: Transportato@ Library 1494 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TOLEDO, PEORIA & WESTERN RAILROAD NEAR BREEDS, ILL., ON FEBRUARY 18, 1929. May 21, 1929 To the Commissi on: On February 18, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between a mixed train and a light engine on the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad near Breeds, Ill.; which resulted in the injury of two passengers. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Western Division extending between Peoria, Ill., and Keokuk, Iowa, a distance of 113.8 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The acci- dent occurred at a point approximately 1.6 miles east of Breeds; approaching this point from the west there is a compound curve to the left 1,637.9 feet in length, ranging in curvature from 40 20 to 50, tangent track for a distance of 369.4 feet, and then a compound curve to the right 2,112.8 feet in length, the maximum curva- ture of which is 4° 06', the accident occurring on this latter curve at a point about 1,420 feet from its western end where the curvature is 3° 02'. The grade is 1.07 per cent ascending for eastbound trains for a distance of approximately 3,000 feet to the point of accident and for some distance beyond that point. Owing to an embank- ment on the inside of the curve on which the accident occurred the view from an approaching eastbound engine is restricted to from 300 to 600 feet. Cl The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 5.50 a.m. Description Eastbound mixed train No. 2 consisted of 15 freight cars, 1 combination mail and baggage car and 1 coach, hauled by engine 10, and was in charge of Conductor Lionberger and Engineman LaBodie. At La Harpe, 61.9 miles west of Breeds, the crew received a copy of train -2- → order No. 301, Form 19, which read in part as follows: "Eng 54 run extra Bushnell to Hollis ahead of No 2 unless overtaken ***" Train No. 2 left La Harne at 1.25 a.m., 2 hours and 55 minutes late, and after setting out some cars at Bushnell, 37.3 miles from Breeds, the train departed from that point at 3.43 a.m., 3 hours and 13 minutes late. Stops were made at four subsequent points, including Breeds, and the train was ascending the grade east of Breeds at a low rate of speed when its rear end was struck by engine 54. Light engine 54 was in charge of Engineman Amick and Fireman Taylor. This engine doubleheaded westbound train No. 5 from Peoria to Bushnell, at which latter point the crew received a copy of train order No 301, Form 19, previously mentioned, and while engine 54 was still at this point train No. 2 arrived and departed. Engine 54 left Bushnell at 4.05 a.m., and after passing Breeds it collided with train No. 2 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been between 18 and 35 miles per hour. The rear vestibule of the coach was crushed while the forward end of this car overrode the steel underframe of the combination car and telescoped it about 10 feet; the forward end of engine 54 was also damaged. None of the equipment was derailed except one pair of wheels of the rear truck of the coach. Summary of evidence. Engineman LaBodie, of train No. 2, stated that the last stop was made at Breeds and after departing from that point the train attained a speed of about 25 miles per hour before reaching the grade on which the accident occurred, but at this approximate locality the speed began to reduce gradually, on account of a brake sticking, until the train was traveling at a speed of about 4 miles per hour; he then felt a jar and his train came to a stop. He further stated that shortly before the accident occurr- ed the fireman had informed him that a brake was sticking on the 5th or 6th car from the rear end of the traie and he tried to release it by moving the brake-valve/ to the full release position and then returning it to the running position. This action failed to release the brake and n -3- { he then sounded a whistle signal to indicate to the train crew that a brake was sticking but to his knowledge no one attempted to release the brake. Engineman LaBodie further stated that no trouble had been experienced with the brakes until after his train left Breeds. The statements of Fireman Steubinger, of train No. 2, were to the effect that the speed of his train was not more than 20 miles per hour at any time after leaving Breeds and that from the way his train was operating he surmised the brakes were sticking so he looked back and observed fire flying and informed the engineman to this effect. Ha corroborated the statements of the engineman as to how the engineman tried to release the brakes and also as to the sounding of the whistle signal. Conductor Lionberger, of train No. 2, stated that he received train order No. 301 and when he arrived at Bushnell he noticed engine 54 was then at that point, and after setting out some cars his train departed ahead of that engine. Several stops were made after leaving Bush- nell and the flagman threw off fusees at three points; on Bushnell hill, and when stopping at Cuba and at Canton, the last-named point being 5.9 miles from Breeds. The usual speed was maintained after departing from Breeds until the train rapidly slowed down on the grade on which the accident occurred. Just as soon as speed began to reduce both he and the flagman started towards the rear of the coach, in which they had been riding, and upon reaching the rear platform he heard engine 54 approaching, He said he immediately got off and started back giving stop signals with a red lantern, not taking time to light a fusee, and had reached a point about two and one-half coach-lengths from his train when the headlight of engine 54 came into view about 15 freight car-lengths distant; the flagman accompanied him and was giving stop signals with a white light. Conductor Lionberger said he continued to give stop signals but received no res- ponse from the approaching engine and when that engine passed him he shouted a warning to the engineman but did not know whether the engineman heard him as the cab windows were closed. He said the speed of engine 54 was 30 or 35 miles per hour and that it was still working steam at the time of the accident. He also said that the marker lights were burning brightly on the rear of his train and that the speed was about 10 miles per hour at the time he got off. Conductor Lionberger further stated that he was aware that engine 54 was following his own train and that in his opinion all the precautions were taken that were necessary, as his train had maintain- ed the usual speed until just before the occurrence of S - 4- ! the accident. The statements of Flagman Landon, of train No. 2, practically substantiated those of Conductor Lionberger as to the movement or their train and the throwing off of fuseos, as well as the speed of engine 54 as it approached the point of accident and the failure of the engineman of that engine to respond to their signals, ex- copt that he estimated the speed of his train at 5 or 6 miles per hour at the time they started back to flag. also thought they had done all that was required of them for the protection of their train; a fusee thrown off west of the embankment which restricted the view might have prevented the accident but when his train was passing that point he did not anticipate any difficulty with the brakes. He Head Brakeman Sharpe, of train No. 2, stated that he was riding in the rear car and that the speed was about 20 miles per hour when the train started to ascend the grade east of Breeds. While going up the hill the train slowed down to about 6 or 7 miles per hour, which was more than usual, and as he could hear a noise indicating that a brake was sticking he got off the train, ran forward and boarded the first car ahead of the combina- tion car. He then proceeded over the train to the 7th car from the rear, this being the car on which the brakes were sticking. He started bleeding the reservoir and was still engaged in this work when he heard the conductor shout; he looked back and for the first time saw the approaching engine. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident at 5 miles per hour. Engineman Amick of extra 54, stated that before he received his orders at Bushnell he observed train No. 3 depart from that point. His engine made three stops be- tween Bushnell and the point of accident. No fusees were encountered en route nor did he see the markers of train No. 2 at any time until just before the occurrence of the accident. His engine was traveling at a speed of between 30 and 35 miles per hour as it was rounding the curve on which the accident occurred, with the cab window open on his side of the engine, but he did not see the markers of train No. 2 until he was about eight car-lengths from them which condition he attributed to the restricted view in that locality together with steam blowing up in front of the cab and interfering with his vision; at about the same time he also noticed some one on the north side of the track waving stop signals from a point about one coach-length from the rear of the train. Engineman Amick 2 kw... "ག ས---"EL 32: .-5- at once reversed the engine, without shutting off steam, applied the brakes in emergency and opened the sanders; the brakes did not seem to hold properly, which he thought was due to the cold weather, the temperature being below zero, at the time. The flagman's signals were not acknow- ledged, as he did not have time in which to do so. He estimated the speed of his engine at 18 or 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Engineman Amick further stated that at the time of the collision the flagman w´s about even with his engine cab, while after the accident he noticed the conductor of train No. 2 at the foot of the fill about opposite the rear of the tender. It also appear. ed from Engineman Amick's statements that while his engine was moving at a rapid rate of speed at a point where the view was restricted yet it was not exceeding the speed limit, which is 35 miles per hour, and he said he was depending on the crew of train No. 2 to provide protec- tion. C Fireman Taylor, of extra 54, stated that he knew train No. 2 was ahead of his engine and that he was on the alert at all times and was riding on his seat box as his engine approached the point of accident, but on account of his position on the outside of the curve he did not see the markers until just before the collision occurred. He did not see any lighted fusees en route neither did he see anybody flagging while his train was approaching the point of accident. Fireman Taylor also said that the engine man did not shut off steam but did reverse the engine, which he thought was done at a point only 6 or 8 feet from the rear of train No. 2, and he did not think the brakes were applied prior to the accident. It was the fireman's opinion that his engine had been operated at a uniform speed of 15 or 20 miles per hour between Bushnell and the point of accident. Master Mechanic McPake stated that he inspected engine 54 at the scene of the accident but failed to find steam escaping to such an extent that the view was res- tricted. Trainmaster Burkhalter rode on engine 54 from the point of accident to Peoria, the engine being operat- ed under its own power, and from his observations there was no leakage of steam from any part of the engine that would obscure the vision of the engineman or fireman. Mİ -6- ¡ Conclusions This accident was caused by failure to provide pro- per flag protection, for which Conductor Lionberger and Flagman London, of train No. 2, are responsible. The rules provide that when a train is moving under circumstances in which it may be overtaken the flagman must take such action as may be necessary to insure full protection; by night, or by day, when the view is obscured lighted fusees must be thrown off at proper intervals. Both Conductor Liorberer and Flagman Landon knew that engine 54 would follow their train from Bushnell to Peoria and, according to their statements, three fusees were thrown off at different points before the arrival of the train at Breeds but none was thrown off after leav- ing that point because they did not think it necessary in view of the fact that their train was maintaining the usual rate of speed until it started to reduce speed rapidly as a result of the brakes sticking on one of the cars. The statements of the engineman and fireman of their own train, however, indicated that the train began to slow down some distance west of the point of accident, and there is also the statement of the head brakeman that he got off the rear car, ran ahead and boarded the third car from the rear, and then went forward over the train until he reached the seventh car from the rear; he began bleeding this car and was so engaged when he first realized that an accident was imminent. There seems little doubt that the speed has been reduced grad- ually, end at a sufficient distance from the actual point of accident to have required the conductor or flagman to throw off a lighted fusee. This was particularly necessary in view of the fact that the view was materially obscured. The employees involved were experienced men, except Fireman Taylor. of engine 54, who entered the service August 14, 1928; at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the pro- visions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND Director. ✔a į Transportation Library HE 1760 · A234 *** *} } {* » 18 19 2 1495 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD AT HOAGLAND, IND., ON FEBRUARY 18, 1929. May 24, 1929. To the Commission: On February 19, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Pennsylvania Railroad at Hoagland, Ind., which resulted in the injury of three passengers. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Fort Wayne Branch of the Cincinnati Division, which extends between Richmond and Adams, Ind., a distance of 86.6 miles, and is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and a manual block-signal system. At Hoag- land there is a passing track approximately 2,950 feet in length which parallels the main track on the north. About 1,700 feet east of the west passing-track switch there is a facing-point switch for eastbound trains which leads off the passing track to the north to what is known as the coal spur track, this track being 580 feet in length and paralleling the passing track. The derailment occurred at the switch leading to this spur track. In the vicinity of the point of accident the track is tangent while at the point of accident the grade is 0.28 per cent descending for eastbound trains. The switch stand involved is of the Ramapo intermediate type and is located on the north side of the passing track. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 3.28 a. m. Description Eastbound passenger train No. 200 consisted of one baggage car, one coach, seven Pullman sleeping cars and one observation car, all of steel construction, hauled by engines 1965 and 8075, and was in charge of Conductor Lonergan and Enginemen Unthank and Krouse. This train departed from Fort Wayne, 12.3 miles west of Hoagland, at 2.56 a. m., 16 minutes late, and upon arrival at Hoagland it entered the passing track at the west switch, and while 1 2- proceeding through this track at an estimated speed of between 7 and 10 miles per hour the rear truck of the third car and the forward truck of the fourth car were derailed at the switch leading to the coal spur track, which in turn threw the switch fully open and permitted The the rear end of the train to enter the spur track. train continued eastward, causing the fourth and fifth cars and the forward truck of the sixth car to run off the end of the spur track. The third car came to rest leaning against a barn, which was partly demolished. The fourth car was overturned, coming to rest on its left side, while the fifth car re- mained upright. None of these cars became uncoupled, and none of the other equipment was derailed or damaged. Summary of evidence Engineman Unthank, of the leading engine, stated that when his train was brought to a stop preparatory to entering the passing track for the purpose of meeting an opposing train he noticed a pronounced leakage of air and after the train entered the passing track he went back alongside the train and located a broken pipe which was connected to the auxiliary reservoir on the fourth car; he cut out the air on this car and returned to his engine. In the meantime the train to be met had passed and his own train then proceeded through the passing track at a speed of 8 or 10 miles per hour and as it neared the east switch he felt an unusual resistance to its movement, whereupon he shut off steam and permitted the train to stop without applying the brakes; he did not know at this time that a part of his train had been derailed. After examining the derailed equipment he went back to the spur track switch and found it lined for the spur track with the lever unlatched. He also examined the track and noticed that the first marks of derailment were near the heel of the switch point. Engineman Unthank further stated that when he inspected the train for air leaks prior to the accident he looked at the brake rigging and other appliances, which appeared to be intact, and it was his opinion that the air pipe on the fourth car had been broken as a result of having been struck by some foreigh object. Engineman Krouse, of the second engine also returned to the spur track switch after the accident and noticed that it was set for the spur track, with the lever out of the hasp, and on testing the switch by moving it in -3- both the open and closed positions he found that the points fitted closely in each position; he also noticed that by raising the lever and then lettingit go the points would open about 1 inch. He did not see any marks on the track that would indicate the derailment occurred west of the switch. A brake show was found by him that had recently been in use, lying near the inside of the north rail of the passing track about two car-lengths east of the switch points; an examination of this brake shoe did not reveal the presence of any flange marks and there was no other loose material in the vicinity of the spur track switch. Conductor Lonergan stated that while his train was moving through the passing track at a speed of 6 or 7 miles per hour he was standing on the right side of the rear platform of the second car, it being his intention to look over the train as it rounded the curve when leav- ing the passing track. There was no unusual movement of the train until he heard a crash and upon locking out he noticed the car behind him settle down, while the car in which he was riding appeared to raise upward. He reached for the signal cord and sounded one blast of the air whistle, which was all he had time to sound before the train came to a stop. Subsequent to the accident he went back and observed wheel marks on the ties beginning near the east end of the switch points. He operated the switch and found that the points fitted properly in both the open and closed positions, but it was somewhat diffi- cult to move the lever entirely around and latch it in the closed position. The statements of Fireman Johnson and Brown, as well as those of Flagman Fertig, added no facts of importance. My Brakeman Nelson, of the westbound train RH-3, which was the last train to use the coal spur track, this being on February 14, stated that upon arrival of his train at Hoagland on that date his train was left standing on the main track while the engine entered the passing track at the east switch in order to pick up a car on the spur track. He opened and closed the spur track switch for this movement and on both occasions he examined the points and noticed that they fitted firmly against the rails. After this had been done the engine and car returned to the train and in doing so a back-up movement was made over the spur track switch. He said he was certain that this switch was properly set when his train departed from Hoagland, although it was not equipped with a lock. Conductor Cook, of the same train, stated that he did not accompany the engine when the car was picked up on the spur track and did not examine the switch after this movement had been made but felt confident that the switch was in the closed position since the engine and car passed over it in returning to the train. Section Foreman Gibson, on whose section the acci- dent occurred, stated that after his arrival at the scene of accident he inspected the spur track switch and found it in perfect condition; the switch points were not sprung and fitted closely to rails in either position, but he noticed marks on the ties just east of the switch points where some wheels had run along the base of the . rail and damaged some of the spikes. He said that the condition of the turnout as to line and surface was not bad, the ties were good and the ballast was about 1 foot in depth. The switch stand was installed on February 6, 1929, and no trouble had been experienced with it prior to the accident. He last inspected this stand on February 15, and his track walker inspected it on February 17 and did not report any defects. S This Track Supervisor Hale stated that he thoroughly inspected the coal track switch and stand subsequent to the accident and did not find any defects; the switch was not damaged by the derailment, and he also gauged the track near the points and found it to be standard. stand had been removed from a main track switch about 2 miles east of Hoagland before it was installed at its present location. He is familiar with this type of switch stand and during his experience he has had no trouble with them, and it was his opinion that the lever was not down in the latch and possibly the vibration of the train as it passed over the switch caused the points to open, allowing the cars to derail. He also said that it is not the practice to lock switches leading from other than the main track. Wreck Master Brown stated that after the cars that were not derailed were reassembled an inspection of them was made, which disclosed that the brake rigging and other appurtenances were intact, while there was no brake shoes missing on any of the derailed equipment. The derailed trucks were picked up and placed on the track and the wheels gauged, but nothing was found to warrant condemning any of them nor was anything noted about the trucks that would have contributed to the accident. He examined the track from the spur track switch to the west passing-track switch and did not see any marks indicating that anything had been ragging, neither did he find any parts of equip- ment. In his opinion the rear truck of the third car from the engine split the switch and the forward truck of the following car dropped down into the switch, lining it for the spur track. The switch stand involved is operated by a lever secured to the side of the stand. This lever has a slot in it so that when it is pushed down in a vertical position this slot passes over a lug on the side of the stand and the lever must be snug against the stand before the switch points fit securely against the rails. The locking mechanism in the stand is so arranged that when the lever is raised a sufficient distance towards the horizontal position the lock is released and the switch points will spring open about 1 inch. Conclusions This accident was caused by a cocked or partly opened switch. The spur track switch was last used on February 14 and apparently was left in proper position as a movement was made over it, eastbound, after the switch was closed. It was inspected by Section Foreman Gibson on February 15 and was last inspected prior to the accident on February 17 by the trackwalker. This switch was also inspected and tested by various employees subsequent to the accident and found to be in good condition, no repairs being required since that time. It is believed that this switch was handled by some person who failed to push the lever down a sufficient distance to engage the locking mechanism securely and that the vibration of the train as it was passing overthe switch caused the lever to work up and the lock or plunger to work out of the base block of the stand, permitting the points to open under the train and resulting in the derailment. .. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library HE 1784 INTERSTATE COMMERCE CO ISSION • A234 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TRACKS OF THE PEORIA TERMINAL CO. PANY NEAR BISHARK SIDING, ILL., ON FEBRUARY 20, 1929. 1 : 1496 To the Commission: May 23, 1929. On February 20, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the tracks of the Peoria Terminal Company near Bismark Siding, Ill., resulting in the death of 6 passengers and the injury of 91 passengers and 1 employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of Sub- Division No. 1 extending between Western Avenue, Peoria, and Hollis, Ill., a distance of 6.1 miles; in the vicin- ity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred on a hillside fill at a point about 0.32 mile east of Bismark Siding; the fill is about 8 feet in height and on the north side of the track. Approaching from the west the track is tangent for a distance of 1,838 feet and the accident occurred on this tangent at a point about 138 feet from its eastern end; east of this tangent there is a 1° curve to the right 1,760 feet in length. The grade for eastbound trains is 0.427 per cent descending. The track was laid with 70-pound rails varying in length from a few feet to 60 feet, with about 35 ties to the longest rail-length, partly tie-plated, and was ballasted with cinders to a depth of from 20 to 24 inches. Various kinds and lengths of rail joints are used; the rail joints were originally placed opposite each other, however, the running of the track and change-outs to shorter lengths of rail neces- sitated the placing of some of the joints at irregular intervals. Giga > The railroad was built as an electric line about 1899 and was acquired by the Peoria Terminal Company on May 1, 1927; freight trains of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad operate over that section of track where the accident occurred and the heaviest engines passing over it are those of that railroad, of the 2-8-0 -2- type, weighing, engine and tender, in working order, 314,500 pounds. The heaviest Peoria Terminal Company engine has a total weight, engine and tender, of 213,000 pounds. The only passenger train operating over this track is the one involved in this accident, which trans- ports miners to the coal mines in the morning and returns them in the evening. On account of track conditions and comparatively heavy power, trains are restricted to a speed of 20 miles per hour. The weather was clear and cold at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 6.43 a.m. Description Eastbound passenger train No. 1 consisted of eight coaches, all of wooden construction, hauled by CRI&P engine 2030, which was backing up, and was in charge of Conductor Hulting and Engineman Fisher. This train left Bismark Siding, the last open office, at 6.42 a.m., according to the train sheet, three minutes late, and was traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 12 and 20 miles per hour when the last six cars were derailed as a result of a defective piece of track. All six cars were derailed to the north, the first four coming to rest on their left sides at the bottom of the fill; the fifth derailed car came to rest with its forward end extending down the embankment and its rear end coupled to the last car, which remained upright on the roadbed with its rear end a few feet east of the defective track involved. None of the coaches was telescoped or crushed, the damage to them being confined principally to their interiors. S Summary of evidence Engineman Fisher stated that the speed of the train was about 10 or 12 miles per hour when approaching the curve located just beyond the tangent on which the accident oc- curred; he closed the throttle and permitted the engine to drift and was unaware of anything wrong until he happen- ed to look back along the train and noticed two of the coaches buckling; he immediately moved the brake valve handle to the emergency position. Engineman Fisher said that he noticed nothing unusual when the engine passed over the section of track where the rear of the train de- railed. Fireman Bowers gave testimony similar to that of Engineman Fisher; the fireman, thought, however, that the air brakes applied from the rear as a result of the -3- derailment before the engineman moved the brack valve handle to the emergency position. The statements of Conductor Hulting and Brakemen Miller and Marshall were to the effect that they knew of nothing wrong until the accident occurred. Subsequent to the accident a hurried inspection of the track disclosed that on the north side of the track a portion of the re- ceiving end of a rail beyond the rail joint, was shattered, with some of the rail still left in the splice bars; no examination was made of the splice bars. These employees estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been from 12 to 15 miles per hour. Roadmaster Gates, of the Peoria, Hanna City & Western Railroad, who was riding in the last car as a passenger, stated that shortly after the accident he ex- amined the broken rail involved and also the angle bars. In his opinion the first break occurred inside the angle bars saying that there was a "Dutchman" in between the angle bars and bolted thereto; this was made of 70-pound rail, was about 5 inches in length, and had been inserted to fill out space between this rail and the adjacent rail. He thought the speed was about 20 miles per hour when the accident occurred, and that the third car was the first one to be derailed although there were no flange marks on the ties to indicate that either the third or fourth cars had been derailed prior to reaching the point where they turned over. Section Foreman De Rose stated that he had worked for the Peoria Terminal Company as a section foreman since 1907, but that on the section where the accident occurred he had relieved the regular foreman, who was sick, for only one day. While he had not passed over the section of track on the day prior to the accident he said that the track walker had been given the usual instructions to walk along and inspect the rail on one side of the track on the outbound journey and to inspect the opposite rail on the inbound journey. Section Foreman De Rose arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after its occurrence and saw the broken rail involved. Measurement of the rail dis- closed that it had been a 25-foot rail; of this length, 21 feet remained intact while the remainder was broken into small pieces, all of which showed fresh breaks; they were scattered over the track and he had difficulty in keeping the miners from carrying them away. There were two pieces of the broken rail in the angle bars, one at the top and the other at the bottom. The joint was a six-hole joint, fully bolted and spiked to two good ties. The inside angle bar was broken,apparently a fresh break, while the out- side bar was in good condition. Section Foreman De Rose stated that he had experienced considerable trouble with broken rails, especially in cold weather, averaging about one a week. -4- Track Walker Farano stated that he patrols the track every day and that he last passed over the section where the accident occurred at about 9 a.m. on the out- bound journey and at about 1.30 p.m. on the inbound journey, this being on the day before the accident, but noticed nothing wrong. C Roadmaster O'Brien arrived at the scene of the accident about 1 hours after its occurrence; he stated that the rail was broken into about 15 pieces, none of which showed old flaws or breaks. All of the six bolts in the angle bars were intact and this joint was still spiked to the ties; the bolts were new and were used again when the rail was changed. Roadmaster O'Brien was of the opinion that the break in the angle bar was caused by one of two trains which passed over it before the miners' train, but that it had nothing to do with the derailment, which he thought was the result of a broken rail. He thought that a section foreman or track walker could have detected the defect in the angle bar during the course of usual inspection. Car Foreman Lafeber arrived at the scene of the accident within two hours after its occurrence and his inspection of the equipment disclosed no defects about the wheels, trucks or other parts of the cars which could have contributed to the accident. The evidence indicated that this accident was caused by a defective piece of track, in which a broken section of rail and splice bar were involved, which were examined by Mr. James E. Howard, Engineer-Physicist, whose remarks upon them immediately follow: Remarks of the Engineer-Physicist. The derailment of train No. 1 is attributed to a defective piece of track, in which a broken section of rail and splice bar were involved. The defect appeared to have been of long standing, and according to testimony was in evidence before the derailment. The examination of the splice bars and fragments of the broken rail showed a battered condition of the upper fishing surfaces of the splice bars, about 6 inches long, under the receiving end of the broken rail. The inner splice bar was broken about midway its length, the frac- ture originating at the upper inside corner. The upper edge of this bar was in a particularly bruised condition, and no doubt the result of exposure to the passage of many trains. -5- The immediate receiving end of the broken rail was missing. The recovered fragments fitted indenta- tions of the splice bars, indicating the missing fragment was about 5 inches long. The recovered fragment of the head showed a line of fracture in the fillet and about the bolt holes of the web. This line of fracture was of earlier origin, and no doubt in existence before the de- railment. The receiving end of this fragment showed a fractured surface in the head, in a plane oblique to the running surface. This end fracture of the head repre- sented a fracture ante-dating the derailment. The portion of the rail immediately beyond the splice bars was broken into a number of short pieces, of which represented secondary features. all In the testimony it was asserted that a short section of rail, 5 inches long, had been inserted in the track between the broken rail and the rail next preceding. This piece was referred to in shop parlance as a "Dutchman". The evidence of the pieces of the rail and splice bars leads to no such conclusion. They indicate the prior existence of a defective joint, which had been allowed to exist for a considerable period of time. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. P 1497 } Iransportation Library HE 1780 .A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY AT SUNBURST, MONT., ON FEBRUARY 20, 1929. May 27, 1929. To the Commission: > On February 20, 1929 there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Great Northern Railway at Suba burst, Mont., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of two employees. This investigation was conducted in conjunction with a representative of the Board of Railroad Commissioners of Montana. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Fourth Sub-division of the Butte Division which extends between Virden and Sweet Grass, Mont., a distance of 36.25 miles and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, ho block-signal system being in use. The general direction of the track is north and south, but the time-table direction is east and west, and this latter direction is used in this report. The accident occurred at a point 1,494 feet east of the station at Sunburst and 70 feet east of the east switch of one of the industry tracks. Approaching the point of accident from the cast the track is tangent for more than 1 mile; the grade is 0.15 per cent ascending at the point of accident. The industry track parallels the main track on the north, and a No. 9 turnout is used. The main track was laid with used rails, 30 feet in length, in 1927, with 18 treated fir and tamarack ties to the rail-length, tie- plated and single-spiked; it is ballasted with from 4 to 6 inches of gravel on about 6 inches of cinders, and is maintained in moderately good condition. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 1.15 p.m. Description Westbound passenger train No. 239 consisted of one baggage car, one smoking car, one coach and one parlor car, in the order named, all of wooden construction, hauled by engine 1062, and was in charge of Conductor Burke and Engineman Reardon. This train departed from Kevin, the last open office, 10.42 miles east of Sunburst, at 12.54 p.m., 49 minutes late, and was derailed at 71ST CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S. 272 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 18, 1929 Mr. ROBINSON of Arkansas introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce A BILL Amending section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 3 That paragraph (4) of section 1 of the Interstate Commerce 4 Act, as amended, is hereby amended by adding at the end 5 thereof a new sentence to read as follows: I 66 6 It shall be unlawful for any such carrier to demand, 7 charge, or collect from any person for transportation, subject 8 to the provisions of this Act, in any parlor car or sleeping 9 car, any fare in addition to that demanded, charged, or 10 collected for transportation in a day coach, but this shall not 11 prevent just and reasonable charges for the use of accommo- 12 dations in parlor cars or sleeping cars by companies owning 13 such cars.' 22 71ST CONGRESS 1ST SESSION {8} S. 272 A BILL Amending section 1 of the Interstate Com- merce Act. By Mr. ROBINSON of Arkansas APRIL 18, 1929 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce 2 1 Ca Į Sunburst while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour. The engine turned over on its left side and came to rest directly across the industry track at a point about 230 feet west of the first point of derailment. The engine truck was detached and came to rest just north of the front of the engine; the tender remained upright, the front end being close to the driving wheels and the rear end across the north rail of the main track. The first car and the forward truck of the second car were derailed. None of the other equipment was derailed or damaged. The employee killed was the fireman. Summary of evidence Engineman Reardon stated that approaching the point of accident he made a light application of the air brakes to ease the train over a rough spot and when near the water tank, which is located about 1,600 feet east of the first point of derailment, he encountered a snow drift. After passing through this snow the train was approaching the station when it struck a little snow and he felt the engine raise up; realizing that some- thing was wrong he closed the throttle and applied the air brakes in emergency. He estimated the speed at the time of the accident to have been 20 miles per hour, and in his opinion the derailment was caused by hard snow in the flangeway. Traveling Engineer Stone, who was riding on the engine at the time of the accident, stated that when the engine hit the snow near the water tank there was some shock but it did not appear to reduce the speed a great deal. At the time of the derailment he did not notice any snow flying and the engine traveled only a short dis- tance before it turned over. After the accident r. Stone made an examination of the track and found the first mark of derailment to be at the No. 3 wheel of the second car on the north side of the track; this was close to the switch, however, and the mark consisted only of a light mark in the snow beside the rail. There was also a slight drift cast of this point, and the snow was solid enough to support the weight of a man. Upon inspecting the engine he found the throttle closed, the brake valve in the emergency position and the reverse lever in the forward position. In his opinion the operation of trains back and forth had formed a rut in the snow, which was above the rails, and new snow, which seemed to be very heavy, had drifted in and was sufficient to pre- vent the engine truck wheels from staying on the rails. The testimony of Conductor Burke disclosed nothing additional of importance. Head Brakeman Ford and Flagman 1 - 3 - Melvin stated that it was not customary to have a great deal of snow at that particular point, although they often encountered some at the station, in which event the train usually pulled ahead beyond the station and then backed up. Master Carpenter Johnson, who was riding as a passenger at the time of the accident, stated that after the accident he examined the track and found the switch point on the north side in perfect condition, but the point. on the opposite side had a piece broken out of the end of it; this point appeared to have been struck by some- thing The switch was locked. He stated that at a point about 64 feet east of the switch there were marks that indicated to him that the engine-truck wheels had left the rails at that point, although there were no marks to show that the flange of the wheel had climbed the rail. Mr. Johnson was of the opinion that the derailment was caused by the hard-packed snow. He stated that the snow was very heavy and there was very little dirt in it. He cleaned away the snow along the side of the rail and found a thin sheet of ice on top of the ties. Heal District Roadmaster Eastman, who has charge of the section of track upon which the accident occurred, stated that he had last been over this territory on February 15 and had found no great amount of snow at that time. On the day following the accident he operated a snow-dozer at Sunburst and found a snow drift about 200 feet long west of the water tank; this drift was composed of some dirt and very heavy snow, about 2 or 3 feet in depth. At the point of derailment there was another drift about 10 or 12 inches deep with more dirt in it than in the first drift. On the night of the 20th the weather was compar- atively calm and he thought the conditions on the following day were just about the same as they were on the day of the accident. Mr. Eastman also stated that the section gang located at Sweet Grass has charge of the track at Sunburst and is expected to cover this territory every day, a dis- tance of approximately 11 miles. In previous years trouble had been experienced by snow drifting over the industry track at Sunburst, but never on the main track. He stated that they have a snow fence near the water tank, where they get as much snow as anywhere, and they also have a snow fence near the track at the point of the accident, which was full of snow at that time. ? Section Foreman Poulos, who has been employed as section foreman at Sweet Grass for the past four months stated that he had never found it necessary to clean out very many drifts at Sunburst as there was usually very little snow there. He also stated that he was unable to go to Sunburst on the motor car on the day of the acci- dent, due to the snow on the track, but took the local train due at Sunburst at 2.05 p.m. The Commission's inspectors were unable to make an i 4 !! There examination of the track in the vicinity of the point of accident until about 48 hours after its occurrence, at which time repairs to the track had been completed. were many marks and cuts on the ties but there was nothing about them which was of assistance in determining when or how they were made. The left or south switch point was battered, and a piece broken from it which was about 5 inches in length; this was a new break, but might have been made when the engine was pulled from the rail by the engine truck. This examination of the track did not disclose any track conditions which might have con- tributed to the occurrence of the accident, although it was noted that the gauge was tight and the elevation was uneven. Conclusions This accident apparently was caused by a drift of heavy snow on the track. There was evidence that east of the point of de- railment the snow was 10 or 12 inches deep, packed very hard and mixed with some dirt, and apparently none of the withesses made any detailed examination of the track, accepting the presence of marks in the snow east of the switch as indicating the point of derailment and reaching the conclusion that the accident was due to hard-packed snow. Bubsequent investigation did not lead to any differ- ent conclusion. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library HE 1780 •A23Y 1498 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD AT HUMBOLDT, TENN. ON FEBRUARY 20, 1929. 2 May 25, 1929. To the Commission: On February 20, 1929, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Humboldt, Tenn., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of one poultry caretaker. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Jackson District of the Jackson Division, extending between Iselin and Cairo, Ill., a distance of 113.66 miles, which is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. At Humboldt there is a passing track 3,619.5 feet in length which parallels the main track on the east. The accident occurred on this passing track within yard limits, at a point 286.5 feet north of the south switch; this switch being located 4,358.5 feet north of the south yard-limit board. Approaching this switch from the south, beginning at the south yard-limit board, the track is tangent to and beyond the switch. The grade at the point of accident is 0.66 per cent ascending for northbound trains. The switch stand at the south passing-track switch is located on the east side of the track and is equipped with a single-blade target 18 inches in diameter and is 5 feet 9 inches above the base of the stand; the target is only displayed when the switch is set for the passing track. There is a switch leading off the passing track to industrial tracks, located 266.5 feet north of the south passing-track switch. It was snowing at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 1.40 . m. Description Southbound third-class freight train No. 73 con- sisted of 10 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 415, and was in charge of Conductor Scott and Engineman Gregory. This train arrived at Humboldt at 12.10 p. m., 1 hour and 25 minutes late. After switching some cars 2 ? -2- at this point the train was pulled into clear on the north end of the passing track and the engine proceeded to the south end of the siding to do some switching on the industrial tracks. In order to accomplish this work it was necessary to open the passing-track switch, and it was while this switching was being done that the engine was struck by train No. 54. Northbound second-class freight train No. 54 con- sisted of 46 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 462, and was in charge of Conductor Schmidt and Engineman Hillman. This train departed from Jackson, 7.15 miles south of Humboldt, at 12.59 p. m., 4 hours and 14 minutes late, entered the open switch at the south end of the passing track at Humboldt, and collided with the engine of train No. 73 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 18 and 25 miles per hour. At the time of the accident there was one car coupled behind engine 415, a short distance from some other cars on the passing track. Engine 415 was driven back against those other cars and came to rest 150 feet from the point of collision; the second car from the engine was broken in two and came to rest across the main track and the others were driven northward a considerable distance. Engine 462 was derailed but remained upright. The first seven cars of train No. 54 were derailed, the first four being overturned. Both engines and the cars that were overturned were quite badly damaged and the other derailed cars sustained some damage. The 24th car in train No. 54 was broken in two but was not derailed. The employee killed was the fireman of train No. 54. Summary of evidence Engineman Gregory, of train No. 73, stated that some cars had been pulled from one of the industrial tracks and then backed northward on the passing track. A brakeman cut them between the first and second cars and gave a proceed signal but before he had time to release the brakes and start ahead the brakeman pointed in that direction and upon looking toward the south he observed train No. 54 approaching, about two car-lengths from the passing track switch. Realizing that a collision was inevitable he warned the fireman and then jumped off. Engineman Gregoxy said it was snowing quite hard but that he could see nearly to the south yard-limit board, or approximately 3/4 of a mile. - The statements of Fireman King, of train No. 73, substantiated those of Engineman Gregory as to the events leading up to the occurrence of the accident. He thought train No. 54 was traveling at a speed of 20 or 25 miles -3- ป R A per hour when it entered the passing track switch. Brakeman Long, of train No. 73, stated that at the time of the accident six cars were on the passing track behind the engine, one of which was coupled to the engine and was to be placed on one of the industrial tracks. It was when this movement was about to be started, at which time he was about two car-lengths to the rear of his engine, that he looked ahead and saw train No. 54 approaching about three car-lengths from the passing track switch; he signalled his engineman by pointing towards that train and then ran for his own safety. He did not give a proceed signal to the approaching train and felt certain that none was given by the other brakemen, who were located near him. He also said that after the accident the weather conditions were such that he could see the caboose of train No. 54 about 20 or 30 car-lengths distant. Brakeman Long further stated that his crew was in posses- sion of an order that train No. 54 would wait at Carroll, 9.71 miles south of Humboldt, until 1.05 p. m., but as he heard no whistle signals sounded by that train as it approached the point of accident, together with the fact that he was busily engaged in switching, he did not main- tain a lookout for it. No one was left to protect the open switch as it was necessary to have all available brakemen in the vicinity of where the switching was being done in order to pass signals. The statements of Brakemen Ferris and Hicks, of train No. 73, were to the effect that they were standing in the vicinity of the switches at the south end of the yard as train No. 54 was approaching but neither of them observed that train until it had nearly reached the south passing track switch; Brakeman Hicks immediately started towards the switch but soon realized that he could not reach it in time so he started giving stop signals. They gave no proceed signals to that train, which they esti- mated was traveling at a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour at the time it entered the passing track. Brakeman Hicks said it was snowing very hard but after the occurrence of the accident he could plainly see the rear end of train No. 54. Ga Conductor Scott, of train No. 73, had just left the freight office when he heard the crash of the collision. He proceeded to the scene of accident and shortly after- wards continued to the south switch and was able to see the caboose of train No. 54, about 40 car-lengths distant. He also said that the snow storm did not prevent him from identifying any member of his crew at a distance of 50 or 60 car-lengths. Bug Budape -4- Engineman Hillman, of train No. 54, stated that he held an order to wait at Carroll until 1.15 p. m. for train No. 73 but as he did not meet this train at that point he expected to pass it at Humboldt. His train approached the latter point in a violent snow storm and the velocity of the wind was about 25 miles per hour. He closed the throttle and applied the brakes approximately 60 car-lengths south of the yard-limit board, reducing speed from about 35 miles per hour to 20 miles per hour. Upon reaching a point about 25 car-lengths from the south passing-track switch, and while he was leaning out looking ahead, some one on the left side of the cab called, "Highball, they are in the clear." He ignored this statement and left the brakes applied but the fireman then stepped towards the center of the engine deck and repeated the signal whereupon he moved the brake valve handle to the full release position. Engineman Hillman again looked out when his train was about four car-lengths from the switch and he observed that the engine of train No. 73 was into clear but because of the snow storm he did not discover that the target at the passing-track switch was displayed until he was within one car-length of it; he at once applied the brakes in emergency but on account of having just released them the emergency application had no effect and the speed of his train at the time of the accident was about 18 miles per hour. He also said that he was in a better position to see the switch target, which was located on his side of the track, then the fireman or head brakeman but that owing to the weather conditions it would have been im- possible to determine the position of the switch until within three or four car-lengths of it. Engineman Hillman considered that his train was moving under control and could have been brought to a stop by another applica- tion of the brakes clear of the south passing-track switch had he not released them, which action was taken only when his attention was called the second time to the fact that the opposing train was in the clear; he depended on the fireman's judgment as he said the fireman was a reliable man and must have received a signal of some kind else he would not have called it. Head Brakeman Barnes, of train No. 54, stated that while approaching the point of accident he was riding on the fireman's side of the engine looking back to see if there was any fire flying from the wheels, and as his train neared the passing track some one, whom he thought was the fireman, called, "Highball, main line clear"; he did not hear this signal repeated. When within two car- lengths of the south switch he looked ahead and observed a man standing on the main track approximately five or six car-lengths north of the switch with his hands raised, which was a slow signal, the accident occurring very shortly afterwards. His other statements brought out 6 1. nothing additional of importance. Conductor Schmidt, of train No. 54, stated that as his train approached Humboldt he felt an application of the brakes and then they were released after which the train travelled approximately 15 car-lengths and then came to a sudden stop. He was looking out the door of the caboose at the time but due to the storm he could only see a distance of four or five car-lengths. He estimated the speed of his train when it passed the yard-limit board at 20 miles per hour and at the time of the accident at 15 to 18 miles per hour. He also said that the air brakes had been working properly and thought the train was under full control, not knowing the conditions exist- ing ahead. B A The statements of Flagman Robinson, of train No. 54, brought out no additional facts of importance, except that immediately after the accident he boarded the rear car of his train, looked ahead and noticed some cars across the main track which he thought were about 30 car-lengths distant. > Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engine man Hillman, of train No. 54, a second-class train, properly to control the speed of his train within yard limits. The rules provide that within yard limits the main track may be used without protection against second and inferior class trains second and inferior class trains must move within yard limits prepared to stop within one- half the range of vision, unless the main track is seen or known to be clear. Engineman Hillman understood the requirements of this rule and recently had his attention called to it by receiving a bulletin notice quoting the rule, in addition to having been warned by the trainmaster on nis last trip about obeying yard-limit as well as other rules. According to his statements, however, he was notified twice that the opposing train was in the clear, the first time having been when he was approximately 25 car-lengths from the switch, and after releasing the brakes it was not until he was within four car-lengths of the switch, or less, that he observed the engine of train No. 73 on the passing track and apparently he did not notice that the switch was open until his own engine had almost reached it. Engineman Hillman was confident that his fireman must have received some signal that the way was clear but according to the statements of the crew of train No. 73 no such signal had been given to the approaching train. Regardless of this fact, however, if C -6- F the weather conditions were such as to restrict the engineman's view to a distance of four car-lengths, or less, then under rule 93 he should have been prepared to stop within two carlengths; as it was, the speed of his train was at least 18 miles per hour when the accident occurred. The employees involved were experienced men; at the time of the accident the crew of train No. 54 had been on duty 1 hour and 40 minutes and the crew of train No. 73, 6 hours and 10 minutes, after off-duty periods of more than 12 hours. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. • } Transportacon Library HE 1780 4234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION + 1500 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LINE OF THE READING COMPANY NEAR LAUREL, PA., ON FEBRUARY 26, 1929. May 31, 1929. To the Commission: On February 26, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a passenger train and a work train on the line of the Reading Company near Laurel, Pa., resulting in the injury of 3 passengers, 1 mail clerk, 5 train employees and 20 other employees, one of whom subsequently died. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Wilmington and Columbia Division, on what is known as the Wilmington & Northern Branch, which extends between Birdsboro, Pa., and Wilming- ton, Del., a distance of 63.4 miles; this is a single-track railroad over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and a manual block-signal system. The accident occurred at a point 2,150 feet south of the station at Laurel; approaching this point from the north, time-table direction, the track is tangent for a distance of about 550 feet, followed by a 60 curve to the left 800 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point about leng25 feet from its northern end. Approaching from the south the track is tangent for a distance of about 650 feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade is slightly descending for southbound trains. Owing to an embankment on the inside of the curve the view of the point of accident is restricted to about 300 feet. A light rain was falling at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 8.20 a.m. Description Work extra 1330 consisted from south to north of engine 1330, one coach, one carload of ties, one tool car, one idler car, and the wrecking derrick; it was in charge of Conductor Boyd and Engineman Elliott. Before departing from Coatesville, 4.6 miles north of Laurel, at 7.30 a.m., a copy of train order No. 5, Form 19, was received, reading as follows: › M * .. 21 V. 1455 PC. E-ORDE APPROXIMATE POINT OF COLLISION 2150' SOUTH OF LAUREL STATION PT. 1460 CURVE و. 1450 -2- LAUREL STATION 1480 1475 1470 1485 15 CURVE PT. RAIL APPROXIMATE HEIGHT OF BANK тор 'A BOVE PC. + Pt. Sw, 1479+62.5 PC: APPROXIMATE END OF CUT. Note: Grade of Track 0.18% Ascending northward. (Terms North and South refer to direction by timetable) APPROXIMATE NORTH END OF CUT. Coatesville ACCIDENT NEAR LAUREL, Pa. SOUTH 3.6 Mortonville 1.0 Laurel 2.1 Embreeville -3m Ca :: "C&E No. 702 C&E Eng 1330 Eng 1330 works extra 7.15 a.m. until 9.45 a.m. between Mortonville and Embreeville protecting against No. 702 and not protecting against extra trains. Look out for cars on main track at Pole 20-E, about one and one half mile south of Laurel not protected." Mortonville is located 1 mile north of Laurel, while Embreeville is located 2.1 miles south thereof; at the time of the accident the block extended from Mortonville to Embreeville. Work extra 1330 Teft Coatesville and pro- ceeded to a point about 1 miles south of Laurel, in order to rerail a car, the fifth car ahead of the caboose, in southbound freight train No. 760; that portion of train No. 760 ahead of the fifth car had continued on its journey, leaving the rear portion standing on the main track. Before the derailed car could be reached by work extra 1330, however, it was necessary to couple to the caboose and four rear cars of train No. 760 and move them back to the passing track at Laurel, located on the west side of the track, the south switch being about 100 feet north of the station. While this back-up movement was in progress, after the caboose and four cars had been moved back slightly more than 1 mile, at a speed estimated to have been from 5 to 10 miles per hour, the north end of the work extra collided with train No. 702. Southbound passenger train No. 702 consisted of gas- electric car No. 76, this being a combination passenger, baggage, and mail car, of all-steel construction, and was in charge of Conductor Workman and Motorman Willard. At Coatesville a copy of train order No. 5, Form 19, previously quoted, was received. Train No. 702 departed from Coates- ville and on being flagged by the flagman of work extra 1330 was brought to a stop just north of Mortonville; the flagman was picked up and then the train moved ahead a few car-lengths, arriving at Mortonville at 8.14 a.m., at which point a permissive card, Form 379, was received, reading as follows: "To Engineman, train No. 702; Proceed, expecting to find a train in the block between this station and next open block station. (Sgd) C.H.Steen, Signalman. Enginemen receiving this card will proceed as indicated." : 4 Train No. 702 departed from Mortonville at 8.18 a.m. according to the train sheet, three minutes late, made a stop at Laurel, then proceeded, and while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 10 miles per hour the work extra was observed approaching around the curve. Train No. 702 had been brought practically to a stop when it collided with work extra 1330. None of the equipment in either train was derailed; the front end of motor car 76 was badly damaged, and seats were torn loose and partitions bent, while the cars in work extra 1330 were damaged more or less. The employee who subsequently died was the flagman of work extra 1330. Summary of evidence Conductor Boyd, of work extra 1330, stated that before departing from Coatesville he read train order No. 5 to Flagman Knabb, told the flagman that it was the intention to shift the derrick to the south end of the work train after the caboose and four rear cars of train No. 760 had been moved back to Laurel, and instructed the flagman to afford protection against train No. 702. Work extra 1330 then departed from Coatesville with Conductor Boyd riding on the left side of the engine; he said that when approaching Mortonville he shouted across the boiler to Engineman Elliott to reduce speed and whistle out a flag, which was done, and the engineman then shouted back that the flagman was out. The conductor's reason for having the flagman drop off at Mortonville was the fact that there was an operator at that point and a telephone by means of which the flagman could be reached. Conductor Boyd was unaware of anything wrong while returning northward to Laurel siding with the rear cars in train No. 760, at which time he was riding in the tool car and he had no idea as to how train No. 702 could have gotten down to the point of accident. Conductor Boyd further stated that he specifically in- structed Flagman Knabb as to what movements were contem- plated and that he should hold train No. 702 but did not instruct the flagman further in detail as the flagman was aware of the contents of train order No. 5, and he expected him to hold train No. 702 at Mortonville. He did not think it was his duty to issue instructions to this effect, however, since he had told the flagman it would be necessary to move the caboose and four cars back to Laurel. Conductor Boyd said that Flagman Knȧbb had been flagging for him for more than five years and that he had never previously had cause to think that the flagman did not know what was re- quired to be done, the custom being to drop the flagman at any point, with or without instructions, and if the flagman is dropped off at any point without instructions he is expected to hold following trains. On the other hand, however, Conductor Boyd said he would often drop the flagman in the yard right ahead of passenger trains and the flagman would stop them and then bring them on down as the work train was moving away. -5- " Engineman Elliott, of work extra 1330, stated that he had no understanding with Conductor Boyd or Flagman Knabb as to where the flagman was going to hold train No. 702, although when the flagman dropped off at Mortonville the engineman was satisfied that protection was being afforded against train No. 702. Middle Brakeman Prosser stated that before departing from Coatesville he heard Conductor Boyd tell Flagman Knabb what movements were con- templated and also instruct the flagman to afford pro- tection against train No. 702; the middle brakeman under- stood this to mean to protect the work extra against train No. 702 at all times. Middle Brakeman Prosser was of the opinion that since Flagman Knabb was an experienced rail- road man he should have known what to do and he could not understand why train No. 702 left Mortonville when Flagman Knabb was aboard it, and then proceeded past Laurel, as it was understood that the work extra would have to pull the cars back to Laurel before the wrecking derrick could reach the derailed car. No statement was obtained from Flagman Knabb prior to his death, while the statements of other members of the crew of work extra 1330 developed nothing additional of importance; their estimates as to the speed of the work extra at the time of the accident ranged from 6 to 10 miles per hour. Motorman Willard, of train No. 702, stated that after Flagman Knabb was picked up at Mortonville he inquired of the flagman as to what train No. 702 should do, and the flagman replied that he did not know, merely saying that work extra 1330 had gone. Motorman Willard said that he made a station stop at Laurel, in order to let the track- walker get off, and then proceeded, and when a speed of about 10 miles per hour was attained he shut off and per- mitted the motor car to drift. On seeing steam rising above the embankment on the inside of the curve he sounded the whistle and said that his car had practically stopped when the collision occurred. Motorman Willard said that he entered the block at Mortonville on a permissive card and that he proceeded expecting to find work extra 1330 "where the order said, about one and one half miles south of Laurel." • Conductor Workman and Baggagemaster Ayers, of train No. 702, were interviewed at the hospital; the conductor stated that he had no conversation or understanding with Motorman Willard or Flagman Knabb and was depending on train orders for the movement of his train. Baggagemaster Ayers stated that he heard Flagman Knabb tell Motorman Willard to look out for the wrecker at a point 1 or 1½ miles south of Laurel. Dispatcher Lichty said the operator at Mortonville told him he could see the flagman of extra 1330 talking with Road Foreman of Engines Moll, and supposing that the road foreman and perhaps the trainmaster would want to reach the -6- point where the derailed car was blocking the track, the dispatcher told the operator to allow train No. 702 to pro- ceed on a permissive card, being of the opinion that proper protection was being given. Road Foreman of Engines Moll said he read the operator's copy of the train order held by train No. 702, the dispatcher having sent the operator a copy for the operator's information. He saw Flagman Knabb in the baggage compartment of the motor car but did not talk with him, and said he did not dream that the crew of the work extra would pull the rear end of the derailed freight train back to Laurel, being of the opinion they could rerail the car and then push the rear of the freight train ahead of them to Embreeville, clearing train No. 702 at the latter point. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of the crew of the work extra to have a definite understanding as to what protection was to be provided against train No. 702, for which Conductor Boyd is primarily responsible. The Conductor Boyd said he informed Flagman Knabb as to the contents of train order No. 5 and also told the flagman what movements were contemplated by the work train. On the other hand, however, he said he instructed the flagman to protect against train No. 702 but had no definite understanding as to where that train should be held, merely telling the flagman to take care of train No. 702. conductor expected the flagman to hold it at Mortonville, and if the flagman thoroughly understood what movements were to be made, then he should have held the train at that point. Other testimony indicated that at times the flagman would stop a train and then bring it down to some indicated point, and apparently this was the flagman's in- tention in this case. Engineman Elliott saw the flagman get off at Mortonville and this was the extent of his knowledge as to what measures had been taken for the safety of his train. All of the employees involved were experienced men and none of them had been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. : JUSIES 1 ཞ ། བ རྐ Transportaton Library HE 1783 A254 IT WON'S THE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1501 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD NEAR LARGO, CALIF., ON FEBRUARY 28, 1929. June 11, 1929 To the Commission: On February 28, 1929, there was a head-end collis- ion between a passenger train and a freight train on the Northwestern Pacific Railroad near Largo, Calif., which resulted in the death of 3 employees and the injury of 32 passengers, 2 persons carried under contract, 3 employees on duty and 1 employee off duty. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Southern Division extending between Fulton and Willits, Calif., a distance of 81 miles; this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred at a point 1,891 feet north of the north passing-track switch at Largo, this passing track being located on the west side of the main track Approaching the point of accident from the south there 160 curve to the right 439.6 feet in length and then tangent track for a distanco of 192.7 feet, followed by a 30 curve to the left 501.7 feet in length, the accident occurring on the last-mentioned curve at a point 260.4 feet from its southern end. Approach- ing from the north there is an 80 curve to the right 544.3 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent for a distance of 139.1 feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade is 0.28 per cent ascend- ing for northbound trains at the point of accident. There is a 100-foot embankment on the inside of the curve on which the accident occurred and a small tree on the side of this embankment close to the track restricted the view of the approaching trains to about 200 feet. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 11.48 a.m. - G * Arhi 4 -3- Description Northbound passenger train No. 2 consisted of one mail and express car, one baggage car, one smoking car and one coach, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 141, and was in charge of Conductor Donohue and Engineman Bradley. Upon arrival at Hopland, 3.8 miles south of Largo, the .crew received a copy of train order No. 32, Form 31, fixing a meet with extra 184 at Largo. Train No. 2 left Hopland at 11.40 a.m., on time, passed Largo without stopping, and collided with extra 184 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Southbound freight train extra 184 consisted of 31 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 184, and was in charge of Conductor Bradley and Engineman Cunard. This train left Ukiah, 10.1 miles north of Largo, at 11.27 a.m., the crew having received at that point a copy of train order No. 32, Form 19, previously mentioned, and was approach- ing Largo at a speed of from 10 to 15 miles per hour when it collided with train No. 2. Both engines were derailed and came to rest leaning toward the west with their front ends against the embank- ment. The tender of engine 184 came to rest down the embankment on the east side of the track with its forward end about 15 feet from the track; both engines and their tenders were badly damaged. The first three cars in extra 184 were derailed and demolished while the fourth car was considerably damaged and the fifth car was slightly damaged. All of the cars in train No. 2 remained on the track except the rear truck of the last car, but they all sustained more or less damage. The employees killed were the engineman and fireman of extra 184 and the engineman of train No. 2. Summary of evidence Fireman Mohn, of train No. 2, stated that while his train was leaving Hopland he read the train order and then returned it to the engineman, at the same time calling the engineman's attention to the meet. He said no mention was made of it again and that he forgot it and evidently the engineman also failed to remember it as he did not reduce speed approaching Largo while there was no communi - cating signal received from the conductor as required by the rules calling attention to the requirements of the order, although upon reaching a point just north of the south passing-track switch the engineman sounded a station pundam -3-· whistle signal which was followed by a road-crossing signal. Fireman Mohn said he was riding on his seatbox looking ahead as his train approached the point of accident and he observed the pilot of the engine of extra 184 as soon as it came into view, at a distance he estimated to have been about two or two and one-half car-lengths distant. He immediately warned the engineman and then jumped out the window, and was not certain whether the engineman applied the brakes although he thought he heard the air go on. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident at about 30 miles per hour. Fireman Mohn also said that the brakes were in good operating condition, and that the engine man was in good physical condition and on the alert. Conductor Donohue, of train No. 2, stated that train orders were received at various points, including order No. 32 at Hopland, copies of which were delivered to the engineman. Several trains had been met before arriving at Largo, and as his train was approaching all of these previous mecting points a communicating signal was sounded which was acknowledged by the engineman. When order No. 32 was delivered to him at Hopland he read it to the operator and signed it, after which he delivered a copy of the order together with a clearance card to the engineman, who at that time was standing near the combination car. The engineman in turn signed the conductor's copy and then read the order back to him, remarking at the time that he thought it strange the order did not require their train to take siding at Largo. Conductor Donohue then boarded the train and handed the order to the head brakeman and after an opposing train had passed his own train proceeded. While en route toward Largo the head brakeman called his attention to the meet with extra 184 but did not return the order, which he presumed the head brakeman had delivered to the flagman. He heard no whistle signals sounded and when his train was approaching Largo he did not sound a communicating signal, as required, and he said he was not aware his train had passed that point until after the accident occurred, although he was thoroughly familiar with the locality and was sitting in the smoking car, on the side opposite the passing track, not engaged in any work to distract his attention. His first knowledge of anything unusual was when he felt an emergency application of the brakes which was followed almost simultaneously by the collision. He could not account for every member of the crew overlooking the meet. Conductor Donohue further stated that he had talked with the engineman on several occasions during the trip and that the engineman appeared to be normal in ~ -4.- every respect, and that the train had been handled properly prior to the accident. Head Brakeman Joslin, of train No. 2, stated that his conductor gave him all of the train orders to read and that he would repeat them and then return them to the conductor, this procedure being followed except in the case of train order No. 32. He did not return this order but placed it in his pocket, for the reason that the con- ductor left while he was reading it; he reminded the con- ductor of the meet a few minutes later, or just after passing the north switch at Hopland, but failed to return the order at this time as he did not think to do so. He did not know that it was customary with this crew for the head brakeman to show the order to the flagman. Head Brakeman Joslin then sat down in the front seat of the smoking car on the right side with the idea of being in a position to open the passing track switch at Largo for the freight train providing it had not arrived when his train reached that point. When he thought his train was nearing Largo he left his seat intending to open the left vestibule door but had just gotten to his feet when he felt an application of the brakes followed immediately by the accident. He said he did not know when the train passed over the passing track switches at Largo and had not the slightest idea that it had passed that point, even after he got off the train after the accident, not learning until later that his train collided with extra 184. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident at 25 or 30 miles per hour. He did not hear the engine whistle sounded nor a communicating signal given approaching Largo, although such signals had been sounded approaching all other meeting points. Head Brakeman Joslin, who was an experienced man although a new man with this crew, further stated that his last trip over the territory in which the accident occurred was on January 5, but during the month of December, 1928, he had made 20 or 21 trips in passenger service. C S Flagman Allen, of train No. 2, stated that when his train arrived at Hopland he observed that the train-order board was in stop position but did not know whether a train order was to be delivered or just a clearance card; he saw no one handling orders before departing from that point and was not shown any orders afterwards. Between Hopland and the point of accident he rode on the left side of the last car and did not hear any signals sounded 2 -5- approaching Largo. From his position on the train he observed the passing track at Largo but as he had no in- formation that a meet had been fixed at that point he made no effort to stop the train. He said that on previous trips it was the practice of the regular head brakeman to bring the train orders to him but on the trip on which the accident occurred he had seen the orders received at only one station and that was when the conduc- tor and brakeman boarded the rear end of the train and the brakeman handed them to him, although he was aware that orders had been received at other points. He under- stood that the rules required that conductors have their brakeman read train orders, but gave as his reason for not attempting to ascertain the contents of these orders the fact that he had been instructed by an official of the company that a flagman must remain at the rear end of the train at all times. Prior to arriving at Largo he had had an opportunity to call the conductor's and brake- man's attention to the fact that he was not being shown the train orders but had failed to take such action, nor did he inquire of the conductor as to what orders had been received at Hopland when the conductor came into the rear car after leaving that station. Flagman Allen further stated that the rules did not require him to request that the conductor allow him to read train orders but that had he done so in this particular case the accident probably would have been prevented. The surviving members of the crew of extra 184 were familiar with the requirements of train order No. 32 and none of them was aware of anything unusual until just before the accident occurred, Head Brakeman Perry stated that he was riding in the gangway of the engine when the fireman shouted a warning, and upon looking ahead he observed the engine of train No. 2 not more than 100 feet distant; he immediately jumped off. He said the train was drifting at the time and that the engineman applied the brakes in emergency as soon as the warning of the fireman was given. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident at 10 or 15 miles per hour. Both Conductor Bradley and Brakeman Staples felt the emergency application of the brakes just prior to the accident and estimated the speed at the time of its occurrenc to have been about 15 miles per hour. } -6- Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure to obey a meet order, for which the entire crew of train No. 2 was responsible. The evidence indicates that all of the members of the crew of train No. 2, except Flagman Allen, had a clear uhderstanding of train order No. 32 and knew that their train was required to meet extra 184 at Largo. Fireman Mohn said that he forgot it before arrival at the meeting point and consequently did not call the engineman's atten- tion to the fact that he was overrunning the meeting point. Conductor Donohue and brakeman Joslin maintained that while they had the order in mind neither of them realized their train had passed Largo until after the accident, although they were not engaged in anything that would distract their attention. Flagman Allen did not see the order, although he had seen the train-order board dis- played at Hopland, and he made no effort after leaving that point to ascertain what orders had been received. even though he had an opportunity to do so when the conduc- tor came into the car in which he was riding. He claimed the rules did not require him to ask the conductor for the orders, and this is perfectly true, but his own judgment should have prompted him to show some interest in the matter. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. *. Transportation Library He 1780 A234 :. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1504 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY AT SIBLEY, MO., ON MARCH 2, 1929. June 10, 1929. To the Commission: On March 2, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway at Sibley, Mo., which resulted in the injury of two employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Second District of the Missouri Division, which extends between Marceline and Kansas City, Mo., a distance of 108 miles, and is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The accident occurred just east of the station at Sibley; approaching this point from the east, be- ginning at the leaving end of a bridge spanning the Missouri River, there is a 60 curve to the right 1,874.1 feet in length and then the track is tangent for a dis- tance of 889.8 feet, followed by a 30 curve to the right 1,289.4 feet in length, the accident occurring on this latter curve at a point near its leaving end. The grade at the point of accident is 0.30 per cent descending for westbound trains, although just east of this point it is ascending for a considerable distance. The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 6.15 p.m. Description Westbound freight train extra 4101 consisted of 122 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 4101, and was in charge of Conductor Poe and Engineman Wise. This train left Marceline, 79.4 miles east of Sibley, at 2.15 p.m., and at Henrietta, 15.57 miles east of Sibley, some cars were set out and others picked up, among the latter being AT&SF 83673; this car was the first car in the train when it departed from Henrietta at 5.40 p.m. The train was approaching Sibley at an estimated speed of between 12 and 15 miles per hour when it parted between the engine and first car. -2- The shock caused by the slack running in as a result of an emergency application of the brakes broke the 103d car in two and derailed the forward truck and one pair of wheels of the rear truck. Eight other cars behind this car were also damaged to some extent but none of them was derailed. The employees injured were the conductor and flagman, who were riding in the caboose. Summary of evidence Engineman Wise stated that the brakes were properly tested before leaving Marceline and that there was no un- usual handling of the train en route, although when the cars were picked up at Henrietta it required two attempts in order to couple the engine to the leading car. When his engine had almost reached the station at Sibley, pull- ing steadily, the train parted between the engine and the first car; he permitted the engine to proceed until the cars came to a stop and later the engine was recoupled to the train without difficulty and the head portion pulled into clear. The engine then was cut off and he examined the coupler on the forward end of the first car finding that some of the parts showed indications of having been battered to a considerable extent, although the lock block appeared to be new. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident at 15 miles per hour. Head Brakeman Smith stated that when the first attempt was made to couple the engine to the train at Henrietta the lift pin of the coupler on the leading car would not drop. He then shook the knuckle and when the engine was again backed against the train the coupling was made successfully. He observed at the time that the lock block and pin were new, but the block was badly battered and apparently was a built-up block. As soon as the engine came to a stop after the accident he went back and examined the coupler and found the knuckle pin and lift pin down, the lock block in proper position and the knuckle open, it having slipped by the block. The statements of Rear Brakeman Gosmeyer who assisted in coupling up the train at Henrietta, practically corroborated those of Brakeman Smith as to the condition of the coupler on the leading car and the difficulty in making the coupling. , Conductor Poe stated that only two stops were made prior to the accident including the stop at Henrietta, and at that point he looked over the train but noticed nothing wrong. He did not know of the difficulty in making the coupling at the head end of the train as he was not at that point at the time, neither did he examine the leading car subsequent to the accident, being relieved from duty im- mediately after its occurrence. 3 - 3000 Roadmaster Kleine stated that he inspected the track on the bridge after the accident and found about 20 ties slightly marked under both trucks of the derailed car, these marks indicating that the car did not move more than 2 or 3 feet after it was derailed. Master Mechanic Eldridge stated that the "B" end of AT&SF car 83673 was equipped with a Simplex coupler and that it was this coupler that failed. This car was re- ceived in interchange at St. Joseph on February 21 and on February 25 some repairs were made to the car at that point, including the installation of a new lock block and block lifter and also the straightening of the uncoupling lever on the "B" end of the car. The car then was moved to Richmond, where it was loaded, and it arrived at Henrietta on March 1. Subsequent to the accident the knuckle, knuckle pin, lock block and lock lifter were removed from the "B" end of this car and inspected. This inspection developed that the lifter was bent, the horn of the knuckle was broken, and the block showed indications of a crushing strain on the end of the contact point. These parts were again applied to the same car at its destination, to de- termine if possible the cause of the trouble, and it was found that the block could be moved back in the coupler about 1 3/8 inches beyond its proper position and that this condition was due to the lock-block stop having been broken off. The result was that there was a contact of only 5/8 inch between the knuckle and the lock block. Mr. Eldridge said that the broken surfaces of the horn and the bottom part or large end of the block stop appeared to be new but that the top part or small end of the stop was an old break. Further inspection showed two badly battered points on the back end of the knuckle and on the front face of the lock block which had been caused by attempting to effect a coupling with the block down and the knuckle open, and apparently this had caused the stop to break off. There were also indications on the back of the block that several attempts had been made to couple up after the stop had been broken. He expressed the opinion that the coupler parts were broken after the car left the shops at St. Joseph. Master Mechanic Eldridge further stated that Henrietta is not a regular inspection point for cars moving over the line, although there are car inspectors located at that point whose primary duties consist of inspecting cars received in interchange. Conclusions This accident was caused by the train breaking in two, due to a defective coupler. An examination of the coupler disclosed that it was broken in two places. One was the horn of the knuckle, which holds the lock block in proper position when the knuckle is open. Apparently when the knuckle was opened PRAT -4- the broken horn permitted the block to drop down directly in the path of the back end of the knuckle and when an attempt was made to couple to the car the block was driven back into the shank breaking off the stop. With the coupler in this condition it only allowed a contact of approximately one-fourth of the surface between the knuckle and the lock block, and while the train was approaching Sibley the knuckle was pulled past the block resulting in the parting of the train. This coupler gave the train crew some trouble when the car was picked up at Henrietta but the brakemen who made the coupling did not discover the defects. They did notice, They did notice, however, that parts of the coupler were considerably battered. March Henrietta is a car inspection and car repair point and the car remained in that yard from 7.50 p.m., 1, until 5.40 p.m., March 2. The broken surface of the knuckle where the horn had broken off was in plain view and could have been seen readily on casual inspection. If the broken knuckle had been observed and removed from the coupler the inspector would have had an opportunity to inspect the portion inside of the shank, and if the lock block stop was broken at that time it could have been seen. If the stop was broken off when the car was picked up at Henrietta, as contended by the master-mechanic, the re- moval of the defective knuckle at that point at the proper time would have avoided breaking the stop, and thus by the taking of proper action the accident would have been averted. After the accident the removable parts of the coupler were taken out and others substituted, but the coupler body was left in the car and the car was allowed to remain in service, going to its destination, through a large terminal and through an interchange point, and being de- livered to the consignee. By applying serviceable parts to the coupler and leaving the coupler body in the car, the visible defect was corrected, but it lessened the likelihood of the concealed and more serious defect being discovered before it caused another accident. This car was a menace to the safety of trains as long as it was being operated in a defective condition, and following the accident it should not have been returned to service until it had been inspected by a competent inspector closely enough to discover the defect in the shank. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in vio- lation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND " ▸ Director. Transpor atom D Library HE 1780 A234 1502 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LINE OF THE READING COMPANY AT ST. CLAIR, PA., ON MARCH 2, 1929. To the Commission: June 5, 1929. C On March 2, 1929, there was a collision be- tween a cut of runaway freight cars and a yard engine on the line of the Reading Company at St. Clair, Pa., resulting in the death of two employees and the injury of three employees. Location and method of operation St. Clair is located on the Frackville Branch of the Reading Division, at the foot of Frackville grade; there are several yards at this point and those involved, adjoining each other from north to south, are the southbound receiving yard, the classification yard, and the southbound departure yard. The runaway cars started from the south end of the receiving yard, on track 7 while the collision occurred at a point approxi- mately 1 mile distant, in the north end of the departure yard, on track 4; proceeding southward over the route followed by the runaway cars the grade is descending, varying from 0.7 per cent to 1.88 per cent, being 1.14 per cent at the point where the cars started. Cars are switched by gravity, brakemen handling them without the aid of an engine. At the south end of the classi- fication yard there is located a hand-operated Hayes derail which protects the departure yard. A light rain was falling at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 1.50 a.m. Description The cut of 33 runaway cars consisted of load- ed cars that had been placed in the receiving yard on track 7 by four different crews; the first 12 cars were placed by engine 1820 at about 7.40 p.m., March 1, the next 7 cars were placed against the north end of the 271 COLLIDED WITH POINT ON TRACK NO.4 Eng. No.979 AT THIS CARS S.B. MAIN → OFFICE SOUTHBOUND Ⓡ 1.094 % sc MAIN 3 ENGINE HOUSE 2 OWER HOUSE CLASSIFICATION YARD ASH PIT Hayes Derail •Right hand on Track Nº 8 LIGHT REPAIR YARD CAR SHOP Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. New Yard at St. Clair, Pa. TR 1.2% 1.59% 1.88 NarruRoUND SCALE MAIN LOWER END OF DRAUGHT Of 33 CARS STANDING ON TRACK No 7 1.14% OVERH S.B MAIN PATTERSON Dotted line shows route taken by draught of 33 cars which ran away from track No. 7 Rec. Yard. Rec. Yard sak a bée – Paynemy tak tu.. 8 • 1 -2- first draft by engine 1052 at about 9.10 p.m. the following 2 cars were then placed on the south end by engine 1811 at about 9.30 p.m., while the last 12 cars were placed against the north end by engine 1057 at about 10.55 p.m. At about 1.45 a.m., March 2, these dars started to move, ran out of the receiving yard, proceeded down the load track of the classification yard, entered track 5 of that yard, headed out upon the lead track at the opposite end, thence down track 8, which track is merely a continuation of the lead track, passed the point where the Hayes derail is located, the derail being off the rail, continued out of the classification yard, then entered upon track 4 of the departure yard and collided with engine 979. Yard engine 979, coupled to its caboose, was in charge of Conductor Titus and Engineman Simpson. It was standing in the north end of the departure yard on track 4 with its caboose against the caboose of a 59-car train, loaded with coal and ready to depart, when it was struck by the cut of runaway cars. Engine 979 was derailed and came to rest in an upright position, with its forward end about 7 feet from the center of the track; the left side of the engine cab was torn off and the engine was otherwise damaged, while the tender cistern was torn from its frame and came to rest about 50 feet away. Both cabooses, which were of steel-underframe construction, were demolished. Eight cars were destroyed beyond repair, and wreckage was spread across tracks 2, 3, 3, 4, and 5, of the departure yard. The employees killed were a brakeman with engine 979, and one of the brake- men called for duty with the train ready to depart from track 4. Summary of evidence Conductor Martin, Engineman Weber and Brake- men Wurster and Harig, of engine 1820, gave testimony to the effect that track 7 of the receiving yard was clear when they placed the first 12 cars thereon and that these cars were left standing on the grade with the hand brakes applied on the first 8 cars at the south end of the draft. The first draft of cars so placed is termed the "bumper" and according to state- ments of the above employees it was the practice to apply enough hand brakes to keep cars from starting of their own accord; in the event drafts of 7 or 12 ว : i 4 • -3- cars were placed against the "bumper", under con- ditions similar to the way such drafts were placed in this instance, hand brakes would be applied on at least 2 of the cars in each draft. In other words each draft of cars would be dealt with separately and enough hand brakes would be applied to hold each draft placed against the "bumper". Conductor Hughes and Brakemen Wesner and McConnon, of engine 1052, gave testimony to the effect that when a draft of cars as large as the first draft, consisting of 12 cars, is left standing on a track as long as track 7 of the receiving yard, which has a capacity of about 35 cars, it is customary to apply enough hand brakes on the same to hold whatever addition- al drafts are placed against the "bumper", to the extent of the full capacity of the track; also, that whenever such additional drafts are so placed, any hand brakes that have been applied in order to help control the switching movement down the grade and against the "bumper" are left applied, and in this case there was only 1 hand brake applied on the second draft of 7 cars; the air brakes on these 7 cars were applied when his crew left them. The manner by which it is determined whether hand brakes have been set on the cars in the "bumper" is to judge by the impact when the other draft comes against it; in this connection, however, it was admitted that if air brakes had been used to hold the cars in the "bumper", instead of hand brakes, the impact would feel just as solid. Conductor Smith and Brakemen Nolan and Hart- nett, of engine 1811, gave testimony to the effect that the third draft, consisting of two cars, was placed against the south end of the "bumper" with the band brakes applied on both of these cars. After the acci- dent engine 1811 was used to pull back those cars in the runaway cut that were not derailed and damaged > 24 in number, and no hand brakes were found applied on these cars at this time. f Conductor Coonan, Engineman Dewald, Fireman Hoy and Brakemen Reed and Roeder, of engine 1057, gave testimony to the effect that the fourth draft consisting of 12 cars, was placed against the north end of the cars already on track 7 without any hand brakes having been applied, they having assumed that the usual prac- tice had been followed of having enough hand brakes set on the cars in the "bumper" to hold such additional cars as might be placed on that track, although Brakeman Reed said the cars moved a little when the coupling was made. These last 12 cars were also left with the air brakes set. Categ ~4.- Conductor Wolf, Engineman Schroding, Fireman Derr and Brakemen Freeman and Reilly, of engine 933, gave testimony to the effect that they were engaged in the performance of work in the classification yard and had just moved cars over the point where the derail is located and were putting these cars away elsewhere when the accident occurred. According to their state- ments they left the derail off the rail because they found it in that position and they were depending upon the car droppers to replace it; it was admitted, how- ever, that it would have been good practice to have restored the derail to derailing position and that to have done so would have derailed the cut of runaway cars. Brakeman Freeman said that it was customary to leave the derail off when there were cars to be dropped down from the classification yard and that was the reason he did not restore it on this occasion. Foreman Car Runner Auman stated that he was engaged in the work of dropping cars from the classi- fication yard to the departure yard and that it was customary not to restore the derail until after all the cars had been dropped; in this case there were still some cars to be dropped after engine 933 passed over the point where the derail is located. Assistant Trainmaster Wingert stated that it was the practice to leave the derail off the track provided it was either left in charge of some one or a definite understanding was had as to restoring it. He said that his instructions called for setting 10 hand brakes on a full track of cars, however, if cars are backed in by different crews, such as was the case in this instance, he requires that each crew secure their own particular draft. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure to apply a sufficient number of hand brakes to hold a cut of cars on a descending grade. Under the instructions relative to the gen- eral operation in St. Clair yard it is required that when handling any cars they must be secured by hand brakes before being allowed to stand at any point; enough brakes must be applied to properly secure the draft which is allow to stand. The weight of testimony however, is to the effect that it is the practice to take it for granted that there are a sufficient number of hand brakes set on the "bumper" or first draft of -5- cars placed on a track, to hold any additional cars placed against it. The result was that in the draft of 7 cars placed against the "bumper" by engine 1052, and the draft of 12 cars placed by engine 1057, only 1 hand brake was set. The air brakes were applied on these 19 cars at the time they were set against the "bumper" and it seems probable that when the air leaked off these cars it permitted the slack to run in and resulted in starting the cars off of the track on which they were standing. As the 33 cars stood prior to the accident, hand brakes were supposed to be set on the first 10 and also on the 15th car; the first 9 cars were destroyed in the accident and after- wards it was found that the hand brakes were not set either on the 10th or the 15th cars. The restoring of the derail at the south end of the classification yard would have mitigated the results of this accident but a practice has grown up of leaving the derail off the rail until the work of dropping cars out of the classification yard has been completed. This practice defeats the purpose for which the derail is intended. K Mater All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1505 ANG : Transportadon Library H U Z 1780 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION Das REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES- TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY NEAR SINGLESHOT, MONT., ON MARCH 4, 1929. To the Commission: June 20, 1929. On March 4, 1929, there was a derailment of a mail train on the Great Northern Railway near Singleshot, Mont., which resulted in the death of one mail clerk and two em- ployees and the injury of three mail clerks and two employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the First Sub-division of the Kalispell Division, extending between Blackfoot and White- fish, Mont., a distance of 101.04 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and an auto- matic block-signal system, which is so arranged that a full block overlap is provided. The accident occurred at a point approximately 3,150 feet east of the station at Singleshot; approaching this point from the east there is a series of curves and tangents, followed by a 70 curve to the left 543.3 feet in length, on which this accident occurred. There is a snowshed, known as No. 6, located at the eastern end of this curve; this snowshed is 246.4 feet in length, and at a point 190 feet east of it there is located another snowshed, No. 5, which is 191.7 feet in length; the accid- ent occurred just west of snowshed No. 6. The grade is descending for westbound trains and varies from 1.48 per cent to 1.80 per cent, being 1.52 per cent from the center of snowshed No. 6 to the end of the 70 curve. The track is laid with 130-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with 20 ties to the rail-length, fully tie-plated and double-spiked; rail anchors are also used. The track is ballasted with about 3 feet of gravel on a rock and dirt foundation and is maintained in excellent condition. At the point of accident there is a fill on the south side of the track about 20 feet in depth and approximately 1,000 feet in length; to the north of the track there is a mountain about 500 feet in height with a slope of about 40°. This mountainside is very sparsely covered with fire-killed timber and has very little vegetation of any kind. The soil is rather sandy, mixed with small rocks, and in some places on the mountainside there are small outcroppings of rocks. : 1 -2- The weather was clear and warm at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 11.10 a.m. Description car, Westbound mail train No. 27 consisted of one storage mail car, two baggage cars, one storage mail car, one mail and four baggage cars, in the order named, hauled by engine 2502, and was in charge of Conductor Bailey and Engine- man Hove. All of the cars were of wooden construction with the exception of the fifth, eighth and ninth cars, which were of steel construction. This train passed Summit, the last telegraph office, 9.89 miles from Singleshot, at 10.40 a.m., six minutes late, and was stopped by a track watchman at snowshed No. 6, warned of snowslides at some points beyond, and had just started ahead and was traveling at a speed of about 10 or 15 miles per hour when it was struck by a snowslide at the west end of snowshed No. 6. The six rear cars were pushed from the track, turned on their left sides and carried down the bank with the slide. The rear car came to rest at a point about 165 feet from the tracks with the other cars fairly well in alignment at lessen- ing distances from the track, so that the head car that was derailed remained foul of the eastbound track; the first three cars and the engine were not derailed nor damaged. The employees killed were the section foreman and the track watchman. Summary of evidence. Engineman Hove, of train No. 27, stated that they stopped for two red signals east of snowshed No. 5, encounter- ed two caution torpedoes just before entering this snowshed, a stop torpedo at a point about halfway between snowsheds Nos. 5 and 6, and the watchman with a red fusee about 5 or 6 car-lengths beyond snowshed No. 6. On stopping his train, with part of the tender outside of snowshed No. 6, the watch- man informed him of a large snowslide west of the station at Singleshot and said that he did not know whether or not they could go through it, but that train No. 4 had just passed through part of it. The watchman also informed him of a small slide just east of tunnel No. 1, which is located at a point about 1,008 feet west of snowshed No. 6. In the meantime a small slide came down just ahead of the engine and Engineman Hove said he attempted to back the train into the snowshed but was unable to do so; he then pulled ahead, passing through the small slide and had entered the second one when a large slide struck the rear of the train. -3- The statements of Fireman Cookingham and Conductor Bailey practically corroborated those of Engineman Hove. Conductor Bailey further stated that upon stopping at the snowshed he went to the head end of the train and was standing in the gangway of the engine when the accident occurred. He did not see the slide strike the train but did see the cars go down the bank. He also stated that Track Watchmen Tanas, who flagged them, and Section Foreman Mazos were standing opposite the gangway of the engine when it stopped just outside of snowshed No. 6. Conductor Bailey estimated the speed to have been about 10 or 15 miles per hour when the accident occurred. Head Brakeman Eschwig stated that he went to the head end of the train behind Conductor Bailey but could reach only the rear of the tender before the train started, and was riding there when he looked back and saw some of the cars going down the embankment. He was of the opinion that the slide struck the rear portion of the train, which pulled the other cars off the track before the train broke in two. Flagman Clarke stated that he was back flagging when he noticed the train moving ahead; he was not able to get into the car through the side door but entered the small door at the rear. Shortly afterwards he noticed the for- ward end of the car move toward the left and he thought that this car left the rails first and pulled the other cars down with it as it tipped over and slid down the embankment. He was able to get out of the car through a hole in the roof and immediately went back to flag. District Foreman of Telegraph Blodgett, who was making repairs to the lines torn out by a slide which had occurred between snowsheds Nos. 5 and 6 during the night of March 2, stated that he saw train No. 27 leave the rails, the rear car hitting the west center timber of the shed and then turning over and sliding down the bank; the other cars appeared to turn over in succession and follow the rear car. The testimony of signal maintainers and linemen who were working in that vicinity and witnessed the accident, revealed nothing additional of importance, nor did the testimony of Express Messenger Simmonson. Superintendent LaBertew stated that ho arrived at the scene of the accident at about 4 p.m., and his ob- servations disclosed that the slide came down from the north, part of it striking the snowshed and part striking the rear cars in the train. He was of the opinion that the equipment remained upright until it came in contact Fith the north rail of the eastbound track, when it over- turned and was carried down the bank, the rear portion of the train pulling the other cars with it until the coupling broke between the third and fourth cars; the other couplings remained intact. The north rail of the eastbound track had been torn loose for a distance of about 600 feet, and * 2 N 4 the :. 7 the south rail for a distance of about 130 feet. The depth of the snow left on the tracks by the slide was about 7 or 8 feet. Superintendent LaBertew stated that it is the policy of the company to erect suitable sheds at points where slides occur with any regularity and which are of any considerable size. Rotary and dozer service is maintained in the snow territory, and in addition patrols are made by trackmen. The track watchmen are supplied with spring clamps, connected with wire, which are fixed to staggered joints, to enable them to operate block signals if trouble is found, and it was his opinion that either the track watchman or the section foreman had used these clamps in the immediate vicinity, which would account for the position of the two signals which train No. 27 found in the stop position when approaching the point of accident. In recent years there had been small slides of snow at the west end of shed No. 6, but no heavy slides except at times when the snow could not be taken care of by the shed, in which event it would be forced off the end of the shed for a distance of 40 or 50 feet. Within the 48 hours preceding the date of the accident there had been small slides of snow of varying depths which the rotary had passed through, and on March 2 a small slide came down between sheds Nos. 5 and 6. Superintendent LaBertew further stated that during the 10 years that he had been in charge of this division, this was. the first time that a moving train had been struck by a slide. With the exception of the sixth car in the train, which was broken in two, none of the derailed cars were greatly damaged by the derailment, but their position at a great distance from the track made it difficult to recover them and they were so badly damaged in the handling that two of them were practically destroyed. Conclusions This accident was caused by a snowslide. The evidence indicates that precautions had been taken to prevent an accident of this nature. The track was being patrolled and the track watchman flagged the train at showshed No. 6 for the purpose of warning the crew of slides just ahead. In recent years, however, there had been small slides of snow at the west end of snowshed No.6 and within the 48 hours preceding the date of the accident there had been small slides of varying depths which caused no serious trouble at the time but necessitated the use of -5- snow-removing machinery to clear the tracks, and during the night of March 2 a slide of some extent occurred between sheds Nos. 5 and 6. In view of these facts, and in view of the policy of the company to erect sheds at points where slides occur with any regularity, it would appear that the erection of a snowshed to connect sheds Nos. 5 and 6, and an addition of about 400 feet at the west end of shed No. 6, should be provided for in order to furnich protection against further trouble at this point. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 1506 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE FUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD AT SCUTH FORK, FA., ON MARCH 5, 1929. To the Commission: June 29, 1937. On March 5, 1929, there was a collision between a freight train and a helper engine on the Pennsylvania Railroad at South Fork, Pa., resulting in the death of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the South Fork Branch of the Pittsburgh Division, extending southward from South Fork Branch Junction to Arrow, Pa., a distance of 23.3 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and a manual block-signal system, and the left-hand track is used by movements with the current of traffic. The accident occurred in the south end of South Fork yard, on yard track 7, at a point about 440 feet north of a facing-point switch that leads off the northbound main track to the left to a yard-lead track. Approaching this switch from the south there is a com- pound curve to the left 1,247 feet in length, the curvature being at its maximum, 76, for the last 512 feet; then the track is tangent to the switch, a distance of about 125 feet, and for a considerable distance beyond that point. The grade for northbound trains is descending, being 0.75 per cent at the point of accident. The tracks of South Fork yard parallel the main tracks on the west and are numbered from east to west; they start with number 5. At a point about 260 feet north of the lead-track switch there is located the south switch of a facing-point crossover. The switch stand is of the ground-throw type, located on the west or fireman's side of the track; night indications are green when the switch is closed and red when it is open. "JK" block station is located at the northern end of South Fork yard and a station known as St. Michael is located 25 miles south of "JK" block station. The block stations on this branch are unattended, being under the control of the train dispatcher at South Fork, in accordance with special instructions S23A and D2306, -2- N Crossover, LISTENINTS Lead Track Switch Point of ACCIDENT ·· Southbound MAIN NORTH BOUND MAIN 330Ft. : PT. "FY 19 Unattended Block Station FLAGMAN 7° 512 Ft. ... Tipple Rock Dump Inv. No. 1506 Pennsylvania R.R. South Fork, Pa. March 5, 1929 Tipple LINE, OF VISION 1250 FT PCC 735 Ft • ↑ -3- contained in time-table No. 8, effective September 30, 1928, reading in part as follows: S23A. An unattended block station is a point designated by a sign, indicating the limits of a block, the use of which is controlled by Manual Block System Rules, except as hereby modified. D2306. Unattended block stations are con- trolled by the signalman. ******** The sign indicating an unattended block station will display by day the station call, and, in addition, by night a red light and a yellow light horizontal, the yellow light next to the main track. The signalman may give a train oral per- mission to enter one block. * ** " % Unless otherwise provided, trains must stop at unattended block stations, and conduc- tor or engineman must obtain permission from the signalman to enter **** ****************** Sp *** Owing to the curve, a rock dump on the inside thereof, and also two coal tipples which extend over the tracks at points about 540 and 750 feet, respectively, south of the yard-lead track switch, it is difficult for the fireman of a northbound engine to determine the posi- tion of the switch, either by day or by night, until the cab of the engine passes under the coal tipple nearest the switch, while the engineman can not determine the indica- tion displayed by either the target or lamp until the engine almost reaches the switch. S Prior to the accident a soft wet snow had fallen, however the weather was clear at the time of the accident which occurred at about 10.30 p.m. -4- Description Extra 4355 was in charge of Conductor Raffensperger and Engineman Heacox, with Engineman McConnell in charge of helper engine 4359. This train entered the yard southbound, backing up on the southbound track, and stop- ped clear of the crossover. The rear portion of the train, which consisted from south to north of helper engine 4359, headed north, a caboose and three freight cars, then made a back-up movement through the cross- over to the northbound track, and was brought to a stop just south of the switch leading to the yard-lead track. This switch was opened and the cars pushed into the yard against a string of 19 cars that stood on track 7; the crossover switches were closed following this move- ment but the crew did not close the lead-track switch, and while the caboose was being cut off from the cars on track 7 the rear end of the tender of engine 4359 was struck by extra 6334. Northbound freight train extra 6334 consisted of 80 loaded coal cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 6334, and was in charge of Conductor Farkley and Engineman Turner. At about 10.10 p.m., permission was obtained at St. Michael to enterthe block and proceed to "JK" block station, under a permissive signal. Extra 6334 departed from St. Michael, entered the open switch at the south end of South Fork yard, and collided with engine 4359 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been between 8 and 30 miles per hour. Both engines and their tenders were derailed and considerably damaged; the engines remained upright. Numerous cars were derailed, damaged and scattered about the yard tracks, most of them remaining upright. The employee killed was the fireman of extra 6334. Summary of evidence Conductor Raffensperger, of extra 4355, stated that when his train came off the Summerhill Branch into South Fork the dispatcher told him to back down the southbound track, as he had a train en route from St. Michael, extra 6334, and did not want him to block the northbound track. The conductor told Brakeman Brode that they were to back up on the southbound track but not to occupy the north- bound track until they got orders, on account of the train en route from St. Michael; the conductor said he then got on engine 4359 and gave Engineman McConnell similar information, after which he got on the caboose and instructed Flagman Nickol in a like manner. Con- -5- 6 ductor Raffensperger and Brakeman Stine were with engine 4355 in the north end of the yard on track 6 until just before the accident occurred and knew nothing of the movement being made by engine 4359. Conductor Raffens- perger said he fully expected that that engine would remain in the clear on the southbound track at the cross- over until after the train en route from St, Michael had passed. Engineman McConnell, of helper engine 4359, stated that after backing down the southbound track and stopping short of the crossover he watched Flagman Nickol goback with red and white lanterns until he was out of sight around the curve and then was given a back-up signal and crossed over to the northbound track with the rear portion of his train, shoving the cars in on track 7. The first intimation he had of anything wrong was on seeing the headlight of the approaching train, burning brightly and only a short distance from where the helper engine stood on track 7, and he shouted a warning of danger to the fireman and jumped. The headlight of the helper engine was not turned on as the front end of the engine was next to the caboose. Engineman McConnell said that he did not see the indication displayed by the lamp at the lead-track switch, as it was on the fireman's side, but that after the cars had been shoved into clear he asked the fireman about it and was informed that the switch lamp was out. Engineman McConnell said that while the switch should have been closed yet he did not know what instructions had been issued in connection with the crossover movement and he said that he made the movement in accordance with the hand signals which were given him. He maintained that he did not know there was a train approaching yet he acknowledged that the conductor had told him that there were a couple of trains at St. Michael; also that Flagman Nickol had cautioned him to hurry the movement at the time the flagman walked by the engine on his way back to flag, as a train had left St. Michael. Engineman McConnell further stated that when making a movement similar to the one in question, provided the engine is going to remain in the clear in the south end of the yard, he usually arranges for the closing of the switch and whistles in the flagman; on the other hand, the flagman is whistled out farther when the switch is going to be used in making up a train. In this instance he did not whistle in the flagman; he knew that his engine would have to go through the yard to take on water after placing the cars on track 7, and then return, possibly with a portion of a train, which would necessitate moving out upon the main track again, and such a movement is frequently made without the switch -6- being restored to normal position as the flagman affords protection while the movement is in progress. Fireman Morrison, of engine 4359, stated that the engineman told him while crossing over to the southbound track that the movement would have to be hurried as a train had left St. Michael; to the best of his knowledge the lamp at the lead-track switch was either out or covered by snow at the time his engine passed it. Flagman Nickol, of extra 4355, stated that when his train had backed down the southbound track and stopped short of the crossover he telephoned the train dispatcher and was told it was all right to make the crossover move- ment, but to hurry it, get into clear in the yard, close all switches and let the train go that had already left St. Michael. Flagman Nickol maintained that he then told Brakeman Brode, who was standing near the telephone and had heard his conversation with the dispatcher, "to throw all switches back" after the helper engine got into clear, after which he started back to flag and on passing the engine he told Engineman McConnell to hurry the movement and get into clear right away, as a train had left St. Michael. Flagman Nickol aid that he went back to a point about 1,150 feet south of the lead-track switch, waited about four or five minutes, did not see anything of an approaching train and started back in, forgetting to put down any torpedoes. He said he then stopped at the coal tipple, about 540 feet fromthe switch, put down two torpedoes and remained there a few minutes. He was satisfied that the helper engine was in the clear, and as all of the switch lamps that he could see were dis- playing clear indications, he was of the opinion that Brakeman Brode had closed the switches as instructed, and he therefore started walking, without having been recalled, permitting extra 6334 to pass him at a point about 330 feet south of the switch without waving a signal of any kind; he estimated the speed of the train at that time to have been about 30 miles per hour. Flagman Nickol did not pay any attention to the lead- track switch lamp on his way back to flag, saying that he first noticed it after the accident and at that time the lamp was out. In his opinion had the switch lamp been burning properly at the time he looked north and saw the clear indications displayed by other lamps in the vicinity the accident would not have occurred. Flagman Nickol fur- ther stated that the reason he telephoned the dispatcher in regard to the crossover movement was because he did not hear the conductor instruct him not to block the northbound track. Flagman Nickol said that the movement. : -7- in question was one of common occurrence and that on prior Occasions when acting as brakeman, he had always closed the switch. After the accident he asked Brakeman Brode why he did not close the switch, and he said the brakeman replied that it was his understanding the flagman would close it. Brakemen Brode, of extra 4355, stated that Conductor Raffensperger instructed him to proceed on the southbound track to the crossover, but not to foul the northbound track without orders. On arrival at that point he accompan- ied Flagman Nickol to the telephone located in the car inspectors' shanty; he said that the flagman obtained permission to cross over, but was instructed to hurry the movement so as not to stop the train that was leaving St. Michael. Brakeman Brode also stated that Flagman Nickol said that when they got into clear they would close the switch and let the train proceed, but denied being instructed to close the switch. Brakeman Brode waited a short time until the flagman got back out of sight around the curve to protect, and then lined the crossover switches, and after engine 4359 had moved through the crossover he closed those switches and opened the switch leading to the yard and left it open. When the 3 cars had been shoved in against the 19 cars on the yard track the engine was fouling the northbound track, which made it necessary for him to walk about seven or eight car- lengths before he could ascertain whether there was room enough to shove the string ahead on track 7. He found that there was room enough, the cars were moved ahead, and he was about to make the cut between the caboose and cars when he saw Engineman McConnell jump and also saw the reflection of the headlight of the ap- proaching train, just before the collision occurred. Brakeman Brode further stated that the switch lamp was not burning when he opened the switch and that he could not light it as the matches in his clothes were wet. It further appeared from his statements that Brakeman Brode intended to close the switch and then have the flagman whistled in after the cars were shoved into clear, but that he did not have time to do so. He de- pended on the flagman to protect until this was done. Body Engineman Turner of extra 6334, stated that one torpedo was exploded by his engine just after it passed the coal tipple. Approaching the open switch, which was on the fireman's side, the speed of the train was about 15 miles per hour, with the air brakes applied, and when almost upon the switch a warning of danger was shouted from the fireman's side. Engineman Turner immediately . -8- A I applied the air brakes in emergency, shortly before the collision occurred, at which time he estimated the speed to have been about 8 or 10 miles per hour. The air brakes had been tested and worked properly. Conductor Barkley was riding on the engine and was unaware of anything wrong until the fireman shouted a warning of danger just as the engine entered the open switch. Conductor Barkley first noticed the switch lamp about 15 minutes after the accident and he said that at that time it was burning very dimly and that both roundels were covered with snow. Dispatcher Ryan, on duty at South Fork, said that at 10.10 p.m. he gave Conductor Barkley of extra 6334, permission to enter the block from the yard at St. Michael, and at about 10.12 p.m. Flagman Nickol call- ed on the telephone and asked for permission to cross over at the south end of the yard. This permission was given and at the same time he told Flagman Nickol to hurry because of the fact that extra 6334 was then on the way from St. Michael. Trackwalker Scrofani said he had been called out that evening to clean snow from the switches and when he reached the south end of the yard at about 8 p.m. he found that the lamp was not burning at the lead-track switch. He relighted it and said it was still burning when he last saw it about one hour afterwards. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Flagman Nickol, of extra 4355, to afford proper flag protection. G It appeared from the testimony that Conductor Raffensperger issued instructions to Brakeman Brode, Engineman McConnell and Flagman Nickol not to foul the northbound track without orders, on account of extra 6334 having left St. Michael. Flagman Nickol said he did not understand that any such instructions had been given by the conductor and after his train had backed up as far as the crossover he telephoned to the dispatch- er and was given permission to cross over with the rear portion of the train, being told to hurry the movement, get into clear in the yard, close all switches, and to let the train go that had already left St. Michael, Flagman Nickol then went out to protect against extra. 6334 while the contemplated movements were being made, but after remaining out for a short time he started back in, of his own accord, without having been re- called. On his way back he stopped, noticed that engine : -9- ī : 4359 was in the clear in the yard, and upon observing that green indications were displayed by all of the switch lamps that he could see he sssumed that every- thing was all right and came all the way in, permitting the approaching train to pass him without giving a signal of any kind. Flagman Nickol was an experienced man, thoroughly familiar with the locality and it is difficult to understand his action in returning from flagging without having been recalled and without giving any kind of a signal to the approaching train when it passed him. Flagman Nickol said he told Brakeman Brode to close all the switches, but in view of the fact that engine 4359 pushed the cars in on track 7 and then had to close up on the cars already on that track andpush the entire cut of cars ahead a short distance, it does not appear that Brakeman Brode wasted any time in the per- formance of his work or that he had any opportunity to close the main line switch behind the engine, which he said he intended to do before having the flagman re- called. The statements of the various witnesses were conflicting as to the condition of the switch lamp. The trackwalker said he relighted it at about 8.p.m. and that it was still burning at 9. p.m. Other witnesses said the lamp was not burning at the time of the accident, while the conductor of extra 6334 said it was burning dimly with the roundels covered with snow when the ex- amined it about 15 minutes after the occurrence of the accident. If there was snow on the roundels at that time then the lamp either had not been burning at all or had not been burning brightly for any great length of time prior to his inspection, otherwise the snow would have melted from the roundels. The presence of a red indica- tion at this switch undoubtedly would have been noted by Flagman Nickol when he had come in far enough for it to be within his range of vision, but the fact that he could see nothing but clear indications displayed by the various switch lamps in the vicinity did not relieve him in any way from his duty of protecting his train, in- stead of assuming that the way was clear and that it was all right for him to return. C ( All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND Director. Iransportacon 1508 Library HE 1720 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTI- GATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ATLANTA, BIRMINGHAM AND COAST RAILROAD AT CHALYBEATE SPRINGS, GA., ON MARCH 15, 1929. July 6, 1929. To the Commission: On March 15, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Atlanta, Birmingham and Coast Railroad at Chaly- beate Springs, Ga., which resulted in the death of one em- ployee and the injury of four passengers, three mail clerks, one express messenger, two employees off duty, and four employees on duty. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Brunswick Division extending between Fitzgerald and Manchester, Ga., a distance of 130 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. This accident occurred at a point 381.2 feet south of the station at Chalybeate Springs; approaching this point from the south there is tangent track for a distance of 1,108.2 feet, followed by a 4 curve to the left 789.2 feet in length, including a spiral of 174 feet at each end, the accident occurring at a point approximately in the center of the southern spiral of this curve. The grade is 1 per cent descending for north- bound trains. The track is laid with 80-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with 18 plain and treated oak and pine ties to the rail-length, single-spiked, with tie-plates on treated ties; it is ballasted with cinders to a depth of from 8 to 15 inches. The fill on which this accident occurred is 300 feet in length, covering a ravine on a mountainside. It was built in 1906 and is about 50 feet in height on the eastern or downhill side and about 10 feet at its maximum on the uphill side. The earth in this fill was obtained from adjacent cuts, consisting of light sandy loam and hard micaceous day, well sprinkled with small soft-flint and gravel boulders. A cast-iron pipe 30 inches in diameter under the fill drains an area of 5 acres. There is no riprapping or revetment work, although there is considerable vegetation along the sides of the fill. The fill is wider at its northern end to take care of a switch for a house track on the right or eastern side. S C " 7 -2- It was raining at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 6.05 a.m. Description Northbound passenger train first No. 4 consisted of two express cars, one combination mail and baggage car, two coaches, and one Pullman sleeping car, in the order named, hauled by engine 122, and was in charge of Conductor Gerow and Engineman Cosby. All of the cars were of wooden construction with the exception of the first car, which had a steel underframe, and the last car, which had a steel underframe with light steel plates over a wooden super- structure. This train departed from Mauk, the last open office, 31.9 miles south of Chalybeate Springs, at 4.50 a.m., two hours and three minutes late, and was de- railed at Chalybeate Springs due to a portion of the roadbed giving way as the train passed over it while travel- ing at a speed estimated to have been about 20 miles per hour. The fill failed near its northern or wider end, the portion which slid out being 110 feet in length, starting at the house-track switch and extending northward from that point. In width it extended on the up-hill side to a point about 15 feet west of the center of the track. It was a sheer break at the north end and the muddy material alid out with great force, uprooting many small trees before its force was spent at a tapering point about 600 feet distant. The engine came to rest leaning slightly to the right at the bottom of the crevasse about 22 feet below the level of the roadbed and about 8 feet down the hill, parallel to the main track; its front end was buried in the bank of the re- maining portion of the fill almost to the top of the smokestack. The tender, losing its trucks, turned a somersault and landed on top of the engine. The first car came to rest on its side about 20 feet down the hill, almost parallel to the engine; the second car came down at right angles with its north end resting across the tender, com- pletely demolished; the third car, badly crushed, came to rest leaning uphill with its rear end just back of the engine while the rear end of the fourth car rested on the house- track switch with the front end down the embankment. The two rear cars were not derailed nor damaged. The employee killed was the fireman. Sma 1 Loggia, Japa K Nato pa pisca ¿ 1 -3- Summary of evidence Conductor Gerow, who was riding in the rear end of the fourth car, stated that he had no warning of the accident and believed his train was being operated in accordance with instructions contained in a train order on Form 19, reading "Heavy rains over entire division. Run carefully looking out for slides and washouts." He estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been 20 miles per hour and did not notice any application of the air brakes. The statements of Flagman Pickel, who was also riding in the fourth car, substantiated those of Conductor Gerow, and he further stated that he thought the fill caved in under the engine. Flagman Pickel said that in conversation with Engineman Cosby the latter stated that he did not have time to make a brake application before the accident occurred. The statements of Porter Stanley added nothing of importance. Engineman Cosby was questioned several times while at the hospital and he stated that he had no warning of any trouble; his headlight was burning, his engine was not rocking, and the first he knew of anything wrong was when the track gave away under his engine. Track Laborer Wilson stated that according to instruc- tions he made an inspection of the track in the vicinity of the point of accident at about 5 p.m., on March 14, and he noticed that there was no water above the fill nor anything to indicate that water was seeping out of the fill. It was raining hard at the time of this inspection and had been raining practically every day for some time. He also noticed that the house-track switch points fitted tightly against the stock rail. Section Foreman Farr stated that he went over a portion of the fill on March 12, and again on the morning of the 13th and he noted nothing to indicate that the fill was cracking or giving away at the bottom, and he had never seen an accumulation of water at this fill, the pipe under it being large enough to take care of the flow of water. When he reached the scene of the accident he noted the position of the engine and it led him to believe that the track gave away under the engine; had the track caved in before the engine reached it, or if the engine had split the switch, he thought the engine would have turned to the right or taken a nose dive. ! 1 -4- Section Foreman Ellerbee, who formerly had been in charge of the track in the vicinity of which this accident occurred, stated that he had never noticed any evidence of seepage and that the water pipe under the roadbed had always taken care of any excess water. Roadmaster Wilder, in charge of the track at Chalybeate, stated that he last had been over the territory in which the accident occurred on March 8 and had found the track in good condition; the track walker makes a close in- spection of the track daily and on the day previous to the occurrence of the accident Roadmaster Wilder stated that he instructed Section Laborer Wilson to be sure to go over that territory. He did not receive any report of this inspection, and did not consider it necessary to station any one in that vicinity. It was his opinion that the fill gave away under the engine. · Switch Engineer Weeks operated an engine over this territory at 2.50 a.m. on the date of the accident; as he passed over the fill he was on the east side of the engine with his head outside the cab window, traveling at a speed of about 6 miles per hour, and he said that he looked down the fill but saw nothing unusual. It was raining at the time, Switchman Smith, who was riding with him added nothing of importance. Chief Engineer Beall was of the opinion that the break in this fill was due to the geological formation and to the excessive rains which had prevailed over this territory for three weeks previous to the accident, and especially due to the excessive rain on the night of March 14. He stated the top soil of the mountainside is a light sandy loam and very spongy, carrying a large per cent of gravel ranging in size from a pea to 4 inches in diameter, and was underlaid at a depth of from 3 to 5 feet with a stratum of micaceous clay which becomes like grease when thoroughly saturated. He believed that the rains thoroughly saturated the top soil and that the water finally worked its way under the fill and thoroughly saturated the under- lying clay, and when the engine of train first No. 4 came over the fill it blew out under/the engine, scattering the material down the mountain for a distance of 500 or 600 feet. He said that previous to this accident he had never found any indication of any weakness in this fill and the report of the track walker of this section for the 14th did not show any evidence of failure, nor were there any indications that there had been any accumulation of water on the up-hill side of the fill. ! -5- Conclusions This accident was caused by a portion of a fill sliding out under the ongine of the derailed train. The investigation disclosed that a portion of a fill 110 feet in length slid cut under the train. There had been heavy rains in this section of the country for the previous three weeks and on the night before the occurrence of the accident an unusually heavy rain fell. It appears that the top soil which is of light sandy loam and very spongy became thoroughly saturated with water and is underlaid with a stratum of micaceous clay which becomes like grease when thoroughly saturated; ap- parently the water finally worked its way under the fill, saturating the clay, and causing the fill to slide out as train first No. 4 passed over it. Not only had instructions been issued to all con- cerned to be on the lookout for slides and washouts in this vicinity, but a track walker had been over this fill at 5 p.m. on March 14 and a 'switch engine was operated over it about three hours previous to the occurrence of the accident, at which times nothing wrong was noted. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. S Transportation Library HE 1780 .4234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1510 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD AT BARTON CROSSING, ARK., ON MARCH 18, 1929. To the Commission: - July 16, 1929. On March 18, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a passenger train and a freight train on the Missouri Pacific Railroad at Barton Crossing, Ark., which resulted in the death of 1 employee, and the injury of 11 passengers and 4 employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Latour District of the Memphis Division, which extends between Lexa and McGehee, Ark., a distance of 82.56 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. At Barton Crossing this line crosses the line of the Clarendon District, with connections between the two lines. The accident occurred at a point 2,727 feet south of this crossing; approaching this point from the north the track is tangent for a distance of 6,420.5 feet, followed by a 1° curve to the left 1,990.8 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 386 feet from its northern end. Approaching from the south the track is tangent for more than 8 miles, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade is 0.20 per cent descending for southbound trains at the point of accident. Owing to trees located on the inside of the curve on which the accident occurred a clear view of opposing trains can not be had until they are within approximately 1,850 feet of each other. At Barton Crossing there is a passing track 4,442 feet in length which parallels the main track on the west, the north switch of this track being located 179 feet south, of the crossing. There is also a storage track at this point on the east side of the main track, the switches of which are located between those of the passing track. train register is kept in the passenger shelter located in the southeast corner of the intersection of the two branch lines, and at a point 384 feet south of this shelter there A RR Xing. 1 Mi. Sign 61+ 59 PS он of Accident. 1580' So. of Pt Hb 07 こんこ ​PT. 58+69.8 Whistle Post of Trees Group of Trees 1 1259' Caution Sign of Accident. So. of Pt. OH. 804 52+60 PS > Lines of Clear Vision. pt. of Accident 6942 +65 D= 1°00' L L= 1990.8' + i 1 A LO O 212' Pt. of Accât.to No.end of Flat Cars on Storage Track 569' Tot. of Accat.to So.end of Flat Cars on 2597 Storage Track 995' pt. of Accdt.to So.PS of Storage Track 2995¹ 1894' Pt. of Accât.to So.PS of Passing Track 5991 No. Accident QQ UQ of water-tank to west edge storage trk. South P S of со a c of Pt. ct @ 'd 11 + C "" Inv. 1510 Missouri Pacific R.R. Barton Crossing, Ark. March 18, 1929. 6930 །་ OF HERE TO SEND N #5 #2 to to to ss in PS 23+56 2213' pt. of Accdt. 23481 17 of Accat. to PS of Helena T 11 " C1 Pt.No.of " Train Reg- "Telephone Bth PS 21+90 PS 20+52 6920 C1. Pt. for Wye 9+17 ← To Clarendon Train Register PS 17+17 20 C in shelter. R.R.XING WATER TANK Booth Telepone #3 TO HELENA → -2- Conn. Helena Conn. ister. LA M -3- is a switch leading to the Clarendon District, a trailing- point switch for Latour District southbound trains. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 3.10 p.m. Description Southbound freight train extra 1255 consisted of 80 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1255, and was in charge of Conductor Wood and Engineman Webb. This train departed from Lexa, 3.78 miles north of Barton Crossing, at 2.50 p.m.,and collided with train No. 334 at Barton Crossing while moving at a low rate of speed. Northbound passenger train No. 334 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car, one coach and one chair car, all of steel-underframe construction, hauled by en- gine 7513, and was in charge of Conductor Brown and Engineman Faust. This train operates into Barton Crossing on the Latour District as train No. 334 and departs over the Clarendon District as train No. 835. This train left Oneida, 5.97 miles south of Barton Crossing and the last open office at 3 p.m., 35 minutes late, and was approach- ing the station at Barton Crossing when it collided with extra 1255 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 30 miles per hour. Both engines were derailed and badly damaged engine 1255 coming to rest upright and engine 7513 on its right side. The forward end of the mail and baggage car in train No. 334 was telescoped for about 10 feet and the coach was slightly damaged. The second and third cars in extra 1255 were considerably damaged, the fourth car slightly damaged and the fifth car was broken in two; no other cars in this train were derailed or damaged. The employee killed was the engineman of train No. 334; the employees injured were the fireman, conductor, brakeman, and baggage and express messenger of train No. 334. Summary of evidence Engineman Webb, of extra 1255, whose only previous trip in this territory had been on Match 14, stated that before reaching Barton Crossing the conductor, who was riding on the engine, instructed him to pull by slowly, saying that he would get off and check the register and if all overdue trains had arrived and passed he would signal the fireman and they could then proceed at slow speed until the engine reached the south passing-track -4- switch, so as to enable the conductor to board the caboose, and then speed could be resumed. Upon arrival at Barton Crossing the conductor got off, went to the register booth and shortly afterwards Engineman Webb observed the conductor give a signal to pull on down, Engineman Webb being located on the deck of the engine at the time. When his engine reached a point about 50 or 60 car-lengths beyond the crossing the fireman warned him that a passenger train was approaching, whereupon he applied the brakes in emergency and got off; he had not seen the opposing train up to this time but when he got off it was then about 8 or 10 car-lengths distant. He estimated the speed of his train at the time it reached the crossing at 4 miles per hour but this speed had been increased to about 10 miles per hour before he was warned of the approaching train. After the accident he asked the conductor as to what was wrong and the conductor replied that he was not certain, unless he had misread the train register. Engineman Webb further stated that he knew the rules required that trains must not pass junction, etc., until it has been ascertained that all trains due have arrived or left, also that the rules require conductors to furnish enginemen with train register slips unless the engineman check the register themselves, but was of the opinion that the former rule was not violated as the speed of his train was such that he could have brought it to a stop short of the switch of the connection leading to the Clarendon District if the conductor had given him a stop signal instead of a proceed signal, while in the latter case he felt that it was just as safe to act on the con- ductor's signal as though a register slip had been deliv- ered to him. The statements of Fireman Koonce and Head Brakeman Griffin brought out nothing additional of im- portance except that the head brakeman estimated that two minutes elapsed from the time the conductor got off until he gave a slow proceed signal after checking the train register, at which time the engine was about 40 feet north of the clearance point of the Clarendon District connection. K C Conductor Wood, of extra 1255, stated that the train orders received at Lexa included a check of the train register at Barton Crossing until 2.20 p.m. While en route he informed the engineman that he would check the register at Barton Crossing and if Latour District trains Nos. 334 and 335 had arrived and departed he would give him a pro- ceed signal. Upon arrival at Barton Crossing he got off and ran to the register booth, found train No. 334 had registered in and train No. 335 had registered out, and gave a proceed signal to his crew; he could not remember, however, whether he registered his own train before this : -5- : signal was given or afterwards. He did not supply the engineman with a train-register slip as there were no forms available, and he said it was not the custom to have the engineman check the register at points where there were no forms on hand. After the accident he went to the telephone booth, which was located on the opposite side of the track from the register booth, and notified the dispatcher and superintendent as to what had occurred, which required not more than two minutes, after which he immediately proceeded to the head end of the train He did without again returning to the register booth. not see any one else in the vicinity of that booth at any time. Conductor Wood further stated that at the time he examined the register he observed that the same con- ductor's name appeared as operating both trains Nos. 334 and 335, but he did not think this unusual as sometimes crews are exchanged, although he could not recall a case of this kind at Barton Crossing. He did not know whether Clarendon District trains Nos. 834 and 835 were registered, these being the time-table numbers of Latour District trains Nos. 335 and 334, respectively, not thinking about it, as well as being anxious to keep his own train moving in order not to delay the Clarendon local train. Upon examining the register at the time of the investigation he stated that it appeared as though an attempt had been made to alter some of the figures; some erasing had been done, as well as some retracing, but the figures "334" seem- ed to be the same as it was on the day of the accident while the handwriting looked to be the same. He admitted that the register showed it had been tampered with but steadfastly maintained that he did not do it, nor did he know of any reason why any one else would be interested in doing so unless with the intention of hurting him, and he did not remember telling his engineman after the acci- dent that he did not know what was wrong unless he had misread the register. The statements of Middle Brakeman Kelly and Flagman Martin, of extra 1255, who were riding in the caboose at the time of the accident, brought out no additional facts of importance. A Fireman Crews, of train No. 334, stated that the usual stops were made en route and that the brakes functioned properly. He was riding on his seatbox as the train ap- proached the point of accident and when it reached a point just beyond the south passing-track switch he observed the section foreman who was standing on the passing track, give a slow signal, which lead him to believe there was a motor car on the main track. On account of the noise he did not call to the engineman but crossed over to the right side of the cab and told the engineman to look out for a motor car, and at this time he noticed the freight train. Assuming that it was on the passing track he returned to his side of the cab to check the engine number when his own train passed. He looked ahead and noticed that the engine of -6- that train did not appear to be in its proper place and on leaning out he discovered that it was on the main track, about 400 or 500 feet distant. He immediately called to the engineman to apply the brakes and at the same time jumped across the cab and shoved the brake- valve handle around, after which he jumped from the left side of the engine. He said that steam had been shut off and the train was drifting at about 45 miles per hour when the brakes were applied in emergency, which reduced the speed to about 25 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Conductor Brown, of train No. 334, stated that a running test of the brakes was made after leaving McGehee and were working properly. His first intimation of any- thing wrong was when the brakes were applied in emergency approximately 150 feet from the point of collision; he estimated the speed at the time of the accident as between 25 and 30 miles per hour. After rendering assistance he proceeded toward the station, about 10 minutes after the accident, and met Conductor Wood on the west side of the track. He inquired of Conductor Wood as to what was the matter and the conductor replied that "they registered wrong up here." Conductor Brown then called the super- intendent by telephone, and at the superintendent's re- quest he immediately took charge of the register. He examined it and found that train No. 334 had been regis- tered, signed by Conductor Waddell and Engineman Campbell; he noticed at this time that a part of this entry had been traced. He said that the register booth is not locked and that it is not the custom to keep it locked, also that there was no one in that vicinity when he arrived. Con- ductor Brown also said that although there were some flat cars on the storage track south of the point of accident they did not interfere with the range of vision, but due to the curve it was his opinion that an engineman would have difficulty in determining whether extra 1255 was on the main track or on the passing track until the trains were very close together. Compan Section Foreman Evans stated that his crew was work- ing near the frog of the south storage-track switch when he observed the freight train approaching, and as he had heard a whistle signal sounded by train No. 334 he became alarmed and upon looking towards the north passing-track switch he could not see the target displaying a red indi- cation, which would have been the case had extra 1255 been entering the switch, so he instructed a laborer to go around the curve to see if the freight train was on the main track or on the passing track. The laborer first boarded a flat car, then got off and started northward, shipme Sta ***** C -7- S and as soon as he had reached a point where he could see he started running towards that train while Section Foreman Evans in turn started giving slow signals to the crew of the passenger train, which was then approximately 300 yards from him, and continued to give such signals until the train passed him. He said that the engine of train No. 334 was still working steam when it passed and was traveling at a speed of at least 45 miles per hour. Sec- tion Foreman Evans thought the accident could have been prevented had he given stop signals instead of slow signals but did not do so as he was not certain that the freight train was on the main track, and was not aware that the crews of these trains did not hold a meet order at this point. the Dispatcher Backs, on duty at the time of the accident, stated that at about 3.11 or 3.12 p.m. Conductor Wood called him by telephone and reported that extra 1255 and train No. 334 had collided at Barton Crossing, conductor remarking that Conductor Waddell had registered in as "334" instead of "834". Upon examining the register, Dispatcher Backs stated that it looked as though the figures "334" had been erased and marked over, the time of arrival changed, and the balance of the entry traced over, this being done with a different colored pencil. Conductor Waddell stated that he operated train No. 834 from Helena to Barton Crossing and upon arrival at the latter point he registered his train arriving as train No. 834 and departing on the Latour District as No. 335, using the same pencil in making both entries. There was no one around the register while his train was at that point. He examined the register book taken from Barton Crossing after the accident occurred and identified the handwriting of the entry for train No. 335 as his own but said the entry for train No. 834 had been altered. The train number had been changed to "334" and the engine number from "7514" to "7512. He further stated that he has been registering at Barton Crossing for about 20 years and during that time his attention had never been called to any irregularities in the way he registered. The only motive he could ascribe for the changing of the register was for the purpose of placing on him the responsibility for the occurrence of the accident. Mrs. Southard, a resident of Barton Crossing, stated that she arrived at the scene of accident about 5 or 10 minutes after its occurrence and in passing the passenger shelter she noticed a man, who appeared to be very much excited, enter it, and after walking a short distance towards the point of collision she looked back and noticed this man -8- had the register book in his hand and was doing something with it but she could not determine whether or not he was writing in it. She described this party and his wearing apparel, but when Conductor Wood was dressed in the same clothes he was wearing on the day of the accident she could not positively identify him as the same person. Gilbert Yeager, a handwriting expert, stated that it clearly appeared that the information entered on the register for train No. 834 had been erased in some re- spects and words traced over in other respects, which indicated there had been some attempt to eradicate all of this information and that it was later decided to restore it as nearly as possible to the original entry, doing so with a pencil having a softer lead. There had been an entire obliteration of the train number and it had been substituted with the figures "334". The original engine number was almost entirely erased and the figures "7512" substituted, although the figure "4" in the former number could be plainly seen. These figures indicated that they were recorded on this sheet by some individual who was apparently very excited and extremely nervous. He said he also examined the handwriting of Conductor Wood in register books at Lexa on former dates and some characteristics in connection with the figures and letters corresponded with those which were substituted in the register book at Barton Crossing and he was of the opinion that Conductor Wood was the party who made the changes on this record. On March 25, 'vision tests were made in the vicinity of the point of accident, using the same types of engines as those involved in the accident. The freight engine was placed 599 feet north of the point of accident and the passenger engine 1,259 feet south of the same point; both engines were in clear view but it could not be de- termined whether the freight engine was on the main or passing track. Another test was made by placing the freight engine at the point of accident and moving the passenger engine northward towards it; at a point 900 feet south of the freight engine it could be seen from the fireman's side of the passenger engine by leaning out the window but it could not be determined definitely whether the freight engine was on the main track; at a point 762 feet distant it could be plainly seen as being on the main track, while at a point 690 feet distant it could be determined from the engineman's side that the freight engine was on the main track. This test was con- ducted with flat cars on the storage track at the same location as on the day of the accident, these cars pre- venting the engineman from seeing the main-track rails until the last-mentioned point was reached. -9- Conclusions This accident was caused by extra 1255 occupying the main track on the time of an overdue superior train, due either to the failure of Conductor Wood properly to check the train register or to errors in making an entry in the train register. The schedule numbers of trains arriving at Barton Crossing from one district are changed when they depart on the other district. Train No. 335 arrives on the Clarendon District and departs as train No. 834 on the Latour District, while train No. 334 moving in the opposite direction over these districts leaves Barton Crossing as train No. 835. Both of these trains are scheduled to depart from that point at 2.35 p.m. Extra 1255 arrived at Barton Crossing at about 5.05 p.m., and had no orders to proceed beyond that point against train No. 334, which was then overdue. Conductor Wood, of extra 1255, stated that he checked the register and found trains Nos. 334 and 335 had registered. On the other hand, Conductor Waddell said he registered his train arriving at Barton Crossing as train No. 834 and depart- ing as train No. 335 over the Latour District, and it is believed that this statement is correct. Examination of this register, however, clearly showed that the informa- tion recorded by Conductor Waddell for train No. 834 had been altered by being erased in some places and traced over in others with the evident purpose of showing the arrival of train No. 334. After the accident the engine- man of extra 1255 asked Conductor Wood what was wrong and he quoted the conductor as saying he did not know, unless he had misread the register. Conductor Wood said he did not remember making such a statement and also denied that he made any changes on the register after the accident, but unless the register was tampered with prior to the accident, which is very unlikely, it would appear that the accident was due to the failure of Conductor Wood to check the register correctly. En- The rules provide that enginemen must check train registers at intermediate stations, when practicable, and if not they must require from conductors a register check, Form 4562, unless provided by train order, Form N. gineman Webb did not hold a Form N order and therefore it was necessary for him either to check the register at Barton Crossing or be supplied with a register check. He did not check the register personally, and so far as receiving a register slip is concerned he said he con- sidered it as safe to rely on information received from S -10- Ś the conductor as it would be if a register slip had been delivered to him. The occurrence of this accident, how- ever, is a sufficient illustration of the necessity for the rule, and emphasizes the fact that employees should obey strictly the rules governing their own actions in- stead of depending on others to perform their duties properly. The employees involved were experienced men, although the engine crew of extra 1255 were not familiar with this particular territory; at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library HL 1 7 8 6 1A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ELGIN, JOLIET AND EASTERN RAILWAY AT CHICAGO, ILL. QN MARCH 23, 1929. TO THE COMMISSION: 1511 : July 22, 1929. On March 23, 1929, there was a derailment of a switching transfer on the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway at Chicago, Ill. which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred in the South Chicago yard on the Gry Division, which is located adjacent to the shore of Lake Michigan and extends southward from 79th street to the Calumet River at the foot of 91st street. This yard consists of three main yards, A, B, and C, extending from north to south, which in turn are sub-divided into smaller units. Each of these yards has lead tracks used by yard engines for switching purposes and the movement of cars from one yard to another. The accident occurred between 86th and 87th streets at a double-slip switch located near the northern end of that part of yard C known as the slab yard. Train movements are governed by signals given to the engine crews by switchmen, yardmasters and switchtenders. The track is level at the point of accident and is well maintained. In the vicinity of the point of accident there are three double-slip switches; the north switch, known as Mill yard puzzle, the center switch, known as the west main puzzle, and the south switch, known as the train yard puzzle. The west main puzzle, the switch involved, is a No. 7 double-slip switch with movable center points of manganese steel, the points having an opening of 4 inches. There are two switch stands and the levers of these stands are provided with a guard or bracket on the side which prevents the movable center points from being thrown against a movement being made through them. When the two switch levers are thrown towards the north, the route is lined through the center of the switch for a north or southbound movement; when the levers are thrown toward the south the route is lined through the center for a through opposing movement; the throwing of one switch lever sets the route around the curve of the switch from one through route to the other through route. 2 ‚ ř -2- The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 5.20 p.m. Description The switching transfer consisted of 30 cars, hauled by engine 306, an 8-wheel stitcher, and as in charge of Conductor Tolley and Engineman Kieser. These cars Tere being hauled from yard A, via yard B to track 3 in the slab yard, a unit of yard C, and the train was moving over the west main puzzle switch when it was derailed while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 6 and 8 miles per hour. The engine was derailed to the left or east, struck in between the ends of two cars on an adjoining track, and then turned over on its right side across the train yard puzzle switch at a point about 50 feet from the first point of derailment. The tender was also overturned to the right, and the forward truck of the first car was derailed. The end trucks of the two cars struck by the engine were also derailed. The employee killed was the fireman and the employee injured was the engineman, both of engine 306. Summary of evidence Conductor Tolley stated that his train started from yard A, proceeded through yard B, came almost to a full stop at 36th street, and after receiving a signal from the yardmaster started through the puzzle switches. He said he was riding on the front footboard on the left side of the engine; he noticed the puzzle switches were set all right but as they proceeded over the west main puzzle switch the engine was derailed at the frog point. Conductor Tolley said he jumped off and ran toward an adjoining track on the left, but realizing that the engine was coming behing him he turned around, jumped back on the engine, climbed over to the other side and jumped off. The frog points had seemed to be all right as his engine approached them. Switchman Nellis stated that he was also riding on the front footboard, on the right side of the engine; he say Yardmaster Dunbar line the switches and they received a signal from him to proceed. He noticed the track was proper- ly lined for a movement straight through the west main puzzle switch but when the engine reached the switch it raised up, gave a lurch to the east, proceeded down the west main track and the forward end swerved between two cars on the adjoining track to the left. Switchman Nellis said that he jumped off immediately after the footboard cleared the puzzle switch. Sugge 2 -3- He estimated the speed to have been between 6 and 3 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Stitchman Krezmer, ho was riding at the rear end of this train, was unaware of the accident until after its occurrence. T Assistant Yardmaster Dunbar stated that engine 85 with 25 cars had just cleared the west main puzzle switch when he saw engine 308 approaching at 86th street. He lined the west main puzzle switch, walked southward, lined the train yard puzzle switch and also the switches up to track 3 in the slab yard, and just as he finished and turned around he say engine 306 leave the track. It lurched toward the left, the driving wheels under the cab were scraping along the ground, and then the engine and the tender turned over on their right sides, the engine traveling a distance of 20 or 25 feet after the derailment before it turned over. He made no examination of the track after the occurrence of the accident; it was badly torn up and he was of the opinion that a close examination would have revealed nothing. He estimat- ed the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been about 8 miles per hour. Traveling Engineer Cuff stated that he rode on engine 306 on the day previous to the accident and also made an inspection of the engine on the afternoon of March 23 just before it was dispatched, and he found nothing that could have caused the derailment. He examined the engine again on the day following the accident but found nothing wrong, and on March 26, without making any repairs, but after disconnecting the main rods and blocking the valves, the engine was hauled in a train up to a speed of 35 miles per hour and Traveling Engineer Cuff stated that he again rode the engine at that time but there was nothing to indicate anything wrong. Traveling Engineer Cuff also stated that he interviewed Engineman Kieser, who was seriously injured in this accident, and the engineman said that he was on the right side of the cab at the time of the accident and that he warned Fireman Reed, who was standing on the deck of the engine, the moment the first driving wheel left the rail. He did not think that the engine would have turned over if they had not struck the cars on the adjoining track. ing to Engineman Kieser the engine was in good condition. Accord- Track Supervisor Sanders stated that he made an examination of the switch after the occurrence of the accident and found the turnbuckle stripped on the connecting rod that operates the west frog point and this point had a kink in it about 4 feet from the end. The stripped turn- buckle would have permitted the west frog point to open only part way, and he was of the opinion that the right front driving wheel went on the inside of this point, hit it and made a kink in it, causing the wheel to take the point on L S M -4- the west main track instead of straight across. He stated that he thought the stripped turnbuckle vas due to rusted threads which in turn were caused by ashes and flue dirt dropping from trains as they passed over it, and that the turnbuckle was stripped prior to the occurrence of the acci- dent. The frog has a manganese point and there was no wear on it. This switch had been installed about 1 years pre- vious to the time of the accident and it had not been neces- sary to make any repairs during that time other than tighten- ing the bolts and surfacing the track. It is inspected daily and there is some one on duty all the time to look after these switches. He stated that in the vicinity in which this accident occurred it is the busiest place in the yard, and drags were going back and forth over this puzzle switch all day prior to the arrival of engine 306. Conclusions This accident was caused by a defective turnbuckle on a double-slip switch. Grade The evidence disclosed that the turnbuckle on the connecting rod of the west frog point was stripped, due to rusty threads, which apparently were caused by ashes and flye dirt dropping down from trains as they passed over it. It appears that the stripped turnbuckle permitted the west frog point to open only part way and the right front driving wheel, instead of going dorm the throat of the open frog point, rode on the point with the flange on the inside, resulting in the engine being derailed to the left. This track is inspected daily and there is some one on duty at all times to look after the stitches. Inspection of the engine disclosed nothing that could have contributed to the occurrence of this accident. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library HE 1780 ·A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1512 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CLINCHFIELD RAILROAD AT THERMAL, N. C., ON MARCH 24, 1929. July 30, 1929. To the Commission: On March 24, 1929, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Clinchfield Railroad at Thermal, N.C., resulting in the injury of three employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of this rail- road extending between Erwin, Tenn., and Spartanburg, S. C., a distance of 141 miles; in the immediate vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders; during the day a manual block-signal system is in effect, no operators being on duty at night. The accident occurred on the passing track at Thermal, at a point approximately 231 feet north of the south switch; the passing track parallels the main track on the west. Approaching the switch from the south the track is tangent for a distance of 1,904 feet, followed by a 2° 40' curve to the left 1,114 feet in length, the switch being located on this curve at a point 503 feet from its southern end. The grade at the point of accident is level. The switch stand and targets are located on the east side of the track while the switch throw is on the opposite side of the track; the switch stand is 16 feet 4 inches in height and the targets are mounted on top of the stand, the targets being 7 feet 3 inches from the main track. A white disk, 36 inches in diameter, is displayed when the switch is closed, and a red arrow, 50 inches long and 30 inches high, when the switches open. The switch stand is not equipped with There is a telephone booth located on side of the track, about 20 feet south of the lamp. TRANSPuch east switch. ... * > ܐ Ar ! -2- The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 1.40 a.m. Description Southbound third-class freight train No. 26 consisted of 65 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 734, and was in charge of Conductor Taylor and Engine- man Fox. At Marion, 14.1 miles north of Thermal, a cop of train order No. 33 was received, directing train No. 26 to meet train No. 95 at Thermal. On arrival at Thermal trein No. 26 headed in on the pass- ing track and was brought to a stop in the clear near the south switch, and about 35 minutes later, while standing at this point with the switch open, it was struck by train No. 95. Northbound second-class train No. 95 consisted of 29 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 414, and was in charge of Conductor Goodin and Engineman Shaffer. At Spartanburg, 44.7 miles south of Thermal, the crew ree ceived copy of train order No. 33, previously mentioned, and on arrival at Thermal train No. 95 entered the open switch and collided with train No. 26 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 30 miles per hour. Engine 734 was driven backwards a distance of about 50 feet and considerably damaged, but remained on the rails; three cars in train No. 26 were badly damaged, one being buckled, another crushed and the third aar telescoped. Engine 414 rode upon the front end of engine 734; the first car in train No. 95 was demolished and the next two cars derailed and overturned, while the fourth car came to a stop on the rails and against the tender. Two other cars back in this train were also damaged. Summary of evidence Head Brakeman Peake, of train No. 26, stated that after his train headed in and came to a stop in the clear on the passing track at Thermal he walked over to the telephone booth and called up the dispatcher, as is required by time-table rule when the train to be met has not arrived. About 10 minutes later he unlocked and opened the south switch, walked across to the opposite side of the track, sat down in the immediate vicinity of the telephone booth and lighted a cigarette. When the headlight of train No. 95 came into view around the curve south of the tangent, Head Brakeman Peake gave a proceed signal with his lantern; he was not positive whether this signal was answered. When the -3- 1 ļ train came off the curve and on to the tangent the whistle was sounded calling for a signal and he therefore gave another proceed signal, which signal was acknowledged by the whistle. Head Brakeman Peake said that he did not realize that there was anything wrong until about the time the engine passed him and the air brakes were applied in emergency. He attributed his mistake to the fact that usually on southbound trips the southbound train holds the main track and after telephoning the dispatcher it is customary to open the switch. In this instance when he left the engine he had not come to the realization that his train was on the passing track and the only thought in his mind was to call up the dispatcher and open the switch, which he did, and at the time he gave the proceed signals to train No. 95 as it approached he was fully aware that the switch was open and that that train would enter the passing track. Enginaran Fox, of train No. 26, stated that after he brought his train to a stop at the south end of the passing track he watched Head Brakeman Peake from the engine cab; he saw the head brakeman enter the telephone booth and watched the booth at intervals, but did not see him come out nor did he see him open the switch. When the engineman heard train No. 95 approaching he turned off the headlight; he then saw the reflection from the headlight of the approaching engine, `heard the whistle sounded in response to the signal from the head brakeman, heard it sounded again calling for a signal and again in answer thereto. Engineman Fox then crossed to the opposite side of the cab to watch the train go by and just afterwards the collision occurred. Fireman Humphreys did not notice the head brakeman open the stitch, nor did he observe that the switch was open until after the accident, saying that he was operating the $toker and building up the fire when the accident occurred. Conductor Taylor and Flagman Britt, of train No. 26, vere in the caboose at the time of the accident and were unaware of anything wrong prior to its occurrence. Engine man Shaffer, of train No. 35, stated that while rounding the curve south of the tangent, when about one-half mile south of the switch, traveling at a speed of about 30 miles per hour, he received a proceed signal given from the immediate vicinity of the switch and answered it; he continued to receive such signals and called for a signal again, received several more, and answered them. Engineman Shaffer could not see the -4- 1. indication displayed by the switch target, but on reach- ing a point about six car-lengths south of the switch the fireman shouted a warning of danger and at about the same time the engineman saw that the switch was open. He immediately shut off steam and applied the air brakes in emergency, but the collision occurred before the speed had been materially reduced. The statements of Fireman Ellis, Conductor Goodin, Head Brakeman Bartles and Flagman Goforth developed nothing additional of importance. Conclusions This accident was caused by an open switch, for which Head Brakeman Peake, of train No. 26, is responsible. The evidence clearly showed that after train No. 26 had pulled into clear on the siding at Thermal the head brakeman called the dispatcher, as required when a train to be met has not arrived, and then opened the switch. According to his statement, southbound trains usually hold the main track and he forgot that in this case his own train was occupying the siding and opened the switch for the express purpose of heading train No. 95 in on the siding, not realizing his mistake until too late to avert the accident. The investigation did not develop any reason for his error other than his statement that southbound trains usually hold the main track. Gledaj Had the particular switch stand involved been equipped with a switch lamp the accident probably would not have occurred. It might be well to mention, however, that this line is a series of short tangents and curves, and most of the passing tracks are located on curves where the view of a switch target is limited to a short distance, the passing track involved in this accident being practically the only one where it is possible to obtain a view for a distance of any consequence. Head Brakeman Peake entered the service of this railroad in August, 1918; his record was good. At the time of the accident he had been on duty 9 hours, the same as the rest of the crew, prior to which he had been off several days. None of the other employees in- any of the provisions volved had been on duty of the hours of service contrary to law. C Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. My Transportation Library не 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1513 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NEW YORK, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RAILROAD AT EDWARDS- VILLE, ILL., ON MARCH 26, 1929. July 30, 1929. To the Commission: collision On March 26, 1929, there was a head-end between two freight trains on the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad at Edwardsville, Ill., resulting in the death of three employees and the injury of two employees. 1 Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of Subdivision 4 of the Clover Leaf District extending between Madison, Ill., near St. Louis, Mo., and Charleston Yard, Ill. a distance of 128.1 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block- signal system being in use. The accident occurred at a point 1,297 feet east of the depot at Edwardsville or 2,520 feet east of the east switch of the passing track; the passing track is 3,323 feet in length and parallel the main track on the north. Approaching the point of accident from the west, beginning at the east switch of the passing track, the track is tangent for a distance of 1,148 feet, followed by a 40 curve to the right 1,557 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 185 feet from its eastern end. Approaching from the east the track is tangent for more than 1 mile, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade for eastbound trains is 0.60 per cent descending at the point of accident. GA The depot at Edwardsville is located on the north side of the track, about 1,200 feet east of the east switch, and the train-order signal is right in front of the depot; the normal position of the train-order signal is at stop, and engine men of approaching trains are re- quired to call for the signal by sounding fourt short blasts on the whistle; if rules and conditions permit, M POINT BE T.O.Signal Depot + 1223 ! V... East house track track Storage East possing Track Switch ACCIDENT 1148 + 1372 *.... V₁... 40 1557 Z No. 1513 N.Y.C.& StL.R.R. Edwardsville, Ill. March 26, 1929. · ? -3- the operator places the signal at proceed and the engine- men then acknowledge the change of position by sounding two short blasts on the whistle. In addition to the train-order signal, it is required that auxiliary train- order signals will be used at all train-order offices to indicate the form of train order to be delivered; a red banner by day, and in addition a red light by night, indicating "31" orders, and a yellow banner by day, and in addition a yellow light by night, indicating "19" orders. At this particular office when the auxiliary signal is displayed it is placed on the mast of the train- order signal at a point about 8 feet above the station platform; in this instance the auxiliary signal was not displayed. On account of buildings and trees on the inside of the curve neither engine crew could see the opposi ng engine until within a few hundred feet of each other. Bag The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred between 5.46 and 5.48 p.m. Description Westbound freight train extra 904 consisted of 36 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 904, and was in charge of Conductor Callahan and Engineman Smith. It was given a train order to run as a "traffic extra" from Charleston Yard to Madison; the term "traffic extra" indicates that it is a preferred train and must not be delayed. This train left Charleston Yard at 12.50 p.m., according to the train sheet, and at Alhambra, 13.3 miles from Edwardsville, a copy of train order No. 131, Form 19, was received, directing train first No. 44 to wait at Edwardsville until 5.50 p.m. Extra 904 Left Alhambra at 5.28 p.m., according to the train sheet, passed Fruit, 4.9 miles from Edwards- ville, at about 5.40 p m., according to testimony given by members of the crew, and was approaching Edwardsville at a speed variously estimated to have been between 15 and 35 miles per hour when it collided with train first No. 44. Eastbound second-class freight train first No. 44 consisted of 36 cars, hauled by engine 860, and was in charge of Conductor Rennels and Engineman Franklin. This train left Madison, its initial terminal, 14.2 miles from Edwardsville, at 5.15 p.m., according to the train sheet, 15 minutes late. As it approached Edwardsville the whistle was sounded calling for the train-order signal and a proceed indication was then displayed by the operator. The train passed the -4- office at 5.48 p.m., according to the train sheet, 13 minutes late on its time-table schedule and without receiving a copy of train order No. 191, previously mentioned, and collided with extra 904 while traveling at a speed of about 35 miles per hour. Both engines were badly damaged, but remained upright; 12 cars were destroyed. The employees killed were the engineman, fireman and head brakeman of train first No. 44; the employees injured were the engineman and fireman of extra 904. Summary of evidence Engineman Smith, of extra 904, said he thought that train first No. 44 would be at Edwardsville right on the time shown in the wait order, 5.50 p.m., and that his own train would be able to reach the east switch at that point by 5.46 or 5.48 p.m., at which time the head brakeman could protect by flag while the train was heading in on the passing track. He operated his train from Alhambra to the point of accident at a speed higher than that permitted by the rules; in fact, according to his figures he consumed only five minutes in traveling the distance of nearly 5 miles between Fruit and Edwards- ville. When approaching Edwardsville he encountered two torpedoes which has been put down by some preced- ing train and the speed of his own train had been reduced to about 15 or 20 miles her hour when the fireman warned him of the approach of train first No. 44 and he at once applied air brakes in emergency. Engine man Smi‍th further stated that he fully expected to violate the rule requiring him to clear the time of the opposing superior train at least five minutes and he said that it was the practice to make such movements and then to protect by flag while moving into clear. Kad he known however, that the wait order had peen put out to the crew of train first No. 44 at the waiting point, which he said was not a common thing for a dispatcher to do, he would have remained at Fruit instead of trying to reach Edwardsville. S > Conductor Callahan, of extra 904, said that when the train order was received at Alhambra he thought his train would have a chance to reach Edwardsville, although he realized that it could not be into clear five minutes before the time expired. The statements of Flagman Snyder, Fireman Tittle and Head Brakeman Middlesworth brought out nothing additional of importance. Engineman Smith thought the accident occurred about 5.46 p.m., while Conductor Callahan said it was 5.47 p.m. T ¿ -5- The only surviving members of the crew of train first No. 44 were Conductor Rennels and Flagman Davis. They estimated the speed of their train to have been about 35 miles per hour when the accident occurred. They also stated that the caboose stopped opposite the train-order signal, which was displaying a clear indi- cation, and it was not until he went into the office that Conductor Rennels found that an order had been issued for his train at that point. He fixed the time of the accident as about 5.47 or 5.43 p.m. q Operator Rufty, on duty at Edwardsville, was getting some coal and on his return to the station he found that the station agent had copied train order No. 191 and he said the station agent told him that the dispatcher wanted to be advised when train first No. 44 was seen approaching, as he was going to lift the order so as to avoid stopping the train. The train-order signal was in the stop position at this time but the auxiliary train-order signal was not displayed and when train first Ho. 44 aproached the station, at 5.49 p.m., it then being about 800 feet distant, Operator Rufty endeavored to get in communication with the dispatcher but was unable to do so and he said he then cleared the train-order signal just before the engine reached the station, tak- ing this action because of the instructions conveyed to him by the station agent that the dispatcher did not want to stop train first No. 44. It further appeared from the operator's statements that the order was not a proper one to put out at Edwardsville and that this was the first time he had ever received such an order. Jan Station Agent Childress said he copied the wait order in the absence of the operator, and after he had repeated the order he was told by the dispatcher that the latter wanted to know when train first No. 44 was coming. Station Agent Childress said he called the order to the attention of the operator on the latter's return to the office, told him what the dispatcher had said, and then left the office for his home, at about 5.35 p.m., without displaying the auxiliary train-order signal. It further appeared from his statements that he had not copied more than 20 orders within the past two years, and although familiar with operating rules and practices it did not occur to him that Edwardsville was not the place at which to put out an order of this character. Dispatcher Green, on duty at the time of the accident, said the operator at Madison kept him advised concerning train first No. 44 and after that train had departed from Madison at 5.15 p.m. he issued train -3- ; : : order No. 191 at Edwardsville on Form 31, the address not including the operator, and at Alhambra on Form 19, these orders being put out at 5.18 p.m. The sole purpose of the orders was to advance extra 904 as far as Fruit, and in view of the normal running of trains of the character involved it never occurred to him that extra 904 would try to reach Edwardsville on the order or thrt train first No. 44 would arrive at that point before the time named in the order had expired. Dispatcher Green knew it was the station agent at Edwardsville who had copied the order for train first No. 44 and he said he told the station agent that he wanted to take up the order before the train reached it; that as soon as the order was dead he wanted to take it up so as to stop train first No. 44 and he denied saying that he ranted to be advised as soon as train first No. 44 approached Edwardsville. At about 5.45 p.m. he left his desk and went to the city telephone for the purpose of making a personal call, returning to his desk at about 5.48 p.m. so as to be in readiness to take care of train first No. 44. It further appeared from the statements of Dispatcher Green that the order was not put out in proper form since he failed to in- clude in the order a provision to the effect that train first No. 44 was to get the order at Edwardsville, and his only reason for not issuing the order in accordance with the rules was the fact that his purpose was to assist the extra, and not to restrict train first Nol 44; had he desired to restrict this latter train, he would have put out the order at Madison. し ​Conclusions. This accident was caused primarily by extra 904 being operated against an opposing superior train on short time, for which Conductor Callahan and Engineman Smith are responsible. Extra 904 did not pass Alhambra, according to the train sheet, until 5.28 p.m., and in order to clear train first No. 44 at Edwardsville by five minutes, as required by the rules, it would have been necessary for it to be into clear at that point not later than 5.45 p.m. In other words, extra 904 had 17 minutes in which to travel 13.3 miles, stop, and head in on the passing track at Edwardsville. The crew used 11 or 13 rinutes in traveling the distance of 8.4 miles from Alhambra to Fruit, or at an average speed of at least 42 miles per hour. This left them only five or six minutes in which to travel the additional distance to Edwardsville of -7- G ☺ 4.9 miles and get into clear at that point. Undoubtedly they were influenced in their action by the fact that their train was designated as a "traffic extra", but there is nothing in this designation which authorizes a crew to run wild over the road, disregarding the rules which long experience has shown must be strictly observed if trains are to be moved in safety under the time-table and train-order system. Operator Rufty had an order on Form 31 in his possession for delivery to the crew of train first No. 44, requiring them to wait at his station until 5.50 p.m., but apparently he became confused when the train was approaching the station and after trying to get in communication with the dispatcher he cleared the train- order signal and allowed the train to proceed. Operator Rufty also failed to see that the auxiliary train-order signal was displayed, this signal being required under the rules of this railroad for the purpose of indicating the form of train order to be delivered. Operator Rufty should have displayed both of these train-order signals and have left them displayed until the order had been made complete and delivered to the crew, al- though in this particular case it is possible that such action on his part rould/have prevented the accident since the train was already beyond the east switch, at which point its rights were restricted. No adequate reason can be given to explain Operator Rufty's actions in failing to see that the proper signals were displayed and in then clearing the train-order signal with an order on Form 31 in his possession for delivery. Kjo M Dispatcher Green is open to criticism for his method of handling train order No. 191. He said his only purpose in issuing the order was to help extra 904 in moving as far as Fruit, 4.9 miles east of Edwards- ville, and that in view of the running time he thought would be made by train first No. 44 that train would not reach Edwardsville until after 5.50 p.m., the time specified in the wait order, and he would then be able to annul the order and thus avoid stopping the train. While his primary purpose was not to restrict the rights of train first No. 44, yet that is exactly what he did when he issued the wait order. Not only should a restrictive order not be put out to an east- bound train at Edwardsville, in view of the fact that the train-order signal is more than 1,200 feet east of the east switch, but the rule governing the general issuance of such orders definitely provides that they must not be sent to the superior train at the meeting point if it can be avoided and when so sent that fact must be stated in the order. In this case, the crew of extra 904 did not know that train first No. 44 was to get the order at the waiting point and there is a possibility that had they be en in possession of this S -8- information they might not have attempted to clear the train at that point. It did not appear that it was a practice to issue restrictive orders to eastbound trains at Edwardsville effective at that point, nor did it appear to be a practice for operators to fail to deliver train orders. According to the statements of Engineman Smith, horever, it was a somewhat general practice to run on short time to the extent of using some of the five minutes clearance time required by the rules. This practice has resulted in the occurrence of many accidents in the past; is recognized as dangerous, and immediate steps should be taken for its discontinuance. There are 6 first-class traing operated over this territory daily or daily except Sunday, and 7 second- class trains daily, as well as 2 other second-class trains which are operated on three days of each week; the total train movements during the 30 days preceding the date of the accident averaged slightly more than 23 trains daily. Traffic of this density on a single- track line is sufficient to warrant the installation of some form of protection to guard against the occurrence of those accidents which experience has shown are likely to occur under the train-order system of operation, and it is believed that the responsible officials of this company should give immediate consideration to this question with a view to providing for an adequate block-signal system. All the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. L- T 1 } 1 21 was, in Thunder Transportation Library HE 1780 ,A234 r INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION No. 1489 No. 1499 MEMORANDUM TO ACCIDENT REPORT MAILING LIST: I ✔ For the benefit of those who keep a file of accident investigation reports according to their numbers, this is to advise that no reports will be issued by the Bureau of Safety on the following accidents: No. 1451 Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe C., C., C. & St.L. " August 2, 1929. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe No. 1519 Pennsylvania Clifton, Tex. Nov. 2, 1928 " Somerville, Tex. Feb. 8, 1929 Indianapolis, Ind. Feb. 21, 1929 Lenover, Pa. Apr. 20, 1929 Very respectfully, W. P. BORLAND MAYAN, * Director, Bureau of Safety. Transportado Library не 1780 ·ARBY INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1514 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD NEAR NORTH CHARLESTOWN, N. H., ON MARCH 28, 1929. To the Commission: July 29, 1929. On March 28, 1929, there was there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Boston and Maine Railroad near North Charlestown, N.H., which resulted in the injury of 12 passengers, 3 mail clerks, 1 express messenger, 2 Pullman employees and 4 railroad employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Connecti- cut Division extending between Windsor, Vt., and Spring- field, Mass., a distance of 109.11 miles, which is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and an automatic block-signal system. The accident occurred at a point approximately 2,450 feet south of North Charlestown station; approach- ing this point from the north the track is tangent for a distance of about 1,900 feet, followed by a 1° 05′ curve to the left about 750 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point approximately 550 feet from its northern end. The grade at the point of accident is 0.8 per cent descending for southbound trains. P GANG In the vicinity of the point of accident the track is laid with 85-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with an average of 19 ties to the rail-length, and is single- spiked; no tie plates are used. The track is located on a fill, the maximum depth of which is 50 feet. The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 4.47 a.m. Description Southbound passenger train No. 78 consisted of one milk car, one baggage car, one combination mail and baggage car, one express car, one Pullman sleeping car, two coaches and one Pullman sleeping car, in the order named, hauled by engine 3651, and at the time of the accident was in charge of Pilot Conductor Moran and Pilot 2 Engineman Costello. This train left Claremont Junction, 4.70 miles north of North Charlestown, at 4.40 a.m., five minutes late, and had just passed the latter point when it was derailed while traveling at a speed estimated at about 45 miles per hour. The engine and first car came to rest approximately 1,1 125 feet beyond the first mark of derailment with the right rear driver and the right trailer wheel of the engine derailed on the inside of the right or west rail: The tender and the rear truck of the car were also de- railed, while the wheels of the front truck indicated that they had been off the rails and had then rerailed themselves; all of the tender wheels were inside the rails. There was a space of about 300 feet between the head end and where the remainder of the train came to rest. The second to the sixth cars, inclusive, and the forward truck of the seventh car were derailed, the body of the fifth car sliding down the embankment and coming to rest about 75 feet from the track. The em- ployees injured were the pilot conductor, conductor, baggage master and head brakeman. Summary of evidence • Pilot Engineman Costello stated that the last stop was at Claremont Junction, where water was taken, and that the speed of his train was not more than 50 miles per hour at any time after leaving that point. He was operating the train on the descending grade with the throttle slightly open, and there was no unusual motion until he felt a lurch from behind when his engine reached a point about an engine and three car-lengths south of a highway crossing. Upon being informed by the other engine- man, who was riding on the fireman's seat, that fire was flying from under the train, he immediately applied the brakes in emergency but he did not know whether this application caused the brakes to apply or whether it was due to the train having already broken in two. He in- spected the engine after the accident and found a train line connection broken between the engine and tender and there was a brake shoe missing from the left side of the tender; this shoe was later found a few feet to the rear of the head car. He then returned to the point of derailment and examined the track. There were light marks as if something had been hitting on the ties north of the highway crossing and a flange mark on a spike head on the outside of the east rail about 10 or 15 feet south of the crossing; there were no flange marks on the ball of the rail to indicate that the wheel rode over the top of it. A piece of metal was found between the main tracks, about three or four car-lengths north of the crossing, which he did not identify at first but later learned that it was an oil step brace. 1 ~3~ Engineman Rice stated that he was not operating the engine at the time of the accident for the reason that he was not qualified to run south of White River Junction. He estimated the speed between Claremont Junction and the point of accident at between 40 and 45 miles per hour, and said he was riding on the fireman's side of the engine at the time of the accident. When he felt a surge of the engine he looked back, saw fire flying from under either the tender or the first car, and immediately notified the pilot engineman, who in turn applied the brakes. He did not think the tender was off the track at the time he felt the lurch, and said he did not know how far south of the crossing the acci- dent occurred as this was his first trip over that part of the road. There was no unusual movement of the engine previous to the accident to indicate that the track was rough. He inspected his engine after the accident and noticed nothing wrong except that a brake shoe was missing from the L-2 tender-truck wheel; he found this shoe near the rear end of the milk car but when he examined it he did not notice any marks on it. Upon examining the track several car-lengths north of the highway crossing he noticed fresh marks on the ties, as though something had struck them, while there were also indications that something had struck the crossing planks lightly; the first indication of de- railment was just south of the crossing. Fireman Smith stated that his train departed from Claremont Junction with the water tank filled to within 6 inches of the top. He was riding on his seat box behind Engineman Rice at the time of the accident and upon looking back he saw fire flying which in his opinion was from under the first or second car. He estimated the speed at the time of the accident at 40 or 45 miles per hour. Pilot Conductor Moran stated that his first inti- mation of anything wrong was when the car in which he was riding, which was the sixth car in the train, be- came derailed; he had not felt any application of the brakes prior to this time, and estimated the speed at the time of the derailment to have been between 45 and 50 miles per hour. The statements of Conductor Stock- well, who was also riding in the sixth car, practically corroborated those of Pilot Conductor Moran, except that he felt an emergency application of the brakes about two or three seconds prior to the accident. He said that the train was in charge of the pilot conductor as this was only his second trip over that part of the line and he was not familiar with it. W -4- Flagman Lyon stated that on his way back to flag he found a piece of iron kying between the northbound and southbound tracks approximately 300 feet north of the highway crossing. He examined but could not find any marks on it, and later he identified this piece of metal as an oil step brace which had fallen from the engine of his train. The statements of Baggageman Gammell and Brakeman Derby added no additional facts of importance as neither of them felt any unusual motion of the train until the cars in which they were riding were derailed. Section Foreman Poisson, in charge of the section on which the accident occurred, stated that he last patrolled the track in that vicinity at about 3.35 p.m., the previous day and that the last work performed was when he had done some shimming about three or four weeks prior to the accident. Upon his arrival at the scene of accident he inspected the track in order to determine if possible what caused the derailment but found nothing except a few fresh marks between the rails on the ties north of the highway crossing which appeared to have been made by something dragging; corresponding marks appeared on the edges of the crossing planks. Assistant Track Supervisor Davis stated that he found indications that something had been dragging. The north end of the middle crossing plank had a piece gouged out of it and the west flangeway of the crossing was marked as if by a loose wheel. He continued north- ward from the crossing and noticed slight marks on the ties between the rails for a distance of about 400 feet. He said that the track south of the point of accident was badly damaged and in some places it was entirely torn out. North of the point of accident the track appeared to be in a very good shape, excepting at a point just south of the crossing the inside rail on three or four ties was slightly low but he did not think it would take one-half inch shims. He also said that the only work done in that locality was the installation of some shims north of the crossing about three or four weeks previously. Division Engineer Sampson stated that he took measurements of the alignment, gauge and elevation. These measurements were taken at a point 6 feet south of the point of derailment, at the point of derailment and at each rail joint northward for a distance of 181 feet. It developed that there was a slight sag in each rail just south of the crossing, but it did not appear that there was any condition which could be held respon- sible for the occurrence of the accident. It is to be noted, however, that within less than two car-lengths • -5- of the point of derailment, which it is believed actually began south of the crossing, there was a variation in elevation of 7/8 inch within a distance of half a rail- length. Engineer of Track Thorton stated that when he ex- amined the track he found that the edge of the plank next to the flangeway of the crossing had been sheared off for about 15 feet, and while it appeared that this had been done by a loose wheel yet he was of the opinion it was caused by something dragging through the flange- way. He said the track approaching the point of acci- dent was in fairly good condition and considered it safe for a speed of 60 miles per hour. Division General Car Foreman Coburn stated that he inspected the first car in the train at the scene of accident, after it was rerailed, and found that the spring-block hanger castings on the left side, at both ends of the car, were out of their proper positions; he also found that the rear truck frame was cracked and the crossover pipe broken, the defect in the truck frame being a new crack. This car was later moved to White River Junction with the same truck still in service. He examined the trucks of all of the derailed cars but could find no evidence of a loose wheel. Traveling Inspector of Locomotives Prentiss stated that his inspection of engine 3651 on the day of the accident disclosed that the train and signal lines were broken under the front tender sill, and the left No. 2 brake shoe and pin, as well as the left front safety bar from underneath the brake beam, were missing. He also noticed that the brace between the bottom of the oil step and the bottom guide on the left side of the engine was missing. General Inspector of Locomotive Maintenance Ohnesorge stated that after the tender was rerailed he checked the side-bearing clearance on the front truck and found it all right but he could not check the clearance of the rear truck as it was off center. He assisted in replacing the tender brake shoe found in the vicinity after the accident and it fitted properly, and it was his opinion that it was the same shoe that was missing from the tender truck. After the engine was taken to Springfield Station the brake hanger was disconnected from the brake head on the No. 2 beam on the left side of the tender and the beam allowed to drop down the full length of the safety chain, and with the beam in this position the brake head cleared the rail about 1 inch, although a bolt through the head and end of the beam came in contact with the rail. He also said he was present when the oil step brace, -6 which was found north of the point of accident, was fitted into place, and said the bolt holes lined up perfectly and he thought it was the same brace that was lost from the engine. Enginehouse Foreman Ollis stated that when engine 3651 arrived at Bellows Falls a few hours after the accident it was discovered that both side-bearing filler blocks were missing from the rear truck of the tender and that a piece of the top side-bearing casting on the left side of the same truck was broken off. This truck was off center and the center pin bent so that the castings could not be centered until this pin had been removed. These parts were replaced by temporary parts in order that the engine could be moved to Springfield for repairs. A new brake rod was applied to the for- ward truck and the brake shoe on the left No. 2 wheel was replaced, while the brake beam truss was out of its socket at one end and had to be forced back into place. Machinist Dubois stated that he made repairs to the tender of engine 3651, at Springfield, which con- sisted of replacing two broken side-bearing casting bolster bolts, located on the right side of each truck. Two side bearing castings were also broken on the left side of the front truck, which were repaired and re- placed. He also replaced two new side-bearing blocks, one on each side of the rear truck. Engine 3651 was in the shops for unclassified reins pairs from February 13 to March 6, 1929. It had been in regular service since that time between Springfield, Mass. and Woodsville, N.H., and was inspected at the end of each trip. This engine was carefully inspected by the Commission's inspectors and it was found that all foundation brake equipment was in proper place and secured, the gauge of the wheels and flanges of both the engine and tender were in good condition, and all parts such as cellars, wedges, etc., were in proper place. Conclusions The cause of this accident was not definitely as- certained. Immediately after the occurrence of the accident an oil step brace from the engine was found a few hundred feet north of the point of accident; there were no wheel marks on this brace, nor was it distorted in any way, and apparently it had nothing to do with the occurrence of the accident. The same thing may be said of a tender ** -7- brake shoe, which was found some distance south of the point of accident. None of the things noted about the milk car, the first car in the train, was of such a nature as to indicate that any of them had any bearing on the accident. There were some variations in elevation, however, a short distance north of the cross- ing, and it is possible that the accident can be accounted for by the presence of these variations, coupled with missing side-bearing blocks from the rear tender truck. These blocks were not found after the accident, and if they were missing at the time of the accident there would have been considerable sway to the tender, nearly full of water, in rounding the curve on which the acci- dent occurred, and this condition would have been aggravated by the uneven elevation which was found to exist. The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident they had not been on duty contrary to the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1515 Transportation Library не 1780 .1234 на ! ; INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY AT DENTON, TEXAS, ON APRIL 3, 1929. UNDATION ZAMOPO AR July 31, 1929. To the Commission giuli On April 3, 1929, there was a side collision between two Missouri Kansas-Texas Railroad Company of Texas freight trains on the tracks of the Texas & Pacific Railway at Denton, Texas, which resulted in the death of one employee and one other person, the injury of one other person. and Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Whitesboro Sub- division of the Denton Division, extending between Bonham and Fort Worth, Texas, a distance of 116.3 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and a manual block-signal system. There are several yard tracks located west of the main track; track 1 leaves the main track at a point 1,126.4 feet south of the passenger station and is a facing-point switch for northbound trains, the accident occurring at the fouling point of this switch, more than 1 miles inside of both of the yard-limit boards. Approaching this point from the south the track is tangent for a distance of 3,673.5 feet, follow- ed by a 5° 02' curve to the right 420.5 feet in length, the point of accident being on this curve 151.3 feet from its southern end. Approaching from the north there is a 7° 18' curve to the right 619.8 feet in length and then tangent track for a distance of 54.2 feet, follow- ed by the curve to the left on which the accident oc- curred. The grade at the point of accident is 0.25 per cent ascending for southbound trains. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 9.30 p.m. Description Northbound freight train extra 596, known as the Dallas-Denton local, was hauled by engine 596, and was in charge of Conductor Lacy and Engineman Werline. This train arrived at Denton from Dallas at 8.10 p.m., -2- Big KENG #407 Plik 3, 1929 Texas 1034 April Denton, Texas & Pacific Ry. No. 1515 coro How Duct cttts 596 JAND A-210° D=5°02 7 cars TOOL House A 9954 4:45° 15'. D=7°18′ F÷EIGHT STATION 19 Cars not derailed- ET. & P. Ry Co. MAIN LINE (JOINT THS) & Passing Track Z EAST HICKORY AUTOMOBILE CRUSHED Passenger Sta. STREET 59 CARS -- and after setting off the train the engine was turned and the crew started assembling a train for the return trip. With the engine headed south, it was shoving nine cars northward from the main track into track 1 at a speed estimated to have been between 5 and 12 miles per hour when it was struck by train second No.373. Southbound freight train second No. 373 consisted of 85 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 907, and was in charge of Conductor Quigley and Engineman Hodge. This train departed from Whitesboro, 36 miles north of Denton, at 7.52 p.m., passed the station at Denton at 9.30 p.m., according to the train sheet, and collided with the side of engine 596 while traveling at an esti- mated speed of from 15 to 20 miles per hour. Engine 596 was overturned and came to rest on its right side on track 2, quite badly damaged; the tender remained upright but was derailed and slightly damaged. Engine 907 came to rest in an almost upright position east of the main track and was also considerably damaged. The tender and one truck of the first car were derailed while impact caused the train to buckle, derailing the 21st to the 25th cars, inclusive, one being demolished and the others more or less damaged. One of these cars fell on an automobile which was parked alongside the station platform, killing one of its occupants and in- juring another occupant. The employee killed was the engineman of engine 596. Summary of evidence Conductor Lacy, of extra 596, stated that a few minutes after arriving at Denton he received copies of the line-up of trains expected to arrive, which included the information that train second No. 373 would be due at about 9.25 p.m One copy of this line-up was de- livered to the engine crew and another to the brakemen. He was at the telegraph office when he heard train No. 373 approaching, and as he did not want to delay that train he went out on the platform and looked toward the south to see if his own engine was obstructing the main track but did not see it, neither did he hear it working steam. Conductor Lacy then returned to the telegraph office, but a few seconds later he heard an unusual noise and upon again leaving the office he saw some cars turn over just south of the station; he did not learn until later just what had occurred. He estimated the speed of train No. 373 at the time the engine passed the station at 12 to 14 miles per hour. Conductor Lacy further stated that he understood the line-up of trains was issued for the purpose of arranging his work in order not to delay those trains if possible, but in his opinion rule 93 provided ample protection for his train 5. ~4 while it was occupying the main track. Rear Brakeman Jackson, of extra 596, stated that his conductor gave him a copy of the line-up showing when trains were due to arrive at Denton but did not instruct him to keep clear of the main track for any of these trains. He was riding on the leading car when the cut of nine cars was being shoved from the main track into track 1 but when this car had reached a street crossing, located approximately 150 feet north of the switch, he got off on the engineman's side and when about four cars had passed him he heard the rapid exhaust of the engine of train No. 373, indicating that that train was moving at a good rate of speed, and as a result he signaled his own engineman to increase speed in order to clear the main track. The speed was in- creased to some extent, and was about 10 or 12 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Head Brakeman Taylor, of extra 596, stated that while the cut of cars was being shoved into track 1 he was walking northward on the west side of the main track and had reached a point about 150 feet south of the switch leading to track 1 when his engine passed him and it was then that he first noticed a train ap- proaching on the main track about 15 car-lengths from where the collision later occurred. He stepped to the center of the main track and started giving stop signals with a white lantern, continuing these signals until his lantern became extinguished a few seconds later. Apparently these signals were not seen, as they were not acknowledged, and he said he thought they would have been difficult to discern in view of the fact that he was in line with the rays of the headlight of his own engine, which was backing up as it passed him. Fireman Heard, of extra 596, was on his seatbox looking northward and when the engine had about reached the switch leading to track 1 he observed the approaching train, at about the time it came into view around the curve south of the station. When the engine of that train reached a point about 15 car-lengths distant he realized it was on the main track and immediately shouted several times to his engineman to get into clear, but as the engineman had his head out of the window he did not know whether he had been heard, and he then got off the engine from the engineman's side of the cab. He estimated the speed of train No. 373 at 18 or 20 miles per hour as it rounded the curve on which the accident occurred. Fireman Heard further stated that the cab light of his engine was burning and he knew of nothing to prevent the engine crew of train No. 373 from seeing it had they been maintaining a clase lookout, but the headlight on the rear of the tender was not burning while switching as it blinded the brakeman. -5- Engineman Hodge, of train second No. 373, stated that his train approached Denton station at a speed of about 10 miles per hour and after whistling twice he received a clear board and then permitted the train to continue to drift until it had nearly reached the station, when he opened the throttle. He was watching ahead closely from the time his train passed the street crossing south of the station and was not aware of any- thing unusual until the fireman warned him of the danger, when he immediately shut off steam but he did not remember whether he applied the brakes, and he said he did not see engine 596 until his own engine entered the curve on which the accident occurred, engine 596 then being about 100 feet distant. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident at 20 miles per hour. Engineman Hodge had not asked the fireman whether the main track was clear and had not instructed him to keep a close lookout while passing through Denton yard, as he had always done so without being cautioned, and he could not account for his own failure to observe the reflection from the headlight of engine 596, the crew of which was known by him to be switching at Denton every night at about this time. Engineman Hodge further stated that he knew rule 93 requires that second and inferior class and extra trains must move within yard limits prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear, and he was familiar with bulletin instructions to the effect that track conditions at Denton are such that it is necessary to proceed through that yard at a very slow rate of speed in order to comply with rule 93, yet he was of the opinion that he had complied with these requirements inasmuch as he thought the track was clear. K 2 Fireman Cox, of train No. 373, stated that the speed of his train was approximately 10 miles per hour when it approached Denton but after passing the station the speed was gradually increased and at the time of the accident it was between 18 and 20 miles per hour. He was riding on his seatbox keeping a sharp lookout ahead but did not see engine 596 until the rays from the headlight of his engine shone upon it, about 100 feet distant. He im- mediately notified his engineman to this effect and jumped off, and as he did so he heard the air go into emergency. Fireman Cox had just previously seen a light in the vicinity of the switch leading to track 1 but did not know whether it was on the main track or on some other track, and he attributed to the curvature of the track his failure to see engine 596 any sooner than he did, and said that probably the lights shining at some industries in the vicinity prevented him from seeing the reflection of the headlight of that engine; he did not see any stop signals given by Brakeman Taylor. -6- Head Brakeman Heacker, of train second No. 373, stated that when his train passed the station at Denton he was standing in the right side of the gangway, look- ing ahead, and continued to do so until the engine reached the leaving end of the curve to the right, but he did not see engine 596. There were lights in the vicinity of the point of accident but he could not as- certain whether one was a cab light or whether they were all street lights. When his engine entered the curve on which the accident occurred he started towards the left side of the gangway but before reaching it the fireman discovered that engine 596 was on the main track and shouted a warning; the engineman immediately shut off steam and applied the brakes in emergency but as the train was then about three car-lengths from the point of accident the speed was only reduced slightly being about 15 miles per hour at the time of the colli- sion. , Conductor Quigley, of train second No. 373, was riding in the caboose as his train approached Denton at a speed of about 10 miles per hour and this speed was later increased to not more than 20 miles per hour The statements of Flagman Smiers, of train second No. 373, brought out nothing of importance. Sant The statements of some of the witnesses mentioned above were to the effect that it was customary for south- bound trains to increase speed while passing through the yard in order to get over the ascending grade which begins about at the point of accident. Operator Mays, on duty at Denton at the time of the accident, stated that when he heard train second No.373 call for the order board he cleared it and then notified the dispatcher to indicate the train by at 9.30 p.m. His first intimation of anything wrong was when he heard the crash of the cars piling up on the crossing south of the station. He estimated the speed of the train at the time it passed his office at 15 or 20 miles per hour, which was about the normal rate of speed for all southbound freight trains through Denton yard. Trainmaster Troutt, of the T&P Railway, stated that he was employed as Chief Dispatcher at Denton from October, 1920, to December, 1927, and from his observa- tions during that time all trains moved under control until the crews knew the main track was clear or were given a proceed signal from some member of the local's crew. Since that time he has closely observed the operation of trains through Denton yard and the crews used every precaution; in fact, for several years it has not been necessary to call the attention of any crew to violations of the bulletin instructions. A11 -7- *** crews were aware that they might expect to find the Dallas-Denton local at Denton, on any track, between the hours of 8 and 11 p.m., and were governed accord- ingly. It was his opinion that it would be necessary for a tonnage train to reduce speed to 12 or 15 miles per hour approaching the point of accident to comply with the bulletin instructions in effect at that point. Trainmaster Winkel, of the M-K-T of T Railroad, stated that from his observations of southbound freight trains passing through Denton they restrict their speed between 8 and 10 p.m., daily except Sunday, expecting to find the local switching on the main track. He said the bulletin instructions remain in effect until a clear vision can be had from the head end of the train south of the freight house, located south of the passenger station. The statements of Superintendent Pistole were to the effect that he has frequently ridden southbound freight trains from Whitesboro to Fort Worth and that the speed of these trains through Denton was such that they could easily have been brought to a stop within range of vision. These trains were operated at slow speed from the time they passed the north yard-limit board until they reached the tangent track south of the point of accident and then speed was increased, which he considered was not in violation of rule 93 or the bulletin instructions. Between 10 p.m. and midnight on April 6, vision tests were made in the vicinity of the point of acci- dent by using the same type of engines that were in- volved in the accident. The first test was made with one engine, headed south and coupled to 9 cars, the engine and one car on the main track and the balance of the cars on track 1. The other engine was moved southward from the station until it had reached the point where the engineman could see the reflection of his headlight shining on the cars fouling the main track, and it was found that this point was 487.8 feet north of the point of accident. This engine was then moved southward an additional distance of 24.3 feet before it could be definitely ascertained from the engineman's side that the cars were fouling the main track. The standing engine came into view from the fireman's side of the moving engine when the latter engine was 480 feet north of the point of accident. Another test revealed that stop signals given from about the point at which Brakeman Taylor said he was located at the time he first observed train No. 373 approaching, could be seen from the fireman's side of an approaching southbound engine when 531 feet north of the point of accident. = L ¡ T -8- Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engine- man Hodge, of train second No. 373, to operate his train under proper control within yard limits. Rule 93 of the Texas & Pacific Railway requires that within yard limits the main track may be used, protecting against first-class trains; second and inferior class and extra trains rust move within yard limits prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear. There are also bulletin in- structions in effect that due to track conditions at Denton it is necessary for trains to proceed through the yard at a very low rate of speed. The evidence indicates that train second No. 373 approached the station at Denton at a speed of about 10 miles per hour but after passing that point the speed was increased until it was 18 or 20 miles per hour when it was dis- covered that the main track was occupied. Engineman Hodge was familiar with rule 93, as well as with the bulletin instructions, but for some reason he presumed that the main track was clear and as a result he began working steam after passing the station, without having received a signal from any one, although he knew that the Dallas-Denton local was usually working at Denton when his own train passed that point. Both Engineman Hodge and Fireman Cox maintained that they did not see engine 596 until it was only 100 feet distant. Tests conducted subsequent to the accident developed that it was possible for the engineman to have definitely as- certained that cars were fouling the main track when they were 463.5 feet distant, and for the fireman to have seen engine 596 at a distance of 480 feet, and it is believed that if these employees had been on the alert, with the train under control as required by the rules, this accident would have been prevented. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND > Director. = + : Transportation Library не 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1516 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY NEAR ARGON, IOWA, ON APRIL 4, 1929. To the Commission: July 31, 1929. On April 4, 1929, there was a head-end collision be- tween a freight train and a section motor car on the Chi- cago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway near Argon, Iowa, which resulted in the death of two employees and the injury of two employees. Location and method of operation. This accident occurred on Sub-division 18 of the Cedar Rapids-Minnesota Division, extending between Valley Junc- tion and Manly, Iowa, a distance of 135.5 miles; in the vi- cinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train or- ders, no block signal system being in use. The accident occurred at a point 2.09 miles west of the west switch at Argon; approaching this point from either direction the track is tangent for more than 1 mile. The grade for east- bound trains is 0.4 per cent ascending at the point of ac- cident. C Information regarding train movements will be obtained from dispatcher when practicable but such information will under no circumstances re- lieve man in charge of car from fully protecting motor car movements at all times. Rule 12 of the rules governing the care and operation of maintenance motor cars provides: - During foggy and stormy weather and on curves and other obscure and dangerous places, where trains cannot be seen sufficiently in advance to remove car from track, special precaution must be taken to avoid accident, flagging when necessary. In case of doubt, remove car from the track and know that the movement is fully protected before again attempting to operate car. There was a dense fog at the time of the accident, which occurred at 7.17 or 7.18 a.m. Age -2- Description. Eastbound freight train No. 914 consisted of 38 cars and a caboose, hauled by engines 2313 and 827, and was in charge of Conductor Tilzey and Enginemen Fowler and Moore. This train departed from Clear Lake Junction, the last open office, 40.3 miles from Argon, at 5.07 a.m., 6 hours and 12 minutes late, and was approaching Argon at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour when it col- lided with the section motor car. << The westbound section motor car involved, a Mudge car, type ES-2, weighing approximately 950 pounds, was in charge of Section Foreman Bakeman, accompanied by three section laborers. Section Foreman Bakeman received at Iowa Falls a line-up of trains showing that train No. 914 was expected to arrive at that point at 7.50 a.m. This motor car depart- ed from that point, located 3.4 miles east of Argon, at 7 a.m., and collided with train No. 914 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 5 and 8 miles per hour. The pilot of engine 2313 was damaged to some extent but none of the equipment of train No. 914 was derailed. The motor car was badly damaged, although it was not derailed. The two employees killed were section laborers and those in- jured were the section foreman and section laborer. Summary of evidence. Engineman Fowler, of the lead engine of train No. 914, stated that at times the fog was so dense that he could not see over a distance of from 60 to 90 feet. When he first saw the motor car it was about 90 feet distant; he immedi- ately applied the air brakes in emergency, at which time he thought they were traveling at a speed of 20 or 25 miles per hour, and he thought the train came to a stop within a distance of 12 or 14 car-lengths. Engineman Fowler further stated that the whistle had been sounded for all stations and public crossings, as nearly as he could tell as to their location; he said he presumed that the whistle had been sounded somewhere in the vicinity of the whistling post for the crossing near which this accident occurred, although he did not see the post in the fog. At another point in his statements he said the whistle was last sounded at a point about 1 mile from where the accident occurred. He did not think that the bell was ringing at the time of the accident but thought the headlight was burning. He also stated that if the accident had not occurred, his train would have ar- rived at Iowa Falls at about 7.45 a.m. In a second state- ment made by Engineman Fowler subsequent to the investiga- tion, he stated positively that the headlight was burning at the time of the accident and was in good condition. - ~3- The statements of Fireman Leslie, of the lead engine of train No. 914, said the whistle was sounded for a cross- ing about 1 mile west of the point of accident but he did not think it was sounded for the whistling post for the crossing located just east of the point of accident; the bell was not ringing and he did not think the headlight was burning. When questioned a second time in regard to the headlight, subsequent to the investigation, he stated it was burning when they left Manly, was turned off while at the siding at Flint, and was turned back on again before leaving that point, although he could not recall seeing the reflection of the light against the fog in the vicinity of the point of accident. Brakeman Boehm, of train No. 914, who was riding on the brakeman's seat on engine 2313 said the whistle was sounded for the crossing near which the ac- cident occurred; that the headlight was burning when the train departed from Clear Lake Junction, and he thought it was burning at the time of the accident. Engineman Moore, of the second engine of train No. 914, stated that at the time of the accident the fog was very dense and limited the vision to about one-half a car-length on a moving engine and about one or two car-lengths when standing. He estimated the speed to have been from 22 to 25 miles per hour when the air brakes were applied in emergen- cy, but did not know whether or not the whistle signal had been sounded for the crossing near which the accident oc- curred. The statements of Fireman Connell, of the second engine of train No. 914, corroborated those of Engineman Moore. Sta Conductor Tilzey, of train No. 914, stated that after the accident he went to the head end of the train and at that time did not notice whether or not the headlight was burning, but later, on his return from telephoning, he ob- served that it was burning. The statements of Brakeman Burke, who was riding in the cupola of the caboose, brought out nothing additional of importance. Section Foreman Bakeman, in charge of the motor car, stated that before departing from Iowa Falls he obtained a line-up of trains which showed that train No. 914 was ex- pected to arrive at that point at 7.50 a.m. There had been a heavy fog, but it had cleared to some extent and the sun came out and he could see a distance of possibly a mile. He then departed on his motor car with one laborer and him- self riding in the forward position and two other laborers riding backward. At a point east of Argon they encountered fog, but later it cleared and they were able to see a rea- sonable distance until they reached mile post 153, located 1,230 feet east of the point of accident, where the fog was very heavy. At about that time Section Foreman Bakeman said he looked at his watch and it was 7.16 a.m. and he decided that train No. 914 had not yet departed from Hampton, which * ¿ -4- is 12.9 miles west of Argon and 16.3 miles from Iowa Falls. He was of the opinion that it would take train No. 914 about 35 or 40 minutes to travel from Hampton to Iowa Falls. He shut off the motor and drifted over a highway crossing and just after he had turned on the motor again he saw train No. 914 appear in the fog; he called a warning to the others and jumped, and just as he struck the ground he heard the sound of the collision. He estimated the speed of his motor car to have been between 5 and 8 miles per hour, and was of the opinion that an object could not have been seen in the fog The en- at this point at a distance of more than 300 feet. gine whistle had not been heard by him at any time, nor did he hear the engine bell ringing. The headlight was not burning, but even if it had been burning he did not think the accident could have been prevented. Section Foreman Bakeman further stated that he was familiar with the rules governing the operation of motor cars, including flagging if necessary in foggy weather, had been last examined on those rules about a year previous to the occurrence of the accident, and had received several circulars relative to the operation of motor cars, but on the other hand he said that he could not afford flag protection in work of this kind due to an insufficient number of men; at the time of the acci- dent he was patrolling the track and he intended continuing to the west end of his section, less than 2 miles farther westward, the track being in such condition that it was nec- essary to go over it as soon as possible. His movements over his section had always been governed by the line-ups and he thought they could be relied upon with safety; he had never had an accident in the 12 years he had been oper- ating a motor car. S CAR DUNDA Section Laborer Schade, who was riding beside Section Foreman Bakeman looking ahead, stated that he first saw the approaching train about four rail-lengths distant; he at once called to the others and then jumped off. He heard no whistle signal sounded nor did he hear the engine bell ring- ing, and he also said that the headlight was not burning, as the first thing he saw was a black object. All of the la- borers on the motor car had seen the line-up, and Section Laborer Schade was of the opinion that the line-up could be depended upon. He estimated the speed of the motor car at the time of the accident to have been 6 or 8 miles per hour. Operator Pardun, on duty at Iowa Falls on the day of the accident, stated that he received the line-up from the dispatcher at 6.12 a.m., and when the section foreman came to the office he had the line-up ready for him. He said he did not know where the section foreman was going on that day and he had no conversation that would lead the foreman to feel or believe that line-ups are absolutely correct. -5- Train Dispatcher Carver, on duty at the time of the ac- cident, stated that he gave Operator Pardun the line-up for the section foreman but did not make a record of it, which was contrary to his usual practice. He further stated that on some occasions the section foreman calls him on the tele- phone from Argon for any additional information he may have to give him, but in this instance even if Section Foreman Bakeman had called him, he would have been unable to have given any additional information as there were no open of- fices between Clear Lake Junction and Iowa Falls. He had never given section foremen train orders to cover movements of motor cars, and trains receive no information concerning motor cars unless construction or some other unusual work is involved. Roadmaster Tjaden stated that he had instruct- ed section foremen not to rely entirely on their line-ups. Conclusions. This accident was caused by the failure of a section motor car to be removed from the main track in foggy .weather, or to be protected by flag, for which Section Fore- man Bakeman is responsible. The investigation disclosed that Section Foreman Bake- man received a line-up showing the time train No. 914 was expected to arrive at Iowa Falls, and it appears that if the accident had not occurred train No. 914 would have ar- rived approximately at the time shown, or a few minutes ear- lier. Information of this character represented the condi- tion under which the section foreman had been operating his motor car for many years. In this particular case the motor car encountered fog; and the rules governing the operation of motor cars provide that in foggy weather special precau- tions must be taken, flagging when necessary. Knowing that a train must be near, Section Foreman Bakeman should have taken particular care strictly to observe the rules, instead of continuing at a moderate speed under weather conditions which made it impossible to move the motor car from the track when the approaching train finally became visible. ying S mah W The statements of the various witnesses were conflict- ing as to whether a whistle signal was sounded by the lead engineman of train No. 914 for the highway grade crossing located near the point of accident; apparently the bell was not ringing, and there is a conflict in the statements as to & whether the headlight was burning. On the latter point, however, the section foreman stated that even if it had been burning he did not think it would have prevented the acci- dent. As to the whistle and bell it is a question, of course, as to whether he would have heard them, assuming that both of them were used. ~6~ All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. : Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library HE 1780 .A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD AT STANLEY, OHIO, ON APRIL 6, 1929. Anamoronation? ALURA 1517 July 31, 1929. To the Commission: On April 6, 1929 there was a side collision between a freight train ma ut cars on the New ent b York Central Railroad at Stanley, Ohio, resulting in the death of one employee. Location and Method of Operation. Stanley is located in the Toledo Terminal District and this accident occurred in what is known as yard K; 16 tracks in this yard are numbered con- secutively from east to west and the accident occurred at the north end of track 14, at the fouling point of this track with the north lead track. All of the tracks in yard K slope slightly downward from each end toward the center, while the yard is lighted at night by means of flood lights. Lovements of trains and engines are required to be made in accordance with the rules and under the direction of the general yardmaster and his assistants. On account of track curvature northbound trains enter the yard at its northern end, thus re- versing their time-table direction. Compass directions are used in this report. Description. The weather was clear and there was a strong wind blowing from the west at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 4.17 a.m. This Michigan Central transfer engine 7889, headed north, was manned by a Michigan Central crew and in charge of Conductor McMahan and Engineman Gibb. engine entered the south end of track 14, shoving a caboose ahead of it; the caboose was then coupled to the south end of some standing cars, which in turn were moved northward until two more couplings were made, resulting in the formation of a cut of 60 cars. The entire cut was then shoved northward at a speed esti- mated to have been from 2 to 4 miles per hour, it being intended to stop clear of the north lead track, cut the -2- engine off the south end, run it around the cut, couple it to the north end, and then haul the cut of cars away as a transfer train. Instead of the cut of cars being brought to a stop in the clear, however, the leading car was shoved into the side of the forty- fourth car in New York Central train No. 95, which was entering the yard on track 15. New York Central freight train No. 95, which was northbound by time-table directions, consisted of 91 cars and a caboose, hauled by engines 3869 and 3950, and was in charge of Conductor Schickler and Enginemen Hoskins and Houser, respectively. On arrival at Stanley this train passed around the curve, entered the yard at the north end, headed down the north lead track and entered track 15. While moving southward on that track at a speed variously estimated to have been from 4 to 10 miles per hour, the side of the forty-fourth car was struck by the cut moving northward on track 14. The forty-fourth to the fifty-seventh cars in train No. 95 were scraped and damaged, but remained on the track, and the train continued until it was brought to a stop in the clear on track 15. The lead- ing car in the cut shoved by engine 7889 was overturned and the following car was scraped and damaged, but re- mained on the rails. The employee killed was a car inspector, who was preparing to inspect train No. 95 when it had been brought to a stop. Summary of Evidence. Flagman Montrie, of MC engine 7889, stated that after the entire cut was assembled on track 14 he gave a back-up signal in order to stretch the slack. He then gave a proceed signal and the cut had been shoved ahead about 10 car-lengths when train No. 95 arrived, at which time there was a strong wind blowing from the west, forcing smoke down over track 14. When the engines of train No. 95 had passed by him a distance of about seven or eight car-lengths, he could see that track 14 was then clear for about 20 or 25 car-lengths northward but on looking back he noticed smoke blowing down and he at once got on top of the leading car and gave an "easy" signal, followed immediately by stop signals, given when about 18 or 20 car-lengths from the north lead track; he said that he gave the stop signals at this time as a matter of extra precaution 1 -3- in view of conditions and in order to make sure that the cut of cars would get stopped without incident. On again looking back he saw smoke was still blowing over the cars from the engines of train No. 95 and he could not see the lantern of his head brakeman, who was passing signals to the engineman. Flagman Montrie then got down on the east side of the lead- ing car and while giving stop signals from that posi- tion his lantern struck the side of a car in a train that was standing on track 13 and was extinguished. After getting off the car and relighting his lantern, taking only an instant to do so, he tried to signal the head brakeman by swinging the lantern low, as he thought he could see the head brakeman's lantern intermittently. The cut of cars continued northward at a low rate of speed, however, anr; after four or five cars had passed him he got back on the top of one of the cars, failed to see the lantern of the head brakeman, and again got down on the ground and commenced giving stop signals close to the ground. The cut continued until the accident occurred how- ever, at which time he was about four or five car- lengths away; he immediately gave back-up signals, which were acted upon, the cut being moved back in the clear. Flagman Montrie further stated that the air was not cut in on the cars, and that it was custom- ary for the transfer engine to enter the yard track at the south end, assemble the cut of cars and shove them to the north end of the yard, instead of having the engine enter from the north end of the yard, assemble the cut and then haul the cars to the north P end of the yard. It was his understanding that this was done in order to allow the air-brake men to test the air brakes on the cars by means of the yard plant in the north end of the yard. He also stated that in switching service it is customary for a stop to be made immediately when the crew loses sight of the lighted lantern of the man directing the movement. Head Brakeman Hamlin, of MC engine 7889, stated that he was hanging on the east side of the third or fourth car ahead of the engine at the time the entire cut was assembled. When Flagman Montrie gave a proceed signal he did not accept the first one, but on receiving the second proceed signal the head brakeman passed it on to the engineman, who did not start the movement immediately. The flagman gave -4- another proceed signal and at this time the movement was started. Head Brakeman Hamlin said he was looking straight ahead, but at no time prior to the accident did he receive a stop signal from the flagman. Head Brakeman Hamlin further stated that he was in plain view of the engineman at all times while passing sig- nals, but that the flagman's lantern was not con- tinuously in his own view, being momentarily obscured by smoke on four or five occasions as the cut was shoved northward. Head Brakeman Hamlin understood that it is required to stop immediately when the lantern of the field man is lost to view for an unreasonable length of time and thought the time taken to travel three or four car-lengths would be an un- reasonable length of time for the flagman's lantern to have been lost from view when moving at such a low rate of speed, but in his opinion the cut did not move over one and one-half or two car-lengths at any time without the flagman's lantern being visible, and this lantern was lighted all of the time. Fireman Weed, of train No. 90, stated that his train was standing on track 13 with the engine headed north and its forward end about two or three car-lengths south of the lead track. He was sitting on his seat box locking ahead and saw the cut of cars just as they were hoved into the side of train No. 95 Fireman Weed estimated the speed of train No. 95 to have been between 5 and 10 miles per hour and that of the cut of cars to have been about 4 miles per hour. About five minutes after the accident, after the cut of cars had been pulled back, he got off his engine and saw a man whom he presumed was a member of the MC transfer crew; this man was about five or six car- lengths south of the point of accident and during the course of the conversation he had with him the man said, "My lantern went out; I was swinging down and my lantern went out." Fireman Weed further stated that the man was very excited, but that to the best of his recollection the man told him that he was giving stop signals from a point about 16 car-lengths south of the lead track. Car Inspector Wicks stated that his duty was to inspect inbound and outbound trains and that he had taken up a position at the north end of yard K, between tracks 14 and 15 and about one and one- half car-lengths south of the lead track, as train -5- No. 95 was pulling into the yard on track 15. At the time he stationed himself in that location he looked toward the south and saw a cut of cars, about 30 or 40 car-lengths distant, but was not aware that it was being shoved northward until about half of the cars in train No. 95 had passed him, at which time one of the cars in the cut brushed against his arm. Car Inspector Wicks did not know whether it was the lead car that brushed against his arm, but said that the crash occurred just afterwards and that he immediately ran southward as fast as he could, between tracks 14 and 15; on reaching a point about 20 car-lengths away he crossed over the cut of cars and there saw the flagman of engine 7889, whom he knew personally. Conductor McMahon, of engine 7889, stated that he was in the yardmaster's office when the acci- dent occurred; he was under the impression that Flagman Montrie understood it was intended that the cut of cars should be left standing where it was after being assembled, and that it was not to be shoved to the north end of the yard. Conductor McMahon stated that it had always been customary with him ever since he had been on this run to leave the cars standing right where they were after all of the coup- lings had been made, and then cut off the engine, run around the cars, couple to the north end, and haul them northward to the yard air plant. In this con- nection, however, he stated that while he had never had a cut of cars shoved northward, such as was done in this case, yet he had never issued instructions to the brakemen not to do it and on this particular oc- casion he felt perfectly safe in permitting these two brakemen to do the work by themselves. Engineman Gibb and Fireman Emerson, of engine 7889, corroborated the statement of Flagman Montrie that it was customary to shove the cars ahead before running around them. ... The statements of various other witnesses, includ- ing Enginemen Hoskins and Houser, Fireman Lamp and Evans, and Head Brakeman Cosgrove, of train No. 95, Yardmaster Lahey and Sergeant of Police Ellis, NYCRR, developed nothing additional of importance as to what transpired just prior to the accident, except that the two firemen and the head brakeman said they did not notice anyone on the leading car of the cut as their engines passed it. · -6- Conclusions. This accident was caused by a cut of cars being shoved ahead on yard track 14 by MC transfer engine 7889 without due regard for safety, resulting in the leading car striking the side of a car in NYC train No. 95, which was moving down the lead track. testimony as to after the 60 cars in track 14 and he had According to his own There was conflict in the just what Flagman Montrie did the cut had been assembled on given the signal to proceed. statements he was at the head end of the cut prac- tically all of the time while it was being shoved ahead at a very low rate of speed. None of the various witnesses saw him there, however, and it does not seem reasonable that all of the various stop signals which he says were given could have been missed by Brakeman Hamlin, who appeared to have been riding on the side of a car near the south end of the cut, in position to transmit any signals which might have been given. Apparently there was no good reason why Flagman Montrie should not have been able to couple this track and shove the cars ahead without danger of accident. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the pro- visions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 2 Transportation Library ! HE 1788 A234 1 ZW INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 粉 ​1518 PERSITI REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD AT KENOVA, ARK., ON APRIL 10, 1929. August 2, 1929. To the Commission: On April 10, 1929, there was a collision between a freight train and a switch engine handling a cut of cars on the Missouri Pacific Railroad at Kenova, Ark., which resulted in the death of one trespasser and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Gurdon District of the Louisiana Division, extending between Gurdon, Ark., and Collinston, La., a distance of 134.14 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track Tine over which trains are operated by time-table, and train orders. The accident occurred within yard limits at Kenova, at a point 2,309 feet north of the/south yard- limit board; approaching this point from the south, beginning at mile post 482, the track is tangent for a distance of 1,125 feet, followed by a 30 curve to the left 2,950 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent to the point of accident, a distance of 90 feet, and for some distance beyond that point. The grade is generally descending for northbound trains and is 0.325 per cent at the point of accident. embankment, trees and oil derricks, of the curve, the view of the point restricted to about 1,560 feet. Categ Owing to an located on the inside of accident is There are six automatic block signals on this district, two of them being located in the vicinity of the point of accident, these being northbound signal 4818 and southbound signal 4813. Northbound signal 4818 is 744 feet south of the south yard-limit board, while southbound signal 4813 is located 2,081 feet north of the yard-limit board or 228 feet south of the point of accident. These signals, of the upper-quadrant type, operate in two positions, stop and proceed. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 10.55 a. m. ¡ 3 ** -- Point of Curve 11+ 23 Engineer on #1234 could first see Sw. Engine at 13+00 Br.No. 44 filled D = 3° 00' R L = 2950' Point of Tangent 40+737 • } D Signal 40+86 10+33 Point of Accident 11+73 P.S. ! 12+61 Signal and Relay box 20+17 20+38 P.S. From this point it could be determined that switch engine was on main track. 28+27 A Z 33+42 Yard Linit Board 25+96 Switch engine could be seen from this point Public Crossing Inv. 1518 Missouri Pacific R.R. Kenova, Ark. April 10, 1929. -3- Description Traveling switch engine No. 78 was in charge of Conductor Cargile and Engineman Harper. This engine departed from Smackover yard, 1.73 miles north of Kenova, and upon arrival at Kenova it became engaged in switching. While this work was being performed the crew observed a train approaching and realizing a col- lision was inevitable the engine and cut of 14 cars coupled ahead of it were started northward, but an estimated speed of only 3 or 4 miles per hour had been attained when the rear of the engine was struck by train No. 272. Northbound second-class freight train No. 272 consisted of 23 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1234, and was in charge of Conductor White and Engineman Reed. This train left Norphlet, 3.93 miles south of Kenova, at 10.44 a.m., 9 hours and 54 minutes late, and after entering the yard limits at Kenova it collided with yard engine 78 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been between 6 and 25 miles per hour. Engine 78 came to rest 165 feet north of the point of accident with only the left front driver remaining on the track; the cab was demolished, the frame broken at its rear end, and the cab appurtenances badly damaged. The tender was overturned to the west and practically destroyed, but none of the cars coupled to the engine were derailed or damaged. Engine 1234 had its front end slightly damaged but was not derailed, while several cars in the middle of the train were derailed, two of them being The employee injured was the head brakeman of train No. 272. demolished. Summary of evidence Engineman Harper, of engine 78, stated that his engine, which was headed north, pulled a cut of cars south- ward on the main track to a point about four or five car- lengths north of the clearance point of the south switch, and after the engine was cut off he had moved back about one-half car-length when the fireman informed him that a train was showing up in the block. He immediately recoupled to the cars and started shoving them ahead but only succeeded in moving them a distance of about three far- lengths before the collision occurred. When he first observed the approaching train, approximately eight pole- lengths away, he sounded a stop signal three times, and when that train had reached a point about one pole-length from 4. : his engine he realized it could not get stopped and got off. He estimated the speed of his own engine at the time of the accident at 3 or 4 miles per hour and that of train No. 272 at 15 or 20 miles per hour. Fireman Owen, of engine 78, stated that his engine had just started to back up after being cut off when he saw the southbound automatic signal, located 228 feet south of the point of accident, drop to the stop position and he at once called it to the engine man's attention. The engine was then coupled to the cars and a second back-up movement started but about this time he observed the train approaching around the curve and he told the engine man to go ahead. A stop was made and the forward movement started but a speed of only about 4 miles per hour was attained before the collision occurred. Brakeman Monday, of engine 78, corroborated the fireman by saying that after the engine had been recoupled to the cars they were moved southward an additional distance of three or four car-lengths before they were again stopped and started northward; this second move- ment southward, however, did not proceed far enough to foul the automatic signal circuit. Brakeman Monday said he did not give the engineman a signal to make the second back-up movement. The statements of Brakeman Fatchett substantiated those of Fireman Owen and Brakeman Monday as to what transpired just prior to the accident. Conductor Cargile, of engine 78, was checking cars on a nearby track when he observed the engine leave the cars and then return to them, and about this time a brakeman warned him there would be a collision; he signalled the engineman to come ahead and the cars had been moved forward about two car-lengths when the collision occurred. He had not noticed that the block signal had changed to the stop position until he heard some one sound a stop signal. Conductor Cargile further stated that he was not working under train orders and was relying on rule 93 for protection against all except first-class trains. Engineman Reed, of train No. 272, stated that he was informed by the car inspectors at El Dorado, the initial terminal of his train, that all of the air brakes were operative, and he had no difficulty im handling the train en route, using the brakes about 15 times. When he passed the block signal, located 744 feet south of the yard-limit board at Kenova, it was displaying a clear indication. His train approached the yard- limit board at a speed of less than 25 miles per hour and when in that vicinity he made two brake-pipe re- -5- } ductions totalling 15 pounds. When his train reached a road crossing, 515 feet north of the yard-limit board, he moved the brake valve to the full-release position and held it in that position until he thought the brakes were fully released. He had started to move the brake valve to the running position when the fireman, who had been keeping a constant lookout, told him to apply the brakes in emergency, and he immediately made an emergency application and also set the independent brake and closed the throttle, which had been cushioned down the grade, but in his excitement he did not notice whether the brakes responded properly. He did not think, however, that they had had time to recharge. On account of the curvature, Engineman Reed did not see engine 78 until it was only two car-lengths distant. Engineman Reed estimated the speed of his train at the time he released the brakes, prior to the emergency application to have been 12 or 15 miles per hour, and at the time of the accident it was 6 or 8 miles per hour. It further appeared from Engineman Reed's statements that he under- stood the speed of his train within yard limits should have been such that he could have stopped within range of vision, and that the indication displayed by the signal south of the yard-limit board had no bearing on the yard-limit rules. The clear indication displayed by that signal told him there was no obstruction between that point and the signal north of the yard-limit board, but he said he used poor judgment in operating his train so that he was not able to stop before passing that sig- nal, although at the time he thought he was complying with the rules, and he said that if he had not felt safe he would not have entered the yard at the speed at which his train was traveling. Fireman Judd, of train No. 272, stated that he observed the block signal south of the yard-limit board at Kenova displaying a clear indication as his train approached it, at a speed of 20 or 25 miles per hour. About the time the train passed this signal the engineman applied the brakes, reducing the speed to between 15 and 20 miles per hour, at which speed the train passed the yard- limit board. The engineman released the brakes about nine and one-half pole lengths south of the south switch, the speed then being probably 15 miles per hour, and about the same time engine 78 came into view of the fireman, although at that time it looked to be in the clear. Fireman Judd watched engine 78 closely and when his own engine reached a point about six pole-lengths from engine 78, where his vision was not interfered with by poles on the inside of the curve, he was able to see that the engine was on the main track and at once shouted to the engine man to apply the brakes in emergency. Fireman Judd further stated that the distance traveled by his train between -6- the time the brakes were released and the time they were applied was between two and four pole-lengths, but he did not know what effect was obtained by the emergency application as he was preparing to get off; he estimated the speed at the time of the accident at 6 to 8 miles per hour. The statements of Head Brakeman Beavers, of train No. 272, practically corroborated those of Engineman Reed and Fireman Judd as to what transpired prior to the accident. Conductor White, of train No. 272, stated that after leaving El Dorado he observed that the gauge in the caboose registered 70 pounds pressure and that two stops en route were made without apparent difficulty. The speed of his train was reduced to about 12 or 15 miles per hour approaching Kenova and the brakes released when the caboose reached a point in the vicinity of mile post 482, which is about 2,000 feet south of the yard- limit board. Conductor White did not notice any subsequent brake application or any further reduction in speed prior to the accident. He considered the train was being operated in compliance with the rules and was of the opinion that it could have been stopped within range of vision, but he did not know why this was not done. The statements of Brakemen Stinnett and Shirey, of train No. 272, brought out no additional information. JARD Section Foreman Miles stated that he was working about five pole-lengths north of the south yard-limit board at Kenova when train No. 272 passed him and at that time it was traveling at a speed which he thought was between 25 and 30 miles per hour, although he did not pay particular attention to the movement of the train; he did not know whether the speed was reduced after that time. On April 13, tests were conducted to determine the range of visibility, using the same types of engines as were involved in the accident. The switch engine was placed at the point of accident and the road engine moved northward towards it. When the road engine reached a point 1,563 feet from the switch engine the latter came into view from the fireman's side but it could not be definitely determined from this point whether it was on the main track. The road engine was then moved to a point 984 feet from the switch engine, when it could be seen that this engine was on the main track. The switch engine could not be seen from the engineman's side of the road engine, however, until these engines were within 267 feet of each other. I £ -7- $ j Another test was made by coupling the road engine to a train of 35 cars, with almost twice the tonnage of train No. 272 at the time of the accid ent, and moving the train northward at a speed of between 20 and 25 miles per hour. When the engine passed the yard-limit board a split reduction of brake-pipe pressure was made, totalling 18 pounds, which reduced the speed to about 15 miles per hour, and when the engine reached the road crossing south of the point of accident the brakes were released and the brake-valve held in full-release position for about three or four seconds; at the point where the fireman could definitely determine that the switch engine was on the main track a service appli- cation of the brakes was made by a 15 pound brake-pipe reduction, which was held applied until the train came to a stop, and it was found that the train stopped 59 feet south of the point of accident. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Reed, of train No. 272, properly to control the speed of his train within yard limits. .. The rules provide that second and inferior class trains must move within yard limits prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear. According to the evidence, however, the engine man made a service application of the brakes, reducing the speed to about 15 miles per hour, and then released the brakes without knowing whether the main track was clear and also before a clear view could be had around the curve south of the point of accident. Not only did Engineman Reed show poor judgment in releasing the brakes at a point where the view was obscured, but the test made subsequent to the accident, with a train of considerably heavier tonnage, indicated that a stop could have been made short of the point of accident. Under the circum stances it seems apparent that Engine man Reed misjudged either the speed of his train or the distance; he should have entered the yard limits under control, and should not have released the brakes until he knew he could stop short of any obstruction. · The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. : Transportation Library HE 1780 4234 1520 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE BUFFALO, ROCHESTER AND PITTSBURGH RAILWAY NEAR WEST FALLS, N. Y., ON APRIL 22, 1929. September 19, 1929. To the Commission: On April 22, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a freight train and a work train on the Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Railway near West Falls, N.Y., which resulted in the injury of nine employees, one of whom died the following day. This investigation was made in conjunction with representatives of the Public Service Commission of New York. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Ruffalo Division, which extends between Buffalo Creek and East Salamanca, N.Y. a distance of 58.03 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and an automatic block-signal system. The point of accident was 6,120 feet south of the station at West Falls, 3,670 feet south of block signal B-147. Approaching this point from signal B-147 the track is tangent for a distance of 1,500 feet, followed by a 3° 30' curve to the right 500 feet in length, the accident occurring at a point about 100 feet from the southern end of this curve; approaching from the south the track is tangent for a distance of 575 feet, followed by the curve on which this accident occurred. The grade for southbound trains is 0.4 per cent ascending at the point of accident. Due to a high embankment on the west side of the track, the range of vision for crews of southbound trains is limited to about 495 feet, while that for crews of northbound trains is limited to about 893 feet. ΟΙ The automatic signal system is of the absolute permissive type. The signal involved, signal B-147, is an absolute signal of the three-position, upper-quadrant semaphore type, with a square end blade. Under the rules when a train is stopped by an absolute block signal on #: West Falls Southbound Signal B-147...* Ni 2,450 POINT OF ACCIDENT 3,6701 A ga dhe, prin Ma 3,7901 Borthbound Signal B-158 X Ø ____· ↑ Stations involved Yates 1.49 Loveland 1.2 Jewettville 0.94 3.58 miles to northbound absolute sig- nal at Colden West Falls 5.04 Colden 2.26 Glenwood 4.61 E. Concord 3.46 Springville No. 1520 B. R. & P. Ry. WEST FALLS, N.Y. April 22,19.29 · * -2- single track, it may proceed when a caution or clear indication is displayed, but if such an indication is not displayed immediately the conductor or engineman will confer with the train dispatcher; if unable to communicate with the train dispatcher, the train is required to proceed under protection of a flag, as prescribed by rule 99, to the next caution or clear signal in advance, expecting to find block occupied, a switch open or the track broken or otherwise obstructed. It is also provided, in rule 100-B, that when work trains are moving against opposing trains they must send out a second flagman before rounding curves. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 9.40 a.m. Description Northbound work extra 414 consisted of eight cars, hauled by engine 414, backing up, and was in charge of Conductor Ranson and Engineman Lubold. At Springville, 15.37 miles south of West Falls, a copy of train order No. 205, Form 19, was received, reading as follows: "Eng 414 works 6.45 a.m. until 7.01 p.m. between Springville and Yates. Work extra 414 protects against third class trains between Springville and Yates." Work Yates is 3.63 miles north of West Falls. extra 414 proceeded northward, and at Glenwood, 7.30 miles south of West Falls, Flagman Finton was sent ahead on train No. 60 to Jewettville, between West Falls and Yates, with instructions to have all trains look out for work extra 414 between Loveland, just north of Jewettville, and Glenwood. Work extra 414 then pro- ceeded to Colden, 5.04 miles south of West Falls, de- parted from that point at 9.26 a.m., according to the block record, stopped en route to pick up some men passed permissive block signal B-158, which is 2,790 feet south of the point of accident and was displaying a caution indication, and collided with train No. 43 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been from 2 to 15 miles per hour. Southbound third-class freight train No. 43 con- sisted of one car and a caboose, hauled by engine 384, and was in charge of Conductor Merkt and Engineman Devans. At Buffalo Creek, 13.7 miles north of West Falls, a copy of train order No. 205, Form 19, previously .. J -3- quoted, was received. The train departed from Buffalo Creek at 6.50 a.m., according tothe train sheet, five minutes late, and at Jewettville the crew received in- struction from the flagman to look out for work extra 414 betwe.n Loveland and Glenwood. This train then proceeded to West Falls, departing from that point at 9.38 a.m., 59 minutes late, passed absolute block signal B-147, which was displaying a stop indication, and collided with work oxtra 414 while rounding the curve at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour. The tender of engine 414 was derailed and consider- ably damaged, while damage was sustained by all of the equipment in train No. 43. The employee killed was the conductor of train No. 43, while those injured were the engineman, fireman and two trainmen of train No. 43 and the fireman, conductor, hoisting engineer and laborer of work extra 414. Summary of evidence Engineman Lubold, of work extra 414, stated that his train proceeded from Springville toward West Falls, doing the necessary work en route, and clearing the main track when necessary for superior trains. After passing permissive signal B-158, displaying a caution indication, he proceeded slowly and shortly afterwards Brakeman Neudeck, who was standing by the window on the fireman's side and had a clear view across to the station at West Falls, informed him that he could see train No. 43 at that point. Engineman Lubold continued to operate his train at a speed that would enable him to bring it to a stop within half his range of vision but had proceeded only a short distance before he saw the approaching train on the curve. He immediate- ly applied the air brakes in emergency, opened the sanders, sounded one blast of the whistle, warned the other men to get off and then jumped off himself. He thought that his train traveled a distance of about six car-lengths after he first saw train No. 43 and he estimated the speed of his train at not more than 2 miles per hour at the time of the accident. statements of Fireman Wolford, of extra 414, practically corroborated those of Engineman Lubold as to the operation of their train xcept that he estimated its speed to have been about 15 miles per hour approaching the point of accident, but he was not sure as to whether this was its speed when the accident actually occurred. The -4- Conductor Ransom, of work extra 414, stated that he sent a flagman to Jewettville on train No. 60 with instructions to have all trains look out for work extra 414 between Loveland and Glenwood. He noticed signal B-158 displaying a caution indication, and said he thought the train was traveling at a speed of about 5 miles when the air brakes were applied in emergency. The statements of Brakeman Neudeck and Flagman Colf, as well as those of Engineman O'Hara and Fireman Butler, of the hoisting machine, brought out nothing additional of importance. Flagman Finton stated that he left the work train at Glenwood and proceeded to Jewettville on train No. 60 with instructions to have all trains look out for work extra 414 between Loveland and Glenwood. He flagged several trains, among which was train No. 43, and he said the engineman read these flagging instructions aloud to his fireman. Flagman Finton thought that train No. 43 departed from Jewettville at about 9.21 a.m. Engineman Devans, of train No. 43, stated that after reading the flagging instructions at Jewettville his train proceeded to West Falls, received a clear indication at the permissive signal at the north end of the passing track, and then stopped at West Falls and consumed 12 minutes in switching. After doing this work his train again proceeded, and he said he called the clear indication displayed by signal B-147 and that the fireman repeated it, and Engineman Devans said it was still in the clear position when his train passed under it. On entering the curve on which the accident occurred he had shut off the throttle, and he then saw extra 414 about 8 or 10 car-lengths distant. He immediately applied the air brakes in emergency and sounded the whistle. Engineman Devans estimated the speed of his train to have been be- tween 20 and 25 miles per hour between West Falls and the point of accident, and admitted that he did not have it under control in accordance with the flagging instructions received at Jewettville, and he understood that even if signal B-147 had been in the clear position, as he stated, yet it did not relieve him of the duty of operating his train in the expectation of finding the work extra at any point. max 50m The statements of Fireman McVeen, of train No. 43, substantiated those of Engineman Devons. He added that when the engineman called "clear block" he looked out and saw the clear indication himself; they were then about 2,000 feet from the signal and they passed it at a speed of about 15 miles per hour, this speed being in- creased later to 20 or 25 miles per hour, and the train was traveling at this latter speed when rounding the curve. Fireman McVeen had been raking the fire just before passing under the signal, but he thought the smoke should have been raised over the caboose so as not to obscure the vision of anyone riding in the caboose cupola. Brakeman Phillips, of train No. 43, stated that he was riding in the cupola of the caboose on leaving West Falls but did not observe the position of signal B-147 on account of the fact that smoke from the engine obscured his view. He estimated the speed at the time of the accident to have been about 20 or 25 miles per hour. He further stated that he knew of the orders his train held and also of the flagging instructions re- ceived at Jewettville. The statements of Brakemen Coulter and McClellan and Flagman Seider brought out nothing additional of importance; none of them observed the position of signal B-147. The members of the crew of train No. 43 except Engineman Devans, also stated that since the installation of automatic block signals it had not been customary for work trains to send out a second flagman when moving around curves, which statement was concurred in by all the members of the crew of work extra 414 with the possible exception of Flagman Finton, and he could not recall that he had ever been sent out as a second flagman. Engineman Bader and Fireman Widmer, of southbound train No. 3 stated that as they approached West Falls about 30 minutes after the occurrence of the accident the permissive signal at the north end of the siding signal B-139-was in the caution position and signal B-147 was in the stop position. Sabade -6- Signal Supervisor Darrow stated that shortly after arriving at the scene of the accident he went to a point of the embankment in order to obtain a view of signal B-147 and this signal was then in the stop position. Supervisor Darrow, in company with Signal Maintainer Colling and Assistant Superintendent of Police Connelly, inspected the relay box containing the relays for signal B-147, and the position of the relays indicated that the signal had been set to stop by the northbound train. Supervisor Darrow and Maintainer Colling, together with Division Engineer Hoyt and Roadmaster Salinsky, walked back to signal B-158, in- spected the relays, and found them in good condition. Supervisor Darrow remained at the scene of the accident until the track had been cleared and observed that the and observed that block signals cleared up properly. He then observed that the movement of train No. 6 from Colden, the first northbound train to move after the track had been cleared, caused signal B-147 to change to the stop position, where it remained until the rear end of that train had passed it. About a minute after this train had cleared signal B-147, extra 600, northbound, departed from Colden, and signal B-147 again went to the stop position and remained in that position until the train had passed, when the signal again assumed the proceed position. Soon afterwards train No. 59, southbound, approached, and once more he observed signal B-147 working properly. The statements of Signal Maintainer Colling verified those of Supervisor Darrow as to the operation of the signals. He further stated that he stayed at West Falls all night, checking train movements in both directions, and found no irregularities whatever in the operation of signal B-147. The statements of Assistant Superintendent of Police Connelly, Masher Mechanic Donaldson, and Roadmaster Salinsky brought out nothing additional of importance, being generally of a corroborative nature. Assistant Superintendent McCarthy stated that he had not made it a practice to accompany work train except when picking up coal, wreckage, etc., and snow plows, and the trains he accompanied had complied with rule 100-B. He also said that all trainmen and enginemen are examined on the book of operating rules every two“ years and this particular rule is made clear to them, and there has been no change in the rule since the in- stallation of the automatic block signals. -7- Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Devans and Fireman McVeen, of train No. 43, properly to observe and obey the stop indication of absolute signal B-147, and by the failure of Engineman Devans to operate his train under full control in accord- ance with flagging instructions. Engineman Devans and Fireman McVeen said signal B-147 was in the clear position when their train passed it. This could not have been the case unless the signal were out of order, in view of the fact that extra 414 had entered on the control circuit at Colden several minutes prior to the departure of train No. 43 from West Falls. Examination of the signal mechanism shortly after the accident showed that the signal had been placed in the stop position by a northbound train, which could only have been extra 414; no repairs to the signal system were necessary as a result of the accident and subsequent checking and observation of its operation after the track had been cleared for the movement of trains in- dicated that it was operating properly, while signal B-147 also was displaying the proper indication when a following southbound train approached it shortly after the occurrence of the accident. Under the cireum- stances therefore, it is believed that this signal was in the stop position when train No. 43 left West Falls and that for some unknown reason its indication was not observed and obeyed. Instructions had been received at Jewettville from the flagman of the work extra to look out for the work extra in the territory in which the accident occurred. Under these circumstances it was incumbent on Engineman Devans to operate his train under full control expecting to find the work extra at any point within the specified limits. Had he done so, instead of proceeding at a speed of 25 miles per hour at a point where his view was very much restricted, he should have been able to stop his train in time to avert the accident. 8 The majority of the members of the crews involved stated that since the installation of automatic block signals it had not been customary for work trains running against opposing trains to send out a second flagman when moving around all curves, as required by rule 100-B, although on the other hand the assistant superin- tendent said his experience showed that rule 100-B had been observed. If the statements of these employees are correct, it has not been their practice to obey this rule, and it is incumbent upon the operating officials to take the necessary action to see that this practice does not continue and that the rules are properly obeyed by those whose actions they govern. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1521 Transportanon Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ST. LOUIS- SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY AT SPAULDING, OKLA., ON APRIL 29, 1929. September 20, 1929 To the Commission: On April 29, 1929, there was a collision between a passenger train and an automobile truck at a grade crossing on the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway at Spaulding Okla., which resulted in the death of the driver of the automobile truck and the injury of two employees on duty, one employee off duty, one mail clerk, one express messenger and one person riding on the truck. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Creek Sub-division of the Southwestern Division, which extends between Sapulpa and Francis, Okla., a distance of 101.9 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The point of accident was 439 feet south of the station at Spaulding, where a public highway crosses the railroad tracks at a slight angle. The highway runs directly north and south while the tracks run in a general northeast and southwest direction, ac- cording to compass direction, or north and south according to time-table direction; the latter direction is used in this re- port in referring to train movements. Approaching from the south. the track is tangent for a distance of 4,311.9 feet followed by a 20 curve to the left 1,586.6 feet in length, the accident ocen curring on this curve at a point 35.5 feet from its southern end. The grade for northbound trains is generally ascending, but it is level at the point of accident. At the crossing the highway passes over three tracks, known as the main, passing, and storage tracks, the main track being the first track encountered by a southbound vehicle. Approaching this crossing from the north on the highway there is a slight incline, the crossing being 2.8 feet above the ground line. The crossing is level and in fair condition. view had by drivers of southbound vehicles of an approaching northbound train is restricted by trees located to the right of the highway and by a tool house located on the railroad right of way 21 feet from the center line of the main track and 53 feet south of the center line of the highway, the tool The 1 - 2 1 house being 16 feet wide and 12 feet deep. There is a small opening between the trees and the tool house where a clear view of the track can be had for a considerable distance. The only protection afforded at this crossing is the standard highway cross-bar sign, reading "RAILROAD CROSS- ING" located 16 feet west of the center line of the main track and 15 feet 8 inches south of the center line of the highway. This sign is supported by a post which extends 16 feet above the ground line and the words "LOOK OUT FOR THE CARS" are painted on the side of the post facing the approaching vehicle. A standard stop sign, required in the State of Oklahoma, is located 37 feet west of the center line of the main track and 8.5 feet south of the center line of the highway. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 2.53 p.m. Description Northbound passenger train No. 510 consisted of one combination mail and express car, one baggage car and two coaches, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 1032, and was in charge of Conductor German and Engineman Miller. This train departed from Sasakwa, Okla., 7.3 miles south of Spaulding, at 2.43 p.m., one minute late, according to the train sheet, and struck the truck on the crossing at Spaulding while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 15 and 25 miles per hour. > The automobile truck involved was a Chevrolet, one-ton truck, with a steel cab and wooden box bed with side boards about 16 inches in height, hauling six 55-gallon drums of gasoline. This truck, operated by Hoyle Boles, was en route to a Shell Petroleum Company station south of Spaulding and was passing over the crossing at a speed timated to have been about 15 miles per hour when it was struck by train No. 510. es- The truck was demolished and the debris came to : rest on the passing track parallel with the main track, with the forward end of the truck about 32 feet north of the center of the road crossing. Two drums of gasoline exploded and the gasoline was thrown over the engine and coaches, which caught fire immediately. None of the equip- ment of the train was derailed. The driver of the truck was killed, and those injured were the other occupant of the truck and the engineman, fireman, mail clerk, express messenger and a fireman who was off duty, all of whom were on the pas- senger train. - 3 3 Summary of evidence Engineman Miller, of train No. 510, who was not questioned in detail because of the serious nature of his injuries, stated that he sounded the whistle signal at the station whistle board about 1 mile south of the station; at the road-crossing whistle board, located about 1/4 mile south of the crossing, he started to sound the road-crossing whistle and repeated this same signal shortly afterwards, as well as sounding two blasts of the whistle acknowledging a flag from the station platform. He made a brake-pipe reduction of about 7 pounds preparatory to making the sta- tion stop and thought that his train was traveling at a speed of between 15 and 20 miles per hour when the accident occurred. Engineman Miller did not see the truck until about the instant his train struck it and he did not believe the fireman saw it until it was too late to avert the accident. It also appeared from the engineman's statements that he did not apply the brakes in emergency as he reailzed that if he did so the coaches would stop in the fire and he knew that without such an application the train would come to a stop at the station platform and would be clear of the fire. Due to the dangerous condition of Fireman Cousins no state- ment was obtained from him. Conductor German, of train No. 510, stated that approaching paulding the engineman sounded the station whistle when about 2 miles south of the station, after which the conductor gave him the signal to stop at Spaulding, the engineman answering with three long blasts of the whistle. The conductor then heard the engineman sound the crossing whistle signal but could not state the location of the engine at that time, nor did he know whether or not the bell was ringing. The first he knew of anything wrong was when he saw the fire as the coaches passed through it, his train coming to an ordinary stop with the engine about 350 feet beyond the point of accident. He estimated the speed at about 15 or 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Brakeman Hodges, of train No. 510, stated that on approaching the crossing they were traveling at a speed of about 20 or 25 miles per hour. A service application of the brakes had been made and the engineman had sounded the sta- tion whistle and then a crossing whistle signal, and before reaching the crossing he sounded a second crossing signal. The first the brakeman knew of anything wrong was when he heard an explosion and saw the flames. He further stated that he noticed that the engine bell was ringing when the train stopped after the accident. 3 - 4 · The statements of Roadmaster Burr, who was standing on the rear platform of the last car of train No. 510 at the time of the accident, practically corroborated those of the train crew. The statements of Section Foreman Coston, who was working at a point about 1 mile south of Spaulding, brought out nothing additional of importance. John Keener, who was riding on the truck, stated that he boarded it near Konawa. The driver stopped at a store just west of the tracks for water and they then pro- ceeded southward on the highway, stopped at the foot of the approach to the crossing at which time the driver shifted the gears to second speed, and then proceeded up the incline to the tracks. Mr. Keener stated that he was sitting on the right side of the truck cab, which would be on the side near- est the approaching train, but that he did not see the train until just before the accident occurred, neither did he hear any whistles sounded nor the bell ringing before reaching the crossing. E. R. Bryant, an eye-witness to the accident, stat- ed that he was sitting on the porch at a store located near the crossing when he noticed the truck drive up from the north and stop at a store on that side of the crossing, where water was obtained for the truck. He then heard a whistle south of the crossing, one long blast of the whistle, and he judged the train was then from 600 to 900 feet from the crossing. At about that time the truck started ahead and he kept watch- ing the truck and the train as they approached. The truck did not slow down until it was on the track and then the accident occurred. He estimated the speed of both the train and the truck to have been about 15 miles per hour. Mr. Bryant further stated that when the truck was about 50 feet from the crossing the driver could have seen the train for a distance of 225 or 300 feet, but at a point 20 feet from the track his view was obstructed by the tool house until he was within 15 feet of the track, when he could have had a clear view. The truck did not stop at the stop sign, but was moving all the time from the time it left the store until it was struck by the train. Irvin Stobaugh, an eye-witness to the accident, corroborated the statements of E. R. Bryant as to the opera- tion of the truck. He was at the store when the truck stopped for water and had heard the train whistle before the truck left the store, although he said that after the one blast of the whistle he did not pay much attention to the train and was unable to state whether or not the whistle was sourd ed again. ! • 5 1 07 The statements of Mrs. Bernice Stewart, who witnessed the accident from the station platform at Spaulding, substantiated those of the other eye-witnesses. Mrs. Stewart further stated that she heard the whistle signal sounded for the trestle located some distance south of the crossing, then the signal for the crossing, and two blasts of the whislte in answer to a flag signal given from the station platform. The truck left the stone after she heard the whistle signal sounded for the crossing. Mrs. Earl Coston, a resident of Spaulding, stated that while sitting inside her house looking out of a window, which was shut, she heard an engine whistle but could not say how many times or where the engine was with respect to the crossing when the whistle was sounded. She observed the truck leave the store north of the crossing, approach the crossing at a low rate of speed, and drive up on the track without stopping at any time aftör leaving the store. Mrs. P. G. Cahill, Mrs. Letta Coston, Mrs. J. F. Evans, and Arnett Weaver, all of whom live at Spaulding, stated that they heard several blasts of the whistle sounded for the crossing, as was the usual case, but none of them was paying any particular attention to the approach of the train and did not witness the accident, nor were any of them able to state whether the engine bell was ringing. W. H. Gladden, constable of Bilby Township, stated that on the day after the accident he was sitting in his automobile, located at a point 55 feet from the center line of the crossing, and when train No. 510 was 1,090 feet south of the crossing only the smoke stack of the engine could be seen; when the train was at a point 540 feet from the cross- ing the front end of the train and the tops of the coaches could be seen. A. F. Edison, agent for the Shell Petroleum Com- pany at Konawa, Okla., stated that Mr. Boles was employed by him and had been in his employ as a truck driver for about six months, and that he had always considered him to be a careful driver. At the time he hired Boles he instruct- ed him to be careful and not to pick up any passengers along the road and he had never known him to do so, nor did he know that he had picked up Keener until after the accident. He also stated that he had ridden with Boles several times and although he did not come to a full stop at all railroad crossings he would always slow down practically to a stop, shift gears and look both ways before proceeding over the crossing. Boles made an average of one trip a week through Spaulding. Grat } 6. Vision tests were made after the occurrence of the accident and it developed that a train approaching from the south could be seen a distance of 3,000 feet from a point in the center of the highway where it crosses the main track. Observations made every 25 feet from the crossing, up to and including a point 200 feet distant on the highway, showed that the most restricted view was from a point 50 feet from the main track, from which point a train could be seen for a distance of only 175 feet. Conclusions This accident was caused by the driver of an auto- mobile truck proceeding upon a railroad crossing at grade directly in front of an approaching train. The only protection afforded at this crossing is the regular cross-bar sign and the State highway stop sign, and the weight of evidence indicates that Driver Boles did not stop at this sign as required by the law of the State of Oklahoma. While the view is somewhat obstructed tests made subsequent to the occurrence of the accident indicated that had the driver stopped, and had he then taken the pro- per precautions, he could have heard and seen the approaching train in ample time to have prevented the accident. All of the employees of the railway were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORL AND, " Director. Transportation ! Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1522 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH BELT LINE RAILROAD AT PORT NORFOLK, VA., ON MAY 1, 1929. To the Commission: August 1, 1929. On May 1, 1929, there was a side collision between two transfer trains on the Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad at Port Norfolk, Va., resulting in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation The Port Norfolk yard is the northern terminus of this railroad; the tracks in this yard extend north and south, are tangent and practically level, and parallel each other. Eastward from what is known as yard track 0 there are four tracks, designated as tracks A, B, C, and D, while westward from track 0 the tracks are numbered consecutively, 1 to 17 inclusive; these tracks vary in length from 1,364 feet to 2,745 feet, track 3 being 1,828 feet long. The north lead track extends from northwest to southeast, and the accident occurred at the fouling point of track 3 with the north lead track. Transfer and switching movements only are made within the yard, they being made under yard rules, with no time-table schedules, train orders or black-signal system in effect. Crews of the Southern Railway System make deliveries and receive cars in this yard. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 10.45 p.m. Description N&PBL engine 35, headed north, and hauling 28 loaded freight cars, was in charge of Conductor Pierce and Engine- man Todd. This transfer movement headed in the south end of the yard on track 2 and instructions were received from the yardmaster to place the first 11 cars in the train on track 1. These cars were cut off and pulled ahead, out on the north lead track, after which the switch leading to track 2 was closed, and as these cars were then being backed in on track 1 at a speed of about 3 or 4 miles per hour xxx the car next to the engine was struck on the left side by the leading car in a transfer train being shoved northward on track 3 by Southern engine 219. 1 1 - 2 - Southern engine 219, headed north, was in charge of Conductor Thompson and Engineman Kay. This engine headed against the south end of a transfer train of 37 cars that stood on track 3, which cars filled that track to capacity, and after shoving them northward about 70 feet they fouled the lead track and the head car struck the cut being backed in on track 1 by N&PBL engine 35. The leading car in the transfer train being shoved by Southern engine 219 scraped the car next to N&PBL engine 35 its entire length and then cornered the tender cistern and forced it against the boiler head. None of the equip- ment being moved by N&PBL engine 35 was derailed, but the leading car in the transfer train being shoved by Southern engine 219 came to rest across track 4, leaning toward the left, somewhat damaged, while the following car was slight- ly damaged but not derailed. The employee killed was the fireman of N&PBL engine 35, and the employee injured was the engineman of that engine. Summary of evidence Engineman Todd, of N&PBL engine 35, stated that the first he knew of anything wrong was when he heard the noise caused by the leading cer in the other transfer striking his engine and he immediately applied the air brakes. The statements of the other members of this crew added nothing of additional importance. Flagman Bone, of Southern engine 219, stated that he was working as the field man on his transfer and that his conductor had instructed him that it was intended to shove their transfer out of the north end of track 3. N&PBL engine 35 was standing on track 2 with the headlight burn- ing and he lined the switches for that engine to pull the head portion of its transfer out on the lead track, which was done, and as those cars were being backed in on track 1 his own transfer was shoved northward on track 3 and fouled the lead track. Flagman Bone stated that he did not give any signal for the movement. Sajdan Head Brakeman Williamson, of Southern engine 219, stated that he thought the cars in his transfer were about two car-lengths in the clear at the north end of the yard and that after his engine headed against the south end of these cars he gave his engine man a proceed signal, of his own accord, as there was an engine on the south lead track waiting to get by. Head Brakeman Williamson stated that he did not see the lighted lantern of the field man, received no signal from the north end to proceed, and was unaware of anything wrong, and after the movement stopped he began - 3 · coupling the air and inspecting couplings as he walked toward the north end of the yard. It further appeared from the statements of Head Brakeman Williamson that his engineman did not call for a signal before the cars were shoved ahead, and that it was customary when coupling to a cut of cars to shove them ahead not over an engine- length, without receiving a signal from the field man, in order to determine whether all couplings have been made, but that in making a regular yard movement it is his gen- eral practice not to give a signal to move until it has been ascertained that the way is clear. Head Brakeman Williamson also said that he was not familiar with instruc- tions issued in 1926 prohibiting the shoving of cars until 2 signal from the field man has been received. Engineman Kay, of Southern engine 219, stated that after heading aginst the cars standing on track 3 his head brakeman, who was then standing opposite the head end of the first car, gave him a signal to proceed and he shoved the cars ahead about an engine-length and stopped, not being aware of anything wrong until afterwards. The air brakes were not cut in on the cars after the engine went against them. Engineman Kayfurther stated that it was his practice to accept a signal to proceed, such as was given in this case, without any question. Statements of Fireman Lamb brought out nothing additional of importance. Conductor Thompson, of Southern egine 219, stated that he had been to the yard office to deliver and receive bills, during which time the accident occurred. Before going to the yard office he instructed Head Brakeman Williamson to go to track 3 with the engine and told Flagman Bone that it was intended to shove the cars on that track. He considered these two brakemen reliable, and trusted them to carry out the work during his absence. Conductor Thompson also stated that he had instructed Head Brakeman Williamson not to shove cars until a signal was received from the field man; with respect to making couplings and testing the air, the con- ductor said that it is the duty of the head brakeman to couple the engine to the cars and cut in the air, and that the car inspector then works on the air. If any couplings are to be made the head brakeman makes them as he goes along the cut. Conclusions This accident was caused by Head Brakeman Williamson giving a proceed signal without having received a similar signal from the field man to indicate that the way was clear for the intended movement. G 4 7 The following Special Instructions were issued by the Southern Railway System, dated Pinners Point, Va., Oct. 13, 1926: "All Yard Train and Engine Crews: "In future when "orking Belt Line connection you find No. 3 or any other track full of cars do not allow your engine to shove these tracks in at the south end until you get a signal from your rear man at the north end, the rear man will look out and see that everything is clear on the ladder before he will allow these cars to be shoved out. "I hope you will comply with these instruc- tions and help keep accidents down. G. L. Lipscomb General Yardmaster." " These instructions covered the exact situation as it existed at the time of the accident. Conductor Thompson and Engineman Kay were familiar with these instructions, but Head Brakeman Williamson, as well as Flagman Bone said they were not acquainted with them. It is not at al1 certain that this was the case, but even so, Head Brakeman Williamson knew nothing about conditions at the north end of the yard, and common sense should have told him not to give a proceed signal until he knew that the movement could be made in safety. Head Brakeman Williamson had been in yard service at this point since March, 1929, prior to which he had had 17 months' experience as a road brakeman; Flagman Bone had had more than two years' yard service. The other employees were also experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation HTTP Valde I • Library HE 1780 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 234 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD NEAR OWEGO, N. Y., ON MAY 3. 1929. ⭑ 1523 August 2, 1929. To the Commission; On May 3, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Lehigh Valley Railroad near Owego, N. Y., which resulted in the death of two employees and the injury of three employees. Location and Method of Operation This accident occurred on that part of the Auburn Division extending between North Fair Haven, N. Y., and Sayre, Pa., a distance of 116.9 miles which is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and a manual block-signal system. The accident occurred at a point approximately 2 miles east of Owego; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for a distance of more than 1 mile, and for some distance beyond the point of accident. The grade is 0.72 per cent descending for eastbound trains at the point of the accident. + The track is laid with 90-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with an average of 20 hardwood ties to the rail- length, and is ballasted with about 2 feet of cinders and ashes upon a subgrade of gravel. There is a bridge, which spans what is known as Young's Creek, located abo ut 400 feet west of the point of accident. The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 2.25 a.m. Description Eastbound freight train extra 1803 consisted of 65 cars and a caboose, hauled by engines 1803 and 710, and was in charge of Conductor Quinn and Engineman Thrall and Flummerfelt. This train left Owego at 2.15 a.m., accord- ing to the conductor's record, and shortly after passing over the bridge at Young's Creek it was derailed while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 18 and 30 miles per hour. Engine 1803 came to rest on its right side to the left of the main track; its tender was to the right of the -2- ! For engine in a reversed position. Engine 710 was derailed but remained upright and stopped to the right of the track while its tender came to rest partly overturned and to the rear of engine 1803. The first four cars in the train was also derailed but none of the other cars in the train were derailed or damaged. The employees killed were the engineman and fireman of engine 1803; the employees injured were the head brakeman, who was riding on engine 1803, and the engineman and fireman of engine. 710. Summary of evidence- Head Brakeman Stevens.stated that heavy showers were encountered between Auburn and Owego but it did not rain. between the latter point and the point of accident. He was riding on the left-side of the leading engine leaning out of the window looking ahead, and a good view could be had as the headlight was burning brightly, but he received no warning of danger nor did he notice any indication of high water or a washout, the track appearing to be in its proper place. The engine suddenly lurched to one side and turned over into the water; he thought the engine man shut off steam just as the derailment occurred and estimated the speed at the time of the accident to have been between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Engineman Flummerfelt, of the second engine, stated that the crew received a message at Auburn to run carefully at points where washouts or land slides might occur, and that one stop was made at Ensenore, 55 miles west of Owego, account of high water. It rained heavily at intermittent points until his train arrived at Owego, but only a light rain was falling when the train left that point. He noticed a small pool of water a short distance west of Young's Creek but did not see any more water along the track after passing that point, while he could not remember of having ever seen high water east of the bridge. first intimation of anything unusual was when the derailment occurred and at that time the speed of the train was not more than 18 or 20 miles per hour, which he considered a safe speed in that locality. His The statements of Fireman Sullivan, of the second engine, practically corroborated those of engine man Flummerfelt as to the weather conditions. He said that the engineman of the leading engine told him that a message had been received at Auburn to lookout for washouts but he did not see this message. While at Freeburg the leading engine man instructed him to inform his engine man that on account of the heavy rain the train would be -3- operated at a low rate of speed after passing over the hill at North Harford. He estimated that his train was not exceeding a speed of 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident, He did not look out after leaving Owego and therefore saw no indications of high water, also they usually do not look for trouble until their train reaches Tioga Narrows, located some distance east of Young's Creek where the trouble is more likely to be from landslides than from high water. The statements of Conductor Quinn were to the effect that in addition to receiving the message at Auburn regarding weather conditions he communicated with the dis- patcher by telephone from Freeburg and the dispatcher in- formed him that the operator at Owego reported heavy rain- fall in that vicinity, which information Conductor Quinn gave to both enginemen. He said his train was traveling at a speed of 18 or 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident. The statements of Brakeman Wride and Flagman Shutter brought out nothing of importance. Engineman Vanderhoff, of eastbound extra 746, which left Owego at 9.30 p.m., May 2, stated that he encount- ered heavy rain all the way to Sayre. There was water in Young's Creek and also on the lowland adjacent to the track in that vicinity, but it did not appear to be any more than usual during a stormy season. There was no water running over the track and no indications of the roadbed ad washing out. Section Foreman Stella, in charge of the section on which the accident occurred, stated that on the morning of May 2 he worked on the track about one-fourth mile east of Young's Creek until about 9 a.m., and then proceeded to Owego, and when he passed over the bridge he noticed there was very little water in the stream and that the channel under the bridge was open. Between 6 and 7 p.m. there was a heavy rainfall at Owego which lasted about 20 minutes and then it started raining lightly which continued until he retired at about 8.30 p.m. He was awakened by an alarm of fire at 10 he again retired, at about 10.30 p.m., at which time it was still raining lightly. As there was no indication of high water he did not consider it necessary to have the track patrolled. .M. and after returning from the fire Supervisor of Tracks Christiansen stated that he arrived at the scene of accident at 7 a.m., May 3, and after examining the surrounding territory he formed the opinion that high water coming down Young's Creek had broken through the bank at a curve in the creek about 300 feet south of the right of way, cutting a channel to the east of the original channel and forming a pocket of water at the fill along the -4- right of way, of way, and that the pressure created a current or swirl which gradually ate away the base of the fill until it finally washed a channel under the track, leaving the track suspended. At the time of his examination there was water coming down the original channel and passing through under the bridge and also through the new channel and out through the washout. He found a small tree lodged under the bridge but as there was no indication of high water at this point except in the middle of the channel where the water had splashed against the bridge, he concluded that the bridge had nothing to do with causing the water to break through the embankment south of that point. He described Young's Creek as a mountain stream originating 6 or 7 miles south of the right of way. examination of this stream from its point of origin to about 3 miles from the right of way showed that small trees had been uprooted and brush washed from its banks, indicating that a cloudburst had occurred near the source of the stream, and the rush of water apparently caused the bank to give way and form a new channel at the bend in the creek south of the bridge. Supervisor Christiansen further stated that he had worked as section laborer, foreman, and supervisor on the Auburn Division since 1885, and during that time he had never known of trouble from high water in the vicinity of the point of accident. An Supervisor of Bridges and Buildings Hofacker stated that he had been employed in that capacity on the Auburn Division for the past 20 years and to his knowledge there never has been any difficulty with high water at Young's Creek bridge. Farmers Young and Vangelder, who own the land on each side of the embankment where the washout occurred, volunteered the information that the stream involved has given them trouble for years. After a heavy rainstorm the water would bring down from the mountain loose gravel and roots of small trees, which would collect in the channel in the low land and build up the bed of the stream to about even with the land, causing the water to break through or overflow the banks and frequently causing new channels to form. They would repair the banks after such storms but this only caused the bank to break or overflow at some other point when the water again became high. Conclusions This accident was caused by a washout. 1- -5- Young's Creek is a stream that originate in the hills about 6 or 7 miles south of the right of way and passes under the track approximately 400 feet west of the point of accident. A definite report of the weather conditions in that locality could not be obtained, but apparently an unusual amount of rain fell at intervals between 7 p.m. and midnight of May 2 in the territory south and east of Owego, causing the creek to swell to such an extent that it broke through its embankment about 300 feet south of the right of way and formed a new channel which carried the water against the roadbed, finally washing the embankment out from under the track for a distance of 70 feet and to a depth of 12 feet, and it appeared that the track was left suspended across this gap until the train involved encountered it. Some of the railroad officials indicated that no trouble from high water had been experienced in this vicinity for the past 40 years, but information obtained from the farmers who own the land through which the creek flows was to the effect that they have had trouble at various times due to the stream becoming clogged with debris causing it to break through or overflow its banks and flood the surrounding lowlands, and their statements seem to be supported by the conditions existing after the storm of May 2. In view of this situation some action should be taken to keep the channel of this stream free from obstructions in order to prevent a recurrence of an accident of a similar nature. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident they had not been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND . Director. T. liansportation Library Авторда мени 1780 A234 1524 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NEW YORK, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS- RAILROAD AT CLEVELAND, OHIO ON MAY 6, 1929. To the Commission: September 26, 1929. On May 6, 1929, there was a side collision between two transfer trains on the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad at Cleveland, Ohio, which resulted in the death of one employee. • Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Nickel Plate District of the Cleveland Division, extending between Conneaut and Bellevue, Ohio, a distance of 131.4 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block- signal system. The accident occurred within yard- limits at a facing-point crossover between the two main tracks, located immediately west of 25th Street station. At a point 171 feet west of the west switch of this crossover there is a trailing-point switch for eastbound trains leading off the eastbound main track to the south to transfer tracks of the Big Four Railroad. Approaching the point of accident from the east there is a 4°30' curve to the right 610 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent for a distance of approximately 1,750 feet, the accident occurring on this tangent at a point about 755 feet from its eastern end. The grade at the point of accident is 0.739 per cent ascending for westbound trains. The abutments of an overhead bridge at the station interfere greatly with the view along the north side of the tracks. The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 11.25 p.m. ADD -2- T.C.9702404.9 4°30' 630Ft. 755 FT. POINT OF ACCIDENT WEST C.T. 9708+14.9 STATION ---- 0 O NAS 72/ DETE ET5 171 Ft. ↓ BIG FOUR FILMORE AVE. TRANSFER TRACK No. 1524 N.Y.C.& St.L. R.R. Cleveland, Ohio. May 6, 1929. LEVERAGESET- ** - 3 Description The westbound transfer train consisted of 14 cars, hauled by engine 112, and was in charge of Conductor Hearn and Engineman Kiley. This train left Broadway yard en route to West 25th Street, a distance of about 1.3 miles, at 11.05 p.m., at 11.05 p.m., and was brought to a stop clear of the crossover at the latter point. The engine was then cut off and run around its train, making this movement by heading through the crossover and then backing up on the eastbound main track. The east crossover switch was left open. Shortly afterwards engine 112 began shoving the cars ahead at a low rate of speed and they entered the open crossover switch and collided with the side of engine 205, which was on the east- bound track. The eastbound transfer train consisted of 33 cars, hauled by engine 205, running backwards, and was in charge of Conductor Garrison and Engine- man Keep. This train left 110th Street yard at 10.35 p.m., en route to Broadway yard, a distance of about 4 miles. Upon arrival at West 25th Street the first five cars were cut off and pulled eastward preparatory to placing them on the transfer tracks, this cut being brought to a stop with the engine fouling the west crossover switch, where it was still standing when it was struck by the cut of cars being shoved through the crossover by engine 112. None of the equipment was derailed, although engine 205 and the leading car in the moving cut were slightly damaged. The employee killed was the engineman of engine 205. 2 Summary of evidence Conductor Hearn, of engine 112, stated that when his engine entered the crossover, preparatory to running around its train, he did not close the east switch but rode on the engine to the west switch and while the run-around movement was being made he noticed an engine approaching on the eastbound main track, but did not think it was going to continue eastward as far as it did. It stopped west of the transfer switch, some cars were cut off, and it then continued eastward. He gave the engine crew an "easy" signal and then started walking towards the i C 1 4 east switch, located on the westbound track, and when the engine passed him, moving at low speed, he called to the engineman to wait until he could close the switch but the cut of cars it was handling was not brought to a stop until the engine had fouled the crossover. At about the same time he heard the slack bunched on his train, whereupon ho started running towards the open switch but before he could reach it the head end had entered the crossover and it then collided with engine 205. Conductor Hearn further stated that he did not see any signals transmitted by the crew of the opposing train prior to the accident, while from his position in the center of the westbound track and from the position of the other members of his own crew he thought it would have been impossible for any of them to have seen a proceed signal even if he had given such a signal. He gave as his reason for not closing the east switch, after his engine passed through it, the fact that it was the intention to shove his train through the crossover en route to the transfer yard as soon as his engine had run around the train, although he knew it was in violation of the rules to leave main line switches open. ► Brakeman Hunter, of engine 112, stated that after the engine was cut off and had started to run around its train, he started ahead to flag the eastbound track. An eastbound train was seen to be approaching and his conductor told him that if it was the eastbound transfer he was to let it pass and then line the switches for the movement of his own train to the transfer yard. Upon reaching the transfer switch the conductor of the eastbound train informed him that they also had some cars to be set out on the transfer tracks. Brakeman Hunter then continued down the transfer lead, south of the east- bound main track, opened the derail and the switch leading to track 1, and was returning towards the main-track switch when the cut of cars from the east- bound transfer pulled by. He saw no signals given by anyone other than a stop signal given by the conductor of that train just before the cars came to a stop at the west switch of the crossover. Flagman Kelley, of engine 112, stated that while approaching West 35th Street he got off at a crossover, located approximately 2,000 feet east of the station, for the purpose of lining the switch to permit his engine to cross back to the westbound ARDUINO 1 . 5 1 : track to couple to the rear of the train. After this movement of the engine had been completed he proceeded to a point about four car-lengths ahead of the engine, on the north side of the cars, from which point he could see the east crossover switch lamp displaying a red indication. He remained at this point for about two minutes watching for signals and then returned to within two car-lengths of the engine to see if anything was approaching on the westbound track. As no train was in sight he returned to his former location and received a signal to shove the cars ahead, which he in turn transmitted to the engineman. The train had been moved ahead a distance of about three or four car-lengths when he heard a sound which resembled the noise of coupling to other cars, and about one-half minute later he received a stop signal. . Flagman Kelley said he had not seen any engine or cars on the eastbound track and that he did not see any other white lights at the head end except the signals to start and stop; he did not know who gave these signals. After the accident he was informed by his conductor that the latter had not given any signals but he was positive that a signal to start was given by some one, and he did not think that an 11 easy" signal could have been mistaken for a signal to shove the cars ahead. Enginoman Kiley, of engine 112, stated that after the engine had been coupled to the rear cnd of the train the flagman started towards the head end and as soon as he had reached a point about three car- lengths from the engine he gave a signal to come ahead. Not being certain as to what this signal was intended for, Engineman Kiley waited until a second signal was given by the flagman before starting the movement. Engineman Kiley said that the only signals he saw were those given by the flagman, and that he could not see the east crossover switch lamp at any time prior to the accident. The statements of Fireman Cox, of engine 112, added no additional facts of importance except that he thought his engine had been coupled to the cars about three or four minutes before the forward movement was started. He also stated that his view of the track ahead was obscured on account of his position on the outside of the curve. Fireman Haber, of engine 205, stated that after his train came to a stop west of the transfer switch the cars for the Big Four transfer were cut and pulled ahead to clear the switch. A stop was then made and the engine was still standing at this point when the collision occurred, about one or two minutes later. There was no warning of danger prior to the occurrence of the accident. S - 6 - Conductor Garrison, of engine 205, stated that the five leading cars in his train were to be placed on the Big Four transfer. He had been riding on the north side of the cars but when they came to a stop he crossed over to the south side, assisted in making the cut, and the cars were pulled ahead, or eastward, a sufficient distance to clear the trans- fer switch. He proceeded to the switch but before it could be thrown the cut of cars moved westward about 3 or 4 feet and he quickly gave a stop signal; it was his opinion that the cars were moved ahead as a result of the collision. Conductor Garrison did not know that another crew was working in that vicinity until he reached the transfer switch, where he met Brakeman Hunter. Brakeman Mott, of engine 205, said he pulled the pin in making the cut west of the transfer switch and then got on the rear step of the fifth car on the north side, gave the engineman a back-up signal, and when the cars cleared the switch he signalled the engineman to stop. He then crossed over to the opposite side of the track and started to unlock the switch, and while doing so the cars moved about one-half a car-length. Thinking they were being moved without a signal he again gave a stop signal, and after throwing the switch he crossed back to the engineman's side and gave a signal to come ahead, but as he got no response he looked towards his engine and observed that a collision had occurred. He said that it had not been necessary to give any signal to the engineman to take care of the slack when the cars were uncoupled from the train, and that the only signal to move ahead was given after he had opened the transfer switch, or after the occurrence of the accident. Conclusions This accident was caused by an open switch, for which Conductor Hearn, of engine 112, is respon- sible. P There was a conflict in the statement of the various witnesses concerning the giving of a signal for the movement of engine 112. Flagman Kelley said he saw some one give such a signal from the head end of the train and that he repeated this signal to the engineman, who acted accordingly. Con- ductor Hearn, however, said that he did not give any - ry such signal, and it could not be determined from the statements of the other witnesses whether such a signal actually was given, or whether some other signal was given which could have been accepted erroneously by Flagman Kelley. Under these circum- stances, the responsibility for the movement of engine 112 can not be definitely determined. Regard- less of the confusion with respect to signals, how- ever, the fact remains that the east crossover switch, located in the westbound track, was left open after having been used by engine 112. Conductor Hearn said it was his intention to use the switch again as soon as his engine had run around its train, but having left the switch open when not actually in use, it was Conductor Hearn's duty either to remain at the switch himself or to have some member of his crew remain near enough to it so that it could be closed immediately should occasion arise. The rules require that main track switches be left in proper position at all times except when being used, or else be protected by the train using them, and it is also provided that crossover switches must not be opened until the train or engine intending to use them has a right to use the adjacent track. Con- ductor Hearn should have seen to it that these pro- visions of the rules were obeyed, and, in the absence of adequate flag protection, both of the crossover switches should have been restored to their normal closed position. Fespectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Mad M The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Director. C 10 T ¡ * K * • Transportation Library HE 1780 .A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1525 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD AT DOWAGIAC, MICHIGAN, ON MAY 14, 1929. September 24, 1929. To the Commission: On May 14, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train as the result of a collision with a motor truck at a grade crossing on the Michigan Central Railroad at Dowagiac, Michigan, resulting in the death of the driver of the truck and the injury of four rail- road employees and one person riding on the motor truck. : C Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Middie Division extending between Kalamazoo and Niles, Mich. a distance of 48.53 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal and train-control system. The accident occurred at Mechanic Street, which crosses the tracks at right angles at a point 2,070 feet east of the station. The railroad track is tangent for a considerable distance in each direction from the crossing; the grade is slightly undulating, being 0.37 per cent descending for westbound trains at the crossing. At the point where Mechanic Street crosses the tracks there is a stub-end siding which parallels the main tracks on the north. At a point just south of the main tracks and on the west side of the street which is only 15 feet wide, there is a wig-wag signal. The mast of this signal is 12 feet in height; an arm projects 6 feet eastward from the mast, and the wig-wag signal, which is painted red and has a red light displayed in the center, is suspended from this arm and is 9 feet above the ground. There is also a warning bell on the mast which rings as the wig-wag signal swings back and Sean MI P amang. selle kaza, PUN < £ A ? -2- forth; the signal and bell are manually controlled from the tower at Division Street, located approximately 800 feet west of Mechanic Street, the crossing watch- man at that point receiving advance warning of the approach of trains by means of an annunciator in the tower. From the driver's seat of the motor truck, when traveling southward on Mechanic Street, the view of an approaching westbound train is obstructed by a large two-story building, located just north of the siding and on the east side of the street; in this instance the view was still further restricted by two box cars that stood on the siding at a point about 75 feet east of the street crossing. This condition, however, in no way affected the driver's view of the wig-wag signal. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 2.08 p.m. Description Westbound passenger train No. 43 consisted of one combination car, one coach and two Pullman parlor cars, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 8319, of the 4-6-2-type, and was in charge of Conductor Maher, and Engineman Gasper. This train passed Lawton, the last open office, 18.92 miles east of Dowagiac, at 1.47 p.m., two minutes late, and struck the automobile truck on the crossing at Mechanic Street while travel- ing at a speed variously estimated to have been between 40 and 70 miles per hour. The vehicle involved in this accident was a GMC 3-ton motor truck, owned by the G.E. Bursley Grocery Co., and was being operated by George Wenzel. The body of the truck consisted of an enclosed cab and platform, arranged for the handling of groceries in bulk. This truck was proceeding southward on Mechanic Street and apparently made a stop for the crossing. It then started across the tracks and was moving at a speed estimated to have been between 5 and 8 miles per hour when it was struck by train No. 43. の ​The motor truck was completely demolished, parts of it being strewn along the track for several hundred feet; the truck frame and body both came to rest north of the tracks and west of the crossing. Apparently one I · Kako se da : . -3- pair of engine-truck wheels of engine 8319 left the track at a point 22 feet west of the center line of the street, as a flange mark appeared on the ties about 11 inches from the gauge side of the south rail, with a corresponding mark on the outside of the north rail, and these marks continued for a distance of 687 feet to a facing-point switch that leads off the westbound main track to the north. The entire train was derailed at this point, with the exception of the last pair of wheels in the rear truck of the last car. Engine 8319 and its tender became detached from the cars; the engine came to rest on its left side across both main tracks, but the tender remained upright, as did the cars, which remained coupled and in line with the track. The rail- road employees injured were the engineman, fireman, conductor, and baggageman. Summary of evidence Engineman Gasper stated that on approaching Dowagiac the engine bell was ringing and that he sounded the crossing whistle signal The speed of his train was about 50 miles per hour, or better, on nearing Mechanic Street and he said that he was leaning out of the side window, looking ahead, when he saw the truck approaching the crossing from the right. Realizing that an accident was inevitable, he applied the air brakes in emergency and shut off steam, and then stood up in preparation for the crash. Engineman Gasper said that both men on the truck appeared to be looking towards the train and that the driver apparently was endeavoring to stop or reverse the truck, but at the last glimpse the engine- man had of the truck it was still moving. He said that if the truck stopped for the crossing it did so before he saw it, as it was moving from the time he first saw it until the accident occurred, and while it was not moving at a high rate of speed yet it was moving at such a rate that he knew the driver could not stop in time to avert the accident. The statements of Fireman Groothuis corroborated in substance those of Engineman Gasper; the fireman was riding on his seat box looking ahead when approaching Mechanic Street. Conductor Maher, Flagman Kildea and Baggageman O'Dell gave testimony to the effect that the air brakes had been tested and worked properly and that the engine 2. X བྷ་ — 4– whistle was sounded for the various crossings en route; they were unaware of anything wrong until the accident occurred. Flagman Kildea estimated the speed of his train to have been about 40 miles per hour, when ap- proaching Dowagiac. None of the members of the engine or train crew was in position to state whether the crossing-protection appliances were working as intended, either prior to or following the accident. Crossing Watchman Bebelwhymer, on duty at Division Street tower, stated that as soon as an approaching train strikes the annunciator in his tower he immediate- ly turns on the switch that places in operation the crossing-protection appliances at Mechanic Street; he also lowers the gates at Division Street. On this occasion train No. 43 was more than one-half mile from Mechanic Street when he turned on the switch and he knew the crossing-protection appliances at Mechanic Street were working properly before train No. 43 reached the crossing as he could see the wig-wag signal and hear the crossing bell ringing. Mr. Bebelwhymer said that he saw the truck approach the crossing from the north at a speed not to exceed 5 miles per hour and that the driver apparently became confused and brought the truck to a stop on the crossing, where it stood until the train struck it. G. A. Andrews, Agent,. Sinclair Refining Co., stated that he was on a tank car about 330 feet from the crossing and witnessed the accident. According to his statements the truck stopped before reaching the tracks, about 20 feet north of the siding, apparently for the purpose of ascertaining whether a train was approaching; after stopping the truck started ahead, at a low rate of speed, probably either in first or second gear, the men on the truck looking first to the west and then to the east. At the time they looked to the east the front wheels of the truck were on the westbound main track and they both saw the train approaching and raised up; the speed of the truck was then increased, just before the accident occurred. Mr. Andrers said that he was on the side of the truck away from the driver, but that he could see both men on the truck and that they were bending over, as if they were looking. It was the crossing-protection appliances in operation that called Mr. Andrews' attention to the fact that a train was -5- approaching, and as was customary when working on a tank car he disconnected the tank and placed the cover. on the dome in order to preclude the possibility of hot cinders falling into the tank as the engine passed. Mr. Andrews said that he makes it a practice always to look up as soon as the crossing bell and wig-wag signal start to operate and that on this occasion he knew that the crossing-protection appliances were in operation before the engine of train No. 43 reached the crossing at Telegraph Street, located about 700 feet east of Mechanic Street. He estimated the speed of train No. 43 to have been between 60 and 70 miles per hour when approaching the crossing but did not recall having. heard the engine bell ringing or the whistle sounded, although he thought he might not have noticed them Mr. Andrews further stated that in his opinion had the men on the truck looked toward the east first, instead of toward the west, they could have seen the approaching train in time to stop before reaching the westbound main track, or had the driver reversed the truck instead of going ahead he could have backed off the track in time to have averted the accident. • · Mrs. Mabel Bailey, a resident, stated that she was at the crossing at Telegraph Street as train No. 43 approached, and heard the crossing signal sounded on the engine whistle and the engine bell ringing. The crossing-protection bell at Mechanic Street was ringing before the train reached Telegraph Street, but she did not notice the wig-wag signal, which is so arranged as to work in conjunction with the bell. Mrs. Bailey could not say just how far away the train was when she first heard the crossing bell ringing at Mechanic Street. • Mr. C.F. Hopkins, a passenger on train No. 43, in a letter adressed to one of the officials of the rail- road, stated that the wig-wag signal and crossing-pro- tection bell were working properly immediately after the accident and continued for about 15 minutes there- after, until disconnected by some railroad employee. The driver of the truck, George Wenzel, 19 years of age, had been in the employ of the grocery company for about one and one-half years and had the reputation of being a sober and industrious young man, of good C 1 -6- habits. The other person riding on the truck at the time of the accident was seriously injured, to such an extent that it was impossible to interrogate him. Conclusions This accident was caused by the driver of an auto- mobile truck proceeding upon a railroad crossing at grade directly in front of an approaching train. · The evidence indicated that the passenger train was approaching the crossing at a high rate of speed and apparently the engine whistle had been sounded and the engine bell was ringing. It also appeared that the crossing-protection appliances were in operation before train No. 43 reached the crossing and that they were operating at the time the automobile truck made the stop just north of the crossing. The truck then started over the crossing, in either first or second gear, with the two men on the truck looking first to the west and then to the east, but by the time they saw the approaching train it was too late to avert the accident. There was nothing to prove that the watchman did not throw the switch controlling the wig-wag and bell in ample time to give warning of the approach of a train, but should anything happen to delay the taking of such action by this watchman, who also handles the gate and bell at Division Street, it would result in the creation of a very dangerous situation. The traffic density averaged 47 trains daily for the 30 days prior to the accident, and it is a question if more certain protection would not be provided by the automatic opera- tion of wig-wag and bells. The railroad employees involved had been on duty less than 1 hour and 45 minutes prior to the accident, previous to which they had been off duty more than 15 hours. Respectfully submitted, W.P. BORLAND, Director. KATEGOR 1 1 " 4 1526 Liansportation Library HE 1780 •A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE SOUTHERN RAILWAY SYSTEM, LINES WEST, NEAR DALLAS, GA., ON MAY 15, 1929. To the Commission; August 2, 1929. On May 15, 1929, there was a derailment of a work train on the Southern Railway System, Lines West, near Dallas, Ga., resulting in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Queen & Crescent District, Atlanta Division, extending between Atlanta, Ga., and Chattanooga, Tenn., a distance of 152.7 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and an automatic block-signal and train-control system. The accident occurred at a point about 1 miles south of the station at Dallas; approaching this point from the north the track is tangent for a distance of 671.7 feet, followed by a 50 curve to the right 766.7 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 195.7 feet from its northern end. The grade for southbound trains is 0.91 per cent ascending at the point of accident. The track was laid with 85-pound rails, 39 feet in length, with about 24 ties to the rail-length, tie-plated, single spiked, and ballasted with slag to a depth of 8 inches. The track was well maintained. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 9.25 a.m. Description Work extra 556, in charge of Conductor Bonner and Engineman Launiere, consisted from north to south of engine 556, headed south and shoving the train, one dump car, one flat car containing ditching machine No. 27, two dump cars, one flat car upon which was mounted another ditching machine, one dump car and one spreader. Work of ditching had been in progress between Dallas and Hiram, 6 miles south thereof, for several days prior to the accident, the work train tying up at Dallas at night. -2- On the morning of the accident work extra 556 proceeded from Dallas to Hiram, in order to station a flagman, then returned northward to the vicinity of mile post 122-H, located about 3 miles south of Dallas, and performed work until it was run in at Dallas. Work extra 556 again departed southward from Dallas at about 9.15 or 9.20 a.m. en route to mile post 122-H, but was derailed while rounding the curve, located just south of mile post 120-H, at a speed estimated to have been between 15 and 20 miles per hour. The five leading cars were not derailed, but the sixth car, this being the flat car upon which was mount ed ditching machine No. 27, and the seventh car, a dump car, were derailed. The flat car came to rest with its trucks astride the left rail and the body of the car to the right of the track, while the ditching machine fell off the bady of the car and came to rest against a bank on the inside of the curve; the dump car was also derailed to the left. The flat car was separated from the leading cars a dis- tance of about 160 feet. The employee killed was the ditching machine fireman and the employee injured was the engineer of that machine. Summary of evidence The first mark of derailment appeared on top of the gauge side of the east or high rail of the curve, at a point approximately 231 feet south of mile post 120-H. This mark was a flange mark and evidently was made by the flange of the leading left wheel in the south truck of ditching machine No. 27; the mark continued to a point 10.8 feet beyond where it dropped outside to the base of the rail and at this point a corresponding mark appeared on the base of the gauge side of the opposite rail. These marks led to the left and the ties were marked for a distance of about 20 feet, at which point the marks on the outside of the east rail dropped off the ties and then the track was damaged considerably for a distance of about 84 feet. Engineman Launiere stated that he was looking directly ahead at ditching engine No. 27 as the engine shoved the cars around the curve at a speed of about 15 miles per hour. On seeing dust flying from underneath the ditching machine he immediately applied the air brakes in emergency. Engineman Launiere stated that he was operating the work train at such an unusually low rate of speed that the conductor, who was riding on the leading car, was waving to him to increase speed. Engineman Launiere had noticed nothing wrong with the track where the accident occurred, so far as the riding qualities -3- 1 of the engine were concerned, at the time the engine passed over it en route to Hiram and later on when run in at Dallas, or on the two days prior to the accident. After the accident he examined the track, but found nothing with respect to track conditions that would have caused the accident, and in his opinion the accident was caused by a broken truck bolster, in the leading truck of the flat car that carried ditching machine No. 27. Conductor Bonner stated that he was riding on the leading car in the work train, looking ahead, and that shortly after passing mile post 120-H, traveling at a speed not to exceed 20 miles per hour, he felt the air brakes apply in emergency. On looking back he saw dust flying and the ditching machine turn over. After the accident he saw the broken truck bolster, which in his opinion caused the accident. Statements of other members of the crew developed nothing additional of importance. Car Repairs Foreman Eubanks stated that according to his records the car upon which ditching machine No. 27 was mounted was last inspected on May 4, 1929, at Atlanta; and at that time, in addition to other repairs two wrought iron side bearings were applied to the truck bolster that failed. Three 5/8 inch bolts were used in applying each of the bearings, two on the outside and one on the inside, the inside bolt being riveted. Foreman Eubanks said that on arrival at the scene of the accident about three or four hours after its occurrence he found these truck bolster side bearings lying on the ground and loose from the truck bolster, having been sheared off as a result of the derailment, but he could not find any of the bolts he had used in applying the side bearings. At first he was of the opinion that the accident was due to the broken bolster, which was worn and showed the presence of an old break. In a subsequent statement, however, he was not positive that the broken bolster caused the accident nor did he think the side bearings were involved. Examination of the track subsequent to the accident disclosed the gauge, surface and alinement to be well maintained and in excellent condition. of the outside rail of the curve was 5 The superelevation inches. Ditching machine No. 27 was mounted at Sheffield, Ala., on June 10, 1927, on what was originally Southern flat car 115564; the flat car was built in August, 1906, with a load limit of 110,000 pounds. The ditching machine was bought new; its engine weighed 30 tons, while the boom and dipper weighed an additional 4 tons. A track extended the full length of the flat car; the ditching machine, which turned on its base, operated forward and backward on this track. Back-stops were bolted to the track at a point 2 feet from the south end of the car. -4- 1 In normal riding position, with the wheels of the ditching machine against the back-stops, the boiler and of upper frame extends 2 feet over the south end of the flat car and the center of the machine reaches 29 inches inside of the center of the south truck bolster, while the boom and dipper rest on an 18-inch block secured at the north end of the flat car. The Simplex bolster in the truck involved in this accident was manufactured, according to the blue print about 1905. The header strap was broken off at the east end of the bolster, this being the left side of the car in the direction in which the train was moving; each of the points of rupture was at a rivet hole, and in each case the strap showed signs of considerable wear, while the surfaces of the breaks indicated that cracks had existed for some time previously. It also appeared that the holes at the side-bearing locations on each end of the holster had been burned with a torch and were oblong-shaped; their average measurement was 1 1/16 inches, while the side bearings which Car Repairs Foreman Eubanks said he found at the scene of the accident had 7/8 inch holes in them, although according to his other statements he used only 5/8 inch bolts when applying the side bearings a few days previous to the accident. An investigation in connection with the truck bolster involved in this accident was conducted by Mr. James E. Howard, engineer-physicist, whose remarks follow: Remarks of the Engineer-Physicist. The accident to the work train, on the Southern Railway System, Lines West, near Dallas, Ga., on May 15, 1929, was apparently due to the fracture of a worn end casting of the bolster of a Simplex truck frame. The truck in which this bolster was located was under the boiler end of a ditching machine, the truck being a part of the running gear of a flat car upon which the ditching machine was carried. The fracture occurred when the ditching machine was in transit and on a 5-degree curve, having a super- elevation of 5 inches. The bolster fractured at the end which was on the high side of the curve. The circumstances attending the accident seem to have been as follows: A weakened end casting, which had shoulders fixing the position of the bolster with reference to the side frames of the truck, fractured at the end on the high side of the curve, roller side bearings facilitated drift of the bolster toward the low side of the curve upon the fracture of the end casting, high 13 -5- center of gravity at boiler end and momentum acquired when shoulders of end casting ceased presenting resistance, slow train movement without appreciable centrifugal force these features seem to describe what happened and account for the wheels of the flat car climbing the high rail of the 5 degree curve, the side frame of the truck on the low side, top arch bar, being bent outward 2 inches, and the overturning of the ditch- ing machine on the low side of the curve. The primary cause of the accident seems attributable to the worn and weakened condition of the wings of the end casting of the truck bolster. In the construction of this truck,. end castings were used which had wings reaching over and riveted to the sides of the bolster. These castings had shoulders which bore against the column castings of the truck frame, thereby limiting the side play of the bolster with reference to the frames. The wings of the casting which fractured had been worn thin. Fracture occurred across the rivet holes. According to evidence presented, there was a partial fracture of the casting prior to the accident. The truck was in a weakened condition, in an important detail of construction, the result of service conditions. Fracture finally occurred in the rupture of this weakened detail, under no unusual stress. From the testimony it appears that this flat car had been on repair tracks eleven days prior to the accident. New wrought iron side bearings were bolted to the bolster which failed. After the accident these bearings were found loose from the bolster. Why new side bearings were put in at that time does not appear in the testimony, nor their relations if any to the incidents attending the accident. However, their having been found after the accident detached from the bolster, with no trace of the bolts, does not present a commendable incident in a recent repair job. Concerning pre-existing evidence of wear of the bolster end casting and abrasion of the column castings of the truck frame, their appearance after the accident would indicate that such evidence was visible. A distinction however should be made between indications which precede and those which follow in the trail of accidents, respecting their interpretation and estimate of their gravity. Parts which fail by reason of abrasion and wear undoubtedly present evidence of such facts, although differing in degree. But abraided surfaces are significant, showing where service stresses are greatest. -6- : ده In the present case evidences of abrasion attached to a weak detail in the construction of this particular type of bolster. Wear took place at a vital detail, necessarily leading to adverse criticism of its design. The decided wear of the bolster at the boiler end of the flat car and very limited wear of the bolster at the boom end is not an unusual feature in ditching machines. In general practice more work is done at one end of the car than the other. An inspection of ditching machines commonly shows more wear under one end than the other. Conclusions In conclusion, the cause of the present accident is attributed to a weakened bolster, the weakness of which was the result of continued service conditions in the use and operation of the ditching machine, and in a minor degree by mileage in carrying more weight on the boiler end than on the boom end of the flat car on which the ditching machine was mounted. ត Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. : Transportation } Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1527 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY AT SPOKANE, WASH., ON MAY 17, 1929. September 30, 1929. To the Commission: On May 17, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between a freight train and a passenger train on the Northern Pacific Railway at Spokane, Wash., resulting in the death of 1 employee, and the injury of 7 passengers and 19 employees, 16 of whom were not on duty. This accident was investigated in conjunction with represen- tatives of the Department of Public Works, State of Washington. Location and method of operation , This accident occurred on the Second Subdivision of the Idaho Division, which extends between Cheney and Yardley, Wash. a distance of 19.8 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, with no block-signal system in use in the immediate vicinity of the point of accident, which was within yard limits on the viaduct over Erie Street, at a point about 2 3/2 miles east of the west yard-limit board or about 1 mile east of the depot. Approaching this point from the west there is a compound curve to the left 2,029.5 feet in length; the curvature of the first 380.1 feet of this curve is 4°32', while the remainder of the curve, upon which the accident occurred at a point 1,080.1 feet from its leaving end, has a curvature of 1°25 The grade at the point of accident is practically level. > Under special instructions contained in time-table 54A effective July 29, 1928, trains may run ahead of superior class trains without orders, in the particular territory where the accident occurred. There are industry tracks on both sides of the main tracks, while a short distance east of the viaduct there are numerous yard tracks on the north side of, and paralleling, the main tracks. Passenger trains are restricted to a speed of 20 miles per hour between the west yard-limit board at Spokane and Yard- ley, a distance of about 5 miles. The weather was clear at the time of the acci- dent, which occurred at about 7.03 or 7.04 a.m. galanya * Su PC. 4426+71.9 Z 1°25'C. 1 PCC. 4442 + 21.3 4°32'C. PT.4446+01.4 E AND INTE Westward Main 18+ + "< Switching Lead ERIE VIADUCT my tru I THEATRE BROMNYAMA direction of tro Eastward Main PC.4448+39.7 5°C. ↓ PT. 4455 +75.4 14436+ 52.) Caboose standing here POINT OF COLLISION ST. (undergrade ) 4436+96 Face of Parapet No. 1527 Northern Pacific Ry. Spokane, Wash. May 17, 1929. - 3 3 Description Eastbound second-class freight train No. 602, running as extra 1820, consisted of 66 cars and a caboose, 68 hauled by engines 1613 and 1820 and was in charge of Conductor Cooper and Enginemen Sampson and Penny. This train passed the depot at Spokane at 6.48 a.m. and on reaching a point about 1 miles east thereof it was brought to a stop, at about 3.55 a.m., at the OWRR&NCO. crossing. After it had been standing at this point about eight minutes the rear end of extra 1820 was struck by train No. 306. > Eastbound first-class passenger train No. 306 consisted of gas-electric motor car B-6, of steel con- struction, and was in charge of Conductor Knowles and Motorman Harrison. This train left Spokane at 7 a.m., on time, and collided with extra 1820 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been from 6 to 35 miles per hour. , S The ends of the caboose of extra 1820 were badly damaged, and some of the side sheeting and floor boards broken. The front end of the motor car was damaged while many of the seats were torn loose and broken off. The employee killed was the conductor of extra 1820, who was crushed on the platform of the caboose. Summary of evidence Flagman Mueller, of extra 1820, stated that he was riding on the rear platform of the caboose as his train passed the depot at Spokane and that he saw train No. 306 at that point. When his own train came to a stop at the OWRR&NCO. crossing, with the caboose on the Erie Street viaduct Conductor Cooper came down out of the cupola and informed him that train No. 306 was due out of Spokane, but the conductor was not sure whether it was due out at 7 or 7.05 a.m. Flagman Mueller said he told the conductor that he was not sure as to the time either, but thought it might be 7.05 a.m., and the conductor then went back into the cupola Flagman Mueller got his red flag and two tor- pedoes and went back about two car-lengths, thinking that it was not necessary to go out very far in restricted speed territory. On seeing the motor car rounding the curve however, the flagman started running back, waving stop signals with his flag and hat, saying that he did not have time to put down torpedoes. He got back seven or eight car-lengths and as the motor car passed him he noticed that the motorman had his head down and shouted to him, and he said the motorman raised up, with train orders in his hand, 4. and looked at him, but at this time the flagman realized that the accident was inevitable. He estimated the speed of the motor car to have been about 35 miles per hour or more when the accident occurred, no attempt having been made by the motorman to set the brakes. Flagman ueller who was from the Pasco Division, the same as the other members of this crew, further stated that he was familiar with the schedule of all trains and knew just when they were due, that there was an Idaho Division time-table in the caboose which the conductor would leave on the table, and that they all used it; sometimes the conductor would put the time-table in his pocket, however, which was the case on this particular occasion. Flagman Mueller felt that he had complied with the flagging rule in going back only seven or eight car-lengths, saying that had the follow- ing train been a steam train be probably would have gone back farther, and he had assumed also that train No. 306 would approach at a speed not to exceed 20 miles per hour in accordance with the rules, and that it could be brought to a stop without incident. He was fully aware of the fact that it was his duty to afford proper protection against first-class trains within yard limits, but said he was relying on the safety restrictions and his supposition that the motorman would obey the rules. gjethe Middle Brakeman Graham, of extra 1820, stated that he knew train No. 306 was due to leave Spokane at 7 a.m., and that on looking out of the cupola window he saw it approaching around the curve, about forty-seven or forty- eight car-lengths distant, traveling at a speed of at least 30 miles per hour. Middle Brakeman Graham got down cut of the caboose and proceeded to the north side of the track, about one car-length back of the caboose, but the conductor remained in the cupola. At this time Flagman Mueller was about six or seven car-lengths in the rear of the caboose and going westward, and shortly afterwards the accident occurred, at which time the speed of train No. 306 in his estimation had not been reduced. Middle Brakeman Graham said that there was no thought in his mind that the motor car would strike the caboose when he got down out of the cupola. Motorman Harrison, of train No. 306, stated that the only train order he received was a slow order, which he received and read at Spokane, and it related to a point located east of Yardley. After departing from the depot a speed of between 18 and 20 miles per hour was attained and he said he permitted the motor car to drift in second gear around the curve approaching the point of accident. He saw that he thought was a string of cars and did not realize that it was the rear end of extra 1820 until it was } I 5 LO not more than 400 feet distant. About the same time he noticed the flagman, who was about 75 feet in the rear of the caboose, and he said that the flagman started to run, waving his arms and the unfurled flag, whereupon he applied the air brakes in emergency, but too late to avert the accident. He thought that the wheels skidded but estimated that the speed of the motor car had been reduced to about 6 or 8 miles per hour when the collision occurred. The air brakes had been tested before departing from Spokane and worked properly. Motorman Harrison denied that he had his head down or was reading the train order when approach- ing the point of accident, but thought that smoke from a switch engine which working on a track on the inside of the curve might have obscured his view of the caboose, although he was not certain as to this nor did he recall whether the sun affected his vision. Conductor Knowles, of train No. 306, stated that he was busy taking up transportation and the first he knew of anything wrong was when the accident occurred; he felt no air-brake application made. Conductor Knowles said that the speed of the motor car was not excessive and he esti- mated it to have been about 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident, saying that there would have been no object in running at a speed of 35 miles per hour as they left Spokane right on time and had 11 minutes in which to make Yardley, the next station, 3.5 miles distant. << " Engineman Sampson, of extra 1820, said he did not whistle out a flag when stopping at the OWR&NCO. crossing, it not being customary in view of a city ordinance against unnecessary whistling; this ordinance, however, specifical- ly provides for signalling to flagman. Statements of other members of the crew of extra 1820 added nothing additional of importance. Fireman Quimby, of a nearby switch engine, saw train No. 306 drifting at a speed of 20 miles per hour. did not think it was reducing speed as it approached, and called to his own engineman to whistle them down, which was done. This statement was corroborated by the engine- man of the switch engine. Master Mechanic Blake said that shortly after the accident he found the brake valve on the motor car in the emergency position. Tests made subsequent to the accident, with the same motor car that was involved in the accident, developed that the rear end of the caboose could first be seen a distance of 1,539 feet, although from that point it could not be determined on which track the caboose was standing. On reaching a point 809 feet from the caboose, however, it could be definitely de- termined that the caboose was on the eastbound main track. Tests with another gas-electric motor car, similar to motor car B-6, disclosed that with the engine shut off and the car drifting in second gear, it could be brought to a stop from a speed of 20 miles per hour by means of an emergency application in a distance of 137 feet, while at 1 CO 6 a speed of 15 miles per hour it could be brought to a stop in a distance of 70 feet. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Conductor Cooper and Flagman Mueller, of extra 1820, to afford proper protection for the rear end of their train, and by the failure of Motorman Harrison, of train No. 306, to maintain a proper watch of the track ahead. Under the rules of this railroad flagmen are re- quired to go back immediately and protect their train without waiting for a signal or instructions to do so. Flagman Mueller knew full well that he should have afforded proper protection against first-class trains within yard limits, but said that he did not deem it necessary to go back very far as this was restricted speed territory and he assumed that the following train, which he knew to be a motor car, would be operated in accordance with the rules. There was no ground for any such assumption on his part; instead of practically ignoring the rules as they related to his own actions and depending on the other man to be 100 per cent perfect, he should have made sure that his own conduct was according to rule, going back a sufficient dis- tance to provide full protection and then putting down two torpedoes. There was testimony to the effect that Conductor Cooper called the attention of Flagman Mueller to the fact that train No. 306 was due out of Spokane, but that the conductor was not sure whether it was 7 or 7.05 a.m., al- though there was a time-table in the caboose and the matter could have been easily determined. Why the conductor did not make it his business to see to it that the flagman actually went back a sufficient distance to afford proper protection is not known, as he was killed in the accident, but the fact that apparently he went back up into the caboose cupola after having cautioned the flagman about the following train would indicate that he placed implicit confidence in the flagman to comply fully with the flagging requirements. < Motorman Harrison said that the speed of his train was not more than 20 miles per hour, that he did not realize that the train ahead was on the eastbound track until it was only about 400 feet distant, and that he then applied the air brakes in emergency. Not only did the conductor of this train say that he did not feel any application of the air brakes prior to the occurrence of the accident but the tests conducted subsequently showed that from a dis- tance of 809 feet it could be determined that the caboose : - 7 P was standing on the eastbound track, and also that a motor car similar to the one involved in the accident could be stopped from a speed of 20 miles per hour within a distance of 137 feet with an emergency application of the air brakes. The results of these tests can not be reconciled with the motorman's statements in any way, and can only lead to the conclusion that he was not paying proper attention to the operation of his train, otherwise he would have been able to stop without difficulty regardless of the negligence of Flagman Mueller. There was evidence to the effect that it was the practice not to whistle out, a flag within the city limits. The city ordinance mentioned, however, merely provided that it should be unlawful for any person operating a locomotive within the limits of the City of Spokane to sound or permit to be sounded the whistle thereof, except to prevent accident not otherwise avoidable, or to signal an inter- locking plant or to communicate with a flagman. Instruc- tions had also been issued by the railroad company against the unnecessary use of steam whistles on locomotives. Un- doubtedly the practice arose as a result of a misunderstand- ing of the ordinance and of the instructions; neither of them, however, contained anything against whistling out a flag, and steps should be taken to have those concerned informed accordingly. The employees involved in the responsibility for this accident were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of the employees had been on duty in viola- tion of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND > BRAND Director. Transportation Library • النے کی E 1700 HR34 Siam id,ming sur ********* INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION L528 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PERE MARQUETTE RAILROAD AT GLEN LORD, MICH., ON MAY 28, 1929. September 30, 1929. To the Commission: On May 28, 1929, there was a derailment of a mixed train on the Pere Marquette Railroad at Glen Lord, Mich., resulting in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Sub- division No. 1 of the Chicago-Petoskey Division, ex- tending between New Buffalo and Grand Rapids, Mich., a distance of 114.86 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an auto- matic block-signal system. The accident occurred at the north switch of the passing track at Glen Lord; approaching this switch from the north the track is tangent for 4,824 feet, this tangent continuing for a considerable distance south of the passing track. The grade is practically level. The passing track is 1,204 feet in length and parallels the main track on the east; the turnout is a No. 10, the switch being a facing-point switch for southbound trains. The switch-stand is located on the east side of the main track, and has a yellow banner or semaphore target, measuring 2 feet by 5 inches, which is located 8 feet 2 inches above the base of the stand; this banner assumes the horizontal position when the switch is open, and 450 above the horizontal when the switch is closed. The automatic block signals are of the three-position upper-quadrant type. The last southbound signal is located 3,573 feet north of the switch involved, near the south end of the passing track at Vine, while the last northbound signal is located 8,551 feet south of the switch involved, at the north end of the passing track at Stevensville. -2- } In the vicinity of the point of accident the main track is laid with 110-pound rails, 39 feet in length, with an average of 21 oak ties to the rail-length, and is ballasted with gravel to a depth of about 12 inches; the track is well maintained. The weather was clear and the sun was shining at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 6.02 p.m. Description Southbound first-class mixed train No. 16 consisted of one express car, two baggage cars, one coach and a caboose, in the order named, hauled by engine 1022, and 1022, was in charge of Conductor Hepfinger and Engineman Haskins. The third car was of all-steel construction, the fourth car of wooden construction, and the remainder were of steel-underframe construction. This train left Benton Harbor, the last open office, 6.05 miles north of Vine, at 5.35 p.m., according to the train sheet, and upon arrival at Vine was brought to a stop in obedience to the stop indication displayed by the automatic block- signal. A back-up movement was then made as far as the telephone booth, where Conductor Hepfinger reported to the dispatcher that the block was in the stop position. The dispatcher issued a caution card to the conductor granting permission to proceed to the next signal under control expecting to find an open switch or the track broken or obstructed, and the conductor personally de- livered it to Engineman Haskins. The train then pro- ceeded, and was derailed at the north switch of the passing track at Glen Lord while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 20 miles per hour. At the time of the accident there were some freight cars standing on the siding, at a point about 240 feet south of the switch, and engine 1022, after being derail- ed, struck these cars and came to rest between the passing track and main track leaning sharply toward the right. The tender and first car were derailed, but remained upright; the forward truck of the second car was also derailed. Four of the freight cars stand- ing on the siding were derailed and damaged, the car at the extreme north end being practically demolished. The employee killed was the engineman of train No. 16, while the employee injured was the fireman of that train. P -3- Summary of evidence > Fireman Damaska, of train No. 16, stated that after the train backed up to the telephone booth at Vine, Conductor Hepfinger went into the booth and then came to the engine and delivered a caution card to Engineman Haskins; the engineman looked at the card and then handed it to the fireman. According to Fireman Damaska, the conductor said that the block was out of order and started back toward the rear end of the train. The train then departed and a speed of about 20 miles per hour was attained approaching Glen Lord. Fireman Damaska was sitting on his seat box looking ahead at the rail watching for an obstruction on the track or a piece of missing rail, and did not notice the position of the switch target. On nearing the switch he looked ahead toward the grade crossing a few hundred feet beyond the switch, a bus having come to a stop near the crossing, and the first he knew of anything wrong was when the lead truck of the engine headed in at the switch, where- upon he shouted a warning of danger and at about the same time the engineman applied the air brakes. After the accident he went back and saw the switch lock lying on the north head-block tie, unlocked, and the ball of the switch-lever thrown in the open position. Fireman Damaska further stated that he had not been paying particular attention to the manner in which the train was being handled, nor had he noticed whether the whistle was sounded after leaving Vine, as he was looking ahead at the rail, which he could see plainly for a couple of car-lengths, but in his estimation the speed of the train was such that it could not have been brought to a stop within that distance had he noticed anything wrong. Conductor Hepfinger, of train No. 16, stated that at the time his train backed up to the telephone booth nothing was seen of a train between that point and Stevensville, located 2.9 miles south of Vine. After receiving the caution card from the dispatcher and per- sonally delivering it to the engineman the train de- parted, and Conductor Hepfinger boarded the baggage car and rode in that car until the accident occurred. After the accident he inspected the switch and came to the conclusion that it had been left open, and then had been run through by a northbound train. Conductor Hepfinger was of the opinion that the engineman operated the train with caution after passing the stop indication displayed by the signal at Vine, estimating the speed to have been not more than 20 miles per hour and saying that it was broad daylight, with the sun shining brightly and the track straight. He could not account for the failure of the engineman to notice the indication dis- } 1 넲 ​: -4- played by the switch-banner, unless it was that he was not looking at it. He felt the air brakes take effect about the time that the cars standing on the siding were struck, and said that just after Engineman Haskins was re- leased from the wreckage the engineman said to him, "Hep, I never saw that switch until I hit it." Statements of Brakeman Covert and Baggageman Miller, of train No. 16, were to the effect that the speed was not over 20 miles per hour and that the air brakes were applied immediately prior to the impact. After the accident they examined the switch and found it to be open, with the switch lock unlocked and lying on the switch-tie, a bridle rod bent, and the switch points badly battered. Track Supervisor Meier arrived at the scene of the accident within less than one hour after its occurrence and his examination of the switch at that time disclosed it to be open and latched; the switch-lock was unlocked and lying on the end of the head-block tie. The connect- ing rod was bent downward at a point about 2 feet from the rail and the No. 1 head rod had also been bent, with both of the switch points slightly rolled at their top edges, indicating that the switch had been run through He did not see any indication of the switch or its ap- purtenances having been tampered with, and said that so far as he knew the signals in this vicinity were in proper working order on the day of the accident. Track Supervisor Meier further stated that his section crew passed over the track at Glen Lord, southbound, the switch being a facing-point switch for such a movement about three hours prior to the accident and at that time nothing wrong was noticed. " Trainmaster Gondor arrived at the scene of the acci- dent several hours after its occurrence and on examining the switch he found conditions to be as described hereto- fore. He thought that the switch had been run through previously by some northbound train, and was of the opinion, judging from the condition of the derailed equipment, that the speed of train No. 16 was about 35 miles per hour at the time of the accident. The last time the switch was used prior to the acci- dent was by the crew of the local switch run, extra 902, at about 4.40 p.m., Glen Lord being the turn-around point of this train prior to its return movement southward. Conductor Kubberness, of extra 902, stated that after some cars had been moved in on the siding at the north switch, he personally closed and locked the switch and it was not used by any other member of his crew, and on departing southward he noticed that the switch still -5- * was in the clear position. After the arrival of his train at Stevensville it went in on the passing track to meet northbound extra 1004, at about 5.20 p.m. Extra 1004 then proceeded toward Glen Lord and passed the north switch at that point at about 5.25 p.m., at a speed estimated by the crew to have been between 25 and 35 miles per hour. The crew did not observe the position of the switch target nor did they notice any- thing unusual at the time their train passed over the switch, and they also stated that the northbound signal at Stevensville was clear when they departed from that point, this latter statement being verified by members of the crew of extra 902. Conclusions C This accident was caused by the damaged condition of a facing-point switch, which had been run through by a train moving in the opposite direction. Examination of the switch immediately after the occurrence of the accident showed that it had been left open and that the switch lock was lying on one of the head-block ties, and the condition of the switch points, connecting rod and bridle rod, indicated that the switch had been run through by some northbound train; there was no indication of malicious tampering. Undoubtedly it was this condition of the switch which caused the signal at Vine to be in the stop position when train No. 16 ap- proached it, and resulted finally in the issuance of a clearance card authorizing the train to proceed past the signal with caution expecting to find a switch open or the track broken or obstructed. For some reason which is not entirely clear, the engine crew apparently failed to notice anything wrong until about the time the engine reached the switch, and it was then too late to avert the accident. The results of the accident, however, probably would have been much less serious in their nature had the train been operated through this block at a low rate of speed; the condition of the wreckage, and its extent, indicated that the estimate of 35 miles per hour made by the trainmaster was much more nearly correct than the estimate of 20 miles per hour made by the crew. The conductor of extra 902 was the last person to have occasion to use the switch and he was positive he closed and locked it, while the crew of extra 1004 did not notice anything unusual when they passed over the switch shortly afterwards. Unless some unknown person was in possession of a switch key and opened the switch after the departure of extra 902, it would appear that this was the crew which left the switch open. In either 6 event, however, it is certain that extra 1004 ran through the switch, there having been no other train movement over this portion of the line between the departure of extra 902 and the time of the accident. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation ľ ! ---- A 1. ¿ ******* 1 Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE EASTERN MICHIGAN RAILWAY AT ORTONVILLE, MICH. ON JUNE 2, 1929. To the Commission: 1529 September 30, 1929. On June 2, 1929, there was a collision between a passenger train and a freight train on the Eastern Michigan Railway at Ortonville, Mich., which resulted in the injury of 60 passengers and 1 employee. Location and method of operation • " This accident occurred on the Flint Division, which extends between Flint and Detroit, Mich., a distance of 68.09 miles, and in the vicinity of the point of accident is a single-track electric line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block- signal system being in use. At Ortonville there is a spur track known as the "stock track," paralleling the main track on the west. The switch is a facing-point switch for northbound trains and leads off the main track to the left at a point 1,100 feet north of the station. The accident occurred on the stock track at a point 201.5 feet north of the switch; approaching the switch from the south, beginning at the station, the track is tangent for a distance of 296.1 feet, followed by a 4° 45' curve to the left 754.4 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent to the switch, a distance of 50 feet, and for some distance bevond that point. level at the point of accident. The grade is practically The switch stand at the stock-track switch is located on the east or right side of the main track. The target is 7 feet 6 inches above the head-block ties and has blades 14 inches wide and 31 inches long, which display a red indication when the switch is open and green when it is closed. اب The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 5.09 a.m. -2- # Description Northbound freight train extra 2000 consisted of six cars loaded with gravel, hauled by motor 2000, and was in charge of Conductor Miller and Motorman Peters. This train left Oxford, 9.99 miles south of Ortonville, at 4.10 p.m., passed the station at Ortonville at about 5.03 p.m., entered the stock track and was brought to a stop, but before the switch could be closed the rear end of the train was struck by train No. 19. Northbound passenger train No. 19 consisted of motor 7534, and was in charge of Conductor Dunn and Motor- man Barron. This train departed from Rochester, 23.18 miles south of Ortonville, at 4.25 p.m., on time, departed from Ortonville at about 5.08 p.m., one minute late, entered the open switch leading to the stock track and collided with extra 2000 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 15 and 25 miles per hour. Motor 7534 was not derailed but its forward end was telescoped for a distance of about 8 feet and all of the seats were torn loose. The rear car in extra 2000 had its rear truck derailed and was slightly damaged. employee injured was the motorman of train No. 19. The Summary of evidence Motorman Peters, of extra 2000, stated that his train passed the station at Ortonville at 5.04 p.m., and at that time he told the conductor to get off and protect until he could get into clear on the stock track for train No. 19. After opening the switch of that track he moved the train in on the spur and brought it to a stop with its rear end about one car-length beyond the clearance point. He then got off and started back to close the switch but when still about one car-length north of the rear end of his train he observed train No. 19 approaching, about 200 or 250 feet from the switch. He hurried towards the switch but as the approaching train was traveling at a high rate of speed he realized he could not reach the switch before the train arrived at that point so he threw up both hands as a warning. He estimated the speed of train No. 19 at the time it entered the siding at 25 miles per hour, although the motor was reversed, and he thought this had reduced the speed to about 15 miles per hour at the time of the accident. He also said that a clear view of a train standing on the stock track could be had from an approaching northbound train for a distance of about 200 feet and that the position of the switch could be plain ly seen for a distance of between 400 and 500 feet; fur- ther view is obstructed by some buildings, trees and poles on the inside of the curve. 41 -3- Conductor Miller, of extra 2000, stated that his train passed Brandon, 2.7 miles south of Ortonville and the last switch south of the latter point, at 4.53 p.m., and consumed 10 minutes in running to Ortonville although it usually requires only about six minutes. As the rules re- quired that his train clear the time of the superior train five minutes it was decided that he should get off at the station and provide flag protection until his train could enter the stock track. When train No. 19 arrived at the station he informed the motorman of that train that his own train would clear at the stock track and that it had had about time enough to get into clear but that the motorman should watch out for it, which instructions were acknowledg- ed by the motorman. Conductor Miller than entered the telephone booth and called the dispatcher for an order to meet another train and was still in the booth when he heard the impact of the collision. He said that he usually acts as motorman and that in his opinion a train should not be operated at a speed of more than 20 miles per hour in order to bring it to a stop short of the stock-track switch, as there are trees and poles obstructing a clear view of the switch. Motorman Barron, of train No. 19, stated that while his train was standing at Ortonville station he was notified by Conductor Miller of the gravel train that that train would clear at the stock track and that it had had about time enough in which to clear. His own train proceed- ed from the station at moderate speed, as he was expecting to find the gravel train on the main track, but when the latter train came into view he observed that it was in the clear although he failed to notice that the switch was open until it was too late to stop, although he reversed the motor in an effort to do so. P Conductor Dunn, of train No. 19, stated that his train departed from Ortonville about on time and as it was leaving he noticed Conductor Miller pass around the rear end of the car carrying a flag, which indicated to him that the gravel train was clearing near that point. He was standing near the rear door as his car approached the point of accident and just before reaching the stock-track switch the motor of his car was reversed; upon looking back he noticed that the car had entered the siding, the colli- sion occurring immediately afterwards. Conductor Dunn said he noticed no unusual speed after departing from the station and thought the train had attained a speed of 20 or 25 miles per hour at the time the motor was reversed, which action did not reduce the speed to any extent as it caused the wheels to slide; he did not feel any air-brake applica- tion prior to the time the motor was reversed. -4- ! Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Motorman Barron, of train No. 19, properly to control the speed of his train approaching a passing point. The rules provide that all trains must approach a meeting or passing point under full control, and must not attempt to pass until the switch is seen to be right and the train to be met or passed is clear of the main track. According to the evidence, Motorman Barron had been notified by Conductor Miller that the latter's train would clear at the stock track, and he had this fact in mind at the time his train approached the passing point, but while he saw the gravel train in the clear he failed to notice that the switch was open until it was too late to prevent the accident. Although his view of the switch was restricted, there is no reason why he could not have stopped his train from a moderate rate of speed had he noticed the open switch when it came within his range of vision. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident they had not been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation " ¿ ܝܬ ܬ ܬܐܥܐܐ ܐܐܘܐܠܐܥܐܝ 51 ܕܒܫܘ 5. ZA ,' ! نیم. Library HE 1780 .42341 1467 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGA- TION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LOUISVILLE & NASH- VILLE RAILROAD NEAR TORRENT, KY., ON DECEMBER 31, 1928. To the Commission: J Sp May 11, 1929. On December 31, 1928, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad near Torrent, Ky., which resulted in the death of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Eastern Kentucky Division which extends between North Cabin and Maloney, Ky., a distance of 52.5 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are oper- ated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred at a point about 1 mile north of Torrent; approaching from the south the track is tan- gent for a distance of 961 feet, followed by a 30 curve to the right 717 feet in length, and then tangent track for a distance of 109 feet, followed by an 80 curve to the left 840 feet in length which includes a spiral at each end 210 feet in length, the accident occurring in the center of this last-mentioned curve. The grade is generally descending for northbound trains, being 0.91 per cent at the point of accident. The track is laid with 80-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with 18 ties to the rail-length, tie-plated and single-spiked. The track is bal- lasted with stone and screenings and is well maintained. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 11.20 a.m. Padd South of the point of derailment a fill 260 feet in length and approximately 13 feet high leads to a bridge 53 feet in length; the fill continues north of the bridge for about 120 feet into an earth cut about 100 feet in length. The first mark of derailment was on this bridge near its southern or receiving end. Description Northbound passenger train No. 4 was detouring over this portion of the road, running as extra 780, and consisted of one combination mail and baggage cer, one baggage car, one com- bination coach, three coaches and one parlor car, hauled by Broken flange. Chilled Iron Wheel Accident on the Louisville, Jasliville Railroad, near Torrent, Ky. Dec. 31. 1928. B A Fracture 1 A. Top of flange worn Smooth, flattened B. Face of flange worn smooth, flattened, Wheel Cast by the Louisville Car Wheel and Ry. Supply Co. Jan. 31.1927. No. 144253. Opposite side of wheel. Top of flange slightly smoothed. Face not work. • + * • 30 - 3 I I engine 780, and was in charge of Conductor Hendren and Engine- man Driley. This train departed from Maloney at 10.40 a.m., passed Torrent, 10.8 miles north of Maloney, at 11.18 a.m., and was derailed at a point about 1 mile beyond while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 15 and 20 miles per hour. Engine 730 came to rest leaning to the right with its front end buried in the dirt on the right or east side of the track at a point 266 feet north of the first mark of derailment; the tender remained coupled to the engine with the rear end partly on the roadbed. The first and second cars were derailed and came to rest with the wheels on the right side off the road- bed; the forward truck of the third car was also derailed. employee killed was the engineman. The Summary of evidence Fireman Weaver stated that they changed engines at Maloney and their only stop was at a point about 2 miles south of the point of derailment, where he and the engineman cleaned the sparks out of the front end, resulting in a delay of about 5 or 10 minutes. He noticed nothing irregular in the riding of the engine until it commenced rocking and he heard the brake valve placed in the emergency position, shortly after which he jumped from the engine, subsequently finding the engineman on the ground near the front end of the mail car. Due to the right side of the engine being against the side of a cut and the front end buried in mud, he was unable to see if there was anything wrong with the engine on that side, but he did notice a mark on the rail which appeared as if something had been dragged along on it. He was unable to state whether or not the engineman made an examination of engine 780 before their departure from Maloney, but he noticed the brakes worked properly en route. Fireman Weaver estimated the speed to have been between 18 and 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident. AN... . The statements of Conductor Hendren practically sub- stantiated those of Fireman Weaver as to the operation of extra 780 from Maloney, and he estimated the speed to have been 15 or 18 miles per hour at the time of the accident. His examination of the track disclosed that something had rubbed on the top of the right rail for a distance of 12 or 15 inches, and then there were marks on the outside of the base of the rail extending across the bridge. The testimony of Flagman Watts and Train Porter Williams brought out nothing additional of importances. Track Supervisor Akers stated that he made an examina- tion of the track a few hours after the occurrence of the accident and he found marks where a wheel had crossed the rail. He checked the gauge and elevation of the track and found them to be in accordance with the standards required for a curve of 80. 1 " ! 4 1 # Assistant Master of Trains Preston and Master Mechanic Oakley arrived at the scene of the accident several hours after its occurrence and their examination of the track disclosed the first mark of derailment to be on the right or east rail at a point 14.4 feet north of the south end of the bridge. There were irregular indentations from the gauge toward the center of the running surface extending 14 inches northward, then a cut mark on the gauge side of the rail, and a flange mark across the rail extending for a distance of 3 or 4 feet. The marks continued on the outside of the base of the rail to the north end of the bridge. A short distance north of the bridge the bridge guards were torn out and from that point northward for a distance of 320 feet the track was badly damaged. An inspection of the right pony truck wheel disclosed that a section of the flange 22 inches in length was missing; a piece of flange 3 inches long was found about 30 feet south of the bridge on the right side of the track, between the ties, and it was found that this piece of flange matched a place on the broken wheel, al- though no other broken parts were found except a sliver which was found underneath the bridge on top of the concrete abutment directly under the first mark of derailment. After the engine had been brought to the shops a com- plete examination was made and it was found that on the broken part of the right pony truck wheel there was a discoloration, next to the tread, ranging from 1/8 to 3/4 inch deep and 14 inches in length. The other parts of the engine the engine, such as spring hangers, shoes, wedges of any other part that might have con- tributed to the accident were found in first-class condition:. The engine was last overhauled t Covington, Ky., in April, 1928, and it was at that time that this pony truck wheel was ap- plied. Baada S The evidence indicated that this accident was caused by a broken wheel and an investigation was conducted by Mr.James E. Howard, Engineer-Physicist, to ascertain the cause of the broken wheel, whose report immediately follows: Report of the Engineer-Physicist. The derailment of train extra 780 near Torrent, Ky., December 31, 1928, was evidently caused by a broken wheel on the pony truck of the engine. A segment 22 inches long was de- tached from the flange of the right hand wheel of the truck, permitting the engine to pass over the high rail of an 8 degree curve leading to the left. A short piece of the flange, from the middle part of the length of the detached segment was found, 30 feet south of the first marks on the high rail. The marks on the too of the rail indicated that something had crossed over it. A few inches beyond, the gauge side of the head of the rail was cut apparently by a broken flange. This was followed by a plain mark 3 or 4. i - 5 St 1 feet long, like the print of a flange, crossing the rail. Next beyond were wheel marks on spikes and ties, and still far ther along marks on the ties indicated that a portion of the flange of the wheel when at that place, was gone. From this evidence, furnished by the track structure, it would appear that the outward thrust of the engine against the high rail of the curve had broken the flange of the right hand wheel of the pony truck; that the broken wheel had climbed the rail and crossed it tangentially; that marks beyond showed a part of the flange of the wheel had been detached before it reached that place. The track from the point of derailment was in good condition for a distance of 125 feet, except the bridge guard had been injured. Then for a distance of 320 feet the track was badly damaged. The derailment of this northbound train be- gan at the south end of a bridge 53 feet long. It was observed by the master mechanic of the rail- road that the factured surface of the wheel was discolored, from the tread ranging in depth from 1/8 inch to 3/4 inch and 14 inches long. The short piece of flange 3 inches long found 30 feet south of the first marks on the high rail also showed dis- coloration, a blue black oxide tint. A smaller fragment of the flange which was recovered, represented one end of the 22 inch segment. This wedge-shaped piece displayed an earlier vertical seam, slightly oblique to the plane of the wheel, with rusty surface, oxidized by exposure to the weather and not heat tinted. S The 3 inch fragment showed a condition which was not exhibited by the flange on the intact parts of it. The face of the flange on this fragment was worn smooth, and flattened. The top of the flange was also worn smooth and flattened. The flange on the opposite side of the wheel, that is 180 degrees apart, did not show these characteristics. It did show a slightly smoothed top, suggestive of having run on the head of the rail perhaps at the time of derailment. The face of the flange did not show wear. Sketch of the 3 inch fragment, end view, indi- cates the worn and flattened surfaces marked for identification A and B. Concerning the tinted surface of the fracture on the rim observed by the master mechanic and exhibited also on the 3 inch fragment, and its possible significance, oxide tints are frequently shown on ruptured surfaces, when fracture is caused by violent blows with some shearing action, or rubbing of the parts against each other. The crystalline structure of the white iron on these surfaces was not destroyed, merely tinted and only slightly. The entire fractured area was not tinted, only a portion of it. The portion tinted, however, was adjacent to the surface of the tread. { & ! g 6 The rusty surface of the crack or seam in the frag- ment detached from the end of the 22 inch segment did not sug- gest the action of heat in its formation; rather a split from a vertical blow. Iron rust is of course an oxide but distinguish- able from heat tinted oxides. The explanation of the cause of the broken flange depends upon the correct interpretation of the somewhat limited evidence presented by the fragments. It is known that throat seams, theremal, shrinkage seams, sometimes occur. Also that warped flanges are known to occur at times. A flange with a throat seam is necessarily a weak flange. A warped wheel may not be a weak wheel, but unserviceable. In any event the correct diagnosis must be the one which satisfies all the conditions of rupture. In the present case opinions have been expressed that the basal cause of the flange fracture was a throat seam. These expressions of opinions have been given weight, and throat seams do result in the failures of wheels. These opinions appear to have been based upon the fact that the line of rupture was at the throat of the flange at the middle of the length of the 22/1/20 inch segment. The character of the fractured surface, however, introduces a doubt whether that was the orimitive cause. It is believed that a controlling feature is exhibited in the local wear of the face of the flange and which is inconsistent with the primary cause being a throat seam. This wheel was one of two on a single axle truck; axle load 18,000 pounds. It was mounted on a swing bolster having some three inches lateral motion. This pony truck was applied when the engine was overhauled in April, 1927 and was put into service May 1, 1927. Up to the time of derailment the engine made 22,248 miles. The average mileage per day was therefore less than 40 miles. The broken wheel was pressed off its axle, requiring 100 tons pressure. Not an unusual resistance to pressing off, which is expected to be a little higher than pressing on. It was returned to its seat, and the axle mounted on centers. Both wheels, the fractured wheel and its mate ran true, so far as pertained to the remaining portion of the flange of the broken wheel. Each wheel was tape 2 size. Additional pieces of the flange of the broken wheel were knocked off with a sledge, all showing a good depth of chill and sound metal. If there was a throat seam, it was of limited extent, not covering one fifth of the circumference of the wheel. Shrinkage seams are not necessarily widely open. The actual separation of the metal required to cause a shrinkage crack is minute in width possibly immeasurable. A wide open seam is the • 7 .. result of contractile forces in adjacent metal, or depending upon circumstances, the reaction of tensile strains. If locally warped, the opportunity for discovery is present when the wheel is centered in the mill for boring the hub. A warped condition is also apparent when thewheel is "rolled". Those who are ex- pert in "rolling" wheels have no difficulty in detecting an ir- regular flange. In choosing between the two explanations, a throat seam, or a warped wheel, the latter is the more consistent one. The flange of the broken wheel was worn locally along less than one fifth of its circumference. The balance of the flange showed no appreciable wear. There was no evidence on the mate of the broken wheel of reaction which would cause local flange wear concentrated on one part of the circumference. These truck wheels, at ordinary speeds, make several rotations per second. A local accelerating force, adequate to cause flange wear. on one side only of the broken wheel cannot be conceived. If the fracture of the flange was due to a pre-existing throat seam, the strength of the flange would not appear to have been suf- ficient to endure the thrusts which its wear calls for. There was no brake action on this truck; no differences in temperature while in service to overstrain the wheel. Repeated side thrusts which may have been received several times per second, would account for the local wear exhibited by the 3 inch fragment of the detached segment. Repeated side thrusts in service would tend to break off a segment of the flange. Other parts of the flange running true would indicate that some local cause attached to that part of the wheel which ultimately ruptured. In conclu- sion the most reasonable explanation of the cause of rupture is that a warped condition of the wheel pre-existed. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. GARD Hann 1490 Transportation Library не 1781 42=4 } 1 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TRACKS OF THE CENTRAL UNION DEPOT AND RAILWAY COMPANY AT CINCINNATI, OHIO, ON FEBRUARY 8, 1939. + May 16, 1929. To the Commission: On February 8, 1929, there was 1929, there was a side collision between the forward portion of a passenger train of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, consisting of empty mail and baggage cars, making a back-up movement, and a standing passenger train of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad on the tracks of the Central Union Depot and Railway Company at Cincinnati, Ohio, resulting in the death of one employee, and the injury of one employee and two other persons. This accident was investigated in con- junction with a representative of the Ohio Commission of Public Utilities. Location and method of operation The Central Union Depot and Railway Company operates the Union Station, used by the trains of eight divisions of five different railways, and also operates a double- track main line extending westward from the station to Harriet Street, a distance of 1.2 miles. This section of track is used by passenger trains of the Louisville & Nashville and Baltimore & Ohio Railroads, and also by passenger trains of other railroads. There is no block signal system in use in the vicinity of the point of accident, nor are train orders used, movements being handled entirely by switch tenders. In the case of move- ments with the current of traffic the signals given by switch tenders/merely indicate whether the switches in question are properly lined up for the movement to be made. while in the case of movements against the current of traffic the switch tenders first make the necessary arrangements between themselves before authorizing such movements to be made. 1 There are eight parallel tracks, numbered from north to south, under the train shed of the Central Union passenger station. The distance from the bumping posts, westward, to the end of the train shed is approx- imately 600 feet; track 3 connects with track 3 at a point about 400 feet west of the western end of the train shed. The accident occurred at the fouling point of the 7 offer at the of -2- junction of these two tracks, 903 feet west of the bump- ing posts. Starting at the bumping post and proceeding westward track 3 is tangent for a distance of about 750 fect and then it curves slightly toward the left for a distance of about 75 feet, following which it is tangent to the point of accident; the grade is 0.97 per cent de- scending for a distance of approximately 550 feet and then it is 0.74 per cent for 100 fect, following which it is level to the point of accident. It was raining at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 8.42 p.m. Description Baltimore & Ohio St. Louis Division passenger train No. 22 arrived at the Central Union passenger station at about 8.05 p.m. The six rear cars were moved vestward to Park Street coach yard by a yard engine at about 8.18 p.m., leaving the forward portion of the train, consisting of B&O engine 5115, headed east, one postal car and two baggage cars, all of steel construction, in charge of Yard Conductor Carner and Engineman Black, standing on track 3 under the train shed with the engine nearest the bumping post. After these three cars were unloaded the contemplat- ed back-up movement was started but shortly afterwards, on reaching the fouling point at the junction of tracks 2 and 3, traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 5 and 10 miles per hour, the northwest corner of the leading car struck the south side of the rear car in L&N passenger train No. 17. Louisville & Nashville passenger train No. 17 con- sisted of an engine, headed east and standing near the bumping post on track 2, two baggage cars, one combination car, one coach, one dining car, five sleeping cars, one observation car, and L&N yard engine 880, headed west and coupled to the west end of the train. This train was made up on track 2 and was in charge of Yard Conductor Gatman and Yard Engineman Herron, while being operated within the Cincinnati terminal, and it was intended that yard engine 880 should haul the train backward to Wood Street and then assist it across the bridge over the Ohio River to Covington, Ky however, while standing on track 2 obstructing track 3, preparatory to starting the con- templated movement, the observation car was struck by the cars in B&O train No. 23. • -3 The leading baggage car in the B&O train scraped the side of the L&N observation car a distance of about 58 feet, damaging the observation car slightly and re- sulting in the derailment of the baggage car, which car then continued westward until it struck the tender cistern of L&N yard engine 880. The impact forced the cistern against the cab of the engine, breaking the coupling between the tender and observation car, and separating the yard engine from the observation car a distance of about 15 feet. The employee killed was the conductor of the yard engine, who was caught between the tender cistern and the engine cab. Summary of evidence Yard Conductor Carner stated that his duty consisted of backing trains in and out of the passenger station. He attached the back-up hose to the leading car of the B&O cut about 20 or 25 minutes before it was ready to back out of the train shed. He then anchored the hose in the door hasp hole, and, as was customary, tested the air merely as a matter of precaution, by opening the back-up hose valve slightly, not in der to set the brakes but just to ascertain that there was a flow of air. After receiving a signal from the platform foreman indicating that the cars were unloaded he again opened the valve to assure himself that there was a proper flow of air, also to give warning to anybody who happened to be working around the cars that the back-up movement was about to start. He then went to the door of the leading car and gave the engineman a back-up signal by means of the air-whistle, and also waved a back-up signal with his lantern. The movement was then started and as the cars approached the end of the train shed Conductor Carner saw that the L&N train was blocking track 3 and that the switch tender was giving stop signals; he said that he opened the tail hose valve slightly and that the air apparently was working but the brakes did not seem to take effect, so he opened the valve wider, but without result, and then he opened the valve completely and as he noticed no reduction in the speed, which he estimated to have been between 8 and 10 miles per hour, he jumped off on the engineman's side, when about two or two and one-half car-lengths from the fouling point, shouted a warning of danger and waved stop signals with his lantern, but to no avail. After the accident he walked toward the leading car and on his way he requested Passenger Car Inspector Campbell, of the CCC&STLRY, to accompany him whichhe did. Steam and water were escaping and there was considerable excitement at the time But Conductor Carner held his lantern over to look at the position of the angle cock and he said -4- the air was cut in and flowing freely; he did not recall having closed the angle cock at this time but said that subsequent to the arrival of the wrecker, while in company with Yardmaster Gray, the yardmaster called his attention to the fact that the angle cock was closed. Conductor Carner said that he afterwards asked Passenger Car In- spector Campbell if he had looked at the back-up hose and whether the latter went to that point with him to verify the position of the angle cock, but received negative re- plies. Conductor Carner's statements as to how he handled the air before starting the back-up movement were very conflicting; at one point he said that after he received the signal from the platform foreman indicating that the cars were unloaded he made a 15 or 20-pound brake-pipe re- duction and that this should have applied the air brakes, yet he did not know whether they did apply; at another point he said that he could not recall having heard any escape of air when he first tested it. He did not try the air after starting out and before seeing the danger ahead, did not get the required signal fromthe switch tender to start the back-up movement, and did not know that the train on track 2 was fouling track 3 until he received the stop signals from the switch tender, at which time his train was about six car-lengths from the fouling point. After the accident the air brakes were tested in his presence and he saw that they applied properly on all three cars; he did not know as tothe engine. Switch Tender Croppsfaded the CUD&Ry Co, stated that he heard no signal/on the back-up hose whistle as B&O train No. 22 approached. He saw that train before and when it started the back-up movement and commenced giving stop signals, continuing to do so until the collision occurred, at which time the speed of the train was about 8 or 10 miles per hour. Engineman Black, of B&O train No. 22, stated that at about 8.40 p.m. he received an air-whistle back-up signal, as well as a lantern signal, and he therefore released the independent engine brake, worked steam for a distance of four or five car-lengths and then shut off at which time he estimated the speed to have been about 5 or 6 miles per hour; the brake valve was in running posi- tion during this movement. The first he knew of anything wrong was when the accident occurred and he did not think the speed at that time could have been in excess of 6 or 8 miles per hour. Engineman Black said that he did not at any time feel an air-brake application made by means of the back-up hose, that he did not test the air brakes before starting the back-up movement, nor was there, so far as he knew, any test made of the air brakes after Genet 5- the back-up hose was attached, although he said that it was customary to make such a test. He only looked back along the train from the time it started until it had moved about two car-lengths and then drew his head in- side on account of the inclement weather. He left the cab window open but did not again look back prior to the accident, at which time the engine was drifting, as he depended upon the man at the rear end to operate the train and he was not in position, therefore, to receive hand signals. Engineman Black did not remember having made an air-brake application when he looked back to see what the trouble was at the time the accident occurred but said that he might have done so; no stop signal was sounded on the air-whistle signal prior to the accident. Fireman Overturf, of B&O train No. 22, stated that he was putting in a fire when the accident occurred. Passenger Car Inspector Cutter, of the L&NRR, stated that he was engaged in testing the air brakeson L&N train No. 17 and was about six car-lengths from the rear end of that train when the air brakes applied in emergency as a result of the accident; he immediately proceeded to the point of collision and on examining the angle cock on the leading car of the B&O cut, about one minute after the accident occurred, found it to be closed, while the valve in the back-up hose was wide oven; the brakes on this car were set; however, and they were also set on the adjacent car. Passenger Car Inspector Campbell, of the CCC&STLRy, stated that he was standing about 40 feet from where the collision occurred and immediately thereafter Yard Conductor Carner requested him to go along to the leading car, which he did, and examination of the angle cock at that time disclosed it to be in the closed position; he then saw Conductor Carner open it. After the arrival of the wrecker Conductor Carner called him aside and asked him about having seen everything lined up properly but at that time he told the conductor that he had not paid attention and then walked away, as he did not want to talk about it. Passenger Car Inspector Campbell was of the opinion that Yard Conductor Carner failed to open the angle cock at the time the back-up hose was attached. Statements of Passenger Car Foreman Crowe, of the B&ORR, were to the effect that a test of the air brakes and back-up hose failed to disclose any condition that would have caused or contributed to the accident, and in his opinion the air brakes would have ? -6- functioned properly had the angle cock been open and proper connection made between the train line and the back-up hose. Testimony given by other witnesses brought forth nothing having any additional bearing on the accident. Conclusions This accident was caused primarily by the failure of Yard Conductor Carner, of B&O train No. 22, to open the angle cock on the leading car, so as to be able to control the movement by means of the back-up hose. A contributing cause was the failure of Engineman Black to know that the brakes had been set on the train by the man at the rear end, which the rules require to be done in order to indicate to the engineman that the train is ready to back out, and his further failure to be in position to receive any hand signals which might be givan him. Rule 15 for the government of the operating depart- ment of the Central Union Depot and Railway Company reads as follows: "(a) Brakemen or backup men, must be at the rear end of their train from the time of arrival until the train backs out. "(b) When a train is unloaded and ready to back out, C.U.D. platform foreman will so indicate by signal to the man at the rear end, who will keep himself in position to observe such a signal. As soon as the man at the rear end gets the signal, he will indicate to the Switchtender by the whistle signal on the back up hose that the train is ready to back out. When the Switchtender gives the proper signal, the man at the rear end will set the brakes on the train thus indicating to the engineer that the train is about ready to back out. The engineer will not move, however, until until he receives a whistle signal and also a hand or lamp signal from the man at the rear end." While Yard Conductor Carner was certain that he opened the angle cock, and said he made a 15 or 30-pound brake-pipe reduction after receiving a signal from the platform foreman that the cars were unloaded, he admitted that he did not know whether the brakes applied. Engineman Black felt no air brake application made by means of the 遥 ​-7- back-up hose at any time, and immediately following the accident the angle cock was observed to be closed. Apparently Yard Conductor Carner failed to open the angle cock before starting the back-up movement and when he realized that the brakes were not applying he did not wait to give the engineman a stop signal on the communi- cating air-whistle, but jumped off and gave him hand signals to stop. These signals were not observed because of the fact that the engineman was not in position to receive them. The rule above quoted requires that the man at the rear end of a back-up movement set the brakes on the train to indicate to the engineman that the train is ready to back out; Engineman Black should not have started the back-up movement until this had been done, and he then would have known whether the brakes could be operated properly from the back-up hose. Yard Conductor Carner and Engineman Black were men of long experience; at the time of the accident they had been on duty 4 hours and 42 minutes and 7 hours and 32 minutes, respectively, prior to which they had been off duty 16 hours or more. None of the other em- ployees involved had been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, ,'t W. P. BORLAND. Director. } i Transportation i Library HE 1780 .4234 1491 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD AT COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA, ON FEBRUARY 8, 1929. May 17, 1929. To the Commission: On February 8, 1929, there was a side collision between two light engines, coupled together, and a trans- fer train on the Union Pacific Railroad at Council Bluffs, Iowa, which resulted in the death of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Bridge Sub-division of the Nebraska Division; this sub-division is comprised of tracks between C. & N.W. Junction, Iowa, and Gilmore, Nebr., all of which are within yard limits. Train move- ments are governed by special rules contained in the time- table, supplemented by Consolidated Superintendent's Bulletin Orders. In the immediate vicinity of the point of accident there are five lead tracks which are desig- nated, from north to south, No. 5 lead, No. 14 lead, hump yard lead, east yard lead, and west yard lead; these lead tracks are connected by crossovers. The accident occurred at the fouling-point of the crossover between the east yard lead and the west yard lead; approaching this point from the west on the west yard lead track there is a short tangent, followed by a compound curve to the right approximately 1,000 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 252 feet from its western end where the curvature is 70 30'. The grade is level. The east switch of the crossover involved in this accident is located 116 feet east of the point of accident and is equipped with a high switch stand, located on the south side of the track. The view of this switch stand is un- obscured from the south side of an engine approaching from the west. The balance of the crossover switches are equipped with low stands. There is a bulletin order in effect providing that a trainman will ride on the rear of the tender of a road engine backing up without cars while switching at stations or moving in yards. The weather was clear and the temperature was about zero at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 10.10 p.m. -2- 1 Description The transfer train consisted of 46 cars, hauled by engines 1927 and 4444, running backwards, and was in charge of Foreman Roberts and Enginemen Katzenstein and McMullen. This train left West Yard on the west yard lead track and was moving westward at a speed of about 8 miles per hour, through the crossover to the east yard lead track and thence through the other crossovers to No. 5 lead track, when the 33rd car was struck by engines 2288 and 2204. Engines 2288 and 2204, headed west, were in charge of Enginemen Coley and Lidgard. These engines departed from the roundhouse and were making a back-up movement eastward on the west yard lead track when they collided with the side of the transfer train while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 4 to 8 miles per hour. One of the cars was considerably damaged and two others slightly damaged, one truck being derailed, and a hole was torn in the rear end of the tender of engine 2204. The employee killed was, a brakeman who was riding on the rear of the tender of that engine. Summary of evidence Engineman Lidgard, of engine 2204, stated that his engine was coupled behind engine 2288, with the air coupled up, when the movement was made from the roundhouse track, and after stopping at the tower some distance west of the point of accident a back-up movement was started eastward, with Head Brakeman Putnam riding on the sill step on the right side of the tender. The engineman was looking ahead watching for signals from the brakeman whose lantern was in full view at all times, while the brakeman was facing in the direction in which the engines were moving. The engines were moving at a speed of about 10 miles per hour but upon reaching a point about four or five car-lengths from the two low crossover switch stands located between the west and east yard lead tracks he observed that they were displaying red indications, and as he saw the train pulling out of the yard these red indications showed him that a crossover movement was being made, as a result of which he reduced speed to about 8 miles per hour. Shortly afterwards the fireman shouted a warning, which was about the time the collision occurred, without any signal having been given by the brakeman. Engineman Lidgard said that steam was escaping from the steam hose at the rear of the tender but did not interfere with his vision as the wind was blowing it towards the fireman's side of the engine, and the fireman told him after the accident that -3- I he could not see the switch lamp any sooner than he did, due to steam. The engineman knew there was considerable steam on the fireman's side but did not tell him to shut it off, but merely to cut it down as much as possible. Engineman Lidgard further stated that he was familiar with the physical characteristics of the yard but hesi- tated about further reducing speed when approaching the crossover as he was relying on the brakeman to warn him of any danger, although the brakeman had informed him before leaving the roundhouse track that he was not very well acquainted with the various switches and requested the engineman to be certain that the engines moved over the proper tracks. In view of what occurred, however, he presumed that the brakeman was depending on him to make the proper movement through the yard. Migratin Fireman Fry, of engine 2204, stated that he was watching ahead closely while the engines were moving on the west yard lead track at a speed of 7 or 8 miles per hour but that on account of steam escaping from the foot heater and tender hose the view was obstructed; he called this matter to the engineman's attention several times during the back-up movement when telling the engineman the position of various switches but did not shut the steam off as the instructions had been not to do so in order to keep them from freezing. He did not see that the switch lamp of the east switch of the crossover was displaying a red indication until his engine reached a point about 20 or 25 feet from the point of accident when he called to the engineman to stop, which the engineman attempted to do by applying the brakes and reversing the engine. Engineman Coley, of engine 2288, stated that he brought the engines to a stop before the back-up movement was started by using the automatic brake and then cut out his brake valve. The movement was made at a speed of 7 to 8 miles per hour but this speed was reduced slightly about the time the engines entered the west yard lead track. He was constantly on the lookout and saw a train moving on No. 5 lead track but could not see beyond engine 2204 due to steam. He said that his engine was not working steam on the back-up movement and that he took no action to reduce the speed until he heard a whistle signal when he applied the independent engine brake just as the col- lision occurred; he was of the impression that the brakeman, whom he had seen riding on the rear of engine 2204 would afford the proper protection. Engineman Coley estimated the speed of the engines at the time of the ac- cident at 6 or 7 miles per hour. .. " -4- The statements of Fireman Callison and Pilot Heath, of engine 2288, were to the effect that they both were looking eastward from the left cab window during the back-up movement but owing to steam escaping from the rear of the leading engine they could not see beyond it. Fireman Callison estimated the speed at the time of the accident at 6 or 7 miles per hour and Pilot Heath at 4 or 5 miles per hour. Engineman Katzenstein, of engine 1937, stated that his engine was on No. 5 lead track about 30 car-lengths from the crossover when the road engines started the back- up movement. He called to the crews that the crossover was being used but did not know whether they heard him; he did not sound a whistle signal. Foreman Roberts, of the transfer train, stated that the speed of his train was about 6 or 7 miles per hour and that he was riding on the side of the 4th or 5th car from the rear end at the time of the accident. He saw two engines backing up down the lead and noticed some one on the rear of the leading engine give a back-up signal with his lantern when the engines were 15 or 20 car-lengths from the point of accident. This light remained in full view and no other signals were given. He said that he had been instructed by the yardmaster to protect crossover movements when practicable; several movements are made daily over these crossovers and the manner of protection against movements on the various lead tracks has been left entirely to him. In this particular case he did not issue any instructions about protection and did not know whether any protection was afforded. The statments of Switchman Callahan, who was riding on the south side of about the 3rd car from the rear end of the transfer train, practically corroborated those of Foreman Roberts as to the person riding on the rear of the road engines giving a signal when the engines were some distance from the crossover; he did not see him give any other signals. Other members of the switching crew gave no testimony of consequence, and they verified Foreman Roberts' statement that the instructions were to provide protection when practicable, except that Switch- man Callahan thought they applied to main line crossovers. Conclusions. This accident was caused by the failure of Head Brakeman Putnam to maintain a proper lookout and notify Engineman Lidgard that the way was not clear and by the failure of Engineman Lidgard to bring the engines to a stop when he saw the red indication of the west crossover switch. """"" """ ~5- · The rules provide that a brakeman is required to ride the rear end of a road engine backing up without cars while switching at stations or moving in yards. Head Brakeman Putnam complied with this rule but failed to signal the en- gineman that the track was occupied as the engines approach- ed the point of accident; the reason for his failure to do so is not known as he was fatally injured in the accident. The rules further provide that in this territory all trains and engines must move prepared to stop unless the track is seen or known to be clear. After the back-up movement of the road engines was started, Engineman Lidgard observed a train moving in the opposite direction on one of the lead tracks and as his engine approached the point of accident he noticed that two of the crossover switch lamps were displaying red indications, one of these being the westswitch of the crossover involved in the accident. This was information to him that the crossover was being used, yet he failed to bring the engines to a stop but depended on the brakeman to afford the proper protection notwithstanding the fact that he had been informed by the brakeman that the latter was not familiar with the switches and to be sure that they used the right tracks. The evidence indicated that steam was escaping from the foot heater, and also the steam hose at the rear of the tender of engine 2204, which interfered with the range of vision of the employees riding on the left side of the two engines, with the result that they did not discover that the east switch was lined for the crossover until just before the collision occurred. Engineman Lidgard knew that this condition existed and had been informed by his fireman that he could not see ahead but did nothing to correct it. The testimony indicated that the question of providing for the safety of the various movements made through the crossovers in this vicinity had been discussed at safety meetings and that oral instructionshad been issued to provide protection when practicable, the matter being left to the judgment of the crews. In this particular case no protection was afforded by the crew of the trans- fer; one of the switchmen was riding at the head end while the foreman and the other switchman were near the rear end. Engineman Lidgard entered the service as fireman on February 24, 1916, and was promoted to engineman in October 1919; Brakeman Putnam was employed on November 16, 1925. At the time of the accident they had not been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. -- - NADA.. , .. ¿ ; Transportation Library HE 1780 4297 1493 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD NEAR NEWTON, ILL., FEBRUARY 16, 1929. ON May 22, 1929. To the Commission: On February 16, 1929, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Illinois Central Rail- road near Newton, Ill., resulting in the injury of one employee and one caretaker in charge of a car of live poultry. GRAD Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Mattoon District of the Indiana Division which extends between Mattoon, Ill., and and Evansville, Ind., a distance of 127.8 miles, intersects the Effingham District at Newton, which is located 40.9 miles south of Mattoon. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, The accident occurred no block-signal system being in use. at a point 200 feet north of mile post B-158 or approxi- mately 2 miles north of Newton. Approaching the point of accident from the south there is a 40 301 curve to the right 900 feet in length, followed by 380 feet of tangent, the accident occurring on this tangent at a point about 120 feet from its southern end. Approaching from the north there is a 40 curve to the right 1,113 feet in length, and then the tangent on which this accident occurred Beginning at a point about 1,800 feet north of mile post B-159 the grade is 0.36 per cent ascending for northbound trains, reaching a maximum of 1.08 per cent at the point of accident and extending about 2,100 feet beyond. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 4.10 p.m. S Description Northbound freight train extra 1762 consisted of 30 loaded cars, 6 empty cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1762, and was in charge of Conductor Alsop and Engineman Storm. This train arrived at Newton at 3.20 p.m., where two cars were picked up and a check was made of the train register. A copy of a train order on Form 19 was received and the train then departed, at 4 p.m., and at a point about 2 miles north of Newton it collided with southbound freight train No. 281 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 15 miles per hour. : -2- *.* Southbound freight train No. 281 consisted of 40 loaded cars, 5 empty care and a caboose, hauled by engine 1861, and was in charge of Conductor Parsons and Engineman Nickerson. This train left Greenup, 17.9 miles from Newton, at 3.28 p.m., 3 hours and 30 minutes late, and collided with extra 1762 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 15 miles per hour. The front ends of both engines were considerably damaged and the engine-truck wheels were driven back under the cylinders. The front and intermediate driving wheels of engine 1762 were derailed while the main and back driving wheels remained on the track but continued to re- volve resulting in the rails being burned to a depth of about 1 3/4 inches. The first car in the train of extra 1762, which was a car of poultry, telescoped the tender of engine 1762, and the 25th car from the engine was also damaged and derailed. Engine 1810 was not derailed but the second to the seventh cars, inclusive, were de- railed and damaged. Summary of evidence Engineman Storm, of extra 1762, stated that his train departed from Newton at 4 p.m., and was traveling at a speed of about 25 miles per hour when he commenced the ascent of the grade north of Newton and on rounding the curve he saw train No. 281 approaching. He immediately applied the air brakes in emergency, closed the throttle and shouted to the firemen and head brakeman to get off; he then gave one blast of the whistle and jumped off him- self. Engineman Storm stated that before departing from Newton he received from the conductor a clearance card, a train order on Form 19, and a register check showing the arrival of seven trains, including the arrival of train No. 281 at 3.15 p.m., and he remarked to Conductor Alsop that they had a clear track to Mattoon and the con- ductor replied, "Yes, first No. 280 is right behind us; hurry up and get out of town." Engineman Storm then showed the orders to the fireman and the head brakeman. Although Engineman Storm closed the throttle before he jumped from the engine, he noticed that the engine was still working steam after the collision occurred and he thought the throttle must have been jarred open due to the collision. He further stated that the air brakes worked properly and he estimated the speed of his train to have been about 20 miles per hour when he made the emergency application. cloguj The statements of Fireman Van Deren of extra 1762, practically corroborated those of Engineman Storm. He estimated the speed of their train to have been 15 miles per hour at the time of the accident. The testimony of · Head Brakeman Owen brought out nothing additional of im- portance. K -3- Conductor Alsop, of extra 1762, stated that on arriving at Newton he went to the telegraph office to register and while there he was interrupted several times; the operator gave him waybills for two cars to be picked On up and he went out to give instructions to his crew. returning to the office to resume his registering he heard train No. 231 approaching and again left the booth to see if his engine was clear and to inform the engineman of train No. 231 of their movements; train No. 231 is a first- class train. He then completed registering and had started to check the register when the conductor of train No. 231 came in and he allowed the conductor to register, at the same time checking train No. 231 on his own register slip and then left the office with the conductor of train No. 231. He later returned to the office and completed the register check, obtained his orders and gave the orders and the register check to Engineman Storm who read them and then gave them to the fireman. After the collision he made a check with the crew of train No. 281 and it then occurred to him that he had train No. 281 of February 15 on his register check; he could account for this error only by the fact that the wind caused by the opening and closing of the door had blown the page of the register Conductor over and apparently he had not noticed the date. Alsop estimated the speed to have been about 25 miles per hour at the time the air brakes were applied in emergency. Flagman Thies, of extra 1762, stated that on leaving Newton he saw only the train order which had been received, but Conductor Alsop told him they had a clear track to Mattoon. His first intimation of anything wrong was when he felt the air brakes apply in emergency at which time the speed was about 20 miles per hour. Engineman Nickerson, of train No. 281, stated that he was operating his train in the usual manner; he had made a 10-pound reduction of the air brakes and then made a heavy service reduction just before descending the grade, and was drifting down the grade when he saw an engine approaching around the curve about 30 car-lengths distant. He then moved the brake valve to the emergency position without having released the air, and told the men on the engine to get off. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident to have been about 15 miles per hour. The air brakes worked properly en route. Operator Richards, on duty at the time of the acci- dent, stated that there was nothing unusual in the pro- cedure of delivering the orders to extra 1762 before its -4- departure from Newton. There was no mention made of train No. 281 by the dispatcher at the time, and he himself did not know of its location on the division. Upon comparing the register check obtained by Con- ductor Alsop with the train register for February 15 and 16, it developed that he obtained his entire check for the arrival of trains on the 15th instead of the 16th, with the exception of train No. 231 which he checked immediately upon its arrival at 3.29 p.m. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Conductor Alsop, of extra 1762, properly to check the train register, The evidence clearly indicates that Conductor Alsop failed to obtain a correct register check, due to the fact that he checked the train register for the previous date by mistake, thus allowing his train to depart before the arrival of train No. 281, an overdue superior train. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. ร Respectfully submitted, W. P. Borland, Director. 1 : i Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1530 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NEW ORLEANS GREAT NORTHERN RAILROAD NEAR BOGALUSA, LA., ON JUNE 15, 1929. August 2, 1929. i To the Commission: On June 15, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train on the New Orleans Great Northern Railroad near Bogalusa, La., the derailed equipment colliding with a passenger train standing on a spur track and resulting in the death of one employee and the injury of five passengers and one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the New Orleans district, extending between Slidell and Bogalusa, a distance of 36.7 miles. This is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The point of accident was at a switch located 2,962 feet inside of the south yard-limit board and slightly more than 2 miles south of the station at Bogalusa. Approaching this point from the south, the track is tangent for a distance of 6.6 miles, while the grade at the point of accident is slightly ascending for northbound trains. The track is laid with 80-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with an average of 20 treated gum and pine ties to the rail-length, single-spiked and ballasted with about 18 inches of gravel. The switch involved in this accident is a facing-point switch for northbound trains and leads off the main track to the right or east to some industrial concerns located on that side of the track. The switch stand is also located on the east side of the track and is of the Ramapo automatic safety type, style 17, constructed so that when in normal operating condition the operating lever can not be latched and locked until the switch is fully thrown either to the open or the closed position. Daylight indications are a green disk when the switch is closed and a red arrow when the switch is open. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 9.31 a.m. -2- Bogalusa с E Freight Train Yard South Yard Point of Accident Inv. 1530 New Orleans Great Northern R.R. Bogalusa, La. June 15, 1929. G.S.L.CO. Z IN 1,155 ft. 2,962 ft. Yard Limit -3- Lescription Northbound freight train second 182 consisted of 13 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 72, and was in charge of Conductor Connerly and Engineman Crawford. At Slidell the crew in charge received among others a copy of train order No. 14, Form 31, providing for a meet with train No. 111 at South Yard, which is located 1.9 miles south of Bogalusa, train No. 111 to pull by and back in. Train second No. 182 departed from Slidell at 8.35 a.m., passed Rio, 4.9 miles from South Yard and the last open office, at 9.20 a.m., and was approaching South Yard when it was derailed at the in- dustrial switch previously mentioned while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 25 and 35 miles per hour. Southbound passenger train No. 111 consisted of a gasoline motor car, in charge of Conductor Calhoun and Engineman Cutrer. At the station at Bogalusa the crew of this train received among others a copy of train order No. 14, Form 31, previously mentioned, and departed at 9.15 a.m. The train passed South Yard and proceeded to the industrial track, an additional distance of 1,200 feet, at which latter point it backed into clear, and it was standing on this track when train second No. 182 approached and was derailed at the switch. The engine and tender of train second No. 182 passed over the switch, broke away from the train, and came to a stop 933 feet north of the switch. The first nine cars were derailed and came to rest between the main track and the industrial track. The head end of the tenth car was also derailed, while the rear truck of this car, the eleventh and twelfth cars, and the forward truck of the thirteenth car, came to rest on the rails of the industrial track, only the rear truck of the thirteenth car and the caboose remaining on the main track. Some of the derailed cars struck the gasoline motor car, turned it over on its left side, and practically demolished it. The employee killed was the baggage and express messenger on train No. 111 and the employee injured was the engine man of that train. Summary of evidence Engineman Crawford, of train second No. 182, stated that his train was traveling at a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour as it approached the switch, after making a 10-pound brake-pipe reduction, and that the brakes were still applied when his engine passed over the switch. The switch target and points were in normal position and he did not feel anything unusual. as his engine passed them -4- : .. "—ཡ # j but immediately afterwards he felt the air applied in emergency and on looking back he saw the third car from the engine as it turned over. He then opened the throttle and continued a short distande before the engine was brought to a stop. Conductor Connerly, of train second No. 182, said he examined the switch immediately after the accident and found it lined and locked for the industrial track but was unable to determine what had caused the accident. The statements of Fireman Browder, Head Brakeman Richardson and Flagman Boler, all of train second No. 182, brought out no additional facts of importance. Engineman Cutrer, who was questioned very briefly at his residence, stated that he was sitting on the driver's seat on the left side of the motor car and could see that the switch was closed, although he could not see the position of the operating lever, which was on the opposite side of the stand. Engineman Cutrer said he thought train second No. 182 was running at a speed of about 35 miles per hour and that he did not know which part of the train was the first to be derailed. Conductor Calhoun, of train No. 111, said that he handled the switch when his train pulled by and backed in on the industrial track. After the movement had been completed he closed and locked the switch and he said that the points fitted properly at that time. When train second No. 182 approached, moving at a speed he estimated to have been about 25 miles per hour, there was no unusual swaying or rocking of the cars, nor did he observe anything dragging, and the first thing which attracted his attention was a peculiar noise, a "slapping" sound, as the cars started to pass over the switch. He thought the derailment began with the third car of the train and thought it might have been the rear truck of that car, although he was not absolutely certain on this point. After the accident he found the switch lined for the industrial track, and on examining the switch he saw a mark on the east switch point which indicated that it had been struck by some object; he did not examine the west switch point. Trainmaster Lipscomb, who was riding in the caboose of train second No. 182, said that from his examination of the switch immediately after the accident he was unable to observe anything wrong in its operation, while Section Foreman Earles, who reached the scene of the accident about 20 minutes after its occurrence, said that at that time the switch was locked, with the points slightly away from the rails, although the switch was so constructed that it could not have been locked ! WING OF THAT INTO THE • ↑ A donatellagio s १ -40.- Gagog, pr minder gis nggo » Section · A – A 2" x 3" Machine Bolt. A Cotter key hole Bolt which anchors spindle to inner sleeve in Ramapo Automatic Safety Switch Stand * Inv. 1530 New Orleans Great Northern Railroad Bogalusa, La. June 15, 1929. -5- i ! D 웰 ​unless fully opened or fully closed. He again examined the switch as soon as the cars on the rear end of the train had been moved back but he did not find anything wrong with its operation and the points then seemed to fit properly. The section foreman did not know how long this particular switch stand had been installed at this point. Roadmaster Smith said the switch seemed to be in perfect condition when he examined it several hours after the occurrence of the accident, but when tests were conducted subsequently it was found that the switch lever could be pushed down in place and locked without having the switch mechanism properly seated. This defect was concealed to such an extent that it would not have been noticed by the usual inspection given by the section foreman. When the switch stand had been removed and dismantled, under the roadmaster's supervision, it was found that the bolt which goes through the inner sleeve and holds the spindle in position was in a defective condition, being worn to a considerable extent where it came in contact with the spindle. The square bottom of the sliding sleeve was also worn to some extent, as well as the square socket in the top of the star block, but Roadmaster Smith did not think that the worn bolt by itself, or the worn sliding sleeve and star block by themselves, would have been sufficient to enable the switch to be locked without the mechanism being properly seated. Assistant Roadmaster Corban also expressed the opinion that the opening of the switch under train second No. 182 was due to the worn spindle bolt coupled with the wear on the bottom of the sliding sleeve and the top of the star block. Master Mechanic Peters said he examined the engine of train second No. 182, as well as the derailed equipment, but found no defective condition which could have caused the accident. Mr. Peters was present when the switch stand was dismantled and expressed the opinion that the worn conditions described by the roadmaster were the result of natural mechanical wear, coupled with some rust. South Yard is shown in the time-table as a station located 1.9 miles from Bogalusa, and at this point is located what is known as the G.S.L. lead, while the freight train yazd is located between South Yard and Bogalusa. Proceeding southward from South Yard there is the industrial track at which this accident occurred, and then still farther south there are two other industrial tracks, the last of which is located about 1,800 feet inside of the south yard-limit board. Relief Dispatcher Bullock said his understanding of train order No. 14 was that train No. 111 would take siding at the G.S.L. lead at South Yard station, that being the point -6- where time applied, and he said the order did not say what track was to be used by train No. 111 in pulling by and backing in because he did not know what track the train would be able to use. It was his expectation, however, that train No. 111 would back in on some track between the station at Bogalusa and the G.S.L. lead, and not proceed beyond the latter point. He thought it would have been impracticable to designate a particular track, however, for if he had designated the G.S.L. lead, for example, it is possible that on arrival at that point the crew of train No. 111 might have found a G.S.L. train occupying the lead. With respect to train second No. 182, Relief Dispatcher Bullock said that it could not proceed north of the G.S.L. lead under the terms of the order, and it was his opinion that the crew of train No. 111 had no right beyond that lead and that in going to the industrial switch at which point the accident occurred, they were over-running their meeting point. Dispatcher Carter said he would not have instructed the crew of train No. 111 to proceed beyond the G.S.L. lead unless he knew that that particular track was blocked, in which event he would have specified some other track as the meeting point, and it was not his understanding of the operating rules that when a meeting point is fixed at a certain point within yard limits, the train so restricted can proceed beyond that point under the protection of 93, which requires that second and third-class and extra trains move within yard limits preparedto stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear. rule Superintendent Gould, who was riding in the caboose of train second No. 182 at the time of the accident, said the speed of the train was about 40 miles per hour as it approached the yard-limit board and that the speed was then reduced and was about 30 miles per hour when the accident occurred. On examining the switch he found it properly locked, with the east switch point wide open and the west switch point fitting tightly against the west rail. He then went under the car which was standing over the switch and found what appeared to be a flange mark on the east switch point;; this mark was about one-half inch long and was about 2 inches from the receiving end of the switch point. At a point 6 inches from the receiving end, there was another flange mark which was about 5 inches long. There was also an indentation on the switch point resulting either from a flange mark or from the tread of a wheel. All of the various exterior parts of the switch seemed to be in good operating condition. With respect to the question of how train No. 111 was able to proceed beyond the G.S.L. lead at South Yard, in view of the meet order held by the crew of that train, -7- Superintendent Gould said that for operating purposes there are two time-table stations, Bogalusa and South Yard, both located within the same yard limits. There is a board placed at South Yard near the intersection of the G.S.L. lead and special instructions in the time-table provide that the time of passenger trains at South Yard applies at this particular point. According to his statement, however, rule 93 required train second No. 182 to be under control within yard limits, unless the main track was seen or known to be clear, and there was no violation of the rules by the crew of train No. 111 in proceeding beyond South Yard inasmuch as the track on which they were to clear train second No. 182 was not designated in the train order, and the superintendent further stated that rule 93 is well recognized as ample protection within yard limits against second and third- class and extra trains. The statements of the various members of the crews of the two trains involved indicated that they were of the opinion that the meet order could be fulfilled at any point inside of the yard-limit boards. The engineman of train second No. 182, however, said that he expected to meet train No. 111 at the G.S.L. lead at South Yard, although they could have gone in on some other track. Conclusions This accident was caused by a defective switch. The evidence indicated that train No. 111 pulled by and backed in on the industrial track and that Conductor Calhoun then closed and locked the switch. As train second No. 182 approached that point, the engine passed over the switch in safety and possibly the first one or two of the cars in the train also passed over the switch before being pulled off by the following cars. These other cars, however, were derailed and when the train finally came to a stop the switch was found lined for the industrial track and still was properly locked. On being dismantled, it was found that the bolt which goes through the inner sleeve and holds the spindle in position was in a defective condition, due to excessive wear, and it was also found that the square bottom of the sliding sleeve and the socket in the top of the star block were showing signs of considerable wear. Apparently the result of this combination was that when Conductor Calhoun closed and locked the switch the slackness in the different operating parts of the mechanism resulted in the switch not being properly seated, thus allowing the points to open under the passing train. -8- | j ! While in no way responsible for the occurrence of the accident it is to be noted that train No. 111 had a meet with train second No. 182 at South Yard, but proceeded an additional distance of nearly 1,200 feet before clearing the main track at the switch where the accident subsequently occurred. Special instructions in the current time-table provide that the time of passenger trains at South Yard applies at the board at the G.S.L. lead, and the train dis- patchers seemed to be of the opinion that neither of the trains named in the meet order had a right under the train-order rules to proceed beyond that point. The majority of the employees on the trains involved thought they could meet at any point within the yard- limit boards and a somewhat similar position was taken by the superintendent, who seemed to consider that rule 93, which on this railroad requires second and inferior class trains to run prepared to stop within yard limits, was ample protection for the action of the crew of train No. 111 in proceeding beyond the point known as South Yard, There would seem to be little doubt, however, that the point designated as South Yard in the time-table and referred to in the special time- table instructions is the point beyond which neither of these trains could proceed except under flag protection, for it is not believed that rule 93 can be accepted as sufficient protection for passing a meeting point. As previously indicated, the views of the various witnesses did not agree as to what constitute "South Yard" from the standpoint of meeting opposing trains. Obviously a railroad can establish such rules governing the operation of its trains as may be required by any particular locality, but there should be an absolutely uniform understanding of those rules by every one coming in contact with them, and in this particular case it is recommended that steps be taken immediately to insure that all concerned have a uniform understanding as to just how far a train can move without exceeding its train-order authority. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Birector. splay > Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 „Boilie 2**** 1531 PRIVE! INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD NEAR NILEGARDEN CALIF., ON JULY 1, 1929. October 8, 1929 To the Commission: On July 1, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a freight train and a light engine on the Western Pacific Railroad near Nilegarden, Calif., which resulted in the injury of two employees. Description Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the First Sub- Division of the Western Division, which extends between San Francisco and Stockton, Calif., a distance of 93.8 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and a manual block-signal system. The accident occurred at a point approximately three-fourths mile west of Nilegarden; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for more than 1 mile, followed by a 50′ curve to the left 8,342 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 1,559 feet from its western end. Approaching from the east the track is tangent, leading to the curve on which the accident occurred, while the grade is practically level for more than 1 mile in either direction. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 11.45 a.m. Eastbound helper engine 81 was in charge of Engineman Woodruff and Fireman Miller. At Niles, 53.1 miles west of Nilegarden, the crew received a copy of train order No. 47, Form 19, reading in part as follows: "Eng 81 run extra Altamont to Stockton Yard with right over No. 61 Eng 38 and No. 77 Eng 23 to Carbona***11 ; p! -2- Engine 81 helped train No. 4 to Altamont, 26,8 miles beyond Niles, and then proceeded light from that point, passed Carbona, and was approaching Nilegarden, which is 11 miles from Carbona, when it collided with trai n No. 77 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been 18 or 20 miles per hour. Westbound freight train No. 77 consisted of 45 cars and a caboose, hauled by engines 49 and 23, and was in charge of Conductor Hardy and Engine men Duarte and Hamma. This train left Stockton Yard, 9.2 miles east of Nilegarden, at 10.55 p.m., 3 hours and 10 minutes late, having previously received a copy of train order No. 77, and after passing Nile garden engine 81 was seen approaching and the train was brought to a stop just before the accident occurred. The None of the equipment was derailed, although engines 81 and 49 were quite badly damaged. employees injured were the engineman and fireman of engine 81, who jumped off prior to the accident. Engineman Woodruff, of engine 81, stated that the conductor of train No. 4 delivered train order No. 47 to him at Niles, this order being his authority to move his engine from Altamont to Stockton Yard, there being no office at Altamont. He read and thoroughly understood its contents and then handed it to his fireman, but did not remember if they discussed it. After assist- ing train No. 4 to Altamont his engine proceeded light met train No. 61 at Midway, and upon arrival at Carbona he found a stop signal displayed. He went into the telegraph office, where the operator handed him ano ther copy of train order No. 47, this being a middle order addressed to the operator, and also a clearance card indicating that his departing time would be 11.29 p.m., or 10 minutes behind train No. 4. As it was only 11.26 p.m., he waited a few minutes and during that time the operator remarked that he would have "clsar sailing" from there, to which he replied in the affirmative, al- though the operator also stated that train No. 77 might not have left Stockton Yard before train No. 4 arrived. Engine man Woodruff returned to his engine, started ahead, and then failed to stop and go in on the passing track but proceeded eastward instead, and was approach- ing the point of accident when both he and the fireman observed the headlight of train No. 77 about 800 or 900 feet distant; he immediately closed the throttle, applied the brakes, opened the sanders and reversed the engine, jumping off when his engine had reached a point about 10 car-lengths from the opposing train. He > • 4 2 -3- 。 estimated the speed of his engine at 30 miles per hour at the time he first observed the approaching train, and he did not think it had been appreciably reduced when he got off. Engine man Woodruff further stated that there was nothing misleading about train order No. 47 and he could not account for his failure to remain at Carbona for train No. 77 other than to say that when he arrived at that point he fully ex- pected to find the train there and that after his con- versation with the operator it never occurred to him again that he was required to wait until the arrival of the superior train. G V. Fireman Miller, of engine 81, stated that he read the train order received at Niles and clearly understood its requirements, but did not read the copy of the middle order received at Carbone although it was delivered to him by the cnginoman with the remark "let's go". He was riding He was riding on his scat box looking ahead as his engine approached the point of accident and observed a light some distance ahead, but as there is a highway crossing in the vicinity of the point of accident and lights could be expected at that point at any time, he did not realize that it was the headlight of an approaching train until it was only about 1,000 feet distant. He immediately shouted a warning and the engineman crossed over to his side of the cab and looked ahead; Fireman Miller then got down on the stops and jumped off. He estimated the speed of his engine to have been 30 or 40 miles per hour at the time ho first definitely ascertained that a train was approach- ing and did not think the engineman had taken any action to reduce its speed before he got off.. He also said that he knew the rules required him to read all orders but did not do so in the case of the middle order re- ceived at Carbona as he was relying on the engineman and took his word for it, consequently he did not know whether they had further rights over train No. 77. S K Engineman Duarte, of the leading engine of train No. 77, stated that train order No. 47 was re- ceived at Stockton Yard, giving engine 81 rights over his train to Carbona. The headlight of his engine was burning brightly and the speed of his train was about 25 miles per hour approaching the point of accident. Upon reaching a point approximately 3/4 mile from where the collision occurred he observed the headlight of engine 81 and at once shut off steam and applied the brakes, bringing the train to a stop about 10 or 12 seconds prior to the accident, and at that time engine 81 was about four pole-lengths distant. He estimated the speed -4- of engine 81 at 18 miles per hour at the time of the accident and thought from the noise it was making just prior to the accident that it was in reversed position. He also said that in the vicinity of the point of accident it is open country and there is nothing to obstruct the range of vision except an occasional clump of trees. The statements of Engineman Hamma, of the second engine, practically corroborated those of Engine- man Duarte. He also noticed the headlight of engine 81 about 3/4 mile ahead and said that one blast was sounded on both engine whistles, while it required 25 or 30 seconds to bring his train to a stop. He estimated the speed of engine 81 at the time of the accident at 20 miles per hour. The statements of Fireman Boone of the leading engine, and Fireman Bruce, of the second engine, brought out no additional facts of importance as they knew of no thing unusual until the engine whistles were sounded and the brakes applied, while Head Brakeman Ketchmark, who was riding on the leading engine, was not in position to have seen the headlight of engine 81 as soon as it came into view. Conductor Hardy and Flagman Fielder wore riding in the caboose and did not know why their train was brought to a stop until the accident occurred. > Operator Schulte, on duty at Carbona at the time of the accident, stated that he had the train-order signal displayed for engine 81, which arrived at his station at about 11.24 p.m. When the engine man entered the office he informed him that he was "stuck" for train No. 77 and the engineman inquired as to the status of that train. The dispatcher had previously notified Operator Schul te that he was hot certain whether train No. 77 had left Stockton Yard, and Operator Schulte in- formed Enginemon Woodruff accordingly. He then delivered the middle order to the engincman but the engineman did not read it back to him and there was no discussion concerning the order. He also delivered a clearance card, on which was noted the leaving time of engine 81 as 11.29 p.m., which was done in accordance with the rules requiring the spacing of trains in the same direction 10 minutes apart, train No. 4 not having left that point until 11.19 p.m. Engine 81 departed at about 11.28 p.m., but at the time the operator was of the opinion that it would pull down and back in on the siding, and he said he did not know it had passed the east switch until he heard a whistle-signal sounded for a road cross- ing beyond that point. He immediately notified the dispatcher and they both made an effort to get in com- munication with other points in order to prevent the Body K ! -5- accident but were unsuccessful. Operator Schulte was certain that he did not tell Engineman Woodruff that he would have "clear sailing" from Carbona, neither did he make any remark that would lead the engineman to believe that engine 81 could depart before the arrival of train No. 77. Conclusions This accident was caused by the action of Engineman Woodruff and Fireman Miller, of engine 81 in overlooking an opposing superior train. Train order No. 47 gave engine 81 rights over train No. 77 from Altamont to Carbona but beyond the latter point it had no authority over the superior train. It appears that both Engineman Woodruff and Fireman Miller read this order, understood its require- ments when it was received at Niles, and knew they would have to remain at Carbona until train No. 77 arrived. A copy of this order was also delivered to them upon their arrival at Carbona, which was again read by the engineman but not by the firema n. Shortly after this middle order was delivered to them, however, they departed and then collided with train No. 77. The only excuse Engineman Woodruff could offer for his failure to remain at Carbona was that he had expected to find train No. 77 at that point upon his arrival there and after talking with the operator it never occurred to him to get into clear until the train had arrived. Fireman Miller did not read the middle order, neither did he make any inquiry as to its contents, although he know that his engine had no right to proceed unless further authority were received. He seemed to have been content to depend on the engine man for the safe movement of the engi ne The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND Director. Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION October 25, 1929 MEMORANDUM TO ACCIDENT REPORT MAILING LIST: In report No. 1531, covering accident on the Western Pacific Railroad near Nilegarden, Calif., on July 1, 1929, which report was released to the mailing list on October 16, the statement was made that "Trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and a manual block-signal system. This statement was in error and should have read, "Trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in effect." Very respectfully, W. P. BORLAND, Director, Bureau of Safety. ?? 1 Iransportaban 1532 • } Library days T Hi 1 1780 4434 LINE: SEWER,BE%83% 1 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY AT METZ, IOWA, ON JULY 2, 1929. To the Commission: October 16, 1929. On July 2, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway at Metz, Iowa, which resulted in the injury of 17 passengers and 1 employee off duty. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on Sub-division 4 of the Iowa Division, extending between Silvis, Ill., and Valley Junction, Iowa, a distance of 188.9 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal and train-control system. There is a passing track approximately 3,000 feet in length which parallels the main track on the north, and there is a depot track of the same length on the south side of the main track, the two depot-track switches being located about 100 feet east of the respect- ive passing-track switches. The initial point of derail- ment was 23.5 feet west of the point of frog of the east passing-track switch. Approaching this point from the east the track is tangent for a distance of 4,000 feet, while the grade for westbound trains is 0.25 per cent descending. The track is laid with 100-pound rail, 33 feet in length, with 20 treated ties to the rail-length, and is ballasted with gravel to a depth of 12 feet. The track is well maintained. The weather was clear at the time of the accident which occurred at 2.45 a.m. Description. Westbound passenger train No. 13 consisted of two refrigerator cars, one express car, one combination baggage and smoking car, one coach and five pullman sleep- ing cars, in the order named, hauled by engine 4007, and was in charge of Conductor Bolster and Engineman Phillips. The cars were of all-steel construction with the excep otion of the first and second cars, which were of steel under- St 2 1 frame construction. This train left Newton, 6 miles east of Metz, at 2.35 a.m., five minutes late, accord- ing to the train sheet, and was derailed at Metz while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 50 miles per hour. The entire train was derailed with the exception of the engine, the first car and the forward truck of the second car. The rear truck of the second car was derailed to the north while the rest of the derailed equipment came to rest on the south side of and parallel with the main track, with the rear end of the train 3,017 feet west of the initial point of derailment; the fifth and sixth cars were on their left sides, while the others were leaning at various angles. All of the cars remained coupled together and were only slightly damaged. Summary of evidence Engineman Phillips stated that his train was moving at a speed of about 50 miles per hour and that the first knowledge he had of anything wrong was when he heard three blasts of the air signal whistle at the west end of Metz. When the third blast did not stop he looked back, saw fire coming from under the second car, and applied the air brakes immediately, but found that the brake-pipe pressure had already been exhausted. The train came to a stop without shock or any indication on the en- gine that the train was derailed. He was working a light throttle and did not shut off the engine until after the train stopped. Engineman Phillips then lighted his torch and walked back to ascertain the trouble, thinking possibly that the train had parted, and found the first car and the forward truck of the second car on the rails and the re- mainder of the train derailed. His inspection of the second car disclosed what appeared to be a loose wheel on the left side of the front axle of the rear truck; a black mark on the axle looked as though the wheel had slipped over about half an inch, and oil had come through the wheel, indicating to him that the wheel had been loose for some time. He looked at the wheel on the opposite side but saw nothing out of the ordinary. Engineman Phillips further stated that the air brakes were inspected by a car inspec- tor before leaving Rock Island, the initial terminal, and the inspector reported them to be working on all of the 10 cars; the head brakeman also looked over the train at West Liberty, 107.2 miles from Metz, while Engineman Phillips had looked back along the train on the curve east of Metz, without noticing anything wrong. Six stops were made en route, and between Newton and Metz three air-brake appļi- cations were made; the air brakes worked properly at all times and Engineman Phillips said he had no difficulty in • - 3- - handling the train. The statements of Fireman Gotthardt practically corroborated those of the engineman. Conductor Bolster stated that after leaving Newton he was riding in the rear seat of the combination car, the fourth car from the engine, and the first warning he had of any trouble was when he heard gravel flying under the car. He started to pull the air but the valve was in the baggage end of the car so he gave two blasts of the air whistle signal. It was his opinion that the speed at the time of the accident was 45 or 50 miles per hour. After the accident he examined the rear truck of the second car and found indications of a loose wheel, and that oil had seeped through the wheel on the axle; the opposite wheel appeared to have a worn flange. He`. was of the opinion that the wheel was not loose when they left Rock Island and did not believe that it had been loose for any length of time. Conductor Bolster also stated that the usual inspection had been made at Rock Island by the car inspectors. · Head Brakeman Teeters stated that he inspected the train at West Liberty and found everything in good condition. Approaching Metz he was riding in the rear end of the combination car; he heard rocks flying and saw the conductor reach for the emergency valve. There was no emergency valve, however, in that part of the car, and Brakeman Teeters ran toward the next car with the inten- tion of applying the brakes from that car. After the accident he was busy assisting the passengers and made no inspection of the derailed equipment. Rear Brakeman Small stated that he was passing between the sleeping car and the coach, going toward the head end of the train to get information from the conductor about the steam heat valve, when the accident occurred. The sleeping car was swaying considerably and he thought something was wrong, but he had only made a few trips on passenger trains and was unfamiliar with the conditions. After the accident he got his flagging equip- ment and went back to flag, and on his way back he noticed a wheel mark about 5 or 6 inches feet thethaifrog hetherth side of the track, about 4 or 5 ties west of the frog of the east passing-track switch, but he did not observe the condition of the track immediately behind the train. General Car Foreman Stephans stated that he arrived at the scene of the accident about four hours after its occurrence and made an inspection of the equipment. He found that the forward wheel on the left side of the tear truck of the second car had slipped outward on the axle ! Sig 4 I about 7/8 inch, but it did not appear to have turned very much on the axle. The pedestals were broken on the right side and the spring was missing, while the truck frame on the right side was sprung downward. With the exception of the loose wheel all of the damage was apparently done after the derailment. The wheel showed marks of oil having seeped through, but did not indicate that it had been loose very long. There was no indication of hot wheels or a sprung axle. He further stated that he noticed the flange of the opposite wheel was considerably worn. General Car Foreman Stephans also stated that the car had passed over the switch and over the frog probably 7 or 8 ties before any wheel marks showed on the ties. Both wheels appeared to be on the ties nearly opposite each other showing that one pair left the track about the same time, continued down to the west depot track switch, and then from there on westward it appeared there were two pairs of wheels off the track. The wheel marks were on the north side of the rails and continued on that side up to the last switch, where they appeared on the other side. General Superintendent Breheny stated that he thought the wheel in question had slipped outward at least 3/4 inch. There was daylight side bearing clear- P ance on the front truck but on account of the rear truck being derailed he was unable to determine the clearance on this truck. He found the first marks of derailment about 20 or 25 feet west of the point of frog of the east passing-track switch. There was one flange mark visible from that point to the west depot-track switch, and from this latter point to the west passing-track switch there were two flange marks. Ganeral Superintendent Breheny stated that he was convinced there were not involved any sharp or worn flanges, but that the lone wheel had caused the accident. Car Inspector Stover stated that at Rock Island he inspected the first four cars in train No. 13, which in- cluded the car involved, and found nothing wrong with them. In his inspection for loose wheels he flashed a light against the opposite wheel from where he was stand- ing. The statements of Car Inspectors Hudson and Johnson, who inspected the remaining cars in train No. 13, brought out nothing additional of importance. The car involved, I.C. refrigerator car 4817, is a 60,000-pound steel-underframe car, with equalizer trucks equipped with 33-inch steel wheels; the journals are 5 inches by 9 inches. The car was designed for passenger- train service. The forward wheel on the left side of the S . – " ! со rear truck, which was found to be loose, was marked on the hub "U.P. 11714" and on the plate 713-2500 B 4016." Measurements of the gauge of the wheels after the acci- dent showed this wheel to have moved outward a distance of 1 1/16 inches and it had turned on the axle one-fourth of a turn. When placed in the wheel press this wheel started to move before pressure registered on the gauge and a pressure of only 10 tons was required to force the wheel entirely from the axle. The diameter of the wheel was 31 inches and thickness of the tread 1 inches. The full length of the wheel fit was found to be coated with oil. The mate wheel was 30 7/8 inches in diameter; its flange was worn so that it would take a one-inch gauge at several points but it would not take the 15/16 inch gauge at any point. It had a vertical flange 13/16 inch high. The thickness of the tread was 1 inches and the metal required to be removed to restore full flange contour was 5/16 inch. A pressure of 100 tons was re- quired to force this wheel from the axle. There was no evidence of any wheels on this car having been hot. Conclusions This accident was caused by a loose wheel. The wheel had moved outward on its axle a distance of approximately 1 inch and had made about one-fourth of a turn on its axle. It also appeared that there was oil in the wheel fit, and when placed in a wheel press it took very little pressure to force the wheel off the axle. The investigation disclosed that the car on which the loose wheel was found was inspected in the usual manner at Rock Island, the last inspection point, and no defects were found. The car traveled a distance of 147 miles after leaving Rock Island before the accident occurred, passing over numerous switches and railroad crossings, which would seem to indicate that the wheel had not been loose for any great length of time. 2 The employees involved were experienced men with the exception of the rear brakeman, who had about 9 months' experience in train service. At the time of the accident the crew had been on duty 4 hours after having been off duty more than 18 hours. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library не 1780 4234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1533 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ANN ARBOR RAILROAD NEAR POMONA, MICH., ON JULY 4, 1929. To the Commission: November 2, 1929 On July 4, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Ann Arbor Railroad near Pomona, Mich. resulting in the death of two employees and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation no This accident occurred on the Third Division, which extends between Selma and Frankfort, Mich., a distance of 64.17 miles; this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, block-signal system being in use. The accident oc- curred at a point about 1,900 feet east of the station at Pomona, in a cut, near its eastern end and about 375 feet west of bridge No. 264-6, a concrete box- culvert; approaching this point from either direction the track is tangent for a considerable distance, while the grade in the immediate vicinity of the point of accident is 0.99 per cent descending for westbound trains. The track is laid with 85-pound sawn rails, approximately 31 feet in length, with an average of about 18 ties to the rail-length, tie-plated, double- spiked, and ballasted with gravel to a depth of about 10 inches; the track iswell maintained. The concrete box-culvert is 4' x 4' x 34' and at the point where it goes under the track there is a fill about 4 feet in height; this fill extends westward from the culvert for a distance of about 200 feet, to the east end of the cut in which the derailment occurred. The cut is about 2,000 feet in length and about 20 feet : in width; the maximum height of its north bank is 22 feet, while that of its south bank is 14 feet. The concrete box-culvert is intended to carry away under the track toward the south any excess water from a small ditch that parallels the main track on the north for about one mile east of the culvert; the ditch is about 2 feet 7 1 ཡ3- wide and 6 inches deep and the flow of water is from east to west until the immediate vicinity of the culvert is reached, at which point the water is di- verted to the left or south under the track and thence away toward the southwest. There are also ditches on each side of the main track through the entire length of the cut, and there is a dry rún which comes down from the north at a point opposite the culvert, merging with the ditch on the north side of the track. During the night of the accident there had been a heavy downpour of rain, causing roads to be washed out and doing much damage. The records of the weather bureau at Benzonia, Mich. about 16 miles from Pomona, showed that 1.75 inches of rain fell at that point between 7 and 9 p.m., July 3rd. The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 1.35 a.m., July 4th. Description Westbound freight train extra 185 consisted of 49 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 185, and was in charge of Conductor Pate and Engineman Carvin. This train left Mesick, 10.91 miles east of Pomona and the last open office, at 12.34 a.m., and was de- railed by a washout near Pomona while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Engine 185 and its tender, coupled, came to rest on their right sides, north of and parallel with the track, at a point about 550 feet west of the concrete box-culvert. The first 14 cars were derailed and piled up in a short space behind the tender, but the fifteenth car was not derailed and came to a stop on the track with its forward end 340 feet west of the culvert. The following six cars, however, were also derailed and piled up in a mass on the north side of the track, but the remaining portion of the train came to a stop intact on the rails, with the forward end of the twenty-second car at a point 150 feet west of the culvert. The employees killed were the engineman and fireman, while the employee injured was a brakeman. Summary of evidence. Conductor Pate stated that at Mesick a message was received to look out for washed track in cuts and low places, due to the heavy rain; he said he received → Z } • this message at the rear end after the train had gotten under way and that the original copy of the message was delivered to the head end. Conductor Pate was riding in the cupola of the caboose, on the right side, between Mesick and the point of accident, and the first inti- mation he had of anything wrong was the shock caused by the slack running in, which he said was not severe. He estimated the speed of the train to have been not more than 30 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Conductor Pate said that the headlight was burning properly on leaving Mesick, and that the air brakes had been tested and worked properly. Immediately after the accident he proceeded along the north side of the train toward the head end and on reaching a point in the immediate vicinity of where the last of the derailed cars came to rest he noticed running water, but did not pay particular attention to this condition. Then he crossed over to the south side of the train and proceeded toward the engine, rendering what assis- tance he could. While so engaged he went to a point ahead of the engine and then started eastward on the ñorth side of the track and went in to water and mud up to his knees. Conductor Pate afterwards proceeded westward toward Pomona station, making no further in- vestigation as to the cause of the accident, but on his way he noticed that the track had washed out under the ends of the ties on the north side of the rail at four or five different places, while just east of the station the gravd had been washed out from under the north rail to the bottoms of the ties, with the north rail suspended at two or three different locations. Brakeman Sudman immediately went back to flag; on his way back he noticed where the water had washed to within 1 foot of the ties at one point and said that he could also hear water running from the north side of the track. đ Section Foreman Berryhill, whose section includes that portion of track where the accident occurred, stated that he last inspected the box-culvert three days prior to the accident and at that time the water was running freely and the entire area of the culvert was open and capable of carrying water. He was at Copemish, about 3 miles west of Pomona, on the night of the accident, and the only rain of which he had any knowledge fell between 8 and 9 p.m., and was not enough to warrant patrolling the track. On arrival at the scene of the accident about 1 hours after its occurence he inspected the culvert and said that it was not ob- structed in any way; the north and south banks of the 4 I ? cut were in good condition, but the water had filled up the ditches and run over the top. At the time of his inspection, however, there was no water on the north side of the track through the cut. No large body of water had backed up in the level low land located north of the tracks and mostly east of the culvert, although there was some water in that area. Between the culvert and the station at Pomona the road- bed had been washed out under the track at several points. In his opinion the accident was caused by a washout, due to water backing up in the flats, north and east of the box-culvert, and then overflowing through the cut west of the culvert, washing out the track in the cut. Section Foreman Berryhill further stated that he had been section foreman at this point for three years, and during this period he had had trouble at this point on one other occasion, when snow was melting, but no damage to the track resulted. Track Supervisor Pickering, who had formerly been in charge of this section as foreman, said he had had a washout at this point in the spring of 1913 or 1914, due to an ex- cessive flow of water as a result of rain and melting snow. Supt. of Bridges and Buildings Turnbull said that when he inspected the culvert in the fall of 1928 he found it filled in at the bottom so that the opening was only 2 feet in height. Track Supervisor Pickering, however, said he last inspected the culvert in May, 1929, and at that time it was unobstructed and water was flowing freely; he next examined it on the day of the accident and again found it to be free of obstruc- tions. 9 Statements of several residents of Pomona and the immediate vicinity were to the effect that the rainfall on the night of July 3 was one of the heaviest ever experienced in this locality. The last train to pass over the track at the point where the accident occurred was eastbound freight train extra 184, doubleheaded, which passed that point about three hours prior to the occurrence of the accident. At that time the crew noticed water running freely through the ditch and cut, but not close to the ends of the ties, and after discussing the matter at Mesick, the two enginemen decided conditions did not justify notifying the dispatcher or stopping extra 185 and ~5- telling that crew what they had seen. This crew gave further testimony to the effect that an extremely heavy rain fell before their train left Frankfort on this trip, but that after departing therefrom, at 8.55 p.m., July 3rd, no rain of any consequence was encountered, although in the vicinity of the point of accident there was so much water that some of them heard it roaring above the noise of the train. Inspection of the track after the accident dis- closed that starting at a point about 240 feet west of the concrete box-culvert, in the cut near its ex- treme eastern end, there was a washout 25 feet in length and 4 feet deep that extended in as far as the center of the track, on its north side; between this point and where the next washout occurred, which was a similar washout about 140 feet in length, the track re- mained intact for a distance of 75 feet and one detached freight car stood on the rails of this piece of track. Another short piece of track, about 30 feet in length, remained intact west of the long washout, but at the west end of this piece of track, at which point the engine and tender came to rest the current westward through the cut had washed entirely underneath the track to the south side thereof. From this point to the station at Pomona, located just beyond the west end of the cut, the ballast at the ends of the ties on the north side, showed evidence of having been cutaway by water. In front of the station the roadbed was washed out a distance of about 60 feet and the north rail was suspended, while an earth embankment at the west end of the station was also washed out, indicating that the water had rushed against the em- bankment and was then diverted toward the north, spend- ing its force over the adjoining fields. No wheel marks or other marks appeared on the ties on those sections of track that remained intact, nor on the ties east of where the first washed-out track occurred. Apparently the engine derailed just east of where it came to rest, as the indications were that it did not travel more than a few feet after it struck the north bank of the cut. There was no indication that the bank on either side of the track had sloughed off and filled the ditches in the cut. Conclusions This accident was caused by a washout. 7 Game E The evidence showed that on the night of the accident there had been a very heavy downpour of rain within a radius of several miles of the point of accident and it appeared that the volume of water de- livered to the culvert from the north side was so large that it could not be handled, with the result that the water backed up in the low land north of the track and mostly east of the culvert, eventually flowing over the top of, and breaking through, a levee built at this point to hold back any accumulation of water, resulting in the water overflowing through the cut and in the roadbed being washed out at various points therein. Steps The washout causing this accident is the second time there has been sufficient trouble at this point to interfere with the safe movement of traffic. should be taken to see that it does not occur again, either by enlarging the culvert, or by providing such other means for controlling flood waters as may appear advisable to the engineering department. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. .: Transportation 14 Library HE 1780 ·A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1535 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TRACZS OF THE TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS AT ST. LOUIS, MO., ON JULY 5, 1929. To the Commission: October 19, 1929. On July 5, 1929, there was a side collision between a St.Louis-San Francisco passenger train and a Chicago, Burlington & Quincy passenger train on the tracks of the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis at St. Louis, Mo., which resulted in the injury of 34 passengers and 2 employees off duty. Location and method of operation All trains entering St. Louis Union Depot are operated over the tracks of the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis. The accident occurred on the Eads Division, which extends between East St.Louis, Ill., and Theresa Ave., St. Louis, Mo., a distance of about 5 miles, and consists of several running tracks the general direction of which is east and west, and over which trains are operated by block or interlocking signals. Union Depot is located north of these tracks, between 13th and 21st Streets, and a series of lead tracks diverge from the running tracks from both directions and then converge at a point where they join the tracks lead- ing into the train shed. It was in this latter territory that the accident occurred, at the intersection of lead tracks 43 and 44; approaching this point from the west on lead track 43 the track is tangent for a distance of 330 feet from which point there is a 12° 30' curve to the left to the point of accident, a distance of 450 feet. Approaching from the east on lead track 44 the track is tangent for 393 feet, followed by a 120 curve to the right to the point of accident, a distance of 580 feet. The general practice is for all inbound passenger trains to back into the train shed which necessitates their being pulled on the running tracks and then backed in over the lead tracks. Train movements over the lead tracks are governed by signals operated from interlocking tower No. 1, located in the triangle formed by the running tracks and the lead tracks. These signals are mounted on signal bridges which span the tracks and the signals directly involved are on signal bridge No. 6 which is located 16 feet south of the intersection of tracks 43 and 44. 9 " 1 2 1 The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 7.25 a.m. Description Eastbound St.L.S.F. passenger train No. 80 consist- ed of six coaches, all of wooden construction, hauled by engine 648, and was in charge of Conductor Chumley and Engineman Dean. This train passed tower No. 2 at 23rd Street at 7.21 a.m., and continued eastward a distance of about 1 miles to a point beyond signal bridge 14, located 1,005 feet east of Union Depot, and after receiv- ing & proceed signal at this bridge it started a back-up movement towards the station on lead track 44, passed signal bridges 12 and 10, which were displaying proceed indications, passed signal bridge No. 6, which was dis- playing a stop indication, and had been brought almost to a stop when the rear car was struck by C.B.& 2. train No. 16. Calga Westbound C.B.& Q. passenger train No. 16 consist- ed of three baggage cars, one mail car, one coach, two chair cars and three Pullman sleeping cars, hauled by engine 2949, and was in charge of Conductor Scanlon and Engineman Cort. All cars were of steel construction ex- cept one of the baggage cars, the coach and the two chair cars, which were of wooden construction. This train passed North Market Street office at 7.05 a.m., and moved a dis- tance of about 3 miles to a point beyond signal bridge 11 located 1,185 feet west of Union Depot. It then started backing towards the station on lead track 43, passed four signalbridges, including bridge No. 6, all of which were displaying proceed signal indications, and collided with the side of St.L.S.F. train No. 30 while traveling at a speed estimated at about & miles per hour. > The rear car of train No. 80 was overturned on its right side and was considerably damaged and the fifth car was partly overturned and slightly damaged. None of the other cars was derailed, although the rear car in train No. 16 was damaged. Summary of evidence Conductor Chumley, of train No. 30, stated that he had frequently handled trains in and out of Union Depot, that he handled train No. 30 into the station during the week meding the accident, and that he was familiar with the route and signals governing its movement. He said that no difficulty was experienced in making several stops be- tween Valley Park, where his train originated, and St.Louis, a distance of 17.9 miles. When his train was stopped east of signal bridge 14 he observed a clear signal displayed, authorizing his train to start the back-up movement towards the station. Shortly after starting this movement he made 7 ¿¡ Ľ 1 3 - a running test of the air-brakes by means of the back-up hose, which proved satisfactory. As soon as the rear of his train passed under signal bridge 10, located 209 feet from bridge 6, he noticed that the signal on bridge 6 governing the movement of his train was in the stop position. He immediately opened the valve on the tail hose to its fullest extent but the brakes did not appear to take proper hold, resulting in his train passing signal bridge 6 and fouling lead track 43, and he said it was still moving slow- ly at the time of the accident. The brakeman who was riding with him on the rear of the train also saw the stop signal on bridge 6 as soon as it came into view and called his attention to it, but he had already started to apply the brakes. Conductor Chumley also heard the emergency air whistle sounded by the towerman but at that time the brakes had been applied. He estimated that his train was moving at a speed of 3 or 10 miles per hour when the brakes were applied, which he said would stop a train within a distance of about 50 feet under ordinary conditions, but he did not know why his train did not stop in this instance. Brakeman Haddock of train No. 80, stated that when his train was coming under bridge 10, moving at a speed of about 15 miles per hour, he observed that the signal on bridge 6 was displaying a stop indication, whereupon he called it to the attention of the conductor. The conductor then made a brake-pipe reduction which brought the train to a stop just before the collision occurred. He thought that if the brakes had been applied in emer- gency as soon as it was discovered that the signal was set against their train it would have stopped in about one- half car-length. Engineman Dean, of train No. 80, stated that his train was carrying the required pressure of 80 pounds brake pipe and 100 pounds main-reservoir pressure, and that he experienced no difficulty with the brakes en route, while on arrival at St. Louis the train was brought to a stop by the air being applied from the rear end. Before starting the reverse movement he received a hand signal from the rear of the train, as well as a communicating whistle signal, and after his train had moved a distance of about three car-lengths the air was applied from the rear which caused the brakes to take good hold and which almost brought the train to a stop. The train continued towards the station and was traveling at a speed of about 10 miles per hour when the brakes were again applied, which appeared to be an emergency application, and he immediately placed the brake-valve handle in the lap position, having previously closed the throttle. He thought the train stopped within about 70 feet, although he was not paying particular attention to the distance as A ? I w} ? r * S W :. : 3.C : P 4 D he was watching the air gauge. The statements of Fireman McRoberts, of train No. 80, practically corroborated those of Engineman Dean as to the operation of the train prior to the accident. Conductor Scanlon, of train No. 16, stated that the brakes functioned properly when a running test was made after his train started backing towards the station and that he and the brakeman were riding on the rear of the train watching the signals as their train approached them and they all displayed clear indications, including the signal on bridge No. 6. The train was moving at a speed of about 8 miles per hour when the brakeman shouted a warning, and upon looking around he observed train No. 80 about 10 feet away. He immediately applied the brakes in emergency, bringing his train to a stop within a dist- ance of 20 or 30 feet. Brakeman Diestelhorst, of train No. 16, stated that all signals governing the route over which his trai n was moving as it approached the station were in the clear or proceed position. He first observed train No. 80 when it was about 20 feet from his own train and at about the same time the brakes were applied and his own train stopped within 12 or 15 feet. He thought train No. 30 was still moving at the time of the accident. Engineman Cort, of train No. 16, stated that a running test was made when the train started the back-up movement and the brakes appeared to operate as intended. His train was moving at a speed of about 12 miles per hour when the brakes were suddenly applied from the rear, bringing the train to a stop within a distance of about 10 feet. Due to another inbound train moving on an adjacent track, his view towards the rear of his own train was obscured. There were no further facts of importance brought out by the statements of Fireman Bramblett, of train No. 16. Signal Repairman Walker stated that he was approx- imately 35 or 40 feet south of signal bridge No. 6 when the trains involved approached that point. He looked at the signals on the bridge and noticed that all of them were. displaying red indications except the one governing the route on track 43, which was displaying a green indication. When he realized that train No. 80 was not going to stop before it passed the bridge, he shouted to the conductor of that train and pointed towards the signal, but the con- ductor did not look at him and the train kept on coming and was still moving at the time of the accident. J 1 · 5 · } * Train Director Reed, on duty at Tower No. 1, stated that the signals were set giving train No. 16 a clear route through the plant and into the train shed and at the same time train No. 60 was given a clear route up to signal bridge Fo. 6. Both trains approached bridge No. 6 at the same time and were moving at a speed of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. When it appeared that train No. 30 was disregarding the signal displayed for it he sounded the emergency air-whistle danger signals, located on bridges 8 and 10, which required both trains to stop, but these signals were not heeded. An air-brake test was made on the first five cars of train No. 80 subsequent to the accident, and it was developed that they were in good condition and were operat- ing efficiently. The brakes on the rear car could not be tested as the brake cylinder was broken as a result of the accident. The back-up hose was also tested and found to be operating effectively and with no obstruction in it. The triple valve on the rear car was removed and subjected to a rack test and the only defect found was a slight leak in the slide valve, and it functioned properly in both service and emergency application tests. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Conductor Chumley, of train No. 80, properly to obey a signal indi- cation. The rules provide that trains or engines must move quite up to but not pass a signal indicating stop. Accord- ing to the evidence both trains arrived in the vicinity of the point of accident at about the same time and the route was lined for train No. 16 to back into the station over lead track 43 and for train No. 30 to back in on lead track 44 as far as signal bridge No. 6, at which point it would have to wait for train No. 16 to get out of the way. Con- ductor Chumley stated that he was on the alert and observed the signal on bridge No. 6 in the stop position as soon as it came into view, or as soon as the rear of the train emerged from under bridge No. 10, which is located more than 200 feet from bridge No. 6, and that he opened the valve on the back-up hose immediately, but that for some reason the brakes failed to take proper hold, resulting in the train passing the signal and fouling lead track 43. No difficulty was experienced with the air brakes on train No. 80 en route to St. Louis, however, and shortly after the back-up movement was started an effective run- ning test of the brakes was made by the conductor from the rear of the train, while the air-brake test made on five of the cars in train No. 30 after the accident had occurred showed that they functioned properly. On account of damages palaka ! 47 : - 6 - sustained in the accident the brakes on the sixth car could not be tested but its triple valve and the back-up hose were tested and found to be in proper working order. In view of all the evidence it is apparent that Conductor Chumley either improperly handled the brake valve on the back-up hose or failed to begin braking soon enough to bring his train to a stop before it passed signal bridge No. 6. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident they had not been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND Director. ་ 4 Transportation Library HE 1780 4234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE CODISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD AT 1.ILLINGTON ILL., ON JULY 6, 1929. ILL. To the Commission: 1536 November 4, 1929. On July 6, 1929, there was a side collision between two portions of the same train on the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad at Millington, Ill., which resulted in the death of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Kontgomery and Streator Sub-division of the Aurora Division, extending between Hontgomery and Streator, Ill., a distance of 57.53 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. At Killington there is a passing track 1,558 feet in length which parallels the main track on the west. There is also a track, known as the ouse track, located west of the passing track, and the north switch of the house track connects with the passing track at a point 106 feet south of the north passing-track switch. The accident occurred at the fouling point between the main track and the passing track at its northern end; approach- ing this point from the south there is a 1° curve to the left 1,615 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent to the point of accident, a distance of 901.3 feet, end for some distance beyond that point. The grade for northbound trains is 0.60 per cent descending at the point of accident. The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 2:45 p. 1. • Description This Northbound freight train extra 5135 consisted of eight cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 5135, and was in charge of Conductor Kurns and Engineman Stedman. train arrived at Millington at 2:40 p.m. and was brought to a stop on the main track just south of the north pass- ing-track switch. The engine then cut off, pulled ahead, and started a back-up movement into the passing track, The -2- 1 but before it could clear the main track it was struck by the cars, which had started moving northward. The forward truck of the leading car was derailed to the right while the engine was damaged but was not de- railed. The employee killed wes the enginemen. Summary of evidence The Fireman Bailey stated that when his train first stopped at Millington there was not sufficient clearance for the engine to enter the passing track, which necessi- tated backing the train so that the leading car was possibly a car-length back of the clearance point. engine was then cut off and moved forward beyond the north switch, and as soon as the switch was opened the engine started backing into the siding but had only moved a short distance when the engineman set the brakes and reversed the engine, and just as it started to move forward the cars on the main track collided with the right side of the engine cab. The engineman did not tell him why 2. reverse movement was being attempted, and from his position on the left side of the cab it was impossible for him to see the moving cars prior to the accident. - Head Brakeman Chandlee stated that the crew had instructions to pick up a car on the house track at illington, but when the train was brought to a stop he noticed the leading car was beyond the clearance point at the north passing-track switch. He decided to cut the train between the first and second cars and had just closed the angle cock on the rear end of the first car when the rear brakeman approached and said that it would be better only to cut off the engine, whereupon he opened the angle cock and the train was backed enough to clear the switch. He said that two attempts were made before the train moved backward which indicated that the air had been set on the balance of the train. When the engine was cut off he closed the angle cock on the tender and the rear brakeman closed the one on the leading car. He accompanied the engine as it moved northward, and after it started the back-up move- ment he was riding on the right side of the tender foot- board when he observed the cars on the main track moving towards the engine; he immediately gave a stop signal to the engineman, who stopped the engine and started it ahead, but the collision occurred before the engine could gain sufficient momentum to keep clear of the cars, which he estimated were moving at a speed of 2 or 3 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Brakeman Chandlee, who was M S : 1 • -3- not an experienced man, said that he noticed the train was stopped on a descending grade and he knew the rules required that hand brakes must be set on cars left stand- ing on a grade, but at the time he did not think the grade was sufficient for cars to start after they had once been brought to a stop. Rear Brakeman Finck stated that after his train stopped at Killington he lined the derail and the house- track switch, and upon noticing that the head brakeman was preparing to cut the train behind the first car, he. advised him that the train should be shoved back into clear. The first attempt to move the cars failed, as the angle cock between the first and second cars was closed and the air brakes on the rear of the train were set. After the train had been shoved back about two car-lengths the head brakeman closed the angle cock on the rear of the tender, while Rear Brakeman Finck closed the angle cock on the forward end of the leading car, and the parting of the engine uncoupled the air hose. As soon as the engine cleared the passing-track switch he opened it and signaled the engineman to back up. At that time the cars were not moving, but when the engine had backed up to a point about three car-lengths from the main-track switch, as it was entering the house track, he saw a stop signal given, this being when it was discovered that the cars had started to move, and they collided with the engine after it had been reversed and started in forward motion. Rear Brakeman Finck further stated that when the train stopped after the back-up movement was made in order to clear the switch, he did not know whether the stop was made by using the automatic brake or the independent brake, and when the engine was uncoupled he did not open the angle cock on the leading car to determine whether the air was set, as it is the usual practice to set the air` brakes before the engine is cut off. He also said that during his experience, engines have been uncoupled from cars left standing on the main track without any hand brakes being set and that he had never known of any cars moving on the grade at Millington, although he was aware that the rules required hand brakes to be applied under such conditions. Conductor Kurns stated that he was thoroughly familiar with the physical characteristics at Killington and that he had been in charge of this particular run on various occasions. Upon arriving at Killington he went into the station to get the waybill for the car that was to be picked up at that point and had just come out of the station when he noticed the cars collide with the side of the engine. He also noticed that the engine was moving in the same direction and at about the same speed as the cars, -4- ท which he estimated at 5 miles per hour. He said that it was not a practice to set hand brakes on cars at illington when the engine is only going to be away from them for a short period of time, but that he would see to it that the air brakes were applied or the cars blocked; while he usually cautioned his brakemen to block the cars, he did not do so on the day of the accident. Conclusions This accident was caused by failure to set the brakes on cars left standing on a grade, for which Rear Brakeman Finck is primarily at fault. Under special instructions contained in the time- table, it is provided that when necessary to leave a train or a portion of a train on a grade, air brakes must be applied, then hand brakes set tight and air brakes re- leased before engine is uncoupled. According to the state- ments of the two brakemen, one of them closed the angle cock on the head end of the leading cer and the other closed it on the rear of the tender, and then they both accompanied the engine as it prepared to enter the siding, without having set any hand brakes or definitely determin- ing that the air brakes were left applied, resulting in the cars starting ahead and colliding with the engine. Rear Brakeman Finck had taken charge of the movement, in- structing the head brakeman what to do, and therefore is primarily at fault for what took place. C W. P. BORLAND, Director. D The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident they had not been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, 1 ļ + Transportation Library не 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION PEPOPT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE YAZOO & MISSISSIPPI VALLEY RAILROAD AT WEBB, MISS., ON JULY 9, 1929 1537 November 5, 1929 To the Commission: On July 9, 1929, there was a head-end collision between two passenger trains on the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad at Webb, Miss., which resulted in the death of 1 employee, and the injury of 53 passengers, 2 mail clerks, 1 Pullman porter and 9 employees. Location and method of operation " the This accident occurred on the Tutwiler District of the Memphis Division, extending between Lambert and Swan Lake, Miss. a distance of 29.4 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signals being in use. Northbound trains are superior to trains of the same class in the opposite direction. There is a passing track at Webb 4,046 feet in length which parallels the main track on the east, south switch of which is located 197 feet north of the station. The accident occurred at a point 1,489 feet south of the north passing-track switch; approaching this point from the south the track is tangent for a distance of 5,000 feet, followed by a 2 curve to the left 1,175 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 125 feet from its southern end. Approaching from the north the track is tangent for a distance of 4,800 feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade is level at the point of accident. Owing to buildings and shrubbery, the view of the point of accident is restricted to approximately 400 feet. ว The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 12.40 p.m. Description Northbound passenger train No. 324 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car, two coaches and one Pullman sleeping car, hauled by engine 1009, and was in charge of Conductor Smith and Engineman Dorrak. The first car was of steel construction, the next two were of wood, and the last car had a steel under frame. At Swan Lake, 6 miles south of Webb, the crew received a copy of train order No. 42, Form 19, reading as follows: : - ; MyMa I I ””-“ 5 - • 3+ 1 7.3 miles Na Na Grad G ! 4046' 197! 6 miles 1489' -2- S Tutwiler North switch www.b Point of accident South switch Webb depot Swan Lake i No. 1537 Y.& M.V. R.R. Webb, Miss. July 9, 1929. -2- "No. 324 Eng 1009 meet No. 323 Eng 1011 at Webb" Webb is also the time-table meeting point of these two trains. Train No. 324 departed from Swan Lake at 12.24 p.m., on time, left the station at Webb at 12.37 p.m., proceeded on the main track toward the north switch, and collided with train No. 323 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 30 miles per hour. Southbound passenger train No. 323 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car and two coaches, hauled by engine 1011, and was in charge of Conductor Reeves and Engineman Todd. The first car was of steel construction, while the other two were of wood. At Tutwiler, 7.3 miles north of Webb and the last open office, the crew received a copy of train order No. 42, Form 19, reading as follows: "No 324 Eng 1009 meet No 323 Eng 1011 at Webb No 324 take siding at Webb Nos 32 and 324 had no signals through" Train No. 323 left Tutwiler at 12.25 p.m., on time, passed the north switch at Webb, and was approaching the station when it collided with train No. 324 while traveling at a speed estimated at from 20 to 30 miles per hour. The front ends of both engines were badly damaged, while their cabs were telescoped by the cis- terns, which rested against the boiler heads. The second car in train No. 324 was considerably damaged and the forward end of the third car was telescoped for a distance of about 15 feet. All of the cars in train No. 323 were slightly damaged. The employee killed was the flagman of train No. 324, who was riding in the vestibule at the head end of the third car. Summary of evidence Engineman Dorrali, of train No. 324, stated that upon the arrival of his train at Swan Lake he received two train orders, one of which was a slow order and the other a positive meet with train No. 323 at Webb, which latter order did not direct his train to take the siding at that point. When his train departed from Webb it continued on the main track and when it reached a point about one-half mile beyond the station, running at a speed of between 25 and 30 miles per hour, he observed a train approaching on the main track about 50 or 60 feet distant; he immediately applied the brakes in emergency and did not remember anything more until after -3- ༨ } the accident. The last time he saw his fireman prior to the accident the latter was engaged in putting in a fire and the engine man said that from his own position on the outside of the curve his view of the track ahead was much restricted. Fireman Callahan, of train No. 324, stated that he read the order received at Swan Lake, to meet train No. 323 at Webb, and as it contained no information for his train to take the siding it gave them the right to the main track at the meeting point. Due to having difficulty in keeping up the steam pressure, he started putting in a fire as soon as the engine passed over a highway crossing a short distance north of the station at Webb, and when he again looked ahead he saw the oppos- ing train only a short distance away; he did not have time to jump before the collision occurred. He thought the speed of his train ras about 25 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Conductor Smith, of train No.324, stated that the operator at Swan Lake handed him a slow order as well as a running order but made no remark concerning their con- tents. He read the meet order to the operator and then informed the train porter as to what it contained, after which he handed it to the flagman to read. While his train was standing at the station at Webb he went forward and when the agent entered the baggage car he remarked to him that the board was clear and inquired if there was a middle order to be delivered, to which the operator re- plied in the negative. As soon as the scheduled departing time of his train had arrived, the train proceeded and when it reached the south end of the curve beyond the station the brakes were applied in emergency, which was the last thing he remembered until some time after the accident. He estimated the speed of his train at the time the brakes were applied at 25 miles per hour. Gj Engineman Todd, of train No. 323, stated that he received the order at Tutwiler fixing the meet with train No. 324 at Webo and directing that train to take the sid- ing. While approaching Webb he eased off on the throttle in order to give train No. 324 sufficient time to enter the passing track and close the south switch. Just before his train entered the curve north of the station he observed smoke in the vicinity of the station, but at that time his view of the station was obscured by trees. As his train was rounding the curve he noticed the engine of train No. 323 pass a whistle post about one-fourth mile north of the station, at which time the two trains were approximate- ly 150 or 175 yards apart. This was his first intimation that the opposing train was on the main track and he immediately applied the brakes in emergency, sounded the , ~4~ whistle, and shouted to the fireman to jump, doing so himself just before the occurrence of the accident. He estimated the speed of his train at about 35 or 40 miles per hour when the brakes were applied, and thought it had been reduced to about 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Conductor Reeves, of train No. 323, stated that he expected his own train to proceed on the main track to the south switch at Webb, where the opposing train would get into clear, and his first indication of any- thing wrong was when the brakes were applied in emergency and the engine whistle sounded, the collision occurring a few seconds later. On account of the short interval be- tween the time the brakes were applied and the occurrence of the accident, he did not think the speed had been re- duced to any extent, and he estimated it to have been about 30 miles per hour. There was nothing of additional importance brought out by the statements of Flagman Leath and Train Forter Fleming, of train No. 323, as they were also un- aware of anything unusual until the brakes were applied just prior to the accident. Dispatcher McAlister, on duty at the time of the accident, stated that train order No. 42 was trans- mitted by telephone simultaneously to the operators at Swan Lake and Tutwiler, directing the two trains involved to meet at Webb and train No. 324 to take the siding, and at the time it was being sent he copied it in his train- order book. As soon as it had been transmitted he instructed the operator at Tutwiler to "add check" and the operator at Swan Lake to repeat. Both operators repeated the order and he underscored it in the train- order book as it was being repeated by each operator. He explained that his reason for instructing the operator at Tutwiler to add a register check was for the purpose of permitting the operator at Swan Lake to repeat the order immediately, and then he would author- ize the operator at Tutwiler to add to the latter's copy of the order a check on signals carried by trains Nos. 32 and 324, so that train No. 323 would not be de- layed in stopping to check train registers at some stations south of that point; this check was a regular occurrence. Instead of waiting, however, however, the operator at Tutwiler apparently went ahead and added the check on his own initiative while the operator at Swan Lake was repeating the order. The operator at Swan Lake was the first to repeat the order, doing so correctly, and Dis- patcher McAlister then gave him complete, at 12.19 p.m. The order then was repeated correctly by the operator at Tutwiler, who added to it the register check on trains Nos. 32 and 324, and the order was made complete to S J K -5- $ : Tutwiler at 12.20 p.m. When the operator at Webb in- formed Dispatcher McAlister that the accident had occurred on the main track he called the operators at Swan Lake and Tutwiler and inquired if their copies of train order No. 42 showed that train No. 324 was required to take the siding and was informed by the operator at Swan Lake that he had no such record while the operator at Tutwiler advised that his copy contained this informa- tion. He did not ask them to repeat the order at this time as he was positive that they had repeated it correct- ly at the time it was put out, else his train-order book would not have Shown this information. Dispatcher McAlister further stated that it is the usual practice to put out meet orders for all first-class trains at scheduled meet- ing points, the object being to insure that the inferior train reaches the meeting point, as well as providing an added safety precaution. As to the requirements of the rules that middle orders be put out when practicable, the dispatcher said he did not do so in this instance as the operator had gone to lunch at 11.30 a.m. and is allowed one hour for this purpose; he knew of no reason why the operator could not be released at some other time except that this period is the most convenient, and said that he probably would have had time to put out the middle order after the operator returned from lunch but had been instructed not to send an order the second time for the purpose of making it a middle order. Operator Bennett, on duty at Swan Lake, stated that he called the dispatcher and asked him to fix No. 324 and after the dispatcher called the operator at Tutwiler he transmitted train order No. 42. As soon as the dispatcher had finished that part of the order which fixed the meeting point at Webb, the dispatcher instruct- ed Operator Bennett to repeat and the operator at Tutwiler to add check. Operator Bennett did not hear the dispatcher say anything about train No. 324 taking the siding, neither did he hear the dispatcher tell the operator at Tutwiler what to add to the order, for as soon as he finished repeating it, which was exactly as it had been written by him, the dispatcher gave him "complete" and the time, which he understood was 12.18 p.m., and authorized the issuance of a clearance card, and he did not listen to any further conversation. Operator Bennett was aware that the rules required him to listen when other operators repeat train orders but did not do so in this case as train No. 324 was then approaching his station and he wanted to be in position to hand up the engineman's copy of the orders when the engine passed the station so that he would not have to walk to the engine, which he said usually stopped about two car-lengths north of the station door. He admitted that there probably would have been time for him to Magdal + -5- listen while the operator at Tutwiler repeated the order, and at the same time handle the mail and baggage, without delay- ing the train. Operator Bennett further stated that he did not write the order in advance, was not behind the dis- patcher in copying it, and did not recopy it afterwards, and having added the information that train No. 324 was to take siding unless the dispatcher furnished this in- formation after Operator Bennett had completed his order and left the office, as he was positive that he had written and repeated it just as it had been given to him. Vladi Operator Schilling, third-trick operator at Swan Lake, stated that he was standing within 2 or 3 feet of Operator Bennett at the time the latter copied train order No. 42 and paid close attention-to the order, and all he heard the operator repeat was the order requiring train No. 324 to meet No. 323 at Webb; he heard no mention made that train No. 324 was to take siding. Operator Schilling also said that Bennett then requested a clearance and filled out a clearance card, folded it with the orders, and delivered them to the train crew without waiting until Tutwiler repeated the order. Operator Schilling was certain that the order was repeated the same as it appeared on the office copy. Operator Stanfield, on duty at Tutwiler, stated that train order No. 42 was transmitted simultaneously to the operator at Swan Lake and himself, down to and in- cluding the words: "324 take siding at Webb." At that point the dispatcher requested the operator at Swan Lake to repeat and for him to add. He did not listen to the operator at Swan Lake repeat the order in its entirety but only that portion of it fixing the meeting point, as he was engaged in completing his own copy of the order by adding the register check on trains No. 32 and 324. The dispatcher had not instructed him to add this check, but he said it was the usual form and a daily occurrence except when those trains carried signals, and he thought it was the dispatcher's intention; he also went ahead with the check because of the fact that he was in a hurry' to complete the order so that he could repeat it as soon as Swan Lake finished and thus avoid delaying train No. 323 and also enable himself to sell tickets. Operator Stanfield did not remove the telephone receiver from his head while the operator at Swan Lake was repeating the order, but was so engrossed in adding the check that he failed to hear Coerator Bennett repeat that train No. 324 was to take siding; he later realized that this was the most important part of the order. Agent-Operator Walker, on duty at Webb, stated that the operators' schedule calls for one hour for lunch -7- between the hours of 11.30 a.m. and 2.00 p.m. On the day of the accident he received permission from the dis- patcher to 50 at about 11.40 a.m., and returned to his station at about 12.10 p.m. He was not called by the dispatcher to put out a middle order for trains Nos. 323 and 324, and said that the order is not put out every day and that sometimes two or three days elapse without his receiving it. He considers himself available for duty as soon as he returns, even though his lunch hour has not ex- pired; in fact, he had been called by the dispatcher to copy middle orders on several occasions after he had re- turned and before he had been off duty an hour. Conclusions This accident was caused by failure to include in a meet order as issued to the superior train a pro- vision requiring that train to take siding. There is considerable conflict in the testimony as to how much of the meet order was transmitted before the dispatcher requested the operator at Swan Lake to repeat and the operator at Tutwiler to add a register check. The operator at Swan Lake steadfastly maintained that he was told to repeat the order as soon as that part of the order naming the meeting point had been sent and he said he immediately repeated it just as it had been written, and received "complete" from the dispatcher at that time. His statements in this respect were upheld by Operator Schilling, who was off duty but was in the tele- graph office at Swan Lake at the time the order was re- ceived. On the other hand, Dispatcher licAlister was equally certain that he did not ask the operator at Swan Lake to repeat until that part of the order directing train No. 324 to take siding had been sent, and he was also certain that Operator Bennett repeated this part of the order, as indicated by his train-order book. The operator at Tutwiler corroborated the statements of the dispatcher, but the train-order book was not conclusive, for the reason that the portion of the order requiring train No. 324 to take siding was underscored three times while all other parts of the order were underscored twice; the reason for this variation could not be ascertained. In support of the dispatcher, however, it may be stated that it does not sound reasonable for Operator Bennett to suggest that the dispatcher added the words about train No. 324 taking siding, after the order had been made complete to Bennett. While the responsibility for the original error can not be definitely placed on any one person, the į -8- responsibility for failing to obey rules which would have detected the error can be very definitely placed. The rules provide that each operator receiving a train order should observe whether the others repeat it correctly. Both operators disobeyed this rule, being in too much of a hurry to attend to other duties, although they admitted that they had several minutes in which to have listened while the other repeated the order, and still perform their other duties without delaying their respective trains. There is a further provision in the rules which requires that train orders, when practicable, must include the operator at the meeting, or waiting point. This pro- vision of the rules was not observed by the dispatcher, although investigation did not develop anything to in- dicate the impracticability of including the operator at the meeting point, which would have given additional opportunity for the prevention of the accident. The dangers attending the operation of trains under the time-table and train-order system are well known, and it is for the purpose of guarding against these dangers that employees are required to compare and check with one another at every opportunity. The train order involved in this accident was not properly handled by the dispatcher, nor by either of the two operators concerned. Had the dispatcher sent a middle order the accident might still have occurred, but at least there would have been one more opportunity for detecting the error which had been made. As for the two operators, there can be no excuse for their failure to listen and make sure that the order was understood and copied alike by each. In train No. 323 there was a steel car followed by two wooden cars; these wooden cars were only slightly damaged. In train No. 324 there was a steel car followed by two wooden cars and then a steel-underframe sleeping car; the head end of the third car was telescoped by the rear end of the second car, and both of these cars were badly damaged, while no damage was sustained by the sleeping car. The flagman, who was fatally injured, was riding in the vestibule at the head end of the telescoped car. The danger of operating cars of wooden construction between cars of steel or steel-underframe construction is well recognized and has been mentioned in previous re- ports covering the investigation of accidents, and it is believed that steps should be taken by all the carriers to eliminate the practice of operating wooden cars in this manner at the earliest practicable date. -9- The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1 Transportation Library HE 1780 · A234 Section Foreman Humbert, in charge of the section involved, stated that work of stripping ties for ballast, spacing, filling in, tightening up, etc., was in progress at the time of the accident, but that his last work at this point had been performed during the last part of the previous month. During the morning about eight new ties had been placed prior to the arrival of train No. 84 these being scattered over a distance of 10 or 12 rail- lengths. He had not used jacks in putting these ties in place, simply pushing them in, spiking them, and finish- ing up as he went along Section Foreman Humbert further stated that the track was in good condition in this vicinity and that about one-fourth mile of it had been stripped for rock ballast, which stripped track he regarded as being safe for a speed of 60 miles per hour. No slow orders were in effect for this piece of track, nor had any such orders ever been put out covering this location to his knowledge. When he started to repair the track after the accident he found that the east rail had been carried down in the swamp with the cars, and that the ties, together with the west rail, had been pulled over to the right for a maximum distance of 6 inches. Section Fore- man Humbert was positive that the derailment was not due to track conditions, saying that two freight trains passed over the track that morning prior to train No. 84 and that he made a close inspection of the track after each train passed, but found nothing wrong. Section Foreman Sellers, in charge of the section north of the one involved, stated that he passed over the point of derailment at 7.30 a.m., but noticed nothing un- usual with track conditions. Section Foreman Humbert was spacing at the time, and had just started work of slipping ties into open gaps, but had no jacks set; this work ex- tended from mile post 18 to about the point where the accident occurred. Section Foreman Sellers assisted in repairing the track after the accident, and at that time noticed that the west rail, together with the ties, had been pulled toward the east, the distance at one point being 8 cr 10 inches. He was of the opinion that the accident was caused by something dragging, saying that at the point where the east rail had started to move out- ward there was a mark on an angle bar, and there were also some marks, more like surface scratches, on the gauge side of the ball of the rail south of this angle bar. The mark on the angle bar showed that it had been struck a sharp blow by something which, after contact, had run up and over it for a distance of 2 or 3 inches; he did not think this mark was made by a wheel. This angle bar was spiked down at the time of his examination, and beyond the angle bar the rail had started to bend outward. -5- Roadmaster Fowler said the section crew had been working in the vicinity of the point of accident renewing ties in the northbound track, but that he had sent them to Enfield about a week previously in order to work on a crossing at that point, with instructions to go back and resume the work of renewing ties as soon as the crossing work had been completed; the day of the accident marked the resumption of the work. The roadmaster said his instruc- tions to all section foremen were to place a 30-mile slow order on track being stripped for ballast and although he did not consider the track at the point of accident to be empty track, yet it was stripped enough so that he told the section foreman to put out a slow order when he resumed his work at the point in question. After the ac- cident, Roadmaster Fowler did not see where the section foreman had been working on the track, and on questioning the section foreman the latter said he had been putting in rail anchors and had not resumed the work of preparing the track for new ballast. Roadmaster Fowler estimated that prior to the accident about 8 rail-lengths of track had been opened up, but not to the bottoms of the ties; this would require about two cars of ballast, and it had been the roadmaster's intention to supply the ballast as soon as enough track had been opened up to accommodate three or four cars of ballast. Roadmaster Fowler further stated that after he saw the broken truck on the dining car he made no further examination to ascertain the cause of the accident, supposing that the truck was its cause. > Terminal Trainmaster Powell arrived at the scene of the accident about two hours after its occurrence. On examining the track he saw a mark on the inside angle bar of the east rail a short distance south of the last of the derailed cars; the east rail south of the angle bar was also marked, while north thereof the rail was turned over and there were flange marks on it, beginning about 4 feet from its southern end. This rail had started to turn over just north of the angle bar, and at its leaving end it was entirely overturned. The track south of the battered angle bar appeared to be in proper gauge, alignment and condition. Mr. Powell was of the opinion that a flaw in the outside of the middle pedestal on the east side of the south truck of the dining car caused the accident. Assistant Mechanical Engineer Lynch, in charge of rolling stock, made a thorough examination of the rear truck of the dining car at the scene of the accident; he saw a very slight flaw in the back flange of the pedestal, | -6- but was positive that this had nothing whatever to do with the accident, and he said the pedestals on the truck had become broken from running on the cross ties. He also noticed that there was very little ballast in this vicin- ity, the track having been stripped for a considerable distance preparatory to laying rock ballast. Many of the ties that he stepped upon would give under his weight and the tie-plates thereon were loose and rattled. It was his opinion that the dining-car truck did not cause the ac- cident. Testimony of various other witnesses developed nothing additional of importance. Northbound freight train extra 1641 passed over this section of the track about one and one-half hours prior to the occurrence of the accident, moving at a speed of about 30 miles per hour. Engineman Walters said that the section crew was working in the immediate vicinity, apparently putting in ties, and that he felt a rough spot in the track, which he attributed to the track repairs being made, and he was of the opinion that had the speed of his train been a little higher, the rough spot might have caused it to become derailed. There was some testimony to the effect that the derailment might have been caused by the breaking of the rear truck of the dining car, but apparently the truck broke on account of its having been dragged over the ties following the derailment. Examination of the pedestal castings by the Commission's engineer-physicist showed the presence of good metal, and the indications were that the truck broke as a result of the derailment. For a week or 10 days prior to the occurrence of the accident, the track had been stripped of its gravel ballast to within 2 inches of the bottoms of the ties. Many new ties had been laid, and the tie plates had not become seated in the ties, while in other cases there was a space between the top faces of the tie plates and the bottoms of the rails, the maximum space being five- sixteenths of an inch. Several of the new ties were spiked up to the rails and seemed to be hanging to them instead of resting on the ballast, moving easily when stepped upon, either at the ends or in the middle. A freight train was watched as it passed over the track and in one instance seven or eight consecutive ties were lifted out of their beds as the weight of the cars moved from one to another part of the rail. -7- Examination of the rails which had been torn out of the east side of the track, beginning at the angle bar at the approximate point of derailment, showed that the south end of this angle bar was badly battered as if from wheel flanges. The first rail to the north was marked on the edge of the running surface, on the gauge side, as if a wheel tread had run along on it, while beginning at a point 34 inches from its receiving end, the web of the rail on the gauge side showed flange marks, which continued all the way to the leaving end of the rail. This rail was slightly twisted and had a slight outward bend near its center and another similar bend about 2 feet from its leaving end. The south end of the angle bar connecting this rail with the second rail to the north was badly battered, and there were many marks on the gauge side of the web of the second rail for the entire length of the rail; a similar condition existed in the case of the third rail to the north. The angle bar at the south end of the fourth rail was badly battered on its bottom edge and there were marks indicating that a wheel had crossed over toward the gauge side of the rail; there were also flange marks on the web, gauge side, which ended 36 inches from the receiving end of the rail. The angle bars at the south ends of the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth rails were marked, but there were no flange marks on the webs of these rails; some of the succeeding rails also bore marks of various kinds. ditions. Conclusions This accident was caused by insecure track con- In stripping the ties for ballast it is probable that the material was removed toward the east, the indica- tions being that the material was disturbed under the east ends of the ties, and partially or completely removed, re- sulting in the ties being inadequately supported at their east ends, and continual thrusts at a weak point on this side of the track, which appear to have been noticed by various witnesses riding in different parts of the train, from the engine back toward the dining car, which was the first car to be derailed, finally caused the east rail to turn over. Roadmaster Fowler said he had instructed Sec- tion Foreman Humbert to place a slow order in effect before starting work again, but no such order had been issued. That a dangerous condition had developed on this MANU -8- k stripped track seems apparent from the statement of the engineman of a freight train which passed about one and one- half hours prior to the accident, to the effect that his train probably would have been derailed had it been moving at a higher rate of speed, and it is believed that a slow order should have been put out for the protection of this section of track. It does not appear that Roadmaster Fowler is en- tirely free from responsibility. After a portion of the track had been stripped he sent the section foreman to an- other point, where he was occupied for a week or more. The work thus being left unfinished, steps should have been taken to insure that no unsafe condition developed. Many trains moved over the track during the time the section foreman was working elsewhere, probably resulting in grad- ually weakening it until it reached the stage where it was noticed by the engineman of the freight train which preceded the derailed train. } The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of ser- vice law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, MAG Director. 's dns Transportadon Library не 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1539 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ERIE RAILROAD NEAR CORNING, N. Y., ON JULY 11, 1929. October 21, 1929 To the Commission; On July 11, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train, the wreckage of which was struck by a passenger train, on the Erie Railroad near Corning, N. Y., which resulted in the death of 2 employees, 2 mail clerks, and 2 trespassers, and the injury of 51 passengers, 9 employees, one of whom was deadheading, 3 Pullman employees, and 2 express messengers. This investigation was made in conjunction with a representative of the Public Service Commission of New York. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Susquehanna Division extending between Hornell, N. Y., and Susquehanna, Pa., a distance of 139.7 miles. This is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and an automatic block-signal and train-control system. The point of accident is approximately 2 miles east of the station at Corning. There is a siding located between the eastbound and westbound main tracks which ex- tends from a point 2,549 feet east of the point of accident to a point 2,986 feet west thereof. Approaching from the east the track is tangent for a distance of 3,100 feet, followed by a compound curve to the right 4,957 feet in length with a maximum curvature of 1° 54' the accident occurring on this curve at a point 2,343 feet from its eastern end. Approaching from the west the track is tangent for a distance of 3,100 feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade for west- bound trains is 0.142 per cent ascending at the point of accident. The track is laid with 100-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with 18 ties to the rail-length, tie-plated, single-spiked, and ballasted with crushed stone to a depth of 10 inches. The general maintenance was good. The weather was slightly hazy at the time of the accident, which occurred at 12.43 a.m. 1 03 2 Description Westbound freight train extra 3352, running as train second No. 91, consisted of 128 cars and 2 cabooses, heuled by engine 3352, and was in charge of Conductor Green and Engineman Balmer. This train passed Cheung Junction, 13.4 miles east of Corning at 12.25 a. m., ac- cording to the train sheet, and was approaching Corning when it was derailed by a broken rail while traveling at 2 speed estimated to have been between 35 and 40 miles per hour. Eastbound passenger train No. 6 consisted of one express car, one mail car, one baggage cer, one coach, one dining car, four Pullman cars and one coach, in the order named, hauled by engine 2917, and was in charge of Con- ductor Kinne and Engineman Blake. The cars were of all- steel construction with the exception of the first and fifth cars, which were of steel-underframe construction. This train departed from Corning at 12.39 a. m., two minutes late, and collided with the wreckage of extra 3352 which had fouled the eastbound track while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 45 and 43 miles per hour. The first, second, sixth and eighth cars of extra 3352 were derailed, the first car coming to rest about 1,600 feet from the initial point of derailment; the ninth to the thirty-third cars, inclusive, five of which contained gasoline, were badly damaged or burned up. The twenty-fourth car, which was one of the cars contain- ing gasoline, fouled the eastbound main track, while three cars in the rear of the train buckled and fouled both tracks. Engine 2917 collided with the derailed twenty- fourth car of the freight train and came to rest on the passing track parallel with the main tracks; the first four cars in train No. 6 were badly damaged and immediate- ly caught fire from the wrecked cars loaded with gasoline in extra 3352. The front truck of the fifth car was also derailed and the front end of the car burned; the remain- ing equipment in train No. 6 was not derailed. The employees killed were the engineman and fireman of train No. 6, and those injured were the baggageman and six dining car employees of train No. 6 and the conductor of extra 3352. Summary of evidence Engineman Belmer, of extra 3352, stated that when he first saw train No. 6 approaching at a distance of about 30 car-lengths he got off of his seat and dimmed the headlight. He then looked out and at about that time he heard a tank wheel jump up, saw fire flying in streaks F 3 1 along the train, and called to the brakeman, "We are piling; plug No. 6." It was then passing them, however, and he next heard an explosion and saw that the train had separated. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident to have been about 35 miles per hour. Fireman DeLap, of extra 3352, stated that he was sitting on the seat box at the time of the accident and his first indication of anything wrong was a light surge; he looked back and saw fire flying. The brakeman called for a fusee but Fireman DeLap was unable to get it out of his seat box before train No. 6 had passed them. It was his opinion, however, that even if the flagging equipment had been instantly available it would have been impossible to have warned train No. 6. Head Brakeman Peters, who was riding on the left side of engine 3352, stated that he felt a surge and the engine began slowing up, and on looking out he saw fire flying from the head car. After obtaining a fusee and light he got off immediately to flag train No. 6, but it was then going by. Conductor Green, of extra 3352, stated that he was riding in the caboose when he felt the air brakes apply in emergency just as the accident occurred. He, started toward the head end of the train and when he was about 15 cars from the caboose he found three cars de- railed and blocking the eastbound main track. He in- structed Brakeman Duygan who was with him to go ahead and protect the eastbound track. He himself opened the switch to throw signal in the eastbound track and went to a phone nearby but could get no communication, and then proceeded to the head end of the train. Brakeman DeWitt went to the rear of his train to flag and Brakeman Duygan went toward the head end, and did not learn that train No. 6 had collided with the wreckage until he arrived at the scene of the wreckage. Conductor Kinne, of train No. 6, stated that he was sitting in the rear seat of the coach, the fourth car from the engine, and had no warning whatever before the crash. He estimated the speed of their train at the time of the accident to have been about 45 miles per hour. He also stated that the brakes had not been applied prior to the accident. Head Brakeman Roach, who was riding in the fourth car, Baggageman Chase, who was riding in the third car, and Flagman Bennett, who was in the rear car, also stated that they felt no application of the air brakes prior to the accident. · 4 Track Supervisor Ruby, who had supervision of the sub-division on which this accident occurred, stated that the accident was caused by a broken rail. He had been over the track on the day previous to the occurrence of the accident and had noticed nothing wrong. He stated that they had found split-head rails at different locations on that division and that such rails had been removed immediately. He further stated that the rails in that vicinity were worn to the extent that they were to have been removed and replaced with new ones as soon as they could be reached on the program which had been mapped out. It was his opinion that the defective rail, involving a hidden defect, could not have been detected by an ordinary track inspection. Track Foreman Reynolds stated that the rail at the point of derailment was classed as first-class relay- ing rail when laid in 1927. About five weeks prior to the occurrence of the accident he did some resurfacing and fixed up the joints, and also took the gauge and elevation in that vicinity. It was his opinion that the accident was caused by a broken rail, saying that it was a piped rail. Track Walker Moore made an inspection of the track in the vicinity of the point of accident on the day previous to the occurrence of the accident and noticed nothing wrong. Subsequent to the accident he saw the broken rail and he also was of the opinion that its de- fective condition could not have been discovered by ordinary inspection. An inspection of the engine and cars of extra 3352 disclosed no defects which could have caused the accident. The investigation indicated that this accident was caused by a broken rail. An examination of this rail was made by Mr. James E. Howard, engineer-physicist, whose remarks immediately follow: Report of the Engineer-Physicist The accident near Corning, N. Y., July 11, 1929, was due apparently to a split head rail, the low rail of a 15 54 curve The rail wes branded "Lackawanna 10031 8 1917 100# ARA-A OH". Heat number 15970, ingot letter B or D. It was fractured 24 feet 11 inches from its receiving end, then followed by a gap of 5 feet 9 inches, representing fragments which were not accounted for, followed by a fragment 28 inches long which repres- ented the leaving end of the rail, aggregating 33 feet in all. I -,5 1 The The leaving end of the long fragment displayed a split head fracture, while the receiving end of the short fragment also displayed a split head fracture. fracture in the short fragment was probed to a depth of 16 inches. In the long fragment the fracture under the head was visible for a length of 2 feet 7 inches. The rail was sawed apart a few inches beyond, the split head fracture still being in evidence. No doubt the fragments representing the 5 feet 9 inches gap contained split head fractures over their entire lengths. The estimated aggregated length of the split head fracture at the time of the accident was not less than ten feet.. Two feet and 7 inches of the leaving end of the long fragment displayed a fracture under the split head, separating it from the web. The surface of the fracture was worn and battered, indicating that it existed prior to the time of the accident. The split head fracture originating a short distance below the running surface of the head, had extended downward through the depth of the head, bifurcated and reached the surface at the fillets of the web, and thus completely separated the head from the web. This no doubt represented the condition of the rail when the train which was derailed entered upon it. The split head fracture had reached the surface at the fillet of the web of the 28-inch fragment; leading to the belief that over a considerable part or the whole of the length of ten feet the fracture had been in sight prior to the accident. The fractured surface separating the head from the web was thus described in the transcript of evidence furnished by the railroad: "The head of the rail was broken away from the base and web in a fresh longitudinal fracture along the base of the ball where same joins the web." The worn and battered condition of this fracture appears to have been interpreted as a fresh fracture where- as its characteristics denoted a fracture of comparatively long standing. The dimensions of the split head fracture, as exhibited a few inches beyond the receiving end of the 28- inch fragment, were in width, at the top, two-tenths of an inch, and having a depth of one and four-tenths of an inch. These fractures are widest at the top tapering to zero at the bottom. They originate at the top and as they extend are necessarily of zero width at the bottom. Grap 34.9" о ****+ my son ← Leaving Brd. 23″ long head split, 15" $76. **** 0 ····· @*^{} ← 24 feet llinc/lies from receiving end. Old fracture, battered Surface, Separating head from web. 21½ feet Total length of Split lecid, estimated over 10 feet. " ← • '•*• 1 ་་ Splithead extended beyond here. کی ف Gulp thi • -8- Fragments not recovered. .. Gauge side -17- Shearing fracture : Origin of split head From long fragment A -8- Gauge side Fracture visible under head Origin of split head Pedagog From short fragment. ! 1 *... The longitudinal fracture of this rail began about a quarter of an inch below the running surface, but from its point of inception oblique shearing fractures formed which passed upward. About fifteen-hundredths of an inch of unfractured metal remained above the shearing fractures. The metal immediately below the running surface of a rail shows flattening of the grain of the steel, due to the lateral flow of the metal under the wheel pressures. When this lateral flow of metal en- counters a longitudinal streak or acicular seam in the upper part of the head an opportunity is presented for the inception of a split head fracture. A distinction will be made between a split head fracture and a piped rail. They result from different causes, independent of each other. Split head fractures result from acicular seams which are located near the peripheral surface of the cross section of the rail, in its head and base, In certain parts of the cross section the seams appear as short dashes, under the varying in- fluence of the rolls during fabrication. Little attention is called to the seams or streaks in those parts of the rail which are not subjected to a lateral flow of metal under service conditions. The seams in the upper part of the head as stated afford op- portunity for the display of split head fractures. Piped rails have structural planes of weakness in the upper part of the web and lower part of the head. They result from a pipe, a shrinkage cavity in the upper part of the ingot. There is no pipe in the lower part of the ingot, consequently no piped rails come from that part of the ingot. Split head rails, on the other hand, may come from any part of the ingot, since slag inclusions have been found in the lower as well as in the upper parts of the ingot. A piped rail is not necessarily a weak rail. The web, being exposed chiefly to vertical compressive stresses. possesses sufficient strength to sustain the wheel loads. The intense impinging pressures at the running surface are distributed when they reach the web and lower part of the head; diminished to unit stresses which the metal of the rail has the ability to successfully endure. It is desirable to use a terminology in the description of fractures which correctly describes them, the loose use of inapplicable terms retards instead of promotes progress in the elminiation of remediable causes in rail fractures. Calling a fractured rail a piped rail is generally a misnomer. I : • ! ī : : : -ཏི་ 3 : -13 Conclusions No doubt attaches to the cause of the present accident, that it was due to the presence of a split head rail. Furthermore that the fractured head, prior to the accident, was of unusual extent, believed to have covered a length of rail not less than ten feet. Since fractures of this kind are discoverable when displayed to the extent witnessed in this rail, and also of very much less degree, the contention that the fracture was not discoverable prior to the accident is not supported by the evidence presented. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. +4.. Transporta Library HE 1780 A234 -1- INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1540 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY AT HARVEY, W. VA., ON JULY 11, 1929. November 6, 1929. To the Commission: On July 11, 1929, there was a side collision be- tween two freight trains on the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway at Harvey, W.Va., resulting in the injury of three employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Loup Creek Sub- division of the Hinton Division, extending between Price Hill and Thurmond, W. Va., a distance of 12.5 miles; this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders. The accident occurred on what is known as the lower crossover at Harvey, at the fouling point of this crossover with the passing siding; approach- ing the crossover from the east there is a series of short curves and tangents, followed by a compound curve to the left 1,865 feet in length, the maximum curvature of which is 14°, and the accident occurred on this curve at a point about 625 feet from its eastern end, where the curvature is 3. The grade is 1.30 per cent descending for westbound trains at the point of accident. P The passing siding is about 3,000 feet in length and parallels the main track on the south; the lower cross- over is about 200 feet in length and the east switch there- of is located about 675 feet west of the east switch of the passing siding. There is another crossover, known as the upper crossover, which connects the main track and passing siding at the east switch of the passing siding, the siding continuing east of the upper crossover. The east switch of the lower crossover, the switch involved in this accident, is a facing-point switch for westbound trains and leads off the main track to the left. The switch-stand is located on the north side of the main track, on the outside of the curve, and is equipped with a switch lamp mounted above the targets; the centers of the lenses are 8 feet 2 inches above the top of the rail. Night indications are red when the switch is open, and green when it is closed. The switch lamp was not burning, however, at the time of the accident. Owing to a mountainside on the inside of the curve, with outcroppings of rock, the view is materially restricted. A H West Time-table directions East { N East switch passing siding. 70 15! -2- Point of accident Lower crossover 140 0° 451 • : + · XS 6801 Upper crossover $ $ Store !!!!! No. 1540 Chesapeake & Ohio. Harvey, W. Va. July 11, 1929. $ -3- The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 10.55 p.m. Description Westbound freight train extra 1035-836 consisted, on its arrival at Harvey, of 26 cars and a caboose, hauled by engines 1035 and 836, and was in charge of Conductor Holliday and Enginemen Hatcher and Clark. It was brought to a stop on the main track east of the east switch of the passing siding, in the vicinity of the upper crossover, and the engines were then cut off and proceeded westward on the main track to the lower crossover, headed through it, and then backed eastward on the passing siding and performed switching, without closing the main line switch of this crossover. The engines then backed some cars eastward through the upper crossover and against the train standing on the main track, after which the entire train was pulled ahead, westward, through the upper crossover and brought to a stop on the passing siding with the rear end of the caboose just east of the frog of the west switch of the lower cross- over. After standing at this point about 12 minutes the rear end of the train was struck by extra 1347. Westbound freight train extra 1347 consisted of 31 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1347, and was in This train charge of Conductor Ashley and Engineman Arthur. left White Oak Junction, 2 miles east of Harvey, at 10.45 p.m., according to the train sheet, and on reaching Harvey encountered the open main-track switch of the lower cross- over and struck the side of extra 1035-836 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 6 and 9 miles per hour. The caboose and two rear cars of extra 1035-836 were derailed and either partly or completely overturned. Engine 1347, together with its tender, was derailed, but remained upright; the left side of the engine was badly damaged. No other equipment in either train was derailed or damaged. The employees injured were the engineman and fireman of extra 1347, and the middle brakeman of extra 1035-836. Sumary of evidence Head Brakeman Anderson, of extra 1035-836, stated that on arrival at Harvey, he cut off the engines and lined the lower crossover switches, the engines proceeding through that crossover to the passing siding. After the switching had been completed and the train started to pull in at the upper crossover, Head Brakeman Anderson got on about five or -4- six car-lengths back of the engines and on reaching a point about opposite the open lower crossover switch, he dropped off, went over, and closed and locked that switch. He said that he did not pull on the chain to test the lock, as the lock snapped, but claimed that he did observe by means of his lighted lantern that the switch points fitted properly. After walking back to the telephone booth, located 95 feet east of the switch and on the north side of the tracks, and standing there with Conductor Holliday until the train had come to a stop on the passing siding, Head Brakeman Anderson proceeded to the head end of the train, walking between the passing siding and the main track, and on his arrival there Engineman Hatcher inquired of him as to whether the lower crossover main-line switch had been closed. After telling the engineman that it was closed, the head brakeman asked the engineman why he had inquired about it and the engine- man replied that he had not seen a light on the stand. Head Brakeman Anderson examined the switch after the accident and at that time the switch was open and the switch lock was hanging in the hasp, unlocked. Head Brakeman Anderson further stated that he had found the switch lamp out on a number of prior occasions, although he had never made a report of this condition, and that had he complied with the rules on this particular occasion, and lighted the switch lamp, the accident probably would not have occurred. Conductor Holliday, of extra 1035-836, stated that he saw Head Brakeman Anderson throw the lower cross- over switch, it having remained open about 30 minutes from the time it was last used, and that as was customary, in order to make sure, he asked the head brakeman, when the latter came to the telephone booth, whether the switch had been closed, and the head brakeman told him that it was. After being advised that all switches were closed, the con- ductor telephoned the dispatcher and reported extra 1035-836 in the clear, and then sat down at the desk in the telephone booth and began doing some work, the accident occurring shortly afterwards. Conductor Holliday further stated that the switch lamp was not lighted and that he had never known of it to be lighted; he only made report of extinguished switch lights when he knew it was the regular practice for such lamps to be kept lighted. Conductor Holliday could not account for the switch being open, although he thought it possible that some one either threw the switch and then Head Brakeman Anderson threw it back to the wrong position, or else that the head brakeman threw the switch twice. Conductor Holliday said that there was ample time at his disposal to have examined the switch prior to the accident and that he would have done so had there been any doubt at all in his mind that it was open; in his opinion the acci- dent would not have occurred had the switch lamp been burn- ing properly. ? -5- Engineman Hatcher, of engine 1035, the lead engine, stated that after his engine had passed by the switch about two car-lengths, at the time the entire train was heading in at the upper crossover in order to let extra 1347 pass them, he looked back to see if the switch had been closed, but the switch lamp was not lighted and he could not see the switch points. Therefore, at the time Head Brakeman Anderson came up to the engines after the train had been brought to a stop on the passing siding, inquired of the head brake- e man whether the switch had been closed and was informed that it had been. Engineman Clark, of engine 836, the helper engine, stated that his attention was occupied in the movements being made and that he did not notice the switch at any time. Flagman Johnson said that the upper crossover main-track switch lamp was not burning either, while the statements of the other members of the crew of this train brought out no additional facts of importance. Engineman Arthur, of extra 1347, stated that he permitted Fireman Webb, a promoted man, to operate the engine from White Oak Junction, and that he informed the fireman extra 1035-836 was at Harvey. at Harvey. Engineman Arthur estimated the speed of his train to have been about 8 miles per hour approaching Harvey and said that the headlight was burning properly; he was riding on the fireman's side of the cab, on the inside of the curve, and saw the yellow markers on the caboose of extra 1035-836. Engineman Arthur said that he was watching for the switch points and when about one car-length away he observed that the switch lamp was not burning and that the switch was open; he called a warn- ing of danger to the fireman, who immediately applied the air brakes in emergency, reversed the engine and opened the sanders, but too late to avert the collision. count of his injuries, Fireman Webb was not interrogated at length, however, statements made by him were similar to those of Engineman Arthur. Statements of other members of this crew developed nothing further, except that later on it was found that the switch lock had disappeared; one witness who had examined it prior to its disappearance thought it had been tampered with. On ac- Section Foreman Furry did not remember when he last made a detailed inspection of the switch lamp involved. He had instructed the track walker to fill, clean and oil the switch lamps at Harvey every week, all of them being eight-day lamps, and to blow out the lights every morning on the six switch lamps west of the store, which is located north of the tracks and between the switches of the lower crossover, and to relight them every evening. Section Fore- -6- man Furry said that he made no examination of the switch lamp following the accident to determine whether there was any oil in the cup, but said that the lamps at Harvey were due to receive the regular oiling and cleaning on the morning following the accident. There was no lock on the switch when he reached the scene, about two hours after the occur- rence of the accident. Track Walker Stevens stated that the switch lamp was burning on the day prior to the accident; he passed the switch on the day the accident occurred, but did not notice whether the lamp was burning. The lamp was out on the morning following the accident, although there was oil in the cup, enough to last the rest of the day. The lamp was a new one and the wick was down in the oil; the lenses were smoked slightly, but not enough to keep the light from being seen had the switch lamp been burning. Conclusions This accident was caused by an open switch. Rules 27-A and 104-A of the book of rules for the government of the operating department of this railroad, read in part as follows: #27 (a). Conductors and enginemen using a switch where the stitch light is imperfectly displayed or absent, must, if practicable, cor- rect or replace the light. Garag A Imperfectly displayed signals must be reported to the Superintendent." "104 (a). Switches must be left in proper position after having been used. Conductors are responsible for the position of the switches used by them and their trainmen ***." Examination of the switch immediately after the occurrence of the accident indicated that it had been left open; the switch lock was hanging in the hasp, unlocked, and the switch lamp was not burning. Head Brakeman Anderson emphatically maintained that he closed and locked the switch, although he did not pull on the chain to test the lock, while Conductor Holliday said that he saw the head brakeman throw the switch; in this connection, however, the conductor thought it possible that some one either threw the switch and then the head brakeman threw it back to the wrong position, -7- ( or that the head brakeman threw the switch twice. Neither of them paid any attention to the extinguished switch lamp. Several members of the crew were close to the switch after it was handled by the head brakeman, and it would have been practically impossible for any one to have tampered with the switch without having been noticed, neither is it believed that the disappearance of the switch lock after the accident had any bearing other than as an attempt to create the im- pression that the open switch was due to malicious tampering. The rules previously quoted were sufficient for the purpose, and their observance upon the part of Head Brakeman Anderson and Conductor Holliday would have prevented this accident. It further appeared that it was customary to ignore unlighted switch lamps in the vicinity of Harvey, and on this particular occasion both the upper and the lower crossover main track switch lamps were extinguished. It is more than probable that had the lower crossover switch lamp been burn- ing properly, some one would have noticed the open switch in time to have averted the accident. Immediate steps should be taken by the officials to see to it that main line switch lamps are given proper attention, both by those charged with their maintenance and by those who handle them in con- nection with switching and other train movements. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND Stag Director. } Iransportation J Library HE 1780 A234 1541 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED OF THE CENTRAL RAILROAD OF NEW JERSEY, AT LANOKA HARBOR, N.J., ON JULY 13, 1929. To the Commission: November 7, 1929 On July 13, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a freight train and a work train on the Central Railroad of New Jersey at Lanoka Harbor, N.J., which resulted in the death of two employees and the injury of four laborers. This investigation was made in conjunction with a re- presentative of the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners. Location and method of operation. This accident occured on the Tom's River and Barnegat Branch of the New Jersey Southern Divi- sion, which extends btnLakehurst and Barnegat, N. J., a distance of 22.2 miles, and is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time- table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The point of accident was 643 feet east of the station at Lanoka Harbor; approaching this point from the east the track is tangent for a distance of 1,128 feet, followed by a 2° 06' curve to the right 1,071 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 393 feet from its eastern end. Ap- proaching from the west the track is tangent for a distance of 1,818 feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade is slightly descend- ing for trains moving in either direction toward the point of accident, and is practically level at the point of accident. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 1.45 p.m. ¿ • -2- Description Westbound freight train extra 433 consisted of two cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 433, and wes in charge of Conductor Creby and Engineman White. The crew of this train held train order No. 17, Form 19, received at Lakehurst, reading: "Engine 433 run extra Lakehurst to Barnegat. Engine 181 works extra 7.55 a.m. until 4.55 p.m. between Lakehurst and Barnegat." After performing station work at Tom's River, 6.1 miles east of Lanoka Harbor, extra 433 departed from that point at 1.30 p.m. It was approaching Lanoka Harbor when the work extra was seen to be approaching, and had been brought to a stop before the collision occurred. Work extra 181 consisted of 11 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 181, of the double-cab type, and was in charge of Conductor Hyer and Engineman Miller. This train held train order No. 9, Form 19, received at Lakehurst, reading: "Engine 181 works extra 7.55 a.m. until 4.55 p.m. between Lakehurst and Barnegat." After performing work at Waretown, 5.7 miles west of Lanoka Harbor, extra 181 departed eastbound at 1.30 p.m., without any flag protection, and collided with extra 433 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 25 to 35 miles per hour. The impact of the collision moved extra 433 backwards a distance of 315 feet and the caboose a greater distance, as it became uncoupled from the train. Both engines were derailed but remained upright, with their front ends badly damaged and their frames broken. The employees killed were the engineman and head brakeman of extra 181; those injured were laborers on the work train. Summary of Evidence Fireman Yates, of work extra 181, stated that at Waretown the engineman expressed a desire to eat his lunch and they exchanged places and he took charge of the engine, the engineman going back in the tender to eat. They departed from Waretown at about 1.30 p.m. -3- ▼ AB and in the vicinity of Forked River, 2.2 miles west of Lanoka Harbor, he received a signal from the rear of his train to slow down. He slowed down and came prac- tically to a stop at the station at Forked River and then received a signal to go ahead from some one at the station, as well as one from the rear of his train. Not finding the local freight at Forked River he did not expect to meet it until he reached Tom's River, but on approaching Lanoka Harbor he shut off steam and allowed the train to drift, thinking that the local freight might be at Lanoka Harbor, and he then saw it approach- ing around the curve about 10 car-lengths distant; he immediately applied the air brakes in emergency and braced himself for the collision. Fireman Yates stated that he had no conversation whatever with the engineman at Waretown as to the movement to be made or how the train should be operated, and he did not see him after they left Forked River; the engineman was in the tender firing at the time of the accident. Fireman Yates said he thoroughly understood from the train order that they were to work between Lakehurst and Barnegat, and should protect their movements at all times, standing or moving, although he stated that the flagman was not on the engine at the time of the collision and that his train had no protection against opposing extra trains, except as he could see that the track ahead was clear. He also said that he thought he had 37 minutes in which to reach Tom's River, 11.8 miles from Waretown, before train No. 4209 departed at 2.12 p.m., and did not think that the local freight would leave ahead of train No. 4209. There was no siding long enough to take care of the number of cars in his train and it would have been necessary to back up to Barnegat if they could not reach Tom's River. He was unable to estimate the speed of his train at the time of the collision, but he was positive that at no time did he exceed the speed of 25 miles per hour per- mitted for the class of train he was operating. Fire- man Yates, who had been on the work train about three weeks and was not a qualified engineman, stated that he knew the engineman well, but had never worked with him before. Conductor Hyer, of extra 181, who had been on the work train nearly all the time for the past two years, stated that before leaving Waretown the engineman asked him if it had been the custom to let the fireman run the engine and he told the engineman that when working, picking up rail, etc., the fireman could relieve him under his supervision, but that he was to operate his own engine upon leaving Waretown. Conductor Hyer also told Head Brakeman Walling to ride on the engine where he belonged. Conductor Hyer was th - 4- He re- working on his reports in the caboose after leaving Waretown, and as they approached the curve at Forked River he noticed the train was traveling fast and went out on the rear platform of the caboose, where he saw that the rear brakeman was giving a hand signal to slow down; the train then ran very carefully. sumed his work on the reports and later noticed they were traveling at a high rate of speed and again went to the rear platform and asked the brakeman if they were near what he called "Lanoka Curve" and if he could see anything of the extra. He then looked ahead himself and on seeing the freight train on the curve he attempt- ed to apply the brakes from the back-up hose on the rear of the caboose, but found there was no air in the hose; the brakeman then ran in the caboose and opened the conductor's valve, the accident occurring shortly afterwards. Conductor Hyer estimated the distance between the two trains to have been about 460 feet when he first saw the approaching train, and he estimated the speed of his own train at the time of the accident to have been about 25 miles per hour, with no ap- plication of the brakes except that which was made from the caboose. Conductor Hyer further stated that no trouble had been experienced with the air brakes, and while a regular test had not been made before leaving Waretown, there was air throughout the train. It appeared, however, that a small car used by the section men, referred to as a grampus car had been chained to the caboose when west of Ware- town, and fearing that the car might run under and burst the hose, the angle-cock on the back-up hose had been closed. This grampus car was then placed in a tool car at Waretown, but the angle-cock in the back- up hose was allowed to remain closed. It also appear- ed from Conductor Hyer's statements that he presumed the head brakeman was on the engine, but after the accident he discovered that he had been on the seventh car from the engine at the time of the accident. The statements of Rear Brakeman Penn, of extra 181, substantiated those of Conductor Hyer as to the operation of their train from Waretown to the point of accident, and he also said that when he pulled the conductor's brake valve he noticed that the gauge registered a pressure of 70 pounds. He verified the conductor's statements about instructing Brakeman Walling to ride on the engine, and said he also heard the conductor instruct the brakeman to tell Engineman Miller to run his own engine. * ŕ - 5- Engineman Miller, of extra 181, was found in the tender, badly injured, and later died without mak- ing any statement. B Engineman White, of extra 433, stated that he received train order No. 17, previously mentioned, which gave him right to the track without protection, but re- quired him to look out for the work extra's flag. He proceeded in a cautious manner and as he neared Lanoka Harbor he shut off steam and was drifting at a speed of about 15 or 18 miles per hour when he saw the work train approaching, and he said he immediately applied the air brakes in emergency and sounded a warning whistle for the crew of his train to get off. His train came to a stop before the collision occurred and he had hoped to get the engine in reverse, but the opposing train closed in too quickly and he jumped off when it was about 50 feet distant. He thought that when he first saw the work train it was about 50 car-lengths distant and he judged its speed to have been about 35 miles per hour. Engineman White further stated that on every day that they had met the work train during the past six weeks he had always found it protected, until the day of the accident. Fireman Irons, of extra 433, stated that at Pinewald, 2.3 miles east of Lanoka Harbor, he got off of the engine and went back to the caboose for a drink of water, and he was riding in the caboose approaching the point of accident when he felt the air brakes applied in emergency and heard the engine whistle blow- ing; he looked ahead, saw the work extra and then jumped off. He stated that his train had stopped when the collision occurred and he estimated the speed of the work train to have been about 30 or 35 miles per hour. Conductor Creby, of extra 433, stated that as they were rounding the curve just east of Lanoka Harbor he felt the air brakes applied in emergency and heard the engine whistle, and on looking out he saw the work train approaching. His train stopped and everyone on it got off before the collision occurred. He saw that the work train was traveling at such a rate of speed that it could not possibly stop before it collided with his own train. The statements of Brakemen Husted and Van and Flagman Stout, of extra 433, practically substantiated those of Conductor Creby. Brakeman Van added that when he first saw the approaching train it was about 40 or 50 car-lengths distant. { ? ་ -6- Tests were conducted in the vicinity of the point of accident with the same type of engine as engine 181, and it was found that a man standing at the extreme eastern end of the curve could be seen when an eastbound engine was 1000 feet distant, by looking through the right front cab window; when resting one arm on the side window rest and looking out of this side window, the range of vision was ex- tended to 1,500 feet. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of the crew of work extra 181 to provide proper protection for its movement against an opposing train. The evidence clearly indicates that work extra 181 was being operated by Fireman Yates, acting as engineman, at a high rate of speed and without pro- tection; on one occasion the flagman gave a hand signal from the rear to reduce the speed of the train, yet with- in a few miles it was again moving at excessive speed. Conductor Hyer should not have allowed the train to attain a high rate of speed a second time, when it was too late to avert the accident, but should have brought his train to a stop and ascertained the reason for such operation, in view of the fact that their only protection was the distance ahead which could be seen to be clear. Fireman Yates seems to have had no real expec- tation of meeting the local freight until his own train arrived at Tom's River, and was operating it at a speed at least equal to the maximum allowable speed for a train of this class, instead of proceeding prepared to stop within half his range of vision, which was all he had a right to do in the absence of flag protection. He was not a qualified engineman and this was the first time that he had worked with Engineman Miller, yet Engineman Miller permitted him to operate the train and made no attempt to supervise him in any way, and ac- cording to the fireman there was no conversation as to what trains were to be met or what protection should be afforded. Engine 181 was of the double-cab type, Engineman Miller being in the second cab, and Fireman Yates stated that he saw him at Forked River when he received a signal from the rear to reduce speed, yet Engineman Miller seemed unaware of the dangerous manner in which his train was being handled. On approaching ! ין 1 A -7- Lanoka Harbor, had he looked out while rounding the curve, he could have seen the track ahead for a distance of more than 2,000 feet and could have brought his train to a stop by means of the emergency valve which was with- in easy reach. Why Engineman Miller either did not operate his own engine as instructed by Conductor Hyer, or make an attempt to supervise its operation, is un- known, as he was killed as a result of the accident. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. : Respectfully submitted, W.P. BORLAND, Director. 1 • 1 Transporta Library не 1780 4234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1542 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY NEAR PRINCETON, WIS., ON JULY 15, 1929. To the Commission: November 11, 1929 On July 15, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Chicago & North Western Railway near Princeton, Wis., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of nine passengers, three employees and one mail clerk. The investigation of this accident was made in conjunction with a repre- sentative of the Railroad Commission of the State of Wisconsin. Location and method of operation. This accident occurred on Sub-division 4 of the Lake Shore Division, which extends between Tower PR, near Fond du Lac, and Marshfield, Wis., a distance of 121 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The derailment occurred at a point approximately 4 miles west of Princeton, where a state highway crosses the track at an angle of about 20°. track runs north and south according to compass direction, but east and west, respectively, accord- ing to time-table direction, the latter direction being used in this report. Approaching from the west there is a 1930 curve to the right 1,343.3 feet in length, followed by tangent track for a distance of 3,310.1 feet, the accident occurring on the tangent track at a point 1,226.1 feet from its eastern end. The grade is slightly descending for eastbound trains, being 0.44 per cent at the point of accident. The track is laid with 72-pound rails, 30 feet in length, with an average of 18 ties to the rail-length, tie-plated, and ballasted with cinders to a depth of about 12 inches. The track is maintained in good condition. The ? -2- At the crossing where the accident occurred there is a 4" x 8" plank laid close to the outside of each rail, with its top surface even with the top of the rail. Flangeways about 2wide are provided on the inside of each rail by having a 60-pound rail laid on its side with the head against the web of the track rail. Another 4" x 8" plank is laid along the inside of each of these flangeways, with its upper surface even with the top of the rail, and highway gravel is laid up to the outside planks and between the inside planks. Approaching this crossing on the highway from the south there is a slight descending grade. There was a standard 7-span pile bridge, 91 feet in length, located 366.5 feet east of the highway crossing. The weather was clear and the sun was shining at the time of the accident, which occurred between 6.30 and 6.40 a.m. Description Eastbound passenger train No. 6 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car and three coaches, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 198, and was in charge of Conductor Brown and Engineman Hassman. This train departed from Wisconsin Rapids, 60.5 miles west of Princeton, at 4.58 a.m. eight minutes late, according to the train sheet, and was derailed at the highway crossing approximately 4 miles west of Princeton while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 35 and 40 miles per hour. The entire train was derailed to the right or south of the track with the exception of the rear truck of the last car, the engine demolishing the bridge east of the crossing and coming to rest on its left side in the bed of the creek at about a right angle to the track, the rear end laying against the east abutment of the bridge. The tender remained upright across the wreckage of the bridge, and the cars remained upright in a straight line at an angle of about 300 with the track, headed down the embankment, the head end of the first car resting against the cylinders of the engine. engine and first car were considerably damaged, while the second car sustained slight damage. The employee killed was the fireman, while the employees injured were the engine man, conductor and baggageman. The -3- Summary of evidence Engineman Hassman stated that before leaving Marshfield, their initial terminal, the air brakes were tested and found to be working properly. He thought they were about eight minutes late in leaving Neshkoro, 9.72 miles west of Princeton, and he was operating the train at the usual speed, reducing it to about 30 miles per hour on the curve just west of the point of accident, and had increased it to 35 miles per hour as he approached the highway crossing. As the engine reached the crossing the front end jumped up; he applied the air brakes in emergency and he judged they traveled a distance of about 15 or 20 feet before the engine dropped off on the ties. Engineman Hassman stated that he thought the truck wheels struck some obstruction in the flangeway on the crossing possibly a stone covered by sand. He further stated that his engine was in good condition upon departing from Marshfield; the wheel flanges were in first-class condition, and he last inspected the engine at Wisconsin Rapids. Cindy Conductor Brown stated that they were about three or four minutes late in departing from Neshkoro and were traveling at a speed of about 35 miles per hour when the accident occurred. After the accident he inspected the track at the crossing and found a great deal of sand and gravel in the flangeways, which in his opinion was the cause of the derailment. He noticed the first marks of derailment were on the ties about 15 or 20 feet beyond the crossing. He found no signs of anything dragging from the engine. He also said that the air brakes worked properly en route. Brakeman Keup stated that his inspection of the track after the accident disclosed a flange mark on the ties at a point about 12 feet from the crossing. He did not notice any indication of dragging equipment or any obstructions, and was of the opinion that there was not enough sand or gravel in the flangeways on the crossing to cause any damage. He estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been about 35 miles per hour. Baggageman Foshay made no examination of the track after the occurrence of the accident. He stated that the train was traveling at a speed of about 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Flagman Larson and Mail Clerk Sommers stated that they noticed gravel and sand in the flangeways on the crossing, and the mail clerk thought it might have caused the derailment. { -4- Section Foreman Pluer stated that he arrived at the scene of the accident about half an hour after its occurrence and upon inspecting the crossing he found it was clean; he did not think there was a good handful of sand in both of the flangeways. He noticed no marks on the rails and he judged the first mark of derailment on the ties was about 17 feet from the crossing. He stated the track was perfect as to surface, gauge and alignment. Inspections of the track are made daily except Sundays and holidays, and it is necessary to clean the flangeways about four or five times a week, the sand and gravel on occasions being even with the ball of the rail. He stated that on Sunday, the day previous to the occurrence of the accident, he was in that vicinity and walked over the crossing, and found it to be the same as when he left it the day previous. Roadmaster Friess stated that he and Division Engineer Dyer inspected the track and found it in good condition as to grade, alignment and gauge; the gauge taken for a distance of 600 feet west of the crossing showed only 1/4 inch wide at any point and 1/4 inch out of level at any point. Roadmaster Friess stated that in his opinion there was some obstruction in the flangeway of the crossing that caused the truck wheel to climb the rail. He further stated that previous to the time this road was graded and graveled for a state high- way, they experienced no trouble of any kind on this crossing. During the time the road was being graveled, and for some time afterwards, they had to watch this crossing very closely on account of the loose gravel working onto the crossing, due to the highway sloping down toward the track from the south. 1 Master Mechanic Hoffman stated that he arrived at the scene of the accident about five hours after its occurrence and found the flangeways still filled with ground-up rocks and gravel. His inspection of the track disclosed the first mark of derailment to be on the outside base of the right rail, 19 feet east of the east end of the crossing, and it appeared that the No. 1 engine-truck wheels left the ends of the ties at a point 153 feet from the center of the cross- ing. He then made an inspection of the engine truck -5- and driving wheels and none of the flanges would take the gauge. One of the No. 1 engine-truck wheels showed slight flange wear and the No. 2 engine-truck wheel flanges were badly marked due to the derailment. The driving-wheel flanges were in good condition and the treads showed 3/32 inch wear. The axles on the engine truck wheels and also the front driving wheels were sprung, caused by the derailment, and the engine truck itself was demolished. Master Mechanic Hoffman stated that he was of the opinion that the derailment was caused by rocks, sand and gravel in the flangeways on the crossing, due to the fact that there had been no traffic over the crossing on the railroad from 8.45 p.m. Saturday, to 6.30 a.m. Monday, the day of the accident. He further stated that while at the scene of the accident he went to the crossing several different times, there being heavy automobile traffic over the crossing, and each time he found a great deal of sand and gravel in the flangeways on account of the fact that the automobile traffic pulled it down the grade from the south, which he said was about a 3 per cent descending grade. Master Car Builder Byrne and Road Foreman of Engines Simmons, who examined the engine truck and driving wheels with Master Mechanic Hoffman, also stated that their examination disclosed nothing that could have caused the derailment. Superintendent Rice stated that when he ched the highway crossing, about five hours after the accident, there was considerable gravel in the flangeways, some of it up to the top of the ball of the rail, and on the outside and ends of the flange- ways there was just enough to show that wheel flanges had traveled in it. The heaviest gravel lay in the flangeways on either side of the point where wheels of automobiles passed over the crossing. The gravel in the flangeways ranged in size from sand to approxi- mately 1 inch, while there were stones on the highway from 1 to 2 inches in size. His examination of the track disclosed a mark on the top of the right rail about 3/4 inch from the gauge side, beginning at the east end of the crossing, which appeared to have been made by a blunt flange. This mark was not a sharp cut, because the flange of this engine-truck wheel was rounded and did not have the sharp edge that is found in the center of most flanges. This mark was plain for about 24 inches, continuing toward the outside of the rail for 15 or 16 feet, where it left the rail about 2 feet west of the point where the flange of the wheel first struck the base of the rail. From this point the wheel ran on the ties, traveling toward the end of the ties, for about 40 feet, when the wheel dropped to the shoulder and traveled in this ....: 13 Tag + -6 position about one rail-length, when the opposite wheel began breaking the ties. It was his opinion that this accident was caused by some obstruction in the highway crossing, causing the lead truck wheels of the engine to lift and ride the ball of the rail, finally dropping to the outside. ¿ The investigation disclosed that while there were no distinct flange marks along the top of the rail to assist in determining the exact point where the engine wheels were first derailed, a straight line drawn along the marks of the derailment on the ties and extended to the crossing would indicate that the initial point of derailment was about the center of the crossing. The first mark of derailment was on the base of the outside of the right rail about 30 feet from the center of the highway and was located about 18 inches from the leaving end of a rail. From this point the marks diverged gradually from the rail for a distance of about 125 feet, when cutting on the inside of the right rail began, and a short distance beyond this point the inside of the head of the right rail was subjected to severe gouging, suggesting that the flange of one of the engine-truck wheels was binding against it; the track was then torn up as far as the bridge, which was demolished. There were no marks to indicate that the driving wheels left the track before they reached the point where the track was torn up, neither were there any marks caused by dragging equip- ment or marks to indicate that the engine had run over any obstruction on the rail. The engine truck being demolished, examination had to be confined to the wheels, and except for marks resulting from the derailment they were found to be in good condition. Conclusions This accident was caused by the flangeways at a highway crossing being filled up with gravel. ' There was a conflict in the testimony as to the exact conditions found to exist immediately after the occurrence of the accident. It did appear, however, that the flangeways at the crossing seemed to fill up quickly, due to automobile traffic and the section fore- man said that it was necessary to clean out the flangeways on this crossing four or five times a week, due to the fact that there are no trains operated over this terri- tory from Saturday night to Monday morning, it seems probable that the flangeways became filled with sand and gravel over the week end to such an extent that the flanges of the engine-truck wheels were unable to clean out the flangeways, but fode over the gravel and thus became derailed. -7.~- A All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully: W. P. BORLAND, Director. Iransportation Library HE 1780 4234 1543 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES- TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAILROAD NEAR TOMAH, WIS., ON JULY 15, 1929. November 14,1929. To the Commission: On July 15, 1929, there was a derailment of an express and deadhead equipment train on the Chicago, Mil- waukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad near Tomah, Wis., which resulted in the death of two employees and the injury of six employees. The investigation of this accident was held in conjunction with a representative of the State Railroad Commission of Wisconsin. J Location and method of operation This accident accurred on the La Crosse and Port- age Sub-division of the La Crosse Division, extending between La Crosse and Portage, Wis., a distance of 102.9 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, an automatic block-signal system and an automatic train stop and cab-signal system, the latter being of the continuous inductive type. The accident occurred at a crossover. located approximately three-fourths of a mile east of Tomah; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for a distance of more than 2 miles, followed by a 1 curve to the left 1,050 feet in length and then tangent track to the crossover, a distance of 566 feet, and for some distance beyond that point. The grade is level at the point of accident. The crossover involved is a standard No. 10 cross- over 194 feet 10 inches in length, which was installed tem- porarily for the purpose of diverting traffic to the west- bound main track between that point and Camp Douglas, 12.8 miles east of Tomah, due to the laying of new rail on the eastbound track between these points. There is also a tem- porary train-order office located at this crossover; no fixed signal had been provided, a red flag being used by the oper- ator when he had orders for delivery. Under special rules contained in the time-table, all trains passing through crossovers must not exceed 10 miles per hour except at desig- nated turnouts with long frogs, where the speed may be in- creased to, but not exceed, 20 miles per hour. The last eastbound automatic signal is located east of the station at Tomah and 3,556 feet west of the west switch of the temporary crossover. A d : 1 I } The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 7.03 a.m. Description Eastbound first-class train second No. 12 consisted of one deadhead Pullman observation car, six loaded express cars, one deadhead dining car and four deadhead Pullman sleeping cars, in the order named, hauled by engine 6133, and was in charge of Conductor Welch and Engineman McMahon. At La Crosse, 41 miles west of Tomah, the crew received, among others, a copy of train order No. 519, Form 31, reading in part as follows: "From 6.50 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. today the eastward track between temporary crossover east of Tomah and east crossover Camp Douglas will be out of service. Eastward trains will not pass the tem- porary crossover Tomah without a 19 order con-- ferring further rights ***!! M This train departed from La Crosse at 6 a.m., passed Tomah at 7.a.m. entered the crossover east of Tomah, and was de- railed on the westbound main track just east of the east crossover switch while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 25 and 40 miles per hour. The engine came to rest on its left side north of the main track at a point 330 feet east of the crossover; the tender cistern was torn from its frame and rested on its left side directly behind the engine. The first seven cars and the forward truck of the eighth car were also derailed; the first car came to rest on its right side on the east- bound main track, 109 feet beyond the engine, the second and third cars remained upright, the fourth car was the fourth car was on its left side and the following three cars were leaning towards the north. All of the derailed equipment, except the eighth car, sustained considerable damage. The employees killed were the fireman and head brakeman, and the employees in- jured were the engineman, conductor, two cooks and a waiter. Summary of evidence Superintendent Frick stated that operators handling temporary switches of this character are instructed not to throw the switches for a crossover movement until after an approaching train has passed the last automatic block signal in order to avoid stopping the train at the signal. This practice is considered safe due to the fact that train orders to safeguard these operations are issued to cover all train movements. . • M I . 3Engineman McMahon stated that he was thoroughly familiar with the territory and was fully aware of his loca- tion at all times during the trip on which the accident oc- curred. He received a copy of train order No. 519 at La Crosse and understood its contents, and after he read it back to the conductor he remarked that they would have to get a 19 order before proceeding beyond the crossover. After leaving La Crosse he made a running test of the air brakes and they functioned as intended, and while approach- ing Tomah he made a 10 or 13-pound brake-pipe reduction, reducing speed from 50 or 60 miles per hour to about 35 miles per hour. When his engine was near the station he ob- served that the automatic block signal, located approxi- mately 525 feet east of that point, was displaying a clear indication, and he then released the brakes and permitted the train to drift. As the train proceeded, his own view of the track ahead being restricted by the curve, the fire- man informed him that some one had come out of the telegraph office with a hoop but that the crossover switches were closed and it was the fireman's idea they were going straight through. From his information Engineman McMahon thought the order to cross over to the westbound track had been annulled and he did not further reduce the speed of the train at this time; the fireman did not say anything about seeing a red flag. Shortly afterwards the fireman told him that the operator had opened the switch and about the same time he received a red indication of the cab signal; he immediately applied the brakes in emergency but due to having just previously been rebased after the service application he thought the full emergency effect was not obtained. He did not remember operating the acknowledging valve of the train- control device, and said that he did not see the red flag in the vicinity of the crossover. Engineman McMahon also said that he felt no application of the brakes from the train prior to the time he applied them in emergency, and estimated the speed at 25 to 30 miles per hour at the time the train entered the crossover. He had the contents of train order No. 519 in mind as his train approached the crossover, knew it was still in effect, and was aware the rules restricted his speed through the crossover to 10 miles per hour, but when the fireman stated that the switch was lined for the eastbound track and that the operator was holding a train-order hoop, it led him to believe there was some change in the orders and it was for this reason that he did not bring his train under proper control for a crossover movement. Engineman McMahon stated that he was close to the crossover switch when he received the red cab-signal indica- tion and made the emergency application of the brakes. He thought at the speed he was running he could have stopped his train in a distance of 25 or 30 car-lengths, and that he would have run by the crossover switch a distance of about 10 car-lenghts. It further appeared from Engineman McMahon's statements that he had been called upon at various times to make movements similar to the one intended to be made in this case, and that the usual practice was being followed; ! 4 100 that is, an order was sent in advance, with further orders to be received at the crossover, and the operator was not to open the crossover switches until the last automatic signal had been passed. He also said that if the operator wants the train to stop he usually gives a hand signal, but if he wants the train to go ahead he holds up the train- order hoop, which is picked up as the train moves through the crossover. G Conductor Welch stated that among the orders re- ceived at La Crosse was the order restricting his rights to the eastbound main track beyond the temporary crossover at Tomah. He delivered the orders to the engineman, who read them aloud and stated time that they were to receive a 19 order at Tomah. Conductor Welch rode in the leading car and felt a brake application shortly after leaving La Crosse. Then the train was approaching Tomah he went out on the rear platform for the purpose of ascertaining the He position of the train-order signal, which was clear. then re-entered the car and after passing the station he remarked to the head brakeman that the train was running pretty fast, after which both he and the head brakeman re- turned to the platform. When the train was close to the crossover he looked ahead from the left side of the train and observed the operator in a stooped position at the west switch, apparently in the act of opening it; the train then was just leaving the curve. • Realizing that the train was traveling at too high a rate of speed to take the crossover he stepped to the rear of the platform and opened the emer- gency valve, the accident occurring very shortly afterwards. Conductor Welch said he felt no air-brake application between the running test made on leaving La Crosse and the time he opened the emergency valve, and he estimated the speed at the time the train passed Tomah station at 40 miles per hour which speed he thought was reduced slightly before reaching the crossover, apparently as a result of the train being al- lowed to drift. After the accident he saw a red flag stick- ing in the ground on the engineman side of the track at the west crossover switch. Conductor Welch further stated that during his experience he has on numerous occasions been de- toured over the opposite track between certain points, and the customary practice in making such movements was to ap- proach the crossover under control and the operator would hand a 19 order to the crew conferring additional rights without requiring the train to stop. Conductor Welch stated that the brake was cut out on one car about the fourth car from the head end of the train. He said this brake was cut out when the train arrived at La Crosse, but he did not know for what reason. Sig Flagman Glass stated that he was aware there was a temporary crossover east of Tomah but was not familiar with its exact location, as he had never been on a train which used it. At La Crosse the head brakeman read the train orders : - 5- to him and he understood that a crossover movement was to be made at Tomah. He assisted in making an air-brake test from the rear car in the train before departing and the brakes applied and released properly. A running test of the brakes was made shortly after leaving that point and this was the last application he felt until just before the train entered the curve west of the point of accident, when there appeared to be an emergency application; he estimated the speed at 45 to 50 miles per hour when the train passed Tomah station. Flagman Glass also said he was of the opinion that the speed was too great at the time the train passed the station to enable it to comply with train order No. 519, but he said he took no action toward applying the brakes from the rear of the train as he was afraid of breaking it in two, and he was momentarily expecting the engineman to apply them. Operator Knuteson, on duty at the temporary crossover and train-order office, stated that train order No. 519 was issued to him, as well as a 31 order to hold all eastward trains, these orders being made complete at 6.31 a.m. Upon receipt of these orders he placed a red flag near the eastbound main track on the engineman's side. At 6.46 a.m., he received two additional orders, one addressed to train second No. 12, authorizing that train to use the west- bound main track between his station am Camp Douglas, and the other addressed to himself which read "Second 12 may go" He placed the orders in hoops for the purpose of delivering them to the crew of that train and then left the office and stood at the east crossover switch awaiting the arrival of the train. After it passed the last automatic signal he opened the switch and then hurried to the west switch, and by the time he reached it the train was about at the east end of the curve; he had just time enough to open the switch and hold up the hoop when the train passed, but there was no one out to receive the orders. Fire was flying from the wheels when the train passed him. Operator Knuteson said that it is the usual practice, when he holds orders giving a train further rights, to give the approaching train crew a proceed hand signal and deliver the orders by hoop when the train passes, without stopping it. He also said that he has had considerable experience at temporary crossovers and that his understanding is that he is to wait until the train passes the last automatic signal before opening the switches, in order to avoid unnecessary delay by stopping the train at the signal. Alejan Dispatcher Farnham corroborated the statements of Operator Knuteson with respect to the orders issued to the latter's station, also as to the practice followed in making detour movements. 1 6 Section Foreman Henchell and two section laborers were standing about half way between the crossover switches at the time of the accident. According to their statements, train second No. 12 was approaching at a high rate of speed. The operator ran from the east switch to the west switch and threw the west crossover switch just in front of the train; the train was only about one rail-length from it. There was a red flag with its staff sticking in the ground on the en- gineman's side of the eastbound track, opposite the switch. The train started to turn over just after it got through the crossover and upon the westbound track. Roadmaster McMahon stated that the crossover in- volved was installed in June, 1928, for the purpose of de- touring trains to expedite the work of relaying rail. Such facing-point crossovers are installed in accordance with plans furnished by the division engineer, who usually lo- cates them so that the automatic block-signals will afford protection. Roadmaster McMahon arrived at the scene of accident at about 9.30 a.m., inspected the crossover and switches, and found them to be in good condition; no repairs were made to this crossover after the accident. There were no marks on the crossover to indicate that the train was de- railed either on the switches or on the crossover, the first mark appearing on the westbound main track about 8 or 10 feet beyond the east switch. He thought that the maximum speed a train could be operated through the crossover with safety was 15 miles per hour. ? The statements of Assistant Signal Supervisor Shoemaker and Assistant Air Brake Supervisor McMinn were to the effect that subsequent to the accident a test was made of the signal and train-control systems, without any changes or alterations having been made, and they functioned as in- tended. Kat Conclusions This accident was caused by train second No. 12 entering a crossover at an excessive rate of speed, for which Engineman McMahon and Conductor Welch are responsible. Under the rules, the speed of trains passing through the crossover at the point of accident was restricted to 10 miles per hour. According to his own statement, Engineman McMahon understood the requirements of train order No. 519 received at La Crosse, he was familiar with the loca- tion of this crossover, and was also aware of speed restric- tions through this crossover. However, the evidence is con- clusive that train second No. 12 approached this crossover at excessive speed. The statements of all employees in- volved and of other witnesses clearly establish this fact. C - 17 When he learned that the crossover switches were being opened, the engineman made an emergency application of the brakes, but because of the short distance then existing between his train and the crossover, and the rate of speed at which the train was running, he thought the train could not be stopped until it had passed a distance of about 10 car-lengths beyond the crossover switch. The conductor realized that the train was running too fast to make the crossover movement safely and according to his statement he opened the emergency valve on the first car, apparently at about the same time the engineman applied the brakes in emergency from the engine; however, this action on the part of the conductor was too late to avert the accident. The flagman on the rear end of the train thought the train was running too fast but took no action to reduce its speed. The operator, the section foreman and two section laborers who were on the roadway near the scene of the accident all stated that the train approached the crossover at a high rate of speed. Estimates of the speed of the train as it entered the crossover varied from 25 to 40 miles per hour, whereas the speed restriction in effect at this point was 10 miles per hour. The location of the train at the time the operator opened the east crossover switch was not determined with exactness. The opening of this switch resulted in the dis- play of a red cab signal; the engineman stated he was close to the switch when he received this cab-signal indication but could not estimate the distance. The conductor said the train was just leaving the curve when he opened the emer- gency valve; the point of curve is 566 feet from the west crossover switch. The operator was unable to state the exact location of train second No. 13 when he opened the east crossover switch except that he was sure it had passed the last automatic signal near the station; the evidence is that he hurried or ran from the east crossover switch to the west crossover switch and threw the west switch while the train was on the tangent between the switch and the curve, completing this operation only an instant before the train entered the crossover. The investigation disclosed no defective or insecure condition either of track or of the crossover which might have contributed to this accident, the direct cause of the accident being the high rate of speed at which the train passed through the crossover. Engineman McMahon was not justified in acting upon an assumption that the order requiring his train to make a crossover movement had been annulled; under the or- ders which he held he was required to approach this cross- over under control, prepared to make the crossover movement. Conductor Welch was equally responsible with him for the safe operation of their train; according to his statement he was fully aware that the speed of the train was not being properly controlled but he failed to act quickly enough to effect the required reduction in the speed of this train. 1 8 The investigation disclosed that this train was being operated with the brake cut out on one car associated with other power brake cars in the train; this is not in conformity with the provisions of the safety appliance law. On the line where this accident occurred there was an automatic train-stop and cab-signal device in ser- vice. It appears from the investigation that this device functioned as intended; a red cab-signal indication was dis- played when the first crossover switch was opened, upon re- ceipt of which the engineman immediately made an emergency application of the brakes without waiting for the automatic apparatus to operate. However, in view of the high rate of speed and the short distance between the train and the cross- over when the first crossover switch was opened, the operation of the automatic train-stop device was not initiated soon enough to prevent the accident. The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. * Iransportation { } Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD AT HILLSIDE, PA., ON JULY 15, 1929. 1544 To the Commission: On July 15, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Pennsylvania Railroad at Hillside, Pa., the wreckage of which was struck by a passenger train on an adjoining track, which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Pittsburgh Divi- sion, which extends between Pittsburgh and Altoona, Pa., a distance of 113.8 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a four-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an auto- matic block-signal system. The tracks are numbered > from south to north, 1, 2, 3, and 4, the first wheel marks occurring on track 1 at a highway crossing located approximately 1,650 feet west of the station at Hillside, while the main portion of the wreckage was about 1,000 feet east of the station. Approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for a distance of about 2,550 feet to where the first wheel marks appeared, and for about 2 miles beyond that point. The grade is 0.44 per cent descending for eastbound trains at the point of accident. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 11.03 p.m. Description } Kovember 15, 1929. " Eastbound freight train extra 4458 consisted of 34 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 4458 with helper engine 4586 behind the caboose, and was in charge of Conductor Ross and Engineman Lotz and Hiland. This train passed DR Block Station, 3.9 miles west of Hill- side, at 10.44 p.m., moving on track 1, and was derailed at Fillside while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 30 and 40 miles per hour. _ • བ akad 1 2 Eastbound passenger train No. 60 consisted of one Pullman combination baggage and club car and six Pullman sleeping cars, hauled by engine 3676, and was in charge of Conductor Simpson and Engineman Evans. This train passed DR Block Station on track 2 at 11 p.m., and collided with the wreckage of extra 4458 at Hillside, while traveling at a speed estimated at about 40 miles per hour. The rear truck of the nineteenth car and the twentieth to the twenty-sixth cars, inclusive, in the freight train, were derailed. The train parted between the nineteenth car and twentieth cars, the nineteenth car stopping more than 600 feet east of the twentieth car. The twentieth car came to rest leaning toward the north obstructing track 2, while the other cars remained upright on track 1. Engine 3676, of train No. 60, came to rest on its right side about 200 feet beyond where it struck the wreckage; the tender was derailed and remained coupled to the engine. The first four passenger cars and the forward truck of the fifth car were also derailed, but they remained upright in line with the track, with the forward end of the leading car resting on top of the ten- der. Engine 3676, its tender, and the first passenger car were considerably damaged, and the other derailed passenger cars as well as four of the freight cars were more or less damaged. The employee killed was the engine- man of train No. 60, and the employee injured was the fireman of that train. Summary of evidence Engineman Lotz, of extra 4458, stated that two cars were picked up at Derry, 3.4 miles west of Hillside and after a brake test was made the train continued, and just after his engine passed the station at Hillside he felt an unusual jerk and upon looking at the air gauge he noticed that the brakes had applied. As the throttle was closed he permitted the train to stop of its own accord, which he thought was about 15 car-lengths beyond the point where the unusual motion had occurred; he estimated the speed of his train at between 30 and 35 miles per hour at the time the air brakes applied. Engineman Lotz also said that he had looked back along the train about three-fourths of a mile west of Hillside but noticed nothing out of the ordinary; he did not hear train No. 60 approaching and did not know what had occurred until some time afterwards. Fireman Boyle, of extra 4458, stated that he was riding on his seatbox as the train approached Hillside and when he felt a slight lurch he looked back and saw fire flying. He estimated the speed at about 30 or 35 11 1 1 3 miles per hour at the time of the first indication of trouble and thought the train stopped within a distance of 10 or 15 car-lengths. He got off to protect against westbound trains just before the engine came to a stop, but on looking back toward the rear of his own train he did not see or hear anything of train No. 60. Head Brakeman Henderson, of extra 4458, stated that he rode on the left side of the engine cab between Derry and the point of accident and that he had looked back while the train was rounding the curve west of Hill- side. Upon reaching a point between 500 and 1,000 feet east of the station at Hillside he felt a lurch, and again looked back and at this time he noticed the glare of fire; both he and the fireman called it to the atten- tion of the engineman at the same time. He did not see train No. 60 and was of the opinion that that train collided with the wreckage before the head end of his own train came to a stop. Ging mag car. Conductor Ross, of extra 4458 stated that while at KR Block Station, 8.7 miles west of Hillside, he in- spected the train and found a hot box on the seventeenth This car was set out at Ligonier and five cars picked up at that point. The train proceeded to DR Block Station, where two more cars were picked up, but he did not inspect the train at this point. He was riding in the caboose approaching Hillside and when the train was going around the curve west of that point he went out on the platform and looked ahead but saw no indications of anything wrong. He re-entered the caboose and when the train was about at the water bridge, approximately 350 feet west of the sta- tion, the air brakes went into emergency; he estimated the speed of his train at this time at 35 to 40 miles per hour. He observed train No. 60 was then approaching closely and he immediately lighted a fusee and threw it on track 2, when train No. 60 was about 15 car-lengths distant. The flagman also gave stop signals with his lanterns, which were acknowledged by the approaching train. He said that fire was flying from the wheels of the passenger train when it passed his caboose. Flagman Taylor, of extra 4458, stated that he rode on the right side in the cupola of the caboose be- tween Derry and Ridge View Park, the latter station being 1.2 miles west of Hillside, keeping a sharp lookout ahead, but after passing that point he left the cupola and went out on the rear platform for the purpose of cutting off the helper engine and was still on the platform when he felt an application of the brakes. At first he thought it was a service application, but he soon realized that it was an emergency application and knowing of no reason for making · 4 such a stop he grabbed his lanterns, got off the caboose just before the train stopped, and started giving stop signals, which were acknowledged by train No. 60, which was then about 15 car-lengths to the rear of his own train. The conductor also threw off a fusee before that train passed their caboose. While going back to flag he noticed marks on the ties but could not determine whether they were flange marks or marks made by something dragging. Engineman Hiland, in charge of helper engine 4586, stated that while at Derry he informed the conductor that he would take water at Hillside. The train was traveling at a speed of about 35 or 40 miles per hour when his engine was uncoupled, which was at a point about 25 or 30 car-lengths west of the water station. The engine was stopped at the water station but train No. 60 passed before water could be taken, and when it passed the engineman on that train acknowledged a flag. Engineman Hiland did not know that an accident had occurred until in- formed of the fact by the flagman after his engine start- ed towards the rear of the train. Today Fireman Ellenberger, of engine 4586, stated that he was looking ahead while going around the curve at Ridge View Park but did not notice anything wrong. As soon as his engine was uncoupled he went back over the tender to take water and then looked ahead to locate the water sta- tion and in doing so he saw two lights on the rear of the caboose, one of which appeared to be a fusce and which seemed to be moving toward the left side of the caboose. Realizing that something was wrong he gave a stop signal to the crew of train No. 60, the head end of their engine at the time being opposite the tender of his own engine. He did not know whether this signal was seen by the engine crew, but when that engine reached a point about four or five car-lengths beyond, he heard a flag signal being acknowledged. He said that the hoad end of train No. 60 passed him before his own engine came to a stop. Fireman Keefer, of train No. 60, stated that after his engine was coupled to the train at Pittsburgh the regular air-brake test was made and the car inspector reported to the engineman that all brakes on the cars were in proper working order, and that the brakes worked satis- factorily en route. The headlight was burning brightly as the train approached Hillside. After calling the indica- tion of the automatic signal east of Ridge View Park he got down on the engine deck and had just started putting in a fire when the engineman sounded two blasts of the whistle and at the same time applied the brakes in emergency. Fireman Ellenberger looked ahead from the left side of the engine after the whistle was sounded but did not see any obstruction although shortly afterwards the engine appeared to have encountered something which caused it to M 1 5 $ sway considerably and finally to turn over on its right side. He did not He did not know the exact location of his train when the brakes were applied but they took hold noticeably and he thought the speed had been reduced to about 40 miles per hour by the time the accident occurred. Conductor Simpson, of train Fo. 60, stated that the brakes were tested and reported in good condition be- fore departing from Pittsburgh and he noticed no unusual handling of the train in making a station stop and also in reducing speed after leaving that point. He was riding in the second car of the train approaching Hillside and his first intimation of anything wrong was when the engine whistle was sounded twice, which was followed immediately by an emergency application of the brakes. He did not know how far the train traveled after the brakes were applied but said the accident occurred a very few seconds later. He estimated the speed at 60 miles per hour at the time the brakes were applied, but they responded promptly and had reduced the speed to about 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Air Brake Inspector Faras stated that he made the regular brake test on train No. 60 at Pittsburgh and found them to be in proper condition. Car Inspector cCarthy stated that he inspected the cars of extra 4458 at Pitcairn, 33 miles west of Hillside, and to the best of his knowledge they were in good condition. Car Inspect- or Regan stated that he was on duty at Pitcarin at the time the cars of extra 4458 were assembled; he did not remember the condition of these particular cars but was satisfied they were intact when they left that point. Air Brake Repairman Decker stated that he assisted in making an inspection and brake test on the cars of extra 4458 at Pitcairn and noticed no defects with the trucks of the cars he inspected. Gett The first indication of any disturbance was a slight mark on the end of a tie on the outside of the south rail of track 1 at a point approximately 6,900 feet west of where the main part of the wreckage came to rest. These marks extended eastward intermittently and became more prominent on the same side of the rail until they came to the road crossing, a distance of 4,134 feet; at this point the first wheel marks appeared on the ties and they con- tinued from that point to the point of final derailment. Fragments of a journal box and bolts were found on the south side of track 1, at a point about 100 feet east of where the first mark appeared on the ties. S 6 1 > The rear truck of the nineteenth car P.R.R. hopper car 149236, was demolished. This car was equipped with trucks of the arch-bar type and had a capacity of 100,000 pounds and a load limit of 130,200 pounds; at the time of the accident it was loaded with 130,000 pounds of iron ore. Both journal box bolts on the right or south side of the truck, front journal, had been sheared off, and it was some of the parts of these bolts which were found near where the first mark appeared on a tie. Conclusions This accident was apparently caused by the fail- ure of the rear truck of the nineteenth car in extra 4458. According to the statements of the crew of extra 4458 they were unaware of anything unusual until the brakes applied in emergency, whereupon the fireman and head brakeman looked back and noticed fire flying from beneath the train. Subsequent to the accident the rear truck of the nineteenth car, of the arch-bar type, was found in a badly damaged condition and the indications were that two journal box bolts on the right side had been sheared off, the top of one and the bottom of another being found approximately 6,900 feet from where the wrecked cars came to rest. The marks on the ties indi- cated that some part of this truck started dragging at that point and continued for a distance of about 4,100 feet until it encountered the crossing plank of a highway crossing and then the truck becane partly derailed and followed along the track in this position until it came in contact with a trailing-point switch near Hillside station, where additional damage was done. A few hundred fret farther east, the truck encountered the frog of another trailing-point switch, where the truck was de- molished, resulting in the final derailment and the break- ing in two of the train. It appears that as soon as it became known that something was wrong with extra 4458, the crew took im- mediate steps to flag train No. 60, which was then closely approaching on track 2; the engineman of that train was on the alert and applied the brakes in emergency, but the distance in which he had to stop his train was not suf- ficient to prevent it from colliding with the derailed equipment which was obstructing track 2. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of ser- vice law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. 30RLANDirector. S 1545 Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD NEAR LATTIMER JUNCTION, PA., ON JULY 16, 1929. To the Commission: *\*** .. ช November 23, 1929. On July 16, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Lehigh Valley Railroad near Lattimer Junction, Pa., resulting in the death of one employee. T Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Evervale Branch of the Hazleton Division known as the Lattimer Colliery Branch; this is a single-track line, a mine track extending between Vexit Junction and Lattimer Junction, Pa., a distance of 1.28 miles and thence from Lattimer Junction to Lattimer Colliery, an additional distance of 0.7 mile. No directions are specified in the time-table, but it is generally understood that east is towards Vexit Junction. At Lattimer Junction, proceeding westward toward the colliery the main track leads off toward the right; at a point 1,380 feet from the junction there is a switch leading to a storage-yard lead track, which par- allels this main track on the right; this is a facing- point switch for westbound movements, and the accident occurred at the frog of this lead-track switch located 60 feet west of the switch points. Approaching the switch from the east, beginning at Lattimer Jct., the -track is tangent for a distance of 660 feet, and then there is a compound curve to the right, extending beyond the point of accident; the curvature of the turnout at the point of derailment is 170. The grade for westbound trains is slightly ascending. No scheduled trains operate over this mine track, the only train being an extra freight train, known as the "Mine Run"; this train delivers empty cars to the mines, receives loaded cars, and does the necessary mine and colliery switching. No passengers are trans- ported. Trains are operated between Vexit Junction and Lattimer Junction by train orders, but between Lattimer Junction and Lattimer Colliery they move without orders, crews protecting themselves. In the vicinity of the point of accident the track is laid with old 90-pound, relaid rails, with about 20 ties to the rail-length, tie-plated, single-spiked, and ballasted with a mixture of cinders and mine slack -2- to a depth of about 12 inches; six-hole rail joints are used, with four bolts to the joint, the bolt heads th being staggered. The track is not well maintained. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 10:30 a.m. Description Westbound freight train extra 332, which was the Mine Run, in charge of Conductor Warning and Engineman Kleckner, consisted of engine 332, headed west, with its caboose coupled ahead of it, and it was shoving 13 loaded cars of unprepared coal through the lead-track switch toward the breaker at Lattimer Colliery at a speed estimated to have been between 9 and 12 miles per hour when the engine became derailed at the frog. Engine 332, together with its tender, came to rest between the main track and lead track, upright, with the rear wheels of the tender on the frog; the caboose came to rest almost crosswise the main track, leaning toward the right. None of the other equipment was derailed or damaged. The employee killed was a trainman, who either jumped or was thrown from the top of the caboose. Summary of evidence Engineman Kleckner stated that his first intima- tion of anything wrong was when the forward end of the engine was on the ties; the airbrakes applied when the train parted and he applied the independent engine brake. Engineman Kleckner was certain that the caboose was derailed after the engine; he noticed no unusual swaying of the caboose and said that the four-wheel caboose usually rounded curves smoothly when being pushed by an engine with cars ahead of it. After the accident he examined his engine, but found nothing wrong, and the day's work was completed with it. On the day prior to the accident about five or six movements were made over the track at the point of derailment with the same engine and at about the same speed as was being made at the time of the derailment. Engineman Kleckner said that engines of the type of the one involved had been used on the Lattimer Colliery Branch for the last four years and that cars had become derailed at this particular location before; on one occasion an engine became derailed, but that derailment was due to a broken rail. • Conductor Warning was at Lattimer Junction when the derailment occurred. Subsequent to the accident the conductor made an examination of conditions in an endeavor to determine the cause of the accident. After -3- * $ the engine had been rerailed and while it was standing with the pony-truck wheels at point of derailment, he noticed that the left or outside pony-truck wheel did not make contact with the rail, being raised about one-sixteenth of an inch, and he could see plainly between the wheel and rail. He found nothing wrong with the engine or caboose and it was his opinion that the derailment was due to the short curve. Statements of other members of the crew developed nothing further. Master Mechanic Conahan made a careful examination of engine 332 at the scene of the accident, but found no defect that would have caused or contributed to the derailment. After the engine was rerailed it was operated forward and backward over the frog and it tracked all right; on being brought to a stop with the pony-truck wheels at the point of derailment the left wheel was one-fourth of an inch above the rail, enabling him to pass his rule between the wheel and the top of the rail. The wheel flange was tight against the rail, and the right wheel rested on the rail properly. Superintendent Mitten in his report, stated that the right pony-truck wheel crossed over the guard.rail. 2 feet in advance of the point of frog, and that the flange on the opposite wheel took the wrong side of the -frog point and followed in the frog groove, resulting in the derailment. He further reported that after a thorough inspection on the ground with this same engine, the indications were that the derailment was due to a -No. 10 frog set in a 160 curve, which condition, with the long wheel base of this class of engine, permitted the pony-truck wheel to raise sufficiently to cross over the guard rail. The first mark of derailment was a light flange mark which appeared on top of the north guard rail, 22 inches in.advance of the point of frog; this mark crossed. the guard rail diagonally for a distance of 30 inches, where it dropped off on the south side. Deep flange marks appeared on the ties, 12 inches inside of the right rail, commencing with the fifth tie beyond the point of frog, and continuing to where the pony-truck: wheels stood when the engine came to rest. By the time the thirty-third tie was reached the derailed wheels had crossed to the left far enough to encounter and turn the left rail. There were corresponding marks by the wheels on the left side of the engine. The first marks made by the wheels of the caboose- appeared on the forty-eighth tie beyond the point of frog, the indications. being that the caboose was pulled. off the track by the derailed engine. ... Engine 332 is of the 2-8-2 type, class N-2; with a total weight, engine and tender loaded, of- - -4- 477,200 pounds. The weight is distributed as follows: pony-truck, 39,000 pounds; No. 1 driving wheels, 58,000 pounds; No. 2 driving wheels, 58,400 pounds; No. 3 driving wheels, 60,000 pounds; No. 4 driving wheels, 58,600 pounds; trailer wheels, 48,000 pounds. The engine wheel-base is 35 feet 2 inches, the rigid driving wheel-base 16 feet 6 inches, and the total wheel base, engine and tender, 67 feet 11 inches. Engine 332 received class 2 repairs in June, 1927, and class 5 repairs in November, 1928. It is designed to operate over a main-track curvature of 160 and over wye tracks and sidings with a curvature of 18°. This particular engine has been used at various times on the Lattimer Colliery Branch for the past several years, while engines of this class have been used regularly on this branch for the past four years. The pony-truck wheels gauged 53 1/8 inches at four points; the flanges were only slightly worn and were well within the allowed limits, while the wheels swung free on the center pin and bearing. Careful inspection of the engine failed to disclose any defect that would have caused or contributed to the accident. In the vicinity of the point of accident there is a large mine-refuse pile, and water constantly seeps from this pile into the track ditch on the north side of the track, standing therein from 2 to 3 inches deep and at the level of the bottoms of the ties. The track is out of gauge and has an uneven curvature, while the elevation varies and is not proportionate to the curvature. On the curve there were 32 loose bolts. The rail heads are badly worn; in one rail there is an old split in the head, one-half inch wide at the open end and 9 inches long,, which apparently extends deep into the head; about 1 inches of unbroken head remains above the split. About 40 per cent of the spikes are pulled from 1/8 to 1 inch, however, the spikes still hold firmly in the ties. There is some wave motion in the track under a moving train; where the spikes are partly pulled, the rails lift under the spike heads and where the spikes are firmly holding the rail on the ties, the ties lift up from the ballast. The frog involved is an old No. 10, 90-A, solid manganese frog. It was a relaid frog when placed in the track following an accident which occurred on March 16, 1927; it is 11 feet 7 inches in length, extends over five ties, rests on tie-plates, and is single-spiked; several of the spikes have been pulled by the wave motion of the track. On the tie at the toe of the frog the spike on the left or main track side was pulled 3/8 inch and the spike on the right or lead track side was pulled 1/4 inch; the spikes on the second and third ties were pulled in a similar manner; both spikes on the fourth tie were pulled 1/4 inch; on the fifth tie, -5- under the heel of frog, the spike heads were down firmly on the base of the rail. The frog was secured to the main rails by six-hole rail joints, fully bolted. The first 2 inches of the point of frog had been battered and broken until there was no bearing surface, and a small freshly-chipped piece of the point was found after the accident. The tongue, near the point, was worn down 3/8 inch below the unworn surface of the wing rails; the wing rails had been worn from 1/16 to 1/4 inch by the treads of wheels. There were thin cracks along each side of the point of frog, at the bottoms of the flangeways; the cracks started at the point and were 9 inches long on the right side and 8 inches long on the left side. The point had been forced over to the left and was inch nearer the left wing rail than it was to the right wing rail, the flangeway at the point of frog on the right side measuring 2 inches and on the left side 1 inches. The gauge of the track was standard at the point of frog and at a point 22 inches in advance thereof; at the toe of frog it was 5/16 inch open; the elevation of the outside rail at these locations was 1 9/16 inches, 1 3/4 inches and 1 7/8 inches. Under the weight of a train the frog settled 3/4 inch at the point of frog and 5/8 inch at the heel. The guard rail opposite the frog is 15 feet long and extends over 11 ties; it is supported by four rail braces and is connected to the right lead-track rail with two rail clamps. The guard-rail flangeway opposite the point of frog was 2 inches wide and extended for a length of 4 feet; the guard rail bends out at each end, toward the opposite side of the track. The top of the guard rail was 5/8 inch higher than the top of the main rail. Under the weight of a train the guard rail and main rail settled 1/4 inch. On July 29, a test was made with engine 321, which is of the same class as engine 332. With the engine standing so that the pony-truck wheels rested at the point of derailment, the left wheel had a full bearing on the rail; at 2 miles per hour it still had a full bearing; at 4 miles per hour there appeared to be uneven pressure, with the greatest pressure at the inside edge of the rail; at speeds from 6 to 10 miles per hour the wheels passed by without making any im- pression on a small pad composed of six sheets of paper, although the amount of lift was not noticeable to the eye. In all of these tests, the right wheel held to the rail, and appeared to have full bearing. This tendency of the left wheel to clear the rail was the same as that noted by the Master Mechanic with engine 332 on the day of the accident. The derailment on March 16, 1927, previously mentioned, involved engine 305, of the same type as -6- > engine 332; that derailment was attributed to the engine truck having mounted the point of frog on the sharp curve. Engine 321, also of the same type, was operated over the frog on the afternoon of the day of that derailment, but did not become derailed. The division engineer in his report covering the 1927 accident, said, it was difficult to drain the turnout, owing to the amount of water coming down from the breaker, and with the frost coming out of the ground at that time of the year, con- ditions must have been such that the engine truck mounted the frog. It was after that derailment that the frog was changed from a No. 8 to a No. 10. Conclusions The This accident was caused by poor track conditions. The track on the curve was not maintained in good con- dition; the roadbed did not provide a firm foundation for the track, the surface was not well maintained, and the elevation of the outside rail was not proportionate, or sufficient, to compensate for the curvature. failure to provide sufficient widening of gauge to compensate for the sharp curvature allowed the wheels to crowd against the outside rail and increased the tendency to climb the rail; it also prevented the guard rail from fully serving its intended purpose of keeping the wheels away from the outside rail and thereby pre- venting extreme lateral pressure against the gauge side of the outside rail and permitting free movement of the wheel to follow the curvature of the track. The de- railing tendency due to the excessive curvature was greatly increased by the bad track conditions and the worn condition of the frog. While all these conditions are probably no worse than is general to many mine tracks on this and other railroads, yet it is obvious that they do not provide a sufficient margin of safety. Steps to- ward remedying such conditions, not only at this partic- ular point but at other points where a similar situation may exist, should be taken immediately. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty contrary to any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportadon Library HE 1780 A234 • 1546 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD NEAR BARRANCA, N. MEX., ON JULY 17, 1929. October 9, 1929. To the Commission: On July 17, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad near Barranca, N. Mex., which resulted in the death of two employees, and the injury of eight passen- gers, one mail clerk, two employees on duty and one employee off duty. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Santa Fe Branch of the Alamosa Division, which extends between Antonito, Colo., and Santa Fe, N. Mex., a distance of 125.6 miles, and is a single-track narrow-gauge line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block- signal system being in use. The accident occurred at the east approach of Bridge 346A, located 1.5 miles west of Barranca; approaching this point from the east the track is a series of sharp curves and short tangents, following which the track is tangent for a distance of 212 feet and then there is a 230 curve to the left 376.3 feet in length, including spirals, the accident occurring on this curve at a point where the maximum curvature begins. The grade for westbound trains is heavily de- scending for a distance of approximately 2,500 feet to the point of accident, and is 3.10 per cent where the derailment occurred. The maximum speed permitted for passenger trains in the vicinity of the point of accident is 18 miles per hour. po The track is laid with 70-pound rails, 30 feet in length, with an average of 19 ties to the rail-length, fully tie-plated, double-spiked and equipped with rail anchors. It is ballasted with natural sandy loam and is maintained in good condition. Bridge 346A is 96 feet in length and is laid with standard-gange ties. wooden guard rail is bolted to the outer ends of the ties for the entire length of the bridge; the distance from the gauge side of the rail to the center of this guard rail is about 36 inches. The weather was clear at the time of the accident which occurred at about 10:56 a.m. A 1 - 2 S Description Westbound passenger train No. 425 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car, one combination baggage car and coach, and one coach, all of wooden con- struction, hauled by engine 174, and was in charge of Conductor Hines and Engineman Reddington. This train left Barranca at 10:49 a.m., on time, and upon reaching bridge 346A it was derailed while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 22 and 30 miles per hour. The engine apparently overturned on its right side at a point approximately 5 feet west of the east approach of the bridge, slid the full length of the bridge, and then dropped down the 9-foot fill on the north side of the track, Goming to rest almost bottom up in a badly-damaged condition. The tender cistern was torn from its frame and practically demolished, the frame remaining attached to the engine. The first car came to rest at right angles to the track, with its forward end in the ravine north of the trestle and its rear end on the trestle; the second car remained on the trestle leaning against its southern edge and partly overhanging the ravine, and the third car was down in the ravine about 75 feet from the track. The cars were so badly damaged that they were dismantled and the wooden parts burned. The employees killed were the enginemand and fireman, and the employees injured were the conductor and brakeman, and an engineman who was deadheading. ! Summary of evidence Conductor Hines stated that upon arrival at Barranca his train was brought to a stop for an air- brake and general inspection, which was performed by the train crew, and before leaving that point he turned up the retainer at the head end of the first car, which had a retainer on each end. As the engineman had not been over this territory for several years he cautioned him to be careful on the descending grade west of Barranca. He then gave a proceed signal, boarded the train between the first and second cars, and blew the retainer to determine if it was operative. After watch- ing the performance of the train for a short time he entered the baggage car and began arranging its contents, as there was no baggageman on the train. The speed of the train did not seem to be unusual and he felt that the engineman had it under full control until it entered the tangent east of the curve on which the accident occurred. At this point the air brakes were released and the train Grandpap - 3 immediately increased speed rapidly. The eigineman's action in releasing the brakes alarmed the conductor, who said it was unusual to release them on tangent track, and he started towards the platform to set hand brakes out before he could reach it the car in which he was riding was derailed. He said the engineman gave no signal or warning of danger prior to the accident, neither did he whistle for brakes at any time on the descending grade. The conductor estimated the speed at the time the brakes were released at 18 miles per hour and at the time of the accident at 25 miles per hour. Conductor Hines further stated that he was positive that the air brakes were in proper working order when they were inspected at Barranca and that the re- tainers also were in operating condition. It also ap- peared from his statements that the general practice is to release the brakes when rounding curves and to hold them applied on tangents or reduce the speed sufficient- ly to release them in safety in order to recharge the train line. Brakeman Bush stated that the air brakes functioned properly between Antonito and Barranca, and at the latter point they were inspected and tested by noting the piston travel, recharging the train line and then releasing the brakes; Brakeman Bush said he also set up and tested three retainers, one at the rear end of the first car and one on each of the other two cars, and found that they worked satisfactorily. The train was operated in the usual manner on the descending grade west of Barranca, the brakeman saying that he thought the brakes were released once prior to the time they were released on the tangent east of bridge 346A. The speed at this time was about 17 or 18 miles per hour too fast to justify releasing the brakes, and as it increased rapidly he started setting a hand brake but about the same time he felt the shock of the accident and he either jumped off or was thrown from the train. He thought the speed at the time of the accident was between 22 and 23 miles per hour. Engineman Walsh, who was deadheading on train No. 425, stated that when the trein left Barranca the engineman worked steam for about one-fourth mile and at that time the train had attained a speed of about 20 or 25 miles per hour. The engineman then shut off steam and permitted the train to drift until it started down the descending grade, when he applied the brakes and reduced the speed. Upon reaching a point approximately 2,000 feet from the point of accident the brakes were released and after the train had traveled a distance of about 750 feet they were again applied and seemed to hold 4 well. A short time later they were released and he felt no further application of the brakes prior to the accident. As the speed increased rapidly after the second release he became apprehensive as to whether the train would round the curve in safety and upon looking out of a window in the car in which he was riding he observed that the engine was swaying considerably and then appeared to turn over when it reached a point about an engine-length beyond the eastern end of the bridge. He estimated the speed of the train when the brakes were released the last time at 25 miles per hour, and at about 30 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Engineman Walsh further stated that prior to the date of the accident he had been operating engine 174 on the Santa Fe Branch for more than two years and he considered it a good curving engine; the retainers on the cars in- volved also worked exceptionally well and the train could be held at any speed on the grade. He said Engine- man Reddington had had a number of years' experience in operating engines on mountain grades and could not ac- count for his failure to apply the brakes after the second release unless he thought that the train was not running at a dangerous rate of speed and would round the curve in safety. Engineman Walsh also was unable to account for the failure of the fireman, with whom he had previously worked, to take some action as he said the fireman was very particular about running and would not hesitate to mention it if he thought any risk was being taken. Section Foreman Trujillo stated that the last time he passed over the track in the vicinity of the point of accident was during the morning of July 15 and at that time he noticed no irregularities. He arrived at the scene of the accident at 1.30 p.m. on the day of its occurrence, and on examining the track east of bridge 346A he was unable to find any defects or marks on the ties. The first marks of derailment appeared on one or two ties on the bridge about 5 or 6 feet from its eastern end, but he did not know whether they were made by the turning over of the engine, or by the cars after they were derailed. He also noticed marks on the guard rail which he thought were caused by the engine having been overturned. · Roadmaster Eagan stated that on the morning of July 18 he thoroughly inspected the track but found no indications of marks on the rails or ties approaching the bridge. The first marks appeared on the guard rail, # - 5 1 beginning at the east end of the bridge, and they ex- tended its entire length. There were also marks on two ties near the east end of the bridge which he thought were caused by a driving rod pin, as they were too wide for flange marks. Upon examining the engine he found that slivers and small pieces of wood were wedged be- tween the cylinder cover and cylinder, and also on the pins. These conditions indicated to him that the engine started to turn over just before it reached the bridge and that the guard rail kept it from falling off the bridge until it reached the opposite end. It was his opinion that a train of the sale character as that involved in the accident would take the curve on which the acident occurred at 30 miles per hour. K Division Engineer Johnson stated that he examined the track approaching the bridge and found it to be in good condition, there being no flange marks on the rails or ties, neither were there any such marks on the bridge. Two rails had been removed from the bridge due to their having been kinked as a result of the accident, but there were no flange marks on these rails. There was a slight variation in the line and elevation of the track when approaching the bridge from the east, but he considered it safe for a speed of 18 miles per hour, and he said he found nothing in connec- tion with the track, bridge or equipment, that would in any way contribute to the cause of the accident, and he was of the opinion that excessive speed caused the engine to tip over and that it then slid the entire length of the bridge. Mr. Johnson also stated that their standard elevation for a 230 curve was 2 and 7/8 or 2 and 15/16 inches, and it appeared that this was the approximate elevation at the point of accident. Master Mechanic Lewis stated that engine 174, which is of the 4-6-0 type, came out of the shops on March 31, 1929, after having been overhauled. He in- spected this engine, as well as the cars, at the scene of accident on July 19, and found that all tires and flanges were in good condition and that there was no wear apparent on the treads of the wheels. The lateral of the engine was less than the maximum permissible, and all brake shoes were intact and resting against the tires; the throttle was open, but he did not know whether this was caused by the accident. The tender cistern was demolished and he could not locate its retainer but the retainers on the cars were in the holding position, except one which also was lost. The cylinder casing on the right side of the engine was scratched and burned from friction and the guide yoke on the same side was - 6 1 bent back, while there were numerous splinters on parts of the cylinder and on the pins which indicated that the engine had slid across the bridge on its right side. Trainmaster Broderick stated that on the day of the accident he inquired of the engineman of train No. 425 es to how long it had been since he had made a trip over the Santa Fe Branch and the engineman replied that it had been more than 15 years. Trainmaster Broderick then produced a time-table and pointed out the speed restrictions on the branch, particularly calling his attention to the 18-miles-per-hour restric- tion on Barranca hill and explaining that this piece of track consisted of sharp curves, short tangents and a 4 per cent grade, and he said the engineman replied that he understood all of the requirements. Trainmaster Broderick also examined the derailed equipment, track and bridge at the scene of accident and from all the indications, which were similar to those mentioned by other witnesses, he concluded that the engine overturned at the east end of the bridge, due to excessive speed and that it then slid across the bridge and dropped off the roadbed at the opposite end. > An examination of the track approaching the eastern end of bridge 346A, made by an inspector of the Commission, as well as an examination of the bridge itself, and of the equipment involved in the accident, failed to develop anything contrary to the conditions as described by the various witnesses. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Reddington to control the speed of his train on a sharp curve and heavy descending grade. It appears that the brakes were inspected and tested at Barranca and that four retainers were set in holding position before leaving that point. The engine- man applied the brakes when the train started down the descending grade west of Barranca, which application reduced the speed and appeared to hold the train properly. While the train was descending the grade the brakes were released and after it had traveled a short distance they were again applied, but upon reaching a point in the vicinity of the leaving end of the first curve east of the curve on which the accident occurred they were again released, this being at a point considered by most of the witnesses as a dangerous point at which to release brakes, 1 and no further application prior to the accident was felt by any of the surviving cmployees. There were no flange marks on the track ap→ proaching the bridge, or on the bridge, although the guard rail extending across the bridge on the outside of the curve was damaged its entire length. An ine spection of the engine showed that the right cylinder was burnished, in fact it had been burned blue at one point from friction, and that splinters of wood were wedged in the cylinder cap and between the rods and pins, and that the right guide yoke was bent backward. These conditions, as well as the statements of the deadheading engineman, indicate that the engine over- turned at the east end of the bridge as a result of excessive speed and then slid along on the guard rail until it reached the opposite end of the bridge. Engineman Reddington was an experienced man in mountain territory and the reason why he failed to control the speed of his train could not be definitely determined. Attention is called to the fact, however, that he had not made a trip over this branch for more than 15 years, making it necessary for the trainmaster to talk it over with him and to point out various dangerous conditions, and attention is also called to the fact that the day of the accident was his first trip of any kind since November 24, 1928, a period of nearly eight months. Investigation developed that it was somewhat of a practice for Engineman Reddington, who was 61 years of age, to lay off for extended periods during the winter and spend the time on his nearby ranch, and it did not appear that there was anything wrong with him physically which would have prevented him from properly performing his duty. Regardless of the man's experience and qualifications, however the judgment of the officials is seriously questioned in allowing Engineman Reddington to operate a train in mountain territory of this nature without giving him an opportunity of going over the line first in order to observe the conditions and make himself familiar with them. > Respectfully submitted, S The employees involved were experienced men although Engineman Reddington had not operated a train over the branch line involved for over 15 years. At the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library HE 1780 •A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1548 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE MOUNT WASHINGTON RAILWAY NEAR THE SUMMIT OF MOUNT WASHINGTON, N. H., ON JULY 20, 1929. August 2, 1929. To the Commission: On July 20, 1929, there was a derailment of a light engine on the Mount Washington Railway near the summit of Mount Washington, N. H., which resulted in the death of one person, and the injury of two employees and one other person. Location and method of operation This railway is a sight-seeing cog railway 3.15 miles in length, extending from Base Station to Summit, N. H., and is owned and operated by the Boston & Maine Railroad. Trains are operated by time-table and run only during the months of July, August and September. A point known as Gulf Tank is located about 3,000 feet from the summit, and the accident occurred at a point approximately 2,100 feet down the incline from this tank. Approaching the point of accident, beginning at Gulf Tank, from which point the engine involved started the de- seent, the track is tangent for about 1,300 feet, followed by a 100 curve to the left 500 feet in length, and then tangent for a distance of 1,000 feet, the accident occurring on this latter tangent at a point approximately 300 feet from its receiving end. The maximum grade is 36.6 per cent, and at the point of accident it is 25 per cent. This line is constructed for practically its entire length on trestlework, the supporting bents of which vary in height from 2 feet to 20 feet, according to the contour of the land, and are spaced about 12 feet apart. The track is laid with 32-pound rails, 30 feet in length. In the center of the gauge, which is 4 feet 7 inches, there is a cog-rail constructed of two angle irons bolted to the track structure, with cross members or teeth to engage the cog wheels on engines. The whole structure appears to be substantially built and well maintained. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 5.22 p.m. · f ** -2- Description Engine No. 1, better known as "Peppersas", was in charge of Engineman Frost and Fireman Newsham, and had proceeded up the incline as far as Gulf Tank. At this point water was taken, after which the engine started the return trip light and running backwards, and shortly afterwards it was derailed while traveling at an estimated speed of 3 miles per hour. The engine then continued down the incline, gaining speed rapidly, and finally left the trestle about 2,050 feet from the initial point of derailment while traveling at a speed of about 35 miles per hour. The engine fell a distance of about 12 feet and was destroyed, practically the only part intact being the boiler. The person killed was a photographer-writer, who was temporarily employed by the Boston & Maine Railroad, and the persons injured were the engineman, fireman and a photographer, all of whom were riding on the engine. Summary of evidence Engine No. 1 made the first ascent of Mount Washington in 1869; it was in regular service until 1878, when it was replaced by the present type of engines in use on this railway. Since that time it made a tour of national expositions as well as being located in museums. On the day of this accident a celebration was in progress on Mount Washington under the auspices of the governor of New Hampshire and the president and directors of the Boston and Maine Railroad. The ceremonies were in connection with the return of "Peppersas" to the mountain where it made its first trip 60 years ago. The plan was to run the engine once to the summit of the mountain and return, after which it was to be placed on permanent exhibition. Six trainloads of guests, each train consisting of an engine pushing one car ahead of it, had preceded engine No. 1 up the mountain to the summit. This engine made one stop while ascending the grade due to low steam pressure and another to lubricate the cylinders. After taking water at Gulf Tank the return trip was started down the grade, and it was on this return trip that the accident occurred. Engineman Frost, whose regular position with the Boston and Maine Railroad is enginehouse foreman, had worked on the Mount Washington Railway for six consecutive summers as machinist, extra engineman and master mechanic. In preparing engine No. 1 for the exercises on July 20 he examined all parts and found the main parts in very good condition. The main valve was missing, but this was -3- replaced and other parts were renewed, including the pistons. After the engine was taken to the base of the mountain several trial trips were made by running part way up the mountain and during these tests the engine appeared to function perfectly. On the trip on which the accident occurred he ran the engine up as far as Gulf Tank. At this point he inspected and oiled the engine, after which the return trip to the base was started. Nothing unusual occurred until he reached a point about one-half mile from where the return trip was started when he heard a snap at the front end of the engine, immediately followed by the forward end raising up and when it came down the cog wheel was out of the cog rail. With the assistance of the fireman he attempted to apply the hand brake but without much effect on the speed of the engine, and realizing that the engine was out of control he shouted to the other persons to jump. Engineman Frost could not account for the front end of the engine lifting out of the cog rail unless it was caused by a broken tooth from a cog wheel being stuck in the cog rail. He further stated that he had never known of a cog wheel breaking on any of the engines used on this line; at one time a front pinion gear broke on one of the present type of engines and the train stopped immediately. The statements of Fireman Newsham substantiated those of Engineman Frost. He estimated the speed of the engine at the time of the accident at 2 miles per hour and at 30 miles per hour at the time he jumped off. He also said that he did practically all of the work in preparing the engine for the trip on which the accident occurred. Caleb Frost, 16 years of age, son of the engineman, stated that on the day of the accident he walked up the mountain behind the engine. When the engine started the return trip he, together with two other persons, got on. The engine was proceeding normally and without indication of trouble until he heard a snapping sound near the front part of the engine and it appeared to be derailed and bumping on the ties. He jumped just as the engine started down the long trestle and the last he saw of the engine was when it disappeared around a curve running at high speed and tearing up the ties. Assistant to Engineer of Maintenance of Way Watson stated that he arrived at the scene of accident on the morn- ing of July 22 and made an inspection of the track in the vicinity of the point of accident. He found marks on the side of the cog rail between bents 768 and 734 which appeared to have been made by something sliding on the angle iron which forms the side of the cog rail. There were also marks on the ties in the same vicinity which appeared to have been made by a gear sliding on them, and about 50 ties were broken between these points. -4- Jenny Later he found several teeth from a broken cog wheel and parts of the broken main driving gears, approximately 1,100 feet from the first mark of derailment. The Mr. Chief Mechanical Officer Richardson stated that he made an inspection of engine No. 1 upon its arrival at Concord shops for the necessary work and repairs in preparation for the ascent of Mount Washington. main concern was with the strength of the boiler, which was 63 years old; a hydrostatic test with a pressure of 150 pounds was made, which pressure remained applied over night. The boiler was also tested by representatives of the mechanical engineer's office and after the results of these tests had been assembled it was considered perfectly safe to run this engine under a steam pressure of 50 pounds. An inspection of the boiler after the accident showed the flues intact, top of boiler and all seams except the mud ring were tight, the dent on the mud ring being inward. This inspection convinced him that the boiler was not involved in the accident. Richardson was fully satisfied that the engine was capable of making the ascent safely but had some doubt whether it would descend freely, and during the trial trips it had so much internal friction that it was necessary to push it down by using other engine. He rode the engine while it made the ascent on the day of the accident and it functioned as intended. He further stated that in descending the mountain the speed of the engine was regulated by compression in the cylinders, and in addition there was a hand brake connected to the rear axle on which there was a cog wheel in mesh with the cog rail. After the accident the front axle assembly was located and the main shaft and main cog were found in good condition. The two large driving gears mounted on the axle were completely broken, only the hubs remaining. The two pinions were still on the drive shaft, one of them intact and the other forced outward about one-half its width and one tooth broken, but it was still keyed solidly to the shaft. In his opinion the accident was caused by the broken tooth in the pinion gear on the drive shaft, which meshed with a large driving gear on the front axle, jamming the gears and locking the entire front axle assembly. This condition, with the engine backing down the heavy grade, according to the usual practice, caused the front end of the engine to raise a sufficient distance to lift the cog wheel out of the cog rail, and when the engine dropped back the cog wheel did not mesh, permitting the engine to get out of control. The engine involved in this accident was designed to run forward up the mountain and backward while descend- ing. The frame was of wood construction, reinforced with metal, engine and tender being one unit. The boiler was of the vertical or upright type, hung in trunnions -5- ་ to permit it to assume the vertical position regardless of the angle of the ascent while climbing the mountain. There was one cylinder on each side of the frame which delivered power through crank shafts to a drive shaft on the front end of the engine, on which were mount ed two pinion gears. The front axle was in front of this drive shaft and two large gears were keyed to it which meshed with the pinion gears. In the center of the front axle there was a large cog wheel which engaged with the cog rail and which furnished the tractive power and also acted as a retarding feature in descending the grade. In addition to the driving cog wheel, there were two other wheels with ratchet attachments which served to hold the engine when it became necessary to stop while ascending the grade. In the center of the rear axle there was a cog wheel similar to the one on the front axle and which meshed with the cog rail and was used in connection with the hand brake, although the principal braking power was by compression in the cylinders. Conclusions This accident is believed to have been caused by the locking of the driving mechanism on the forward part of the engine. According to the evidence, the first intimation of anything wrong had by the persons riding on the engine was when they heard a click or snap at the front end of the engine, which then seemed to raise upward and then to drop down, apparently with the driving cog wheel out of mesh with the cog rail. An attempt to control the speed with the hand brake was without avail. Examination of the front axle after the accident showed that the cog or driving wheel was still intact and secured to the axle, although both large driving gears were completely broken. The drive shaft was also found and both pinion gears were attached to it. One of the gears, however, had a tooth broken off and this gear had been forced out of position on the shaft for a distance of about one-half its width; the other gear was in good condition. The damaged condition of this driving assembly indicates that the gears probably were jammed by the broken tooth of the pinion gear becoming lodged between this gear and the large driving gear with which it was supposed to mesh, resulting in the locking of the mechanism. This condition apparently accounted for the raising of the front of the engine sufficiently to disengage the forward cog from the rail, and when this end of the engine came down the cog wheel failed to mesh with the cog rail. # : .. -6- Engineman Frost and Fireman Newsham had been on duty 12 hours and 22 minutes at the time of the accident, after having been off duty for more than eight hours; both had good records. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. • Transportation Library He 1780 14234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE SUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TONOPAH AND TIDEWATER RAILROAD NEAR SODA, CALIF., ON AUGUST 5, 1929. To the Commission: 1549 • November 23, 1929. On August 5, 1929, there was a derailment of a mixed train on the Tonopah and Tidewater Railroad near Soda, Calif., which resulted in the death of two employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the First District, which extends between Ludlow and Death Valley Junction, Calif., a distance of 122.01 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred at bridge 36-A, located 1,364 feet north of mile post 36, which in turn is located 2.66 miles north of Soda. The track is tangent for several miles in each direction and the view is unobstructed. The grade is level at the point of accident. The track was laid with 65-pound rails, 30 feet in length, with 16 pine ties to the rail-length, single-spiked, and ballasted with gravel to a depth of from 14 to 16 inches. Bridge 36-A was a two-span, deck-ballasted bridge, 20 feet 6 inches in length, supported by three 4- post framed bents with 10-foot centers, six stringers, a ballast deck, and outside guard rails, with 8 inches of ballast under the ties and filled in with ballast to the tops of the ties. The wings extended a distance of 18 feet from the bulkheads and 8 feet from the track. This bridge was constructed in August, 1911. Approaching the bridge from the south there is a fill from 4 to 6 feet in height, the fill on the north side of the bridge being about 4 feet. The banks of the stream just east of the bridge were about 2 or 3 feet in height. There had been a severe thunder-storm and cloudburst in the Soda Lake Mountains, located about 5 or 6 miles west of the track, late in the afternoon of August 4, the afternoon previous to the occurrence of the accident, and also a storm of a general character to the south of, and in the vicinity of bridge 36-A. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred between 7:45 and 7:50 a.m. SANTA -2-- Description Northbound mixed train No. 25 consisted of seven loaded and eight empty freight cars, and one combination baggage car and coach, hauled by engine 7, and was in charge of Conductor Trenkle and Engineman Quinn. Train order No.1. Form 31, was received at Ludlow, reading as follows: "Run with care at all points where water would soften or wash track in event of thunder showers or cloudbursts. Run slow and careful between Mile Post 30 and Soda where water has been running over track." 2 Mile post 30 is located south of Soda, Train No. 25 departed from Ludlow at 5:40 a.m., 10 minutes late ac- cording to the train sheet, passed Soda, at 7:35 a.m., 30 minutes late, and while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour was derailed near mile post 36 due to bridge 36-A having been washed out. The engine came to rest with its front end on the north embankment, with the tender in reverse position to the right or east of the engine, both being badly damaged. The first four cars were scattered in various positions in the creek bed, considerably damaged; the fifth car was de- railed to the left or west, on the south embankment. The remaining equipment was not derailed. The employees killed were the engineman and fireman. Summary of Evidence Due to the rain storm on the day previous to the occurrence of the accident, there was a heavy rush of water that came down from the mountains west of the track, which eroded the north and south banks of the stream to a depth of from 3 to 5 feet at points within 1,500 feet of bridge 36-A. In addition to this heavy stream that came down the arroyo there was a distinct evidence of a stream coming from the north and cutting a water course on the west side of the track from culvert 36-B, located 1,466 feet north of bridge 36-A. The converging of these two streams at the north bulkhead of bridge 36-A undermined that bulkhead and the embankment north of the bridge; and, as the flow of this heavy stream continued, the stream bed under the bridge was scoured out to a depth of 5 or 6 feet, causing the bridge structure proper to fall into the stream bed and float away to a point about 50 feet east of the track. A small portion of the original ballast remained on the deck of the bridge. The erosion and scouring of these streams widened the channel spanned by bridge 36-A to a width of 60 feet. Conductor Trenkle stated that upon leaving Ludlow he had a copy of train order No. 1 and a clearance card; his train set out and picked up cars at several points en route, proceeded slowly from mile post 30 through the -3- stretch of bad track to Soda, as required by the train order, and from that point northward the train picked up speed, as the track looked safe, and had attained a speed between 20 and 25 miles per hour when the accident occurred. He was riding in the coach at the time of the accident, and had not noticed any prior application of the air brakes. Conductor Trenkle stated that he had talked with Trainmaster McPhee at Ludlow relative to track conditions and also with the track walker at Rasor, which is located. 3.94 miles south of Soda, who told him the section men were out looking over the track where water had run over it a couple of miles north of Rasor, and when his train passed Soda he felt that they were out of the danger zone. He had never seen water running under bridge 36-A, and at the time of the accident there was no running water in the creek bed - only water and oil from the train. He was of the opinion that the bridge as it rested after the washout, 50 feet or so from the track, was a little too low to be seen from the engine, saying that at times there is a pile of ties lying there that could be taken for a bridge. He thought, however, that if standing on a level with the engine cab he could have seen the bridge a distance of 400 or 500 feet had he been looking for it. Conductor Trenkle said he last talked with the engineman at Rasor, at which time the engineman did not say that anything was wrong with the engine which would in any way distract his attention. He had worked with him about eight years and considered him a first-class engineman - one that was careful. Roadmaster Horton stated that in addition to his duties as roadmaster he has charge of bridges and buildings. He was on train No. 25 on the morning of the accident, and before leaving Ludlow he had been told by the trainmaster that water had been reported running over the track between Rasor and Soda. This was his first knowledge of any danger- ous conditions and when they reached that territory he was riding on the rear platform of the last car in order to observe the conditions, and saw the section men making repairs. North of Soda he observed water on the west side of the track and some of it running through culverts toward Soda Lake on the east side of the track; there also was a small cave-in on the west side of the track at one of the culverts about 1/2 mile south of the point of accident. На stated that he was standing on the coach steps looking ahead when the derailment occurred; he immediately went to the head end of the train and after rendering what assistance he could, he noticed that the water had scoured out a hole under the bridge bents 4 or 5 feet in depth, which caused the bridge to collapse, and it was his opinion that the track itself had sagged from 4 to 6 inches, possibly more. There was extensive erosion of the banks on the north and south sides of the stream, but more especially on the north side, and this scouring and erosion was caused by two streams coming from the west and north, converging at the north bulk- head of the bridge, as the greater portion of track embank- ment was washed away on the north side, the width of the P -4- 葛 ​arroyo, having increased from about 21 feet to approximately 60 feet. From his knowledge of conditions he was of the opinion that there had not been enough water in the imme- diate vicinity to have washed out the track and that it came from the mountains about 5 miles to the west, and he did not think the full force of the water could have reach- ed the bridge before midnight. He further stated that he had never noticed water running under this bridge since its construction in 1911; he considered it a dry arroyo, al- though previous to that time there had been water in the vicinity. This bridge had been last inspected on July 23. Roadmaster Horton further stated that on his way to the head end of the train after the occurrence of the accident he noticed a hole 6 or 7 feet across, on the east side of the track at culvert 35-B, located 1,043 feet south of bridge 36-A; this was plainly visible from the engineman's side. Roadmaster Horton had issued instructions to section foremen at different times to the effect that they were to patrol the track during stormy weather and to take no chances whatever, and upon an investigation he found that the track in the vicinity of the point of accident had not been properly patroled in this instance. The last train to go over this bridge was train No. 26 on the evening of August 3, and the track walker, had passed over that section of track northward from Rasor on August 4, the morning pre- vious to the occurrence of the accident. A Mr. H. P. Gower, a passenger on train No. 25 at the time of the accident said he had lived in the desert country about 16 years. There was evidence of a very se- vere rain storm for several miles north of Rasor; the storm had been over the whole vicinity although undoubtedly the largest amount of water had come down from the mountains, as there were new freshly-washed water courses, but it also had rained along the track, because he saw where an auto- mobile had come up onto the track, the road being flooded, and had proceeded along for 2 miles or more on the right of way, making deep ruts in places. He estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour. He then assisted in getting the engineman and fireman out of the wreckage; the engineman was dead but the fireman lived about 20 minutes and according to Mr. Gower he told the fireman they had run into an open bridge and asked the fireman if he had seen anything, to which he replied in the negative. Section Foreman McDonald, located. at Rasor, stated that his section extends between mile post 15 and mile post 34, the latter being at the northern end of the section. On the afternoon previous to the occurrence of the accident there was a light rain at Rasor and there had been a cloudburst in the mountains west of the track. He patroled his entire section that afternoon and found the first indication of rain on his way northward between mile post 32 and mile post 33; at 10:30 p.m. that night, accom- panied by Track Walker Edwards, he again went to the north -5- end of his section and found water standing on the west side of the track north of mile post 34, but there was no running water. At 6 a.m. the next morning he reported to Train- master McPhee at Ludlow that there had been a cloudburst on Sunday evening, that water had carried some dirt onto the track, that there was a little washout at bridge 32-A, but that the track had been cleared was protected by slow flags, and was safe at a reduced speed. S Track Walker Edwards, whose district extends be- tween Ludlow and Rasor, stated that he went with Section Foreman McDonald to mile post 34 on Sunday evening and at that time it was quite dark and they could not see much. The next morning he telephoned the trainmaster at Ludlow and told him to give slow orders, as the track was in bad shape from mile post 30 to Soda that water had been over the track. He also said that when train No. 25 arrived at Rasor that morning he told Engineman Quinn that the track was in bad shape that water had been over the track, and to go slow up to mile post 34. That was as far as he and Section Forman McDonald had gone and he could not say any- thing about conditions beyond that point. He said he also talked with Conductor Trenkle. Sp Section Foreman Allen, located at Baker 8.48 miles north of Soda, whose section extends from mile post 34 to mile post 52, which includes the territory on which the accident occurred, stated that there had been a light rain at Baker on Sunday, that there was no water on the track and he did not think it necessary to go over his section that night, having talked with the track walker who passed through Baker on Sunday on his way north to Riggs. On Monday morning he patroled his section as far south as mile post 38 arriving at that point about 7 a.m. The track looked all right; there was a little water on the ties, but it was running very slowly. He then looked down toward mile post 36 and as everything seemed all right and in a safe condition, he returned northward to a point about 4 miles north of Baker, as it had been raining heavily in the hills; there was a black cloud to the north and the possibility of a storm was,greater to the north than to the south. He further stated that he had been in charge of this section for 15 months and that he had never seen water running under bridge 36-A and had never experienced any trouble with washouts on his section. Trainmaster McPhee, who is also chief dispatcher, stated that he went on duty at 5 a.m. on August 5, turned to the transfer made at 11 p.m. the previous night, and found there were no orders, but a specific notation "All section formen to patrol track in a.m." signed by the second trick dispatcher. The office was closed from 11 p.m. Sunday night until he opened it the following morning, there being no trains during that time. He then turned to the train sheet and noted there were no alarming weather conditions. He then received a telephone message from : -6- Track Walker Edwards reporting the conditions between Mile Post 30 and Soda, and advising him to issue a slo order which he did and he said he gave a copy of it to train No. 25. At 6 a.m. he received a telephone call from Section Foreman McDonald, who told him there had been a little cloudburst between mile post 30 and bridge 32-A, that the water had run some dirt on the track and that there was a little washout at bridge 32-A but that it was safe and the track was clear. The next report he received was of the occurrence of the accident. The only other message he re- ceived relative to rain was one received from the section foreman at Riggs on Sunday reading "Report everything is O.K. between mile post 52 and 72. Looks like rain east of Valjean. Will patrol in the morning ahead of train. Riggs is located 26.13 miles north of Soda and Valjean is 5.64 miles north of Riggs. As he received no report from Baker he took it for granted that everything was all right on that section. 11 Chief Clerk Brown, who previously had been a telegraph operator, stated that about 7:30 or 8 p.m. on August 4, at the request of Superintendent Cahill, he tele- graphed as to weather conditions and the agent at Crucero, 7.66 miles south of Soda, reported a light sprinkle, and the agent at Silver Lake, 16.69 miles north of Soda, re- ported that it had been raining very hard for about an hour and the rest of the time there had been a light sprinkle. Conclusions This accident was caused by a washout. The evidence indicates that on Sunday, the after- noon previous to the occurrence there had been a severe rain storm in the mountains west of the vicinity in which this accident occurred, and also a rain storm of a general character in the immediate vicinity, which resulted in an unusual amount of water coming from the west and north, scouring out the stream bed and undermining the north bulk- head and the track embankment north of the bridge, causing the bridge to fall into the stream bed and float to a point about 50 feet east of the track. The operating rules of this railroad require section foremen or one of their men, to patrol their entire sections daily, Sundays included. Section Foreman Allen in charge of the section on which this accident occurred, was at Baker on Sunday,August 4, and talked with the track walker who passed through on his way north. On Monday morning,August 5, he patroled his section as far south as mile post 38, and then started back north, leaving 4 miles of track at the south end of his section that had not been patroled. There is only one scheduled train daily, No. 25 on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, and No. 26 on Tuesday Thursday and Saturday, and in view of the fact that train No. 25 would be the first train to pass over his section, -7 and was coming from the south, a thorough inspection of the track to the southern limits of his section, or to mile post 34, was his paramount duty; if this requirement had been fulfilled, the washed-cut bridge would have been dis- covered and this accident averted. It is doubtful if the track structure had sagged enough to cause it to be noticeable from an approaching engine, and it is probable that the washed-out holes on each side of the roadbed approaching the point of accident would have been a better indication to the engine crew that they had not yet passed through the storm zone. It is apparent, however, that after passing through the territory where water had run over the track between mile post 30 and Soda, Engineman Quinn concluded that he was out of the storm zone and increased the speed of his train to 20 or 25 miles per hour, and even had he observed the washed-out bridge lying in the stream bed 50 feet from the track, it is questionable if he could have stopped in time to prevent his engine from falling into the stream bed. The employees involved in this accident were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation 68 Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1550 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE IN- VESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE SOUTHERN RAILWAY AT DAISY, TENN., ON AUGUST 7, 1929. To the Commission: November 22, 1929. On August 7, 1929, there was a derailment of a work train on the Southern Railway at Daisy, Tenn., which resulted in the death of one person. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Third District of the Queen & Crescent District, extending between Chattanooga and Oakdale, Tenn., a distance of 83.6 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and án automatic block-signal and train-control system. At a point 1,156 feet south of the station at Daisy there is a switch leading off the main track to the west to a spur track 1,766 feet in length, the point of accident being at the end of this spur. Beginning at a point on this track 725 feet from its southern end, the track is tangent for a distance of 211 feet, followed by an 110 curve to the left 135 feet in length and then a 120 curve to the right 122 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent to its northern end, a distance of 573 feet. The grade at the point of accident is 0.38 per cent ascending for northbound movements. There is a store building located 38 feet north of the end of the spur track, the east side of which is directly in line with the west rail of the track. There was nothing but a cross tie to prevent cars from leaving the end of the track. There are two other tracks which lead off from this spur track, one of them being of much greater length. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 3.25 p. m. 1 -2- Description Northbound work train extra 6271 consisted of 47 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 6271, and was in charge of Conductor Jackson and Engineman Lehman. This train de- parted from Chattanooga, 13.9 miles south of Daisy, at 10.48 a. m., and after setting cars off at several points en route, it arrived at Daisy at 2.01 p. m., where it be- came engaged in switching. At the time of the accident, from north to south, the movement consisted of 2 cars, the caboose, 17 cars and the engine, which was headed north and was shoving the cars in on the spur track. Two cars were shoved off the end of the track, the leading car striking and partly demolishing the store build- ing; this car sustained slight damage. The person killed was in the store building. Summary of evidence Conductor Jackson stated that during the course of switching at Daisy, 17 cars and the caboose were left standing on the main track, and when it became necessary to clear the time of train No. 3 the engine was coupled to these cars and they were shoved in on the spur track, on which track 2 cars were then standing. Before this move- ment was started he instructed Brakeman Culvahouse to re- main at the switch and informed Brakeman Stringfield that they would couple to the 2 cars and shove them to the north end of the track, where 1 of them was to be placed. Conduc- tor Jackson rode on the caboose, which was on the north end of the cut, until they coupled to the two cars, and he then went to the north end of the leading car and climbed up on the ladder on the east side of it for the purpose of pass- ing signals to Brakeman Stringfield, who was located on the ground opposite the station and who was in plain view at all times. When the leading car reached a point about four car- lengths from the end of the track he gave the brakeman a steady" signal and the brakeman in turn passed it to the engineman, but after the cars moved an additional car-length Conductor Jackson realized that no action was being taken, jumped off, ran to a highway which parallels the spur track on the east, and gave the engineman a stop signal. This signal was immediately acted upon, but before the cars could be stopped the leading two cars were shoved off the end of the track and into the store building. Conductor Jackson said that the air was not coupled up, as it was entirely a switching movement, while at no time was the speed greater than 3 or 4 miles per hour. He also said that this : S Categor S -3- was the first day that Brakeman Stringfield had worked with him, but he considered him an experienced man and said he was aware of the contemplated movement. Conductor Jackson did not notify the engineman as to just what movement was to be made, as it was a switching movement and he did not deem it necessary. He was satisfied that Brakeman Stringfield was in proper position to transmit his signals when the movement was started, and supposed the brakeman would keep in sight of the engineman. Brakeman Stringfield stated that he was familiar with the various tracks at Daisy but that this was his first trip on this particular run for some time. The conductor notified him that in order to clear the main track for train No. 3, the cars would be shoved in on the spur track and at the same time one of the two cars then standing on that track would be placed at the northern end. Brakeman Stringfield took a position in the roadway between the station and the spur track, so that he could pass signals, and after coupling to the two cars the conductor went ahead and boarded the side ladder of the leading car at its northern end, and constantly remained within view. The conductor then gave a proceed signal, which he repeated to the engineman, and when the cars neared the north end of the track the conductor gave a stop signal which he also transmitted, but at this time he discovered that the engineman had disappeared from view due to the engine then being on a curve. He immediately boarded the cars about 10 car-lengths ahead of the engine and started back towards the engine giving stop signals; he did not know whether the engineman observed these signals, although he could see the engine from his position on top of the cars, nor did he know how long the conductor remained on the side of the leading car. Engineman Lehman stated that when the movement was started he did not know on which track the cars were to be placed. Upon reaching a point about six or seven car- lengths from the main-track switch, Brakeman Stringfield, who was standing near the station, gave a signal to come ahead, shortly after which the brakeman disappeared from view, and the engineman did not see him again prior to the accident. He continued moving the cars ahead at a speed of 3 or 4 miles per hour until he saw the conductor move out in the roadway and give a stop signal; he immediately applied the engine brakes in emergency and brought the cars K - 3- was the first day that Brakeman Stringfield had worked with him, but he considered him an experienced man and said he was aware of the contempleted movement. Conductor Jackson did not notify the engineman as to just what movement was to be made, as it was a switching movement and he did not deem it necessary. He was satisfied that Brakeman Stringfield was in proper position to transmit his signals when the movement was started, and supposed the brakeman would keep in sight of the enginemen. Brakeman Stringfield stated that he was familiar with the various tracks at Daisy but that this was his first trip on this particular run for some time. The conductor notified him that in order to clear the main track for train No. 3, the cars would be shoved in on the spur track and at the same time one of the two cars then standing on that track would be placed at the northern end. Brakeman Stringfield took a position in the roadway between the station and the spur track, so that he could pass signals, and after coupling to the two cars the conductor went ahead and boarded the side ladder of the leading car at its northern end, and constantly remained within view. The conductor then gave a proceed signal, which he repeated to the engineman, and when the cars neared the north end of the track the conductor gave a stop signal which he also transmitted, but at this time he discovered that the engineman had disappeared from view due to the engine then being on a curve. He immediately boarded the cars about 10 car-lengths ahead of the engine and started back towards the engine giving stop signals; he did not know whether the engineman observed these signals, although he could see the engine from his position on top of the cars, nor did he know how long the conductor remained on the side of the leading car. Engineman Lehman stated that when the movement was started he did not know on which track the cars were to be placed. Upon reaching a point about six or seven car- lengths from the main-track switch, Brakeman Stringfield, who was standing near the station, gave a signal to come ahead, shortly after which the brakeman disappeared from view, and the engineman did not see him again prior to the accident. He continued moving the cars ahead at a speed of 3 or 4 miles per hour until he saw the conductor move out in the roadway and give a stop signal; he immediately applied the engine brakes in emergency and brought the cars -4- to a stop. He estimated the distance that the cars moved after the brakeman became lost to view, until the conductor gave a stop signal, at three or four car-lengths. Engine- man Lehman was familiar with the requirements of rule 1313 that if, in switching, the train or yard man giving signals is lost to view the engineman is required to stop, but said the reason he did not do so was because he was under the impression that when the brakeman disappeared he had boarded the train, and that the cars were being shoved into the other track which is of greater length, which is the regular practice in making a movement of this kind. K Fireman Freeman stated that he was riding on his seatbox when the cars were shoved into clear but he did not know on which track they were moving on account of the curve, as well as some box cars standing on a spur track which ob- structed his view. He did not see any signals after the cars cleared the main track until he noticed Brakeman String- field appear on top of the cars, giving a stop signal, and about the same time the engineman moved the brake-valve handle into the emergency position. Fireman Freeman said that it is customary in switching at Daisy for signals to be given from the east side of the spur track, except when cars are shoved in on one of the other tracks, in which event signals are passed from the tops of the cars. The statements of Brakeman Culvahouse added nothing more of importance, as he remained at the main-track switch and had no connection with the handling of the cars after they entered the spur track. The statements of Sam Morgan and Fred Nelson, employees of an industry at Daisy, were to the effect that they were working about 120 feet south of the north end of the spur track and watched the cut of cars as it was being shoved northward. They said there was no one riding on either of the two cars ahead of the caboose, the conductor being located on the north platform of the caboose. They both noticed the conductor giving stop signals when the leading car was some distance from the end of the track, and Mr. Nelson said the conductor afterwards ran out into the road and continued giving stop signals. - B Track Supervisor Kidd stated that there was a tie across the north end of the spur track, with some dirt be- hind it which caused the cars to mount the tie. Some time ago there was a standard mound at the end of this track, but on account of wagons working around this track, keeping the mound cut away, it was practically impossible to keep a standard mound at this point. On August 12, a test was conducted at this point by using the same engine with a like number of cars and the same crew as was involved in the accident. The brakeman stationed himself as nearly as possible to the location at which he was standing at the time he transmitted signals, and it was found that the conductor riding on the east side of the leading car could be seen by the brakeman at all times. From the engineman's side of the cab, the brakeman was lost to view when about 12 car-lengths away. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engine- man Lehman to stop the cut of cars when the brakeman, who was transmitting signals, disappeared from view, and also by the failure of Brakeman Stringfield to keep himself where he could be seen by the engineman. It appears that Engineman Lehman observed the brake- man give a signal to come ahead after the cars entered the spur track and a short time later the brakeman was lost to view, but the engineman did not bring the cars to a stop although he knew the rules required him to do so under such circumstances. His only reason for failing to do so was that when he did not see the brakeman he assumed the brake- man had boarded the cars and that they were being shoved into another track which branches off from the spur track and extends farther northward. Brakeman Stringfield knew what movement was in- tended and stationed himself in the vicinity of the station for the purpose of transmitting signals to the engineman. When the conductor gave a stop signal from the head end of the cars he attempted to repeat it to the engineman but at that time the engineman was not in view and the brakeman then boarded the train and again gave stop signals, but it was too late to avert the accident. It was possible for him મ S to have moved a few feet away from the track to a roadway where he could have been seen in either direction at all times; it was his duty to keep in sight of the engineman, and if in doing so he lost sight of the conductor, then he could have given the engineman a signal to stop. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. ENK Transportation Library HE 1780 4234 1551 INTERST. TE COMMERCE COMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHICAGO, MIL. MUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAIL- ROND IT LADSWORTH, ILL., ON AUGUST 9, 1929. November 18, 1929 To the Commission: On August 9, 1929, there was a head-ond col- lision between a passenger train and a freight train on the Chicago, Milwaukoc, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad at Wadsworth, Ill., rcsulting in the death of 2 employees and 1 trospasser, and the injury of 20 passengers and 2 employces. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Location and mothod of operation. This accident occurred on that part of the Chicago & Milwaukoo Division cxtcnding botwo on Chicago, Ill., and Kilwaukee, Wis., a distance of 85 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double- track line over which trains ordinarily arc opcrated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system, however, as the castbound main track was blocked during daylight working hours, in connection with tho making of a fill for the extension of the castbound pass- ing track at Rannoy, located 8.7 miles west of Wadsworth, it was necessary to establish a single-track zonc, the wostbound track being used for this purpose, with manual block oboration. Star T The general direction of tho track is north and south, but the timo-tablo directions are cast and west, and those latter directions are the directions used in this report. The accident occurred within the interlocking limits of Wadsworth, at a point about 1 mile wost of the tower, at the west switch of the passing track, a facing- point switch for trains moving against the current of traffic on the westbound track; the passing track parallels the main tracks on the north. Approaching from the west the track is tangent for a considerable distancc, followed by a 10 curve to the right 800 foot in length, the switch being located on this curve at a point 152 feet from its castorn ond. The grade for castbound trains is slightly desconding. ܝ ܪ ܬ ܬ ܛ ܐ i -2- West Switch Dwarf Signal. : N 648' - 290' 55' ---- Main Westbound 46 Eastbound Main • 1° Curve 800' ¡ 6500 Tangent M.. 4.1 mi. -Point of Accident. Russell ↑ 4.6 mi. 1 To Wadsworth Tower about ¡ mi. → Ranney Wadsworth A No. 1551 C.,M., St.P.& P.R.R. Wadsworth, Ill. Aug. 9, 1929. SDA 11-14-29 # : AU -3- The switch involved is controlled from the tower at Wadsworth, the tower being located on the south side of the main tracks and directly opposite the station. Dwarf signal 5, of the two-position, upper-quadrant type, is located 55 feet west of the switch and between the main tracks; it normally displays a stop indication, and governs reverse movements either on the main track or into the passing track. The automatic block-signal system functions only for trains moving with the current of traffic. Rules 352, 670-4 and 1093 of the rules and regulations of the operating department read in part as follows: 332. If, from any cause, a signalman is unable to communicate with the next block station in advance, he must stop all trains approaching in that direction.*** 670-A. On two or more tracks, trains moving against the current of traffic must reduce speed to not more than ten miles per hour and be under control when approaching und passing through interlocking limits, prepared to stop at a dwarf signal giving a "Stop" indication. The indications of these signals can be seen at a distance of approximately only 600 feet in alear weather. *** 1093. After receipt of a train order addressed to two or more offices each operator to whom the order is sent will check his copy with the first repetition The operator repeating first will check with the next repetition. If a difference is found operators will immediately interrupt and call the dispatcher's attention to it. *** The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 5.05 p.m. Description. Eastbound passenger train No. 46 consisted of one milk car, one baggage car, one express car, three coaches and two parlor cars, hauled by engine 6159, and was in charge of Conductor Wybourn and Engineman Lorimer. The first and third cars were of steel underframe con- struction, while the remainder were of all-steel con- struction. At Ranney this train was crossed over to the westbound main track, against the current of traffic, and while passing the office, at 4.55 p.m., according G -4- to the train sheet, 14 minutes late, the operator handed on a copy of train order No. 29, Form 19, reading as follows: No. 46 has right over opposing trains on westward track Ranney to Wadsworth. Do not exceed 10 miles per hour through crossovers. Train No. 46 passed Russell, 4.1 miles west of Wadsworth, at 5.02 p.m., according to the train sheet, at which point a clear indication was displayed on the train-order signal, passed dwarf signal 5, which apparently was displaying a stop indication, entered the open facing- point switch at the west end of the passing track at Wadsworth while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 25 and 35 miles per hour and collided with the head end of west bound freight train extra 8378, an 37-car train, in charge of Conductor Martin and Engineman Kelly, which was standing on the passing track with the engine just east of the "holding" signal, near the clearance point, or about 336 feet east of the switch. Engine 8378 was partly derailed and badly damaged, its boiler being torn from the frame, and the tender was also badly damaged. Four cars in the freight train were damaged, two being practically demolished. Engine 6139, its tender and the first three cars in the passenger train were derailed; engine 6139 was also badly damaged and its tender demolished. The milk car was demolished, and the baggage car considerably damaged, while the damage to the remaining six cars was confined principally to interior fixtures. The employees killed were the engine man and fireman of train No. 46, while the employees injured were the baggageman and flagman of that train. Summery of evidence. Dispatcher Tabbert stated that he issued train order No. 29 at 4.35 p.m., by tele phone, simultaneously to Wadsworth, Russell and kanney; it was addressed to all westward trains and the operator at Wadsworth on Form 31; to the crew of a work extra and the operator at Russell on Form 31, and to the crew of train No. 46 at Ranney on Form 19, the order sent in each case read- ing exactly as previously quoted. Immediately afterwards, and before train order No. 29 had been repeated by any of the operators, the dispatcher issued train order No. 30, as an extra precaution, addressing it to the operators at Wadsworth and Russell on Form 31, reading "hold -5- westward train.fi Dispatcher Tabbert stated that Operator Porter, at Wadsworth, correctly repeated both orders, and also assured him that extra 8578 was in the clear and being held on the passing track at that point. Dispatcher Tabbert also stated that for two or three days prior to the accident, train No. 46 had been run against the current of traffic from Ranney to Russell and that Operator Porter had been involved in all of those movements. On this occasion, however, train order No. 29 specified "Ranney to Wadsworth", and in fact, it was the intention of the dispatcher to extend the order and run train No. 46 against the current of traffic all the way to Rondout, 10.6 miles cast of Wadsworth, on account of another eastbound train having developed trouble between Wadsworth and Rondout. Dispatcher Tabbert further stated that prior to the time at which train order No. 29 was issued, and while in telephone con- versation with the operator at Wadsworth relative to a westbound motor car, he told the operator to "let the motor car go and hold extra 8378 west for No. 46, running No. 46 wrong." G > Operator Porter, on duty at Wadsworth, stated that he went on duty at 4 p.m., at which timo extra 8378 was on the passing track. The motor car departed westbound at 4.27 p.m. and when it cleared the circuit ho opened the wost switch of the passing track, but about a minute or two later he closed the switch. At 4.35 p.m. ho received train order No. 29, directing the movement of train No. 46 against the current of traffic on the westbound track. Operator Porter said that the order was transmitted at about the average speed, so that he could write it down as given, and that he had the order entirely written out before he started to ropeat it; he repeated the order promptly to the dis- patcher, but did not comply with the rules and check with the repetitions by the operators at Russell and Ranney. Operator Porter was questioned as to the procedure he followed in repeating the order to the dispatcher, and his statements in this connection were as follows: pronounced the station thought it was part of order. I reported the of order. A. G. In repeating order No. 29 to the train dis- patcher, did you spell out the word 'Russell? Had a little trouble with the telephone cutting in and out at times. It's my idea that when I spelled out the name of 'Russell' possibly the phone cut out and when I Wadsworth' he 1 the repetition of the phone being out -6- Q. What do you mean, repeated Wadsworth'? A. As a finish of the repetition. Q. In other words, you repeated this: 'Train No. 46 has right over opposing trains on westward track Ranney to Russell - Wads- worth'. A. Yes, sir. Q. ↑ Is there anything in the rules pertaining to the handling of train orders by tele- phanc that would make it necessary for you to pronounce the name of your station, practically in the body of a train order? A. We give name of station when we finish any business on the phone, as a rule. SEPTE Q. Well, when the order was checked with you, you repeated it to the dispatcher and all of the testimony is to the effect that you repeated it 'Wadsworth. ? A. I explained a while ago how the phone con- nection got cut off at times and I sup- pose when I repeated 'Russell' the phone cut out and he did not hear it and when I pronounced 'Wadsworth' he took it for the repetition of the order. Q. Do you actually know whether or not the order road Russoll' or 'Wadsworth'? A. I thought ho said 'Russell.' Aftor having received the order, he said he put a copy on the hoop and throw one copy in the waste basket. Shortly afterwards, Dis patcher Tabbert issued another train order, No. 32, giving train No. 46 right over opposing trains on the westbound main track from · Wadsworth to Rondout, which Operator Porter repeated at 4.44 p.m. After Cotting this order, Operator Porter again oponcd the west switch of the passing track, of his own accord, with the intention of lotting extra 8378 dc- part westward as soon as train No. 46 had cleared at Russell, having in some way formed the opinion that train No. 46 would only run against the current of traffic as far as Russoll and that the dispatcher then would let extra 8378 depart from Wadsworth. Operator Porter then left the office for the purpose of delivering train order No. 32 by hoop to the crew of train No. 46, but in a few minutos, or about 5 p.m., he returned to the office and started calling Russell on the telephone, in order to -7- ascertain whether train No. 46 had crossed over to the eastbound main track at that point, so that he could let extra 8378 depart from the passing track; the operator at Russell did not answer until nearly 5.05 p.m., and it was during the course of this conversation that Operator Porter first realized that train No. 46 was moving against the current of traffic to Wadsworth. He looked at the train indicator in the tower and saw that train No. 46 was heading in at the west switch and although he changed the lever controlling the switch it was then too late to avert the accident. Operator Porter said that the dwarf signal lever in the tower was in the stop posi- tion at all times. A short time after the accident a copy of train order No. 29 was found in the waste basket; it was hardly legible, bore erasures and changes, and read as follows: 叫 ​: No. 46 has right over opposing trains on westward track Ranney to Russell. It will be noted that this copy of the order read, "Ranney to Russell", instead of "Ranney to Wadsworth". Operator Porter acknowledged that he did not include in the order that part reading "do not exceed 10 miles per hour through crossovers". Further questioning of Operator Porter indicated that he was considerably disturbed by personal affairs, and that his wife had been in the office at the time he copied train order No. 29. It also appeared from his statements that a freight train was passing the tower at the same time, that it made a great deal of noise, and that if he made any error in copying the order it must have been due to this noise. He felt, however, that the only mistake he had made was in open- ing the switch for extra 8378 without having any knowl- edge as to when that train would be allowed to depart. Operator Oskins, who had been relieved by Operator Porter at 4.p.m., said it was clearly evident that there was something on Operator Porter's mind when he came on duty, and that he did not seem to be paying any attention when the transfer was made; the situation was so unusual that Operator Oskins gave it considerable thought on his way home, but at the time he did not feel that there was any danger in turning over the office to Operator Porter. S Operator Newyear, stationed at Russell, stated that he checked his own copy of train order No. 29 as it was repeated by Operator Porter to the dispatcher, and he was positive that the order was repeated correctly, spelling out the word "Wadsworth". Operator Newyear also checked his own copy of this order when Operator Thompson, at Ranney, repeated it, saying that that operator also repeated it correctly. Operator Newyear stated that train No. 46 was reported to him as having left Ranney H -8- at 4.55 p.m., and that he at once endeavored to get in telephone communication with the operator at Wadsworth, several times, but to no avail, and when trein No. 46 ap- proached the station at Russell, instead of stopping it and getting into communication with the dispatcher as he should have done, he permitted it to pass his office under a clear train-order signal without first having obtained the block from Wadsworth, feeling at the time that it was perfectly safe to do this, in view of the contents of train orders Nos. 29 and 30, and feeling that the operator at Wadsworth knew train No. 46 would be on the westbound track from Ranney to Wadsworth. After train No. 46 passed Russell the operator at Wads- worth rang the telephone and at this time Operator New- year informed Operator Porter that train No. 46 had passed Russell at 5.02 pim. on the westbound track. pang " Operator Thompson, stationed at Ranney, left the telephone after receiving train order No. 29, in order to line up his plant for a Chicago & North Western train, and therefore did not completely check his own copy of the order as it was repeated by the operator at Wadsworth, returning to the telephone just as that operator was finishing. Operator Thompson did, however, check his own copy of the order at the time it was repeated by the operator at Russell. Conductor Wybourn, of train No. 46, stated that approaching the interlocking limits at Wadsworth the speed of his train was about 40 miles per hour, and that a service air-brake application was made, reducing the speed of the train to 25 or 30 miles per hour when about one-fourth to one-half mile west of the switch; the con- ductor felt certain that the train could be brought to a stop without incident provided the dwarf signal was dis- playing a stop indication. The air brakes were held applied following the application, and went into emergency immediately prior to the collision; he estimated the speed of his train to have been about 25 miles per hour on entering the switch. The air brakes had been tested at Milwaukee and worked properly en route. Conductor Wybourn further stated that the speed of his train did not exceed 40 miles per hour at any time between Ranney and the point of accident, and that he was thoroughly familiar with rule 670-4, relative to having the train under con- trol prepared to stop at a dwarf signal displaying a stop indication. After the accident he oxamined the switch and it was open, with the dwarf signal in the stop posi- tion. The statements or other members of the crew developed nothing additional di Members of the crew of extra 8378 estimated the speed of train No. 46 to have been between 25 and 35 miles 2 per hour on entering the switch. Their testimony was to the effect that they did not know that train No. 46 was being run against the current of traffic, and that the dwarf signal did not display a proceed indication at any time while their train stood on the passing track. Conclusions. The direct cause of this accident was an open switch, but there were a number of incidents leading up to its occurrence which need to be noted. Dispatcher Tabbert issued an order directing train No. 46 to run against the current of traffic from Ranney to Wadsworth, and reducing speed to 10 miles per hour through cross- overs, but Operator Porter, at Wadsworth, wrongly copied the order as reading from Ranney to Russell, and omitted the provisions containing the speed restriction. Operator Porter admitted that he left out the speed-restriction provision, but said he was sure the rights of train No. 46 on westbound track extended only from Renney to Russell. Even under these circumstances, however, the accident would not have occurred had not Operator Porter opened the west passing-track switch with the idea that the extra on the passing track would be allowed to depart westward as soon as train No. 46 had crossed back to the eastbound track at Russell. Operator Porter then left the office with the expectation of delivering orders to the crew of train No. 46, and remained out of the office for a period of probably two or three minutes, during all of which time the passing track switch was allowed to remain open, although there was nothing to be gained by opening this switch until the extra on the passing track had actually been authorized to proceed. Operator Porter's only state- ment in this connection was that it was not customary to line up a route in this manner, and the only explanation for the way in which he handled this switch, which was the direct cause of the accident, and for the manner in which he copied train order No. 29, probably can be found in the fact that he clearly was not in the mental condi- tion necessary to enable him to attend properly to his duties. ... Operator Newyear, on duty at Russell, failed to obtain the block from Wadsworth for train No. 46, but said he thought it was safe to allow the train to proceed under a clear block-signal indication, because of the fact that under the orders which had been issued he supposed the operator at Wadsworth knew that the train was moving against the current of traffic from Ranney to Wadsworth. No reasonable excuse can be offered to justify his action, and it is only necessary to point out that had Operator -10- Newyear had a proper conception of his duties, it is more than probable that the accident would have been prevented. Under the rules, Engine man Lorimer, of train No. 46, also is at fault for his failure to reduce the speed of his train to not more than 10 miles per hour when approaching interlocking limits against the current of traffic, and for his further failure to bring his train to a stop before passing dwarf signal 5. All of the evidence available indicated that this signal was in the stop position at all times, but under the circumstances, it is impossible to say what it was that caused Engine- man Lorimer to fail to see the indication of this signal in time to stop his train. The facts surrounding the occurrence of this accident give one more illustration of.the necessity for strict adherence to the rules provided for the safe operation of trains. Each of the three employees above mentioned failed to perform his own duties properly, and yet any one of them could have prevented the accident. This has been the story of innumerable accidents in the past. Various safety devices have been adopted with the idea of reducing accidents to the greatest possible extent, but there will always remain the human element for which no substitute can be found. The only answer is to guard continually against the taking of chances, against the inclination to act upon assumption, and against the idca of one employee that he can wink at the rules himself and depend on the other man's carefulness to prevent the occurrence of an accident. If cach employee would see that his own performance was strictly in accordance the rules, accidents of this character would not occur. with Operator Porter and Enginoman Lorimer had had over 30 years' experience, and Operator Nowyear had had ovor 10 years' experience. The other employees involved wore also experienced mon, and at the time of the acci- dent none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. A S י. } Transportation Library HE 1780 14234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMISSION 1552 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD AT WILSHERE, DEL., ON AUGUST 11, 1929. Sorum November 22, 1929. · Description Lax 3 UNIY: To the Commission: On August 11, 1939, there was a side collision between a light engine and a cut of cars being handled by a switch engine on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at Wilsmere, Del., which resulted in the death of one employee. Location and method of operation 老​福州 ​This accident occurred on that part of the Baltimore Division extending between Baltimore, Md., and Philadelphia, Pa., a distance of 97.5 miles. At Wilsmere there are groups of yard tracks designated as receiving yards and de- parture yards; the accident occurred in the west receiving yard. The tracks in this yard extend east and west and are numbered, from south to north, 1, 3, 5, 7, etc. At the east end of this yard there is a track which continues eastward, known as track 29, and a track known as the fire-track lead extends toward the north from track 29, being used by engines en route to the round house; the accident occurred at the fouling point between these two tracks. The grade is level at the point of accident. > POS The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 3:00 a.m. The light engine involved was engine 4623, which had arrived at Wilsmere, hauling westbound freight train first No. 97, and was in charge of Engineman Knudsen and Fireman Wojtowicz. After setting the train off on track 7 at the west end of the yard the engine remained at that point until another engine had coupled to the train and the train had departed. Engine 4323 then started a back-up movement towards the roundhouse over track 7 and track 29, and was about to enter the fire track lead, moving at a speed of about 2 miles per hour, when it was struck by a cut of cars being shoved by engine 1039. · C 1 1 دو -2- Track 3 TK: 1/2 Car lengths-2 between Clearance Point & West End of Cars Handled by Engine #1039 Track #29 Start » 6- 1 TK 7%. TK · Indicates Movement of Engine #4623 Indicates Movement of Engine #1039 Engine #4623 Moving Backwarās. 1 Point of Accident. N End of Cars Handled by Engine #1039 No. 1582 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Wilsmere, Del. Aug. 11, 1929. SDA 11-14-29 -3- 嚣 ​Yard engine 1039, headed west, was coupled to the east end of 22 cars, and was in charge of Conductor Walsh and Ingineman Schwinn. This cut of cars was pulled eastward from track 3 into track 29 and was brought to a stop clear of the fouling point of the fire track lead, in order to allow engine 4623 to use that track, but just about the time engine 4623 had reached the fouling point the cars were shoved ahead and collided with the side of that engine. The leading car struck the engine on its left side at the gangway between the engine and tender, crushing the side of the engine cab. The forward truck of the leading car was derailed and the car damaged to some extent. The em- ployee killed was the fireman of the light engine. Summary of evidence Engineman Knudsen, of engine 4623, stated that upon ar- rival at Wilsmere with train first No. 97 he was instructed by the yardmaster to return the engine to the roundhouse over track 7 after another engine had pulled the train from the yard. Soon afterwards the back-up movement was started; a stop was made to allow the brakeman to open the switch at the east end of track 7 and the engine then proceeded until it reached the fire track lead, as that switch was also closed. The brakeman started towards the switch but before he reached it some member of the yard crew opened it and the brakeman, from his position on the ground, gave Engine man Knudsen another back-up signal which he acted upon, the col- lision occurring a few moments later. He estimated the speed of his engine at the time of the accident at 2 miles per hour; he was using the drifting valve and said he did not stop the engine immediately when he heard the crash as he did not know what was occurring and was making an effort to prevent injury to himself. Engineman Knudsen further stated that the last signal he noticed was the back-up signal given by his brakeman, made at less than half arm's length, and involving a movement not more than 8 or 10 inches in circumference. While this signal was clear to him as a back-up signal, he thought it possible it could have been misconstrued by the engine crew of engine 1039 for a "kick" signal. Brakeman Jowett, of engine 4623, stated that he rode on the steps of the tender on the right side while the engine backed through track 7 en route to the roundhouse. After opening the switch at the east end of track 7 he signalled the engineman to continue the back-up movement and while the engine was approaching the fire-track lead switch he noticed that it was not lined for a movement into that track. After the engine stopped he again got off and started towards the switch but a member of the yard crew opened it for him and معلم ← ~A called to him to continue the back-up movement; there was no hand signal given by any member of that crew. He gave the engineman another back-up signal and remained on the ground to close the switch as soon as the engine got into clear. Brakeman Jowett did not know how there was any possibility for the crew of the yard engine mistaking his back-up signal for a proceed signal unless some obstruction hid part of the signal or unless when he got off the engine it caused a down- ward motion of his lantern which could have been taken for a proceed signal. S Conductor Walsh, in charge of the yard crew, was several car-lengths west of the point of accident when the accident Occurred. He stated that his engine pulled 22 cars from track 3 for the purpose of switching them. While the cars were being pulled out of this track he noticed engine 4623 backing up on track 7 and he instructed both of his switch- men to pull back into clear to permit this engine to enter the fire track. He observed that the cut of cars continued beyond the clearance point, and when engine 4623 passed him he told the brakeman, who was riding on the steps of the tender, that the switch crew was in the clear Conductor Walsh said that he gave no signals whatever after his train pulled out of track 3 and the only signal he saw after that time was a stop signal given by one of his switchmen when the cars reached the clearance point, and a back-up signal given by the brakeman of engine 4623 from the right side of the tender after the engine left track 7 He described the latter signal as a short snappy back-up signal which was made parallel to the track and which might have been taken by his engine crew as a "kick" signal. There was no other crew in the vicinity whose signals could have been seen by the engine At the time of the accident he did not know who was operating his engine but had seen the fireman operating it and during this time all signals had been acted upon properly and satisfactorily. crew. " Yard Helper McGowan, of engine 1039, stated that when the movement was started from track 3 the conductor instructed Helper Gregson and himself to pull back far enough to clear the fire-track lead switch. As soon as the cut of cars had cleared, he opened the fire-track lead switch to enable engine 4623 to enter that track. He was standing on the engineman's side of that engine when it started to back in at the fire-track lead and this obstructed his view of the out of cars and consequently he did not see them move forward. The only signal he saw just before the accident occurred was a back-up signal given by the brakeman while he was still on the tender steps on the right side of the engine, after which the brakeman stepped to the ground; he did not know whether the brakeman gave another signal after getting off the engine. The signal he saw was made quickly at half arm's length and was almost parallel with the track, which he said would be the natural way for a signal to be given -5- r ཁྐྲ ་་ 5. from the side of the tender. It was his opinion that a sig- nal given in this manner or practically in line with the vision of his engine crew, in view of the distance, would look to them like a proceed signal. Yard Helper Gregson, of engine 1039, stated that he understood the cars were to be moved beyond the clearance point of the fire-track lead and upon reaching that point he Cave a stop signal, bringing the cars to a stop about one and one-half car-lengths from the clearance point, and then joined Yard Helper McGowan on the other side of the fire track. He noticed that engine 4623 was then approaching, with the brakeman riding on the rear of the tender giving a back-up signal, and on returning to the fire-track lead switch he observed that it was open. At this time the brakeman was on the ground near that switch and gave another signal to back up. Yard Helper Gregson did not see the out of cars start ahead and did not know they were moving until he heard the crash of the collision; he immediately gave a stop signal, which was acknowledged by a blast of his engine whistle, but by this time the cut of cars had stopped. He thought the cars moved a distance of about 1 car-lengths after the accident occurred, while engine 4623 continued a distance of about four car-lengths before it came to a stop. He said the reason he did not remain with the cut of cars, or move toward his engine so that he would be in a better posi- tion to relay signals, was because he wanted to get informa- tion as to the next switching movement to be made. Categ St J Fireman Blackson, of engine 1039, stated that he was handling the engine at the time of the accident, as he had been requested to do so by the engine man in order to relieve the engine man temporarily. Fireman Blackson said that when he pulled the cars from track 3 he continued back on track 29 until he received a stop signal from the rear end of the cut. Shortly afterwards he received a steady come-ahead signal from a point in the vicinity of the switch, which was made by one downward motion of the light and which he saw plainly. He started the cars ahead but after moving about two car- lengths he felt a slight jar and stopped them immediately. Shortly after starting ahead, the light used in giving him the proceed signal disappeared from view, but about the time the cars stopped he received an emergency stop signal, which he acknowledged by the engine whistle. Fireman Blackson further stated that when the cars were first stopped on track 29, he could see two lights near the switch which were very close together, but a little later another light appeared along the track beyond these lights. When he received the proceed signal, however, the three lights appeared to be at the switch, but he was not certain which one of the se lights was used in giving him the signal to come ahead, although he thought it was one of the two which had previously been close together. -6- f Engineran Schwinn, of engine 1039, stated that about 20 or 25 minutes prior to the accident it became necessary for him to leave the engine and he requested the fireman to oper- ate it during his absence. He returned within 5 or 10 minutes and started fixing the fire instead of taking charge of the engine, and at the time of the accident he was between the engine and tender getting a drink of water. He saw none of the signals given just before the occurrence of the acci- dent. Engineman Schwinn said he did not think the fireman was a promoted man, but considered it safe for him to operate the engine. Conclusions This accident was caused by a misunderstanding of hand signals. > According to the evidence, there were several back-up signals given from points in the vicinity of the switch lead- ing to the fire-track lead. It did not appear that any of the men in that vicinity gave a proceed signal at any time nor were there any other crews working in that locality who could have given the signal which was acted upon by Fireman Blackson, and it seems probable that the fireman, who was 25 or 26 car-lengths distant, mistook one of these signals and accepted it as a proceed signal. Both of the helpers in the crew of engine 1039 crossed over to a point near the fire track lead switch. Yard Helper Gregson was with the cut of cars when they were brought to a stop and he should have remained with them until engine 4623 had cleared the switch. Had he done so it is possible he could have prevented the accident. St The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in viola- tion of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. Borland, Director. gl I Transportation } Library HE 1780 A234 1553 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE DENVER AND SALT LAKE RAILWAY NEAR VOLCANO, COLO., ON AUGUST 12, 1929. November 23, 1929. To the Commission: On, August 12, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a work train and a section motor car on the Denver and Salt Lake Railway near Volcano, Colo. which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of two employees, one of whom later died. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Second District, which extends between Tabernash and Phippsburg, Colo. a distance of 102 .03 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred on bridge 169.21, located 2.4 miles west of Volcano Ballast Pit, also known as Cinder Pit which in turn is located about 1 mile west of Volcano. Bridge 169.21 is located between tunnel 52, which is 1,318 feet in length, and tunnel 53, which is 129 feet in length, there are open cuts at each end of the tunnels. Approaching the point of accident from the east there is a 120 curve to the left 901.2 feet in length, the east portal of tunnel 52 being located on this curve at a point 283.8 feet from its western end; continuing westward through the tunnel, the track is then tangent for a distance of 515.9 feet, followed by a 120 curve to the right 690.6 feet, in length, the west portal of tunnel 52 being on this curve at a point 173.3 foot from its western end; the track is then tangent for a distance of 58 feet followed by a 100 curve to the left 469.7 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve 203.7 feet from its eastern end, or 435 feet from the west portal of tunnel 52. Approaching from the west the track is tangent for a distance of - Bi PORTAL TUNNEL NO 52 WEST East Bulkhead Point of Accident Open Cut Bridge 169.21 21 Span Trestle Length 324' /02 Location of Motor Car Elfter Accident West Bulkhead EAST PORTAL TUNNEL NO 53 Telephone Booth Open Cut 2081 SLI 1 ૨૦૨ 1911 -0.82% MOL'O -1.90 0.822 !. ·It ng mga p NO, 1553 DENVER & SALT LAKE RAILROAD Volcano, Colo. Aug. 12, 1929. 7 ว 156.0k Tang. 10°Curve R 4697 sda11/26/29 1 : - 3 1 846.5 feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred, tunnel 53 being located on the tangent track near its eastern end, or 429 feet from the point of accident. The grade is descending for eastbound trains, being 0.65 per cent at the point of accident. Bridge 169.21 is a 21-span trestle bridge, 324 feet in length, and the accident occurred on this bridge at a point about 116 feet from its eastern end. The greatest depth from the tops of the rails to the base of the bridge is 60 feet, which is near the west bulkhead; at the point of accident the depth is 41 feet. There is a clear view across the 10 curve from the west- ern end of the cut at tunnel 52 to the point of accident of 256 feet, and to the end of the cut at tunnel 53 of 500 feet. Tunnel 52 runs through a mountain of rock and earth, rising hundreds of feet above the tunnel portals, and due to this fact the sound of a whistle on an approaching train at one portal is deflected and cannot be heard over the mountain at the other portal. • Bulletin No. 784, issued at Denver on March 5, 1926, and still in effect, addressed to motor-car operators, provides in part: The train dispatcher will issue a general lineup to all motor car operators once each day, beginning 7.30 a.m. All section foremen, extra gang forcmen, B.& b. foremen and others, at points where no operator is on duty, between Denver and Phipps- burg, who will need information regarding train movements for motor car operation in the morning, will get on the telephone and be ready to re- ceive the information from the dispatcher. = Where an operator is on duty, he will re- cord this lineup as given by the dispatcher and issue it in writing to motor car operators, re- questing it, retaining a file copy. MA A *** This lineup will be depended upon for pro- tection up to 9.30 a.m. After that time cars must be protected by flag regardless of lineup. A flagman must be sent ahead with flag and torpedoes at all points where view is obstructed. S 4 Motor cars and push cars will not be loft standing on the main line at any time without full flag protection on both sides. Trains must be expected and protected against at all hours. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 7.25 a.m. Description Westbound work extra 114 consisted of 10 dump cars pushed by engine 114, and was in charge of Conductor Dearing and Engineman Ohrns. This train departed from Cinder Pit at 7.03 a.m., en route to bridge 170.12 and collided with section motor car 31 on bridge 169.21 while traveling at an estimated specd of 3 miles per hour. " Eastbound section motor car 31, hauling a push car loaded with track tools, was in charge of Section Foreman Bedard, accompanied by four section men. The motor car departed from Egeria, 7.26 miles west of Volcano, at 7.10 a.m., after Section Foreman Bedard had received a line-up of trains, and collided with extra 114 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 6 or 7 miles per hour. The force of the collision drove the motor car backward a distance of 102 feet. There was very slight damage to the equipment and none of it was derailed. The employees killed wore two of the suction men, while the employee injured was the section foreman. Summary of cvidence Section Foreman Bedard stated that at 6.45 a.m. he received the line-up, which was broadcasted by the dis- patcher and was to the effect that work extra 114 works between 7.01 a.m. and 5.01 p.m. between Cinder Pit and Egoria, as well as containing information about other trains. Thinking that he would have time to patrol the track from Egeria to tunnel 52 and return, before work cxtra 114 would arrive, he proceeded castward, leaving Egoria at 7.00 2.m., and was traveling at a speed of about 6 or 7 miles per hour when at about the center of bridge 169.31 he saw cars coming out of tunnel 52, about 300 fout distant. He immediately shut off the motor and applied the brakes, which were in good conditions, but was unable to stop the motor car before the collision 1 ! • - 5 1 } occurred. Ho helped Sectionman Dillinger to get out on a bridge cap and then ran back to get out on the next cap himself, but he was unable to reach it because of the fact that the train was so near him and he thereforc leaped off the bridge. Scction Foreman Bedard stated that he saw Conductor Duaring and Brakeman Rogers riding on the head car, and he heard the sound of the air when they applied the brakes, but he did not hear the whistle on the engine or the tail-hose whistle on the head car. Suction Foruman Budard further stated that he did not flag when he went through tunnel 53 and out on to bridge 169.21, although under the flagging requirements he should have boun protected by flag, saying that the work train had never arrived that early in the morning but would usually come between 9 and 12 o'clock. When the, ngincman and conductor of extra 114 went down the hill tocarry him up to the track, Section Foreman Bedard said to the conductor that he did not expect his train down thero that carly in the morning and the conductor then told him that they went to work at 6.55 a.m. Section Foreman Bedard was seriously injured and this statement was ob- tained while he was in the hospital. Sectionman Dillinger stated that he was riding in the center of the motor car, and when near the telephone booth at east end of the cut, after leaving tunnel 53, he saw the approaching train and called to Section Foreman Bedard, who immediately applied the brakes. Hi thân jumped off the motor car and ran along the side of it trying to stop it, out when he saw that they were to col- lide, he got down on the side and crawled out on a bridge cap. Scctionman Dillinger said he had been working on this section only since August 5, but was thorough familiar with the conditions, as he had previously worked on sections nearby. He further stated that Section- man Stewart usually acted as flagman, and had his flag in his hand on this occasion, but at no time did the section foreman sond him ahead in accordance with the usual custom; he had always flagged around curves and through tunnels and it was invariably his practice to flag through tunnel 52. Sectionman Dillinger thought that they had boon traveling at a speed of about 10 or 12 miles por hour, but this speed had been reduced considerably before the collision occurred. It also appeared from his state- ments that they went to work at 7.00 a.m. put the cars on the track, loaded a few tools and started; he did not know what time they started but said it could not have been later than 7.10 a.m. The statements of Sectionman Arrondondo brought out nothing additional of importance. { ! Quinet 6- Conductor Dearing, of work extra 114, stated that he and the brakeman were riding on the lead car and that he sounded the air whistle on all curves and on ap- proaching all tunnels, and that on passing out of the cut at the west end of tunnel 52 he saw the motor car approach- ing, about five car-lengths distant. Brakeman Rogers immediately applied the brakes in emergency by means of the tail hose coupled to the brake pipe. Conductor Dearing further stated that the air brakes worked properly, and he estimated that the speed of the train which had been about ls miles per hour, was reduced to about 3 miles per hour at the time of the collision. According to his statements, his train did not depart from Cinder Pit until 7.08 a.m. The statements of Brakeman Rogers corroborated those of Conductor Dearing. The statements of Engineman Ohrns and Fireman Harrison brought out nothing additional of importance except that they both stated that the brakes worked properly, the engineman saying he made an air- brake test before leaving Cinder Pit; the fireman thought they left Cinder Pit at 7.05 or 7.06 a.n. Roadmaster Kane stated that the Egeria section, on which this accident occurred, extends from mile post 175 to a point within tunnel 52, twenty-one rail-lengths from its eastern end, and he requires both section fore- men when working in that vicinity to go all the way through tunnel 52 for the reason that the Volcano foreman, in order to return with safety, should go to the telephone at the east end of tunnel 53, and when the Egeria foreman is working in tunnel 52 his instructions are to go all the way to the east end and then work back. He also stated that the motor car stops cometimes at the telephone booth and sometimes at the west end of the tunnel, when sending a flag ahead. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Section Foreman Bedard to provide proper flag protection for the movement of his motor car. The investigation disclosed that SectionForeman Bedard received a line-up showing that extra 114 would work between Cinder Pit and Egeria between 7.01 a.m. and 5.01 p.m., and he assumed that he could cover his section from Egeria to the end of his section, which is within tunnel 5%, before extra 114 would arrive at that point, and therefore provided no flag protection on approaching bridge 169.21 or tunnel 52, in direct violation of Bulletin No. 784, previously quoted, which provides that - 7. 1 a flagman must be sent ahead with flag and torpedoes at all points where view is obstructed. This motor car was also operated in violation of rule 118 of the maintenance of way rules, which provides in part that foremen must not assume t..at a train may not come for a certain time. All of the employees involved were experienced men with the exception of the sectionmen who had been in the employ of this railroad less than one year. None of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. : 24 A Transportation Library не 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1554 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY AT HENRYETTA, OKLA., ON AUGUST 18, 1929. To the Commission: December 3, 1929. On August 18, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway at Henryetta, Okla., resulting in the death of 12 passengers and 2 employees, and the injury of 27 passengers, 2 mail clerks and 2 express messengers. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Creek Subdivis- ion of the Southwestern Division, extending between Francis and Sapulpa, Okla., a distance of 101.9 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred within the yard limits of Henryetta, at a switch located 2,382 feet north of the south yard-limit board or 4,439 feet south of the station; the switch is a facing-point switch for northbound trains and leads off the main track to the right or east to an industrial spur track, which is about 935 feet in length. Approach ing the switch from either direction the track is tangent for a considerable distance; the grade for northbound trains is descending, varying from 0.34 to 0.72 per cent to within about 650 feet of the switch, from which point it is level to and beyond the switch. The switchstand is of the Elliott high-revolv- ing type and is located on the east side of the main track; when the switch is closed no target is visible, but when the switch is open a disk, 12 inches in 14 diameter, is displayed; this disk is painted bright my i Hug ? : * -2- red, with a white center about 3 inches in diameter, and the center of the target is 5 feet 8 inches above the head-block ties. The view of the switchstand is entirely unobstructed. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 5.59 a.m. Description Northbound passenger train No. 118 consisted of one baggage car, one combination mail and baggage car, one coach, one chair car, and three Pullman sleeping cars, in the order named, hauled by engine 1056, of the 4-6-2 type, and was in charge of Conductor McCaughan and Engineman Wolfe. The cars were of all-steel construction, with the exception of the third and fourth cars, which were of steel-underframe construction, with steel sheathing on the super- structures. This train left Weleetka, 12.6 miles south of Henryetta, at 5.42 p.m., according to the train sheet, two minutes late and was derailed on encountering a cooked or partly-open switch at Henryetta while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 50 and 60 miles per hour. The entire train, with the exception of the last car, was derailed. Engine 1056 came to rest on its right side, between the main and spur tracks, with its forward end about 365 feet north of the switch; the engine was badly damaged, the cab and all of the appurtenances being stripped from the boiler. The tender was also on its side, to the left of the engine. The baggage car came to rest on top of the engine and tender, leaning toward the left; the mail car was east of the spur track, headed northeast, but remained upright; the coach was in line with and back of the mail car, coupled to it, with its left side leaning against the rear end of the boiler of the engine, directly opposite the broken off safety valves, from which live steam was escaping under pressure; the chair car was headed northwest across the main track, leaning at an angle of about 30°; the next two cars remained on the roadbed of the spur track and in line therewith, in an upright position, while the last car stopped on the spur track with its rear end just north of the switch. The passen- gers killed were riding in the coach; the employees killed were the engineman and fireman. 1 -3- ..... Summary of evidence The first mark of derailment appeared on the head of a rivet at the east switch point, 27 inches from the point of switch; and apparently was made by the flange or flanges of wheels riding between the switch point and the east rail of the spur track. On the west side of the track there was a mark on the outside of the head of the west switch point, 20 feet 9 inches from the point of switch, apparently caused by wheels or tires rubbing against the rail as the engine or cars were pulled over to the east. Flange marks appeared on the base of the outside of the east rail of the main track, 17 feet 9 inches from the point of switch, while on the outside of the base of the west rail of the spur track, flange marks appeared at a point 24 feet 4 inches from the point of switch. The switch points apparently had been struck a heavy blow, as about 1 inches of the tip of the west switch point had been broken away, and there was a pronounced abrasion on the tip of the cast switch point. There were indications that the engine split the switch, derailed, and continued on the ties a short distance beyond the frog, followed by the tender and baggage car, while the rest of the train followed the sour track. On account of the damaged condition of the track, with ties having been removed and replaced, it was impossible to ascertain the exact spot where the engine left the ties. Conductor McCaughan stated that he was riding in the rear compartment of the third car approaching Henryetta and estimated the speed of the train to have been about 55 or 60 miles per hour, this latter figure being the maximum permissible speed for passenger trains. The first he knew of anything wrong was when the accident occurred, without any application of the brakes having been made, and the car immediately became filled with steam. He climbed out of a window and summoned assistance from a near- by telephone, and then went to the switch in an en- deavor to find out what caused the accident; the switch. was unlocked, the switch lock was missing, the lever was raised and moved around about 2 inches from the notch where it should have been, and the switch points were open about 1 inch, but he did not notice whether the switch lamp was burning, as it was day- light. The switch target was turned at an angle, although it displayed almost a full red indication; he was of the opinion however, that at the time his train approached, the switch was not open far enough for the target to give warning of impending danger to the engineman, and that it became opened, to the extent afterwards found to exist, as a result of the accident: mayor' - 1** _4_ Flagman Andre was riding on the rear end of the last car at the time of the accident; immediately after the train came to a stop he looked at the switch and its appurtenances and found them to be practically in the condition described by Conductor McCaughan. Flagman Andre then went back to flag and on his way back he inspected the track, but found no indication of dragging equipment. Train Porter Stoner was riding in the rear or third compartment of the coach approaching Henryetta and on hearing a crossing signal sounded, he started toward the front end of this car in order to open the trap door. On starting through the front compartment he felt a jolt and at the same time the air brakes applied in emergency. Train Porter Stoner was of the opinion that no fatalities would have occurred in the coach had it not been for the escaping steam. Assistant Superintendent Hutchison and Division Engineer Busch arrived at the scene of the accident about 2 hours after its occurrence. The switch and its appurtenances were found to be practically in the condition as previously described, and no indication was found of dragging equipment. Both switch points had small pieces chipped out of them, about 1 inches long and from to inch deep, where they had been struck. The switch lamp was not burning; later in the day Division Engineer Busch tried to light it but found that the wick had been turned down completely and he assumed that the lamp probably was tampered with at the time the switch was partly opened. Assist- ant Superintendent Hutchison stated that during the late afternoon of the day of the accident several boys came in from the north and one of them was carrying a switch lock by the end of a chain; this boy said that he had found the lock, in the weeds, about 50 or 60 feet from the main track and on the west side thereof, at a point about 725 feet north of the switch. The lock was closed and there was no evidence of its having been hammered open; no attempt was made to open it at this time by means of a switch key and it was turned over to the special agents. Assistant Super- intendent Hutchison went with this boy to the exact spot where the lock was said to have been found; apparently the lock had been laid down or tossed from a point only a few feet distant, as no mark was found on the ground indicating that the lock had been thrown from a point as far away as the main track. Owing to the manner in which the equipment came to rest, Division Engineer Busch thought that the engine, tender and baggage car followed the main track, while -5- the remainder of the train followed the spur track. He did not think that it would have been possible for traffic to have jarred the switch lever out of its notch even if the lock had not been in its proper place, as the jaws of the notch were square and in good condition, and the lever fitted tightly therein. In his opinion the switch lock was unlocked by some unknown party or parties, and the switch opened only to the extent that it would have been impossible to detect it until too late to avert the accident. Section Foreman King stated that he inspected the switch between 4 and 5 p.m., August 16. At that time he examined the switch points to see that they fitted tightly, and also gave a jerk on the chain of the lock, but nothing wrong was noticed; in making this inspection he did not open the switch. Section Laborer Smith inspected the switch about 1.30 p.m., August 17, while filling switch lamps with oil; he was positive that the lock was in the hasp and properly locked at that time. The switch was last used about 2.30 p.m., August 16, by the Henryetta mine switcher, in order to place one car on the spur track. At that time the switch was closed by Brakeman Adams, who was positive that he locked the switch and jerked on the chain to make certain that the switch was properly secured; Conductor Kleiser was standing beside the brakeman and saw him lock it. Brakeman Adams said that he exper- ienced difficulty in unlocking the lock with his switch key, but that he did not try to open the lock without using his key, only testing it by jerking on the chain after closing the switch. Testimony was also given to the effect that while no trouble with unlocked main-line switches had been experienced previously in this vicinity, yet such was not the case with yard-track switches, some of which had been found cocked or partly open. This condition was attributed to mischievousness on the part of boys in the neighbor- hood and yard-track switches subsequently were equip- ped with hooks; instructions also were in effect to keep the locks wired to the stands, so that they would not be laid on a tie and then forgotten. section foreman did not remember whether the wire was in place when he inspected the switch on August 16 but one of his laborers said the lock was wired to the switch lever. Statements of various other wit- nesses developed nothing additional of importance. The --- MAST -6- Northbound freight train extra 4164 and south- bound passenger train No. 117 passed over this switch on the main track about 6 and 5 hours, respectively, prior to the occurrence of the accident. During the investigation the lock that was found was tested with different switch keys of members of the crew of the Henryetta mine switcher; when tried with the key of Conductor Kleiser, which was old and worn, it would not open. The conductor said that this lock apparently was the lock that had been on the switch, as it was the only lock that his key would never unlock. The key of Brakeman Tucker would open the lock, but would not make a full revolution; with the key of Brakeman Adams, difficulty was exper- ienced in opening the lock. Section Foreman King also tried his key in the lock and opened it, but it appeared as though there was something wrong with the inside of the lock, although subsequent internal inspection failed to disclose anything wrong. Section Foreman King also stated that there was a mark on the lock, apparently made recently, indicating that the lock had been struck, right at the point where it would be hit in order to force it open. Several tests were made by Section Foreman King, jerking on the chain of the switch lock with the lock fastened to a railing, and also to a switchstand, and the lock was pulled open each time; in this connection, he said that he gave the chain a similar jerk when he inspect- ed the switch on August 15, but that the lock did not open at that time. Cross levels and gauge taken for a considerable distance south of the switch showed the track to be in good condition, while careful inspection of engine 1056, including flanges of the engine-truck wheels, tender-truck wheels, driving-wheel tires, lateral, driving-brake foundation gear, engine truck center casting and cradle, etc., failed to disclose anything that would have caused or contributed to the accident. Tests of the switch and its appurtenances dis- closed that when the switch lever was released sudden- ly, the east switch point would spring open about 2 inches and the west switch point remained open about 2 inches. With the switch in this condition a test was made to determine how far the switch target could be seen from the engineman's side of the cab of a northbound engine. engine. It could not be definitely deter- mined that the switch was not properly lined until a point approximately 495 feet south of the switch was reached, while the position of the switch points could not be determined until a point 231 feet south of the switch was reached. K -7- Conclusions This accident was caused by a cocked or partly-opened switch, apparently due to malicious tampering. No defective condition was found about the track or equipment which would have caused the accident, while the switch was last used about 2.30 p.m., August 16; Section Foreman King inspected the switch between 4 and 5 p.m., August 16, while Section Laborer Smith inspected it about 1.30 p.m., August 17, nothing wrong being noticed at the time of either of these inspections. Since these inspections, several train movements had been made over the switch in each di- rection, the last of these being northbound freight train extra 4164, which passed this point about six hours before the accident occurred, and southbound passenger train No. 117, which passed about one-half hour after extra 4164. After the accident, however, the switch was found to be cocked or partly opened, and it appeared that the lock might have been forced open, tests disclosing that this could be done by giving quick hard jerks on the chain. It also appear- ed that when the switch lever was taken from its socket the points would spring open just enough to cause the switch target to turn only part way around, with the result that proper warning of danger would not be given to the engineman of an approaching north- bound train. The circumstances point quite clearly to a case of malicious tampering, particularly in view of the fact that after the accident a lock was found in the weeds on the west side of the main track, at a considerable distance north of the switch, which seemed to have been the one that had been on the switch; at the time of this investigation, however, it had not been determined when or by whom the tampering was done. The Commission's inspectors were informed by an official of the railroad that within the next year, that part of the Creek Subdivision extending between Bryant, 5.9 miles south of Henryetta, and Sapulpa, 50.8 miles north of Bryant, over which the greater part of traffic on this subdivision is handled, will be equipped with an automatic block-signal system. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND Director. M Iransportadou Library HE 1780 1235 1555 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT ICH OCCURRED ON THE GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILWAY AT MORRICE, MICH., ON AUGUST 18, 1929. December 3, 1929. To the Commission: On August 18, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between two freight trains on the Grand Trunk Western Railway at Morrice, Mich., which resulted in the death of two employees and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Flint Sub-division of the Chicago Division, extending between Battle Creek and Port Huron, Mich., a distance of 159.30 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double- track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use, The accident occurred at a point 2,020 feet west of the station at Morrice; approaching this point in either direction the track is tangent for several miles and the grade is slightly undulating; it is 0.09 per cent ascending for eastbound trains at the point of accident. The eastbound passing track at Morrice parallels the main tracks on the south and is 4,726 feet in length; the east switch of this passing track is located 86 feet west of the station. The maximum speed permitted for freight trains is 40 miles per hour. A dense fog prevailed at the time of the accident, which occurred about 5.41 a.m. Description Eastbound freight train symbol 500 consisted of 67 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 3453, and was in charge of Conductor Rutledge and Engineman Hutchings. This train departed from Nichols Yard, 64.89 miles west of Morrice, at 2.05 a.m., and arrived at Morrice at 5.30 It was brought to a stop on the eastbound main track a short distance east of the station, and was still standing at that point at the time of the accident. a.m Eastbound freight train symbol 486 consisted of 28 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 6311, and was in This charge of Conductor Scouten and Engineman Henry. train left Nichols Yard at 3.20 a.m., passed train second 484 at Bellevue, 11.9 miles beyond, at 3.43 a.m., -f. ;: : -2- and arrived at Morrice at 5.39 a. m., where it was stopped in the rear of train 500, and shortly after- wards it was struck by train second 484. Eastbound freight train symbol second 484 con- sisted of 64 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 3748, and was in charge of Conductor Marks and Engineman Drew. This train departed from Nichols Yard at 2.50 a. m., and remained at Bellevue until train 486 passed. departed from this point at 3.53 a. m., and was approach- ing Morrice when it collided with the rear end of train 486 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 35 and 45 miles per hour. It The caboose of train 486 was demolished and the four cars immediately ahead of it were badly damaged. Engine 3748 was derailed and came to rest leaning at an angle of about 45° and headed in a southeasterly direction. The tender was torn from its trucks and rested on the frame of a car across the main tracks. The first car in train second 484 was demolished, the next five cars were badly damaged, and the following two cars were partly derailed. All of the derailed cars except the two last mentioned were piled in a mass of wreckage. The employees killed were the engineman and fireman of train second 484 and the employee in- jured was the head brakeman of the same train. Summary of evidence As Engineman Hutchings, of train 500, stated that after passing Haslett, 13.15 miles west of Morrice, fog was encountered which increased in density and when he arrived at Morrice he found it very heavy. his engine passed the station the operator signalled him to pull by and back in at the east switch of the passing track. The train was stopped clear of the switch and after waiting for a period of time which he could not estimate, he received a back-up signal from the head brakeman, who was located alongside the train about five or six car-lengths from the engine; this signal could only be seen dimly due to the fog and he could not see the markers on the rear of the train. After backing a distance of about two car- lengths the train was stopped by the air brakes being applied from the rear end. Conductor Rutledge, of train 500, stated that upon arrival at Morrice he observed the operator east of the station with a yellow fusee in his hand. He inquired as to what was wanted and the operator informed him that his train was to back into the eastbound passing track to enable train 486 to pass; the operator then continued eastward for the purpose of assisting in relaying signals for this movement. Conductor Rutledge instructed the flagman to go back and protect and the flagman departed immediately and soon disappeared in the fog. The conductor observed the following train approaching at a distance of about 600 or 700 feet, but waited until it came to a stop before he gave his own crew a back-up signal. The train only moved about three car-lengths when the flagman, who reappeared from the west, lighted a red fusee and gave him a stop signal, on account of the accident having occurred, and he at once applied the air from the caboose. Conductor Rutledge also said that al- though he was aware two other manifest trains were following him, there were no fusees thrown off while passing through the dense fog, as he did not think it was necessary in view of the fact that his train maintained a speed of between 30 and 35 miles per hour which he thought was sufficient to keep the other trains from closing up on him. C ? Flagman Hughes, of train 500, stated that as soon as his train stopped at Morrice he complied with the conductor's instructions by going back to flag. He opened the east passing-track switch as he passed it and then ran westward and had reached a point about 35 or 40 car-lengths from his train when he heard the whistle of the approaching train; he immediately lighted a fusee and gave several stop signals before they were acknowledged. He estimated that the headlight of train 486 came within view at a distance of 65 car-lengths, and when the engine passed him he boarded the steps and informed the engineman as to what was taking place and was still in this position when the collision occurred, which was only a minute or two after train 486 had stopped. In going back and finding the passing track blocked, he ran ahead and stopped the back-up movement of his own train. Engineman Henry, of train 485 of train 486, stated that while at Lansing the head brakeman told him that the operator at that point had advised that train 500 had departed only a short time previously. As his train approached the coal dock at East Lansing, where coal was taken, he noticed a yellow fusee ahead, but this fusee burned out before his train departed from the coal dock. Realizing that train 500 was not much over 10 minutes ahead, he did not operate his train at more than 25 miles per hour after leaving that point. Intermittent banks of fog were encountered between Haslett and Shaftsburg, and it became very thick in the vicinity of Morrice, so that he could not see more than three car-lengths ahead. When about 2 miles west of Shaftsburg, which is 6.49 miles from Morrice, he obtained a faint glimpse of the caboose of train 500, about 15 car-lengths ahead, and at once reduced speed to about 10 miles per hour in order to permit a 10- -4- : minute spacing of the trains; he later increased the speed to about 15 miles per hour. Engineman Henry expected train 500 to be either heading in, or already on the passing track at Morrice, but when he did not find that train there he decided that the train-order board would be against him and therefore made a further reduction in speed to 6 or 8 miles per hour, at which speed his train was traveling when he observed stop signals being given by the flagman of train 500. He did not know the exact time at which his train stopped, but thought it was about 5.40 a. m., and he said he did not whistle out a flag after stopping as he was talking with the flagman of train 500 and forgot to do so. The statements of Fireman Olney and Head Brakeman DeLacey, of train 483, substantiated those of Engineman Henry. They both stated that their train came to a stop at Morrice at 5.40 a. m., and that not more than one minute elapsed before the occurrence of the accident. Conductor Scouten, of train 486, stated that short- ly after leaving Lansing, fog was encountered which prevailed at intervals. Speed was reduced approaching Shaftsburg and the flagman threw off a yellow fusee. Two more yellow fusees were thrown off at different points after passing Shaftsburg, and a red fusee was thrown off when the train reached a point about three- fourths mile west of where it afterwards was stopped. On account of the density of the fog he could not de- termine the speed of his train, but was of the opinion that these fusees were properly spaced. The train continued at reduced speed and then was brought to a sudden stop at 5.40 a. m. He was on the rear platform of the caboose and as soon as the train stopped he heard train second 484 approaching, although he could not see it. The flagman ran back immediately with a red fusee but the fog was so dense that he disappeared from view when about one and one-half car-lengths from the caboose. He estimated that his train had been standing about one or one and one-half minutes before it was struck by the following train. Flagman Given, of train 486, stated that because of the fog he rode on the rear platform of the caboose between Lansing and Morrice, dropping off five yellow fusees en route, and he said he threw off a red fusee upon reaching a point just west of the west switch of the eastbound passing track at Morrice. All of these fusees were burning when they struck the ground, but they soon disappeared in the fog. Immediately after the train stopped at Morrice, he ran back with a lighted red fusee, and he thought he had reached a point about 20 car-lengths from his caboose before he was able to give a stop signal to the crew of the approaching train. -5- 1 } He could not see this train until it was only a car- length from him, but he said he heard a whistle signal sounded, although he did not know whether this was an acknowledgment of his stop signals. He judged the speed of train second 484 at 35 miles per hour when it passed him and at that time he heard the brake shoes grinding against the wheels. S Conductor Marks, of train second 484, stated that his train entered the siding at Bellevue to permit trains No. 16 and 486 to pass and that he rode in the engine cab behind the engineman from Lansing to Morrice. He estimated the speed of his train between these points at 40 miles per hour. The weather was foggy, and it increased in density as the train proceeded, and after passing Shaftsburg he kept a sharp lookout ahead but noticed no burning fusees. He did not see the stop signals being given by the flagman of train 486 until he was only 150 or 200 feet distant, this flagman being about 15 or 20 car-lengths from his own train. The engineman immediately applied the brakes in emergency, but there did not appear to be any reduction in speed, although he thought the speed might have been reduced and that he did not notice it due to his excitement. Conductor Marks further stated that the engineman was also keeping a strict lookout, and he did not know how they could have failed to see burning fusees unless they were on the opposite side of the track, in which event it was possible they could have missed them. The conductor did not suggest to the engineman that speed should be reduced, as he had worked with this engine- man on numerous occasions for years, and considered him a careful man. Head Brakeman White, of train second 484, stated that he rode on the left side of the engine cab between Lansing and Morrice, looking ahead from the side window, but did not see any fusees between these points, neither did he see anything of train 486 prior to the accident. His first intimation of anything wrong was when the engineman shouted a warning; he immediately left his seatbox and was descending the steps at the gangway when the collision occurred. He estimated the speed of his train at 45 miles per hour as it approached the point of accident and he did not think it had been reduced to any extent, because the engineman did not apply the brakes until just before the collision occurred. It was his opinion that, although the weather was quite foggy, he would have seen burning fusees had the train passed them. Flagman Clubb, of train second 484, stated that after leaving Lansing he dropped off fusees at 10- minute intervals, due to the fog. The door of his -6- caboose was open most of the time but he saw no burning fusees other than the ones he threw off. Between Lansing and the point of accident a speed of about 40 miles per hour was maintained, and that upon arrival at Morrice he felt a surge of the train which was followed almost immediately by a sudden stop. He did not know whether the brakes had been applied in emer- gency and because of the fog he was unable to state the distance his train travelled before coming to a stop. C Dispatcher Campbell, on duty at the time of the accident, stated that on account of trains 486 and second 484 being faster trains than train 500, and in order to save delay, it was his intention to get the latter train out of the way of the other two trains, and it was for this reason that he sent a message to the operator at Lansing, addressed to the conductor of train 500, telling him to keep clear of train 486. That operator later informed him that he had been unable to deliver this message, a passenger train hav- ing been between the operator and train 500, so Dispatcher Campbell notified the operator at Morrice to instruct the crew of train 500 to clear the main track at that point for train 486. The rules do not require operators to report weather conditions, but he said he had received reports from four stations east of Morrice that a light fog prevailed. He also said that in extreme cases of inclement weather, and where conditions warrant it, trains are blocked one station apart, but this was not done on the morning of the accident as he had received no weather report from the operator at Morrice. Operator Racey, on duty at Morrice, stated that he first noticed the fog at about 4.30 a. m., and about six or eight minutes later he reported this condition to the dispatcher. He received a message from the dispatcher to clear train 500 for train 486 and when the former train arrived he signalled the crew to back into the passing track. Due to the flagman going back to protect, and also because of the heavy fog, he proceeded eastward along the train to a point about 25 or 30 car-lengths from the caboose to assist in re- laying signals, and was at this location at the time of the accident. He did not know how long train 486 had been standing prior to the collision as he did not hear the crash, Conclusions This accident was caused primarily by train second 484 being operated at a speed which was excessive in view of the existing weather conditions. -7- It appears that fog was encountered by all of the trains involved shortly after leaving Lansing, a station 21.25 miles west of Morrice, and that in the vicinity of Morrice it was very dense and materially restricted the range of vision. The conductor and engineman of train second 484 knew that train 486 had passed their train at Bellevue 10 minutes before they departed from that point, yet they operated their train at approximately the maximum speed for freight trains and did not take any action to reduce its speed when the fog was encountered or when approaching the passing track at Morrice, an open office. According to the statements of the conductor and flagman of train 486, yellow fusees were thrown off at intervals, and finally a red fusee was thrown off in the vicinity of the west switch of the eastbound passing track at Morrice, their train coming to a stop shortly afterwards. On the other hand, Conductor Marks and Brakeman White, both of whom were riding on the engine of the following train, maintained that they did not see any fusees along the track after leav- ing Lansing. The fusees used by this railway burn for a period of 10 minutes, and if they were thrown off as stated by the crew of train 486, some of them should have been burning at the time train second 484 en- countered them. The automatic block-signal system now in use be- tween Chicago and Battle Creek is being extended to Lansing. The protection afforded by such a system probably would have prevented this accident. As it was, the requirement of rule 91 that freight trains keep 10 minutes apart was the only protection other than that afforded by the vigilance of the crews. These three trains passed Lansing at 3.55 a. m., 4.43 a. m., and 4.58 a. m., according to the train sheet. The coal dock is east of the office, however, and the conductor of the first train said it was 4.40 a. m. when they were out on the main track and ready to leave. The conductor of the second train said they got coal and left at 4.45 a. m., and the conductor of the third train said they left the coal dock at 5.07 a. m. The first train used about 50 minutes in reach- ing Morrice, the second train about 55 minutes, and the third train, according to the conductor's figures, minutes. These facts illustrate the inadequacy of the system, which resulted in the first two trains not being properly spaced when actually leaving Lansing, and in the 'third train overtaking the trains ahead because of its operation at a much higher rate of speed. The need for adequate protection against such a situa- tion is obvious, and it is believed that when considered in connection with the average daily train movement, which is about 36 trains, there is justification for a 33 -B recommendation that steps be taken toward providing block signal protection east of Lansing. The employees involved are experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1556 41T1 Transportaimen Library не 11780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMISSION To the Commission: REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES- TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PENNSYL- VANIA RAILROAD NEAR CONDIT, OHIO, ON AUGUST 18, 1929. December 4, 1929. On August 18, 1929, there was a derailment of a pas- senger train on the Pennsylvania Railroad near Condit, Ohio, vhich resulted in the injury of 250 passengers, 1 person car- ried under contract and 3 employees. Location and method of operation. This accident occurred on that part of the ikron Divi- sion extending between Hudson and Joyce Ave., Columbus, Ohio, a distance of 142.1 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and a manual block-signal system. The accident occurred at a point approximately 1 miles north of Condit; approaching this point from the north the track is tangent for a distance of almost 6 miles, while the grade at the point of accident is 0.7 per cent descending for southbound trains. ㅏ ​G S The track is laid with 100-pound rails, 30 feet in length, with an average of 17 ties to the rail-length, and is ballasted with gravel to a depth of about 18 inches. Rail anchors are used and the track is about 90 per cent tic-plated. At the time of the accident the shoulders of the roadbed had been plowed off preparatory to roballasting and resurfacing, although ballast had not been dumped along the track. J The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 11.42 a.m. Description Southbound passenger train No. 614 consisted of one combination baggage and passenger car, five coaches, one Pullman parlor car, four coaches and one Pullman parlor car, all of steel construction and in the order named, hauled by engines 7143 and 7271, and was in charge of Conductor Buch and Engineman lurtough and Csborn. The train left Orrville, 81.9 miles north of Condit, at 9.47 a.m., 12 minutes late, passed Centerac, 5.2 miles from Condit, at 11.38 a.m., eight minutes late, and was approaching Condit when it was derailed while traveling at a speed estimated at about 60 miles per hour. : -2- Engine 7142 care to rest 1,488 feet south of the initial point of derailment, with its tender derailed. Engine 7271 and its tender were derailed and turned over on their right sides, coming to rest 765 feet south of the point of derailment. The first six cars and the forward truck of the seventh car were also derailed, but remained upright. Summary of evidence. Engineman Murtough, of the leading engine, stated that he inspected his engine at Akron and also at Millers- burg, these points being located 106.2 and 58.2 miles, respectively, north of Condit. The brakes were tested before leaving Akron and again after picking up cars at Orrville, and they functioned properly en route. He noticed no unusual riding of the engine and his first knowledge of anything wrong was when he heard a peculiar sound under the tender and upon looking back he noticed an unusual motion of the tender, as if the rear truck was derailed, and he immed- iately applied the brakes in emergency and opened the sanders. He said the train as drifting at a speed of about 60 miles per hour at the time of the derailment, and in his opinion this was a safe speed in that vicinity. Engineman hurtough estimated that the tender contained 20,000 pounds of coal and 18 or 20 inches of water, which he did not think would have a tendency to cause it to sway with the second engine pushing it. After the accident he examin- ed the tender and trucks but did not find anything which could have contributed to the cause of the accident. Fireman Johnson, of the leading engine, stated that he looked over the engine at the initial terminal but did not know to what extent the engineman had inspected it. The brakes were tested and worked satisfactorily en route, while he noticed no rough handling of the train, or any unusual motion of the engine. When he heard a noise he looked back and noticed that the rear truck of the tender was derailed, and at that time the front end of the tender rode as if the forward truck was on the rails. After the accident he inspected the tender trucks, but discovered nothing wrong, and on going back and examining the track he failed to find any indication of dragging equipment. : Engineman Osborn, of the second engine, stated that he. made a careful inspection of his engine and also made a terminal test of the brakes before departing from Cleveland. 1 -3- Upon arrival at Akron, cars were picked up and another engine coupled to the train, after which the brakes were again tested. The leading engineman handled the train after leav- ing the latter point and in his estimation it was operated in a satisfactory manner. His own engine was not swinging more than was to be expected, and from his position he did not observe any unusual motion of the leading engine or tender until he saw gravel flying from under the tender and then the rear of the tender swung out of line with the track. He estimated the speed at the time of the accident at 60 miles per hour, which was not excessive under the track con- ditions existing in that locality. Fireman Wagner, of the second engine, stated that cars were picked up at Akron and Orrville and that the brakes vere tested before leaving each place. He was riding on his seat box when approaching the point of accident but did not notice any swaying of the leading engine or its tender, and his first intimation of trouble was when he saw dust flying under the tender of that engine, at a point about two coach- lengths in advance of here his own engine became derailed. His estimate as to the speed agreed with the estimates rade by the two enginemen. The statements of Conductor Buch, and Brakemen Wile, Turner, and Levering, were to the effect that they noticed no unusual handling of the train and that there did not appear to be any undue rocking of the train prior to the accident. They estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident at not more than 60 miles per hour. Section Foreman Clewell stated that he has been in charge of the section on which the accident occurred for a period of two years and during that time he has not received any complaints or reports regarding track conditions in the vicinity of the point of accident. He rode over this por- tion of the track on his motor car during the evening of August 17, and noticed nothing unusual. There is a soft place in the track north of the point of accident, and the track in that vicinity was raised about two weeks previous to the derailment; this part of the track was also found in good condition when he passed over it on his motor car. Supervisor Kauffman stated that he last walked over this section of track about eight days prior to the derail- ment, and last rode over it on a train on August 16, and an neither occasion did he notice anything wrong. To the best of his knowledge, he had never known of any soft places in the track in the vicinity of the point of accident; in fact, he had never known of any kind of trouble, and he said that in his opinion the condition of the track did not cause -4- or contribute to the cause of the accident. Supervisor Kauffman further stated that while making track measure- ments subsequent to the accident, he found a three-fourths inch nut lying along the west side of the track about 8 feet from the rail and 7 or 8 feet south of the point of derail- ment. This nut showed no evidence of rust, but was in a crushed or a shed condition, indicating that apparently it had been run over. An examination of the track made by the Commission's inspectors subsequent to the accident disclosed that no repairs of any kind were made at the initial point of de- railment, and their observations indicated that there was very little spring of the track under passing trains, and it seemed to be maintained fairly well. No marks were found to indicate that some part of the equipment had been dragging. The first ark was about 10 feet from the leav- ing end of a rail in the rest side of the track. This mark was about one-fourth inch from the gauge side of the rail was slightly diagonal, about 1 inches in length, and had the appearance of having been made by the burred edge of a nut. The second mark was about 6 feet farther south and was a flange mark on top of the west rail, beginning about 1 inch from the outside edge and continuing southward for about 6 feet to where the wheel dropped off the rail on the outside. At this point there was a corresponding flange mark on a tie on the inside of the east rail. These marks continued on the ties a distance of approximately 18 feet to where the west wheel passed off the ties. The mark between the rails worked inward as far as the center of the track and then continued in that position for a distance of 300 feet, beyond which point the track was torn up for a dis- tance of 400 feet. " The flanges and treads of all tender wheels of the lead engine were found in fair condition and all wheels in proper gauge, with no excessive lateral wear at the journal bearings. Measurements taken for side-bearing clearances of both trucks showed the forward truck had approximately 5/8 inch clearance and the rear truck 1/4 inch clearance. There were no bolts missing from the engine, and no evidence of any spare nuts having been riding loose on the engine or tender. A bolt used to secure the brake-beam safety cross tie rod of the front tender truck was missing, but this ap- peared to have been sheared off as a result of the accident. All brake beams, hangers and safety supports on both the engine and tender were still in place. The brake shoe on the right No. 1 wheel of the leading tender truck was mis- sing, but this was found some distance south of the first marks of derailment and showed no evidence of having been dragging or run over. -5- Conclusions This accident appears to have been caused by a nut lying on the running surface of the rest rail. inch A nut was found along the track a short distance from the initial point of derailment. This nut as for a bolt and was inch thick and 1 inches square; one side of it was flattened and elongated, and it appeared to have recently been on a bolt to the extent of about three threads, hile the remaining threads were rusty. The burred edge com- pared with the mark found on the rail at the point of derail- ment and one side of it fitted the ball of the rail when placed over the mark. The other side of it fitted the right No. 1 heel of the tender truck of the leading engine at a light mark found on the tread of the heel. This mark was diagonal in shape and in the same relative position as the mark on the rail. A bolt was found to be missing from the forward truck of the leading engine tender, but this bolt not only was of slightly larger diameter than the nut found at the point of accident, but it appeared to have been sheared off as a result of the accident. The reason for the presence of this nut on the rail could not be ascertained, although it is possible that it could have been riding loose on some part of the nine. M/ The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident they had not been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, . P. 30RLAND, Director. r Transportaban Library не 1780 .A23 To the Commission: 1557 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR HE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE IN VESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE FORT WAYNE-LIMA RAILROAD NEAR MIDDLEPOINT, OHIO, ON AUGUST 21, 1929. December 5, 1929. On August 21, 1929, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Fort Wayne-Lima Railroad, operated by the Indiana Service Corporation, near Middle- point, Ohio, which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of five employees. { Location and method of operation This railroad is an electric line which extends between Fort Wayne, Ind., and Lima, Ohio, a distance of 64.7 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block- signal system being in use. The accident occurred at a point about half way between France Siding and Gamble Siding, which are located 1 mile and 2.7 miles, respective- ly, west of Middlepoint. Approaching the point of accident from the east the track is tangent for a distance of 3,260.8 feet, followed by a: 0° 8' curve to the right 400 00 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 124 feet from its western end; approaching from the west there is a 09 151 curve to the left 293.4 feet in 0º length, tangent track for a distance of 806.1 feet, and then the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade for westbound trains is generally a scending for a distance of 2,000 feet, reaching a maximum of 0.48 per cent at the point of accident and extending for a distance of 150 feet beyond; it is then generally descending for a distance-of 2,400 feet, the maximum dos cending grade being .46 per cent. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 4.28 a.m. Description Westbound freight train extra 763 consisted of seven cars, hauled by motor 763, and was in charge of Conductor Brown and Motorran Mitchell. At Lima this train received train order No. 10, directing it to run extra from Grand Avenue to Fort Wayne, and to report to the dispatcher at France Siding. This train departed from Lima, 31.4 miles east of France Siding, at 3.39 a.m., passed France Siding without stopping, and collided with extra 853 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been from 25 to 40 miles per hour. F S... w Anak p - pay. -2- Eastbound freight train extra 853 consisted of four empty side-dump cars, of all-stebl construction, hauled by motor 853, and was in charge of Conductor Johnson and Lotorman DeWitt. This tri departed from Fort Wayne et 2.55 a.m. and at Convoy, 20.1 miles from Fort Wayne, re- ceived an order to meet extra 763 at Gamble Siding, which is located 12.5 miles bevond that point. On arriving at Gamble Siding, the crew received train order No. 13 provid- ing for a meet with extra 763 west at France Siding instead of Gamble Siding, which order was made complete at 4.26 a.m. Extra 853 started for France Siding, an additional distance of 1.7 miles, and although the reflection of the headlight of extra 763 was visible for a distance of about 2 miles, yet the location of extra 763 was not definitely decided as being west of France Siding until the two trains were about 1,000 feet apart. Extra 353 was brought to a stop before the col- lision occurred. Both motor cars were demolished and two box cars in extra 763 were considerably damaged. The employee killed Tas the motorman of extra 763, while those injured were the conductor and brakeman of extra 763 and the motorman, con- ductor and brakeman of extra 853. Sta De Summary of evidence Conductor Brown, of extra 763, stated that when he received train order No. 10, requiring his train to re- port at France Siding, he repeated it to the dispatcher and then gave it to the motorman, who read it aloud to him. He then informed the brakeman of its contents. Conductor Brown was thoroughly familiar with the location of the tele- phone, about 500 feet east of the east switch at France Siding, which was a facing-point switch for his train, but on approaching this siding he was dozing and did not araken until just an instant before the collision occurred. He was riding in the front end of the motor and when he looked up and saw the approaching train he called to the motorman, but he did not know whether or not the motorman was also asleep. A brake test had been made at Lima and the brakes Forked properly en route, but they were not applied prior to the collision. Conductor Brown further stated that he was in good physical condition and did not feel tired when he went on duty at 10.30 p.m. on August 20. - Brakeman Court, of extra 763, stated that at the time of the accident he was sitting in the motor car, exam- ining bills and reports for the purpose of learning the work for a conductor's position, and while he is fairly well acquainted with the sidings and telephone booths on that div- ision, he was not paying any attention as to the location of his train. The conductor had said something to him about re- porting at France or Cave, the latter station being west of Gamble, but he was not sure which place was meant and did S -3- C not concern himself about the matter, and it also appeared that while he usually reads the orders himself, yet in this instance he made no effort to obtain information as to the contents of the orders. He stated that there ras consider- ablo noise in the car, which ade it difficult to hear any conversation between the motorman and conductor, although he heard them at times, but he did not hear any sounds of conversation after they passed Middlepoint. Brakeman Court estimated the speed of their train at the time of the accident to have been between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Motorman DeWitt, of extra 853, stated that after leaving Gamble Siding, where he received an order providing a meet with extra 733 at France Siding, his train attained a speed between 20 and 25 miles per hour, and hen he discovered that extra 793 had passed France Siding, he shut off the controller and applied the air brakes, the train being brought to a stop before the collision occurred. He estimated the speed of the opposing train to have been between 35 and 40 miles per hour. Conductor Johnson, of extra 853, thought that the arc light of extra 753 was visible for a distance of about 2 miles, and he said that as soon as the motorman realized that the opposing extra had passed France Siding, he commenced to reduce speed, Conductor Johnson estimating the distance between the two trains at that time to have been 1,000 feet. The conductor also stated that he turned off the headlight on his own car just before the accident occurred; at this latter time his own train had about come to a stop, while he estimated the speed of the opposing train to have been about 40 miles per hour. The statements of Brakeman Harrison brought out nothing additional of importance, except that it had been the custom of the con- ductor to advise him of the orders they received, and in this case he had been informed by Conductor Johnson rela- tive to the orders governing their movement and thoroughly understood them. Train Dispatcher Young, located at Fort Wayne, stated that when extra trains leave their terminals they are given the order to run extra over the whole division, and if impossible to issue positive meet orders, he issues a positive order to report from certain sidings named in the order, which he did in this instance, and he said that this system is thoroughly understood by all concerned. Such an order restricts a movement beyond the designated point just as much as if a meet order had been issued. į -4- Trainmaster Lentz stated that motor 763 was geared for a speed of 37 miles per hour, and his examin- tion of the car after the accident showed the controller in full multiple position and the brake valve in full release, and there was no evidence of sand having been used prior to the collision. Conclusions. This accident was caused by the failure of Motorman Mitchell and Conductor Brown, of extra 763, to stop their train at a siding specified by train order, and obtain further orders before proceeding beyond that point. The investigation disclosed that the crew of extra 763 received train order No. 10, directing them to run as an extra train, and to report at France Siding, orders of this type being used on this line as a matter of practice. It appeared, however, that on approaching France Siding, Conductor Brown was asleep and that he did not awaken until just before the collision occurred. The reason for the failure of Motorman Mitchell to bring his train to a stop at France Siding is unknown, as he was killed as a result of the accident, but it would appear that he also was asleep or he would have known when he passed France Siding and also would have seen the head- light on the approaching train. An examination of the car after the occurrence of the accident showed that the brakes had not been applied, nor had the sanders been used. The evidence also disclosed that while Conductor Brown had told Brakeman Court of the contents of the order, the brakeman was unable to state whether they were to report to the dispatcher at France or at Cave. Had he obtained the correct information relative to this order and had he not been so occupied in learning the clerical duties of a conductor that he failed to pay attention to the operation of his train, he would have been in a posi- tion to check up with the motorman and conductor Then he saw that the train was not going to stop at France Siding. C All of the employees involved were experienced men with the exception of Brakeman Court, who entered the service of this railroad on July 11, 1929, and Brakeman Harrison, who entered the service on August 12, 1929, and none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law; Motorman Hitchell, of extra 763, had been on duty 7 hours at the time of the accident, after having been off duty 15 hours, and Conduc- tor Brown had been on duty 6 hours, after having been off duty 15 hours. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND > Director, | ··· L . ľ } I * # Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 •.~. & INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1558 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD AT ROYALTON, PA., ON AUGUST 26, 1929. December 13, 1929. To the Commission: On August 26, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between two freight trains on the Pennsylvania Railroad at Royalton, Pa., resulting in the death of two employees and the injury of one employee. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Columbia Branch of the Philadelphia Division, extending between Royalton, and Lan- caster, Pa., a distance of 30.2 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and a manual block-signal system. Royalton is the junction of the main line of the Philadelphia Division and the Colum- bia Branch, and "MB" tower is located on the north side of the tracks at the junction, the accident occurring on the branch at a point about 4,000 feet east of the tower. Ap- proaching the point of accident from the west, beginning at "MB" tower, the branch-line tracks curve to the right for a distance of about 450 feet, and then they are tan- gent for about 3,000 feet, followed by a 1º 30' curve to the right about 550 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point about 10 feet from its eastern end. The grade is slightly descending for eastbound trains. J There is a manual block signal located at a point about 400 feet east of "MB" tower, on the south side of the branch line tracks. Starting at a point about 375 feet east of this signal there is a siding, known as the long siding, which parallels the main tracks on the south; this siding is about 3,600 feet in length, and there is a water column just east of its eastern end. About 1,175 feet east of the west end of the siding there is a public highway grade crossing, while at a point about 600 feet east of this highway grade crossing there is a crossover, known as the middle crossover, which connects the siding with the eastbound main track. The distance between this crossover and the point of accident was about 1,450 feet. Owing to -2- Point of accident ROYALTON A 1450 WE 600 3501 PR.R. BA PHILA. DIV. To Columbia-> MAIN LINE HIGHWAY GRADE orange baten engage & can a "MB" Tower K. NIUW EASTWARD MAIN WESTWARD 10 ab Water Column [ㅁ ​HOUSE SIDING To Harrisburg 1030: 5501 3NQ7 5151 Middle crossover CROSSING Ra 3000 : > Manuak Block Signal 400! توا NO. 1558 PENNSYLVANIA R. R. ROYALTON, PA. Aug. 26, 1929 A 12.13.29. -3- dense foliage overhanging the siding and close to the east- bound main track, the view of the point of accident is con- siderably restricted; "MB" tower, however, is in direct line with the 3,000 feet of tangent track located west of the curve on which the accident occurred. Under the rules, a train other than a passenger train may be permitted to follow a train other than a passenger train into a block under a permissive block signal indica-- tion; trains other than passenger trains receiving a per- missive block-signal indication are required to proceed with caution prepared to stop short of a train or obstruc- tion. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred between 3.30 and 3.35 a.m. Description Eastbound freight train extra 1045, consisting of en- gine 1045, headed east and shoving a caboose, was in charge of Conductor Kane and Engineman Floyd. It left "MB" tower and was brought to a stop on the eastbound main track of the branch line, just east of the middle crossover; a run- ning switch was then made, the engine backing through the crossover and the switch being thrown between it and the caboose, which continued westward on the main track and was brought to a stop. The engine picked up 10 cars from the west end of the long siding, headed out on the main track, and backed against the caboose. The train then departed from the middle crossover, eastward, at 3.16 a.m., accord- ing to the station record maintained at "MB" tower, and was brought to a stop with the engine at the water plug and the rear end of the caboose on the curve about 1,450 feet east of the middle crossover; while standing at this point it was struck by extra 1369. PRAY Eastbound freight train extra 1369 consisted of 54 cars and a caboose, 6,490 tons, hauled by engine 1369, and was in charge of Conductor Shuler and Engineman Ruby. This train passed "MB" tower at 3.29 a.m., according to the sta- tion record, passed the manual block signal, which was dis- playing a permissive indication, and collided with the rear end of extra 1045 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 25 and 35 miles per hour. The caboose and three rear cars of extra 1045 were derailed, badly damaged, and scattered across both main tracks and the siding; the force of the impact moved extra 1045 forward about one car length. Engine 1369, together with its tender, came to rest on its right side across the three tracks; seven cars in this train were derailed and -4- scattered about. The employees killed were the engineman and head brakeman, of extra 1369, and the employee injured was the fireman of that train. Summary of evidence. Conductor Kane, of extra 1045, had no knowledge that his train was going to stop for water, but said that when it did make the stop for that purpose, at about 3.22 a.m., the flagman immediately started back to flag and went back around the curve beyond the view of the conductor, who es- timated this distance to have been about 200 feet. About four or five minutes after the stop was made the conductor was apprised of the approach of extra 1369 by one of the brakemen in the caboose the brakeman remarking, "I hope } he is not on our track. Conductor Kane got up and went to the rear door, but at this time he could not see extra 1369, although he could plainly hear it as it approached, and he therefore picked up two fusees and got off, and when about four or five car-lengths back from the caboose, he lighted one of the fusees and began giving stop signals. At this time he could see the headlight of extra 1369, about at or just east of the public highway grade crossing, while Flagman Shaffer was back on the tangent track, about 15 or 20 car-lengths from the caboose, flagging with his lighted lanterns, white and red. When extra 1369 passed Conductor Kane, he was over on the public road that paral- lels the track, still flagging with the lighted fusee; the conductor did not think that the air brakes were applied on extra 1369, said that the engine was working steam, and es- timated the speed of that train to have been about 25 miles per hour at the time of the accident; he looked at his watch on coming out of the field after the collision oc- curred and it was then 3.32 a.m. Conductor Kane further stated that he did not see Flagman Shaffer using a fusee at any time, but that Brakeman Haak used a flash light for flagging purposes after extra 1369 was heard approaching. Conductor Kane did not hear the approaching train sound whistle signals of any kind or explode any torpedoes. Standa M Flagman Shaffer, of extra 1045, stated that he was back flagging near the highway grade crossing, or just east of it, while his train was being made up. When he was called in, he put down a torpedo, between the grade crossing and the switch, but did not leave a lighted fusee as he did not think it necessary, although he said that he should have left one and that he would have done so had he known it was intended to stop for water. Flagman Shaffer was riding on the caboose when the stop was made at the water column; immediately afterwards he heard the exhaust of extra 1369, told those in the caboose that some one was coming, and started back to flag, saying that when he first saw the headlight of engine 1369 it was about half way be- tween the block-signal and the crossing. Flagman Shaffer maintained that he flagged with a lighted fusee and two 7 ' -5- ! lanterns, red and white, Erd that he went back about 20 or 25 car-lengths, on the engineman's side. No answer was re- ceived to his flag signals and the engine was working steam when it approached, the air brakes not being applied until it had passed three or four car-lengths beyond him. Flagman Shaffer estimated the speed of extra 1369 to have been about 25 or 30 miles per hour when it passed him and fixed the time of the accident as 3.30 a.m., saying that he looked at his watch after engine 1369 passed and before the accident occurred. He did not hear any signal sounded on the engine whistle for the road crossing. Flagman Shaffer further stated that he could plainly see the marker lights on his own caboose from the point where he was sta- tioned when extra 1369 finally passed him, and he fixed this location as being in the vicinity of a house which is located about 350 feet west of the point of accident. Head Brakeman Deckert, of extra 1045, stated that the flagman got off immediately, at the time the train stopped for water, and that his train had been standing at the water column about five minutes before he heard the exhaust of engine 1369. He estimated that the engine was passing "MB" tower at that time, saying that the manner in which it was exhausting, similar to the way an engine exhausts when a run is being made for a hill, gave him considerable con- cern, and that he remarked to those in the caboose that he hoped the following train was not on their own track; he got off the caboose, looked at his watch, at which time it was then about 3.30 a.m., and saw Flagman Shaffer flagging at a point about 20 or 25 car-lengths from the caboose, on the engineman's side of the track; the engine, however, had passed him at this time. He estimated the speed of extra 1369 to have been about 30 or 35 miles per hour, and thought that his own train had been standing at the water column close to 10 minutes in all, prior to the occurrence of the accident. In his opinion, engine 1369 was still working steam when the collision occurred, although he said that he saw fire flying from the wheels when the train was about eight car-lengths from the caboose. Head Brakeman Deckert further stated that Engineman Floyd had told Fire- man Nicholl and himself that he was going to stop at the water column, but the head brakeman did not mention this fact to the rest of the crew nor did he know whether they were aware of it. Head Brakeman Deckert at first said that he did not hear a torpedo exploded, but later said that he did hear one; he did not hear any whistle signal sounded on engine 1369. Cl Brakeman Haak, of extra 1045, did not know that a stop was going to be made at the water column, but said that af- ter his train had been there about one or two minutes, ex- tra 1369 was heard approaching, apparently as it was round- ing the curve at "MB" tower. Flagman Shaffer got off at -6- this time and Brakeman Kaak estimated that the flagman was back about 15 car-lengths, and still going, when extra 1369 came into view, traveling at a speed of about 25 to 30 miles per hour, with the engine working steam until the collision occurred. Brakeman Haak saw fire flying from the wheels when extra 1369 was about seven car-lengths from the caboose. He did not hear a torpedo exploded, nor any whistle signal sounded, and said he did not think that Flagman Shaffer used a lighted fusee to flag with, although he was on the opposite side of the tracks from the flagman and not in position to see him at all times. Engineman Floyd, of extra 1045, stated that it was his intention to make a stop at the water column at the time he called in the flagman on completion of the work at the middle crossover; it was the practice to call in the flag- man, provided there was any distance to go, and in this in- stance he thought that the flagman would not want to walk the distance involved. Engineman Floyd did not whistle out a flag when his train approached the water column. His at- tention was attracted to the approach of extra 1369 by the sounding of a road crossing signal, and on looking back he saw his flagman with a lighted fusee and also the headlight of engine 1369; then he saw another fusee, and men running over in the field, following which the collision occurred. Engineman Floyd estimated that his train stood at the water column about two or three minutes in all prior to the col- lision. The statements of Fireman Nicholl developed noth- ing additional of importance. Fireman Frederick, of extra 1369, stated that at "MB" tower a permissive indication was displayed on the manual block signal, which was called and repeated by all three of the men on the engine, namely, himself, the engineman, and the head brakeman. Fireman Frederick was working on the fire and the first he knew of anything wrong was when the engineman applied the air brakes in emergency and shouted, a warning of danger. The fireman looked out on the left side, and plainly saw the markers on the rear of the caboose of extra 1045, not more than five or eight car- lengths distant, also two men running over in the field, one with a flash light and the other with a fusee, and then he jumped. He estimated the speed of his train to have been fully 30 or 35 miles per hour when the air brakes were applied in emergency. Fireman Frederick further stated that he heard torpedoes exploded in the vicinity of Royal- ton, although he could not definitely locate where this oc- curred, but said that the speed was not reduced afterwards; he considered Engineman Ruby to be a fast runner. Fireman Frederick further stated that the air brakes had been in- spected by a car inspector at Harrisburg, but that no ter- minal test was made of them, only a road test after the train had been assembled from the two tracks on which it C -7- had been standing, and that the brakes had not been used any time prior to the accident. Conductor Shuler and Flag- man Sullivan were riding in the caboose and were unaware of anything wrong prior to the accident; they estimated the speed to have been between 30 and 35 miles per hour. Con- ductor Shuler also stated that Engineman Ruby had the repu- tation of being a fast runner, saying that he, as well as other conductors, had cautioned the engineman in this re- spect. Flagman Sullivan stated that no terminal test was made of the air brakes, but that a road test was made. Crossing Watchman Weirich, on duty at the highway grade crossing, stated that he did not notice what the flagman was doing at the time extra 1045 performed work at the middle crossover. About five minutes after extra 1045 left the crossover, he saw extra 1369 coming around the curve at "MB" tower, then he looked toward the, east to see if the flagman of extra 1045 ras out, and he said the flagman was in the vicinity of the west end of the curve, waving stop signals with a lighted red lantern; he thought that the flagman also had a white lantern. Crossing Watch- man Weirich estimated the speed of extra 1369 to have been about 30 miles per hour on passing the crossing, with the engine working steam; he was on the north side of the tracks at the time and did not see any lighted fusees prior to the accident. Signalman Berkstresser, on duty at "MB" tower, stated that while extra 1045 actually entered the block at about 3.05 a.m., he did not record it as having departed until it left the middle crossover, at 3.16 a.m. He had seen the flagman at a point about 15 to 18 car-lengths east of the highway crossing, at the time the train was being made up heard the flagman whistled in before extra 1045 left that point, and estimated that the train arrived at the water column at 3.20 a.m. Extra 1369 received a permissive in- dication on the manual block signal, and when the engine was passing that signal he looked toward the east and saw the flagman of extra 1045 waving stop signals with a lan- tern and a fusee, in ample time for extra 1369 to have been brought to a stop without incident. incident. His statements were so conflicting, however, that it can not be stated definitely where extra 1369 was located when he first saw the flag- man's stop signals. He also saw another fusee, a few sec- onds later, over on the public road that parallels the tracks, saying that this light appeared about the time the road crossing signal was sounded on the engine whistle of extra 1369; he figured that the accident occurred about 3.33 or 3.35 a.m. -8- Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Conductor Kane and Flagman Shaffer, of extra 1045, to provide proper flag protection; a contributing cause was the failure of Engineman Ruby, of extra 1369, properly to control the speed of his train when operating under a permissive block-signal indication. Under the rules, when a train stops under circum- stances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in addition, displaying lighted fusees. When recalled, and safety to the train will permit, the flagman may return, and when the condi- tions require he will leave the torpedoes and a lighted fusee. Conductors and enginemen are responsible for the protection of their trains. The testimony was extremely conflicting in various details, particularly as to the movements of Flagman Shaffer both at the time work was and performed at the middle crossover by extra 1045, shortly afterwards when the stop was made at the water column, however the requirements of the flagging rule ap- parently were violated at each of these points. According to the flagman's own statements, when the stop was made at the water column he did not start back until he heard the exhaust of an approaching train, and he only got back around the curve to a point in the vicinity of the dwell- ing, which is located about 350 feet west of where the collision occurred. It appears that there was ample time at the disposal of Conductor Kane and Flagman Shaffer within which to have provided proper rear-end protection, but instead of so doing they virtually took no action what- ever along this line until it was too late to avert the accident. > Captai Ka Engineman Ruby apparently was in full possession of his faculties, called the indications displayed by the signals at "MB" tower, and shouted a warning of danger just prior to the accident. Why he did not properly obey the permissive indication displayed by the block signal and proceed with a greater degree of caution, prepared to stop short of a train or obstruction, could not be ascer- tained, as he was killed in the accident. Ja In view of the short distance from the middle cross- over to the point of accident, about 1,450 feet, there is a question as to the judgment exercised by Engineman Floyd, of extra 1045, in calling in his flagman before departing from the crossover, when he fully intended to stop again at the water column. It is also to be noted that he did t. Tieť ? -9- T not whistle out a flag approaching the water plug. The members of this crew were practically all together while making up their train, which was a very short one, and Engineman Floyd either should have said that he intended to make a stop at the water column, or else he should have proceeded to that point without recalling the flagman. this connection it is to be noted that Head Brakeman Deck- ert knew a stop was to be made for water, and although he rode in the caboose from the middle crossover to the water column, yet he said nothing about it to the other members of the train crew. In All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. # Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1559 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES- TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RAILWAY NEAR GLENWOOD, ALA., ON AUGUST 29, 1929. To the Commission: December 14, 1929 On August 29, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Central of Georgia Railway near Glenwood, Ala., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Andalusia District of the Columbus Division, extending between Andalusia, Ala. and Columbus, Ga., a distance of 138.3 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The point of accident was at a highway grade crossing located approximate- ly 1 mile east of the station at Glenwood; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for a distance of more than 1 mile. The grade for eastbound trains is 0.9 per cent as cending for a distance of 2,250 feet, followed by a descending grade of 0.67 per cent to the point of accident, a distance of 450 feet, and extending some distance beyond that point. The track is laid with 63-pound rails, 30 feet in length, with an average of 16 pine ties to the rail- length, 25 per cent tie-plated, and is single-spiked. The track is ballasted with gravel to a depth of 4 inches, on a subgrade of sand, and is well maintained. Sawada The highway crossing involved is located in a slight cut and crosses the track at a slight angle. There is a descending grade toward the track on each side; approaching on the highway from the south the grade is 5 per cent descending for a distance of 145 feet to the cross- ing, and approaching from the north it is 3.9 per cent descending for a distance of 130 feet, followed by 3.2 per cent descending grade for a distance of 155 feet to the crossing. At a point about 25 feet from each side of the track there are bulkheads, or ridges, which extend across the highway, for the purpose of diverting the flow of water from rainfall to the ditches on either side. There are also surface ditches at the top of the cut on the north side of the track which divert the water so it will not flow down the highway toward the track. The track is paralleled on each side with 12-inch terra cotta drainage pipes extending under the highway. The highway is 24 feet in width, un- improved, and surfaced with a mixture of sand and clay, and the crossing is constructed of plain dirt and is not planked. I # · -2- Due to the grade of the track approaching this cross- ing from the west, the view had by crews of eastbound trains is restricted to a distance of about 700 feet. There had been a heavy rain storm between 3 and 3.20 p.m. in the vicinity of Glenwood, which covered an area of acout 2 miles, but it was not raining at the time of the accident, which occurred about 3.40 p.m. Description Eastbound passenger train No. 16 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car and two coaches, all of Fooden construction, hauled by engine 355, and was in charge of Conductor Rawls and Engineman Ledbetter. This train departed from Brantley, 8.4 miles west of Glenwood, the last open office, at 3.20 p.m., on time, stopped at Glenwood, and on reaching the highway crossing located approximately 1 mile beyond Glenwood it was derailed while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 30 to 35 miles per hour, The engine was derailed to the right and came to rest on its left side at a point 150 feet from the initial point of derailment, with the rear wheels and cab resting on the track and the pilot buried in the bank. The tender was torn loose from its frame and came to rest on its left side on the left or north side of the track; the tender frame buckled and was torn from the trucks, but remained coupled to the first car. The first car and the front truck of the second car were derailed to the left but re- mained upright. The rear car was not derailed and stopped on the crossing. The employee killed was the fireman and the employee injured was the engineman. Summary of evidence On Engineman Ledbetter stated that west of Glenwood there had been a light sprinkle, but it was not raining to any extent when he arrived at Glenwood and he saw no evidence of there having been a heavy rain at any time. approaching the highway crossing, while it was cloudy, the visibility was good and he was watching the highway closely as the traffic is usually heavy there, and when about 20 feet from the crossing he noticed sand on the track; he immediately applied the air brakes in emergency but the derailment occurred before the brakes had time to take ef fect; he estimated the speed of the train to have been about 30 or 35 miles per hour at the time. Due to the rise of the track on approaching this crossing the view is consid- erably restricted and when he starts sounding the road crossing whistle the fireman usually fixes the fire so he can watch the crossing, and Engineman Ledbetter thought the fireman was standing in the gangway Then they approached SAMAR ~3~ the crossing on that afternoon. His train westbound on the morning of the same day was the last one to pass over the crossing prior to the accident, and at that time noth- ing wrong was noticed. Engineman Ledbetter had been run- ning over this territory for the last five or six years, and during that time he had never seen sand washed on this crossing. He further stated that the brakes had been test- ed that morning at Columbus, and also at Andalusia, and were found to be in good condition and had worked properly en route. The engine was in good condition, and he did not think there was anything about it that could have caused the derailment, and it was his opinion that the sand on the track caused the heels to jump and the flange to run over on the side of the rail. Starý On Conductor Rawls stated that the first intimation he had of anything wrong was when he felt the air brakes apply in emergency just before the derailment occurred, his way back to the station at Glenwood, to telephone for medical aid and report the accident, he noticed that there was about 2 or 3 inches of sand on the rails at the cross- ing, and he was of the opinion that this sand had been wash- ed on the track by a rain storm just prior to the arrival of his train and that it was the cause of the derailment. There had been a light rain west of Glenwood, but on arriv- ing at Glenwood the rain had stopped, and although he noticed there had been considerable rain at that point, the only definite information he had of a heavy rain was from three young ladies who boarded the train at Glenwood and told him they had encountered a very heavy rain storm on their way to the station from their homes. Conductor Rawls' statements corroborated those of Engineman Ledbetter as to the air brakes, and he also estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been about 35 miles per hour. Conductor Rarls further stated that they had never experienced any trouble at this crossing. The statements of Brakeman McCain and Express Messenger Childs brought out nothing additional of importance. They felt the air brakes apply in emergency practically at the time the derailment occurred. Track Supervisor Howard, in charge of the section of track on which this accident occurred, staved that he arrived at the scene of the accident about four hours after its occurrence, and his examination of the crossing dis- closed that there was about 2 inches of sand on the out- side of the south rail for a distance of about 10 fect, for a distance of about 4 feet along the north rail. It appeared that the engine left the track at the east end of the crossing, as there was a flange mark at that point, but on examining the engine truck he found nothing that could have contributed to the derailment. Track and -4- Superviscr Howard stated that the ditches on the south side of the crossing were cpen, but one of the ditches on the north side was filled with water from the bulkhead to the track, and it appeared to him that the sand had poured in from the west side of the highway and had run down and spread over the south rail, while on the north rail the sand seemed to have flowed down from the bulkhead in the ruts of vehicles on the highway. Track Supervisor Howard further stated that he had had some trouble with a small amount of sand having been washed on other crossings, but he had never had any previous trouble of this nature at this particular crossing. It is an old crossing but he had always felt that by keeping up the bulkheads it would be perfectly safe; he had gone over this territory on the day previous to the cc- currence of the accident, and his section foreman had cover- ed that territory on the morning of the accident, at which time nothing unusual was noted. It also appeared from the statements of the track supervisor that he had personally given rigid instructions to all of his sectionmen to patrol their track after heavy rains, and that on one occasion he had dismissed a man for failing to perform this duty. At the time of the accident none of the sectionmen was on duty; the section foreman lives at Goshen, 4 miles east of the crossing, and the rain had been so recent and within such a limited area that no one had had an opportunity to discover the condition of the crossing before the arrival of train No. 16. Section Foreman Meads stated that when he arrived at the scene of the accident he made an examination of the track and found that on the crossing it was covered with sand for a distance of about 8 feet, and the first mark of derailment was on the south rail at a point about 10 feet beyond that point. He thought that the sand was heavy enough so that there were no flange marks on the ball of the rail until the wheels had passed over the crossing. He did not see any flange marks on the ball of the rail on the opposite side but found where the wheel had dropped off on the ties on the inside of the north rail. He had patrolled the track over this crossing on the day of the accident, walking over it in both directions, but found nothing wrong. The surface and alignment of the track were good; the re were no low places and the drainage was good, while the cut had been ditched out on the north side of the track, up to the cross- ing, about 10 days previous to the occurrence of the accident it was not needed on the south side. Section Foreman Meads stated that he has very rigid instructions to patrol his track after storms, and has always done so. On this ccca- sion, however, there had been only a light rain at Goshen, and he did not know of there having been a heavy rain at Glenwood, consequently he did not intend to patrol the track again that day. This track is patrolled about twice a week. S -5- ( The statements of Trainmaster Doughtie, Road Foreman of Engines Thompson and Haster Mechanic McCafferty brought out nothing additional of importance, except that they stated they made an examination of the engine after the accident and could find nothing that contributed in any way toward the derailment, which fact was substantiated by the examination of the engine made by the Commission's inspectors. Conclusions. This accident was caused by the track at a highway grade crossing being covered with sand. The evidence indicates that there had been an unusually heavy rain storm in the immediate vicinity of the point of accident just prior to the arrival of train No. 16, result- ing in sand being washed down on the track to such an extent that the engine became derailed when it encountered the sand. The highway is well drained, but due to the heavy descend- ing grade toward the track on both sides, it appears that the drainage was unable to take care of the excess water on this occasion. Neither the train crew approaching from the west nor the section crew located east of the crossing had any knowledge of such a storm having prevailed. The track had been patrolled a few hours before the occurrence of the accident, at which time nothing wrong was noted. The view of the highway crossing had by the crew of an eastbound train is considerably restricted, owing to the grade of the track, and with the engineman giving his attention to the traffic on this crossing, it is doubtful whether the sand could have been seen on the track except from a very short distance, as the sand is of the same general color as the crossing, which is constructed of plain dirt and is not planked. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of ser- vice law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND ? Director. Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD AT SHAWSHEEN, MASS., ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1929. B mission. いや ​1560 B November 22, 1929 To the Commission: On September 14, 1929, there was a head-end col- lision between a freight train and two light engines, coupled together, on the Boston and Maine Railroad at Shawsheen, Mass., which resulted in the death of two employees and the injury of six employees. The investiga- tion of this accident was held in conjunction with representatives of the Massachusetts Public Service Com- Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Portland Division extending between Lowell Junction, Mass., and Scarboro Beach, Me., a distance of 89.08 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The ac- cident occurred at a point approximately 1,600 feet west of the station at Shawsheen; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for a distance of 2,940 feet, followed by a 10 39' curve to the left 1,750 feet in length, the accident occurring at the leaving end of this curve. Approaching from the east the track is tangent for a distance of 7,960 feet, followed by a 0° 57 curve to the right 1,980 feet in length, and then tangent track for a distance of 500 feet to the point of accident. The grade is 0.533 per cent descending for eastbound trains at the point of accident. At Lowell Junction, 4.34 miles west of Shawsheen, the tracks of the Lowell branch connect with the main line of the Portland Division and form a wye in making this connection. The east leg of this wye is single track and connects with the westbound main track at a point 1,397 feet east of the tower, while at a point ap- proximately 50 feet east of the wye switch there is a facing-point cross-over between the two main tracks; the switches and signals at this point are operated from an interlocking tower. The signals involved are interlocking signals 31 and 40, located 1,240 feet and 1,685 feet, re- spectively, east of the tower. These signals are of the semi-automatic color-light type, mounted vertically on high posts, the lights being designated, from top to -2- A 32 Eastbound - To PORTLAND, ME. Westbound - To BosTON D199 7 38 6 ⇐ 33 36 37 ୫ 1240' 39 31 A 40 C B C Lowell Jct. Station # 288' "1 445' …………………….. WARNIN 18 i 201 19H B A 311! 23 24 A B C 100 25 430 29 To Worcester No. 1560 Boston & Maine R.R. Shawsheen, Mass. Sept. 14, 1929. SDA 11-15-29 -- - 3 3. 1. bottom, A, B, and C. Light A on signal 31 governs movements from the east leg of the wye eastward to the westbound main track and is fixed to indicate stop at all times, while lights B and C are used in crossover or diverging movements. Signal 40 is connected with the automatic block-signal circuit and governs movements westward on the westbound main track; it also represents the eastern limits of interlocking protection. The interlocking machine is also arranged so that on light C of these signals the signalman can give a "calling-on" indication. The weather was cloudy and a fog prevailed at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 4.45 a.m. Description Westbound freight train LR-1 consisted of 80 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 3014, and was in charge of Conductor Bregeau and Engineman Mooney. This train departed from South Lawrence, its initial station, 1.72 miles east of Shawsheen, at 4.30 a.m., 30 minutes late, and shortly after passing Shawsheen it collided with engines 3682 and 3637, coupled, while traveling at a speed estimated at about 8 miles per hour. Eastbound light engines 3682 and 3637, coupled, and running as an extra train, were in charge of Engineman Kirkwood and Abbott. These engines departed from Worcester at 1.58 a.m., en route to Portland via Lowell and Lowell Junction. On arriving at Lowell Junction about 4.35 a.m. they passed around the east leg of the wye and out on the westbound main track, and then passed the crossover and continued eastward until they collided with train LR-1 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 25 miles per hour. All three engines and the first four cars in train LR-1 were derailed, while the equipment involved was con- siderably damaged. The employees killed were the engine- man and fireman of engine 3682, the lead engine, and the employees injured were the engineman, fireman and a flagman on engine 3637, and the engineman, fireman and brakeman of train LR-1. Summary of evidence Engineman Mooney, of train LR-1, stated that his train was moving at a speed of 7 or 8 miles per hour when the collision occurred. He was riding on his seatbox, observing signal indications as he passed them, but did not see the light engines approaching and did not know what had occurred until some time after the accident; the 4 1 ! last signal he passed before reaching the point of acci- dent was displaying a clear indication. He attributed his failure to see these engines to the fog, which he said was more dense in some places than in others, and to the fact that he was operating the injector and watching the water glass, due to the fact that the fireman and head brakeman were engaged in cleaning out the elevators of the stoker. The statements of other employees on this train brought out nothing additional of importance. Engineman Abbott, of engine 3637, stated that upon arrival at Lowell he held a conversation with the leading engineman and noticed nothing unusual about his actions; this was the last time he talked to him. While the engines were approaching the east end of the wye at Lowell Junction he observed that signal 31 was displaying a yellow, or calling-on, signal, which authorized the engines to enter onto the westbound main track but did not authorize them to pass westbound signal 40 against the current of traffic without flag protection or a train order. The engines continued beyond the latter signal without stopping, however, and as they had no train order and the movement was not being protected, he became ap- prehensive and inquired of the flagman, who was riding on his engine, as to whether they had authority to pro- ceed and the flagman replied in the affirmative, and since he was also placing reliance on the leading engineman he therefore took no action to bring the engines to a stop. It also appeared from his statements that at certain points on the road, when they get a signal from a tower, they go regardless of the track being used, and after passing Lowell Junction he asked his fireman how long it had been the practice to operate trains between Lowell Junction and Lawrence without orders and the fireman replied that it had been done frequently and remarked that they probably were being run around some train on the eastbound track. Engineman Abbott admitted that he was equally responsible for the movement of the engines and could give no other reasons for his failure to ascertain definitely by what authority the movement was being made. He further stated that the last time he was examined on the book of rules was in February, 1918, although a new book of rules was issued in 1927, and that he had been in the instruction car only once during the past year. S Fireman Cheney, of engine 3537, stated that he was a qualified engineman but that he had never done any running. He was in a position to see all signals between Worcester and the point of accident and noticed that the lower light on signal 31 at Lowell Junction was displaying a yellow indication. The engines then entered on the west- - 5 - bound main track and continued eastward without stopping. He was aware they were running against the current of traffic and knew of no train orders granting this authority, yet he did not call his engineman's attention to it, neither did he take any other action to stop the engines, and the only excuse he could offer for his failure to take some action was that he thought possibly they were running around some train on the eastbound main track. He also said he did not have any conversation with the engineman and that the engineman did not say anything to him about the movement; although he did notice the engineman convers- ing with the flagman. Fireman Cheney estimated the speed of the engines at the time of the accident at between 20 and 25 miles per hour. Flagman French stated that he rode on the second engine the entire distance between Worcester and the point of accident and had no conversation with the crew of the leading engine after leaving the initial station. He knew they were moving on the westbound main track after passing Lowell Junction but thought they must have rights over it, although he had not seen any written authority to this effect. He could not recall whether Engineman Abbott made any inquiry concerning the movement against the current of traffic, neither did he remember telling the engineman that it was all right. He thought the speed of his train was not more than 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Signalman Wing, on duty at Lowell Junction at the time of the accident, stated that he had been notified by the dispatcher that two light engines were approaching his station en route to Portland, but no train orders were issued for these engines to operate against the current of traffic. When the engines reached the track circuit on the Lowell Branch he lined the route for them to pass over the east leg of the wye and then inquired of South Lawrence engine house as to the status of train LR-1. Being of the opinion that he could cross the engines over to the eastbound main track before the arrival of that train, he displayed a yellow signal on light C at signal 31 before he attempted to line the crossover switches. Realizing his mistake he then decided to allow the engines to proceed on the westbound main track to a point beyond the interlocking limits, or as far as signal 40, clear of the circuit, after which he would give them a signal to back up and then have them make the crossover movement. After the circuit light in the tower went out, he heard the engines working steam, whereupon he picked up a lantern, left the tower, and ran and ran towards the crossover in an ef- fort to stop the engines but was unsuccessful. He then returned to the tower and notified the dispatcher as to what had occurred. Signalman Wing said that the general • : | 6 - practice is to line up the entire route before any signal indications are displayed but on the day of the accident he operated signal 31 before he discovered that he had not lined the crossover, and that he made no attempt to change the signal indication as he thought it would be better to make the movement in the manner described. Dispatcher Crowley stated that at 4.39 a. m. the towerman at Lowell Junction informed him that he had let the light engines down the westbound main track. As train LR-1 had been reported by South Lawrence engine house tower, and as there was no open office between that point and Lowell Junction, there was nothing he could do to prevent the accident. Signal Engineer Scott stated that lights A and B on signals 31 and 40 are semi-automatic, and that lights C are manually controlled from the tower. Light A on signal 31 is permanently set in the stop position and can not be changed by the towerman. Trains are not permitted to pass signal 31 unless a green or yellow light is displayed by lights B or C. With the east wye switch lined for the main track and the crossover switches set in normal position, which was the situation at the time the two light engines passed through the plant, a green light can not be displayed on light B, it only being possible for the towerman to give them the calling-on signal by means of light C, which would be a yellow light, and would authorize them to move eastward against the cur- rent of traffic only as far as signal 40. Conclusions Signal Maintainer Cowx stated that he was familiar with the interlocking plant at Lowell Junction. He arrived at that point about two hours after the occurrence of the accident and made an inspection and test of the plant and found everything in good condition. He said that while the weather was rather foggy at that time, he could see the indications displayed on signal 31 from the tower. C This accident was caused by extra 3682-3637 being operated against the current of traffic without authority and without protection, for which both engine crews and the flagman were responsible. According to the evidence, when these engines ap- proached Lowell Junction the towerman lined the route for them to move over the east leg of the wye and onto the westbound main track, but he unintentionally gave them a calling-on indication at signal 31 before he had lined - 77 the crossover switches between the main tracks. This signal indication authorized the engines to enter the westbound main track and to proceed against the current of traffic on that track at slow speed prepared to stop, only as far as signal 40, which is at the eastern end of the interlocking plant. The surviving members of the crew knew they had no authority for continuing on that track, but the engineman said he was depending on the lead engineman and also that he was told by the flagman that they had authority for the movement; the fireman thought they might be running around some other train, and the flagman thought they must have rights over the westbound track, and the result was that they made no attempt to have the movement stopped, but continued east- ward for a distance of approximately 4 miles to the point of accident. The reason the crew of the first engine fai led to stop could not, of course, be determined. In questioning some of the witnesses in connection with the rules, the following information was developed: Engineman Abbott said he was promoted on February 1, 1918, and that he had not been examined on the book of rules since that time, although the current book of rules took effect on April 4, 1927; his statements clearly showed that he did not know what his rights were when making the movement against the current of traffic beyond the inter- locking plant at Lowell Junction. VAŠ Fireman Cheney, who entered the service in January, 1918, and qualified as an engineman in January, 1927, said there was doubt in his mind as to his rights on the westbound track beyond the interlocking plant. In addition, he was questioned concerning the movement made by the two light engines while en route between Worcester and Lowell Junction, in which they were operated against the current of traffic within the yard limits at Ayer, 24.72 miles from Lowell Junction, and when asked if he understood whether he could make such a movement, he said he did not know but that it had been done before. It also appeared from Fireman Cheneyis statements that on one occasion he had been firing when a movement was made from Lowell Junction to Ayer against the current of traffic without train orders, but when pressed for further information on this point, he was unable to say when it was done. Flagman French, who entered the service in August, 1918, but had not qualified as a conductor, was questioned by Superintendent Twombly, of the Portland Division, in part as follows; 1 - 8 1 Q. A. Q. A. A. Q. A. Q. Q. Do you take interest enough in the job to keep yourself posted on special rules and time cards? Yes. A. Q. Although you have not taken any examination on the book of rules, you are familiar with the rules enough and your experience has been long enough so that you know you have no right to operate against traffic from Lowell Jct. to Ballardvale, Andover or Lawrence without orders. Well I don't know, I felt absolutely sure that we were all right that morning. Why did you feel that you were all right? I can't explain it unless I had the two points mixed up. Do you know between what points trains are allowed to operate against traffic on the Portland Division main line? Between Wigington Jct. and Lowell Jct., at BT tower and between Alfred Road and Kennebunk. I think so. Immediately following these statements, Mr. Pfeifer, assistant general manager, continued the questioning of Flagman French, as follows: Dou think you can operate between Alfred Road and Kennebunk without train orders? A. No, sir. That last statement you made to Mr. Twombly that you can make a reverse movement between Alfred Road and Kennebunk against traffic, you study up on your rules and pass an examination before Mr. Twombly before you go to work. Did you make any question to Mr. Abbott as to your right to be on the westbound main leaving Lowell Jct. to the effect that it must be all right to run any way around here? - 9 - 2. Do you know you cannot make a reverse movement between Lowell Jct., Andover Andover, Ballardvale and Lawrence without a train order? A. Q. I was not sure, I felt he was all right. Is your time so taken up you cannot familiarize yourself, so that you do not know the rules? A. No, sir. I read bulletins when they come out. The situation as regards Engineman Abbott, who had last been examined on the book of rules at the time of his promotion in 1918, although, a new book of rules was issued in 1927, is similar to that developed with the first accident investigation by this commission on the Boston and Maine Railroad; that which occurred at Hamp- stead, N. H., on October 9, 1911, and in the report cover- ing the investigation of that accident, the following statement was made: The Boston & Maine Railroad adopted standard rules June 21st, 1909, and at the time of their adoption a general circular was issued calling attention to a number of important changes from the rules then in effect. Conductors and engine- men promoted prior to this time were not examined as to the new rules, but all employees promoted since their adoption were required to pass a written examination. The conductor and engine- man at fault had been in service twenty and eighteen years, respectively. They had not been examined on the standard code rules now in effect, neither have any of the employees on this division been examined unless promoted after the adoption of the same. To insure safety it is obvious that the officials of the Boston & Maine Railroad should see to it that employees have a full and complete knowledge of the rules under which they operate. The statements of the witnesses in the case of the accident here under investigation, as previously referred to in these conclusions, justify again a recommendation that the management of this road take prompt and adequate steps to insure that its employees are at all times proper- ly instructed and examined on the rules under which they are operating; it is not believed that the requirements are fulfilled when employees are in the service for years without the benefit of periodical instruction and examina- tion, possibly developing improper or indefinite under- standings of various rules which were in effect when they C $ ..... MAAR : * 4 - 10. were examined, or which have become effective in sub- sequent years. It is true that instruction cars are operated from point to point over the system, thus af- fording an opportunity for employees to be orally instructed on the operating and air-brake rules; at- tendance is not mandatory, however, and it is doubted that such a system is sufficient for the purposes of safety in train operation. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. Borland, Director. Brensportation Library HE 1780 .A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMISSION 1562 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WEICH OCCURRED ON THE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY AT SARTELL, MINN., ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1929. December 18, 1929. To the Commission: On September 15, 1929, there was a rear-end colli- sion between two freight trains on the Northern Pacific Railway at Sartell, Minn., resulting in the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation. In This accident occurred on the First Subdivision of the St. Paul Division, extending between Staples and St. Paul, Minn., a distance of 141.3 miles. the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains normally are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system, however, in order to avoid serious delay in clearing several superior trains, the east- bound freight trains involved in this accident were being operated against the current of traffic from Gregory to Sartell, a distance of 24.5 miles, under train-order authority. The accident occurred within the yard limits of Sartell, on the westbound track, at a point about 3,466 feet east of the west yard-limit board; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for a considerable distance, followed by a 10 curve to the left 2,613 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point about 1,593 feet from its western end. The grade for eastbound trains is slightly descending. There is an embankment on the inside of the curve, through a cut, which is about 10 feet in height at the point of accident, and owing to the curvature and a growth of weeds and brush, as well as a line of tele- graph poles, the view was restricted to a distance of 1,728 feet from the fireman's side of the cab of an eastbound engine and to about 350 feet from the engine- man's side. : E : 1 w I The weather was clear and the sun was shining at the time of the accident, which occurred about 6.20 a.m. Description Eastbound freight train extra 1509 consisted of 73 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1509, and was in charge of Conductor Grace and Engineman Broshofke. At Gregory, the last open office, a copy of train order No. 9, Form 19, was received, reading as follows: "Extra 1509 east has right over opposing trains on westward track Gregory to Sartell Crossover." This train left Gregory on the westbound track at 4.07 a.m., according to the train sheet, and arrived at Sartell about 5.50 a.m., and while standing at this point the caboose was struck by extra 1572. Eastbound freight train extra 1572 consisted of 55 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1572, and was in charge of Conductor McLeer and Engineman Donahue. At Randall, 13 miles west of Gregory, a copy of train order No. 11, Form 19, was received, reading as follows: 11 "Extra 1572 east has right over opposing trains on westward track Gregory to Sartell Cross- over. This train left Gregory on the westbound track at 5.41 a.m., according to the train sheet, 1 hour and 34 min- utes behind extra 1509, exploded two torpedoes while approaching Sartell yard limits, passed the west yard- limit board, and collided with the rear end of extra 1509 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 8 and 12 miles per hour. The caboose of extra 1509 and the first car ahead of it were demolished; the second car ahead was derailed, While the rear truck of the third car was shoved under the center of the car. Engine 1573 had its pilot demolished; the front end of the engine was also other- wise damaged and two pairs of driving wheels were de- railed. None of the other equipment in either train was derailed or damaged. The employee injured was the conductor of extra 1509. S : ? - 3. 1 Summary of evidence. Engineman Donahue, of extra 1572, stated that his train was drifting at a speed of about 30 miles per hour when torpedoes were exploded which he thought were in the vicinity of the yard-limit board, and he then applied the independent brake and kept a sharp lookout ahead. Approaching the curve to the left, he shouted across to the firemen and head brakeman inquiring as to conditions and soon after- The wards they warned him of the train ahead. engineman immediately applied the air brakes in emergency, opened the sanders, and reversed the engine. Engineman Donahue estimated the speed of his train to have been about 25 miles per hour when the emergency air-brake application was made, and between 8 and 10 miles per hour when the accident occurred, and fixed the location of his engine at the time of the emergency application as in the vicinity of a road crossing which was 1,020 foet from the point of accident. The air brakes had been tested, and worked properly en route. Enginoman Donahuc further stated that had he been advised that extra 1509 left Gregory 1 hour and 34 minutes ahead of his own train, also on the restbound track, he would have been more cautious; ho had operated against the current of traffic over this section of track before, however, without receiv- ing information on preceding trains. While operating with the current of traffic, the automatic block signals afford protection, as well as the yard-limit board, but when operating against the current of traffic, such as was the case in this instance, no protection was afford- ed except the yard-limit board, therefore, he said he was expecting to be flagged. Enginoman Donahue fully understood however, that he was required to operato within yard limits prepared to stop. Stat Head Brakeman Dupre, of extra 1572, stated that he had been looking back along the train, but that just before his train started around the curve ho looked ahead, and on seeing the caboose of extra 1509, he shouted a warning to the engineman, who at Head Brak oman once applied the brakes in emergency. Dupre stated that the train was drifting at a spocd of about 25 miles per hour before the torpedocs Tero exploded and that the onginonen acknowledged them and reduced speed slightly; the head brakoman estimated the spood to have been about 20 miles per hour on pass- į -4 ing the yard-limit board, about 15 or 20 miles per hour at the time the emergency application was made, and about 8 or 10 miles per hour when the accident occurred. The head brakeman could not estimate the distance betwoon his engine and the caboose when ho saw it, but said he thought his train traveled about 30 or 40 cor-lengths after the emergency application was made. he Fireman Patterson, of extra 1572, stated that ho had been sitting on his seat box about one minute, having just gotten back on it, when he saw the caboose ehead, apparently about 20 car-lengths distant; ho estimated the speed of his train at this time to have then been about 25 or 30 miles per hour; and said ho did not think he could have soon the caboosc a greater distance. Conductor MoLoer, of extr. 1572, stated that the speed of his train was between 25 and 30 miles per hour when the emergency application was made, and ho thought it then traveled a distance of about 25 car- lengths before the accident occurred. He estimated the spoed to have been about 10 or 12 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Conductor McLeer also stated that it was not customary to receive notice of an extra train ahead on the westbound track. The statomonts of Flagman Cannon developed nothing addi- tional of importanco. grad Conductor Grace, of cxtra 1509, was under treat- mont in the hospital for injuries received in the accident and was not interrogatcd. Flagman Higgins was at the hoad end of the train, assisting with the work at Sartell; and he said that after arriving at that point he telephoned the dispatcher, at about 5.55 .m., and received information concerning several trains. He was also told that extra 1572 s following extra 1509, but he said he did not go back and inform Conductor Grace, or any one else, in view of the fact that under the rules, no flag protection was required, since his train was within yard limits. The statements of other members of this crew added nothing additional of importance. The two torpedce s that wore exploded by cxtra 1572 on the westbound track had been placed there by the Conductor of castbound freight train extra 1788, which loft Gregory behind cxtra 1503 and ahead of extra 1572, at the time cxtra 1788 stopped to head-in - 5 - ་ on the castbound passing track at Sartell, the conductor having anticipated that his train prob- ably would be backed over, and having put down the torpedoes as a matter of extra precaution. Roadmaster Sonburg informed the Commission's inspector that he found the remains of a recently exploded to rpedo along the inside rail of the westbound track at a point 1,914 feet west of the west yard-limit board, and undoubtedly this ras one of the torpedoes used by the conductor of extra 1788, for had these torpedoes been placed on the rail by some member of the crow of a westbound train, for a following movement, they would have been placed on the opposite rail, on the ongincman's side of the track. These facts rould indicate that the torpedoes encountered by oxtra 1572 roro more than 40-car-lengths outside the yard-limit board and more than 1 mile from where the accident occurred. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Enginoman Donahue, of extra 1573, to operate under proper control within yard limits. The evidence showed that torpedoes had been put down at a point some distance outside of the yard- limit board, having been plced there by the conductor of a train not involved in the accident. Enginemon Donahue's engine exploded these torpedocs, but his viow of the track shond was good, rnd he continued with very little roduction of speed, passing the yard-limit board at a speed of about 30 miles per hour, and his train was moving at a spood of at least 25 miles per hour hon approaching the curve to the left on hich the accident occurred, where he had practically no vicw of the track head. The result was that he ras unable to stop his train when the firoman and head brakeman, both of whom were riding on the left side of the engine, gave varning of the presence of extra 1509. Engineman Donahue scomod to think that flag pro- tcction should have been provided. Ho ras thoroughly familiar with rule 93, however, which in part requires extro trains to move within yard limits prepared to stop, unless the main track is soon or known to be clear, and since this rule also provides that first- · 6 i. L class trains when running against the curront of traffic must be operated prepared to stop, it is difficult to sec why he should have had any idea that his own train, which was an extra, could be opcrated may differently. Enginemon Donahue also said he would have been more cautious had he known extra 1509 was ahead of him. Here, again, the answer is to be found in the requirements of rule 93, just referred to, nd it might also be well to point out that in view of the fact that extra 1509 loft Gregory, only 24.5 miles from Sertoll, 1 hour and 34 minutes head of him, it is rather doubtful if he would have operated his train any differently, even had all of this information bocn given to him. There was other evidence, however, to the cffcct that he had operated under similar circumstances on previous occasions without being furnished with in- formation concerning procoding trains, and it is not believed that there is my justification for the excessive speed at which he was operating his train then entering the yard at Srtell against the current S of traffic. There is a questions to whother Enginoman Donahue was given as much warning as possible by those on the left side of the engine. The onginoman said the emergency application was made in the vicinity of a road crossing which is only about 1,000 foot from the point of accident; the hond brokoman said the train travelled 30 or 40 car-lengths after this application had been made; the fireman thought the caboose was about 20 car-longths distent when he first saw it, and the conductor thought the train moved about 25 car- lengths after the brake application was made. The vic from the firum'n's side was found to be 1728 foot, and this fact, when considered in connection with the cs- timates of the engineman, fireman and conductor, just referred to, make it appear probable that warning was not given to the onginoman at the earliest possible moment, and there is a possibility that the accident might have been provented had the enginomen had the benefit of the full distance of 1,700 foot within which to bring his train to stop. こ ​All of the caployees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of thom had boon on duty in violation of my of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1563 Transportation Library HE 1788 .4234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE DELAWARE. LACKAWANNA & WESTERN RAILROAD NEAR GREENDELL, N.J., SEPTEMBER 17, 1929. ON To the Commission: January 10, 1930 On September 17, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between a freight train and a train of empty express refri- gerator cars on the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad near Greendell, N.J., resulting in the injury of four employees. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners. GRANDE Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that portion of the Morris and Essex Division extending between Slateford Junction and Port Morris Junction, N.J., a distance of 28.6 miles, desig- nated as the New Jersey cut-off; this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The accident occurred on the eastbound main track at a point about 6 miles east of Greendell tower, or 242 feet east of the eastern portal of Roseville tunnel, which is 1,016 feet in length. Approaching this point from the west there is a 2º curve to the right 2,366 feet in length, followed by more than 2 miles of tangent, the accident occurring on this tangent at a point 5,224 feet from its western end. The grade is 0.55 per cent ascending for eastbound trains. The automatic block signals involved, signals 528 and 520, are of the two-arm, two-position, lower-quadrant semphore type, and are located 7,160 and 3,000 feet, respect- ively, west of the point of accident. Owing to an overhead arch bridge, which spans the tracks at a point 843 feet west of signal 520, the view of that signal is somewhat obstructed but under favorable conditions a clear view can be had of both arms of this signal when it is 1,848 feet distant. It was daylight, but raining very hard, at the time of the accident, which occurred about 6.31 a.m. -2- į Description Eastbound freight train extra 2227 consisted of 47 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 2227, and was in charge of Conductor McCarthy and Engineman Edwards. On departing from the castbound passing siding at Groondell, the east switch of which is located about 7,000 fost east of the tower, at about 5.50 or 5.55 a.m. Flagman Cawley put down two tor- pedoes and left a yellow fusee; on reaching a point just cast of signal 520, and before entering Roseville tunnel, he dropped off another yellow fusee. Shortly after the caboose emerged from the opposite end of the tunnel, at which time the train was traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 12 and 20 miles per hour, it was struck by extra 1192. > Eastbound deadhead equipment train extra 1192 consisted of 24 empty express refrigerator cars and a coach, hauled by engine 1192, and was in charge of Conductor Hosey and Engineman Walker. On passing Greendell tower, at 6.17 a.m. according to the train sheet, copy of the following message was delivered to both the head and rear ends of the train: "C&E Exa 1192 East Clear at Roseville siding for No. 14." The west switch of the eastbound passing siding at Roseville is located about 2 miles east of where the collision oc- curred. Extra 1192 exploded the two torpedoes placed in the vicinity of the east switch of the castbound passing track at Greendell, passed signal 528, which was displaying a caution indication, passed signal 520, which was displaying a stop indication, passed the lighted yellow fusce that had been dropped off in this immediate vicinity by the flagman of oxtra 2227, and collided with the rear end of that train while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 30 and 35 miles per hour. The caboose of extra 2227 came to rest on its left side on the westbound main track, as did engine 1192. The first two cars ahead of the caboose were damaged, while the tender of engine 1192 and two express cars were derailed. The employees injured were the conductor and flagman of extra 2227, and the engineman and fireman of extra 1192. Summary of evidence. Flagman Cawley, of extra 2227, stated that he did not see any reflection from the headlight of engine 1192 at the time he dropped off the last fusee; he then went back inside the caboose, up into the cupola, and sat by the window. He estimated the speed of his train through the tunnel, to have been about 20 miles per hour, the collision occurring just after emerging therefrom. Conductor McCarthy, -3 who was also riding in the caboose, estimated the speed of his train through the tunnel to have been between 10 and 12 miles per hour. Engineman Walker, of extra 1192, stated that the fireman took the message handed on at Greendell as the train passed that point at a speed of about 15 miles per hour. After reading the message the fireman handed it to the engineman, who also read it. Engineman Walker said it was raining very hard and that at first he had the storm window wide open in order to get a view ahead; however, as the rain beat in and he was getting wet, he closed the window to the 45° angle. On reaching the vicinity of the east switch of the eastbound passing siding at Greendell two torpedoes were exploded, but there was no lighted fusee at this time. Extra 2227 had left the siding more than 20 minutes before extra 1192 passed Greendell tower. After leaving Greendell the engineman started eating his lunch; approaching signal 528, which he saw was displaying a caution indication, the speed of his train was about 30 miles per hour and just after passing the signal he began to consult the time-table in order to ascer- tain how much time he had on train No. 14. It was while he was so engrossed that he passed signal 520 without having observed its indication, but he did see a burning yellow fusee that had been dropped off in this immediate vicinity by the flagman of extra 2227. At about this time a train went by on the opposite track, leaving the tunnel filled with smoke and steam; he turned his head to identify this train, opened the window and threw out lunch paper, between signal 520 and the tunnel, and shut off steam upon entering the tunnel. Although he could not see through the tunnel, he proceeded at a speed of about 30 miles per hour, and the first indication he had of anything wrong was when he felt the crash, no air-brake application having been made. Engineman Walker further stated that while approaching signal 520 he looked under the overhead arch bridge and saw the bottom arm of the signal, but that he passed it without seeing the top arm. Engineman Walker fully realized that he had passed a signal without seeing the indication displayed; but said that the fusee encountered in this immediate vicinity ha¬ burned down about 3 or 4 inches from the top, indicating to him that the preceding train was from 5 to 7 minutes ahead of him. Fireman Decker, of extra 1192, stated that he took the message off the hoop, read it, and handled it to the engine- man. He did not recall whether two torpedoes were exploded in the vicinity of the east switch of the eastbound passing siding. After leaving Greendell, the speed was increased from about 10 or 15 miles per hour to about 30 or 35 miles per hour, and from that point on he was kept busy, almost continuously, pulling down coal and working on the fire, and did not see either of the signals involved or the yellow fusee, the first indication he had of anything wrong being when the collision occurred. Conductor Hosey, Head Brakeman ก -4- Hughes and Flagman Wilson were riding in the coach, the last car in the train, and were unaware of anything wrong prior to the collision. They estimated the speed of their train to have been between 30 and 35 miles per hour at the time of the collision. After the accident, both Conductor Hosey and Flagman Wilson saw a stop indication displayed on signal 520; Flagman Wilson further stated that the lighted yellow fusee had just about burned out as he got back to it. Section Laborer Cavana stated that he was walking east- ward on the south side of the tracks when extra 2227 passed him. When it went by signal 520 he saw that signal assume the stop position, both arms going to the horizontal position. Section Laborer Cavana then observed extra 1192 following, a short distance away, and thought that it would be brought to a stop at the signal but when he realized that it was not going to be brought to a stop, he waved his arms to attract the attention of the engineman, but he did not see the engineman as the cab windows were closed. Section Laborer Cavana said that he was only a few feet away from signal 520 when extra 1192 passed it. Tests made of signals 528 and 520 subsequent to the accident disclosed them to be in proper working order. Conclusions This accident was casued by the failure of Engineman Walker, of extra 1192, properly to observe and obey auto- matic block signals and other restrictive indications. From the warnings which he had received, Engineman Walker should have been fully aware of the fact that he was closing up on the preceding train. He had run over torpedoes near signal 528, and the caution indication of that signal was displayed for his train; near signal 520 there was a yellow fusee only partly burned out. The caution indication of signal 528 required him to approach signal 520 prepared to stop, and the burning yellow fusee required him to proceed with caution, prepared to stop short of train or obstruction. He observed neither of these requirements. Instead of being on the alert to observe the indication of signal 520 and prepared to bring his train to a stop as required by the indication of that signal, he was occupied in eating his lunch and examining the time table to check up on a following train, and his attention was also attracted to a passing train on the opposite track. He admitted that he saw only the bottom arm, which was in caution position, but failed to see the top arm which, as disclosed by the investigation, was in stop position, and notwithstanding the fact that he knew he had passed a signal without seeing its indication he did not stop as required by the rules but proceeded at practically undimin- ished speed. The burning yellow fusee which he encountered i -5- near signal 520 was an additional warning, but in spite of even this warning, Engineman Walker proceeded through the smoke-and-gas-filled tunnel, where the view was almost wholly obscured, at a rate of speed which he himself esti- mated at about 30 miles per hour. Engineman Walker entered the service of the Lackawanna as fireman in 1906 and was promoted to engineman in 1912. It is difficult to believe that an engineman of his experience could have displayed such disregard of restrictive and warning signals if he was in good physical condition and in possession of all his faculties, yet he steadfastly maintained that he was awake and not sick or incapacitated in any way. This accident again directs attention to the necessity for automatic train control devices to enforce obedience to restrictive signal indications when not observed or heeded by enginemen. For a period of several weeks prior to this accident the traffic over this line averaged about 48 trains daily, with approximately the same number in each direction. The employees involved in this accident/were experienced men and none of them was on duty contrary to the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1564 this delito ! Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE IN- VESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD, UNION PACIFIC SYSTEM, AT NUGGET, WYO., ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1929. To the Commission: January 21, 1930. On September 22, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between a freight train and a light engine on the Oregon Short Line Railroad, Union Pacific Sys- tem, at Nugget, Wyo., resulting in the death of one employee. Location and Method of Operation This accident occurred on the First Subdivi- sion of the Utah Division, extending between Granger, Wyo., and Montpelier, Ida., a distance of 115 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-sig- nal system. The passing track at Nugget, on which the accident occurred, at a point 1,897 feet from the east switch, is 4,733 feet in length and parallels the main track on the south. Approaching the point of accident from the east, beginning at the turnout, the passing track is tangent for a distance of 1,186 feet, following which there is a 4° 51' curve to the right 1,350 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 447 feet from its eastern end. There is another passing track which parallels the main track on the north. The grade for westbound trains is slightly descending. St K Under the rules, trains using a siding must proceed with caution, expecting to find it occupied by other trains, while under instructions contained in Consolidated Superintendent's Bulletin Orders No. 3, revised to January 28, 1929, trainmen and engine- men will be held responsible for striking cars on sidings or for damage done in making emergency stop to avoid striking cars. If view is obstructed, brake- men must be sent ahead. The markers of a caboose standing at the point of accident are plainly visible from the cab of a westbound engine, making a back-up movement, for a distance of more than 2,500 feet, and while these lights remain in constant view from the fireman's side, nevertheless, on account of the curve, it can not be Jaja -2- ĭ < 1 definitely determined upon which track a caboose is standing until within a short distance of it. The view from the engineman's side is obstructed inter- mittently until the engine backs in on the passing track, at the east switch; the caboose markers then can be seen from the engine man's side for a distance of 539 feet, after which they pass out of the engine-- man's line of vision, the marker on the south side again coming into view of the engineman when he is about 90 feet from it. The weather was cloudy at the time of the acci- dent, which occurred about 11:45 p.m. Description Westbound freight train extra 2553 consisted of 57 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 2553, and was in charge of Conductor Gardner and Engineman Powell. On arrival at Nugget, at about 11:25 p.m., extra 2553 headed in at the east switch of the pass- ing track in order to meet eastbound freight train extra 5084, and while standing on the passing track the rear end of the caboose was struck by light en- gine 2549. go Light engine 2549, of the 2-8-2-type, headed east, was in charge of Engineman Carrington and Fire- man Huggins. The tunder, rectangular in shape, was equipped with a headlight on the rear end of the cis- tern. This engine was engaged in helper service, had assisted two eastbound trains from Nugget to Tunnel, 2 distance of 12.7 miles, and was returning to Nugget in order to assist extra 5084 to Tunnel, but while making a back-up movement through the passing track it collided with extra 2553 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 12 and 15 miles per hour. The caboose of extra 2553 was demolished and The the rear truck of the adjacent car was derailed. rear truck of the tender of engine 2549 was derailed and the engine itself was slightly damaged. The em- ployee killed was a road foreman of engines, wo was in the caboose at the time of the accident. Summary of Evidence Conductor Gardner, of extra 2553, stated that as his train headed in at the east switch, he stood on the rear platform of the caboose to watch the flag- men close the switch. When his train came to a stop, at about 11:32 p.m., the indicator lamps and the markers on the caboose were burning, but the cupola lamp was out, having a leaky fount; the markers were -3- 1 displaying red indications to the rear, it having been neglected to turn them. There was also a lighted red lamp just inside the rear door of the caboose. He was on the north side of his train and about two car- lengths west of his caboose at the time light engine 2549 approached, backing up at a speed of about 15 or 20 miles per hour, with the headlight on the rear of the tender burning brightly. On definitely realizing that the engine was going to back into his caboose, he immediately ran toward the approaching engine, with his flagman right behind him, and reached a point from two to six car-lengths east of the caboose; he said he shouted a warning of danger, and saw the fireman on the deck of the engine, and that the fireman dropped his shovel and jumped to the window on hearing them shout, the collision occurring immediately afterwards. Con- ductor Gardner further stated that he did not have a lantern with him, but that the flagman did have one, he said that he did not think he could have crossed over to the south side of the passing track in safety, in order to give a warning of danger on the engineman's side of the light engine. After the accident the con- ductor climbed aboard the light engine and he said that at that time the fireman asked him whether the markers were burning, and he informed the fireman that they were, and were displaying red to the rear. and Flagman Robinson, of extra 2553, stated that when his train came to a stop on the passing track, he left the caboose and walked heed along the south side of the train a distance of about 25 or 30 car-lengths, looking over the brakes, brake beams, journals, etc., crossed over to the north side of the train, and then came back to the caboose. He saw light engine 2549 approaching, and on definitely realizing that something was wrong, by which time the rear headlight on the ten- der was shining brightly in his face, he ran toward the approaching engine on the fireman's side, saying that he did not have time to cross over to the engineman's side in safety, waving stop signals with his electric lantern and shouting, but to no avail; he thought he had reached a point about 30 or 40 feet from the caboose when the collision occurred. The statements of Flagman Robinson as to the actions of the fireman of light en- gine 2549, immediately prior to the accident, were simi- lar to those of Conductor Gardner. Flagman Robinson further stated that he did not turn the markers when his train went in on the passing track. as he thought his train would depart in a short time and that he might be down along the train locking it over and would not have time to turn them back again. The markers were not removed from their brackets while the train was on the passing track, being in place, lighted, and displaying red indications to the rear. SPONSO Kat -4- agging " Engineman Carrington, of light engine 2549, stated that after closing the east switch, the fire- man climbed upon the head brakeman's seat box and faced towards the tender, remaining there all the time, while the engineman sat on his own seat box facing in the same direction, leaning on the arm rest, with his head out of the window. The light engine was moving down the passing track under con- trol, at a speed of about 12 or 15 miles per hour, and his fireman shouted "all clear" this being about eight seconds before the collision occurred. The air brakes were in proper condition, but he did not apply them until the crash occurred, not having been given any warning of danger and it was the en- gineman's opinion that he could have stopped without difficulty had he been warned. Engineman Carrington further stated that the fireman he had on this occa- sion, Fireman Huggins, had only worked with him for three days, and while he did not know how long the fireman had been in the service, yet he appeared to be competent, and he expressed the opinion that pro- vided the caboose markers were burning and display- ing red indications to the rear, it would have led the fireman to believe that extra 2553 was standing on the main track instead of the passing track. En- gineman Carrington was unable to explain his own failure to notice the markers of extra 2553 while on the main track or while backing through the east end of the passing track. Fireman Huggins, of light engine 2549, had had about 81 days' experience as a road fireman and had been in helper service for three days at the time of the accident. He stated that after he closed the switch, he climbed upon the engine and sat on the head brakeman's seat box and looked out of the window, fac- ing the direction in which the engine was moving, and although keeping a lookout continuously, yet he was unaware of anything wrong until the collision occurred. He did not see anyone, or a light of any kind, except the caution indication of a block signal governing the movement of a train on the main track, which sig- nal is located on the north side of the tracks and about 250 feet west of where the collision occurred, and he denied having been on the deck of the engine, as claimed by the conductor and flagman of extra 2553. Engineman Carrington had instructed him to be particu- larly careful when making a back-up movement on this passing track, as it might be occupied by a train, and he said that just prior to the collision he in- formed Engineman Carrington that everything was clear. Fireman Huggins further stated that at the time his engine was assisting the last eastbound train, extra 2553 was passed in the vicinity of Fossil, 5.7 miles M -5- east of Nugget, in double-track territory, and that he looked back and saw the markers burning on extra 2553, and he said it was reasonable to presume that they were still burning when extra 2553 came to a stop on the passing track; he could offer no plaus- ible excuse for not having seen the caboose. Tests made subsequent to the accident dis- closed that even with no lights displayed on the ca- boose as it stood on the curve at the point of acci- dent, it could have been distinctly seen for a dis- tance of 372 feet from the fireman's side of the cab of the light engine, by means of the rays of the headlight on the rear of the tender. At no time while backing around the curve did the view of the caboose pass out of vision from the fireman's side, nor did the rays of the rear headlight fail to shine upon and distinctly outline the caboose. Conclusions S This accident was caused primarily by the fail- ure of Fireman Huggins, of light engine 2549, to main- tain a proper lookout and to give warning of a caboose ahead while making a back-up movement on a passing track. A The testimony is to the effect that the markers on the caboose of extra 2553 were burning, but that it had been neglected to turn them after the caboose enter- ed the siding, with the result that they displayed red indications to the rear. Such an indication usually means that the caboose is on the main track, and while this might have misled the engineman and fireman of en- gine 2549 had they noticed the markers, yet it does not explain their total failure to see the markers at any time, nor does it explain why Fireman Huggins should have notified the engineman, at a time when the engine- man's view was obscured, that the track was clear, particularly in view of the fact that the caboose could have been seen a distance of 372 feet, even had no markers been displayed. The conductor and flagman of extra 2553 szid Fireman Huggins was on the deck of the engine; if this was the case, not only is it ample ex- planation for the fireman's failure to note that the way was not clear, but Engineman Carrington then would be equally responsible because of his action in continu- ing the back-up movement under such circumstances. Fireman Huggins was employed as a road fireman on October 24, 1928, was relieved from duty on Novem- ber 23, 1928, and was recalled on August 27, 1929; Engineman Carrington had had 17 years' experience as an engineman. At the time of the accident, Fireman h I -6- Huggins and Engineman Carrington had been on duty about 8 hours and 30 minutes, prior to which they had been off duty about 12 hours; none of the other em- ployees involved had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND Director. $ M At Ames & TransportaBop Library HE 1780 4234 S INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1565 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES- TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY NEAR CLAY CENTER, KANS. ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1929. ? January 18, 1930 To the Commission: On September 27, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail- way near Clay Center, Kans., which resulted in the injury of 24 passengers and 3 employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Clay Center Line of the Kansas Division, which extends between McFarland and Belle- ville, Kans., a distance of 104.1 miles, and is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred at a point approximately 3 miles west of Clay Center; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for a distance of 1,631 feet, and for some dis- tance beyond that point, while the grade at the point of accident is 0.10 per cent descending for eastbound trains. The maximum speed permitted for passenger trains is 50 miles per hour. Ž The track is laid with 35-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with an average of 20 treated ties to the rail- length, fully tie-plated, and is ballasted with crushed rock, gravel, and cinders, to a depth of about 14 inches. In the vicinity of the point of accident the track is laid on a fill 3 feet in depth; the track is fairly well main- tained. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 12.55 a.m. Description Eastbound passenger train No. 224 consisted of one mail and baggage car, one baggage car, one coach, two Pullman sleeping cars, and one coach, all of steel construc- tion except the baggage car, which was of steel-underframe construction, was hauled by engine 970, and was in charge of Conductor Shafer and Engineman Fisher. This train departed from Clyde, 21.9 miles from Clay Center, at 12.22 a.m., seven minutes late, and was approaching Clay Center when it was derailed while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 40 and 50 miles per hour. f * 2- The engine came to rest 960 feet from the point of derailment, with its tender derailed. All of the cars in the train were also derailed; the first and second cars remained coupled to the engine, the third and fourth cars were overturned on their right sides on the south side of the track, being separated from each other by a distance of 225 feet, while the fifth and sixth cars remained up- right and on the roadbed. Summary of evidence Engineman Fisher stated that he was operating his train normally and that nothing unusual occurred until he felt a surge of the engine and upon looking back he observed that the tender was off the track, whereupon he immediately applied the brakes in emergency, it was his opinion that the forward truck of the tender was the first to derail, but his inspection of the tender brought out nothing that could have contributed to the derailment. He estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident at 45 miles per hour, which is the usual rate of speed for passenger trains in that vicinity. He also said that he had operated the engine involved in the accident on several occasions recently, the last time being with westbound train No. 25 during the afternoon prior to the accident, and upon arrival at Belleville at that time he inspected the engine but did not find anything wrong with it, nor had he noticed any unusual motion of the engine in the vicinity of the point of accident during that prior trip. Fireman Lee stated that the tender was filled with water at Clyde and that the train had been running smoothly, there being no indication that the tender was not riding freely. At the time of the accident he was putting in a fire and his first intimation of anything wrong was when he noticed the tender suddenly lurch to the right, as though it had encountered a low spot in the track, and it then began to surge violently. He thought the train was running at a speed of between 40 and 45 miles per hour at the time of the accident, which was not any faster than the usual speed in that territory. He made an inspection of the engine after the accident but found no parts missing. Conductor Shafer stated that he had not noticed any- thing unusual in the movement of the train prior to the accident. The train was running at the usual speed of 45 or 50 miles per hour when the car in which he was riding, the third car from the engine, became derailed, overturning shortly afterwards. As soon as he had ascertained the con- dition of the passengers, and had taken action to send the most seriously injured to the hospital, he examined the equipment, but could not find anything that could have caused the accident. Some of the brake beams were down, but he thought this was a result of the accident. He also examined the track to the rear of the derailed equipment ! I * -3- and found a flange mark on top of the rail and also on the ties. He could not determine that part of the train was first to derail, but was of the opinion that it was ahead of the car in which he was riding. The statements of Brakemen Stahly and Studebaker added no additional facts of importance. Section Foreman Grover stated that as soon as he learn- ed of the accident he called the section laborers and pro- ceeded to the point of derailment, where he found the track to have been considerably damaged. He made no examin- ation to determine that caused the accident, but did place his level board on the track about three or four rail-lengths rest of the point of derailment and found one of the track rails 1 inch low. He immediately raised this portion of the track but did not thoroughly tamp the ball- ast at the time; this was the first track work he had done at this particular place for approximately one month. also said that at the point where the derailment occurred, there is a soft spot under the track, and during wet weather it requires more work than at other points on his section. It had been his practice to patrol his section daily, but he did not do so on the day prior to the acci- dent as he was occupied at another point, and as there had been no rain recently, he did not think there would be any difficulty. He Roadmaster Sinsabaugh stated that on September 23 he walked over and inspected the track in the vicinity of the point of accident; he rode over it on September 24 and again on September 26, the latter trip being about 2 hours and 45 minutes before the occurrence of the accident, and during these trips he noticed no unusual track conditions. On his arrival at the scene of accident, he found the north rail still on the fill, but the south rail had been entirely forced off of it and the track torn up for approxi- mately 750 feet. Two broken rails were among the debris, but one of these had been originally located about 6 rail- longths and the other about 10 or 12 rail-lengths east of the initial point of derailment. He measured the track just west of the first mark of derailment and discovered that the north rail was about one-half inch low, and the section foreman informed him that this rail had been raised 1 inch subsequent to the accident; before the roadmaster made his measurement, however, the engine of the work train has passed over this spot and apparently had caused the track to settle again to some extent. It was the opinion of Roadmaster Sinsabaugh that this low spot in the track was not sufficient to cause excessive roll of an engine tender at a speed of 45 miles per hour, but from the dis- tance the equipment traveled after it became derailed, and from the damaged condition of the track, he judged that the speed was greater than 58 miles per hour at the time of the accident, and that this high rate of speed, coupled with the low place in the track, caused the tender to derail. - 4- Roadmaster Sinsabaugh described the fill at the point of accident as being from 3 to 4 feet in depth, constructed of top soil taken from along the right of way, which is com- posed more or less of gumbo. This subgrade was covered with rock, then some gumbo, and then cinders to a depth of from 14 to 18 inches. He further stated that on the Clay Center line there are spots which are termed "mud holes" and which range in distance from one-half to six rail-lengths, one of these being at the point of accident. The material in these mud holes is of spongy clay and is subject to shifting, especially after heavy rains. There had not been any heavy rains, however, in this particular locality since June, and to his knowledge the track had been holding very well. > Engine 970 is of the Pacific 4-6-2 type, and has a total weight, engine and tender, loaded, of 467,500 pounds. The tender is equipped with splash plates, and had a capacity of 16 tons of coal and 10,000 gallons of water; at the time of the accident it was nearly full of water. An inspection of this engine and tender subsequent to the accident re- vealed that the flanges and treads of the wheels were in good condition, and there were no defects noted that could have contributed to the occurrence of the accident. The first mark of derailment was a flange mark on top of the gauge side of the south rail, which continued dia- gonally across the rail for a distance of 26 feet to the point where flange marks first appeared on the ties, these marks continuing diagonally across the ends of the ties until the wheels finally left the roadbed. Corresponding flange marks appeared on the ties on the inside of the north rail, and beyond these marks the track was torn up for a distance of about 750 feet. Conclusions This accident is believed to have been caused by uneven track, resulting in its being unsafe for the operation of trains at high rates of speed. The investigation developed that subsequent to the accident the section foreman found that the north rail was 1 inch low at a point a short distance west of where the first flange mark appeared on the running surface of the south rail. The engineman and fireman said their first knowledge of anything wrong was when they felt a surge of the engine and then they discovered that the front end of the tender was derailed, the engineman immediately applying the brakes in emergency. In view of these statements, and in view of the distance the train traveled with the brakes applied in emergency, coupled with the track being torn up for a considerable distance, it seems probable that the train was traveling close to the maximum permissible speed of 50 miles per hour, if in fact this speed was not being exceeded, and that when the tender encountered the depres- . . -5- sion in the track it caused it to sway to such an extent that it lifted the right forward tender-truck wheels from the rail and the resulting rebound caused the flanges to drop on top of the rail, leading to the derailment of the train. Several trains passed over point of accident within the 24 hours preceding its occurrence, and if the depression had existed during this time, it would appear that some of the employees on these trains would have discovered and re-o ported it. Roadmaster Sinsabaugh rode over it on train No. 39 about 2 hours and 45 minutes prior to the accident and did not observe any unusual condition, and the train sheet did not record any train movement over this place after train No. 39 passed and before train No. 224 was derailed, so it is possible that the depression originated after train No. 39 passed over it, due to the slippery and shifting condition of the gumbo soil of which the roadbed is con structed. Examination of the records covering tender derail- ments on the Kansas Division disclosed that seven others had occurred at comparatively recent dates, all of which involved tenders of the convertible Vanderbilt typo, the same as the one involved in this accident; six of these occurred on the Clay Center Line. The cause of one was not definitely determined, but the others were due to track defects. The statements of officials of this district indicate that the gumbo soil of which the road bed is con- structed, is of a slippery character and subject to shift- ing with deterrent effect to the track. Furthermore, it appears that there are other points on this district at which the slippery and shifting character of the road bed is similar to that prevailing where the present accident occurred, and as these points are known it calls for fre- quent attention to avert a possible similar derailment. The files of this company record numerous tender derailments on this district, during the last 22 months, a majority of which are attributable to track irregularity, and this further emphasizes the necessity of more vigilance in track maintenance. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in viola- tion of any of the provisions of the fours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND " Director. · : 5 " ! Transportation Library تی ہے صحیح 1780 4334 1566 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED CN THE PERE MARQUETTE RAILWAY NEAR PETOSKEY, MICH., ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1929 January 23, 1930 To the Commission: On September 27, 1929, there was a head-end col- lision between two freight trains on the Pere Marquette Railway, near Petoskey, Mich., which resulted in the death of two employees and the injury of six employees. Location and method of operation use. This accident occurred on Sub-Division 6 of the Chicago-Petoskey Division, which extends between Boardman and Bay View, Mich., a distance of 79.02 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time- table and train orders, no block-signal system being in The accident occurred at a point approximately 2 miles south of Petoskey; approaching this point from the north there is a 40 curve to the right 1,026.3 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent for a dis- tance of 442.2 feet, followed by a 30 curve to the left 812.5 feet in length, the accident occurring on the last mentioned curve at a point 261.5 feet from its northern end. Approaching from the south the track is tangent for a distance of 2,627 feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade at the point of accident is 0.4 per cent ascending for southbound trains. Owing to an embankment on the inside of the curve on which the accident occurred, the view had by engine crews of south- bound trains is restricted to about 520 feet and that of northbound trains is limited to about 610 feet. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 4.56 p.m. Description Southbound engine 282, hauling a caboose, was run- ning as an extra train and was in charge of Conductor Ely and Engineman Mertes. At Petoskey, 0.99 mile south ܚ ܘ ܘ VLOMNYENGIVEN A F 2 3 -3- ! of Bay View, the crew received a copy of train order No. 247, Form 31, reading as follows: "Eng 282 run extra Petoskey to Boardman with right over extra 372 north wait at Petoskey until five 500 PM Lamson until five forty 540 PM for extra 372 north" Extra 282 departed from Petoskey at about 4.53 p.m., shortly afterwards it collided with extra 372 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been from 2 to 20 miles per hour. and Northbound freight train extra 372 consisted of eight cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 372, and was in charge of Conductor Dobson and Engineman Markham. The crew received a copy of train order No. 247, Form 31, previously quoted, at Charlevoix, 15.44 miles south of Petoskey, and left that point at 3.40 p.m., departed from Lamson, 3.4 miles south of Petoskey, at 4.52 p.m., according to the train crew, and was approaching Petoskey when it collided with extra 282 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been between 20 and 60 miles per hour. The impact forced extra 283 backward a distance of 165 feet but did not derail the engine, although it was badly damaged; the rear truck of the caboose was derailed. Engine 372 was entirely derailed but remained upright, and it also was badly damaged. The tender came to rest stand- ing on its forward end, with the rear end against the boil- er head. The first car in this train was demolished and the second car was derailed and damaged. The employees killed were the engineman and head brakeman of extra 372, and the employees injured were the rear brakeman of extra 372 and the entire crew of extra 282. Summary of evidence Engineman Mertes, of extra 282, stated that he was. called to leave Petoskey at 5 p.m., and that while in the caboose awaiting the arrival of northbound train No. 1, which he knew was due at that point at 4.55 p.m., the conductor delivered to him a copy of train order No. 247. His train was standing in the south end of the yard and shortly after train No. 1 passed, he pulled out on the S J- ! -3- main track, waited until the brakeman closed the switch, and then continued southward without noting the time of departure. He estimated the speed of his train at 25 miles per hour as it approached the point of accident and when he saw the approaching train, he shut off steam but did not remember whether he applied the brakes. After the accident he looked at his watch and it was then 4.58 p.m., but his watch was 20 seconds slow. Engineman Mertes further stated that although both he and the conductor read the order to each other at the time it was delivered to him, he failed to remember that it required his train to wait at Petoskey until 5 p.m., and at Lamson until 5.40 p.m. Fireman Weaver, of extra 282, stated that he read and understood train order No. 247 before leaving Petoskey. He did not know at what time his train departed from that point, but about one or two minutes after train No. 1 passed, the head brakeman opened the main line switch and gave them a proceed signal. Fireman Weaver then started working on the fire and continued to do so until just be- fore the collision occurred; when the engineman applied the brakes, the fireman jumped from the gangway of the engine. Immediately after the accident he looked at his watch and saw that it was 4.56.30, but he was not certain that this time was entirely correct as he had not compared his watch with a standard clock before departing, and had not compared it with any member of the crew. He also said he did not know whether the conductor and engineman had read the order involved, but that when he read it he re- marked "five o'clock Petoskey and 5.40 Lamson;" no mention of the order was made on route. He Head Brakeman Wilkins, of extra 282, read the orders before his train entered the main track at Petoskey and understood they were required to wait at that point un- til 5 p.m. After the arrival of train No. 1, he was instructed by the engineman to open the main track switch; he complied with these instructions, closed the switch after the train was on the main track, and then gave a proceed signal, after which he boarded the caboose. did not remember of anything being said concerning the wait order after leaving Petoskey, and said he was riding in the cupola of the caboose as the train approached the point of accident and that on account of his position on the outside of the curve he did not see the opposing train. Head Brakeman Wilkins was aware that train No. 1 was due at Petoskey at 4.55 p.m., but did not know at what time it arrived on the day of the accident and he failed at F, the mist E ! ~4~ to check the time of departure of his own train. Shortly after the accident, however, he noted that it was 5.02 p.m., and this convinced him that his train had departed before the time specified in the wait order. Conductor Ely, of extra 282, stated that train order No. 247 was made complete at 4.22 p.m., but that he did not deliver it to the engineman until about 4.50 or 4.52 p.m., and the engineman, who was in the caboose at the time, read it back to him; Conductor Ely also informed the engineman that train No. 1 was on time. The conduc- tor did not know how much time elapsed after the arrival of train No. 1 before his own train departed, neither did he know the time at which his train departed, while due to his being rendered unconscious as a result of the col- lision he was unable to determine the time of its occur- rence. Brakeman Sherwood, of extra 282, stated that before leaving Petoskey he read back train order No. 247 to the conductor and also heard the engineman read it to him. Train No. 1 passed the point where their train was standing in the south end of the yard at 4.56 p.m., and he then started getting his markers ready and did not know at what time his train departed, paying no further attention to the time until eight or nine minutes after the accident, et which time it was then 5.08 p.m He esti mated the speed of his train as it approached the point of accident at 20 or 22 miles per hour, and thought that the air brakes, which were applied just prior to the ac- cident, reduced the speed to not more than 2 miles per hour. Fireman Brown, of extra 372, stated that they re- ceived a copy of train order No. 247 at Charlevoix and that his train proceeded to Lamson and there cleared the main track for train No. 1, which passed that point et 4.46 p.m.; the schedule shows train No. 1 as due by Lamson at 4.57 p.m. His train then moved out on the main track and departed at 4.52 p.m. He had just picked up his shovel preparatory to putting in a fire when the engineman applied the brakes and shouted a warning. Fire- man Brown jumped immediately and was slightly dazed by his fall, but as soon as he regained his composure he com- pared time with his conductor and it was then 4.55 p.m. It was his opinion that the speed of his train was be- tween 50 and 60 miles per hour at the time of the ac- cident. Fireman Brown also said that he was a promoted man, that he is familiar with the rule which permits -5- freight trains to follow passenger trains with caution after the expiration of 10 minutes, and that under this rule his train should not have left Lamson until 4.57 D.m. He did not call the engineman's attention to it, but instead when the train was departing, he remarked to the engineman that the time was very short and they would have to hurry. Conductor Dobson, of extra 372, stated that before starting on this trip, he and the engineman compared time with a standard clock. Train No. 1 passed him at Lamson at 4.47 p.m., and his own train left that point at 4.52 p.m., which allowed them eight minutes in which to reach Petoskey on the wait order for extra 282. The accident occurred at 4.56 p.m., and shortly after its occurrence he compared watches with Engineman Mertes and Fireman Brown and it was then 4.58 p.m. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident at 25 miles per hour. Conductor Dobson also knew that under the rules, freight trains on the Petoskey Division are not permitted to follow passenger trains until the expira- tion of 10 minutes, but took no action to see that this rule was complied with. > Rear Brakeman Price, of extra 372, stated that al- though he had read train order No. 247, he paid no parti- cular attention to the time at which train No. 1 passed Lamson or the time at which his own train departed from that point, but was of the opinion they had ample time in which to reach Petoskey and comply with the wait or- der. The rear brakeman was riding in the caboose when the collision occurred and the shock caused him to be thrown, but as soon as he regained his feet he noted the time as 4.57 p.m.; he was not certain as to the speed of his train at the time of the accident, but thought it was between 20 and 30 miles per hour. Conclusions This accident was caused by failure to obey a wait order, for which the entire crew of extra 282 is respon- sible. The evidence indicates that train order No. 247, requiring extra 282 to wait at Petoskey until 5 p.m., was received and read by all members of the crew of extra 282. Shortly after northbound train No. 1 passed through the south end of the yard, extra 282 pulled out Make y and -- -6- on the main track and proceeded southward without any of the employees noting the time at which their own train departed; the engineman said he could not remember that part of the order requiring him to wait at Petoskey until 5 p.m., and all of the other members of the crew seem to have left it to the engineman. No adequate reason could be devebped to explain the failure of all of these employees to pay more attention to the proper performance of their duties. " Under special instructions contained in the time- table, it is provided that, except in automatic block- signal territory, freight trains are permitted to follow passenger trains under caution, after the expiration of 10 minutes, while rule 91 of the, operating rules, re- quires following movements to keẹp 10 minutes apart ex- cept when closing up at stations. It appears that train No. 1 passed Lamson at 4.46 or 4.47 p.m. and that extra 372 departed from that point at 4.52 p.m., instead of waiting the required 10 minutes. The crew of extra 372 was familiar with the spacing rules, and had they waited at Lamson until 4.56 or 4.57 p.m., there would not have been sufficient time for them to attempt to reach Petoskey before the time specified in the wait order, which was 5 p.m., and in this event the accident would not have occurred. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfullly submitted, W.P. BORLAND, Director. Kansportation 1567 Library HL 1730 A284 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES- TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LOUIS- VILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD NEAR CRAB ORCHARD, KY., ON OCTOBER 4, 1929. To the Commission: 199 April 8, 1930 On October 4, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Louisville Nashville Railroad near Crab Orchard, Ky., which resulted in the injury of 18 passen- gers, 3 Pullman porters, and 2 employees. T Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Louisville Division which extends between Lebanon Junction and Sinks, Ky., a distance of 107.2 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block signal system being in use. The point of accident was approximately 2 miles north of Crab Orchard; approaching this point from the south, there is a compound curve to the right 1,577.1 feet in length, the maximum curvature of which is 6° 02', and then tangent track for a distance of 211.1 feet, the accident occurring on this tangent at a point 136.5 feet from its southern end. The grade at the point of accident is 1.25 per cent descending for northbound trains. The track is laid with 100-pound rails, 39 feet in length, with an average of 25 ties to the rail-length, fully tie-plated, and is ballasted with limestone to a depth of about 18 inches; the track is well maintained. In the vicinity of the point of accident the track is constructed on a bench cut in a hillside on the east side of the track, the maximum depth of the embankment on the west side of the track being approximately 20 feet. The weather was foggy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 5.15 a.m. Description one Northbound passenger train No. 24 consisted of one express car, one combination baggage and express car, postal car, three coaches, and three Pullman sleeping cars, all of steel construction except the first, seventh and eighth cars, which were of steel-underframe construction, hauled by engine 402, and was in charge of Conductor Thompson and Engineman Whitehead. This train left Sinks, 21.9 miles south of Crab Orchard, at 4.23 a.m., and departed from Crab Orchard at 5.09 a.m., one hour and two minutes late, being derailed shortly afterwards while traveling at an estimated speed of 25 miles per hour. * : KAULA PREKA. Lant + JETCOS LASERS S 1...3. -2- The fifth to the ninth cars, inclusive, were de- railed to the left, the fifth, sixth and seventh cars being overturned and coming to rest at the foot of the embankment, while the remaining derailed cars were also on their sides but rested on top of the embankment. The first three de- railed cars were quite badly damaged, and the other two were slightly damaged. The employees injured were the conductor and flagman. Summary of evidence Engineman Whitehead stated that after departing from Crab Orchard, the train attained a speed of about 45 miles per hour, but about one-half mile south of the point of accident he applied the brakes, releasing them when the speed had been reduced to about 25 miles per hour. A few seconds later the brakes went into emergency and he immedi ately placed the brake valve in the lap position, the for- ward portion of the train coming to a stop shortly after- wards. While oiling the engine at a station 7 miles south of Crab Orchard, he had inspected it and noticed nothing un- usual, the engine rode smoothly en route, and there was no unusual motion of the engine when it passed over the point of derailment, his first intimation of anything wrong being when the brakes applied in emergency. After the accident, he inspected as much of the derailed equipment as possible, but found nothing that could have contributed to the cause of the accident. He also examined the track and found a broken rail which in his opinion was the cause of the acci- dent. He continued with the forward portion of the train to Louisville and experienced no further trouble. Fireman Boes stated that speed was reduced to about 20 or 25 miles per hour while the train was approaching the point of accident, and about 10 seconds after the brakes were released they went into emergency, whereupon he looked back and noticed the rear portion of the train as it left the track. He did not notice anything out of the ordinary when the engine passed over that part of the track where the de- railment occurred, and was unaware that anything was wrong until the emergency application of the brakes. Pla Baggagemaster Stodghill, who was standing in the forward end of the second car, said he felt a very unasual movement and heard a peculiar noise under the car. He started towards the opposite end of the car for the purpose of opening the emergency valve, and at the same time he called to the express messenger, who was in that end of the car, to open the valve, but before either of them could reach it, the car came to a stop. After ascertaining what had oc- curred and learning that the flagman was injured, he pro- cured flagging equipment and went back as far as Crab Orchard, where he reported the accident. He then returned to the scene of accident and observed a broken rail, but did not examine it to determine if it had been defective. -3- The statements of Conductor Thompson and Flagman Lawrence brought out no additional facts of importance; they were riding in the derailed cars and were rendered uncon- scious as a result of the accident. P Roadmaster Leeds stated that on October 3, the sec- tion crew passed over that portion of the track on which the accident subsequently occurred, and upon inquiry the section foreman advised that he noticed nothing wrong with the track in that vicinity; he also said that the supervisor passed through that territory on a motor car on the same date. It is the practice to have trackwalkers patrol their sections daily, and the trackwalker on the section on which the acci- dent occurred had done so on the day preceding the accident, and advised that he saw no indication of a broken rail or anything else to cause him to make a report. The rail. involved was located on the west side of the track and was laid during August, 1927. This rail was broken in 10 pieces, ranging from 1 feet to 11 feet in length. The first break in the rail was 10 feet 1 inch from the receiving end, and showed a fresh break, with a trans- verse fissure in the ball which measured 2 inches wide by 1 1/8 inches high. The second break was 11 feet & 3/4 inches from the receiving end, and this break showed an old trans- verse fissure that covered the entire ball of the rail, ex- cept inch on the outside, this fissure extended slightly into the web. The first mark of derailment was a flange mark on a spike-head on the outside of the rail, following the second break. Sixteen and one-half feet north of the second break, and 7 inches from the gauge side of the east rail, a flange mark appeared on a tie and continued on the ties northward. Measurements were taken of the gauge and cross- level of the track for some distance south of the point of accident and the track was found to be in perfect condition. Conclusions P GRID This accident was caused by a broken rail. An examination of the track subsequent to the acci- dent revealed a rail which had been broken in several pieces, and an inspection of these pieces of rail showed the presence of transverse fissures at two of the breaks, and from the marks found on the track it appeared that the initial derail- ment occurred at the second break, which was 11 feet 6 inches from the receiving end of the rail. The engineman and fireman did not notice anything wrong when their engine passed over this rail, and it is possible the rail broke either under the tender or the first car. J * test pakkuda.. : ! 2 ای ملی . ~4~ The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. ; 1 ។ 1 : . ! M 3 : i : t 1 , 1 Transportation Library HE 1980 , A234 1568 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD NEAR PORTAGE, OCTOBER. 39, 1929. PA., PA., ON October 26, 1929 To the Commission: On October 9, 1929, there was a collision between a passenger train and a freight train on the Pennsylvania Railroad near Portage, Pa., which resulted in the death of three employees. The investigation of this accident was made in conjunction with a representative of the Public Service Commission of the State of Pennsylvania. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Pittsburgh Division extending between Altoona and Pittsburgh, Pa., a distance of 113.8 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a four-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The tracks are numbered from north to south, 4, 3, 2 and 1; tracks 4 and 3 are for westbound traffic and tracks 2 and 1 for eastbound traffic. Track O is on the south side of track 1. The accident occurred at the facing-point crossover leading from track 2 to track 1 located 2,273 feet west of the station at Portage and within the limits of NY interlocking. Approaching this point from the west there are 1,744 feet of tangent, a 20 curve to the left 1,145 feet in length, and then 1,755 feet of tangent, the accident occurring on the last-mentioned tangent at its leaving end. Except in the vicinity of the track water pans at Wilmore, 2 miles west of NY Block Station, the grade is generally ascending for eastbound trains, being 1.15 per cent at the point of accident. " The mechanical interlocking plant at this point is operated from NY Block Station, located 387 feet west of the point of accident. At this point there is a series of crossovers connecting tracks 4 and 3, 3 and 2, 2 and 1, and 1 and 0, the last-mentioned crossover being at the extreme eastern end of the interlocking limits, with the first-mentioned crossover at the western end of the inter- locking limits. The home signal bridge at the western end of the interlocking limits spans all five tracks and is 883 feet west of NY Block Station; the home signals -2- T 2701 1 17551 Tangent I 1 1 I 1 2 A 1 1145! 20 curvel left ** i 业 ​1744'. Tangent I Track 4 # [21 03 T 1 1 ļ ji 1 1 I 1 1 1 11 ! 1 1 11 1 Agg 1} ! *. 387 M₂-+ 米 ​I ! I - Advance signal bridge I 1 4281 1 | 8831 ¡ ا 32091 Distant ! * signal bridge to NY 1 Point of accident 1 Home signal bridge NY Block station 1 10,2971 Approach signal bridge to NY ! | 1 业 ​-Route taken by Extra 4455 west in backing across Train No.4. G Z No. 1568 Pennsylvania R. R. Portage, Pa. Oct. 9, 1929. ~3 mounted on this bridge for eastbound tracks 2 and 1 are of the position-light type. The signal bridge on which the eastbound distant signals are located is 6,209 feet west of NY Block Station and spans the four main tracks; these distant signals also are of the position-light type, the normal indication being "approach next signal prepared to stop". There is another signal bridge 10,297 feet west of NY Block Station; when an eastbound train on track 2 passes this point the approach locking with which NY inter- locking is equipped becomes effective and prevents the towerman from changing the route unless he releases the lock by manually operating the clockwork mechanism which is set to run down in 2 minutes and 35 seconds. At the eastern end of the interlocking limits at a point about 815 feet east of NY Block Station or 428 feet east of the point of accident, there is another signal bridge which spans the four main tracks; on this bridge are mounted what are known as the eastward advance signals, these being three-position automatic signals of the semaphore type. These advance signals are so controlled, however, that they display a stop indication whenever the route is lined for a movement through the crossovers to track 0. Under the interlocking rules, within home-signal limits which are protected by home and distant signals, their indications supersede superiority of trains and crews are relieved from observing rule 152, which requires flag protection when making a crossover movement and which also provides that such movements must not be made when a superior train is due. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 11.07 p.m. Description Westbound freight train extra 4455 consisted of 65 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 4455, and was in charge of Conductor Hippo and Engineman Read. This train arrived at NY Block Station on track 4 at 10.34 p.m. Helper engine 2353, in charge of Engineman Howard, arrived on track 4 at 10.38 p.m. and coupled to the rear of extra 4455. Shortly afterwards the route was lined for a back- up movement across all of the main tracks to track 0, and at 10.59 p.m. the dwarf signal indication was displayed to authorize the movement. The train was backed through the various crossovers and finally was brought to a stop with engine 4455 on the crossover leading from track 2 to track 1, and it was while it was standing at this point that it was struck by train No. 4. 4. -4- Eastbound passenger train No. 4 consisted of two express cars, one combination car, two coaches and four Pullman sleeping cars, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 3672, and was in charge of Conductor Smith and Engineman Johnson. This train, which was being operated on track 2, passed Tower, 4.6 miles west of NY Block Station, at 11.01 p.m., rractically on time, arrived at NY Block Station at 11.07 p.m., and collided with extra 4455 on the crossover leading to track 1 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 35 or 40 miles per hour. Engine 4455, which was driven backward a distance of about 84 feet, was derailed and badly damaged, while six cars immediately back of the engine were also derailed, the wreckage blocking all four main tracks. Engine 3672, of train No. 4, was entirely derailed and badly damaged, but remained upright with its front end interlocked with the front end of engine 4455. The tender of engine 3672 telescoped the first express car in this train, the car coming to reat on its right side in a badly-damaged con- dition. The second car in this train was partly derailed, but none of the other cars in the passenger train was de- railed, and only one of them sustained any damage. The employees killed were the engineman and fireman of train No. 4 and the engineman of extra 4455. Summary of evidence • Fireman Flenner, of engine 4455, stated that after the passage of eastbound train No. 52 he noted that the home signal on track 2 was displaying a stop indication. His own train then started to back across from track 4 to track 0 and he did not again notice the indications displayed by any of the signals on the home signal bridge, as he was working on his fire. A train-line leak seemed to develop after the movement had been started, and when the brakes were applied from helper engine 2353, which was handling the movement, this application being made for the purpose of slowing down for a street crossing, the gauge on engine 4455 indicated a 12-pound reduction. The engine came to a stop on the crossover leading from track 2 to track 1, with the pilot of the engine about on track 2, and shortly afterwards Fireman Flenner saw train No. 4 at the western end of the interlocking plant. He then told his engineman to sound a back-up whistle, which was done, and he said the engineman then looked out towards train No. 4 and called to him to get off, which he did just before the collision occurred. Fireman Flenner further stated that the headlight on his own engine had been dimmed but that the headlight on the engine of train No. 4 was burning brightly. He did not think that train No. 4 was traveling at a very high rate of speed, estimat- ing it to have been not more than 30 or 35 miles per hour. 2 -5- Middle No other member of the crew of extra 4455, with the exception of the engineman, who was killed in the accident, was at the head end of the train at the time it started to back through the crossovers. Head Brakeman Wampler had gotten off when the train arrived at NY Block Station, ging back to the caboose in order to eat, and he said he was riding on the head end of the caboose when the back-up movement was started. He had noted that the home signals on tracks 2 and 1 were in the clear position just prior to the passage of train No. 52, but he did not notice their position after that time, although when the back-up movement started he had noted that the advance automatic signals governing tracks 2 and 1 were in the stop position. Brakeman McKinley, who was riding on the last car in his train when it started the back-up movement, had not noticed the indications of any of the signals. Conductor Hippo did not notice the indications of the home signals at any time, but after the helper engine had coupled to his train and the back-up movement had started, he noticed that the advance automatic signals governing tracks 2 and 1 were in the stop position. Conductor Hippo also stated that the back-up movement was stopped in order to permit the flagman to protect the movement of the train over a street crossing, the air going on shortly afterwards, as if an amergency application of the brakes had been made, and at the same time he heard the noise of the collision. Flagman Sayler said that when his train stopped west of the eastbound home signal bridge, he was stationed at the bridge on which the eastbound advance automatic signals are located and therefore was not in position to observe the home signal indications governing tracks 2 and 1. The advance automatic signals were in the proceed position prior to the passage- of train No. 52, and the next time he noticed them was when his own train was backing through the crossovers, at which time both of these automatic signals were in the stop position. Engineman Howard, of helper engine 2353, stated that after coupling to the rear of extra 4455 and while waiting at that point for a signal to cross over, he noted that both the home and the advance automatic signals governing tracks 2 and 1 were in the stop position at all times ex- cept during the movement of train No. 52 on track 2. These statements were corroborated by those of his fireman. Conductor Smith, of train No. 4, said he was riding in the fourth car in the train and that he did not notice anything wrong until the collision occurred, there having been no application of the air brakes; he estimated that his train had been moving at a speed of 40 or 45 miles per hour. It also appeared from Conductor Smith's statement that Engineman Johnson was a man who always used good judgment in the handling of his train and it seemed to him TTD 49DD : A -6- that the engineman must in some way have become in- capacitated prior to the occurrence of the accident. The statements of Baggagemaster Roland, Head Brakeman Goodwin, and Flagman Cochrane, all of train No. 4, corrobo- rated the statement of Conductor Smith about there having been no application of the brakes prior to the occurrence of the accident. Flagman Cochrane also stated that when he went back to flag he noticed that the home signal governing track 2 was in the stop position and that the distant signal showed an approach indication; this indi- cation meant "approach next signal prepared to stop". Signalman-Operator Cullen, on duty at NY Block Station, stated that extra 4455 arrived at 10.34 p.m. on track 4, followed by helper engine 2353 at 10.38 p.m. Westbound train No. 21 passed on track 3 at 10.55 p.m. and eastbound train No. 52 on track 2 at 10.58 p.m. After the passage of train No. 52 he lined the crossovers for the extra to back across from track 4 to track 0 and the movement was started, he having previously talked with the dispatcher about the movement and the latter having authorized it to be made. Signalman-Operator Cullen said he stood at the levers following up the movement of the train, restoring the switches of the crossovers to their normal position as soon as the extra had cleared the crossovers. He had closed the crossovers leading from track 4 to track 3 and from track 3 to track 2, and was waiting at the levers in order to close the crossover leading from track 2 to track 1, so as not to delay train No. 4. While standing at the levers he saw train No. 4 approaching on the curve between the distant and home signal locations, and he said he watched it until it passed the home signal. He then called it to the attention of the third trick signalman-operator, who had arrived in the tower, and the latter obtained a fusee and endeavored to light it with the idea of trying to warn the engine crew of train No. 4, but was unsuccessful in lighting the fusee; in the meantime, Signalman-Operator Cullen was sounding the emergency tower whistle. Train No. 4 proceeded, however, with the engine still working steam and with no noticeable reduction in speed prior to the accident, nor was there any fire flying from the wheels. He did not, however, notice the position of the engineman and fireman as the engine passed the tower. Signalman- Operator Cullen further stated that the headlight on the engine of train No. 4 was burning brightly, that the night was clear and dark with nothing to obscure visibility, and that the advance automatic signal governing track 2, 10- cated just east of the point of accident, was also in the stop position. , -7- Marketing Signalman-Operator Farren said he came into the tower about 11.04 or 11.05 p.m., at which time extra 4455 was backing through the crossovers, finally stopping with the engine on the crossover leading from track 2 to track 1. Signalman Operator Cullen was standing at the levers con- trolling this particular crossover, and at about the same time he saw train No. 4 about half a mile distant and re- marked to Signalman-Operator Cullen that it might be de- layed. Shortly afterwards, however, train No. 4 passed the home signal without stopping, and he then picked up a fusee and started for the front window, while Signalman- Operator Cullen sounded the emergency tower whistle. Signalman-Operator Farren was unable to light the fusee, however, by the time the train passed the tower, at which time he could see the engineman in the cab, but could not see what he was doing; he did not recall seeing the fireman. He corroborated statements of Signalman-Operator Cullen to the effect that the engine of train No. 4 was working steam when it passed the tower. Belg Engineman Riblett, in charge of engine 3676, was sent from Conemaugh, 13.1 miles west of NY Block Station, to handle the undamaged portion of train No. 4 eastward to Altoona. He said he arrived at NY Block Station on track 2 at 12.15 a.m. and received an approach indication on the distant signal and a stop indication on the home signal. He then coupled to the rear end of train No. 4, charged the train line, tested the brakes and found them working properly, and then pulled the rear end of the train back as far as W Tower, a distance of 4.6 miles. At this latter point he ran around the train with his engine, tested the brakes again, and proceeded with the train to Altoona, the brakes working properly at all points. His statements were corroborated by those of his fireman. Signal-Maintainer Keil said he was called about 11.15 p.m. and reached the scene of the accident about 20 minutes later, finding both the second and the third-trick operators in the tower. He checked the positions of the levers and found them in the proper positions for the routes involved, examined the seals on the electric locks and found them intact, and then went to the home signal governing track 2 and found it in the stop position. No repairs or adjust- ments were made at the tower or at the home signal, and a check of the electric locking showed that it was working as intended. Observers then were placed at the home and distant signals and these signals were kept under observation until the completion of tests on the afternoon of October 12. These tests, as well as examinations of the track relays, interlocking machine, etc., failed to disclose the presence of anything which could have caused an improper signal per- formance. -8- An examination of the records showed that the chart covering the track water pans located just east of Wilmore, or about 2 miles from NY Block Station, indicated that train No. 4, moving on track 2, scooped approximately 3½ inches of water from the pan at about 11.03 p.m. Among the data furnished in connection with the investi- gation of this accident was a brief statement from Dr. C.J. Bibb, surgeon of the Pennsylvania Railroad, to the effect that he was called to attend Engineman Johnson of train No. 4, and he stated: "It is my professional opinion that death was due to accident caused by the wreck. 11 Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Johnson, of train No. 4, properly to observe and obey signal indications. The evidence indicated that the signal system was in proper working order and displaying the proper approach and stop indications as train No. 4 approached NY Block Station on track 2. Under the rules, an "approach" indication re- quires a train to "Approach next signal prepared to stop", while the speed must be reduced at once until it is not more than one-half the maximum authorized speed at the point in- volved. Apparently no action was taken by Engineman Johnson, however, in obedience to these provisions of the rules, and the evidence further indicated that he passed the home signal in the stop position without any reduction in speed and would have passed the advance automatic signal in the stop position had the accident not occurred. According to the records, water was taken at the track water pans at Wilmore, about 2 miles from the point of accident, indicating that there was nothing wrong with the engine crew at that time, and while no definite reason can be assigned for the failure of Engine- man Johnson to obey the signal indications which were dis- played for his train as it was approaching the point of acci- dent, the fact that the engine was working steam even after passing the home signal, with no application of the air brakes having been made, the fact that the weather was clear and favorable to the observance of signal indications, which in this case could have been seen for a considerable distance, and the further fact that the air brakes on train No. 4 were in good working order both before and after the accident, would make it seem more than probable that Engineman Johnson became incapacitated in some way as his train was approaching NY Block Station and that he was unable to take the proper steps towards bringing his train to a stop. { } Ga While of course no definite information is available as to why Fireman Burkholder, of train No. 4, did not know that Enginemen Johnson was not operating the train in accordance with the signal indications which were displayed, it seems reasonable to suppose that after water had been taken at the Wilmore track pans, the fireman began to work on the fire and that he was still so engaged at the time of the accident, since his body, together with his shovel, was found in the coal pit after the occurrence of the accident. > The occurrence of this accident recalls the accident which occurred on this same railroad near Short Lane, Md., on January 17 of this year. In the case of the Short Lane accident there was a very dense fog, which undoubtedly caused the engineman of one of the trains involved to fail to see the signal indications, the result being the occurrence of a disastrous accident. In the present instance, it seems probable that the engineman was in some way incapacitated and for that reason failed to observe the signal indications, the result being the occurrence of another disastrous acci- dent. As was the case with the Short Lane accident, it is probable that there would have been no difficulty at NY Block Station had the line been equipped with an automatic train stop or train-control system, and it is also possible that the accident would not have occurred had the line been equipped with a system of visible and audible cab signals. : As a result of the Short Lane accident, the railroad arranged to install a system of visible and audible cab signals in that territory. This system repeats inside of the cab within view of the fireman the indications displayed by the wayside signals, and there is also within the cab an audible signal which gives ample warning to any one in the engine in case the wayside signals are set against the movement of the train. In this particular case, such a system would have re- sulted in warning Fireman Burkholder that Engineman Johnson was not obeying the signal indications and would have given the fireman an opportunity to bring the train to a stop before the accident occurred, The average daily train movement past NY Block Station for the 30 days preceding the date of the accident was 216, of which 53 were on track 2. The density of traffic on this line is amply sufficient to warrant the installation of some system which will aid in the prevention of accidents due to the failure of enginemen either to observe or to obey signal indications, and this is particularly so where train movements are such that when an accident does occur there is the ac- companying danger of involving other trains moving on adjacent tracks. It is recommended, therefore, that this railroad proceed as quickly as practicable with the installation of further safety devices, not only on this particular division, but on other portions of its main trunk lines where there is a very heavy traffic movement, and where no additional pro- 584 · 15 -10- tection has yet been supplied in addition to that afforded by the automatic block-signal system. Engineman Johnson was a man 53 years of age, and had been in engine service for a period of nearly 30 years, practically all of which had been on the Pittsburgh Division. He had last been given a physical examination, as well as an examination on vision, color sense and hearing, less than one month prior to the occurrence of the accident, being approved in all of these respects. All of the other em- ployees involved in this accident also were experienced men, and none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND > Director. Iransportation Library HE 1780 A234 1569 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY AT IVORYDALE, OHIO, ON OCTOBER 15, 1929. January 24, 1930. To the Commission: On October 15, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway at Ivorydale, Ohio, resulting in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. This accident was investigated in conjunction with repre- sentatives of the Ohio Commission of Public Utilities. Location and method of operation This accident occurred within the defined limits of the Cincinnati Terminal Division, part of the Cincinnati Division, extending between Ivorydale Junction and Gano, Ohio, a distance of 10.7 miles; within these limits this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and an automatic block-signal system. The ac- cident occurred within yard limits east of Ivorydale, at a switch located about 400 feet west of Township Avenue; this switch is a facing-point switch for westbound trains, and leads off the main track to the right or north through a crossover that connects with a siding; the siding paral- lels the main tracks for a considerable distance in each direction from the point of accident. Approaching this point from the east the track is tangent for several miles, this tangent extending considerably west of the switch. The grade for westbound trains is 0.20 per cent descending at the point of accident. The high switch stand is of the lever throw type and is located on the north side of the main tracks; the turnout is a No. 10. When the switch is closed a white banner is displayed, and when it is open it displays a red banner. This switch works in conjunction with west- bound automatic signal 2521; this signal is of the one- arm, three-position, upper-quadrant type, and is located approximately 2,475 feet east of the switch, and a short distance east of Elmwood Place. 1 ་ -2- There are seven street crossings between signal 2521 and the switch. At the time of the accident there were two passenger coaches standing together on the siding; the west end of these coaches was approximately 100 feet east of the switch, resulting in the view of the switch lamp and banners being restricted to a dis- tance of 1,150 feet from the left side of the westbound main track and to 1,050 feet from the right side there- of. There was also a gondola standing on the siding at a point about 775 feet east of the coaches, but this car did not obstruct the view. The weather was somewhat hazy and a light fog pre- vailed at the time of the accident which occurred about 8.51 a.m. Description The westbound motor car and trailer involved in this accident were owned by the Western Union Telegraph Company, were operated by an employee of that company, and were in charge of Conductor-Pilot Daley, an employee of the railway company. The motor car was insulated and therefore did not actuate the automatic block signals It left West Sharon, the last open office, 6.3 miles east of Ivorydale, at 8.16 a.m., and was attempting to get in on the siding when it was struck by train No. 15. Westbound passenger train No. 15 consisted of one club car, four Pullman cars, one dining car; and four Pullman cars, in the order named, all of steel construc- tion, hauled by engine 6520, and was in charge of Con- ductor Martin and Engineman Maloney. This train passed West Sharon at 8.45 a.m., one minute late, passed signal 2521, which apparently was displaying a proceed indica- tion, and was derailed at the switch while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been between 40 and 60 miles per hour. The motor car and trailer were completely demolished. Engine 6520 came to rest across both main tracks and on! its right side, headed north, with the front end about 400 feet west of the switch; the tender was torn from its trucks, but remained upright. The first three cars were derailed, but remained upright on the siding. The employee killed was the fireman of train No. 15, while the employee injured was the engineman. · -3- Summary of evidence Conductor-Pilot Daley, in charge of the motor car and trailer, stated that he was given information as to trains and informed that train No. 15 was on time. The motor car departed from West Sharon at 8.16 a.m. and a few miles west thereof a stop was made, of about two or three minutes duration, in order to pick up tools. The motor car and trailer then continued westward and on reaching. Elmwood Place, 0.4 mile east of Ivorydale, he looked at his watch and it was then 8.46 a.m., while train No. 15 was due by West Sharon, 5.9 miles distant, at 8.44 a.m. Conductor-Pilot Daley figured that he could get into clear at Ivorydale before train No. 15. arrived, but on looking back he saw the headlight of that train, about at the depot at Carthage, located 1.2 miles east of Ivorydale, and told the gang foreman to light a fusee. The speed of the motor car was reduced to about 20 miles per hour and the gang foreman got off, between the first and second streets west of Elmwood Place, which would be about 1,000 feet from the switch, and began giving stop signals with the lighted fusee, on the engineman's side of the approaching train. The motor car and trailer continued to the switch and Con- ductor-Pilot Daley ran forward and opened it as the motor car slowed down, and the cars were moving in on the siding and the conductor-pilot was attempting to close the switch when the engine of train No. 15 reached it. Conductor-Pilot Daley said that immediately after the accident he looked at his watch and it was then be- tween 8.48.30 and 8.49 a.m. He could not recall at what time he passed Carthage, 0.8 mile east of Elmwood Place, where he could have cleared the main line, and also said that just before he opened the switch he noticed that. signal 2521 was displaying a proceed indication, but that he could not tell whether the engine of train Nọ 15 had passed the signal at that time, saying that it requires a short interval for the signal to function. Conductor-Pilot Daley further stated that he was busy watching street crossings between signal 2521 and the. switch, in order to prevent an accident, as the insulated motor car did not actuate crossing-protection devices. He was thoroughly familiar with the territory in this vicinity, had a full supply of flagging equipment, and said that he should not only have been clear of the main track five minutes ahead of train No. 15, but that he should have been into clear at the time that train was due to leave the next station in the rear where time is shown, which in this instance was West Sharon, the time being 8.44 a.m. • 副菜​を ​[ -4- Gang Foreman Smith, a Western Union Telegraph Company employee, stated that when east of Elmwood Place, at about Oak Street, located approximately 1,700 feet east of the switch, Conductor-Pilot Daley looked at his watch and said that it was 8.46 a.m., the gang foreman looking at his own watch and noting that it was 20 seconds faster than that of the conductor-pilot, who then remarked that train No. 15 was due out of West Sharon at 8.44 a.m. When about 1,000 feet east of the switch, moving at a speed of about 20 miles per hour. Gang Foreman Smith said that he got off with a lighted red fusee, fell against the side of the gondola that stood on the siding, and then waved stop signals on the engineman's side, but that his stop signals were not answered and train No. 15 passed him at a speed of about 60 miles per hour, without the air brakes hav- ing been applied. Gang Foreman Smith stated that a crossing whistle signal was sounded on the engine whistle just as the engine passed him. He was not familiar with the territory in this vicinity and did not notice the indication displayed by signal 2521. With the exception of Workman Greenley, who estimated the speed of the motor car to have been about 5 or 6 miles per hour at the time the gang foreman jumped off with the fusee, statements of three other members of the gang crew developed nothing additional of importance. All of them fixed the location of the flagman as 1,000 feet, or more, east of the switch. Engineman Maloney, of train No. 15, stated that signal 2521 was displaying a proceed indication, green, and that the fireman called it. The speed was about 50 miles per hour on passing Elmwood Place station and just afterwards he saw a fusee light up, whereupon he applied the air brakes in emergency, before any stop signals were given with the fusee, and he said it was not until he reached a point in the vicinity of Town- ship Avenue, which is located about 400 feet east of the switch, that he saw the switch banner displaying a red indication. Engineman Maloney said that he saw the motor car at the same time that he saw the fusee, and he fixed the location of the man with the fusee as being just a little west of Township Avenue and about 200 or 300 feet east of the motor car, he did not see anyone around the motor car. Engineman Maloney further stated that the air brakes had been tested and worked properly, that no trouble was experienced in observing signal indi- cations on account of weather conditions, that the head- light was burning brightly, that the automatic bell -5- ringer was in operation, that the engine whistle was sounded almost continuously for the street crossing, and that he did not see anyone at the switch, and it was his opinion that he had done all that he could to prevent the accident, but that everything heppened so quickly he had no change at all, saying that he could have brought the train to a stop had proper pro- tection been afforded. Conductor Martin, of train No. 15, was riding in the second car; he said that a service air-brake ap- plication was made approaching Elmwood Place station, how far east thereof he could not tell, following which a second application was made, a heavy one, and then he felt the cars bumping on the ties. Brakeman Filmore, of train No. 15, was riding in the seventh car; he said that an air-brake application was made about one-half mile east of the switch, and then the brakes were released, and he did not feel another application until the accident occurred. Cross- ing signals were sounded on the engine whistle all the way. Immediately after the accident he got off, about two car-lengths east of the switch, and said that at that time he saw a man with a lighted fusee standing on the engineman's side of the track in the vicinity of Township Avenue, just east of the two coaches that stood on the siding. The fusee apparently had just been lighted, as it was not flaring brightly at the time. Flagman Markins, of train No. 15, stated that im- mediately after the accident he went to the forward end of the observation car, the last car in the train, got off and looked along both sides, saw escaping steam and derailed cars, and then started back to flag. He estima- ted that on account of the fog, his vision was restrict- ed to about 500 feet. The flagman also said that the train came to a stop, with the observation car east of Township Avenue, and that at no time did he see a man with a lighted fusee. Agent Drake, on duty at Elmwood Place, said he was looking toward the west and saw a man flagging with a fusee; he located this man as being in the vicinity of Township Avenue. Agent Drake also stated that he did not notice any reduction in the speed of train No. 15, which he estimated to have been about 40 or 50 miles per hour, and he fixed the time of the accident as 8.48 a.m. -6- Î Conclusions This accident was caused by the operation of a motor car and trailer ahead of a first-class train, without sufficient time to clear the main track and without adequate flag protection. Conductor-Pilot Daley said he should have cleared the time of train No. 15 not less than five minutes, and should have been into clear by the time it passed the last station, which was West Sharon, where the train was due at 8.44 a.m. He could have cleared the main track at Carthage, located 1.2 miles east of Ivorydale, but instead of doing so he continued westward and did not look at his watch until in the vicinity of Elmwood Place; it was then 8.46 a.m., according to his time, with train No. 15 overdue at West Sharon, and it was not until he looked back and saw the headlight of train No. 15 that he took any action toward affording flag pro- tection. There is little excuse for his attempt to clear the main track at Ivorydale, leaving the question of protection until after train No. 15 had come in sight. While the testimony is conflicting as to when and how the air brakes were applied, and also as to the exact location of Gang Foreman Smith at the time he was flagging with the lighted fusee, yet it is clear that he was not back far enough to enable Engineman Maloney to bring train No. 15 to a stop before reaching the switch. It also appears that the engine of train No. 15 had passed signal 2521 before the switch was opened. All of the employees involved were experienced men, the conductor-pilot having spent about 20 years in this territory; none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W.F. BORLAND, Director. 1 Transportation Library HE 1780 A2. разу > INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1570 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY AT WILSON, ARK., ON OCTOBER 15, 1929. To the Commission: February 17, 1930. On October 15, 1929, there was a collision be- tween a passenger train and a cut of cars on the St. Louis- San Francisco Railway at Wilson, Ark., which resulted in the injury of 16 passengers, 3 employees and 1 person carried under contract. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Chaffee Sub- Division of the River Division, which extends between Chaffee, Mo., and Turrell, Ark., a distance of 139.5 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred within yard limits at a point 4,423.5 feet south of the station at Wilson and 132 feet south of the south passing track switch; approach- ing this point from the north the track is tangent for a distance of 3,401.2 feet and approaching from the south it is tangent for a distance of 5.2 miles, while the grade is practically level. The passing track is 4,013 feet in length and parallels the main track on the east, the north switch being 225.8 feet south of the station. The switch stand at the south end of the passing track is located on the east side of the main track and is equipped with a switch lamp with lenses 5 inches in diameter, which are located 7.5 feet above the head block. The weather was clear and it was about dusk at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 7.05 p. m. Description Southbound freight train extra 4016 consisted of 33 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 4016, and was in charge of Conductor Harris and Engineman Gettings. This train arrived at Wilson at 3.30 p. m., and after taking water it entered the north switch of the passing track where it coupled to a cut of 56 cars standing on that track and shoved them ahead in order to clear the north switch. } Ly : I $ : 1 2 In making this movement the south end of this cut of cars was shoved out on the main track and while standing at that point the leading car was struck by train No. 822. Northbound passenger train No. 822 consisted of one baggage car and two coaches, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 186, and was in charge of Conductor Wilson and Engineman Green. This train departed from Turrell, 18.7 miles south of Wilson, at 6.41 p. m., 16 minutes late, and was approaching the station at Wilson when it collided with the cars ahead of extra 4016 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 10 and 20 miles per hour. None of the equipment was derailed, although the forward end of the first car ahead of extra 4016 was tele- scoped about 3 feet. Engine 186 had its forward end quite badly damaged and the three cars in its train sustained slight damage. The employees injured were the engineman, baggageman, and train porter, of train No. 822. Summary of evidence Engineman Gettings, of extra 4016 stated that upon arrival at Wilson he found the train-order signal displayed, and after instructing the head brakeman to as- certain if they had any additional time on train No. 822, the engine was cut off and spotted at the water tank. While water was being taken, the brakeman returned and ad- vised there were no orders pertaining to train No. 822. The engineman then gave the brakeman two fusees and in- structed him to proceed along the cars standing on the passing track and see if they were all coupled, and if he found there was any room to shove these cars ahead, the brakeman was to give a signal for such a movement. The train then entered the passing track at the north switch and coupled to the cars; Engineman Gettings called for a signal and received a proceed signal from the head brake- man. After moving a short distance, the brakeman's lantern disappeared from view, but upon calling for another signal, it was transmitted by the brakeman. The train continued to move slowly ahead and then the head brakeman's lantern again disappeared; the engineman called for signals the third time and the brakeman lighted a fusee and gave the same signal that had been previously given. Engineman Gettings then looked back and noticed that the caboose was clearing the main track, looked ahead again but did not see any light at the head end of the cut, looked back and then received a stop signal from the rear end. The middle brake- man, had repeated the first of the signals given by the head brakeman, but did not give any more signals after that time. Not being able to see any lights at the head end after the train stopped, Engineman Gettings thought perhaps G • 1. נא 3 something was wrong, so he got off and started forward, and when he reached a point about 35 or 40 car-lengths from the engine he noticed that some of the cars had been shoved out on the main track and that the brakeman was some distance beyond the cars, flagging with a red fusee, and at this time he thought these signals were intended for train No. 822. Being of the opinion that the cars had been shoved through the switch, resulting in damaging it, he returned to the engine and called the conductor three different times by means of the usual whistle signal. As he did not see the conductor's lantern appear, he started back along the train and met the conductor about 10 car- lengths from the caboose. He informed the conductor as to what had occurred and advised the conductor to go forward and supervise the backup movement to prevent derailing the cars. The conductor hesitated at first, not knowing whether the rear brakeman would know how to handle the situation regarding a possible backup movement and also about flagg- ing against train No. 807, due in about one hour, but En- gineman Gettings volunteered to go to the caboose and give the proper instructions, so that the conductor could go up to the head end. After this had been done, the engineman started ahead toward his engine and had reached a point about four or five car-lengths from the engine when the collision occurred. He did not see a backup signal at any time, but while he was back near the caboose he heard a backup signal acknowledged by the engine whistle, although this signal was not acted upon. Engineman Gettings further stated that before heading in on the passing track, he did not know how many cars were on that track, and the reason he gave the head brakeman the two fusees was for the pur- pose of flagging train No. 822 providing his train could not get into clear. He said it was an oversight on his part in failing to provide the brakeman with a red lantern and tor- pedoes, although at the time he felt that the fusees would be all that was required. When questioned as to why he did not continue southward and examine the switch at the time he went forward to determine what was wrong, he explained that he was in doubt as to the possibility of pulling the cars back without derailing them and thought it would be better to have the conductor inspect the switch and be on hand to direct the backup movement. He also said that the reason he did not continue beyond the cars at that time, and make certain that train No. 822 was properly flagged, was that when he saw the brakeman giving stop signals with a fusee, he felt satisfied that the train was then approach- ing and thought these signals were sufficient warning. p Fireman Miller, of extra 4016, stated that he did not hear the instructions given to the brakeman by the en- gineman, as he was on the tender taking water at the time. While the train was moving through the siding, he crossed 4 over to the engineman's side of the cab and saw the head brakeman, who was riding on the side of a car, giving pro- beed signals with his lantern, after which the brakeman lighted a fusee and used it in giving the same signals. He said the engineman called for signals each time the brakeman's lantern went out of sight. He did not know that the cars had been shoved out on the main track until the engineman returned, after going ahead, and informed him of the fact, the engineman remarking that he was going back to get the conductor. While the engineman was proceed- ing towards the caboose he sounded a backup signal, but re- ceived no signal from the rear of the train, although the awing brakeman, who was between the engine and the south passing-track switch, gave a backup signal; he did not accept this signal as the engineman had stated that he thought the switch had been run through and the points damaged. Head Brakeman Pendergrass, of extra 4016, who had had only three weeks' experience, said that when he returned from the office at Wilson, the engineman handed him two fusees and instructed him to go to the far end of the cars on the passing track and to stop them when they reached the clearance point. He proceeded to the south end of these cars, which were then 12 or 15 car-lengths from the switch, and after the engine coupled to the other end, they were moved ahead in response to his proceed signal. After the cars had moved a distance of two or three car-lengths, and while giving proceed signals, his lantern became extinguish- ed; he attempted to relight the lantern, using all the matches in his possession, but without success, so he light- ed a fusee and gave stop signals, first from the side of a car and then while standing on the ground facing north- ward or toward his engine, and at this time the leading car was three or four car-lengths north of the clearance point. The cars continued to move slowly ahead, however, and think- ing that they might not be coupled, he boarded the second car from the head end, a gondola, and set a hand brake, but this also failed to stop the cars. Realizing that the cars would move beyond the south end of the passing track, he got off, ran ahead and opened the switch, and while the cars wer still moving he ran southward to protect against train No. 822. He said the fusees in his possession were five-minute fusees and the one he had lighted to use in passing signals, burned out about two minutes after he left the cars. About three or four minutes later, he thought he saw the headlight of train No. 822 approaching and so he lighted the second fusee, but it developed that he had been misled by auto- mobile headlights on the highway which parallels the main track on the west, and when the train finally approached, this second fusee had also burned out, leaving him without lights or any other flagging equipment. He attempted to } • 5 сл . warn the crew of the approaching train by standing in the middle of the track and waving his cap with one hand and his unlighted lantern with the other, continuing this erformance until the train was se close that it as necessary to step off the track on the engineman's side, and when the engine passed him he continued his stop ie signals. He did not know whether the engineman acknowledg- ed his signals and did not think the speed was reduced before the engine passed him, which was at a point approxi- mately 4 telegraph-pole lengths south of a bridge which is 1,700 feet from where the cars were standing on the main track. Brakeman Pendergrass said he knew that in addition to fusees, engines are supplied with red lanterns and tor- pedoes, but he did not provide himself with this addition- al equipment on account of the fact that he was on the ground at the time the engineman gave him the instructions, togeth- er with the fact that at the time he left the engine he did not think it would be necessary to flag train No. 822. It also appeared from his statements that he had cleaned his lantern that morning, but could not remember when he had filled it; he did not know why it went out, but said that after the accident he refilled it. Top S Swing Brakeman Crader, of extra 4016, who made his first trip under pay on the day before the accident, stated that he coupled the engine to the cars standing on the passing track and then walked southward to a point about midway between the engine and the south end of the cut. He noticed the head brakeman give to proceed signals with his lantern, which he relayed to the engineman. Hc also saw the hoad brakeman standing on the main track wav- ing a fusce, but did not know whether he was giving signals to the crew, as this was the first time he had ever seen signals given with a fusee. It appeared to him that the head brakeman was waving the fusee in line with the track instead of across it, and from the way these signals were being given he thought they were intended for a highray crossing. As soon as the cars came to a stop, he ran to a point about six car-lengths from the leading car, from which point he could see that the cars wore out on the main track. After giving a backup signal, he returned to the engine and informed the fireman that the train would have to be backed up and the fireman whistled a backup signal, but there was no signal given from the rear of the train. G Conductor Harris, of extra 4016, who had been made a conductor only two days prior to the accident, stated that when his train arrived at Wilson, he walked to the head end of the train and the engineman advised him as to what arrangements had been made with the brakemen to handle the cut of cars on the passing track. The conductor re- mained at the north switch and the train cleared the main track at 6.45 p.m., after which he closed the switch and B gave a stop signal, and then went to the telegraph office to get bills and train orders. While these movements were being made, the flagman was in the vicinity of the caboose. The conductor returned to the caboose about 10 minutes later, left the bills, and then started walking towards the head end of the train, and when he had reached a point about 10 car-lengths from the caboose he met his engine- man, who informed him that some of the cars had been shov- ed out on the main track, the engineman asking him to pro- ceed to the south switch and ascertain whether the switch was all right before a backup movement was started. Con- ductor Harris hurried southward and had reached a point about 10 car-lengths from the south end of the cars when the collision occurred. He was of the opinion, at the time the arrangements were made to clear the main track for train No. 822, that his train was being given the proper supervision, in view of the fact that the engineman had instructed the two brakemen at the head end of the train as to how to handle the situation, and since the rear brakeman did not know what movement was to be made, he thought it was necessary to remain at the north switch and close it, and then to and then to get the bills and orders, so that as soon as train No. 822 arrived his own train could proceed to Bassett ahead of train No. 807 without delaying the latter train. Flagman Rhodes, of extra 4016, who had had about three months' experience, said he was the one who closed the switch after the caboose had cleared the main track. He then started ahead, but met Enginoman Gettings and was told by the engineman that the latter thought some cars had been shoved out on the main track at the south switch, that the head brakeman had gone out to flag train No. 822,, and that he was to return to the rear end of the train and look out for train No. 807. Realiz- Engineman Green, of train No. 822, stated that the customary air brake test was made before leaving Memphis and that several stops were made en route without difficulty. The train approached Wilson at a speed of about 60 miles per hour and when it reached a point in the vicinity of the bridge, he observed some one, without lights, in the center of the track jumping up and down and waving his arms, about a pole-length ahead of the engine. ing there was something irregular, he started making a service application of the brakes, but continued moving the brake-valve handle around into the emergency position. The brakes responded promptly and had reduced the speed to about 10 or 12 miles per hour by the time the accident oc- curred. Engineman Green did not see the indication dis- played by the switch lamp at the south passing-track switch ntil about the time he noticed the man standing on the track, and he also stated that although the headlight of י Subang - 7 i ! Mar 1 7 his engine was burning properly, it was impossible, at that time of the evening, to have seen the man on the track at a distance of 800 feet. Fireman Kizer of train No. 822. stated that upon reaching a point a short distance south of the bridge, he `noticed a man standing on the engineman's side of the track about an engine-length ahead of the train flagging with his arms; he thought the engineman saw this person at about the same time, as the engineman applied the brakes as soon as he came into view. Shortly afterwards he noticed the cars obstructing the main track and called them to the attention of the engineman. He estimated the speed of the train at the time the brakes were applied at 50 or 55 miles per hour, but this speed had been reduced to 15 or 20 miles per hour by the time the accident occurred. Fireman Kizer also stated that the time of day prevented him from seeing the switch light at the south passing-track switch any sooner than he did, which was about the time that he saw the cars on the main track, although under ordinary conditions this light could be seen for a distance of about 1 miles. > A - The statements of Conductor Wilson and Brakeman Marshall, of train No. 822, were to the effect that the brakes were properly tested at Memphis, and that their first intimation of anything wrong was when they felt a heavy application of the brakes which appeared to be an emergency application, while the train was approaching the passing track at Wilson. They estimated the speed of their train at this time to have been from 40 to 55 miles per hour and at the time of the accident at 18 or 20 miles per hour. Immediately after the accident, Brakeman Marshall went back to flag and met the head brakeman of extra 4016, who was hurriedly walking northward, between the train and the bridge south of the passing track. Statements of Assistant Superintendent Sims in- dicated that on account of an unusual amount of business, it had been necessary to call back into service all avail- able men and even after calling on other divisions of the railway, as well as other railroads in the vicinity, it had been impossible to obtain a sufficient number of train- men. It also appeared that on this division, within the past 30 days, 26 experienced trainmen and 30 inexperienced trainmen had been employed in addition to those called back into service. On the morning of October 14 no regular freight crews were available at Chaffee for train No. 835, a second-class merchandise train, and it was necessary to make up a crew from the extra board, this being the train crew involved in the accident here under investigation. * i ↓ • • 8 Conclusions This accident was caused by cars having been pushed out on the main track, on the time of an overdue first-class train, without proper flag protection. The evidence is to the effect that there was a cut of 56 cars standing on the passing track at Wilson, and when extra 4016 entered that track to meet northbound train No. 822 it was necessary to shove these cars ahead in order to clear the main track at the north switch. This movement was started by proceed signals given by Head Brakeman Pen- dergrass, and in continuing these signals his lantern was extinguished. Being unable to relight it, he lighted a fusee and gave signals, which were intended for stop sig- nals, but the middle brakeman did not know what they were, while the engineman thought they were proceed signals. The result was that some of the cars were pushed out on the main track a distance of nearly 200 feet and the head brake- man then continued southward to flag train No. 822. A short time later he observed a light in the distance, mistook it for train No. 822, used his second and last fusee, and when train No. 822 finally came in sight the head brakeman had nothing left in the way of flagging equipment, consequently he did what he could to flag the train by waving his arms while standing in the center of the track, but was unable to warn the crew of that train in time to prevent the acci- dent. J The rules provide that a flagman's equipment at night shall consist of a red light, a white light, torpedoes and fusees. Brakeman Pendergrass did not provide himself with the additional equipment before he left the engine, simply taking what the engineman gave him, while Engineman Gettings was of the opinion, at the time he handed the two fusees to the brakeman, that these would be sufficient to flag train No. 822 providing there was insufficient room on the siding for his train to clear the main track. Had Brakeman Pendergrass been furnished with the proper flagging equipment, there is no doubt he would have been able to pre- vent the accident. The testimony is conflicting as to the signals given with the fusee by Brakeman Pendergrass at the time the cars were being shoved ahead. He maintained that some of these signals were given while he was on the ground fac- ing the engine, but Engineman Gettings and Fireman Miller contended that the signals were given in the same manner as those previously given with the brateman's lantern, while Brakeman Crader said that the signals appeared to be given in line with the track as if flagging a crossing, although AAA BAT og - 9 he had never seen signals given with a fusee and did not know what they meant. In Consideration of all the circumstances attend- ing this accident indicates quite clearly that the funda- mental difficulty rested with the inexperience of the train crew. Of the four men composing the train crew, the con- ductor was the only member who was an experienced man, and he had been made a conductor only two days previously. view of the lack of experience of all three of his brake- men, it would seem that Conductor Harris should have arrang- ed to give personal supervision to the movement which was being attempted, instead of leaving it to the engineman to operate his engine, see that his rear end was into clear, and at the same time supervise the work of two inexperienc- ed brakemen, one of whom was 50 car-lengths distant. At the time of the accident none of the employees involved had been on duty in violation of any of the pro- visions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, S Director. wip Transportation Library не 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1571 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE BOSTON & MAINE RAILROAD AT NAHOR, N.H., ON OCTOBER 16, 1929. Commission. January 25, 1930 To the Commission; On October 16, 1929, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Boston & Maine Railroad at Nahor, N. H., resulting in the death of three employees and the injury of six employees. This accident was investigated in conjunction with representatives of the New Hampshire Public Service Location and method of operation in use. This accident occurred on that part of the Southern Division extending between Peterboro and Contoocook, N. H., a distance of 32.77 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time- table and train orders, no block-signal system being The accident occurred at a point approximate- ly 500 feet west of the station at Nahor; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for more than 1 mile, followed by a compound curve to the left about 1,400 feet in length with a maximum curvature of 5º, the accident occurring on this curve at a point about 825 feet from its western end, where the curv- ature is 3° 40'. Approaching from the east there are 1 -2- . A W PARK, NJ MANA. several short curves and tangents, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade for westbound trains is 1.30 per cent ascending at the point of accident. Owing to a building on the north side of the track at the cast end of the station platform, and some large boulders and a growth of trees on the inside of the curve, neither crew could see the opposing train until they were within a very short distance of each other. The weather was clear at the time of the ac- cident, which occurred at about 11.49 a.m. Description The westbound local freight train involved in this accident was being operated as the second section of first-class train No. 8122. It consisted of three cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1427, and was in charge of Conductor Vantine and Engineman Chapman. This freight train arrived at Elmwood, 3.87 miles east of Nahor, as extra 1427, but in order to expedite traffic, and as was customary in many cases, instructions were issued for it to run from Elmwood to Peterboro, 7.23 miles, both of which points are register stations, as the second section of train No. 8122, a gasoline motor car train. Train second No. 8122 left Elmwood at 11.38 a.m., and collided with extra 1446 at Nahor while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour. Eastbound freight train extra 1446 consisted of one freight car and a caboose, hauled by engine 1446, A ܝ Cemet Vlast * -3- and was in charge of Conductor Raby and Engineman Crosby. This train left Peterboro at 11.38 a.m., no check having been made of the train register, set out a car of coal which was being pushed ahead of the engine, this being done at a siding a short distance east of the station, and then proceeded, colliding with train second No. 8122 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 25 miles per hour. Both engines were locked together and badly damaged, the engine trucks being pushed back under the frames, the engine cabs practically demolished, and the boiler head appurtenances broken; both tender cisterns were jammed against their respective engines. None of the equipment in either train was derailed, with the ex- ception of the caboose of train second No. 8122. The employees killed were the engineman and fireman of train second No. 8122 and the engineman of extra 1446, while the employees injured were the conductor, brakeman and flagman of each train. Summary of evidence Conductor Vantine, of train second No. 8133, stated that before departing from Elmwood, the agent came out and informed him that the dispatcher wanted them to hurry, as there was a train waiting for them at Peterboro. Conductor Vantine transmitted this in- formation to the engineman and shortly afterwards the train departed, and the first intimation he had of any- thing wrong was when he felt the air brakes apply, Sta -4- followed by the collision. Conductor Vantine stated that it had been practice, off and on, for quite a few years to run freight trains as the second section of scheduled passenger trains, and that the practice had been increased on this branch in the past year, the last time his train having been operated as the second scction of train No. 8122 between Elmwood and Peterboro, under similer orders, being on October 11, 1929. State- ments of Flagman McClure developed nothing additional of importance. Conductor Raby, of extra 1446, stated that after the work of switching was completed at Peterboro, he registered the arrival of his train, went into the freight office, and received from Operator Sullivan a copy of train order No. 89, Form 19, reading "Eng 1446 run extra Peterboro to Elmwood", together with a clearance but that he received no verbal instructions from the operator, nor did the operator make any mention to him of the fact that train No. 8123 was being run in two sec- tions. About the time he received the order from the operator, he had some conversation with Agent Wheeler, who was in the office, as was Traveling Car Agent Gearon, this conversation being of a joking nature so far as the con- ductor was concerned, and having no bearing on the train order received or the fact that train No. 8122 was being run in two sections. Conductor Raby then left the office and was unaware of the second section of train No. 3122; he proceeded to the fireman's side of the engine and gave ca? •! -5- the fireman the engineman's copy of the train order, but did not compare the order with the fireman, nor was any mention made by the fireman or engineman as to whether all overdue trains had arrived or left. The flag- man was then called in, after which the conductor went to the register book, located outside of the passenger station, and registered out, but did not check the rcgis- ter. The first knowledge the conductor had of any thing wrong was when Brakeman Berry shouted a warning of danger, the collision occurring immediately afterwards. Conductor Raby stated that during the course of switching at Peterboro, before he went to the freight office for his orders, he had observed train No. 8122 standing in the yard at its usual place, with its markers displayed, but no signals displayed for a following section, and he assumed that there was no opposing train due. Conductor Raby acknowledged that in his hurry, he neglected to perform the duty of checking the register, either at the time he registered in or at the time he registered out, to ascer- tain if all trains due had arrived. Fireman Hardy, of extra 1446, stated that the conductor handed up to him a copy of train order No. 89; the fireman read the order to the engineman, who read it back, and the fireman thought that he also remarked to the engineman that they would probably go to Elmwood for Conductor Vantine's train. The first the fireman knew of anything wrong was on seeing the opposing train across the inside of the curve, about eight or nine car-lengths · S -6- j and he shouted a warning of danger and jumped just Fireman Hardy said that Engineman Crosby had shut off steam prior to the accident and he thought that the engineman applied the air brakes. The statements of Brakeman Berry were to the cffect that he, the conductor, and flagman, rode in the caboose after the car of coal was set out, but the brake- man did not recall any conversation as to train orders or about train No. 8122 being operated in two sections; he said the conductor usually showed any orders received, but that on this occasion the conductor did not show him the order and he did not know whether the conductor showed the order to the flagman. Conductor Eaton, of train first No. 8122, stated that he received orders at Elmwood to display signals for the following section and accordingly green flags were dis- played from Elmwood to Peterboro. His train departed from Elmwood at 10.28 a.m., according to the train sheet, and ho said that after arrival at Peterboro, at 10.43 a.m. according to the train sheet, the signals were taken down, this being done on reaching the turntable in the yard. Conductor Eaton also stated that at the time he registered in at Peterboro, some one spoke to him, diverting his attention from the register book, and that on this account he made an error in registering, writing on two lines, one above the other, instead of writing only on one line, how- ever, he noticed the error before leaving the book, imme- away, before the collision occurred. -7- diately crased and corrected it, while the agent was pre- sent, and called the correction to the attention of the agent. Statements of Engineman Moody corroborated in substance those of Conductor Eaton; the engineman said that extra 1446 had not arrived at Peterboro at the time the green flags were taken down. Operator Sullivan, at Peterboro, stated that before Dispatcher Ainsworth made train order No. 89 com- plete, the dispatcher told the operator to be sure that Conductor Raby, of extra 1446, understood that train second No. 8122 was not in, and the operator gave the dispatched his acknowledgment of these instructions. the time the operator delivered the train order to Con- ductor Raby in the freight house, the customary place to deliver orders except in the case of a passenger train, at about 11.25 a.m he told the conductor to look out for train second No. 8122, but the conductor made no re- ply. Operator Sullivan stated that at the time this took place, Agent Wheeler and Traveling Car Agent Gearon were present in the freight office, and that all the conductor did was to remark something about why the operator had told him to place a car on a track that was occupied by another car with the hopper doors down. After delivering the order to the conductor, the operator left the office and went to dinner, being informed of the accident at his home, at about 11.53 a.m., by Agent Wheeler. Agent Wheeler stated that at the time the train At + ? -8- order was delivered to Conductor Raby, Operator Sullivan remarked to look out for train second No. 8123, but that the conductor made no reply. Agent Wheeler also confirm- ed the statements of Conductor Eaton, of train first No. 8122, as to the correction made at the time that con- ductor registered in, on his arrival at Peterboro. Statements of Traveling Car Agent Gearon were to the effect that a remark was made while he was in the freight office about train second No. 8122, but he did not know who made the remark or whether Conductor Raby was present when it was made. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Conductor Raby, of extra 1446, to check the train regis- ter before departing from Peterboro. Rule 109, of the book of operating rules of this railroad, reads in part as follows: 11 ***Conductors must, unless other- wise instructed, register their trains and make the proper exam- ination of registers personally, and ascertain if all trains due have been registered." The investigation developed that it was not unusual on this branch, in order to expedite traffic, to operate freight trains as the second section of scheduled pass- enger trains. On the day of the accident, however, train first No. 8122, the gasoline motor car, arrived at Peterboro, registered, proceeded to the turntable, and had taken down the green flags before extra 1446 -9- arrived. After extra 1446 arrived and while perform- ing switching, Conductor Raby noticed the gasoline motor car standing in the yard at its usual place, but no green flags, indicating a following section, were displayed at this time, and the conductor assumed that there was no opposing train due. When Conductor Raby went to the freight office, after work was completed, and received the train order from Operator Sullivan, it appears that the operator made mention of the fact that train No. 8122 was being run in two sections, but that the conduc- tor did not hear the remark, the operator failing to im- press this fact on the conductor's mind, as he had been instructed to do by the dispatcher. The conductor, apparently, was more concerned as to why the operator had told him to place a car on a track that was occupied by another car with the hopper doors down. Conductor Raby then left the office and shortly afterwards his train departed; he had registered its arrival and depart- ure, but no check had been made in order to ascertain if all trains due had been registered. Operator Sullivan erred in not firmly impress- ing on the conductor's mind the verbal instructions of the dispatcher, issued as a matter of extra precaution; apparently he made a somewhat feeble attempt to carry out the instructions he had received, but it does not appear that he was thoroughly alive to the situation or partic- ularly energetic in attending to his own duties properly. A little more cooperation on his part might have prevented n -10- the occurrence of this accident. All of the employees involved were experienced men; at the time of the accident the crews of train second No. 8122 and extra 1446 had been on duty less than 6 hours, and 4 hours, respectively, prior to which they had been off duty 11 hours or more. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. I ** ÷ Transportauon Library HE A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD AT ROCKVILLE, MD., OCTOBER 23, 1929. MD., ON GY To the Commission: ****** Hours X 1410 1572 February 15, 1930. no ܐܐ UNIVERSITY OF PR On October 23, 1929, there was a collision between a light engine and a gasoline motor car on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at Rockville, Md., which resulted in the death of four employees and the injury of three employees. Location and method of operation " This accident occurred on the Metropolitan Sub-Division of the Baltimore Division, extending between Washington, D. C., and Point of Rocks, Md., a distance of 42.2 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and an automatic block-signal system. A section tool- house is located on the north side of the main tracks and approximately 600 feet west of the station at Rockville, the accident occurring on the westbound main track at a point about 150 feet east of the tool- house. Approaching this point from the west, against the current of traffic, there is a 1° 32' curve to the left 600 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent to the point of accident, a distance of about 475 feet, and for some distance beyond that point. The grade at the point of accident is 0.3 per cent descen- ding for eastbound trains. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 3.30 a.m. Description j ....... C Eastbound light engine 4485, headed west and backing up against the current of traffic, was in charge of Engineman Spurrier and Fireman Hoffmaster. The crew received instructions at Gaithersburg, 5.1 miles west of Rockville, to proceed to Garrett Park, 4.1 miles east of Rockville, with authority to use the westbound main track in making this movement, for the purpose of assisting westbound freight train extra 4490, which had a disabled engine. Engine 4485 left Gaithersburg at ! J : -3- 3.15 a.m., and was approaching the station at Rockville when it collided with the motor car while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 15 and 20 miles per hour. ! The motor car involved was a standard section motor car and was in charge of Section Foreman W. H. Coleman. The section crew had been called at about 3 a.m., to proceed eastward to the Georgetown Branch. Upon arrival at the toolhouse, Section Foreman Coleman instructed his crew to place the motor car on the westbound track, and after this had been done the crew started shoving it eastward but had only moved a short distance when it was struck by engine 4485. The motor car was demolished and the debris carried ahead of the tender for a distance of 500 feet before the engine came to a stop; the engine was not derailed or damaged. All of the employees killed and injured were members of the section crew. Summary of evidence. Section Foreman Coleman stated that at about 3 a.m. he was called by a section laborer and informed. that a car of sand had been dumped at Georgetown and that he was to proceed to that point with the section crew. When he arrived at the toolhouse he found other members of the crew there, among them being Section Foreman Selby, and he thought the latter had obtained a line-up as to trains on the westbound track. Section Foreman Coleman instructed the men to place the car on the westbound track, it being his intention to use that track as far as a highway crossing, located approximately 200 feet east of the station, where he would get per- mission to operate over the eastbound track by using the telephone in the watchman's shanty. After the car was placed on the track, two of his men started pushing it, without the motor running, but it was moved only a distance of about four rail-lengths when it was struck by the light engine. He said that he heard an engine approaching from the west but thought it was train No. 12 on the eastbound track and conse- quently did not look back to see if there was any danger; one of his laborers, who was killed in the accident, apparently was of the same opinion, as this laborer had been instructed to start the motor but replied that he could not do so until the train passed. Section Foreman Coleman further stated that in addition to a headlight, there were four lighted white lanterns cn the motor car, but he did not know if there were any red lanterns. He also said that he had recently been examined on the operating rules and understood them, but did not arrange for flag protection covering ܹܕ S -3- the movement on the westbound track for the reason that Section Foreman Selby had arrived at the toolhouse ahead of him and he was of the impression that that foreman had received the proper authority to make the movement. Section Laborer R. L. Coleman stated that he accompanied Section Foreman Coleman to the toolhouse and about five minutes after their arrival he assisted in putting the motor car on the track and the car was started eastward with three or four men pushing it, and after the car had been moved a distance of about 30 yards, he and another laborer boarded it on the north side; Foreman Coleman was also riding on the same side of the car, these being the only employees riding on the car at the time of the accident. Laborer Coleman did not see or hear the light engine approach- ing and was not aware of any danger until the collision occurred. There were some lanterns on the car, but he did not think any of them were burning, and while there was one lighted electric light on the car, he did not know in which direction the rays were shining. After the accident, he noticed a light on the rear of the engine tender. Section Laborer Poole stated that when he arrived at the toolhouse, the motor car was on the westbound track and that he boarded it while it was being shoved forward by other employees. He did not see the engine approaching, neither did he hear anyone mention it. He said the only light on the car was an electric hand lantern equipped with a reflector, but did not know in which direction it was shining. Section Laborer Smith stated that while there were some lanterns on the car, he did not know whether they were burning. After the car was put on the track, he returned to the toolhouse to get two inspectors' lanterns and was still in the toolhouse when the engine passed it. He did not hear the engine whistle sounded nor the bell ringing, and his first knowledge that an accident had occurred was when he came out of the toolhouse. Section Laborer Warfield stated that he ap- proached the toolhouse from the south, and when about 300 feet from it he noticed an engine approaching from the west with two white lights on the tender but did not know on which track it was moving. He heard the engine whistle sounded when this engine was about 700 feet west of the toolhouse, but did not hear the bell ringing. He did not witness the accident as it occurred before he reached the toolhouse. A Supervisor Selby stated that at about 2 a.m., he was called by telephone and requested to send some men to the Georgetown Branch to unload a car of sand, due to the car having become disabled. Accompanied by Section Foreman Selby, a son who lived with him and was one of those killed in the accident, they proceeded to Rockville by automobile and then started calling the section men. After some of the men had been called, Foreman Selby stated that he would go to the tool- house and remove the tools from the motor car. Super- visor Selby went to call another laborer and had just returned to the vicinity of the station when he heard the crash caused by the accident. Shortly afterwards he saw some lanterns lying around, but they were not lighted and did not have the appearance of having been lighted prior to the accident. It also appeared from the supervisor's statements that he did not get a line-up of trains moving on the main line, as he never assumes the responsibility of getting orders for fore- men to operate motor cars, and also because of the fact that by doing so it would create an unsafe practice and might lead foremen to believe, upon seeing him around a telephone booth or telegraph office, that it was all right for them to put their motor cars on the track, acting on the assumption that he would get the orders. Supervisor Selby further stated that he checks his foremen regularly on the rules, and discusses them at meetings, and that he had recently conducted a written examination covering the operation and protection of motor cars in which Foremen Coleman and Selby partici- pated and at that time both of them fully understocú the rules. G Engineman Spurrier, of engine 4485, stated that after assisting an eastbound train as far as Gaithersburg, he received instructions to turn his engine, and run it backwards on the westbound track to Garrett Park, east of Rockville, to help westbound extra 4490, which was at that point with a disabled engine. He communicated by telephone with the con- ductor of that train and arrangements were made for the conductor to hold all westbound trains at Carrett et Park until his engine arvived. He said the headlight on the tender was burning and the engine bell was ringing continuously, and when the engine reached the whistle board, about 1,400 feet west of the highway crossing at Rockville, he sounded the regu- lar crossing whistle signal. He was looking east- ward approaching the point of accident, but did not see the motor car, or a light of any description in S S : -3- the vicinity of the toolhouse. He felt no jar when the engine collided with the motor car and his first intimation that an accident had occurred was when Brakeman Stewart, who was riding on the foreman's side of the cab, informed him that something had been struck; he immediately applied the brakes in emergency, having just released them after reducing speed to 15 or 18 miles per hour for the highway crossing, and brought the engine to a stop within a distance of about 50 or 60 yards. He then got off the engine and dis- covered what had occurred, and at this time he noticed that the tender headlight was burning, in addition to a small flashlight on the rear of the tender, which was also burning. He said the rear headlight is located on the top of the tender and that its reflection does not shine on the track for some distance ahead of the engine. It also appeared from Engineman Spurrier's statements that he did not follow up the crossing signal with several short blasts on the whistle, as required when running against the current of traffic, because his attention was attracted by Brakeman Stewart before he had had an opportunity to do so. Q Fireman Hoffmaster stated that the rear headlight was burning and the engine bell was ringing at all times between Gaithersburg and the point of accident, and the engine whistle was sounded while rounding the curve west of the station at Rockville. He was riding on his seatbox looking ahead but saw no lights in the vicinity of the toolhouse and did not know that his engine had encountered anything until he observed an object fall away from the rear of the tender. He estimated the speed of the engine at the time of the accident at between 15 and 18 miles per hour. Fireman Hoffmaster said the headlight on the tender was a standard portable headlight and was burning brightly, but its rays were reflected nearly parallel with the ground and did not shine on the track for a considerable distance ahead of the engine. The statements of Brakeman Stewart corrob- orated those of Engineman Spurrier and Fireman Hcff- master as to the rear headlight burning properly ană the crossing whistle signal being sounded when approach- ing the point of accident, but he was not certain as to whether the engine bell was ringing. He was also look- ing towards the east but noticed no cbstruction on the track, his first knowledge of anything wrong being when he noticed something fall away from the rear of the tender; he called this to the attention of the engineman and the latter applied the brakes. Co -6- Operator Hill, on duty at DS Tower, 8 miles west of Gaithersburg, stated that the engineman of extra 4490 called him by telephone from Garrett Park and advised that his engine was disabled and it would be necessary to get another engine to handle the train. Operator Hill then communicated with the dispatcher and was instructed to authorize the crew of engine 4485, upon their arrival at Gaithersburg, to proceed to Gar- rett Park over the westbound main track to assist extra 4490. While arrangements were being made for the move- ment he heard the conductor of that train inform the engineman of engine 4485 that he would protect the westbound track until the light engine arrived at Garrett Park. Operator Hill did not receive a request from anyone to operate a motor car from Rockville. Conclusions This accident was caused by the operation of a motor on the main track without proper authority or protection, for which Section Foreman W. H. Coleman is responsible. Conta 11 Rule 89-A, of the "Instructions Governing the Maintenance of Way Department," provides in part that "Cars must not be used at night *** except by permission of the superintendent, or if unable to communicate with the superintendent, except by proper flag protection. Section Foreman Coleman admitted that he was familiar with the rule but failed to obtain authority to operate the car on the westbound track, due, he said, to the fact that Section Foreman Selby, who was in charge of another section, had arrived at the toolhouse before he did, and he assumed that Foreman Selby had obtained a line-up of westbound trains, although Foreman Coleman apparently did not inquire for the purpose of finding out whether this had been done. The rules also provide that when carrying two or more men, one must face the front and another face the rear; that a constant lockout must be main- tained for trains moving against the current of traffic, and that cars must carry a white light in front and a red light on the rear when being operated at night. The evidence indicated that the first two of these provisions were practically ignored, while it is con- flicting as to how many lights were on the motor car at the time of the accident. Foreman Coleman stated that there were four lighted white lanterns on the car Gunda -7-0 in addition to an electric lantern being used as a headlight, but some of the surviving laborers were of the opinion that the only light burning was the electric lantern, while the members of the crew of engine 4485 observed no lights and did not know the track was ob- structed until after their engine had collided with the motor car. There was nothing to indicate that a red light was displayed at any time. The provisions of the rules mentioned above were adequate for the occasion and if they had been observed, this accident would not have occurred. The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. + Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 : INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1573 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ..CCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ATLANTA & WEST POINT RAILROAD AT EAST POINT, GA., ON OCTOBER 23, 1929. January 31, 1930. To the Commission: On October 23, 1929, there was a collision between a Central of Georgia passenger train and an Atlanta & West Point work train on the line of the latter railroad at East Point, Ga., resulting in the injury of one employee and four passengers. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Atlanta & West Point Railroad extending between Newnan and East Point, Ga., a distance of 32.53 miles; in the immediate vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. Trains of the Central of Georgia Railway are operated over this The portion of this railroad under trackage agreement. collision occurred at a point about 2,000 feet west of the depot at East Point, on a siding; this siding parallels the main tracks on the south, the point of accident being 344 feet east of the west switch of a crossover that con- nects the eastbound main track with the siding; this switch is a facing-point switch for eastbound trains, with a No. 10 turnout. Approaching the switch from either direction the track is tangent for a considerable distance, while the grade for eastbound trains is level to a point about 60 feet east of the switch, and it is then ascending, be- ing 0.57 per cent at the point of collision. The switchstand is of the low ground-throw type, equipped with small, oval, two-way targets, and is lo- cated on the engineman's side of an eastbound engine; when the switch is open a red indication is displayed, and when it is closed it displays a green indication. Signal A-74, a permissive signal, normally displaying a caution indication, is of the one-arm, upper-quadrant, semaphore type, and is located 1,740 feet west of the switch; it governs the approach to the beginning of the manual block system in effect between East Point and At- lanta, a distance of 9.95 miles. S -2- n 1 2,222 feet point of accident to station Point of accident + * 344 ft. Taylor f-a- West crossover switch 1,740 ft. | ¡ 1 1 Signal A-74. V Westboună main Eastbound main Street 曹 ​Legend Train No.18: Extra 231: No. 1573 Atlanta & West Point R.R. East Point, Ga. Oct. 23, 1929. sta » file-malalimpartih male selle -3- . The view approaching the switch is unobstructed, how- ever, on account of dust from a nearby crossing having ac- cumulated on the switch targets, it was difficult to dis- tinguish the color of the indication displayed, when at a distance of more than 200 feet. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 9.49 a.m. Description A&WP work extra 231, a local switch run serving in- dustries, in charge of Conductor Walker and Engineman Moseman, was performing switching, and at the time of the accident engine 231, headed west, was shoving four box cars eastward on the siding at a speed of about 6 miles per hour when it was struck by C of Ga. train No. 18. This Eastbound C of Ga. passenger train No. 18 consisted of one baggage car and two coaches, in the order named, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 424, and was in charge of Conductor Ware and Engineman Stephenson. train passed College Park, the last open office, 1.83 miles west of East Point, at 9.47 a.m., two minutes late, passed signal A-74, which apparently was displaying a cau- tion indication, entered the crossover switch, which had been opened practically in front of the approaching train, and collided with work extra 231 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 15 miles per hour. Both engines had their front ends badly damaged, but none of the equipment in either train was derailed. The employee injured was the engineman of C of Ga. train No. 18, who jumped just prior to the collision. Summary of evidence Conductor Walker, of work extra 231, stated that the work of switching the industry tracks located south of the siding had been performed and that on reaching a point on an industrial track, located at the west end of the siding, where he had a clear view of the main tracks, he looked toward the west, at about 9.48 a.m., and saw train No. 18 approaching, a short distance west of signal A-74. Con- ductor Walker and Brakeman Butler were riding on the lead- ing car as the four empty cars were being backed eastward toward the siding; Head Brakeman White was riding on the car next to the engine. Conductor Walker gave signals to Head Brakeman White, it being intended to kick the four cars in on this track, and the conductor expected the head brakeman to cut off the cars at the engine. The conductor gave the engineman a "kick" signal, and then went to the hand brake, located on the forward end of the leading car, : -4- 2nd started to apply it., The first he knew of anything wrong was when Brakeman Butler shouted a warning of dan- ger, and on looking back, the conductor saw train No. 18 entering the open main line switch. Conductor Walker had no idea that the head brakeman was going to open the main line switch, saying that it was not his intention to use it until six or eight minutes afterwards. Head Brakeman White, of work extra 231, stated that he was riding on top of the car next to the engine and that while rounding the wye track he looked at his watch and thought it read 10.46, when as a matter of fact it read 9.46, consequently he presumed that train No. 18 had gone. When the conductor gave him the signals, he under- stood what movements were intended; the head brakeman at first gave the engineman signals to slow down and then a stop signal, in order to permit Brakeman Butler to line the switch leading to the siding. The work train was brought to a stop and the head brakeman climbed down the side of the car next to the engine, on the main track side, and almost directly opposite the main track switch. As he knew that his engine would be heading out of the siding and on to the eastbound main track within a few minutes, he decided that he would unlock and open the main track switch in order to have it lined when his en- gine did head out. After opening this switch, Head Brake- man White started eastward in order to cut off the four cars and on reaching a point about one and one-half or two car-lengths from the switch, but not yet in position to make the cut, he saw Brakeman Butler come around the end of the leading car. The first the head brakeman knew of anything wrong was on receiving a signal, made in haste and given by Brakeman Butler, to close the main track switch, at which time the work train had just started to back eastward again. On turning and looking toward the west, Head Brakeman White saw train No. 18 approaching, it then being about one or two car-lengths west of the switch; the head brakeman ran as fast as he could toward the switch in an endeavor to close it, but to no avail. He estimated the speed of train No. 18 to have been about 35 miles per hour when he first saw it, but said that the speed had been reduced considerably at the time of the accident. Head Brakeman White said he felt sure that train No. 18 had passed and that he never saw it at the time he opened the switch, not having looked to see if any train was approaching. S M Engineman Moseman, of work extra 231, stated that at the time his engine was backing around the wye track, he saw train No. 18 approaching, west of signal A-74, which at that time was displaying its normal indication. Just prior to the accident, however, his attention was centered on the contemplated back-up movement on the siding and he -5- was looking back watching for signals from the conductor, and he did not see Head Brakeman White get off and open the main track switch. Statements of other members of the crew of extra 231 developed nothing additional of im- portance. Engineman Stephenson, of train No. 18, stated that signal A-74 was displaying its normal indication, caution, at the time his engine passed it, at a speed of about 18 or 20 miles per hour. He noticed the work train switching on the siding and saw a kick signal given to the engineman of that train. Just as his own engine got almost to the switch, he noticed some one waving toward the switch, and it was then that he saw that the switch points were open. He applied the air brakes in emergency, reversed the en- gine, opened the sanders and jumped from the fireman's side just prior to the collision. Engineman Stephenson said that he did not see any one at the switch just be- fore or after he passed signal A-74, saying that he was not paying any attention to the position of the switch, but was watching the man who was going to make the cut be- tween the work engine and cars, and being afraid that that man would not clear his own train, he sounded a warning signal on the air whistle, with which engines in this ter- ritory are equipped, on account of a city ordinance against the use of steam whistles except in certain cases. Statements of Fireman Murphy corroborated in substance those of Engineman Stephenson. Conductor Ware, Flagman Oattis and Baggagemaster Mabry, of train No. 18, estimated the speed of their train to have been about 30 miles per hour at the time signal A-74 was passed and also when the air brakes were applied in emergency, at about 12 or 15 miles per hour when the collision occurred. They were unaware of anything wrong until the emergency application was made. Tests made of signal A-74 subsequent to the accident disclosed it to be in proper working order. Conclusions This accident was caused by a switch being opened directly in front of an approaching train, for which Head Brakeman White, of work extra 231, is responsible. Sp Head Brakeman White misread his watch and thought that it was 10.46 a.m., when as a matter of fact it was only 9.46 a.m. consequently, he presumed that train No. 18 had gone and opened the main track switch, of his own accord, in order to have it open when his engine was ready to head out of the siding, knowing that it would be ready to head out within a few minutes. At the time he opened the switch, he did not look to see if any train a 1 " -6- was approaching, and after opening it he immediately started eastward in order to make the cut between the en- gine and the four cars that were to be kicked in on the siding. When he became aware of the approach of train No. 18, which appeared to have passed signal A-74 before the switch was opened, he ran back toward the switch in an endeavor to close it, but could not reach it in time. Head Brakeman White had no business opening this main track switch until his crew was ready to use it, and had he followed this procedure, the accident would not have occurred. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. ... Transportation Library HE 1780 •A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1574 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD AT WALTON, KY., ON OCTOBER 24, 1929. 13 February 15, 1930. To the Commission: On October 24, 1929, a passenger train struck a motor truck at a grade crossing on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad at Walton, Ky., resulting in the de- railment of the train and the death of the operator of the motor truck and two employees, and the injury of one passenger and one other person. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Cin- cinnati Division extending between Cincinnati, Ohio, and Louisville, Ky., a distance of 113.7 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The accident occurred at a highway crossing which crosses the track at an angle of about 30°; approaching this point on the railroad from the north there is a 4° 18' curve to the left 702.6 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent for a distance of approximately 900 feet, the accident occurring on this tanget at a point about 350 feet from its northern end. The grade is practically level at the point of accident. Approach- ing from the west on the highway a train approaching from the north can be plainly seen for a distance of 700 feet. The crossing is protected by a warning signal of the wigwa, type, located just east of the track on the south side of the highway. This signal is equipped with a red light in the center of the disc which flashes at intervals when the signal is in operation. There is also a warning bell on the signal mast; the disc and bell are actuated by trains approaching from the north when they encounter the control circuit, which extends for a distance of about 1,780 feet from the crossing. * V** u/54 1 2 A A The weather was cloudy and a mist prevailed at the time of the accident which occurred at about 9.58 a.m. Descripticn Southbound passenger train No. 7 consisted of one express car, one postal car, one storage car, one baggage car, two coaches and three Pullman cars, in the order named, hauled by engine 414, and was in charge of Con- ductor Gregg and Engineman Frazier. This train passed Latonia, 15.7 miles north of Walton, at 9.35 a.m., 30 minutes late, and was derailed after it collided with the motor truck at Walton while traveling at an estimated speed of 30 miles per hour. The motor truck involved was a 12-ton Armleader truck, loaded, and was traveling east on the highway, known as Nicholson Road; the truck was moving over the crossing at a speed estimated to have been between 8 and 10 miles per hour when it was struck by train No.7. Engine 414, its tender the first four cars, and the forward truck of the fifth car, were derailed. The enginė came to rest on its right side, east of the main track, and approximately 375 feet south of the crossing. The tender was also overturned, but the derailed cars remained upright. The motor truck was demolished. employees killed were the engineman and fireman. The Summary of evidence. Conductor Gregg stated that the brakes were tested before leaving Cincinnati and that they functioned pro- perly in making station stops en route. He was riding in the third car from the rear of the train when approach- ing the point of accident, but did not hear a whistle signal sounded for the highway crossing, although such a signal could have been sounded without his having heard it, in view of his location in the train. His first knowledge that something was wrong was when the brakes were applied in emergency, and after the train stopped he looked out and discovered what had occurred. He had not paid particular attention to the speed of the train, but did not think it was above the average between Latonia and the point of accident. After the train came to rest, he went rward but at this time CONTA -3- he did not notice whether the crossing signal was operat- ing, although some time afterwards he saw and heard it in operation when other trains reached the track circuit. He said that while the weather was cloudy and misty, he did not think these conditions interfered with the range of vision. Flagman Wallace stated that the train was handled in the usual manner after leaving Latonia and approach- ed the point of accident at a speed of about 40 miles per hour. When the car in which he was riding, the third car from the rear, reached a point a short distance north of the section house, located approximately 600 feet north of the crossing, he felt an emergency applic- ation of the brakes. He failed to hear a whistle signal sounded while the train was approaching the crossing, but thought it might have been due to his being near the rear of the train and the fact that the wind was blowing in about the same direction the train was moving. Baggageman Lee stated that he was riding in the baggage car and noticed no unusual operation of the train at any time until the brakes were applied in emer- gency, at which time the baggage car was just leaving the curve north of the crossing. He heard the whistle sounded for the crossing, which was followed within a few seconds by the brake application. He estimated the speed of the train at the time it struck the motor truck at 30 miles per hour. After the accident he noticed that the crossing signal was not working, but later on it functioned properly when other trains approached. Train Porter Blythe stated that he was riding in the forward part of the fifth car, but did not hear a crossing whistle signal sounded. He aid no attention to the crossing signal and did not know whether it was working subsequent to the accident. P Ernest Hartman, a truck driver for the Standard Oil Company at Walton, stated that at the time of the acci- dent he was on the cast side of the track about 200 feet from the crossing. When he heard an engine whistle he looked towards the crossing and noticed a motor truck approaching it from the west; the engine whistle was sounded continuously until the engine collided with the truck. He also heard the air brakes on the train apply Then it was about 200 feet north of the crossing and noticed that some of the wheels were sliding prior J CHANG=DRZE € } ז་ז -- to the accident. Due to his attention being attracted by the train and the truck, he did not notice whether the crossing signal was in operation, and if the warn- ing bell as ringing he was unable to hear it on ac- count of the blowing of the engine whistle. He had, however, noticed that this signal as functioning when a train passed that point prior to the arrival of train No. 7 and also noticed that it operated when another train entered the circuit subsequent to the accident. Driver Hartman further stated that the truck approached the crossing at a speed of not more than 8 miles per hour, which led him to believe it was going to stop, but it failed to do so and started over the crossing directly ahead of the approaching train. He also said that the driver of the truck involved lived at Walton, had been driving a truck for the same firm for about nine years, and undoubtedly as familiar with the crossing. He described the approach to the crossing on the highway from the west as being at such an angle that the driver of the vehicle faces almost directly toward an approaching southbound train. Robert Robinson, another truck driver, stated that he was following the truck involved in the accident and was about 100 feet behind it when this truck turned off the Dixie highway into Nicholson road, about 200 feet west of the crossing, and at that time he observed the train rounding the curve north of the crossing. He also noticed that the driver of the truck ahead of him was sitting erect and looking straight ahead, but could not account for his failure to see the train, as it was almost in line with his vision and there was nothing to obstruct the view. Just before the engine entered the tangent, the engine whistle started blow- ing and continued to blow until it was about 50 feet from the crossing, while steam was shut off about 100 feet from the crossing. He estimated that the truck was 75 feet from the crossing, moving at a speed of about 10 miles per hour, at the time the whistle first commenced blowing, but instead of stopping, the truck continued to the crossing without reducing speed. Driver Robinson did not notice "hether the crossing signal was "orking, as he was engrossed in watching the train as well as the truck as they approached the crossing. Signal Supervisor Welsh stated that he arrived at the scene of the accident at about 2.15 p.m. and G 1 ** -5 immediately communicated with the signal maintainer in charge of the crossing signal, and "as informed that the signal had not been inspected by him; the maintain- er's helper also advised that there had been no repairs or adjustments made to the bell prior to his arrival. Supervisor Welsh then inspected the bell and found it to be working properly. He also made observations when other trains "ore passing/the circuit, and in no in- stance did the bell fail to ring, there being no necessity to make any adjustments subsequent to the accident. over Conclusions This accident was caused by the driver of a motor truck proceeding on a crossing at grade directly in front of an approaching train. The evidence was to the effect that the baggageman and other witnesses heard a "histle signal sounded while the train was approaching the point of accident, al- though the train crew heard no such warnings, but they stated this might have been due to their riding near the rear end of the train; they all agreed, however, that the brakes "ere applied in emergency prior to the accident. The two truck drivers who witnessed the accident stated that the truck approached the crossing at slow speed but did not stop before it started over the crossing. Evidently the driver of the truck did not see or hear the approaching train, although the physical characteristics in that locality are such that the driver of a vehicle approaching from the ost has an intermittent vier of a train approaching from the north for a distance of approximately 2,300 feet and a full view of a train for a distance of 700 feet. The driver of the truck lived at Walton, had been operat- ing a truck in that vicinity for several years, and it seems probable that he was thoroughly familiar with the crossing, but no reason can be advanced to explain why he did not see the approaching train and bring his truck to a stop. There was no direct evidence that the crossing arning signal and bell "cro operating at the time of the accident, but there were statements that it had boen operated by a southbound train which passed that point less than two hours prior to the accident, and also by trains approaching after the occurrence of the accident, whileSignal Supervisor Welsh stated that Am »JAVETEL I -6- no repairs or adjustments to the signal were required subsequent to the accident. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation cf any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. Borland, Director. Transportation b . Library کے ام 1780 4239 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1575 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD AT IRON HILL, MD., ON OCTOBER 25, 1929. February 17, 1930. To the Commission: On October 25, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train, the wreckage of which was struck by a passenger train traveling in the same direction on an adjacent track, on the Pennsylvania Railroad at Iron Hill, Md., resulting in the death of 1 employee, and the injury of 23 passengers and 2 employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Maryland Divison, extending between Brill, Pa., and North Point, Md., a dis- tance of 85.3 miles; in the vicinity of the point of acci- dent this is a four-track line over which trains are oper- ated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block- signal system. The tracks are numbered from east to west, 1, 2, 3, and 4, the tracks involved being northbound tracks 1 and 2. The accident occurred at a point approximately 1,825 feet south of the station at Iron Hill; approaching this point from the south the tracks are tangent for a considerable distance, followed by a 0° 30' curve to the left about 740 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point about 135 feet from its southern end. The grade for northbound trains is 0.65 per cent ascending at the point of accident. Sang - The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 5.55 p.m. Description Northbound freight train extra 1650 consisted of 106 loaded cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1650, and was in charge of Conductor Cook and Engineman Derrickson; helper engine 1635 was coupled behind the caboose and was in charge of Engineman Coulter. This train passed Big Elk, the last open office, 2.2 miles south of Iron Hill, at 5.44 p.m., moving from that point on track 1. The twentieth car in the train developed an overheated journal and it was decided to set off this car at Iron Hill, but when the stop was made, the fifty-third car in the train, Reading box car 15444, apparently buckled toward the east and caused the $ -2. fifty-second car, CC&O box car 8039, to be derailed toward the west and to foul track 2. • Northbound passenger train No. 148 consisted of three Pullman parlor cars, one dining car and three coaches, in the order named, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 3738, and was in charge of Conductor Collins and Engineman Rollins. This train passed Big Elk at 5.52 p.m., about two minutes late, moving on track 2, and while approaching the station at Iron Hill it collided with the wreckage of extra 1650 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 60 and 70 miles per hour. Engine 3738 had its pilot beam on the right side broken off and that side of the engine was scraped; the front engine-truck wheels were derailed to the east, while the rear engine-truck wheels were derailed to the west, however, none of the driving wheels was derailed and the engine continued to work steam and ran with its engine truck and tender derailed for a distance of about 30 car- lengths, tearing up the track and causing all of the cars in the passenger train to become derailed. All of the passenger cars were damaged on their right sides, due to scraping the freight cars, but came to rest in an upright position along track 2. The employee killed was the engineman of train No. 148, while the employees injured were the fireman of that train and a dining-car cook. Summary of evidence G Engineman Derrickson, of extra 1650, stated that a terminal test of the air brakes was made at Perry- ville, 17.6 miles south of Iron Hill, and that the brakes on all of the cars in the entire train worked properly. A stop was made at Principio, 2.2 miles north of Perryville, by means of a 15-pound air-brake application, after which both engines were cut off and took water. After the en- gines re coupled to the train the brake-pipe pressure was pumped up to 70 pounds and then Engineman Derrickson made a 25-pound reduction, the air brakes working properly at the time this test was made; there was no brake-pipe leak- age of any consequence. After leaving Principio, no air- brake application was made by Engineman Derrickson prior to the accident. Approaching Iron Hill, Head Brakeman Short called the engineman's attention to an overheated journal, on the twentieth car in the train, and it was decided to set off this car at Iron Hill. Engineman Derrickson closed the throttle and after the train had traveled about 50 or 60 car-lengths, Head Brakeman Short got off on the fire- man's side of the engine, at which time the speed was about 6 or 8 miles per hour. Engineman Derrickson looked back along the train for a stop signal from the head brakeman, however, he said that he received no such signal, but that Sig -vagi dad. 5 1 3. he did see the brakeman's lantern as he moved out from between the cars and away from the train and that at about the same time he also saw fire toward the rear of the train, calling this to the attention of the fireman and remarking that something was wrong. Engineman Derrickson maintained that he did not apply the air brakes from the engine, saying that he did not use either the independent engine brake or the automatic air brakes; he did not notice any reduction in the brake-pipe pressure on the engine gauge. Engine- man Derrickson at first stated that to the best of his knowledge the air brakes did not apply on the cars in the forward portion of the train, and that after the accident occurred he noticed that the gauge registered 70 pounds brake-pipe pressure and 100 pounds main-reservoir pressure, however, he subsequently stated that it would have been possible for the angle cock to have been closed by the brakeman after the stop was made. Engineman Derrickson was not certain whether his train had come to a full stop at the time train No. 148 collided with the wreckage, but said that with the heavy train he had, and with his engine not working steam, it would have been impossible for the helper engine alone to have shoved the train over the grade, but that it would have come to a gradual stop, which it did. After the accident, the engineman asked the head brakeman whether he had turned an angle cock and the head brakeman replied that he had turned the angle cock behind the car with the overheated journal, but that it had not been turned until after the train came to a full stop. Engine- man Derrickson felt positive that the head brakeman did not turn the angle cock until after the train came to a stop and emphatically maintained that he did not use the brakes on the engine to bring the train to a stop. Head Brakeman Short, of extra 1650, said that after getting off the engine on the fireman's side, he waited at that point and boarded the nineteenth car, in order to inspect the overheated journal on the fireman's side of the twentieth car. He then crossed over to the engineman's side of the train, got down on the step, gave the engineman stop signals with his lantern, and while giving these signals the air brakes applied, the head brakeman hearing them apply on the nineteenth car, and a smooth stop was made. Head Brakeman Short was of the opinion that the train had been brought to a stop by Engineman Derrickson in response to his stop signals. the train came to a full stop, he got off the nineteenth car and walked to the twentieth car, to make the cut in order to set off that car, and just after closing one angle cock, on the south end of the twentieth car, he heard the crash, caused by train No. 148 colliding with the wreckage. Head Brakeman Short emphatically stated that his train had come to a full stop at the time he got off the nineteenth After 袋 ​: car and before he turned the angle cock on the twentieth car. Engineman Coulter, of helper engine 1635, stated that the air brakes were tested at Perryville and Principio and worked properly. While shoving the train up the as- cending grade at Iron Hill, the brakepipe pressure regis- tered 65 pounds on the gauge in his engine and his engine continued shoving until the train stopped, due to an air- brake application, the stop being a very smooth one. When the train came to a stop, at which time he still had the throttle open on the helper engine, in order to keep the slack bunched while going up the hill, the brake-pipe pressure reduced from 65 pounds to about 45 or 50 pounds, and then the indicator kept going down until it reached zero. The flagman then came by the helper engine on his way back to flag, and inquired as to the reason for the stop, and Engineman Coulter answered that he thought it probably was due to an overheated journal. At about the time the stop was made, passenger train No. 148 passed on the adjacent track, and shortly afterwards, on looking northward along the left side of the train, Engineman Coulter saw the markers on the rear end of the passenger train and told his fireman to afford protection as he be- lieved that something had happened. Conductor Cook and Flagman Wootten were riding in the caboose; the conductor stood in the caboose watch- ing the air gauge by means of his lantern; it registered about 65 pounds pressure, and after the train had come to a full stop, the gauge registered about 52 pounds pressure. The conductor started to get off the front platform of the caboose and took one step down, but then stepped back again to allow train No. 148 to pass. Conductor Cook further stat ed that there was no slack shock whatever from the air brake application that brought his train to a stop. The flagman immediately went back to flag, being of the im- pression that the stop was made merely on account of an overheated journal. Statements of other members of the crew of extra 1650 developed nothing additional of impor- tance, the indications being that there was not sufficient time to have afforded protection to train No. 148 in time to have prevented the collision with the wreckage. Fireman Fraim, of train No. 148, stated that the air brakes were tested at Washington and worked proper- ly en route. He thought that the freight train was stand- ing still when his engine passed the rear end of that train and the first he knew of anything wrong was when the crash occurred. A few boards from the wreckage flew into the engine cab, and Engineman Rollins fell over and knocked * - 5 - him down, the engine running a considerable distance be- fore the fireman could close the throttle and apply the air brakes. Fireman Fraim further stated that after pass- ing Big Elk, all signals displayed clear indications for track 2. Other members of the crew of train No. 148 were unaware of anything wrong prior to the collision; Conductor Collins estimated the speed of his train to have been be- tween 60 and 65 miles per hour at the time of the collision, while Head Brakeman Coskey estimated it to have been be- tween 65 and 70 miles per hour. Subsequent to the accident the entire freight train was carefully inspected for a burst air hose, but all of them found to be in good condition and all brake hangers, brake shoes, keys and bottom connections were found intact. Conclusions This accident was caused by the buckling of the 53rd car in extra 1650, causing the 52nd car to foul track 2, where it was struck by train No. 148. The evidence was conflicting as to how extra 1650 was brought to a stop. Engineman Derrickson said he did not make any air-brake application, merely shut- ting off steam and allowing the train to come to a stop; Head Brakeman Short said he gave a stop signal from his position on the nineteenth car, and that he heard the brakes apply on that car, presumably in answer to his signal; Engineman Coulter, of the helper engine, said the brake-pipe pressure dropped from 65 to 45 or 50 pounds, and then started down again, while Conductor Cook said the caboose gauge indicated that a 13-pound application was made in bringing the train to a stop. In any event, how- ever, all the evidence was to the effect that the stop was made very smoothly and without any indication that there had been any damage to the train, with the result that when train No. 148 approached on the adjoining track a few sec- onds afterwards, no attempt was made to stop it, and ap- parently the engineman of that train had no indication that there was anything wrong prior to the time his engine col- lided with the car which was fouling track 2. S S Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. P All the employees were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Transportation Library *-* L INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1598 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LINE OF THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY AT FAMOSO, CALIF., ON DECEMBER 9, 1929. February 27, 1930. To the Commission: On December 9, 1929, there was a collision be- tween a passenger train and the trailer of a motor truck at a highway grade crossing on the line of the Southern Pacific Company at Famoso, Calif., which resulted in the death of two employees and one mail clerk, and the injury of one mail clerk. The investigation of this accident was made in conjunction with a representative of the Railroad Commission of California. Location and method of operation G This accident occurred on the Fresno and Bakers- field Sub-Division of the San Joaquin Division, which ex- tends between Fresno and Bakersfield, Calif., a distance of 107.4 miles, and in the vicinity of the point of acci- dent is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The track is straight for more than 1 mile in each direction, and the grade is practically level. K There is a state highway parallel to and on the north side of the right-of-way, referring to time-table directions. This highway is intersected by another high- way known as the Wasco road, which crosses the right-of- way of the railroad practically at right angles. This is a four-track crossing, and approaching on the Wasco road from its intersection with the state highway on the north side of the tracks, a southbound vehicle encounters the tracks in the following order: turn-table track, Porter- ville branch, main track, and siding. There is a slight incline leading up to the tracks, which are about 2 feet above the ground line. The crossing itself is level and maintained in good condition, with concrete roadway between the tracks, and heavy creosoted planks between the rails. The road itself, on each side of the crossing, also is of concrete. The driver of a vehicle proceeding over the crossing from north to south has an unobstructed view of an approaching westbound train extending as far east as the I 1 2 > station, a distance of 1,408 feet. At a point about 450 feet west of the station there were two stock cars on a house track, which leads off from the Porterville branch, but these cars did not materially interfere with the view. The only protection afforded at this crossing consisted of the standard crossing sign reading "Railroad Crossing", this sign being located 50 feet south of the center line of the main track and about 31 feet east of the center line of the highway. There was also the standard crossing sign as required by state law located north of the crossing, 132 feet from the main track, and on the west side of the high- way. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 2.12 p.m. Description one Westbound passenger train No. 51 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car one baggage car, smoking car, one chair car, one lunch car, one dining car, and one paríor car, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 2418, and was in charge of Conductor Johnson and Engineman Toland. This train passed the station at Famoso at 2.11 p.m., according to the train sheet, two minutes late, and collided with the trailer of a motor truck at Wasco road crossing, while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 45 to 50 miles per hour. > The motor truck and trailer involved in this accident consisted of a Mack truck, equipped with a gasoline tank with a capacity of about 2,600 gallons, and a trailer truck equipped with a tank of about 3,500 gallons capacity; both truck and trailer had nearly a full load of gasoline. They left Bakersfield at 1.05 p.m., in charge of Driver Wilbanks, reached Famoso, a distance of about 22 miles, over the state highway, and made a left turn into Wasco road. The truck and trailer then proceeded southward a distance of approximately 150 feet to the main track of the Southern Pacific Company, and were proceeding over that track at a speed estimated to have been from 10 to 15 miles per hour, no stop having been made for the crossing, when the trailer was struck by train No. 51. The trailer was demolished, and the chassis came to rest about 100 feet west of the point of accident, while the tank which had been mounted on the chassis came to rest about 450 feet from the crossing and close enough to the track to scrape all the cars as they passed it. Neither the engine nor any of the cars was derailed, but the gasoline 12 - 3. in the tank of the trailer exploded and was thrown over the engine and first car, the resulting fire damaging the cab of the engine and destroying the contents of the car. The Mack truck was not damaged in the accident. The em- ployees killed were the engineman and fireman, each of whom, as well as the mail clerk who died, sustained in- juries from the burning gasoline. Summary of evidence Calga Matara Conductor Johnson, of train No. 51, who was riding in the rear end of the third car, said the engine- man sounded the whistle signal for the station, called for the train-order signal by sounding four blasts on the whistle, acknowledged it with two short blasts, and then sounded the whistle for the crossing after passing the station building. He also stated that the engine bell was ringing and estimated that the speed of the train was about 45 miles per hour. His first knowledge of anything wrong was when the brakes were applied just before the collision occurred. Head Brakeman Donivan heard the last three of the whistle signals mentioned by the conductor. After the accident he went ahead and saw the engineman sitting on the ground, and was told by the engineman to get into the cab, close the oil valve and open the injector. The en- gineman did not say anything, however, as to the cause of the accident. Rear Brakeman Dow heard the engineman call for the trainorder signal and his acknowledgment of the same but did not pay any attention to other signals. The statements of Baggageman Mitchell, as well as those of two brakemen who were deadheading on the train, did not bring out any additional facts of importance. S Agent-Telegrapher Gordon, on duty in the station at Famoso, said the engineman called for the train-order signal, acknowledged it, and then after passing the station sounded the road crossing whistle signal. Agent Gordon was outside when the engine passed the station, but then went inside to report the passage of the train to the dis- patcher, and did not witness the occurrence of the accident. Trainmaster Prosole saw the engineman in the hospital several hours afterwards, but did not talk with him to any extent. The engineman inquired about the truck driver, and Trainmaster Prosole replied that he did not know where he was, and then asked the engine man whether the truck driver stopped, to which the engineman repļied in the negative. H. S. Bunting, lubrication engineer for the Associated Oil Company, was driving on the state highway in the same direction in which train No. 51 was moving, and said that according to his speedometer the train was travel- 22 } : | 4 ing about 55 miles per hour. Mr. Bunting did not actually witness the collision, and did not know whether the truck stopped for the crossing, as the station building obscured his view, but he said that the whistle on the engine was blowing constantly from a point near the station up to the time of the accident, and that it seemed to him that the engineman shut off steam. M. H. Bon, who witnessed the accident from a point near the station, said the truck driver did not stop for the crossing. Mr. Bon, who had had 24 years in engine service, also stated that the engineman whistled for the train-order signal, acknowledged it, sounded a road cross- ing whistle signal, and then continued to sound the whistle until the accident occurred. After the accident, Mr. Bon talked with the truck driver and was told by him that the brakes on the truck were not effective, and that after the driver noticed the approaching train he tried to make a right turn away from the track but found he was too close to the rail to do so, and then tried to get the truck and trailer over the crossing ahead of the train. Several other persons who witnessed the occurrence of the accident stated that the truck driver did not stop for the crossing. G. M. Phillips, proprietor of a gasoline station located opposite the railroad station, said the truck and trailer stopped at his station and that the driver filled the radiator with water. Mr. Phillips said he could see from the way the driver handled the truck that there was something wrong with the brakes, although nothing was said about defective brakes. Charles Bergman, service manager of the Bakersfield garage, said he was called upon to ex- amine truck 225 of the Lang Transportation Company and found no lining on the upper foot brakes and the braking equipment was badly soaked with grease, while the emergency brakes were entirely out of adjustment and were oil soaked. Both the foot and the emergency brakes at the time of his inspection were absolutely useless in so far as controlling the truck was concerned. S M R. M. Maxwell, manager of the Bakersfield divi- sion of the Lang Transportation Company, said he did not inspect the truck and trailer prior to the accident, it having come from a point off of his division, and he had no knowledge as to its condition when it left Bakersfield on the trip on which the accident occurred. Driver Wil- banks was charged with manslaughter as a result of the accident, and upon the advice of an attorney he declined to make a statement, but Manager Maxwell said the driver was about 30 years of age and had been in the employ of the - 5 - m. en company on this occasion about 20 days. Two years pre- viously, however, he had been employed in the same capa- city for a period of about 1 year. It also appeared from Mr. Maxwell's statements, that Driver Wilbanks went on duty at Fresno at 10 a. m. December 8, after having been off duty since 9 p. m. the previous day; he started for the oil fields, a distance of about 60 miles from Fresno, at 1 p. m., left the oil fields with a load at 7 p. m. route to Porterville, a distance of 129 miles, and went off duty at Porterville about 1 a. m., December 9. December 9. He then went back on duty at Porterville at 7 a. m. and drove from Porterville to Bakersfield, a distance of 60 miles, with empty equipment, arriving at Bakersfield about noon and leaving with a load at 1.05 p. m., proceeding to the point where the accident occurred, a distance of about 22 miles. Mr. Maxwell further stated that their drivers of gasoline trucks are instructed to stop at all crossings regardless of wigwag devices of any kind, and that a driver had been discharged several months previously for failure to make such a stop. Conclusions This accident was caused by a gasoline motor truck and its trailer being driven on a highway crossing in front of an approaching passenger train. All the evidence indicated that the driver of the truck failed to stop for the crossing, as is required by state law in the case of gasoline tank trucks and a few other types of vehicles. The view had by him of an ap- proaching westbound train was very good. When 100 feet from the track, his view was partly obstructed by some cars on a siding, these cars being located about 950 feet from the crossing, but when either 50 or 150 feet from the track, the truck driver could have seen as far as the sta- tion, a distance of about 1,400 feet. The driver of the truck refused to make any statement, acting on the advice of counsel, but such other evidence as was available in- dicated that he might have been having difficulty with the brakes. In the absence of more definite information, no opinion on this phase of the situation can be expressed; if such were the case, then the driver should have exer- cised more than the usual amount of caution before attempt- ing to pass over the crossing. Vide M The Commission has investigated other accidents involving collisions between passenger trains and motor vehicles carrying gasoline or other inflammable articles, and it is understood that several similar accidents occur- red within the State of California during the few months preceding the date of the accident here under investiga- tion, although they did not result in such serious con- K I - 6 sequences. That the results were not as serious, however, is nothing but a matter of good fortune, for there is no doubt that a catastrophe involving great loss of life and untold suffering might result should a passenger train composed of wooden equipment be sprayed with burning gas- oline. There is also the possibility that the train might be derailed as a result of the collision, in which event the plight of passengers would be dangerous in the extreme. Taken altogether, the hazards surrounding the operation of motor vehicles carrying explosives or in- flammables can hardly be over-estimated. Transportation of explosives and inflammables on railroads engaged in interstate commerce is strictly regulated by federal laws (U. S. Code, Title 18, Sections 232 to 236, inclusive) and by regulations formulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission under authority contained in those sections, and severe penalties are provided for violation of such laws or regulations. In view of the volume of such articles now being transported over the highways, adequate regulations to promote safety should be provided by author- ities having jurisdiction over such transportation and effective means adopted to insure their observance. Great care should be exercised in the operation and maintenance of both trucks and accessory equipment used in the transportation of such commodities. As previously indicated, the evidence in this case raises the question of whether the brakes on the truck and trailer involved in this accident were in proper operating condition. No authority rests with this bureau, however, to make the extended investigation warranted by the circumstances of this accident, with a view to ascertaining the exact con- dition of the motor vehicle and its trailer, when and where they were inspected and repaired, and all the other data necessary to a final decision on the question as to whether they were in safe condition for operation. The record furnished by the local manager of the transportation company owning the truck and trailer, show- ing the hours on duty and distance traveled by the truck driver during the 28 hours preceding the time of the acci- dent, brings up another question, that relating to whether the truck driver was in proper physical and mental condi- tion for the work in which he was engaged. Beginning at 10 a.m. December 8, and ending at the time of the accident, 2.12 p.m. December 9, Driver Wilbanks had been off duty onl 6 hours, this having been between 1 a.m. and 7 a.m. on December 9; in other words, he had been on duty 22 hours out of the last 28 hours and during his period on duty he had driven a truck a distance of 271 miles. While the mileage is not excessive, yet it is very doubtful whether > - K GA he had had sufficient rest and whether he was in proper condition to respond quickly in case of sudden emergency. With the increasing use of motor vehicles for transportation of explosives and inflammables, it is of great importance that authorities having jurisdiction over such matters give the most serious consideration to the questions of the condition of such vehicles, and of the qualifications and condition, both physical and men- tal, of the drivers who operate them. All of the employees of the railroad company involved in the accident were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. ! Transportation Library سچ 24 1780 A234 : TERAU SOCKJAYALALE Lup Poste TAR BUTIKK 7. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE IN- VESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NEW YORK, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RAILROAD AT DEAN, PA. ON OCTOBER 25, 1929. 1576 March 5, 1930. To the Commission: On October 25, 1929, there was a head-end colli- sion between two freight trains on the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad at Dean, Pa., which resulted in the injury of two employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Buffalo Division, extending between Buffalo, N.Y., and Conneaut, Ohio, a distance of 116.8 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders; there is a manual block-signal system in use but it governs only the movement of passenger trains. The accident occurred approximately 100 feet east of the east passing-track switch at Dean; this passing track is about 4,500 feet in length and parallels the main track on the north. Approaching the roint of accident from the west, the track is tangent for a distance of approximately 6,100 feet, followed by a 30 curve to the right 285.6 feet in length, from which point the track is tangent for more than 3 miles, the accident occurring on this tangent at a point about 1,050 feet from its western end. The grade is practically level at the point of accident. In the vicinity of the point of accident, the tracks of the New York Central Railroad are north of and parallel those of the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 7.53 p.m. Description Eastbound second-class freight train second No. 52 consisted of 68 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 616, and was in charge of Conductor Clark and Engineman Wagner. At Thornton Junction, 20.7 miles west of Dean, -2- : the crew received a copy of train order No. 110, Form 19, directing them to wait at Dean until 7.50 p.m. for train second No. 37. Train second No. 52 left Thornton Junc- tion at 7.04 p.m., three hours and four minutes late on its schedule, passed Erie, 2.7 miles from Dean, at 7.47 p.m., passed the siding at Dean after the time named in the wait order, and collided with train second No. 37 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been be- tween 10 and 15 miles per hour. Westbound third-class freight train second No. 37 consisted of 70 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 603, and was in charge of Conductor Lynch and Engineman Mickie. At North East, 11.7 miles east of Dean, the crew of this train received a copy of train order No. 110, on Form 17, previously mentioned. The train depart- ed from North East at 7.32 p.m., according to the train sheet, 7 hours and 33 minutes behind its schedule, and had been brought to a stop east of the passing track at Dean when it was struck by train second No. 52. Both engines were damaged but were not derailed. The second car in train second No. 37 had one truck de- railed, the third and fourth cars were overturned to the south, and the fifth car was partly telescoped. None of The em- the cars in train second No. 52 was derailed. ployees injured were the engineman and fireman of train second No. 52, both of whom jumped from the engine prior to the collision. Summary of evidence Engineman Wagner, of train second No. 52, stated that when the head end of his train reached a bridge located approximately 8,000 feet west of the point of accident, he looked at his watch, noted the time to be 7.50 p.m., and consequently he called it to the fire- man's attention, in view of the time limit at Dean hav- ing expired, and after the fireman had consulted his While watch, the fireman acknowledged in the affirmative. the train was approaching the curve west of the point of accident, he remarked to the fireman that the opposing train had not arrived. The headlights of two engines east of the curve could be seen, but they appeared to be on the New York Central tracks and he watched them closely to make certain of it. He did not see the head- light of train second No. 37 until his own engine had completely rounded the curve; he immediately applied the brakes in emergency, jumping off when the engine was -3- about at the clearance point at the east end of the passing track. The speed of his train at the time it crossed the bridge west of Dean was about 17 miles per hour and it was about 30 miles per hour when he applied the brakes, but he thought this speed had been reduced to about 15 miles per hour by the time he jumped off. He said he did not see a fusee or any lights being used as a warning in the vicinity of the point of accident, neither did he see anyone standing at the east passing- track switch, and on account of being blinded by the headlight, he could not tell whether train second No. 37 was standing or moving. Engineman Wagner also stated that during his experience he has proceeded against an opposing train on a wait order when there was not suf- ficient time to reach the point specified in the wait order, although he had been cautioned about making move- ments of this kind. Fireman Groger, of train second No. 52, was rid- ing on his seatbox and when the train reached the west switch of the passing track at Dean, he looked at his watch and it was then 7.51 p.m. While rounding the curve west of the point of accident he noticed the reflection of a headlight, and in order to make certain as to which track it was occupying he crossed over to the engineman's side, and when the engine was just leaving the curve he discovered that the headlight was on the main track. After notifying the engineman to apply the brakes he got down in the gangway and jumped off. He estimated the speed of his train at the time the brakes were applied at 30 or 35 miles per hour. He saw no warning signals given with a fusee or lantern, although he did not pay particular attention as his only concern was to get off as soon as he realized the danger. Head Brakeman Reffner, of train second No. 52, stated that as the train was passing over the bridge west of Dean, the engineman called attention to the time and he looked at his own watch, which indicated the time as 7.50 p.m. When the engine reached the west switch of the passing track, he went over to the right side of the cab with the intention of watching the train as it rounded the curve. After glancing towards the rear he looked ahead and noticed a headlight; the fireman, who was also on the engineman's side, apparently observed this headlight at about the same time, as the fireman called to the engineman to apply the brakes. Head Brake- ¿ THE 4- man Reffner then got down on the steps and while pre- paring to step off, he heard the brakes apply in emer- gency; he estimated the speed at that time at 25 miles per hour. He did not see a fusee being used to flag his train at the time he looked ahead, and if one was later used for this purpose he failed to notice it, as he did not look ahead again after starting to get off. Conductor Clark, of train second No. 52, noted the time to be 7.47 p.m. when his train passed Erie, 2.7 miles west of Dean, and also noticed that it was 7.50 p.m. when the caboose reached the east end of the bridge west of Dean. He then entered the cupola of the caboose to watch the train while rounding the curves, and when the rear of the train had reached a point near the west pass- ing-track switch, he noticed the flash of a yellow fusee ahead of his engine and at about the same time he felt the brakes apply in emergency. He estimated the speed at the time of the brake application at 25 miles per hour and thought the train travelled distance of 15 or 20 car-lengths before the collision occurred, the speed at this time having been reduced to 10 or 12 miles per hour. Immediately after the accident he noticed the time to be 7.53 p.m. Conductor Clark said that although headlights in this vicinity could be seen for some dis- tance, yet on account of the curve it was difficult to determine whether they were on the New York Central or on the line of the Nickel Plate. The statements of Flagman Marsh substantiated those of Conductor Clark as to the time their train passed Erie, and the bridge west of Dean, as well as the time of the accident, he having noted the time on each occasion. Engineman Mickie, of train second No. 37, stated that upon arrival at North East he received train order No. 110, requiring train second No. 52 to wait at Dean until 7.50 p.m., in addition to other waits cast of that point, which he clearly understood. He said his train left North East at 7.29 p.m., passed the rest switch at Wesley, 1.3 miles east of Dean, at 7.46 p.m., and that when it reached the General Electric switch, approximately 3,000 feet east of the east switch at Dean, he instructed the head brakeman to light a fusee and the brakeman complied with this instruction. The train was brought to a stop about one-half car-length from the east switch at 7.48 p.m., after which he noticed the -5- ! brakeman running ahead with a fusee, but shortly after the brakeman started eastward the fusee went out. Train No. 52 was then entering the curve west of that point and in order to provide additional protection Engineman Mickie lighted a fusee, got off the engine, and started forward, but only reached a point about two car-lengths from his engine when the head end of the opposing train passed him, the accident occurring at 7.51 p.m. Engine- man Mickie further stated that the time-table schedule of his train between Wesley and Dean is five minutes and as he had four minutes in which to reach the latter point before the expiration of the time named in the wait order, he thought this was sufficient time to make the movement and provide protection. He knew that train second No. 52 was superior to his train and was familiar with the rule requiring inferior trains to take siding and clear the superior train five minutes, but at the time he passed Wesley he had in mind that possibly the superior train would arrive at Dean a few minutes later than the time shown on the wait order, which would allow additional time in which to provide flag protection. He did not remember hearing the head brakeman call his attention to the fact that the time was 7.47 p.m. when they passed the east switch at Wesley. Fireman Hill, of train second No. 37, stated that he was aware train second No. 52 was required to wait at Dean until 7.50 p.m., and he noticed that it was 7.45 p.m. when his train was approaching the east switch at Wesley, but did not mention this fact to the engine- man, who at that time was operating the train at a speed of about 45 miles per hour. He observed the head brake- man talking to the engineman while passing Wesley, but was unable to hear the conversation. Fireman Hill noted the time again when the train stopped east of the passing track at Dean and it was 7.48 p.m. Just before the train came to a stop, the brakeman lighted a fusee but it sputtered and failed to give a good light so Fireman Hill handed another fusee to the brakeman, who got off and started running eastward waving this fusee until it was extinguished a short time later, but the brakeman continued to give signals with a white lantern. Realiz- ing that the opposing train was getting pretty close, Fireman Hill lighted a yellow fusee and held it out of the window and the engineman also lighted a fusee, then got off the engine and ran towards the switch. 1 1 { -6- Head Brakeman Dames, of train second No. 37, stated that he was familiar with the requirements of train order No. 110 and was of the opinion that his train would not proceed beyond Wesley against train second No. 52. His train passed Wesley, however, at 7.47 p.m., and at that time he told the engineman the time was pretty short to go to Dean but the engineman made no reply, al- though he looked at his watch. When the engine passed the General Electric switch, he lighted a fusee but be- fore the train stopped this fusee went out. He got off the engine with another burning red fusee and a white lantern, before the engine had come to a complete stop, and started ahead giving warning signals to the approach- ing train, but upon reaching a point about one car-length west of the east passing-track switch, this second fusee also went out; he continued running forward swinging his lantern, and was about eight car-lengths from his engine when the head end of the opposing train passed him. On account of attempting to flag the eastbound train, he failed to note the time his train stopped and the time of the accident. He further stated that he had been on trains quite often when they did not have their sched- uled running time in which to travel between stations and meet a train holding a wait order, but the trains would continue on short time. Conductor Lynch, of train second No. 37, stated that he understood from the train order received at North East that his train had until 7.50 p.m. to reach Dean. The train passed the east switch at Wesley at 7.46 p.m. and at that time he remarked to the flagman that the time was pretty short to proceed to Dean. The brakes were applied when the caboose reached the west switch at Wesley and he thought the engineman intended to back the train into clear, although it was then traveling about 30 miles per hour. He looked ahead from the steps of the caboose before the train came to a stop and noticed a burning fusee. When the train stopped, the caboose was about 25 or 30 car-lengths from the west passing track switch at Wesley and at that time it was 7.48 p.m. He got off the caboose and started towards the engine, and was about 12 car-lengths from the caboose when his train was struck by train second No. 52, and according to his watch, it was then 7.51 p.m. He said he made no attempt to stop the train when he realized that it was not going into clear at Wesley, in view of the short distance from that point to Dean, and with four minutes remaining in -7- which to reach the latter point on the wait order, he thought there was ample time in which to do so and still The state- have time to provide proper flag protection. ments of Flagman Allen, of train second No. 37, added no additional facts of importance. Conclusions for This accident was caused by train second No. 37 be- ing operated against a superior train on short time, which Conductor Lynch and Engineman Mickie are respon- sible. The rules provide that at meeting points between trains of different classes, the inferior train must take siding and clear the main track at least five minutes. The statements of the members of the crew of train second No. 37 as to the time at which their train passed Wesley vary from 7.45 to 7.47 p.m.; under the provision of the rules just referred to, their train was required to be in to clear at 7.45 p.m. Engineman Mckie was familiar with this rule, and was aware that his train was running on short time, but was of the opinion that the opposing train might be a few minutes late on the order and that his own train could reach Dean before the time limit on the wait order expired and that flag protection could then be afforded. Conductor Lynch also knew that train second No. 52 was required to wait at Dean until 7.50 p.m., and according to his own watch, when his train passed Wesley only four minutes remained before that time expired. The reason he took no action to bring the train to a stop was that, due to the short dis- tance between Wesley and Dean, he thought the train would reach the latter point in time to provide protec- tion. It is also to be noted that train second No. 37 departed from North East, according to the train sheet, at 7.32 p.m. The distance from North East to Dean is 11.7 miles, and the schedule of train No. 37 calls for a running time of 56 minutes, yet this crew had only 13 minutes at their disposal if they were to clear the opposing superior train by the five minutes required by the rules. No justification can be found for the opera- tion of their train under such circumstances. The physical characteristics in the vicinity of the passing track at Dean are such that when on trains approaching/the west, it is difficult to determine from C -8- whether engines in the vicinity of the east passing- track switch are on the tracks of the New York Central or on the line of the Nickel Plate, and usually there are from one to five engines standing in the New York Central yard with headlights burning. In the report covering the investigation of the accident which occurred on this railroad at Edwards- ville, Ill., on March 26, 1929, attention was called to the fact that it appeared to be somewhat of a practice to run on short time to the extent of using some of the five-minutes clearance time required by the rules, and the following statement was made: "This practice has resulted in the occurrence of many accidents in the past; is recognized as dan- gerous, and immediate steps should be taken for its discontinuance." The circumstances surrounding the accident here under investigation suggest that the lesson to be learned from the Edwardsville accident was not of much benefit in the present case, for this was an even more flagrant violation of the rules than was involved in the Edwards- ville accident. The operation of trains in haste at the expense of safety is something which should not be tolerated, and it is recommended that the operating officials of this system give this matter their imme- diate attention, with a view to seeing to it that the rules are rigidly enforced and obeyed by all concerned. In the Edwardsville accident, it was found that the average train movement during the 30 days preceding the date of the accident was slightly more than 23 trains daily, and a recommendation was made that con- sideration be given to the question of installing an adequate block system. In the case of the accident on this same railroad, near Swanville, Pa., on June 13, 1928, it was found that between Brocton and Thornton Junction, passenger movements were protected by a block-signal system; as to freight trains, however, it appeared that there were 6 westbound and 7 eastbound trains operated daily, in addition to sections and such extras as might be operated from time to time, and it was pointed out that with such a traffic density the operation of the block-signal system should be extended to govern train movements of all classes. In the case ! -9- of the accident here under investigation at Dean, which, like Swanville, is in the territory between Brocton and Thornton Junction, it appears that the average train movement during the 30 days preceding the date of the accident was slightly more than 33 trains daily. Obviously, the recommendation contained in the Swanville report has been amply justified, and in this connection it is to be noted that plans have been made to install an automatic block-signal system, and that the material for this installation is now be- ing awaited. 7 The employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the/hours of service law. provisions of the Respectfully submitted, W.P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation Library HE 1780 ·4234 "VORISMI DHE F** INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1577 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD AT COLLINSTON, LA., OCTOBER 27, 1929. ON To the Commission: February 18, 1930. On October 27, 1929, there was a rear-end col- lision between a freight train and a passenger train on the Missouri Pacific Railroad at Collinston, La., re- sulting in the injury of 68 passengers. Location and method of operation a This accident occurred on the McGeehee District of the Little Rock Division, extending between McGeehee, Ark., and Collinston, La., à distance of 72.92 miles; this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred within yard limits, 4,128 feet south of the north yard-limit board; approaching this point from the north, the track is tangent for a distance of 6.1 miles, then there is a 1° 58' curve to the left 1,217 feet in length, followed by more than 1 miles of tangent, the accident occurring on this latter tangent at a point 516 feet from its northern end. The grade is practically level. A caboose standing at the point of accident first comes into view across the inside of the curve, from the fireman's side of a southbound engine, at a point 4,035 feet distant, and remains in view for about 900 feet; on account of trees and brush located on the inside of the curve, the caboose can not be seen for the next 1,492 feet, following which it remains in continuous view, a distance of 1,643 feet; from the engineman's side, the view of the caboose around the outside of the curve is restricted to a distance of 778 feet. The weather was cloudy and hazy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 2.45 or 2.46 p.m. Description Southbound second-class freight train No. 173 consisted of 75 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 5206, and was in charge of Conductor Roe and Engineman Lockhart. On arrival at Dermott, 65.35 miles north of Collinston, a copy of train order No. 52, Form 19, was received, reading in part as follows: -2- + 4035' 3/35' 1756 ¥. 1643 884' 808 778 900' Fireman could See caboose thru trees, • POINT OF ACCIDENT Y... 1 1°58' 12.17 Ft. 1 1 ! ! : : 1 • • i 2 Fireman could See caboose. YARD LIMIT • / ! Bris -6.1 miles tangent. Direction of Train No. 105 oo ou 22 2 Fireman could see caboose. ← "22" Flagman. First Flagman. 42 Engineer could first see 2 Engineer could see "Second" Flagman. 2-Engineer could see "First Flagman. Fireman could see caboose & Second Flagman. Fireman could see "First "Flagman. Note: "First Flagman" - Point where flagman claims to have been located. "Second Flagman? - Point where engine crew claim flagman was located. INV. No. 1577 MISSOURI PACIFIC R. R. Colliston, Ala. Oct. 27, 1929. sda 2/14/30 -a- "No. 173 Eng 5206 run ahead No. 105 Eng 6518 Dermott to Collinston ***." ac- Train No. 173 departed from Dermott at 12.30 p.m., cording to the train sheet, four hours late, and ar- rived at Wilmot, 31.69 miles north of Collinston, at 1.33 p.m. While at this point the following train, No. 105, was flagged, while the crew of train No. 173 received a copy of train order No. 59, Form 19, extend- ing the "run-ahead" territory from Collinston to Honroe yard, as well as containing other instructions. Train No. 173 departed from Wilmot at 1.40 p.m., 3 hours and 45 minutes late, and was standing within the yard limits at Collinston when its rear end was struck by train No. 105. Southbound first-class passenger train No. 105, at the time of the accident, consisted of one baggage car, two coaches, and two show cars, in the order named, hauled by engine 6518, and was in charge of Conductor Hart and Engineman Warren. The first three cars were of steel-underframe construction, while the remaining two were of wooden construction. The crew of this train also received copies of the train orders referred to above, at the same points designated, in addition to which their train was flagged at Wilmot, departing from that point at 1.45 p.m., seven minutes late and five minutes behind train No. 173. At Bonita, 20.22 miles north of Collinston, train No. 105 picked up the two show cars, listed above in its consist, and left that point at 2.18 p.m., 17 minutes late; it departed from Galion, 13.81 miles north of Collinston and the last open office, at 2.29 p.m., still 17 minutes late, and collided with train No. 173 in the yard at Collinston while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 10 or 15 miles per hour. The caboose of train No. 173 was demolished, while the car ahead of it was only slightly damaged, as was the front end of engine 6518. With the exception of the caboose, none of the equipment in either train was derailed. Summary of evidence Conductor Roe, of train No. 173, stated that on arrival at Collinston, his train first came to a stop, about 2.34 p.m., with the caboose about 25 or 30 car- lengths north of the curve, this stop being occasioned by another train performing switching in the yard. A flag was whistled out and Conductor Roe told Flagman ♪ Gambino, who was not an experienced man, that he had to go to the head end of the train in order to supervise the work of setting off cars and for the flagman to get off, remain on the straight track, and protect against the following train, No. 105, and that in the event the flagman saw he was going to be left behind, he was to get aboard the engine of train No. 105 and ride it to Monroe. The flagman got off and the freight train started ahead, having stopped and then started again; while on top of about the first or second car ahead of the caboose, and after the train had moved forward about four or five car-lengths, the conductor looked back and saw the flagman in the act of placing torpedoes on the rail. The conductor then continued over the tops of the cars toward the head end of the train, which moved ahead about 40 or 50 car-lengths, where a second stop was made. About four or five minutes after the second stop was made, and while the work of setting out cars was in progress, Conductor Roe heard train No. 105 sound the whistle and also heard the explosion of torpedoes, this being four or five minutes after the second stop had been made. He looked at his watch when it was 2.46 p.m., and saw train No. 105 standing at the rear of his own train, but did not know how long it had been standing there and was unaware that there had been an accident until his engine was coupled to the rear portion of the train, ready to go. Conductor Roe further stated that he was thoroughly satisfied with the way Flagman Gambino had flagged train No. 105 at Wilmot saying that after that train came to a stop at that point, his flagman rode in on the engine, and then the flagman told him that the engineman of train No. 105 had said not to get excited, as he knew that train No. 173 was ahead of him. > Flagman Gambino, of train No. 173, stated that at the time the first stop was made at Collinston, Conductor Roe told him that their train was going to pull down again for some distance and for the flagman to get off and put down torpedoes, also that in the event the flagman was left behind, he was to ride the engine of train No. 105 to Monroe; he denied that the conductor told him to remain at the point where the first stop was made and flag train No. 105, but on the other hand he admitted that that was the conductor's intention and that the conductor had no way of knowing that his instructions had not been obeyed. Flagman Gambino stated that his train just stopped and then started again; he put down two torpedoes on the west rail, about 3 or 4 car-lengths behind the caboose and } -8- about 50 car-lengths north of the curve involved, then ran and caught the caboose, and rode the rear end of it to where the second stop was made. He then started back to flag, going only a few car-lengths before he heard the whistle of train No. 105 and also hearing the torpedoes explode. He lighted a fusee and got back an additional 15 car-lengths, or about the point of curve, giving stop signals with the lighted fusee and also with a flag, but said that his signals were not answered until train No. 105 was only one car-length distant, and that it passed him at a speed of about 30 miles per hour, which speed he thought had been reduced to about 12 miles per hour by the time the collision occurred. Flagman Gambino knew that his train was going to make a second stop at Collinston, but had assumed that it would stop with the caboose south of a railroad crossing, located about 4,000 feet south of the point of accident, as had been done on the only previous trip he had made on this district, and that by having the torpedoes down where they were on this occasion, he would have plenty of time within which to afford ample protection; he admitted, however, that it would have been a display of good judgment on his part to have remained on the straight track north of the curve, where he could have seen train No. 105 for a long distance. Flagman Gambino was fully aware that the run-ahead order held by his train did not relieve him from the duty of affording proper protection within yard limits against train No. 105, and that that train was closely following his own train, having flagged it at Wilmot. Statements of other members of the crew of train No. 173 developed nothing additional of importance. Engineman Warren, of train No. 105, stated that the speed of his train was about 45 miles per hour approaching Collinston and that in the vicinity of the yard-limit board he shut off steam and made a brake-pipe reduction of from 7 to 10 pounds, reducing the speed of his train to about 30 miles per hour, and then placed the brake-valve handle in the lap position. While rounding the curve the fireman shouted that there was a caboose ahead, standing on the main track, and at about the same time the torpedoes were exploded, when about 8 or 8 pole-lengths from the caboose, approximately 1,600 feet distant. The engineman at once moved the brake- valve handle to the emergency position, no release hav- ing been made from the service application and he estimated the speed to have been reduced to between 10 and 15 miles per hour when the collision occurred. Engineman Warren said that when he first saw the flagman, he was standing about five car-lengths behind the caboose, waving stop signals with a lighted fusee and a red flag. The air brakes had been tested after the show cars were picked up at Bonita, and worked properly en route; he did not think, however, that an emergency effect was obtained just prior to the accident, owing to the previous service application. Engineman Warren further stated that at the time his train was brought to a stop at Wilmot, on being flagged by Flagman Gambino, he told the flagman that since both trains had a meet with an opposing train at Jones, located 23.79 miles north of Collinston, he would look out for the flagman on the reverse curves in that vicinity. Both he and his fireman were keeping a sharp lookout ahead for train No. 173, and the reason he made the service appli- cation where he did when approaching Collinston was that he expected to find train No. 173 occupying the main track at some point. Engineman Warren said that good judgment should have prompted him to have materially reduced spe d a considerable distance north of the yard- limit board, and that he should have operated his train with respect to train No. 173 so that he could have brought his own train to a stop within the distance he could see the caboose of that train, until the train order had been fulfilled. Fireman Burns, of train No. 105, stated that he was sitting on his seat box and that he saw the caboose of train No. 173 when about eight pole-lengths from it and shouted a warning of danger; about one pole-length further south the torpedoes were exploded, and he then noticed the flagman about five car-lengths behind the caboose. He said that the torpedoes were just at the north end of the curve and that the flagman lighted the fusee just about the time the torpedoes were exploded. In other respects his statements practically cor- roborated those of Engineman Warren. S Conductor Hart was riding in the second car in the train and estimated the speed to have been about 25 or 30 miles per hour at the time the air brakes were applied in emergency, on the curve, and said that when his train came to a stop as a result of the collision he stepped off and saw the flagman of train No. 173 at a point not more than five or six car-lengths behind the caboose. Flagman Benedict, of train No. 105, stated that on his way back to flag he found the remains of two torpedoes about eight pole-lengths behind the caboose. Assistant Superintendent Stevenson stated that when a train holds a Form B type of train order, direct- ing a train to pass or run ahead of another train, such as was the case in this instance, the instructions are that the following train shall govern its speed so as to be able to stop short of the train ahead. C -7--7- སྐ With regard to the experience of Flagman Gambino, it appeared from the statements of Trainmaster McKnight that he employed Flagman Gambino on October 19, 1929 but that he did not give him the usual rules examina- tion, because he had a "cut off" letter from another division of the system, showing that he had been em- ployed on that division from December, 1928, to March 13, 1929, and had been cut off on account of a reduc- tion in force, and after wiring that superintendent and being advised that it was all right to use Gambino, Trainmaster McKnight authorized the placing of his name on the brakemen's board. In addition, before taking this action, he had asked Flagman Gambino sufficient questions to satisfy himself that he was familiar with the duties of a brakeman. It also appeared from his statements, that brakemen are not permitted to perform duties on the Missouri Pacific System until they have been examined on the book of rules, and that the wire received from the super- intendent who formerly had jurisdiction over Flagran Gambino indicated that the flagman had received the required rules examination. Conductor Roe said that from the information he obtained from Flagman Gambino, he considered him competent to do the flagging, but on the other hand, Flagman Gambino said he told Conductor Roe that he was not a real brakeman, and that anything told him in the way of instruction would be appreciated. > Conclusions > Coding > This accident was caused by the failure of Flag- man Gambino, of train No. 173, to provide proper flag protection; a contributing cause was the failure of Engineman Warren, of train No. 105, properly to control the speed of his train when holding an order author- izing a second-class train to run ahead of him. Flagman Gambino was fully aware that there was a train closely following his own train, having flagged it at Wilmot, and he thoroughly understood that the run-ahead order held by his train did not relieve him of the duty of affording proper protection while his own train occupied the main track within yard limits. While there is a conflict in the testimony as to where the torpedoes were placed by Flagman Gambino, and also as to the location of the flagman just prior to the accident, there does not appear to be any question but that he was told to stay out, coming in on train No. 105 if necessary; he should have remained on the straight track north of the curve, at the time the first stop was made, where he could have seen train No. 105 for a long distance, and had he done so, so, the ac- cident would not have occurred. There is also his own statement that after the second stop was made, he 1* F went back only as far as the curve, the curve, a distance of not much more than 500 feet, although he must have had several minutes at his disposal and should have gone back a much greater distance. As it was, there was an interval of 11 or 12 minutes between the time of the first stop and the time of the accident, during which time adequate flag protection could and should have been provided, Conductor Roe said that from the information he obtained from Flagman Gambino, he considered him com- petent to do the flagging, while Flagman Gambino said he told the conductor he was not a real brakeman and would appreciate any help given him. These state- ments can not be reconciled; if the flagman's statement is correct, there is no excuse for the failure of the conductor to notice the flagman when he was returning to the train after the first stop, although this in no way justifies the action of the flagman in dis- obeying instructions. G It is very questionable whether sufficient effort was made to ascertain Flagman Gambino's quali- fications before assigning him to duty as a flagman. Certainly there is no reason why a more experienced man could not have been doing the flagging, in view of the fact that train No. 173 departed from McGehee with two other brakemen in the crew, each of whom had had about 16 years' experience with this railroad. A situation of this kind strongly suggests the need for more attention on the part of supervisory officials. S Engineman Warren knew that train No. 173 was only a short distance ahead of his own train, and that it was incumbent on him to operate his train so as to be able to stop short of the preceding train. Never- theless, in view of the existing conditions, instead of operating under extreme caution, he approached and entered the yard limits of Collinston at a comparative- ly high rate of speed, rounded a curve to the left where his view was considerably restricted, and when he finally was apprised of the fact that there was a caboose ahead, he could not bring his train to a stop in time to avoid an accident. ? It further appears that had Fireman Burns been maintaining a lookout ahead, when his train entered yard limits he could have first seen the caboose across the inside of the curve when it was 4,000 feet distant, and had he then notified Engineman Warren of its presence, it is probable the engineman could have averted the accident. den " med bag -9 1 Flagman Gambino made trips as a student brake- man on the I-GNRR, Missouri Pacific Lines, from December 16, to December 20, 1928, and was employed as a brakeman on December 22, 1928, being relieved from duty on March 13, 1929; he entered the service as brakeman on the Little Rock Division, MoPacRR, on October 19, 1929. Engineman Warren entered the service as fireman on January 18, 1906, and was pro- moted to engineman on November 15, 1912; at the time of the accident none of the employees involved had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. 1 Respectfully submitted, W. F. BORLAND, Director. Transporation Care The “test ה Librory HE 1780 • A234 1578 INTERSTATE CODERCE COMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTI- GATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILROAD NEAR WEST PLATTE, HO., ON CCTOBER 28, 1929. February 18,1930. To the Commission: On October 23, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a freight train and a work train on the Chicago Great Western Railroad near West Platte, Mo., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Seventh District of the Southern Division, extending between Conception, Mo., and Leavenworth, Kans., a distance of 72.4 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, block-signal system being in use. Beverly is located 3.1 miles west of West Platte and the yard limits of severly ex- tena 8est Platte; the accident occurred at a point 1,670 feet west of the west passing track switch at West Platte, which point is within the yard limits of Beverly. Approach- ing this point from the west the track is tangent for a dis- tence of 725 feet, followed by a compound curve to the left 2,075 feet in length, the maximum curvature of which is 4° the accident occurring on this curve approximately 400 feet from its eastern end where the curvature is 2° 30'. Approaching from the east there is a 20 curve to the right 1,400 feet in length; the track is then tangent for a distance of 3,100 feet, to the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade at the point of accident is .54 per cent descending for eastbound trains. In the vicinity of the point of acci- dent the track passes through a cut 500 feet in length and with a maximum depth of 14 feet which restricts the view to a short distance from trains approaching in either direction. > It was raining at the time of the accident, which oc- curred at about 8.40 a.m. no -2- Description Westbound second-class freight train No. 91 consisted of 102 cars and a caboose, hauled by engines 321 and 359, and was in charge of Conductor Golliday and Enginemen Richards and Flora. At Bee Creek, 13.8 miles east of West Platte, the crew received a copy of train order No. 59, Form 31, reading in part as follows: "Eng 278 works extra seven ten 7.10 a.m. until seven thirty 7.30 p.m., between Beverly and Bee Creek protecting against second class trains*** No 91 engines 321 and 359 wait at Dearborn until eight ten 8.10 a.m. New Market until eight twenty 8.20 a.m. for work extra 278***"1 " Train No. 91 departed from Bee Creek at 7.53 a.m. 8 hours and 18 minutes late, and shortly after passing West Flatto it col- lided with work train extra 278 while traveling at a speed estimated at from 2 to 4 miles per hour. Eastbound work train extra 278 consisted of 29 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 278, and was in charge of Conductor Beam and Engineman Karlov. The crer of this train received a copy of train order No. 59, form 31, previously mentioned, at Stillings Junction, 6.7 miles west of West Platte, and departed from that point at 7.20 a.m. Aftor picking up cars at Beverly it continued castrard and collided with train No. Sl while traveling at a speed estimated to have been 5 or 6 miles per hour. All three engines were derailed and more considerably damaged. The two forward cars and the 28th, 29th and 30th cars in train No. 91 were derailed, the 28th car being demol- ished while the 14th car was partly telescoped; the leading car in the work train was also damaged. The employee killed was the engineman of extra 278. Summary of evidence Engineman Richards, of the leading engine of train No. 91, stated that when train order No. 59 ras delivered to him at Bce Creek he read it aloud to the conductor. His train passed New Market at 3.20 a.m. the time spccified in the order, and was running at a speed of about 30 miles per hour when it passed Woodruff, shortly after which he shut off steam and allowed the train to reduce speed to about 10 miles per hour when it passed West Platte, his object being to ap- proach the yard limit board west of that point under control; and he was also looking out for extra 278. The speed had been further reduced to 7 or 8 miles per hour when he saw the work train approaching at a distance of about 120 yards, which was as soon as it could be seen in view of the weather K -3= j conditions, the curve and the cut. He applied the brakes in He had emergency, sounded the whistle and then jumped off.. experienced no difficulty with the brakes en route and thought that the speed of his train was not more than 3 miles per hour at the time of the collision. Engineman Richards knew that the rules require all trains other than first class trains to approach and move within yard limits under control, which is defined as being able to stop within one-half the distance the track is seen to be clear. He was of the opinion that his train was being operated in accordance with this rule. Fireman Broscheid, of the leading engine, stated that is train passed New arket at about 8.20 a.m. and at that time he informed the engineman the work train was not on the siding. He said the engineman shut off steam between Woodruff and West Platte and the train was traveling at a speed of 10 or 12 He did not miles per hour when it passed the latter point. see the work train approaching and his first knowledge of any- thing wrong was when the engineman applied the brakes in emergency; he estimated the speed at that time at 7 or 8 miles per hour and at the time of the accident at 3 or 4 miles per hour. Head Brakeman Wall stated that he was riding on the fire- man's seatbox of the leading engine and noticed the engineman shut off steam about 1 or 2 miles east of West Platte which resulted in the speed being reduced to about 10 miles per hour. He was looking ahead but did not see the opposing train until it was about 200 feet from his engine; this was after the brakes had been applied and the whistle was blowing. estimated the speed at 2 to 4 miles per hour at the time of the accident and thought his train would have been stopped in another 1 car-lengths. He St Engineman Flora, of the second engine, stated that he noticed the train had excellent braking power when it stopped He ob- at Bee Creek, the last stop prior to the accident. served the time to be 8.20 when they passed New Market and upon reaching a point about 2 miles from West Platte he shut off steam on his engine. He was keeping a lookout for extra 278 but did not see it approaching until the trains were approximately seven or eight car-lengths apart, and about the same time the brakes were applied from the leading engine; the brake valve on his engine was cut cut. He immediately jumped off, ran up the bank along the track, then looked around and noticed the engine of the work train was still working steam. He estimated that the brake application reduced the speed from 7 or 8 miles per hour to 3 or 4 miles per hour, end was of the opinion the brakes operated properly and would have brought the train to a stop within the distance that the opposing train came into view. Conductor Golliday, of train No. 91, stated that nis train was not separated between St. Joseph and the point of -4- ; : : He ¦ } accident and the air brakes operated properly. While at Bee Creek tho engincmen read train order 59 back to him. Con- ductor Colliday estimated the speed of his train as it approached and passed West Flatte at 10 miles per hour. His first knowledge of anything wrong was a severe shock, caused by the emergency application of the brakes; the train then traveled a distance of about three car-lengths before it stopped. K Fireman Norris, of extra 278, stated that he read train order No. 59 to the engineman before le wing Stillings end there was nothing about the order that was uncertain or con- fusing; the order was not mentioned again after leaving that Coint. The crew worked at Beverly about 45 minutes but he did not note the time they left that point. In view of the cavy train it was necessary for him to shovel coal almost all of the time after leaving Beverly and approaching the point of accident he was on the engine deck; his first warning of danger was when the head brakeman shouted. He jumped off as quickly as possible; before doing so he noticed the engineman standing up and looking ahead, and just about the time he jumped he heard the brakes go into emergency, the collision Occurring just about the time he struck the ground. He said that he had entirely forgotten about train No. 91 and was of the opinion that the engineman and brakeman had also over- looked it. There was nothing about the engine to divert their attention from the train orders except that it was neces- sary to remove and clean a send pipe at Beverly. He further stated that prior to the accident the engineman appeared to be in normal condition, and he was extremely careful in handling train orders. Head Brakeman Morrissey, of extra 278, stated that he read train order No. 59 in the presence of the conductor and flagman and understood that train No. 91 as required to wait at New Market until 8.20 a.m. He rode on the engine efter leaving Beverly but at no time did he think of train No. 91, neither was there any conversation held by the engine crew concerning that train; he had in mind that the be at Dearborn, a station beyond New Harket. realized the danger he jumped off; the engine was working steem at that time, the collision occurring after the engine moved an additional distance of about the length of the tender. He said the last Thistle signal sounded was for a crossing at Beverly and the engineman did not indicate that he anticipated meeting train No. 91 at West Platte. next stop would As soon as he Conductor Beam, of extra 278, stated that among the train orders received at Stillings was order No. 59 mich was handled in accordance rith the rules and was clearly understood is train was at Beverly approximately 1 hour, doing station work, and it departed from that point between 3.20 and 8.25 He stated that he had entirely overlooked train No. 91, and consequently he made no effort to see that his train a.m. -5- cleared the main track for that train as required by the rules. His first intimation that something was wrong was when the brakes were applied and the sudden stopping of the train which only moved a distance of from one-helf to one car-length after the brakes rere first pplied. He estimated the speed at 3 to 5 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Rear Brakeman Jackson, of extra 278, stated that he read the orders received at Stillings and understood his train was required to clear the main track not later than 8.15 for train No. 91. He thought of that train some time before leaving Beverly but did not think of it again until after the accident, and at the time his train left beverly, between 8.20 end 8.25 a.m., le was of the impression that the next stop "ould be at Dearborn. He estimated the train moved a dis- tence of only 10 or 12 feet after the brakes were applied immediately preceding the accident. Conclusions This accident was caused by all members of the crew of extra 278 overlooking a superior train, and their failure to get into clear for a superior train as required by the rules. All of the surviving members of the crew of extra 278 admitted they had completely forgotten about train No. 91 and it is evident from the fact that the work train was starting to leave Beverly on the time of train No. 91 that the engine- man of the work train had also overlooked train No. 91. The accident occurred within yard limits and the rules provide that in such territory the main track may be used, protecting against first class trains; however, under the rules both of the trains involved in tais accident were re- quired to move within yard limits prepared to stop ithin one- helf the distance the track is seen to be clear. According to the evidence both trains approached the point of accident at low rates of speed; the leading engineman of train No. 91 was on the alert and made every effort to stop his train as soon as the opposing train came into view, but it did not ap- pear that steam on engine 273 "as shut off prior to the accident although the brakes were applied just before the col- lision occurred. Had an adequate block signal system been in use on this line this accident probably would not have occurred. for a period of 30 days prior to the date of is accident traffic over tais line averaged about 14 trains daily. The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in viola- tion of any of the provisions of the hours of service lar. Respectfully submitted, 7. P. BORLAND, Director. • g Transportation Library не 1780 A234 1584 INTERSTATE CONROE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD NEAR OXFORD, KANS., ON NOVEMBER 3, 1929. " February 1930. To the Commission: On November 8, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Missouri Pacific Railroad near Oxford, Kans., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of three employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Conway Springs District of the Southern Kansas Division, which extends be- tween Conway Springs and Dearing, Kans., a distance of 130.04 miles and is a single-track line over which trains are op- erated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal sys- tem being in use. The accident occurred at a point 9 feet east of mile post 525-26, which is located east of Oxford. Approaching this point from the rest the track is tangent for a distance of 2,495 feet, while the grade in the vicin- ity of the point of accident is level. The maximum speed permitted for passenger trains is 40 miles per hour. S It had been raining about seven hours prior to the occurrence of the accident and it was still raining at the time of the accident, which occurred at 2.35 p.m. Stat The track is laid with 56-pound rails, 30 feet in length, with an average of about 17 oak ties to the rail- length, and is single-spiked; four-bolt angle bars are used, and the track is ballasted with sandy loam soil. Description Eastbound passenger train No. 314 consisted of one deadhead dining car, one combination mail and baggage car, one coach and one combination cafe and chair car, in the order named, hauled by engine 7525, and was in charge of Conductor Davis and Engineman Francis. The first two cars had steel center sills and the third car a steel under- frame, while the fourth car was of all-steel construction. This train departed from Oxford, the last open office, at 2.31 p.m., 11 minutes late, and was traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 30 to 35 miles per hour when it was derailed as a result of a broken rail. V - 2 } The engine was derailed to the right and came to rest on its right side with the front end slightly near- er the rail than the rear end; the tender was derailed to the right at an angle of 459, while the first two cars were also derailed to the right but remained upright. All of the equipment remained coupled. The employee killed was the en- gineman, while those injured were three dining-car employees. Summary of evidence Cat " Fireman Funk stated that he was riding on his seat box and the first he noticed of anything unusual was when the engine gave a lunge, at first towards his side; then it straightened up and started to lean toward the right until finally it turned over. About 30 minutes after the occurrence of the accident, he examined the broken rail which was on the south side of the track, and noticed that the east or leaving end of the rail was turned toward the south and that there was a slight coating of rust on the fractured ends. Fireman Funk stated that he was thoroughly familiar with the track in this vicinity, having operated over it both as an engineman and a fireman, but had never noticed that the engine had swayed any more in the vicinity a of the point of accident than at any other point. On two previous trips with Engineman Francis, he had noticed that the engineman reduced speed in this locality, but he did not know his reasons for doing so. Fireman Funk estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been about 30 miles per hour. Conductor Davis stated that the first intimation he had of anything wrong was when he felt the air brakes apply in emergency, and he was of the opinion that the acci- dent was caused by a broken rail. He observed that the end of the east section of the broken rail had been pushed over toward the north or inside of the track and formed a lip, which, he thought, caught the wheel flange. He also was of the opinion that the pony trucks of the engine were the first to derail. Conductor Davis said they held no slow orders over this section of track and he estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been about 35 miles per hour. The statements of Brakeman Monroe brought out nothing additional of importance. S Division Engineer Murray stated that he arrived at the scene of the accident about two and one-half hours after its occurrence and found a broken rail which in his opinion was the cause of the derailment. He thought the failure of the rail was due to crystalization, age, and climatic con- ditions, and did not think its condition could have been detected by inspection. There was a little rust on the ends of the broken rail, due to the constant rain on the day of 3 the accident. At the end of the break at the west section of the rail, there was a battered appearance which indi- cated to him that the rail had been broken by a westbound passenger train which had passed over the track that morn- ing. A freight train had also passed over the track, at about 6 a.m., but he was of the opinion that had the rail been broken by the freight train, the following westbound passenger train would have been derailed, or at least the broken rail would have been noticed by the crew of that train. He did not think there were any other track condi- tions that could have caused the derailment. Division En- gineer Murray further stated that measurements taken for a distance of 150 feet west of the point of accident showed a maximum of only one-half inch variation in cross level and 1 inch in gauge; the line was good and the surface was in fair condition, although there were some slopping joints which were due to recent rains. The broken rail was left in the track until the following day, and during that time the track was used for switching movements in clearing up the wreckage. gland GRAN Roadmaster Philpot stated that he arrived at the point of accident about 3.10 a.m. the following morning, at which time the broken rail was still in use. He noticed that the ends were battered and rusty, and was of the opin- ion that the rail had been broken only a few hours previous to the occurrence of the accident, by one of the two trains which had passed over the track that morning. He himself had been over that territory on the day previous to the accident and had noticed no bad conditions in the track which would warrant any immediate action on the part of the section forces. Section Foreman Cokenour stated that he examined the broken rail on his arrival at the scene of the accident about one-half hour after its occurrence. He also noticed that the broken ends of the rail were battered, the end of the west section being battered more than the other end, and they also had a burnished appearance. The west section was in place on the ties, while the east section was turned in- ward and there was a flange mark for a distance of about 2 feet on the ball of that portion of the rail, extending to where the wheel dropped off on the ties on the outside of the rail. It was the section foreman's idea that the east sec- tion had been moved inward enough to form a lip, and that a wheel flange caught it and caused the derailment. He had inspected this section of track on the afternoon previous to the occurrence of the accident and noticed nothing that would necessitate issuing a slow order. Statements made by the crew of freight train No. 393, which passed over the track about 6 a.m. on the morn- } - 4 - ing of the accident, and by the crew of passenger train No. 313, which passed over the track about 11.30 a.m., were to the effect that nothing wrong was noted and there was no indication of a broken rail. An examination of the track for a distance of 1,376 feet west of the point of derailment disclosed the track to be in poor condition; of the 780 ties within that distance, 92 per cent were oak and the balance were untreat- ed soft pine, and 35 of these were split or broken; the general appearance indicated that they were center bound, and at 15 different points they had been churning or slopp- ing during rainy weather. The ballast, which was of sandy loam soil, covered the ties between the rails at many places so that it was impossible to ascertain the true condition of all of them. However, at four or five of the places where the ties had been churning, this condition extended a distance of four or five ties, while at other points two or three consecutive ties were working, and the ballast had slushed out, leaving the ties practically unsupported. The track was not uniform as to gauge, there being a variation within a distance of 300 feet west of the point of accident of from 1/8 inch to 1/2 inch; and the surface was very un- even, varying from level to 3/4 inch low in the south or right rail and from level to 1 1/2 inches low in the north rail; such a condition would cause a swaying motion of an engine, traveling at a speed of 30 or 35 miles per hour the speed of train No. 314 at the time of the accident. Grad The rail involved was rolled in 1887 and was laid during the same year. Inspection of this rail showed that the break occurred at a point 21 feet 6 inches from the receiving or west end of the rail, and at the break in the short end there was an indentation in the center of the ball, as if it had been struck by the flange of a wheel; this mark was plainly visible along the ball to the leaving end of the rail and extended onto the adjoining rail for a short distance, where it disappeared as the rail turned over. The ties were broken up at that point so that no marks could be traced. The fracture was comparatively new, although the entire surface was rusted when examined by the railroad employees immediately after the occurrence of the accident. There was a spike maul mark on the top of the base of the rail at the edge of the tie, indicating that at some past time, in driving a spike, the maul had missed the spike and hit the rail and apparently caused a crack to extend into the base a distance of 3/8 inch, as this portion of the fracture was dark colored while the rest of the break was comparatively new. The break extended upward irregularly and slanted backwards as it approached the top of the ball, so that the fracture through the ball was about 1 inch west of a verti al line at right angles with the base of the rail as it lay in the track, thus forming - 5 - a chair or seat for the ball of the short end of the rail to rest upon. Conclusions. This accident was caused by a broken rail. The rusted appearance of the fracture and the badly battered condition of the broken end of the west section, indicated that this rail was broken at some time prior to the arrival of train No. 314, the location of the fracture at this particular point possibly being determined by the fact that it had been damaged at some previous time as a result of having been struck with a spike maul. • The indications also were that the short section of this rail was forced out of its normal position, re- sulting in the formation of a lip, and when this was en- countered by the engine it caused a wheel or wheels to mount the rail. ■ The investigation disclosed that the track was not in good condition, the surface being especially bad. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director, Transportation i Library HE 1780 8234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1579 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD, SOUTHERN RAILWAY SYSTEK, AT NEW ENGLAND, GA., ON OCTOBER 29, 1929. February 17, 1930. 14T1 To the Commission: On October 29, 1929, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Alabama Great Southern Rail- road, Southern Railway System, at New England, Ga., resulting in the death of one employee, and the injury of four passengers and one mail clerk. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Queen & Crescent District extending between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Birmingham, Ala., a distance of 143 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and an automatic block-signal and train- control system; the signal system however, was tempora- rily out of service. The accident occurred at a switch located about 60 feet south of the station at New England; this switch is a facing-point switch for southbound trains and leads off the main track to the west to an industrial spur track, which is about 500 feet in length. Approach- ing the switch from the north the track is tangent for a considerable distance and then there is a 20 curve to the right 317 feet in length, followed by 186 feet of tangent to the switch, this tangent continuing for a considerable distance beyond. The grade for southbound trains is de- scending, averaging 0.77 per cent. S The low switchstand, located on the west side of the main track, was not equipped with either targets or a switch lamp; the turnout is a No. 10, with 15 ft. switch points. The insulated bridle bar is of the solid type, 5/8 inch thick and 2 inches wide, with riveted lugs and 1 inch bolts; the tie or No. 2 bar is fastened like- wise, and a solid-type connecting rod is used. The switch works in conjunction with the automatic block-signal and train-control system, and the signals are operated if the switch points are open inch or more; the signals are of the three-position, upper-quadrant type, displaying light indications of red, yellow, and green, for stop, caution, and proceed, respectively. Automatic signal 14.5, the last southbound signal, is located 305 feet north of the switch. The automatic train-control system is of the intermittent ga, da ljude da pla • > * 1 i 1 1 ¿ -2- 305 14.6 14.5 SPUR 500'LONG SOUTH POINT OF Switch 186 Ft. 2 317 Ft. NORTH : SOUTH AVERAGE GRADE 0.779% DESCENDING !.... NO. 1579 A.G.S.,SOU. RY. SYS. New England, Ga. Oct 29,1929 sda 2-14-30 - 3 inductive type, known as the auto-manual automatic stop, manufactured by the General Railway Signal Co. It was daylight and the weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 6.15 a.m. Description Southbound passenger train No. 43 consisted of one mail car, one baggage car, two coaches, three Pullman sleeping cars, and one dining car, in the order named, hauled by engine 6690, of the Pacific type, and was in charge of Conductor McAllister and Engineman Daniels. The cars were of all-steel construction, with the exception of the second and eighth cars, which were of steel-underframe construction. At Morganville, 12.1 miles south of Chatta- nooga, absolute signal 12.3 was in the stop position, and the conductor received and copied train order No. 210, Form 19, from the dispatcher over the emergency telephone, reading as follows: "Block signals between Morganville and Trenton not working May be passed without stopping looking out for obstructions broken rail or switches not properly set This order void after 650 six fifty am" Morganville and Trenton are 5.8 miles apart, and include the territory within which this accident occurred. Train No. 43 departed from Morganville at about 6.02 or 6.03 a.m., about 15 minutes late, and when in the vicinity of signal 13.1, which signal was displaying a stop-and-proceed indica- tion and is located 7,392 feet north of signal 14.5, speed was reduced in order to permit their own flagman, who had been sent ahead to flag through the block while the conduc- tor was obtaining the train order, to get aboard the train; the engineman also operated the forestalling feature of the automatic train control apparatus and the train passed sig- nal 13.1 without stopping. Approaching signal 14.5, which was also displaying a stop-and-proceed indication, the engineman again forestalled and the train passed that signal at a speed estimated to have been between 15 and 20 miles per hour and was then derailed at the switch leading to the spur track. Engine 6690, together with its tender came to rest on its right side, diagonally across the spur track, headed southeast, with its forward end 360 feet south of the switch points; the first, third and fourth cars also came to rest in a similar manner across the spur track, The second except that one of the coaches remained upright. car was on the opposite side of the main track, the fifth car was entirely derailed and in line with the spur track, 1 1 4 and the sixth car only had its south or forward truck de- railed. Starting at the frog of the switch, both the main track and the spur track were torn up for a distance of 300 feet, while one of two box cars that were standing on the spur track at the time of the accident was demolished and the other one was damaged. The employee killed was the fireman. Summary of evidence Engineman Daniels stated that when approaching New England, he was leaning out of the side window and looking ahead; the headlight was not burning. The switch at which the accident occurred was the only facing-point switch within the territory covered by the train order, and on seeing the switch points, which were plainly dis- cernible when the engine was about 350 or 400 feet north of them, and after satisfying himself that they were pro- perly lined for the main track, at which time he estimated the speed of his train to have been about 15 miles per hour, he released the air brakes and opened the throttle a little, and then a little more, and the speed was increasing on the descending grade at the time the switch was encounter- ed. The first he knew of anything wrong was right after the switch points were lost to vier under the front end of the engine, when a sudden lurch occurred, at which time he es- timated the speed to have been not more than 18 or 20 miles per hour, throwing him from his seat box before he could close the throttle or apply the air brakes, the engine over- turning before he could regain his feet. Engineman Daniels further stated that he was handling the train under control and could have brought it to a stop at any time without in- cident, and that he observed the switch points before reach- ing the block signal and operating the forestalling feature of the train control system. After the accident, he observ- ed that the switch was locked and lined for the main track, > and that the engine had derailed right at the point of switch, both points having fresh breaks, as did the bridle rod, in which condition the switch points were free to move. In his opinion the engine-truck wheels struck the switch points. Engineman Daniels knew that there was no train in the block on account of the kind of train order that the conductor had received, but he did not know whether the automatic block signals were displaying stop indications on account of the switch points having been partly open, saying that they appeared to be properly lined to him, otherwise he would have brought the train to a stop before the switch was reached and would have examined the points. Engineman Daniels accounted for the amount of damage done as a result of the accident by saying that the engine was working steam on a descending grade, continuing to do so after the derailment, and then the momentum of the cars in the train pushed it along, tearing up the track. " W Ga - 5. 1 ( Conductor McAllister stated that southbound automatic block signal 12.3, located at the south end of the passing track at Morganville, was displaying a stop indication and that he went into the station at that point, telephoned the dispatcher, and received train order No. 210. He and Flagman White were riding in the rear car approaching the switch and they estimated the speed to have been between 18 and 20 miles per hour, a speed which the conductor con- sidered as being under control, otherwise he said that he would have applied the air brakes from the rear and caution- ed the engineman about running too fast. After the accident the conductor examined the switch; there was no indication of the switch having been tampered with, and it was lined and locked for the main track; the No. 1 bridle rod was broken, on the west side of the track, under the switch point. The conductor's statements relative to the amount of damage done as a result of the derailment supported those of Engineman Daniels. Flagman White immediately went back to flag. Statements of other members of the crew developed nothing additional of importance. Ag Roadmaster Metcalfe stated that it was not the policy to maintain targets or lamps on switches located within 500 feet of automatic block signals. Switches are inspected once each week by section foremen. He arrived at the scene of the accident about 5 p.m., the day of its Occurrence. Examination of the switch disclosed the break in the bridle rod to be apparently a new break, although ther appeared to be a small seam in the steel, which was conceal- ed and could not have been detected by ordinary inspection; there was no evidence of anything having dragged through the switch, striking the bridle bar, but the east switch point showed evidence of having been struck, apparently by a de- railed car. There was no indication of dragging equipment. Tests of the switch, with the connecting rod unfastened from the bridle rod, leaving the switch points free to move, disclosed that the switch points opened from 1 3/16 to 1 1/2 inches. The switch was then lined for the spur track with lining bars, which were jerked out quickly in order to give the same action that wheels running over the switch would produce, and it was found that in every case the switch points came back to the main line side, leaving the switch cocked to the extent of about 1 3/16 inches. During these tests, the only new material used was a No. 1 bridle rod. In his estimation, the speed of the train was about 25 miles per hour at the time of the accident, judg- ing from the condition of the engine and equipment and taking into consideration that steam was being worked on the descending grade and was not shut off, nor the air brakes applied, when the accident occurred. Section Foreman Killian last gave the switch a regular inspection three days prior to the accident, while S . со 1 on the day before the accident he looked it over; nothing unusual was noticed on either of these occasions. After the accident, he examined the switch and found it to be practically in the condition as described heretofore. The break in the No. 1 bridle bar was new and near the center of the bolt hole, the hole being concealed, and the break- ing of the bar allowed the points to swing open. He could not find anything to explain the breaking of the bar. Superintendent of Terminals Whitaker was of the opinion that the engine-truck wheels split the switch, the engine and forward part of the first car following the spur track, while the rear part of that car and the second car followed the main track, the other cars following between the main track and the spur track. Judging from the con- ditions, he estimated the speed of the train to have been about 30 miles per hour at the time of the accident. G Signal Maintainer Ellis went over the track in this vicinity on the day prior to the accident, about 11 a.m., and at that time the signals were in proper working order. Subsequent to the accident, after repairs were made, the signals functioned properly. There was no indication of the seals having been tampered with. Track Supervisor Price ginted that he arrived at the scene of the accident about two hours after its occurrence; the No. 1 bridle rod showed a new break through the bolt hole where it fastens to the switch lug on the clos- ed point side. In his opinion the broken bridle rod caused the accident. Master Mechanic Bunn inspected the engine at the point of accident, but found no defect that would have caused or contributed to the derailment. He was of the opinion that the engine did not derail until it struck the derailing device located on the west rail of the spur track at a point 189 feet south of the switch points; he estimated the speed of the train to have been not less than 35 or 40 miles per hour, judging from the damage done. The engine was equipped with a device which would auto- matically apply the air brakes in emergency, provided the engine truck wheels assumed an angle of more than 100 from the driving wheels. S The first mark of derailment was on the gauge side of the base of the east main track rail, 9 feet from the point of switch; this mark extended a distance of 4 feet and then appeared on the ties, continuing to the frog, be- yond which point the track was torn out. The first mark on the west rail was at the angle bar on the outside, 14 feet from the point; marks continued on the base of the rail for a distance of 8 feet before passing off on to the ties and then extending up to the frog. : & - 77 Conclusions This accident was caused by the defective condition of a switch. The investigation developed that the automatic block-signal and train-control system functioned as intend- ed, that the No. 1 bridle rcd of the switch had broken in some unknown manner, and that this condition permitted the switch points to open, causing the automatic signals to assume the stop position. Engineman Daniels did not see the open switch points from his position in the engine cab, it appearing to him that they were properly lined for the main track. Engineman Daniels, however, should have known that there was a break somewhere in the track circuit by reason of the signals displaying stop indications, since he knew there was no train in the block; this was the only facing-point switch between the points named in the train order, and the switch was not equipped with either a target or a lamp. In the interest of safety and in view of the existing conditions, Engineman Daniels should have been operating his train at a much lower rate of speed than is actually believed to have been the case when approaching the switch, and had he done so, even though the switch points were open or cocked, in all probability no serious consequences would have resulted. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. Borland, Director. : Transportation ܀ Library HE 1780 A234 At T 1580 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE FORT WORTH & DENVER CITY RAILWAY AT MEMPHIS, TEXAS, ON OCTOBER 30, 1929. February 24, 1930. To the Commission: On October 30, 1929, there was a side collision between a passenger train and a freight train on the Fort Worth & Denver City Railway at Memphis, Texas, which re- sulted in the death of one employee and the injury of seven passengers, one Pullman porter and five employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Amarillo and Chil- dress Sub-division of the Amarillo Division which extents between Amarillo and Childress, Texas, a distance of 115.1 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred at the foul- ing point at the south end of the passing track at Memphis; the passing track is 3,079.3 feet in length and parallels the main track on the east. Approaching the point of accident from the south there is a 10 curve to the left 2,820 feet in length, followed by tangent track for a distance of 2,094.4 feet, then a 30 21 curve to the right 1,054.2 feet in length, from which point the track is tan- gent to the south passing track switch, a distance of 1,923.7 feet, and for more than a mile beyond that point. The grade at the point of accident is 0.53 per cent de- scending for northbound trains. ་ ན Description Southbound freight train first No. 76 consisted of 32 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 459, and was in charge of Conductor Mitchell and Engineman Ross. This train departed from Lelia Lake, 20.1 miles north of Memphis, at 4.16 p.m., 4 hours and 31 minutes late, and upon arrival at Memphis it headed into the passing track at the north switch and after cutting the train for a highway crossing the head end of the train was pulled forward and brought to a stop with the engine fouling the main track. After standing at this point about 15 minutes a back-up movement was started to recouple the train, and engine 459 was mov- ing at a low rate of speed when it was struck by train No.1. S Nama Ba • - E • 2 1 Northbound passenger train No. 1 consisted of one mail and baggage car, one baggage car, two coaches, one dining car and three Pullman sleeping cars, hauled by en- gine 555, and was in charge of Conductor Gowdy and Engine- man Wire. This train left Estelline, 13.1 miles south of Memphis, at 3.16 p.m., on time, and just after passing the south passing track switch at Memphis it collided with train first No. 76 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 35 and 40 miles per hour. Engine 555 came to rest on its right side west of the main track approximately 175 feet north of the point of collision and was considerably damaged. The tender was upright but remained coupled to the engine. The first car and the forward truck of the second car in train No. 1 were also derailed. Engine 459 was derailed to the east and had its right side badly damaged; the tender and the first car of train first No. 76 were slightly damaged. The em- ployee killed was the engineman of train No. 1. Summary of evidence Engineman Ross, of train first No. 76, stated that upon arrival at Memphis the board was red and he pull- ed into the siding at the north switch; when the engine reached a point about 8 or 10 car-lengths north of the clearance point at the south end of the siding he brought it to a stop. As proceed signals were given at the rear end of his train, he sounded a stop signal and also a signal for flag protection and then moved ahead and stopped with the engine still in the clear; the proceed signals were con- tinued at the rear of the train and he again moved ahead and stopped with the engine fouling the main track, with the pony truck wheels nearly to the frog. He immediately in- structed the fireman to procure flagging equipment and flag train second No. 76 which he knew was closely föblowing his own train; he said he had more time to protect against No.1. The fireman went northward and when he met the head brake- man, who had stopped at the office, they both returned to the engine; at this time it was between 6.25 and 6.30 p.m. Enginoman Ross then instructed Head Brakoman Avery to flag train No. 1, and he also instructed the brakeman to give him a backup signal as soon as train No. 1 came into view; it was his intention then to back the train up and recouple it where it had been cut for a highway crossing. He saw the brakeman start ahead with a burning fusee and a white lantern but did not know how far out he went. After the brakeman started he watched for signals from the rear and shortly before the occurrence of the accident he sounded a backup signal and upon receiving such a signal an attempt was made to back up but the engine wheels S G K 3 1 slipped and before it could be gotten into clear it was struck by train No. 1. He said that while the engine was standing on the turnout the headlight was continuously burning brightly and the rays were reflected almost direct- ly down the main track but in such position that he could not see the track. He did not see train No. 1 approaching although he heard the whistle of that train sounded in acknowledgment of a flag just before the collision occurred. Engineman Ross was of the opinion that he had provided for the proper protection of his train, as there was ample time for Brakeman Avery to get out a sufficient distance, although he did not watch to see how far out the brakeman went and did not know whether he had the flagging equipment required by the rules. man. Fireman Baker, of train first No. 76, corrobo- rated the statements of Engineman Ross concerning the move- ments of their train on the passing track and the whistle signals sounded but was not aware of the fact that the engine fouled the main track until informed by the engine- As instructed by the engineman he secured a red lan- tern, a white lantern, fusees and torpedoes and immediately went back about five or six car-lengths and flagged train second No. 76, which was then approaching on the main track. He met Head Brakeman Avery at this point. When he returned to the engine he noticed that the headlight was shining at an angle of about 250 to the main track. He heard the en- gineman instruct the brakeman to flag train No. 1 and also to give him a back-up signal when No. 1 showed up; the brakeman went ahead carrying a lighted fusee, and two others that were not burning, and started southward. The last time he saw the brakeman he was walking near the south passing track switch. Fireman Baker then boarded the engine, at about 6.30 p.m., and after conversing with the engine- man he crossed over to his side of the cab; a short time later the engineman remarked that train No. 1 was approach- ing. The engineman then sounded the whistle for a back-up movement, and a signal was apparently given as he acknow- ledged it; a back-up movement was started but he did not know how far the engine moved before the collision occurred. His view of the track toward the south was obstructed by some cars on a stock track a short distance ahead. He had not seen train No. 1 approaching but heard two short blasts of its whistle just an instant before the accident. He thought that about 7 or 8 minutes elapsed between the time the brakeman started ahead and the time of the accident. G Head Brakeman Avery, of train 1st No. 76, stated that he was employed as a brakeman on June 30, 1929, and had worked pretty regularly since that time. He opened the switch at the north end of the passing track at Memphis and - 4 - then rode as far as the station, located about midway of the siding; he went into the office, got a clearance card, and then proceeded toward the head end. He said the train was moved ahead on three occasions after it first came to a stop and in the first two instances the engineman sound- ed a stop signal, followed by one long and three short blasts of the whistle. After the final stop he stepped close to the train, looked ahead and it appeared that the engine was fouling the main track. When he arrived at the engine he delivered the clearance card to the engineman and was told by the engineman to go ahead and watch out for train No. 1; the engineman also instructed him that as soon as that train appeared he should transmit a back-up signal; he was not instructed how far to go. He expected to flag train No. 1 if at the time it approached his own train was not clear of the main track. The fireman then gave him a lighted fusee and two that were not lighted and he started walking towards the south. He also had a white electric lantern but did not secure or ask for a red lantern before departing. Upon reaching a point a short distance beyond the passing track switch the fusee burned out and at this time his watch indicated it was 6.33 p.m. He said he con- tinued walking forward and when he reached a point approxi mately five or six car-lengths from his engine; he saw the headlight of train No. 1, which was then in the vicinity of the one-mile board. He lighted a second fusee and after giving his engineman a backup signal with the lantern he walked ahead slowly and started giving stop signals with the fusee and lantern; he continued to give these signals but did not hear them acknowledged. When he realized the approaching train was not going to stop he turned around and ran towards his own train, swinging the fusee behind him. He thought that 4 or 5 minutes elapsed from the time he first saw the headlight until the collision occurred. His reasons for not going farther south were that he thought the headlight of his train which was burning, in addition to his fusee would be ample warning to the crew of the approaching train, and he wanted to be near enough after No. 1 passed to open the switch so that his train could pull out of the siding and proceed. Conductor Mitchell, of train 1st No. 76, stated that the train stopped north of the north passing track switch at 5.55 p.m., and it immediately headed in the sid- ing but was stopped when it lacked five or six car-lengths of being into clear. After giving a signal to pull ahead he heard the engineman sound a stop signal and also a sig- nal for flag protection, but he thought the latter signal was for protection at the head end. The train was then moved forward until the rear end was just into clear. He hurried to a crossing just north of the station, cut the ► เว 5 1 train and again signalled the engineman to pull ahead. After the crossing had been cleared and the train stopped he looked towards the engine and it appeared to be in the clear as the rays of the headlight seemed to shine direct- ly down the track, although the darkness and mist somewhat interfered with the view. He returned to the rear of the train and was at that point when he heard train No. 1 sound a road-crossing signal, at that time he could see a burning fusee ahead of his engine and it appeared to be in line with the rays of the headlight. This fusee was still burning when he saw the headlight of train No. 1 coming around the curve south of the point of accident. Conductor Mitchell said he knew the time-table showed the capactiy of the passing track at Memphis was 60 cars and that his train consisted of 62 cars in addition to the caboose but stated he has had a train of 65 cars and an engine on this siding and cleared a passenger train although there was no crossing cut at that time. .A Flagman Dormire, of train 1st No. 76 stated that after the train pulled into the siding he closed the switch and as the caboose was close to the fouling point he removed a marker to allow train second No. 76 to pass. He then walked down to the crossing for the purpose of recoupling the train but could not see the engine of his train from that point and did not know it was fouling the main track until after the accident. While train No. 1 was approach- ing he saw the flare of a red fusee in the vicinity of his engine. Fireman Allen, of train No. 1, stated that the brakes were tested at Childress and they functioned proper- ly in making the station stop at Estelline, the last stop prior to the accident. Approaching Memphis he was riding in the left side of the cab and maintaining a good lookout. The engineman was on his seatbox and had the side window open and it appeared he was looking ahead from this window. The whistle was sounded for two road crossings in the vicinity of the section house south of the station and then a station signal was sounded. Just after his engine got around the curve south of the point of accident he noticed a light through steam from the stack of his engine, but could not determine exactly where it was. He asked the engineman where it was but the engineman made no reply. He said the brakes were applied only a moment before the collision occurred and at about the same time a whistle signal was sounded but he did not know whether it was in answer to a flag. He had not seen engine 459 as it was on the opposite side of the track from where he was riding. He estimated the speed of the train at 35 or 40 miles per hour, and said it was not reduced to any extent prior to Dur - 6 - HO the accident due to the short time after the brakes were applied. He did not see a fusee or any other signals given in the vicinity of the point of accident but the headlight of his engine was burning brightly and this may have obscured the view. He could not say whether the steam and smoke from the engine interfered with the view of the engineman. The engineman had not complained of feeling ill and appeared to be normal in every respect. Conductor Gowdy, of train No. 1, stated that while approaching Memphis he heard a road crossing whistle and a station whistle signal sounded; he heard no other signals sounded prior to the accident. He felt an applica- tion of the brakes just before the collision occurred but did not think it was an emergency application, and esti- mated the speed of his train to be about 35 or 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident. A very short time after the train stopped he looked at his watch and it was between 6.39 and 6.40 p.m.

had he made any effort to ascertain whether his instructions were being carried out he would have known the flagman was not out far enough to provide proper protection. The fireman of train No. 1 was on the alert as he noticed a light shortly after leaving the curve scuth of the point of accident and called it to the attention of the engineman. According to the statements of the sur- viving members of the crew of train No. 1, the brakes on their train were not applied until just before the colli- sion occurred. No reason can be given for the apparent failure of the engineman to see the headlight of train first No. 76 or the burning fusee held by Brakeman Avery sooner than he did unless steam and smoke from his own engine interfered with his vision, as it evidently did in the case of the fireman. Brakeman Avery had been employed in that capacity for only about 4 months; the other employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of : | 8 S them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportation # f ASTERN TRANSCORTATION Ž 190 Library HE 1780 4234 42- INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION UNIVERSITY OF REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVES- TIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE KISSOURI- KANSAS-TEXAS RAILROAD AT SAVONBURG, KANSAS, ON OCTOBER 31, 1929. o the Commission: 1581 December 6, 1929. " On October 31, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between two freight trains on the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad at Savonburg, Kans. which resulted in the injury of two officials and one employee. This accident was in- vestigated in conjunction with representatives of the Public Service Commission of Kansas. Description Location and method of operation " This accident occurred on the Kansas City Division of the Parsons District, which extends between Kansas City and Parsons, Kans. a distance of 136.8 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders,no block-signal system being in use; under an operating rule trains in the same direction are required to keep 10 minutes apart. The point of accident was 1,575 feet north of the station at Savonburg; approaching this point from the north the track is tangent for a considerable distance, followed by a 20 curve to the right, which is 1,129 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 401 feet from its leaving end. The grade is ascending for south- bound trains for a distance of about 2,000 feet, and is 1.1 per cent ascending at the point of accident. The speed limit for freight trains, according to the time-table instructions, is 30 miles per hour. The weather was clear and it was nearly dark at the time of the accident, which occurred at 6.08 p.m. golently Southbound fourth-class freight train No. 99, which was a local freight train, consisted of 37 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 745, and was in charge of Conductor Maxwell and Engineman Musson. At a station known as Parker, which is 44.8 miles north of Savonburg, the crew received a copy of train order No. 12, Form 19, reading as follows: "No 99 Eng 745 will occupy main track at all stations unprotected by flagman against southward extras." It -2- Train No. 99 left Parker at 10.42 a.m., 1 hour and 10 minutes late, stopped at various points en route, left Elsmore, 3 miles north of Savonburg, at 5.58 p.m., 4 hours and 23 minutes late, and stopped at Savonburg at about 6.01 p.m. in order to do local work, and it was while standing at this point that its rear end was struck by extra 868. Southbound freight train extra 868 consisted of air- brake instruction car 419, 55 freight cars and a caboose, in the order named, hauled by engine 868, and was in charge of Conductor Hicks and Engineman Welker. Extra 868 passed Parker at 4.22 p.m., receiving a copy of train order No.12, Form 19, previously quoted, together with a message from the dispatcher which stated that train No. 99 had passed Mildred, which is 25.4 miles south of Parker and 19.4 miles north of Savonburg. On the arrival of the train at Moran, which is 11.7 miles north of Savonburg, Road Foreman of Engines Tierney and Fuel Supervisor Wyant took charge of the engine, in order to allow the engineman and fireman to go back and ride in the air-brake instruction car, the engineman first turning over to the road foreman the train orders and message he had previously received. As the train was departing from Moran, some additional train orders were handed on, which were not involved in this accident, and also a message from the dispatcher, advising that train No. 99 left Moran at 5.05 p.m. Extra 868 depart- ed from Moran at 5.46 p.m. with Mechanical Engineer Bowers and Head Brakeman Reasor also riding in the cab of the engine, and was approaching the station at Savonburg when it collided with the rear end of train No. 99 while travel- ing at a speed of 43 miles per hour. > The caboose and three rear cars of train No. 99 were demolished, and four other cars in that train were derailed and damaged. Engine 868 was derailed and turned over on its right side, while the air-brake instruction car and the car immediately behind it were damaged to some extent. The officials injured were the road foreman of engines and the mechanical engineer; the employee injured was the head brakeman. Summary of evidence. Conductor Maxwell, of train No. 99, stated that after train order No. 12 had been received, his train occupied the main track at different points without flag protection. While his train was at Moran, he had suggested to the dis- patcher that the latter give the crew of extra 868 a message -3- to the effect that train No. 99 had work to do at Elsmore and Savonburg, and he said the dispatcher replied that he would give them a message telling them the time at which train No. 99 departed from Moran. When train No. 99 left Elsmore, which Conductor axwell said was about 5.55 p.m., the entire train crew was riding in the rider car, which was the third car from the engine, and he said that they arrived at Savonburg at 6.01 p.m., and stopped with the merchandise car, which was the fifth car from the engine, opposite the platform. Conductor Maxwell then received an order giving him time on a following third-class train, No. 275, which was due at that point at 6 p.m.,performed what station work there was to be done, and had given a signal to proceed, but before the train could be started, its rear end was struck by extra 868. The statements of none of the other members of the train or engine crews of train No. 99 brought out any additional facts of importance in connection with the actual operation of their train, except that Flagman Nickell said he lighted the markers when the train was leaving Mildred, which, according to the train sheet, was at 4.02 p.m. The flagman also stated that he rode on the rear of the train from Mildred to Moran, a distance of 7.7 miles, was in the rider car between Moran and Arden, 4.3 miles, was in the caboose from Arden to Els- more, 4.4 miles, and then from Elsmore to Savonburg, a distance of 3 miles, he was again back in the rider car. There was considerable testimony from these employees con- cerning their rights under the protecting order No. 12, which will be briefly referred to later in this report. C Engineman Welker, of extra 868, said that at Parker he received a copy of train order No. 12, Form 19, previously quoted. When his train left Moran, Air Brake Supervisor Vergan came close enough to the engine for Enginemán Welker to speak to him, and Engineman Welker said he asked the air brake supervisor if he should ride in the air brake car to Parker, and the supervisor told him he did not have to do so, but in view of the fact that Engineman Welker wanted to ride in the car, he then asked Road Foreman of Engines Tierney if he could do so and received the necessary permis- sion. Engineman Welker then went back into the air brake car and was still in that car, talking with the air brake supervisor, when the accident occurred. He said that before leaving his engine he turned over to the Road Foreman of Engines Tierney the orders he had received up to that time, together with the message received at Parker, but did not discuss the orders with the road foreman or call his particular attention to the order authorizing train No. 99 to occupy the main track at stations without protection. Fireman Loveless, of extra 868, stated that he read the orders and the message received at Moran, and that after leaving Moran he was told by Fuel Supervisor Wyant that he could go back into the air brake car, which he did, at the same time saying that the local was ahead of them, but addressing this remark to no one in particular. 1 -4- Fireman Loveless said he had seen Road Foreman of Engines Tierney reading some of the orders, but did not have any conversation with him and was not positive that either the road foreman or the fuel supervisor actually read or were accuainted · with the contents of train order No. 12, although he did state that the road foreman was in possession of the message received at Moran, together with the orders, and that after reading them the road foreman handed them to him to read, which he did and then turned them over to the fuel supervisor. Head Brakeman Reasor said that when pulling by the tower at Moran, at which time the road foreman was in charge of the engine, additional orders were received, together with the message saying that train No. 99 left Moran at 5.05 p.m., and he read these orders to the road foreman. Head Brakeman Reasor did not read train order No. 12 to him, but said that when the road foreman took charge of the engine, both Engineman Welker and himself told the road foreman that they had a protecting order on train No. 99. Head Brakeman Reasor further stated that when he read the message and orders received at Moran, he read them aloud to all of those on the engine, and he remarked that they Would have to look out for train No. 99 all the way to Parsons, which statement he said was acknowledged by the fuel supervisor, while the road foreman acknowledged it by saying that he was not sure but that anyway they had a protecting order on the local. It also appeared from statements of the head brakeman that he was riding on the engine as the train approached Savonburg, and that his first knowledge of anything wrong was when Road Foreman of Engines Tierney applied the air brakes in emergency and told them to get off. Road Foreman of Engines Tierney said that before taking charge of the engine at Moran, he had read the order received at Parker giving train No. 99 the right to occupy the main track at stations without protection against following extras, and also had read the message saying that they had passed Kildred. When relieving Engineman Welker at Moran, the engineman handed him the orders which had been previously received, and he also received the message that train No.99 had left Moran at 5.05 p.m. It appeared, however, from the statements of Road Foreman of Engines Tierney, that he did not read this message, nor did he read all of the orders or remember hearing anyone say anything about train No. 99, and after leaving Moran he gave no thought to that train at any time. He operated his own train at a speed which he & -5- said was a little fast, estimating it to have been about 40 or 45 miles per hour, and said that he made no applica- tion of the air brakes, with the possible exception of an application of the independent brake at one point in order to take care of the slack, and his first knowledge of the presence of train No. 99 ahead of him was when he saw two red lights, and on looking at them closely he realized there was a train ahead and immediately applied the air brakes in emergency. The only explanation offered by the road foreman for the occurrence of the collision was that he had forgotten. Fuel Supervisor Wyant said he had been riding on the engine at different points en route, returning to the engine for the last time at Moran, and that he had read all of the orders and messages received, either reading the copies delivered to the engine crew or the copies delivered to the air brake car. Mr. Wyant stated that Engineman Welker delivered his orders to the road foreman of engines, while standing beside the engine at Moran, and to the best of his knowledge the engineman called the road foreman's attention to the fact that the local was ahead of them. Orders also rere received while pulling out of Horan, being delivered to the head brakeman, who in turn unfolded them and handed them to the road foreman, who did not take them but asked the head brakeman to hold them up so that he could read them. The road foreman then read the orders, which were accompanied by a message, and later on, Mr. Wyant saw the road foreman take out of his pocket the orders he had received from Engineman Welker and look them over, and he therefore supposed the road foreman was fully acquainted with the orders which had been received. In addition, Mr Wyant also stated that while there was no discussion of the orders among those on the engine, vet when the fireman left the engine to go back to the air brake car, the fireman remarked that the local was ahead of them and that they would have to look out for it. Fuel Super- visor Wyant was riding on the seat box on the left side of the engine, and as the train approached Savonburg he was watching the road foreman closely, expecting that he would reduce the speed, which was from 40 to 45 miles per hour. The road foreman at that time was sitting on the engineman's seat box, looking out of the window across the curve in the general direction of the station, and had every appearance of being about to apply the air brakes, but Mr. Wyant said K -6- he did not make any move to do so until suddenly he applied the brakes in emergency. Mr. Wyant then crossed over to the engineman's side and saw the rear end of train No.99 immediately ahead of them. It further appeared from Mr. Wyant's statements that he had been closely associated with the road foreman for many years and considered him to be an expert in the handling of trains, and he said the road foreman appeared to be in normal mental condition.· on the day of the accident. He also stated that the road foreman was not ungated in conversation with Mechanical Engineer Bovers, who at that time as standing beside the road foreman. The statements of the train crew of extra 868 brought out no additional facts of importance concerning the oper- ation of their train or the handling of the various train orders and messages involved. Conductor Hicks, who had been riding in the caboose as the train was approaching Horan, had started over the train towards the head end and had reached a point about 15 cars back from the engine when the train left Moran, and he said that by the time he had reached the air brake car, both the engineman and fireman were in there. Air Brake Supervisor Vergan stated that the air brake car was equipped with various recording instruments for the purpose of enabling the car to be operated behind all engineman in freight service, with the idea of checking air brake performance and eliminating break-in-twos, flat wheels, etc. An increase in break-in-twos had been noted on the Parsons District, and it was for this reason that the air brake car was being operated in this territory at the time of the accident. While looking over the air brake equipment at Moran, Mr. Vergan met Eigineman Welker at the side of the engine and told him he had operated the air properly and that it would not be necessary for him to ride in the air brake car. The engineman replied, how- ever, that he would like to do so, and about the time the train was leaving Moran the engineman and fireman came back into the car. Mr. Vergan had not read the orders himself, but said he asked all those in the car if the orders were understood, this being his practice whenever a crew is changed. He then began explaining to Enginoman Welker how he had handled the train, and about the time he had finish- ed talking with the engineman he looked out of the rindow to ascertain his location, saw mile post 105, and immediate- ly glanced at the speedometer to see if the speedometer was correct at the milepost. At about this time the air brakes applied in emergency and he at once announced this fact, supposing at the time that it was due to a break-in-two. -77- The collision occurred 13 seconds after the brake valve had been placed in the emergency position, by which time the speed of the train had been reduced from 47 miles per hour to 43 miles per hour, and he said the distance between the point where the brakes were applied and the point of colli- sion was approximately 2/10 of a mile. Mr. Vergan further stated that about two hours after the accident he looked over the train in company with a car foreman and found the brakes still applied on all of the cars in the train with one exception, and in this one case the brakes had leaked off. Kā Conductor Maxwell, of train No. 99, was questioned in detail concerning the protection afforded his train at various points en route, and it appeared that there had been irregularities at Beagle, Mildred, and Savonburg, Work was done at Beagle, which is 7 miles north of Parker, but the train occupied the main track at that point without flag protection, the conductor saying that he had called up the dispatcher and had been informed that there was nothing behind him and that he would get a protecting order when he left Parker. Train order No. 12 was received at Parker, as promised by the dispatcher, and after that time, work was done at various stations en route without flag protection, this being in accordance with the pro- visions of the order. At Mildred, At Mildred, however, it was necessary to back out of the siding, and on account of its being a bad location for such a movement, Conductor Maxwell inquired of the dispatcher before the back-up movement was started as to what southbound trains might be behind him, and then made the movement without flag protection, although the protecting order he had previously received did not relieve him of protecting a back-up movement. It further appeared that his train arrived at Savonburg at 6.01 p.m., and that train No. 275, a following train of superior class, was due there at 6 p.m., and when questioned as to that protection he had at Savonburg against train No. 275, Conductor laxwell replied that he had talked with the dispatcher and had been told that train No. 275 would not leave Moran before 9 p.m.; this was the only protection he had against train No. 275 upon his arrival at Savonburg, and at that point he received an order giving him time on that train. 1 A great deal of testimony was taken from the various members of the two crews as to the meaning of train order No. 12, particularly with reference to the requirements of a state law which was read into the record and which provides in part that when a train is occupying the main track it must be protected "against approaching trains at all times" regardless of block signals or yard limit boards, by a com- petent flagman with both visible and audible signals; there was also considerable testimony as to where the rear end of a train could stand, and still be relieved under the , - 5 -8- protecting order. For all practical purposes, a sumary of the statements of most of the various witnesses in re- gard to these matters may be had from the statements of Conductor Maxwell, of train No. 99, who said that in his opinion train order No. 12, which directed his train to occupy the main track at all stations unprotected against following extras, meant just what it said; that the use of such orders was a matter of custom, and that extra 868 should have approached under control, expecting to find train No. 99 occupying the main track without flag protec- tion. As to the application of the state law, Conductor Maxwell said that all he knew about it was based on conver- sation he had heard among the employees; to the best of his knowledge, he had never read the law, did not know when it took effect, did not know personally that there was such a law, and he said he had no intention of violating any law or rule, When questioned as to where the caboose could have been standing and still be protected under the order, Conductor Maxwell said that no instructions on this point had been issued, nor had he discussed it with the rules examiner, but his understanding was that his train would be protected while doing its work in the usual manner, even up to the maximum length of the train, and even though at some stations the caboose might be inside of the switches and at other points it might be outside of the switches. Not all of the itnesses, however, agreed with the statements of Conductor Maxwell, as expressed in the preced- ing paragraph. The fireman of train No. 99, for instance, thought his train would be protected under the order if it were standing at any point inside of the whistling post, and the flagman of that train seemed to be of the same opinion. The conductor, head brakeman and flugman, of extra 868, seemed to think that the protecting order would relieve a crew only when standing between the switches, although the conductor stated that in the past, when in possession of such an order, he had allowed his train to go without protection, even when outside the switches, provided the track behind the caboose was straight for a considerable distance. In the case of the accident under investigation, however, he thought the rear end of train No. 99 should have been protected by flag, because of the difficulty in seeing at a time of day when it was just getting dark, coupled with the curvature of the track, and his flagman also stated that he thought the curvature was sufficient to require flag protection. The fact that all employees might not be of the same mind when operating trains under orders of this kind seems to have been recognized several years previously, when instructions were issued to the division superintend- ents over the signature of Vice-President and General Manager McGee. These instructions, issued on December 29, 1924, read as follows: -9- "The practice of relieving fourth class trains from protecting by flag- men at their regular and flag stops by giving them an order that all extras following them will wait at a certain station until a certain time, has been misinterpreted, as relieving these trains from flagging while making stops between stations. "In order to avoid such a misconstruc- tion and also to prevent tying up extras that may be following up these fourth class trains at unexpected times, train orders covering should be changed to read as follows: "No. will occupy main track at regular and flag stop unpro- tected by flagman against infer- ior extras south (or north). This order annulled after P.M. or A.M.) " Dispatcher Hillman, when questioned about the state- ment of Conductor laxwell that he had occupied the ain track at Beagle without protection, after ascertaining from the dispatcher that there was nothing behind him, said that this was not the usual practice, and yet he felt that under such circumstances the conductor would be relieved of flag- ging. When asked if there was any rule to that effect, he replied as follows: "Rule reads when trains expected that they shall flag. If he ascertained that no trains were due, it would relieve him." The dispatcher was also questioned about the operation of train No. 99 on the time of train No. 275, a superior train, and he stated that train No. 99 had verbal authority for the movement and that it could keep on going until it received orders. It was not his practice, however, to run inferior trains ahead of other trains on verbal orders, and he said that according to the rules, a train order should be obtained for such a movement. It further appeared from the dispatcher's statements that very few extra trains were operated in this particular territory, the majority of trains being scheduled movements, and this statement was verified by a check of the train movements for the 50 days immediately prior to the date of the accident, which indi- cated that on the average the movement of extra trains in this territory was only slightly more than one such train daily in each direction. G -10- With regard to the question of how far the rear end of a train could stand from a station without flag protect- ion, providing the crew was in possession of the usual protecting order, Train Rules Examiner Wachker said that there were so many factors governing the question that when the instructions were issued allowing the use of the protect- ing order, the officials did not undertake to fix any definite distance, leaving it to the local officers to deter- mine, according to the conditions on their particular districts, and he said that whenever anyone inquired about the matter he would tell the inquirer to look for the rear of the train at a point a long train-length from where the head end of the train would stop in order to do its work. r. Wachker also stated that the local freight men were told that whenever the view was obscured within a distance of 750 feet from their rear end, they should assist the following train, although this "ould not in any way relieve the following train from responsibility. It also appeared from Mr. Wachker's statements that the protecting order had been in use for a number of. years, and in his opinion there had not been as many rear-end collisions since its adoption. Mr. Wachker also made the statement that prior to the occur- rence of this accident he had not known anything about the requirements of the state law as to flagging, and that he did not examine the employees on the requirements of various laws. MAR Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Road Foreman of Engines Tierney, who was acting as engineman, to read all of the orders affecting the movement of his train, as a result of which he was moving at a high rate of speed when approaching a station where a train was occupying the main track without flag protection. The evidence in this case indicated quite clearly that for several years it had been the practice on this line to relieve the crews of local freight trains from the necessity of protecting their trains while occupying the main track at stations, the evident purpose being to enable the flagman to be used in connection with the station work. This prac- tice was carried out through the issuance of orders direct- ing the train involved to occupy the main track at all stations unprotected by a flagman against following extras. It further appears that this practice was well understood. by all concerned, and it was in accordance with this prac- tice that such orders were issued to the crew of train No. 99 and copies furnished to the crew of extra 868. After the issuance of this order and while the train was at Moran, Road Foreman of Engines Tierney relieved Engineman Welker so that the latter could ride in the air brake car immed- iately behind the engine. The orders then in the possession Stadt -11- ** of Engineman Welker, together with a message, were turned over to the road foreman, but for some unknown reason he failed to read all of the orders, including the one author- izing the local to occupy the main track without protection, and he also failed to read the message which would have reminded him that the local freight train was ahead of him. It also appears that when looking over orders received as his train was leaving Moran, the road foreman again failed to look them over carefully, and in some way did not notice the message issued at that point, which stated that train No. 99 had left Moran at 5.05 p.m. Some of the evidence indicated that the road foreman had been reminded of the presence of the local. Fireman Loveless said that when relieved by the fuel supervisor, he(the fireman) remarked that the local was ahead of them, which statement was verified by the fuel supervisor; the latter also said that he thought the engineman spoke to the road foreman about it, while the head brakeman said that both he and the engineman had told the road foreman that they had a protecting order on train No. 99. The engineman, however, said he did not call the road foreman's attention to the protecting order, and at the time the road foreman was questioned, which was in the hospital, he did not re- member that anyone had said anything about the local. He admitted that he knew of the protecting order having been put out at Parker, which was more than seven hours prior to the accident, and said that he subsequently overlooked the preceding train. The statements of the road foreman and the engine- man did not agree exactly as to the conversation which took place at the time the orders were transferred, but it seems apparent that at the most there was only some general con- versation between the two men. Rule 220 prescribes a definite method for turning over orders to a relieving engineman, there being a provision which says that all grain orders and instructions must be delivered to the relieving engineman, and must be compared by the conductor and engine- man before proceeding. Road Foreman of Engines Tierney had placed himself in the position of a relieving engineman, and in view of the fact that he occupied an official position, he should have been particularly careful to set an example in obedience to the rules. No statement was obtained from Mechanical Engineer Bowers, who was riding on the engineman's side and was among those injured in the accident, but Fuel Supervisor Wyant and Head Brakeman Reasor had seen the orders and were fully acquainted with the situation. They were riding on the fireman's side of the engine, however, when approaching Savonburg, and could not see what was ahead of them, but -12- apparently they had every reason to believe that the road foreman knew what was transpiring; Fuel Supervisor Wyant also said that he had been watching the road foreman close- ly, expecting him to reduce speed at any moment. Notwith- standing these facts, however, it does not seem as if either of these men was justified in failing at least to say something about the presence of the local freight train ahead of them, and it is believed that had either of them said anything at all, instead of leaving the whole thing to the road foreman, who was operating the train considerably in excess of the speed limit, it is possible that the acci- dent might have been averted. The form of protecting order used in this case, al- though not strictly in accordance with the instructions issued by the vice-president and general manager in 1924, has been in use for years and appears to have been well understood. There was a conflict of opinion between the witnesses, however, as to where the rear end of a train could be standing and still be at a station within the mean- ing of the order. Some witnesses thought it meant between the switches; others that it applied when inside of the whistling posts, and others took the view that it applied whenever a train was standing where it normally would stand in order to do its regular work, even though this might cause the rear end of the train to be outside of the switches. The last-mentioned idea seems to have been the one intended by the management. The providing of proper flag protection, however, is one of the most fundamental principles of railroading, and when some substitute is adopted, then the utmost care should be exercised in its application. In the case here under consideration, differ- ences of opinion such as those just referred to, could lead easily to the creation of a dangerous situation, and parti- cularly would this be the case if the number of extra trains in operation were larger than is the case on this particular division. If the use of this form of order is to be continued, then the necessary instructions should be issued to insure that all concerned have a uniform under- standing as to their rights when operating under such an order. C There is a question as to whether the existence of the practice of relieving the flagman of local freight trains did not have a more or less direct bearing on the irregular- ities noted in connection with the handling of train No. 99 at Beagle, where it occupied the main track without flag -13- ↑ protection and before the protecting order had been issued; at Mildred, where a back-up movement was made without flag protection, and at Savonburg, where the train was on the time of a following superior class train without flag protection, having nothing but verbal authority from the dispatcher. There is no question as to the fact that the conductor, through the dispatcher, was watching out for following trains, but this does not alter the fact that the requirements of the rules should be paramount, and unless modified by written instructions from recognized authority, they should be enforced and obeyed. All the employees involved were men with long experience, that of Road Foreman of Engines Tierney extend- ing over a period of 50 years in engine service, and none of the employees had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. › Transportation : Library HE 1780 4234 1582 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY AT LICK BRANCH, W. VA., ON NOVEMBER 1, 1929. November 30, 1929. To the Commission: On November 1, 1929, there was a rear end collision between two freight trains on the Norfolk and Western Railway at Lick Branch, W. Va., which resulted in the in- jury of two employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Pocahontas Division extending between Bluefield, W. Va., and William- son, W. Va., a distance of 105 miles; this is a double track line over which trains a re operated by time- table, train orders, and an automatic block signal system. On that portion of the division extending between Bluefield and Iaeger, a distance of 57.2 miles, electric locomotives as well as steam locomotives are used, the trains involved in this accident being hauled by electric locomotives. The accident occurred on the westbound track 1,303 feet west of automatic block signal 3807, located at Lick Branch. Approaching this point from the east there is a series of short curves and tangents, a compound curve to the right, 30 for 812 feet and 1° 15' for 678 feet, is fol- lowed by a tangent 612 feet in length on which the accident occurred, the point of accident being 305 feet from the eastern end of this tangent. Beginning at Ruth, approxi- mately 3.6 miles east of the point of accident, there is a descending grade for westward trains, the gradient varying from a maximum of 2.40 per cent to 1.475 per cent at the point where the collision occurred. M GUND 12 The track in the vicinity of the point of accident is laid with 130 pound rail, about 3 feet in length, with an average of 20 hardwood ties to the rail, is rock-ballasted and well maintained; it extends through an open cut and along the north bank of a greek. Just east of the point of collision a precipitous rock cut rises about 50 feet at the north side of the track, restricting the vision of enginemen of westbound trains approaching the point of accident to about 660 feet. Day was just breaking, and it was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at 6.20 a.m. i : + - 2 - : Description Westbound extra 2513 cmsisted of 34 cars of coal and a caboose, hauled by electric locomotive 2513, and was in charge of Conductor Snider and Engineman Edwards. This train was assembled at Flat Top Yard and was en route to Eckman; it had been flagged at Lick Branch at about 6.10 a.m. on account of a train ahead making a crossover movement, and it was just preparing to proceed when struck by extra west 2504. Westbound extra 2514, consisting of 28 loaded cars and a caboose, hauled by electric lɔcɔmotive 2514, in charge of Conductor Allen and Engineman Lyons, left Bluefield at 4.58 a.m., and proceeded to Flat Top Yard where 12 cars loaded with coal were picked up, making a total train weight of 2403 tons leaving Flat Top. After picking up these cars at Flat Top this train proceeded to Bluestone, where electric locomotive 2514 was exchanged for electric loco- motive 2504. Extra 2504 left Bluestone at 5.54 a.m., and while descending the grade west of Ruth the speed of this train was being controlled at a rate of about 14 miles per hour by means of electric or regenerative braking. Block signal 3801 indicated "caution", and block signal 3807 indicated "stop". When the block signal in stop position was seen by the engineman he attempted to apply the air brakes on the train and he then shut off the motor, but the brakes failed to operate and the speed of the train began to increase. Extra 2504 passed block signal 3807 in stop position, and the flagman of extra west 2513, and collided with the rear end of train extra west 2513, while running at an estimated speed of 20 miles per hour. S At the time of the accident the engineman of extra 2513 had just released the air brakes; this train was driven ahead a distance. of about 15 feet. The caboose and three rear cars of extra 2513, and the motor and three head cars of extra 2504 were derailed and together with the fourth car were badly damaged. The employees injured were the engineman and head brakeman of extra 2504. Summary of evidence Conductor Snider of extra 2513 stated that his train was stopped at Lick Branch at about 6.10 a.m.; after the stop was made Flagman Davidson went back to flag and he opened an angle cock on the rear end for the purpose of holding the brakes applied and then made an inspection of his train. He said that he had completed the inspection and was in his caboose when he heard a train whistling for brakes about three minutes after the angle cock was closed; he saw the headlight of extra 2504 approaching and he jumped off when that train was within 5 or 6 car lengths of his caboose. He thought its speed at the time was about 20 - 3- ! i miles per hour. It was just breaking day at the time of collision and he fixed the time of the accident at about 6.20 a.m. He also said that the marker lights were burning on his caboose at the time and that Flagman Davidson was · back a sufficient distance to protect the train. Engineman Edwards of extra 2513 stated that he was flagged just east of Ennis by extra 2503 east which was crossing over from the westbound to the eastbound main track. When he tried to start the train he found that the brakes were applied; shortly afterwards his conductor came up and told him that he had an angle cock open on the rear and that he should proceed when it was closed. He had just gotten brake pipe pressure pumped up and the brakes re- leased when there was a jar in his train which knocked it ahead about 15 feet, and at the same time the brakes went into emergency. He said that he had heard a motor blowing for brakes. He went to the scene of the accident where he met Engineman Lyons of 2504 who told him that he had no air on extra 2504, and he just got a "spit" at the brake valve. It was cloudy but not raining and just breaking daylight when the accident occurred. He stated that when coming west from the tunnel near Coaldale he did not make an application of the air to test the brakes when starting down the grade; that he knows this running test is required by the rules but it is not made on trains hauled by electric locomotives on the Pocahontas divisi on. 1 Flagman Davidson of extra 2513 stated that his train stopped at Lick Branch about 6.10 a.m.; he went back to protect his train and stationed himself at the point of curve just west of block signal 3807 which was in stop. position. At this point he could see an approaching train a distance of about 30 car lengths, and he was about 20 or 25 car lengths from the rear of his train. At the time extra 2504 came in sight it appeared to be running at about 14 miles per hour; when it passed him it was making about 16 or 17 miles per hour and increasing speed until the time of collision when he estimates the speed at about 20 miles an hour. He fl.ggod extra 2504 from the time it came into sight but did not remember that his signals were acknowledged. He saw no fire flying from the wheels or other indication of braking on the train. Immediately after the collision he walked to the hend end of extra 2504, and as he went he noticed that the brakes were then applied. He came back along the train some 40 minutes later and the brakes were still applied on some of the cars. When the train passed him he saw Brakemen Jack son and Lusk setting hand brakes on the first and second cars. He stated that the engineman of extra 2504 whistled for brakes 5 or 6 times from the time he came into sight of the signal in stop position until he was 3 or 4 car lengths from the rear end of extra 2513. He also stated that he was back far enough to afford ample 1 4 : 44 protection to his trai n, that it was the distance from which he had flagged trains before at this point and that they had always before stopped at a safe distance behind his train. • Engineman Lyons of extra 2504 stated that he left Bluefield with 28 loads and a caboose; brake pipe leakage on this train leaving Bluefield was 3 pounds per minute and the air brakes were working properly. At Flat Top 12 more cars were picked up, the brakes on these cars were inspected, tested and reported to be operating properly. He then pro- ceeded to Bluestone where he stopped for the purpose of changing engines. In making the stop at Bluestone he stated that he used the automatic brake, making one re- duction wher approaching Bluestone and making a second brake pipe reduction in order to stop at the proper point. He said he did not notice the amount of brake pipe reduction for this stop but thought it must have been between 15 and 20 pounds. Engine 2514 was cut off and engine 2504 coupled to his train; he handled both locomotives in making this change which he thought consumed a period of about seven minutes. After engine 2504 Was coupled to the train, he said that he gave the brakes time to release; with the large capacity feed valve now in use no reduction of brake pipe pressure is indicated on the gauge if the angle cocks are turned slowly when the air is cut through after an opera- tion of this character. As engine 2504 was coupled to the train and the air was cut through, or he thought it was cut through, the brakes did not apply on the engine; he thought he moved the brake valve to release position once or twice for not more than 2 seconds each time, but with the large capacity feed valve used it is not necessary to go to release position in order to release the brakes. test of the brakes was made at that point after coupling on engine 2504 but he thought it would have been impossible for him to have left there without air or with the brakes ap- plied on the train. He stated he had no difficulty in starting, and the ampere readings of the meters were just about normal for a train of the t character while ascending the grade between Bluestone and Ruth. He did not make a ny running test of the brakes after leaving Bluestone and be- fore starting down the grade west of Ruth as it has not been the practice to make such tests on trains hauled by electric motors. He stated that he changed over to regenerating position just as his train entered the tunnel at the summit of the grade at Ruth for the purpose of controlling the speed of the train on the descending grade westward. Approaching Lick Branch they received a yellow signal or caution indi- cation and the next signal was red, indicating "stop". AS soon as Helper Clark could see the stop signal from his side of the motor, he called "Red board". Engineman Lyons said he immediately made an application of the brakes but the brake valve exhaust seemed to be too short for a No - 5 : long train and he remarked that he did not believe they had much air; he made a second reduction and the pressures equalized so quickly that he knew he did not have a large amount of air but thought he had enough to hold the train. He then moved the brake valve to emergency position, and he cut off the regenerative braking as he thought he would be able to stop with the emergency application. However, the speed of the train immediately began to increase and he then tried to get back into regenerating position, and he also sounded the whistle signal for brakes several times. In the short distance remaining he was unable to regain control of his train by means of regenerative braking. The speed continued to increase and he jumped off just be- fore the collision occurred, when he thought the speed was about 20 miles per hour. He said he did not think it necessary to make a test of the air brakes at Bluestone as required by the rules, and he regarded it as impractical to make the running test just before starting over the sum- mit of the grade at Ruth; as to the practicability of making a running test after starting over the summit he expressed no opinion. He further stated that in descending grades with electric locomotives the regenerating feature holds the speed of the train to 14 miles per hour while descending, but cannot be used to bring the train to a stop, and he considered it just as essential to have the air brakes on a train handled by an electric locomotive in good condition as on a train handled by a steam locomotive. While he could not state the cause of the brak es failing to operate on his train, he thought somebody had closed an angle cock about three or four cars behind the locomotive immediately before he undertook to use the brakes, or that it worked closed due to vibration or the slack action of the train. The statement of Fireman Clark of extra 2504 was sub- stantially the same as that of Engineman Lyons regarding the trip to Bluestone, where he said that not over five minutes were consumed in changing engine 2514 for engine 2504. He did not know whether the brakes were left ap- plied on his train or not when engine 2514 was detached to exchange engines; from the time the stop was made until after engine 2504 had been coupled on and started to leave Bluestone he was performing other duties and knew nothing of the manipulation or condition of the air brakes at that point during the change of engines. He also said tha t while the rules require an air brake test be made after changing engines, sometimes it is done and sometimes it is not done at Bluestone, and he did not think it neces- sary to comply with this rule at all times. tɔ He further stated that after leaving Bluestone there was no occasion to apply the brakes at any time until they were near Lick Branch store where they saw a red block signal and a flagman; at that time they were descending the grade at a speed of about 14 miles per hour, in regeneration; Engine- - 6 S : man Lyons placed the brake valve in emergency position, shut off the electric motor, whistled for hand brakes, and then tried to get back into regeneration, calling to him that he had no air. He further stated that he did not notice any indications of the air brakes taking hold on the motor or the cars, and that after the motor was shut off the speed of extra 2504 increased until the rear end of extra 2513 was struck, at which time he estimated it at about 20 miles per hour. He also said that it is not customary, when starting to descend the grade at Ruth, to make a running test of the air brakes in compliance with rule 387; he did not know if it would be practical but said that it could be done; the rule requires it and if the rule had been complied with in this case the condition of the train brakes would have been known. Conductor Allen of extra 2504 stated that he was not informed of the condition of the air brakes on his train before leaving Bluefield. He did not know whether an air test was made at Flat Top Yard where 12 loads were picked up, as he was getting car numbers, but he noticed when leaving Flat Top that the pressure on the caboose gauge registered somewhere rear 70 pounds; they then proceeded to Bluestone where engine 2514 was exchanged for engine 2504. He did not know how the train was stopped at Bluestone, and he did not look at the caboose gauge when stopping or during the interval they were there. He thought not more than 5 or 6 minutes were consumed in changing engines; during this time he was in the caboose writing, and he thought no air brake test was made, but he did not look at the air gauge until extra 2504 was leaving Bluestone, when he noticed that it registered about 70 pounds. He further stated that a running test of the brakes was not made when over the sum- mit of the grade at Coaldale tunnel, that after leaving Bluestone the brakes were not applied at any time until after the collision occurred. He stated that if a reduc- tion had been made with the automatic brake valve at the summit of the grade near Ruth to test the condition of the brakes and they did not respond there would have been plenty of time to have stopped the train by other means when their attention was called to it. The first information he had of the collision was after the train came to a stop at which time the caboose gauge showed 40 pounds brake pipe pressure and was going down as if an air hose had burst; he went forward along the train looking for a burst hose and when within about 10 or 12 car lengths of the head end he saw the wreckage. He said that the speed of his train while coming down the grade from Coaldale tunnel was about 14 miles per hour until the engineman shut off the motor at the red board (signal 3807), and that it had increased to about 20 miles per hour when the accident Occurred. He thought nothing of this since enginemon often shut off regeneration at this point to increase the speed. He thought that the emergency application of the brakes was · 7 not made until after the train collided with the rear of extra 2513 and was the result of the broken brake pipe. Head Brakeman Lusk of extra 2504 stated that the middle brakeman tested the air brakes on the 12 loads picked up at Flat Top. When the stop was made at Bluestone to change engines he thought a heavy application of the auto- matic brake was made because he noticed coal and sand dust flying about cars in train. He stated that when engine 2514 was detached he closed one angle cock and the middle brakeman closed the other and that when engine 2504 was coupled to the train and the air hose coupled Brakeman Jackson turned the angle cock on one side and he turned it on the engine. He stated that he heard no release of the train brakes at this time or afterwards, and that the train started without any trouble. On leaving Bluesto ne he rode the rear end of motor 2504 to a point just west of Lick Branch store where the engineman called for brakes and he climbed back on the cars and he and Middle Brakeman Jackson doubled on the first two brakes after which he set the brakes on the third car and rode the middle of the fourth car into the wreck. When he came out of the rear of the motor to set hand brakes he did not notice the position of the angle cocks, and he saw no one on the train but the middle brakeman. Middle Brakeman Jackson of extra 2504 stated that he tested the brakes on the 12 cars picked up at Flat Top and the brakes were working on all these cars. When the stop was made at Bluestone for the purpose of changing engines he did not know whether the automatic brake was used or not, or whether the train brakes were set or re- leased before detaching engine 2514 from or after coupling extra 2504 to the train. He stated that when engine 2504 was coupled to the train he turned the angle cock handle on the right side and that Brakeman Lusk was on the left side of the motor; but he heard no release of the brakes at that time, and no air brake test was made before leav- ing that point. After leaving Bluestone he and Brakeman Lusk rode in the back of the motor until the whistle was sounded for hand brakes a short distance west of Lick Branch store when he and Brake man Lusk ran out on the train and doubled on the hand brakos on the two head cars which were together; he did not look for a closed angle cock when he went out of the motor. He further said that when setting the two brakes he had to take up some of the slack in the brake rigging by hand which would indicate to him that the air brake ras not applied at that time. He climbed down and got off as the collision occurred and afterward proceeded along the entire remaining portion of the train looking for a closed angle cock, but found none; during this trip to the rear all the pistons he saw were out, indicating that the brakes were then applied. He thought the speed of the train had increased to about 18 or 20 miles per hour at the time of the collision. Cat CO Rear Brakeman Brown stated that the train brakes were applied at Bluestone because the stop was slightly rough and he and the conductor mentioned it; the pressure on the air gauge went back about.10 pounds. He also stated that the train brakes were released during this time, but he could not say which engine released the brakes as he re- mained in the caboose while the train was standing at Blue- stone. He further stated that after lerving Bluestone and while proceeding westward he looked at the air gauge in the caboose several times and that it showed about 70 pounds pressure until the final stop was made when it showed 40 pounds and was still going down when he went back to flag. The statements of other members of the crew of extra 2513 and members of the train crew of extra 2503 who saw the collision or were familiar with events leading up to it corroborated some of the statements of employees who were directly involved. A number of them heard the whistle-signals for brakes which were sounded by Engineman Lyons of extra 2504 and stated that the speed of that train was increasing as it approached the point of accident. The consensus of opinion was that the speed of thet train was about 20 miles per hour at the time of collision. None of them saw any indication of the brakes being applied on that train prior to the accident, but several persons noticed that they were applied after the accident. According to the statements of Air Brake Inspector Farmer and Air Brake Repairer Catron, the 28 cars which left Bluefield in extra 2514 on the morning of the accident were inspected and the brakes found to be in good condition; brake pipe leakage was 3 pounds per minute. A test was made by charging the brake pipe from an air line and making an application by breaking the hose connection. After the engine was coupled on, en application and release test was made. Engineer of Tests Coddington stated that on the day following the accident all of the cars which were in extra 2504 at the time of the accident except the motor and the first four cars were assembled at Eckman yard and arranged in the sand order as they were at the time of the accident. The brake pipe was charged to a pressure of 71 pounds and a 15 pound reduction was made. All cars were inspected and it was found that all brakes applied and piston travel ranged from 5 to 9 inches. The brake pipe leakage was 4 pounds in 1 minute and 22 pounds in 12 minutes, the time required for the inspection. A release was then made and all brakes released properly. The engine was then shifted from the head end to the rear end of the cars and the tests were repeated, with similar results. After this test the brake pipe was again charged to 71 pounds pressure, the angle cock was closed and the brake pipe was discon- nected from the engine. Observations were made to determine 9 whether or not any of the brakes would apply as a result of brake pipe leakage. After a period of 5 minutes, one brake applied. No additional brakes applied during a total period of 40 minutes. An emergency application was then made by opening the angle cock on the herd end of the cars, as a result of which all brakes applied. The period of 40 minutes was selected as corresponding to the period from the time extra 2504 stopped at Bluestone to change locomotives to the time of the accident. An in- spection of the running gear and drivers of locomotive 2504 disclosed evidence of heavy braking on all drivers of both units. This was disclosed not only by the ap- pearance of the driver tires but also by the surfaces of the brake shoes. General Air Brake Inspector Looney stated that the rules in effect covering operation and maintenance of air brakes on the Norfolk and Western Railway were contained in rule books M.P. 229, M.P. 294 and the rules adopted as standard by the American Railway Association in 1923 and by the N & W Ry. on October 14, 1924. He stated that he is familiar with the A.R.A. rules for operation and maintenance of air brakes adopted in 1925, and understands that they are the minimum requirements accepted by the Interstate Commerce Commission. He said that the 1935 rules had been put in effect on his line as far as the maintenance of air brakes is concerned but not with re- spect to train or engine crews. Engine and train crews are governed by the rules adopted October 14, 1924, which he thinks are sufficient. He stated that if the conductor of extra 2504 was not notified as to condition of brakes on the train as it left Bluefield, rule 28 was not fully observed. He ap- proves of making air tests by breaking the hose, but said that practice does not comply with existing rules. In regard to the operation at Bluestone, he said that according to the statements made at the hearing rule 31 of their rules was not observed at that point. After listening to all evidence, and with his general knowledge of air brakes, it was his opinion that an angle cock was left closed next to the engine at Bluestone, which caused the accident. He said that because of the slow leakage he did not think the brakes would creep on. This was further indicated by the test made of the train of extra 2504 at Eckman on the next day. He was present when Engineman Lyons' statement was taken in the hospital; Engineman Lyons had made a positive statement that he stopped the train at Bluestone with the automatic brake and left the broke applied when engine was detached; he did not know whether Engineman Lyons' statement might be influenced on account of his responsibility and he did not know whether Engineman Lyons was sufficiently in possession of his 10 G + faculties to make proper statement. proper statement. However However, if this were true he could not have gotten away from Bluestone. He further stated that enginemen are taught to stop long trains on level track with the independent brake. The air broke inspector at Bluestone had examined the air brake equipment on motor 2504 prior to the trip when accident occurred and did not find anything wrong at that time; after the accident the equipment was damaged to such an extent that it was impossible to make an examination. He examined the driving-wheel tires and brake shoes after the accident, and they showed evidence of having been subjected to severe braking. On November 6 he and Division Car Inspector Jest made an examination of the brake pipe, air hose and angle cocks on the wrecked motor and cars, that they located all rir hose and angle cocks on both units of motor 2504, angle cocks and air hose on the third car in train and the air hose and angle cocks from A end of second car in train, which were all found in good condition with the angle cocks open; they were unable to locate the angle cock or air hose from B end of second cer in train. They located the angle cock and air hose from A end of the car which had been next to the motor end the hose was in good condition except that the outer surface was cut as the result of collision; however, the angle cock was closed and it evidently had been struck by some- thing which broke the lug off the safety lock and forced the handle slightly beyond closed position as was indicated by an impression on angle cock handle. Conclusions This accident was caused by a runaway freight train due to a closed angle cock in the brake pipe at the head end of the first car behind the locomotive, and failure to make proper air brake tests which would have disclosed this condition after the locomotives were changed at Blue- stone or before starting down the grade on which the ac- cident occurred. S The rules in effect required that an application and release test be made when a locomotive is changed and that a running test be made before a train starts from the summit of a grade such as is here involved. Neither of these tests was made; had either of these tests been made the fact that an angle cock was closed would have been discovered in time to avert the accident. The fact that an angle cock was left closed when extra 2504 departed from Bluestone was clearly established by the investigation. When locomotive 2514 was changed for locomotive 2504, the air hose were coupled and un- coupled and angle cocks manipulated by Brakeman Lusk on one side and Brakeman Jackson on the other. However, 2.0- cording to their statements each of them claimed that he 11 - 4:1 opened the engle cock on motor 2504 when it was attached to the train and it does not appear that either of ther opened the angle cock on the herd end of the first car. As a result of the emergency application made by Engineran Lyons just before the accident occurred the brakes on cars of the train did not apply, as there was no fire flying from the car wheels and brake shoes, the conductor who was in the caboose said there was no brake application after leaving Bluestone until after the collision occurred, and when the brakeman set the hand brakes on the first two cars the slack in the brake rigging had to be taken up; however, there was unmistakable evidence of severe braking on the motors. These facts definitely located the stoppage in the brake pipe between the motor and first car. When the angle cock from the forward end of the first car was later recovered it was found closed, and its condition, together with marks which were found upon it, indicated that it was in closed position when it was struck by the motor end sill at the time of the collision; it was so damaged that it could not be manipulated by hand and con- sequently its position could not have been inadvertently changed after the accident occurred. That the run fror? Bluestone to the point of accident could have been made with the angle cock closed and without the brakes creeping on was fully established by the tests the following day when, even with increased brake pipe leakage, the brake on only one car applied in a period of forty minutes after the angle cock was closed. After leaving Bluestone no stops were made and no effort was made to use the air brakes until Engine an Lyons undertook to stop the train when he saw signal 3807 in stop position. From Bluestone to the point where the engineman whistled for brakes, Brakeren Jackson and Lusk both rode in the rear end of the motor, practically at the location of the angle cock which it later developed was closed; they saw nobody else on the train and were in position to have been anyone in that location; it is wholly improbable that the angle cock was closed between Blue- stone and the point of accident; it undoubtedly was closed at the time the train departed from Bluestone. After engine 2504 was coupled to the train at Bluestone there is no evidence that a release of the brakes occurred. No one heard them release; Engineman Lyons merely said that he gave them time enough to release. That the brakes were not applied when the train departed from that point is evident from the fact that no difficulty was experienced in start- ing, and current consumption on the ascending grade to Ruth was not excessive. It is therefore believed either that Engineman Lyons made the stop at Bluestone by means of the independent brake, or if he used the automatic brokes he must have released them before engine 2514 was cut off. Some of the rules in effect which required specified tests to be made of the brakes of extra 2504 prior to the occurrence of this accident are as follows: ! * : •> ; Rule 26. "When brakes are to be tested from yard plants, after blowing cut yard line, train must be charged to the required pressure. 12 - "While brake system is being charged, a visual in- spection of retaining valves and retaining valve pipes must be made, and position of ange cocks and hose as- certained. Close examination must be made for leaks and necessary repairs made to reduce leakage to a minimum. "When brake system is charged to standard pressure, a 15 pounds service reduction must be made, after which a second examination of the train must be made to deter- mine: A B C Brake pipe leakage If brakes will apply in service application. Piston travel. D) That brake rigging does not bind or foul. 30 "Release tests must be then made to determine if brakes release properly. "If, during these tests, the brake pipe leakage as indicated by the brake pipe gauge exceeds 8 pounds per minute it should be reduced to 8 pounds (preferably 5 pounds) and if piston travel is less than 6 inches or more than 8 inches, it should be adjusted to nominally 7 inches. "After road engine is coupled to train, brakes must be tested as prescribed in Rule 31." T Rule 27. "Before a train leaves an originating point, where brakes have not been tested from yard plant, test must be made as follows: "After air gauge on engine indicates within 5 pounds of standard brake pipe pressure, enginemen must, on re- quest or signal, make a service brake pipe reduction of 15 pounds, and determine by length and force of brake pipe discharge if there is open communication through- out the brake pipe. After the brake pipe discharge ceases and having noted brake pipe leakage, he must crease reduction to a total of 25 pounds. Inspectors, or train crew, must then make certain that brakes have applied, that piston travel is not less than 6 nor more than 8 inches, and that brake rigging does not bind or foul; inspectors or member of train crew must then give enginemen proper signal for releasing brakes and see that all release." in- Rule 30. "When cars are added to a train, the brakes on such cars must be tested as prescribed in Rule 27, and where practicable they should be charged before coupling them to the train." 1 13 : ; Rule 31. "When engines are changed, or an angle cock has been closed, except for cutting off car or cars from the rear of train, an application and release test must be made from the engine. Inspector or trainmen will note that rear brakes of train apply and then signal for a release, noting that rear brakes release." Rule 387. "When handling freight trains on mountain Grades, the engineman must pull the train over the summit, and as soon as the danger of train parting has passed, he must apply the brakes with a reduction of from 7 to 10 pounds to check the speed of the train. It must be borne in mind that it is a great deal easier to hold the train at a slow speed than it is to bring it down from a high to a low speed. The speed should be kept low until the efficiency of the brakes is determined, which should govern the speed to be maintained afterwards." The requirements of rule 26 were not fully complied with at Bluefield prior to the departure of extra 2514; brakes on the cars which were picked up at Flat Top were not tested in accordance with rules 30 and 27; when locomotives were changed at Bluestone no test was made as required by rule 31, and when the train reached the summit of the grade at Ruth no running test of the brakes was made as required by rule 387. 4 During this investigation it appeared that both di- vision officials and employees undertook to justify the practices which were followed, as being safe and sufficient; at the same time, however, it was freely admitted that the rules requiring the tests had not been rescinded or modi- fied. It was brought out during the investigation that on trains hauled by electric motors, it has not been the prac- tice to make running tests of the brakes before starting the descent of grades on this division. This is probably due to the fact that the speed of trains on these descending grades is controlled by electric or regenerative braking; while this is an effective and efficient method of controlling speed at a relatively uniform rate, the fact remains that in case a stop is required to be made the brakes must be de- pended upon for that purpose, and it is therefore fully as essential for electric trains as for steam trains that all the required tests be made to insure that the air brakes are in effective operating condition. In addition to the fact that the rules in effect on this line relating to the operation and testing of air brakes were not rigidly observed and strictly enforced, the inves- tigation disclosed that the requirements of the Norfolk & Western in respect to maintaining and testing brakes have not been revised to conform to the current standard practice. The rules for engine and train crews which were in effect at the time of this accident conformed to the standards adopted by the American Railway Association in 1923; revised rules 44 - 14 ! 43 were adopted as standard by the American Railway Association in 1925, superseding the 1923 code, but these revised rules o far as they apply to engine and train crews had not been accepted or adopted by the Norfolk & Western Railway. The 1925 code of rules was one of the results of a proceeding of inquiry and investigation entered upon in 1922 by the Inter- state Commerce Commission in respect to power brakes and appliances for operating power brake systems "to determine whether, and to what extent, power brakes and appliances for operating power brake systems, now generally in use upon the locomotives and cars of carriers by railroad subject to the interstate commerce act, are adequate and in accord- ance with requirements of safety, what improved appliances or devices are available for use, and what improvements in power brakes and appliances may or should be made, to the end that increased safety in train operation may be obtained." P The Norfolk & Western Railway Company was one of the respondents in this proceeding. In its report of July 18, 1924, the Commission said (p. 516): "Throughout this proceeding the necessity for better maintenance of present power brake equipment in order to secure proper operation and safely to control trains was repeatedly stressed, and this necessity was recognized by both carriers and em- ployees. It is beyond question or argument that piston travel should be maintained within proper limits, triple valves should be kept properly cleaned, brake pipe and brake cylinder leakage should be kept below certain prescribed amounts, and retaining valves with their pipe connections should be kept in good condition; furthermore, rules should provide and proper tests should be made to insure that trains will not leave terminals with defective, inoperative, or cut-out brakes on any cars." One of the conclusions of the Commission which was stated in this report was that: "Improvements in the operation of power brakes for both passenger and freight trains are essential and must be effected." Following the issuance of that report the American Railway Association, with the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Safety, revised its rules for maintenance of air brake and train air signal equipment which had been adopted as standard in 1925. The purpose of this revision · 15 was to bring about improvements in the maintenance and opera- tion of power brakes, the necessity for which had been pointed out in the Commission's report of July 18, 1924. These re- vised rules were approved by the Commission and adopted as standard by the American Railway Association in 1925; when issued, the following statement was made: "These rules were formulated jointly by the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Safety Appliance Committee of the Mechanical Di- vision of the American Railway Association. They represent minimum requirements, and shall govern the maintenance of air brake and air brake signal equip- ment on locomotives and cars, provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed as prohibiting the carriers from enforcing additional rules and in- structions not inconsistent with these rules." The revised rules specified in detail certain tests of air brakes under different operating conditions which were considered essential to insure that air brakes on trains would be maintained in efficient operating condition, and these revised rules marked a distinct advance in safety requirements as compared with the rules of 1925 which they superseded. The responsibility for this accident rests not only upon Engineman Lyons and Conductor Allen for their neglect to make air brake tests as required by the rules, but also upon the entire staff of division operating officers for permitting and encouraging violation of definite rules with respect to air brake tests until it had become common prac- tice to disregard the requirements of these rules on the di- vision. The management of the Norfolk & Western Railway should promptly give consideration to the matter of revis- ing their rules and adjusting their practices to make fully effective the provisions of the current standard rules of the American Railway Association covering maintenance and tests of air brake equipment. All of the employees involved in this accident were experienced men, and none of them was on duty contrary to the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted. W. P. BORLAND Director. C 1583 Transportation Library He 1780 Aksy INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION To the Commission: REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TOLEDO TERMINAL RAILROAD NEAR TOLEDO, OHIO, ON NOVEMBER 8, 1929. > February 19, 1930. In November 8, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between a Pennsylvania Railroad transfer train and a Toledo Terminal Railroad transfer train on the tracks of the latter railroad near Toledo, Ohio, resulting in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation The Toledo Terminal Railroad skirts the City of Toledo, making a complete loop and covering a dis- tance of 28.59 miles; it connects with several railroads at various points. The greater portion of this loop is double-track line, which was the case at the point of accident, and trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The inside track of the loop is known as "B" main, and the clockwise direction thereon is classed as direction B; the opposite direction, classed as direction A, is maintained on the outside track, known as "A" main. The accident occurred within yard limits, on "B" main, just outside of the city limits of Toledo, at a point about 2,500 feet west of Tower K, or about 650 feet east of Bennett Road; no regular trains are operated over this portion of the railroad and foreign train and engine crews operate thereon, subject to the requirements speci- fied in the Toledo Terminal Railroad time-table, which they are required to have in their possession. K Approaching from the west, via direction B, there is a 10 curve to the right 237.5 feet in length, followed by 1,550 feet of tangent to the point of colli- sion, this tangent extending for a considerable distance beyond. The grade for direction B movements is slightly descending for a considerable distance, being 0.116 per cent at the point of collision. The weather was clear at the time of the aoci dent, which occurred at about 3.38 a.m. S -2- ; Description. Pennsylvania Railroad transfer train 8615 con- sisted of ôl freight cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 8615, and was in charge of Conductor Fuller and Engine- man Palmer. This train was manned by a crew of Pennsyl- vania Railroad employees and entered upon the tracks of the Toledo Terminal Railroad at Temperance, 1.7 miles west of Tower K. It departed from that point as extra 8615 on "B" main, at 3.18 a.m., and arrived at Tower K at 3.28 a.m., where it was brought to a stop in obedience to the indication displayed by an interlocking signal. After standing at this point about 10 minutes, and just as it was starting ahead again, its rear end was struck by extra 49. Toledo Terminal transfer train extra 49 con- sisted of 12 freight cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 49, and was in charge of Conductor Shea and Engineman Hardy. This train passed Vulcan, the last open office, 6.07 miles from Tower K, at 3.13 a.m., according to the train sheet, and collided with extra 8615 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 6 and 10 miles per hour. The caboose of extra 8615 was considerably damaged, being partly shoved under the car ahead of it, which car in turn was damaged and had its rear end de- railed and shoved out of line to the right; the second car ahead of the caboose was also damaged. Engine 49 was slightly damaged. The employee killed was the conductor of extra 8615, while the employee injured was the flagman of that train. Summary of evidence. Flagman Kikel, of extra 8615, was interrogated first at the hospital and subsequently at his residence. He stated that when his train came to a stop at Tower K, he did not go back to flag, but just stepped off the caboose, and that when his train started ahead again, having stood at that point for several minutes, he stepped on the caboose and went inside, to the front end, saying that Conductor Fuller was on the rear end. Flagman Kikel was cleaning windows and saw the reflection of the head- light of the following train in the glass, called the attention of Conductor Fuller to that train, and the con- ductor remarked that he was aware of it. Flagman Kikel did not pay much attention to the following train, saying that it looked to be a good distance away, judging from the headlight, and that he kept on cleaning windows; the following train was only about six or eight car-lengths away when he realized that a collision was imminent. He saw the conductor go for the door, and at once did like- wise, but the collision occurred before they could get off the caboose. Flagman Kikel said that the markers on -3- 2 the caboose were in perfect condition; the outside markers were equipped with the round type of cup, the kind that fit in them regularly, and it was not necessary to change the position of the cups when changing the position of the markers, but merely to take the markers out of the brackets and replace them in the desired position. Other than the markers in use, he recalled that there was one old type inside-marker in the caboose; he did not look to see if there was a cup in the old marker. This was the second night he had been on this particular caboose. It also appeared from the statements of Flagman Kikel that his train was moving at the time of the collision, that he did not notice the following train before he stepped on the caboose, and that he heard no whistle signal sounded on the engine of that train. Engineman Palmer, Fireman Boyd and Head Brakeman Kavanagh, of extra 8615, were riding on the engine and were unaware of anything wrong prior to the occurrence of the accident. Engineman Palmer stated that his train had started and had moved ahead, how much he could not say, when the air brakes applied in emergency from the rear. Engineman Palmer did not feel any effects on the engine of anything crashing into his caboose, saying that his engine was pulling, moving at a speed of not over 2 or 3 miles per hour. When the accident occurred, he looked bank and no difficulty was experienced in observing lighted lanerns at the point of collision, and when depart- ing from the yard at Temperance, Engineman Palmer had looked back along his train and was able to observe that the markers on the caboose were lighted, watching them all the way out to the main line switch. Engineman Palmer further stated that when he first brought his train to a stop at Tower K, he did not whistle out a flag, as it had never been the practice to do so at that point, and that rear-end protection is never afforded there. He had a Toledo Terminal time-table, but was not furnished with a book of rules of that railroad and had not seen one; there was nothing in the time-table that required flag protection in this instance, and he knew that it was not required to flag through any instructions he had received. Fireman Boyd gave testimony similar in practically every respect to that of Engineman Palmer; the fireman had neither a Toledo Terminal time-table nor a book of rules of that railroad, while the head brakeman had a Toledo Terminal time-table. The statements of all of the sur- viving members of extra 8615 were to the effect that the weather was clear and that there was frost, but no haze. Engineman Hardy, of extra 49, stated that he sounded the road crossing signal on the engine whistle for Lewis Avenue crossing, located about 2,500 feet west of Bennett Road, and also sounded it for the latter crossing, these signals being sounded when about 150 feet from the crossings. The electric headlight on his engine was turned on fully, but he did not see the caboose of extra S -4- 2 8615, or its markers, which were burning dimly, until he was about three car-lengths from it, at which time the speed of his train was about 15 miles per hour, and he was sure that the caboose was standing still; at about the same time, the fireman called his attention to the markers. He was working steam, but shut off as quickly as he could and placed the brake valve handle in the emergency position, the air brakes taking effect at about the time the caboose was struck. Engineman Hardy said flagmen should go back and protect at the point involved under the conditions that existed, but that a flagman is not often encountered at that point under those conditions, and it is not customary to whistle out a flag when a stop is made at such places; when bad curves are involved, however a flag is always whistled out. It further appeared from Engineman Hardy's statements that the weather was not clear, being hazy, with a heavy frost, that he was sitting on his seat box, looking out from the inside of the cab, and that the front cab window was closed, although the side window was open. There was no steam leaking in the cab that he knew of, and he could offer no reason for not having seen the caboose ahead, even though there was no flagman out, nor were fusees or torpedoes encountered. " Fireman Beck, of extra 49, stated that the engine whistle was sounded from Lewis Avenue crossing and also for Bennett Road crossing, that he put in a fire just after passing Bennett Road, about five or six scoops of coal, and that although he looked ahead before getting down on the deck of the engine, he did not see anything of a train ahead. When he got back up on his seat box, at which time the speed was about 15 miles per hour, he looked through the front window and noticed the rear end of the caboose ahead, about three or four car-lengths away, and gave warning to the engineman, who immediately shut off steam and applied the air brakes; the fireman estimated the speed to have been about 6 or 8 miles per hour when the accident occurred. Fireman Beck only saw the marker on the left side of the caboose ahead, saying that it was quite frosty and that the markers were burning very dimly, being either turned down too low or covered with frost. While it was not exactly customary for flagmen to go back in that locality, yet in view of the existing weather conditions Fireman Beck thought it would have helped quite a bit; after the collision occurred, however, he and the engineman got off right away and no flag was whistled out nor did he know whether his flagman went back. He had seen flagmen out behind a train in that location in foggy weather or when it was dark, yet it had been quite awhile since he had seen one out behind a train going in direction B at Tower K, as the majority of trains he worked on came in under control, for as a rule a stop indication is dis- played on the interlocking signal at that point. 1 MEL. at Conductor Shea, of extra 49, who was riding in his caboose, estimated the speed of his train to have been about 15 or 17 miles per hour when the air brakes applied, saying that he braced himself, thinking that the stop was being made on account of a train ahead, and then his train stopped all of a sudden; he estimated that the speed was about 10 miles per hour, or less, the time of the collision, and that the caboose traveled about four car-lengths after he felt the air brakes apply. He immediately went ahead, and on seeing what had happened he continued on to Tower K and summoned assistance. Con- ductor Shea said that he did not consider it necessary to use fusees in that locality unless it was foggy, and that on this occasion the weather was fair, pretty frosty and a little hazy down in the hollow. Conductor Shea stated that it was not customary to flag in that vacinity, but that had the rear end of his own train be n standing at that point, under the circumstances, he would have seen to it that his own flagman was affording protection, and that it would not have been necessary to go back very far in order to afford such protection. Flagman Spaulding was also riding in the caboose at the time of the accident; after the accident he went forward to the point of collision and rendered what assistance he could, remaining at that point. Flagman Spaulding stated that the weather was fair and that visi- bility was not interfered with on account of weather con- ditions. When he arrived at the point of collision, there was a marker hanging on the left side of the caboose, next to "A" main, but it was not burning at that time. He estimated the speed of his train to have been about 15 miles per hour Then the air brakes were applied and not over 8 or 10 miles per hour when the collision occurred. Flagman Spaulding further stated that while the accident occurred within yard limits, yet for his own protection he thought that he would have protected in some way had he been the flagman of the train ahead. Stang Head Brakeman Niethamer was also riding in the caboose and went to the point of collision immediately after the accident occurred; he did not think that the air brakes were applied in emergency just prior to the accident, nor did he think there was anything about weather conditions that would interfere with visibility at the point of accident. Head Brakeman Niethamer thought that it was customary to have a flag out at this locality, saying that one should have been out to protect. When questioned, however, as to why the rear end of his o train was left entirely without protection, following the occurrence of the accident, he endeavored to account for such action as being duc to the excitement, saying that they knew where the train behind them was working and that it would not be up there right away. : . -b- $ Superintendent Nally, of the Toledo Terminal Railroad, stated that the markers and cups, the cups being oval shaped, claimed to have been found at the point of accident not later than one hour after its occurrence, were brought to his office by Toledo Terminal Chief of Police Ramsey and Toledo Terminal Trainmaster Vesey. Diligent search was made by several employecs for other markers and cups in and about the wreckage, but to no avail. Superintendent Nally thought it possible that when the stop was made at Tower K, it upset the cups in the markers, and that this accounted for the markers not being seen by Enginoman Hardy for a greater distance. He further stated that it is insisted that flagging bo done all over the road, however, no tests had ever becn conducted prior to the accident to see whether crews wêre flaggi ng or not, but at various times he had been out on the road personally and had found crews flagging, although a lot of this was platform flagging, which he considered inefficient in one sense and not so in another, as on the Toledo Terminal Railroad train movements are slow, are slow, and for only short distances at a time. Chief of Police Ramsey, of the Toledo Terminal Railroad, stated that he arrived at the scene of the ac- cident about one-half hour after its occurrence, and shortly thereafter he noticed one marker lying in the path along side of the train and the other in the ditch with the wreckage, both extinguished. The marker found on the path was all right with respect to the lens, but the cup was rectangular, while the bottom of the marker was in- tended to accommodate only a round fit. S Trainmaster Vesey, of the Toledo Terminal Rail- road, stated that he arrived at the sdene of the accident about 4.15 a.m. At that time there was one marker hanging on the side of the caboose, not burning, and the cup in the marker did not fit, but was setting flat on the bottom of the marker. Trainmaster Vesey further stated that within yard limits, there is little flagging done, depend- ing on the situation. The markers in question were shown to the Com- mission's inspectors; they were the standard bracket marker used on cabooses of the Pennsylvania Railroad. This type of marker is intended to accommodate a round cup, but the cups in the markers shown were oval-shaped, being somewhat oblong, and this prevented them from being set flat in the cup receptacle of the marker, necessitating that they be applied in a tilted position. Tests were made with a standard marker, using both a round cup and an oval-shaped cup. With the oval-shaped cup and a one-half inch burner and wick, lighted and turned to a position where it did not smoke, and with the lens of the marker somewhat dirty, the light could be seen for a distance of 1,180 feet, this being in misty weather and looking over a switch light slightly below the range of -7- } ? vision and about 200 feet in front of the marker, and with several switch lights and two locomotive headlights in the background and slightly to the right, also with electric flood lights in the background slightly to the left and above the marker. Under similar conditions, but with a round cup and a one-inch wick, turned to the highest position at which the light did not smoke, and placed in the same marker, it could be seen for a distance of 2,290 feet. An examination of flagging equipment and marker supplics was made at the Outer Yard of the Pennsylvania Railroad, where supplies for use in the vicinity of Toledo are kept, and while there was large quantity of red lamps, white lamps, red flags, fusees, torpedoes, bracket markers, round cups, burners and wicks on hand, yet no oval-shaped cups were found at the supply house. It was developed that an oval-shaped cup was at one time used in a slide-in type of marker light, which is now practi- cally extinct on the Pennsylvania Railroad. ? Conclusions. This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Hardy, of Toledo Terminal transfor train cxtra 49, to operate under proper control within yard limits. Rulo 93, of the book of rules of the Toledo Terminal Railroad Company, reads as follows: "Within yard limits the main track may be used protecting against first-class trains. malaj 07 Extra trains must move within yard limits prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear. There is a conflict in the testimony as to whether extra 8615 was standing or moving at the time of the accident, and also as to weather conditions, visibility manner of affording flag protection, condition of the caboose markers, etc. The fact remains, however, that both of the markers on the caboose of extra 8615 were burn- ing at the time of the accident, and had Engineman Hardy been operating his train at a reasonable rate of speed, maintaining a proper lookout, there is no reason why he should not have seen the rear end of extra 8615 in time to stop. The fact that he did not see the caboose until it was only three car-lengths distant is sufficient evidence that he was not maintaining a proper lookout within yard limits. The evidence indicates a confusing situation as to the affording of flag protection, and it is not helped C C · -8- any by the statement of the Toledo Terminal superintendent that he had personally noted quite a little "platform flagging," which he considered inefficient in one sense and not inefficient in another, in view of the type of movements handled over this terminal railroad. Rule 99 of the Toledo Terminal Railroad is of the usual type, requiring flag protection then a train stops or is moving under circurs tances in which it may be overtaken by a following train, while rule 93, previously quoted, allows the main track to be used within yard limits, and requires extra trains to move within such limits prepared to stop. There is nothing confusing about the requirements of those two rules, and it would not appear that there is any excuse for the apparent confusion existing in the minds of the various employees as to whether flag protection should have been provided at the point of accident. In the absence of other instructions to the contrary, the rear end of extra 8615 was not required to be protected by flag Thile standing within yard limits. If it is the desire of the management of this property that flag protection be provided at all points, regardless of circumstances or con- ditions, then such a requirement should be placed in effect and all employees should be properly instructed in ac- cordance therewith. But Thother such a requirement is placed in effect or not, stops should be taken by the rü- sponsiblc operating officials to see that one uniform under- standing of the rules and regulations is had by all employees operating over this railroad. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 4 Transportation ( Library HE 1780 A234 1586 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY AT FICKINGER, ARK., ON NOVEMBER 11, 1929. : February 20, 1930. To the Commission: On November 11, 1929, there was a collision be- tween a passenger train and a cut of standing freight cars on the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway at Fickinger, Ark. resulting in the injury of nine passengers, two mail clerks, one person carried under contract, and five employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Memphis Subdivision of the Southern Division, extending be- tween Thayer, Mo., and Memphis, Tenn., a distance of 144.6 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time- table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The accident occurred on the passing track at Fickinger, at a point 1,752 feet south of the north switch; the passing track is 3,002 feet in length and parallels the main track on the east. Approaching from the north the passing track is tangent to within 416.5 feet of the point of accident and then there is a 30 curve to the left to where the col- lision occurred, this curve extending for a distance of 200.2 feet beyond that point. The grade for southbound trains is slightly ascending to within about 150 feet of the point of collision; it is then level to and beyond where the col- lision occurred. , G A track known as the "back track" parallels the passing track on the east; this track is 815 feet in length and its north switch is located 400 feet north of the point of collision. At the time of the accident, a cut of 10 loaded hopper cars was standing on the passing track, the north end of this cut being at the point of collision. On account of the bank of a cut on the inside of the curve and the ascending grade, the fireman's view from the cab of a southbound engine was restricted. The weather was cloudy at the time of the acci- dent which occurred at about 2.03 p.m. K C 1 - 2 - Description Southbound passenger train No. 103 consisted of one mail car, one baggage car, one combination coach and baggage car, and one coach, in the order named, hauled by engine 1061, and was in charge of Conductor Emery and Engineman Jacobs. All of the cars were of steel construc- tion, with the exception of the last car, which was of steel- underframe construction. At Thayer, 10.5 miles north of Fickinger, a copy of train order No. 54, Form 19, was re- ceived, reading as follows: "No. 103 Eng 1061 meet No 104 Eng 1062 at Fickinger." Fickinger is also the scheduled meeting point for these two trains. Train No. 103 left Thayer at 1.36 p.m., according to the train sheet, six minutes late, and left Mammoth Springs, 2.5 miles beyond, at 1.45 p.m., according to the train sheet, 10 minutes late. On arrival at Fickinger it headed in at the north switch of the passing track, and while moving through that track at a speed estimated to have been between 8 and 15 miles per hour, it collided with the cut of cars. The north car of the cut was considerably damaged. The front end of the engine was more or less damaged and the first car in the passenger train was slightly damaged. None of the equipment involved was derailed. The employees injured were the conductor, brak eman, baggageman, helper, and the train porter. Summary of evidence Fireman Judkins, of train No. 103, stated that after heading in at the north switch, his train came almost to a stop in order to permit the flagman to close the switch and get back on; at this time he could not see the cut of cars on account of the bank of the cut on the inside of the curve and the ascending grade. As his train continued on the passing track, he looked ahead through the side.storm window and first saw the cut of cars when about 11 car- lengths from them, but thought that they were standing on the "back track". At about that time the injector broke and he shut it off, thereby momentarily diverting his attention from maintaining a lookout, and on looking ahead again, when about eight car-lengths from the cut of cars, he saw that they were on the passing track and not the "back track"; he shouted a warning of danger, and then a second warning, and the engineman moved the brake-valve handle to the emergency position, but the air brakes did 1 - 3. + : not seem to take effect prior to the collision. He esti- mated the speed to have been about 15 miles per hour when he first saw the cut of cars on the passing track, but could not judge what the speed was at the time of the collision. Fireman Judkins further stated that no trouble was ex- perienced in making the stop for Mammoth Springs or to head in at the north switch of the passing track. It also appeared from his statements that it was not unusual to find cars standing on the "back track" and that about once a week a train would be found occupying the passing track, but that this was the first time he had ever found cars standing on the passing track without a crew in attendance, saying that he had never found cars on any other passing track unless the dispatcher gave notification of their presence. Fireman Judkins understood, however, that the absence of such notification did not relieve him of the duty of main- taining a proper lookout ahead; in this instance he thought that when he did not find a train at the north end of the passing track, that his own train would have a clear track. ( Ba Engineman Jacobs, of train No. 103, stated that just before starting around the curve the fireman shouted a warning of danger, twice in succession, and he immediately shut off steam and applied the air brakes in emergency, the collision occurring before the air brakes could, or just about the time that they did, take effect. He esti- mated the speed of his train to have been about 10 miles per hour at the time he received warning of danger, when the engine was about 35 or 40 feet from the cut of cars, saying that the speed had not been reduced at the time of the collision. The air brakes had been tested and worked properly. Engineman Jacobs also said that he could have brought his train to a stop without incident had he been given proper warning of the cut of cars; he was looking ahead out of the front window on his own side of the cab the window being open. He further stated that he had not been notified that the cars were on the passing track, although it was customary to receive a message in such cases. Statements of other members of the crew developed nothing additional of importance. The investigation developed that crews usually were notified of cars standing on passing tracks. In this particular case, the cut of cars had been left by work extra 34, it being intended to return for them before the arrival of train No. 103, however, Conductor Collier, of the work extra, on arrival at Williford, 18.4 miles south of Fickinger, at about 1 p.m., told the operator at that point to take a message to the effect that the cut of cars had been left on the passing track at Fickinger and to be sure to inform train No. 103 to back out, as a matter of extra precaution. The operator transmitted this informa- tion to the dispatcher's office, and Dispatcher Gentry, K 1 4 who was due to go off duty at 1 p.m., was notified by the chief dispatcher while the transfer was being made out, but made no mention of it to Dispatcher Patrick, who was just coming on duty, as he assumed that the latter had also heard about the matter. Dispatcher Patrick took over the transfer at about 1.03 p.m., but did not know the siding was blocked. He said it was the practice to protect passing tracks when blocked by cars, in order to prevent delay to trains going to that point to make a meet, and that had he known that the siding at Fickinger was blocked, he would have notified both train crews to that effect. Vision tests disclosed that the fireman could have seen the cut of cars at a distance of 1,053 feet, and that he could have definitely determined upon which track they were standing at a distance of 702 feet; the engineman, be- ing on the outside of the curve, could not have seen any portion of the cars until his cab was within 120 feet of them. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Fireman Judkins, of train No. 103, to maintain a proper lookout while moving through the passing track. Under the rules, trains using a siding must pro- ceed, expeeting to find it occupied. Fireman Judkins should have been maintaining a proper lookout ahead while moving through the passing track, and it he had done so, he could have seen the cut of cars on the curve and have warned the engineman of their presence in ample time to have prevented the accident; as it was, however, he assumed that the pass- ing track would be unoccupied, and for some reason failed to notice the cars until it was too late to stop. It was the practice to notify crews when sidings were blocked by cars, although not required by rule, and this practice would have been followed in this case had Dispatcher Patrick, on duty at the time of the accident, been informed concerning the cut of cars. The necessary information was given to Dispatcher Gentry by the chief dispatcher at the time the transfer was being made out, but Dispatcher Gentry, assuming that Dispatcher Patrick had also heard about the cut of cars, made no mention of them to Dis- patcher Patrick. While the absence of notification to the crew of train No. 103 in no way excuses Fireman Judkins for his failure to maintain a proper lookout ahead, yet the lack that the passing track was unoccupied. Errors in the making of transfers between dispatchers are likely to lead to serious results; and in this particular case, had there been a little more teamwork in the dispatchers' office, the accident probably would not have occurred. of such notification possibly misled him/to believe lack . .. - 5 All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. p. Borland, Director. 1538 ; A C ALL Transportation Library HE 1780 4234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY NEAR ELK PARK, MONT., ON NOVEMBER 12, 1929. February 21, 1930. To the Commission: On November 13, 1939, there was a collision between a passenger train and a light engine on the Great Northern Railway near Elk Park, Mont., which resulted in the death of 1 employee and the injury of 17 passengers, 8 employees and 1 express messenger. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Second Sub-divis- ion of the Butte Division which extends between Great Falls and Butte, Mont., a distance of 169.74 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block- signal system being in use. Helper engines are used at different points on account of the heavy grades but operate mostly out of Butte and between Butte and Clancy where the heaviest grades are encountered; Clancy is located 57.37 miles east of Butte. Wyes are located at Woodville and Elk Park, 9.43 miles and 17.79 miles east of Butte, respectively. The eastward movements of helper engines between Elk Park and Clancy, a distance of approximately 40 miles, are made backing up so that the engine will be headed in the proper direction when coupled to the train to be helped at Clancy. The accident occurred at a point 1 mile east of Elk Park, ont.; approaching this point from the east there is a compound curve to the right 1,225 feet in length, the curvature varying from 3° 30' to 5°, followed by tangent track for a distance of 235 feet, the accident occurring at a point 13 feet from the eastern end of this tangent. Approaching from the west there is a 70 curve to the right 910.4 feet in length, tangent track for a distance of 463 feet, then a 5° 30' curve to the right 880 feet in length, followed by the tangent track on which the accident occurred. The grade for westbound trains is 1.2 per cent ascending from a point about one-half mile east nearly to the point of accident where it reaches a maximum of 2.0 per cent. The grade for eastbound trains approaching the point of accident is descending and varies from 1.95 to 2.2 per cent. L 1 • ~2~ The view had by an engineman of a westbound train is limited on account of a cut on the inside of the curve approaching the point of accident, the range of vision being about 1,100 feet from a point about 480 feet from the leaving end of the curve to a point at about the center of the 5° 30' curve immediately west of the tangent track on which the accident occurred. The view had by an engineman on eastbound light engine, backing up, is restricted to the length of the tangent on which the accident occurred. The weather was clear at the time of the accident which occurred at 7.38 p.m. Description Westbound passenger train No. 237 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car, one smoking car, one coach and one cafe and parlor car, in the order named, all of wooden construction, hauled by engine 1721 and was in charge of Conductor Huestis and Engineman Sieben. This train departed from Great Falls at 2.00 p.m., left Basin, the last open office, 12 miles east of Elk Park, at 7.15 p.m., two minutes late, and collided with extra 1968 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 25 to 30 miles per hour. Extra 1968 consisted of engine 1968, running light, and was in charge of Engineman Powell and Fireman Hastie. The crew of this train received train order No. 56, Form No. 19, directing them to run as extra from Butte to Clancy and to meet No. 673, en- gine 1956, at Clancy. Extra 1968 departed from Butte at 6.30 p.m., with the engine headed east; on arriving at Elk Park the engine was turned and it proceeded eastward, backing up, until it collided with passen- ger train No. 237. Engine 1721 penetrated the tender of engine 1968 and mounted the tender frame, stopping about halfway through the tender in an almost upright position; engine 1721 and the rear end of 1968 sustained con- siderable damage. The remaining equipment of train No. 237 was not derailed and received only slight damage. The employee killed was the fireman of engine 1968. ~3~ Summary of evidence Engineman Sieben, of train No. 237, stated that after leaving Basin his train was running on schedule time. Approaching the point where the accident occurred, as the train rounded the curve the headlight of his engine shone on the tender of engine 1968 which he thought was about 2 or 3 car lengths ahead. He immediately applied the air brakes in emergency but he did not think that the speed of his train was materially reduced before the collision occurred. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident to have been about 30 miles per hour. Engineman Sieben stated that the air brakes had been tested at Great Falls and they worked properly en route. He further stated that due to the headlight of his own train shining so brightly on the tender of engine 1968 he could not tell whether there were any lights of any kind on the rear of that engine. In the last week or ten days he had met helper engines once or twice at Elk Park. Fireman Crawford, of train No. 237, stated that the first he knew of anything wrong was when Engine- man Sieben called to him. He then looked out and saw the tender of engine 1968 ahead. He estimated the speed of their train at the time of the accident to have been about 27 or 28 miles per hour. Con- ductor Huestis and Brakeman Fleming also estimated the speed of their train to have been between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Fireman Hastie, of engine 1958, was killed as a result of the accident and Engineman Powell sustained such serious injuries that it was impossible for him to be interviewed until December 17, more then a month after the occurrence of the accident. At this time Engineman Powell's memory of what occurred was not entirely clear; he stated that he looked at his watch before leaving the wye at Elk Park and he figured he had time to reach Spur 5, which is located 2.89 miles east of Elk Park, before the arrival of train No. 237, although he could not remember the time shown by his watch. He stated that very often he had reached Spur 5 while in helper service before the arrival of train No. 237, and he expressed the opinion that on the day of the accident something must have gone wrong with his watch. A subsequent statement was obtained from Engineman Powell on January 31, 1930, in which he reiterated his belief that his watch must have failed. He said that when #t -4- he departed from Elk Park he pulled out his watch and said to the fireman that they had 15 minutes before train No. 237 was due out of Bernice, 8.04 miles beyond, and that they could reach Spur 5. Engineman Powell said that the fireman did not look at his own watch, and in fact he did not know whether or not he had one. He further stated that he had always relied on his watch, that it had been compared six days prior to the occurrence of the accident, and that so far as he knew he had never misread it. Chief Dispatcher Huhn stated that it is the practice to call helper engines at Butte to go to Clancy to assist heavy freight trains over the moun- tain from Clancy to Butte, but it was not the practice to use pilot conductors or brakemen with helper en- gines and that if any train orders were necessary between Butte and Clancy the engine-man would get them from the dispatcher over the telephone. S Traveling Engineer Stone stated that engine 1968 was not a regularly assigned helper engine and that the tender of that engine was not equipped with a back-up headlight, but that engines regularly assigned to this service were so equipped. Conclusions This accident was caused by extra 1968 failing to clear for an opposing superior train as required by the rules. It is apparent from the evidence that either Engineman Powell's watch was wrong or that he misread it. According to his statement Engineman Powell looked at his watch at Elk Park and figured that he had 15 minutes before train No. 237 was due out of Bernice, 8.04 miles beyond, and that he had plenty of time to reach Spur 5, 2.89 miles east of Elk Park. The collision occurred, however, when he had travelled a distance of only about one mile. Fireman Hastie was killed as a result of the accident but it appears from the engineman's statement that he did not check the time by his own watch when it was decided to pro- ceed to Spur 5 to meet train No. 237. Had a block signal system been in service on this line this accident would probably not have occur- red. There an average of about 12 train move- ments daily over this line during the 30-day period preceding the date of this accident. And -5- { All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. . BORLAND Director. 1588 Transportation Library не 1780 A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY NEAR ELK PARK, MONT., ON NOVEMBER 12, 1929. February 21, 1930. To the Commission: On November 13, 1939, there was a collision between a passenger train and a light engine on the Great Northern Railway near Elk Park, Mont., which resulted in the death of 1 employee and the injury of 17 passengers, 8 employees and 1 express messenger. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Second Sub-divis- ion of the Butte Division which extends between Great Falls and Butte, Mont., a distance of 169.74 miles, and is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block- signal system being in use. Helper engines are used at different points on account of the heavy grades but operate mostly out of Butte and between Butte and Clancy where the heaviest grades are encountered; Clancy is located 57.37 miles east of Butte. Wyes are located at Woodville and Elk Park, 9.43 miles and 17.79 miles east of Butte, respectively. The eastward movements of helper engines between Elk Park and Clancy, a distance of approximately 40 miles, are made backing up so that the engine will be headed in the proper direction when coupled to the train to be helped at Clancy. The accident occurred at a point 1 mile east of Elk Park, Kont.; approaching this point from the east there is a compound curve to the right 1,225 feet in length, the curvature varying from 3° 30' to 5°, followed by tangent track for a distance of 235 feet, the accident occurring at a point 13 feet from the eastern end of this tangent. Approaching from the west there is a 70 curve to the right 910.4 feet in length, tangent track for a distance of 463 feet, then a 5° 30' curve to the right 380 feet in length, followed by the tangent track on which the accident occurred. The grade for westbound trains is 1.2 per cent ascending from a point about one-half mile east nearly to the point of accident where it reaches a maximum of 2.0 per cent. The grade for eastbound trains approaching the point of accident is descending and varies from 1.95 to 2.2 per cent. $!... : -2- The view had by an engineman of a westbound train is limited on account of a cut on the inside of the curve approaching the point of accident, the range of vision being about 1,100 feet from a point about 480 feet from the leaving end of the curve to a point at about the center of the 5 30 curve immediately west of the tangent track on which the accident occurred. The view had by an engineman on eastbound light engine, backing up, is restricted to the length of the tangent on which the accident occurred. The weather was clear at the time of the accident which occurred at 7.38 p.m. Description Westbound passenger train No. 237 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car, one smoking car, one coach and one cafe and parlor car, in the order named, all of wooden construction, hauled by engine 1721 and was in charge of Conductor Huestis and Engineman Sieben. This train departed from Great Falls at 2.00 p.m., left Basin, the last open office, 12 miles east of Elk Park, at 7.15 p.m., two minutes late, and collided with extra 1938 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 25 to 30 miles per hour. Extra 1968 consisted of engine 1968, running light, and was in charge of Engineman Powell and Fireman Hastie. The crew of this train received train order No. 56, Form No. 19, directing them to run as extra from Butte to Clancy and to meet No. 673, en- gine 1956, at Clancy. Extra 1968 departed from Butte at 6.30 p.m., with the engine headed east; on arriving at Elk Park the engine was turned and it proceeded eastward, backing up, until it collided with passen- ger train No. 237. S Engine 1721 penetrated the tender of engine 1968 and mounted the tender frame, stopping about halfway through the tender in an almost upright position; engine 1721 and the rear end of 1968 sustained con- siderable damage. The remaining equipment of train No. 237 was not derailed and received only slight damage. The employee killed was the fireman of engine 1968. . . . -3-- Summary of evidence Engineman Sieben, of train No. 237, stated that after leaving Basin his train was running on schedule time. Approaching the point where the accident occurred, as the train rounded the curve the headlight of his engine shone on the tender of engine 1968 which he thought was about 2 or 3 car lengths ahead. He immediately applied the air brakes in emergency but he did not think that the speed of his train was materially reduced before the collision occurred. He estimated the speed of his train at the time of the accident to have been about 30 miles per hour. Engineman Sieben stated that the air brakes had been tested at Great Falls and they worked properly en route. He further stated that due to the headlight of his own train shining so brightly on the tender of engine 1968 he could not tell whether there were any lights of any kind on the rear of that engine. In the last week or ten days he had met helper engines once or twice at Elk Park. Fireman Crawford, of train No. 237, stated that the first he knew of anything wrong was when Engine- man Sieben called to him. He then looked out and saw the tender of engine 1968 ahead. He estimated the speed of their train at the time of the accident to have been about 27 or 28 miles per hour. Con- ductor Huestis and Brakeman Fleming also estimated the speed of their train to have been between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Fireman Hastie, of engine 1958, was killed as a result of the accident and Engineman Powell sustained such serious injuries that it was impossible for him to be interviewed until December 17, more than a month after the occurrence of the accident. At this time Engineman Powell's memory of what occurred was not entirely clear; he stated that he looked at his watch before leaving the wye at Elk Park and he figured he had time to reach Spur 5, which is located 2.89 miles east of Elk Park, before the arrival of train No. 237, although he could not remember the time shown by his watch. He stated that very often he had reached Spur 5 while in helper service before the arrival of train No. 237, and he expressed the opinion that on the day of the accident something must have gone wrong with his watch. A subsequent statement was obtained from Engineman Powell on January 31, 1930, in which he reiterated his belief that his watch must have failed. He said that when ~4- he departed from Elk Park he pulled out his watch and said to the fireman that they had 15 minutes before train No. 237 was due out of Bernice, 8.04 miles beyond, and that they could reach Spur 5. Engineman Powell said that the fireman did not look at his own watch, and in fact he did not know whether or not he had one. He further stated that he had always relied on his watch, that it had been compared six days prior to the occurrence of the accident, and that so far as he knew he had never misread it. Chief Dispatcher Huhn stated that it is the practice to call helper engines at Butte to go to Clancy to assist heavy freight trains over the moun- tain from Clancy to Butte, but it was not the practice to use pilot conductors or brakemen with helper en- gines and that if any train orders were necessary between Butte and Clancy the engine-man would get them from the dispatcher over the telephone. Traveling Engineer Stone stated that engine 1968 was not a regularly assigned helper engine and that the tender of that engine was not equipped with a back-up headlight, but that engines regularly assigned to this service were so equipped. Conclusions This accident was caused by extra 1968 failing to clear for an opposing superior train as required by the rules. It is apparent from the evidence that either Engineman Powell's watch was wrong or that he misread it. According to his statement Engineman Powell looked at his watch at Elk Park and figured that he had 15 minutes before train No. 237 was due out of Bernice, 8.04 miles beyond, and that he had plenty of time to reach Spur 5, 2.89 miles east of Elk Park. The collision occurred, however, when he had travelled a distance of only about one mile. Fireman Hastie was killed as a result of the accident but it appears from the engineman's statement that he did not check the time by his own watch when it was decided to pro- ceed to Spur 5 to meet train No. 237. Had a block signal system been in service on this line this accident would probably not have occur- red. There an average of about 12 train move- ments daily over this line during the 30-day period preceding the date of this accident. -5- 1 • All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. . BORLAND Director. * *** Transportation Library не 1780 UNIVERSIT A234 C 2.190 1589 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION To the Commission: REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY AT WILLMAR, MINN., ON NOVEMBER 15, 1929. February 24, 1930. On November 15, 1929, there was a side colli- sion between two passenger trains on the Great Northern Railway at Willmar, Minn., resulting in the death of one employee. p Location and method of operation > This accident occurred at junction of the Second and Third Subdivisions of the Willmar Division: The Second Subdivision extends between Breckenridge and Willmar, a distance of 112.67 miles, and in the vicinity of the point of accident is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders and an automatic block-signal system, while the Third Subdivision extends between Ihlen, Minn., and Second Subdivision Junc- tion. a distance of 112.29 miles, being a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred within yard limits, at the fouling point of the junction switch connecting these two subdivisions, 102 feet west of the head block tie of the turnout; this is a trail- ing point switch for eastbound trains and is located 2,467 feet west of the station at Willmar. Approaching the switch from the west on the Second Subdivision the track is tangent for a distance of 2,134 feet, while approaching from that direction on the Third Subdivision the track is tangent for several miles, followed by a 40 curve to the right for a distance of about 744 feet to the switch. grade is practically level. The with The switchstand, of the high type, equipped red and green lenses, is located on the south side of the tracks; its normal position is lined for the Second Sub- division and when so lined a green indication is displayed. The Second Subdivision automatic block signals involved of the three-indication, color-light type, are eastbound signals 103.8 and 102.8, located 5,756 and 449 feet, re- spectively wost of the switch. Indications are red, yellow PINA E VI A ↓· Ca and green, for stop, caution and proceed, respectively. The approach-lighting contact point is located about 2,600 feet in advance of each signal. On the Third Subdivision there is a stop board, located south of the track and 481 feet west of the switch; there is an insulated joint on the Third Subdivision 155 feet west of the switch and when an eastbound train passes this joint it automatically causes signal 102.8 to display a stop indication and signal 103.8 a caution indication. The reather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 3.22 a.m. Description Eastbound Third Subdivision passenger train No. 52 consisted of one baggage car, one combination bag- gage and mail car, one coach, one parlor coach, and one sleeping car, in the order named, hauled by engine 932, and was in charge of Conductor Kendall and Engineman Rothwell. This train loft Granite Falls, the last open office and 34.19 miles west of Second Subdivision Junction, at 2.20 a.m. according to the train sheet, 15 minutes late; approaching the junction switch a stop was made for the stop board, then the train proceeded at a low rate of specd and was not brought to a stop again until after the engine had passed the insulated joint and fouled the Second Sub- division main track. Immediately afterwards, while stand- ing at that point, the left rear corner of the tender was struck by train No. 10. " Eastbound Second Subdivision passenger train No. 10 consisted of one express car, three baggage cars, one mail car, and two coaches, in the order named, hauled by engine 1429, and was in charge of Conductor Nethway and Engineman Sandberg. This train passed Pennock, the last open office and 6.2 miles west of Third Subdivision Junction. at 3.16 a.m., according to the train sheet, 29 minutes late, passed signal 103.8, which was displaying a proceed indica- tion, and as signal 102.8 was approached a proceed indica- tion was also displayed; however, this indication changed to stop directly in front of the engine, and before train No. 10, could be brought to a stop it collided with train No. 52 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 10 miles per hour. Engine 932, together with its tender came to rest on its right side, south of and parallel to the track, with the point of the pilot just clear of the west end of the head block tie of the junction switch, The first car ... { """. - 3. in train No. 52 had its forward truck derailed. Engine 1429 and the forward truck of its tender were derailed; the engine remained upright. None of the other equipment in either train was derailed. The employee killed was the engineman of train No. 52. Summary of evidence Fireman Marlow, of train No. 52, stated that he was sitting on the seat box and leaning out of the win- dow, maintaining a lookout approaching the switch, and that as Engineman Rothwell made an air brake application in order to make the stop for the stop board that he called the engineman's attention to the approach of train No. 10, the engineman acknowledging the warning. No trouble was experienced in making the stop at the stop board, after which his train immediately started ahead again, just mov- ing, and the fireman called the engineman's attention to the approaching train a second time; the fireman noticed that his engine was getting close to the switch and called the engineman's attention to the approaching train a third time, expecting all the while that his own train would be brought to a stop clear of the other track. However, his train was not brought to a stop until it fouled the switch. The headlight of the approaching engine was shining direct- ly in his face, and realizing that a collision was imminent Fireman Marlow jumped off from the engineman's side just about the time that his train stopped, immediately follow- ing which the collision occurred. Fireman Marlow stated that Engineman Rothwell did not acknowledge his last two warnings of the approach of train No. 10; the engineman kept applying and releasing the air brakes, something he had never seen the engineman do before, nor did he know why it was being done. Fireman Marlow could advance no reason for the failure of the engineman to handle the train in his usual careful manner at the switch; he had talked frequently with the engineman en route on this trip and he appeared normal in every respect. The air brakes worked properly in making the various stops en route, and Fireman Marlow did all that he could to get the engineman to bring the train to a stop before fouling the switch. The head brakeman had not come forward in order to throw the switch at the time the accident occurred; after the occurrence of the accident it was still lined for the Second Subdivision main track, with the switch lamp burning. S At the time of the accident Conductor Kendall, of train No. 52, was in the vestibule between the third and fourth cars; Head Brakeman Butler had just stepped off the third car, in order to go forward to throw the switch, and Flagman Dennison was on the rear end of the train. Their statements were to the effect that their train made a stop for the stop board, and then as customary moved ahead at a low rate of speed toward the clearance point; they thought the train would again be brought to a stop in the clear as usual, and none of them was aware of anything wrong prior to the accident. > Engineman Sandberg, of train No. 10, stated. that the speed of his train was about 50 miles per hour on passing signal 103.8, which was displaying a proceed indication. Approaching signal 102.8, which at first was also displaying a proceed indication, the speed had been reduced to about 20 miles per hour, by means of about a 10-pound brake pipe reduction; the engineman released the brakes and permitted the train to drift; when about one car length from signal 102.8 its indication changed to stop. Engineman Sandberg immediately placed the brake valve handle in the emergency position and opened the sanders; he estimated the speed of his train to have been about 10 miles per hour at the time of the collision. The air brakes were tested and worked properly, but he did not think that full emergency effect was obtained owing to the previous service air brake application. Engineman Sandberg first saw train No. 52 after he had passed signal 102.8 and after he had applied the air brakes in emergency, at which time that train appeared to be moving slowly toward the switch; he thought that the engine was fouling the switch then, but did not know whether or not that train was moving. State- ments of Fireman Borowick were similar to those of Engine- man Sandberg. Conclusions This accident was caused by train No. 52 fouling the junction switch directly in front of train No. 10, for which Engineman Rothwell is responsible. The investigation developed that train No. 52 made the stop for the stop board and then, as was customary, immediately started ahead again at a low rate of speed, but instead of again coming to a stop in the clear it passed the insulated joints, causing the indication displayed by sig- nal 102.8 to change from proceed to stop directly in front of train No. 10, and that train No. 52 did not come to a stop until it had fouled the switch, immediately after which it was struck by train No. 10, which train could not Prior be brought to a stop in time to avert the collision. to the accident Engineman Rothwell appeared to be normal in '.2 BLANX ** ! foot ped direkt · 5 every respect and in full possession of his faculties; Fireman Marlow called his attention to the approach of train No. 10 three different times. The air brakes worked properly en route; the switch as lined for the Second Subdivision main track, with the switch lamp burning. Engineman Rothwell was the regular engineman on this train and had been on this run for over 10 years. Why he failed to bring his train to a stop the second time clear of the switch is not known, as he was killed in the accident. Engineman Rothwell had been in the service of this railway for 34 years, 4 years as fireman and the rest as engineman; he had a good record. At the time of the accident he had been on duty 10 hours, prior to which he had been off duty 28 hours and 45 minutes. None of the other employees involved had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, a W. P. BORLAND, Director. : Transportation Library HE 1780 4234 1590: REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT THE CROSSING OF THE MONON RAILWAY AND THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD AT ROACHDALE, INDIANA, NOVEMBER 15, 1929 January 9, 1930 To the Commission: On November 15, 1929, there was a side collision between a Baltimore & Ohio passenger train and a Monon freight train at the Baltimore & Ohio Monon crossing at Roachdale, Indiana, which resulted in the injury of 4 passengers and 5 employees. * AT THE LACK The Decatur subdivision, Indianapolis Division of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad extends westward from Indianapolis, Indiana, to Springfield, Illinois, a distance of 194.5 miles. At Roachdale, 35.3 miles west of Indianapolis, this line crosses at grade the Fourth Subdivision, Southern Division, of the Monon Railway, which extends southward from Shops (Lafayette), In- diana, to Mc Doel, Indiana, a distance of 103.3 miles. These are both single track lines and the crossing is practically at right angles. The law of Indiana re- quires that trains operated over railroad crossings which are not protected by interlocking must be stopped not less than 40 feet nor more than 500 feet from such crossings, and at Roachdale there are stop signs on both roads at the approaches to this crossing. There is also a crossing gate, manually operated, adapted to be swung into position across either line when the route is clear for the other line. It is mounted upon a switch-stand base located in the southwest angle of the intersection, 10 feet from the center line of each track, the mast being 19 feet in height and having mounted at its top a switch target and lamp, the night indications of which are red for stop and green for proceed. The gate arm is mounted approximately 7 feet above the base and it about 12 feet in length, the outer end for a distance of 6 feet being of wood, 3 inches wide, painted red, with three 4-inch holes with painted white rings around them, and is adapted to be secured in position at right angles to either track by means of an iron rod hooked to a spike in a tie. On the Monon there is an automatic block signal system in use, the signals being of the normal clear, three position type; automatic signals governing both northbound and southbound move- ments are located on a bracket mast in the southwest angle of the intersection. There is a dead section in the track circuit of about 12 feet at the crossing, -2- į ! : ! | and the crossing gate is not interconnected in any way with the signal system. There are train-order signals for both roads located at the station which is in the .southeast angle of the intersection. The view from trains approaching on either road is not obstructed and signals and the crossing gate can be seen for consider- able distances. Approaching Roachdale crossing from the west the Baltimore & Ohio track is tangent for a distance of more than a mile; the grade is slightly ascending west of the station and then practically level for a distance of about 700 feet, the crossing where the accident occurred being located in this level track. The Monon track is tangent for several miles in each direction; approaching from the south the grade is level for a considerable distance, followed by a descending grade of 0.73 per cent for 1500 feet and then level track for 2100 feet to the point of accident. The trains involved in this accident were Baltimore & Ohio eastbound passenger train No. 49, consisting of 1 locomotive, 1 mail car, 1 baggage car, 1 coach, 1 sleeping car and 1 parlor-cafe car, in the order named, the first three cars being of all steel construction, the 4th car being of steel-underframe construction, while the last car was of wooden construction; and Monon northbound freight train extra 570, consisting and caboose. of 1 locomotive, 52 loaded and 2 empty cars, and caboose. Train No. 49, with Conductor Glidewell and Engineman Shaffer in charge, was eastbound from Springfield and arrived at Roachdale at 12.21 p.m., on time; it was moving over the crossing at low speed when the parlor- cafe car was struck at about its center by Monon extra 570. Extra 570 was not brought to a stop before reach- ing the crossing, and was traveling at a speed estima- ted at from 3 to 5 miles per hour when it struck the rear car of the passenger train. The weather was clear at the time of the accident. Na vla As a result of the collision Baltimore & Ohio cafe car was overturned and badly damaged, and Monon loco-- motive No. 570 was partly derailed. All the persons injured were in the cafe car. Summary of Evidence Engineman Shaffer of Baltimore & Ohio train No. 49 stated that he made the crossing stop at Roachdale and was preparing to make the station stop when he heard whistle signals; he saw the Monon train approach- ing, and realized that the whistle signals were intended as a warning and that the Monon train would not be stopped before reaching the crossing; He stated that he released the brakes and moved forward in an attempt to clear the crossing before the Monon train reached it; -3- MA he thought his train was moving at the rate of about 5 miles per hour when the collision occurred. Engineman Shaffer's statement was practically corroborated by Conductor Glidewell who also stated that when he realized the situation he gave the engineman a signal to keep going. Trainmaster Partlow was riding in the rear car of train No. 49 and just as this train was about to make the regular station stop his attention was suddenly attracted to a series of short blasts of an engine whistle. He saw the Monon train approaching and only had time to reach the rear door of the parlor car when the collision occurred. Engineman Cole of Monon train extra 570 stated that the brakes of his train were inspected before leaving McDoel and he had no difficulty in controlling or stop- ing his train at points enroute between McDoel and Roachdale. He stated that he was running at a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour when he passed the south switch of Roachdale passing track, approximately 4300 feet south of the crossing, and at that point he made an application of the brakes. At the crossover switch approximately half a mile south of the crossing, at which point he could see the crossing gate, he made a further brake pipe reduction. As he approached the crossing he saw the engine of the Baltimore & Ohio passenger train start over the crossing and as he was then afraid he was not going to ret stopped he began to sound the whistle. For the last few seconds before the collision occurred he thought his train would be stopped before it reached the crossing but he continued to sound the warning signals by means of his engine whistle. He stated that the first brake pipe reduction was about 10 pounds and then after a minute or a minute and a half he drew off 20 or 25 pounds; when he realized he was not going to stop he moved his brake valve to emergency and reversed the engine. He stated that he saw the crossing gate was against him when he made the second reduction; had he seen the train at that time he Would have made an emergency application instead of the second service reduction. When he finally did go to emergency position he did not get emergency effect on account of the preceding service reductions. After his engine was rerailed and the train proceeded northward following the accident, an inspection and test of the brakes was made at Whitesville; at the time of this inspection 3 brakes were not applied, one of which the conductor had bled off and he thought that the other two had leaked off. He said that while no trouble had been experienced in the operation of the brakes and the con- trol of the train prior to the accident, a number of V -4- } cars were picked up at Bainbridge, some of which had long piston travel, and he thought that might have reduced the efficiency of the train brakes so rewhat. The engine was recently out of the shops and Road Foreman of Engines Martin operated the engine part of the time; he expericnced no difficulty in the oper- ation of the brakes or the control of the train. Conductor Meehan of extra 570 stated that his train consisted of 27 loads and 3 empties when leaving Mc- Doel; at Bainbridge 22 loads were picked up and at Wallace Junction 3 loads were picked up. After leaving those points he noticed that the brake pipe gage in the caboose registered 70 pounds; hehoted no unusual speed and did not notice particularly the operation of the brakes approaching Roachdale. He was writing in the caboose and did not know that an accident occurred until the rear brakeman told him. After the accident occurred the train was inspected and it was found that all the. brakes were cut in. Leaving Roachdale the brake on on... car was sticking and he bled it off. The Brakeman Jacobs of extra 570 stated that after cars were picked up at Bainbridge they waited several minutes for the brake pipe pressure to be pumped up. Approaching Roachdale he was riding on the engine. enginemen had shut off steam some distance back on account of the descending grade and did not again use steam before the accident occurred. The first brake pipe reduction was made at the south switch of the passing track and the engineman did not release before the second reduction was made. From his position in the cab he could not see the air grge and consequently he did not know the amount of those reductions. At the south end of the platform as the engincman began to sound warning whistle signals he got off and gave gave the Baltimore & Ohio train a signal to go ahead. Traveling Fireman Mitchell who was riding on the engine of extra 570 stated that when going down the grade at Carpentersville south of Roachdale the engine- man controlled the speed by means of the engine brake. When they were at about the crossover switch the fireman called attention to the approaching Baltimore & Ohio train and athbout that time they saw that the crossing gate was against them. The engineman had already ap- plied the brakes. Just before the engine reached the depot platform the engineman set the brakes in emergency. He estimated the speed at the time the Baltimore & Ohio train was first seen at about 25 miles per hour, and at about 10 miles per hour when the brake valve was placed in emergency position. When asked what in his opinion was the cause of the accident he stated that he thought their train must have been running a little faster than they realized on account of the engine being new and -5- ÷ : · the road being in good condition. He thought the engineman operated the brakes in the usual manner for making the required stops at this point. Fireman Bridges of extra 570 stated that he saw the passenger train when they were about at the cross- over switch or a little south of it and called the engineman's attention to it. He also saw the red gate set against his train and called that. The engineman had applied the brakes but as the train approached the depot he saw that it was not going to be stopped and he got off just south of the station platform. Road Foreman of Engines Martin who operated the engine part of the way during this trip stated that he thought the accident was due to the fact that Engineman Cole did not start braking strong enough the proper dis- tance from the crossing. He handled the engine on its trip northward from Roachdale after the accident and while there had been some change in the position of cars in the train he did not think that materially affected the efficiency of the air brakes and he had no difficulty in controlling the train during that part of part of the trip. Operator Lewis who was on duty at Roachdale stated that a northbound Monon extra left that point at 10:01 p.m. and after it departed he turned the crossing gate so as to clear the route for the Baltimore & Ohio line; train No. 49 made the usual crossing stop west of the station and waspartly over the crossing when he noticed extra 570 was approaching too fast to make the crossing stop. He gave the Baltimore & Ohio enginc- man signals to go ahead in an effort to clear the crossing before the Monon train arrived. He thought both trains were traveling at a speed of 3 or 4 miles per hour when the collision occurred. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Cole of Monon extra 570 properly to control the speed of his train, which resulted in failure to bring his train to a stop before entering upon the crossing which was already occupied by a train on the conflicting line. The investigation disclosed that no difficulty was experienced in properly controlling the train prior to or following the accident; approaching Roachdale there were no unusual conditions encountered and it is appar- ent that the brake equipment of this train was adequate to properly control it at this point. It is believed that Engineman Cole underestimated the speed of his train and either did not begin braking soon enough or -6- did not make a sufficiently heavy initial brake pipe reduction to bring his train properly under control before reaching the crossing. The evidence disclosed that Engineman Cole realized he was not going to be able to stop in time and attemp- ted to make an emergency application, but because of the previous service reductions he was unable to obtain any additional braking power as a result of this emer- gency application. During this investigation it was noted that the crossing gate was not connected in any manner with the automatic block signals on the Monon at this point and because of the dead section in the track circuit these automatic signals would not indicate that the drossing was obstructed. The signals are in a location where they are likely to be seen for a greater distance than the crossing gate and had the crossing gate been so connected with the signal sys tem that the automatic block signal would display stop indications when the crossing gate was set against Monon trains, it is possible Engineman Cole would have realized the necessity for heavier braking earlier than he did and he might then have been able to avert the accident. All of the employees involved in this accident were experienced men and none of them was on duty contrary to the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully, J W. P. BORLAND, Director. : transportation Library PE 1780 •A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1591 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CENTRAL RAILROAD OF NEW JERSEY AT TREICHLER, PA., ON NOVEMBER 23, 1929. February 21, 1930. To the Commission: On November 23, 1929, there was a side collision between two freight trains on the Central Railroad of New Jersey, at Treichler, Pe.., which resulted in the injury of two employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Lehigh, and Susquehanna Division extending between WK Tower, at Allentown, Pa., and Mauch Chunk, Pa., a distance of 27.59 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. There is an eastbound passing siding located between the two main tracks; this passing siding begins at Lockport telegraph office and extends a distance of 5,106 feet eastward to a point 175 feet west of Treichler. The point of accident was at the fouling point of the eastbound main track with the east end of this passing siding. Approaching this point from the west, there is a compound curve to the left which is 1,936 feet in length, with a maximum curvature of 30, followed by 2,357 feet of tangent track, the accident occurring at the leaving end of this tangent. The grade is 0. 13 per cent descending for eastbound trains. There is a spring switch at the east end of the passing siding, the normal position of the switch points being for through movements on the main track. Under special time- table instructions, trains may trail through spring switches without operating the switch stand. ܨܝ ㅁ ​Treichler EAST 106' 2 Point of switch 150 Π Point of frog and approximate point of accident 30 623' .V……. 0 Lockport Telegraph Office WEST 297.4 -Insulated joints 2°20' 1313' / THE OVER THE COMBINED THE ARMED RES MAIN EASTWARD PASSING TRACK - GASTWARD Signal 1002 WESTWARD 1841 MAIN · * * · • Engineman could see signal 1002 4603' Rear of train CU-2 No. 1591 C.R.R.of N.J., Treichler, Pa. Nov. 23, 1929. V... Signal 1004 SDA - 3- The signals involved are signals 1004, located 37 feet west of the switch at the west end of the passing siding, and signal 1002, located 4,603 feet east of signal 1004, or 553 feet west of the switch at the east end of the passing siding. These signals are of the 3-position, upper-quadrant, normal-clear, semaphore type, signal indications being red, yellow, and green, for stop, caution, and proceed, respectively. Signal 1002 can be seen by the enginemen of an eastbound train e distance of 1,841 feet. The insulated joints at the east end of the passing siding are located 256 feet west of the switch points, and not more than 60 feet from the fouling point with the eastbound main track. The weather was clear and dark at the time of the accident, which occurred at 5.56 a.m. Description Eastbound freight train CU-2, consisted of 28 load- ed cars, 55 empty cars, and a caboose, hauled by engine 909, and was in charge of Conductor Harrison and Engine- man Kline. On its arrival at Lockport, this train was headed in on the passing siding at 5.33 a.m., and after the departure of eastbound passenger train No. 102, or about 5.51 a.m., the required permission was received from the train dispatcher, by means of the telephone at Treichler, to again occupy the main track. Train CU-2 started ahead, and was pulling out on the main track at a low rate of speed when struck by train TJX-6. Eastbound freight train TJX-6 consisted of 80 loaded cars, 5 empty cars, and a caboose, hauled by engine 923, and was in charge of Conductor Long and Engineman Murtha. This train passed Lockport telegraph office at 5.55 a.m. and collided with train CU-2 shortly afterwards, while traveling at a speed estimated to have been approximately 30 miles per hour. The indications were that the first car struck by the engine of train TJX-6 was the third car in train CU-2, that car being carried eastward a distance of about 140 feet. The second car in train CU-2 was demolished, and the first car overturned, while the engine of that train broke away and ran down the track for some distance without being damaged; the side of the fourth car of the train was slightly damaged. Engine 923, of train TJX-6, came to rest in an upright position about 440 feet east of the point of accident, in a badly-damaged condition. -4- ; The first nine cars and the forward truck of the tenth car in this train were derailed, some of them going down an embankment on the south side of the track. The employees injured were the fireman and the brakeman of train TJX-6. Summary of evidence Head Brakeman Dugan, of train CU-2, was in the caboose when his train stopped on the passing siding be- tween Lockport and Treichler stations. He then went ahead and was at the station at Treichler when train No. 102 left that point. After its departure, he called the dispatcher on the telephone, received permission to fol- low train No. 102, and immediately gave his engineman a proceed signal, without opening the switch. This signal was acknowledged by the engineman, and the movement was started. Head Brakeman Dugan was standing near the station on the left side of the track, waiting to board his engine as it passed him, and at about the time his train started, he saw the headlight of a train approach- ing on the eastbound main track. He did not know how far away it was located at that time, saying that his view had been interfered with to some extent by his own engine, but apparently it was close enough to cause him to run down to a nearby highway in order to get out of the way. Graduate Engineman Kline, of train CU-2, thought that when his engine stopped on the passing siding, it was separated from the fouling point by a distance about equal to the length of the engine and one car; it was back far enough so that it cleared the insulated joints, because he said he looked back for that particular purpose and saw signal 1002 in the clear position. After train No. 103 had de- parted, he saw the head brakeman go to the telephone and then give him a signal to proceed, which he acknowledged with two short blasts on the whistle. The train started ahead, and when his engine was about over the frog of the switch, he glanced back and saw a headlight, remaking to Conductor Harrison, who was on the engine, that a train was coming. The conductor at once said that the approach- ing train was not going to stop, and Engineman Kline re- plied that it would stop, but on looking back again he realized that the conductor was correct, and he said he at once opened the throttle wide, in order to get the engine off the switch so as to avoid a side collision between the two engines. When the collision occurred, his -5- ; engine broke away from the train and ran some distance down the track, Engineman Kline keeping the brake valvẹ in the release position and the throttle open, so as to get as far away as possible from the point of accident. Engineman Kline further stated that it was the custom to depend on the flagman to provide protection whèn start- ing out of a passing siding. It was not the custom to call in the flagman when on a siding, but on the other hand, the engineman said the flagman would hear the whistling and know that his train was ready to proceed. In this particular case, the only whistle signals sounded by him were two short blasts in answer to the head brakeman's signals, and then two longer blasts to indi- cate that he was starting the train. Engineman Kline realized that with the spring switch in use at this point, he was not afforded any signal protection until his train moved over the insulated joints, whereas with a hand-operated switch he would have had it opened, causing the signals to assume the stop position, before starting the movement. The statements of Fireman Savadge brought out nothing additional of importance. M Conductor Harrison, of train CU-2, said that after the train had started, Engineman Kline looked back and said there was a train coming on the straight track. The conductor then looked back, at which time his own engine was about on the frog of the switch, and told the engineman that the train was not going to stop, and he said Engineman Kline then remarked that he would try to get the engine far enough out on the main track so that it would not be struck by the approaching train. Conduc- tor Harrison then got off the engine and began flagging the approaching train with his white lantern, but realiz- ing that it was too late to avert an accident, he soon got out of the way. Conductor Harrison also stated that he had noticed signal 1002, both before and after train No. 102 passed it, and it was operating properly on both occasions, and he also saw it in the stop position after the accident had occurred. He admitted that a fușee should have been displayed for the purpose of protecting the head end of the train when it started to move. It further appeared from his statements that he did not think the whistle on his engine had been sounded loudly enough to be heard by the flagman, and that his flagman also told him the engine of train TJX-6 had passed the caboose before it started to move. { ; -6- Flagman Donlin, of train CU-2, said he was on the ground a couple of cer-lengths back of the caboose when he saw the headlight of train TJX-6. He watched the train as it approached, moving at a speed of 30 or 35 miles per hour, and said that the engine was about opposite his caboose when his own train started to move, and although he called to the engine crew, it was too late to attract their attention. He estimated that his own train moved a distance of four or five car-lengths before the accident occurred, and that the bfakes on train TJX-6 were applied when about three-fourths of that train had passed his caboose. Flagman Donlin further stated that it was his practice to place torpedoes and a fusee on the main track when pulling out of a siding, this action being taken either when he is recalled, or when his train starts to move, but in this case he had not heard any whistle signals indicating that his train was about to start, and when it finally did start, it was too late to warn the engine crew of train TJX-6. Engineman Murtha, of train TJX-6, said signal 1004 was in the clear position when he passed it, and that a clear indication was also displayed by signal 1003 when it first came in sight. When he was about 12 car-lengths from the signal, moving at a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour, the signal went to the stop position, at which time he had started to sound the whistle signal for the highway crossing at Treichler. He at once applied the brakes in emergency, told the head brakeman and fireman to get off, and then got off himself, just before the collision occurred. Engineman Murtha had not noticed that there was a train on the passing siding until he heard the sound occasioned as his engine was passing it. It was his opinion that even if a fusee had been lighted at the head end of train CU-2, it would not have prevented the accident, although the resulting damage might have been lessened to some extent. The throwing of the switch, how- ever, might have caused him to receive a caution indica- tion at signal 1004, in which event the accident probably would not have occurred. Engineman Murtha did not notice anyone near the switch flagging him with a lantern. The statements of Fireman Maloney and Head Brakeman Cutsler, of train TJX-6, who were riding on the engine, and of Conductor Long and Flagman Stewart, who were riding in the caboose, brought out nothing additional of importance. { : --7-- Train Dispatcher Anthony, who was on duty at the time of the accident, said some member of the crew of train CU-2 had called him on the telephone about 5.49 or 5.50 a.m., and that he told them to follow train No. 102 out of Treichler. The last report he had received concerning train TJX-6 was from Palmerton, which is 8.27 miles west of Treichler. Judging from this report, he did not expect that the train would reach Lockport before 6.02 or 6.04 a.m., and consequently he said nothing about it to the crew of train CU-2, as it was his intention to keep that train ahead of train TJX-6 on account of a fast freight connection at Allentown, and also as it is not the practice to inform crews about following movements, except on portions of the line where there are no automatic signals, the expectation being that movements will be properly protected according to the rules. Subsequently, however, Dispatcher Anthony said it was not the practice to give permission for a train to leave a passing siding with a following train so close behind it. Operator Mendsen, on duty at Lockport, said train TJX-6 had a clear signal indication at signal 1004. The train passed his office at a speed of about 35 miles per hour, and he said he heard the air brakes being applied after the train had passed his office a distance of 20 or 30 car-lengths. Operator Mendsen did not know train CU-2 was going to follow train No. 102, and his first knowledge of anything wrong was received on the telephone after the accident had occurred. Conclusions This accident was caused by train CU-2 heading out on the main track without adequate flag protection. The evidence indicated that after receiving per- mission to occupy the main track, train CU-2 was started immediately. Since the switch leaving the siding was a spring switch, which could be trailed through without operating the switch stand, it was not until the engine had fouled the track circuit that signal 1002 was caused to assume the stop position. This was the first warning received by the engine crew of train TJX-6, which ap- parently was close to the signal at the time it changed from proceed to stop, and although the engineman of that train at once applied the brakes in emergency, it was Cate -8- too late to avert the accident. It also appeared from the evidence that train CU-2 did not begin to move until the engine of train TJX-6 was passing its caboose, and this in turn resulted in the inability of the flag- man of train CU-2 to warn the crew of train TJX-6. In making the movement from the passing siding out on the main track, it was absolutely necessary for the crew of train CU-2 to make sure that their train was furnished with adequate flag protection; the conductor and engine- man were together on the engine, and on them rests the responsibility for not providing such protection. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND Director. : ን I mik Transportation Library We 8780 „A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION To the Commission: 1592 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE COLORADO AND SOUTHERN RAILWAY NEAR GARCIA, N. MEX. ON NOVEMBER 24, 1929. > February 21, 1930. On November 24, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Colorado and Southern Railway near Garcia, N. Mex., resulting in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Trinidad and Sixela Subdivision of the Southern Division, extending between Trinidad, Colo., and Sixela, N. Mex., a distance of 134.5 miles; this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred between Oakton and Garcia, in a cut about 10 feet in depth, at a point approximately 2,715 feet south of mile post 226; approaching this point from the north the track is tangent for a distance of 661 feet, followed by a 5° 16' curve to the right 626 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point approximately 258 feet from its northern end. The grade for southbound trains is 0.96 per cent descending for about 3,500 feet, practically level for 1,000 feet, then 1.04 per cent ascending for 300 feet, following which it is practically level for 200 feet to the initial point of derailment and for some distance beyond. The track was laid with 85-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with about 21 treated ties to the rail-length, tie-plated, single-spiked, and ballasted with cinders to a depth of 12 inches. The track was maintained in fair condition. The maximum speed permitted for freight trains in this territory is 30 miles per hour, while on the curve involved freight trains handled by engines of the 2-8-2 type are restricted to a speed of 20 miles per hour. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 5.05 p.m. -3- Description Southbound freight train extra 5215 consisted of 43 cars and a caboose, hauled by CB&Q engine 5215, of the 3-8-2 type, and was in charge of Conductor White and Engineman Dowling. This train left Trinidad at 4.25 p.m., according to the train sheet, and while approaching Garcia, 15.8 miles beyond, was derailed while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been between 15 and 35 miles per hour. Engine 5215 continued on the ties for a distance of 504 feet, where it came to rest on its left side, east of and parallel to the main track. The first 19 cars were derailed and badly damaged, 8 of them being practically destroyed; all of these 19 cars were piled up more or less crosswise the roadbed within a distance of about 400 feet. The employee killed was the fireman. Summary of evidence Engineman Dowling stated that he handled the train in the usual manner on this occasion, making about a. 6 or 8 pound brake pipe reduction to apply the brakes about 20 car lengths north of the point of derailment; he said he kept the brakes applied on the descending grade, saying that he had reduced speed to about 20 miles per hour around all curves en route. The first he knew of anything wrong was while rounding the curve, at which time it felt like the engine was on the ground on the left side; he immediately placed the brake valve in emergency position, but he did not think that emergency effect was obtained owing to the fact that he already had the air brakes applied in service; he estimated the speed to have been about 15 miles per hour at the time of the derailment. Engineman Dowling stated that there was nothing wrong with the riding qualities of the engine and that prior to the derailment he did not notice any unusual motion such as would have been caused by defective track. After the accident he noticed that a couple of rails had turned over on the east side of the track where the engine was first derailed; he also examined the overturned engine and so far as he could see there was no defect that could have caused the accident. -3- J., Head Erakeman Morris stated that he was riding on the engine, standing between the engineman and fireman, and that he was concerned about the high rate of speed; he estimated it to have been between 30 and 35 miles per hour at the time of the derailment. Head Brakeman Morris stated that at the first curve north of the curve where the accident occurred (a 5° 04' curve to the left 749 feet in length) the engine gave a severe lurch; he said he was while afraid then that the engine was going to be derailed he said the fireman made some remark to the effect that if the engineman did not use the air brakes he would go back to the caboose. He noticed no defect in the track. > Conductor White was riding in the caboose; he estimated the speed to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour at the time of the derailment. About 2 hours after the derailment he examined the track and noticed that the east rail was worn quite a bit and was thrown to the left possibly 2 or 3 inches; he thought that the track had gradually been put out of alinement for a few days prior to the accident. The engine was not derailed at the point where the track was out of alinement, but at a point about two or three rail lengths beyond... Conductor White further stated that the speed of his train was not such that it would have put the track out of alinement and in his opinion it was the track being out of alinement that caused the engine to be derailed. Flagman Yokeley was also riding in the caboose; he estimated the speed to have been the same as usual in this vicinity, between 20 and 25 miles per hour and not exceeding 25 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Roadmaster Reese stated that at the initial point of derailment the east rail was slightly canted for a distance of about one-quarter rail length, from which point the angle gradually increased until the rail was turned over on its side. The track for about three rail lengths north of where the rail started to turn over was kicked out of line about 2 inches and for a short distance in this section the gauge was about 1 inch wide; marks showed on the ties where the tie plates were kicked out, which indicated that this had happened at the time the track was kicked out of line. The elevation had been re- duced to 2 inches from a standard of 3 inches. The inside rail was standing in its normal position for about three rail lengths beyond where the outside rail commenced to turn. The gauge of the track north of the point of derail- ment was standard and the elevation of the north spiral of the curve was uniform. Roadmaster Reese considered track conditions safe for a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour on curves, saying that otherwise he would have placed a slow order on it. Section Foreman Rael, in charge of the section where the accident occurred, stated that he was last over the track on the day prior to the accident and although he made careful inspection he noticed nothing wrong. He had performed work on the track where the derailment occurred about 2 or 3 days prior to the accident. The track was in proper alinement and gauge. After the accident he in- spected the track in company with Roadmaster Reese. Sec- tion Foreman Rael stated that no more trouble was exper- ienced with the track at this particular point than else- where and that while there were a few bad ties in the track where the engine left the rails, there were also plenty of good ties to keep the track in gauge. Material General Roundhouse Foreman Mitchell stated that engine 5215 was given the regular daily inspection before it left the roundhouse and that no defect of any consequence was found. Engine 5215 entered the shop on October 19, 1929, for class 5 repairs, and a new main driving axle was applied, new driving box brasses, lateral taken up in all driving boxes, new driving wheel tires applied, new rod brasses and the lateral taken up in the engine truck. The trailer wheels were removed, tires turned and lateral taken up. Engine 5215 was turned out of the shop on November 3, 1929, and at the time of the derailment it had traveled approxi- mately 2,000 miles. Subsequent to the accident Mr. Mitchell made careful inspection of the engine, including measure- ments of the lateral on engine truck, driving wheels and trailer truck, distance between these wheels, face to face, flanges, etc., also as to whether any of the axles were sprung, but nothing was found that would have caused the accident. Statements of members of the crew of northbound freight train extra 5288, consisting of about 37 cars and a caboose, which train passed over the track where the de- railment occurred less than 1 hour before its occurrence, at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour, were to the effect that they noticed nothing un- usual with respect to track conditions at that time. G -5- Conclusions This accident is believed to have been due to a rate of speed which was materially in excess of the speed restrictions on this curve for the type of locomotive in use. Engine 5215 is of the 2-8-2 type, and was re- stricted to a speed of 20 miles per hour on this curve. This engine had recently received class 5 repairs and appeared to have been in good mechanical condition at the time it was derailed. While minor defects existed in the track, apparently they were not of such a nature as to have caused a derailment had the speed requirements been complied with. It is believed that the train was being operated at a speed considerably in excess of 20 miles per hour, especially in view of the statements of Head Brakeman Morris regarding the rate of speed prior to the accident, as well as the condition of the equipment after the accident and the manner in which it came to rest the first 19 cars being piled up in a distance of about 400 feet. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director,. *** : ! Transportation Library HE 1780 A234 * INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1587 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD AT WEST PHILADELPHIA, PA., ON NOVEMBER 12, 1929. February 20, 1930. To the Commission: On November 12, 1929, there was a side collision be- tween an express train and an empty passenger-equipment train on the Pennsylvania Railroad at West Philadelphia, Pa., resulting in the death of one employee. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Philadelphia Terminal Division, in the West Philadelphia passenger train yard, between "K" tower and "N" tower, just west of a switch- man's station, known as station W. P. 7, at which point tracks 4 and 17 converge. "N" tower is located about 1,900 feet from the West Philadelphia Station, outbound, while "K" tower is located about 2,300 feet beyond; sta- tion W. P. 7 is located about 1,050 feet east of "K" tower, in the vicinity of Spring Garden Street bridge. Approaching the switch, outbound, at which tracks 4 and 17 converge, track 4 curves gradually to the left; track 17 parallels track 4 on the left, but is not imme- diately adjacent thereto, being separated therefrom by two other tracks until reaching a point a short distance beyond Spring Garden Street bridge, where the two other tracks end, and track 17 then curves first to the right and then to the left, converging with track 4 just west of station W. P. 7. > Movements within the yard are made subject to the book of operating rules, time-table and special instruc- tions; such movements are also under the direction of a yardmaster. Movements from the yard to the main track or vice versa, are under the control of the towermen at "K" tower and "" tower, with a switchman stationed be- tween these two towers at W. P. 7, who operates hand- thrown switches, such a switch being in use at the point where tracks 4 and 17 converge; the normal position of this switch is lined for track 17, it being a trailing-point switch for the movements involved. Outbound trains depart- ing on track 17 are given signal to proceed after the towerman at "N" tower notifies the towerman at "K" tower -2- and receives information that the route is clear. Under special instructions issued on August 13, 1929, a movement must not be made from track 4 to track 17 without first obtaining permission from the switchman at W. P. 7, who must get his authority from the towerman at "K" tower. Under the rules, trains moving on yard tracks, but not operated under block signal rules or train orders, must run prepared to stop within range of vision, unless tracks are known to be clear and switches properly set. The weather was slightly foggy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 1.20 a.m. Description > Shifting engine 564, headed east, was coupled to the west end of 10 mixed passenger equipment cars, empty and in charge of Conductor Huey and Engineman Fogarty. This train moved outbound, making a back-up movement on track 4, and was brought to a stop with the engine fouling the switch at which tracks 4 and 17 converge. While standing at this point, preparatory to making a reverse movement to Broad Street station, engine 564 was struck on its right side by train No. 91. Outbound first-class express train No. 91 consisted of 19 express cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 3755, and was in charge of Conductor Hiller and Engineman Yeater. This train departed from the West Philadelphia station at 1.17 a.m., 22 minutes late, and collided with shifting engine 564 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been between 3 and 12 miles per hour. The employee Both engines were slightly damaged. killed was the engineman of engine 564. Summary of evidence Fireman McFarland, of engine 564, stated that the back-up movement on track 4 was made at a speed not to exceed 15 miles per hour; when in the vicinity of the switch, Engineman Fogarty told him that the switch was lined for track 17 and he made a heavy air brake applica- tion. Fireman McFarland stood up on the seat box, but could not see the switch, and then his train came to a sudden stop, fouling the switch and causing him to lose his balance. Engineman Fogarty immediately sounded the engine whistle and shouted a warning of danger, following which the collision occurred. Fireman McFarland further stated that he did not see or hear train No. 91 prior to the collision, as he was on the opposite side of the en- gine cab; the air brakes had been tested and the head- light was burning properly. S .... -3- Conductor Huey, of engine 564, stated that he was rid- ing at the rear end of his train while the back-up movement was being made on track 4, at a speed not to exceed 8 miles per hour. Approaching the switch the air brakes went into emergency and he got off to see what the trouble was; on account of the haze he could not see his own engine. At about this time the engine of train No. 91 passed him on track 17, following which he heard a blast sounded on the engine whistle, then the air brakes applied in emergency on train No. 91, and the conductor ran the length of his train, as he thought his own engine might have fouled the switch. Conductor Huey said that there was nothing he could have done to prevent the accident. He said that he had never worked with Engineman Fogarty before, but that the engineman told him that he was qualified. Conductor Huey advanced the opinion that the switch was fouled by reason of the fact that Engineman Fogarty, although quali- fied to work in this yard apparently was not thoroughly familiar with the physical characteristics at this point. " Engineman Yeater, of train No. 91, stated that he was proceeding under "caution, slow speed" signal indications, and that the speed of his train was about 12 miles per hour; after passing under Spring Garden Street bridge and hearing his fireman call the indication of a signal located near "K" tower, he opened the throttle, increasing the speed slightly, but on hearing a shrill blast sounded on an engine whistle he immediately shut off steam and applied the air brakes in emergency, then the collision occurred at which time he estimated the speed to have been about 3 miles per hour. Engineman Yeater did not see engine 564 prior to the collision, account of the curvature. The cir brakes were tested and worked properly; he had the head- light burning dimly on his engine. Engineman Yeater fur- ther stated that he saw cars standing on track 4, but did not think that they extended beyond the fouling point of the switch, saying that had he been given proper warning that such was the case he could have brought his train to a stop without incident. He was thoroughly familiar with conditions in this vicinity and realized that he was in no way relieved from the duty of operating his own train pre- pared to stop within range of vision unless the tracks are known to be clear. G Q Fireman Thompson, of train No. 91, stated that after his engine passed under Spring Garden Street bridge he called the signal in the vicinity of "K" tower, which dis- played a "caution, slow speed" indication, and resumed work on his fire; he then heard the blast of an engine whistle, following which the collision occurred. He esti- mated the speed to have been not more than 12 miles per hour. He was unaware that the switch was fouled by engine 564. -3- Conductor Huey, of engine 564, stated that he was rid- ing at the rear end of his train while the back-up movement was being made on track 4, at a speed not to exceed 8 miles per hour. Approaching the switch the air brakes went into emergency and he got off to see what the trouble vas; on account of the haze he could not see his own engine. At about this time the engine of train No. 91 passed him on track 17, following which he heard a blast sounded on the engine whistle, then the air brakes applied in emergency on train No. 91, and the conductor ran the length of lis train, as he thought his own engine might have fouled the switch. Conductor Huey said that there was nothing he could have done to prevent the accident. He said that he had never worked with Engineman Fogarty before, but that the engineman told him that he was qualified. Conductor Huey advanced the opinion that the switch was fouled by reason of the fact that Engineman Fogarty, although quali- fied to work in this yard apparently was not thoroughly familiar with the physical characteristics at this point. G My > Engineman Yeater, of train No. 91, stated that he was proceeding under "caution, slow speed" signal indications, and that the speed of his train was about 12 miles per hour; after passing under Spring Garden Street bridge and hearing his fireman call the indication of a signal located near "K" tower, he opened the throttle, increasing the speed slightly, but on hearing a shrill blast sounded on an engine whistle he immediately shut off steam and applied the air brakes in emergency, then the collision occurred at which time he estimated the speed to have been about 3 miles per hour. Engineman Yeater did not see engine 564 prior to the collision, account of the curvature. The cir brakes were tested and worked properly; he had the head- light burning dimly on his engine. Engineman Yeater fur- ther stated that he saw cars standing on track 4, but did not think that they extended beyond the fouling point of the switch, saying that had he been given proper warning that such was the case he could have brought his train to a stop without incident. He was thoroughly familiar with conditions in this vicinity and realized that he was in no way relieved from the duty of operating his own train pre- pared to stop within range of vision unless the tracks are known to be clear. S ?? Fireman Thompson, of train No. 91, stated that after his engine passed under Spring Garden Street bridge he called the signal in the vicinity of "K" tower, which dis- played a "caution, slow speed" indication, and resumed work on his fire; he then heard the blast of an engine whistle, following which the collision occurred. He esti- mated the speed to have been not more than 12 miles per hour. He was unaware that the switch was fouled by engine 564. .*: Conclusions This accident was caused by shifting engine 564 foul- ing a switch, for which Engineman Fogarty is responsible, and by the failure of Engineman Yeater, of train No. 91, to operate his train under proper control on a yard track. Why Engineman Fogarty, of engine 564, failed to bring the draft of cars to a stop before his engine fouled the switch, at the time the back-up movement vas made on track 4, is not known, as he was killed in the accident. Engine- man Yeater, of train No. 91, saw the draft of cars stand- ing on track 4 as his train approached the switch on track 17, and he should have realized that there was a possibil- ity of that train extending beyond the fouling point. As it was, however, he could not see the switch on account of the curvature and the first he knew of anything wrong was on hearing an engine whistle signal; although he immedi- ately shut off steam and applied the air brakes in emer- gency it was then too late to avert the accident. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. G Engineman Fogarty entered the service as fireman, on August 4, 1916, and was made engineman on May 14, 1923. Engineman Yeater entered the service as fireman on Decem- ber 12, 1900, and was made engineman on October 13, 1915. At the time of the accident none of the employees involved had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. kama m Ayten magi S 1593 + i Transportation Library HE 1781 A234 INTERSTATE COLERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHIC AGO, ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS AND OMAHA RAILWAY NEAR SIBLEY, ÍA., ON NOVEMBER 30, 1929. February 25, 1930 To the Commission: On November 30, 1929, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway near Sibley, Iowa, which resulted in the death of tro employees and the injury of four employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on Sub-division 2-of the Western Division, which extends between St. James, Minn., and Sioux City, Ia., a distance of 147.7 miles, and in the vicinity of the point of accident is a single- track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and a manual block-signal system. Compass directions are practically north and south, but time- table directions are east and west, and these latter directions are those used in this report. The accident occurred 4,475 feet east of the east passing-track switch at Sibley; approaching this point from the west, the track is tangent for a distance of more than 8,000 feet, followed by a 20 curve to the right, which is about 2,250 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point about 950 feet from its western end. Approaching from the east there is a long tangent, fol- lowed by about 925 feet of 10 curve to the right, about 875 feet of tangent, and than the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade is generally descending for westbound trains, with a maximum of 1 per cent; it is 0.3 per cent at the point of accident. P There is a passing track east of the station at Sibley; this passing track is located on the south side of the main traek, is about 2,100 feet in length, and its west switch is about 900 feet east of the block signal, which is located at the station. The engineman of an eastbound train leaving Sibley has an unobstructed view to a point approximately 2,000 feet beyond the point of accident, but the view of a westbound engineman is re- stricted very materially on account of hills and the curvature of the track. It was snowing at the time of the accident, which occurred about 8.20 p.m. 12- : C Description Westbound second-class freight train No. 19 consisted of 27 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 432. At Worthington, 17.6 miles east of Sibley, the crew in charge of this train received copies of two train orders on Form 19. These orders were as follows: No. 165 "No. 20 wait at Ritter until seven fifty-five 7:55 PM Ashton eight five 8:05 PM Sibley eight fifteen 8:15 PM for Extra 231 West. Bigelow eight thirty five 8:35 PM Org eight forty five 8:45 PM for No. 19. No. 167. "No. 19 meet Extra 101 and 301 coupled east at Bigelow and No. 20 at Sibley. Order at Sibley for No. 20 No. 19 hold main line at Bigelow." Bigelow and Org, the stations at which train No. 20 was to wait for train No. 19, are both located east of Sibley. Train No. 19 departed from Worthington at 7.35 p.m., 2 hours and 30 minutes late, and when passing Org, the last open office, the crew received a caution card calling attention, among other things, to the meets with extra 101-301, and train No. 20, as provided for in train orders Nos. 165 and 167. Train No. 19 passed Org, which is 13.8 miles from Sibley, at 7.46 p.m., and was approaching Sibley when it collided with train No. 20 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 20 to 30 miles per hour. Eastbound second-class freight train No. 20 con- sisted of 43 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 433, and was in charge of Conductor Haugen and Engineman Bridwell. At Alton, which is 32.3 miles from Sibley, the crew re- ceived a copy of train ord: r No. 165, quoted. above, and when passing Sheldon, 16.2 miles from Sibley, they received a caution card calling attention to the requirements of train order No. 165. Train No. 20 passed Sibley, an open office, at 8.17 p.m., without receiving a copy of train order No. 167, and collided with train No. 19 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been from 15 to 25 miles per hour. Both engines remained upright, although each of them was very badly damaged. The first three cars in train No. 19 were derailed, one of them being demolished, while six cars in train No. 20 were derailed and more or less badly damaged. The employees killed were the engine- man and head brakeman of train No. 19; the employees injured were the fireman of train No. 19 and the engine- man, fireman and head brakeman of train No. 20. : -3- Summary of evidence Fireman Albrecht, of train No. 19, said that after meeting extra 101-301 at Bigelow, which is a closed station 8.2 miles from Sibley, his train proceeded towards Sibley, moving at a speed not in excess of 35 miles per hour at any point. The fireman rode on his seat box throughout this distance, with the head brakeman behind him, and was looking through the front window of the cab. Fireman Albrecht noticed a reflection, which subsequently disappeared from his view, and at the time he thought it might be from train No. 20 waiting for them at the east passing-track switch at Sibley. He said nothing about it to the engineman, but shortly afterwards he saw the head- light of train No. 20, apparently not more than six car- lengths distant, and he at once called a warning to the engineman and jumped from the cab window. He estimated the speed of his train at that time to have been about 25 miles per hour, and said the engineman at once applied the air brakes in emergency, but that he did not think there was time enough for the brakes to reduce the speed of the train to any extent. Fireman Albrecht further stated that the headlight on his own engine was burning brightly, as was also the case with the headlight on the engine of train No. 20. The statements of Conductor Hart and Flagman Bertelson, of train No. 19, both of whom were riding in the caboose, brought out nothing additional of import- ance. The conductor thought the speed of his train was between 20 and 25 miles per hour, and the flagman thought it was between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Engineman Bridwell, of train No. 20, said that when passing the station at Sibley, moving at a speed of about 15 miles per hour, a caution card was received, calling attention to extra 101-301 ahead of them, and also calling attention to the meet with train No. 19 "as per time table, or as per train order No. It is to be noted in this connection that the number of the train order was not shown on this caution card. The speed of the train then was increased to about 25 miles per hour, and finally Engineman Bridwell saw the reflection of the headlight of train No. 19. At first he thought it was an automobile, not remembering at the time that there was no highway in the immediate vicinity, and he estimated that he watched it for a period of from 60 to 70 seconds before finally realizing that it was an approaching train. By this time the two trains 7ere not more than seven or eight car-lengths apart, and he said that he at once applied the brakes in emergency, callta to the fireman and head brakeman to get off, and then jumped off himself. Engineman Bridell further stated that with the train orders already in his possession which, as previously stated, directed his train to wait at Bigelow and at Org for train No. 19, both of those stations being east of Sibley, there was no doubt in his ~4~ 1:- mind as to his authority to proceed under the caution card. The statements of Fireman Bloom and Head Brake- man Johnson, of train No. 20, did not develop anything additional of importance. Conductor Haugon and Flagman Roberts, of train No. 20, were riding in the caboose. Conductor Haugen said the speed of his train Then passing Sibley was 10 or 15 miles per hour, and he did not think this rate of speed had been increased at the time of the accident. Copy of the caution card was handed on by hoop as the caboose passed the station, and Conductor Haugen said it was his idea that that part of the order relat- ing to mecting train No. 19 had reference to the require- ments of train order No. 165, that his train wait for train No. 19 at certain points cast of Sibley. Conductor Haugen estimated that his train did not move more than six or seven car-lengths after the emergency application was made at the time of the accident. The statements of Flagman Roberts developed nothing additional of importance. Signalman Woenick, on duty at Sibley, said train order No. 167, addressed to extra 101-301 coupled, and to train No. 20, at Sibley, and providing in part for a meet between trains Nos. 20 and 19 at Sibley, was re- ceived from the dispatcher and the "X" response given. The dispatcher had indicated that six copies of the order were to be made, but not having a 6-copy set up ready, he used one of nine copics. Signalman Woenick thoroughly understood that copies of this order were to be delivered both to the crew of extra 101-301 and to the crew of train No. 20, and he made delivery of the copies of the order to the crew of the double-header, arranged for the block to the next open office, and the train departed, at 7:39 p.m. The remaining copies of train order No. 167 were left on the table beside his typewriter, covered with a sheet of carbon paper. Signalman Wocnick then filled out a caution card for train No. 20 and when filling out the last portion of the card, which related to trains Nos. 20 and 19 meeting or passing as per time-table or train order, he had in mind the Tait order, No. 165, and forgot that he had a mest order put out for train No. 20 at his own station on Form 31. A few minutes before the arrival of train No. 20, he was able to see the reflection of its headlight, and asked for and received from the dispatcher a number for the caution card he had already filled out. Signalman Weonick then went out and delivered copies of the caution card by hoop to the engineman and also to the conductor, returned to the office, received payment for a telegram froma man who was in the office, and then reported to the dispatcher the departure of train No. 20, and it did not occur to him that he had forgotten to deliver train order No. 167 until the dispatcher asked him about the order. He then found the copies of the order wedged between the typewriter and the telegraph -=-=-=- ? # table. Signalman Wecnick further stated that a caution card may be issued by a signalman without permission from the dispatcher to a train having orders to meet at an intermediate or closed station, but a card issued to a train following another train into a block must not be issued until permission has been granted and an order number given by the dispatcher. The dispatcher gives the card a number, specifics the train to which it is issued, gives his "O.K.", and the signalman furnishes the balance of the information, and in this particular case, Signal- man Wecnick had been previously advised by the dispatcher about the wait order which had been issued to train No. 20 at a previous station. It further appears from Signal- man Wecnick's statements that the information shown on the caution card is not repcated, and the dispatcher hos no knowledge of what information it contains. The numbers of train orders are supposed to be shown on the caution card in the space provided for that purpose, but in some cases Signalman Wecnick would comply with these instructions, while in other cases he would not do so, and on the caution card delivered to train No. 20 in this particular case ho did not show the number of train order 165, which required train No. 20 to wait at certain points and which he supposed was the only restricting order in effect as far as that train was concerned. Signalman Wecnick also said that there were no abnormal conditions existing at the time, except that he had a dull headache and had been quite busy with a car of stock which had been delivered by the Rock Island, and had also delivered to messages to the crow of a train at his station. He as familiar with the instructions requiring a signalman to keep undelivered orders on top of the caution and release cards, which in turn were required to be kept on top of the block shoot, the idea being to prevent a signalman from filling out a card without first seeing the undelivered orders, and said that in this case he failed to comply with these instructions. p Dispatcher Fahey said it was not customary to issue a number for a caution card before obtaining the signature of the conductor to train orders addressed to the particular train involved, but in this case the dispatcher departed from the usual custom and gave the signalman a caution card number before train No. 20 arrived at Sibley, because of the fact that both of the trains involved were important and there would be a time-saving element in so doing, the only time to be saved, however, would have been the time it would take the signalman to fill out the card after the order had been made complete. Dispatcher Fahey did not think that his action had created a situation whereby train No. 20 might pass without receiving the order, saying that he had the "X" response of the signalman, and that if the signalman had not failed in his duty the train could not have been cleared until the signature of the conductor had been -6- obtained and the order made complete. It further appears from the statements of the dispatcher that signalmen are not required to repeat the information or the train order numbers shown on the caution cards, with the result that there is no way of checking up on what orders are deliver- ed. It was the opinion of the dispatcher, however, that the crew of train No. 20 should have stopped their train in order to have the number of the order filled in on the space provided for that purpose on the caution card. 2 Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Signalman Weenick, on duty at Sibley, to deliver a meet order. The evidence indicates that an order to wait for train No. 19 had been put out to train No. 20 at a pre- ceding station, effective at Bigelow and Org, points east of Sibley. Subsequently, train order No. 187 was address- ed to train No. 20 at Sibley, providing in part for a meet with train No. 19 at Sibley. Signalman Weenick delivered copies of the order to a train immediately ahead of train No. 20, but in some way overlooked the fact that the order was also addressed to train No. 20, and was of the opinion that the only order restricting that train's rights was the wait order previously issued. When train No. 20 came along, therefore, Signalman Weenick gave the crew a caution card calling attention to the preceding train, which was still in the block, and also providing that they were to meet train No. 19 as per train order, having in mind the provisions of the wait order. The crew of train No. 20 naturally supposed that the caution card referred to the wait order, and the result was that their train continued eastward toward Bigelow where they supposed they were to wait for train No. 19 until 8.35 p.m. Neither engine crew became definitely aware of the opposing train until too late to avert the accident. The statements of Signalman Weenick did not indicate any definite reason for his forgetfulness other than the fact that when taking the address of train order No. 167, at the time it was issued to him by the dispatcher, he in some way failed to make a mental note of the fact that the order was addressed to train No. 20, as well as to extra 101-301. Dispatcher Fahey said it was a practice not to give a number for a caution card until all orders to the train in question had been signed for. He did not follow this practice in this case, however, deviating therefrom simply for the purpose of trying to save the few seconds in time which would be needed by the operator in filling out the card after the train had arrived. It also appeared that the signalman failed to show on the caution card the numbers of the train orders which restricted the rights of train No. 20, although under the circumstances as they ì -7-0 existed in this case, it is probable that this made no great difference, for if the signalman had inserted what he thought was the proper number, he would have shown only the number of the wait order and would have omitted the number of the meet order. Examination was made of 691 caution cards, gathered from different stations, and it appeared that 7 per cent failed to show the numbers of the orders in the space provided for that purpose. It is also to be noted that both of the caution cards issued by Signalman Weenick, to extra 101-301 coupled and to train No. 20, failed to show this information, and in each case the crew of the train involved accepted such a caution card as suf- ficient authority to enter the block. These are small matters, but it occurs only too often that if some matter of comparatively small importance is handled correctly, the opportunity for the occurrence of an accident is materially decreased, and in this particular case, if the dispatcher had followed the usual practice and refrained from giving a number to the caution card until the order outstanding at Sibley had been signed for, the accident could have been prevented. It would also appear that an added factor of safety in all cases could be provided for very easily by having signalmen repeat to the dispatcher the numbers of the orders to be delivered, at the time they obtain the caution c ard. All of the employees involved were experienced men, and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. 密 ​Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 2 C • Transportation Library A C 1780 Azzy 1594 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY AT DIX, IND., ON NOVEMBER 30, 1929. February 25, 1930. To the Commission: On November 30, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a passenger train and a light engine on the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway, at Dix, Ind., which resulted in the death of 1 employee and the injury of 4 employees and 31 passengers. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on that part of the Chicago Division, which extends between Cincinnati, Ohio, and Indianapolis, Ind. Ind., a distance of 103.6 miles. It is a double-track line between Indianapolis and Dix, a dis- tance of 14 miles, on which an automatic block signal system is in use, while on the single-track east of Dix a manual block system is in service. The accident oc-. curred on single track within the limits of Dix inter- locking plant at the junction of double end single track line, at a point about 15 feet rest of the tower. There is an eastbound passing track 4,876 feet in length located east of Dix Tower and south of the main track. Approach- ing the point of accident from either direction the track is tangent for several miles and the view is unrestricted. The grade for westbound trains is 0.33 per cent descend- ing at the point of accident. makaa Dix is an interlocking plant from which the move- ments of trains are controlled from single to double track, and to and from sidings. The home signal govern- ing westbound movements is located 215 feet east of Dix Tower. It is a three-arm, three-position signal of the upper quadrant type. The normal position of the home signal is at red for stop. A "take-siding" signal and a distant signal are located 4,089 feet and 10,166 feet, respectively, east of Dix Tower. When the home signals are set at stop both of these outlying signals display caution indications for westbound trains. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 4.34 0.m. S 2. S 7 ! -2- Description Westbound passenger train No. 5 consisted of one combination mail and baggage car, one combination baggage car and coach, one coach, and two Pullman parlor cars, in the order named, hauled by engine 6410, and was in charge of Conductor Smith and Engineman Kern. This train departed from Cincinnati at 3.05 p.m., on time passed Fairland, the last open office, 6.3 miles east of Dix at 4.28 p.m., 6 minutes late, passed the west- bound home signal in the stop position and collided with light engine 167 while traveling at a speed esti- mated to have been between 30 and 35 miles per hour. " A .. Light engine 167 was in charge of Engineman Thompson and Fireman Lynch. This engine was just out of the shops at Beech Grove, 8.1 miles west of Dix, and was being broken in between the shops and Dix. It de- parted from Beech Grove at 4.20 p.m. and on arriving at Dix the route was set for a movement to the eastbound siding which diverges from single track at the tower; this engine had just reached the single track at the tower and had come practically to a stop when it was struck by train No. 5. The force of the impact drove engine 167 back. a distance of about 175 feet where it came to rest across the eastbound and westbound main tracks. The boiler of engine 6410 was torn from its frame; both engines were considerably damaged. None of the equipment of train No. 5 was derailed. The employee killed was the engine- man of train No. 5. Summary of evidence Fireman Smith, of train No. 5, stated that as their train was approaching the "take-siding" signal east of Dix Tower Engineman Kern reduced the speed of the train to about 30 or 35 miles per hour, and he did not know whether or not the brakes were released after this ap- plication as he was endeavoring to get the aspect of the home signal. Fireman Smith asked Engineman Kern if he could see the home signal and the engineman replied. that he could not. The view was obstructed by smoke and steam blowing over the track from engine 6169 which was standing on the eastbound passing track. When the home signal did become visible Fireman Smith called "all red" to the engineman and told him that he was going right into engine 167. Fireman Smith jumped off the engine immediately and as he did so he saw the engineman place the brake valve in emergency position. Both out- lying signals approaching this tower showed caution indications and their indications were called. ; ; L : i !!! -B ܐ ܐ Conductor Smith, of train No. 5, stated that the air brakes had been tested at Cincinnati, and no trouble was experienced with the air brakes en route. The speed had been reduced to about 30 miles per hour on approach- ing Dix. Conductor Smith said he next felt the air brakes applied in emergency, the accident occurring almost immediately. He afterward observed smoke and steam from engine 6169 on the eastbound siding drifting over the track rising to about the height of the signals. The statements of Brakeman Arnold and Baggageman Teagarden corroborated those of the conductor as to the operation of the air brakes and as to the speed of the train at the time of the accident. Engineman Thompson, of light engine 167, stated that when he first saw train No. 5 it was between the take-siding signal and the home signal, and he had just brought his train to a stop when struck by that train. He saw that the signals governing the westbound movements were red, but he did not observe any smoke or steam blowing from engine 6169 on the eastbound siding that would obscure the view had by the crew of 2 westbound train. Fireman Lynch, of light engine 167, stated that he first observed train No. 5 when it was in the vicinity of the east end of the eastbound siding, approximately 4,900 feet east of the tower. He noticed steam blowing from the engine on the siding but could not say whether it would obscure the view of engine crew of train No. 5. Fireman Lynch said that he thought their engine had come practically to a stop when the collision occurred. Engineman Leppert, of engine 6169, stated that his engine had been standing at a point about 150 feet east of the home signal for about 10 or 15 minutes when train No. 5 passed. He stated his engine had not been fired for 30 minutes prior to that time and that the stack was free from black smoke; the blower was on, slightly open. The statements of Fireman Wehrel, of engine 6169, corro- borated those of Engineman Leppert. Operator Clements who was on duty at Dix Tower at the time of the accident stated that light engine 167 was reported in the block between Beech Grove and Dix at 4.20 p.m. He then lined the route for engine 157 to enter the eastbound siding and at that time engine 167 was in the circuit about 2 miles west of Acton. At 4.28 p.m. he received a report from Fairland that train No. 5 had entered the block and he judged that the light engine was then near Acton, 1 mile west of Dix Tower. ▸ -4- He did not deem it advisable under the circumstances to change the route as such a move might introduce compli- cations. He stated that he could see the approaching train a distance of about 2 miles. Engine 6169, also being broken in, was standing east of the home signal on the eastbound siding and it was emitting smoke and steam which he thought obscured the home signal indica- tions to westbound trains. He noted that train No. 5 was approaching rapidly and as it neared it became ob- scured by smoke and steam; he then raised his window and looked out and saw the train emerge as from behind a smoke screen. Road Foreman of Engines Davis stated that after the Occurrence of the accident he examined the interior of the cab and its appurtenances and found the independent brake valve in quick-action position, the automatic in emergency, the reverse lever in the running notch and the throttle and sanders closed. An inspection of the locomotive wheels developed spots on the tires ranging from the size of a nickel to a quarter and from 4 to 6 inches apart; these were burned blue, indicating a heavy brake application. Conclusions C This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Kern, of train No. 5, to properly control the speed of his train approaching a signal in the stop position and to stop before passing that signal. The evidence indicates that the home signal could not be seen by either the engineman or the fireman, due to smoke and steam blowing across the track from an engine standing on the eastbound siding a short dis- tance east of the signal. In view of this fact, how- ever, Engineman Kern made no attempt to further reduce the speed of his train and when his train emerged from the smoke and steam and the signal was seen in the stop position he was unable to stop in time to avert the accident. Both the distant signal and the "take-siding" signal were in the caution position, and it was incumbent upon Engineman Kern to operate his train under control, especially when his view of the home signal was obstructed. All of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the hours of service laws. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transportabon Library не 1780 .A234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1596 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD NEAR MAUCH CHUNK, PA., ON DECEMBER 1, 1929. February 26, 1930. To the Commission: On December 1, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a freight train and a light engine on the Lehigh Valley Railroad near Mauch Chunk, Pa., which resulted in the injury of two employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the New Jersey and Lehigh Division extending between Greens Bridge, N. J., and Penn Haven, Pa., a distance of 56.2 miles; in the vicinity of the point of nccident this is a double- track line over which trains are operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal and train control system. The accident occurred at a point 1,500 fɛet east of a trailing-point crossover, located approx- imately 1 mile west of Mauch Chunk. Approaching the point of accident from the east the track is tangent for a distance of 1,470 feet, followed by a 2° 30' curve to the right 1,000 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 290 feet from its eastern end. Approaching from the west the track is tangent for a distance of 600 feet, followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. There is a retaining wall and an embankment on the inside of the curve on which the no- cident occurred which restricts the range of vision from trains approaching in either direction. The maxi- mum speed authorized for freight trains in the vicinity of the point of accident is 20 miles per hour. Gla The signals involved are signals 1231 and 1241 and are of the three-position upper-quadrant type; signal 1231 is located 4,110 feet east and signal 1241 is 10- cated 1,170 feet west of the point of accident. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 7.10 a.m. 12. -2- Description Light engine 1665, headed west, was in charge of Conductor Begel and Engineman Weiss. This engine de- parted from Mauch Chunk at 6.53 a.m., en route to Cler Onoko, a station 2.3 miles west of Mauch Chunk, to assist an eastbound train which was disabled at that point. Shortly after arriving at Glen Onoko this engine started eastward on the westbound main track, it being intended to proceed as far as the crossover but before reaching that point it collided with extra 2111 while traveling at a speed estimated at 10 miles per hour. Westbound freight train extra 3111 consisted of 32 cars and a caboose, hauled by engines 376 and 2111, end ras in charge of Conductor Daley and Enginemen Clark and Newman. This train left Packerton, 3 miles east of Hauch Chunk, at 7.00 a.m., passed auch Chunk at 7.08 a.m., and collided with engine 1665 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 5 and 10 miles per hour. Engine 1665 was not derailed but ras separated from its tender by a distance of about 235 feet. The tender wes considerably damaged and had one pair of wheels derailed. Engine 376 was damaged to some extent and had the rear tender truck derailed while engine 2111 was only slightly damaged and was not derailed. The employees injured were the enginemen and a brakeman of the light engine. Summary of evidence Engineman Weiss, of engine 1865, stated that while at Hauch Chunk his conductor instructed him to go to Glen Onoko to ascertain whether a freight train at that point, which was disabled, needed assistance, and to leave a flagman at the crossover between these points. A few minutes after arriving at the latter point the conductor instructed him to return to the crossover and notify the flaman not to open the crossover switches, and then return to Glen Onoko. He immediately started a backup movement on the westbound track and was moving at a speed of about 10 miles per hour when he noticed the exhaust of stean from an approaching engine which was then about 10 car-lengths distant; at that time he thought it was an engine on an adjoining track, as he understood the return movement to the crossover would be protected by the flagman whom they had left at that point. He did not discover that the other engine was on the westbound track until its whistle was sounded and it was then within four car-lengths of his own engine; ; -3- he immediately applied the brakes, reversed the engine and opened the throttle. He said that he did not hear the instructions given by the conductor to the flagman who had been dropped off at the crossover, and was of the impression that this flagman would have the cross- over switches open which would cause the signals to function and protect the movement against the current of traffic. Fireman Geiger, of engine 1865, stated that he did not see the opposing train until it was called to his attention by the engineman and at that time the engines rere about two car-lengths apart. Conductor Begel, of engine 1665, stated that he received orders from the yardmaster at Mauch Chunk to proceed to Glen Onoko to determine what was delaying an eastbound train there, and to leave a flagman at the crossover. He instructed this flagman, who got off near the east switch, to hold all trains until the engine returned and not to open the crossover switches until 7.15 a.m. Upon arrival at Glen Onoko he learned that the dis- abled train was about ready to proceed and after notifying the dispatcher to this effect he instructed the engineman to return to the crossover and instruct the flagman not to open the switches; he remained at Glen Onoko to keep the dispatcher advised as to the movement of the east- bound train. He said that he realized afterwards he should have left the flaman about 30 car-lengths east of the crossover and another man at the crossover to provide full protection for the reverse movement but did not do so for the reason that he did not think of it at the time, as well as the fact that a train seldom follows an engine en route to assist a disabled train. His purpose in not having the flaman open the switches until 7.15 a.m. was to keep from holding the eastbound train that he was going to assist at the signal west of that point. Flagman Hollenbach, of engine 1865, stated that he was instructed by the conductor to get off at the cross- over west of Mauch Chunk and to flag all trains and leave the crossover switches closed until 7.15 a.m. He got off, unlocked the switches and then walked eastward and upon reaching a point about 10 car-lengths from the east stitch he observed extra 2111 approaching. He gave rarn- ing signals with a red lantern from the engineman's side of that train but these signals were not acknowledged, the train passing him at a speed of about 35 or 40 miles per hour, and it appeared that the leading engine was still working steam. He did not place torpedoes on the rails as he was anxious to get back as far as possible and said he lost no time in doing so after unlocking the switches. 4- Engineman Clerk, of helper engine 376, stated that when signal 1231 first came into view it was displaying 2 clear indication but before his engine reached that point he noticed it was displaying a caution indication and he acknowledged it by operating the automatic train stop acknowledging valve. The speed of his train at that time was about 35 or 40 miles per hour and he partly closed the throttle and the engineman on the second engine shut off steam. While his train was approaching the crossover he observed a flagman standing on track 3, which parallels the stbound track on the north, flagging him in the ordinary janner. This flagman was about 8 or 10 car lengths east of the east crossover switch and was not more than 2 car-lengths ahead of the engine when he was first seen. Engineman Clark immediately shut off steam and made a heavy service application of the brakes, and after the train travelled a distance of about 15 car-lengths he noticed engine 1665 approaching and he applied the brakes in emergency but this had very little effect due to having previously made a service reduction; he thought the speed was reduced to about 5 miles per hour at the time of the accident. He said he did not apply the brakes in emergency as soon as he saw the flagman as he did not know the westbound track was being used for a reverse movement and the service application of the brakes would have brought the train to a stop before it passed signal 1241 which he expected to find in the stop position. He thought the reason he was being flagged was that some crew intended to set out a trainon track 3 and the west switch of which is located beyond signal 1341. It was his opinion that if it was intended to use the crossover the flagman should have been located at a much greater distance east of where he was actually standing as it would have been impossible even by an emergency application of the brakes to stop the train short of the crossover between the point where he could see this flagman and the east crossover switch. He also thought that the switches should have been opened and this would have caused signal 1231 to display a stop indication. He was familiar with the rule restricting the speed to 20 miles per hour between Penn Haven Junction and Mauch Chunk but did not think it applied to westbound trains. Engineman Newman, of the second engine of extra 2111, stated that before leaving Packerton an inspector gave him an air-brake test form which indicated that the brakes were working on all of the cars except one. When his engine reached a point about four or five car-lengths east of signal 1231 he noticed that it displayed a caution indication and he shut off steam but did not notice at that time whether steam was shut off on the leading en- gine although he was positive that it was shut off within -5- ! 10 car-lengths beyond that signal. He did not see the flagman east of the crossover as the stoker had become stalled and he was working on it when his engine passed that point. He returned to his engine cab after passing the crossover, or about 600 feet from the point of ac- cident, and at that time the speed was about 25 miles per hour. He did not know at what point the brakes were applied but they took proper hold and reduced the speed to about 15 miles per hour when the opposing engine came into view and this speed was further reduced to about 10 miles per hour at the time of the accident. He noticed fire flying from beneath engine 1665 while it was approaching and estimated the speed of that engine at 15 miles per hour. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure to provide proper flag protection for a movement against the current of traffic, for which Conductor Segel and Flagman Hollen- bach are responsible. The rules provide that conductors must carefully instruct flagmen as to the safe performance of their duties. A flagman must be sent in the direction of opposing traffic a sufficient distance from a detour crossover to insure full protection, with instructions to stop and hold all trains. In automatic signal ter- ritory, crossover switches at each end of single track section will be operated so as to hold automatic signals at stop. Conductor Begel did not instruct the flagman to co back to insure protection, although he did tell him to hold all trains at the crossover. He also failed to arrange for the opening of the crossover switches to provide automatic signal protection, but instead he specifically instructed the flagman to leave them closed until 7.15 a.m., which he said was for the purpose of allowing the eastbound train to proceed without stopping at the signal west of the crossover. He admitted that had he arranged to have the crossover switches opened before his engine departed from that point on its west- bound trip the accident would have been prevented. also said that he should have dropped another flamen off about 30 car-lengths east of the crossover but did not think of it at the time. He The rules further require that the flagman must go back immediately and proceed rapidly to a distance suf- ficient to insure full protection and on reaching the required distance or on the approach of a train to dis- play stop signals and in addition place two torpedoes -6- The on the rail. Flagman Hollenbach said that as soon as he got off at the crossover he unlocked the switches then started eastward, and when he reached a point about 10 car-lengths from the crossover he observed extra 2111 approaching. He gave the required stop signals but did not place torpedoes as he said he did not have time. train sheet shows that engine 1665 left Mauch Chunk at 6.58 a.m., and arrived at Glen Onoko at 7.02 a.m., which would indicate that it passed the crossover at about 7.00a.m. As Flagman Hollenbach under his instruc- tions was expected to be at the crossover to open the switches at 7.15 a.m., he had 7 minutes in which to provide protection in accordance with this rule and during that interval he should have reached a greater distance from the crossover than he actually did at the time extra 2111 passed him. Engineman Clark, who was operating the leading en- gine of extra 2111, said that his train was traveling at a speed of between 35 and 40 miles per hour when it passed signal 1231 which was displaying a caution indication. He partly closed the throttle at that time and when he observed the flagman he completely closed the throttle and made a heavy service application of the brakes with the intention of bringing the train to a stop short of the next signal in advance; while he did not know that a reverse movement was being made he was not justified in assuming, after being flagged, that the block was not occupied or obstructed. The maximum speed permitted for freight trains between Penn Haven Junction and Mauch Chunk as prescribed by time-table is 20 miles per hour, but Engineman Clark was of the opinion that this rule did not apply to westbound trains. The investigation developed that the speed restriction of 20 miles per hour between Penn Haven Junction and Mauch Chunk is being exceeded as a matter of common practice. A check of the train sheets for the two days preceding the date of the accident disclosed that out of a total of 75 freight trains 49 of them exceeded the speed limit be- tween these points. Cat The employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1597 Transportation Library INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION HC REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE 1880 *****. 423 Y INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY AT PECATONICA, ILL., ON DECEMBER 2, 1929. February 28, 1930. To the Commission: On December 2, 1929, there was a rear-end col- lision between two freight trains on the Chicago & North Western Railway at Pecatonica, Ill., resulting in the injury of three live stock attendants. ❤ Location and method of operation This accident occurred on Subdivision 3 of the Galena Division, extending between West Chicago, and Free- port, Ill., a distance of 90.9 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, and manual block operation is in effect between Rockford and Freeport, Ill., located 14.5 miles east and 13.6 miles west of Pecatonica, respectively, from 6.30 a.m. to 4.15 p.m., except Sundays; at the time of this accident the block system was not in effect. The accident occurred at a point 38 feet east of the depot at Pecatonica; approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for more than one mile, followed by a 1° 55' curve to the right 2,123 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 606 feet from its western end. The grade for eastbound trains is 0.195 per cent ascending at the point of accident. There is a passing track on the south side of the main track; the passing track is 1,626 feet in length and its east switch is located 945 feet east of the depot. Several other tracks lead off the passing track, which was unoccupied at the time of the accident. Under the rules when a train stops under circum- stances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in addition, displaying lighted fusees. When recalled and safety to the train will permit, he may return. The rules also provide that all third- class trains must approach and pass all stations, sidings, fuel and water stations at restricted speed expecting to find trains within the switches or taking coal or water, and will be prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear. Trains occupying main track at such S ; | ૨૭ points will protect against all trains where the view is obscured by fog, storms or track curvature, or other causes requiring additional safeguards. Owing to the depot and a water tank located 260 feet west of the depot being on the inside of the curve, the view of the left marker of a caboose standing at the point of collision is restricted to a distance of 643 feet from the engineman's side of the cab of an eastbound engine, while a clear view of both markers can be had for a distance of 560 feet. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred between 6.10 and 6.15 p.m. Description Eastbound freight train extra 1154, on arrival at Pecatonica at 5.20 p.m., according to the train sheet, con - sisted of three cars or stock and a caboose, hauled by engine 1154, and was in charge of Conductor Wahl and Engine- man Dyer. The train was left standing on the main track with the rear end of the caboose just east of the depot, while the engine was cut off and proceeded to the stock chutes, located south of the main track, in order to pick up some cars; while standing at this point the caboose was struck by train No. 738. Eastbound third-class freight train No. 733 con- sisted of 12 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 1376, and was in charge of Conductor Schluetter and Engineman Shriver. This train left Freeport at 5.40 p.m., according to the train sheet, 10 minutes late, and struck the rear end of extra 1154 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been between 5 and 20 miles per hour. The caboose of extra 1154 was telescoped by engine 1376 a distance of about 12 feet, the forward end of the caboose being driven about 6 feet into the stock car ahead of it; the caboose and three stock cars were driven ahead a distance of about 200 feet by the force of the impact. Summary of evidence Conductor Wahl, of extra 1154, stated that he in- structed the head brakeman to protect Main Street Crossing, located about 225 feet east of the depot at Pecatonica, and that he took the flagman along to assist in switching operations and to help load stock, leaving the caboose and ་ 3 - F : three cars standing on the main track unprotected, although the markers were burning properly. After the caboose and three cars had been standing on the main track about 50 or 55 minutes the collision occurred. Conductor Wahl admitted that he had not afforded proper protection to the rear end of this train as required, saying that he had a time-table in his possession and was fully aware of train No. 738, but that his engineman was not familiar with the work and as a result the moves made were slow, more time being consumed in performing the work than he had anticipated; he did not realize how much time had elapsed, and thought it was not yet 6 p.m. when the collision occurred. He stated he had intended to provide protection from that time on if his own train had not departed from Pecatonica prior to that time. Conductor Wahl further stated that had the caboose and three cars been placed on the passing track, when he saw that the stock was not loaded, the accident would have been avoided. Head Brakeman Guillouy was unaware of anything wrong prior to the accident. Engineman Shriver, of train No. 738, stated that the speed of his train was about 15 miles per hour on passing the west switch of the passing track and that approaching the depot he had the air brakes applied in full service, in- tending to bring his own train to a stop with the caboose at the depot in order to see if there was a car of milk to be moved. On account of the curve his headlight did not shine upon the caboose ahead, and he was at the water tank before he got a good view of both markers; he moved the brake valve handle to the emergency position, and estimated the speed of his train to have been reduced to about 5 miles per hour at the time of the collision. The air brakes worked properly, but he did not think that an emergency effect was obtained owing to the previous service application. Engineman Shriver thought the reason for the caboose and three cars being driven ahead about 200 feet by the force of the impact, al- though he estimated the speed of his own train to have been 5 miles per hour at the time of the collision, was because the caboose and cars had been standing so long that the brakes probably leaked off. Statements of Fireman McKeown corroborated those of Engineman Shriver; Conductor Schluetter was riding in the caboose and estimated the speed of his train to have been about 15 miles per hour at the time of the collision. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Conductor Wahl, of extra 1154, to see to it that proper protection was afforded to that portion of his train left standing on the main track, and by the failure of Engin eman Shriver, train No. 738, properly to control the speed of his train approaching the depot at Pecatonica. of 4 Conductor Wahl should have provided for flag pro- tection or should have left the caboose and three cars standing on the passing track, which was unoccupied, in- stead of leaving them on the main track, when the engine was cut off and proceeded to the stock chutes. By so doing the accident would have been avoided. As it was more time was consumed in making the switching movements than he anticipated or realized, the caboose and cars being left standing on the main track about 50 or 55 minutes. Conductor Wahl acknowledged his failure to provide proper protection as required. S Engineman Shriver should have approached the depot under full control, especially so when his view across the inside of the curve was obstructed by the depot and water tank, and then the accident could have been averted. While he estimated the speed of his train to have been 5 miles per hour at the time of the collision, the distance the caboose and three cars were driven ahead on the slightly ascending grade by the force of the impact, indicated that the speed was probably in excess of his estimate. Conductor Wahl entered the service on July 3, 1919; Engineman Shriver entered on September 15, 1901, and was promoted to engine man on January 1, 1907. At the time of the accident none of the employees involved had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. Transporton F Library HE 1599 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS NEAR PITTSBURG, TEX., ON DECEMBER 13, 1929. March 8, 1930. To the Commission: On December 13, 1929, there was a rear-end collision between two freight trains on the line of the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas, near Pittsburg, Tex., resulting in the injury of five employees. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Mt. Pleasant Subdivi- sion of the Texas Division, extending between Mt. Pleasant and Tyler, Tex., a distance of 87.03 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred at a point 2.21 miles north of the depot at Pittsburg, or 5,581 feet north of the north switch of the passing track; the passing track is 4, 200 feet in length and parallels the main track on the east. Approaching the point of collision from the north the track is tangent for a distance of 2,266 feet, then there is a 30 curve to the left 1,319 feet in length, followed by 500 feet of tangent, the accident occurring on this tangent at a point 36 feet from its northern end. The grade for southbound trains approaching and for some distance beyond the point of accident is ascending, being 1.87 per cent at the point of collision. The view of the point of collision across the inside of the curve from the fireman's side of the cab of a southbound engine is restricted to a distance of 919 feet. The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred between 2.40 and 2.50 a. m. Description Southbound freight train extra 759 consisted of 41 cars and a caboose, of 1,515 tons, hauled by engine 759, and was in charge of Conductor Starling and Engineman Blackwell. This train departed from Mt. Pleasant, 11.64 miles north of Pittsburg, at 2.08 a. m., according to the train sheet, and while either moving at a very low rate of speed or having just stalled on the ascending grade the caboose was struck by extra 766-774. • -2-- Southbound freight train extra 766-774 consisted of 40 cars and a caboose, of 3,600 tons, hauled by engines 766 and 774, coupled, and was in charge of Conductor Holmes and Enginemen Conder and Waller. This train departed from Mt. Pleasant at 2.18 a. m., according to the train sheet and collided with the rear end of extra 759 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been/18 and 25 miles per hour. between The caboose of extra 759 was demolished and the four cars ahead of it were derailed and damaged. Engine 766 came to rest on its right side, east of the main track, almost reversed and about 125 feet beyond the point. of collision; its tender came to rest almost upright. Engine 774 came to rest on its left side across the roadbed about 110 feet south of the point of collision; the tender was on its side. The first car in this train was derailed. The employees injured were the enginemen, firemen and the head brakeman of extra 766-774. " Summary of evidence Conductor Starling, of extra 759, stated that the caboose of his train passed the depot at Mt. Pleasant at about 2.08 a. m., then his train proceeded to the south end of double-track and was brought to a stop, where it remained for about 10 or 12 minutes, waiting for an opposing train, extra 576, northbound. After that train passed, his own train pulled ahead on to the single track and then stopped while the engine took on water, about three minutes being consumed for this purpose, the engine not being cut off. He said that his train departed from the water tank at 2.20 a. m., and that a speed of about 30 miles per hour was maintained after leaving Mt. Plea- sant; while moving up the grade near Pittsburg, however, he noticed that the speed of his train was being retarded. He said he got down from the cupola of the caboose and told Flagman Skidmore that the double-header extra was following and to look out for that train; that if anything should happen to their own train to make it necessary to double the hill he would be over at the forward end of the train. Conductor Starling said that he looked back but saw nothing of the following train; then he started ahead over the train and found the air brakes sticking on the second car ahead of the caboose, a flat car; he tried to bleed off the air from the deck of the car, but being unable to do so he got off the car, on the west side of the train, and bled off the air, then ran ahead to bleed y -3- off the air on about the fifth or sixth car from the caboose. While running ahead toward about the fifteenth he car from the caboose in order to bleed off the air, looked back and saw the reflection of the headlight of the following train as it rounded the curve and then the collision occurred, at about 2.40 or 2.41 a. m.; at this time his own train was moving at a very low rate of speed, about 1 or 2 miles per hour. No stops were made en route between Mt. Pleasant and the point of accident. Conductor Starling could advance no reason for the air brakes sticking, saying that he looked for retainers turned up, but saw none. While the air brakes had been tested at Texarkana, about 60 miles north of Mt. Pleasant, he did not receive any report of the test. No trouble had been experienced with the air brakes previous to the accident and subsequent thereto his engine handled the head 37 cars, including the fifteenth car ahead of the caboose, to Tyler without any trouble being experienced with sticking air brakes; the air was not bled off the fifteenth car before leaving the point of accident. Conductor Starling further stated that he did not instruct his flagman to drop off lighted fusees, nor did he know whether the flagman was protecting, but the flagman said that he would protect and the conductor was depending on him to protect the train. Flagman Skidmore Skidmore, of extra 759, corroborated the statements of Conductor Starling as to what transpired between Texarkana and the time his train started up the hill near Pittsburg, including time of departures, stops en route, length of stops, time of collision, speed, air brake condition, etc. Flagman Skidmore stated that he got down from the cupola of the caboose with Conductor Starling and on looking at his watch it was 2.40 a. m. The conductor went out on the front end of the caboose and the flagman stated that after the conductor had been gone about three minutes he walked to the rear end with a lantern and fusee, opened the rear door and that the headlight on the engine of the following train shone directly in his face, being only about five car lengths away; the flagman gave a stop signal with his white lantern and jumped off on the engineman's side, at which time he estimated the speed to have been between 5 and 7 miles per hour, then the collision occurred. Flagman Skidmore said that he did not have his red lantern with him when he went out of the door, but that that lantern was burning properly and hanging on the rear end of the caboose; the cupola lamp and the two markers were also burning properly. Flagman Skidmore stated that while in -4- the cupola the conductor told him that the air brakes were sticking on the second car ahead of the caboose and that he would bleed off the air on that car and that if it was necessary for their own train to double the hill for the flagman to protect the rear end, and the flagman informed the conductor he would protect, then got down from the cupola. Flagman Skidmore stated that the double- header extra was standing in the yard at Mt. Pleasant when his own train passed, but he did not know that it closely followed his own train from that point, nor did he look back to see if any train was following prior to the time he stepped out of the rear door of the caboose, just before the collision occurred. He did not hear a flag whistled out. Flagman Skidmore did not know what pressure was registered on the air gauge in the caboose on leaving Texarkana, and after leaving Mt. Pleasant he did not look at the gauge, although no trouble was ex- perienced prior to going up the hill near Pittsburg. Flagman Skidmore stated that he did not afford any pro- tection whatever prior to the time he gave the stop signal with his white hand lantern at the time he stepped out the rear door of the caboose and saw extra 766-774 about five car lengths away; he had no idea that that train was coming and said that the reason he did not drop off a fusee was that it would have caused the follow- ing train to double the hill and also that he figured that his own train was 10 minutes ahead of the following train and that it was not necessary to drop off a lighted fusee. Since the accident, however, he felt satisfied that had a lighted 10-minute fusee been dropped off on the tangent, just before starting around the curve, that the accident would have been avoided, as that train would then have been held 10 minutes behind his own train. • P With regard to the qualifications of Flagman Skid- more. the investigation developed that although he was an old employee in point of service he had not, according to his om statements, kept himself posted on bulletin instructions relative to the speed of trains, nor was he properly acquainted with the rules; he took an examina- tion on the rules the past summer, but said that he did not get through and that at the present time he was not in possession of a certificate of qualification on the rules governing the employees of the operating department. During the course of the investigation, Flagman Skidmore was interrogated as follows: i !. : .. "Q. Don't your duties as a brakeman require you to protect your train and keep a lookout on the rear end? A. Yes, sir; when we stop on the main line short of yard limit board, that's the first thing I always do. -5- Q. Doesn't the rule require you, when your speed gets down pretty low and there is a possibility of somebody getting into you on a bad hill to throw off a fusee and protect your train? A. I think so; am not positive how the rule reads. Q. Did you know that on November 15, 1929, bulletin No. 70 was issued by Mr. Post that authorized freight trains without loaded tanks to make 35 miles an hour between Winona and Mt. Pleasant, without any restric- tions on ballast trains? A. No, I have not read that bulletin. Q. A. Q A. Did you know anything about bulletin No. 78? No, sir. Or bulletin 79 or other bulletins? Know nothing regarding speed restrictions. Q. Mr. Skidmore, is there not a bulletin board at Mt. Pleasant where you can read these bulletins and which you are supposed to read? A. There is a little board up there. 2. Then there are bulletin boards at Texarkana where you have been working out of and at Mt. Pleasant where you could have read all these bulletins and kept yourself posted. A. Yes, sir. 4. Are you not supposed to keep posted on those bulletins? A. I suppose I am, yes, sir. A. Q. Then you could have gotten the benefit of all this information, if you had tried? A. I guess I could. I am just a brakeman doing a brakeman's work and did not consider it necessary to keep posted on those bulletins governing speed restrictions. Q. Then if there were other things regarding the operation of the railroad, don't you think you are required to keep posted? Yes, sir. Star -6- Q. Are you familiar with rule 91? A. No, sir; I don't know what rule 91 is. (Rule 91 was then read to Flagman Skidmore, rule reading as follows: Unless some form of block signals is used trains in the same direction must keep at least ten minutes apart, except in closing up at stations.) this } Q. Do you think that this rule would have prevented you from throwing off a fusee in the vicinity of where the accident occurred. A. Yes, sir. I figured he was 10 minutes behind me and him being 10 minutes behind me, I had 10 minutes to get back around the curve and protect my train, if I stopped." 2 Engineman Blackwell, of extra 759 stated that the air brakes were tested at Texarkana and that no trouble was experienced with them en route prior to going up the hill near Pittsburg; the gauge on the engine registered the maximum brake-pipe pressure, 70 pounds, no indica- tion of any leakage being noticed, and the main reservoir pressure was 90 pounds. The speed was about 30 miles per hour when first starting up the hill, however, while going up the grade he noticed that the speed was being considerably retarded, so he told the head brakeman that he thought the air brakes were sticking and to get off and look out for sticking brakes on the cars, which the head brakeman did. Engineman Blackwell did not know when the collision occurred, saying that it caused no jar on the engine, but thought that it occurred at about 2.44 a. m., as it was about that time that the air brakes applied in emergency from the rear, just about the time that the engine stalled. Engineman Blackwell stated that the rail was good and that the driving wheels were not slipping; the engine steamed freely and he could advance no reason for the air brakes sticking. He whistled out a flag just before he closed the throttle and the train came to a stop. After the accident the head portion of the train was moved to Tyler, and no trouble was experienced with sticking air brakes. State- ments of Fireman Acker developed nothing additional of importance; he thought that the accident occurred at about 2.43 a. m. Head Brakeman Womack stated that the gauge registered 70 pounds brake-pipe pressure before he got off the engine and that after getting off, on the west side of the train, while going up the hill he found the air brakes sticking so hard that the brakes squeaked, on about the fifteenth and seventeenth cars from the engine, and he bled off the air on those cars as he walked along beside the train. Gangt -7- 1 Engineman Conder, of engine 760, the lead engine, stated that he saw extra 759 on its arrival at Mt. Flea- sant, it having passed the telegraph office at 2.05 a. m. He knew that that train met a northbound train at the end of double track and presumed that extra 759 took water before departing, but did not know exactly what time it actually departed. Before his own train departed, however, he went to the second engine, 774, got a drink of water and remarked to Engineman Waller that they would give extra 759 plenty of time to get out of the way before following them. Engineman Conder stated that his train departed from Mt. Pleasant at 2.25 a. m., and that while rounding the curve going up the hill near Pittsburg at a speed of about 30 miles per hour, when about 7 to 10 car lengths from the caboose ahead, the fireman shouted a warning of danger; the engineman said that he immediate- ly applied the air brakes in emergency and reversed the engine, the air brakes taking proper effect. He did not see the markers of the caboose ahead around the outside of the curve until about 2 or 3 car lengths from it and estimated the speed to have been about 25 miles per hour at the time of the collision. Engineman Conder did not know whether an air brake test had been made before his train left Mt. Pleasant, nor was he actually aware of their condition until going down the hill beyond Kilfoyle, this station being located 3.47 miles south of Mt. Plea- sant, at which time he made a heavy service air brake application, about a 15 to 20 pound reduction, and the air brakes responded properly. Engineman Conder stated that there are no carmen at Mt. Pleasant, but that when coupling the engine to the train at that point he places the brake valve handle on lap, thereby keeping applied all the brakes that are set on the cars in the train, then the air is cut in and the brake valve handle moved to full release and returned to running position. The air brake system is then pumped up until the air gauge registers 70 pounds brake-pipe pressure and 90 pounds main reservoir pressure, which was the case in this instance. Engineman Conder further stated that he could have brought his train to a stop in time to have averted the accident had he been given proper warning of the caboose ahead. alga Fireman Craycraft, of engine 766, the lead engine, stated that he was aware that extra 759 had departed ahead of his own train. While going up the hill he was sitting on his seat box maintaining a lookout ahead across the inside of the curve and saw the marker on the right side of the caboose when about 7 or 8 car lengths from it; he -8- called a warning of danger, but his engineman raised up as if he was going to look out of the window in order to ascertain what was ahead; the fireman jumped over to the engineman's side, started to grab the brake valve handle, but the engineman applied the air brakes in emergency be- fore the fireman got hold of it. Fireman Craycraft estimated the speed to have been about 30 miles per hour after leaving Mt. Pleasant, about 25 miles per hour when he saw the marker on the caboose ahead, and about the same when the collision occurred, saying that the air brakes had not taken effect at the time he jumped, when about one car-length from the caboose. The front and side cab windows of his engine were open, and the electric headlight was burning properly. Statements of Head Brakeman Duggan, who was riding on engine 766, as well as those of Engineman Waller and Fireman Hill, of engine 774, the helper engine, brought out nothing additional of importance. Conductor Holmes stated that he made an air brake test at Mt. Pleasant before the engines were coupled to the train by having the head brakeman open the angle cock on the first car and then the conductor went back over the train until he met the flagman coming forward. Conductor Holmes said that the air brakes were applied on all of the cars that he looked over and that the flagman advised him likewise; no report, however, was made to the engineman as to this test. Conductor Holmes and Flagman Bennett were unaware of anything wrong until the air brakes applied in emergency; they estimated the time of the accident as between 2.48 and 2.50 a. m. Operator Sinclair, on duty at Mt. Pleasant, stated that extra 759, southbound passed the telegraph office at 2.05 a. m., but that it had a meet with extra 576, north- bound, and continued to the south end of double track. He said that extra 576, northbound, passed the telegraph office at 2.18 a. m., and since it required about 6 or 8 minutes for extra 576, after meeting extra 759, to travel the distance from the water tank to the telegraph office, he assumed that extra 759 could have left Mt. Pleasant at about 2.12 a. m. Operator Sinclair further stated that extra 786-774, southbound left the telegraph office at 2.23 a. m., but that he OS'd that train out of Mt. Pleasant at 2.18 a. m., as a matter as a matter of form, knowing that extra 766-774, southbound, would have to also meet extra 576, northbound, at this point and that he OS'd extra " Graing -C- 766-774 on the arrival of extra 576, saying that extra 766-774 was still standing in the yard opposite the yard office at the time extra 576 passed and continued to stand there until 2.23 a. m. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Flagman Skidmore, of extra 759, to provide proper flag protection, and the failure of Conductor Starling to take proper precautions for the safety of his train. Under the rules, when a train stops or is moving under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by a fol- lowing train the flagman must take such action as may be necessary to insure full protection, by night, dropping off lighted fusees at proper intervals. According to his own statements, Flagman Skidmore made no attempt whatever toward affording protection until about three minutes after the conductor left the caboose, and when the flagman finally did start out the rear door for the purpose of protecting it was then too late to avert the accident. Flagman Skidmore stated that he did not drop off a lighted fusee for the reason that it would have made it necessary for the following train to double the hill. He should have dropped off a fusee on the straight track north of the curve, where it could have been seen by the engine crew of the following train for a distance of more than 2,000 feet, and had he done so the accident could have been averted. Apparently, however, he assumed that the following train was spaced 10 minutes behind his own train and for that reason did not act promptly to provide the required flag protection. Conductor Starling was in the caboose when his train began to slow up on the grade, and he should have seen to it that proper protec- tion was immediately provided. That he was aware that another train was closely following his own is apparent from the fact that he cautioned the flagman about the following train before he started ahead over the cars in order to release sticking air brakes. Conductor Starling should himself have dropped off a fusee or seen to it that Flagman Skidmore did so. > S As a result of the investigation it appears that extra 759 and extra 766-774 were not spaced the required 10 minutes on leaving Mt. Pleasant. The train sheet shows extra 759, southbound, as leaving Mt. Pleasant at 2.08 when as a matter of fact that train had a meet a. m. -10- ! with extra 576, northbound, at Mt. Pleasant and after extra 759 passed the telegraph office it continued to the south end of double track, met extra 576, pulled ahead to the water tank, took water, and then left Mt. Pleasant, between 2.20 and 2.22 a. m., according to members of the crew. According to the train sheet, extra 576, northbound, passed Mt. Pleasant at 2.18 a. m., this also being shown as the time that extra 766-774, south- bound, left Mt. Pleasant. Operator Sinclair, however maintained that he OS'd that train as a matter of form, saying that extra 760-774 was still standing in the yard office at the time extra 576 passed and continued to stand there until 2.23 a. m. Members of the crew of " extra 766-774 placed the time of departure as 2.25 a. m. If these figures are correct then extra 759 departed from the water tank between 2.20 and 2.22 a. m., while extra 766-774 departed from the yard office between 2.23 and 2.25 a. m. Officials of this road should immediately take steps to see that trains in the same direction are spaced in accordance withthe provisions of the rules. Consideration should also be given to the need for addi- tional protection which would be afforded by the use of the block system on this line. At the time of this accident the average movement was approximately 15 trains per day. The competency of Flagman Skidmore is seriously questioned and his statements during this investigation did not indicate that he had a proper understanding or realized the importance of his duties. He was not in possession of a certificate of qualification on the rules governing the employees of the operating department. ? Flagman Skidmore entered the service of this rail- road as brakeman on October 15, 1915, 1915, was relieved from duty on March 8, 1922 1922, and reinstated as brakeman on December 15, 1923. With the exception of Head Brakeman Duggan, who entered the service on June 8, 1928, all of the employees involved were experienced men and at the time of the accident none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Garde Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director. 1600 Transportation Library не 4780 4234 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TOLEDO, PEORIA & WESTERN RAILROAD AT FORREST ILL., ON DECEMBER 21, 1929. > January 29, 1930. To the Commission; On December 21, 1929, there was a head-end collision between a freight train and a road engine making up a train on the Toledo, Peoria & Western Rail- road at Forrest, Ill., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of one employee. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a represe ative of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Location and method of operation This accident occurred on the Eastern Division, which extends between Effner, Ind., Ind., and Peoria, Ill., a distance of 111.1 miles; in the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table and train orders, no block- signal system being in use. At Forrest the eastern yard- limit terminates at mile post 46, the accident occurring at a point 123 feet inside of this mile post. Approach- ing the point of accident in either direction the track is tangent for a distance of more than 3 miles, while approaching from the east the grade is level for a dis- tance of 2,400 feet, from which point the grade is 0.667 per cent descending for a distance of 4,403 feet to the point of accident. There is a siding, known as the "hill track" 2,778 feet in length, which parallels the main track on the north; the east switch of this track is located 1,583 feet east of M.P. 46, and there is a cross- over extending eastward from the main track to the hill track, the main track crossover switch being 312 feet west of M.P. 46. At a point 1,274 feet west of M.P. 46, the tracks of the Wabash Railway cross those of the T.P. & W. Railroad at grade. , The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 9.26 a.m. Description Engine 14, headed east, was in charge of Con- ductor Overacker and Engineman I. R. Smith, and at the time of the accident the crew was making up a train pre- paratory to proceeding eastward. This engine had pro- § • -2- Wabash West hill track switch ů T 883 ft. Crossover * 1 189 ft. Point of accident - 123 ft. Mile post 43 * East yard limit) ¡ East hill track switch ¡ l ¡ 1583 ft. ¡ ¡ 1 WEST EAST Station 46 Ry. Hill track No. 1600 Toledo, Peoria & Western Forrest, Ill. Dec. 21, 1929. ~ Bi ceeded to the east end of the hill track, where two cars were picked up behind the engine, and it then returned to the main track and backed to a point just east of the east yard limit and a few car-lengths east of a cut of cars coupled behind engine 32, which was standing on the main track waiting for a Wabash train to clear the crossing. After engine 14 had stood at this point several minutes, the engineman observed a westbound train approaching, and in an attempt to avert ar accident he moved backward into the yard limits until stopped by the cut of cars coupled to engine 32, the collision occurring immediately afterwards. Westbound freight train extra 42 consisted of 25 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 42, and was in charge of Conductor Monce and Engineman Coppock. This train departed from Effner, 46.2 miles east of Forrest, et 4.50 a.m., left Chattsworth, 5.9 miles from Forrest, at 9.07 a.m., and entered the yard limits at Forrest and collided with engine 14 while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 18 and 20 miles per hour. Engine 42 was considerably damaged and had two pairs of drivers derailed; the rear of the tender was de- railed to the left. The first 12 cars in extra 42 were derailed and scattered in various positions along the right of way, three of them being demolished and the bal- ance more or less damaged. Engine 14 was derailed but re- ained upright in a badly-damaged condition. The two cers coupled to this engine came to rest across the hill track, the first car being destroyed and the second car badly damaged, while the two cars coupled to engine 32 were also derailed and destroyed. The employee killed was the fireman of extra 42, and the employee injured was the engineman of engine 14. Summary of evidence Engineman Smith, of engine 14, stated that after leaving the roundhouse, his engine entered the hill track and proceeded to the crossover switch, backed through the crossover, and then continued eastward on the main track to the east end of the hill track, where two cars were picked up, after which a return movement over the main track was made. The cut of cars was brought to a stop a short distance from the engine and cut of cars standing at the Wabash crossing, waiting for a passenger train to clear the crossing. About five minutes later, he observed extra 42 approaching from the east, and as it was moving rather rapidly he thought something was wrong, so he sounded one blast of the engine whistle and backed up until his train came in contact with the westbound cut, this being done in order to give the approaching train plenty of room in which to stop. He thought extra 42 was moving at a speed of about 15 miles per hour at the time of the accident, -4- Head Brakeman Kirk, of engine 14, stated that while standing on the rer of his own train, ho looked towards the cast and saw a train approaching, and after ' signaling his engineman three or four times that a train was approaching, which signals apparently were not observed, he started running eastward towards the engine and shouted a warning to the engineman; he continued to run castward until he was about 100 feet from the ap proaching train before he realized that it was not going to stop, and he then started towards the right-of-way fence. He did not hear the brakes grinding when the engine of extra 42 passed him, which was at a point be- tween 100 and 200 feet from the point of accident. He estimated the speed of that train at 25 miles per hour, although he said that due to his inexperience he was not a very good judge of speed. Conductor Overacker, of engine 14, stated that after instructing his crew to get two cars from the east end of the hill track, he went to the freight house and became engaged in loading freight. After completing this task he started towards his engine, which had re- turned with the cars, with the intention of instructing the crew to follow the westbound engine. As he stepped across the track he observed a train approaching from the east, it then being in the vicinity of the east hill track switch, but at that time he had no idea the ap- proaching train would not stop as from his location he could not approximate its speed. The statements of Fireman Wilson and Road Brake- man G. E. Smith, both of whom had had very little ex- perience, brought out no additional facts of importance as to what transpired prior to the accident. Engineman Coppock, of extra 42, stated that the brakes had been inspected by a car inspector, and tested, before departing from Effner, the initial station. Seven cars were picked up at Sheldon, 2 miles west of Effner but no other cars were picked up or set out after leaving that point. Subsequently, four other stops were made en route, the last being at Chatsworth, but in no instance was any difficulty experienced in stopping, and upon leaving Chatsworth he noticed the air gauge registered 90 pounds main-reservoir and 70 pounds brake-pipe pressure. There is an ascending grade west of Chatsworth and steam was worked until the train reached a point about 1 mile east of Forrest, at which time the train was moving at a speed of slightly over 20 miles per hour. He then closed the throttle and made a brake-pipe reduction of about five or six pounds for the purpose of testing the brakes, and judging from the length of the exhaust, he thought the brakes were working through the entire train. When -5- his engine reached a point just east of the east hill track switch, or about one-half mile from where the running test was made, he observed an engine standing on the main track; the fireman apparently saw it at about the same time, as the fireman shouted something that the engineman did not understand. Engineman Coppock immediately made a service application of the brakes and when he noted that the exhaust was very short, he moved the brake-valve handle to the emergency posi- tion, this also failed materially to check the speed of the train, although he thought the engine brakes were working properly. He estimated the speed at the time the brakes were applied in emergency at 20 miles per hour, which was at a point between 1,200 and 1,500 feet from the point of accident, and at 18 miles per hour at the time of the accident. It also appeared from Engineman Coppock's statements that the front window and one side window on his side of the cab were open, and that the visibility had been good for about 1 mile, ex- cept at one point after starting down the grade, where the engine encountered a small Snow drift which caused the snow to fly to some extent, and at no time were conditions such that he could not determine his location. Engineman Coppock further stated that the short exhaust received when he applied the brakes in emergency indicated to him that the train line had become stopped up near the forward end of the train, after the running test of the brakes was made, and he expressed the opinion that possibly an angle cock could have been turned by some person who was riding on the train and who got off prior to the accident; he did not see anybody alight from the train, but said he had heard that some person had been seen to get off, although he did not know the name of his informant. S Sta Head Brakeman Ruble, of extra 42, stated that after the cars were picked up at Sheldon, he coupled up the air hose at the head end of the train. He rode on the fireman's side of the engine between Chatsworth and the point of accident and noticed the engineman use the brakes on two or three occasions after leaving Chatsworth. The engine encountered several snow drifts before reach- ing Forrest, which caused the snow to fly considerably on his side of the engine, and this materially restricted his range of vision; in fact, it became necessary to close the side windows to keep the snow from blowing into the cab. As the train approached the point of ac- cident, he was standing on the deck near the fireman's seatbox and the fireman was in the gangway between the engine and tender trying to get a view ahead; the fireman suddenly called to the engineman to apply the brakes, the collision occurring very shortly afterwards. Head Brak e- man Ruble did not see the engine standing on the main track prior to the accident, and was of the opinion that -6- the fireman was the first to observe it, as the brakes were not applied until the fireman had called to the engineman. Head Brakeman Ruble also said that he did not have enough experience to judge the speed of the train at the time of the accident, neither could he estimate the distance the train traveled after the fire- man shouted a warning. Conductor Monce, of extra 42, stated that be- fore leaving Effner, the train was inspected and re- ported by the car inspector to be in good condition. After picking up the seven cars at Sheldon, he coupled up the air on the seventh car and Brakeman Ruble coupled up the engine. Two stops were made by Watseka, once to meet a train and once to take water and two more at Chatsworth, once for the I.C. crossing and once in the passing track, and on each occasion these stops were made by using the air brakes, which appeared to function properly. He looked over his train while it was standing on the passing track at the latter point waiting for another train to pass, and as the head end of that train was passing his caboose he blew the tail hose whistle, and after his train pulled out of the siding he sounded it again, which indicated that the air was coupled through the train. Between Chatsworth and the point of accident he looked at the air gauge in the caboose on three or four occasions, and in each case it showed a pressure of 70 pounds. He felt no application of the brakes until after the entire train had passed over the Summit east of Forrest, and at that time the engine was probably in the vicinity of the east hill track switch. This appeared to be a light application which caused the slack to bunch and when the caboose rebounded he lost his balance but as soon as he got up he was again knocked down by a second shock, and he did not have time to realize what was happening or whether the brakes were holding. He thought the maximum speed attained after leaving Chatsworth was not more than 25 miles per hour and estimated it at 18 or 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Conductor Monce did not inspect the train until after the fireman had been removed from the wreckage, which was at 11.52 a.m., and then he walked back along the train to the caboose and found all of the pistons in braking position, although this would be their natural position on account of the broken brake pipes resulting from the accident. He was unable to inspect some of the derailed cars, the ends of which were buried in the mud, but was present when a gondola, which had been the sixth car from the engine, was picked up and found to have a closed angle cock; this angle cock was of the self-locking type, the handle of which had to be raised before it could be opened or closed. Conductor Monce further stated that at the time he inspected the train at Chatsworth he did -7- not see any unauthorized person on the train, while no one could have been inside any of the cars, as they were all loaded and sealed. Subsequent to the accident, however, he was informed by the roadmaster that a man had been seen riding on his train, and it was his opinion that if the closed angle cock found in the wreckage was turned to that position prior to the accident, it was done by some one other than an employee. Superintendent Eckard stated that the only reference he could locate regarding the yard limits at Forest was General Order No. 19, dated May 9, 1919, which fixed the eastern yard limit at mile post 46 and the western limit at mile post 47. He had no knowledge as to when the yard-limit boards were removed, as it had been done without authority, but as nearly as he could determine, they were removed more than six months previous to the date of the accident. Mr. Eckard also said that the angle cock which was found closed in the wreckage was discovered on December 23 while digging under the drawbar of the car in order to place a cable preparatory to picking up the car, but his special agents were unable to uncover anything to support the theory that it had been turned with malicious intent. The investigation developed that none of the employees involved knew the location of the eastern yard limit at Forrest, there being no yard-limit board to designate this point. Engineman Smith, of engine 14, was of the opinion that it was about 400 feet east of the east hill track switch, and, therefore, thought he was within yard limits when the cars were picked up from the east end of the hill track. Fireman Wilson heard there were yard limits at Forrest but did not know their locations; Brakeman Kirk understood the east yard limit was close to the east hill track switch but did not prO- vide flag protection while using the main track in that vicinity as he had not been instructed to do so; Brake- man Smith did not know definitely and Conductor Overacker had not signed for the general order covering the loca- tion of yard limits as he was not a conductor at the time it was issued, but he thought the eastern yard limit was 500 or 600 feet east of the hill track switch. Engine- man Coppock, of extra 42, was of the impression that the yard limit began about at the east hill track switch, and Brakeman Ruble did not know, while Conductor Monce stated that he had not seen a yard-limit board but from informa- tion obtained from other employees he understood it was a few feet east of the east hill track switch. Conclusions This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Coppock, of extra 42, to have his train under proper control when approaching yard limits. -8- > According to the statements of Engi neman Coppock, no difficulty was experienced with the air brakes while making various stops en route; he also made a running test of the brakes when his train reached a point about 1 mile east of Forrest, and the exhaust indicated that the brakes were working the full length of the train. Upon reaching a point in the vicinity of the east hill track switch, however, he observed engine 14 occupying the main track and at once made a service application of the brakes; it was on this occasion that, for the first time there appeared to be something wrong with the brakes, and he immediately moved the brake-valve handle to the emergency position but it seemed to have very little ef- fect in reducing the speed of the train, although he thought the engine brakes were working properly. Extra 42 consisted of 25 cars and a caboose, with a tonnage of approximately 1,400 tons, and even in view of the 0.667 per cent descending grade approaching the point of accident, it would seem that the use of only the engine brakes, which were found to have been in good condition, should have materially reduced the speed of the train within the distance the train travelled, providing the brakes were handled in the manner described by Engineman Coppock. The damage caused by this accident indicates that the speed probably was higher than the estimates of 18 or 20 miles per hour, and it is more than probable that if the accident had not occurred, extra 42 would have collided with the passenger train standing on the Wabash crossing, 1,151 feet distant. The rules provide that second and third-class and extra trains must move ithin yard limits prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear; there is also a provision that yard limits will be indicated by yard-limit boards, and locations shown in the time-table. The yard limits at Forrest were not marked by yard-limit boards, and the locations are not shown in the current time-table; however, a general order dated May 9, 1919, fixed the location of the east yard limit at mile post 46. While the accident occurred only 123 feet inside yard limits, it was the opinion of all the employees questioned that the limits extended to or east of the hill track switch, located more than 1,700 feet from the point of accident. Engineman Coppock was familiar with the locality and was not confused as to his location, and according to his understanding of the yard limits, he should have had his train under control, as required by the rules, before it passed the east switch of the hill track. There should be no question, however, as to yard limits, and it is recommended that this phase of the situation be corrected immediately by the responsible officials of this railroad. While clearing the wreckage two days after the 41 " L -9- accident, the angle cock on the rear end of the sixth car in the train was found closed. The theory was advanced that this angle cock had been turned by some unknown person prior to the accident, but as this end of the car was buried in the earth the angle cock could easily have been turned during the course of the accident. Nothing could Nothing could be developed to support the theory of a closed angle cock, and there seems little reason to attach importance to this discovery. Engineman Coppock has been an engineman on this railroad for 20 years and Fireman L. T. Smith was employed in July, 1928. Conductor Monce entered the service November 21, 1929, as a brakeman, and was pro- moted to conductor on December 10; he had had 17 years' previous experience, 6 of which had been as a conductor. Flagman Shepard had been employed as a brakeman at intervals since 1918, while Brakeman Ruble was an in- experienced man. Engineman I. R. Smith has been in the service as fireman and engineman since 1920; Conductor Overacker was employed as a brak eman during 1918, being promoted to conductor December 12, 1929; Brakeman G. E. Smith was recently employed by this road but an ex- perienced man, having had six years' experience as a conductor, while Fireman Wilson and Brakeman Kirk were inexperienced. At the time of the accident none of the se employees had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law. Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director.