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PREFACE.
In this dissertation four only of the topics outlined at the
beginning are discussed. The remaining five are reserved for
later publication.
The subject of the dissertation was suggested by Professor
Paul Shorey, Head of the Greek Department, University of
Chicago, to whose critical supervision I am greatly indebted.
RocKFoRD College, - GENEVA MISENER.
Nozember, 1904.
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CONTENTS.
CHAPTER. & PAGE.
I. The Meaning of TAP... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * g º 'º e º sº e º e º º 'º is tº e º e º & e º 'º 7
II. TAP in Declarative Sentences... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I3
III. Anticipatory TAP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
IV. TAP in Question...... & © tº e º e º 'º º º is ſº e º e º 'º º º º tº º a tº t e º 'º u is a e º 'º e i s m is 9 tº e 35
V. AAAA TAP.................................................... 52
THE MEANING OF TAP,
CHAPTER I.
After these many centuries of research it would seem probable
that some final and generally accepted conclusion had been
reached in regard to the syntax of so simple and common a par-
ticle as yáp. Yet, save in the explanation of yap in declarative
sentences, to denote causal relations between the sentence in
which it occurs, and the immediately preceding context, opinions
are still at variance. Concerning the uses of yap which remain,
scarcely two commentators agree throughout, and many are
diametrically opposed, as the brief historical review which follows
will show.
Vigerius was among the first to attempt a somewhat systematic
treatment of the particle. In his work “De Idiotismis Graecis”
(p. 492), he divided the meanings of yūp into these rather vaguely
defined classes, (I) the common conception, (2) the ironical, (3)
the interrogative. This last division was recognized also by
Matth. Devarius (De Graec. Ling., Ed. Klotz, p. 52), and in
addition an adversative force illustrated, he believed, in Aristoph.
Peace 319.
Hoogeveen (De Particulis Graecis, 1806, p. 97), who was greatly
in advance of his predecessors in methods of investigation and
scholarship, pointed out the errors into which they had ſallen,
and suggested the following classification (I) causal, (2) inchoative,
(3) ratiocinative or syllogistic. He offered tentatively the theory
that yūp may be composed of ye and āpa, but did not attempt to
refer the meanings of the particle to its component parts.
Likewise Thiersch (Greek Gram., 2nd. edit., 1826), after stating
with certainty that yáp is composed of ye, àpa, made no further
use of the etymology, declaring yáp everywhere causal. In this
he was supported by Krüger, whose Greek grammar appeared
in 1842. h - - *
About the first to apply the results of philology in interpre-
tation was Klotz in his edition of Devarius' book on particles.
The syllogistic force which yáp appeared to him to have in certain
passages, questions for example, was traced to the inferential ſpa.
3 THE MEANING OF TAP.
On the casual suggestion offered by his predecessor as an
explanation of one meaning of the particle, Hartung (Griech.
Partikeln, Erlangen, 1832, Vol. I, p. 457) based an elaborate
systemization of all its uses. He distinguished two broad classes
of meanings, one combining the argumentative ye and the ex-
pletive àpa, the other uniting the suppletive ye and the syllogistic
or conclusive àpa.
This attempt, however, to explain yap by an analysis of its
component parts did not—it seems—bring a final solution of the
problems of interpretation. There was left, rather, a wider
field of possible permutations and combinations of forces, varying
with the subtle shades of meaning which could be discovered
in these equally elusive particles ye and āpa. -
Accordingly it is not surprising to find in the next important
work on particles an altogether different rendering supported by
the same theory of origin. Batimlein in his “Untersuchungen
iiber Griechischen Partikeln, Stuttgart, 1869 (p. 68)”, thus analyzed
yáp:—The ye contained in the particles brings into prominence
the ſact stated by the sentence, the āpa asserts that it is undeniably
true. The original force of the compound would be that of em-
phatic assertion of a fact as indisputably true.
From this is developed the causal signification, because that
which serves for the ground of another statement must itself be
certain and granted. Although the causal predominates, there
remain, he believed, traces of the primitive meaning in uses
which were developed when the language was in a paratactic
stage. These still continue in good usage along with the later
force. He would, then, assign to the class of original yáp, the yáp
in wish, in certain questions, in responses, in the groups, äAAá yáp,
vöv 88–yáp, kai yap and finally proleptic yáp.
Kühner in his Griech. Gram., 2nd edit. (1870), part I, p. 724,
accepted Baiimlein's theory of origin and development, but did
not include proleptic yáp and kai yáp among the original uses.
A reaction against this etymological method of interpretation
appeared in the next work on the subject, Sernatinger's scholarly
treatise “De particula yáp (Pars I, 1874, II, 1875)”, wherein it was
set forth that, inasmuch as yap and āpa are combined in Homer,
the Greeks at that time had no conception of its origin, and the
question must then be decided by a close examination of the
relation of the sentences.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 9
Sernatinger thus defined the function of ydp: “Particula yáp
rationem reddit sententiae aut superioris aut insequentis aut
cogitatione intelligendae”, rejecting the theory that it is an
affirmative adverb on the ground, that it destroys the continuity
of the sentences by removing the logical connection. Such a
loose style (eipopévn Aééis), as is necessitated by the hypothesis just
mentioned, while occasionally found in all the Greek writers is,
he insisted, an intentional imitation of daily speech or a force-
giving device, and not a survival of a primitive period of language.
The Greeks had passed beyond the paratactic stage long before
the time of Homer, who shows great skill in sentence-formation.
This same writer likewise criticized at length Schraut’s theory,
that yáp is restrictive in force and asserts, that whatever may be
the truth about the preceding statements, the facts given in the
yáp clause are at least certain, pointing out that such modesty
and restraint are not characteristic of men, least of all of the
Greeks, in argument, where yap occurs most frequently. Apart
from this subjective reasoning, he proved convincingly that in
some of the instances of the original force cited by Schraut, the
statement for which yūp gives the reason cannot be otherwise
than certain.
Among the scholars treating the uses of this particle in one
author, Broschman, who published at Leipzig, 1882, an accurate
and scholarly dissertation, “De yáp particulae usu Herodoteo’’,
should be mentioned. Objecting to Sernatinger's utter rejection
of the asseverative force of yap, he supported Baimlein's theory
of its development. His researches, however, in Herodotus led
him to conclude that the particle bears a causal meaning in all
instances in this author, except perhaps in wish (where the
original signification has been obscured), and in the compounds
Tolyap and rolyapojv. The last, he asserted, are certainly relics
of the earlier asseverative yáp.
Kalinka, “De usu coniunctionum quarundam apud scriptores
Atticos antiquissimos.”, Diss. Phil. Vind. Vol. 2, p. 149 fg (1890),
adopted in part the hypothesis of Batimlein, in that he believed that
yáp has two meanings, confirmatory, and causal. His theory,
however, of the development of the particle was the reverse. The
causal force, he maintained, was the earlier, and the confirmatory
arose through the gradual obscuring of the causal in certain uses,
and then extended far beyond the original limits, through false
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IO THE MEANING OF TAP,
analogy, till finally its association with the causal meaning was
forgotten.
The attempt to explain the uses of this particle in classical
Greek by reference to its component parts ye and āpa would seem
to be, at least, a fruitless, and, perhaps, a well-nigh impossible
task, for admitting that it is in form derived from ye and #pa, the
time of its formation so antedates literary Greek, that all con-
sciousness of its origin was certainly lost before the time of
Homer. This, the most ardent supporters of the etymological
interpretation concede; for the evidence is almost conclusive: (1)
The lengthened form yápa is never found. (2) yáp and āpa are
frequently combined. (3) The different developments of āpa and
'yápa, to which yáp, in its original use, is supposed to have been
parallel, are difficult to reconcile with the theory which holds that
yáp continued to bear throughout literary Greek a meaning simi-
lar to that of these particles, since ydp and āpa are, in the majority
of instances, the symbols of diametrically opposite logical relations
—namely cause and sequence.
The differentiation in the meanings of the particles must have
occurred in an earlier and obscure stage of linguistic growth,
when the significations of the forms ye and āpa were still vague,
having not yet been clearly defined by usage in a widely-known
cycle of songs or poems. The causal force, then, had, without
doubt, completely superseded the original force long before the
age of Homer, who is, clearly, far removed from the early
formative period of language, as Sernatinger has shown.
Batimlein's supposition that the causal meaning is a later devel-
opment than the affirmative, is not substantiated by the relative
frequency of the two uses in Greek literature. The so-called
affirmative uses of ydp, with the exception, perhaps, of ydp in wish,
are more common in the later than they are in the earlier Greek
authors. The proportion of ydp in question, for example, in
Sophocles compared with Homer, is about 9 : I. This increase,
even allowing for the greater frequency of questions in dramatic
dialogue, than in epic narrative, would seem to point toward the
gradual recognition and extension of a derivative meaning, rather
than to a lingering of a decadent primitive force, characteristic of
a ruder period. The same phenomenon occurs in the use of
vöv Šē-yáp, d\\ā-yáp' and yáp in responses.
:
** See:p. 54 for table of authors.
:
:
©
o e tº
THE MEANING OF TAP, II
Furthermore Batimlein does not offer a satisfactory explanation
of the manner in which the causal force is developed from the
primitive asseverative. There is no necessary kinship between
a particle, which merely affirms a certainty, and one which sym-
bolizes the causal connection between two facts. In the latter
case, both the causal and the main statements may be equally
hypothetical and uncertain, and yet, it may be asserted, that they
bear the relation to one another of cause and result. The affirma-
tive particle has no reference beyond the thought of its own
clause, while the causal determines the relation of this thought to
the preceding or following context. A sentence introduced by
8é, in Homer and Herodotus, often contains the cause of the fore-
going statement though Šá is never other than an adversative, or
lightly contrasting particle.
It is true that the German “ja” or English “indeed”, or
“certainly ”, may often translate yáp without offending our logical
sense. For these particles, since they indicate no sentence rela-
tion, may be inserted in any declarative sentence, whatever its
connection be with the preceding thought. The English and
German languages permit an asyndeton, where the Greek makes
the relation of the sentences explicit. Translation, then, is not a
reliable criterion of the force or function of a word in a foreign
language.
The unfortunate ellipses which have been the objects of scorn
and derision from the supporters of the asseverative theory, serve
a purpose. They make explicit the logical links which are
obscure or omitted, and are necessary mediums in explaining any
thought relation. Whether they should be introduced into a
literary translation is another question. A translator should aim
at reproducing in his native language the thought of the original.
When the idiom of his own tongue is at variance with the idiom
undergoing translation the former must be substituted. It is not
surprising, accordingly, that in many instances, where the Greeks
use a symbol to denote the causal relation, but allow an ellipse in
the main sentence, we must either omit the causal particles, or
supply in full the ellipse.
An investigation, then, of the meanings of yap should be based,
not on etymology and possibilities of translation, but on a careful
analysis of the relation of the clause introduced by this particle,
to the immediate context, and a comparison of the uses of the
analogous causal particles.
j }
I2 THE MEANING OF TAP.
We shall reserve Kalinka's theory for discussion in our treat-
ment of the various uses where he believes the causal force has
faded into the affirmative, making, however, this general criticism
in advance, that it is always hazardous to assert to just what
extent the hearer or speaker was conscious of the causal force
in the more obscure cases. The Greek may not, in the some-
what stereotyped expressions, have analyzed carefully the syntax
of the sentence. But the test of such formulae is to ascertain
whether it was possible or not to revert to the more complete
analogous phrases, in which the meaning of the particle is indis-
putable.
It is the purpose, then, of this paper to prove, that all of the
meanings of yáp are derivatives, more or less remote, of the reason-
idea which it primarily conveyed, and that they may be assigned
to the four following categories, (A) causal, (B) explicative, (C)
motivating, (D) confirmatory.
The above meanings, though they are the bases of all the
uses of the particle, have been subjected to various differentiations
and modifications, due (I) to the character of the sentence,
declarative, interrogative, or exclamatory, in which they occur,
(2) to changes in the order of the yáp clause in its relation to the
main sentence, (3) to the tendency of the Greek language to
suggest, but, not make explicit certain steps in the process of
reasoning, (4) to the fact, that, word-groups, through frequency
of use, are apt to become stereotyped.
With a view to showing how these factors have operated in
varying, and, in some instances, obscuring, the original meaning
of yap and, at the same time, aiming to test the conclusions of the
scholars previously mentioned, I have divided the uses of yūp
into the following classes:—
(1) yáp in declarative sentences referring to a definite antece-
dent which precedes, (2) anticipatory yáp, (3) yúp in questions,
(4) in the groups dANā-yáp, (5) viv 8é-yép, (6) kai yap, (7) yáp in
response, (8) yáp in wishes, (9) yúp in the compounds rolyáp, and
rolyapoºv. Some of the classifications necessarily overlap.
In each of these classes again, there are distinguished, as far
as the form of the subject-matter will admit, the four main divis-
ions of the meanings of yūp, namely, the causal, explicative, moti-
vating and confirmatory.
CHAPTER II.
yáp in declarative sentences.
I. Causal.
(1) The well-known use of ydpin declarative sentences to convey
the reason for the thought expressed in the preceding statement,
may be dismissed with the citation of a few illustrations. Hom.
Il. II 66. 60pméat o' ékéAevore kápm Kopåovras'Axalows/tavo vöin viv yap
key Aois Tów sipváyvtav/Tbóov' oi yüp ir'âupis 'OXàutta čápar’
#xovres/366varot ºppáčovrat”
An absolute distinction cannot be maintained, between the
causal and explicative yáp, since the cause of a fact is, in a sense,
an explanation of it: e. g. Il. II 687 dAA’ of y' of troAéuoto 8vonxéos
épyáovroſoi yüp env Šs Tis otbw ini grixas #yño atto'
(2) After a command, the yáp clause gives the reason, why the
particular act referred to should, or should not, be performed:
e.g. Od. XV. 335 d\\ā pév” oë yáp ris rot divideral Tape&vri, Eur. Med.
926 6dpost vuv' e5 yap rôvěe 6%gopal Tépi.”
(3) A peculiar turn is often given the clause of reason, by re-
ferring it to a subordinate part of the preceding sentence, or, to
one word: e. g. Od. XXI. I72. velleagópat 36 tº dročov, ſei 3) rodrö
ye Táčov dplorias Kekaðūget/6vuoi kai VivXàs, ité, oi biºuaga oi ravčgoat./
où yáp rot gé ye rotov yetvaro Tórvia pirmp,/oióv re jvriipa Bioi T'éueval . . .”
The yáp clause must be construed with of 86000 at gº. The tone
of the Greek might be conveyed by supplying eikáros, which does
occur in a few instances. The clause of reason, here, serves, by
chance, an ulterior purpose, in that it justifies an objection invali-
dating a conclusion drawn from a certain circumstance (oí, Sãwaga)
by a natural explanation of the fact.
An instance of a yáp referring to a single word may be seen in
Soph. O. C. I.15. ai p' éé 6800 Tóða/kpükov kar’ &Agos róvö’ gos àv
* Il. I, I 77, Od. X. 32 et passim, Thucyd. I. I8, 2, 47.3, 49.5, 57.2, et al., Aesch.
Prom. 716, Ag. I532, Soph. Aj. I57, El. 244, I.305, Plat. Rep. 331. D.
*Cf. Soph. O. C. 252, 498, 501, 824, II2I, II85, I2OI, I'722, Aj. 69, El. II9,
Io3 I, II 23, Aesch. Prom. 59, I28, 3IO, 718, Plat. Rep. 336 E, et al.
* Cf. Od. IV. 206, Thucyd. I, 20, 2, 141. I, Prom. I49, Aj. 21, Ant. 270, 489,
O. C. 79, Dem. De Cor. 204, (eikóTøg) 208, (Öukát0g).
I4. THE MEANING OF TAP,
êkpá66/rivas Adyovs poigtv. čv yöp ré pačeiv/ vegru mūdgeta rôv Totov-
Hévov.' . . .
(4) The cause of a fact, when it is not of sufficient importance
to the progress of the narrative to be incorporated in it, is fre-
quently added, as an aside, in a parenthesis: e. g. Herod. II. I49.
I9, to 8° 38op to év tá Aiuwn abówyevès pièv oëk art (āvvôpos yöp 8) belvås
éat, j raûrm) *
II. Epexegetical or Explicative.
The yáp clause explains, or develops the thought of either the
whole sentence preceding, or, of a part of it. An explanation
may assume two forms. It may (1) add some new fact, which is
not a part of the main narrative, though essential to its clearness,
or, (2) expand an incomplete, or general expression of a thought,
by giving further details. In the latter case, it is a continuation
of the principal theme, though subordinate in form. This use is
closely allied to the confirmatory, which will be discussed on p. 22
since an expansion of a statement frequently affords proof of its
truth.
(I) The explanatory sentences included in this category are
logically parenthetical, though not always so written. They
break the course of the thought, for a time, to render an
obscure fact or expression more intelligible to the hearer.
The explanatory sentence may refer (a) to the main sentence
as a whole: e. g. Od. V. 402. kai 3) bodirov čkovoe Tori atrixáðegot
6a)\árans'/56x6ee yāp uéya kūpa Tori £epôv hireipolo/”. . . (b) to a subor-
dinate clause: e. g. Il. X. 352. dAA’ &re ºf 5’ dirémy 60 gév tº emi otºpa
TéAovrat/#atóvov–ai yáp re Boöv Tpoſhepéo repai sia w/ēAkéueval vetoio
Ba6eins Tmkrów porpov . . . /ræ, pèv éirièpapérmy,'... (c) to a word or
phrase, very frequently a proper name: e. g. Herod. II. I2. 9.
où uév oióē rā >upin (tiſs yap'Apašims tº Tapá 6á\agorav Süpot véuovrat), ...”
(2) The second division, explanation by expansion, is of
especial interest by reason of the number of variations, and ex-
tensions of use, that it presents. Its close connection with con-
firmatory yáp, which will be discussed later as a separate cate-
gory, has already been noted. Along another line of develop-
1. Cf. Aj. Io99, and Jebb's note; Aesch. Ag. 1368. See motivating Yáp p. 18.
* Cf. Brosch. p. 14 for other instances in Herod.
3 Cf. Il. I. 270, II. 597, WI. 300, XXIII. 774, Od. XVI. 161, Herod. I. 151.
4, et freq. Broschman, p. 14, for list of instances, Thucy. I. 126. 6, Soph.
O. R. I5O4.
4 Cf. Il. XVII. 612, Od. III. 221, IV, 368, Herod. II. 68. 23, 121b. 6, et al.
5 Cf. Od. XII. 354, XVII. I'72, Il. I. 63, Herod. I, 77. 6, II. 99. 21.
THE MEANING OF TAP. I5
ment, the expansion of a single word, it is one of the chief sources
of the yáp used in introducing a narrative or an argument.
Before, however, we enter upon an investigation of the differ-
ent steps, in the transition to these uses, a few instances of the
simpler epexegetic clauses will be cited. The same distinction
must be made, here, as in the other divisions, between ydp referring
to, (a) a whole sentence, (b) a subordinate thought, and (c) a word.
(a) Od. XIV, 317. Évêa pie eerſporów BagiNews ékopto garo beiðav/
ipos diſpuérmv' row yūp pi\os viðs TeX6óv/ afépº kai kapārg Sedumuévov
fiyev is olxov" . . . .
(b) Aesch. Ag. I583. xºp's Tarpºšas Krivovra unXavās./'Arpe's yúp
āpxov rigèe yńs, rotºrov Tarijp, /Tarépa evéornu rôv ćuov, . . . / vöpm\ármolev
ék TöAeos . . . . . .
(c) Soph. O. C. 1615. d\\' év yüp pávov/ Tà Távra Aéet raûr' mos
pox6#uara./ to yap pi\eiv oëk gotiv čá árov TAéov * .
In the latter class must be included the yáp clauses expanding
forward-pointing demonstrative pronouns, and adverbs: “ e. g.
Il. VIII. I48, dAAä Töö' aivöv čxos Kpačinv kai 6vgöv irável'ſ "Ekrop yáp
Tore påget évi Tpéego' àyopetov'"
Stein and Sernatinger insist on another explanation of the like
instances in Herodotus. The explanatory clause introduced by
yáp, they maintain, never refers to the demonstrative pronoun,
but looks forward, and prepares the way, for the real explanation
which follows, by elucidating some obscure point mentioned in it:
e. g. Herod. I. I34, vrvyxávovres 8' d\\?\otal év that 680ſort, rööe āv
tis Šuayvoim ei čuotoi eig, oi rvvrvyxavdvres dvri yap rod Tpodayopetſew
d\\ñNovs pºéovot total orápagº, #v Šē iſ offrepos intočečo repos &Alyq), Tås
Tapetas (pt)\éovrai, #v Šč . . . . The explanation to which ráðs points,
begins, according to these scholars, with v 8é. This view is
rightly criticized by Broschman" who points out, that if we make
yáp point forward, there is no explanation of the kind of saluta-
tion used, when the social status of the persons is such as is de-
"Cf. II. I. I2, II. 386. IV. 518, V. 188, Od. I. 33, III. 89, Aesch. Ag. 326,
559, 654, 916, I630, Soph. O. R. 317, Aj. 723, 764.
*Cf. Prom. 29, 862, IoI6, Ag. I4.
* Cf. Aesch. Pers. 337, Soph. El. 1320, O. R. 476.
* This is substantially the explanation of yáp given by Devar. p. 236, Matth.
p. 467, Hart. I. p. 468, Kl. p. 235, Kueh. § 544 A, Baúm. p. 83.
* Cf. Il. XVI. 239, Od. IX. 319, XX. 42, XXI. 74, 232, XXIII. 362, after
&óe Il. II. 803, XXIV. 662 Totáče Soph. O. R. 779, TotoWToy Plat. Prot. 328 B,
&vôāv Óe Apol. 31 B, ŠKeiffev Isoc. III. 31.
* Cf. p. 22. A collection of instances in Herod. is also given here.
I6 THE MEANING OF TAP.
scribed in the condition si èpotoi elot of ovvrvyxavóvres, for v 3: . . . .
continues the description begun in the évrvyxávovres 8é clause by
introducing a new set of circumstances.
Forman, an adherent of Baiimlein's School (Plato Selections
App. 5. 3.) defines yap epexegetic, as a survival of the original
certifying yáp. He includes, however, it would seem from the
illustrations used, only those instances, where the yáp introduces
an expansion of a demonstrative phrase, or, follows àkove 8ff, or a
similar expression calling attention to the information, contained
in the yáp clause. He believes that it is an appositive sentence,
equivalent to the object clause which is frequently found after
these phrases: e. g. § 6; Trávrov dºoyárarov 3rt . . .
Mr. Forman has fallen into error, by failing to note the con-
nection between these highly developed uses of explanatory yáp
and the simpler forms, where the “for” meaning of the particle is
undeniable: e. g. Aesch. Ag. I630. 'Oppel 33 y\ógoav Tijv Švavriav
#xets/. 6 pévyāp fiye Távr' diró (p60.yyās xapá,/ at 6' ééopivas vmiriots inay-
pagw/ášet . . . Now, here, the yáp clause might be considered
appositive to évavrlay, yet, if it were omitted, there would be an
asyndeton, an allowable one, it is true, but, still, apparent, since ap-
position indicates similarity of thought, but, not thought relation,
The latter is expressed, in the example quoted above by the yáp.
Why should a different interpretation be applied where this
particle performs a similar function after Tööe or rotáðe? It is true,
évavriav conveys a more definite idea, and does not, like rotéðe, force
us to suspend our judgment, until we reach the expanding clause,
which, for this reason, is so closely connected, that the causal
particle is often omitted. But the yáp clause is, in each case, a
development of a thought, of which, only a bare suggestion has
been given. -
When some descriptive phrase is added to the colorless
demonstrative, the causal force of the particle is more easily dis-
cerned : e. g. Soph. O. R. 779. Totáð’ étréorm, 6avpdo at uév čía,/
otrovëns ye uévrot Tiis uns oëk déta./āvīp yap v 8sitivots u' itepmºmorósis
péén/ka)\et trap' divº, TXagrès &s simv tarpi.
From the expansion of a demonstrative combined with a word
meaning argument, instance, and the like, the explanatory usage
was extended to the elliptical phrases without the demonstrative:
e.g. rexpºptov 6é, a muetov 8é, kepā\atov Šá, 688 betwóratov, to Śē Héytotov,
axerxtórarov.” A transitional example may be seen in Thucyd.
* Cf. Thucy. I. 2. 6, 3. I, 3. 8, II. I, 34, 2, 73. 5, 93. I, O. R. 71 I.
THE MEANING OF TAP. - I7
I. 2. 6. Kai trapáðetypa Tööe roi, Adyov oilk AdXuaróv čari Štá ràs peroukjoets
rā āA\a pº 6potos atºmóvat"/ēk yap ris àA\ms "ENAdôos . . ."
yáp introducing a narrative has a similar origin to that of
the above. It was first used to expand, and explain, some
general phrase, announcing the speech to follow: e. g. Od.
XI. 508. Tågav ćXmóelny pºvějoropat, &s ue keyeſeis'/airós yáp Puy
éyò kotAns étri vuòs étons/#yayov čk . . . XII. 59. épéo & rot dºo-
répoéev./ Évêev uév yüp Térpat . . . Soph. El. 681. Käreptăținv irpès
Taira kai to Tây (ppára./ kelvos yöp A6&v eis rô KAewów ‘EAAá60s. . . .”
Frequent occurrence of such colorless phrases as are cited
here, made it possible for a speech or an argument to be in-
troduced by narrative yáp, where only a bare declaration of
intention to speak, or a phrase arresting the hearer's attention,
had preceded.
It is impossible to say how far the Greeks were conscious in
each case of the explanatory force of yap, which at last may have
become a stereotyped formula for the opening of a speech. The
constant reversion, however, to the fuller phraseology is proof
that the original function of the particle in this construction was
not wholly obscured.
The developed use in narrative is exemplified by such instances
as Thucyd. I. 73. 4. Énéâgerat 83 oi Tapattàgeos pāX\ov čveka iſ papruptov
kai Öm\ógeos Tpós otav Špitv TóAw plm sö 8ov\evopévous ó dyóv Karagrão'etat.
‘bapéu yūp Mapaéðvi re uévot Tpokw8vveto at tº 8ap3ápºp" . . . Plat.
Rep. 329 A. Eyð got, Épm, vi) row Ata épô, & 36x., oiáv yé pot paiveral.
ToMAákis yúp ovvepxópe6á rives eis rairò . . . ."
Plato and the orators frequently employ yap in a like narrative
sense to introduce arguments: e. g. Plat. Prot. 323 C. §rt & air}v
où bào et àyoëvral sivat . . . . Tooró got usrā Tooro Teipágouai drobeiðat.
60 a yūp #yoëvrat āAAñ\ovs Kaká čxew évépoirot (båget à têxm,” . . .
III. Motivating.
* Cf. Sernatinger I. p. 45 fg. for discussion of various interpretations. The
Tööe must be referred, as Sern. says, to the clause following.
*Cf. Soph. El. 32, 379, 644, 681, 690, 893, Ant. 238, Aj. 216, 285, 749, Phil.
9I5, 1326, 1337, O. R. 277, 346, 1241, O. C. 909, Aesch. Prom. Io'ſ, 645, 829,
903, Ag. II.86.
* Cf. Thucyd. I. 2. I, I41. 3, O. R. 994, O. C. 547.
* Cf. Plat. Apol. 24. B. C., Apol. 32. A. B. Prot, 319. A (§yô Yáp), 320 C,
342 A, Apol. 39 C, Rep. 338 C.
* Cf. Apol. 32 D, 39 E, 40 B, Prot. 349 D. Note yáp referring to Tide in
argument, Apol. 40 C.
I8 THE MEANING OF TAP,
The motivating yáp clause, as distinguished from the above
Categories, does not give the reason for, nor, explain the thought
contained in a previous statement, question, or command, but
justifies the utterance of these sentences; it interrupts the ob-
jective discourse, and gives in parenthesis, as it were, the inner
motive for the words just spoken. By this medium the sub-
conscious processes of reasoning, which have found only partial
expression in speech, are revealed.
In the sphere of the emotions, it is a convenient device for con-
veying that nice logical distinction, always maintained by the
Greeks, between the feeling and the circumstance, which had
caused the feeling. The yáp clause may be preceded by a mani-
festation of the emotion through an exclamation, or other means,
or may itself be the first indication of the emotion. It is most
frequent in the dramatists and writers of prose dialogue, the
continuous play of feeling, present in all lively dramatic discourse,
finding in this form its happiest expression. The exact reference
of the particle is not always easily discerned, since the speaker
may, under stress of feeling, pass over the intermediate stages
of reasoning, to a thought or emotion, remotely and vaguely
connected with the preceding utterance.
A like subjective use is made of the other causal conjunctions,
as Goodwin (M & T 719. 2) and Forman (Plato Select. App.
to IO5. IO) have noted. It is especially characteristic of éiret,
which in all those instances, where we are tempted to translate
it as “although ", may, almost invariably, be explained, as moti-
vating the making of the statement, or some part of the statement.
Motivating yap and étreſ clauses tend to approach, in extreme
cases, the explanatory and confirmatory meanings. They may
often do double service, motivating, for example, the use of a
certain word, by explaining its meaning and pointing out its
peculiar aptness. The predominant force of the particle is in
that case, determined by the context, or, the point of view of the
interpreter. This fusion of meanings will be better understood,
after examining the cases of pure motivation under the several
divisions following.
(1) At the close of a speech, an explanation of the circumstances
which occasioned it, is frequently appended: e. g. Soph. Trach.
285. Tatra yüp Tóg is te gºs/č(beir’, y0, 8: Tugrós &v kelvø TeXà.
Likewise, after a statement, the reason for mentioning the fact
therein contained may be given: e.g. Plat. Rep. 328 A. kai Tſpós ye
THE MEANING OF TAP. IO
TavvvXiða Toujo ovov, v šštov 6edoſagóat' gavaarmo 6psáa yāp perä rô
beinvov kai rāv Tavvvytóa 6eagópe6a. . . . "
The use of this yap, to justify an advance in the argument,
is a characteristic trait of the style of Plato, e. g. Theae. I55 C.
kai äA\a Öſ pupia èti pivpious otros éxel, eitrep kai Tatra Tapadeśćpe6a.
âtre, yāp Tov, & eeat”
(2) In analyzing the yáp clause after a command, the reason
why the person issues the command, or, addresses it to a par-
ticular person, must be distinguished from the reason for the
performance of the specific act mentioned. The latter is con-
cerned, wholly, with the thought-content, and has no personal
element. In the other instance, the act is viewed with reference,
either to the person commanding, or, commanded. The ex-
amples following will make clear this distinction. Il. I, 78. g. 8:
giv6eo Kai Hot Suoggov/fi Håv uot ſpéºpov regul kai xepoiv dpáčew./ā yāp
ðiopas àvôpa XoAogéuev Šs péya Távrov . . . .”
Soph. El, 42 gº uév pox&v, 3ray oe kalpês eigáyn,/8ópov go róvo',
to 6. Tāv Tó 8pópevov, . . . of yap o'e ui yipg Te Kai xpóvº pakpó/yvög',"
Batimlein p. 84, despite of his aversion to ellipse, would supply
here, “du kannst ohne Gefahr hineingehen denn . . . .” But
the sentence supplied does not express fully the logical con-
nection of the yáp clause with the command. To put every step
into precise words, we should have to say, “I address the
command to you, for . . .”. It would then be unnecessary to
add the sentence supplied by Baimlein, since the assurance, that
there is no danger, is virtually the thought, which Orestes wishes
to convey in the causal clause.
The connection may be, occasionally, somewhat obscure, as
when a yap clause for example, Soph. O. R. 576 contains the reason
for a command, indicating acquiescence in the demand of another.
KP. ei pew Aéyet Tá6', airós old 6'' éyò 8é gov/uaffeiv Sukató raß6', direp
kāuoi, at vöv./OI, Čkpáv6av” oë yāp 3) povets àAágouai.” Oedipus
in a tone of defiant assurance consents to have Creon learn the
* Cf. Od. IV. 200 Soph. O. R. 569, 1397, Tr. 289, 479, El. 466, 957, Eur. Med.
I370, Ar. Plut. 76, Plat. Rep. 367 B, 345 C, Prot. 319 A.
* Cf. Euthyd. 295 C, Phaedo 60 A.
* Cf. Od. VIII. 552, Aes. Prom. 345, Soph. O. R. 862, Eur, Med. 625,
663, IO76, I360. Cf. §Tet Dem. XL. 54.
* Cf. Il. X. I76, IX. 422, XX. 312, O. C. 508, Eur. Med. 821. Cf. §Tetó)
Med. 603.
°Cf. Aj. I330. Aesch. Prom, 940. 995.
2O THE MEANING OF TAP.
whole truth, because he rejects the alternative of that, which he
alleges is the truth, namely his innocence of the murder of Laius.
There is a number of instances, however, where the motive for
the command is also the reason why the act should be performed :
e.g. Eur, Med. 618. oër’āv £évotal roigt gois xpmoratue6' àv,/ oër’āv ri
ôe£alued 6a, uſió' juiv 8tbov'ſ kakov yūp àvēpēs 86p' 8vnow oëk exel."
(3) A question may be motivated by relating the circumstances,
which necessitated the asking of it. This use must not be con-
founded with the yáp, introducing a confirmation, after a rhetorical
question equivalent to a negative statement: e.g. Aesch. Ag. I 133.
âté 3: 6erqārov ris dyadá párts/ 8porois réA\eral; kaków yūp 8tai/ toºvereis
réxvat 6eatriºv/q,680y pépova w uq6eiv. Here the yáp clause does not
reveal the questioner's motive, but establishes the truth implied
in the question. The distinction will be apparent, if we compare
the following instances of the motivating use: Soph. O. R. 559.
8éðpake Totov ćpyov; oi yüp evoč. Il. VI. I24, ris 8é at togi, béptore,
Karaövmtöv čvěpátov;/oi pew yáp Tor’ &rota påxn évi květaveipm/rö Tpiv"
Another class of yap clauses confirming questions, is less easy
to distinguish from the above, namely, when the asking of the
question is justified by a verification of the correctness of the
sentiment therein expressed, or of the aptness of some word:
e.g. Soph. O. R. 357. Tpos toū 8tóax6ets; oi yöp k ye ris réxums.”
Again, in Soph. Phil. 624 the yáp while motivating the scorn,
and incredulity suggested in the question, also confirms the im-
plied negative statement. # kelvos, # Tāga 3A43m,/ u' sis’Axalows
&pogev Teto as grexeiv; / Teto 6ágopal yáp &ös kää"Atôov 6avów/ Tpós (pós
ãveX6eiv, &grep oikeivov Tarip."
(4) Instances of ydp justifying the utterance of a wish, are more
rare than the above, but no less clearly defined in character: e. g.
Soph. Aj. 1265. eid' ipiv ćpºpotu vows yévoiro godpovetv' rotºrov yap oièv
orqāv Éxo A$ov (bpágat."
An interesting parallel étrel occurs Soph. O. C. I 125: kai got 6eol
Tópolev &s éyò 6éAø, / airé ré kai yi rjö’’ inſei Tô y' eige6és/uévois Tap'
iptu mūpov dvěpátrov ćyò . . . .
* Cf. Soph. O. C. 560 Arist. Eccles. I64.
* Aesch. Ag. IIIo, Soph. O. R. 89, I2O, 57I, O. C. II.5, El. 813, II 75, Phil.
1358, Eur. Med. 1376, Plat. Rep. 376 A, Laws 629 D. Cf. §Tei Il. XIII. 309.
* Cf. Soph. O. R. I.42O, O. C. 359, Aj. I83, I322; Eur. Ion. 326. Cf. Štei Od.
I. 226.
*Cf. Il. XI. 408, (Baiim, construes as affirmative yáp), Dem. XIX. 335 p. 449,
(rebuke) IX. I6, p. II.4.
* Cf. Aesch. Ag. 350, 948.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 2I
(5) When justifying an emotion, the more animated question,
or wish form, is usually preferred to the declarative sentence.
The feeling motivated by the declarative sentence, is, as far as I
have been able to observe, always expressed by some epithet, or
exclamation: e.g. Soph. O. R. IO/I, where it follows a wail of woe.
iovioſ, biotive, toiro yáp o' éxo/uávov ſporetirelv, AAo 3' otºro8' to repov./*
In Soph. O. R. 334, the yáp may be said to justify the anger
calling forth the epithet, or, the epithet alone: oik, & Kaków kákiore, kai
'yūp àv Térpov/ (pêow at y' àpyáveas, ééspels Tore,/ . . . A clear instance
of the latter may be seen Eur, Med. 465: & Taykákiore, Toàro ydp o'
eitreiv #x0/y\ógan péytotov eis dvavóptav Kaków, . . . -
(6) Justification of the utterance of a word, or, of a subordinate
part of the main sentence, is the most common form of the motiva-
ting use : e.g. Soph. El. 577 (a condition is motivated). ei 8' oëv,
épô yāp kai Tô göv, keivov 6é\ov/ iſoqeXfig at raûr' ºpa” . . . Aesch. Ag.
I226, (a single word). €k révôe Towäs (bmut 8ovXečew rivă/Aéovr'
âvaškºv . . . poxávri begitórn/éué' (pépew yūp xpi to bot)\tov (vyów.”
With the first instance, an analogous use of émet may be com-
pared: Dem. XV. 13. oiual pév obv of 8é Bomáñorew airffv, fiv 8' àpa toûro
Toth, paños kai kakós : étei kai 8agiNéa ye, & Tu pév Totáget på Ai' otºk fiv
eitroup' #yoy’ &s oióa," . . . Prot. 336 D illustrates éirst motivating a
word : éos āv Čirixáčovrat Tepi ärov Tó épôrnua ñv of ToxAoi Töv drovávrov
été 20kpárm y' éyò éyyvápai pi énºffgegóat . . . .”
It is difficult, in a number of examples, to separate, absolutely,
the motivating and confirming uses of both yáp and énet, since the
application of a word is justified by proving, that it is true to fact,
or, that the alternative of it is impossible. In the latter case,
attention is invariably called to the contrasted word, by placing
the particle ye after it: e. g. Il. III. 453. dAA’ of ris Ščvaro Tpóov
k\eirów T' étrikoúpov/ §eiðat 'AAééavôpov rót’ dpmºbiAQ MeveMáq./oi pév
yāp pixármti y ákeč6avov, et ris tootto" Plat. Rep. 382 B. 'AAA', pºv
ôp6órará y' àv, 6 viv 8) &Aeyov, toiro Ös d\móas Več80s kaxotro, v rá
Wr • */ f • 3 z a 3 w z 5 * \ó f z y • 3
UXI) ayvota m TOU éyevo pièvov € 7Te I TO ye £1/ TOIS oyous plupımpla T TOU e Ly Ti,
* Aesch. Ag. I 137, Soph. O. R. 167, 317, El. 788.
* Cf. Od. XV. 433, Soph. Aj. 23, Ant. 328, 489,722, Plat. Phil. 30 E.
* II. I. 295, II. IIQ, Soph. Ant. 32, Aj. IO69, O. R. IO5.
* Cf. Od. I. 226, Plat. Prot, 335 C, 338 C, Sym. 182 A, 187 A, Parm. I26 E,
Dem. LXI. 49, Epist. III. 15.
* Plat. Theae. I42 C, Gorg. 471 E, Prot. 333 C, Laws 769 B, 818 B, Dem.
XVIII. IoI, Epist. II. 18.
* Cf. Od. XI. 450, Soph. O. R. 87.
22 THE MEANING OF TAP,
VºvXà éori Taghuatos kai to repov yeyov's eiðoxov, où Távv čkparov iſ stºos.’
In like manner a yáp clause, Il. I. 342, admits of the two interpre-
tations: rö 8' airò uápropol torov/... ei Tore 3' atre/xpetà épsto yévmrat
deukéa \otyöv duival/rois àA\ots. yāp 6 y' \otiat ºperl 66et,/oööé ri oièe
vojoat àua Tpáo go kai Örigoro, /öttos of tapå vnvoi géot paxéovrat 'Axalot.
Batimlein, p. 69 cites this passage, as an instance of the
affirmative meaning. The causal connection, however, it seems
to me, can not be disputed. Achilles, by means of the yáp clause
establishes the likelihood of the prediction contained in the
condition, and thereby shows, that he has just ground for calling
attention to it explicitly. If a merely asseverative force were
given to yap, the sequence of thought would be obscure. The
particle à has sufficient asseverative meaning for the sentence.
What is needed, is, rather, a word to indicate the subtle logical
connection.
IV. Confirmatory.
The distinguishing characteristic of confirmatory yap is, that
it verifies the truth of an assertion, or, the correctness of use
of a word, or phrase. At times, it approaches the simple causal”
and explanatory" uses, in that an explanation, or proof, may
be employed to substantiate a statement, and again, it is often
merged in the motivating ydp, as was shown in the preceding
pages."
Apart, however, from these indeterminate blended uses, there
exists a number of instances, in which the function of the particle
is distinctively confirmatory. Though methods of proof are
countless, a few of the typical forms will be briefly outlined.
(1) The yáp clause points out that the supposition of con-
ditions opposite to those in the main clause, necessitates a
conclusion which is contrary to well-known existing facts. As
a natural result the confirmatory sentence is, in every case, con-
ditional, and the premise, that must usually be supplied, is the
opposite of the preceding statement. § yáp (for else), or oil yáp
are the common, introductory formulae: e. g. Il. II. 242. dAA&
pá\' otºk 'Axi\in XóNos (ppegiv, d\\ā uéðfluovº/ yüp ſiv, 'Arpetón, viv
to Tara AoSigato. Soph. O. R. 318. Taira yāp kaśās éyò/ eióðs 8t-
&\eo' oi yüp (iv beip’iköpiny.”
* Cf. O. C. 966, Eur, Hel. 97. Plat. Rep. 352 C.
* Cf. p. 13. * Cf. p. I4. * Cf. p. 18.
* Cf. Herod. I. I 24, II. 49. I 3, 134. 6, III. 38. I, et al. Soph. O. C. I25,
O. R. 318, El. I448, Phil. 947.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 23
Sometimes, as in Dem. XVIII. § 228, the condition is expressed
in the form of a genitive absolute. ÖpoMáymkev juás intápxetv ćyvoo-
pévows, épé pºv Aéyetv inſep Tis Tarpiðos, airów 6' itép Pºitirov' oi yüp
&v perateiðew ipas àret, pſi) totaúrms oiſons Tns intapxotions intoxi,\becos
Tepi ékatépov.
A similar proof may be introduced by éiret: e.g. Xen. Cyr. II.
2. 31. Mā Ata épm oë yöp (pixótovás éo Tuv' étrel #pkel áv airó, si épé j6eXe
q,w}\eiv tooto duri Távrov Tów yupuwagiov.
(2) A particular instance is often cited, to substantiate a general
truth, or, a maxim, in confirmation of a specific case: e.g. Soph.
Trach. 62. & Tékvov, & Tai, kāś dyevvirov ćpa/pi,6ot kaśās Titſtovolv.
#3e yāp yuviiſ&oën pév, eipnkev 6' éAeó6epov Adyov.' Ant, 295 k Tóvöe
toūrovs ééetriotapat kaśćs/trapmypévovs pugéolaiv eipyägóat Táče./oëv yūp
dvépétrotow oiov āpywposſ Kakov váptop' éðNagte.”
(3) Another way of verifying the truth of an assertion, is,
to relate the circumstances which enable the speaker to have an
accurate knowledge of the matter: e. g. Il. III. 205. & yºval, #
páAa toûro èros vmueprés Éetires' / #6m yöp kai čeňpó Tot' ºvée 8tos 'Oövo-
gets / geſ' ver' dyyevimv.” . . .
(4) The rejection of the alternative of that which is maintained
as true is another well-known form: e.g. Med. 325. Aóyovs dwaxois'
où yüp of v Teigets Toré.," as is also the challenging of the hearer
to test, or refute the assertion: e. g. Aesch. Prom. 294. yvögel
8è Táð’ &s étup', où8é uárnv/xaptroyMoggeiv ºut vot' (bépe yāp/ a juatv' &rt
xpff ool ovumpággety “ ye or obv is frequently combined with the yáp
or étrel of the first named use: e. g. Plat. Gorg. 471 E. of yap
é6éAets, éirei Šokeſ yé orot &s éyò Aéyo."
Fusion of causal and confirmatory meanings, to which reference
was made at the beginning of this chapter, may be seen most
clearly in those instances, where a prediction is justified: e. g.
Il. XXIV. 729. Tpiv yap TóAts #8s kat' àkpms / Tépoetal yüp &AoAas
ériokoros, Šs répu airós/560 ke', . . ."
More common, however, is the intermingling of the explanatory
with this meaning; for the expansion of a statement, by giving
further details, may establish also its reasonableness, and truth:
1 Cf. Soph. O. R. 590, Ant. I84, Aj. 650, El. 698. * Cf. id. 661, 703.
3 Cf. Od. II. 170, Plat. Prot. 312 A, and Brosch. p. 19, who discusses the
instances in Herod. under the general topic of ellipse.
4 Cf. frequent use of Štrei O. C. 969, El. 352, O. R. 390.
* Cf. Soph. Elect. 585, and &Tet id. 352, O. R. 390, Eur, Hec. 1208.
* Cf. Rep. 601 B. "Cf. Soph. O. R. 1227, O. C. 1372.
24 THE MEANING OF TAP.
e.g. Od. VII. 20I.. ei 84 ris d6avárov . . . six?ov6ev, /d\\o ti 3) ráð’
#Tetra 6eol repunxaváovrat.ſaiei yüp Tö täpos ye 6sol halvovral évapysis
juiv, . . ."
yáp must sometimes be referred to a part, only, of the sentence:
e.g. Soph. El. 525 Aéyo kakós k\tovo a ſpés Gé6ev 6apá.) Tarijp yāp, où8èv
&\\o goi iſpágxma' dei, Ös éé šuoi réðunkev. The statement contained
in the participial phrase, kakós . . . 6apá is verified. In Aesch.
Ag. 422 reference is to a single word, (uaratav): Tápétat 66&al
dépova at xápw paratav./ adrav yap, eúr’āv čo 6\d ris Soków āpā,ſas also,
Soph. O. C. I IO oikripar’ avópós Oióirov ráð' à6\tov'ſ eiðoxov oë yāp
3) ráð' àpxalov 8éuas. The blending of motivating and confirmatory
forces is well illustrated in the last example. The yāp clause
contains, at the same time, the reason for the use of etēoxov and
a confirmation of the correctness of its application. The same
fusion occurs in the use of éiret referring to a single word: e. g.
Plat. Prot. 317 A. oë yāp \affeiv Tóv àvépôtrov Tows 8vvapiévows év rais
tróAegt Tpdrrew, &virep eveka Taür' éori Tà Tpoozåuara" Čirei of ye ToxAoi
Ös gros eitreiu oièév airódvovrat, dAA’ &rr' àv oërot 8tayyáAoot, raûra
ūpwoño i.”
The exact reference of the yáp clause is sometimes obscure,
owing to the fact, that, between this clause and the one to which
it refers, there intervenes another independent sentence. Failure
to trace this connection has, in not a few instances, led interpreters
to deny the causal force of the particle.
Since this loose sentence juncture is found in all of the uses
of yáp mentioned above, the citations following are given under
these several classes.
(1) Causal, Od. XX. 273. kai XaAeróv Tep Šávra öexópe6a uş6ov,
'Axalot, / Tºepdxov' pſi\a 6' juv direixidas dyopetet./oi yüp Zeis stage
Kpowtov' rô ké utv #6m/tratoragev čv Heydpoto, . . . .”
Batimlein is clearly mistaken in his analysis. He translates
thus “Zeus liess es ja nicht geschehen; sonst hätten wir ibn
lāngst zur Ruhe gebracht,” and classifies it with the use of ydp
in an independent sentence preceding the conclusion which is
drawn from it. Such sentences, he maintains, are not gram-
matically connected with the previous context. This is impossible,
* Cf. Soph. O. C. 339, 555, 1613, Ant. I4I, I 78, 615, 962, II68, Trach. 9, 132,
El. 305, Aj. 9. *
* The Štrei clause motivates toūg Óvvapiévovg, and confirms &vTep Šveka šotiv.
Cf. Xen. Oec. XIX. 7.
* Cf. Her. I, 71. 20, III. 89, et al. Cf. Brosch. p. 17, who notes this as a trait
of Her, style.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 25
for the sentence introduced by yáp is not the main sentence, but
a confirmation of the statement, to which it is added, and,
as Sernatinger (I p. 35) suggests, must be connected with XaAerów
Tep Šávra . . . Öexópe6a.
(2) Explanatory: e. g. Aesch. Ag. 555. Tà 3' atre kåttuoupa, ris
ôè T^i\v 6eavſ àwavr' àmàuov Tóv 8t' aiãvos Xpóvov; Héx60vs yöp ei Aéyout
kai ÖvgavXias, grapvås . . ."
(3) Confirmatory and explanatory: e.g. Od. XX. 306. Krágurm’,
fi pāAa to róðe képôtov ćirMero 6vpé'/oëk £3a)\es róv čeivov' d\etaro ydp
8é\os airós. yāp kev ore puéorov 8á\ov ćyxel . . . .
(4) Motivating: e. g. Il. II. I 19 kai pe keVečevſ 8vok\ée' "Apyos
ikégéal, rei Tojºv 3\ega Nadu./offro Tov Ali uéAAet inteppevil, hūow cival,
| Šs . . . . aioxpov yūp Tööe y' éori kai éggopévouri Tv6égéal, /pdſ, otro
y * <>
totôvöe rooſévêe re Aaov’Axatówſ diſpnkrov TóNepov Toºepičuev . . .”
* Cf. Od. XIV. 228, Soph. Aj. 25.
* A number of obscure instances found in Anthol. Lyr. have been omitted
in this summary, because it is probable that a lost context gave them their
meaning: e. g. Tyrtaeus 8. I. (Bergk) Theog. 423, 44I. Archil. 60, Theog.
287; compare Euenus 8. with Theognis 472. The latter explains the former.
CHAPTER III.
Anticipatory yáp.
A speaker may reverse the usual order of the clause of
reasoning and the main sentence for rhetorical effect, or for the
sake of clearness, and, anticipating the command or statement
which he is about to make, conciliate and prepare in advance
the mind of the hearers for a favorable acceptance, and better
understanding of his words.
The difference between this use and the regularly-arranged,
causal and motivating yáp clauses, is purely rhetorical. Logically,
the thought of the main sentence must be conceived in the mind
of the speaker, before he can give the reason, or motivate, or
explain it, but he seeks to have the two parts strike the ear of
the listener in a different relation.
The possibility, however, of a forward-pointing yáp, has been,
in the case of Homer, disputed at some length by Doederlein,
in his dissertation, entitled “Homerica particula yáp nusquam
refertur ad insequentem sententiam.” He maintains that yap
“quoties credatur ad sequentia verba spectare, reddere gestus
potius alicuius nutusve rationem qui aliquo animi motu expressus
orationem loguentis praecesserat aut comitetur”, and supports
his view by drawing attention to the fact that the proleptic
yáp (so-called) is found only in speeches.
As we have stated before, the difference between the two uses
is rhetorical and not logical, and Doederlein's suggestion does
not remove the objection, that the order of the thoughts, or
feelings, to which utterance is given, is still at variance with
common usage. It makes little difference whether we say that
a person had the command, or statement in mind, before the
yáp clause, or that he expressed it by some gesture, so long as
there is no articulate expression of it, to which yap could be
referred.
No confusion in understanding the relation of the causal clause
can result, since it invariably either follows directly after the
vocative, or is inserted after some other opening words of the
main sentence.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 27
Classen (Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachge-
brauch, Frankfurt am Main, 1854) was the first to draw attention
to, and rightly explain, the force of proleptic ydp, as he named
it. He remarks on the greater frequency of parataxis in Homer
than in classical authors, and the consequent tendency to denote
subordination by parenthesis rather than by relative conjunctions.
Homer, he believes, shows in this an earlier stage of linguistic
development, for he allows the parts of the sentence to follow in
their genetic order, where the grammatical formation of the
period, which has in view the relation of the single parts to one
another, would demand a more artificial order.
This theory of the development of proleptic yap, while it appears
plausible if we consider Homer only, fails in accounting for the
continuation of this use in classical Greek. Anticipatory yáp is
employed by later authors in all of the various connections in
which it is found in the Iliad and Odyssey, namely, at the begin-
ning of a speech anticipating a command or question, in ex-
planations, and in the groups d\\d yáp and vöv Šē-yáp, in the latter
even more frequently than by Homer.
The more probable hypothesis is, then, that it is, on the one
hand, a rhetorical device, consciously employed by Homer, as well
as the later Greek masters of style, in imitation of the irregularity
of natural speech, where stress of feeling, or politic considerations,
break through the rules of logical and grammatical sequence.
Its dramatic effect is, as we have stated, that it holds the
judgment of the hearer in suspense and prepares for a more
favorable attitude toward what is to follow. In explanatory clauses
(parenthetical), it is to be considered rather an unavoidable con-
cession of the strict order demanded by grammar, to lucidity
of expression.
Baiimlein, although not denying that a causal relation usually
exists between the yáp clause and that which follows, holds, that
no indication of this relation, is given by the particle, which
is not a subordinating conjunction like étel and therefore, cannot,
he believes, point forward. He would, then, class the proleptic
yáp, as it is commonly called, with the original asseverative uses.
Grammatically, yáp is not as close a bond as émet yet the forward
connection which syntactical subordination necessitates, in the
case of émei, logical subordination requires, in the case of ydp.
You cannot have cause, without that of which it is the cause.
As soon as the cause is stated, logical sense demands the other
28 THE MEANING OF TAP,
term of the relation. There can be no confusion. The fact, that
the position of yáp is unusual, creates the desired rhetorical effect,
but makes no change in the interpretation of the sentence.
The logical relation, as we have said before, must be considered
also from the point of view of the speaker. Does he intend the
yáp to be an emphatic independent sentence, or, does he, with
mind intent on what he is to say, prefix the yáp clause, solely
as a means of justifying or confirming the command he is to
voice, or the truth he is to state? An examination of a few sen-
tences will make it plain that the speaker, at least, conceives them
in the latter relation. He changes the order purposely, because
he wishes to prejudice the hearer's mind.
Another test may be used to show the dependent character
of the yáp clause. If the main sentence, (or conclusion, in the
terms of Batimlein), is taken away, the reader at once feels that
there is an anacoluthon of some kind. It, then, seems arbitrary
on an a priori theory, to deny its usual force to a particle on
account of a change of order, when it is admitted, that the
thought-sequence remains the same. |
In the treatment of anticipatory uses of the particle, the usual
subdivisions are followed.
I. Causal.
Since the differences, in general, between this and the other
meanings of yáp are discussed at some length in the preceding
chapter, we may proceed at once to examine the forms it assumes.
(I) The main sentence, introduced by a vocative or some other
opening words, may be completed after the yáp clause, without
any indication of the interruption: e.g. Her. I. 8. IO. Töyn, où yáp ore
ôokéo Teiðeorðat pot Aéyovri trepi Toi etóeos ris yuvaikós . . . Tolee Škos ékeivnv
6eñoreal yupuffy." The order here is one, that a person urging an
unusual request, naturally follows, if he wishes to soften the effect
of the blunt demand, and justify the means by the end. Il.
XXIV. 223. vöv 8', airós yáp #kovga 6eoû kai égéðpakov čvrmy/, eiu, kal
oix àAtov ćiros écroſsrai.” (2) The main sentence is very often con-
nected with the preceding by kat, or, some other particle, and the
"Cf. Od. XIV. 355. Pind. Py. I. 85, Aesch. Ag. IO69, Choe. 75, Eum. 230,
Soph. Phil. 500, 603, O. R. 222, O. C. I540, Eur. I. T. 646 (cf. for discussion
Sern. II. p. 20), Hec. 900, Med. 80, Theoc. Carm. VII. 35. Cf. also instances
of a like kind, cited under viv Óé—Yáp and ā%á Yáp p. 59 f.
* Cf. Od. I. 301, Soph. O. C. I540, Eur, I. T. 95. Arist. Acharn. IO2O.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 29
yáp clause is inserted after one or two words. There is no reason
why this particle should be interpreted with the yáp clause, since
it is the thought of the main sentence, which is coordinated or
contrasted with that which precedes: e. g. Her. IV. 125. 4.
é\ačvov Šē Tiju Taxiotmv Tów otpatów . . . Švékvpore duqotépnot that uotpnot
tów 2kv6éov, ŠvrvXöv 8° 38toke Üirekºpépoutas juépms 66%. Kai oi yöp dviet
étrºv 6 Aapelos, oi ><öðat kard tâ Bešov) evpéva itépevyov . . . ."
(3) The completed principal sentence is introduced by 84 or
ãA\á which are commonly used at the beginning of an apodosis,
or a main sentence after a preceding relative clause. It is dif-
ficult, where an imperative follows, to determine, whether the 82
or dANá should be explained in this way, or, should be connected
closely with the imperative. In either case the adversative par-
ticle marks the beginning of a thought differing from the prece-
ding : e. g. Od. XII. I54 fg. & pixot, oi yüp xpi čva tºueval oëe 85’
otovs/ 6éo (ba6', 3 pot Kipkm uvéâgaro, öia 6edov'ſ dAA’ spéo uév ćyöv.”
Od. X. I74 fg. & pi\ot, où yáp to Karaövgäueð . . ./d\\' àyer',
êºp' év vmi floff 8póg is Te Tóg is te pºwmgöpeda 8póplms.” . . . Od. XIX. 407.
ToMAotov yap y&ye ā8wo gåuevos Töö'ikávo/āvěpáow . . . / Töö’’08voets
ãvop’ orro èróvvuov.” Where no words precede the yáp clause, there
is no break in the grammatical structure any more than, when after
a conditional sentence, the apodosis is distinguished from the
protasis by a 3é or āAAá. The change of order has placed the yáp
clause in the position of a subordinate clause, and the 84 or āXX4
indicates that it is so considered. When the main sentence pre-
cedes, there is no necessity for such a symbol.
By a kind of anacoluthon, d\\d is sometimes used, where the
principal sentence has been introduced by kai. After the long
interruption of the yáp clause, the author forgets that he has used
ăN\á and, having in mind now the connection of the yáp clause,
and the main sentence, rather than the relation of the latter to the
previous thought, inserts the d\\á, or 84 of apodosis: e. g. Her.
IX. 93. I5. kai oi yap ÉNaffe Tovs 'AtroX\oviñras taúra 'yevópeva, d\\’ &s
5 / t p * \ § / Af 5
&Túðovto vTayayoutes puu viro ukaotmptov Katekplvau. . . .
1. Cf. Her. IV. 8. II. 76. 7, 152. 9, V. 33.6, 8O. 6, VI. 5.6, 61. 9, 76.8, 87.7,
II.8. 7, VII. IOS. I2, IX. 31. 6, 87. I, Thuc. I. 3I. 2, III. IO7. 3, VII. 48. 2.
2 Cf. Od. IV. 722, XIV. 496, (a wish follows à%á) XXII. 70.
3 Cf. Od. X. Igo, XII. I54, XXIII. 248, Il. XIII. 736, Tyrt. Hyp. I. I.
4 Cf. Od. XII. 320, XIII. 208, (viv 0° àyet”).
* Cf. Brosch. p. 50, who offers the same explanation. Cf. Thucyd. IV. I32.2.
3O THE MEANING OF TAP.
(4) A conclusive particle rô (Homer), &v (Herod.) rolyapóv
may resume the interrupted sentence": e. g. Il. VII. 328 fg.
'Arpetón re kai d\\ot àptories IIavaxatſov, Tox\ol yáp reflvão, kāpm kopidovres
'Axalot, / . . . tº gexp) TóAepov gèv àu' àát traúoat, 'Axatów, . . . .” Her.
III. 63. 4. 'Ov6pore, his yúp #kely tapå Spépôtos toū Kópov dyyevos. viv
&v eitras Tºv d\móeimv Čirić, xatpov.” In Soph. O. C. IOOO after an
anticipatory yáp clause of some ten lines, the main sentence when
taken up again by áv6' 3v does not continue the construction, with
which it began. or 8', et yap of Sikatos, d\\' àirav KaNov/ . . . (IoIO)
ăv6' &v ćy& vöv ráo be tas 6eas poi/ KaNou ikuotpat Kai karaokärro
Airais/ēA6eiv dpoyot's . . .
A still closer connection often arises between the causal and
main sentences, when the latter is introduced by a demonstrative
pronoun referring to some person, thing, or place, mentioned for
the first time in the yáp clause. This occurs most commonly in
introducing a new person or thing, whose existence, character,
and position must be explained before the sentence can proceed:
e.g. Il. II. 803 to M\oi yüp karā āorv péya IIpuduov éiríkovpot, / 3AM, 8’
ãN\ov y\@oroa Toxvoirépéov div6póTov'ſ rototv čkaotos dump a muatvéro oigt
Irep &pxel . . . The number of the auxiliaries and the varied
character of the races under the command of the generals make
it necessary that each should issue the orders to his own troops.
Batimlein p. 76 translates, “Es sind ja in der Stadt viele Hülfs-
volken und sie reden verschiedene Sprachen; diese mogen alle
je von ihrens Gebietern Befehle empfangen”. There is no reason
for emphatic assertion of the fact, that there are many auxiliaries
in the city. It is well known. The purpose of the speaker in
making this statement, is merely to give the reason for the com-
mand a muawéro. -
No different explanation is required in Il. VII. 73. Öpiv Luévl
yāp Éagu áptories IIavaxatów'ſ róv vvv Švrwa 6vgös époi paxéraoréal dwóym,/
Sevp' iro èk Távrov Tpópos éppeva, "Ekropt 3iº. The text of the clause
is uncertain. pºv is the reading of H, C, B, E, G, L, (La Roche)
yáp om. H. Aristarchus, however, reads ipſiv 8' v yöp agw.
La Roche believes that Appollon. Rhod. B. 882 is an echo of this
1. Cf. Sern. I. pp. 48 and 9. Cf. the instances under á%ā yáp and vöv Ó’ yáp,
where the main clause is resumed by the particles mentioned above and also
by 6% (Euthy. IIC,) 6tā Taijta. Prot. 347 A. and like phrases.
2 Cf. Od. XVIII. 259, XIX. 407, Il. XIII. 228, XV. 738, XVI. 630, XVII.
221, 338, XXIII. 607.
* Cf. Her. I. 30. Io, 69. 7, 121. 2, 166. 4, V. IQ, 124, VI. II, 87, VII.
I43, Xen. An. III. 2. 25, 29, V. I. 8, VI. 4. 8. Cf. Brosch. Ch. III. p. 33 fg.
THE MEANING OF TAP, 3I
line, namely, juiv pév yāp #aat Kv3epvármpes, as given by MSS. But,
pèv yāp is almost impossible on account of a pévyāp in the line pre-
ceding. In the passage of the Iliad under discussion, the read-
ings of editions differ greatly. Öpiv 3’ is read by La Roche, Bekker,
Dindorf, Nauck, Christ. Cauer reads 8é, and, divides thus juiv 6'-áv
yáp. Düntzer prefers pév, which he thus interprets “betheurt den
einzelnen Satz; Leaf explains in a like manner, but he rejects
69-72, inclusive, as not in harmony with the sense. 3' ev, states
the latter, has no good MSS authority, and, is doubtless a con-
jecture, which, there is no ground for attributing to Aristarchus.
The text is explicable, he thinks, only on the supposition that uév
is original, and remained untouched, even after the interpolation
of 69-72.
Either uév or 84, I believe, is a possible reading, as far as the
sense is concerned. Öpiv 6’—év yáp may be due to the fusion of
two constructions. ipſu belongs to the Šč and yép clauses at once,
which are in this particular, merged. But 8é must be read, logi-
cally with the main clause which is taken up again by the re-
sumptive róv. After the remarks about Zeus, which are addressed
to both Achaeans and Greeks, Hector turns to the Greeks alone,
denoting the change by Šć. But, what should have been ip69
according to the construction following the yáp clause, is attracted
by év of the latter, and becomes dative. The juiv, therefore, is
not repeated in the yáp clause."
If we read uév the explanation of the yáp clause is the same as
before, except that it is not, then, parenthetically inserted in the
main clause, but precedes.”
II. Motivating Anticipatory.
Cause for the change of order in the yáp clause, performing this
function, is not far to seek. Before the speaker utters a state-
ment, question or command, he would naturally wish to incline
his hearer to a favorable attitude, by explaining his motive. If
the motive followed later, he might not be able to alter the first
hasty impression made by the previous words.
(1) To conciliate, in advance, the hearer, a politic compliment
is paid to his ability to perform the task, about to be requested.
Naturally, where the personal element is predominant, the
1. Cf. Her. II. IOI. I. for similar attraction and Brosch., p. 63, who gives a
like explanation of the instances in Herod.
2 Cf. for uév II. IV. 286.
32 THE MEANING OF TAP,
motivating clause would follow directly the vocative. It causes
no break in syntax: e. g. Il. XXIII. I56. ’Arpetëm, gol yáp re
páAtotá ye Āads 'Axatów / Teloſovrat uéðotat, ydoto uév čari kai ärat, ſvöv 8'
âtrö Trupkaths orkéðagov . . .". Düntzer notes here, that yáp gives the
reason, why the speaker turns to Agamemnon. We must go
farther and say that the yáp clause does not motivate his address
alone but takes into account his aim in addressing the other.
The nature of the command as well as the person addressed, is,
in the former's mind from the first, as the motivating clause shows
by its content. Reference is made, not merely to the general
ability of the person, but, to his ability to perform this particular
command.
A question is thus motivated in advance: Eur. Bacch. 477 Ai.
doré8eway do koúvr' àpyi' éx6alpet 0600/IIE. Töv 6eóv ćpāv yöp (bis oraqīās,
Tolós tus fiv;
Before dismissing this class it is necessary to note a motivating
yáp clause Eur, El. 82, which is made obscure in its reference by
the omission of its main sentence. OP. IIvXáðm, oré yép 8) ſparov
ăvěpárov dy&ſ turrow wouiſo . . . . (87) dāiyuat 6' x 6eoû xpmarmptov/
'Apyelov offèas oićevös £vvetóóros . . . .” Orestes, before revealing to
Pylades his secret plans, gives the reason for the confidence in
his friend thus shown by stating in the yáp clause his belief in
the latter's fidelity. Consequently, the actual revelation of the
plans which follows the yáp clause constitutes, in effect the main
Sentence.
(2) An d\\ā or 8* indicates the transition from the motive to
the command or statement which the yáp clause anticipates: e. g.
Il. XVII, 475. 'AAktueóov, ris yáp rot 'Axatów &\\os épotos/introv
ādavárov exéuev buildiv re uévos reſ . . . . dAAö at pév pågriya . . . 6&ai.
Od. XIX. 350, £eive pix', où yáp Tó ris àvåp Tervupévos &öe/£elvov
Tmebatów (pixiov šuov trero 66pa, . . . Éott öé pot ypnºs Tukwä (ppeal . . .”
(3) The intervention of the yáp clause is recognized by means
of a conclusive particle ró or vuv, showing that the command is
the logical consequence of the motives mentioned by the speaker:
e.g. Il. XIII. 228. dAAö, edav, kai yap rô Tápos pewebſitos #06a, /örpüvels
* Cf. Plat. Gorg. 449 C. Phaed. II 7 A, Theae. I48 D, Arist. Lys. II37.
*Cf. Plat. Gorg. 465 A.
* Düntzer would refer to the voc. §eive piñe. The vocative is only a partial
indication of Penelope's kindly attitude toward Odysseus, which the yáp clause
motivates.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 33
8è kai àNov, . . . /ræ vöv piſt' dirómye, kéAevé te qori ékágrº." Her. I.
124. 4.’o Tai Kapflögeo, gé yāp 6eoi étropór, . . . at www 'Aarváyea row
geovroß (bovéa tigat.”
III. Anticipatory explanations.
Explanatory clauses in general, assume two forms, as I have
stated in the discussion of this category in the previous chapter.
They are either a development of the main theme, and, therefore,
an integral part of the narrative, due to the hearer's ignorance of
some detail of the situation, or, to the writer's desire to add
an interesting fact by the way. Since their insertion does not
affect the current of the thought, their position is determined
by the exigencies of the narrative. Where a person must be
introduced or a place described, or a circumstance explained,
to give a clear understanding of an event about to be related, the
explanation naturally precedes. But if the yáp clause contains
information, added, by the way, about a person or thing men-
tioned in the sentence, there is no reason why it should antici-
pate that to which it refers. When the explanatory clause is a
development of the subject under discussion, naturally, it will not
precede the statement of the subject.
(I) No break is made in the grammatical construction by the
insertion of the yáp clause, which is parenthetical in nature: e.g.
Her. I. I 18. II. Totto èë (0.60 tpa yāp row Tatóðs péA\o 6vetv. . .)
Tápio 6i pot ºri beinvov.” º
Some particle of sequence 65 or öv resumes the main sentence:
e.g. Her. VI. 87.7. Kai fivyāp 6) rotot 'A6mwatoto. Tevretmpis étri Sovvig,
Aox#gavres &v Tiju 6eoptèa véa eixov . . . ." -
By a backward-pointing demonstrative pronoun, a closer union
of the yáp and main clauses is effected. This device is employed
repeatedly when a new person or place is introduced into the
narrative: e.g. Her. I. I 19.4. Éo ex8&v Še Ty Taxiotny, fivyāp of Tais eis
poivos . . . Toorov čkirépire. . . .” Towrov would have no meaning without
* Capelle Philol. XXXVI. p. 705, translates by German “ja”. This may
serve as a translation, but it does not adequately express the meaning of the
Greek particle. Cf. Od. XVIII, 259.
* Cf. Stein ad locum and Brosch. p. 47. Cf. Her. IV. 79. 15, W, 19. II, Plat.
Euthyph. I4 C (0%) Lach. 200 E (obv).
* Cf. Her. I. 74. I, I 74. I6, VIII. Io'7. Io, Eur, Alc. 280. Cf. Brosch. p. 44
for full list in Her.
* Cf. Her. (viv čv) I. I21, 4, 129, 8, III. 63.5, W. 124. I. Cf. Brosch. pp.
44, 45.
°Cf. Her. I. 8.4, W. III. 3, VI. Io9. 5, VIII. 5. 4, 8, 4.
34 THE MEANING OF TAP.
the preceding yáp clause, which can not, then, be considered
parenthetical. Her. V. 67. 6. Toºro Sé, pátov yūp #v kai fort év
airfi tā āyopſ. . . . , todrow éireóðumore 6 KAeto.66wns. . . ." Od. IX. 432.
Tpels ö, äkaorov bör'âtes pépov, airãp éyòye,/ dpvetés yüp env, p \ov 8x’
āpigros ūrávrov, ſtoi, Karā vēra Aa3&v, Aag inviro yarrép'éAvg6eis / kelp.my.*
Od. IX. 319, jöe 6é pot karū dupov dpio Tn paivero Bovāj:/Kūk\otos yāp
éketro uéya fiówaxov trapū onkó|x\opov \alveov' rú pew krajiev, 3dpa
(popoim. . . . Objection may be made, that yáp introduces a narrative
and refers to #3e épio'rn Bovāń. But (1) the analogy of Od. IX 432,
where the yáp clause must be interpreted as an anticipatory
explanation, (2) the fact that the #8e-Bovº formula is not followed
by yap in the other five instances” in which it is used in Homer,
support the other analysis.
"Cf. Her. I. I26. I, VI. IO2. 4. (both explanation and cause), III, 78. I4, VII.
44. IO, VIII. IO7. Io.
*Cf. Od. XI. 69. Ameis treats yáp in this example as a parenthesis, pre-
paring for the prayer which follows. But the long causal parenthesis, as
Pfudel rightly objects, would make the already long invocation, with which
the speaker begins, inartistic. The content of the prayer begins with the yáp
clause which looks forward to the command 1. 72, in which évôa points back
to the preceding explanation.
*In two of these cases, there is asyndeton; in the other three, the formula
is completed by an infinitive. Cf. Od. IX. 425, which is parallel to the above,
in having also a backward-pointing demonstrative at the beginning of the
main clause.
CHAPTER IV.
yáp in question.
In our investigation of yap in question, we may at once dismiss
from our consideration, the purely rhetorical question, equivalent
to a negative statement, and preceded by a definite antecedent,
to which the yáp clause may be reſerred. Here, the causal force
of the particle is undeniable.
But there remains a yet more frequent use of yap in question,
when yáp has, apparently, no direct relation to a previous thought,
as, for example, at the beginning of a reply. This, in that it is
foreign to the idiom of most languages, has been the crux of
linguistic students from the earliest times.
Viger (p. 492) recognizes, as a distinct category the yáp, which
“Servit interrogationi”, like Latin “nam” or “quisnam ”. Later,
he says, “ot yáp saepe vehementer interrogat '.' Hoogeveen
(note 3, p. 493), in criticism of Viger” says that ydp refers to the
preceding sentence and is airtoxoyukós. Tis yap does not correspond
to quisnam, but, rather, to nam quis. In a number of instances,
however, he translates by igitur, itaque, adding as a reason
“utpote compositum ex yé et àpa”.”
Thiersch supports, here, as everywhere, the view that ydp
can have no other than the causal meaning. Hartung,” however,
who follows next in order of time, reverts to the syllogistic theory,
which he defends by a more systematic investigation than the
earlier scholars had given to the subject. In yáp in questions and
* Hoog. XII. p. 102, states that Stephanus and Devarius held a similar view,
and criticizes them on the same grounds as he does Viger.
* Hermann p. 161, ad Vig. likewise opposes Viger and supports the theory,
that yáp is always causal.
* In his treatise on particles (p. IOI) he makes the ratiocinative-syllogistic
use of y&p include all questions. He translates by “enim", “vero’”, “ergo.”
However, he would seem to believe that it is possible, in most instances to
trace an underlying causal meaning, by supplying an ellipse.
* Cf. § 351, 18. Likewise Matthia § 615 fg., who adds that through fre-
quency of use yāp lost its primitive force, and finally was used merely to
strengthen the question like the Latin nam in quisnam.
"Cf. Vol. 1. p. 476 fg.
36 THE MEANING OF TAP.
exclamations, he believes, the syllogistic àpa is the predominant
part in the compound, and determines its meaning.
To the conclusive yáp in question Klotz' would add the affirm-
ative use, but offers no defense of his view except the interpreta-
tion of a few individual cases.
Batimlein adopting the latter meaning, suggested by the pre-
vious scholar, supports it by a new etymological explanation of
yáp in question. He believes that it is a relic of the original as-
severative use, and serves three purposes, (I) to ask whether a
certain fact is an undeniable, indisputable truth, and (2), when
following directly after the interrogatives ris, ºrt, trós, and the like,
to introduce a reason for the preceding sentence, and, at the
same time, to denote, that the question itself is a natural one, and
the doubt expressed by it justifiable, (3) to give more tone and
animation to the question, by showing that it is natural and rea-
sonable.
In the analysis of this use of ydp, Kühner (p. 726) who has
accepted, almost completely, Batimlein's theory, differs, in that
he adds, to the original asseverative meaning, two derived forces,
the causal and conclusive.
Sernatinger “ II, p. 46 fg. the defender of the causal meaning,
sees no obstacle to a like interpretation of the yáp in question. He
concedes, however, that in some instances, this force has been
almost completely obscured. This is due, he believes, to a cer-
tain brevity and conciseness of expression, manifested in ques-
tions, and to a tendency to neglect everything, except that which
the questioner desires to know.
Kalinka is, as usual, in harmony with Batimlein, in his inter-
pretation of yap, but diverges in his explanation of the chrono-
logical relation of the two meanings, causal and affirmative, yāp
in all questions, he holds was originally causal, but in certain
developed usages, finally, lost this significance, becoming purely
confirmatory. This just mentioned change occurred above all in
two kinds of questions, (I) the elliptical formulae of response, which
were used in the later sense, without any thought of their origin, and,
(2) instances, where the causal meaning of ydp was obscure, (e. g.
Xen. Oec. XVIII. 22), and the confirmatory being the more evi-
dent, seemed to be the true force of the particle. Consequently,
I
p. 245.
*So Brosch. p. 7, who follows in this Hermann, Thiersch and Kruger.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 37
in later writers, he believed, the latter meaning completely super-
seded the former in such formulae as # yáp and ri yáp, and even in
the fuller questions, e.g. Xen. Mem. I. IV. I4.
To determine indubitably, to what extent the Greek was con-
scious of the original causal force of yap, would be impossible,
in the elliptical questions of response. These questions belong
to the stereotyped forms, for conveying assent, or dissent, and
can be varied by similar questions without yáp. All such formu-
lae are, in function, confirmatory, but it does not follow, that
there is a consequent levelling in the meanings of all of the par-
ticles, which might introduce them. Trôs 6' oi; is a frequent sub-
stitute for trós yáp oë; but that the 3é meant the same to a Greek,
as the yáp, cannot be affirmed. Different methods of reasoning
are employed in each case. yap gives the reason for the implied
assent, by directing attention to the impossibility of the opposite
proposition. The adversative particle points out this same fact,
in protest against the doubt implied by the previous speaker in
the very asking of the question, or, if a statement were used,
in the tentative form of the statement. Without doubt, this
variation in the use of the formulae is nothing more than a
stylistic device for relieving the monotony of the recurrent
assents and dissents. There is no grammatical likeness between
the different forms.
Whether the speaker consciously analyzed yáp in every case,
is not important to the discussion. From the earliest times," the
Greeks were familiar with 'causal ydp, in a complete question
confirming a previous statement, e. g. Her. III. 81. After an
expression indicating assent, as well, a similar question was a well
recognized usage: e. g. Plat. Phil. 26 E. so. ôpa yāp, et got 8okeſ
dvaykaiov cival Távra rā ytyväueva èuá riva airiav yiyvegóat. IIPQ. "Epolye'
Tós yöp du Xopis roſtov yiyvotto;
There is no reason to believe, that the causal sense of yap
ceased to be evident, in the next grade of question, in the down-
ward scale to the elliptical formula trós yap fiv; e.g. Plat. Soph. 241 A
Tós yāp &v àN\cos rototros yévotto; Omission of the words giving
assent was not sufficient to alter the function of yap; nor, again,
the ellipse, e.g. Phil. 43 E. of the latter part of the question
ãN\os yévouro, which could be readily supplied from the context.
Furthermore, the incomplete question was used like the full form,
1 Cf. Hom. Od. IV. 443.
38 THE MEANING OF TAP,
both after a statement, e.g. Lys. I. 27, and after an expression
of assent or dissent, e.g. Laws 901 A KA. oi pew off' trós yöp &v;
Since in all of the instances cited above a like logical relation,
exists between the yáp clause and the thought preceding it,
whether expressed or implied, no grammatical distinction can be
made between the uses on the ground of completeness or the
opposite. The later Greeks play back and forth continually,
between the full and the incomplete questions, in the elliptical and
non-elliptical forms of response. Plato, for example, may use,
at one time, Eikás, trós yap oil; (Laws, 769 E), again Eikós ye., not
followed by a confirmatory clause (Craty. 397 C), or, Eikós yáp.
(Craty. 424 B), and at another time, the questions with yap, e. g.
trós yöp of ; (Laws, 629 D). Further illustrations may be obtained,
by following up almost any other formula of response in the
dialogues of Plato.
However, the development of the new meaning of ydp was due,
partly, Kalinka believes, to another group of questions in which
the causal force was not lost, but only obscured. He cites as
instances, Xen. Mem. III. 5. 15, Oec. XVIIII. 2, and Cyr.V. I. 9.
Kalinka's illustrations do not support his hypothesis. In the
first example because yáp directs attention to the circumstances
which cause the fact, which is asserted in the preceding sentences,
to be true, the function of the whole question, is confirmatory.
But this use of yáp, in advancing an argument, in proof of an
assertion, is well recognized in declarative sentences, and, would
cause no confusion."
yáp in Oec. XVIIII. 2, is not confirmatory, but motivates a
feeling of surprise at a previous remark. Its causal force in this
use is attested by the fact that some sentence or exclamation,
indicating the surprise, often goes before, e. g. Eur. Alc. IO89.
Kalinka evidently confuses with the confirmatory force the
asseverative feeling associated with all such emotional questions as
that introduced by yap in this example, which feeling is, however,
never conveyed by this particle but by adverbs such as āvros
(Arist. Eccl. 786), and éreóv, (Knights 32).
Cyr. V. I. 9, is similar to the preceding, but there is, in addi-
tion a tone of scorn, as is shown by ávayeMāoras in the sentence
before.
That there still remains some trace of the orginal causal meaning
in these passages, Kalinka is willing to concede, but, in the brief
* Cf. p. 22 for fuller discussion.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 39
formulae, such as # yáp; and ri yáp; (transitional, e.g. Xen. Mem.
II. 6. 2), yāp has, he asserts, passed altogether to the confirma-
tory meaning.
With the first of the groups just cited, there is associated an
idea of confirmation, which belongs to the question as a whole, not
to the yáp; but the transitional question ri ydp; is a formula used to
indicate sequence. Like explanations can, in no wise, be applied
to both, nor can their development have been parallel.
# yáp; can not be interpreted apart from the other elliptical
questions, trós yáp; ri yáp; etc. employed in verifying. All these,
again, differ only, in being incomplete, from the well-known full
confirmatory questions with ydp, which occur from Homer down
and the like instances with étrel; e.g. compare Aesch. Ag. I I39, Toi
ôň ue beſpo riv ráNaway #yayes;/ oë8év tor'el ui évv8avoupévny, ri yáp; (ri
yáp; confirms the assertion, by challenging the hearers to suggest
any other possibility), and an émet Plat. Euthyd. 287 C, used, with
similar effect, to yūp oëk éxo 3 ti xpópat, ti Tore Aéyets, 3 Atovvgööope;
# 67Mov Štu Ös oëk #x0 éée)\éyéat airóv; éirei eitré, ti got àA\o voeſ toūto Tö
fina, to oik exo 3 ti xprſo opal rois Náyots; No distinction in syntax should
be made, on the ground of the ellipse. # yáp; similarly, appeals
to the hearer for assurance, in regard to the truth of the statement
to which it is subjoined, e.g. Plat. Phil. 25 C. 6eppórepov čq6eyyápe6a
vöv &# Toč tº kai Jºuxpórepov. 7 yáp; The fi indicates, that the speaker
presents the previous assertion in question form, and yép, that he
does this for the purpose of confirmation.
There are a number of other formulae, without yap performing
a like function, e. g. Plat. Phil. 25 B, # Tøs gº ºffs; Phil. 27 A # Tós;
Phil. 60 C, oùx of ros; In the first two, the disjunctive # excludes
the yáp, but in the latter, the causal link is omitted, as it frequently
is in the response-formulae.
A sufficiently exhaustive summary of the uses of yap in question
will be afforded by the following classification:
I. Confirmatory in rhetorical questions, (I) after statements,
(2) in assent and dissent.
II. Justifying an attitude of objection or reproof, or some
emotion, surprise, indignation, grief.
III. Motivating a word or phrase.
IV. Explanatory.
V. Transitional.
All of these classes are found in Homer, except, perhaps, the
transitional, which, according to the data I have collected, appears
40 THE MEANING OF TAP.
for the first time in Aeschylus. Elliptical confirmatory questions
likewise do not seem to have occurred before this author.
I. (I) yáp, in rhetorical questions, substantiating a previous
statement, is a well-recognized use of the causal particle. Between .
this form and that in declarative sentences no distinction can be
made, since the question is equivalent to a negative statement.
Any other interpretation of yap in these questions than the causal
is made impossible by the parallelism of émet.
As a basis for the discussion of the elliptical forms, however,
it will be necessary to cite a few instances of both yáp and éret.
Od. IV. 443, Evêa key àwóratos A6xos émºero' reipe yāp aivösſ bokáov
ăNtorpediéov čNoératos éðuń./ris yáp k'eiva\tº Tapū kºrei koupin&ein;" Her.
III. 81, 6 pév yáp ei Tt Totéet, yuárkov trotéel, Tå Öe oë yuágkew vi' kôs
yāp àv yivó0 kot &s oit' 38tóáxón oire eiðe . . . .”; Arist. Lys. 259,
# TóAA’ {e\Tr' vegrw v rá pakpá Big, bei, /ērei ris àv Tór' #Arto' &
3rpvpóðop', akoúgal . . .'; *
Since the confirmatory question usually takes the form of a
negative rhetorical question, asking how the opposite can be
possible, and would if complete repeat the thought of the main
sentence, the interrogative and the particle indicating the logical
relation are frequently used alone. A like Greek tendency to
avoid repetition is evidenced in the d\\& yáp, contradicting a
negative statement, where the 3\\á clause is, almost invariably,
elliptical, e. g. Il. XV. 739. No instances of the incomplete ques-
tions are found in Homer or Herodotus, but, beginning with the
dramatists, from then on they occur in every author, becoming
most common, however, in the colloquial Platonic dialogues.
One early occurrence is met in Aesch. Choe. 754, to pi) ºppovoúv
'yūp &gtepei Botövſ Tpépew dváykm, Tós yāp ot; a later in Arist. Frogs
* This verse is rejected by Hemmings (Telemachie, p. 189), Düntzer,
Rirchoff, and Kochly, as not in accord with the sense. To illustrate the
effect of the sealskins by the use of the analogy civa) tº Kåret is not illogical.
The question implies that their Wóżog was virtually the same as sleeping by
a sea-monster, but not that it was the same.
* Cf. Thuc. V. 98, Aesch. Sept. 771, Ag, 1239, 1487, Pr, 1056, Soph. O. R.
II89, I496, Aj. 279, El. 909, 975, Tr. 829, Eur. I. A. 485, El. 759, Alc. 941,
Arist. Wasps 563, 550, I470, Lys. 526, Thesm. 389, Plut. 485, Eccl. 670, Peace
Io27, Birds 339, 343, Isae. I., p. 36, II, Xen. Mem. I. IV. I4, Cyr. W. W. I8,
Plat. Crit. 53 A, et freq.
* Cf. Plat. Sym. 208 D, Gorg. 461 B, Euthyd. 287 C, Xen. Mem. III. XII. 6,
Arist. Clouds 786, Thesm. 553, Dem. XXIV. 125, XXXI. I.3, LVI. 25, Epist.
II, I5.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 4. I
II89, pá têv At' of bir', oi nèv oßv ćiračgaro. / Tós yáp; Śre 6)
Tparov. . ." Confirmatory ti ydp; equivalent to our “what else”,
points out the impossibility, not of the opposite of the preced-
ing thought, as the above, but of any alternative, e. g. Aesch.
Ag. 1239, Kai Tôvö’ duotov et ri pi Teido' ti yáp;/ró péA\ov #áel.”
Of like character is the # yáp; used so frequently in later Greek,
when, by an appeal to the hearers for assurance, the speaker
seeks to confirm the statement just made. Sufficiently exact
translation of this use would be “for this is true?” or, “surely
this is true?” since we are more apt to omit the logical sign.
Had the declarative sentence and the following yáp; question
been combined in the form of a rhetorical question, the sense
would not have been altered. This most common idiom may
be illustrated by a few instances: e. g. Plat. Laws 640 C, AeH.
"Eart 8é yé à rotatºrm ovyovoia, elitep £arat perá páðms, oùk d66pv60s' fi yáp;"
# yáp; may support a virtual statement, expressed in the inter-
rogative form, e. g. Theae. I82 C, >2. Kweirai, kai pel, &s pare, Tà
Távra ; # yáp;
(2) Where the assent or dissent is made explicit, the con-
firmatory question which follows does not differ from those
discussed above, e.g. Phil. 26 E, IIPQ. "Epolye' irós yāp &v xopis
toūrov yiyvotro; Tet frequently introduces a like question, after
some brief indication of the nature of the response, e.g. Gorg.
491 E, KAA. Távv ye gºbóðpa, & 36k. Éirei Tós āv etbaluov yevotro
ãvěpotros Sov)ešov Órgoûv; 4
But by far the more familiar form, after such expressions of
assent, is the incomplete question with yap. It is analogous to
the abbreviated question, after statements, in unbroken dis-
course: e. g. Laws, 769 E. 'Etkós, Tós yāp ot; 907 A Eüqiuet Tós
yāp àv;"
Brevity and appropriateness for any context make the short
formula a more favored form of response than the complete
question. Still, numerous instances of the latter occur, e. g.
* Cf. Rep. 379 B, et al.
*Aesch. Choe. 88o.
* Cf. Gorg. 450 C, 45 I D, 460 E, 468 C, D, 478 B, 496 A, 499 C, 510 E, 513 D,
520 D, E. For frequency of this formula cf. Ritter, Untersuchungen über
Plato, pp. 37 and 57. He finds in those dialogues, which he ascribes to Plato,
47 instances.
*Cf. Arist. Clouds 688, Övöauðg y', Štei Tôg àv Kažágetaç $vrvyāv 'Apivvig;
5 Cf. Phil. 31 B. et passim.
42 THE MEANING OF TAP,
Plat. Soph. 241 A, trós yöp &v àN\os rototros yévoiro; Arist. Birds
1219, IP. Tota yap &\\m xpi Téreo 6a rows 6eočs;"
Declarative sentences often follow the short formulae and de-
velop further the argument: e. g. Arist. Clouds I 183, STP. oëk &v
yávoiro; PEI. Tàs yáp; el uſ rép y áua air) yévour’āv ypads Te Kai véa yová.”
To complete the series, a few examples of the briefer forms of
reply may be quoted. Others will readily occur to every reader
of Greek. Plat. Phil. 35 B, 'AAAa piv 3 y' étuffvuòv Twós éirtóupel,
qapév. IIPO. Tós yap oi; ; 43 D. oikočv oilk &v ein rô pil Avireto 6ai Tors
Tairov rá Xaipew; IP2. Tós yap div; Parm. I47 C, ri yüp &v;
II. Justifying.
The second category of y&p in question, which may be briefly
characterized as justifying, is directly descended from the causal.
Unlike the argumentative, it does not challenge the refutation of
an assertion, but it raises the question whether a certain act,
previously mentioned, was not reasonable and justifiable. This
defense is usually called forth by some expression of censure,
reproof, or, it may be, merely surprise. An exclamation or
question, rejecting with surprise or indignation the criticism, may
be prefixed: e. g. Od. V. 23 rékvov Čučv, Totów o'e Tos (böyev ćpkos
606vrov;/oi yap 6) roºrov påv č800Xevgas vôov air), /ös i to keivovs 'Oövoets
drotto eral éA6óv;” -
But the question alone, by justifying the act, may indicate the
attitude of the speaker: e.g. Gorg. 494 E, KAA. Oik aloxévet eis row-
aúra àyov, & Søk./ rows Aóyovs; 20.*H yap yo dyo vraú6a, 6 yeuvate, ;
ékeſvos, Ös āv bh ăvény oùro Tois Xaipovtas Širos àu Xaipoorly, eiðatuovas
eivat," (Socrates’ feeling at the rebuke of Kallias, might be ex-
pressed by the Homeric Totov, ore gros . . . .), Eur. Bacch. I366,
KA. Ti p' duºpišá\\ets xeportv & Tá\awa trai, /öpviv Štos knºbiiva Toxtóxpov
kökvov;/AT. Toi yüp Tpáropat Tarpiðos ékšek\muévn;"
In reply to a reproving question, as to whether a person, in
truth, intended to perform a certain deprecated act, the defender
1. Cf. Frogs 739, Birds 611, Plat. Soph. 244 E, Parm. I31 A, Phil. 29 D, 43 A,
50 C, 52 B, Gorg. 480 B.
* Cf. Plat. Gorg. 491 E, et al., Laws, 640 C.
3 Cf. Od. XVII, 382, XXIV. 479, Xen. Mem. II. 3. I6, Arist. Birds. 1606,
Plut. 429.
* Cf. Aesch. Prom. 987, Soph. Phil. I583, Ant. 736, 744, O. R. 339, Aj. II:30,
I320, Eur. Hec. I258, Arist. Plut. 458, Acharn. 594, Frogs 25, Xen. Mem.
I. 3. IO.
°yáp, here, introduces a justification, after an expression of surprise. Cf.
Xen. Cyr. VIII.3.4.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 43
may, while justifying his course of action signify, at the same
time, his determination to persist, despite the protest made: e. g.
Arist. Clouds 1231, IIA. viv če 8ta toût ééapvos sivat Stavoeſ;/STP. ti
yāp &AA’ &v diroNaša apt toº pačáuatos;." Two functions are fulfilled
by the question, assent and defense.
Through a further extension of its use, a defending question
may forestall a possible objection or criticism. d\\& yáp as we
shall see, performs a like function, but with the latter formula,
there is inserted another link in the reasoning: e.g. compare Ag.
I374, IIoMA6v tápotóev kapios eipmuévowſ Tāvavrī’ eitely owk eravoxvy-
6ñoopa.ſ Tós yap ris éx6pois Éx6på Topaiºvov, biºols / Sokojov cival,
Tnuovňs āpkógrat' àv/ppáčetev Šlos Kpelagov čkirmöhuaros;” and Isocr.
269 a-b kai pmösis oiégéo p" dyvoeiv, 3rt Tâvavria rvyxávo Aéyov ois év tá,
IIavnyupukó Nóyº paveinu äu Tepi Tów airów Totºrov yeypadás' d\\ā yāp
où6éva vopičo . . . 60tus oik du Tauvégété pºe kai Goppovetv #yñoratto . . .
The question Ag. I374 justifies directly the act in despite of
the anticipated censure, while d\\á (Isocr. 269) first rejects the
possible reproach, and the yáp clause following then defends the
act. The result is the same in both cases and one formula, with
a few changes in the external form of the sentence, might be sub-
stituted for the other.
III. Motivating.
Repetition of the distinction, between the causal and motiva-
ting uses, made in the introduction to the general treatment of
yáp, will be unnecessary. There is a close analogy between the
use in question and in declarative sentences, except, that by rea-
son of its form the former is more suited to emotional passages
than the other.
Within this group, two broad classes may be distinguished,
(I) where the yáp motivates a command, question, or, wish, (2)
where it motivates some manifestation of emotion—anxiety, per-
plexity, grief, despair, Surprise, objection, and indignation.
Division one, is less frequent, since the declarative form is as
apt, here, as the question. Some few instances will serve to
exemplify the three kinds of sentences, connected with this use:
e.g. Od. XIX. 325, d\\d utv, duqiroNow, droviyare, . . . . (322) ré 3'
ãNytov, Šs kev čkeivowſ toūrou äuuää, övgoſp66pos' ... 325, Tós yāp usû gé,
* Cf. Arist. Thesm. 544, Peace I236.
* Cf. Soph. El. 59, 226, 257, 1313, Eur. Andr. 938, IA. 90I, II44, Arist. Lys
526, 884, 962, Wasps I470, Xen. Mem. III. 6, 6.
44 THE MEANING OF TAP,
&eive, bajo eat, ei ri yuvatków/d\\áov repleipt v6ow kai ériºpova piru, / el Kev
aiota\éos, kakā eigévos év Heydpouri/ Salván.” Penelope, after instruct-
ing her servants, in regard to the entertainment of the stranger,
warns them against any slight to him, and, then, turning to
Odysseus, justifies the consideration thus shown. Soph. Tr. 817.
YA. Éar' àdépirew’ oëpos éq6a\póvápºv/airfi yºvoir’âtrø6ev Špiročom KaNós./
&ykov yap d\\os événaros ti bettpébew/unrpóov, #ris unºv &s rekočga Spă;”
O. C. I749, alai, Toi ué\opew, & Zeß:/éAribov yap is riv' ºr us / Saipov
Tavöv y' éAaëvet;" Jebb correctly paraphrases “we may well ask,
whither we are to go, for, toward what remaining hope is fate now
urging us?”
No absolute distinction, between this and the purely emotional
use, can be maintained. For example, in the instance above, it
cannot be determined, whether the author intended the yáp ques-
tion to be referred to the feeling of despair evinced both by the
exclamation and the question following, or, to the previous ques-
tion, alone, as revealing a real desire for advice.
Since the various shades of emotion manifested, often approach
and intermingle with one another, a minute classification would
involve a closer psychological analysis than is necessary for the
purposes of this paper. However, in the case of two or three of
the emotions, the occurrences are numerous enough to warrant a
separate treatment.
(a) Despair, perplexity, grief, regret, associated feelings, are
seen in the following group of examples: Soph. Aj. 868 Trévos
Távº Távov (bépet. Tà Tâ/Tä yüp oëk Bay yo; “Eur, El. 243, OP. Šákvet gº
āşeāq,0s & Te 6avov toos Tatip./HA. oipot, ri yáp pot rôvöé y' éoti (biº-
repov;" Hec. II 24, IIAM. &pot, Ti Aésis; ; yap eyyús éoti Tov;"
(b) The question, occasioned by surprise, intermingled with
scorn, incredulity, anxiety, or objection, is by far, the most usual
form of the emotional use. There are about forty instances in
Aristophanes, over half that number in Euripides and Sophocles,
each, but with the exception of a few appearances in Homer,
Plato, and Xenophon, the idiom is seldom found outside of the
dramatists.
* Cf. Il. XVII. 475, anticipates a command.
*Cf. O. C. 309, where yáp refers, particularly, to £ituxāg in the wish. Cf.
Aesch. Choe. 388.
* Cf. Arist. Peace 1252, Xen. Mem. II. I. I5.
* Cf. id. IOO6, El. 930, Eur. El. 969, Arist. Frogs 33, (regret.)
* Grief. Cf. Od. XVI. 70, in which a feeling of objection is blended.
* Anxiety rather, cf. Knights 858.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 45
Unlike grief and the allied emotions, instanced in the citations
above, surprise is rarely given explicit utterance. The reasons
are not obscure. Surprise is an emotion, spontaneously mani-
fested by gesture, look or tone of voice. It does not need to find
vent, as grief in wailing, or, as indignation in opprobrium. The
first impulse is, preferably, to ask for assurance about the truth of
the remark made, or, the reason for the actor expression which has
excited the feeling, and although the question is the first verbal
indication of the emotion, it is still a justification. For, the other
interlocutor has either foreseen or, at least, at once been made
aware of the effect of his remark. Švros, reáv and #3m, (already,)
and the eager fi are the constant accompaniments of the question,
and give to it that asseverative notion, which some translators,
erroneously associate with the yáp.
Yet, instances are not lacking, where the feeling is betrayed
by a question or exclamation: e. g. Aesch. Pers. 798, Tós stras;
oi yüp Tây orpárevua Bap3ápovſ repá têv "EAAms Topóuðv Eipóms āro;"
In Arist. Knights 32, scorn and surprise are blended, as is
evident from rotov 8péras and éreóv. Totov 8péras; reëv #yet yap
6eoûs;* Plat. Phil. 13 B. shows an intermingling of a tone of
objection tràs Aéyéis, 3, 2%r.; oist yáp riva ovyxopff'regóat, 6éuevov
#8ovijv eiwat rāya&ów, eira àvééegóai gov Aéyovros rās uév eival rivas
āyaôās [jöovás], rås 8é rivas répas airów Kakás;* No explanation is
required of the syntax of yáp in these passages. An attempt to
assign to it any other than the causal meaning, causes an awkward
asyndeton, and ignores the logical relation of the two sentences.
Questions, which are not preceded by any hint of the emotion
are an extension of this usage, as is attested by their similarity
in form, and sentiment, and by the analogy of émet with a like
ellipse: e. g. Aesch. Choe, 2I4, OP. Eixov rá Nottrö, rois 6eois rexed-
$6povs/sixás érayyáAova'a, rvyxávew kaxós./HA. Tei ti viv čkari 8at-
póvov kvpó;
The same gradations of feelings, as in the above, are found
in the elliptical yáp questions. Pure surprise is illustrated in
Soph. O. C. 222, OI. 36Atov Oiêoiróðav, XO. or yap 38' st;" which
1 Cf. Eur, Alc. 1089, Med. 670, Arist. Clouds 200, Xen. Oec. IV. 23, Cyr.
IV. 2, 13.
* Cf. Clouds I47o, Plut. I24, Theocr. V. 5.
3 Cf. Meno 77 C, Xen. Mem. II. III. I6.
* Cf. El. II93, O. R. IO2, IO29, O. C. 539, 542, (elliptical tº yáp) 581,
598, I583, Aj. I325, Eur. Sup. IO8, I23, 647, Hec. 688, 709, Hel. IoS, 590,
46 THE MEANING OF TAP,
emotion is in other instances more clearly marked by the presence
of the asseverative adverbs redv and Švros, the emphatic #6m
and fi: e. g. Eur. Her. Main. 610 HP. Xpóvg. 8' dwehéðv éé àvnxiov
HvXów/"Atôov Köpms r' évepòew oëk dripágo . . . . /AMP. A6es yāp
ãvros Sápar’ eis "Auðov rékvov; , Arist. Eccl. 377, BAE. dràp tró6ev
jkets reáv; XPE. §§ £kk\matas. BAE. #3m AéAvral yáp;” Aesch. Prom.
757 IIP. vöv 6' oibév čart réppa uot ſpokeiuevowſ uáxôov, trpiv čv Zei's
ékiréam rvpavviðos. Io. # yáp iror' forw ékirerely āpxis Ala;” In Eur.
Hipp. 322, TP. emorečs ruv' findprinkev sis or’ āpapriav;/PAI. pi) ôpôo’
éyoy' ékéivov čq6einy kakós/TP. ri yüp rà èewöv roë9' 3 o' ééaipei.
6avely; not surprise so much as wonder and perplexity is evinced
by the question. Anxiety and fear again are strongly marked
in Her. Main. II 26, AMP. rogoûrov to 6. Tāv kaków, rå 3’ &AA' ga./
HP. dpkeſ quot; yap pačeiv & SočNopal; and, in Arist. Birds
I4O2, a question is used to reject, with surprise, an implied
reproof, Xaptevrá Y, & irpeggiºr', doodligo kai copé./IIEI, oi yüp at
Xaipets irrepoëóvnros yewduevos;* Surprise at the question of another,
and objection to the doubt therein implied, are the motives of
questions with yūp in a few other instances: e.g. Soph. Phil. 249,
‘PIA. & rékvov, oi yüp oio 64 u' àvruv' sigopäs; NEO. trós yāp károlò’
āv y' eiðov oë8eróirore;” Arist. Eccl. 667, BAE. oë3' at KAérrms oëösis
to rat; IIPA. Tós yúp k\élet ueróv airó;" where the speaker is im-
patient at the obviousness of the question asked.
When remonstrance or deprecation of a threatened act is united
with surprise, the slightly adversative attitude, manifested in the
previous questions, becomes still more prominent: e.g. Il. XV. 201,
otro yāp off rot, yaujoxe kvavoxatra,ſ róvãe dépa Ali uíðov dirmvéa te
Kparepów re . . . ;' Aesch. Prom. 974, fi kāpé yép ri avpdopaís état-
• .. 8
tug ,
Her. Main. II98, Ion. 954, Or, III.3, Cyc. I54, Arist. Birds IO2, IIo, 300, 355,
I235, I386 (disbelief), 1505, Ach. I2II, Clouds II.79, Eccl. 771, 932, Peace 721,
Lys. 489, Xen. Oec. XI. 9, XIX. I.
* Cf. Or. 739 (Ög &Amflóc). Cf. Arist. Plut. 286, Eccl. 786.
*Cf. Soph. O. C. 385, Eur, Hel. Io?, Her. 672, Arist. Eccl. 717.
* Cf. Soph. Phil, 248, 322, 654, O. R. IOOO, Io99, II 73, O. C. 64, El. I221
(note tróg elitag; in previous question of same speaker showing the general
feeling) Eur. Hel. 784, Hec. 765, IOA7.
* Cf. Plut. Io27, Knights 353, Ach. 594, Frogs 25, Plat. Phaedr. 234 D.
* Cf. Eur. Bacch. I366, Xen. Mem. I. 3. Io.
* Cf. Arist. Birds I526.
7 Cf. Soph. Ant. 770.
8 Cf. Prom. 745, Eur. Her. Main. I I42, Arist. Birds 1430 Xen. Cyr. IV. 5. 44.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 47
(c) Between the just mentioned group, in which an undertone
of objection is mingled with the feeling of surprise, and the ques-
tions now to be considered, wherein objection is the predominant,
and surprise or perplexity a minor tone, it is difficult to establish a
hard and fast dividing line. In the latter class the yáp question,
suggesting the cause of the perplexity and consequent objection,
is usually the only verbal expression given the adversative feeling.
Yet there can be no doubt of the sense of objection, since some few
passages with d\\ā are found of sufficient similarity to the elliptical
instances, to prove indisputably the feeling conveyed by the latter:
e.g. Arist. Peace 222, EPM. &v of vek' oëk oió' el tor' Eipfivny artſ
rô Aoûröv Švec 6'. TPY. dAAä Toi yüp oixerat;"
Failure to observe this adversative attitude in other analogous
questions has been a fruitful source of new interpretations for the
particle: e. g. Arist. Birds 89, EYE. eité pot/ot be riv kopówny otr
āqīkas karategóv;/IIEI, pë Al'oùk éyoye. EYE. Troö yáp forw;’ Bekker
translates “Ubi igitur est”, which may serve as a convenient
translation, but the Latin particle does not correspond to the yáp
in its logical connection with the preceding remarks, for the former
(igitur) denotes, that the question is the result of the acceptance
of the answer, the latter (yāp), that it is the cause of the doubt
shown in the answer. -
In another series of examples, an objection is raised against the
tenor of a question or reply, on the ground that it is not apt,
does not remove the difficulty, or is based on a wrong conception
of certain, fundamental principles: e. g. Aesch. Eum. 427. XO. povets
yāp sival unrpès hôtégaro./Ae. ÖAAats àváykais iſ twos ſpéov Károv; XO.
Toº yap rooroºro kévrpov &s pmrpovkrovsiv;” In the above citation
demurrer is made to the question of Athene, on the plea that such
excuses, as she suggests, are not sufficient to justify a matricide.
An objectionable word in a previous remark is taken up in the
retort, Soph. Aj. I 126, and repeated in an emphatic position in the
| Cf. Arist. Lys. 463, Acharn. 594.
*Cf. Aesch. Ag. 272, 1366, Eur. Alc. II43, (It is possible to interpret
the question here, as transitional, asking for further information. Still,
it would seem to indicate, that Admetus doubts Heracles' assurance that his
wife has returned from death.) Arist. Clouds 342, Peace 4 I, Birds 289,
Eccl. 767, Plat. Gorg. 469 B.
3 Cf. Eum. 211. 607. Some editors punctuate after yáp. The question may
then be considered transitional. It is, however, more nearly akin to the in-
stances above. The thought is “you should not confine yourselves to the
slayers of mothers, alone, for, what say you of a wife, who slays her husband?”
48 THE MEANING OF TAP.
yáp clause, which justifying, as well as indicating the objection
then inquires whether the word was rightly applied in the circum-
stances, which it proceeds to describe. TEY. §§v rá čikaig yap
péy' #sorw ºpovetv./M.E. 8tkata yüp révô' sirvyetv kretvavrá pe;’
Dissent from the suggestion of another, or, reluctance to obey
a command, may be indicated, by a yáp question, drawing atten-
tion to the obstacles which make the task difficult: e.g. Od. X.
5OI, & Kipkm, ris yúp raúrmy 660V #yegovečget;/eis "Atôos 6' oi! Tó ris
dqikero vni pe'aivn.”
When accompanied by other emotions, such as grief, or indig-
nation, an attitude of objection is expressed by an exclamation or
a statement rather than by the purely adversative d\\á: e. g. Od.
XVI. 70, where a declarative sentence contains, at the same time,
a rejection of a proposal and a protestation of pain thereat.
Eüuat', ; pſiAa toûro Éiros 6vuaxyès etires'/rós yöp 8) rôv čeivov työv
itroëéopal oikº;
A question in Il. I. I23, has for its major note indignation,
as is manifest from the reproachful epithet; nevertheless it is, in
thought content, an objection, in that it draws attention to the
obstacles, which make compliance with Agamemnon's demand
impossible, 'Arpetón köötgre, pi\okreavórare Távrov, ſtrós yáp rot
8%govot yépas peyáðvuot 'Axalot; . . . /áAAá at pév vöv távöe 6eó Tpées.
Classen p. 6 refers yúp to the following command. Piderit (re-
view of Classen, Jahresb. pp. 70 and 73,) criticizes him on the
ground, that impossibility of recompense could not motivate the
command to return the maiden; Agamemnon consents to give
up his captive, but only on condition, that he be recompensed,
to which condition in particular Achilles objects. Pfudel p. 21,
would connect trós yáp with the words of Agam. I 18, airãp
spot yepas . . . Doederlein believes that yáp explains a gesture
of refusal, which, translated into words would be of yewija eral,
Naegelsbach and Düntzer refer yáp to pi\okreavórare, but, translate
by Germ. “ja”, which does not denote relation. By referring
the particle to $1\okreavórare, they must mean that it justifies the
use of these epithets and, accordingly, the feeling which the
epithets suggest.
1. Cf. id. I 133, Ant. 730, 732, 734, Phil. 250, Eur, Alc. 7II, Or. 1600.
* Cf. Soph. Phil. I405, which may be thus interpreted, or, punctuating after
yáp, as a transitional question introducing a new objection. Cf. &WAd yáp
p. 52. The readings of all except two MSS (in Od. X. 501) is yáp. For
discussion of Yáp and Táp in Homer, see appendix (to be published later). Cf.
Arist. Lys. 910, Eur. E1, 969 (grief is blended, pei precedes), Od. III. 22, XV. 509.
THE MEANING OF TAP, 49
In other passages there is no previous voicing of the indigna-
tion but an impatient question alone with yáp, setting forth the
reasons for the refusal of a request, conveys clearly the emotion
which actuates the speaker: e. g. Od. X. 337, & Kipkm, trós ydp pe
kéAeat go frtov sivat;/# pot gºs pév £6mkas vi Heyāpotow raipovs."
With the above may be noted the instances in which the argu-
ment, claim, or threat of another is rejected with contempt and
indignation. Idiomatic àAmées warns the hearer of the attitude to
be expected: €. g. Arist. Birds IO47, EIII, kaRoipat IIeto 63rapov
£8peos és row povvixtóva Hiva./IIEI, Amées, otros; Ért yap Évraú6'
#06a orá;” No indication of the feeling motivated, precedes the
question in Eur. Andr. 590, ME. Wraigăv y’, tv' eiðffs, Kai TéAas Tpóg-
s\6é pov./IIH, a yūp uer' àvöpóv, & Kákiore kák kaków; Her. III. 120,
2ö yöp £v dvöpóv \óyº, ös 8aat)\éi vigov 2dpov Tpós ré gº vopº Tpog-
keuévny oi Tapektúrao . . . ;”
(d) The questions, discussed above, in which objection and
indignation are united form the transitional link to another series,
belonging to the sphere of pure indignation, in which, condemning
an act, the person, instead of advancing the reasons for his
objection, angrily asks the other interlocutor whether he has actu-
ally dared, or will dare to perform the deprecated act. Words,
such as these, “I may well be angry, for will you dare ... ?”
might voice the indignation which occasions the question. In-
dignant exclamations, or, insulting epithets, accompanying the
questions, frequently betoken the feeling: e. g. Soph. Tr. I 124,
HP. & Taykáktore, kai tapepuñoo yūp aſſ/ris Tarpoºpóvrov unrpós, òs
k\éew épé; O. C. 863, & 6éyp' àvatóés, fi or yūp Watoes époi ; * A
good illustration of the difference between Greek and English
idiom in such questions is found in the Shakespearean parallel
“Wilt thou lay hands on me, villain?” (As You Like It. Act I,
Sc. I.)
A similar example, yet, lacking the epithets is Eur. I. A. 325;
no doubt can be felt concerning the passion which inspires the
* Cf. Od. X. 383, Arist. Wasps II 59.
*Cf. id. Ios I, 1606, Plut. 429.
* Brosch., Rawlinson, and Lange rightly read as question. Brosch. thinks
that the reproach contained in the previous Tpogépovta is defended by the
yáp question. I prefer, with Stein, to understand some thought like obóév got
péteotl aper?c, before the question. The reproach, contained in the question,
then, supports this assertion, which is a denial of the claims of the other per-
son referred to in the context immediately before.
* Cf. Eur. Or. I595, Phoen. I673, Andr. 249, Arist. Clouds 57, Thesm. Io95.
50 THE MEANING OF TAP,
question. ATA, i, yāp olog' à uſ oe kalpês eiðéval, oftuavrp' àvels;
ME éare o' dyūvat y', ivotéas, 4 or kák’ eipyägo Adépg." Indigna-
tion at the act of some person not taking part in the dialogue,
again, is the motive of a question, Arist. Wasps 1299, où yāp 6
yépov armpórarov ćp' fiv kaków, ſkai rôv čvvávrov toº mapowskóraros;”
IV. Explicative.
Although the instances of explanatory ydp in question form are
comparatively rare, the clearly defined character of the few, which
occur, compel us to recognize the use as a distinct category:* e. g.
Od. XX. 42, where a preceding rööe points forward to the ques-
tion ºpés 8' ºri kai rébe usičov čvi ºpegi peppinpiſo"/eirsp yāp kretvaul
Atós re géðey re ékmri, /Tä kev inſekitpopóyout; Arist. Clouds 370
amuelous is expanded by a like question. HeyāAois 84 o' éyò o muetois
airò êibáčo. / (pépe, Toi yüp Tómor' àvev NeſpeXóv Čovr' #6m refléagai;
V. Transitional.
The causal particle introducing a question of transition is an
idiom, peculiar to Greek and Latin. In translation into the
modern languages, when not wholly disregarded, it is repre-
sented by some particle of sequence. This fact, however, is not
a sufficient basis for the conclusion, that its use is a survival of
the original yá ápa force, or, that the yáp in later Greek had de-
veloped a new meaning of sequence. Such an inference, would
overlook the parallelism of yap in another transitional formula
&\\ā yáp, where the particle is often equally untranslatable. That
yáp with the interrogative has a tendency to usurp the functions
of d\\ā yáp, is supported by the like use of both forms in convey-
ing an objection." In the former case, the very fact that the
speaker asks the question, suggesting some doubt or difficulty,
shows that he does not agree with the statement of the other
interlocutor. Consequently, explicit utterance of the objection is
not necessary, although, in a few instances d\\á or its equivalent
is prefixed.
Likewise, in the transitional use, the interrogative form allows
the omission of the interrupting d\\á. For, while a declarative
sentence could not easily signify that a new topic is introduced,
without the formal expression of transition, since some symbol is
required to warn the hearer of a break in the old line of thought,
* Note the reply (āāyúval); to arouse the feeling of indignation motivated by
the Yáp question, was the purpose of the censured act.
*Cf. Acharn. 576, Xen. Mem. III. IV. I.
* For general discussion of explicative yáp see p. 14. *Cf. p. 47.
THE MEANING OF TAP, 5I
the interrogative, on the other hand, beside arresting the atten-
tion, has associated with it that slightly contrasting sense, which
makes an āAAá unnecessary. But, it must be recognized that the
interrogative is not the syntactical equivalent of the other; yáp
does not give the reason for any idea conveyed in its own clause,
but for the intention to change the topic or pass to a new item
in the same, present in the mind of the speaker. In the one
case, this idea is conveyed by d\\á, but in the other, must
be inferred from the context. Possibly, in conversation, where
most of the instances occur, facial expression and gesture were
effective aids in indicating transition. For example, in Arist.
Clouds 218, it is probable that Strepsiades pointed to the new
objects of interest with some show of surprise. STP. v.) At',
oiuáčeg 6' àpa./ºpe ris yúp otros oiti ris Kpepáðpas àvñp;" Abrupt
pépe also assisted in diverting the attention of the hearer from the
old subject to the new. Likewise, Arist. Knights 1002 the yáp
may be referred to pép' too, which introduces the new topic, ºpép'
Żów, rivos yáp eigw of xpmorpot trore; In a series, the completion of one
member indicates clearly enough, that the speaker will turn
to the next in order; e.g. Soph. Phil. 651, NEO. dAN’ expep' airó.
rt yap ºr' àAA’ pås Aa3eiv;* Neoptolemus, by performing the first
task requested, signifies that he is ready for further orders.
* Cf. Clouds 191, Birds 299.
* Cf. Aesch. Ag. 630, 634, Pers. 239, Soph. Aj. IOI, Phil. 327, Arist. Clouds
351, 403, Peace 838, Birds I5oI, Xen. Oec. XVII. 6, 14, Mem. II. VI. 2, Cyr.
I. VI. 5, 12, Theoc. XXII. II.5.
CHAPTER V.
AAAA. TAP
The exact syntactical analysis of d\\ā yáp has been, for the past
century, a moot question. Logically, a sentence cannot bear, at
once, an adversative and causal relation to its foregoing narra-
tive. GAAá, an adversative conjunction and yáp, of which the tra-
ditional interpretation is “for”, are found, both separated, and in
juxtaposition, with one predicate only, following. To what the
yáp refers is not clear at the first glance, since the context seems
to require only the adversative idea. The ready inference is,
that ydp cannot be conjunctive.
Recourse is had here, as in the other more obscure uses of yáp
to etymology, the interpretative value of which has been dis-
cussed above.
Hartung, for example, (Vol. I. p. 470,) sees no difficulty in the
combination of d\\a and causal yáp. Since the latter particle is
compounded of yé and āpa, it is corresponsive, but not conjunc-
tive; consequently, it may be combined with conjunctions, without
demanding for itself a separate sentence. Although he classifies
â\\a yáp among the argumentative-explicative uses, he prefers to
translate by German “eben”, or “ja”.
Batimlein (p. 70,) Kühner, (II p. 725,) and Schraut (pp. 54 & 55)
follow Hartung in assigning the two particles to the same sen-
tence, when there is only one predicate. They hold that yáp
bears its original confirmative force, and is an adverbial, not a
conjunctive particle; that causal yáp clauses, inserted in an āA\d
main sentence with one or more words intervening, between the
two particles, must be a distinct class, yáp being here conjunctive
and introducing a parenthesis. Yet, when the juxtaposed parti-
cles, are followed by two distinct sentences, which happens rarely,
Baimlein, while, apparently, interpreting the yáp as causal, assigns
both particles to one sentence, and assumes the omission of some
conclusive particle with the second, while Kühner explains the
combination, as the result of an intermingling of the causal and
adversative sentences.
Supporters of the traditional interpretation of yap in this com-
bination are not lacking, namely, Viger, p. 472, n. 67, Devarius,
THE MEANING OF TAP. 53
(ed. Klotz), Vol. I. p. 121, Hoogeveen, p. 106, Sec, V, Thiersch,
p. 302, II, n. 6, Matthia, No. 615. II, Krüger, No. 64. I4, (4)
Sernatinger, part 2, p. 23 fg., Broschman, p. 58 fg. These scholars
all agree that the yáp is primarily causal, and, that it is inserted
in the 3\\á sentences, to anticipate the thought which follows.
As regards the incomplete formula, there is some difference of
opinion. Hoog. (p. 106, under yap obv I.) and Krüger (No. 69.
I4), insist that an ellipse must always be supplied. Devarius
believes that the group may sometimes be treated as the equiva-
lent of d\\' 3pos. Matthia, likewise, compares the particles to the
Latin “enim vero” but, with the reservation, that it is always pos-
sible to restore the original form. Klotz (Vol. II. Sec. I. p. 22),
will not concede that yáp loses its causal force even in the most
extreme cases. Sernatinger and Broschman, wherever there is
a sentence following, with which the yáp can be connected, though
the grammatical construction be broken by a new particle, for
example, a conclusive or an adversative, believe it is unnecessary
to supply an ellipse after the 3\\d. Where the d\\á is completely
elliptical, they think it prolix, to supply in precise words, what
the author has rightly omitted, as readily understood.
Kalinka, whose theory in regard to the history of yap in
general we have mentioned above, takes a stand between the
two opposing groups of scholars, the supporters of the new
etymological interpretation, and those who uphold the traditional.
He believes that the original force of yap in this combination was
causal, and that later from the frequent omission of the words
completing the main clause, yāp “per transgressionem”, was placed
directly after dAAá. This very fact, namely that yáp could follow
immediately the d\\d, proves, he maintains, that the causal force
was no longer felt, and that the particle had become purely con-
firmatory. His especial aversion is the ellipse hypothesis, which
he deprecates in these words: “atoue ut aliquam veri speciem
opinioni suae adiciant (some of the earlier editors, e.g. Gebauer),
ad tam artificiosas violentas ellipses confugere coguntur, ut si eos
omnino ad interpretandum adhibere liceat, hoc modo quidvis
possis demonstrare”.
The glaring inconsistency in the theory expounded by Baiim-
lein and his school, arises in the different significations, which
they are forced to ascribe to d\\á-ydp elliptical and complete,
because the adverbial interpretation given by them to ydp
in the elliptical instances, produces an awkward asyndeton if
54 THE MEANING OF TAP.
applied to the completed formulae. But any difference in the
explanation of the formulae is forbidden by the evident
similarity of context in many instances. Consistency, for
example, requires one rendering of dAAd yáp in the following
series of citations, all of which belong to the same period, and
perform the same function. (ÖAAd is adversative, and, an-
nounces an interruption or change in the course of the speech at
the approach of a third person.) In these successive, related
examples, the particles are exhibited in all stages, from d\\á
completed, followed in regular order by yáp, to the elliptical jux-
taposed group. Arist. Lys. I IO6, AAK. val rô ová, KaNire rāv Aval-
orpárav./A.e. d\\'où8év juás, &s toure, bei kašeiv'/air yáp, Ös #kovgev,
#6' ééépxeral. Eur. Hel. 1385, dAN' ékirspá yüp Souárov 6 rows uo's/
yduovs éroiuovs év xspoiu exely 80ków, ſo tymréow pot" id. Or. 725, oùros yāp
#v uot karaqvy) orormpias. /d\\' eioropa, yāp révôe pi\ratov 8porów / IIvXdónv
8páup a reixovra .../#öslav Šlºw' Plat. Theae. 144 C, 'Akikoa piv
Toivopia, plumuovečo be oč. dAAä yáp éort rôvöe Töv Tpoortóvrov 6 év tº
uérg . . . . dAAá oráneº, el yuyvágrets airóv. Eur. Phoen. I307,
d\\ö yüp Kpéovra Nečago róvãe beſpo avvvediſ ſpós 8ópovs a reixovra,
Taügo tois Tapeqróras yóovs.
Greek is the best commentary on itself. With a few changes,
necessitated by the variation of context, the d\\á sentence of Arist.
Lys. I 106, might be supplied after that particle in Theae. I44 C
ãNA’ ow8év Čuč, ćis fours, āei uvnuoveſetv, for yūp rôvös róv irpoolávrov 6
év tá uérg . . . Close analogy, again, in Eur. Hel. I385, where
the particles are separated, and, Eur. Phoen. 1307, demands the
same analysis in both instances. -
Lastly, the chronological development is not in harmony with
the theory of Batimlein. As is shown in the table given below,
the complete expressions are more frequent in the earlier authors,
than the elliptical, but in the later orators and philosophers, the
juxtaposed particles supersede almost completely, the other
forms.
Author. Complete. Elliptical. Juxtaposed.
Homer, 4. 4. O
Pindar, 2 3 3
Aeschylus, O 2 I
Herodotos, 9 5 8
Sophocles, IO 6 2 (one not ellipt.)
Euripides, I 3 - IO 3 ( {{ )
Aristophanes, 3 4 I
THE MEANING OF TAP, 55
Author. Complete. Elliptical. Juxtaposed.
Andocides, O O 6
Lysias, O 3 9
Isocrates, O O 3O
Demosthenes, O O 9
Xenophon, O 3 2O
Plato, O 8 53
Now if yáp were originally affirmative, we should expect the
history of the group to be reversed. The elliptical formulae, in
which ydp bears its primitive, etymological force would be the
earliest to appear; juxtaposition of the particles would be fre-
quent from the first, since there could be no logical obstacle to
the close combination of an adversative and an affirmative parti-
cle, and it is the natural tendency of yáp to claim everywhere the
second place in the sentence. Throughout the history of the
group the predominant meaning of ydp would have been affirma-
tive, not causal. Instances of parenthetical yáp inserted in an
d\\d clause, would be a later growth, the result of chance arrange-
ment, having no historical relation to the recognized group
dA\ā yáp.
Another possibility, however, must be considered. As Kalinka
suggests, the primal meaning of yáp in this group, may have been
one of cause, but have been superseded by the later-developed
confirmatory. At what stage in the evolution did the change
occur P Kalinka answers, when äAAá and yáp were directly com-
bined, for, the causal and adversative relations could not be so
blended.
No objection can be made to the general principle, on which
his theory is based, namely, the incompatibility of adversative
and causal ideas in one sentence. But before his conclusion can
be accepted, we must ascertain whether it is supported by the
actual use of the group in literary Greek. Has dANā yáp com-
bined, a different sense and grammatical relation from the separa-
ted form? Are they not used interchangeably, in the same
period 2
To answer these questions no further citations are needed than
those on p. 54. As has been stated, these examples, belonging
to the same period, and bearing the same meaning, exhibit d\\ā
'yāp in all combinations. -
Position alone, then, cannot be accepted as indisputable evidence
of the meaning of ydp.
56 THE MEANING OF TAP.
Lastly, if Kalinka's theory be true, the two particles when
directly combined can never be referred to different sentences,
since yap has lost its original conjunctive power. What interpre-
tation, then, must be given to Eur. Phoen. 1307, and other like
instances cited elsewhere?
Such sentences point to another conclusion which might follow
from Kalinka's premise, that a sentence cannot be both causal and
adversative, namely that in the Greek there was no conflict of
logical relations, since the two particles were construed with sepa-
rate sentences. But, the ready objection of all supporters of the
affirmative theory, both of Batimlein's and of Kalinka's school,
will be, that we must resort, then, to the tortuous and artificial
ellipses. The elaboration of an ellipse, says Forman, “can only
be defended by rote, not by reason”.
Unfortunately, many of the earlier scholars insisted on the full
expression of the ellipse in certain fixed forms. That the Greek
hearer was conscious of an ellipse, whenever he heard áAAá yap
and mentally supplied the fuller expression cannot be affirmed.
But, whether we must supply the ellipse in translation is one
question, whether d\\á in the Greek performed the function of a
whole sentence, which might be elaborated in various ways, is
another.
In answering the latter question, we must bear in mind that nicer
logical analyses were made by the Greeks than by modern peo-
ples, for example, English or German. The former have as scru-
pulous a conscience for expressing the reason for an āAAä feeling,
as for explaining some objective fact. We however fail to recog-
nize, in our speech, relations as entities demanding explanation.
James remarks this inadequacy of language in his Psychology, Vol.
I. p. 245. “We ought to say a feeling of “and”, a feeling of “if”, a
feeling of “but ', and a feeling of “by”, quite as readily as we say
a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold. Yet we do not; so invet-
erate has our habit become of recognizing the existence of the
substantive parts, alone, that language almost refuses to lend it-
self to any other use”.
Shakespeare recognizes this possibility of speech in objectify-
ing “but yet”. Ant, and Cleopat. Act II. Sc. 5, “I do not like
‘ but yet’, it does allay the good precedence; fie upon ‘but yet'.
“But yet' is as a gaoler to bring forth some monstrous male-
factor”. In this psychological fact, lies, I believe, the solution of
the peculiarity of Greek syntax under discussion.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 57
Nor do the Greeks show this tendency to hypostatize feelings
as feelings in d\\ā yáp only. In yap in question, we see that they
differentiate the emotion and the cause for the emotion contained
in the question, as separate entities. On the other hand, the
modern races express the fact, alone, that occasions the feeling,
without giving objective indication of the feeling, by an insertion
of the logical link connecting the unexpressed feeling and the fact.
If we recognize, then, the different methods of expression ob-
served in these languages, the possibility of translating d\\& yáp
by an adversative particle without the causal symbol, affords no
evidence in regard to the syntax.
Still more conclusive argument for the causal force of yáp is
afforded by the parallel use of éiret, such as is found in the follow-
ing group of examples, where dAAá introduces a change in a
course of action, due to the reasons given in the yáp or émet
clauses: e. g. Od. XIV. 355, oi 83 peyāAa a reváxovres/potraov. ÖAA'
—ot yáp a piv čhaivero képôtov sival/uategéat irporépo-toi uév táAw ałrts
#8avov . . . . Od. V. I37, 3AA' Tei oi! Tos éort Auðs v6ov alytóxoto/
oëre tape; A6siváAAov 6sov oë' &\tórai,ſéppéro, sí puu keivos émorptvet kai
àváyet, . . . . Her. IX. 46, ... v v69 yévero eitely raúra rá Tep ipsis
q6ávres Tpopépete. dAAä yāp dppoèéopiev pil ipſu oëk jöées yévovral oi Aóyot.
£met could be substituted for yap or the causal sign omitted as in
Eur. Phoen. 99 dAN’ oëris dorów rotoče Xpium rera ööplots, ſkéðpov traMalay
k\tuak' ékirápa Troöt, and no change would result in the relation of
the main and logically subordinate clauses.
Between the étel and the yáp clauses the only ground for dis-
tinction is the irregularity in the position of the latter; for, while
the émie clause, that is subordinate in syntax, and constitutes,
accordingly, an integral part of the main sentence, may antici-
pate the thought which it motivates, without disturbing the order,
the yáp clause, that is as independent as the sentence which it ex-
pounds, naturally, should follow that for which it gives the reason.
From the examples quoted above, and on p. 54 a probable hypo-
thesis in regard to the origin and growth of the combination,
might be deduced, although all theories about language condi-
tions before the literary period, are necessarily more or less con-
jectural.
The full and regular expression, such as we find Arist. Lys.
I Ioë, would, in all likelihood, be the first, since the interposing
of the yáp clause, like the use of parenthesis, is a method of
subordination and presupposes sentence analysis.
58 THE MEANING OF TAP,
Next in order would follow, through a desire to emphasize its
content, the insertion of the yáp clause in the main sentence.
When this stage has been reached, it might be expected, that
the completion of the intercepted main sentence would frequently
be neglected, since the subsequent action or context, supple-
mented by the yáp clause would show the particular form which
the adversative feeling conveyed by d\\á assumed. This ellipse
of the main sentence is, furthermore, made possible by the ability
of the Greek to motivate a mere indication of relation or feeling
as well as an objective fact.
Juxtaposition of d\\ā yáp would be the natural consequence of
the ellipse when the usage of this group had become accepted
and frequent in certain easily recognized senses, because, now that
the 3\\á no longer introduces a sentence but merely suggests the
adversative relation, it is reasonable that yáp with its marked
tendency to usurp the second place in the sentence in which it
occurs, should be inserted directly after d\\á, and from its posi-
tion, seemingly claim that sentence as its own. But that in this
final development the grammatical relation of yáp and āAAé was
never forgotten, is indisputably proven by the fact, that in the
latest period of classical Greek literature (Aristotle) a writer can
always revert to the full formula or even complete d\\4 in the
juxtaposed group.
Some of the confusion shown in the explanation of the syntax
of these particles is due to the erroneous supposition that the
meanings of this combination may be roughly divided into two
classes: e. g. one comprising those instances in which dAAá yáp.
conveys objection, and the other class, those in which the parti-
cles are translated: “but be that as it may ”or “but the truth
is "." A more searching investigation will discover as many
distinctions as there are shades of adversative feeling denoted by
ãA\á, of which distinctions the examples, moreover, are not
isolated but constitute certain clearly marked groups. Undeni-
able analogy between the parts of these several groups forbids
any variation in interpretation such as might be based on differ-
ences of position or fulness of expression.
In the brief summary of the uses of d\\ā yáp which follows, the
main divisions only are noted. When discussing individual
instances, a more minute distinction is essential.
Cf. Riddel, Digest Plat. Idioms, Ed. of Apol. Holden, note to Xen. Cyr.
VII. I. 49. Thiemann, Worterbuch zu Xen. Hel. recognizes only two uses
the one in objection, and the transitional.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 59
I. Simple Adversative.
(1) Positive statement or command after a negative.
(2) Denial of supposed condition and statement of true.
(3) Change in intention or action.
II. In Objections.
(1) Real objection to preceding remarks.
(2) Hypophora.
(3) Setting aside of objection or accusation.
(4) Resolve or exhortation to act despite objection or obstacle.
III. Transitional.
(1) Speech interrupted by appeal, or command.
(2) Speech intercepted by entrance of another person.
(3) Abrupt close of remarks or arguments owing to futility.
(4) Close of speech.
(5) (a) Dismissal of topic with ground for dismissal.
(b) Introduction of new topic.
I. Simple Adversative.
(1) d\\á yáp introduces the positive of that which has been ex-
pressed in negative form immediately before." In Il. XV. 739, for
example, où pew ri axe66v čott tróAts Túpyota' dpapvia, ſī k’ drapw-
valued 6' repaxkéa bipov exovres'ſ dAN’év yüp Točov trebiº Túka 6opmeráov,
. Käs jueóa Tarpiðos aims"/rā, śv xspori pāos, oi pet\xim Tokéuoto; “the
thought that the safety of the Achaeans rests in their valour is
opposed to the previous negative statement that they have no
other means of defense. Whether we consider that rô continues
the interrupted d\\á clause, or, introduces a new sentence, the
interpretation of the passage will not be materially changed. In
the first case, dANá and the following clause with rô, negate parti-
cularly the thought of the relative clause, j k' drapvvaipeg 6'. The
yáp clause confirms by describing the situation, which is the re-
verse of that depicted in the negative statement. Otherwise,
ăAAá must suggest some thought, such as “we are unprotected or
alone”, the natural consequence of which is expressed in the
clause introduced by ré, that their safety depends upon them-
selves.
1 Cf. Sem. Anth. Palat. VII. 507, where the d2%d Yáp is carelessly used as
a mere formula to fill out the metre.
2 Cf. Her. VII. 209, Aesch. Eun. 797, Arist. Thesm. 384, Plat. Symp. 180
A (an extension of this use), Charm. I66 C, Apol. IQ C. The Platonic ex-
amples illustrate à%á Yáp juxtaposed and elliptical.
60 THE MEANING 6F TAP.
A prohibition, and a positive command are the contrasted,
main ideas in Herod. VIII. Io9. 18, jueis 8é . . . ui, Štókopey àvöpas
ºpečyovras. . . . . dAN'eº yūp éxet és rô trapsov juiv viv učv (äpelvow) āv rà
‘EAAáði karapeivavras juéow re airów impeãmóñval. . . ." §ret is occasion-
ally substituted for yáp e. g. Eur, Ion. 439, poigos, ri rāoxes' trap-
6évows Big yapāv/mpobibogi, Taibas Krekvoúnevos Aáðpg//61ffarovras
âpéAet. pil gé y” d\A’ rei Kpareisſ éperås Stoke.
Soph. Aj. I67 must be classified in this group, though the
argument is somewhat obscured by a digression, xàueſs otòev oré-
vousy ſpès rair'ſ draNéaotai got Xopis, ivač.] úNA’ &re yāp 8) rô gov čup'
âtéðpav,ſ trarayočov inep Trºvãv dyéAal. ſ péyav aiyumièv[0] intočetravres
/ráx' àv, Šatºvns ei gö haveins, ſatyń Tráčetav čhovot. Of the variety
of readings conjectured for this passage, that suggested by Dawes
has been adopted, as involving the least change, and as most
Sophoclean.” With this reading yáp introduces the whole thought
from Öre yáp . . . to #4 ovoi. The bare skeleton of the reasoning
would be “we are helpless without you, but you must aid us, for,
perchance, if you should appear, they would cower, dumb, in
silence”. §re . . . trarayojaw is not essential to the argument, al-
though, dramatically, the simile, and the contrast of the present
insolence with the future discomfiture of Ajax' foes, support
effectively the appeal, which d\\á suggests.”
Jebb's rendering of d\\d, namely “we are helpless” has no
exact parallel. Some definite, positive idea is always contained
in the sentence introduced by d\\á, not a mere reiteration of the
preceding negative thought. In Electra 307, which Jebb quotes
in support of his theory, kámurmösſelv Kaká conveys a distinct sug-
gestion in contrast to of godpowev. Moreover, god Xopts which is
clearly a part of the sentence oëbèv géévolev, is disregarded in his
interpretation. Yet the yáp clause shows that the apodosis must
contain some reference to Ajax' assistance, else, why the insistence
on its value?
(2) Denial of supposed, and statement of true conditions by
means of this group is illustrated in its ordinary form, by Herod.
VI 6 3 º' ſ sy * sy a 3 ty • A 3. M y y
ſº I3O. , €l OLOI) Te eim, Xapuſoipmv aw; punt £1/(l vpueov éâaiperov atrokpwov. & G a
* Cf. Il. XVII. 338, where alóóc makes the preceding clause, virtually a
negative command. Tó resumes. &
* A list of the readings, with the arguments pro and con, is given in the
appendix to Jebb's Ajax under this passage. •
*Schneidewin's interpretation, in his edition of this play, is similar. Cf.
Her. II. I39.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 6I
N
ãAA’ of yap oiá regart puñs Tépt Tap6évov 8ov\etſovra trägt Kará včov Totéew,
row. pèv juéov direAavvopévotal roße toº ydpov táNavtov ćpyvptov čkágrº
8ope), 8iSoul. The yáp clause contradicts the premise of the pre-
vious conditional statement, the 3\\á introduces the altered con-
clusion, Greek method of expression, here, is full and exact—
almost prolix. The real grammatical relation of the two clauses,
cannot be mistaken. Transposition of the reason-sentence for
which numerous parallels have been cited under anticipatory
yáp" is the only irregularity. But, examples of the complete ex-
pression, in natural order, are not wanting: e. g. Dem. Ol. T 15.
3. w 3 * ¥ y y 3 3y r > 2 f ef p p
ei yap airápkm Tú Wºmºbiopiat' fiv, if ipas dvaykáčew & Tpooijkel Tpatteuv
: * * y
, . . . oit' àv Úpets, troX\ā Qºm piſópevot pukpá, pax\ov 6' oióēv étpárrete
2. 2P g gº. t f g y y 3. eſ ~ X
roſtav, oùre pi\tTiros roo'oùrov Ú8pikei Xpévov. . . . d\\ oix otra Taüt
*Yet rô yåp Tparretv Toi, Aéyetv kai Xeuporovéiv ča repov &v rà ráčet, Tpórepov
rj Švvápei kai kpeirröv ša riv. Arist. De Coelo. 274 b 7, d\\a uiv eſtep
ye ék Temepaguévov čotal rô direpov, dváykm kai Tów poptov čkaotov elva,
âneupov, . . . &AA’ döövarov. 8éðeukrat yūp Öri oiſte 8ápos otte kov börms
Early direpos.” Aristotle's precise style of reasoning, forbade the
frequent omission of logical links." Where the more colloquial
speech of drama or dialogue might have used the elliptical juxta-
posed particles, Aristotle, with characteristic exactness, adopts
the longer expression.
Occurrence of these expansions in writers so late as Demos-
thenes and Aristotle, proves that although áAAá yap in this sense
had become so stereotyped, that the particles were written in
juxtaposition, yet the full form had not grown obsolete.
In fact, throughout Greek literature all forms are found,
from the full idiom to the incomplete. Herodotus, Isocrates
and Plato afford, as will be seen, a majority of the examples,
the incomplete predominating in the latter two. In drama it
is extremely rare. The one instance in Homer shows the
dAAd clause resumed after the interruption. Od. XIX. 591,
et K' é6é\ots pot, Śeive, rapāuevos év Heyāpotatſ répreu, oi ké pol
firvos éiri 8Aeqāpoto xv6eim./d\\'où yáp tros éatu äätvows ºpplevat aiév /
ãvépôtrovs' . . . . d\\' à rot uév ćyöv Útrepôtov eioavaSāga/Aééopat eis
eiväv.” A slight departure is made from regular norm in that the
1. Cf. p. 28.
*Cf. Lys. 13. 79 (similar expansion), and Dem. Phil. IV. 73.
* Cf. De Coelo 275 a 20, 276 b 13, 283 b 12, 321 a I 7.
* Aristotle uses the elliptical formula only 6 times.
°Cf. Monroe, “the lines 591–3 are, perhaps, interpolated. The repetition of
â%á in 594 is suspicious ”. See, however, p. 64 for similar instance.
62 THE MEANING OF TAP.
yáp does not deny the premise, but another general condition,
which the conclusion tacitly takes for granted. Such a thought
as this, “but I cannot refrain from sleep”, might complete the 3XXá
clause, dAA’ # to . . . would then contain the positive thought,
contrasted with the previous negative statement. An alternative
explanation would be, that d\\' fi rot resumes the thought of the
first adversative particle and gives, practically, the content of
the ellipse.
Like resumption by 8% is seen in Herod. V. 3. 5. ei Še in gvös
āpxotro # ºpovéot kará têvrö, äuaxóv r'âu ein . . . dAAü yüp toiro àropów
a pi kai durixavov uſ kore éyyévmrat' eigi Öm karū todro do 6evées. Clearly
the interpretation is not altered by the juxtaposition of the parti-
cles. The usual translation “but the truth is ” expresses accu-
rately the sense but not the syntax of the Greek sentence; be-
cause our idiom permits the omission of logical links, it is not
safe to conclude that the same liberty can be taken with the
Greek.
d\\á elliptical, but separated from yáp is instanced in Hero-
dotus II. I2O. ei fiv ‘EAévm év 'IAiº, droöoffivat àv airiv roigt "EX\mat .
(several lines down) d\\' oë yáp eixov ‘EAévny droðočval oëöe Aéyoval
* Plat. Meno 94 E supplies
an example of the juxtaposed, elliptical construction. kai oiktas
Ae gº * ºf
Heyd'Ans fiv, kai éðūvaro piéya €v rm tróAet kai év rois àAAous "EAAmo w, Öore
* -> gy
airolort Tiju äAméeimv étriotevov oi "EAAmves.
sitep fiv tooto Ötödkróv, ééevpeiv čv Šatus ÉueMXev airoi, rows visis dyadows
Toufigetv . . . . d\\ā yáp, & raips "Avvre ui oilk i ötöakrôv dpetà." (If
virtue were teachable, he would have found someone who would
make his children good. But, (he couldn't) for I fear it is not
teachable.) The āAA’ döövarov of the Aristotle passage, might
easily be inserted here. *
yáp had become so closely associated with d\\á in this usage,
at the time of Plato, that even where the latter sentence was
afterwards completed, yāp still maintained its position: e. g.
Plat. Phaedr. 228 Socrates had asked Phaedrus to repeat to him
Lysias’ speech but the other had protested that he could not
memorize it, in so short a time. Socrates replies, ’o paíðpe, ei éyò
dai&pov dyvoà, kai épavrot, ÉmixéAmapai, d\\ā yåp oë8érépá čart rotºrov, eú
otôa Śri Avalov Adyov droëov ékéivos of uávov imaš #kovoev, . . . . The
form is irregular. It is unusual for the yáp clause to deny both
1. Cf. Her. VIII. IoS, Plat. Apol. 20 C, Charm. I65 B.
* Cf. Her. V. 3, VII, 143. 9, IX. I 13, Isocr. Io9 b-c, 147d. Plat. Lach. 200 D,
Apol. 19 C, 25 C.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 63
protasis and apodosis. But, Šuavroj čnixéAngual is really subordi-
nate in thought, although not in construction. Both sentences
might be thus paraphrased, “If I do not know Phaedrus, I have
forgotten myself, and your statement is true . . . you have not
had time to learn the speech of Lysias”. Emphasis is laid on the
latter conclusion. The other, a manifest impossibility is a mere
substitution."
Variations of this construction occur, but the analogy between
the different forms, is clear throughout. By a slight extension of
their use, the combined particles may contrast the actual conditions
with those which the speaker represents as right (āštov fiv, #xpmv,
£6et), or more desirable (troX\of Čv étoing dumv), or anticipated (&pmv):”
e.g. Isoc. Antid. § 227, d'ois àétov fiv drawras rows Toxiras pºort-
peio 6at . . . dAAä yāp otro rivés àyvopóvos éxova w śar' . . . Isoc. XII.
126 fg. IIepi of ſpº troºoj čv étoingdpnv på ÖietNéx6at ſpórepov trepi riis
ãperms . . . &\\& yāp XaXetröv fiv, HäA\ov 8' déâvarov, . . . Id. XII. 20
fg. āumv yāp otros éiribavis sival rols d\aćovevouévois ToMepôv . . . dAAá
yāp oëk d\óyos &öupáumv čv dpxi, Tāv druxtav Tiju Tapakokov6oßgav pot . . .
(3) The abandonment of a desire or enterprise may be denoted
by d\\ā yáp. Contrast, is the predominant idea of d\\á here as in
the preceding group; modes of action or plans adopted are con-
trasted with those desired, or attempted. The yáp clause relates
the failure or other reasons necessitating the change.
* Stalbaum thinks à%á Yáp, as Lat. “at enim" is, for the sake of brevity,
so used, that what is really adversative, has, at the same time, a causal force.
He would transcribe thus, d??’ obóétépa šott Toitov el yāp olda. The yāp has
been attracted to the 67% sentence. Cf. Hoog, ad Viger p. 472 for a like ex-
planation.
But, ei olóa is the main statement, and, this, we have seen, is always intro-
duced by á%. Such an attraction as Stalbaum suggests, is unparalleled.
The example cited by Hoog, viz. Arrian de Exp. Alex, lib. II. cap. 6, unkétt
'AAégavópov Štěžev Tpotéval Toi Tpógo àWW’ Ökvěiv yāp Twyffavóuevov 6tt airóg
TpooãYot is not apposite. &AWä introduces the positive of the negative state-
ment, but conveys a thought similar to Ökveiv. Consequently, it is tempting to
construe à%’ with ökveiv; but, yáp cannot be read with Tvuffavópevov.
*Cf. Lys. Ed. Frohberger, Vol. I. p. 489, where a number of examples are
quoted. Cf. Andoc. Myst. 23, Lys. XXII. III. 26, Isocr. 317 c, 228 d, 299 b,
Dem. TIpóg Aea/Xápm XLIV. 28, Plat. Apol. IQ D. Note the use of Étretó) 6é
and viv 6é with expressions of expectation. When the first phrase is used, the
#Telóſ clause states the actual conditions, and 66 the changes in the course of
action or circumstances which result. When viv Óé is used, the actual condi-
tions are simply contrasted with those expected or desired: e.g. Lys. VII. I,
XXXI. I, Plat. Apol. 36 A, Is. V. I, II. I, Isoc. XIX. I.
64 THE MEANING OF TAP.
The following variations of the formula, in reference to com-
pleteness of the d\\á sentence and separation of the two particles,
OCCUlr .
(a) d\\ä . . . yūp, separated: e. g. Od. XIV. 355 which has
already been quoted p. 57 and as a further illustration, Her. IX.
IO9. I7, Eépêms be travrotos éyiveto, oil 8ov\ópevos 600Val . . . dANä TóAus
Te éðiðov kai Xpworów . . . . dAN', oi yüp Tetée, 8v80ſ to påpos.'
(b) d\\ā . . . yáp, separated and elliptical: e.g. Od. X. 568, roſaw
ði karek\do 6m (pixov irop. /čápawot be kar’ ač6 yóov riNAovré texatras' / 3AN'
où yáp ris Tpñés àyiyvero pºvpopévotorw' d\\' Śre Öh p' émi via 60%v kai 6iva
6a)\dogms/#ousy dyväuevo . . . . Clearly, the reference of the yáp
clause is to the futility of their despair, in affecting Odysseus'
purpose. With d\\á, if we wish to make explicit the adversative
idea, there might be supplied “they consented to go”, “yielded ”,
or “ceased ”. In Bacchylides V. 168, the same yáp clause with
à\\á, is used in introducing a transition necessitated by the futil-
ity of further speech.” The d\\á is completed. An expansion in
regular order of an exactly parallel passage, Il. XXIV. 524, is
still more conclusive evidence of the relation of the particles.
dAA’ dye 3) kat' àp' ée' éti 6póvov, &Ayea 3’ pºrns /áv Óupº karakeio 6at
éágouev ćxvčuevot rep. /oi yáp ris Tpičis rêeral kpvepolo yóoto.
(c) d\\á yáp, juxtaposed and elliptical: e. g. Plat. Theae. I48
E. dAA’ eſſ to 6’ & 26k., Toºſikis 35 airó Texeipnga okévagóat, dročov
tàs mapá goû droºpepopévas porúgets dAAé yép oit' airós 80yapat Teiga,
épavröv &s travº's ti Aéyo, . . . .” Her. III. I52, 8, kai 3) kai rô Köpos
sixé ordeas, kai rottº èirelpíðm. dAAd yáp betwós fia’av čv pu)\akāort of Bağv-
Aóviou, oë8é ordeas oiós re fiv éAeiv."
Some kinship may be traced between this category and yép
used in introducing a change in the course of events differing
from what would have been naturally expected from the circum-
stances related in preceding sentences: e. g. Pind. Isth. III. 34,
in Torpāqol r'éyévouro, / XaAkéq t' "Apel áčov./d\\' épépgyáp v uč/rpaxeig
vidós ToMéuoto reogápov dvöpóv påuorev uákaipav čariav'" (They be-
came rearers of horses, and, found favour with bronze-clad Ares,
"Cf. Od. V. 137, where $ſtel is substituted, quoted p. 57, Her. IV. 83.7, Soph.
Phil. IO2O.
* Cf. Od. X. 202, XI. 393, Plat. Prot. 336 A.
*Cf. Isoc. 237 b, 418 a (pseudo), Xen. Cyr, VII. I. 49.
4 Cf. Her. VII. 4, IX. 46.
5 Cf. Pind. Pyth. IV. 32, Isth. III. 34, Ol. I. 55, Xen. Cyr. I. IV. 3.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 65
but, (their good luck did not continue) for in one day the rough
storm of war reft their happy hearth of four men.) Before dismis-
sing this topic we should note the connection between the ex-
amples cited above and a few instances which are similar, except
that they introduce no change in events, but, merely contradict
an inference which might be drawn from the previous remarks:
e.g. Eur. Cyc. 432, 6 uév Yap Évêov gos Tatip Túð’ #vegev. (dAA’ do 6evis
yāp kärokepòalvov Toroú/. . . at 66, weavias yip el/080mri per' époi . . . ."
(but he will not aid me, as it seemed probable from his approval,
for he is weak and drunk; but do you, for you are young).
II. In Objections.
That this is a derivative, not an original use of d\\á-yāp—a branch
late-developed from the adversative, is evidenced by its absence
in Homer. Other facts point toward this conclusion : from the
first (Herod.), d\\a yap appears in the elliptical juxtaposed form;
the completed formula is rarely found, except in some later anal-
Ogous expansions.
An ellipse is quite natural. Merely an expression of the speak-
er's objection, which is conveyed plainly enough by the object-
ing d\\á, and the grounds advanced in the subjoined clause,
would be contained in the main sentence if completed. Happy
illustration of the nature of the ellipse, in its simplest form is given
by Arist. Wasps 356 XOP. pépivng at 876', 3r' émi ortpartãs k\élas Tore
rows 38eºtokovs/tets gavröv karū too reixovs taxéos, Gre Nâgos éâ\o;/ PIA.
olò” d\\d ti Toit'; oióēv yap toir' éotiv čkeive irporðuotov. No rigid
formula of completion can be applied to all instances. The context
necessitates slight variations. But the fundamental feeling of 3XX4
and its relation to yūp are always the same.
In early writers, the usage under discussion is rare. One in-
stance only is met in Herodotus, and but few in the drama. Un-
der the technical form of hypophora, it becomes common in the
orators; but Plato, more than any other, made it his own. Xeno-
phon and Aristotle continued its use, yet in a more limited degree.
(1) Real Objection.
ãAAd yép expresses disapproval of a remark, or suggests some
obstacle against the compliance with a suggestion. Concession
of the partial truth of what has been said anticipates the objection.
* Cf. Plat. Tim. 94 E. Prot, 3IO E. Cf. a like Shakespearean use of “but
for ” Sonnet, 54. 9. The canker-blooms have full as deep a dye/as the per-
fumed tincture of the roses/ . . . . But, for their virtue only is their show/
They live unwoo'd and unrespected fade/Die to themselves.
66 THE MEANING OF TAP.
Arist. Nub. 798 has instanced the complete formulas: STP, dAN' gar'
éuoty' viðs kaxós re kāyatés'ſ dAN'oùk é6éAel yáp pav6ávew, ri yo, Tá60;
The elliptical form, such as is found in Plat. Euthyph. 6 D, is the
more common. 'EYe, kai d\máñ ye &Aeyov, & Sák, 20K. "Igos, d\\d
yáp, & Eiðūqipov, kai äAAa troXXè (bjs sivat Sota.' (Euthph. Yes, and
what I said was true, Socrates. Soc. Perhaps, but what of that,
(Cf. Supra d\\á rà root';) for you say, that many other things, also, are
holy.) To make clear the grammatical relation, I have put into
words the idea of objection in dAN4, but, in a literary trans- .
lation, it would be as unnecessary, as it was in the original, to sup-
ply them. In fact, English idiom would omit the symbol of the
logical connection between the objection and the reason, and, in-
troduce the latter by an adversative particle.
Following the yáp clause, and containing the inference to be
drawn therefrom, in Plat. Sym. 199 A, is a sentence introduced
by a conclusive particle. Its thought is similar to that suggested
by the d\\ā. kai kaxós y Éxei kai repv6s 6 travos. dANă yöp y& otº
#ön rôv Tpóirov toº waivov, ow8' sióðs juiv Špoxéynga kai airós év tá uépet
énawégeogat. § y\órra of v inégxero, # 85 ppy of Xalpéro &#. (The en-
comium is very fine, and impressive, but, still I object to fulfilling
my promise, for I did not understand the kind of encomium, and
I agreed without knowledge. The tongue has promised but not
the mind. So, let it go.)
(2) Hypophora (or Prolepsis).
Hypophora, a rhetorical artifice, by which an orator anticipates
and forestalls an objection which his opponent may raise, is well
known to Greek literary critics. Arist. Rhet. II. 25, discusses it
under the technical term \ſorts. -
toos is often added, to indicate the hypothetical character of
the objection. As in the case of the real objection, the idea con-
veyed by the d\\á is so obvious that it is rarely given verbal
expression.” On the other hand, there is shown, also, a tendency
toward the method of abbreviation characteristic of the modern
languages. By a kind of logical ellipse yáp is omitted and the
"Cf. Eur. Hipp. 923, Arist. Plut. 425, Plat. Pol. 262 B (note concessive uév),
263 A., Phaed. 87 D, 95 C, Io.2 B, Phil. 43 A, 49 C, 12 B, Gorg. 448 D, 517 B,
Euthyph. 9 C, Theae. I76 B, Rep. 471 C, 487 B, Laws 707 C, 709 B, 839 C,
[Epin.] 987 B, Hip. Maj. 291 E, 300 C, 301 B, Xen, An. VII. III. 47, Mem.
II. I. I7.
* Seyffert, Schol. Lat, p. 240, believes that it is unnecessary to supply an
ellipse in the Greek. Ö7% suggests the objection, and the context shows
whether it is a real or a supposed objection. Cf. Blass, Vol. II, p. 173b.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 67
reason for the objection is blended with the objection, introduced
by GAAá.
By no means confined to the orators," instances of hypophora
are found in the historians and philosophers: e. g. Her. VI. 124,
'AAkpeovíðat 3e épiqavéos \ev6épooray, el 8) oitol ye āAmééos ja'aw oi riv
IIvölnu ávateto avres ſpoo muaively . . . dAAd yāp toos tº éirigenſbópevot
'Aönvalov rô Shuq Tpoeëlèogav riv tarpiða.” Herodotus suggests the
possible objection, the Alcmeonidae may have betrayed their
native land, in revenge for some wrong done them by the people.
The idiom suffers many variations. By a clever turn, the
orators employ it to enhance the weakness of their opponents
position. Attention is called to the utter absence of grounds for
defense or accusation, by bringing forward, point by point, under
the form of supposed objections the possible reasons for acquittal
or condemnation: e. g. Lys. XII. 40. dAAd yap 37Aa rôv troXeptov
éorköMevoſav rogadra öga Tep juáv dºpetNovro ;
Similarly, in the same oration of Lysias, the accuser leads up
to the punishment that he claims to be due, by suggesting other
possible punishments, the inadequacy of which he at once pro-
ceeds to prove. $83 ÖAä yöp ei Tà Xpñuara rā havepā 8mueñoratre,
ka)\@s āv ćxoi fi Ti, TóAst, is otrol troXXè sixtiqiaow, i, roſs iótárats, &v oikias
ééetépôngay; In both the instances cited, the function of dAAá ydp
is closely allied to that in the transitional use which will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter, in that it introduces a new possibility
in a series of supposed objections. If its function in the series
be considered, the transitional idea is uppermost, if the import of
the group in its own sentence be taken into account, the same
interpretation must follow as above.
(3) d\\ā ydp may be used in setting aside as well as in advan-
cing an objection. The rejection takes the form of either (a) a
justification of the argument or act criticized, or, (b) a resolve to
persist despite the objection or obstacle suggested. No other
comment is needed on the nature of the ellipse after d\\d than the
expansion in regular order in Aristotle De Coelo 281 a 24 p.mögy
8’ huās Tapevox\eiro” biopto 60 yūp kará ràs intepoxis rô réAos Aeyáuevov
w y a a * 3. f 3/ c y 3 y w ^ e f w
TO Kupuals ôvvaróv. Taxa 'yap evoltain T&S (11/ Cº.) S Olyk avaykm TO \ex8év O yap
* Cf. Andoc. Agst. Alc. 37, [Lys.]VI, 48, 40, Isoc. 77 b, I32 c-d, 230 d, 391 d.
Dem. XVII. 7.
* Cf. Xen. Anab. V. VII. 8, VII. VII 35, Plat. Rep. 365 C, 366 A, Men.
94 D.
* This is another form used in rejecting.
68 THE MEANING OF TAP.
ôpóv grâ8tov oi kai rā évrös à l'eral peyéén, . . . dAA’ oióēv Šuaq pet Tpós
rôv \6)ov. Ötopio 60 ydp jrot tri Tàs 8vvápeos. . . . '
Plat. Soph. 227 A may be cited as an instance of the common
elliptical form justifying an argument to which exception is taken.
kai Tôv dyūxov goplárov, &v yuabevtuki kai čípiraga koopmruki Tiju tripé-
Neuau trapexopéum karū a pukpā Tox\á kai yeMota Šokoëvra öväpara éaxev.
eEAI. MáAa ye. EE. Tavrátraort pièv oëv, & 6eairnte, dANā yāp rm Tov
Aóyov pe6689 aſtroyyto rukms . . . oiðev fittov oióé ri pāA\ov rvyxávet
péAov . . . .”
Various modifications of the objecting sense are admitted.
à\\a yáp sometimes introduces the alleviating circumstances after
an acknowledgment of ground for complaint or sorrow : e. g.
Soph. O. C. 1615, ÖAoAe yāp 3) Távra rāpā, kočkértſ riv Švatrövmtov čer'
ăud’époi tpodiv'ſ a k\mpåv uév, olòa, Taibes' &A' év yüp uávov/rā Távra
Aüel Tair' ros uoxóñuata.”
Likewise, a request for pardon accompanied by a partial justi-
fication of the act censured, may be placed in adversative relation
to a preceding confession: e. g. Soph. El. 256, aioxövouat uév, &
yvvaikes, ei Sokó/. . . 8vodopeiv piv dyav. /áNA' | Bia yūp rair’âvaykáčet
pe påv, / ačyyvore”
There is another use of d\\d yáp, rather unique in character, yet
frequent enough to be recognized as a distinct category. Though
not paralleled by any of the above classes it is somewhat akin to
the d\\d yáp setting aside an objection, and, might have arisen
from it through extended analogy. A speaker, after a remark,
which would appear to his hearer strange or unusual, forestalls an
expression of surprise by explaining how the fact mentioned was
possible or reasonable. Eur. Med. IO85 troAAákus #6m/8tà Aerrorépov
púðov ćuo)\ov . . . . / h xpi yeweav 67Avv épevvav' &MAä yöp early poèga kai
juïv, . . . , (Often ere this, have I entered into deeper problems,
than was meet for the race of women to inquire into. But [it is
not strange], for we, also, have a muse.) Pind. Ol. VI. 53, roi 8'
oër’ &v čkočgat/ offr’ibeiv sixovro repºrraiov yeyevnuévov, a\\'évſkéspurro
zº y gº f *
yāp oxolvö Bareia T' év direpárº, ſtov £av6aioi kai Tapiroppípots àkriot
* Cf. Arist. Pol. 1275 a 29.
* Cf. Laws 746 B, 805 B, Soph. 227 A.
8 Cf. Soph. O. C. 985, 988. Cf. Isocr. 89 b, 278 d, e, extenuating circum-
stances after an expression of censure. Cf. Dem, 58-63, the speaker offers an
ironical excuse for the action of his opponents.
* Cf. id. 619, O. C. 755, Isoc. 258 e, (elliptical) 250 a, (el.) 269 b, (el.).
THE MEANING OF TAP, 69
Begpeyuévos 43pövſgöpia’’ The author foreseeing the surprise and
doubt which might be aroused by the statement roi 8' . . . sixovro
anticipates this feeling, by an objection (āAAá) and confirms the
truth of his assertion, by relating the circumstances which made
it probable.
As stated on p. 67 there is another type of rejecting d\\&
yáp. After admitting that a certain method of conduct is open to
censure, the speaker announces his resolve to persist in despite.
yáp motivates the determination : e. g. Soph. El. 223, Öewois àvay-
kágény, Četvois'ſ ÉÉotò', oi, A46et p’ Spyd./ dAN' év yap bewois ot axhoroſ
raúras āras /ēqpa pe 8tos éxiſ.”
In this same classification, may be included the use of this
group to introduce a resolve or exhortation to undertake a pro-
posed task, despite the obstacles, which must be encountered.
The completed formula is found Soph, Phil. 81, #otòa, Tai, dºget
ge ui Tequkóra/rotavra (povetv uměe texvågøat Kaká'ſ dAN' jöö yáp ri kräua
rfis vikms Aa3eiv,/róAua “ After the example just quoted, it is not
difficult to supply the ellipse in Plat. Rep. 432 D, or yojvokoretvös
kai 8vo.8tepeſviros' d\\ā yüp Suos iréov. Laws 75I D, is worthy of
note. The thought of the d\\á sentence is resumed by a kai 3) kai,
applying the proverb, which is quoted as a reason. 'AAA', yap dyóva
Tpoqāorets oi! pag i öéxeo 6at' kai Öm kai goi Totto vov kai spoi Toumtéov.
In Arist. Acharn. 403, GAA’ duos followed by the act composes the
main sentence. There can be no question about the relation of
elliptical d\\á and the yáp clause. AIK. & Tptopakápi' Eöputièm,/66'
6 800A0s oirogi roqās intokplveral. ſ kkáAerov airów. KHP, dAN' àöövarov.
AIK. dAA’ 5uos./oi yüp fiv diréA6op', d\\\ kóvo Tºv 6&pav./Eüpurión, . . . . "
* Fennel supplies an ellipse which is merely a repetition of the preceding
sentence, “But, though he was five days old, no one had heard or seen him,
for . . . . .”. The force of the d'AWä yåp would, by this interpretation, be very
unusual. Gildersleeve's suggestion, “But in vain, for . . . .”, while a very
common ellipse in other uses of ā%á Yáp is not apposite here. Cf. example
like the just cited, Isocr. I 81 C.
* Cf. Lys. XII.61, Plat. Theae. IQ6 D. (buog 6’—yáp), Rep. 595 C, Xen. Cyr.
II. I. I.3.
3 Cf. Pind. Pyth. I. 85, Eur. I. T. 118 (complete.)
4 Archil. Anth. Lyr. Bergk 9 (55), And. Myst. 22, Lys. XXXIV. Io, Arist.
Acharn. 738 (separated but elliptical), Plat. Critias IO8 C, Tim. 53 C, Theae.
191 C, Rep. 607 C, Laws 636 A, Arist. Pol. 1275 B.
* Cf. id. 408 &WW’ 6plog is used without any yáp clause in a sense similar to that
In 4O3.
70 THE MEANING OF TAP.
III. Transitional.
The adversative signification of d\\d, which is here lightly
touched, arrests the attention and prepares for an interruption or
change in the line of thought. As a matter of course, then, the
transitional idea suggested by the d\Aá is seldom couched in So
many words. The act, the pausing, or, in many instances, the
closing of the speech is sufficient.
When introducing a new objection in a series of objections, the
function of the group is so indissolubly connected with that
indicating an objection, that it is impossible to determine which
should be considered the paramount meaning of the group in
the passage in question." -
Although found in Homer, and authors of early period with
Some frequency, d\\& yáp becomes in the orators an almost invari-
able formula, for connecting the different points of argument, and
closing an oration.
(I) d\\ā yáp interrupting a speech to introduce an appeal or
command, is one of the simplest types of this usage. This, com-
monly called, dANá of appeal, is used frequently with an impera-
tive alone. Its function is, in effect, to introduce an appeal, but,
by the adversative feeling always associated, it connotes a con-
trast between the preceding and subsequent speech. From its
very nature the purpose of the interruption must be distinctly
stated. Consequently, there is less variation in this class than in
the others.
Many instances of the natural order—the completed yép fol-
lowing the completed d\\á clause are met with, but, as these are
not usually included under the d\\ā yáp combination, only a few
passages as parallels are cited: e. g. Med. 133, d\\á, yepatá/Aéov'
ën' dudurðov yap Égo us\áðpov yóov čk\vov’. Analogous instances
are found with éret; e. g. Soph. O. C. 1405, & roë8' 5uatpot traßes,
âMA' ipsis, étréiſ rā a k\mpå Tarpos k\{ere roß6' apopévov, / A# rot us ſpós 6eów
ordó y'. . . pff u’āripáonte ye, . . .” The normal form is illustrated
in Aj. 328. Tecmessa has been describing the strange conduct
of Ajax, but, suddenly remembering the purpose of her com-
ming, says, dAA’ & ‘ptºot, rotrow yap sivek’ éotáAmv,ſ dpiſéar' eigex-
6óvres . . . .
* Cf. Hypophora p. 67.
*Cf. Soph. O. C. 500, 1201, 1284, 1776–9, O. R. 297, 1429, Arist. Lys. 547
637.
* Cf. Id, 237, O. R. I 503.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 7I
In Homer Il. XIII. 228, a conclusive ré, resumes the intercepted
dAAá sentence, d\\ā, eóav, kai yüp Tö täpos uevedítos fig6a, / 3rpúvets
8è kai d\\ov, 30 pećiévra tomat'ſ rô vöv pår' àtómye kéAevé te ſpori ékágrº."
Complete reversals of the regular order are instanced by this
same author, d\\á introducing the exhortation follows the yáp
clause: e. g. Od. X. I74, “3 pi\ot, où yáp to Karaövgäue6' àxvépevot
Tep/eis 'Albao 66povs, ſpiv uápouou huap inéA6m.ſ dAA’ &yer', . . .”
(2) Approach of a new character is usually announced by
some one on the stage, in Greek drama. This serves the double
purpose of closing the conversation and informing the audience
of the title of a new person. Here, again, the dramatists find
the transitional āAAö yáp a convenient medium. If completed, the
dAAá, sentence contains a declaration of the speaker's intention to
be silent, or to perform some other action which brings to an end
the dialogue. Yet, frequently, the cessation of the speech is the
sole hint of the thought of the particle.
To evidence the fact that all forms, from complete to elliptical,
were in good usage in the same period of Greek literature, it is
not necessary to repeat the examples quoted earlier in this paper.
In the first dramatists, this idiom in rarely employed, but, in
Euripides and Aristophanes it has become a stereotyped expres-
sion, like kai uńy for announcing a new arrival.
(a) d\\ā yáp, separated and complete, e. g. Eur. Hipp. 52, dAN'
eioopó yüp révêe Taíða engéos / o telyovra 6hpas uéx6ov čk\exotitára, / ITT6-
Avrov, #6 Tów8s 8fforouat rôtov.” In Arist. Acharn. 175, the greeting
is the completion of the sentence. oluo, TáNas, uvrroróv Šalov diróAega./
d'AA' ék Aakeóaiuovos yap 'Appióeos 68i./xaſp', 'Appiées."
(b) d\\ö-yáp, separated and elliptical : e. g. Aesch. Prom. 941,
ôapöv yāp oëk ipêst 6eois./'AAA' eioopó yāp révôe rôv Atos Tpóxiv, . .
(c) d\\& yáp, juxtaposed and elliptical: e. g. Plat. Theae. 144 C.
'Akikoa uév toivoua, pumuovečo be ot, d\\ā yáp fort rôvös róv Tportávrov
à év tá uéoºp. dANā orkómes, ei yuyváo kets airów. (As Campbell (Ed. of
Theaetetus) notes on this passage, the second d\\á puts definitely
forward the proposition for which the first has cleared the way.)
* Cf. Soph. O. C. I. 267. Eur. El. 391, Heracl. 770, Arist. Lys. I40, 547, I239,
Thesm. 264, Theoc. Id. V. 29.
* Cf. Od. X. 226, XXIII. 248, and other instances given under antic. Yáp p. 29.
°Cf. Hel. I 385, Hec. 724, El. IO7, Ion. 392, Arist. Lys. (complete and in reg-
ular order), I239 (a question equivalent to a command completes až%á).
* Cf. id. Eccl. 951, Eur. Bacch. II65.
"Cf. Soph. Ant. I 55, Eur. Or. 725, Her. Main. 138, 442, Arist. Birds 1169,
Acharn, 40.
72 THE MEANING OF TAP.
(d) d\\& yáp, juxtaposed and complete: e. g. Aesch. Sept. 861,
'AAAa yap ſkovo' ató' éti Tpāyos'ſ trukpóv'Avriyávn r" #8’’Iguńvi), 6pivov
dós) boiv' oix dubiš6\osſoluai gº' ... jøew {Ayos étráčov.'
Some punctuate with a semi-colon after dèeXpoiv but this leaves
a marked asyndeton in the next sentence. - *
(3) Tragedy and comedy employ d\\ā yáp with dramatic effect
to break off abruptly a display of emotion or a tirade of passion
and introduce a calmer mood. Avowal of shame, or, lament over
the unseemly character or the futility of the outburst is contained
in the yáp clause. Rhetorical use is made of this same device by
prose writers, occasionally, in discontinuing an argument or de-
bate, which they wish to represent as fruitless or untimely. In
illustration note the following:
(a) d\\á sentence completed: e.g. Eur. El. 1245, 8tkala pév viv #8
exei' at 6' oix. 8pás, ſpoigós re poigos–àAA’ avaš yáp ear’ pås,/ aliyā’
(Electra's reverence overcomes her passion and she checks her-
self in the midst of her denunciation of Apollo), and Eur. Med.
I344, where a sense of the futility of anger checks further abuse,
dA\'ovyāpāv as avpiots jveićegi/8ákopa rotévô' épirédvké got 6páros'ſ ºpp'."
(b) d\\ā yáp, separated and elliptical : e. g. Soph. Trach. 552,
Tair' oëv pogoûpal pil Tóris uév Hpak\ſis/ºubs kanjrat, ris veorépas 6' àp'
# /áAA’ oi yáp, 60tep sirov, Špyaively kaxov/yuvaika vojv ćxovo av’ # 8
éxo, pi\al . . . .” (äA\d introduces a new turn in the speech
suggested by a nobler thought). *.
(c) d\\4 yáp, juxtaposed and complete: e. g. Eur. Tro. 444,
dNAá yüp ri toys 'Obvgoréos ééakovrićo róvovs;/oreix' &mos Táxtot' is
"Auðov vuuq tº yauðueda./ (Close similarity of this to Medea 1344
and other instances where dAAd is separated from the yáp and
completed, support the construing of former with greix'. Still it
is possible to treat it as an ordinary elliptical 3XXá yap.)
(d) d\\ā yáp, juxtaposed and elliptical: e.g. Lys. II. 77. 'ANNä
yāp owk olò' à ti bei rotavra ÖAoqêpeg 6at of yap \av6ávogev pas airot's
ëvres 6vnrot'’ Plat. Hip. Maj. 304 E, ovuòé8mke 6% uoi, Śrep Aéyo, kakós
Héu üb' juáv dročev . . . , d\\ā yńp toos dvaykalov intopévew raúra Távra'
oë6évyāp àrotov, ei ÖpeNoiumv,
"Cf. Eur. Phoen. I 307, quoted on p. 54.
* Cf. Soph. O. R. 1409, 1429, (in regular order), O. C. 624, 797, Eur. Med.
252, Rhes. IO6, Phoen, 891, Lys. VI. 50, Bacchyl. Carm. V. I62.
* Cf. Her. IX. 27, Soph. El. 595, Eur. Tro. 706, Phoen. 1762.
* Cf. Xen. Cyr, V. V. 13, Oec. VIII. 2, Plat. Alc. I 14. A, Theocr. Carm. V. 44.
THE MEANING OF TAP. 73
(4) For closing a speech, d\\a yáp is a common formula. Its
conventional character is evident in the survey of a few typical
instances: e.g. Xen. An. V. VII. II, d\\ā yöp uoi pºev dokei Tepitov-
róv rá sipmuéva. Plat. Ap. 42 A, d\\ā yüp #3m &pa diſtéval, époi gºv
âmoôavovgévg." Of this nature is the only example of the transitional
use that occurs in Homer : e. g. Il. VII. 242, oièa 3’ evi graðin Šmigº
pé\regóat "Apni./āAA’ oë yáp o' é6é\o Baxéev rotoirov čávra/Xá6pm &tin-
ečgas, d\\' duqadév, at ke rôxopt.” Signal for action is given by d\\d
while the yáp clause explains why Hector thus warns his oppo-
nent. As in Il. III. Io9, the actual tale of woe constitutes the
main clause to an AAA, so the attack here completes the same
particle. If we accept the affirmative sense of ydp, the relation of
this sentence to what goes before, is obscure. dAAd cannot, then,
be adversative, for, what precedes is simply an account of Achilles'
prowess, and has no suggestion of secret attack, with which é6é\o
8a)\éev . . . Öpiqaëöv might be contrasted. Completion of a sen-
tence by action is paralleled in Il. XXI. 487–9, where the main
sentence of a condition is otherwise unexpressed.
(5) d\\a yáp affords a means of transition from topic to topic.
Within this group, may be made the following distinctions, based
on the content of the yáp clause: (a) d\\d warns the hearers of
the dismissal of the present topic, while yáp advances the reasons,
and the following sentence introduces the new subject, (b) d\\d
arrests the attention of the hearer, and prepares him for a break
in the course of the speech, yāp introduces a statement of the new
topic.
(a) The syntax of the two clauses, in this form of transition,
and their logical relation to each other and immediate context,
can be deduced from one or two expansions: e. g. Aesch. Prom.
44I, Kairot 6eotal rols véots toūrous yepa/rls áN\os i 'yū Tavréâ6s 8tóptoev;
/āNA’ airá oriyâ’ kai yap eiðviatow iv/ipiv Néyou.” There is a variety
in points of order and completeness in the group under discus-
sion, similar to that found in the previous divisions:
(a) d\\ā . . . yap separated and complete, Her. I. I.4, d\\'o68év
yāp uéya dir' airoi &MAo Épyov čyáveto Baotºeto avros 8vºv 8éovra reorgepá-
Aº a * * * Af
Kovra étea, Toorov pièv trapmo'opiev too atta étriplvma 6évres.
* Cf. Lys. XII. 99, Isocr. 345 c, Xen. An. III. II, 32, VII. VII. 43, Cyr.
VIII. VII, 26, Oec. XII. I.
* Doederlein's suggestion of a gesture following the ā%á is apposite here.
*Cf. Soph, Phil. II, (á%ā Taita uév tá dei Aé) etv; akuň yāp oil uakpóv #uiv
Żóyov.) ... . . . ;
tº e : * &
tº _ _
:
:
:
-
;
74. THE MEANING OF TAP.
(8) &\\a . . . yap separated and elliptical : e. g. Eur. Med. I301,
Tétotô' àirokretvaga kotpávovs X60,0s/d660s air rôvěe pečeróat 86pov;
ãAA’ oë yöp airms ºppovriè’ &s rékvov ćxo~ *
(y) d\\ā yáp, juxtaposed and complete: e. g. Soph. Ant. I48,
'AAAé yüp & ueyaxóvvuos Aée Nikaſ rā Toºvapuárq àvrixapeſoa eñ8g/ik
piv on ToMéuov/rów viv 960.6e Anguorévav, . . .” •
(8) d\\ā yáp, juxtaposed and elliptical: e. g. Pind. Nem. VII. 52,
Alywa, reáv Aids T'ékyóvov 6pagú poi Tô6'eimeiv/ baevvais dperats 66&w kvpiav
Aóyov/oiko6ev àAAö yöp dváravo is v Tavriy\vketa épy?" also, in making
a transition from a digression to the main subject, Isocr. I55 c,
'AAA', yap v širakoxov66 roſs évoila w śirituñora kai karmyophoral rôv čverr-
&rov Tpayuárov, 8éôotka, ui tróppo Niau ris intaðéaeos diroſhavnéð."
Under this same subdivision must be classified those instances
where the argument is dismissed by a brief and emphatic sum-
mary of the true facts of the case: e. g. Lys. XXV. 17, kai aev 8%,
& divöpes Sukaotai, peyiot my jºyoup at trepi épavrot rà èmuokpariq triotiv Šešo-
kéval, Šotis yūp tore . . . . d\\ā yūp totatºrmv Štú TéAovs yuápmy Éxo, ögre
iv ô\vyapxiq pºèv pai) émuffvueiv Tóv d\\orpiov čv Ömpiokpatig óē rà èvra Tpo-
6éuos eis inäs àva\to kew.” After āAAé a question such as tº be uakpo-
Noyely might be supplied.
d\\a yáp Plat. Theae. I96 E introduces the climax, as it were, of
a series of arguments and so removes the necessity for further
debate. "Eteur' oik dwatóēs 60ket, ui, eið6tas Émigräumv dropaiver6at rô
étrio Tao flat oióv éo ruv; d\\ā yáp, & Beairnre, TáAat éopév dváTAeº too pum
kaðapós Sta\éyeoffat. Another variation appears in Herod. I. I.47,
where the author dismisses the discussion, by setting aside the
question of the real truth and granting the claim made for the
sake of the argument, d\\ā yüp Tepiéxovrat toà oðvágaros pāAAév tº row
2 y 3. gº y
ãN\ov 'I&vov, a too av Ši) kai oi kaðapós yeyovóres "Ioves.
&
e
©
tº
1. Cf. Thucy. VI. 77. I.
* It is possible to supply after ā%á some thought like (But let us say no
more of our sorrows, for . . .), Töv viv would be a continuation of the theme
of the 3% clause. The explanation given above does not differ in thought,
while it has the advantage of removing the unnecessary asyndeton.
* Cf. Isth. VI. 16, Nem. VII, 30, Lys. VII. 42, XXIV. 21, Isocr. III b, I75
a, 187 b, 415 c, Dem. De Cor. § 263, Arist. Pol. 1264 a 36, De Gen. et Cor. 333
a 3. It is worthy of note that the sentence following which introduces the
new topic, often begins with a resumptive dé or ov-sometimes combined with
Woltov: e.g. Gorg. Pal. 32 (6é), Lys. VII. 9, Isocr. 356 b, 382 a, (Öé) Antid. 215
(obv), Plat. Apol. 28 A (66) Arist. Pol. 1323 b 36 (6é).
* Cf. id., 250 d, 345 c, Dem. De Cor. 42, 2II, (note resumption with Öe).
:: Cf. Isºe:1:9 b, 419 a, Plat. Apol. 4I9 a, 25 C, 26 A, Rep. 598 C.
s
* : * > . . .
e tº Q &
THE MEANING OF TAP, 75
(b) Less common is that form of transition in which dAAá yap
clause abruptly introduces the new topic; it is usually elliptical.
A passage showing the completed formula makes indubitable
what thought is conveyed by the elliptical d\\á, e.g., Lys. XIII.
79, dAN' repov' otºre yap avogurăgas rottº oiºsis pavigeral . . . repov
introduces the argument to which ydp refers. How aptly the com-
pleted sentence in the above passage expresses the thought sug-
gested by d\Aá in the elliptical examples may be seen from Andoc.
Myst. I24, 'Qs 8' d\móñ Aéyo, kāAet uot rows uáprupas. . . . MAPTYPEX
'AAAd yüp Töv viðv atroë roßTov, & Aaxeiv hºtoge ris 'ETiNvkov 6-y-
aſpás, gkévagóe Tós yéyovev, Kai Tôs étrothgar' airów."
"Cf. id. I28, 130, 132, Isoc. 169 b, 264 b (not exactly similar, d7%á Yáp takes
up a topic which has been merely mentioned, and, introduces a further con-
firmation on the ground, that what has been said is not enough) Eur. Ion. (ā%á
Yáp separated) Med. 1067, Xen. Hist, VII, III, 4, Plat. Meno 92 C, Phaedr.
261 C, Pol. 257 C, Ion. 541 E, (i2%á Yáp separated) Dem. XV. 34.
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