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Ex Libris
Thomas Spencer Jerome
TWO TREATISES
OF
PROCLUS,
THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR;
THE FORMER CONSISTING OF TEN DOUBTS CON-
CERNING PROVIDENCE, AND A SOLUTION OF
THOSE DOUBTS;
AND THE LATTER CONTAINING A DEVELOPMENT-
OF THE NATURE OF EVIL.
TRANSLATED FROM the edition of THESE WORKS
BY VICTOR COUSIN,
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS,
BY
THOMAS TAYLOR,
TRANSLATOR of plato, ARISTOTLE, Etc. etc.
"Who finds not Providence all-good and wise,
Alike in what it gives, and what denies ?"
"All partial ill is universal good."
"One truth is clear; whatever is, is right.”
POPE'S Essay on Man.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR THE TRANSLATOR;
AND SOLD BY WILLIAM PICKERING, CHANCERY LANE.
1833.
PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR,
RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.
ΤΟ
CHARLES ATTWOOD, Esq.,
THIS WORK
IS INSCRIBED, AS A TESTIMONY
OF VERY GREAT ESTEEM FOR HIS TALENTS AND WORTH,
AND PARTICULARLY FOR HIS
ADMIRATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO;
AND AS A MOST
GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE KINDNESS
WHICH HE HAS
SO MUNIFICENTLY AND SO DISINTERESTEDLY SHOWN TO
THE TRANSLATOR.
PREFACE.
No subjects of discussion are perhaps more in-
teresting or more important than those of which
the present volume consists. For what can more
demand our most serious attention, or what can be
more essential to the well-being of our immortal
part, than a scientific elucidation and defence of the
mysterious ways of Providence, and a development
of the nature of Evil? For as Divinity is good-
ness itself, it is requisite that all the dispensations
of his providence should be beneficent, and that
perfect evil should have no real existence in the
nature of things. That this is necessary, is de-
monstrated by Proclus in the following Treatises
with his usual acuteness and eloquence, by argu-
ments which are no less admirable for their
spicuity, than invincible from their strength.
per-
In praise of Proclus, I have said so much in
most of my other numerous works, that I shall only
summarily observe at present respecting this cory-
phæan philosopher, that his disciple Marinus says
in his Life of him, "that he was wise in a most trans-
cendent degree"a; and that Ammonius Hermias
calls him his divine preceptor, and says "that he
а
Οι κατα μονην λέγω την των σοφων ευδαιμονίαν, ει και τα μαλιστα
ταυτην διαφεροντως εκέκτητο.
278782
vi
PREFACE.
possessed the power of unfolding the opinions of
the ancients, and a scientific judgement of the na-
ture of things, in the highest perfection possible to
man"ª. And with respect to his eloquence, his
before-mentioned disciple Marinus says, "that he
did not appear to be without divine inspiration, for
he produced from his wise mouth words similar to
the most thick-falling snow"; so that his eyes
emitted a bright radiance, and the rest of his
countenance participated of divine illumination"c.
Among the moderns also, the sagacious Kepler,
after having made a long extract from the first
book of the Commentaries of Proclus on Euclid,
says of him, "His language flows like a torrent,
inundating its banks, and hiding the dark fords
and whirlpools of doubts, while his mind, full of the
majesty of things of such a magnitude, struggles
in the straits of language, and the conclusion never
satisfying him, exceeds by the copia of words, the
simplicity of the propositions". Dr. Barrow also,
ย
του θείου ήμων διδασκαλου Προκλου του πλατωνικού διαδόχου,
του εις άκρον της ανθρωπινης φυσεως την τε εξηγητικην των δοκουντων τοις
παλαιοις δυναμιν, και την επιστημονικην της φυσεως των οντων κρισιν ασκη
σavros.—Ammon. in Aristot. De Interpretatione.
σαντος.
Alluding to what Homer says of the eloquence of Ulysses, in
the third book of the Iliad, v. 222.
Και επεα νιφάδεσσιν εοικοτα χειμερίησιν.
Marini Proclus, cap. 23.
"Oratio fluit ipsi torrentis instar, ripas inundans, et cæca du-
bitationum vada gurgitesque occultans, dum mens, plena majestatis
tantarum rerum, luctatur in augustiis linguæ, et conclusio nun-
quam sibi ipsi verborum copiâ satisfaciens, propositionum simplici-
tatem excedit."-Vid. Harmonices Mundi, lib. iv. p. 118.
PREFACE.
vii
in his Mathematical Lectures (p. 8.), quotes Pro-
clus's eulogy of a point, and says that it is mag-
nificently written. And lastly, the author of the
Pursuits of Literature calls Proclus, alluding to
his diction, "the animated rival of Plato."
With respect to Morbeka, the author of the Latin
version from which the following translation was
made, the Greek original being unfortunately lost,
nothing more is known of him than that he was
Archbishop of Corinth in the thirteenth century,
and that the version of the former of these treatises
was completed by him in the year 1280, on the
4th day of February. His version also of the very
admirable treatise of Proclus on Providence and
Fate, was first published entire by Fabricius in
the eighth volume of his Bibliotheca Græca, and
afterwards, together with his Latin version of the
two following treatises, by Victor Cousin, Professor
of Philosophy in the University of Paris, 8vo, 1820.
To this gentleman, who, as well as myself, is an ar-
dent admirer of the philosophy of Plato, the public
are indebted for excellent editions of the Commen-
taries of Proclus on the First Alcibiades, and on
the Parmenides of Platob.
I shall only further observe, that in the following
a of this treatise I have given a translation, which the reader
will find near the end of my translation of Proclus on the Theology
of Plato.
This justly celebrated man has done me the honour to cor-
respond with me, and has spoken in the most handsome manner of
my Platonic publications.
viii
PREFACE.
translation I have endeavoured to give the accurate
meaning of Proclus, and to preserve as much of his
manner as is possible, from an original which, as
Fabricius justly observes, is "all but barbarous "a;
and that the reader will find in these Treatises a
demonstration of those great Platonic dogmas
which Pope has so elegantly celebrated in his
Essay on Man, but without attempting to prove
that they are true. The dogmas I allude to are
the following: That "there must be somewhere, such
a rank as Man"b; that "all partial evil is universal
good"; and that "whatever is, is right." Hence
Proclus proves by incontrovertible arguments, that
evil has no real existence, but has only a shadowy
subsistence, and that Divinity concealed it in the
utility of good.
a ❝ Versio inculta fateor, et tantum non barbara, sed ex qua
Græcæ linguæ et Philosophiæ Platonicæ peritis pulchras sententias
auctoris perspicere, nec difficile ut confido erit, nec injucundum."
b Pope also says of man, in the above-mentioned philosophical
poem, with no less accuracy than elegance, that he is,
"Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise and rudely great.”—Epist. II.
For man is situated between beings that eternally abide in the
possession of real good, such as divine natures, and those that per-
petually participate only of apparent good, such as brutes. Hence,
ranking in the last order of rational essences, his wisdom may justly
be said to be dark, and his greatness rude.
TEN DOUBTS
CONCERNING
PROVIDENCE, &c.
a
THE great Plato, in the tenth book of his Laws,
compels us, by adamantine arguments, as it were,
to confess that Providence has an existence; and
also elsewhere in many places, as in the Timæus,
he shows that the Demiurgus has elaborated the
fabrication of things, by his providential energies,
as far as to the last portion of intelligence, and this
he likewise clearly asserts. But it is requisite that
we should be persuaded by what Plato has demon-
strated, and by the most efficacious attestations
given by the [Chaldean] oracles to the demon-
strations of Plato. For I conceive that this tra-
dition of the oracles to the worthy auditors of the
Gods, is a most manifest demonstration of the
existence of Providence, in answer to whatever
a In the version of Morbeka ostendes; for which it is necessary
to read ostendens.
B
2
opposes it according to the conceptions of the mul-
titude, and is sufficient to repel the phantasms
which prevent them from believing that all things
subsist conformably to the will of Providence, and
to lead them from base garrulity on this subject,
to the truth of things. And we say this, not as if
we thought that what has been written on this
subject by those prior to us is not worthy of great
attention, but because the soul, though these things
have been the occasion of doubt, and have been
distinctly considered a thousand times, yet desires
to hear and speak concerning them, to revolve
them, and, as it were, discuss them in herself, and
is not willing to receive information alone about
them from others. Let us, therefore, interrogate
ourselves, and doubting, in the secret recesses of
the soul, endeavour to exercise ourselves in the
solution of doubts, considering it as of no conse-
quence whether we discuss, or whether we do not,
what has been said by those prior to us; since as
long as we deliver what we are persuaded is truth,
we shall appear to assert and to write our own
conceptions on this subject. To which may be
added, that we shall have Hermes for our common
leader, who is said to insert anticipations of common
conceptions in every soul.
1. And prior to everything else, let us investi-
gate whether Providence extends to all things, to
a
The latter part of this sentence in the version of Morbeka is,
"et non solum de foris recipere de his sermones nolente." But
for nolente I read volente.
3
wholes and parts, and to the most individual things
in the heavens, and under the heavens, to eternal.
and corruptible natures. But it is requisite that
Providence should either know the desert of the
things for which it provides, or that it should not
lead all things according to their desert, in con-
sequence of being ignorant of their worth. We
must also investigate the manner in which Provi-
dence knows all things, both wholes and parts,
and corruptible and eternal natures, and what the
characteristic is of its knowledge. And if we are
able to apprehend this, afterwards something else,
and again another thing will become the subject of
doubt.
Considering therefore this in the first place, and
invoking the common leader, Hermes, we must say
that with respect to knowledge, one kind is con-
nascent with irrationality, and is called sense or
phantasy; it also pertains to things of a partial
nature, and which are not external to body, and
therefore manifests that the cognitions themselves
are directed to partial essences. But another kind
of knowledge is essentially inherent in the rational
life, and is called opinion and science; differing
indeed from irrational cognitions in this, that it
knows universals, they, as we have said, having a
perception of partial qualities alone. These two
kinds of rational knowledge likewise differ from
each other, because the one, viz. opinion, is the
knowledge of mutable natures; but the other, viz.
science, is the knowledge of things permanently
B 2
4.
immutable. Prior to these, however, there is
another knowledge, which is denominated intellec-
tual; of which one kind apprehends all things at
once and simply, but the other is a knowledge, not
of all things at once, but of one thing at a timeª.
And in this they differ, one being the knowledge
of an intellect in every respect perfect, but the
other being the knowledge of partial intellects;
all intellectual essences indeed understanding all
things, and in this transcending rational cognitions;
but one intellect having a total subsistence, and
intellectually perceiving all things totally; but
another apprehending all things partially, because
being itself partial, its intellections are also of a
partial nature.
Beyond all these, however, is the knowledge of
Providence, which is above intellect, and exists in
the one alone, according to which every God is es-
sentialized, and is said to attend providentially to
all things, establishing himself in an energy prior
to intellectual perception. By this one, therefore,
according to which also he subsists, he knows all
things. For if we admit that other cognitions
necessarily remain connascent with the essences to
which they pertain,—as, for instance, phantasy and
sense, which, being irrational, belong to the irra-
tional life, and likewise the cognitions prior to
these, which are rational, as pertaining to rational
souls, and the intellectual to intellectual essences,—
it would be absurd not to admit, that the cogni-
"And such is the knowledge of our intellect.
เว
tions of the Gods, so far as they are Gods, are
defined according to an hyparxisª which is tran-
scendently one, since from common conceptions we
think that divinity is something better than intel-
lect, and that the knowledge of everything is con-
formable to what the thing is.
If, therefore, Providence subsists according to the
one, and is that which imparts good to all things,
and the good is the same with the one, through
being which it provides for all things, in this one
it likewise knows the things which are the subjects
of its providential energies. By the one, therefore,
it possesses the power of knowing all things. To
this one, however, there is no greater knowledge
of wholes than of parts; of things which are accord-
ing to nature, than of such as are preternatural;
of species, than of things which are without species.
For as of all sensible things, it is necessary that
there should be some impartible organ which forms
a judgement of them,—and likewise of the forms
prior to sensibles, that there should be another judi-
ciary organ by which they are perceived; since if
the judiciary organ was divisible, and by one part
of itself perceived one thing, and by another part of
itself another thing, it would be just the same as if
I should perceive this thing, but you that;—thus
Hyparxis signifies the summit of the essence of a thing, and
is that according to which that thing principally subsists.
b The good, according to Plato, is the same with the one. For in
his Republic, he celebrates the principle of all things by the former
of these appellations, and in the Parmenides by the latter.
6
also it is requisite that there should be something
prior to forms, which has one knowledge both of
universals and individuals; or after what manner
could it arrange them, these indeed as partici-
pants, but those as things participated? To these,
however, there is nothing else common than unity.
Prior therefore to forms, there is something gnostic,
which knows all things so far as they are one. But
it is evident that this which knows according to the
one, knows so far as the similar is known by the
similar, I mean so far as that which proceeds from
a cause is known by its cause. For everywhere,
and in all these, there is the one. And, indeed,
every being, of whatever kind it may be, does not
subsist universally; since that which exists accord-
ing to a part, is different from that which exists as
a wholeª. Nor is everything species [or form],
since there is something else which is not species ;
nor is everything according to nature, since there
is also that which is preternatural. But every-
thing which can be conceived, whatever it may be,
is one, in consequence of the one existing above all
things. If, however, there is anything which does
not participate of the one, neither will it wholly
participate of being, nor will it be able to partici-
pate of Providence. If, therefore, nothing escapes
the one, that which knows all things from itself,
will possess this knowledge through a transcendency
a i. e. Whole does not subsist universally, because some things
are parts; or in other words, everything is not a whole, because
a part, so far as it is a part, is not a whole.
7
This
of union; since it will know all things either by
the one, or by that which is not the one.
latter mode of knowledge, however, is of a subor-
dinate nature, and foreign from that of the one.
By the one, therefore, Providence knows everything
which is in any respect whatever one.
For unity
is common to all things, both to beings, and to non-
beings. [Hence Providence, as we have said, being
defined according to the one and the good, and the
good being prior to intellect (for intellect aspires
after the good, since this is the object of desire to
all beings, but the good does not aspire after intel-
lect,)—this being the case, it is necessary that pro-
vidential should be superior to intellectual know-
ledge; and in consequence of this, that Providence
should know all things by its own one, through
which it benefits all things, the intellectual and
the non-intellectual, the vital and the non-vital,
beings and non-beings, inserting in all things the
one, as a representation of its own one".] For the
a In Morbeka's version "unialiter". But this in the original
was doubtless ενιαίως, i. e. (κατα την της ενώσεως ὑπερβολην) accord
ing to a transcendency of union.
b The original of the part within the brackets is to be found in
Philoponus contra Procl. de Mundi Æternitate, and is as fol-
lows : Της δη συν προνοιας ὡς ειρηται κατα το ἓν και το αγαθόν αφωρι
σμένης, και του αγαθού προ του νου οντος, (νους γαρ ορέγεται του αγαθού,
και γαρ τα όντα παντα, και ουχι του νου το αγαθον,) αναγκη και την
προνοητικήν γνωσιν ὑπερ την νοεραν ειναι και οὕτω δη την προνοιαν παντα
γινωσκειν τῳ ἑνι τῷ ἑαυτης, καθα και αγαθύνει παντα, τα νοουντα (supple
και τα μη νοούντα, και τα ζωντα *) και τα μη ζωντα, και τα οντα και
τα μη όντα, πασιν επιβαλλουσα το έν, εμφάσει του έαυτης ένος.
* This addition, which is obviously necessary, is corroborated by
the version of Morbeka, which has in this place "et non intelli-
gentia et viventia," &c.
ce
one of it is not like an individual one. For this is
the last of beings, and is inferior to that which is
universal, through the participation of which it is
that which it is. The one of Providence, however,
is more excellent than that which is universal: for
the universal is a certain one, but is not the one
itself; because it is many things, and not one alone,
in consequence of possessing the differences of the
things which it contains. But neither is the one
according to which Providence exists such as a
whole; for this indeed is partible; but that as being
truly one, is also truly impartible.
[In short, therefore, since we assert that this one
of Providence is productive of all things, we must
also acknowledge that it is the saviour of all things;
having an hyparxis more true than all essence, and
more manifest than all knowledge; not being dis-
tributed into parts together with things which are
the objects of its knowledge, nor moved about
them, since these are the peculiarities of psychical a
and intellectual knowledge. For every intellect is
one many, both in its being and its intellectual
perception; and every soul, since it is essentialized
in motion, perceives intellectually in conjunction
with motion. But the one of Providence abiding
in the one, is at the same time immutable and in-
divisible, and knows all things in a way which is
eternally the same. Nor does it know man alone,
and sun, and everything else of this kind, but also
every particular thing. For nothing escapes that
one, whether you speak of the being of a thing, or
i. e. Pertaining to soul.
9
consider it as an object of knowledge.] And it
is said indeed, and is rightly said, that the whole
circle exists centrally in the centre, since the centre
is the cause, but the circle the thing caused; and
for the same reason every number subsists monadi-
cally in the monad. All things, however, exist in
the one of Providence in a far superior manner,
since it is in a much more transcendent degree one
than a centre and the monad. As, therefore, if the
centre had a knowledge of the circle, it would have
a central knowledge of it, as it likewise has a cen-
tral hypostasis, and would not distribute itself into
parts with the parts of the circle; [thus also the
transcendently united knowledge of Providence, is
a knowledge of all divisible essences in the same
impartible nature, and of each of the most indivi-
dual and most total things; and as it gave subsis-
tence to everything according to the one, so like-
a The following is the original of the part within the brackets,
and is to be alone found in the before-cited work of Philoponus :
Συλλήβδην ουν λεγοντες πάντων παρακτικόν εκείνο το έν, παντων σωστικών
ειναι φαμεν πασης ουσίας ὑπαρξιν εχον αληθεστεραν, και πάσης γνώσεως
τρανεστέραν*· ου μεριζόμενον τοις γνωστοις, ουδε κινουμενον περί αυτα, τουτων
μεν γαρ ἡ ψυχική και νοερα γνωσις έχει τας ιδιοτητας. και γαρ νους σας
εις πολυς και τῳ είναι και τῷ νοειν, και ψυχη πασα κινησις ούσα, και νοει
μετα κινησεως. εκείνο δε εν τῳ ἑνι μονον (lege μενον†,) αμετάβατον ἅμα
και αδιαίρετον, και γινώσκει παντα τον αυτόν τρόπον, και ουκ ανθρωπον
μονον, και ἥλιον, και παν οτιουν τοιουτον, αλλα και έκαστον των καθ' έκασ
ουδεν γαρ εκφεύγει το εν εκείνο, και το είναι λεγης, και το γινωσ
κεσθαι.
τω
* Morbeka has here eminentiorem, but erroneously; for τρανεσ
τερων should be rendered clariorem.
† Morbeka also has rightly in this place manens.
10
wise by the one it knows everything ª]. And
neither is its knowledge divided with the things
known; nor are the things that are known con-
founded on account of the profound union of know-
ledge. This knowledge, however, being one, com-
prehends indeed all the infinity of the objects of
knowledge, but is transcendently united above all
the union that is in them. Such, therefore, is the
answer to the first of the doubts concerning Pro-
vidence.
2. If you are willing, however, we will direct.
our attention to a second object of inquiry. We
say, then, that Providence knows things of a con-
tingent nature; and by the ancients the profundity
of this doubt has been sufficiently established: for
on account of this profundity, some of them, ad-
mitting the existence of Providence, have taken
away from beings the nature of what is contingent;
but others, not at all contradicting the evidence
which presents itself for the subsistence of con-
tingent events, have denied that Providence ex-
tends as far as to these. Both these, however, pre-
assume rightly that Providence exists, that the
thing known is definite to the gnostic nature, and
that the indefiniteness of that which is known arises
" This part also within the brackets, is to be found in the before-
cited work of Philoponus, and the original of it is as follows: OUTW
και η της προνοιας ενιαιη γνωσις εν τῷ αὐτῷ αμερείς παντων εστι των μερι
ζομένων γνωσις, και των ατομωτατων ἕκαστον, και των ὁλικωτατων, και
ὡς ὑπεστησιν έκαστον κατα το έν, οὕτω και γινωσκει έκαστον κατα το
ένα
11
from its own nature. We however saya, that Pro-
vidence knows the whole of this, in consequence of
possessing a definite knowledge of the indefinite,
the indefiniteness being about to be, but not actu-
ally existing, and knowledge antecedently compre-
hending the cause of that which is indefinite. For
Providence knows that something indefinite will
take place, and looking to the cause of this, it
knows the indefinite thing; and as it gave subsist-
ence to, so likewise it knows the indefinite, not by
the indefinite, but as it produced the indefinite by
the definite: in like manner it knows the indefinite
definitely, just as it knows incorporeally and with-
out interval, that which is distended into bulk and
is corporeal. And if, indeed, the reason [or pro-
ductive principle] which is in seed, being one and
wholly in each part of the seed, and possessing the
cause of the seed, should know that there would be
a separation of its productive power from itself,
existing indeed as the cause of a distribution into
parts to that which is posterior to itself, but being
itself impartible;-in this case, it would say, I pos-
sess the whole of this partibility impartibly; not
existing separately from either, but containing that
which is subordinate in that which is more excel-
lent; so that neither is the distribution without a
cause, nor does it pre-exist in the cause [distri-
a It appears to me that in this place, immediately after the words
in Morbeka's version, "et 7 indeterminatum esse propter illius
naturam," it is requisite to add, Dicimus tamen ut Providentia, &c.
For in what follows, Proclus gives his own opinion, and not that
of the ancients.
12
butedly], but it subsists there according to cause,
and in its participants, according to hyparxis. And
if, indeed, it should investigate the cause of that
partition, it would find it in itself, because in itself
it is impartible; but when it becomes situated in
another subject, and not in itself, it is the source to
them of a distribution into parts, in consequence of
which each of the parts is not everywhere. After
this manner therefore we say, that Providence being
the cause of all things, knows the things of which
it is the cause, has a definite knowledge both of
that which is definite and of that which is indefinite,
and gives generation to things which will have an
indefinite subsistence. Nor does anything impos-
sible happen on account of this, [the indefiniteness
existing in things posterior to Providence,] in
whose knowledge they are antecedently compre-
hended, and in such a way as is adapted to causes.
But this is now manifest.
3. In the third place, the doubt consequent to
this deserves to be considered, since it likewise re-
quires much attention; viz. if Providence is the
cause both of things definite and indefinite, whether
it is the cause of both these according to one and
the same thing, or according to different things.
For if according to the same thing, how can it
ceive in its knowledge, that this thing which is pro-
per-
a This part within the brackets is in the version of Morbeka, "in
determinatione in iis quæ post ipsam existente." But for in deter-
minatione, it is necessary to read indeterminatione, conformably to
the above translation.
13
duced by it will be definite, but that indefinite? But
if according to different things, how will it any
longer remain one in hyparxis, if this thing which
pertains to it is one thing, but that another? In-
voking, therefore, Divinity to illuminate the reason
which perfects our conceptions on this subject, we
must say to ourselves, that Providence is established
in the one [and this is the same with the good]. For
everything which is of a providential nature, if we
believe in common conceptions, always procures
some real or some apparent good for the objects of
its providential care; nor is providential anything
else than beneficent energy. But we have before ob-
served, that to impart good is the same thing as to
impart unity, because the one is good, and the good
is one; and this has been ten thousand times as-
serted. We say, therefore, that Providence is cha-
racterized by the one, or, which is the same thing,
by the good. The one of it, however, as we have
before observed, is neither such as a material one,-
for this is inefficacious and unprolific, because after
matter there is nothing,-but the one of Providence
is prolific and most efficacious, because all things
are posterior to Providence. Nor is it one as that
which is an individual; for this presents itself to
the view in the last division of things, and is one in
such a way as to be none of other things. But
Providence is one as containing all things, as pre-
sent to all things of which it is the cause, and as the
salvation of all things; [not after the same manner
as the universal which subsists in opinion, and
14
which some assert to be the one a;] for this, indeed,
though it comprehends the things which are under
it, and imparts essence to each of them, in con-
sequence of containing their differences causally,
yet it is essentially one many. The one of Provi-
dence, however, is exempt from all the beings of
which it is the productive and perfective cause,
and is unreceptive of variation of every kind. Pro-
vidence, therefore, being no one of these, but esta-
blished above every specific essence, and neverthe-
less producing all things according to the most pro-
found union, possesses a power uncircumscribed,
and incomprehensible by all things; so that neither
can any one of the natures which subsist from it,
nor all of them taken collectively, unfold the power
which pre-exists in it, or receive and comprehend
the immensity of it in its bosom. But all things
being as it were absorbed by Providence, they par-
ticipate of it in some way or other, according to the
natural adaptation of each to this participation.
Hence the one of Providence, being more pro-
foundly one than every incorporeal and corporeal
union, and being infinitely powerful, possesses this
power in an infinitely greater degree than every in-
finite and finite power. For it is not at all wonderful
* The part within the brackets is in the version of Morbeka as
follows: " non quod inopinabile dicere, ut universale quidam aiunt
unum;" instead of which I read, conformably to the above trans-
lation, non ut universale quod in opinione subsistit, et quod quidam
aiunt unum esse.
b What I have rendered specific essence, is in Morbeka speciona-
lem essentiam, which doubtless was in the Greek adını ove(XY.
15
that in infinite powers one should be more infinite
than another. For the infinite according to quan-
tity must not be considered as existing in the one
of Providence; since in quantity there is not [in
energy] the infinitely more than the infinite. Ne-
vertheless, everything infinite will be such to the
natures which are under it, according to infinite
power; but to the natures which are prior to it it will
be finite, in consequence of being bounded by them.
For if it were not comprehended by the natures
prior to it, neither could it be under the dominion
of things more excellent than itself, and therefore
would not be contained by them. If, therefore, it
is contained by them though it is infinite, they pre-
dominate over it; and if they predominate over it,
and it is comprehended by them, it is not infinite
[with reference to them]. Neither, likewise, is it in-
finite to itself. For that which is infinite to itself,
is incomprehensible to itself; and hence it is not
able to contain, and be the saviour of itself. But
every being is according to power preservative of
itself. It remains, therefore, that each of the things
that are infinite, is alone infinite to the natures pos-
terior to itself. Hence the infinite power of Pro-
vidence, being comprehensive of all the powers of
the natures which are the subjects of its providen-
tial energy, generates as well as contains them ac-
cording to the most profound union in the infinite
depths of itself; just as it imparts to all things a
union commensurate to each. For neither is the
16
one everywhere the same, for instance, in incorpo-
real natures and in bodies; nor in perpetual bo-
dies, and in such as are corruptible. For the union
of perpetual is greater than that of corruptible bo-
dies; or how could the former remain indissoluble,
but unity perish in the other? To which also it
may be added, that an incorporeal nature is more
proximate to the one; but body, on account of the
infinite separation of its parts, falls very far short
of the one.
Nor must it be doubted whether one
thing is in a greater degree one than another;
since we see that everything by diminution always
becomes something different from that which is
prior to itself, till it proceeds to the extremity of the
order to which it belongs.
Providence, therefore, existing according to tran-
scendent union, and possessing infinite power, some
of the natures which are produced by it and par-
take of its beneficent energy, (though all things
proceed from, and participate of Providence,) sub-
sist according to the one, by which they are con-
nascently bounded; but others subsist according
to the infinite, indefiniteness being connascent with
their essence. For imitations of the infinite which
is with Providence subsist here through indefinite-
ness; but the imitations of its unity, through bound.
On this account, the first of the natures in the uni-
verse, and which are unchangeable, subsist accord-
ing to one bound; but the natures that succeed
these tend to indefiniteness, in consequence of pos-
17
sessing a second rank. But every infinity subsists
according to the infinity of Providence, and every-
thing definite subsists according to union. The in-
finity likewise which is in primary natures is van-
quished by unity, and largely partakes of the one.
Here too [i. e. in the sublunary region] things na-
turally indefinite, are subservient to such as are
definite; and definite natures give an orderly ar-
rangement to such as are borne along indefinitely
according to an all-various transmutation. As pri-
mary natures likewise are to each other according
to their mutual order, thus also such of their reci-
pients as possess a habitude analogous to them,
give completion to the world; less excellent being
suspended from more excellent beings.
What has been said, however, will become more
evident by assuming that intellect produces both
body and that which is incorporeal, but each of
these incorporeally, and that it knows and produces
them conformably to its own nature. And as the
productive principle of incorporeal natures is in in-
tellect incorporeal, so likewise the cause of body in
it is incorporeal; the former assimilating to itself
the things which are produced, but the latter, on
account of diminution with respect to intellect, pro-
ducing things more foreign to the incorporeal spe-
cies. Soul itself likewise generates those vital and
motive productive powers or forms which are in
other souls; but of those forms which fall into mat-
a The words in italics are in Morbeka's version "propter submis-
sionem"; but the original was, I have no doubt, dız üçırır.
C
18
ter, some it produces of a gnostic, but others of a
fabricative nature. And it produces indeed all these
vitally, some proceeding through life into life, but
others proceeding through life into the privation of
vitality. And, in short, everything which generates,
and at the same time knows that which it generates
from different causes, generates and knows the
thing produced by it, by a knowledge superior to the
object of its knowledge. Of the natures, however,
which are produced by this cause, some are pro-
duced conformably to it, but others according to
diminution. Hence, you may say that Providence,
possessing through the one of itself the cause of de-
finite natures, but through infinity the cause of such
as are indefinite, knows and generates both of them
definitely; just as intellect knows and produces in-
corporeally, both that which subsists according to
the form of the incorporeal essence, and that which
subsists according to the form of body. But you
will speak rightly if you say, that of the things pro-
duced, these indeed are definite on account of the
one, but those are indefinite on account of infinity.
For neither are beings which have a necessary ex-
istence without infinity, nor such as are contingent
without bounda. For the latter are entirely termi-
nated in the bound of necessity, and the former,
being eternal essences from a necessity of nature,
a Morbeka's version of this sentence is, "Nam necessariis entibus
expertibus infinitate, neque contingentibus termino." But for
"Nam necessariis," it is necessary to read, conformably to the above
translation, Nam neque necessariis.
¡
19
participate of infinite power. Or whence do they
derive this perpetuity, and an invariable sameness
of subsistence? Here, indeed, the one predomi-
nating, and, on account of this, causing that which
is generated to be necessary, and being the cause of
the colligation of the infinite; but there the infinite
predominating, and causing the one to be diminish-
ed, through flying from the infinite, which runs.
above it, and comprehends it in its embrace. Pro-
vidence, however, possesses a knowledge of both
these, though, as we have already said, its know-
ledge is according to that which is more excellent
than the things which it knows", and antecedently
comprehending in its knowledge a power produc-
tive of the peculiarity of each, and causing this
thing to be characterized by bound, but that by
infinity.
Every bound, therefore, is from thence, and every
infinity, whether in incorporeal natures, or in bo-
dies; and, in like manner, that which consists of
both these is from thence derived. Hence also the
knowledge both of simple and of composite natures
is there, just as the generations of things simple
and of things composite proceed from thence.
ล
" This sentence in the version of Morbeka is, "Etenim hæc peni-
tus in eum qui necessarii terminum terminate, et illa propter ipsam
necessariam naturam æterna entia participare infinitâ virtute." But
for terminate, it is necessary to read terminari.
b For knowledge subsists according to the nature of that which
knows, and not according to the nature of that which is known.
This is admirably illustrated by Proclus in his Commentary on the
Parmenides of Plato.-See vol. iii. of my translation of Plato,
p. 82.
;
C 2
20
Because, likewise, the one of Providence produces
every kind of bound, and every kind of infinity, and
also every whole, which consists of both these;
hence, either from the one prevailing, that which
is produced is necessary, or from infinity running
before bound, that which is contingent is effected.
Because, however, neither here was it lawful for
the infinite to be deserted by the one, hence the
contingent, as we have said, terminates in the na-
ture of that which is necessary: and this is either
in a greater degree detained by the one, and, passing
into a necessary event, becomes for a longer time
definite; or, in consequence of participating of the
one in a more debile degree, becomes necessary in
a less time, but suffers the same thing, and becomes
definite. The contingent likewise imitates the in-
finite power of the one, but not the power of itself.
For every power is the power of another thing which
possesses it, but not of itself; since everything, of
whatever kind it may be, which is indefinite, in con-
sequence of not yet having a definite existence, pos-
sesses what is said to be contingent, but necessarily
terminates in either being or not being; and this
either prior to a greater, or prior to a less time.
And this is manifested by conjectural divinations.
For they are more verified in a less than in a greater
time, as if the indefiniteness had now passed away.
That it is requisite, however, that there should be
a knowledge of the indefinite in beings superior to
us, if this also ought to have an allotted order, and
not to be, as it were, adventitious to the universe,
21
must be admitted at present, as being elsewhere
demonstrated; but we now alone investigate after
what manner it is effected. And this likewise will
become manifest. For the universe would not be
one, nor the government of it according to intellect,
if this government was not definite; and of those
things of which there is the same order, there is a
certain colligation.
It is necessary, however, to attribute this know-
ledge either to dæmons alone,-for as they are
proximate to things in the sublunary region, they
appear to have a knowledge of, and to preside over
them, or this knowledge must be attributed to the
Gods prior to dæmons, to whom the Gods commit
the providential inspection of all mundane affairs.
But if we leave to dæmons alone the knowledge and
providential inspection of things indefinite, we must
say either that they know them apart from each
other, and also the subjects of their providential
attention, and the natures prior to themselves, as we
do, or that they have a simultaneous knowledge of
both. And if, indeed, they have a knowledge of
these separate from each other, in what do they
differ from our souls? For these are incapable of
paying attention to themselves and their own con-
cerns, and of surveying at the same time the natures
which are above them. But so far as they do not
extend themselves to external objects, and yet pos-
sess a knowledge of these, we must confess that
they tend to a definite knowledge of things indefi-
nite. If, however, at the same time it is necessary
22
to admit that their knowledge of the natures over
which they preside is derived from a reasoning pro-
cess, we must also grant that they contain the forms
and exemplars of things indefinite. For diavola (i. e.
the discursive energy of reason) is the knowledge
of these. Or if we assert that this knowledge per-
tains to beings who energise prior to ratiocination,
much more must we refer it to the Gods, from whom
dæmons also possess the power of divination, and
the definite foreknowledge of things indefinite. For
if, indeed, they perceive definite things indefinitely,
we must not ascribe to them an impassivity which
is adapted to immutable genera. For everything
of this kind requires phantasy and sense, so that in
consequence of not remembering present circum-
stances, the soul may conjoin the assimilation of
future events to the present and the past. But if
they perceive indefiniteª things definitely, why, if
we ascribe this power to dæmons, should we not
admit that this in a much greater degree is possible
to the Gods, so as to grant that they know temporal
concerns untemporally, indefinite things definitely,
and that they provide for indefinite natures accord-
ing to a definite mode of knowledge? For if, in-
deed, they are unable to know things indefinite, de-
finitely, but this is possible to dæmons,-then the
b
2 In the version of Morbeka in this place, "Si autem determi-
nate," after autem it is necessary to add indeterminata.
↳ The word determinatum is evidently wanting in this place in
the version of Morbeka; for he has only in the latter part of this
sentence, "et providere indeterminatis secundum cognitionis mo-
dum," instead of secundum determinatum cognitionis modum.
23
Gods will be deprived of a knowledge of this kind
through want of power, which is absurd. And if
it should be said, that they do not wish to possess
this knowledge, this would be attended with a much
greater absurdity than to assert that they are not
able to possess it; since, though they give subsist-
ence to things of this kind, they would be unwilling
to pay a providential attention to their own produc-
tions. Or on this hypothesis it must likewise be
granted, that not all mortal natures and particu-
lars, and everything which the world contains, were
produced by the Gods. And some things, indeed,
were [immediately] fabricated by the one father of
the universe, but others by the mundane gods, yet
through the command of their father, who at the
same time through them produced these. But it
is not lawful for those beings who produce other
things either immediately or mediately to neglect
the Gods.
If, however, the Gods wish to provide for things
indefinite definitely, and are able to effect this, they
will entirely both provide for them, and at the same
time that they providentially attend to, will know
the desert of the subjects of their providential care.
And the Gods, indeed, will possess this knowledge
exemptly', extending to all things their providen-
tial attention: but dæmons, distributing into parts
a The version of Morbeka has here "nolunt," but the true read-
ing is obviously volunt.
b This word, used here by Morbeka in his version, is "exaltatim;"
but the word used by Proclus was, I have no doubt, conformably to
my version, gnμevws.
24
the superessential illuminations which they re-
ceive from them, are allotted a different prefecture
over different herds of animals, as far as to the last
partition, as Plato says; so that some of them pre-
side over men, others over lions, and others over
other animals, or have dominion over plants. And
still more partially, some are the inspective guard-
ians of the eye, others of the liver, and others of the
heart. But all things are full of Gods; some pro-
viding for certain things, immediately, but others,
as we have said, for other things through dæmons
as media: not that the Gods are incapable of being
present with all things, but ultimate natures are
not able of themselves to participate such as are
primary. The inaptitude of participants likewise,
by insinuating itself, becomes sometimes an obsta-
cle to the enjoyment of the beneficent influence of
the Gods, and to the conscious perception of the
providential interference of dæmons. That, how-
ever, which possesses a proper adaptation, has the
Gods immediately present with it, and hence knows
when it is known by them; and begins to see ª Pro-
vidence descending into it, the guardian care of
which it was ignorant of prior to its adaptation, and
which it had participated immanifestly. But if some
one sleeping in the light of the sun, and being il-
luminated by it, should be ignorant during his
sleep that he was thus illuminated, and on waking
should see himself surrounded by the solar splen-
a It
a
appears to me to be necessary to add in this part of Mor-
beka's version, videre.
25
dour, he might then think that this light was not
present with him before, because he, on account of
his ignorance, was not present with the light. Then,
therefore, [i. e. when a thing becomes adapted to
the participation of the Gods,] the indefinite also
becomes definite, and is converted to divinity, with
whom the indefinite subsisted definitely, and from
thence derives, through participation, bound. For
prior to its conversion to divinity, it was indeed
with reference to itself indefinite, but not such to
divinity; but conformably to his nature, had with
him a definite subsistence, and was known to him
as a thing separated from him through its own in-
definiteness, yet not so separated as to escape all
bound; for in this case, falling into the abyss of
nonentity, it would become latent; but it is cut off
from him in such a way, as neither to be without
bound, nor yet to be perfectly established in it.
After its conversion, however, it both has a know-
ledge of its own indefiniteness, and of the pre-ex-
isting bound by which indefiniteness is adorned.
This will likewise follow, if we admit that good
accedes to all things from Providence alone, in the
same manner as intelligence proceeds from intellect,
and life and vital motion from soul. But if every-
thing which lives, in any way whatever, lives on
account of soul, and everything intelligent intel-
lectually perceives on account of intellect, it is
evident that whatever participates of the good of
Providence, possesses this good on account of Pro-
vidence, though the participant should rank among
26
partial natures, and things which participate of it
only at times, and not always. For it is requisite
to lead everything to its fountain, from which the
whole series of it is derived. If anything, there-
fore, which the world contains is benefited, it is
benefited on account of Providence; and this is
not only the case with eternal, but likewise with
corruptible natures; and not only with definite, but
also with such as are indefinite, whether each of
these receives its proper good from Providence im-
mediately, or through media is first benefited by
it. For intermediate beings do not subvert the
gifts of the causes prior to themselves, but render
the inaptitude of ultimate natures adapted to the
participation of such as are primary, corrobora-
ting them by their own forerunning illuminations.
Hence things which are more proximate to Pro-
vidence enjoy and are adorned by it in a greater
degree; just as we must admit from common con-
ceptions, that the natures which are nearer to the
sun are more illuminated by it than those which are
more remote from it; that the beings which are
more proximate to soul, are more vital; and those
that are nearer to intellect, are more perfect in in-
tellectual perception. For proximity is said to be
that which it is, on account of the alliance of its
essence to the things to which it is near, and re-
moteness is entirely so denominated on account of
its essential elongation from something else. It be-
a In Morbeka's version, for "bonificat" in this place, it is neces-
sary to read bonificatur.
27
ing admitted, therefore, that Providence is nothing
else than that which imparts good to all things,
those natures which more largely participate of it,
are in a greater degree benefited and adorned.
Hence it is not requisite that everything should be
proximately suspended from Providence, but it is
proper that intermediate natures should be sus-
pended from those that are proximate to Provi-
dence; for this causes the latter to enjoy the good
of Providence by themselves, and the former to be
in want, as it were, of other colligations, in order to
receive the good which it imparts. For if there
was not a co-ordination of all things with reference
to the one, neither would the world be one; or if
all things participated of their adorning cause after
the same manner, there would not be an order of
things adorned. If, therefore, there are both order
and co-ordination, the former giving distinction to
all things, and causing some things to be prior and
others to be posterior,-but the latter converting
divided natures to one good,-if this be the case, .
it is necessary that all things should participate of
Providence, but that the participations should not
be the same; that all should participate, indeed,
on account of co-ordination; but not of the same
things, on account of order, which causes some
things to be first, others to be second, and others to
be successive to these. For, as Plato says, every
power which is motive of greater, is much more
motive of less things, and obtaining dominion over
stronger, it will much more predominate over more
28
debile natures. There 2, however, will concurring
with power, it is necessary that Providence should
extend its beneficent care to things of a less excel-
lent nature. For it must not be said, that Provi-
dence is able indeed, but unwilling, to effect what it
is able to effect; since whatever good men are able
to accomplish, they also wish to accomplish. Nor
is the power of Providence without will, nor its will
without power; since the latter would render ap-
petition vain, and the former would cause power
to be imperfect.
If, however, it is requisite that Providence should
extend itself to secondary, it is much more neces-
sary that it should extend itself to primary natures.
For it does not pertain to Providence to profit and
adorn less excellent beings, but leave such as are
more excellent destitute of itself. For if more ex-
cellent beings are not in want of anything, they de-
rive this superiority to any kind of indigence from
Providence, which imparts to primary beings the
power of being sufficient to themselves. Our com-
mon conceptions, therefore, as we have before said,
necessarily proclaim, that we should assert Provi-
dence to be the cause of all good, and that we should
confess that the power by which any being is suffi-
cient to itself is thence derived, and subsists for its
sake. Whether, therefore, beings are indigent, they
a i. e. with Providence.
The version of Morbeka in this place is, "Hoc quidem enim
appetitum facit verum, hoc autem virtutem imperfectam ;" but for
verum I read vanum.
29
are allotted plenitude from Providence in a way
conformable to their nature; or whether they are
not indigent, they are always filled, and have suffi-
ciency from themselves (To avтapxes) prior to the
natures which are always indigent; but at the same
time they always receive from Providence an appro-
priate plenitude. All things, therefore, as I have
said, according to the order which they possess,
derive their subsistence from Providence; and of
the beings which are generated, and are not always,
some are essentially produced from it, and from
eternal beings; but others have their generation
through eternal beings, not because Providence is
indigent of things posterior to itself for the produc-
tion of these, but these, in consequence of being
much distant from it, requiring to the participation
of it the influence of the beings which it proximately
produced. If, however, though Providence is pre-
sent everywhere and in all things, yet the same
good is not in all things, we ought not to be sur-
prised. For this is the work of the most excellent
Providence, to impart good indeed to all things,
but to measure the participation of it by the desert
of the recipients; and for everything to receive
only as much as it is able to receive, whether es-
sence causes a difference, as in souls and bodies,
(for the good of each of these is not the same, be-
cause the essence is not the same,) or whether their
desert arises from energy alone, as we say, that
souls differently energising, always receive from
Providence different allotments. And all souls, in-
30
deed, have allotments from Providence; but some
submit to their allotment with facility, and others
with difficulty; because they cannot be converted
to Providence without obstacle. This, therefore,
must be admitted. For that it is most true that
there is also a particular Providence, may be as-
sumed by directing our attention to sublunary af-
fairs, because all these contribute something to the
universe, and no one of the things which it contains
is superadventitious, though we are not able to
perceive the causes from which it is derived.
which it may be added, that in certain souls also
the power of Providence is displayed. But it would
be ridiculous to admit that these things thus sub-
sist, and others do not, if all things existed after a
similar manner. On this subject, however, enough
has been said.
To
4. Respiring however, as it were, from the dis-
cussion of this head, let us consider in the fourth
place, from another principle, after what manner
we say the participations of the Gods are effected:
which also those who engage in the speculation of
ideas are accustomed to investigate. For if the
Gods always energising, the natures which are here
do not always participate of them, must it not fol-
low that the Gods would energise in vain? Or if
we do not admit that they possess an eternal energy,
a still greater absurdity will follow: if it is proper
to call that which is impossible absurd. For what-
ever exists with the Gods, always exists with them,
and prior to all time. Hence their energy does not
31
take place in a part only of infinite time: for time
and that which is infinite are external to the Gods.
That these things, therefore, may also be appro-
priately discussed, it must be observed, in the first
place, that every participation, whether it is of eter-
nal or of corruptible natures, is always allotted a
middle order between participants and the things
participated. And as a communication with the
extremes is requisite to all media, it is necessary
that the media should be united both with the par-
ticipants and the things participated; for if the
media pertained to one of these only, they would
not conjoin both the extremes to each other, but
being media, they subsist in the before-mentioned
manner in their participants. For they proceed
indeed from the things participated, but are esta-
blished in the recipients of their energies; just as
we say, that knowledge primarily subsists in gno-
stic natures, and not in the things known. For
gnostic natures have to things that are known the
relation of participants; since every gnostic being
wishes to participate that which is known. Hence,
participation having this order, and Providence
being primarily participated by all things, by ani-
mate, inanimate, rational, irrational, eternal and
corruptible natures, according to their several pow-
ers,--for with respect to all the instruments of it,
these are more proximately produced, but those
more remotely, this being the case, it is necessary
that not only participations should indicate Pro-
vidence as the cause from which they proceed, but
32
also that there should be an antecedent aptitude
in the participant. This aptitude, therefore, will
subsist rationally in rational, but intellectually in
intellectual natures; phantastically or sensibly in
those beings which live according to phantasy or
sense; and essentially, and through existence alone,
in those which possess being without life. But all
these being instruments, and Providence using all
of them, it is necessary that each of them should
correspond to the power which employs each ac-
cording to its proper work; neither in its energy
obscuring the peculiar hyparxis of Providence, nor
its own nature, but exhibiting one thing which is
effected by both. Thus the sun transmits light to
the moon, and from the moon imparts it to us; yet
the light which we receive is not such as that of the
sun, whiteª and dry, nor like that of the moon, gross
and caliginous, but is mingled from the power of
that which is participated, and of the participant,
and its colour is changed conformably to its energy;
and in many other particulars this also may be
seen. Hence, Providence being placed above all
beings according to divine union itself, and ener-
gising conformably to one energy adapted to the
one, everything which accedes to participates of it,
and in a way conformable to its natural adaptation;
one thing indeed essentially, another vitally, an-
a In Morbeka's version "calidum"; but the true reading is doubt-
less candidum, agreeably to the above translation. For according
to Plato, as is shown by Proclus in Tim., the solar light is vivific
and unburning.
33
a
other gnostically, and another participating of it
according to all these, and being naturally perfect.
One thing, likewise, always receives the beneficent
illuminations of Providence, on account of its own
power, and possesses a never-failing participation 2
of it through the infinite energy of the giver, and
through its own permanent and firm habitude with
reference to it; but another is a participant only
sometimes, in consequence of not being allotted a
stability of nature. Hence, on account of its debi-
lity not being always a participant, it possesses, in-
deed, well-being from Providence, but it is owing
to the recipient that it does not always participate ;
Providence being always able to give, and giving to
those natures that possess the power of always re-
ceiving from it that which it imparts. Hence the
participation which is effected sometimes only, is
not from Providence, but from the imbecility of the
participant; just as the sun, illuminating perpetu-
ally that which is not always able to see its light,
and which only sometimes sees, does not by its light
occasion this temporary perception, but the recipi-
ent rejecting its light, deprives itself of perpetual
vision, and when turned from no longer participates
of the solar rays".
a In the version of Morbeka partitionem; but the true reading
is doubtless participationem.
b That which energises essentially does not energise in vain, be-
cause such an energy is natural to it. Hence the perpetual emis-
sion of light from the sun, though it is not received by opake bodies,
is not emitted in vain, because the very nature of the sun consists
in such an emission, though its light is only received by bodies that
D
34
If, therefore, Providence [always] energising
something, only participates of it at a certain time,
the thing itself diminishes its own participation, yet
does not exclude the eternal energy of Providence;
but the energy of deity remains always the same.
Just as if a face standing in the same position, a
mirror should at one time receive a clear image of
it, and at another, one obscure and debile, or in-
deed no image at all. If some one, therefore,
should say, that oracles sometimes participate of
the Gods, who are the sources of divination, and
sometimes fail, becoming inefficacious, and, as it
were, without spirit for a certain time, the causes of
the irregularity are to be referred to the spirits that
use and energise through the prophetic Gods, failing
in the power of always participating of these Gods.
For true oracles are those to which angels, dæmons,
and heroes give completion, and which are illumi-
nated by the Gods, and by the allotments which
have a perpetual subsistence in the universe; though
certain waters and chasms of the earth cannot al-
ways participate of them on account of the instabi-
lity of their nature. Or if it should be said that
the virtues of sacred rites, which sometimes cause
statues to be animated" and replete with divine in-
are adapted to receive it. In like manner the eternally beneficent
illuminations of Providence are not extended in vain, though,
through the inaptitude of participants, they are not always effica-
cious; for Providence is essentialized in an overflowing perennial
communication of good.
a
Semper is wanting in this place in the version of Morbeka.
These were statues of the Gods, fabricated by telestæ, or mystic
35
spiration, fail in. certain periods, the defect also of
these, as it appears to me, ought to be ascribed to
the recipients, and not to any variation in the ener-
gy of the Gods by whom these statues are inspired.
operators, so as to become animated, illuminated by divinity, and
capable of delivering oracles. These statues are alluded to by
Proclus, on the Timæus and Cratylus of Plato, and by Iambli-
chus, and the author of the Asclepian Dialogue; but are very
explicitly mentioned by Hermias, in his Scholia on the Phædrus,
p. 104, as follows: Πως δε και αγαλματα λεγεται ενθουσιαν; η αυτο
μεν ενεργει ου περί το θείον, ὁ γε αψυχον εστι, αλλα την ύλην ἡ τελεστική
διακαθήρασα και τινας χαρακτηρας και συμβολα περιθεισα τῷ αγαλματι,
πρωτον μεν εμψυχον αυτο δια τουτων εποίησε, και ζωην τινα εκ του κόσμου
καταδεξασθαι όπερ αγαλμα αει χρηματίζει, ἕως δυνανται δέχεσθαι οἱ επι
τηδειοι. το μεν γαρ αγαλμα, ὡς αν τελεσθη, μενει εφεξης, έως αν παντη
ανεπιτήδειον γενηται προς την θειαν ελλαμψιν ο μεντοι δοχεύς παρα μερος"
νυν μεν γαρ δεξαμενον αποπαύεται, αυθις δε παλιν εμφορείται. το δε αιτιον,
ὅτι ἡ μεν ψυχη εμφορούμενη αυτη ενέργει περί το θείον, διο αποκάμνει ὑπερ
την εαυτης δυναμιν ενεργουσα. ἡ γαρ αν ἦν θεος και όμοια ταις των αστρων
ψυχαίς, ει μη απεκαμνη. το δε αγαλμα, ὡς αν παθη, οὕτω μενει ελλαμ
ώς
πομενον· διο και η ανεπιτηδειοτης αυτου εις στέρησιν πανταχη χωρεί, εαν μη
παλιν εκ νεας ὑπο του τελεστου τελεσθη και εμψυχωθη. i.e. But how are
statues said to have an enthusiastic energy? May we not say, that
a statue, being inanimate, does not itself energise about divinity;
but the telestic art, purifying the matter of which the statue con-
sists, and placing round it certain characters and symbols, in the
first place renders it, through these means, animated, and causes it
to receive a certain life from the world; and, in the next place,
after this, it prepares the statue to be illuminated by a divine nature,
through which it always delivers oracles, as long as it is properly
adapted. For the statue, when it has been rendered perfect by the
telestic art, remains afterwards [endued with a prophetic power], till
it becomes entirely unadapted to divine illumination; but the mor-
tal who receives the inspiring influence of the Gods, receives it only
at certain times, and not always. But the cause of this is, that the
soul, when filled with deity, energises about it. Hence, in conse-
quence of energising above its own power, it becomes weary. For
it would be a God, and similar to the souls of the stars, if it did not
become weary.
But the statue, conformably to its participations,
D 2
36
For neither must we dare to accuse the sun as the
cause of the moon being eclipsed, but we must as-
sign as the cause of this, the conical shadow of the
earth into which the moon falls. Nor, in reality,
must the participation of the energies of Providence
by some things at certain times only be attributed
to Providence, but the cause of this must be referred
to the participants, and not to that from which the
remains illuminated. Hence the inaptitude of it entirely proceeds
into privation, unless it is again, de novo, perfected and reanimated
by the mystic operator."
ών
Conformably to this, Proclus also, in Tim. p. 239 and 240, says:
Και παλιν και εκ τουτου δηλον, όπως τον δημιουργον κατα τους ακρους ίδρυει
των τελεστών. αγαλματοποιον αυτόν αποφαίνων του κόσμου, καθαπερ
εμπροσθεν όνοματων ποιητην θείων, και χαρακτηρων θείων εκφαντικον, δι ὧν
την ψυχην ετελεσεν. ταυτα γαρ και οἱ τῷ οντι τελευται (lege τελεσται)
δρωσι, δια χαρακτήρων και ονοματων ζωτικών, τελούντες τα αγαλματα,
και ζωντα και κινουμενα αποτελούντες. i. e. “ And again, from this it is
evident that Plato establishes the Demiurgus conformably to the
most consummate of the telesta: for he exhibits him as the statuary
of the world, just as before he represented him the maker of divine
names, and the enunciator of divine characters, through which he
gave perfection to the soul. For these things are effected by those
who are telesta in reality, who give completion to statues, through
characters and vital names, and render them living and moving.”
It must be observed, that these telesta were initiators into the myste-
ries, and were theurgists, or capable of performing divine opera-
tions,
And again, in his Scholia on the Cratylus, p. 21 : Και ώσπερ ἡ
διαδη τηδε αγαλ-
τελεστική δια δη τινων συμβόλων και αποῤῥητων συνθηματων τα
ματα τοις θεοις απεικάζει, και επιτηδεια ποιει προς ὑποδοχην των θείων
ελλαμψεων, ούτω δε και ἡ νομοθετικη κατα την αυτην αφομοιωτικην δυνα
μια αγάλματα των πραγματων ὑφίστησι τα όνοματα. “ And as the te
lestic art, through certain symbols and arcane signatures, assimilates
statues to the Gods, and makes them adapted to the reception of
divine illuminations, so the legislative art, according to the same
assimilative power, gives subsistence to names, as the statues or
images of things." The excellent Sallust, in his treatise on the
37
participation is derived, both to these, and to those
beings that always participate. Providence, how-
ever, according to the transcendently united and in-
finite energy of itself, is present to all things; and
of those beings which participate of it differently at
different times, in consequence of their possessing
an incomprehensible variety, there are certain col-
ligations, conjoining the one of Providence and the
Gods and the World, informs us, that these characters which were
placed round statues were imitations of supernal ineffable powers, os
χαρακτηρες τις αῤῥητους ανω δυναμεις μιμούνται.
δε
Iamblichus also, in a treatise gı ayaλµarwv, on Statues, which
is unfortunately lost, but is mentioned by Photius, in Biblioth.
p. 554, and which Philoponus attempted to confute, shows, "that
statues are divine, and full of divine participation. And this he
demonstrates to be the case, not only of such statues as are fashioned
by the hands of men, by an occult art, and which are denominated
diopetes, (i. e. descended from Jupiter, or from heaven,) through the
immanifestness of the art by which they were made,—for these are
of a celestial nature,-but also of such as are fashioned by artists
in common, for money."
And, in the last place, in the Asclepian Dialogue, which is at-
tributed to Hermes Trismegistus, and is only extant in a Latin
translation, ascribed to Apuleius, it is said, near the end: "Omnium
mirabilium vicit admirationem, quod homo divinam potuit invenire
naturam eamque efficere. Quoniam ergo proavi nostri multum er-
rabant, circa deorum rationem increduli, et non animadvertentes ad
cultum religionemque divinam, invenerunt artem, qua deos effice-
rent, cui inventæ adjunxerunt virtutem de mundi natura conveni-
entem, eamque miscentes. Et quoniam animas facere non poterant,
evocantes animas dæmonum, vel angelorum, eas indiderunt imagi-
nibus sanctis, divinisque mysteriis, per quas sola idola et benefaci-
endi et malefaciendi vires habere potuissent." In this extract it is
clearly asserted, that the ancient Egyptians evocated the souls of
dæmons, or angels, and inserted them in sacred images; and that it
was through these souls alone that idols possessed the power of being
beneficent or malefic. These sacred statues are likewise alluded to
in other parts of this work of Hermes,
38
multitude of these, the impassivity of the former
and the instability of the latter. Hence, as it ap-
pears to me, of these colligations, angels are more
proximate to Providence, but heroes to beings of an
unstable nature; and dæmons form the connecting
link between the two, uniting the beings which
participate of deity differently at different times,
to the perpetually-abiding hyparxis of Providence,
and multiplied natures to the one. And sometimes,
indeed, the illuminations of Providence immedi-
ately extend to the beings posterior to angels, dæ-
mons and heroes, but sometimes through these as
media. For there is a great difference between
illuminating some of the better genera, and the
transmission of illuminations through the better
genera. For the natures to whom these illumina-
tions are transmitted, scarcely participate of the be-
ings which are proximately arranged above them,
through the inferiority of their aptitude; but the
better genera, on account of the excellence of their
nature, tend upwards to the participation of supe-
rior beings, and the illuminations which they re-
ceive from these, have the relation, as it were, of
matter with reference to supernal gifts. Thus, if
some one should be able to participate of geometry
alone, but anotherb, not only of this, but also of a
sublimer theory, though not without the assistance
a The version of Morbeka has in this place, "et ro passivum il-
lius, et horum instabilitatem.' But for passivum, it is obviously
necessary to read non passivum.
The version of Morbeka has in this place aliter; for which it
is obviously necessary to read alter.
39
of geometry, through which he is led upwards, and
becomes accustomed to an incorporeal nature; the
former of these characters delighting in geometri-
cal speculations, but not having the eye of his soul
sufficiently able to perceive the objects of intellec-
tual vision, it is again evident that the perfection of
the former is derived from geometry, and that his
ascent is as far as to this; but that the transition to
the latter is through geometry, and that by means
of this he ascends to things which are prior to it.
If, therefore, the like takes place in the genera that
are more excellent than our nature, it is one thing
to be illuminated by the genera which are posterior
to the Gods, and another to be illuminated by the
Gods themselves; and the former, indeed, refers
the cause of the illumination to the attendants of
the Gods, but the latter to the presiding Gods
themselves; except that though illuminations are
transmitted by the better genera, certain splendours
are imparted after another manner in a greater de-
gree by Providence, from whom the guardian care
of the former is derived, in consequence of their
imitating its beneficent energyª according to the
order which they are assigned. And such are my
answers to this question, through which we may be
able to lead those that are well adapted to the per-
fect speculation of Providence.
5. After this, if you please, let us direct our at-
a In Morbeka felicitatem; but it appears to me, that for evdaio-
way, which I suppose Morbeka found in his copy, it is requisite to
read, conformably to the above translation, vegysıar.
40
tention to a fifth subject of inquiry, which disturbs
the imaginations of many, I mean, why, if Provi-
dence exists, evil has a place among beings? For
through this many are persuaded, either to deny
the existence of Providence, in consequence of
perceiving that evil extends to all things; or, if
they admit that Providence adorns all things, they
are induced to exclude evil, and to assert that all
things are alone good, though certain persons think
fit to call that good which is most remote from
primary natures evil, for there is not any evil,
which is not a less good. If, therefore, we also
accord with these, there is no occasion to investi-
gate any further what we proposed to consider.
For there will not be anything evil, which, as we
have said, will molest Providence. But if there is
something, which in some way or other we assert
to be evil, it is necessary to explain whence this is
derived. For it is not proper to say that it is
from Providence, from whom everything that is
good proceeds; but if it is derived from another
cause, if this ranks among the causes which origi-
nate from Providence, then again it will be re-
quisite to refer to it this cause. For the beings
which proceed from the causes that owe their
existence to Providence, proceed likewise from
Providence. If, however, they are produced with-
out Providence co-operating in their existence, we
shall make two principles, one of good, and the
other of evil, and we shall not preserve Providence
unmolested, since it will have something contrary
41
to it. Admitting, therefore, that there is such a
thing as evil, let us consider what kind of a thing
it is, without molesting the kingdom of Provi-
dence.
And in the first place, because evil is twofold,
this existing in bodies, and being preternatural,
but that in souls, and deviating from reason; and
because that which is preternatural does not sub-
sist in all bodies, nor in souls that rank as wholes,
let us direct our attention to the bodies in which,
by the will of Providence, the preternatural exists.
It is obvious, therefore, that what is preternatural,
is in corruptible bodies alone: for that which is
not susceptible of the preternatural, is perpetual,
since the preternatural is the path to non-being.
But everything which is corrupted has a place
among beings. Hence, it ranks among beings,
either on account of some other cause, or in order,
as Timæus says, that the universe may not be im-
perfect, and that primary natures may not be the
last of the whole of things. For primary natures
are eternal, and congenial to their cause. If evil
therefore exists, it exists as that which is corrupti-
ble; but this is, in order that there may not only
be that which is eternal; and this again in order
that the universe may be perfect. Hence, it is
most manifest that evil subsists on account of that
Providence which energises about the world, and
that Providence may be entirely what it is, by
causing the world to be perfect. For to this evil
the end is good; since on account of good, evil was
42
introduced among beings, as contributing some-
thing requisite to the whole of things. For all cor-
ruption is on account of the generation of an-
other thing, and everything which is preternatural
exists in order that something may be produced
which is according to, but not contrary to, nature.
Hence, that is not in every respect evil, which is
for the sake of good, nor is it unmingled with good,
but to a certain thing it is evil, viz. to that which
is corrupted, and to another thing good, viz. to
that which subsists on account of the corruption of
it. Hence, likewise, it is good to the universe, as
the cause of the corruption of one thing, and the
generation of another. For it is necessary that
there should be both generation and corruption,
and the universe requires both these, in order that
it may be truly allª, as we have frequently said.
And if, indeed, that which corrupts energises ac-
cording to nature, but that which suffers, suffers
preternaturally, perhaps this also suffers according
to nature. For being a contrary, it is natural to it
to suffer from a contrary, and thus it now becomes
manifest to us, that on account of the most excel-
lent Providence by which the universe is governed,
that which is preternatural takes place among
beings, and that it is not absolutely preternatural,
a Proclus alludes here to the following words of Plato in that
part of the Timæus in which the Demiurgus says to the junior or
mundane Gods, Ιν' ουν θνητα τε ή, το,τε παν οντως ἅπαν ᾗ, κ.τ.λ. viz.
"In order, therefore, that mortal natures may exist, and that the
universe may be truly all," &c.
4.3
but is in a greater degree conformable to than
contrary to nature; since it is natural for that
which is corruptible to be corrupted, and for that
which is capable of corrupting to corrupt. And
if they are contraries, it is requisite that the one
should be corruptible, but the other corruptive. If,
also, it is necessary that generation should always
exist, it is necessary there should be contraries:
for generation is from contraries. Hence, if gene-
ration is according to Providence, and that which
is prior to generation is likewise according to Pro-
vidence; and if, also, that which is preternatural
subsists differently from alternate generations,-if
this be the case, the preternatural is an instrument
of the cause of generations, and gives completion
to that which is natural. But let us here termi-
nate that which does not require much discussion.
Let us, therefore, pass on to the consideration of
that which is preter-rational, and evil in souls, in
order that we may understand how this likewise
subsists according to Providence. Here, there-
fore, the association of certain contraries, I mean
of the immortal and mortal soul, affords a place
for that which is preternatural. For when that
which is mortal in us predominates over that which
is divine, then the generation of evil is effected in
the soul; as, for instance, when either anger or
desire predominate, in consequence of either of
them suffering that which is conformable to its
nature; the one in wrath, but the other in concu-
piscence. For each of them suffers that which it
44
is naturally adapted to suffer; but on account of
that which is essentially divine being extraneous
to mortal passions, and the irrational nature exist-
ing in those beings in which this conjunction takes
place, the natural union of these two becomes pre-
ternatural. Hence reason, which possessed in us
the appellation of divine, is denominated preter-
rational, instead of preternatural; at the same time
both the rational and irrational part of the soul,
wishing to energise conformably to the desire of
that which is natural; the one desiring to live with
passion, but the other without passion; and the
one rationally, but the other irrationally. In the
mixture, however, of both these, and in their de-
praved habitude with reference to each other, that
which is denominated a parypostasis, or a deviation
from subsistence, takes place, which as it has not a
principal essence, it is evident that what is called.
preter-rational and not preter-irrational, is not only
evil, but is likewise not evil; for it is evil to that to
which a deviation from reason is not natural, but
not evil to that to which the preter-rational is ac-
cording to nature. For where there is not reason,
nothing of this kind is evil, as in irrational animals;
and this, not because to suffer through passion is
according to nature, but to be vanquished by rea-
son preternatural; since the latter is in a greater
degree conformable to nature, because reason is
naturally adapted to vanquish. For when of op-
posites, one is better, but the other worse; though
the latter, in energising as it is adapted to energise,
4.5
suffers that which pertains to itself, yet when sub-
servient to the former, which is better, it is trans-
ferred to that which is above its own nature; since
reason, also, energising in us as reason, impedes the
energy of that in us which is divine and better than
reason, though in so doing it operates conformably
to its nature; nevertheless, from the predominance
of what is divine, reason [being corroborated]
exists as reason in a greater degree. For every
being has both a good connascent with itself, and
a greater good derived from that which is more
excellent than itself. Thus intellect is able to
energise divinely, soul intellectually, and body self-
motively. That which is irrational therefore, and
anger and desire, are moved as such, according to
nature; and the more vehemently they are moved,
the more natural are their energies. But when
considered with reference to that part in us which
is divine, and as impeding its energy, and also as
capable of participating from it another greater
good, of which they are deprived, as long as they
wish to be moved with their own motions, which
are preter-rational, they occasion an ingress of evil
to partial souls.
If, however, these things are truly asserted, it is
necessary that those who think they do not exist
through Providence, should either blame a divine
soul for its descent into generation, or the mortal
soul which is in generation. For admitting that
both these subsist through Providence, it is entirely
necessary to refer the generation of that which is
46
preter-rational to good, in consequence of Provi-
dence distributing everything into the world ac-
cording to its desert. But, indeed, it is evident
that it is good for the human soul to descend to
the ultimate part of the world, in order that the
universe may be perfect, and that it may not only
be full of rational and immortal animals, and again,
of such as are irrational and mortal, but likewise.
of the media between these, viz. rational, and at
the same time mortal animals. For a thing of
this kind exists in the universe; since if these na-
tures were wanting, the world would be truly im-
perfect. It is likewise manifest to every one, that
in consequence of a divine soul acceding to gene-
ration, it is requisite that prior to this a mortal
soul should be present with bodies; and that the
divine soul should not dwell in these fleshly, bony,
and, in short, terrene organs. For how is it pos-
sible that body destitute of vitality, and mingled
from many things, should of itself participate of
an incorporeal and immortal soul? How also in
reality is it possible, if it were merged in material
masses, that it should not blind its own reason,
itself suffering everything which pertains to the
mortal soul; perceiving indeed the passions of the
body, which are the objects of sense; being capti-
vated by imaginative forms; desiring whatever is
adapted to the wants of the body; and wishing, by
energising according to anger, to repel whatever is
noxious to the mortal animal. For suffering all
these, it would be corrupted in as great a degree
47
as the body, and its descent would be in vain, through
not being assisted, but corrupted by its recipientsª.
For neither would it be possible to know the things
which externally corrupt, without sense which
knows particulars; nor to desire liquid and solid
aliment, without that part of the soul which is the
source of all-various appetitions; nor to pursue
what is mortal, without the remembrance of that
which is able to hurt or assist it. By how much
better, therefore, it is for that which is connected
with another thing different from itself, by which
also it is perhaps molested, to be thus connected,
sometimes only, and not always, by so much more
beneficial is it for the soul, to direct its attention
to the irrational nature, than to become itself irra-
tional. If, therefore, it is necessary that the im-
mortal soul should descend hither, that the mortal
soul also should subsist on account of it,—and the
existence of both these is conformable to the will
of Providence,-if this be the case, the preterna-
tural also must be referred to the same bound of
Providence, for the sake of that which is accord-
ing to nature. Thus too in souls, that which is
preter-rational is for the sake of that which is ac-
cording to reason, that which energises preter-
a The whole of the above which is in italics, is in the version of
Morbeka, "et frustra utique descensus esset, non jam adjutus ab
ipsis suscipientibus ipsum, sed corruptis." But as Proclus is here
speaking of the rational soul, for adjutus it is necessary to read
adjuta; for ipsum, ipsam; and for corruptis, corrupta.
In Morbeka "præter rationem;" but it is obviously necessary,
from what immediately follows, to read præter naturam.
48
rationally in us subsisting for the sake of our ra-
tional energy. But respecting this problem enough
has been said at present.
6. Consequent to this, let us direct our attention
to the sixth problem. If Providence exists,—and
Providence existing, it is necessary there should
be that which is according to desert,-how does it
happen that there is so great an inequality of human
lives in the universe?-some tyrannizing in con-
sequence of being depraved characters, but others
being in a state of servitude, though they are vir-
tuous?-and some, indeed, being prosperous, in
consequence of having a good condition of body,
living in affluence, and the like; but others, on the
contrary, being deprived of these, so that worse
circumstances fall to the lot of better men? For
everything of this kind appears to accuse Provi-
dence as not only here distributing equal things to
things unequal, which is itself irrational, but, on
the contrary, in things unequal, distributing what
is worse to the better, and what is better to the
worse; though neither can it be thought that arith-
metical media will accord in such cases, nor the
geometrical, by which a distribution of external
good or evil is made according to the desert of those
that receive it. In the first place, therefore, we
should say, that Providence distributes to every-
thing that which is adapted to it,-for this is
admitted, and bestows ends which accord with
habits. But this being the case, it is not at all
wonderful that it should give to good men what-
49
ever may increase virtue; nor that depraved men,
relinquishing the benefits with which virtue is sur
rounded, should earnestly endeavour to procure
health of body, and should be solicitous to obtain
wealth and power, which are wholly neglected by
the good. Hence, as those who direct all their
attention to apparent good, are not grieved that
they are not temperate, that they are not contem-
plators of real being, and that their soul is muti-
lated, thus, also, neither are good men afflicted
because they are not rich, or because they are de-
prived of power; but pursue virtue alone, with the
possession of which they are satisfied. For neither
are husbandmen indignant because they do not ob-
tain the same things as sailors; nor sailors, because
they do not reap; but both these, being intently
occupied in their proper ends, if they obtain these
from Providence, they are satisfied and rejoice.
We must not therefore say, that the donation of
Providence is destitute of geometrical proportion;
for it is the most harmonic of all gifts, imparting to
all things good, and to each that good which it
shows itself qualified to obtain, viz. either true or
apparent good. For this is evident, that he who
pursues virtue, always obtains the object of his desire,
and lives according to virtue; but he who desires
externals, does not always obtain that which is con-
joined to his appetition; here, also, Providence
bestowing what is adapted to habits,-to the vir-
tuous, indeed, that which is stable, and sufficient
to itself; but to those who pursue externals, that
E
50
which is dubious and full of indigence. This,
therefore, must be learnt in the first place: but
this, in the second place, that with worthy men a
deficiency of apparent good contributes to virtue;
for it accustoms them to despise the body, with-
draws them from a solicitude about appearances,
enlarges their conceptions of the magnitude of vir-
tue, discloses to them the inanity of those things
which are believed to be good by the multitude,
and exhibits to those who are able to perceive true
beauty, that good which is essentially venerable,
and admirable in the most transcendent degree.
For we do not admire the pilot's art during the
tranquillity of the sea and air, but in tempest and
storm; nor virtue in an affluence of human good,
but in those things which the violent attacks of for-
tune cannot shake.
In the third place, if we say that Providence
affords instruction to those who do not live ac-
cording to Providence in such distributions, we
shall assert that which is not very remote from the
truth. For if Providence always imparted to the
good, riches, beauty of body, and power; but to the
bad, deformity, ignominy, poverty, and everything
of this kind, it would indeed truly appear that
virtue, comprehending all things, possesses what is
honourable, and vice what is fleeting. But now,
b
a The version of Morbeka has in this place "pecunias;" but it
appears to me to be necessary to read instead of it paupertatem.
↳ Morbeka has here "exter;" but it should be, conformably to
his barbarous version, enter, i. e. in Greek, ovtas.
51
a
exhibiting virtue by itself alone, and vice with all
its abundance, it renders the former in a greater
degree admirable in a worse fortune, but shows
that the latter is to be in a greater degree avoided
in a better fortune, and excites those that are well
born to the love of virtue and the avoidance of
vice: the latter [i. e. the bad] blaming fortune on
account of itself; but the former [i. e. the good]
truly adorning every condition: and the latter not
suffering any diminution in that which is foreign to
itself, but filling it with turpitude; but the former
using every circumstance that may occur as its
proper ornament. Or will not justice blame
wealth, but health intemperance", and magnificence
of soul, power? And magnanimity, indeed, adorns
poverty, but a masculine mind sorrow, and a tran-
scendency of wisdom the privation of power. If we
assert, therefore, that these things thus distributed
are the eruditions of Providence, we shall not wan-
der from the truth. This, likewise, as it seems,
must be said by us, that man is soul, and this has
been well demonstrated; but he is soul, using the
body and the mortal form of life. And the two
latter frequently oppose the amatory energies of
the immortal soul about that which is truly good,
and require such things as may be able to prevent
a The version of Morbeka has here erroneously "injustitia," in-
stead of justitia.
Morbeka's version in this place is, "sanitatem autem intempe-
rantia ;" instead of which it is necessary to read, sanitas autem in-
temperantiam.
E 2
52
their attacks. Thus, for instance, affliction is re-
quisite, that the body may not, by its wanton im-
pulses, draw down the intellect which is in us [from
the contemplation of real being]; but poverty, that
the soul may not through wealth be filled with an in-
temperate form of life; and the privation of power,
that it may be void of ambition.
Hence many
a
worthy men have thought fit to live in insalubrious
instead of salubrious places, punishing the evil ger-
minations of corporeal desires, and choosing rather
to carry about with them a feeble instrument, than
to become unwise by using one that is robust.
But others have abandoned the riches which they
possessed, in consequence of wishing to have a soul
liberated from those passions which germinate
through wealth. And many instances may be ad-
duced of those who have acted in this way. Thus,
Plato dwelt in an insalubrious place', in order
that he might subdue the excessive impulses of
the body. But Crates abandoned his wealth, at the
same time exclaiming, Crates liberates himself from
the sordid burden of riches! And other examples
are recorded of the like kind.
If, therefore, Providence imparts to good men
such things as they themselves affect through the
a In Morbeka here for "despicere," it is necessary to read de-
sipere.
See the first book of my translation of Porphyry's treatise on
Abstinence from Animal Food, in which this is asserted, accom-
panied by many admirable observations of Porphyry, well worthy
the attention of the liberal reader.
53
love of virtue, independently of Providence, how
can any one complain of its dispensations to those
that are worthy? And how is it possible that the
donations to the wicked of wealth and power, and
the like, should not rather be called punishments
[than blessings]? For these gifts call forth into
energy their latent evil, in order that by punish-
ment they may be finally purified from itª.
Again, therefore, according to another mode of
considering the subject, we must say, that it is
the work of Providence not to comprehend in one
description of persons alone the donations of all-
various good,—as neither did Plato, when insti-
tuting the most excellent city, think it fit that one
genus only should be adorned with every good,
but that different things should be distributed to
different persons,-and that this is the province of
him who intends to make the whole city happy, and
not one part of it alone. Because, however, souls
descend into generation, it is requisite that they
should have a certain experience of those evils in
which they are here involved, by which they are
a
Synesius, in perfect conformity to what is here asserted by Pro-
clus, says, in his excellent treatise on Dreams, p. 141: "Misfor-
tunes, which are said to happen contrary to our deserts, are of the
greatest advantage in extirpating the affections by which we are
captivated with externals: and thus the doctrine of a Providence is
confirmed to the intelligent, from the very circumstances which
produce diffidence in the ignorant. For no place would be left for
the soul to take her flight from the dominion of matter, if in the
present state she lived free from the incursions of evil. Hence it is
proper to believe, that the præfects of the infernal regions have in-
vented vulgar prosperities as the snares of the soul,"
54
excited to desire a transition from hence, to that
place which is beyond the reach of every ill. To
those, therefore, who are good from themselves,
things apparently disastrous are for this purpose
sent by Providence. But as it is requisite that
bad men also should participate of good, they par-
ticipate indeed of a certain image of it; and the
punishments inflicted by divine vengeance lead
these likewise to a flight from this terrene abode.
With respect also to everything which we pos-
sess, some of these belong to us on account of
the free will of our soul, some on account of our
being passive to other things, and some on account
of the universe alone as the cause. Hence, if those
things over which we have dominion through our
own energies [terminate badly], we must accuse
ourselves. For if any one becomes diseased, or is
in poverty, through his own misconduct, the cause
of this must be referred to him, and not to Pro-
vidence. For we must not say that free will ob-
tained the power which it possesses in the universe
for the destruction, but for the salvation of its pos-
sessor. And with respect to those things which we
suffer from others, though we may unjustly suffer,
we should consider that the law of the universe
permits parts to act on each other according to
their own impulse: for such are all things which
conspire in union; these, indeed, naturally acting
and suffering, but those electively. Retribution ª,
a In Morbeka "vindicta ;" but the original was, I have no doubt,
avranodoσış, retribution.
55
however, follows both those that act well, and those
that act ill. That also which suffers, suffers ac-
cording to its desert, and what it does is not neg-
lected by the law [of the universe]. For as it is
said of beings which energise immaterially, that
they produce what is contingent in an uncontin-
gent manner, and that they do not suffer from
what is contingent; thus, also, in those beings that
energise electively, it does not appear that every-
thing suffers from everything indiscriminately, but
that only which has an opportune arrangement in
the universe for this purpose. Nor does the self-
motive agent relinquish its proper motion, though
it may become the instrument of the universe: for
the quality of the impulse leads that which acts to
retribution; since it was not an inanimate instru-
ment, but an instrument co-adapting itself to that
which uses it. The cause, however, of those things
which we suffer from the universe, whether they
are better or worse, must be ascribed to our desert ;
and this must either be referred to the present life,
-as if we should require, for instance, a certain
bridle, as it were, (since many on account of cir-
cumstances become better,)—or it must be referred
to a former life; since if those that suffer, were
not worthy from the first, purification is requisite
prior to the possession of virtue, or it must be
referred to a future life, Providence withdrawing
us from human concerns, in order that, by consi-
dering virtue alone to be the perfection of our na-
ture, we may establish the love of it in ourselves,
56
and be persuaded that nothing else is our proper
good.
Further still, if some one after the same manner
should inquire, why equal things are imparted by
Providence to things unequal, according to arith-
metical equality, (for this remains to be considered,)
-as for instance, when whole cities perish, and one
destruction ensues both of the good and bad, and
a similar circumstance, as it appears, takes place
with respect to those who are dissimilar in their
habits,-in answer to this inquiry, therefore, it
may I think be said, in the first place, that they do
not suffer what is similar so far as they are dissi-
milar, but so far as they are similar; being willing,
perhaps, to inhabit the same city, to enter the same
ship, to engage with others in the same battles, or
act in conjunction with them in anything else, and,
by thus acting, suffer with them the same calamity.
Hence, so far as some of them are better, and others
worse, they bear the common calamity differently;
the latter, indeed, impatiently, but the former mild-
ly, though they perish. And after a separation from
the present life, the abode of more excellent souls
receives the former, but of depraved souls the lat-
ter. In the second place, it may be said, that of
such co-ordinations of those that are at the same
time saved, or at the same time perish, there is an
order by which they are similarly collected together
in the universe, and a common period of fate, pro-
ceeding from different principles to the same end.
There is likewise a concurrence of progressions,
57
which are either preservative or destructive of all;
and it is requisite that of parts, in consequence of
their following wholes, these should effect and suf-
fer something in conjunction with certain things,
but those with other things of a different nature;
since with us, also, the heart is sometimes so dis-
posed that a certain part is copassive, but many
parts at another time. In this universe, likewise,
with respect to the less principal parts, these suffer
peculiarly, but those in common from the more
principal parts; and some suffer nothing from those
things from which others suffer. It is not won-
derful, therefore, that the motions of one of these
should be conformable to Providence, but those of
the other should be from necessity, in consequence
of being subdued by passions.
It may also be added, in answer to those who
accuse Providence of distributing equality in things
unequal, that they are ignorant of the different equa-
lity of souls, which originates from many causes.
For of souls which proceed from the same divinity,
as, for instance, the sun or the moon, there is an
assimilation of the former to the latter in different
conditions of life, and in former periods there was
a conformity in their energies. Nor is it at all won-
derful that they should suffer the same thing, since
this is nothing more than a retribution of actions
which proceeded in common from common pas-
sions; and by how much the more amply they
corresponded with each other in different circum-
stances, by so much the greater is the similitude of
58
the incidental events which befall them. But in
answer to those who accuse Providence on account
of the inequality which takes place in the external
circumstances of the good and the bad, we ask
whether laudable renown, which is alone bestowed
on the good, is not to be preferred to corporeal
delight, to riches, and bodily health? For all bad
men are inglorious and without honour, though
they may be surrounded by myriads of flatter-
ers; since those who extolled them when living,
scorn them when dead. But those who despised
good men when they were alive, admire them in a
transcendent degree when they are dead. If, there-
fore, better men partake of the greatest of external
goods [i. e. honour], how can it be any longer said,
that Providence does not impart that which is ac-
cording to desert, bestowing on those who desire
nothing else, such things as extend only to the
present life, but conferring on others those bene-
fits which are capable of being transmitted to a
future and more excellent life? For the former
live according to the mortal, but the latter accord-
ing to the immortal part of the soul. Hence,
whatever is of a more mortal nature, is adapted to
those who prefer that which is mortal in things
within and external to them; but such as are more
immortal, are adapted to those who prefera that
which is immortal. And thus distribution accord-
ing to desert is preserved in each, through the
a
For "angentibus," in this place, in Morbeka's version, I read
anleponentibus.
59
similitude of the gifts to the life of the recipients.
But if to him who possesses virtue, that which is
propitious is always present, and this is imparted
by the Gods themselves; but the whole life of the
depraved man is full of inquietude and perturba-
tion, of brutal delights, ferocity, and the envenomed
bitterness of guilt; and if he finds no rest from
these evils, which are to him inexplicable, is it
not perfectly evident that Providence proclaims
the former character to be deserving of things of a
more excellent nature; but that the latter, by sub-
jugating himself to the dominion of his passions,
connumerates himself with beings inferior to the
nature of man?
7. Relinquishing, therefore, any further consi-
deration of this subject, let us pass on to those
questions, which are wont to be continually agi-
tated, respecting brutes, and let us direct our at-
tention to this seventh problem, Providence also
proceeding to irrational, as well as to rational ani-
mals. What equality, therefore, is there in brutes,
since some of them are well disposed, but others
not; some of them possess an ill, but others a good
habit of body; and according to other such like
differences they are separated from each other?
Again, therefore, what equality can there be in
them, since they are thus dissimilar? For of these
also, as well as of men, we see that there are certain
common corruptions; and it is requisite in these
to contemplate the cause of the events, being per-
suaded that Providence extends even to the last of
60
things; and likewise to consider what reason can
be assigned for their ultimate devoration. For
these are the three particulars which occasion men
to doubt respecting the administration of Provi-
dence, viz. the inequality in what happens to brutes,
the common corruptions of these, and their devo-
ration of each other, of which it is now requisite
to say something; and to discuss this in the first
place as follows: Either there is some vestige of a
self-motive life in brutes, and which is separable
from body, or there is none; and every species of
soul which is in them is extinguished together with
the body, and is assimilated to [corporeal] quali-
ties, and to innate heat. But this division being
made, we shall abound with arguments, by which
we may be able to show that there is a Providential
dispensation in these.
If, therefore, as we have said, there is some ves-
tige of a self-motive life in them, and a brute can do
something worse and something better from itself,-
such as we say is the case with the self-motive nature,
whether according to opinion, or according to truth,
—if this be admitted, then we must refer to Provi-
dence their good domestication, their devoration of
each other, and their common corruption, just as we
refer to Providence what happens to men from the
management of their passions, and the co-ordina-
tion which they are allotted, either according to a
similitude of life, or according to mundane periods,
or according to both these. But if brutes are only
corporeal, it is of no consequence if they suffer the
61
same thing as a shadow all-variously transformed,
and are subject to the dominion of Fate*.
8. After this, let us consider, in the eighth place,
a doubt which is very widely diffused, and occa-
sions many to oppose the existence of Providence,
viz. why punishments do not immediately follow the
commission of crimes, but this happens some time
after, or even after a great lapse of time? For
offenders will be corrected in a much greater de-
gree when they are immediately punished, than if
the punishment is deferred for so long a time that
they forget for what they are punished. And, in-
deed, they are excited to murmur at Providence, in
consequence of feeling the punishment, but forget-
ting the offence which they had committed; in the
same manner as he is affected who suffers for the
crimes of others a long time after they have been
committed. In answer to this we may say, that
the implanted root of wickedness causes the same
energies to take place in consequence of continuing
inflexible by punishment, just as the earth bearing
thorns, though the germs are a thousand times
cut off, still produces the like. Providence, there-
fore, waits for an appropriate time, not such as
may be pleasing to the vulgar, but such as it knows
will contribute to the health of souls, and will in-
a Morbeka's version of the remaining part of this seventh ques-
tion is, unfortunately, so barbarous, that I found it impossible to
translate it.
b Here, too, in the remaining part of this eighth question, the
version of Morbeka is so barbarous, that I have been obliged to
epitomise it.
62
struct many by endurance. For, together with the
Gods, says Plato, Fortune and Time govern all
things, whether it be requisite that some good
should be imparted, or that there should be a pu-
rification from something contrary to good. The
cure of souls, indeed, which is called dixŋ (or jus-
tice), is more artificial than all external medicinal
arts. For the cure of the soul may be said to be a
divine thing, the evil which is in it being more
various than that which is in bodies. In the next
place, vice is a punishment to itself, and the most
grievous injury the soul can sustain. Precipitate
anger, also, is not a good dispensator of punish-
ments. Plato once, being about to chastise a slave,
was seen holding his hand in an elevated position
for some time, and being asked why he did so, said
that he was punishing his own impetuous anger.
Archytas said to his servants in a field, who had
not done what he had ordered them to do, and
expected to be punished for their negligence,
66 It
is well for you that I am angry." And Theano a
said to one of her servants, "If I were not angry I
would chastise you." Among the Egyptians there.
was a law, that a pregnant woman, who was judged
worthy of death, should not be put to death till she
was delivered. Is it, therefore, wonderful that
Providence should for a time spare those who are
deserving of death, but are able to perform not
a The wife of Pythagoras.
b See Plutarch, De sera Numinis vindicta, in which treatise he
says the same thing.
63
trifling, but illustrious actions, till they have ac-
complished them? If Themistocles had been im-
mediately punished for what he did when he was
a young man, who would have delivered Athens
from the Persian evilsa? Who, also, would have
explained the Pythian oracle? If Dionysius had
perished in the beginning of his tyranny, who would
have freed Sicily, which was thought to be irreme-
diably lost, from the Chalcedonians? If the pu-
nishment of Periander had not been deferred for a
long time, who would have freed the pleasant island
of Leucadia,—who would have liberated Anaxo-
rium from its adversaries? To which may be added,
that the time of deferred punishment seems long to
our feeble vision, but is nothing to the eye of Pro-
vidence, just as the place, also, in which we live,
and carry about these bodies, is perfectly small for
the punishment of great offences; but there are
many and indescribable places of punishment in
the infernal regions, and excessive torments for
the offenders that are there. On account of the
magnitude of the punishments, likewise, the whole
of them are not inflicted at once. Souls, also, are
naturally adapted to feel remorse, which is the fore-
runner of their greater sufferings. For they say,
that Apollodorus the tyrant saw himself in a dream
scourged and boiled by certain persons, and his
heart exclaiming from the kettle, "I am the cause
of these thy torments!" But Ptolemy, who was
a See the before-mentioned treatise of Plutarch, in this and the
following historical instances.
64
surnamed Thunder, thought in a dream that he
was called to judgement by Seleucus, and that vul-
tures and wolves sat there as his judges. Such are
the preludes to the vicious of impending punish-
ment.
9. After this, let us consider how the crimes of
other persons, as, for instance, of parents or an-
cestors, are punished in their posterity. For that
certain persons are said to have suffered punish-
ment for the crimes of their ancestors, both reve-
lations and the mysteries manifest, and certain
liberating Gods are said to purify from them. In
answer to this it may be said, in the first place,
that every city and every genus is one animal, in
a much greater degree than every man, and is more
immortal and sacreda. For one tutelar deity pre-
sides over a city as over one animal, and likewise
over the whole of one race; and there is one com-
mon period to a city, and also to a generation,
comprehending in one boundary the life and death
of each, as if one nature pervaded through the
whole city, and every individual that it contains.
And hence, one common nature extending through
a whole city, and a whole race, makes each to be
one. If, therefore, as we have shown, every city,
and each genus of men, is a certain one, why is it
wonderful that the crimes of progenitors should be
"See Plutarch in the before-mentioned treatise.
› Morbeka's version of the concluding part of this sentence is,
"et generis equidem secundum eadem concludens utriusque vitam et
mores. But for "mores” I read mortes, or mortem.
97
65
punished in their posterity? And the life of cities
being one, has a retribution in after-times for the
better or worse deeds which it performed in prior
times. For Providence not only rewards or pu-
nishes each of us for what we have done at another
time, but considers a city as one, and a race as
one; the first agents also not being neglected. For
Providence existing, it is not lawful that anything
should be neglected. There is also a co-passivity
of posterity with their ancestors; for the former
have a reference to the latter as to a summit or
leading monad, being generated from, and having a
common life and nature together with them; and
hence, on account of them, they are deservedly
honoured or punished. I do not, however, con-
ceive it to be at all wonderful, if all being parts of
one, and some things being co-adapted to others,
not those that are near, but those that are remote,
should be allotted circumstances similar to those of
their ancestors. For neither is there the same si-
militude of all the parts to all; but of these it is
greater, and of those less. Nor is there the same
proportion; for there is a greater colligation of
these, but less of those; and this, not because that
which is near has more similitude, but that which
is more remote less². For nothing hinders us from
admitting, that things which are more remote may
a The latter part of this sentence is both defective and erroneous
in Morbeka. For instead of, "et hæc quidem non, eo quod prope
habet ro magis aut ro majus, I conceive it necessary to read, et hæc
quidem, non eo quod prope habet ro magis, aut quod remotius ro
minus.
F
66
be more assimilated than such as are more near.
And this, also, is manifest from medical operations.
For when the loins are diseased, physicians caute-
rize, not the parts which are near, but those which
are opposite to the loins; and when the liver is im-
posthumated, they scarify the epigastrium. When,
likewise, the hoofs of oxen are extremely tender,
they anoint the tips of the horns, and not the parts
which are proximate to the hoofs 2. For the effect
produced in them is not through the parts which
are near, but through those which from co-passivity
are in want of sanation. All the first delinquents,
therefore, suffer punishment for their crimes; and
through these, something occultly passes to their
co-passive posterity. Nor do these suffer unjustly,
but from a similitude of life similar things are al-
lotted to them by Providence. If, also, it be re-
quisite to speak of the transmigrations of souls, and
their transitions into different lives, it must be ad-
mitted by those who believe in this doctrine, that
souls are rewarded or punished in a posterior, for
what they have done in a former life. Besides, in
a This, and the preceding sentence, are taken from the treatise of
Plutarch, Περι των ύπο του θείου βραδέως τιμωρουμένων, i. e. Concerning
those who are slowly punished by Divinity. And the whole passage in
the original is as follows: Καθολου δ' ειπον ώσπερ εν ιατρική το χρησιμον
και δικαιον εστι, και γελοιος ὁ φασκων αδικον είναι των ισχίον πονούντων και
ειν τον αντίχειρα, και του ήπατος ὑπουλου γεγονότος, αμύσσειν το επιγειο
στριον, και των βοων αν εις τας χηλας μαλακιωσι προσαλείφειν τα ακρα
των κεράτων, κ.τ.λ. But for τον αντιχειρα, in this extract, I read τα
avrincipiva, the opposite parts. Morbeka, also, has in his version,
“angis enim ægrotantibus, non quæ prope, sed quæ ex opposito adu-
runt."
67
human life, the whole period of a race is analogous
to a drama, different souls being frequently in-
troduced in it, and often the same souls, in order
to give completion to the inevitable sceneª; just as
there the same players sometimes speak in the cha-
racter of Tiresias, and sometimes in that of Edipus.
Providence, however, punishes or rewards souls
according to their desert, and, through a similitude
of life, punishes some on account of others, as if
cutting off a certain malignant root of a plant,
which it could easily antecedently perceive. For a
sting is congenial to scorpions, and venom to vipers.
But there is a power in the universe which knows
this prior to the percussion. After the same man-
ner, therefore, Providence, perceiving in souls ini-
quity congenial to that of their ancestors, punishes
them for it, though they may not have committed
the same crimes; previously destroying the similar
evil in those who possess it, like a malady growing
to an epilepsy. For as the excrescences of the
extremities, blackness, and marks of fathers which
do not appear in their immediate offspring, reger-
minate in their grandchildren, thus, also, the pecu-
liarities of manners burst forth in more distant
progeny, which are indeed unknown to others: but
by the one of Providence, which knows all things,
it must be granted that they are known by an
antecedent knowledge. The similitude, however,
becomes evident through this, that it is seen to
a
ª Morbeka has here "funem;" but the original was, doubtless,
conformably to the above translation, “x””.
F 2
68
extend to them punishments correspondent to the
crimes which their ancestors committed. But I
well know that I have elsewhere discussed these
particulars.
10. I shall, therefore, put an end to these doubts,
by adding as a colophon, as it is said, a tenth
inquiry. For Providence, by this its much cele-
brated unity, knowing and reducing all things to
good, how are angels and dæmons said to energise
providentially; and, if you are willing, heroes like-
wise and souls, governing the world in conjunction
with them and the Gods? For it is requisite that we
should define what the nature is of their providen-
tial energy, since it is not, like that of the Gods,
characterized by the one, if we admit that a dæmon,
an angel, a soul, and a hero, are not the same with
deity. For the hyparxis of every God, as I have
before said, subsists according to the one; and this
one is prior to intellect, and is the same with the
good, from which also it proceeds. But unities or
goodnesses are twofold, which the good itself pro-
duces, being the cause of both, and being one in a
more transcendent degree. And of these unities,
some indeed are self-perfect, but others are distri-
buted in their participants. For the one and the
good have a triple subsistence; viz. either accord-
ing to cause, as, for instance, the first good; since
this is from itself the cause of every good, and of
all unities; or according to hyparxis, for thus every
God is one and good;—or according to participa-
tion, as, for instance, the one and the good which
69
subsists in beings, on account of which every es-
sence is united, and every God is boniform, though
he is a unity. The unity, however, of self-perfect
natures does not belong to anything else, but per-
tains to itself only. But every intellect, and every
soul, participates of a certain one.
For the one
which soul, and also the one which intellect parti-
cipates, possess a transcendency of union. Thus,
likewise, one all-perfect intellect is the cause of all
intellects. But of the intellects which proceed from
it, some are self-perfect, each being partially that
which the all-perfect intellect is totally; one pos-
sessing the partial according to a certain thing, but
another according to something else; and this ex-
isting in the moon, but that in the sun. This, also,
being distributed into some other of the forms con-
tained in all-perfect intellect, but that being an
illumination from these intellects in intellectual
souls; on which account, also, these souls are said
to be intellectual according to participation, and
tend upward to the first intellect. And all souls,
indeed, have the self-motive nature in common;
but those which participate of intellect, universally
possess intelligence. If, therefore, we direct our
attention to the first soul, and the twofold souls that
proceed from it, we shall perceive that some of
them are essential and separable from bodies, but
others are illuminations in bodies, derived from
a In Morbeka's version, "unialis est ;" but this in the Greek was
doubtless vialov 1071, and valos signifies rns sywosws ixsgboàn, a tran-
scendency of union.
70
essential souls. For that which is animated, is so
through the participation of a certain soul, which
some one calls (EVTEλEXEIα) entelecheia, and which
may be denominated an animated bond.
Hence, there is a number proceeding from each
of the principal hypostases, viz. from soul, intel-
lect, and the good. But this number is twofold, the
one consisting of self-perfect essences, but the other
of illuminations proceeding from these self-per-
fect beings into subordinate natures. Hence, too,
though angels and dæmons are neither Gods nor
unities simply, and the like is true of heroes, of
souls superior to ours, and also of ours,-yet they
participate of certain unities, and are profoundly
united. And the first of these illuminations are
those which are suspended from the Gods them-
selves; the second in order are suspended from the
first; the third from the second; and the fourth,
which is our order, is suspended from illumina-
tions which rank as the third. For in us, also,
there is inherent a certain occult vestige of the one,
which is more divine than our intellect, and in
which the soul, perfecting and establishing herself,
becomes divine, and lives, as far as it is possible
for this to be accomplished by her, a divine life.
All the Gods, therefore, energise providentially.
a For a demonstration of what is here said by Proclus about in-
tellects and souls, see my translation of his Theological Elements.
It is so called by Aristotle in his Treatise on the Soul, to my
translation of which I refer the reader.
C
* See Proposition 64 of my translation of Proclus's Theological
Elements.
71
But angels, dæmons and heroes, in consequence
of possessing a certain seed, as it were, of the one,
exert a providential energy, not so far as they are
vital or intelligent,—for it is the province of soul
to move, and of intellect to know, and the former
characteristic property exists in all souls, and the
latter in all intellects, but they energise providen-
tially through the one which they contain. For
according to that through which they imitate the
Gods, they provide for all things. But if all the
Gods primarily exert a providential energy, because
they are primarily good, but souls after these, when
they are established in unity, energise divinely, and
provide for other things without habitude together
with the Gods, and the genera which transcend
our nature,—if this be the case, the providential
energies of souls do not consist in reasonings con-
jectural of futurity, like those of human political
characters, but in illuminations in the one of the
soul derived from the Gods. Hence, being sur-
rounded with the transcendently united splendour
of deity, they see that which is in time untempo-
rally, that which is divisible indivisibly, and every-
thing which is in place unlocally; and they ener-
gise not from themselves, but from the powers by
which they are illuminated. And souls, indeed, are
sometimes affected in this manner, but the above-
mentioned energy is always present with angels,
dæmons and heroes. On this account, likewise,
a In Morbeka's version in this place, for "mirantur,” it is neces-
sary to read imitantur.
72
they providentially attend to subordinate natures
in a more excellent manner than if they energised
according to ratiocination, not in a way similar to
their productions, but perceiving all things accord-
ing to the one and causally, without any diminution
of providential energy. These powers, therefore,
differ, as we have said, from souls, by always at-
tending to the objects of their care; but they differ
from the Gods, of whom they are the attendants,
by not energising providentially according to the
whole of themselves, but according to their most
divine part, by which they are conjoined with the
Gods themselves. For of the Gods, each is a unity;
but of these, each possesses through participation
a transcendency of union. Hence, each having
something else besides unity, imitates through
unity the divinity prior to itself, and from which
it is suspended; but by something else, it lives
according to another energy. And the summit of
the essence of each is according to the one; but
being subsists in each according to that which is
not one [but united]. This, however, being known,
other particulars which have been mentioned con-
cerning Providence may be adapted to dæmons
and heroes in a secondary degree, except that in
these also, in the same manner as in the Divinities,
unity has in some of them a more total, but in
others a more partial power. The ineffable prin-
ciple of things, however, as it is more excellent
than every power, so likewise it transcends Provi-
dence. But if some one should dare to assert, that
73
it providentially attends to all things, it must be
said that this is in no other way than as desirable
to all things, and as that for the sake of which all
things subsist, and as the cause of Providence. For
the providential energies of the Gods, and of all
the beings posterior to the Gods, are on account of
good; and this both things themselves manifest,
and also Plato, as we have said in the beginning
of this discussion,
74
ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL.
WHAT the nature of evil is, and whence it derives
its generation, some of those who preceded us have
investigated, and engaged in the theory of it not
superfluously, nor for the sake of something else;
but have considered whether evil itself, surveyed
by itself, is, or is not; and if it is, what kind of a
thing it is, and whence it proceeds into existence
and hypostasis. But it will not be amiss that we
also, since we have leisure, should briefly narrate
what each of these has said rightly, and prior to
these, what have been the speculations of the di-
vine Plato concerning the essence of evil. For by
understanding what has been asserted by these
men, we shall always more easily and more nearly
comprehend the subjects of investigation, and shall,
as it were, enkindle a light in ourselves from these
inquiries.
1. In the first place, therefore, it must be con-
sidered whether evil is, or is not. And if it is,
whether it is in intellectual natures or not? And
if it is in sensibles, whether it subsists according
to a principal cause, or not? And if not, whether
some kind of essence must be given to it, or its
existence must be considered to be wholly unsub-
stantial? And if it be admitted that it has some
75
kind of essence, how does it subsist, there being
another principle [contrary to it]? And, further
still, how Providence existing, evil exists, and
whence it is derived? In short, all such parti-
culars must be considered as we are accustomed
in our Commentaries to investigate.
The beginning, therefore, according to nature, of
the speculation of these things will be, whether evil
ranks among beings or not? But after what man-
ner is it possible for that to exist, which is entirely
destitute of the principle of beings? For neither
is it possible for darkness [so far as it is darkness]
to participate of light, nor vice of virtue, nor evil
of good. As, therefore, if light was the first cause,
there would be no darkness in secondary natures,
as the generation of it would not be from chance,
nor from anything else than the principle of things;
so, because good is the cause of all things, it is re-
quisite that evil should have no subsistence among
beings. For if it is from goodness itself, how can
the gooda be any longer the cause of all good, when
it also produces the nature of evil? But if it does
not derive its subsistence from the good, the good
will not extend itself to all things, and will not be
the principle of all beings, since evil having an ar-
rangement among beings, will escape the progres-
sion which is from the good. In short, if every-
thing which has an essential subsistence, of what-
ever kind it may be, derives this subsistence from
a For "et ayatwy" here in Morbeka's version, it is necessary to
read τ' αγαθον.
76
being; but that which participates of being, neces-
sarily likewise participates of the one; since at the
same time that a thing has being, it is one; for the
one is prior to being: and if it neither was nor
will be lawful for eternal natures a to produce what
they produce in any other way than in conjunc-
tion with the principles superior to themselves,-
intellect indeed with life, but life with being, and
all things with the one,—if this be the case, it is
again requisite that evil should suffer one of two
things. *For it is necessary either that it should
not at all participate of being, or that, deriving its
existence in some way or other from being, it
should at the same time participate of that cause
which is beyond being. And again, as consequent,
and, as it were, successive to these things, it is ne-
cessary, either that there should be no principle of
things, or that evil should have no existence, or
that it should not have been generated as evil.
For that which is deprived of being is non-being,
and that which proceeds from the first cause is not
evil. But in either way it is necessary to assert
that evil has not anywhere an existence. And if,
as we have said, the good is above being, and is the
fountain of beings, because all beings and gene-
rated natures, of whatever kind they may be, desire
a For seculis in this place, in Morbeka's version, the original was
doubtless τοις αιωνίοις.
See my translation of Proclus's Theological Elements for a
demonstration of what is here asserted.
с
The punctuation of the part between the asterisks, is in Mor-
beka's version obviously very erroneous.
77
good, how can evil rank among beings? For it
will be excluded from such an appetition of good.
If, however, it should be said that it is requisite
evil should exist, because it is necessary there
should be something subcontrary to good, yet
being subcontrary, how can it desire a nature con-
trary to its own? But it is impossible for that
which does not desire good to rank among beings.
For on account of this desire all beings are pro-
duced and exist, and from this derive their salva-
tion. If, therefore, evil is contrary to good, evil
is not one among the number of beings. And
what occasion is there to be prolix. For if the one,
which we also denominate the nature of the good,
is beyond being, evil is beyond non-existence".
But I mean non-existence or non-being simply
considered; for the good is better than that which
is simply being.
One of two things, therefore, must follow, if non-
being is that which is in no respect being, much
more is evil without existence, which is more debile
and less permanent than perfect non-entity. For
a This sentence in Morbeka's version is, " Quare si malum con-
trarium bono, malum non est æternum." But the word æternum
is here obviously irrelevant. Instead of it, therefore, I substitute
unum entium.
b In the version of Morbeka, "ultra ipsum esse malum"; but it
is necessary to read, ultra ipsum non esse malum. For as the good
through its transcendency is beyond being, the processions from it
extend beyond those of being. But non-being is that in which
the progressions of being terminate, and that which is non-good
bounds the progressions of the good. Hence evil is something more
debile than non-entity.
78
evil is much more distant from good than non-
being. Hence that which is in no respect being,
has a subsistence rather than that which is called
evil. And consequently evil is much more deprived
of existence, than that which is in every respect
non-entity. But if the Demiurgus, as Plato says
[in the Timæus], not only produced the nature of
good, but was also willing that there should be no-
where anything evil, by what contrivance is it
possible evil can subsist contrary to the will of the
fabricator of all things? For it is not lawful for
him to will some things, and produce others [con-
trary to his will]; since will and productive energy
are simultaneous in divine essences. Hence, evil
is not only contrary to the will of the Demiurgus,
but is likewise unhypostatic; not because he did
not produce it, (for it is not lawful to conceive that
he did,) but because he was willing, in short, that
it should not exist. What, therefore, can cause evil
to have an existence, after the father of all things
has brought it to a perfectly non-existent state?
For what is there contrary to him, and whence
does it derive its being? For that which is malefic
is not from divinity, (since it is not lawful to admit
that it is,) and it would be absurd to suppose that
it is derived from anything else. For everything
which the world contains proceeds from the father
of it, either immediately-and these are self-subsis-
tent natures-or mediately, through the energies of
other superior powers.
And such is the reasoning which exterminates
79
evil from existence; and such are the arguments
which may with probability be adduced. But he
who asserts the contrary to this will require us to
look to the hypostasis of things, and to direct our
attention to intemperance and injustice, and what-
ever else we are accustomed to call the evil of the
soul. He will also ask us whether we call each of
these good, or each of them evil. For if we admit
that each of these is good, we must necessarily say
one of two things, either that virtue is not contrary
to vice, the whole to the whole, and the parts like-
wise analogously, or that what opposes good is not
always evil. But what can be more contrary to
common sense than each of these, or less congruous
to the nature of things? For the virtues oppose
the vices, and the manner in which this opposition
subsists is evident from the hostile conduct of men
towards each other, viz. of the unjust towards the
just, and of the intemperate towards the temperate;
and also from the dissension which is in souls
themselves; as when in the incontinent man reason
draws one way, but passion compels another way,
and both acting in contrary directions, the better
is vanquished by the worse. For what else is this,
than the dissension of the temperate with the in-
temperate manners of the soul? And does not
something else of the like kind take place in the
opposition between reason and the irascible part?
And is it not so in other evils, in which we perceive
a
a In the version of Morbeka, " ducit quidem ratio aliò, cogat au-
tem passio;" but after passio, it is necessary to add aliò.
80
discord in the soul? For, in short, the apparent
contrarieties of evil to good, by a much greater
priority occultly subsist in souls themselves; and
this disease of the soul then takes place, when our
more excellent part, and its inherent forms which
participate of good, are subdued by passions which
are terrene and vile. The recalling these things,
therefore, to our memory through many arguments
cannot be considered as very foreign to the pur-
pose.
If, however, as we have said, the vices are con-
trary to the virtues, but evil is entirely contrary to
good,-for the nature of good is not adapted to be
discordant with itself, but as being the offspring of
one cause and one unity, through similitude and
friendship and unity, it adheres to it, and if beings
which possess a greater portion of good are the
saviours of such as possess a less degree of it, and
the latter are adorned by the former as being more
perfect,—if this be the case, it is necessary that
the vices should not only be evil in definition, but
that each of them should be really evil, and not a
less good. For nowhere is a less contrary to a
greater good, as neither is what is less to what is
more hot, nor what is less to what is more cold.
But if the vices of the soul must be confessed to
be of the nature of evil, it will be shown that evil
effects something among beings; and the effective
power of evil is likewise evident from this, that it
is corruptive of everything. For that evil is this,
is demonstrated by Socrates in the Republic, who
81
But
very properly says, that the good of everything is
that which is preservative of everything, on which
account all things desire good; for existence and
salvation to all things are thence derived; just as
non-existence and corruption are on account of the
nature of evil. Is it necessary, therefore, that
nothing should be corruptive of anything?"
thus the progress of generation would be stopped.
For things of a corruptive nature not existing,
neither is it possible that there should be corrup-
tion; and corruption not existing, neither will there
be generation, because all generation is effected
through the corruption of another thing. Gene-
ration likewise not existing, the whole world will
at the same time be imperfect; for it will not con-
tain in itself the mortal genera of animals. It is,
however, requisite that it should, in order (says
Timæus) that it may be sufficiently perfect. If,
therefore, it is requisite, [as Plato says in the
Timæus,] that the world should be a blessed God,
it is also requisite that its similitude to all-perfect
animal should be perfectly preserved. And if
this is necessary, it is requisite that mortal genera
should give completion to the universe; but if this,
then there must be generation and corruption; and
if this also be admitted, different things must be
C
* This sentence is not interrogative in Morbeka, but doubtless
ought to be.
C
bi. e. the Timæus of Plato.
* The paradigm of the universe is called by Plato, in the Timæus,
all-perfect animal. See my translation of the Commentaries of
Proclus on that Dialogue.
G
82
generative and corruptive of different things. For
generation and corruption are not from the same.
things to all things. But the natures which are
allotted generation being corruptive, are so from
an innate power, and this is their evil. For the
evil of that which is generated, is a corruptive prin-
ciple, primarily and essentially inherent in it. For,
indeed, one thing is corruptive of the soul, but
another of the body. That also which is corrupted
is different from that which corrupts; and there is
not the same mode of corruption; but in one thing
it is essential, and in another vital; and in this
thing essentially leading to corruption; but in that
vitally, in consequence of the life of it flying from
being to non-entity. The same reasoning, there-
fore, will preserve for us the whole world perfect,
and will give a place to evil among beings. Hence,
not only will evil exist on account of good, but it
will also be good for it to exist. This, therefore,
which is most paradoxical, will again become more
known.
If, however, it be requisite not only to acquiesce
in the above reasonings, but to pursue the object
of inquiry in another way, let us unfold it in the
following manner. Every good which receives the
difference of the more and the less, according to
the more has a greater degree of perfection, and is
constituted nearer to the fountain of its existence.
a In Morbeka, "et hujus quidem substantiâ ut esse et corruptionem
ducente." But for ut I conceive it to be necessary to read et, and
for ct, after esse, to read ad, conformably to the above translation,
83
Again, according to the less becoming debilitated
and more imperfect, it recedes to the less excellent
part of its unity. For with respect to the equal,
also, that which approximates to it in a superlative
degree, will be most allied, and, as it were, conse-
quent to it; but that which is equal in a compara-
tive degree, will have the second order after this;
and that which is equal in a positive degree only,
will possess the ultimate order [in the approxima-
tions to equality]. And the same reasoning will
take place with respect to the hot and the cold, the
beautiful, the great and the small. Must we not,
therefore, also admit that injustice and intemper-
ance have the more and the less; or must we assert
that all men are equally intemperate and unjust?
By no means must we admit the latter. But with
respect to the more and the less, must we not say,
that what is less unjust is less distant from the na-
ture of good? And again, with respect to that
which is more unjust, must we not say, that by how
much the greater its possession is of injustice, by
so much the more it is destitute of good? This,
indeed, must be necessarily admitted. Of every
good, however, whether it be less or whether it be
greater, it must be granted, that when augmented
it becomes nearer to the first good, and that what
is perfectly good, is the same with that which is
good in the most transcendent degree. Hence it
is not proper to call either a greater or a less in-
justice good, but each of these must be denominated
entirely evil. For that, indeed, which is a less good,
G 2
84
becomes by increase good in a greater degree; but
that which is unjust, when it increases does not
become a greater good. Subsisting, therefore, in
a way contrary to good, how is it possible it should
not rank among evils? Hence reason confidently
asserts these things of the hypostasis of evil, which
is also corroborated by the testimony of Plato, who
not only enunciatively, but also demonstratively,
appears to have introduced the nature of evil into
beings. For Socrates, in the Theætetus, strenuously
asserts that it is not possible for evils to perish; and
again says, that the existence of them is not super-
fluous, and, as it were, casual; for they are neces-
sary, and are good. But if it is good for evil to
be, evil exists as Socrates says; and thus indeed
by its transition into existence, it has good for its
principle.
What cause, therefore, shall we assign of the ne-
cessary existence of evil, and that contrariety of it
to good, according to Socrates? For there are, as
we have elsewhere observed, both all forms, and
that which is beyond forms. But divine forms are
not adapted to generate immediately after them-
selves that which participates of essence casually;
nor do they extend their energy as far only as to
those beings which, without transition, are always
able to enjoy them with invariable sameness; but
on account of exuberant power, and transcendent
goodness, they produce orders which proximately
participate of themselves, and subsist uniformly,
without being mingled with privation. They like-
85
wise produce by their energies the last hypostases,
which are incapable of remaining immaculate and
intransmutable. For these cannot participate of
those beings which are inseparable from wholes,
and exempt from all the natures which subsist in
others; and they rank among participants alone.
Nor is it proper that those beings alone should
exist, which always receive the impressions of di-
vine forms, and that the last of things should not
be produced, which sometimes only participate of
these forms. For in this case, all excellent beings
would have an ultimate rank, and things which
have an eternal subsistence would have a material
order. Hence they would be sterile and debile,
and would have all the properties which we are
accustomed to ascribe to generable and corruptible
natures, in the same manner as if such natures did
not exist. If these things, therefore, are necessary
from the omnipotent and all-beneficent energy of
first causes, neither will good always subsist with
invariable sameness in all beings, nor will the ge-
neration of evil be expelled from beings. For if
there is that which is sometimes able to participate
of good, but again sometimes neglects a co-existence
with it, there will indeed, from necessity, be a pri-
vation of participation; but as the privation of good
is not able to subsist by itself, nor can be entirely
liberated from the nature of which it is the priva-
a i. e. They are merely participants, and are not participated by
other things. But the beings which are inseparable from wholes,
are participated by inferior natures.
86
tion, it is after a certain manner rendered powerful
by this nature, on account of its complication with
the order of things contrary to good. Other pri-
vations, indeed, are alone produced by the absence
of habits, assuming nothing from themselves which
contributes to existence; but good, on account of
the transcendent excellence of its power, gives
strength even to the privation of itself. For as in
all beings the good implants the first power, so
likewise every being which is perfectly good gene-
rates its own power. But, as we have said, the
privation which is complicated with good, using as
a remedy for the instability of its nature the power
of good, becomes indeed contrary to good, yet is
corroborated by its mixture with it, and thence is
enabled to oppose that which is proximate to it.
Nevertheless it is not affected in the same manner
as other privations. For these have an existence
when habit departs; but evil, when good departs,
vanishes into non-entity. For there is no species
of life so bad as to extinguish entirely the power
of reason; since reason remains within, but speaks
in a debile manner, in consequence of being sur-
rounded by all-various passions. These things,
however, will be considered by us again.
But if, as we have said, it is not only requisite
that the above-mentioned arguments should have
been adduced, but that the doctrine concerning
the existence of evil should be unfolded from the
writings of Plato, what has been already delivered
by us is sufficient even for those who are only able
87
in a moderate degree to comprehend discussions of
this kind. It is fit, however, in the same manner as
in a court of justice, that we should not only hear
the arguments of the contending parties, but that
we should offer some opinion of our own.
Let the
following, therefore, if you please, be our decision
on the subject, that evil is, as I may say, twofold;
one, and that the first, being real evil, unmingled
with good; but the other not being real, nor un-
mingled with the nature of good. For with respect
to good also, one kind is primarily good, and, as it
were, good itself, and nothing else than good, being
neither intellect, nor intelligence, nor truly-exist-
ing being; but another kind is mingled with other
things. And good is sometimes found unmingled
with privation, and sometimes is to be seen mingled
with it. For that which sometimes participates of
what is primarily good, is complicated with what
is not good; because being itself, also, and the na-
ture of being, is in its highest subsistence truly-
existing being; and being alone, but in its last sub-
sistence, is in a certain respect comingled with non-
being; so that in consequence of being replete with
non-entity, it possesses more of non-existence than
of existence. And non-being itself, which is in no
respect whatever another being, and is beyond the
nature which subsists accidentally, is neither able
to subsist according to itself, nor according to ac-
cident. For that which is true non-entity, has not
existence in one way, but in another not. But the
being which subsists simultaneously with non-being,
88
whether it be lawful to call it a privation of being,
or difference, is not the same with true non-entity.
For with respect to non-entity, one kind is entirely
deprived of being, but another kind, which subsists
in intelligibles, suffers, as the Eleatic stranger [or
guest] says, no diminution of being. But in
those things which are sometimes beings, and some-
times non-beings, non-entity is more debile than
entity; but yet after a certain manner they are
vanquished by being. As, therefore, with respect
to non-being, if some one should ask us, whether
it has an existence, or whether it has not, we should
reply, that what is entirely non-being, and in no
respect whatever participates of existence, is in no
respect whatever being; but, nevertheless, that non-
being is after a certain manner to be connumerated
with beings. Thus also with respect to evil, be-
cause it has a twofold subsistence, one kind being
evil alone, but another not unmingled with good;
the former has no existence whatever, in conse-
quence of falling below being, just as the good is
beyond being; but the latter must be ranked among
beings. Hence it is not deserted by being, on
a The non-being of which Proclus is here speaking, is denomi-
nated by the Eleatic guest, in the Sophista of Plato, difference, and
is one of the five genera of being in intelligibles. But these five
genera are, essence, sameness, difference, motion, and permanency.
See my translation of the Sophista.
In Morbeka, “hoc autem non permixtum ad bonum ;” but for
permixtum, it is necessary to read impermixtum.
• For "abessc," here in Morbeka's version, it is necessary to read
ab esse.
89
account of the intervention of good, nor by good,
since it is still capable of remaining, on account of
being: for it is at one and the same time being and
good. And that which is in every respect evil,
since it is a perfect falling off from the first good,
is deservedly likewise deprived of being. For what
can have a progression into beings that is unable to
participate of good? But that which is not in every
respect evil, is sub-contrary indeed to a certain good,
but not to all good. It is, however, arranged and
benefited through the transcendency of the source
of all good. And it is evil to those things to which
it is contrary; but it is nevertheless suspended as good
from total good. For it is not lawful to act in op-
position to this; but it is requisite that all things
should be disposed according to justice, or that
they should have no existence whatever.
Plato, therefore, rightly says in the Timæus, that
so far as pertains to the demiurgic will, all things
are good, and nothing is evil. But in the Thea-
tetus he asserts that evil cannot be destroyed, and
that it has from necessity a place among beings.
For all things partake of good through the will of
the father; and nothing is evil with reference to his
fabrication, either of real beings, or of things which
are becoming to be. And darkness, indeed, which
is entirely mingled with its contrary, is therefore
not destitute of light; and things which are made
in the light, are on all sides terminated by it. With
the sun, indeed, nothing is dark, for it gives even
to darkness a debile splendour; but in the air,
90
darkness is a privation of the light which was in
it. All things, therefore, are good with the father
of all; and evil is in the natures which are not able
to remain established in good. On what account,
however, this is necessary, we have before shown.
After what manner, therefore, evil subsists, and
after what manner it does not, is from these things
evident. For both those who assert that all things
are good, and those who do not, speak in one re-
spect rightly, and in another erroneously. For
that all beings are good is true; but non-being
also is complicated with being. All things, there-
fore, are good, because there is no evil which is not
adorned and mingled with good. And evil is in
those beings whose nature is not adapted to remain
in good in an unmingled state.
2. In the next place it is requisite to consider, in
what beings evil exists, after what manner it sub-
sists, and whence it is derived; because the nature
of it has appeared to us to be something belonging
to beings. Let us begin, therefore, from on high,
and survey as far as we are able, where evil sub-
sists.
The Gods, then, the kingdoms of the Gods, their
numbers and their orders, obtain the first portion.
of being, or rather they preside over all beings and
an intellectual essence, on which being, as it were,
seated, they generate and rule over all things, pro-
ceed to and are present with all things, without being
mingled with them, and exemptly adorn everything
which the universe contains. Nor is their intel-
91
a
ligence debilitated by their providential energies,
nor their paternally transcendent government dis-
solved by the purity of their intellections. For
their intellectual energy is the same with their es-
sence; and providential inspection is present with
them on account of goodness, and likewise on ac-
count of their twofold power, [viz. providential and
demiurgic,] not being willing to remain in itself,
but, as it were, producing into light from themselves
whatever it is lawful for them to produce, viz. all
beings, the genera that are more excellent than
souls, souls themselves, and whatever else has a
being inferior to these. For the Gods themselves,
indeed, are beyond all beings, and are the measures
of existence, because every being is contained in
them, just as number is in monads. But beings
proceed from them, some indeed [at the same time
that they proceed from,] abiding in them, but others,
through their manifold nature, falling off from the
unity of the Gods, in consequence of a diminution
of essence. And these latter, indeed, are placed in
the order of participants, suspended from the good-
ness of the Gods; but the former are essentialized
in good itself, and the measure of wholes, and are
nothing else than the unities, and measures, and
goodnesses of beings. They are likewise, if you
are willing, summits, and as. it were flowers, and
superessential luminaries, and everything of this
kind. And they are indeed participable according
a For "valentem," here in Morbeka's version, it is necessary to
read volentem.
92
to true being and the first essence; but they pro-
duce from themselves everything good and beauti-
ful, all media, and being of every kind. As, there-
fore, if some one should interrogate us respecting
this visible light, which the God who is the king
of it, and who has an arrangement analogous to
the good, scatters through the whole world,-whe-
ther it is of itself susceptive of darkness or not,
our answer to him would be multifarious. For at
one time we should adduce the simplicity of its
nature; at another time, its continuity with the
divinea genera; and at another something else.
Thus also in speaking of the Gods, we must assert
that evil has no subsistence whatever in them; and
it is requisite to recollect that the Gods adorn all
things, that they are not indigent of anything, and
that their life is perfectly blessed and divinely exu-
berant. For these are our unperverted conceptions
respecting them, and from these we should assume
what it is requisite to assert of the Gods themselves.
But souls of a fortunate destiny', giving themselves
to intellect, expanding the winged part of them-
selves, and being assimilated to the Gods, are per-
manently established in good; and no evil is pre-
а
a In Morbeka, "quandoque autem eam quæ ad genera continui-
tatem."
But for ad genera, it is requisite to read ad genera divina.
b In Morbeka "animæ ephimeræ. But for ephimera, which in
the Greek, as the learned Professor observes, was onμegial, I read
Evpigiai: for Proclus is here speaking of that order of souls which
are denominated by the Platonists axgavras, or undefiled. See
Proclus in Tim., and elsewhere; for this order of souls is mentioned
by him in many places in his works.
αχρανται,
93
sent with them, nor ever will be. Perfect hilarity,
likewise, an innoxious life, and the choir of the
virtues, lead such a soul to the supernal region, to
the banquet, and the enjoyment of delicate foodª,
and to a condition of being far removed from the
evils which are here, not for the purpose of van-
quishing these maladies, but that together with the
Gods, adorning sublunary affairs according to jus-
tice, they themselves may remain established in the
Gods. And though while they are filled with the
contemplation of real being, they possess a latent
tendency to these inferior realms, yet they do not
experience that which is perfectly evil. If, there-
fore, there is no evil in souls which are divine, how
is it possible it should exist in the Gods? For, as
it is said, heat is not in snow, nor cold in fire:
and hence, neither is evil in the Gods, nor is a
divine nature situated in evil.
In addition, therefore, to what has been said, it
must be remembered that the very essence of the
Gods is established in good. For as souls are
derived from that soul which ranks as a whole",
and as partial intellects are derived from an all-
perfect intellect, thus also, from the first good, or
rather, if it be lawful so to speak, from goodness
itself, and from the unity of all good, the most pri-
a All the above in italics is, in Morbeka, "quæ utique talem
animam ducunt ad superiorem locum, ad epulationemque et frui-
tionem." But Proclus in what is here said, alludes to the following
words of Plato in the Phædrus; όταν δε δη προς δαιτα τε και επι
BOLYNY IWσLY, X. T.λ. p. 23. Astii edit.
i. e. as they are derived from the soul of the world.
91
mary number of things that are good is derived,
the being and existence of which is nothing else
than unity and goodness. For neither is the es-
sence of partial intellects anything else than intellec-
tion, nor of souls anything else than vitality. For
if to all the preceding natures there is a continued
progression from their principle, through simili-
tude,—if this be the case, the progressions from
the first unity must be primary unities, and from
the one [first] good a multitude of natures charac-
terized by good. How, therefore, can evil, and the
nature of evil, be inherent in things essentially
good? For it is not lawful that it should; since
good is measure and light; but evil is darkness
and incommensurability. And the latter, indeed,
is without location, and is debile; but the former
is the cause of all location, and of all power. The
former likewise is preservative of all things; but the
latter leads everything with which it is present to
destruction, according to the order which each
thing is assigned: for, as we have said, there is
not the same mode of termination in all things.
Whether, therefore, shall we say, it is false that the
Gods are good, or shall we admit that being good
they are changed; which we assert to be the case
with partial souls, these being transmuted into
different forms of life? In thus speaking, how-
ever, we shall assert of the existence of the Gods
what is both impious and absurd. For good is
not congenial with non-good; and that which is
not good is not God. Nor is that which is trans-
95
muted similar to the one, and to that which is bet-
ter than all energy. For what similitude is there
between that which subsists according to an eternal
essence, and that which is prior to eternity; or
between that which is established in an invariable
sameness of energy, and that which is more excel-
lent than the peculiarity of even the highest energy?
Hence, there is no evil in the Gods, neither simply,
nor according to time. For, in short, the eternal and
time are posterior to the Gods; since both these
are essences, and subsist about essence. But the
Gods are prior to essence and being. For beings
derive their subsistence from them, they having an
hyparxis prior to being. And here, indeed, every
one is good; but truly-existing being is suspended
from the good [which is the characteristic of the
Gods].
Again, therefore, after the Gods, if you are
willing, let us direct our attention to the order of
angels, and consider, whether we must assert this
to be perfectly good, or that evil subsists in this
order primarily. If, however, evil, of whatever kind
it may be, is in them, how can we any longer call
them the messengers of the Gods? For all evil,
indeed, is far distant and foreign from the Gods,
and is like darkness with respect to the light which
is with them. It also is not only ignorant that it is
itself evil, but it is ignorant of everything else, and
especially of whatever is good. For it flies from
3
See my translation of the Theological Elements of Proclus,
in which this is demonstrated.
96
and destroys itself, not being able to know either
itself or the nature of good. But the genus which
is the interpreter of the Gods, is continuous with
the Gods, knows their intellect, and elucidates the
divine will. This angelic genus, also, is itself a di-
vine light, proceeding from that effulgence which
is concealed in the adyta of deity, becoming exter-
nally manifest, and being nothing else than good
primarily shining forth from the beings which eter-
nally abide in the unfathomable depths of the one.
For it is requisite that the progression of wholes
should be continued; and, on account of similitude,
one thing is naturally consequent to another. To
the fountain, therefore, of all good, many natures
characterized by good are consequent, and an oc-
cult number of unities abiding in the ineffable foun-
tain of deity. But the first number of preceding
and proceeding natures continuous with the divine
unities is that of the angelic order, which is situated,
as it were, in the vestibules of the Gods, and unfolds
their truly mystic silence. How, therefore, can
evil exist in those beings whose essence consists in
the elucidation of good? For where there is evil,
good is absent; so far is it from being elucidated;
but it is rather concealed by the presence of a
contrary nature. That, however, possesses a tran-
scendency of union which is enunciative of the one;
and this is also the case with whatever in a second
order is enunciative prior to that energy which is
in other things. Hence, the angelic tribe is in a
transcendent degree assimilated to the Gods, from
97
which it is suspended, so that it is able, by a most
manifest similitude, to unfold its peculiarity to pos-
terior natures.
If, also, you are not willing to survey the bene-
ficent order of angels in this way only, but accord-
ing to another mode, consider that in all the
genera,
and all the numbers of beings, of whatever kind
they may be, that which is allotted a first and
principal order possesses good genuinely, and un-
mingled with evil. For it is requisite that what is
first in every series of things should bear the image
of the first cause; since everywhere primary natures
are analogous to this cause, and the salvation of all
things is through the participation of it. For whether
you divide all beings into intellectuals and sensi-
bles; or, again, the sensible nature into heaven and
generation; or, in like manner, the intellectual es-
sence into soul and intellect, you will everywhere
find, that what ranks as first and most divine is
unreceptive of evil. It is requisite, therefore, that
not only in these, but also in the triple empire of
the better genera, [viz. of angels, dæmons, and he-
roes,] there should be the immaculate, the intellec-
tual, and the unmingled with evil. And this is
likewise the case with everything that has a first
order essentialized in good, because the progres-
sion of it takes place on account of goodness; just,
again, as the progression of dæmons is according
to power, and to that which is generative in the
" In Morbeka, "genimum Deorum;" but for genimum it is ne-
cessary to read genitivum.
H
98
Gods; and hence, also, they rank as media in the
three genera. For power pertains to the middleª,
just as intellect, and a circular conversion to the
principle, pertain to the third progression, which
is that of heroes; but goodness energises in angels,
and defines their existence by its own unity. How
is it possible, therefore, for any one to admit that
evil can enter into such natures as these? Hence,
that alone which is boniform will obtain the order
of angels, but will never partake of any evil. For
angels are the elucidators of the Gods, are the
summit of the better genera, and their very being
is characterized by good.
Does evil, therefore, subsist primarily in dæ-
mons? For they exist in an order consequent
to that of the angelic choir. There are, there-
fore, some who speak of the passions of dæmons,
and these, indeed, such as are according to na-
ture, when they tragically narrate their different
deaths and generations. But of other dæmons,
the passions are from choice alone, and these
they denominate wicked and evil dæmons, who
defile souls through iniquity, lead them to mat-
ter, and draw them down from their celestial jour-
ney to the subterranean place. The authors of
these assertions, likewise, think that they have
Plato as the patron of this doctrine, who establishes
twofold exemplars in the universe; the one divine,
luminous and boniform, but the other without
a In Morbeka, " Medii enim potentiâ;" but for "potentiâ," it is
requisite to read potentia.
99
God, dark and malefic. Of souls, also, according
to them, some tend to the former, but others to the
latter, at which when they arrive, they suffer the
punishment of their crimes. As, again, of those
that are in Hades, some fly from the mouth of the
opening which is there; but others are dragged
along by fiery and fierce phantasms, are torn on
thorns, and hurled into Tartarus. What is as-
serted by these men, therefore, insinuates that every
such genus of dæmons which is seductive, malig-
nant and destructive of souls, is susceptive of pri-
mary evil, and that the nature of dæmons is distin-
guished by good and evil. It is requisite, however,
to inquire of these, if we ask them nothing else,-
for the fathers of these assertions are divine menº,
-whether are the dæmons which you call evil,
such to themselves; or are they not evil to them-
selves, but to others? For if, indeed, they are
evil to themselves, one of two things must follow;
either that they must remain in evil for ever, or
that they are susceptive of transmutation. And if,
indeed, they are always evil, how can that which
subsists from the Gods be perpetually evil? For
it is better not to exist at all, than to exist always
essentially evil. But if they are changed so as to
pass into different forms, they do not rank among
a See the 10th book of the Republic of Plato, near the end,
from which what is here said by Proclus is derived. The version
of Morbeka in this part is extremely barbarous and inaccurate.
Among these is Porphyry. See the 2nd book of my transla-
tion of his treatise on Abstinence from Animal Food.
DorM
H 2
100
a
those that are essentially dæmons, but among those
who are such only through habitude [i. e. through
proximity and alliance]. The like must be said of
that which is better and worse, and has another
form of life. All essential dæmons, however, re-
main so perpetually, and continue in the order
which they are severally allotted. But if they are
good to themselves, and evil to others, in conse-
quence of leading them to a worse condition of
a After essential heroes, an order of souls follows, who proxi-
mately govern the affairs of men, and are dæmoniacal κατα σχεσιν,
according to habitude or alliance, but not essentially. Of this kind
are the Nymphs, that sympathise with waters, Pans, with the feet
of goats, and the like: and they differ from those powers that are
essentially of a dæmoniacal characteristic, in this, that they assume
a variety of shapes (each of the others immutably preserving one
form), are subject to various passions, and are the causes of mani-
fold deception to mankind. Proclus, in his Scholia on the Craty-
lus of Plato observes, Οτι εισι και Πανες τραγοσκελείς και Αθηναΐκαι
ψυχαι σχήμασι ποικίλοις χρωμεναι, και προσεχως ύπερ τους ανθρωπους
πολιτευομεναι, οία ην η Αθηνα ἡ τῳ Οδυσσει και τῳ Τελεμαχῳ φανείσα.
i. e.
"There are Pans with the feet of goats, and Minerval souls
assuming a variety of shapes, and proximately governing mankind,
such as was the Minerva that appeared to Ulysses and Telemachus.”
τω
Proclus also, in Plat. Polit. p. 359, remarks concerning dæ-
mons κατα σχεσιν, as follows: Προσθέντος δε του Πλάτωνος εν τοις περι
της αληθείας, ότι παντη αψευδές, ου μόνον το θείον, αλλα και το δαιμονιον,
δει λαβειν απο ταυτης της προσθηκης, ότι το ὡς αληθως δαιμόνιον παντή, ου
το κατα σχέσιν, ὁ και μεταβολας ὑπομένει παντοίας, και απατα τουτους
οἷς αν γένηται φίλον, παν δε το κατ' ουσίαν δαιμονιον λογικον μενον, παντως
αληθευτικόν εστιν. αλογον δε ον αδεκτον και αληθειας και ψεύδους. διο και
ὁ Πλατων ουκ είπεν αληθευτικον σαν το δαιμονιον και θείον, αλλ' ότι αψευ
δες παν. αδεκτον γαρ παν ψεύδους" αλλα το μεν ὡς πεφυκος αληθεύειν
μονως, το δε, ὡς μητ' αληθεύον, μητε ψευδόμενον. ὅσον ουν απατητικον γε
νος ὁ ἱστορείται, ἢ τας χρησμωδιας ὑποδυόμενον, ἢ ταις κλήσεσιν ὑπακουον,
ή και εκ ταυτοματου τισι συγγινομενον, των κατα σχεσιν εστιν δαιμόνων.
ει δε τινες ύπο δαιμονων απατώνται των οντως δαιμονων, δι ἑαυτους απα
101
being, this is just as if some one should call certain
preceptors and pedagogues wicked, who, from rank-
ing as castigators of faults, do not permit those
whom they superintend to pursue a better order
in an unappropriate manner. Or as if some one
should denominate those evil, who, standing [as
guardians] before sacred places, prevent the im-
pure vulgar from entering within the curtains, be-
cause they prohibit them from a participation of
σωνται, και ου δι' εκείνους, ώσπερ και επι των θεων ελεγομεν. i. e. σε As
Plato however adds, in what he says about truth, that not only di-
vinity, but likewise a dæmoniacal nature, is entirely without false-
hood, it is necessary to assume from this addition, that what truly
possesses the nature of a dæmon, and not a dæmon according to
habitude, is perfectly free from falsehood. For a dæmon accord-
ing to habitude sustains all-various mutations, and deceives those
with whom he is friendly. But every essential dæmon, and who
is at the same time rational, is perfectly veracious; and if he is
irrational, he is unreceptive both of truth and falsehood. Hence,
Plato does not say, that every dæmoniacal and divine nature is ve-
racious, but that every such nature is without falsehood. For all
these are unreceptive of falsehood; but this is the case with the
rational kind, as being naturally adapted to be alone veracious; and
with the irrational, as not being conversant with either truth or
falsehood. Hence, whatever deceitful kind of dæmons is men-
tioned in history, either as secretly assuming the office of delivering
oracles, or becoming obedient to invocations, or being casually pre-
sent with certain persons,-every such kind pertains to those who.
are dæmons according to habitude, proximity and alliance. But
if certain persons are deceived by those who are truly [or essenti-
ally] dæmons, they are deceived through themselves, and not
through them, as we before observed respecting the Gods." To
such dæmons as these may be applied what Iamblichus says, De
Myst. sect. 4. cap. 7., viz. “An evil dæmon requires that his wor-
shiper should be just, because such a dæmon assumes the appearance
of one belonging to the divine genus; but he is subservient to what is
unjust, because he is depraved.”
102
the internal rites. It is not evil, therefore, for
those to remain external to these sacred places,
who are not worthy to enter into them; but it is
evil to be of such an order, and to deserve such
prohibitions. Hence, if of the mundane dæmons,
some lead souls on high, but others keep the souls
that are not yet able to ascend, in their own man-
ners, we cannot justly say that either of these are
evil,—either those by whom souls are separated from
hence, or those by whom they are detained. For
it is requisite there should be dæmons, who keep in
custody about the terrestrial region souls that are
Ουκ
a What the Pseudo Dionysius says in that part of his treatise on
the Divine Names in which he shows that there is no such thing
as evil itself, is wholly derived from this treatise of Proclus, as will
be evident by comparing the one with the other. I give the follow-
ing extract from that work, as an obvious proof that what is said
by Proclus in this place, was taken from thence by Dionysius:
ада
ουδε εν αγγελοις εστι το κακον. αλλα κολάζειν τους αμαρτάνοντας
εισι κακοι. τούτῳ γουν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ οἱ σωφρονισται των πλημμελούντων
κακοι, και των ιερέων οἱ τον βεβηλον των θείων μυστηρίων απείργοντες. και
τοι ουδε το κολαζεσθαι κακον· αλλα το αξιον γενεσθαι κολασεως. ουδε το
κατ' αξίαν απειργεσθαι των ιερων αλλα το εναγή, και ανιερον γενεσθαι και
των αχράντων ανεπιτήδειον. i. e. “ Hence, neither is evil in angels;
unless it should be said that they are evil because they punish of-
fenders. But if this be admitted, the castigators of all those who
act erroneously will be evil; and consequently, this will be the
case with those who exclude the profane from the inspection of di-
vine mysteries. It is not, however, evil to punish those that deserve
to be punished, but it is evil to deserve punishment. Nor is it evil
to be deservedly excluded from sacred mysteries, but to become de-
filed and profane, and unadapted to the participation of what is
pure."
The learned reader will find, on perusing the whole of
what is said by this Dionysius concerning evil, in the above-men-
tioned treatise, that the greater part of it is derived from the pre-
sent work of Proclus.
103
defiled with vice, and unworthy of a progression to
the heavens. Neither, therefore, does it appear
that evil, even in these dæmons, can rationally be
found; for they severally effect that which is con-
formable to their nature, and always after the same
manner. But this is not evil.
Again, with respect to the genus of heroes, does
not, in the first place, the very being of these con-
sist in an essential conversion to that which is more
excellent? And, in the second place, heroes are
always the causes to other things of a conversion
to better natures. This providential employment,
therefore, was assigned them by the father of the
universe; and if their energy is invariably the same,
it is not evil. For everything evil is naturally un-
stable and without locality; but the contrary is
true of that which is always a whole. For perpe-
tuity is power; but a subsistence in capacity per-
tains to those things to which evil pertains. In
short, to be changed in the form of life, in any
way, causes those who suffer this change to be
heroes according to habitude, and not yet to be
such as essential heroes. For every angel, dæmon
and hero, who is such essentially, is naturally
adapted always to preserve its own order, and
does not subsist in one way at one time, and in
a different way at another, but energises always
according to the nature which it has received.
Further still, if anger, violent efforts, and every-
thing of this kind which is called evil, are em-
ployed by them through a perversion of what is
104
according to nature,-in this case, evil in them is
a disorderly use of their power, and is everywhere
a departure from a perfection adapted to their es-
sence; for evil is impotent and imperfect, and is of
a nature too debile to effect the salvation of any-
thing. But if each in thus acting preserves itself
and its own nature, and the condition which it is
perpetually allotted in the universe, how can it any
longer be preternatural in them thus to act? For if
it is according to nature, to them it will not be evil,
if the evil to everything is that which is preterna-
tural to it. For you would not say, that fury is an
evil to lions or leopards; but it is an evil to men, to
whom what is most excellent is reason. To other
beings, however, whose essence is according to
intellect, it is not good to energise according to
reasona. For it is requisite that evil, as we have
frequently said, should not be that which is ac-
cording to nature, and which in everything is the
better part,—for a thing of this kind is good,—but
that it should be the concomitant of a deteriorated
nature. Hence a precipitate phantasy, fury, anger
and pertinacity, are not unnatural to those beings.
to whom such things, and not reason, are essential.
What, therefore, is evil to them from these things?
But the above-mentioned particulars are impedi-
ments to souls, and a bond; for to those, a ten-
dency downward is a deviation from rectitude.
For these powers do not lead to the place adapted
* Because reason is inferior to intellect. For the intellectual per-
ception of a thing is intuitive, and not the result of ratiocination.
105
to themselves, those souls which have not yet fallen
into vice, because this would not be possible. But,
in conformity to the laws of the universe, they
punish souls that tend to a subordinate nature,
and that require chastisement [as preparatory to
their purification]. And these powers, indeed, in
so doing act according to nature; but the uni-
verseª uses them as instruments for the sanation of
souls. For it also uses brutes for the devoration
of men, and inanimate substances for some other
natural purpose. And a stone, indeed, in falling
naturally strikes that with which it meets; for these
actions are the percussions of bodies; and the uni-
verse opportunely uses the nature of these in order
to give completion to the necessity of that which
ought to suffer. Neither, therefore, is percussion
evil to bodies; nor, in short, is there any evil in
the operations of things which act conformably to
their own nature. But everything acts according
to nature, which has no energy better than its na-
tural energy. Hence, it is not possible to assign
any more excellent energy of these heroical powers
than what has been before mentioned. For this is
their order; and this species of energy was assigned
to them by the fabricator of the universe, for the
sake of guarding the perfections of things. Hence,
whatever is transacted in the boundaries of these
a Morbeka's version of this part is, "utitur autem ipsis ut organis
ad sanationem omnem." But for "omnem" it is necessary to read,
conformably to the above translation, omne, i. e. ro xay, the uni-
verse.
106
powers, contrary to their life, becomes in destined
periods of time subject to their guardian care. But
the period of the time of punishment corresponds
to the power of the patients; and the purgation
being perfect, the mouth of the opening a ceases to
bellow, and all the other impediments to ascending
souls are withdrawn. While the punishment, how-
ever, is as yet imperfect, some souls, on account of
an ignorance of themselves, desire a progression
upwards, and the universe leads these to what is
appropriate to their condition. The guardians of
such, likewise, being subservient to the will of the
universe, convert some to one, and others to a dif-
ferent kind of punishment; and employing coercion
to these for a longer, but to those for a shorter time,
they at length dismiss them conformably to the ar-
rangements of the universe and its laws. We must
say, therefore, with respect to the Gods, and the
genera superior to our species, that their conduct
towards us is through commiserating our condi-
tion, and that there neither is any evil in them,
nor ever will be. For they energise in all things
conformably to the order in which each of them is
arranged, and, abiding in their accustomed man-
ner, they preserve invariably that boundary which
they possess from the fabrication of things.
3. In the next place, let us direct our attention
to the natures consequent to the above, and inves-
tigate whether evil is anywhere to be found in these.
a See the latter part of the 10th book of the Republic of Plato,
from which what Proclus here says is derived.
107
If, however, it must be said, that evil has nowhere
an existence, it follows that it is neither there, nor
in human souls. For all the above-mentioned ge-
nera are unreceptive of transmutation; I mean, of
a transmutation according to their order. For
each of them is always adapted to preserve the order
which it received. But the natures consequent to
these [viz. human souls] possess a power of some-
times ascending, and sometimes tending to genera-
tion and a mortal nature. Of these, likewise, some
are better and more divine, and, in being connected
with a mortal nature, do not abandon divine know-
ledge; but others sustain all-various fractures and
distortions of their circles", and are replete with
oblivion, habitude [to things subordinate], and
evil. Let us, therefore, in the first place, consider
the better kind of human souls. That these, then,
in consequence of being better, do not admit in
themselves any passion of human depravity, is in-
dicated by Socrates in the Republic, where he
accuses the poets of representing the offspring of
the Gods [i.e. heroes] as equally avaricious with
[other] men, and replete with such evils as we
perceive to be accidental to human nature. If,
however, as it is said, a very great part of their
period consists in contemplation, in an innoxious
i.e. they cannot be changed into a different order.
› This is asserted by Plato in the Timæus. See my translation
of the 5th book of Proclus on that Dialogue.
C
See the Introduction to the 2nd and 3rd books of the Republic,
in vol. i. of my translation of Plato, in which the reader will find
an apology for what is here said, from Proclus.
108
life, and in a secure providence of wholes in con-
junction with the Gods; and if, when they descend
into generation, their descent is for the benefit of
terrestrial souls,-some, indeed, for the purpose of
procuring a good offspring, others for the sake
of purity, but others for the purpose of trans-
mitting the illuminations of a divine intellect,—and
if, also, they accomplish this in conjunction with
the Gods, with renown, together with the inspira-
tion of good dæmons, and the consent of the uni-
verse,-what evil, in short, will there be in them,
unless you are willing to call generation itself [or
the whole of a visible nature] evil? For, as So-
crates says in the [10th book of the] Republic, it is
necessary that every soul should drink a certain
measure of the cup of oblivion. With respect to
oblivion, however, it is different in different souls;
in some, indeed, the habit of recollection being
lost; but in others, remembrance in energy being
alone buried [for a time, but not destroyed]. This
rest of energy therefore,-habit remaining within,
like a concealed light, incapable of proceeding ex-
ternally on account of the adjacent darkness,—you
may call oblivion, or, if you are willing, the evil of
these souls. These souls, likewise, are impassive
a
b
In Morbeka, “pro paritate”; but the true reading is, I have
no doubt, conformably to the above translation, pro puritate.
b Morbeka's version of this part is, "Mensuram enim quandam
poculi oblivionis necessarium omnem animam facere"; but for “fa-
cere" it is requisite to read bibere. Morbeka appears to have had in
his MS. instead of , which is the true reading. The words
of Plato are: Μετρον μεν ουν τι του ύδατος πασιν αναγκαίον είναι πιειν.
109
to the perturbations which subsist about the soul
in generation, and on this account we are accus-
tomed to call them immaculate; because the evils
which are here cannot enter into them, though
they are incapable of preserving in this terrene
abode that invariable and immutable life which
they led in the intellectual realms; but they per-
mit that which is adapted to disturb them, and is
unstable, to remain in the natures which are sus-
pended from their essence. These impassive souls,
too, are internally silent, as long as they are situated
in tranquillity; but when they are excited to vehe-
ment energy, then their beauty shines forth, so as
to evince that they are truly the offspring of the
Gods. Hence, whether in terrene animals, or in
other parts of the universe, there are generations of
souls, this is the mode of descent to all of them,
and as far as to this, oblivion and evil are the re-
sult. For we say, that light is darkened, because
the extraneous nature of that which surrounds it
being gross and nebulous, it cannot illuminate that
which is near to it. But that is perfectly involved
in darkness, which cannot even be the saviour of
itself. The descent, therefore, of these divine souls,
not destroying their internal life, gives to them a
debility of energy.
* See an admirable account of these undefiled souls in the Scholia
of Proclus on the Cratylus, in the notes at the end of the 5th volume
of my Plato; where the reader will find a translation of nearly
the whole of these most excellent Scholia, which are nothing more
than extracts from a complete Commentary on that Dialogue of
Plato, by some one of the disciples of Proclus, as will be evident
to the intelligent reader from the perusal of them.
110
With respect, however, to the souls that are
posterior to these, and which destroy their internal
life, and fall into an oblivion of the contemplations
arising from the energies of it,-in souls of this
kind there is death, an insatiable tendency to mor-
tal concerns, a defluxion of their wings, and what-
ever else of such souls, we are accustomed fre-
quently to assert. For what other medium is it
requisite to assign between that which is unsuscep-
tible of evil, and that which is entirely malignant,
than a slender, and, as I may say, apparent evil?
These things, therefore, must be asserted of such
souls. The habit, too, of these latter tribes of
souls is truly all-various, and is transmuted by
all-various impulses and elections. Their internal
powers, likewise, suffer defalcation, and their ener-
gies are attended with great labour. Being also
lame and debile, they suffer all the evils in which
souls are said to be involved through falling from
that place, the inhabitants of which are free from
sorrow, and lead a blessed life. For every soul
when on high is conversant with sublime concerns,
governs the whole world, and ascends, together
with the presiding Gods, to the contemplation of
the felicitous and most perfect energy of truly ex-
a See the Phædrus of Plato, where it is said that such souls
suffer this defluxion.
In Morbeka, “ Habitum autem iis quλov, id est tribus omnimo-
dum enter est et varium," &c.; but for "quλov, id est tribus," it is
necessary to read Quλos, id est tribibus.
с
μετεωροποιεί;
© In Morbeka μɛrewgor; instead of which it is requisite to read
μETEWGOTOλE. For Proclus here, and in what immediately follows,
μετεωροπολείο
alludes to what is said in the Phædrus, where this word is used by
Plato. See Plat. Phædr. p. 23. Edit. Ast.
111
isting being, and surveying all the forms that it
contains, is filled with the nectar which is there.
For, as some one says, contemplation, prudence,
and an intellectual life, are not the primary good
of the beings that energise according to these; but
the energy according to a divine intellect is that
which is primarily good, comprehending intelli-
gibles in the intellectual perception of itself, but
encompassing sensibles by those powers which be-
long to the circle of differenceª, and exhibiting to
these also a certain portion of the most exalted
good. For that which is perfectly good, not only
possesses plenitude in the salvation of itself, but
likewise in what it imparts to other things, and
through the unenvying abundance of its energy, de-
sires to benefit all things, and causes them to be
similar to itself. But when the soul, according to
both species of life, is incapable of imitating its
presiding Gods, it then indeed becomes deprived
of the contemplation of truly-existing being, and is
attracted by other secondary powers, which revolve
about the world. This, then, is to souls the prin-
ciple of generation, and of a periodic revolution, and
is the cause to them of impotency, and of a privation
of the contemplative energy; and this is their evil.
For there that which is sufficient to itself primarily
exists, where there is that which is primarily good;
a i. e. to opinion; for opinion is called by Plato in the Timæus,
the circle of difference; just as diavola, or the discursive energy of
reason, is there called by him the circle of sameness. Morbeka's
version of this part is, "Ambiens autem sensibilia iis quæ alterius
potentiis.
According to the theoretic and practic life.
112
and there power is transcendent, where that which
is sufficient to itself subsists. This, therefore, is the
debility of the soul, that, failing of the perfection
pertaining to the first life, it tends downwards; but
it there again acquires a power of ascending to the
region from which it fell, before it sinks into the
profundity of a material life. For there is not the
same mode of debility to all things. For neither
are all bodies placed in the same degree of dete-
rioration through their distance from the power a
by which they are measured and preserved. But
if, as Plato says", the soul through an unfortunate
occurrence, by which it becomes connected with
generation and mortality, is filled with oblivion,
and, becoming heavy, falls to the earth, then the
universe, indeed, leads it to an appropriate order;
but it varies the form of its life, till, as it is said in
the Timæus, following the revolution of that same
and similar nature contained in its essence, it
vanquishes those abundantly turbulent passions,
tumultuous and irrational, which afterwards exter-
nally adhere to it, and is led back to being itself,
and the most splendid of being.
3
d
i. e. through their distance from the physical power by which
their parts are held together.
C
Plato says this in the Phædrus.
* In Morbeka, "Ducit quidem ipsam ad convenientem ordinem
omnem." But for omnem, it is, I conceive, obviously necessary to
read omne, i. e. To rav, the universe.
d In all the printed editions of the Timæus, the word ğwley, ex-
ternally, is wanting in this place. For it is evident from the Com-
mentary of Proclus on that Dialogue, that it ought to be inserted.
Hence, in τον πολύν όχλον και ύστερον προσφύντα, κ.τ.λ., immediately
after oxλov it is requisite to add sğwosv.
113
The soul, therefore, descending from thence, ar-
rives at the circumambient ether, and surveys the
souls that are there. It likewise proceeds under
the throne of Necessity to the plain of Oblivion,
no longer contemplating such objects as it did,
when it possessed a primordial nature. For the
objects of contemplation to souls when on high,
were the plain of Truth, and the divine forms which
it contains. The nutriment, however, as Plato says,
which is adapted to the soul in its best condition of
subsistence, is derived from the meadow which is
there; but the nutriment which is here, is pro-
cured through opinion. Hence, also, this terrene
abode is near to the river of Oblivion, and the dire
world, through which the soul is filled with folly
and darkness, and is surrounded with all the evils
to which the mortal nature is subject. For the
fractures and distortions of circles [mentioned in
a By the circumambient ether, I suppose Proclus alludes to what
is said by Plato near the end of the 10th book of his Republic,
viz. "that souls descending pure from heaven, rested themselves in
the meadow, as in a public assembly," &c.
b In Morbeka, “veniet autem et sub necessitatis terminum, et ob-
livionis campum.” But for terminum, it is necessary to read
thronum: for Proclus here alludes to the following passage in the
1oth book of Plato's Republic: Εντευθεν δε δη αμεταστρεπτι ύπο τον
της Ανάγκης ιεναι θρονον· και δι' εκείνου διεξελθοντα, επειδη και οἱ αλλοι
διήλθον, πορευεσθαι απαντας εις το της Λήθης πεδιον.
i. e. from the meadow in the supercelestial place. See the
Phædrus of Plato. This meadow, therefore, is very different from
the circumambient ether, mentioned in Note ª.
a
d In Morbeka, "et mundum horum dirum." But the dire world,
is the μoopavns xooμos, or light-hating world, mentioned in the Chal-
dean Oracles.
I
114
the Timæus], and whatever introduces death to
souls, the periods of a thousand years, the punish-
ments of the passions, and all that is tragically said
respecting the law which the universe ordains, are
the consequences of the soul's lapse into this mortal
abode. And we shall not be able to fly from these
maladies, nor to rest from labours, till rising above
things foreign to our nature, we separate from mor-
tal nugacity, our own good and the contemplation
of real being. We must therefore strip ourselves
of the garments with which in descending we be-
came invested, we must proceed naked from hence
thither, must entirely purify the eye of the soul by
which we contemplate truly-existing being, and
instead of sense must make intellect to be the prin-
cipal ruler of our internal life. Our communication
indeed, and life in conjunction with a nature sub-
ordinate to our own, exhibit to us the generation
of evil; and our oblivion and ignorance arise from
surveying that which is unintellectual and dark ;
but our good consists in a flight and similitude to
that which is divine. For there total good exists,
a Proclus here alludes to the following beautiful passage in
Porphyr. de Abstin., lib. i. p. 27. Απολυτεον αρα τους πολλους
ἡμιν χιτώνας, τον τε όρατον τούτον και σαρκινον, και ούς εσωθεν ημφιεσμεθα,
προσεχεις οντας τοις δερματινοις· γυμνοι δε και αχιτωνες επι το σταδιον
αναβαινωμεν, επι τα της ψυχης Ολυμπια αγωνισομενοι. i. e. “We
must therefore divest ourselves of our manifold garments, both of
this visible and fleshly vestment, and of those with which we are
internally clothed, and which are proximate to our cutaneous habi-
liments; and we must enter the stadium naked and unclothed,
striving for [the most glorious of all prizes] the Olympia of the
soul."
115
and the fountain of all good, and there the purity
of [real] being, and a felicitous life are present with
perfect souls. And thus with respect to the soul
which is able to ascend to a divine nature, and also
to descend hither, we have shown after what man-
ner evil subsists in it, together with debility, mis-
fortune, and everything else which we have before
mentioned.
With respect, however, to those souls, which are
not parts of [real] beings, but certain images and
parts of a worse soul, which the Athenian stranger
or guest calls malefic, it is requisite to consider
whether they are unreceptive of evil, or whether
evil also exists in them, but after a different man-
ner. If, therefore, they are indeed worse than the
souls of men,-I mean than the image of the rational
soul which is in us,-evil in them consists in not
acting conformably to nature. For in the natures
which are always changed according to a good and
a bad condition of being, the good and the evil
have not a uniform subsistence; since the good as
well as the evil varies. But if, like our souls, they
pertain to another soul which is prior to them,
again it is necessary that the soul, which is capable
of being better and worse, and which is also con-
nected with the image of the rational soul, must
sometimes tend to supernal beings, and sometimes
to generation and the abode of matter; and that in
consequence of irrationality being suspended from
reason, that which is worse in them must consist
in a discord with reason, in not receiving light
I 2
116
а
from thence, and in the incommensurability of its
nature being deprived of the measure which is
thence derived. For this is not the power of such
souls, but debility, and a defect of power. Hence,
to these souls, the ascent to that which is better
takes place when some energy is resplendent in
them conformable to reason, which, like a present
dæmon, inspires them with an energy leading to
such a progression. But again, their tendency to
that which is worse is effected, when, on account of
the evil condition of the body, or unappropriate
aliment, the natural energy being vanquished, the
soul is filled with a depraved habit.
In the next place, let us consider nature, and
everything to which this imparts the whole of its
being and existence. Whether, therefore, is there
evil in this, or not? And if there is, on account of
what cause does it subsist? We neither assert,
therefore, nor conceive, that the nature of the uni-
verse, nor the nature of any eternal body, departs
at any time from its own habit. But we are of
opinion that abiding such as it is, it leads conform-
ably to nature the body with which it is connected:
for what else is the employment of nature, than to
preserve and perpetually retain that in which it
subsists? And the same thing is effected by all
causes. This nature, also, when it exists in a part
over which it entirely predominates, conducts it
rightly and wisely; but when as being partial it is
a In Morbeka, "et "ro immensuratum ipsius curante en quod
inde metro"; but for "curante," it is necessary to read carente.
117
vanquished, then the whole of that which uses it
thus perverted, acts in a way contrary to its native
adaptation. For to nature, indeed, considered as
a whole, nothing is preternatural; because all na-
tural productive powers are derived from it. But
to the nature which ranks as a part, one thing is
according to, and another contrary to nature.
Thus the form of a lion is preternatural to the
nature of man, because neither the productive
power of this, nor of any other species, is inherent
in man, but that of man alone. And thus in every
other class of beings, the productive powers of
different species are different. Hence it pertains
to a partial nature to be vanquished, and to act
contrary to nature, but not to the nature which
ranks as a whole, nor to anything which is eternal.
For matter, when it is the subject of beings that are
not eternal, is frequently vanquished by the bonds.
proceeding from nature, and then it adorns and as
it were illuminates its own darkness and deformity,
and invests itself with a foreign ornament. And
thus in the beings that rank as wholes, its turpitude
is concealed. Hence though it subsists from a
principle, it does not become known to every one,
nor even to those who have elucidated many of the
secrets of nature. But the nature which exists in
a part is impotent through a defect of essential
power. For it is as it were a ray, impression and
reason [or form] of total nature, being divided
from thence, flowing downward into body, and in-
118
capable of remaining unmingled and pure. This,
again, likewise arises from the power of the con-
traries by which it is on all sides surrounded. For
the things which are external to it are many,
foreign to the mortal nature.
and
Thus then, as we have said, this partial nature
becoming debile, and superinducing the baseness
of itself, defalcates indeed its own energy, and
causes by its own deformity the light which pro-
ceeds from it to be darkened. For the turpitude
of nature, in consequence of reason [or form] not
having dominion, is passion, and is inordinate
through the impotence of order; but then reason
is vanquished by that which is subordinate to reason,
and becomes itself irrational. If, therefore, there
is also in the energy of a partial nature the unim-
peded, we shall have all things according to nature,
and there will nowhere in these essences be evil.
But if in this, one thing is an end to it, and a path
according to nature, but another thing is contrary
to this, and an impediment to nature; and if, in-
deed, reason is one, but the things which are dif-
ferent from it are infinite, what else can we say
than that this is the evil of nature? For to the
being to whom contemplation is good, the priva-
tion of it is evil. But to that to which it is good
to effect something in another thing, and to energise
according to reason, it is evil for reason not to van-
quish, and for energy not to arrive at its destined
end, through being vanquished by an inferior na-
119
ture.
a
And the evil of bodies consists in the form
which is above them being vanquished by that
which is worse than themselves. For corporeal
turpitude arises from reason [or form] being sub-
dued, and the disease of body, from its order being
dissolved; because beauty then exists when form
vanquishes matter, and falls like a [luminous] flower
on things deprived of form. And with respect to
health, this is produced, when the order which is
conformable to nature is stably preserved. These
things, therefore, as existing in nature, extend as
far as to material bodies, and individual beings;
but do not extend to beings which rank as wholes;
nor must it be admitted that they subsist in the
natures which are beyond the reach of matter. For
deformity, wherever it exists, is from matter, which
we are accustomed to call deformity itself, and the
last of things, as being without measure, and with-
out beauty, and as not possessing even the most
debile portion of splendour. But where is inordi-
nation and the præternatural to be found in those
beings which always subsist according to nature,
and which, in consequence of this, possess an inva-
riable sameness of well being? Individual or par-
a For "invincibilis" here, it is necessary to read vincibilis.
b The whole of this sentence is in Morbeka's version as follows:
“ Etenim turpitudo quæ corporalis est, victa ratione; et ægritudo or-
dine soluto, quoniam et pulchritudo quando vincit, species velut flos
speciebus superincidens." But it appears to me that for “quando
vincit, species," &c., we should read, conformably to the above trans-
lation, quando materiam ratio vincit, species velut flos speciebus caren-
tibus superincidens.
120
ticular bodies, therefore, which in matter sustain
all-various mutations, sometimes, indeed, possess
order and good, but sometimes not, through con-
traries vanquishing their nature. But the bodies
which do not rank as particulars, and which as
wholes remain always the same, and complete the
measure of their nature, perpetually possess order,
vanquishing inordination. And of the bodies which
are immaterial, some, indeed, are always numeri-
cally the same, and always possess similar energies,
and are liberated from all mortal difficulty; but
others are in their nature and essence the same,
yet in their energies are led to the better and the
worse. And such are the organs of human souls,
which have, indeed, the essential according to na-
ture, but possess a variation according to life. And
sometimes, indeed, they abide in their own beauty,
and in an energy and order according to nature;
but at other times they are dispersed into a foreign
region, are brought into a condition contrary to
nature, and introduce into themselves the baseness
of matter. For each organ of the soul follows the
impulses of it, and in so doing sustains all-various
motions, and becomes assimilated to the appetitions.
of the soul. We have spoken, however, of a cor-
poreal nature, and have shown what the evil of it
is, and how in a different nature, there is a different
evil.
Let us, therefore, in the next place direct our
attention to matter, and consider whether it is evil
or not. For it is by no means possible that evil
121
can happen to it, because of itself it is without
quality, and formless; is a subject, but is not in a
subject; and is simple, but is not one thing in
another. But if in short, as some say, it is evil, it
is essentially evil. And hence, according to them,
matter is primarily evil, and is that which is odious
to the Gods. For what else is evil than the want
of measure and bound, and whatever besides these,
is a privation of good? For good is the measure,
the bound, the end, and the perfection of all things.
Evil, therefore, is incommensuration,—the infinite
itself, the imperfect, and the indeterminate; for all
these are primarily in matter, not being anything
else than it; but they are matter itself, and the
very essence of it. Hence matter is primarily evil,
and is the nature of evil, and the last of all things.
If also good is twofold,-one being the good itself,
and nothing else than good; but another good sub-
sists in something else, and is a certain good, and
not primarily so,—evil likewise will be twofold, one
being evil itself, and primarily, and nothing else
than evil; but another evil subsisting in something
else, and being a certain evil, by a participation of,
or assimilation to, evil itself. And as good itself
is the first, so evil itself is the last of things. For
it is not possible for anything to be better than
good, or for anything to be worse than evil; since
we say that all other things are better or worse on
See
All that is here said about matter being primarily evil, and
evil itself, is said conformably to the opinion of Plotinus.
my translation of his treatise On Evil.
122
account of these. But matter is the last of things.
For everything else is naturally adapted either to
act or suffer. But good itself and evil itself are
not adapted to either of these, being deprived of
the power of both. Hence matter is evil itself,
and that which is primarily evil.
If, however, that which is preternatural in bodies
arises, as we have said, from the predominance of
matter,—and in souls evil and debility are produced
by their lapse into, and inebriation from matter,
becoming assimilated to it, through the indefinite-
ness which subsists about it,-why, dismissing this,
should we investigate any other cause, principle
and fountain of these evils? But if matter is evil,
we must either make good to be the cause of evil,
or we must admit that there are two principles of
beings. For everything, of whatever kind the na-
ture of it may be, is either the principle of wholes,
or from the principle. Matter, however, since it
is from the principle, has also its progression into
being from good. But if there are two principles
of beings, we must admit that there are two prin-
ciples opposing each other, viz. that which is pri-
marily good, and that which is primarily evil. This,
however, is impossible; for there cannot be two
firsts. For whence, in short, can there be two
principles without a monad [from which they pro-
a Good itself is deprived of the power of acting or suffering
through transcendency of nature, as being superior to both; but
evil itself is deprived of this power, through the most extreme de-
bility of nature.
123
ceed]? If, indeed, each of these is a unity, it is
necessary that prior to both, there should be the
one, and one principle, through which each of these
is one. Nor can evil be produced from good.
For as the cause of all that is good, is good in a
greater degree than the things of which it is the
cause; so likewise that which is generative of evil,
is evil in a greater degree than the things which it
produces. And on this hypothesis, how will good
possess its own nature, if it is the cause of the prin-
ciple of evil? But if that which is generated, loves
to be assimilated to its generator, evil itself also
will be good, in consequence of possessing the form
of good, through participating of its cause. Hence
good, indeed, will be evil, as the cause of evil; but
evil will be good, as being produced by good.
If, however, matter is necessary to the universe,
and the world would not be in every respect a great
and blessed God" without matter, how can the
nature of evil be any longer referred to matter?
For evil is one thing, and that which is necessary
another. And matter, indeed, is that without which
it is impossible for the universe to exist; but evil is
the privation of existence. If, therefore, matter
exhibits the aptitude of itself as subservient to the
fabrication of the whole world, and was from the
first produced as the receptacle, and, as it were,
то ипить
a This sentence in Morbeka is, "Si enim utrumque duorum
unum, oportet ante ambo esse ro unum quo hæc ambo unum, et
unum pincipium.' But for hæc ambo, it is requisite to read, con-
formably to the above translation, horum uterque.
>>
The world is thus denominated by Plato in the Timæus,
124
nurse and mother of generation, [as Plato says in
the Timæus,] how can it any longer be said to be
evil, and to be that which is primarily evil? For
we manifoldly speak of incommensurability, the in-
finite, and everything of this kind; since we say
that it opposes measure, is the absence and ablation
of it, and is the subject of it, and, as it were, is in-
digent of measure and bound. But matter is not
adapted to oppose, nor, in short, to produce any-
thing, since neither is it naturally adapted to suffer,
on account of its deficiency of passive power. It
is not, however, an ablation of measure and bound.
For it is not the same with privation, because pri-
vation does not exist when measure and bound are
present; but matter both exists, and receives the
representation of these. Hence the infinite of the
nature of matter, and its privation of measure, are
indigent of measure and bound. But being indi-
gent of these, how can it be contrary to them?
And how can it be still evil, if it is indigent of
good? For evil, and in short every habit contrary
to good, flies from the nature of good. But if, as
Plato says [in the Timæus], matter is the nurse of
generation, which it also desires and conceives,—in
this case, matter being a mother, she will not be
the cause of any evil to the natures which proceed
from her, or rather, which are generated in her.
But if debility and misfortune happen to souls, it
is not on account of matter, because they were
subject to these prior to bodies and matter. And
these in a certain respect preexisted in souls, as
125
the causes of evils, antecedent to matter. Or
whence of the souls that follow Jupiter [to the
vision of the supercelestial place] is the head of the
charioteer in some of them, incapable of raising
itself to this place, and of beholding, through dim-
ness of sight, the blessed spectacles which that place
contains?a How, likewise, does it happen that
there is an oblivion of truly-existing being in these
souls, an unfortunate occurrence, and a tendency
downward, before they are connected with mat-
ter? For the horse which participates of depra-
vity, becomes heavy and verges to the earth. For
when the soul has fallen to the earth, she then is
connected with matter, and is involved in the dark-
ness of the terrestrial realms. But prior to her
lapse, she experienced debility, oblivion and evil.
For we should not have departed [from the vision
of perfect realities] unless we had been debilitated,
because, though we are distant from true being,
we still aspire after the contemplation of it.
If, therefore, the soul becomes debile prior to
her drinking of the cup [of oblivion], but proceeds
a See my translation of the Phædrus of Plato, from which dia-
logue what is here said by Proclus is derived.
b What is here said likewise is from the Phædrus; but for ovv-
înxα in Morbeka, it is necessary to read ouvruxia, the word used
by Plato.
This σuvruxia, or unfortunate occurrence, is the meeting
with certain malefic dæmons. For so Hermeas in his Scholia on
the Phædrus explains it.-Vid. Ast. Phædr. p. 149. The word
Be also employed by Plato in this part, is erroneously translated
by Morbeka exorbitat. Βρίθει γαρ ὁ της κακης ἱππος μετέχων, επι γην
jerav re xas Baguvav. So Plato in the Phædrus.-Vid. Ast. Edit.
p. 23.
126
into matter, after her flight from the intelligible
world, debility and, in short, evil do not accede to
souls on account of matter. For what can matter
effect in other things, since it has no effective
power? Or how, again, can that which is void of
quality, so far as it is void of quality, be able to
act? Moreover, either matter draws souls to it-
self, or souls are by themselves drawn and become
separate from themselves, and impotent. Hence,
if they were indeed drawn from themselves, their
impulse towards and appetition of that which is
subordinate, became evil to them; but of this, mat-
ter was not the cause. For all flight from a more
excellent condition of being is evil, and much more
descent to that which is worse. And souls choosing
badly through debility, suffer what such souls ought
to suffer. But if they are drawn to this by matter,
where is the self-motive nature and elections of the
soul, if we ascribe the cause of its descent into the
realms of generation to the attractions of matter,
as to a certain compulsive power? Or after what
manner, with respect to those souls which subsist
in matter, do these look to intellect and the good,
but those to generation and matter, if matter draws
all of them to herself, and molests, and offers vio-
lence to souls while they are still in the intelligible
world? Reason, indeed, will say this, and will
a For "autem" here in Morbeka's version, it is necessary to
read aut. The punctuation also of this and the following sentence
is erroneous, as the learned reader will from the above translation
easily perceive.
127
compel us to confess, not merely that matter is not
evil, but that it is good, giving a testimony con-
trary to the assertion that matter is evil itselfa.
It may seem, however, that Plato is drawn to
both opinions. For in the Timæus, indeed, when
he calls matter the mother and nurse of generation,
and a concause of the fabrication of the world, it is
manifest to every one that he admits matter to be
good. He likewise denominates the whole world
a blessed God, and considers matter to be a por-
tion of the world. But in the discourses of the
Elean stranger or guest, [in the Politicus,] he re-
fers the cause of the inordination of the universe
to its subject nature. He likewise says, that the
world, through its producing cause, possesses every
good, but through a former habit, the contraries
of these are ingenerated in it. In the Philebus,
however, producing matter itself, and every nature
of the infinite from the one, and in short assigning
a divine cause of the difference between bound and
infinity, and asserting that good, and the genera-
tion which is from deity, are effected by the parti-
cipation of deity, he grants, that evil has nowhere
a divine origin, but that it is requisite to investigate
other causes of it, as it is elsewhere said. Perhaps,
therefore, inordination and evil are not on account
of matter, but on account of that which is moved
a
This sentence in Morbeka is, "Hoc quidem et ista ratio dicet
et coget non quod non malum, sed et bonum materiam ostendi con-
trario illi modo tempestans." But for tempestans, it appears to me
to be requisite agreeably to the above translation to read attestans.
128
in a confused and disorderly manner. For this is
a corporeal nature, which, as the Elean guest says,
is the cause of inordination to the last parts of the
universe. For motion subsists about a corporeal
nature, matter being of itself immoveable. Nor is
the body which is void of quality the first compo-
site. For the first composite body, as Timæus
says, is visible; but that which is without quality is
not visible. The first composite, however, with a
representation of all forms in itself,-and these, as
it were, in a confused state,-in being moved, pro-
duces that which is inordinate. For the vestiges of
different forms, leading to different local motions,
manifest the whole motion to be fluctuating and
turbulent. This, therefore, is the former habit of
the world. For body of itself, not being able to
retain forms, shows itself to be in its own nature
unadorned, and destitute of beauty. And in wholes,
indeed, reasona [i. e. form] has dominion; but in
things which have the relation of parts, reason, on
account of its debility, being vanquished by a na-
ture contrary to itself, is led to evil, and becomes
as it were irrational, in consequence of being sub-
dued by its inferior.
After what manner, therefore, that which is præ-
ternatural enters into bodies, will be shortly after
manifest. That evil, however, is not from matter,
nor from bodies, is evident from what has been
a In Morbeka, there is nothing more in this place than, "et in
totis quidem obtinet"; but after quidem, I conceive it to be necessary
to add ratio, conformably to the above translation,
129
said.
For matter is not the same with that which
But that matter
is moved in a disorderly manner.
must not be considered to be primarily evil, So-
crates, I think, sufficiently shows in the Philebus,
in which Dialogue he generates infinity from God.
If, however, it must be said that matter is the in-
finite itself, matter, or that which is primarily infi-
nite, is from God. For it must be admitted that
essential infinity, depending on one cause, has a
divine origin, and especially that infinity which, in
conjunction with bound, is not able to produce a
mixture; since God is the cause of the subsistence
and mixture of these. These, therefore, and the
nature of body, so far as body, are to be referred
to one leading cause, which is God; for it is he
who produced the mixture. Hence neither is body
nor matter evil; for they are the progeny of deity,
the former as a mixture, but the latter as infinite.
In body, indeed, one thing has the relation of a
fountain and of reason or form, but another thing
is analogous to the infinite. For what else is the
infinite in body, than matter? And what else is
bound in it, than form? What, likewise, is that
which consists of both these, than the material
world? If, therefore, all the natures that are ge-
nerated, and the things of which they consist, are
from bound and infinity,—but that which produced
all these ranks as the fourth, as Plato says,-if this
be the case, we must say that neither matter nor
form, nor that which is mixed from both, originated
from any other cause than God. But what that is
K
130
generated from thence can be evil? For [as Plato
says in the Laws,] it is not the province of heat to
refrigerate, nor of good to produce evil. And
hence, neither matter nor body must be said to be
evil.
Perhaps, therefore, some one may ask us what
our opinion is concerning matter, and whether we
admit it to be good or to be evil, or in a certain
respect each of these? Let this, then, be our de-
cision, that matter is neither good nor evil. For if
it is good, it will be an end [to which something
else will be moved], and not the last of things, and
will be that for the sake of which something else
exists, and will be an object of desire. For all
good is a thing of this kind, because that which is
primarily good is an end, is that for the sake of
which all things subsist, and is desirable to all
beings. But again, if matter is evil, there will be
another principle of beings discordant with the
cause of all good, and there will be two fabled
fountains flowing contrary to each other, one
being the fountain of good, but the other of evil.
And neither will the life of the Gods themselves
b
a The punctuation of this sentence in Morbeka is very erro-
neous; for "Sive enim, bonum finis erit et non ultimum omnium et
cujus gratiâ et desiderabile," should be, Sive enim bonum, finis erit et
non ultimum omnium, &c.
b Proclus here alludes to the two vessels placed by the throne
of Jupiter, which are mentioned by Homer in Iliad 24. v. 527.
But by the evils of which one of the vessels is the fountain, Homer
meant the common calamities of human life, which are not evils in
reality, but, as a certain poet said,
"Are blessings in disguise."
131
be innoxious, nor free from mortal difficulty, or
from anything else which it is not easy to bear,
and which is foreign, and, as it were, attended
with molestation. If, however, evil is not, what
will that be which will have an existence accord-
ing to it? Or is it not sufficient to repeat what
has been often said, that we must assert of it an
existence which is necessary? For the nature of
good is one thing, but the nature of evil another;
and the one is contrary to the other. And there is
another third thing, which is neither simply good nor
evil, but necessary. For evil, indeed, leads from
good, and flies from its nature; but that which is
necessary is all that it is for the sake of good, has
a reference to it, and whatever has a generation
subsists on account of it. If, therefore, generation
is for the sake of good, but another thing which is
evil, is for the sake of generation,-in this case we
must say, that so far as it is necessary to genera-
tion, it is an end, and is good, and must not be
called [real] evil, but was produced by divinity as
necessary to forms, which are incapable of being
established in themselves. For it is not fit that the
cause of all good should alone produce beings that
are good, and who are able to generate from them-
selves natures characterized by good, but it is re-
quisite that it should likewise give existence to that
nature which is not simply and from itself good.
This nature, however, desires good, and through
this desire it gives generation to other things, and
contributes to the fabrication of a sensible essence.
K 2
132
For being [itself] not only gives subsistence to [real]
beings, but also to things which desire a participa-
tion of essence, and whose existence consists in the
desire of having a being. Hence, that which is
primarily desirable is one thing, and that which
desires this another, and which, through this de-
sire, possesses an intermediate good. But it desires
what has a prior subsistence to itself, and for the
sake of which it exists.
If, therefore, we thus consider matter, we shall
find that it is neither good nor evil, but necessary
alone; and that so far as it was produced for the
sake of good, it is good, but is not simply good.
And so far, indeed, as it is the last of things, it is
evil, because that is evil which is most distant from
good; but simply considered, it is not evil, but, as
we have said, is necessary. In short, it is not true
to assert that evil can effect anything by itself; for
that which can, is not unmingled evilª, and pri-
marily evil. For if evil is contrary to all good, it
is requisite that it should be contrary to that which
is good from itself and primarily good, prior to
being contrary to the good which subsists in some-
thing else; and also that evil should be twofold,
this being evil itself, but that existing in another
thing. But if evil is contrary to that good which
subsists in something else, much more will evil be
in another thing, and will not have an existence
from itself; for the good also to which evil is con-
a For "non mixtum malum," in Morbeka, it is necessary to read
non impermixtum malum, conformably to the above translation.
133
trary, subsists in another thing, and has not a
separate existence. For what that ranks among
beings will be contrary to the first good? Since all
beings exist on account of, and for the sake of it.
But it is impossible that a contrary should derive
its existence on account of a contrary nature. For
contraries are corrupted by each other; and, in
short, all contraries proceed from one summit and
genus. What, however, will be contrary to that
which is primarily the genus of the good? For
what is beyond the nature of the good? And what
among beings will become homogeneous to it? For
it would be requisite that there should be some-
thing else about both these, of which they will par-
ticipateª; and the good will no longer be the prin-
ciple of beings, but that will be the principle which
is common to both these. Hence, nothing is con-
trary to the first good, nor to all the participants
of it, but to those only which participate of it in
a variable manner. Of these, however, we have
before spoken, and therefore here we dismiss the
discussion of matter.
Again, then, let us pass to privation, because
certain persons assert this to be evil and entirely
contrary to good. For, say they, it is sufficient to
matter for form to be present with it; but privation
a Because, as Proclus just before observed, contraries proceed
from one summit and genus. Thus, from being itself motion and
permanency, sameness and difference proceed, which are opposed
to each other.
134
is never good, since it is always malefic and con-
trary to forms. And matter, indeed, aspires after
good, and partakes of it; but privation flies from
good, is the cause of corruption, and, in short, is
evil. If, indeed, the first good was the same with
being, and good and being were at the same time
one nature, it would be requisite that privation
should be primarily evil, in consequence of being
of itself non-entity and contrary to being. But if
good is different from being, and each is not the
same thing, evil also will be different from priva-
tion. In short, with respect to inordination and
incommensuration, these, as we have said, must be
assumed in one way, as the absence of measure and
order; but in another way, as naturally contrary to
them. For the latter are adverse to order and
measure; but the former are only an ablation of
them, and are nothing except a negation of these.
For when present, they are what they are; but
when absent, they leave the privations of them-
selves. If, therefore, evil is indeed contrary to
good, and discordant with it,—but privation neither
opposes the habit of which it is the privation, nor
is adapted to effect anything, the essence of it, as
our opponents say, being so debile and fleeting,-
how can we any longer ascribe to that a malefic
nature which is destitute of all effective power?
For that which is effective is form and power; but
privation is formless and debile, and is not power,
but rather the absence of power. Hence, from
135
what has been said, it is evident what the beings
are in which evil exists, and what those are in
which it has no existence.
Because, however, evil subsists in souls in one
way, but in bodies in another, what order of them
is to be assumed, and whence does it begin, and
how far does its diminution extend? Shall we say,
that the evil of souls is greater than that of bodies;
or shall we admit that the latter is the last of evils,
but that the evil of the former is of a more debile
nature? With respect, however, to the evil in soul,
one kind extends to energy alone, but another re-
strains this. And with respect to the powers of
the soul, its evil introduces to some of them all-
various fractures; but to others, as Plato says, a
cessation of energy. One evil, therefore, is alone
an impediment of energy; but another extends as
far as to power; and another is corruptive of es-
sence itself. And the first, indeed, is the passion
of divine souls, that become connected with the
realms of generation; but the second debilitates the
a This sentence in Morbeka is as follows: "Quod autem in
animâ; hoc quidem usque ad operationem solum; hoc autem has
obtinet;" but for has obtinet, it is necessary to read hanc detinet.
For Proclus here, and in the sentence that immediately follows it,
alludes to what is said by Plato in the Timæus, of the injury which
the soul sustains from the senses. For he there says, that through
them the circle of sameness, or the ratiocinative power, is restrained
in its energies, (την μεν ταυτου πανταπασιν επέδησαν, εναντια αυτή
ῥέουσαι, και επεσχον αρχουσαν και ιουσαν. την δε αν θατερου διέσεισαν,
πασας
·
δε κλασεις και διαφορας των κυκλων εμποιειν, όσαχη περ ην δυνατον,)
and that the circle of difference, or the power by which we opine,
sustains all-various fractures and distortions.
136
splendour of intellect, and the last is the passion of
bodies themselves. Hence, the first will be only
an apparent evil; but the last will be real evil,-I
mean that evil which destroys the nature of the
thing in which it is inherent,-and that which sub-
sists between these, and which is the evil of power,
is not adapted to effect anything in essence. In
short, that which can injure greater things, is a
greater evil; but essence is beyond power, and
power is beyond energy. And that, indeed, which
is corruptive of essence, at the same time dissipates
power and energy; but that which is corruptive of
power, destroys also energy; (neither, therefore, is
essence the same with power and energy, nor can
energy exist after the cessation of powera ;) and
that which is corruptive of first power, as far as to
energy, is privation, and not the contrary; but that
which is corruptive of power is contrary to essence,
[because essence is productive of power]. A greater
evil, however, is contrary to a greater good; and
therefore the evil of souls is greater than that of
bodies, not indeed of all bodies [for this is not true
of such as are immaterial], but of those the power
of which is naturally adapted to suffer. And the
evil is less to those beings in whom there is alone
a cessation of energy, since it is alone the absence
and the diminution of total perfection. One evil,
a This part within the parenthesis is in Morbeka, "Neque ergo
substantia cum iis, neque potentia post operationis cessationem ;” but
the true reading is, Neque ergo substantia eadem cum iis, neque opt -
ratio post potentiæ cessationem.
137
b
a
also, is contrary to virtue, but another to the good
of the body; and one is contrary to what is con-
formable to intellect, but another to what is con-
formable to nature. By how much better, there-
fore, intellect is than nature, and that which is
according to intellect than that which is accord-
ing to nature, by so much greater is the evil
which is a deviation from intellect, than that which
is a deviation from nature. If, however, one evil is
corruptive of essence, but another of power alone,
it is not wonderful. For when of the same thing,
this corrupts the essence, but that the power of it,
then that which is corruptive of essence is evil in
a greater degree. But when this takes place in a
different thing, and of a different nature, there is
no absurdity in admitting, that what is corruptive
of power, being more remote from the nature of
good, exceeds in evil, as when the power of one
thing is better than the essence of another.
thus the powers of the soul are said both to gene-
rate and preserve the corporeal essence [and are
therefore superior to it]. Hence, Socrates in the
[10th book of the] Republic says, that injustice is
not deadly to the soul by which it is possessed,
which it would be if the soul was mortal. For it
a
For
This sentence in Morbeka is, “Si autem hoc quidem substantiæ
est corruptivum, hoc autem potentiæ solum, mirabile;" but for "mi-
rabile," it is obviously necessary to read non mirabile.
tunc.
C
For "tam," in this place in Morbeka, it is requisite to read
• This sentence in Morbeka is, "Hoc ergo et qui in Politiâ So-
crates omnino dıny malitiam nominat, et non utique talem esse ait si
mortale erat. But for dinny here, it is necessary to read adixiv, this
being the word used by Plato in the passage above referred to.
""
138
would rapidly lead the souls that possessed it into
non-existence. But it is better not to be, than to be
in an evil condition; since the former is a privation
of being, but the latter of good. Hence corporeal
evil does not idly disclose to us the wickedness of
souls. For one corporeal evil by its intensity ter-
minates in non-existence [by destroying the life of
the body]; but another terminates in a bad con-
dition of being.
If, therefore, we assert these things rightly, mat-
ter will not be primarily evil, in consequence of the
reason which we have assigned. For body, which
is nearer to souls than matter, is replete with a less
evil than that of souls. But neither is that which is
more remote from good, more good, nor that which
participates more of evil, a less evil; but in souls,
indeed, the evil is greater, and in bodies less;
because the order of souls is different from the or-
der of bodies. For of souls, those that dwell on
high are entirely pure; but in others, there is a
privation of malefic energy; and in others, the re-
ception of evil extends as far as to their powers
[but not to their essence b]. And of bodies, some
indeed are always in order; in others, energy and
a Hence, if the evil of bodies is less than the evil of souls, the evil
of matter also must be less than that of soul, because matter is one
of the things of which body consists.
primarily evil.
b This is the case with human souls,
at times vitiated, but not their essence.
Matter, therefore, is not
for their powers become
And the evil of their pow-
ers consists in the privation of symmetry between the rational and
irrational parts of the soul, as Proclus elsewhere observes; so that
these powers are not essentially evil, but are evil only xara ox8064,
according to habitude, or proximity and alliance.
139
power subsist differently at different times; and in
others, their essence is the recipient of evilª. And
such is the order of these.
:
It follows, in the next place, that we should sur-
vey what evil itself is by itself, and what nature it
possesses. Prior, however, to this, we should con-
sider whether of evils there is some one and the
same cause, or whether there is not.
For some
say there is; but this is denied by others. And the
former of these asserting that there is a fountain of
evils, from this produce all evil, of whatever kind
it may be; but the latter, contending that the prin-
ciple of evil is a malefic soul, say that evils are
generated from hence. Others, again, ascribing
the species of evil to an intellectual nature, which
is a medium between the two above-mentioned
principles, acknowledge that evils, as well as all
other things, have from thence their progression.
With respect to the authors, however, of these
opinions, some form their conclusions from other
hypotheses; but others make Plato the father of
their dogmas. And the latter, indeed, establishing
intellectual ideas of all things, adduce what is said
by Socrates in the Theætetus in corroboration of
a The celestial bodies are always in order, and experience no other
alteration than a mutation of figure, and a variation of light. But
of the sublunary spheres, so far as wholes, they always remain inde-
structible; but their energies and powers are different at different
times. Hence, in the sublunary region there are periods of ferti-
lity and sterility, as Plato observes in the Republic. But the parts
of sublunary bodies are the recipients of evil, so far as they are de-
structible, though this destructibility contributes to the good of the
whole.
140
their doctrine, viz. that there are twofold paradigms,
the one divine, but the other without deity: but
the former cite the Athenian guest, who introduces
two kinds of souls, the one beneficent, but the
other, on the contrary, malefic; and they say that
the universe is governed by the former of these
souls alone, but the mortal region by both.
For, in short, if it is admitted that there is one
cause of evils, it is requisite to think that this cause
is either divine, or intellectual, or psychical. The
Gods, however, intellects and souls, receive the
order of cause; but of other things, some are their
instruments, and others are representations and
images produced in matter. In answer to those,
therefore, who contend that there is a fountain of
evils, what has been said is sufficient. For all the
Gods, and all the fountains [or principles of things],
are the causes of good; but are not the causes, nor
ever will be, of any evil. For if, as we have before
said, and as Socrates in the Phædrus asserts, every-
thing divine is good, beautiful and wise, it will
either produce evil contrary to its nature; or every-
thing which subsists from thence will be boniform,
and the progeny of the goodness which is esta-
blished in divinity. But, as it is said, it is not the
province of fire to refrigerate, nor of good to pro-
duce evil from itself. Hence, one of two things
must follow; either that evil must not be said to be
evil, if it is of divine origin, or that it exists, but
has not deity for its cause. It has, however, been
before shown, that there is another cause of evils,
141
and that God is not the source of them; as Plato
also somewhere teaches, admitting that the pro-
gression of all good is from one cause, but refer-
ring the generation of evils to other causes, and
not to a divine original. For everything which
thence subsists is good, and therefore the whole
is good. And from that which is, as it were, a
cardiack or invigorating light of goodness in the
Gods, another light proceeds, being a splendour
and power, and part of deific power. Those blessed,
however, and felicitous beings, the progeny of the
Gods, are said to adorn and give measure to evils,
and to bound their infinity and darkness, in conse-
quence of that portion of good which they receive,
and the power of existence which they are allotted.
This adorning and arranging cause, therefore, is
called the fountain of evils, not as the fountain
from which they are generated,—for it is not lawful
that the first causes of beings should be the prin-
ciple of evils,—but [it is rather a fountain of good]
as imparting to evils end and bound, and illumi-
nating their obscurity by its own beneficent light.
For evil, indeed, is infinite from partial causes,
but receives an end from wholes; and on this ac-
count it is evil to these causes, but to wholes is not
evil. For the infinite in evils is not according to
power, since thus, by the infinitude of themselves,
a It appears to me that Morbeka, in his translation of the above
sentence, has either omitted or altered something which Proclus
said. For how can an adorning and arranging cause be called in
any way the fountain of evils? I have therefore added [it is rather
a fountain of good].
142
they would participate of the nature of good,—but
it is in consequence of a defect of power. And
evils are in a certain respect corroborated by good
through the participation of bound.
The authors of these assertions, therefore, thus
conceiving, and being persuaded that the genera-
tion of evils is not inordinate, make God to be the
cause of the order of these. But it appears to me,
that not the Barbarians only, but likewise the most
eminent of the Greeks, ascribing to the Gods a
knowledge of all things,-both of such as are evil,
and such as are good,―ascribe the generation of
things essentially good to the Gods, and also of
such as are evil, so far as they receive a portion
of good, and the power of existing, in order to
accomplish a certain end. For, as we have often
said, evil is not evil without a mixture [of good];
but it is in one respect evil, and in another good.
And so far, indeed, as it is good, it is from the Gods;
but so far as evil, it derives its subsistence from an-
other, and that an impotent cause. For all evil is
generated on account of impotence and defect,
because evil, so far as it is good, receives its hy-
postasis from power and [so far as it is evil from]
impotence. For the power of evil is in good" [i.e.
exists so far as it partakes of good]. For if evil
was evil without a mixture, and evil alone, it would
ย
" In Morbeka, "quoniam et bonum," should be, conformably to
the above translation, quoniam ut bonum.
↳ In Morbeka, “Ipsius enim potentia et in ipso;" but the true
reading is, Ipsius enim potentia est in ipso [i. e. in bono].
143
be unknown to the Gods, since they are good, and
are able to benefit all things, of whatever kind they
may be, which derive from them their existence; or,
in other words, they benefit everything of which
they have a knowledge. For their cognitions are
energetic powers, and are fabricative of all things,
of which also they are said to be the cognitions. Be-
cause however evil, at the same time that it is evil,
is likewise good, and is more good than evil, because
it is good to the universe, neither must the know-
ledge of evil by the Gods be destroyed, nor the
generation of it from thence; but it must be ad-
mitted, that the Gods both know and produce evil,
so far as it is good. Hence, after the same manner
that they know, they produce it; and the causes of
evils are with them powers which impart good to
the nature of evil; just as if some God should,
according to forms, give a specific subsistence to
intellectual powers in the forms of nature.
It is well, however, that our discussion has led
us to speak of forms, and the order of forms, lest
perhaps evils, and the generations of evils, should
proceed from these; or whence to evils also is the
never-failing derived? For everything which per-
petually exists, proceeds from an immoveable and
definite cause. If, therefore, evil perpetually sur-
rounds the mortal nature, what is the perpetuity of
it, and whence does it originate? For we cannot
say that it proceeds from any other cause than that
a Proclus beautifully observes, in his Commentary on the Timæus
of Plato, "that Divinity concealed evil in the utility of good."
144
which eternally subsists after the same manner, and
from an immoveable nature. But this
But this is the na-
ture of forms, and that which always exists is good.
And what, indeed, will be produced by intellect
which is not good? If, therefore, intellect is good,
whatever is produced conformably to it is good; for
that which is assimilated to good, is good; but evil,
so far as evil is not adapted to be assimilated to good.
We likewise say, that what is assimilated to intel-
lectual forms, is perfect and happy; but, on the
contrary, we denominate every being that is evil
miserable and unhappy. Hence evil, so far as
evil, is not assimilated to intellect; and this being
the case, neither will there be in intellect paradigms
of evils. For every image is the image of a para-
digm. But if Plato, also, calls forms or ideas the
most divine of beings,-for the Elean stranger or
guest says, that a perpetually invariable sameness
of subsistence alone pertains to the most divine of
all things; and if, as we have said, the paradigm of
evils is destitute of divinity and dark,—if this be
the case, how is it possible to suppose that such a
nature as that which is most divine being innate in
forms, evil can thence be produced? If, however,
the fabricator of the universe, who contains in him-
a In Morbeka, "Non ergo malus quia malus assimilatur intel-
lectui;" but for "malus quia malus," I read, conformably to the
above translation, malum quà malum.
The latter part of this sentence in Morbeka is, "quod ingeni-
tam talem naturam in illis supponentes inde producere malum.” But
for “quod,” I read quomodo possibile est, and in consequence of
this, make the whole sentence interrogative.
145
self all forms, and the number of forms, was willing
that evil should not exist in the universe, and like-
wise wished to generate all things similar to him-
selfa, and therefore free from evil, how can there
still be a paradigm of evils? For, containing all
things, he will benefit them, and will not permit
anything to be in vain. For he does not indeed
give subsistence to, and generate some forms, but
with respect to others is barren and inefficacious;
but by his very being producing all things, his ge-
nerative power operates with an impartible energy.
One of two things, therefore, is necessary, either
that the divine intellect should wish evils to exist,
and to be generated, if it contains essentially the
forms of these; or that, not being willing, it should
neither generate nor produce them, nor possess the
forms of them in the same manner as it does of the
mundane natures of which it is the cause.
This hypothesis, however, which introduces a
paradigm of evils, is not of itself sufficient to per-
suade us that it is true, since it is often changed to
what is contrary to truth. But it is not wonderful,
if, while asserting that evil is eternal, and admitting
that there are immoveable causes of eternal beings,
we should at the same time refuse to grant that
there is such a cause of evil. For that is properly]
eternal, which has perpetually a progression into
existence according to nature, but not that which
is produced [perpetually] in any way whatever ;
since it must be said, that evils revolve about a
a Plato asserts this of the Demiurgus in the Timæus.
L
146
mortal nature, not in consequence of everything
mortal being evil, but because these evils also are
adorned by the order of the universe, and espe-
cially by the heavens. Hence these, after impart-
ing essence to generated natures, cause them like-
wise to participate of eternity. But to the bodies
which have a rectilinear motion, they give circular
periods, and impart order to things inordinate,
bound to things indefinite, and goodness to every-
thing that is evil. Everything, therefore, which is
according to nature, and exists always, is generated
from a definite cause. But evil is not according to
nature. For neither is there a producing principle
of lameness in nature, nor of a deviation from art
in art. How, therefore, is it possible to investigate
an immoveable principle, and a producing cause of
evils in forms, since everything which derives its
existence from them is a form and an end; but the
nature of evils is of itself infinite and undefined?
In the third place, therefore, let us direct our
attention to the soul which we denominate ma-
lefic, and consider whether or not we must ascribe
to this the cause of all evils. Shall we say, then, that
as it is essentially the province of fire to heat, but
not to refrigerate anything,—and of other things,
there is another employment,-so likewise it essen-
tially pertains to this malefic soul to generate evils,
and to infect with evil everything to which it is
proximate? Or shall we admit that the nature of
it is always good, but that its energies subsist dif
ferently according to the same order, a different
147
energy producing a different life? If, therefore,
it should be said that these indeed are malefic, it
must be granted that it is malefic, not because it is
an irrational soul, but because it is better than this,
and through which it is good. For to this soul
there is a transmutation of habit to the better and
the worse. But if, as some say, this soul is essen-
tially and of itself evil, from whence does it derive
its being? Is it from any other source than the
demiurgic cause, and the mundane Gods? And
how is it possible that it should not proceed from
those causes, from which the species of the mortal
life originates? But if it proceeds from these, how
can it be essentially evil? For all the progeny of
these are good, and in short, all evil is beyond es-
sence, and is not essence; since nothing is contrary
to essence. But good is contrary to evil. And a
sensible essence, indeed, is the image of being; but
being [i. e. real being,] is established in good, and
generates all things according to good, and nothing
which is thence derived is evil. It is not, however,
wonderful, if the Athenian guesta denominates such
a soul malefic, on account of the evil which is in
a Vide Plat. de Legibus, lib. x. The words of the Athenian
guest to which Proclus here alludes are, "We should not, there-
fore, establish less than two souls, one beneficent, and the other of
a contrary nature." See vol. ii. p. 308. of my translation of Plato.
As I have there observed, however, Plato, by an evil soul, means
the nature or natural life suspended from the rational soul of the
world, and which is the proximate vis motrix of bodies. As this
life without the governing influence of the rational soul of the
world, would produce nothing but confusion and disorderly mo-
tions, it may be said, when considered as left to itself, to be evil.
L 2
148
its powers and energies, this evil not always re-
maining, but as I have elsewhere observed, being
made in a certain respect boniform, and adapting
its own energies to those of a superior soul. For
this latter soul is adapted to save itself; but the
former is incapable of being converted to itself.
And to the latter, indeed, since it is of a boniform
nature, measure and reason are derived from itself;
but to the former, from an external cause: because
to body, and to all alter-motive natures, both being
and well-being are on account of another, and, as
it were, externally acceding cause.
In short, as I
may say, it is absurd to make such a soul to be the
cause of evils. For neither is it the cause to body
of all the evils that are in it, nor to a more excellent
soul. For evil and debility are to a better soul
from itself, because when it descends, the form of
the mortal life springs up together with it; but de-
bility was allotted to it, prior to its descent into
the realms of generation. For the causes of its
descent were no other than debility, and an im-
potency of contemplating supernal natures; since
neither while we were able and at the same time
willing to be established in the intelligible world, did
our flight from real being, and inordination with re-
spect to the contemplation of it, exist; nor, in short,
does the flight from the survey of it proceed from
not wishing to see the spectacles in the superior
[i. e. in the supercelestial] place. For all those
that are distant from, aspire after the vision of it;
a And its descent is owing to its debility.
149
!
After what manner,
but, as Plato says [in the Phædrus 2], being impo-
tent, they are carried round in a submerged con-
dition. Hence it remains, that this arises from
debility alone. For the eyes of the soul are impo-
tent with respect to a permanent vision of the truth
and splendour which are there. By a much greater
priority, therefore, is evil in souls, and does not
originate from a second life.
however, evil subsists in the former soul, and why
Plato denominates it malefic, has been shown by us.
sufficiently for the present. For its incommensura-
bility and indefinite nature are contrary to measure,
and to those boundaries which proceed from form;
and it neither is alone deprived of, nor desires the
participation of them. If any one, therefore, look-
ing to these things, should denominate this latter
soul malefic and contrary to form, he will not assert
this of it as if it was allotted a nature of this kind,
but as verging to that which is without measure
and bound, though at the same time it is able to
be drawn by itself to a more excellent nature.
4. But if these are not the causes of evils, why
do we ourselves admit that there is a cause of the
generation of them? To this we reply, it must by
no means be admitted that there is one cause, which
of itself is the source of evils. For if there is one
cause of everything that is good, there are many
causes, and not one cause alone, of evils; since all
things that are good, are commensurate with, simi-
3
The words of Plato are, αδυνατούσαι δε, ὑποβρυχιαι ξυμπεριφέρονται.
Vide Phædr. Edit. Ast. p. 24.
150
lar and friendly to each other; but, on the con-
trary, evils are neither commensurate with each
other, nor with things that are good. If, therefore,
one cause precedes the commensurability of simi-
lars with each other, but many that of dissimilars,-
for all things which are from one cause, are friendly
to, and co-passive with, each other, and assemble
together, some in a greater, but others in a less
degree,—if this be the case, and if there be many
causes, and not one cause only of evils,-some, in-
deed, to souls, but others to bodies,-from these,
and in these, evil must be surveyed. And it ap-
pears to me that Socrates, in the Republic, insi-
nuating this, denies that a divine nature is the cause
of evils; but says that other causes of them are to
be investigated. For by this he signifies that
these causes are many, indefinite and particular.
For what monad or triad, or eternally producing
principle can there be of evils, the very being of
which is through dissimilitude and indefiniteness
as far as to an individual nature? But that which
ranks as a whole is everywhere without evil. The
effective causes of evils, therefore, are these: and
souls, likewise, and such forms as subsist about
matter, are certain causes of this kind. For some
of these lead to evil, but others being adverse to
each other, afford a place to that which is præter-
natural in generation; since that which is accord-
ing to nature to some things, is præternatural to
others. Let an instance of this, if you are willing,
"In Morbeka "significant," instead of significat.
a
151
be that paradigm, destitute of Divinity and dark,
which is mentioned by Socrates in the Theatetus",
where he speaks of the evils which necessarily re-
volve about a mortal nature, and this place of our
abode. For souls when assimilated to evil beings,
change their life by an assimilation to a more ex-
cellent nature. For the soul, indeed, beholds the
exemplars of good, when she is converted to her-
self, and to beings better than herself, with whom
things primarily good subsist, and the summits of
beings, separately established on a pure and holy
foundation; but again, she looks to the paradigms
of evils, when she directs her attention to things
external to, and posterior to, herself, which are
naturally inordinate, indefinite and flowing, and
are destitute of that good by which the eye of the
soul is nourished and watered, and lives her own
proper life. The forms and powers of evils, there-
fore, are not effective, but are impotence and de-
bility, and an incommensurable communion with,
and mixture of, similars. Nor, again, are there
certain immoveable paradigms of evils, and which
always subsist after the same manner, but such as
are infinite and indeterminate, and borne along in
a Proclus here alludes to the following words of Plato in the
Theætetus: Παραδειγματων ω φιλε εν τῷ οντι έστωτων, του μεν θείου ευ
δαιμονεστάτου, του δε αθέου αθλιωτατου, κ.τ.λ. See vol. iv. of my trans
lation of Plato's works, p. 52.
ს τρέφεται και αρδεται so Plato in the Phædrus.
c In Morbeka, "commensurata communio"; but for " commen-
surata," it is necessary to read incommensurata.
-
152
other, and these innumerable, things. But that
for the sake of which something else subsists, is
the least of all things to be ranked among evils.
For it is not fit that the end of evils should be
good: but because souls search after good in every
possible way, and for the sake of this undertake all
that they effect, and act badly,-on this account,
some one perhaps may think that the end of evils
is good. All things, therefore, are for the sake of
this good, both such as are really good and such
as are contrary to it. For we act badly through
an ignorance of our own nature, at the same time
desiring good. And perhaps it will be well, neither
to establish evil as a principle, nor as a paradigm
according to nature, nor as of itself subsisting for
its own sake. For the form and nature of evils is
defect, indetermination, privation, and a mode of
hypostasis, which, as it is usually said, may be ra-
ther assimilated to a parhypostasis, or deviation
from subsistence. And hence, as it has been fre-
quently observed, evil is involuntary. For how,
indeed, can it be voluntary, since that which is
voluntary subsists for the sake of good? But evil
of itself is neither desirable, nor an object of choice
to any being. These things, however, we shall
elsewhere discuss. But from what has been said,
it is evident that evil in souls arises from debility,
and the victory of a subordinate nature; for the
horse which participates of depravity, says Plato
[in the Phædrus], gravitates and tends to the earth.
153
And in bodies, it arises from the mixture of dissi-
milars, viz. of form, and matter which is formless,
and of contrary producing powers.
It follows, therefore, that we who admit that evil
is to be called a parhypostasis, or deviation from
subsistence, should show after what manner, from
the above-mentioned causes and non-causes, it sub-
sists; since it is not possible for it to exist other-
wise than as a parhypostasis. For that which is
produced by a principal cause, of whatever kind it
may be, has itself a principal subsistence, neither
having an indefinite end, nor the relation of that
which alone subsists for the sake of something else,
nor a progression from itself into being. And [in
short,] whatever is generated from a cause, is ac-
cording to nature. For without a cause, it is im-
possible for anything to have a generation, or to
refer the order of its existence to any end.
we say, therefore, that evil is accidental to certain
things, and that it subsists for the sake of some-
thing else, and is not derived from the first princi-
ple? For we also energise in everything, for the
sake of the participation of good, and in conse-
quence of looking to it, and being as it were, par-
Shall
a In Morbeka, “ro cujus gratiâ,” which in the Greek was TO
ἕνεκα του, which is opposed to το οὗ ἕνεκα, or that for the sake of which
other things subsist. For as Proclus beautifully observes, in Plat.
Theol. lib. ii. p. 105, Το μεν γαρ εσχατον των πραγματων, ένεκα του
μόνον εστί, το δε πρώτον οὗ ἕνεκα μονον. i. e. "The last of things is that
which only subsists for the sake of something else; but the first
principle of things is that for the sake of which alone other things
subsist.' Hence, the vexa Tov μovov pertains to matter, but the ou
ivixa μovov, to the ineffuble principle of things.
154
turienta with, and always desiring it. Hence, in
some things we act rightly; but in others not. For
because we esteem that which is not good, [as if it
were good,] we act erroneously; but because in
what we do, we desire to obtain good, we act rightly.
And our conduct, so far as pertains to what is uni-
versal, is right; but so far as pertains to what is par-
ticular, is wrong. Hence that which is desirable
to us is one thing, and that which we obtain is
another. And the one is the nature of good; but
the other is contrary to it. The generation, there-
fore, of what is contrary to good, of whatever kind
it may be, arises from the debility of the efficient,
and its incommensurability to that which is effected.
For we rightly assert that those things have a sub-
sistence which proceed from a principle, and have
a certain end to which their progression is directed;
but we say that those things have a deviation from
subsistence, which neither proceed from a principle
according to nature, nor have a definite end. But
evils neither have a principal cause of their genera-
tion, for neither the nature of that which is præter-
natural, nor the reason of things præter-rational,
is a cause, nor do they reach to an end. For every-
thing which is generated, is generated for the sake
of something [different from itself]. Hence such
a
b
" In Morbeka "parientes," for which it is necessary to read
parturientes: in the Greek adivovres, an expression much used by
Proclus.
b Reason, in the Greek λoyos, signifies in this place a productive
power, but which, from its imbecility, does not merit the appellation
of a cause.
155
a generation must be said to be a deviation from
subsistence, imperfect and without a scope, and
also in a certain respect uncaused and indefinite.
For neither is there one cause of it, nor does that
which is a cause of itself, and a principal cause,
effect anything, looking to evil itself, and the na-
ture of evil. But the very contrary to this takes
place. For everything which is produced, is pro-
duced for the sake of good; but evil is extrinsically
derived, and is superadvenient. The attainment,
indeed, of that which is appropriate, is to every-
thing an end; but the unattainment of it proceeds
from the debility of the efficient, so far as it re-
ceives a nature which is partly less and partly more
excellent; and in consequence of this, one part of
it is different from the other. For where the one
is, there at the same time is the good; but evil is
in its nature divided and not one. For the incom-
mensurable, the unharmonious and contrariety are
in multitude; but from these debility and indigence
proceed; because in the Gods also [who are cha-
racterized by unity] there is the winged nature,
and at the same time each of the horses is goodª.
There, however, all things are good, and from
such things as are good, and not from their con-
traries; but in other beings, there is a mixture of
evil and good, multitude, and a diversity of powers,
through which they are drawn to things of a dif-
"In Morbeka, "simul et equorum utrumque," but after utrum-
que, it is necessary to add bonus. See the Phædrus of Plato, to
which Proclus in what he here says alludes.
156
ferent nature. And among divine beings, indeed,
multitude looks to one thing, and is bounded by
one species of life. But where multitude and dif-
ference shine forth, there, on account of a diminu-
tion of union, there is an indigence of power. For
all power is one thing, and is that which it is from
unity, and discord and discrepance arise from the
appetition of one thing being different from that
of another. And thus we have shown after what
manner the generations of evils subsist, and what
that is which is called a parhypostasis, or deviation
from subsistence, and whence it is derived.
5. It must now, therefore, be shown what evil
itself is. It appears, however, to be the most dif-
ficult of all things to know what is essentially the
nature itself of evil; since all knowledge is a con-
tact with form, and is itself a form. But evil is
without form, and is as it were privation. This,
perhaps, will become manifest, if, looking to good
itself and the nature of what is good, we thus sur-
vey
what evil itself is. For as that which is the
first good, is beyond all things, so evil itself is de-
stitute of all good; I mean so far as it is evil, and
a defect and privation of good. With respect to
good, therefore, how far it extends, after what man-
ner it subsists, and what orders it possesses, we
have elsewhere shown. But with respect to evil,
if so far as evil it is entirely a privation of good,
it follows that as evil it is destitute of the fountain
of good; that as infinite it is deprived of the first
bound; as debility, that it is without the power
157
which is in the intelligible order; that as incom..
mensurable, and false, and turpitude itself, it is des-
titute of the beauty, truth and symmetry a through
which that which is mixed, and in which the uni-
ties of beings subsist; that as being naturally with-
out location and unstable, it is deprived of the
nature and power of eternity which abides in one;
but that as privation and without life it does not
participate of the first monad of forms, and of the
life which is there. And if evil is corruptive, and
the cause of division to the natures with which it is
present, and is imperfect, it is deprived of the per-
fective goodness of wholes. For as corruptive,
indeed, it leads from existence to non-existence;
as dividing, it destroys the continuity and union
of being; and as imperfect, it prevents particulars
from obtaining their perfection and natural order.
Further still, the indefiniteness of the nature of evil,
causes it to be destitute of, and to deviate from,
""
a Proclus here alludes to what Plato says in the Philebus, viz.
"that every mixture if it is rightly made requires three things,
viz. beauty, truth and symmetry.' But that which is first mixed
is being itself; and in symmetry, truth and beauty, the unities of
beings subsist. See the 3rd book of my translation of Proclus on
the Theology of Plato.
D
""
Plato says this of eternity in the Timæus, so that the Greek of
the "manentis æterni in uno of Morbeka is, του αιώνος μένοντος
εν ένιο
C
• The first monad of forms is what Plato calls, in the Timæus,
airo【wov, or animal itself, and is the extremity of the intelligible
triad.
d viz. it is deprived of the intelligible and at the same time in-
tellectual order of Gods.
158
d
the summit which possesses transcendent union a;
its infecundity deprives it of generative, and its
inertness of demiurgic, power. For it is the ex-
clusion, debility and indefiniteness of every good of
this kind, viz. it is a privation of the monadic cause,
of generative power, and efficacious production.
But if it is the cause of dissimilitude, partition and
inordination, it is evident that it is thus deficient of
assimilitative good, and of the impartible provi-
dential inspection of partible natures, and of the
order which is necessary to impartible beings. If,
however, good does not only extend to these orders,
but there is also the immaculate genus, which is
efficacious and magnificent in its energies, evil will
be inefficacious, dark and material. Or whence
will it possess each of these, and other things of a
like kind, if not from privations of the above-men-
tioned species of good? For there good subsists
primarily, of which the good that is in us is a part
€
a viz. evil is destitute of the participation of the summit of the
intellectual order, i. e. of Saturn.
b viz. evil is destitute of a participation of the middle of the in-
tellectual order, which is vivific and generative.
с
* i. e. evil does not participate of the extremity of the intellec-
tual order, in which the Demiurgus subsists.
d Evil also does not participate of the good derived from the
super-mundane order of Gods, who are characterized by similitude.
• The immaculate genus, is the order of the añoλuta b101, or li-
berated Gods, which genus is said by Proclus, in Theol. Plat. lib. vi.
p. 387, to be αχραντον, undefiled, ὡς με ρεπον εις τα χειρονα, μηδε την
εξηρημένην ὑπεροχην εκλυον τη περι τον κόσμον προμήθεια : i. 6.
verging to less excellent natures, nor destroying its exempt trans-
cendency, by its providential energies about the world."
as not
159
and an image; and of which evil is the privation.
And what occasion is there to say this, since the
evil also which is in bodies, is not only a privation
of the good which exists in the intelligible and in-
tellectual orders, but also of that which prior to
body is in souls. For the good which is in bodies,
is a corrupt image of the good of souls. Hence,
likewise, the privation of form will not be a frus-
tration of anything else than of intellectual power;
because form is the offspring of intellect; and that
which is productive of essence, is essentially intel-
lectual. And thus we have shown, that what is in
every respect evil, is a privation and defect of good.
Such, therefore, being the nature of evil, let us
in the next place show whence its contrariety to
good proceeds. For evil, indeed, is a privation,
but not perfect privation. Hence, being co-ex-
istent with the habit of which it is the privation, it
causes it by its presence to be debile; but from the
habit assumes itself power and form. In conse-
quence of this, the privations of forms, being per-
fect privations, are alone the absence of habits, and
are not adverse to them; but the privations of
good, are adverse to, and in a certain respect con-
trary to, their habits. For they are not entirely
impotent and inefficacious, being co-existent with
their powers, and led as it were by them into form
and energy. Plato also knowing this, says that
injustice itself, is of itself debile and inactive, but
through the presence of justice both possesses power
and is led to energy, not abiding in its own nature,
160
nor in a privation of vitality alone, because that
which is vital subsisting prior to evil, imparts to
evil a participation of life. All life, however, is
essentially power; but evil being produced through
a power which is not its own, is contrary to good,
employing its own power for the purpose of resist-
ing good. And the greater, indeed, the inherent
power is, the greater are the energies and the works
of evil; but they are less when the power is less.
In the powers of nature, likewise, in bodies, the
præternatural then exists in a greater degree, when
order is entirely dissolved. Hence, in souls also,
greater effects are produced from a less evil, but
less from a greater. For evil being destitute of
its contrary [good,] is increased, indeed, accord-
ing to its turpitude and privation of form; but
being diminished according to power and energy,
is debile, and at the same time inefficacious. For
its strength is not from its own power, so that the
power being increased, the transition would be to
something greater; but it is from the presence of
its contrary; just as if cold should use the power
of heat for the purpose of effecting its own work,
vanquishing its power, and causing it to be in sub-
b
a For a less evil, participating more of good, has more power;
but a greater evil has less power, in consequence of participating
less of good: because the power of evil, such as it is, is derived
from good. For evil in itself, so far as evil, is powerless; so that
the power which it appears to have, arises from its mixture with
good.
"In Morbeka, "Solificata enim a contrario"; but the original
of “solificata" was, I have no doubt, egnµovra.
161
jection to itself. Hence, there being a deficiency
of the nature contrary to evil, and privation in-
creasing in proportion to the deficiency; and the
effective energy likewise becoming more debile,
through a diminution of power, the evil, indeed,
is greater, but the effect produced by it is less.
If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, it
must not be said that evil [so far as evil,] either
effects, or is capable of effecting anything; but
both its efficiency and its power are derived from
its contrary good. For good, on account of its
mixture with evil, is debile and inefficacious; and
evil participates of power and energy on account
of the presence of good, since both subsist in one
thing. Thus too, in material bodies, where one
thing is contrary to another, that which is accord-
ing to nature corroborates that which is præterna-
tural. Or whence do bodies derive a periodic
measure, and an order of periods, except from na-
tural numbers, and from that disposition which is
conformable to nature? That, however, which is
præternatural debilitates that which is according to
nature, the energy of nature being blunteda, and the
order being dissolved in which its well-being con-
sists. Thus also in souls, evil vanquishing good",
employs the power of it for its own purposes, viz.
a In Morbeka, " latitante naturâ ad facere"; but for “ latitante,”
it appears to me to be necessary to read hebetante.
b When evil in the soul vanquishes good, it is because the good
which is mingled with the evil, is greater than the good which it
subdues. For, as Proclus has well observed, all the power which
evil possesses is derived from good.
M
162
it uses the power of reason and its inventions for
the gratification of inordinate desires. Each, like-
wise, imparts to the other what pertains to its own
nature; this indeed power, but that debility; be-
cause evil of itself is not adapted to the possession
of either energy or power. For all power is good,
and all energy is an extension of power.
6. And how, indeed, is it possible to admit that
evil possesses power, if it is the province of all power
to preserve that in which it resides? But evil dissi-
pates everything of which it is the evil. Hence, evil
is of itself inefficacious and impotent; and if, also,
as Plato says, it is involuntary, it will be without
will, and thus is deprived of the most primary triad
of good, viz. of will, power and energy. For good,
indeed, in its own nature, is accompanied by will,
and is powerful and efficacious; but evil is without
will, and is debile and inefficacious. For neither is
that wished for by anything which is corruptive of
that thing; nor is it the province of power, so far as
it is power, to corrupt; nor of energy, not to have
its hypostasis according to power. But as things
that are evil desire what appears to them to be
good, and the evil which appears to them is the
object of their will, on account of its mixture with
good; so, likewise, power and effective energy have
in evil an apparent subsistence, because evil has not
these essentially, nor so far as it is evil, but derives
them externally, in consequence of not having itself
a real subsistence, but being a deviation from sub-
sistence. It appears, therefore, to me, that this is
163
shown by Socrates, in the Theaetetus, to those who
are capable of apprehending his meaning, viz. that
evil is neither [absolutely] privation, nor contrary
to good. For privation is not able to effect anything,
nor, in short, is at all powerful; nor of itself is a
contrary, nor has any power or energy. Hence, we
denominate evil in a certain respect a subcontrary,
because it is not of itself entirely a perfect privation,
but, together with habit, deriving from it power and
energy, is constituted in the part of contrariety, and
is neither perfect privation, nor contrary, but sub-
contrary to good. But the term parhypostasis in-
dicates the truth concerning it to those who do not
negligently attend to its meaning. It is evident,
therefore, from what has been said, what the nature
of evil is, and whence it is derived.
7. In the next place, let us speak of the differ-
ences of evil, and show what they are. It has,
therefore, been before observed by us, that of evil,
one kind is in souls, but another in bodies; and,
likewise, that evil in souls is twofold, this subsisting
in the irrational form of life, but that in the rational
part. And we now say, that in the three following
things evil subsists, viz. in a partial soul, in the
imagea of soul, and in the body which ranks among
particulars. Hence, if the good of the rational
soul is derived from its conversion to intellect,—
for intellect is prior to it ;—and the good of the ir-
rational part is from reason,-for the good of every-
thing is derived from that which is proximately bet-
a i. e. the irrational, which is the image of the rational soul.
M 2
161
ter than itself;—and again, if the good of body is
a subsistence conformable to nature,-for nature
is the principle of motion and rest to it ;-if this be
the case, it is necessary that the evil of the rational
part should be in a subsistence subcontrary to in-
tellect, but of the irrational part, in a deviation
from reason; since the good of it consists in acting
conformably to reason; and the evil of body will
be a præternatural subsistence. And these three
evils are inherent in the three natures, through their
being subject to debility from a diminution in the
partial nature of their essence. For wholes, as we
have frequently said, possess their proper good
perpetually; but evil exists in particulars and in-
dividuals, in which there is a deficiency of power,
through a diminution of essence, together with di-
vision and an attenuated union. In short, there is
one evil in souls, and another in bodies.
these, that which is in souls is twofold; this, indeed,
being a molestation of the soul arising from grief
or some other passion; but that being turpitude,
as it is somewhere said by the Elean guest. But
the turpitude of the soul is indeed ignorance and a
privation of intellect, and its molestation from pas-
sion arises from discord in the soul, and an aban-
donment of the life which is according to reason.
And thus, evil will have a threefold subsistence;
but each of these likewise is twofold. For, with
respect to turpitude, one kind subsists about the
dianoetic, but another about the doxastic power;
because the knowledge of each is different; and in
And of
165
the one, there is a want of science, but in the other,
of art. With respect, however, to turpitude and
the molestations of the soul, one kind of these sub-
sists in its cognitions, and another in its impulses.
For appetite is not [in its own nature] conformable
to reason,—and there are many senses and preci-
pitate imaginations,-so that appetites oppose those
whose life consists in action, and the phantasy in-
tervening is hostile to those who give themselves
to the contemplative energy by destroying the pu-
rity and immateriality of the contemplations. The
præternatural, likewise, is twofold. For the tur-
pitude which is in body is præternatural; since this
is the debility, the defect and malady of form, the
order and commensuration of it being dissolved.
In so many ways, therefore, is evil to be divided;
because the measures also of beings are in those
three principles,-nature, soul and intellect. The
incommensurate, likewise, is either a privation of
the productive powers which are in nature, or of
those which are in soul, or of those which are in
intellect, and are generated by intellect. For that
which adorns anything primarily is better than the
thing adorned. But I mean by this, every adorn-
ing nature which has a primary subsistence. And
such in bodies, indeed, is nature; in the irrational
forms of life, reason; but in the rational forms, that
which is prior to them, and which is intellect; and
i.e. the præternatural takes place both in soul and in body.
b This sentence in Morbeka is, "Etenim ornans singula melius
est ornantis primè." But for "ornantis," it is necessary to read
ornatis.
166
[in intellectual forms], the gooda. In the images,
likewise, of the rational soul, the good which they
participate is either on account of the rational soul
[from which they are suspended], or on account of
the soul which dwells on high". But whatever the
natures are which are suspended from such a soul,
they either [subsist on account of such a soul, or]
on account of that principle which is external to
them, and from which good is imparted to the
beings to which it providentially attends. But
with respect to bodies, good to some of them is
derived from a partial soul, and to others, from that
soul which ranks as a whole.
Some one, however, may still doubt after what
manner evils can subsist, and whence they are de-
rived, Providence existing. For if evil exists,
how will the energy of Providence be solely di-
rected to good? Or, if the universe is replete
with the energies of Providence, how can evil sub-
sist among beings? Some, therefore, yield to one
of the reasons, viz. that all things are not from Pro-
a The words within the brackets are wanting in Morbeka. Hence,
after "in rationalibus autem quod ante ipsas," it is requisite to add,
sed in intellectualibus.
b In Morbeka, there is nothing more of this sentence than "Idolis
autem aut propter eam quæ sursum animam"; but after "aut," it is
requisite to add, conformably to the above version, propter rationa-
lem aut, &c. But by the soul which dwells on high, Proclus means
a divine soul.
* This sentence in Morbeka is, "Quæcunque autem et ex animâ
dependent tali, aut propter id quod extrinsecus principium, à quo bonum
üs quibus providetur." But immediately after "tali," it is requisite
to add, conformably to the above translation, aut propter talem uni-
mam aut, &c.
167
vidence if evil exists, and that evil is not, if all
things are from Providence and the good. For this,
in the first place, perhaps, disturbs the mind, that
evil is in souls. For evil considered by itself is
unmingled with its contrary good, is most obscure,
and nothing else than darkness; and if it subsisted
by itself, it might perhaps be an impediment to the
works of Providence. But, as we have frequently
said, evil is not unmingled with good, and there is
no such thing as evil itself; since it is in a certain
respect, and not absolutely evil, through its partici-
pation of good. For, in short, it is not the same
thing to say, that God is the cause of all things,
and that he is alone the cause of all things [since
other causes co-operate with him]. For the former
assertion is true, but the latter not. For intellect
is the cause of the natures posterior to itself; soul,
of the beings which are consequent to it; and na-
ture, of bodies, and whatever is inherent in bodies.
Each of these, likewise, produces in a different way.
For God produces primarily, and according to tran-
scendent union; intellect, according to an eternal
energy; soul, self-motively; and nature, through
necessity. And neither is that which produces in-
tellectually the same with that which is prior to it,
nor with that which is secondary to it, so far as it
is secondary. If, therefore, all things are from
Providence, and no one of all things is evil, so far
as it is from, and is produced by Providence, why
is it wonderful that evil should have a place among
beings, so far as it subsists from soul? And the
168
same thing, indeed, will be evil to particulars, but
good to wholes. It will, however, be in a greater
degree evil to particulars, because evil is derived
from them. For not energy alone, but also that
which energises, possesses from Providence an ex-
cellent condition of being. Hence, in a certain
respect good is in them,-I mean, in the evils
which exist in the soul. And thus it will be cre-
dible that Providence does not suffer any one of
these to be deprived of itself. Evil, therefore, must
be admitted to be twofold; one being within the
soul, and consisting either in improper imagina-
tions, or vicious consent, or base choice; but the
other subsisting externally, and becoming apparent
in various actions, which are the effects either of
anger or desire.
8. All such things, therefore, as these mani-
foldly possess good. For they are effected for the
avengement of other natures. The action, also,
is according to the desert of the agent; and that
which acts badly, does not suffer the same punish-
ment for every bad action, whatever it may be,
nor does it require the same punishment for each.
These deeds, therefore, are entirely good to that which
suffers from them; and they are also good to that which
is effective of them, so far as it follows or acts in con-
formity to wholes; but so far as it acts from itself,
the deeds are evil, and detrimental to itself, and do
not give completion to the great conceptions of the
soul. This, however, is the beginning of salvation
to the patient. For in many persons, the meditated
169
evil remaining within the soul is concealed, but at
length 2, as being base and improper, is benefited,
and its nature then becomes evident when it exists
in energy.
and remorse of the soul, reproaching itself, as it
were, for the evil deed. For the arts of physicians,
also, by opening ulcers, and thus making the pas-
sion and the inwardly concealed cause of the dis-
ease evident, exhibit an image of the operations of
Providence, who admits both the base deeds and
depraved passions, in order that the latter being
changed from the conception which they had form-
ed, and from the habit which was caused and in-
flated by evils, may assume the principle of a better
period and life. But whatever passions are within
the soul, are accompanied by the good of the evil,
so far as they always lead the soul to what is proper.
For it is not possible for that which chooses things
of a worse nature to remain in such as are better,
but it soon tends to that which is dark and base.
And not actions only, but likewise without these,
the elections of the soul contain in themselves [re-
tributive] justice. For every election leads the
soul to that which is similar to its choice. If,
therefore, there is anything depraved and base
and atheistical in the soul, the transferring it to
that which is congenial to itself is soon attended
with good, with the desert which is from Provi-
dence, and with the law inherent in souls, which
This is manifested by the penitence
a
Tandem is omitted in this place in the version of Morbeka,
but evidently ought to have been inserted.
170
leads each of them to what is appropriate. For
Providence foreknows the life of the soul, and
through this conjoins it to things similar to itself;
but this is the same as uniting it with that which it
deserves, or with that which is conformable to its
difference with respect to other souls; this, again,
unites it to what is imparted by Providence, and
this [finally] to good. If, indeed, it were fit that
souls which act unjustly should abide on high,
which it is not lawful to assert, their choice would
in no respect possess what is good; but being
alone evil, it would be entirely atheistical and un-
just. But if choice soon removes the elective soul
from things of a better nature, it possesses good
mingled with evil. For every soul naturally de-
sires the supernal region. When souls, therefore,
descend into the realms of mortality, their choice
is directed to a degraded life; but it is necessary
that everything should descend which does not [al-
ways] energise according to intellect, though the
lapse is to some souls more, and to others less,
because the choice in them varies.
But after what manner is the evil that is in bodies
at the same time good? May we not say, that this
to the whole is according to nature, but to the
part is præternatural. Evil, however, is in a greater
degree good to the whole than to the part, because
it contributes naturally to the universe; but so far
as it is distributed into parts, it has from thence
a For "secundum rationem" here in Morbeka, it is evidently
necessary from what follows to read secundum naturam.
171
the præternatural. But the evil which is in bodies
is twofold, one kind existing as deformity, but
another as disease. I call, however, the deformity
of body everything which is not a præternatural
disease of it. For monsters are the turpitudes of
nature. And in nature, considered as a whole,
deformity subsists naturally, because in this it is
reason [i. e. a producing principle] and form; but
in a partial nature, deformity is one reason [or
form], and that which is contrary to this, is to
such a nature præternatural. But in nature as a
whole, all producing principles and all forms sub-
sist naturally. And sometimes, indeed, from one
species or form, that which is generated is one
thing; for the form of man in nature may be said
to generate man in a more principal manner than
anything else. But sometimes many things are
generated from one form; for there is one produc-
tive principle of figure in nature, but many different
kinds of figures proceed from it. And sometimes,
from many forms one thing is produced; such as
are the mixtures of species about matter, that ap-
pear to be monsters to an individual nature, which
desires to obtain, and subsists according to one
form. Lastly, sometimes many things [of the same
species] proceed from many forms; for in many
such things there is both equality and inequality.
All species or forms, therefore, are according to
a In Morbeka, in this place, after "hoc quidem turpe secundum
naturam totam,” it is necessary to add, est naturaliter, conformably
to the above translation.
172
nature, both such as are unmingled, and such as
are mingled, and proceed from those producing
powers which are in Nature herself, with all the
variety of which she is replete. To some bodies,
however, disease is according to nature; because
each of these is generated that which it is said to
be in a twofold respect, viz. both from a partial
and a total nature. But that which is corruptible
is so naturally with respect to nature considered as
a whole, but is præternatural to a partial natureª.
For that into which the thing that is corrupted is
transmuted, possesses a form and reason from total
nature, contrary to the nature of the thing cor-
rupted. For so far as that which is corrupted is a
whole, so far the corruption of it is præternatural;
but so far as it is a portion of the universe, the
corruption of it is according to nature; since every
whole subsists according to the form or productive
principle which is in it. And thus corruption is pro-
duced from one thing, and the corruption is again
the cause of the generation of another thing.
9. Hence, the evil which is in bodies is not un-
mingled evil; but the evil of these, so far as it is
from Providence, is natural; and, in short, those
things that have a generation, have it on account
of good. Some one, however, may say, How is it
possible for that which is perfectly good to suffer
a This sentence in Morbeka is, "Corruptibile autem secundum
naturam quidem totam, præter naturam autem particularem"; but
immediately after "quidem ", it is necessary to insert ad, and also
immediately after “autcm”.
173
that which is deprived of the nature of good to
remain? For neither is it possible for evil to exist,
without having the appearance of its contrary, good;
because all things, and even evil itself, are for the
sake of good. To this we answer, that if all things
are for the sake of good, Divinity is not the cause
of evils. For evil, so far as evil, is not derived
from thence, but from other causes, which, as we
have before observed, generate not from power, but
from debility. On which account, as it appears to
me, Platoª, arranging all things about the King of
a What is here asserted by Proclus is to be found in the second
Epistle of Plato to Dionysius; and the whole of the passage to which
he refers is as follows: Φης γαρ δη κατα τον εκείνου λογον ουχ' ἱκανως
αποδεδειχθαι σοι περί της του πρωτου φύσεως. Φραστεον δη σου δι αινιγμών,
ἵν' αν τι ἡ δέλτος ἢ ποντου ἢ γης εν πτυχαίς παθῇ, ὁ αναγνους μη γνω. ώδε
γαρ έχει, περί τον παντων βασιλέα παντ' εστι, και εκείνου ένεκα παντα, και
εκείνο αιτιον απαντων των καλων. δευτερον δε περι τα δευτερα, και τρίτον περι
τα τριτα. ἡ ουν ανθρωπινη ψυχη περί αυτα ορέγεται μαθειν ποι' άττα εστί,
βλέπουσα εις τα αυτης συγγενη, ών ουδεν ἱκανως εχει, του δε βασιλέως περι
και ών είπον, ουδεν εστιν τοιουτο, το δη μετα τουτο ἡ ψυχη φησιν· αλλα
ποιον τι μην τουτ' εστιν, ω παι Διονυσίου και Δωρίδος, το ερωτημα, ὅ παντων
αιτιον εστι κακων; μαλλον δε ἡ περι τουτων ώδις, εν τη ψυχή εγγιγνομενη
ήν ει μη τις εξαιρεθήσεται, της αλήθειας οντως ου μήποτε τυχαί
There is an important difference between some parts of this pass-
age as quoted by Proclus, and all the printed editions of it, which
has not been noticed by any of the editors of Plato's Works. For
Proclus (in Plat. Theol. p. 103.) for εν πτυχαίς παθῇ, has τυχης
μαθη. But I have no doubt that Proclus originally wrote εν τυχαις
παθη, and that τυχης μαθῇ is an error of the transcriber. In the se-
cond place, in the sentence αλλα ποιον τι μην τουτ' εστιν, ω παι Διονυσου,
κ.τ.λ., which, from what Proclus says of it, was evidently not con-
sidered by him as interrogative, for καλων * in Proclus, it is requisite
to read, conformably to all the editions of Plato, κακων. With these
* See this confirmed in the Treatise of Damascius περι Αρχων.
174
all, and asserting that all things are for his sake,
and even such as are not good,—for they have the
appearance of good,-calls this King the cause of
all things, and the cause of every being. But he
does not, indeed, call him the cause of evils, so far
as they are evils, but so far as each of these is
good, in consequence of ranking among beings.
If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, both
alterations, therefore, the whole passage will be in English as fol-
lows: "You say, according to his report, [i. e. the report of Archi-
demus,] that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the parti-
culars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you therefore
in enigmas, that in case the letter should meet with any casualties,
either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand [this part
of its contents]. For these particulars are as follow: All things
are situated about the King of all; and all things subsist for his sake;
and he is the cause of all beautiful things. But second things are
situated about that which is second, and such as are third about
that which is third. The human soul, therefore, extends itself
about these, in order to learn what kind of things they are, looking
to such natures as are allied to itself, none of which is sufficient for
the purpose. But about the King himself, and the things of which
I have spoken, there is nothing of this kind; since the soul alone
speaks of that which is posterior to this. Indeed, O son of Diony-
sius and Doris, this your inquiry [about the first nature] is as of that
which is endued with a certain quality, and such an inquiry is the
cause of all evils*. Or, rather, it is a parturition respecting this
ingenerated in the soul, from which he who is not liberated will
never in reality acquire truth."
Proclus has made some admirable observations on this passage
in the above-mentioned part of his treatise on the Theology of
Plato, to my translation of which I refer the English reader.
* In translating this part of the passage in my Plato, I was
misled by finding in Proclus xaλwv instead of xaxwv. And I did
not discover the mistake till I had read the above-mentioned
Treatise of Damascius, which was not printed at the time of the
publication of my translation of Plato, but long after.
0
175
all things will be derived from Providence, and
evil will have a place among beings. Hence, also,
the Gods produce evil, but they produce it as
good; and, as possessing a transcendently united
knowledge, they know all things, impartibly such
as are partible, boniformly such as are evil; and
multitude is known by them according to profound
union. For there is one knowledge pertaining to
soul, another to an intellectual nature, and another
to the Gods themselves. And the first of these,
indeed, is a self-motive, the second an eternal, and
the third an ineffable and transcendently united
knowledge, both knowing and producing all things
by the one itselfa.
a See a most admirable confirmation of all that is said in this
treatise on the Subsistence of Evil, by Proclus, in my translation
of his Commentary on the Timæus of Plato, vol. i. p. 311.
MAY 1 @ 1915
THE END.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR,
RED LION COURT, FLEET STRECT.

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