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AMERICAN SLAVE CODE
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3i (ilitary am practice;
ITS
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES
SHOWN ISY. ITS
STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, & ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS,
BY
WILLIAM GOODELL,
AUTHOR OF THE “ HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND ANTI-SLAVERY.”
“Truth is stranger than fiction.”—Modern Marim.
“ Statutes against fundamental morality are void.”—Judge M'Lean, C. S.
Supreme Court. - - - - -
§§º
Jim
§
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CLARKE, BEETON, AND CO., FOREIGN B00RSELI, FRS,
148, FLEET STREET,
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LONDON .
SALISBURY, BBETON, AND CO., PRINTERS, BOUVERIE STRIglºt,
AND PRIMRosſ, HILL, FLEET STREET,
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L E T T E R.
FROM THE
HON, WILLIAM JAY TO THE AUTHOR,
New York, Jan. 25, 1853.
REv. AND DEAR SIR,
On returning the MSS. of your “AMERICAN SLAVE
Cod E, IN THEORY AND PRACTICE,” I must ask you to ac-
cept my thanks for writing it, as well as for favouring me
with its early perusal. Surely, never before has mischief
been framed by law with more diabolical ingenuity than
in this infernal code. Your analysis of the slave-laws is
very able, and your exhibition of their practical applica-
tion by the Southern Courts evinces great and careful
research.
It is more easy to make than to refute a charge of
exaggeration against a work of fiction like Mrs. Stowe's;
but your book is as impreguable against such a charge as
~ is Euclid's Geometry, since, like that, it consists of pro-
iv. LETTER TO THE AUTHOR,
positions and demonstrations. The book is not only true,
but it is unquestionably true. You show us the rack
2
constructed “according to law;” we examine, at our lei-
sure, the cruel but skilful contrivance of its machinery;
we see the ministers of the law bind the victim on the
instrument of torture; we see one feature of humanity
after another crushed and obliterated, till at last an
immortal man, made a little lower than the angels, and
for whose redemption the Son of God shed his blood on
the cross, is converted into a beast of burden—a vendible
animal, scourged at the will of its owner, and offered for
sale in the market with horses and oxen.
Your book will take from our Northern dough-faces
and slave-catchers the flattering unction they are laying
to their souls that “Uncle Tom's Cabin” is a gross
exaggeration; that, of course, slavery is, after all, not so
very bad; and that they, in doing its biddings, are not as
base as they seem to be. You show them that the most
educated and refined among the slaveholders have, for the
past century, as legislators, been deliberately enacting the
most fiendish of laws, in utter defiance of the moral sense
of mankind, and the precepts of the blessed gospel of the
Lord Jesus; and that their grave and learned judges have
enforced these accursed statutes, in all their execrable
LETTER, TO THE AUTHOR, V.
rigour, thus giving a solemn sanction to the atrocities
portrayed by Mrs. Stowe and others without number,
still more aggravated by investing them with legal
impunity.
May God make your book a means of awakening
the consciences of our cottom divines to the deep sin
of upholding, in the mame of the blessed and ador-
able Redeemer, a system so damnable as American
Slavery ! These reverend pro-slavery champions of Chris-
tianity resemble the priests of Juggernaut, recommending
the worship of their god by pointing to the wretches
writhing, and shrieking, and oxpiring under his car.
That the blessing of God may rest on your labours for
his glory and the good of our suffering and oppressed
brethren, is the fervent prayer of
Your friend and servant,
WILLIAM JAY.
REV. WILLIAM Goold ELL.
(ſomitmt5.
PAGE.
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER . . . . . . . . . 15
PART I.
THE RELATION OF MASTER AND SLAVE * * * 2]
CHAPTER I.
SLAYE-OWNIERSHIP.
Tundamental Idea of modern Slaveholding, namely, the assumed plin-
ciple of II uman Chattelhood, or Property in Man, constituting the
helation of Owner and Ph open ty, of Master and Slave & * & 23
cº
C H A P T E R II.
SILAVIE TRAFFIC.
Sale, Purchase, Balter, Montgage, Auction, Coffle-gang, Shipments
—as absolutcly as in the case of any other Property, and by the same
lemure . & e * g e & * tº e e * tº 41
CHAPTER III.
SEIZURE OF ST. AYE PROPICRTY TOR DEBT.
As Property, Slaves may be seized and sold to pay the Debts of theil
Owners, while living, or for the Settlement of their Estates after
their Decease º & e e a º a e tº wº º 63
CHAPTER IV.
INIIICRITANCE OF SIAWTIE PROPERTY.
Slaves, as Property, are transmitted by Inheritance, or by Will, to Heils-
at-law or Legatees. In the distribution of Estates they are distri-
buted like other Property . e * ſº & # * * gº 69
viii CONTENTS.
CIIAPTER, W.
USES OF SLAVE PROPICRTY.
Slaves, as Property, may be USED, absolutely, by thcur Owners, for their
own pl oft or pleasure . gº e
CHAPTER WI.
SLAVICS CAN POSSESS NOTIIING.
Being Property themselves, they can own no l?ropel ty, nor make any
Contract e & º s e
º & & tº º
CHAPTER WII.
SLAVES C. ANNOT MAIRRY.
Being held as Property, and incapable of making any Contract, they
cannot conth act Mannlage ecognised by law
© º * *
CITATTER VIII.
SLAVIES CANNO D CONSTITUTE FAIMILIES.
Being Property—‘ Goods and Chattels Personal, to all intents, construc-
tions, and purposes whatsoevel”—they have no claim on each other;
no security from separation; no Marital Rights; no Parental Rights;
no Family Government; no Family Education; no Tamily Protection
I’.Y.C. E .
8 )
105
112
CIIAPTER IX.
TJNLIMITED POWER OF SLAYERIOLDERS.
The Power of the Master or Owner is virtually unlimited ; the submission
required of the Slave is unbounded ; the Slave, being Property, can
have no protection against the Master, and has no redress for
injulies inflicted by him e e
CHAPTER X.
I.A.D.OUR OF SLAYTICS.
The Slave, being a Chattel, may be worked at the discretlon of his Owner,
as other working Chattels are
CHAPTER XI.
ROOD, CLOTIIING, AND DWELLINGS OF SLAVES.
The Slave, as a Chattel, is fed or famished, covered or uncovered, shel-
tered or unsheltered, at the discretion or convenience of his Owner,
like other working animals . © *
& † º º
135,
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XII.
COERCED LABOUR WITHOUT WAGES.
The “legal relation of Master and Slave,” being the relation of an
Owner to a Chattel, is incompatible with the matural and Heaven-
sanctioned “relation” of Labour and Wages * g &
CHAPTER XIII.
PUNISEIMIENTS OF SLAVES BY THE OWNER AND HIRER.
Being the absolute Property of the Owner, the Slave is wholly in his
power, without any effectual restraint g * sº & *
CEIAPTER, XIV.
OF LAWS., CONOERNING THE MURDER AND KILLING OF SLAVES.
The structure of the Laws and the condition of the Slaves render adequate
Protection impossible . * e * re ū ſº
CEIAPTER, XW.
OF THE DELEGATED POWER, OF OWIERSEERS.
All the power of the Owner over his Slave is held and exercised also by
Overseers and Agents . . . w * * , tº * *
CHAPTER XVI.
PAGE,
150
77
197
OF TEIE PROTECTION OF SLAVE PROPERTY FROM DAMAGE IBY ASSAULTS
EROM OTEIER PERSONS TEIAN TEIEIR OWNERS.
Slaves are better protected as Property than they are as Sentient Beings
CEIAPTER XVII.
201
FACTS ILLUSTRATING THE KIND AND DEGREE OF PROTECTION EXTENDED
TO SLAVES.
The Extent, the Atrocity, the Frequency, and the impunity of barbarous
Outrages upon Slaves show that the Laws aſſord them little or no
Protection * tº * & * * º * & e º *
CHAPTER, XVIII.
RUGITIVES FROM SLAVERY.
The Slave, being Property, may be hampered and confined to prevent his
escape; may be pursued and reclaimed; must not be aided or com-
cealed from his Master; and when too wild or refractory to be used
by his Owner, may be killed by him with impunity
209
225
X CONTENTS,
l?AC.E.,
CHAPTER, XIX.
TEIE SLAVE CANNOT SUE HIS MASTER.
Slave Property cannot litigate with its Owner . º e e º - 239
CHAPTER, XX.
NO POWER OF SELF-REDEMPTION OR CHANGE OF MASTERS.
The Slave, being a Chattel, has no power of Self-redemption, nor of an
exchange of Owners . - º g • º e * - . 245
CHAPTER, XXI.
TEIE RELATION FIEREDITAIRY AND PERPETUAL.
Slaves, being held as Property, like other Domestic Animals, their Off-
spring are held as Property in the same manner º e º - 248
CHAPTER, XXII.
RIGHT TO EDUCATION.—RELIGIOUS LIBERTY—RIGEITS OF CONSCIENCE.
The Slave, being held as a Chattel, is held by a Tenure which excludes
any legal recognition of his Rights as a thinking and religious Being 25l.
CEIAPTER XXIII.
ORIGIN OF THE RELATION AND SUBJECTS.
The so-called “legal relation” of Slave-Ownership of Negroes originated
in that African Slave-trade which our Laws now punish as Piracy;
but Slavery is, in general, extended over all classes whom the
Slaveholders have been able to seize upon and retain—over Indians,
free persons of Colour, and Whites . º - e º * º 258
PART II.
RELATION OF THE SLAVE TO SOCIETY AND TO CIVIL
GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
CHAPTER I. -
OF THE GROUND AND NATURE OF THE SLAVE's CIVIL CONIDITION.
The Civil Condition of the Slave grows out of his relation to his Master,
as Property, and is determined and defined by it . * º . .289
CONTENTS. xi
PAG E.
CHAPTER II.
No ACCESS TO THE JUDICIARY, AND NO HONEST PROVISION FOR TESTING
THE CLAIMS OF TEIE ENSLAVED TO FREEDOM.
“A Slave cannot be a Party to a Civil Suit.” (Stroud) . & * e 295
CHAPTER III.
REJECTION OF TESTIMONY OF SLAVES AND FREE COLOURED PERSONS.
Slavery is upheld by suppressing the Testimony of its Victims * & 300
CHAPTER IV.
SUBJECTION TO ALL WHITE PERSONS.
Submission is required of the Slave, not only to the will of his Master,
but to the will of all other White Persons / . re e e . . 305
CHAPTER, W.
PENAL LAWS AGAINST SLAVES.
The Laws are unequal; their Administration despotic ; their Execution
barbarous. Even this is exceeded by “Lynch Law” e tº ir 309
CHAPTER WI.
EDUCATION PROEIIRITED.
The Slave, not being regarded as a Member of Society, nor as a Human
Being, the Government, instead of providing for his Education,
takes care to forbid it, as being inconsistent with the condition of
Chattelhood . e g e & * º * & * º tº 3.19
CHAPTER WII.
FREE SOCIAL WORSHIP AND RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION PROHIBITED.
The Government not only allows the Master to forbid the Free Social
Worship and Instruction of his Slaves, but it also steps in with
direct Prohibitions of its own; which even the Master himself may
not relax or abrogate . * * & & * $ tº- º tº 326
CHAPTER WIII.
LEGISLATIVE, JUDIOIAL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTRUCTIONS TO
EMANCIPATION.
The Statutes of the Slave States not chly make no provision for a general
Emancipation, but they obstruct and prevent Emancipations by the
Master. And the Constitutions of some of the States forbid the
Ilegislatures to abolish Slavery . tº tº º e te g g 338
xii CONTENTS.
PAGE.
PART III.
RELATION of THE SLAVE Copr. To THE LIBERTIES
OR THE FREE . . . . . . . . . . . 353
CHAPTER, I.
LIBERTIES OF TEIE FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR.
The free People of Colour, though not in a condition of Chattelhood, are
constantly exposed to it, and, at best, enjoy only a portion of their
Rights . g & g g e e & * e tº & & 355
CHAPTER II.
LIBERTIES OF TEIE WEIITE PEOPLE OF TEIE SLAVEHOLDING STATES.
The White People of the Slaveholding States, whether Slaveholders or
Non-Slaveholders, are deprived, by the Slave Code, of some of their
essential Rights, and cannot be regarded as a people in possession
of Civil, Religious, and Political Freedom . tº g ë ge . 37.2
CHAPTER, III.
LIBERTIES OF TEIIL WELITE PEOPLE OF THE NON-SLAVEEHOLDING STATES.
The Rights of the White People of the Non-Slaveholding States are
directly and indirectly invaded by the Slave Code of the Slave States;
their Liberties, to a great extent, have already fallen a sacrifice,
and can never be secure while Slaveholding continues . º g 389
CONCLUDING CHAPTER.
Summary Review of the Slave Code; its Character and Effects – Inqui-
ries concerning the Duty of Christians, Churches, and Ministers—
The Responsibilities of Citizens, of Society, of Civil Government,
of Legislators, of Magistrates—Scrutiny of the Legality of American
Slavery—The Heaven-prescribed IRemedy–The Worthlessness of
Temporising Expedients—Closing Appeal . g * & e & 394
THE
AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
BRELIMINARY CHAPTER.
OCCASIONS AND USES FOR THIS VOLUME.
THE practical importance of an exact knowledge of the
Slave Code, and of its legitimate workings, will be mani-
fest from the considerations that follow.
It is often maintained that the “legal relation of master
and slave” is not a criminal One, and that there is no sin
or moral wrong in the mere fact of sustaining that rela-
tion. On the other hand, it is held that the relation is
wrong in itself, and cannot be innocently sustained.
Such a question cannot, intelligently, be settled without
a correct understanding of that “legal relation,” and of
the particulars in which it consists. And it is only by
the Slave Code of the country that “the legal relation”
can be ascertained. By this, and by this only, is it to be
defined. “The legal relation of master and slave” is
what the Slave Code declares it to be. And it is nothing
else.
It is worse than mere trifling, it is evasion and
B
2 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Sophistºry, to ransack the archives of some other age and
nation for the laws and usages which then constituted
slavery, or which we may now choose to call slavery ;
and then, on the assumed (or even the ascertained)
innocency or divine Sanction or tolerance of those
wsages, to argue the innocency of the existing “relation
of master and slave” in this country. Sincere and honest
inquirers are bound to ascertain “the legal relation of
Imaster and slave” as it now exists in America, in virtue
of the code that authorises and defines it. They are
bound to bring “the legal relation,” as thus defined and
ascertained, to the standard of the Divine will, and
say whether or no it corresponds with that standard.
The question whether it is right or wrong to Sanction
such a “legal relation” by “sustaining” it, will then be
easily Settled.
No man, in America, can hold a slave by any other
tenure, or in any other “relation,” than that which the
American Slave Code describes. He cannot hold a slave
under the code of Moses (if it ever could have been done),
nor under the usages of Abraham's day, for no such code
or usages now exist. If he relinquishes the hold on his
slave that the American Slave Code gives him, he manu-
mits him at once and entirely. Let him do this, or let
that code be blotted out, and he cannot forcibly retain a
man in bondage a single day, without becoming a felon in
the eye of the law. So that in “sustaining the legal
relation,” he sustains and sanctions the code, and its cha-
racter becomes his. The more unsullied his reputation
PRELIMINARY CHAPTER, 3
may be in other respects, the more effectually does his
example of slaveholding Sanction the system, and rivet
the chains of the slave.
It must be futile and absurd to decry the code, and yet
attempt to justify him who holds a slave under it. The
code would harm no one, if no one ever made use of it.
The worst that can properly be said of the code is, that it
enables men who are thus disposed to hold the “relation”
described by it. For, the very men for whose conside-
ration we make this remark are forward to tell us that
the system (in other words, the code) is not to be held
responsible for the mere abuses committed under it. It
must, then, be responsible for the relation, and those who
sustain the relation must be responsible for it.
We propose, then, by an exhibition of the American
Slave Code, to test the moral character of American slave-
holding. The practice (in the absence of mere abuses)
cannot be better than the code, or rule of conduct, that
gives it license and Sanction.
On the other hand, the usages under any code are
seldom or never better than the code itself. Communities
are not forward to proclaim themselves worse than they
aro, by giving public license to evil practices not preva-
lent among them, and which they do not intend to prac-
tise and sustain. “No people,” says a learned writer and
profound thinker,” “were over yet found who were better
than their laws, though many have been known to be
worse.”
* Dr. Priestley.
4 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
The only exceptions to this rule are where bad laws
are forced upon a community without their consent ; or
where, from their odiousness, or by the progress of civi-
lisation since their enactment, they have become obsolete.
In our own country, the people (except the victims of the
Slave Code) enact their own statutes. And in the pre-
sent investigation it will be made apparent that the Slave
Code has not become obsolete.
The present contest for the abolition of American
slavery has encountered a species of opposition which it
has been difficult to meet. If existing practices are
arraigned, we are told that these are only abuses of the
system, which argue nothing against the innocent “legal
relation.” Thus, all efforts for the abolition of that inno-
cent relation are discountenanced and disparaged. At the
same time, all adequate, trustworthy, and truthful repre-
sentations of the cruelties habitually and extensively
practised upon slaves are scouted as incredible or exagge-
rated. Attempts are made to offset them by the cool
remark, that parents are sometimes cruel to their children,
mechanics to their apprentices, and capitalists to operatives
in their employ. To this it is often added that, on the
whole, slaves are as well off as other labouring people, and
better off than they would be if set free. In this way the
sympathies of the people of the North are withdrawn
from the slaves. And whether we arraigm “the legal
relation,” or the so-called “abuses,” we find our attacks
warded off by the arts of Sophistry and evasion. Even
ministers of religion and ecclesiastical bodies have been
PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. •)
*
proficients in these arts, and the friends of liberty them-
selves have thereby been led, in Some instances, to make
unwise and unfortunate concessions.
In this book we shall endeavour to show what “the
legal relation” is, what the usages of slaveholders gene-
rally are, and the natural and necessary correspondence
and connexion between them. In describing the “legal
relation,” we shall use the testimony of slaveholders them-
Selves, in their own language, set forth in the most solemn
and authenticated form, the public testimony of their
legislative acts and judicial decisions, made for the very
purpose of defining and enforcing that relation. If such
testimony cannot be received, there is an end to all
rational discussion. Our account of the usages and prac-
tices current among slaveholders will be found sufficiently
authenticated by their own testimony, and by other um-
impeachable witnesses. More than all this, the intelli-
gent and reflecting reader will be compelled, if we mistake
not, to perceive that the connexion between the “legal
relation” and the most frightful “abuses” is that of cause
and effect, or, more properly, of a whole with its consti-
tuent and essential ports, insomuch that the presence of
the one implies and certifies the presence of the other.
In speaking (as we are compelled by the prevailing use
of language to do) of “the legal relation” of the “laws of
slavery and of slave “owners,” we must not be understood
to concede the “legality” of such a relation, or the validity
of such “laws,” or the reality of such “ownership,” in
the proper meaning of those terms. The “law of sin and
6 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
death” is not obligatory law. “Mischief framed by
a law” binds men to nothing but the repudiation and
contempt of it. “If it be found,” says Lord Lyttelton,
“that a former decision is manifestly absurd and unjust,
it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but
that it was not law.” “It is generally laid down that
Acts of Parliament contrary to reason are void.” Of the
character and validity of the Slave Code the reader of this
volume will have an opportunity to judge when he shall
have carefully examined and considered it.
N.B.-It is sometimes alleged that the severe laws against the education
and free religious worship of slaves were occasioned by the impertinent
interference of abolitionists. But it will be found on an examination of
their dates that, with few exceptions, they were enacted long before any
of the Abolition Societies were formed, and even bofore the American
Revolution.
On the other hand, it is sometimes said that these and other severo
enactments are antiquated and obsolete. It is marvellous to see with how
much confidence these self-confuting statements are made by the same
persons. The careful reader of the following pages will find ample evi-
dence that both these pleas are without a shadow of foundation.
BART I.
RELATION OF MASTER AND SLAWE.
CHAPTER I.
SL A V E O WN ERS HIP.
Fundamental Idea of modern Slaveholding; namely, the assumed Prim-
ciple of Human Chattelhood, or Property in Man; constituting the
relation of Owner and Property—of Master and Slave.
SouTH CAROLINA.—“Slaves shall be deemed, sold,
taken, reputed and adjudged in law to be chattels per-
sonal, in the hands of their owners and possessors, and
their executors, administrators and assigns, to all intents,
constructions, and purposes whatsoever.” (2 Brevard's
Digest, 229 ; Prince's Digest, 446, &c. &c.)
LOUISIANA-‘A slave is one who is in the power of a
master to whom he belongs. The master may sell him,
dispose of his person, his industry and his labour. He
can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything,
but what must belong to his master.” (Civil Code, art.
35.)
“The slave is entirely subject to the will of his master,
who may correct and chastise him, though not with um-
usual rigour, or so as to maim and mutilate him, or ex-
pose him to the danger of loss of life, or to cause his
death.” (Art. 173.)
It will be found, as we proceed, that this attempted
10 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CORDE.
or pretended limitation of power has no real existence,
and affords no protection to the slave.
An exception, in Louisiana, to the general tenure of
“chattels personal,” is expressed as follows:
“Slaves, though moveable by their nature, are con-
sidered as immoveable by the operation of law.” (Civil
Code, art. 461.)
“Slaves shall always be reputed and considered real
estate ; shall, as such, be subject to be mortgaged, accor-
ding to the rules prescribed by law, and they shall be
seized and sold as real ostate.” (Statute of June 7, 1806;
1 Martin's Digest, 6.12.)
This provision, if literally carried into effect, would
prevent the sale of slaves from off the plantations of
their masters. More of this in its proper place.
ICENTUCRY.--—By the law of descents, slaves are con-
sidered real estate, and pass in consequence to heirs, and
not to executors. (2 Littell and Swigert’s Digest, 1155.)
From the following it appears, however, that special
care was taken in Kentucky, that the slaves should derive
no benefit from the distinction between real estate and
chattels personal.
“They are, however, liable, as chattels, to be sold by
the master at his pleasure, and may be taken in execution
for the payment of his debts.” (Ib. ; see also 1247.)
VIRGINIA—In 1705 a law similar to that of Kentucky
was enacted, but was soon after repealed. (Note to Re-
vised Code, 432.) Slaves are therefore held as chattels
personal in Virginia, as in most of the Slave States,
SLAVE OWNERSHIP. 11
where, in the absence of the entire written codes, or such
general onunciations as those of South Carolina and
Touisiana, the chattel principle has, nevertheless, been
affirmed and maintained by the courts, and involved in
legislative acts. A specimen of the latter description we
have in the following.
MARYLAND.—“In case the personal property of a ward
shall consist of specific articles, such as slaves, working
beasts, animals of any kind, Stock, furniture, plate, books,
and so forth, the court, if it shall deem it advantageous
to the ward, may, at any time, pass an order for the Sale
thereof.” &c. &c. (Act of 1798, chap, ci, No. 12.)
Without further citation (as might be made) of par-
ticular enactments in this place, it may be sufficient to
state that the “Roman civil law,” as existing at an early
period, before its modification under professedly Christian
emperors, is generally referred to in our Slave States, as
containing the principles of their “peculiar institution.”
Where other usages or statutes, in any of the States, fail
of furnishing the requisite definition of the “legal rela-
tion,” recourse is generally had to the “Roman civil law.”
Those, also, who defend the “legal relation” as an innocent
one, and who claim that Christ and his apostles did not
disapprove it, but gave it their sanction, are forward to
remind us that it existed in the Roman Empire at that
period. It seems desirable, therefore, in more aspects
than one, to ascertain precisely what that relation was.
We find that information in Dr. Taylor’s “Elements of
the Civil Law.”
I 2 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“Slaves were held pro nullis : pro mortuis, pro quadrupe-
dibus; they had no head in the State ; no name, title, or
register; they were not capable of being injured, nor could
they take by purchase or descent ; they had no heirs,
and could therefore make no will. Exclusive of what was
called their peculium, whatever they acquired was their
master's ; they could not plead or be pleaded for, but were
excluded from all civil concerns whatever. They could
not claim the indulgence of absence reipublica cousa :
they were not entitled to the rights and considerations of
matrimony, and therefore had no relief in case of adultery;
nor were they proper objects of cognation and affinity,
but of quasi-cognation only. They could be sold, trans-
ferred, or pawned as goods of personal estate, for goods
they were, and as such they were esteemed ; they might
be tortured for evidence, punished at the discretion of
their lord, or even put to death by his authority.” (Tay-
lor's Elements, p. 429.)
Such was the “legal relation” said to have been sanc-
tioned by Christ and his apostles as innocent, or (as others
express it) not condemned, disapproved, or censured by
them. Such was the heathen “institution” now held to
have been adopted as Christian. It must be added that,
the ancient heathen “relation” of owner and property has
been more rigidly enforced in Christian America than it
ever was in Pagan Rome. Our slavery allows no peculium
or exempted property to be held by the slave. It denies
education and literature to its human brutes. It ignores
their religious nature, and bars the door of rodemption
SLAVE OWNERSHIP. 13
and release. But we anticipate topics of future examina-
tion.
The testimony already presented is corroborated by
jurists who have examined the subject. Judge Stroud, in
his “Sketch of the Laws relating to Slavery,” has fully
expressed his views on this point. Having explained the
maximim of the civil law, “partus sequitur ventrem,” by
which the condition of the slave-mother is for ever entailed
on all her remotest posterity, he remarks as follows.
“This maxim of the civil law, the genuine and degrad-
ing principle of slavery, inasmuch as it places the slave
upon a level with brute animals, prevails universally in
the slaveholding States.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 11.)
The same writer also says:
“It is plain that the dominion of the master is as
unlimited as that which is tolerated by the laws of any
civilised country in relation to brute animals—to quadru-
peds, to use the words of the civil law.” (Stroud's Sketch,
p. 24.)
“The cardinal principle of slavery—that the slave is not
to be ranked among sentient beings, but among things, as
an article of property, a chattel personal—obtains as
undoubted law, in all these (the slaveholding) States.”
Ib., pp. 22, 23.)
This, then, is the definition of the terms Slavery, Slave,
and Slaveholding, as furnished by slaveholding communi-
ties, and as understood by jurists who have studied their
legislation and jurisprudence. This is the theory of
American slavery. This is its fundamental law, if it has
14 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
any. This is the “legal relation of master and slave,” if
there be any such relation.
The next point of inquiry is, Whether these definitions
correspond with existing realities, or facts? Whether this
theory is an empty abstraction ; or whether it is carried
out into actual practice Whether this law is merely a
nominal one (as is sometimes alleged), antiquated and
obsolete, or whether it furnishes the rule of action to
the slaveholder, the rule of condition to the slave 7
From statutory enactments and recognised codes, we
now turn to the courts. Their reported decisions, in the
hands of the lawyers, and in daily use in the decision of
new causes, will tell us whether or mo the code of slavery
is obsolete, and the statute-book of the Slave States a dead
letter.
Chief Justice Kinsey, of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in 1797, Said :
“They (Indians) have so long been recognised as
slaves in our law, that it would be as great a violation of
the rights of property to establish a contrary doctrine at
the present day, as it would in the case of Africans, and
as useless to investigate the manner in which they origi-
mally lost their freedom.” (The State v. Wagoner, I
Halstead's Reports, 374 to 378.)
To be a slave, then, even in New Jersey, is to be pro-
perty, upon the same tenure upon which other property is
held. This is “ the legal relation of master and slave”
there, if the courts understand it correctly.
We will now travel further south, and look into the
SLAVE OWNERSHIP. 15
courts for information. As our guide we will take
“Wheeler's Law of Slavery,” a regular law-book, made
for the use of slaveholders.” Slave property, like other
property, is the subject of frequent litigation between the
different owners or claimants of it, or with their neigh-
bours. From these suits chiefly, and for use in future
suits, the volume of Mr. Wheeler is compiled. The inci-
dental testimony of such a work to the nature and inci-
dents of slavery is the strongest and the most unobjection-
able that can be conceived. We shall refer to it frequently
in this volume. On the property tenure and chattelhood
by which slaves are held, its testimony is clear and explicit.
The idea is involved and implied throughout the entire
volume. A few direct statements of the doctrine will be
sufficient. Let it be understood that our quotations are
the decisions of courts, stated in the language of the
judges.
“Slaves, from their nature, are chattels, and were put in
the hands of executors, before the act of 1792 declaring
them to be personal estate.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery,
p. 2.)
“The phrase ‘personal estate, in wills and contracts,
should be understood as embracing slaves.” (Ib) \
* “A Practical Treatise of the Taw of Slavery, being a Compilation of
all the Decisions made on that subject, in the several Courts of the United
States, and State Courts; with copious Notes and References to the Sta-
tutes and other Authoritics, systematically arranged. By Jacob D.
Wheeler, Esq., Counsellor at Law. New York: Allan Pollock, Jr. New
Orleans: Benjamin Levy. 1837.” 476 pages, octavo. This work is
recommended by Hon. Judge H. Hichcock, of Alabama, and by the New
York Mercantile Advertiser, and New York Star,
16 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“Slaves were declared by law to be real estate, and
descend to the heir at law. They are considered real
estate in case of descents.” (Ib)
“Although for some purposes slaves are declared by
statute to be real estate, they are, nevertheless, intrinsi-
cally personal, and are therefore to be considered as in-
cluded in every statute or contract in relation to chattels
which does not, in terms, exclude them. They are liable,
as chattels, to the payment of debts,” &c. (Ib., p. 37.)
In the case of Harris v. Clarissa and others, March
Term, 1834 (6 Yerger's Tenn. Rep., 227 ; Wheeler's Law
of Slavery, pp. 319-26), the Chief Justice, in delivering the
opinion of the court, found occasion (p. 325) to say :
“In Maryland, the issue (i. e., of female slaves) is
considered not an accessory, but as a part of the use, like
that of other female animals. (1 Har. & McHen. Rep.,
160, 352 ; 1 Har. & John's Rep., 526; 1 Hayw. Rep.,
335.) Suppose a brood mare be hired for five years, the
ſoals belong to him who has a part of the use of the dan).
(2 Black. Com., 290; 1 Hayw. Rep., 335.) The slave, in
Maryland, in this respect, is placed on no higher or dif-
ferent ground.”
Mr. Gholson, of the Virginia Legislature, by the use of
similar language (as will hereafter be quoted), offended
the delicacy of some, who supposed him to be peculiarly
brutish and gross; but we here find it to be in accordance
with the Ordinary language of the courts of law
About forty-five pages of “Wheeler's Law of Slavery”
are occupied with judicial decisions concerning the
SLAVE OWNERSHHP. 17
“warranty of slaves” sold, in respect to their soundness,
health, “freedom from all redhibitory vices, diseases,” &c.
t is impossible to look over the revolting details, and to
thotice the cold-hearted insensibility with which the rules
and decisions of the courts are laid down and recorded,
without being deeply impressed with the unhumanising
effects of the process, particularly in the systematic for-
getfulness that the slave is anything more than a brute
animal. The section concerning “the warranty of moral
qualities” may be claimed as an exception, and is cer-
tainly one of the most remarkable pieces of law litera-
ture extant.
“The 2500th article of the Code of Louisiana divides
the defects of slaves into two classes : vices of body, and
vices of character. But with regard to those of character,
the next article expressly declares that they are confined
bo cases where the slave has committed a capital crime,
where he is convicted of theft, and where he is in the
habit of running away.” (P. 133.)
“Drunkenness is a mental, not a physical defect, and
is not ground of redhibition.” (Ib) “But a fraudulent
concealment of it will be a ground for rescinding the
contract.” (Ib., p. 134.)
“In South Carolina there is no implied warranty of
the moral qualities of the slave;” “as where a slave was
sold who had committed burglary, the fact being unknown
to both the seller and purchaser.” (Ib., p. 136.)
These quotations are made to prove the bomá ſide,
matter-of-fact chattelhood of the slave, or his being
C
I8 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
degraded to the condition of mere property, either real
or personal. And they show that the condition adheres
not merely to the body, but to the soul; to the moral
qualities that distinguish a man from a brute! It is an
homest servant that the vender sells. If the article is
proved to have been dishonest, the sale is vitiated. The
honesty of the man, then, is a commodity in the market !
“Craziness or idiocy is an absolute vice; and, where
not apparent, will annul the sale.” (Ib., p. 136.)
The God-like intellect of the human chattel is, there-
fore, the commodity sold and warranted! On the same
page, a case is cited—“Icar v. Suars, Jan. Term, 1835;
7 Louisiana Reports, 517”—in which Judge Bullard,
after stating the law and the facts, gave judgment for
the plaintiff, saying, “We are satisfied that the slave in
question was wholly, and perhaps worse than useless.”
In the case of the State v. Mann, the defendant was
indicted for an assault, and battery on a hired slave,
mamed Lydia. Judgment was rendered for the State;
but, on an appeal, the judgment was reversed. In giving
his decision, Judge Ruffin thus disposes of the plea that
the relation of master and slave resembles other domestic
relations.
“This has indeed been assimilated, at the bar, to the
other domestic relations; and arguments drawn from the
well-established principles which confer and restrain the
authority of the parent over the child, the tutor over the
pupil, the master over the apprentice, have been pressed
upon us. The court does not recognise their application.
SLAVE OWNERSHIP. I9
There is no likeness between the cases. They are in
opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf
between them. The difference is that which exists be-
tween freedom and slavery, and a greater cannot be
imagined. In the one, the end in view is the happiness
of the youth, born to equal rights with that governor on
whom the duty devolves of training the youth to useful-
ness, in a station which he is afterwards to assume among
freemen. To such an end, and with such a subject, moral
and intellectual instruction seem the natural means; and,
for the most part, they are found to suffice. Moderate
force is superadded, to make the others effectual. If that
fail, it is better to leave the party to his own headstrong
passions, and the ultimate correction of the law, than to
allow it to be immoderately inflicted by a private person.
With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit
of the master, his security, and the public Safety. The
subject is doomed, in his own person and his posterity,
to live without knowledge, and without capacity to make
anything his own, and to toil that others may reap the
fruits,” &c.
From such premises the Judge infers the necessity of
absolute power in the master over the slave, and the im-
possibility of any legal protection to the slave from that
power, while the slave-system continues. We shall cite
his words, to this effect, in another connexion.
It would be easy to multiply appropriate quotations
from the courts, but we reserve them for a still more
appropriate use, in treating of the various features of
2
0 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
slavery, all of which spring out of the principle of pro-
perty in man, and attest its existence and activity.
Let us next see how this matter is understood among
slaveholders themselves, Hear the testimony of their
stateSmen.
Thomas Jefferson, in his letter to Governor Coles, of
Illinois, dated August 25th, 1814, asserts that slave-
holders regard their slaves as property and as brutes, in
the paragraph that follows.
“Nursed and educated in the daily habit of seeing the
degraded condition, both bodily and mental, of these un-
fortunate beings, few minds have yet doubted that they were
as legitimate subjects of property as their horses or cattle.”
(American Slavery as it Is, pp. 110-11.)
Henry Clay, in his celebrated speech in the United States
Senate, in 1839, based his argument against the abolition
of slavery on the value of the slaves as property. This
was his language.
“The third impediment to immediate abolition is to
be found in the immense amount of capital which is in-
vested in slave property.” “The total value of slave pro-
perty, then, by estimate, is twelve hundred millions of
dollars. And now it is rashly proposed, by a single fiat
of legislation, to annihilate this immense amount of pro-
perty To annihilate it without indemnity, and without
compensation to the owners.” “I know that there is a
visionary dogma which holds that negro slaves cannot be
the subject of property. I shall not dwell on the specu-
lative abstraction. That is property which the law
SNAVE OWNERSHIP. 2I
declares to be property. Two hundred years of legislation
have sanctified and Sanctioned negro slaves as property.”
This argument identifies slaveholding with human chat-
telhood, and the relinquishment of this claim of property
with abolition. It bases the practice upon the theory, and
rests the justification of its perpetuity upon the practical
efficacy of the law, as being neither a dead letter nor
obsolete. In this argument the slaveholders confide, the
mation consents, and therefore slavery exists, with all the
evils it brings in its train.
By claiming their slaves as “property,” the “ owners”
of this property are naturally led to forget and even to
deny that they are human beings. For proof of this we
cite the speech of Mr. Summers, of Virginia, in the Legis-
lature of that State, January 26, 1832, as published in the
Richmond Whig. &
“When in the sublime lessons of Christianity, he (the
slaveholder) is taught to ‘do unto others as he would have
others do unto him, he nevor dreams that the degraded
negro is within the pale of that holy cºnom.”
We learn from this that the Southern pulpit has failed
to teach the community a contrary lesson. The innocent
“legal relation” has been suffered to circumscribe the
jurisdiction of the golden rule.
Colonel Dayton, formerly member of Congress from
South Carolina, in a work entitled “The South vindicated
from the Treason and Fanaticism of Northern Abolition-
ists,” holds the following language.
“The Northerner looks upon a band of negroes as so
22 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
many men, but the planter or Southerner views them in
very different light.”
Mr. Gholson, of Virginia, in his speech in the Legisla-
ture of that State, Jan. 18, 1831, as published in the Rich-
mond Whig (in reply to some members who had proposed
abolition), said:
“Why, I really have been under the impression that I
owned my slaves. I lately purchased four women and
ten children, in whom I thought I obtained a great bar-.
gain, for Ireally supposed they were my property, as were
my brood mares.”
Mr. Wise, in the United States House of Representa-
tives, said:
“The right of petition belongs to the people of the
United States. Slaves are not people in the eye of the
law. They have no legal personality.”
Another gentleman (as quoted by Mr. Vanderpool, of
New York) said: “Slaves had no more right to be heard
than horses and dogs.”
Mr. Vanderpool, of New York, himself said: “He
should be ashamed of himself if he ever could have sup-
posed that slaves had a right to petition this or any other
body where slavery exists.” “Had anyone, before to-day,
ever dreamed that the appellation of the people embraced
slaves 2 Sir,” said he, “I hesitate not to say, that were
I a Southern man, I would not submit to the doctrine
that slaves have a right to petition, if Congress were ever
mad enough to Sanction it. Nay, I go farther, and say
that as a Northern man I would not submit to it.”
SLAVE OWNERSHIP. 23
Mr. Pickens, of South Carolina, said :
“The offence of Mr. Adams consisted in his announcing
that he had a petition from the slaves, thus destroying
the relation between master and slave, and denying the
doctrine that the slave can be heard only through his
amaster.”
The doctrine, thus explained and advocated, was delibe-
rately and solemnly sanctioned by the House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States, in a resolution adopted
Feb. 11, 1837—Yeas, 162, Nays 18, as follows.
“Resolved, that slaves do not possess the right of peti-
tion secured to the people of the United States by the
Constitution.”
Thus was the national sanction given to the definition
of “the legal relation between master and slave” which
denies that “the relation” can consist with the recognition
of personality and humanity in the slave.
Ecclesiastical bodies have been equally explicit in their
definition of the relation.
The Charleston Baptist Association addressed a memo-
rial to the Legislature of South Carolina, maintaining that
“the Divine Author of our holy religion” adopted this
institution “as one of the allowed relations of society ;”
and they further say:
“Neither society nor individuals have any more autho-
rity to demand a relinquishment, without an equivalent,
in the one case than in the other,” that is, their right to
“the money and lands inherited from ancestors, or derived
from industry.” “We would resist to the utmost every
24 THE AMERIC AN SLAVE CO3DE.
invasion of this right, come from what quarter and under
what pretence it may.”
In the settlement of the estate of Rev. Dr. Furman, of
the same sect, in the same State, his legal representatives
exercised this “right,” in an advertisement of a public
Sale of his property at auction, as follows.
“A plantation or tract of land on and in Waterce
Swamp, a tract of the first quality of fine land on the
waters of Black River ; a lot of land in the town of Cam-
den ; a library of a miscellaneous character, chiefly theo-
logical ; twenty-seven negroes, some of thern very prime ;
two mules ; one horse ; and an old waggon.”
“Slaves are neither considered nor treated as human
beings.” + This is the testimony of Mr. L. Turner, a re-
gular and respectable member of the Second Presbyterian
church in Springfield, Illinois ; who was brought up in
Caroline County, Virginia. And the testimony is ap-
provingly communicated by Rev. William T. Allan, of
Chatham, Illinois, pastor of a Presbyterian church in that
place. Mr. Allan is son of Rev. Dr. Allan, pastor of the
Presbyterian church in Huntsville, Alabama. (Weld's
“Slavery as it Is,” p. 46.)
“Slaveholders regard their slaves as property, the mere
* Nothing else than the prevalence of this feeling can account for the
preposterous effºrt to discredit the unity of the negro race with the rest of
mankind It is very remarkablo that Mr. Jefferson, who wiote so clo-
quently against slavery, and whose kindness to his own mulatto slave-
children was so commendable, should have published to the world such
crude speculations of this character—not less unphilosophical than un-
scriptural. It is still more remarkable that professed believers in the
Bible should express doubts on tho subjectſ
SLAVE OWNERSHIP. 25
instruments of their convenience and pleasure. One
who is a slaveholder at heart never recognises a human
being in a slave.” This is the testimony of Angelina
Grimke Welde, daughter of the late Judge Grimke, of
the Supreme Court of South Carolina, and sister of the
late Hon. Thomas S. Grimke of Charleston. (Ib., 57.)
When a slave is accidentally killed, the Southern news-
papers speak of it merely as a loss of property to the
owner. Nothing is said of the bereaved widow, children,
or parents of the deceased. It would be easy to present
numerous instances in proof.
The Natchez (Miss.) Free Trader, of February 12,
1838, contains the following advertisement.
“Found.—A negro's head was picked up on the rail-
road yesterday, which the owner can have by calling
at this office and paying for this advertisement.” (Ib.,
169.)
The idea of the advertiser probably was, that the head
would be of use to the owner in establishing his claim on
the Railroad Company, or some one, for damages in the
destruction of his property.
The Vicksburg (Miss.) Register, December 27, 1838,
contains the following item of news for the amusement
of its readers.
“ARDOUR IN BETTING-Two gentlemen at a tavern
having summoned the waiter, the poor fellow had scarcely
entered when he fell down in a fit of apoplexy. ‘He's
dead ' exclaimed one. ‘He'll come to P replied the
other. ‘ Dead for five hundred l’ ‘Done P retorted the
26 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Second. The noise of the fall, and the confusion which
followed, brought up the landlord, who called out to
fetch a doctor, ‘No, no we must have no interference ;
there's a bet depending !’ ‘But, sir, I shall lose a valu-
able servant l’ ‘Never mind, you can put him down in
the bill l’”
This is shocking; but, aside from the moral wrong of
betting, the principle involved differs nothing from that
avowed by the Charleston Baptist Association already
quoted, so far as the matter of human chattelhood is
concerned. Admit the doctrine, as held by the Associ-
ation, and as defended by Mr. Clay, and the life of the
negro was no more sacred than the life of a horse. “The
innocent legal relation.” “sanctifies and Sanctions” the
whole.
The same principle finds daily expression in the ordi-
nary vocabulary of slaveholders. Their slaves, like their
other domestic animals, are called “stock.” The children
of slaves are spoken of, prospectively, even before they
are born, as anticipated “increase.” Female slaves that
are mothers are called “breeders,” till past child-bearing.
Those who compel the labour of slaves are called
“drivers.” Like horses, they are warranted, when sold,
to be “sound,” and are returned by the purchaser when
“unsound.”
The same principle is recognised by the free citizens
and professed Christians of the North, whenever they
speak of the slaveholder's “rights of property,” or enter-
tain the idea of “compensation” to them, in case of a
SLAVE OWNERSHIP. 27
general abolition of slavery, or of the redemption of par-
ticular slaves, in any such sense as implies that such
appropriation or purchase-money would be equitably due.
It remains to be observed that this claim of property
in slaves, both in theory and practice, as defined by
legislation and jurisprudence, as defended by theologians
and as sanctioned by ecclesiastical bodies, as carried out
into every-day practice by the pious and by the profane,
is manifestly and notoriously a claim, not only to the
bodies and the physical energies of the slave, but also to
his immortal soul, his human intelligence, his moral
powers, and even (in the case of a pious slave) to his
Christian graces and virtues.
This is proved by the fact, that the body of the slave
without his soul would be a dead carcase of no value.
Or, if it be objected that the same distinction obtains
between a dead horse and a living one, our proposition is
proved by the fact, that if the slave had only the intel-
lectual powers of a horse, his inferiority to a horse in
physical strength would sink him below the pecuniary
value of a horse, instead of his commanding, as he now
does, the price of a number of horses.
In advertisements of slaves to be sold or to be hired
out, their intelligence, their skill, their homesty, their
sobriety, their benevolent dispositions are specified and
insisted on as items of primary importance in estimating
their value. Their piety is not unfrequently mentioned
in the inventory, and they are recommended as being
Worthy members of Methodist, Baptist, or Presbyterian
28 TIEE AMERICAN SLAVE CORD’E,
churches. And church members of the same sects both
buy and Sell them on the basis of these recommendations,
This, in the United States of America, in this nine-
teenth century, is “the legal relation of master and
slave”—a relation that challonges as “goods” and “chat-
tels personal, to all intents, constructions, and purposes
whatsoever,” the immortal soul of man, the image of the
invisible Creator, the temple of the Holy Spirit, the pur-
chase of a Redeemer's blood. The statement is no rhe-
torical flourish; it is no mere logical inference; it is
no metaphysical subtlety; it is no empty abstraction.
It is no obsolete or inoperative fiction of the law. It
is veritable matter-of-fact reality, acted out every day
wherever and whenever a negro or anyone else is claimed
as an American slave. If any slaveholder denies it, let him
be challenged to put the denial in writing, duly attested,
and in such a shape that the courts of law can take
cognizance of it. Whenever he does this, and puts the
paper in the hands of his slave or trusty friend, his slave
is set frce. Every intelligent slaveholder knows this.
The evidence already presented is sufficient, but there
is much more in reserve. In the chapters that follow, the
various features of the slave system will be presented, as
defined by the Slave Code and as oxhibited in daily
practice, And each one of these features will be seen
to grow out of the foundation principle of American
slavery—to wit, human chattelhood, as exhibited in this
chapter; thus proving the presence and the vitality of
that principle by its practical operations and bearings.
SLAVE OWNERSIIIP. 20
The whole system may be educed from this parent stock,
as any science, in detail, is educed from its fundamental
axioms. Tiet any reflecting person assume that chattel-
hood or property in man is the foundation of the system ;
then let him follow out, in his own mind, the natural and
necessary workings of such a principle reduccd to practice,
and he will be able to anticipate beforehand almost the
entire code of slavery, and the practices existing under it.
30
C H A P T E R II.
SLAVE TRAFFIC.
Sale, Purchase, Barter, Mortgage, Auction, Coffle-gang, Shipments—as
absolutely as in the case of any other Property, and by the same
Tenure.
THIS feature must result, of necessity, from “the legal
relation” of ownership exhibited in the first chapter. The
quotations there made cover explicitly this ground.
“The master may sell him.” “Slaves shall be sold.”
“Sold, transferred, or pawned as goods, or personal
estate ; for goods they were, and as such they were
esteemed.”
Any modification of this feature must evidently relax
the application of the principle of ownership, and limit
its operation. In the Spanish, Portuguese, and French
colonies, such modifications, nevertheless, obtained. The
Code Noir, art. 47, prohibits the selling of the husband
without the wife, the parents without the children, or
vice versé. In cases of voluntary Sales, made contrary to
this regulation, the wife or husband, the children or
parents, though expressly retained by the seller, pass by
the same conveyance to the purchaser, and may be claimed
by him without any additional price. (See Stephen's
Slavery, 69 ; # Stroud's Sketch, 51.)
* This remarkable provision arises, doubtless, from the fact that the
SLAVE TRAFFIC. 31
What bearing this humane regulation would have upon
our internal slave-trade, if it were established in this
country, the reader will see by the following account of
its operation.
Says the compiler of the “Ammals of the Sovereign
Council of Martinique:”
“This law has always been rigidly executed, whenever
a claim has been set up on the part of the purchaser. I
have known slaves who have been sent to Guadaloupe or
St. Domingo to be expatriated and sold, to reclaim their
children remaining in our colony, with success, through
the action of the purchasers in the colonies to which they
were sent.” (See Stephen's Slavery, 69 and 70, citing
“Annales de la Martinique,” tome i., p. 285. Wide Stroud,
p. 51.)
It would not, probably, be quite as easy for slave chil-
dren to recover their aged parents, or for husbands to
reclaim their feeble and sickly wives, by this “action of
the purchasers.” Humanity, mevertheless, would gain
much. The principle of human chattelhood would be
weakened. Perhaps it was partly through the influence
of this and similar relaxations of the principle that the
entire system was swept away in Mexico and the South
American Republics. By this feature of the Code Noir,
the bondage under its jurisdiction was made to resemble,
in this aspect, the feudalism or serfdom of northern
laws repecting slavery in those colonies are framed in the mother-country,
and not (as in the British colones) by colonial legislatures, composed of
slaveholders,
32 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Europe, where the villein is attached to the soil, rather than
the chattel slavery of the American Slave States.
In Pennsylvania, in New York, perhaps in other
American States, when measures were taken for the pro-
spective abolition of slavery, the sale of slaves to be sent
out of the State was prohibited by express statute. Ex-
cept in these instances, we know of no departure, in the
matter of sale and transfer, in our American Slave States,
from the principle of unrestricted and absolute human
chattelhood, unless the anomaly be found in the State of
Touisiana, as hinted in our first chapter, where it was
stated that slaves are held in Louisiana as real estate.
“In the slaveholding States,” says Judge Stroud, “ex-
cept in Louisiana, no law exists to prevent the violent
separation of parents from their children, or even from
each other.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 50.) Again, after
dwelling upon these cruelties of the domestic slave-trade,
as being peculiar to “the republican States of North
America,” the same writer adds in a mote (p. 52), “From
the generality of this remark, the State of Louisiana
must be excepted.” “The slaves are declared to be real
estate, to be ranked among immoveable property. When,
therefore, the owner of slaves is, as I presume is most
commonly the case, possessed of land, the slave cannot be
separated from it by process of law. Besides this humane
regulation, there are several others which deserve to be
signalised, viz.: “If, at a public sale of slaves, there hap-
pen to be some who are disabled through old age or
otherwise, and who have children, such slaves shall not
SLAVE TRAFFIC. 33
be sold but with his or her children, whom he or she may
think proper to go with.’” (1 Martin's Digest, 612;
Act of July 7, 1806; Stroud's Sketch, p. 52-3.)
How far these provisions are, at this late day, avail-
able for the benefit of the slaves of Louisiana, we have no
means of knowing. Louisiana has been a purchasing,
rather than a slave-exporting State. The striking con-
trast between these enactments and the known usages and
Scenes of other States, mark their anomalous character,
as exceptions which prove and illustrate the general
rule of unrestricted chattelhood in our slave-holding
States.
It is to be noticed that these refreshing anomalies are
witnessed in only one of the Slave States—a State coming
within our jurisdiction from under that of France, and
receiving its earlier features of polity under the laws of
Spain. Louisianian slavery took its type from the Code
Noir, and from the usages growing up under what our
citizens are pleased to denominate Spanish despotism and
Superstition. Anglo-Saxon civilisation and religion, with
all their “republican” and “Protestant” boastings, have
mot yet reached the same point of progress; nor do we
learn that in Florida, acquired from Spain, the mild
features of Spanish slavery have survived the transfer.
The reason may be, that too many Northern citizens (the
most merciless of all slaveholders) have planted themselves
there. Be this as it may, it is certain that the “legal
relation of master and slave,” as commonly understood,
plactised, vindicated, and protected, in these United
D
34 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
States, differs widely in the feature now under consi-
deration from that defined by the Code Noir. We may
venture to affirm that the commonly-received exposition,
as it exists in theory and practice, in the Church and
the State, has been truthfully set forth by one of our
most prominent and popular statesmen, the late Henry
Clay, in his speech in the United States Senate, February
7, 1839, in which he said—
“The moment that the incontestable fact is admitted,
that the slaves are property, the law of moveable property
irresistibly attaches itself to them, and secures the right of
carrying them from one State to another.”
This definition, which is acted upon every day, identi-
fies “the legal relation” and the slave system with the
* It may be said that there is an exception to this statement of Mr.
Clay, in the laws of some of the Slave States, prohibiting the importation
of slaves from other States; also, in the restrictions recently imposed, on
motion of Mr. Clay himself, upon the prosecution of the slave-trade from
the Federal District.
Those State regulations were, for reasons of policy or supposed interest,
to encourage slave-breeding at home, instead of receiving supplies from
abroad. Whether consistent or inconsistent with the rights of property,
they have their precedent in the prohibitions of importations of other
kinds of property, by different mations and States. But, under our
Federal Constitution, the power of regulating commerce between the
several States is committed to Congress, not to the States; and hence, in
Mississippi, notwithstanding the prohibitory enactment, the slave-dealers
in 1836-7 brought into that State and sold slaves to the value of ninety
millions of dollars It is true that when they undertook the collection of
their debts, the purchasers pleaded the illegality of the sales; the State
court sustained them, and thus they obtained the greater part of the im-
portation without paymentſ
The restriction in the Federal District prevents dealers from bringing
in supplies from the States, for sale and shipment abroad, but does not
prevent purchases and sales among the citizens,
SLAVE TRAFFIC. 35
domestic slave-trade, and its constant and violent disrup-
tion of the most sacred and tender ties of consanguinity
and affection. If the “legal relation” does not produce
this effect in respect to each slave, it does, in each instance,
uphold and Sanction the principle of chattelhood upon
which alone the traffic in slaves rests. It recognises the
rightfulness of the traffic by recognising the rightfulness
of slave ownership, which includes the right of purchase
and sale. This is what Mr. Clay affirmed, and, thus far,
he spoke truthfully. The moment the right of property
in man is admitted (and here lies the core of the “relation”),
that moment the right of purchase and sale is virtually
conceded likewise. It was a triumph of human sympathy
over legal congruity and logical consistency that enacted
the Code Noir.
The exposition of Mr. Clay reduces slaves to a level
with poultry and swine ; it denies to them personality
and the attributes of human beings. It does this not
merely in theory, but on a point of the most pressing
practical importance. It certifies us that the chattel
principle is neither a dead letter nor an unmeaning abs-
traction. It exhibits the practical statesmanship, not of
Henry Clay only, but of all who admit the validity of the
so-called “legal relation.”
A similar exposition we have from Rev. James Smylie,
of the Amite Presbytery, Mississippi, in a pamphlet
written in defence of slaveholding. Alluding to the
charges of abolitionists, he admits the facts adduced by
them, but denies their criminality. And he says—
36 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“If slavery be a sin, and advertising and apprehending
slaves with a view to restore them to their masters is a
direct violation of the divine law, and if the buying, selling,
and holding a slave, for the sake of gain, is a heinous
sin and scandal, then, verily, three-fourths of all the Epis-
copalians, Methodists, Baptists, and Presbyterians in eleven
States of this Union are of the devil. They hold, if they
do not buy and sell, slaves; and (with few exceptions) they
hesitate not to apprehend and restore runaway slaves,
when in their power.”
It will be noticed that the holding, the buying, and the
selling of a slave are here put together, as being essentially
of the same character. And common-sonse as well as
“the law” of the peculiar “relation,” as expounded by
Henry Clay, attests the same thing.
A large portion of “Wheeler's Law of Slavery” is
occupied with legal decisions connected, directly or in-
directly, with cases growing out of the transfer of slaves.
One division or chapter of the work treats “Of the
Increase of Slaves—to whom the increase belongs—
of the grant or devise of the increase.” Another topic is,
“Of the Title to Slaves;” another, “Of Warranty;”
another, “Of Hiring of Slaves;” another, “Of Mort-
gage of Slaves;” another, “Of Dower of Slaves;” an-
other, “Of the Division of Slaves;” another, “Of the
Remainder in Slaves.” Upwards of one hundred and
fifty pages of the book (nearly one-third of the entire
work) are occupied with these topics. From the extent
and variety of litigation coming before the courts and
SLAVE TRAFFIC. 37
demanding these complicated legal rules and decisions, it
would seem that a very large part of the business trans-
actions of the people must consist in the reception or
transfer, in such form, of this species of property. And,
at every step, it appears that transfers of slave property
are made upon the same principles that govern the trans-
fer of other property, that it is held and conveyed under
the same tenure, and with as little sense of the impro-
priety of the transaction; thus placing, in practice, a
human being upon a level with a mere thing. Thus,
when the judge, the lawyer, or the law compiler or author
would lay down the legal rule by which the decision
should be made in a litigated case, in a matter of sale,
delivery, possession, warranty, &c., he looks up the prece-
dents and rules originally occurring or laid down in
respect to “a mare” or “a colt,” and then, with the
utmost coolness and gravity, applies it, as valid law, to
the sale, delivery, or warranty of “a girl!” An instance
of this occurs in “Wheeler's Law of Slavery,” pp. 119,
120, in a note on the case of Smith v. Rowzee, Spring
Term, 1821; a case in which “the girl” purchased was
unable to travel home with her new master, eight miles
distant, and soon died. A lawsuit followed, and the law
concerning other live stock determined the case!
In one instance (p. 68) we find “a negro woman slave,
mamed Peg,” sold for 300 dollars, with leave to return
her in three weeks, if the purchaser did not like her.
With her new master she became frost-bitten, which ren-
dered her “of little value.” Hence a suit between the
38 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
parties, judgment given, an appeal taken, judgment re-
versed—just as in the case of a horse or an ox.
On page 79 we learn that “five years' peaceable pos-
session gives a title to a slave, and which, if lost, may be
regained.” We infer that if possession, as between
contending claimants of slave property, be thus potent,
it would be at least equally powerful as between the
possessor and the slave's legal right to freedom.
Of the extent of the slave traffic between the slave-
growing and planting States (of which we shall speak
presently) some tolerably reliable approximation towards
the true statistics may be gathered. But of the extent of
local and neighbourhood transfers, with which Wheeler's
reported cases seem mostly occupied, very little can be
accurately known. We can only say that a perusal of
“Wheeler's Law of Slavery” has very greatly swelled our
own estimate or apprehension of that extent. It can
hardly be supposed that more than a tithe of such trans-
fers would occasion lawsuits. But we seem to see the
courts crowded with them, and a compilation of the
reported cases swelling a law volume. It must be folly
to pretend that the slave traffic occupies only the vulgar
portion of Southern society, when it figures so largely in
the courts.
“Slaves may be sold and transferred from one to
another without any statutory restriction or limitation as
to the separation of parents and children, &c., except in
Louisiana.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 41.)
It can hardly be necessary to cite witnesses to prove
SLAVE TRAFFIC. 39
that this feature of the Slave Code, which licenses the
slave-trade and the separation of families, is not a dead
letter. But it might be useful to impress upon the reader
Some idea of the magnitude and the atrocity of this traffic.
This would open a wide field. We might refer the
inquirer to Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” to Jay’s “In-
quiry,” and to Goodell’s “History of Slavery and Anti-
Slavery,” for collections of facts and testimonies on this
subject, upon which we cannot enlarge here.
The extent of the slave-trade in America may be con-
ceived from the testimony of the Presbyterian Synod of
Rentucky, that “these scenes” (i. e., coffle-gangs) are
“ daily occurring in the midst of us ;” that “there is not
a neighbourhood where these heart-rending scenes are not
displayed;” that “there is not a village or road that
does not behold the sad procession of manacled outcasts,
whose chains and mournful countenances tell that they
are exiled by force from all that their hearts hold dear.”
Its general prosecution may be seen by the numerous
advertisements of both purchasers and venders in the most
respectable newspapers in the Slave States, as, for example,
the following.
“NEGROES FOR SALE.—A negro woman, twenty-four
years of age, and her two children, one eight and the
other three years old. Said negroes will be sold sepa-
"ately or together, as desired. The woman is a good
Seamstress. She will be sold low for cash, or exchanged
Jorgroceries. For terms apply to
“MATTHEW BLISS & Co., 1, Front Levee.”
lNew Orleans Bee.
40 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
“I will give the highest cash price for likely negroes
from ten to twenty-five years of age.
“GEORGE KEPHART.”
Alexandria (D. C.) Gazette.
“ FIFTY NEGROES WANTED IMMEDIATELY. —The sub-
scriber will give a good market price for fifty likely
negroes from ten to thirty years of age.
“ HENRY DAVIS.”
Petersburg (Va.) Constellation.
Having obtained their supplies and driven or shipped
them South, the dealers offer them for sale, in advertise-
ments like the following, which appeared in the papers of
Charleston, S. C.
“ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY NEGROES FOR SALE,-
The subscriber has just arrived from Petersburg, Virginia,
with one hundred and twenty likely young negroes of both
sexes and every description, which he offers for sale on the
most reasonable terms. The lot now on hand consists of
plough-boys, several likely and well-qualified house-ser-
vants of both sexes, several women with children, small
girls suitable for nurses, and several Small boys without
their mothers. Planters and traders are earnestly requested
to give the subscriber a call previously to making pur-
chases elsewhere, as he is enabled to sell as cheap or cheaper
than can be sold by any other person in the trade.
“BENJAMIN DAVIS.
“EIamburg, S. C., September 28, 1838.”
SLAVE TRAFFIC. 41
The respectability and profitableness of the traffic may
be inferred from the fact, that some of the largest ship-
ping merchants are slave-merchants, that they own, and
charter, and freight numerous vessels to transport their
slaves coastwise, and invest princely fortunes as capital in
the business.
The importance of this branch of commerce will be
apparent from the speeches of leading statesmen, and the
paragraphs of prominent editors.
Henry Clay, in his speech before the Colonisation
Society, in 1829, said—
“It is believed that nowhere, in the farming portion
of the United States, would slave-labour be generally em-
ployed, if the proprietor were not tempted to raise slaves,
by the high price of the Southern market, which keeps it
up in his own.”
Mr. Gholsom, of Virginia, in the same speech in the
State Legislature before quoted, after claiming his negro
women as his property, like his “brood mares,” expatiated
upon the profitableness and the rightfulness of the invest-
ment.
“The owner of land had a reasonable right to its
annual products, the owner of brood mares to their pro-
tluct, and the owner of female slaves to their increase.”
“The value of the property justifies the expense; and I
do not hesitate to say that in it consists much of our
wealth.”
The editor of the Virginia Times, in 1836, made a cal-
42 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
culation that 120,000 slaves went out of that State during
the year, that 80,000 of them went with their owners,
who removed, leaving 40,000 who were sold, at an average
price of 600 dollars; amounting to twenty-four millions
of dollars.
Similar estimates and testimonies might be added.
The annexation of Texas and the conquest of Mexico
were openly advocated, and notoriously prosecuted, for
the object of extending the area of slavery, and thereby
opening a new slave-market for the breeders of slaves.
And the coastwise slave-trade has been protected by the
National Government, and its diplomacy prostituted to
this purpose. The particulars may be found in Jay's
“View of the Action of the Federal Government in be-
half of Slavery,” and Jay’s “Review of the Mexican War;”
also (briefly) in Goodell’s “History of Slavery and Anti-
Slavery.”
Of the character of this traffic little more need be said.
By our own National Government the African slave-
trade is branded “piracy.” But Thomas Jefferson Ran-
dolph, in the Virginia Legislature, in 1832, declared the
domestic slave-trade to be “much worse.”
About 1100 citizens of the Federal District, including
Judge Cranch and the principal clergy of the district,
petitioned Congress against it, as there existing; and,
comparing it with the African slave-trade, they said that
it is “scarcely less disgraceful in its character, and even
more demoralising in its influence.” This was in 1828.
The Grand Jury of the district had, many years before
SLAVE TRAFFIC. 43
(1802), presented it as a nuisance.* Its character there,
at that time, differs nothing from its character in the
different States at present.
The New Orleans Courier, February 15th, 1839, says—
“The United States law,” prohibiting the African slave-
trade, “may, and probably does, put millions into the
pockets of the people living between the Roanoke and
Mason and Dixon's line ; still we think it would require
some casuistry to show that the present slave-trade from
that quarter is a whit better than the one from Africa.”
It may be asked, who are they, at the South, that
prosecute this domestic slave-trade? The Presbyterian
Synod of Kentucky, describing its extent, its common
occurrence and its barbarities, inform us, in the same
paragraph, that “professors of the religion of mercy,” “who
hold to our communion,” have “torn the mother from the
children, and sent them into returnless exilo. Yet acts of
discipline have rarely” (never) “followed such conduct.”
In the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1835, it was
stated by an elder, Mr. Stewart of Illinois, and without
contradiction, that “even ministers of the gospel and
doctors of divinity may engage in this unholy traffic, and
yet sustain their high and holy calling.” “Elders,” said
he, “ministers and doctors of divinity, are, with both
hands, engaged in the practice.” Yet nothing was done
*By the Act of Congress of 1850, the slave-dealers are prohibited from
making the Federal District a deposit for slaves. But this does not pre-
Vent amy citizen of the district from selling his slave, or purchasing a
slave from abroad.
t James G. Birncy, long resident in Kentucky, and a Presbyterian, says
“jºever.”
44 THE AMERICAN SLAVE COO E.
or said by the Assembly in condemnation of it. The tes-
timony of the Rev. James Smylie, already cited for another
purpose, implicates “three-fourths” of the leading religious
sects in the practice.
If a distinction be set up between the Virginian breed-
ers and Mississippi purchasers, gentlemen planters, on the
one hand, and the human drovers, commonly called “soul-
drivers,” on the other, who ply between the two, disposing
at the far South of their “stock” purchased at the North,
we maintain that there is no legal or moral distinction
between them. “The legal relation” is as innocent and as
criminal in the one as in the other. The “growers,” the
3.
“consumers,” and “dealers,” so necessary to them, stand
on the same level.
Besides, the “dealers” are sometimes esteemed as re-
spectable and as pious as the “growers” and “consumers.”
A number of authentic narratives assure us that itinerant
preachers, in more sects than one, carry on the double avo-
cation of converting souls, and buying up the souls and
bodies of men, women, and children for sale. An instance,
in “the fine old Methodist preacher who dealt in slaves,”
may be found in Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” p. 180. In
the higher circles of society at the South, this would be
thought low and vulgar—equally so with buying up horses
and swine. But slave-trading on a sufficiently large scale
is considered a reputable employment, just as the large im-
porters and distillers of rum are respected among us, while
the dealer of drams is despised. The items that follow
are from the work of Mr. Weld, just mentioned, and which,
SHAVE THAFFIC. 45
for thirteen years past, has had an extensive circulation
and eager perusal in our widely-extended country, with-
out having had ome of its vast collection of facts disproved
Or even questioned, to our knowledge.
“That they,” the smaller dealers, “are not despised
because it is their business to trade in human beings and
bring them to market, is plaim from the fact that when
Some ‘gentleman of property and standing, and of a
‘good family, embarks in a negro speculation, and em-
ploys a dozen “soul-drivers’ to traverse the upper country
and drive to the South coffles of slaves, expending hun-
dreds of thousands in his wholesale purchases, he does
mot lose caste.
“It is known in Alabama that Mr. Erwin, son-in-law
of Henry Clay, and brother of J. P. Erwin, formerly
postmaster and late mayor of the city of Nashville, laid
the foundation of a princely fortune in the slave-trade
carried on from the northern Slave States to the planting
South; that the Hon. H. Hitchcock, brother-in-law of
Mr. E., and since one of the Judges of the Supreme Court
of Alabama, was interested with him in the traffic; and
that a late member of the Kentucky Senate (Colonel Wall)
not only carried on the same business a few years ago,
but accompanied his droves in person down the Mis-
sissippi—not as the driver, for that would be vulgar
drudgery, beneath a gentleman ; but as a nabob in state,
ordering his understrappers.
“It is also well known that President Jackson was a
‘Soul-driver,’ and that even so late as the year before the
46 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
last war, he bought up a coffle of slaves and drove them
down to Louisiana for Sale.
“Thomas N. Gadsden, Esq., the principal slave auc-
tioneer in Charleston, S. C., is of one of the first families,
and moves in the very highest class of society there. He
is a descendant of the distinguished General Gadsden, of
revolutionary memory,” and “member of the Continental
Congress,” “afterwards Governor of the State.” “The
Rev. Dr. Gadsden, rector of St. Philip's Church, Charles-
ton, and the Rev. Philip Gadsden,” and “Col. James
Gadsden, of the United States Army, are his brothers.”
“ Under his hammer, men, women and children go off by
thousands; its stroke probably sunders, daily, husbands
and wives, parents and children, brothers and sisters,
perhaps to see each other's faces no more. Now, who
supply the auction-table of this Thomas Gadsden, Esq.,
with its loads of human merchandise'. These same
‘ detested soul-drivers, forsooth—as they are sometimes
called, even at the South. They prowl through the
country, buy, catch, and fetter them, and drive their
chained coffles to his stand, whore Thomas Gadsden, Esq.,
knocks them off to the highest bidder, to Ex-Governor
Dutler, perhaps, or to Ex-Governor Hayne, or to the Hon.
Robert Barnwell Rhett” (M. C.), “ or (it may be) to his
own revorend brother, Dr. Gadsden.” (Weld’s “Slavery
as it Is,” p. 174.)
One illustration more must suffice. During the great
negro speculation of 1836, when all the negro-consuming
States were insanely eager to purchase at high prices, and
SLAVE TRAFFIC. 47
Hy
all the negro-breeding States were enriching themselves
with the sales, the “soul-drivers, now multiplied beyond
all former precedent, were separating wives and husbands,
parents and children, with unwonted celerity, and driving
them in chained coffles, or droves, as speedily as possible
to the market. The whole South was feverish and im
motion. Money for the operation was in brisk demand.
The banks extended their loans, and were drained. Capi-
talists demanded high rates of interest. Through the
banks they made loans to the speculators, Then it was
that the Trustees of the General Assembly of the Pres-
byterian Church, lured by these high rates of interest,
though well knowing, as everybody did, the purposes for
which their capital was wanted, withdrew their funds, to
the amount of 94,692 dollars 88 cents, from a Northern
institution where they were drawing the usual interest,
and invested them in the South-western banks, where
they would be loaned to the speculators in the bodies and
Souls of men, women, and children. In the reaction and
general bankruptcy that followed, the Presbyterian Church
lost 68,893 dollars 88 cents of their funds. Had the
General Assembly and its Trustees understood and felt,
as they should have dome, the sinfulness of “the legal
relation of master and slave,” they would have understood
and felt the sinfulness of this abominable slave-trade
which the relation involves, and the consequent sinfulness
of loaning money to carry it on. But they deemed it
“ultra” and “fanatical” to recognise these self-evident
truths ; and therefore lost the greater part of their funds.
48 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
We dismiss this feature of the Slave Code, presuming
that its paternity, its character, its vitality, and its prac-
tical workings have now been made sufficiently clear. In
this feature of the system, its slave traffic, the people
have been found no better than their laws, and the Church
no better than the people.
49
CHAIPTER III.
SEIZUIRE OF SLAVE PROPERTY FOR, DEBT.
As Property, Slaves may be seized and sold to pay the Debts of their
Owners, while living, or for the settlement of their Estates, after their
decease.
THIS is evident from the very nature of property, espe-
cially of chattels personal, as well as from the fact that
slaves may be bought and sold, and pawned or mortgaged
for the security of debts. A pawn or mortgage is of the
mature of barter. If not redeemed, it becomes a barter in
the end. And barter is only one form of purchase and
sale. Whatever may be bought and sold may be bartored,
consequently mortgaged ; and, if unredeemed, seized,
taken possession of
The very definition of slave property, as cited in Chap-
ter T., specifies this incident. They “may be sold, trans-
ferred, and pawned.” They are “chattels personal, to all
intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever.”
“The slave, being a personal chattel, is at all times liable
to be sold absolutely, or mortgaged, or leased, at the will
of his master. He may also be sold by process of law for
the satisfaction of the debts of a living, or the debts and
bequests of a deceased master, at the Suit of creditors or
legatees.” (Stroud's Sketch, pp. 25-51.)
E
5() }<
THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
“If a slave sold remains with the vender, he is liable
to be seized for his debts.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery,
p. 54.)
“Slaves are considered as property, and in most of the
States they are considered as chattels personal. They are,
therefore, subject to those rules and regulations which
society has established for the purchase and sale, and
transmission from one to another, of that species of pro-
perty. They therefore may be mortgaged as personal
property, or are the subjects of a qualified or conditional
sale, to suit the wants of the owner or purchaser of them.
They are declared to be personal estate by the Revised
Code of Mississippi, 379 ; Revised Code of Virginia, vol.
i., pp. 431-47. Indeed, they are considered the subjects
of mortgage in all the States by custom, and which exists
in many of the States by express statutory provisions.”
By the Black Code of Louisiana, vol. i., Dig., p. 102,
sec. 10, it is declared that slaves shall be reputed and con-
sidered real estate ; shall be, as such, Subject to be mort-
gaged, according to the rules prescribed by law, and
they shall be seized and sold as real estate. (Ib., Note,
pp. 164-5.) *
“Slaves may be sold by creditors for debts of their
owners, in all the States but Louisiana, where they
cannot be separated from the land.” (1 Martin's Dig,
612, Act of July, 1806; cited in Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, p. 41.)
“The children of a female slave mortgaged, born after
the execution of the mortgage, are as much liable to the
SALE OF SLAYES FOR DEBT. 51
demand of the mortgagee as the slave herself.” (Ib.,
p. 167.)
In contrast with the preceding, we present the follow-
ing.
“Plantation slaves, not only in the Spanish and Portu-
guese, but in the French colonies also, are real estate, and
attached to the soil they cultivate, partaking therewith all
the restraints upon voluntary alienation to which the
possessor of the land is there liable, and they cannot be
seized or sold by creditors for the satisfaction of the debts
of the owner. It has already been stated that by the
Code Noir, art. 47, the husband cannot be sold without
the wife, nor the parents without the children. Sales
made contrary to this regulation, by process of law, under
seizure for debts, are declared void.” (See Stephens’ Sla-
very, 68-9 ; Stroud's Sketch, p. 53.)
It is evident that this feature of liability to seizure for
the master's debt is, in many cases, more terrific to the
slave than that which subjects him to the master's volun-
tary sale. The slave may be satisfied that his master is
not willing to sell him—that it is not for his interest or
convenience to do so. He may be conscious that he is,
in a manner, necessary to his master or mistress, or that,
being a favourite and tried servant, they would not sell
him at any price. He may even confide in their Chris-
tian benevolence and moral principle, or promise that they
would not sell him, especially that they would not thus
separate him from his wife and children. But all this
affords him no security or ground of assurance that his
52 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
master's creditor will not seize him, or his wife or his
children, against even his master's intreaties. Such
occurrences are too common to be unmoticed, or out of
mind.
(Advertisement in the Georgia Journal of January 2nd, 1838.)
“Will be sold, the following property, to wit: one
child, by the name of James, levied on as the property
of Gabriel Gunn.”
(From the Southern Whig, March 2, 1838.)
“Will be sold, in La Grange, Troup County, one negro
girl, by the name of Charity, aged about ten or twelve
years, as the property of Littleton L. Burk, to satisfy a
mortgage fi, fa, from Troup Inferior Court, in favour of
TDaniel S. Robertson v. Said Burk.”
Neither the court, the sheriff, the plaintiff, the defend-
ant, nor the negro girl, appear to have been instructed in
the literature which assures willing dupes that the Slave
Code is obsolete—a dead letter.
(From the Milledgeville Journal, Dec. 26, 1837.)
* Eacecutor's Sale.—Agreeable to an order of the Court
of Wilkinson County, will be sold on the first Tuesday of
April next, before the Court-house door in the town of
Irwington, one negro girl, about two years old, named
Rachel, belonging to the estate of William Chambers,
deceased. Sold for the benefit of the heirs and creditoi's
of said estate.
“SAMUEL BELL,
Eacecutors.”
“JESSI, PEACOCK, |
SALE OF SLAVES FOR, DEBT. 53
Here, again, the “chattel principle” appears not to
3 c 5
have been regarded as “a mere metaphysical, speculative
abstraction,” as some would persuade us to believe it is.
(From the Natchez Courier, April 2, 1838.)
“Notice is hereby given, that the undersigned, pursuant
to a certain deed of trust, will, on Thursday, the 12th
day of April next, expose to sale at the Court-house, to
the highest bidder, for cash, the following negro slaves, to
wit: Fanny, aged about twenty-eight years; Mary, aged
about seven years; Amanda, aged about three months;
Wilson, aged about nine months. Said slaves to be sold
for the satisfaction of the debt secured in the said deed
of trust. “W. J. MINOR.”
The “legal relation” was here defined and exemplified,
as likewise in the following.
(Extract of a letter to a member of Congress from a friend in Mississippi,
published in the Washington Globe, June, 1837.)
“The times are truly alarming here. Many plantations
are entirely stripped of their negroes and horses by the
marshal or sheriff. Suits are multiplying,” &c.
Truly alarming times, indeed, for slave mothers and
their babes—for slave wives and their husbands. But of
their alarms, the writer, the publisher, and the readers
generally, it may be presumed, thought no more than they
did of the alarms of the “horses” associated and seized
with them.
In all this we have only the natual workings of the
“legal relation;" the legality of which was understood
54 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
and enforced by the sheriff. It were idle to talk of his
act, or of the act of the creditors, as an abuse of the rela-
tion. The relation is that of owner and chattels, and
nothing else. It would be absurd (not to say dishonest)
for the law to Sanction such a relation, and then leave the
rights unprotected which the relation implies. Were it
true that such a relation existed, and that it was truly
legal and valid, there would be manifest injustice to the
attaching creditor, as well as to the voluntary slave ven-
der, in the Code Noir. The truth is, no such “legal rela-
tion” can be valid; and to this fact the Code Noir gives
its attestation, by its veto upon the exercise of its involved
rights.
We dismiss also this feature of the Slave Code, with
the remark that, in respect to it, we find the people to be
mo better than their laws, and their usages no worse than
“the legal relation” that gives Sanction to them.
5
5
CHAPTER IV.
INHERITANCE OF SLAVE PROPERTY.
Slaves, as Property, are transmitted by Inheritance or by Will to Heirs-at-
law or to Legatees–In the distribution of Estates they are distributed
like other Property.
THIS feature of the slave system, like all its other
features, is derived from its cardinal primciple of property
in the bodies and souls of mem. Without this principle,
the whole edifice falls to the ground. With it, the entire
system, in all its parts, and entire, is sustained.
We have already stated the law on this subject. The
slave “may be sold” “at the suit of creditors or legatees.”
(Stroud, p. 51.)
A more specific recognition of this feature is found in
a law of North Carolina, substantially copied by other
States, in which, after prohibiting, in a great measure,
the further introduction of slaves into their limits,” a
proviso is added that “mothing in this act shall prohibit
any citizen of this State who may obtain slaves, &c., by
marriage, gift, legacy, devise, or descent,” “from bringing
the slaves, &c., into this State by land or water.” (Hay-
* It has already been seem that these probibitions have not prevented
an immemse slave traffic between the States. In some of the States these
prohibitions have been repealed.
36 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
ward's Manual, 533-4; Act of 1794, chap. ii., &c, &c.
Wide Stroud, p. 55.)
This indicates what is the known fact, that slaves had
previously been inherited in the several States.
The inheritance of slave property appears to have occa-
sioned much litigation in the courts, and accordingly the
topic occupies no little space in the reported decisions
collected together in “Wheeler's Law of Slavery.”
In the case of Beatley v. Judy, &c., in Kentucky, it
was determined that the phrase “personal estate” in wills
and contracts should be construed as embracing slaves.
(2 Wash. Rep., 1-8.) The same in the case of Plumpton
v. Cook. (2 Marshall's Ky. Rep., 450; copied by
Wheeler, p. 2.4)
In the case of Banks, Admr., v. Marksbury, it was
decided that “the owner of a female slave may give her
to one of his children, and the future increase (that is,
unborn children) to another ſ” (Wheeler, p. 28. The
case is reported at length. We give here, as in many
other instances, the bricf marginal statement of the com-
piler.)
In the case of Carroll et al. v. Connet (in Kentucky),
Robinson, Ch. J., it was held that “the administrator is
* Tn our quotations from Wheeler, we often (to save room) omit his
statements of the names of the litigants, the judges, and the “Reports”
from which he has copied. We preserve these, in some instances, that
the reader may be impressed with the matter-of-fact nature of the record,
and not fancy himself reading “legal ſiction.” Whatever may be said of
statutes, the daily decisions of courts are not “obsolete,” nor are they
“ theoretical abstractions.”
INHERITANCE OF SLAVE PROPERTY. 57
liable for failure to distribute slaves. Although for some
purposes slaves are declared by statute to be real estate,
they are, nevertheless, intrimsically personal, and there-
fore are to be considered as included in every statute or
contract in relation to chattels which does not, in terms,
exclude them. They are liable, as chattels, to the pay-
ment of debts. They may be attached as chattels, and
they have invariably been theated as chattels, in both
Virginia and Kentucky, so far as the rights and duties of
administrators are concerned.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery,
pp. 37-8.)
And yet Kentucky is one of the only two States in
which the statutes have declared slaves to be real estate;
a tenure which, if adhered to, would attach the slave to
the soil, and prevent the separation of families. The
practice, as Sanctioned by custom and the courts, is in
this case found to be less favourable to the slaves than
the words of the statute in their plain import. The
people have been worse than their statutes, and the judges
have conformed to the people.
“Enlaws v. Enlaws, Spring Term, 1821; 3 Marshall's
Ky. Rep., 228. The court held that the slaves of a
female, immediately on the marriage, vest in the husband ;
and although she may survive him, her right to the slaves
is not revived.” (Wheeler, p. 39.)
“A wife's estate in dower of slaves, by a former hus-
band, on her marriage vests in her husband ; and her
right to manumit them is gone.” (Ib., p. 182.)
“Slaves are subject to dower in all the States. Not
58 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
only are they subject to dower, but the widow's interest
in them is protected by statutory provisions. If the hus-
band manumits his slaves, whereby creditors and the
dower are affected, the manumission is so far ineffectual,
that the manumitted slaves may be sold for a period, and
the proceeds applied to the creditors of the former owner
and his widow.” (Wheeler, p. 181.)
“Slaves are devisable like any other chattel. A dis-
tinction, however, exists where slaves are considered as
real property. In these cases they pass immediately to
the legatee, and not to the executor as personal estate.”
(Wheeler, p. 57.)
“If a father, at the time of his daughter's marriage,
puts a megro or other chattel into the possession of his
son-in-law, it is, in law, a gift, unless the contrary can be
proven.” (Ib., p. 62.)
“The increase,” i.e., the children, “of slaves born during
the life of a legatee for life, belong to the ulterior legatee,
who is the absolute owner.” (Ib., p. 23.)
“By the Revised Code of Mississippi, p. 50, slaves
descending from an intestate may be sold by order of the
Orphan's Court, where equal division cannot be made ;
and persons holding life estate in slaves, or guardians for
infants, are required to deliver a list of slaves to the
register of the Orphan's Court, and also the increase,
p. 51. And similar provisions exist in the other States
for the division of slaves.” (Ib., p. 183.)
On the same page appears, however, the following,
which seems less inflexible. It appears from the “Table
of Cases” that the court was held in Virginia.
INHERITANCE OF SLAVE PROPERTY. j9
“Held by the court, that an equal division of slaves, in
number and value, is not always possible, and sometimes
improper, when it cannot be exactly done without sepa-
rating infant children from their mothers, which humanity
forbids, and will not be countenanced in a court of equity;
so that a compensation for excess must, in such cases, be
made and received in money.” (Ib.)
Here, the humanity of the judge appears to have modi-
fied the statute.
Everyone is familiar with the phrases “inherited” or
“entailed slave property.” Such an one is said to have
been “born to a slave inheritance,” or “born a slave-
holder.” These phrases occur in almost every plea for the
blamelessness of the slaveholder, and for the “innocency of
the legal relation.” “The man was born into it, and how
can he be blamed for it !” This plea is never more confi-
dently urged than by a class of clergymen who are forward
to teach that all men are born sinners and shapen in
iniquity; but who would, nevertheless, be shocked at the
impiety of the reprobate who should urge his “birth” in
sim, his “inherited" or “entailed” depravity, in excuse of
his obstimate and voluntary transgression. Perhaps it
never occurs to them that “inherited" and “entailed ”
slaveholding, like other “inherited” and “entailed” trans-
gressions, incur guilt when they are voluntarily adopted
and cherished. In the case of any other “inherited" sin,
they would readily make the requisite explanation.
This feature of the “legal relation,” deemed so “inno-
cent,” so capable of whitewashing, with the supererogation
of its meritorious innocency, the crimes of sucessive gene-
6() THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
rations and whole nations of slave-breeders and slave-
venders, with their approving Senates and synods, will be
found, on a close scrutiny, to embody one of the most foul
and damming features of the whole system—the feature of
self-perpetuity—of self-transmission to the future ; the
quality of Seducing and cursing posterity—securing the
sin and the shame, the wretchedness and the hopelessness,
of the unborn. It is an “innocent relation,” forsooth,
because it embodies, and because (as is claimed) it even
mecessitates, these results |
No feature of the slave-system is more terrific to the
poor slave than this. The hazards of a voluntary sale by
his master he and his loved ones may escape; the dreaded
mortgage, and creditor, and sheriff, may pass them by
untouched. But there is a mortgage hanging over them
that all the gold of California cannot lift ; there is a cre-
ditor whose debt against the master must be cancelled, but
seldom without touching some of them ; there is a sheriff
whose warrant is already out, who may seize at any day,
and will soon seize, but probably not without touching them,
if alive | The death of the master is the close of their
respite. They are liable to be “distributed,” like other
2
“property,” among the “heirs,” whoever and wherever
they may be ; “for goods they are, and as goods they are
esteemed”—“chattels personal, in the hands of their
owners and possessors, their executors, administrators,
and assigns, to all intents, constructions, and purposes
whatsoever.” This is the very definition of an American
slave, and there is no escape from the condition it describes,
INHERITANCE OF SLAVE PROPERTY. 61
but by the “fanaticism of abolition.” This is the “legal
relation,” too immocent to be questioned, claiming relation-
ship with Abraham and Moses, the Sanction of Jesus and
Paul -
- (From the Georgia Journal.)
“TO BE SOLD.—One negro girl, about eighteen months
old, belonging to the estate of William Chambers, deceased.
Sold for the purpose of distribution.
“JETHRO DEAN, ) Jºaº's.”
“SAMUEL BEALL, ſ e
Here, again, the practice corresponds with the theory,
and the people are in harmony with their laws.
How the distribution of slave property among heirs
and legatees is effected under the Code Noir, or where
slaves are held as real estate, as in Louisiana, we are not
minutely informed. If the soil and the slaves must re-
maim together, a distribution would seem to require the
whole to be sold, and to one purchaser. We doubt whether
such a restriction obtains, at present, in that State. Under
the old feudal system, the estate, consisting of soil and
serfs, was kept together by the law of primogeniture,
ontailing it to the eldest son, in perpetuity. The repeal of
that law has been justly regarded as a step in the march
of human progress ; but if the “peculiar institution” of
slavery is to remain, humanity might, perhaps, invoke its
re-enactment, as it might prevent the separation of slave
families, or rather permit, their existence.
62
CHAPTER. V.
USES OF SLAVE PROPERTY.
Slaves, as Property, may be used, absolutely by their Owners at will, for
their own Profit or Pleasure.
PROPERTY is that which may be used by the owner.
“The slave is one who is in the power of a master, to
whom he belongs.” “Goods they are, and as goods they
are esteemed.” This is the law of the relation. “As
goods,” therefore, they may be used, while, like other
goods, they “perish with the using.” “Have I not a
right to do what I will with mine own?” is a question
affirming a prerogative universally claimed. Admit the
validity of the ownership, and the right of use follows of
course. If the “legal relation” be an innocent one, the
right of use and the exercise of that right are innocent
likewise, provided the use be a legitimate one. We shall
see what uses are deemed legitimate by those who have
shaped, defined, and administered “the relation.”
It is true that the use of property by the owner is
limited by the rights of other persons. But slaves are
not persons in the view of the law, for any purposes of
benefit to them; as will hereafter be more fully shown.
The rights of a slave are not recognised, and no limita-
USES OF SLAVE PROPERTY. 63
tion of the master's use of him can come from that
quarter. “The slave” (says the law) “is entirely sub-
ject to the will of his master.” Nothing, therefore, can
prevent the master from putting him to any use he
pleases.
It is also true, that the use of property by the owner
is limited by the nature of that property. Thus, a living
horse, or other domestic animal, may not lawfully be
hacked and hewed to pieces, as a block of wood may be.
The barbarity may be punished. The most that can be
claimed for the Slave Code on this point is, that by
placing slaves upon a level with other live cattle, it
entitles them to the same kind and degree of protection.
Beyond this, the Slave Code, so far as we know, never
attempts or pretends to protect them. It knows them
only as mere animals. Their rational and moral natures
not being recognised by the laws, can claim no legal pro-
tection. Sufficient evidence of this has already been
adduced, but it will accumulate as we proceed. And it
will be seen that, as a mere animal, the slave has not
equal protection, in Some respects, with other animals.
We will specify some of the uses of slave property.
1. A prominent use of slave property is unrequited
slave labour. The hired labourer is employed. The
slave labourer is used as a horse or an ox is used. His
labour is held to be the property of his owner. At this
point he is degraded to the level of a brute, whether
moderately or excessively worked. The use of a slave as
a brute labourer is an injury and an insult. It is a
64 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
denial of his nature as a man, and of his rights as a free
moral agent.
“The end of slavery,” said Judge Ruffin, “is the profit
of the master.” The slave “is doomed to toil, that others
may reap the fruits.” State v. Mann. (N. Carolina Re-
ports, p. 263. Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 246.)
This honest judicial decision should shame the pretence
that slaves are held for their own benefit. N.
In a separate chapter, we shall look more directly into
the particulars of slave-labour, and in another shall con-
sider the withholding of wages. Additional light will
then be thrown upon this use of slave property. In the
mean time, it will be easy to show that in this use of
slave property, in some of the Slave States, it is systema-
tically amd deliberately so used as to be used up, and
destroyed in a manner that would be shameful and
wicked even if brute beasts were the victims.
Dr. Deming, a gentleman of high respectability, residing
in Ashland, Richland county, Ohio, stated to Professor
Wright, at New York city, that—
“During a recent tour at the South, while ascend-
ing the Ohio River, on the steam-boat Fame, he had an
pportunity of conversing with a Mr. Dickinson, a resi-
dent of Pittsburg, in company with a number of cotton-
planters and slave-dealers from Louisiana, Alabama, and
Mississippi. Mr. Dickinson stated as a fact, that the
sugar-planters upon the sugar-coast in Louisiana had
ascertained that, as it was usually necessary to employ
about twice the amount of labour during the boiling-
|USES OF SLAVE PROPERTY. 65
season that was required during the season of raising,
they could by excessive driving, day and night, during
the boiling-season, accomplish the whole labour with one
set of hands. By pursuing this plan, they could afford to
sacrifice one set of hands once in seven years . He fur-
ther stated that this horrible system was now practised
to a considerable extent. The correctness of this state-
ment was substantially admitted by the slaveholders them
on board.” (Weld's Slavery as it Is, p. 39.)
“The late Mr. Samuel Blackwell, a highly-respected
citizen of Jersey City, opposite the city of New York, and
a member of the Presbyterian Church, visited many of
the sugar-plantations in Louisiana, and says, “that the
planters generally declared to him that they were obliged so
to overwork their slaves, during the sugar-making season
(from eight to ten weeks), as to use them up in seven or
eight years. For, said they, after the process is com-
menced, it must be pushed without cessation, night and
day, and we cannot afford to keep a sufficient number of
slaves to do the extra work at the time of sugar-making,
as we could not profitably employ them the rest of the
year.” (Ib.)
Rev. Dr. Reed, of London, who went through Ken-
tucky, Virginia, and Maryland, in the summer of 1834,
gives the following testimony.
“I was told confidently, from excellent authority, that
recently, at a meeting of planters in South Carolina, the
question was seriously discussed whether the slave is more
profitable to the owner, if well fed, well clothed, and
F
66 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
worked lightly ; or, if made the most of at once, and
exhausted in some eight years. The decision was in favour
of the last alternative. That decision will, perhaps, make
many shudder. But, to my mind, this is not the chief
evil. The greater and principal evil is considering the
slave as property. If he is only property, and my pro-
perty, then I seem to have some right to ask how I may
make that property most available.” (Visit to the
American Churches, by T)rs. Reed and Mattheson, vol.
ii., p. 173.)
Other testimony might be added. Southern newspapers
have published the proceedings of Agricultural Societies,
in which, after discussion, it had been agreed that the
more profitable method was to “use up” a gang of negroes
once in seven or eight years, and then purchase a fresh
supply of the dealers.
A terrible sacrifice of life arises from a change of cli-
mate. A writer in the New Orleans Argus of 1830 says,
“The loss by death, in bringing slaves from a northern
climate, which our planters are under the necessity of
doing, is not less than twenty-five per cent.” Advertise-
ments like the following are not uncommon.
“I offer my plantation for sale. Also twenty fine
acclimated negroes. O. B. CoBB.” (Vicksburg Reg., Dec.
27th, 1838.)
“I will sell my Old River Plantation, near Columbia,
in Arkansas ; also one hundred and thirty acclimated
negroes, BEN. HUGHES.—Port Gibson, 14th Jan.”
“PROBATE SALE –Will be offered for sale, at public
USES OF SLAVE PROPERTY. 67
auction, to the highest bidder, one hundred and thirty
acclimated slaves, G. W. KEETON, Judge of the Parish
of Concordia, La., March 22nd, 1837.”
General Felix Houston advertises in the Natchez
Cowrier, April 6th, 1838, “Thirty very fine acclimated
megroes.” (See Jay's View, pp. 98, 99.)
Dr. Reed was correct in charging the murderous use of
slave property to the primciple or law of slave ownership,
which constitutes what is called “the legal relation.” Such
treatment may be called an “abuse,” but is a result
which will be almost certain to follow where labourers
can be owned and used, instead of being bargained with
and hired. Even on the low ground of “consequences,”
such a “relation” is to be condemned.
2. Another prominent use of slave property, in the case
of females capable of being mothers, is that of breeders of
slaves. And if the tenure of slave property be legitimate,
and the ownership valid, by what rule of law or of logic
shall this use of slave property be condemned ? The
argument of Mr. Gholsom, of Virginia, on that assump-
tion, holds good. (See Chapter II.) If the owners of
lands, of orchards, and of brood mares had a right to their
products, why had he not a right to the products of the
slave women he had purchased ? Had not the Slave
Code, the legislatures, and the courts secured to him his
claim upon them as “chattels personal, to all intents,
constructions, and purposes whatsoever ? Might he not,
with other great statesmen,” affirm that “that is property
* Henry Clay. Speech in U. S. Senate, 1839.
68 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
which the law declares to be property,” and that “two
hundred years of legislation have sanctified and sanctioned
megro slaves as property?” Did he not sustain to those
women the relation of owner'ſ And had not Doctors of
Divinity, Northern and Southern, attested the lawfulness
and the innocency of sustaining the relation ? And how
could there be a relation without its implied rights?
Thus fortified, was not his inference warranted by his
premises, when he spoke as follows 7 (we quote again from
his speech :)
“The legal maxim of ‘Partus sequitur ventrem’ is coeval
with the existence of the rights of property, and is founded
in wisdom and justice. It is on the justice and inviola.
bility of this maxim that the master foregoes the service
of his female slave; has her nursed and tended during the
period of her gestation, and raises the helpless and infant
offspring. The value of the property justifies the expense,
and I do not hesitate to say that in its increase consists
much of our wealth.” (Speech in Leg. of Va.)
The closing sentence indicates the extent and import-
ance of this use of slave property. According to the esti-
mate of Henry Clay as before cited (Chap. II.), this use
(to “raise slaves” for the “Southern market”) is of more
pecuniary value to the “farming portion of the slave
States” than all their agricultural operations !
The value, indeed, cannot fall short of the receipts for
exports of Surplus slaves to the South. Professor Dew,
afterwards President of William and Mary University
(Va.), speaking of the slave-trade from Virginia, said, “It
|USES OF SLAVE PROPERTY. 69
furnishes every inducement to the master to attend to his
negroes, to encourage breeding, and to cause the greatest
number of slaves to be raised,” &c. “Virginia is, indeed,
a negro-raising State for other States.” To which may be
added the far-famed announcement—“The noblest blood
of Virginia runs in the veins of slaves.”
In the Charleston Mercury, the leading political paper
of South Carolina, appeared the following advertisement.
“ NEGROES FOR SALE.—A girl, about twenty years of age
(raised in Virginia), and her two female children, one four
and the other two years old—is remarkably strong and
healthy, never having had a day's sickness, with the excep-
tion of the small-pox, in her life. The children are fine and
healthy. She is very prolific in her generating qualities,
and affords a rare opportunity to any person who wishes to
raise a family of healthy servants for their own use. Any
person wishing to purchase will please leave their address
at the Mercwry office.”
The coarseness of this language disgusts us, and so does
the language of Mr. Gholsom. But the facts involved
differ nothing from the statements of Henry Clay, as
quoted in our chapter on the Traffic in Slaves.
And whoever will take up and study the judicial deci.
sions cited in “Wheeler's Law of Slavery” concerning
“the increase of slaves,” will find that the newspaper
advertisements of which we have furnished a specimen
are merely descriptive of a business recognised and pro-
tected as respectable, in courts of justice. And this
remark will be found to apply not merely to the supply
70 THE AMERICAN SHAVE CODE.
raised for the inter-State slave-trade. The litigation
reported in Mr. Wheeler's book under the head of “In-
crease of Slaves,” is mainly that which grew out of
neighbourhood transactions and the inheritance of slave
property.
And we have already, in discussing the nature of slave
ownership (Chap. I.), taken occasion to quote from
“Wheeler's Law of Slavery” (p. 325) the express lan-
guage of the judges, placing the issue of female slaves,
when hired out for five years, upon the same footing, and
to be awarded upon the same rules, as in the case of the
increase of “brood mares” or other “female animals.”
3. Another use of slave property (sometimes, probably,
connected with the preceding) is indicated by advertise-
ments of beautiful young mulatto girls for Sale; and by the
fact that these commonly command higher prices than the
ablest male labourers, or any other description of slaves.
A reputed daughter of Thomas Jefferson was said to
have been sold at auction in New Orleans for 1000
dollars. Many have been sold for 2000 dollars. One
young woman was sold at public auction to a rich young
planter for 7,500 dollars. It must be an able field-hand
that commands 800 dollars.
Forced marriages of slaves with slaves, including
second and third marriages after separations from former
companions by sale, constitute a class of well-attested
facts. The Savannah River Baptist Association decided
that in case of such separation of Baptist slave husbands
and 'wives, it was lawful for them, without church Cen-
|USES OF SLAVE PROPERTY. 71
sure, to form such mew commexions, “in obedience to
their masters,” whose right to enforce such arrangements
was thus tacitly acknowledged.
Forced concubimage of slave women with their masters
and overseers, often coerced by the lash, constitutes
another class of facts, equally undemiable. Wide Weld's
“Slavery as it Is,” p. 15. “Bape committed on a female
slave is an offence not recognised by law.” (MSS. by
Judge Jay.)
Such facts, in their almost interminable varieties, cor-
roborate the preceding, and illustrate the almost inmu-
merable uses of slave property!
4. Another use of slave property, and a very remark-
able one, assures us that the Southern “owners” of this
“peculiar” kind of property have ways of turning it to
account that even Northern ingenuity could scarcely
have devised, unless, indeed, it be a Yankee's invention.
Assortments of diseased, damaged, and disabled negroes,
deemed incurable and otherwise worthless, are bought
up, it seems (cheap, no doubt, like old iron), by medical
institutions, to be experimented and operated upon, for
purposes of “medical education” and the interests of
“medical science!” The Charleston (S. C.) Mercury, Oct.
12, 1838, contained an advertisement, by Dr. T. Stillman,
on behalf of the “Medical Infirmary,” setting forth its
objects, and closing as follows.
“To PLANTERS AND OTHERS.—Wanted, fifty negroes,
Any person having sick negroes, considered incurable by
their respective physicians, and wishing to dispose of them,
72 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Dr. S. will pay cash for negroes affected with scrofula, or
king's evil, confirmed hypochondriasm, apoplexy, diseases
of the liver, kidneys, spleen, stomach and intestines,
bladder and its appendages, diarrhoea, dysentery, &c. The
highest cash price will be paid, on application as above”
(viz., “Medical Infirmary, No. 110, Church-street, Charles-
ton”).
5. It seems, indeed, difficult to foresee or imagine all
the uses to which slave property may be put by the owner.
“The slave is entirely subject to the will of his master.”
He is supposed to have no conscience and no rights.
What his “ owner” commands him to do, he must do.
What he requires him to be, he must be. What he chooses
to inflict upon him, he must suffer. He must never lift a
hand in self-defence. He must utter no word of remon-
strance. He has no protection and no redress. This will
more fully be shown as we proceed.
The slave, however pious, and whatever his scruples,
must do the work allotted to him—it may be the drudgery
of a tippling-shop, a gambling-house, a brothel, or a den
of counterfeiters or shoplifters. And he must witness
in silence whatever he sees there, if it be murder. He
cannot testify against a white man. He is merely property
to be used /
6. A class of murders of slaves by slave-masters may
as well be put down in this category. w
The monster, Lillburn Lewis, nephew of Thomas Jef-
ferson, who chopped in pieces a living article of slave
property, in presence of his other slaves, only used up
USES OF SLAVE PROPERTY. 73
that article to awe the others into subjection, as he told
them.
But this was “an abuse” of the relation, a violation of
the law Perhaps it was. In words, the law prohibits
the murder of slaves. How much it intends or effects, will
be seen in another chapter.
A slaveholder flogged a little slave-girl, and put her feet
in the stocks. She was found dead. A prominent lawyer,
of a respectable family, was asked “Whether the murderer
of this little helpless child could not be indicted?” He
coolly replied that “the slave was Mr. P.'s property, and
if he chose to suffer the loss, no one else had anything
to do with it.” (Wide Weld's “Slavery as it Is,” p. 54.)
The slave-child was “property,” and had only been
used “It is believed that no record exists of a white
man having been executed in the United States, simply
for the murder of a slave.” (MSS. by Judge Jay.)
In another chapter this point will be examined.
Again we find the people to be no better than their
laws. If these practices are to be considered unauthorised
“abuses,” the people are worse than their laws, for they
are practised with impunity.
7
4.
CHAPTER VI.
SLAVES CAN POSSESS NOTIIING.
Being Property themselves, they can own no Property, nor make any
Contract.
MAN was created proprietor of the earth, with dominion
over the beasts of the field. The humanity of the slave
is denied, by denying to him any share in this original
right of human mature or capability of its exercise. He
is “not ranked among Sentient beings, but among things.”
A chattel cannot be the owner of a chattel. The slave
“can possess nothing nor can acquire anything but what
must belong to his master.” (Civil Code, art. 35.) They
“cannot take by purchase or descent.”
“Slaves have no legal rights in things real or personal;
but whatever they may acquire belongs, in point of law,
to their masters.” (Stroud, pp. 25, 45.)
“Slaves can make no contract.” (Ib., 25, 61.)
“Slaves are incapable of inheriting or transmitting
property.” (Civil Code, art. 945.)
By the Roman law, the slave might possess what was
called his peculium, or what his master might, by stipula-
tion, accord to him, and which, having thus stipulated,
he could not afterwards take from him. By this law,
SLAVES CAN OWN NOTHING. 75
slaves acquired property, sometimes embarked in com-
merce, redeemed themselves and amassed fortunes; or,
in other cases, without an absolute purchase of them-
selves, paid their masters an annuity, as the price of their
services, and attended to their own affairs. Not so in
Republican and Christian America | The “legal rela-
tion” here is another thing. The only exception ap-
proximating the Roman Code in this particular, so far
as we know, is found in the Civil Code of Louisiana,
as follows.
“All that a slave possesses belongs to his master, he
possesses nothing of his own except his peculium; that is
to Say, the sum of money or moveable estate which
his master chooses he should possess.” (Art. 175; see
1 Martin's Digest, 616.)
Yet in the same Code stands the following.
“Slaves cannot dispose of or receive by donation, inter
vivos or mortis causa, unless they have been previously
and expressly enfranchised conformably to law, or unless
they are expressly enfranchised by the act by which the
donation is made to them.” (Art. 1462.)
“The earnings of slaves and the price of their service
belong to their owners, who have their action to recover
the amount of those who have employed them.” (Louisi-
ana Code of Practice, art. 103.)
Except in the permission of a pecklium, the laws of
the other States on this subject are similar to those of
Touisiana.
SouTH CAROLINA.—“Slaves cannot take by descent
76 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
or purchase,” (4 DeSaussure's Chancery Reports, 266,
Bynum v. Bostwick.)
NORTH CAROLINA.—“Slaves cannot take by sale, or
devise, or descent.” “A devise of land to be rented out
for the maintenance of a slave was adjudged to be void.
(1 Cameron and Norwood's Reports, 353; same decision,
1 Taylor's Reports, 209.)
MARYLAND.—A gift, bequest, or devise, made to a slave,
by any one not his owner, would be void (see Dulamy's
opinion, 1 Maryland Reports, 561); though such a devise
of real or personal estate, made by the owner of a slave,
has been held to entitle him to freedom, as the implied
intention of the owner. (Hall v. Mullin, 5 Harris and
Johnson's Reports, 190.)
In “Wheeler's Law of Slavery” may be found ample
evidence that this feature of the Slave Code (the incapa-
city of the slave to possess property) is not a dead letter,
but recognised by the courts, and enforced whenever there
is occasion, not only to the letter of the statute, but by an
application of the principle and spirit of the enactment
in a contingency which legislative sagacity did not, pro-
bably, foresee.
A slave, for instance, accidentally found a sum of
money, in bank-bills, which some one took from him and
carried to the bank. The owner of the slave-boy brought
an action of trover against the bank for the sum, and
recovered it by judgment of court.
Judge Safford said :
“Our slaves can do nothing in their own right, can hold
SLAVES CAN OWN NOTHING. 77
no property, can neither buy, sell, barter, nor dispose of
anything, without express permission from the master or
overseer ; so that everything they can possess or do is, in
legal contemplation, on authority of the master.”
Judge Crenshaw said:
“A slave is in absolute bondage ; he has no civil right,
and can hold no property, except at the will and pleasure
of his master. A slave is a rational being, and endowed
with understanding and volition, like the rest of man-
kind ; and whatever he lawfully acquires, and gains pos-
session of, by finding or otherwise, is the acquirement and
possession of the master. A slave cannot take property
by descent or purchase.” (Brandon et al. v. Merchants'
and Planters' Bank of Huntsville, 1 Stewart's Ala. Re-
port, 320 ; S. P. Bynum v. Bostwick, 4 Desaussure, 266;
Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 6, 7.)
In the preceding decision, the manhood, the reason, the
understanding, the volition of the slave are distinctly re-
cognised, and for the express purpose of claiming all the
acquirements of such a being as the property of his master
—equivalent to the claim of absolute proprietorship in
the human soul itself! The theory and the practice of
slavery are here found to be in harmony, and the courts
enforce the enactments of the legislatures.
In a note to the preceding decision, Mr. Wheeler says
(p. 7): “These principles prevail in all the States, and
are taken from the civil law, and were adopted in all,
except Connecticut, and perhaps Massachusetts.”
“Hall v. Mullin, 5 Har. and John's Md. Report, 190.
78 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
The court held that no legal contract whatever could be
made with a slave, without the consent of his master.”
(Ib., p. 7.)
“In Jackson ea; dem. the People v. Lervey, 5 Cowen's
Rep., 397, the court held that a slave at common law
could not contract matrimony, nor could the child of a
slave take by descent or inheritance.” (Ib., p. 7.)
“Free Lucy and Frank, Fall Term, 1826, 4 Monroe's
Rep., 167; Emmerson v. Howland, 1 Mason's Rep., 45.
The court held that contracts made by negroes while in
slavery do not bind them when liberated; and con-
sequently a plea by a free megro that a writing sued
on was delivered when he was a slave, is good.” (Ib.,
p. 190.)
In a note on this topic, Mr. Wheeler says, “One
general principle prevails in all the States, and in the
British, Spanish, and Portuguese West Indies; and that
is, that a slave cannot make a contract, not even the con-
tract of matrimony.” And he cites numerous authorities
for the statement. (Ib., p. 190.)
The slave is thus taught that his promises and agree-
ments are of no binding force I Even the free negro, as
has been seen, is baught the same lesson in respect to his
former condition Yet those by whom these lessons are
taught affect to marvel at the moral obtuseness of the
negroes, and consider themselves as occupying a high
moral eminence above them.
A warrant for one thousand acres of land, issued to a
slave in Tennessee, for military services as a musician
SLAVES CAN OWN NOTHING. 79
during the revolutionary war, was adjudged to be the
property of his owner, in 1834. This decision was made
against the claims of an heir of his former owner, Colonel
Patton, a revolutionary officer, who caused his slave
to be enlisted. No cláim appears to have been set up
on behalf of the slave. (See Wheeler's Law of Slavery,
p. 229.)
Though “a slave can make no contract” on his own
account, yet his master may constitute a slave his agent
for the most important pecuniary transactions. We once
knew of a prominent public man, whose personal credit
in his market-town was so low that his written order on
his merchant for fifty dollars' worth of goods was rejected;
but when his managing slave stepped forward and pro-
mised that the next loads of produce should be delivered
in payment, the answer was, “Very well, Cuffee ; if you
say so, I’ll deliver ten times the amount of goods.”
“Chastain v. Bowman et al., May Term, 1833, 1
Hill's S. C. Reports, 276. The court charged the jury
that a slave might be the agent of his master ; and if his
agency was established, the master was bound. Verdict
for the plaintiff, and motion for a new trial.
“ Per Cur., Johnson J.-It is not questioned that a
master may constitute his slave his agent, and I cannot
conceive of any distinction between the circumstances
which constitute a slave and a freeman an agent. They
are both the creatures of the principal, and act upon his
authority. There is no condition, however degraded,
which deprives one of the right to act as a private
80 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
agent. Motion dismissed.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery,
p. 228.)
It is certainly remarkable that a man should “have a
right" to act as an agent for another who can have no
right to act for himself. Equally remarkable is the plea
that slaves cannot take care of themselves, and must be
benevolently superintended for their benefit, while they
conduct the business of their masters. The slave is ad-
judged to be a mere thing, except where his master's in-
terests or convenience require that he should be regarded
3, 1])3,1].
Another curiosity of slave jurisprudence deserves notice
here. Although it is adjudged an offence against the
State for a free white citizen to hold honest commerce
with a slave for the beneficial and useful purposes of life,
to employ a slave to labour and to pay him just wages—
an offence, likewise, for the master of a slave to permit and
authorise such transactions (as will be shown presently)—
yet, according to Wheeler, “It is ovot an offence, either at
common law or by statute, to gamble with slaves.” This
statement is his marginal title to the law-case of “The
State v. Pemberton and Smith, T)ec. Term, 1829, 2 Deve-
reux’s N. Carolina Rep., 281,” in which, “after verdict
for the State, his Honour Judge Strange arrested the
judgment, being of opinion ” as before stated. “From
this judgment the solicitor for the State appealed,” but
the judgment of the court below was affirmed. (Wheeler's
Law of Slavery, p. 441.)
With exception of Louisiana, as already mentioned, our
SLAVES CAN OWN NOTHING. 81
American Slave States have signalised themselves, by
special enactments, to prohibit the possession of the
smallest amount of property by the slave, even with the
consent of the master | The Greeks, the Romans, the
ancient Germans, the Poles, with the Portuguese, the
Spanish, and the French of our own times, had provided,
both by law and by custom, for the possession of property
by the slave, which could not be seized by his master. In
the British West Indies, though no written law had sanc-
tioned the custom, a public sentiment had indulged the
slave in the enjoyment of some petty possessions, and had
forbidden the master to interfere with them.
But this lenity was manifestly inconsistent with the
absolute and unlimited chattelhood of the slave. A prin-
ciple was seen to be involved, which, if tolerated in an age
of inquiry, would undermine the whole system. If the
slave could possess property, he could dispose of it ; he
could make contracts; he might contract marriage; he
he might become a man, and, becoming such, cease to be
a slave. The safety of the entire fabric required that not
one stone in the edifice should be missing. And be-
sides, the idea that a slave can possess property, however
trifling the amount, is the idea that the slave has rights;
an idea that must by no means be permitted to enter the
mind of the slave, or be entertained by the community
around him. Especially must this not be done in a land
wherein human rights have been discussed and proclaimed.
The jealousy, the vigilance, the sagacity, the appliances of
a grim despotism, are never so severely tasked as in the
G
82 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
presence of the spirit and the doctrines of freedom. This
single thought solves the enigma, and repels the oppro-
brium, of an unprecedented tyranny in a land wherein are
taught the principles of liberty. A despotism in such a
country must be doubly despotic, or die instantly. The
reader has, in these suggestions, our philosophy of the
remarkable enactments that follow.
SouTH CAROLINA.—“It shall not be lawful for any slave
to buy, sell, trade, &c., for any goods, &c., without a
license from the owner, &c. Nor shall any slave be
permitted to keep any boat, periauger or canoe, or raise
and breed for the benefit of such slave any horses, mares,
cattle, sheep, or hogs, under pain of forfeiting all the
goods, &c., and all the boats, periaugers or canoes, horses,
mares, cattle, sheep, or hogs. And it shall be lawful for
any person whatsover to seize and take away from any
slave all such goods, &c., boats, &c. &c., and to deliver the
same into the hands of any justice of the peace, nearest
to the place where the seizure shall be made ; and such
justice shall take the oath of the person making such
seizure, concerning the manner thereof; and if the said
justice shall be satisfied that such seizure has been made
according to law, he shall pronounce and declare the goods
so seized to be forfeited, and order the same to be sold at
public outcry; one half of the moneys arising from such
sale to go to the State, and the other half to him or them
that sue for the same.” (James's Digest, 385-6 ; Act of
1740.)
GEORGIA.—The statute is nearly the same as in South
SLAVES CAN OWN NOTHING. 83
Carolina, with this additional prohibition: lest the mas-
ter should sometimes permit the slave to hire himself to
another for his own benefit, the State imposes a penalty of
thirty dollars “for every weekly offence on the part of
the master, unless the labour be done on his own premises.”
(Prince's Digest, 453, 457.)
RENTUCKY.—The same, with a slight modification. (2
Litt. and Sui. Digest, 1159-60.)
TENNESSEE-Similar. (Act of October, 23, 1813, chap.
135.)
VIRGINIA.—If the master shall permit his slave to hire
himself out, it is made lawful for any person, and the
duty of the sheriff, &c., to apprehend such slave, &c.; and
the master shall be fined not less than ten dollars, nor
more than twenty, &c. (1 Revised Code, A.D. 1819,
374-5.)
MISSISSIPPI.-Same as in Georgia and Kentucky, before
stated. (Revised Code, 375.)
A slave in Mississippi is forbidden to raise cotton for
his own use ; and should the master permit him to do so,
he incurs a fine of fifty dollars. (Revised Code, 79.)
Further : “If any master, &c., of a slave, license such
slave to go at large and trade as a freeman, he shall forfeit
the sum of fifty dollars for each and every offence.”
(Revised Code, 374. See also North Carolina.)
An equal fine is imposed upon any master convicted of
bermitting his slave to keep “stock of any description”
(Act of Jam, 29, 1825; Pamph. Laws of Mississippi, of
1825.)
84 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Missouri-Same as Virginia, before stated. (2 Mis-
souri Laws, 743; Hayward's Manual, 534.) Also, same
as Mississippi, third specification, just stated. (2 Missouri
Laws, 743.)
NoFTH CAROLINA.—Act of 1779. “All horses, cattle,
hogs, or sheep, that, one month after the passage of this
act, shall belong to any slave, or be of any slave's mark,
in this State, shall be seized and sold by the county
wardens, and applied, one half to the support of the poor
of the county, and the other half to the informer " (Hay-
ward's Manual, 526.) Same or similar law, also, in Mis-
sissippi. (Revised Code, 378.) Same also in Maryland.
(Act of 1723, chap. 15, sect. 6; Kilty's Laws of Maryland.)
And so the white poor are to be fed by plundering the
coloured poor
MARYLAND.—See last preceding item. Also Mississippi,
third item there stated. See Kilty's Laws of Maryland,
Act of April, 1787, chap. 33.
By act of April Sessions, 1787, any person who shall
permit and authorise any slave belonging to him or
herself, &c., to go at large, himself or herself, within
this State, shall incur the penalty of five pounds (13
dollars 33 cents) current money per month, except ten
days at harvest. The penalty was increased to twenty
dollars, excepting, however, an additional ten days in
harvest. (Act of December Sessions, 1817, chap. 104,
sect. 1.) By both acts, a slave being a pilot is not
included in the prohibition.
* No person shall trade, barter, commerce, or in any
SLAVES CAN OWN NOTHING. 85
way deal with any servant or slave, &c. &c., without leave
or license first had from such servant or slave's master,
dame, or overseer, for his or her so doing, under penalty
of two thousand pounds of tobacco,” &c. (Laws of Mary-
land, 1715, chap. 44, sect. 11, 12, 13.)
DISTRICT of CoiuMBIA.—“Under exclusive jurisdiction
of Congress.” Same as in Maryland.
It may easily be conceived that this law would be
inconvenient and disadvantageous to many owners of
slaves in or near maritime towns, where job-labour, or
labour by the day or the hour, might be picked up by the
labourers themselves, better than by their owners. In
such localities the strict letter of the law could not always
be rigidly enforced. The public convenience, the wants
of everybody who must needs employ transient labourers,
would interpose obstacles. It is known that in Wilming-
ton, N. C., a port from which much lumber used to be
shipped, which needed much cooper's labour in the pre-
paring, the work was often or commonly carried on by
slaves, who paid a large monthly stipend to their owners.
Stevedores (who stow away cargoes), caulkers, riggers,
and perhaps ship-blacksmiths, and even sail-makers, being
slaves, were allowed the same privilege. The custom had
an elevating effect on the slaves, and was therefore looked
upon with jealousy by masters not interested in such
arrangements. This was thirty years ago. The present
usages are unknown to the writer, who gladly presents
this one brighter spot in the picture. But it must not be
forgotten that all the surplus earnings of these slaves, if
86 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
any, over and above their support (after having paid ten
or fifteen dollars monthly to their masters for their time),
is nevertheless, in the eye of the law, the property of their
masters, and they can take away, if they please, whatever
they find in their possession.
The convenience and interest of the planter might per-
mit or even direct the slaves to cultivate small patches of
vegetables near their cabins, for food, by Sunday labour,
for the most part. In Spanish Florida this was a custom.
It may obtain to a small extent in other States, without
serious violation of the letter or spirit of the statutes
quoted. Such small and transient supplies would hardly
be accounted possessions or property.
That the statutes quoted are not commonly regarded a
dead letter, may be seen by the reports of judicial deci-
sions, as compiled by Mr. Wheeler, who expressly refers
to the statutes as the ground of the decisions. And in a
note he adverts to some of their provisions which we
have not yet mentioned.
“By the Revised Code of Virginia (A. D. 1819), vol. i.,
p. 442, sect. 81, it is declared, that a slave going at large,
or hiring himself out, may be committed by a magistrate,
who may fine the owner, and may order the slave to be
sold.” “Also, by the Revised Code of Mississippi, 374,
sect. 25”—“in certain cases, the slave may be sold. And
by sect. 20, any citizen may seize a slave offering articles
for sale, and take him before a justice of the peace, and
the justice shall order the slave to be whipped, and for-
feit the article to the person apprehending the slave ſ”
(Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 153.)
SLAVES CAN OWN NOTHING. 87
It is preposterous to suppose that such modern enact-
ments, holding out such inducements to informers and
prosecutors, should remain a dead letter. Mr. Wheeler
adds:
“Similar provisions are to be found in the statute-
books of those States where this species of property is
recognised.” (Ib)
In the same note he had before said:
“The statutes of the States contain a prohibition with
a penalty against the slave going at large, or hiring him-
self out.” (P. 152.)
He cites the law of Alabama in particular ; and Judge
Hichcock, of Alabama, says of his book: “I have no
doubt it will be a valuable work for the use of the mem-
bers particularly of the Southern bar of the United
States.” He understands, of course, that these laws are
to be enforced, as in the following instance recorded in
the same “valuable” auxiliary of “the Southern bar.”
“Jarrett v. Higbee, 5 Monroe's Ky. Report, 546.
Jarrett brought trespass against Higbee for taking and
imprisoning his slave.” “Defendant admitted that when
he took the slave up, he produced a pass from his master,”
which gave him permission “to bargain and trade for
himself until the first day of May next; and also for
to pass and repass from Livingston county, Kentucky,
to Monongahela county, State of Virginia,” &c., dated
26th Sept., 1822. The following is from the judicial
decision.
“Per Cwr., Bibb Ch. J. That the master shall not let
loose his slave, with a permit for him to violate the esta-
88 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
blished order and economy prescribed by law in relation
to slaves, is due to society.” “Without abridging the
lawful powers of the master to use his property in the
slave, it may safely be declared that this paper, given by
the master in (to) the slave, violated that duty which he,
as owner, owed to the laws of society.” “These permis-
sions, and such acts of the slave, are violations by master
and slave of the policy, spirit, and letter of the statute
of 16th December, 1802, against permitting the slaves to
go at large and hire themselves.” “Such licenses would
tend to beget idle and dissolute habits in the particular
slaves so indulged, as well as in others, and to lead to
depredations upon the property of others, and to crimes
and insubordination. To such licenses and indulgences
society are not bound to submit ; the master has no right
to give such.” “It was not a lawful pass or permit. It
was a species of temporary and unlawful manumission,”
&c. (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 269-70.)
In other language, the statute and its enforcement are
deemed necessary to the security and the perpetuity of
slavery.
It deserves especial notice that this decision was made
in Kentucky, where slavery is said to be exhibited in its
mildest form, and where the privileges of slaves are
greater than in most of the other States.
It is not known that in any other nation, ancient or
modern, the robbery of the poor has been carried, by
system, to such a pitch as to prohibit the mass of the
labouring people from holding the smallest article of pro-
SLAVES CAN OWN NOTHING. 89
perty as their own, or from making any bargain or
contract.
And it ought to be noticed and remembered that this
condition of things has resulted from an extreme solici-
tude to protect from danger the so-called “legal relation”
of owner and owned, of master and slave.
90
CHAPTER VII.
S L A V ES CAN N OT M A. R. R.Y.
Being held as Property, and incapable of making any Contract, they
cannot contract Marriage recognised by Law.
MEN may forget or disregard the rules of logic in their
reasonings about slavery, but the genius that presides over
American slavery never forgets or disregards them. From
its well-defined principle of human chattelhood it mever
departs for a single moment. If anything founded on
falsehood Inight be called a science, we might add the
system of American slavery to the list of the strict
sciences. From a single fundamental axiom all the parts
of the system are logically and scientifically educed; and
no man fully understands the system who does not study
it in the light of that axiom.
The slave has no rights. Of course, he or she cannot
have the rights of a husband, a wife. The slave is a
chattel, and chattels do not marry. “The slave is not
ranked among sentient beings, but among things;” and
things are not married.
“Slaves are not people in the eye of the law. They
have no legal personality.” So said Mr. Wise. So, by
SLAVES CANNOT MARRY. 9]
their votes, said the Federal Congress. But none except
“people” and “persons” ever marry.
“The slave is one who is in the power of a master to
whom he belongs.” How, then, can the slave marry
“The legal relation of master and slave,” with all the
vestal robes of its spotless innocency, and saintly Biblical
patermity, has never, in this country, been held to be com-
patible with marriage. So early as in colonial times,
when parish ministers, all over New England, owned
slaves, it was held by learned civilians, in good old Con-
mecticut, that when a slave-master, though inadvertently,
gave verbal license to a female slave to marry, the license
made her free. Being married, she was not a slave, and
the husband bore off his prize in triumph before her
master
The same doctrine has always been held (though dif-
ferently enunciated) at the South. Slave-mothers are
there licensed by their masters to be “breeders,” not wives;
and thus they are retained as slaves.
“A slave cannot even contract matrimony ; the asso-
ciation which takes place among slaves, and is called
marriage, being properly designated by the word comtºw-
bernium—a relation which has no sanctity, and to which
no civil rights are attached.” (Stroud's Sketch of the
Slave Laws, p. 61.)
“A slave has never maintained an action against the
violator of his bed. A slave is not admonished for in-
continence, or punished for fornication or adultery ; never
prosecuted for bigamy, or petty treason for killing a hus-
92 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
band being a slave, any more than admitted to an appeal
for murder.” (Opinion of Daniel Dulaney, Esq., Attor-
mey-General of Maryland, 1 Maryland Reports, pp. 561,
563.)
“Slaves were not entitled to the conditions of matri-
mony, and therefore they had no relief in cases of adul-
tery; nor were they the proper objects of cognation or
affinity, but of quasi-cognation only.” (Dr. Taylor's Ele-
ments of the Civil Law, p. 429.)
“It is clear that slaves have no legal capacity to assent
to any contract. With the consent of their master they
may marry, and their moral power to agree to such a
contract or connexion cannot be doubted ; but while in a
state of slavery it cannot produce any civil effect, because
slaves are deprived of all civil rights. Emancipation
gives to the slave his civil rights, and a contract of mar-
riage, legal and valid by the consent of the master, and
moral assent of the slave, from the moment of freedom,
although dormant during slavery, produces all the effects
which result from such contract among free persons.”
(Opinion of Judge Matthews, case of Girod v. Lewis, May
Term, 1819; 6 Martin's Louisiana Reports, p. 559.
Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 199.)
The most favourable inference from this ingenious
decision is, that the joint action of master and slave can
legalise a slave's marriage when he ceases to be a slave
The obligations of marriage are evidently inconsistent
with the conditions of slavery, and cannot be performed
by a slave. The husband promises to protect his wife
SLAVES CANNOT MARRY. 93
and provide for her. The wife promises to be the help-
meet of her husband. They mutually promise to live
with and cherish each other till parted by death. But
what can such promises by slaves mean . The “legal
relation of master and slave” renders them void . It
forbids the slave to protect even himself. It clothes his
master with authority to bid him inflict deadly blows on
the woman he has sworn to protect. It prohibits his
possession of any property wherewith to sustain her.
His labour and his hands it takes from him. It bids the
woman assist, not her husband, but her owner | Nay !
it gives him unlimited control and full possession of her
own person, and forbids her, on pain of death (as will be
shown), to resist him, if he drags her to his bed It
severs the plighted pair, at the will of their masters, occa-
sionally or for ever ! The innocent “legal relation” of
slave-ownership does or permits all this, and without for-
feiting clerical favour, or a high seat in the Church, or in
the Senate, or Presidential chair. What, then, can the
marriage-vows of slaves mean 7
The laws annulling slave-marriage are explicit, as has
been seen. The corresponding position of the judiciary,
as attested by the Maryland Reports, has been adduced.
Will any one inquire whether or mo, in this particular,
the Code be a “dead letter 7 or whether the institution
of marriage among slaves may not have survived the
annulling action of the legislatures and the courts' As
a recognised “legal relation,” most assuredly the marriage
relation among slaves does not and cannot exist. The
94 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
petted “legal relation” of owner and slaves crowds it off
from the platform of human society. The two “legal
relations” cannot co-exist. A choice must be made be-
tween the two. And those who will still persist in affirming
the innocency and the validity of the “relation” of slave-
owner, are bound, if sincere and truthful men, to repu-
diate the “relation” of slave marriage. The Savannah
River Baptist Association had the nerve and the con-
sistency to do this.
“In 1835, the following query relating to slaves was
propounded to the Savannah River Baptist Association of
ministers: Whether, in case of involuntary separation of
such a character as to preclude all future intercourse, the
parties may be allowed to marry again 7"
“Answer. — That such separation, among persons
situated as our slaves are, is, civilly, a separation by death,
and they believe that, in the sight of God, it would be
so viewed. To forbid second marriages in such cases
would be to expose the parties not only to greater hard-
ships and stronger temptations, but to Church censure for
acting in obedience to their masters, who cannot be
expected to acquiesce in a regulation at variance with
justice to the slaves, and to the spirit of that command
which regulates marriage between Christians. The slaves
are not free agents, and a dissolution by death is not more
entirely without their consent and beyond their control
than by such separation.”
The Church is here seen submitting, with complacency,
to that feature of the Slave Code that annuls marriage
SLAVES CANNOT MARRY, 95
What the Southern Baptists have avowed, the other
religious sects there practise.
Some of the facts stated concerning the “ uses of slave
property” illustrate the absence of slave marriage. And
so do the statistics of the domestic slave-trade. The
restored institution and sanctity of marriage would cut off
the supplies that gorge the slave-markets.
The Presbyterian Synod of Kentucky, in their address,
have given us their testimony to the general fact and its
effects. They say:
The system “ produces general licentiousness among the
slaves. Marriage, as a civil ordinance, they cannot enjoy.
Our laws do not recognise this relation as existing among
them, and, of course, do not enforce, by any sanction, the
observance of its duties. Indeed, until slavery waxeth
old, and tendeth to decay, there cannot be any legal
recognition of the marriage-rite, or the enforcement of its
consequent duties. For all the regulations on this sub-
ject would limit the master's absolute right of property
in the slaves. In his disposal of them he could no longer
be at liberty to cousult merely his own interest. He
could no longer separate the wife and the husband to suit
the couvenience or interest of the purchaser, no matter
how advantageous might be the terms offered.” “Hence,
all the marriages that could ever be allowed them would
be a mere contract, violable at the master's pleasure.
Their present quasi marriages are continually thus voided.
They are, in this way, brought to consider their matri-
monial alliance as a thing not binding, and they act
96 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
accordingly. We are, then, assured by the most unques-
tionable testimony that licentiousness is the necessary
result of our system.” (Address, pp. 15, 16.)
“Chastity is no virtue among them ; its violation
neither injures female character in their own estimation
nor in that of their master or mistress. No instruction
is ever given—mo censure pronounced. I speak not of
the world. I speak of Christian families generally.”
(Lexington, Ky., Luminary.)
Even in Puritan New England, seventy years ago,
female slaves, in ministers' and magistrates' families, bore
children, black or yellow, without marriage. No one
inquired who their fathers were, and nothing more was
thought of it than of the breeding of sheep or swine.
We had the facts from those who well remembered them.
The universal testimony concerning “slave-quarters”
connected with plantations is, that “the sexes are herded
together promiscuously like beasts.”
Said a sister of President Madison to the late Rev.
George Bourne, then, a Presbyterian minister in Virginia,
“We Southern ladies are complimented with the name of
wives; but we are only the mistresses of seraglios.”
The report of the Presbyterian Synod of Georgia, De-
cember, 1833, Sustains, on this general subject, the testi-
mony of the Synod of Kentucky.
We have seen a well-authenticated account of a re-
spectable Christian lady at the South, who kept a hand-
Some mulatto female for the use of her genteel son, as a
method of deterring him, as she said, from more indis-
SLAVES CANNOT MARRY. 97
*
criminate and vulgar indulgences. Undoubtedly he
passed current in the first circles of respectable young
ladies. In our chapter on the uses of slave property, this
item would have been in place.
The rapid and constant bleaching of colours, at the
South, assures us that there is no exaggeration in these
pictures. And if the Synod of Kentucky were not
mistaken, the innocent “legal relation” of slave-owner-
ship is to be held responsible for it all. Where the laws
annul marriage, we may be certain that “the people are
not better than their laws.”
98
CHAPTER VIII.
SLAVES CANNOT CONSTITUTE FAMILIES.
Being Property, “Goods” and “Chattels Personal,” to all Intents, Con-
structions and Purposes whatsoever, they have no Claim on each other—
no Security from Separation—no Marital Rights—no Parental Rights
—no Family Government—no Family Education—no Family Pro-
tection.
THE family relation originates in the institution of
marriage, and exists not without it. We have already
proved that slaves cannot have families or be members of
families, by proving that they cannot be married. To
this latter point, in its connexion with the former, we cite
the words of Judge Jay.
“A necessary consequence of slavery is the absence of
the marriage relation. No slave can commit bigamy, be-
cause the law knows no more of the marriage of slaves
than of the marriage of brutes. A slave may, indeed, be
formally married; but so far as legal rights and obligations
are concerned, it is an idle ceremony.” “Of course, these
laws do not recognise the parental relation as belonging to
slaves. A slave has no more legal authority over his
child than a cow has over her calf.” (Jay's Inquiry,
p. 132.)
The fact that the slave, as a chattel personal, may be
NO FAMILY RIGHTS. 99
bought, sold, transported from one place to another,
mortgaged, attached, leased, inherited, and “ distributed,”
in the settlement of estates, shows plainly that slaves
cannot constitute families.
“In the slaveholding States, except in Louisiana, no
law exists to prevent the violent separation of parents
from their children, or even from each other.” (Stroud's
Sketch, p. 50.) t -
“Slaves may be sold and transferred from one to
another without any statutory restriction or limitation,
as to the separation of parents and children, &c., except
in the State of Louisiana.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery,
p. 41.)
This has been the condition of American slaves in
every period of our history, since their first introduction
among us. John Woolman, the philanthropist, a minister
of the Society of Friends, residing in New Jersey, bears
the following testimony concerning the slaveholders of his
times (A.D. 1757).
“They often part men from their wives by selling them
far asunder, which is common when estates are sold by
executors at vendue.” (Journal of the Life of John
Woolman, London edition, p. 74.)
At a later period than this, according to a well-authen-
ticated tradition in the neighbourhood, a Congregational
minister at Hampton, Conn. (Rev. Mr. Moseley), sepa-
rated by sale a husband and wife who were both of them
members of his own church, and who had been, by his
own officiating act as a minister, united in marriage.
100 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Yet no legal or ecclesiastical proceedings grew out of the
transaction. Some thought it a hard case, but the suf-
ferers were only negroes and slaves. -
It is the common understanding at the South, that
slaves do not constitute families. It is the common un-
derstanding of the country at large. The American Bible
Society, many years ago, proposed to supply each family
in the United States with a Bible. After a long effort,
it was announced by the Society that the great work was
completed. It was afterwards ascertained that no part
of the supply went to the then two and a half mil-
lions of slaves. The Society made no apology for its
mistake, nor acknowledged that it had committed any.
Public opinion in general—with exception of abolitionists
—attributed to them no error. The nation knew nothing
about families of slaves
The practice corresponds with the theory. The state-
ment that follows is from Sarah M. Grimke, daughter of
the late Judge Grimke, of Charleston, S. C.
“A slave who had been separated from his wife, because
it best suited the convenience of his owner, ran away. He
was taken up on the plantation where his wife, to whom
he was tenderly attached, then lived. His only object in
running away was to return to her ; no other fault was
attributed to him. For this offence he was confined in
the stocks six weeks, in a miserable hovel, not weather-
tight. He received fifty lashes weekly during that time,
was allowed food barely sufficient to sustain him, and
when released from confinement was not permitted to
NO FAMILY RIGHTS. 101
return to his wife. His master, although himself a hus-
band and a father, was unmoved by the touching appeals
of the slave, who intreated that he might only remain
with his wife, promising to discharge his duties faithfully ;
his master continued inexorable, and he was torn from his
wiſe and family. The owner of this slave was a professing
Christian, in full membership with the church, and this
circumstance occurred while he was in his chamber, during
his last illness.” (Weld's Slavery as it Is, p. 23.)
The following is from Mrs. Angelina Grimke Weld,
sister of the preceding witness.
“Chambermaids and sempstresses often sleep in their
mistresses' apartments, but with no bedding at all. I
know of an instance of a woman who has been married
eleven years, and yet has never been allowed to sleep out
of her mistress's chamber. This is a great hardship to
slaves. When we consider that house-slaves are rarely
allowed social intercourse during the day, as their work
generally separates them, the barbarity of such an arrange-
ment is obvious. It is peculiarly a hardship in the
above case, as the husband of the woman does not ‘be-
long to her ‘owner,’ and because he is subject to dreadful
attacks of illness, and he can have but little attention
from his wife in the day. And yet her mistress, who is
an old lady, gives her the highest character as a faithful
Servant, and told a friend of mime that she was entirely
dependent on her for all her comforts; she dressed and
undressed her, gave her all her food, and was so neces-
sary to her that she could not do without her. I may
102 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Çı
add that this couple are tenderly attached to each other.”
“I know an instance in which the husband was a
slave, and the wife was free. During the illness of the
former, the latter was allowed to come and nurse him;
she was obliged to leave the work by which she made a
living, and come to stay with her husband, and thus lose
weeks of her time, or he would have suffered for want of
proper attention ; and yet this ‘owner' made her no com-
pensation for her services. He had long been a faithful
and a favourite slave, and his owner was a woman very
benevolent to the poor whites.” “She, no doubt, only
thought how kind she was to allow her to come and stay
so long in her yard.” (Ib., p. 56.)
“Persons who own plantations and yet live in the cities
often take their children from them as soon as they are
weaned, and send them into the country ; because they do
not want the time of the mother taken up with attend-
ance upon her own children, it being too valuable to the
mistress. As a favour, she is sometimes permitted to go
to see them once a-year. So, on the other hand, if the
field-slaves happen to have children of an age suitable to
the convenience of the master, they are taken from their
parents and brought to the city. Parents are almost
never consulted as to the disposition to be made of their
children, and they have as little control over them as
have domestic animals over the disposal of their young.
Every natural and social feeling and affection are violated
with indifference. Slaves are treated as though they did
not possess them.” (Ib., pp. 56-7.)
NO FAMILY RIGHTS. t 103
If such be the condition of domestic or house-Servants,
in the best and most refined families of the South, what
must be the condition of field-slaves, under the direction
of overseers, on the plantations?
“Among the gangs there are often young women, who
bring their children to the fields, and lay them in a fence
corner while they are at work, only being permitted to
nurse them at the option of the overseer. When a child
is three weeks old, a woman is considered in working
order. I have seen a woman, with her young child
strapped to her back, labouring the whole day beside
a man, perhaps the father of the child, and he not per-
mitted to give her any assistance, himself being under the
whip.” (Testimony of L. Sapington, a native of Mary-
land; Tb., p. 49.)
On page 157 of the same book may be found the par-
ticulars of the public execution of a negro in a barbarous
manner, by burning and beheading, after which his head
was stuck up on a pole. His crime was killing a white
man. The provocation was, that the white man “owned
his wife, and was in the habit of sleeping with her. The
negro said he killed him, and he believed he should be
rewarded in heaven for it.”
The bearing of “the legal relation” of slave-ownership
upon the “family” relation may be seen by such adver-
tisements as the following, which abound in the Southern
papers. They are selected from about thirty similar ones
in Weld's “Slavery as it Is,” pp. 164-166.
104 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
(From the Richmond Enquirer, Feb. 20, 1838.)
“FIFTY DOLLARS REWARD.—Ran away from the sub-
scriber, his negro man Pauladore, commonly called Paul.
I understand Gen. R. Y. Haynek has purchased his wife
and children from H. L. Pinckney, Esq., and has them
now on his plantation at Goose-creek, where, no doubt,
the fellow is frequently lurking. “T. DAVIS.”
“TwPNTY-FIVE DOLLARS REWARD.—Ran away from the
subscriber, a negro woman named Matilda. It is thought
she may be somewhere up James River, as she was claimed
as a wife by some boatmen in Goochland. “J. ALVIS.”
“TEN DOLLARS REWARD for a negro woman named
Sally, forty years old. We have reason to believe said
negro to be lurking on the James River Canal, or the
Green Spring neighbourhood, where, we are informed, her
husband resides. “POLLY C. SHIELDS.
“ Mount Elba, Feb. 19, 1838.”
(From the Savannah Georgian, July 8, 1837.)
“Ran away from the subscriber, his man Joe. He visits
the city occasionally, where he has been harboured by his
mother and sister. I will give one hundred dollars for
proof sufficient to convict his harbourers.
“B., P. T. MONGIN.”
We add another, on page 156.
# Ex-Governor of South Carolina, and United States Senator.
# Member of Congress.from South Carolina.
NO FAMILY RIGHTS. 105
(From the Wilmington (N.C.) Advertiser of July 13, 1838.)
“Ran away, my negro man Richard. A reward of
twenty-five dollars will be paid for his apprehension, DEAD
or ALIVE. Satisfactory proof only will be required of his
being KILLED. He has with him, in all probability, HIS
WIFE ELIZA, who ran away from Colonel Thompson, now
a resident of Alabama, about the time he commenced his
journey to that State. “DURANT H. RHODES.”
We have some reason to believe that this Rhodes was
originally from New England. When he visits the North,
he will probably tell his friends that he has never known
any cruel treatment of slaves. Should he dine with the
parish pastor, the result would perhaps be a sermon on
“the innocent legal relation ſ”
The hair-splitters in logic will nevertheless persist in
admonishing us to distinguish between the “relation” and
its “abuse.” But what, we demand, must be the nature
of a “relation” that is constantly producing such fruits'
|Undoubtedly there are slaveholders who would not
thus advertise slaves. But if, in refraining, they are
governed by any moral principle, it must be a principle
at variance with the “legal relation” of slave-ownership,
which authorises such acts, and interposes no check or dis-
approbation of them. The very idea of slave-ownership
naturally suggests the right of doing such things. And
when slave-ownership is held to be legalised, and is dig-
mified with the mame of a “legal relation”—and when
106 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
these results (which some call “abuses”) are neither for-
bidden nor discountenanced by the authorities that
establish the said “legal relation,” it is sheer sophistry to
attempt discriminating between them so as to approve
the one and condemn the other.
107
CHAPTER, TX.
TJNLIMITED POWER OF SLAVEHOLDERS.
The Power of the Master or “Owner” is virtually unlimited—The
Submission required of the Slave is unbounded—The Slave being
“Property,” can have no Protection against the Master, and has no
Remedy or Redress for Injuries inflicted by him.
THIS proposition is substantially involved in the legal
definition of slavery, as presented in our first chapter.
The proof and illustration of it has been gradually
evolving as we have proceeded thus far. It will continue
to accumulate as we shall in future chapters examine the
topics of slave labour, slave sustenance and clothing, slave
pumishments, and the intellectual and religious condition
of slaves. At every step, the slave will have been found
wholly subject to his master, dependent upon him, and
defenceless. In this chapter we shall aim only to present,
in a condensed form, the precise doctrine of the Slave
Code on this subject.
If the slave be the absolute property of his master—
“entirely subject to his will”—“incapable of being in-
jured”—“chattels personal, to all intents, constructions,
and purposes whatsoever”—“not ranked among sentient
beings, but among things”—the subjects of absolute pur-
chase and sale—of seizure for debt—of inheritance and
distribution—incapable of possessing property—“not en-
108 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
titled to the conditions of matrimony”—“not capable of
constituting families”—(and all this has been shown)—
then the master is indeed absolute, and the slave defence-
less, of course. And any attempt by the Legislature or
by the Courts to afford him protection, would be, in
effect, an attempt to subvert “the legal relation of master
2
and slave,” and overturn the tenure of slave-ownership
entirely.
The question before us is, whether any such attempts
have been made; and if so, how much, in a way of limit-
ation and protection, has been accomplished.
We repeat, here, a quotation before made from Judge
Stroud. “It is plain that the dominion of the master is
as unlimited as that which is tolerated by the laws of
any civilised country in relation to brute animals—to
quadrupeds, to use the words of the civil law.” (Stroud's
Sketch, p. 24.)
We quote further and still more specific statements of
the law, from the same writer.
“The master may determine the kind, and degree, and
time of labour to which the slave shall be subjected.
“The master may supply the slave with such food and
clothing only, both as to quantity and quality, as he may
think proper or find convenient.
“The master may, at his discretion, inflict any punish-
ment upon the person of his slave.
“All the power of the master over his slave may be
exercised not by himself only in person, but by any one
whom he may depute as his agent.
POWER OF THE MASTER, 109
“A slave cannot be a party before a judicial tribunal,
in any species of action, against his master, no matter how
atrocious may have been the injury received from him.
“Slaves cannot redeem themselves, nor obtain a change
of masters, though cruel treatment may have rendered
such change necessary for their personal safety.
“Slaves being objects of property, if injured by others
their owners may bring suit, and recover damage for the
injury.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 25.)
To this we will add :
The master may wholly forbid and prevent the educa-
tion, the moral and religious instruction of his slaves—
their attendance on religious meetings and religious wor-
ship, either among themselves or at meetings conducted
by white persons.
There is not a slave in the United States that can
claim these benefits as legal rights, or that can enjoy
these privileges in any degree, except with the leave of
their “owners” or their agents.
There is not a slave-owner in the United States, how-
ever ignorant, vulgar, degraded, immoral, and irreligious,
that does not hold this authority over each and all of his
slaves, however pious or intelligent they may be. And
this authority, involved in slave-ownership, is part and
parcel of “the legal relation of master and slave.”
There is not a Slave State, or slave territory or dis-
trict under the federal jurisdiction, that does not, by its
Slave Code, extend its sanction and its guaranty to this
power of the slave-owner.
110 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
We speak here only of the power of the individual
who holds slaves. The laws forbidding education and the
free exercise of religion will be considered in another
connexion.
“A statu, liber” (a slave minor, entitled to freedom at
the age of twenty-one) has (in the mean time) “no action
at law for ill treatment.” Dorothee v. Coquillon et al.,
Jan. Term, 1829. (19 Martin's Louisiana Rep., 350;
Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 108-9.)
No resistance must be made by a slave to his master.
“While the institution of slavery exists, everything
like resistance to the master's lawful authority should be
decisively checked. Strict subordination must be exacted
from the slave, or bloodshed and murders will unavoidably
ensue. The laws of the slaveholding States demand, how-
ever, a much larger concession of power to the master
than is here granted ; they demand that THE LIFE of the
slave shall be in the MASTER’s KEEPING—that the slave,
having the physical ability to avoid the infliction of a
barbarous and vindictive pumishment by his master, shall
not be permitted to do so.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 97.)
We reserve a quotation from Prince's Digest and from
Several statutes, until, in treating of the civil relations of
the slave, we shall use them to prove more than our pre-
sent argument requires—viz., that the same absolute sub-
mission of the slave is required by the laws, not merely
towards the “ owner” and his agent, but towards “all
white persons !” *rs
Judge Ruffin, of North Carolina, in the case of State v.
Mann, decided as follows. “The power of the master
POWER OF THE MASTER, lii
must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave
perfect. It would not do to allow the rights of the master
to be brought into discussion in the courts of justice. The
slave, to REMAIN a slave, must be sensible that there is NO
APPEAL from his master.” (2 Devereaux's N. Carolina
Rep., 263.)
This justifies our statement that “the legal relation of
master and slave” is responsible for all this despotic
power.
In Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 244-8, there is a full
report of the opinion of Judge Ruffin, from which we have
taken the preceding extract. We shall revert to it again,
and make further extracts, when, in another chapter, we
come to treat of “Punishments of Slaves by the owners
and hirers.” An examination of that topic will more
fully illustrate the general proposition at the head of this
chapter, for the correctness of which we here cite a few
personal testimonies.
“The whole commerce between master and slave is a
perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the
most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading
submission on the other.” “Thus nursed, educated, and
daily exercised in tyranny,” &c. (Jefferson.)
“I knew a gentleman of great benevolence and gene-
rosity of character,” “speak of breaking down the spirit
of a slave, under the lash, as perfectly right.” (Angelina
Grimke Weld, “Slavery as it Is,” p. 54.)
“There was no law for the negro, but that of the
overseer's whip.” (L. Sapington, Ib., p. 49.)
The Savannah River Baptist Association approvingly
1 2 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
recognised the unlimited authority of the master, when
they maintained his authority to annul slave-marriages,
and to compel new sexual connexions between Baptist
husbands and wives whom he had forcibly severed . The
people are here found to be no better than their laws, and
the Church no better than the people. Hence they
consider the “legal relation an innocent one.” It stands
precisely on their own moral level.
This chapter may serve as a key to a number of the
chapters that follow, as it contains the principle upon
which their specifications are based, the absolute authority
of the master. Those chapters, in their turn, will furnish
illustrations and evidences of the truth of this.
113
CHAPTER X.
LA B O U R OF SIL A V ES.
The Slave, being a Chattel, may be worked at the Discretion of his Owner,
as other working Chattels are.
IF the Legislature of one of our Northern States should
enact a law restricting farmers to a specified number of
hours per day, in which their oxen and horses should be
worked ; and if the Act should be prefaced with a
preamble, stating that many farmers were in the habit of
overworking their cattle, it would be thought a severe
reflection upon the farmers. A stranger would conclude
that they were an inhuman as well as a short-sighted
class of people, to treat their working beasts in that
manner. They would eagerly read the Act, to see how
many hours were allowed as a relief to the poor beasts.
And they would necessarily infer that the practice had
been to work the cattle a longer time than that prescribed
by the law,
Let us now look at some of the laws of the Slave
States.
SouTH CAROLINA (Act of 1740)-" Whereas many
owners of slaves, and others who have the care, manage-
ment, and overseeing of slaves, do confine them so closely
I
114 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
to hard labour that they have not sufficient time for
matural rest; Be it therefore enacted, That if any owner
of slaves, or other persons who shall have the care,
management, or overseeing of slaves, shall work or put
any such slave or slaves to labour more than fifteen hours
in twenty-four hours, from the 25th day of March to the
25th day of September ; or more than fourteen hours in
twenty-four hours, from the 25th day of September to the
25th day of March; every such person shall forfeit any
sum not exceeding twenty pounds nor under five pounds
current money, for every time he, she, or they shall
offend herein, at the discretion of the justice before
whom the complaint shall be made.” (2 Brevard's Digest,
243.)
How much longer than fourteen or fifteen hours per
day, in winter and Summer, the South Carolina plantels
had been in the habit of working their slaves, we are left
to conjecture | But we know that the “laws of Mary-
land, Virginia, and Georgia forbid that the criminals in
their penitentiaries shall be compelled to labour more
than ten hours a day” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 130); and not
exceeding nine hours in some portions of the year, and
eight during the three other months (Stroud's Sketch,
p. 29). In Jamaica (before emancipation), “besides many
holidays which are by law accorded to the slave, ton hours
a day is the extent of the time which the slave is colm-
pelled, ordinarily, to work.” (2 Edwards' W. Indies,
book iv., chap. 5, &c.)
GEORGIA (Act of 1817).-‘Amy owner of a slave or
L.A.BOUR OF SLAVES. l 15
slaves who shall cruelly treat such slave or slaves by un-
necessary or excessive whipping, by withholding proper
food and nourishment, by requiring greater labour from
such slave or slaves than he or she or they may be able to
perform, by not affording proper clothing, whereby the
health of such slave or slaves may be injured or impaired,
every such owner or owners of slaves shall, upon usfficient
information being laid before the grand jury, be by said
grand jury presented, whereupon it shall be the duty of
the attorney or solicitor general to prosecute said owner
or owners, who, on conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a
fine, or be imprisoned, at the discretion of the court.”
(Prince's Digest, 376)
In this act, the “owner” only is specified, and not the
overseer or agent.
Louis IANA (Act of July, 1806).-" As for the hours
of work and rest which are to be assigned to slaves in
summer, the old usages of the territory shall be adhered
to, to wit : The slaves shall be allowed half-an-hour for
breakfast during the whole year; from the first day of
May to the first day of November they shall be allowed
two hours for dinner; and from the first day of November
to the first day of May, one hour and a half for dinner :
Provided, however, that the owners who will themselves
take the trouble of causing to be prepared the meals of
their slaves, be, and they are hereby authorised to abridge.
by half-an-hour per day, the time fixed for their rest.”
(1 Martin's Digest, 610-12.) -
This relic of “the old usages” under the Spanish aud
116 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
gº-
French laws may be considered, like the Louisiana laws
before quoted, an exception to the general code of
American slavery. Yet even here the hours of begin-
ning and ending the day's labour are not specified, and,
consequently, the hours of labour per day are not
limited nor ascertained. The known custom of might-
work in boiling Sugar is not touched by this statute.
In Georgia and in Mississippi, there are laws forbidding
the unmecessary labour of slaves on the Sabbath. This
is all the information before us. Th most of the Slave
States, there are no laws limiting slave-labour. (See
Stroud, p. 26.)
One single consideration is sufficient to show that the
limitations just quoted are of no practical value. No
slave and no free coloured person, in the Slave States, can be
a witness against a white person. (Ib., 27.) Slaveholders
would not be forward to prosecute each other for ill
treatment of slaves. And many of the non-slaveholding
whites at the South are a servile and degraded class, not
daring to offend the slaveholders.
The celebrated George Whitefield, in a “Letter to the
Inhabitants of Maryland, Virginia, North and South
Carolina,” in 1739 (after having travelled among them),
says: “Your slaves, I believe, work as hard, if not
harder, than the horses whereon you ride. These, after
their work is done, are fed, and taken proper care of; but
many negroes, when wearied with labour in your planta-
tions, have been obliged to grind their own corn, after
their return home.”
IABOUR OF SLAVES. II 7
John Woolman, in his Journal, under date of 1757,
speaks of the labour of slaves as “heavy, being followed
at their business in the field by a man with a whip, hired
for that purpose.” (Life of Woolman, p. 74.)
The following are specimens of a great amount of
similar testimony recorded in Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,”
p. 35 and onward:
“So laborious is the task of raising, beating, and
cleaning rice, that had it been possible to obtain
European servants in sufficient numbers, thousands and
tens of thousands of them must have perished.” (History
of Carolina, vol. i., p. 30.)
The Hon. Alexander Smythe, of Va., in a speech in Con-
gress on the Missouri question, January 28, 1820, argued,
on the ground of humanity, in favour of extending
slavery into Missouri, that the slaves would be more
comfortable there than in the older States, where they
are “forced to incessant toil,” “hard-worked,” &c. If
you “hem then in where they are,” you “doom them to
hard labour.” It would be “extreme cruelty to the
blacks.”
Henry Clay, in 1834, in a conversation with James G.
Birney, expressed a belief (contrary to his former impres-
sions) that at the far South, the births among the slaves
were not equal to the deaths. He related what he
had heard and believed, that an overseer in Louisiana
“worked his hands so closely, that one of the women
brought forth a child while engaged in the labours of the
field.” He was also told of a plantation containing from
j S Tii E ANIERH CAN SLAYE CONDE.
“twenty to thirty young women in the prime of life,”
and the proprietor told him there had not bgen a child
born among them for the last two or three years, although
they all had husbands.
We have before us much more testimony to the Sallie
point ; also, to the fact, that the slaves are commonly
“obliged to work from daylight till dark, or as long as
they can see.”
“Everybody here (Natchez, Miss) knows overdriving
to be one of the most common occurrences. The planters
do not deny it, except, perhaps, to Northermers.” (A. A.
Stone, Theological Student.)
In our Chapter V., on the “Uses of Slave Property,’
it was shown how coolly and deliberately gangs of slaves
are used up on the Sugar-plantations of Louisiana, once in
seven or eight years. In Mir. Weld's book, before us, we
have many testimonies that corroborate the gencral fact.
We spare room for only one, which comes under the au-
thority of the Rev. John O. Choules, Baptist minister,
once of New Bedford, Mass., afterwards of Buffalo, New
York. “While attending the Baptist Triennial Conven-
tion at Richmond, Va., in 1835,” says Mr. C., “I had a
conversation with an officer of the Baptist church in that
city, at whose house T was a guest. I asked him if he
did not apprehend that the slaves would eventually rise
and exterminate their masters! “Why, said the gentle-
man, “I did use to apprehend such a catastrophe; but God
has made a providential opening, a merciful safety-valve,
and now I do not feel alarmed, in the prospect of what is
LABOUR OF SLAVES. 119
coming.” “What do you mean,’ said Mr. Choules, ‘by
Providence opening a merciful safety-valve º’ ‘Why,’
said the gentleman, ‘I will tell you. The slave-traders
come from the cotton and sugar-plantations of the South,
and are willing to buy up more slaves than we can part
with. We must keep a stock for the purpose of rearing
slaves, but we part with the most valuable, and at the
same time the most dangerous; and the demand is very
constant, and is likely to be so ; for when they go to
those Southern States the average existence is only five
years /*
The people, including church members, are not better
than their laws.
120
CHAPTER XI.
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND DWELLINGS OF SLAVES.
The Slave, as a Chattel, is fed or famished, covered or uncovered, sheltered
or unsheltered, at the Discretion or Convenience of his Owner, like other
working Animals.
LOUISIANA-‘Every owner shall be held to give his
slaves the quantity of provisions hereinafter specified, to
wit, one barrel of Indian corn, k or the equivalent thereof
in rice, beans, or other grain, and a pint of Salt, and to
deliver the same to the slaves, in kind, every month, and
never in money, under penalty of a fine of ten dollars for
every offence.” (1 Martin's Digest, p. 610; Act of
July 7, 1806.)
“The slave who shall not have on the property of his
owner a lot of ground to cultivate on his own account,
shall be entitled to receive from said owner one limen
shirt and pantaloons for the summer, and a linen shirt
and woollen great-coat and pantaloons for the winter.”
(1 Martin's Digest, 610.) Neither the quantity nor the
quality of the “lot of ground” is specified, nor the amount
of time to be allowed for tilling it.
* Meaning a flour barrel full of Indian corn in the ear, equal to about
one and a half bushels of shelled corn.
FOOD-CLOTHING—SHIELTER, 121
NORTH CAROLINA.—“In case any slave or slaves, who
shall not appear to have been fed and clothed according
to the intent and meaning of this Act—that is to say, to
have been sufficiently clothed, and to have constantly
received for the preceding year an allowance of not less
than a quart of cornik per day—shall be convicted of steal-
ing any corn, cattle, &c. &c., from any person not the
owner of said slave or slaves, such injured person shall
and may maintain an action of trespass against the master,
owner, or possessor of such slave, &c., and shall recover his
or her damages.” (Hayward's Manual, 524-5.)
GEORGIA.—The Act of 1817 (as quoted in the last pre-
vious Chapter on Labour) provides for the punishment of
“owners” of slaves who “by excessive whipping, by with-
holding proper food and sustenance, by requiring greater
labour,” &c., shall “cruelly treat” such slaves, “whereby
the health of such slave, &c., may be injured or impaired.”
Another Act, of Dec. 12, 1815, is as follows.
“Sect. 1. From and after the passing of this Act, it shall
be the duty of the inferior courts of the several counties
in this State, on receiving information, on oath, of any
infirm slave or slaves in a suffering condition, from the
neglect of the owner or owners of said slave or slaves, to
make particular inquiries into the situation of such slave
or slaves, and render such relief as they in their discretion
shall think proper.
“Sect. 2. The said courts may and are hereby autho-
* It will be observed that in neither of these legal rations of food is
any mention made of meat.
| 22 TIII. AMIERICAN SLAVE CODE,
rised to sue for and recover, from the owner or owners
of such slave or slaves, the amount that may be appropri-
ated for the relief of such slave or slaves, in any court
having jurisdiction of the same ; any law, usage, or
custom to the contrary motwithstanding.” (Prince's Di-
gest, 460.)
SOUTH CAROLINA.—“In case any person, &c., who shall
be owner, or who shall have the care, government, or
charge of any slave or slaves, shall demy, neglect, or refuse
to allow such slave or slaves, under his or her charge, suffi-
cient clothing, covering, or food, it shall and may be
lawful for any person or persons, on behalf of said slave
Or slavos, to make complaint to the next neighbouring
justice in the parish where such slave or slaves live, or are
usually employed ; and the said justice shall summon the
party against whom such complaint shall be made, and
shall inquire of hear, and determine the same ; and if the
said justice shall find the said complaint to be true, or
that such person will not exculpate or clear himself from
the charge by his or her own oath, which such person
shall be at liberty to do in all cases where positive proof
is not given of the offence, such justice shall and may
make such orders upon the same, for the relief of such slave
or slaves, as he in his discretion shall think fit ; and shall
and may set and impose a fine or penalty on any person
who may offend in the premises, in any sum not exceeding
twenty pounds current money for each offence, to be
levied by warrant of distress and sale of the offender's
goods,” &c. &c. (2 Brevard's Digest, p. 241. Similar in
Louisiana, 1 Martin's Digest, 638-40.)
FOOD-CLOTHING—SHELTER. 123
On these enactments we remark:
1. They embrace the legislation of only four States.
The other slaveholding States, so far as we are informed,
have never pretended to prescribe to the slave-owner the
kind or amount of food he must furnish his slaves. He
can starve them if he pleases to do so, and there is no law
to prevent it.
2. Considering that the slave can bring no suit against
his master; that he is unprovided with a protector, and
that neither the slave nor any other coloured person can
testify against a white main ; and that, in case of any
interference in his behalf, whether successful or otherwise.
the slave still remains “entirely subject to the will of a
master to whom he belongs,” and who can avenge himself
upon him with impunity in secret the very next day—it is
quite certain that such enactments can avail little or
nothing for his benefit, while he remains a slave.
3. Aside from all this, the law of North Carolina was
evidently designed for the benefit, not of the slave, but of
the “persons” from whom a hungry slave might “steal”
a subsistence. It prescribes mo relief to the slave, and no
punishment to his master, but only subjects him to the
bayment of “damages” for the food his slave has caten ;
just as in the case of an unruly horse or ox that should
break into a neighbour's erib It does not even provide
for the hungry slave's exemption from punishment by
his master, or by the magistrate, for his “stealing” to
appease hunger. There is no humanity in this law. It
is a monument of the barbarity of its framers, and of the
slaveholders.
124 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
4. The Georgia Act of 1817, strictly construed, im-
poses no punishment on a master who shall “cruelly treat”
his slave by “excessive whipping,” or by withholding
proper food, or by “requiring greater labour,” &c. All
these acts of “cruelty” must be combined in each instance,
or the statute fails to apply to the case. Even then it is
not reached, unless the health of the slave be “injured or
impaired.” There may be “cruelty” by “excessive whip-
ping,” by hunger, and by excessive labour; but if the
subject of all this “cruelty” retains his “health,” the
“cruelty” is not to be punished.
5. The Georgia Act of 1815 applies only to the case of
“infirm slaves.” Other slaves “in a suffering condition
from the neglect of the owner” are not provided for. It
requires “information on oath” (which no coloured person
can give), before a legal inquiry can be commenced The
facts must be first proved before the process can begin,
and proved, too, without the testimony of the sufferer It
shall be “the duty” of the courts to render such relief as
they think proper. From whence the supply is to be
obtained, unless from the pockets of the judges, does not
appear. (We have copied the entire Act.) They are not
authorised to order an execution against the delinquent
“owner” on their judgment. Instead of this, the judges
are authorised (not directed) to become suitors themselves,
as a “court,” in another court, to collect of the owner the
amount of the appropriation, if they can ; and if not,
put up with the loss as they can, costs and all ! Where
shall we find a parallel to this farce
|FOOD-CLOTHING—SHIELTER. 125
6. The South Carolina Act must also be useless for the
want of “positive proof” (as the slave cannot testify), in
the absence of which the defendant is cleared by his own
oath.
7. We conclude, therefore, that these laws, on the
whole, are no better than none. We should not antici-
pate, from their operation, any better provision for the
clothing and sustenance of slaves, in these four States,
than in the other slave States, where no laws exist. We
are not aware that there is any perceptible difference, in
fact. And we may extend the remark to the laws of the
four States mentioned in the previous chapter, on the sub-
ject of slave-labour. The principle of slave-ownership,
viz., human chattelhood, is not impaired or infringed by
them. The master has the power in his own hands. He
may do what he wills with his own. Such, at every point,
is “the legal relation of master and slave.”
From the law, we now turn to the prevailing practice.
From the former we may anticipate the latter. In
the work to which we have so often referred (Weld's
“Slavery as it Is”) may be found a great amount of
authentic testimony of highly-respectable witnesses, of
former and later times, for which we cannot spare room,
but the substance is as follows.
HUNGER.—Slaves in Virginia (1820) are “ill fed.”
They are “doomed to scarcity and hunger.” (Alex.
Smythe, M.C.) In 1739, they “ had not sufficient food
to eat ; they were scarcely permitted to pick up the
crumbs that fell from their masters’ tables.” (Rev. Geo,
126 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Whitefield.) They are “deprived of needful subsistence.”
(Rev. Geo. Bourne.)—In 1791 “they were supplied with
barely enough to keep them from starving.” (Dr. Jona-
than Edwards, of Connecticut.)—In Georgia, “ their
allowance is often not adequate to the Support of a labour-
ing man.” (Thomas Clay, Esq., a slaveholder.)—In Ten-
nessee “thousands are pressed with the gnawings of hun-
ger.” (Rev. John Rankin.)—In North Carolina, 1826,
“the greater part of them go half starved much of the
time.” (Moses and Wm. Swain.)—In Louisiana, 1835,
“there is a good deal of suffering from hunger”—“utter
ſamishment, during a great portion of the year.” (A. A.
Stone.)—In Mississippi, “half starved.” (Tobias Bou-
dinot.)
KINDS OF FOOD.—The general testimony is, that slaves
are allowed meat only as an occasional “indulgence
or favour”—“at Christmas,” &c. &c. Experiments have
been made with cotton-seed, as a substitute in part for
corn. General Wade Hampton is said to have tried the
experiment, till, as he himself declared with an oath, his
slaves “died like rotten sheep.” This statement was fur-
nished by “a lady of high respectability and great moral
worth,” to “a clergyman in the West, extensively known
both as a preacher and a writer. His name is with the
Executive Committee of the American Anti-Slavery
Society.” (Weld's American Slavery as it Is, p. 29.)
QUANTITY.-"The quantity allowed by custom is a peck
of corn a week.” (Thos. Clay, Esq., Georgia, 1833.)
Same testimony by W. C. Gildersleeve, now of Wilkes-
FOOD-CLOTHING-SHELTER. 127
barre, Pa.; and Rev. Horace Moulton, of Marlboro’, Mass. ;
both once resident in Georgia.
Maryland : Same quantity, 1788. (Baltimore Adver-
tiser.)—Florida : A quart of corn a day, to a full-task
hand, with a modicum of salt. Kind masters allowed a
peck of corn a week. Some masters allowed no salt.”
(Wm. Ladd, once a Florida slaveholder, since of Minot,
Me.)—North Carolina : Seven quarts of meal, or eight
quarts of small rice, for one week.” (Nehemiah Caulkins,
Waterford, Ct. ; resident in North Carolina eleven
winters.)—Virginia : A pint of corn-meal and a salt her-
ring is the allowance (for one meal); or, in lieu of the
herring, a ‘dab’ of fat meat of about the same value. I
have known the sour milk and clauber to be served out to
the hands, when there was an abundance of milk on the
plantation. This is a luxury not often afforded.” (Rev.
C. S. Renshaw, a native Virginian.)
John Woolman, in his Journal (1757), makes the
general statement, that “they have in common little else
allowed but one peck of Indian corn and some salt, for
one week, with a few potatoes; the potatoes they com-
monly raise by their labour on the first day of the week.”
(Life of Woolman, p. 74.)
QUALITY OF FooD.—“There is often a defect here.”
(Thos. Clay, Esq., Georgia.)—“The feed of slaves is gene-
rally of the poorest kind.” (Rev. Horace Moulton.)—In
Kentucky, “They live on a coarse, crude, unwholesome
diet.” (Western Medical Reformer.)—“Large numbers of
badly-fed negroes were swept off by a prevailing epidemic.”
128 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
—“The best remedy for that horrid malady, “ Cacheasia.
Africana, is to feed the negroes with nutritious food.”
(Professor A. G. Smith, of New York Medical College,
once physician in Louisville, Ky.)
NUMBER AND TIMES OF MEALS, EACH DAY. —“The
slaves eat twice during the day.” (Dr. Jonathan Edwards,
Connecticut, 1791.)
Florida. “The slaves go the field in the morning ;
they carry with them meal, wet with water, and at noon
build a fire on the ground, and bake it in the ashes.
After the labours of the day are over, they take their
second meal of ash-cake. (Philemon Bliss, Esq., Elyria,
Ohio; resident in Florida, 1834-5.)
Mississippi, 1837. “The slaves received two meals
during the day. Breakfast about eleven o'clock; the other
meal after night.” (Eleazer Powell, now of Chippewa,
Pa.)
North Carolina. “The breakfast of the slaves was
generally about ten or eleven o'clock A. M.” (Nehemiah
Caulkins.)
Virginia. “Two meals a day. Breakfast from ten to
eleven o'clock A. M. Supper from six to mine or ten at night,
as the season and crops may be.” (Rev. C. S. Renshaw.)—
“Meals generally taken without knife, dish, or spoon.”
(Wm. Leftwitch, a Virginian.)
Georgia. The corn is ground in a hand-mill, by the
slave, after his task is done. Generally there is but one
mill on a plantation; and as but one can grind at a time,
the mill is going sometimes very late at night.” (W. C.
FOOD-CLOTHING—SFIELTER. 129
Gildersleeve, Esq., a native of Georgia.) Similar testi-
mony from other States.
South Carolina. “Only two meals a day are allowed
to the house-slaves; the first at twelve o'clock. If they eat
before this time, it is by stealth; and I am sure there must
be a good deal of suffering among them from hunger,
particularly by children. Besides this, they are often
kept from their meals by way of punishment. No table
is provided for them to eat from. They know nothing of
the comfort and pleasure of gathering round the social
board; each takes his plate or tim pan, and holds it in
the hand or on the lap. I never saw slaves seated
round a table, to partake of any meal.” (Angelina
Grimke Weld.)
“Stealing food is a crime, punished by flogging. A
woman was punished for stealing four potatoes.” (P.
Bliss, Esq.)
“Cooks, waiters, chambermaids, &c., generally get
some meat every day—the remaining bits and bones of
their masters’ tables.” (Weld, p. 31.)
The law of Louisiana of 1806 (chap. x.), prescribing
the time allotted to meals, by its mention of breakfast
and dinner, seems to indicate a third meal, though it is
not directly mentioned.
The fare of slaves is doubtless better in the slave-
growing than in the slave-consuming States. And there
are exceptions to the general picture we have presented.
CLOTHING.-Mr. Weld has shown, by abundant and
unimpeachable testimony, that “the clothing of slaves by
FC
130 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
day, and their covering by night, is not adequate either
for comfort or decency.” (P. 40, &c.)
Virginia. Hon. T. T. Bouldin, a slaveholder, in a
speech in Congress, Feb. 16, 1835, said, “He knew that
many negroes had died from exposure to weather ;” and
added, “They are clad in a flimsy fabric that will turn
neither wind nor water.”
Maryland. “The slaves, naked and starved, often fall
victims to the inclemencies of the weather.” (George
Buchanan, M.D., of Baltimore, 1791.)
Georgia, &c. “We rode through many rice-swamps,
where the blacks were very numerous”—“working up
to the middle in water, men and women nearly naked.”
(Wm. Savery, Philadelphia, Minister Friends' Soc. 1791.)
Tennessee, &c. “In every slaveholding State many
slaves suffer extremely, both while they labour and when
they sleep, for want of clothing to keep them warm.”
(Rev. John Rankin.)
The South generally. “Men and women have many
times scarce clothes enough to hide their nakedness; and
boys and girls, ten and twelve years old, are often quite
naked among their masters' children.” (John Woolman,
1757. Journal, &c., p. 150.)
“Both male and female go without clothing at the age of
eight or ten years.” (John Parish, Minister Soc. Friends,
1804.) Same testimony from many others more recently.
Alabama, 1819. “Hardly a rag of clothing on them.”
—“Generally the only bedding was a blanket.” (S. E.
Maltby.)
FOOD-CLOTEHING—SHIELTER, I3]
Virginia. “Two blankets.” (Wm. Leftwich.) Ad-
vertisements of fugitives every year often describe them as
“ragged” or “nearly maked.”
Florida. “They were allowed two suits of clothesa-year;
viz.: one pair of trousers, with a shirt or frock of Osna-
burgh, for summer ; and for winter, one pair of trousers
and a jacket of negro-cloth, with a baize shirt and a pair
of shoes. Some allowed hats, and some did not ; and
they were generally, I believe, allowed one blanket in two
years. Garments of similar materials were allowed the
women.” (Wm. Ladd, late of Minot, Me.)
“The slaves are generally without beds or bedsteads.’
—“I have seen men and women at work in the fields
more than half naked.” (Testimony furnished by Rev.
C. S. Renshaw, from his friend.)
“In Lower Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana,
)
clothing made of cotton-bagging”—“mo shoes.” (G. W.
5 So 85
Westgate.)
“Will” of the celebrated John Randolph, of Roanoke,
Va., distinguished as a “kind master :”—“To my old and
faithful servants Essex and his wife Hetty, I give and
bequeath a pair of strong shoes, a suit of clothes, and a
blanket each, to be paid them annually ; also an annual
hat to Essex.” No socks, stockings, bonnets, cloaks,
handkerchiefs, or towels—no change either of outside or
inner garments And a solemn “Last Will and Testa-
ment” was deemed necessary to secure to them even the
articles specified
Ramily servants, waiters, &c., and hotel attendants,
132 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
must needs appear decently clad ; and kept-mistresses of
gentlemen are often arrayed extravagantly. Superficial
observers and shallow thinkers, seeing this, report the
happy condition of slaves in general, having never seen
the “negro quarters” on the plantations.
DWELLINGS.—These “generally contain but one apart-
ment, and that without a floor;” “no partition to separate
the sexes;” nothing that a Northern labourer “would
call a bed ;” sometimes “built by themselves of stakes
and poles, and thatched with palmetto-leaf; sometimes of
clay;” “no window-glass or sashes;” “not sufficient to
keep off the inclemency of the weather ; sometimes built
of logs—on old plantations sometimes of frames and clap-
boards; size, eight feet by ten, or ten by twelve, and but
eight feet high ;” “without any chimney—a hole at top
to let the Smoke out ;” “generally put up (in Georgia)
without a nail ;” “ill ventilated ;” “surrounded with
filth ;” “with neither chairs, table, nor bedstead ;” “on
the cold ground they must lie without covering, and
shiver while they slumber.” Such is the picture attested
by competent witnesses. (Weld's Slavery as it Is,
p. 43, &c.)
TREATMENT OF THE SICK, THE INFIRM, AND THE AGED.—
On this topic we have not room here to enter. In Mr.
Weld's work, pp. 44, 45, may be found statements from
the late Rev. Dr. Channing, of Boston, once resident in
Virginia (extracted from his work on Slavery); from Miss
Sarah M. Grimke, formerly of Charleston, S. C. ; from
George A. Avery, merchant, Rochester, N. Y., once
*
FOOD-CLOTHING—SHIELTER, 133
living in Virginia; from Rev. William T. Allan, once of
Alabama; the late Rev. Elias Cornelius (p. 161);4 and
several others, all showing that great barbarity charac-
terises the slaveholders, generally, in their ill-treatment or
neglect of these unfortunate beings, held dependent upon
them, and defenceless, as slaves.
Into all the particulars which go to make up the dread-
ful condition of the slave, the plan and limits of the
present treatise do not permit us to go. We select mainly
such facts as illustrate the slave-laws, and the consequent
“legal relation” of master and slave. At every step we
find it a relation identified with wretchedness and wrong.
From Wheeler’s “Law of Slavery” it would seem that
slaveholders are in the habit of refusing to pay physicians
for medical attendance on their slaves, and that suits at
law are the consequence, which are variously decided, the
decisions of a lower court being sometimes reversed by a
higher. The following points are put down by Mr.
Wheeler in his marginal titles.
Dumbar v. Williams, 10 John's New York Rep., 249.
“No action lies by a physician against the master for
attendance upon his slave without his knowledge, unless
it be a case of extreme necessity.” (Wheeler, p. 225.)
Wells v. Kennerly, 4 McCord's S. C. Rep., 123.
“The owner is not liable for medical attendance upon
a hired slave, given at the request of the hirer.” (Ib.,
p. 226.)
It is hardly to be expected that the temporary hirer of
* See Edwards' Life of Rev. Elias Cornelius, pp. 101-3.
134 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
a slave would be forward to incur the expense of much
medical attendance.
In the case of Johnson et al. v. Barrett, Judge John-
son, South Carolina, said : “If a slave be in peril in the
absence of his master, the interest of the owner is most
effectually subserved by rendering assistance to the slave,
and in good conscience the owner is bound to make Satis-
faction.” (Ib)
The legal rule, then, is, to give medical aid when the
interest of the owner demands it.
CHAPTER XII.
COERCED LABOUR, WITHOUT WAGES.
The “legal relation of Master and Slave,” being the relation of an Owner
to a Chattel, is a relation incompatible with the natural and heaven-
sanctioned “relation” of Labour and Wages.
CHRISTIANITY is “a swift witness against those that
oppress” even “the hireling in his wages.” It also pro-
claims, “Woe unto him that useth his neighbour's service
without wages, and giveth him not for his work.”
To “oppress the hireling in his wages,” is to pay him
inadequate wages, or to withhold a part of his earnings.
To use a neighbour's service without wages, is to pay him
no wages at all. This latter is the definition of slave-
labour, and that labour is extorted by brute force. The
slave is not a “hireling.” He is not hired at all, any
more than a working horse or ox is hired. In saying
this, we only state the legal and the inevitable fact of the
case. More particularly—
1. Wages is “that which is stipulated to be paid for
services.” There is, in this, of necessity, the concurrent
action of two parties who stipulate, namely—the employer
and the employed, the payer and him that receives pay.
The wages are determined by a mutual stipulation, agree-
ment, or contract between the parties.
2. Wages, to be legitimate, must be equitable or equal.
136 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
There must be, by both the parties, an equivalent given
and received. The labour must be equal in value to
the wages, and the wages must be equal in value to the
labour.
3. Wages is that which, when received by the labourer,
becomes his own, his property. The very ideas of pro-
perty, and of the rights of property, have their origin here.
He who receives wages, possesses, appropriates, and dis-
poses of his wages; and no one, without an equivalent, or
without his leave, can take them from him.
4. Wages for the faithful services of an able-bodied
man, during the proper working hours of the day, in
order to be adequate and equitable wages, must more than
Suffice for his comfortable sustenance as a mere animal.
They must enable him to support a family, to supply his
own and their social wants as intellectual and moral
beings, to discharge his responsibilities as a member of
Society, and lay up a surplus for the ordinary exigencies of
the future.
5. The wages of the successful producer of the fruits of
the earth, to be equitable, must secure to him, as his pos-
session, a large proportion of those fruits. On a plantation,
or in a parish, township, or province, in which the men
whose labour has built comfortable houses may not live in
comfortable houses—whose labour has procured ample
supplies of food, clothing, and family comforts, but may
not share in and enjoy those supplies and comforts (unless
squandered by improvidence), there could not have been
an equitable receipt of wages by the labourer.
SERVICE WITHOUT WAGES. 137
By each and all of these definitions and tests of wages,
the slave-system, the slaveholding “relation,” both in
theory and practice, stand condemned. They do not and
they cannot accord wages to the labourer.
For, in the first place, “the slave can make no contract,”
and hence he cannot stipulate for wages.
2. “The slave can possess nothing;” and hence he can-
not receive, because he cannot possess, appropriate, or use,
wages.
3. The slave is “goods and chattels,” and these cannot
earn wages. The sustenance of the horse and ox are not
wages. The needful repairs of a machine are not wages.
Were all the slaves as “fat and sleek” as Henry Clay's,
their comfortable fare would not be wages. Besides:
4. The cost of sustenance for the slave (were it matter
of mutual stipulation) is too trivial to be dignified with
the name of wages Look over the preceding chapters.
Estimate the labour. Look at its products—houses, equi-
pages, wardrobes, wines, feasts, exports, returns, revenues,
banks, cities, navies | Imagine an exodus of the slaves,
like that of the Hebrews out of Egypt, and let the wand
of their Moses sweep along with them all the products
of their labour ! What would be left after them : Then
inquire after the compensation that has been paid for this
labour. “A peck of corn a week, with a modicum of
salt.” Say twelve and a half bushels of corn a year, at
fifty cents, is six dollars twenty-five cents—the salt,
twenty-five cents, makes six dollars fifty cents for a year's
board. Then add the wardrobe of John Randolphs’
138 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“faithful servant Essex,” possibly ten dollars more. The
house-rent, at what the “owner” thinks it worth ! Then
foot up the sum total—or take the estimate of slave-
holders themselves, in Reports of Committees of Agricul-
tural Societies, published to the world—viz., fifteen to
twenty dollars per annum—along with the confession of
Thomas Clay, Esq., of Georgia : “The present economy of
the slave-system is, to get all you can from the slave, and
give him as little as will support him in a working con-
dition.” It is no counterproof or palliation that the
system is unprofitable. To “use a neighbour's service
without wages” has always been profitless, because always
wrong and heaven-abhorred.
The balance between the slave's earnings (possessed or
squandered by his “owner”) and the cost of the slave's
support, may tell us whether the slave could “take care
of himself” if suffered to receive honest wages.
Again, we say, look at the wealth earned by the slave ;
than look at the slave, half famished, half naked, without
a bed, shivering, sleeping on the bare ground with an old
blanket around him, or turned off, perhaps, in decrepit
old age, by his “owner,” “a gentleman [reputedly] of
great benevolence and generosity of character,” to beg in
the streets of Charleston (S.C.), because “too old to work,
and therefore his allowance was stopped ;”* then learn
how “the innocent legal relation” enforces labour without
2009éS.
* See Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” p. 54. Testimony of the daughter of
Judge Grimke, of Charleston (S. C.).
SERVICE WITHOUT WAGES. 139
When we say it is “the legal relation” that does this,
we have the testimony of Southern judicial decision to
Sustain us.
In the case of the State v. Mann, before cited, Judge
Ruffin said :
The slave is “doomed, in his own person and his pos-
terity, to live without knowledge, and without capacity
to make anything his own, and to toil that others may
reap the fruits.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 246, copied
from 2 Devereaux's North Carolina Rep., 263.)
CHAPTER, XIII.
PUNISHMENTS OF SLAVES BY THE OWNER AND HIRER.
Being the absolute Property of the Owner, the Slave is wholly in his
power, without any effectual restraint.
WE have seen that “the legal relation” of slave-owner-
ship, being the relation of an owner to his property, in-
vests him with unlimited power. We have traced the
exercise of that power in a number of directions, and have
witnessed at every step, thus far, the express Sanction or
the silent acquiescence of slave-laws. Or, if limitations
to his power have, at Some points, and in some of the
States, appeared to be interposed, it has been found, on a
close scrutiny, to be only an appearance, and not a reality.
In the vitally-important matters of absolute purchase,
Sale, Seizure for debt, inheritance, distribution, marriage (or
rather no marriage), annihilation of family Sanctities,
incapacity to possess property, to make a contract, or to
receive Wages in the appointment of labour, supply of food,
clothing, and habitations, we have seen the power of the
master everything—the rights, the protection, the defence,
the redress, and the power of the slave, nothing ! We
come now to inquire whether, in the item of slave punish-
ments by the master, there are any available limita-
PUNISHMENT BY MASTERS. 14|
tions or restrictions of his power. In other words,
whether, in “the legal relation” of slave-owner and slave,
the “owner” be, in reality, at this vital point, amenable
to law; or whether here, as at all the preceding points,
he rises above law, making it the instrument of his will,
but not subjecting himself to its authority.
If there be any such limitation, it must be, thus far, an
inroad upon the principle of human chattelhood, denying
its claims, and thwarting the exercise of the “rights of
property” involved in it. The rights of property in brute
animals might be limited at this point without danger to
the tenure of such property. The brute could take no
advantage of such lenity, to throw off the yoke of domi-
nion and outgrow its chattelhood. Not so with chattels
endued with thought and reason. To be held and used as
chattels at all, they must be taught (as before quoted from
Prince's Digest, 450) that “the life of the slave must be
in his master's keeping;” or, as Judge Ruffin expressed it,
“the slave must be sensible that there is no appeal from
his master.” The old Romans understood this necessity,
when they engrafted the same maxims into their civil
code : the slaves “are not capable of being injured”—they
may be “punished at the discretion of their lord, or even
put to death by his authority.” The people of the South,
their courts, and their jurists, understand this, when they
“generally refer” (as Stroud says they do) to the Roman
civil code, “as containing the true principles of their
institution,” “except where modified by statutes, or by
usages which have acquired the force of law.” Those
142 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
statutes and usages (on this point) we are now to inquire
after. If it be found that Judge Ruffin, and that Mr.
Prince, in his “Digest,” have rightly represented them,
the apologists of the “innocent legal relation” must not
too severely or too exclusively arraign their barbarism for
expounding (not enacting) the law of the “relation.”
It could hardly be supposed that, in any civilised
country, the Legislature would, by express statute, authorise
the master to commit cruel outrages upon the persons of
his slaves, or murder them ; nor that, in the present age
of the world, a civil government would openly proclaim
impunity to any persons beforehand, in the commission of
such crimes. If it were desired and intended by the
Legislature to produce such a result, the more feasible
and effectual means of doing this (especially in an elective
government) would be to make a show of prohibiting and
punishing the crimes, but under circumstances and arrange-
ments so contrived as to render the execution of the law
or the conviction of the offenders impracticable.
Laws and courts of justice are chiefly needed for the
protection of the weak and the defenceless. That class
in any community that, from these causes, is most exposed
to violence and outrage, is the class in respect to which the
Legislature, if it intends to protect them at all, will most
solicitously seek methods of doing it effectually. If any
distinctions are made between the subjects of the govern-
ment, it will be made in their favour. Whenever an oppo-
site policy is witnessed, especially when this is carried so far
that the exposed class are not allowed to bring a complaint
PUNISHMENT BY MASTERS. 143
against one of the class to whose aggressions they are most
exposed, or even to bear testimony against them, we may
be certain that no protection of them was intended ; but
that, on the other hand, the powerful party was intended
to be countenanced in their injurious aggressions. And
this would be doubly confirmed, if none but the same
powerful party administered the law, or had any share in
the government, or participation in the immunities or
privileges enjoyed under it. Det such be the case between
Catholics and Protestants, Normans and Anglo-Saxons,
or Turks and Greeks, and no reader of history would
hesitate in making such a decision. This is the precise
fact in respect to American slaveholders and slaves. No
principle in the Slave Code is more firmly established than
this : that a slave can bring no suit against his master,
unless it be a suit for his freedom. Even the minor
female slave, who is to be free at the age of twenty-one,
can have no suit brought by a free parent for her relief
from ill-treatment. Such was the decision (before alluded
to) of Judge Martin, in the case of Dorothee v. Coquillon
et al., Jam. Term, 1829. (19 Martin's Louisiana Reports,
350. Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 198).
It must be idle to pretend that any statutes for the
protection of the slave can be of any avail in the pre-
sence of such rules, and the following.
“It is an inflexible and universal rule of slave-law,
founded in one or two States upon usage, in others
sanctioned by express legislation, that the testimony of a
coloured person, whether bond or free, cannot be received
against a white person.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 27.)
144 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
To this feature of slave-law we have alluded before, and
shall devote to its details a distinct chapter when we
come to treat of the civil relations of the slaves. In the
mean time, it is a feature of sufficient motoriety to be
assumed in this chapter, having been, at one time, enacted
in the free State of Ohio, and also incorporated into
the ecclesiastical polity of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
as administered in those States where it obtains as civil
law.
In the presence of such a regulation, very clearly, there
can be no adequate protection of the slave under any laws
framed for his benefit, however well constructed in other
respects. Nevertheless, we will examine them, and notice
their spirit, and the kind and degree of protection they
appear to contemplate.
SOUTH CAROLINA (Act of 1740)-‘‘In case any person
shall wilfully cut out the tongue, put out the eye, castrate,
or cruelly scald, burn, or deprive any slave of any limb or
member, or shall inflict any other cruel punishment,
other than by whipping or beating with a horse whip,
cowskim, switch, or small stick, or by putting irons Om, or
confining or imprisoning such slave, every such person
shall, for every such offence, forfeit the sum of one hum-
dred pounds, current money.” (2 Brevard's Digest, 241.)
. This law, it is believed, is still on the statute-book.
We have said, it could hardly be supposed that any Legis-
lature, in a civilised country, would, by express statute,
authorise the master to commit cruel outrages upon the
persons of his slaves. But this is done in the statute just
PUNISHMENT BY MASTERS. I45
quoted. The expression “other than,” in its connexion,
does expressly authorise “cruel punishment.” And it
authorises “cruel punishment” in a number of forms
specified, viz.: “ by whipping or beating with a horse-
whip, cowskin, switch, or Small stick, or by putting irons
on, or confining or imprisoning.” “Cruel punishment,”
if inflicted in either of these ways, is expressly excepted
from the “cruel punishments” forbidden. And, on inspec-
tion, it will be found that the methods of “cruel punish-
ment” forbidden are such, and such only, as diminish the
pecuniary value of the slave. The “legal relation” which
contemplates the slave only as a chattel, was evidently the
presiding genius of this enactment.
The specific prohibitions assure us that certain “per-
sons” (whether owners, overseers, or others) had com-
mitted outrages of that character, or such particular speci-
fications would not have been thought of Such wanton
destruction of “property” was not to be suffered. The
heavy pecuniary fine would afford some security to slave-
“owners” against 'passionate “overseers” and others. The
defencelessness of the slave, and the brutality of those
around him, are frightfully depicted in this statute, the
like of which was never needed for the security of domestic
beasts. Yet no compensation or damages are awarded to
the sufferers. The “owner” might be the aggressor, but
the slave was not allowed “to go free for his eye's sake,”
like the Hebrew servant whose master had thus injured
him. (Exodus xxi. 26, 27.) The “cruelty” authorised
is a sufficient proof that the Legislature had little or no
L
146 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
regard to the suffering or pain endured by the slave, pro-
vided the article of “property” were not essentially
damaged.
LOUISIANA-The slave is entirely subject to the will of
his master, who may correct and chastise him, though
not with unusual rigour, nor so as to maim or mutilate
him, or to expose him to the danger of loss of life, or so
as to cause his death.” (Civil Code of Louisiana, art.
173.)
Here, again, the protection of slave-property, rather
than the prevention of suffering by the slave, appears to
be the leading object in view. The slave may not be
maimed, he may not be mutilated, he may not be killed.
Beyond this, there is nothing in the way of prohibition
that is tangible or definite. Permission to the master is
far more distinct and prominent. The “master may
chastise,” and he may chastise “with rigour” (severity;
without abatement, relaxation or mitigation—vide
Webster), but “not with unusual rigour.” There is
something in this singular phraseology that requires study.
Such a law, instead of correcting prevailing usages,
receives its definition from them. That which is “usual”
is authorised, whatever it may be, short of maiming,
mutilation, and murder. And the more rigorous, severe,
and cruel may be the prevailing usages of a community,
the more rigorous, severe, and cruel they are expressly
authorised to be. The individual is referred, as a standard
of lawful action, to the common practices of his neighbours
around him. What is “usual” among them is lawful for
PUNISHMENT BY MASTERS. 147
him. If it is “usual” to “chastise” a slave by inflicting on
him a hundred lashes, it is lawful to do so. If it is usual
to add five hundred lashes more, it is equally lawful In
short, the current usages of the fratermity of slaveholders
(with the exceptions specified) are proclaimed by the
Civil Code of Louisiana to constitute the law. This
approximates closely to the abrogation of law, so far as
slaveholders are concerned, or the abdication of supre-
macy by the civil government in their favour. The
condition of this great nation of twenty millions of
people, controlled by a little more than one hundred
thousand slaveholders, seems but an expansion of this
idea.
“ Unusual rigour” must be defined in the light of what
is usual. And we may learn something of what was then
considered usual rigour in Louisiana, by the fact that the
provisions of the law of South Carolina, before cited, with
exception of its prohibition of mutilation, had been sub-
stantially in force there, up to the time this new Civil
Code was adopted. We may infer, therefore, that “cruel
punishment” by “whipping or beating with a horsewhip,
cowskin, Switch, or small stick, or by putting irons on or
confining or imprisoning,” was not “unusual,” and con-
sequently not forbidden, by the new Civil Code.
In 1819, the Legislature of Louisiana recognised the
lawfulness of putting iron chains and collars upon slaves,
to prevent them from running away, as follows.
“If any person or persons, &c., shall cut or break any
iron collar which any master of slaves shall have used in
148 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
order to prevent the running away or escape of any such
slave or slaves, such persons so offending shall, on convic-
tion, be fined not less than two hundred dollars, nor
exceeding one thousand dollars; and suffer imprisonment
for a term not exceeding two years, nor less than six
months.” (Act of Assembly of March 6, 1819. Pam-
phlet, p. 64.)
Compare this penalty with that imposed by the Legis-
lature of the same State for cruelties committed on slaves
viz., “not more than five hundred dollars, nor less than
two hundred” (1 Martin's Digest, 654), and it will appear
that the releasing of a slave from the “usual” punishment
of the “iron chain or collar” is regarded a more aggra-
vated crime than inflicting upon him the “unusual
punishment,” whatever it may be, prohibited by law
For the act of mercy, the offender may be fined 1000
dollars and imprisoned two years; for the act of atrocious
cruelty, he may be fined 500 dollars, but without imprison-
ment. Thus it is that the Legislature of Louisiana dis-
countenances cruelty.
MISSISSIPPI.-The Constitution empowers the Legisla-
ture to make laws to oblige the owners of slaves to treat
them with humanity—to abstain from all injuries to them
extending to life and limb, and in case of their refusal or
neglect to comply with the direction of such laws, to have
such slave or slaves sold, for the benefit of the owner or
owners. (Const. Mississippi, title Slaves, sect. 1; Rev.
Code, 554.)
The Legislature, so far as appears, have taken no action
PUNISHAIENT BY MASTERS. 149
under the powers granted in this last clause for the sale
of maltreated slaves.< Under the former clause the
action of the Legislature is as follows.
“No cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted on
any slave in this State. And any master or other person
entitled to the service of any slave, who shall inflict such
cruel or unusual punishment, or shall authorise or permit
the same to be inflicted, shall, on conviction, &c., be fined
according to the magnitude of the offence, at the discretion
of the Court, in any sum not exceeding five hundred
dollars, &c.” (Rev. Code, 379 ; Act of June 18, 1822.)
Here, again, no satisfaction or remumeration is awarded
to the slave, for “a slave is not capable of being injured ;"
he is a “chattel”—a “thing”—not a person. And it is
only an “unusual” punishment that is forbidden . The
masters and overseers have only to repeat their excessive
punishments so frequently that they become “usual,” and
the statute does not apply to them | In this view, it
holds out an inducement to render the most cruel inflic-
tions usual. Besides all this, the slave can bring no suit.
* No such provision appears to exist in any of the States, except,
perhaps, in Louisiana; and this constitutes another harsh feature of
modern American slavery, as contrasted with the ancient. Nothing can
be more manifest than that no laws against the cruelty of masters and
oversecrs can be of much benefit to the slave, if he is still to remain in
the hands of a master whose tyranny had already demanded legal inter-
fercnce, and who would, in most cases, be exasperated against the slave
on whose behalf the interference had been made. Judge Ruffin, if we
rightly understand him, in the case of “the States v. Mann,” adduces
this as a reason why the master must not be indictable for a battery on
his slave. It would only prompt him to “bloody vengeance, generally
practised with impunity, by reason of its privacy.” (Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, p. 247.)
150 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
He can enter no complaint. He can bear no testimony.
No other slave or free coloured person can bear testimony
against a white person; and the law is administered by
slaveholders. It is incredible that owners and overseers
should be much restrained by the provisions of this act.
ALABAMA-Has a statute similar to that of Mississippi,
except that the fine imposed is only one hundred dollars,
instead of five hundred. (Toulman's Digest, 631.)
MISSOURL–The Constitution not only empowers the
Legislature “to oblige the owners of slaves to treat them
with humanity, and to abstain from all injuries to them
extending to life or limb” (art. 3, sect. 26, last clause,
1 Missouri Laws, 48), but it is also made its duty to
pass such laws as may be mecessary for this purpose.
Here, as before, the “life and limb”—the pecuniary
value of the “property”—appears the prominent idea.
Owners of property may not wantonly destroy it, to the
public detriment, at the risk of their families and creditors.
Owners of this refractory species of property, being
“nursed and daily exercised in tyranny,” are under special
temptations. “To treat them (the slaves) with humanity,”
is an indefinite expression. Rightly construed, it would
restore to them the right of testimony—the rights of
human beings. But this was not the design, nor is it the
practical construction of the instrument. So far as is
known (or previously to 1827, the latest dates in our pos-
session), “no law has been enacted on the authority of
this article in the Constitution.” (Wide Stroud's Sketch,
p. 43.)
PUNISHMENT BY MASTERS. 151
The following, however, is found on the statute-book.
“If any slave resist his or her master, mistress, over-
seer, or employer, or refuse to obey his or her lawful
commands, it shall be lawful for such master, &c., to com-
mit such slave to the common jail of the county, there to
remain at the pleasure of the master, &c.; and the sheriff
shall receive such slave and keep him, &c., in confinement,
at the expense of the person committing him or her."
(1 Missouri Laws, 309.)
“Lawful commands.” But what if the commands are
not lawful ? And who is to decide, and by what testi-
mony The slave can bear mo testimony—can enter no
complaint—can set up no plea in arrest of proceedings.
The “innocent legal relation,” being a mere relation of
owner and property, would not permit this. A legal
process between owner and chattel would be an absurdity,
and the statute, accordingly, prescribes nome. The master
simply “commits” his slave to the “sheriff,” and it is the
business of that public functionary to “receive” him. The
insertion of the word “lawful” was a mere farce. It
might be the “command” of the “owner” to a slave wife
or virgin to submit to his embraces. Worse punishments
than imprisonment are known to be in use in such cases,
and are believed to be not “unusual.” This law has its
counterpart or emendation in the municipal regulations of
slave-cities, where house-servants (in the absence of any
plantation overseer) are summarily sent to a public officer
to be whipped a specified number of lashes, without any
mention of the offence,
152 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
So far from any limitation of the “owner's" authority
and power, we here find it enlarged. The public arm,
instead of protecting the slave against the master, assists
the master in the exercise of his irresponsible despotism
over the slave.
And in doing this the slave-owner is invested with a
dignity not conferred on any other class of citizens. He
becomes eac officio, in virtue of his being a slaveholder, a
judicial functionary himself, with the powers of a court of
justice to award sentence, and order a public officer to
put it in execution—a court in which the prosecutor is
judge, and without even the forms of trial, or permitting
the adverse party a hearing, gives verdict and sentence in
his own case I
This feature of the Southern Slave Code was extended
over all the United States by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, in which it
was laid down that the slave-owner himself has authority
to arrest his alleged fugitive without a warrant from a
magistrate. The same principle is also contained in the
Fugitive Slave Bill, enacted by the Federal Congress in
1852.
From the acts of the Legislatures we now turn to the
decisions of the Courts, to learn the practical value of the
protection provided by the statutes for the slave.
The State v. Maner, 2 Hill's S. C. Rep., 453.
S. P. Hilton v. Caston, 2 Bay's Rep., 98.
White v. Chambers, 2 Bay's Rep., 70.
State v. Cheatwood, Hill's Rep., 459.
PUNISHMENT BY MASTERS. 153
“Per Cur., O’Neill J.-The criminal offence of assault
and battery cannot, at common law, be committed on the
person of a slave. For, notwithstanding for some pur-
poses a slave is regarded in law as a person, yet generally
he is a mere chattel personal, and his right of personal
protection belongs to his master, who can maintain an
action of trespass for the battery of his slave.
“There can, therefore, be no offence against the State for
a mere beating of a slave, unaccompanied by any circum-
stances of cruelty, or an attempt to kill and murder. The
peace of the State is not thereby broken, for a slave is
not generally regarded as legally capable of being within
the peace of the State. He is not a citizen, and is not, in
that character, entitled to her protection.” (Wheeler's
Law of Slavery, p. 243.)
It may be thought that this case is not in point, in
discussing, as we here do, the liabilities of masters for
maltreating their slaves, as this was not the case of a.
slave-master. Our argument is this : If the Courts decide
that white persons, not the owners of the slave thus
abused, cannot be punished for assault and battery, it is
very evident that the owners cannot be.
And this is distinctly laid down in the case that next
follows, where, although the defendant was only the hirer,
and not the owner, the Court laid down the rule of law
for an owner, and then applied it to the hirer, which
(with the preceding) covers the whole ground, and shows
that the slave has no legal remedy or protection in the
Criminal Code against assault and battery, from any
ſº
lö4 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE, l
person whatever ! The right of the master to maintain
an action against the assailant of his slave property for
pecuniary damages is altogether another question.
“The master is not liable to an indictment for a bat-
tery committed upon his slave.” (Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, p. 244.)
This statement is the reporter's (or Mr. Wheeler's)
marginal title to the case of “The State v. Mamm, Dec. 7,
1829. 2 Devereaux's North Carolina Rep., 263.”
“The defendant was indicted for an assault and battery
upon Lydia, the servant of one Elizabeth Jones. On the
trial it appeared that the defendant had hired the slave
for a year; that during the term the slave had committed
some Small offence, for which the defendant undertook to
chastise her ; that while in the act of so doing, the slave
ran off, whereupon the defendant called upon her to stop,
which being refused, he shot at and wounded her. The
judge in the court below charged the jury that if they
believed the punishment inflicted by the defendant was
cruel and unwarrantable, and disproportionate to the
offence committed by the slave, that in law the defendant
was guilty, as he had only a special property in the slave.
A verdict was returned for the State, and the defendant
appealed.
“Per Cur., Ruffin J.-A judge cannot but lament,
when such cases as the present are brought into judg-
ment. It is impossible that the reasons on which they
go can be appreciated but where institutions similar to
our own exist, and are thoroughly understood. The
PUNISHMIENT BY MASTERS. 155
struggle, too, in the judge's own breast between the
feelings of the man and the duty of the magistrate, is a
severe one, presenting strong temptation to put aside
such questions, if it be possible. It is useless, however,
to complain of things in our political state ; and it is
criminal in a court to avoid any responsibility which the
laws impose. With whatever reluctance, therefore, it is
dome, the court is compelled to express an opinion upon
the extent of the dominion of the master over the slave
in North Carolina.” “The inquiry here is, whether a
cruel and unreasonable battery upon a slave, by the hirer,
is indictable. The judge below instructed the jury that
it is. He seems to have put it upon the ground that the
defendant had but a special property. Our laws uniformly
treat the master or other person having the possession
and command of the slave as entitled to the same extent
of authority. The object is the same—the service of the
slave ; and the same powers must be confided. In a
criminal proceeding, and, indeed, in reference to all other
persons but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of
the slave, in relation to both rights and duties, is, for the
time being, the owner. This opinion would, perhaps, dis-
pose of this particular case, because the indictment
which charges a battery upon the slave of Elizabeth
Jones is mot supported by proof of a battery upon defen-
dant's own slave ; since different justifications may be
applicable to the two cases. But upon the general ques-
tion whether the owner is answerable, criminaliter, for a
battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority
I 56 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
or force, not forbidden by statute, the court entertains
but little doubt. That he is so liable has never been
decided, mor, as far as is known, been hitherto con-
tended. THERE HAs [have] BEEN NO PROSECUTIONS OF
THE SORT.* THE ESTABLISHED AND UNIFORM PRACTICE
OF THE COUNTRY in this respect is the best evidence of
the portion of power DEEMED BY THE WHOLE COMMUNITY
REQUISITE TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE MASTER’s DOMI-
NION. If we thought differently, we could not set our
notions in array against the judgment of everybody else,
and say that this or that authority may be safely lopped
off. This has, indeed, been assimilated, at the bar, to
the other domestic relation,” &c. &c.
Having answered this plea by showing the contrast
between such domestic relations and those between mas-
ter and slave, and the consequent degradation of “the
subject,” his Honour proceeds.
“What moral considerations shall be addressed to such
a being, to convince him, what it is impossible but that
the most stupid must feel and know can never be true,
that he is thus to labour upon a principle of matural duty,
*This testimony tells us how much those statutes are worth that pre-
tend to limit the amount of punishment that an owner may inflict on his
slave. It may, indeed, be said that although a master is not indictable in
general terms for an assault and battery, yet he may be indicted for viola-
tions of specific provisions of a statute. But if this be so, why was not
the defendant, in this case, indicted for the shooting of Lydia, if there
2xisted any statute forbidding such an outrage P And if not, where is the
protection f
# The answer of Judge Ruſtin to this plea we have already copied, in
our definition of Slavery in Chapter T., and need not repeat it here.
Plj NISHMIENT BY MASTERS. 157
or for the sake of his own personal happiness? Such
services can only be expected from one who has no will
of his own; who surrenders his will in implicit obedience
to that of another. Such obedience is the consequence
only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is
nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The
power of the master must be absolute, to render the sub-
mission of the slave perfect. I most freely confess my
sense of the harshness of the proposition. I feel it as
deeply as any man cam. And, as a principle of moral
right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it.
But in the actual condition of things it must be so.
There is no remedy. This discipline belongs to the state
of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without abroga-
ting at once the rights of the master, and absolving the
slave from his subjection. It constitutes the curse of
slavery to both the bond and the free portions of our
bopulation. BUT IT IS INHERENT IN THE REL ATION
OF MASTER AND SLAVE. That there may be particular
instances of cruelty and deliberate barbarity where in
conscience the law might properly interfere, is most pro-
bable.
“The difficulty is to determine where a court may
broperly begin, Merely in the abstract, it may well be
asked, which power of the master accords with right 2
The answer will probably sweep away all of them. But
we cannot look at the matter in that light. The truth
is, that we are forbidden to enter upon a train of general
reasoning on the subject. We cannot allow the right of
158 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
the master to be brought into discussion in the courts of
justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sen-
sible that there is no appeal from his master; that his
power is in no instance usurped, but is conferred by the
laws of man at least, if not by the law of God. The
danger would be great indeed, if the tribunals of justice
should be called on to graduate the punishment appro-
priate to every temper and every dereliction of menial
duty. No man can anticipate the many and aggravated
provocations of the master, which the slave would be con-
stantly stimulated, by his own passions or the instigations
of others, to give ; or the consequent wrath of the master
prompting him to bloody vengeance upon the turbulent
traitor—a vengeance generally practised with impwrity, by
areason of its privacy. The court, therefore, disclaims the
power of changing the relation in which these parts of our
people stand to each other.” “I repeat that I would
gladly have avoided this ungrateful question ; but being
brought to it, the court is compelled to declare that
while slavery exists among us in its present state, or until
it shall seem fit to the Legislature to interpose express
enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty
of the judges to recognise the full dominion of the owner
over the slave, except where the exercise of it is forbidden
by the statute. And this we do on the ground, that
this dominion is essential to the value of slaves as pro-
perty, to the security of the master, and the public tran-
quillity, greatly dependent upon their subordination ;
and, in fine, as most effectually securing the general pro-
p
PUNISHMENT BY MASTERS. 159
tection and comfort of the slaves themselves. Judgment
below reversed, and judgment entered for the defendant.”
(Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 244-8.)
Here is a document that will repay profound study.
The moral wrong of slavery is distinctly and repeatedly
admitted, along with the most resolute determination to
support it, by not allowing the rights of the master to
come under judicial investigation, betraying a conscious-
mess that they would not abide the test of the first prin-
ciples of legal science. The struggle between the man
and the magistrate, implying that slavery requires of its
magistrates to trample upon their own manhood—the
cool and deliberate decision to do this, and to elevate the
law of slavery above the law of mature and of nature's God,
are painful but instructive features of the exhibition.
And so is the incidental testimony to the frequency of
bloody outrages, “generally practised with impunity, by
reason of their privacy.”
But, in this chapter, we are chiefly concerned with this
judicial decision that “a cruel and unreasonable battery on
a slave by a hirer is not indictable,” because such battery
by an owner would not be ; the testimony that the oppo-
site doctrine has never been held by the courts; “that
he [the master] is so liable has never been decided, nor, so
far as known, contended for ;” that “there has been no
prosecutions of the sort ;” that the established habits and
uniform practice of the country prove that the whole com-
munity deem this power of the master “requisite to the
preservation of his dominion ;” and that this must be so,
160 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
while the slave-system continues. The arguments of
Judge Ruffin, in proof of this, we deem impregnable.
And it deserves notice that this decision, made in 1829,
before there was any excitement raised on the slave-ques-
tion, was virtually endorsed, in the midst of the anti-
slavery agitation, in 1837, by Judge Hitchcock of
Alabama (through his recommendation of the volume for
the use of the “Southern bar”), as containing the true
Southerm doctrine.
All this should be borne in mind in the discussions of
the next chapter. In order to understand, correctly and
fully, any one phase or feature of the slave-system, it must
be studied in its natural and necessary connexion with the
other features of the system most nearly related to it, and,
indeed, with all its features; for they are all mutually
dependent upon and defined by each other.
16]
CHAPTER, XIV.
OF LAWS CONCERNING THE MURDER AND KILLING OF
SLAVES.
The Structure of the Laws, and the Condition of the Slaves, render
adequate Protection impossible.
WE come now to consider the laws purporting to restrain
and punish the murderers of slaves.
The revelations of the last chapter establish clearly the
principle and the fact that the authority of the master
is unlimited, and that he is not indictable, and never has
been indicted and punished, for the “cruel and unreason-
able battery of his slave.” It seems difficult to conceive
how, in such a condition of the statute-book, the judiciary,
and the community, there could be any effectual restraints
upon the murderers of slaves, or how they could be con-
victed and punished, at least where the offenders were
owners or hirers of the slaves they had murdered. If a
man is not protected from cruel and unreasonable battery
at the pleasure of his assailant, how can he be protected
from the liability to be killed by such battery 7 And if
the law permits the optional battery of a man, what power
can it retain to punish him for the natural effects of such
battery Will the law allow one man to beat another as
M
162 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
much as he pleases, or shoot him (as in the case last
cited), and then punish him because the man is thus
killed ,
In former times, the murder of a slave in most, if not
all the slaveholding regions of this country, was, by law,
punishable by a pecuniary fine only. At present, the wilful,
malicious, and deliberate murder of a slave, by whomsoever
perpetrated, is declared to be punishable with death, in
every State. (See Stroud's Sketch, p. 36.) The exclusion
of all testimony of coloured persons, bond or free, is a feature
sufficient of itself to render these laws nugatory. The
“owner” or “overseer” may command the slave to attend
him to any secret spot, and there murder him with im-
punity. Or he may do it openly (it has often been done),
in the sight of many coloured persons, with equal impu-
mity. But let us examine some of these laws.
SouTH CAROLINA, 1740–The Act, in its preamble,
sets forth that “cruelty is not only highly unbecoming
those who profess themselves Christians, but is odious in
the sight of all men who have any sense of virtue or
humanity.” [Therefore :] “To restrain and prevent bar-
barity being exercised towards slaves, Beit enacted, that iſ
any person shall wilfully murder his own slave, or the slaves
of any other person, every such person [i. e., the offender
shall, upon conviction thereof, forfeit and pay the sum of
seven hundred pounds, current momey, and shall be rendered
for ever incapable of holding, exercising, &c., any office,
&c. And in case any such person shall not be able to
pay the penalty and forfeiture hereby inflicted and im-
MURDER OF SLAVES. } 63
posed, every such person shall be sent to any of the from-
tier garrisons of the province, or committed to the work-
house in Charleston for the space of seven years, &c. &c.,
at hard labour.” (2 Brevard’s Digest, 241.)
Another provision of the same Act is as follows: “If
any person shall, on a sudden heat or passion, OR by undue
correction, kill his own slave, or the slave of any other
person, he shall forfeit the sum of three hundred and fifty
pounds, current money.” (Ib., 241.)
For this latter offence there seems to have been no
incapacity to hold office.
The greater part of cases, especially in the absence of
coloured testimony, would come under this latter provi-
sion. To shoot down a slave deliberately would incur the
heavier fine, and the civil disability. To beat out his
brains with a club, or whip him to death, would cost
fºã0; that is, if any free white person should witness the
act, and see fit to institute proceedings.
This Act continued in ſorce till 1821, when the wilful
murder of a slave was made pumishable by death, with-
out benefit of clergy ; while the penalty for killing in
“Sudden heat,” or “undue correction,” was reduced to five
hundred dollars, but authorising an imprisonment for six
months. This latter sum, therefore, in South Carolina,
may be considered the price at which a slave-owner is
licensed to kill a slave, in the prescribed manner, as
above ; with some hazard, perhaps, of six months' confine-
memt-both contingent upon the testimony of a free white
person
164 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
NoRTH CAROLINA.—Act of 1798, section 3 : “Whereas,
by Act of another Assembly, passed in the year 1774, the
killing of a slave, however wanton, cruel, and deliberate,
is only punishable, in the first instance, by imprisonment,
and paying the value thereof to the owner, which distinc-
tion of criminality between the murder of a white person
and one who is equally a human creature, but merely of
a different complexion, is disgraceful to humanity, and
degrading in the highest degree to the laws and principles
of a free, Christian, and enlightened country ; Be it
enacted, &c., that if any person hereafter be guilty of
maliciously killing a slave, such offender shall, on the first
conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of murder, and shall
suffer the same punishment as if he had killed a free man :
Provided always, this Act shall not extend to any person
killing a slave outlawed by virtue of any Act of Assembly
of this State, or to any slave in the act of resistance to
his lawful owner or master, or to any slave dying wnder
onoderate correction ſ” (Hayward's Manual, 530.)
What a contrast between the preamble and the details
of the Act | Disgraceful to make a distinction between
white and coloured persons, yet still keeping up the dis-
graceful distinction. The “wilful and malicious murder”
of the slave to be punished, “provided” said “wilful and
malicious murder” be not thus and thus committed, &c.;
implying impunity to other forms of such murder.
Notice the exceptions provided against.
1. “Wilful and malicious killing a slave” is to be
punished, “provided" it be not the “killing of a slave
outlawed,” &c.
\{URDER OF SILAVES. I65
The meaning of this appears in the fact, that a procla-
mation of outlawry against a slave is authorised by
statute, whenever he runs away from his master, conceals
himself in some obscure retreat, and, to sustain life, “kills
a hog, or some animal of the cattle kind.” (See Hay-
ward's Manual, 521. Act of 1741, ch. 24, sect. 45.
Stroud, p. 38.)
2. Another exception is the case of “any slave in the
act of resistance to his lawful owner or master.” The
courts have determined that this proviso renders it lawful
to kill a slave “resisting or offering to resist his master by
force.” (2 Hayward's Reports, p. 54.)
No matter what the occasion or the necessity of resist-
ance may be—whether to ward off murderous attacks, or
(in the case of females) outrages worse than murder—the
first motion or preparation for self-defence is the signal
for lawful slaughter, on the spot, according to statute |
This is an Act ostensibly for the slave's protection.
Bearing in mind that the master's account% of the matter
(in the absence of white witnesses) cannot be questioned
in court, we have the doctrine of Judge Ruffin and of
Prince's Digest sustained. “The slave must be taught
that there is no appeal from his master.” “IHis life must
be in his master's keeping.”
3. The third exception is the case of a slave dying under
* At Alexandria (D. C.), in 1823, a slave-owner chased his female
slave, whip in hand, in open daylight, before multitudes, to the end of a
wharf, where she jumped in and was drowned. Verdict of the coroner's
inquest: “Death by suicide, to escape descrved punishment;” the term
“deserved” being inserted by testimony of the “owner,” without even a
statement of the offence.
166 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
moderate correction | | This gives us a legislative defini-
tion of “moderate correction.” It is such as may be
apprehended or supposed to endanger and even take away
the life of the slave. In the light of this, we may under-
stand also the prohibition of “unusual punishment.” It
does not always reach the case of those who die under the
lash, for even this may be “moderate correction,” and con-
sequently not “unusual.”
The sum of the matter is, then, this : In North Caro-
lina, the “wilful and malicious killing of a slave,” if
proved by white witnesses, is to be punished by death,
“provided” the said slave, being “in pursuit of" “liberty
and happiness,” does not hold his “right to life " more
sacred than the life of “a hog, or some animal of the cattle
kind ſ” Provided also, that, in self-defence, she or he
never offers to lift a finger to avert rape or murder ; and
provided, finally, that he is not killed “under moderate
correction "
TENNESSEE-Act of October 23, 1799; similar to the
Act of North Carolina, and with a like proviso. (Laws of
Tennessee.)
The outlawry of slaves is a very common occurrence in
the Slave States.
GEORGIA.—Constitution, art. 4, Sect. 12: “Any person
who shall maliciously dismember or deprive a slave of life,
shall suffer such punishment as would be inflicted in case
the like offence had been committed upon a free white
person, and on like proof: except in case of insurrection
* It must not be inferred that this provision restores the testimony of
coloured witnesses. It only reminds us that such witnesses cannot be
MURDER OF SLAVES. 167
of said slave, and unless such death should happen by acci-
dent, in giving such slave moderate correction.” (Prince's
Digest, 559.)
One question presents itself in a review of such enact-
ments. What definite objects were intended to be reached
by them 7 A decent respect for the intellects and the
common sense of Southern legislators forbids the suppo-
sition that they could have been seriously intended for
the protection of the slave. The uniform exclusion of
coloured witnesses is conclusive of this. When, in a dis-
tinct chapter, we shall consider that feature of the Slave
Code, this conclusion will, perhaps, be more deeply im-
pressed. The preambles quoted from the Acts of North
and South Carolina betray a consciousness that the sterner
features of the Slave Code are “ odious,” “disgraceful,”
and “degrading” to a “free, Christian, and enlightened
country.” Philanthropic men at the South, more or less
distinctly dissatisfied with the Slave Code, might be also
appeased by some apparent relaxations. Attempts by
some members of the Legislatures to introduce reforms
would be likely to be marred and rendered abortive by
incongruous provisos, engrafted by the majority upon
bills proposed by them. In these ways we may readily
account for the absurd and confused legislation recorded
in this and the preceding chapters.
We turn next to the reported cases in Wheeler’s “Law
of Slavery,” for any additional light on the subject of this
summoned to attest the murder of one white person by another, thus
weakening the arm of civil protection in general, throughout the entire
South.
168 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
chapter, and of the preceding one. One division of his
book, numbered XTV., on page 200, is headed thus:
“Masters' and others' liabilities for maltreating their slaves.”
If any materials are to be found “in all the decisions
made on that subject (of slavery) in the several courts of
the United States and State courts,” # of which Mr.
Wheeler's work is “a compilation,” which could show that
adequate legal protection against outrage and murder is
extended to the slave, we have certainly a right to look
for it under this appropriate head. Especially might it
be reasonably expected, after such a note by the author
or compiler as the following, which is appended to the
title of this same division or chapter, at the foot of page
200, viz.:
“It is stated ill Stroud’s ‘Sketch of the Laws relating
to Slavery, p. 35, ‘that the master may, at his pleasure,
inflict any species of punishment upon the person of his
slave.’ This proposition, so repugnant to humanity, is
equally opposed to the fact, and also to the law. In
those States where there are no enactments upon the sub-
ject, the common law would be efficient to protect the
slave. Our books are full of criminal prosecutions for
cruelty to horses and other animals. And the common
law remedy is considered effective, without any statutory
enactment. And if the slave be considered an animal,
still he is under the protection of the law, and acts of
inhumanity and cruelty to him is a public misdemeanour,
and the person guilty may be indicted and punished.”
* See title-page of “Wheeler's Law of Slavery.”
MURDER OF SLAVES. 169
On this note of Mr. Wheeler we remark :
1. It is undoubtedly true that the common law, if
applied to the slave, would amply protect him from outrage
and murder. It would also protect him in his right to
his earnings and to the disposal of the products of his
industry, to exemption from seizure and sale : in a word,
the common law, if applied to the slave, would emanci-
pate him ; for everybody knows, and the Louisiana and
Rentucky courts have decided, that the slave becomes
free the moment he comes under the jurisdiction of com-
mon law, by being carried by consent of his master out of
the jurisdiction of the municipal law, which alone binds him.
There is no such municipal law against “horses and other
animals,” removing them from the protection of the com-
mon law. Mr. Wheeler does not appeal to the municipal
law, as existing either in statutes or in the judicial deci-
sions with which he is so conversant, to prove that the
slave enjoys effective protection. It is this municipal
law, and not the common law, that defit. Gs the condition
of the slave.
2. Judge Stroud had explained and vindicated his
statement by the following explanation, of which Mr.
Wheeler takes no notice.
“From the laws which I shall now cite, it will fully
appear that, so far as regards the pages of the statute-book,
the life, at least, of the slave is safe from the authorised
violence of the master. The evil is not that laws are
wanting, but that they cannot be enforced ; not that
they sanction crime, but that they do not punish it. Amd
170 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
this arises chiefly, if not solely, from the cause that has
been more than once mentioned—the exclusion of the
testimony, on the trial of a white person, of all who are
not white.”
If the reader will examine the laws against the murder
of slaves which we have already quoted, he will probably
agree with us that Judge Stroud has conceded quite
enough in their favour.
3. On a candid review of all the slave-laws we shall
have collected in this book, with the judicial decisions
we shall have quoted from Wheeler’s “Law of Slavery,”
let the reader judge what benefit the slave derives from
the existence either of common law, or of statutes, or of
decisions of courts.
4. “Our books,” says Mr. Wheeler, “are full of criminal
prosecutions for cruelty to horses and other animals!”
This is undoubtedly true. But this is not pertinent to
the question at issue. Mr. Wheeler, in order to have met
the statement of Judge Stroud, should have been able to
Say, “Our books abound in criminal prosecutions for
cruelty to slaves.” But this he has not said.
5. And this brings as back to the observation before
made, that if the courts have extended to the slave effec-
tive protection against outrages and murders, especially by
their owners, we have a right to expect the reported cases
and instances, in this division of Wheeler's “compilation
of all the decisions,” &c. &c., which is headed, “Masters'
&nd others' liabilities for maltreating their slaves.”
Let us, then, see what this division of the work con-
MURDER OF SLAVES, 171
tains, and notice whether it “is full of criminal prosecu-
tions for cruelty to” slaves, and notice, too, the amount
of protection thus afforded to them.
The reported cases under this head occupy less that five
pages, and are only seven in number. Two only of these
were “criminal prosecutions” in the name of “the State.”
The remaining five are suits at law between one white
citizen and another, respecting the peculiar kind of
property.
1. “Markham v. Close, Sept., 1831. 2. Louisiana Rep.,
581–Bield by the court, Porter, J., that the infliction
of cruel punishment on a slave by his master is a criminal
offence, and must be punished by a criminal prosecution,
and not before a civil tribunal. And, after conviction, the
fine is to be levied on the offender by the court before
whom the conviction takes place.” (Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, p. 200.)
The decision seems at variance with that of Judge Ruffin
before quoted, but the real object and the effects of the
decision do not clearly appear. If, as seems implied, the
defendant was the owner of the slave he abused, the right
of the plaintiff to bring a suit against him is not apparent.
And the decision would seem to have dismissed, the pro-
ceedings on the ground that there was mo foundation for
a private litigation. Whether any “criminal prosecu-
tion” was ever brought against the offender we do not
learn. Very probably the effect of the decision was to
quash the proceedings and hush up the matter entirely,
while the marginal title reads, “Master may be convicted
j 72 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
and fined for maltreating his slave.” We get no evidence
that he was thus convicted and fined.
2. “Allan v. Young, Jan. T., 1821. 9 Martin's Lou-
isiana Rep., 221,–Matthews, J. : This is a case in
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages to the value
of a slave, alleged to have been killed by the defendant.”
The decision is thus stated in the margin : “If a slave of
a bad character is pursued on suspicion of felony, attempt
to seize a gun, flies and is killed in the pursuit, the
Supreme Court will not disturb a verdict for the defendant
who killed him.”
Of what felony the slave was “suspected,” or in what
respects he sustained “a bad character,” we are not in-
formed. He may have ventured to take a tithe of his
own earnings—he may have harboured a fugitive slave—
he may have attempted to escape, himself, into freedom—
he may have been in the habit of absenting himself to
visit his wife—he may have attempted to teach or to
learn the alphabet. Or he may have been “suspected”
of some of these crimes |
3. “Jennings v. Furderburg, Jan. T., 1827. 4
McCord's S. C. Rep., 161.—Trespass for killing the
plaintiff's slave. The defendant, with others, being
in search of runaway negroes, surprised them in their
camp, and fired his gun towards them as they were run-
ning away, to induce them to stop. One of the negroes
was, however, killed by a random shot. Decision : ‘The
firing of the defendant, in the manner stated, was rash
and incautious.’ Hence the rule, as in the margin : “To
MURDER OF SLAVES. | 73
excuse a trespass for killing a slave, on the ground of
accident, it must appear to have been done without the
least fault on the part of the person killing.’” (Ib.,
p. 201.)
4. “Richardson v. Dukes, Jan. T., 1827. 4 McCord's
S. C. Rep., 156.—Trespass for killing the plaintiff's slave.
It appeared that the slave was stealing potatoes from a
bank near the defendant's house. The defendant fired on
him with a gun loaded with buck-shot, and killed him.
The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for one dollar.
Motion for a new trial, which was granted. The point
of law established, as stated in the margin, was this :
The proper rule of damages for killing a slave, is the
value of the slave to the master at the time of his death.”
(Ib., p. 202.)
5. “Westell v. Earnest and Parker, Jan. T., 1818.
1 Nott and McCord's S. C. Rep., 182.”—This was another
suit for damages in killing a runaway slave by shooting
him, as he ran towards a swamp. Verdict for the defen-
dants. Motion to set it aside, which motion prevailed.
Judge Colcock said—“If the slave assaults a white person,
he may be killed ; but a slave merely flying away cannot
be killed :” to which it is added in the margin, “and if he
be, the owner may recover compensation for the loss.”
(Wheeler, 202-3.)
6. “The State v. E. Smith and R. Smith, Nov. T.,
1817. I Nott and McCord's S. C. Rep., 13.−The defend-
ants were convicted of killing a negro, under the Act of
1740.” “Sentence was pronounced by the judge upon
174 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
the defendants, that they pay three hundred and fifty
pounds, old currency.” They paid the sum and took the
clerk's receipt. Afterwards the sentence was amended by
fining each of the defendants £350. On an appeal, before
Judge Colcock, the emendation was sustained. (Wheeler,
p. 203.)
7. “The State v. Raines, May T., 1826. 3 McCord's
S. C. Rep., 533.-The prisoner was indicted for murder.”
“Verdict, guilty of manslaughter, and motion in arrest of
judgment.” The motion prevailed, on the ground that
the charges in the indictment were not sufficiently specific.
(Ib., pp. 203-4.)
Whether the defect was intentional cannot be known,
but such arts are not uncommon when the guilty are to
be shielded.
The reader has now before him all the evidences of
protection to the slave, whether by “common law” or
otherwise, which Mr. Wheeler has presented under his
appropriate division, headed “Masters' and others' liabili-
ties for maltreating their slaves;” although, as he says,
“Our books are full of prosecutions for cruelty to horses
and other animals.”
Of the seven cases adduced, not one of them appears to
have resulted in the punishment, in any way, of a master
for maltreating his own slave. Except, perhaps, in the
first case, where no conviction was reached, it does not
appear that either of the defendants were the owners of
the slaves maltreated or killed. And four of the sevela
cases were clearly the prosecutions of slave-owners against
others for the destruction of their property
MURDER OF SLAVES. 175
In the division of the book headed, “Of the trial and
punishment of slaves,” there is a case (that of State v.
Reed, June Term, 1823, 2 Hawk's N. C. Rep., 454)
which, if it had appeared in the division of “Masters' and
others' liabilities,” would have seemed a case in point for
citation in this discussion. It is possible that it was
placed, by mistake, under the wrong head, though no-
thing conclusive appears to show that the prisoner was
not a slave. He was indicted for the murder of a slave;
was found guilty; and a motion for arrest of judgment,
because of the insufficiency of the indictment, was over-
ruled. (Wheeler, p. 210.)
Another case occurs in the division of the book headed,
“Liabilities of others to masters for abusing their slaves,”
which seems not to have been classified under the appro-
priate head. It is not a suit of the owner for damages,
but a criminal prosecution by the State for the “murder
of a slave,” under the Act of 1821, viz., State v. Cheat-
wood, 2 Hill's S. C. Reports. The defendant was com-
victed, and moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground
that the indictment did not charge the crime in the words
of the statute. The motion was overruled. The report
does not state whether the prisoner was a slave, a free
coloured man, or a white man. (Wheeler, p. 250.)
A similar instance appears in the case of State of
Mississippi v. Jones, June Term, 1820, Walker's Rep.,
83. “The question in this case,” said Judge Clarke,
“arising in arrest of judgment, transferred on doubts
from Adams Superior Court, is, whether, in this State,
imurder can be committed on a slave.” His Honour
176 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
proceeded to argue that it could, and decided accordingly.
The colour and condition of the prisoner does not appear
from the Report.
In the same division is found the case of the State v.
Hale, December Term, 1823, 2 Hawk's N. C. Rep., 582,
in which it was decided by Judge Taylor, as stated in
the marginal note of the reporter, that “a battery
committed on a slave, no justification or circumstances
attending it being shown, is an indictable offence.”
(Wheeler, pp. 239-40.) But this could not have been
intended to apply to the case of a slave-master abusing
his own slave, as the case stands under the heading
of “Liabilities of others to the master for abusing
his slave.” And in giving his opinion, Judge Taylor
said, “If such offences may be committed with impunity,
the public peace will not only be rendered extremely
insecure, but the value of slave-property must be much in-
paired, for the offenders” [previously described as a low
class of persons] “can seldom make any reparation in
damages.” “It cannot be disputed that a slave is ren-
dered less capable of performing his master's service,
when he finds himself exposed by the law to the violence
of every turbulent man in the community.”
We seem to have here a revelation of the existing
state of things in that community, which compelled the
courts, with the ready assent of the slaveholders, to make
use of the criminal code to protect slave-property And
this perhaps explains, further, why it is that we find, in
Wheeler’s “Law of Slavery,” under the head of “Liabilities
MURDER OF SLAVES. 177
of others to the master for abuse of his slave,” a number
of reports of criminal prosecutions, in the name of the
State, for battery and even for the murder of slaves |
What had seemed to us an inappropriate classification is
now, perhaps, explained. Irresponsible rowdies, “ of dis-
solute habits,” unable to pay “damages” to the “owner” of
the slaves whom they may maim and murder, must be
restrained and punished by the criminal code
“Hall, J. : I concur in the opinion given. I think it
would be highly improper that every assault and battery
On a slave should be considered an indictable offence,” &c.
“Much depends on the circumstances of the case, when it
happens,” &c.
Anomalies and self-contradictions may be expected in
slave jurisprudence, for slavery is an anomalous thing.
The chattel principle is, however, the key to its mysteries.
An “attempt to kill and murder” a slave is a blow at
slave-property. Even if an owner kills his slave, it
familiarises murder, and incites others to similar acts.
In the case of State v. Maner, it was decided that “an
assault with intent to murder a slave is indictable.”
(Wheeler, p. 244.)
“Commonwealth v. Carver, June T., 1827. 5 Rand's
Va. Reports, 600,—The prisoner was indicted for felo-
niously, maliciously, and unlawfully shooting, with intent
to maim, disfigure, disable, and kill a negro man slave, of
the name of Armistead, the property of Andrew Houtem,
under the Act of 9th of February, 1819. The judge
doubted whether a negro slave is the subject or person on
N
178 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
which the offence created and the penalties prescribed by
the Act can be committed or incurred, and adjourned the
case to the General Court.
“The court, Breckenbrough, J., after referring to
Dolly Chapple's case, 1 Virg. Cas, 184, declared that the
slave was a person on whom the offence of stabbing and
shooting might be committed ; and that the Act was
intended to protect slaves as well as free persons from
such outrages. It may further be remarked that there
appears no reason, arising from the relation of master and
slave, why a free person should not be punished as a felon
for maiming a slave. Whatever power our laws may give
to the master over his slave, it is as important for the inte-
Test of the former as for the protection of the latter that a
Stranger should not be permitted to exercise an unre-
strained authority over him. The opinion of the court
is, that judgment ought not to be arrested.” (Wheeler,
p. 254.)
The plain implication here is, that the power of the
master is as unrestrained as was represented and decided
by Judge Ruffin, as before cited.
And in this case, again, we see the Criminal law of
“the State” wielded as a mere implement for enforcing
“the liabilities of others to the master, for abusing his
slave,” to the injury of his “interests.”
In the case of Fields v. the State of Tennessee (Jan.
T., 1829, 1 Virger's Reports, 156), on writ of error to
arrest judgment against Said Fields, on a verdict against
him for manslaughter, it was decided that “the felonious
MURDER OF SLAVES. 179
slaying of a slave without malice is manslaughter.”
Judgment affirmed.
We close our examination of Wheeler’s “Law of Slavery”
on the topics involved in our present chapter, without
having been able to ascertain a single instance in which
a slave-owner has been convicted or even prosecuted for
the murder of his own slave; nor have we found an ex-
ception to the statement of Judge Ruffin, before cited,
that a “cruel and unreasonable battery on a slave” by
his owner, or hirer, is not an indictable offence, and that
“there have been no prosecutions of this sort.” Thus
far, therefore, the statement of Judge Stroud, that “the
master may, at his pleasure, inflict any species of punish-
ment on the person of his slave,” though contradicted by
Mr. Wheeler, stands unimpeached, so far as we can dis-
cover, by any cases he has recorded in his compilation of
IReports. Not even the case of Markham v. Close fur-
nishes any such instance, so far as appears from his
report of it.
If it be said that a motive of self-interest in the
master would prevent his inflicting outrages upon his
slave, we answer—l. That this restraint operates only
in those cases where the injury would destroy his pro-
perty in the slave, or impair his power to labour; it
would be no protection against the infliction of any
sufferings and indignities which fall short of this. 2.
Abundant evidence is at hand to prove that this motive
is not, in numerous instances, sufficient to restrain the
passions of the masters, and prevent the maiming and
180 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
killing of their own slaves, as will be shown in another
chapter. 3. Were it otherwise, the fact remains that
the law does not protect the slave against his master.
4. Anger and malice often act in opposition to self-
interest. How comes it that “our books are full of
criminal prosecutions for cruclty to horses and other
animals,” if the interest of the owner is itself a security
against his abuse of his own property The malignant
passions of the master are far more likely to be excited
against his slave, who by a word or a look may dispute
his authority, defy his power, or withhold the respect
he claims, than by a dumb animal, governed only by
natural instinct.
181
CHAPTER XV.
OF THE DELEGATED POWER OF OVERSEERS.
All the Power of the Owner over his Slavc is held and exercised also by
Overseers and Agents.
WE have, thus far, considered chiefly the power of the
slave-owner. It has been seen, likewise, that essentially
the same power is lodged in the hirer of a slave. Inci-
dentally, the power of overseers and agents has been
alluded to. But we must now take a more distinct
view of this feature of slavery. It has been expressed
thus:–
“All the power of the master over the slave may
be exercised, not by himself only in person, but by
anyone whom he may depute as his agent.” (Stroud's
Sketch, p. 44.)
Considering the judicial authority vested in the slave-
owner, whoever he may be (drunk or sober), and the
duty of the “sheriffs” and public negro-Whippers to
execute his decisions (as already noticed), this additional
power of delegating his magisterial dignity and autho-
rity to whomsoever (drunk or sober) he may think
proper, becomes a very remarkable one. Irresponsible
himself, and absolute, he commits the same authority
182 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
over the slave to a subordinate despot, responsible solely
to himself. s
Louisiana, by express statute, enacts as follows:—
“The condition of a slave being merely a passive one, his
subordination to his master, and all who represent him, is
not susceptible of any modification or restriction (except
in what can excite the slave to the commission of crime),
in such manner that he owes to his master and to all his
family a respect without bounds and an absolute obedience,
and he is consequently to execute all the orders which
he receives from him or from them.” (1 Martin's Digest,
616.)
Thus does “the innocent legal relation” of slave-owner-
ship confer on every slave-owner a power which no magis-
trate or government holds over him, or over any subject or
citizen ; and, not content with this, it clothes him with the
prerogative of transferring this authority, not only by the
sale of the slave, but by verbal commission while he yet
owns him. His wife, his housekeeper, his overseer, and
even his young children, share his unlimited power and
authority over the slave, though at the age of threescore
Instead of controlling his own children, the slave is
controlled by the children of his master, and by hired
OVēTSéel"S.
The exception, in the statute just cited, informs us that
when the slave is “incited to crime” by the commands of
his tyrant, whom he may not resist, he may, nevertheless,
be held responsible for the crime ! In its practical bearings
the law can effect nothing else, unless it be the martyr-
POWER OF OVERSEERS. 183
dom of the slave. Whatever crime he may be commanded
to commit, he can lodge no information against his master,
he can bear no testimony against him. If he persists in
refusing to assist in the commission of the crime, his
master may lawfully “chastise” him with the “moderate
correction” that may cause his death ; and then, if he
“offers” resistance, he may be lawfully killed !
Louisiana is said to be the only State with an express
statute on the topic of the master's delegated authority;
but the usage, recognised by the courts as law, umi-
versally exists. “In the other Slave States,” says Stroud
(p. 44), “the subjoined extract from Mr. Stephen's deli-
meation of Slavery in the West Indies will, it is believed,
accurately express the law and the practice.
“‘The slave is liable to be coerced or punished by the
whip, and to be tormented by every species of personal
ill-treatment, subject only to the exceptions already men-
tioned (i. e., the deprivation of life and limb), by the
attorney, manager, overseer, driver, and every other person
to whose government and control the owner may choose
to subject him, as fully as by the owner himself. Nor is
any special mandate or express general power necessary
for this purpose; it is enough that the inflictor of the
violence is set over the slave for the moment, or by the
owner, or by any of his delegates or sub-delegates, of what-
ever rank or character.” (Stephen's Slavery, p. 46.)
“This power of deputation by the master is one of the
degrading and distinguishing features of negro slavery.
It was not permitted by the laws of villeimage.” (Stroud,
184 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
p. 45. See 9 Coke's Reports, 76 A., &c. See Stephen,
Supra.)
The following description of “overseers” is from William
Wirt's Life of Patrick Henry —“Last and lowest (i. e.
of the different classes of society in Virginia), a feculum
of beings called overseers; the most abject, degraded,
unprincipled race, always cap in hand to the Dons who
employed them, and furnishing materials for the exercise
of their pride, insolence, and spirit of domination.”
The great majority of slaves, male amd female, labour
on plantations, under the charge of these “overseers.”
The “house-servants,” as already seem by the statute of
Louisiana, are under absolute subjection to every member
of the family. Slaves hired out, waiters at hotels, &c.,
are, in this particular, in no better condition. Almost
everywhere, they are controlled by others, in addition to
the direct control of their owners.
185
CHAPTER, XVI.
OF THE PROTECTION OF SLAVE– PROPERTY FROM DAMAGE
BY ASSAULTS FROM OTHER PERSONS THAN THDIR
OWNERS.
Slaves are better protected as Property than they are as Sentient J3eings.
IT has been represented that the slaves are sufficiently
protected from outrage and murder on the part of those
who are not their owners, by the fact that slave-property
is, of course, protected by law from such depredations,
and that the interest of the master affords a guarantee for
the enforcement of such laws.
In our researches after the legal protection of slaves,
in the preceding chapters, a large portion of all the legal
proceedings that have come before us have been found to
be of this character. Under the head of “Masters' and
others' liabilities for maltreating their slaves,” we have
met chiefly with suits of masters against the depredators
upon their property ; and what purported to be crimni-
mal prosecutions, we have found, on inspection, to be
State actions to prevent “damage” to the slaveholder.
But we come now to consider, directly, the laws avowedly
framed for that object.
“Slaves, being objects of property, if injured by third
persons, their owners may bring suit and recover damages
186 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
for the injury. This is a maxim of the common law
in respect to property in general, and it may therefore
be assumed to be the law of all the slaveholding States in
regard to slaves also.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 59.)
MARYLAND.—Decision of Supreme Court : “There
must be a loss of service, or at least a diminution of the
faculty to labour, to warrant an action by the master.”
(1 Harris and Johnson's Reports, 4 ; Cornfute v. Dale.
Stroud, p. 59. Wheeler, p. 239.)
SOUTH CAROLINA-Act of 1740: “If any negro or other
slave who shall be employed in the lawful business of his
master, owner, overseer, &c., shall be beaten, &c., by any
person or persons not having sufficient cause or authority
for so doing, and shall be maimed, or disabled by such
beating from performing his or her work, such person or
persons so offending shall forfeit and pay to the owner
or owners of such slaves the sum of fifteen shillings cur-
rent money per diem, for every day of his lost time, and
also the charge of the cure of such slave.” (2 Brevard's
Digest, 231-2.)
The workings of this law will appear in the following.
Constitutional Court of Appeals, South Carolina, 1796.
Sims White v. James Chambers.-‘Special action in the
case for beating the plaintiff’s negro man.” The negro
was charged by his master with the care of a fishing-
canoe, with strict orders not to let anyone have it. The
defendant persisted in taking it away, and the negro per-
sisted in forbidding him ; “whereupon, defendant struck
him a blow with his fist, then took a paddle, knocked
DAMAGES DONE TO SLAVES. 187
him down, and afterwards beat him severely, which laid
him up for several days, before he was able to go about
his business again.” Verdict for the plaintiff: Damages
35, and costs. (2 Bay's Reports, 70.)
A similar law exists in—
LouisianA.—(Statute.) “If the slave (maimed, &c.)
be for ever rendered unable to work, the offender shall be
compelled to pay the value of said slave, according to the
appraisement made by two freeholders, appointed by each.
of the parties; and the slave thus disabled shall for ever
be maintained at the expense of the person who shall have
thus disabled him, which person shall be compelled to
maintain and feed him, agreeably to the duties of masters
and slaves, as ordered by this Act.” (1 Martin's Digest,
630-2)
NORTH CAROLINA.—It has been held that patrols are
not liable to the master for inflicting punishment on the
slave, unless their conduct clearly demonstrates malice
against the master.” (1 Hawk's Reports, 418, Tate v.
O'Neal.)
VIRGINIA—Supreme Court of Appeals. May v. Brown
and Boisseau. Action of trespass, &c., for breaking into
his close, and beating several of his slaves, so that he was
deprived of their services for a long time. The defence in
mitigation of damages was, that plaintiff had given a
general permission to Brown (though not in his employ as
overseer) to visit his negro-quarters, and chastise any of
his slaves who might be found acting improperly This
defence failed, because Boisseau, who had inflicted the
I SS THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
beating, had received no such permission from the plaintiff.
(I Munford's Reports, 288. Stroud's Sketch, pp. 59, 60.
Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 248.)
The workings of the principle of delegated authority
are signally exemplified in this last case.
In Wheeler’s “Law of Slavery,” the division or chapter
entitled, “Of the liability of others to the master for
abusing his slave,” occupies about twenty-seven pages.
Some of the cases we have cited already. Under this head
are classed several State prosecutions for crime, viz.: State
v. Hale, State v. Maner, State v. Mann (before Judge
Ruffin), State v. Cheatwood, State of Mississippi v. Jones,
and Commonwealth of Virginia v. Carver, which we have
before cited in our 13th and 15th Chapters. Under this
same classification we found and cited also a number of civil
prosecutions for killing slaves, some of whom were rum-
aways.
We will here glance hastily at a few other decisions of
the same class.
Smith v. Hancock, 4 Bibb's Ky. Rep., 222.-4: Held by
the court that, in an action of trespass for beating a slave,
the property of the plaintiff, whereby he died, the defen-
dant may justify by showing that the slave was at an un-
lawful assembly, combining to rebel, and that he refused
to surrender, and resisted by force.” (Wheeler, p. 239.)
Meetings of slaves for religious worship or mental
instruction are “unlawful assemblies,” as will be shown
in the proper place. -
In the case of Skidmore v. Smith, the harbouring of
I)AMAGES DONE TO SLAVES. 189
slaves was the ground of complaint. (Wheeler, p. 248.)
It will not be claimed that there is any valuable protec-
tion to the slave in this.
Crawford v. Cheney, A. D. 1824, 15 Martin's Louisiana
Rep., 142, was “an action brought to recover the price of
a negro whom the plaintiff charges the defendant with
having shot and killed.” The testimony, it was argued,
was weak. Judge Porter said : “The act charged here
is one rarely committed in the presence of witnesses”
(owing, he might have added, to the law excluding
coloured witnesses). He therefore allowed “presumptive
evidence to support the verdict.” (Wheeler, p. 249.)
Jourdan v. Patten, 1818; 5 Martin's Louisiana Rep.,
615.-A suit for damages by injuring a slave, who was
made blind by the assault. The defendant was adjudged
to pay the price of the slave, and to take possession of
him, as his property. Marginal note (as a rule of law
established): “If, on an injury to his slave, the plaintiff
recovers his full value, the property is transferred to the
defendant, on payment of the judgment.” (Wheeler,
p. 249.) And so the disabled slave is “transferred” from
perhaps a kind master or mistress, and from the presence
of his wife and children, and the scenes of his childhood,
and turned over to the tender mercies of his persecutor,
rendered the more bitter against him for the losses sus-
tained in the transaction, and the prospect of receiving no
valuable service from him And this is the protection
(in this exigency) afforded to the slave by his master's
right of prosecuting his assailant
190 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
The court, it seems, were not unaware of the effects of
this decision. In making it, Judge Matthews said, “The
principle of humanity, which would lead us to suppose
that the mistress, whom he had so long served, would treat
her miserable blind slave with more kindness than the
defendant, to whom the judgment ought to transfer him,
cannot be taken into consideration in deciding the case.”
And so the judgment of the “Parish Court” (which had
decreed the payment of the price of the slave, with an -
additional annuity for his sustenance, and to remain with
the plaintiff) was reversed. (Ib.)
The benefit to the slave of this protection of slave-pro-
perty is sufficiently apparent. It is the master that is
protected in his property, not the slave in his right to
security. The award is to his master, not to him. It is
for the “loss of service” or “capacity to labour,” not for
indignities and sufferings endured—it is for the injury of
a working beast, not of a man; for in this the maxim of
the civil law holds good—“the slave is not capable of
being injured ſ” Property damaged, or “malice against
the master,” constitute the offence—compensation to the
master is the redress | The “legal relation” of owner and
property is worthily honoured and expressed in all this.
Incidentally and remotely, the slave, it may be, in some
instances, is protected by this from injuries that would
otherwise cripple or kill him. The dread of the bill of
“damages” may be some restraint. Slender as it is, it is
the best, if not the only protection afforded to him by
the law.
DAMAGES DONE TO SLAVES. 191
In one important and comprehensive view, this inci-
dental and dubious protection, if it be such, is an injury
to the slave in the long run, and on the whole. It not
only certifies and Sanctions his degradation to the con-
dition of a brute, but, in so doing, it stands in the way
of any suitable legislative and judicial protection. It
is regarded as a substitute or equivalent for it. It not
only prevents proper enactments and processes, but it
vitiates those in existence and in use. We have seen
how it confounds the criminal with the civil prosecutions
for maltreating slaves, classifies indictments for murder
under the head of “liabilities of others to the master
2
for abusing his slave;” makes the penal code the instru-
ment of the slave-owner, and seduces even the better
portion of the judges, as in the case of “the State v.
Hale” (Wheeler, pp. 239-43), while making the most
favourable and merciful decisions known to slave juris-
prudence, into the lamentable expedient of grounding
their decisions upon “the interests” of the owner, and
23
“the value of slave-property,” instead of the majesty of
violated law, and the sacredness of human life; or, per-
haps, commingling incongruously the two classes of con-
siderations!
As a matter-of-fact result of all this, we may well be
assured that a judiciary and a community accustomed to
award “damages” to a slave-owner for the maiming and
killing of his slave, will not long continue to prosecute
with efficiency any other—any criminal processes for
the same acts. One punishment for one misdemeanour
192 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
will be accounted sufficient. If the one is inflicted, the
other will, as a general if not a universal fact, be with-
held or evaded. On the first announcement of a bar-
barous or murderous outrage upon a slave, human nature,
even among slaveholders, will gush forth in demands for
justice upon the perpetrator. An indictment for murder
may be talked of, or even resorted to. In the mean
time comes the “owner,” with his suit for damages for
loss of property All eyes are directed to watch the
result. The high tone of moral indignation gives place
to an anxiety for the pending issue of dollars and cents
If the defendant loses his case and pays the equivalent,
the public feeling is appeased or modified. Perhaps a
sympathy is got up in the defendant's favour. The
indictment for murder slumbers, or results in an acquittal
or a pardon. The man is not to be fined five hundred
dollars and then hanged! And in a community wherein
slaveholders administer the law, the prosecution for
damages will be deemed of paramount importance.
193
CHAPTER, XVII.
FACTS ILLUSTRATING THE KIND AND DEGREE OF
PROTECTION EXTENDED TO SLAVES.
The extent, the atrocity, the frequency, and the impunity of barbarous
Outrages upon Slaves, show that the Laws afford them little or no
Protection.
WE have occupied so much space with the laws on the
subject of the protection of slaves that we can spare
little room for the abundant facts which correspond and
illustrate them.
In respect to the murdering of slaves by white men
with general impunity, two propositions, if sustained, will
settle the question. First, the murdering of slaves by white
men has all along been, and still is, notoriously frequent.
Not a few of these murdered their own slaves. Second,
upon the most diligent inquiry and public challenge, for
fifteen or twenty years past, not one single case has yet
been ascertained; in which, either during that time or
previously, a master killing his slave, or indeed any other
white man, has suffered the penalty of death for the mur-
* We say “ascertained.” We have already alluded to some few cases
in Whecler’s “Law of Slavery” which may have been of that character,
though the result does not appear clearly, which is the more remarkable,
as the compiler had called in question the statement of Stroud. There
may have been convictions, and sentences of death may have been passed,
and the criminals permitted to escape, or pardoned.
O
194 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
der of a slave. These two general facts, if they are facts,
tell the whole story, so far as the protection of the lives
of slaves is concerned.
At a time of much general excitement on this very
question, during the period just now mentioned (1839), a
case occurred which, it was generally supposed on all
hands at the North, would prove an exception. A court
in South Carolina convicted a white man of having mur-
dered a slave, and sentenced him to death. Governor
Butler declined to comply with an application for his
pardon, assigning, as a reason, that the eyes of the civilised
world were upon them, and that the reputation of the
State was at stake. This appeal, it was supposed, would
be sufficient, but it only added fuel to the general excite-
ment occasioned by the unusual if not unprecedented
sentence of the court. The whole State was in a ferment.
The court and the governor were denounced. The
press fulminated its anathemas; and before the day of
execution arrived, the community were quieted with the
announcement that the prisoner had escaped Whether
the locks were opened with keys or the bolts broken—
whether the walls were pierced or the windows opened—
or whether the higher or lower authorities connived, the
great public never heard | The Southern papers were
watched for announcements of executive offers of reward
for the prisoner's apprehension, but none ever appeared.
The fugitive was not a fugitive slave. He might come to
the North, if he pleased, without danger that the arm of
the Federal Government would molest him | He was not
PRACTICAL PROTECTION. 195
guilty of rebelling against a slave-owner's authority. He
had only murdered a slave
The frequency of such murders in South Carolina, so
long ago as 1791, was publicly announced in her courts
of law, no one contradicting it. In the case of the State
v. McGee, Messrs. Pinkney and Ford, counsel for the
State, said: “The frequency of the offence (wilful murder
of a slave) was owing to the nature of the punishment,”
&c. (i.e., a pecuniary fine.) (1 Bay's Reports, 164. Wide
Stroud, p. 39.)
“In 1791, the Grand Jury for the district of Cheraw
(South Carolina) made a presentment on the same sub-
ject, expressing their confidence that the Legislature
would provide some other more effectual measures to
prevent the frequency of crimes of this nature.” (Matthew
Carey's American Museum for February, 1791, Appendix,
p. 10. Weld's Slavery, &c., p. 155.) Yet thirty more
years elapsed before the penalty was changed, and still
the law seems as powerless as ever. It is paralysed by
“the innocent legal relation” between an owner and his,
human chattel !
If anyone doubts the frequency and the impunity of
such murders, let him con over the attested facts in the
book to which we have so frequently referred, Weld's
“Slavery as it Is.” Take a few specimens. On page 47
are four cases, related by the Rev. William T. Allan, son
of a slaveholding D.D. in Alabama. e
1. “A man near Courtland, Ala., of the name of
Thompson, recently shot a negro woman through the
196 T] IE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
head, and put the pistol so close that her hair was singed.
He did it in consequence of some difficulty in his dealings
with her as a concubine. He buried her in a log-heap;
she was discovered by the buzzards gathering around it.”
2. “Two men, of the name of Wilson, found a fine-
looking negro man at Dandridge's Quarter, without a
pass, and flogged him so that he died in a short time.
They were not punished.” 3. “Colonel Blocker's overseer
attempted to flog a negro. He refused to be flogged,
whereupon the overseer seized an axe, and cleft his skull.
The Colonel justified it.” 4. “One Jones whipped a
woman to death for grabbing a potatoe hill.”
Compare these four cases with the slave-laws already
cited. The second and fourth, being deaths by whipping,
would pass, probably, as cases of “death under moderate
correction.” The third, Colonel Blocker's overseer, would
be justified by a court of law as readily as by the Colonel.
The slave was “resisting” or “offering to resist” the
overseer, and was therefore an outlaw. The first case is
not quite as clear. If the concubine “resisted” or “offered
to resist” Mr. Thompson's advances, whether revengeful
or lustful, she came, plainly, into the same legal predi-
cament, and was lawfully killed ! For “the legal rela-
tion” must be maintained But were not these flagrant
cases of murder'ſ Take some other facts, furnished also
by Mr. Allan on the page previous (46).
1. Mr. Turner stated that one of his uncles, in Caro-
line county, Virginia, had killed a woman—broke her
skull with an axe-helve : she had insulted her mistress |
PRACTICAL PROTECTION. 197
No notice was taken of the affair. 2. Mr. T. said that
slaves were frequently murdered. 3. In Mississippi, a
slave chanced to come forward hastily from eating, to
hear the “orders,” with a knife in his hand. The over-
seer, alarmed, raised his gun and shot him dead. He
afterwards saw and confessed his mistake. But “no
notice was taken” of the killing.
On page 50 will be found, by the testimony of Mrs.
Nancy Lowry, a native of Kentucky, three cases of “pre-
mature deaths”—“generally believed by the neighbours
that extreme whipping was the cause.” Mr. Long, the
inflictor and owner, was “a strict professor of the Chris-
tian religion,” and “thought to be a very humame master.”
The victims, “John, Ned, and James, had wives.” They
were flogged frequently and “severely.” The cause of
their flogging was commonly staying a little over the
time with their wives |
On page 97, in the testimony of the Rev. Francis Haw-
ley, there is a characteristic case. A son of a slaveholder
“took,” as was believed, “the wife of one of the negro
men. The poor slave felt himself greatly injured, and
expostulated with him. The wretch took his gun and
deliberately shot him. Providentially, he only wounded
him badly.” This shows, however, the cause of many
murders of slaves.
In South Carolina, a physician whipped his slave to
death, “was tried and acquitted, and the next year elected
to the Legislature /* (Ib., p. 173.)
“I know a local Methodist minister, a man of talents,
198 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
and popular as a preacher, who took his negro girl into
the barn to whip her, and she was brought out a corpse.”
(P. 173.) This is the testimony of Mr. George A. Avery, of
łochester, N. Y., who states further that the friends of
the minister seemed to think it of “little importance to
his ministerial standing.” Of course, he was not indicted
This was in Virginia. *-
A minister in South Carolina, a native of the North,
had a stated Sabbath appointment to preach, about eight
miles from his residence. He was in the habit of riding
thither in his gig or sulkey, after a very swift-trotting
horse, which he always drove briskly. Behind him ran
his negro slave on foot, who was required to be at the
place of appointment as soon as his master, to take care
of his horse. Sometimes he fell behind, and kept his
master waiting for him a few minutes, for which he always
received a reprimand, and was sometimes punished. On
one occasion of this kind, after sermon, the master told
the slave that he would take care to have him keep up
with him going home. So he tied him by the wrists, with
a halter, to his gig behind, and drove rapidly home. The
result was that, about two or three miles from home, the
poor fellow's feet and legs failed him, and he was dragged
on the ground all the rest of the way by the wrists
Whether the master knew it or not till he reached home
is not certain ; but on alighting and looking round, he
exclaimed, “Well I thought you would keep up with
me this time !” So saying, he coolly walked into the house.
The servants came out and took up the poor sufferer for
PRACTICAL PROTECTION. 199
dead. After a time he revived a little, lingered for a day
or two, and died The facts were known all over the
neighbourhood, but nothing was done about it ! The mi-
nister continued preaching as before ; and another slave
of his, unable to labour or walk, was seen lying under a
shed, near the house, where he would have starved but for
the food thrown over the fence to him by some mechanics
working near by, and which he devoured ravenously. He
was sent off to the plantation, and soon after died. When
that minister comes up to our General Assemblies, Annual
Conferences, or May Anniversaries, he can doubtless tell us
all about the “innocent legal relation” of slave-owner, and
how kindly the slaves are treated by their masters | We
should not publish this narrative, which has never before
appeared in print, had it not been told to us by an eye-
witness, with whom we are well acquainted, and in whose
statements we can implicitly confide—Mr. John W. Hill,
Green Point, near New York city. He saw the gig when
it came up, with the slave dragging behind, and saw the
minister alight and go in.
“I knew a young man” (in Virginia—says Mr. George
A. Avery, of Rochester, N.Y.) “who had been out hunt-
ing, and returning, with some of his friends, seeing a negro
man in the road, at a little distance, deliberately drew up
his rifle, and shot him dead. This was done without the
slightest provocation, or a word passing. This young man
passed through the form of a trial; and although it was
not even pretended by his counsel that he was not guilty
of the act, deliberately and wantomly perpetrated, he was
200 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
acquitted. It was urged by his counsel that he was a
young man (about twenty years of age), had no malicious
intention, his mother was a widow, &c. &c.” (Weld's
Slavery as it Is, p. 172.)
The young man or his mother probably paid the
“owner” the value of the chattel (if he was a slave), and
he would perhaps be cautious in indulging his propensities
as a sportsman, in shooting such expensive game, in future.
In a civil suit of the “owner” for “damages,” a jury of
slaveholders would be less lenient. It would, however, be
too much to expect of them that, for the same act, they
would first oblige the unfortunate young gentleman to
pay the market value of the commodity, and then hang
him for the murder of the man—especially where it is
gravely maintained that satisfaction to the master is a
sufficient protection to the slave The facts, as thus
stated (the most charitable version that could be made),
present the most favourable illustration of the law. It
would appear still worse if there was not even the pecu-
niary forfeiture. The facts and the law combined are the
legitimate and natural results of “the legal relation of
owner and slave.” If the principle and the relation are
right, it might be difficult to show the practice to be
wrong. Communities educated in the former will be sure
to become involved in the latter.
Will it be said that these statements are only the fic-
tions or exaggerations of Northerners? Or that they
describe only a few isolated cases? Or that they apply
only to the lower circles of society at the South . Listen,
PRACTICAL PROTECTION. 20]
then, to a Virginian slaveholder, moving in the very highest
circles of Southern society—the Hon. John Randolph, of
Roanoke.
“Avarice alone can drive, as it does drive, this infernal
traffic, and the wretched victims of it, like so many post-
horses, whipped to death in a mail-coach. Ambition has
its cover-sluts in the pride, pomp, and circumstance of
glorious war; but where are the trophies of avarice
The handcuff, the manacle, the blood-stained cowhide
What man is worse received in society for being a hard
master 2 Who denies the hand of a sister or daughter to
such monsters ?” (Speech in Congress.)
Study this picture. Wholesale murder—barbarism—
cruelty. The general prevalence of these in the highest
circles, and no one regarding the perpetrators the worse
for it, or shrinking back from the closest family affinity
with “the monsters P’
What Northern pencil has drawn a more frightful pic-
ture of the Slave States than this? Old Virginia sat for
the likeness, drawn by one of her most gifted sons ! Was
John Randolph a slanderer, a fanatic Hear the testi-
mony, then, of another honoured son of Virginia, the sage
of Monticello.
“When the measure of their tears is full, when their
GROANS have involved heaven itself in darkness, doubtless a
God of justice will listen to their DISTRESS.” (Jefferson's
Correspondence.)
Recal to mind the wholesale murders of General Wade
Hampton, recorded in another commexion. (Chap. XI.)
202 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Remember the still more extensive and systematic mur-
ders of the Louisiana sugar-planters (Chap. V.), compla-
cently regarded and connived at by pious slave-breeders
in Virginia (Chap. X.), cold-blooded, calculating, diabolic,
like that of pirates; then say whether it be credible that
such laws as have been reviewed in this chapter could
protect the lives of slaves | Say, rather, what possible
enactments could avail for them, while the “legal relation”
of slave-ownership continues.
If any further light is wanted on that feature of the Slave
Code that insultingly proffers to the slave its protection
from “unusual” punishments, the inquirer might see what
punishments are “usual” by looking over the advertise-
ments and paragraphs of a dozen leading Southern journals,
from as many different States, for twelve months. Cut
out, arranged, and pasted in a scrap-book, with an index,
they would furnish him with a copious and authentic
commentary on the slave-laws. Every successive year, if
he chose to repeat the process, would furnish a new volume.
If he would save the labour, and avail himself of a faith-
fully-collated scrap-book, made up to his hand, we refer
him to Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” large portions of which
he will find to have been gathered by this process.
He will there find numerous advertisements of runaway
slaves, and of jailers' motices of apprehensions and commit-
ments of them, in which the descriptions specify scars
from whipping, from iron collars, from gun-shots, from
brandings, &c. &c. Many are described as having on
handcuffs, chains, and iron collars. One is “much marked
PRACTICAL PROTECTION. 203
with the whip"—another, “severely bruised”—another,
“a great many scars from the lash”—another, “several
large scars on his back from severe whipping in early
life ſ”
down”—another “ had on a drawing-chain, fastened around
another “had a collar on, with one prong turned
his ankle with a house-lock”—another was “much marked
with irons”—another (negress Fanny) “ had an iron band
about her neck,” &c. &c. All this, as the reader now
knows, is authorised by law—not prohibited as “un-
usual.”
Then comes another class, which, if not expressly
authorised, are found by their frequency to be outside of
the prohibited pale of “unusual.” “Mary has a scar on
her back and right arm, caused by a rifle-ball”—another,
“ branded on the left jaw”—“Arthur has a scar across his
breast and each arm, made by a knife ; loves to talk much
of the goodness of God”—“George has a sword-cut, lately
received in his left arm”—“ Mary has a small scar over
her eye, a good many teeth missing, the letter A branded
on her cheek and forehead.” Many others “scarred with
the bite of a dog.”
“Ran away, a negro woman and two children. A few
days before she went off, I burnt her with a hot iron on
the left side of her face. I tried to make the letter M.”
Another class are described by mutilations which,
though nominally prohibited by law, appear to be far
from being “unusual ;” and neither fear of law nor of
public odium prevent the public advertisement of them.
One “has only one eye;” another, “Rachel, has lost
204 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
all her toes except the large one.” “Joshua, his thumb
is off, on the left hand.” Another, “his right leg
broken.” “John, left ear cropt ;” another “has lost one
of his ears.”
Many pages might be occupied with similar advertise-
ments, which appear in the most respectable Southern
journals, with the names of the advertisers, many of them.
prominent citizens, and sometimes respectable ladies
One case, on page 15 of Mr. Weld's book, is doubtless a
specimen of tens, if not hundreds of thousands ; assuredly
it does not come under the condemnation of being “un-
usual.” The “owner” of a female slave, who was a Me-
thodist, proposed a criminal intercourse with her : she
refused. He sent her to the “overseer” to be flogged.
Again he made advances—again she refused, and again
she was flogged Afterwards she yielded to his adul-
terous wishes | And now, the attentive reader of the
preceding pages will have learned that all this was strictly
within the protection of the law . Its limitations this
monster had not overstepped. At least, there is no
adequate law for his punishment—may, so far as appears,
there have been no legislative attempts or even preten-
sions to provide protection against such outrages |
But details of this kind, on this subject, are always set
down as exceptions. We turn, then, again to a specimen
of general testimonies.
The Rev. George Whitefield, in his letter to the slave-
holders of Maryland, Virginia, the two Carolinas and
Georgia, after admitting “particular exceptions,” charges
PRACTICAL PROTECTION, 205
them, in general, with treating their slaves “worse than
if they were brutes.” He adds, “The BLOOD of them,
SPILT for these many years in your respective provinces,
will ascend up to heaven against you.”
William Pinckney, of Maryland (1789), calls Maryland
“the foster-mother of petty despots, the patron of wanton
oppression "
Dr. Jonathan Edwards, of Connecticut (1791), says,
“The Smack of the whip is all day long in the ears of
those who are on the plantation, or in the vicinity ; and
it is used with such dexterity and severity as not only
to lacerate the skin, but to tear out small portions of the
flesh at almost every stroke. This is the general treatment
of the slaves. But many individuals suffer still more
severely. Many are knocked down ; some have their eyes
beaten out ; some have an arm or a leg broken, or chopped
off; and many, for a very Small or for no crime at all, have
been beater to death,” &c.
John Woolman, of New Jersey (1758): “Their punish-
ment is often severe, and sometimes desperate.” (Journal,
&c., p. 74.)
George Buchanan, M.D., of Baltimore (4th of July
Oration, 1791) : “Their situation” (the slaves') “is insup-
portable : misery inhabits their cabins, and pursues them
in the field. Inhumanly beaten, they OFTEN fall sacrifices
to the turbulent tempers of their masters, Who is there,
unless inured to savage cruelties, that can bear to hear of
the inhwman punishments daily inflicted upon the unfor-
tunate blacks, and not feel for them : Can a man, who
calls himself a Christian, coolly and deliberately tie up
206 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
thumb-screw, torture with pincers, and beat unmercifully
a poor slave, for perhaps a trifling neglect of duty tº
American Colonisation Society : “We have never heard
of slavery in any country, ancient or modern, Pagan,
Mohammedan, or Christian, so terrible in its character as
the slavery which exists in these United States.” (Seventh
Report, 1824.)
The Presbyterian Synod of Kentucky (1834), said,
“Brutal stripes, and all the varied kinds of personal
indignities, are not the only species of cruelty which slavery
licenses.”
“They (the slaves) suffer all that can be inflicted by
wanton caprice, by grasping avarice, by brutal lust, by
malignant spite, and by insane anger. Their happiness is
the sport of every whim, the prey of every passion that
may occasionally or habitually infest the master's bosom.”
Rev. James A. Thome, now of Ohio City, a native of
Kentucky, and son of a slaveholder, says, “Slavery is the
parent of more suffering than has flowed from any one
Source since the date of its existence. Such sufferings,
too ! Sufferings inconceivable and innumerable ; unmin-
gled wretchedness from the ties of nature rudely broken
and destroyed ; the acutest bodily tortures, groans, tears,
and blood ; lying for ever in weariness and painfulness,
im watchings, in hunger and in thirst, in cold and in
nakedness I’
We forbear citing further witnesses. It is manifest
that human chattels must be worse treated than brutes,
in order to be kept in chattelhood. Other working ami-
mals are not punished as examples to their fellows. They
PRACTICAL PROTECTION. 207
are not the objects of suspicion, jealousy, lust, or revenge.
They are not hated. They are not threatened. They are
not conversed and quarrelled with. They cannot be re-
garded guilty, or proper subjects of censure or punish-
ment. They have no aspirations above their condition.
They have no keen sense of being injured by being em-
bruted. They can utter no provoking language, nor retort,
nor retaliate. All these items are bulwarks of defence to
the brute, but inlets and avenues of attack upon the
slave. The individuals and the classes of men most wronged
are proverbially most hated by the wrong-doer. This is
the dreadful doom of the poor megro, and he is completely
under the power of his tyrant. As the exercise of despotic
power over the defenceless makes men hardhearted and
cruel, it is evident that the more absolute any despotism
becomes, the more cruel will the persons become who ad-
minister it. And the most absolute form of despotism
known among men is that of human chattelhood in the
TJnited States of America, as its code proves.
The unnatural and monstrous “legal relation” of slave-
ownership, unhumanising human beings, insures cruelties
that human language cannot describe, nor human ima-
gination conceive. No pencil can portray them ; no sta-
tistics exhibit the sum total. The Slave Code is sufficiently
horrible, but every syllable of it can be written, printed,
and measured by pages. The practical illustration has no
limits; its horrors swell into infinity.
“No people were ever yet found who were better than
their" [living and recognised] “laws, though many have
been known to be worse.”
CHAPTER XVIII.
Flu GITIVES FR O M S L A V ERY.
The Slave, being Property, may be hampered or confined to prevent his
escape—may be pursued and reclaimed—must not be aided, or concealed
from his Owner—and when too wild or refractory to be USED by his
Owner, may be KILLED by him with impunity.
THIS topic is closely connected with those of several of
the preceding chapters, and is, in Some of its aspects, a
branch of them. The laws on this subject are too verbose
and various to be transcribed at large, which would swell
the volume and weary the reader. We shall present only
an abstract of what is characteristic and most important,
connected with the usages under them. One design of
these laws and usages is to prevent escapes; another, to
facilitate recaptures; another, to punish the fugitives and
deter others; another, to punish slaves, free coloured
people, or whites who may entice or aid the fugitives.
Prevention of escapes is sometimes sought by the use
of iron collars, chains, handcuffs, locks, &c., as before
mentioned, whenever the “Owner” or his agent thinks
proper; and the law, as has already been seen, authorises
this, and punishes anyone who may cut or break them.
Another frequent precaution is the locking up of the
slaves at night ; and this, too, is within the lawful power
of the master, at his own discretion.
FUGITIVE SLAVES. 209
In cities, corporate towns, &c., there are regulations
forbidding the slaves or free people of colour to be in the
streets after a specified hour in the evening. At Wil-
inington (N. C.), we knew a case (1821) in which the
holding of a Methodist meeting (under charge of white
persons) a few minutes too late, occasioned the locking up
of one half the worshipping assembly in the watch-house,
men, women, and children, till eight or nine o'clock the
next morning, church members and all, when the legal
forms were gone through with, to effect their release ; in
which it appeared that a “class-leader” at the meeting had
“taken up” five members of his own “class,” and all in
obedience to “the law.”
A general rule on plantations is, that slaves must not
5
be absent from “quarters” in the evening, nor leave the
plantation at any time without a written “pass.” In at
least some of the States, there are laws strictly enforcing
this rule. Then, there are “patrols” established in city
and country, regulated by law, and clothed with ample
powers to arrest whom they please, and see that the
existing laws and usages are enforced.
An Act of Maryland (1715), chap. 44, sect. 6, “for the
better discovery of runaways,” &c., requires that “any
person or persons whatsoever,” travelling beyond the limits
of the county wherein they reside, shall have “a pass
under the seal of said county;” otherwise, “if appre-
hended, not being sufficiently known, nor able to give a
good account of themselves,” the magistrate, at his dis-
cretion, may deal with them as with runaways. (Stroud,
P
210 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
p. 83.) This is particularly remarkable as being without
distinction of colour, and so applicable to the class of
low whites. These, however, were to be released after
six months, in distinction from “negroes and mulattoes.”
To facilitate recaptures, sect. 7 of the same Act—“for
the better encouragement of all persons to seize and take
up all runaways travelling without pass, as aforesaid”—
provides a bounty, in tobacco (commuted for six dollars),
“to be paid by the owner” of said runaway ; “and if such
suspected runaways be not servants, and refuse to pay the
same, he, she, or they shall make Satisfaction by servitude
or otherwise, &c.” In 1719, an additional provision
authorised the sheriff, in case of non-payment of costs, &c.,
by these wronged and innocent free negroes and mulattoes,
to sell them to the highest bidder | | This monstrous
provision was afterwards expunged from the Code of
Maryland, but not till after the cession of the Federal
District, which therefore remains under the old law.
And this furnishes the foundation of those laws of the
Corporation of Washington City by which, at the present
day, free negroes or mulattoes arrested as fugitive slaves,
and not being claimed by anyone, are held liable for their
jail fees, and, in default of payment, sold into slavery.
(Wide Jay's Inquiry, p. 154, and Jay's View, p. 33, &c.,
where it is shown that such cases frequently occur.)
It is made the official duty of sheriffs and constables
to arrest suspected fugitives, and of jailers to commit them
to prison. By law of Maryland (1723), ch. 15, sect. 2,
&c., it is made the duty of the constable to repair
FUGITIVE SLAVES. 211
monthly to all suspected places, and whip every negro he
finds there without a license !k Owners of plantations,
by the same Act, are required to send home to their
masters any “strange negroes” on their premises; they
are authorised to whip them, &c.; and forbidden to har-
bour or encourage them, on penalty of fine, &c. Same
law in Federal District. (Snethen's Dist. Col., p. 13.)
“In Georgia, any person may inflict twenty lashes on
the bare back of a slave found without license on the
plantation, or without the limits of the town to which he
belongs. So also in Mississippi, Virginia, and Kentucky,
at the discretion of the justice.” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 134.)
“In South Carolina and Georgia, any person finding
more than seven slaves together in the highway, without
a white person, may give each one twenty lashes.” (Ib)
Similar in Delaware : “more than six slaves.” (Delaware
Laws, 104. Stroud, p. 102.)
This law has also been introduced into Florida, since
its cession to the United States, contrary to the milder
code of Spanish slavery. Many of the Indian slaves in
East Florida, with most of the free people of colour near
St. Augustine, transported themselves to Havanna, as
soon as they heard of the approach of the American
authorities, (Stroud, p. 101.)
* In this aspect, the slave is neither treated as a man nor as a brute,
but worse than either man or beast is treated . A man has the right of
locomotion and social intercourse. And when a brute animal leaps his
fence in quest of food or company, or to roam at large, no one thinks of
treating him as a criminal, of subjecting him to punishment. The power
of the State is not in requisition, to send sheriffs and constables after him.
212 THE AMERICAN SLAVſ. CORDE.
“In Kentucky, Virginia, and Missouri, a slave, for
keeping a gun, powder, shot, a club, or other weapon
whatever, offensive or defensive, may be whipped thirty-
nine lashes, by order of a justice.” (Ib.)
“In North Carolina and Tennessee, a slave travelling
without a pass, or being found in another person's negro-
quarters or kitchen, may be whipped forty lashes ; and
every slave in whose company the visitor is found, twenty
lashes " (Ib) The visits of parents and children, hus-
bands and wives, may be thus punished.
“In Touisiana, a slave, for being on horseback, without
the written permission of his master, incurs twenty-five
lashes; for keeping a dog, a like punishment.” (Ib)
Horses and dogs, as well as weapons, might assist their
escape.
“By the law of Maryland, for ‘rambling, riding, or
going abroad in the night, or riding horses in the day-
time without leave, a slave may be whipped, cropped, or
branded on the cheek with the letter R, or otherwise
punished, not extending to life, or so as to unfit him for
labour.’” (Ib.)
In Georgia and South Carolina, “If any slave shall be
out of the house, &c., or off the plantation, &c., of his
master, &c., and shall refuse to submit to an examination
by any white person, &c., such white person may appre-
hend and moderately correct him ; and if he shall assault
or strike such white person, he may be lawfully killed.”
(2 Brevard's Digest, 231. Prince's Digest, 447. Sect. 5
of Act of 1770, and page 348, No. 43; title, Penal Laws.
|RUGHTIVE SHLAVES. 213
Stroud's Sketch, p. 101.) The reader will recollect here
that “moderate correction,” as legally defined, is such as
may cause death ! And the slave not submitting quietly
to this may be lawfully killed !”
“If any slave shall presume to come upon the plan-
tation without leave in writing from his master, employer,
&c., not being sent on lawful business, the owner of the
plantation may inflict ten lashes for every such offence.”
(1 Virg. Rev. Code of 1819, 422-3. Mississippi Rev.
Code, 371. 2 Littel and Suigert's Digest, 1150. 2
Missouri Laws, 741, sect. 3. Maryland Laws, Act of
1723, chap. 15, sects. 1 and 5.)
North Carolina. —“Any person may lawfully kill a
slave who has been outlawed for running away and lurk-
ing in Swamps,” &c. (Act of 1741. Haywood's Manual,
521-2. Stroud, 103.) Similar in Tennessee.
In Maryland and District of Columbia, “If any negro
or other slaves, absenting themselves from their master's
service, running out into the woods and there remaining,
killing and destroying hogs and cattle belonging to the
people of this province, shall refuse to surrender them-
Selves, and make resistance against such persons as pursue
to apprehend and take them up, being thereunto legally
empowered, it shall be lawful for such pursuers, when such
resistance is made, to shoot, kill, and destroy such negroes
or other slaves.” (Laws of Maryland, 1723, chap. 15,
sect. 7. Snethen’s Dist. Col.)
In North Carolina (as cited in the chapter previous) a
proclamation of outlawry against a slave is authorised
214 TIII. AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
whenever he runs away from his master, conceals himself
in some obscure retreat, and, to sustain life, “kills a hog,
or some animal of the cattle kind.” (See Haywood's
Manual, 521. Act of 1741, chap. 24, sect. 45. Stroud,
p. 38.) The same or similar in Tennessee.
In Virginia, “in 1705, two justices of the peace were
authorised, by proclamation, to outlaw runaways, who
might thereafter be killed and destroyed by any person
whatsoever, by such ways and means as he may think fit,
without accusation or impeachment of any crime for so
doing.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 103.) This Act was, how-
ever, repealed in 1792. (Ib)
From an article in the Norfolk (Va.) Herald of Feb.,
1837, it however appears that a case of slave-hunting and
shooting had just occurred “near New Point Comfort.”
“It was not until a musket was fired at them [the slaves],
and one of them slightly wounded, that they surrendered.”
(Weld's “Slavery as it Is," p. 160.)
The customary usages of the South in general, on this
Subject, are such as to supersede the necessity of any
formal proclamation of outlawry by the magistrates.
The more general laws, as in South Carolina, Georgia,
Maryland, and District of Columbia, just now cited,
sufficiently answer the same purpose.
In South Carolina, “a slave endeavouring to entice
allother slave to run away, if provisions, &c., be prepared,
for the purpose of aiding such running away, shall be
punished with death.” (2 Brevard's Dig, 233, 244.)
“And a slave who shall aid and abet the slave so en-
FUGITIVE SLAVES. 215
deavouring to entice another slave to run away shall also
suffer death.” (Ibid.) An equivocal and unimportant
modification of this Act was afterwards made. (Stroud,
p. 104.) The “owner” of slaves sentenced to death is
probably remunerated out of the public treasury. This is
the law of Maryland. (Laws of Maryland of 1737, chap. 2,
and of 1751, chap. 14. Wide Smethen’s Dist. Col., p. 16.)
“If a slave harbour, conceal, or entertain another
slave, being a runaway, in South Carolina and Georgia,
he is subjected to corporal punishment to any extent, not
affecting life and limb.” (2 Brevard's Digest, 237. Prince's
Digest, 452.) In Maryland, thirty-nine stripes is the
penalty for harbouring one hour. (Act of 1748, chap. 19,
Sect. 4.) º
In South Carolina, “if a free megro harbour, conceal
or entertain a runaway slave,” he is fined ten pounds for
the first day, and twenty shillings for every succeeding
day ; and if unable to pay the fines and charges, he may
be sold at public outcry, and the overplus, if any, paid
into the hands of the public treasurer.” (2 Brevard's
Dig., Act of 1740.)
In August, 1827, the Charleston Court passed sentence,
according to this law, against Hannah Elliott, a free
black woman, her daughter Judy, and her sons Simon and
Sam, and they were sold into slavery. (Stroud's Sketch,
p. 17.) Yet Judge Stroud is of opinion that that section
of the Act of 1740 had been repealed. (Ib.) The law of
1821 provides “corporal punishment, not extending to life
or limb.” (Ib)
..] .. 6 THE ANIERICAN SLAVE CODE,
White as well as coloured persons are forbidden, under
heavy penalties, to entice, transport, or secretly carry
away slaves. (Laws of Maryland of 1715, chap. 19, sect, 4.
Smethen's Dist. Col., p. 12.) Also, forbidden to entertain
slaves unlawfully absent. (Laws of Maryland, 1748,
chap. 19, sect. 2, &c. Snethem, p. 17.) Also, masters of
vessels to conceal slaves on board. (Laws of Maryland,
1753, chap. 9, sect. 3. Smethem, p. 19.)
“By Aiken's Alabama Digest, p. 109, it is declared
that ‘any person or persons, being convicted of harbour-
ing or concealing any negro or megroes belonging to any
other person or persons whatsoever, or suffering the same
to be done with his consent or knowledge, shall be fined
in a sum mot exceeding seven hundred dollars, and shall
be imprisoned not less than one calendar month, nor
exceeding six calendar months; and shall be liable in
damages to the party injured, to be recovered by action
on the case before any tribunal having competent juris–
diction.’ And similar enactments are to be found in the
statute-books of the other States.” (Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, note, pp. 264-5.)
Giving passes to slaves is prohibited in Maryland by
Act of 1796, chap. 67, sect. 20. Snethem, p. 29.)
And “free negroes or mulattoes” who may sell or give
away their “certificates of freedom,” may be fined three
hundred dollars, which, if not paid, may be raised by the
sale of such free persons into slavery ! (Laws of Maryland,
1796, chap. 67, sect. 18. Smethem, pp. 28-9.)
By Act of Congress of 1852, heavy penalties are im-
RUGITIVE SLAVES, 217
posed upon all persons who knowingly entertain or aid
fugitive slaves; and it is made the duty of United States
commissioners, marshals, and “all good citizens,” to
assist in returning them.
In our examination “ of the laws concerning the murder
and killing of slaves” (Chap. XIV.), we had occasion to
cite some cases from Wheeler’s “Law of Slavery,” by which
it would appear that the courts are quite familiar with
such occurrences as the shooting and killing of fugitive
slaves, since the owners often bring suits against the
“hunters” for damages in killing them And these suits.
are as coolly argued and disposed of as if it were a ques-
tion of the shooting of a mad bull. Sometimes, where
the shooting appeared to have been needless, “rash, and
incautious,” the plaintiff recovered damages. Other cases
conclude with “judgment for the defendant.”
The subject of “Runaway or fugitive slaves” occupies
a distinct division or chapter, of above a dozen pages,
in Mr. Wheeler's Compilation of Reported Cases. The
decisions of the courts are in harmony with the statutes
already cited, and show that they are not a dead letter.
We refer to a few cases. The first case introduces us to
slave law as expounded in the State of New York.
Glen v. Hodges, Jan. T., 1812; John's New York
Reports, 67. Trespass for taking the plaintiff's slave.
The fugitive had been seized by his master in Vermont.
The defendant, who had a claim on the negro for debt,
pursued him, and, with a writ of attachment, took him
from the plaintiff's possession, and imprisoned him for
218 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
debt. It was decided that the contract with a slave was
void, and therefore the defendant had no right to take
him. (Wheeler, pp. 266-7.)
Hutchins v. Lee, Dec. T., 1827; Walker's Miss.
Reports, 293. In this case it was decided that, in the
sale of a fugitive slave by a sheriff, “if the slave sell for
less money because of any neglect in the sheriff to perform
his duty, the remedy is by an action against the sheriff
for damages.” (Ib., p. 270.)
Tabranche v. Watkins, June T., 1816; 4 Martin's
Louisiana Reports, 391. This was a litigation between a
slave-owner and the sheriff, who had had him in custody
as a runaway. The sheriff sold the slave, then bought
him back of the purchaser. The court decided the act
of the sheriff to be fraudulent, and that “a runaway slave
cannot be sold by the sheriff till he had been advertised
two years.” (Wheeler, pp. 275-6.)
Under the head of “harbouring slaves,” in Wheeler's
“Law of Slavery,” a number of cases are put down, e.g. :
Scidmore v. Smith. The Court decided that “the
penalty for harbouring slaves is cumulative, and does not
destroy the common law remedy.” (P. 442.) That is, the
penalty for the criminal act is in addition to the damages
that may be claimed by the master in a civil suit.
We need occupy little space with proofs that the part
of the Slave Code contained in this chapter, frightful as it
is, is not a dead letter | Slave-hunts, with muskets and
bloodhounds, are too horribly frequent, by the testimony
of the Southern journals, to admit of any doubt on this
FUGITIVE SLAVES. 219
subject. And so are advertisements of runaway slaves by
their owners, with offers of reward for them “dead or
alive P’ or “for killing them,” or for “evidence of their
being killed !” Of such slave-hunts the inquirer may find
ample details in Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” pp. 21, 97, 102,
108, 155, 160. Specimens of such advertisements may
be found on page 156 of that book, together with a pro-
clamation of Outlawry, and an announcement of the con-
sequent “killing” of a negro.
The following advertisement is from the Ouachita
Register, a newspaper dated “Monroe, La. Tuesday evening,
June 1, 1852.”
“ NEGRO DOGS.
“The undersigned would respectfully inform the citizens
of Ouachita and adjacent parishes, that he has located
about two and a half miles east of John White's, on the
road leading from Monroe to Bastrop, and that he has a
fine pack of dogs for catching megroes. Persons wishing
negroes caught will do well to give him a call. He can
always be found at his stand when not engaged in hunting,
and even them information of his whereabouts can always
be had of some one on the premises.
“Terms.-Five dollars per day and found, when there is
mo track pointed out. When the track is shown, twenty-
five dollars will be charged for catching the negro.
“M. C. GOFF.
“Monroe, Feb. 17, 1852.”
With a full knowledge of these laws and of these facts—
nay, under the hardening effects of familiarity with them—
220 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
our leading statesmen and religious teachers will affect to
believe that the slaves are contented and happy in their
present condition. In almost the same breath they will
exhort us to the patriotic and Christian duty of enforcing
the infamous Fugitive Slave Bill; quote the Bible and
the Constitution to sustain their exhortations; and then
complain of being slandered, if accounted pro-slavery !
“No people were ever yet found who were better than
their [recognised and living] laws, though many have
been known to be worse.”
Judge Tucker, Professor of Law in the University of
William and Mary, Virginia, speaking of this law of
“outlawry” of runaways, and others of a similar nature,
said: “Such are the cruelties to which slavery gives birth ;
such the horrors to which the human mind is capable
of being reconciled by its adoption " (Stroud, p. 193.)
The tree is known by its fruit. The laws on this sub-
ject, State and mational, are but the matural progeny, as
they are also the indispensable defences, of “the immocent
legal relation.” Repeal them, and slave “property” takes
to itself legs, and runs away. To recognise the right of
“property” is to recognise the right of reclaiming it, and
the duty of its restoration. But it is likewise to reverse
the divine law : “Thou shalt not deliver unto his master
the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee:
He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place
which he shall choose, in one of thy gates, where it liketh
him best : thou shalt not oppress him.” (Deut. xxiii.
15, 16.)
CHAPTER, XIX.
T H E SL A V E CAN N OT S U E H IS MASTER,
Slave Property cannot litigate with its Owner
THE slave is a “chattel;" his master is his “owner.”
This “legal relation” precludes the idea of a suit at law
between them, especially a suit in which the chattel
should be plaintiff! As a horse or an ox cannot sue his
owner, so neither can a slave; for “slaves shall be deemed,
sold, taken, reputed, and adjudged in law to be chattels
personal, &c. &c., to all intents, constructions, and pur-
poses whatsoever.” “A slave is one who is in the power
of his master, to whom he belongs.” These all-compre-
hensive definitions are not a dead letter, and they accord-
ingly settle, at every step, every question that can be
raised concerning the condition of the slave. This is “the
legal relation,” and the whole of it. If this be tolerated,
all the rest of the system, in all its parts, and in all its
legitimate and natural workings and results, may be tole-
rated likewise. The parts, severally, cannot be worse
than the whole.
“A slave cannot be a party before a judicial tribunal,
in any species of action against his master, no matter how
atrocious may have been the injury which he has received
from him.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 57.)
222 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
We cited this paragraph in our Chapter IX, in proof
of the master’s “unlimited power.” In the chapters suc-
ceeding it has been shown that the laws ostensibly framed
for the protection and redress of the slave are of no value
to him. And nowhere have we found any provision for
a suit at law by the slave against his master. If the
master assaults his life, if he inflicts torture, if he takes
away his wife by force, or ravishes her before his eyes,
neither he nor his wife can bring him to trial, nor enter
complaint or bear testimony against him. If any instance
has occurred, amid the outrages of the last two hundred
years, let it be produced.
“The law is unquestionably as stated above, without
any exception or limitation.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 57.)*
The proposition at the head of this chapter, that “a
slave cannot sue his master,” is involved, of necessity, in
the still more comprehensive one (which will be esta-
blished when we come to treat of “the civil condition of
the slave”) that a slave cannot be a party in any civil
suit whatsoever. It would be absurd to suppose that he
could maintain a suit against his owner, when he could
maintain a suit against nobody else. And it would be
equally absurd to suppose that he who could possess no-
thing, if he should gain a suit, could have any power to
bring a suit before the courts for so idle a purpose. The
testimony of Mr. Wheeler to this point, in his “Law
* The case of an alleged slave bringing a suit for his freedom (which will
be considered in its place) is not an exception to the above proposition,
because the question whether the plaintiff be a slave is still to be settled,
and is not to be taken for granted.
OWNERS CANNOT BE SUED. 223
of Slavery,” p. 197, we reserve for its more appropriate
place hereafter, but refer to it here, for the convenience
of the inquiring reader.
The following cases, extracted from the same author,
will, however, be as appropriately inserted here as else-
where, though they prove more than the mere proposition
now before us.
“Berard v. Berard et al., Feb. Term, 1836; 9 Louisiana
Rep., 156.
“Per Cur., Martin, J.-The plaintiff is a person, and
sues her aunt, Marie Louise Berard, for the purpose of
establishing her and her children's claim to their freedom.
The defendant disavowed any title to the plaintiff, but
averred that she belonged to her late sister, Marie Jeane
Berard, and that she descended to her sister's natural
children and legal heirs, Celina and Antoine Garide!.
These heirs intervened, and claimed the plaintiff and her
children as their property, in the right of their deceased
mother. The case was tried by a jury, who found a
judgment for the intervening party, and the plaintiff
appealed.
“The court instructed the jury that the interveners
were not bound to show their title. The plaintiff ex-
cepted.
“On a full consideration of the case, this court is of
opinion that the instruction given to the jury by the
district judge was correct. A slave cannot stand in
judgment for any other purpose than to assert his free-
dom. He is not even allowed to contest the title of the
224 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
person holding him as a slave.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery,
197-8.)
This decision covers the entire ground of the incapacity
of the slave to sue his master, or any other person. And
it lifts the curtain from the scenery of society in a slave-
holding community. It shows us a niece, suing her
aunt for her freedom—the aunt claiming her niece as a
slave, not for herself, but on behalf of two other mieces—
those nieces coming forward to claim their cousin and her
children as their slave—the court and jury sustaining
the claim without calling upon the claimants to show
their title—the Supreme Court, “on a full consideration
of the case,” confirming the decision, and all as coolly as
if the claim were for a horse; yet upon a principle by
which no horse could be held, without showing a title !
This is slavery in the concrete, as actually existing, Sanc-
tioned by the courts, and not merely an abstraction.
The case that follows has been twice alluded to already,
and may be referred to again. We give it in full here.
“Dorothee v. Coquillon et al., Jan. T., 1829; 19
Martin's Louisiana Rep., 350.
“Appeal from the Parish Court of the parish and city
of New Orleans.
“Per Cur., Martin, J.—The plaintiff, a free woman of
colour, complaimed that her child was directed to be
emancipated at the age of twenty-one, by the will of her
mistress, who bequeathed her services, in the mean while,
to defendant's daughter, who is still a minor ; that the
will requires the child to be educated in such a manner
as may enable her to earn her livelihood when free ; that
OWNER CANNOT BE SUED. 225
/
wº
Ino care of her education is taken, and she is treated
cruelly. The prayer of the petition is, that the child be
declared free at twenty-One, and in the mean Linue hired
out by the sheriff. The answer denies the plaintiff’s
capacity to sue, that she has any cause of action ; and
the general issue is pleaded. The petition was dismissed,
and the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff cannot sue for
her minor daughter, in a case in which the latter could
not sue were she of age. The daughter is a statu liber,
and, as such, a slave till she reaches her twenty-first year,
(Clef des Loix Romaines, verbi Statu Liber.) As a slave, she
can have no action except to claim or prove her liberty.
(Civil Code, 177.) Her right to her freedom will not
begin till she is twenty-one ; if in the mean time the
legatee fails to perform the conditions of the bequest, and
the heirs of the testatrix have the legacy annulled there-
for, the statu, liber must continue a slave in the mean
while, and her services enjoyed by her heir ; so that the
object of the suit, so far as concerns her, is relief from ill-
treatment, which a slave cannot sue for. The plaintiff is
without any right of action, Judgment affirmed, with
costs.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 198-9.)
, And so the poor free coloured woman loses her case in
behalf of her slave daughter, who is to be free at twenty-
one, and is saddled with the costs of two courts, because
she did not know better than to suppose that a slave
might sustain an action against her master for ill-treat-
ment, and that the conditions of the will would be
enforced by the courts :
Q
226
CHAPTER XX.
NO POWER OF SELF-REDEMPTION, OR CHANGE OF MASTERS.
The Slave, being a Chattel, has no Power of Self-redemption, nor of an
Exchange of Owners.
AN ox cannot buy himself of his owner, nor transfer
himself to the ownership of another. Here again, “to
all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever,” the
slave is on a level with other working chattels | This
must be his predicament in the very nature of the case,
if the principle of chattelhood is to be consistently
maintained.
“Slaves cannot redeem themselves, nor obtain a change
of masters, though cruel treatment may have rendered
such a change necessary for their personal safety.”
(Stroud's Sketch, pp. 57-8.)
It is of American slavery in the nineteenth century of
the Christian era, and among a people boasting their pure
religion and their free institutions, that this is affirmed.
Among ancient heathen nations were found laws pro-
viding that slaves abused by their masters might apply
to the magistrates, who would order them to be sold to a
new master.
In Mississippi, as before moticed, the Constitution has
NO RIGHT OF RED EMPTION, 227
empowered the Legislature to enact such a law, but the
Legislature have not seen fit to exercise the power.
In Louisiana, the new Civil Code contains a regulation
looking apparently in that direction, but difficult, if not
impossible, to be made effective. It is as follows.
“No master shall be compelled to sell his slave, but in
One of two cases, to wit : the first, whem, being only co-
proprietor of the slave, his co-proprietor demands the
Sale, in order to make a partition of the property; second.
when the master shall be convicted of cruel treatment of
his slave, and the judge shall deem it proper to pro-
nounce, besides the penally established for such cases.
that the slave shall be sold at public auction, in order to
place him out of the reach of the power which his
master has abused.” (Art. 192.)
It is to be moticed here, that the judge is only em-
powered, not directed, to make such a decree. He may
apply merely the other penalties alluded to, and which
have already been examined. (Chap. XIII.) The master
must be convicted of cruelty by “white” testimony, by a
court and jury of slaveholders, and amid legal rules and
usages that expressly authorise chastisement with rigou",
provided it be mot “unusual,” nor “so as to maim or
mutilate,” or endanger life. (Civil Code of Louisiana.
before cited, Chap. XIII.)
It is not known that this law of Louisiana has evo
been enforced, and no other Slave State in the Union, so
far as we know, has any similar provision, though they
are careful to provide, in this particular, for the security
228 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
of indented apprentices. Without a change of masters,
it is evident that no other laws against cruelty would
be of any value. To punish an owner or overseer for
abusing a slave (even if it ever were done), and then
send the slave back again to be under the power of the
same tyrant (enraged, as he would be, at his punishment),
would only be to secure fresh injuries in secret.
As to the slave's power of self-redemption, there is no
legal provision for it in any of our American Slave States.
|Under the Spanish laws—as, for example, in Cuba—a
slave may apply to the proper magistrates and be ap-
praised. If, within a specified period, by the assistance
of friends, or by a customary if not prescribed arrange-
ment with the master, and by his own extra exertions,
the amount of the appraisal can be raised, he becomes free.
In this way many emancipations take place, as was also the
fact among the ancient heathem. Our Christian and Pro-
testant slavery knows no relaxation of the kind The late
TJnited States Senator, James D. Wolfe, of Rhode Island,
who owned a slave-plantation in Cuba, and who was in
early life a captain or supercargo of a slaver to Africa,
was wont to dwell with satisfaction on this feature of
Cuban slavery, and to congratulate himself that he was
not a slaveholder under our American Code, which
allowed no opportunity to an industrious and enterprising
slave to become free.
CHAPTER, XXI.
THE RELATION HEREDITARY AND PERPETUAL.
Slaves being held as Property, like other Domestic Animals, their Offspring
are held as Property, in perpetuity, in the same manner.
“THE law of South Carolina says of slaves, “All their
issue and their offspring, born or to be born, shall be, and
are hereby declared to be, and remain for ever hereafter,
absolute slaves, and shall follow the condition of the
mother.’” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 129. See Act of 1740.
2 Brevard's Digest, 229.)
In Maryland, “All negroes and other slaves, already
imported or hereafter to be imported into this province,
and all children, now born or hereafter to be born of
such negroes and slaves, shall be slaves during their
natural lives.” (Act of 1715, chap. 44, sect. 22. Stroud's
Sketch, p. 11.)
Similar in Georgia. (Prince's Dig., 446. Act of 1770)
And in Mississippi. (Revised Code of 1823, p. 369.)
And in Virginia. (Revised Code of 1819, p. 421.) And
in Kentucky. (Littell and Swigert's Digest, 1149-50.)
And in Louisiana. (Civil Code, art. 183.) In all these
laws it is laid down that the child follows the condition
of the mother, whoever the father may be The same
2
3{} THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
usage, whether with or without written law, prevails in
all our Slave States; and under its sanction, the slave
“owner” very frequently holds and sells his own children
as “property,’” though sometimes as white as himself.
“That is property which the law declares to be property.
Two humdred years of legislation have sanctified and
sanctioned negro slaves as property.” (Henry Clay ;
Speech, U. S. Senate, 1839.)
So also Mr. Gholsom, in the Legislature of Virginia :
“The owner of land has a reasonable right to its annual
produce, the owner of brood mares to their products, and
the owner of female slaves to their increase.”
Thus the perpetuity of slavery grows out of its here-
ditary transmission, and this, again, comes from its tenure
of chattelhood. If the “legal relation” be valid and
innocent, there can be no argument admitted against the
right of its perpetuity; and slave-property may be held
so long as other property is held. The duty of a future
liberation would imply the unlawfulness of present posses-
sion. Intelligent slaveholders, perceiving this, are careful
to fortify their present claims upon human chattels, by
enactments seeking the perpetuity of the system.
In Jamaica, before emancipation, the mixed breed, at
the fourth degree of distance from the negro ancestor,
were liberated by express law. In the other British West
India Islands, a similar custom prevailed. (See Stephen's
West India Slavery, p. 27, and Edwards West Indies,
book 4, chap. 1.) In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies
(probably, also, in the French), a similar usage is believed
SLAVERY HEREDITARY-PERPIETUAL. 231
to prevail. (Wide Stroud's Sketch, p. 14.) Not so in our
North American Slave States, where biblical defences of
slavery, on the pretended foundation of Hebrew servi-
tude, forget to define it by the Hebrew usages, and are
resorted to in defence against the proclamation of the
Hebrew Jubilee | By this process, and by defences of or
apologies for “the legal relation” of slave-ownership, the
idea of “rights of property” is sustained, which includes
the right of perpetuity, of course, and makes it a work of
supererogation to emancipate. Refusing to do so, the
citizen remains as good as the laws; and the Christian
(so he is taught) as good as the apostles and Moses, so far
as the slave-question is concerned. With “fanatics” he
leaves it to attempt being better. Hence, the people
(with few exceptions) are “no better than their laws” in
this matter.
232
CHAPTER XXII.
TIGHT TO EDUCATION.—RELIGIOUS LIBERTY-RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE,
The Slave, being held as a Chattel, is held by a tenure which excludes any
legal Recognition of his Rights as a thinking and religious Beng.
WE are not now speaking of laws or of usages that
directly infringe such rights and prohibit their exercise.
There are such laws, and we shall give some specimens of
them when we come to inquire after the condition of the
slave in relation to civil society.” At present we are only
unfolding to view “the legal relation of master and slave.”
We affirm that a recognition of thé validity or lawfulness
of that relation is equivalent to a denial of the literary
and religious rights of the slave. And if that relation be
an innocent one, then the denial and the withholding of
those rights, as rights, are innocent likewise. The mere
bestowal of privileges, with the permission to enjoy them,
is not the recognition of rights; it is rather an implied
denial of their existence. Mon do not grant permission
nor confer privileges where they recognise rights. The
power to permit and to confer carries with it the power
to refuse and to withhold. Both the master and the slave
understand this, where permissions are most frequently
* Chapters VI, and VII., Part II.
SPIRITUAL IDESPOTISM. 233
given. It is injurious to confer, as it is degrading to
accept as a boom, what belongs to every man as man, by
absolute and inherent right. The rights of investigation,
of free speech, of mental culture, of religious liberty, and
of conscience, are of this class. Man may no more affect
to confer them or permit their exercise than he may pre-
sume to take them away.
The statement, then, is not that slave-masters do not
educate mor permit the education of their slaves, nor allow
nor furnish them the benefits of religious instruction and
Social worship. As a general statement, with particular
and local exceptions, it might be made and sustained, as
will appear in its allotted place. But we waive and pass
by all this for the present, to affirm distinctly that “the
legal relation” of slave-ownership in America, as defined
by the code that upholds it, is a relation that cannot and
does not consist with the recognition (either in theory or
practice) of the intellectual and religious RIGHTS of the
slave.
The slave “is a chattel.” But chattels have no literary
or religious rights. He is a chattel “to all intents, con-
structions, and purposes whatsoever.” He is “in the
power of a master, to whom he belongs”—“entirely
subject to the will of his master”—“not ranked among
Sentient beings, but among things.” It would be an ab-
surdity for such a code to recognise the slave as possessing
religious rights. It is free from any such absurdity.
Except the provisions, in some of the States, for the
“baptism” of slaves, and for their “spiritual assistance
234. THE AMERICAN SLAVE COROE.
when sick” (see Chap. VII, Part II.), we have fourd
no recognition of their religious wants, their religious
natures, or immortal destinies. Even here they seem to
be considered passive beings, whose Salvation is to be
bestowed by their masters. The American Slave Code,
from beginning to end, knows no rights of conscience in
its subjects. The master is to be implicitly obeyed. His
will is to be law. The slave is allowed mo self-direction,
no Sacred marriage, no family relation, no marital rights
—none that may not be taken away by his master.
Religion and its duties are based on human relations,
including family relations. These relations, the “relation:
of slave-ownership” and chattelhood abrogates. Religion
requires and cherishes self-control ; but the “ owner's"
authority supersedes and prohibits self-control. Religion
implies free agency; but “the slave is not a free agent.”
His “condition is merely a passive one.” So says the
Slave Code, and so says ecclesiastical law, and therefore
releases him from the obligations of the seventh com-
mandment. Witness the decision of the Savannah River
Baptist Association, while allowing its slave members,
without censure, to take second or third companions, in
obedience to their masters, by whom their original con-
nexioms had been severed
Rights of conscience require, and therefore authorise, i
man to choose his own place of worship, and not “forsake
the assembling together ;” nay, to choose and follow the
avocation, and select the residence and the associates
where, in his own judgment, he can best serve God, fit
SPIRITUAL DESPOTISM. dº
º
35
..)
his own soul for heaven, and lead his fellow-men to the
Saviour. It commands and authorises him to “search the
Scriptures,” and train up his family “in the nurture and
admonition of the Lord.” The master emancipates his
slave, and ceases to be his “owner” when he fully accords
to him, in practice and in theory, these Heaven-conferred
rights. It is useless to attempt evading this, by adducing
the case of children and minors. The slave, at maturity,
is entitled to the rights and responsibilities of a man, and
without them he is despoiled of his religious rights.
The slave-master may withhold education and the
Bible; he may forbid religious instruction, and access to
|ſublic worship. He may enforce upon the slave and his
family a religious worship and a religious teaching which
be disapproves. In all this, as completely as in secular
matters, he is “entirely subject to the will of a master to
whom he belongs.” The claim of chattelhood extends to
the soul as well as to the body, for the body cannot be
otherwise held and controlled.
There is no other religious despotism on the face
of the earth so absolute, so irresponsible, so soul-
crushing as this. It is not subjection to an eccle-
siastical body or functionary of any description—a
presbytery, a conference, a bishop, a prelate, a pope,
who may be supposed to be sensible, in some sort, of
their sacred and responsible charge The free white
American exults in his oxomption from the jurisdiction
of these, except during his own free consent. He would
freely part with his life's blood, in martyrdom or in War,
236 THE AMERICAN SLAVE COIDE.
rather than relinquish or compromise this right ! But he
thinks it a light matter (if he thinks of it at all) that
three millions of his countrymen are in a worse spiritual
thraldom than this, under bishops that regard and treat
them as “chattels personal!” a bishopric entailed by
descent, or conferred by the hammer of the auctioneer,
the writ of the sheriff, or the chances of the billiard-
table, and transferable in the same manner! may, exercised
by deputation every day, by the brutal overseer, the igno-
rant housekeeper, the spoiled child—a bishopric, Christian
or infidel, drunken or sober, chaste or lewd, as the chances
may happen! Who thinks of it, that the religious rights
of immortal men are thus trampled in the dust in this
country—that their religious privileges are in such keep-
ing'. How is it that Christian ministers, “sons of the
Pilgrims,” can overlook all this, as they do, when they
speak of the “innocent legal relation” that involves, of
necessity, all this? The absolute power of the Pope,
though conferred, as it once was, by the almost unani-
mous consent of all Christendom, they can denounce as
“the Antichrist,” forgetful of the more absolute power of
every “owner” of an American slave The doom of
the former they read in the Apocalypse; the latter they
deem Heaven-sanctioned and approved, blaming only its
abuse ! Why may not Papal power have the benefit of
the same apology 7. Whence comes it that the absolute
religious despotism (for such it is) of the slave-owner is
so much more Sacred and unapproachable than that of
the Protestant or Catholic Church ;
SPIRITUAL IDESPOTISM. 237
}=r
A single incident—we hope it is an uncommon one—
will illustrate this absolute power of the slaveholder.
At a planter's dinner-table, one day (perhaps over the
wine), a guest remarked upon the hypocrisy of all reli-
gious slaves. The planter dissented. He was the owner
of one who would rather die than deny his Redeemer.
This was ridiculed. The slave was brought and put to
the test. He was ordered to deny his belief in the Cord
Jesus Christ. He refused; was terribly whipped; re-
tained his integrity; the whipping was repeated, and
“he died in consequence of this severe infliction.” This
was in South Carolina. The facts were related to Miss
Sarah M. Grimke, daughter of Judge Grimke, of Charles-
ton, by an intimate friend, the wife of a slaveholder.
The particulars, over the signature of Miss Grimke, are
inserted in Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” p. 24.
There is no adequate legal protection against Such out-
rages, nor can there be, consistently with the “legal
relation” of slave-ownership. There was probably no
legal investigation of this case. If there had been, and
if “white” witnesses had attested the fact, the verdict, in
conformity with the laws of the State, would probably
lº
have been, “death by moderate correction Into the
causes or reasons of chastisement, the Slave Code does not
inquire It is sufficient that the slave disobeys his
“owner,” “overseer, or agent l’
We have made no quotations from the statutes or
judicial decisions of the Slave States, on the subject of this
chapter directly, because we have found none! Neither
238 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Stroud nor Wheeler, mor any other compiler of slave-laws
and decisions that we know of, appear to have discovered
any provisions for the education and religious liberties of
slaves | The eloquent silence of these significant blanks
in the statute-book and judicial reports of the, Slave
States is sufficient to certify the facts of the case. Who-
ever has read the preceding enactments and decisions well
knows how to interpret such silence.
CHAPTER XXIII.
ORIGIN OF THE “RELATION,” AND ITS SUBJECTs.
The so-called “ legal relation” of Slave-ownership of Negroes originated in
that Aſrican Slave-trade which our Laws now punish as piracy; but
Slavery is, in general, extended over all Classes whom the Slaveholders
have been able to seize upon and retain—over Indians, free persons
of colour, and Whites.
SIR JOHN HAWKINS obtained leave of Queen Elizabeth,
in the year 1562, to transport Africans into the American
cołomies with their own free consent, a condition with
which he promised to comply. But he forfeited his word,
and forced them on board his ships by acts of devastation
and slaughter. For this he was denominated a murderer
and a robber, even by the historian Edwards, an advocate
of the slave-trade. (Wide Clarkson's History, p. 30; and
Edwards' Hist. W. Indies, vol. 2, pp. 43-4.) This was the
Beginning of the slave-trade by Englishmen.
By Act of 23 George II., the “trade to Africa” was
“regulated,” including a strict prohibition, under penalties,
of the taking on board or carrying away any African “by
force, fraud, or violence.” (Wide Clarkson, p. 314. See
also Spooner's Unconstitutionality of Slavery.)
Under no other legal sanction than this, the forcible
and fraudulent seizure and transportation of slaves from
Africa to the British-American Colonies was carried on
240 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
till the West India, and North American Colonies were
stocked with slaves, and many were introduced into Eug-
land, held as slaves there, and the tenure accounted legal
But in 1772 it was decided by Lord Mansfield, in the
case of James Somerset, a slave, that the whole process
and tenure were illegal; that there was not, and never
had been, any legal slavery in England. This decision
was understood by Granville Sharpe, the chief agent in
procuring it, to be applicable to the British colonies, as
well as to the mother-country, and undoubtedly it was so.
The United States were them colonies of Great Britain,
But the slaves in the colonies had no Granville Sharpe to
bring their cause into the courts, and the courts were
composed of slaveholders.
In the great struggle, afterwards, in the British Parlia-
ment for abolishing the African slave-trade, William Pitt
cited the Act of 23 George II. (which we have already
mentioned), and declared that, instead of authorising the
slave-trade, as was pretended, it was a direct prohibition
of the whole process, as it had actually been carried on by
fraud, force, and violence. An elaborate investigation by
Parliament sustained the statement ; and, after a long
struggle, the doctrine prevailed, and the traffic was ex-
pressly and Solemnly abolished, though it has been secretly
carried on to the present day, and is prosecuted still.
There is reason to believe that great numbers are still
Smuggled annually into the United States, as it is known
that numerous plantations in the States bordering on the
Gulf of Mexico are stocked with slaves, evidently African,
SJAVERY--ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS, 241
and unable to speak English.* The whole process is, and
has been, illegal, from beginning to end.
The first introduction of slaves into Georgia was in
direct violation of express statutes of the colony itself,
until slaveholders gained the ascendancy and repealed
the laws. Into the other colonies slaves were introduced
a long time before there were any colonial enactments
authorising it, and consequently without any show of
legal sanction. When statutes were enacted, they did not
pretend to create or originate the relation. Nor did they
define, with exactness, who were slaves and who were not
slaves. They only assumed or took for granted the exist-
ence of slave-property, and made laws for its security and
regulation. The consequence is, that no slaveholder can
now prove that the particular slaves claimed by him were
ever made slaves according to law, or that their ancestors
were thus enslaved And there are no statute laws in
either of the States, by which it can be legally proved by
the common rules and usages of courts, as applied to other
* See Weld’s “Slavery as it Is” (p. 139, &c.), for important facts on this
subject, among which are the following:—The President's Message, in
1837, stated that a naval force had been employed in preventing the
inportation of slaves. Mr. Middleton, of South Carolina, in 1819, de-
clared, in a speech in Congress, that “thirteen thousand Africans are
annually smuggled into the Southern States.” Mr. Mercer, of Virginia,
in a speech in Congress, declared that “cargoes” of African slaves were
Smuggled into the South, to a deplorable extent. Mr. Wright, of Mary-
land, in a speech in Congress, estimated the “number imported annually
at fifteen thousand.” Particulars are also given of the importation of a
cargo of five hundred from Guinea and Congo into Savannah, the cap-
ture, the sham trial of the importers, their acquittal, and the distribution
of the slaves among the planters! New Orleans papers, in 1839, recorded
the fact of frequent and extensive smuggling.
R.
242 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
subjects, that slavery legally exists there. This was
avowed by Mr. Mason, of Virginia, in the Senate of the
United States, when the Fugitive Slave Bill was pending.
Eſe objected to the proposed “trial by jury” that it would
bring up the question of the legality of slavery in the
States, which, said he, it would be impossible to prove.
Mr. Bayly, member of Congress from Virginia, took the
same ground. So Congress struck out the jury trial, be-
cause slaveholders avowed their inability to prove the
legality of slavery in a court of law
It may be proper to explain that, while these gentlemen
admit that there are no express statutes of the States that
are adequate to the legalisation of slavery, they neverthe-
less affect to believe that it is legalised by the common
law It is not strange that they are unwilling to go with
that plea into the courts | The courts of Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, and Kentucky have already set it aside. (See
the case of Marie Louise v. Mariott et al., May Term,
1836; 8 Louisiana Reports, 475. Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, 348-9. Also, same principle in Rankin v. Lydia,
Fall Term, 1820; 2 Marshall's Kentucky Rep., 467.
Wheeler, p. 339. Also in Lunsford v. Coquillon, May
Term, 1824; 14 Martin's Louisiana Rep., 401. Wheeler,
p. 335. See also Harvy and others v. Decker and Hop-
kins, June Term, 1818; Walker's Mis. Rep., 36. Wheeler,
pp. 340-6. See also Commonwealth of Massachusetts v.
Thomas Aves, Aug., 1836. Wheeler, p. 368, and Story's
Conflict of Laws, 92-97.)*
* While these statements were in the hands of the printer, a gentleman
of the city of Now York, who, for several years, was a practising lawyer
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 243
All these affirm that slavery, being without foundation
in nature, is the creature of municipal law, and exists
only under its jurisdiction. In the case first mentioned
(Marie Louise v. Mariott et al.), in which the slave had
been taken to France by her master, and brought back to
Louisiana, Judge Matthews said, “Being free for one
moment in France, it was not in the power of her former
owner to reduce her again to slavery.” (Wheeler, p. 349.)
The absence, therefore, of municipal law, is fatal to the
legality of the claims of the slaveholder, even by the
-Slave Code. In the case of Lunsford v. Coquillon, above
mentioned, Judge Martin said, “The relation of owner
and slave is, in the States of this Union in which it has a
legal existence, the creature of municipal law.” (Wheeler,
p. 335.)
In Wheeler’s “Law of Slavery,” pp. 8-11, there is a
brief account of the origin of slavery, which in no essen-
tial particular conflicts with the account we have here
given of it, and in some of the most important particulars
is coincident with it. The same remarks will apply to
the statements cited from Judge Matthews of Louisiana,
pp. 15, 16.
“It is an admitted principle that slavery has been per-
mitted and tolerated in all the colonies established in
America by the mother-country—not only of Africans,
but also of Indians. Wo legislative act of the colonies can
be found in relation to it.” (Wheeler, pp. 8, 9.)
In other words, the practice had no municipal law to
in Georgia, informed the author that thero had been similar judicial
decisions in that State.
244 THE AMERICAN SLAYE CODE.
sanction it. It was barely “tolerated ;” that is, it was
not suppressed. This is a very different thing from saying
that it was legal, which could not be without local enact-
ment, even according to the lowest definition of legality.
No lawyer ever speaks of the holding of property in
horses (which is a natural right) as being “tolerated ſ”
Again—
“Hudgins v. Wright, Nov. T., 1806; 1 Hen. and
Mumf, Va. Rep., 139.
“Per Cur. : The slavery of the African negro has existed
from the time of bringing them into the colony. In many
of the States express enactments have been made declar-
ing them slaves, and in others they are slaves by custom.”
(Wheeler, p. 12.)
It would have been interestimg to have learned from
the court in which of the colonies, and when and how,
“express enactments” were made. It would then have
confirmed fully the statement before quoted, that “no
legislative enactments” originating slavery can be found.
Again—
In the case of Seville v. Chretien, Sept. T., 1817, 5
Martin's Louisiana Reports, 275, Judge Matthews admits,
and labours to account for, “the absence of any legislative
act of European powers for the introduction of slavery
into their American dominions.” (Wheeler, p. 15.)
So that American slavery owes its origin neither to
American nor European legislation. The courts, indeed,
whenever they approach the subject, appear to be perplexed
with the problem of its legal origin. As for example :—
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 245
Hall v. Mullen, June T., 1821 ; 5 Har, and John's
Md. Rep., 190, Judge Johnson said, “But the condition
and rights of slaves in this State depend not exclusively
either on the civil or feudal law, but may, perhaps, rest
in part on both ; subject, nevertheless, to such changes in
their condition,” &c., “as the laws of the State may pre-
scribe.” (Wheeler, pp. 10, 11.)
By what authority, when, and how, the feudal law or
the Roman civil law became established in the American
States, we are not informed ; nor is it very important,
since the courts at the South will be careful not to allow
the feudal law to define slavery—as, indeed, appears by
the preceding.
- Whence, then, is the original of slavery And how
does it appear to have been or to be legalised ? In the
case of
Harvey and others v. Decker and Hopkins, June T.,
Walker's Miss. Rep., 36, the Court said, “Slavery is con-
demned by reason and the laws of mature. It exists, and
can only exist, through municipal regulations.” (Wheeler,
pp. 340-6.) -
But the “municipal regulations” (so far as originating
the “legal relation” is concerned) appear, as has been
seen, to be missing ! They “cannot be found” on the
statute-book
The New Jersey judge who frankly confessed that he
could not tell and did not care how the legal right to
enslave the Indians originated, took the most prudent
course, and should be imitated by all pro-slavery judges
246 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
who are so unfortunate as to stumble upon “the delicate
question” of the origin of legalised negro slavery.
“The State v. Waggomer, April T., 1797; 1 Halstead's
N. J. Rep., 374-476.
“They (Indians) have so long been recognised as slaves
in our law that it would be as great a violation of the
rights of property to establish a contrary decision at the
present day, as it would in the case of the Africans, and
as useless to investigate the manner in which they origin-
ally lost their freedom.” (Wheeler, p. 18.)
And yet, in Wheeler’s “Law of Slavery,” we find cases
in which even Southern judges (to their honour be it
recorded) have awarded freedom to persons enslaved, upon
the opposite principle, that “prescription is never plead-
able to a claim of freedom.” This is the marginal note
to the case of
“Delphene v. Devise, 14 Martin's Louisiana Rep., 650.
“Per Cur., Porter, J. : The plaintiff urges she is de-
scended from one Marie Catherene, a negro woman now
deceased, who was the slave of a certain Marie Durse, and
that the said Marie emancipated and set free Catherene
and her children, Florence, Luce, and Catherenc, the
mother of the petitioner.” “The defendant pleaded the
general issue and prescription. We shall, before entering
upon the merits, dispose of the exception which forms
the second ground of defence in the defendant's answer.
We do so by referring to the third partida, title twenty-
mine, law twenty-four, in which we find it provided that
if a man be free, no matter how long he may have been
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 247
Hey
held by another as a slave, his state or condition cannot
be thereby changed, nor can he be reduced to slavery in
any manner whatever, on account of the time he may have
been held in servitude.” “The plaintiff is entitled to her
freedom.” (Wheeler, p. 101.)
Same principle in case of Metayer v. Metayer, Jan.
T., 1819; 6 Martin's Louisiana Rep., 16. (Wheeler, p.
103.) Also in Vaughan v. Phebe, Jan. T., 1827 ; Martin
and Yerger's Tenn. Rep., 1. (Wheeler, pp. 395-404.)
Judge Crabb said, “The act of limitations would be no
bar.” (P. 399.)
Neither by statute, therefore, nor by the common law,
nor yet by prescription, are the negroes in America legally
held in bondage.
But it is time, now, in further confirmation of this, to
cite more fully the language held by Judge Matthews,
of Louisiana, in the case of Seville v. Chretien, before
mentiomed.
Having alluded to “the absence of any legislative act of
the European powers for the introduction of slavery into
their American dominions,” Judge Matthews adds—
“If the record of any such act exists, we have not been
able to find any trace of it. It is true that Charles the Fifth,
in the first part of the sixteenth century, granted a patent
to one of his Flemish subjects for the privilege of import-
ing four thousand negroes into America, which was pur-
chased by some Genoese merchants, who were the first
who brought into any regular form the commerce for
slaves between Africa and America. A few years before,
248 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
a small number of negroes had been introduced by order
of Ferdinand. But the privilege granted by the Emperor,
so far from being the first introduction of slavery into the
New World, was intended as a means of enabling the
planters to dispense with the slavery of the Indians by
their European conquerors. A full account of these trans-
actions may be seen in Robertson's ‘History of America.’”
(Wheeler, p. 15.)
It will not, probably, be contended that the enslavement
of the Indians here mentioned was under sanction of law.
But let us hear Judge Matthews further—
“On turning our attention to the first settlement of the
British colonies in America, we find that the introduction
of negro slaves into one of the most important was acci-
dental. In the year 1616, as stated by Robertson, and
1620 by Judge Marshall, in his Life of Washington, a
Dutch ship from the coast of Guinea sold a part of her
cargo of negroes to the planters on James River. This is
the first origin of the slavery of the blacks in the British-
American provinces. About twenty years after, slaves
were introduced into New England; and it is believed that
Indians were at the same time, or before, held in bondage.
The absence of any act or instrument of Government wºnder
which their slavery originated is mot a matter of greater swº-
prise than that there should have been none found authorising
the slavery of the blacks. The first Act of the Legislature
of the Province of Virginia on the subject of the slavery
of the Indians was passed in 1670; and one of its provisions,
according to Judge Tucker, prohibits free or manumitted
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 249.
Indians from purchasing Christian servants. The words
free or manumitted are useless and absurd, if there did not
exist Indians who had been slaves and had been manu-
mitted before and at the time this Act was passed.”
(Wheeler, pp. 15, 16.)
Thus full and explicit is the testimony of Judge Mat-
thews, of Louisiana (and in the very act of making a
decision against the claims of an Indian “to recover his
liberty”), to the fact that both Indians and negroes were
originally enslaved in this country, in the absence of either
European or colonial legislation to sanction or create the
relation of owner and slave.
Put this by the side of the Southern decisions, before
cited, that slavery can have no legal existence in the
absence of municipal law, and we have the result
that slavery in this country had no legal origin, and
has continued to exist without law; since (by the same
testimony) “no legislative act of the colonies can be found
in relation to it.”
The reader may be curious to know on what ground
Judge Matthews, of Louisiana, in the case already cited,
could maintain the legality of American slavery. It is
this—
“However, we are of opinion that it may be laid down
as a legal axiom that, in all governments in which the
municipal regulations are not absolutely opposed to
slavery, persons already reduced to that state may be held
in it ; and we also assume it as a first principle that
slavery has been permitted and tolerated in all the colo-
250 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
nies established in America by European powers, most
clearly as relates to the blacks and Africans, and also in
relation to Indians, in the first periods of conquest and
colonisation.” (Wheeler, p. 15.)
According to this “legal axiom,” any person in a State
where there are no express statutes forbidding slavery
(as perhaps in Massachusetts and Maine) may seize any
other person and enslave him ; and having done this,
he may continue to “hold” him legally, because the laws
have not forbidden it ! By the same or a similar “ legal
axiom,” it would follow that in a State where no express
statutes had been enacted against such minor injuries as
assault, battery, and maiming, such practices might be
considered legal Thus the “ axiom” ignores the exist-
ence of natural law and common law
Another important circumstance is, that the colonial
charters which were their constitutions of government
expressly provided that the colonies should enact no laws
contrary to the common law, the Constitution, and the
fundamental laws of Great Britain. But these (as decided
by Lord Mansfield, and as attested by Coke, Fortescue,
and Blackstone) are incompatible with the existence of
slavery.
Another fact is, that the thirteen United States, on the
4th of July, 1776, declared that “all men are created
equal, and are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.” Similar declarations were incor-
porated into the original constitutions of the several
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 251
w
States, and the courts in Massachusetts decided that this
was equivalent to an act abolishing slavery.*
Such was the origin, and such are the legal foundations
of the “legal relation of master and slave” in this coun-
try ; just as “legal” now, and no more so—just as
“innocent” now, and no more so than in the person of
John Hawkins, when he first forced a band of naked
Africans on board his slave-ship, on the coast of Africa,
or when he first offered them for sale in the colonies ;
quite as cruel, Heaven-defying, and murderous now as it
was them, and involving its present perpetrators in the
same condemnation with John Hawkins, at the bar of an
impartial posterity, and at the bar of God. “Where the
foundation is weak,” says the common law, “the structure
falls.” “What is invalid from the beginning cannot be
made valid by length of time.” (Noyes' Maxims.) “He
that stealeth a man and selleth him,” says Moses, “ or if he
* The historical facts hastily himted at in this chapter are detailed at
length in Goodell’s “History of Slavery and Anti-slavery.” Since that
work was issued, and since this book has been in the hands of the printer,
the author has received additional information from John Scoble, late
Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, London. In
consequence of atrocities committed by a West India slaveholder of
eminence, a legal investigation took place, which resulted in the discovery
and announcement that there was no legalised slavery in the British
colonies. This was made public in England previous to the Act of Par-
liament terminating the practice of slaveholding. The Act, accordingly,
does not repeal or assume to repeal any existing laws, either colonial or
British. It only provides for the suppression of an unlawful custom or
practice. Intelligent Englishmen do not now speak of British West
Indian slavery as having ever been legal. This accords with the maxim
of James Madison and of Lord Brougham, that man cannot hold property
l]] ]]].8ll.
252 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death.”
“The law was made for men-stealers,” says Paul. “Stealers
of men,” said the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1794,
“are those who bring off slaves or freemen, and keep, sell,
or buy them.” “Those are man-stealers,” says Grotius,
“who abduct, keep, sell, or buy slaves or freemen.” “To
hold a man in a state of slavery,” said Dr. Jonathan
Edwards, “is to be, every day, guilty of robbing him of
his liberty, or of man-stealing.” “Mem-buyers,” said
John Wesley, “are exactly on a level with men-stealers.”
We might quote similar language from Dr. Porteus,
Bishop of London, Bishop Warburton, Macknight, Abra-
ham Booth, and other eminent writers.
This is the pretended “legal relation” of master and
slave in America. Let us now see who are its subjects.
1. The descendants of all who were stolen by John
Pławkins and others on the coast of Africa | The law of
hereditary slavery, as defended by Henry Clay and Mr.
Gholson, and as practised by the entire community of
slaveholders, identifies their slaveholding with the slave-
holding of John Hawkins, and bases their claim of pro-
perty upon his If this is not so, then they are guilty of
commencing the process de movo, and of kidnapping the
innocent, helpless infant “upon their own hook " This
is called being “born to a slave inheritance I’’ This is the
º
“innocent legal relation The slave-law enables the
heir to seize upon the slaves of his father or their off-
spring ; and he is under the umfortunate necessity of
seizing upon all within his grasp—not unfrequently his
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 253
own father's daughters and sons ! Were they his own
mother's daughters and sons, too, and if he had the power,
it would be the same thing ! Equally “legal”—equally
“innocent "
And here is the evidence.
Hudgins v. Wrights, Nov. T., 1806; 1 Hen. and
Munf. Va. Rep., 134. Per Cur., Tucker, J. : “From the
first settlement of the colony of Virginia to the year 1788,
October Sessions, all negroes, Moors, and mulattoes, except
Turks and Moors in amity with Great Britain, brought
into this country, by sea or land, were slaves; and by the
uniform declaration of our laws, the descendants of females
remain slaves to this day, unless they can prove a right
to freedom by actual emancipation, or by descent in
matermal line from an emancipated slave.” (Wheeler,
p. 3.)
Hudgins v. Wrights (same case). “Held by the
Court, Green, J., that, to solve all doubts, the Act of
1662 was passed, which declared that all children born in
this country shall be bond or free, according to the con-
dition of the mother. It is the rule of the civil law. By
that law the state of the child was determined by that of
the mother at the time of its birth.” (Ib., p. 3.) “The
rule is umiversally followed.” (Ib., p. 34.)
“The code of the civil law prevails in all the States”
(says Mr. Wheeler, in a mote on the preceding), “and in
many of them statutes have been enacted on the subject.”
(Ib., p. 11. See also Stroud's Sketch.)
By Act of Maryland, 1663, chap. 30, we are informed
254 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
(in the preamble) that “divers free-born English women,”
&c., “do intermarry with negro slaves, by which also
divers suits may arise touching the issue of such women,”
&c.; whereupon it was enacted that, in such cases, the
woman shall also serve the master of her husband during
his life, and their children “shall be slaves as their fathers
were.” But in 1770 this law was repealed, and it was
enacted that the child should follow the comdition of the
mother instead of the father. (Stroud's Sketch, pp. 8-10.)
As mulattoes, with few exceptiolus, were the offspring
of white fathers by slave mothers, this law, as was in-
tended, secured to the father the right of ownership over
his own children—a very common and extensive mani-
festation of “the innocent legal relation.” As this law
obtains in all the Slave States, a large and increasing pro-
portion of the slaves are held in slavery under its opera-
tion. If the child followed the condition of the father,
the system would rapidly run itself out.
2. Free people of colour may be and continually are
brought into slavery, in this country, in a variety of ways.
Some of these ways have been already specified, incident-
ally, while treating of other topics. Some will be specified
hereafter ; and they will be clustered together and
adverted to again, in a chapter on “The Liberties of the
Free People of Colour.” In the mean time, the topic
demanded attention here, in our inquiry concerning the
subjects of slavery, and we shall cite Some particulars
which need not be repeated again.
The general fact of the enslavement of the free coloured
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 255
people, of the facility with which it is done, and of the
indifference, not to say the connivance, of the Southern
courts, will appear from the following:—
Davis v. Sandford, Spring Term, 1815; 6 Littell's Ky.
Rep., 206.
“The appellant sold to the appellee a slave. The deed
of bargain and warranty certified that the negro was born
a slave. It appeared that the megro had been in Ohio,
and had, by the courts of that State, been declared free,
which fact was known to both parties—the seller alleging
that the judgment declaring the slave free had no force or
effect upon his rights, as he was not made a party. The
court, Charles J. Boyle, held that the warranty was not
broken, it not being alleged or proved that the negro was
not born a slave; and the justice of the case was with the
seller—the buyer purchasing with a knowledge of all the
facts, which was properly shown by parol evidence.”
(Wheeler, p. 121.)
But we must proceed to classify some of the principal
methods of reducing free people of colour to slavery.
(a) Slaves made free by the volumtary act of their
masters may be re-enslaved in various ways. A failure
of conformity, in every minute particular, to the enact-
ments regulating emancipations (however vexatious and
unreasonable), will work the forfeiture of liberty to the
emancipated.
In cases where infant children of slaves were made
free by the will of their “owners,” but inadvertently the
precise time of their becoming free failed to be specified,
256 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
such “shall be esteemed slaves for life I’ (Maryland
Laws, Act of 1809, chap. 71. Stroud's Sketch, p. 151.
See chapter on Legislative and Judicial Obstructions to
Emancipation.)
(b) A full and exact compliance with the legal regu-
lations, in emancipating slaves, does not always secure
their freedom. The Legislature of North Carolina set
aside the decisions of the courts, and re-enslaved large
numbers who had been legally set free. (See chapter
just mentioned.)
In Virginia, “if any emancipated slave (infants ex-
cepted) shall remain in the State more than twelve
months after his or her right to freedom shall have
accrued, he or she shall forfeit all such right, and may be
apprehended and sold by the overseers of the poor, &c.,
for the benefit of the Literary Fund !!!” (1 Revised
Code of 1819, 436.)
President Jefferson, in his will, having emancipated
five of his slaves, adds, “Thumbly and earnestly request
of the Legislature of Virginia a confirmation of the
bequests to these servants, with leave to remain in the
State, where their families and connexions are,” &c.
(c) Coloured persons who cannot prove their freedom
may be enslaved. In Mississippi, “every negro or mu-
latto found within the State, and not having the ability
to show himself entitled to freedom, may be sold, by order
of the court, as a slave.” (Mississippi Revised Code, 389.)
And no negro or mulatto can be a witness to prove his
frcedom |
SLAVERY--ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS, 257
In North Carolina, by decision of the courts, this rule
is limited to negroes, and the mixed race is exempted.
It is by this unrighteous presumption against colour
that suspected fugitives, though unclaimed, are sold for
the payment of their jail-fees in Washington City. In
South Carolima, by Act of 1740, the doctrine is affirmed,
both in respect to negroes and the mixed races. The
same in Georgia, by Act of 1770. Also in Mississippi,
Revised Code, 389. In Virginia there is no statute ; but
the courts have affirmed the doctrine, except where
Indians or white persons are claimed as slaves. (See
Stroud's Sketch, p. 19 ; also, pp. 76–88, including Notes.)
“JEvery ovegro is presumed to be a slave.”—“This is the
general doctrine in all the States; and the application of
a different rule is only in cases where the person is a
mulatto, or some other grade approximating to a white
person.” (Wheeler, p. 5.)
“Or person or colour.”—“Colour and long possession
are such presumptive evidence of slavery as to throw the
burden of proof on the party claiming his freedom.”
(Ib., pp. 5, 6, Case of Davis, a man of colour, d. Curry,
Fall T., 1810. 2 Bibb's Ky. Rep., 238.)
And who is a “person of colour !”
“When there is a distinct and visible admixture of
African blood, the person is to be denominated a mulatto,
or person of colour.” (State v. Davis and Hamma, Dee. T.,
1831, 2 Bailey's S. C. Rep., 558. Wheeler, p. 4.)
And the fact of colour “may be known by inspection.”
(Wheeler, p. 5; also p. 22.)
258 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
(d) Free negroes may be enslaved for “entertaining” a
runaway slave, and for nonpayment of the fine thus in-
curred 1 (See law of South Carolina before cited, and the
consequent sentence of the court of Charleston in the
case of “Hannah Elliott, a free black woman, with her
daughter Judy, and sons Simon and Sam.” Stroud's
Sketch, pp. 16, 17.)
(e) Also, for selling or giving away to a slave their
certificates of freedom, as before-mentioned. (Laws of
Maryland, 1796, chap. 67, sect. 18. Snethen’s Dist. Col.,
pp. 28-9.)
(f) Also, free negroes and mulattoes, arrested on sus-
picion of being fugitives, but not claimed by anyone,
and unable to pay their jail-fees, are sold by the sheriff
(Jay's Inquiry, p. 154; and Jay's View, p. 33, &c.)
(g) “Where a white woman intermarries with a slave,
the issue are slaves; though the Act subjecting such
issue to slavery was repealed, if the marriage took place
before the repeal of the Act.” (Butler v. Boardman,
Sept. T., 1770. 1 Har, and M'Hen. Md. Rep., 371.
Wheeler, p. 21.)
(h) “The issue of slaves entitled to liberty at a future
day, if born before the day, are slaves.” (Maria v. Sur-
baugh, Feb. T., 1824. 2 Rand's Va. Rep. ; and other
cases. Wheeler, p. 32.)
(i) “Children born during a qualified manumission of
their mothers are born slaves.” (McCutchen et al. v.
Marshall et al., Jafi. T.; 8 Peters' United States' Rep.,
220; and another case. Wheeler, p. 35.)
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 259
(j) Intermarriages with whites are punished by en-
slavement. (Maryland, Act of 1717, chap. 13, sect. 5.)
“If any free negro or mulatto intermarry with any white
woman, or if any white man shall intermarry with any
megro or mulatto woman, such negro or mulatto shall
become a slave during life, except mulattoes born of white
women, &c., who shall become servants for seven years.”
(Stroud, p. 19.) For “a white man” to live in adulterous
concubinage with his slave woman incurs no penalty at
all. Adulterers are entitled honourable, but marriage is
punished by the judge
(%) Innumerable free persons of colour are kidnapped
and sold by the operation of the laws excluding coloured
witnesses, and forbidding coloured persons to resist white
persons. In Philadelphia, within two years, more than
thirty persons, mostly children, known to be free, were
kidnapped and carried away, and only five of them, with
great difficulty and expense, reclaimed. (Stroud's Sketch,
p. 74.)
This process of kidnapping is facilitated by the fact
that such vast numbers of slaves are carried from State to
State, not only by the removal of “owners,” but by the
inter-State slave-trade. The kidnapper of free coloured
persons readily passes for a removing owner, or for a
dealer in slaves; and, in fact, many of the dealers are
themselves kidnappers of free negroes and mulattoes.
Persons Ostensibly or in reality employed to arrest
fugitives are known frequently to practise the same
villany even in the free States; and under this cover they
260 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
are generally secure. The coloured person seized cannot
testify in a Slave State, and no coloured person can testify
for him. At the South, very few white persons would
pay the least attention to their protestations of being
free. It would seldom or never embarrass the auctioneer,
or diminish the number and amount of the bids. This is
evident from the fact that “hundreds of advertisements
in the Southern papers” of Sales of negroes at auction,
and of runaways, describe them as claiming to be free
See Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” pp. 162-3, where speci-
mens of such advertisements may be found, one of them
describing a negro “who was originally from New York.”
(l) Free people of colour, by passing out of a free
State into a Slave State, where by the Federal Constitu-
tion they are entitled to all the rights of free citizens,
incur penalties of fines for so doing, which, if unable to
pay, they may be enslaved (Jay's Inquiry, p. 24. See
chapter on “Liberties of Free People of Colour.”)
(m) Negroes unlawfully imported from Africa are en-
slaved, not only when clandestinely smuggled (which is
done to a great extent), but, strange to tell, when brought
into port by capture of naval officers. A case occurring
at Savannah, and before alluded to, is narrated circum-
stantially in Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” pp. 139-40. So
openly and systematically has this been done, that the
States of Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama have enacted
statutes for the express purpose of having the slaves sold
for the benefit of the State Treasury | A law of Con-
gress, conferring power on the State legislatures to
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS. 261
dispose of the slaves illegally imported, was not repealed
until 1819. And the law of Alabama (of 1823) is still
more recent, and in open defiance of the laws of the
United States abolishing the African slave-trade 1 (See
Stroud's Sketch, pp. 158-164.)
And the courts have accordingly laid down the prin-
ciple that “a slave does not become free on his being
illegally imported into the State.” Such is the marginal
note to the case of “Gomez v. Bonneval, June T., 1819;
6 Martin's Lou. Rep., 656–Per Cur., Derbigny, J. : The
petitioner is a negro in actual state of slavery ; he claims
his freedom, and is bound to prove it. In his attempt,
however, to prove that he was free before he was intro-
duced into this country, he has failed ; so that his claim
now rests entirely on the laws prohibiting the intro-
duction of slaves in the United States. That the plaintiff
was imported since that prohibition does exist, is a fact
sufficiently established by the evidence. What right he
has acquired under the laws prohibiting such importation
is the only question which we have to examine. For-
merly, while the Act dividing Louisiana into two terri-
tories was in force in this country, slaves introduced here
in contravention of it were freed by the operation of that
law ; but that Act was merged in the legislative provi-
sions which were subsequently enacted on the subject of
the importation of slaves into the United States gene-
rally. Under the mow existing laws, the individuals thus
imported acquire no personal rights. They are mere
passive beings, who are disposed of according to the will
262 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
of the different Legislatures. In this country they are to
remain slaves, and to be sold for the benefit of the State.
The plaintiff, therefore, has nothing to claim as a free-
man ; and as to a mere change of master, should such be
his wish, he cannot be listened to in a court of justice.”
(Wheeler, pp. 380–1.)
2. But the descendants of Africans are not the only
subjects of American slavery. The native Indians have
also been enslaved, and their descendants are still in Sla-
very. In South Carolina, by Act of 1740, “All negroes,
Indians (free Indians in amity with this Government, and
negroes, mulattoes, and mestizoes who are now free, ex-
cepted), mulattoes, and mestizoes who now are or shall
hereafter be in this province, and all their issue and off-
spring born or to be born, shall be, and are hereby de-
clared to be, and to remain for ever hereafter, absolute
slaves, and shall follow the condition of the mother,” (2
Brevard's Digest, 229.) Similar in Georgia. (Prince's
Dig., 446, Act of 1770.) And in Mississippi. (Rev. Code.
Miss, of 1823, p. 369.) And in Virginia. (1 Rev. Code
of 1819.) And in Kentucky. (2 Littell and Swigert's
Dig, 1149-50.) And in Louisiana. (Civil Code Lou, art.
183. Stroud's Sketch, pp. 11, 12-15.) Same in New
Jersey, by decision of Supreme Court, 1797. (Stroud,
p. 16.)
And finally—
3. Whites are enslaved. Several known instances have
occurred already of the successful kidnapping of free
whites, without a drop of negro or Indian blood in their
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS, 263
veins ! and the process of intermixture of the races is
now so far advanced, and is so rapidly going forward, that
a “perfectly white complexion, light blue eyes, and flaxen
hair,” are scarcely a presumptive evidence of freedom.
Persons thus described are advertised as runaway slaves;
are liable to be pursued with muskets and bloodhounds,
shot, maimed, captured, brought before United States
marshals, sworn to be slaves, given up and sent to the
rice and cottom and sugar plantations of the South,
without trial by jury, and by a “summary” process
that precludes anything deserving thé name of an
investigation—sometimes, under a peremptory refusal
to wait a few hours for witnesses. Yet the people ima-
gine themselves free, and their liberties secure under this
enactment (the Fugitive Slave Bill of 1850), which, while
it makes no distinction of colour, forbids them, under
pains and penalties, to “ harbour” and “entertain” each
other when thus pursued By the estimate of Henry
Clay (speech in Senate, 1839), one hundred and fifty years
will obliterate the distinctions of race and colour in this
country, but without abolishing slavery Reposing, as it
does, by his showing, upon the “rights of property,” and
“sanctified and sanctioned” already “by two centuries of
legislation,” its conservators look for its perpetuity, as
they do for the perpetuity of property in “brood mares
and their increase.” For “that is property which the law
declares to be property.” The blacks will not be the slaves
of the whites, but the poorer will be the slaves of the
wealthier ; and the most they can hope for is that, per-
264. THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
haps, they will be kept “fat and sleek ſ” Their idolised
statesmen, their venerated religious teachers, can promise
them nothing better. Nor do they seem to desire it !
The “innocent legal relation” of slave-ownership conducts
us to this result, and it leaves us here.
In our chapter concerning “Fugitives from Slavery,”
it was shown that the State of Maryland, at an early
date (1715), enacted laws by which all persons, irrespec-
tive of colour, were forbidden to travel out of their own
county without an official pass ; and “if apprehended,
not being sufficiently known, nor able to give a good
account of themselves,” the magistrates might deal with
them as with runaways, and sell them temporarily, to pay
their fines, Our Fugitive Slave Bill of 1850, in like
manner, knows nothing of colour; and its provisions are
more stringent and humiliating than the old law of
Maryland
The reader is referred to Jay’s “View,” pp. 83-87, for a
number of advertisements of runaway slaves, in which
they are described as being white.
As for example—
“ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS REWARD.—The above reward
will be paid for the apprehension of my man William.
He is a very bright mulatto, straight yellowish hair. I
have no doubt he will change his name, and try to pass
himself for a White mam, which he may be able to do,
unless to a close observer.—T. S. PITCIIARD.”
“ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS REWARD.—Ran away from
James Hyhart, Paris, Ky., &c., the mulatto boy, Norton,
SLAVERY-ITS ORIGIN AND SUBJECTS, 265
&c. Would be taken for a white boy, if not closely ex-
amined. His hair is black and straight, &c.”—New
Orleans Free American, 11th Aug., 1836.
Anderson Bowles advertises, in the Richmond Whig,
6th Jan., 1836, his “negro !” who has “straight hair,”
and is “nearly white ;” so that “a stranger” would sup-
pose there was “no African blood in him.” “He was
with my boy Dick a short time since at Norfolk, and
offered to sell him, but escaped, under pretence of being
a white man.”
In the Wewberry Spectator, 13th March, 1837, John T.
Lane advertises “William, about nineteen years old, quite
white, and would not readily be taken for a slave.”
Edwin Peck, Mobile, April 22, 1837, offers 100 dollars
reward for a slave named Sam, “light samdy hair, blue
eyes, ruddy complexion ; is so white as very easily to
pass for a white man.”
In the New Orleans Bee of June 22, 1831, P. Balie
advertises as a runaway, “Maria, with a clear white com-
plexion.”
“Mr. Paxton, a Virginia writer, tells us in his work on
Slavery, that ‘the best blood of Virginia runs in the
veins of slaves.” (Jay's View, p. 85.)
“Dr. Torrey, in his work on Domestic Slavery in the
United States, p. 14, relates that, “not far from Frede-
ricktown, there was a slave-estate, on which there were
several white females, of as fair and elegant appearance as
white ladies in general, held in legal bondage as slaves.”
(Ib., pp. 85-6.)
266 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“White lady fugitives” have been hunted in the State
of New York, and have taken refuge in Canada. (Vide
Utica “Friend of Man,” and the Syracuse papers.)
“A Missouri paper, reporting the trial of a slave-boy,
says, “All the physiological marks of distinction which
characterise the African descent had disappeared.’” (Jay's
View, p. 86.)
Mr. Niles, in his Register, tells us that John C. Cal-
houn related a similar instance. (Tb, pp. 86-7.)
“Mary Gilmore, of Philadelphia, claimed as a runaway
slave in 1835, was proved to be the child of Irish parents,
and had not a single drop of African blood in her veins.”
(Ib., p. 86.)
PART II.
RELATION OF THE SLAVE TO SOCIETY AND TO CIWIL
GOVERNMENT.
269
CHAPTER I.
OF THE GROUND AND NATURE OF THE SLAVE's CIVIL
CONDITION.
The Civil Condition of the Slave grows out of his relation to his Master
as “Property,” and is determined and defined by it.
IF slaves were “deemed, reputed, and adjudged in law”
to be “sentient beings,” and not “things,” then their
relation to society and to civil government would be the
relation of human beings. But this is directly the oppo-
site of the fact. “Slaves” are “deemed, sold, taken, and
adjudged in law to be chattels personal, in the hands of
their owners and possessors, their administrators and
assigns, to all intents, constructions, and purposes what-
soever.” Their relation to Society and to civil govern-
ment is, accordingly, the relation of brutes.
The only real exception to this, or modification of it, is
where the interests of the “owner,” the wants of society,
or the exigencies of the Government, require an ano-
malous departure from the principle of slave chattelhood,
by the temporary and partial recognition of their hu-
manity. Such exceptions and modifications are never
made for the benefit of the slave. They enable the
Government to punish, as a human being, the poor
creature whom, in no other respect, it recognises as such
270 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
The slave is subjected to the control of the Government,
but is not considered entitled to its protection.
The slave cannot be considered by the Government as
entitled to its protection while he is not regarded by it as
having any rights to be protected ; and the Government
that recognises and protects slave chattelhood has already,
in that very act, denied to the slave the possession of any
rights, by denying to him the right of self-ownership,
which is the foundation and parent stock of all other
rights, and without which they cannot exist.
Having no right to himself, to his bones, muscles, and
intellect (being all of them the property of his “owner”),
he has no right to his own industry, to its wages or its
products—no right to property or capability of possessing
it, as already shown. Of course, he has no rights of pro-
perty to be protected by the Government, and none of the
rights that grow out of them.
Having no recognised right of making any contract, he
has no contracts with others to be enforced by the Go-
vernment, and no one has any legal pecuniary claims upon
him to be enforced. He can neither Sue nor be sued.
This is no arbitrary rule. It is the inevitable result of
his chattelhood.
|Unable to contract marriage, as already seen, he can
bring no action at law against the violator of his bed.
Eſaving no marital or parental rights, he has none for the
Government to protect.
Not being accounted a person, but a thing, he can have
mo personal rights to be protected—no rights of repu-
SLAVE's CIVIL CONDITION. 271
tation or character—no right to education—no rights of
conscience—no rights of personal Security—no Social
rights—no political capabilities or rights—not even the
right of petition, as the Federal Congress (very consist-
ently with its recognition of legal human chattelhood)
have affirmed. It would be an anomaly to receive the
testimony of such an one in a court of law
It is futile, it is absurd, it is self-contradictory, it is
short-sighted and foolish (to say nothing more severe) for
any persons to find fault with any of these things while
they recognise as innocent and valid “the legal relation
of master and slave,” the relation of slave-ownership,
which includes, implies, and necessitates it all. Such
persons should ask themselves seriously what they would
have
Would they have the Government stultify itself, and
add mockery to injustice, by pretending to attempt known
impossibilities in the enactment of contradictions ! by
making a show of civil protection where none is intended,
or where they have rendered it impossible? What pro-
tection can they bestow so long as, by sustaining or even
permitting or tolerating human chattelhood, or failing to
suppress it as a crime, they leave not the slave the
possession of one single right of humanity to be pro-
tected
Or, suppose the Government to be honest and successful
in its attempts to confer upon the slave civil rights, to
recognise and treat him as a member and component ele-
ment of civil society. Suppose it to protect, instead of
272 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
denying these rights—rights of conscience—rights of
Security—rights of reputation—right to education—free
speech—parental rights—marital rights—right of testi-
mony—right to Sue and be sued—right to make contracts
—rights of property—right to his earnings and products.
What would become of the right of slave-ownership, “the
legal relation of master and slave?” Would it not
vanish and disappear ! Assuredly it would.
These thoughts open a wide field for reflection and
remark, if we could spare room.
The Hebrew servitude, so often cited as a precedent for
modern slavery, was wanting in its essential element,
human chattelhood. Its abundant recognition and gua-
rantee of the civil rights of servants affords demonstrative
proof of this.
In the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and even the
(recent) British West India types of slavery, we see the
principle of human chattelhood less perfectly developed
than in our own—less consistently enforced. They exhibit
faint recognitions of civil rights in the enslaved. They
are less inveterate, and hence (under the same appliances)
less difficult to be overthrown. In our country, where
so much is said and known of human rights, the slave
bower has been compelled to fortify and entrench itself in
the most unlimited and unmitigated system of despotism
ever known or conceived.
In dealing with such a type of slavery, it is especially
important to remember that nothing is to be accomplished
without striking directly at the root. Attempts at
SLAVE's CIVIL CONDITION. 273 °
ameliorations, restrictions, limitations, and gradual re-
moval, are signally out of place here. Such a despotism,
under such a form of government, and in such a state of
society as ours, and at such a crisis as that which is now
reached, must be overwhelmed and uprooted speedily, or
it will overwhelm and uproot all that does not harmonise
with and uphold it. But we must not enlarge.
The statements made in this chapter, like those made
in the first chapter of the former series, will be found to
contain the key to the chapters that follow ; and the
present series is the sequel to the former one.
The single idea of human chattelhood, or of slave-
ownership, carried out in all possible directions, gives us
the details of the entire code of slavery. Take away that,
and they all vanish. Retain it, and they all stand firmly.
The courts in the Slave States understand this.
“A slave is in absolute bondage. He has no civil
rights.” So said Judge Crenshaw, in Brandon et al. v.
Planters' and Merchants' Bank of Huntsville, Jam, T.,
1838; 1 Stewart's Ala. Rep., 320. Same principle in
Bynum v. Bostwick, 4 Desauss., 266. (Wheeler, p. 6.)
“Slaves are deprived of all civil rights.” “Emancipa-
tion gives to the slave his civil rights.” (Judge Matthews,
in Girod v. Lewis, May T., 1819; 6 Martin's Lou. Rep.,
559. Wheeler, p. 199.) If this be true in Louisiana,
with its relics of the Code Noir, we may be well assured
that it is true of the codes of the other States.
T
274
CHAPTER II.
No ACCESS OF SLAVES TO THE JUDICIARY, AND NO HONEST
PROVISION FOR TESTING THE CLAIMS OF THE ENSLAVED
TO FREEDOM. ſ
“A Slave cannot be a party to a Civil Suit.” (Stroud’s Sketch, p. 76.)
“A SLAVE cannot be a party to a suit, except in the
single case where a negro is held as a slave and he claims
to be free.” (We omit the references to authorities here
cited.) “It would be an idle form and ceremony to make
a slave a party to a suit by the instrumentality of which
he could recover nothing ; or, if a recovery could be had,
the instant it was recovered, would belong to the master.
A slave can possess nothing. He can hold nothing. He
is, therefore, not a competent party to a suit. And the
same rule prevails wherever slavery is tolerated, whether
there be legislative enactments upon the subject or not.”
(Note to p. 197, in Wheeler's Law of Slavery. Case of
Berard v. Berard, before cited.)
We proceed to examine the condition of the slave in
reference to suits for freedom.
“In all cases where the slave alleges to be free, he is of
course a party. He may have a habeas corpus, and, if
there be a false return, may sue upon it ; or he may
bring a trespass for assault and battery and false impri-
No ACCESS TO JUDICIARY. 275
sonment, in which action the defendant, to justify himself,
must plead that he is his slave. In many States he may
proceed by petitions for freedom.” (Note in Wheeler,
p. 197.)
In inquiring after “the origin of the relation and its
subjects” (Chapter XXIII. of the former series), it was
ascertained that coloured persons who cannot prove their
freedom may be enslaved ; that coloured persons, whether
megroes or mulattoes, whether bond or free, cannot be
admitted as witnesses to prove their freedom—a free
coloured mother not being permitted to come into court
to identify, under oath, her own kidnapped free child,
torn from her arms the day previous, nor give testimony
to the fact, nor identify the kidnapper It was ascer-
tained, further, that colour was held to be presumptive
evidence of the condition of slavery. The bearing of all
this upon law-suits for the recovery of freedom will be
readily appreciated. (Hudgins v. Wrights, 1 Hen, and
Munf. Va. Rep., 134.) Judge Roane said, “In the case
of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the presump-
tion is, in this country, that he is a slave, and it is
incumbent on him to make out his right to freedom ; but
in the case of a person visibly appearing to be a white
man, or an Indian, the presumption is that he is free, and
it is necessary for his adversary to show that he is a
slave.” (Wheeler, p. 394.)
The same principle appears in other cases, and seems
to be the general rule. -
South Carolina.—The Act of 1740 provides that, “if
276 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
any negro, Indian, mulatto, or mestizo claim his or her
freedom, it shall be lawful” for such person “to apply to
the judges,” &c., who are empowered to appoint for the
applicant a guardian, to prosecute in his or her behalf
&c. &c. “And if judgment shall be given for the plaim-
tiff, a special entry shall be made, declaring that the
ward of the plaintiff is free, and the jury shall assess
damages, with full costs of suit ; but in case judgment
shall be given for the defendant, the said court is hereby
fully empowered to inflict such corporal punishment, not
extending to life or limb, on the ward of the plaintiff, as
they in their discretion shall think fit. Provided that, in
any action or suit to be brought in pursuance of the
direction in this Act, the burden of the proof shall lay on
the ward of the plaintiff'; and it shall always be presumed
that every negro, Indian, mulatto, and mestizo is a slave,
unless the contrary be made to appear”—the Indians in
amity with the Government excepted, in which case the
burden of proof shall be on the defendant. (2 Brevard's
Digest, 229-30.)
In Georgia, the Act of May 10, 1770, is almost lite-
rally a copy of the preceding. (Prince's Digest, 446.)
The slave, it seems, must first find a white friend willing
to incur the expense and trouble of conducting the suit,
1iable, in case of failure, to lose the costs. Then he must
find white witnesses to prove his freedom, instead of
demanding that the pretended “owner” (as in the case of
other property) prove his right to ownership. And then,
for the crime of losing his case in court (the fault, per-
NO ACCESS TO JUDICIARY, 277
haps, of judge and jury, even by their own laws), he may
be subjected, by the same court, to corporal punishment,
resulting, perhaps, in “death by moderate correction "
But this is not all.
In South Carolina, by Act of 1802 (by way of progress
in sixty-two years), “the guardian” (in a trial for freedom)
“of a slave” (who may have been illegally imported into
the State, and is on that account, by the same law,
declared to be free) “claiming his freedom shall be liable
to double costs of suit, if his action shall be adjudged
groundless; and shall be liable to pay to the bond fide
owner of such slave all such damages as shall be assessed
by a jury, and adjudged by any Court of Common Pleas.”
(2 Brevard's Digest, 260.)
In Maryland, the attorney, in a trial for freedom, must
pay all the costs, unless the court shall be of opinion that
there was probable cause for supposing that the petitioner
had a right to freedom.” (Act of 1796, chap. 67, sect. 25.)
And on such a trial, the master (the defendant) is allowed
twelve peremptory challenges as to the jurors. (Ib.,
sect. 24.)
In Virginia, “for aiding and abetting a slave in a trial
for freedom, if the claimant fail in his suit, a fine of one
hundred dollars is imposed.” And this is by the “Revised
Code” (of 1819), 482.
Missouri mercifully allows the slave, on permission of
court, to “sue as a poor person.” So far, the law appears
praiseworthy. Yet “it is made to depend upon the arbi-
trament of the court, or even of a single judge, whether
278 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
the petitioner shall be heard by a jury at all.” (Stroud,
p. 78.)
In Alabama, the objectionable parts of the Missouri
law are retained, and the beneficial provisions omitted.
(Ib. Toulmin's Digest, 632.)
It is evident that very few of the thousands of free
coloured persons kidnapped into slavery, or otherwise
held, contrary to even the Southern laws, will ever be
able to institute a suit at law for their freedom ; and it is
equally evident that very few of those who may get their
cases into court will ever derive any benefit from the pro-
cess, but only secure to themselves a terrible punishment
in the first instance, and worse treatment from their
masters afterwards. The spirit of these laws warrants
us to say this.
CHAPTER III.
REJECTION OF TESTIMONY OF SLAVES AND FREE COLOURED
PERSONS.
Slavery is upheld by suppressing the Testimony of its Victims.
“A SLAVE cannot be a witness against a white person,
either in a civil or criminal cause.” (Stroud's Sketch,
p. 65.)
“It is an inflexible and universal rule of slave-law,
founded in one or two States upon usage, in others sanc-
tioned by express legislation, that the testimony of a coloured
person, whether bond or free, cannot be received against &
white person.” (Ib., p. 27. Same in Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, 193-5.)
In Virginia, the Act of Assembly is as follows: “Any
negro or mulatto, bond or free, shall be a good witness in
pleas of the commonwealth, for or against negroes or
mulattoes, bond or free, or in civil pleas where free negroes
or mulattoes shall alone be parties, and in no other cases
whatever.” (1 Revised Code, 422.)
Similar in Missouri. (Missouri Laws, 600.) And in
Mississippi. (Revised Code, 372.) And in Kentucky.
(2 Littell and Swigert's Digest, 1150.) And in Alabama.
(Toulmin's Dig, 627.) And in Maryland, (Maryland
280 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
Laws, Act of 1717, chap. 13, sects. 2, 3 ; and Act of 1751,
chap. 14, sect. 4.) And in North Carolina and Tennessee.
(Act of 1777, chap, 2, sect. 42.) And in the free State of
Ohio. (Act of January 25, 1807.)
In South Carolina and in Louisiana, there are enact-
ments which, in direct allusion to this feature of their
laws, and reciting in a preamble that “Whereas many
Cruelties may be committed on slaves, because no white
person may be present to give evidence of the same,
unless some method be provided for the better discovery
of the offence,” &c. &c., Be it enacted, &c. &c.: The only
remedy provided is, that “when no white person shall be
present,” or, being present, shall refuse to testify, “the
owner or other person having charge of such slave [who
shall have “suffered in life, limb, member,” &c.] shall be
deemed guilty and punished,” “unless such owner or
other person, &c., can make the contrary appear by good
and sufficient evidence, or shall, by his own oath, clear and
exculpate himself;” and the court may administer the
oath and “acquit the offender, if clear proof of the offence
be not made by two witnesses at least.” (2 Brevard's Dig,
242.)
Judge Stroud (in his Sketch, &c., p. 76) considers this
“a modification of the former law, not for the protection
of the slave, but for the especial benefit of a cruel master
or overseer.”
In most of the slaveholding States, the owners of
slaves are required by law “to keep at least one white
person on each plantation to which a certain number of
NO COLOURED WITNESSES, 28].
slaves is attached.” (Stroud, p. 67.) This indicates the
previous absence of white persons, and the consequent
lack of white witnesses. Whether the law was ostensibly
for the remedy of that defect, or whether it was for the
greater security against the slaves, does not appear. It
is hardly credible that a white person is employed for the
former object. And as most of the present overseers are
whites, it may be inferred that the design was to dis-
countenance the employment of slaves or other coloured
persons as overseers. Be this as it may, a white overseer
answers the requisitions of the law, and he could hardly
be a witness against himself, though specially authorised
to exculpate himself by his own oath !
Chief Justice Ottley, of St. Vincent's, in answer to
parliamentary inquiries proposed to him in 1791, said—
“The only instances in which their [the slaves'] persons
appear to be protected by the letter of the law are in
cases of murder, dismemberment, and mutilation; and in
these cases, as the evidence of slaves is never admitted
against a white man, the difficulty of establishing the
facts is so great that white men are, in a manner, put
beyond the reach of the law.” -
Sir William Young, Governor of Tobago in 1811, and
an advocate of slavery, said, “I think the slaves have
no protection. In this, as I doubt mot in every other
island, there are laws for the protection of the slaves, and
good ones; but circumstances in the administration of
whatever law render it a dead letter. When the inter-
vention of the law is most required, it will have the least
282 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
effect ; as, in most cases, where a vindictive and cruel
master has care to commit the most atrocious cruelties,
even to murder his slave, no free person being present to
witness the act,” &c. &c.
Many others, holding official stations in the British
West Indies during the existence of slavery, have testified
to the same general fact, the insufficiency of all laws for
the protection of slaves, in consequence of rejecting slave
testimony. (WideStephen's West Indian Slavery, pp. 168-9)
The case is too plain to require either testimony or
argument. A community or a Government that could
tolerate such rejection of testimony—the testimony of the
defenceless against those holding and daily exercising
despotic power over them—must be resolutely bent on
oppressing instead of protecting them.
Yet the reasonableness of the rule is beyond question,
if the “innocent legal relation” is to be preserved. It
would be an absurdity for chattels to come into court and
bear testimony against their owners! They could not be
“chattels, to all intents, constructions, and purposes what-
soever.” They could not remain chattels at all. The
power to testify against their owners and overseers would
imply the right of protection from assaults by them.
“The slave, to remain a slave,” said Judge Ruffin, “must
be sensible that there is no appeal from his master.”
Allow slaves to testify, and the hitherto unimagined
secrets of the Bastile would explode like an earthquake.
Universal humanity would unite in one general erusade,
and break down the whole fabric.
283
CHAPTER IV.
SUBJECTION TO ALL WHITE PERSONS.
“Submission is required of the Slave, not to the will of the Master
only, but to the will of all other White Persons.” (Stroud's Sketch,
pp. 96-7.)
IN Georgia it is enacted that, “if any slave shall pre-
sume to strike any white person, such slave, upon trial
and conviction before the justice or justices, according to
the directions of this Act, shall, for the first offence,
suffer such punishment as the said justice or justices
shall, in his or their discretion, think fit, not extending to
life or limb ; and, for the second offence, suffer DEATH.”
“Provided always, that such striking, &c., be not done
by the command and in the defence of the owner or other
person having the care and government of such slave, in
which case the slave shall be wholly excused, and the
owner or other person, &c., shall be answerable, as if the
act had been committed by himself.” (Prince's Digest,
450.)
South Carolina has an Act in the same words, except
that death is the penalty of the third offence, instead of
the second. (2 Brevard's Digest, 235.)
In Maryland, for this offence, the offender's ears may
284 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
be cropped, though he be a free black. (Act of 1723,
chap. 15, sect. 4.)
In Kentucky there is the same prohibition ; and, as in
Maryland, free coloured persons are included. Penalty,
“thirty lashes on his or her bare back, well laid on.”
(Littell and Swigert's Digest, 1153.)
In Virginia, the same as in Kentucky, from 1680 till
1792, when the following exception was added : “Except
in those cases where it shall appear to said justice that
such negro or mulatto was wantonly assaulted, and lifted
his or her hand in his or her self-defence.” (1 Rev. Code,
426-7.)
In Maryland, “If any slave shall happen to be slaim for
refusing to surrender him or herself, contrary to law, or in
unlawful resisting any officer, or other person, who shall
endeavour to apprehend such slave or slaves, &c., such
officer or other person so killing such slave, as aforesaid,
making resistance, shall be and is by this Act indemnified
from any prosecution for such killing aforesaid,” &c.
(Maryland Laws, Act of 1751, chap. 14, sect. 9.) This is
cited by Judge Stroud as a specimen of the laws of
several States. (Pp. 98-9.)
South Carolina.-Act of 1740: “If any slave who
shall be out of the house or plantation where such slave
shall live or shall be usually employed, or without some
white person in company with such slave, shall refuse to
submit to undergo the examination of any white person,
it shall be lawful for any such white person to pursue,
apprehend, and moderately correct such slave ; and if
SUBJECTION OF COLOUR, 285
such slave shall assault and strike such white person,
such slave may be lawfully killed !!” (2 Brevard's
Digest, 231.)
It does not appear that any of these laws recognise or
contemplate any self-defence by the slave, male or female,
from the most villamous assaults of any white person,
except the Act of Virginia. And as the “negro or mu-
latto,” whether bond or free, cammot lodge a complaint, or
even testify, it is not easy to see how the exception can
be made available for his or her benefit. Such laws illus-
trate the general position already laid down, that the
Government cannot secure to the master his assumed
right of slave-ownership, and yet extend to the slave civil
protection. If the negro be a chattel, he must needs he
restrained from straying ; he must be held subject, like
other domestic animals, to the Superior race holding
dominiom over him. It would be preposterous for the
Legislature to attempt doing this by a process which
should at the same time provide for his protection as a
man . It would be abusive to demand this at their
hands, if the “relation” of human chattelhood is to be
held legal and immocent
Yet the existence of such laws renders more than
probable, and even certain, the common prevalence of the
worst outrages that could be imagined. The best laws
cannot fully protect the weaker portion of a community
against the stronger. The weak must be left utterly
defenceless when all protecting laws are only repealed.
But the climax is reached when, by express statute, each
286 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
member of the weaker class is placed under the absolute
control of any one of the dominant class—when resist-
ance is forbidden on penalty of stripes and cropping by
the public authorities, with the liability of being “law-
fully killed” by the assailant . If civil government were
designed for human demoralisation and torture, it is not
easy to see how its ends could be more effectually reached.
287
CHAPTER W.
PENAL LAWS AGAINST SLAV ES.
The Laws are unequal—their Administration despotic—their Execution
barbarous. Even this is exceeded by “Lynch Law.”
THE slave, who is but “a chattel” on all other occa-
sions, with not one solitary attribute of personality ac-
corded to him, becomes “a person” whenever he is to be
punished . He is the only being in the universe to whom
is denied all self-direction and free agency, but who is,
nevertheless, held responsible for his conduct, and amen-
able to law. Forbidden to read the law, and kept as
ignorant and as unenlightened as possible, he is never-
theless accounted criminal for acts which are deemed
innocent in others, and punished with a severity from
which all others are exempted. He is under the control
of law, though unprotected by law, and can know law
only as an enemy, and not as a friend.
The following statement is evidently as favourable a
one as could be made, yet it attests the main facts of the
case ; and what seems to have been intended as a pallia-
tion is the strongest condemnation of the slave system,
especially of this feature of it :—
“Much has been said of the disparity of punishment
288 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
between the white inhabitants and the slaves and negroes
of the same State ; that slaves are punished with much
more severity, for the commission of similar crimes by
white persons, than the latter. The charge is undoubt-
edly true to a considerable extent. It must be remem-
bered that the primary object of the enactment of penal
laws is the protection and security of those who make
them.* The slave has no agency in making them. He is,
indeed, one cause of the apprehended evils to the other
class, which those laws are expected to remedy. That he
should be held amenable for the violation of those rules
established for, the security of the other, is the natural
result of the state in which he is placed ; and the seve-
rity of those rules will always bear a relation to that
danger, real or ideal, of the other class. It has been so
among all nations, and will ever continue to be so, while
the disparity between bond and free remains. In a prac-
tical treatise it would probably be considered out of place
to collect the various statutes in relation to whipping and
other punishment of slaves, to be found in the statute-
books of the various states.” (Note in Wheeler's Law
of Slavery, pp. 222-3.)
The punishment of slaves by their owners has already
been examined. Their punishment by civil government,
or by society, is the topic now under review. Not a few
* The “primary” and only object of all honest legislation is tho pro-
tection of the equal rights of all.
+ From whence comes that “danger, real or ideal,” that calls for such
severe laws P What but injustice, and a consciousness of that injustice,
could Inake the governing party thus apprehensive of “danger ?”
LAWS AGAINST SLAVES. 289
specimens have fallen under our notice already, as con-
nected with other points of inquiry. We must briefly
recal these, and connect them with others of a like
character.
We have seen how the “cruel punishments” inflicted
by the master are expressly sanctioned by the Legislatures,
and how the public arm, with its sheriffs and prisons, is
at the beck of the slaveholder, as his agents and instru-
ments, whenever he wishes his slaves punished We
have seen, too, some few specimens of direct penal inflic-
tion upon the slave by the Government. For the crime
of earning property and making bargains, we have seen
his property seized and confiscated for the benefit of the
whites, who pretended to doubt whether he could take
care of himself For the misdemeanour of “hiring himself
out,” even with the consent of his master, we have seen
him “apprehended” as a felon. For seeking liberty, and
the protection of law, we have seen him proclaimed an
outlaw, and “lawfully killed !” For attending a religious
meeting in the evening, conducted by whites, and staying
till the close of the meeting, we have seen him, with his
wife and children, locked up in the watch-house till
morning, with no bed but the floor. For keeping a
weapon or club, we have seen him subjected, by a cow-
ardly code, to public whipping ! For being absent with-
out a “pass,” to visit a wife or child, we have seen him
under the same sentence For riding on horseback,
whipped or branded. For losing a cause at court, when
sueing for freedom, any “corporal punishment, not ex-
U
290 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
tending to life or limb,” with the hazard of “death by
moderate correction "
Free negroes, for entertaining or assisting fugitive
slaves, or giving or selling certificates of freedom, we have
seen subjected to heavy fines; and, in default of pay-
ment, sale into slavery. For being arrested on suspicion
of being slaves, we have seen them fined and enslaved.
For “presuming to strike a white person,” punished with
whipping or cropping ! In the case of slaves, for the
second or third offence, death /
All these are but specimens of similar legislation. For
taking away or loosing a boat, a slave in South Carolina
is to receive thirty-nine lashes; “for the second offence,
shall forfeit and have cut off from his head one ear.”
(2 Brev. Dig, 228.) So, as to the first offence, in North
Carolina and Tennessee. (Haywood's Manual, 78.)
“For having any article of property [in Kentucky]
without a ticket of permission from his master, particu-
larly specifying the same, and authorising it to be sold by
the slave, ten lashes, by order of the captain of the
y
patrollers;” and “if the slave be taken before a magis-
trate, thirty-nine lashes may be ordered.” (Littell and
Swigert's Dig, 11.) Also in North Carolina and Ten-
nessee, (Haywood's Manual, 529.) And in Mississippi.
(Rev. Code, 390.) i,
A slave in Kentucky being at an unlawful assembly,”
* Meetings for “mental instruction” and “religious worship ’’ are
among the “unlawful assemblies” forbidden, as will be seen in another
chapter.
LAWS AGAINST SLAVES. 291
the captain of patrollers may inflict ten lashes upon him.
(Littell and Swigert's Dig., 981 ; also 2 Missouri Laws,
741, sect. 2; and ibid., 614.) Iftaken before a magistrate,
he may direct thirty-nine lashes.
To beat the Patuxent River (to catch fish), ten lashes.
(Maryland Laws, 1796, chap. 32, sect. 3, &c. &c.)
In North Carolina, a “slave, hunting with dogs in the
woods even of his master, is subjected to a whipping of
thirty lashes.” (Haywood's Manual, 524, Act of 1753.)
We reserve for their appropriate chapters the penal
laws against mental instruction, and assembling together
for religious worship, except with white persons.
The reader will have noticed that a large portion of the
offences thus punished are not considered offences when
committed by white persons ! Another feature deserves
notice.
“In Virginia, by the Revised Code (of 1819), there are
seventy-one offences for which the penalty is death when
committed by slaves, and imprisonment when committed
by whites.” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 134.)
In Mississippi there are seventeen offences punishable
with death when committed by slaves, which, if committed
by white persons, are either punished by fines or imprison-
ment, or punishment “not provided for by statute,” or at
“common law.” (Stroud's Sketch, p. 110-11.)
“Where human life is so cheap, and human suffering so
little regarded, it is not to be expected that the dispensers
of slave-justice will submit to be troubled with all those
forms and ceremonies which the common law has devised
292 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
for the protection of innocence. We have seen that, in
many instances, any white person may, instanter, discharge
the functions of judge, jury, and executioner. In innu-
merable instances, all these functions are united in a single
justice of the peace; and in South Carolina, Virginia, and
Louisiana, life may be taken, according to law, without
intervention of grand or petit jurors. In other States a
trial by jury is granted in capital cases; but in no one
State, it is believed, is it thought worth while to trouble a
grand jury with presenting a slave. In most of the Slave
States, the ordinary tribunal for slaves charged with
offences not capital is composed of justices and freeholders,
or of justices only. A white man cannot be convicted of
misdemeanour, except by the unanimous verdict of twelve
of his peers. In Louisiana, if the court is equally divided
as to the guilt of a slave, judgment is rendered against
him " (Jay's Inquiry, p. 135.)
The proper idea of trial by jury includes a trial by the
“ peers” or equals of the accused. There is no such jury
trial for the slave Trial by jury of slaves would soon
upset the “legal relation” of slave-owner
In Tennessee, the sheriff is empowered to make selec-
tion of “three justices to preside on the trial, and twelve
housekeepers, being slaveholders, to serve as a jury | "
(Tennessee Laws of 1819, chap. 35.) By a modification
of this law, in 1831, “Householders may serve as jurors,
if slaveholders cannot be had ſ” (Child's Appeal, p. 70.)
“In 1832, thirty-five slaves were executed in Charles-
ton, in pursuance of the sentence of a court consisting of
LAWS AGAINST SLAVES, 293
two justices and five freeholders, on charge of an intended
insurrection. No indictments, no summoning of jurors,
no challenges for cause or favour, no seclusion of the triers
from intercourse with those who might bias their judg-
ment, preceded this unparalleled destruction of human
life.” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 135.)
Though no coloured person, bond or free, can testify in
any case where any white person is concerned, yet the
evidence of “all free Indians without oath, and of any
slave without oath,” may be taken for or against a slave
And among the “meritorious services” for which freedom
is conferred, the most important is “information of crimes
committed by a slave.” What a temptation for one slave
to bear false testimony against another | See Stroud's
Sketch, p. 126, where the authorities are cited for
several States where the law prevails, viz. –South Caro-
lima, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky,
and Mississippi; with conditions, in Georgia and Lou-
isiana.
The law of South Carolina provides expressly that
slave trials shall proceed “in the most summary and ex-
peditious manner;” and also that, in case of conviction,
the “justice shall award such manner of death” as will
“be most effectual to deter others,” &c. (James's Dig,
392-3.) This authorised “the burning of a negro woman
to death, as may be found in the daily prints of 1820.”
(Stroud, p. 124.) Any other tortures might be inflicted.
“The last authorised edition of the laws of Maryland,”
said Judge Stroud, in 1827, authorises “to have the
294 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
right hand cut off, to be hanged in the usual manner, the
head severed from the body, the body divided into four
quarters, and the head and quarters set up in the most
public places of the county where such fact was com-
mitted.” (Stroud, p. 117.)
The burning to death a free coloured man near St.
Louis, the frequent infliction of murderous outrages by
irresponsible “Lynch Committees” all over the South, by
the testimony of their own journals, may assure us that,
in the public administration of slave punishments, “the
people are no better than their laws,” but much
“worse ſ”
Communities tolerating such laws must become law-
less—must lose the conception and the proper definition
of law, in its just sense. They must be at once in a con-
dition of despotism and of anarchy. And such is the
known state of society at the South.
And yet, no practical business man, who looks over,
carefully, the whole ground, and knows human mature,
and the circumstances of the times, will be likely to con-
clude that any better or milder code, or method of admi-
mistration, could preserve “the innocent legal relation of
slave-ownership !” If that is to be tolerated, all the rest
is to be left where it is Indeed, the note of Mr. Wheeler,
already quoted (Wheeler's Law of Slavery, pp. 222-3),
very nearly expresses this idea ; and, in looking over his
few reported cases on this subject, we find nothing to
disparage the conclusion.
We notice the following items, as the most important —
|
LAWS AGAINST SLAVES. 295
“A slave tried for a capital crime may be convicted
on testimony of a slave, though uncorroborated by preg-
nant circumstances.” (Wheeler, p. 204. Case of the
State v. Ben, Dec. T., 1821; 1 Hawks' N. C. Rep., 434.
Opinion of Judge Badger, Judge Hall dissenting.)
“A slave on trial for a capital felony is entitled to a
jury of slave-owners.” (Wheeler, p. 212. Case of the
State v. Jim, Dec. T., 1826 ; 1 Devereaux’s N. C. Rep.,
142.)
“On an indictment of a slave for a capital offence, the
master cannot be compelled to testify.” (The State v.
Charity, Dec. T., 1830; 2 Devereaux’s N. C. Rep., 214.)
In delivering his opinion, Judge Ruffin said, “The pri-
vilege not to testify, on the ground of interest, is that of
the master, not of the slave. It may consequently be
waived by the former. He may himself prosecute and
give evidence against his slave.” “Could I separate her
[the slave's] rights from those of the witness [her master],
I would do so, and let the verdict stand [a verdict of
conviction for murder]. But they are so connected that
justice cannot be dome to the master without giving to the
slave the benefit of it. We cannot restore him his pro-
perty, without yielding her another trial for her life ; nor
reverse the judgment for the costs without reversing it
altogether, I therefore conclude, though with great
hesitation, that, as the master did object to be sworn,
there must be a new trial.” (Wheeler, pp. 214-15.)
We see here the sacred rights of public justice on the
one hand (where the prisoner was charged with the mur-
296 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
der of her own child), and the sacred rights of the accused
to an impartial trial for her life, both treated as inferior
and minor interests, which must bend to the slave-
master's right of property in the accused If she was
acquitted, as she probably was, at the new trial, it was
not as a matter of justice or of mercy towards the accused
or the murdered, but as an act of protection to slave-
property
“Free persons of colour are entitled to trial by jury.” )
(Wheeler, p. 222. Bore v. Bush, 18 Martin's Lou.
Rep., 1.) A jury, doubtless, of white men, not “a jury
of their peers” or equals. This is no “trial by jury”
deserving the name.
CHAPTER VI.
EDUCATION PROHIBITED,
The Slave not being regarded as a Member of Society, nor as a Human
Being, the Government, instead of providing for his Education, takes
care to forbid it, as being inconsistent with the condition of Chattel-
hood.
CHATTELs are not educated And if human beings
are to be held in chattelhood, education must be withheld
from them.
South Carolina.—Act of 1740: “Whereas, the having
slaves taught to write, or suffering them to be employed
in writing, may be attended with great inconveniences;
Be it enacted, that all and every person and persons what-
soever, who shall hereafter teach or cause any slave or
slaves to be taught to write, or shall use or employ any
slave as a scribe, in any manner of writing whatsoever,
hereafter taught to write, every such person or persons
shall, for every such offence, forfeit the sum of one hun-
dred pounds, current money.” (2 Brevard's Digest, 243.)
Georgia, similar; penalty twenty pounds. (Prince's
Dig., 445.)
South Carolina.-Amother Act in 1800: “That assem-
blies of slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, and mestizoes,
whether composed of all or any of such description of
persons, or of all or any of the same, and of a portion
298 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
of white persons met together for the purpose of mental
instruction, in a confined or secret place, &c. &c., are
declared to be an unlawful meeting; and magistrates, &c.
&c., are hereby required, &c., to enter such confined places,
&c. &c., and break doors, if resisted, and to disperse such
slaves, free negroes, &c. &c.; and the officers dispersing
such unlawful assemblage may inflict such corporal punish-
ment, not exceeding twenty lashes, upon such slaves, free
negroes, &c., as they may judge necessary for deterring
them from such unlawful assemblage in future.” “That it
shall not be lawful for any number of slaves, free negroes,
mulattoes, or mestizoes, even in company with white per-
sons, to meet together for the purpose of mental instruc-
tion, either before the rising of the sun, or after the going
down of the same.” (2 Brevard's Dig, 254-5.)
Virginia.—Revised Code of 1819: “That all meetings
or assemblages of slaves, or free negroes or mulattoes
mixing and associating with such slaves at any meeting-
house or houses, &c., in the night; or at any school or
schools for teaching them reading or writing, either in the
day or night, under whatsoever pretext, shall be deemed
and considered an unlawful assembly; and any justice of a
county, &c., wherein such assemblage shall be, either from
his own knowledge or the information of others, of such
unlawful assemblage, &c., may issue his warrant, directed
to any sworn officer or officers, authorising him or them
to enter the house or houses where such unlawful assem-
blages, &c., may be, for the purpose of apprehending or
dispersing such slaves, and to inflict corporal punishment
LEARNING FORBIDDEN. 299
on the offender or offenders, at the discretion of any
justice of the peace, not exceeding twenty lashes. (1 Rev.
Code, 424-5.)
Besides the State laws, the corporate towns and cities fre-
quently have ordinances on the subject. For example, in Sa-
vannah, in 1818, the public journals announced as follows:
“The City has passed an ordinance by which any per-
son that teaches any person of colour, slave or free, to
read or write, or causes such persons to be so taught, is
subjected to a fine of thirty dollars for each offence; and
every person of colour who shall keep a school to teach
reading or writing is subject to a fine of thirty dollars, or to
be imprisoned ten days, and whipped thirty-nine lashes "
“In North Carolina, to teach a slave to read or write,
or sell or give him any book [Bible not excepted] or
pamphlet, is punished with thirty-nine lashes, or imprison-
ment, if the offender be a free negro; but if a white, then
with a fine of 200 dollars. The reason for this law,
assigned in its preamble, is, that “teaching slaves to read
and write tends to dissatisfaction in their minds, and to
produce insurrection and rebellion.’” (Jay's Inquiry, p.
136.) This was enacted in 1831. (Wide Child's Appeal.)
“In Georgia, if a white teach a free negro or slave to
write, he is fined 500 dollars, and imprisoned at the dis-
cretion of the court ; if the offender be a coloured man,
bond or free, he may be fined or whipped, at the discre-
tion of the court. Of course, a father may be flogged for
teaching his own child. This barbarous law was enacted
in 1829.” (Ib)
300 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
“In Louisiana, the penalty for teaching slaves to read
and write is one year's imprisonment.” (Ib.)
The following statement will be regarded with interest,
as being from one of the highest legal authorities:—
“In Georgia, by Act of 1829, no person is permitted to
teach a slave, negro, or free person of colour to read or
write. So in Virginia, by statute, in 1830, meetings of
free negroes to learn reading and writing are unlawful,
and subject them to corporal punishment; and it is un-
lawful for white persons to assemble with free negroes or
slaves, to teach them to write or read. The prohibitory
Act of the Legislature of Alabama, passed in the session
of 1831-2, relative to instruction to be given to the
slave or free coloured population, or exhortation or
preaching to them, or any mischievous influence attempted
to be exerted over them, is sufficiently penal. Laws of
similar import are presumed to exist in the other slave-
holding States; but in Louisiana, the law is armed with
tenfold severity. It not only forbids any person teaching
slaves to read or write, but it declares that any person
using language in any public discourse, from the bar,
bench, stage, or pulpit, or in any other place, or in any
private conversation, or making use of any signs or
actions having a tendency to produce discontent among
- the free-coloured population, or insubordination among
the slaves, or who shall be knowingly instrumental in
bringing into the State any paper, book, or pamphlet,
having the like tendency, shall, on conviction, be punished
with imprisonment or death, at the discretion of the
LEARNING FORBIDDEN, 301
court.” (Kent's Commentaries, vol. ii., part iv., p. 268,
note.)
Bible Societies do not distribute the Bible among
slaves, because it is prohibited, and because the slaves are
unable to read.
John Woolman, of New Jersey (1757), said, “Some
of our Society” (Friends), “and some of the Society
called New Lights, use some endeavours to instruct those
[slaves] they have, in reading; but in common this is not
only neglected, but disapproved.” (Journal of Life, &c.
of Woolman, p. 74.)
In the House of Delegates of Virginia, in 1832, Mr
Berry said, “We have, as far as possible, closed every
avenue by which light might enter their [the slaves']
minds. If we could extinguish the capacity to see the
light, our work would be completed ; they would then be
on a level with the beasts of the field, and we should be
safe I am not certain that we would not do it, if we
could find out the process, and that on the plea of
necessity.”
Rentucky is one of the few Slave States (perhaps the
only one, except Maryland) in which slave education is
not expressly prohibited; but the condition of the slave
there was thus described by the Presbyterian Synod of
Kentucky, in 1834 : “Slavery dooms thousands of human
beings to hopeless ignorance.” “If slaves are educated,
it must involve some outlay on the part of the master.”
“It is inconsistent with our knowledge of human nature
to suppose that he will do this for them. The present
302 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
state of instruction among this race answers exactly to
what we might thus naturally anticipate. Throughout
the whole land, so far as we can learn, there is but one
school in which, during the week, slaves can be taught.
The light of three or four Sabbath-schools is seen glim-
mering through the darkness that covers the black popu-
lation of a whole state. Here and there a family is
found where humanity and religion impel the master,
mistress, or children to the laborious task of private in-
struction.” “Nor is it to be expected that this state of
things will become better, unless it is determined that
slavery shall cease.” (Address, &c., p. 8.)
In North Carolina the “patrols” were ordered to
“search every negro house for books or prints of any
kind. Bibles and hymn-books were particularly men-
tioned.” (Weld's Slavery as it Is, p. 51.)
The appeals and statements made by clergymen, mis-
sionaries, and others, concerning the religious instruction
of slaves, are usually guarded from misapprehension by
the use of the phrase “ oral instruction,” indicating that
books are not to be put into their hands ! “A sabbath-
school” for coloured children at the South, commonly
includes nothing more. Forgetful of their anathemas of
the Church or Pope of Rome for withholding the Scrip-
tures, most Protestant ministers at the South, and some
at the North, insist that mere “ oral instruction” will
answer very well for the negroes | And this introduces
to us the subject of our next chapter.
|
303
CHAPTER VII.
FREE SOCIAL WORSHIP AND RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION
PROHIBITED.
The Government not only permits the Master to forbid the free Social
Worship and Religious Instruction of his Slaves at his Pleasure, but
it also steps in with direct Prohibitions of its own, which even the
Master himself may not relax or abrogate.
IT is quite remarkable that all the real, practical
restraints which the slave-codes of the South throw
around the slave-master are obviously for the purpose of
withholding him from some exercise of humanity or of
justice towards the slave ; not one of them is for the pur-
pose of restraining him from inhumanity and injustice
From no act of barbarity, cruelty, or even murder, is
he in reality restrained. The enactments professing to
have that object we have found to be ineffectual, impos-
sible to execute, deceptive, self-contradictory, and, in fact,
sheer pretence . We have found no laws that even pro-
fessed to guard the highest interests of slaves as human
beings, family sanctities, female chastity, education, reli-
gious development. No restraints upon the violation and
destruction of these are attempted to be thrown around
the slave-master. But, on the other hand, he is restrained,
as has been shown, from allowing to his slave (for the
304 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
mutual benefit of both parties) a peculium of property
from a tithe of his own earnings, with the benefits of
“hiring out” for that purpose ! He is restrained, as we
have seen, from bestowing upon his slave an education
that would increase his usefulness, or of employing him
to do any kind of writing ! The slave may be “used” so
as to be “used up” in seven years—may be used as a
“breeder,” as a prostitute, as a concubine, as a pimp, as a
tapster, as an attendant at the gaming-table, as a subject
of medical and surgical experiments for the benefit of
science; and the Legislature makes no objections against
it ! But he may not be used as a clerk | In all this, the
master's absolute right of ownership is restrained It is
restrained, too, as we shall see, by not permitting even
the master to allow his slave the privileges of free social
worship and religious instruction, well calculated as these
privileges may be to increase in him those Christian vir-
tues for which he is sometimes commended in advertise-
ments, to enhance his value in the market ! The master's
right we shall also find restrained by the laws forbidding
him freely, and at self-discretion, to emancipate | The
great solicitude of the law seems to be, to prevent the
master from being too kind to his slave
The philosophy of this is readily seen. A minority of
slave-owners are deemed exposed to the weakness of
exercising some humanity and justice, of manifesting
some feeling of responsibility to God, in their treatment of
their fellow-men . The majority of slaveholders, who
make the laws, will not tolerate this They enter, fully
RELIGION PROSCRIBED, 30.5
and understandingly, into the spirit of slave-ownership.
That “legal relation” must be preserved at all hazards;
and they know it is endangered by humanity, by justice,
by education, and by religion. They know that, if others
emancipate, their own tenure will be weakened. The
rise of an oppressive oligarchy of slave-owners begins
bere; and religious liberty is the very last thing to be
tolerated by it. Religious liberty is the precursor of civil
and political liberty and enfranchisement, and must be
suppressed. The gospel would, indeed, abolish American
slavery (as is often said), if it could only be introduced
among the slaves so far as to confer upon them religious
liberty. This our American slaveholders understand, as
will now be shown.
In Georgia, by an Act of Dec. 13, 1792, with the title,
“To protect religious societies in the exercise of their re-
ligious duties,” it is required of every justice of the peace,
&c., to take into custody any person who shall interrupt
or disturb a congregation of white persons, &c., assembled
at any church, &c., and to impose a fine on the oftender;
and in default of payment he may be imprisoned, &c. &c.
Yet the same law concludes with these words, “No
congregation or company of negroes shall, under pretence
of divine worship, assemble themselves, contrary to the
Act regulating patrols.” (Prince's Digest, 342.)
This Act regulating patrols is understood to be the Act
of May 10, 1770, “for ordering and governing slaves,”
wherein slaves are forbidden to assemble “ on pretence of
foasting,” &c., and “any constable,” on direction of a
X
306 gº
THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
justice, is commanded to “disperse any assembly or meet-
ing of slaves which may disturb the peace or endanger the
safety of his Majesty's subjects; and every slave which
may be found at such meeting, as aforesaid, shall and
may, by order of such justice, immediately be corrected,
without trial, by receiving on the bare back twenty-five
stripes with a whip, switch, or cowskin,” &c. (Prince's
Digest, 447.) From the general terms of this Act, there,
can be no doubt that it was applicable to religious meet-
ings, before the Act of 1792 occasioned its reiteration with
more distinct specifications.
In South Carolina, in the same Act of 1800, already
cited as forbidding “slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, and
mestizoes” to assemble for “mental instruction,” there is
the following additional section:-
“It shall not be lawful for any number of slaves, free
negroes, mulattoes, or mestizoes, even in company with
white persons, to meet together and assemble for the pur-
pose of mental instruction or religious worship, either
before the rising of the sun or after the going down of
the Same ; and all magistrates, sheriffs, militia officers,
&c. &c., are hereby vested with power, &c., for dispersing
such assemblies.” (2 Brevard's Digest, 254-5.) “Three
years afterwards, upon petition, as the Act recites, of cer-
tain religious societies, the rigour of the Act of 1800 was
slightly abated, by a modification which forbids any
person, before nine o'clock in the evening, ‘to break into
a place of meeting wherein shall be assembled the mem-
bers of any religious society in this State, provided a
RELIGION PROSCRIBED, 307
majority of them shall be white persons, or otherwise to
disturb their devotion, unless such person, &c., so entering
said place [of worship], shall first have obtained from some
Imagistrate, &c., a warrant, in case a magistrate shall be then
actually within a distance of three miles from such place
of meeting; otherwise the provisions, &c. [of the Act of
1800], to remain in full force.” (Brevard's Digest, 261.
Stroud's Sketch, pp. 93-4.)
So that, in order to attend a religious meeting securely,
the slave must know beforehand, 1st, that there will be
present “a majority of white persons;” 2nd, that there
will be no person there with “a warrant” from a justice
to apprehend him; and, 3rd, that a justice will not “be
them” within three miles' distance For a mistake in
either of these particulars, he (or she) is subjected to the
penalty of “twenty-five lashes with the cowskin on the
bare back, well laid on "
“In Virginia, all evening meetings of slaves at any
meeting-house are unequivocally forbidden.” (Jay's In-
quiry, p. 137. See Stroud, p. 94. See also 1 Revised
Code (of 1819), 424-5, already cited (Chap. VI.), as pro-
hibiting meetings for promoting education.) The first
clause will be found to prohibit “all meetings” of slaves,
&c., in the evening. “Slaves may, however, attend at
church on any day of public worship.” (Stroud, p. 94.)
Mississippi—same as Virginia, with a proviso that a
master may permit his slave to attend the preaching of a
white minister, regularly ordained and licensed, or where
at least two discreet and respectable white persons
308 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
appointed by some regular church, shall attend. (Missis-
sippi Rev. Code, 390. Stroud's Sketch, p. 94. Jay's
Inquiry, p. 137.)
Religious liberty secures the right of the worshippers
to choose and arrange their own modes and forms of
religious worship, and to select their own teachers; not
the privilege of being permitted to worship when, where,
and how the Government or a slaveholder may appoint,
and under such religious teachers as they may select.
The essence of spiritual despotism and of religious perse-
cution lies in the enforcement of such claims. It is no
discredit to the slaves that they have little or no desire to
hear religious harangues from their oppressors, or that
they loatho the instructions of ministers who preach the
rightfulness of slaveholding.
The Southampton slave insurrection of Nat. Turner
(once a preacher) may have furnished a pretext for the
following —
“The Legislature of Virginia passed a law in 1831, by
which any free coloured person who undertakes to preach
or conduct a religious meeting by day or night may be
whipped, not exceeding thirty-nine lashes, at the discretion
of any justice of the peace ; and anybody may apprehend
any such free coloured person without a warrant. The
same penalty, adjudged and executed in the same way,
falls on any slave or free coloured person who attends
such preaching ; and any slave who listens to any white
preacher in the night-time receives the same punishment.
The same law prevails in Georgia and Mississippi. A
RELIGION PROSCRIBEi). 309
master may permit a slave to preach on his plantation to
none but his slaves.” (Child's Appeal, p. 67.)
An early law of Maryland (Act of 1715, chap. 44,
Sec. 23), and a similar one in South Carolina (in 1711),
permits the baptism of slaves; but carefully provides that
“such baptism shall not be construed to effect the eman-
cipation of any slave.” This arose from a contrary appre-
hension growing out of ancient usages in England, and
the opinion of some jurists that Christians could not be
lawfully enslaved.
In Louisiana the Legislature enacted, “It shall be the
duty of every owner to procure his sick slaves all kinds of
temporal and spiritual assistance which their situation
may require.” (1 Martin's Dig, 610.)
These Maryland and Louisiana privileges of baptism at
birth, and of extreme unction on a death-bed, apparently
of Roman Catholic origin, were undoubtedly considered
great kindnesses; and they constitute, to this day, almost,
iſ not entirely, the sum total of the legal provision for the
slave as a religious being.
The prohibitions recorded in this chapter have found
their defence or apology in the alleged dangers of insur-
rection and insubordination The plea is strongly con-
demnatory of the system, its apologists, and its adminis-
trators . Of no system but an iniquitous one could it be
true that religious liberty would array and arm its sub-
Jocts against its fundamental law . No right-minded
person, who was at heart neither a slave nor a tyrant,
would ever urge such a plea ; and if the slaveholders
310 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
treated their servants justly and kindly, the danger of
insurrection would cease. The plea, if false, should itself
be execrated. If founded on a real danger, it reveals the
inherent and inexpressible wickedness of slaveholding, and
of the so-called “legal relation” that sustains it, and that
is itself maintained at such a sacrifice . The “necessity”
of such laws, rightly interpreted, resolves itself into the
mecessity of “immediate and unconditional abolition.”
The general condition of the slaves is not better than
is indicated by these enactments. We have not room to
present a full specimen of Southern testimony on this
subject.
The Presbyterian Symod of Kentucky, in 1834, said,
“Slavery deprives its subjects, in a great measure, of the
privileges of the gospel.” “The law, as it is here, does
not prevent free access to the Scriptures; but ignorance,
the natural result of their condition, does. The Bible is
before them ; but it is to them a sealed book. Very
few of them enjoy the advantages of a regular gospel
ministry.” -
The Address of the Synod proceeds to say that some
have proposed missionaries among slaves, but adds that
the “community” will never sustain this measure until
they are “ripe for measures for emancipation.” They
add, “It is evident that, as a body, our slaves do not
enjoy the public ordinances of religion. Domestic means
of grace are still more rare among them.” -
From a sermon of Bishop Meade, it may be inferred that
the religious condition of slaves is not better in Virginia.
The Presbyterian Synod of South Carolina and Georgia,
RELIGION PROSCRIBED, 31 I
in 1833, published a statement in which they said of the
slaves, “There are over two millions of human beings in
the condition of heathem, and some of them in a worse
condition.” “They may justly be considered the heathen of
this country, and will bear a comparison with heathem in
any country in the world. The negroes are destitute of
the gospel, and ever will be under the present state of
things. In the vast field extending from an entire State
beyond the Potomac [i. e., Maryland] to the Sabine River
[at that time our South-western boundary], and from the
Atlantic to the Ohio, there are, to the best of our know-
ledge, not twelve men exclusively devoted to the religious
instruction of the negroes. In the present state of feel-
ing in the South, a ministry of their own colour could
neither be obtained nor tolerated. But do not the negroes
have access to the gospel through the stated ministry of
the whites ? We answer, Wo. The negroes have no re-
gular and officient ministry; as a matter of course, no
churches; neither is there sufficient room in the white
churches for their accommodation. We know of but five
churches in the slaveholding States built expressly for
their use. These are all in the State of Georgia. We
may now inquire whether they enjoy the privileges of the
gospel in their own houses, and on our plantations !
Again we return a megative answer. They have no Bibles
to read by their own firesides. They have no family
altars; and when in affliction, sickness, or death, they
have no minister to address to them the consolations of
the gospel, nor to bury them with appropriate services.”
Again, in 1834, the same Symod said:—
312 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“The gospel, as things now are, can never be preached
to the two classes [whites and blacks] successfully in con-
junction.” “The galleries or back seats on the lower
floor of white churches are generally appropriated to the
negroes, when it can be dome without inconvenience to the
whites. When it cannot be dome conveniently, the me-
groes must catch the gospel as it escapes through the
doors and win lows.” “If the master is pious, the house-
servants alone attend family-worship, and frequently few
or none of them.” “So far as masters are engaged in the
work [of religious instruction of slaves], an almost un-
broken silence reigns on this vast field.”
The Charleston (S. C.) Observer, and the Western Zºmi-
mary, Lexington (Ky.), fully corroborate these statements.
So also does Rev. C. C. Jones, of Georgia, who says further :
“We cannot cry out against the Papists for withholding
the Scriptures from the common people, and keeping them
in ignorance of the way of life ; for we withhold the Bible
from our servants, and keep them in ignorance of it, while
we will not use the means to have it read and explaimed
to them.”
The North Carolina Baptist Convention adopted a
Report concerning the religious instruction of the coloured
people, with a series of resolutions concluding as follows:
“Resolved, That by religious instruction be understood
verbal communications on religious subjects ſº
But not even verbal instructions, it seems, could be
tolerated in South Carolina. In 1838, the Methodist
Conference of South Carolina appointed a missionary, Rev.
RELIGION PROSCRIBEL), 313
Mr. Turpin, to labour among the coloured people ; but it
was soon suppressed by the principal citizens. The Green-
ville (S. C.) Mountaineer of Nov. 2, 1838, contained the
particulars. A committee was appointed, who addressed
a note to Mr. Turpin, requesting him to desist. This was
backed up by a remonstrance to the same effect, signed by
James S. Pope, and three hundred and fifty-two others.
The document is before us. It argues at length the incom-
patibility of slavery with the “mental improvement and
religious instruction” of slaves. “Verbal instruction,” say
they, “will increase the desire of the black population to
learn. We know of upwards of a dozen negroes in the
neighbourhood of Cambridge who can now read, some of
whom are illembers of your Societies at Mount Lebanon
and New Salem. Of course, when they see themselves en-
couraged, they will supply themselves with Bibles, hymn-
books, and catechisms!” “Open the missionary sluice, and
the current will swell in its gradual onward advance. We
thus expect that a progressive system of improvement will
be introduced, or will follow from the mature and force of
circumstances, and, if not checked (though they may be
shrouded in Sophistºry and disguise), will ultimately revo-
lutionise our civil institutions.” “We consider the colm-
mon adage that “Knowledge is power,’ and as the coloured
lman is enlightened, his condition will be rendered more
unhappy and intolerable. Intelligence and slavery have
no affinity with each other.” The document refers to
the laws of the State, and hopes that “South Carolina is
yet true to her vital interests,” &c. &c.
314 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
The missionary enterprise was thus suppressed, or was
relinquished. The editor of the Mountaineer said, “The
opposition to the late Home Mission among us comprised
the great body of the people.”
“No people are found to be better than their laws.”
“The legal relation” of slave-ownership, as understood
at the South, requires all this. And the church and
ministry there either acquiesce or succumb
At every point we have found an utter repugnance and
opposition between the Slave Code and the Christian reli-
gion. And the Slave Code is nothing more nor less than
the truthful exponent and the vigilant guardian of the
so-called “legal relation of master and slave.” While the
one remains, the other remains, with all the practical
results that naturally grow out of them.
CHAPTER VIII.
LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTRUCTIONS
TO EMANCIPATION.
The Statutes of the Slave States not only make no Provision for a general
Bmancipation, but they obstruct and prevent Emancipations by the
Master. And the Constitutions of some of the States forbid the Legis-
latures to abolish Slavery.
WE have seen that slavery is hereditary and perpetual
in the nature of its tenure, and that the code by which it
is defined contemplates no period of its termination, and
points out no conditions upon which the slave or his pos-
terity can escape from it. (See Chap. XXI. of the former
series.) One avenue of hope only remains for him. The
slave-master may himself emancipate. In very many in-
stances, slave-masters have done so. The hope has been
thus inspired of such an increase of manumissions as should
weaken and ultimately terminate the whole system.
The hopes of humanity, in this direction, have not out-
run the fears of the majority of slaveholders, who control
the legislation of the Slave States. The laws accordingly
interpose obstacles to emancipation.
The reasons urged at the South for legislative and judi-
cial restrictions upon emancipation cannot, perhaps, be
316 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
more favourably or more forcibly stated than in the fol-
lowing extract from a mote by Mr. Wheeler, at the close
of his chapter of reported cases, concerning “the emanci-
pation of slaves:”
“It will be seen by this chapter that the owner of
slaves may emancipate them by deed, will, or contract
executed. But to this benevolence of the owner there are,
in most of the States, restraints upon the exercise of this
power by the owner. Slaves are recognised, wherever
this system is tolerated, as property, and are subject to all
the rules in the acquisition, possession, and transmission
of property. It would seem, therefore, upon a first view
of the case, that the owner should do with his property
whatever he pleased, and should have the privilege of
renouncing his right to it whenever he pleased, and with-
out being qualified by any public laws or regulations on
the subject. Such, however, is not the fact ; restraints
upon this right exist in nearly all the States.”
After citing some of the laws on the subject, including
those of Tennessee and Alabama, which we shall copy,
Mr. Wheeler proceeds:–
“When it is considered that slaves are a peculiar
species of property, it will not excite surprise that laws
are necessary for their regulation, and to protect Society
from even the benevolence of slave-owners, in throwing
upon the community a great number of stupid, ignorant,
and vicious persons, to disturb its peace and endanger its
permanency.
“The right of society to regulate and control the
LAWS Q). MANUMISSION. 3
17
ownership and control of this kind of property may be
justified on the same grounds as some other species of
property. No one can doubt the right of individuals to
acquire, possess, and sell gunpowder. But if the pos-
sessor chooses to take it to his house or store, in a city or
populous town, the public become interested, and will
restrain him within reasonable and proper limits.”
“Amd the constitutionality of such laws cannot be
doubted. So of slaves. The owner may keep as many
as he pleases; but if he emancipates them, and turns
them loose upon Society, they have a right to protect
themselves against his improvidence, or even against his
benevolence and generosity. They have a right to de-
clare the act illegal, or restrain it within such bounds as
shall secure their safety.” (Wheeler's Law of Slavery,
pp. 386-8.)
In Mr. Wheeler's book we have met with no mention
of the laws forbidding the education of slaves and free
coloured people, and their free access to the means of
religious and moral instruction. By the side of such
laws, the plea for laws restraining emancipation on the
ground of the ignorance and vice of the coloured people
would have seemed incongruous. It is the intelligence
and virtue of the coloured race that constitute the
* To have made the cases parallel, the writer should have adduced
laws restraining owners of slaves from having too many of them in one
place, or else he should have cited laws restraining owners of gunpowder
from pouring water upon it, or from transmuting it into articles that
could endanger nobody . It is slavery, and not liberty, that is
“dangerous.”
3.18 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“danger” to be guarded against in this feature of slave
legislation and jurisprudence. And the honesty and con-
scientious misgivings of repenting slaveholders (quite as
- truly as their “benevolence and generosity”) constitute
another danger against which a “society” of slaveholders
thus protects itself.
This principle of restriction obtains in the code of
nearly every one of the Slave States, though an express
enactment cannot always be cited for it.
In South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama,
the Legislature only, by express enactments, have autho-
rity to emancipate slaves. (Wide authorities cited by
Stroud, p. 147.)
In North Carolina, a slave cannot be emancipated ex-
cept for meritorious services, to be adjudged and allowed
of by the court. (Haywood's Manual, 537, Act of
1796.)
A general principle, pervading the legislation and
jurisprudence of the several States, is, that the owner may
not emancipate without the consent of his creditors.
Thus, “in Virginia and Mississippi, an emancipated slave
may be taken in execution to satisfy any debt contracted
by the person emancipating him, previous to such eman-
cipation.” (1 Rev. Code of Virginia, 434. Mississippi
Rev. Code, 386.)
In Kentucky, the emancipating papers must contain a
saving of the rights of creditors. (2 Litt. and Swi, 1155.)
In Louisiana, “any enfranchisement made in fraud of
creditors is void.” (New Civil Code, art. 190.)
\
&
* -
LAWS Q). MANUMISSION. 3.19
In Virginia, Mississippi, and Kentucky, the widow of
a deceased slaveholder who may have emancipated a
slave, may claim her “third” to which the widow is en-
titled. (1 Rev. Code of Virginia, 435. Mississippi Rev.
Code, 386. 2 Litt. and Swi., 1246.) And when one-
third part of an emancipated slave is thus re-enslaved,
the problem of preserving the remaining two-thirds of
him in a state of freedom would, perhaps, puzzle his best
legal advisers |
In Georgia, “the attempt” to set free a slave, otherwise
than by application to the Legislature, is punished as an
“offence”—a fine of two humdred dollars, one half to the
informer and the other half to the county; and the
manumitted slave is retained in slavery. (Prince's Di-
gest, 457.) And, as if this were mot sufficient, an addi-
tional Act, in 1818, declares that every last will and tes-
tament by which slaves shall be set free, or any such will
or other “instrument in writing, or by parol,” by which
slaves shall be allowed the privilege of working for them-
selves, “to be utterly null and void.” And the person
executing such writing, or “attempting to give it effect,”
or “accepting a trust” under it, may be fined “not ex-
ceeding one thousand dollars;” and every slave “on
whose behalf” such instrument shall be written, “being
thereof convicted (!!), shall be sold at public outcry, and
the proceeds appropriated,” &c. (Prince's Digest, 466.)
In Tennessee, the courts, on petition of the owner, and
for sufficient reasons therein set forth, may emancipate a
slave 1 (Tenn. Laws; Act of 1801, chap. 27.)
320 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“Emancipation is guarded in Tennessee by a provision
(statute of 1777) that the State must assent, or the act of
manumission by deed or will is ineffectual; and (as ap-
pears in Fisher v. Dabbs, 6 Yerger's Rep., 119), the
emancipated slave must be immediately removed beyond
the limits of the United States.” (Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, p. 387.)
“By statute of Alabama, Aikin's Dig, 647, slaves
may be emancipated by the master, on application to the
County Court, and on proof of meritorious services;
but the slave must remove out of the limits of the State.”
(Ib.)
Mississippi has combined all the obstacles in the laws
of all the other States. (Stroud, p. 149.)
Kentucky, Missouri, Virginia, and Maryland afford
greater facilities for emancipation. (Ib.) In Kentucky
and Missouri the master may emancipate, “saving the
rights of creditors,” and by giving bonds for the main-
tenance of the aged and infirm.
In Virginia, the law is similar, only that, if the eman-
cipated slave be over twenty-one years of age, he must
leave the State in one year, or be re-enslaved (Revised
Code, 436.)
Maryland has a proviso that the emancipated slave
shall be “ of healthy constitution,” &c., “capable of
labour,” and “not exceeding forty-five years of age.”
(Laws of 1796, chap. 67.)
In Louisiana, “no one can emancipate his slave, unless
the slave has attained the age of thirty years, and has be-
LAWS Q). MANUMISSION, 321
haved well for at least four years preceding his emancipa-
tion.” But “a slave who has saved the life of his master,
his master's wife, or one of his children, may be emanci-
pated at any age.” (Arb. 185, 186.) Also, the child of
a deceased slave-mother who had acquired the right to
freedom at a future time becomes free at that time.
(Art. 196.) And a slave entitled to a future release is .
capable of receiving property by testament or donation.
(Art. 193.) For these remnants of justice and mercy,
humanity is indebted, perhaps, to the former usages of the
French and Spaniards, under the Code Noir.
From the legislators we now turn to the judges and
reporters of judicial decisions.
“With respect to emancipation, it may be stated as a
principle, without an exception, that, as slaves are con-
sidered property upon which creditors have a right to
look for the payment of their debts due by the owner of
slaves, regard must be had to the rights of the creditor ;
and no act of emancipation is valid when these are vio-
lated.” (Note, in Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 310.)
So then the slave, by extraordinary exertions and by
agreement with his master, may have obtained emanci-
pation for himself and family, and may have removed with
them to a free State. Yet the master's creditor may take
out an execution, and re-enslave them, by the help of the
Fugitive Slave Act of Congress. The money paid by the
slave does not constitute him a creditor, in the eye of
the law ; for it belonged, in law, to the master, before it
was paid to him
Y
322 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“Slaves manumitted by will, where the personal estate
is not sufficient to pay the debts of the testator, are not
entitled to freedom.” This is the marginal note to the
case of Negro George et al. v. Corse, Adm'r ; June T.,
1827. (2 Harris and Gill's Md. Rep., 1.)
The will of James Corse, manumitting the slaves, con-
tained the following: “And it is hereby provided that if
my personal estate, eacclusive of negroes, should not be
sufficient to discharge all my just debts, then my will is
that my executor or administrator, as the case may be,
may sell so much of my real estate as will pay my debts,
so as to have my negroes free, as before stated.”
“It was admitted that the personal estate of the tes-
tator, either including or excluding the negroes, was not,
at the time of his death, or at any time since, sufficient to
pay his debts; but that his real estate, including his per-
sonal property, and excluding the negroes, were, at the
time of his death, and still are, sufficient to pay his debts.
Verdict for defendants, and petitioners appealed. After
argument, the Court, Dorsey, Archer, and Earl, Judges,
affirmed the judgment, and that the creditors had a right
to their demands out of the personal estate.” (Wheeler,
pp. 327-8.)
Thus the court annulled the express provisions of the
will, whether with or without authority from the statute
does not appear. And the principle established would, in
the same manner, set aside a similar will of a testator
who might leave millions in real estate, if his personal
estate, exclusive of megroes, should fall short of paying.
LAWS Q). MANUMISSION. 323
his debts. The object and spirit of such decisions cannot
be hid. The rights of the free as well as of the enslaved
are outrageously infringed by such proceedings, in which
the death-bed promptings of conscience, repentance, jus-
tice and mercy, are profanely spurned and trampled in
the dust.
“Slaves are subject to dower in all the States. Not
only are they subject to dower, but the widow's interest
in them is protected by statutory provisions. If the
husband manumits his slaves, whereby creditors and the
dower of the widow are effected, the manumission is so
far ineffectual that the manumitted slaves may be sold
for a period, and the proceeds of the sale applied to the
creditors of the former owner and his widow.” [Numer-
ous authorities cited.] (Wheeler, note to p. 181.)
Tn other circumstances the courts are less regardful of
the rights of woman.
“A wife's estate in dower of slaves, by a former hus-
band, on her second marriage rests in her husband.”
“And her right to manumit them is gone.” (Wheeler,
p. 182.)
On the subject of the validity of contracts and pro-
mises of masters to manumit, there seems some slight
diversity among the judges, as will be seen from the
following, in which the general doctrine is apparent:-
“A written agreement by a master with his slave to
manumit him is obligatory; it rests in benevolence, not
in contract.” (Marginal note.) The judge said, “The
manumission of a slave does not rest upon the principle
324 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
of a contract, depending upon a consideration; but it is
an act of benevolence Sanctioned by the statute, and
made obligatory, if in writing.” (Kettletas v. Fleet,
Feb. T., 1811; 7 John's New York Rep., 324. Wheeler,
p. 232.)
“Chancery cannot enforce a contract between master
and slave, though the slave perform his part.” (Stevenson
v. Singleton, Feb. T., 1829; 1 Leigh's Va. Rep., 72.
Wheeler, p. 233.)
Same decision in Sawney v. Carter, March Term, 1828;
6 Randolph's Va. Rep., 173. Wheeler, p. 237. Cited in
Teigh's Rep. T., 72, Virg, 1829, as follows:–
“Application to enforce a contract between master and
slave.—Per Cur. : In the case of Sawney v. Carter, the
court refused, on great consideration, to enforce a pro-
mise by a master to emancipate his slave, where the con-
ditions of the promise had been partly complied with by
the slave. The court proceeded on the principle that it
is not competent to a Court of Chancery to enforce a
contract between master and slave, even although the
contract should be fully complied with on the part of the
slave.”
Fugitive slaves, on arriving at the North, have some-
times exhibited the written agreements of their masters
to emancipate them, on condition of their payment of a
certain specified amount of money, payable in instal-
ments. Along with these, they have exhibited the
receipts of their masters for the several instalments in
full. And yet they have been compelled to run away to
LAWS Q), MANUMISSION, 325
obtain their hard-earned freedom, with all the hazards of
being hunted and recaptured The writer has seen and
examined such documents.
“If an informal emancipation takes place, the master
promising to comply with the legal formalities, his rights
are not thereby affected before the formalities be ob-
served.” (Bazzy v. Rose and child, May T., 1820; 8
Martin's Louisiana Rep., 149. Wheeler, p. 307.) In
this case, the promise, in writing, was produced. On a
habeas corpus, the slaves (Rose and child) had been dis-
charged, as free persons. But the claimant, Bazzi, brought
this suit against them, and the court, Martin, J., decreed
them to be slaves of the plaintiff
“A contract to manumit is obligatory.” (Case of
Negro Tom, Feb. T., 1810; 5 John's New York Rep.,
365. Wheeler, p. 309.)
“No declaration or promise made to a slave can be
enforced in a court of law.” (Marginal note.)
Beall v. Joseph, Trespass to try Joseph's right to
freedom. He had been a slave to one Woods, who agreed
to let Edwards have him for four years, after which he
was to be free. Both Woods and Edwards made parol
declarations to this effect. But Edwards sold him a slave
to Beall. The judge said, “It is clear that no declara-
tion or promise made to the slave in this State (Kentucky),
or for his benefit, by the owner or any other person, can
be enforced in a court of law or equity. And see Will
w, Thompson, in a note at the end of the case, where it
was held, that where a purchaser in writing contracted
326 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
with the Seller to manumit the slave at a specified time, it
is not a ground for a suit at common law, but equity will
enforce the contract, and give damages for the detention
of the negro.” (Harden's Ky. Rep., 51. Wheeler, p.
331.)
A contrary decision appears in Negro Cato v. Howard.
(June T., 1808; 2 Har, and John's Md. Rep., 323.
Wheeler, p. 323.)
“Parol evidence of an agreement for the freedom of a
slave is inadmissible.” (Victoire v. Dussuau, March T.,
1816; 4 Martin's Louisiana Rep., 212. Wheeler, p. 334.)
“An infant cannot be emancipated,” “nor can a slave
be set free who is not both under the age of forty-five
years, and able to work, and gain a sufficient maintenance
and livelihood, at the time the freedom is intended to
commence.” (Hamilton v. Cragg, June T., 1823; 6 Har.
and John's Md. Rep., 16. Also Hall v. Mullin, 5 Har.
and John's Md. Rep., 190. Wheeler, p. 31.1.)
“A bequest of liberty to slaves, in contravention of
the law, is void.” (Mary v. Morris et al., Aug. T., 1834;
7 Lou. Rep., 135. Wheeler, p. 311.)
“A deed of emancipation not recorded in the proper
court, but in some other, gives no title to freedom until
properly recorded.” (Sawney v. Carter [before cited].
Also Givens v. Mann, 6 Mumf Va. Rep., 191. Also
Lewis v. Fullerton, 1 Randolph's Va. Rep., 15. Wheeler,
p, 238.) -
“Whether a slave who is directed to be set free by the
last will and testament of his master can have the inter-
LAWS U. MANU MISSION. 327
vention of a magistrate to prevent his removal out of the
State, quere.” (Marginal note to Moosa v. Allain, 16
Martin's Lou. Rep., 99. Wheeler, p. 317.) The testator,
Julien Poydras, directed in his will that his slaves on his
several plantations should each be considered inseparable
from the respective plantation on which they were, and that
they should, at the end of twenty-five years, be free. The
plaintiff was, however, sold, and taken to another plan-
tation, against his will and consent, and, as he believed,
with an intention of carrying him out of the State. He
petitioned for a recession of the sale, and to be restored to
the plantation where he belonged. There was judgment
for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Judgment
affirmed !
“A slave cannot be emancipated by a nuncupative
[verbal, declaratory] will, nor by an executory or con-
ditional instrument in writing.” (Cooke [coloured] v.
Cooke; 3 Littell's Ky. Rep., 236. Wheeler. p. 328.)
Besides these legislative obstructions to emancipation
by the masters, there are, in several of the States, con-
stitutional provisions restraining the State legislatures
from abolishing slavery by statute. As the State will not
intrust the planters with the power of manumission, so
neither will the planters allow the State to hold the power
of abolition.
The laws forbidding or obstructing emancipation have
been pleaded on behalf of the slaveholders, as an excuse
for mot emancipating their slaves. But they can be of no
avail, except to such as oppose those laws, Slaveholders,
328 THE AMERICAN SLAVIE CODE.
moreover, might give their slaves “a pass” to the borders
of the free States, or accompany them thither. The fact
that others will re-enslave those whom they may emanci-
pate cannot excuse them. They have no right to continue
a wicked practice because others would take it up if they
relinquished it !
Concerning the law of Virginia re-enslaving the eman-
cipated negro, the Powhatan Colonisation Society (address-
ing the Virginia Legislature) said, “The law was doubtless
dictated by sound policy, and its repeal would be regarded
by none with more unfeigned regret than by the friends
of African colonisation. It has restrained many masters
from giving freedom to their slaves, and has thereby con-
tributed to check the growth of an already too great and
growing evil /* (Jay's Inquiry, p. 108.)
It ill befits those who hold and who patronise this
language to cite the laws impeding emancipation, to
justify slaveholders in refusing to emancipate | But this
incongruity is constantly witnessed The popularity, at
the South and at the North, of those societies, and states-
men, and ministers of religion who hold such language,
and occupy such a position, may assist to throw light on
the inquiry, whether, in this particular, the people are
better than their laws.
And let it be remembered that, in the judgment of
those who ought to know, and who are directly interested
in the matter, it is only by such laws that “the innocent
legal relation” of slave-ownership can be sustained.
In Weld’s “Slavery as it Is,” p. 164, may be found the
LAWS Q). MANUMISSION. 329
particulars of the re-enslavement of one humdred and
thirty-four slaves in North Carolina, who had been libe-
rated by the Quakers in 1776. The old law of 1741
could not prevent it. In 1777, after the manumissions
had taken place, a new law was made prohibiting such
procedure, and the county courts, under this Act, ordered
the emancipated slaves to be sold into slavery The
Superior Court, in 1778, reversed the decision, and the
negroes were, a second time, set at liberty. But the
Legislature, in 1779, confirmed the title of the purchasers
by a special Act ; and they were taken up, and a second
time reduced to slavery! A fair illustration of the legality
of the “peculiar relation ſ”
Such are the relations of the slave to civil government
and to society; such the protection he receives from
them.
PART III.
RELATION OF THE SLAVE CODE TO THE LIBERTIES OF
THE FREE.
333
CHAPTER I.
LIBERTIES OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR.
The Free People of Colour, though not in a condition of Chattelhood, are
constantly exposed to it, and at best chjoy only a portion of their
Rights.
WE have already seem how, in many ways, a free co-
loured person may be enslaved. He may be enslaved for
assisting a slave, however nearly related to him, to escape
into freedom. He may be enslaved for being suspected
of being himself a runaway slave ; for being thus im-
prisoned, and unable to pay his jail-fees. He may be
re-enslaved, after having been emancipated, if the process
were mot in exact accordance with unreasonable and vex-
atious regulations; or if, however regularly emancipated,
he presumes to remain among his friends, and amid the
Scenes of his childhood. He may be enslaved for incurring
fines which he is unable to pay, under unjust and unequal
enactments. He may be enslaved for not being able,
by white witnesses, to prove himself free | Though a
Northern man, and always before free, he may be enslaved
by entering a Slave State (Georgia or Maryland), and thus
incurring a fine and being unable to pay it. (Jay's In-
quiry, 24. Child's Appeal, p. 64.) He may be enslaved,
with his children after him, for being married to a slave.
334 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
He may be enslaved by being unlawfully and piratically
imported into a Slave State, even though the kidnapper
may be arrested and punished And in none of the free
States can any free native coloured citizen be safe from
the operation of the Federal Fugitive Slave Bill of 1850,
and from the clutches of United States' marshals and
commissioners | The law presumes him to be a slave,
unless he can prove himself free. (Wheeler's Law of
Slavery, pp. 5, 6.) “In South Carolina, if a free negro
cross the line of the State, he can never return.” (Child's
Appeal, p. 68.)
“Mississippi, in 1831, passed a law to expel all [free]
coloured persons under sixty, and over sixteen years of
age, within ninety days, unless they could prove good
characters, and obtain from the court a certificate of the
same, for which they paid three dollars: these certificates
might be revoked at the discretion of the county courts.
If such persons do not quit the State within the time
specified, or if they return to it, they may be sold for a
term not exceeding five years.” (Ib., p. 68.) And per-
sons sold for a term of years seldom regain their freedom,
as has been ascertained in the District of Columbia.
In Tennessee, emancipated slaves must leave the State
forthwith. (Ib., p. 68.)
While tracing, in the preceding chapters, the legal
condition of the slave, we have found the “free negro,
mulatto, or mestizo,” associated with him in some of the
most painfully humiliating incidents of his degradation.
Like the slave, the free coloured person is held incompe-
\
"FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR. 335
tent to testify against a white man I Like the slave, he
is debarred, to a great extent, from the benefits of educa-
tion, and from the right of enjoying free social worship
and religious instruction Like the slave, he is required
to be passive, without exercising the right of self-defence,
under the insults and assaults of the white man Like
the slave, as will be shown, he is denied the ordinary safe-
guards of an impartial trial by a jury of his peers. Like
the slave, he has no vote nor voice in framing the laws
under which he is governed. Even in many of the free
States he exercises this right only on unequal conditions,
or coupled with invidious distinctions! And yet he is
complimented with the title of “free!” To be a “free
negro” differs widely, it would seem, from being a free
man -
For striking a white man im Maryland, no matter
for what cause, a justice may “direct the offender's
ears to be cropped, though he be a free black.” (Stroud,
p. 97. Act of 1723, chap. 15.)
In Louisiana it is gravely set forth, by express statute,
that “free people of colour ought never to insult or strike
white people, nor presume to conceive themselves equal to
the whites; but, on the contrary, they ought to yield to
them on every occasion, and never speak or answer them
but with respect, but under penalty of imprisonment,
according to the nature of the offence.” (1 Martin's
Digest, 640-42.)
“In some of the States, if a free man of colour is ac-
cused of crime, he is denied the benefit of those forms of
336 TEIE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
trial which the common-law has established for the pro-
tection of innocence. Thus, in South Carolina, it is
thought quite unnecessary to give the grand and petit
jury the trouble of inquiring into the case: he can be
hung without so much ceremony. But who is a coloured
man? We answer, the fairest man in Carolina, if it can
be proved that a drop of negro blood flowed in the veins
of his mother.” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 21-2) Judge Jay
adduces an instance. William Tann, an overseer on a
plantation, shot a slave. He was supposed to be a white,
and the customary forms of trial before the Court of
Sessions were in preparation (before whom, as being a
white man, he would undoubtedly have been cleared),
But “on an issue ordered and tried for ascertaining his
caste, it was decided that he was of miaced blood.” So he
was “turned over by the court to the jurisdiction of
magistrates and freeholders, by whom he was sentenced to
be hung. The particulars appeared in the Charleston
Cowrier in 1835.
“The Corporation of Georgetown, in the District of
Columbia, passed an ordinance, making it penal for any
free negro to receive from the post-office, have in his
possession, or circulate, any publication or Writing of a
seditious character.” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 23.)
“In North Carolina, the law prohibits a coloured man,
whatever may be his attainments or ecclesiastical autho-
rity, to preach the gospel.” (Ib)
“In Georgia, a white man is liable to a fine of five
hundred dollars for teaching a free negro to read or write.
FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR. 337
If one free negro teach another, he is fined and whipped,
at the discretion of the court | Should a free negro pre-
sume to preach to or exhort his companions, he may be
seized without warrant, and whipped thirty-nine lashes,
and the same number of lashes may be applied to each
one of his congregation.” (Ib)
“In some States, free negroes may not assemble in
greater number than seven. In North Carolina, free
negroes may not trade, buy, or sell, out of the cities
wherein they reside, under penalty of forfeiting their
goods, and receiving, in lieu thereof, thirty-nine lashes ſ”
(Ib)
“In Ohio [a free State], not only are the blacks ex-
cluded from the benefit of public schools, but, with a re-
finement of cruelty unparalleled, they are doomed to idle-
mess and poverty by a law which renders a white man
who employs a coloured one to labour for him for one
hour liable for his support through life.” (Ib., 24.)
The Ohio law is, we believe, repealed. But in New
York, and some other Northern cities, coloured persons
are still denied licences to drive carts, and pursue other
similar avocations for a livelihood.
In Indiana, a free State, the testimony of free negroes
and mulattoes is not received against a white man.
(Child's Appeal, p. 66.)
“By a late law of Maryland, a free negro coming into
the State is liable to a fine of fifty dollars for every week
heºremains in it ! If he cannot pay the fine, he is sold ſ”
(Jay's Inquiry, p. 24.)
s.”
338 THE AMERICAN SLAVE COD.E.
“Should a coloured citizen of Maryland cross its boun-
dary, on business never so urgent to himself and his
family, on returning home, more than a month after, he
is liable to be seized and SOLD, unless, previous to his "de-
parture, he had complied with certain vexatious legal
formalities, and which, from ignorance, he would be ex-
tremely likely to neglect, or perform imperfectly.” (Jay's
Inquiry, p. 90.)
“A citizen of New York, if he happens to be coloured,
may not visit a dying child in Maryland without in-
curring a penalty of fifty dollars for every week he
remains; and if he is unable to pay the fine, why, then
he is to be sold by the sheriff at public sale, for such a
time as may be necessary to cover the aforesaid penalty.
But if a free negro is sold for a limited time, he is in
reality sold for life. During the term for which he is
sold, he is sold as a chattel, and may be transported at
the pleasure of his master; and when the expiration of
his term finds him in a cotton-field in Missouri, or a
sugar-mill in Louisiana, who is to rescue him from inter-
minable bondage 7” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 90.)
It is known that such cases have occurred, and that
free negroes taken up as fugitives in the Federal District
have been sold to the slave-traders and sent to the far
South. A case is narrated in a petition to Congress,
signed by Judge Cranch and nearly eleven hundred
citizens of the Federal District in 1828. And the adver-
tisements of free negroes for sale by the marshal and
sheriff appear frequently in the public journals. Mr.
FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR. 339
Miner, in the United States House of Representatives, in
1829, stated that in 1826-7 no less than five persons in
the Federal District were thus sold into perpetual bond-
age for jail-fees 1 (Jay's Inquiry, p. 155.)
“A free-coloured man, living near the line of the dis-
trict of Columbia, petitioned the House of Delegates of
Maryland for leave to bring his grandchild from the City
of Washington. The child had probably been left an
orphan, and he naturally wished to take it to his own
house. The petition was rejected.” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 90.)
“In North Carolina, free negroes are whipped, fined,
and imprisoned, at the discretion of the court, for inter-
marrying with slaves.” (Child's Appeal, p. 70.)
In Georgia, “any person of colour, bond or free, is
forbidden to occupy any tenement except a kitchen or
out.house, under penalty of from twenty to fifty lashes.
Some of these laws are applicable only to particular cities,
towns, or counties; others to several counties.” (Ib)
“Emancipated slaves must quit North Carolina in ninety
days after their enfranchisement, on pain of being sold for
life. Free persons who shall ‘migrate into’ the State
may be seized and sold as runaway slaves; and if they
‘migrate out' of the State for more than ninety days, they
can never return, under the same penalty.” “A visit to
relatives in another State may be called “migrating;' being
taken up and detained by kidnappers over ninety days
may be called ‘migrating.’” (Ib., p. 68.)
In all the seaport cities and towns of the Slave States
there are regulations forbidding masters of merchant-
340 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
vessels to land any free coloured person. And if any
seaman, cook, or steward in such vessel be coloured, he is
immediately seized (though a citizen of one of the free
States), and kept in jail at the expense of the ship, until
she is ready to sail. This is a great grievance, not only to
such coloured seamen, but to the ship-masters and ship-
owners. It is also a direct and palpable violation of the
Constitution of the United States.
The Legislature of South Carolina, in Dec., 1822, by
express statute, ordained the enforcement of this usage, by
providing that, in case the ship-master should refuse pay-
ing the expense of the seaman's imprisonment, he may be
“indicted and fined not less than one thousand dollars,
and imprisoned not less than two months, and such free
negroes shall be sold as slaves. The Circuit Court of the
United States adjudged the law unconstitutional and
void. Yet nearly two years after this decision, four
coloured seamen were taken out of the English brig Mar-
onion. England made a formal complaint to our Govern-
ment. Mr. Wirt, the Attorney-General, gave the opinion
that the law was unconstitutional. This, as well as the
above-mentioned decision, excited strong indignation in
South Carolina. Notwithstanding the decision, the law
still remains in force.” (Child's Appeal, p. 63.)
“North Carolina has made a law, subjecting any vessel
with free coloured persons on board to thirty days’ qua-
rantine, as if freedom were as bad as the cholera ! Any
person of colour coming on shore from such vessels is
seized and imprisoned till the vessel departs, and the cap-
FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR. 341
tain is fined five hundred dollars; and if he refuse to take
the coloured seaman away, and pay the expenses of his
imprisonment, he is fined five hundred more. If the sailor
do not depart within ten days after the captain's refusal,
he must be whipped thirty-nine lashes; and all coloured
persons, bond or free, who communicate with him, receive
the same.” (Ib., p. 69.)
“In Georgia there is a similar enactment. The pro-
hibition is, in both States, confined to merchant-vessels
(it would be imprudent to meddle with vessels of war);
and any person communicating with such seaman is
whipped, not exceeding thirty lashes. If the captain
refuse to carry away seamen thus detained, and pay the
expenses of their imprisonment, he is fined five hundred
dollars, and also imprisoned, not exceeding three months.”
(Ib.)
The State of Massachusetts sent an agent to South
Carolina, and another to Louisiana, to see what adjust-
ment could be made of the difficulties growing out of
these enactments; but they were both promptly ejected
from those States, laden with insults, and gladly hastened
their escape to Save their lives.
A most comprehensive class of oppressive enactments
against the free people of colour are those designed and
operating, directly or indirectly, to drive them out of the
cowntry / Some of the enactments mentioned already,
particularly those of Maryland, are known to have had
this end in view, and to have been instigated by the lead-
ing influences seeking their expulsion to Africa
342 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
A favourite scheme of the Virginia slaveholders, at an
early day, was to enlist Congress in the enterprise of
colonising the free blacks in Africa, for the better security
of the slave-system at home. Soon after the alarms of a
suspected or attempted insurrection of slaves, the propo-
sition was formally brought forward. It proved a failure;
whereupon the leaders of the movement, members of
Congress and others, organised the American Colonisation
Society, which has its auxiliaries in most of the States,
North and South. At the North, it has been advocated
as an ally of emancipation ; at the South, as the grand
conservator of the slave-system ; in both sections, it has
infused the Sentiment that there must or can be no eman-
cipations, unless connected with transportation to Africa;
that it is impossible for the coloured race to enjoy the
rights of freemen in this country; and that the whites
and blacks cannot live together in peace, in the enjoyment
of equal rights Into the history or the merits of this
society we cannot here enter, any further than is neces-
sary in order to understand the state legislation, Southern
and Northerm, designed to harass and oppress the free
blacks, and drive them out of the country. The consti-
tution of the society restricts it to the colonisation of free
coloured people, with their own free consent. But it is a
well-established fact that many of its leading members
have contemplated, whenever practicable, the employment
of force. The reader is referred to Jay’s “Inquiry” for
abundant evidence of this. And the same class of persons
have been busily engaged in promoting legislation against
|FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR. 343
the free people of colour, both in the slave and the free
States. On many occasions, the auxiliary Colonisation
Societies, their agents and their public speakers, have
explicitly justified and Sanctioned those oppressive enact-
ments, And the official organ of the Parent Society (the
African Repository) has given systematic circulation to
those injurious and slanderous aspersions of this much-
injured class, upon which the legislative persecution of
them has been based. (See Jay's Inquiry, p. 18, &c.)
In the preceding chapter we have quoted an instance of
direct approbation of those laws by an auxiliary society,
and will here add one more. The New York State
Colonisation Society, in a memorial to the State Legis-
lature, said, “We do not ask that the provisions of our
Constitution and statute-book should be so modified as
to relieve and exalt the condition of the coloured people,
whilst they remain with us. Let these provisions stand,
in all their rigour, to work out the ultimate and unbounded
ſº
good of this people That is, by compelling them to be
colonised, or remain oppressed and degraded !
In Connecticut, in 1833, the leading colonisationists
procured a legislative enactment against Schools for
coloured pupils, avowedly for the purpose of breaking up
the school of Miss Prudence Crandall, at Canterbury.
Under that enactment she was prosecuted, and, being
unable to procure bail, was committed to prison, but was
bailed out the next day. At her trial, before Judge
Daggett, a verdict was given against her. “The cause
was removed to the Court of Errors, where all the pro-
344 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
ceedings were set aside on technical grounds.” Miss
Crandall's school was afterwards broken up by a mob ;
and the gentleman who had been most active in procuring
the passage of the “back act” against the education of
free negroes (Mr. A. T. Judson) was appointed agent and
orator of the Windham County Colonisation Society.
We record the facts, in evidence that enactments against
the free people of colour are not a dead letter, but are pro-
cured and Sustained by the leading influences in the Church
and the State, at the North and the South.
In Philadelphia, in New York City, and in other places,
meetings of the Colonisation Society—in which doctors of
divinity, statesmen, and jurists have declaimed vehemently
against the free people of colour, denied their right to a
home in the land of their birth, and justified the oppres-
sive statutes against them—have been immediately followed
by frightful riots against the proscribed class, in which
their dwellings have been demolished, their churches
broken open and injured, their persons assaulted, and
numbers of them, in one instance, killed ! And no legal
protection or redress has been extended to them . These
scenes have been uniformly followed by special efforts to
induce them to be colonised in Liberia, “with their own
free consent "
The Virginia and Maryland auxiliaries to the Ameri-
can Colonisation Society have sought and obtained appro-
priations from the Legislatures of those States, under
circumstances that virtually involved compulsion. The
original bill (in the Virginia Legislature) making the
appropriation “contained a clause for the compulsory
FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR. 345°
transportation of free blacks.” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 50.) On
a motion to strike out the compulsory clause, Mr. Brodnax
opposed it, saying, “It is idle to talk of not resorting to
force. Everybody must look to the employment of force
of some kind or other | If the free negroes are willing to
go, they will go. If they are not willing, they must be
compelled to go. Some gentlemen think it politic not now
to insert this feature in the bill, though they proclaim their
readiness to resort to it when necessary; they think that
for a year or two a sufficient number will consent to go,
and then the rest can be compelled. For my part, I deem
it better to approach the question at once, and settle it
openly. The intelligent portion of the free negroes know
very well what is going on. Will they not see that
coercion is ultimately to be resorted to ? I have already
expressed my opinion that few, very few, will voluntarily
consent to emigrate if no compulsory measures be adopted.
Without it, you will still, no doubt, have applicants for
removal equal to your means. Yes, sir. People will not
only consent, but beg you to deport them | But what sort
of consent # A consent extorted by a species of oppression
calculated to render their situation among us insupport-
able | Many of those who have been already sent off
went with their avowed consent, but under the influence
of a more decided compulsion than any which this bill
holds out. I will not express in its fullest extent the
idea I entertain of what has been done, or what enormi-
ties will be perpetrated to induce this class of persons to
leave the State.”
Mr. B. proceeded to describe, at length, the process of
346 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
obtaining “consent” by a series of “flagellations,” and
then said—
“I have certainly heard (if incorrectly, the gentleman
from Southampton will put me right) that all the large
cargo of emigrants lately transported from that country
to Liberia, all of whom professed to be willing to go, were
rendered so by some such ministration as I have described.”
(Jay's Inquiry, pp. 50-1.)
Mr. Fisher expressed similar sentiments. The compul-
sory clause was, however, struck out. The result justi-
fied the prediction of Messrs. Brodnax and Fisher.
“I warned the managers against this Virginia business,”
said the Rev. R. J. Breckenridge, “and yet they sent out
two ship-loads of vagabonds, not fit to go to such a place,
and that were coerced away as truly as if it had been done
by a cart-whip.” (Speech before the Society. Jay's Inquiry,
p. 51-2.) Dr. Breckenridge, it is believed, has since de-
clared himself openly in favour of compulsory colonisation,
with a view, perhaps, of avoiding the worse “enormities”
described by Mr. Brodnax.
The “Maryland Colonisation Society” having, at length
(in 1841), openly defined its position, we let it speak for
itself, in its own language. We have the account from a
Baltimore paper. The meeting was held in the Light-
street Methodist Episcopal Church, Bishop Waugh in the
chair, and the meeting opened with prayer . The declara-
tion is as follows:–
“That while it is most earnestly hoped that the free
coloured people of Maryland may see that their best and
FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR, 347
most permanent interests will be consulted by their emi-
gration from this State, and while this Convention would
deprecate any departure from the principle which makes
colonisation dependent upon the voluntary action of the
free coloured people themselves, yet if, regardless of what
has been done to provide them with an asylum, they con-
tinue to persist in remaining in Maryland, in the hope of
enjoying here an equality of social and political rights,
they ought to be solemnly warmed that, in the opinion of
this Convention, a day must arrive when circumstances
that cannot be controlled, and which are now maturing,
will deprive them of the freedom of choice, and leave them
no alternative but removal.”
And this is what is meant by colonising the free people
of colour with their own consent | The Maryland Colo-
misation Society, with a bishop presiding, and with its
meeting opened by prayer, have openly taken a position
that the Legislature of Virginia, from a remaining sense
of decency, could not be persuaded to avow !
A Florida slaveholder wrote “A Treatise on the Patri-
archal System of Slavery,” in which he says, “Colonisa-
tion in Africa has been proposed to the free coloured
people, to forward which, a general system of persecution
against them, upheld from the pulpit, has been legalised
throughout the Southern States.” (Jay's Inquiry, p. 49.)
That “Florida slaveholder” (if we mistake not the person)
has good cause to feel the injustice he describes. His
only heirs are “free people of colour,” his own children,
for whom he has obtained an education among the abo-
348 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
litionists of the North ! We see in this one of the many
ways in which the wrongs of the coloured race are visited
upon their white oppressors. -
~" The constitutions and statutes of free States debarring
their free coloured citizens from eligibility to office, and
from equal access to the ballot-box, are among the most
marked and mischievous specimens of injury to the
coloured race. It is this that sustains the Slave States in
their oppression of both the bond and the free ; and of
this iniquitous legislation at the North, the negro pew,
and the corresponding treatment of negroes in Seminaries
of learning controlled by the Church, are the principal
supports. A Legislative Committee, in the State of New
York, alleged this as the reason why the policy of the
State could not be changed. Social customs, placing
coloured people out of the pale of refined society, come
under the same censure. How much better, on the whole,
are the people than their laws, whether at the North or
at the South
The picture presented in this chapter contrasts strikingly
with the condition of the free people of colour in the
British West Indies before emancipation, and at the time
it took place. That event, if we are rightly informed,
found the free-coloured people in the enjoyment of civil
and political rights, some of them editors of public
journals, and holders of municipal office.
But such a condition of things, it may be said, could
not consist with the perpetuity of West Indian slavery,
and may account for its termination. Be it so. Our
FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR. 349
slaveholders undoubtedly think so. The whole system of
persecuting and of attempting to drive away the free
people of colour to Africa has its origin in this apprehen-
sion. The main object is the perpetuity of slavery. The
Fugitive Slave Bill is chiefly designed and relied upon to
frighten the free-coloured people of the free States out of
the country ! This is its chief power
The “innocent legal relation of slave-ownership” comes
in again here, as the responsible parent of all the oppressive
enactments recorded in this chapter.
350
CHAPTER II.
LIBERTIES OF THE WHITE PEOPLE OF THE SLAVEHOLDING
STATES.
The White People of the Slaveholding States, whether Slaveholders or
Non-slaveholders, are deprived, by the Slave Code, of some of their
essential Rights, and cannot be regarded as a People in possession of
civil, religious, and political Freedom.
THE usages of human chattelhood cannot be tolerated
in any community without impairing the freedom and
invading the rights of every member of that community,
whether slaveholder or non-slaveholder. The fact of
tolerated human chattelhood is the fact of constantly
violated natural law, which lies at the basis of all law, the
guardian of every man's rights. In the very act of claim-
ing a slave, a man denies all rights of property, by denying
the inherent right of self-ownership in all men, upon
which right all other rights are based. All rights of
personal security are denied by the same claim. Wher-
ever “the innocent legal relation” of slave-ownership is
witnessed and is tolerated, there is witnessed the public
and deliberate denial of all that which forms the basis of
human laws, and upon which all legislative enactments for
the protection of human rights must repose.
One necessary consequence must be that, in adjusting
the legislation and the jurisprudence of a country to the
LIBERTY AT THE SOUTH. 35]
public recognition of human chattelhood, the adjustment
must inevitably trench upon the rights of all other men,
as well as upon the rights of the enslaved. This may
seem to some a mere abstract speculation, but a few
familiar instances will make the case clear.
We will take, in the first place, the case of the slave-
holder himself. Assuredly, it will be said, the slaveholder
is sufficiently free | Let us examine. To be a despot is
a very different thing from being free.
Here is a slaveholder who, as a thrifty manager of his
own property, wishes to make the best and most econo-
mical use of his slave-property, according to his own best
discretion. Can he do so Here is Tom, a shrewd, in-
telligent, trustworthy fellow, whom he would gladly make
“overseer” of his plantation, as is, indeed, sometimes done.
He wishes to send Tom to market frequently with his
produce, and to buy goods. It would be very convenient
to have Tom read, write, and “cipher,” which “the law”
will not allow ! And here comes the new law, requiring
each planter to keep “at least one” white man on the
plantation (under pretence that a white witness must be
there). This one white man must, of course, do some-
thing to pay his way. What can it be but to act as over-
seer, in which double capacity, if need be, he can bear
witness against himself or his employer | So Tom, in
whom his master reposes more confidence, must sink back
into the station of a mere field-hand.
Here is a waiting-maid, discreet and pious ; or here is
a nurse, whom all her owner's children call “Mammy.”
352 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
A little knowledge of letters would qualify one or both of
them to teach the little white masters and misses their
alphabet. Is it too much to suppose that there is, in
all the slaveholding South, one “good Christian slave-
holder” (so called) who has good sense and humanity
enough to desire such an arrangement [If there is not,
let “the innocent legal relation” be called to account for
it..] If there be such an one, where is the legal protection
of his right to select a teacher of the alphabet to his own
children In Louisiana, he would be subject to one year's
imprisonment for teaching such a slave to read He
enjoys liberty, does he 7
But here is a master whose aspirations for freedom are
less sublimated. He only wishes to make money by
slaveholding. And the best way, he thinks—especially
as he has not the land for them to cultivate, or does not
choose the vexation of attending to that business—is to
let them “hire out” in the neighbouring borough, where
their labour, at various jobs, is much wanted by the white
citizens. A “peculium” of their earnings would greatly
stimulate their exertions. But the Slave Code forbids it !
And it forbids the white citizens of the borough, including
slave-owners, to employ them. This is liberty for white
people Forbidden to hire their work done for them
They will be likely, in such an exigency, to discover that
there is “a higher law” than the Slave Code
Look next at the enactments forbidding emancipation
on the soil, or obstructing or forbidding it altogether.
Those slaveholding Quakers in North Carolina that eman-
LIBERTY AT THE SOUTH, 353
cipated 134 slaves in 1776, only to see them re-enslaved,
where were their rights? They forfeited them, perhaps,
by turning abolitionists.
Took, then, at the dying Thomas Jefferson, the penman
of the declaration that “all men are created equal,” now
penning a clause of his last will and testament, conferring
freedom (as common report says) on his own enslaved
offspring, so far as the Slave Code permitted him to do it,
Supplying the lack of power by “humbly” imploring the
Legislature of Virginia to confirm the bequests, “with
permission to remain in the State, where their families
and connexions are ;” then dying, under the umcertainty
whether his requests would be granted, or his children
sold into the rice-swamps One of his daughters, it
Seems, was afterwards sold at auction in New Orleans, at
the harem-price And his grand-daughter was colonised
to Liberia—“coerced,” perhaps, by the “cart-whip !” A
land of liberty for white people, for slaveholders, is it,
where a Jefferson cannot bequeath liberty to his own
children ' In Georgia, had he lived and died there, the
“attempt” would have been an “offence,” for which his
estate would have been subjected to a fine of a thousand
dollars; and each of his executors, if accepting the trust,
a thousand more
The “Florida slaveholder” before mentioned, with his
Princely fortune, his educated and accomplished heirs, the
children of his parental affection, his only ones, but—
under the “persecuting” ban of the “Colonisation So-
ciety,” “the pulpit” (Northern and Southern), and the
2 A
354 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“legislation” approved by them—outcasts, unable to tes-
tify in a court against a white man; liable to be colonised
to Liberia under force of “flagellations” and untold
2
“enormities;” or even to be kidnapped and enslaved 1–
the Florida slaveholder, we say, with such a family around
his board, presents another specimen of the liberty and
human rights enjoyed by the slaveholder | By no means
so rare a case as the Northern reader would, perhaps,
imagine.
Nor is it on the plantation alone that such cases occur.
We remember a thrifty mechanic in a Southern city,
who acquired a comfortable estate, and lived more ele-
gantly than mechanics in Southern cities commonly do.
He owned several slaves. But his family was of the
mixed race. He lived with a quadroom woman, without
marriage, of course, for the laws would not permit it.
His daughters were elegant, beautiful, and nearly white.
They were free, as was also their mother; but they were
subject to the vexations that harass “free people of colour.”
The father sought for them respectable connexions in life,
and nothing but the laws forbidding such marriages stood
in the way ; for they were much admired, members of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, and one of them was
loved and wooed by a white member of the same church,
and a slaveholder; but the law stood in the way of their
marriage . She might have become his mistress without
fear of the law, and almost, perhaps, without scandal.
Whether she afterwards did so we cannot tell. We call
attention to the legal rights, not of slaves, but of slave-
LIBERTY AT THE SOUTH. 355
holders, to the holy institution of marriage, and to the
sanctities of the family relation.
Having broached the “delicate subject,” we will venture
one other illustration. A young man, a son of a slave-
holder, a graduate of one of our Northern colleges, became
emamoured, on his return home, of a beautiful girl, nearly
white, who was the property of his father. She had been
piously educated, and had become a member of a church.
The young man, too, had made a profession of religion at
the North. They had played together in childhood, and
were affectionately attached to each other. An illicit or
secret connexion was not to be contemplated. But she
was a slave ; and, whether bond or free, she could not
legally be married to a white man | What could be done?
If they eloped without her owner's consent, the slave-
catchers and their bloodhounds might be after them. If
his consent and her free papers could be obtained, where
should they go! Not to the “free North,” for the
exquisite curl of her hair, so lovely in his eyes, would
attract the attention and the obloquy of the children of
the Puritans. The sequel we cannot tell, further than
that the young man took an exploring-voyage to the West
Indies, and was said to have returned. Whether they
emigrated and were married, or whether, remaining in
this “free Christian country,” they fell into the current of
prevailing usages around them, we cannot tell. The
imagination of a Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe may fill up
the picture—a subject worthy of her pencil.
Are we dealing in romance Come, then, and we will
356 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
introduce you to a Vice-President of the United States—
a very singular man, to be sure, though not singular in
being a slaveholder, nor singular in having beautiful
coloured daughters, to be sought after (in some sort) by
white gentlemen; but singular in giving his coloured
daughters a good education, attending them in public as
a father, and insisting that whoever admired and sought
them should do so only in the way of honourable marriage
The singularity of Colonel Richard M. Johnson attracted
the nation's attention. He was so very singular as to
treat the mother of his coloured daughters as though she
were his wife, to give her the charge of his household, a
seat by his side at his table, addressing her as “Mrs.
Johnson”—to do all this, instead of selling her in the
market, as some other great statesmen have sold the
mothers of their colouled children. When “Mrs. John-
son” became religious and wished to unite with the church,
the good minister felt it his duty to tell her that there was
an obstacle in the way—the Scandal of her living as she
did with Colonel Johnson. She immediately communi-
cated the fact to the Colonel. “You know, my dear,”
said he, “I have always been ready to marry you, when-
ever it could be done. I am ready now, and will call on
your minister about it.” He did so, and requested the
minister to marry them, after explaining the facts of the
case. The good minister was now in a worse dilemma
than before | What! marry Colonel Johnson to a coloured
woman | What could he say ? He could only say that
the law would not permit such a marriage. “Very well,”
LIBERTY AT THE SOUTH. 357
retorted Colonel Johnson (who was not a Christian), “if
your Christian law of marriage will not permit me to
marry the woman of my choice, nor permit her to marry
the man of her choice, it must even permit us to live toge.
ther without marriage.” So saying, he walked away, and
that was the last that was said about the marriage, Whe-
ther the lady was received into the church we cannot tell.
Before the outbreak of the anti-abolition excitement,
and the consequent clamour about amalgamation, an agent
of the New York State Temperance Society (Rev. Mr.
Yale) was sent to New Orleans to promote the cause of
temperance. He wrote from thence a letter, published in
an Albany religious paper, containing a graphic picture
of the state of morals and of society in that city. The
cause of temperance could make little progress there with-
out a reformation in other respects: the uprooting of
habits of licentiousness, the restoration of the family insti-
tution ; “but this can never be,” he continued, “until the
laws are repealed which forbid the intermarriage of the
white and coloured races. A large portion of the people
are of the mixed blood. The women of this class are
accounted elegant and beautiful. Many of the first gem-
tlemen of New Orleans will live with them, whether with
or without marriage; the consequence of which is a
general depravity of morals.”
It is needless to say that the picture is truthful, and
that its truthfulness is not confined to New Orleans. One
iron link in the chain of the slave is the denial to him of
the rights of the family relation, and of freedom of choice
35S THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
in marriage. But this badge of slavery we have found
upon the neck of the slaveholder. In denying free mar-
riage to his coloured brother, the white man has denied
the same right to himself!
We cannot dismiss this branch of the subject without
a further remark. When we contemplate the vast and
rapidly increasing extent of intermixture between the
races; when we remember that “the noblest blood of
Virginia” and of all the Slave States “runs in the veins
of slaves,” and is still more widely diffused among the
so-called “free people of colour;” and when we remember
the legalised persecutions, inflictions, and liabilities to
which even the latter class are found subject—hunted
back into slavery, or driven as exiles from the country of
their birth—we are shut up to one of two conclusions:
Either the Southern slaveholders must be almost univer-
Sally the most heartless, barbarous, and brutal people on
the face of the earth, or else there must be thousands of
slaveholders whose hearts are wrung daily with anguish
at the thought of the murderous injustice done by the
slave-laws to their relations and kindred—to their chil-
dren, to their sisters, to their brothers, to their nephews,
to their nieces, to their cousins—for of such are a large
portion of the slaves and free-coloured people composed
We take the most charitable supposition, and conclude
that the same cruel laws that wear out the lives of the
proscribed race, are oppressive likewise to a large class of
slaveholders, who see their near kindred crushed and
murdered continually by them.
LIBERTY AT THE SOUTH. 359
If this is not so, then the pretence of “humane and
Christian slaveholders” is all a delusion . If it is not so,
then the slave-system has extinguished human nature and
religion at the South.
If slaveholders are not themselves oppressed by the
Slave Code, it can only be because they have become
monsters who have no sensibilities to be lacerated, no
hearts capable of compassion, no unseared consciences to
be outraged. We should be sorry to think thus of the
majority of them.
The same may be said of the operation of those laws
and usages of slavery that forbid the education, religious
instruction, and free social worship of the slaves and so-
called free people of colour. The pious white people of
the South, the ministers of religion, churches, and church
members, are either aggrieved and oppressed by these
enactments and usages, or else they are not. On the
latter supposition, we are presented with a Church and
ministry disregardful of their high mission, and well-nigh
apostate. On the former, we see a Church and ministry
under the ban of persecution, and crippled in their opera-
tions by the strong arm of despotic power.
Under laws by which coloured Methodists, Baptists,
and Presbyterians are forbidden the free exercise of reli-
gion and religious worship, we are warranted in assuming
that white Methodists, Baptists, and Presbyterians feel
themselves insulted and aggrieved ; that when they see
them dragged from the house of prayer (or on their return
home) to the watch-house, or writhing under the lash
360 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
awarded by law for the offence, they sympathise with
them under their persecutions, and feel themselves, in the
persons of their brethren and sisters, under the same ban.
Or else, if it be not so, we are compelled to regard them
as virtually consenting to the persecution of their brethren.
We should be sorry to think thus of all the white Metho-
dists, Baptists, and Presbyterians of the South. And
consequently we are compelled to consider the better por-
tion of them under persecution along with their coloured
brethren.
If there be anything that Christianity enjoins on her
disciples, if there be anything in which they are engaged,
if there be anything from which they cannot, without the
strong arm of persecution, be driven—it is the free
assembling of themselves together for social worship and
consultation, for mutual instruction and united prayer ;
and especially the communication of religious knowledge
to others, and promoting the circulation and reading of
the Holy Scriptures among them. If there are professors
of the Christian religion who do not feel themselves
aggrieved and persecuted under enactments or usages
which restrain or forbid these, we need not be at any
great doubt where to classify them.
Religious white people at the South are either in
unity with persecutors or else they are under persecution
themselves.
Where were the religious liberties of that Methodist
Home Mission Society, whose missionaries among the
coloured people, Messrs. Wightman and Turpin, were
LIBERTY AT THE SOUTH. 361
driven from the missionary field in South Carolina, in
1838, as related in a previous chapter
What were the religious liberties of those white Chris-
tians in Charleston (S. C.), in 1818, who established a
Sabbath-school for the instruction of coloured children,
and then were forbidden (under penalty of fines, imprison-
ment, and the infliction of “twenty-nine lashes”) from
teaching them
What is religious liberty in New Orleans ?
From the New Orleans Picayune, Aug. 16, 1841 :—
“Chaumcey B. Blake was brought before Recorder Baldwin,
charged with tampering with slaves. It was proved that
he was seen conversing with a number of them in the
street ; that he asked them if they could read and write,
and if they would like to have a Bible. This was the
amount of the testimony against him. In palliation of his
conduct, it was shown that he was a regularly-appointed
agent of the Bible Society in New Orleans, to distribute
the Bible to such as would accept it. The Society, how-
ever, disclaimed having the most distant intention of
giving the Scriptures to slaves, and it was said Blake
had exceeded his commission in offering it ; but as it
appeared to be a misunderstanding on his part, and not
intentional interference, he was discharged, with a caution
not to repeat his offence.” (Furnished by Judge Jay.)
What is civil, religious, or political liberty, or where is
the independence of the judiciary, under enactments like
the following .
Louisiana: “If any person shall use any language from
362 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
the bar, bench, stage, pulpit, or in any other place, or hold
any conversation having a tendency to promote discontent
among free coloured people, or insubordination among
slaves, he may be imprisoned at hard labour mot less than
three nor more than twenty-one years; or he may suffer
death, at the discretion of the court.” (Child's Appeal,
p. 71. See also Kent's Commentaries, vol. ii., part iv.,
p. 268, note.)
The lawyer cannot effectively plead the cause of a
negro claiming his liberty; the judge, in charging the
jury, or in giving his judicial decision, cannot repeat the
common-law maxims of Blackstone, Littleton, Coke, and
Fortescue, appropriate to the case ; the actor of a drama
cannot repeat the best passages in Shakspeare; the minis-
ter of the Gospel cannot use the language of Bishop Porteus,
of John Wesley, of Jonathan Edwards—may, of St. James
or Isaiah, without incurring the hazards of a condemna-
tion under this statute When one reads the laboured
“opinions” of Judge Ruffin and others, in Wheeler’s “Law
of Slavery,” where the man is seen struggling with the
judge, and a strong sense of the wrong of slavery betrays
itself amid forced apologies and decisions in its favour, it
is difficult to resist the impression that the intelligent
judge is himself under the yoke of bondage to such sta-
tutes as the preceding, or to the proscriptive temper that
gave rise to them. The same may be said of such self-
contradictory clergymen as Dr. Fuller and others, who, on
the slave-question, cannot conceal their knowledge of anti-
slavery truth, nor their fear of giving it expression.
LIBERTY AT THE SOUTH, 363
&T) ſº
There is no freedom of speech nor of the press on this sub-
jeet in the Slave States.
“In Mississippi, a white man who prints or circulates
doctrines, sentiments, advice, or inuendoes, likely to pro-
duce discontent among the coloured class, is fined from
one hundred to a thousand dollars, and imprisoned from
three to twelve months.” (Child's Appeal, p. 71.)
“In North Carolina, ‘for publishing or circulating any
pamphlet or paper having an evident tendency to excite
slaves or free persons of colour to insurrection or resis-
tance, the law provides imprisonment not less than one
year, and standing in the pillory, and whipping, at the
discretion of the court, for the first offence, and death for
the second.” (Ib., p. 67.)
“In Georgia, the same without any reservation.” (Ib.)
“In Virginia, the first offence is punished with thirty-
mine lashes, and the second with death.” (Ib)
Mr. Preston, Senator in Congress, declared, in his place
in that body, that any person uttering abolition sentiments
at the South would be hanged.
What liberty, then, is there for white people at the
South And who knows how much would be said there
against slavery if the people dared to speak their thoughts?
Let us not rashly and too severely condemn the entire
South. The white people there do not enjoy freedom.
They share deeply in the bondage of the blacks
“Abolition editors, in Slave States, will not dare avow
their opinions.” (Missouri Argus.)
Perhaps the editor of the Argºs dares not avow his.
364 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
|Perhaps he penned this very sentence to allay suspicion,
and save his own life.
A Southern member of Congress was not restrained by
manly independence, or by any sense of shame for the lack
of it, to avow his fears of punishment under such laws as
have been quoted. An editor of a Northern paper, The
Friend of Man, at Utica, N. Y., published Mr. Pinck-
mey's Report in the House of Representatives, on a subject
involving the slave-question, and to the Report he ap-
pended a review of its positions. He sent some spare
copies to members of Congress at Washington City, among
whom was Hon. Adam Huntsman, of Tennessee, who soon
after wrote a letter to the editor, requesting him not to
send him any such paper (opposed to slavery) after he
should have returned to Tennessee, lest the bare reception
and use of it should subject him to an “infamous punish-
ment—a penitentiary offence of five years' confinement "
The request was, of course, complied with, and the legis-
lator remained unharmed.
Where are the liberties of the citizens of the Slave
States, when forbidden to “trade, barter, or commerce”
with one-third, one-half, or two-thirds of the inhabitants
—forbidden to obey God by hiding the outcasts—for-
bidden to “entertain strangers,” to “give food to the
hungry”—forbidden to convey their persecuted neigh-
bours to a home of security—forbidden to ease their
tortures by striking off their pronged iron collars from
their necks? Who will slander the South by saying
that none of its white citizens feel themselves injured,
LIBERTY AT THE SOUTH, 365
crushed, persecuted, and wronged by enactments like
these ? Or can a people be said to cujoy liberty and secu-
rity who live under such a code as this?
There can be no liberty where there is no security, no
protection, no law. And in the presence of such despotic
power as that of the slaveholder, there can remain very
little of these. A general spirit of lawlessness pervades
the Slave States.
As to the non-slaveholding whites in the Slave States,
they are, as a class, and with few exceptions, in an abject
and degraded condition. A large portion of them are
uneducated and poor. In the presence of slave-labour,
and with the soil in the hands of slaveholders, there is
little of lucrative labour within their reach ; and labour
is there a badge of disgrace, assimilating them with the
slaves. It is not strange that large numbers of them
become improvident and idle. Mechanics, including some
from the North, constitute, to a considerable extent, an
exception to these remarks. Even these are looked down
upon by the slaveholding planters, who have contrived to
monopolise and wield nearly all the political power.
On the whole, it cannot with propriety be said that
civil, religious, and political liberty exist in the slave-
holding States. Nor can they exist there, so long as
“ the legal relation of owner and slave” remains, That
relation blights and destroys all the natural and heaven-
established relations of life.
366
CHAPTER III.
LIBERTIES OF THE WHITE PEOPLE OF THE NON-SLAVE-
EIOLDING STATES.
The Rights of the White People of the Non-slaveholding States are
directly and indirectly invaded by the Slave Code of the Slave States.
Their Liberties, to a great extent, have already fallen a sacrifice, and
can never be secure while Slaveholding continues.
WE open here upon a wider field than our limits will
permit us to explore as its importance demands. The
entire political history of the country, which might oc-
cupy volumes, demands attention under this head. But
we must pass it by, only asking of the reader that he
examine it at his leisure.*
The topics of the last preceding chapter might, for the
most part, be introduced here again. The white people
of the North and of the South suffer, in common, many
of the heavy inflictions of the slave-master's lash. If the
stroke fall less heavily upon the citizens of the free
States, it nevertheless falls, and none the less really be-
cause, from stupidity induced by long-standing habit, a
callous insensibility indicates that it is scarcely felt or
perceived. In no other way did ever a people, once free,
submit to part with their freedom. “A people,” says
* Some sketches and outlines of this history may be found in the
Author’s “Slavery and Anti-Slavery, a Iſistory,” &c.
LIBERTY AT THE NORTH. 367
Montesquieu, “may lose their liberties in a day, and not
miss them for a century.” Thus it was with the Romans,
who, under the reign of the tyrant Nero, had not ceased
boasting of their liberties
So closely connected are the people of the free and
of the Slave States, that whatever affects the latter can
scarcely fail to affect the former.
If the spectacle of human beings bereft of self-ownership
and the rights of property is found to undermine the foun-
dations of personal security and the rights of property at the
South, they cannot remain perfectly stable at the North.
If brutal inflictions on the slaves beget brutal assaults
and encounters between Southern gentlemen, the con-
tamination of the bad example cannot but have its effect
at the North.
If slave-labour at the South makes manual-labour a
badge of degradation there, such labour will become less
respectable in the free States.
If the whites of the South submit to the tyranny that
forbids them to hold “commerce, trade, or barter” with
one-half of their neighbours, the money-making traffickers
of the North will scarcely think of the indignity or the
immense losses they suffer, in being shut out by the Slave
Code from their natural and political right of commerce
with millions of their fellow-countrymen.
If the people of the South become debased and servile,
by submitting to the loss of freedom of speech and of the
press, those imestimable rights will become less prized at
the North, and the natural attempts of slaveholders to
368 TILE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE,
extend this feature of their sway over the North will not
lack for auxiliaries among editors, politicians, statesmen,
lawyers, judges, and ministers of religion, in close affinity
with those slaveholders at the North.
If the whites of the South submit to enactments which
forbid them to relieve the suffering, to feed the hungry, to
shelter the outcasts, to perform the common offices of
humanity to those most in need of them, the same ignoble
and unmanly servility will be likely to manifest itself at
the North, until the despots of the South become em-
boldened to enact statutes for extending this feature of
their sway over the entire country.
If churches, church members, and ministers of religion
at the South (either as persecutors or as persecuted) submit
to arrangements by which the rights of free social wor-
ship, religious instruction, and missionary labour (including
the distribution of Bibles and the teaching of the people
to read), are forbidden and suppressed, the churches,
church members, and ministers of the North connected
with them, will be exposed to similar indignities, tempta-
tions, and derelictions. And by this process it may come
to pass that, while compassing sea and land to convert the
heathen abroad, and give to every family on the earth a
Bible, and teach them to read it in Sabbath-schools,
admonishing their missionaries not to heed the pro-
hibitory decrees of civil governments, they may, neverthe-
less, be among the first to cry out against the application
of their own doctrine to the heathen of America, made
such by the slave codes of the South.
LIBERTY AT THE NORTH. 369
And, finally, if the non-slaveholding whites of the South
submit to be shorn of their political power, and despoiled
of their civil liberties and political rights, the non-slave-
holding whites of the North, equally contemned by the
same oligarchy of slaveholders, will be likely to imbibe
the same spirit of pusillanimous submission, to sink into
the same degradation, and share the same fate.
The intelligent reader need not be told that such,
indeed, are the facts of the case, as already developed and
incorporated into the history of the country. We need
not and cannot enter into the details; nor is it necessary
to cite authorities in proof. Whoever has been on the
stage of action in this country, and a reader of the public
journals for the last twenty years, will be at no loss for
the particulars to which we refer.
What has been now witnessed was matter of intelligent
anticipation and prediction before it took place. Though
the climax of disgrace and ruin has not yet been reached,
and may yet be averted by prompt efforts, yet we have
come sufficiently near the precipice to recognise the truth-
fulness of the picture drawn, long since, of the gulf below,
by one of our most eminent statesmen. In the House of
Delegates of Maryland, in 1789, William Pinckney (a
member of the Convention that had just drafted the
Federal Constitution) held the following remarkable lan-
guage :—
“I have mo hope that the stream of general liberty will
flow for ever unpolluted through the mire of partial
bondage, or that those who have been habituated to lord .
w) ºr,
* A-2
370 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
it over others will not, in time, become base enough to let
others lord it over them. If they resist, it will be the
struggle of pride and selfishness, not of principle.”
If the relation of slave-owner and slave is to be com-
tinued, all this may be expected to follow, as the natural
if not necessary result. By reverting again to the facts
presented in the latter part of our chapter on the “origin
of the relation and its subjects,” it will be seen that the
process of enslaving white people has already commenced,
and is making steady and rapid progress, with the pros-
pect (according to Henry Clay) of becoming prevalent a
few generations hence, when the slavery and the existence
of the black race shall have ceased.
371
CONCLUDING CHAPTER.
Summary Review of the Slave Code–Its Character and Effects—In-
quiries concerning the Duties of Christians, Churches, and Ministers—
The Responsibilities of Citizens, of Society, of Civil Government, of
Legislators, and Magistrates—Scrutiny of the Legality of American
Slavery—The Heaven-prescribed Remedy–The Worthlessness of Tem-
porising Substitutes—Closing Appeal.
IF the reader has attentively considered the preceding
pages, he will now be able to pass an intelligent judgment
upon the character of the Slave Code, and of the practice
of slaveholding, protected and defined by it. The so-
called “legal relation of master and slave” he will have
found to be the relation of an owner to a human chattel,
body and soul. The verity and the efficacy of this mon-
strous claim he will have traced in each successive chapter
and topic of the entire treatise. He will have witnessed.
the legitimate workings of this claim in the connected
incidents of slave traffic, seizure of slave-property for
debt, inheritance and division of slave-property, and uses
of slave-property. He will have seen that in the pre-
sence of this claim slaves can possess nothing, can make
no contract, can neither enter into the marriage relation,
nor discharge the duties, nor claim the rights, nor share
the sanctities of the family relation. He will have ob-
served how this claim of absolute proprietorship in the
37.2 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
slave involves the claim and virtually secures the exercise
of unlimited and irresponsible authority on the part of
the “owner ;” the enforcement of his labour without
wages; the direction of his food, clothing, and shelter ;
the infliction of discretionary punishment upon him, vir-
tually amounting (in consequence of the incompetency of
coloured witnesses) to the power of life and death over
him. This despotic power of the “owners” he will have
seen delegated to overseers or agents, and shared by the
members of their families. The same relation of slave-
ownership he will have seen substituting the legal pro-
tection of slave-property for the personal protection of
the slaves, leaving them exposed to the most frightful
barbarities, without the right of self-protection, or the
means of redress by a suit against the “owner ;” without
power of self-redemption, or even a change of masters.
This “relation,” hereditary and perpetual, he has found
to include the most crushing spiritual despotism over the
rights of conscience ever claimed by man on the face of
the earth ; and he has seen it hunting its fugitive victims
as if they were brute beasts. This “relation,” as thus
developed and systematised, he has found to have been
originated by the piratical African slave-trade, as com-
menced by the infamous John Hawkins, yet extending
itself over Indians and white persons, and fostering in the
heart of our boasted republic a slave-trade more demo-
ralising than that on the African coast.
This so-called “legal relation,” as thus defined and
described, he will have found to be the very same that
CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 373
is daily declared to be a blameless and innocent one,
involving no guilt in those who “hold” and “sustain” it.
The attentive reader has further seem how this “rela-
tion” of slave-ownership has shaped and determined the
“relation” of the slave to society and to civil govern-
ment ; how it bars his access to the judiciary, denying
his capacity to be a party to a civil suit ; how it bids
the courts reject the testimony not only of slaves, but of
free-coloured persons; how it enforces the subjection of
slaves not only to their “owners” and overseers, but to
all other white persons; how it frames and executes
unjust and inhuman penal enactments against the slaves;
how it forbids their education, their religious instruction,
and free social worship ; and, finally, how it interposes
obstacles to manumissions by the master, and to acts of
emancipation by the State.
The same “relation” of slave-ownership he has found
waging successful warfare upon the liberties of the free,
degrading the free people of colour, and dragging them
back into chattelhood ; despoiling the free whites of the
South, mot excepting slaveholders themselves, of some of
the essential rights of humanity, freedom of speech and of
the press, the right of propagating true religion, and of
reducing it to practice by deeds of justice and mercy to
the oppressed ; extending the same iron sway over the
free citizens of the North, and bidding the sons of the
Pilgrims dishonour their sires, by joining in the hunt
after fugitive slaves.
All this the attentive readers of the preceding pages
374 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
have witnessed. The writer will not insult them by
asking them whether they consider such a “relation,”
with Such a paternity, with such a character, and with such
fruits, an innocent one, reposing upon the foundation of
apostles and patriarchs, the Bible its charter, the Founder
of Christianity its chief corner-stone ! But he wishes to
propound to them, for their consideration and decision,
a few plain and important practical questions.
Is it not high time that the churches of this country, of
all sects, their members and ministry, were purged from
the sin of slaveholding, and from the taint of religious
fraternity with slaveholders ?
If this system and sum of abominations is to be
tolerated in the church, what description of practices,
what crimes should be excluded from her pale and de-
barred from her communion ? Is it theft | Is it robbery
Is it cruelty? Is it murder'ſ Is it man-stealing? Is it
extortion? Is it adultery'ſ Is it bloody persecution?
Is it using a neighbour's service without wages, and giving
him naught for his work'ſ Is it violence? Is it fraud?
Is it despising the poor'ſ Is it taking away the key of
knowledge? Is it proscribing Bibles, and forbidding free
religious worship ! Is it upholding, abetting, and Sustain-
ing all these combined 7
If these are to be excluded from religious communion
and fellowship, must not the so-called “legal relation of
master and slave” be excluded likewise, by excluding those
who resolutely persist in sustaining it ! Can the former
be done without doing the latter ? And if it be left
CONCHLUIDING CHAPTER. 375
undone, what must become of the church'ſ Will not the
salt lose its savour ! And what will it then be good for,
but to be cast out and trodden underfoot of men'ſ Is
there nothing in the signs of the times that gives signifi-
cance to these questions ! How long shall infidelity be
armed with the most powerful of all weapons against
the Bible and Christianity, against the ministry and the
church .
If the reader be a Christian, will not his regard for
Christianity suggest to him the proper answer to these
inquiries' And if he be not a Christian, would he mot,
nevertheless, desire to see the most potent of all social
influences—that of the prevailing religion of the country—
arrayed against this stupendous system of inhumanity and
wrong .
If the Saviour of men was manifested “that he might
destroy the works” of the Devil, and “proclaim deliverance
2
to the captives;” if his disciples are his witnesses, and
engaged in the prosecution of his work, are they not bound
to “ have no fellowship with the works of darkness, but
rather reprove them 7" Especially, are not his ministers
bound to “cry aloud and spare not—to lift up their voice
like a trumpet—to show the people their transgression, and
the house of Jacob their sim?” If such an iniquity as the
holding of humanity in chattelhood may escape their
rebukes, what form of wickedness may not claim equal
exemption ? What commandment of the law, what precept
of the gospel, what principle of the Christian theology is
not set at naught by the enslaver ? What meaning can
376 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
there be in the words justice or mercy, what significance
in the doctrine of human brotherhood, or what force in
the precepts, “Love thy neighbour as thyself,” “Remember
them that are in bonds, as bound with them,” and “Go
teach all nations,” if the practice of enslaving immortal
men, for whom Christ died, and of whose nature he is
partaker, is not to be condemned ; if the cause of the slave
is not to be vindicated ; if the oppressor is not to be
called to repentance ; if his victim is not to be taught and
disenthralled .
Is it not mockery to pray, “Thy kingdom come,” and
yet neglect engaging in labours like these ? If the work
of elevating depressed humanity be Christ's work, should
not the “undoing of the heavy burdens,” and “letting the
oppressed go free,” be the work of Christians, the mission
of the church of Christ |
Turning next to the responsibilities of citizens, of
society, of civil government, of legislators, and of magis-
trates, we demand whether the crime of enslaving and
embruting a human being ought not to be promptly and
vigorously suppressed by the strong arm of penal law
Iſ not, what crime or what outrage against humanity
ought to be thus suppressed ? Shall a man be punished
for stealing an OX, or for knowingly receiving, appropri-
ating, and using a stolen ox, and yet be suffered with
impunity to steal or receive, appropriate and use, a stolen
man? Will the law pretend to protect my rights of pro-
perty, and yet refuse to protect my personal right to
myself? By what authority, by what rule, on what prin-
CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 377
£)
ciple, with what consistency, and with what ultimate
success, will the law, or the administrators and expound-
ers of law, attempt to maintain, by the sanctions of penal
infliction, the rights of white men, while they refuse thus
to maintain the rights of black, or yellow, or Swarthy, or
brown men . Upon what maxims of civil law or of the
science of jurisprudence will they proceed in doing this?
Or will they proclaim to the world that there is no such
thing as “legal science,” that the pretence of it is a cheat ;
that the belief in it is a delusion ; that jurisprudence is a
game of chance ; that law rests upon caprice, and inter-
poses no obstacle to aggression, no protection from brute
force, no guarantees against despotic power | If this be
the decision of grave jurists, who will care to have jurists?
Who will be grateful for the institution of civil goverm-
ment ' Who will respect the magistracy Who will
venerate law Ż How shall civil government, jurispru-
dence, and law be vindicated from aspersion and shielded
from execration and contempt, but by wielding them for
their high and holy ends ! How, indeed, shall this bo
done but by denying to the American Slave Code (instinct,
as it is, with all the elements of inherent lawlessness) any
just claim to the honours or the authority of valid law
What, after all, becomes of the boasted legality of slave-
ownership, and where is the legal validity of the American
Slave Code, in the presence of such legal decisions and
common-law maxims as the following 7
“Statutes against fundamental morality are void.”
(Judge McLean. Supreme Court of the United States.)
378 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
Is not the Slave Code “against fundamental morality?”
If it is not, what existing or conceivable statute could
come under that description, or of what use is the maxim!
But if the Slave Code is “against fundamental morality,”
have not the people a claim upon Judge McLean and the
United States Supreme Court for a decision affirming the
illegality of slave-ownership, whenever a suitable case
shall be presented for their consideration, and action 7
“If it be found that a former decision is manifestly
absurd and unjust, it is declared not that such a sentence
was bad law, but that it was not law.” (Littleton.)
Are not the “decisions” in support of slavery, as cited
in this volume, “manifestly absurd and unjust 7” If not,
what recorded or conceivable decisions could be thus
characterised But if they are of that charactor, does
not the maxim of Littleton call for judicial decisions
declaring “not that such sentence was bad law, but that
it was not law ſº
Will it be said that time and precedent have so settled
the law on this subject that it must mot or cannot be
disturbed
“Where the foundation is weak, the structure falls.”
“What is invalid from the beginning cannot be made
valid by length of time.” (Noyes' Maxims.)
Will it be said that statutes and judicial decisions set
aside or modify matural or common law . It is of the
very nature of natural or common law to contradict this
plea Hear it—
“The law of nature being coeval with mankind, and
CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 379
dictated by God himself, is, of course, Superior in obliga-
tion to every other. It is binding all over the globe, in all
countries, and at all times. No human laws have any
validity if contrary to this, and such of them as are valid
derive all their force, mediately or immediately, from this
original.” (Fortescue.)
“The inferior must give place to the superior ; man's
laws to God’s laws. If, therefore, any statute be enacted
contrary to these, it ought to be considered of no authority
in the laws of England.” (Noyes.)
“If any human law shall allow or require us to commit
crime, we are bound to transgress that human law, or
else we must offend against both the matural and the
divine.” (Blackstone.)
“When an Act of Parliament is against common right
or reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed,
the common law will control it, and adjudge such Act to
be void.” (Coke.)
Will it be said that common or natural law may pos-
sibly allow the practice of slaveholding'
“Those rights which God and nature have established,
and which are therefore called matural rights, such as life
and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more
effectually vested in every man than they are ; neither
do they receive any additional strength when declared
by the municipal law to be inviolable. On the contrary,
no human legislation has power to abridge or destroy
them, unless the owner himself has committed some act
that amounts to a forfeiture.” (Fortescue.)
380 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
“The law, therefore, which supports slavery and opposes
liberty must necessarily be condemned as cruel, for every
feeling of human mature advocates liberty. Slavery is
introduced by human wickedness, but God advocates
liberty by the mature which he has given to man.”
(Fortescue.)
Much more might be quoted from the great luminaries
of common law to the same point. Call there be any
doubt on the question of the legality of slavery 4 If so,
the common-law rule of decision is simple :
“Whenever the question of liberty seems doubtful, the
decision must be in favour of liberty.” (Digest.)
The remedy for slavery and its untold abominations and
horrors is simple. It is so simple that worldly wisdom
(which is foolishmess with God, and which bewilders itself
in its own never-ending labyrinths) thinks it complex and
difficult. It is merely to cease doing evil, and to com-
mence doing right. It is for the Government to “break
every yoke and let the oppresed go free”—to “proclaim
liberty throughout the land to all the inhabitants thereof.”
—to “execute judgment between a man and his neigh.
bour,” and “deliver the spoiled out of the hands of the
oppressor.” It is for the citizens to “bring the poor that
are cast out to their own house, and not hide themselves
from their own flesh ;" to welcome them to a residence
“among” them “where they shall choose,” “where it
liketh them best.” It is for the “masters” to “render
unto their servants that which is just and equal,” “for the
labourer is worthy of his reward.” It is for the voters,
CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 381
who are the sovereign people, to choose “judges and
officers” who shall “judge the people with just judgment,”
remembering that “he that ruleth over men must be just,
ruling in the fear of God.” If the tenure of slave-property
be illegal, let the courts thus decide. If not, or if the
judges decline doing their duty, let the legislators abolish
slavery by statute. In either case, let them repeal their
own unrighteous enactments. Let those who need the
labour of the coloured people employ them for homest
wages, and leave off living by plunder.
This is God's own remedy for slavery. Experiment
has fully tested its safety and its benefits, till those who
had not learned to confide in God and walk by faith have
been compelled to recognise historical facts, and may, at
least, walk by sight.
A moderate measure of historical information and com-
mon-sense, one would think, might suffice (with the single
eye that causes the whole body to be full of light) to
detect the folly, the absurdity, and the inefficiency of all
those schemes by which, on this particular subject, men
have sought to reach the ends or results of justice and
honesty without the task of their self-denying exercise.
The attempt to kill the poisomous tree of slavery by lop-
|ping off a few of its more unsightly branches—the subtle
but short-sighted diplomacy that seeks to outwit the
arch-enemy of humanity and fritter away his power by
temporising expedients and conciliatory compromises—
the policy of conceding the innocency of the so-called legal
relation while raising an outcry against its component
3S2 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
parts, the particulars in which it consists, the incidents by
which it is defined—the inveterate day-dream of suppres-
sing the traffic in human beings without overturning
human chattelhood, or of preventing the extension of
slavery so long as it is suffered to exist—the delusion that
the circumscribing of its boundaries (if it were practicable)
would be equivalent to its abolition or secure its termina-
tion—the notion that national neutrality can uproot a
national sin, or excuse from its abandonment ; or that
there can be such a thing as a Republican Government
maintaining neutrality concerning the chattelhood of
its citizens—above all, the expedient of exporting the
oppressed, instead of ceasing from and overturning oppres–
sion—these are some of the fallacies of our times which,
in generations to come, will be cited as exemplifications
of the bewilderment introduced by the presence of slavery.
In conclusion, the writer would urge on all classes of
his readers the claims of the enslaved. What portion of
the community, or what description of human beings,
should be exempted from the appeal, or excused from
earnest efforts in their favour !
Lives there the man who could justify himself in the
retirement of his own heart, should his own conscience
convict him of coldness and indifference concerning the
chattelhood of man'ſ Could he help despising himself,
and sinking, in his own estimate of himself, to the level
of the servile slave, or the dulness of the unthinking
brute? Lives there the woman, with a woman's heart
and a woman's love, whose inmost soul does not bleed at
CONCLUDING CHAPTER, 383
the wrongs of the slave How could the woman be
lovely or attract virtuous love who should fail to do this?
How could she respect herself, how could a wise and
manly husband confide in her, or how could she claim for
herself the respect due to a woman, should she be justly
charged or suspected of indifference when woman shrieks
under the lash, when woman's affections are outraged,
when woman is torm from husband and child, when
woman is crushed and polluted by lawless and domineer-
ing lust, when woman is transformed to a beast ! Is
there the circumspect and self-respecting woman who
would bestow her affections and repose her confiding
hopes upon the man who should betray an indifference to
such wrongs inflicted upon woman
Is there a patriot, a lover of his country, who can be
indifferent to the existence and the sway of the Slave
Code—who does not blush at the national disgrace, and
tremble, as did Jefferson, in view of impending judgments
incurred by the national sin 7
Is there a wise statesman who fails to foresee the ruin
of his country and the wreck of its free institutions,
unless the leprosy can be healed ,
Can the political economist be unconcerned, when he
witnesses this incubus upon the pecuniary prosperity of
the Republic—this paralysis of the nation's strength
Can the friend of education, the patron of intellectual
progress, neglect to protest against the enforcement of
ignorance, the proscription of letters, the closing of every
avenue to the intellects of increasing millions of his
Q O
384 THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE.
countrymen? Can he do otherwise than deplore and
condemn the code that prevents the establishment and
prosperity of schools and colleges for whites, while it for-
bids the elements of literature and science to the people of
colour ! - -
is there the wise legislator, civilian, or jurist, who does
mot see and condemn, in the Slave Code, the opprobrium
of legislation, the disgrace of jurisprudence, the subversion
of equity, the promotion of lawlessness, the element of
social insecurity, and the seeds of every crime which legis-
lation and jurisprudence should suppress or restrain 7
Can the moralist look with unconcern upon a system
that fosters every vice, and represses every virtue—that
opens the flood-gates of immorality, and shuts up every
fountain of enlightenment and reformation 7
Can the patrons of Christian missions do less than con-
demn the code that closes the avenues of missionary enter-
prise against millions of their own countrymen Can
distributors of Bibles and religious tracts fail to re-
monstrate with the supporters of a system that forbids
the distribution and the reading of them Can Chris-
tians, cam Christian ministers and churches, be silent
witnesses of all this enforced heathemism in our midst'.
Can they regard with apathy or disfavour the effort to
relieve from the condition of chattelhood so many mil-
lions of precious souls for whom Christ died ?
Every dictate of our common humanity, every impulse
of unperverted human sympathy, every deduction of un-
sophisticated reason, every monition of enlightened com-
CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 385
science, every maxim of Sound political wisdom, every
conclusion of a far-reaching and prophetic prudence,
every principle and precept of our holy religion, every
aspiration after a likeness to the blessed Redeemer and
the Universal Father, every desire and hope of the on-
ward progress and elevation of our country and our
species, unitedly impel us to espouse, earnestly and
courageously, the cause of the enslaved.
Let each reader be persuaded to do this, by considera.
tions derived from all that is precious in human nature,
or Sacred in impartial justice; by all that is binding in
moral obligation and law, or ennobling and göd-like in
mercy ; by all that is attractive in human virtue, and
inestimable in human freedom ; by all that is momentous
in a state of earthly probation, and solemn in the final
judgment, when it will be said to those who withhold
needed kindness, “Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of
the least of these my brethren, ye did it not unto me!”
APPENDIX A.
FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL OF 1850.
.AN ACT TO AMEND, AND SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ACT EN-
TITLED, “AN ACT RESPECTING FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE, AND
Pl:RSONs ESCAPING FROM THE SERVICE OF THEIR MASTERs,”
APPROVED FEBRUARY 12, 1793.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
persons who have been, or who may hereafter be, appointed
commissioners, in virtue of any Act of Congress, by the Cir-
cuit Courts of the United States, and who, in consequence of
such appointment, are authorised to exercise the powers that
any justice of the peace or other magistrate of any of the
United States may exercise in respect to offenders for an
crime or offence against the United States, by arresting, im-
prisoning, or bailing the same under and by virtue of the
thirty-third section of the Act of the twenty-fourth of Sep-
tember, Seventeen hundred and eighty-nine, entitled, “An Act
to establish the judicial courts of the United States,” shall be,
and are hereby authorised and required to exercise and dis.
charge all the powers and duties conferred by this Act.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Superior Court
of each organised Territory of the United States shall have the
same power to appoint commissioners to take acknowledgments
388 APPENDIX. t
of bail and affidavit, and to take depositions of witnesses in
civil causes, which is now possessed by the Circuit Courts of
the United States; and all commissioners who shall hereafter
be appointed for such purposes by the Superior Court of any
organised Territory of the United States shall possess all the
powers and exercise all the duties conferred by law upon the
commissioners appointed by the Circuit Courts of the United
States for similar purposes, and shall moreover exercise and
discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this Act.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the Circuit Courts of
the United States, and the Superior Courts of each organised
Territory of the United States, shall from time to time enlarge.
the number of commissioners, with a view to afford reasonable
facilities to reclaim fugitives from labour, and to the prompt
discharge of the duties imposed by this Act.
S.E.C. 4. And be it further enacted, That the commissioners.
above named shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the judges,
of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, in their
respective circuits and districts within the several States, and
the judges of the Superior Courts of the Territories, severally
and collectively, in term time and vacation ; and shall grant
certificates to such claimants, upon satisfactory proof being
made, with authority to take and remove such fugitives from
Service or labour, under the restrictions herein contained, to
the State or Territory from which such persons may have
escaped or fled.
SEc. 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty
of all marshals and deputy-marshals to obey and execute alk
warrants and precepts issued under the provisions of this Act,
when to them directed; and should any marshal or deputy-
marshal refuse to receive such warrant or other process, when
tendered, or to use all proper means diligently to execute the
APPENDIX. 389
same, he shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of one
thousand dollars to the use of such claimant, on the motion of
such claimant, by the Circuit or District Court for the district of
such marshal; and after arrest of such fugitive by such mar-
shal or his deputy, or whilst at any time in his custody, under
the provisions of this Act, should such fugitive escape, whether
with or without the assent of such marshal or his deputy, such
marshal shall be liable, on his official bond, to be prosecuted,
for the benefit of such claimant, for the full value of the service
or labour of said fugitive in the State, Territory, or district
whence he escaped; and the better to enable the said commis-
Sioners, when thus appointed, to execute their duties faithfully
and efficiently, in conformity with the requirements of the Con-
stitution of the United States and of this Act, they are hereby
authorised and empowerod, within their counties respectively,
to appoint in Writing under their hands any one or more suit-
able persons, from time to time, to execute all such warrants
and other process as may be issued by them in the lawful per-
formance of their respective duties; with an authority to such
commissioners, or the persons to be appointed by them to exe-
cute process as aforesaid, to summon and call to their aid the
by-standers or posse comilatius of the proper county, when
mecessary to insure a faithful observance of the clause of the
Constitution referred to, in conformity with the provisions of
this Act: and all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid
and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law,
Whenever their services may be required, as aforesaid, for
that purpose ; and said warrants shall run and le executed
by said officers anywhere in the State within which they are
issued.
Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That when a person held
to service or labour in any State or Territory of the United
390 APPENDIX.
States has heretofore or shall hereafter escape into another
State or Territory of the United States, the person or persons
to whom such service or labour, may be due, or his, her, or
their agent or attorney, duly authorised, by power of attorney,
in writing, acknowledged and certified under the seal of some
legal office or court of the State or Territory in which the same
may be executed, may pursue and reclaim such fugitive person,
either by procuring a warrant from some one of the courts,
judges, or commissioners aforesaid, of the proper circuit, dis-
trict, or county, for the apprehension of such fugitive from
Service or labour, or by seizing and arresting such fugitive
where the same can be dome without process, and by taking
and causing such person to be taken forthwith before such
court, judge, or commissioner, whose duty it shall be to hear
and determine the case of such claimant in a summary man-
ner; and upon satisfactory proof being made, by deposition or
affidavit, in writing, to be taken and certified by such court,
judge, or commissioner, or by other satisfactory testimony,
duly taken and certified by some court, magistrate, justice of
the peace, or other legal officer authorised to administer an
oath and take depositions under the laws of the State or Terri-
tory from which such person owing service or labour may have
escaped, with a certificate of such magistracy or other autho-
rity, as aforesaid, with the seal of the proper court or officer .
thereto attached, which seal shall be sufficient to establish the
competency of the proof, and with proof, also by affidavit, of
the identity of the person whose service or labour is claimed
to be due as aforesaid, that the person so arrested does in fact
owe service or labour to the person or persons claiming him or
her, in the State or Territory from which such fugitive may
have escaped as aforesaid, and that said person escaped, to
make out and deliver to such claimant, his or her agent or
APPENDIX, 391
attorney, a certificate setting forth the substantial facts as to
the service or labour due from such fugitive to the claimant,
and of his or her escape from the State or Territory in which
such service or labour was due to the State or Territory in
which he or she was arrested, with authority to such claimant,
or his or her agent or attorney, to use such reasonable force
and restraint as may be necessary under the circumstances of
the case, to take and remove such fugitive person back to the
State or Territory from whence he or she may have escaped as
aforesaid. In no trial or hearing under this Act shall the testi-
mony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence; and
the certificates in this and the first section mentioned shall be
conclusive of the right of the person or persons in whose favour
granted to remove such fugitive to the State or Territory from
which he escaped, and shall prevent all molestation of Said
person or persons by any process issued by any court, judge,
magistrate, or other person whomsoever.
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall
knowingly and willingly obstruct, hinder, or prevent such
claimant, his agent or attorney, or any person or persons law-
fully assisting him, her, or them, from arresting such fugitive
from Service or labour, either with or without process as afore-
said; or shall rescue, or attempt to rescue, such fugitive from
Service or labour, from the custody of such claimant, his or her
agent or attorney, or other person or persons lawfully assisting
as aforesaid, when so arrested, pursuant to the authority herein
given and declared; or shall aid, abet, or assist such person, so
owing service or labour as aforesaid, directly or indirectly, to
escape from such claimant, his agent or attorney, or other
person or persons, legally authorised as aforesaid; or shall
harbour or conceal such fugitive, so as to prevent the discovery
and arrest of such person, after motice or knowledge of the fact
392 APPENDIX.
that such person was a fugitive from service or labour as afore-
said, shall, for either of said offences, be subject to a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not exceed-
ing six months, by indictment and conviction before the Dis-
trict Court of the United States for the district in which such
offence may have been committed, or before the proper court
of criminal jurisdiction, if committed within any one of the
organised Territories of the United States; and shall moreover
forfeit and pay, by way of civil damages to the party injured
by such illegal conduct, the sum of one thousand dollars for
each fugitive so lost as aforesaid, to be recovered by action of
debt in any of the District or Territorial Courts aforesaid,
within whose jurisdiction the said offence may have been
committed.
SEC. S. And be it further enacted, That the marshals, their
deputies, and the clerks of the said District and Territorial
Courts, shall be paid for their services the like fees as may be
allowed to them for similar services in other cases; and where
such services are rendered exclusively in the arrest, custody,
and delivery of the fugitive to the claimant, his or her agent or
attorney, or where such supposed fugitive may be discharged
out of custody for the want of sufficient proof as aforesaid, them
such fees are to be paid in the whole by such claimant, his
agent or attorney; and in all cases where the proceedings are
before a commissioner, he shall be entitled to a fee of ten dol-
lars in full for his services in each case, upon the delivery of
the said certificate to the claimant, his or her agent or attorney;
or a fee of five dollars in cases where the proof shall not, in
the opinion of such commissioner, warrant such certificate and
delivery, inclusive of all services incident to such arrest and
examination, to be paid in either case by the claimant, his or
her agent or attorney. The person or persons authorised to
APPENDIX. 393
execute the process to be issued by such commissioners for the
arrest and detention of fugitives from Service or labour as
aforesaid shall also be entitled to a fee of five dollars each
for each person he or they may arrest and take before any such
commissioner as aforesaid at the instance and request of such
claimant, with such other fees as may be deemed reasonable
by such commissioner for such other additional Services as
may be necessarily performed by him or them: Such as attend-
ing to the examination, keeping the fugitive in custody, and
providing him with food and lodging during his detention, and
until the final determination of such commissioner; and in
general for performing such other duties as may be required
by such claimant, his or her attorney or agent, or commissioner
in the premises; such ſees to be made up in conformity with
the fees usually charged by the officers of the courts of justice
Within the proper district or county, as near as may be practi.
cable, and paid by such claimants, their agents or attorneys,
Whether such supposed fugitive from service or labour be
ordered to be delivered to such claimants by the final deter-
mination of such commissioners or not.
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That upon affidavit made
by the claimant of such fugitive, his agent or attorney, after
such certificate has been issued, that he has reason to appre-
hend that such fugitive will be rescued by force from his or
their possession before he can be taken beyond the limits of
the State in which the arrest is made, it shall be the duty of
the officer making the arrest to retain such fugitive in his
custody, and to remove him to the State whence he fled, and
there to deliver him to said claimant, his agent or attorney.
And to this end the officer aforesaid is hereby authorised and
required to employ so many persons as he may deem necessary
to overcome such force, and to retain them in his service so
394 APPENDIX.
long as circumstances may require; the said officer and his
assistants, while so employed, to receive the same compensa-
tion and to be allowed the same expenses as are now allowed
by law for the transportation of criminals, to be certified by
the judge of the district within which the arrest is made, and
paid out of the treasury of the United States.
SEC, 10. And be it further enacted, That when any person
held to service or labour in any State or Territory, or in the
District of Columbia, shall escape therefrom, the party to whom
such Service or labour shall be due, his, her, or their agent or
attorney, may apply to any court of record therein, or judge
thereof in vacation, and make satisfactory proof to such court,
or judge in vacation, of the escape aforesaid, and that the per-
son escaping owed service or labour to such party. Where-
upon the court shall cause a record to be made of the matters
so proved, and also a general description of the person so
escaping, with such convenient certainty as may be ; and a
transcript of such record, authenticated by the attestation of
the clerk, and of the seal of the said court, being produced in
any other State, Territory, or district in which the person so
escaping may be found, and being exhibited to any judge,
commissioner, or other officer authorised by the law of the
United States to cause persons escaping from Service or labour
to be delivered up, shall be held and taken to be full and
conclusive evidence of the fact of escape, and that the service
or labour of the person escaping is due to the party in such
record mentioned. And upon the production by the said
party of other and further evidence, if necessary, either oral
or by affidavit, in addition to what is contained in the said
record of the identity of the person escaping, he or she shall be
delivered up to the claimant. And the said court, commis-
Sioner, judge, or other person authorised by this Act to grant
APPENDIX. 395
certificates to claimants of fugitives, shall, upon the production
of the record and other evidences aforesaid, grant to such claim
ant a certificate of his right to take any such person identified
and proved to be owing service or labour as aforesaid, which
certificate shall authorise such claimant to seize or arrest and
transport such person to the State or Territory from which he
escaped: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be
construed as requiring the production of a transcript of such
record as evidence as aforesaid ; but, in its absence, the claim
shall be heard and determined upon other satisfactory proofs
competent in law.
HOWELL COBB,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
WILLIAM R. KING,
President of the Senate, pro tempore.
Approved September 18th, 1850.
MILLARD FILLMORE.
APPENDIX B.
SLAVERY AMONG THE CHEROKEES AND
CHOCTAWS.
SINCE the body of the preceding work was mostly in type,
the author has met with a volume containing the Comstitutions
and Laws of the Cherokees and Choctaws, which embrace
many provisions on the subject of slavery, very similar to those
of our American Slave States in their vicinity, and evidently
borrowed from them. A few specimens may be interesting,
especially as throwing light upon the question whether it is
proper to assist in building up churches in those nations that
admit and retain as members those who enact, administer, and
support such laws, or who uphold them by claiming and sus-
taining the relation of slave-ownels.
"l'HE CHEROKE}}S.
The “Constitution of the Cherokee Nation,” iormed by a
Convention of Delegates from the soveral districts at New
Echota, July, 1827, contains the following:—
“No person shall be eligible to a seat in General Council
but a free Cherokee male citizen, who shall have attained to
the age of twenty-five years. The descendants of Cherokee
men by all free women, carcept the African lace, whose parents
may [have] been living together as man and wife, according
APPENDIX. 397
sº
to the customs and laws of this nation, shall be entitled to all
the rights and privileges of this nation, as well as the posterity
of Cherokee men by all free men. No person who is of negro
or mulatto parentage, either by the father or mother's side,
shall be eligible to hold any office of profit, honour, or trust in
this Government.” (Art. III., Sect. 4.)
The same provision is retained in the New Constitution of
the Cherokee Nation, passed at Tah-le-quah, in Sept., 1839.
(Art. III., sect 5)
Among the laws of the Cherokees we find one, Sept., 1839,
entitled, “An Act to prevent amalgamation with coloured
persons” (meaning descendants of Africans), just as if Che-
rokees were whites, and not “coloured.” Penalty, corporal
punishment, not to exceed fifty stripes, and such intermarriages
doclared not to be lawful.
Another “Act,” under date of Nov. 15, 1843, is “to legalise
intermarriage with white men'"
Another Act, Nov. 7, 1840, declares that “it shall not be
lawful for any free negro or mulatto, not of Cherokee blood, to
hold or own any improvement within the limits of this nation;
neither shall it be lawful for slaves to own any property of the
following description, viz., horses, cattle, hogs, or fire-arms.”
Provision is made for the seizure and sale of such property, &c.
Another “Act,” Oct. 19, 1841, is for “authorising the ap-
pointment of patrol companies,” who “shall take up and
bring to punishment any negro or negloes that may be stroll-
ing about, not on their owner's premises, without a pass from
And any neglo not entitled to Che-
y
their owner or owners.'
rokee privileges, if found armed, may be whipped, not exceed-
ing thirty-nine lashes.
Another “Act,” dated Oct. 22, 1841, is for “prohibiting
the teaching of negroes to read and write.” “Be it enacted by
398 APPENDIX.
the National Council, That from and after the passage of this
Act, it shall not be lawful for any person or persons whatever
to teach any free negro or negroes not of Cherokee blood,” or
any slave belonging to any citizen or citizens of the nation, to
read or write.” The penalty annexed to a violation of this
onactment is a fine of 100 to 500 dollars, at the discretion of
the court trying the offence.
“An Act in regard to free negroes,” Dec. 2, 1842, directs
“the sheriffs of the several districts” to notify free negroes to
leave the limits of the mation by the 1st of January, 1843. If
they refused to go, they were to be immediately expelled.
“Sect. 4. Be it further enacted, That should any free negro or
megroes be found guilty of aiding, abetting, or decoying any
Slave or slaves to leave his or their owner or employer, such
free negro or negroes shall receive for each and every such
offence one hundred lashes on the bare back, and be imme-
diately removed from this nation.”
Bound up in the same volume with these Constitutions and
enactments, we find the “Constitution of the Cherokoe Bible
Society,” in which is the following:—“Art. 2. The object of
the Society shall be to disseminate the Sacred Scriptures in the
English and Cherokee languages among the people of the
Cherokee nation; and all funds collected by the Society shall
be expended for that object.”
From the preceding extracts of the Constitutions and Laws,
it would seem that “free negroes and mulattoes not of Che-
rokee blood” were not considered as “entitled to Cherokee
privilegos,” or as constituting a part of “the Cherokee mation.”
And the teaching of them or the slaves to read or write, as has
* “INot of Cherokee blood P’ It would be quite an improvement,
should our Anglo-Saxon slave legislators imitate this by saying, “not of
Jºnglish blood,” in their statutes of this character.
APPENDIX. 399
been shown, is expressly forbidden, under heavy penalties.
So that the peculiar phraseology employed by the Bible Society
is readily understood. Its object did not include the supply of
such persons, and it was intended to guard against any such
use of its funds ! It is lamentable to see a nation so recently
put in possession of the Bible so forward to withhold it flom
others, even forbidding its use ! But in this the Cherokees
only imitate our own nation and our own Bible Societies, from
whom they have received the Scriptures They have only
practised the religion they have received from us ! We may
See in this the fruit of sending to the heathen a gospel that
tolerates slaveholding.
CHOCTAWS.
The Constitution of the Choctaw Nation, approved October,
1838, embodies a “l)eclaration of Rights,” the first article of
which commences with, “All freemen, when they form a social
compact, are equal in rights,” &c. It is not difficult to trace
the parentage of this emendation of the Declaration of '76. It
is revealed in the following:—
“l'rom and after the adoption of this Constitution, no free
negro, or any part negro, unconnected with Choctaw or Chick-
asaw blood, shall be permitted to come and settle in the Choc-
taw nation.” (Art. VIII., sect. 6.)
“No person who is any part negro shall ever be allowed to
hold any office under this Government." (Art. VIII., sect 14.)
“The General Council, when in session, shall have the
power by law to naturalise and adopt, as citizens of this nation,
any Indian, or descendant of other Indian tribes, eacept a negro
or descendant of a negro.” (Art. VIII., sect. 15.)
The following is an Act approved October 5, 1836:—
“Be it enacted, dºc., That from and after the passage of this
400 APPENDIX.
Act, if any citizen of the United States, acting as a missionary
or a preacher, or whatever his occupation may be, is found to
take an active part in favouring the principles and notions of
the most fatal and destructive doctrines of Abolitionism, he
shall be compelled to leave the nation, and for ever stay out
of it.
“Be it further enacted, die. That teaching slaves how to
read, to write, or to sing in meeting-houses or schools, or in
any open place, without the consent of the owner, or allowing
them to sit at table with him, shall be sufficient ground to
convict persons of favouring the principles and notions of
Abolitionism.”
It was provided also that no slave should “be in possession
of any property or arms;" that if any slave infringed any
Choctaw rights, he should “be driven out of company to be
have himself;” and in case of his return and further intrusion.
“he should receive ten lashes.” But “any good honest slave
shall be permitted to carry a gun, by having a pass from his
master.”
In 1838 it was enacted, “That from and after the passage of
this law, if any person or persons, citizens of this nation, shall
publicly take up with a negro slave,” he or she so offending
shall be liable to pay a fine of not less than ten dollars, nor
exceeding twenty-five dollars, and shall be separated; and for
a second offence of a similar nature the party shall receive not
exceeding thirty-nine lashes, nor less than five, on the bare
back, and shall be separated, as the Court may determine.”
“The Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation,” from
which the preceding extracts are taken, bears the imprint of
* “Publicly taken up with.” The possibility of a legal marriage with
a slave seems not to have been recognised The union was only “a
taking wb with.”—a phrase used among slaves.
APPENDXX. 401
1840; and the latest enactments it contains are dated October,
1839. But the “American Missionary,” New York, January,
1853, contains an account of some later enactments, taken from
a Report made in 1848 by Mr. Treat, one of the Secretaries of
the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.
The following is an extract from this statement of the “Ame-
rican Missionary:"—
In 1840 “it was enacted that all free negroes in the nation,
unconnected with the Choctaw or Chickasaw blood, “should
leave the nation by the 1st of March, 1841, and ‘for ever keep
ont of it.’ In case of their infringing this law, “they were to
be seized and sold to the highest bidder for life.' It was also
enacted, that if any citizen of the nation hired, concealed, or in
any way protected any free negro, to evade the foregoing pro-
vision, he should forfeit from two hundred and fifty to five
hundred dollars; or if unable to pay this fine, “receive fifty
lashes on his bare back.’
“In 1846 a law was passed which prohibited all negroes,
whether they had ‘papers' or not, from entering and remaining
in the Choctaw nation. The offenders were to receive “not less
than one hundred lashes on the baro back,' besides a forfeiture
of all property found in their possession, one-third ‘to go to
the light horsemen' who apprehended them, and two-thirds
‘to be applied to some beneficial purpose.'
“The most objectionable enactment, says Mr. Treat, which
he found, having any bearing upon slavery, was approved
October 15th, 1846. It is as follows:—
“‘Be it enacted, d’e., That no negro-slave can be emancipated
in this nation except by application or petition of the owner
to the General Council; and provided also, that it shall be
made to appear to the Council the owner or owners, at the time
of application, shall have no debt or debts outstanding against
2 D
402 APPENDIX.
him or her, either in or out of this nation. Then, and in that
case, the General Council shall have the power to pass an Act
for the owner to emancipate his or her slave; which negro,
after being freed, shall leave this nation within thirty days
after the passage of the Act. And in case said free negro or
negroes shall return into this nation afterwards, he, she, or
they shall be subject to be taken by the light horsemen and
exposed to public sale for the term of five years; and the funds
arising from such sale shall be used as national funds.'”
LIST OF R. E PO R T E D C A S E S
CITED IN THIS VOLUME,
Allan v. Young, (La.) 172
I}anks, Admr., v. Marksbury, 56
Bazzy v. Rose and child, (Lou.) 325
Beatley v. Judy, (Ky.) 56
I3eall v. Joseph, (Ky.) 325
Berard v. Berard et. al., (Lou.) 223,
74
Bore v. Bush, (Lou.) 296
Brandon et al. v. Merchants’ and Plan-
ters’ Bank, (Ala.) 77, 273
Butler v. Boardman, (Md.) 258
Bynum v. Bostwick, (S. C.) 76, 77, 273
Carroll et al. r. Connet, (Ky.) 56
Chastain v. Bow man et al., 79
Commonwealth (Va.) v. Carver, 177,
18S
Commonwealth (Mass.) v. Aves, 242
Cooke (colouned) v. Cooke, (Ky.) 327
ACornfute v. Dale, (Md.) 186
Crawford v. Cheney, (La.) 189
I)avis p, Curry, (Ky.) 257
Davis v. Sandford, (Ky.) 255
Delphene v. Devise, (Lak) 246
I)olly Chapple, (Va.) 178
Dorothee v. Coquillon, (La.) 110, 143
224
Dunbar v. Williams, (N. Y.) 133
Enlaws v. Enlaws, (Ky.) 57
Emmerson v. IIowland, 78
fields v. State of Tenn., 178
Fisher v. Dabbs, 320
Free Lucy v. l'rank, 78
George et al. v. Corse, (Md.) 326
glen v. Hodges, (N. Y.) 217
Givens v. Mann, (Va.) 326
Girod v. Lewis, (Lou.) 92, 273
Gomez v. Bonneval, (Lou.) 261
II all v. Mullen, (Md.) 76, 77, 245, 326
Hamilton v. Cragg, (Md.) 326
IIarris v. Clarissa et al., (Tenn.) 16
Harvey et al. v. Decker and IIopkins,
(Miss.) 242, 243
Hilton v. Caston, 152
Hudgens v. Wrights, (Va.) 244, 253,
275 e
Hutchins v. Lee, (Miss.) 218
Icar v. Suars, (La.) 18
Jarrett v. IIighee, IXy.) 87
Jennings v. Funderburg, (S. C.) l
S.) 1
Johnson ct al. v. Bal rett, (S. C
Joundan v. Patten, (La.) 189
Kettletas v. Fleet, (N. Y.) 324
;
sº
{
•x
º
Labranche v. Watkins, (La.) 218
Lew is v. Fullerton, (Va.) 326
Lunsford v. Coquillon, (La.) 212
Malkham v. Close, (La.) 171, 179
Alsº Louisa v. Manriott et al., (La.)
242
Maria v. Surbaugh, (Va.) 358
Mary v. Mori is et al., (lou.) #26
McCutchen et al. v. Marshall et al.,
(U.S.) 258
May v. Blown and Boisseau, (Va.)
187
Metayer v. Metayer, (Lou.) 247
Moosa v. Allain, (Lou.) oxi
Negro Tom, (N.Y.)"325
Negro Cato v. IIoward, (Md.) 326
Negro George et al. v. Conse, (\!d.)
322
People v. Lervey, 78
2 D 2
~d
404
LIST OF REPORTED C ASES.
Plumpton v. Cook, (Ky.) 56
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, (U. S.) 152
Tankin a . Lydi \, (IX.y.) 242
Richandson & . Dukes, (S. C.) 173
Sawmey v. Calter, (Va.) 324, 326
Skidmore v. Smith, 188, 218
Seville v. Chrethen, (La.), 244
Sims White v. James Chambe, s. (S. C.)
152, 186
Smith 7. Row zee, 37
Smith v. IIancock, (ICy.) 188
Some set, James, (slave) 240
State of Miss. v. Jones, 175, 188
,, N. J. v. Waggone, , 14, 216
,, .N. C. v. Mann, 18, 64, 110,
139, 154, 188
x 3 ,, p. Teed, 175
~ 5 x ,, o Hale, 176, ISS
3 * ., v. Ben, 295
x 3 ,, v Jam, 285
x 3 ,, v. Charity, 295
State of S. C. v. Maner, 152, 177, 188
3 3 ,, . . Cheatwood, 152, 175.
188
2 3 ,, v. E. Smith and 18. Smith,
73
3 3 ,, t. Raines, 17 |
9 3 ,, ... McGee, 105
x 2 , , P. IIannah Dlliott, 215,
258
s * . Day 1s and IIanna, 257
5 5. Va. v. Can yel, 177, 188
Stevenson v. Singleton, (Va.) 321
Tate v. O’Neill, (N. C.) 187
Vaugham v. Phebe, (Tenn.) 247
Victoire v. Dussuau, (Lou.) 326
Wells v. Kennelly, (S. C.) 133
Westell v Eal nest and Paiken, (S. C )
173
White v. Chambe, s. (S. C.) 152, 186
Will v. Thompson, 325
G E N E R A L IND EX.
Advertisements :
Slaves sold for distribution, {}}
wanted by dealers, 40
for sale by dealers, 39, 40
taken, and for sale for debt,
52, 53
“ acclimated” for sale, 66,67
“breeder” for sale, 69
“damaged” wanted, 71
fugitives in search of their
families, 104
Reward for evidence to convict a
mother of the crime of “harbour-
ing” her son, 104
o: wife in search of her husband,
x *
> 3
$ 5
Reward offered for killing a slave
for running off with his wife, 105
Describing fugitives scarred, bran-
ded, cropped, shot, &c., 202
“Negro dogs” and slave-hunting,
219
“White” slaves,”264
-\gricultural Societies, Southerty (tes-
timony of), 60
Alabama : slaves ill clothed, 130 ; }e-
galised skaye discipline, 150; laws e.
harbouring fugitives, 216; mode of
testing claims to freedom, 278 ; laws
tº preaching, 300; }ays "... emancipa-
tion, 318, 320
Alarm at negroes reading, 31?
Alºndria (l). C.), coroner’s inquest,
(5%) -
Allan, ;" Win. T. (Testimony), 24,
- *)
An). Bible Soc. and slaye families, 100
Auler, Colonisation Soc. (See Colonisa-
tion Soc.)
.Ameliorations impracticable, 273
Ancient slavery, “peculium,” 81
-\n aunt in court, claiming nieces as
słayes of other nieces, 223
Appendix A, Fugitive Slave Bill, 387
y \ B, Cherokees and Choctaws,
396
Archer, Judge, 322
Avery, George A.
*
*
(Testimony), 132,
198, 199
Badger, Judge, 295 *
Baltimore Advertiser (Testimony), lºi
Baptism of slaves, 233, 309
Battery on a slave, 18, 153, 175
Betting on a negro's life, in a fit, 2.5
Berry, Mr. (Va.), Testimony, 301
33ibb, Judge, 87
Bible prohibited, 299, 301
}ible Societies do not supply slaves,
30 R
Birney, James G. (Testimony), 43
Blackwell, Samuel (Testinaony), 63
Böss, Philemon (Testimony), 339
Bourne, Rev. Geo. (Testimony), 96,
*2 ſ;
Boudinot, Tobias (Testimony), lºë
Bouldin, Hon. 'A'. 'Y', ("Yestiyooyy}, \}}
Boyle, Judge, 255
Branding slaves, 202
Breckenridge, Dr. R.J. ('Yestimony),936
Breckenbrough, Judge, 178
“Breeders,” 16, 4l, 69 &
Brougham, Lord. “No property in
Yam,” 2.5l.
Brodnax, Mr. (Va.), 345 r
Buchaman, Dr. Geo. (Testimony), R30,
205
Butler, Gov. (S. C.), 194 *
Burning and beheading a slave, 103
* * a free negro, 294
Calhoun, John C. (Testimony), 266
Carey, Matthew (Testimony), 195
Catechisms “inceudiary,” 31,
Caulkins, Nehemiah (Testimoy), 137,
128
406
INDEX.
Charles V., 247
Charleston (S. C.) Bap. Asso., 22, 26
5 x ,, Observer (Testi-
mony), 312
Channing, Dr. Wm. E. (Testimony),
132 .
Chattel principle, 9, 15
Choules, Rev. J. O. (Testimony), 118
Cherokee slave-laws, 396
Choctaw slave-laws, 399
Clay, Henry, on slave-property, 20, 230
3 * slave-traffic, 34, 41
x 5 slave-breeding, 69
5 2. overtasking, 117
2 x slaves “fat and sleek,”
137
22 perpetuity of slavery,
230
2x future slavery of
whitcs, 263
Clay, Thomas (Testimony), 126, 127
Clarke, Judge, 175
Claims to freedom, 274
Clothing of slaves, 129, &c.
Code Noir, its comparative mildness,
30, 54, 61
Colcock, Judge, 173
Colonial Slavery, 241, &c.
Colour defined, 257
,, presumptive of slavery, 257,
275
Coloured testimony excluded, 279, &c.
Coloured scamen imprisoned, 339
Coloured people. (See “l’ree People of
Colour.”)
Colonisation Society v. manumission
on soil, 328; origin and objects of,
342; meetings, effects of, 344; com-
pulsion, 345; Maryland Soc., 346 :
N. Y. State Auxiliary, 343; American
(Testimony of), 206
Connecticut, slave marriage, 91
Contracts of master and slave void,
323, Szc.
Constitutions (State) v. Abolition, 327
Congress, U. S., v. slaves’ personality,
9] ; right of petition, 22; Fugitive
Slave Bill, 152, 217, 387
Cornelius, Rev. Elias (Testimony), 133
Cost, per annum, of slaves’ support, 138
Cousins in court, claiming cousins as
slaves, 223
Cranch, Judge (Testimony), 338; peti-
tion,
Crandall, Prudence, 342
Craziness or idiocy of slave-property
sold and warranted, 18
Crenshaw, Judge, 273
Criminal prosecutions to defend slave-
property, 175
Cropping ears legal, 204
Cruelty, certain kinds, authorised, 144
,, . philosophy of, 206
Daggett, Judge, 343
Damaged slaves, uses of, 71
Damages to slave-property, 185, &c.
Dayton, Col. (M. C.), 21
“Dead or alive” to be returned, 105
Death from nakedness, 130
5 x starvation, 126, 130
3 x “moderate correction,” 164
Delegated power of overseers, 181, &c.,
1S7
Delaware, laws to prevent cscapes, 21.l
Deming, Dr. (Testimony), 64
Derbigny, Judge, 261
Dew, Prof. (Testimony), 68
District of Columbia, slave-trade, 43 ;
slaves may not traſſic, 85; free ne–
groes sold, 210; killing authoriscq,
213
Distribution of slave estates, 60
Dorsey, Judge, 322
Dower of widows in slaves, 57, 323
Drunkenness of slave-property sold and
warranted, 17
Dwellings of slaves described, 132
Earl, Judge, 322
Education, slaves no right to, 232
5 y ,, prohibited, 297
Edwards, Dr. Jonathan (Testimony),
126, 128, 205; accounted slavehold-
ing man-stealing, 252
Erwin, Mr. (Ala.), slave-trader, 45
Facts, treatment of slaves, 193, &c.
Family relation, slaves’, 98, &c.
Fine for killing a negro, 175
Fisher, Mr. (Va.). Testimony, 346
Florida, clothing of slaves, 131
,, laws to prevent escapes, 211
“Florida Slaveholder” (Testimony),
347; his liberties, 353
Food, clothing, shelter, 120, &c.
Free people of colour sold for jail-fees,
210; enslaved, 254, 329; liberties of,
333, &c.
Free worship forbidden, 303
French slavery, milder type, 33
IPugitive slaves, 208, &c,
Fugitive Slave Bill (of 1850), 263,387
Furman, Rev. Dr., sale of theologica
books and negroes, 24 -
Gadsden, T. N., Esq., slave auctioneer.
Georgetown (D. C.), ordnance, 336
INDEX.
407
Georgia, Presb. Synod (Tcstimony),
96 ; slaves forbidden to traffic, 82;
slaves’ labour, 114; food, 121 ; cloth-
Img, 130; murder, 166 : “mode-
rate comrcetion,” 167 : slave with-
out “pass,” 211; harbouring, 215;
Slavery perpetual and he editary,
230 ; on 1g in, 241 :
slaved, 257; claims to freedom,
276, punished, if falls to prove
in ecdom, 276, death to strike white
person, 283; penal laws v. slaves,
293; education plohibited, 297, 300;
fice negn oes en- |
|
Ill-treatment,’rfb legal remedy for, 110,
224-5
Illegal importation of slaves, 241, &c.
Imprisonment of slaves by owner, 151
Increase of slaves, 56, 58; belong to
ulterior legatee, 58; may be sold by
Ol phan’s Coult, 58; subject to mont—
gage, 5
Infants cannot be emancipated (Md.),
326
Indians canslaved, 14, 248-9, 262, 27.5
Indiana excludos Colouned W lºnesses,
337
mo frce worship, 305; v. emancipation, Inheritance of slave-property, 55
318–19; whites fined for teaching,
330; nestliction on right of hning
houses, 339; quarantine of fleedom,
341 ; no freedom of speech on of the
pl ess, 863
Gholson, Mr. (Va.),16,22, 41, 67, 69,252
Gºles e, W. C. (Testimony), 126,
© (
º e, Maly, white, In 1sh, enslaved,
266
Gills, mulatto, high price, 70
Grand Jury of Chen aw (S. C.), Testi-
mony, 195
Greenville (S. C.) Mountaineer (Testi-
mony), 313
Grumke, Shah M. (Testimony), 100,
lö2, 138, 237
Ground of slav es’ civil condition, 260
Hall, Judge, 177, 295
IIampton, Gen. Wade, feeding slaves,
cotton seed, 126, 201
IIan bouring fugitives, 215-16, 218
nº , lècy. Francis (Testimony),
Hawkins, Sir John, 239, 251
IIay me, Gov. R. Y., purchased a mun’s
Whfe and children, 104
IHebrew sel witude, 272
IIereditary and perpetual slavery, 220
Hill, John W. (festimony), 198-9
II story of S. C. (Testimony), 117
Hitcheock, Judge II. (Ala.), concerned
in slav c-trade, 45, 160
Home Mission, Methodist, put down,
312-13
IIonesty of slave-property sold and
warranted, 18
Hº-slas es, their condition, 96, 102,
mºunty punished more than cruelty,
IIunger of slaves, 135
IIunting slav cs, 217
Tiuntsman, IIon. Adam, 364
Hymn books, incendiary,301
Intel mann lago with slaves, 259
Iron collars, accolding to law, 147-8
Jackson, Gen. Andrew, a slave-trader,
4.5-6
Jamaica (W. I.), mixed breed free, 230
Jeffen son, Thomas, 20, 24, 111, 201:
lms will, 256, 353; lils daughter sold,
70
Johnson, Col. Tºlchand M \ 356-7
Johnson, Judge, 79, 134, 213
Jones, Tev. C. C., of Geo (Testimony),
312
Judson, A. T., 336
Judiciary pen verted, 191
Jury tilal, why denied, 242
Rentucky : slaves real estate, 10; but
sold as chattels, 10, Plesb. Synod
(Testimony), 39, 95, 203, 310 ;
Slaves may not traffic, 83; nor hire
out, 88 ; nor can my weapons, 212 ;
flee coloured degraded, 279; laws v.
slaves, 290–3; hopeless ignorance,
301-2; laws v. emancipation, 320
Kidnapping, 259
JAmowledge, uncemdiary, 313
Labour of slaves, 63, 113, S&c., 135, &c.
Ladd, William (Testimony), 127, 131
Lady advertising a fugitive wife in
sealch of her husband, 104
Leftwich, Wm. (Testimony), 128, 131
Legality of slav cry, 3, 243, NC.
Legislation, nome creating slavery, 242,
, 72
N.C.
Lewis, Lillburn, his barban ty, 72
Lexington (IVy.) Luminal y (Testi-
mony), “6
Libelty of flee people of colour, 333, &c.
ot whitcs at the South, 350, &c.
,, of whitos at the North, 366
Licence to malry emancipates, 91
Licentiousness produced by slavery,
3 3
Life of slave in his owner’s hands, 110.
4.08
INDEX.
Life of slave taken wishout jury, 292
littleton, Lord, 6, 378
Louisiana: property tenure of slaves,
9; held as real estate, 10; warranty
of slaves, 17 ; ameliorated code, 32;
allows a peculium, 75; slave families,
99; law of slaves’ labour, 115; food,
clothing, &c., 120; of punishments,
146; iron collars authorised, 147;
overseer's authority, 182; damages to
slave-property, 187; slaves on horse-
back, 212; relief from ill-treatment,
227; penal laws v. slaves, 292-3; v.
free speech and press, 300; religious
privileges of slaves, 309; v. eman-
cipation, 320-1; subjection of free
blacks to whites, 335
Lowry, Nancy (Testimony), 197
Lynch Committee (Mo.), 294
Madison, James, sister of (Testimony),
96
Madison, James, denied the right of
property in man, 251
Maltby, S. l. (Testimony), 130
Mansfield, Lord, 240, 250
Marriage of slaves abrogated, 92, &c.
x 3 of whites restricted, 354, &c.
Martinique, comparative lenity shown
to slaves, 31
Martin, Judge, 224, 243
Maryland: chattel tenure, 11; issue of
female slaves, 16; bequests to slaves
void, 76; slaves may not traffic, 84;
naked and starved, 130; damages to
slave-property, 186; whites and
blacks required to have “passes,”
210; slaves rambling or riding,
212; killing slaves authorised, 213;
slavery hereditary and perpetual,
229; enslaving white women and
their children, 253-4; emancipated
negroes re-enslaved, 256,337; trial of
claims to freedom, 277; cropping free
blacks, 283-4; penal laws v. slaves,
291 ; laws of emancipation, 320;
relig. privileges of slaves, 309
Mason, Mr. (Va.), 242
Massachusetts, submission
law, 341
Matthews, Judge (La ), 92, 172, 190,
243, 247, 273
Meade, Bishop (Testimony), 310
“Merciful safety-valve,” 118-19
Meth. E. Church, exclusion of coloured
witnesses, 144; class imprisoned,
209; missions suppressed, 313, 360-1
Miner, Mr. (M. C.) Testimony, 339
Ministry for slaves, 311
to slave
Mississippi: slave importation, 34;
constitutional power of Legislature
to relieve ill-treated slaves, not exer-
cised, 152, 226 ; enslaves free ne-
groes, 256; penal laws v. slaves,
290-1; free worship forbidden, 307;
laws v. emancipation, 318-20; expul-
sion of free coloured people, 334;
no freedom of speech or of the press,
Missouri: slaves may not traffic, 84;
laws concerning cruelty, 150, &c.;
masters may imprison slaves, 151;
slaves forbidden weapons, 212: tost-
ing claims to freedom, 277-8 ; Lynch
law, burning free negro, 294; no
freedom of speech or of the press,
363; v. emancipation, 320
Missionary Society put down, 313
Mixed race, 358, &c. -
“Moderate correction,” “death under,”
164
Mortgage of slaves, 10,49-50
Mosely, Rev. Mr. (Conn.), sale of wife
from husband, 99
Mother (free) cannot sue for relief of a
slave daughter from ill-treatment, 225
Moulton, Horace (Testimony), 126-7
Municipal law (slavery under), 243,
&C.
Murders of slaves, law of, 161, &c.;
frequency of, 195; instances of, 195
&c.; of a slave child, 73; im-
punity of white murderers, 72, 195;
doubts of judges whether the murder
of a slave be indictable, 175, 177 ;
murders punished to protect slave-
property, 176-7; virtually commuted
for a verdict for pecuniary damages,
191-2
“Negro’s head” advertised, 25
Negro pew, 348
“Negro dogs” (for slave-hunting) ad-
vertised, 219
New Jersey, Indians enslaved, 14, 245
New Orleans Argus (Testimony), 66
New Orleans Bee (Testimony), 265
New Orleans Picayune (Testimony),
36l
New Orleans Bible Society disclaims
the intention of giving Bibles to
slaves, 361
Nieces sueing their aunt for their free-
dom, 223-4
Niles’ Register (Testimony), 266
No appeal of a slave from his master,
111
No prosecution for battery on a slave,
155-6
INDEX.
4.09
No right of redemption from slavery,
**
No access to judiciary, 274, &c.
No statutes creating slavery, 239, 248,
&c.
Nonth Carolina Baptist Convention
(Testimony), 312
North Carolina : law of slave legacies,
55 ; “slaves cannot take by de-
scent,” &c., 76; may not traffic,
84; law of food, clothing, &c., 121;
of killing slaves, 164,213; outlawry
of, 164; damages to slav e-property,
187; slaves without pass, 212; en-
slaving free coloured persons, 257;
no freedom of speech or of the pless,
363; fleedom quarantaned, 340; penal
laws v. slaves, 290; education pro-
hibited, 299; Bibles forbidden, 302;
laws v. emancipation, 318; preaching
forbidden, 336; free colouled people
legally plundered, 337; expatriation
on le-enslavement, 339
Obsolete, slave-laws not, 6
Obstructions to emancipation,
315, &c.
Ohio, black law, 337
O'Neill, Judge, 153
“Oral instruction,” 301-2, 312
Origin of the “legal relation,” 239
Ottley, Chief Justice, 281
Ouachuta (La.) Register (Testimony),
219
25.5,
Outlawry of slaves, 164
Overseers: their power,
character, 184
181 ; their
I’arrish, John (Testimony), 130
Patrols, regulation of, 305-6
Pavton, Mr. (Testimony), 265
J’eculum of slaves, 12, 74
Peg, slave, damaged, 37
Penal laws v slaves, 287, &c.
Pense-ution for religion, 237, 359
Pickens, Mr. (M. C.), 23
Piety of slaves advertised for sale, 27
Pinckney, Hon. H. L., sale of a man’s
wife and children, 101
Pinckney and Ford (Testimony), 195
Pinckney, William (Testimony), 205
Pitt, William, 240
Tortuguese slavery, milder type of, 31
Powell, Eleazer (Testimony), 12S
Presby. Church, Gen. Assembly, funds
loaned and used in slave-trade, 47;
definition of man-stealing, 252; Sy-
nod of Ky. (Testimony), 39, 43, 95,
206, 310 ; Synod of S. C. and Geo. |
(Testimony), 96, 310–11
“Prescription” no valud foundation
for slaveholding, 247-8
Priestley, Dr., maxim of, 3
Protection of slaves in fact, 193, &c
Propelty in a slav e adjudged pal a-
mount to the slave's right to lite,
295
Punishment of slaves by masters, 140,
&c.
Quaken s of N. Carolina, enhancipation
Y > * *
Quài antine of freedom, 340–41
Randolph, Thos. J. (Testimony), 42
Randolph, John (Testimony), 201
* 3 , will of, 131
Rankim, Rev. John (Testimony), 126,
130
Rape of female slave, no plotection
against, 71
Reed, Rev. Dh. (Testimony), 67
Relation of slave to Society, 267
Religious liberty of slaves, 232, Skº.,
303, &c.
Religious worship plohibited, 303
Itenshaw, Rev. S. C. (Testimony), 12S,
Revolutional y sely ice of slave, bounty
belongs to his master, 78-9
Roame, Judge, 275
Ičobinson, Judge (Ky.), 56-7
Roman Civil Law, ll, 12, 141, 2 #5
Ruffin, Judge (of N. C ), 18, 64, 110-11,
139, 140, 149, 154, 295
Sabbath-schools for slaves, 302
Sale of slaves, 9, 11, 40, 52-3
Stafford, Judge, 76-7
Sapington, L. (Test mony), 103, Il I
Savery, William (Testamony), 130
Savannah River Bap. Asso. v. mari lage,
94, lll-iº
Savannah City Ordina hee c. Schools,
299
Schºols broken up, 298, &c., 344
Self-defence not allowed, 284-5
Separation of families, 38; exceptions
to this, 59
Severity not caused by aboliuionists,
($
Sharpe, Granville, 240
Shellffs obey orders of slav Jholders,
5}.
Selzurº of slaves for debt, 19
Slaves : not considered men, 21 ; no
n \ght of petition, 23 devisable, like
other chattels, 58; can own nothing,
74, &c.; can in the no contracº, 78 :
can be gents for their mast rs, 79,80;
410
INDEX.
no crime to gamble with them, 80;
laws forbidding them to hold pro-
perty, 81; may not traffic, 80; nor
hire out, 83 ; nor marry, 90 ; nor
constitute families, 98 ; nor control
their children, 98, 102, 182; nor ap-
peal from master, lll; cost of their
support, 138; aged sent out to beg,
138; punished at will, 140; cannot
testify, 143; in prisoned by owners,
151-2; battery of thern, by owners,
no breach of the peace, 153; not even
by shooting, 154; laws concerning
murder of, 151; outlawry of, 164;
controlled by overseers and by chil-
dren, 182; how protected, as proper-
ty, 185, 190; branded, cropped, shot,
203-4,213; cannot sue master, 221;
&c., 306; Methodist Missions sup-
pressed, 313
Spanish slavery, milder type of, 31,
86, 116, 228, 272, 230, 321
Spiritual despotism, 109-10, 232, &c.
“Statu liber,” no relief for ill-treat-
ment of, 110 -
Stewart, Mr. (Ill.), Testimony, 43
Stone, A. A. (Testimony), 118, 126
Story’s “Conflict of Laws,” 242
Subjects of slavery, 232, &c.
Sugar plantations “use up” slaves, 65
Summers, Mr. (Va.), 21
Swain, William and Moses (Testi-
mony), 126
Taylor, Judge, 176
Tennessee : slaves may not traffic, 82;
no right of redemption, 226; nor of
education, 232; nor of religion, 232;
whipped to death for religion, 237;
follow condition of slave-mother,
254 ; civil condition, 269; no access
ill-clothed, 130; law on killing slaves,
166; and see N. Carolina, 164; slaves
without pass, 212 ; penal laws v.
slaves, 290; laws v. emancipation,
319-20; expatriation laws, 334
Testimony excluded, 143, 279, &c.
Thome, lºcv. James A. (Testimony),
6
to judiciary, 274; whipped by law
for failing to sustain suit for free-
dom, 275; subjection to all white 20
persons, 283; self-defence not al- || Torrey, Dr. (Testimony), 265
lowed to coloured persons, 284-5; Traffic in slaves, 30, &c.
penal law. v. slaves, 287; slave- | Treatment of sick, infirm, and aged,
hunts, 214-17 l32
Slaveholders may not allow slaves to | Tucker, Judge (Testimony), 220
traffic or hold property, 82, &c.; Turner, I. (Testimony), 24
authority of, 146-7; rights not to be Turpin, Mr. (Missionary), 313, 360
questioned in courts, 157–8; self-in-
Yerest, does not proi eqt the slave,
179; not bound to show title to a
slave claiming freedom, 223-4; do not “ Unusual punishments” prohibited,
enjoy civil and religious liberty, 350, 146, &c.; defined, 117, &c.
&c. “ Used up” in five to eight years, 118-19
Smith, Dr. A. G. (Testimony), 128 Uses of slave-property, 62, &c.
Smythe, Hon. Alexander (Testimony),
Unlimited power, 13, 107
“ Unlawful assemblies,” 188
O-O
l 17, 185 Vanderpool, Hon. Mr., 22
Smylie, Rev. James (Testimony), 35, “Verbal instruction” for slaves, 302,
44 313
Violence to female chastity, 204
Virginia: slaves chattels, 10; may not
traſſic, 83; sold for trading, 86;
clothing of slaves, 130; damages
to slave-property, 187-8; weapons
forbidden, 212 ; killing lawfully,
Somerset, Jamics (slave), case, 240
South Carolina : chattel tenure, 9 ;
warranty of slaves, 17; slaves can own
nothing, 75-6 ; may not traffic, 82;
law of labour, 113 ; of food and
clothing, 122; laws respecting cru-
elty, 144, 162,280; damages to slave-
property, 186-7; slaves without pass,
211; enticing slaves, 214; perpe-
tnity of slavery, 229; imprisonment
of coloured seamen, 340 ; laws v.
emancipation, 318; testing claims to
freedom, 276-7; owner exculpated by
oath, 280; death for striking white
person, 283-4; penal laws v. Slaves,
290; education prohibited, 297,
214; “literary fund,” from sale of
emancipated negroes, 259 ; testing
claims to freedom, 277; attorney's
fined for pleading, if suit fails, 277 ;
•free coloured persons striking white
persons, 284; penal laws v. Slaves,
201 ; education prohibited, 298;
religious worship forbidden, 307-8;
emancipation laws, 318-20; no free-
dom of speech or of the press, 363
INDEX.
411
Wages, slaves receive none, 135
Wall, Col. (IXy.), senator and slavc-
dealer, 45
Warranty of slaves sold, 17, 18
Washington City Corporation, 210
Waugh, Bishop, 346
Weld, Angelina Grimke (Testimony),
101, 111, 129
Western Medical lteformer,
mony), 127
Western Luminary (Testimony), 312
Westgate, G. W. (Testimony), 131
West Indies (Brit.), slavery was illegal,
251 ; free coloured people less op-
pressed, 350
Wesley, John, on “men-stealers,” 252
Wheeler's criticism on Stroud czam-
ined, 168, &c.
White men on plantations required,
280–1
White persons enslaved, 262
White women marrying slaves, 234
(Testi-
White poor supported by coloured
poor, 8
Whitefield, Rev. George (Testimony),
116, 125, 204
Wife no right to manumit, 323
Wills, of personal estates, embrace
slaves, 56; may bequeath unboru
slaves, and separate the future “in-
crease” from the mother, 56 : for
emancipation, set aside, 322, &c.
Wirt, William, Attorney-General, his
opinion of cortain laws, 340; his
description of overseers, 184
Wilmington (N. C.), 85, 200
Wise, Hon. Mr., 22, 90
Wives of slaves appropriated by their
owners, 103 -
Woman, with infant, at work on plan-
tation, 103
Woolman, John (Testimony), 99,
117, 127, 130, 205, 301
Young, Sir William, 384-2
THE END.
LON DON :
Salisbury, Becton, and Co., Printers, Bouyeric-st, and Prinrose-hill, Eleet-st,
III
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