it as not attainable.
9. What the objection really amounts to.
(1.) That, although the promise just quoted is undemiably a promise of
the very state in question in this life, yet it is irrational to hope, by anything
that we can at present do, however much we may at present will and desire
it, to secure to ourselves either its present or its future fulfilment in this life.
(2.) It amounts to a demial, that at any future time during this life it
will be rational for us to hope, by anything that we can at that time do, to
secure either at that or any other time, the fulfilment of the promise to us.
(3.) It amounts to a denial, that we can rationally hope, at any time in
this life, to believe or do anything that will render it in the least degree
probable, that this promise will be fulfilled to us; that, however much we
may at present desire and will to secure the thing promised, we can at
present or at any future time, rationally hope to secure the thing promised.
(4.) It amounts to a denial, that it is rational to expect under any cir-
cumstances, that this class of promises will ever be fulfilled to the saints
(5.) The principles assumed and lying at the foundation of this objection
must, if sound, prove the gospel a delusion. If it is true, that by no
present act of faith we can secure to us the present or the future fulfilment
of the promise of entire Sanctification, I see not why this is not equally
true in respect to all the promises. If there is no such connexion between
our present and future faith and obedience, as to render it even in the
least degree probable, that the promises of persevering grace shall be
vouchsafed to us, them what is the gospel but a delusion ? Where is the
ground of a rational hope of Salvation 2 But suppose it should be replied
to this, that in respect to other promises, and especially in respect to
promises of salvation and of sufficient grace to secure our salvation, there
is such a connexion between present faith and future faith and Salvation, as
to render the latter at least probable, and as therefore to afford a rational
ground of hope of perseverance, in such a sense as to secure Salvation; but
that this is not the case with the promises of entire Sanctification. Should
this be alleged, I call for proof. Observe, I admit the connexion contended
for as just stated between present faith and obedience, and future per-
severance, and final salvation, that the former renders the latter at least
probable ; but I also contend, that the same is true in respect to the
promises of entire sanctification. Let the contrary be shown, if it can be.
Let the principle be produced, if it can be, either from scripture or reason,
that will settle and recognize the difference contended for, to wit, that
present faith and obedience do lay a rational foundation' of hope that we
shall persevere to the end of life, in such a sense as that we shall be saved;
and yet that:pºpéent faith in the promises of entire Sanctification does not
tº a
SAN CTIFICATION. 691
render it in the least degree probable, that we shall ever receive the fulfil-
ment of those promises. Let it be shown, if it can be, that the present
belief of certain promises renders it certain or probable that they will be
fulfilled to us, but that no such connexion obtains in respect to other
promises. Let it be shown, if it can be, that present faith in the promises
of perseverance and salvation renders it either certain or probable, that
these promises will be fulfilled to us, while present faith in the promise of
entire sanctification in this life, renders it neither certain, nor in the least
degree probable, that these promises will ever, in this life, be fulfilled to us.
Suppose a Calvinist should allege, that the first act of faith renders it
certain that the new believer will be saved, and therefore it renders it
certain that he will persevere to the end of life, but that the same is not
true of promises of entire Sanctification in this life. I ask for his proof of
the truth of this assertion ; that is, I ask him to prove, that faith in the latter
promises does not sustain as real and as certain a relation to the reception
of the thing promised as does faith in the former promises. Suppose him to
answer, that God has revealed his design to save all Christians, and from
hence we know, that if they once believe they shall certainly persevere and
be saved. But in answer to this I ask, is it not as expressly revealed as
possible, that God will wholly sanctify all Christians, spirit, soul, and body,
and preserve them blameless unto the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ?
The language in 1 Thes, v. 23, 24, may be regarded either as an express
promise, or as an express declaration: “And the very God of peace sanctify
you wholly, and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be pre-
served blameless unto the coming of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he
that calleth you, who also will do it.” Here observe, Paul expressly affirms
that God will do it. Now where in the bible is there a more express
promise, or a more express revelation of the will and design of God than
this? Nowhere. But suppose it should be replied to this, that, if we take
this view of the subject, it follows, that all saints have been wholly sanctified
in this life. I answer, they no doubt have been, for there is not a word in
the Bible of their being sanctified in any other life than this; and if they
have gone to heaven, they were no doubt sanctified wholly in this life.
But, secondly, it would not follow, that they have all been wholly sancti.
fied until at or near the close of life, because many of them have probably
never understood and appropriated this and similar promises by faith, and
consequently have failed to realize in their own experience their fulfil.
ment, for any considerable length of time before their death. The exact
question here is: If the soul at present apprehends, and lays hold on the
promises of entire Sanctification in this life, is there not as real and as
certain a connexion between present faith and the future fulfilment of the
promise, as there is between present faith in any other promises and the
future fulfilment of those promises. If this is not so, let the contrary be
shown, if it can be. The burden of proof lies on the objector. If to this
any one should reply, that present faith in any promise does not sustain any
such relation to the fulfilment of the promise, as to render it rational to
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692 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
*
hope for its fulfilment, I answer, that if this is so, then the gospel is a
mere nullity and sheer nonsense. Nay, it is infinitely worse than nonsense.
I will not at present contend, that present faith in any promise of future
800d sustains such a relation to its fulfilment, that its fulfilment to us is
absolutely certain ; but upon this I do insist, that present faith in any
Promise of God does render it at least in some degree probable, that the
promise will be fulfilled to us; and that therefore we have ground of rational
hope, when we are conscious of desiring a promised blessing, and of laying
hold by faith upon the promise of it, and of setting our hearts upon obtain-
ing it —I say, when we are conscious of this state of mind in regard to any
promised blessing, we have rational ground of hope that we shall receive
the thing promised. And it matters not at all what the blessing promised
is. If God has promised it, he is able to give it; and we have no right to
Say, that the nature of the thing promised forbids the rational expectation
that we shall receive it. It is plain that the principle on which this ob-
jection is based amounts to a real denial of the gospel, and makes all the
promises a mere nullity.
10. What this objection must assume in reference to the provisions of
grace —
That grace has made no provisions for securing the fulfilment of the con-
ditions of the promises. This must certainly be assumed in relation to the
promises of entire sanctification in this life; that grace has made no such
provisions as to render the fulfilment of the conditions of this class of
promises in any degree probable; that the grace of God in Jesus Christ does
not even afford the least degree of evidence, that real Saints will ever in this
life so believe those promises as to secure the blessing promised ; that
therefore it is irrational for the saints to hope, through any provisions of
grace, to fulfil the conditions and secure the blessing promised ; the grace
of God is mot sufficient for the saints, in the sense, that it is rational for
them to hope so to believe the promises of entire Sanctification, as to secure
the thing promised. The gospel and the grace of God then are a complete
failure, so far as the hope of living in this life without rebellion against God
is concerned. His name is called Jesus in vain, so far as it respects salva-
tion from sin in this life. There is then no rational ground of hope, that
by anything we can possibly do while in the present exercise of faith, and
love, and zeal, we can render it, through grace, in the least degree probable,
that we shall persevere in seeking this blessing until we have fulfilled the
condition of the promise, and secured the blessing. Nothing that we can
now do, while in faith and love, will render it through grace in the least
degree probable, that we shall at any future time believe or do anything that
will secure to us the promised blessing. Christians do at present desire this
attainment, and have a heart or will to it. This objection must assume
that grace has made no such provision as to render the hope rational, that
this will and desire will exist in future, do what we may at present to
secure it.
11. What the provisions of grace are not.
SANCTIFICATION. 693
(1.) Grace has made no provision to save any one without entire holi-
ness of heart.
(2.) It has made no provision to secure holiness without the right
exercise of our own will or agency, for all holiness consists in this.
(3.) It has made no provision to save any one who will not fulfil the
conditions of salvation.
(4.) It has made no provision for the bestowment of irresistible grace,
for the very terms imply a contradiction A moral agent cannot be forced
or necessitated to act in any given manner, and still remain a moral agent.
That is, he cannot be a moral agent in any case in which he acts from
necessity.
(5.) Grace has made no provision to render salvation possible without
hope; that is, without desire and expectation.
12. What these provisions are.
In this place, I can only state what I understand them to be ; and to
avoid much repetition, I must request the reader to consult foregoing and
subsequent lectures, where these different points are developed and dis-
cussed at length.
(1) God foresaw that all mankind would fall into a state of total aliena-
tion from him and his government.
(2.) He also foresaw that by the wisest arrangement, he could secure the
return and salvation of a part of mankind.
(3.) He resolved to do so, and “chose them to eternal salvation, through
sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth.”
(4.) He has instituted a system of means to effect this end ; that is, with
design to effect it.
(5.) These means are :—-
(i.) The revelation of the law.
(ii.) The atonement and mediatorial work of Christ.
(iii.) The publication of the gospel, and the institution of all the means
of grace.
(iv.) The administration of providential and moral governments.
(v.) The gift and agency of the Holy Spirit to excite in them desire,
and to work in them to will and to do, in so far as to secure in them the
fulfilment of the conditions, and to them the fulfilment of the promises.
(6.) Grace has made sufficient provisions to render the salvation of all
possible, and such as will actually secure the salvation of a portion of
mankind.
(7.) Grace has brought salvation so within the reach of all who hear the
gospel, as to leave them wholly without excuse, if they are not saved.
(8.) Grace has made the salvation of every human being secure, who
can be persuaded, by all the influences that God can wisely bring to bear
upon him, to accept the offers of salvation
(9.) Grace has provided such means and instrumentalities as will actually
secure the conviction, conversion, perseverance, entire sanctification, and
final salvation of a part of mankind
69.4 SYSTEMIATIC THEOLOGY.
(10.) Grace has not only provided the motives of moral government, but
the influences necessary to secure the saving effect of this government
over all the elect.
(11.) Grace has not only made promises to be fulfilled upon certain con-
ditions, but it has provided an influence which will, in every case of the
elect secure in them the fulfilment of the conditions of these promises
unto salvation.
(12.) Grace has not only given commands, but has provided the
requisite influence to Secure obedience to them, in such a sense, as to
Secure the perseverance, Sanctification, and full salvation of all the elect
unto Salvation.
This I understand to be a summary statement of the doctrine of grace,
as it is taught in the Bible.
13. What are the real grounds of hope in respect to the question now
under consideration ?
Here it is necessary to state again distinctly, what is not, and what is,
the real question to be decided.
It is not what Christians have hoped upon this subject, for they may
have entertained groundless expectations and irrational hopes; or they
may have had no hope or expectation, when there have been good grounds
of hope. Let it be distinctly understood then, that the true point of
inquiry is, have Christians a right to expect to obtain in this life a
complete victory over sin 2 Not, do they expect it? but, have they a
right to indulge such a hope 2 Provided they have such a hope, is it
irrational 2 Or, provided they have not such a hope, have they good and
sufficient ground for such hope revealed in the Bible? This brings us to
inquire what are not, and what are, the grounds of rational hope.
(1.) They are not in the mere natural ability of man, for the Bible
abundantly reveals the fact, that if man is left to himself, he will never so
exert his agency as to comply with the conditions of salvation. This is
equally true of all men.
(2.) They are not in the gospel, or in the means of grace, aside from
the agency of the Holy Spirit, for the Bible reveals the fact, that no one
will ever be sanctified by these means, without the agency of the Holy
Spirit.
In prosecuting inquiry upon this subject, I remark:
(i.) That the inquiry now before us respects real Christians. It might
be interesting and useful to look into the subject in its bearings upon the
impenitent world, but this would occupy too much time and space in this
place. It might be useful to inquire, what ground of rational hope any
simmer may have, that he shall actually be converted and Saved, when the
gospel is addressed to him. It certainly cannot be denied, with any show
of reason, that every sinner to whom the gospel call is addressed, has
some reason to hope that God has designs of mercy toward him, and that
he shall be converted, and kept, and sanctified, and Saved. He must have
some ground to hope for this result, upon the bare presentation to him of
SANCTIFICATION. 695
the offers of mercy. He has all the evidence he can ask or desire, that
God is ready and willing to save him, provided that he is willing to accept
of mercy, and comply with the conditions of Salvation. So that, if he is
disposed to accept it, he need not raise any question about the grounds of
hope. There is nothing in his way but his own indisposition ; if this is
removed, he may surely hope to be saved. But the offers of mercy also
afford some ground of hope, that the Holy Spirit will strive with him and
overcome his reluctance, so that he may rationally hope to be converted.
The ground of this hope may be more or less strong in the case of
individual sinners, as they find the providence and Spirit of God working
together for the accomplishment of this result. If, for example, the
sinner finds, in addition to the offers of salvation by the Word of the
gospel, that the Holy Spirit is striving with him, convincing him of sin,
and trying to induce him to turn and live, he has of course increased
grounds for the hope that he shall be saved.
But, as I said, the inquiry mow before us respects the grounds of hope
in Christians.
(ii.) I remark, that Christians, of course, from the very nature of their
religion, have come strongly to desire a complete and lasting victory over
sin. I need not in this place attempt to prove this.
(iii.) Christians not only desire this, but in fact so far as they are
Christians, they will to obtain this victory. That is, when they have the
heart of a child of God, and are in a state of acceptance with him, they
will to render to God a present, full, universal, and endless obedience.
This is implied in the very mature of true religion.
(iv.) The inquiry before us respects future acts of will. The state
under consideration consists in an abiding consecration to God. The
Christian is at present in this state, and the inquiry respects his grounds
of hope, that he shall ever attain to a state in this life, in which he shall
abide steadily and uniformly in this state, and go no more into voluntary
rebellion against God. Has grace made no such provisions as to render
the hope rational, that we shall in this life ever cease to sin 2 Or has it
pleased God to make no such provisions, and are we to expect to sin as
long as we live in this world 2 Has the Christian any rational ground for
a hope, that he shall be sanctified in this life 2 that is, that he shall obtain
a complete and final victory over sin in this life? The question here is,
not whether Christians do hope for this, but, may they rationally hope for
this 2 Have they good reason for such a hope, did they apprehend or
understand this ground 2 They have desire, which is an element of hope
—have they grounds for a rational expectation ? I do not here inquire,
whether they do expect it, but whether they have good and valid reason for
such an expectation ? Is the difficulty owing to a want in the provisions
of grace, or in a misconception of these provisions 2 Some Christians do
hope for this attainment. Are they mad and irrational, or have they good
reason for this hope?
In replying to these inquiries, I remark, that the Holy Spirit is given to
696 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
*
the saints for the express purpose revealed in such passages as the follow-
ing. I Thes. v. 23, 24. “And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly ;
and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blame-
less unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that calleth
you, who also will do it.” With this, and similar promises, and express
declarations in his hands, is it rational or irrational in him, to expect to
receive the fulfilment of such promises? If it be answered, that these
promises are conditioned upon his faith, and it is irrational for him to hope
to fulfil the condition; I reply, that the Holy Spirit is given to him, and
abides in him, to draw him into a fulfilment of the conditions of the
promises. It is nowhere so much as hinted in the Bible, that the Holy
Spirit will not do this until the close of life. Observe, that this is the very
office-work of the Spirit, to work in us to fulfil the conditions of the promises
of entire Sanctification, and thus to secure this end. His business with and
in us, is to procure our entire Sanctification ; and, as I said, there is not so
much as a hint in the Bible, that he does not desire or design to secure this
before death. Now, suppose we lay aside all knowledge of facts, in relation
to the past experience of the church, and look into the Bible. From read-
ing this, would any man get the idea, that God did not expect, desire, and
intend, that Saints should obtain an entire victory over sin in this life 2
When we read such promises and declarations as abound in the Bible,
should we not see rational ground for hope, that we shall obtain a complete
victory over sin in this life?
But here it may be said, that the past history of the church shows what
are the real promises of grace; that grace has not in fact secured this
attainment, at least to a great part of the church until at or near the close
of life; and therefore grace in fact made no provision for this attainment
in their case.
But if this objection has any weight, it proves equally, that grace has
made in no case any provision for any one's being any better than he really
is, and has been, and that it had been irrational in any one to have expected
to be any better than in fact he has turned out to be. If he had at any
time expected to be any better at any future time, than he turned out to be,
this, upon the principle of the objection in question, would prove that he
had no rational ground for the expectation: that grace in fact had made
no such provision as to render any such hope rational. If this be true, we
shall all see when we get into the eternal world, that in no case could we
have indulged a rational hope of being any better than we have been, and
that when we did indulge any such hope, we had no ground for it.
But again, if what the church has been settles the question of what it is
rational for her to hope in time to be, why then we must dismiss the hope
of any improvement. This objection proves too much, therefore it proves
mothing.
But again, since the Holy Spirit is given to and abides in Christians,
for the very purpose of Securing their entire and permanent sanctification,
and since there is no intimation in the Bible that this work is to be delayed
SANCTDFICATION. 697
until death, but, on the contrary, express declarations and promises, that as
fully and expressly as possible teach the contrary, it is perfectly rational to
hope for this, and downright unbelief not to expect it. What can be more
express to this point than the promises and declarations that have been
already quoted upon this subject?
Now the question is, not whether these promises and declarations have
inspired hope, but might they not reasonably have done so 2 The question
is, not whether these promises have been understood and relied upon, but
might they not reasonably have inspired confidence, that we should, or that
they should gain a complete and lasting victory over sin in this life 2 Do
not let us be again diverted by the objection, that the provisions of grace,
and what it is rational to hope for, is settled by what has been accomplished.
We have seen that this objection is not valid.
Desire has existed, why has not expectation also existed 2 We shall see
in its place. I said, that the Bible represents the design of God to be, to
sanctify Christians wholly in this life, and nowhere so much as intimates,
that this work is not to be complete in this life. Let such passages as the
following be consulted upon this question. Titus ii. 11–14. “For the
grace of God that bringeth Salvation hath appeared to all men, teach-
ing us, that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly,
righteously, and godly in this present world; looking for that blessed
hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus
Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all
iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works.”
This passage teaches that this state is to be expected; it also teaches that
it is to be expected before death, (ver, 12.); that Christ gave himself
to secure this result, (ver, 14.) The chapter concludes with this
direction to Titus, “These things speak, and exhort, and rebuke with all
authority. Let no man despise thee.” Now suppose Titus to have taught,
as some now teach, that it is dangerous error to hope to live in this life
according to the teaching of this passage;—suppose he had told them, that
although Christ had given himself expressly to secure this result, yet there
Was no rational ground of hope, that they would ever do this in this present
evil World; would he have complied with the spirit of the apostle's
injunction in verse fifteeenth 2
Again : the thing spoken of in this passage is no doubt a state of entire
sanctification, in the sense, that it implies a complete victory over sin in
this present evil world.
Again, 2. Cor. vi. 17, 18 : “Wherefore come out from among them,
and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing : and
I will receive you, and will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons
and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty.” Now in view of these promises,
the apostle immediately adds the following injunction. 2 Cor.vii. 1: “Having
therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all
filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God.”
Did the apostle think it irrational to expect or hope to make this attain-
698 SYSTEMIATIC THEOLOGY.
ment in this life? Suppose he had added to the injunction just quoted,
that it was dangerous for them to expect to make the attainment which he
exhorted them to make. Suppose he had said, you have no right to infer
from the promises I have just quoted, that it is rational in you to hope to
make this attainment in this life. But suppose the Corinthians to have
inquired, Do not these promises relate to this life 2 Yes, says the apostle.
And does not your injunction to perfect holiness in the fear of God, relate
to this life 2 Yes. Did you not utter this injunction seeing that we have
the promises 2 Yes. Is it not rational, seeing we have these promises,
to hope to avail ourselves of them, and to perfect holiness in the fear of
God in this life 2 Now suppose that to this last question the apostle had
answered, No. Would not this have placed the apostle and the promises
and his injunction in a most ridiculous light? To be sure it would.
Would not any honest mind feel shocked at such an absurdity. Certainly.
Again, 1. Thes, v. 23, 24 : “And the very God of peace sanctify you
wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit, and Soul, and body be preserved
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that
calleth you, who also will do it.” Now suppose that, immediately upon
making this declaration, the apostle had added, you cannot rationally hope
that God will do what I have just expressly affirmed that he will do.
Suppose he had said, the declaration in the 24th verse is only a promise,
and made upon a condition with which you cannot rationally hope to
comply, and therefore as a matter of fact, you cannot rationally hope to
be sanctified wholly and preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord
Jesus Christ. How shocking and ridiculous would such a prayer, with
such a promise, accompanied with such a conclusion, appear.
Again, a Christian is supposed not only to desire to make this attain.
ment, but also to be at present willing to make it, and at present to have
his heart set upon obedience to God, and upon attaining to such a degree
of communion with God as to abide in Christ, and sin no more. A Chris-
tian is supposed at present to be disposed to make this attainment; not
only to desire it, but also to will it. Now, may he rationally aim at it, and
rationally intend or hope to make this attainment 2 Or must he calculate
to sin so long as he lives; and is it irrational for him to expect or hope to
have dome with rebelling against God, and with unbelief, and accusing him
of lying, as long as he lives 2 If he is at present desirous and willing to
have done with sin, is it rational for him to hope, by any means within his
reach and which he is at present disposed to use, to attain a state in which
he shall have a permanent victory over sin, in which he shall abide in
Christ, in such a sense as to have done with rebellion against God 2 By
present willingness, desire and effort, is it rational for him to hope to
secure a future desire and willingness, and an abiding state of heart-con-
formity to God 2 Are there any means within his reach, and which he can
at present, while he has the will and desire, rationally hope so to use as
to secure to him either at present, or at Some future time in this life, a
complete and lasting victory over sin 2 May he hope through present faith
SANCTIFICATION. 699
to secure future faith 2 th; ough present love, and faith, and effort, to Secure
future faith, and love, and successful effort? For it is not contended
by me, that the Christian will or can ever stand fast in the will of God
without effort. This I have sufficiently insisted on. The question is
exactly this ; May a Christian, who is conscious of being at present willing
to attain, and desirous of attaining, a state of abiding consecration to God
in this life, rationally hope to make such an attainment? Has the grace
of God made any such provision as to render such a hope rational 2 Not,
can he rationally hope to make it without desire and effort; but with both
present desire and effort 2 Not whether he could rationally hope to make
such an attainment, if he is at present neither willing nor desirous to make
it ; but whether, provided he at present has both the will and desire, he
may rationally hope to secure so rich an anointing of the Holy Spirit, and
to be so thoroughly baptized into the death of Christ, as to remain hence-
forth in a state of abiding consecration to God 2
I care not to speculate upon abstractions, and upon the grounds of hope
where there is neither desire nor will; that is, where there is no religion.
But I have been amazingly anxious myself to have the question here put
answered in relation to myself; and I know that many others are intensely
anxious to have this question answered. Must I always expect to be over-
come by temptation ? May I not rationally hope to obtain a permanent
victory over sin in this life? Must I carry with me the expectation of
going more or less frequently into rebellion against God so long as I live 2
Is there no hope in the case ? Has grace made no such provision, that it
is rational for me, in this state of intense interest and anxiety, to hope for
complete deliverance from the overcoming power of sin in this life 2 Is
there no foundation anywhere upon which I can build a rational hope, that
I shall make this attainment P Are all the commands, and exhortations,
and promises, and declarations in the Bible touching this subject, a delu-
sion ? Are they no warrant for the expectation in question 2 May I never
rationally expect to be more than a conqueror in this life 2 Must I expect
to succumb to Satan ever and anon, so long as I live, and is every other
expectation irrational 2
The Holy Spirit is given to Christians, to abide with and in them, for
the express purpose of procuring entire sanctification in this life. It is
said, Rom. viii. 26, 27 : “Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities:
for we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit itself
maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered. And
he that searcheth the hearts, knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit,
because he maketh intercession for the Saints according to the will of
God.” Now it is a fact that the Holy Spirit often stirs up, in the souls
of all Christians, intense desire for this attainment. He as manifestly
begets within them a longing for this attainment, as he does for ultimate
Salvation. Now, why is it not as rational to expect the one as the other ?
Their ultimate salvation they do expect, and receive the drawings of the
Spirit after the grace of perseverance, as an earnest or evidence, that God
' A DOTIOGIHJ, OILVINGILS US (){} /
oq, Osm on pub oaeſtaq on amunuoo llºus I ºbul odou Iguong.I. Joj puno.15
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“Out JI & posituotd 5UTII] ouſ, OAlaoa, Iſbus I quuſ, odou. On out uſ [guoſhº. 11
Jopual sºul lotl soop ‘AON asſuold quun uodn unpuj Kq poll 5uiſt'ſ juoso.Id
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où loſ oſsop sourge soul alſ, stuns tuo Iſe uſ sonºxa Iuds Klopſ au.J.
'elaſq. aul uſ sasſuold Ssaid Xa put unj isou oth 5uoup are osaul. ... aſſi
SRI, uſuogbogoues arguo Jo Sasſuold att, Jo ant, aut's oth hou sppuy
‘tuatin Jo quattuguſ aun [O] odou
o, Ibſtone. Alloaſted SI q. (Ioun Kiams 'sasſuold osaun uo piou expun on du
poiſºs [99] Aoû] put posſuloid sº Burun atlï, atisap Kaun uolu A Burun oun
Joy odou ol put ‘THIds Klopſ on Aq panſoxo attsop spun oampuſ on tuuong.
sº I prufio. KotīI, tonnaies pub oottuta Mostad taun atmoos on spuouſ
SANCTIFICATION. 701
means ? Then the fact that the Holy Spirit at present stirs me up to
present faith, affords no degree of evidence that he will continue to do so;
and the fact, that I at present lay hold of the promise, does not afford the
least reason for the hope, that I shall keep hold and use the means, in any
such sense as to secure the blessing promised. Well, if this were so, the
Bible were the greatest deception that was ever palmed upon mankind.
The fact is, there must be at least a connection of high probability, if not
of certainty, between the present actual belief of the promises, and the
future fulfilment of them to us, or the Bible and the whole gospel are
1]O]].SéllS62.
But again: I say that this is as true of the promises of entire sanctifica-
tion in this life, as of any other promises whatever. If it is not, I say
again, let the contrary be shown, if it can be.
But again: when Christians are stirred up by the Holy Spirit to lay hold
upon any class of promises in prayer, and faith, they have good ground for
the hope, that it is the design of God to grant the blessing promised them.
Now, it is plainly in accordance with the revealed will of God, that
Christians should be wholly sanctified and kept from sin. And suppose
the Holy Spirit stirs up the soul to great longings snd wrestlings for com-
plete deliverance from sim, and to plead and believe such promises as the
following —
1 Thes, vi. 23: “And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I
pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless
unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. 24. Faithful is he that calleth
you, who also will do it.”
Jer. xxxi. 31 : “Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make
a liew covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah ;
32. Not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the
day that I took them by the hand, to bring them out of the land of Egypt,
(which my covenant they brake, although I was a husband unto them, saith
the Lord ;) 33. But this shall be the covenant that I will make with the
house of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in
their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and
they shall be my people, 34. And they shall teach no more every man
his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, know the Lord, for they
shall all know me from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith
the Lord ; for I will forgive their imiquity, and I will remember their sin
mo more.”
Jer, XXXii. 40; “Aud I will make an everlasting covenant with them,
that I will not turn away from them, to do them good ; but I will put my
fear in their hearts, that they shall not depart from me.”
Ezek. xxxvi. 25 : “Them will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye
shall be clean ; from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I
cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put
within you ; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I
will give you a heart of flesh. 27. And I will put my Spirit within you,
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SANCTIFICATION. 703
will not, than the delay in the case of the promise that Abraham should have
a son, proved that it was irrational in him to expect the promise to be
fulfilled to him. It has been objected, that it was irrational to expect to
attain to a state in this life in which we should sin no more, because many
have supposed they had made the attainment, and found at length that they
were mistaken. But there is no force in this objection. Suppose this is
granted, what then 2 Does this prove that the prayer of faith will not be
answered 2 Suppose many such mistakes have been made; does this
disprove the word of God? In no wise. God will still fulfil his promises,
and “is not slack concerning them as some men count slackness.” If such
a promise has been pleaded in faith, heaven and earth shall pass away
before the answer shall fail. But suppose it should be alleged, that evidence
is wanting that any ever did or will plead those promises in faith. To this
I answer, that the soul may be as conscious of exercising faith in these
promises, as it is of its own existence ; and although one might think he
believed when he did not, still it would be true, that when one actually did
believe he would know and be sure of it.
Many Christians can as confidently affirmthat they plead these promises
in faith, as that they are Christians. Now, is it irrational for them to expect
the fulfilment of them 2 No indeed, any more than it is irrational to
expect to be saved. If the one expectation is irrational, so is the other.
Will it be replied, that the one is less probable than the other ? I ask,
what have probabilities to human view to do with rendering it irrational to
believe God, and expect him to fulfil his word? Suppose it is less likely
to human view, that we shall ever in this life arrive at a point in Christian
attainment, beyond which we shall sin no more, than it is that we shall
ultimately be saved: I say, suppose this to be granted, what them? Cannot
God as truly, and so far as we know, as easily secure the one as the other?
It may be, that God foresees that the final Salvation of some or of many
souls turns altogether upon the fact, that such a work be accomplished upon
them as shall settle and confirm them in obedience, before certain trials
overtake them.
But suppose, again, it be said that few or none have given evidence of
this attainment before death, and yet many have been saved; there is
therefore little or no reason to believe that the elect are entirely sanctified
in this life. I answer, that it is certain from the Bible, that the saints are
sanctified wholly in this life; that is, at some period in this life.
I have no doubt, though I do not expect this to have weight with an
objector, that great multitudes have been sanctified and preserved, agree-
ably to 1 Thess. v. 23, 24, “And the very God of peace sanctify you
wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that
calleth you, who also will do it.”
But again, I say, that the past experience and observation of the church,
whatever it may be in respect to the subject under consideration, is not the
test of what it is reasonable to expect in future. If it is, it is unreasonable
704 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to expect any improvement in the state of the church and the world. If
past experience is to settle the question of what it is rational to expect in
future, then at no period of the church's past history was it rational
to expect any improvement in her condition. It is not to past expe-
rience, but to the promises and the revealed design of God, and to the
Holy Spirit, that we are to look for a ground of rational hope in regard to
the future.
I suppose that it will not be denied by any one, that most Christians
might rationally hope to be indefinitely better than they are ; that is, to
be much more stable than they are. But if they might rationally hope to
be much better than they are, on what ground can they rationally hope
for this 2 The ground of this hope must be the indwelling and influence
of the Holy Spirit; that “exceeding great and precious promises are given
to us, whereby we may be made partakers of the divine nature, and escape
the corruptions which are in the world through lust;” that the Holy Spirit
is struggling within us to secure in us the fulfilment of the conditions of
those promises, and therefore we may reasonably hope to make indefinitely
higher attainments in this life than we have yet made –I say, I suppose
that no Christian will demy this. But some of these promises expressly
pledge the state of entire sanctification in this life. This is not only true
in fact, but is plainly implied in the saying of Peter just quoted. Observe,
Peter says, 2 Pet. i. 4: “Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and
precious promises; that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature,
having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust.” This
plainly implies, that those promises cover the whole ground of entire
sanctification. Now with such promises in our hands, why should it be
thought unreasonable to hope for entire and permanent victory over sin in
this world, any more than it is irrational to hope for indefinite improve-
ment in this life. Will it be said, that it is easier to keep us from sin
generally than uniformly. But who can know, that God cannot as easily
give us a complete victory, as to suffer us to sin, and then recover us again?
At any rate, the promises of entire Sanctification are made, and it is just
as rational, that is, just as truly rational to expect them to be fulfilled to
us, and to expect that we shall be led to fulfil the conditions of them, as
that we shall fulfil the conditions of the promises of perseverance. If there
be not the same degree of reason to hope for one as for the other, still there
is real ground of rational hope in both cases. This cannot reasonably be
denied. It is therefore rational to hope for both.
Now the fact is, that Christians find themselves disposed to attain this
state. If they are disposed to aim at it, and to pray and struggle for such
a victory, is it rational for them to expect or hope to obtain such a victory?
The question is not really, whether it is rational to hope that Christians
will be disposed to attain this state. The fact of their being Christians
implies that they are thus disposed ; and the inquiry is, being thus dis-
posed, is it rational for them to expect to make the attainment 2 I answer,
—yes. It is perfectly rational for any and every Christian, who finds
SANCTDFICATION. 705
himself disposed to aim at and struggle after this state, to expect to obtain
the blessing which he seeks; and every Christian is drawn by the Holy
Spirit to desire this attainment. He has, in the very fact of his being led
to desire and pray after it, and to pray and struggle after a complete and
lasting victory over sin, the best of evidence that he may rationally expect
to make the attainment. It is just as rational to expect this, under such
circumstances, as it is to expect to persevere to the end of life in grace;
or as rational as it is to expect to make indefinitely higher advances in
holiness. If it is rational to hope to make indefinitely higher attainments
than we have made, because of, or upon the conditions of the promises,
and of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, to stir us up to fulfil the conditions
of the promises, it is just as rational to hope for a permanent victory over
sin, upon the same conditions. If the Holy Spirit leads on to indefinitely
higher attainments, it is rational to expect to make them. If he leads on
to the fulfilment of the conditions of the promises of complete and perma-
ment victory over sin, it is just as rational to expect to attain this state,
as it is to expect to make indefinite advances toward it.
How can this be denied ? I cannot see why one expectation should be
irrational, if the other is not so.
Now observe, the question respects acts of will. Religion, as we have
seen, consists in the consecration of the will or heart to God. A Christian
is supposed to have consecrated his heart and himself to God. The will is
influenced either by light in the intelligence, or by the impulses of the
sensibility. Selfishness, or sin, consists in the will's being governed by the
desires, appetites, passions, or propensities of the sensibility. Temptation
finds its way to, and exerts its influence upon, the will through the sensi-
bility. Now, can a Christian expect or rationally hope, by aiming to do so,
to attain to such a state of mind, that he shall be no more overcome by
temptation, and led into sim 2
We have seen, that the end upon which benevolence fixes, is the highest
good of being in general. This is the Christian's ultimate end or intention.
We have also seem that the elements of this intention are—
(1.) Entiremess; that is, the whole will or heart is devoted to this end,
(2.) Present time; that is, the soul enters now upon, and at present
makes, this consecration.
(3.) The cousecration is designed to be entire, and everlasting; that is,
the consecrated soul does not enlist as an experiment, nor for a limited
time; but true consecration or devotion to God is comprehensive, so far as
present intention goes, of all the future. This consecration to be real is
comprehensive of all future duration, and of all space; that is, the soul
in the act of true consecration, enlists in the service of God for life, to be
wholly God's servant in all places, at all times, and to all etermity. These
are the true elements of all acceptable consecration to God. The soul in
the act of consecration makes no reserves of time, or place, or powers ; all
are surrendered to God. It does not intend nor expect to sin at the
moment of consecration. It fully intends to be, and remain wholly the
Z 2.
706 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Lord's. It chooses the great end upon which benevolence fixes, and designs
to relinquish it no more for ever. But experience teaches the Christian
his own weakness, and that, if left to himself, he is easily overcome by
temptation. His sensibility has been so little developed in its relations to
eternal realities; his will has so long been in the habit of being led by
the feelings and desires of the sensibility, that when the propensities are
strongly excited, he finds to his confusion and unspeakable grief, that he is
weak; and that if left to himself, he invariably yields to temptation; or that
he is at least very liable to do so, and that he frequently sins. Now, the
question is, Is there no ground of rational hope that he may attain such an
established state as uniformly to have the victory over temptation? Is there
no ground of rational hope in this respect, until after this life? Has grace
made no such provision, as to render it rational in the true Saints, to expect
or hope to gain so complete a victory that Rom. v. 21, shall be realized
in their own experience: “That as sim hath reigned unto death, even so
might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ
our Lord ;” also, vi. 14 : “For sin shall not have dominion over you, for
ye are not under law, but under grace.” Also, Thess. v. 23, 24 : “And the
very God of peace sanctify you wholly, and I pray God your whole soul, &c.,
faithful is he that calleth you, who also will do it.” Also, Jeremiah xxxii.
40 : “And I will make an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not
turn away from them, to do them good, but I will put my fear in their
hearts, that they shall not depart from me.” Also, Col. iv. 12: “That you
may stand perfect and complete in all the will of God.” I say, the true
question is, Is there no hope for the Christian, that these and such-like
passages shall be fulfilled to him, and realized in his own experience in
this life? Can he not rationally hope, that the developements of his sensi
bility may be so corrected, that he may be thoroughly and constantly en-
lightened by the Holy Spirit, and enjoy so constant and so deep an amoint-
ing, may be so baptized into Christ, and made so thoroughly acquainted
with him, in his various offices and relations, as to break effectually and
permanently the power of temptation; and so confirm the soul in its con-
secration as that, through the indwelling of Christ by his Spirit, he shall
be more than conqueror in every conflict with the world, the flesh, and
Satan? Is there no hope 2 This is the agonizing inquiry of every soul
who has felt the galling and fascinating power of temptation. Observe, in
the case supposed, the Soul is at present Willing, and deeply solicitous to
avoid all sin in future. Thus far grace has prevailed; the soul has com-
mitted itself to God. Is there no hope that it can abide in this state of
committal? Is it irrational for it, in the midst of its anxieties, to stand
fast for ever; to hope that it shall ever in this life find itself practically
able to do so? If not, what do the scriptures mean? If I may not ration-
ally hope to stand in every hour of temptation, what can this passage mean?
1 Cor. x. 13: “There hath no temptation taken you but such as is common
to man; but God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above
that ye are able, but will with the temptation also make a way to escape,
SANCTDFICATION. 707
that ye may be able to bear it.” Does this only mean, that we shall have
the natural ability to bear temptation? Does it not mean, that such Divine
help shall be vouchsafed, as that we may rationally hope and expect to
stand in the hour of trial? Indeed it does.
There certainly is not in the philosophy of mind anything to forbid the
entertaining of a rational hope of making the attainment in question; but,
on the contrary, everything both in the Bible and in the philosophy of mind
to warrant such an expectation. The mind only needs to be brought into
such a state of developement, and to be so constantly under the influence
of Divine illumination, as to set the Lord always before it ; and so to have
the sensibility developed in its relations to divine things, as to secure
the uniform action of the will, in conformity with the law of God.
The great difficulty with all classes of unsanctified persons is, that their
desires are too strong for their reason. That is, their sensibility is so de-
veloped, that their excited propensities control their will, in opposition to
the law of God, as it is revealed in the reason. Now, if a counter develope-
ment can be effected that shall favour, instead of oppose, the right action
of the will, it will break the power of temptation, and let the soul go free.
If desires to please God, if desires after spiritual oijects, shall be developed,
if the sensibility shall be quickened and drawn to God, and to all spiritual
truths and realities, these desires, instead of tending to draw the will away
from God, will tend to confirm the will in its consecration to God. In this
case, the desires going in the same direction with the reason, the power of
temptation is broken. The sensibility, in this case, rather favours the right
action of the will. That such a developement of the sensibility is needed
and possible, every Christian knows.
That the Holy Spirit, by enlightening the mind, often creates the most
intense desires after God and universal and unalterable holiness, is a matter
of common experience. It is a matter of common experience, that while
those desires continue, the soul walks in unbroken consecration to, and
communion with, God. It is when counter desires are awakened, and the
feelings and emotions toward God and divine things are quenched and sup-
pressed, that the will is seduced from its allegiance. Now there is, there
can be, nothing in the philosophy of mind, to forbid the hope of attaining
to such a state of developement of the sensibility, that it shall become, as
it were, dead to every object that tends to draw the heart from God, and so
alive to God as to respond instantly to truth and light, and as to be mellow
and tender towards God and Christ and divine things, as the apple of the
eye. When this is effected, it is perfectly philosophical to look for perma
ment consecration of will to God, in obedience not to the sensibility, but in
obedience to the reason. The feelings are then such, that the reason de-
mands their indulgence, and that the objects upon which they fasten shall
be sought. The whole mind is then going forth in one direction. Observe,
I do not say that it is impossible for the will to abide steadfast in opposition
to the feelings, desires, and emotions; but I do say, and all experience
proves, that until the sensibility is developed in its relations to God and
Z Z 2
708 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,
divine realities, the steady and undeviating action of the will in its devotion
to God cannot be depended upon. Now the great work of the Holy Spirit
in the Soul consists, at least very much, in so enlightening the mind, in
respect to God and Christ and divine realities, as to render the soul dead
to things of time and sense, and alive to God and eternal things; to crucify
the old man; and to develope a new class of desires and emotions that will
favour, instead of oppose, the right action of the will.
Now observe, when the Spirit begets this hungering and thirsting after
the universal and complete conformity of the whole being to God; when he
stirs up the Soul to an intense effort, and to a tearful agony and travail for
deliverance from the power of temptation; is it irrational for the soul to
make these efforts? Does reason or revelation forbid the expectation, that
the blessing sought should be obtained 2 Is the soul mad, and irrationally
aiming at an impossibility, or is it irrationally engaged in striving to get
loose, and to rise permanently above the power of temptation ? If it is
irrational to expect to make the attainment in question, it is irrational to
aim at it. Nay, it is impossible truly to aim at it, except it be regarded as
possible. The Soul must think it reasonable to expect to make this attain-
ment, or it cannot think it reasonable to try to make it. But is it deceived
in thinking this attainment practicable? If so, but convince it that the
expectation is irrational, and it will aim at making it no longer. It must,
by a law of its own nature, give up the pursuit, in despair of ever living
without being, at least frequently, overcome by temptation while it abides
in the flesh. But does the Bible encourage this despair? Does not the
Bible denounce this state of mind as unbelief and sim 2 What are the pro-
mises—what is the gospel—and what are the provisions of grace, if after
all there is practically no remedy for the agonized Christian in such cir-
cumstances? Is there no rational ground of hope or help for him in God?
Then surely the gospel is a vain boast and a deception.
Observe, the question before us is, whether the Christian, who is
actually willing, and most earnestly desirous of rising permanently above
the power of sin and temptation, and who is stirred up to lay hold on the
promises of complete deliverance, and to plead them in faith before God,
can rationally hope to make the attainment in this life at which he is
aiming 2 Is such a soul mad and deluded, or is it rationally employed 2
and are its expectations in accordance with reason and revelation ? Un-
doubtedly they are in accordance with both.
But before I dismiss this objection, I must not fail to glance at the
future prospects of the church. It is, and long has been, the belief of the
great body of orthodox Christians, that the church is destimed, at a future
period of her earthly history, to rise to a state answerable to the repre-
sentations of the prophets and apostles, a state in which she shall come
forth “clear as the Sun, fair as the moon, and terrible as an army with
banners.” In proof of the fact of a future millenium on earth, let such
passages as the following be consulted —
Gen. xxii. 18: “And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be
blessed, because thou hast obeyed my voice.”
SANCTDFICATION. 709
Ps. xxii. 27 : “ All the ends of the world shall remember, and turn
unto the Lord ; and all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before
thee.”
Ps. xxxvii. 11 : “But the meek shall inherit the earth; and shall
delight themselves in the abundance of peace.”
Ps. lxxii. 6 : “He shall come down like rain upon the mown grass, as
showers that water the earth. 7. In his days shall the righteous flourish ;
and abundance of peace so long as the moon endureth. 11. Yea, all kings
shall fall down before him ; all nations shall serve him. 17. His name
shall endure for ever: his name shall be continued as long as the Sun; and
men shall be blessed in him : all nations shall call him blessed."
Ps. lxxxvi. 9: “All nations whom thou hast made shall come and
worship before thee, O Lord ; and shall glorify thy name.”
Isa. ii. 2: “And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain
of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and
shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. 4. And
he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people; and
they shall beat their swords into plowshares; and their spears into prun-
ing hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall
they learn war any more. 17. And the loftimess of man shall be bowed
down, and the haughtiness of men shall be made low ; and the Lord alone
shall be exalted in that day. 20. In that day a man shall cast his idols of
silver, and his idols of gold, which they made each one for himself to
worship, to the moles, and to the bats.”
Isa. xxv. 6 : “And in this mountain shall the Lord of hosts make unto
all people a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the lees, of fat things
full of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined. 7. And he will destroy
in this mountain the face of the covering cast over all people, and the Vail
that is spread over all nations. 8. He will swallow up death in victory;
and the Lord will wipe away tears from off all faces; and the rebuke of
his people shall be taken away from off all the earth: for the Lord hath
spoken it.”
Isa. xxii. 13 : “Upon the land of my people shall come up thorns and
briars, yea, upon all the houses of joy in the joyous city. 15. Until the
Spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness be a fruitful
field, and the fruitful field be counted for a forest. 16. Then judgment
shall dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness remain in the fruitful
field. 17. And the work of righteousness shall be peace; and the effect
of righteousness, quietness and assurance for ever, 18. And my people
shall dwell in a peaceful habitation, and in sure dwellings, and in quiet
resting-places.”
Isa. xlv. 22 : “Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the
earth; for I am God, and there is none else. 23. I have sworn by
myself, the Word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not
return, That unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear.”
Isa. xlix, 6 : “And he said, It is a light thing that thou shouldest be
710 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
my servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved
of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the gentiles, that thou mayest
be my Salvation unto the end of the earth.”
Isa, lix. 19 : “So shall they fear the name of the Lord from the west, and
his glory from the rising of the sum. When the enemy shall come in like
a flood, the Spirit of the Lord shall lift up a standard against him. 20.
And the Redeemer shall come to Zion, and unto them that turn from
transgression in Jacob, Saith the Lord.”
Isa. lx. 18: “Violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting nor
destruction within thy borders: but thou shalt call thy walls salvation, and
thy gates praise. 21. Thy people shall be all righteous: they shall inherit
the land for ever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hands, that I
may be glorified.”
Isa. lxvi. 23: “And it shall come to pass, that from one new moon to
another, and from one sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship
before me, saith the Lord.”
Dan. vii. 27: “And the kingdom, and dominion, and the greatness of
the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the
Saints of the Most High, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and
all dominions shall serve and obey him.”
Mic. iv. 1 : “But in the last days it shall come to pass, that the moun-
tain of the house of the Lord shall be established in the top of the moun-
tains, and it shall be exalted above the hills; and people shall flow unto it.
2. And many nations shall come, and Say, Come, and let us go up to the
mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob ; and he will
teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for the law shall go
forth of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.”
Hab. ii. 14 : “For the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the
glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.”
Mal. i. 11 : “For from the rising of the Sun even unto the going down
of the same, my name shall be great among the Gentiles: and in every
place incense shall be offered unto my name, and a pure offering : for my
name shall be great among the heathem, saith the Lord of hosts.”
John xii. 31 : “Now is the judgment of this world; now shall the prince
of this world be cast out. 32. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth,
will draw all men unto me.”
Rom. xi. 25 : “For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of
this mystery, (lest ye should be wise in your own conceits,) that blindness
in part is happened unto Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come
in. 26. And so all Israel shall be saved; as it is written, there shall come
out of Sion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob.
27. For this is my covenant unto them, when I shall take away their sins.”
Rev. xi. 15: “And the seventh angel sounded, and there were great
voices in heaven saying, the kingdoms of this world are become the king-
doms of our Lord, and of his Christ; and he shall reign for ever and ever.”
Rev. xx. 2: “And he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which
SANCTDFICATION. 711
is the devil, and Satan, and bound him a thousand years. 3. And cast him
into the bottomless pit, and shut him up, and set a seal upon him, that he
should deceive the nations no more, till the thousand years should be
fulfilled: and after that he must be loosed a little Season.”
These things are said of the extension and state of the church undeniably
at some period of its history in this world. That is, they are said of the
church, not in a glorified state, but of her in her state of earthly prosperity.
At least, this is and has long been held by the great mass of Christians.
The following things are said of her holiness at the time specified.
Isa. lx. 21 : “Thy people also shall be all righteous; they shall inherit
the land forever, the branch of my planting, the Work of my hands, that I
may be glorified.”
Jer. xxxi. 33: “But this shall be the covenant that I will make with
the house of Israel; After those days saith the Lord, I will put my law in
their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and
they shall be my people. 34. And they shall teach no more every man his
neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord, for they
shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith
the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin
IlO Ill Olſe. -
Ezek. xxxvi. 25 : “Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye
shall be clean; from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I
cleanse you. 26. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I
put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and
I will give you a heart of flesh. 27. And I will put my Spirit within yeu,
and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and
do them. 28. And ye shall dwell in the land that I gave to your fathers;
and ye shall be my people, and I will be your God. 29. I will also save
you from all your uncleannesses; and I will call for the corn, and will
increase it, and lay no famine upon you.
Ez. xxxvii. 23: “Neither shall they defile themselves any more with
their idols, nor with their detestable things, nor with any of their trans-
gressions, but I will save them out of all their dwelling-places, wherein they
have simmed, and will cleanse them ; so shall they be my people, and I will
be their God. 24. And David my servant shall be king over them ; and
they all shall have one shepherd ; they shall also walk in my judgments,
and observe my statutes, and do them.”
Zeph. iii. 13 : “The remnant of Israel shall not do iniquity, nor speak
lies; neither shall a deceitful tougue be found in their mouth; for they
shall feed and lie down, and none shall make them afraid.”
Zech. xiv. 20: “In that day shall there be upon the bells of the horses,
HOLINESS UNTO THE LORD ; and the pots in the Lord's house shall be like
the bowls before the altar.”
Rom. xi, 25 : “For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of
this mystery, (lest ye should be wise in your own conceit,) that blindness
in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in.
7 12 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
26. And So all Israel shall be saved ; as it is written, There shall come out
of Zion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob. 27.
For this is my covenant unto them, when I shall take away their sins.”
These things are said of the holiness of the church at that time.
The following, among other passages, represent the spirit of peace and
unanimity that shall prevail at that time.
will bless his people with peace.”
Ps. xxxvii. 11 : “Tut the meek shall inherit the earth, and shall delight
themselves in the abundance of peace.”
Ps. lxxii. 3: “The mountains shall bring peace to the people, and the
little hills, by righteousness. 7. In his days shall the righteous flourish;
and abundance of peace So long as the moon endureth.”
Isa. lii. 8 : “Thy watchman shall lift up the voice; with the voice
together shall they sing; for they shall see eye to eye, when the Lord shall
bring again Zion.”
Isa. lx. 17 : For brass I will bring gold, and for iron I will bring silver,
and for wood brass, and for stones iron ; I will also make thy officers
peace, and thine exactors righteousness. 18. Violence shall no more be
heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy borders; but thou
shalt call thy walls Salvation, and thy gates Praise.”
Isa. lxvi. 12: “For thus saith the Lord, Behold, I will extend peace to her
like a river, and the glory of the Gentiles like a flowing stream ; then shall
ye suck, ye shall be borne upon her sides, and be dandled upon her knees.”
Micah iv. 3: “And he shall judge among many people, and rebuke
strong mations afar off; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares,
and their spears into pruning-hooks; mation shall not lift up a sword
against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. 4. But they shall
sit every man under his vine, and under his fig-tree, and mone shall make
them afraid; for the mouth of the Lord of hosts hath spoken it.”
The following passages speak of the great intelligence of the church at
that period :
Isa. xi. 9 : “They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain ;
for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters
cover the Sea.”
Isa. xxix. 18; “And in that day shall the deaf hear the words of the
book, and the eyes of the blind shall see out of obscurity and out of dark-
ness. 24. They also that erred in spirit shall come to understanding, and
they that murmured shall learn doctrine.”
Isa. xxxiii. 6: “And wisdom and knowledge shall be the stability of thy
times, and strength of Salvation; the fear of the Lord is his treasure.”
Jer, i. 15: “And I will give you pastors according to mine heart, which
shall feed you with knowledge and understanding.”
Heb. viii. 11 : “And they shall not teach every man his neighbour, and
every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord : for all shall know me, from
the least to the greatest.”
SANCTIFICATION. 7 13
The following passages describe the temporal prosperity of the church at
that time, and show clearly, that the state of which mention is made, be-
longs to a temporal, and not to a glorified state, as I understand them.
Ps. lxxii. 7: “In his days shall the righteous flourish ; and abundance
of peace so long as the moon endureth. 16. There shall be a handful of corn
in the earth on the top of the mountains; the fruit thereof shall shake like
Lebanon, and they of the city shall flourish like grass of the earth.”
Isa. lx. 5. “ Then thou shalt see and flow together, and thine heart shall
fear, and be enlarged, because the abundance of the sea shall be converted
unto thee, the forces of the gentiles shall come unto thee. 6. The mul-
titude of camels shall cover thee, the dromedaries of Midian and Ephah ;
all they from Sheba shall come ; they shall bring gold and incense; and
they shall show forth the praises of the Lord. 7. All the flocks of Kedar
shall be gathered together unto thee, the rams of Nebaioth shall minister
unto thee; they shall come up with acceptance on mine altar, and I
will glorify the house of my glory. 13. The glory of Lebanon shall come
unto thee, the fir-tree, the pine-tree, and the box together, to beautify the
place of my sanctuary; and I will make the place of my feet glorious.”
Joel ii. 21. “Fear not, O land; be glad and rejoice; for the Lord will do
great things. 22. Be not afraid, ye beasts of the field; for the pastures of
the wilderness do spring, for the tree beareth her fruit, the fig-tree and the
vine do yield their strength. 23. Be glad then, ye children of Zion, and
rejoice in the Lord your God, for he hath given you the former rain,
moderately, and he will cause to come down for you the rain, the former
rain, and the latter rain in the first month. 24. And the floors shall be
full of wheat, and the fats shall overflow with Wine and oil. 25. And I
will restore to you the years that the locusts hath eaten, the canker-worm,
and the caterpillar, and the palmer worm, my great army which I sent
among you. 26. And ye shall eat in plenty, and be satisfied, and praise
the name of the Lord your God, that hath dealt wondrously with you; and
my people shall never be ashamed.”
Joel iii. 18. “And it shall come to pass in that day, that the mountains
shall drop down new wine, and the hills shall flow with milk, and all the
rivers of Judah shall flow with waters, and a fountain shall come forth of
the house of the Lord, and shall water the valley of Shittim.”
Isa. XXV. 6. “And in this mountain shall the Lord of hosts make unto all
people a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the lees; of fat things full
of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined.”
Isa. xxxv. 1. “The wilderness and the solitary place, shall be glad for
them; and the desert shall rejoice, and blossom as the rose. 2. It shall
blossom abundantly, and rejoice even with joy and singing; the glory of
Lebanon shall be given unto it, the excellency of Carmel and Sharon;
thay shall see the glory of the Lord, and the excellency of our God. 3.
Strengthen ye the weak hands, and confirm the feeble knees. 4. Say to
them that are of a fearful heart, Be strong, fear not : behold, your God will
come with vengeance, even God with a recompense; he will come and save
714 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
you. 5. Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the
deaf shall be unstopped. 6. Then shall the lame man leap as a hart, and
the tongue of the dumb sing; for in the wilderness shall waters break out,
and streams in the desert. 7. And the parched ground shall become a
pool, and the thirsty land springs of water; in the habitation of dragons,
where each lay, shall be grass, with reeds and rushes. 8. And a highway
shall be there, and a way, and it shall be called, The Way of holiness; the
unclean shall not pass over it; but it shall be for those ; the wayfaring
men, though fools, shall not err therein. 9. No lion shall be there, nor any
ravenous beast shall go up thereon, it shall not be found there; but the
redeemed shall walk there. 10. And the ransomed of the Lord shall
return, and come to Zion with Songs and everlasting joy upon their heads;
they shall obtain joy and gladness, and Sorrow and sighing shall flee away.”
Isa. xli. 18. “I will open rivers in high places, and fountains in the
midst of the valleys; I will make the wilderness a pool of water, and the
dry land springs of water.”
Again : the church at that period shall have great enjoyment:
Isa. xxy. 8. “He will swallow up death in victory; and the Lord God
will wipe away tears from off all faces; and the rebuke of his people shall
he take away from off all the earth; for the Lord hath spoken it.”
Isa. xxxv. 10; “And the ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come
to Zion with songs, and everlasting joy upon their heads; they shall
obtain joy and gladness, and Sorrow and sighing shall flee away.”
Isa. lii. 9; “Break forth into joy, sing together, ye waste places of
Jerusalem : for the Lord hath comforted his people, he hath redeemed
Jerusalem.”
Isa. lxv. 18; “But be ye glad and rejoice for ever in that which I
create : for, behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her people a joy.
19. And I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and joy in my people : and the voice
of weeping shall be no more heard in her, nor the voice of crying.”
Zeph. iii. 14; “Sing, O daughter of Zion; shout, O Israel; be glad
and rejoice with all the heart, O daughter of Jerusalem. 15. The Lord
hath taken away thy judgments, he hath cast out thine enemy: the King
of Israel, even the Lord, is in the midst of thee: thou shalt not see evil
any more. 16. In that day shall it be said to Jerusalem, Fear thou not :
and to Zion, Let not thy hands be slack. 17. The Lord thy God in the
midst of thee is mighty; he will Save, he will rejoice over thee with joy;
he will rest in his love, he will joy over thee with singing.”
Let the following passages be viewed in contrast with the past history of
the church :—
Isaiah xi. 6.—“The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall
lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling
together; and a little child shall lead them. 7. And the cow and the bear
shall feed ; their young ones shall lie down together: and the lion shall
eat straw like the ox. 8. And the sucking child shall play on the hole
of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice's den.”
SANCTIFICATION. 715
Isa. xl. 4 “Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill
shall be made low ; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough
places plain. 5. And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh
shall see it together: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.”
Isa. xli. 18. “I will open rivers in high places, and fountains in the
midst of the vallies: I will make the wilderness a pool of Water, and the
dry land springs of water. 19. I will plant in the wilderness the cedar,
the shittah-tree, and the myrtle, and the oil-tree; I’will set in the desert
the fir-tree, and the pine, and the box-tree together. 20. That they may
see, and know, and consider, and understand together, that the hand of the
Lord bath done this, and the Holy One of Israel hath created it.”
Isa. lv. 13. “Instead of the thorn shall come up the fir-tree, and instead
of the briar shall come up the myrtle-tree : and it shall be to the Lord for
a name, for an everlasting sign that shall not be cut off.”
These passages are, as every reader of the Bible knows, specimens of
the manner in which the Bible represents the state of the church in
future. I have quoted thus copiously to lay before the reader the general
tenor of scripture upon this subject. It is also a matter of common know-
ledge, that nearly all orthodox Christians are expecting the church to enter
upon this state soon. But how is this state to be attained, if it is irrational
for Christians to hope to be entirely sanctified in this life 2 If the above
passages do not describe a state of complete and continued holiness, what
language could describe such a state 2 These promises and prophecies will
be fulfilled at some time. They are, as it respects individuals, and respects
the whole church, conditioned upon faith. But this faith will actually be
exercised. The church will enter into this state. Now, is it unreasonable
for the church, and for any and every Christian, to hope at this age of the
world to enter upon this state 2 Would it be irrational for the church to
arise, and aim at making these attainments in holiness during the present
century 2 How is it possible for the church as a body to arrive at this
state, while it is regarded as unreasonable, and as dangerous error for
Christians to hope or expect to get into a state of abiding consecration to
God in this life 2
It must be, I think, evident to every one, that if the objection under
consideration has any weight, the prophecies can never be fulfilled; and
that, while the theological schools insist, and ministers insist, that the
expectation of making the attainment in question is irrational and dan-
gerous, the prophecies and promises will not be fulfilled to the church.
While such a sentiment is insisted on, the seminaries and the ministry are
in the way of the onward movement of the ark of holiness and of truth.
The objection, that it is irrational to expect to make such attainments in
this life, as to get a complete victory over temptation and sin, must be
groundless, or both the Bible and the Holy Spirit are found false witnesses:
but this cannot be ; the thought of it is blasphemy.
716 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE LXIX.
SAINCTIFICATION.
14. I come now to the consideration of the tendency of a denial, that
Christians have valid grounds of hope, that they shall obtain a victory over
sim in this life.
(1.) We have seen that true religion consists in benevolence, or in heart
obedience to God. It consists essentially in the will's being yielded to the
will of God, in embracing the same end that he embraces, and yielding
implicit obedience to him in all our lives, or in our efforts to secure that
end. This constitutes the essence of all true religion. The feelings or
affections, or the involuntary emotions, are rather a consequence, than
strictly a part of true religion. Since religion consists essentially in yield-
ing the will to God in implicit obedience, it follows that faith or implicit
confidence is a condition, or rather an essential element, of true religion.
(2.) We have in former lectures also seen what faith is; that it consists
in committing the Soul to God, in trust, or confidence. It is not an in-
voluntary, but a voluntary state of mind. We have also seen, that intel-
lectual conviction is an indispensable condition of faith; that this conviction
is not evangelical faith, but is only a condition of it. Faith essentially
consists in the will's embracing the truths perceived by the intellect; and
this intellectual perception is, of course, indispensable to faith. We have
seen, that faith cannot exist any further than truth is apprehended, under-
stood, and intellectually believed. This intellectual apprehension, under-
standing, and belief, I say again, is not itself saving or evangelical faith,
but only a condition of it. When truth is apprehended, understood and
intellectually embraced or believed, then and so far, true faith is possible,
and no further. Then, and not till them, can the will embrace and commit
itself to truth.
(3.) Of course, as we have heretofore seen, faith is a condition of all
heart obedience to the will of God. The will cannot consistently yield, and
ought not to be yielded, to any being in whose wisdom and goodness we
have not the best perceived and understood grounds of confidence. The
intellect must apprehend the grounds of confidence, before we have a right
to trust in, or commit our will to, the direction of any being. We ought
to have the fullest intellectual conviction of the wisdom and uprightness of
a being, before we can innocently yield up to him the direction of our
powers, and commit ourselves to him in implicit and universal obedience.
(4.) Again, faith is also a condition of prevailing prayer. Without faith
it is impossible to please God in anything. It is, as every reader of the
Bible knows, the everywhere expressed or implied condition of the fulfil-
ment of the promises of God; and we are expressly assured, that he who
wavers, and does not implicitly believe or trust in God, must not expect to
receive anything in answer to prayer.
(5.) Implicit confidence or faith is also a condition of sanctification, as
SANCTDFICATION. 717
we have fully seen. Indeed faith is indispensable to any progress in reli-
gion. Not a step is taken from first to last in the real and true service of
God, without faith or heart-confidence in him. The very nature of religion
forbids the expectation, and the possibility of progress in religion without
faith.
(6.) Implicit confidence or faith is, of course, and as every one knows, a
condition of salvation. Without faith a preparation for heaven is naturally
impossible, and of course without faith Salvation is naturally impossible.
(7.) We have also seen what hope is ; that it is compounded of desire
and expectation; that it includes a feeling, and Some degree of expectation.
As we have seem, both these elements are essential to hope. That which
is not desired, cannot be hoped for, although it may be expected. So, that
which is desired cannot be hoped for, unless it is also expected. Both
expectation and desire are always essential to hope. It has also been seen,
that a thing may be truly desirable, which is not desired. A thing may be
ever so excellent and desirable in itself, yet, from false views of its nature,
it may not be desired; so also a thing may be desired which is not expected;
and there may be good reason to expect an event which is desired, and yet
expectation may be prevented, for want of a knowledge of the reason, or
grounds of expectation. There may be never so good and substantial
evidence that an event will occur, and yet we may not expect it, for want
of an apprehension of it. Since desire and expectation are both essential
elements of hope, it follows, that whatever tends to inspire desire and
expectation, tends to produce hope. And so, on the other hand, whatever
tends to prevent desire and expectation, tends to prevent hope.
(8.) From what has been said, it is plain, that hope is a condition of the
beginning of religion, and of all progress in it. T)esire and expectation
must both exist, as a condition of true religion. If there be no desire, there
will of course be no attention to the subject, and no effort. But if there
be desire, and no expectation or intellectual conviction, there can be no
faith. Both desire and expectation are conditions of all religion, and of all
salvation. Hope is a condition of all effort on almost every subject. With-
out both desire and expectation, the very sinews of effort are wanting.
Whatever therefore tends to prevent hope, tends to prevent religion.
There is, as every one must see, a difference between a hope of eternal life,
founded upon a consciousness of being a christian, and a hope founded upon
the mere offer of Salvation. The difference however does not consist in the
nature of hope, but only in the evidence upon which expectation is based.
The offer of Salvation, as has been said, lays a good foundation for a rational
hope, that we shall be converted and saved. But finding ourselves in the
way of obedience, and drawn by the Holy Spirit, we have a higher evidence
upon which to base expectation. Both desire and expectation are greatly
increased in the latter case, but they may justly exist in a lower degree, in
the former case.
The foregoing remarks prepare the way for saying,
(9.) That there are two effectual ways of opposing religion,
718 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(i.) By so misrepresenting it as to prevent desire.
When God and his government and service are so represented as to
prevent desire, this is one of the most effectual ways of opposing religion.
If such representations are accredited, this is an effectual bar to religion in
every case. This is a common Way in which Satan and his emissaries oppose
the religion of the Bible. They misrepresent God and religion, and hold
it up to contempt, or so misrepresent it in multitudes of ways, as to cause
the human mind necessarily to regard it as undesirable, as rather injurious
than beneficial to the world, and to individuals. They represent religion,
either as unnecessary, or as something that cannot be desired upon any other
principle, than as the less of two evils—as something to be submitted to,
rather than to go to hell, but as being far from anything desirable and lovely
in itself. This, I say again, is one of the most common, and most fatal
methods of opposing religion. Many men who think they are promoting
religion, are among the most efficient agents of Satan in preventing it, by
the false representations they make of it. They, by their spirit and manner,
throw around and over it a famatical, or a melancholic, or a superstitious
cant, whining, and grimace, or a severity and a hatefulness that necessarily
disgust, rather than attract the enlightened mind. Thus the soul is repelled
instead of attracted ; disgust is awakened, instead of desire. Such repre-
sentations are among Satan's most efficient instrumentalities for opposing
God and ruining Souls.
(ii.) Another frequent and most successful method of opposing God and
his government is, by discouraging expectation. This was the devil's first
successful experiment with mankind. He succeeded in undermining confi-
dence in God; this he did, by suggesting that God is selfish in his requisi-
tions and prohibitions. Ever since the fall of our first parents, unbelief has
been the easily besetting sin of our race. God has therefore taken, and is
taking, all possible pains to restore confidence in himself and in his govern-
ment, as a condition of Saving the Souls of fallen men.
We have seen, and Satan and his emissaries know, that intellectual ex-
pectation or conviction is a condition of faith, and that faith is a condition
of all holiness and of salvation. It has therefore always been, and still is,
one of the principal objects of Satan to prevent faith. To do this, he must
destroy hope or expectation, and desire, Men are exceedingly prone to
discredit the Divine testimony and character; and it would seem, that un-
belief is the most common, as well as the most unreasonable, abomination in
the world. It is remarkable with what readiness, and with what credulity,
a hint or an insinuation against the testimony of God will be received. It
would seem, that the human mind is in such an attitude towards God, that
his most solemn declarations and his oath can be discredited, upon the bare
denial of man, and even of the devil. Man seems to be more prome to un-
belief, than to almost any other form of sin. Whatever, therefore, tends to
beget distrust, or to prevent expectation in regard to the promises and truth
of God, tends of course in the most direct and efficient manner to oppose
God and religion. Now suppose ministers should set themselves So to
SANCTIFICATION. 719
caricature and misrepresent religion, as to render it undesirable, and even
odious to the human mind; so that, as the human mind is constituted, it
would be impossible to desire it. Who cannot see that such a ministry were
infinitely worse than none; and would be the most successful and efficient
instrumentality that Satan could devise to oppose God, and build up the
influence of hell? If those who are supposed to know by experience, and
who are the leaders in, and teachers of religion, represent it as undesirable,
in just so far as they have influence, they are the most successful opposers
of it. The result would be the same, whether they did this through misap-
prehension or design. If they mistook the nature of religion, and without
designing to misrepresentit, did nevertheless actually do so, the consequence
must be just as fatal to the interests of religion as if they were its real, but
disguised enemies. This, as I have said, is no uncommon thing for ministers,
through misapprehension to misrepresent the gospel so grossly as to repel,
rather than attract, the human mind. In so doing they of course render
hope impossible, by preventing the possibility of one of its essential elements,
desire. There is then no effort made on the part of the hearers of such
ministers, to obtain what they are prevented from desiring. Such ministers
preach on, and ascribe to the sovereignty of God their want of success, not
considering that the fault is in their grossly misrepresenting God and his
claims, and the nature of his religion. It were perfectly easy, were this the
place to do so, to show that the representations of God, and of his claims,
and of religion, which are sometimes made in the pulpit, and through the
press, are calculated, in a high degree, to repel and disgust, rather than
attract the human mind. When such misrepresentations are complained
of, we are told, that the carnal mind will of course repel true representations
of the character of God and of religion; and the fact, that disgust is pro-
duced, is regarded as evidence that the truth is held forth to the people.
I know it is true, that the carnal or selfish mind is enmity against God.
But what does this mean? Why it means, that the carnal heart is selfish-
ness, that the will is committed to self-gratification, which is a state of
heart, or an attitude of the will directly opposite to that which God requires.
It is also true, that this selfish state of will does often beget emotions of
opposition to God, when God is contemplated as opposed to the sinner,
on account of his selfishness. But it is also true, that the human intel-
ligence cannot but approve the character and government of God, when
they are rightly apprehended; and further, when the true character of God,
of his government and religion is properly represented to, and appre-
hended by the human mind, from a law of necessity, the mind pronounces
the character of God to be lovely, and his government and religion infi-
mitely desirable. Such being the nature of the human mind, the Holy
Spirit, by thoroughly enlightening the intellect, arouses the desires, and
developes the feelings in their relations to God. The desires thus come
into harmony with the law of God, and favour the consecration of the
Will, and the whole man is renewed in the intage and favour of God. Men
are susceptible of conversion by the truth as presented by the Holy Spirit,
720 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
upon condition of their mature being such, that a true representation of
God rather attracts than repels them. But since I have dwelt so much
at large upon this particular, in lectures on depravity and regeneration, I
must not enlarge upon it in this place.
It is very plain that when, through mistake or design, God, his govern-
ment, and religion are so represented as naturally to repel, rather than
attract men, this is the most efficient method of opposing the progress of
religion, since it prevents desire, which is an essential element of hope,
and hope is indispensable to successful effort.
But suppose, that the teachers of religion set themselves to prevent
the expectation of becoming religious, or of making progress in religion.
Suppose they represent to sinners, that there is no rational ground of
hope in their case—that men cannot rationally expect to be saved, or to
be converted, however much they may desire it. What must be the effect
of such teaching? Every body knows, that in just so far as such teachers
had any influence, hell could not desire a more efficient instrumentality
to dishonour God and ruin souls. This would be just what the devil would
himself inculcate. It would prevent hope, and of course prevent faith,
and render salvation impossible, and damnation certain, unless the lie could
be contradicted, and the spell of error broken.
Suppose also, that religious teachers should instruct the church, that
they have no rational ground for the expectation that their prayers will be
answered. Suppose they should tell them that present faith has no con-
mexion whatever with future faith, or no such connexion as to render future
faith probable; that present faith in any promise is so far from having any
certain connexion with its fulfilment, that it affords no ground whatever for
rational hope, that the promises at present believed will ever be fulfilled.
Suppose they are told that prayer for the grace of perseverance, and a
present desire and determination to persevere, had no such connexion with
the desired end as to afford the least ground of rational hope that they
should persevere.
Suppose that ministers should take this course to render expectation,
and of course hope and faith impossible, what must be the result 2 Every
one can see. Take any class of promises you please, and let the ministry
in general represent it as a dangerous error for Christians to expect or
hope to realize their fulfilment, and what must the consequence be? Why,
in so far as they had influence, they would exert the very worst influence
possible. Apply this principle to the promises of the world's conversion,
and what would be dome for missions? Apply it to parents in relation to
their children, and what would become of family religion 2
Now take the class of promises that pledge a victory over sin in this life.
Let, for example, ministers explaim away 1 Thess. v. 23, 24: “And the
very God of peace sanctify you wholly, and I pray God your whole spirit,
and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord
Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that calleth you, you also will do it:” and
this whole class of promises; or let them teach, as Some of them do, that
SAINCTIFICATION. 721
it is a dangerous error to expect that these promises will be fulfilled to
Christians, and what must the result be 2 This would be just as the devil
would have it. “Ha, hath God said, he will sanctify you wholly, spirit,
soul, and body, and preserve you blameless unto the coming of the Lord
Jesus Christ? Ye shall not surely be so sanctified and kept, and the Lord
doth know this, and it is dangerous to trust him.”
This surely is the devil's teaching; and when he can get the ministers
of Christ to take this course, what more can be done? Suppose the
ministers admit, as many of them do, that the blessing we have been
considering is fully promised in the Bible ; but, at the same time, inculcate
that it is promised upon a coudition with which it is irrational for us to
hope to comply. What must result from such teaching as this 2 It repre-
sents God and his gospel in a most revolting and ridiculous light. The
provision, say such teachers, is adequate, and proffered upon conditions
with which you might comply, but with which you cannot rationally hope
to comply. Well, then, what remains but to regard the gospel as a failure?
The fact is, every man and every soul may rationally hope to comply with
the conditions of Salvation, and with the conditions of the promises, or
what are they 2
But the point we are now considering is, the tendency of such teaching;
the tendency of teaching the church that it is irrational for them to expect
to fulfil the conditions of the promises. I care not what class, any class.
God has written them, and holds them out to inspire desire and expect.
ation—to beget hope, and faith, and effort, and thus to secure their
fulfilment to his people. Now, what an employment for the leaders and
instructors of the people, to be engaged in teaching them not to expect the
fulfilment of these promises to them, that such an expectation or hope is
a dangerous error, that it is irrational for them to hope so to fulfil the
conditions of these promises, as to secure the blessings promised, however
much they may at present desire to do so. I say again, the devil himself
could not do worse than this, Hell itself could not wish for a more
efficient opposition to God and religion than this. This is indeed a most
sublime employment for the ministers of God, to be zealous in their
private and public, in their individual, and in their associated capacities,
in season and out of season, in persuading the people, that the grace of
God is sufficient for them if they would believe the promises, and appro-
briate this proffered grace to themselves; but that it is “dangerous error."
for them to expect, even by grace divine, so to fulfil the conditions of the
promises as to avail themselves of this proffered grace, however willing
and desirous they now are to do so. They might be saved, but it is
dangerous to expect to be saved. They might obtain answers to prayer,
but it is dangerous error to expect them. They might obtain a victory
over sin in this world, but it is “dangerous error” to expect to do so,
however much they may desire it. This is indeed sublime religious in-
struction ; or rather, it is a most gross contradiction and denial of the
8 A
722 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
grace and truth of God. I will not of course say, nor do I think, that it
is intentional, but I must expose its true mature, and its tendency.
Such instruction is, in its very nature, a libel upon the glorious gospel
of the blessed God ; and it tends as directly and as efficiently as possible
to infidelity, and to the ruin of the church of God. Why, in just so far
as such teaching is believed, it renders hope and faith impossible.
There are good and sufficient grounds of hope, in the case under
consideration, but these grounds are strenuously denied by multitudes
of ministers; and pains are taken, in every way, to discourage faith in the
class of promises that pledge deliverance from the bondage of sin in this
life. Those who plead for God, and his promises, and inculcate expect-
ation, and faith, and effort, are branded as heretics, and proscribed and
treated as the enemies of religion. Oh, tell it not in Gath ! I would on
mo account Say this, were it not already a matter of common knowledge.
Why may not a man as well caricature God and religion, and so repre-
sent both, as to render them odious, and thus render desire in possible,
as to exclaim against there being any ground of rational hope, that the
promises will be fulfilled to us? Why may not a man as well be employed
in preventing desire, as in preventing expectation ? One certainly is
equally as fatal to the interests of religion, and to souls, as the other. I
do not complaim of designed misrepresentation, in regard to the truth we
have been considering; but Oh, what a mistake What an infinitely
ruinous misapprehension of the gospel, and of the grounds of hope God
has endeavoured by every means to inspire desire and expectation, to
secure confidence and effort, but alas ! alas ! how many ministers have
fallen into the infinite mistake of laying a stumbling-block before the
church How many are crying, There is no reason to hope; no ground
for rational expectation, that you shall 50 fullil the conditions of the pro-
mises, as to secure their fulfilment. You must expect to live in sin as long
as you are in this world; it is dangerous to entertain any other expectation.
Who does not know, that faith is a sine quá won of all progress in
religion? Nothing can be more fatal to the progress of the gospel, and to
its influence over individuals, and over masses of men, than to destroy
expectation, and thus render faith impossible. Observe, hope is composed
of desire and expectation. The very nature of hope shows beyond contro-
versy its relation to effort and to faith. Expectation is itself intellectual
faith, or belief. It is capable of indefinite degrees. In many instances
hope, in relation to a desired event, is very weak; we greatly desire it,
but our expectation is very slight, so that we can hardly say that we hope,
and yet we are aware that we do hope. Now, in this case, hope will
increase as expectation increases. If expectation is slight, it is difficult to
believe with the heart, that is, to rest confidently in, or confidently to look
for the occurrence of the event. It is difficult, when intellectual faith or
expectation is but slight, to commit the will, and trust calmly, that the
desired object will be obtained. It is a common experience, in regard to
objects of desire, to find ourselves unable to rest or trust with the heart,
SAINCTIFICATION. 723
in the confidence that the event will be as we desire. Now, the thing
needed in this case is, to have expectation or intellectual faith increased.
The mind needs to be more thoroughly convinced; it wants more evidence,
or to apprehend more clearly the reasons for rational expectation. Now,
if the occurrence of the event depends in any measure upon our hope or
faith, as all events do that are dependent upon our diligent attention and
use of appropriate effort and instrumentalities, who does not see, that we
need encouragement and evidence, instead of discouragement? Discourage-
ment, in such a case, is ruinous to what slight hope we have.
God has made to us exceeding great and precious promises, and held
them out to our faith, and said, “All things are possible to him that
believeth.” “If thou canst believe, thou shalt see the glory of God.” “Be
it unto thee according to thy faith.” “If ye will not believe, ye shall not
be established.” But why should I quote passages; every reader of the
Bible knows that everywhere the greatest stress is laid upon faith, and
that mothing is too hard for God to do, when his people will believe.
What must be the influence of a religious teacher who discourages faith ?
Suppose he explains away the promises to parents in reference to their
children. Who has not observed the influence of a teacher that is himself
stumbling through unbelief, in regard to that class of promises. You will
universally find, that so far as his influence extends, it is death to the
expectation, and of course to the faith of parents, in regard to the conver-
sion of their children. Of course their children grow up in sin, and the
families of the members of his church are filled with impenitent children.
The same will be true in reference to revivals of religion. Let the pastor
be himself unbelieving ; let him have little or no hope of having religion
revived ; let him cast the stumbling-block of his own imiquity or unbelief
before the church, and the influence is death. It were much better that a
church had no minister, than for them to have one who has so much
unbelief as to preach unbelief, instead of faith, to the people; who is for
ever throwing out discouraging suggestions in regard to the efficacy of
prayer and faith in the promises of God. What would be the influence
of a minister, who should from year to year hold out to his people the
doctrine, that the promises are made upon conditions which they had no
rational hope of fulfilling? that they might have a revival, if they would
use the appropriate means in the appropriate manner; but it was dangerous
error for them to expect to do so? That the children of the members of his
church might be converted, if the parents would appropriate to themselves,
and rest in, and plead the promises made to parents; but, that these
promises were made upon conditions that they had no rational ground for
hope that they should fulfil ; and that therefore it was dangerous error to
expect to fulfil them, and to have their children converted 2 Who does not
see what the influence of such a pastor must be 2 It must be death and
ruin. He preaches unbelief, instead of faith, to the people.
Precisely the same is true in respect to the doctrine of holiness in this life.
Suppose a pastor to read to his congregation such passages as the following:—
3 A 2
724 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
2 Cor. vi. 16: “And what agreement hath the temple of God with
idols 2 for ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will
dwell in them, and walk in them ; and I will be their God, and they shall
be my people. 17. Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye
separate, and touch not the unclean thing, and I will receive you. 18.
And will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters,
saith the Lord Almighty.”
2 Cor. vii. 1 : “Having therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let us
cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holi-
ness in the fear of God.”
1 Thess. v. 23 : “And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly ; and
I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless
unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. 24. Faithful is he that calleth
you, who also will do it.”
Now, suppose that he explains away, or suggests that these passages are
interpolations; or that they are not correctly translated ; or affirms that,
at any rate, they have no rational ground of hope that these promises will
be fulfilled to them ; that they might be fulfilled to them if they would
believe them, but that they have no reason to expect that they shall believe
them; that very few, if any, have in fact believed them ; and that many
who have thought they believed them, and that they had received the ful-
filment of them, have found themselves mistaken ; that it is very difficult
to get a permanent victory over sin in this world; that they might fall into
famaticism, if they should expect these promises to be fulfilled to them :
and that such an expectation were dangerous error.
Now I ask, how could a minister more directly serve the devil, than by
such teaching as this? He could hardly be more injuriously employed.
The fact is, that an unbelieving minister is the greatest of all stumbling-
blocks to the church. I have had occasion to witness enough of this to
make any man's heart sick. It matters not at all, in what particular form
his unbelief developes itself; in that direction all will be ruin. Suppose
he loses, or never had any confidence in revivals of religion, and is always
letting out his unbelief upon his church. He is the greatest stumbling-
block that could be laid before them. Suppose he neither understands nor
believes the promises of God made to parents respecting their children,
and that in this respect he lets out his ignorance and unbelief, he is the
ruin of their children. Suppose he is in the dark, and filled with error or
unbelief, in respect to overything where faith and emergetic action are con-
cerned, and throws doubt and discouragement in the Way: his influence is
death.
What a loader in the host of God's elect disheartening the church of
God by his unbelief! It is in vain to say that entire Sanctification in this
life is not promised; for it really and plainly is, and nothing is more
expressly promised in the word of God. These promises, like all others,
are conditioned upon faith, and it is as rational to hope to believe them,
and to expect them to be fulfilled to us, as it is to hope to believe any
SANCTIFICATION, 725
other class of promises, and to have them fulfilled to us. We have the
same Spirit to help our infirmities, and to make intercession for us in one
case as in the other ; but the ruin is, that false teaching has forbidden
expectation and crippled faith, and therefore the blessing is delayed. It
would be just so in regard to everything else whatever. Now suppose that
this course should be taken in regard to family religion, and to revivals of
religion, until centuries should pass without revivals, and without the
faithfulness of God being manifested to parents in the conversion of
their children; and then suppose, that the fact, that there had been so
few or no revivals, or so few children converted in answer to the parents'
prayers, should be urged, as proving that parents had no rational ground
for the hope that their children would be converted ; or that the church
had any rational ground for the hope that religion would be revived; what
would be the effect of all this 2
The fact is, that nothing can be more disastrous and death-dealing, than
for religious teachers to throw discouragements in the way of Christians
taking hold of and appropriating the promises. It is ruin and death. God
presents promises, and calls the church to believe them at once, and without
hesitation to cast themselves upon them, to appropriate them and make
them their own, and to lay hold on the blessings promised. But what an
employment for a minister to stand before the people and cry out, “It is
dangerous error for you to expect these promises to be fulfilled to you.”
Surely this is the devil's work.
Let facts be searched out, and it will be found to be true, that the
influence of a minister is as his confidence in God and in his promises, is.
Let search be made, and it will be found, that those ministers who by
precept and example encourage the faith of their churches, are producing
a healthful influence in proportion as they do so. But on the contrary,
when by example and precept they discourage the faith of their churches,
the influence is disastrous in proportion as they do so.
LECTURE LXX.
SANCTIFICATION.
FURTHIER OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.
1. It is objected to the foregoing argument, that the passages adduced to
prove Paul's entire sanctification do not sustain the position that he had
attained a state of entire, in the sense of permanent, Sanctification. To
this objection I reply,–
(1.) That an examination of all the passages will, if I mistake not, show
that he speaks of his holiness or sanctification as a state, and as an abid-
ing state, as distinguished from a temporary obedience. To me it is quite
manifest, that Paul intended that his converts to whom he addressed his
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uonuoguoubs stu Jo Kououvullad out ºutin ‘popuolaid hott sº I of emättöl sitſ
uo.II aſqr.Iaju, KLUTI SI 3utt[] Ions out ºutſ, “AOUIs on to ‘Ālūnū00 aſſ) oAOId
o, Ioloaſqo out, utodu hr AOTU) puu 'snuo oup effuuuo Kusaſſuuu Tsūtū ‘shou Jo
soulas Åletodrua) tº to job ut, unt[] ontºs quoubtulod tº touyut stºw pitt: “[gnuſ,
-uo sºw ssoullou stu mutu 'solduſ AluruId sº eSumäuuſ (Ions toyooſ.10 ou?
IIodn Joold Jo (toptuq att, AOI'll on Auguſd su uous sº ooliopiao all L (A)
ºuamºtulianuſ hott puu Tununuoo to quoubullod suM ssouſſou sitſ neul ‘Āſītūſ
on ALTuolo studes ‘ttoos o Aull ow st: ‘soottºnsul [&taaos III aſſumāuel SIH (AI)
ºuis Sossajttoo oortunsuſ on tu pitt: ‘SAes ou
intº Jo unman oun to pop on suoddu ou ‘IIB Until O.IOU put ‘palomb oxbû I
tiopſiA suoissaſoid put stion,lossu poſſilenbum asoul ‘soutouto put spuolij Jo
'suoutus put shun's Jo oomy ou uſ sausſtand a H ‘dītisonsode Stu Jo poſted
and Huttup uls Jo Kiſmå alo A at J. St. Muods all soop oottunsuſ out UI (III)
‘poiſopold on tPoin w lodso:5 oth Jo Stuttgotu put UtopsiAOId oul Jo (Ione.Insmiſſ
un su Ospu put : Ittoq, on populatuuLoool on tPoſtIA S]uotututnºe ou dojº
a.IIIsu ol tuoſſ, duo.[d on 'ajo LA at tuouſ A on ason, on Juautoğginootto Jo
AusA Aq shutouttſa11u UAO SIU Jo Itads 01 UOISuðoo luteubolj put a H (II)
‘aſſ optomsode sitſ Jo aſotº oth hott JI ‘lted oštu tº 1sueſ tº StoAoo I (1)
'aoûtapi Aa (onumoo III: Jo 90Utøs (8 all
uţ ‘Āiologismus or on atti on Sibedde asto s,ſubd III XIIounsal ou.L ('g)
“I quountA anald
-tuo) SI quounău, oup ‘uo;stiania.Iddu Kun III quq : ].IOddms STI uſ shuounăte
aul Jo auo Kuo sº hl ontºs stru Jo KhHIqbt[It]18 [pornogld out, Jo q.[Oddus
up quattinäug oup on [untlass9 || SI (Ott ‘anssi hp (IOI)somb nea.[3 out, hott SI
‘pagnouds Kuuaupultad Jo osuos on uſ ‘Stallºtta ältſoq sºul Jo Utomsomb out
natin ºpiutual aun nuadal atoll I put ‘Utatſ, plus I ‘sul Jo atta\g 3uſogi ayll
ao ºtball Jo us polluttuoo aoutºstII ou up ou nºun uſultao Kū0ajied 11 lapuot
on sº ſpºns out si uongognouts luaupulod SIII Jo Oollapſ Aa out, ºpt[] ‘AAOUI
uſe put “[ned Jo uombogºups out) Jo anotA I uous out Ab StºA I (8)
‘oop.13 5ul Atosa.Id Sºsituſ) poouarted No 5uſ Auti Ka ‘plus at
qetſa\ 3UAOuxi \nounſA ‘JIASUUUUI aſ āūIAarloq “an IIA out plmoo AOH ºr op
[[IA Osſe OUA ‘mok uloſſeo quun ou SI Injunºſ 'nsiſt[O Suso'ſ pio"I Imo Jo
3upuloo aun Oyun ssaſatueſq poAlasaid aq. ‘Apoq pub ‘Imos put “nºuds apoua,
unoX pop Ábid I pub : ĀIOUA no& Ajnouts aouad Jo pop Alox att, puy,
—: fő ‘gz, "A 'ssati.I., I-3 sta.ſvid SIU on popuaddu ou Hoſq.A troubleſoap to
asſuold att, Jo unnum aul pub ‘3ttp[gods stºw ou (Iou A Jo StºA ontºns oup quuM
eouepiadza Ka Aoux hou plp au Ji subſuoussau.L out) on tonnel sitſ up ağussed
3uſ AOILO) aun an IIA athsode pe.IIIsur up plmoo AOH ‘Utoun uodn pattpoſue
all yºu.A paouaitad No oxbu ol āuissa]old sº UIU publistopun p[mous ‘sonside
262. "NOIJ.VOIJII.LONVS
tº Si Sutto all otojoq ‘uonisod sº one Insuoulap Atomosqu snut juvulage
9tſ, JI Aubut Jo Ino asto auo uſ ostbus g pooš 5upſetu Jo to ‘equalap
tº Jo SITUTI, to ITU) on ssalasu alaw it “alm.1 oun allow Joultoſ oup, JI apm.
398tt00 out AIpanduopum SI lamul all I, § pooupoid sº oolieppaa alph topus,
Jo toddus uſ 'uoismlottoo aq, on shonpuoo aouappa att, Jo uomnold tenuſ
Iºmett put JITſ isotti alſh hurt, ‘Aous on 100.1d Jo tropinq oup asuguo on
quaſoſuus II SI to & ontºns sun it pasſ.I.It all nutu 'Uomon.Insuoo oldissod Toulo
où a Mull uto sº lous put ‘aquapi Aa a Anisod put hoaup Åd UAous aq ºr sn]\!
? Sutto all ºuttſ) on St. paxoid os sun si uous 's Sunbuy oun inq : [esta Aſun
SI IIonºsodoid SIU, asuas º uſ hutu 'pamupu si ni Tſe it tus hott pup
eII IIoIIIA (alſº aduallad No SmoląIIal stu uſ tuod u ju past.I.It or melin ‘poxoid
SI I Iſhtun no apºtu hott SI osto our atopoloun youn put : pattupuu si (Ionisol
-old ſusta Aſun tº atau \\ atto si lued Jo asto spun you ‘prus sſ iſ \otis I
‘panoſ AUToo Sputns ou ‘Shūrqipato
Slſ asſets on AbA attos (II put ‘aatu on spruſ at asto uſ put unt supeãu
aouapi Ao oth ol Kidal on Hodn paſſed sº apt ‘apis datino on to aouapixa
aúl loºpb.Intoo to uſedXe to ‘IIaeedup upo pasmoot, où ssoſun ino oppu.
SI asto ot.I., pastıoob all uodu Jooid Jo uapind oup SAOIT) stuſ, 'alotti
ăuțulou pub “Villuš s pasnoop aun asuo uſ pagood Na Arquuosº.1 od quâIIII
at II) popuutuab alu aquapi Aa Jo oatãop pub pupſ alſ.I. posmoot oth Jo Imā
all on p.1858.1 III ºnquop aſquTIOsgat Joj puno.13 out a Mbal ſlºw sº toollapſ AG
Jo aa.15ap put pupi tº Utons huasa.Id on Ktuo inq ‘Ulong Insuouap P ino ox!ºut on
pſall houl SI Tuettſu[dutoo aul ‘Uluap quay alſTºusſumd atto put ‘autu.to [ºntóſuo
tº Jo SI 35.18q2 all tially pub ‘aseo stun tu Ua Ao lngſ uſe[dutoo Raúl Hoſt(\\
Jo ouſto Alta A attl ‘Kulotuſ]sel 5uyou! Attoo soul aun Ka ‘USITTºsa ATIn sutti
Inſee MTIOUTUOO all : aſſu Nagūl pub pisi. VIIado.[d a.ru Joord Jo Sa[n] all asgo
stſ, III unſea Auotuuloo help Jo Ied tº alb Ainſ put aspnſ alſº put, ‘plooet
oth Uto Khued tº sº quaw UIQUIUILoo eul ‘unleasalto(IIUIoo aq) sureşu outſ.to
e Jo pasnoop pug ‘Kununoo sIII Jo Kunſ pub quoo 8 a.ſojoq past.LUE ST (tetu e
Uat \\ Khted 8 ‘astles 8 UI ate Aaul IIoIIIA (II asbo E tu ‘nuatušpuſ U TIS on
‘Iaquinti Iſaq, Jo spenpEAIpuſ IIIbn Tao Kq ‘II)[gawuotutuloo aq, Ioſ II Buſ Ataſ pub
‘Tempp.Anput up supeña pleasuouTuToo 8 BUAE.I.Tº asto sIII) (II hott SI of I
‘Attatuuſaaoğ ugunu 8 sum:58 auſto è Jo Khūnâ stay uptu b ºutſ, “politosse pett
aq j palmbal aq plmow sº Joold Jo aatsop put pupſ outs ou? and 5upſetti
on piau you si at Joold stu no Sunſetti tu qatū ‘Matutai o) atteltoſłtuſ st
q atau ang UIII uodn sº Jooid Jo trap.Inq alſ, put iſ avoid ºsmiu ‘ssauls st
ăuţaq uptunu Kug acq, 's][asse OTIA atopolotſ, a PH 'esºtaújo aq on paadid st
où seapun autus esſ tubul Alexa help ‘sſ uondunsse oth ‘oopiš Āq pagnottes
uaaq axed Naqn ssaſun slautiſs aq on UAOux are uou IIB 00IIIs "tº pub
‘pastaxat stuondumsst am 'uomºtapºsuoo Mapun osco atti tu quun ‘poultripe
taxa wou sº aſ Āhūnâ ad on payoid SI ou Inun pottinsse sſ aouaootſui
sitſ ‘atuito & Jo pasnoog slugtu b uaUAA IIAIo (II Ubill sosuo Iguſtuſ to uſ
pp3II atolu ate samu asatil, Sisa. Joold Jo Utop.mq ou? aloux AOIs ALT8919
IIIA asso spun on patidde uous, Jooid put ootſap Ao Jo Soſni otſ.I. (TA)
‘JI SSaj
-uoo on turn palmbai eAbu plmow Inoptico IIIs ontº Holſº pet ou ‘atun Kuu
"A SOTOGIHI, OILWWIGILSXS . 83, 1.
st ou sulton (UIouad uſ qutu 's Juul, ºuts notinia, ‘Alſºmidºu stol tº ‘poa II
Intd ºutly oxold on luorogus SI q. ‘uonºtopistloo topun asto ou? III ‘OS
'oïusn Kuanuoo Jo allubya up to ‘saiduluxa oompold
on uodu poſſeo si quapuodso.1 oun put poſſutuo uoun St Joold Jo uðſtud all L
‘Kuounson tonumoo Joaouasqu oup uſ ‘luoroſums od on plot S! “astoutuſ subottl
AIIuliottaş ozºndon quun ºno 5uppºtu Ilotſ,I, IIoneogußis [BstoAſun & Jo
IIoniassu au, Jo Joold uſ ‘uongogiušis tutouai º Tuo ox!ºut on Sisºded ou? IOJ
quoſoſuus plau si qu yng 'uonuoglušis auo tubul atoul oxetſ sp.toA IIB 113II]
‘s uondutnsst ou.L 'tuoq, 1stUušu sſ (Ionduussu 1.10).tol p ou odou.A Soseo
Unoq att, Kaul, "Uod luſualulu out uſ [aſſºlud out ‘Utonºtopistloo Tøpull
otto out, put aspo sºul, utontoglu’ārs KIUO put TestaAIUIn STI out SI [IOISIOTU
-tuſ hutſ, AOU's pub ‘AIdol on uodn patteo Utatſ, ott Slshdºd-opædſ '90ttopſA2
talunoo Jo aouasquatin UI utonºsod (Ioun sausſ|qºso Áſhuaſoſums SITIL 'Stoll IA
suo launu Ka uorstatutuſ Aſtušis on posh SI plow all lºun "axold on utoum IOI
huapoſ[]ns aq on plau Autonoë (d. 1sual ng SI ºr ‘spun Jo peoist I tooutºsuſ Attu
uſ osta 5uſunou subatu aſ hull, Aous put ‘asm syſ Jo aouensuſ Ato Ao plºtoſ
5uild sutu Aoun ‘tion|A Tuo oxbut on ‘ttoſ.statutuſ (IETIn Oslo 5uſſ|1Attu struatti
10Aou oxyldom ºutp awold on tuoul olmbat pluoA iſ ownešou tº ºutsold
on humous pluo. A p ashboaq ‘ttomsodoid Iſoul Ato MIAISOd oAOld on tuouſ]
top opussoduſ 3.10A ni ‘paopu I pontululton a Mull oouis 5uo Tsutu As.10A0I)
-uoo slut, ‘pell Kaúl JI to] : osuola'o (II (IoImisodotd [USIoMITIti Iſou, Jo Buraold
tº on s]sſlduq juisiautuſ ouſ, pIOUI on populoloid to Aoti stolſ.IA Tºotºoloolin
nutſ, ‘SAAOUIS ASIO AOI) (too slul Jo OS.Inoo alouſA at L 'oºdpq UItal aun
asm stonſ. A patidsuſ aul Uloſt|A III “lsbø ºg ‘asuas ATuo out, 10u SI u0(Statutul
1UTI, 5uſAouis Ád ‘Autoutſºsºl sitſ] ]nqo.1 on SysInduq-opæd ðū ūodu Iſeo on pub
‘snuo oup 35uptio on Juaſoſums od on SIon IIA (borjoſoeul Kol pox.OIUB ST studſ,
'uoſstatut[II Stigotu Aptodoid iſ 18th put ‘UtomboglušIS
KIBUTItd shi SI u01.statutuſ help ‘sootnos Suoſ Tea IIIOI) put offbsu oisseto tuouſ
AOIs on 1quoint, Kaul ‘Utopisodord SIU, Jo 1,10ddns III asſolutuſ on KTULO
Subau oznd pil ºutin ‘uoſhisodoid ſusta Aſun out, UAop Ke Sisinduq 5utstatutul
aq. ‘Usmdeq Jo looſans out, Utodn Åsta Aoûttoo oth uſ ‘adubra to I shooſqns
[Boſjoloat[] uodn Joold Jo pub ‘aouapi Ao Jo salm.I hoa.[109 se poptºot alſº ºutlaw
AOIs on ‘SIon IIA (90.30.00111 UIOI) ponio ad huārlū sold tug No Smolatum N.
wº- ‘Attapuodset
oùn uodn Smtſo att, AOTII) put ‘ano apºtu aq on asgo on p[OII Kolū ‘aoutopſ Ao
1911tnoo Jo OouðSqb all uſ ‘uono!AUOO adupoid ptuous St. To ‘aompoud on su
tions SI 3ouapſ Aa ou? (IoIAA ‘aouajap oil, Ioſ Iſèo pure pañubt[o aq. On Snuo
oùn plou Kaū, Utau, pub : on.I.) SI (Ion Isodoid paşallº out, utú ‘Uloſsuſottoo aſqu
IIosbal aun ºut...I.IVA 01 ‘aajãap put puty UU oouapi Ao huaſoſpºns Ubun atoui Ou
atmbal Kaúl ‘aoutºnioduſ Souju att) Jo Soseo uſ tte.Ao ‘Ātºnttoo alſº uto ‘nnd
: ooutop|Ae Jo oatãop put pupt SIU, pubutap Khmbo put A\tº Jo Shinoo op aseo ou
nsolute III alojatau.L "ttonsomb out, Jo Ano SI 19Asutº IIB alojataul put ‘em.In
aq hou plmous tionſSodoid paytºnsuoulap on] quTIn a qissoduſ SI q. ‘uonuns
-uotuop tº on Shunout: JOOId alth II Ulong Insuoulap g on Shunoute 20tlapſ Aa
oup odou A qdooxo ‘ajitſuo & Buſta on Osn Kut, Jo asto Ott (II SI q. ‘Jounity
pub : uonsonb aul Jo Imo St Kidal to aottajap uouſ, Kilw ‘paśuguo esco Áue
SANCTIFICATION. 729
Ç
said to have lived without sin, This changes the onus, and the assumption
then is, that he lived altogether without sin, unless the contrary be shown:
Or more strictly, it is sufficient to show, that Paul lived a considerable
period, during the latter part of his life, without sin. This throws the
burden of proof upon him who would deny that he continued in this state
until death.
However, I have repeatedly said, I care not to contend for the Sanctifica-
tion of Paul, or of any other man, in support of the practical attainability
of this state. If such cases had been frequent in the early ages of Chris-
tianity, they would not in all probability have been recorded, unless it was
done after their death. It is the doctrine of practical attainability, and not
the fact of actual attainment, for which I contend.
2. Another objection to the doctrine we have been considering has been
stated as follows:—
The promises of entire sanctification are conditioned upon faith. We
have no right to expect the fulfilment of the promises to us until we believe
them. To believe and appropriate them is to believe that they will be
fulfilled to us. But of this we have no evidence, until after we have believed
that they will be fulfilled to us, which is the condition of their fulfilment.
Therefore, we have no reason to expect their fulfilment to us. To this
objection I reply,
(1.) That it applies equally to all the promises made to the saints; and
if this objection is good, and a bar to rational hope in respect to the pro-
mises of entire sanctification, it is equally so in respect to all the promises.
(2.) The objection represents the gospel and its promises as a mere
farce. If this objection has any weight, the matter stands thus : God has
promised us certain things, upon condition, that we will believe that he
will give them to us. But the condition of the promise is such as to render
it impossible for us to fulfil it. We really, in this case, have no promise,
until after we have believed that we shall receive the thing promised. We
must believe that he will give the thing promised to us. But of this we
can have no evidence until we have believed this, since this belief is the
condition of the promise. This reduces us to the necessity of believing
without a promise, that God will give us the promised blessings; for this
belief is the condition of the promises in which the blessing is pledged.
We must first believe that we shall receive the thing promised, before we
have a right to expect to receive, or before we can rationally believe that
we shall receive it. Thus the promises are all made upon a condition, that
renders them all a mere mullity in the estimation of this objection.
This objection was once stated to me by a celebrated minister of New
England, as applicable to the prayer of faith. It has probably occurred to
many minds, and deserves a moment's attention. In further remarking
upon it, I would say :—
(3.) That the objection is based upon a misapprehension of the condition
of the promises. The objection assumes, that the promises are conditioned,
not upon confidence in the veracity of God, but upon our believing that he
* \{}OTOGIHL OTUWINGILSXS O8/.
a.Ayooet Ituus aw yºun axonſeq 0\\ quq, tonſpiroo uodn Átuo apºtu 9.19A Sesſù
-oid aq. ‘sounssu Sulteppsuoo ete as Uonoaſſo alſ, St J AON soalesino Ol
sasſuold oup oupidoidde put ‘uodu piouſ Kul on Sn aſquuo stuſ, put ‘poº) Jo
Kuobia, on up oouopguoo audstil on ‘uoalā SI ITIdS KIOH 3TU) 80ttøH 'poº)
Jo ssaulnytſinn testeaun oup uſ Burpguoo Ioſ IIostal out ow pull ‘positioſd
säuſun out oxiaoot on 10odzo Aubuong. You plmoo o AA "sasſuold sº Jo quotſ
-IgEng oup aspooat on 3uploadXa Ino Jo Ironpuoo tº SI SSouTujuyſºy pub SSouTuj
-Upuu pºsta Apun spop uſ oottopguoo ‘UIoun uſ pošpaid säuſun our oaſeoal
on 5unoadsø Jo pub ‘tuatin uſ Supguroo Jo uonpuoo & puu 'sostuoid out, Jo
IIonºpuoo oup ſpoq st pop Jo Khloulas out uſ oottopg|Too ‘Ulou? publisleptin
aw su Taj os ‘sostuloid stuſ up appuoo quq houltºo aw ‘ĀſobtaA SIII II opyū00
oA uatiº ‘poo Jo Kuouſes oun Jo ooltopſAe 1soušill out, “IIIdS KIOH STI
Aq pub plow pub Sylow stu up Hostulu Jo opulu Sull pop Uſoſt|A SUOI2013A9t
aqi tu ‘UOsual uxo Imo Jo Suonpuliſgu o Allmuſ oth uſ oxbu e AA sm 01
paſtgunj aq on utout 5unoadXa top put ‘sasſuold spu Sulkoſſoq Ioj ‘Āſhūonb
-Osttoo put pop Jo Kyotºla A out uſ ooliopſ][100 Ioſ IIosuot pooš Āſalſugu'ſ
a Abū as ‘s quit, où mugſ ATIIInti otout 8 sm on aq. It isnut Kotī, ‘Ulotſ,
Jo Japlaq tuo uodu pottonſpuoo Kotu OtoA pub saxlostuouſ, Sosiuolid eu, uſ
oAgu as quuM dooxa pop Jo Kapoptoa ott uſ oolieppuoo Ioj punolfi ou put
oA II ‘AoN Kyou,10A stu uſ oottopguoo [0] puno.13 OAbū ow (Ibuſh tou] Tuj Ott
sasſuold oup uſ aoutopguoo top puno.13 oAgú Utto a AA Kºſotºtoa spli III oolieppſ
-ltoo a Mutſ ow utúl Toultuj Kuu ‘àuſeq Out Jo OSIUIOId oth UI still Ugo a AA
"sasſuold out, UT paupunuoo qutu Ubun equapi Ao Tetſuo Oxtºti OA SIT, JO "pop
Jo Khlobioa oup uſ sm.In to ‘uſ oxoplaq OM ºutſ) uompuloo (todu apºtu IIB e.It
sasſutold out, ‘SI jouj ot.I. 'sasſuold out, Jo UOInpuoo eul spuotia.Iddesſttt
(Ionoaſqo att, Jetſ, upgåu Kes I apºtu si asſulotd. aul UOInſpuoo Sun uodn
Joj 'n' aarooat IIBTIS 6A ºpun oxalloq oA Intum posſutold 5uſtſ, alth eaſooat
[[Bus as quuſ, ooltopſ Ao otl sp.toUg asſuold out, pub : Sasſuold oul ºnq ‘nsel
O) to UA UIOdn aouepiao ou o Abū oA quuſ, SOSOddus Ulonoaſqo SIULL pop
Jo aldoed oul Jo Sapnºjoſſos put Sadott out, Jo 3UZIſentiºn snomorpſ.I '8 Sasſul
-oid Shi put [odsoã aul topual ptuow looſqns att, Jo AaTA SITIL postuoid
5uTul eul aaſaoat [[GUIs a M. Buſh equapploo Jo puno.13 [guoſhet Kub To ‘asſu
-oid 8 BUIAbū Jo uompuoo tº St. ‘Osſuloid tº Tuounts oAaſtaq 1stU snut a \\
‘OS op on pošpold SI Knotte.A SIU atojoq ‘su ol 'll eM3 IIIA out 18tſ, aaaſtaq
o] din ºnus att, oa yºun OS sm on II oxiš IIIA all quul oottapao AnounſA
poAalaq oapUI as Ionju Inum ‘āuissoſq att, oxià on pešpald hott St Khloeta A
S.pop Unſeſ to] (loſºpunoj on OAbu e A Smt.I., Utomºpūoo SIU, UOdu Kuo
posſutold SI IT IOJ ºr oxbû IIBUS a.M. ºbt[] paxantaq oAbū oA inun pasſuold
ăuţūl all tutºſo on AUSTI ou eatti aa\ anq IIIA on help oAolloq Āmū oA
Inun op IIIA au bû] 20ttappaa OUI axell as JetIA pub ‘op on peãpold houſ sp
Áhſob.IoM SIU quuM op IIIA pop quúl oxallaq 1snut as os put : posſutold 3upun
otſ, oxbû IIBUS 3A yºun poxolloq extºll as [I]tin “asto KUB III pasſuold 8tut[]
oul ºut 13 on pošpaid you SI Knotte.A S.pop mutu sounsse (Ionoaſqo alſT, ºr
oA2001 IIBUS 2A lºtſ, poweſted oABU aw 101ſt Inum ‘asſuold out 3Abū oA qopuM.
Jo Sn 01 || 0A3 UA ou ºbt[] exaltaq OM jetſ, uompuoo uodn ‘5ussopſ spun
pastuloid set an ºng postuoid set all Tolu A āulun aun sm on a M3 IIIA
SANCTIFICATION. 731
*
the thing promised, that is, if the thing is promised only upon condition
that we first believe that we receive it, then surely the promises were vain;
for this would suspend the fulfilment of the promise upon an impossible
condition. But, if the promises are conditioned upon our confiding in the
veracity of God, then they are made to a certain class of persons, and as
soon as we are conscious of exercising this confidence in him, we cannot but
expect him to fulfil all his promises. Thus a confidence in his veracity at
once fulfils the conditions of the promises, and renders the expectation that
we shall receive the things promised, rational and necessary.
We may appropriate the promises and expect their fulfilment, when we
are conscious of confidence in the veracity of God; for upon this condition
they were made, and upon no other condition is confidence in their fulfil-
ment to us possible. That is, we cannot expect God to fulfil his promises
to us, except upon the condition, that we confide in his universal truthful.
mess. For this confidence we have the best of all reasons, and to secure
this confidence the Holy Spirit is given. God requires us to expect to
receive the things promised, simply because he has promised to bestow
them upon condition of faith in his veracity, and because faith in his
veracity implies, and includes, the expectation of receiving the things
which we know he has promised, upon condition of this faith. If we have
good reason for confidence in the veracity of God, we have good reason
for the expectation that he will fulfil to us all his promises; for confidence
in his veracity is the condition of them. Confidence in his veracity must
imply confidence in his promises, so far as they are known.
God requires faith in his promises only because he requires faith in his
universal veracity, and when he conditionates his promises upon our confi-
dence in them, it is only because he conditionates them upon our confidence
in his veracity; and because confidence in his veracity implies confidence
in his promises, and confidence in his promises implies confidence in his
veracity. When therefore he conditionates his promises upon our believing
them, and that we shall receive the things promised in them, the spirit and
meaning of the condition is, that we confide in his truthfulness, which
confidence is implied in the expectation of receiving the things promised.
It should be distinctly understood then, that faith in the promises implies
faith in the divine veracity, and faith in the divine veracity implies faith in
all the known promises. In the order of nature, confidence in the divine
veracity precedes confidence in a specific divine promise. But where the
latter is there the former must always be. The general condition of all
the promises is, confidence in the character and truthfulness of God. This
also implies confidence in his promises, and hence the expressed condition
is faith in the promise, because faith in his veracity implies confidence in his
promises, and confidence in his promises inplies confidence in his veracity.
But here it may be asked, does not this reasoning prove too much, and
will it not follow from this, that all the promises must be, and are really
due and fulfilled to all true saints; for all true Saints have true confidence
in the veracity of God? If faith in the Veracity of God is the true con-
732 SYSTEMiATIC THEOLOGY.
dition of all the promises, it follows, that every true believer has fulfilled
the conditions of all the promises; then the veracity of God is pledged for
the fulfilment of all of them to every true believer. To this I answer,
that the promises are made to believers in Christ, or in other words, to all
true saints. Their being true saints is the condition of their right to
appropriate them, and claim the fulfilment of them to themselves. True
confidence in God is the condition of the promises, in the sense, not that
they will all be fulfilled to us, of course, upon the bare condition that we
confide in the general and universal veracity of God, without either plead
ing, appropriating, or using means to secure the fulfilment of certain
specific promises to us. But confidence in the veracity of God is the con-
dition of our having a right to appropriate the promises to ourselves, and
to expect their fulfilment to ourselves. A consciousness that we confide in
the Veracity of God gives us the right to consider every promise as made
to us which is applicable to our circumstances and wants, and to lay hold
upon, and plead it, and expect it to be fulfilled to us. Observe, the pro-
mises are not merely conditioned upon confidence in the veracity of God,
but also upon our pleading them with entire confidence in the veracity of
God, and in the fact that he will fulfil them to us, and also upon the
diligent use of means to secure the promised blessing. God says, “I will
be enquired of by the house of Israel to do these things for them.” By
trusting the veracity of God, we become personally and individually
interested in the promises, and have a title to the things promised, in
such a sense as to have a right, through grace, to claim the fulfilment to
us of specific promises, upon the further condition of our pleading them
with faith in the veracity of God, and using the necessary means to secure
their fulfilment to us. Most, not to say all, of the promises of specific
blessings have several conditions. An implicit faith or confidence in God
as a hearer and answerer of prayer, and as a God of universal sincerity and
veracity, as true and faithful to all his word, is the general condition of all
the promises.
The promises are made to this class of persons. The promises of par-
ticular things are addressed to this class, for their individual use and
benefit, as circumstances shall develop their necessities. By the exercise
of implicit confidence in God, they have fulfilled the conditions of the
promises, in such a sense, as to entitle them to appropriate any specific
promise, and claim through grace its fulfilment to them, as their circum-
stances demand. This laying hold of, and appropriating the promises of
specific blessings, and using the means to Secure the thing promised, are
also conditions of receiving the promised blessing.
The Holy Spirit is given to all who have confidence in the Veracity of
God, to lead them to a right use and appropriation of the specific promises,
and when we are drawn to wrestle for the fulfilment to us of any particular
promise, we have the best of reasons to expect its fulfilment to us. What
Christian does not know this 2 Aud what Christian has not had frequent
examples and instances of this in his own experience?
SANCTIFICATION. 733
LECTURE LXXI.
* -- - - SAINCTIFICATION.
FURTHER OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.
3. I will next consider those passages of Scripture which are by some
supposed to contradict the doctrine we have been considering.
I Kings viii. 46: “If they sin against thee, (for there is no man that
sinneth not.) and thou be angry with them, and deliver them to the enemy,
so that they carry them away captives unto the land of the enemy, far or
near,” &c. On this passage, I remark,-
(1) That this sentiment in nearly the same language, is repeated in
2 Chron. vi. 26, and in Eccl. vii. 20, where the same original word in the
same form is used,
(2) These are the strongest passages I know of in the Old Testament,
and the same remarks are applicable to the three.
(3.) I will quote, for the satisfaction of the reader, the note of Dr.
Adam Clarke upon this passage, and also that of Barclay, the celebrated
and highly spiritual author of “An Apology for the True Christian
Divinity.” And let me say, that they appear to me to be satisfactory
answers to the objection founded upon these passages.
CLARRE: “If they sin against thee."—This must refer to some general
defection from truth ; to some species of false worship, idolatry, or cor-
ruption of the truth and ordinances of the Most High ; as for it, they are
here stated to be delivered into the hands of their enemies, and carried
away captive, which was the general punishment of idolatry; and what is
called, [verse 47.] acting perversely and committing wickedness.
“If they sin against thee, for there is no man that sinneth not.’ The
second clause, as it is here translated, renders the supposition in the first
clause, entirely mugatory ; for, if there be no man that sinneth not, it is
useless to say, if they sim ; but this contradiction is taken away, by refer-
ence to the original ki yechetau lak, which should be translated, if they
shall sin against thee; or should they sin against thee, ki ein adam asher
loyecheta; for there is no man that may not sin;’ that is, there is no
man impeccable, none infallible ; mone that is not liable to transgress.
This is the true meaning of the phrase in various parts of the Bible, and
so our translators have understood the original, for even in the thirty-first
verse of this chapter, they have translated yecheta, if a man trespass;
which certainly implies he might or might not do it; and in this way they
have translated the same Word, if a soul sin, in Lev. v. 1, and vi. 2;
1 Sam. ii. 25; 2 Chron. iv. 22 ; and in several other places. The truth is,
the Hebrew has no mood to express words in the permissive or optative way,
but to express this sense it uses the future tense of the conjugation kal.
“This text has been a wonderful strong-hold for all who believe that
there is no redemption from sin in this life ; that no man can live without
committing sin ; and that we cannot be entirely freed from it till we die,
734 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
“(i) The text speaks no such doctrine ; it only speaks of the possibility
of every man's simming ; and this must be true of a state of probation.
“(ii.) There is not another text in the divine records that is more to
the purpose than this.
“(iii.) The doctrine is flatly in opposition to the design of the gospel;
for Jesus came to save his people from their sins, and to destroy the works
of the devil.
“(iv.) It is a dangerous and destructive doctrine, and should be blotted
out of every Christian's creed. There are too many who are seeking to
excuse their crimes by all means in their power ; and we need not embody
their excuses in a creed, to complete their deception, by stating that their
sins are unavoidable.”
BARCLAY : “Secondly,–Another objection is from two passages of scrip-
ture, much of one signification. The one is 1 Kings viii. 46 : “For there
is no man that simmeth not.’ The other is Eccl. vii. 20 : “For there is not
a just man upon earth, that doeth good and sinneth not.’
“I answer,
(i.) These affirm nothing of a daily and continual sinning, so as never
to be redeemed from it; but only that all have sinned, that there is none
that doth not sin, though not always so as never to cease to sin ; and in
this lies the question. Yea, in that place of the Kings he speaks within
two verses of the returning of such with all their souls and hearts, which
implies a possibility of leaving off sim.
(ii.) There is a respect to be had to the seasons and dispensations; for
if it should be granted that in Solomon's time there were none that simmed
not, it will not follow that there are none such now, or that it is a thing
mot now attainable by the grace of God under the gospel.
(iii.) And lastly, this whole objection hangs upon a false interpretation;
for the original Hebrew word may be read in the potential mood, thus,
There is no man who may not sin, as well as in the indicative; so both
the old Latin, Junius, and Tremellius, and Vatablus have it, and the same
word is so used, Ps. cxix. 11 : “Thy word have I hid in my heart, that I
might not sin against thee'—in the potential mood, and not in the
indicative ; which being more answerable to the universal scope of the
scriptures, the testimony of the truth, and the sense of almost all inter-
preters, doubtless ought to be so understood, and the other interpretation
rejected as spurious.
(iv.) Whatever may be thought of the views of these authors, to me it
is a plain and satisfactory answer to the objection founded upon these
passages, that the objection might be strictly true under the Old Testament
dispensation, and prove nothing in regard to the attainability of a state of
entire sanctification under the New. What does the New Testament
dispensation differ mothing from the Old in its advantages for the acqui-
sition of holiness 2 If it be true, that no one under the comparatively
dark dispensation of Judaism, attained a state of permanent Sanctification,
does that prove such a state is not attainable under the gospel ? It is
SAINCTIFICATION. 73.5
expressly stated in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that “the old covenant
made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of a better hope did." Under
the old covenant, God expressly promised that he would make a new one
with the house of Israel, in “writing the law in their hearts,” and in
“engraving it in their inward parts.” And this new covenant was to be
made with the house of Israel, under the Christian dispensation. What
then do all such passages in the Old Testament prove, in relation to the
privileges and holiness of Christians under the new dispensation 2
(v.) Whether any of the Old Testament saints did so far receive the
new Covenant by way of anticipation, as to enter upon a state of perma-
ment sanctification, it is not my present purpose to inquire. Nor will I
inquire, whether, admitting that Solomon said in his day, that “there was
not a just man upon the earth that liveth and simeth not," the same could
with equal truth have been asserted of every generation under the Jewish
dispensation 2
(vi.) It is expressly asserted of Abraham, and multitudes of the Old
Testament saints, that they “died in faith, not having received the pro-
mises.” Now what can this mean 2. It cannot be, that they did not know
the promises; for to them the promises were made. It cannot mean, that
they did not receive Christ, for the Bible expressly asserts that they did—
that “Abraham rejoiced to see Christ's day"—that Moses, and indeed all
the Old Testament saints, had so much knowledge of Christ as a Saviour
to be revealed, as to bring them into a state of salvation. But still they
did not receive the promise of the Spinit, as it is poured out under the
Christian dispensation. This was the great thing all along promised, first
to Abraham, or to his seed, which is Christ. Gal. iii. 14, 16: “That the
blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ :
that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.” “Now to
Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not, Amd to
seeds, as of many; but as of one, and to thy seed, which is Christ ; and
afterwards to the Christian church, by all the prophets. Acts ii. 16—Ql :
“But this is that which was spoken by the prophet Joel ; And it shall
come to pass in the last days. (saith God,) I will pour out of my Spirit
upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your
young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams; and on
my servants, and on my handmaidens, I will pour out in those days cf
my Spirit; and they shall prophesy ; and I will show wonders in heaven
above, and signs in the earth beneath ; blood, and fire, and vapour of
Smoke ; the sum shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood,
before that great and notable day of the Lord come ; and it shall come to
pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved.”
Act; ii. 38, 39: “Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized
every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sims,
and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto
you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as
the Lord our God shall call.” Acts iii. 94, 26: ‘Yea, and all the prophets
* A \)OTOGIHL OIJ.VINGLISAS 99 L
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quo Jo ſexotiat e Kuo sº nº and : ponuadol oatſ ow (IoIRIA Jo stus ol) uðAft
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2.84. "NOILWOIUCIJAONWS
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a.A. J. Qugſ, 'So AIosmo OAIodop ow “Soop q Kūs ow. J juq : US IIB tuouſ Sn
Unosuolo Susaſ Jo poolq out, ‘SI Jetſ, ...: SSousnoonu(3rtum Iſu tuo, J Su Osuuato
on put, ‘Suſs Ino sm oaſă Ioj on 1suſ pub Injunpuj sport , yºu] ‘Aus on uo
Sø03 out asto A Uluſu oun uſ puw 'plus isn'ſ pull ou ºut A 5unoppºlyttoo Anug
Smith ‘so.AIasino oAlaoap ow ‘us IIu tuo, J postttalo aq on seAlasmo osoddns
oA J. Juul ‘ātū.VUs su ‘eStoA Illièſo out, UU pub : IIIs Itu tuo, J Sn unasutoſo
IIOS syū situ.) Suso'ſ Jo pooll oth ‘juſ Kºs st; ‘osio.A quo AoS out, Jo uolsulo
-uoo oth uſ othsode our sluoso.Idol uoul looſus out, Jo Aaj A slui, (6)
‘passoid Xo od pinoo SU Ulonoſpb.Inuod u oſqudud sº uſ tupu so.AoAut
Aſ “ºuſtibou sili alo A spun II us [tº tuouſ sm asubato soop situſ) susaf Jo
poolſ oſt) ºut, ‘pollossu 1suſ put ouſ to] : so.AEastuo OAlaoap as ‘soop qi Kes
oA J put ‘US IIU tuo, J Sn osttuoſo jott Saop aſ 18th (‘pp all asoddus Voup
su) ‘Aus on tºotu pluous onsode oth utontossu spun tongu Stoupauluſ J. ‘aptu
->[Tutuol Ado A aſ plnow aſ AON ... US ITU tuoſ, sm (Inastuoſo isºtto Susaf Jo
booſt, où pun uontossu au, & pepodoid Koyutpoultuſ stastex slui, (6)
‘Suonopuſ)ttoo quu OA) up uorkoutloo spun up
JIostuſ I so IOAU ou ‘juſtibaul Sonsode out, alo A spun Ji AoN su uſ nou st
[[mu] oun pub 'soalasimo asſooop ow ‘us you op put uonuoguous othuo Jo
ouls U U otb ow Ausow JI ‘ºutſ] ‘āulu.(IUU St opisode out, puunstapuu Koul,
‘solingoeſ asoul uſ pontoo."pu hualunuos ou äuſsoddo Jo osolind oup log
q; alomb on A \ſ publisleptum Aoû] IoIIIA uſ asuas oun up ‘spuuns iſ qopus, uſ
IIop-outuoo oth uſ || Iopistloo su 19 'oïussud suſ, Jo Surugøtu au, aq on puuns
-tepun I quTIA ontºs on pa200id I otojaq inq quoppae sun lapua, ‘stump I
‘IIIA Sputns ostoa SIU. Iloilº III (IoIXoutloo oth on uonuomº annul V 'uon
bogſ ismſ Jo Atolos 5uptuods SI uq ‘uonuognotus on atou uoismtſu out sopulu
ausole oup ºutſ, Utopiao iſ topuot IIIA lott onſulsiu I JI ‘oãussud oup
Jo uomuttſutuxo Souou up suotolia : Utomognsuſ Jo peoistu uonuounous
Jo 5upſûods olouſ sſ onsodiu ou hull) ounssu ‘ajul stun up uonuoguous
olnuo Jo oupinoop out on uonooſuo ul, eiussud SIU) oxſutu ou A osotiſ, (I)
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sasſuold osett, up padſtosop Kuluid aq on Sutaos TollTV ontºns aul III usaq
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du attoo ovut on Itu At Stuaas hutu putoA sun Jo Stoist oth uſ polmooo has
JaMa Suti Suſquoti ºutp pedun aq. pUnous nº “stup, on to ASUU III tºll ‘asoddus
qng ‘onp attiboaq Āaul UlotA atun aq) suM II*IssaIN alſ, Jo Juaapu au, Jult,
put ‘Tºttonpūooum allow Kaū, Tutſ, ‘pollſ][m] uaaq Āpuðū ū pull sosuold
asoul Tutu 'paſidal aq pulous qi pallosuoo aq on SI putoA out, Tuul Jooid
ul poomphu aſ pluous plow all, Jo uotsaa Attoo ou put Atolā Āup-la]]ut
aul ărthoodset sainaudoid put sasſuold oun uou W put Juosold nu si pub
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SI asſutold alth ItaúA’atuo putſ atun att, asnuoaq ‘patujúnj alta W Kup-ladsO3
où ol āūnūlat sapotſdoid put sasſuold alſ, Jo sat aul Ulu nºun 'ponius aq
IIoM Su mūštú II—: Jawsuit. I spun on AON 1st IUC) Jo Attaxpt, aun he palliſing
eq 0) su iſ salonb 's Maida H oup on apsida SIt uſ ‘ansode oth quTIL (II)
‘pot) unt A sisal otoyolauſ, KhIIIqisuoſisal au) but ‘poliduſ
to passaid Xa ‘tionſ putoo oti sutſ asſuold aun qutu ‘jog otſ, uto.I.T ('I)
—: panj.It Ulaaq Suri STIL Apua.III:
pallgluj Taaq Sull Teſtuateſ III asſtttold spun ºutl “paulultuutu (taaq Sull I
'aybus still onuſ patalute 39A Jou a Muti (Iolutio out, In,
nell] ‘noaſans alſ, Jo Aaj A spun on tonaaſqo up Subottl out Ku sſ I and 5uſ
-Heads 3.18 a.M (TopſiA Jo Juuua Moo Aa N att, Jo Sasſuold att, Jo mo 5uſ.tutº
aúl aq IIIA situ Jetſ, put Nielsºn tatt Jo poltad auds uſ ttonwoſſottus
aII)[Ia Jo'antºs e onuſ tantia plio.A spun tu Ilúus Apoq tº su Mointlo alſ, util
‘plomatoſ Anuppuntle aq on steaddu iſ ‘poapUI ...soston all Jo slioq all toda
ItalypIA aq. Ibus plorſ oup on ssaulſorſ ..., putº paſſ[]oups all [[UIs Stoquiotti
Jatt Iſu untiw ‘Nup tº tºo muſ) an on 5ttisſuold Kissaid No st; oãussed spun
publslapun on ‘sapaqdoid aq, Uppw 5urdaas a tºtta U sº I (UII, I (ºf)
'spumpſ Mbuſ Jo uomu.tau.a3 to “[Pupi Apuſ Iuluonted Atto
on tonuomiſide sit on tPopulat uſ [Buonpubo Ssaiothloxau si loſt|A ‘Atols iſ
s]! Jo poſtad ouds [II ‘Apoq ū sº ſpintlo alou A' oth on uomºlo. Itſ luatu
-Igny & Jo uſuniao put “almosqu IO IETIOInſpIOottu aq &III asſuold V (8)
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unpºj Na inq poxiaoat o' WITIssod hottuto Stussail att, Juſt] puu ‘unſuſ
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740 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and prophecies—and that it cammot be, that anything the world has yet
experienced is what is meant by such language as is used in the Bible, in
relation to the future state of the world. Now suppose to this it should be
replied, that the event has shown what the promises and prophecies really
meant ; that We are to interpret the language by the fact; that as the
promises and prophecies were unconditional, and the gospel day has really
come when they were to be fulfilled, we certainly know, whatever their
language may be, that they meant nothing more than what the world has
already realized 2 This would be precisely like the reasoning of some
persons in relation to Jer. xxxi. 31–34. They say —
(a.) The promises are without condition.
(b.) The time has come for their fulfilment. Therefore, the world has
realized their fulfilment, and all that was intended by them : that the facts
in the case settle the question of construction and interpretation; and we
know that they never intended to promise a state of cntire sanctification,
because, as a matter of fact, no such state has been realized by the church.
Indeed! Then the Bible is the most hyperbolical, not to say ridiculous,
book in the universe. If what the world has seen in regard to the extension
and universal prevalence of the Redeemer's kingdom, is all that the promises
relating to these events really mean, then the Bible of all books in the
world is the most calculated to deceive mankind. But who, after all, in the
exercise of his sober senses, will adunit any such reasoning as this 2 Who
does not know, or may not know, if he will use his common sense, that
although these promises and prophecies are unconditionally expressed, yet
that they are, as a matter of fact, really conditioned upon a right exercise of
human agency, and that a time is to come when the world shall be converted ;
and that the conversion of the world implies in itself a vastly higher state
of religious action in the church, than has for centuries, or perhaps ever
been witnessed—and that the promise of the New Covenant is still to be
fulfilled in a higher sense than it ever has been 2 If any man doubts this,
I must believe that he does not understand his Bible. Faith, then, is an
indispensable condition of the fulfilment of all promises of spiritual bless-
ings, the reception of which involves the exercise of our own agency.
Again: it is not a little curious, that those who give this interpretation to
these promises, imagine that they see a very close connexion, if not an
absolute identity of our views with those of modern Antinomian Perfec-
tionists. Now, it is of importance to remark, that this is one of the leading
peculiarities of that sect. They (the Antinomian Perfectionists) insist that
these are promises without condition, and that consequently their own watch-
fulness, prayers, exertions, and the right exercise of their own agency, are
not at all to be taken into the account in the matter of their perseverance
in holiness—that the responsibility is thrown entirely upon Christ, inasmuch
as his promises are without condition. The thing he has promised, say
they, is, that without any condition, he will keep them in a state of entire
sanctification, that therefore for them to confess sin is to accuse Christ of
breaking his promises. For them to make any efforts at perseverance in
SANCTIFICATION. 74.1
holiness, is to set aside the gospel, and go back to the law. For them even
to fear that they shall sin, is to fear that Christ will tell a lie. These
sayings are not found in their Confession of Faith, but they are held at
least by many of them, as Cvery one knows Who is at all familiar with their
views.
The fact is, that this, and their setting aside the moral law, are the two
great errors of their whole system. It would be easy to show, that the
adoption of this sentiment, that these promises are without condition, ex-
pressed or implied, has led to some of their most fanatical and absurd
opinions and practices. They take the ground, that no condition is expressed,
and that therefore none is implied ; overlooking the fact, that the very
mature of the thing promised implies that faith is the condition upon which
its fulfilment must depend. It is hoped, therefore, that our brethren who
charge us with perfectionism, will be led to see that to themselves, and not
to us, does this charge belong.
These are the principal passages that occur to my mind, and those I
believe upon which the principal stress has been laid, by the opposers of this
doctrine. And as I do not wish to protract the discussion, I shall omit the
examination of other passages.
There are many objections to the doctrine of entire Sanctification, besides
those derived from the passages of Scripture which I have considered. Some
of these objections are doubtless honestly felt, and deserve to be considered.
I will therefore proceed to notice such of them as now occur to my mind.
8. It is objected, that the doctrine of entire and permanent sanctification
in this life, tends to the errors of modern perfectionism. This objection has
been urged by some good men, and I doubt not, honestly urged. But still
I cannot believe that they have duly considered the matter. It seems to me,
that one fact will set aside this objection. It is well known that the
Wesleyan Methodists have, as a denomination, from the earliest period of
their history, maintained this doctrine in all its length and breadth. Now
if such is the tendency of the doctrine, it is passing strange that this tendency
has never developed itself in that denomination. So far as I can learn, the
Methodists have been in a great measure, if not entirely, exempt from the
errors held by modern perfectionists. Perfectionists, as a body, and I believe
with very few exceptions, have arisen out of those denominations that deny
the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life.
Now the reason of this is obvious to my mind. When professors of
religion, who have been all their life subject to bondage, begin to inquire
earnestly for deliverance from their sins, they have found neither sympathy
nor instruction, in regard to the prospect of getting rid of them in this life.
Then they have gone to the Bible, and there found, in almost every part
of it, Christ presented as a Saviour from their sins. But when they pro-
claim this truth, they are at once treated as hereties and famatics by their
brethren, until, being overcome of evil, they fall into censoriousness; and
finding the church so decidedly and utterly wrong, in her opposition to
this one great important truth, they lose confidence in their ministers and
742 *# SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the church, and being influenced by a Wrong spirit, Satan takes the advan-
tage of them, and drives them to the extreme of error and delusion. This
I believe to be the true history of many of the most pious members of the
Calvinistic churches. On the contrary, the Methodists are very much
secured against these errors. They are taught that Jesus Christ is a
Saviour from all sin in this world. And when they inquire for deliverance
they are pointed to Jesus Christ as a present and all-sufficient Redeemer.
Finding sympathy and instruction on this great and agonizing point, their
confidence in their ministers and their brethren remains, and they walk
quietly with them.
It seems to me impossible that the tendency of this doctrine should be
to the peculiar errors of the modern perfectionists, and yet not an instance
occur among all the Methodist ministers, or the thousands of their mem-
bers, for one hundred years.
And here let me say, it is my full conviction, that there are but two
ways in which ministers of the present day can prevent members of their
churches from becoming perfectionists. One is, to suffer them to live so
far from God, that they will not inquire after holiness of heart; and the
other is, most fully to inculcate the glorious doctrine of entire consecration;
and that it is the high privilege as well as the duty of Christians, to live
in a state of entire consecration to God. I have many additional things
to say upon the tendency of this doctrine, but at present this must suffice.
By some it is said to be identical with perfectionism ; and attempts are
made to show in what particulars antinomian perfectionism and our views
are the same. On this I remark:—
(1.) It seems to have been a favourite policy of certain controversial
writers for a long time, instead of meeting a proposition in the open field
of fair and Christian argument, to give it a bad name, and attempt to put
it down, not by force of argument, but by showing that it is identical with,
or sustains a near relation to Pelagianism, Antinomianism, Calvinism, or
some other ism, against which certain classes of minds are deeply preju-
diced. In the recent controversy between what are called old and new
school divines, who has not witnessed with pain the frequent attempts
that have been made to put down the mew school divinity, as it is
called, by calling it Pelagianism, and quoting certain passages from Pela-
gius and other writers, to show the identity of sentiment that exists between
them.
This is a very unsatisfactory method of attacking or defending any doc-
trine. There are no doubt, many points of agreement between Pelagius
and all truly orthodox divines, and so there are many points of disagree-
ment between them. There are also many points of agreement between
modern perfectionists and all evangelical Christians, and so there are many
points of disagreement between them and the Christian church in general.
That there are some points of agreement between their views and my own,
is no doubt true. And that we totally disagree in regard to those points
that constitute their great peculiarities is, if I understand them, also true.
SANCTDFICATION. 743
But did I really agree in all points with Augustine, or Edwards, or
Pelagius, or the modern perfectionists, neither the good nor the ill name
of any of these would prove my sentiments to be either right or wrong. It
would remain, after all, to show that those with whom I agreed were either
right or wrong, in order, on the one hand, to establish that for which I
contend, or on the other, to overthrow that which I maintain. It is often
more convenient to give a doctrine or an argument a bad name, than it is
Soberly and satisfactorily to reply to it.
(2.) It is not a little curious, that we should be charged with holding
the same sentiments with the perfectionists; while yet they seem to be
more violently opposed to our views, since they have come to understand
them, than almost any other persons whatever, I have been informed by
one of their leaders, that he regards me as one of the master-builders of
Babylon. And I also understand, that they manifest greater hostility to
the Oberlin Evangelist than almost any other class of persons.
(3.) I will not take time, nor is it needful, to go into an investigation or
a denial, even of the Supposed or alleged points of agreement between us
and the perfectionists. But, for the present, it must be sufficient to
read and examine for yourselves. You have, at the commencement of
these lectures upon this subject, their confession of faith drawn up with
care, by their leader, in compliance with a particular request; let a com-
parison of that with what is here taught, settle the question of our agree-
ment or disagreement with that sect.
With respect to the modern perfectionists, those who have been ac-
quainted with their writings, know that some of them have gone much
farther from the truth than others. Some of their leading men, who
commenced with them, and adopted their name, stopped far short of
adopting some of their most abominable errors; still maintaining the
authority and perpetual obligation of the moral law; and thus have been
Saved from going into many of the most objectionable and destructive
notions of the sect. There are many more points of agreement between
that class of perfectionists and the Orthodox church, than between the
church and any other class of them. And there are still a number of
important points of difference, as every one knows who is possessed of
correct information upon this subject.
I abhor the practice of denouncing whole classes of men for the errors
of Some of that name. I am Well aware, that there are many of those who
are termed perfectionists, who as truly abhor the extremes of error into
which many of that name have fallen, as perhaps do any persons living.
9. Another objection is, that persons could not live in this world, if they
were entirely sanctified. Strange Does holiness injure a man 2 Does
perfect conformity to all the laws of life and health, both physical and
moral, render it impossible for a man to live 2 If a man break off from
rebellion against God, will it kill him 2 Does there appear to have been
anything in Christ's holiness inconsistent with life and health 2 The fact
is, that this objection is founded in a gross mistake, in regard to what con-
744 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
stitutes entire sanctification. It is supposed by those who hold this objection,
that this state implies a continual and most intense degree of excitement,
and many things which are not at all implied in it. I have thought, that
it is rather a glorified than a Sanctified state, that most men have before
their minds, whenever they consider this subject. When Christ was upon
earth, he was in a sanctified but not in a glorified state. “It is enough
for the disciple that he be as his Master.” Now, what is there in the
moral character of Jesus Christ, as represented in his history, that may not
and ought not to be fully copied into the life of every Christian 2 I speak
not of his knowledge, but of his spirit and temper. Ponder well every
circumstance of his life that has come down to us, and say, beloved, what is
there in it that may not, by the grace of God, be copied into your own 2
And think you, that a full imitation of him, in all that relates to his moral
character, would render it impossible for you to live in the world 2
10. Again, it is objected that should we become entirely in the sense of
permanently sanctified, we could not know it, and should not be able in-
telligently to profess it.
I answer: All that a sanctified Soul needs to know or profess is, that the
grace of God in Christ Jesus is sufficient for him, so that he finds it to be
true, as Paul did, that he can do all things through Christ who strengthen-
eth him, and that he does not expect to sim, but that on the contrary, he is
enabled through grace “to reckon himself dead indeed unto sin, and alive
unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” A Saint may not know that he
shall never sin again ; he may expect to sin no more, because of his confi-
dence, not in his own resolutions, or strength, or attainments, but simply
in the infinite grace and faithfulness of Christ. He may come to look
upon, to regard, account, reckon himself, as being dead in deed and in fact
unto sin, and as having done with it, and as being alive unto God, and to
expect henceforth to live wholly to God, as much as he expects to live at
all; and it may be true that he will thus live, without his being able to say
that he knows that he is entirely, in the S&mse of permanently, sanctified.
This he need not know, but this he may believe upon the strength of such
promises as I Thess. v. 23, 24: “ And the very God of peace sanctify you
wholly: and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that
calleth you, who also will do it.” It is also true, that a Christian may
attain a state in which he will really fall no more into sin, as a matter of
fact, while, at the same time, he may not be able to express even a thorough
persuasion that he shall never fall again. All he may be able intelligently
to say is: “God knoweth I hope to sin no more, but the event will show.
May the Lord keep me; I trust that he will.”
il. Another oljection is, that the doctrine tends to spiritual pride. And
is it true, indeed, that to become perfectly humble tends to pride? But
ontive humility is implied in entire Sanctification. Is it true, that you
must remain in sin, and of course cherish pride in order to avoid pride? Is
your humility more safe in your own llands, and are you more Secure
SANCTDFICATION. 745
against spiritual pride, in refusing to receive Christ as your helper, than
you would be in at once embracing him as a full Saviour 2
I have seen several remarks in the papers of late, and have heard several
suggestions from various quarters, which have but increased the fear which
I have for some time entertained, that multitudes of Christians, and indeed
many ministers, have radically defective views of Salvation by faith in
Jesus Christ. To the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life, as believed
and taught by some of us, it has been frequently of late objected, that
prayers offered in accordance with this belief, and by a sanctified Soul,
would savour strongly of spiritual pride and self-righteousness. I have
seen this objection stated in its full force of late, in a religious periodical,
in the form of a supposed prayer of a sanctified soul—the object of which
was manifestly to expose the shocking absurdity, self-righteousness, and
spiritual pride of a prayer, or rather thanksgiving, made in accordance with
a belief that one is entirely sanctified. Now, I must confess, that that
prayer, together with objections and remarks which suggest the same idea,
have created in my mind no small degree of alarm. I fear much that
many of our divines, in contending for the doctrines of grace, have entirely
lost sight of the meaning of the language they use, and have in reality but
very little practical understanding of what is intended by Salvation by grace,
in opposition to salvation by works. If this is not the case, I know not
how to account for their feeling, and for their stating such an objection
as this to the doctrine of entire Sanctification.
Now, if I understand the doctrine of salvation by grace, both sanctifica-
tion and justification are wrought by the grace of God, and not by any
works or merits of our own, irrespective of the grace of Christ through
faith. If this is the real doctrine of the Bible, what earthly objection can
there be to our confessing, professing, and thanking God for our sanctifica-
tion, any more than for our justification. It is true, indeed, that in our
justification our own agency is not concerned, while in our sanctification it
is. Yet I understand the doctrine of the Bible to be, that both are brought
about by grace through faith, and that we should no sooner be sanctified
without the grace of Christ, than we should be justified without it. Now,
who pretends to deny this? And yet if it is true, of what weight is that
class of objections to which I have alluded ? These objections manifestly
turn upon the idea, uo doubt latent and deep seated in the mind, that the
real holiness of Christians, in whatever degree it exists, is, in some way, to
be ascribed to Solne goodness originating in themselves, and not in the
grace of Christ. But do let me ask, how is it possible that men who enter-
tain, really and practically, right views upon this subject, can by any
possibility feel, as if it must be proof conclusive of self-righteousness and
Pharisaism, to profess and thank God for sanctification 2 Is it not under-
stood on all hands, that sanctification is by grace, and that the gospel has
made abundant provision for the sanctification of all men º' This certainly
is admitted by those who have stated this objection. Now, if this is so,
which is the most honourable to God, to confess and complain that our sins
746 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
triumph and gain dominion over us, or to be able truly and homestly
to thank Him for having given us the victory over our sins? God has said,
“Sin shall not have dominion over you, for ye are not under the law, but
under grace.”
Now, in view of this and multitudes of kindred promises, suppose we
come to God, and say: “O Lord, thou hast made these great and precious
promises, but, as a matter of fact, they do not accord with our own expe-
rience. For sin does continually have dominion over us. Thy grace is not
sufficient for us. We are continually overcome by temptation, notwith-
standing thy promise, that in every temptation thou wilt make a way for
us to escape. Thou hast said, the truth shall make us free, but we are not
free. We are still the slaves of our appetites and lusts.”
Now, which, I inquire, is the most honourable to God, to go on with a
string of confessions and self-accusations, that are in flat contradiction to
the promises of God, and almost, to say the least, a burlesque upon the
grace of the gospel, or to be able, through grace, to confess that we have
found it true in our own experience, that his grace is sufficient for us—that
as our day is so our strength is, and that sin does not have dominion over
us, because we are not under the law, but under grace 2
To this I know it will be answered, that in this confessing of our sins
we do not impeach the grace or faithfulness of God, inasmuch as all these
promises are conditioned upon faith, and consequently, that the reason of
our remaining in sin is to be ascribed to our unbelief, and is therefore no
disparagement to the grace of Christ. But I beg, that it may be duly con-
sidered, that faith itself is of the operation of God—is itself produced by
grace; and therefore the fact of our being obliged to confess our unbelief
is a dishonour to the grace of Christ. Is it honourable or dishonourable to
God, that we should be able to confess that even our unbelief is overcome,
and that we are able to testify from our own experience, that the grace of
the gospel is sufficient for our present salvation and Sanctification ? There
is no doubt a vast amount of self-righteousness in the church, which, while
it talks of grace, really means nothing by it. For a man to go any farther
than to hope that he is converted, seems to many minds to Savour of self-
righteousness. Now, why is this, unless they themselves entertain self-
righteous motions in regard to conversion 2 Many persons would feel
shocked to hear a man in prayer unqualifiedly thank God that he had been
converted and justified. And they might just as well feel shocked at this,
and upon precisely the same principle, as to feel shocked, if he should
unqualifiedly thank God that he had been sanctified by his grace.
But again, I say, that the very fact that a man feels shocked to hear a
converted or a sanctified soul unqualifiedly thank God for the grace
received, shows that down deep in his heart lies concealed a self-righteous
view of the way of salvation, and that in his mind all holiness in Christians
is a ground of boasting; and that, if persons have become truly and fully
sanctified, they really have a ground of boasting before God. I know not
how else to account for this wonderful prejudice. For my own part, I do
SANCTDFICATION. 747
not conceive it to be the least evidence of self-righteousness, when I hear
a man sincerely and heartily thank God for converting and justifying him
by his grace. Nor should I feel either shocked, horrified, or disgusted, to
hear a man thank God, that he had sanctified him wholly by his grace. If
in either or both cases I had the corroborative evidence of an apparently
holy life, I should bless God, take courage, and feel like, calling on all
around to glorify God for such an instance of his glorious and excellent
grace.
The feeling seems to be very general, that such a prayer or thanksgiving
is similar, in fact, and in the principle upon which it rests, with that of
the Pharisee noticed by our Saviour. But what reason is there for this
assumption ? We are expressly informed, that that was the prayer of a
Pharisee. But the Pharisees were self-righteous, and expressly and openly
rejected the grace of Christ. The Pharisee them boasted of his own
righteousness, originating in, and consummated by, his own goodness, and
not in the grace of Christ. Hence he did not thank God, that the grace
of Christ had made him unlike other men. Now, this prayer was designed
to teach us the abominable folly of any man's putting in a claim to righte-
ousness and true holiness, irrespective of the grace of God by Jesus Christ.
But certainly this is an infinitely different thing from the thanksgiving of
a soul, who fully recognizes the grace of Christ, and attributes his sanc-
tification entirely to that grace. And I cannot see how a man, who has
entirely divested himself of Pharisaical notions in respect to the doctrine
of sanctification, can suppose these two prayers to be analogous in their
principle and spirit.
LECTURE LXXII.
SAINCTIFICATION.
FURTHER OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.
12. Again it is objected, that many who have embraced this doctrine,
really are spiritually proud. To this I answer :
(1.) So have many who believed the doctrine of regeneration been de-
ceived, and amazingly puffed up with the idea that they have been regen-
erated, when they have not been. But is this a good reason for abandoning
the doctrine of regeneration, or any reason why the doctrine should not be
preached 2
(2.) Let me inquire, whether a simple declaration of what God has done
for their souls, has not been assumed as of itself sufficient evidence of
spiritual pride, on the part of those who embrace this doctrine, while there
was in reality no spiritual pride at all 2 It seems next to impossible, with
the present views of the church, that an individual should really attain this
state, and profess to live without known sin in a manner so humble, as mot,
of course, to be suspected of enormous spiritual pride. This consideration
748 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
has been a Snare to some, who have hesitated and even neglected to declare
what God had done for their souls, lest they should be accused of spiritual
pride. And this has been a serious injury to their piety.
13. But again it is objected, that this doctrine tends to censoriousness.
To this I reply:
(1.) It is not denied, that some who have professed to believe this doctrine
have beeome censorious. But this no more condemns this doetrime than it
condemns that of Tegeneration. And that it tends to censoriousness, might
just as well be urged against every acknowledged doctrine of the Bible, as
against this doctrine.
(Q.) Let any Christian do his whole duty to the church and the world in
their present state, let him speak to them and of them as they really are,
and he would of course incur the charge of censoriousness. It is therefore
the most unreasonable thing in the world, to suppose that the church in its
present state, would not accuse any perfect Christian of censoriousness.
Entire sanetification implies the doing of all our duty. But to do all our
duty, we must rebuke sin in high places and in low places. Can this be
done with all needed severity, without in many cases giving offence, and
incurring the charge of censoriousness? No, it is impossible ; and to
maintain the contrary, would be to impeach the wisdom and holiness of Jesu
Christ himself.
14. It is objected, that the believers in this doctrine lower the standard
of holiness to a level with their own experience. To this I reply, that it
has been common to set up a false standard, and to overlook the true spirit
and meaning of the law, and to represent it as requiring something else than
what it does require ; but this notion is not confined to those who believe
in this doctrine. The mºral law requires one and the same thing of all
moral agents, namely, that they shall be universally and disinterestedly
*—
S
benevolent : in other words, that they shall love the Lºrd their God with all
their heart, and their neighbour as themselves. This is all that it does require
of any. Whoever has understoºd the law as requiring less or more than
this, has misunderstºod it. Love is the fulfilling of the law. But I must
3.
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inquire. whether the error has not been in giving such an interpretation of
the law, as naturally to beget the idea so prevalent, that, if a män should
teegme hºly, he cºuld not live in this wºrld. In a letter lately received
from a beloved, and useful, and venerated liminister ºf the gospel, while the
SANCTDFICATION. 749
writer expressed the greatest attachment to the doctrine of entire consecra-
tion to God, and said that he preached the same doctrine which we hold to
his people every Sabbath, but by another name, still he added, that it was
revolting to his feelings to hear any mere man set up the claim of obedience
to the law of God. Now let me inquire, why should this be revolting to the
feelings of piety 2 Must it not be because the law of God is supposed to
require something of human beings in our state, which it does not and cannot
require 2 Why should such a claim be thought extravagant, unless the
claims of the living God be thought extravagant? If the law of God really
requires no more of men than what is reasonable and possible, why should
it be revolting to any mind to hear an individual profess to have attained to
entire obedience 2 I know that the brother to whom I allude, would be
almost the last man deliberately and knowingly to give any strained inter-
pretation to the law of God; and yet. I cannot but feel that much of the
difficulty that good men have upon this subject, has arisen out of a com-
parison of the lives of Saints with a standard entirely above that which the
law of God does or can demand of persons in all respects in our circumstances,
or indeed of any moral agent whatever.
15. Another objection is, that, as a matter of fact, the grace of God is
not sufficient to secure the entire sanctification of Sáints in this life. It is
maintained, that the question of the attainability of entire Sánctification
in this life, resºlves itself after all into the question, whether Christians
are sanctified in this life? The objectors say, that nothing is sufficient
grace that does not, as a matter of fact, secure the faith, and obedience,
and perfection of the saints; and therefore that the provisions of the
gospel are to be measured by the results; and that the experience of the
church decides both the meaning of the promises, and the extent of the
provisions of grace. Now to this I answer —If this objection be good
for anything in regard to entire sanctification, it is equaily true in regard
to the spiritual state of every person in the world. If the fact that men
* * - -
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any better, with any rational hope of success. - fatalist
will admit any such conclusion as this 2 And yet I do not see but this
conclusion is inevitable from such premises. As well might an impenitent
sinner Ürge, that the grace of the gºspel is not, as a matter of fact, suffi-
cient for him, because it does not convert him : as well Inight he resolve
-:
everything into the sovereignty of God, and say, the sovereignty of God
must convert me, or I shall not be cºnverted: and since I am not con-
verted, it is because the greee of God has not proved itself sufficient to
convert me. But who will excuse the sinner, and admit his plea, that the
grace and provisions of the gºspel are not sufficient for him?
Let ministers urge upon bºth saints and sinners the claims of God.
Let them insist that sinners may, and ean, and ought, immediately to
become Christians, and that Christians can, and may, and ought to live
‘Āš)OTIOSIHI, OILVINGILSAS 09/
Jo Kuounson oth ‘preptºns Ino su Sn 3.ſojoq pop Jo ATI ap In!AA (t.)
“Inq : Utopºgnottus huosold mo on KItto Kynson osmoo Jo upo Sson
-Suoſostoo sm uſunºw sassud quu A Jo spurtu (IAO amo 0) aduapºo aqJSSOd
qsauðrú on syn, Juul puu 'sosyotoxa puu Oottonsixa UAO Shi Jo Honºuš009.I
spurtu oup aq on ssousnojostloo publslaptul I puttu (UAO spli Jo onuns attos
-oid out, Jo aduaprao isoq pub isoúrû out, sI SSottsuoſosuoo subtu V (I)
: Aldo. I spun ol, 'Jott to my pottſunnu Sull out lounou A AOUDI Utto atto
out su upontusbuſ ‘upu A si Khuſſaultſtºu Shi uſunupuu on hºu] put : ]ttatušpuſ
Jo Kup oup Inun at Aotty lott pluod ow ‘utonºognottus to IIontºloasttoo [ºuttſ,
-Itoo Jo onus spun unnu pluous O.W. J. ‘hull, ‘polooſ to SI 11 : Unºt inq I
(, Khitouſyuu Tſoul alomb on A osoul
Kq papuap Klotnuto SI uomott Toſu M ‘Āhistºtdop tutout [uois&Id Jo out thoop out,
III paptuno) suM ‘spurul Itaúl uſ utonoaſat SIU, Jo Utospot our oùùA ‘ajū spun
uſ (IOI) boghout's aunto Jo out.Inoop out 5unooſal St. Uloun 5unonb (II olotſ, sº
Kottons/Suoo Yuu W ISU pulow I ‘AON (poq out. Itſ out|A poghout's Alatnuo
9q pluod Suoslad nºtin ‘popt out, looſal on Utou] pol aSITO) Jo Kouonsisttoo
‘paxu.Idap Kūhputs allow puputt puu Spoq Jo SonſLIQIYdoošns [ution mºsttoo
all) ºutin ‘oudp ºut on tubos Kou() sº ‘āuluºhun, IN 'oji I spun Uſ (Ionuog
-noutus othua Jo ouſtoop alſ, 5unoaſat Tºtt) Jo puuotă out, Kūsajpubut sºw
IIoIIIA ‘ĀhūAbidop (Utout [tºols&qd Jo outlinoop oth plauſ III: Ulotti asoul.I. (g)
'auſthoop (tensittiO Jo
sittſod luthiodtuſ isom oth Jo otſios to Sottſ Aſp osott, Jo smoſuſdo oup looſe.
ATIOIA on A osoq, tuo,) adultà III Átax tº IIIA soutoo uomoaſqo spill, (6)
'oùùùoop uunsºlio Jo SAOIA Imo Jo (Ionutulu.to)ap oup UUI on du play, on su
ositos (; lions uſ "totuuſ uutu Ott Iſu) on Ottº ow—: olaA Koun esoddus ( 1)
: IOASItu I SIU, OL
"Itoſuſdo attatau Ip tº Jo otoA “oy ‘spite ApH of puppoCI ‘upape) ‘ounsmäny
sº taut Tons ºutſ) : Intuito oth uſ [tout isoq put soluotº oth Jo autos jo
SAoA alſ, o] Klunttoo s ][ ]utſ ‘s ouſanoop SIT) on uonooſqo (albotty '91
‘Totto Smolašutºp sº spun
lood No on ºutſ, sm IIon Louis I uſ stonsultſ ‘ptorſ att, Jo Rutuloo an oyuu ssol
-outuſ sn oatosold puu 'Allou A sm Ajnatius IIIA on stus pop (toti M ...ºpop
IIIA OSIU oilA ‘nos Iloſuo jutſ, or sſ Injunju I asſulo susof plorſ uno Jo
âtiſſuo all out ssalouluſq postosold aq. ‘Apoq pub Inos put hurds orouw
moº pot) Autd. I puu : XIIoHA no. Kynottus aouad Jo pop Álex aun puy,
: fē ‘88. A 'ssaqJ. l III asſuloid ou, Jo ‘eduuxo to ‘tuoup on nuouſum, ou,
Tood so on totle smološupp s iſ autū ‘tually on sesſuold oth Jo Auotulum,
aſſ, 1990 No on you quºmº uooq Sull Iomua oui, Jalodum qāuoup peow
ºdox tood oauti soliolutio our Inun popuop puu put useq suit Ladsoã oup
ºutſ, ‘uoad jou Sull Allmoutp ou lounaúA aos toos Iluus aw puu : ), Jo hugd
u tuo'ſ su Us IIb utoly oxus on attooſuns su si lodsoã ou, Jo 90013 aun you
issuſ put ‘llu on todsoś autus out. Intoſ plou slosſuyut horſ obutylboop
but uopiud punoy oxuſ Stottus su ‘axoſ Joaſtad Jo Kiloqui oup on 5uptonuo
on subſisſillo juſt pug troos IIults ow puu slottus on mo spou loops wou
oul ºut) attoulošutuotto otuus oth put ‘puttutuoo Jo Kouo Sun outus oup no
plot puu 'tiſs Tuolijº o AII on suuusſulo osm tuoul horſ pop on Allou,
SANCTIFICATION. 75 I
consciousness, in regard to whether the mind is conformed to that standard
or not, is the highest evidence which the mind can have of a present state
of conformity to that rule.
(3.) It is a testimony which we cannot doubt, any more than we can
doubt our existence. How do we know that we exist 2 I answer : by our
consciousness. How do I know that I breathe, or love, or hate, or sit, or
stand, or lie down, or rise up, that I am joyful or sorrowful? In short, that
I exercise any emotion, or violition, or affection of mind 2 How do I know
that I sin, or repent, or believe 2 I answer : by my own consciousness.
No testimony can be “so direct and convincing as this.”
Now, in order to know that my repentance is genuine, I must know what
genuine repentance is. So if I would know whether my love to God and
man, or obedience to the law is genuine, I must have clearly before my
mind the real spirit, and meaning, and bearing of the law of God. Having
the rule before my mind, my own consciousness affords “the most direct
and convincing evidence possible,” whether my present state of mind is
conformed to the rule. The Spirit of God is never employed in testifying
to what my consciousness teaches, but in setting in a strong light before my
mind the rule to which I am to conform my life. It is his province to make
me understand, to induce me to love and obey the truth; and it is the pro-
vince of consciousness to testify to my own mind whether I do or do not
obey the truth, when I apprehend it. When God so presents the truth, as
to give the mind assurance, that it understands his mind and will upon any
Subject, the mind's consciousness of its own state in view of that truth, is
“the highest and most direct possible” evidence of whether it obeys or
disobeys.
(4.) If a man cannot be conscious of the character of his own supreme
or ultimate choice, in which choice his moral character consists, how can he
know when, and of what, he is to repent 2 If he has committed sin of
which he is not conscious, how is he to repent of it 2 And if he has a
holiness of which he is not conscious, how could he feel that he has peace
With God 9
But it is said, that a man may violate the law, not knowing it, and con-
sequently have no eonsciousness that he simmed, but that, afterwards, a
knowledge of the law may convict him of sin. To this I reply, that if
there was absolutely no knowledge that the thing in question was wrong,
the doing of that thing was not sin, inasmuch as some degree of knowledge
of what is right or Wrong is indispensable to the moral character of any
act. In such a case, there may be a sinful ignorance, which may involve
all the guilt of those actions that were done in consequence of it; but that
blame-Worthiness lies in that state of heart that has induced this, and not
at all in the violation of the rule of which the mind was, at the time, en-
tirely ignorant.
(5.) The Bible everywhere assumes, that we are able to know, and un-
qualifiedly requires us to know, what the moral state of our mind is. It
commands us to examine ourselves, to know and to prove our ownselves
* X5)OTOGIHL Oſl.VINGILSXS 39 /
toquouſeſ on put ‘Kirbolo to Aoosp on UTIII 3USnto ‘Āſoutou Stu Jo qušil
3UOI’s Italo att] uſ 'atun aun 10 pull aſ Moſula ssotismoſosttoo aun Buſould Aq
1nq : SSousnokosuoo suſ Bunoppu.[][100 Åd nou SI 11 ‘IIIs Jo (IBut tº slop.Attoo pop
ItaúAA ‘ssausmoposttoo us\o stu ponoſpenuoo ni Ji “I looſot snu äuſoq Spu
Jo SA*I KIOA all tuo II put ‘por) Jo Kuounsel out 10aſol pluow ou quuſ, ‘ppū
out haſ put : Kuounsel louno Ilu Sloaſat au ‘àuroq Spu Jo SAu Kia A out UIOU
‘sosto (Ions IIB UI issousmorosuoo uso stu Jo Kulotuſ]sal out on Kubiºuoo
‘uutu tº Jo aouaoottuſ to lună oup on Kyūso, SassouTiNa alſ, olotA ‘oottolamooo
Itoultuoo Jo Sasuo att, alou.J., 'luous pnſ [bug out] uſ unu (IntA Buſºap S. pop
Jo Klaſſidoid oth Jo (UIII Ájsnes to Aoti upo Áuotunson 1900 ‘UTIII ºströu
Jo Joj Jatſ) ſo “SSauni M tº aq on hou si SSottsmolosuoo UIAAO suutu e JI (“III)
‘lolobiulio on.In Imo Jo oottop|Ao ‘Kuo out, poapUI put ‘hsoudu all
sm on SI pop On ottompaqo Josseusmorosuoo Imo ‘JI tadat I ‘īngſ 'Slibatſ
Tuo Jo alums ou) Jo aoutopſ Ao tuoul on St ‘stat(10 Kot paatasqo Su ‘nonpuoo InC)
& SSousnokosuoo Ino Ka and Jonpuoo Ino Jo 5uſun Kut. AOUXI oA op AOH & Aaqo
-sup to Kotto èA ToulouſA AOUI a M. op AOH ‘O.InDIII plmow I qugſ ‘lou to
buſul Jo omns huàII y III on 3A tallmot[A ooliepiso Su ‘Aoqosºp to Koſſo KiplbA
-]uo as Ioulou A ‘hou] ouſ, on UIonuta)}\; tıno Shoorn) alſº oth ‘prus SI T1 ºng
'uonulidsuſ huulsuoo topum SI utºut Klaxo Juul KIdruſ plmoa sitſ, IO;
: hott to 11 op 3A lounou A Su. On Tua Mat KT109.Iſp Tou Saop qug ‘sn alojaq Khmp
itno slas pop Jo IIIds atlï, 'ssausmorosuoo us\o sitſ on Kuounson SIU, Ioj
staja. I ‘SAoqo Oti Toulouſ A hop] oil, Iboyal holl Saop hmſ, ‘Khmp SIU Speasal
*I hou to pop S.Kono ou lounou.A ‘uttu Kuu on log oup peasa. Knoeup
qou soop oUIIgſ ou.I. Jolt to tutu Kaqo a W launou A 3UAOuy Jo subout
old Issod out Ioval uno (IIUMA ind Sull pop quit, solduſ uonooſho aqJ., ( II)
‘lſ AOUXI tºo ouſ UIA (IA UIT KuA aſqissod Kuo atti SI SIULL 'ssatismoros
-Uoo (IAO stuſ Aq : 19ASUB I & littºolſ sitſ IIe UniM so AOL to shuadal out agún
AOUI all soop AOH 'SSousnokosuo) UAO SIII Ág : [0,\\sup I & adu sº at so
1st'ſ su syſtew to ‘sum, to ‘tuto at su tomtu su sign ou http Aoux tutu e Saop
AOH II* lu (uſu ako as Toulou A Soop ºr se ‘hubotſ Imo IIb unIA pop aaol
hou op 10 op 3A Toulou A Kyūson KIIu20Amhoun su soop ssousnoosuoo ( )
—: Kºdat I SIU, OL
‘puttu Ino Jo Kiſobdeo quaso,Id all on lumba att, Kolū Taulau A ‘aatsop aroun on
pitóð. Itſ sn (Iouan Youtubo ), “sasſotaxa Ino Jo pupt all) on hoodset up sm touan
pluod SSotismolosttoo JI atojatoll) ºutſ, put ‘eit spurru and Jo Sanſouduo put
lowotſ aun hull w sm (Iouan You Soop SSausmorosuoo Imo ‘plus sſ p qug (9)
'aouais No UIAo luo on pluša.1 UI pasſooop aq ūuo ow tubul atoul Kub
pasſadop od 10ttupo as ‘puttu Jo ontºs luno Ainboun paproop ‘Taj u Jossauna
Stuaq SSaustioſosttoo tuo put ‘aqāII ate plupuuns oup Jo SAOIA (no uot A hugſ
‘plupurns quâII oth UniM sa Mostmo anºdtuoo ol āunooújou Kū ‘so Apostmo oAlao
-op Abul ow ºpt[] ‘sſ long ou.J., & Jo AajuuLA pulu tuo Jo Oslo taxa taupo Áut
to ‘ooutºuadal ino on loadsø.I uſ || a \laoat on 3A on: ‘uonuounouts quesaid
Juo on p.1850.1 UI ‘SSousuolosuoo UAo no Jo Kitotunson oup asſooed on hou
ote aw J ºngſ & At I ou ol Khutojūoo Jo on 1s tº uſ ‘lott att, Io att, as Iðun
-at M ‘ssousnokosuoo UAO Ino Jo Kuolumsø) out 5upith Utoq, puu pop Jo Aeſ
où, Jo quân oth oltiſ sligati Ino 5uffuſiq Āq Inq ‘oubp aq SIII, upo Aou ‘AON
SANCTIFICATION. 753
distinctly what light he had, what thoughts, what convictions, what inten-
tion or design; in other words, what consciousness he had at the time.
And this, let me add, is the way, and the only way, in which the Spirit of
God can convict a man of sin, thus bringing him to condemn himself.
Now, suppose that God should bear testimony against a man, that at such
a time he did such a thing, that such and such were all the circumstances
of the case; and suppose that at the same time the individual's conscious-
ness unequivocally contradicts him. The testimony of God in this case
could not satisfy the man's mind, nor lead him into a state of self-condemna-
tion. The only possible way in which this state of mind could be induced,
would be to annihilate his opposing consciousness, and to convict him
simply upon the testimony of God.
(7.) Men may overlook what consciousness is. They may mistake the
rule of duty, they may confound consciousness with a mere negative state
of mind, or that in which a man is not conscious of a state of opposition to
the truth. Yet it must for ever remain true that, to our own minds,
“ consciousness must be the highest possible evidence" of what passes
within us. And if a man does not by his own consciousness know whether
he does the best that he can, under the circumstances—whether he has a
single eye to the glory of God—and whether he is in a state of entire con-
secration to God—he cannot know it in any way whatever. And no
testimony whatever, either of God or man, could, according to the laws of
his being, satisfy him either as to conviction of guilt on the one hand, or
Self-approbation on the other.
(8.) Let me ask, how those who make this objection know that they are
not in a sanctified state 2 Has God revealed it to them 2 Has he revealed
it in the Bible 2 Does the Bible say to A. B., by mame, You are not in a
sanctified state 2 Or does it lay down a rule, in the light of which his own
consciousness bears this testimony against him 2 IIas God revealed directly
by his Spirit, that he is not in a sanctified state, or does he hold the rule
of duty strongly before the mind, and thus awaken the testimony of con-
sciousness that he is not in this state 2 Now just in the same way con-
sciousness testifies of those that are Sanctified, that they are in this state.
Neither the Bible nor the Spirit of God makes any new or particular
revelation to them by name. But the Spirit of God bears witness to their
spirits by setting the rule in a strong light before them. He induces that
state of mind which conscience pronounces to be conformity to the rule,
This is as far as possible from setting aside the judgment of God in the
case; for conscience, under these circumstances, is the testimony of God,
and the way in which he convinces of sin on the one hand, and of entire
consecration on the other ; and the decision of conscience is given to us in
consciousness.
By some it is still objected, that consciousness alone is not evidence
even to ourselves of our being, or not being in a state of entire Samctifica-
tion, that the judgment of the mind is also employed in deciding the true
intent and meaning of the law, and is therefore as absolutely a witness in

3 C
754 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the case as consciousness is. “Consciousness,” it is said, “gives us the
exercises of our own mind, and the judgment decides whether these exer-
cises are in accordance with the law of God.” So then it is the judgment
rather than the consciousness, that decides whether we are, or are not, in
a state of entire sanctification; and therefore if, in our judgment of the
law, we happen to be mistaken, than which nothing is more common, in
such case we are utterly deceived if we think ourselves in a state of entire
sanctification. To this I answer:-
(i.) It is indeed our judgment that decides upon the intent and meaning
of the law.
(ii) We may be mistaken in regard to its true application in certain
cases, as it respects outward conduct, but let it be remembered, that neither
sin nor holiness is to be found in the outward act. They both belong only
to the ultimate intention. No man, as was formerly shown, can mistake
his real duty. Every one knows, and cannot but know, that disinterested
benevolence is his duty. This is, and nothing else is his duty. This he
can know, and about this he need not mistake. And sure it is, that if
man can be certain of anything, he can be certain in respect to the end for
which he lives, or in respect to his supreme ultimate intention.
(iii.) I deny that it is the judgment which is to us the witness, in
respect to the state of our own minds. There are several powers of the
mind called into exercise, in deciding upon the meaning of, and in obey-
ing, the law of God; but it is consciousness alone that gives us these
exercises. Nothing but consciousness can possibly give us any exercise of
our own minds; that is, we have no knowledge of any exercise but by our
own consciousness. Suppose then the judgment is exercised, the will is
exercised, and all the involuntary powers are exercised. These exercises
are revealed to us only and simply by consciousness; so that it remains an
invariable truth, that consciousness is to us the only possible witness of
what our exercises are, and consequently of the state of our own minds.
When, therefore, I say, that by consciousness a man may know whether he
is in a state of sanctification, I mean, that consciousness is the real and
only evidence that we can have of being in this state.
Again : the objection that consciousness cannot decide in regard to the
strength of our powers, and whether we really serve God with all our
strength, seems to be based upon the false supposition, that the law of
God requires every power of body and mind to be excited at every
moment, in its full strength ; and that, too, without any regard to the
nature of the subject, about which our powers, for the time being, are
employed. On a former occasion I endeavoured to show, and trust I did
show, that perfect obedience to the law of God requires no such thing.
Sanctification is consecration. Entire consecration is obedience to the
law of God ; and all that the law requires is, that our whole being be
consecrated to God; and the amount of strength to be expended in his
service at any one moment of time, must depend upon the mature of the
subject about which the powers are for the time being employed. And
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SANCTIFICATION, 757
fulfilled, by free grace drawing and securing the concurrence of free-will.
With respect to the salvation of sinners, it is promised that Christ shall
have a seed to serve him, and the Bible abounds with promises to Christ
that secure the salvation of great multitudes of sinners. So the promises,
that the church, as a body, at some period of her earthly history, shall be
entirely sanctified, are, as it regards the church, unconditional, in the sense
that they will assuredly be accomplished. But, as I have already shown,
as it respects individuals, the fulfilment of these promises must depend
upon the exercise of faith. Both in respect to the salvation of simmers
and the sanctification of Christians, God is abundantly pledged to bring
about the salvation of the one and the Sanctification of the other, to the
extent of his promise to Christ.
20. It is also objected, that the sanctification of the Saints depends upon
the sovereignty of God. To this I reply, that both the sanctification of
the saints and the conversion of sinners is, in Some sense, dependent upon
the sovereign grace of God. But who except an antinomian would, for
this reason, hesitate to urge it upon sinners to repent immediately and
believe the gospel? Would any one think of objecting to the doctrine or
the fact of repentance, that repentance and the conversion of sinners were
dependent upon the sovereignty of God 2
Amd yet, if the sovereignty of God can be justly urged as a bar to the
doctrine of entire sanctification, it may, for ought I see, with equal pro-
propriety be urged as a bar to the doctrine and fact of repentance. We
have no controversy with any one upon the subject of entire sanctification,
who will as fully and as firmly hold out the duty and the possibility, and the
practical attainability, of entire same tification, as of repentance and salvation.
Let them both be put where the Bible puts them, upon the same ground,
so far as the duty and the practicability of both are concerned.
Suppose any one should assert, that it were irrational and dangerous for
simmers to hope or expect to be converted, and sanctified, and saved,
because all this depends upon the sovereignty of God, and they do not
know what God will do. Who would say this? But why not as well say
it, as make the objection to Sanctification which we are now considering 2
LECTURE LXXIII.
SANCTIFICATION,
REMARIXS.
1. THERE is an importance to be attached to the sanctification of the
body, of which very few persons appear to be aware. Indeed, unless th
bodily appetites and powers be consecrated to the service of God—unless
we learn to eat, and drink, and sleep, and wake, and labour, and rest, for
the glory of God, permanent sanctification as a practical thing is out of the
question. It is plain, that very few persons are aware of the great influence
e
7.58 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
which their bodies have over their minds, and of the indispensable necessity
of bringing their bodies under, and keeping them in subjection.
Few people seem to keep the fact steadily in view, that unless their
bodies be rightly managed, they will be so fierce and over-powering a source
of temptation to the mind, as inevitably to lead it into sin. If they indulge
themselves in a stimulating diet, and in the use of those condiments that
irritate and rasp the nervous system, their bodies will be, of course and of
necessity, the source of powerful and incessant temptation to evil tempers
and vile affections. If persons were aware of the great influence which
the body has over the mind, they would realize, that they cannot be too
careful to preserve the nervous system from the influence of every improper
article of food or drink, and preserve that system as they would the apple
of their eye, from every influence that could impair its functions.
No one who has opportunity to acquire information in regard to the
laws of life and health, and the best means of sanctifying the whole spirit,
soul, and body, can be guiltless if he neglects these means of knowledge.
Every man is bound to make the structure and laws of both body and mind
the subject of as thorough investigation as his circumstances will permit,
to inform himself in regard to what are the true principles of perfect
temperance, and in what way the most can be made of all his powers of
body and mind for the glory of God.
2. From what has been said in these lectures, the reason why the church
has not been entirely sanctified is very obvious. As a body the church has
not believed that such a state was attainable until near the close of life.
And this is a sufficient reason, and indeed the most weighty of all reasons,
for her not having attained it.
3. From what has been said, it is easy to see, that the true question in
regard to entire sanctification in this life is: Is it attainable as a matter of
fact? Some have thought the proper question to be : Are Christians
entirely sanctified in this life? Now certainly this is not the question that
needs to be discussed. Suppose it to be fully granted that they are not :
this fact is sufficiently accounted for, by the consideration that they do not
know or believe it to be attainable until the close of life. If they believed
it to be attainable, it might no longer be true that they do not attain it.
But if provision really is made for this attainment, it amounts to nothing,
unless it be recognized and believed. The thing needed them is, to bring
the church to see and believe, that this is her high privilege and her duty.
It is not enough, as has been shown, to say that it is attainable, simply on
the ground of natural ability. This is as true of the devil, and the lost in
in hell, as of men in this world. But unless grace has put this attainment
so within our reach, as that it may be aimed at with the reasonable prospect
of success, there is, as a matter of fact, no more provision for our entire
Sanctification in this life, than for the devil's. As has been said, it seems
to be trifling with mankind, merely to maintain the attainability of this
state, on the ground of natural ability only, and at the same time to tell
them, that they certainly never will exercise this ability unless disposed to
SANCTDFICATION. 7.59
do so by the grace of God; and furthermore, that it is a dangerous error
for us to expect to receive grace from God to secure this result; that we
might by natural possibility make this attainment, but it is irrational and
dangerous error to expect or hope to make it, or hope to receive sufficient
grace to secure it.
The real question is, Has grace brought this attainment so within our
reach, that we may reasonably expect, by aiming at it, to experience it in
this life? It is admitted, that on the ground of natural ability, both wicked
men and devils have the power to be entirely holy. But it is also admitted
that their indisposition to use this power aright is so complete, that as a
matter of fact, they never will, unless influenced to do so by the grace of
God. I insist therefore that the real question is, whether the provisions of
the gospel are such, that did the church fully understand and lay hold
upon the proffered grace, she might attain this state 2 Are we as fully
authorized to offer this grace to Christians, as we are the grace of repent-
ance and pardon to the sinners? May we as consistently urge Christians
to lay hold on sanctifying grace sufficient to keep them from all sin, as to
urge sinners to lay hold of Christ for justification 2 May we insist upon
the one as really and as honestly as the other? *.
4. We see how irrelevant and absurd the objection is, that as a matter
of fact the church has not attained this state, and therefore it is not attain-
able. Why, if they have not understood it to be attainable, it no more
disproves its attainableness, than the fact that the heathen have not
embraced the gospel, proves that they will not when they know it. Within
my memory it was thought to be dangerous to call sinners to repent and
believe the gospel; and on the contrary, they were told by Calvinists, that
they could not repent, that they must wait God's time; and it was regarded
as a dangerous error for a sinner to think that he could repent. But who
does not know, that the thorough inculcation of an opposite doctrine has
brought scores of thousands to repentance? Now the same course needs
to be pursued with Christians. Instead of being told, that it is dangerous
to expect to be entirely sanctified in this life, they ought to be taught to
believe at once, and take hold on the promises of perfect love and faith.
5. You see the necessity of fully preaching and insisting upon this
doctrine, and of calling it by its true scriptural name. It is astonishing
to see to what an extent there is a tendency among men to avoid the use of
scriptural language, and to cleave to the language of such men as Edwards,
and other great and good divines. They object to the terms perfection and
entire sanctification, and prefer to use the terms entire consecration, and
such other terms as have been common in the church.
Now, I would by no means contend about the use of words; but still it
does appear to me to be of great importance, that we use scripture
language, and insist upon men being “perfect as their Father in Heaven is
perfect,” and being “sanctified wholly, body, soul and spirit.” This appears
to me to be the more important for this reason, that if we use the language
to which the church has been accustomed upon this subject, she will, as she
760 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
has dome, misunderstand us, and will not get before her mind that which
we really mean. That this is so, is manifest from the fact, that the great
mass of the church will express alarm at the use of the terms perfection
and entire sanctification, who will neither express nor feel any such alarm,
if we speak of entire consecration. This demonstrates, that they do not by
any means understand these terms as meaning the same thing. And
although I understand them as meaning precisely the same thing, yet I
find myself obliged to use the terms perfection and entire Sanctification to
possess their minds of their real meaning. This is Bible language. It is
unobjectionable language. And inasmuch as the church understands entire
consecration to mean something less than entire sanctification or Christian
perfection, it does seem to me of great importance, that ministers should
use a phraseology which will call the attention of the church to the real
doctrine of the Bible upon this subject. With great humility, I would
submit the question to my beloved brethren in the ministry, whether they
are not aware, that Christians have entirely too low an idea of what is
implied in entire consecration, and whether it is not useful and best to
adopt a phraseology in addressing them, that shall call their attention to
the real meaning of the words which they use 2
6. Young converts have not been allowed so much as to indulge the
thought that they could live even for a day wholly without sin. They
have as a general thing no more been taught to expect to live even for a
day without sin, than they have been taught to expect immediate transla-
tion, soul and body, to heaven. Of course, they have not known that there
was any other way than to go on in sin; and however shocking and dis-
tressing the necessity has appeared to them, in the ardour of their first love,
still they have looked upon it as an unalterable fact, that to be in a great
measure in bondage to sin is a thing of course while they live in this
world. Now, with such an orthodoxy as this, with the conviction in the
church and ministry so ripe, settled and universal, that the utmost that the
grace of God can do for men in this world is to bring them to repentance,
and to leave them to live and die in a state of sinning and repenting, is
it at all wonderful, that the state of religion should be as it really has
been 2
In looking over the results to Christians, of preaching the doctrine in
question, I feel compelled to say, that so far as all observation can go, I
have the same evidence that it is truth, and as such is owned and blessed
of God to the elevation of the holiness of Christians, as I have, that those
are truths which I have so often preached to simmers, and which have been
blessed of God to their conversion. This doctrine seems as naturally
calculated to elevate the piety of Christians, and as actually to result in the
elevation of their piety, under the blessing of God, as those truths that I
have preached to sinners were to their conversion.
7. Christ has been in a great measure lost sight of in some of his most
important relations to mankind. He has been known and preached as a
pardoning and justifying Saviour; but as an actually indwelling and reigning
SANCTDFICATION. 761
Saviours in the heart, he has been but little known. I was struck with a
remark a few years since, of a brother whom I have from that time greatly
loved, who had been for a time in a desponding state of mind, borne down
with a great sense of his own vileness, but seeing no way of escape. At an
evening meeting the Lord so revealed himself to him, as entirely to over-
come the strength of his body, and his brethren were obliged to carry him
home. The next time I saw him, he exclaimed to me with a pathos I shall
never forget, “Brother Finney, the church have buried the Saviour.” Now
it is no doubt true, that the church have become awfully alienated from
Christ—have in a great measure lost a knowledge of what he is, and ought
to be, to her, and a great many of her members, I have good reason to
know, in different parts of the country, are saying with deep and overpower-
ing emotion, “They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they
have laid him.”
8. With all her orthodoxy, the church has been for a long time much
nearer to unitarianism than she has imagined. This remark may shock
some of my readers, and you may think it savours of censoriousness. But,
beloved, I am sure it is said in no such spirit. These are “the words of
truth and soberness.” So little has been known of Christ, that, if I am
not entirely mistaken, there are multitudes in the Orthodox churches, who
do not know Christ, and who in heart are Unitarians, while in theory they
are orthodox. They have never known Christ, in the sense of which I have
spoken of him in these lectures.
I have been, for some years deeply impressed with the fact, that so
\many professors of religion are coming to the ripe conviction that they
never knew Christ. There have been in this place almost continual deve-
lopements of this fact ; and I doubt, whether there is a minister in the
land who will present Christ as the gospel presents him, in all the fulness
of his official relations to mankind, who will not be struck and agonized
with developements that will assure him, that the great mass of professors
of religion do not know the Saviour. It has been to my mind a painful
and a serious question, what I ought to think of the spiritual state of
those who know so little of the blessed Jesus. That none of them have
been converted, I dare not say. And yet, that they have been converted,
I am afraid to say. I would not for the world “quench the smoking flax,
or break the bruised reed,” or say anything to stumble, or weaken the
feeblest lamb of Christ; and yet my heart is sore pained, my soul is sick;
my bowels of compassion yearn over the church of the blessed God. O, the
dear church of Christ! What does she in her present state know of gospel-
rest, of that “great and perfect peace which they have whose minds are
stayed on God? The church in this place is composed, to a great extent,
of professors of religion from different parts of the world, who have come
hither for educational purposes, and from religious considerations. And as
I said, I have sometimes been appalled at the disclosures which the Spirit
of God has made of the real spiritual state of many who have come here,
762 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and were considered by others before they came, and by themselves, as truly
converted to God.
9. If I am not mistaken, there is an extensive feeling among Christians
and ministers, that much that ought to be known and may be known of the
Saviour, is not known. Many are begimming to find that the Saviour is to
them “as a root out of a dry ground, having neither form nor comeliness;”
that the gospel which they preach or hear is not to them “the power of
God unto salvation” from sin ; that it is not to them “glad tidings of great
joy ;" that it is not to them a peace-giving gospel; and many are feeling
that if Christ has dome for them all that his grace is able to do in this
life, the plan of Salvation is sadly defective ; that Christ is not after all a
Saviour suited to their necessities; that the religion which they have is
not suited to the world in which they live; that it does not, cannot make
them free, but leaves them in a state of perpetual bondage. Their souls
are agonized, and tossed to and fro without a resting-place. Multitudes
also are beginning to see, that there are many passages, both in the Old
and New Testament, which they do not understand; that the promises
seem to mean much more than they have ever realized ; and that the
gospel and the plan of Salvation, as a whole, must be something very
different from that which they have as yet apprehended. There are, if I
mistake mot, great multitudes all over the country, who are inquiring more
earnestly than ever before, after a knowledge of that Jesus who is to save
his people from their sins.
A fact was related in my hearing, some time since, that illustrates in an
affecting manner the agonizing state of mind in which many Christians
are, in regard to the present state of many of the ministers of Christ. I
had the statement from the brother himself, who was the subject of his
narrative. A sister in the church to which he preached became so sensible
that he did not know Christ as he ought to know him, that she was full of
unutterable agony ; and on one occasion, after he had been preaching, fell
down at his feet with tears and strong beseechings that he would exercise
faith in Christ. At another time, she was so impressed with a sense of
his deficiency in this respect as a minister, that she addressed him in the
deepest anguish of her soul, crying out, “O, I shall die, I shall certainly
die, unless you will receive Christ as a full Saviour :” and attempting to
approach him, she sunk down helpless, overcome with agony and travail of
soul, at his feet.
There is manifestly a great struggle in the minds of multitudes, that the
Saviour may be more fully revealed to the church, that the present minis-
try especially may know him, and the power of his resurrection, and the
fellowship of his sufferings, and be made conformable to his death.
10. If the doctrine of these lectures is true, you see the immense im-
portance of preaching it clearly and fully, in revivals of religion. When
the hearts of converts are warm with their first love, then is the time to
make them fully acquainted with their Saviour, to hold him up in all his
SANCTIFICATION. 763
offices and relations, so as to break the power of every sim—to lead them
to break off for ever from all self-dependence, and to receive Christ as a
present, perfect, everlasting Saviour, so far as this can possibly be done
with their limited experience.
11. Unless this course be taken, their backsliding is inevitable. You
might as well expect to roll back the waters of Niagara with your hand, as
to stay the tide of their former habitudes of mind, surrounded as they are
with temptation, without a deep, and thorough, and experimental acquaint-
ance with the Saviour. And if they are thrown upon their own watchful-
ness and resources, for strength against temptation, instead of being
directed to the Saviour, they are certain to become discouraged, and fall
into dismal bondage.
12. But, before I conclude these remarks, I must not omit to notice the
indispensable necessity of a willingness to do the will of God, in order
rightly to understand this doctrine. If a man is unwilling to give up his
sins, to deny himself all ungodliness and every worldly lust, if he is un-
willing to be set apart wholly and forever to the service of the Lord, he
will either reject this doctrine altogether, or only intellectually admit it,
without receiving it into his heart. It is an eminently dangerous state of
mind to assent to this, or any other doctrine of the gospel, and not reduce
it to practice.
13. Much evil has been done by those who have professedly embraced
this doctrine in theory, and rejected it in practice. Their spirit and temper
have been such as to lead those who saw them to infer, that the tendency
of the doctrine itself was bad. And it is not to be doubted, that some who
have professed to have experienced the power of this doctrine in their
hearts, have greatly disgraced religion, by exhibiting a very different spirit
from that of an entirely sanctified one. But why in a Christian land
should this be a stumbling block 2 When the heathen see persons from
Christian nations who professedly adopt the Christian system, exhibit on
their shores, and in their countries, the spirit which many of them do, they
infer that this is the tendency of the Christian religion. To this our
missionaries reply, that they are only nominal Christians, only speculative,
not real believers. Should thousands of our church members go among
them, they would have the same reason to complain ; and might reply to
the missionaries, these are not only nominal believers, but profess to have
experienced the Christian religion in their own hearts. Now what would
the missionaries reply 2 Why, to be sure, that they were professors of
religion; but that they really did not know Christ, that they were deceiv-
ing themselves with a name to live, while in fact they were dead in tres.
passes and sins.
It has often been a matter of astonishment to me, that in a Christian
land, it should be a stumbling block to any, that some, or if you please, a
majority of those who profess to receive and to have experienced the truth
of this doctrine, should exhibit an unchristian spirit. What if the same
objection should be brought against the Christian religion; against any and
764 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
every doctrine of the gospel, that the great majority of all the professed
believers and receivers of those doctrines were proud, worldly, selfish, and
exhibited anything but a right spirit 2 This objection might be made with
truth to the professed Christian church. But would the conclusiveness of
such an objection be admitted in Christian lands? Who does not know the
ready answer to all such objections as these, that the doctrines of Chris-
tianity do not sanction such conduct, and that it is not the real belief of
them that begets any such spirit or conduct; that the Christian religion
abhors all these objectionable things. And now suppose it should be replied
to this, that a tree is known by its fruits, and that so great a majority of
the professors of religion could not exhibit such a spirit, unless it were the
tendency of Christianity itself to beget it. Who would not reply to this,
that this state of mind and course of conduct of which they complaim, is
the natural state of man uninfluenced by the gospel of Christ; that, in
these instances, on account of unbelief, the gospel has failed to correct
what was already wrong, and that it needed not the influence of any corrupt
doctrine to produce that state of mind? It appears to me, that these
objectors against this doctrine, on account of the fact that some and
perhaps many who have professed to receive it, have exhibited a wrong
spirit, take it for granted that the doctrine produces this spirit, instead of
considering that a wrong spirit is matural to men, and that the difficulty is
that, through unbelief, the gospel has failed to correct what was before
wrong. They reason as if they supposed the human heart needed some-
thing to beget within it a bad spirit, and as if they supposed, that a belief
in this doctrine had made men wicked ; instead of recognizing the fact,
that they were before wicked, and that through unbelief, the gospel has
failed to make them holy.
14. But let it not be understood, that I suppose or admit, that the great
mass who have professed to have received this doctrine into their hearts,
have exhibited a bad spirit. I must say, that it has been eminently other-
wise, so far as my own observation extends. And I am fully convinced,
that if I have ever seen Christianity and the spirit of Christ in the world,
it has been exhibited by those, as a general thing, who have professed to
receive this doctrine into their hearts.
15. How amazingly important it is, that the ministry and the church
should come fully to a right understanding and embracing of this doctrine.
O, it will be like life from the dead! The proclamation of it is now
regarded by multitudes as “good tidings of great joy.” From every
quarter, we get the gladsome intelligence, that souls are entering into the
deep rest and peace of the gospel, that they are awaking to a life of faith
and love—and that, instead of sinking down into antinomianism, they are
eminently more benevolent, active, holy, and useful than ever before; that
they are eminently more prayerful, watchful, diligent, meek, sober-minded,
and heavenly in all their lives. This is the character of those, to a very
great extent at least, with whom I have been acquainted, who have embraced
this doctrine, and professed to have experienced its power. I say this for
SANCTDFICATION. 76.5
mo other reason, than to relieve the anxieties of those who have heard very
strange reports, and whose honest fears have been awakened in regard to
the tendency of this doctrine.
16. Much pains have been taken to demonstrate, that our views of this
subject are wrong. But in all the arguing to this end hitherto, there has
been one grand defect. None of the opponents of this doctrine have yet
showed us “a more excellent way, and told us what is right.” It is cer.
tainly impossible to ascertain what is wrong, on any moral subject, unless
we have before us the standard of right. The mind must certainly be
acquainted with the rule of right, before it can reasonably pronounce any-
thing wrong: “for by the law is the knowledge of sin.” It is therefore
certainly absurd, for the opponents of the doctrine of entire sanctification
in this life, to pronounce this doctrine wrong without being able to show us
what is right. To what purpose, them, I pray, do they argue, who insist
upon this view of the subject as wrong, while they do not so much as
attempt to tell us what is right? It cannot be pretended, that the scrip-
tures teach nothing upon this subject. And the question is, what do they
teach 2 We therefore call upon the denouncers of this doctrine, and we
think the demand reasonable, to inform us definitely, how holy Christians
may be, and are expected to be in this life. And it should be distinctly
understood, that until they bring forward the rule laid down in the scripture
upon this subject, it is but arrogance to pronounce anything wrong ; just as
if they silould pronounce anything to be sin without comparing it with the
standard of right. Until they inform us what the scriptures do teach, we
must beg leave to be excused from supposing ourselves obliged to believe,
that what is taught in these lectures is wrong, or contrary to the language
and spirit of inspiration. This is certainly a question that ought not to be
thrown loosely aside, without being settled. The thing at which we aim
is, to establish a definite rule, or to explain what we suppose to be the real
and explicit teachings of the Bible upon this point. And we do think it
absurd, that the opponents of this view should attempt to convince us of
error, without so much as attempting to show what the truth upon this
subject is. As if we could easily enough decide what is contrary to right,
without possessing any knowledge of right. We therefore beseech our
brethren, in discussing this subject, to show us what is right. And if this
is not the truth, to show us a unore excellent way, and colvince us that we
are wrong, by showing us what is right. For we have no hope of ever
seeing that we are wrong, until we can see that something else than what
is advocated in this discussion, is right.
17. But before I close my remarks upon this subject, I must not fail to
state what I regard as the present duty of Christians. It is to hold their
will in a state of consecration to God, and to lay hold on the promises for
the blessing promised in such passages as 1 Thess. v. 23, 24 —“And the
very God of peace sanctify you wholly, and I pray God your whole spirit,
and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord
766 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Jesus Christ; faithful is he that calleth you, who also will do it.” This is
present duty. Let them wait on the Lord in faith, for that cleansing of
the whole being which they need, to confirm, strengthen, settle them. All
they can do, and all that God requires them to do, is to obey him from
moment to moment, and to lay hold of him for the blessing of which we
have been speaking; and to be assured, that God will bring forth the answer
in the best time and in the best manner. If you believe, the anointing
that abideth will Surely be secured in due time.
LECTURE LXXIV.
ELECTION.
In discussing this subject,
I, I SHALL NOTICE SOME POINTS IN WHICH THERE Is A GENERAL AGREE-
MENT AMONG ALL DENOMINATIONS OF CHRISTIANS RESPECTING THE NATURAſ,
AND MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
II. WHAT THE BIBLE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION IS NOT.
III. WHAT IT IS.
IV. I SHALL PROVE THE DOCTRINE TO BE TRUE.
V. SHOW WHAT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE REASONS For ELECTION.
VI. WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN THE REASON.
VII. WHEN THE ELECTION WAS MADE.
VIII, ELECTION DOES NOT RENDER MEANS FOR THE SALVATION OF THE
ELECT UNNECESSARY.
IX. ELECTION IS THE ONLY GROUND OF HOPE IN THE SUCCESS OF MEANs
TO SAVE THE SOU LS OF MEN.
X. ELECTION DOES NOT OPPOSE ANY OBSTACLE TO THE SALVATION OF
THE NON-ELECT.
XI. THERE Is No INJUSTICE IN ELECTION.
XII. THIS IS THE BEST THAT COULD BE DONE FOR THE INHABITANTS OF
THIS WORLD.
XIII. How WE MAY ASCERTAIN OUR OWN ELECTION.
I. I shall motice some points in which there is a general agreement among
all denominations of Christians respecting the natural and moral attributes
of God.
1. It is agreed that etermity is a natural attribute of God in the sense
that he grows no older. He was just as old before the world or universe
was made, as he is now, or as he will be at the day of judgment.
2. It is agreed that omniscience is an attribute of God, in the sense that
he knows from a necessity of his infinite nature all things that are objects
of knowledge.
3. That he has necessarily and eternally possessed this knowledge, so
that he never has, and never can have, any accession to his knowledge.
Every possible thing that ever was, or will be, or can be an object of
ELECTION. 767
knowledge, has been necessarily and etermally known to God. If this were
not true, God would be neither infinite nor omniscient.
4. It is agreed also that God exercises an universal providence, embracing
all events that ever did or ever will occur in all worlds. Some of these
events he secures by his own agency, and others occur under his providence,
in the sense that he permits or suffers them to occur rather than interpose
to prevent them. They may be truly said to occur under his providence,
because his plan of government in some sense embraces them all. He made
provision to secure those that are good, that is, the holy intentions of moral
agents, and to overrule for good those that are evil, that is, the selfish inten-
tions of moral agents. These intentions are events, and may be said to
occur under Divine Providence, because all events that do, or ever will,
occur, are and must be foreseen results of God's own agency, or of the
work of creation.
5. It is agreed that infinite benevolence is the sum of the moral attri-
butes of God.
6. That God is both maturally and morally immutable; that in his natural
attributes he is necessarily so, and in his moral attributes he is certainly so.
7. It is agreed that all who are converted, sanctified and saved, are con-
verted, sanctified, and saved by God's own agency; that is, God Saves them
by securing, by his own agency, their personal and individual holiness.
II. What the Bible doctrine of election is not.
1. Not, as Huntington inaintained, that all men are chosen to salvation
through the atonement of Christ. This gentleman, who was a congrega-
tional minister of New England, left a treatise for publication after his
death, (which was accordingly published,) in which he maintained the usual
Orthodox creed, with the exception of extending the doctrine of election to
the whole human race. He took the old school view of the atonement, that
it was the literal payment of the debt of the elect; that Christ suffered what
and as much as they deserved to suffer, and thus literally purchased their
salvation. Assuming that such was the nature of the atonement, he sets
himself to inquire into the extent of the atonement, or for whom it was made.
Finding that Christ tasted death for every man, that he died for the world,
he came to the conclusion that all were elected to salvation, and that all will
therefore be saved. I have never seen the work of which I speak, but such
is the account I have had of it from those who know. But this is not
the Bible doctrine of election, as we shall see.
2. The Bible doctrine of election is not that any are chosen to salvation,
in such a sense, that they will or can be saved without repentance, faith,
and Sanctification.
3. Nor is it that some are chosen to salvation, in such a sense, that they
will be saved irrespective of their being regenerated, and persevering in
holiness to the end of life. The Bible most plainly teaches, that these are
naturally indispensable conditions of Salvation, and of course election can-
110t dispense with them.
768 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
4. Nor is it that any are chosen to salvation for, or on account of their
own foreseen merits, or good works, 2 Tim. i. 9 : “Who hath saved us,
and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according
to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before
the World began.” The foreseen fact, that by the wisest governmental
arrangement God could convert and sanctify and fit them for heaven, must
have been a condition in the sense of a sine quá mon, of their election to
Salvation, but could not have been the fundamental reason for it, as we
shall see. God did not elect them to salvation for, or on account of their
foreseen good works, but upon condition of their foreseen repentance, faith
and perseverance.
5. The Bible doctrine of election is not that God elected some to salva.
tion, upon such conditions that it is really uncertain whether they will
comply with those conditions, and be finally saved. The Bible does not
leave the question of the final salvation of the elect as a matter of real
uncertainty. This we shall see in its place. The elect were chosen to
Salvation, upon condition that God foresaw that he could secure their
repentance, faith, and final perseverance.
III. What the Bible doctrine of election is.
It is, that all of Adam's race, who are or ever will be saved, were from
etermity chosen by God to etermal salvation, through the sanctification of
their hearts by faith in Christ. In other words, they are chosen to salva.
tion by means of Sanctification. Their salvatioi is the end—their sancti-
fication is a means. Both the end and the means are elected, appointed,
chosen ; the means as really as the end, and for the sake of the end. The
election of some individuals and nations to certain privileges, and to
do certain things, is not the kind of election of which I treat at this time ;
but I am to consider the doctrine of election as it respects election unto
Salvation, as just explained.
IV. I am to prove the doctrine as I have stated it to be true.
It is plainly implied in the teaching of the Bible: the Bible everywhere
assumes and implies the truth of this doctrine, just as might be expected,
since it so irresistibly follows from the known and admitted attributes of
God. Instead of formally revealing it as a truth unknown to, or unknow-
able by, the human reason, the scriptures in a great variety of ways speak
of the elect, of election, &c., as a truth known by irresistible inference from
his known attributes. To deny it involves a denial of the attributes of
God. I have been surprised at the laboured and learned efforts to show
that this doctrine is not expressly taught in the Bible. Suppose it were
not, what then 2 Other truths are taught, and reason irresistibly affirms
truths, from which the doctrine of election, as I have stated it, must follow.
It is common for the inspired writers to treat truths of this class in the
same manner in which this is, for the most part, treated. Suppose it were
possible so to explain every passage of Scripture as that no one of them
ELECTION. 769
should unequivocally assert the doctrine in question, this would be to no
purpose; the doctrine would still be irresistibly inferrible from the attri-
butes of God. It would still be true, that the Bible assumes the truth of
the doctrine, and incidentally speaks of it, and introduces it as a truth
of reason, and as following of course from the attributes of God. It is thus
treated throughout the entire scriptures. The Bible as really assumes the
truth of this doctrine, as it does the existence of God. It asserts it just as
it does the attributes of God. The learned and laboured efforts to show
that this doctrine is not expressly asserted in the Bible, are of no value,
since it would follow as a certain truth from the attributes of God, and
from the revealed facts that some will be saved, and that God will save
them, even had the Bible been silent on the subject.
I shall therefore only introduce a few passages for the purpose of showing
that the inspired writers repeatedly recognize the truth of this doctrine,
and thus preserve their own consistency. But I shall not attempt by
laboured criticism to prove it from scripture, for reasons just mentioned.
Matt. xx. 16 : “So the last shall be first, and the first last, for many be
called, but few chosen.
Matt. XXiv. 22 : “And except those days should be shortened, there should
no flesh be saved ; but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened.”
John Niii. 18: “I speak not of you all; I know whom I have chosen.”
John XV. 16: “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained
you, that ye should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should
remain ; that whatsoever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, he may
give it you. 19. If ye were of the world, the world would love his own;
but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world,
therefore the world hateth you.”
Acts xiii. 48: “And when the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and
glorified the word of the Lord ; and as many as were ordained to eternal
life believed.”
Rom. viii. 28: “And we know that all things work together for good to
them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.
29. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed
to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many
brethren.”
Rom. ix. 10; “And not only this, but when Rebecca had conceived by
one, even by our father Isaac ; 11. (For the children being not yet born,
neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according
to election might stimd, not of works, but of him that calleth.) 12. It was
said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger, 13. As it is written,
Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. 14. What shall we Say
then 2 Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. 15. For he
saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will
have compassion on whom I will have compassion.”
Rom. xi. 5; “Even so at this present time also there is a remnant
according to the election of grace. 7. What then Israel hath not
3 D
770 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
obtained that which he seeketh for, but the election hath obtained it, and
the rest were blinded.”
Eph. i. 4: “According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation
of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.
11. In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestimated
according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of
his own will.”
1 Thess. i. 4: “Rnowing, brethren beloved, your election of God.”
1 Thess. v. 9: “For God hath not appointed us to wrath, but to obtain
Salvation by Our Lord Jesus Christ.”
2 Thess. ii. 13: “But we are bound to give thanks alway to God for
you, brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning
chosen you to Salvation through Sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of
the truth.”
1 Pet. i. 2: “Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father,
through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the
blood of Jesus Christ.”
Rev. xvii. 8: “ The beast that thou Sawest was, and is not; and shall
ascend out of the bottomless pit, and go into perdition : and they that
dwell on the earth shall wonder, (whose names were not written in the
book of life from the foundation of the world,) when they behold the beast
that was, and is not, and yet is.” This doctrine is expressly asserted, or
indirectly assumed and implied in every part of the Bible, and in ways and
instances too numerous to be quoted in these lectures. The above are only
specimens of the scripture treatment of this subject.
2. It is plainly the doctrine of reason.
(1.) It is admitted that God by his own agency secures the conversion,
sanctification, and salvation of all that ever were or will be saved.
(2.) Whatever volitions or actions God puts forth to convert and save
men, he puts forth designing to secure that end; that is, he does it in
accordance with a previous design to do as and what he does.
(3.) He does it with the certain knowledge, that he shall succeed in
accomplishing the end at which he aims.
(4.) He does it for the purpose of securing this end.
(5.) This must be an universal truth, to wit, that whatever God does for
the salvation of men, he does with the design to secure the Salvation of all
who ever will be saved, or of all whose Salvation he foresees that he can
secure, and with the certain knowledge that he shall secure their Salvation.
He also does much for the non-elect, in the sense of using such means with
them as might secure, and ought to secure, their salvation. But as he
knows he shall not succeed in securing their salvation, on account of their
voluntary and persevering wickedness, it cannot be truly Said, that he uses
these means with design to save them, but for other, and good, and wise
reasons. Although he foresees, that he cannot secure their salvation,
because of their wilful and persevering unbelief, yet he sees it important
under his government to manifest a readiness to save them, and to use such
ELECTION. 771
means as he wisely can to save them, and such as will ultimately be seen
to leave them wholly without excuse.
But with respect to those whom he foresees that he can and shall save,
it must be true, since he is a good being, that he uses means for their
salvation with the design to save them. And since, as we have seen, he is
an omniscient being, he must use these means, not only with a design to
save them, but also with the certainty that he shall save them. With
respect to them, he uses these means for the sake of this end; that is, for
the sake of their salvation. But with respect to the non-elect, he does not
use means for the sake of, or expecting to accomplish, their salvation, but
for other purposes, such as to leave them without excuse, &c.
(6.) But if God ever chooses to save any human beings, he must always
have chosen to do so, or else he has changed. If he now has, or ever will
have, any design about it, he must always have had this design ; for he
never has, and never can have, any new design. If he ever does, or will,
elect any human being to Salvation, he must always have chosen or elected
him, or he has, or will, form some new purpose, which is inconsistent with
his moral immutability.
(7.) If he will ever know who will be saved, he must always have known
it, or he will obtain some new knowledge, which is contrary to his omis-
cience.
(S.) We are told by Christ, that at the day of judgment he will say to
the righteous, “Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom pre-
pared for you from the foundation of the world ;” that is, from eternity.
Now, has the judge at that time any new knowledge or design respecting
those individuals 2 Certainly not
(9.) Since God of necessity eternally knew all about the elect that will
ever be true, he must of necessity have chosen something in respect to
them; for it is naturally impossible, that he should have had no choice
about, or in respect to, them and their salvation.
(10.) Since God must of necessity from etermity have had some choice
in respect to their salvation, it follows, that he must have chosen that they
should be saved, or that he would not use such means as he foresaw would
save them. If he chose not to use those means that he foresaw would save
them, but afterwards Saves them, he has changed, which is contrary to his
immutability. If he always chose that they should be saved, this is the
very thing for which we are contending.
(ll.) It must therefore be true, that all whom God will ever save were
from etermity chosen to salvation by him ; and since he saves them by
means of Sanctification, and does this designedly, it must be that this also
was etermally designed or intended by him.
To deny the doctrine of election, therefore, involves a denial of the attri-
butes of God.
(12.) It must also be true, that God foreknew all that ever Will be true
of the mon-elect, and must have eternally had some design respecting their
3 D 2
772 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
$
final destiny. And also that he has from etermity had the same, and the
only design that he ever will have in respect to them. But this will come
up for consideration in its place.
V. What could not have been the reasons for election.
1. It is admitted that God is infinitely benevolent and wise. It must
follow that election is founded in some reason or reasons; and that these
reasons are good and sufficient ; reasons that rendered it obligatory upon
God to choose just as he did, in election. Assuming, as we must, that God
is wise and good, we are safe in affirming that he could have had none but
benevolent reasons for his election of some to eternal life, in preference to
others. Hence we are bound to affirm, that election was not based upon,
nor does it imply partiality in God, in any bad sense of that term. Parti-
ality in any being, consists in preferring one to another without any good
or sufficient reason, or in opposition to good and sufficient reasons. It
being admitted that God is infinitely wise and good, it follows, that he can-
not be partial ; that he cannot have elected some to eternal salvation and
passed others by, without some good and sufficient reason, That is, he
cannot have done it arbitrarily. The great objection that is felt and urged
by opposers of this doctrine is, that it implies partiality in God, and repre-
sents him as deciding the etermal destiny of moral agents by an arbitrary
Sovereignty. But this objection is a sheer and altogether unwarrantable
assumption. It assumes, that God could have had no good and sufficient
reasons for the election. It has been settled, that good is the end upon
which God set his heart; that is, the highest well being of himself and the
universe of creatures. This end must be accomplished by means. If God
is infinitely wise and good, he must have chosen the best practicable means.
But he has chosen the best means for that end, and there can be no parti-
ality in that.
In support of the assumption, that election implies partiality, and the
exercise of an arbitrary sovereignty in God, it has been affirmed, that there
might have been divers systems of means for securing the same end in
every respect equal to each other; that is, that no reason existed for pre-
ferring any one, to many others; that therefore in choosing the present,
God must have been partial, or must have exercised an arbitrary sove-
reignty. To this I answer:
(1.) There is no ground for the assumption, that there are or can be
divers systems of means of precisely equal value in all respects, in such a
sense, that there could have been no good reason for preferring one to the
other.
(2.) I reply, that if there were divers such systems, chosing the one, and
not any other, would not imply preference. Choice of any one in such
case must have proceeded upon the following ground ; to wit, the value of
the end demanded, that one should be chosen. There being no difference
between the various systems of means, God chooses one without reference
to the other, and makes no choice respecting it, any more than if it did not
ELECTION. 773
exist. He must choose one, he has no reason for preference, and conse-
quently he cannot prefer one to the other. His benevolence leads him to
choose one because the end demands it. He therefore takes any one of
many exact equals, indifferently, without preferring it to any of the others.
This implies no partiality in God in any bad sense of the term. For upon
the Supposition, he was shut up to the necessity of choosing one among
many exact equals. If he is partial in choosing the one he does, he would
have been equally so had he chosen any other. If this is partiality, it is a
partiality arising out of the necessity of the case, and cannot imply any-
thing objectionable in God.
That there is no preference in this case is plain, because there is no
ground or reason for preference whatever, according to the supposition.
But there can be no choice or preference, when there is absolutely no rea-
son for the choice or preference. We have seen on a former occasion, that
the reason that determines choice, or the reason in view of which, or in
obedience to which, or for the sake of which, the mind chooses, and the
object or end chosen, are identical. When there is absolutely no reason
for a choice, there is absolutely no object of choice, nothing to choose, and
of course there can be no choice. Choice must have an object; that is,
choice must terminate upon something. If choice exists, something must
be chosen. If there are divers systems of means, between which there is
no possible ground of preference, there can absolutely be no such thing as
preferring one to the other, for this would be the same as to choose without
any object of choice, or without choosing anything, which is a contradiction.
If it be said, that there may be absolutely no difference in the system of
means, so far as the accomplishment of the end is concerned, but that one
may be preferred or preferable to another, on some other account, I ask on
what other account 2 According to the supposition, it is only valued or
regarded as an object of choice at all, because of its relation to the end.
God can absolutely choose it only as a means, a condition, or an end; for
all choice must respect these. The inquiry now respects means. Now, if
as a means, there is absolutely no difference between diverse systems in
their relation to the end, and the value of the end is the sole reason for
choosing them, it follows, that to prefer one to another is a natural impos-
sibility. But one must be chosen for the sake of the end, it matters uot
which ; any one is taken indifferently so far as others are concerned. This
is no partiality, and no exercise of arbitrary sovereignty in any objectionable
SëllSé.
But as I said, there is no ground for the assumption, that there are
various systems of means for accomplishing the great end of benevolence in
all respects equal. There must have been a best way, a best system, and
if God is infinitely wise and good, he must have chosen that for that
reason ; and this is as far as possible from partiality. Neither we, nor any
other creature may be able now to discover any good reasons for preferring
the present to any other system, or for electing those who are elected, in
774 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
preference to any other. Nevertheless, such reasons must have been
apparent to the Divine mind, or no such election could have taken place.
2. Election was not an exercise of arbitrary sovereignty. By arbitrary
sovereignty is intended the choosing and acting from mere will, without
consulting moral obligation or the public good. It is admitted that God is
infinitely wise and good. It is therefore impossible that he should choose
or act arbitrarily in any case whatever. He must have good and sufficient
reasons for every choice and every act.
Some seem to have represented God, in the purpose or act of election,
as electing some and not others, merely because he could or would, or in
other words, to exhibit his own sovereignty, without any other reason than
because so he would have it.
But it is impossible for God to act arbitrarily, or from any but a good
and sufficient reason ; that is, it is impossible for him to do so, and continue
to be benevolent. We have said that God has one, and but one end in
view ; that is, he does, and says, and suffers all for one and the same
reason, namely, to promote the highest good of being. He has but one
ultimate end, and all his volitions are only efforts to secure that end. The
highest well being of the universe, including his own, is the end on which
his Supreme and ultimate choice terminates. All his volitions are designed
to secure this end, and in all things he is and must be directed by his
infinite intelligence, in respect not only to his ultimate end, but also in
the choice and use of the means of accomplishing this end. It is impossible
that this should not be true, if he is good. In election then he cannot
possibly have exercised any arbitrary sovereignty, but must have had the
best of reasons for the election. His intelligence must have had good
reasons for the choice of some and not of others to salvation, and have
affirmed his obligation in view of those reasons to elect just as and whom
he did. So good must the reasons have been, that to have dome otherwise,
would have been sin in him ; that is, to have done otherwise would not
have been wise and good.
3. Election was not based on a foreseen difference in the moral character
of the elect and the non-elect, previous to regeneration. The Bible every-
where affirms, that, previous to regeneration, all men have precisely the
same character, and possess one common heart or disposition, that this
character is that of total moral depravity. God did not choose some to
salvation because he foresaw that they would be less depraved and guilty
previous to regeneration, than the non-elect. Paul was one of the elect,
yet he affirms himself to have been the chief of sinners. We often see,
and this has been common in every age, the most outwardly abandoned and
profligate converted and saved.
The reason of election is not found in the fact, that God foresaw that
some would be more readily converted than others. We often see those
who are converted hold out for a long time in great obstimacy and rebellion,
while God brings to bear upon them a great variety of means and
ELECTION. 775
influences, and takes much more apparent pains to convert them than he
does to convert many others who are, as well as those who are not, con-
verted. There is reason to believe, that if the same means were used with
those who are not converted that are used with those who are, many who
are not converted would be. It may not be wise in God to use the same
means for the non-elect that he does for the elect, and if he should, they
might, or might not be saved by them. God often uses means that to us
seem more powerful to convert the non-elect than are used to convert
many of the elect. This is fully implied in Matt. xi. 20–24. The fact is,
he must have some reason aside from their characters for stubbornness or
otherwise, for electing them to Salvation.
VI. What must have been the reasons for election.
1. We have seen that God is infinitely wise and good. It follows that
he must have had some reason, for to choose without a reason is impos-
sible, as in that case there would be, as we have just seen, no object of
choice.
2. From the wisdom and goodness of God, it follows, that he must have
chosen some good end, and must have had some plan, or System of means,
to secure it. The end we know, is the good of being. The means we know,
from reason and revelation, include election in the sense explained. It
follows, that the fundamental reason for election was the highest good of
the universe. That is, the best system of means for securing the great end
of benevolence, included the election of just those who were elected, and no
others. This has been done by the wisdom and benevolence of God. It
follows, that the highest good demanded it. All choice must respect ends,
or conditions and means. God has, and can have, but one ultimate end.
All other choices or volitions must respect means. The choice or election
of certain persons to etermal Salvation, &c., must have been founded in the
reason, that the great end of benevolence demanded it.
3. It is very easy to see, that under a moral government, it might be
impossible so to administer law, as to secure the perpetual and universal
obedience of all.
It is also easy to see, that under a remedial system, or system of grace, it
might be impossible to secure the repentance and salvation of all. God
must have foreseen all possible and actual results. He must have foreseen
how many, and whom, he could save by the wisest and best possible arrange-
ment, all things considered. The perfect wisdom and benevolence of God
being granted, it follows, that we are bound to regard the present system of
means as the best, all things considered, that he could adopt for the pro-
motion of the great end of his government, or the great end of benevolence
The fact, that the wisest and best system of government would secure the
Salvation of those who are elected, must have been a condition of their
being elected. As God does everything for the same ultimate reason, it
follows, that the intrinsic value of their salvation was his ultimate end, and
that their salvation in particular must have been of greater relative value
776 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
in promoting the highest good of the universe at large, and the glory of
God, than would have been that of others; so that the intrinsic value of
the salvation of those elected in particular, the fact that by the wisest
arrangement he could save them in particular, and the paramount good to
be promoted by it, must have been the reasons for election.
VII. When the election was made.
1. Not when the elect are converted. It is admitted, that God is
omniscient, and has known all things from etermity as really and as
perfectly as he ever will. It is also admitted, that God is unchangeable,
and consequently has no new plans, designs, or choices. He must have
had all the reasons he ever will have for election, from etermity, because
he always has had all the knowledge of all events that he ever will bave ;
consequently he always or from etermity chose in respect to all events just
as he always will. There never can be any reason for change in the divine
mind, for he never will have any new views of any subject. The choice
which constitutes election, then, must be an etermal choice.
2. Thus the scriptures represent it.
Eph. i. 4. “According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation
of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.”
Eph. ii. 10. “For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto
good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them.”
2 Tim. i. 9. “Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not
according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which
was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.”
Rev. xvii. 8. “The beast that thou sawest was, and is not, and shall
ascend out of the bottomless pit, and go into perdition: and they that
dwell on the earth shall wonder, (whose names were not written in the
book of life from the foundation of the world,) when they behold the beast
that was, and is not, and yet is.”
This language means from etermity, beyond question.
3. But the question will arise, was election in the order of mature sub-
sequent to, or did it precede the Divine foreknowledge? The answer to
this plainly is, that in the order of nature what could be wisely done must
have been foreseen before it was determined what should be done. And
what should be done must, in the order of nature, have preceded the
knowledge of what would be done. So that in the order of nature, fore-
knowledge of what could be wisely done preceded election, and foreknow-
ledge of what would be done, followed or was subsequent to election.” In
other words, God must have known whom he could wisely save, prior, in
*
* I say, in the order of nature. With God all duration or time is present. In the
order of time, therefore, all the divine ideas and purposes are cotemporaneous. But the
divine ideas must sustain to each other a logical relation. In the above paragraph I have
stated what must have been the logical order of the Divine ideas in regard to election. By
the order of nature, is intended that connection and relation of ideas that must result from
the nature of intellect.
ELECTION. 777
the order of nature, to his determination to Save them. But his knowing
who would be saved must have been, in the order of nature, subsequent to
his election or determination to save them, and dependent upon that
determination.
VIII. Election does not render means for the salvation of the elect un-
necessary.
We have seen that the elect are chosen to salvation through the use of
means. Since they are chosen to be saved by means, they cannot be saved
in any other way or without them.
IX. Election is the only ground of hope in the success of means.
1. No means are of any avail unless God gives them efficiency.
2. If God gives them efficiency in any case, it is, and will be, in accord-
ance with, and in execution of, his election.
3. It follows that election is the only ground of rational hope in the use
of means to effect the salvation of any.
X. Election does not oppose any obstacle to the salvation of the non-elect.
1. God has taken care to bring salvation within the reach of all, and to
make it possible to all.
2. He sincerely offers to save all, and does all to save all that he
wisely can.
3. His saving some is no discouragement to others, but should rather
encourage them to lay hold on etermal life.
4. The election of some is no bar to the salvation of others.
5. Those who are not elected may be saved, if they will but comply with
the conditions, which they are able to do.
6. God sincerely calls, and ministers may sincerely call on the non-elect
to lay hold on salvation. *
7. There is no injury or injustice done to the non-elect by the election
of others. Has not God “a right to do what he will with his own 2" If
he offers Salvation to all upon terms the most reasonable, and if he does all
he wisely can for the salvation of all, shall some complaim if God in doing
for all what he wisely can, secures the salvation of some and not of others ?
XI. There is no injustice in election.
God was under obligation to no one—he might in perfect justice have
sent all mankind to hell. The doctrine of election will damn no one : by
treating the non-elect according to their deserts, he does them no injustice;
and surely his exercising grace in the salvation of the elect, is no act of
injustice to the non-elect; and especially will this appear to be true, if we
take into consideration the fact, that the only reason why the non-elect will
not be saved is, because they pertinaciously refuse salvation. He offers
mercy to all. The atonement is sufficient for all. All may come, and are
under an obligation to be saved. He strongly desires their salvation, and
778 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
does all that he wisely can to save them. Why then should the doctrine
of election be thought unjust 2%
XII. This is the best that could be done for the inhabitants of this world.
It is reasonable to infer from the infinite benevolence of God, that his
present government will secure a greater amount of good than could have
* To this paragraph it has been objected as follows:–“Can it be said, that the only
reason why the non-elect are not saved is their rejection of salvation, &c.? Is there not a
reason back of this ? God does not give that gracious influence in their case, which he
does in the case of the elect. If the only reason why the non-elect are not saved is their
pertinacious refusal, then it would follow that the only reason why the elect are saved, is
their acceptance of Salvation. If these two points are so, then why all this discussion about
election to salvation, and the means to that end, and God's reason for electing. The
whole matter would resolve itself into free will, and God would stand quite independent
of the issue in either case. Then would there be no such thing as election.”
The objection contains a non sequitur.
I say, the only reason why the non-elect are not saved, is because they pertinaciously
refuse salvation. But if this is true, he says, “it will follow that the only reason why the
elect are saved, is their acceptance of salvation. But this does not follow. The non-elect
fail of salvation only because they resist all the grace that God can wisely bestow upon
them. This grace they resist, and fail of salvation. It is no more reasonable to say, that
God’s not giving them more divine influence to convert them “is a reason back of this,”
than it would be to say that his not having, by a gracious influence, restrained them from
sin altogether, is “a reason back of ’’ their pertinacious resistance of grace. If the non-
elect are lost, or fail of salvation, only because they resist all the grace that God can
wisely bestow, it would not follow that the only reason why the elect are saved, is
because they accept, or yield to the same measure of gracious influence as that bestowed
upon the non-elect, for it may be, and in many cases the fact is, that God does bestow
more gracious influence on the elect than on the non-elect, because he can wisely do so.
Here then is a plain non sequitur. Observe, I am Writing in the paragraph in question
upon the justice of the divine proceeding. I say, that so far as this is concerned, he fails
of salvation, not because God withholds the grace that he could wisely bestow, but only
because he rejects the grace proffered, and all that can be wisely proffered.
If I understand this objector, there is another non sequitur in his objection. I under-
stand him to say, that upon the supposition that the elect and the non-elect have the
same measure of gracious influence, and that the reason why the elect are saved, and the
non-elect not saved is, that the elect yield to, and the non-elect resist this influence : the
whole question resolves into free will, and there is no election about it. If this is his
meaning, as I think it must be, it is a plain non sequilur. Suppose God foresaw that this
would be so, and in view of this foreseen fact elected those whom he foresaw would yield
both to the privileges and gracious influence to which he foresaw they would yield, and to
salvation as a consequence of this influence and yielding. And suppose he foresaw that
the non-elect, although ordained or elected to enjoy the same measure of gracious
influence, would resist and reject salvation, and for this cause rejected or reprobated them
in his eternal purpose. Would not this be election ? To be sure, in this case the
different results would turn upon the fact that the elect yielded, and the non-elect did
not yield, to the same measure of gracious influence. But there would be an election of
the one to eternal life, and a rejection of the other. I cannot see how this objector can
say, that in this case there could be no election, unless in his idea of election there is the
exercise of an arbitrary sovereignty. I suppose that God bestows on men unequal
measures of gracious influence, but that in this there is nothing arbitrary ; that, on the
contrary, he sees the wisest and best reasons for this; that being in justice under obligation
to none, he exercises his own benevolent discretion, in bestowing on all as much gracious
influence as he sees to be upon the whole wise and good, and enough to throw the entire
ELECTION. 779
been secured under any other mode of administration. This is as certain
as that infinite benevolence must prefer a greater to a less good. To Sup-
pose that God would prefer a mode of administration that would secure a
less good than could have been secured under some other mode, would
manifestly be to accuse him of a want of benevolence. It is doubtless true
that he could so vary the course of events as to save other individuals than
those he does; to convert more in one particular neighbourhood, or family,
or mation, or at one particular time ; or it may be a greater number upon
the whole than he does. It would not follow that he does not secure the
greater good upon the whole.
Suppose there is a man in this town, who has so strongly intrenched him-
self in error, that there is but one man in all the land who is so acquainted
with his refuge of lies as to be able to answer his objections, and drive him
from his hiding-places. Now, it is possible, that if this individual could be
brought in contact with him, he might be converted ; yet if he is employed
in some distant part of the vineyard, his removal from that field of labour
to this town, might not, upon the whole, be most for the glory of God's
kingdom ; and more might fail of Salvation through his removal here,
than would be converted by such removal. God has in view the good of
his whole kingdom. He works upon a vast and comprehensive scale. He
has no partialities for individuals, but moves forward in the administration
of his government with his eye upon the general good, designing to secure
the greatest amount of happiness within his kingdom, that can be secured
by the wisest possible arrangement, and administration of his government.
responsibility of their damnation upon them if they are lost. But upon some he foresaw
that he could wisely bestow a sufficient measure of gracions influence to secure their
voluntary yielding, and upon others he could not bestow enough in fact to secure this
result. In accordance with this foreknowledge, he chose the elect to both the gracious
influence and its results, eternal life. In all this there was nothing arbitrary or unjust
He does all for all that he wisely can. He does enough for all to leave them without
excuse. If the non-elect would yield to that measure of gracious influence which he can
and does bestow upon them, which is the best he can do without acting unwisely, and of
course wickedly, they would be saved. To this they might yield. To this they ought to
yield. God has no right to do more than he does for them, all things considered ; and
there is no reason of which they can justly complain why they are not saved. They can
with no more reason complain of his not giving them more gracious influence than that he
created them, or that he made them free agents, or that he did not restrain them from sin
altogether, or do anything else which it had been unwise, and therefore wrong to have
done. Nor is the fact that God does not bestow on them sufficient grace to secure their
yielding and salvation, a “reason back of their obstimacy to which their not being saved is
to be ascribed,” any more than any one of the above-named things is such a reason.
This objection proceeds upon the assumption, that election must be unconditional
to be election at all. That election must be so defined, as to be the cause of the difference
in the eternal state of the elect and non-elect. But I see not why election may not be
conditioned upon the foreseen fact, that the wisest possible administration of moral govern-
ment would secure the free concurrence of some, and not of others. What could be
wisely done being foreseen, the purpose that so it should be done would be election. No
man has a right to define the terms election and reprobation in such a sense, as to exclude
all conditions, and then insist that conditional election is no election at all,
780 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
XIII. How we may ascertain our own election.
Those of the elect that are already converted, are known by their character
and conduct. They have evidence of their election in their obedience to
God. Those that are unconverted may settle the question each one for him-
self, whether he is elected or not, so as to have the most satisfactory evidence
whether he is of that happy number. If you will now submit yourselves to
God, you may have evidence that you are elected. But every hour you put
off submission, increases the evidence, that you are not elected.
Every simmer under the gospel has it within his power to accept or reject
Salvation. The elect can know their election only by accepting the offered
gift. The non-elect cam know their non-election only by the consciousness
of a voluntary rejection of offered life. If any one fears that he is one of
the non-elect, let him at once renounce his unbelief, and cease to reject salva-
tion, and the ground of fear and complaint instantly falls away.
I quote some remarks from a former discourse upon this subject.
INFERENCIES AND REMARKS.
1. Foreknowledge and election are not inconsistent with free agency.
The elect were chosen to etermal life, upon condition that God foresaw that
in the perfect exercise of their freedom, they could be induced to repent and
embrace the gospel.”
2. You see why many persons are opposed to the doctrine of election,
and try to explain it away ; 1st., they misunderstand it, and 2nd, they deduce
unwarrantable inferences from it. They suppose it to mean, that the elect
will be saved at all events, whatever their conduct may be ; and again, they
infer from the doctrine that there is no possibility of the salvation of the
non-elect. The doctrine, as they understand it, would be an encouragement
to the elect to persevere in sin, knowing that their salvation was sure, and
their inference would drive the non-elect to desperation, on the ground that
for them to make efforts to be saved would be of no avail. But both the
doctrine, as they understand it, and the inference, are false. For election
does not secure the salvation of the elect irrespective of their character and
conduct; nor, as we have seen, does it throw any obstacle in the way of the
salvation of the non-elect.
* An objector has said, “You say that the elect were chosen upon condition that God
foresaw,” &c.; this is certainly inconsistent with your previous statement, that election
includes all the means to secure its end ; that is, it is independent of any conditions fore-
seen, because it includes efficient grace to gain its end.”
What does this objection mean : What if election does include efficient grace to gain
its end, does it follow that the elect would have been chosen, if it had been foreseen that
these means would not have secured the consent of their free will P Why, these means
could not have been efficient but upon condition of their consent. I say, in the above para-
graph, that the elect were chosen upon condition that God foresaw that, by certain means,
he could secure the consent of their free will. The objector says, that this was electing
them without reference to their consent, or that their foreseen consent was no condition of
their election, because the means, as well as the result, were included in election. But I
can see no possible force or pertinency in this objection : it is a plain non sequitur.
ELECTION. 781
3. This view of the subject affords no ground for presumption on the one
hand, nor for despair upon the other. No one can justly say, if I am to be
saved I shall be saved, do what I will. Nor can any one say, if I am to be
damned I shall be damned, do what I will. But the question is left, so far
as they are concerned, as a matter of entire contingency. Sinners, your
salvation or damnation is as absolutely suspended upon your own choice, as
if God meither knew nor designed anything about it.
4. This doctrine lays no foundation for a controversy with God. But on
the other hand, it does lay a broad foundation for gratitude, both on the
part of the elect and non-elect. The elect certainly have great reason for
thankfulness, that they are thus distinguished. Oh, what a thought, to have
yourname written in the book of life, to be chosen of God an heir of eternal
salvation, to be adopted into his family, to be destined to enjoy his presence,
and to bathe your soul in the boundless ocean of his love for ever and ever.
Nor are the non-elect without obligations of thankfulness. You ought to be
grateful, if any of your brethren of the human family are saved. If all were
lost, God would be just. And if any of this dying world receive the gift
of eternal life, you ought to be grateful, and render everlasting thanks to
God.
5. The non-elect often enjoy as great or greater privileges than the elect.
Many men have lived and died under the sound of the gospel, have enjoyed
all the means of salvation during a long life, and have at last died in their
sins, while others have been converted upon their first hearing the gospel of
God. Nor is this difference owing to the fact, that the elect always have
more of the strivings of the Spirit than the non-elect. Many who die in
their sins, appear to have had conviction for a great part of their lives ;
have often been deeply impressed with a strong sense of their sins and the
value of their souls, but have strongly intrenched themselves under refuges
of lies, have loved the world and hated God, and fought their Way through
all the obstacles that were thrown around them to hedge up their way to
death, and have literally forced their passage to the gates of hell. Sin Was
their voluntary choice.
6. Why should the doctrine of election be made a stumbling-block in the
way of sinners? In mothing else do they make the same use of the
purposes and designs of God, as they do on the subject of religion ; and
yet, in everything else, God's purposes and designs are as much settled, and
have as absolute an influence. God has as certainly designed the day and
circumstances of your death, as whether your soul shall be saved. It is not
only expressly declared in the Bible, but is plainly the doctrine of reason.
What would you say if you should be called in to see a neighbour who was
sick; and, on inquiry, you should find he would neither eat nor drink, and
that he was verily starving himself to death. On expostulating with him
upon his conduct, suppose he should calmly reply, that he believed in the
sovereignty of God, in foreknowledge, election, and decrees; that his days
were numbered, that the time and circumstances of his death were settled,
that he could not die before his time, and that all efforts he could make
782 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
would not enable him to live a moment beyond his time. If you attempted
to remonstrate against his inference, and such an abuse and perversion of
the doctrine of decrees, he should accuse you of being a heretic, of not be-
lieving in divine sovereignty. Now, should you see a man on worldly
Subjects reasoning and acting thus, you would pronounce him insane. Should
farmers, mechanics, and merchants, reason in this way in regard to their
worldly business, they would be considered fit subjects for bedlam.
7. How forcibly the perversion and abuse of this doctrine illustrates the
madness of the human heart, and its utter opposition to the terms of salva-
tion. The fact that God foreknows, and has designs in regard to every
other event, is not made an excuse for remaining idle, or worse than idle,
on these subjects. But where men's duty to God is concerned, and here
alone, they seize these scriptures, and wrest them to their own destruction.
How impressively does this fact bring out the demonstration, that sinners
want an excuse for disobeying God; that they desire an apology for living
in sin; that they seek an occasion for making war upon their Maker.
8. I have said, that the question is as much open for your decision, that
you are left as perfectly to the exercise of your freedom, as if God neither
knew nor designed anything in regard to your Salvation. Suppose there
was a great famine in New York city, and that John Jacob Astor alone had
provisions in great abundance ; that he was a benevolent and liberal-minded
man, and willing to supply the whole city with provisions, free of expense ;
and suppose there existed a universal and most unreasonable prejudice
against him, insomuch that when he advertised in the daily papers that his
store-houses were open, that whosoever would, might come and receive
provisions, without money and without price, they all, with one accord,
began to make excuse, and obstimately refused to accept the offers. Now,
suppose that he should employ all the cartmen to carry provisions around
the city, and stop at every door. But still they strengthened each other's
hands, and would rather die than be indebted to him for food. Many had
said so much against him, that they were utterly ashamed to feel and
acknowledge their dependence upon him. Others were so much under their
influence as to be unwilling to offend them ; and so strong was the tide of
public sentiment, that no one had the moral courage to break loose from the
multitude and accept of life. Now, suppose that Mr. Astor knew before-
hand the state of the public mind, and that all the citizens hated him, and
had rather die than be indebted to him for food. Suppose he also knew,
from the beginning, that there were certain arguments that he could bring
to bear upon certain individuals, that would change their minds, and that he
should proceed to press them with these considerations, until they had given
up their opposition, had most thankfully accepted his provisions, and were
saved from death. Suppose he used all the arguments and means that he
wisely could to persuade the rest, but that, notwithstanding all his benevolent
efforts, they adhered to the resolution, and preferred death to submission to
his proposals. Suppose, further, he had perfect knowledge from the be-
gimming, of the issue of this whole matter, would not the question of life and
ELECTION. 783
death be as entirely open for the decision of every individual as if he knew
nothing about it?
9. Some may ask, Why does God use means with the non-elect, which
he is certain they will not accept? I answer, because he designs that
they shall be without excuse. He will demonstrate his willingness and their
obstimacy, before the universe. He will stop their mouths effectually in
judgment by a full offer of Salvation ; and although he knows that their re-
jection of the offer will only enhance their guilt, and aggravate their deep
dammation, still he will make the offer, as there is no other way in which
to illustrate his infinite willingness to save them, and their perverse re-
jection of his grace.
10. Lastly, God requires you to give all diligence to make your calling and
election sure. In choosing his elect, you must understand that he has
thrown the responsibility of their being saved upon them ; that the whole is
suspended upon their consent to the terms; you are all perfectly able to
give your consent, and this moment to lay hold on eternal life. Irrespective
of your own choice, no election could save you, and no reprobation can damn
you. The “Spirit and the Bride say, Come : let him that heareth say, Come;
let him that is athirst come ; and whosoever will, let him take the water of
life freely.” The responsibility is yours. God does all that he wisely can,
and challenges you to show what more he could do that he has not dome.
If you go to hell, you must go stained with your own blood. God is clear,
angels are clear. To your own Master you stand or fall; mercy waits; the
Spirit strives; Jesus stands at the door and knocks. Do not then pervert
this doctrine, and make it an occasion of stumbling, till you are in the
depths of hell.
LECTURE LXXV.
IREPROB ATION.
In discussing this subject I shall endeavour to show,
I. WHAT THE TRUE DOCTRINE of REPRORATION Is NoT.
II. WHAT IT Is:
III. THAT IT IS A DocTRINE of REASON.
IV. THAT IT IS THE DOCTRINE of REVELATION.
W. SHOW THE GROUND OR REASON of THE DocTRINE.
VI. WHEN MEN ARE REPROBATED.
VII. REPROBATION Is JUST.
VIII. REPROBATION IS BENEvoleNT.
IX. REPROBATION IS THE BEST THING THAT CAN BE DONE, ALI.
THINGS (SONSIDERED.
X. How IT MAN BE KNOWN WHo ARE kEPROBATEs.
XI. ANSWER objecTio Ns.
I. What the true doctrine of reprobation is not.
1. It is not that the ultimate end of God in the creation of any was their
damnation. Neither reason nor revelation confirms, but both contradict the
784 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
assumption, that God has created or can create any being for the purpose of
rendering him miserable as an ultimate end. God is love, or he is bene-
volent, and cannot therefore will the misery of any being as an ultimate end,
or for its own sake. It is little less than blasphemy to represent God as
creating any being for the sake of rendering him miserable, as an ultimate
end of his creation,
2. The doctrine is not, that any will be lost or miserable to all etermity,
do what they can to be saved, or in spite of themselves. It is not only a
libel upon the character of God, but a gross misrepresentation of the true
doctrine of reprobation, to exhibit God as deciding to send sinners to hell in
spite of themselves, or notwithstanding their endeavours to please God and
obtain salvation.
3. Nor is this the true doctrine of reprobation, to wit: that the purpose
or decree of reprobation is the procuring cause of the destruction of repro-
bates. God may design to destroy a soul because of its foreseen wicked-
mess; but his design to destroy him for this reason does not cause his
wickedness, and consequently does not prove his destruction.
4. The doctrine is not, that any decree or purpose of reprobation throws
any obstacle in the way of the Salvation of any one. It is not that God
has purposed the damnation of any one in such sense as that the decree
opposes any obstacle to the Salvation of any soul under heaven.
5. Nor is it that any one is sent to hell, except for his own voluutary
wickedness and ill-desert.
6. Nor is it that any one will be lost who can be induced, by all the
means that can be wisely used, to accept salvation, or to repent and be-
lieve the gospel.
7. Nor is it, nor does it imply, that all the reprobates might not be saved,
if they would but comply with the indispensable conditions of salvation.
8. Nor does it imply, that the decree of reprobation presents or opposes
any obstacle to their compliance with the necessary conditions of Salvation.
9. Nor does it imply, that anything hinders or prevents the Salvation of
the reprobate, but their perverse perseverance in sin and rebellion against
God, and their wilfull resistance of all the means that can be wisely used
for their salvation.
II. What the true doctrine of reprobation is.
The term reprobation, both in the Old and New Testanent, signifies
refuse, cast away. Jer. vi. 30 : “Reprobate silver shall men call them,
because the Lord hath rejected them.” The doctrine is, that certain indi-
viduals of mankind are, in the fixed purpose of God, cast away, rejected and
finally lost.
III. This is a doctrine of reason.
By this is intended, that since the Bible reveals the fact, that some will
be finally cast away and lost, reason affirms that if God casts them off, it
must be in accordance with a ſixed purpose on his part to do so, for their
foreseen wickedness. If, as a matter of fact, they will be cast away and
REPROBATION. 785
lost, it must be that God both knows and designs it. That is, he both knows
that they will be cast away, and designs to cast them off for their foreseen
wickedness. God can certainly never possess any new knowledge respecting
their character and deserts, and since he is unchangeable, he can never have
any new purpose respecting them.
Again, it follows from the doctrine of election. If God designs to Save
the elect, and the elect only, as has been shown, not for the reason, but upon
condition of their foreseen repentance and faith in Christ, it must be that
he designs, or purposes to cast away the wicked, for their foreseen wicked-
ness. He purposes to do something with those whom he foresees will
finally be impenitent. He certainly does not purpose to save them. What
he will ever do with them he mow knows that he shall do with them. What
he will intend to do with them he now intends to do with them, or he were
not unchangeable. But we have seen that immutability or unchangeable-
mess is an attribute of God. Therefore the present reprobation of those who
will be finally cast away or lost, is a doctrine of reason.
The doctrine of reprobation is not the election of a part of mankind to
damnation, in the same sense that the elect unto Salvation are elected to be
saved. The latter are chosen or elected, not only to Salvation, but to holi-
mess, Election with those who are saved, extends not only to the end,
salvation, but also to the condition or means; to wit, the sanctification of
the Spirit, and the belief of the truth. This has been shown. God has not
only chosen them to Salvation, but to be conformed to the image of his Son.
Accordingly, he uses means with them, with the design to sanctify and save
them. But he has not elected the reprobate to wickedness, and does not
use means to make them wicked, with the ultimate design to destroy them.
He knows, indeed, that his creating them, together with his providential
dispensations, will be the occasion, not the cause, of their sin and conse.
quent destruction. But their sin and consequent destruction are not the
ultimate end God had in view in their creation, and in the train of pro-
vidences that thus result. His ultimate end must in all cases be bene-
volent, or must be the promotion of good. Their sin and damnation are
only an incidental result, and not a thing intended as an end, or for its own
sake. God can have no pleasure, in either their sin or consequent misery
for its own sake; but on the contrary, he must regard both as in themselves
evils of enormous magnitude. He does not, and cannot therefore elect the
reprobate to sin and dammation, in the same sense in which he elects the
Saints to holiness and Salvation, The elect unto salvation he chooses to this
end, from regard to, or delight in the end. But the reprobate he chooses
to destroy, not for the sake of their destruction as an end, or from delight
in it for its own sake; but he has determined to destroy them for the public
good, since their foreseen sinfulness demanded it. He does not use means
to make them sinful, or with this design; but his providence is directed to
another end, which end is good; and the destruction of the reprobate is, as
has been said, only an incidental and an unavoidable result. That is, God
cannot wisely prevent this result,
3 E
786 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
IV. This is the doctrine of revelation.
That this view of the subject is sustained by divine revelation, will ap-
pear from a consideration of the following passages:—
Ex. ix, 16: “And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for
to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout
all the earth.”
Prov. xvi. 5: “Every one that is proud in heart is an abomination to
the Lord ; though hand join in hand, he shall not be unpunished.”
Mark iv. 11 : “And he said unto them, unto you it is given to know the
mystery of the kingdom of God, but unto them that are without, all these
things are done in parables. 12. That seeing they may see, and not
perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest at any time
they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them.”
Rom. ix. 17 : “For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, even for this
Same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee,
and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. 22. What
if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured
with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. 23.
And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of
mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory. 24. Even us, whom he
hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles?”
2 Cor. xiii. 56 : “Examine yourselves, whether ye be in the faith; prove
your own selves; know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in
you, except ye be reprobates? But I trust that ye shall know that we are
not reprobates.”
2 Peter ii. 12: “But these as natural brute beasts, made to be taken
and destroyed, speak evil of the things that they understand not ; and shall
utterly perish in their own corruption.”
Izek, xviii. 23: “Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die?
saith the Lord God; and not that he should return from his ways, and live 2
32. For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord
God, wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye?”
Ezek. XXXiii 1.1 : “Say unto them, as I live, saith the Lord God, I have no
pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way
and live; turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O
house of Israel ‘’”
2 Peter iii. 9 : “The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some
men count slackness, but is long-suffering to usward, not willing that any
should perish, but that all should come to repentance.”
These passages when duly considered are seen to teach:
1. That some men are reprobates, in the sense that God does not design
to save, but to destroy them and —
2. That he does not delight in their destruction for its own sake; but
would prefer their salvation, if under the circumstances in which his wisdom
has placed them, they could be induced to obey him.
3. But that he regards their destruction as a less evil to the universe,
REPROBATION. 787
than would be such a change in the administration and arrangements of
his government as would secure their salvation. Therefore, for their fore-
seen wickedness and perseverance in rebellion, under circumstances the
most favourable to their virtue and salvation, in which he can wisely place
them, he is resolved upon their destruction; and has already in purpose
cast them off for ever.
V. Why sinners are reprobated or rejected.
This has been already substantially answered. But to avoid misappre-
hension upon a subject so open to cavil, I repeat:
1. That the reprobation and destruction of the sinner is not an end, in
the sense that God delights in misery, and destroys sinners to gratify a
thirst for destruction. Since God is benevolent, it is impossible that this
should be.
2. It is not because of any partiality in God, or because he loves the
elect, and hates the reprobate, in any sense implying partiality. His bene-
volence is disinterested, and cannot of course be partial.
3. It is not from any want of interest in, and desire to save them, on
the part of God. This he often affirms, and abundantly attests by his deal-
ings with them, and the provision he has made for their salvation.
4. But the reprobates are reprobated for their foreseen imiquities:—
Rom. i. 28: “And even as they did not like to retain God in their
knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things
which are not convenient.”
Rom. ii. 6: “Who will render to every man according to his deeds:
7. To them who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, honour,
and immortality, eternal life; 8. But unto them that are contentious, and
do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath;
9. Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the
Jew first, and also of the Gentile ; 10. But glory, honour, and peace, to
every man that worketh good; to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile :
11. For there is no respect of persons with God.”
Ezek. xviii. 4: “Behold all souls are mine ; as the soul of the father, so
also the soul of the son is mine : the soul that sinneth, it shall die.
19. Yet say ye, Why? doth mot the son bear the iniquity of the father ?
When the son hath dome that which is lawful and right, and hath kept all
my statutes, and hath dome them, he shall Surely live. 20. The soul that
sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,
neither shall the father bear the imiquity of the son : the righteousness of
the righteous shall be upon him, and the Wickedness of the wicked shall be
upon him.”
2 Cor. V. 10 : “For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of
Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according
to that he hath dome, whether it be good or bad.”
Gal. vi. 7: “Be not deceived, God is not mocked : for whatsoever a man
Soweth, that shall he also reap.”
- --- 8 E 2
788 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Eph. vi. 8: “Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the
Same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free.”
Col. iii. 24: “Knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of
the inheritance: for ye serve the Lord Christ.”
Rev. xxii. 12: “And, behold, I come quickly; and my reward is with
me, to give every man according as his work shall be.”
Jer. vi. 30: “Reprobate silver shall men call them, because the Lord
hath rejected them.”
These passages show the teachings of inspiration on this subject. Be it
remembered, then, that the reason why any are reprobated, is because they
are unwilling to be saved ; that is, they are unwilling to be saved on the
terms upon which alone God can consistently save them. Ask sinners
whether they are willing to be saved, and they all say, yes; and with
perfect sincerity they may say this, if they can be saved upon their own
terms. But when you propose to them the terms of salvation upon which
the gospel proposes to save them; when they are required to repent and
believe the gospel, to forsake their sins, and give themselves up to the
Service of God, they will with one consent begin to make excuse. Now, to
accept these terms, is heartily and practically to consent to them. For
them to say, that they are willing to accept Salvation, while they actually
do not accept it, is either to deceive themselves, or to utter an infamous
falsehood. To be willing is to accept it; and the fact, that they do not
heartily consent to, and embrace the terms of Salvation, is demonstration
absolute, that they are unwilling. Yes, sinners, the only terms on which
you can possibly be saved, you reject. Is it not then an insult to God for
you to pretend that you are willing 2 The only true reason why all of you
are not Christians, is that you are unwilling. You are not made unwilling
by any act of God, or because you are a reprobate; but if you are a repro-
bate, it is because you are unwilling.
But do any of you object and say, why does not God make us willing 2
Is it not because he has reprobated us, that he does not change our hearts
and make us willing? No, sinner, it is not because he has reprobated you ;
but because you are so obstimate that he cannot, wisely, and in consistency
with the public good, take such measures as will convert you. Here you
are waiting for God to make you willing to go to heaven, and all the while
you are diligently using the means to get to hell—yes, exerting yourself
with greater diligence to get to hell, than it would cost to insure your
salvation, if applied with equal zeal in the service of your God. You tempt
God, and then turn round and ask him why he does not make you willing?
Now, sinner, let me ask you, do you think you are a reprobate 2 If so, what
do you think the reason is that has led the infinitely benevolent God to
reprobate you? There must be some reason ; what do you suppose it is
Did you ever seriously ask yourself, what is the reason that a wise and
infinitely benevolent God has never made me willing to accept salvation P
It must be for one of the following reasons: either—
(1.) He is a malevolent being, and wills your dammation for its own
sake; or—
REPROBATION. 789
(2.) He cannot make you willing if he would ; or—
(3.) You behave in such a manner in the circumstances in which you are,
that, to his infinitely benevolent mind it appears unwise to take such a
course as would bring you to repentance. Such a change in the admi-
mistration of his government as would make you willing, would not, upon
the whole, be wise.
Now, which of these do you think it is ? You will not probably take
the ground that he is malevolent, and desires your damnation because he
delights in misery; nor will you, I suppose, take the ground that he could
not convert you if he would, that is, if he thought it wise to do so.
The other, them, must be the reason, to wit: that your heart, and con-
duct, and stubbornness, are so abominable in his sight, that, every thing
considered, he sees that to use such further means with you as to Secure
your conversion, would, on the whole, do more hurt than good to his
kingdom. I have not time at present to agitate the question whether you,
as a moral agent, could not resist any possible amount of moral influence
that could be brought to bear upon you, consistently with your moral
freedom.
Do you ask how I know that the reason why God does not make you
willing is, that he sees that it would be unwise in him to do so? I answer,
that it is an irresistible inference, from these two facts, that he is infinitely
benevolent, and that he does not actually make you willing. I do not
believe that God would neglect anything that he saw to be wise and
benevolent, in the great matter of man's salvation. Who can believe that
he could give his only-begotten and well-beloved Son to die for sinners, and
then neglect any wise and benevolent means for their salvation ? No,
sinner, if you are a reprobate, it is because God foresaw that you would do
just as you are doing ; that you would be so wicked as to defeat all the
efforts that he could wisely make for your salvation. What a variety of
means he has used with you. At one time he has thrown you into the
furnace of affliction ; and when this has not softened you, he has turned
round and loaded you with favours. He has sent you his word, he has
striven by his Spirit, he has allured you by the cross; he has tried to melt
you by the groanings of Calvary; and tried to drive you back from the way
to death, by rolling in your ears the thunders of dammation. At one time
clouds and darkness have been round about you; the heavens have thun-
dered over your head divine vengeance has hung out, all around your
horizon, the portentous clouds of coming wrath. At another time mercy
has smiled upon you from above like the noon-day sun, breaking through
an ocean of storms. He urges every motive : he lays heaven, earth and
hell, under perpetual contributions for considerations to move your Stony
heart. But you deafen your ears, and close your eyes, and harden your
heart, and say, “Cause the holy one of Israel to cease from before us.”
And what is the inference from all this? How must all this end ? “Re-
probate silver shall men call them, because the Lord has rejected them.”
VI. When sinners are reprobated,
790 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
1. In respect to the act of casting them off, they are cast away only
When, and not until, the cup of their iniquity is full.
2. In respect to the purpose of reprobation, they are in the purpose of
God reprobated or rejected from etermity. This follows irresistibly from
the omniscience and immutability of God. He has certainly and neces-
Sarily had from etermity all the knowledge he ever can or will have of the
character of all men, and must have designed from all eternity all things
respecting them which he ever will design. This follows from his un-
changeableness. If he ever does cast off sinners, he must do it designedly
or undesignedly. He cannot do it without any design. He must therefore
do it designedly. But if he does it designedly, it must be either that he
eternally entertained this design, or that he has changed. But change of
purpose or design is inconsistent with the moral immutability of God.
Therefore the purpose of reprobation is etermal; or the reprobates were in
the fixed purpose of God cast off and rejected from etermity.
VII. Reprobation is just.
Is it not just in God to let men have their own choice, especially when
the highest possible motives are held out to them as inducements to choose
eternal life. What is it not just to reprobate men when they obstimately
refuse Salvation—when every thing has been done that is consistent with
infinite wisdom and benevolence to save them 2 Shall uot men be willing
to be either saved or lost? What shall God do with you? You are un-
willing to be saved; why then should you object to being damned 2 If
reprobation under these circumstances is not just, I challenge you, sinner,
to tell what is just.
VIII. Reprobation is benevolent.
It was benevolent in God to create men, though he foresaw that they
would sin and become reprobate. If he foresaw that, upon the whole, he
could secure such an amount of virtue and happiness by means of moral
government, as to more than counterbalance the sin and misery of those
who would be lost, them certainly it was a dictate of benevolence to create
them. The question was, whether moral beings should be created, and
moral government established, when it was foreseen that a great evil would
be the incidental consequence. Whether this would be benevolent or not,
must turn upon the question, whether a good might be secured that would
more than counterbalance the evil. If the virtue and happiness that could
be secured by the administration of moral government, would greatly out-
measure the incidental evils arising out of a defection of a part of the sub-
jects of this government, it is manifest that a truly benevolent mind would
choose to establish the government, the attendant evils to the contrary not-
withstanding. Now, if those who are lost deserve their misery, and bring
it upon themselves by their own choice, when they might have been saved,
then certainly in their damnation there can be nothing inconsistent with
justice or benevolence. God must have a moral government, or there can
REPROBATION. 7.91
be no such thing as holiness in the created universe. For holiness in a
creature is nothing else than a voluntary conformity to the government of
God.
Doubtless God views the loss of the Soul as a great evil, and he always
will look upon it as such, and would gladly avoid the loss of any soul, if it
were consistent with the wisest administration of his government. How
slanderous, injurious, and offensive to God it must be, then, to say, that
he created sinners on purpose to damn them. He pours forth all the tender
yearnings of a father over those whom he is obliged to destroy—“How
shall I give thee up, Ephraim 2 how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how
shall I make thee as Admah 2 how shall I set thee as Zeboim 2 my heart
is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together.” And now,
sinner, can you find it in your heart to accuse the blessed God of a want of
benevolence? “O ye serpents ye generation of vipers' how can you
escape the damnation of hell ?”
IX. Reprobation is the best thing that can be done, all things considered.
Since the penalty of the law, although infinite, under the wisest possible
administration of moral government, could not secure universal obedience;
and since multitudes of sinners will not be reclaimed and saved by the
gospel, one of three things must be dome; either moral government must
be given up; or the wicked must be annihilated, or they must be repro-
bated and sent to hell. Now, that moral government should be given up,
will not be pretended ; annihilation would not be just, inasmuch as it
would not be an adequate expression of the abhorrence with which the
divine ruler regards the violation of his law, and consequently it would not
meet the demands of public justice. Now, as sinners really deserve eternal
death, and as their punishment may be of real value to the universe, in
creating a respect for the authority of God, and thus strengthening his
government, it is plaim that their reprobation and dammation is for the
general good, making the best use of the wicked that can be made.
There is a difference between evidence and proof. To prove is to
establish. We prove by evidence. Every design of evidence is not proof.
There is prima facie evidence, probable evidence, and every degree of
evidence, from possible to demonstration, or intuition. There may be much
evidence that a thing is true, when in fact it is not true. There may be
much evidence, or many reasons to fear, or to believe that one is a reprobate,
when in fact he is not.
X. How it may be known who are reprobates.
It may be difficult for us to ascertain with certainty in this world, who
are reprobates; but there are so many marks of reprobation given in the
Bible, that by a sober and judicious investigation, we may form a pretty
correct opinion, whether we or those around us are reprobates or not.
1. One evidence of reprobation, is a long course of prosperity in sin.
The Psalmist lays it down as such in Psa. xcii. 7 : “When the wicked
spring as the grass, and when all the workers of iniquity do flourish, it is
792 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
*
that they shall be destroyed for ever.” God often gives the wicked their
portion in this world, and lets them prosper and wax fat like a stalled ox,
and them brings them forth to the slaughter. “The wicked are reserved
unto the day of Wrath.” When therefore you see an individual for a long
time prospering in his sins, there is great reason to fear that man is a
reprobate. In this passage inspiration assumes the truth of the distinction
between evidence and proof. The Psalmist does not mean to be understood
as affirming a universal truth. He did not intend, that prosperity in
sin was proof conclusive that the prosperous sinner is a reprobate. But the
least that could have been intended was, that such prosperity in sin affords
alarming evidence of reprobation. It may be called presumptive evidence.
Those who deny the distinction between evidence and proof, as some have
dome, must either deny the truth of this assertion of the Psalmist, or
maintain that prosperity in sin does in all cases render it certain, that the
prosperous sinner is a reprobate.
2. Habitual neglect of the means of grace is a mark of reprobation. If
men are to be saved at all, it is through the Sanctification of the Spirit and
belief of the truth ; and it will probably be found to be true, that not one
in ten thousand is saved of those who habitually absent themselves from
places where God presents his claims. Sometimes, I know, a tract, or the
conversation or prayer of some friend, may awaken an individual, and lead
him to the house of God; but, as a general fact, if a man stays away from
the means of grace, and neglects his Bible, it is a fearful sign of reproba-
tion, and that he will die in his sins. He is voluntary in it, and he does
not neglect the means of grace because he is reprobated, but was reprobated
because God foresaw that he would take this course. Suppose a pestilence
were prevailing, that was certain to prove fatal in every instance where the
appropriate remedy was not applied. Now, if you wish to know whose days
were numbered and finished, and who among the sick were certain to die
with the disease, if you found any among them neglecting and despising
the only appropriate remedy, you would know that they were the persons.
All this was known to God as certainly beforehand as afterward. Now,
if you wish to know who are reprobates in any town or village, look abroad
upon the multitude of Sabbath-breakers, swearers, drinkers, and whore-
mongers; upon the young men that “assemble in troops in harlots'
houses;” or the boys and young men that you may see assembled on the
sabbath before grog shops, or at the corners of the streets, with their
cigars, their bloated cheeks, and swollen, blood-shot eyes. Look through
the length and breadth of the land, and see the thousands of young men
who are utterly neglecting and despising etermal salvation. O horrible !
poor, dying young men not one in a thousand of them is likely to be
saved; perhaps some of them came from a family given to prayer, where
they used to kneel morning and evening around the domestic altar, And
now where are they 2 And where are they going? They are already
within the sweep of that mighty whirlpool, whose circling waters are
drawing them nearer and nearer the roaring vortex. They dance, and
REPROBATION. 793
trifle, and sport themselves. They heed not the voice that cries from
heaven, nor the wail that comes up from hell, but nearer and nearer, with
accelerated motion, they circle round and round, till they are swallowed up
and lost in the abyss of damnation.
3. Where persons are entirely destitute of the strivings of the Spirit.
I speak not of those who mever heard the gospel; but in gospel lands it is
doubtful whether any, except they are given up of God, live without more
or less of the strivings of the Holy Spirit. Where therefore it is found
that his strivings have entirely ceased with any mind, that soul has solemn
and alarming evidence that it is given up of God. God says, “Yea, also,
wo unto them when I depart from them.”
4. Where persons have passed through a revival, and are not converted
it affords evidence that they are reprobates; I mean here, not conclusive,
but presumptive evidence ; and this presumption grows stronger and
stronger every time an individual passes such a season without conversion.
It is common for persons in seasons of revival, to have more or less con-
viction, but to grieve away the Spirit. Some such persons are perhaps
here, and dreaming away one more offer of etermal salvation. If you have
once resisted the Spirit until he is quenched, I have but little hope that
anything I can say will do you any good. The great probability is that
you will be lost, unless you now repent and believe in Jesus.
5. Those who have grown old in sin, are probably reprobates. It is a
solemn and alarming fact, that a vast majority of those who give evidence
of piety, are converted under twenty-five years of age. Look at the
history of revivals, and see, even in those that have manifested the
greatest power, how few aged persons have been converted. The men
who are set upon the attainment of some worldly object, and determined
to secure that before they will attend to religion, and yield to the claims
of their Maker, expecting afterwards to be converted, are almost always
disappointed. Such a cold calculation is odious in the sight of God.
What take advantage of his forbearance, and say, that because he is
merciful you will venture to continue in sin, till you have secured your
worldly objects, and Worm yourself out in the service of the devil, and thus
turn your Maker off with the jaded remnant of your abused mortality
You need not expect God to set his seal of approbation upon such a
calculation as this, and suffer you at last to triumph, and say, that you had
served the devil as long as you pleased, and got to heaven at last.
You see such a man passing on from twenty years old and upwards, and
the probabilities of his conversion fearfully diminishing every year. Sinner,
are you forty years old 3 Now look over the list of conversions in the last
revival; how few among them are of your age 2 Perhaps some of you are
fifty or sixty how seldom can you find one of your age converted. There
is only here and there one ; they are few and far between, like beacons on
distant mountain tops, scattered sparsely along, just to keep old sinners
from absolute despair. Aged sinner, there are more than fifty chances to
one that you are a reprobate.
6. Absence of chastisements is a sign of reprobation. God says in the
794 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
epistle to the Hebrews: “My son, despise not thou the chastening of the
Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of him ; for whom the Lord loveth
he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth; if ye endure
chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons; for what son is he whom
the Father chasteneth not ; but if ye be without chastisement, whereof all
are partakers, them are ye bastards, and not sons.”
7. When men are chastened and not reformed by it, it is a mark of
reprobation. A poet has said, “When pain can't bless, heaven quits us in
despair.” God says of such, “Why should ye be stricken any more; ye
will revolt more and more.” When your afflictions are unsanctified, when
you harden yourselves under his stripes, why should he not leave you to
fill up the measure of your iniquity ?
8. Embracing damnable heresies, is another mark of reprobation. Where
persons seem to be given up to believe a lie, there is solemn reason for
fearing that they are among that number upon whom God sends strong
delusions, that they may believe a lie, and be dammed, because they obey
not the truth, but have pleasure in unrighteousness, Where you see per-
sons giving themselves up to such delusions, the more certainly they
believe them, the greater reason there is for believing that they are repro-
bates. The truth is so plain, that with the Bible in your hands, it is next
to impossible to believe a fundamental heresy, without being given up to
the judicial curse of God. It is so hard to believe a lie, with the truth of
the Bible before you, that the devil cannot do it. If therefore you reject
your Bible, and embrace a fundamental falsehood, you are more stupid and
benighted than the devil is. When a man professes to believe a lie, almost
the only hope of his salvation that remains, is, that he does not cordially
believe it. Simmer, beware how you trifle with God's truth. How often
have individuals begun to argue in favour of heresy, for the sake of argu-
ment, and because they loved debate, until they have finally come to believe
their own lie, and are lost for ever.
XI. Olſections,
1. To the idea that God rejected the reprobate for their foreseen wicked-
mess, it is replied that, Prov. xvi. 4 : “The Lord hath made all things for
himself; yea, even the Wicked for the day of evil,” teaches another doctrine;
that this passage teaches, that God made the reprobates for the day of evil,
or for the purpose of destroying them.
To this I reply, that if he did create them to destroy them, or with a
design when he created them to destroy them, it does not follow that their
destruction was an ultimate end, or a thing in which he delighted for its
own sake. It must be true, as has been said, that he designed from
etermity to destroy them, in view, and in consequence, of their foreseen
wickedness; and of course, he designed their destruction when he created
them. In one sense then, it was true, that he created them for the day of
evil, that is, in the sense that he knew how they would behave, and
designed as a consequence to destroy them when, and before, he created
them. But this is not the same as his creating them for the sake of their
REPROBATION. 79.5
destruction as an ultimate end. He had another and a higher ultimate
end, which end was a benevolent one. He says, “I have created all
things for myself, even the wicked for the day of evil;” that is, he had
some great and good end to accomplish by them, and by their destruction.
He foresaw that he could use them for some good purpose, notwithstanding
their foreseen wickedness; and even that he could overrule their sin and
destruction to manifest his justice, and thus show forth his glory, and
thereby strengthen his government. He must have foreseen that the
good that might thus, from his overruling providence, result to himself and
to the universe, would more than compensate for the evil of their rebellion
and destruction ; and therefore, and upon this condition, he created them,
knowing that he should destroy, and intending to destroy them. That
destruction was not the ultimate end of their creation, must follow from
such scriptures as the following:—
Ezek. xxxiii. 11 : “Say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord God, I
have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from
his way and live : turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye
die, O house of Israel ?”
Ezek. xviii. 23 : “Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die 2
saith the Lord God ; and not that he should return from his ways and live?”
2 Peter iii. 9 : “The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some
men count slackness, but is long-suffering to us-Ward, not willing that any
should perish, but that all should come to repentance.”
1 John iv. 8 : “He that loveth not, knoweth not God, for God is love.
16. And we have known and believed the love that God hath to us. God
is love ; and he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him.”
Heb. ii. 9 : “But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the
angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour : that he
by the grace of God should taste death for every man.”
2. Another objection to the doctrine of this lecture is founded on Rom.
ix. 20–23 : “Nay, but O man, who art thou that repliest against God?
Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made
me thus 2 hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to
make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour º' What if God
willing to shew his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much
long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might
make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had
afore prepared unto glory.”
From this passage it has been inferred, that God creates the character and
disposes of the destinies of both Saints and sinners with as absolute and as
irresistible a sovereignty as that exercised by the potter over his clay ; that
he creates the elect for salvation, and the reprobate for damnation; and
forms the character of both so as to fit them for their respective destinies,
with an absolutely irresistible and efficient sovereignty ; that his ultimate
end was in both cases his own glory, and that the value of the end justifies
the use of the means, that is, of such means. To this I reply:
796 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(1.) That it is absurd and monsensical, as we have abundantly seen, to
talk of creating moral character, either good or bad, by an irresistible effi-
cient sovereignty. This is maturally impossible, as it implies a contradic-
tion. Moral character must be the result of proper, voluntary action, and
the moral character of the vessels of wrath or of mercy neither is, nor can
be, formed by any irresistible influence whatever.
(2.) It is not said nor implied in the passage under consideration, that
the character of the vessels of wrath was created, or that God had any such
agency in procuring their character, as he has in forming the character of
the vessels of mercy. Of the vessels of wrath it is only said they are
“fitted to destruction,” that is, that their characters are adapted for hell;
while of the vessels of mercy it is said “which he had afore prepared unto
glory.” The vessels of wrath are fitted, or had fitted themselves to destruc-
tion, under the light and influence that should have made them holy. The
vessels of mercy God had, by the special grace and influence of the Holy
Spirit, engaging and directing their voluntary agency, afore prepared for
glory.
(3.) But the lump spoken of in the text contemplates, not the original
creation of man, nor the forming or creating in them of a wicked character.
But it manifestly contemplates them as already existing as the potter's clay
exists; and not only as existing, but also as being simmers. God may rea-
sonably proceed to form out of this lump vessels of wrath or of mercy, as
seems wise and good unto him. He may appoint one portion to honour and
another to dishonour, as is seen by him to be demanded by the highest
good.
(4.) The passage under consideration cannot, in any event, be pressed
into the service of those who would insist, that the destruction of the re-
probate is chosen for its own sake, and therefore implies malevolence in
God. Hear what it says: “What if God, willing to show his wrath, and
make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of
wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his
glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory.”
Here it appears, that he designed to show and make known his attributes.
This cannot have been an ultimate, but must have been a proximate, end.
The ultimate end must have been the highest glory of himself, and the
highest good of the universe, as a whole. If God willed thus to make
known his holiness and his mercy, for the purpose of securing the highest
good of the universe, who has a right to say, What doest thou? Or why
doest thou thus 2
3. Another objection is, if God knew that they would be reprobate or
lost, why did he create them 2 If he knew that such would be the result,
and yet created them, it follows that he created them to destroy them.
I reply: -
This objection has been already answered, but for the sake of perspicuity
I choose here to answer it again.
From the admitted fact, that God knew when he created them just what
REPROBATION. - 797
their destiny would be, it does not follow that their destruction was the end
for which he created them. He created them, not for their sin and destruc-
tion as an ultimate end, but for another and a good end, notwithstanding
his fore-knowledge of their sin and ultimate ruin.
4. It is further objected, that if God designed to make known his attri-
butes, in the salvation of the vessels of mercy, and in the destruction of the
vessels of wrath, he must have designed their characters as well as their
end, inasmuch as their characters are indispensable conditions of this
result.
I reply, that it is true, that the characters of both the vessels of wrath
and of mercy must have been in some sense purposed or designed by God.
But it does not follow that he designed them both in the same sense. The
character of the righteous he designed to beget, or induce by his own
agency; the character of the wicked he designed to suffer him to form for
himself. He doubtless designed to suffer the one rather than to interfere,
in such manner and form as would prevent sin, seeing as he did, that hate-
ful as it was in itself, it could be overruled for good. The other he designed
to produce, or rather induce, both on account of the pleasure he has in ho-
liness, and also for the sake of its bearings on the subject of it, and upon
the universe.
5. To the doctrine of this lecture it is further objected, that if one is a
reprobate it is of no use for him to try to be saved. If God knows what
he will be in character, and designs his destruction, it is impossible that it
should be otherwise than as God knows and designs, and therefore one may
as well give up in despair first as last.
(1.) To such an objector I would say, you do not know that you are a
reprobate, and therefore you need not despair.
(2) If God designs to cast you off, though you cannot know this, it is
only because he foresees that you will not repent and believe the gospel; or
in other words, for your voluntary wickedness. He foreknows that you will
be wicked simply because you will be, and not because his foreknowledge
makes you so. Neither his foreknowledge respecting your character, nor
his design to cast you off, in consequence of your character, has any agency
in making you wicked. You are therefore perfectly free to obey and be
saved, and the fact that you will not, is no reason why you should not.
(3.) You might just as reasonably make the same objection to every
thing that takes place in the universe. Everything that did, or will, or
can occur, is as infallibly known to God, as the fact of your wickedness and
destruction is. He also has a fixed and etermal design about everything
that ever did or will occur. He knows how long you will live, where you
will live, and when and where you will die. His purposes respecting these
and all other events are fixed, eternal, and unchangeable. Why, them, do
you not live without food and say, I cannot make one hair black or white;
I cannot die before my time, nor can I prolong my days beyond the ap-
pointed time, do what I will; therefore, I will take no care of my health 3
No ; this would be unreasonable. *
798 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Why not also apply this objection to everything, and settle down in des-
pair of ever doing or being anything, but what an irresistible fate makes
you? The fact is, that the true doctrine, whether of election or reprobation,
affords not the least countenance to such a conclusion. The foreknowledge
and designs of God respecting our conduct or our destiny, do not in the
least degree interfere with our free agency. We, in every case, act just as
freely as if God neither knew mor designed anything about our conduct.
Suppose the farmer should make the same objection to sowing his seed,
and to doing anything to secure a crop ; what would be thought of him 2
And yet he might with as much reason, since he can plead the foreknow-
ledge and designs of God, as an excuse for doing nothing to secure his
salvation, God as really knows now whether you will sow and whether you
will have a crop, and has from etermity known this, as perfectly as he ever
will. He has either designed that you shall, or that you shall not, have a
crop this year, from all etermity; and it will infallibly come to pass just as
he has foreseen and designed. Yet you are really just as free to raise a
crop, or to neglect to do so, as if he neither knew nor designed anything
about it.
The man who will stumble either at the doctrine of election or reproba-
tion, as defined and maintained in these lectures, sluould, to be consistent,
stumble at everything that takes place, and never try to accomplish any
thing whatever; because the designs and the foreknowledge of God extend
equally to everything; and unless he has expressly revealed how it will be,
we are left in the dark, in respect to any event, and are left to use means
to accomplish what we desire, or to prevent what we dread, as if God knew
and designed nothing about it.
6. But it is oljected, that this is a discouraging doctrine, and liable to
be a stumbling-block, and therefore should not be inculcated. I answer—
(1.) It is taught in the Bible, and plainly follows also from the attri-
butes of God, as revealed in the reason. The Scriptures that teach it are
not less likely to be a Snare and a stumbling-block, than are the definition
and explanation of the doctrine.
(2.) The proper statement, explanation, and defence of the doctrines of
election and reprobation, are important to a proper understanding of the
mature and attributes of God.
(3.) The scriptures that teach these doctrines are often subjects of cavil,
and sometimes of real difficulty. Religious teachers should, therefore, state
these doctrines and explain them, so as to aid the inquirer after truth, and
stop the mouths of gainsayers.
(4.) Again, these doctrines have often been so mis-stated and perverted
as to make them amount to an iron system of fatalism. Many souls have
heard or read these perversions, and greatly need to be enlightened upon
the subject. It is therefore all the more important, that these truths
should find a place in religious instruction. Let them be understood,
properly stated, explained, and defended, and they can no more be a
stumbling-block, than the fact of God's omniscience can be so.
REPROBATION. 799
REMARKS,
1. The salvation of reprobates is impossible only because they make it
so by their own wicked conduct.
2. God will turn the damnation of the reprobate to good account. In
establishing his government, he foresaw that great evils would be incidental
to it; that multitudes would sin, and persevere in rebellion, until they
were lost, notwithstanding all that could consistently be done to save them.
Yet he foresaw, that a vastly greater good would result from the virtue and
happiness of holy beings, and that he also could make a good use even of
the punishment of the wicked. Here is an instance of the divine economy
in turning everything to the best account. I do not mean that the dam-
nation of the wicked results in greater good than their salvation would, if
they would repent. If their salvation could be secured by any means that
would consist with the highest good of the universe, it would be greatly
to be preferred. But as this cannot be, God will do the best that the
nature of the case admits. When he cannot save them, he will, by their
punishment, erect a monument to his justice, and lay its foundation deep
in hell, and build it up to heaven, that being seem afar off, in the smoke
of their torment that ascendeth up for ever and ever, it may ever stand as
an affecting memento of the hatefulness and desert of sim.
3. It is very wicked and blaspenous to complain of God when he has
done the best that infinite wisdom, benevolence, and power could do.
Who should complaim 2 Surely not the elect; they have no reason to
complain. Shall the reprobate complain, when they have actually forced
upon God the necessity of either giving up his government, or of sending
them to hell ?
4. Reprobates are bound to praise God. He has created and given you
many blessings, simmer, and offers you eternal life; and will you refuse to
praise him 2
5. God has every reason to complain of you, simmer. How much good
you might do | See how much good individuals have often done Now,
of all the good you might do, you rob God. While etermity rolls its ever-
lasting rounds, on how many errands of love you might go, diffusing
happiness to the utmost bounds of Jehovah's empire 2. But you refuse to
obey him ; you are in league with hell, and prefer to scatter firebrands,
arrows, and death, to destroy your own soul, and lead others to perdition
with you. You drive on in your career, and help to set in motion all the
elements of rebellion in earth and hell. Will you complain of God? He
has reason to complaim of you. He is the injured party. He has created
you, has held you in his hand, and fanned your heaving lungs; and in
return, you have breathed out your breath in rebellion, and blasphemy,
and contempt of God, and compelled him to pronounce you reprobate.
6. There is reason to believe, that there are many reprobates in the
church. This is the probable history of many professors of religion.
They had convictions of sin, and after a while their distress more or less
suddenly abated. If their distress had been considerable, if the Spirit
800 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
left them, their minds would maturally have gone toward the opposite
extreme. When their convictions left them, they thought, perhaps, this
was conversion ; this very perhaps created a sensation of pleasure, and the
thought that this felt pleasure was evidence that they were converted,
would maturally increase their confidence. As their confidence increased,
their joy at the thought of being saved would be increased. This selfish
joy has been the foundation upon which they have built their hopes for
etermity; and now you see them in the church, transacting business upon
worldly principles, pleading for sin, and finding a thousand apologies for
conformity to the world. They live on in sin, perhaps not openly vicious,
but negligent of duty, cold and formal reprobates, and go down to hell
from the bosom of the church.
7. Reprobates live to fill up the measure of their imiquity.
We are informed that the Amorites were spared, not because there was
any hope of their reformation, but because their cup of iniquity was not yet
full. Christ said to the Jews, “Fill ye up the measure of your fathers;"
and God said unto Pharoah, “For this purpose have I sustained thee,
that I might show in thee my mighty power.” Oh, dreadful thought live
to fill up the measure of your sins ! The cup of trembling and of wrath
is also filling up, which shall soon be poured out to you without mixture,
when there shall be done to deliver you. “Your judgment now of a long
time lingereth not, and your damnation slumbereth not.”
8. Saints should not envy prosperous sinners.
The Psalmist once had this trial. He says, “Truly God is good to
Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart ; but as for me, my feet were
almost gone ; my steps had well high slipped, for I was envious at the
foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked, for there are no bands in
their death, but their strength is firm. They are not in trouble as other
men, neither are they plagued like other mem. When I thought to know
this, it was too painful for me, until I went into the sanctuary of God;
them understood I their end. Surely thou didst set them in slippery
places, thou castedst them down into destruction. How are they brought
into desolation, as in a 'moment they are utterly consumed with terrors.”
How can a saint envy them, standing upon a slippery steep, with fiery
billows rolling beneath them “Their feet shall slide in due time.”
Christians, do not envy the wicked, though they enjoy the wealth of the
world; do not envy them ; poor creatures their time is short, they have
had almost all their good things.
Perhaps, reader, you have not been in the least benefited by anything I
have said, or could say. You have set yourself to oppose God, and have
taken such an attitude, that truth never reaches you to do you good. Now,
simmer, if you do this, and close this book in this state of mind, you will have
additional evidence that God has given you up, and that you are a repro-
bate. Now, will you go on in your sins, under these circumstances 2
Do not talk of the doctrine of election or reprobation as being in your way.
No man is ever reprobated for any other reason, than that he is an obstimate
S]]]ll & I",
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 801
Have you not been reading to find something in this lecture that you can
stumble over ? Take care if you wish to cavil, you can always find occa-
sions enough. Simmers have stumbled over every other doctrine of the
Bible into hell, and you may stumble over this. What would you say of
any man that should cut his throat, and say he did it because God foreknew
that he would do it, and by creating him with this foreknowledge, designed
that he should do it 2 Would saying that excuse him 2 No. Yet he is
under just as much necessity of doing it as you are of closing this book,
and going away in your sins.
You only show that you are determined to harden your hearts, and resist
God, and thus compel the holy Lord God to reject you. There is no
doctrine of the Bible that can save you, if you persevere in sin, and none
that eam damn you, if you repent and believe the gospel 2 The blood of
Christ flows freely. The fountain is open. Sinner, what say you ? Will
you have eternal life? Will you have it now, or will you reject it? Will
you trample the law under foot, and stumble over the gospel to the depths
of hell ?
L E C T U R E L XXVI.
DIVINE SOWEREIGNTY.
In this discussion I shall endeavour to show,
I. WHAT IS NOT INTENDED BY THE TERMI SOVEREIGNTY, WHEN APPLIED
To GoD.
II. WHAT IS INTENDED BY IT,
III. THAT GoD IS, AND OUGHT TO BE, AN ABSOLUTE AND UNIVERsat.
St.) VEHREIGN.
I. What is not intended by the term “sovereignty" when applied to God.
It is not intended, at least by me, that God, in any instance, wills or acts
arbitrarily, or without good reasons; reasons so good and so weighty, that
lie could in no case act otherwise than he does, without violating the law of
his own intelligence and conscience, and consequently without sin. Any
view of divine sovereignty that implies arbitrariness on the part of the
divine will, is not only contrary to scripture, but is revolting to reason, and
blasphemous. God cannot act arbitrarily, in the sense of unreasonably,
without infinite wickedness. For him to be arbitrary, in the sense of
unreasonable, would be a wickedness as much greater than any creature is
capable of committing, as his reason or knowledge is greater than theirs.
This must be self-evident. God should therefore never be represented as
a sovereign, in the sense that implies that he is actuated by self or
arbitrary will, rather than by his infinite intelligence.
Many seem to me to represent the sovereignty of God as consisting in
a perfectly arbitrary disposal of events. They seem to conceive of God as
being wholly above and without, any law or rule of action guiding his will
by his infinite reason and conscience. They appear shocked at the idea of
3 F
802 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
God himself being the subject of moral law, and are ready to inquire, who
gives law to God? They seem never to have considered that God is, and
must be, a law unto himself; that he is necessarily omniscient, and that
the divine reason must impose law on, or prescribe law to, the divine will.
They seem to regard God as living wholly above law, and as disposed to
have his own will at any rate, reasonable or unreasonable ; to set up his
OWn arbitrary pleasure as his only rule of action, and to impose this rule
upon all his subjects. This sovereignty they seem to conceive of as con-
trolling and disposing of all events, with an iron or adamantime fatality,
inflexible, irresistible, omnipotent. “Who worketh all things after the
counsel of his own will.” This text they dwell much upon, as teaching
that God disposes all events absolutely, not according to his own infinite
wisdom and discretion, but simply according to his own will ; and, as their
language would often seem to imply, without reference at all to the uni-
versal law of benevolence. I will not say, that such is the view as it lies
in their own mind ; but only that from the language they use, such would
seem to be their idea of divine sovereignty. Such, however, is not the
view of this subject which I shall state and defend on the present occasion.
II. What is intended by divine sovereignty.
The sovereignty of God consists in the independence of his will, in
consulting only his own intelligence and discretion, in the selection of his
end, and the means of accomplishing it. In other words, the sovereignty
of God is nothing else than infinite benevolence directed by infinite know-
ledge. God consults no one in respect to what shall be done by him. He
asks no leave to do and require what his own wisdom dictates. He consults
only himself; that is, his own infinite intelligence. So far is he from being
arbitrary in his sovereignty, in the sense of unreasonable, that he is inva-
riably guided by infinite reason. He consults his own intelligence only,
not from any arbitrary disposition, but because his knowledge is perfect
and infinite, and therefore it is safe and Wise to take counsel nowhere else.
It were infinitely unreasonable, and weak, and wicked in God to ask leave
of any being to act in conformity with his own judgment. He must make
his own reason his rule of action. God is a sovereign, not in the sense that
he is not under law, or that he is ab ve all law, but in the sense that he is
a law to himself; that he knows no law but what is given him by his own
reason. In other words still, the Sovereignty of God consists in such
a disposal of all things and events, as to meet the ideas of his own reason,
or the demands of his own intelligence. “He works all things after the
counsel of his own will,” in the Sense that he formed and executes his own
designs independently; in the sense that he consults only his own infinite
discretion; that is, he acts according to his own views of propriety and
fitness. This he does, be it distinctly understood, without at all setting
aside the freedom of moral agents. His infinite knowledge enabled him to
select an end and means, that should consist with and include the perfect
freedom of moral agents. The subjects of his moral government are free
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 803
to obey or disobey, and take the consequences. But foreseeing precisely
in all cases how they would act, he has laid his plan accordingly, so as to
bring out the contemplated and desired results. In all his plans he con-
sulted mone but himself. But this leads me to say—
III. That God is and ought to be an absolute and a universal sovereign.
By absolute, I mean, that his expressed will, in obedience to his reason,
is law. It is not law because it proceeds from his arbitrary will, but
because it is the revelation or declaration of the affirmations and demands
of his infinite reason. His expressed will is law, because it is an infallible
declaration of what is intrinsically fit, suitable, right. His will does not
make the things that he commands, right, fit, proper, obligatory, in the
sense, that should he require it, the opposite of what he now requires
would be fit, proper, suitable, obligatory; but in the sense that we need no
other evidence of what is in itself intrinsically proper, fit, obligatory, than
the expression of his will. Our reason affirms, that what he wills must be
right; not because he wills it, but that he wills it because it is right, or
obligatory in the nature of things; that is, our reason affirms that he wills
as he does, only upon condition, that his infinite intelligence affirms that
such willing is intrinsically right, and therefore he ought to will or com-
mand just what he does.
He is a sovereign in the sense that his will is law, whether we are able
to see the reason for his commands or mot, because our reason affirms that
he has and must have good and sufficient reasons for every command ; so
good and sufficient, that he could not do otherwise than require what he
does, under the circumstances, without violating the law of his own intelli-
gence. We therefore meed no other reason for affirming our obligation to
will and to do, than that God requires it; because we always and neces-
sarily assume, as a first truth of reason, that what God requires must be
right, not because he arbitrarily wills it, but because he does not arbitrarily
will it: on the contrary that he has, and must have in every instance, in-
finitely good and wise reasons for every requirement.
Some persons represent God as a sovereign, in the sense, that his
arbitrary will is the foundation of obligation. But if this is so, he could in
every instance render the directly opposite course from what he now
requires, obligatory. But this is absurd. The persons just mentioned
seem to think, that unless it be admitted that God's will is the foundation
of obligation, it will follow that it does not impose obligation, unless he
discloses the reasons for his requirements. But this is a great mistake.
Our own reason affirms that God’s expressed will is always law, in the
sense that it invariably declares the law of nature, or discloses the decisions
of his own reason.
God must and ought to be an absolute sovereign in the sense just de-
fined. This will appear if we consider:—
I. That his end was chosen and the means deeided upon, when no being
but himself existed, and of course, there was no one to consult but himself.
3 F Q
804 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
* Creation and providence are only the results, and the carrying out of
his plans settled from etermity.
8. The law of benevolence, as it existed in the divine reason, must have
etermally demanded of him the very course he has taken.
4. His highest glory and the highest good of universal being demand,
that he should consult his own discretion, and exercise an absolute and a
universal sovereignty, in the sense explained. Infinite wisdom and good-
ness ought of course to act independently in the promotion of their end.
If infinite wisdom or knowledge is not to give law, what or who shall ? If
infinite benevolence shall not declare and enforce law, what or who shall 2
God's attributes and relations render it obligatory upon him to exercise
just that holy sovereignty we have ascribed to him.
(1) This sovereignty, and no other, he claims for himself.
Job xxiii. 13: “But he is in one mind, and who can turn him 2 and what
his soul desireth, even that he doeth.”
Job xxxiii. 13: “Why dost thou strive against him 2 for he giveth not
account of any of his matters.”
Ps. cxv. 3: “But our God is in the heavens; he hath dome whatsoever
he hath pleased.”
Ps. cxxxv. 6: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, and
in earth, in the seas, and all deep places.”
Isa. lv. 10 : “For as the rain cometh down, and the snow from heaven,
and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring
forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sower, and bread to the eater;
11. So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth ; it shall not
return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall
prosper in the thing whereto I sent it.”
Dam. iv. 35 : “And all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as
nothing ; and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and
among the inhabitants of the earth ; and none can stay his hand, or say
unto him, What doest thou?”
Matt. xi. 25 : “At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O
Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from
the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. 26. Even so,
Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.”
Matt. xx. 12: “Saying, These last have wrought but one hour, and thou
hast made them equal unto us, which have borne the burden and heat of
the day. 13. But he answered one of them, and said, Friend, I do thee
no wrong; didst not thou agree with me for a penny ? 14. Take that
thine is, and go thy way; I will give unto this last, even as unto thee.
15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own 2 Is thine eye
evil, because I am good? 16. So the last shall be first, and the first last;
for many be called, but few chosen.”
Rom. ix. 15 : “For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will
have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.
16. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of
IDIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 805
God that showeth mercy. 17. For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even
for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power
in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth.
18. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he
will he hardeneth.”
Eph. i. 1] : “In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being pre-
destinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the
counsel of his own will.”
Phil. ii. 13 : “For it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to
do of his good pleasure.”
(2.) Again: God claims for himself all the prerogatives of an absolute
and a universal sovereign, in the sense already explained. For example,
he claims to be the rightful and sole proprietor of the universe.
and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty; for all that is in the
heaven and in the earth is thime ; thine is the kingdom, O Lord, and thou
art exalted as head above all.”
Ps. l. 10 : “For every beast of the forest is mine, and the cattle upon a
thousand hills; 11. I know all the fowls of the mountains; and the wild
beasts of the field are mine. 12. If I were hungry, I would not tell thee,
for the world is mine, and the fulness thereof.”
Ps. XCV. 5: “The sea is his, and he made it, and his hands formed the
dry land. 6. O come, let us worship and bow down, let us kneel before the
Lord our Maker : 7. For he is our God, and we are the people of his
pasture, and the sheep of his hand.”
Ps. c. 3: “IXnow ye that the Lord he is God, it is he that hath made
us, and not we ourselves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture.”
Ezek. xviii. 4: “Behold, all Souls are mine ; as the soul of the father, so
also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth it shall die.”
Rom. xiv. 8: “For whether we live, we live unto the Lord ; and whether
we die, We die unto the Lord ; whether we live therefore, or die, we are
the Lord's.”
(3.) Again : God claims to have established the natural or physical laws
of the universe.”
Job XXXViii. 33. “Knowest thou the Ordinances of heaven 2 canst thou
set the dominion thereof in the earth 2"
Ps. cxix. 90 : “Thy faithfulness is unto all generations, thou hast esta-
blished the earth, and it abideth, 91. They continue this day according
to thine ordinances, for all are thy servants.”
Prov. iii. 19 : “The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, by under-
standing hath he established the heavens. 20. By his knowledge the depths
are broken up, and the clouds drop down the dew.”
Jer, XXXi. 35: “Thus saith the Lord, which giveth the sun for a light
by day, and the stars for a light by night, which divideth the sea when the
Waves thereof roar; the Lord of hosts is his name.”
Jer. xxxiii. 25 : “Thus saith the Lord, if my covenant be not with day
806 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and night, and if I have not appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth;
26. Then will I cast away the seed of Jacob, and David my servant, so that
I will not take any of his seed to be rulers over the seed of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob ; for I will cause their captivity to return, and have mercy
on them.”
(4.) God claims the right to exercise supreme authority.
Exod, xx. 23 : “Ye shall not make with me gods of silver, neither shall
ye make unto you gods of gold.”
1 Chron. xxix. 11 : “Thine, O Lord, is the greatness, and the power,
and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty; for all that is in the
heaven and the earth is thine; thine is the kingdom, O Lord, and thou
art exalted as head above all.”
Ps. xlvii. 7 : “For God is the king of all the earth, sing ye praises with
understanding.”
Prov. xxiii. 26: “My son, give me thine heart, and let thine eyes
observe my ways.”
Isa. xxxiii. 22 : “For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the
Lord is our king; he will Save us.”
Matt. iv. 10; “Then saith Jesus unto him, get thee hence, Satan ; for it is
written, thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.”
Matt. xxii. 37 : “Jesus Saith unto him, thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.”
(5.) God claims the right to exercise his own discretion in using such
means, and in exerting such an agency as will secure the regeneration of
men, or not, as it appears wise to him.
Deut. xxix. 4 : “Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive,
and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day.”
Jer. v. 14 : “Wherefore thus saith the Lord God of hosts, Because ye
speak this word, behold, I will make my words in thy mouth fire, and this
people wood, and it shall devour them.”
Matt. xiii. 10 : “And the disciples came, and said unto him, Why
speakest thou to them in parables 2 He answered and said unto them,
Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of
heaven, but to them it is not given.”
Matt. xx. 15, 16: “Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine
own 2 Is thine eye evil because I am good 2 So the last shall be first,
and the first last : for many be called, but few chosen.”
Mark iv. 11 : “And he said unto them, Unto you it is given to know
the mystery of the kingdom of God ; but unto them that are without, all
these things are done in parables: 12. That seeing they may see, and not
perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest at any
time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them.”
Rom. ix. 22 : “What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his
power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted
to destruction. 23. And that he might make known the riches of his glory
on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory.”
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 807
2 Tim. ii. 25 : “In meekness instructing those that oppose themselves ;
if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the
truth.”
(6.) God claims the right to try his creatures by means of temptation.
Deut. xiii. 1 : “If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of
dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, 2. And the sign or the wonder
come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, let us go after other
gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them ; 3. Thou shalt not
hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams; for the
Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God
with all your heart and with all your soul.”
1 Kings xxii. 20: “And the Lord said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that
he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead? And one said on this manner,
and another said on that manner. 21. And there came forth a spirit, and
stood before the Lord, and said, I will persuade him, 22. And the Lord
said unto him, Wherewith ? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a
lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt per-
suade him, and prevail also ; go forth, and do so.”
Job ii. 3. “And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my
servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an
upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil? and still he holdeth
fast his integrity, although thou movedst me against him, to destroy him
without cause. 7. So went Satan forth from the presence of the Lord, and
smote Job with Sore boils, from the sole of his foot unto his crown.”
Matt. iv. 1 : “Them was Jesus led up of the spirit into the wilderness to
be tempted of the devil.”
(7.) God also claims the right to exercise his own discretion in so arrang.
ing the affairs of his government as to control the hearts of men, not
necessarily, but through the exercise of their own liberty.
1 Sam. xxvi. 19. “Now therefore, I pray thee, let my lord the king hear
the words of his servant. If the Lord have stirred thee up against me, let
him accept an offering; but if they be the children of men, cursed be they
before the Lord, for they have driven me out this day from abiding in the
inheritance of the Lord, saying, Go, serve other gods.”
Ps. xxxiii. 14: “From the place of his habitation he looked upon all the
inhabitants of the earth. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike; he con-
sidereth all their works.”
Is, xlv. 9 : “Woe unto him that striveth with his Maker | Let the
potsherd strive with the potsherds of the earth. Shall the clay say to him
that fashioneth it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands 2"
Rom. ix. 20: “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?
Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me
thus 2 21, Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to
make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour.”
(8.) God also claims the right to use all creatures, and to dispose of all
creatures and events, so as to fulfil his own designs.
808 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
2 Sam. vii. 14. “I will be his father, and he shall be my son; if he
commit iniquity, I will chastem him with the rod of men, and with the stripes
of the children of men.”
2 Kings v. 1: “Now Naaman, captain of the host of the king of Syria,
was a great man with his master, and honourable, because by him the Lord
had given deliverance unto Syria ; he was also a mighty man in valor, but
he was a leper.”
1 Chron. vi. 15: “And Jehozadak went into captivity, when the Lord
arried away Judah and Jerusalem by the hand of Nebuchadnezzar.”
Job i. 15: “And the Sabeans fell upon them, and took them away; yea,
they have slain the servants with the edge of the sword; and I am escaped
alone to tell thee. 17. While he was yet speaking, there came also another,
and said, The Chaldeans made out three bands, and fell upon the camels,
and have carried them away; yea, and slain the servants with the edge of
the sword ; and I only am escaped to tell thee. And Job said, Naked came
I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I return thither; the Lord
gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord.”
Ps. xvii. 13: “Arise, O Lord, disappoint him, cast him down ; deliver
my soul from the wicked, which is thy sword, from men which are thy
hand, O Lord.”
Isa. x. 5: “O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand
is mine indigmation: 6. I will send him against an hypocritical nation, and
against the people of my wrath will I give him charge, to take the spoil,
and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets.
7. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so ; but it is in
his heart to destroy and cut off mations not a few. 12. Wherefore it shall
come to pass, that when the Lord hath performed his whole work upon
Mount Zion and on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the stout heart of
the king of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks. 15. Shall the axe
boast itself against him that heweth therewith 2 or shall the saw magnify
itself against him that shaketh it? as if the rod should shake itself against
them that lift it up, or as if the staff should lift up itself, as if it were no
wood.”
Jer, xxvii. 8 : “And it shall come to pass, that the nation and kingdom
which will not serve the same Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, and
that will not put their neck under the yoke of the king of Babylon, that
nation will I punish, saith the Lord, with the sword, and with the famine,
and with the pestilence, until I have consumed them by his hand.”
Ezek. xxiv. 14 : “And I will lay my vengeance upon Edom by the hand
of my people Israel; and they shall do in Edom according to mine anger,
and according to my fury; and they shall know my vengeance, saith the
Lord God.”
Hab. i. 6 : “For, lo, I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter and hasty na-
tion, which shall march through the breadth of the land, to possess the
dwelling-places that are not theirs. 12. Art thou not from everlasting, O
Lord, my God, mine Holy One 2 We shall not die, O Lord, thou hast or-
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 809
dained them for judgment; and O mighty God, thou hast established them
for correction.”
(9.) God claims the right to take the life of his sinful subjects at his
own discretion.
Gen. xxii. 2 : “And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac,
whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah, and offer him
there for a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains, which I will tell
thee of.”
Deut. xx. 16: “But of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy
God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that
breatheth. 17. But thou shalt utterly destroy them ; namely, the Hittites,
and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the
Jebuzites, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee : 18. That they
teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have dome unto
their gods; so should ye sin against the Lord your God.”
1 Sam. xv. 3 : “Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that
they have, and spare them not ; but slay both man and woman, infant and
suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.”
(10.) God also claims the right to employ wicked rulers and instruments
as his own rod, and scourge, to chastise individuals and nations for their
wickedness.
1 Kings xix. 15 : “And the Lord said unto him, Go, return on thy way
to the Wilderness of Damascus : and when thou comest, anoint Hazael to
be king over Syria.”
2 Kings viii, 12 : “And Hazael said, Why weepeth, my Lord 2 And
he answered, Because I know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children
of Israel: their strong holds wilt thou set on fire, and their young men
Wilt thou slay with the sword, and wilt dash their children, and rip up their
Women with child.”
Ezek. xx. 24 : “Because they had not executed my judgments, but had
despised my statutes, and had polluted my sabbaths, and their eyes were
after their fathers' idols. 25. Wherefore I gave them also statutes that
were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live. 26. And I
polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass through the
fire all that openeth the womb, that I might make them desolate, to the end
that they might know that I am the Lord.”
Dam. iv. 17. “This matter is by the decree of the watchers, and the de-
mand by the word of the holy ones; to the intent that the living may know
that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whom-
soever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.”
Hos. Xiii. 11 : “I gave thee a king in mime anger, and took him away
in my wrath.”
(11.) God furthermore claims the sole prerogative of executing ven-
geance on the Wicked. Jº
Ps, Xciv. 1 : “O Lord God, to whom vengeance belongeth; O God, to
whom vengeance belongeth, show thyself.
810 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Rom. xii. 12: “Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give
place unto wrath : for it is written, Vengeance is mine ; I will repay, Saith
the Lord.”
Deut. xxxii. 35. “To me belongeth vengeance and recompense; their
feet shall slide in due time; for the day of their calamity is at hand, and the
things that shall come upon them make haste. 36. For the Lord shall judge
his people, and repent himself for his servants, when he seeth that their
power is gone, and there is none shut up, or left. 39. See now that I, even
I, am he, and there is no god with me: I kill, and I make alive; I wound,
and I heal: neither is there any that can deliver out of my hand. 40. For
I lift up my hand to heaven, and say, I live for ever. 41. If I whet my
glittering sword, and mine hand take hold on judgment, I will render ven-
geance to mine enemies, and will reward them that hate me. 42. I will
make mine arrows drunk with blood, and my sword shall devour flesh; and
that with the blood of the slain, and of the captives, from the beginning of
revenges upon the enemy. 43. Rejoice, O ye nations, with his people ; for
he will avenge the blood of his servants, and will render vengeance to his
adversaries, and will be merciful unto his land, and to his people.”
(12.) God declares that he will maintain his own sovereignty.
Isa. xlii. 8. “I am the Lord; that is my name: and my glory will I not
give to another, neither my praise to graven images.”
Isa. xlviii. 11. “For mine own sake, even for mine own sake, will I do it:
for how should my name be polluted ? and I will not give my glory unto
another.”
These passages will disclose the general tenour of scripture upon this
Subject.
REMARKS,
1. The Sovereignty of God is an infinitely amiable, sweet, holy, and
desirable sovereignty. Some seem to conceive of it as if it were revolting
and tyrannical. But it is the infinite opposite of this, and is the perfection
of all that is reasonable, kind and good.
Isa. lvii. 15. “For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth
etermity, whose name is holy: I dwell in the high and holy place, with him
also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble,
and to revive the heart of the contrite ones. 16. For I will not contend
for ever, neither will I be always wroth: for the spirit should fail before me,
and the souls which I have made. 17. For the imiquity of his covetousness
was I Wroth, and smote him : I hid me, and was Wroth, and he went on
frowardly in the way of his heart. 18. I have seen his ways, and will heal
him; I will lead him also, and restore comforts unto him, and to his
mourners. 19. I create the fruit of the lips; Peace, peace to him that is
far off, and to him that is near, saith the Lord; and I will heal him.”
.2. Many seem afraid to think or speak of God's sovereignty, and even
pass over, with a very slight reading, those passages of scripture that so
fully declare it. They think it unwise and dangerous to preach upon the
DIVINE SOWEREIGNTY. 8] I
subject, especially unless it be to deny or explain away the sovereignty
of God. This fear in pious minds has no doubt originated in a miscon-
ception of the mature of this sovereignty. They have been led either by
false teaching, or in some way, to conceive of the divine sovereignty as an
iron and unreasonable despotism. That is, they have understood the doc-
trime of divine sovereignty to so represent God. They therefore fear and
reject it. But let it be remembered and for ever understood, to the etermal
joy and unspeakable consolation of all holy beings, that God's sovereignty
is nothing else than infinite love directed by infinite knowledge, in such a
disposal of events as to secure the highest well-being of the universe; that,
in the whole details of creation, providence and grace, there is not a solitary
measure of his that is not infinitely wise and good.
3. A proper understanding of God’s universal agency and sovereignty, of
the perfect wisdom and benevolence of every measure of his government,
providential and moral, is essential to the best improvement of all his dis-
pensations toward us, and to those around us. When it is understood, that
God's hand is directly or indirectly in everything that occurs, and that he is
infinitely wise and good, and equally wise and good in every single dispensa-
tion—that he has one end steadily and always in view—that he does all for
one and the same ultimate end—and that this end is the highest good of him-
self and of universal being;—I say, when these things are understood and
considered, there is a divine sweetness in all his dispensations. There is
them a divine reasonableness, and amiableness, and kindness, thrown like
a broad mantle of infinite love over all his character, works and ways. The
soul, in contemplating such a sacred, universal, holy sovereignty, takes on
a sweet smile of delightful complacency, and feels secure, and reposes in
perfect peace, surrounded and supported by the everlasting arms.
4. Many entertain most ruinous conceptions of divine sovereignty. They
manifestly conceive of it as proceeding wholly independent of law, and of
second causes, or means. They often are heard to use language that implies
this. They say, “if it is God's will you cannot hinder it. If God has begun
the work, he will accomplish it.” In fact, their language means nothing,
unless they assume that in the dispensation, of grace all is miracle. They
often represent a thing as manifestly from God, or as providential, because
it was, or appeared to be, so disconnected with appropriate means and
instrumentalities. In other words it was quite miraculous.
Now, I suppose, that God's sovereignty manifests itself through and by
means, or second causes, and appropriate instrumentalities. God is as
much a sovereign in the kingdom of nature as of grace. Suppose farmers,
mechanics, and shopkeepers should adopt, in practice, this absurd view of
divine sovereignty of which I am speaking? Why, they would succeed about
as well in raising crops and in transacting business, as those Christians and
ministers who apply their views of sovereignty to spiritual matters, do in
Saving Souls.
8 12 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE LXXVII.
PURPOSES OF GOD.
In discussing this subject I shall endeavour to show,
I. WHAT I UNDERSTAND BY THE PURPOSES OF GOD.
II. NoTICE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PURPOSE AND DECREE.
III. SHOW THAT IN SOME SENSE THE PURPOSEs of GOD MUST EXTEND
TO ALL EVENTS.
IV. STATE DIFFERENT SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSES DIFFERENT
EVENTS.
V. THAT GoD's REVEALED WILL Is NEVER INCONSISTENT WITH HIS
SECRET WILL OR PURPOSE.
VI. NOTICE THE WISDOMI AND BENEvol.BNCE of THE DIVINE PURPOSES.
VII. SHOW THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE DIVINE PURPOSEs.
VIII. THAT THE PURPOSEs of GoD ARE A GROUND OF ETERNAL AND
JOYFUIL CONFIDENCE.
IX. CONSIDER THE RELATION OF THE PURPOSEs To THE PRESCIENCE OR
FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD.
X. SHOW THAT GoD's PURPOSES ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH, BUT
DEMAND THE USE OF MEANs, BOTH ON THE PART OF GOD AND ON OUR PART
TO AC COMIPLISH THEMI.
I. What I understand by the purposes of God.
. Purposes, in this discussion, I shall use as symonymous with design,
intention. The purposes of God must be ultimate and proximate. That
is, God has and must have an ultimate end. He must purpose to accom-
plish something by his works and providence, which he regards as a good
in itself, or as valuable to himself, and to being in general. This I call
his ultimate end. That God has such an end or purpose, follows from the
already established facts, that God is a moral agent, and that he is
infinitely wise and good. For surely he could not be justly considered as
either wise or good, had he no intrinsically valuable end which he aims to
realize, by his works of creation and providence. His purpose to secure
his great and ultimate end, I call his ultimate purpose. His proximate
purposes respect the means by which he aims to secure his end. If he
purposes to realize an end, he must of course purpose the necessary means
for its accomplishment. The purposes that respect the means are what I
call in this discussion, his proximate purposes.
II. Distinction between purpose and decree.
Purpose has just been defined, and the definition need not be repeated.
The term decree is used in a variety of senses. It is much used in legal
and governmental proceedings. When used in judicial or equitable pro-
ceedings, it is synonymous—
1. With judgment, decision, determination; and—
2. With Order, direction, command.
PURPOSES OF GOD. 813
When used in legislative proceedings, it is synonymous with ordinance,
law, statute, enactment, command. The term is used in the Bible as
synonymous—
(1.) With fore-ordination or determination, appointment.
Job xxviii. 10. “ He putteth forth his hand upon the rock; he overturn-
eth the mountains by the roots. 26. When he made a decree for the rain,
and a way for the lightning of the thunder "
Ps. Xi. 2: “I will declare the decree, the Lord hath said unto me, Thou
art my son ; this day have I begotten thee."
Ps. cxlviii. 6. “ He hath also established them for ever and ever ; he
hath made a decree which shall not pass.”
Prov. viii. 29. “When he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters
should not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of
the earth.”
Jer. v. 22. “ Fear ye not me? saith the Lord: will ye not tremble at
my presence, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea, by a
perpetual decree that it cannot pass it, and though the waves thereof toss
themselves, yet can they mot prevail; though they roar, yet can they not
pass over it."
Dan, iv. 24. “This is the interpretation, O king, and this is the decree
of the Most High, which is come upon my lord the king.”
(2.) It is used as synonymous with ordinance, statute, law.
Dan. vi. 7. “ All the presidents of the kingdom, the governors, and the
princes, the counsellors, and the captains, have consulted together to
establish a royal statute, and to make a firm decree, that whosoever shall
ask a petition of any god or man for thirty days, save of thee, O king, he
shall be east into the den of lions. S. Now, O king, establish the decree,
and sign the writing, that it be not changed, according to the law of the
Medes and Persians, which altereth not. 26. I make a decree, that in
every dominion of my kingdom men tremble and fear before the God of
Daniel ; for he is the living God, and steadfast for ever, and his kingdom
that which shall not be destroyed, and his dominion shall be even unto
the end.”
This term has been generally used by theological writers as synonymous
with fore-ordination, appointment. To deeree, with these writers, is to
appoint, ordain, establish, settle, fix, render certain. This class of writers
also often confound decree with purpose, and use the word as meaning the
same thing. They seldom, so far as I recollect, use the term decree as
Synonymous with law, enactment, command, &e.
I see mo objection to using the term decree, in respect to a certain class of
physical events, as synonymous with appointment, fore-ordination, fixing, ren-
dering certain. But I think this use of it, applied, as it has been, to the actions
of moral agents, is highly objectionable, and calculated to countenance the
idea of fatality and necessity, in respect to the actions of men. It seems
inadmissible to speak of God's decreeing the free actions of moral agents,
in the sense of fixing, settling, determining, fore-ordaining them as he fixes,
814 SYSTEMATIC TRIEOILOGY,
settles, renders certain all physical events. The latter he has fixed or
rendered certain by a law of necessity. The former, that is, free acts,
although they may be, and are certain, yet they are not rendered so by a
law of fate or mecessity ; or by an ordinance or decree that fixes them so,
that it is not possible they should be otherwise.
In respect to the government of God, I prefer to use the term purpose,
as I have said, to signify the design of God, both in respect to the end at
which he aims, and the means he intends or purposes to use to accom-
plish it. The term decree I use as synonymous with command, law, or
ordinance. The former I use as expressive of what God purposes or de-
signs to do himself, and by his own agency, and also what he purposes or
designs to accomplish by others. The latter I use as expressive of God's
Will, command, or law. He regulates his own conduct and agency in
accordance with the former, that is, with his purposes. He requires his
creatures to conform to the latter, that is, to his decrees or laws. We shall
see, in its proper place, that both his purposes and his actions are conformed
to the spirit of his decrees, or laws; that is, that he is benevolent in his
purposes and conduct, as he requires his creatures to be. I distinguish
what God purposes or designs to accomplish by others, and what they
design. God's end or purpose is always benevolent. He always designs
good. His creatures are often selfish, and their designs are often the
direct opposite to the purpose of God, even in the same events. For
example, see the following cases —
Gen. xlv. 4: “And Joseph said unto his brethren, Come near to me I
pray you ; and they came near. And he said, I am Joseph your brother,
whom ye sold into Egypt. 5. Now therefore, be not grieved, nor angry
with yourselves that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you,
to preserve life. 6. For these two years hath the famine been in the land,
and yet there are five years, in the which there shall neither be bearing nor
harvest. ”
Gen. 1, 19: “And Joseph said unto them, Fear not ; for I am in the place
of God. 20. But as for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant
it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive.”
Isa. x, 5 : “O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their
hand is mine indignation. 6. I will send him against a hypocritical
mation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to take
the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire
of the streets. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so, but it is in his heart to de-
stroy, and cut off nations not a few. 12. Wherefore it shall come to pass,
that when the Lord hath performed his whole work upon Mount Zion and
on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the stout heart of the king of
Assyria, and the glory of his high looks.”
Mark xv. 9 : “But Pilate answered them, saying, Will ye that I release
unto you the king of the Jews 2 10. (For he knew that the chief priests
had delivered him for envy)."
John iii. 16; “ For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begot-
PURPOSES OF GOD. S 15
ten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have
everlasting life.”
Acts ii. 23 : “ Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and
fore-knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified
and slain.”
III. There must be some sense in which God's purposes extend to all
tº l'é’)lts.
1. This is evident from reason. His plan must, in some sense, include
all actual events. He must foreknow all events by a law of necessity.
This is implied in his omniscience. He must have matured and adopted
his plan in view of, and with reference to, all events. He must have had
some purpose or design respecting all events that he foresaw. All events
transpire in consequence of his own creating agency; that is, they all
result in some way directly or indirectly, either by his design or sufferance,
from his own agency. He either designedly brings them to pass, or suffers
them to come to pass without interposing to prevent them. He must have
known that they would occur. He must have either positively designed
that they should, or, knowing that they would result from the mistakes or
selfishness of his creatures, negatively designed not to prevent them, or,
he had no purpose or design about them. The last hypothesis is plainly
impossible. He cannot be indifferent to any event. He knows all events,
and must have some purpose or design respecting them.
2. The Bible abundantly represents God's purposes as in some sense
extending to all events. For example:
(1.) He is represented as perfectly wise in his works, and ways, and plan
of creation and government:
Deut. xxxii. 4: “He is the Rock, his work is perfect ; for all his ways
are judgment; a God of truth, and without iniquity: just and right is he. '
Ps, civ. 24 : “O Lord, how wonderful are thy works; in wisdom hast
thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches.”
Eccl. iii. 14 : “I know that whatsoever God doeth it shall be for ever;
nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it; and God doeth it,
that men should fear before him.”
If God is infinitely wise, he must have had a universal plan.
(2.) The Bible represents his purposes as universal and particular.
Job xiv. 5 : “Seeing his days are determined, the number of his months
are with thee; thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot pass.”
Isa. Niv. 26: “This is the purpose that is purposed upon the whole
earth ; and this is the hand that is stretched out upon all the nations.”
Acts NWii. 26: “And hath made of one blood all nations of men for to
dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before
appointed, and the bounds of their habitation.”
Eph. i. 11 : “ In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being pre-
destimated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after
the counsel of his own will.”
816 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(3.) It represents his purposes as in some sense extending both to
matural evil, and to sin or moral evil.
Acts i. 23: “Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-
knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and
slaim.”
Acts iv. 27 : “For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou
hast amointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the
people of Israel, were gathered together. 28. For to do whatsoever thy
hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.”
Acts xiii. 29: “And when they had fulfilled all that was written of him,
they took him down from the tree, and laid him in a sepulchre.”
1 Pet. ii. 8: “And a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, even to
them which stumble at the word, being disobedient ; whereunto also they
were appointed.”
Jude 4: “For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before
of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of
our God, into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, and our
Lord Jesus Christ.”
Rev. xvii. 17 : “For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and
to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God
shall be fulfilled.”
(4.) It represents God’s purposes as both ultimate and proximate, or
including means and ends.
Acts xxvii. 22 : “And now I exhort you to be of good cheer; for there
shall be no loss of any man's life among you, but of the ship. 23. For
there stood by me this night the angel of God, whose I am, and whom I
serve. 24. Saying, Fear not Paul, thou must be brought before Caesar;
and, lo, God hath given thee all them that sail with thee. 30. And as the
shipmen were about to flee out of the ship, when they had let down the
boat into the sea, under colour as though they would have cast anchors out
of the foreship, 31. Paul said to the centurion and to the soldiers, Except
these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved.”
2 Thess. ii. 13: “Dut we are bound to give thanks alway to God for
you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning
chosen you to Salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of
the truth.”
1 Pet. i. 2 : “Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father,
through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the
blood of Jesus Christ.”
(5.) The Bible represents God's providence and agency as extending in
some sense to all events; from which also we must infer the universality
of his purposes —
Ps. cxlvii. 8 : “Who covereth the heaven with clouds, who prepareth
rain for the earth, who maketh grass to grow upon the mountains. 9. He
giveth to the beast his food, and to young ravens which cry. 15. He
sendeth forth his commandment upon earth ; his word runneth very swiftly.
PURPOSES OF GOD. 817
16. He giveth snow like wool; he scattereth the hoar-frost like ashes. 17.
He casteth forth his ice like morsels; who can stand before his cold 2 18.
He sendeth out his word and melteth them, he causeth his winds to blow,
and the waters flow.”
Isa. xxvi. 12 : “Lord, thou wilt ordain peace for us; for thou also hast
wrought all our works in us.”
Isa. xlv. 7: “I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace and
create evil. I the Lord do all these things.”
Dan. iv. 36: “And all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as
nothing; and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and
among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say
unto him, What doest thou ?”
Amos. iii. 6: “Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not
be afraid 2 shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it 2"
Matt. x. 29 : “Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing 2 and one of
them shall not fall on the ground without your Father.”
Rom. xi. 36: For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things.”
Eph. i. 11 : “In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being
predestimated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after
the counsel of his own will.”
Phil ii. 13 : “For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do
of his good pleasure.”
Heb. xiii. 20: “Now the God of peace, that brought again from the
dead the Lord Jesus, that great Shepherd of the sheep, through the blood
of the everlasting covenant, 21. Make you perfect in every good work to
do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight, through
Jesus Christ.”
Ps. civ. 14 : “He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the
service of man, that he may bring forth food out of the earth ; 15. And
wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine,
and bread which strengtheneth man's heart. 21. The young lions roar
after their prey, and seek their meat from God. 27. These wait all upon
thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. 28. That
thou givest them they gather, thou openest thine hand, they are filled with
good.”
Matt. v. 45 : “That ye may be the children of your Father which is in
heaven; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and
sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.”
Matt. vi. 26: “Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither
do they reap, nor gather into barns : yet your heavenly Father feedeth
them. Are ye not much better than they 2 28. And why take ye thought
for raiment 2 Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow ; they toil
not, meither do they spin. 19. And yet I say unto you, That even Solomon
in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these. 30. Wherefore, if God
so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into
the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith ?”
3 G
818 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(6.) The Bible also represents all creatures as dependent on the provi-
dence, and of course on the purposes of God.
Job xii. 10: “In whose hand is the soul of every living thing, and the
breath of all mankind.”
Ps. lvii. 7 : As well the singers as the players on instruments shall be
there : all my springs are in thee.”
Jer. x. 23: “O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself; it is
not in man that walketh to direct his steps.”
Jer. xviii. 6 : “O house of Israel, cannot I do with you as this potter 2
saith the Lord. Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye in
mine hand, O house of Israel.”
John xv. 5 : “I am the vine, ye are the branches: he that abideth in
me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit : for without me ye
can do nothing.”
Acts xvii. 26: “And hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to
dwell on all the face of the earth ; and hath determined the times before
appointed, and the bounds of their habitation. 27. That they should seek
the Lord, if happily they might feel after him, and find him, though he be
not far from every one of us. 28. For in him we live, and move, and have
our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For We also are his
offspring.”
2 Cor. iii. 5: “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything,
as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God.”
(7.) The Bible also represents all creatures as preserved by the providence
of God, from which also we must infer, that his purposes extend to them.
Neh, ix. 5: “Thou, even thou, art Lord alone: thou hast made heaven,
the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things that
are therein, the Seas, and all that is therein, and thou preservest them all;
and the host of heaven worshippeth thee.”
Job vii. 20: “I have simmed; what shall I do unto thee, O thou Preserver
of men 2 why hast thou Set me as a mark against thee, so that I am a
burden to myselſ?”
Job x. 12: “Thou hast granted me life and favour, and thy visitation
hath preserved my spirit.”
Job xxxiv. 14 : “If he set his heart upon man, if he gather unto himself
his spirit and his breath ; 15. All flesh shall perish together, and man
shall turn again unto dust.”
Ps, xxxvi. 6: “Thy righteousness is like the great mountains; thy judg:
ments are a great deep. O Lord, thou preservest man and beast.”
Ps. lxiii. 8: “My soul followeth hard after thee; thy right hand uphold-
eth me.”
Ps. lxvi. 8: “O bless our God, ye people, and make the voice of his
praise to be heard ; 9. Which holdeth our soul in life, and suffereth not
our feet to be moved.”
Ps. cxxi. 7: “The Lord shall preserve thee from all evil: he shall pre-
serve thy Soul.”
PURPOSES OF GOD, 819
Heb. i. 3 : “Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express
image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power,
when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the
Majesty on high.”
(8.) The Bible also represents the Lord, as, in Some sense, and in some
manner, influencing the hearts of men.
From this also we must infer, that his purposes, in Some sense, extend
to the moral actions of men.
Ezra vii. 27: “Blessed be the Lord God of our fathers, which hath put
such a thing as this in the king's heart, to beautify the house of the Lord
which is in Jerusalem.”
Prov. xvi. 1 : “The preparation of the heart in man, and the answer of
the tongue, is from the Lord. 9. A man's heart deviseth his way; but
the Lord directeth his steps.”
Prov. xxi. 1 : “The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers
of water ; he turneth it whithersoever he will.”
Isa. lxiv. S: “But now, O Lord, thou art our Father; we are the clay,
and thou our Potter; and we all are the work of thy hand.”
Zec. Nii. 1 : “The burden of the word of the Lord for Israel, saith the
Lord, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the
earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him.”
Acts xvi. 14 : “And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple,
of the city of Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard us: whose heart the
Lord opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of
Paul.”
Rom. ix. 20: “Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against
God 2 Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou
made me thus? 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the
same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?"
(9.) The Bible represents God as often, at least, controlling public sen-
timent.
Gen. xxxxi. 21: “But the Lord was with Joseph, and showed him mercy,
and gave him favour in the sight of the keeper of the prison.”
Exod. iii. 21: “And I will give this people favour in the sight of the
Egyptians.”
Dan, i. 9 : “Now God had brought Daniel into favour and tender love
with the prince of the eunuchs.”
Acts vii. 9: “And the patriarchs, moved with envy, sold Joseph into
Egypt; but God was with him. 10. And delivered him out of all his
afflictions, and gave him favour and wisdom in the sight of Pharaoh, king
of Egypt; and he made him governor over Egypt, and all his house.”
From these passages we must infer, that the purposes of. God extend to
these events. -
(10.) The Bible also represents the providence of God as extending to
moral evils and delusions; from which again we must infer, that his pur.
poses in some sense extend to them.
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PURPOSES OF GOD. 821
and hardened our heart from thy fear? Return, for thy Servant's sake, the
tribes of thine inheritance.”
Exek. xiv. 6: “And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a
thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet; and I will stretch out my
hand upon him, and will destroy him from the midst of my people
Israel.”
Zech. viii. 10 : “For before these days there was no hire for man, nor
any hire for beast; neither was there any peace to him that went out
or came in, because of the affliction: for I set all men every one against his
neighbour.”
Luke x. 21 : “In that hour Jesus rejoiced in spirit, and Said, I thank
thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things
from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes: even so,
Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight.”
John xii. 32 : “Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias
said again, 40. He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart;
that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart,
and be converted, and I should heal them. 41. These things said Esaias,
when he saw his glory, and spake of him.”
Tom. ix. 18 : “Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy,
and whom he will he hardeneth.”
Rom. xi. 7 : “What then 2 Israel hath not obtained that which he
Seeketh for, but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded.
8. (According as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber,
eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear), unto
this day.”
2 Thess. ii. 10; “And with all deceivableness of umrighteousness in
them that perish ; because they received not the love of the truth, that
they might be saved. 11. And for this cause God shall send them strong
delusions, that they should believe a lie; 12. That they all might be
damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.”
Rev. xvii. 17 : “For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and
to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God
shall be fulfilled.”
These passages will show the general tenor of scripture upon this sub-
ject.
IV. Different senses in which God purposes different events.
1. The great end of all his works and ways he must have purposed
positively, that is, absolutely. This end, namely his own good and the
highest good of the universe, he set his heart upon securing. This end he
no doubt properly intended, or purposed to secure. This must have been
his ultimate intention or purpose. This end was no doubt a direct object
of choice.
3. God must no doubt also, in some sense, have purposed all the neces.
Sary means to this result. Such actions as tended naturally, or on account of
822 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
their own nature, to this result, he must have purposed positively, in the sense
that he delighted in them, and chose them because of their own nature, or
of their natural relation to the great end he proposed to accomplish by
them. Observe, the end was an ultimate end, delighted in and chosen for
its own sake. This end was the highest good or well-being of himself and
the universe of sentient existences. This has been sufficiently shown in
former lectures; and besides it follows of necessity from the nature and
attributes of God. If this were not so, he would be neither wise nor
good. Since he delighted in and chose the end for its own sake or value,
and purposed it with a positive purpose, he must also have chosen and
delighted in the necessary means. He must have created the universe,
both of matter and of mind, and established its laws, with direct reference
to, and for the sake of, the end he purposed to accomplish. The end was
valuable in itself, and chosen for that reason. The necessary means were
as really valuable as the end which depended upon them. This value,
though real, because of their tendency and natural results, is not ultimate,
but relative; that is, they are not, in the same sense that the end is, valu-
able in themselves; but they being the necessary means to this end, are as
really valuable as the end that depends upon them. Thus our necessary
food is not valuable in itself, but is the necessary means of prolonging our
lives. Therefore, though not an ultimate good, yet it is a real good of as
great value, as the end that maturally depends upon it. The maturally
necessary means of Securing a valuable end we justly esteem as equally
valuable with the end, although this value is not absolute but relative. We
are so accustomed to set a value on the means, equal to the estimated
importance of the end to which they sustain the relation of necessary
means, that we come loosely to regard and to speak of them as Valuable in
themselves, when in fact their value is not absolute but relative.
God must have purposed to Secure, so far as he wisely could, obedience
to the laws of the universe, both physical and moral. These laws were
established for the sake of the end to which they tended, and obedience to
them must have been regarded by God as of real, though not ultimate,
value, equal to that of the end, for the accomplishment of which they were
ordained. He must have delighted in obedience to these laws for the sake
of the end, and must have purposed to secure this obedience so far as he
could in the nature of things; that is, in so far as he wisely could. Since
moral law is a rule for the government of free moral agents, it is conceiv.
able, that, in some cases, this law might be violated by the subjects of it,
unless God resorted to means to prevent it, that might introduce an evil of
greater magnitude than the violation of the law in the instances under
consideration would be. It is conceivable, that, in some cases, God
might be able so to overrule a violation of his laws, physical and moral, as
upon the whole to secure a greater good than could be secured, by intro-
ducing such a change into the policy and measures of his administration, or
so framing his administration, as to prevent altogether the violation of any
law. God might, and no doubt does, prefer that every creature should, in
PURPOSES OF GOD, 823
the precise circumstances in which he is placed, obey all the laws of his
being. But if, under these circumstances, voluntary agents will in any
case disobey, their disobedience, though a real, may be a less evil than
such a change in the administration of his government as would prevent
the violation, would be. In this case, he might regard the violation as the
less of two evils, and suffer it rather than change the arrangements of his
government. He might sincerely deplore and abhor these violations of
law, and yet might see it not wise to prevent them, because the measures
necessary to prevent them might result in an evil of still greater magni-
tude. He might purpose to suffer these violations, and take the trouble to
overrule them, so far as was possible, for the promotion of the end he had
in view, rather than interpose for their prevention. These violations he
might not have purposed in any other sense than that he foresaw them, and
purposed not to prevent them, but on the contrary to suffer them to occur,
and to overrule them for good, so far as this was practicable. These events,
or violations of law, have no matural tendency to promote the highest well-
being of God and of the universe, but have in themselves a directly
opposite tendency. Nevertheless, God could so overrule them, as that
these occurrences would be a less evil than that change would be that could
have prevented them. Violations of law then, he might have purposed
only to suffer, while obedience to law he might have designed to produce
Ol' SéClll'é.
3. We have seen, that God and men may have different motives in the
same event, as in the case of the brethren of Joseph, already alluded
to :—
Gen. xlv. 4: “And Joseph said unto his brethren, Come near to me, I
pray you. And they came near. And he said, I am Joseph your brother,
whom ye sold into Egypt. Now therefore be not grieved nor angry with
yourselves that ye sold me hither ; for God did send me before you to
preserve life. 6. For these two years hath the famine been in the land;
and yet there are five years, in the which there shall neither be earing nor
harvest '''
As also in the case of the king of Assyria : Is. X, 5. “O Assyrian, the
rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation. 6. I
will send him against a hypocritical nation, and against the people of my
wrath will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and
to tread them down like the mire of the streets. 7. Howbeit he meaneth
not so, neither doth his heart think so; but it is in his heart to destroy and
cut off nations not a few. 12. Wherefore it shall come to pass, that when
the Lord hath performed his whole work upon mount Zion, and on Jerusalem,
I will punish the fruit of the stout heart of the king of Assyria, and the
glory of his high looks.”
Also, John iii. 16: “I'or God so loved the world, that he gave his only
begotten Son,' that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have
everlasting life.”
Acts i. 23. “Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-
824 SYSTEMLATIC THEOLOGY.
knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified
and slain.”
These, and such like instances, show that wicked agents may, and often
do, and when wicked always do, entertain a very different reason for their
conduct from what God entertains in suffering it. They have a selfish
end in view, or do what they do for a selfish reason. God, on the contrary,
has a benevolent end in view in not interposing to prevent their sin; that
is, he hates their sin as tending in itself to destroy, or defeat the great end
of benevolence. But foreseeing that the sin, notwithstanding its matural
evil tendency, may be so overruled, as upon the whole to result in a less
evil than the changes requisite to prevent it would, he benevolently prefers
to suffer it rather than interpose to prevent it. He would, no doubt, prefer
their perfect obedience, under the circumstances in which they are, but
would sooner suffer them to sin, than so change the circumstances as to
prevent it; the latter being, all things considered, the greater of two evils.
God then always suffers his laws to be violated, because he cannot benevo-
lently prevent it under the circumstances. He suffers it for benevolent
reasons. But the sinner always has selfish reasons.
4. The Bible informs us, that God brings good out of evil, in the sense
that he overrules sin to promote his own glory, and the good of being —
Ps. lxxvi. 10. “Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; the remainder
of wrath shalt thou restrain.”
Rom. iii. 5: “But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of
God, what shall we say P Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance 2 (I
speak as a man.) 7. For if the truth of God hath more abounded through
my lie unto his glory; why yet am I judged as a simmer ? And not rather
(as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say,) Let us do
evil, that good may come 2 whose damnation is just.”
Rom. v. 20: “Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might abound ;
but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.”
Rom. viii. 28 : “And we know that all things work together for good to
them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.”
5. The Bible also informs us that God does not aim at producing sin in
creation and providence ; that is, that he does not purpose the existence of
sin in such a sense as to design to Secure and promote it, in the administra-
tion of his government. In other words still, sin is not the object of a
positive purpose on the part of God. It exists only by sufferance, and not
as a thing which naturally tends to secure his great end, and which there-
fore he values on that account and endeavours to promote, as he does
obedience to the law.
Jer. vii. 9. “Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear
falsely, and burn incense unto Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye
know not ? 10. And come and stand before me in this house, which is
called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations?”
I Cor. xiv. 33: “For God is not the author of confusion, but of peace,
as in all churches of the Saints.”
PURPOSES OF GOD. 825
James i. 13: “I let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of
God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man;
14. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and
enticed. 15. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin
when it is finished, bringeth forth death. 16. Do not err, my beloved
brethren. 17. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and
cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness,
neither shadow of turning.”
James iii. 14: “But if ye have bitter envying and strife in your hearts,
glory not, and lie not against the truth. 15. This wisdom descendeth not
from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish. 16. For where envying and
strife is, there is confusion, and every evil work. 17. But the wisdom that
is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated,
full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and hypocrisy.”
I John ii. 16 : “For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and
the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the
world.”
Obedience to law is an object of positive purpose. God purposes to pro-
mote it, and uses means with that design. Sin occurs incidentally, so far
as the purpose of God is concerned. It need not be, and doubtless is not,
the object of positive design or purpose, but comes to pass because it can-
not wisely be prevented. God uses means to promote obedience. But
moral agents, in the exercise of their free agency, often disobey in spite of
all the inducements to the contrary which God can wisely set before them.
God never sets aside the freedom of moral agents to prevent their sinning,
nor to secure their obedience. The Bible everywhere represents men as
acting freely under the government and universal providence of God, and
it represents sin as the result of, or as consisting in, an abuse of their
freedom.
Gen. xlii. 21 : “And they said one to another, We are verily guilty con-
cerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he be-
sought us, and we would not hear; therefore is this distress come upon us.”
Ex. viii. 32: “And Pharaoh hardened his heart at this time also, neither
would he let the people go.”
Ex. ix. 27: “And Pharaoh sent, and called for Moses and Aaron, and
said unto them, I have simmed this time: the Lord is righteous, and I and
my people are wicked.”
Ex. x. 16: “Then Pharaoh called for Moses and Aaron in haste ; and
he said, I have simmed against the Lord your God, and against you.
17. Now therefore forgive, I pray thee, my sin only this once, and entreat
the Lord your God, that he may take away from me this death only.”
Deut. xxx. 19: “I call heaven and earth to record this day against you,
that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore
choose life, that both thou and thy Seed may live.”
Josh. xxiv. 15: “And if it seem evil unto you to serve the Lord, choose
ye this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers
served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the Amorites,
K})OTOGIHL OILVINGINESXS 938
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IPURPOSES OF GOD. 827
The following things appear to be true in respect to the purposes of God,
as taught both by reason and revelation :-
(1) That God's purposes extend in some sense to all events.
(2) That he positively purposes the highest good of being, as a whole,
as his end.
3.) That he has ordained wise and wholesome laws as the necessary
means of securing this end.
(1) That he positively purposes to secure obedience to these laws in so
far as he wisely can, and uses means with this design.
(5.) That he does not positively purpose to secure disobedience to his
laws in any case, and use means with that design; but that he only pur-
poses to suffer violations of his law rather than prevent them, because he
foresees that, by his overruling power, he can prevent the violation from
resulting in so great an evil as the change necessary to prevent it would
do. Or in other words, he sees that he can secure a greater good upon
the whole, by suffering the violation under the circumstances in which it
occurs, than he could by interposing to prevent it. This is not the same
thing as to say, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. For
should all moral agents perfectly obey, under the identical circumstances
in which they disobey, this might, and doubtless would result in the highest
possible good. But God, foreseeing that it were more conducive to the
highest good of being to suffer some to sin, rather than so change the
circumstances as to prevent it, purposed to suffer their sin, and Overrule it
for good; but he did not aim at producing it, and use means with that intent.
(6.) Obedience to law he directly purposes to secure.
(7.) Disobedience to law he never purposed or aimed to secure; but on
the contrary purposed to prevent it, so far as he wisely could.
(8.) When he cannot wisely prevent it, he wisely suffers and overrules
it, so as to render it, not a less evil than obedience Would have been in the
identical circumstances in which the disobedience occurs, but as a less evil
than the change of circumstances necessary to prevent it would be.
V. God's revealed will is never inconsistent with his secret purpose.
It has been common to represent sin as the necessary occasion, condition,
or means of the greatest good, in such a sense, that upon the whole God
secretly, but really prefers sin to holiness in every case where it exists;
that while he has forbidden sim under all circumstances, upon pain of
eternal death, yet, because it is the necessary occasion, condition, or means
of the greatest good, God really prefers its existence to holiness in every
instance in which it exists. It has been said, sin exists. God does
not therefore prevent it. But he could and would prevent it, if he did
not upon the Whole prefer it to holiness, in the circumstances in which
it occurs. Its existence, then, it has been said, is proof conclusive that
God Secretly prefers its existence to holiness, in every case in which it
occurs. But this is a mom sequitur. It does not follow from the existence
of sin, that God prefers sin to holiness in the circumstances in which it
828 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
occurs; but it may be, that he only prefers sin to such a change of circum-
stances as would prevent it. Suppose I require my son to do a certain
thing. I know that he will do it, if I remain at home and see to it. But
I know also, that if I go from home he will not do it. Now I might prefer
that he should do as I command, and consider his disobedience as a great
evil; still I might regard it as a less evil than for me to remain at home,
and keep my eye upon him. I might have just reasons for supposing that,
under the circumstances, a greater good could be secured upon the whole
by my going from home, although his disobedience might be the conse-
quence, than by remaining at home, and preventing his disobedience.
Benevolence therefore might require me to go.
But should my son infer from my leaving him, under these circum-
stances, that I really, though secretly, preferred his disobedience to his
obedience, under the identical circumstances in which I gave the command,
would his inference be legitimate 2 No, indeed. All that he could justly
infer from my leaving him, with the knowledge that he would disobey me if
I did, would be, that although I regarded his disobedience as a great evil,
yet I regarded remaining at home a greater.
Just so, it may be when sin exists. God is sincere in prohibiting it. He
would greatly prefer that it should not exist. All that can be justly in-
ferred from his not preventing it is, that, although he regards its existence
as a great and real evil, yet upon the whole he regards it as a less evil, than
would result from so great a change in the administration of his govern
ment as would prevent it. He is therefore entirely and infinitely sincere
in requiring obedience, and in prohibiting disobedience, and his secret pur-
pose is in strict keeping with his revealed will. Were the moral law
universally obeyed, under the circumstances in which all moral agents exist,
no one can say, that this would not be better for the universe, and more
pleasing to God than disobedience is in the same circumstances. Nor is it
fair to infer, that upon the whole, God must prefer sin to holiness, where it
occurs, from the fact that he does not prevent it. As has been said, all
that can justly be inferred from his not preventing it is, that under the
circumstances he prefers not sin to holiness, but prefers to suffer the agent
to sin and take the consequences, rather than introduce such changes in the
policy and administration of his government as would prevent it. Or it
may be said, that the present system is the best that infinite wisdom could
devise and execute, not because of sin, but in spite of it, and notwithstand-
ing sin is a real though incidental evil.
It is a palpable contradiction and an absurdity to affirm, that any being
can sin, intending thereby to promote the greatest good. This will appear
if we consider :
1. That it is admitted on all lands, that benevolence is virtue.
2. That benevolence consists in willing good, or the highest good of
being as an end.
3. That it is duty to will both the end and the necessary means to pro-
mote it.
PURPOSES OF GOD, 829
4. That right and benevolence are always at one, that is, that which is
benevolent must always be right, and can in no case be wrong.
5. That consequently it can never be sin to choose the highest good of
being, with all the necessary occasions, conditions, and means of promot-
ing it.
6. It is impossible therefore for a being to sin, or to consent to sin, as
an occasion, condition, or means, or designing thereby to promote the high-
est good of being ; for this design would be virtue, and not sin. Whether
all virtue consist in benevolence, or not, still it must be admitted, that all
forms of virtue must be consistent with benevolence, unless it be admitted,
that there can be a law of right inconsistent with, and opposed to, the law
of benevolence. But this would be to admit, that two moral laws might be
opposed to each other ; which would be to admit, that a moral agent might
be under an obligation to obey two opposing laws at the same time, which
is a contradiction. Thus it appears, that there can be no law of right op-
posed to, or separate from, the law of benevolence. Benevolence and
right must then always be as one. If this be so, it follows, that whatever
benevolence demands, cannot be wrong, but must be right. But the law
of benevolence demands, not only the choice of the highest good of being
as an end, but also demands the choice of all the known necessary occa-
sions, conditions, and means with a design to promote that end.
It is naturally impossible to sin, in using means designed and known to
be necessary to the promotion of the end of benevolence. It is therefore
maturally impossible to do evil, or to sin that good may come, or with the
design to promote good thereby. To deny this, and to maintain, that a
man can possibly sin in intending to promote the highest good of being,
and in fulfilling the necessary conditions, and in using what he regards as
the necessary means, is, I Say again, to hold, that there is a law of right
Separate from, and opposed to, the law of benevolence;—which is, as before
said, to hold, that two moral laws are opposed to each other, and require op-
posite courses of conduct in the same agent at the same time;—which is to
hold, that there are two opposing laws of nature and of God at the same
time;—which is to hold, that a moral agent may justly be required, on pain
of eternal death, to choose, design, and act in opposite directions at the
Same time;—which is to hold, that it is his duty to sin and not to sin at the
same time;—which is to hold, that a moral agent might sin in doing his
duty, or in obeying moral law.
Let those who hold that right and benevolence may be opposed to each
other, and that a moral agent can sin with a benevolent intention, see
what their doctrine amounts to, and get out of the absurdity as best they
can. The fact is, if Willing the highest good of being is always virtuous,
it must always be right to will all the necessary occasions, conditions, and
means to that end. It is therefore a contradiction to say that sin can be
among the necessary and intended occasions, conditions, and means; that
is, that any one could sin intending thereby to promote the highest good.
But it is not pretended by those who hold this dogma, that sin sustains
830 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
to the highest good the same relations that holiness does. Holiness has a
natural tendency to promote the highest good; but the supposition now
under consideration is, that sin is hateful in itself, and that it therefore
must dissatisfy and disgust all moral agents, and that its matural tendency is
to defeat the end of moral government, and to prevent rather than promote
the highest good; but that God foresees that, notwithstanding its intrin-
sically odious and injurious nature, he can so overrule it as to make it the
condition, occasion, or instrument of the highest good of himself and of
his universe, and that for this reason he really upon the whole is pleased
that it should occur, and prefers its existence, in every instance in which it
does exist, to holiness in its stead. The supposition is, that sin is in its
own nature infinitely odious and abominable to God, and perfectly odious
to all holy moral agents, yet it is the occasion of calling into developement
and exercise such emotions and feelings in God and in holy beings, and
such modifications of benevolence, as do really more than compensate for
all the disgust and painful emotions that result to holy beings, and for all
the remorse, agony, despair, and endless suffering, that result to sinners.
It is not supposed by any one that I know of, that sin maturally tends
to promote the highest good at all, but only that God can, and does, so
overrule and counteract its natural tendency, as to make it the occasion or
condition of a greater good, than holiness would be in its stead. Now in
reply to this, I would say, that I pretend not to determine to what extent
God can, and will, overrule and counteract the naturally evil and injurious
tendency of sin. It surely is enough to say, that God prohibits it, and
that it is impossible for creatures to know that sin is the necessary occasion,
or condition, or means of the highest good.
“If sin is known by God to be the necessary occasion, condition, or means
of the highest good of himself and of the universe, whatever it may be in
itself, yet viewed in its relations, it must be regarded by him as of infinite
value, since it is the indispensable condition of infinite good.’ According
to this theory, sin in every instance in which it exists, is and must be re-
garded by God as of infinitely greater value than holiness would be in its
stead. He must then, upon the whole, have infinite complacency in it,
But this leads me to attend to the principal arguments by which it is
Suppposed this theory is maintained. It is said, for example —
(1.) That the highest good of the universe of moral agents is condition-
ated upon the revelation of the attributes and character of God to them;
that but for sin these attributes, at least some of them, could never have
been revealed, inasmuch as without sin there would have been no occasion
for their display or manifestation; that neither justice nor mercy, nor
forbearance, nor Self-denial, nor meekness, could have found the occasions
of their exercise or manifestation, had sin never existed.
To this I reply, that sin has indeed furnished the occasion for a glorious
manifestation of the moral perfections of God. From this we see that
God's perfections enable him greatly to overrule sin, and to bring good
out of evil; but from this we are not authorized to infer, that God could
PURPOSES OF GOD. 83 I
not have revealed these attributes to his creatures without the existence of
sin. Nor can we say, that these revelations would have been necessary
to the highest perfection and happiness of the universe, had all moral
agents perfectly and uniformly obeyed. When we consider what the
moral attributes of God are, it is easy to see that there may be myriads
of moral attributes in God of which no creature has, or ever will have,
any knowledge ; and the knowledge of which is not at all essential to
the highest perfection and happiness of the universe of creatures. God's
moral attributes are only his benevolence, existing and contemplated in its
various relations to the universe of beings. Benevolence in any being
must possess as many attributes as there are possible relations under
which it can be contemplated, and should their occasions arise, these
attributes would stand forth in exercise. It is not at all probable, that all
of the attributes of benevolence, either in the Creator or in creatures, have
yet found the occasions of their exercise, mor, perhaps, will they ever. As
mew occasions rise to all eternity, benevolence will develope new and
striking attributes, and manifest itself under endless forms and varieties
of loveliness. There can be no such thing as exhausting its capabilities
of developement.
In God benevolence is infinite. Creatures can mever know all its attri-
butes, nor approach any nearer to knowing all of them than they now are.
For it is infinite, and there can be no end to its capabilities of developing
in exercise new forms of beauty and loveliness. It is true, that God has
taken occasion to show forth the glory of his benevolence through the
existence of sin. He has seized the occasion, though mournful in itself, to
manifest some of the attributes of his benevolence by the exercise of them.
It is also true, that we cannot know how or by what means God could have
revealed these attributes, if sin had not existed; and it is also true, that we
cannot know that such a revelation was impossible without the existence of
sin; nor that, but for sin, the revelation would have been necessary to the
highest good of the universe.
God forbids sin, and requires universal holiness. He must be sincere
in this. But sin exists. Shall we say that he Secretly chooses that it
should and really, though secretly, prefers its existence to holiness, in the
circumstances in which it occurs ? Or shall we assume, that it is an evil,
that God regards it as such, but that he cannot Wisely prevent it; that is,
to prevent it would introduce a still greater evil? It is an evil, and a great
evil, but still the less of two evils; that is, to suffer it to occur, under the
circumstances, is a less evil than such a change of circumstances, as would
Prevent it, would be. This is all we can justly infer from its existence.
This leaves the sincerity of God unimpeached, and sustains his consistency,
and the consistency and integrity of his law. The opposite supposition
represents God and the law as infinitely deceitful.
(3.) It has been said, that the Bible sustains the supposition, that sin is
the necessary means of the highest good. I trust the passages that have
been quoted, disprove this saying.
832 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(3.) It is said, that to represent sim as not the means of the highest good,
and God as unable to prevent it, is to represent God as unable to accom-
plish all his will; whereas he says, he will do all his pleasure, and that
mothing is too hard for him.
I amswer: God pleases to do only what is naturally possible, and he is
well pleased to do that and nothing more. This he is able to do. This he
will do. This he does. This is all he claims to be able to do ; and this is
all, that in fact infinite wisdom and power can do.
(4.) But it is said, that if sin is an evil, and God can neither prevent
nor overrule it, so as to make it a means of greater good than could be
secured without it, he must be unhappy in view of this fact, because he
cannot prevent it, and secure a higher good without it.
I answer: God neither desires nor wills to perform natural impossibili-
ties. God is a reasonable being, and does not aim at nor desire impos-
sibilities. He is well content to do as well as, in the nature of the case, is
possible, and has no unreasonable regrets because he is not more than
infinite, and that he cannot accomplish what is impossible to infinity
itself. His good pleasure is, to secure all the good that is possible to
infinity: with this he is infinitely well pleased.
Again: does not the objection, that the view of the subject here presented
limits the divine power, lie with all its force against those who make this
objection ? To hold that sin is the necessary means or condition of the
highest good, is to hold that God was unable to promote the highest good
without resorting to such vile means as sin. Sin is an abomination in it-
self; and do not they, as really and as much limit the power of God, who
maintain his inability to promote the highest good without it, as they do
who hold, that he could not wisely so interfere with the free actions of moral
agents as to prevent it? Sim exists. God abhors it. How is its existence
to be accounted for 2 I suppose it to be an evil unavoidably incidental to
that system of moral government which, notwithstanding the evil, was
upon the whole the best that could be adopted. Others suppose, that sin
is the necessary means or condition of the greatest good; and account for
its existence in this way:-that is, they suppose that God admits or permits
its existence as a necessary occasion, condition, or means of the highest
good; that he was not able to secure the highest good without it. The
two explanations of the admitted fact that sin exists, differ in this:—
One method of explanation holds, that sin is the necessary occasion,
condition, or means of the highest good; and that God actually, upon the
whole, prefers the existence of sin to holiness, in every instance in which
it exists; because, in those circumstances, it is a condition or means of
greater good than could have been secured by holiness in its stead. This
theory represents God as unable to secure his end by other means, or upon
other conditions, than sin. The other theory holds, that God really prefers
holiness to sin in every instance in which it occurs; that he regards sin as
an evil, but that while he regards it as an evil, he suffers its existence as a
less evil than such a change in the administration of his government as
PURPOSES OF GOD. 833
would prevent it, would be. Both theories must admit, that in some sense
God could not wisely prevent it. Explain the fact of its existence as you
will, it must be admitted, that in some sense God was not able to prevent
it, and secure his end.
If it be said, that God could neither wisely prevent it, nor so overrule
it as to make it the means or condition of the highest good, he must be
rendered unhappy by its existence; I reply, that this must be equally true
upon the other hypothesis. Sin is hateful, and its consequences are a great
evil. These consequences will be eternal and indefinitely great. God
must disapprove these consequences. If sin is the necessary condition or
means of the greatest good, must not God lament that he cannot secure the
good without a resort to such loathsome, and such horrible means? If his
inability wisely to prevent it will interfere with and diminish his happiness,
must not the same be true of his inability to secure the highest good, with-
out such means as will prove the eternal destruction of millions 2
VI. Tſ’isdom and benevolence of the purposes of God.
We have seen that God is both wise and benevolent. This is the doc-
trime both of reason and of revelation. The reason intuitively affirms that
God is, and is perfect. The Bible assumes that he is, and declares that he
is perfect. Both wisdom and benevolence must be attributes of the infinite
and perfect God. These attributes enter into the reason's idea of God.
The reason could mot recognize any being as God to whom these attributes
did not belong. But if infinite wisdom and benevolence are moral attributes
of God, it follows of course that all his designs or purposes are both per-
fectly wise and benevolent. God has chosen the best possible end, and
pursues it in the use of the best practicable means. His purposes embrace
the end and the means necessary to secure it, together with the best prac-
ticable disposal of the sin, which is the incidental result of his choosing this
end and using these means; and they extend no further; they are all there.
fore perfectly wise and good.
VII. The immutability of the divine purposes.
We have seen that immutability is not only a natural, but also a moral
attribute of God. The reason affirms, that the self-existent and infinitely
perfect God is unchangeable in all his attributes. The ground of this affir-
mation it is not my purpose here to inquire into. lt is sufficient here to
say, what every one knows, that such is the affirmation of the reason. This
is also everywhere assumed and taught in the Bible. God's moral attributes
are not immutable in the sense of necessity, but only in the sense of cer.
tainty. Although God is not necessarily benevolent, yet he is as immutably
So, as if he were necessarily so. If his benevolence were meeessary, it would
not be virtuous, for the simple reason that it would not be free. But being
free, its immutability renders it all the more praise-worthy.
VIII. The purposes of God are a ground of eternal and joyful confidence.
That is, they may reasonably be a source of eternal confort, joy, and
3 H
834 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
&
peace. Selfish beings will not of course rejoice in them, but benevolent
beings will and must. If they are infinitely wise and good, and sure to be
accomplished, they must form a rational ground of unfailing confidence and
joy. God Says:—
Isa. xlvi. 10: “Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient
times the things that are not yet dome, saying, My counsel shall stand, and
I will do all my pleasure.”
Psa. xxxiii. 11: “The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts
of his heart to all generations.”
Prov. xix. 21 : “There are many devices in a man's heart, nevertheless,
the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand.”
Acts v. 39: “But if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be
found even to fight against God.”
These, and many parallel passages are reasonably the source of perpetual
confidence and joy to those who love God, and sympathize with him.
IX. The relation of God's purposes to his prescience or foreknowledge.
We have seen that God is omniscient, that is, that he necessarily and
etermally knows whatever is, or can be, an object of knowledge. His pur-
poses must also be etermal and immutable, as we have seen. In the order
of time, therefore, his purposes and his foreknowledge must be coeval, that
is, they must be co-eternal.
But in the order of mature, God's knowledge of what he could do, and
what could be dome, must have preceded his purposes: that is, he could
not, so to speak, in the Order of nature, have formed his purpose and made
up his mind what to do, until he had considered what could be dome, and
what was best to be done. Until all possible ends, and ways, and means,
were weighed and understood, it was of course impossible to make a selec-
tion, and settle upon the end with all the necessary means; and also settle
upon the ways and means of overruling any evil, natural or moral, that
might be seen to be unavoidably incidental to any system. Thus it appears,
that, in the order of mature, fore-knowledge of what could be done, and
what he could do, must have preceded the purpose to do. The purpose
resulted from the prescience or fore-knowledge. He knew what he could
do, before he decided what he would do. But, on the other hand, the pur-
pose to do must, in the order of nature, have preceded the knowledge of
what he should do, or of what would be done, or would come to pass as a
result of his purpose. Viewed relatively to what he could do, and what
could be dome, the Divine prescience must in the order of nature have
preceded the Divine purposes. But viewed relatively to what he would do,
and what would be dome, and would come to pass, the Divine purposes
must, in the order of nature, have preceded the Divine prescience. But I
say again, as fore-knowledge was necessarily eternal with God, his purposes
must also have been eternal, and therefore, in the order of time, neither
his prescience could have preceded his purposes, nor his purposes have pre-
ceded his prescience. They must have been cotemporaucous and co-eternal.
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836 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
there is no escape 2 Surely “madness is in their hearts while they live.”
But let them understand, that, in thus doing, they sin against the Lord,
and be sure their sin will find them out.
LECT U R E L XXVIII.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.
In discussing this subject, I will,
I. CALL ATTENTION TO THE DIFFERENT KINDs of CERTAINTY THAT MAY
BE IFREDICATED OF DIFFERENT THING.S.
II. STATE WHAT IS NOT INTENDED BY THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS,
AS I HOLD THE DOCTRINE.
III. SHOW WBAT IS INTENDED BY IT.
IV. PRESENT THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF IT.
V. NOTICE THE OBJECTIONS TO THIS DOCTRINE.
I. I am to notice the different kinds of certainty.
Everything must be certain with some kind of certainty. There is a way
in which all things and events either have been, are, or will be. All events
that ever did or will occur, were and are as really certain before as after
their occurrence. To an omniscient mind their real certainty might and
must have been known, as really before as after their occurrence. All future
events, for example, will occur in some way, and there is no real uncertainty
in fact, nor can there be any real uncertainty in the knowledge of God respect-
ing them. They are really as certain before they come to pass as they will
ever be, and they are as truly and perfectly known as certain by God as they
ever will be. They are as truly present to the Divine fore-knowledge as
they ever will be. Whatever of contingency and uncertainty there may be
respecting them in some respects, yet, in point of fact, all events are
certain, and there is no real uncertainty in respect to any event that ever
did or will occur. This would be equally true, whether God or any other
being knew how they would be or not. The fore-knowledge of God does not
make them certain. He knows them to be certain simply because they are
so. Omniscience is the necessary knowledge of all objects of knowledge,
past, present, and future. But omniscience does not create objects of
knowledge. It does not render events certain, but only knows how they
certainly will be, because it is certain, not only that they will be, but how
and when they will be, All the free actions of moral agents are as really
certain before they occur, as they ever will be. And God must as truly
know how they will be before they occur, as he does after they have occurred.
l. The first kind of certainty that I shall notice, is that of absolute
necessity; that is, a certainty depending on no conditions whatever. This
is the highest kind of certainty. It belongs to the absolute and the infinite,
to the existence of space, duration, and to the existence of God; and in short
to everything that is self-existent, infinite, and immutable in a natural sense ;
that is, to everything infinite that does not imply voluntariness. The
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 837
natural attributes of God are certain by this kind of certainty, but his moral
attributes, consisting as they do in a voluntary state of mind, though in-
finite and etermal, do not belong to this class.
2. A second kind of certainty is that of physical, but conditional necessity.
To this class belong all those events that come to pass under the operation
of physical law. These belong properly to the chain of cause and effect.
The cause existing, the effect must exist. The event is rendered certain
and necessary by the existence of its cause. Its certainty is conditionated
upon its cause. The cause existing, the event must follow by a law of
necessity, and the events would not occur of course, did not their causes
exist. The causes being what they are, the events must be what they are:
This class of events are as really certain as the foregoing class. By speaking
of one of them as certain in a higher sense than the other, it is not in-
tended, that one class is any more certain than the other, but only that the
certainty is of a different kind. For example, the first class are certain by
a kind of certainty that does not, and never did depend on the will of any
being whatever. There never was any possibility that these things should
be otherwise than they are. This, it will be seen, must be true of space
and duration, and of the existence and the matural attributes of God.
But all other things except the self-existent, the maturally immutable and
eternal, are certain only as they are conditionated directly or indirectly upon
the will of some being. For example, all the events of the physical universe
were rendered certain by creation, and the establishing and upholding of
those physical and necessary laws that cause these events. These are,
therefore, certain by a conditioned, though physical necessity. There is no
freedom or liberty in the events themselves ; they occur necessarily, when
their causes or conditions are supplied.
3. A third kind of certainty is that of a moral certainty. I call it a moral
certainty, not because the class of events which belong to it are less certain
than the foregoing, but because they consist in, or are conditioned upon, the
frce actions of moral agents. This class do not occur under the operation of
a law of necessity, though they occur with certainty. There is no contingency
predicable of the absolutely certain in the sense of absolute certainty above
defined. The second class of certainties are contingent only in respect to
their causes. Upon condition that the causes are certain, the events de-
pending upon them are certain, without or beyond any contingency. This
third class, though no less certain than the former two, are nevertheless con-
tingent in the highest sense, in which anything can be contingent. They
occur under the operation of free will, and consequently there is not one of
them that might not by natural possibility fail, or be otherwise than it is or
will in fact be. This kind of certainty I call a moral certainty, as opposed
to a physical certainty, that is, it is not a certainty of necessity in any sense ;
it is only a mere certainty, or a voluntary certainty, a free certainty, a
certainty that might, by matural possibility in every case, be no certainty at
all. But, on the contrary, the opposite might in every instance be certain
by a natural possibility. God in every instance, knows how these events
838 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
will be, as really as if they occurred by mecessity; but his foreknowledge
does not affect their certainty one way or the other. They might in every
instance by matural possibility be no certainties at all, or be the opposite of
What they are or will be, God's foreknowledge in anywise notwithstanding.
God knows them to be certain, not because his knowledge has any influence
of itself to necessitate them, but because they are certain in themselves.
Because it is certain in itself that they will be, God knows that they will
be. To this class of events belong all the free actions of moral agents. All
events may be traced ultimately to the action of God's free will; that is,
God's free actions gave existence to the universe, with all its physical
agencies and laws, so that all physical events are in some sense owing to,
and result from, the actions of free will. But physical events occur never-
theless under the immediate operation of a law of necessity. The class now
under consideration depend not upon the operation of physical law as their
cause. They are caused by the free agent himself. They find the occasions
of their occurrence in the providential events with which moral agents are
surrounded, and therefore may be traced indirectly, and more or less re-
motely to the actions of the Divine will.
Concerning this class of events, I would further remark, that they are
not only contingent, in such a sense, that they might in every case by
natural possibility be other than they are, but there may be, humanly
speaking, the utmost danger that they will be otherwise than they really
will be ; that is, there may be danger, and the utmost danger, in the only
sense in which there can be in fact any danger, that any event will be
otherwise than what it turns out to be. All events being really certain,
there is in fact no danger that any event whatever will turn out differently
from what it does, in the sense that it is not certain how it will be. But
since all acts of free will, and all events dependent on those acts, are con-
tingent in the highest sense in which any event can in the mature of things
be contingent; and in the sense that, humanly speaking, there may be
millions of chances to one that they will be otherwise than they will in fact
turn out to be, we say of all this class of events, that there is danger that
they may or may not occur.
Again: I remark, in respect to this class of events, that God may foresee
that so intricate is the labyrinth, and so complicated are the occasions of
failure, that nothing but the utmost watchfulness and diligent use of means
on his part, and on our part, can secure the occurrence of the event.
Everything revealed in the Bible concerning the perseverance and final
salvation of the saints, and everything that is true, and that God knows of
the free actions and destinies of the Saints, may be of this class. These
events are nevertheless certain, and are known to God as certainties. Not
one of them will, in fact, turn out differently from what he foresees that
they will; and yet by natural possibility, they might every one of them
turn out differently; and there may, in the only sense in which danger is
predicable of anything, be the utmost danger that some or all of them will
turn out differently from what they in fact will. These events are contin-
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 839
gent in such a sense, that should the means fail to be used, or should any
event in the whole chain of influences connected with their occurrence, be
otherwise than it is, the end or event resulting, would or might be other-
wise, than in fact it will be. They are, nevertheless, certain, every one of
them, together with all the influences upon which each free act depends.
Nothing is uncertain in respect to whether it will occur or not and yet no
free act, or event depending upon a free act, is certain, in the sense that
it cannot by natural possibility be otherwise, nor in the sense that there
may not be great danger, or, humanly speaking, a probability that it will
be otherwise, and that, humanly speaking, there may not be many chances
to one that it will be otherwise.
When I say, that any event may, by natural possibility, be otherwise
than what it will in fact be, I mean, that the free agent has natural power
in every instance to choose otherwise than he does or actually will choose.
As an illustration of both the contingency and the certainty of this class
of events, suppose a man about to attempt to cross Lake Erie on a Wire, or
to pass down the falls of Niagara in a bark canoe. The result of this
attempt is really certain. God must know how it will be. But this result,
though certain, is conditionated upon a multitude of things, each of which
the agent has natural power to make otherwise than in fact he will. To
secure his safe crossing, every volition must be just what and as it will be
but there is not one among them that might not, by natural possibility, be
the opposite of what it will be.
Again, the case may be such, and the danger of failure so great, that
mothing could secure the safe crossing, but a revelation from God that
would inspire confidence, that the adventurer should in fact cross the lake,
or venture down the falls safely: I say, this revelation of God might be
indispensable to his safe crossing. Suppose it were revealed to a man
under such circumstances, that he should actually arrive in safety , but the
revelation was accompanied with the emphatic assurance, that the end
depended upon the most diligent, cautious, and persevering use of means
on his part, and that any failure in these would defeat the end. Both the
revelation of the certainty of success, and the emphatic warning, might be
indispensable to the securing of the end. Now, if the adventurer had con-
fidence in the promise of success, he would have confidence in the caution
not to neglect the necessary means, and his coufidence in both might
secure the desired result. But take an example from scripture: –
Acts xxvii. 21 : “But after long abstinence, Paul stood forth in the
midst of them, and said, Sirs, ye should have hearkened unto me, and not
have loosed from Crete, and to have gained this harm and loss. 22. And
now I exhort you to be of good cheer: for there shall be no loss of any
man's life among you, but of the ship. For there stood by me this night
the angel of God, whose I am, and whom I serve, 24. Saying, Fear not,
Paul : thou must be brought before Caesar; and lo, God hath given thee
all them that sail with thee, 25. Wherefore, sirs, be of good cheer: for I
believe God, that it shall be even as it was told me, 26. Howbeit we must
840 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
be cast upon a certain island. 27. But when the fourteenth night was
come, as we were driven up and down in Adria, about midnight the ship-
men deemed that they drew near to some country; 28. And sounded, and
found it twenty fathoms; and when they had gone a little further, they
Sounded again, and found it fifteen fathoms. 29. Then fearing lest we
should have fallen upon rocks, they cast anchors out of the stern, and
wished for the day. 30. And as the ship-men were about to flee out of the
ship, when they had let down the boat into the sea, under colour as though
they would have cast anchors out of the foreship, 31. Paul said to the
centurion and to the soldiers, Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be
saved.” Here the end was foreknown and expressly foretold at first, with-
out any condition expressed, though they plainly understood that the end
was to be secured by means. Paul afterwards informs them, that if they
neglected the means, the end would fail. Both the means and the end
were certain in fact, and God therefore expressly revealed the certainty of
the result, and afterwards by a subsequent revelation secured the use of
the necessary means. Here was no uncertainty, in the Sense that the thing
might, in fact, turn out otherwise than it did, and yet it was uncertain in
the sense that, by natural possibility, both the means and the end might fail.
I remark, again, in respect to events that are morally certain, that if they
are greatly desired, they are not the more, but all the less, in danger of
failing, by how much stronger the confidence is that they will occur, provided
it be understood, that they are certain only by a moral certainty; that is,
provided it be understood, that the event is conditioned upon the free acts
of the agent himself.
Again : it is generally admitted, that hope is a condition of success in
any enterprise; and if this is so, assurance of success, upon the proper con-
ditions, cannot tend to defeat the end.
I remark, again, that there is a difference between real danger, and a
knowledge or sense of danger. There may be as great and as real danger
when we have no sense or knowledge of it, as when we have. And on the
other hand, when we have the highest and the keenest Sense of danger,
there may be, in fact, no real danger; and indeed, as has been said, there
never is any danger in the sense that anything will, as a matter of fact,
turn out differently from what God foresees it will be.
Again: the fact that anything is revealed as certain, does not make it
certain ; that is, the revelation does not make it certain. It had been
certain, had not this certainty been revealed, unless it be in cases where the
revelation is a condition or means of the certainty revealed. All event may
be really certain, and may be revealed as certain, and yet, humanly speaking,
there may be millions of chances to one, that it will not be as it is revealed;
that is, so far as human foresight can go, the probabilities may be all againstit.
II. State what is not intended by the perseverance of the Saints, as I hold
the doctrine.
1. It is not, indeed, that any sinner will be saved without complying
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 841
with the conditions of salvation; that is, without regeneration, and per-
severing in obedience to the end of life, in a sense to be hereafter
explained.
2. It is not intended that saints, or the truly regenerate, cannot fall from
grace, and be finally lost, by natural possibility. It must be naturally pos-
sible for all moral agents to sin at any time. Saints on earth and in heaven
can by matural possibility apostatize and fall, and be lost. Were not this
naturally possible, there would be no virtue in perseverance.
3. It is not intended, that the true saints are in no danger of apostacy
and ultimate damnation. For, humanly speaking, there may be, and doubt.
less is, the greatest danger in respect to many, if not of all of them, in the
only sense in which danger is predicable of any event whatever, that they
will apostatize, and be ultimately lost.
4. It is not intended, that there may not be, humanly speaking, myriads
of chances to one, that some, or that many of them will fall and be lost.
This may be, as we say, highly probable ; that is, it may be probable in the
only sense in which it is probable, that any event whatever may be different
from what it will turn out to be.
5. It is not intended, that the salvation of the Saints is possible, except
upon condition of great watchfulness and effort, and perseverance on their
part, and great grace on the part of God.
6. It is not intended, that their salvation is certain, in any higher sense
than all their future free actions are. The result is conditioned upon their
free actions, and the end can be no more certain than its means or con-
ditions. If the ultimate salvation of the saints is certain, it is certain only
upon condition, that their perseverance in obedience to the end of life is
certain. Every act of this obedience is free and contingent in the highest
sense in which contingency can be predicated of any thing whatever. It
is also uncertain by the highest kind of uncertainty that can be predicated
of any event whatever. Therefore there is and must be, as much real
danger of the saints failing of ultimate salvation, as there is that any event
whatever will be different from what it turns out to be.
But here it should be distinctly remembered, as was said, that there is
a difference between a certainty and a knowledge of it. It is one thing for
an event to be really certain, and another thing for us to have a knowledge
of it as certain. Everything is really equally certain, but many things are
not revealed to us as certain. Those that are revealed as certain, are no
more really so than others, but with respect to future things, not in some
way revealed to us, we know not how they will prove to be. The fact that
a thing is revealed to us as certain does not make it certain, nor is it
really any the less uncertain because it is revealed to us as certain, unless
the revelation tends to secure the certainty. Suppose the ultimate salva-
tion of all the Saints is certain, and that this certainty is revealed to us;
unless this revelation is the means of securing their salvation, they are in
just as much real danger of ultimately failing of eternal life, as if no such
revelation had been made. Notwithstanding the certainty of their salva-
842 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
tion, and the fact that this certainly is revealed to them, there is just as
much real, though unknown, certainty or uncertainty, in respect to any
future event whatever, as there is in respect to this. All events are
certain with some kind of certainty, and would be whether any being what.
ever knew the certainty or not. So all events, consisting in or depending
upon the free acts of free agents, are really as uncertain as any event can
be, and this is true whether the certainty is revealed or not. The salva-
tion of the Saints them, is not certain with any higher certainty than
belongs to all future events that consist in, or are conditionated upon, the
free acts of free will, though this certainty may be revealed to us in one
case, and not in the other.
Of course the Salvation of the Saints is not certain by any kind or degree
of certainty that affords the least ground of hope of impunity in a course of
sin. “For if they are to be saved, they are to be saved upon condition of
continuing in faith and obedience to the end of life.”
Moreover, their salvation is no more certain than their future free
obedience is. The certainty of future free obedience, and a knowledge of
this certainty, cannot be a reason for not obeying, or afford encouragement
to live in sin. So no more can the knowledge of the conditional and moral
certainty of our salvation afford a ground for hope of impunity in a
life of sin.
8. The Salvation of the saints is not certain by any kind or degree of
certainty that renders their salvation or their dammation any more impossible,
than it renders impossible any future acts of sin or obedience. Consequently,
it is not certain in such a sense as to afford the least encouragement for hope
of salvation in sin, any more than a certainty that a farmer would raise a
crop upon condition of his diligent, and timely, and persevering use of the ap-
propriate means, would encourage him to neglect those means. If the farmer
had a knowledge of the certainty with its conditions, it would be no tempta-
tion to neglect the means; but, on the other hand, this knowledge would
operate as a powerful incentive to the required use of them. So neither can
the knowledge of the certainty of the salvation of the Saints, with the condi-
tion of it, be to them a temptation to live in sin ; but, on the contrary, this
knowledge must act as a powerful incentive to the exercise of confidence in
God, and perseverance in holiness unto the end. So neither can the certainty,
that the necessary means will be used, afford any encouragement to neglect
the use of them in the case of man's salvation, any more than the revealed
certainty, that a farmer will sow his field and have a crop, would encourage
him to neglect to sow. The known certainty of both the means and the
end, with an understanding of the moral mature of the certainty, has no
natural tendency to beget presumption and neglect; but, on the contrary,
to beget a diligent, and cheerful, and confident use of the mecessary means.
III. Show what is intended by the doctrine in question.
It is intended, that all who are at any time true Saints of God, are pre-
served by his grace and Spirit through faith, in the sense that, subsequently
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 843
to regeneration, obedience is their rule, and disobedience only the exception;
and that being thus kept, they will certainly be saved with an everlasting
Salvation.
LECTURE LXXIX.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.
PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS PROVED.
IV. I conſe, NOW TO A CONSIDERATION OF THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF THIS DOCTRINE.
Before I proceed to the direct proof of the doctrine, a few remarks may
be desirable.
I. I would remark, that I have felt greater hesitancy in forming and
expressing my views upon this, than upon almost any other question in
theology. I have read whatever I could find upon both sides of this ques-
tion, and have uniformly found myself dissatisfied with the arguments on
both sides. After very full and repeated discussions, I feel better able
to make up and express an opinion upon the subject than formerly. I have
at some periods of my ministry been nearly on the point of coming to the
conclusion that the doctrine is not true. But I could never find myself
able to give a satisfactory reason for the rejection of the doctrine. Apparent
facts that have come under my observation have sometimes led me seriously
to doubt the soundness of the doctrine ; but I cannot see, and the more
I examine the more unable I find myself to see, how a denial of it can be
reconciled with the scriptures.
I shall give the substance of what I regard as the scripture proof of this
doctrine, and beg the reader to make up his opinion for himself by a
careful examination. Perhaps what has been satisfactory to my mind may
not be so to the minds of others. Let no one believe this, or any other
doctrine upon my authority, but “prove all things and hold fast that
which is good.”
2. I observe, that its truth cannot be inferred from the nature of regene-
ration. It is true, as was said, and as will be farther shown, that perse-
verance is an attribute or characteristic of Christian character; but this
does not necessarily result from the mature of regeneration, but from the
indwelling Spirit of Christ. It has been common for that class of writers
and theologians, who hold what is called the Taste Scheme of regeneration,
to infer the truth of this doctrine from the mature of the change that con-
stitutes the new birth. In this they have been entirely consistent. If, as
they suppose, regeneration consists in a change in the constitution of the
mind, in the implanting or infusion of a new constitutional taste, relish, or
appetite, if it consists in or implies a change back of all voluntary action,
and such a change as to secure and necessitate a change of voluutary action;
why, then it is consistent, to infer from such a change the perseverance
844 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
of the Saints, unless it can be made to appear that either God, or Satan, or
Voluntary sin, can change the nature back again. If, in regeneration, the
nature is really changed, if there be some new appetite or taste implanted,
some holy principle implanted or infused into the constitution, why, then
it must follow, that they will persevere by a physical law of the new nature
or constitution. I see not how, in this case, they could even be the sub-
jects of temporary backsliding, unless the new appetite should temporarily
fail, as does sometimes our appetite for food. But if this may be, yet if
regeneration consists in or implies a new creation of something that is not
Voluntary, but involuntary, a creation of a new nature, instead of a new
character, I admit, that perseverance might be reasonably inferred from the
fact of such a change. But since I reject wholly this theory of regenera-
tion, and maintain that it is wholly a voluntary change, I cannot consist.
ently infer the final Salvation of the Saints from the mature of the change
that occurs in regeneration. I have been struck with the inconsistency of
those who hold the Taste Scheme of regeneration, and yet contend, not
only for falling from a regenerate state, but also that the regenerate may
and do fall into a state of entire depravity, every time they sin; that they
fall from this state of physical or constitutional regeneration every time
they commit sin, and must be regenerated or converted anew, or be lost.
Now, this is not reconcileable with the idea of the physical regeneration.
3. Nor can we infer the perseverance of the Saints, with any justice,
from their being, at their conversion, brought into a state of justification.
By perseverance some seem to mean, not that the saints do persevere
or continue in obedience, but that they will be saved at any rate, whether
they persevere in obedience or not. It was against this idea that such men
as the Wesleys, and Fletcher, and their coadjutors fought so valiantly.
They resisted justly and successfully the doctrine of perpetual justification,
upon condition of one act of faith, and maintained that the Saints as well
as sinners are condemned whenever they sin. They also contended, that
there is no kind of certainty that all true Saints will be saved. Since I
have endeavoured to refute the doctrine of a perpetual justification, con-
ditioned upon the first act of faith, I cannot of course infer the final salva-
tion of the Saints from the mature of justification. Those who hold, that
the first act of faith introduces the soul into a new relation of such a nature
that, from thenceforth, it is not condemned by the law, do what it will,
may justly infer from the nature of such a justification, that all who ever
exercise faith will escape the penalty of the Divine law. But we have
seen, that this is not the mature of gospel justification, and therefore we
must not infer that all Saints will be saved, from the mere fact that they
have once believed and been justified.
But the following considerations, taken together, seem to me to establish
the truth of the doctrine in question beyond reasonable doubt.
(l.) God has from etermity resolved upon the salvation of all the elect.
This we have seen. No one of this number will ever be lost. These
are given to Christ from eternity as a seed to serve him. The con-
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 845
version, perseverance, and final salvation of the elect, we have seen to be
secured. Their conversion, perseverance, and Salvation, are secured by
means of the grace of God in Christ Jesus, prevailing through the gospel,
so to influence their free-will as to bring about this result. The instruc-
tions, promises, threatenings, warnings, expostulations of the Bible, with all
the influences with which they are surrounded, are the instrumentalities by
means of which the Holy Spirit converts, Sanctifies, and saves them. At
every step, as Fletcher acknowledges, “grace is beforehand with free-will.”
God first comes to, and moves upon, the sinner; but the sinner does not
come to and move, or attempt to move God. God first draws, and the
sinner yields. God calls, and the sinner answers. The sinner would never
approach God, did not God draw him.
Again : God calls effectually, but not irresistibly, before the sinner
yields. He does not yield and answer to a slight call. Some indeed wait
to be drawn harder, and to be called louder and longer than others; but
no one, in fact, comes to God until effectually persuaded to do so; that is,
until he is effectually hunted from his refuges of lies, and drawn with so
great and powerful a drawing, as not to force, but to overcome, his re-
luctance or voluntary selfishness, and as to induce him to turn to God and
to believe in Christ. That the sinner is wholly disinclined to obey, up to
the very moment in which he is persuaded and induced to yield, there cam
be no doubt. His turning, as we have seen, is an act of his own, but he is
induced to turn by the drawings of the Holy Spirit.
Every person who was ever truly converted knows, that his conversion
is not to be ascribed to himself, in any other sense, than that he finally
consented, being drawn and persuaded by the Holy Spirit. The glory
belongs to God, for the simmer only yielded after, perhaps, protracted
resistance, and never until after he was so convinced as to have no further
excuse or apology for sin, nor until the Spirit, by means of truth, and
argument, and persuasion, fairly overcame him, and constrained, not forced
him to submit. This is a brief statement of the facts connected with the
conversion of every soul that was ever converted to God. This is true of
the conversion of all the elect of God ; and if others besides the elect are
ever converted, this is a true account of their conversion.
Again: the same is true of their perseverance in holiness, in every
instance, and in every act. The Saints persevere, not by virtue of a consti-
tutional change, but alone by virtue, or as a result of the abiding and
indwelling influence of the Holy Spirit. “Free grace is always before-
hand with free-will;" that is, the will never obeys, in any instance, nor for
one moment, except as it is persuaded to do so as really as at the first.
The work begun by the Holy Spirit is not carried on, except as the same
Spirit continues to work in the saints to will and to do of his good pleasure.
Saints do not begin in the Spirit, and then become perfect through or by
the flesh. There is no holy exercise that is not as really to be ascribed to
the grace and to the influence of the Holy Spirit, as is conversion itself,
The saints convert not themselves, in the sense that they turn or yield
846 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
When drawn, until persuaded by the Holy Spirit. God converts them in
the sense, that he effectually draws or persuades them. They turn them.
selves, in the sense that their turning is their own act. God turns them,
in the sense that he induces or produces their turning. The same is true
of their whole course of obedience in this life. The saints keep them-
selves, in the sense, that all obedience is their own ; all their piety consists
in their own voluntary obedience; but God keeps them, in the sense, that
in every instance, and at every moment of obedience, he persuades, and
enlightens, and draws them, insomuch, that he secures their voluntary
obedience ; that is, he draws and they follow. He persuades, and they
yield to his persuasions. He works in them to will and to do, and they
Will and do. God always anticipates all their holy exercises, and persuades
the Saints to put them forth. This is so abundantly taught in the Bible,
that to quote scripture to prove it were but to waste your time. The saints
are not only said to be converted, but also sanctified, and kept by the
power of God.
No saint then keeps himself, except in so far as he is kept by the grace,
and Spirit, and power of God. There is therefore no hope for any saint,
and no reason to calculate upon the salvation of any one, unless God
prevails to keep him from falling away and perishing. All who ever are
saved, or ever will be, are saved by and through free grace, prevailing over
free Will, that is, by free grace securing the voluntary concurrence of free
will. This God does, and is sure to do, with all the elect. It was upon
condition of the foreseen fact, that God could by the wisest administration
of his government, securé this result, that they were elected to eternal sal-
vation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth. Now
observe how the elect are saved. All the threatenings, warnings, and
teachings of the Bible are addressed to them, as to all others. If there
are any Saints, at any time, who are not of the elect, the Bible nowhere
notices any such persons, or speaks of them, as any less or more secure
than the elect.
Again: the Bible nowhere represents or implies, that any but the elect
are converted. It does not represent any but the elect as at any time
coming in heart to Christ—as at any time regenerated or born of God. The
Bible nowhere acknowledges two classes of saints, elect and non-elect. But,
if there were two such classes, and the salvation of the elect was certain, as
it really is, and that of the non-elect not certain, it is incredible that the
Bible should not reveal this fact. Again: so far is the Bible from recog-
nizing or implying any such distinction, that it everywhere implies the
contrary. It divides mankind into two, and but two classes, and these it
sets one over against the other. These are contrasted by the mames, saint
and sinner; people of God, and people of this world ; children of God,
and children of this world, or children of the devil ; the elect and the
reprobate, that is, the chosen and the rejected ; the sanctified and the
unsanctified ; the regenerated and the unregenerated ; the penitent and the
impenitent. By whatever names they are called, it is manifest that the
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 847
same classes and none others are meant. The elect of God is a common
name for the saints or people of God. I cannot find in the Bible any
evidence, that any were converted at any time, but the elect, or those whose
salvation is sure. The elect are, or will be, every one of them certainly
converted and saved. If any one chooses to contend, that any other are
ever converted, the burden of proof is upon him ; let him prove it, if he
can. But this he must prove, in order to establish the fact, that any truly
regenerated persons are ever lost, for sure it is, that no one of the elect
will ever be lost. But, since I am to take the affirmative, I must take the
burden of showing, that none but the elect are recognized in the Scriptures
as Saints; and as I am speaking only of the Salvation of the Saints, I shall
take it for granted, that all those who were from etermity chosen to etermal
salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth, will
certainly be saved.
Now, if it can be shown, that some saints have been really lost, it will
follow, that some have been converted who were not of the elect. And, on
the other hand, if it can be shown that no saint has been, or will be, finally
lost; but, on the contrary, that all the true Saints are, and will be saved, it
will follow that mome but the elect are converted. For all who are, or will
be saved, are saved by God, and Saved by design, and in accordance with
an etermal design, and of course they were elected to salvation from
eternity.
I have already said, that it is incredible that the Bible should read as it
does, and that it should nowhere distinguish between elect and non-elect
Saints, if there is any such distinction. It cannot be said with justice, that
the Bible purposely conceals from all Saints the fact of their election, lest
it should be a stumbling-block to them. This we have seen is not the fact,
but on the contrary, that the elect, at least in some instances, have known
that they were elect.
But it is said, that Peter exhorts the saints to “give all diligence to
make their calling and election sure ;” from which it is inferred, that they
did not know that they were elect; and furthermore, that it might be that,
although they were real saints, nevertheless they were not, at least all of
them, of the elect. The words here referred to stand in the following
COT).]]{2X101) :-
2 Pet. i. 1 : “Simon Peter, a servant and an apostle of Jesus Christ, to
them that have obtained like precious faith with us, through the righteous.
ness of God and our Saviour Jesus Christ: 2. Grace and peace be mul.
tiplied unto you through the knowledge of God, and of Jesus our Lord :
8. According as his divine power has given unto us all things that pertain
unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called us
to glory and virtue: 4. Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and
Precious promises; that by these ye might be partakers of the divine
nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust.
5. And beside this, giving all diligence, add to your faith, virtue; and to
virtue, knowledge; 6. And to knowledge, temperance ; and to temperamee,
848 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
patience; and to patience, godliness; 7. And to godliness, brotherly kind-
ness; and to brotherly kindness, charity. 8. For if these things be in you and
abound, they make you that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the
knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. 9. But he that lacketh these things
is blind, and cannot see afar off, and hath forgotten that he was purged
from his old sins. 10. Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to
make your calling and election sure : for if ye do these things, ye shall
never fall.” Upon this passage, I remark,+
(i.) That Peter addressed this epistle to all who had faith, that is, to all
true Christians, as appears from the first verse. He addressed no one by
name, but left it for every one to be sure that he had faith. He then pro-
ceeds to exhort them to grow in grace, assuring them that, if any one did
not do so, he had forgotten that he was purged from his former sins; that
is, if any one lacked that which he enjoined, it would prove that he had
not true faith, or that he had backslidden. Then he adds, as in the 10th
verse: “Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling
and election sure : for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall.” Here I
remark:
(ii.) That the apostle plainly assumes:
(a) That the called and elected will be saved ; to make their calling and
election sure, was to make their Salvation Sure : and,
(b.) That mone others are saved but the called and elected, for if others
are saved, it were of no consequence whether they were of the called and
elected or not, provided they were saved ;
(c.) That he regarded mone as Christians, or as at any time having true
faith, but the called and elected ; for he was not exhorting supposed impe-
nitent sinners to become Christians, but supposed Christians to be sure of
their calling and election. This shows that he regarded all Christians as
of the called and elected. To be sure of their calling and election was to
be sure of their salvation. The apostle did not certainly mean to exhort
them to become of the number of the elect, for this mumber we have seen
was settled from etermity; but by diligence and growth in grace to secure
their salvation, or thus to prove or demonstrate their calling and election.
He meant also to admonish them that, although called and elected, still
their ultimate salvation was conditionated upon their diligent growth in
grace, and perseverance in holiness to the end of life. He therefore exhorts
them to make their calling and election sure, which is the same as to Se:
cure their salvation. He speaks of calling and election as indissolubly
connected. Effectual calling either results from election, or election from
calling. We have seen that election is eternal; therefore, election cannot
result from calling, but calling must result from election.
Again: Christians and saints, and the children and people of God, the
disciples of Christ, and the elect, are to all appearance regarded throughout
the Bible as the same class.
Again: Christ says, John vi. 37: “All that the Father giveth me shall
come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.
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6#8 ‘SJLNIWS HO GIONVºIGIAQISSICIJ
I &
850 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
object just now to establish the fact, that mone come to Christ but those
who are of the number that are given to Christ, and also that every one
who is given to him shall come to him. These, and these only, are effect-
ually called or drawn of the Father. All are called in the sense of being
earnestly and homestly invited, and all the divine persuasion addressed to
them that can Wisely be addressed to them. But others, besides those
given to the Son, are not, as a matter of fact, persuaded and effectually
drawn, in a sense that secures the “concurrence of free will with free
grace.”
The same truth is strongly implied in many other passages in the teach-
ings of Christ. For example, He says—
John X. 1 : “Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that entereth not by the
door into the sheep-fold, but climbeth up some other way, the same is a
thief and a robber, 2. But he that entereth in by the door is the shepherd
of the sheep. 3. To him the porter openeth ; and the sheep hear his
Voice ; and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them out.
4. And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and
the sheep follow him : for they know his voice. 5. And a stranger will
they not follow, but will flee from him : for they know not the voice of
strangers. 6. This parable spake Jesus unto them : but they understood
not what things they were which he spake unto them.”
He then proceeds to expound the parable. He is the good shepherd
having the care of his Father's sheep. He says:
7. “Then said Jesus unto them again, Verily, verily, I say unto you, I
am the door of the sheep. 8. All that ever came before me are thieves
and robbers: but the sheep did not hear them. 9. I am the door : by me
if any man enter im, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out, and find
pasture. 10. The thief cometh not, but for to steal, and to kill, and to
destroy: I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it
more abundantly. 11. I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd giveth
his life for the sheep. 12. But he that is a hireling, and not the shepherd,
whose own the sheep are not, seeth the Wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep,
and fleeth, and the wolf catcheth them, and scattereth the sheep. 13. The
hireling fleeth, because he is a hireling, and careth not for the sheep. 14.
I am the good shepherd. and know my sheep, and am known of mine, 15.
As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father ; and I lay down
my life for the sheep. 16. And other sheep I have, which are not of this
fold : them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there
shall be one fold, and one shepherd. 17. Therefore doth my Father love
me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again.” t
He had other sheep which were not yet called—they were not of this
fold—that is, they were not Jews, but Gentiles; these he must bring. To
the unbelieving and cavilling Jews he said:
John x. 26: “But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I
said unto you. 27. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they
follow me : 28. And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 851
perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand. 29. My Father
which gave them me, is greater than all; and none is able to pluck them
out of my Father's hand.”
Here it is plainly implied, that all those were sheep who were given to
him by the Father, and that all such would surely hear and know his voice
and follow him, but those that were not of his sheep, or were not given him
by the Father, would not believe. He says, verse 26: But ye believe not,
because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. What he here says
amounts to this: all those are sheep who are given to me of my Father.
All my sheep thus given, shall and will hear my voice, and follow me, and
none others will. I do not notice in this place what he says of the cer-
tainty of their salvation, because my present object is only to show that
those and those only come to Christ who are given to him of the Father, or
are of the elect.
This same truth is either expressly taught, or strongly implied in a great
many passages, and indeed it seems to me to be the doctrine of the whole
Bible. Again, Rom. viii. 28 : “And we know that all things work together
for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to
his purpose.” Here they that love God are represented as identical with
those “who are the called according to his purpose.” In other words, they
who love God are the called according to, or in consequence of their elec-
tion. All that love God, do so because they have been effectually called,
according to the purpose or election of God. This passage seems to settle
the question, especially when viewed in its connexion, that all who ever
love God are of the elect, and that they are prevailed upon to love God in
conformity with their election.
We shall have occasion by and by to examine the connexion in which
this passage is found, for the purpose of showing that all who at any time
truly come to love God, will be saved. I have only quoted this twenty-
eighth verse here for the purpose of showing, not directly, that all that
love God at any time will be saved, but that they are of the number of the
elect, from which fact their ultimate Salvation must be inferred.
It is plain that the apostles regarded regeneration as conclusive evidence
of election. The mammer in which they address Christians seems to me
to put this beyond a doubt. Paul, in writing to the Thessalonians, 2 Thes,
ii. 13, says, “But we are bound to give thanks alway to God for you,
brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen
you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth.”
Here the apostle speaks of all the brethren at Thessalonica as beloved of
the Lord, and as being from etermity chosen to salvation. He felt called
upon to give thanks to God for this reason, that God had chosen them to
Salvation from etermity. This he represents as true of the whole church :
that is, doubtless, of all true Christians in the church. Indeed, the apostles
everywhere speak as if they regarded all true saints as of the elect, and
their saintship as evidence of their election. Peter, in writing to the
Christians in his first letter, says:
3 l º
852 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
1 Pet. i. 1 : “Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to the strangers scattered
throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia, 2. Elect
according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification
of the Spirit unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ:
Grace unto you, and peace, be multiplied. 3. Blessed be the God and
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, which, according to his abundant mercy,
hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus
Christ from the dead. 4. To an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled,
and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you, 5. Who are kept by
the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the
last time : 6. Wherein ye greatly rejoice, though now for a season, if need
be, ye are in heaviness through manifold temptations; 7. That the trial of
your faith, being much more precious than that of gold that perisheth,
though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise, and honour, and
glory, at the appealing of Jesus Christ ; 8. Whom having not seen ye love;
in whom, though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy
unspeakable, and full of glory: 9. Receiving the end of your faith, even
the Salvation of your Souls.”
Here it is plain that Peter regarded all who had been born again to a
lively hope, or who were regenerated as elected, or as chosen to salvation.
I might pursue this argument to an indefinite length, but I must attend to
other considerations in support of the doctrine in question.
I will for the present close what I have to say under this particular
branch of the argument, by reminding you that Christ has expressly
asserted that no man can or does come to him except the Father draw him,
and that the Father draws to him those—and by fair inference those only—
whom he has given to Christ; and further, that it is the Father's will, that
of those whom the Father had given to Christ, and drawn to him, Christ
should lose none, but should raise them up at the last day. It is, I think,
evident, that when Christ asserts it to be his Father's will, that of those
whom the Father had given him he should lose mome, but should raise
them up at the last day, he intended to say, that his Father not merely
desired and willed this, but that such was his design. That the Father
designed to secure their salvation.
This we shall more fully see in its proper place.
LECTURE LXXX.
PERSEVERANCE PROVED.
(2.) I remark, that God is able to preserve and keep the true Saints from
apostacy, in consistency with their liberty: 2 Tim. i. 12: “For the which
cause I also suffer these things ; nevertheless, I am not ashamed ; for I
know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that
which I have committed unto him against that day.” Here the apostle
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 853
expresses the fullest confidence in the ability of Christ to keep him: and
indeed, as has been said, it is most manifest that the apostles expected to
persevere and be saved only because they believed in the ability and willing
mess of God to keep them from falling. Again : Rom. xiv. 4: “Who art
thou that judgest another man's servant; to his own master he standeth
or falleth yea, he shall be holden up, for God is able to make him stand.”
Again, Phil. iii. 21 : “Who shall change our vile body, that it may be
fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby
he is able even to subdue all things unto himself.” Again, Eph. iii. 20:
“Now unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we
ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us.” Again, Jude 24:
“Now unto him that is able to keep you from falling, and to present you
faultless before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy.” Again, 2 Cor.
ix. 8: “And God is able to make all grace abound towards you ; that ye,
always having all sufficiency in all things, may abound to every good work.”
Eph. i. 18: “The eyes of your understanding being enlightened; that ye
may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glory
of his inheritance in the saints. 19. And what is the exceeding greatness
of his power to usward who believe, according to the working of his mighty
power, 20. Which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the
dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places.” Again,
Heb. vii. 25 : “Wherefore he is able to save them to the uttermost that
come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for
them.” These and many other passages prove beyond a doubt that God is
able to preserve his saints.
(3.) God is not only able to keep all that come to Christ, or all true
Christians, but he is also willing. But Christ has settled this question, as
We have seen.
John vi. 37 : “All that the Father giveth me shall come to me, and him
that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out, 38. For I came down from
heaven, mot to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me; 39. And
this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given
me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.
40. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth
the Sou, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise
him up at the last day.”
Here, them, we have just seen these two points settled, namely
(i.) That God is able to save all Saints, or all who at any time truly
believe and come to Christ; and,
(ii.) That he is willing, or wills to do it. Now if he is both able and
willing to keep and save all the saints, he certainly will do it.
But here I know it will be objected, that by this course of argument, the
doctrine of universal salvation may be established. The Bible, it is said,
represents God as both able and willing to save all men, and if his being
both able and willing to save the saints, proves that they will all be Saved,
it follows that his being able and willing to save all men proves that all
854 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
men will be saved. But the cases are not parallel; for God no where pro-
fesses ability to save all men, but on the contrary, disclaims such ability,
and professes to be unable to save all men; that is, he cannot, under the
circumstances, wisely save them, nor can he wisely do any more for saints
or sinners than he does. No passage can be found in the Bible, in which
God asserts his ability to save all men. The passages that affirm that
“God can do all things,” and that “nothing is too hard for the Lord,” and
the like, cannot be understood as affirming God's ability to save all men.
They do imply, that he has power to do whatever is an object of physical
omnipotence; but to save sinners is not an object of physical power. Their
Salvation, if accomplished at all, must be brought about by a moral and
persuasive influence, and not by the exercise of physical omnipotence. In
the sense in which we can justly apply the terms ability and inability to
this subject, God is really unable to do what it is unwise for him to do.
He has an end in view. This end is the highest good and blessedness of
universal being. This end can be accomplished only by the appropriate
means, or upon certain conditions. These conditions include the perfect
holiness of moral agents. If God cannot wisely use such means as will
Secure the conversion and sanctification of simmers, he cannot save them.
That is, he is unable to save them. This he repeatedly professes to be
unable to do.
Ezek. xviii. 23 : “FIave I any pleasure at all that the wicked should
die? Saith the Lord God; and not that he should return from his ways, and
live 2 32. For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the
the Lord God; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye.”
Ezek. xxxiii. 11. “Say unto them, As I live, Saith the Lord God, I
have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from
his way and live : turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye
die, O house of Israel ?”
Isa. v. 4: “What could have been done more to my viemeyard that I
have not dome in it? wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth
grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?”
Hos. xi. 8: “How shall I give thee up, Ephraim 2 how shall I deliver
thee, Israel ? how shall I make thee as Admah 2 how shall I set thee as
Zeboim 2 My heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled to-
gether.”
These are only specimens of the manner in which God speaks of his
ability to save sinners, and to do more for the church or the world than he
does. From such professions on the part of God, we are to understand
him, as disclaiming ability to do more or otherwise than he does, in con-
sistency with the highest good of being in general. Since the highest good
of being in general is the end which he is aiming to secure, he “may justly
be said to be unable to do whatever he cannot do in consistency with the
use of those means that will secure this end.” God, therefore, does not
affirm his ability to save all men, but fully disclaims any such ability, and
professes to do, and to be doing, all that he can to Save them. He pro-
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 855
fesses to be perfectly benevolent and infinitely wise, and to be doing all that
infinite wisdom and benevolence can do for sinners and for all men, and
complains, that all he can do does not save, and will not save many of
them.
But with respect to the Saints, he does expressly affirm his ability to keep
them, in a sense that will secure their Salvation. This we have seen. He
does for them all that he wisely can, and does enough, as he expressly affirms,
to secure their salvation. No one can attentively read and consider the
passages relating to God’s ability to save all men, and his ability to save
his people, without perceiving, that the two cases are not parallel, but that
in fact they are contrasts. He expressly affirms his ability to keep, to
sanctify, and to save his elect children, whilst he repeatedly, either expressly,
or by implication, disclaims ability to save all men.
Again: the Bible no where represents God as willing the salvation of all
men, in the same sense in which it represents him as Willing the Salvation
of Christians, or of his elect. Such passages as the following are specimens
of God's professions of willingness to save all mem.
1 Tim. ii. 4 : “Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the
knowledge of the truth.”
John iii. 16. “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten
Som, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlast-
ing life. 17. For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the
world; but that the world through him might be saved.”
2 Peter iii. 9; “The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some
men count slackness; but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any
should perish, but that all should come to repentance.”
These and similar passages teach that God wills the salvation of all men,
only in the sense of desiring it. This we know from the fact, that he no-
where intimates a willingness, in the sense of a design or intention, to save
all men; but on the contrary, plainly reveals an opposite purpose or design;
that is, he reveals the fact, that he cannot, shall not, and of course, does
not, expect or design to save all mem. By the profession of a willingness
to save all men, we can therefore justly understand him to mean, only that
he desires the Salvation of all men, and that he would secure their salvation
if he wisely could. This is all that we can understand him as affirming,
unless we would accuse him of self-contradiction.
But he professes a willingness to save his elect, or in other words, all
regenerate persons, or all believers in Christ, and all whoever will truly
believe in him, in the sense of purposing or designing to save them. This
is most manifest from the scriptures we have already examined, and this
will still further appear from the passages to be examined.
We have seem that the Father has given a certain number to Christ, with
express design to secure their salvation ; that he has committed to him all
the requisite power and influences to save them, and that they will actually
be saved. Nothing like this can be found in the Bible, respecting any other
class of men whatever. This objection, then, is without foundation, and the
856 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
argument from the ability and willingness of God to save his saints, remains
in full force and conclusiveness.
(4.) Again : Christ expressly prayed for all believers, and in a manner
that secures their being kept and saved :—
John xvii. 2 : “As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he
should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him. 6. I have
manifested thy mame unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world;
thine they were, and thou gavest them to me; and they have kept thy
word. 7. Now they have known that all things, whatsoever thou hast given
me are of thee; 8. For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest
me; and they have received them, and have known surely that I came out
from thee, and they have believed that thou didst send me. 9. I pray for
them; I pray mot for the world, but for them which thou hast given me, for
they are thine. 10. And all mine are thine, and thine are mine ; and I am
glorified in them. 11. And now I am no more in the world, but these are
in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own
name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are.
12. While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name: those
that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of
perdition, that the scripture might be fulfilled. 13. And now come I to
thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy
fulfilled in themselves. 14. I have given them thy word; and the world
hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the
world. 20. Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall
believe on me through their word. 21. That they all may be one; as thou,
Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the
world may believe that thou hast sent me. 22. And the glory which thou
gavest me, I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one.
23. I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one, and
that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as
thou hast loved me. 24. Father, I will that they also whom thou hast
given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which
thou hast given me; for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the
world.”
Now observe, that in this most affecting prayer Christ says,
(i.) Verse 2, “As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he
should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him."
We have seen, that, in the 6th chapter of this book, Christ expressly
teaches, that all are given to him that come to him, and that all shall come
to him who were given to him by the Father.
(ii.) He proceeds to affirm, that he had in the exercise of this power
kept in his Father's name all who had been given, and had come to him,
and had lost mone.
(iii.) He asks the Father henceforth to keep them in his own name, as
he was about to leave them, as to his bodily presence. He says, verse 15,
“I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 857
shouldest keep them from the evil.” Again, he says, 20–24 : “Neither
pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through
their word. That they all may be one ; as thou, Father art in me, and I
in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that
thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou gavest me I have given
them; that they may be one, even as we are one. I in them, and thou in
me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know
that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as thou hast loved me. Father,
I will that they also whom thou hast given me be with me where I am :
that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me; for thou lovedst
me before the foundation of the world.”
Now, as surely as Christ's prayer is answered, all believers will be saved :
that is, at least all who ever have believed, or ever will believe, subsequent
to the offering of this prayer. But Christ's prayers are always answered.
To this it is objected, that a part of this same prayer is not answered,
and of course never will be. It is said, for example, that in the 21st
verse he prays for the union of all believers, which has been far enough
from having been answered. The verse reads, “That they all may be one ;
as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us;
that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.” Here he explaims the
sense in which he prays that all believers may be one, not that they should
be all of one denomination or creed, but that they should possess one and
the same spirit; that the same spirit that united the Father and the Son,
that is, the Holy Spirit, who is in the Father and the Son, might also be
in all Christians. This is plainly his meaning ; and that this is true of all
real Christians, that they possess the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit that dwells
in the Father and the Son, no one can doubt who understands and believes
his Bible.
But it is objected again, that Christ prayed to be delivered from
crucifixion, and his prayer was not answered.
I reply, that he did not pray for this, if at all, unqualifiedly. He says,
“If it be possible, nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt.” If it
were the pains of the cross from which his soul shrunk in the garden, and
from which he desired, if possible, to be excused, it is plain that he did not
pray unqualifiedly to be delivered ; but, on the contrary, submitted the
question to the will of his Father. But in the prayer, in John 17, he
made no such condition. He knew that in this case it was his Father's
will to grant his request. Of this he had expressly informed his disciples,
as we have seen ; that is, that it was his Father's will to keep and save all
who were given to Christ, and had been drawn by the Father to Christ.
The Spirit of this petition accords precisely with his teaching upon the
subject. He had taught before that all believers would be kept and saved,
and that this was his Father's will ; now, could he either expressly or
impliedly, in this prayer, put in the condition that was in the prayer just
referred to, namely, “If it be thy will 2" But, although what has been
said is a full answer to the assertion that Christ's prayers are not always
858 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
answered, it may be, for some minds, important to say, that it is far from
being certain that Christ prayed to be delivered from crucifixion.
John xii. 23: “And Jesus answered them, saying, the hour is come,
that the Son of man should be glorified. 24. Verily, verily, I say unto
you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone;
but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit. 25. He that loveth his life,
shall lose it ; and he that hateth his life in this world, shall keep it unto
life eternal. 26. If any man serve me, let him follow me; and where I
am, there shall also my servant be ; if any man serve me, him will my
Father honour. 27. Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say ?
Father, save me from this hour; but for this cause came I unto this hour.
28. Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven,
saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again.”
Here Christ plainly intimates, that he did not pray to escape the death
to which he was appointed, and for which he had come to that hour. But
it may be asked, against what did Jesus pray in the garden 2 I reply,
against being overcome by the agony of his soul, and crushed to death
before he came to the cross. The following passages may throw some light
upon this question: John xiv. 30: “Hereafter I will not talk much with
you ; for the prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me.”
Here he informs his disciples, that he must soon break off the conversa-
tion with them, for he was just entering into a severe conflict with Satan.
Matthew records the conflict through which the Saviour passed, and of
which he advised his disciples.
Matt. xxvi. 37: “And he took with him Peter and the two Sons of
Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and very heavy. 38. Then saith he
unto them, My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death: tarry ye here,
and watch with me. 39. And he went a little further, and fell on his face,
and prayed, saying, O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from
me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt. 40. And he cometh
unto the disciples, and findeth them asleep, and saith unto Peter, What!
could ye not watch with me one hour? 41. Watch and pray, that ye enter
not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.
42. He went away again the second time, and prayed, saying, O my Father,
if this cup may not pass away from me, except I drink it, thy will be done.
43. And he came and found them asleep again: for their eyes were heavy.
44. And he left them, and went away again, and prayed the third time,
saying the same words. 45. Then cometh he to his disciples, and Saith
unto them, Sleep on now, and take your rest: behold, the hour is at hand,
and the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners. 46. Rise, let
us be going: behold, he is at hand that doth betray me.”
Here it appears, that Christ had his last and great conflict with Satan.
Satan set on him, as it appears, to kill him outright with anguish.
Luke, in recording this transaction, says, xxii. 89: “ And he came out,
and went, as he was wont, to the Mount of Olives; and his disciples also
followed him. 40. And when he was at the place, he said unto them,
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 859
Pray that ye enter not into temptation. 41. And he was withdrawn from
them about a stone's cast, and kneeled down, and prayed, 42. Saying,
Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless, not my
will, but thine be done. 43. And there appeared an angel from heaven,
strengthening him. 44. And being in agony, he prayed more earnestly :
and his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the
ground. 45. And when he rose up from prayer, and was come to his
disciples, he found them sleeping for sorrow, 16. And said to them, Why
sleep ye 2 rise and pray, lest ye enter into temptation.”
It is, I think, plain, that this struggle in the garden was a Sore and
overwhelming temptation, and that an angel was sent to assist him, by
resisting and putting away Satan; that is, it was by sending an angel, that
his Father answered his prayer. This prayer appears to have been heard and
answered ; for from this time his mind remained calm. There is a passage
in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that I think evidently refers to this scene.
Heb. v. 7 : “Who, in the days of his flesh, when he had offered up
prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, unto him that was
able to save him from death, and was heard in that he feared.”
To what does this refer, if not to the death he feared in the garden 2 He
said on that occasion, “My soul is exceeding Sorrowful even unto death.”
He then offered up prayer with strong crying and tears, and was heard, &c.
To my mind all these circumstances taken together make it very evident,
that Christ did not pray against the cross, in the petition under considera-
tion, but that, on the contrary, he prayed to be delivered from temptation,
and was heard and answered.
But be this as it may, we are to remember that Christ expressly affirms,
that his Father always hears, that is, answers his prayers.
Jno. xi. 42 : “And I knew that thou hearest me always: but because of
the people which stand by I said it, that they may believe that thou hast
sent me.”
Again, Paul Says of Christ, Heb. vii. 25 : “Wherefore he is able also to
save them to the utermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever
liveth to make intercession for them.”
Here he asserts, that Christ is able to save unto the uttermost all that
come unto God by him, seeing he always lives to make intercession for
them. This, as plainly as possible, implies, that his intercessions are all-
prevailing. Indeed, as he is the mediator, they must be.
Now let us consider how far we have advanced in establishing the per-
severance and final salvation of all believers.
(i.) We have seen, that all the elect to salvation will be saved.
(ii.) That all true believers are of this number.
(iii.) That God and Christ are able to keep them from apostacy, and save
them.
(iv.) That he is willing or wills to do it.
(v.) That Christ expressly prayed for the perseverance and final salva.
tion of all believers.
860 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
(vi.) That he prayed in express accordance with the revealed will of his
Father; and—
(vii.) That his prayers always prevail and are answered.
In Christ's prayer in John, chap. xvii., he expressly affirms, that he did not
pray for the world, that is, for all men. He prayed only for those whom
the Father had given him. For these he prayed, not merely that God
would save them upon condition of their perseverance, but that God would
keep them from the evil that is in the world, and save them, and make
them one, in the sense, that one Spirit should be in them all. He asked
manifestly the same things for all that in future believe, that he asked for
those who had already believed.
Should I proceed no further the argument is complete, and the proof
conclusive. But since this doctrine is so abundantly taught, either
expressly or impliedly, in the Bible, I proceed to the consideration of a
number of other passages which will throw still further light on the subject.
(5.) Christ expressly and designedly teaches this doctrine.
John vi. 39: “And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of
all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up
again at the last day. 40. And this is the will of him that sent me, that
every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting
life: and I will raise him up at the last day, 47. Verily, verily, I say
unto you, He that believeth on me hath everlasting life. 51. I am the
living bread which came down from heaven. If any man eat of this bread,
he shall live for ever ; and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I
will give for the life of the world.”
Here he expressly teaches, as we have before seen, that it is his Father's
will, that all believers, or all who at any time believe, (for this is plainly
his meaning,) shall be saved; that he should lose none of them, but as we
have seen, John xvii. 2, should give them etermal life. Then he claims
ability to keep and save them, agreeably to his Father's will. This,
remember, respects all believers, or all who are given to Christ, who, we
have learned, are the same perSons.
Again: John x. 27: “My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and
they follow me: 28. And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall
never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand. 29. My
Father which gave them me, is greater than all; and none is able to pluck
them out of my Father's hand.” -
The whole connexiom shows, that Christ intended to teach the certainty
of the salvation of all his sheep, or of all the elect, or, which is the same,
of all true believers. But, to this it is objected, that none are sheep any
longer than they remain obedient, and therefore the assertion that he will
save the sheep, does not secure those who at any time sin. But I reply,
that Christ recognizes all the elect as his sheep, whether converted, or
whether in a state of temporary backsliding, or not. He represents his
sheep as hearing his voice, and as following him, and those who are not of
his sheep as not hearing his voice, and as not following him : John X. 16 :
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 861
“And other sheep I have which are not of this fold: them also I must
bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold, and one
shepherd. 26. But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I
Said unto you.”
Again, Matt. xviii. 12: “How think ye? If a man have a hundred
sheep, and one of them be gone astray, doth he not leave the ninety and
nine, and goeth into the mountains, and seeketh that which is gone astray?
13. And if so be that he find it, verily I say unto you, he rejoiceth more of
that sheep, than of the ninety and nine which went not astray. 14. Even
so it is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, that one of these
little ones should perish.”
The design of this parable is to teach the doctrine I am defending. If
not, what is its design 2. This is a full answer to the objection, that no
one is recognized as a sheep who has gone astray.
But again, it is said, that although no one else can pluck the sheep out of
the Father's hand, yet we can do it ourselves. I grant, that we can, by natural
possibility; but this objection is good for nothing, for Christ expressly says,
John x. 27: “My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow
me: 28. And I give unto them eternal life ; and they shall never perish,
meither shali any pluck them out of my hand. 29. My Father, which gave
them me, is greater than all; and mone is able to pluck them out of my
Father's hand.”
Not only is no one able to pluck them out of his Father's hand, but
Christ gives unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish. This im-
plies, that while they might or are able to apostatize and be lost, yet, as a
matter of fact, they never will. What could be made out of all he says of
himself as a shepherd in this passage, if, after all, he loses some of his
sheep? Let any one ponder the whole chapter, and see.
(6.) Another argument, in support of the doctrine under consideration,
I deduce from the fact, that Paul, an inspired apostle, believed it.
Phil. i. 1 : “Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the
saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons;
2. Grace be unto you, and peace, from God our Father, and from the Lord
Jesus Christ. 3. I thank my God upon every remembrance of you, 4. (Al-
ways in every prayer of mine for you all making request with joy,) 5. For
your fellowship in the gospel, from the first day until now. 6. Being con-
fident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you will
perform it until the day of Jesus Christ.”
Here the apostle represents himself as giving thanks for all the Saints at
Philippi, upon the ground of his confidence that he who had begun a good
work in them would perform, or perfect it, until the day of Christ. His
confidence did not rest in them, but in the faithfulness of Christ. He did
not express a confidence, that they would of themselves persevere, but that.
he who had begun a good work in them, would carry it on ; that is, that
he would so work in them as to keep them, and as to seeure their perse-
Verance to the end. This he expected with respect to all the saints at
862 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Philippi. But if he believed this of all the saints at that place, it is
plainly and fairly inferable that he believed it, simply because he expected
this, as to all true Saints. He does not intimate, that he expected this
because of any peculiarity in their case, that is, not because they were
better than other saints, or that God would do more for them than for
others. He seems plainly to have expressed this confidence, upon the
ground of his expectation, that he who begins a good work in any saint,
Will carry it on and perfect it until the day of Christ. Should it be said,
that Paul intended merely to express the conviction or opinion of a good
man, that the Philippian saints would be saved, but that he did not intend
to utter this as the voice of inspiration; I reply, that Paul plainly expresses
a confidence that they would all be saved, and that God would perfect the
Work which he had begun. Now, how came he by this confidence? He
Was an inspired man. If inspiration had taught him that real saints do
fall away and are lost, how could he consistently express so thorough a
bersuasion, that all the saints at Philippi would be saved? If Paul believed
in the perseverance of the saints, it must be true, or he was deceived in
respect to this important doctrine. But is it not safe to trust Paul's
opinion of this doctrine 2 If any one is disposed to contend, that we can-
not with strict justice infer that Paul believed the same in respect to God's
perfecting the work in all saints, that he believed in respect to the Philip-
pians, I will not contend with him with respect to this. It is, however,
clear, that Paul no where in this epistle, nor elsewhere, intimates that he
had higher expectations in regard to the salvation of the Philippians, than
he had in respect to the salvation of all true saints. In writing to the
churches, the apostles appear to have regarded and spoken of all true saints
as the elect-children of God. They seem to represent the salvation of all
such persons as certain, but always keeping in mind and holding forth,
either expressly or by way of implication, the nature of this certainty, that
it was conditioned upon the right and persevering use of their own agency.
They consequently constantly endeavour to guard the churches against
delusion, in regard to their being real Saints, aud admonish them to prove
themselves in this respect, and also warn them against the supposition,
that they can be saved, without actual perseverance in faith and obedience
to the end of life.
(7.) The apostles seemed to have regarded the conversion of simmers as
an evidence that God designed to save them, or that they were of the
elect:—
Acts ii. 47 : “Praising God, and having favour with all the people. And
the Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved.”
Acts xiii. 48. “And when the Gentiles heard this, they were glad and
glorified the word of the Lord ; and as many as were ordained to etermal
life, believed.”
In these passages as elsewhere, the conversion of sinners is spoken of as
settling the question of their salvation. But if true Saints do fall from
grace and perish, why should the inspired Writers so often express them-
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 863
selves, as if they regarded the regeneration of a person as an indication that
he is one of the elect, and as Securing his Salvation ?
So common is it for Christ and the apostles to speak of regeneration as
settling the question of the salvation of those who are regenerated, that great
multitudes have overlooked the fact, that there was any other condition of
salvation insisted on in the Bible. When the jailor demanded of Paul and
Silas what he should do to be saved, Paul replied to him “Believe in the
Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be Saved, and thy house.”
Here, as is common in the Bible, faith is spoken of as if it were the sole
condition of salvation. Repentance, faith, regeneration, &c., are often, as
every student of the Bible knows, spoken of as if they were the only condi-
tions of Salvation. Now, it seems to me, that this could not, and ought not
to be, if there is not a certain connexion of Some sort between real conver-
sion and etermal salvation. It is true, the necessity of perseverance to the end
is often mentioned and insisted upon in the Bible as a condition of salva-
tion, just as might be expected when we consider the nature of the certainty
in question. If there is not, however, a certain connexion between true re-
generation, or faith, or repentance and Salvation, it seems to me incredible,
that we should so often find faith, and repentance, and conversion spoken of
as if they secured Salvation.
Those who believe are represented as already having eternal life, as not
coming into condemnation, but as having passed from death unto life. The
following passages are specimens of the manner in which the scriptures
speak upon this subject.
John i. 12. “But as many as received him, to them gave he power to
become the Sons of God, even to them that believe on his name; 13. Which
were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man,
but of God.”
John iii. 36. “He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, and
he that believeth not the Son shall not see life ; but the wrath of God
abideth on him. 16. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have
everlasting life. 18. He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he
that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the
name of the only begotten Son of God.”
John iv. 14: “But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give
him, shall never thirst : but the Water that I shall give him shall be in him
a well of water springing up into everlasting life.”
John v. 24, “Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word,
and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come
into condemnation ; but is passed from death unto life.”
John vi. 37 All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him
that cometh to me I Will in no wise east out. 40. And this is the will of
him that sent me, That every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on
him, may have everlasting life : and I will raise him up at the last day.
45. It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God.
864 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father,
cometh unto me. 47. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on
me hath everlasting life.”
Acts ii. 38. “Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized every
one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins; and ye
shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.”
Acts xiii. 48. “And when the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and
glorified the word of the Lord ; and as many as were ordained to eternal
life, believed.”
Acts xvi. 31. “And they said, Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and
thou shalt be saved, and thy house.”
Mark xvi. 15 : “And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world, and
preach the gospel to every creature. 16. He that believeth and is baptized
shall be saved ; but he that believeth not shall be damned.”
Now it seems to me, that this numerous class of passages strongly imply
that there is a certain commexion of some sort between coming to Christ, re-
ceiving Christ, &c., and etermal life. Observe, I do not contend that per-
severance in faith and obedience is not also a condition of salvation, but on
the contrary, that it actually is. Nor do I contend that such like representa-
tions as the above, settle the question that all who at any time repent, believe,
or come to Christ, will be saved. The thing which I here intend is, that
this class of texts is just what we might expect, if the fact of regeneration
were certainly connected with salvation, and just what it seems they ought
not to be, in case this were not true.
To this it is objected, that many who attended on Christ's ministry are
represented from time to time as believing, of whom it is almost imme-
diately said, that they turned back and walked no more with him. I answer,
that the Bible manifestly recognizes different kinds of faith, such as an
intellectual faith, a faith of miracles, and the faith of the heart. The fol-
lowing are specimens of the Bible treatment of this subject :
Acts viii. 13 : “Then Simon himself believed also : and when he was
was baptized, he continued with Philip, and wondered, beholding the mira-
cles and signs which were done. 21. Thou hast neither part nor lot in this
matter: for thy heart is not right in the sight of God. 37. And Philip
said, If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. And he answered
and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.”
James ii. 19. “Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well :
the devils also believe and tremble.”
These and many other passages manifestly speak of an intellectual faith,
or of a simple conviction of the truth.
Matt. vii. 22, 23 ; 1 Cor. xiii. 1, 2, are specimens of the manner in which
the faith of miracles is represented.
See Rom. x. 9, 10, 11 ; Acts viii. 37 ; Gal. v. 6. These and such like
passages speak of evangelical faith, or the faith of the heart. When the
multitude are spoken of as believing under Christ's instruction, or in view
of his miracles, and then as going back and walking no more with him, we
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 865
are doubtless to understand those passages as teaching simply, that they
were at the time convinced of his Messiahship, and that they intellectually
believed that he was what he professed to be. But their history seems to
forbid the conclusion that they were truly regenerated, or that they had the
true faith of the gospel.
Again : John speaks of those who openly apostatized as if they had not
been true Christians : 1 John ii. 19: “They went out from us, but they
were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would no doubt have con-
tinued with us ; but they went out, that they might be made manifest that
they were not all of us.” Observe the force of the expressions, “They
went out from us, but they were not of us;” that is, were not truly Chris-
tians. Why does he say so 2 He assigns the reason for this assertion : “for
if they had been of us, they would have continued with us, but they went
out from us that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us.”
That is, a part of the professed disciples went out from the rest and re-
turned to the world, that it might be made manifest who were and who were
mot Christians. I do not say, however, that this is indubitably taught in
this passage; but it cannot be denied, that this is its most natural construc-
tion.
(S.) The inhabitants of heaven seem to believe that there is a certain
commexion between repentance and Salvation.
Luke xv. 7 : “I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over
one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons
which need no repentance.”
Now surely this joy is premature, unless they expect the penitent to be
saved. If, after all, there is an uncertainty about the result, in their esti-
mation, and if it may be, or there is a probability, that the penitent will
fall, and suffer a vastly more aggravated damnation than if he had never
been enlightened, one would think that they would at least suspend their
triumph until the result was known. To be sure they might rejoice, if the
simmer broke off temporarily from his sin, and rejoice at the bare prospect
of his salvation ; but to me this passage reads just as it might be expected
to read, if they regarded repentance as certainly connected with ultimate
Salvation.
Again : there are several parables that seem to take the perseverance of
of the saints for granted, or to assume its truth. The one immediately pre-
ceding the verse upon which I have just remarked is one of them.
Luke xv. 3 : “And he spake this parable unto them, saying: 4. What
man of you, having a hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave
the ninety and mine in the Wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until
he find it 2 5. And when he hath found it, he layeth it on his shoulders,
rejoicing. 6. And when he cometh houne, he calleth together his friends
and neighbours, saying unto them, Rejoice with me ; for I have found my
sheep which was lost. 7. I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in
heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over minety and nine just
persons which need no repentance.”
3 K
866 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Now, why this joy at the return of a strayed or lost sheep, if there is no
certainty, or scarcely any probability, that he will not stray again, and be
finally lost with an aggravated destruction ? Immediately following this
is another parable of the same import.
Luke xv. 8: “Either what woman, having ten pieces of silver, if she
lose one piece, doth not light a candle, and sweep the house, and seek dili-
gently till she find it 2 9. And when she hath found it, she calleth her
friends and her neighbours together, saying, Rejoice with me ; for I have
found that which was lost. 10. Likewise, I say unto you, There is joy in
the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth.”
Here again it may be asked, why this great joy at finding the simmer,
unless his conversion is to result in his salvation ?
I do not quote these passages as proving the doctrine in question, but
only as specimens of the class of passages that seem to assume the truth
of the doctrine, and as being just what might be expected, if the doctrine
is true, and just what might not be expected if the doctrine is not true.
To this it may be, and has been replied, that there are many passages
that are just what we could not expect, if the perseverance of the saints
were true. The following are relied upon as examples of this class —
Heb. vi. 1 : “Therefore, leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ,
let us go on unto perfection ; not laying again the foundation of repentance
from dead works, and of faith toward God; 2. Of the doctrine of bap-
tisms, and of laying on of hands, and of resurrection of the dead, and of
eternal judgment. 3. And this will we do if God permit. 4. For it is im-
possible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the
heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost; 5. And have
tasted of the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come; 6.
If they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance ; seeing they
crucify to themselves the son of God afresh, and put him to an open
shame.”
Ez. xviii. 24: “But when the righteous turneth away from his right-
eousness, and committeth iniquity, and doeth according to all the abomi-
nations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness
that he hath dome shall not be mentioned; in his trespass that he hath tres-
passed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die.”
Tºzek. xxxiii. 13: “When I shall say to the righteous, that he shall
surely live ; if he trust to his own righteousness and commit iniquity, all
his righteousness shall not be remembered ; but for his iniquity that he hath
committed, he shall die for it.”
Matt. x. 22 : “And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake :
but he that endureth to the end shall be saved.”
John xv. 6: “If a man abide mot in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and
is withered ; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they
are burned.”
1 Cor. x. 12: “Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed
lest he fall.”
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 867
Heb. iii. 6: “But Christ as a Son over his own house; whose house we
are, if we hold fast the confidence and the rejoicing of the hope firm unto
the end. 12. Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil
heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God. 13. But exhort one
another daily, while it is called To-day; lest any of you be hardened
through the deceitfulness of sin. 14. For we are made partakers of
Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the
end.” -
Heb. iv. 1: “Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of
entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. 11.
Let us labour therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the
same example of unbelief.”
2 Peter i. 10: “Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make
your calling and election sure: for if we do these things, ye shall never
fall.”
In reply to this objection I remark, that instead of these passages
being otherwise than might be expected if the doctrine in question were
true, and therefore implying that the doctrine is not true, they are pre-
cisely what might be expected, if the doctrine as I have stated it, were
true. If the certainty be but a moral certainty, even when the fact of
conversion is settled beyond all doubt, or possibility of mistake, if the
final salvation of the truly regenerate be as really conditioned upon
perseverance as if there was no certainty about it ; and if, moreover,
the fact of conversion is seldom settled in this life beyond the possibility
of mistake, then these passages, instead of implying any real uncer-
tainty in regard to the final salvation of the saints, are just as and
what might be expected, because they are just what is needed, upon the
supposition, that the doctrine in question is true. They do not affirm that
any true saints are, or will be, lost. They do imply the natural possibility,
and, humanly speaking, the danger of such an event. They further imply,
that without watchfulness and perseverance salvation is impossible They
also imply, that caution, warning, and threatening, are needed. They also
imply, that some men, to say the least, are not certain of their own salva-
tion, and that they do not certainly know that they are saints, beyond all
possibility of mistake.
Now, these things that are fairly implied in this class of passages are
really true: hence these passages just meet the necessities of the church,
and are therefore just what might be expected when all the facts in the
case are considered. I do not intend that this class of passages imply
the truth of the doctrine under consideration, but that they are consistent
with it, and might be expected, if the doctrine, as I have stated it, be
true.
(9.) Regeneration is represented as securing perseverance in obedience:–
First, In those passages that make it the condition of salvation.
Secondly, In those passages that expressly affirm, that the truly regene-
rated do not, and cannot, live in sin.
3 R 2
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PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS, 869
air devoured it. 6. And some fell upon a rock; and as soon as it was
sprung up, it withered away, because it lacked moisture. 7. And some
fell among thorns; and the thorns sprang up with it, and choked it.
8. And other fell on good ground, and sprang up, and bare fruit a hundred
fold. And when he had said these things, he cried, He that hath ears to
hear, let him hear. 11. Now the parable is this: The seed is the word
of God, 12. Those by the way side are they that hear; then cometh the
devil, and taketh away the word out of their hearts, lest they should
believe and be saved. 13. They on the rock are they, which, when they
hear, receive the word with joy; and these have no root, which for a while
believe, and in time of temptation fall away. 14. And that which fell
among thorns are they, which when they have heard, go forth, and are
choked with cares, and riches, and pleasures of this life, and bring no fruit
to perfection. 15. But that on the good ground are they, which, in an
honest and good heart, having heard the word, keep it, and bring forth
fruit with patience.”
If this parable was not designed to distinguish true religion from its
counterfeits, and to illustrate the persevering nature of true religion, I do
not know, and cannot conceive, what was its design. I need not enlarge
upon it. Let any one read and consider the parable for himself.
Again: the parable of the leaven seems designed also to teach the pro-
gressive and persevering mature of true religion.
Matt. xiii. 33: “Another parable spake he unto them : the kingdom of
heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures
of meal, till the whole was leavened.
This parable I understand to represent or teach the aggressive mature of
true faith and piety, as it exhibits itself both in the hearts and lives of
individual Christians, and also as it progresses and extends itself in the
world. It is in its nature persevering and aggressive, and when it once
truly exists, it will through grace triumph. When I speak of the perse-
vering mature of true religion, I do not mean, that religion as it exists in
the hearts of the Saints in this life would of itself, if unsupported by the
grace and indwelling Spirit of God, prevail and triumph over its enemies;
but the thing intended is, that through the faithfulness of God, he that has
begun or shall begin a good work in any heart, will perfect it until the day
of Jesus Christ. The persevering character of true religion is owing to
the indwelling Spirit of God. This leads me to remark,
Again, that repentance is made the condition of receiving the Holy
Spirit; and when this Spirit is received, it is with the express promise and
pledge that he shall abide in the heart for ever.
John vii. 37: “In the last day, that great day of the feast, Jesus stood
and cried, saying, If any man thirst let him come unto me and drink. He
that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow
rivers of living water, 39. (But this spake he of the Spirit, which they
that believe on him should receive : for the Holy Ghost was not yet given;
because that Jesus was not yet glorified.”)
870 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Here we learn that water represents the Holy Spirit. This is abundantly
taught in the Bible. Now let us hear what Christ said to the woman of
Samaria.
John iv. 13 : “Jesus answered and said unto her, Whosoever drinketh
of this water shall thirst again. 14. But whosoever drinketh of the water
that I shall give him, shall never thirst: but the water that I shall give
him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life.”
The prominent truth taught in this text is, that whosoever shall drink of
this water shall never thirst. In this particular respect the Saviour con-
trasts it with the water of Jacob's well, and says, 13, 14 : “Jesus
answered and said unto her, Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst
again: But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall
never thirst ; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well cf
water springing up into everlasting life.” This Christ plainly states as a
fact.
That is, he shall never perish for lack of this Spirit or water, but it
shall abide in him, and spring up into eternal life. The Spirit shall
remain in him, and secure him against falling and perishing. The fact
that the Spirit shall abide with and in all who ever receive him, and shall
prevail to secure their Salvation, seems to be plainly taught in this passage.
Again, Rom. viii. 9 : “But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if
so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the
Spirit of Christ, he is none of his, 10. And if Christ be in you, the body
is dead because of sin ; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness.
ll. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in
you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal
bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.”
Here it is expressly declared, that mone are Christians who have not the
Holy Spirit, or Spirit of Christ, and that they who are Christ's do not walk
after the flesh, but after the Spirit ; that they who are Christ's have
crucified, that is killed, the lusts of the flesh. This is the real character
of all true saints. Such like passages, observe, are designed to distinguish
true religion from its counterfeits, and to teach that perseverance in true
obedience is a characteristic of all real Saints.
The Bible everywhere represents professors who do not persevere and
abide steadfast, as hypocrites, or as self-deceived. Job says:
Job xxvii. 8 : “For what is the hope of the hypocrite, though he hath
gained, when God taketh away his soul ? 9. Will God hear his cry when
trouble cometh upon him 2 10. Will he delight himself in the Almighty -
will he always call upon God 2"
Here he represents the failing to “always call upon God" as a demon-
stration of hypocrisy. Christ expressly represents perseverance as the
characteristic of true believers, “My sheep hear my voice and follow me.”
This must relate at least to habitual character.
(10.) Christ represents it as impossible to deceive the elect. Matt. xxiv.
24 : We have seen that the elect unto Salvation includes all true Christians;
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 871
that is, that all Christians are the elect children of God. They have come
to Christ. Observe, the Saviour himself teaches, as we have seen :
(i.) That no one can come to, or believe in him, unless the Father draw
him.
(ii.) That the Father draws those, and only those to Christ, whom he
has given to him.
(iii.) That all whom the Father has given to him shall come to him, and
of those that come to him he will lose none, but will raise them up at the
last day.
John vi. 44 : “No man can come to me except the Father which hath
sent me, draw him ; and I will raise him up at the last day. 45. It is
written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man
therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto
me. 37. All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that
cometh to me I will in no wise cast out. 38. For I came down from
heaven not to do mime own will, but the will of him that sent me. 37. And
this is the father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath
given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last
day. 40. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which
seeth the Son and believeth on him may have everlasting life , and I will
raise him up at the last day.”
False theories are represented as permitted to test the piety of true and
false professors. 1 Cor. xi. 19 : “For there must be also heresies among
you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you."
Those that are of the elect, or are true children of God, will not follow
heresies. Christ says, Johm x. 4, 6: “And when he putteth forth his own
sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep will follow him ; for they know
his voice. 9. And a stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him : for
they know not the voice of strangers. 27. My sheep hear my voice, and I know
them, and they follow me. 28. And I give unto them etermal life; and
they shall never perish, meither shall any pluck them out of my hand.”
But those who are not true believers will not, and do not hear and know
his voice, and follow him. John x. 26: “But ye believe not, because ye
are not of my sheep, as I said unto you.”
(11.) The eighth chapter of Romans seems to settle the question, or
rather is, of itself a clear proof of the doctrine we are examining. We need
to read and ponder prayerfully the whole chapter, to apprehend distinctly
the scope of the apostle's teaching upon this subject. He had in the
seventh chapter been dwelling upon and pourtraying a legal experience.
He begins this eighth chapter by asserting, Rom. viii. 1 : “There is there-
fore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk
not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. 2. For the law of the Spirit of life
in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of Sim and death. 3. For
what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God
sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned
sin in the flesh; 4. That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in
872 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
us, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit. 5. For they that are
after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the
Spirit, the things of the Spirit. 6. For to be carnally minded is death;
but to be spiritually minded is life and peace. 7. Because the carmal mind
is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither
indeed can be 8. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God.
9. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of
God dwell in you. Now, if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is
mome of his. 10. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of
sin; but the Spirit is life, because of righteousness. 11. But if the Spirit
of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up
Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit
that dwelleth in you. 12. Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the
flesh, to live after the flesh. 13. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall
die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall
live. 14. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons
of God. 15. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear;
but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.
16. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the
children of God: 17. And if children, then heirs; heirs of God and joint
heirs with Jesus Christ: if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be
also glorified together, 18. For I reckon, that the sufferings of this
present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be
revealed in us.”
Here he describes the character of true believers as distinguished from
mere legalists, of whom he had been speaking. True believers, he here
asserts, are justified; they are in Christ Jesus; they walk not after the flesh,
but after the Spirit; the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in them, that
is, the law is written in their hearts; they have the Spirit of Christ, the
Spirit of adoption ; the Spirit witnesses with their spirit that they are the
adopted children of God ; “If children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint
heirs with Christ;" the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be
compared to the glory that shall be revealed in them. Verse 24, he says:
“For we are saved by hope; but hope that is seen, is not hope; for what
a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for 2"
He them proceeds to notice the ground of this hope. The first particular
he notices is, that the Spirit which he had just said, dwells in all true
believers; and of which, as we have seen Christ says, that when he is once
given, the soul that has received him shall never thirst, but that he shall
be in him like a well of water springing up into everlasting life. Paul says
of this Spirit, verses 26 and 27, “Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our
infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the
Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be
uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the
Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the Saints according to the will
of God.” This, observe, he affirms to be true of all who are Christ's,
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 873
or who are true believers. Of this Spirit he affirms the following things:
(1.) That all Christians possess this Spirit. (2.) That this Spirit bears
witness with the spirits of Christians that they are the children of God.
Verse 16, “The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are
the children of God.” (3.) That he makes intercession for the saints
according to the will of God; that is, that he prays in them or excites
them to pray, and to pray aright, for those things which it is the will of
God to grant to them. He then in the 28th verse says, “And we know
that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who
are the called according to his purpose.” Here he represents those who
love God, and those who are the called according to his purpose, as the
same persons ; and affirms, that we know that all things shall work together
for their good. This he notices as a second ground of hope. He next
proceeds to state, how we know that all things work together for the good
of those that love God; or, which he regards as the same thing, to those
who are the elect, called according to the election or purpose of God. He
says, verse 29, “ For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestimate to be
conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among
many brethren :” that is, we know it, because they are predestimated to be
conformed to the image of his Son. Not if they will be, but to be, and
therefore, all things must directly or indirectly contribute to this result.
He then says, “ Moreover, whom he did predestimate, them he also
called ; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he
justified, them he also glorified.” That is, furthermore, we know this, and
have good ground of hope from the fact, that whom he did predestimate to
be conformed to the image of his Son, them, that is the same persons, he
also called ; and whom, that is, the same persons whom he had predesti-
mated to be conformed to the image of his Son, and had called, them he
also justified; and whom he predestinated, and called, and justified, them,
that is, the same persons, he also glorified.
Here then, he concludes, is a firm foundation for the hope of which he
had spoken, the grounds of which he had been pointing out. He accord-
ingly proceeds to say in a spirit of triumph :-
Rom. viii. 31 : “What shall we then say to these things? If God be
for us, who can be against us? 32. He that spared not his own Son, but
delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us
all things 2 33. Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It
is God that justifieth. 34. Who is he that condemneth 2 It is Christ
that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of
God, who also maketh intercession for us.”
Here he says, “if God be for us, who can be against us?” and then
proceeds to point out several other considerations that enter into this
ground of confidence. All who love God are his elect. God justifies them,
and who is he that condemns them 2 God is for them, and who shall be
against them 2 God freely gave his Son for all of them, how much more
shall he freely give them all things? If he did not withhold his son,
874 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
Surely he would withhold nothing else from them that was necessary to
Secure their salvation. Furthermore, it was Christ that died, and still more
and rather, that had risen again, and maketh intercession for them. If
these things are so, we may well inquire —
Rom. viii. 35 : “Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? shall
tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or
sword 2 36. (As it is written, For thy sake we are killed all the day
long ; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.)”
He then triumphantly affirms, verses 37–39 : “ Nay, in all these things
We are more than conquerors, through him that loved us. For I am per-
suaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor
Powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor
any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God,
which is in Christ Jesus onr Lord.”
If Paul in the eighth of Romans does not settle the question, that all
true Saints will be saved, how could it be settled 2 Let us in few words
sum up the argument, as he here presents it —
(i) We are saved already in anticipation, or in hope; and only by hope,
for as yet we have not received our crown.
(ii) The grounds of this hope are, that we are in Christ Jesus, have the
spirit of Christ, spirit of adoption. We walk not after the flesh, but after
the Spirit. This spirit witnesses that we are children and heirs of God.
He makes intercession for us according to the will of God. We also know,
that all things work together for good to them who love God, for they are
the called according to his purpose. They who are called, that is, effectually
called, are called in conformity with their predestination to be conformed
to the image of the Son of God. Hence those who are thus predestimated
are called, and justified, and glorified. Therefore, no one can lay anything
to the charge of God’s elect. God justifies, and who shall condemn them 2
Christ died for them, yea, rather, has risen and makes intercession for
them. God withheld not his Son, and of course will withhold from Chris-
tians nothing that is essential to secure their salvation. Wherefore he
concludes, that mothing shall be able to separate us from the love of God.
I know that to this it has been replied, that although mothing else can
Separate us from the love of God, yet we may separate ourselves from his love.
To this I answer, true ; we may, or can do so; but the question is, shall
We, or will any of the elected and called do so 2 No, indeed; for this is
the thing which the apostle intended to affirm, mamely, the certainty of the
Salvation of all true Saints. The apostle manifestly in this passage assumes,
or affirms, that all who ever truly loved God are elect, or are chosen to be
conformed to the image of his Son ; and are called, and Sanctified, and
justified, in conformity with such predestination.
If this is not his meaning, what is? If this is not his meaning, what
ground of hope do we, after all, find in what he says?
The apostle seems to have had the same thought in his mind in writing
to the Hebrews.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 87.5
Heb. vi. 17: “Wherein God, willing more abundantly to show unto the
heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath;
18. That by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to
lie, we might have a strong consolation, who have fled for refuge to lay hold
upon the hope set before us; 19. Which hope we have as an anchor of the
soul, both sure and steadfast, and which entereth into that within the veil;
20. Whither the forerunner is for us entered, even Jesus, made a high-
priest for ever, after the order of Melchisedec.”
There are a great many other passages of scripture, of the same import
as those I have quoted in support of this doctrine, as every one knows who
has taken the trouble to examine for himself.
But I have pursued this investigation far enough. If what has been said
fails to satisfy any mind, it is presumed that nothing which might be added
would produce conviction. I will therefore, after replying to some further
objections, conclude the discussion of this subject.
LECTURE LXXXI.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.
W. Consider the objections to it.
1. It is said that the natural tendency of this doctrine condemns it;
that it tends to beget and foster a carnal presumption in a life of sin, on
the part of those who think themselves saints.
There is, I reply, a broad and obvious distinction between the abuse of a
good thing or doctrine, and its natural tendency. The legitimate tendency
of a thing or doctrine may be good, and yet it may be abused and perverted.
This is true of the atonement, and the offer of pardon through Christ.
These doctrines have been, and are, greatly objected to by universalists
and unitarians, as having a tendency to encourage the hope of impunity in
sin. It is said by them, that to hold out the idea that Christ has made an
atonement for sin, and that the oldest and vilest sinners may be forgiven
and saved, tends directly to immorality, and to encourage the hope of ulti-
mate impunity in a life of sin; the hope that, after a sinful life, the sinner
may at last repent and be saved.
Now, there is so much plausibility in this objection to the doctrine of
pardon and atonement, that many sensible men have rejected those
doctrines because of this objection. They have regarded the objection as
unanswerable. But a close examination will show, that the objection
against those doctrines is entirely without foundation; and not only so,
but that the real matural tendency of those doctrines affords a strong pre-
sumptive argument in their favour. Who does mot know, after all, that
from the nature and laws of mind, the manifestation of compassion and of
disinterested good will, and a disposition to forgive a fault on the part of
~ 876 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the justly offended, tend in the highest degree to bring the offender to
repentance 2 “If thine enemy hunger, feed him ; if he thirst, give him
drink; for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head.” This
command is the perfection of wisdom. It recognises mind, and the laws
of mind as they are, The free offer of pardon to a convicted and self-con-
demned sinner has no matural tendency to encourage him in sin, but is the
most potent influence possible to bring him to immediate repentance.
So the telling of a convinced and self-condemned sinner, that Christ has
died for his sins, and offers freely and at once to forgive all the past, has no
matural tendency to beget a spirit of perseverance in rebellion; but is on
the contrary the readiest, and safest, and I may add, the only effectual
method of subduing him, and bringing him to immediate repentance. But
suppose, on the other hand, you tell him there is no forgiveness, that he
must be punished for his sins at all events, what tendency has this to
bring him to immediate and genuine repentance; to beget within him the
love required by the law of God 2 Assuring him of punishment for all
his sins might serve to restrain outward manifestations of a sinful heart,
but certainly it tends not to subdue selfishness, and to cleanse the heart;
whereas the offer of mercy through the death of Christ, has a most sin-
subduing tendency. It is such a manifestation to the sinner of God's
great love to him, his real pity for him, and readiness to overlook and blot
out the past, as tends to break down the stubborn heart into genuine
repentance, and to beget the sincerest love to God and Christ, together
with the deepest self-loathing and self-abasement on account of sin. Thus
the doctrines of the atonement and pardon through a crucified Redeemer,
instead of being condemned by their legitimate tendency, are greatly
confirmed thereby. These doctrines are no doubt liable to abuse, and so
is every good thing; but is this a good reason for rejecting them 2 Our
necessary food and drink may be abused, and often are, and so are all the
most essential blessings of life. Should we reject them on this account 2
It is admitted, that the doctrines of atonement and forgiveness through
Christ, are greatly abused by careless sinners and hypocrites; but is this a
good reason for denying and withholding them from the convicted sinner,
who is earnestly inquiring what he shall do to be saved? No, indeed.
It is also admitted, that the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints is
liable to abuse, and often is abused by the carnal and deceived professor;
but is this a good reason for rejecting it, and for withholding its consolations
from the tempted, tempest-tossed Saint 2 By no means. Such are the
circumstances of temptation from within and without, in which the saints
are placed in this life, that when they are made really acquainted with
themselves, and are brought to a proper appreciation of the circumstances
in which they are, they have but little rational ground of hope, except what
is found in this doctrine. The matural tendency and inevitable consequence
of a thorough revelation of themselves to themselves, would be to beget
despair, but for the covenanted grace and faithfulness of God. What saint
who has ever been revealed to himself by the Holy Spirit, has not seen what
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 877
Paul saw when he said, “In me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good
thing?” Who that has been made acquainted with himself, does not know
that he never did, and never will take one step towards heaven, except as
he is anticipated and drawn by the grace of God in Christ Jesus? Who
that knows himself does not understand that he never would have been con-
verted, but for the grace of God anticipating and exciting the first motions
of his mind in a right direction ? And what true Saint does not know, that
such are his former habitudes, and such the circumstances of trial under
which he is placed, and such the downward tendency of his own soul on
account of his physical depravity,” that although converted, he shall not
persevere for an hour, except the indwelling grace and Spirit of God shall
hold him up, and quicken him in the path of holiness?
Where, I would ask, is the ground of hope for the Saints as they exist in
this world? Not in the fact that they have been physically regenerated, so
that to fall is naturally impossible. Not in the fact that they have passed
through any such change of nature as to secure their perseverance for an
hour, if left to themselves. Not in the fact that they can, or will sustain
themselves for a day or a moment by their resolutions. Where them is
their hope? There is not even a ground of probability, that any one of
them will ever be saved, unless the doctrine in question be true, that is,
unless the promised grace and faithfulness of God in Christ Jesus goes
before, and from step to step secures their perseverance. But if this grace
is promised to any Saint, as his only ground of confidence, or even hope
that he shall be saved, it is equally, and upon the same conditions, promised
to all the Saints. No one more than another can place the least reasonable
dependence on anything, except the grace equally promised and vouchsafed
to all. What does a man know of himself who hopes to be saved, and who
yet does not depend wholly on promises of grace in Christ Jesus?
The natural tendency of true and thorough conviction of sin, and of such
a knowledge of ourselves, as is essential to Salvation, is to beget and foster
despondency and despair; and, as I said, the soul in this condition has
absolutely little or no ground of hope of ultimate salvation, except that
which this doctrine, when rightly understood, affords. However far he
may have progressed in the way of life, he sees, when he thoroughly knows
the truth, that he has progressed not a step, except as he has been drawn
and inclined by the indwelling grace and Spirit of Christ; and that he
shall absolutely go no further in the way to heaven, unless the same
gracious influence is continued, in such a sense, and to such an extent, as
to overcome all the temptations with which he is beset. His only hope is
in the fact, that God has promised to keep and preserve him. Nothing
but God's faithfulness to his Son procured the conversion of any saint.
Nothing but this same faithfulness has procured his perseverance for a day,
and nothing else can render the salvation of any soul at all probable. What
can a man be thinking about, or what can he know of himself, who does not
* See distinction between moral and physical depravity. Page 370.
878 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
know this? Unless the same grace that secures the conversion of the
Saints, secures their perseverance to the end, there is no hope for them. It
is true, that the promises to sinners and to saints are conditioned upon
their faith, and upon the right exercise of their own agency; and it is also
true, that grace secures the fulfilment of the conditions of the promises,
in every instance in which they are fulfilled, or they never would be
fulfilled.
We have seen that the promises of the Father to the Son secure the
bestowment upon the Saints of all grace to ensure their final salvation.
It shocks and distresses me to hear professed Christians talk of being
saved at all, except upon the ground of the anticipating, and persevering,
and sin-overcoming, and hell-subduing grace of God in Christ Jesus. Why,
I should as soon expect the devil to be saved, as that any saint on earth
will be, if left, with all the promises of God in his hands, to stand and per-
severe without the drawings, and inward teachings, and over-pursuading
influences of the Holy Spirit. Shame on a theology that suspends the
ultimate Salvation of the Saints upon the broken reed of their own resolu-
tions in their best estate. Their firmest resolutions are nothing unless
they are formed and supported by the influence of the Spirit of grace, going
before, and exciting, and persuading to their formation and their con-
tinuance. This is everywhere taught in the Bible; and who that has con-
sidered the matter does not know, that this is the experience of every saint?
Where, then, is the ground of hope, if the doctrine in question be denied ?
“If the foundation be destroyed, what shall the righteous do?” Where,
them, is the evil tendency of this doctrine 2 It has no naturally evil
tendency. Can the assurance of etermal salvation through the blood, and
love, and grace of Christ, have a matural tendency to harden the heart of a
child of God against his Father and his Saviour? Can the revealed fact,
that he shall be more than a conqueror through Christ, beget in him a dis-
position to sin against Christ P Impossible ! This doctrine, though liable
to abuse by hypocrites, is nevertheless the sheet anchor of the saints in
hours of conflict. And shall the children be deprived of the bread of life,
because sinners will pervert the use of it to their own destruction ?
This doctrine is absolutely needful to prevent despair, when conviction is
deep, and conflicts with temptation are sharp. Its natural tendency is
to slay and keep down selfishness, to forestall selfish efforts and resolu-
tions, and to sustain the confidence of the soul at all times. It tends to
subdue sin, to humble the soul under a sense of the great love and faithful-
ness of God in Christ Jesus; to influence the soul to live upon Christ, and
to renounce entirely and for ever all confidence in the flesh. Indeed, its
tendency is the direct opposite of that asserted in the objection. It is
the abuse, and not the natural tendency of this doctrine, against which this
objection is urged. But the abuse of a doctrine is no reason why it should
be rejected.
2. But it is said that real saints do sometimes fall into at least temporary
backsliding, in which cases the belief of this doctrine tends to lull them
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 879
into carmal security, and to prolong their backsliding, if not to embolden
them to apostatize. To this I reply,–
That if real Christians do backslide, they lose for the time being their
evidence of acceptance with God; and withal they know that in their present
state they cannot be saved. This objection is levelled rather against that
view of perseverance that says, “once in grace, always in grace;” that
teaches the doctrine of perpetual justification upon condition of one act of
faith. The doctrine as stated in these lectures, holds out no ground of
hope to a backslider, except upon condition of return and perseverance to
the end. Moreover, the doctrine as here taught is, that perseverance in
holiness, in the sense, that, Subsequent to regeneration holiness is at least
the rule, and sin only the exception, is an attribute of Christian character.
Lvery moment, therefore, a backslider remains in sin, he must have less
evidence that he is a child of God.
But as I said, he loses confidence in his own Christianity, and in this
state of backsliding he does not believe the doctrine of perseverance, as a
doctrine of revelation. It is absurd to say, that while backslidden from
God he still has faith in his word, and believes this doctrine as a Christian
doctrine, and upon the strength of the testimony of God. He does not in
this state really believe the doctrine, and therefore it is not the tendency
of the doctrine when believed that harms him, but a gross abuse and per-
version of it. But the perversion of a doctrine is no objection to it. The
real tendency of the doctrine is to break the heart of the backslider, to
exhibit to him the great love, and faithfulness, and grace of God which
tend maturally to subdue selfishuess, and to humble the heart. When
backsliders are emboldened by this doctrine and rendered presumptuous, it
is never by any other than a gross perversion and abuse of it.
But still it is said, that when Christians backslide, they know if this
doctrine is true, that they shall not die in a backslidden state, and that,
therefore they are naturally rendered presumptuous by it. I answer, that
the same objection lies against the doctrine of election, which cannot be
denied. Who does not know that sinners and backsliders say, If I am
elected, I shall be saved; and if not, I shall be lost? The event is certain
at any rate, and if I am to use the means, I shall use the means; and
if I am to neglect them, I shall neglect them. If I am one of the
elect, I shall not die in sin ; and if not, I shall, do what I may. The
backslider says, I have been converted, and am therefore one of the elect :
for there is no evidence that any of the non-elect are ever converted:
but the elect cannot be lost, or will not be lost, at any rate; therefore I shall
be reclaimed before I die. Now who does not see that all such refuges are
refuges of lies 2 They are abuses of precious truth. The objection we are
considering is based upon an overlooking of the all-important distinction
between the natural tendency and the abuse of a doctrine. If this doctrine
has a matural tendency to mischief, it must be calculated to mislead a
humble, honest, and prayerful mind in search of truth. It must tend to
lead a true saint away from, instead of to Christ. The fact that simmers
880 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
and backsliders, who for the time being are the chief of sinners, will and
do abuse and pervert it, is no better reason for rejecting this doctrine, than
it is for rejecting the doctrine of atonement, of justification by faith, or the
doctrine of the free pardon of the greatest simmers, upon condition of
repentance and faith. It is true that no person whom God foresees will be
saved, will die in sin. It is true that no elect person will die in sin; and
as I believe all true Saints are elect, nevertheless, the natural tendency of
this doctrine is anything else than to beget presumption in the real saint;
but on the contrary, it has a natural and a powerful tendency to impress
him with sin subduing views of the infinite love, compassion, faithful.
ness, and grace of God, and to charm him away from his sins for ever,
If by any means he falls into temporary backsliding, he may abuse this,
as he may every other doctrine of the gospel ; but let it be understood, that
he does not believe for the time being one of the doctrines of the gospel.
Not believing them, he of course is not injured by their matural tendency,
but only by a perverse abuse of them.
As well might a universalist complain, and accuse you of preaching
smooth things, and of encouraging sinners to continue in sin, by preaching
that the vilest Simmer may be forgiven, as for you to object to this doctrine,
that backsliders are rendered presumptuous by it.
If one is more liable to abuse than the other, the difference is only in
degree and not in kind. The backslider cannot know that he was ever
converted ; for, as a matter of fact, he has lost communion with God, and
has lost the present evidence of acceptance. He does not, therefore, rest
in a real belief of this doctrine, but only in a perverse abuse of it.
Those who persist in such objections should reflect upon their own
incomSistency, in making a manifest perversion and abuse of this doctrine
an objection to it, when they hold other doctrines, equally liable to abuse
and equally abused, in spite of Such abuse. Let such persons see, that
they are practically adopting a principle, and insisting upon its application
in this case, which, if carried out, would set aside the whole gospel. They
are thus playing into the hands of infidels and universalists, and giving the
enemies of God occasion to blaspheme.
3. It is objected, that the Bible speaks of the Saints as if there were real
danger of their being lost. It requires them to spend the time of their
Sojourning here in fear, and abounds with cautions, and warmings, and
threatenings, that are certainly out of place, and not at all to be regarded,
if the salvation of the saints is a revealed certainty. How, it is inquired,
can we fear, if God has revealed the certainty of our salvation ? Is not
fear in Such a case a result of unbelief? Can God reveal to us the fact,
that we shall certainly be saved, and then call on us or exhort us to fear
that we shall not be Saved 2 Can he require us to doubt his word and his
oath 2 If God has revealed the certainty of the Salvation of all true saints,
can any saint fear that he shall not be saved without downright unbelief?
and can God approve and even enjoin such fears? If a person is conscious
of possessing the character ascribed to the true Saints in the Bible, is he
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 88.1
not bound upon the supposition that this doctrine is true, to have and to
entertain the most unwavering assurance that he shall be saved 2 Has he
any right to doubt it, or to fear that he shall not be saved 2
I answer, that no true Saint who has an evidence or an earnest of his
acceptance with God, such as the true Saint may have, has a right to doubt
for a moment that he shall be saved, nor has he a right to fear, that he
shall not be saved. I also add, that the Bible nowhere encourages, or
calls upon the saints to fear, that they shall not be saved, or that they
shall be lost. It calls on them to fear something else, to fear to sin or
apostatize, lest they should be lost, but not that they shall sin and be lost.
The following are specimens of the exhortations and warnings given to
the Saints:–
Matt. xxvi. 41. “Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation ;
the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.”
Mark xiii. 33: “Take ye heed, watch and pray; for ye know not when
the time is. 34. For the Son of Man is as a man taking a far journey,
who left his house, and gave authority to his servants, and to every man his
work, and commanded the porter to watch. 35. So watch ye therefore ;
for ye know not when the master of the house cometh, at even, or at midnight,
or at cock-crowing, or in the morning ; 36. Lest, coming suddenly, he
find you sleeping. 37. And what I say unto you, I say unto all, Watch.”
Luke xii. 37: “Blessed are those servants, whom the lord when he cometh,
shall find watching; verily I say unto you, That he shall gird himself, and
make them to sit down to meat, and will come forth and serve them.”
1 Cor. X. 12: “Wherefore, let him that thimketh he standeth take heed
lest he fall.”
1 Cor. xix. 13: “Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men,
be strong.”
Eph. V. 15 : “See then that ye walk circumspectly, not as fools, but as
wise. 16. Redeeming the time, because the days are evil.”
Eph. vi. 10. “Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord and in the
power of his might 11. Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be
able to stand against the wiles of the devil.”
Phil. i. 27 : “Only let your conversation be as it becometh the gospel of
Christ ; that whether I come and see you, or else be absent, I may hear of
your affairs, that ye stand fast in one spirit, with one mind striving together
for the faith of the gospel; 28. And in nothing terrified by your adver-
Saries; which is to them an evident token of perdition, but to you of salva.
tion, and that of God.”
1 Thess. v. 6. “Therefore, let us not sleep, as do others; but let us
Watch and be sober.”
1 Tim. vi. 12: “Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal life,
Whereunto thou art also called, and hast professed a good profession before
many witnesses.”
3 Tim. ii. 3: “Thou therefore endure hardness, as a good soldier of
Jesus Christ.”
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882 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
2 Tim. iv. 5; “But watch thou in all things, endure afflictions, do the
work of an evangelist, make full proof of thy ministry.”
1 Pet. iv. 7. “But the end of all things is at hand; be ye therefore
Sober, and watch unto prayer.”
Matt. x. 22. “And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake;
but he that endureth to the end shall be saved.”
John XV. 6. “If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and
is withered ; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they
are burned.”
Rom. ii. 6: “Who will render to every man according to his deeds;
7. To them who, by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, and
honour, and immortality, etermal life.”
1 Cor. ix. 27 : “But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection;
lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be
a castaway.”
2 Cor. vi. 1 : “We, then, as workers together with him, beseech you
also that ye receive not the grace of God in vain.”
Col. i. 23: If ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and be not
moved away from the hope of the gospel, which ye have heard, and which
was preached to every creature which is under heaven ; whereof I Paul am
made a minister.”
Heb. iii. 6: “But Christ as a Son over his own house ; whose house are
we, if we hold fast the confidence and the rejoicing of the hope firm unto
the end. 12. Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart
of unbelief, in departing from the living God. 13. But exhort one another
daily, while it is called, To-day ; lest any of you be hardened through the
deceitfulness of sin. 14. For we are made partakers of Christ, if we hold
the beginning of our confidence stedfast unto the end.”
Heb. iv. 1: “Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of
entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. 11. Let
us labour therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the same
example of unbelief.”
2 Pet. i. 10 : “Whefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make
your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never
fall.”
Rev. ii. 10. “Fear none of those things which thou shalt suffer; behold,
the devil shall cast some of you into prison, that ye may be tried : and ye
shall have tribulation ten days; be thou faithful unto death, and I will
give thee a crown of life. 11. He that hath an ear, let him hear what the
Spirit saith unto the churches; he that overcometh shall not be hurt of the
second death. 17. He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith
unto the churches: To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden
manma, and will give him a White stone, and in the stone a new name
written, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it. 26. And he
that overcometh, and keepeth my Words unto the end, to him will I give
power over the nations.” -
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 883
Rev. xxi. 7 : “He that overcometh shall inherit all things; and I will
be his God, and he shall be my Son,”
1 Pet. i. 17: “And if ye call on the Father, who without respect of
persons judgeth according to every man's work, pass the time of your
Sojourning here in fear.”
I find no instance in the Bible in which the Saints are enjoined or
exhorted to fear that they shall actually be lost; but, on the contrary,
this kind of fear is everywhere, in the word of God, discountenanced and
rebuked, and the saints are exhorted to the utmost assurance that Christ
will keep and preserve them to the end, and finally bestow on them eternal
life. They are warmed against sin and apostacy, and are informed that if
they do apostatize they shall be lost. They are expressly informed, that
their salvation is conditioned upon their perseverance in holiness to the
end. They are also called upon to watch against sin and apostacy; to fear
both, lest they should be lost.
Heb. iv. l ; “Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of
entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it.”
Heb. vi. 1 : “Therefore, leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ,
let us go on unto perfection ; not laying again the foundation of repentance
from dead works, and of faith toward God. 2. Of the doctrine of baptism,
and of laying on of hands, and of resurrection of the dead, and of eternal
judgment. 3. And this will we do, if God permit. 4. For it is impossible
for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift,
and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost; 5. And have tasted the
good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, 6. If they shall
fall away, to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to
themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame.”
Heb. iii. 12 : “Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil
heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God, lg. But exhort one
another daily, while it is called to day; lest any of you be hardened
through the deceitfulness of sin. 14. For we are made partakers of Christ,
if we hold the beginning of our confidence stedfast unto the end.”
They are required to fear to sim, but not to fear that they shall sin in
any sense that implies any expectation of sinning. They are to fear to
apostatize, but not to expect, or fear that they shall apostatize. They are
to fear to be lost, but not that they shall be lost. To fear to sin lest we
should be lost, is a very different thing from fearing that we shall sin and
shall be lost. There is just as much need of our fearing to sin, and of
fearing to be lost, as there would be if there were no certainty of our salva-
tion. When we consider the nature of the certainty of the Salvation of the
Saints, that it is only a moral and conditional certainty, we can see the
propriety and the necessity of the warnings and threatenings which we fin
addressed to them in the Bible. The language of the Bible is just what it
might be expected to be, in case the salvation of the Saints were certain,
With a moral and conditional certainty.
But in replying to this objection, it is important to ascertain the mean-
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884 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
ing of the terms used by the objector. I will first show what there is not,
and what there is, implied in the term danger —
(1) We have seen that all events are really certain by some kind of
certainty. Danger, them, cannot imply that there is any real uncertainty in
respect to that of which we predicate danger; for this cannot truly be said
of any event whatever. It will be in some way, and it is beforehand as
really certain how it will be, as it is after it has occurred. Danger, then,
does not imply real uncertainty.
(2) We generally use the term as implying uncertainty as it respects
our knowledge of how the event will be; that is, we predicate danger of
that of which we are not certain how it will turn out to be. We generally
use the term as implying that we regard the result as uncertain, and that
there is at least a possibility, and even a probability, that it may turn out
differently from what we would have it. The term, then, does not imply
real, but only to us an apparent uncertainty. This is commonly implied
in the term “danger,” as we use it.
(3.) But the term does not always and necessarily imply, that we are
uncertain in respect to the event of which we predicate danger. If a thing
may fail by natural possibility; if, moreover, the result is suspended on the
action of free-will ; and if, humanly speaking, and judging of the probability
of the result from the usual course of events, there are seen to be many
chances to one against it ; and if from the nature of the event nothing can
make it certain, or Secure its occurrence, but the most strenuous care and
watchfulness and effort on the part of those whose agency is to be employed
in its production ; and if, moreover, it is understood, that those concerned
Will have many temptations to take a course that would, if taken, defeat it;
to each of which temptations the agent can yield with the greatest ease,
and no compulsion will be used to prevent his yielding;-I say, when there
is a concurrence of such facts and circumstances, we should say that there
was danger, even if the result were a revealed certainty. There is in this
case, in truth, as real and as much danger of failure, as there is that any
event whatever will be different from what it in fact turns out to be ; and
considering the nature of the certainty, and the multitude of apparent con-
tingencies upon which the result is suspended ; and, humanly speaking,
the many chances to ome against its occurrence, we should in such a case
say there is danger, and could not but feel a sense of danger, although we
knew that the result was certain. For example, Suppose a man about to
cross the Niagara river upon a wire just over the falls, and suppose it to be
revealed to him and to the world that he should cross in safety; but sup-
pose it to be revealed also that he is not to be preserved by a miracle, but
that his safety is to depend upon his own skill, prudence, and efforts, and
the fact revealed to be simply that he will so behave as to cross in Safety.
Now all would say and feel that there was danger in this case, although
they might have the fullest confidence in the result. The danger is as
real, in this case, as if the certainty were not revealed ; and considering
the multitude of chances of failure, we should feel, and say that there is
JPERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 885
danger notwithstanding the revealed certainty. If the certainty were
absolute, or were that of necessity, we should not say or feel that there was
danger. But when the certainty is understood to be only a moral one, we
should as properly say that there was danger, as if the certainty, though
real, were not revealed. By danger, then, we mean to express, not a real,
but only an apparent uncertainty, and a human probability, or at least a
natural possibility, that an event may turn out otherwise than we desire.
We do not always and necessarily mean that the event is uncertain to us,
but that humanly speaking, and judging from the ordinary course of events,
it is possible or probable that it may not occur as we would have it; and
that nothing can render it certain but care, and watchfulness, and diligence,
and perseverance on the part of him or them upon whose agency the event
is suspended.
But this objection assumes a false philosophy of mind. It assumes that
fear is out of place and impossible, except when there is at least supposed
uncertainty. It is said that fear is an emotion that always implies real
or apprehended danger in the sense of uncertainty.
It is asserted, that the emotion of fear cannot exist but upon condition
that the subject does not regard himself as Safe, or that he does not regard
the interest or thing safe, concerning which fear is excited; but this is a
mistake. It is true that fear is more readily excited when there is no
accredited certainty in regard to the safety of the thing or interest con-
cerning which the fear is excited ; and it is also true, that this kind of fear
tends, by reason of its strength and from its nature, very strongly to selfish
efforts to escape from apprehended danger. It is also true, that fear may
be and often is excited, when there is no accredited uncertainty, and no
apprehended danger, in the sense of uncertainty in regard to the safety of
self, or of the interest or thing respecting which the fear is excited. For
example, place an individual upon the verge of a precipice, beneath which
yawns a gulph of frightful depth, and withal chain him fast so that he
knows that to fall is impossible, and yet his fears will be excited. An
emotion of fear will arise in spite of himself. Webster quotes Rogers's
definition of fear, thus: “Fear is that passion of our mature which excites
us to provide for our security on the approach of evil.” But this, as we
shall see, is saying only half the truth, “Fear,” Webster says, “expresses
less apprehension than dread, and dread less than terror, and terror less
than fright. The force of this passion beginning with the most moderate
degree may be thus expressed : Fear, dread, terror, fright.” He says
again, “Fear in scripture is used to express a filial, or a slavish passion. In
good men, the fear of God is a holy awe, or reverence of God and of his
laws, which springs from a just view and real love of the divine character,
leading the subjects of it to hate and shun everything that can offend such
a holy being. Slavish fear is the effect or consequence of guilt: it is the
painful apprehension of merited punishment.” Every one knows that
these two kinds of fear are frequently spoken of in the Bible. Fear does
not necessarily imply an apprehension of real danger. For example, to
886 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
return to the individual upon the verge of the precipice : here, although
there is a known natural impossibility of falling, and of course no appre-
hension of danger, in the sense of uncertainty, yet who does not perceive,
that even more than simple fear would, at least in many cases, be excited 2
To look down, even if certain of not falling, would excite in many minds a
degree of dread, and even of terror, that would be almost unendurable.
Few individuals could be found, in whom the emotion of fear, and even of
terror would not, under Such circumstances, be awakened. It is a great
mistake to suppose that this emotion cannot exist, except where there is
real or apprehended danger in the sense of uncertainty. Who, for
example, cannot conceive, and who that has considered the matter does not
admit, that a view of the torments of the damned may, and doubtless will,
excite a wholesome fear and dread of sin in the inhabitants of heaven 2
The witnessing of anything terrible in its nature tends to awaken the
emotion of fear or terror, whether we regard ourselves as exposed to it or
not. Much more is this true, when we know that the evil is naturally
possible to us, and that nothing but care and watchfulness on our part,
prevents its actually coming upon us. Now, although we are certain, that
we shall not fall from a precipice upon which we stand, yet a view of so
terrible an object awakens the corresponding emotions at once. Instead
of saying that fear is an emotion that is awakened only by an apprehension
of real danger, it were more in accordance with truth to say, that it is an
emotion that is awakened when its correlated object is present to the
thoughts; and its correlated object is anything whatever that is fearful, or
dreadful, or terrible in its nature, whether we regard ourselves as really
exposed to it in the sense of uncertainty or not. Thus, should we stand on
the shore and witness a shipwreck, or be within hearing of a battle, or
witness the rush of a distant tornado, as it spreads its wings of desolation
over a country or a city, and in a direction that forbids the possibility of
injury to us, the emotion of fear, and even of terror, in such cases would be
awakened, even if we were sure that no real harm would result to any being
whatever. All the emotions have their correlated objects; and it is a great
mistake to say, that the presence of these objects does not awaken them,
except upon condition that our own interest, or the interest of some one
else, is to be affected thereby. Objects naturally lovely when present to
the mind, naturally awaken corresponding emotions. Objects of beauty
and deformity, of desire, and of terror, naturally awaken their corres-
ponding emotions, wholly irrespective of any apprehended pleasure or pain
to be derived from them. But surely I need not enter into a further state-
ment or illustration of a fact of universal consciousness. The affirmation
that fear is correlated only to real or apprehended danger, in the sense of
uncertainty, and not at all to objects maturally fearful or terrible, irres-
pective of apprehended danger, is so palpable a contradiction of human
consciousness, that few reflecting minds can fail to perceive it.
Again: the sanctions of law have, and even in heaven will and must have,
their appropriate influence. But what is their appropriate influence?
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS, 887
These sanctions are remuneratory and, vindicatory, as we have formerly seen.
They present all that isnaturally desirable as the reward of virtue. They
hold forth all that is dreadful and terrible as the reward of sin. The con-
templation of these sanctions naturally begets their correlated emotions in
all worlds and at all times. The inhabitants of hell no doubt have their
desires awakened by a contemplation of the happiness of heaven, while the
inhabitants of heaven have their pity, their fears, their dread awakened in
view of the torments of hell, and in neither case is it in view of any appre-
hended uncertainty. The inhabitants of hell know that the joys of heaven
are certainly never to be theirs, and the inhabitants of heaven know that
the miseries of hell are never to be theirs. Nevertheless, the emotions
respond to their correlated objects in both worlds, and no doubt will as long
as mind exists.
Sin is a hateful, and a fearful, and a terrible thing. The wrath of an
offended God is infinitely terrible in its mature. Endless torments are
unspeakably fearful and terrible. The flaming penalty of the divine law is
an object of infinite terror. These things are so correlated to the consti-
tution of moral agents, as naturally to excite their corresponding emotions,
entirely irrespective of any apprehended personal danger. When added to
this tendency that results from the nature and correlations of those objects,
there is a sense of uncertainty in regard to our personal safety, the con-
templation of these objects causes intense agony. A certainty of personal
security relieves the agony, but it does not cause the emotion of fear, and
awe, and dread, wholly to subside. Enough remains to fix the attention,
and to act as a safeguard against presumption, in cases where there is a
natural possibility of the evil we fear becoming ours. What a mistake in
psychology to affirm, that fear cannot exist unless it be excited by a belief
of personal danger, in the sense of uncertainty in respect to whether the
evil shall come upon us. I say again, that the emotion is correlated to its
object, and is not dependent upon an apprehension of personal danger, as
every one knows. When the apprehension of personal danger is added,
the excitement of the emotion is greatly and painfully aggravated. And on
the other hand, the emotion is modified and softened by a sense and
certainty of personal Security. But still the emotion in a modified and
softened form will exist so long as an object, fearful and terrible in its
mature, is made the object of contemplation. -
In this life, time, and habit, and reflection, may cause emotions of fear
to cease, even in the presence of a fearful object, as in the case of the sup.
posed precipice. Continuing for a long time to look upon precisely the
same object, and considering that there was and could be no danger, in the
sense of uncertainty, and familiarizing the mind to this contemplation,
might in time cause the sensible emotions of fear to cease. The same
would be true of any other emotion, such as an emotion of love, or a sense
of beauty, or deformity, &c. This would occur where the object contem-
plated presented no new attractions on the one hand, or repulsions or
terrors on the other. But suppose the more the object was contemplated,
888 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
the more it developed its beauties, its deformities, or its terrors to the
mind. In this case, the emotions corresponding would never cease. This
is precisely the case with the sanctions of moral law, with the wrath and
the love of God, with the joys of heaven and the pains of hell. These
objects will never lose their influence for the want of novelty. They will
never cease to beget their correlated emotions, for the reason that they will
be ever new in the sense of always presenting to the gaze of intelligent
beings, more to desire on the one hand, and more to fear and dread on the
other.
But again : we see that this objection is based upon a gross error in
respect to the philosophy of moral government. Moral law exists with its
sanctions as really in heaven as on earth, and its sanctions have in heaven
the very influence that they ought to have on earth. It is as true in heaven
as on earth, that the Soul that sinneth shall die. Now, can the sanctions
of law exert no influence in heaven? I suppose no reasonable person will
doubt the certainty, and the known certainty of the perseverance of all
saints there. But if they are certain that they shall not sin and fall, can
they not be the subjects of fear in any sense ? I answer, yes. They are
naturally able to sin, and may be sometimes placed under circumstances
where they are tempted to selfishness. Indeed, the very nature of mind
renders it certain, that the Saints will always have need of watchfulness
against temptation and sin.
Now, it is the design of the sanctions of law in all worlds to produce
hope on the one hand, and fear on the other; in holy beings the hope of
reward, and the fear to sin lest they should perish. This hope and fear in
a being duly influenced by them, is not selfishness. It is madness and
desperate wickedness not to be influenced by them. Our reason affirms
that we ought to be influenced by them, that our own Salvation is of infinite
value, and that our damnation were an infinite evil. It therefore affirms
that we ought to secure the one and to avoid the other. This is law both
on earth and in heaven. This we are not to do selfishly, that is, to seek
our own salvation, or to avoid our own damnation, exclusively or only, but
to seek to save as many as possible; to love our neighbour as ourselves,
and ourselves as our neighbour. In all worlds the Sanctions of law ought
to have their influence, and with holy beings they have. Holy beings are
really subjects of fear, to sin, and to be lost, and are the only beings who
have the kind of fear which God requires, and which it is the design of the
sanctions of law and of the gospel to inspire. What! are we to be told
that a certainty of safety is wholly inconsistent with every kind and degree
of fear 2 What, then, is the use of law in heaven 2 Must a man on earth
or in heaven doubt whether he shall have eternal life, in order to leave
room for the influence of moral law, and of hope, and of fear? or in order
to leave play for the motives of moral government? There is room for the
same fear in heaven that ought to be on earth. No one had a right to
expect to violate the precept, and thereby incur the penalty of law. But
every one was bound to fear to do so. The penalty was never designed on
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 889
earth, any more than it is in heaven, to beget a slavish fear, or a fear that
we shall sin and be damned ; but only a fear to sin and be damned. A
fear to sin and to be lost, will, to all eternity, no doubt, be a means of con-
firming holy beings in heaven. The law will be the same there as here.
Free agency will be the same there as here. Perseverance in holiness will
be a condition of continued salvation there as really as here. There may,
and doubtless will be, temptations there as well as here. They will,
therefore, need there substantially the same motives to keep them that they
need and have here. There will there be laws and conditions of continued
bliss as here. There will be the same place, and in kind, if not in degree,
the same occasion for fear there that there is here. I say again, that the
objection we are considering, overlooks both the true philosophy of mind,
and of the influence of the sanctions of moral law.
The objection we are considering is based upon the assumption that
warnings, exhortation to fear, &c., are inconsistent with the revealed cer-
tainty of the salvation of the saints. But does not the Bible furnish
abundant instances of warning in cases where the result is revealed as
certain 2 The case of Paul's shipwreck is in point. This case has been
once alluded to, but I recur to it for the sake of illustration in this place.
God, by Paul, revealed the fact, that no life on board the ship should be
lost. This he declared as a fact, without any revealed qualification or
condition. But when the sailors, who alone knew how to manage the ship,
were about to abandon her, Paul informs them that their abiding in the ship
was a condition of their salvation from death. The means were really as
certain as the end; yet the end was conditionated upon the means, and if
the means failed, the end would fail. Therefore Paul appealed to their
fears of death to secure them against neglecting the means of safety. He
did not intend to excite in them a distrust of the promise of God, but only
to apprise them of the conditional nature of the certainty of their safety
which had been revealed to them, and thus cause them at once to fear to
neglect the means, and to confide in the certainty of safety in the diligent
use of them. But this is a case, be it understood, directly in point, and by
itself affords a full answer to the objection under consideration. It is a case
where a revealed certainty of the event was entirely consistent with warning
and threatening. Nay, it is a case where the certainty, though real, was
dependent upon the warming and threatening, and the consequent fear to
neglect the means. This case is a full illustration of the revealed certainty
of the ultimate salvation of the Saints; and were there no other case in the
Bible where warning and threatening are addressed to those whose safety is
revealed, this case would be a full answer to the assertion, that warnings
and threatenings are inconsistent with revealed certainty. Paul feared to
have the means of safety neglected, but he did not fear that they really
would be, because he knew that they would not.
To the pertinency of this case as an illustration, it is objected, that
the prophet pronounced the destruction of Nineveh in forty days to be
certain, as really as Paul in this case revealed the certainty of the safety
890 - SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
of all on board the ship; therefore, it is contended that Paul did not intend
to reveal the result as certain, because when a revelation was made respect-
ing the destruction of Nineveh, in just as unqualified terms, the event
showed that it was not certain. To this I reply, that in the case of Jonah,
it is manifest from the whole marrative that neither Jonah nor the Ninevites
understood the event as unconditionally certain. Jonah expressly assigned
to God his knowledge of the uncertainty of the event, as an excuse for not
delivering his message. So the people themselves understood, that the
event might not be certain, as their conduct abundantly shows. The
difference in the two cases is just this: one was a real and a revealed
certainty, and the other was neither. Why then should this case be adduced
as setting aside that of the shipwreck? But it is said, that no condition was
revealed in the one case more than in the other. Now so far as the history
is recorded, no mention is made in the case of Nineveh, that Jonah inti-
mated that there was any condition upon which the destruction of the city
could be avoided: yet it is plain, that both Jonah and the Ninevites under-
stood the threatening to be conditional, in the sense of the events being
uncertain. Jonah himself did not expect it with much certainty. But in
the case of Paul, he expressly affirms, that he believed God that it should be
as he had declared, that there should be the loss of no man's life, and
he encouraged them to believe the same thing. Paul understood the end
to be certain, though he knew, and soon informed them, that the certainty
was a moral one, and conditioned upon the diligent use of means. The two
cases are by no means parallel. It is true that Nineveh would have been
destroyed, had they not used the appropriate means to prevent it; and the
same is true of the ship's crew; and it is also true that, in both cases, it was
really certain that the means would not be neglected; yet, in one case, the
certainty was really understood to be revealed, and was believed in, and not
in the other. Now observe, the point to be illustrated by reference to this
case of shipwreck. It is just this: Can a man have any fear, and can there
be ground and need of caution and fear, where there is a real and revealed,
and believed or known certainty? The objection I am answering is, that,
if the salvation of the saints is certain, and revealed as such, and is believed
to be certain, there is then no ground of fear, and no necessity or room for
warning, threatening, &c. But this case of shipwreck is one in which all
these things meet.
(1.) The event was certain, and of course the conditions were sure to be
fulfilled.
(2.) The certainty was revealed.
(3.) It was believed. Yet,
(4.) There was warning, and threatening, and fear to neglect the means.
But these things did not all meet in the case of Jonah and the Ninevites.
In this case,
(1.) It was not certain that the city would be destroyed.
(2.) It was not understood to be revealed as certain.
. (3.) It was not believed to be certain.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 891
Why, then, I ask again, should these cases be taken as parallels 2
Paul's case is conclusive for the purpose for which it is cited, to wit, as
being an instance in which there was .
(1.) Certainty.
(2.) Revealed certainty.
(3.) Believed certainty.
(4.) Threatening and warning.
(5.) Fear to neglect the means. It follows that threatenings, and warm-
ings, and fears, are consistent with revealed and believed certainty. This
strikes out the foundation of the objection.
LECTURE LXXXI.
O B J E C T I O N S A N S W E R E D .
Again, Paul repeatedly speaks of his own salvation as certain, and yet
in a manner that conditionates it upon his perseverance in faith and
obedience to the end. He says ;
Philip. i. 19 : “For I know that this shall turn to my salvation through
your prayer, and the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ. 25. And having
this confidence, I know that I shall abide and continue with you all, for
your furtherance and joy of faith.”
2 Tim. iv. 18: “And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil work,
and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom : to whom be glory for
ever and ever.”
In this place it is plain, that he regarded his perseverance and ultimate
salvation, by and through the grace of God, as certain. Paul everywhere,
as every attentive reader of the Bible knows, renounces all hope but in the
indwelling grace and Spirit of Christ. Still he felt confident of his salva-
tion. But if he had no confidence in himself, on what was his confidence
based ? Again :
2 Tim, i. 12: “For the which cause I also suffer these things: nevertheless
I am not ashamed ; for I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded
that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that
day.”
Here again Paul expresses the fullest confidence of his own salvation.
He did not merely intend to say that Christ was able, if he was disposed,
to keep that which he had committed to him, but he assumed his willing-
mess and asserted his ability, as the ground of his confidence. That he
here expressed entire confidence in his ultimate salvation, cannot reason-
ably be doubted. He did not say that he was persuaded that Christ was
able to Save him, if he persevered; but his confidence was founded in the
fact, that Christ was able to secure his perseverance. It was because he
Was persuaded that Christ was able to keep him, that he had any assurance,
and I might add even hope, of his own Salvation. The same reason he
892 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
assigned as the ground of confidence that others would be saved. To the
Thessalonians he says, 2 Thess. iii. 3 : “But the Lord is faithful, who shall
establish you, and keep you from evil.” Again, Jude says, ver. 24: “Now
unto him that is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless
before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy.” Again, Peter says,
of all the elect or saints, 1 Peter i. 5: “Who are kept by the power of
God through faith unto Salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time.”
Thus we see, that the ground of confidence with the apostles was, that God
and Christ could and would keep them, not without their own efforts, but
that he would induce them to be faithful, and so secure this result. The
same was true of Christ, as is manifested in his last prayer for them.
John xvii. 15, 16: “I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the
world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil. They are not of
the world, even as I am not of the world.” But the apostles frequently
express their confidence, both in the certainty of their own salvation, and
also in the Salvation of those to whom they wrote. Paul says, 1 Cor.
ix. 26, 27 : “I therefore so run, not as uncertainly, so fight I, not as
one that beateth the air : But I keep under my body, and bring it into
subjection : lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself
should be a cast away.” Here he expresses the fullest confidence that
he shall win the crown, but at the same time recognizes the condition of
his Salvation, and informs us that he took care to fulfil it, lest he should be
a cast away. ... He says, verse 26: “I therefore so run, not as uncertainly,
so fight I, not as one who beateth the air.” He alludes to the Olympic
games, and in this connexion says, verses 24 and 25: “ Know ye not that
they which run in a race run all, but one receiveth the prize 2 So run, that
ye may obtain. And every man that striveth for the mastery is temperate
in all things. Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an
incorruptible.” He then adds, verse 26 and 27, “I therefore so run, not as
uncertainly, so fight I, not as one that beateth the air: But I keep under my
body, and bring it into subjection ; lest that by any means, when I have
preached to others, I myself should be a cast away.”
Of those who ran in these games, but one could win the prize. But not
so in the Christian race : here all might win. In those games, because but
one could possibly win, there was much uncertainty in respect to whether
any one in particular could win the prize. In the Christian race there was
no need of any such uncertainty. As it respected himself he says, verse
26: “I therefore so run, not as uncertainly, so fight I, not as one that
beateth the air :” that is, I do not run with any uncertainty or irresolution,
because of uncertainty in respect to whether I shall win the prize. Nor do
I fight as one that beateth the air, or as one who fights uncertainly or in
vain; but while I have this confidence, as a condition of this confidence, I
keep under my body. It has been denied that Paul intended to express a
confidence in his Salvation in this place ; but this cannot be reasonably
denied. He was speaking in this connexion of the Christian race, and of
the conditions of winning the victor's crown. He affirms that there was no
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 893
real uncertainty whether he should win the crown. In the Olympic games
there was uncertainty, because but one could win; but here no such ground
of uncertainty existed; and, moreover, with him there was no real un-
certainty at all, while at the same time he understood the conditional mature
of the certainty, and kept under his body, &c. Can any one suppose that
Paul really had any doubt in regard to his own ultimate salvation ? Now
observe, these passages in respect to Paul are not adduced to prove that all
saints will be saved ; nor that, if Paul was sure of his Salvation, therefore
all saints may be. To prove this is not my present design, but simply to
show, that while Paul was sure, and had no doubt of his ultimate Salvation,
he yet feared to neglect the means. He was not disheartened in the
Christian race with a sense of uncertainty, as they who ran in the Olympic
games. He was not, as they might be, irresolute on account of their great
uncertainty of winning. He expected to win, and yet he dared not neglect
the conditions of winning. Nay, he expected to win, because he expected
to fulfil the conditions; and he expected to fulfil the conditions, not because
he had any confidence in himself, but because he confided in the grace and
Spirit of God to secure his perseverance. Nevertheless, he kept under his
body, and feared self-indulgence, lest he should be a cast away.
Paul affirms of the Thessalonians, that he knew their election of God.
1 Thess, i. 14 : “Knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God.” In both
his epistles to this church, he often speaks of them in a manner that implies,
that he regarded their salvation as certain, and yet he also frequently warms
and exhorts them to faithfulness, and to guard against being deceived by
false teachers, &c. 2 Thess. ii. 1–3 : “Now we beseech you, brethren, by
the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by our gathering together unto
him, that ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by spirit,
nor by word, nor by letter as from us, as that the day of Christ is at hand.
Let no man deceive you by any means; for that day shall not come, except
there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of
perdition.” He addresses the same strain of exhortation to them that he
does to all Christians, and plies them with admonition and warning, just as
might be expected, considering the moral and conditional mature of the
certainty of their salvation.
In writing to the Philippians, he says, Phil. i. 6, 7 : “Being confident of
this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you, will perform
it until the day of Jesus Christ. Even as it is meet for me to think this of
you all, because I have you in my heart; inasmuch as both in my bonds,
and in the defence and confirmation of the gospel, ye are all partakers of
my grace.” Here he expresses the confidence of an inspired apostle, that
Christ would secure their salvation. But yet in the 2d chapter, 12th and
13th verses, he says: “Wherefore, my beloved, as ye have always obeyed,
not as in my presence only, but now much more in my absence, work out
your own Salvation with fear and trembling; For it is God which worketh
in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure.” Here he warns them
to work out their salvation with fear and trembling. There is no stronger
894 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
passage than this, where the Saints are exhorted to fear; and mark, this is
addressed to the very persons of whom he had just said, 1, 6 : “Being con-
fident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you, will
perform it until the day of Jesus Christ.” Almost at the same breath he ex-
presses the confidence of an inspired apostle, that he who had begun a good
Work in them would carry it on until the day of Jesus Christ; that is, that
he would surely save them; and at the same time exhorts them to “work
out their salvation with fear and trembling.” He did not express confidence
that they would persevere, except their perseverance was secured by Christ,
but that Christ would carry on the work he had begun. Paul also addresses
the church at Ephesus as follows:—
Eph. i. 1 : “Paul an apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God, to the
saints which are at Ephesus, and to the faithful in Christ Jesus. 2. Grace
be to you, and peace, from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ.
3. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath
blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ. 4. Ac-
cording as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world,
that we should be holy, and without blame before him in love. 5. Having
predestimated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself,
according to the good pleasure of his will. 6. To the praise of the glory
of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the Beloved. 7. In
whom We have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, ac-
cording to the riches of his grace. 8. Wherein he hath abounded toward
us in all wisdom and prudence. 9. Having made known unto us the mys-
tery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in
himself. 10. That in the dispensation of the fulness of times, he might
gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and
which are on earth, even in him, 11. In whom also we have obtained an
inheritance, being predestimated according to the purpose of him who work-
eth all things after the counsel of his own will. 12. That we should be to
the praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ.”
Now, let any one read the epistle through, and he will find, that these
Same elect persons are addressed throughout with precept, exhortation, and
Warning, just as all other saints are throughout the Bible. To quote the
instances of this were only to quote much of the epistle. Indeed this is
the common usage of the inspired writers, to address the Saints as the elect
of God, as persons whose Salvation was secure as a matter of fact, but
whose salvation was after all conditionated upon their perseverance in holi-
mess; and they hence proceed to warm, admonish, and exhort them, just as
we might expect when we consider the nature of the certainty of which
they were speaking.
But if it be still urged, that the fact of election is not revealed in any
case to the individuals who compose the elect ; that if the fact of election
were revealed to any one, to him threatenings and warnings would be out
of place ; I reply, that this is only saying, that if certainty is revealed as
£uch at any time, and in respect to anything, then Warnings, and threaten
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 895
ings, and fears, are wholly out of place. But this is not true, as we have
seen in the case of the shipwreck. Here the certainty Was revealed to the
individuals concerned, and accredited. Christ also revealed to his apostles
the fact of their election, as we have seen, also to Paul. Can any one rea-
sonably call in question the fact, that the apostles understood well their
election of God, not only to the apostleship, but also to eternal life? John
directs one of his epistles as follows: “The elder to the elect lady and her
children.” Observe again, what Paul says in writing to the church at
Ephesus, in the passage which has just been quoted. -
Here he expressly recognizes himself as one of the elect, as he does else-
where, and as the apostles always do, directly or by Way of implication, and
yet Paul and the other apostles did not feel that warming, and watchfulness,
and fear to sin were at all out of place with them.
Job speaks as if the certainty of his salvation had been revealed to him.
He says:
Job xix. 25 : “For I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall
stand at the latter day upon the earth : 26. And though after my skin
worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God: 27. Whom I
shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another; though
my reins be consumed within me.”
Cam any one suppose that Job regarded threatenings, and Warnings, and
fear to sin, as out of place with him 2
It is generally admitted, that there is such a thing as the full assurance
of faith or hope, or as attaining to the certain knowledge that Salvation is
secure to us. But Would a saint who has made this attainment be less
affected than others by all the threatenings, and Warnings, and exhortations
to fear, found in the Bible 2 Would such souls cease to tremble at the
word of God 2 Would they cease to pass their time of sojourning here
with fear 2 Would they cease to “Work out their salvation with fear and
trembling 2" Would God no longer regard them as belonging to the class
of persons mentioned in Isa. lxvi. 1 : “For all those things hath mine hand
Imade, and all those things have been, Saith the Lord : but to this man will
I look, even to him that is of a contrite spirit, and trembleth at my word.”
Christ prayed for the salvation of his apostles, in their presence, in such
a manner as to leave no room for them to doubt their ultimate salvation, if
they expected his prayers to be answered. He did the same with respect
to all that should believe on him through their word. Now will you affirm,
that they who are conscious of believing in Jesus, must cease to have con-
fidence in the efficacy of his prayers, before they can feel the power, and
propriety, and influence of warnings, and threatenings, and the various
motives that are addressed to the elect of God to preserve them from fall-
ing? The supposition is preposterous. What! must we doubt the efficacy
of his prayers, in order to credit and appreciate the force of his warnings 2
In fact, the more holy any one is, and the more certain he is of his etermal
Salvation, the more does sin become an object of loathing, of fear, and even
of terror, to him. The more holy he is, the more readily he trembles at the
896 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
word of God, and the more sensibly and easily he is affected by a contem-
plation of sin and divine wrath, the more awful and terrible these things
appear to him, and the more solemnly do they affect him, although he has
the fullest assurance that he shall never taste of either sin or hell. It is
true, indeed, as we shall have occasion to remark hereafter, that in general,
the Bible assumes that individuals are not sure of their salvation, and upon
that assumption proceeds to warn them.
But still it is insisted that, if the end is certain, so are the means; and
if one is revealed as certain, so is the other ; and that therefore it is absurd,
and implies unbelief, to fear that we shall neglect the means, or that either
the end or means will fail. But as we have said, to fear to neglect the
means, and to fear that we shall neglect them, are not the same. We are
naturally able to neglect them, and there is just as much real danger of our
neglecting them, as there would be if no revelation were made about it,
unless the revelation of the certainty of their use be a means of securing the
use of them. We are therefore to fear to neglect them. There is, in fact,
as much real danger of our neglecting the means of our salvation, as there
is that any event whatever will be different from what it turns out to be.
There is no more real danger in one case than in the other; but in one
case the certainty is revealed, and in the other not. Therefore, when the
certainty is not revealed, it is reasonable to fear that the event will not be
as we desire, and as it ought to be. But in the other,-that is, when the
certainty is revealed, we have no right to fear that it will be otherwise than
as revealed, nor to fear that the means will in fact be neglected; but in all
such cases we should fear to neglect the means, as really and as much, as
if no revelation of certainty had been made: just as Paul did in the case of
his shipwreck.
Again: it is inquired, are we not to fear that any of the Saints will be
lost, and pray for them under the influence of this fear? I answer, no.
The saints are the elect. None of God's elect will be lost. We are to
pray for them as Christ prayed for his apostles, and as he prayed for all
believers, not with the fear that they will be lost, for this were praying in
unbelief; but we are to pray for all persons known to be saints, that they
may persevere unto the end and be saved, with confidence that our prayer
will be answered. But it is said, that Paul expressed doubts in regard to
the salvation of the churches in Galatia. I answer, that he expressed no
doubt in respect to their ultimate salvation; he says, “I desire to be pre-
sent with you now, and to change my voice; for I stand in doubt of you.”
Gal. iv. 20. In the margin it reads, “I am perplexed for you.” He says
in the next chapter: “I have confidence in you through the Lord, that ye
will be mone otherwise minded ; but he that troubleth you shall bear his
judgment, whosoever he be.” Gal. v. 10. Paul set himself zealously to
reclaim these churches from error, and expresses full confidence of the
result; and no where, that I see, intimates, that he doubted whether they
would finally be saved.
But it is said still, that if the salvation of all the Saints is secured, and
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 837
this certainty is revealed, there is no real danger of their either neglecting
the necessary means, or of their being lost, and therefore warnings, and
threatenings, and fears are vain; and that the certainty being granted, it
is irrational and impossible to fear, without doubting the truth of God;
that certainty is certainty, and it matters not at all of what kind the cer-
tainty is; that if it be granted that the event is certain, all danger, and of
course all cause of fear, is out of the question.
To this form of the objection I reply, that it proceeds upon the assump-
tion, that there is no danger of the saints' falling, if God has revealed the
certainty of their ultimate salvation. But what do we mean by danger? It
has already been said, that all events are certain, in the Sense that it is and
was from eternity as really certain that they will be, and how they will be;
and that all their circumstances and conditions are, and eternally were, as
certain as they ever will be. So that there never is any real danger, in
the sense of uncertainty, that any event will be otherwise than it turns out
in fact to be. By danger, then, is not meant that there is really any
uncertainty in respect to how anything will be. But all that can properly
be intended by danger is, that there is a natural possibility, and, humanly
speaking, a probability, that it may be otherwise than as we desire ; that
this is probable in the sense that there is, humanly speaking, from the
circumstances of the case, and so far as we can judge, from the course
of events, a probability that a thing may not occur as we would have it.
Now, a natural possibility always exists in respect to the falling and final
destruction of the Saints; and in most cases at least, the circumstances are
such, that humanly speaking, and aside from the grace of God, there is not
only real danger, but a certainty that they will fail of eternal life. There
are, humanly speaking, many chances to one that they will fall and be
lost. Now, this danger is as real as if nothing of certainty had been
revealed. The event would have been as certain without the revelation of
the certainty as with it, unless it be true, which I suppose in many cases is
the fact, that the revelation of the certainty helps to secure their perse.
Yêl'Éll] Cè. .
But again: the objection overlooks the nature of the certainty, and
erroneously assumes that nothing depends upon its mature, when, in fact,
everything depends upon its nature. If it were a certainty of necessity,
then there could be no danger, because no possibility of being otherwise.
In this case, warnings, expostulations, threatenings, exhortations to fear,
&c., would be out of place and mere trifling; but since the certainty is but
a certainty of liberty, or a moral certainty, and one that is conditionated
upon our own free acts, and upon the influence of those warnings which
are found in the Bible, as well as upon the influence of those fears to sin
to which we are exhorted;—I Say, since the nature of the certainty is such
as to be conditionated upon these influences, it is preposterous to Say that
nothing depends upon the nature of the certainty; for it is manifest that
the entire event may be dependent, and turn upon the nature, and an
understanding of the nature of the certainty. When the nature of the
3 M
898 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
certainty is understood, it is entirely rational and necessary to fear to sin,
lest thereby we should lose our Souls. For be it remembered, we are able
to apostatize, and should we do so, we must be lost. It is no answer to
say, that it is a revealed certainty that we shall persevere, and not be lost;
for the certainty that we shall not be lost is no greater than that we shall
not apostatize, and we are maturally able to apostatize. The certainty that
we shall be saved, is no greater than that we shall persevere to the end.
If, then, we do not persevere, but apostatize, we shall assuredly be lost.
Fear to sin and apostatize, fear to neglect perseverance, is just as rational
as if the certainty of the event were not revealed. Perseverance in holiness
will no doubt be a condition of the abiding of the saints in heaven; and,
since they will be free, and there will be a natural possibility of falling or
of sinning, they will then fear to sin.
But it is said, that “perfect love casteth out fear.” True, but what kind
of fear does love cast out 2 I answer, the “fear that hath torment.” It
casts out the fear of hell, that is, of actually going to hell; but it does not
cast out the fear of God, nor the fear of sin, but begets both. Love casts
out the fear that we shall be lost, but not a fear to be lost. It cast out
the fear that we shall apostatize, but begets a fear to apostatize. The place
for fear in the saints is in the presence of temptation. When enticed or
tempted to sin, a salutary fear and dread of sin and of its consequences
is aroused, and the soul recoils from the temptation as from death and hell.
Let it not be said, then, that if a thing is certain, it is certain, and it
matters not by what kind of certainty; for there is in no case of real, known
certainty, any rational ground of fear. Such things are loosely said. Both
the kind of certainty, and the kind of fear are here overlooked. It is true
that, in this case, there is no rational ground to fear that either the end or
the means will actually fail; but there is just as rational a ground to fear
to neglect the means, as if no certainty whatever were revealed. There is
no more room for presumption in one case than in the other. In both
cases to neglect the conditions is possible; and in our circumstances, ex-
tremely natural and easy, and even certain, but for the preventing grace of
God. This neglect would in either case prove fatal.
The temptations to neglect are alike in both cases: there are therefore
equally rational grounds of fear to neglect the conditions in both cases.
There are not, it is true, equal grounds to fear in both cases that we really
shall neglect these conditions, but there are equal grounds to fear to neglect
them. A fear that we shall really neglect them is not salutary. But a
fear to neglect them is highly so. A fear that we shall neglect them, and
that we shall be lost, tends strongly to selfishness, because it does not imply
nor consist with confidence that we shall be preserved and saved. But a
fear to sin, to offend God, to be lost, is consistent with a confidence that
we shall be preserved and saved, and does not therefore tend to selfishness
in efforts to escape damnation, at least not to the same extent. The right
kind of fear tends to liberty and to life. The wrong kind of fear gendereth
to bondage and to death.
PERSEVER ANCE OF SAINTS. 899
But it is said again, that fear implies a sense of danger, which it is said
is impossible, when we know the certainty. I answer again, that fear to
sin does imply a sense of the danger of sinning, and there is reason to have
this sense of danger, when there is, in fact, all the real danger that there
is in any case whatever, that any event may be different from what it turns
out to be. As I have said, a sense of danger is possible and reasonable
when failure is possible, and when the event is conditioned, not only upon
free acts, but also upon the greatest watchfulness and perseverance on our
part. The danger is so real, and the sense of danger is so reasonable in
this case, that although the event is certain, yet it is conditioned upon this
sense of danger. Were not the danger as real as in cases where no cer-
tainty had been revealed, and were there not a sense of danger, the result
might fail. But the fact, that there is as real a danger of the damnation
of the saints as there is that any event may turn out to be different from
what in fact it will be ; and the fact that the saints have a sense of this
danger, and understand the conditional and moral mature of this certainty,
are conditions of the certainty of their salvation, and tend to make it certain.
Surely this is extremely plain ; for example, let us suppose again that a
man is about to venture down Niagara Falls in a bark canoe. It is revealed
to him that he shall go down safely, but at the same time it is also revealed
that he is not to be preserved from death by a miracle, but on the contrary
that he must, as a condition, exert all his skill, and avoid everything that
tends to procure a failure, and omit nothing that is essential to his de-
scending safely without a miracle ; that the event, though certain, is condi-
tioned upon the right and persevering exercise of his own agency, and that
although it is sure, and he may rest in the assurance, that both the means
and the end are certain, and that neither of these will fail; yet to defeat
the end by the neglect of the means is within his power; that he will meet
with great temptations to neglect the means—temptations to presumption
on the one hand, and to unbelief and despair on the other; temptations
to levity, or to despondency; to innumerable neglects and wanderings of
attention, and such-like things, which, if not guarded against will prove
his destruction. Now who cannot see in this case the propriety and neces-
sity of both the assurance, and the warnings, and the place for the salutary
influence of a fear to neglect the necessary means? This I regard as a fair
illustration of a revealed certainty of the perseverance of the saints, in the
sense under consideration.
But thus far I have replied to the objection, upon the assumption, that
the certainty of the salvation of the Saints is revealed, in the sense that
individual saints may know the certainty of their own salvation. I have
shown, as I trust, that admitting this to be true, yet the nature of the
certainty leaves abundant room for the influence of a wholesome sense of
danger, and for the feeling of hope and fear. But the fact is, that in
but few cases comparatively does it appear, that the certainty is revealed
to the individuals as such. The salvation of all true saints is revealed, as
we have seen, and the characteristics of true Saints are revealed in the Bible.
3 M Q
900 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
So that it is possible for individual saints to possess a comfortable assur-
ance of Salvation, upon the knowledge that they are saints. And as was
shown, it is doubtless true that in some cases, in the days of inspiration,
and not improbably in some cases since the Bible was complete, individuals
have had a direct revelation by the Holy Spirit that they were saints, and
accepted of God.
But in the great majority of cases in all time hitherto, the saints have
had no personal and clear revelation of their being Saints, and no evidence
of it, except what they gather from an experience that in their view accords
with the Bible description of the character of the saints. When Peter
addressed his epistles to the elect Saints, for example, although he regarded
the elect as certain of Salvation, yet he did not distinguish and address
individuals by name; but left it for them to be satisfied of their own elec
tion and Saintship, by their own consciousness of possessing the character
that belongs to the Saints. He did not reveal to any one in particular the
fact of his own election. This was for the most part true of all the letters
written to the churches. Although they were addressed as a body, as elect,
and as saints, yet from this they were not to infer, that they were all saints
or elect, but were to learn that fact, and who were real saints, from their
conscious character.
We have seem, in another place, that the Bible represents perseverance,
in the sense already explained, as an attribute of Christian character; and
therefore no one can have evidence that he is a Saint, any farther than he is
conscious of abiding in obedience. If Saints do abide in the light, and have
the assurance that they are Saints, we have seen the sense in which they
may be influenced by hope and fear, and the sense in which moral law with
its sanctions may be useful to them. But when a Saint shall backslide, he
must lose the evidence of his being a Saint, and then all the Warnings and
threatenings may take full effect upon him. He finds himself not persever-
ing, and has of course to infer that he is not a Saint; and the doctrine of
the perseverance of the saints can be no comfort to him. It is in fact
against him ; for this doctrine is, that the Saints do persevere ; and every
day he lives in backsliding, it becomes less evident that he is a saint. The
Bible is manifestly written, for the most part, upon the assumption, that
individual saints do not certainly know their election, and the certainty of
their own salvation. It therefore addresses them, as if there were real
uncertainty in respect to their salvation ; that is, as if, as individuals, they
were not certain of Salvation. It represents the Salvation of real Saints as
certain, but represents many professed Saints as having fallen, and warns
them against presumption and self-deception, in the matter of their pro-
fession, privileges, and experience. It represents the danger of delusion
as great, and exhorts them to examine and prove themselves, and see
whether they are truly Saints. The warnings found in the Bible, are for
the most part, evidently of this kind; that is, they assume that individuals
may deceive themsleves, and presumptuously assume their own election,
and saintship, and safety, from their privileges, relations, and experiences.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 901
Inspiration, therefore, proceeds to warn them, assuming that they do not
know the certainty of their own individual salvation. We shall by and by
have occasion to examine some passages that will illustrate and confirm
this remark.
There is, therefore, I apprehend, no real difficulty in accounting for the
manner in which the Bible is written, upon the supposition that the doctrine
under consideration is true. But on the contrary, it appears to me, that
the scriptures are just what might be expected, if the doctrine were true.
When we consider the nature of the certainty in all cases, and also that the
great mass of professed Christians have no certain revelation of their being
real saints, that there is so much real danger of deception, in regard to our
own characters, and that so many are and have been deceived;—I say, when
we consider these things, there can be no difficulty in accounting for the
manner in which both professors and real Saints are addressed in the word
of God.
LECTURE LXXXIII.
P E R S E W E R A N C E O F S A. IN T S.
FURTHER OBJECTIONS ANSWERED,
3. A fourth objection to this doctrine is, that if, by the perseverance of
the saints is intended, that they live anything like lives of habitual
obedience to God, them facts are against it.
To this objection I reply: that by the perseverance of the saints, as I
use these terms, is intended that, subsequently to their regeneration, holi-
Aess is the rule of their lives, and sin only the exception. But it is said,
that facts contradict this.
(1.) The case of king Saul is brought forward as an instance in point
to sustain the objection,
To this I reply: that it is far from being clear that Saul was ever a truly
regenerate man. He appears, in connexion with his appointment to the
throme of Israel, to have been the subject of divine illuminations, in so far
as to be much changed in his views and deportment, and as to have had
another heart, in So much that he prophesied, &c.; but it is nowhere
intimated that he became a truly regenerate man, a truly praying child of
God. Similar changes are not unfrequently witnessed in men, and changes
evidently brought about by the illuminations of the Holy Spirit, where
there is no good reason to believe that the subjects of them were truly
regenerated. From the history of Saul, subsequent to the change of which
we are speaking, we gather absolutely nothing that looks like true piety.
His case therefore cannot properly be brought as an objection to the
doctrine in question, for the plaim reason, that evidence is wanting that he
ever was a saint. His prophesying, as is evident from the connexion in
which it is spoken of, was merely speaking fervently upon religious subjects.
902 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
He was so much enlightened, as to manifest for a time considerable excite-
lment upon the subject of religion, and as to mingle with the schools of the
prophets, and take an interest in their exercises. But this was only similar
to what we often witness, when the end, and indeed when all the circum-
stances, duly considered, show clearly that true regeneration has not taken
place. Who has not seen men have, for the time bein
holy, heart?
(2.) It is said, that David did not persevere in obedience, in the sense
that obedience was his rule, and sin only the exception. To this I reply—
(i.) It is not pretended that there is any doubt respecting the final
salvation of David.
(ii.) That David did not persevere, in the sense above defined, wants
proof. His Psalms, together with his whole history, show that he was a
highly spiritual man. He was an eminent type of Christ, and, for a man
in his circumstances, was a remarkable Saint. To be sure, David practised
polygamy, and did many things that in us, under the light of the gospel,
would be sin. But it should be considered, that David lived under a dis-
pensation of comparative obscurity, and therefore many things which would
now be unlawful and sinful, were not so in him. That David, with com-
paratively few exceptions, lived up to the light he had, cannot be reasonably
called in question. He is said to have been a man after God's own heart.
I know this is said of him as a king, but I know also that, as king this
could not have been said of him, unless he had feared and served the Lord,
and in the main lived up to the light with which he was surrounded.
(3.) It is also said, that Solomon king of Israel did not persevere, in the
sense contended for in this discourse. Of Solomon I would say,+
(i.) That he was manifestly a type of Christ.
(ii.) That he at one period of his life, for how long a time it does not
appear, fell into grievous backsliding, and appears in Some sense to have
tolerated idolatry.
(iii.) His final apostacy has been inferred from the fact, that idolatry was
practised in Israel, after his supposed repentance, and until the end of his
life. The people were allowed to offer sacrifices, and to burn incense in
the high places, and therefore his repentance was not genuine.
To this I reply, that the same was true also during the reign of several
of the pious kings who succeeded him, and is probably to be accounted for
by the fact, that neither Solomon nor his successors had, for a considerable
time, political power or influence enough to abolish idolatry altogether.
The people were greatly divided in their religious views and worship. Many
were the priests and devotees of the groves and high places, and multitudes
of the high and more influential classes clave to their idols. It was a very
difficult matter to put an effectual stop to idolatry, and perhaps was impos-
sible in Solomon's day, and for a long time after. Solomon's idolatrous
wives and concubines had doubtless exerted great influence in rendering
idolatry popular with the people, and it was not until several generations
had passed away, that the pious kings seem to have had sufficient political
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904. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
connot be conclusive upon this subject, because we cannot certainly know,
that any of the cases just alluded to are real conversions to God. Hence
the objection fails of conclusiveness. Were it certainly known, that such
persons were truly regenerated, and that afterwards they fall away and live in
sin, and die in that state, it would follow, that the doctrine, at least in the
form in which I have stated it, cannot be true. But this is not, and cannot
be certainly known by observation. If, as I trust, it has been found to be
true, in our examination, that the Bible plainly teaches the doctrine in
question, in the form in which I have stated it, it must follow of course that
observation cannot disprove it, for the reason that it is not a question that
lies within the reach of observation, in such a sense as to admit of certainty,
or of any such kind or degree of evidence as to shake the sure testimony of
the Bible.
5. But an appeal is also made to consciousness to overthrow this doc-
trine. It is said, that the real saints, at least in some instances, know
themselves to have lived a great part of their lives in sin, and even by far
the greater part of their days subsequent to regeneration.
This objection or assertion may be answered substantially as was the
last. It is true, indeed, that the Saints may know themselves to have been
regenerated ; and it is alo true, that many may think they know this when
they are deceived. A man may know himself to be awake, but from this it
does not follow that no one can think himself awake while he is asleep.
But since upon examination, it has been found that the Bible plainly
teaches the doctrine of the Saints' perseverance, in the sense in which I
have defined it, we must of course yield the objection founded on experience,
and grant that such experiences can weigh nothing against the testimony
of God. The objection of course cannot be conclusive ; for it is not one
of the mature that admits of no error or doubt. The Bible defines all the
essential attributes of Christian character. Now, if upon examination,
perseverance in the sense here insisted on is proved to be one of them, it is
absurd to array against the doctrine the consciousness of not persevering.
It is to assume that we, and not the Bible, can decide who is a Christian,
and what are the essential attributes of Christian character.
6. But it is also objected to the doctrine of the perseverance of the Saints,
that several passages of scripture plainly teach that Some real Saints have
fallen away and been lost. I will therefore now proceed to the examination
of those passages upon which the principal reliance is placed to disprove
this doctrine. The first one which I shall notice is found in 1 Cor. i. 10,
“Moreover, brethren, I would not that ye should be ignorant, how that all
our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the Sea; 2. And
were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea; 3. And did all eat
of the same spiritual meat; 4. And did all drink the same spiritual drink;
(for they drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them, and that rock was
Christ); 5. But with many of them God was not well pleased, for they were
overthrown in the wilderness, 6. Now these things were our examples, to
the intent we should not lust after evil things, as they also lusted. 7. Neither
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 905
be ye idolaters, as were some of them, as it is written ; The people sat down
to eat and drink, and rose up to play. S. Neither let us commit fornication
as some of them committed, and fell in one day three and twenty thousand.
9. Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted, and were de-
stroyed of serpents, 10. Neither murmur ye, as some of them also mur-
rhured, and were destroyed of the destroyer. 11. Now all these things
happened unto them for ensamples, and they are written for our admonition,
upon whom the ends of the world are come. 12. Wherefore, let him that
thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall.”
It is said of this passage, that the history of the Israelites is here intro-
duced as a warning to real Christians; consequently, the apostle must have
assumed, that those of the Israelites who fell were real Saints, or there
would have been no pertinency or force in his allusion. To this I reply,
that the pertinency and force of the allusion appear to me to have been as
follows. The Israelites composed the visible church of God. At the time
mentioned, they were all professors of religion. All possessed great light
and privileges compared with the rest of the world; they therefore felt
confident of their acceptance with God, and of their consequent safety and
salvation. But with many of them it turned out, that God was not well
pleased. Some of them turned out to be idolaters and were destroyed.
Now, says the apostle, let this be a warning to you. You are in like manner
professors of religion. You are all members of the visible church of God
to which the promises are made. You have great light and privileges when
compared with the world at large. You may think yourselves to be altogether
safe, and sure of final Salvation. But remember, that the history of the
ancient church is written for your benefit; and the destruction of those just
alluded to, is recorded for your admonition. Be not high minded, but fear.
Do not be presumptuous, because you are members in good standing in the
visible church, and possess great light and privileges; but remember, that
many before you, who were like you in these respects, have lost their souls;
“Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall.”
If the apostle had intended to convey the impression that they were real
saints that fell in the wilderness. and that real saints do fall away and are
lost, he would no doubt have said, let him that standeth, instead of him that
thinketh he standeth, take heed let he fall. The term rendered thinketh is
represented by Robinsou as correctly translated in this passage. The mean-
ing of the apostle appears to have been this, that others who were, from their
circumstances and fancied characters, very confident of their safety, had
been finally cast off and lost; therefore, take heed to yourselves, lest being
similarly situated, you in like manner deceive yourselves; and while you
think that you stand, you should fall and perish.
But it may be said, that the apostle speaks of those as falling who had
eaten of the spiritual meat, and drank of the rock Christ, and therefore
must have been real Saints. To this I reply, that the apostle does indeed
use universal language, and speak of all the Israelties as doing these things;
but who will soberly contend that he intended really to be understood as
906 SYSTEMLATIC THEOLOGY.
affirming, that all the Israelites that passed through the sea, &c., were true
saints 2 What he says does not necessitate the conclusion that any of them
were truly regenerated Saints. They were all baptized unto Moses, that
is, were all introduced into the covenant of which he was the mediator.
They all ate of the same spiritual bread, that is, the mamma on which the
Lord fed them. They all drank of the spiritual rock; that is, of the water
that gushed from the rock when Moses smote it with his rod, and which
rock was a type of Christ, as was also the mamma. Now, does the apostle
mean to say, that all the Israelites understood the typical meaning of these
waters, and this manna, and that they were all truly spiritual or regenerate
persons? I think not. All that he intended appears to me to be, that all
the church of the Jews at the time were so far partakers of the grace of
Christ, as to receive this baptism, and as to have this spiritual or typical
bread and water, and also to enjoy great light and much miraculous instruc-
tion, but that, nevertheless, with many of them God was displeased. Their
being baptized in their passage through the Red Sea, did not imply that they
so understood and consented to it at the time, nor does the assertion that
they ate the spiritual food, and dramk of the spiritual rock, imply anything
more than that they enjoyed these great and high privileges, and counted
themselves as very secure in consequence of them. It is certainly straining
the sense to make the apostle affirm, that all the Israelites were real Saints
who passed through the sea. Indeed, it is doubtful whether he intended to
affirm the real piety of any of them. It was not essential to his purpose
to do so.
In examining the class of passages adduced to prove that some real
saints have fallen from grace and been lost, I am only concerned to show,
that they do not by fair construction necessitate this conclusion. I may
admit that, if the doctrine of perseverance were not found to be clearly
taught in the Bible, the not unnatural construction of Some of the class of
texts in question might lead to the conclusion that some, yea many, real
saints have been lost.
But since, from the previous examination it has appeared, that the
doctrine is plainly and unequivocally taught in the Bible, all that needs to
be shown of the class of texts now under consideration is, that they do not,
when fairly interpreted, really and unequivocally teach that some true Saints
have been lost. This showing will sufficiently windicate the Scriptures
against the imputation of self-contradiction, in both affirming and denying
the same doctrine. Observe, I am not called upon to show, that the
passages in question cannot be so construed, and with considerable plausi-
bility, as to make them contradict this doctrine; but all I am called upon
to show in this place is, that they do not necessarily, by fair construction,
contradict it; that they do not necessitate the admission either that the
Bible contradicts itself, or that a different construction must be given to
the passages that seem to teach this doctrine.
With these remarks I proceed to the examination of 2 Peter ii. 9–22:
“The Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptations, and to
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 907
reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished: But chiefly
them that walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness, and despise
government: presumptuous are they, self-willed; they are not afraid to
speak evil of dignities. Whereas angels, which are greater in power and
might, bring not railing accusation against them before the Lord. But
these, as matural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil
of the things that they understand not ; and shall utterly perish in their
own corruption; And shall receive the reward of unrighteousness, as they
that count it pleasure to riot in the day-time. Spots they are, and
blemishes, sporting themselves with their own deceivings, while they feast
with you ; Having eyes full of adultery, and that cannot cease from sin;
beguiling unstable souls: a heart they have exercised with covetous
practices; cursed children : Which have forsaken the right way, and are
gone astray, following the way of Balaam the son of Bosor, who loved the
wages of unrighteousness; But was rebuked for his iniquity : the dumb ass
speaking with man's voice, forbade the madness of the prophet. These are
wells without water, clouds that are carried with a tempest; to whom the
mist of darkness is reserved for ever. For when they speak great swelling
words of vanity, they allure through the lusts of the flesh, through much
wantonness, those that were clean escaped from them who live in error.
While they promise them liberty, they themselves are the servants of cor-
ruption : for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought into
bondage. For if after they have escaped the pollutions of the world, through
the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, they are again
ental,gled therein and overcome, the latter end is worse with them than the
beginning. For it had been better for them not to have known the way of
righteousness, than, after they have known it, to return from the holy com-
mandment delivered unto them. But it is happened unto them according
to the true proverb, The dog is turned to his own vomit again; and the
sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire.”
Now observe, the apostle calls the persons of whom he speaks “wells
without water : clouds that are carried with a tempest : " that is, without
rain. His whole description of them shows, that he is speaking of false
professors or hypocrites. But it is inferred, that they are fallen saints,
because it is said they have “forsaken the right way, and are gone astray
after the error of Balaam,” &c. But this does not necessarily imply that
they were in heart ever in the right way, but that they have forsaken the
right way, so far as the outward life is concerned; in which respect they had
doubtless been in the right way, or they would not have been admitted to
membership in the church.
But it is said of these false professors, that “they allure through lust
and much wantonness those who were clean escaped from those who live in
error.” But neither does this necessitate the conclusion, that they had
escaped in heart from those that lived in error, but merely that they had
for the time being outwardly abandoned their idolatrous practices and com-
panions, and had made a profession, and put on the form of Christianity.
908 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
But it is also said, verses 20–22: “For if after they have escaped the
pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour
Jesus Christ, they are entangled therein and overcome, the latter end is
Worse than the beginning. 21. For it had been better for them not to
have known the way of righteousness, than, after they have known it, to
turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them. 22. But it is
happened unto them according to the true proverb, The dog is turned to
his own vomit again ; and the sow that was washed to her wallowing in
the mire.”
Neither does this necessitate the conclusion, that they had in heart
escaped from the pollutions that are in the world, but merely that they
had outwardly reformed. What is said in the last verse seems to favour
this construction. Verse 22: “But it is happened unto them according to
the true proverb, The dog is turned to his own vomit again; and the sow
that was washed to her wallowing in the mire.” That is, the dog has
returned to his vomit, because he remains a dog, and is not changed; and
the Sow that is washed to her wallowing in the mire, because she is still a
Sow, and her washing has not changed her nature. So, the apostle would
Say, by returning to their former ways, do the persons in question show,
that they have experienced no radical change; but on the contrary, that
they are only like a washed sow, sinners still, who have been only outwardly
cleansed, while within they are the same as ever. This appears to me to
be all that can fairly be made out of this passage.
I will now attend to 1 Tim. i. 19, 20: “Holding faith and a good con-
science, which some having put away, concerning faith have made shipwreck.
Of whom is Hymeneus and Alexander, whom I have delivered unto Satan,
that they may learn not to blaspheme.” Of this text I may say, that the
apostle was writing to Timothy as an eminent religious teacher, and was
giving him cautions respecting his influence in that relation. Hymeneus
and Alexander, as we may infer from this, and which is still more plainly
taught in other passages, were religious teachers, who had cast off or per-
verted the true faith or doctrine of the gospel, and thus made shipwreck.
They had put away faith and a good conscience, and by So doing had made
shipwreck of the true gospel, This passage does not teach that these men
were true Christians, nor does it necessarily imply that any had been true
saints who had gone with them. The expression, “Some having put away,”
does not necessarily imply that they once had true faith and a good con-
science, but only that they taught that which was incomsistent with either;
or it may mean that they had rejected or refused both faith and a good
conscience ; that they practised and taught things inconsistent with either
true faith, or with the true gospel, or with a good conscience, and had
therefore run upon a rock, and wrecked their souls, and the Souls of those
who followed them. But this proves nothing in respect to their ever having
been real saints.
The apostle was speaking in popular language, and represented things
as they appeared to the observer. Thus we should speak of spurious con-
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 909
verts. It certainly does not appear to me, that this passage would, without
forced construction, warrant the conclusion that some real Saints had been
lost, even apart from those passages that, we have seen, seem unequivocally
to teach the doctrine. Much less, when those passages are considered, are
we, as I think we have seen, authorized so to construe this passage as to
make it either contradict them, or to necessitate such a modification of their
construction as is contended for by those who deny the doctrine in question.
If the doctrine in question is not really taught in the Bible, we certainly
should not believe it; but if it is, we must not lightly reject it. We need
candidly to weigh each passage, and to understand, if we can, just what is
the mind of God as therein revealed.
The case of Judas has been relied upon as an instance of utter apostacy,
and of consequent destruction. It is said, that in the Psalms Judas is
spoken of as the familiar friend of Christ in whom he trusted. Psalms
xli. 9 : “Yea, mime own familiar friend, in whom I trusted, which did eat
of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me."
There is no reason to believe that Ps. Xli. primarily respected either
Christ or Judas. Christ quotes the 9th verse, as is common in the New
Testament, not because it was originally spoken of himself or of Judas, but
because his case was like that of the Psalmist. In the passage in which
Christ quotes these words, he directly negatives the idea of Judas being
oue of his true disciples. He says, John xiii. 18, “I speak not of you all ;
I know whom I have chosen ; but that the scripture may be fulfilled, He
that eateth bread with me hath lifted up his heel against me.”
Here Christ plainly teaches, that he to whom he applied these words,
was not chosen in the sense of being chosen to Salvation, or in the sense of
his being a true Saint. He says :
John vi. 64 : “But there are some of you who believe not. For Jesus
knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should
betray him. 65. And he said, Therefore said I unto you, that no man
can come unto me, except it were given him of my Father. 70. Jesus
answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil 2
71. He spake of Judas Iscariot the son of Simon : for he it was that should
betray him, being one of the twelve.”
He had chosen twelve to follow him as pupils or disciples ; but one of
them he had known from the beginning to be a wicked man. In John
xvii. 12 : Christ says, “While I was with them in the world, I kept them
in thy name : those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is
lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled.”
Christ has been represented as saying to his Father in this passage, that
he had lost none that the Father had given him except the son of perdition,
that is Judas, But this is not the meaning of the passage in Christ's
prayer. He intended that of those that the Father had given him, he had
lost mome; but the son of perdition was lost that the scripture might be fufilled.
The same form of expression is used in Luke iv. 27 : “And many lepers
were in Israel in the time of Eliseus the prophet ; and mone of them was
9 || 0 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. ſº
cleansed, saving Naaman the Syrian. Here eine is used in the original
as meaning not except, but as an adversative conjunction but. Naaman
was not an Israelite, but a heathem. Christ here used the same form of
expression as in John Xvii. 12: In this passage in Luke it is plain, that he
intended that the prophet was not sent to any Israelite, but to a heathem,
This same form is also used, Matt. xii. 4: “How he entered into the house
of God, and did eat the shew-bread, which was not lawful for him to eat,
neither for them which were with him, but only for the priests.
Here the same form of expression in the original is used, as in John xvii.
12. “The plaim meaning of this form in Matt xii. 4 : is but, not eaccept.
It was not lawful for David, nor for his companions to eat the shew bread,
but it was lawful for the priests to do so. So also, Acts xxi. 25 : As
touching the Gentiles which believe, we have written and concluded that
they observe no such thing, save only that they keep themselves from
things offered unto idols, and from blood, and from strangled, and from
fornication. Here the same form is used, and the plain meaning of the
phraseology is just that which I am contending for, in the passage in
Christ's prayer. Likewise, Rev. xxi. 27 : And there shall in no wise enter
into it anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or
maketh a lie ; but they which are written in the Lamb's book of life.
Here again the same form of expression, and the same word in the original,
are used in the sense now contended for. Nothing shall enter into the
city that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lie,
but they which are written in the Lamb's book of life, shall enter in. So
beyond reasonable doubt, Christ intended to say in his prayer to his Father:
While I was with them in the world I kept them in thy name: those that
thou gavest me I have kept and mone of them is lost, that is, I have lost
none of those whom thou hast given me; but the son of perdition is lost,
according to the scriptures.”
But it seems to me, that the context shows clearly what the Saviour in-
tended by this form of expression. He says, verses 11 and 12 : “And
now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to
thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast
given me, that they may be one as we are. While I was with them in the
world, I kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest me I have kept,
and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition ; that the scripture
might be fulfilled :” that is: “Do thou keep them in thime own name and
lose none of them, for while I was with them I kept them in thy name, and
lost none of them ; but the son of perdition is lost.” He evidently did
not mean to say, I lost but one whom thou gavest me. Or that he kept in
his Father's name all except one of those whom the Father had given him.
He says, 6 : I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest
me out of the world : thine they were, and thou gavest them me ; and they
have kept thy word. 7. Now they have known that all things, whatsoever
thou hast given me, are of thee. 8. For I have given unto them the
words which thou gavest me; and they have received them, and have
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 911
known surely that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou
didst send me. 9. I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them
which thou hast given me; for they are thine. 10. And all mine are thine,
and thine are mine ; and I am glorified in them. 11. And now I am no
more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy
Father, keep through thy own name those whom thou hast given me, that
they may be one as we are. 12. While I was with them in the world, I
kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of
them is lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled.
Here he plainly represents, that all who had been given him by the
Father, had known and kept the word of God. They had believed and
persevered, and Christ was glorified in them. Since he had kept them
in his Father's name, and had lost none of them, he proceeds to pray, that
now the Father will keep them in his own name. Let any one ponder well
this passage from verse 6 to 12, and he will see, I trust, that this is a true
view of the subject. At any rate this cannot be a proof text to establish
the fact, that any have fallen from grace : for the plain reason, that the
text can quite as maturally at least, and I think with much greater propriety,
be quoted to sustain the doctrine which it is adduced to disprove. Again :
Matt. xviii. 21 : “Then came Peter to him, and said, Lord, how often
shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him 2 till seven times 2
22. Jesus saith unto him, I Say not unto thee until seven times; but until
seventy times seven. 23. Therefore is the kingdom of heaven likened
unto a certain king, which would take account of his servants. 24. And
when he had begun to reckon, one was brought unto him which owed ten
thousand talents. 25. But forasmuch as he had not to pay, his lord com-
manded him to be sold, and his wife and children, and all that he had, and
payment to be made. 20. The servant therefore fell down and worshipped
him, saying, Lord, have patience with me, and I will pay thee all.
27. Then the lord of that servant was moved with compassion, and loosed
him, and forgave him the debt. 28. Put the same servant went out, and
found one of his fellow-servants, which owed him a hundred pence; and he
laid hands on him, and took him by the throat, saying, Pay me that thou
owest. 29. And his fellow-servant fell down at his feet, and besought him,
saying, Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all. 30. And he would
not; but went and cast him into prison, till he should pay the debt. 31.
So when his fellow-servants saw what was done, they were very sorry, and
came and told unto their lord all that was done. 32. Then his lord, after
that he had called him, said unto him, O thou wicked servant. I forgave
thee all that debt, because thou desiredst me : 33. Shouldest not thou also
have had compassion on thy fellow-servant, even as I had pity on thee?
34. And his lord was wroth, and delivered him to the totmentors, till he
should pay all that was due unto him. 35. So likewise shall my heavenly
Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his
brother their trespasses.”
This has been adduced to prove that some do fall from grace, especially
912 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,
the 32nd to the 34th verses. But from this whole passage it is evident,
that what the Lord meant, was to set in a strong light the necessity of a
forgiving spirit, and that this is a condition of salvation. It is a parable
designed to illustrate this truth, but does not assert as a fact, that any truly
pardoned Soul was ever lost; nor does it imply this, as any one may see
who will duly weigh the whole parable. It does plainly imply, that a par-
doned soul would be lost should he apostatize; but it does not imply that
such a Soul ever did apostatize. I consider next, 1 Tim. v. 12: “Having
dammation, because they have cast off their first faith.” This passage stands
in the following connexion —
1 Tim. V. 9 : “Let not a widow be taken into the number under three-
score years old, having been the wife of one man : 10. Well reported of
for good works; if she have brought up children, if she have lodged
strangers, if she have washed the saints' feet, if she have relieved the
afflicted, if she have diligently followed every good work, 11. But the
younger widows refuse, for when they have begun to wax wanton against
Christ, they will marry; 12. Having damnation, because they have cast
off their first faith. 13. And withal they learn to be idle, wandering about
from house to house ; and not only idle, but tattlers also, and busy bodies,
speaking things which they ought not.”
The word rendered dammation in this passage is often rendered judg-
ment and condemnation; and the meaning may be, that the younger
widows were found to Wax wanton and fall into condemnation, and for a
time at least to disgrace their profession, by casting off their first faith ; or
it may mean, that they were apt to be found among those who renounced
the profession of the true faith, which they at first professed. They were
young widows. Uneducated as heathen women were and are, and it could
not be surprising that many of this class should make a spurious profession,
and afterwards cast off their profession through wantonness, and disgrace
their profession. The apostle, therefore, warns Timothy against too hasty
a reception of them, or against having too early a confidence in the reality
of their piety.
As every one knows, that Dr. Adam Clarke was a strong opponent of the
doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, I give his views of this passage
from his commentary. See Clarke, on verses 3, 9, 11 and 12 —
“Verse 3: ‘Honour widows that are widows indeed.' One meaning of
the word timao, to honour, is to support, sustain, &c., Matt. xv. 45, and
here it is most obviously to be taken in this sense. Provide for those
widows especially, which are widows indeed; persons truly destitute, being
aged and helpless; and having neither children nor friends to take care of
them ; and who behave as becometh their destitute state.
“Verse 9: ‘Take not into the number." Let her not be taken into the
list of those for which the church must provide. But some think that the
apostle means the list of those who were deaconesses in the church ; and
that no widow was to be admitted into the rank who did not answer to the
following character.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 913
“Verse 11 : “But the younger widows refuse’ Do not admit those
into this office who are under sixty years of age. Probably those who were
received into such a list, promised to abide in their widowhood. But as
young or comparatively young women, might have both occasion and
temptations to re-marry, and so break their engagement to Christ, they
should not be admitted. Not that the apostle condemns their re-marrying
as a crime in itself, but because it was contrary to their engagement.
“‘Wax wantom. Katastreniasosi, from kata intensive, and streniao, to
act in a luxurious or wanton manner. The word is supposed to be derived
from sterein, to remove, and emia, the rein ; and is a metaphor taken from
a pampered horse, from whose mouth the rein has been removed ; so that
there is nothing to check or confine him. The metaphor is plain enough,
and the application easy.
“Verse 12 : ‘Having damnation.” In the sense in which we use this word,
I am satisfied the apostle never intended it. It is likely that he refers here
to some promise or engagement, which they made when taken on the list
already mentioned ; and now they have the guilt of having violated that
promise ; that is the krima, or condemnation, of which the apostle speaks.
“‘They have cast off their first faith.” By pledging their fidelity to a
husband, they have cast off their fidelity to Christ; as a married life and
their previous engagement are incompatible. Dr. Macknight translates
these two verses thus:— But the younger widows reject; for when they
cannot endure Christ's rein, they will marry , incurring condemnation,
because they have put away their first fidelity.’”
This passage does not assert, that any real Christian had fallen and had
been lost, and the most that can be made of it is that they may, or can do so,
and that there is danger of apostacy. This I fully admit and maintain;
that is, that humanly speaking there is danger ; which is the only sense in
which there is danger that any event may be different from what it, in fact,
turns out to be. I have already said, and shall have occasion to say again,
that there is, and can be, no danger in the sense of real uncertainty, that
any event whatever will be different from what it turns out to be, and from
what God foresees that it will be. But in the sense of probability, judging
from the natural course of events as they appear to us, there may be a high
degree of probability, and therefore the utmost danger that things may be
different from what in fact they turn out to be, and from what God foresees
that they will be, and from what they really would be, were it not for the
Warmings, and threatenings, and a consequent sense of danger.
Again : It has been said, that from Christ's letters to the churches in
Asia, recorded in Revelations, we learn that those churches, some of them
at least, were in a state of apostacy from God; and that from the fact that
the judgments of God annihilated those churches, there is reason to believe
that the apostacy was complete and final, and their destruction certain. To
this I reply, that those letters were written to churches as such, just as the
prophets spoke of the Jewish Church as such. The things which the
prophets declare of the Jewish church were declared of them as a body of
3 N
914 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
professed saints, some generations of whom had more, and some less, real
piety. The prophets would rebuke one generation for their backsliding and
apostacy, without meaning to represent that the particular individuals they
addressed were ever true Saints, but meaning only that the body as such was
in a degenerate and apostate state, compared with what the body as such
had been in former times. So Christ writes to the churches of Asia, and
reproves them for their backslidden and apostate condition, asserts that they
had fallen, had left their first love, &c., from which, however, we are not to
infer, that he intended to say this of those who had been truly converted as
individuals, but merely that those churches as bodies had fallen, and were
now composed of members as a whole who were in the state of which he
complained; just as we say of the Roman Catholic church, or of the Lutheran
or German Reformed, or of other bodies in which piety is at a low ebb, that
they have left their first love, &c. In saying this, we should not mean to be
understood as affirming, that the individuals who now compose those churches
were at any time in a better spiritual state than they are at present, but
only that the churches as such are fallen from what those bodies once were,
and had left the love, and zeal, and obedience once manifested in them.
The churches of Asia were doubtless, when first gathered by the apostles
and primitive ministers, full of faith, and zeal, and love. But things had
changed. Many of the members had changed, and perhaps every member
who had originally composed those churches was dead, previous to the time
when these letters were written. However this may be, there had doubtless
been great changes in the membership of those churches; and since they
were evidently addressed as bodies, it cannot be fairly inferred, from what is
said, that the same persons addressed had fallen from a state of high
spirituality into backsliding or apostacy, but that that was true only of the
then present membership, when compared with the former membership and
state of the churches. These letters cannot be justly relied upon as dis-
proving the doctrine in question; for the utmost that can be made of them
is, that those churches as bodies were at the time in a state of declension.
The passages we have examined are, so far as I know, the principal ones
upon which reliance has been placed to disprove the doctrine in question. I
have read over attentively several times the views of Mr. Fletcher, in his
Scripture Scales, and the passages quoted by him to disprove this doctriue.
His chief reliance is manifestly upon the numerous passages that imply the
possibility and danger of falling, rather than on any passages that unequi-
vocally teach that any have fallen or will utterly fall. I am not aware that
any respectable writer has laid much stress upon other passages than those
I have examined, as expressly teaching, or unequivocally implying the fact
of the fall and ruin of real saints. There may be such writers and such
passages as those of which I speak ; but if there are, I do not recollect to
have seen them.
REMAIRIKS.
1. If the doctrine under consideration is not true, I cannot see upon what
ground we can affirm, or even confidently hope, that many of our pious
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 915
friends who have died have gone to heaven. Suppose they held on their
way until the last hours of life. If we may not believe that the faithfulness
of God prevailed to keep them through the last conflict, what reason have
we to affirm that they were preserved from sin and apostacy in their last
hours, and saved 2 If the sovereign grace of God do not protect them
against the wiles and malice of Satan, in their feebleness, and in the wreck
of their habitation of clay, what has become of them? I must confess that,
if I did not expect the covenanted mercy and faithfulness of God to prevail,
and to sustain the soul under such circumstances, I should have very little
expectation that any would be saved. If I could have any confidence that
Christians would stand fast while in health, aside from the truth of this
doctrine, still I should expect that Satan would overcome them in the end,
when they passed through the last great struggle. Who could then trust to
the strength of his own purposes?
2. But I could no more hope, that myself or any one else, would per-
severe in holiness in our best estate, even for one day or hour, if not kept
by the power of God through faith, than I could hope to fly to heaven.
As I have before said, there is no hope of any one's persevering, except
in so far as free grace anticipates and secures the concurrence of free will.
The soul must be called, and effectually called, and perpetually called, or
it will not follow Christ for an hour. I say again, that by effectual calling,
I do not mean an irresistible calling. I do not mean a calling that can-
not, or that might not be resisted; but I do mean by an effectual calling, a
calling that is not in fact resisted, a calling that does in fact secure the
voluntary obedience of the soul. This is my only hope in respect to myself,
or any body else. This grace I regard as vouchsafed to me in the covenant
of grace, or as a reward of Christ's obedience unto death. It is pledged to
secure the salvation of those whom the Father has from etermity given to
the Son. The Holy Spirit is given to them to secure their salvation, and I
have no expectation that any others will ever be saved. But these, every
one of them, will surely be saved. There is, there can be no hope for any
others. Others are able to repent, but they will not. Others might be
saved, if they would believe, and comply with the conditions of salvation,
but they will not.
We have seen, that none come to Christ, except they are drawn of the
Father, and that the Father draws to Christ those and those only whom he
has given to Christ, and also, that it is the Father's design that of those whom
he has given to Christ, he should lose mone, but that he should raise them
up at the last day. This is the only hope that any will be saved. Strike out
this foundation, and what shall the righteous do 2 Strike out from the
Bible the doctrine of God's covemanted faithfulness to Christ — the truth
that the Father has given to him a certain number whose salvation he fore-
sees, that he could and should secure, and I despair of myself and of every
body else. Where is any other ground of hope 2 I know not where.
3 N 2
APPENDIX.
A N E X A M I N A TI O N,
BY PROF. C. G. FINNEY,
O E THE REWIEW OF FIN N E Y'S SYSTEM ATIC THE OLOGY,
PUBLISHED IN THE “BIBLICAL REPERTORY,” PRINCETON, N. J., JUNE, 1847.
THIS review is so very miscellaneous in its character, that to reply to it
in eatenso, were but little less than to re-write the volume reviewed. Every
one familiar with the work criticised by the reviewer, will perceive upon an
attentive perusal that the reviewer had not made himself well acquainted
with the work in question; and that, almost without an exception, a complete
answer to his objections might be quoted verbatim from the work itself. I
have read and re-read his review, and every time with increasing wonder
that the reviewer could pass over, so apparently without reading or con-
sideration, the full and complete answer to nearly all his objections which
is found in the book he was reviewing.
This consideration has led me seriously to question the propriety of reply-
ing at all to his remarks, since to do so in the best manner, would be little
more than to quote page after page from the work reviewed.
There is nothing new or unexpected in the review, except it be some of
his admissions, and it is upon the whole just what might be expected from
that school, and probably the best that can come from that quarter.
Were it allowable, I should publish the above named article entire. But
since this is not the case, I must content myself with making such quota-
tions as will fairly exhibit the writer's views of the work in question, and
with a brief reply to his strictures.
The great object of the reviewer seems to have been to fastem upon new
school men what he esteems to be the errors of Oberlin, and to sustain the
peculiarities of old schoolism. Hence I am not flattered by his so fully
endorsing and eulogizing my logic, because it was essential to his purpose
to show, that my conclusions follow by a rigorous logic, from what he sup-
poses to be the two fundamental errors of new schoolism.
He however admits the great, and even fundamental importance of the
principles and conclusions of the work, if they are true.
He assumes, as we shall see, the old School dogma of original sin or con-
stitutional moral depravity, and the head and front of the offending of my
work is, that it denies and disproves that doctrine, with its consequences.
The reviewer refuses to argue the questions at issue, but says, “We
promised not to discuss Mr. Finney's principles. We propose to rely upon
the reductio ad absurdum, and make his doctrines the refutation of his prin-
ciples.”
APPENDIX. 917
In several instances he misapprehends my meaning, and of course mis
represents me. This he also does by quoting and applying passages out of
their proper connexion. But I do not complain of intentional misrepre-
sentation. I can easily perceive, that with his views, those misapprehen-
sions and consequent misrepresentations of my views are natural.
His admissions have greatly marrowed the field of debate. I am happy
that this is so; for I hate the spirit, and dread even the form of controversy.
In the compass of a reply to his review I cannot follow the reviewer through
the whole train of his miscellaneous remarks, nor is it proper that I should.
Our readers would not thereby be edified. I care not for masteries. If I
know my heart, I am willing and anxious to have the errors of the work
under consideration detected and exposed, if errors there be in it. As
the interests of truth are concerned only with the discussion and settlement
of the main positions of the work and their legitimate consequences, I shall
content myself with the examination of these.
The reviewer has taken a most extraordinary course. He sat down to
review a book of which he says:—
“The work is therefore in a high degree logical. It is as hard to read as Euclid. Nothing
can be omitted ; nothing passed over slightly. The unhappy reader once committed to a
perusal is obliged to go on, sentence by sentence, through the long concatemation. There
is not one resting place : not one lapse into amplification or declamation, from the begin-
ning to the close. It is like one of those spiral staircases, which lead to the top of some high
tower without a landing from the base to the summit ; which, if a man has once ascended,
he resolves never to do the like again. The author begins with certain postulates, or what
he calls first truths of reason, and these he traces out with singular clearness and strength
to their legitimate conclusions. We do not see that there is a break or a defective link in
the whole chain. If you grant his principles, you have already granted his conclusions.”
The same in substance he repeats elsewhere. Now, what course does this
reviewer take in the review before us? Does he take issue upon the pre-
mises from which he admits that the conclusions irresistibly follow 2 Does
he meet argument with argument? Does he attempt by argument to show
that either the premises, or the conclusions of the book before him; are
unsound? O, no indeed. This were a painful and hopeless task. He
therefore assumes the correctness of the peculiarities of what is called old
schoolism; to wit, constitutional sinfulness, physical divine influence, physi-
cal regeneration, natural imability; that the Sovereign will of God is the
foundation of moral obligation; that moral obligation does not imply ability;
that moral obligation extends beyond the sphere of moral agency to the
substance of the soul and body, and that therefore these can be and are sinful
in every faculty and part; that the involuntary states of the intellect and
the sensibility are virtuous in a higher degree than benevolence or good-
will to being is ;-I say he assumes the correctness of these and sundry other
similar dogmas; and finding that the conclusions in the work before him
conflict with these, he most conveniently appeals to the prejudices of all who
sympathize with him in those views, and without one sentence of argument,
condemns the work because of its conclusions. He says, p. 257 —
“We promised, however, not to discuss Mr. Finney's principles. We propose to reply
on the reductio ad absurdum, and make his doctrines the refutation of his principles.”
918 APPENDIX.
Again, he says, p. 263:—
“We consider this a fair refutation. If the principle that ohligation is limited by ability,
leads to the conclusion that moral character is confined to intention, and that again to the
conclusion that when the intention is right, nothing can be morally wrong, then the principle
is false. Even if we could not detect its fallacy, we should know it could not be true.”
He relies altogether upon the absurdity of the conclusions to refute the
premises. And has he shown that the conclusions are absurd 2 No, in-
deed; but he has all along assumed this upon the strength of his own
preconceived opinions and prejudices, and those of his readers. A summary
and most short-hand method, truly, of disposing of the opinions and argu-
ments of an opponent They contradict our theory; therefore they must
be absurd. The argument when reduced to a logical formula would stand
thus: Whatever is inconsistent with old schoolism must be absurd ; the
book under review is inconsistent with old schoolism; therefore its doctrines
and conclusions are absurd. He has not thus stated the argument in form;
but, as every reader may see for himself, he has done the same thing in
substance. Now suppose I should do the same thing in reply, or suppose
I had dome the same thing in the book under consideration ; how much
would our readers be edified ? It is very natural for such men as the
editors of the New England Puritan and the New York Observer, and that
class of men who sympathize with the reviewer, to inform their readers
that the reviewer has used up the book in question. But stay. Men are
not all of this mind. Many would like to be better informed, and to see
the premises on which the argument in the work rests, grappled with and
overthrown by argument, or in some legitimate way disposed of, before
they can suffer the mere say-so, or the prejudices of any school, to settle
the weighty questions in debate.
I am well aware, that the peculiarities of old Schoolism will not bear
reasoning upon. Who, by any process of reasoning, or by any affirmation,
or by any deduction of the intelligence whatever, could arrive at the posi-
tions comprising the peculiarities of the school above named 2 Who, in the
use of his reason, could affirm for example, that men deserve the wrath
and curse of God for ever, for inheriting (of course without their knowledge
or consent,) a nature from Adam wholly sinful, in every faculty of soul and
body; or that a man is under infinite obligation to do what he never pos-
sessed any more ability to do, than to create a world; and, that he deserves
the wrath and curse of God for ever, for not performing matural impossibi-
lities; that he deserves eternal damnation for not being regenerated, when
his regeneration is a thing in which he is entirely passive; a work of God,
as wholly and exclusively as the work of creation; and a work which he
has no more power to effect, than he has to re-create himself? What has
either reason or reasoning to do with such dogmas as these, which make
up the peculiarities of old Schoolism, but to demy and spurn them 2 No-
thing, surely. But since these are the points assumed by the writer, no
wonder that he refuses to reason, or to take issue with either the premises
or the conclusions. That will never do. He must appeal to prejudice,
APEPENDIX. 919
and professedly to the Bible, while he only assumes that the Bible sustains
his positions, without so much as examining one text This to be sure is
asummary way of disposing of all the great questions between us.
But another peculiarity of this writer is, that he admits that the conclu-
sions follow with irresistible logic from the premises, without knowing what
the premises are. At first he appears to have been much confused in his
mind, and on page 250 he says—
“As it would be impossible to discuss the various questions presented in such a work as
this, within the compass of a review, we propose to do no more than to state the principles
which Mr. Finney assumes, and show that they legitimately lead to his conclusions. In
other words, we wish to show that his conclusions are the best refutation of his premises,
Our task would be much easier than it is, if there were any one radical principle to which.
his several axioms could be reduced, and from which the whole system could be evolved,
but this is not the case. No one principle includes all the others, nor leads to all the con-
clusions here deduced ; nor do the conclusions admit of being classed, and some referred to
one principle and some to another, because the same conclusions often follow with equal
certainty from different premises. We despair therefore of giving anything like unity to
our exhibition of Mr. Finney's system, but we shall try not to do him injustice. We regard
him as a most important labourer in the cause of truth. Principles which have been long
current in this country, and which multitudes hold without seeing half their consequences,
he has had the strength of intellect and will, to trace out to their legitimate conclusions,
and has thus shown the borderers that there is no neutral ground ; that they must either
go forward to Oberlin, or back to the common faith of Protestants.”
In this paragraph he sees not, plainly, what the premises are, from
which he had before said, that my conclusions irresistibly follow. But
soon after his vision clears up a little, and he says, at the bottom of the
same page:—
“We are not sure that all Mr. Finney's dectrines may not be traced to two fundamental
principles; namely, that obligation is limited by ability ; and that satisfaction, happiness,
blessedness, is the only ultimate good, the only thing intrinsically valuable.”
Here he is not sure that he has not discovered the premises, from
which, he had asserted, before he saw them, that my conclusions followed
irresistibly.
On page 258 it appears, that he had finally come to be assured that he
had discovered the premises upon which the logical conclusions of the book
were based. And lo! these principles, instead of being manifold, as he had
represented them, are discovered to be but two in number. Thus, after
writing twenty pages of his review, and nearly one half of the whole, he
finally begins to understand the work he is reviewing ; and behold, instead
of its being a wilderness of premises and conclusions that mock all syste-
matic discussion and examination, the conclusions are based, as he at last
discovers, upon two fundamental positions. Now, what does he do? Does
he, since now he has found the clue, lay aside what he had written, and
close in with, or attempt to refute, either the premises or the conclusions?
Oh no ; but, as has been said, he assumes the truth of an opposite scheme
of doctrine, and then comes to the grave conclusion that the premises in
the work are false, because they are opposed to what he calls the common
and the long established views of Christians,
920 APPENDIX.
But what are the two principles upon which he has discovered the whole
work to rest, and from which he so fully admits the whole train of conclu-
sions to follow 2 We will hear him again, page 258:—
“The two principles to which all the important doctrines contained in this work may
be traced are, first, that obligation is limited by ability ; and secondly, that enjoyment,
Satisfaction, or happiness, is the only ultimate good which is to be chosen for its own sake.”
This, to be sure, is most extraordinary. He begins by discovering and
affirming the logical conclusiveness of the whole work; that the conclusions
follow from the premises; but soon he despairs of finding the definite
premises upon which the conclusions are based. Then he is not sure but
the conclusions may be traced to two premises, and at length he is sure
of this. How he could set out with the affirmation that the conclusions
followed from the premises—that there was not a defective link in the
whole chain of argument—that to admit the premises is to grant the con-
clusions, while at the same time he had not discovered the premises, is
hard to say.
But what does he do with the two principles or premises in question ?
Why, he undertakes to show, partly by garbled quotations from the work
before him, and partly by his own logic, that the conclusions of the book do
follow from the premises; then relies upon the manifest absurdity of the
conclusions, as a sufficient refutation of the premises. .
I now proceed to a brief statement of the points upon which it appears
from his admissions that we are agreed.
We have just seen what he regards as my two fundamental principles.
Again he says, page 258 :—
“If these principles are correct, then it follows: first, that moral obligation, or the de-
mands of the moral law can relate to nothing but intention, or the choice of an ultimate
end. If that is right, all is right. The law eam demand nothing more. That this is a fair
sequence from the above principles is plain, as appears from the following statement of the
case. The law can demand nothing but what is within the power of a moral agent. The
power of such an agent extends no further than to the acts of the will. All acts of the will
are either choices of an end, or volitions designed to attain that end: the latter of course
having no moral character, except as they derive it from the nature of the end in view of
the mind. Therefore all moral character attaches properly to the intention, or ultimate
choice which the agent forms.”
Again he says, page 253 —
“l. Mr. Finney obviously uses the word will in its strict and limited sense. Every one
is aware that the word is often used for every thing in the mind not included under the
category of the understanding. In this sense all mental affections, such as being pleased
or displeased, liking and disliking, preferring, and so on, are acts of the will. In its strict
and proper sense, it is the power of self-determination, the faculty by which we decide our
own acts. This is the sense in which the word is uniformly and correctly used in the work
before us.
2. Mr. Finney is ſurther correct in confining causality to the will, that is, in saying that
our ability extends no farther than to voluntary acts. We have no direct control over our
mental states beyond the sphere of the will. We can decide on our bodily acts, and on
the course of our thoughts, but we cannot govern our emotions and affections by direct acts
of volition. We cannot feel as we will.
3. In confounding liberty and ability, or in asserting their identity, Mr. Finney, as re-
APPENELX. 921
marked on a preceding page, passes beyond the limits of first truths, and asserts that to be
an axiom which the common consciousness of men denies to be truth.
4. The fallacy of which he is guilty is very obvious. He transfers a maxim which is
an axiom in one department, to another in which it has no legitimate force. It is a first
truth that a man without eyes cannot be under an obligation to see, or a man without ears
to hear. No blind man ever felt remorse for not seeing, nor any deaf man for not hearing.
Within the sphere, therefore, of physical impossibilities, the maxim that obligation is limited
by ability, is undoubtedly true.”
Again he says, page 243 –
“It is a conceded point that man is a free agent. The author therefore is authorized to
lay down as one of his axioms, that liberty is essential to moral agency.”
From these quotations it is manifest that we agree :—
1. That the conclusions contained, in the work reviewed, legitimately and
irresistibly follow from the premises.
2. We also agree, that men are moral agents.
3. We also agree, that liberty of will is a condition of moral agency.
4. We also agree, that moral agency is a condition of moral obligation.
5. We also agree, that so far as acts of the will are concerned, liberty of
will implies ability of will to obey God. In other words, so far as acts of
will are concerned, we agree that men have ability, and that with respect
to voluntary acts, obligation is limited by ability. This is fully admitted.
The foregoing, and many other sayings in this review, render it evident
that the writer holds, and therefore that we agree, that my first premise,
to wit, that moral obligation is limited by ability, is true, so far as acts of
will are concerned.
6. The foregoing quotations also show that we are agreed, that all
causality resides in the will; that whatever a man can accomplish directly
or indirectly by willing, is possible to him ; and whatever he cannot thus
accomplish, is to him a matural impossibility.
7. We also agree, as the foregoing quotations show, that the states of
the intellect and of the sensibility, are passive or involuntary states of mind.
8. We further agree, that muscular action, together with the attention
of the intellect, is under the direct control of the will.
9. We also agree, that the states of the sensibility, or the desires,
appetites, passions, and feelings, are only under the indirect control of the
will.
10. We therefore further agree, that in so far as any action or state of
mind is under either the direct or indirect control of the will; or, which is
the same thing, whatever is possible to man, that may be justly required of
him.
11. We also agree, that in so far as thoughts, actions, or feelings, are
under the direct or indirect control of the will, they are proper objects of
command, and of praise and blame.
12. We also further agree, that, strictly speaking, the moral character of
acts and states of mind that proceed directly or indirectly from acts of will,
belongs to, or resides in, the intention that directly or indirectly caused
them.
922 APPENDIX.
13. We also fully agree, that all acts of will consist in choice and voli-
tion; that is, in the choice of an end, and volition or executive efforts to
secure that end.
14. We also agree, that in so far as acts of will are concerned, moral
obligation and moral character, strictly belong only to the ultimate inten-
tion; and that volitions, designed to secure the end intended, derive their
character from the nature of the end. His language is, page 258:—
“All the acts of the will are either choices of an end, or volitions designed to attain that
end; the latter of course having no moral character, except as they derive it from the nature
of the end in view of the mind. Therefore, moral character attaches properly to the inten-
tion, or ultimate choice which the agent forms.”
I wish the reader to mark and ponder well these admissions, and to
examine the quotations in which they are made, and see if he fully makes
these admissions, together with those that follow. I desire this, because I
shall soon call the attention of the reader to the remarkable dilemma in
which his admissions have placed him. -
15. We also further agree, that a physical inability is a bar to, or incon-
sistent with, moral obligation. He says—
“He transfers a maxim which is an axiom in one department, to another in which it has
no force. It is a first truth, that a man without eyes cannot be under an obligation to see,
or a man without ears to hear. No blind man ever felt remorse for not seeing, nor any
deaf man for not hearing. Within the sphere, therefore, of physical impossibilities, the
maxim that obligation is limited by ability is undoubtedly true.”
Let the reader mark this admission,
16. In so far as acts of will are concerned, we also agree, in the simpli-
city of moral action; that acts of will must in their own nature be for the
time being, either wholly right or wholly wrong. This is one conclusion
which I deduce from the premises in question, and which he admits to fol-
low from them.
17. We also agree, that if moral obligation be limited by ability, it
follows that moral obligation and moral character must strictly belong only
to acts of will, and not, strictly speaking, to outward acts, or any involuntary
feelings or states of mind. These have moral character only in a qualified
sense, as proceeding from the intention, and receive character, so far as
they have character, from that intention. Thus, from his admissions it
appears, that in respect to what he calls the first of my fundamental prin-
ciples, we differ only in this, to wit: he affirms, and I deny, that moral
obligation extends beyond the sphere of moral agency, to that state of the
constitution which he calls sinful, and to those states of mind that lie
wholly beyond, either the direct or indirect control of the will. Observe,
we are fully agreed as touching everything that lies within either the direct
or indirect control of the will. Our disagreement, then, in respect to what
he calls my first principle, respects only those states of mind over which
the will has no direct or indirect control.
Now, reader, observe : he fully admits:
1. That all causality resides in the will, and that therefore, whatever
APPENDIX. 923
cannot be accomplished either directly or indirectly by willing, is impossible
to man. He fully admits also :
2. That whatever comes within the sphere of physical impossibility is
without the pale of moral obligation, that is, that a physical impossibility
or inability, is a bar to, or inconsistent with moral obligation.
The real and only point of difference between us in respect to the first
great principle in question, resolves itself into this: WHAT Is A PHYSICAL
INABILITY 2
This writer and his school admit and maintain, that the inability of men
to obey God, is a proper inability of mature or constitution ; and that it
consists in a nature that is wholly sinful, in every faculty and part of Soul
and body. This I call a proper physical inability, and therefore I insist,
that did such an inability exist, it would be a bar to moral obligation.
This writer will not call this a physical inability, although he insists that
it is a real inability of mature. He must, to save his orthodoxy, maintain
that this is a real constitutional or matural inability, but for the same
reason he must deny that it is a physical inability; to avoid the charge of
denying moral obligation. But how is the question between us here to be
decided ? The question, and the only question thus far between us is,
What is a proper physical inability? Webster's primary definition of
physical is, “Pertaining to mature or natural productions, or to material
things as opposed to things moral or imaginary.”
This writer assumes that a physical inability must be a material inability.
“A man without eyes is under no obligation to see,” &c. This he admits.
But he says, “it is no less obviously true that an inability which has its
origin in sin, which consists in what is sinful, and relates to moral action,
is perfectly consistent with continued obligation.” But what is this sinful
inability, that consists in sin, that relates to, (not that consists im) moral
action ? Why, it is that which lies wholly beyond, both the direct and
indirect control of the will—in a sinful nature, in a constitution wholly
sinful in every faculty, and part, of Soul and body.
But this inability is not physical it is a proper inability of nature or
constitution; it extends to both the substance of the soul and body, and
yet we are to believe that it is not physical But why is it not physical ?
Why, because if physical, it would be a bar to moral obligation. But this
must not be admitted. If I am born without eyes, I am under no obliga-
tion to see. Why? Because I am maturally or physically unable to see.
It is to me maturally impossible. But if I am born without any ability to
obey God, with a constitution that renders it impossible for me to love and
obey him, I am still under obligation in respect to those things to which
this inability extends. Why? Because it is not a physical inability.
If the inability consists in a defect in the material organism, that is simply
the instrument of the mind, it is a bar to moral obligation to perform those
acts which are thus rendered naturally impossible. But if the inability
belong to the constitution, or substance of the mind, and an inability
with which I came into being as real and as absolute an inability as
924 APPENDIX.
the bodily one just referred to, still, I am under infinite obligation to per-
form those acts to which this inability extends. Why Because this
is not a physical inability | Here then, I take issue with this writer, and
maintain that this is a proper physical inability. It is matural. It is con-
stitutional. It belongs to the substance of both soul and body, both being
wholly defiled, and sinful in every faculty and part. It is an inability
lying wholly without the pale of moral agency, and beyond either the
direct or indirect control of the will. A man can no more overcome it by
Willing, than he can create for himself eyes or ears by willing. Why, then,
I ask, should the want of eyes and ears be a bar to moral obligation to see
or hear, any more than an utter constitutional inability to obey God should
be a bar to obligation to obey him 2 There neither is nor can be a reason.
They are both a proper natural or physical inability, and alike a bar to
moral obligation. I therefore deny that moral obligation extends to any
act or state, either of soul or body, that lies wholly beyond, both the direct
and indirect control of the will, so that it is naturally impossible for the
agent to be, or do it.
He says, page 253 :—
“Mr. Finney is further correct, in confining causality to the will, that is, in saying that
our ability extends no further than to voluntary acts.”
Again, page 243, he says —
“It is a conceded point that man is a free agent. The author therefore is authorized to
lay down as one of his axioms, that liberty is essential to moral agency.”
From these two quotations it appears, that a man has ability so far as
the sphere of moral agency extends. Moral agency implies free agency.
Free agency implies liberty of will. Liberty of will implies ability of will,
according to him. His inability, then, lies beyond the pale of moral agency.
In support of his position he assumes, that both the instinctive judgments
of all men, and the Bible affirm, that there is moral obligation where there
is a conscious inability. This I deny, and maintain, that neither reason,
the instinctive judgments of men, nor the Bible, affirm moral obligation of
any act or state of mind that lies wholly beyond the direct or indirect
control of the will. Both reason and revelation hold men responsible for
all voluntary and intelligent acts, and also for all states of mind that lie
within the direct or indirect control of the will ; but no other. Men are
conscious that their will is free, and that for its acts they are responsible;
also that their outward life, and most of their inward feelings are under the
direct or indirect control of their will, and for this reason alone do they
affirm, or even conceive, that moral obligation extends to them. That they
have this consciousness is certain, and that this is a sufficient ground of
the affirmation of moral obligation in respect to them, cannot be denied.
Now, it must not be assumed, that reason or revelation affirms obligation,
in respect to anything whatever that lies wholly beyond the direct or in-
direct control of the will. He complains that I assume, that moral obli-
gation does not and cannot extend beyond moral agency, or which is the
APPENDIX. 92.5
same thing, beyond the acts of will, and those acts and states which lie
within its direct or indirect control.
Now, before I close my remarks upon this point, let me request my
readers to mark and understand distinctly the exact difference between this
writer and myself, upon the subject of ability. For here, let it be observed,
is the real point of divergence between the Old and the New School in
theology. What this writer calls my other fundamental principle I have
shown is not fundamental, but that it follows irresistibly from this.
Observe, then, that this writer fully admits, that in so far as acts of
will are concerned, and those acts and states of mind, that lie either within
the direct or indirect control of the will, men have ability. This he
repeatedly admits, and assumes. He says, as the foregoing quotations
show, that the assumption, that obligation is limited by ability, implies
that obligation is limited to acts of will, because ability is limited to acts of
will. He also holds, that the will is the executive faculty, and that which
we can directly or indirectly do by willing, we have ability to do. But the
thing of which he complains is, that I assume, that moral obligation cannot
extend beyond those acts, and mental states, that lie wholly beyond the
will's direct or indirect control. He insists, that obligation extends into
the region of absolute impossibility. He admits that it cannot extend into
the region of physical impossibility, but holds, that it can, and does extend
to matural impossibilities; that men are under obligation to be and do what
they have never possessed any ability to be and do, what they can never
accomplish directly or indirectly by willing. This I deny, and on the con-
trary hold, that obligation implies ability, in the sense that it is possible for
man to be all that he is under an obligation to be; that by Willing, he can
directly or indirectly do all that God requires him to do; that, strictly
speaking, the willing is the doing required by God; and that “if there be
first a willing mind, it is accepted according to what a man hath, and not
according to what he hath not.” This is the expressed, and everywhere
assumed doctrine of the Bible. This writer admits, that, “I Ought, there-
fore I can, is a doctrine of philosophers.” But he insists, that the common
people say, “I Ought to be able, but I am not.”
This theological writer does not hesitate to appeal from a doctrine of
philosophy to the loose language of the common people. But I deny, that
even the common people, or any moral agents whatever, hold themselves
morally bound to perform natural impossibilities. Now, this is the exact
point between us. He affirms, that men are under moral obligation to
perform matural impossibilities. This I deny. He holds, that both the
Bible, and the instinctive judgments of men affirm and assume, that men
are under obligation to perform matural impossibilities. This again I deny.
On the other hand I maintain, that both reason and revelation affirm and
assume, that what man ought to do, is possible to him. He admits
that it must be physically possible. I insist, that a proper natural
or constitutional impossibility, is a physical impossibility, and that it
can absolutely be nothing else than a physical impossibility. But I will
926 APPENDIX.
not contend for the word. It is the thing upon which I insist. I do insist,
that a proper inability of nature is a bar to moral obligation; that obligation
always implies possibility. This he admits in reference to acts of will. He
also admits it in reference to physical acts, or acts that depend on the material
organism. But he denies it in reference to mental acts and states. I
insist, that this is an absurd distinction. What! admit that a physical, in
the sense of a bodily inability is a bar to obligation, but maintain, that an
absolute inability of mind, and one too with which we came into being, is
no bar to obligation! If a man is born with a deformed, or defective body,
it is a bar to obligation, in respect to all actions to which the body is
incapable. But if born with a deformed, a morally defective, and a sinful
mind, that renders obedience a natural impossibility, this is no bar to moral
obligation. It is preposterous to argue such a question. If there be a self.
evident truth in the universe, this must be one, that a proper natural
inability of mind, is as real and as absolute a bar to obligation as an
inability of body.
It is vain to affirm, that the inability in this case is a sinful one; that it
consists in a nature that is wholly defiled or sinful, in every faculty and
part of soul and body. I deny that there is any proper inability, that is, in
the sense of natural impossibility. And if there were, I deny that this
inability could be sinful in the sense of being the fault of him who inherits
it; therefore I maintain that, if such an impossibility existed, it would be
an effectual bar to moral obligation.
I must now attend to the disposal he has made of the first premise,
which is, that moral obligation is limited by ability. He says, if moral
obligation is limited by ability, it follows, “that the law can demand nothing
but what is within the power of a moral agent. The power of such an
agent extends no further than to acts of the will. All the acts of the will
are either choices of an end, or volitions designed to attain that end, the
latter of course having no moral character, except as they derive it from
the mature of the end in view of the mind. Therefore, all moral character
attaches properly to the intention, or ultimate choice which the agent
forms.” He them proceeds to quote from the work he is reviewing, and
gives the quotation in capitals, page 259:—
“Let it be borne in mind, that if moral obligation respects strictly the ultimate intention
only, it follows that ultimate intention alone is right or wrong in itself, and all other things
are right or wrong as they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate intention.”
Upon this he immediately and triumphantly exclaims:
“How strangely does this sound like the doctrine, the end sanctifies the means ! Every
thing depends on the intention ; if that is right, all is right. We fear Mr. Finney has not
recently read Pascal's Provincial Letters: a better book for distribution at Oberlin, we
should be at a loss to select."
After quoting a page or two, exposing the absurdities of the Jesuits in
maintaining that the end sanctifies the means, he says:
“How does Mr. Finney’s doctrine differ from theirs ? On p. 134, he says, in the passage
just quoted, “let it be borne in mind [it is a matter at once plain and important] that if
moral obligation respects strictly the ultimate intention only, it follows that ultimate inten-
APPENDIX. 927
tion alone is right or wrong in itself, and all other things are right or wrong as they proceed
from a right or wrong ultimate intention.” The only difference here arises from the inser-
tion of the word “ultimate.” But we cannot see that this makes any real difference in the
doctrine itself. Both parties, (i. e. the Jesuits and Mr. Finney,) agree, that the intention
must be right, and if that is right, everything which proceeds from it is right. The former
say, that the hononr and welfare of the church is the proper object of intention, Mr.
Finney says, the highest good of being is the only proper object. "The latter, however,
may include the former, and the Jesuit may well say, that in intending the welfare of the
church he intends the glory of God, and the highest good of the universe. In any event,
the whole poison of the doctrine lies in the principle, common to both, viz: That whatever
proceeds from a right intention is right. If this is so, then the end sanctifies the means;
and it is right to do evil that good may come; which is Paul's reductio ad absurdum.
“We consider this a fair refutation. If the principle that obligation is limited by ability,
leads to the conclusion that moral character is confined to intention; and that again to the
conclusion, that where the intention is right nothing can be morally wrong, then the
principle is false.”
So then, it appears to himself and to many of his readers, no doubt, that
the first and fundamental position of the work before him is refuted. The
doctrine of ability has fallen. New School theology is no more. But stay,
not so fast. Let us look at this a little. We will inquire—
(1.) Whether this same objection does not lie with all its force against
this reviewer himself, and against every school of philosophy, theology,
morals, law and equity in Christendom 2 whether it does not lie alike
against reason, revelation, and common sense? This reviewer calls the
doctrine, that moral character belongs to the ultimate intention, Mr. Fin-
mey's doctrine. But how came this to be Mr. Finney's doctrine? Let us
hear this reviewer upon the subject of his own views. In remarking on the
subject of ability he says, p. 258 —
“If these principles are correct, then it follows: First, that moral obligation or the
demands of the moral law can relate to nothing but intention, or the choice of an ultimate
end. If that is right, all is right. The law can demand nothing more. That this is a
fair sequence from the above principles is plain, as appears from the following statement
of the case. The law can demand nothing but what is within the power of a moral agent.
The power of such an agent extends no further than to the acts of the will. All the acts
of the will are either choices of an end, or volitions designed to attain that end ; the
latter of course having no moral character, except as they derive it from the nature of the
end in view of the mind. Therefore all moral character attaches properly to the intention,
or ultimate choice which the agent forms.”
Here then, and elsewhere, it fully appears, that in so far as acts of
will are concerned and the dogma of the Jesuits never did nor can apply
to any other, this reviewer holds precisely the same doctrine that I do
myself. He has done little else than express his opinion in my own
words. Throughout his entire review, with one strange exception, he has
maintained precisely the same doctrine in regard to acts of the will that I
do; namely, that so far as acts of the will are concerned, moral character
belongs strictly only to the ultimate intention, and that volitions, or executive
acts, have strictly no moral character, except as they receive it from the
ultimate desigu or end of the mind. The only exception, to which I have
just alluded, I shall notice in its proper place, and show that it not only
928 APPENIDIX.
contradicts the reviewer himself, but that it contradicts reason and revela-
tion, and shocks the moral sense.
But who does not hold, and that too by a law of his own intelligence,
that moral character belongs to the ultimate intention? Who does not
know and hold, that a man is to be judged by his motive or design 2. This
can never be intelligently and homestly denied by any moral agent, any
more than he can deny his own existence. Where shall moral character
be found, so far as voluntary acts are concerned ? Certainly, not in the
muscular action, that results by a law of necessity from volition, or the
executive act of the will. It cannot belong to mere volition, which results
also by a law of necessity, from the design or intention of the mind. Voli-
tion, as distinct from choice or intention, is only an executive act which
the designing mind puts forth to secure an end. The intelligence of
all men affirms, and this has been the doctrine of all schools from time
immemorial, and always must be, that moral character belongs to the
ultimate intention, or choice of an end, and that the agent's character for
the time being is as his intention is. But I said, this reviewer had made
one strange and self-contradictory exception to this doctrine of intention—
he says, p. 262:—
“Mr. Finney cannot say, certain things are prohibited by the law of God, and are there-
fore wrong, no matter with what intention they are performed, because his doctrine is,
that law relates only to the intention ; its authority extends no further. The will of God,
is not the foundation of any obligation. Here he has got into a deeper slough even than
the Jesuits, for they hold that the law of God is not a mere declaration of what is obliga-
tory; and so far as we know, they never substitute obedience to the intelligence as a synony"
mous expression with obedience to God.”
But suppose it be admitted, that the will of God is the foundation of
obligation. Has God no respect to the intention 2 Do his commands
contemplate only the outward act, so that a thing may be right or Wrong,
“whatever the intention may be * This doctrine that God's commands
do not respect the ultimate intention, but only the outward life, may be
palateable enough to hypocrites and worldly moralists, but it is an abomina-
tion to reason, to the Bible, and to God. And can this reviewer say, that a
thing, anything whatever, is morally right or wrong without regard to the
intention ? No, indeed, it is absurd.
But to return to the dogma of the Jesuits. They have grossly perverted
a fundamental truth, a truth held alike by all moral agents, because held
by a necessity of the intelligence. I am acquainted with the doctrine of
the Jesuits, but I am not so frightened thereby as to renounce both reason
and revelation, and scout a truth which I hold by a necessity of my own
nature. I might refuse the responsibility of replying to this perversion,
and leave it with this writer to reply to the Jesuits as best he can, since it
is most evident, that the objection lies with just as much force against him
as against myself. All schools of philosophy, theology, morals, law and
equity, and all moral agents are equally concerned to answer this objection,
as it lies with equal force against them all, and lies against reason and
APPENDIX. 929
revelation. Why then are Oberlin and Mr. Finney to be held particularly
responsible, and obliged to answer this objection ? Why is the doctrine that
moral character belongs to the ultimate intention, so far as acts of will are
concerned, heresy at Oberlin, but Orthodoxy at Princeton and everywhere
else ?
Before I proceed to point out the manifest perversion of the Jesuits, I
must not omit to remark, that So far as their dogma is concerned, it matters
not at all what the end is upon which right intention is supposed to termi-
nate. Their doctrine is, that “the end sanctifies the means.” Whatever
the end is, provided it be right, it would follow in their view that the means
must be right. This is fully admitted by this reviewer:
“In any event, the whole poison of the doctrine lies in the principle common to both,
namely, That whatever proceeds from a right intention is right. If this is true, then the
end sanctifies the means; and it is right to do evil that good may come.”
Whether the end be justice, or truth, or right, or virtue, or happiness, it
matters not : it is equally open to this objection, and perversion, unless it
can be shown, which, cannot justly be pretended, that men universally, and
necessarily possess a knowledge in all cases of what is right, or true, or
just, or useful, &c.
I now proceed to inquire, in what sense the doctrine, that the end
sanctifies the means is true, after which, I shall show in what sense it
is false.
I. It is true in the sense that the end, design, or ultimate intention,
gives character to the use of means to accomplish the end. The mere out-
ward act has no moral character, except as its character is derived from
the end, or design of the mind. This everybody knows to be true, and
this no one can honestly and intelligently deny.
2. The doctrine that the end sanctifies the means, is true in the sense,
that from the laws of mind, a moral agent in the homest pursuit of an
ultimate end, can use no other than means which he honestly regards as
the appropriate and necessary means. That is, his intention must secure
the use of means, and the means which, in the honest apprehension of his
mind, are the appropriate and necessary means to that end. For example:
if his end be benevolent, he can use no other than benevolent means. If
he is homest in the choice of an end, that is, if he chooses an end in 8 C-
cordance with the dictates of reason and revelation, he cannot but choose
the means by the same rule. He cannot choose an end in obedience to
God and reason, and then disobey and disregard both, or either, in the use
of means to secure his end. This is impossible. If honest in his end, he
will be and must be homest in the use of means. Benevolence consists in
the choice of the highest good of universal being as an ultimate end, and
implies the choice of every interest, of every being, according to its per-
ceived and relative value. With a benevolent end it is impossible for a
moral agent to use umbenevolent means, knowingly to disregard, or unjustly
trample down, any interest of any being. The nature of benevolence is
such, as to forbid the use of any but benevolent means to secure its end,
*Y
J O
930 APPENI) IX.
The constitution of the mind is such, as to render it impossible for it to use
- any other means to secure an end, than those which are, in the judgment
of the mind, the appropriate means. In this sense, then, the end sanctifies
the means ; to wit, a good or benevolent end secures the use of benevolent
1)] (28.]].S.
3. But the end does not sanctify the means, in the sense, that any means
Whatever may be justly resorted to, to secure a good end. Now this is the
very sense, in which the Jesuits hold that the end sanctifies the means, and
herein consists their error, and from this resulted all the odious and ridicu-
lous consequences with which they are chargeable. They held, that a good
end justifies or sanctifies the use of any means whatever; that is, that a
benevolent end might justify unbenevolent means, or more strictly, that the
benevolence of the design imparts the same character to the use of any
means whatever. It is true, that a truly benevolent design imparts its
character to the use of any and every means which it does, or can, from its
11ature, consent to use. Dut be it remembered, that it cannot consent to
use other than benevolent means, that is, means which are, in the honest
judgment of the mind, the appropriate means. The end is the highest
good of being in general, therefore the interest of no being can be over-
looked, or disregarded, or trampled down, in the use of means. If the mind
has regard to the will and authority of God in the choice of an end, it can-
not disregard his will and authority in the use of means. It cannot seek
to please him in the pursuit of an end, by means that are known to be dis-
pleasing to him. Every moral agent knows, that the highest good of
sentient beings, and of moral agents in particular, can be secured only by
conforming to the laws of their mental, moral, and physical constitution.
Therefore a moral agent can no more homestly intend to promote the
highest good of moral agents in the use of unbenevolent means, than in
intending to secure their highest physical well-being, he could knowingly
deprive them of every condition of physical comfort and well-being, and
feed them only with poison. The error of the Jesuits consists :
(1) In proposing a wrong end. They set up the church and the priest-
hood, in the place of God, and of being in general. This is partial love,
and not benevolence. Hence any and every other interest might be tram-
pled down, and set at nought, to promote the exaltation of the priesthood
and the church.
(2.) They overlooked the real good, and of course the conditions of the
real and highest good of the part of creation, whose good they put in the
place of universal good. They overlooked the true end, and the true nature
of benevolence, and of course, let loose a flood of errors and absurdities
upon the world. It was not that blessedness that is connected with holi-
ness, which constitutes the real and ultimate good of moral agents, at which
they aimed as an end. But it was rather the influence, the authority, and
aggrandizement of the church and the priesthood, at which they aimed as
an end. This was setting up a selfish, and not a benevolent end. What
but wickedness, could ever result from such an intention 2
APPENDIX. 93.1
Let it be distinctly understood, them, that “the end sanctifies the
means :”
1. In the sense, that it secures the use of such as the mind regards as
the appropriate means.
2. In the sense, that the end or ultimate intention imparts its character
to the use of what the mind homestly regards as necessary means.
3. But that the end does not sanctify the means, in the sense that the
end sanctifies or justifies the use of any means whatever. This last, be it
understood, is the sense in which the Jesuits hold that the end sanctifies
the means. This is radical error. It cannot be honestly and intelligently
denied, that in both the former senses, the end does sanctify the means.
(1.) It certainly is true, that in the pursuit of an honest end, the mind
can use none but homest means.
(2.) A moral agent is certainly bound to use the means which, in his
homest judgment, under the best light he can get, he regards as the appro-
priate means. If homest, he must have respect to the will and judgment
of God, both in respect to the end and the means, and if honest in the
end, he will and must be in the means. If he is not justified in using the
means which he supposes reason and revelation to Sanction and ordain,
what means is he to use 2 These, and these only, are the means he ought
to use ; and being homest, they are the only means he can consent to use,
and his intention gives character to their use. No man is, or can be homest,
who has access to the Bible, in the selection of either end or means, with-
out consulting the judgment and the will of God respecting both.
But I am aware that, to leave this question here, will be unsatisfactory
to this reviewer, and to those who agree with him. They will inquire, but
what are benevolent means ? Are not any means benevolent, which are
necessary to secure the highest good of the universe 2 To this I answer,
yes. They inquire again, may not this end, in some cases at least, require
injustice and lying, fraud, and various forms of sin 2 I answer, no. The
difficulty with this writer is, that he regards benevolence as a simple, unin-
telligent choice of happiness, having no necessary regard to the means
whatever. So the Jesuits regarded it. Hence their perversion. This
writer is unable to point out the error of the Jesuits, if he admits,
which he cannot but do, in respect to acts of will, that moral character be-
longs to the ultimate intention, and that the means must partake of the
character of the end. This writer and the Jesuits regard benevolence as a
simple choice of happiness, and of course as possessing no attributes what-
ever. Remarking upon the doctrine, that enjoyment is the ultimate good
of being, he says, pages 256, 7 :
“On this doctrine we remark: 1. That it is readily admitted that happiness is a good.
2. That it is consequently obligatory on all moral agents to endeavour to promote it. 3.
That the highest happiness of the nniverse, being an unspeakably exalted and important
end, to make its attainment the object of life is a noble principle of action. 4. Conse-
quently, this theory of moral obligation is inconceivably more elevated than that which
makes self-love the ultimate principle of action, and our own happiness the highest object
of pursuit. 5. That the error of the theory is, in making enjoyment the highest and only
3 O Q
932 APPENDIX.
intrinsic or real good. 6. That this error derives no countenance from the fact, that the
Bible represents love to God and love to our neighbour, as the fulfilling of the law. To
derive any argument from this source, Mr. Finney must first take the truth of his theory
for granted. To prove that all love is benevolence, it must be assumed that happiness is
the only good. If love is vastly more than benevolence, if a disposition to promote hap-
piness is only one, and that one of the lowest forms of that comprehensive excellence which
the scriptures call love, his argument is worth nothing. In accordance with that meaning
of the term which universal usage has given it, any outgoing of the soul, whether under
the form of desire, affection, complacency, reverence, delight towards an appropriate
object, is in the Bible called love. To squeeze all this down, and wire-draw it through one
pin-hole, is as impossible as to change the nature of the human soul. Every man, not a
slave to some barren theory of the understanding, knows that love to God is not benevo-
lence ; that it is approbation, complacency, delight in his moral excellence, reverence,
gratitude, devotion.
The reason, then, why the scriptures represent love as the fulfilling of the law, is two-
fold. First, because love to an infinitely perfect Being involves in it approbation of all
conceivable forms of moral excellence, and consequent congeniality of soul with it under
all those forms. He who really loves a God of truth, justice, purity, mercy, and benevo-
lence, is himself truthful, just, holy, merciful, and kind. Secondly, because love to Cod
and man will secure all obedience to the precepts of the law. We may admit therefore
that love is the fulfilling of the law, without being sophisticated into believing, or rather
saying, that faith is love, justice is love, patience is love, humility is love.”
Upon this I remark:—
1. That he here distinctly admits, that enjoyment or happiness is an
ultimate good.
2. That it is virtue to choose it, and intend to promote it, as an ultimate
good, and to make its attainment the object of life.
3. Consequently, there must be a law requiring benevolence.
4. It must be always right to obey this law. That is, if there be a
moral law, requiring that the highest enjoyment or happiness of the uni-
verse shall be chosen, as an ultimate end, or as a good in itself, and that
all moral agents shall consecrate themselves to the promotion of it, then,
benevolence is always a duty, and it must be always right to aim at pro-
moting this end, and to use the appropriate means to this end.
5. But here the reviewer stumbles, and does not see why this position,
which he seems to overlook, as really his own position, does not lie open to
the objection, that even injustice, fraud, lying, oppression, or murder itself,
may be innocently resorted to, may, that they may become a duty, and
therefore virtues, if demanded as the necessary means of the highest hap-
piness of the universe.
The difficulty in this reviewer's mind lies in his overlooking the attri-
butes of benevolence. He regards it, manifestly, as having no attributes;
as consisting in a mere blind choice of happiness, without any necessary
regard to the means by which it can be secured. Now this, as I have
shown in the work under consideration, is a radical error in respet to the
nature of benevolence. I have there attempted to show, that the very
nature and essence of benevolence implies and includes, a regard to all
the laws of the constitution of schtient beings, and especially of moral
agents; that therefore justice, truthfulness, righteousness, &c., were attri-
APPENDIX. 933
butes of benevolence, and that therefore the law of benevolence could never
sanction the violation of any of these, for the good reason, that they are
essential attributes of benevolence. Benevolence is a choice in accordance
with the law of the reason. Reason not only demands the choice of the
highest happiness of being as an end, but at the same time, and just as
absolutely, affirms that conformity to the laws of our being is the appro-
priate means, or is a condition of securing that end. The Creator has so
constituted us, that our nature itself indicates and points out the conditions
aud indispensable means of our highest ultimate enjoyment. Moral law,
or the law of nature, is nothing else than the indication of our natures,
announced and enforced by the authority of God. Our body has its neces-
sities, and is endowed with those appetences that indicate the means of its
highest health and perfection. Food and drink are necessary means of its
well-being. Hence appetites, terminating on these necessary means. So
the soul has its wants. The reason indicates the means of meeting its
necessities. The end demanded by the reason is the highest good of
universal being, and so far as may be, of every being in particular. The
means or conditions it affirms to be, universal conformity to the laws of our
being, especially to moral law. The reason has its ideas of the intrinsically
and the relatively valuable, of moral law and moral obligation to will the
intrinsically valuable, with the conditions and means to that end. It has
also the idea of the moral rightness and justice of thus willing, and of the
wrongness of selfish willing. It also has the idea of the moral beauty,
fituess, and propriety of benevolence, both as it respects the end upon which
it terminates, and also as it respects the conditions or means by which its
end is to be secured. Hence it has the idea of moral excellence, or of
praise and blameworthiness; and affirms, that the benevolent ought to be at
least ultimately happy , and that of this happiness he cannot be justly
deprived but by his own consent ; that the selfish man who refuses to will
the good of being in general, deserves no good himself; and that on the
contrary, he deserves to be deprived of good, and to be made miserable.
The reason demands that he be made miserable, unless he becomes
benevolent. These ideas are necessarily in the mind of a moral agent.
Now let it be distinctly understood, that the reason affirms the moral obli-
gation of all moral agents to conform their wills to these ideas, and God also
commands the same. This is what is truly meant by moral law, or the law
mature. It is the law of God. It is the authoritative command of God
and of reason, that the will of every moral agent be conformed to these
ideas. This conformity both God and reason affirm to be the indispensable
condition of the ultimate and, highest enjoyment of moral agents.
But this writer, it would seem, sees no way to avoid the conclusions and
errors of the Jesuits, but by assuming that the law of right, justice, &c., is
distinct from, and may be opposed to, the law of benevolence; that therefore
certain things are right or wrong in themselves, as violations of the law of
right, entirely irrespective of their relation to the law of benevolence; that
934 APPENDIX,
certain acts are wrong, such as stealing, fraud, lying, &c., entirely irre-
spective of their relations to the law of benevolence, and only on account of
their being violations of the law of right; and also wholly irrespective of the
ultimate intention or end in view of the mind. He also regards right, and
justice, and truth, &c., as distinct grounds of moral obligation, and conse-
quently he must, if consistent, hold that there are distinct laws of right,
truth, justice, &c.; that is, that these laws are distiuct from the law of
benevolence in such a sense, that benevolence may sometimes be a violation
of the law of right ; that a choice of the highest happiness of being, and an
intention to promote it, and to use the necessary means, may be a viola-
tion of the law of right, of justice, or of truth; and in all such cases, that
benevolence would not be right but wrong. The assumption of this writer
must be, that the law of right, of justice, &c., are distinct moral laws, above
the law of benevolence, in such a sense, that should they ever come into
conflict, as it is supposed they may, the law of benevolence is superseded,
suspended, or limited by the law of right, &c. By taking this ground, he
thinks to avoid the rock upon which the Jesuits have split. To a Jesuit
who should affirm the lawfulness of sacrificing truth, right, justice, to pro-
mote the highest good or happiness, he would reply : Stay, this thing is
wrong, or right, or just in itself; and therefore right, or wrong, or just,
whether the law of benevolence requires or prohibits it. Or he would say,
God commands or forbids it, “therefore it is right or wrong, whatever the
intention may be.” But suppose the Jesuit should make right his end, or
truth, or justice ; and assume, that these are distinct grounds of moral
obligation, as this writer does, and should say, right, or truth, or justice,
requires that such and such things should be done, whether the law of be-
nevolence requires them or not ; and therefore they are right or wrong in
themselves, and the law of benevolence must be limited and suspended ?
that sin deserves punishment—and must be punished—it is right, per se, and
therefore forgiveness is wrong, per se—and thus set aside the plan of salva-
tion 2 The fact is, the true and only proper answer to the Jesuit is, that
the law of benevolence includes the law of right, and truth, and justice, &c.;
that these are not distinct laws, that may come into collision with each
other; that truthfulness, and justice, and righteousness, are only attributes
of benevolence; that is, they are only benevolence contemplated in its
relations to moral law ; that benevolence can never sacrifice right, nor
right benevolence, for one is only an attribute of the other,
But since this writer assumes, that there are divers foundations or
grounds of moral obligation, and since his whole error may be traced to
this assumption, it is necessary to enter upon an examination of this sub-
ject. This question I have discussed at length in the work under review:
but this writer has not replied to my argument; and as I have said, for
this reason I have doubted the propriety of my replying at all to his
assumptions. A sufficient refutation of his assumption, that there are
divers grounds of moral obligation, might be quoted verbatim from the
APPENDIX. 935
work reviewed. But it would occupy too much room for our article. I
will therefore condense as much as possible the substance of the argument
upon that subject, as far as is necessary to reply to this reviewer.
1. Let it be remembered, that the present inquiry respects acts of will,
since to no other can the objection arising out of the perversion of the
Jesuits apply.
2. Let it be remembered also, that this writer admits, that all intelligent
acts of will are either choices or yolitions; that is, that they consist in the
choice of an end, or of means and volitions to secure an end.
3. He also admits, that in respect to acts of will, moral obligationbelongs
strictly only to the choice of an end, or to the ultimate intention. In this
all schools must agree. The moral law or laws, then, so far as acts of will
are concerned, must be laws of choice or of ultimate intention ; the ultimate
intention or choice always implying the choice of all the appropriate
conditions and means of Securing the end upon which it terminates.
4. Moral law and moral obligation respect the choice of an ultimate
end, or of something for its own sake, or for what it is in and of itself, and
for the reason that it is what it is.
5. It is plain, therefore, that the ground of the obligation must be found
in the thing itself, which is to be chosen for its own sake. That is, it
must be worthy of being chosen for what it is, in and of itself. The thing
of itself must be such as to impose obligation to choose it, by virtue of its
OWI) Inature.
6. A ground or foundation of moral obligation, then, must be that which,
upon condition of moral agency, can and does impose obligation of itself,
to choose itself as an ultimate end.
7. That which is a ground of moral obligation, must impose obligation
under all circumstances; that is, its own nature being such that it ought
to be chosen for its own sake, it always and necessarily imposes obligation
upon a moral agent to choose it as an ultimate end. It can never be
wrong, but always right to choose it.
8. Moral law is the rule that requires this ultimate end, or, if there be
more than one, these ultimate ends to be chosen for their own sake.
Observe; moral obligation, it is admitted, so far as acts of the will are con-
cerned, respects only ultimate intention, or the choice of an ultimate end,
or of something for its own sake, together with the condition and means of
securing it. This something must be of such a nature, as to be worthy of
being chosen for its own sake. This nature enforces the obligation to
choose it. The law is the affirmation of God and of reason, that the thing
ought to be chosen for its own sake. Let it then be distinctly borne in
mind, that there can be no moral law enforcing obligation to choose an
ultimate end, except the nature of the end be such as to deserve to be
chosen for its own sake; and all moral law does and must require the
choice of anything as an ultimate end for this reason, that is, for its
own sake.
9. It is admitted, that the intrinsically valuable must be a ground of
936 - APPENDLX.
moral obligation. To deny this were to deny a first-truth ; for by the
valuable we mean that which is a good to being, something that is worthy
of being chosen for its own sake —and is it not Self-evident, that what is
Worthy of being chosen for its own sake, ought to be so chosen, ash as
been said.
10. It is admitted also, that enjoyment is intrinsically valuable, and
therefore that it is a ground of moral obligation; that is, that it imposes
obligation on a moral agent, to choose it as an ultimate good or end;—that
therefore it is always duty to intend or choose the highest enjoyment of the
Whole universe as an end; also to use the necessary means to that end.
ll. It is admitted, that entire consecration to this end is virtue ; that
is, that it is always right to be entirely consecrated to the promotion of the
highest glory of God, and the highest well-being of the universe. Now the
enquiry before us is, can there be any other ground of moral obligation ?
any other end than the valuable to being, which ought to be chosen for its
own sake 2 Anything else than the valuable, that can of itself impose
obligation to choose it for its own sake? The writer, whose views we are
examining, must hold, that there are other ultimate ends or grounds of
moral obligation, other things than the intrinsically valuable to being, that
can of themselves not only impose obligation, but can set aside the law of
benevolence, as has been said. He thinks, by this assumption, to avoid
the rock upon which the Jesuits have split. He holds, that the will of God
is a ground or foundation of obligation, and complains of me for denying it.
If the will of God be a foundation of obligation, then it can, upon the con-
ditions of moral agency, impose obligation of itself. But moral obligation
in our present inquiry respects acts of will, and the choice of an ultimate
end. Now, what is the ultimate end which the will of God alone can
impose obligation to choose 2 Observe, an ultimate end is something
chosen for its own sake; not for a reason out of itself, but for a reason
Within itself; that is, for its own nature. If the will of God can be a
foundation of obligation to choose an ultimate end, that end must be the
will of God itself. But this is absurd. It is a contradiction to affirm,
that the will of God is the ground, or a ground of obligation to choose any
ultimate end whatever; for the ground of the obligation must be, the
mature and intrinsic value of the end itself. God requires us to will his
good. Now are we to will good to him because of its own value to him, or
because he commands it 2 If his will is the reason or ground of the obli-
gation, or a ground of the obligation that could of itself impose obligation,
then if he should command us to will evil to him as an ultimate end, we
should be under obligation to obey. In this case obligations would be
opposites, and of course opposite duties would exist. The well-being of
God is intrinsically and infinitely valuable ; and for that reason it is
unalterably right to will it. But if God's will can of itself impose obli-
gation to will an ultimate end, and should he command us to will evil
instead of good to him, it would impose a contrary obligation. What
should we love God, or will his good, not because his well-being is infinitely
APPENDIX. 937
valuable, but because he commands it 2 God's will is always authoritative
and imposes obligation, not in the sense of its being a foundation of obli-
gation, but in the sense that it is an infallible declaration of the law of
mature, or of the end at which, in the nature of things, moral agents ought
to aim, and of the conditions or means of this end. But this writer
admits that it is not the arbitrary will of God which, except in some cases,
is a ground or foundation of obligation. He says, pages 264, 5 —
“Mr. Finney’s book is made up of half-truths. It is true that the will of God, divorced
from his infinite wisdom and excellence, mere arbitrary will, is not the foundation of moral
obligation. But the preceptive will of God is but the revelation of his nature, the ex-
pression of what that nature is, sees to be right, and approves. It is also true, that some
things are right because God wills or commands them, and that he wills other things
because they are right. Some of his precepts, therefore, are founded on his own immu-
table nature, others on the peculiar relations of man, and others again upon his simple
command. We can have no higher evidence that a thing is right, than the command of
God, and his command creates an obligation to obedience, whether we can see the reason
of the precept or not, or whether it have any reason apart from his good pleasure. Mr.
Finney is right, so far as saying that the will of God, considered as irrational, groundless
volition, is not the ultimate ſoundation of moral obligation, but his will as the revelation
of the infinitely perfect nature of God, is not merely the rule, but ground of obligation
to his creatures.”
What does he mean by the preceptive will of God being the revelation
of his nature, the expression of what that mature is, and sees to be right and
approves 2 If this has any meaning, it is only another way of expressing
the very doctrine of the book he was reviewing ; but being thrown into this
mystical form, it conceals the fact that he agrees with me. I said, that the
moral law had its foundation in the nature of God, and is an idea, externally
existing in the divine reason, of the course of willing that is obligatory
upon him, and upon all moral agents; and that the expression of this law
by commandment imposes obligation upon us, not fundamentally because
God wills it, for this course of willing would be obligatory upon us if God
forbade it; but his will imposes obligation for the reason, that it is an
infallible declaration of what infinite intelligence sees to be right. Law is
given by the intellect, and not by the will of any being. Will may express
and declare it, as God's will does But his reason gives the law to himself
and to us. It is the Divine Reason and mot the Divine will, that perceives
and affirms the rule of conduct. The Divine will publishes, but does not
Originate the rule. Cannot this writer see this 2 It is true, as he says,
pages 264—5.
“We can have no higher evidence that a thing is right, than the command of God, and
his command creates an obligation to obedience, whether we can see the reason of the pre-
cept or not.”
To be sure we can have no higher evidence, and need no other; and this
evidence alone imposes obligation, whether we are able to see the reason
for the command or not, because our own reason affirms that he must have
some good reason for the requirement, although we are unable to see what
it is. But when this writer adds, that “it would be obligatory whether it
have any reason apart from his good pleasure,” it is not true, if by good
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APPENDIX. 939
and do. The will of God then is not the foundation of obligation in such
a sense as to impose obligation, irrespective of its being founded in any
good reason. But if God wills as he does because he has a good reason so
to will, then that reason must be the foundation of the obligation ; and the
assumption that there is a good reason for the divine command, is the con-
dition both of the obligation, and of our affirming obligation to obey.
But before I leave this point, let me remind you of the intrinsic absurdity
of the will of God being the foundation of obligation to choose any ultimate
end besides the will of God itself. What a moral agent bound to choose
something for its own sake, or because of its intrinsic nature and value, yet
not for this reason, but because God commands it ! That is, God com-
mands men to will it as an ultimate end, or for its own Sake, yet not for
this reason, but because he wills that they should will it ! Or, he com-
mands me to will it for its own sake, and also because he wills it. Now if
his command be a distinct ground of moral obligation, it would follow, that
should he command me to will it as an ultimate end, I should be under
obligation to do so, irrespective of its intrinsic value, even if it were an
ultimate evil instead of a good. But this is absurd and impossible. God's
will then can never be a moral law distinct from the law of benevolence.
God is always benevolent, and can never will anything inconsistent with
benevolence; and until recently I did not know that anybody would now
deny, that every moral attribute of God is a modification of benevolence.
But to be consistent, this reviewer must deny it. Benevolence has been
regarded, and I suppose justly, as comprising the whole of God’s moral
character, and his different moral attributes as only modifications of bene-
volence, or as only benevolence contemplated in different relations. But if
this writer is correct, it must follow that this is all a mistake. But if this
is a mistake, the gospel Surely is false, that represents God as love, and his
moral attributes as all harmonizing and limiting the exercise of each other :
justice as limiting the exercise of mercy, and mercy as limiting the exercise
of justice. But if these attributes are not modifications of benevolence,
it is impossible and inconceivable that this limitation should take place ;
for unless the law of benevolence is to decide when mercy or justice is to
be exercised, no possible rule of limitation can exist.
But to come to the enquiry, are there distinct grounds of moral obliga.
tion, and consequently distinct moral laws; for example:—Is right a
distinct ground of moral obligation ? Remember, that moral obligation
respects the choice of an ultimate end, or of something for its own sake.
If right is a ground of moral obligation, it must, upon condition of moral
agency, impose obligation of itself, and invariably impose it. And more-
over, the obligation must be to choose right itself as the end, for the reason
or the ground of the obligation to choose an ultimate end, must be found
in the end itself. But what is right, that it ought to be chosen as an
ultimate end ? Right is objective or subjective. Objective right is a mere
abstraction, or a nidea of the fit, the suitable ; and of that choice which is
subjectively right, or which constitutes virtue. Can this abstraction impose
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APPENDIX. 94 |
can be of no possible value in itself, in preference to that which is infinitely
valuable 2 Impossible that this should be obligatory. If you reply, that no
case can occur in which objective right, or in which these supposed laws or
precepts can come into conflict, you not only deny that they are distinct
grounds of moral obligation, and distinct moral laws or precepts, but you fail
utterly in making out your attempted reply to the Jesuit. If whatever is
demanded by the law of benevolence must be demanded by the law of God,
of right, of justice, &c., then the Jesuit turns upon you and says, this is
plainly demanded by the law of benevolence, and therefore it must be right
and just, &c., for these can never conflict with each other. This you admit
upon the last made supposition. Now, where is your pretended answer to
the Jesuits? Should you say, that although the law of right and the law of
benevolence can never come into conflict, yet sometimes we are to be guided
be the law of right instead of the law of benevolence, because we can tell
what is right, but cannot, in a given case, tell what is demanded by the law
of benevolence—should you say thus, you would talk nonsense. Both the law
of right and the law of benevolence, if there be two such laws, have respect
to, and demand certain ultimate intentions, and neither of them regards
anything as right but these intentions, and those volitions that proceed and
receive their character from them. If therefore you would know what is
right, the law of right must answer, to will the right as an ultimate end, and
the conditions and means of promoting this end. But this were nonsense.
The law of benevolence must answer, to will the good as an ultimate end,
and the conditions and means of promoting it, is right. You can therefore
always as infallibly know what is right by reference to the law of bene-
volence, as by reference to the law of right. If these laws cannot come into
conflict, it is always right and always safe to will the good, and in so doing
you always will right. But to suppose the laws can come into conflict,
involves an absurdity and a contradiction. Whenever one supposes himself
to know what right demands, better than he knows what the law of benevo-
lenee demands, he is deceived. In the supposition, he supposes that there
is a law of right distinct from, and which may be opposed to the law of
benevolence, which is not true. And again. In the supposition he, is conceiving
of moral obligation and moral character as belonging to some particular act,
and not to the ultimate intention. It is common to hear people loosely say,
I know that such and such a thing is right or wrong, when they can have
respect only to the outward act, or to the volition that caused it; or, to say
the most that can truly be said, they make the affirmation only of the proxi-
mate, and not of the ultimate intention. But it is certain, that if they affirm
right or wrong of acts of will, without regard to ultimate intention, they
deceive themselves; for with respect to acts of will at least, it is admitted,
that right and wrong can strictly be predicated only of ultimate intention.
But if we are to look to the ultimate intention for right and wrong, and
if executive volitious receive their character from the ultimate intention,
then we can always as certainly tell what is right or wrong by reference to
the law of benevolence, as by reference to the law of right, if there be two
942 APPENDIX.
moral laws. For suppose we would know what is right by consulting the
law of right, the answer is, to intend the right as an end is right; and
all volitions and actions proceeding from this intention, receive their cha-
racter from this intention. Should we enquire what is right by consulting
the law of benevolence, the answer would be, to will the good or the
intrinsically valuable to being as an end, is always right; and all the voli-
tions and actions which proceed from this intention receive their character
from the intention. We can in no case decide what is right or wrong without
reference to the ultimate intention, for in this all moral character properly
resides. But if the end or the intention is right, whatever the end may
be supposed to be, whether it be abstract right, or justice, or the will of
God, or the valuable if the intention be right, the executive volitions and
acts must be right as proceeding from a right intention. So that whatever
be supposed to be the foundation of moral obligation, if it be granted, as
it must be, that obligation respects ultimate intention, and that executive
volitions and acts receive their character from the ultimate intention, it
follows : —
1. That we can tell as well what is rightin anyone case as in any other; and,
2. That the doctrine lies equally open to the perversion of the Jesuits,
or to any one who is wicked enough to abuse it; and,
3. That nothing is gained in replying to the Jesuits, or to those who
would abuse the doctrine of intention, by assuming that there are divers
grounds of moral obligation.
But since this writer will have it, that the will of God is the foundation
of moral obligation, let us see how the supposed different moral precepts
would read, upon the supposition that the will of God is the foundation of
the obligation to obey them. Take first the law of right. This law, if there
be such an one separate from the law of benevolence says: Will the right as
an ultimate end, that is, for its own sake. Now, if the will of God is the
foundation of the obligation to obey this law, it should read thus: “will
the right for its own sake; yet not for this reason, but because God com-
mands it.” If God's will of itself, instead of the nature of right, makes it
obligatory and right to will the right, then should he will the direct oppo.
site, it would make that right and duty.
The same is true of justice. Suppose there be a distinct moral law
requiring justice. This law must require, that the just should be willed as
an ultimate end, or for its own sake. But if the will of God be the ground
of the obligation to obey this law, it would read: “will the just, not for the
sake of the just, but because God wills that you should will the just.” Or
suppose God's will is a distinct ground of obligation in such a sense, that it
could of itself impose obligation to will the right or the just, irrespective of
the nature of right, or justice, which it must be, to be a ground of obliga-
tion at all, it would follow, that should God will that I should choose the
direct opposite, it would impose obligation. The same is and must be true,
whatever we suppose to be the end required to be chosen. Unless the will
of God itself be the end to be chosen, it can never be the ground, or
APPENDIX. 943
foundation, or a ground of obligation to will it. The ground, and
the only ground of the obligation to will anything whatever as an ulti-
mate end. must be found in and be identical with the end itself. God
requires it because it is obligatory in its own nature, and his will is only a
declaration of the law of his own reason respecting it. The divine reason
sees it to be right, fit, and suitable, and therefore the divine will publishes
the affirmation of the divine reason, and pronounces the sentence of the
divine reason against disobedience. It has been so long customary to talk
loosely in reference to the foundation of moral obligation, and to speak of
God as an arbitary sovereign whose will alone is law, without so much as
assuming that he has any good reason for his requirements, or without once
thinking that his own will is under the law of his infinite reason, and that
his commands are nothing else than the revelation of the decisions of the
infinite intelligence:—I say, it has been so long customary for theologians to
talk and write loosely upon this subject, that now if we introduce a rigid
inquiry into this matter, what this writer would call the pious feeling of
many are shocked. But it is their prejudices, and not their piety, that are
shocked, unless their piety consists in the belief of error.
Nor is the divine reason the ground of obligation. It gives law to God
and to us. It declares that we ought to will the good for the sake of the
good, or because it is good, and not because the divine will or the divine
reason requires it. Law is never itself the ground of obligation. It only
discloses, declares, or reveals the ground of obligation, and affirms the obli-
gation with the sanctions that enforce it, and is in no case itself the ground
or foundation of the obligation. Law is always a condition, but never
a ground of obligation ; so that where there is no law there is no obliga-
tion. But law never is nor can be the ground of obligation. But all this
and much more is contained in the work in question, and I am doing little
else than re-writing the arguments to which the reviewer has made no reply.
The fact is, his review is rather, for the most part, an appeal to loose preju-
dices than to reason or revelation, as any one may see by a thorough exa-
miuation, both of the review and of the work reviewed. I do not in thus
saying intend to impeach his motives ; for he has himself been so long
accustomed to a certan way of thinking and speaking, that he really feels
shocked at the conclusions of my work as he understands them, and speaks
as he feels. I cannot deny, however, that there is in his review, an appear.
ance at least, of a disposition to excite a public prejudice against the work
reviewed.
But can virtue or subjective right be a ground of moral obligation 2
What is it? Observe, we are now inquiring, not whether it can be a ground
of obligation to exercise certain emotions; but whether it can be a ground
of obligation to choose an ultimate end. If it can, it must impose obliga.
tion to choose itself as an ultimate end; for the ground of the obligation to
choose anything as an ultimate end, must be found in, and be identical with
the end itself.
Now whether there be virtue separate from choice or not, it is admitted
944 APPENDIX.
that the choice of the highest good of being is virtuous. That is, either
the choice itself is virtue, or virtue is the moral attribute or quality of this
choice. Hence, I remark:—
1. One's own present virtue cannot be a ground of moral obligation,
for in this case his obligation must be to choose either his own present
choice, or an attribute of his own choice as an end, which is absurd. If
his virtue consists in the choice of good, or of right, or of anything, to
choose his own virtue as an ultimate end, were to choose his own choice as
an ultimate end, instead of choosing the right or the good, without regard
to any other end, which is absurd. Observe, if virtue consists in the choice
of an end, and if it be a foundation or ground of obligation, it can of itself
impose obligation to choose itself, without any other reason. But can a
present choice be its own end or object? Impossible. But suppose virtue
be regarded as the moral attribute or quality of choice ; then if it can be a
ground of moral obligation, the quality of a present choice can impose
obligation to will it, irrespective of any other end, or thing chosen. This,
again, is absurd ; for it is not possible to regard the quality of a present or
a proposed choice as a sufficient ground of obligation to make it, and as
constituting the only object of choice. But if it be a ground of obligation,
it must impose obligation by itself, to choose itself as an ultimate end.
The moral quality of a present choice, an end which of itself imposes
obligation to choose itself as an ultimate | If this is not absurd, what is 2
2. I remark, that our future virtue cannot be a distinct ground of moral
obligation. For if it can, it must impose obligation to will itself as an
ultimate end. But my future virtue must consist, either in choosing an
ultimate end, or in the quality of that choice. If it consists in future
choice, then I am under present obligation to choose a future choice for its
own sake, and wholly irrespective of any other end whatever. If you say,
that virtue consists in the choice of good or of the right, and I am bound
to choose the future choice of the good or the right, because this choice is
virtuous, I ask, Is the choice virtuous because of the end on which it ter-
minates ? Then it is the end that gives character to the choice, and it is
not the choice, but the end, upon which it terminates that imposes the
obligation. If you say, the choice is to be chosen for its own sake irre-
spective of the end, then the choice is to terminate on choice as an end,
without regard to any other end. If you say that the choice is to be chosen,
or imposes obligation to choose itself, only because it terminates on a certain
end, then it must be the end on which the future choice is to terminate,
that imposes the obligation to choose this choice. But if you say, that I
am under obligation to choose both the end and the choice upon which it
is to terminate as ultimates, this is the same as to say, that the choice
itself without regard to its end, can impose obligation to choose itself as an
ultimate end ; this is absurd. But suppose virtue to consist in the moral
quality, or attribute of future choice. If this quality can impose obligation
to will or choose itself as an ultimate end, it can do so irrespective of all
other ends. But the quality of this choice depends entirely upon the end
APPENIDIX. 945
chosen. If it can impose obligation, it must be to choose itself for its own
sake, and not for any other reason. But what it is, in and of itself,
depends altogether upon the end upon which the choice of which it is a
quality terminates. It is therefore impossible and absurd to say, that a
quality of present or of a future choice, should of itself be a ground of
obligation to choose it as an ultimate end.
3. The same is true, if we regard the present or future virtue of any
other being than ourselves as a ground or foundation of moral obligation.
It matters not at all what we regard as the ultimate end upon which choice
ought to terminate, whether it be happiness or objective right or virtue;
the virtuousness of choosing this end can never of itself impose obligation
to make this choice; and to affirm that it can, is to affirm that the virtuous-
mess of a choice can impose obligation to make the choice, without regard to
the end, the nature of which end alone can make the choice virtuous.
Why, if the virtue of a choice depends wholly on the nature of the end
upon which it terminates, it is absurd and ridiculous to say, that the virtue
of the choice can alone impose obligation to choose it as an ultimate end.
But surely I have proceeded far enough in this discussion to show, that
mothing is gained in replying to the Jesuits, by assuming that there are
divers independent grounds of moral obligation, and consequently, divers
moral laws. For if the supposition be admitted that there are, either these
laws may come into conflict or they cannot. If they can, who will say that
the law of benevolence shall yield to the law of right; or that it can be a
duty to will abstract right as an end, rather than the highest well-being of
God and the universe 2 But if these supposed moral laws cannot come
into conflict, why then the Jesuit will of course reply, that it is and must
be always right to will the highest well-being or good of God and the uni-
verse, with the necessary conditions and means; and therefore the end, or
the intention, must give character to and Sanctify the means. Or again:
suppose that there be divers ultimate ends or grounds of moral obligation,
he would tell you that in the pursuit of any one of these, the end or inten-
tion sanctifies the means, so that nothing is gained so far as avoiding the
perversion of the Jesuits is concerned, by assuming that there are divers
grounds of moral obligation, and of course divers moral laws. And the
same is true, whether it be admitted or denied, that these ends or laws
can come into conflict.
The fact is, that the assumption that there are divers independent
grounds of moral obligation, each of which cam impose obligation of itself,
is a mistake; and when men think that there are, it is only because they
have lost sight of the fact, that moral obligation is strictly predicable only
of ultimate intention, or of the choice of something for its own sake.
Nothing can be thus chosen but the intrinsically valuable to being, and
therefore there can be no other ground of moral obligation, but that which
is intrinsically valuable. This is, and must be, the sole ground of moral
obligation ; for the plain reason, that it is naturally impossible to choose
anything else as an ultimate end. This writer admits, that it is a first
3 P
946 - APPENDIX.
truth of reason, that enjoyment is valuable in itself, and ought to be chosen
for this reason. This has the characteristics of a first truth; all men
practically admit, that enjoyment is a good per se.
But suppose this writer to take the ground, which, in fact, I understand
him to take, that there may be divers grounds of moral obligation in respect
to one and the same intention. Suppose he should say, that although there
cannot be divers grounds of obligation in such a sense that they can come
into conflict, yet there may be several distinct and consistent grounds of
obligation in respect to the same act. He says, page 266:—
“It is one of Mr. Finney's hobbies that the ground of obligation must be one and simple.
If it is the will of God, it is not his moral excellence; if his moral excellence, it is not his
will. This however may be safely referred to the common judgment of men. They are
conscious, that even entirely distinct grounds of obligation may occur; as the mature of the
thing commanded, the authority of him who gives the command, and the tendency of what
is enjoined.”
Here this writer affirms, what I have above supposed, namely, that there
are distinct grounds of moral obligation in respect to one and the same act.
The mature of the thing commanded—the authority of him who gives the
command, and the tendency of what is enforced. These, he says, are dis-
tinct grounds of moral obligation ; of course he must mean in respect to
orſe and the same act. This is a common error. I will therefore spend a
moment upon it. Here let it be remembered, that we are discoursing of
acts of will, and of ultimate choice or intention; for, as this writer agrees,
and as all must agree, so far as acts of will are concerned, strictly speaking,
moral obligation belongs only to the ultimate choice or intention. If
therefore there can be several distinct grounds of moral obligation respect-
ing the same act, it must be, that there are divers distinct grounds of moral
obligation to make an ultimate choice or intention. But the absurdity of
this will appear, if we consider, that the choice of an ultimate end consists
in choosing it for its own sake, and not for some other reason. Now, sup-
pose that there are the following distinct grounds of moral obligation to
will the well-being of God and the universe.
l. The intrinsic value of the end.
2. The will or authority of God.
3. The utility, and—
4. The rightness of thus willing.
Now, be it remembered, that a ground of moral obligation must be
something which upon certain conditions can impose obligation of itself,
without the existence of any other ground of obligation. The intrinsic
value of the end named is a ground of moral obligation, and is seen by all
men instantly and necessarily to impose obligation. But can the will of
God alone in this case impose obligation ? Should he command me to
choose his well-being as all ultimate end, would this impose obligation to
do so, entirely irrespective of the value of the end ? No; for it were a
contradiction and an impossibility to make this choice in obedience to his
will, irrespective of the value of the end. But for the value of the end, his
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948 APPENDIX.
mand me to put forth any act whatever, and should inform me that there
was no reason for it whatever, but his arbitrary will; that he had mo reason
for giving the command, and I had nome for obedience, except his arbitrary
will;-would this impose obligation ? No; I say again, we can affirm our
obligation only as we assume, that God has in fact a good reason for all his
requirements, whether we can understand what they are or not. Observe,
I expressly maintain, that the command of God always imposes obligation
without the knowledge of any other reason; but it does this upon the
ground of an affirmation of reason, that he has a good reason for the com-
mand, whether we can understand it or not.
But I have dwelt enough at length on this part of the subject, my
object being only to show, that the great objection of this writer to my
views, lies as really and as fully against himself, and against all others as
against me; and that he does not avoid the difficulty by the assumption,
that there are divers distinct grounds of moral obligation: and that there is
in fact no way of replying to this objection, but that in which I have replied
both here and in the book reviewed.
I must remark very briefly, upon what this writer calls my second
fundamental principle, to wit, that mental satisfaction, enjoyment, bless-
edness, or happiness, is the ultimate good of being. I did not assume this
as true, but showed, as I think, conclusively, that this follows irresistibly
from the first truth, that obligation is limited by ability. This writer has
not replied at all to my argument in support of the position now to be
examined, which has led me to doubt whether I should reply at all to his
strictures upon this point. As it is, nothing more can be expected of me
than a condensation of the argument in support of this position: when it is
replied to, it will be in time either for me to yield the point, or enter into a
fuller vindication of it. I assumed as a first truth, that obligation must
imply a possibility of obedience. This I now, in view of what has been
said, take as established. If obligation is limited by ability, it follows, as
this writer concedes, that all obligation must strictly and properly belong
to ultimate intention, or to the choice of an ultimate end, with all the
necessary conditions and means of securing it. This end must be some-
thing chosen for what it is, in and of itself; that is, it must be regarded by
the mind as intrinsicically valuable to being, and chosen for that reason.
Nothing can be so regarded but a state of mind, that is, the ultimate good
of God and of all beings, must be something existing within the field of
consciousness, that of which a being can be conscious. I insist, that this
ultimate good must be enjoyment alone. This my reviewer denies. Now,
we are agreed, that in so far as acts of will are concerned, obligation is
strictly predicable only of the choice of an ultimate end, or of something
which the mind regards as a good, or as intrinsically valuable in itself,
together with the necessary conditions and means. I insist, that this end
is enjoyment alone. He admits that enjoyment is an ultimate good, and
that this is a first truth, and that it ought to be chosen for its own sake.
But he also insists, that moral excellence is also a good in itself, and that
APPENDIX. 749
it ought to be chosen as an ultimate end; and that this is also a first truth,
This I deny. We are agreed, then, that enjoyment is an ultimate good.
The only question between us here is, Is moral excellence also an ultimate
good? He says, page 265 —
“Our author denies, that the divine moral excellence is the ground of moral obligation.
This he pronounces to be absurd. Moral obligation respects the choice of an ultimate end.
The reason of the obligation and the end chosen must be identical. Therefore, what is
chosen as an end, must be chosen for its own sake. But virtue, being chosen as a means to
an end, viz. enjoyment, cannot be the end chosen. This of course follows from the principle,
that enjoyment is the only intrinsic good, the only thing that should be chosen for its own
sake, and other things only as they are the means or conditions of attaining that end.
We should like to ask, however, how Mr. Finney knows that happiness is a good, and a
good in itself to be chosen for its own sake 2 If he should answer, that is a first truth of
reason; is it not a first truth of reason, that moral excellence is a good, and a far higher
good to be chosen for its own sake It is degraded and denied, if it be chosen simply as a
means of enjoyment. If the moral idea of excellence is not a primary, independent one,
then we have no moral nature, we have a sentient and rational nature; a capacity for en-
joyment, and the power of perceiving and adapting means to its attainment.”
This writer here, as elsewhere, confounds virtue with moral excellence.
I have distinguished between them. I hold that moral excellence consists
in character, and is not a state of mind, but only a result of a state of mind.
Since the ultimate good must consist in a state of mind, and since the
moral character of a being is not a state of mind, but the result of moral
action, moral excellence cannot be an ultimate good. I think it is plain,
that this writer regards virtue, which he confounds with moral excellence,
an an ultimate good. To this I have two objections:—
1. That it is impossible, as has been shown, that virtue should be chosen
as an ultimate end ; and,
2. That virtue is an ultimate good, and is so regarded by moral agents,
is not, and cannot be, a first truth of reason.
1. Virtue cannot be chosen as an ultimate end. Virtue, in so far as
acts of will are concerned, it is admitted, is either identical with, or is a
quality of ultimate choice. It either consists in that choice which the law
requires, or is a quality of it. It is either identical with obedience to law,
or is a quality of obedience. Now, it is ridiculous to say, that the required
choice is identical with the end chosen. The law requires the choice of an
ultimate end. Can this end be identical with the choice of it? The choice
and the end chosen identical This is monsense. But suppose virtue be
regarded, not as identical with choice, but as the moral attribute or quality
of ultimate choice. But the virtue of choice depends upon the end chosen.
Can that end be the quality of the choice itself? The choice terminating
on a quality of itself, which quality depends upon, and owes its existence
to, the nature of the end chosen. But this end is the quality which has no
existence until the end is chosen. Who does not see that ultimate choice
must terminate on some valuable end out of itself, which end gives charac-
ter to the choice.
But can we not choose the virtue of another being as an ultimate end ?
No ; for his virtue is either identical with his choice of an ultimate end, or
950 APPENDIX.
is a quality of that choice. If identical with it, to choose his virtue as an
ultimate end, were to choose his choice as an ultimate end instead of
choosing the end that he ought to choose. If virtue consists in choosing
the virtue of other beings as an ultimate end, it amounts to this: If virtue
be identical with choice, I must will that another should will that another
should will, and so on, ad infinitum, without any end willed in any case
except the willing of another —all willing in an everlasting circle.
If virtue be regarded merely as a quality of choice, then I am to will the
quality of another's choice, of the quality of another's choice, of the quality
of another's choice, and so on for ever. But this quality depends upon the
end chosen. Unless the choice terminate on an intrinsically valuable end,
or on the right end, the choice is not virtuous. But in the case supposed.
the end is nothing but the quality of another's choice, and this quality of
the other's choice depends upon the end he chooses. But he chooses only
the quality of another's choice, and so on to infinity. This is ridiculous
enough. But there is no escaping this absurdity, if virtue is to be regarded
as an ultimate good, to be chosen for its own sake. It is plain that virtue
cannot be an object of ultimate choice ; and therefore cannot be an ultimate
good, and a foundation of moral obligation. The ultimate good, must consist
in a state of mind. All states of mind are voluntary or involuntary. A
voluntary state we have just seen, cannot be chosen as an ultimate end.
The ultimate good then must be an involuntary state of mind. But no
involuntary state of mind can be an ultimate good, but enjoyment. This
everybody knows to be an ultimate good. After this all are seeking, either
selfishly or benevolently. This is the ultimate, the end at which all moral
agents aim. The selfish aim at their own personal enjoyment; that is,
they seek enjoyment selfishly. Benevolent beings aim at promoting the
highest ultimate enjoyment of all, or as many as possible.
2. I deny that it is a first truth of reason that virtue is an ultimate good.
This has not the characteristic of a first truth. A first truth is necessarily
and universally known and practically assumed by all men, whether they
admit or deny it in theory. But all men do not assume that virtue is an
ultimate good. We have seen that it cannot be chosen as an ultimate end,
and of course it cannot be a first truth of reason that it is an ultimate good.
All moral agents do regard virtue as a good, and as a great good, but not
as an ultimate good. It is a good of infinite value, but it is only a relative
good. It is the condition of the infinite blessedness of God, and therefore
infinitely valuable. It is the condition of blessedness in all moral agents,
and therefore as really valuable as their blessedness ; but it is not an ulti-
mate good. Its value is relative, and not ultimate. Hence ultimate good
is that blessedness in which virtue naturally and governmentally results.
Moral agents, from the laws of their being, cannot but approve of virtue.
Holy beings delight in it for its own sake. It is morally beautiful and
lovely, and the contemplation of it gives a sweet satisfaction and pleasure
to the mind of a holy being. Hence we say, we love it for its own sake ;
and so we do if by love we mean delight. But to delight in a thing for its
APPENDIX. 951
own sake, is not the same as choosing it for its own sake. Delight is not
choice. Virtue is delighted in for its own sake. but we have seen that it
cannot be chosen for its own sake. We are apt to call that a good in itself
which we are conscious of delighting in, without considering that the de-
light is really the ultimate good, and not that which gives delight. I
contemplate physical or moral beauty; I experience a sweet enjoyment in
the contemplation. Now I may call the beauty which I enjoy a good,
per se, but I talk loosely. It is not the beauty, but the enjoyment that is
the good, per se; beauty is only a relative and not the ultimate good. This
is the fact with virtue. It is morally and exquisitely beautiful. God and all
holy beings enjoy the exercise and the contemplation of it. Men are wont
to confound the cause of the enjoyment with the enjoyment itself, and to
speak of holiness or virtue as a good in itself. But suppose that moral
agents had no pleasure at all in it; suppose it was not to them a beautiful
object; suppose that its contemplation did not excite the least feeling,
desire, or emotion of any kind; suppose it were contemplated as a pure act
of will, or as a moral quality of choice, and that we were so constituted as
to experience not the least pleasure in the contemplation, or that it did not
satisfy any demand of our being; could it be regarded as a good in itself,
or as a good in the sense of valuable at all 2 But if it were not regarded
either as relatively or intrinsically valuable, we could not affirm obligation
to choose it at all. We know nothing as valuable except upon condition of
its relation to the sensibility. But for this faculty, the idea of the valuable
could not exist. All moral agents regard obedience to moral laws as the
condition of moral blessedness; and since they regard blessedness as a good
in itself, they affirm their obligation to fulfil the necessary conditions of
their own blessedness, and to will the blessedness of all other moral agents,
and that they should be virtuous, or do right, as the condition of their
blessedness. Were it not for the relation that virtue is seem to sustaim to
happiness in general, no moral agent would conceive of it as valuable.
Virtue is obedience to moral law. Now, do but consider how ridiculous
it is to assert, that obedience is itself the ultimate good, or end contemplated
by the law 2 Does the law aim, not at the results of obedience as an end,
but at obedience itself as an ultimate end ? Do moral agents, can they
possibly regard obedience itself as the ultimate good P Obedience consists
in choice or willing, and does the law contemplate mere choice, or a quality
of choice, as an ultimate end ? The ultimate good, is that blessedness
promised as the reward of obedience to law. So all moral agents must
regard it, and so they must affirm, when they know what they say, and
whereof they affirm. Obedience to law, the ultimate good, instead of that
which is the end or object of obedience The assertion is ridiculous.
Obedience is not, and cannot be regarded as of any value at all, were it not
for its relation to the end or object to be secured by it. Law is of no value,
except as it is related to the end proposed to be secured by it. So it is
with obligation and with obedience. Obedience to moral law is morally
beautiful; that is, we so regard it by a law of our being, just as we regard
952 APPENDIX.
a rose as naturally beautiful. We have pleasure in both, but the pleasure
and not the beauty, is the ultimate good. The beauty is a good to us, but
it is only a relative good; that is, the beauty is the cause of the enjoyment,
and is valuable for that reason.
Observe, I am not contending that our own personal enjoyment is the
end at which we ought supremely to aim. The precept of the law requires
me to choose as an ultimate end the highest enjoyment of being in general,
and the sanction promises that obedience shall secure my own enjoyment,
and the highest amount of enjoyment in others which can result from my
efforts. It is not partial good-will or self-enjoyment of which I am speaking
as the requirement of the law, nor partial enjoyment which is its end. It
requires the choice of universal good, and aims as far as possible to
secure it.
But in support of the affirmation, that virtue is a good in itself, it may
be said that God requires virtue. Now, does he require it as an end, or as
a means? If as an end, this proves that he regards it as an ultimate good;
if as a means, them this is the doctrine that utility is the foundation of
moral obligation, which my work denies. To this I answer, as in substance
I have before done:—
1. That virtue consists in obedience to moral law, and it is nonsense to
make obedience to moral law an end. The law requires the choice of an
end. Can choice be the end chosen 2 Virtue, strictly speaking, is an attri-
bute of choice, can a quality of the choice be the end chosen But the
quality of the choice depends altogether upon the nature of the end chosen;
the quality does not exist, and cannot therefore be known or conceived of,
until it is settled in regard to the end upon which the choice terminates, or
is to terminate. If this end is valuable in itself, the quality of the choice
is virtue; if the end be not a good per se, the choice has no virtue. Now,
how absurd and nonsensical it is to say, that the quality or virtue of the
choice is the end chosen, when the quality does not exist, except upon con-
dition that something besides itself is chosen as the ultimate end.
2. It is absurd to talk of requiring anything whatever as an ultimate
end. What, require an ultimate end instead of requiring the choice of that
end All requirement respects doing or choosing, but doing or choosing
cannot be an ultimate end. All law or commandment respects, so far at
least as acts of will are concerned, action in reference to some end. Re-
quirement in respect to acts of will at least, must of necessity respect the
choice of an end, or the choice of means to secure an end, and virtue must
be a quality of this required choice. To say that the choice of the end is
required, not for the sake of the end, but for the sake of the quality of the
choice, is to overlook the fact that it is the value of the end alone that gives
quality to the choice. It were strange indeed if the quality of choice which
owes its existence to the value of the end, were of greater intrinsic value
than the end itself; and it is absurd to say that the quality of the choice is
the ultimate end, instead of the end whose value gives the quality to the
choice, But let us come back to the thought that it is an absurdity to
APPENDIX. 953
say, that which is required, the action, choice, should be an ultimate end.
Law, I say again, proposes an end, and requires action in reference to that
end. The thing required is not the end, but action in reference to that
end. Nor can the end be the quality of this required choice or action.
If it be asked, why God or reason demands the choice of the intrinsically
valuable for its own sake, the answer is, God and reason demand the
choice for the sake of the intrinsic value of the end. It is right per se to
choose the valuable for its own sake. Virtue is a quality of this choice.
That is, the choice of the valuable for its own sake is a right choice. God
requires the choice because the end demands it. The rightness of the
choice is a condition of the obligation, but not the foundation of it. It is
the good that is to be chosen as an ultimate end, and not the right or
virtue of the choice; the goodness or value of the end makes the choice
right, but the rightness of the choice does not affect the value of the end.
Choice of which virtue is an attribute, is not demanded as an end, for it
cannot be an end. Ultimate choice is not demanded as a condition or
means. It is demanded by the law of reason and of God, as a thing right
in itself, but not as a thing valuable in itself. Choice respects ends or
means—law requires the choice of an end with the conditions and means.
It requires the choice of the end for its intrinsic value, and of means upon
condition of the perceived tendency to secure the end; but the ground of
the obligation to choose the means is the value of the end. Moral law
them, does not require the choice of which virtue is an attribute as an end.
Nor does it require it as a means, but it requires this choice because of the
value of the end, and upon condition that it is right per se. But if the law
requires this choice upon condition that it is right per se, are we not
to make this choice because it is right per se 2 I answer, no. The thing
is impossible and absurd, for this were to choose the right, and not the
good as an ultimate end. The thing required by the law is to choose the
intrinsically valuable to being for its own sake, or as an end : the law
requires this upon the condition that this is right per se. But I am bound,
not to will the rightness of the choice as an end, or to will the valuable
because it is right thus to will, but for the sake of the valuable. That is,
it is the valuable, and not the right, which I am bound to will.
Unless I will the valuable for its own sake, the choice is not right, for it
is not what the law demands. God requires the choice, then, of which
virtue is a quality, neither as an end nor as a means. The choice required
must terminate on an end, but the choice is not required as an end. The
choice will secure the use of means, but ultimate choice is not required as
8, IN) (28.1].S.
Law does not require ends and means, but the choice of ends and means,
Choice therefore is never demanded as an end or as means, but choice is
required because of the value of the end, and upon condition that the
choice of this end is right per se. The argument to which I am now reply-
ing assumes, that whatever the moral law requires, it requires as an end,
or as a condition or means; whereas the truth is, that the law requires not
954 APPENDIX.
ends and means, but the choice of ends and means. The choice of the
right end, and of the appropriate conditions and means, is virtuous. God
requires the choice, both of the end and the means for the sake of the value
of the end, but upon condition that such choice is right per se. Right,
therefore, is a condition of the requirement, but not the foundation of it;
for were it not for the value of the end, I say again, it would not be right
to choose it, and therefore God could not command us to choose it.
Now, reader, let us see where we are in our argument. Observe, we are
now inquiring into the ultimate ground of obligation, or what is the ulti-
mate good of being. I have asserted, that enjoyment, blessedness, mental
satisfaction, or happiness, is the only ultimate good. My reviewer asserts
that virtue is an ultimate good. Now, what have we seen 2
1. That the ultimate good must consist in a conscious state of mind.
2 That a voluntary state of mind, or a choice or volition, cannot be an
ultimate end, and therefore cannot be an ultimate good.
3. That the ultimate good must consist in an involuntary state of mind,
and in that involuntary state in which all action conformed to law ter-
minates.
4. That this involuntary state is mental satisfaction or happiness.
5. We have seen, that voluntary action cannot be the end aimed at by
law or requirement, but that requirement must always contemplate an end,
and require action or choice in reference to that end ; that this end cannot
be the choice required, nor a quality of this choice.
6. We have also seen, that the will of God cannot be the ultimate good
that is to be chosen for its own sake, that objective right cannot, that virtue
Cannot.
7. That all men give the highest evidence of regarding enjoyment as an
ultimate good.
8. But that they do not, and cannot, understandingly affirm, that virtue
is an ultimate good.
9. That the very idea of regarding choice, or a quality of choice, as an
ultimate good, is absurd and ridiculous. These things are indubitably
established 2 Where then is the foundation upon which this reviewer rests
his criticism 2 “It has vanished into thin air.” He “has laboured in
vain, and spent his strength for nought, and in vain.” We have seem that
what he calls my two main positions or premises, from which he admits that
my conclusions logically follow, are established. Why then does he triumph
and say, new schoolism is fallen 2 Such triumphing is short.
I have already said so much, that I must close this reply with a few
additional words in reference to some of his many, I would hope, unin-
tentional misrepresentations, and perhaps a few sentences respecting some
of the absurdities contained in his review. Some of these last are so gross
and glaring, and withal so heterodox, that it is well for the reviewer that
he does not live in Oberlin. If he did, the well in would ring with the cry
of heresy heresy ! In respect to his misrepresentations I am willing to
ascribe them to misapprehension, and his misapprehensions to his loose habit
APPENIDIX. 955
of thinking on metaphysical and moral subjects, and to his want of rigid
analysis in his theological investigations,
He says, pages 272, 273 —
“Mr. Finney's principles lead him to assert, that there is no difference in their feelings
between the renewed and the unrenewed, the sinner and the saint. ‘The sensibility of the
sinner,’ he says, “is susceptible of every kind and degree of feeling that is possible to saints.’
p. 521. He accordingly goes on to show, that sinners may desire sanctification, delight in
the truth, abhor sin, have complacency in good men, entertain feelings of love and gratitude
to God, and in short, be as to feeling and conduct, exactly what saints are. The only
essential difference is in the will, in their ultimate purpose or intention. The sinner's
u'timate intention may be to promote the glory of God, from a sense of duty, or from ap-
preciation of the loveliness of moral excellence, and he be no better than a pirate ; if his
ultimate end is to promote happiness because happiness is intrinsically valuable, he is
a saint.”
This is a specimen of this writer's reading and criticism. Here he
represents me as holding the ridiculous absurdity, that a sinner's ultimate
intention may be to glorify God from a sense of duty, or from an appre-
ciation of the loveliness of moral excellence ; that is, his ultimate choice or
intention may be to glorify God, and yet this is not chosen as an end for
its own sake, but from a sense of duty, or from an apprehension of the
loveliness of moral excellence. He may choose the glory of God for its
own sake, and yet not for its own sake, but from a sense of duty, &c. This
is a ridiculous contradiction ; and if this writer had understood the book he
was reviewing, he would not have failed to see, that I again and again ex-
pose the very absurdity which he here charges upon me. The thing I hold
is, not that the sinner's ultimate end may be the glory of God, and he be as
wicked as a pirate; but I say, that his ultimate end may be selfish, and yet
he may aim to do his duty as a means of securing his own interest, or he
may be selfish in aiming to promote the glory of God, &c. Self may be his
end, and duty or aiming to glorify God a means. What a gross blunder for
the reviewer to represent me as holding, that the ultimate intention may be
to glorify God, and yet the glory of God not be his end, but duty or some-
thing else be his end, or to represent me as holding, that a man can be
wicked at all when his ultimate end is to glorify God. But as I said, this
is but a specimen of the misrepresentations of this reviewer. The book
was regarded by him as so hard to read, that he reviewed it without taking
pains to understand it, or else he was unqualifiedly wicked in misrepresent-
ing me. I prefer the former supposition. Further: what this writer here
says will make a false impression in other respects. He says, “I assert,
that there is mo difference in their feelings between the renewed and the
unrenewed, the sinner and the saint.” He then quotes from me, that “the
sensibility of the sinner is susceptible of every kind and degree of feeling
that is possible to Saints.” But is this saying what he says I say, that
there is no actual difference in their feelings 2 I said sinners are capable
of feeling as Saints do. Is this saying that they really do feel as saints do?
I say what sinners may feel, that is, what they are susceptible of feeling.
This leads him to say, that I hold that there is no difference in their actual
956 APPENDIX.
feelings. Is not this a misrepresentation of what I say? I will not accuse
this writer of a design to misrepresent, but this, I am sorry to say, looks
like an appeal to prejudice.
Again, page 267 :—
“Mr. Finney's system will not allow him to attach any other meaning to love than
‘good will,' that is, willing good or happiness to any one. Love of God therefore can, accord-
ing to his doctrine, be nothing more than willing his happiness; and this obligation is
entirely independent of his moral excellence. He admits, that his moral goodness is the
condition of our willing his actual happiness, but it is not the ground of our obligation to
love him, or to will his good. As far as our feelings are concerned, there ought to be no
difference between God and Satan, we are bound to will the happiness of each according
to its intrinsic value.”
Here he complains of me for holding, that the ground of our objection to
will the good of God as an ultimate end, is not his moral excellence. He
then holds, that we ought to will the good or well-being of God as an
ultimate end, not for its own sake or value to him, but for his moral excel-
lence. This is again a ridiculous contradiction, that the foundation of the
obligation is not the value of God's happiness to him, but because He is
virtuous. But suppose God were not virtuous, should we be under no
obligation to will his good 2 Are we to will the good of God and of all
beings for its own value, or because they are virtuous 2 I hold that the
intrinsic value of their well-being is the ground of the obligation to will it
as a possible good, and their virtue is a condition of the obligation to will
their present actual blessedness. But he holds, that we ought to will good
to God, not for the sake of its own value to him, but for the sake of his
moral excellence. But this is to will his moral excellence as the ultimate
end, and not the well-being of God. I will the highest blessedness of God
for its own value to him, but I will his actual and perfect blessedness as a
concrete reality upon condition of his moral excellence. But do not over-
look the contradiction involved in what he holds, to wit, that we ought to
will good to God for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, yet not as an
ultimate end, or for its own sake, but for, or on account of, the divine
excellence. The utter looseness of this writer's thoughts upon questions
of this kind, has led him into many truly ridiculous blunders in this review.
But here again he entirely misrepresents me. I say, that we are bound
to will the good of every being according to its relative value, so far as we
understand it ; that Satan's character and governmental relations are such,
that we are not at liberty to do him good or express our benevolence
toward him, but as his well-being is really valuable, we ought to be bene-
volent toward him, or to will his good. And is not this true 2 Have we a
right to be otherwise than benevolent towards any being 2 In the passage
just quoted, the writer represents me as holding that as far as our feelings
are concerned there ought to be no difference between God and Satan. I
said we ought to will the good of each according to its perceived relative
value, but he represents me as holding that we ought to feel alike toward
God and Satan. Such confusion is common in the thoughts and language
of this writer. He has here represented me as holding the very opposite
APPENDIX. 957
of what I do hold in the work under review. It is impossible for us to feel
alike toward God and Satan, nor have we any reason to do so. We cannot
but have feelings of abhorrence toward Satan. These feelings correspond
with his infernal character; while at the same time we ought to have,
because, if our will is right, we shall have feelings of complacency in God.
Thus in this case again this writer by his loose way of thinking and writing
totally misrepresents me. Is it the same thing to feel and to will 2 I said,
we ought to will the good of Satan, or to be really benevolent to him. God
is benevolent and loves his enemies, and we ought to love ours, or will their
good. But from this, this writer represents me as holding, that we ought
to feel alike toward them; and to render the sentiment ridiculous, which it
truly is, he italicised “feelings.” But the instances of misapprehension, and
of consequent misrepresentation, are too mumerous to be noticed. I could
not believe this writer honest in all these misrepresentations, were it not
that every part of his review affords so high evidence of his loose way of
thinking and writing upon metaphysical subjects. But I have followed
him far enough. He endorses my conclusion provided my premises are
sound. But I must not omit the notice of this writer's idea of true religion.
On pages 256 and 257, he says: —
“On this doctrine we remark: 1. That it is readily admitted that happiness is a good.
2. That it is consequently obligatory on all moral agents to endeavour to promote it. 3.
That the highest happiness of the universe, being an unspeakably exalted and important
end, to make its attainment the object of life is a noble principle of action. 4. Consequently
this theory of moral obligation is inconceivably more elevated than that which makes self-
love the ultimate principle of action, and our own happiness the highest object of pursuit.
5. That the error of the theory is making enjoyment the highest and the only intrinsic or
real good. 6. That this error derives no countenance from the fact, that the Bible repre-
sents love to God and love to our neighbour as the fulfilling of the law. To derive any
argument from this source, Mr. Finney must first take the truth of his theory for granted.
To prove that all love is benevolence, it must be assumed that happiness is the only good.
If love is vastly more than benevolence, if a disposition to promote happiness is only one,
and that one of the lowest forms of that comprehensive excellence which the scriptures call
love, his argument is worth nothing. In accordance with that meaning of the term, which
universal usage has given it, any out-going of the soul, whether under the form of desire,
affection, complacency, reverence, delight towards an appropriate object, is in the Bible
called love. To squeeze all this down, and wire-draw it through one pin-hole, is as im.
possible as to change the nature of the human soul. Every man, not a slave to some
barren theory of the understanding, knows that love to God is not benevolence; that it is
approbation, complaceney, delight in his moral excellence, reverence, gratitude, devotion.
The reason then why the seriptures represent love as the fulfilling of the law, is twofold.
First, because love to an infinitely perfect Being, involves in it approbation of all conceiv-
able forms of moral excellence, and consequent congeniality of soul with it under all those
forms. He who really loves a God of truth, justice, purity, mercy, and benevolence, is
himself truthful, just, holy, mel ciful, and kind. Secondly, because love to God and man
will secure all obedienee to the precepts of the law. We may admit therefore that love is
the fulfilling of the law, without being sophisticated into believing, or rather saying, that
faith is love, justice is love, patience love, humility love.”
Upon this paragraph I remark —
1. That this writer's views of what constitutes virtue or true religion are
utterly defective. I trust that, as we say, his heart is upon this subject
958 APPENDIX.
better than his head. He freely admits, that benevolence consists in the
choice of the highest happiness and well-being of God and of the universe,
and that benevolence is true virtue.
2. He regards benevolence, as has been said, as possessing no attributes,
but as consisting in the simple choice of the happiness of God and of being
as an ultimate end, without taking into view the essential attributes of
benevolence. He talks of Squeezing down, and wire-drawing all virtue
through a pin-hole, &c. He then regards the representation that benevo-
lence is the love required by the law of God, and that it is, when properly
defined, the whole of virtue, as squeezing down and wire-drawing virtue
through a pin-hole ! I had said in the work before him (see “Systematic
Theology,” pages 183–185:—
“Of this truth we shall be constantly reminded as we proceed in our investigations, for
we shall find illustrations of it at every step of our progress. Before I proceed to point
out the attributes of benevolence, it is important to remark, that all the moral attributes of
God and of all holy beings, are only attributes of benevolence, Benevolence is a term that
comprehensively expresses them all. God is love. This term expresses comprehensively
God’s whole moral character. This love, as we have repeatedly seen, is benevolence.
Benevolence is good willing, or the choice of the highest good of God and the universe as
an end. But from this comprehensive statement, accurate though it be, we are apt to re-
ceive very inadequate conceptions of what really belongs to and is implied in benevolence.
To say that love is the fulfilling of the whole law; that benevolence is the whole of true
religion; that the whole duty of man to God and his neighbour, is expressed in one word,
love; these statements, though true, are so comprehensive, as to need with all minds much
amplification and explanation. The fact is, that many things are implied in love or bene-
volence. By this is intended, that benevolence needs to be viewed under various aspects
and in various relations, and its dispositions or willings considered in the various relations
in which it is called to act. Benevolence is an ultimate intention, or the choice of an
ultimate end. Now, if we suppose that this is all that is implied in benevolence, we shall
egregiously err. Unless we inquire into the nature of the end which benevolence chooses,
and the means by which it seeks to accomplish that end, we shall understand but little of
the import of the word benevolence. Benevolence has many attributes or characteristics.
These must all harmonize in the selection of its end, and in its efforts to realize it. Wisdom,
justice, mercy, truth, holiness, and many other attributes, as we shall See, are essential
elements or attributes of benevolence. To understand what true benevolence is, we must
inquire into its attributes. Not everything that is called love, has at all the nature of be-
nevolence. Nor has all that is called benevolence any title to that appellation. There are
various kinds of love. Natural affection is called love. The affection that exists between
the sexes is also called love. Our preference of certain kinds of diet is called love. Hence
we say we love fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, &c. Benevolence is also called love, and is
the kind of love, beyond all question, required by the law of God. But there is more than
one state of mind that is called benevolence. There is a constitutional or phrenological
benevolence, which is often mistaken for and confounded with the benevolence which con-
stitutes virtue. This so-called benevolence is in truth only an imposing form of selfishness;
nevertheless, it is called benevolence. Care, therefore, should be taken in giving religious
instruction, to distinguish accurately between them. Benevolence, let it be remembered,
is the obedience of the will to the law of the reason. It is willing good as an end, for its
own sake, and not to gratify self. Selfishness consists in the obedience of the will to the
impulses of the sensibility. It is a spirit of self-gratification. The will seeks to gratify the
desires and propensities for the pleasure of the gratification. Self-gratification is sought as
an end, and as the supreme end. It is preferred to the claims of God and the good of being.
Phrenological or constitutional benevolence is only obedience to the impulse of the sensi-
APPENDIX. 959
bility, a yielding to a feeling of compassion. It is only an effort to gratify a desire. It is
therefore as really selfishness, as is an effort to gratify any constitutional desire whatever.
It is impossible to get a just idea of what constitutes obedience to the Divine law and
what is implied in it, without considering attentively the various attributes or aspects of
henevolence, properly so called. Upon this discussion we are about to enter. But before
I commence the enumeration and definition of these attributes, it is important further to
remark, that the moral attributes of God as revealed in his works, providence, and word,
throw much light upon the subject before us. Also the many precepts of the Bible, and
the developements of benevolence therein revealed, will assist us much as we proceed in our
inquiries upon this important subject. As the Bible expressly affirms, that love compre-
hends the whole character of God ; that it is the whole that the law requires of man ; that
the end of the commandment is charity or love, we may be assured that every form of true
virtue is only a modification of love or benevolence ; that is, in its last analysis, resolvable
into love or benevolence. In other words, every virtue is only benevolence viewed under
certain aspects, or in certain relations. In other words still, it is only one of the elements,
peculiarities, characteristics, or attributes of benevolence. This is true of God’s moral
attributes. They are, as has been said, only attributes of benevolence. They are only
benevolence viewed in certain relations and aspects. All his virtues are only so many
attributes of benevolence. This is and must be true of every holy being.”
I then proceed to point out and define strictly, thirty-two of the moral
attributes of benevolence, as specimens and illustrations of the varieties or
modifications under which benevolence developes and manifests itself.
Could I here quote, entire, what I have written upon this subject in the
work before him, perhaps the reader might wonder, as I have done, how
an homest and a Christian man could represent me as Squeezing down and
wire-drawing through a pin-hole the love required by the law of God. But
I cannot in a reply make the quotation, as it occupies sixty-four pages of
the work reviewed, The object of Writing so fully on the attributes of
benevolence was, as the above extract shows, to prevent the very inference
or mistake into which this writer has fallen. But this is only a painful
specimen of his strange misapprehensions and misrepresentations of the
work reviewed. I had shown that every form of virtue was resolvable in
the last analysis into a modification of benevolence. But he represents me
as squeezing down and wire-drawing through a pin-hole the love required
by the law of God, instead of saying, as he was bound to do, that I ampli-
fied the meaning of the word, and understood it as being comprehensive of
all those modifications of virtue of which we have been accustomed to hear
and speak. Let any one read what I have written upon the attributes of
benevolence, and then pronounce judgment upon this reviewer's representa-
tions. But as I said, what he has here done, is only a specimen of the
manner in which he blundered through, or rather over the work he was
leviewing. But I make all due allowance for his old-school eyes and
prejudices, and would exercise all charity towards him.
3. In this paragraph he represents benevolence as one of the lowest
forms of virtue. He says, page 257 —
“To prove that all love is benevolence, it must be assumed that happiness is the only
good. If love is vastly more than benevolence, if a disposition to promote happiness is only
one, and that one of the lowest forms of that comprehensive excellence which the scriptures
call love, his argument is worth nothing. In accordance with that meaning of the term,
960 APPENDIX.
which universal usage has given it, any out-going of the soul, whether under the form of
desire, affection, complacency, reverence, delight towards an appropriate object, is in the
Bible called love. To squeeze all this down, and wire-draw it through one pin-hole, is as
impossible as to change the nature of the human soul. Every man, not a slave to some
barren theory of the understanding, knows that love to God is not benevolence; that it is
approbation, complacency, delight in his moral excellence, reverence, gratitude, devotion.
The reason then why the scriptures represent love as the fulfilling of the law, is two-fold.
First, because love to an infinitely perfect Being, involves in it approbation of all conceiv.
able forms of moral excellence, and consequent congeniality of soul with it under those
forms. He who really loves a God of truth, justice, purity, mercy, benevolence, is himself
truthful, just, holy, merciful, and kind. Secondly, because love to God and man will
secure all obedience to the precepts of the law.”
God's love to us must be benevolence, and his love to the universe must
be benevolence. Complacency in holiness, I have shown, may consist
either in an emotion of delight in it, or in a modification of benevolence or
good will. God loves all beings with good will, and towards holy beings
he exercises complacency, both in the form of benevolence, and in the
form of an emotion of delight in them. But it seems, that this writer
eonsiders approbation as a higher form of virtue than benevolence. But
what is approbation ? Why, it is a necessary state of the intellect in view
of moral excellence. No moral agent can otherwise than approve of virtue
or of moral excellence. This is as true of the worst as of the best of men.
Who does not know, that from a law of the intellect, a moral agent, whether
holy or sinful, must and does of necessity approve of moral excellence.
But this it seems we are to regard as a higher form of virtue than that
which we approbate in God. God is benevolent, and we are, from the laws
of our being; necessitated to approve of it; but in this involuntary state we
are more virtuous, or exercise a higher order of virtue, than the benevolence
which we behold in God, and approve.
Now I affirm, that there is nothing of the nature of virtue in the appro-
bation of moral excellence, and that this approbation is common to Saints
and sinners, and doubtless to devils and holy angels. What sinner on
earth or in hell is not conscious of approving the moral excellency of God?
But he makes delight in moral excellence, another form of virtue of a
higher order than benevolence. Delight, as he uses it, is not a modifica-
tion of good will, but an involuntary state of mind. So it seems that
delight in God’s moral excellence, or which is the same thing, in his bene-
volence, is more virtuous than the benevolence in which we delight. But
this state of the sensibility I have shown may exist in the mind of a sinner
as well as in a saint, and I believe that many sinners can attest, that they
are conscious at times of this delight. They give themselves credit for it
as something really good, and it seems that at Princeton they grant to such
sinners, not only all that they claim of virtue in this exercise, but infinitely
more. They make the delight a higher form of virtue than benevolence.
So the sinner who plays the miser and hoards up his millions, may quiet
himself, and by approving and delighting in the benevolence of God, may
be even more virtuous than God is. This is worse than Jesuitism.
Again: he represents reverence, gratitude, and devotion, as higher forms
APPENDIX. 96.1
of virtue than benevolence. I had shown, that these were attributes of
benevolence, but he regards them manifestly as involuntary emotions.
Reverence for God, for, or on account of his benevolence, gratitude to God
for his love or benevolence; devotion to God for his benevolence, higher
forms of virtue than the benevolence which we adore Amazing ! What
will the church and the world say, when they are told that at Princeton
they hold such views of the nature of true religion? What, good will to
God and to being in general, that efficient principle that is the foundation
and the source of all doing good, one of the lowest forms of virtue ! “Tell
it not in Gath.” I could enlarge indefinitely on the absurd, and most false
and ruinous views of this writer, as it respects the nature of true religion.
With his views, I do not wonder that he says, on page 276 :—
“Mr. Finney is well aware, that this doctrine changes the whole nature of religion; and
hence his frequent denunciations of the false philosophy and pretended orthodoxy, by which
religion has been perverted and the church corrupted. And certain it is that religion, as
represented by him, is something exceedingly different from what good people in all ages
have commonly regarded it. We should have to provide a new language, new hymns, new
prayers, and especially a new Bible.”
I freely admit, that this writer and myself have exceedingly diverse views
of the nature of true religion. If, as he says, the involuntary states of the
intellect and the sensibility are more virtuous, than the benevolence in
which I hold that all virtue strictly consists, I am utterly mistaken. And
if on the other hand, supreme disinterested good will to God and man,
including all its attributes and developements is virtue, and strictly speak-
ing, the whole of virtue, then this writer is wholly in fault, and has not the
true ideal of the Christian religion before him when he writes.
Again ; this writer repeatedly insinuates, that I confound God with the
universe, and make good-will to the universe, instead of love to God the
great thing in religion. This representation is as false as possible, as every
one who reads the book reviewed will see. I hold, indeed, that love to God
considered as a virtue, consists in good-will; that love to God as an emotion
always exists where good-will exists, but that virtuous love is a voluntary
exercise, that God's well-being and interests are of infinitely greater value
than those of all the universe besides; and of course, that love to him should
always be supreme.
It is amazing to me, that this writer could have so misunderstood and
misrepresented me, as he has in many of these things.
There are a number of other things contained in the review before us
that I should like to examine, and may do so, the Lord Willing, at another
time. But the present article has already become too long for our paper.
It might be amusing enough to turn the reductio ad absurdum, upon this
Writer himself. He has asserted many strange and absurd things indeed
in this review. But for the present, at least, I must close,
962
A REPLY TO THE “WARNING AGAINST ERROR."
WRITTEN BY THE REW. D.R. DUFFIELD,
AND APPROVED AND ADoPTED, FIRST BY THE PRESBYTERY OF DETROIT, AND SUBSFQUENTLY
BY THE SYNOD OF MICHIGAN.
B Y P R O F E S S O R. C. G. F I N N E Y.
TO T H E S Y NO D OF MICH I G. A. N.
REVEREND AND BELOVED BRETHREN:
I have received a pamphlet entitled, “A Warming against Error,” being
the Report of a Committee, adopted by the Presbytery of Detroit, at their
Session at Northville, Mich. Approved by the Synod of Michigan, at
their Session at Kalamazoo, Oct. 18, 1847.
Sickness and death in my family, my own ill health, together with the
loss of our press by fire, have hitherto prevented a reply. I see nothing in
this pamphlet intrinsically worthy of a reply, and should take no public
notice of it, but for the extraordinary manner of its appearance before the
churches. Its author has, in some way which I cannot explain, obtained
for it the endorsement and Sanction of the Synod. On perusing the pam-
phlet I have been constrained to doubt whether the members of the Synod
had to any considerable extent made themselves acquainted with my pub-
lished volumes of theology. I must also doubt whether the writer of the
pamphlet had patiently and understandingly read my work through; for I
cannot conceive how a discerning mind could have fallen into so many
strange misapprehensions and misrepresentations, if he had really read and
pondered the positions taken in the work reviewed. Two reasons mainly
induce me to reply. 1. The present relations of the Synod of Michigan
to the pamphlet. They, it seems, have made themselves responsible to
God and to the world for the truthfulness of this “Warning against Error,”
and pledged their Christian and ministerial characters in support of its po-
sitions. This gives to the pamphlet an importance that seems to demand
a notice from me. Silence on my part under such circumstances might be
deemed either a contempt for the Synod, or a tacit acknowledgment of error.
I am unwilling that either of these inferences should be drawn, because
neither is true, and either might injure the cause of truth. 2. My Second
reason for replying is, that it will afford me an opportunity to state in a
few words my views upon the points considered as erroneous. Such a state-
ment may be read and understood by many who may never read my
theology entire.
Before I enter directly upon the work of reply, I must notice a few of
the many peculiarities of the pamphlet before me.
1. I have been struck with the remarkable manner in which the writer
of the “Warning” has quoted from my book. He has seldom, if at all,
APPENDIX. 963
dome more than quote isolated sentences, leaving their connexion out of
view. Suppose this should be done with the Bible or any other book, what
could not be made out of it 2
2. The writer has seldom, if at all, so much as noticed the proof of my
positions, as stated in my book. He has found it convenient to pass my
arguments unnoticed, and has quoted the Confession of Faith in reply, as
if it were of Divine authority. He also appears to quote scripture in oppo-
sition to my positions; but with what success we shall see.
3. The writer of the “Warning" seldom takes issue with my real posi-
tions. He almost uniformly misapprehends and misrepresents my views.
He seldom grapples manfully with my positions, but “ dodges" the real
question.
4. The “Warning” abounds with false issues, and consequently with
most impertinent argumentation, and quotations of scripture.
5. Another peculiarity of the “Warning” is, that it is very ambiguous.
Much that is said may be read almost equally well two or three ways. It
may be so read as to be old school, or new school, or no school at all; so
as to be orthodox, heterodox, or mere nonsense. If my limits will permit,
I may call attention to some instances of this ambiguity.
I am made happy by the consideration, that it is not for me to sit, in
judgment upon the intention of this writer, but that in this I may leave
him to the judgment of God, and attend only to his opinions.
Again : in reading the “Warning against Error,” I have been struck, as
often before, with the fact, that the brethren abroad are not opposing so
much the real as the imputed views of Oberlin. To make us out heretics,
our opponents must impute to us sentiments that we do not hold, and
which we abhor as really as themselves. I wrote and published my theo-
logy to avoid this, but it seems to be impossible to speak so plainly, that
certain men will not misapprehend us, and by their blunders mislead others.
How long shall this be? Of what use it to misrepresent us, and fight a
man of straw 2
In reply, I must, 1. Condense as much as possible. 2. I must omit
lengthy quotations from Scripture, and rely in general upon the memory of
my readers to supply them. 3. I might in almost every instance quote a
complete reply to the writer from the work reviewed ; but for brevity's sake
I must content myself with stating in as few a Words as possible my views,
as contained in my published volumes of theology, and leave those who are
disposed, to examine that work for themselves.
The writer has occupied the first twelve pages of his pamphlet in defend-
ing himself against the charge of having himself departed from the
Presbyterian Confession of Faith. I will mot trouble myself nor you with
remarks upon this prolix introduction to his Warning.” It is only the
old story about “The Form of Sound Words,” accompanied with the ad-
mission that these “sound words” are not the words in which he should
always prefer to express his doctrinal belief, and also with the admission
that much latitude is allowed to Presbyterians in construing these “sound
3 Q 2
964 APPENDIX,
Words,” so that opposing schools may each properly express their doctrinal
Views in these “sound words.” These Words, it appears, are so “sound,”
that they may be understood with about equal propriety, to mean one thing
or the other, according to the psychological views of opposing schools and
different individuals. Alas! for these “sound words!” the true interpre-
tation of which has cost the church so much division and disgrace. But I
Would not speak disparagingly of the Confession of Faith. In the main
I think it true; but in no instance do I acknowledge it as an authoritative
exposition of the word of God. I claim the right to examine the “lively
oracles" for myself, and am not bound to take the Confession of Faith as a
conclusive exponent of the Bible. Be it understood, however, that in my
reply to this pamphlet, I make no war with the Confession of Faith. I
have only to deal with the author.
I will now attend to the pretended issues of the “Warning."
1. His first issue is as follows, pages 12, 13, 15:
THE FOUNDATION OF FAITII.
“The erroneous system assumes and teaches, as the true philosophy, certain meta-
Physical views of the nature and foundation of moral obligation, which it makes the key to
unlock the mysteries of our faith ; or in other words, the postulates by which human
reason may explain the doctrines of the Bible, and reconcile the differences among pro-
fessing Christian in point of doctrinal belief. It claims philosophy to be the legitimate
expositor of Bible theology.
“But we protest against any man's metaphysical theory or definitions, or philosophical
views of the nature and foundation of moral obligation, being made the arbiter of our
aith, and the interpreter of the doctrines of the Bible, however great may be his
pretensions to holiness, or whatever his fame and reputed success in preaching the gospel.
“We warn you against all attempts to make metaphysics, or philosophy, the arbiter
and interpreter of the facts affirmed by the Spirit of God in the sacred scriptures. We
are bound to believe the facts when once, and as God affirms them, even though we cannot
explain them by our philosophy.”
The point of my alleged offence here is, that I appeal to philosophy or
reason as the legitimate expounder of the Bible. But is there really any
issue between this writer and myself upon this point 2 No, indeed. Why
does he warn the churches against what he holds as really as I do 2 to wit,
that we must appeal to reason ; 1. In sitting in judgment upon the evi-
dences that the Bible is of divine origin 2 and 2. In ascertaining what the
Bible means ? In interpreting the language, the doctrines, and facts con-
tained in it 2 Without the aid of mental science we can form no definite
idea of what the most common terms in the Bible mean. The terms sin,
holiness, regeneration, repentance, faith, and the like, are all expressive,
not of muscular action, but of acts and states of the mind ; and without
assuming the great truths of mental science, no man can rightly understand
these terms. This this writer admits, and this is that for which I contend.
He admits that it is the appropriate business of the schools to interpret
these and similar terms in the light of mental Science. He constantly does
this himself, and so does every minister. Where then is the issue 2
Brethren of the synod, has this writer made you believe, that I hold that
reason or philosophy is higher authority than the Bible 2 I hold no such
APPENDJX. 965
thing. The meaning of the Bible once ascertained, its teachings are with
me an end of all controversy. But the Bible must be expounded by reason
or philosophy, or we can have no opinion even, of what it means. All men
do and must expound the Bible by, and in accordance with, their views of
mental science. The difference among theologians is founded in their dif-
ferent views of mental science. Who does not know this? Why then
does this writer exclaim against reason and philosophy, and talk about re-
ceiving the simple facts and doctrines of Christianity, by faith, without
philosophizings, &c. 2 Why does he repudiate philosophy, and yet con-
stantly obtrude his own philosophy upon us? The fact is, he and I differ
in our philosophy, and consequently in our theology. The issue between us
is not as he here represents it. It is not whether we may, or must of ne-
cessity, appeal to reason and philosophy in our exposition of the language
of scripture. This he repeatedly admits. This I also maintain. The
real issue between us respects our views of mental Science, in the light of
which we respectively interpret the language of the Bible. Here then is a
false issue in the outset. It is more convenient for him to exclaim against
philosophy as an expositor of the Bible, and then surround himself with
the smoke of his own philosophy in combating my views, than it is to take
issue with me upon those points of philosophy, upon which our diverse the-
ological views are founded. He exclaims against my appeal to philosophy,
and yet glaringly assumes the truth of his own, and that of the framers of
the Confession of Faith.
Every one knows, that the framers of the Confession held a peculiar phi-
losophy, which gave shape to that whole document. Why, then, does this
writer protest against philosophy as an exponent of the Bible? Such pro-
tests are nonsensical. Had I space, I might quote enough of the philosophy
of this writer, both from this pamphlet and from his other published works,
to silence a modest man, and prevent his exclaiming against interpreting
scripture in the light of mental science. I conclude this head then, with
repeating, that the writer has here made an issue where there is none. He
professes to differ with me, as it respects the relations and use of philose-
phy, when in fact we agree in this, and difier only in our views of what
constitutes true philosophy.
2. His second issue is as follows, pages 15, 16, 17:
THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
“The facts, that we are free agents, possessing powers to know and obey the will of
God, and that he has given his law for the regulation of our conduct, are generally
acknowledged and felt to be a sufficient ground of that moral obligation which binds us to
do his will. His right to command and require our obedienee, men generally traee to the
facts, that he is our Creator, and made us for himself ; our Proprietor, and claims us for
his own ; our Sovereign, and possesses authority to command ; our beneficent friend, and
in every way best fitted and qualified, by his own excellence and resources, to exercise
dominion over us. The Bible speaks plainly on this subject. and in accordance with such
views. When God commanded Abraham to walk before him and be perfect, the chief
reason he assigned for it was, ‘ I am the Almighty God,” God all-sufficient. All the holy
obedience and adoration of heaven is referred to this source. ‘Thou art worthy, O Lord,
to receive glory and honour, and power ; for thou hast created all things, and for thy
966 APPENDIX.
pleasure they are and were created.’ The will of God, expressed in his law, is every-
where, in the sacred scriptures, recognized to be, as well the reason for, as the rule of our
obedience. Thus, the Saviour speaks of himself; ‘I came down from heaven, not to do
mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.’ It is given as a distinctive trait in the
character of him whose morality is acceptable, that “he doeth the will of God,” and
“keepeth his commandments.” God has required it, therefore we are bound to obey. The
expression of his will as to our actions or conduct, as to what we are, or are not, to do ;
that is, his law is a sufficient, and indeed, a paramount reason of obedience.
“The error against which we warn you, teaches that ‘the right of God’ to exercise
moral government “cannot be found in the fact that God sustains to (us) the relation of
Creator.” As counterpart with this, it teaches, that ‘the fact that God is the owner and
sole proprietor of the universe, is no reason why he should govern it.’ It further teaches,
that his right to govern ‘ cannot be founded in the fact, that God possesses all the attri-
butes, natural and moral, that are requisite to the administration of moral government ;’
but that ‘ the necessity of government is the foundation of the right to govern.” So far
from moral obligation being founded in the will of God, it teaches, that “it is a respon-
sibility imposed on the moral agent by his own reason,’ and that “there can be no law that
is, or can be, obligatory upon moral agents, but one suited to, and founded in, their
nature, relations, and circumstances.’”
Upon this point I would remark : (1.) That the utmost confusion seems
to have reigned in the mind of this writer upon certain points of funda-
mental importance in theological investigations, and hence he continually
misapprehends and misrepresents me, where I have been careful to make
those discriminations prominent.
I have throughout made an important distinction between the conditions,
and the foundation or ground of moral obligation, the conditions and the
ground or foundation of justification, &c. In the first sentence under this
head, he has fallen into the error of confounding this distinction. I repre-
sented moral agency, ability, &c., as conditions, but not as the ground
or foundation of it. Without free agency and ability we could not be sub-
jects of moral obligation; but then free agency and ability are not the
ground or foundation of the obligation, I have shown, that the fundamental
reason why men ought to will and to do good, is the intrinsic value of the
good. Their ability to do this is a condition of their obligation to do it,
but their ability is not, and cannot be, the foundation of the obligation.
Ability is, of itself, no more a reason for willing good than evil. The fun-
damental reason for doing good must be the value of the good, and the
ability only a condition of the obligation. This is made so plain in the
book reviewed, that it seems hardly possible that such a man as Doctor D.
can have overlooked it. In his first sentence he represents ability, &c., as
the ground of moral obligation ; and this confusion reigns throughout the
whole pamphlet, and fatally vitiates, as we shall see, his whole work.
I have taught, that the fact that God is the Creator, and that he possesses
perfect and infinite attributes, natural and moral, are conditions of his right
to govern, and of our obligation to obey him; but that his relations and at-
tributes are not the foundation of our obligation to will or to do good rather
than evil. There must be something in the nature of good and evil that
is the fundamental reason for our obligation to will and to do one rather
than the other. It must be the intrinsic value of the good, and the in-
APPENDIX. 967
trinsic evil of the evil, that constitutes the fundamental reason for God's
requiring the one and prohibiting the other; and that also constitutes the
fundamental reason of our obligation to choose the one and refuse the
other. But here is the utmost confusion in the Doctor's mind. He seems
to be either unable or unwilling to perceive a distinction at once so plain
and so important, and hence he wholly fails in his showing. It is surely
ridiculous to affirm, that the relations and attributes of God are the foun-
dation of our obligation to will and do good, and to avoid evil, rather than
anything in the nature of the good and the evil, for this would be obligatory
upon us, whatever God's relations and attributes might be. We, being
moral agents, should be under obligation to will and do good, even if God
should forbid it.
(2.) The Doctor under this head, as we shall see elsewhere, at first ap-
pears to take issue with me, and afterwards, by contradicting himself, anmi-
hilates the issue, and concedes what I claim. On page 16, he represents
the will of God, as he does elsewhere, as the reason manifestly in the sense
of the ground or foundation of moral obligation. The connexion and strain
of reasoning show, that by reason he means the fundamental reason or
ground. Here then is the appearance of an issue. But on page 10,
he says:
“In so saying, we mean not that the law and constitution of God are mere arbitrary
enactments, that is, emanating wholly from a capricious volition ; nor that they can be so
changed by any capricious act of the divine will, as to make that right, which according
to our intelligent powers, and the nature with which God has endowed us, may be, under
present circumstances, wrong, or that wrong which is now right.”
He knew very well that I had shown, that if God's will is the foundation
of moral obligation, rather than the intrinsic value of the good, it would
follow, that if God had willed, or should will the direct opposite of what he
does, it would impose obligation upon us; that if his will be the foundation
of our obligations, he might, by willing it, change our obligations, and
render it obligatory upon us to will evil instead of good. But the Doctor
is on his guard, and takes both sides of the question. The will of God is
the ground of the obligation ; yet he does not mean by this, that God could
by any arbitrary or “capricious volition” change the mature of virtue and
vice, and render it obligatory to will evil rather than good. But why not?
This is getting out of the difficulty, or escaping from the consequences by a
denial of his premises. It is undeniable, that if the sovereign will of God is
the foundation of the obligation, he can by his sovereign will change the
nature of virtue and vice. If his willing that we should will and do good,
is the reason why we should will and do good rather than evil, and the in-
trinsic nature of the good and the evil is not the fundamental reason of the
obligation, certainly it follows, that should he will the opposite of what he
does, his willing would impose obligation, and of course change the nature
of virtue and vice. I insist upon the Doctor's taking one side or the other
of this question; that he either make a real issue and abide by it, or that
he relinquish all pretence of an issue. I must protest against his appearing
968 APPENDIX.
to make an issue, and then in anticipation of my answer, turning round
and virtually denying the very position upon which, alone, the appearance
of an issue rested. If God by an arbitrary choice cannot change the
nature of virtue and vice, he cannot change moral obligation, of course.
Hence, it follows that his will is not the foundation of moral obligation.
Why does not the Doctor admit this at once 2 Why has the Doctor italicized
“Wholly" and “capricious 2" Does he mean to imply that God's enactments
do or may emanate partly from a capricious volition ? So it would seem.
But this I deny, and maintain, that God has no more right to will or to
legislate unreasonably than we have. But the Doctor will have it, that it
is because God is what he is, &c., because he possesses infinite perfections,
moral and matural, that his will is the foundation of moral obligation. But
the fact of these perfections is by me represented, not as the ground, but
as the condition of our obligation to obey him. He commands us to will
and do good, because good is valuable, and for that reason. But it seems
that Doctor D. will have it, that we are to will and do good, not for good's
Sake, or because good is good or valuable, but because God wills it. We
are to will good to God and to our neighbour, not that we care for their
well-being for its own sake, but we are to will it because God commands it!
This he insists is the teaching of the Bible and of the standards. We are
to love God and our neighbour, and seek the glory of God and the good of
our neighbour; not that we care for these things for their own intrinsic
value or importance, but because God wills it. And God wills it, not for
its value, but because he does will it. Marvellous! But the Doctor in-
forms me and his readers, of the origin of my error, pages 18 and 19.
“The error originates in losing sight of God's sovereignty in the original creation of man,
with the powers, and in the relations in which he was constituted, and adapted to His law,
or the law to him. The nature and fitness of things cannot be apprehended by us, or
correctly spoken of, as though some eternal constitution, or as the preacher called it, fate,
existed, irrespectively of God's will, in the exercise of His wisdom and henevolence,
originally planning the whole system. The scriptures speak explicitly of “the mystery of
His will, according to his good pleasurg, which He purposed in Himself;' and of His con-
stitutions being ‘according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counse
of his own will.” To assume an eternal fitness in the nature of things, anterior to, and
irrespective of, His original, wise, good, and holy ordinations, and to affirm that God adapts
his moral law to it, is to impugn his sovereignty. It is to make both God and his creatures
dependent on a state of things out of Himself, or something other than ‘the counsel of His
own will,’ AN ETERNAL FATE *
This is a wonderful discovery The universe originated in the sovereign
good pleasure of God, and therefore his will, and not the nature and
relations of things, is the foundation of obligation. He created the nature
of things, and therefore his will, and not the nature of things is the founda-
tion of moral obligation. Had he pleased, he could have so constituted
things, that what is now virtue would have been vice, and what is now vice
had been virtue. That is, he might have so constituted moral agents, that
benevolence had been sin, and selfishness virtue ; that it Would have been
duty to prefer our own good to that of God, to prefer a less to a greater
good, to love ourselves supremely, or to hate God, and adore ourselves. If
APPENDIX. 969
this is not what he means, what does he mean, and what does the paragraph
just quoted amount to ? If the Doctor means to affirm this, I greatly
wonder that the Synod should endorse a sentiment so preposterous.
The fact is, God's eternal and self-existent nature, and not his willing,
has for ever settled the question of the nature of virtue and vice. His
etermal and self-existent reason has imposed law upon his will, and no
willing of his can change this law. But more of this in another place.
Why does the Doctor represent me as holding that the nature and fitness
of things is the foundation of obligation ? I hold, that things being as they
are, that is, that our mature and relations are conditions of our obligations,
but deny that they are the foundation of obligation. The foundation of
obligation I hold to be, the intrinsic value of the good we ought to choose
and do ; that the intrinsic value of the good is the reason why God requires
us to will and do it, and of course the fundamental reason why we ought
to will and do it. I hold that the intrinsic value of the glory of God and
the well-being of the universe, is the fundamental reason of our obligation
to will it, and seek it. Now suppose the Doctor to deny this, and to main-
tain that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of the obligation.
Then the matter stands thus. We are under obligation to be benevolent,
that is, to will and do good, not because good is valuable in itself, but
because God wills it. But why does God will it 2 If for its intrinsic
value, we ought to will it for the same reason. The Doctor, page 19,
admits that our obligation is not founded in the mere fact that God wills
thus and thus, but in the fact, that he is an infinitely good Being. Now
what does this mean P Does it mean that the obligation is founded in the
fact that God wills what he does? that is, that he requires us to will and
do that which we ought to will and do, and that which he ought to require
us to will and do, on account of the nature or value of that which he
requires us to will and do 2 In other words, is the obligation to obey God
founded in the fact that his will is wise and good 2 I admit that this is a
condition of our obligation to obey him, but I deny that his goodness or his
will is the foundation of the obligation to will and do good; and maintain,
that God's Willing and his goodness are so far from being the foundation
of our obligation to will and do good, that we should be under obligation
to will and do good if God forbade it, and if he were perfectly wicked. I
say again, that his being good, or his willing as he does, is the condition
of our obligation to obey him ; but is so far from being the foundation of
the obligation to do that which he commands, that the obligation would
exist if God should forbid that which he now commands. Should God
fordid us to will and seek his good and the good of the universe, it would
be our duty to will and seek it notwithstanding. I go farther, and affirm,
that God could not possibly create a universe of moral agents, and render
it obligatory upon them to be selfish. I utterly deny, that God by his
Sovereignty could, by any possible constitution of things, render benevolence
a sin and selfishness a virtue. Brethren of the Synod of Michigan, do you
hold with Dr. D. upon this point, and deny the position which I take I
970 APPENDIX.
cannot believe it. I must believe that you adopted this pamphlet on a bare
hearing it read, and that you do not, and cannot endorse it, on a more
thorough understanding of it. But we shall see.
But again, page 19, the Doctor says of God:—
“His own glorious nature, His own infinitely exalted excellence, and not anything
conceivably existing apart from, independent and irrespective of God, is that which
determines His will.”
What does the Doctor mean 2 Does he mean that God is a necessary
as opposed to a free agent? That his will is necessarily determined by his
self-existent nature ? If he means this, what virtue is there in God? His
nature is necessarily self-existent. No one can suppose that God is deserv-
ing of praise for possessing a mature which he did not create, and which he
cannot annihilate or change. God is not praiseworthy for having this
mature, but for the voluntary use or exercise of it. It is his benevolence,
and not his nature, for which he deserves praise.
But what does the Doctor mean by “God’s infinitely exalted excel-
lence 2" Does he mean moral excellence? He says that God’s excellence
determines his will. What is this excellence, l inquire again 2 Is it
moral? And what is moral excellence 2 I had supposed that Dr. D. and
the Synod of Michigan, were at least so far new school as to hold that moral
excellence consists in voluntary action, that is, in choice, benevolence, love.
But here it seems you all hold that moral excellence lies back of choice
and determines it ; that God's moral excellence, according to the Synod of
Michigan, is not voluntary, but necessary. It does not belong to or con-
sist in choice or volition, nor in any action of the will, in any free or
voluntary state of mind, but lies back of all actions of will and determines
them. This then is your idea of the moral excellence of God. And is this
moral excellence in creatures? And you, brethren, feel solemnly called
upon to warn the churches against believing in the free agency of God, and
in his voluntary moral excellence ; and charge them to believe that God's
moral excellence lies back of all voluntary states of the will, and determines
them. They must believe that God's moral excellence does not consist in
benevolence, but in something back of good-will, that determines the will to
good. And this is orthodoxy in your churches 2 My dear Brethren, you
cannot mean so. But what do you mean º Do you say, that by excellence,
you do not mean moral excellence 2 But how does this relieve you ?
What is this excellence 2 It must be moral or physical. If the former,
then moral excellence is involuntary, which is absurd. If the latter, that
is, if this excellence be that of his self-existing and necessary nature, then
he is a necessary being, and his will is determined to benevolence by his
immutable and self-existent nature. Is there, can there be any virtue in a
necessary benevolence 2 I had supposed, that God freely determined his
own will in accordance with the law of his eternal reason ; that God is free,
and in the sovereign exercise of this freedom, yielded a voluntary obedi-
ence to the moral law, or law of benevolence, as it is affirmed by his reason.
But you hold, it seems, that it is some natural or substantial involuntary
APPENDIX. 971
excellence that determines his will. God's virtue then, must consist, not
in voluntary conformity to the law of his reason, but in his will being
determined by some involuntary excellence. What can this excellence be,
and would it be virtue in a creature ?
Under this head the Doctor repudiates the idea, that the necessity of
government constitutes the condition of God's right to govern, and main-
tains that God has this right by virtue of his own infinite excellence, or, as
it would seem, by virtue of his sovereignty. Now what does the Doctor
mean by this 2 Does he mean, that God's being infinitely great and good
confers on him the right to govern his creatures even if they need no
government? Or if there is no good reason, either in himself or in them,
for this government 2 I have taught, that God has no right to do anything
without a good reason. Is this heresy 2 That unless there be a good
reason for government existing, either in God or in his creatures, or in
their relations, or in all these together, God has no right to govern.
I maintain that government is a necessary means of securing the highest
glory of God, and the highest well-being of the universe, and that the
intrinsic value of this glory and well-being is the ground of the obligation
and right of God to govern. God's attributes and relations, together with
the necessities of his creatures, are conditions of the obligation and right to
govern. Why should God's attributes, natural and moral, give him a right
to control his creatures, or to exercise any government over them, if there
is no good reason for it? Is God unreasonable 2 Has he a right to be
unreasonable 2 Has he a right to exercise a capricious and arbitrary
sovereignty, in administering a government of law with its terrible sanc-
tions, when government is not at all necessary 2 when no good end is
secured, or even proposed by it 2 If God has such a right, it must be
because his “capricious volition " makes right. But this cannot be. The
truth is, that if God's arbitrary and capricious will does not make right, it
must be that he, as well as all other moral agents, must have some good
reason to authorize him to do anything. What will Doctor D. gravely
maintain, that God has a right to govern the universe when there is no need
whatever of government? When there is no necessity for it in his own
nature and relations, nor in the nature and relations of his subjects 2 If
he maintains this, what is this but holding, that God has a right to exercise
a perfectly arbitrary and capricious sovereignty. But if the Doctor does
not hold this, why does he pretend to disagree with me upon this point,
and gravely sound the alarm of heresy 2 Let him, if he thinks best, pro-
claim it as orthodoxy in Michigan, that God's right to govern is founded,
not in the necessity of government as a means to an infinitely valuable end,
but that his right is founded in an arbitrary sovereignty. But, brethren of
the Synod, will you endorse this sentiment for him 2
Observe, my position is, that the intrinsic value of the end to be secured
by moral government, is the foundation and the attributes of God, moral
and natural, together with his relations to the universe, are conditions of
his right to govern ; that neither his attributes or relations could of
97.2 APPENDIX.
themselves confer on Him this right, except there is good reason for the
existence of government. If the Doctor ask, why we may not as well say
that the attributes and relations of God are the ground, and the intrinsic
value of the end to be secured by government the condition of the right,
the answer is plain. The ground of the right, that is, the intrinsic value
of the end to be secured by government would exist, and be the same, even
were God's attributes changed. But this change in his attributes and
relations, while it would not dispense with the necessity and importance of
government, would nevertheless affect his right to govern. I would ask
Doctor D. if he holds that God would have a right to govern the universe,
if he were a wicked being, although he might have been its creator? If
the Doctor says no, what is this but admitting that his goodness is a
condition of the right 2 If the Doctor will still insist that his goodness
confers on Him the right, and is the foundation of this right, in such a
sense that the right would exist, although the end to be secured by govern-
ment were of no value, and although there were no good reason for govern-
ment whatever, what is this but saying that God's goodness confers on Him
the right to that which is perfectly unreasonable and capricious?
3. The Doctor's third issue is as follows:—
THE NATURE AND AUTIIORITY OF MORAL LAW'.
“On this subject, the system of error against which we warn you, teaches that “moral
law is not, and never can be the will of God, or of any other being.” It affirms, that the
will of no being can be law, but that “moral law is an idea of the reason’—‘the law of
nature, the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent imposes on himself"—
‘the rule imposed on us, not by the arbitrary will of any being, but by our own intelligence.
Human reason is thus enthroned as lawgiver to the human conscience. The authority
binding to obedience ‘is nothing else than the reason's idea, or conception of that course of
willing and acting that is fit, proper, suitable to, and demanded by the nature, relations,
necessities, and circumstances of moral agents.’”
What I hold and teach upon the subject of this paragraph is this. Moral
law is given by the reason of God as the rule of his own conduct, and the
conduct of all moral agents. Moral law does not originate in the will, but
in the reason of God. It is and must be his own rational conception,
apprehension, idea, or affirmation of the course of willing and acting, that is
fit, proper, right, in himself and all moral agents. It is ridiculous to
affirm, that moral law has its foundation in the will of any being. God's
expressed will reveals law, but the law consists in the rule of action imposed
by the reason and conscience, upon the will of God and of all moral agents.
God is a law to himself. That is, his reason imposes law upon his will,
and his virtue must consist in his will's obeying the law of his reason.
Does not Doctor D. admit this 2 God has created mankind in his own
image, that is, moral agents like himself. Consequently, they necessarily
have the idea of moral law and moral obligation. They necessarily affirm
their obligation to be benevolent. They have the idea, conception, appre-
hension, or affirmation, that to love God and their neighbour, is fit,
suitable, proper, right. Thus, as the Bible says, they are a law unto
themselves. Thus God's law, the law of his own intelligence, is revealed
APPENDIX. 973
to all moral agents in the necessary ideas of their own reason. This is not
exalting reason above God, nor enthroning reason as lawgiver in any other
sense, than that it is through, and by their reason, that God reveals his
law to moral agents. This is what is intended by moral law being an
idea of the reason. Does not Doctor D. know this? Does he need to be
told, that moral law must be a rule of action, conceived, or apprehended
and affirmed by the reason of a moral agent 2 This rule or law may be
declared and enforced by the expressed will of God, but it is utter nonsense
to say, that it originates in his will, and not in his reason. God's self-
existent nature is the source or foundation of moral law. He is necessarily
a moral agent. Possessing this mature, benevolence is his duty. That is,
benevolence is fit, proper, right in him, and selfishness would be wrong in
him. He must be a subject of moral law and moral obligation, or virtue
is impossible to him. His reason must impose upon his will the obligation
of benevolence. He is his own lawgiver, and the lawgiver, in the sense of
revealing law, of all moral agents. He has so created them, that they can-
not but have the idea, and affirm it to be their duty to be benevolent.
This law God has revealed to them in the necessary laws and ideas of their
own reason. The Bible also declares it to the reason, and imposes it upon
the conscience through the reason. The reason is the only faculty that can
have the idea of moral law. This is what all writers on moral law mean
by its subjectivity; that is, the law is not merely objective, something
without the reason, and contemplated as an object apart from the mind,
but it is an idea, a conception of the mind itself. It lies in the reason of
the subject. And is this error 2 Do you, brethren, feel called upon to
warn the churches against this teaching as error 2 Do you seriously
sympathize with Doctor D. in his alarm, and can you declare this de-
liberately to the churches in Michigan 2
I have said, a few pages back, that God's self-existent nature had for ever
settled the nature of virtue and vice, so that he can never change them.
We are now prepared to see what is intended by such language.
His reason is self-existent, and of course infinite and immutable. This
eternally and necessarily affirms, that benevolence is virtue and selfishness
vice. So that God never did settle the nature of virtue and vice by an act
of will, or by ordaining and establishing any constitution of things whatever.
His eternal, self-existent and necessary reason has settled this from etermity.
No sovereignty of God was concerned in settling, creating or establishing
the intrinsic nature of virtue and vice, nor in creating, or establishing moral
law. Moral law, and the nature of virtue and vice, are and always were as
independent of God's will as his self-existent and eternal nature is. Neither
his reason nor its necessary affirmations, are subject to his will. He cannot
affirm differently if he would. That is a shallow and an absurd theology
that represents moral law, moral obligation, and eonsequently the nature of
virtue and vice, as dependent upon the sovereign will of God. Why, if
moral law were, or ever was, dependent upon the sovereign will of God, he
could by willing it, have made selfishness in himself and in all moral agents
974. APPENDIX.
virtue, and benevolence wice. Do you believe this? Doctor D. is terrified
with this view which I have taken, as being the doctrine of an “ETERNAL
FATE,” or as something above God. But what nonsense is this. Fate
separate from God! No, indeed; it is God’s own nature, his own reason
that has given moral law to him and to all his creatures. It is not fate,
but the infinite and perfect reason that has for ever settled the nature of
moral law, of moral obligation, and of course, of virtue and vice. This is
not an eternal fate, but an eternal God. Cannot Doctor D. see this?
It is the grossest error to maintain, that God’s sovereign will originated
moral law, or established the nature of virtue and vice. This would render
virtue in God impossible. If there were no law obligatory upon his will,
then virtue would be impossible to him. For what is virtue in God, or in
any other being but conformity to moral law? But all this and much more
is in the work reviewed, and it is wonderful that Doctor D. can so utterly
misapprehend and misrepresent me on this, and almost every other point,
upon which he attempts to warn the churches. Brethren of the Synod
have you attentively examined what I have said in my work upon this sub-
ject? I cannot believe you have. Do you, can you believe that what
I have just now said upon the nature of moral law is heresy, or merely
“ philosophy falsely so ealled?” I cannot believe that you do. But we
shall see. On the Qlst page the doetor says:—
“How unlike is this philosophy to the unerring testimony of God, which makes His will,
made known to unen for the regulation of their conduet, to be the law In the first instance
God gave to Adam an expression of His will, and this was law—His command. In the
same way, He spake the law by an audible voice in the ten commandments, which all
admit to be the moral law, thus making known His will for the regulation of our conduct,
Everywhere in the seriptures we are referred to God's will, expressed in His command, as
law binding us to obedience.”
Now, does the doctor believe, and do you believe that I deny this?
God's will is the law, in the sense that it expresses and enforces the law or
rule of his own reason, as the law of all moral agents. His will is always
declarative of law, but never creates it. He gave particular laws to Adam
and to the Jews; not arbitrary enactments, but his will declated the affir-
mations of his own reason, relative to their conduct, under particular cir-
cumstances. He declared that which he saw to be required in their cir-
Culmstances.
God's declared will is always law in the sense of being obligatory, it
invariably declares the decisions of the divine reason. So that we need no
other evidence of what is obligatory than the expressed will of God. But
God's will is not law, in the sense that law originates in his will, as distinct
from his intelligence. His arbitrary will can never be law. His expressed
will is always law, I say again, because it reveals what is the law or decision
of his own reason, in regard to the conduct of his creatures. The whole
that Doctor D. has said of my teaching under this head, is the result of
misapprehension.
IV. The fourth issue is as follows, pages 22, 23 —
APPENDIX. 975
THE NATURE OF OREDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.
“The system of error against which we warn you, affirms the moral law to be “the rule
of action, which is founded, not in the will of God, but in the nature and relations of moral
agents,’ and ‘prescribes the course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature
and relations.”
“Obedience to moral law, therefore, is made to consist in acting conformably with our
nature and relations; “and sin in being governed by the sensibility instead of being
governed by the law of God, as it lies revealed in the reason.' It teaches, that ‘ as the
moral law did not originate in (God's) arbitrary will; as ‘He did not create it, and cannot
‘ introduce any other rule of right among moral agents; so, “nothing is or can be obligatory
on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his nature and relations.”
“This, it is obvious, is very vague, and very liable to mislead. It is the very doctrine of
the refined sensualist, who, in acting according to the demands of appetite and the dictates
of affection and passion, claims that he is actuated by enlightened reason, and is fulfilling
the law of God. The depravity of man has utterly perverted his nature, and his judgment
as to his relations, and disqualified him to judge by his reason, as to what is duty and ob-
ligation. He needs a more distinct and definite rule. This, the Bible and our standards
teach us, is the deelared will of God.” - *~ -
Upon this, I remark —
(1) I have already shown in what sense I regard the moral law as founded,
not in the will of God, but in the nature of God and of moral agents.
The law or rule of action suitable for moral agents, is of course that which
is agreeable to their nature and relations. That is, they ought to will and
do just as is fit and proper, with their natures and in their relations. The
rule of action is conditionated upon, or grows out of, or is a consequenee of
their nature and relations. This is true, first, of God. His nature being
what it is, it is fit and proper that he should be benevolent. Thus it also
is with all moral agents. Their natures and relations, being what they are,
it is fit, proper, and right, that they should love God supremely, and their
neighbours as themselves. God pursues this course himself, and enjºins
condition that his nature and relations, and their nature and relations, are
what they are. Their being moral agents, and not the will of God, is the
reason why this rule is their law. This law would be binding upon them
whether God willed it or not. God wills this or commands it, because this
course is demanded by the value of the end which he requires them to seek,
and not because his will ean create law. Does Doctor D., does the Synod
doubt or deny this? If you do, say so. Would God's will be moral law
should he require moral agents to will and do contrary to their natures and
relations? No, indeed. Nor, as I have before said, is it possible for God
to create moral agents, and impose any other law upon them than that which
is suited to their nature and relations,
it upon all moral agents, not as an arbitrary enactment, but because or upon
(2.) The Doctor, as he well knows, or ought to know, seeing he bas assumed
the responsibility of a reviewer, has made a totally false issue.
He objects to the idea that moral law is founded in, or grows, so to speak,
out of the nature and relations of moral agents, that this is a vague rule, and
liable to be misunderstood ; and that therefore the declared will of God is
necessary to reveal to us our duty, &c. Now the question is not, whether
man needs a revelation of the moral law by the expressed will of God, but
97.6 APPENIOIX.
in what is this rule based ? Is the law founded in the will of God, or in the
nature of God, and in the nature and relations of moral agents? When
God reveals the moral law to men, does he reveal to them, and require of
them a course of willing and doing which is naturally and necesarily fit and
proper for them, their matures and relations being what they are 2 Or does
he publish an arbitrary edict which is not naturally obligatory upon them,
but which is rendered obligatory, merely by his willing it 2 This is the
question. I no more believe than he does, that man in his present blinded
State would perceive in multitudes of instances, what his nature and relations
require of him, or what is fit and proper for him, seeing he possesses this
mature and sustains these relations, without a revelation and an injunction
from God. Man needs, to say the least, to have the true application of the
great principle of moral law revealed to him through the expressed will of
God. But the question is, what is the law when it is revealed 2 Is it an
arbitrary enactment, sustaining no matural and necessary relation to the
nature and relations of moral agents, and whose obligation or authority is
founded in the sovereign will of God 2 Or is it a law founded in the eternal
nature of God, and in the nature and relations of moral agents, and enforced
by the authority or command of God, not as an arbitrary enactment, but as
a rule necessarily growing out of, and founded in his own nature, and the
nature and relations of his subjects 2 Will Doctor D. and will the Synod of
Michigan affirm, that the moral law is anything else than that rule of action
which is in accordance with the mature and relations of God and of his moral
subjects 2 Remember, the question is not, whether man needs a revelation
of this, at least in its specific applications, but what is this law, and on what
is it based? Is it founded in the sovereign and arbitrary will of God P Or
in the eternal and immutable mature of God, and in the mature and relations
of moral agents 2 This is the question. Will Doctor D. or the Synod
answer it? It is perfectly impertinent to quote scripture, as Doctor D. has
done, to settle this question, Who doubts or denies that God's expressed
will is law, and imposes obligation ? I do not doubt this, as the Doctor very
well knows. But this is all the passages prove, which he has quoted. There
is no issue between us on this point. The question is not, whether God's
revealed will is law. This is conceded on all hands. This the Bible every-
where affirms and implies. But the question is, why is God's revealed will
law 2 Is it simply because God wills something, or because he wills what he
does 2 Would his will be law, if he willed in every instance the opposite of
what he does? This is the question. Is it upon condition that God wills
in accordance with the mature and relations of moral agents, that his revealed
will is moral law 2 Or would his will be moral law if he willed contrary to
the nature of God, and to the nature and relatious of moral agents 2 If the
Doctor admits the former, this is what I have taught. If he insists upon
the latter, let him say so. Iłut will the Synod go with him? We shall see.
(3) Again, pages 23, 24, 25, the Doctor says:-
“The actual doing of what the moral law requires, and that too out of respect to the
divine command, is that alone which the Saviour accepts as obedience. ‘ Ye are my
APPENDIX. 977
friends, says he, “if ye do whatsoever I command you.' In like manner we are explicitly
assured, that he alone is accepted ‘that doeth the will of our Father which is in Heaven;
that not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law, shall be
justified.’ It is only he that doeth righteousness is righteous.” But ‘cursed is every one
that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.’
The intention or will to do is of value in estimating our obedience, but it is not all. The
law of God goes beyond the will, and looks also to the action; nor is obedience to it com-
plete till that is consummated.
“In opposition to this, the error we condemn teaches that “moral obligation respects
ultimate intention only, that the law of God requires only consecration to the right end.”
By the ultimate intention is meant the choice of an end for its own sake, and by consecra-
tion to that end, the supreme controlling choice. The highest possible aim of a rational
creature is affirmed to be the greatest good of the universe. The choice of this, for its own
intrinsic value, that is, ‘choosing every interest according to its value as perceived by the
mind,' it teaches is the law, is the sum and perfection of obedience to the moral law. This
it calls holiness, which it defines, ‘to consist in the supreme ultimate intention, choice or
willing of the highest well-being of God and the highest good of His kingdom: and nothing
else than this is virtue and holiness.’ This, too, is what it calls the love which Christ says
is “ the fulfilling of the law.” It avers that sincerity of choice, or honesty of intention, here,
“is moral perfection;’ ‘it is obedience to the law;’ and ‘insists that the moral law requires
nothing more than honesty of intention.” But the Bible teaches, that sincerity in error,
good intention in wrong deeds, change not the character of the act.”
With reference to these paragraphs,
1. I would inquire, whether Doctor D. means to assert that the Bible
does not regard the motive or intention of the agent in any given act . If
he does, I affirm that this is as great a heresy as ever was taught. But if
the Doctor does not mean this, what does he mean, and where is the issue
between us? He insists, that the Bible requires the doing as well as the
intending. So do I, and he knows it full well, I insist, that the outward
act follows from the intention by a law of necessity. This the Doctor
knows. I hold, that when the Bible requires doing, it requires that the
specified act shall be dome with a benevolent intention; that the spirit of
the requirement regards the intention; that God does not accept the outward
doing, unless the intention is right. But if the intention is right, God
accepts the will as the deed where the outwad act or deed is impossible. The
doing will and must follow the willing unless something renders the outward
act impossible. But where there is a right willing or intending, and the
outward performance is rendered impossible, God accepts the intention as
obedience. So of sin; if the willing or intending evil exists, God regards
the crime as already committed, although the outward performance or doing
should be prevented. What reader of the Bible does not know that this is
everywhere taught in it? Does Doctor D. deny this 2 He appears to do so.
Nay, if he does not do so, why does he find fault º' Where is the issue
between us upon this point? What does the Doctor mean by doing, when
he says that this doing alone is accepted as obedience. Does he mean the
muscular action, or the willing, or both? If he means the first, I deny it
and call for proof. Does the Doctor really intend to teach, that the Bible
represents God as accepting for obedience nothing but the doing, and that
he does accept the doing as distinct from the intending? I deny that the
3 R
978 APPENDIX.
Bible does teach this, and affirm that if it did, the human intelligence would
and must reject its divine authority, by a law of necessity.
2. The Doctor says,
“But the Bible teaches, that sincerity in error, good intention in wrong deeds, change
not the character of the act.”
To this I reply, that the Bible nowhere teaches or implies, that wrong
deeds can proceed from good intentions, or that good deeds can proceed
from wrong intentions. But the Bible everywhere teaches, that the charac-
ter of the deed is as the intention is. The doctrine of the Bible is, that
the intention gives character to the deed; that good fruit cannot grow upon
an evil tree, nor evil fruit upon a good tree; that the intention is known
by the deed ; that the outward life reveals the nature of the intention.
What does Doctor D. and does the Synod of Michigan, believe that the
outward or muscular act can be right or wrong per se, in opposition to the
intention ? Certainly you will not gravely assert this. And yet the Doctor
has charged this absurdity upon the blessed Bible !
I omit quotations from Scripture, on points so plaim, to save space, and
because every reader of the Bible will readily supply them from memory.
But can it be, that a D.D. should gravely assert, that the Bible teaches
or implies, that moral character belongs, not to the intention, but to mere
muscular action, in such a sense that the muscular action can be right or
wrong, irrespective of, or contrary to, the intention? Really such teaching
merits the deep rebuke, rather than the sanction of a Synod. And the
churches must be gravely warned against the dreadful error, that moral
character belongs to the intention that necessitates muscular action, and not
to the muscular action itself! If much of the teaching of this “Warning
against Error" be not itself the most pernicious error, I know not what it is.
But the Doctor labours to show that the Bible requires more than good
intention, that it requires good deeds. Now, does the doctor mean, or
expect to make the churches believe that I deny this? He knows that I do
not deny it, but that I hold it as strongly as he does. I repeat, that I hold
that good deeds, or outward actions, are connected with good intention by a
law of necessity. If I will or intend to move my muscles, and to do a
certain thing, the action follows by necessity, unless the established con-
nexion between willing and muscular action is by some means suspended.
When the Bible requires outward acts, the spirit of all such requirements
is, that the subject shall will that which he is required to do; and if the
outward or muscular action does not follow the act of the will, but fails on
account of inability in the will to cause the outward act, God, in this case,
accepts the will for the deed, “If there be first a willing mind, it is
accepted according to what a man hath, and not according to what he
hath not.” If the will or intention exists, the outward act follows of course
and of necessity, unless it has by Some means become impossible for the
will to cause or perform the outward act. In all such cases the act of the
will or intention, is regarded as complying with the spirit of the require-
ment. Similar things are true, of sinful intention. Does the doctor deny
APPENDIX. 979
this? Who does not know that this is the doctrine of the Bible, of com-
mon law, of equity, of all schools of philosophy and of theology? I am
distressed with the Doctor's affecting to prove so often by scripture, either
what nobody denies, or what nobody believes. If the Doctor does not really
deny what I have taught in this paragraph, and the same in my theology,
what does he mean by pretending to differ with me upon this point? I
should lose all respect for the doctor's theological ability, and even for his
common sense, if I supposed that he really held that moral character be:
longs to the outward act, as distinct from, and opposed to, the intention.
But if he does not hold it, but admits, as he must, or demy both reason and
revelation, that the commands of God respect directly in their spirit the
intention, why does he profess to differ with me, and cry heresy”
V. The fifth issue which the doctor takes, is as follows, pages 27, 28:-
“THE SPIRITUALITY AND EXTENT OF THE MORAL LAW.
“The system of error against which we warn you, teaches, ‘that moral law requires
nothing more than honesty of intention,’ and ‘that sincerity or honesty of intention is
moral perfection.” By this rule it graduates the claims of the law of God, so as to make
it a most convenient sliding scale, which adapts itself to the ignorance and weakness of
men. It utterly perverts men's notions of that high and absolute perfection which the law
demands, and makes moral perfection a variant quantity, changing continually, not only
in different persons, but in the same individual. It reasons as follows, namely: Moral law
respects intention only. Honesty of intention, or sincerity, is moral perfection. But
light, or knowledge of the ultimate end, is the condition of moral obligation. Conse-
quently, the degree of obligation must be just equal to the mind's honest estimate of the
value of the end Thus to love God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength, means
nothing more than ‘ that the thoughts shall be expended in exact accordance with the
mind's honest judgment of what is at every moment the best economy for God.”
“But the Bible teaches plainly, that the law of God reaches further than the ultimate
intention, even to the actings of the moral agent, in the exercise of all the various faculties
of the mind, in all the purposes, choices and intentions of the will, in all the inclinations
and desires, the passions and affections of the heart, and in all the members of the body.
So far from making obligation to vary with light or knowledge, and the moral ability of
the individual, the law and word of God hold men responsible for their ignorance ; and
attribute the deeper degrees of depravity and obnoxiousness to punishment, to those who
have blinded their minds and hardened their hearts, so as to have destroyed or lost all
power of perceiving and feeling the truth. “It is a people of no understanding, therefore
He that made them will not have mercy on them, and He that formed them will show
them no favour.’ ‘That servant which neither knew, nor did his Lord's will, was beaten,
it is true, with fewer stripes than was he who knew it and did it not,’ but he was beaten.
His ignorance did not render him innocent. ‘The weapons of our warfare are not carnal,
but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds, casting down imaginations,
and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of Christ, and bringing
into captivity every thought to the obedience of faith.’”
I sum up my teachings upon this subject as follows:–
1. The Bible requires no matural impossibilities.
2. Honesty of intention, with those states of mind, and those outward
acts that are by a natural law connected with, and consequently flow from
it, is all that is maturally possible. \
3. All acts and mental states that are directly or indirectly under the
control of the will, are proper subjects of command or prohibition, and are
accordingly either commanded or prohibited. -
- 3 R Q
980 APPENDIX.
4. But no act or mental state is either required or prohibited by the
Bible, which in no sense is either directly or indirectly under the control
of the will. These truths I have argued at length in the work reviewed ;
but, upon this, as on most other points, the Doctor takes no notice of my
argument. He finds it convenient to pass my proofs and arguments by in
silence, and keep his readers in ignorance of my reasons in support of my
opinions; and even treats my opinions as if they were mere dogmatical
assertions, without even an attempt on my part to Support them by reason
or Scripture. He merely quotes some single sentences and parts of sen-
tences from my work, and seldom more in any one place, and then affects
to array the scriptures against me. But in no instance does he show that
my opinions, as I hold and teach them, are inconsistent with the Bible.
But does the Doctor deny the truth of the above propositions? If he
does, let him say so. But if he does not, why does he profess to disagree
with me, and cry heresy 2 But, as is usual, the Doctor quotes the Confes.
Sion of Faith. He quotes from your Confession as follows, page 25 —
“Good works, or holy obedience, are only such as God hath commanded in his holy
word ; not such as, without the warrant thereof, are devised by men out of blind zeal, or
‘wpon any pretence of good intentions.’”
I have italicized this just as I find it in the pamphlet before me.
In reply to this, I would say, that I fully accord with this sentiment, as
I do with most of the sentiments of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith.
But what does it teach on this point?
1. Not that the Bible has no regard to the intention.
2. Not that the character of an outward act can be opposed to the
intention.
3. Not that the character of an act is not invariably as the intention is.
4. But it does teach, that good works are not those that are devised by
men, without a warrant from the word of God, under the pretence of good
intentions. Now, why does not the Confession say, as the doctor will have
it, that good works are not always such as flow from good intentions, instead
of carefully saying, a pretence of good intentions.
The framers of the Confession knew that good works must flow from
good intention, but that evil works flow from a mere pretence of good
intention. The plain teaching of the passage is this: Works, to be good,
must have the Sanction of the Bible, and not a mere pretence of good
intentions. Have I taught that a pretence of good intentions can justify
any course of conduct whatever? No, indeed; but as far from it as possi-
ble. This the doctor knows. What, them, has his quotation from the Con-
fession of Faith to do with my teaching? I hold that intention must be
honest, that is, that it must be such intention as God requires; and that
when the intention is as God requires it to be, the outward deed must
follow by a necessary law, unless something is interposed that renders the
outward act impossible, in which case God invariably accepts the will or
intention for the deed. I might support this teaching by abundant quota-
tions from scripture, and from the wisest and best of men, as the Doctor
APPENDIX. 98.1
ought to know. It is truly remarkable, that the Doctor should so often
quote scripture and the Confession of Faith with no just application to the
point in debate. In the present instance, the Confession does not at all
support his position, but implies the position which I hold. To hold his
position, it should read, “good works are only such as God has commanded
in his holy word, not such as, without the warrant thereof, are devised by
men out of blind zeal, or from good intentions.” But instead of this, it
says, “upon pretence of good intentions;” plainly implying, that works
that have not a warrant in the word of God, can only proceed from pre-
tended good intentions. This is what I teach. Does the doctor deny this?
If so, let him say so. If not, why does he pretend to differ with me?
VI. The Doctor's sixth objection is as follows, pages 29. 30 —
“THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD.
“By the divine sovereignty, the Supreme authority and right of God to govern, has
been generally understood by Presbyterians. The entire constitution of nature is referred *
by the Bible, to the sovereign will of God as its proper cause. It is as it is, because
God so ordained it should be ; ‘who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.”
Why angels and men, and other creatures, with all their varied powers, exist, is to be
resolved into the sovereign will of God. “Thou hast created all things, and for thy
pleasure they are and were created.’ Why this man, wise and prudent, perceives not, and
is left to reject the truths of salvation and the overtures of mercy, and the other man,
simple and ignorant as a child, receives them, believes, and is saved, is referred by our
blessed Redeemer to the same adorable sovereignty of God. ‘In that hour Jesus rejoiced
in spirit and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid
these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes, even so
Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.”
“But this sovereignty, the system of error we condemn, denies. For it teaches, that
the obligation of moral law is ‘entirely independent of the will of God,”—“does not, and
cannot, originate in (His) will'—was not created by Him—binds God himself—is as
entirely independent of His will as His own existence, is necessarily and self-evidently
obligatory, grows out of, and consists in what is fit, proper, and suitable to the nature,
relations, and circumstances of moral beings; and that “everything else that claims to be
law, and to impose obligations upon moral agents, from whatever source it emanates, is not,
and cannot be law, but must be an imposition and a thing of nought.”
The Doctor seems to be horrified at the denial that the arbitrary will of
God is the foundation of moral obligation, that he does little else than
repeat the objection over and over. Here we have his objection again. I
have fully discussed this subject in the work reviewed, and showed con-
clusively that God's sovereign will cannot be the foundation of obligation.
I have also shown it fully in the preceding pages, but by no means so
fully, and to so great a length, as in my Theology. The Doctor takes no
notice of my argument, nor apprises his readers that I have any in support
of my position, but only professes to be shocked at the impiety of such
teaching. But does the Doctor himself believe that God's will is the
foundation of obligation ? Does he believe that God's will would impose
obligation, did he will the contrary of what he does 2 Does he believe that
God's will would impose obligation, if he had no good reason for willing as
he does, or if he willed contrary to right reason 2 Does he demy, that God
wills as he does, because there is the best reason for his so willing? But,
982 APPENDIX.
if God wills as he does because he has good reasons for so willing, how is
his will the foundation of the obligation ? God wills good, and requires us
to will good. Is he under an obligation so to will and so to require 2 If
so, how can his will be the foundation of the obligation ? I have shown
that moral law is founded, not in the will, but in the reason of God; that
he is as truly under obligation to be benevolent, or to obey the naoral law,
as we are. Does the Doctor deny this 2 If so, let him say so.
Under this head again, the Doctor insists that the nature and relations
of things must be ascribed to the sovereign will of God. I admit this in
some sense, but in what sense 2
1. Not in the sense that God had a right, or that it was possible for him
to have created moral agents in such a way that benevolence should have
been vice, and selfishness virtue. It was not possible for God to create
a universe of moral agents, and render any other than the law of benevo-
lence obligatory on them. He might have abstained from creating moral
agents; but if he did create them, or having created them, he could give
them no other law than that of benevolence, which his reason imposed
upon himself. Nor could he possibly have so created them as moral agents
that another law could have been binding upon them. His etermal reason
from etermity affirmed the law of all possible moral agents, and God can
never, by Willing it, change this ordinance of his own intelligence. Does
Doctor D. deny this? If not, why does he pretend to differ with me upon
this point, and continue to ring changes upon different statements of this
objection, which I have so fully and so often answered 2 If I am guilty of
repetition in my reply, it is only because I have to follow the Doctor.
In these lectures five and mine, I have considered fully the question
of the sovereign will of God being the foundation of moral obligation.
If I am not mistaken, the reader of those lectures will, if he duly considers
them, be convinced, that the heresy lies on the Doctor's side of this ques-
tion, and that it is a most injurious blunder in theology to hold that the
sovereign will of God is the foundation of moral obligation. Will the
reader consult also what I have written on the purposes and sovereignty of
God.
VII. The Doctor's seventh head is as follows—pages 31, 32, 33:—
TIIE NATURE, AND GROUND, OR REASON OF JUSTIFICATION.
“Justification is the acquittal from guilt, and acceptance as righteous, of an individual,
either on the part of man or of God. Among men, it is founded on the individual's
innocence or freedom from crime. The justification of a sinner can never take place on this
ground. He has offended, and therefore the sacred scriptures declare, “By the deeds of
the law, (that is, our personal obedience,) shall no flesh be justified in his sight.” If ever
a sinner of the human race shall be treated and accepted as righteous or justified before
God, it must be by an act of grace ; that is, it must be an act of unmerited favour. The
ground or reason for God's doing this in any case, is not because of the sinner's return to
obedience ; nor because of his repentance ; nor because of any moral perfection or virtue
in him ; nor because he is in any sense morally perfect; but simply and solely on account
of the obedience unto death of Jesus Christ.
« It is not the sinner's own personal obedience to the law, nor the believer's, which,
properly speaking, forms the condition of justification before God. By condition, we
A PPENDIX. 983
understand and mean, that which is to be performed previously by one party, in order to
entitle to something promised, stipulated, or engaged to be done by another in return. It
is in this sense the word is commonly understood and employed, in the ordinary trans-
actions of life. There is, it is true, another sense in which the word is used by some
theologians—its philosophical meaning--who express by it simply the state or position
in which things stand connected with each other, as when, having said that faith and holi-
ness are the conditions of salvation, and when called to explain themselves, affirm, that
they by no means intend that these are the meritorious grounds, but merely that they
will be found invariably connected with, as they are indispensable evidences of, a state of
Salvation.”
I have defined gospel justification to be pardon of sin, and acceptance
with God, as if the sinner had not sinned. I make a broad distinction
between the conditions of justification, and ground or foundation of justifi-
cation. I use the term condition in the sense of a sine quá mon, a “not
without which.” The ground or foundation of justification I regard as
that to which we are to ascribe our justification.
The following I hold to be conditions of pardon and acceptance, or of
gospel justification in the sense just explaimed, that is, not in the sense of
the ground or foundation of justification, but in the sense that justification
cannot take place where these are wanting. Men are not justified for
these things, but they cannot be justified without them, just as men are
not justified by good works, but cannot be justified without them. I regard
this distinction as fundamental. I regard and teach the following as con-
ditions, but not as the ground, of justification. 1. The atonement of Christ;
2. Repentance ; 3. Faith in the atonement; 4. Sanctification, or such
repentance and faith as imply present obedience to God, or present entire
consecration to him. I make a distinction between present, and continued,
and final justification.
I conditionate present pardon of past sin, and acceptance or justification,
upon present faith and obedience, and future acceptance upon future faith
and obedience. The Doctor denies this, and maintains that one act of
faith introduces the sinner into a state of unalterable justification. We
shall attend to his teaching soon, but for the present I must present my own.
I have just said, that I hold perseverance in faith and obedience to be a
condition of continued justification. With regard to the ground or foun-
dation of justification, I hold and expressly teach, as the Doctor well
knows, that the following are not grounds of justification.
1. Not the obedience of Christ for us.
2. Not our own obedience either to the law or gospel.
3. Not the atonement of Christ.
4. Not anything in the mediatorial work of Christ.
5. Not the work of the Holy Spirit in us.
These are all conditions of our justification in the sense that we cannot
be justified without them. But the ground or fundamental reason of our
justification is the disinterested and infinite love of God:—“For God so
loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Som, that whosoever be-
lieveth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.”—John iii. 16.
984 APPENDIX.
Now, how does the Doctor treat this teaching 2 Why, he knows that I
make the important distinction between the conditions and ground of
justification, and admits that some writers make this distinction, but he
does not say that I make it and treat me accordingly, but proceeds to take
issue with me, and to represent me as if I did not make it.
But the Doctor perfectly misrepresents me upon this subject. Page 39.
“But the system of error against which we warn you, plainly and avowedly makes
justification before God to be on the ground and condition of man's personal obedience to
the law.”
Here, as all along, the Doctor confounds the conditions and ground of
justification, and represents me as teaching, that obedience to the moral
law is both the ground and condition of justification. Let any one read
my lecture on Justification, and then say whether the Doctor has fairly
represented my views.
From what the Doctor says in regard to the conditions of justification,
it appears as if his charge against me on this point was not an oversight.
It seems as if he saw clearly that I made the distinction above explained,
between the conditions and the ground of justification, and it also seems
as if he intended to cover up this distinction, and keep the fact that I had
made it out of view. It is plain, that the distinction in the sense above
explained, is an important one, and too obvious to be reasonably disputed.
It is also clear, that the only appearance of error in my teaching, as it
respects the ground of justification, is found in the overlooking of this
distinction. I must confess that I have been distressed with the apparent
dishonesty of this writer in this and several other parts of his review.
There is in this review, as a whole, so much of the appearance of a spirit
of fault-finding, as almost to agonize me. But, as I said, I must not sit
in judgment upon his intention, but leave him to the judgment of God.
Dear brethren, will you consider the injustice, I may hope unintentionally,
done to me and to the cause of truth, in this gross mistake made by
Doctor D., and endorsed by you ? I think I may safely say, that I never
for a moment, at any period of my Christian life, held that man's own
obedience or righteousness was the ground of his justification before God.
I always held and strenuously maintained the direct opposite of this. In
my published theology I have insisted upon it at large, and yet Doctor D.
has charged me with that which is as untrue as possible, and you reiterate
the charge, “Tell it not in Gath."
Do not understand me as accusing the Doctor of designed misrepresent-
ation. I make no such charge. I am aware of the power of habit as well
in thought as in other things. The Doctor has so stereotyped his trains of
thought, and has so long been accustomed to a certain way of thinking,
and to a certain phraseology, that he does not readily understand what is
said when it varies much from his accustomed track.
VIII. But let us attend to the Doctor's teaching, pages 34, 40–42.
*
APPENDIX. 985
THE IMM UTABILITY OF JUSTIFICATION, OR ADOPTION INTO GoD's FAMILY, AND
PERSEW ERANCE UNTO LIFE.
• The eternal continuance of the true believer in a state of justification before God, and
his perseverance in the way of faith and holiness, so as never to come under the dam-
natory sentence of the law of God, as a broken covenant of works, are essential points of
faith.
“The sacred Scriptures clearly teach, that God, by one gracious act, once passed, and
for ever immutable releases the sinner who believes, so effectually and fully from the
penalty of the law, that he is removed from under its dominion, and never more comes
into condemnation.
“But the system of error, against which we warn you, utterly repudiates such a release
from the condemnation of the law, and such a filial relation to God, except in so far as it may
exist simultaneously, and only in connection with what it calls, at one time, ‘present full
obedience,’ at another, ‘entire sanctification,’ and again, ‘moral perfection.” It affirms that
the Christian ‘is justified no farther than he obeys, and must be condemned when he dis-
obeys, or antinomianism is true.’ It does not distinguish between the offending Christian's
displeasing God as his heavenly father, and the condemnation of the impenitent sinner by
God as his lawgiver and judge ; between God's parental discipline administered to his
erring children, and the infliction of the penalty of the law as moral governor upon the
guilty ; between forgiveness as a father, and pardon as a prince. A system of parental
chastisement which is disciplinary, reforming, and not penal, is very different from a moral
government armed with penal sanctions. Chastisement aims to reform and save ; penalty
does not ; but to protect society and promote the public good. This distinction is very
important ; but it is wholly lost sight of in the erroneous theory which we condemn. It
identifies these things, and confounds all the gracious relations and offices of God through
Jesus Christ, with that of the high executive functionary or moral governor of the universe,
boldly affirming, that “when the Christian sins, he must repent and do his first works, or he
will perish; until he repent, he cannot be forgiven.’ Whenever he sins he must, for the
time being, cease to be holy ; he must be condemned, he must incur the penalty of the
law of God.”
“Justification is an act of God’s free grace, which takes immediate effect in this mortal
life, and by which the relation of the sinner who believes on Jesus Christ, is so thoroughly
changed to the law, that through the acting of his faith, he passes from under the con-
demnation and penalty of the law ; and being accepted as righteous, only for the righte-
ousness of Christ, is adopted into the family of God's children. It is one act of God,
once done and for ever, and begins innmediately to produce its fruits.”
Here them, we have the doctor's views of justification :-
1. That one act of faith so changes the relation of the sinner, that he
never again comes under condemnation, however much he may sin '
He is removed from under God's moral government, and is only under a
parental government. In this state he may sin, but the law does not con-
demn him. God no longer sustains to him the relation of moral governor,
but only that of a father. Now I should like to know where the Doctor
gets all this? Indeed! is a Christian no longer a subject of moral govern.
ment 2 How does the Doctor know this 2 But what is a parental govern-
ment 2 Is it not a moral government? Has God, as a father, no law, no
rule of action ? If He has not, what is virtue in his children? If He has,
what is this law 2 Has it any penalty º If the Doctor says, No, then I
aftirm that it is no law. Penalty is a universal attribute of law. That
is not, cannot be law, which has no penalty. It is only counsel or advice.
986 APPENDIX.
If the Doctor admits, that the law of God's children has a penalty, I
would ask whether his children incur this penalty when they sin 2 If the
Doctor says mo, I ask, why them do they need pardom, or how can they be
pardoned, if not condemned 2 If he says yes, I inquire how this, that is,
pardom, is consistent with the doctrine that Christians are justified, that is,
pardoned, “once for all?” If justification consists in pardon and accept-
ance or a restoration to favour, how can it be “once for all,” or perpetual,
and yet pardon for subsequent sin be necessary or possible 2 Will the
Doctor inform us 2 In this, as in all other cases, the Doctor has found it
convenient to pass in silence my whole argument against his views of justi-
fication, with all the scriptures I have quoted to sustain my position.
To go into a full refutation of the Doctor's errors upon the points at
issue, were but to re-write the entire lecture to which I have referred the
reader. I ask only that the reader may read and understand that lecture,
and I cheerfully submit the points now at issue to his judgment, without
further argument.
But think of it, reader, Christians not under the moral government of
God | So far from it, that they can commit any number or degree of sins
without condemnation—may backslide and not be condemned—might apos-
tatize, and still not be condemned by the law . If this is not dangerous
error, what is 2 But the Doctor says, page 33:—
“The acceptance and appropriation of a gift can, in no proper sense, be called a
condition. The sinner is “freely justified by grace.’ He is not asked, or required, by God,
to do anything with a view to a future justification ; but to accept of a free justification
at present offered.”
But is not this accepting of a free justification a doing something, and
doing something not as a ground, but as a condition of justification ? In
confounding the ground with the conditions of justification, the Doctor
blunders at every step. What, are there mo conditions of justification ?
Nothing for a sinner to do as a sine quá non of his justification ? I affirm
that the Bible everywhere represents perseverance in obedience as a condi-
tion of ultimate justification. The Doctor represents me as teaching that
this perseverance is the ground of ultimate justification. In this he greatly
errs. What can the Doctor mean by the assertion, that “the acceptance
and appropriation of a gift can in 110 proper sense be a condition ?" Is it
not a condition of possessing the thing given 2 Is it not a sine quá non of
justification ? Perhaps in reply the Doctor will give us a learned essay on
the etymology of the term condition. If so, I will not dispute about the
meaning of a word, while the sense in which I use the term is plaim.
There are three points at issue between the Doctor and myself upon the
subject of justification:—
1. I hold, that we are to ascribe our justification before God to his infinite
love or grace, as its ground or foundation. The Doctor holds that the atone-
ment and work of Christ are the ground of justification. I hold that the
atonement and mediatorial work of Christ are conditions, but not the
ground of justification.
APPENDIX. 987
3. I hold, that “breaking off from sin by righteousness and turning unto
God,” is a condition of justification; that repentance, and faith that implies
whole-hearted consecration to God, that a ceasing from present rebellion
against God, is a condition of the present pardon of past sin, or of present
justification. The Doctor, it would seem (for he professes to differ with
me upon this point,) holds, that a present cessation from rebellion is not
even a condition of pardon and acceptance with God, but the sinner is
pardoned and justified upon the first act of a faith that does not imply pre-
sent, entire renunciation of rebellion against God. Thus the Doctor holds
that a sinner may be justified while he continues his rebellion. If he does
not mean this, where is the difference between us upon this point? If the
Doctor denies, that a sinner can be pardoned and accepted until he ceases
from present rebellion, let him say, that upon this point he agrees with
me. for this is what I hold. I admit, that the Christian is justified through
faith; but I also hold that—
“'Tis faith that changes all the heart,
'Tis faith that works by love,
That bids all sinful joys depart,
And lifts the thoughts above.”
But it seems that the doctor denies this, and of course considers Watts, in
the above stanza, as teaching heresy. I hold, that this purifying faith is a
condition of present justification. The doctor denies this. Who is right?
Is the Doctor of old-school, or of new-school, or of no school at all upon
the subject of justification ? Does he hold strictly to the imputed righteous-
ness of Christ as the ground of justification? I cannot tell. Upon this, as
upon sundry other points, he seems to be so loose in his phraseology, and
so indefinite in his use of language, that he may be understood as being one
thing or another, or nothing, as you please. This whole review is charac-
terized by such looseness and ambiguity of language, as to preclude a
rational hope of ever concluding controversy with the writer, except upon
the condition that I consent to let him have the last word, and say what he
pleases.
3. A third point of difference respects the perpetuity of justifieation. I
hold, that the Christian remains justified no longer than he continues in
faith and obedience; that perseverance in faith and obedience is a com-
dition of continued and ultimate justification. I support this in my
theology at great length by scripture and reason. This the Doctor demies,
and holds that one act of faith for ever changes the relation of the Christian,
insomuch, that from the first act of faith, he is justified “once for all.”
However much then, a Christian may sin, he is not condemned, and of
course needs no pardon. For pardon is nothing else than Setting aside the
execution of an incurred penalty of law. Why then do Christians pray for
pardom, and why should they offer the Lord's prayer?
Is not this teaching of the Doctor as plaimly contrary to the Bible as
possible? “But when the righteous turmeth away from his righteousness,
and committeth imiquity, and doeth according to all the abominations that
988 APPENDIX.
the wicked man doeth, shall he live 2 All his righteousness that he hath
done shall not be mentioned; in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and
in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die.” Ezek. xviii. 24.
“When I shall say to the righteous, that he shall surely live; if he trust
to his own righteousness, and commit imiquity, all his righteousness shall
not be remembered ; but for his iniquity that he hath committed, he shall
die for it.” XXXiii. 13. “If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a
branch, and is withered ; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire,
and they are burned.” John XV. 6. “Who will render to every man accord-
ing to his deeds; to them, who by patient continuance in well-doing, seek
for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life.” Rom. ii. 6, 7. “For
we are made partakers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence
steadfast unto the end.” Hebrews iii. 14.
IX. The ninth issue which the Doctor professes to take, is upon the
subject of Perfection, or Entire Sanctification. He says, page 43 —
“ PERFECTION OR ‘ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION.”
“We believe, according to the word of God, and our standards, that ‘ there is not a
just man upon earth, that doeth good and sinneth not,’ that “if we say we have no sin we
deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us,” and “that no mere man, since the fall, is
able, in this life, perfectly to keep the commandments of God.' We mean not, that the
true Christian will or can deliberately make choice of, and allow himself to do, what he
knows to be sinful, or refuse to do what he knows to be his duty. The consecration of
mind and heart to God, ‘with full purpose of, and endeavour after, new obedience,’ are
what we look for, and affirm to be among the very first indications of “effectual calling '
and a regenerate state; not an attainment which is or may be made in a more advanced
period of the Christian life.” -
Upon this passage I would inquire, whether the Doctor means gravely to
maintain, that a person once regenerated does not and caunot choose and do
what he knows to be wrong, or refuse to choose and do what he knows to
be right? This he affirms. But does he really mean it? and does the
Synod of Michigan hold this too 2 Did not David choose to do what he
knew to be wrong in the seduction of Bathsheba, and the consequent
murder of her husband 2 Will the Doctor say that he was not a regenerate
man? Or will he say that he did not act intelligently or “deliberately 2”
If so, what does he mean by “deliberately 2” Will the Doctor inform us 2
Again, the Doctor says, pages 46, 17 —
“It is altogether a fallacy that men must believe in the actual attainability of perfection
in this mortal life, in order to aim at it, and to stimulate to effort for it, which is the main,
popular, and plausible argument, by which this system of error advocates perfection in this
world. The artist and tradesman aim at perfection in their professions; the painter has a
beau ideal constantly in view, and skill and improvement continually result from their
efforts after perfection; but their constant imperfections, and failures, and yet conscious
advancement, keep them humble, persevering, and diligent, ever pressing on toward it.”
1. I was not aware that this was the “main, popular, and plausible
argument by which the advocates of Christian perfection endeavour to
sustain their position.”
2. I was not, and still am not aware of the fallacy of this argument.
APPENDIX. 989
The Doctor's illustrations will show the fallacy, not of the argument, but of
his answer.
It is altogether a fallacy" to assert that the painter aims at perfection.
He knows it to be impossible, and all that can be truly said is, that he
intends to go as far as he can, and to reach as high an elevation in his art
as is possible to him. But he never for a moment intends or expects to
attain to perfection. Nor does, nor can a Christian really intend to be or do,
what he knows or believes to be impossible to him.
But I must now attend to the pretended issue which the Doctor takes
with me upon this subject. I must first get at his definition of perfection,
or entire sanctification. He says, pages 45, 46 —
“There is a deterioration of our moral and intellectual, as well as of our physical powers,
consequent on the fall, so that the most exact obedience any mortal man ever rendered,
comes far short of the demands which the law of God made on our great progenitor, who
was created in the image of God, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, and in the full
developement and perfection of all his moral powers. Uninterrupted obedience is the only
obedience that can satisfy the claims of the law. To continue in his obedience, as perfect
as God had made him, agreeably to the test which He had instituted, was the condition
required for his justification, and to which the promise of eternal life was annexed. This,
then, is the standard by which we are to judge of moral perfection, and not the fluctuating
standard of the different degrees of moral power in different individuals—the endlessly
deteriorated varieties of human ability, developed in man’s fallen nature. Whoever is thus
perfect, as Adam was required to be, will be justified by his own obedience to the law, and
entitled to eternal life, as having perfectly kept the commandments of God. This, and this
only, is perfection in the eye of God and of His law.”
Again, page 53 :—
“To affirm perfect holiness, or entire sanctification, therefore, to pertain to an individual,
because of an ultimate intention, or purpose, or governing act of will, or faith, which has
not been subjected to tests, nor been tried without failure or interruption through an entire
life, is greatly to dishonour God's law, and to magnify human vanity and pride.”
Again, page 56:—
“What is ‘entire obedience,’ ‘entire sanctification,’ if these phrases mean anything dis-
tinct and definite 2 and what else can it be, but perfect, absolute conformity in thought and
word, in will and deed, in purpose and affection, in heart and habits, to every requirement
of the divine law, from the very first moment of our mortal existence, and without the
least failure or interruption : This was had only by our first parents in their state of
innocence.”
In these passages we have all that I can gather of the Doctor's idea of
what constitutes perfection, or entire Sanctification. In reply, I remark:—
1. That, as has been usual, the Doctor makes a totally false issue with
us. He has given altogether a different definition of entire sanctification
from that which I have given and defended, and that too, notwithstanding
my solemn protest upon this subject as follows.—See the beginning of the
lectures on Sanctification.
“Here let me remark, that a definition of terms in all discussions is of prime import-
ance. Especially is this true of this subject. I have observed that, almost without an ex-
ception, those who have written on this subject dissenting from the views entertained here,
do so upon the ground that they understand and define the terms sanctification and
Christian perfection differently from what we do. Every one gives his own definition,
990 APPENDIX.
varying materially from others, and from what we understand by the terms; and then they
go on professedly opposing the doctrine as inculcated here. Now this is not only utterly
unfair, but palpably absurd. If I oppose a doctrine inculcated by another man, I am bound
to oppose what he really holds. If I misrepresent his sentiments, “I fight as one that
beateth the air.’ I have been amazed at the diversity of definitions that have been given
to the terms Christian perfection, sanctification, &c.; and to witness the diversity of
opinion as to what is, and what is not implied in these terms. One objects wholly to the
use of the term Christian perfection, because, in his estimation, it implies this and that
and the other thing, which I do not suppose are at all implied in it. Another objects to
our using the term sanctification, because that implies according to his understanding of it,
certain things that render its use improper. Now it is no part of my design to dispute
about the use of words. I must however use some terms; and I ought to be allowed to
use Bible language in its scriptural sense, as I understand it. And if I should sufficiently
explain my meaning, and define the sense in which I use the terms, and the sense in which
the Bible manifestly uses them, this ought to suffice. And I beg that nothing more or less
may be understood by the language I use than I profess to mean by it. Others may, if
they please, use the terms and give a different definition of them. But I have a right to
hope and expect, if they feel called upon to oppose what I say, that they will bear in
mind my definition of the terms, and not pretend, as some have done, to oppose my views,
while they have only differed from me in their definition of the terms used, giving their
own definition, varying materially, and I might say, infinitely from the sense in which I
use the same terms, and then arraying their arguments to prove that according to their
definition of it, sanctification is not really attainable in this life, when no one here or any
where else, that I ever heard of, pretended that in their sense of the term, it ever was or
ever will be attainable in this life, and I might add, or in that which is to come.
Now hear what the Doctor says to all this, page 56 :—
“We warn you against its deceptive and jesuitical use of terms, as it makes the phrases
‘entire obedience,’ ‘full present obedience,' ‘honesty of intention ;’ ‘sincerity,’ ‘entire
sanctification '—its novel, peculiar, and Sophistical technics, synonymous with moral per-
fection or perfect holiness—perfection of moral character and conduct. The phrases are
actually unmeaning, and ambiguous—mere vehicles for the most dangerous sophistry, and
eminently calculated to mislead and deceive.”
I will not remark upon the characteristic language of this last paragraph.
I supposed I had a right to use such terms as I chose, to define my own
position, if I was careful to define the sense in which I used them,
especially to use Bible language. I took much pains to say what I did not,
and what I did mean by the terms I used, and protested against any one's
overlooking my own definitions, and substituting a totally different one of
their own, and thus setting up the pretence of opposing my views, when
they were only assailing a position which I did not occupy. But, after all,
this is the identical course which the Doctor has taken. His definition of
perfection or entire sanctification, does not even pretend to be that of
Christian perfection, or of Christian Sanctification. It is only a definition
of what would constitute perfection, in a being who had never simmed. My
definition designates perfection or entire Sanctification in one who has been
a sinner. The Doctor well knows that there is no issue between us upon
the attainability of perfection in this life, in his sense of the term perfec-
tion. I no more believe in the possibility of attaining perfection in this life
in his sense of the term, than he does.
Have our opponents no way to oppose us but to cavil at our definitions,
APPENDIX. 99 |
and make false issues with us? It would seem not. But what are the
elements of the Doctor's ideal of perfection ? Hear him, page 56:—
“What is ‘entire obedience,’ ‘entire sanctification,’ if these phrases mean anything
distinct and definite And what else can it be, but perfect absolute conformity in thought
and word, in will and deed, in purpose and affection, in heart and habits, to every require-
ment of the divine law, from the very first moment of our moral existence, and without
the least failure or interruption ? This was had only by our first parents in their state of
innocence.”
Here, then, he lays it down, that entire Sanctification in his use of
the term, implies uninterrupted and perfect obedienee from the first
moment of moral agency. That is, to be Sanctified, in his sense of the
term, one must have never sinned. If any moral agent has sinned, accord-
ing to this, he can never be entirely sanctified in this nor any other world.
No Saint in glory can be entirely sanctified, because he has sinned. He
can never at any period of his existence perfectly obey the law of God,
because his obedience has not “always been perfect, from the first moment
of his moral existence.” Marvellous! Brethren of the synod, do you
accept and endorse this definition of entire Sanctification ?
Again : let us hear what constitutes a Second element in his ideal of
entire obedience to moral law, or entire sanctification. He says, page 45 —
“There is a deterioration of our moral and intellectual, as well as of our physical
powers, consequent on the fall, so that the most exact obedience any mortal man ever
rendered, comes far short of the demands which the law of God made of our great pro-
genitor, who was created in the image of God, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness,
and in the full developement and perfection of all his moral powers. Uninterrupted
obedience is the only obedience that can satisfy the claims of the law. To continue in his
obedience, as perfect as God had made him, agreeably to the test which he had instituted,
was the condition required for his justification, and to which the promise of eternal life
was annexed. This, then, is the standard by which we are to judge of moral perfection,
and not the fluctuating standard of the different degrees of moral power in different
individuals, the endlessly deteriorated variety of human ability, developed in man’s fallen
nature.”
It here appears, that all mankind, whatever their age, or education, or
circumstances, or ability may be, are according to him required by the law
of God, to render the very same service to God, both in kind and degree,
that was required of Adam, “ created as he was in the image of God, in
knowledge, and righteousness, and true holiness, in the full developement
and perfection of all his moral powers.” Notwithstanding that, “there is
a deterioration of our moral and intellectual, as well as our physical
powers; ” so that the same obedience is impossible to us, yet the law still
demands this impossible obedience of us all. And how does the Doctor
know this 2 He has not informed us. Does the Bible teach it? No,
indeed; that informs us that “if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted
according to what a man hath, according to his ability, and not according to
what he hath not.” The very language of the law as laid down by Christ re-
stricts requirement to ability, whatever that may be. “Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy might, and
with all thy strength.” Now every one can see, that the Doctor has taken
992 APPENDIX.
no issue with me in respect to the attainability in this life of a state of
entire sanctification in my sense of the term. And I take no issue with
with him on the attainability of such a state either in this or in any life, in
his sense of the term. Nay, it is impossible for one who has ever sinned
to attain in this sense entire Sanctification, as we have seen. The only
point at issue between us upon this subject respects the spirit of the re-
quirement of God's law. He maintains, that he requires of man in his
present state a natural impossibility; that it requires a degree of obedience
that is no more possible to him, than to undo all he has done, or to make a
world; that it threatens him with eternal death for not rendering this im-
possible obedience. I do not wonder that the Doctor vehemently opposes
the idea, that “moral law is a rule of action, suited to the nature and
relations of moral agents." Should he admit this, which reason and reve-
lation equally affirm, he must of course give up his old-school dogma, that
God requires of his creatures natural impossibilities. Brethren of the
Synod, do you hold with Doctor D. the doctrine of natural inability 2 I
supposed you did not. But it seems I am mistaken. Will all the new
school Presbyterians go back with Dr. D. to all the absurdities of old
schoolism, to escape from our conclusions º' We shall see.
Since the Doctor has given a definition of entire sanctification, and of
entire obedience to the law of God differing toto calo from mine, and
indeed from any other I have ever heard or read, I will not follow him,
nor trouble him with a reply. It will be time enough for me to reply when
he undertakes to show, that entire Sanctification, in my sense of the term,
is unattainable in this life.
The Doctor does indeed almost rail at my idea of entire sanctification.
He vehemently urges, that that is no entire Sanctification at all. But on
what ground does he insist upon this? Why, on the grounds above
explained, namely, that the moral law requires impossibilities of man, and
that no one can ever be justly said to be entirely sanctified who has ever
sinned. Well, I will leave the Doctor quietly to enjoy his opinion.
X. The Doctor's next head is as follows, pages 57, 58, 59, 65 :
TH E N ATURE OF MORAL D EPR.A.W ITY,
“In the language of common sense, men attribute to the moral being, whose general
state of mind manifests itself in uniform choices and prevalent governing emotions and
passions, the same character they do to these its manifestations. Both the general state
of mind and its specific manifestations, as well in uniform or habitual choices, as in occa-
sional ascendant passions, affections or propensities, are regarded as developements and
attributes of character, which are to be predicated of the person or moral agent, strictly
speaking of the rational, responsible mind or soul in which they exist, either as habitudes
or as acts or events, rather than of the specific faculties, susceptibilities, affections, or
passions. Thus we denominate this one or the other, ‘the debauchee and the glutton
and the drunkard,) and the gambler, and the miser, and a host of others, each in his turn
giving striking and melancholy proof” of the man's moral depravity, rather than, as it is
affirmed by this theory, of the monstrous developement and physical depravity of the
human sensibility." This man and the other is called revengeful, malicious, lewd,
lascivious, deceitful, covetous, avaricious, and the like, according to the ascendant passion,
APPENDIX. 993
affection, propensity, or habit of mind, which determines his choices and conduct, and, in
so doing, developes his moral character. Hence it is common to speak of sinful dispositions,
sinful affections, sinful words, sinful conduct, as well as sinful choices, not as sinful per se,
that is, in themselves, by a mere necessity of being, but as related to sinful choice, that is
to say, the dispositions, affections, &c., influencing the sinful choices of sinful beings. -
“Hence it has been customary to predicate moral depravity of what lies back of choice
or ultimate intention, that is, of whatever state of mind or feeling, or both, exists anterior
to choice, and tends, inclines, impels, and prevails to determine the moral and accountable
being to sinful choice.”
But a few pages back we hear the Doctor affirm, that the moral excel-
lence of God determines his will. Here he comes forward with the theory
that the moral depravity also “lies back of choice, and tends, inclines,
impels, and prevails, to determine the moral and accountable being to
sinful choice.” Here then the Doctor defines his position. Moral depravity is
involuntary. It is not an action or voluntary attitude of the will, but is some-
thing back of voluntary action which prevails to determine sinful choice.
This is indeed ripe old schoolism. To reply to this were to re-write my
whole volume on moral government, and to repeat what has been Said in
reply to this nonsensical philosophy a hundred times.
Under this head the Doctor forgets all the protests he has filed against
philosophizing, and plunges into a dense fogbank of old school metaphysics,
and assumes, with the utmost assurance, the truthfulness of all that has
been so often refuted by new school writers. Most that he says under this
head is high old schoolism. But, as is usual with him, he is often very
ambiguous. Sometimes he speaks of disposition as distinct from the will
and as determining its choices, and then again he speaks of it as if it were
or might be a voluntary state of mind. Brethren of the Synod, do you
understand the Doctor upon this subject, and believe in his positions 2
For myself I can do neither. But since to reply to him upon this point
were but to re-write all that myself and others have written to expose the
errors of this philosophy, it cannot be expected that in this reply I should
attempt it. Why does he dogmatically assume as true what has been
shown to be false, and that too, Without onee attempting a reply to what his
opponents have said ' This might do for laymen and women, who are not
expected to have read much and entered into this controversy; but that he
should succeed in gaining the Sanction of a new school Synod to his old
and exploded positions, is surely marvellous. Brethren, I cannot believe
that you had opportunity to understand this pamphlet before you adopted
it. But we shall see.
XI. The Doctor's next head is as follows, pages 73, 74, 75:—
“THE NATURE OF REGENERATION AND OF THE SPIRIT.
“The system of error, against which we testify, teaches that regeneration is change in
the attitude of the will,’ and that it consists in the sinner's changing his “ultimate choice,
ntention, preference.’ A resolution, or purpose, or choice, or ultimate intention to seek
the well-being of God and of the universe, is the whole of it. This it calls, a change
from entire sinfulness to entire holiness.’ “Regeneration is nothing else than the will
being duly influenced by truth.' The agency of the Spirit in regeneration is, indeed,
theoretically acknowledged, and the passivity of the sinner also ; but the former is repre-
sented to consist in presenting the truth, and the latter in being a ‘percipient of the truth
3 S
994 APPENDIX.
(so) presented by the Sprit, at the moment, and during the act of regeneration.' An
efficient determining influence upon the mind and heart of the sinner, causing and enabling
him to renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil, and to make choice of God, and
Christ, and holiness, is denied and denounced. The perception of truth on the sinner's
heart, according to the error against which we warn you, follows the law of necessity that
governs intellect. The Spirit's presentation of the truth, it is admitted, is necessary ; but
only as a prerequisite to such perception. That perception is but ‘ the condition and the
oceasion of regeneration.’ The sinner himself is ‘the sovereign and efficient cause of the
choice’ of his will. He solely originates, in a Sovereign manner, his choices. Any other
influence ‘ than light poured upon the intelligence, or truth presented to the mind,' being
beyond conseiousness, this theory affirms, ‘is and must be physical ;' and that the Spirit
exerts any other influence in regeneration, than that of divine illumination, it affirms to be
a “sheer assumption.’
“In sustaining these views, this theory affirms, that the word heart, as used in this con-
nexion in the sacred Seriptures, does not mean the feelings, the sensibilities, or suscepti-
bilities, but only the ultimate intention ; and that of the latter alone, never of the
former, can moral character be predicated. A change of heart is simply a change of will.
This view is directly opposed to the language and spirit of the Bible. In it, the word
heart is sometimes used to denote the sensibilities and feelings, the affections and passions,
the susceptibilities and emotions, and not exclusively the supreme ultimate intention or
governing purpose.”
In remarking upon this extract I would say,+
1. That I nowhere maintain, as the Doctor represents, that the term
heart is used in the Bible exclusively to mean the ultimate intention or
controlling preference of the mind. This is sheer misrepresentation, for I
expressly assert the contrary.
2. I would inquire what the Doctor means by “ an efficient determining
influence upon the mind and heart of the sinner, causing and enabling him
to renounce the flesh ." Now in what sense does the Doctor use the term
heart in this sentence 2 What does he mean by efficient influence 2 What
does he mean by causing “ the sinner 2" &c. He has not told us what he
means. The heart, it would seem with him, must be the Sensibility, or
something distinct from the will, or from ultimate preference or intention.
Again he says, page 76 —
“No bald purpose or resolution, or will to seek the well-being of God and of the
universe, will suffice as evidence of regeneration, or of that change which takes place when
the sinner renounces sin and self, and begins to lead a new and holy life. It must be such
an entire consecration to God as bears along with it, mind, will, affections, and places
every power of the body, soul, and spirit, under his direction and control.”
Here the Doctor gives his views of what is implied in regeneration
This also is what I hold to be implied in regeneration, and hence I hold,
that regeneration implies present entire obedience to God. Does not the
Doctor's language here imply present entire obedience to God 2 If it does
not, what language would 2
The Doetor ought to know, that I nowhere maintain that a “bald purpose,
or resolution, or will,” &c., constitutes all that is implied in regeneration.
I hold, that a change in the ultimate intention or ruling preference of
the mind, necessarily carries with it the whole man ; that the affections,
emotions, outward life, are all carried and controlled, directly or indirectly,
by the will and hence a change in the supreme preference or ultimate
APPENDIX. 995
intention of the will, necessarily carries with it a change of feeling, purpose,
desire, affection, effort, and makes the regenerate man a “new creature."
The difference between us on this head does not respect the greatmess
of the change implied in regeneration, but simply respects the quo modo
of the change.
Again the Doctor says, pages 7 6, 77 :—
« while the sinner is active, and acts freely in this consecration of himself to God, he
is nevertheless acted on. Motive influence, external to the mind itself, must be brought
to bear upon it, to induce it to exercise its free will in such consecration to God. This is
the work of the Spirit. It is the province of the Spirit of God, and His office, as provided
for in the gracious scheme of redemption through Jesus Christ, to help our infirmities, to
come in with the aid of His motive power, to induce us to renounce our selfishness, and
make choice of God and holiness.”
I must confess myself unable to understand the Doctor upon this subject.
He seems to hold, that the sinner is active and free in this change, and Net
he insists upon the Holy Spirit's exerting upon him a “ motive power,"
inducing him, &c. Now what does the Doctor mean by this “ motive
power * Not the influence of motives or of moral considerations, or truths
presented to the intellect and conscience by the Holy Spirit. This view
he repudiates. What, then, does he mean by motive power?" Not
surely moral power, or a persuasive influence. It must be a physical influ-
ence, for what else can it be 2 But the Doctor seems to repudiate the idea
of a physical influence exerted by the Holy Spirit in regeneration. But is
it neither moral nor physical? What is it? Will the Doctor explain him-
self? If he will, I can then say whether I agree with him as to the mature
of this influence or not. The Doctor is really so loose and ambiguous that
I cannot understand him. It really seems as if the Doctor often intended
to be non-committal, and hence so expresses himself that he can be under-
stood in either of several ways. But perhaps this is unintentional.
Sometimes the Doctor speaks as if he agreed with me, that regeneration
consists in a change of choice. He says, pages 7 S. 79 —
“But this He does by the influence of the Spirit, who brings the mind and heart into
that state which disposes and inclines it to make choice of God and holiness, to come to
Jesus Christ for “grace and strength to help in every time of need.’ In doing so, the
Spirit employs the truth as His instrument ; and that, not at man's will, but of His own
will. His office, in this respect, is more than the mere presentation of the truth. As a
teacher, He does indeed enlighten; but he does more. He renders the truth “quick and
powerful." It is ‘the sword of the Spirit,' and “mighty through God to the pulling down
of strong holds.”
“In what way precisely it is that the Spirit gives energy to the truth, and renders it
efficient, so that he becomes the author or the cause of the sinner's regeneration, it is in
vain for us to inquire.”
Here, as elsewhere, he seems to hold, that regeneration is a voluntary
change, and consists in choosing God, in coming to Christ, &c. He also
admits, that in inducing this change, the Holy Spirit uses the truth as his
instrument ; but he also insists that he does more than to present the
truth. “He renders the truth quick and powerful.” It is admitted that
he renders the truth quick and powerful. But how does the Doctor know
996 APPENDIX.
that he does anything more than so to present it that it shall be quick and
powerful ? He admits his inability to explain the quo modo, or to tell
what the Spirit does more than to present the truth. Why then does he
assume that he does anything more than so to present it as to give it the
requisite power 2 Why this assumption without proof?
I have endeavoured to show the teaching of the Bible upon this subject,
and why does the Doctor assume the contrary without noticing my proof 2
He all along does this with as much assurance as if he were inspired. Is
this right P But I will not further reply to the Doctor upon this point,
for really I cannot be certain that I at all understand him. If you, breth-
ren of the Synod, are edified by what he has said upon this subject, cer-
tainly you possess a happiness that is denied to me; for to me he seems to
say upon this and Sundry other subjects, things totally inconsistent with
each other. I will not say the fault is not in the obtuseness of my intellect.
Thus much, brethren, in reply to what the Doctor has written of what
he is pleased to call throughout his “Warning,” “a system of error.” I
am sorry to be laid under the necessity of replying to such a production, by
the fact that the venerable Synod of Michigan have endorsed it, and thus
committed themselves for its truthfulness, to God and the church. But for
this fact, as I have said, I should have made no reply.
Had I time and room, I should not satisfy myself with standing on the
defensive, but should go over and assail some of the Doctor's positions.
Brethren, are you satisfied with his teachings in this pamphlet 2 If you
are, I should like to meet with some of you, and have a fraternal conference
upon certain points. If the Doctor has not laid down erroneous, and pre-
posterous, and self-contradictory positions in this pamphlet, I am surely
very dull of apprehension. But I must for the present close. And may I
not hope, dear brethren, if any great man feels called upon to raise the cry
of heresy, that before you again suffer yourselves to be prevailed upon to
endorse for him, you will hold him bound at least to understand and fairly
represent me 2
Your brother in the Lord,
C. G. FINNEY.
P.S.. I have seen Dr. Duffield's review of my Theology in the Biblical
Repository. That is only an expansion and a dilution of the Warming
against Error, to which I have in the foregoing article replied. All I need
to say in reply to such a production is, that if he has enlightened any one
by what he has written, I shall be happy to know it.
J. HADDo N, PRINTER, CASTLE STREET, FINSB'ſ R Y.
85, QUEEN STREET, CHEAPSIDE.
WILLIAM TEGG AND CO.'S
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World ; and Miscellaneous Tracts. With Notes, &c., by the Rev. T. S.
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SHUTTLEwokTII's (BISHoP) Sermons on the Leading Principles and practical
Duties of Christianity, 2 vols. 8vo. . º º º $ * º
º jAN 3 1919
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… • FINNEY’s THEOLOGY. Tstudent he wouTEETſ'ºva-Tººrººm
º §º. According to Coleridge, Milton went sº half, the books in his library for one pe- º & º
. . . . . . . . . ) L. J * º w e I b. ~ :-
Yºfar beyond his contemporaries as to dwar! rusal of those Lectures.” And, with º
- * ... " ' '.' - '• '*.*. - “... F
ºhimself in the distance. As a theological him, we add, that “no young student of § 2.É.
... ººphilosopher, President Finney's relation to theology will ever regret the purchase, or º
º, the theologians of thirty years ago corre-perusal, of them.” It is well known that fº
ºù sponds somewhat to this idea of Milton, the strength ºf Mr. Finney's strong mind º
º Now that men are coming up to him, the | Was put into this book, and it is to live 3S º
... . º form of the stately thinker daily in-fa tribute to the power of thought. Its º,
sº creases. As a winner of souls Mr. Fin-author makes no pretence of learning; § º,
... ºney was ever acknowledged to be great;|here are no mazes of German in foot ºš
º tº but, we repeat, as a theological thinker|notes, no unpronounceable technics &e. Fº
º!he has not been highly enough esteemed. | this , reader, no fathomless philosophy Jºšć.
3 tº Hence our welcome to this new edition of jim. Neither does the author spend º º
ºbis Lectures. - ſ in the dress of his ideas, only to see:" sº
ºß sia, ti - † : {{`ſ -
tº In commending this volume to Chris- *... well clad in homebred Saxon. Histº
~gº º tian thinkers, it may be well to say that it ti le eloquence of thought, the fittest for º
ºn is not a new book, but a new and revised book of thought. He wrote as he ºiº.
' ' , ; *...” • , s a • , - e e &
º * edition of the original lectures of 1846, spoke, with a desire to convey ideas, not ºf
ºs more particularly an amended reprint of to charm with oratory. Like his fellow-º
gº ºš the English edition of 1851. President|thinker, Andrew Fuller, he mastered JºJº,
º A. Fairchild's revision must be intelligentſ thought by native strength, rather than ºſsº.
ºš and thoughtful, for he was among the first by educated skill, and expressed it like Ejº,
sº of the Oberlin students to whom Mr. Fin-ſhimself, in peasant English. Yet who sº.
'º, ºney delivered these lectures, and, ever lets the dazed thinker see through #
ºš º since he has been in contact with their “faith” or “ability,” like these clear-jº
*_ º ºthought, using them, in part, in his own eyed theologians. They are to theology º: --
* , ſº prelections, and for many years living in what Franklin was to philosophy, and Fºrº
*.*.3; daily contact with their author. Readers |Burns to poetry; fresh and refreshing tº
|: ºst of the English edition miss the first chap- originals, whose originality lay in seeing º ſº. s
ſººter, and the replies to the Princeton Re-with their own eyes what others thought || ºſ-
º Sºview and the Synod of Michigan. But visible only to the glasses of the cultivat- º ſº
sº the omissions are doubtless justifiable, in- |ed, and telling with their own tongues F.,
sºasmuch as fuller instruction in psycholo-|what was thought intelligible only by the tº º
*ºgy and philosophy is requisite than was tongues of the learned. .
§
†º
tº ſº tº * * *
tº-ſº ºcontained in that first chapter; and the Yet here we must in all
i . y ~~ | - • , - * º º -
zººpresbyterian alarm against Oberlin has |ness warn the intending reader
ºwaxed old and decayed, so that what was this is not a volume to lounge away tº
º ºracy reading a "ſtarter of a century ago|an idle hour with. Though there is w
~ *...
a’
ºxet, to many who not a passage in it which may not be - &
jº may not be softg i t .
Štěd the church into |mastered by any one of fair English ed-
ºwatched and &
'ºner present clearnés, of doctrine, the two |ucation, yet it is anything but an easy º §§ r^ - 3.
ºpieces, reprinted in the English edition, book to read. To read it as it ought to §§§ -
ºmanifest an ability in defense equal to be read, puts any metaphysician on his º º *A-2-
. . . . . , theºry shown in the lectures them-|mettle; to master it is an achievement º º,
-- ºselºill these defenses are not strict- for any theologian. Hear this from an º º
ºy *i. etures on Systematic Theology,” able, yet an unfriendly, critic, and whenlº
- ºſ hence the editor keeps to his close duty, you hear, believe every word of it but º-
º tº and omits them. one—the word “unbappy” in the fourth Ǻ.
*, *, 3. Intending purchasers should also note|sentence: sº
s." ºr the bond on the title page, for this is Lot || The work is in a high degree logical. It º “... --
.. -: - . ‘A zº - - s $ 1- e
…tº a “System of Theology,” like Dick's or is as hard to read as Euclid. Nothing can lſº
\ . - – ‘’ * - º º |
ºpwight's, only ‘‘Lectures '' On Certain |be omitted; nothing passed OVer slightly. is, º
º:
Q•" -
*º-
..A.
º, ºtopics in theology. But, in the i The unhappy reader once committed to a pe-ſº
... } ºtopics in gy. , in the judgment rusal, is obliged to go on, sentence by sen-ſºº (;
' ' ). ‘of many, these topics were never so lect-|tence, through the long concatenation. There ſº
r ºured on, before nor since. Not that Prof. ), is ...A. º: not * º º * {
, º& fi . º amplification or declarnation, from the be-lºº).
---, ºf inney reached absolute truth on all giuning to the close. . It is like one of those || $g
. ºpoints. But after a fresh examination of spiral staircases which lead to the top of ſº,
“’º, the lectures on Moral Government, Mor- i. high i. ..". rom || Wºº.
" Yºal obligati ſº * . . #the base to the summit; which, if a luan has || ||
º tal Obligation and Its Foundation, Moral *once ascended, he resolves never to do the .º.º.
º, Law, Depravity, Atonement, Regenera-; like again. The author begius with certain ||
. . . . .(tion, Ability and Inability, Sanctification, postulates, 9; what he calls first truths of X
7, , º's rereignty. P s of God d P reason, and these he traces out with singular
* , , ...” Overeignty, urpose O Od, an ** { clearness and strength to their legitimate
, , severance of Saints, we can honestly copy | conclusions. We do not see that there is a
: break, or a defective link, in the whole |
|\!*
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º.º
.
Tºº-
º as our own the estimate of Dr. Redford, chain. If you grant his principles, you have [.
A the English editor, who say*: “When a ſiready grºuted his condiusioisºrinº, | º:
hº- *--~~~~ : " . . . . . . . . . . Rezyżew, 1847. t
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by the wayside: “I have no hope of any ||
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Srn a wriſ. A p T. Wran Tº Tz' S
A good exposition of this volume is its
author’s Memoirs, and a good illustra-
tion of it is his Lectures on Revivals. The
first shows how he was set on the writing
of it, taking the Bible as he took Black-
stone, and discovering law “the very es-,
sence of reason '' in Revelation; and, from
that discovery, thinking on till he, in this º:
able manner, vindicated the ways of God
The last shows the outcome of
his pondering—the preaching of religion,
not as an “intellection,” nor as a “feel.
to man.
ing,” but as “a committal of the will,”
and hence of the whole man, to an obe-
J dient life before God.
These Lectures are republished in a
|time of need; for not only are they an
able and original discussion of our great
(Evangelical doctrines, they are a power-
ful testimony to their truth. Their au-
thor started in his pursuit of truth out-
side traditional and scholastic lines, and,
came clearly and triumphantly into the
‘Catholic C ristian system by a new and
rational industion. And in his progress
he grappled with old difficulties and new
speculations, and single-handed fought
then down — literally, single-minded,
thought them down—reinowing their mis-
chiefs from thousands of souls, and in-
ducing thousands more to look with new |
linterest on a religion which has no claims
that under God man does not lay on him-
self, and no salvation which the God of
all grace does not reason into men, as the
Only one under heaven whereby they
can be saved. Mr. Finney’s Lectures and
his Memoirs both join with his preaching
and his manner of life, to commend his
views of a religious consecration. All
four seemed knit into a sentence he ut- |
tered with his own peculiar impressive-
ness to the writer of this notice, one day
man's salvation, who does not stand com-
_mitted to do the whole will of God.”
W
[For sale by Cong. Pub. Soc. $5.00.]
ºf gives this description of Pres, it inney's [.
er in the pulpit.
* --> *
{ %
"Rev. Robert Aikman, in the Independent, ſº
r
pulpit power: *** * *
He was a very striking figure in the pul: ;
pit. About six feet in height, erect and Jº
iong-armed, with a lofty forehead and a
iarge gray eye, whose gaze seemed now to * .
sweep over a whole audience and then to
pierce into the secret soul of some individ-:
tial before him; his voice, not deep, but 805.
clear that it reached into every corner of 4.
those large audience-rooms, and at times:
pitched in tones of awful solemnity; his:
manner entirely his own and utterly unafrº.
fected, but such as arrested, and compelled-
attention—all these external qualities com-º.
bined to make him a man of peculiar pow-ſcº
Then his imagination, al-A-
ways at work and Sometimes as luridº
as Dante's; his power of Saxon lan->'s
guage; his absolute contempt of all mereº.
elegancies of speech; his lucid and relent-sº
less logic; and a certain dauntless disre-3
gard for all human opinion, or, more cor-5.
rectly speaking, an ever-pervasive feeling2.
that he was not accountable to man for:
what he said—these also combined to makes,
him the preacher that he was. *s
His enunciation of certain words had as I
tone of peculiar Solemnity. ... It is said that:
few men can utter “Oh!” with effect. Fin-:
ney made that monosyllable a real powerº.
of speech. The way in which, after some:
clear and clinching argument upon God’ss,
claims to love and obedience, he would ut-Fº
ter the words ... Oh, sinner!” or the singleſ:
word “Shame!” had in it the power of a tº
whole sermon. No man could mistake his
meaning. ... gº ...[
In marvelous dramatic power he was at:
times the peer of Whitefield. Those who sº.
heard him frequently will recall many il-; ſº
lustrations of this. One of these was rela- «T
ted to me by the late Dr. Beman, of Troy. º.
Finney was preaching a series of sermons ºs-
in the old First Church. There was a º
mighty Work of grace under his labors, theº.
preacher was in the fullest sympathy with j,
the work, and he was then in the flush of ºr
his great powers. In the course of one of:
his sermons he was endeavoring to magni-K:
fy the redemptive work of Christ by com-ºs.
paring with it his material creative' ;
work, and he described the Almighty assº
launching his newly-created worlds jº
out upon their vast orbits. The pul--ſº
pit of the church was quite narrow and 2-
the platform Wide, So that the preacher was º
free to move, and had full sweep for his ºr
iong arms. Beman sat on a chair behind sº
him, and as Finney swept a world out intosſ
Space, himself moving round with it, Be-sº
man suddenly dodged, back. When theyº
Were in the study, after the service, Mr. *
Finney said to the Dr.: “What made you gº.
dodge so, when I was preaching?” “Why, sº
Said Dr. Beman, “I really thought, Brothérº.
Finney, that one of your worlds was goings.
>
k=-
x.
He was a mighty man in his day, a holy:
plan of God, transparent in motive and is
life; unselfish all through, loving to theik,
Souls of men when he seemed most severe SS-
and utterly loyal to Christ. Few men haveº
tº entered into Sweeter experiences of the diº
s Vine, life, and fewer still have had such.
Jºj greetings as must have met him when he is
' ' | ºnfered thrºugh the gates into the City-º
into that City whither had preceded him ºn
tº so, many of his own spirituai childrej
With songs and everlasting i
heads. - 2- , Z 37-ſº
*śsºs, sº ...º is sº-X'.
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º'gº, ºf SºNº sº,
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y upon theirº
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