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A MODEL STATE LEGISLATURE
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AN ARTICLE est. 2.
FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES,
JANUARY 28, 1923
BY
HON. GEORGE W. NORRIS
UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
(Printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
February 5, 1923)
*
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
- 1923
31783—23501
ARTICLE
- By
GEORGE W. NO RRIS,
SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA.
[From the New York Times, January 28, 1923.1
A MoDEL STATE Legislaturn. -
LEGISLATURE should consist of on E. Body.
When our forefathers adopted the Constitution of the United
States they provided that the legislative function of govern-
ment should be composed of a House of Representatives and of a
Senate. It would be interesting, but it is not material in the
present discussion, to give the reasons why this was done. It
is Sufficient to know that the Federal Government in this re-
Spect was accepted as a model and was followed by all of the
States of the Union. The experience of more than 100 years
has demonstrated that the two-branch legislature, at least so
far as the various States are concerned, has been very unsatis-
factory in its results. One of the fundamental requisites that
should always exist in any legislature where universal suf-
frage prevails is to enable the citizen to properly place responsi-
bility, either for the success or the failure of legislation.
In every legislature composed of two branches the finishing
touches on practically all legislation are made by conference com-
mittees. A bill that has passed one branch and then been amended
in another one must go to conference for adjustment of the
differences between the two houses. . These conference com-
mittees in all two-branch legislatures are absolutely essential
in order that anything may be accomplished. Experience has
shown that it is within the privacy of the conference com-
mittee room that jokers get into legislation, and that provisions
of law demanded even by a majority of both branches of the
legislature are sometimes not included in the finished product.
When a bill is in conference it is necessary that compromises
be made in order to secure any legislation. It wery, often hap-
pons that the most important features of: legislation are put
into the bills while they are being thus COnsidered. Members
of conference Committees are often compelled to surrender on
important items where no surrender would be even demanded
if consideration of the legislation Were in the Open where a
public record could be had of the proceedings. When the bill
emerges from Conference it is not then Subject to amendment.
It must be accepted or rejected as a whole. The conference
is held in Secret. There is no record Vote On any proposition
decided at the conference. The public is excluded from the de-
liberations, and the only thing that emerges from the confer-
ence is the final agreement. . . .
... . , 81783—23501 . . . 3
4
The individual legislator must then vote upon a conference
report without any opportunity of expressing by his vote his
opposition to anything that the bill in this form contains. The
citizen is deprived entirely of an opportunity to pass a just and
fair judgment upon the result. In conference, provisions are
often put in and Other provisions taken out, where an entirely
different result would be obtained if the action took place in the
Open where a record vote could be had upon all provisions of
the bill.
A One-branch legislature would obviate all these difficulties.
There would be no way for any member of the legislature to
conceal his opposition upon any legislative propositions that
come before the body. The citizen would be able to absolutely
and without difficulty place responsibility where it properly
belonged for every act of the legislature. It would thus be
easy to punish those whose records are unsatisfactory and to
reward those whose services are meritorious.
It is quite a common thing in a double-branch legislature for
one house to shift responsibility for failure upon the other
house. Bills are often passed when it is known by those who
pass them that the bill is to be killed in the other house, and
in like manner bills coming from the other house are pigeon-
holed in the first one. Responsibility for failure is thus divided,
enabling participants in the fraudulent procedure to conceal
their own records and to cover up their own tracks.
In a one-branch legislature it would be impossible to thus
obscure the record by parliamentary tactics and proceedings
that make it impossible for the ordinary citizen to properly
judge the record of his representative. It is not only the un-
worthy legislator that ought to be exposed, but the faithful one
ought to be able to make his record clear to his constituents
without the necessity of a long and tedious explanation of the
various parliamentary predicaments into which existing condi-
tions placed him. A single-branch legislature would simplify
the entire record. The ordinary citizen, without becoming a
parliamentary expert, could easily satisfy himself as to whether
the official conduct of his representative was satisfactory or
otherwise. Adroit politicians would be unable to cover up their
practices, but every act would be performed in the open, and the
record would be simple and easily understood.
LEGISLATURE SHOULD BE SMALL IN NUMBER,
One of the evils of our legislatures is that they are entirely
too large. In theory a large legislature is supposed to give a
larger and more complete representation of the entire citizen-
ship. In practice, however, it has been demonstrated that a
large membership is detrimental to real representation. We
should avoid either extreme. A large body of men, in order
to accomplish any legislative results, must of necessity surren-
der many of the individual rights and prerogatives of its mem-
bers. Members must deny themselves the right in large bodies,
on important matters of legislation, to even offer amendments.
They must surrender to committees the right to determine pro-
cedure. The very size of the bodies sometimes makes it impos-
sible for the necessary and proper deliberation and discussion
that should always take place before legislation is enacted. The
31783—23501
5
House of Representatives in Washington illustrates this point. T
The Members of the House are, as a class, both able and con-
scientious. They are moved by the highest of motives and are
a picked body of fine men. And yet any constructive critic will
say that their work is not only incomplete but is very unsatis-
factory.and often ill considered. This result Comes about en-
tirely and solely from the huge size of the body. In Order to
accomplish anything whatever they are often compelled, in the
most vital kind of legislation, by special rule and otherwise, to
deprive themselves of the right to offer amendments and of the
right to debate and thus point out errors or suggest corrections,
and the result is not only disappointing but it brings about all
kinds of errors in the final enactment. Members are thus often
compelled to vote for bills containing provisions that in their
own judgment are absolutely wrong in order to get what, in
their judgment, is right and proper; or they are compelled to
vote against bills because, in their judgment, the evil contained
is greater than the good.2 it is true, of course, that in the
final passage of a bill through any legislature, members in
deciding how they shall vote must weigh the good and the bad
and vote as their judgment dictates; but in a smaller body of
men there would always have been an opportunity to offer
amendments striking out bad provisions and to offer amend-
ments suggesting good ones, so that the record of the member
upon all provisions of the bill would clearly appear. If this
right were not denied, it would mean better legislation and
enable members to keep a correct record of their own positions.
It would often occur that if the right to debate and the right
to offer amendments had not been denied, bad provisions would
be excluded on a roll Call and good provisions put in. .
The exact number that should be contained in the member-
ship of a State legislative body would undoubtedly vary some-
what with the different States. Having in mind a State about
like Nebraska, I should say that the membership should not
exceed 20 or 30. This would make it absolutely impossible for
any member to cover up his record in any respect Or to shift
any responsibility. It would enable a citizen to be fully in-
formed upon the record of his representative without the neces-
sity of doing anything more than to read the news While the
legislature was in session. Punishment could be meted Out to
those who deserved it, and the faithful could be properly re-
warded. It would give to the State a business administration.
It would result in full discussion, complete deliberation, and
the highest possible wisdom in the enactment of laws.
SALARIES OF LEGISLATOR'S SHOULD BE INCREASED.
A State having the kind of legislature I have outlined would
be able to increase the salaries of its members. Under existing
conditions it is a well-known fact that it is extremly difficult
in many instances to secure good men in State legislatures, be-
cause the ordinary individual can not afford to leave his busi-
ness and expend the time necessary to attend the Sessions of
the legislature. The result is that we not only get a less de-
sirable membership but the good legislator, who is induced to
sacrifice himself, must give the greater portion of his time to
his private business and never becomes really posted on the "
31783—23501
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propositions that come before the legislature. Existing condi-
tions afford inducements to the dishonest and corrupt, who
avail themselves of the Opportunity to become candidates for
the legislature with a view of recouping themselves after elec.
tion by their official conduct. There are, of course, many hon-
est and able men who are members of the State legislatures.
Undoubtedly, a large majority of them could be thus designated ;
but it is oftentimes much easier to deceive the honest man than
it is to buy the corrupt man. The ordinary farmer or business
man who goes to the legislature with the very best of inten-
tions is often deceived by lobbyists and evil influences. He is
in attendance upon the legislature but a short time, and devotes
the balance of his time to his business or occupation, and it is
a ‘physical impossibility, whatever may be his desire, to prop-
erly qualify himself for the duties of his office. . . . .
x A member of the legislature ought to be paid a sufficient salary
so that he could devote his time to the duties of his office.
This would not only attract better men for the position but it
would enable good men to perform better service. He ought to
be paid a salary that would command all of his time, and he
~ should, in my judgment, be elected for a term of four years.
This term, with the right of the people to recall their repre-
Sentative, Would not, in my Opinion, be too long.
THE PROPOSED PLAN WOULD BI ECONOMICAL.
The plan I have outlined would not only result in better legis-
lation but it would save money for the taxpayer. If members
of such a legislature were paid a salary equal to the salary of
other State officials whose entire time is required in the per-
formance of the duties of their offices there would still be,
in most cases, a large saving of money on the salary item alone.
We would not only get better legislators and not only have
the benefit of their entire time but we would do it all with a
less cost than under present conditions. Better results for
S. less money would be the outcome.
PARTISAN SHIP WOULD BIE ELIMINATED.
s The members of the legislature should be elected by districts
upon a nonpartisan ballot. The business of the legislature of
a State is in no sense partisan. The evils that creep into State
management and State legislation on account of such positions
being coupled up with national questions of politics are exceed-
ingly great. Men are often elected to the State legislature
because they happen to be candidates On SOme particular party
ticket, while the duties they are to perform when elected have
nothing to do with the national administration or with the wel-
fare or success of any political party. If politics were elimi-
nated, members would be elected according to their qualifications
for the State legislature. The State would be similar to a
gigantic corporation and the members of the legislature would
be members of the board of directors.
Without being handicapped on account of any partisanship
matters, they would be able to give the best that was in them
for the welfare of the State. Their duties would be mainly of
a business nature. HOW illogical it is to elect a man to the
legislature because he believes in a tariff for protection, or be-
31783—23501 - . - -
7
cause he is a free trader, or because he believes in a Federal
subsidy to the national merchant marine or is opposed to such
subsidy, or because of his ideas on the League of Nations, Or,
What is more probable, because he belongs to some political
party and will follow that party regardless of what course it
takes, when, as a matter of fact, the duties of the office for
which he is a candidate have nothing to do, either directly or
indirectly, with any of these partisan questions. Why should
we not divorce the business of our States entirely and com-
pletely from such partisan influences? Why not elect a legis-
lature that shall become a business Organization, looking Solely
after the interests and the welfare of the people of the State?
It would not be difficult to have a legislature entirely divorced
from partisan politics, and the Smaller the membership the more
easily would it be possible to make it a business institution en-
tirely independent of partisanship.
THE ELIMINATION OF CORRUPTION IN LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
A legislature Such as I have outlined would be much more free
from Corrupt influences than would a two-branch legislature or
a legislature composed of a very large number. I know that
many people at first blush do not realize the truth of this state-
ment, but I am sure that the candid student, especially one who
has had experience with two-branch legislatures, will agree that
this is true. The corrupt legislator, or the one who in reality
represents some special interest, is always looking for a place
and an opportunity to cover up his tracks. The two-branch
legislature gives him many opportunities to ply his trade with-
Out being found out. He is able to shift the responsibility.
Through various parliamentary maneuvers and proceedings, and
Often through the instrumentality of conference committees, he
is able to deceive the honest citizen. If there were no opportuni-
ties for this deception he would not be a candidate for the leg-
islature. He would know in advance that he would be a one-
termer, and if the recall existed in his State he would probably
not serve even One term. But the lobbyist not Only deals with
Corrupt men—he often deceives honest men. In fact, the actual
Cases of honest men being misled are far more numerous than
the purchase of dishonest men.
With the increased salary we would get, to begin with, men
who, on the average, would be high class and more difficult to
deceive than we do now. The Opportunities for deception or
Corruption would be greatly lessened. The men, therefore, to
be deceived would be much less, and the man who would try to
practice the deception would be almost powerless, and we
would have a legislature that would be untrammeled and to a
great extent untempted. A legislature that is known to be
incorruptible would be practically free from attempts at cor-
ruption. It is said, I know, that a small legislature could be
purchased easier than a large one, and that one branch could
be more easily deceived than two branches. If the opportuni-
ties for deception and the caliber of the membership were the
Same in both instances, then this statement would be true;
but when the possibility of covering up the tracks of those who
Want to deceive is practically wiped out and when the morale
of the membership is raised to the highest possible point of the
31783—23501
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8
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citizenship of the State, then this argument falls to the ground.
Who would say, for instance, that the judges of Our Various
States are corrupt and argue that, therefore, we should have
five or six judges instead of one presiding at a trial? And yet
if we had the kind of a legislature I have outlined the members
would stand as high as the members of Our judiciary. They
would become as expert in their line as the judges are expert in
the construction of laws. Perfection, it is true, would not be
attained, but the morale and the standing of our State legisla-
tures would be on the same high plane as Our judiciary.
31783—23501
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