-|-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~º: * * · · · -******, *)?(, , , ,-.. '?!T: , , , , : -t.· · · * * * ·•|-~::…ç. ; aeſae…»·-· ·:2, … !%).·:?∞ √°.',-!::::::::::::::-* ( . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *-ae•zº, , , . .* * · ··gaeae ... * ?,* * . .__. ”:? - ) , 2,222źéº&&ºzza,¿??¿z.22,،22?,?,!,: º-º-:º ; , *ºr : * * * * * * . . »::* - x * , , , , , … …’ ,,,,,,,,º * *¡ ¿ - ( ) ، ، ، ، ، ،º º; ; ), º.º., º.į9. ·ſº'º g & * * * · * * * · * · · · · · -į, º→ | +2.º, , , ºs º, , , ºz. :,:, … ( …:... ► » . (* º.º. º. º.ä. º º : * -ae, º „ºſº. ww.º.º.º. a º ae :: ?!? ſae ! %± * * * J. .. zºº NOMY g- |ENCE |)|A E00 AN ID |TICAL SCI |. POLITICAL YCLOP/ O P() -- ***– ~*~~~~ … … — • • …-…---- CYCLOPAEDIA O F POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. BY THE BEST AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN WRITERS, EDITED BY JOHN J. LALOR. WOL. III, OATH — ZOLI,VEREIN. CHICAGO : - MELBERT B. CARY & COMPANY. 1884. ENTERED AccordLNG To ACT of CoNGRESS, IN THE YEAR 1884, BY MELBERT B. CARY AND COMPANY, IN THE OFFICE OF THE LIBRARIAN of CongBEss, AT WASHINGTON, D. C. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED., º RAND, McNALLY & Co., Printers, Binders and Electrotypers, 148 to 154 Monroe St., Chicago. Among the Writers of the Articles in the Three Volumes, are the following: EDWARD ATKINSON, Boston, Mass. BARTHELEMY SAINT-HILAIRE, Member of the In- stitute of France. FREDERICK BASTIAT, the famous French Econ- omist. HENRI BAUDRILLART, Member of the Institute of France. MAURICE BLOCK, Statistician, Political Economist and Publicist, Editor of the Diction maºré Gén- | L. FoubERT, Chef de division, France. éral de la Politique, Paris. J. C. BLUNTSCHLI, one of the editors of Blunt- Schli & Brater’s Staatsºpórterbuch. GEROLAMO BOCCARDO, Editor of the Dizionario Universale di Economia Politica e di Commercio, Italy. JACQUES DE BOISJOSLIN, Paris, France. ALBERT S. BoILEs, Author of “History of Amer- ican Finance,” Philadelphia, Pa. GASTON DE BOURGE, Advocate, Paris, France. R. R. BowkER, New York. T. T. BRYCE, New Haven, Conn. HORATIO BURCHARD, Director of the Mint, Wash- ington, D. C. EDWARD CARY, New York. E, CAUCHY, Member of the Institute of France. EMILE CHEDIEU, Advocate, France. A. E. CHERBULIEz, Political Economist, contrib- utor to the Diction/maire de l’Economie Politique, JoBN W. CLAMPITT, Counselor-at-Law, Chicago. AMBROISE CLEMENT, the distinguished French Economist. JAMES F. CoIBY, Counselor-at-Law, New Haven, Conn. ROYER-COLLARD, Professor of the Faculté de Droit, Paris. - EUSTACE CONWAY, Counselor-at-Law, New York. THOS. M. COOLEY, Author of “Constitutional Limitations,” etc., etc., Judge of the Supreme Court of Michigan. CHAs. Coque LIN, one of the Editors of the Dic- tionnaire de l’Economie Politigue, France. C. CowLEY. COURCELLE-SENEUIL, Paris, France. E. H. CROSBY, Counselor-at-Law, New York. J. C. BANCROFT DAVIs, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. DELABARRE-DUPARCQ, Director at the Military School of St. Cyr, France. CHARLES DUNOYER, France. JULES DUVAL, Publicist, France. CL. DUVERNOIS, French Ex-Minister. DORMAN B. EATON, Chairman of the Civil Serv- ice Commission, New York. MAX. EBERHARDT, Counselor-at-Law, Chicago. LEON FAUCHER, Member of the Institute of France. HENRY FAWCETT, M. P., Professor of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge; at present, Postmaster General of Great Britain. GASPAR FINALI, Ex-Minister, Italy. JoBN FISKE, Cambridge, Mass. WoRTHINGTON C. FoED, Brooklyn, N. Y. JosLPH GARNIER, Professor of Political Econ- omy, Member of the Institute of France. HENRY GEORGE, Author of “Progress and Pov- erty,” New York. D. C. GILMAN, President of Johns Hopkins Uni- versity, Baltimore. E. L. GODKIN, Editor New York Nation. G. BROWN GOODE, Smithsonian Institute, Wash- ington, D. C. LOUIS GOTTARD, Publicist, France. GEORGE WALTON GREEN, Counselor-at-Law, New York. JULES GRENIER, Publicist, France. W. E. GRIFFIS, Author of “The Mikado's Em- pire,” Schenectady, N. Y. F. P. G. GUIZOT, France. ARTHUR. T. HADLEY, Instructor in Political & Science, Yale College, New Haven, Conn. J. B. HAMILTON, Surgeon General U. S. Marine Hospital, Washington, D. C. FAUSTIN HäLIE, Member of the Institute of France. XAVIER HEUSCHLING, Minister of the Interior, |Brussels, Belgium. J. E. HoRN, Writer on Finance, Member of the Hungarian Parliament. FRANKLIN B. Hough, Washington, D. C. EDWARD S. ISHAM, Counselor-at-Law, Chicago, Ill. E. J. JAMES, University of Pennsylvania, Phila- delphia, Pa. JOHN A. JAMESON, Author of “The Constitu- tional Convention,” Chicago, Ill. PAUL JANET, Member of the Institute of France. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON, Professor of Jurispru- dence, Princeton College, N. J. JoHN JOHNSTON, Banker, Milwaukee, Wis. JOHN J. KNOx, Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D. C. GUSTAVE KOERNER, Ex-Governor of Illinois. CHAs. LAVOLLEE, Ex-Prefect, France. LOUIS LECLERC, France. A. LEGOYT, France. (iii) iy LIST OF WHITERS. T. E. CLIFFE LESLIE, the eminent English Polit- ical Economist. HENRY D. LLOYD, Financial Editor of the Chi- cago Tribune. E. LöNING, Professor University Dorpat, Russia. JoHN LOWELL, Chestnut Hill, Mass. . . . ALFRED BISHOP MASON, Counselor-at-Law, Chi- cago, Ill. * D. H. MASON, Chicago, Ill. CHARLES DE MAZADE, France. J. R. M'CULLOCH, the English Economist. G. DE MOLINARI, Editor of the Journal des Dé- bats, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France. - - - M. MoR.JEAN, France. - E. MonTEGUT, France. - MICHEL NicoLAs, Professor, Montauban, France. S. N. D. NORTH, Utica, N. Y. M. ORTOLAN, Lawyer, France. A. OTT, France. - E. PAIGNON, France. ESQUIROU DE PARIEU, Member of the Institute of France. H. PAssy, France. JULES PAUTET, French Vice-Prefect. M. PoEZL, Professor at the University of Mu- nich. - FRED. PoELock, Cambridge University, England. R. P. PoETER, Special Agent (Tenth Census U. S.) for Statistics of Wealth, Debt, Taxation and Railroads, Washington, D. C. GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, New York. M. RABUTAUx, Publicist, France. R. W. RAYMOND, New York. ERNEST RENAN, Member of the Institute of France. LOUIS REYBAUD, France. LEON DE ROSNY, France. Member of the Institute of A. UBICINI, Italy. WM. RoscHER, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Leipzig. M. ROTHE, Professor at Soró, Denmark. F. B. SANBORN, Concord, Mass. HORACE SAY, France. - J. B. SAY, France. LEON SAY, Economist, France. L. SCHWARTZ, Germany. | JULES SIMON, Member of the French Academy. |PDMUND MUNROE SMITH, Professor in Columbia. College, New York. - HAYDN SMITH, Chicago Times. L. SMITH, London. - - A. R. SPOFFORD, Librarian of Congress, Wash- ington, D. C. - - SIMON STERNE, Counselor-at-Law, New York. M. STOESSEL, Switzerland. A. M. SULLIVAN, M. P., London, England. HENRI THIERS, France. - JOHN P. TOWNSEND, one of the Vice-Presidents. of the Bowery Savings Bank, New York. FRANCIS A. WALKER, Mass. Institute of Tech- nology, Boston, Mass. - J. D. WEEKS, Editor of the Iron Age, Expert and Special Agent (Tenth Census U. S.) for Wages. in Manufacturing Industry, Pittsburg, Pa. DAVID A. WELLs, the eminent American Econo- mist, Norwich, Conn. HORACE WHITE, New York. FREDERICK W. WHITRIDGE, Counselor-at-Law, New York. - - TALCOTT WILLIAMS, Pa. FRED. H. WINEs, Springfield, Mass. H. B. WITTON, Inspector of Canals, Hamilton, Ont. - - L. WOLOWSKI, Paris, France. THEO. S. Wool,SEY, Professor at Yale College. The Press, Philadelphia, CYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. O A. T. H. ATH. Oaths have been in use in all coun- tries of which we have any exact information, and it is probable that there is no nation which has any clear notion of a Supreme Being, or of Superior beings, that does not make use of oaths On certain solemn occasions. An oath may be described generally as an appeal or address to a superior being, by which the person making it engages to declare the truth on the occasion on which he takes the oath, or by which he promises to do something hereafter. The person who im- poses or receives the oath, imposes or receives it on the supposition that the person making it ap- prehends some evil consequences to himself from the superior being, if he should violate the oath. The person taking the oath may or may not fear such consequences, but the value of the oath in the eyes of him who receives or imposes it con- sists in the opinion which he has of its influence over the person who takes it. An oath may be taken voluntarily, or it may be imposed on a per- son under certain circumstances by a political superior; or it may be the only condition on which the assertion or declaration of a person shall be admitted as evidence of any fact. — The form of taking the oath has varied greatly in different countries. Among the Greeks a person sometimes placed his hand on the altar of the deity by whom he swore; but the forms of oaths were almost as various as the occasions. Oaths were often used in judicial proceedings among the Greeks. The Dicasta”, who were judges and jurymen, gave their verdict upon oath. The Heliastic oath is stated at length in the speech of Demosthenes against Timocrates (c. 36). It does not appear that the oath was always imposed on witnesses in judicial proceedings; and yet it ap- pears that sometimes witnesses gave their evidence 120 VOL. III. — 1 on oath: perhaps the oath on the part of wit- nesses was generally voluntary. (Demosth., IIpó5 "Aqjo/3ov Pevé, c. 16; Kazó. Köv Govos, c. 10; and Meier and Schömann, Att. Process., p. 675.) — In the Roman jurisprudence an oath was required in some cases from the plaintiff, or the defendant, or both. Thus the oath of calumny was required from the plaintiff, which was a solemn declaration that he did not prosecute his suit for any fraudulent or malicious purpose. The offense of false swearing was perjurium, perjury; but it was considered a less offense in a party to a suit when the oath was imposed by a judea than when it was voluntary. It does not appear that in civil proceedings witnesses were necessarily examined on Oath; but witnesses appear to have been examined on oath in the judicia publica, which were criminal proceedings. The title in the Digest, “De Testibus” (22, tit. 5), makes no mention of the oath, though it speaks of punish- ment being inflicted on witnesses who bore false testimony. — The law in America and England, as a rule, requires evidence or testimony for judi- cial purposes to be given on Oath. A Jew, a Mohammedan and a Hindoo may be sworn as witnesses, but they must severally take the oath in that form which is sanctioned by the usage of their country or nation, and which they severally consider to be binding. The offense of declaring what is false when a witness is examined upon oath, constitutes perjury. — Declarations made by a person under the apprehension of immediate death are generally admitted as evidence in judi- cial proceedings, when properly verified; for it is considered that the circumstances in which the person is placed at the time of making the declar- ation furnish as strong motives for veracity as the obligation of an oath. Quakers also, in all 2 OATH. civil cases, were allowed by the statute 7 & 8 Wm. III., c. 34, to give their evidence on affirm- ation; and now the affirmation of Quakers and Moravians is admissible in all judicial proceed- ings, both civil and criminal. — As oaths may be either voluntary or may be imposed by a political superior, so they may be imposed either on extra- judicial or on judicial occasions. Oaths which are imposed on Occasion of judicial proceedings are the most frequent, and the Occasions are the most important to the interests of society. The principle on which an oath is administered on judicial occasions is this: it is supposed that an additional security is thereby acquired for the veracity of him who takes the oath. Bentham, in his “Rationale of Evidence,” on the contrary, affirms that, “whether principle or experience be regarded, the oath will be found, in the hands of justice, an altogether useless instrument; in the hands of injustice, a deplorably serviceable one;” “that it is inefficacious to all good purposes,” and “that it is by no means inefficacious to bad ones.” — The three great Sanctions or securities for ve- racity in a witness, or, to speak perhaps more Cor. rectly, the three great sanctions against mendacity in a witness, are, the punishment legally imposed on a person who is convicted of false swearing, the punishment inflicted by public opinion or the positive morality of society, and the fear of pun- ishment from the Deity, in this world or the next, or in both. The common opinion is, that all the three sanctions operate on a witness, though they operate on different witnesses in very different degrees. A man who does not believe that the Deity will punish false swearing can only be under the influence of the first two sanctions; and if his character is such that it can not be made worse than it is, he may be under the influence of the first sanction only. Bentham affirms that the third sanction only appears to exercise an influence in any case, because it acts in conjunction with “the two real and efficient sanctions,” “the political sanction and the moral or popular sanction;” and that if it is stripped of those accompaniments, its impotence will appear immediately. — Bentham's chief argument is as follows: “that the supposition of the efficiency of an oath is absurd in principle. It ascribes to man a power over his Maker. It supposes the Almighty to stand engaged, no matter how, but absolutely engaged, to inflict on every individual by whom the ceremony, after having been per- formed, has been profaned, a punishment (no matter what) which, but for the ceremony and the profanation, he would not have inflicted. It Supposes him thus prepared to inflict, at com mand, and at all times, a punishment, which, being at all times the same, at no time bears any proportion to the offense.” Again: “either the ceremony causes punishment to be inflicted by the Deity in cases where otherwise it would not have been inflicted; or it does not. In the former case the same sort of authority is exercised by man over the Deity, as that which, in English law, is ex. ercised over the judge by the legislator, or over the sheriff by the judge. In the latter case the ceremony is a mere form without any useful effect whatever.” — The absurdity of this argu. ment hardly needs to be exposed. He who ad- ministers the oath, by virtue of the power which he has to administer it, and the political superior who imposes the oath, may either believe or not believe that the Deity will punish false swearing, and it is quite immaterial to the question which of the two opinions they entertain. That which gives the oath a value in the eyes of him who ad. ministers it, or of that political superior who imposes it, is the opinion of the person who takes the Oath; and if the individual who takes the oath believes that the Deity, in case it is profaned, will inflict a punishment which otherwise he would not inflict, the object of him who enforces the oath is accomplished, and an additional sanc- tion against mendacity is secured. It matters not whether the Deity will punish or not, or whether he who enforces the oath believes that he will punish or not: if he who takes the oath believes that the Deity will punish false swearing, that is sufficient to show that the oath is of itself a sanction. — The fear of legal punishment is admitted by Bentham to be a sanction against mendacity. But the legal punishment may or may not overtake the offender. Legal punish- ment may follow detection, but the perjury may not be detected, and therefore not punished. Is the oath, or would a declaration without oath be, “a mere form without any useful effect what- ever,” because the legal punishment may not, and frequently does not, overtake the offender? When a Greek or a Roman swore by his gods, in whose existence he believed, and who, being mere imaginations, could not punish him for his perjury, was not his belief in their existence and their power and willingness to punish perjury a sanction against mendacity? All antiquity at least thought so. — There are occasions on which oaths are treated lightly, on which he who im- poses the oath, he who takes it, and the Com- munity who are witnesses to it, treat the violation of it as a trivial matter. Such occasions as these furnish Bentham with arguments against the efficacy of oaths on all occasions. Suppose we admit, with Bentham, as we do merely for the sake of the argument, that “on Some Occasions oaths go with the English clergy for nothing;” and this, notwithstanding the fact, which nobody can doubt, “that among the English clergy be- lievers are more abundant than unbelievers.” The kind of oaths “which go for nothing” are not mentioned by Bentham, but they may be con- jectured. Now, if all oaths went for nothing with the clergy, or with any other body of men, the dispute would be settled. But this is not the fact. If in any way it has become the positive morality of any body of men that a certain kind of oath should go for nothing, each individual of that body, with respect to that kind of oath, has the opinion of his body. He does not believe OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. 3 that such oath, if broken, will bring on him divine punishment, and therefore such oath is an idle ceremony. But if there is any oath the vio- lation of which he thinks will bring on him divine punishment, his opinion as to that kind of oath is not at all affected by his opinion as to the other kind of oath./ Now, oaths taken on judicial Occasions are by the mass of mankind considered to be oaths the violation of which will bring Some punishment some time, and therefore they have an influence on the great majority of those who take them. Whether society will in time so. far improve as to render it safe to dispense with this ceremony in judicial proceedings, can not be affirmed or denied; but a legislator who knows what man now is, will require better reasons for the abolition of judicial oaths than Bentham has given. — How far the requisition of an oath may be injurious in excluding testimony in certain cases, and how far oaths on solemn and impor- tant occasions may be made most efficacious, and in what cases it may be advisable to substitute declarations in lieu of oaths, are not matters of consideration here. It is enough here to show that an oath is a sanction or security to some ex- tent, if the person who takes it fears divine pun- ishment in case he should violate it; and that this, and no other, is the ground on which the oath is imposed. — There is some difficulty in stating accurately how far oaths were required from wit- nesses in Roman procedure under the republic and the earlier emperors. In addition to what has been stated, the readēr may refer to Cicero, Pro Q. Rosc. Comod., c. 15, etc.; and Noodt, Op. Omn., ii., 479, “De Testibus.” By a constitu- tion of Constantine, all witnesses were required to give their testimony on oath; and this was again declared by a constitution of Justinian. (Cod. 4, tit. 20, s. 9, 16, 19.) — Many persons con- scientiously object to the taking of an oath on religious grounds, and particularly with refer- ence to the prohibition in Matthew v., 33. On the subject of oaths in general the reader may consult Grotius, De Jure, B. & P., lib. ii., c. 13; Paley's Moral Philosophy; Tyler's Origin and History of Oaths; the Law Magazine, vol. xii.; and the work of Bentham already referred to.” BOHN. * In the United States a witness may be sworn in any manner considered binding on his conscience. Quakers and others having conscientious scruples against the taking of an oath under any circumstance, may affirm instead. In some of the states the witness, whoever he be, may elect between the taking of an oath and judicial affirmation. The penalty for the affirmation of what is false by a witness in a civil or criminal case, is the same as for perjury. — Besides the judicial and professional oath, there is what the French call the “political oath,” which in part corresponds to the oath taken, in countries like the United States, to sup- port the constitution. Of this latter oath, C. Lavollee says: “In feudal times, when political society was made up of suzerains, vassals and serfs, the oath of fealty was but the necessary or at least logical consecration of the bonds of submission which united the inferior to his superior. Sub- sequently, when absolute monarchy, basing itself on divine right, had survived feudalism, the oath of fealty was retained; and it could not but be retained, since the sovereign repre- OATH OF ALLEGIANCE, The (IN ENGLISH HISTORY). The natural history and antiquity of Oaths in general were discussed some time ago by Mr. E. B. Tylor. (Macmillan's Magazine, “Or- deals and Oaths,” May, 1876.) Mr. Tylor has, among other interesting points, Inade it all but Sented both God, whose delegate he was, and the nation, all of whose rights he absorbed into his own person. The polit- ical oath was then as logical as it was under the feudal sys- tem. — The external ceremonies and formulas of the oath were in keeping with the principle of submission, or rather of Subjection, which bent the subject at the feet of his master. The master had all the rights; the subject had only duties. By the oath the subject solemnly pledged himself to main- tain a condition of things which he had not brought about, and which he could not do away with. He fulfilled his chief duty by promising fidelity to the person whom he recog- nized as his superior and master. Nothing simpler or more rational. — The modern law regulating the forms of government of a people, in the greater number of civilized states, rests on a totally different principle. Divine right has joined feudalism in the ruins of history, and has been replaced by the right of the people. Dynasties no longer force themselves on a people; they have to be accepted; the prince is the delegate, the mandatary of national sovereignty; in such a manner, that by the overthrow of the old order of things, logically speaking, the prince owes the oath of fealty to the people, and not the people to the prince. It is so in certain republics, in which the principle of popular sov- ereignty has been established from the beginning, and is not perverted by traditional formalities which had their origin in the old right of kings. In several constitutional states the king takes the oath of fealty to the constitution. — Hence in countries which profess the dogma of popular sovereignty, the political oath can not be what it was under the old regime. We might even say that not only has it no raison d’étre, no reason why it should exist, but that there are reasons why it should not exist. An oath, with the forms of solem- nity which surround it, represents in the eyes of men the idea of an indissoluble and perpetual engagement. But should the citizen swear to be always faithful to a sovereign whose rights, created by the national will, may be destroyed by that same will? Should be swear always to obey and Support a constitution which the nation may modify or ab- rogate at any moment? We can understand an oath made to a superior and immutable being, to God, or to a sovereign consecrated by divine right; we can understand an oath to the great principles of truth, probity, honor, duty, princi- ples universally accepted and respected, implanted by God in the human conscience, whence they dominate time, circumstances and laws. But it is very difficult to de- fine the character and value of an oath given to a remov- able sovereign, to precarious institutions, made by the very persons in whom resides the right to change the sovereign and modify the institutions. In such an act we can see only a conditional oath, limited by restrictions and hedged in by reservations; but such an act is not an oath. * * * Not only is the political oath useless, since it never strengthened or saved a constitution or a sovereign, but, moreover, it is sometimes only an instrument of tyranny or violence. * * * The political oath has not, in the eyes of the people of our day, the authority which belongs to so solemn an act. It has not the character of inviolability; it is commented on and discussed. It is not of rare occurrence, that the person who takes it harbors, in his innermost soul, a faith different . from that to which he has just sworn; public opinion no longer grows indignant at this, nor is it even surprised at it: sometimes it is an accomplice to the wrong, requiring the official or other person who takes the oath to remember, at the moment he takes it, an oath he had previously taken. This is a deplorable confusion of ideas; for just as there is but one conscience and one morality, there can be but one oath: it matters not what we call it, judicial, professional or political: all oaths impose the same duties and should be kept with the same fidelity + 4 +. But we must not lose sight of the fact that, according to modern law, the constitu- tion of a country may be indefinitely modified by the nation- al will, so that an oath can be no obstacle in the way of the 4 OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. certain that our formula, “So help me God l’ is of Scandinavian or pre-Christian origin; a dis- covery which throws an unexpected light on the much abused dictum that Christianity is parcel of the common law of England, and the proposi- tion, confidently advanced at a later time, that the oath of allegiance taken by members of parliament is in some way (notwithstanding the removal of Jewish disabilities) a bulwark of the Christian religion in England. This statement, however, errs Ónly in generality and in being out of date. It is perfectly true that the oath of allegiance was, down to the Catholic emancipation, one of the chief statutory defenses of the Protestant religion, though in a political rather than a theological sense; and for many years later it contained a promise to maintain and support the Protestant succession to the crown as limited by the act of settlement. The history of the oaths of allegiance and su- premacy and of the various transformations they have undergone, is a varied and complex One. — Before we go back to the beginning, it may be as well to look at the end. As late as 1868 the Eng- lish oath of allegiance was reduced by the promis- sory oaths act to its present simple, not to say mea- gre, form, which stands thus: “I, , do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law. So help me God.” —What the substance of the oath as thus reduced may amount to would not be a very profitable question to discuss at large. It certainly does not promise anything beyond what is at common law the duty of every subject, and it seems to follow that it could not be broken except by some act which was otherwise an offense at common law, for example, treason or sedition, or perhaps also the vaguely defined offense of disparaging the dignity of the crown. And it seems at least a tenable view that the words “according to law " not only express the limit within which the crown is entitled to obedience, but cover the possibility (a possibility, fortunately, of the most remote desires or of the proposals of reform which it is the right of every citizen to express in a legal way. The oath itself would be opposed to the constitution if it held the person taking it within bounds which would prevent him from ex- ercising that right. With the oath as governments have always wished to interpret it, it would be possible to confis- cate the national will for all time. Revolution has too fre- quently undertaken the task of answering that pretense. * * Says M. Odilon Barrot, ‘Oaths are taken or refused, but not discussed. The sanction of the oath being entirely in the conscience, the strength of the oath is entirely in the moral- ity of the person who takes it.” In political matters, more than in any other, it is the character of the man which gives authority to the oath. * * Let the politician, functionary or civil magistrate take an oath to the law, the soldier to his flag, and every citizen to what to him is duty: such, in our opinion, is the simple and easy solution of this much de- bated question. In politics everything is variable, uncertain and precarious. In the midst of the crumbling of thrones and constitutions which our generation has witnessed, we should like to have pointed out to us a form of govern- ment or a dynasty certain to grow old with its oaths. But duty is, and will always subsist. Let men take an oath of fealty to it.” The “political oath " here spoken of is very intimately related on one side to the oath of allegiance.—ED. kind) of the course of succession being legally varied.” Such is the bare residue of the formida- ble and elaborate fabric of Oaths and declarations raised up by parliaments of former generations against the pope and the pretender. We say against the pope and the pretender; for our mod- ern oaths of allegiance are of statutory devising, and date from Henry VIII.'s assertion of the crown's ecclesiastical supremacy as against the see of Rome. The earliest point of history we have to observe is of a distinguishing kind, namely, that the modern oath of allegiance is a thing apart from the older oath of fealty, though formed on its analogy. Side by side with the fealty due from a man to his lord in respect to tenure, there was recognized in England, it would seem as early as the tenth century, an obligation of fealty to the crown as due from every free man without regard to tenure.} — Sometimes we find mixed or transi- tional forms. Thus, there is preserved among the so-called statutes temporis incert; an oath taken by bishops, which, translated, is as follows: “I will be faithful and true, and faith and loyalty will bear to the king and to his heirs kings of England, of life and of member and of earthly honour, against all people who may live and die; and truly will ac- knowledge, and freely will do, the services which belong to the temporalty of the bishoprick of N., which I claim to hold of you, and which you ren- der to me. So help me God and the Saints.”f — This bears considerable generic resemblance to the modern oath. But it is not simply an Oath of allegiance in the modern sense: it includes an oath of fealty in respect of a specific tenure, namely, for the temporalities of the see holden of the crown. This is made more evident by compari- son of the common forms of a free man's homage and fealty: “I become your man from this day forth, for life, for member and for worldly honour, and shall bear you faith for the lands that I claim to hold of you; saving the faith that I owe unto * There is, I conceive, nothing in law to prevent the crown, by and with the consent of the estates of the realm, in the ordinary form of an act of parliament, and with the advice of responsible ministers, from repealing or amending the act of settlement. In the event of its appearing likely that there should be a failure of the persons thereby defined as capable of succession, amendment would become necessary; for example, if they should not be or should cease to be Pro- testants. + It is remarkable that in the assize of Northampton (1176) the justices are directed to take the oath of fealty even from “rustics” : “Item, justätäde capìant domini regis fidelitates * * ab omnibus, Scălăcet comitábus, baronibus, militābus et libere tementibus, et etiam rusticis, Qui in regno manéré voluerint.” Does this include men who were not free? In the earliest forms of the oath of ſealty to the king, both in England and elsewhere, the promise was to be “fidelis Sicut homo debet esse domż720 sºlo.” Allen (“Royal Prerogative,” pp. 68–71) thinks this was a limitation of the subject's obe- dience, or reservation of his right to throw off allegiance if the king failed in his duties, and this is probable. But the words would likewise operate in the king's interest by add- ing the stricter personal bond of homage to the more general obligation of fealty. + Bishops after consecration swore fealty only; but on their election, and before consecration, they did homage. Glanvill, Jib. 9, cap. 1, ad fin. OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. 6 our lord the king * * I shall be to you faith- ful and true, and shall bear you faith of the tene- ments I claim to hold of you, and loyally will acknowledge and will do the services I owe you at the times assigned. So help me God and the Saints.” — Moreover, the ceremonies of homage and fealty have in no way been abrogated or superseded by any of the statutes imposing politi- cal oaths. In England an oath of homage is to this day taken by archbishops and bishops, in a somewhat fuller form than the old one above cited. An oath of fealty is stated in our law books of the thirteenth century to be required from every one attending the sheriff’s tourn, and Coke speaks of it in Calvin’s case, as if it had been still in use in his time.* There appears no reason why this oath of fealty should not in theory still be due from every subject at com- mon law, though it would be doubtful who had authority to administer it, and what would be the legal consequence, if any, of a refusal to take it. — Shortness of time and space, how- ever, forbid the further discussion of the doc- trine or history of allegiance at common law. We must pass on to the additional obligations imposed by a series of statutes, from which the oath of allegiance in its existing form and applica- tion is lineally derived. – In the spring of 1534, when the last hopes of a reconciliation with Rome were exhausted, there was passed “An act for the establishment of the king's succession,” (25 H. VIII., c. 22), the objects of which were to declare valid the king's marriage with Anne Boleyn, and to limit the succession of the crown to his issue by her. It also enacted that all sub- jects of full age should make a corporal oath that they would “truly, firmly and constantly, with- out fraud or guile, observe, fulfill, maintain, de- fend and keep to their cunning wit and uttermost of their powers, the whole effect and contents of this present act.” The oath was not further specified in the act itself, but a form was at once prepared and used, and was expressly authorized by statute in the next session. (26 H. VIII., c. 2.) This, as the earliest specimen of its kind, deserves the honor of being given in full, with the original spelling: “Ye shall swere to beare faith, truth and obedyence alonely to the Kynges Majestye and to his heires of his body of his moost dere and entire- ly belovyd laufull wyfe Quene Anne, begotten or to be begotten. And further to the heires of oure said Soveraign Lorde accordyng to the lymytacion in the Statute made for Suretie of his succession in * Strictly there is not any oath of homage distinct from the oath of fealty. The oath was always an oath of fealty, and the duty of homage, where it was present, carried with it the duty of swearing fealty to the lord. On the other hand, there might be, and often was, fealty without hom- age. (Allen, p. 62. Cp. Hargrave's and Butler's Notes on Co. Litt., 68a.) Homage was the privilege of the freeholder, being “the most honourable service, and most humble ser- vice of reverence, that a franktenant may do to his lord.” (Litt., S. 85.) As to the common-law duty, cp. Selden, “Table Talk,” s. v. “Fathers and Sons,” “Every one at twelve years of age is to take the oath of allegiance in court-leets [sic] whereby he swears obedience to the king.” the crowne of this Realme mencioned and con- teyned, and not to any other within this Realme nor foreyn auctorite or Potentate; And in case any othe be made or hathe be made by you to any persone or persones, that then ye do repute the same as vayne and adnychillate; And that to your connynge wytte and utter moste of your power, without gyle, fraude or other undue meane, you shall observe, kepe, mayntene & defende the Saide acte of successyon, and all the hole effectes & Con- tentes therof, and all other actes and statutes made yn confirmacion or for execucion of the same or of any thynge therin conteyned; and this ye shall do ayenst all maner of persones of what estate, dignyte, degree or condicion so ever they be; And in no wyse do or attempte, nor to your power suffre to be done or attemptid, directly or indirectly, any thinge or thinges prively or ap- partlye to the lette, hindrannce, damage or deroga- cion therof or of any parte of the same by any maner of meanes or for any maner of pretence; So helpe you God, all Sayntes and the Holye Evangelystes.”— Within two years the calami- tous end of the marriage with Anne Boleyn brought about a new “Act for the establishment of the succession of the imperial crown of this realm,” (28 H. VIII., c. 7), which, after repealing the former acts and making minute provision for the descent of the crown, appointed a new Oath of allegiance, and declared that refusal to take it should be deemed and adjudged high treason. There is no variation worth noticing in the form of the words, save that Queen Jane is substituted for Queen Anne. In the same session (c. 10) there followed an “Act extinguishing the authority of the bishop of Rome,” which introduced a special oath of abjuration. The preamble is a notable specimen of the inflated parliamentary style of the time. It sets forth how “the pretended power and usurped authority of the bishop of Rome, by some called the pope, * did obfuscate and wrest God’s holy word and testament a long season from the spiritual and true meaning thereof to his worldly and carnal affections, as pomp, glory, ava- rice, ambition and tyranny, covering and shadow- ing the same with his human and politic devices, traditions and inventions, set forth to promote and stablish his only dominion, both upon the souls and also the bodies and goods of all Chris- tian people”; how the pope not only robbed the king's majesty of his due rights and pre-eminence, “but spoiled this his realm yearly of innumerable treasure”; and how the king and the estates of the realm, “being overwearied and fatigated with the experience of the infinite abominations and mischiefs preceding of his impostures,” were forced of necessity to provide new remedies. The oath of abjuration was to be taken by all officers, ecclesiastical and temporal, and contained an undertaking to “utterly renounce, refuse, re- linquish or forsake the bishop of Rome and his authority, power and jurisdiction.” – In 1544, however, it had been discovered that in these Oaths of allegiance and supremacy, though they 6 OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. seem to a modern reader pretty stringent and comprehensive, “there lacketh full and sufficient words”; and in the act further regulating the succession to the crown (35 H. VIII., c. 1) occa- sion was taken to provide a new consolidated form to replace the two previously appointed oaths. This is very full and elaborate ; some of its language survived down to our own times, as will be seen by the following extract: “I, A B, having now the veil of darkness of the usurped power, authority and jurisdiction of the see and bishop of Rome clearly taken away from mine eyes, do utterly testify and declare in my con- science that neither the see nor the bishop of Rome nor any foreign potentate hath, nor ought to have, any jurisdiction, power or authority within this realm, neither by God’s law nor by any other just law or means, * * and that I shall never consent nor agree that the foresaid see or bishop of Rome, or any of their successors, shall practice, exercise or have any manner of authority, jurisdiction or power within this realm or any other the king's realms or dominions, nor any foreign potentate, of what estate, degree or condition soever he be, but that I shall resist the same at all times to the uttermost of my power, and that I shall bear faith, truth and true allegiance to the king's majesty and to his heirs and successors, * * and that I shall accept, repute and take the king's majesty, his heirs and suc- cessors, when they or any of them shall enjoy his place, to be the only Supreme head in earth under God of the church of England and Ireland, and of all other his highness’ dominions * *.”— Refusal to take the oath is, as before, to subject the recusant to the penalties of high treason. Appar- ently this act remained in force till Mary’s acces- sion, in 1553. One of the first proceedings of her reign was to abolish all statutory treasons not within the statute of Edward III., by which the offense of high treason was and still is defined. (1 Mar., St. 1, c. 1.) Thus, the penalty for not taking the oath of allegiance and supremacy was abrogated, and the Oath of course became a dead letter, though not dealt with in express terms. Nor was it revived in the same form when the reformation again got the upper hand with the accession of Elizabeth. The first act of parlia- ment of her reign *—which, in repealing the reactionary legislation of Philip and Mary, names “Queen Mary, your highness’ sister,” with a significant absence of honorable additions—cre- ated a new and much more concise oath of su- premacy and allegiance, to be made by all eccle- siastical officers and ministers, and all temporal officers of the crown, and also by all persons taking Orders or university degrees. It is short enough to be cited in full: “I, A B, do utterly testify and declare in my conscience that the Queen's highness is the only supreme governor of this realm and of all other her highness’ * 1 Eliz., c. 1. In the argument in Miller vs. Salomons, in the Exchequer (7 Ex., at p. 478), it was erroneously stated to be the first statute on the subject. dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal, and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, Superiority, pre-eminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm, and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the queen's highness, her heirs and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, pre-eminences, privileges and authorities granted or belonging to the queen's highness, her heirs and successors, or united or annexed to the im- perial crown of this realm. So help me God and by [sic] the contents of this Book.” — The oath was not imposed on all subjects, and the only penalty for refusing it was forfeiture of the office in respect of which it ought to be taken. So far this presents a very favorable contrast to the vio- lent legislation of Henry VIII. Under the act of Elizabeth the sanction is the mildest one compat- ible with the law being effectual; indeed, it is not properly a penalty, but a condition. The law no longer says to all sorts of men, “You must take this oath or be punished as a traitor,” but only to men receiving office or promotion, “You must take this oath to qualify yourself for holding the place.” But troubles were not long in gathering, and they bore their natural fruit in a return to disused severities. A new and more stringent anti-papal act was passed in 1563 (5 Eliz., c. 1), and it seems that even sharper meas- ures had been first proposed. The obligation to take the oath of supremacy was extended to all persons taking orders and degrees, schoolmasters, barristers, attorneys, and officers of all courts. A first refusal to take the oath was to entail the penalties of premumºre; a second, those of high treason. Temporal peers were specially exempt- ed., “forasmuch as the queen’s majesty is other- wise sufficiently assured of the faith and loy- alty of the temporal lords of her highness’ court of parliament.” So matters stood till, early in the reign of James I., yet a new outbreak of indignation and panic was produced by the gun- powder plot. The Protestant majority was con- vinced by “that more than barbarous and hor- rible attempt to have blownen up with gunpowder the king, queen, prince, lords and commons, in the house of parliament assembled, tending to the utter subversion of the whole state,” that popish recusants and occasionally conform- ing papists should be more sharply looked after. Hence the “Act for the better discovering and repressing of popish recusants” (3 Jas. I., c. 4), which established, among other precautions, a wordy Oath of allegiance, supremacy and ab: juration, which might be tendered by justices of assize or of the peace to any commoner above the age of eighteen; persons refusing it were to incur the penalties of premumºre. This oath contains an explicit denial of the pope's authority to de- OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. 7 pose the king or discharge subjects of their alle- giance, a promise to bear allegiance to the crown notwithstanding any papal sentence of excom- munication or deprivation, and a disclaimer Of all equivocation or mental evasion or reservation. About the middle of if OCCIlrs for the first time the ‘‘damnable doctrine and position” clause, as we may call it, which was long afterward con- tinued in the interests of the Protestant succession against James II. and the pretender. The words are these: “And I do further swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine and position, that princes which be excommunicated or de- prived by the pope may be deposed or mur- dered by their subjects or any other whosoever.” Here also we find the words, afterward discussed in relation to the admission of Jews to parlia- ment, “upon the true faith of a Christian.” They can not have been particularly intended to exclude Jews from office, as Jews were at that time excluded from the realm altogether. It has been plausibly conjectured that their real inten- tion was to clinch the proviso against mental reservation or equivocation “by conclusively fix- ing a sense to that oath which by no evasion or mental reservation should be got rid of without (even in the opinion of the Jesuit doctors them- selves) incurring the penalty of mortal sin.” For in a certain treatise on Equivocation, of which a copy corrected in Garnet’s handwriting was found in the chamber of Francis Tresham, One of the conspirators named in the act, and was much used on the trial, this point of mental reservation is fully discussed; and it is laid down that equiv. ocation and reservation may be used without danger to the soul even if they are expressly dis- claimed in the form of the oath itself. But there is this exception, that “no person is allowed to equivocate or mentally reserve, without danger, if he does so, of incurring mortal sin, where his doing so brings apparently his true faith toward God into doubt or dispute.” It was probably conceived by the advisers of the crown that the words, “upon the true faith of a Christian,” brought the statutory form of oath within this exception. (Judgment of Baron Alderson in Miller vs. Salomons, 7 Ex. 536, 537.) A few years later, in the session of 1610, a sort of con- firming act was passed (7 James I., c. 6), which made minute provision as to the places where, and the officers by whom, the oath should be admin- istered to various classes of persons. – Shortly after the restoration an oath declaring it unlawful upon any pretense whatever to take arms against the king, was imposed on all soldiers and persons holding military offices (14 Car. II., c. 3, ss. 17, 18); and the act of uniformity (14 Car. II., c. 4, s. 6) contained a declaration to the like effect, and also against the solemn league and covenant. A simi- lar provision in the corporation act was overlooked at the revolution, and escaped repeal till the reign of George I. In 1672 a revival of the anti-Cath- olic agitation followed upon Charles II.'s attempts {}} to dispense with the existing statutes, nominally in favor of Romanists and Dissenters equally, by a declaration of liberty of conscience. The result was, that a declaration against transubstantiation was added to the oaths of allegiance and suprem- acy, by a new penal statute entitled “An act for preventing dangers which may happen from popish recusants,” (25 Car. II., c. 2). After the revolution of 1688, however, a new start was taken. By the combined effect of two of the earliest acts of the convention parliament (1 Will. & Mar., c. 1 and c. 8), all the previous forms of the oaths of allegiance and Supremacy, expressly including the declaration as to taking arms against the king, were abrogated, and a concise form sub- stituted, which stood as follows: “I, A B, do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to their majesties King William and Queen Mary. So help me God, etc.” I, A B, do swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure, as impious and heretical, that damnable doctrine and position that princes excommunicated or deposed by the pope or any authority of the see of Rome may be deposed or murthered by their subjects or any other whatso- ever. And I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, states or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre- eminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm. So help me God, etc.” – In 1701 came the death of James II. at St. Ger- mains, and the Ostentatious recognition of the pretender as king of England by Louis XIV. Fuller and more stringent precautions were again thought needful, and in the very last days of William III.’s life an act was passed (13 & 14 Wm. III., c. 6), imposing on specified classes of persons, including peers, members of the house of commons, and all holding office under the crown, an oath of special and particular abjura- tion of the pretender's title. The declaration of 1672 against transubstantiation (which had been spared from the general abrogation of other exist- ing tests at the beginning of the reign) was at the same time expressly continued. As the form settled by this act remained substantially un- changed down to our own time, it is here set out: “I, A B, do truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify and declare in my conscience be- fore God and the world, that our sovereign lord King William is lawful and rightful king of this realm and of all other his majesty’s dominions and countries thereunto belonging. And I do solemnly and sincerely declare that I do believe in my conscience that the person pretended to be the prince of Wales during the life of the late King James and since his decease pretending to be and taking upon himself the stile and title of king of England by the name of James the Third, hath not any right or title whatsoever to the crown of this realm or any other the dominions thereto * The “etc.” means, I suppose, “and the contents of this Book.” - S - OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. belonging. And I do renounce, refuse and ab- jure any allegiance or obedience to him. And I do swear that I will bear faith and true alle- giance to his majesty, King William, and him will defend to the utmost of my power against all traitorous conspiracies and attempts what- soever which shall be made against his person, crown or dignity. And I will do my best en- deavours to disclose and make known to his majesty and his successors all treasons and traitorous conspiracies which I shall know to be against him or any of them. And I do faithfully promise to the utmost of my power to support, maintain and defend the limitation and succession of the crown against him the said James and all other persons whatsoever as the same is and stands limited (by an act instituted an act declar- ing the rights and liberties of the subject and settling the succession of the crown) to his maj- esty during his majesty’s life, and, after his majesty’s decease, to the Princess Ann of Den- mark and the heirs of her body being Protestants, and for default of issue of the said princess and of his majesty respectively, to the Princess Sophia, electoress and duchess dowager of Hano- ver, and the heirs of her body being Protestants. And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the plain and common sense understanding of the same words, without any equivocation, mental evasion or secretreservation whatsoever. And I do make this recognition, acknowledgment, abjuration, renunciation and promise, heartily, willingly and truly, upon the true faith of a Christian. So help me God.” — This oath was in addition to the oaths of allegiance and supremacy prescribed by the acts already mentioned of the first session of William and Mary’s reign, not by way of substi- tution for them. It will be observed that the words “upon the true faith of a Christian * now reappear. In Queen Anne's reign the only alter- ations made were, first to put Anne's name for William's, and then to leave a blank to be filled in with the name of the sovereign for the time being.” The accession of George I., in 1714, gave occasion for a full re-enactment of the oaths of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration, in what would now be called a consolidating act. (1 Geo. I., st. 2, c. 13.) All persons holding civil or mil- itary office, members of foundations at the uni- versities, schoolmasters, “preachers and teachers of separate congregations,” and legal practition- ers, were required to take the oaths; besides which, they might be tendered by two justices of the peace to any one suspected of disaffection. Mem- bers of both houses of parliament are, as before, specially forbidden to vote without taking the oaths. The form was settled by inserting the name of George in the blank left by the last statute of Anne, but no provision was made in * 1 Anne, c. 16, 4 & 5 Anne, c. 20; and as to Scotland, 6 Anne, c. 66 (Statutes of the Realm, c. 14, in other edi- tions). } terms for substituting from time to time the name of the reigning sovereign. In 1766, upon the pretender's death, the oath of abjuration was made appropriate to the new state of things by inserting the words “not any of the descendants of the person who pretended to be the prince of Wales,” etc. — In this form the oaths remained for nearly a century, affected only by a certain number of special exemptions. The most im- portant of these was made by the Catholic eman- cipation of 1829. The act which effected this (10 Geo. IV., c. 7) allowed Roman Catholics to sit in parliament, taking, instead of the Oaths of allegiance, Supremacy and abjuration, a single modified oath containing the substance of them expressed in a milder form. The Catholic mem- ber was required, instead of detesting and abhor- ring the ‘‘damnable doctrine and position,” to “renounce, reject and abjure the opinion” that excommunicated princes might be deposed or mur- dered; and to disclaim the belief that the pope of Rome or any other foreign prince had or Ought to have any temporal or civil jurisdiction, etc., within this realm. The words “upon the true faith of a Christian ’’ were for some reason omitted, and the oath concluded thus: “And I do solemnly, in the presence of God, profess, testify and declare, that I do make this declar- ation, and every part thereof, in the plain and ordinary sense of the words of this oath, with- out any evasion, equivocation or mental reserva- tion whatsoever.” This act contains, for the first time, a standing direction to substitute in the form of the oath, as may be required, the name of the sovereign for the time being. — All this time the penalties of the statute of 1714 against a member of parliament who voted with- out having taking the oaths (or, in the Case of a Catholic, the special oath provided by the Catholic relief act), continued in force, and very alarming they were. In addition to the pecun- iary forfeiture of £500, they included disability to sue in any court, to take a legacy, to hold any office, and to vote at parliamentary elections. Disability to be an executor, which is also in the list, would at this day be regarded by many per- sons as rather a benefit than otherwise. — The next step was in consequence of the persistent endeav- ors made through several years to procure the re- moval of Jewish disabilities. It would be too long to trace the history of this movement through its various stages; and the episode of Mr. Salomons' gallant attempt to take the position by a coup de main has now lost its interest for most people except lawyers who have a taste for ingenious argument on the construction and effect of statutes. In 1857 Mr. Salomons, being duly elected for Greenwich, took the oath on the Old Testament, omitting the words “upon the true + One of the minor points taken by Mr. Salomons' coun- sel was that, as the act of George III. did not authorize the insertion from time to time of the reigning sovereigns' names, it expired at the end of the reign, or at all events when there ceased to be a king named George. OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. 9 faith of a Christian"; he was sued for the statu- tory penalty, as having sat without taking the oath; and it was decided (with one dissenting voice, but a weighty one)* that these words were a material part of the oath, and could not be dis- pensed with otherwise than by legislation. At last, in 1858, a very odd and peculiarly English compromise was arrived at after the house of lords had rejected bills sent up from the commons. By one act (21 & 22 Vict., c. 48) a simplified form of oath, but still containing the words “upon the true faith of a Christian,” was substituted for the Oaths of allegiance, Supremacy and abjuration in all cases where they were required to be taken. The application of this enactment to clerical subscrip- tions was afterward more especially regulated by the clerical subscription act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict., c. 122). H. Then, by a separate act (21 & 22 Vict., c. 49), either house of parliament was empowered to permit by resolution “a person professing the Jewish religion, otherwise entitled to sit and vote in such house,” to take the oath, with the omis- Sion of the Words, “and I make this declaration upon the true faith of a Christian.” It was also provided, that in all other cases where the oath of allegiance was required to be taken by a Jew, these words might be omitted. Such an exemp- tion had once already been given by parliament in the eighteenth century, but, after the fashion of legislation in those days, only on a special occasion and for a limited purpose; and more recently to enable Jews to hold municipal offices. The act Of 1858, being general in its terms, is a full statu- tory recognition of the civil equality of Jews with other British subjects, which, though long allowed in practice, had never yet been expressly declared. —At length, in 1866, we come out into the day- light of modern systematic legislation. The par- liamentary oaths act of that year (29 Wict., c. 19) swept away the former legislation relating to the oaths of members of parliament, and prescribed the following shortened form: “I, A B, do Swear that I will be faithful and bear true alle- giance to her majesty Queen Victoria; and I do faithfully promise to maintain and support the succession to the crown, as the same stands lim- ited and settled by virtue of the act passed in the reign of King William the Third, instituted ‘An act for the further limitation f of the crown, and better Securing the rights and liberties of the Subject,’ and of the subsequent acts of union with Scotland and Ireland. So help me God.” — For not taking the oaths only the pecuniary penalty of £500 was retained out of the terrible * Sir Samuel Martin's, then a baron of the exchequer, and now the only survivor, as it happens, of the judges before whom the case was argued. t The Oaths of allegiance, etc., were enforced on the clergy by Charles II.'s act of uniformity and various other Statutes. The taking of them was part of the ordination service until separated from it by this act. f It may be worth while to explain to lay readers that this does not mean limiting the powers of the crown, but defining the course of the succession. list enacted by earlier statutes. This act was ex- cellent as far as it went, but it applied only to members of parliament. It is the fate of English legislation to be carried on as best it can, piece- meal, and at Odd times. Measures which excite opposition pass through a struggle in which they are lucky if they escape without maim or grave disfigurement. As to those which do not excite opposition, it is for that very reason of no ap- parent political importance to push them on, and, as it is worth nobody’s while to be much interested in them, they have to take their chance. In this case an act of the following year (the office and oath act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 75) authorized the new parliamentary form of oath to be taken in all cases where the oath of allegiance was required as a qualification for office. Finally, the promis- sory oaths act of 1868 (31 & 32 Wict., c. 72) cut down the oath of allegiance in all cases to the form already given at the beginning of this paper, and substituted a declaration for an oath in the great majority of cases where an oath was formerly required. Still the work of simplification was not formally complete. A repealing act was passed in 1871 (34 & 35 Vict., c. 48), which struck off the statute book a long list of enactments imposing Oaths for various purposes on various persons, and others partially amending or repealing them, from the middle of the fourteenth century down- ward. And so the story ends for the present; England no longer stands in fear of pope or pre- tender, and the modern oath of allegiance, de- vised for the protection of the realm against foe. men and conspirators, and swollen with strange imprecations and scoldings, is brought back to the more plain and seemly fashion of the ancient Oath of fealty. Yet our English ancestors were not capricious in the elaborate safeguards which they built up again and again round a ceremony Originally of the simplest. Every clause and almost every word in the statutory oaths of alle- giance, Supremacy and abjuration was directed against a distinct and specific political danger. It is unhappily true that examples of repressive legislation against mere speculative opinions, though less common in England than elsewhere, are by no means wanting. But the political test oaths do not belong to this class. They were framed to discover and bring to punishment, or to disable and exclude from privileges, not the holders of theological opinions as such, but persons holding opinions, of which, rightly or wrongly, disloyal and seditious behavior was supposed to be the necessary or highly probable result. The attempt lately made, and for the present made with success, to use the parliamentary oath as a relig- ious test, and thereby exclude a person obnoxious to a majority of the house of commons, partly for theological but much more for politica, and social reasons, has nothing to justify it in English his- tory, or in the traditions of English politics. It is an unhappy example of the ignorance and con- fusion of mind concerning the institutions of their own country which are still too common among 1() OCCUPATION. English legislators. (See ALLEGIANCE, and the note to the preceding article.) FREDERICK POLLOCK. OCCUPATION. I. Of the different mean- ings of this word, that which has the longest ex- ercised the ingenuity of publicists relates to the manner of acquiring lands which up to the time of acquisition had no owner. The occupation of such lands, that is, the taking of effective posses- sion of them, is one of the means of obtaining the right of property in them. The individual who discovers an uninhabited island, which constitutes no part of an established state, may appropriate it, cultivate it and dispose of it, and the more labor he expends upon it the less contestable is his title thereto. If the island forms part of a state, he can not acquire the ownership of it, unless the laws recognize the rights of the first occupant, or he can acquire these rights only on the conditions provided by the laws of the country. Thus, in the United States, the land which belongs to no one in particular forms part of the domain of the Union; it is not, strictly speaking, without an owner; and hence the first occupant has only a limited right, the right of pre-emption of such land. But to proceed with the hypothesis of a desert island. A Euro- pean, let us suppose, discovers such an island in the Pacific Ocean, and takes effective possession of it. It does not suffice for this purpose to erect a post, and nail a board to it, with a notice of the taking of possession, and do nothing further; the occu- pation and exploitation of the land are absolutely necessary. Our European is assuredly the pro- prietor of this island by private title, or from the standpoint of the civil law, but is he also its political lord? He can only be so in one case; if he has previously freed himself from the bonds which attach him to his own country. As long as he remains a Frenchman, a German or an Englishman, his status follows him, his country retains its rights over him, he nationalizes or nat- uralizes the objects which become his property, for, in many respects, property, at least movable property, is an accessory of the man. The power of a citizen, however, to cause an accession of land in favor of his country is not unlimited, for the power of his country is not unlimited. Just as his personal status follows him wherever he goes, while his real status (immovable prop- erty) necessarily remains subject to the territorial laws of his country; so his right of extending the boundaries of the nation to which he belongs may be contested. In other words, the right of an in- dividual to take possession of land in the name of his government may be questioned. The law on this point is not well settled, for the reason that the facts in cases of this kind have not greatly varied. An individual might live on an island, lost in the Ocean, and enjoy sovereignty, because no one cares to disturb him. He might also feel the need of protection, and ask it of his native country; but the latter is the judge of what he may with propriety do. It can grant or refuse its protection. It will never grant that an individual can bind it without a commission to do so, and it is free not to ratify the taking of possession; but if it wishes to accord its protection, if it consents to cover with its flag the domain which has come to it by accession, it must do so by a formal or express act; it is for the government to take pos- session. The official occupation of land without an owner, by the agents of a government, consti- tutes a mode of acquisition fully recognized by international law. This mode of acquisition has been used and abused, but in proportion as the earth becomes peopled, there is less occasion to have recourse to it. — II. Up to this point there has only been in question the occupation of a terri- tory without an owner, but there is also such a thing as the occupation of an inhabited country. A victorious army, which invades a country, oc- cupies it in part or in whole, and sometimes during a long period. We shall not stop to discuss an occupation which lasts days or weeks, and the near end of which may be foreseen. The invader should be humane, should demand only those things which he needs for his support, and should destroy nothing, except to defend himself or as an act of war. He should not destroy simply for the sake of destruction. If the Occupation is a lengthy one, matters become complicated, and a great number of questions arise. In such case evidently the power which occupies a country has become its master; it exercises there the rights of sovereignty, levies taxes, makes the necessary laws, and, if need be, administers justice; but it pos- sesses only sovereignty de facto, and not sover- eignty de jure. Thus, the inhabitants do not lose their nationality, the civil relations between the citizens of the country occupied remain intact, and the laws continue in force, save those which the conqueror has expressly repealed, modified or suspended. A crime committed during the Occu- pation is punishable by the tribunals of the coun- try, even after the conclusion of peace. An alien, even if he belongs to the nationality of the con- queror, but is not a part of the army, remains sub- ject to the laws of the invaded country, and he may, if the statutes of limitation do not prevent it, be arrested after the declaration of peace, for the crimes he may have committed at a time when the courts perhaps were not in a condition strictly to enforce the law. — Unless the commander of the invading army decides to the contrary, the admin- istrative authorities may remain at their posts, and maintain their governmental order. The courts may continue to administer justice, and it is even their duty to do so as long as there are no serious moral or material obstacles in the Way. They administer justice in the name of their sov- ereign. In the Franco-German war a very pecul- iar difficulty arose. During the war, the revolution of the 4th of September having changed the form of the French government, and the Germans not having yet recognized the republic, they thought that they could not permit justice to be adminis- tered in their presence, in the name of the repub- OCEANICA. 11 lic, without seeming to recognize it; they there- fore requested that the court of Nancy and several other courts should sit in the name of the “Occu- pying governments,” which these courts rightly refused to do. The Germans were doubly mis- ſhken: ſirst, in asking that justicc should be admin istered in their name; and secondly, in supposing that the administration of justice in the name of the republic implied on their part a recognition of its government. They were supposed, or might have been supposed, to ignore the proceedings of the courts, as long as the magistrates had nothing to do with the war, and their judgments and decrees affected only private interests. – III. We have again the occupation of a country by way of pledge, as for instance, for the payment of a war indemnity. In cases of this kind the details of the mode of occupation are generally regulated by treaty. However, as a state of peace has here succeeded that of war, all public services are re- sumed and directed by the national government, and the commander of the army of occupation has no power but such as is necessary for the security of his troops. He can not levy taxes, nor demand any contributions except those stip- ulated for in the treaty; but if the local author- ities are unable to preserve his safety, he has the right to protect himself. The inhabitants of the occupied country should have the patriotism to avoid giving him any serious ground of complaint. A calm dignity is always more noble than daring but ill-judged annoyance. Occupation may also be a mode of coercion, of compelling the fulfill- ment of a contract. For example, if one of the German countries did not submit to some one of the provisions of the federal constitution, the em- peror might send troops of occupation into such country, which would act as a sort of bailiff at the expense of the country occupied. But the state of peace would not necessarily be interrupted, and the civil authorities would continue to dis- charge their functions as usual. These two kinds of occupation may be considered as legal meas- ures, but history has also recorded, and much too frequently, occupations more or less well (we should say illy) justified by policy. These occu- pations being made outside of the provisions of international law, publicists can scarcely think of laying down rules for them. MAURICE BLOCK. 00EANICA. Under this head, although con- trary to the custom of geographers, we propose to treat of both Oceanica and Australia. — I. OCE- ANICA. By the name Oceanica are designated all the islands scattered in the Pacific Ocean, from the coasts of Asia and the Indian ocean to the coasts of America. The most northerly of the islands belonging to Oceanica is the rock of Crespa, latitude 32° 46' north; the most southerly are the islands of Bishop and his Clerk, latitude 55° 15' South; the most westerly point is the island of Boh, longitude 129°12' east; while the rock of Sala y Gomez, longitude 254° 40' east of Greenwich, forms the eastern boundary. The islands are divided into high and low. The for- mer are, in almost every case, of volcanic origin and mountainous; they are the largest and most important in all the groups, and have a fertile Soil; the low islands, on the contrary, are mostly but ring like rocks of coral rag, encircling a body of water. The waves of the ocean often carry seeds from great distances to these barren coral reefs and deposit them there. These seeds de- velop into graminous plants or trees; aquatic birds visit the yet destitute strip of land, and shortly afterward there appear insects and amphibia, car. ried thither by the waves on living trees. – The area of Oceanica, by far the greater part of which is situated between the tropics, may, according to an approximate estimate, the only one possible, be 1,156,000 square kilometres. All the islands and groups of islands of Oceanica may be divided into three great principal divisions, based upon differ- ences in the physical conformation, and in the institutions and manners as well as in the lan- guages of the natives. Melanesia (or West Poly- nesia) comprises the islands, extending from west to east, thence southeast, which encircle the Australian continent like a wreath. To these islands belong the extensive island of New Guinea with the neighboring groups, the Luisiad archi- pelago, the archipelago of New Britain and the Admiralty islands, the Salomon islands, the Queen Charlotte islands, the New Hebrides, New Cale- donia and the Loyalty islands. The islands of Melanesia are inhabited by the Papuas, a dark skinned people, who are also called Negritos or Australian negroes, on account of there being some similarity between them and the natives of Afri- ca. To Polynesia belong the following islands and groups of islands: New Zealand, the Fiji islands, Tonga, Samoa, the Hervey islands, the Society group of islands, the Australian islands, the Tuamotu, the Marquesas, and the Sandwich or Hawaiian islands. In New Zealand the Euro- pean population prevails at present. The Fiji islands are accounted as belonging to Polynesia, because the inhabitants of these islands, although Melanesians as far as their language and physical conformation are concerned, possess the same degree of civilization as the Polynesians. The islands of Polynesia are inhabited by a light brown, well formed race of men, accessible to civ- ilization, good seamen, and somewhat resembling the Malays. By the term Micronesia is desig- nated the group of islands situated in the north- western part of the Pacific Ocean, and extending north and west near the coasts of Japan and the Philippine islands; this group of islands is inhab- ited by that part of the Polynesian race which differs from the Polynesians proper in peculiari- ties of character, mode of living, and chiefly by the difference in languages. These (mostly low) islands are divided into three groups: the La- drones, the Bonin islands north of them, and the Caroline islands, the Marshall and the Gilbert islands. – Throughout nearly the whole of Mela- nesia oppressive heat prevails, which, combined Y. 12 OCEANICA, with the humidity of the densely wooded islands, is as prostrating as it is injurious to health; the climate of the other islands is warm, but not disagreeable, because of the sea breezes, and is as agreeable as it is healthy. While on the low islands vegetation can not be called rich and lux- uriant, on the high islands it is of a tropical abun- dance. The mountains are for the most part wooded to the top; the trees are high, and service- able for building. Among the food plants the following are to be found on all the larger islands: the cocoanut tree, the banana tree, different kinds of taro or arum, the bread-fruit tree, the pandang, yam-root, and the sweet potato; besides these, there are the sugar cane, the pineapple, the coffee tree, the lemon and orange trees; in short, nearly all the useful plants of warmer climates. While New Guinea vies with the Moluccas in the abun- dance and peculiar character of its plants and the magnificence and grandeur of its forests, its vege- tation, without losing its luxuriance, shows a decline in so far as the number of varieties is concerned; thus, Tahiti seems to have but 500 different plants, Tuamotu only about fifty, Waihu (Easter island) some twenty only. It is equally striking that not only the vegetation on all of these islands is of a character similar, for the most part, to that of the vegetation of India, but also that it retains this character even in the most easterly islands, which, although nearest to America, pos- sess none of the American types of plants. The same law applies, on the whole, to the distribu- tion of animals; however, there is a general lack of land mammalia on these islands in So far as that lack has not been done away with in more recent times, by the importation of domestic ani- mals. It is true, there are larger quadrupeds in New Guinea, but only kangaroos and nocturnal animals. Besides these, the Europeans, who first visited these islands, found of land mammalia only the hog, the dog and the rat, and even these not on all the islands. Birds are more numerous. Fowl, pigeons, parrots, different kinds of singing birds, snipes, herons, wild ducks and numerous sea fowl were found on almost all these islands. Besides these, there are the bird of paradise in New Guinea and the cassowary, distributed as far as New Britain. Sea animals, fish and turtles are exceedingly numerous in the waters surround- ing these islands; the dugong (Halicore cetacea) is found between the tropics. Whales are still caught in the southern and nörthern parts of the ocean, and the widely distributed sperm whale (Physeter macrocephalus) has given rise to active fisheries. Shells and corals present a greater variety of brilliant colors and forms than almost anywhere else in the world. Snakes, mostly of a harmless character, are found only on the western islands, probably not farther than on the Tonga group; there is, however, one harmless species of snake which is said to be found on the Marquesas; the crocodile is not found except in the extremest western part of this territory. Sharks are fre- quent everywhere, and there are also poisonous Polynesian languages. fish. But few species of insects are found; most frequently they are met within the western islands. — Comparative philology has shown that the native population of Oceanica came from Indo- China and from the Indian archipelago. On all the larger islands of the Indian archipelago there is a dark colored race of men, called Papuas, and another of lighter color, the Malay race, which originally inhabited the Southeastern parts of Asia, and which in the distant past removed their habi- tations to the Indian archipelago; these two races are also to be found in Oceanica. The dark colored Papuas are the natives of Melanesia, while the lighter brown Malayo-Japanese element prevails in Polynesia; the now nearly extinct Micronesians are more similar to the Tagalian element. — As a rule the inhabitants of the high islands are stronger, taller, handsomer, of lighter color, and better developed; on the low and more barren islands they are shorter, less strong, uglier, and of a darker color. The color of the skin of the Polynesians varies from light to dark brown, with a hue of yellow or olive-green; their hair is mostly of thick growth, black and smooth; their eyes are black; their mouths are well formed; their foreheads well developed; the nose is either Short and straight, or long and of aquiline shape; the form of the face is oval. The Micronesians are of lighter color, their figure is more graceful and agile, their expression brighter, their noses more prominent and bent, and not so flat. The difference in their languages is still more pro- nounced. While the language of the Melanesians is distinguished by more numerous and harsher consonants, and is clearly distinct from the Malay and Polynesian languages, the phonetic system of the Polynesian languages evinces great pov- erty, a certain weakness and want of force; the Micronesian languages, however, as far as their form is concerned, are the most closely connect- ed with the simpler Malay family of languages, having also an intimate relationship with the While the several lan- guages of the Polynesian family are almost only dialectically distinguished from each other, there are great differences in the languages spoken on the Micronesian groups. As far as mental capac- ity is concerned, the Melanesians are inferior to the Polynesians; love of war and warlikeness, distrust and suspicion, are the principal features of their character; cannibalism, too, is practiced by most of the Melanesian tribes. . The Poly- nesians, on the contrary, although as a rule they also practice cannibalism in as far as they have not been converted to Christianity, occupy a higher intellectual position than others living in a state of nature; they are eminently skillful in copying, or at least in assuming, the outward appearance of European manners. The Micro- nesians also are well endowed intellectually, very receptive, and possess a certain physical clever- ness; they are hospitable, friendly, good natured, peaceful and honest, but sometimes very revenge- ful and blood-thirsty. — The religious ideas of the OCEANICA. 13 Melanesians are vague and confused. Thus, on some of the islands they believe in a power which has created and governs all things. Others wor- ship the sun, while the Tanneese and the New Caledonians seem to have no religion whatever. Besides this, every individual has his own guard- ian spirit. The Polynesians believe in a number of high gods, by whom the universe has been created, and who, although with some diversity, are worshiped throughout all Oceanica. Besides these high gods the Polynesians worship an im- mense host of inferior deities, of elementary genii, fairies and giants. There is, besides, a third class of deities, consisting of apotheoses of human beings. The Tabu, too, forms part of the religious ideas of the Polynesians. In Micronesia religion is based on the belief in an invisible supreme being, and, in addition thereto, sometimes on the belief in invisible intermediary beings. – In regard to social relations Melanesia is also very backward. The population of each island is divided into many tribes, which, as a rule, are enemies of one another. The tribes have each a chief, for the most part, however, without authority; and they are classed by villages into numerous small sub- divisions, with a common ruler on important occasions. In Polynesia, however, there are two estates to be distinguished: the nobles, who are related to the gods, and the common people, who are of this earth only and without soul. Between these two estates, that of the landed proprietors, in many instances, has assumed the intermediate position of a third estate; thus in some places, for instance in Tahiti, the high nobility merely con- sists of the king, the king's family, and their nearest relatives. They also have generally a kind of feudal system, in which one king or superior chief rules over several subordinate chiefs, who derive their landed property from him, and who in turn Owe him service in case of war. A similar feudal system is in existence in Micronesia, but there the estates are divided into the nobility, the semi-nobility and the common people. Even as far as industry and skill are concerned, the Melanesians rank below the Poly- nesians. They pursue fishing and to a limited extent agriculture. Some of the groups of islands have no connection whatever with Europe. Only in the New Hebrides and the Loyalty islands did the sandalwood commodity give rise to an active traffic, since European vessels transported the wood from these islands to Asia. For centuries, however, an active trade has been carried on between the inhabitants of the western and north- western coasts of New Guinea and those of the Moluccas. New Caledonia, it is true, has been brought into connection with Europe in conse- quence of its occupation by the French; but that intercourse is inconsiderable. In Polynesia agri- culture is highly developed. In building houses and boats, as well as in manufacturing bast-cloth (which is frequentºy very beautiful), weapons and tools, the Polynesians display great skill. The trade in Sandalwood, pearls, cocoa oil, and the Catching of trepangs and whales, ever since the end of the eighteenth century, attracted many European ships to these waters and gave rise to an active intercourse with the inhabitants of these islands. – In Micronesia, too, agriculture thrives, as far as the condition of the soil is favorable. With their skillfully constructed boats the natives make extensive voyages for trading purposes; they export the products which they manufacture in large quantities, as, for instance, boats, pandang mats, ropes and twine of cocoanut fibre, weapons of cocoawood, implements made of the wood of the bread-fruit tree, cloth, baskets, Sails, and, above all, hammocks, which are very much in demand. Ever since the white element established itself on the islands a marked decrease of the native population has been noticeable. On the Hawaiian group and in Melanesia the popula- tion has decreased to about one-fifth since the days of Cook. In Micronesia, too, the contact with white men, chiefly in consequence of destructive diseases, such as Small-pox and syphilis, having been brought into the country, has had the same effect. —II. AUSTRALIA. In former times and in a wider sense, under the name of Australia was comprised the extensive group of islands in the Pacific Ocean scattered between the coasts of Asia and the Indian ocean, and the coast of America. In a narrower sense the name Australia is used to- day to designate the insular continent, the Aus- tralian continent (formerly called New Holland), while the other islands and groups of islands be- longing thereto are known by the collective name Oceanica. The Australian continent, in the south- eastern part of the Indian archipelago, is situated entirely on the eastern hemisphere. — The popu- lation of Australia consists of natives and of Eu- ropeans recently settled there. The farther the Europeans penetrate from the coasts into the inte- rior and cultivate its soil, the more are the natives confined to the deserts and the nearer they approach extinction. In the settled portions of Australia they gradually disappear before European civili- Zation, as do also in part the native flora and fauna. At the time of the first arrival of Euro- peans, there may have been about 50,000 Austra- lians wandering about in the now colonized por- tions of New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. In the year 1851 the number of na- tives was estimated at 1,750 in New South Wales, at 2,500 in Victoria and at 3,780 in South Austra- lia; in 1872 there were still 3,369 natives in South Australia; in Victoria, there were but 1,330 native Australian aborigines left, while the number of aborigines in New South Wales had dwindled down to 984. The total number of natives for the whole continent can not be given with cer- tainty. The latest estimates showed that their number does not amount to more than 60,000. The native population of Tasmania is now en- tirely extinct. Including Tasmania and New Zea- land, which are officially considered part of the Australian colonies, there are at present seven Australian colonies, irrespective of the Northern 14 OCEANICA. territory under the administration of South Aus- tralia and peopled by but few white men. The area and population of each of the colonies is shown in the following table: * Inhabitants English e COLONIES. sºi. .#;. New South Wales---------------. 308,560 #560,275 Victoria -------------------------- 88,451 #790,492 South Australia------------------- 380,602 $198 257 Queensland----------------------- 668,259 $146,690 West Australia ------------------- 975,824 +25,781 Northern Territory---------------- 523,531 +201 Total ------------------------- 2,945,227 1,721,696 To this there are to be added: Tasmania------------------------- 26,215 *104,217 New Zealand--------------------- 106,259 *310,437 Grand total.------------------- 3,077,701 2,136,350 ::: End of 1S73. + End of 1871. Thus Australia had, in 1873, an area of 2,945,227 English square miles, and 1,721,696 inhabitants, exclusive of the natives (only 0.57 inhabitants to the square mile). The larger cities are, in Victoria: Melbourne, with 193,698 inhabitants; Ballarat, with with 24,260; Sandhurst, with 27,642; Geelong, with 22,618; in New South Wales: Sydney, with 134,756 inhabitants; in South Australia: Adelaide, with 27,208 inhabitants; and in Queensland: Brisbane, with a population of 19,413. How rapidly the population of these colonies increased by immigra- tion is apparent from the fact, that in 1821 the pop- ulation of New South Wales was only 29,783; that of Victoria, in 1836, only 224; that of South Aus- ralia, in 1838, only 6,000; that of Queensland, in 1848, only 2,257; and that of West Australia, only 11,743. — The principal occupation of the colonists is the raising of cattle and the cultivation of the soil. The chief branch of stock raising at present is the raising of sheep, which, within a short time, will secure to England the entire foreign demand for wool. In the interior of the colonies the lands are divided into farms; in the frontier districts, however, the colonists live on so-called stations, which are isolated encampments of shepherds. Besides this, the produce of gold, copper and hard coal is of great importance; the fisheries, espe- eially whaling, are worthy of mention. Australia exports chiefly gold, wool, tallow and copper, and imports English manufactures of every descrip- tion, although, especially lately, the industry of the colonies has largely developed. —Each colony has its own governor, assisted by an executive ministry and a legislative body. One-third of the representatives in the parliaments are chosen by the government, and two-thirds are elected by the inhabitants; parliament has a right to enact laws, in so far as they are not at variance with the laws of England, and it is authorized to dispose of the receipts of the colony, in so far as they are not derived from crown lands. All bills passed by parliament must be ratified by the governor on behalf of the English government. All lands belong to the government by law, and are sold to the highest bidder at public auction. Besides this, unsold crown lands are leased for an insig- nificant consideration for the raising of cattle. The English government has of late kept no troops in the colonies; the latter, therefore, or- ganized volunteer corps, of a total strength of something over 10,000 men. For the protection of the coasts a fleet of iron-clads is being built at the expense of the colonies. At present the fleet is represented by the steam advice boat ‘‘Victoria, ’’ and the monitor ‘‘ Cerberus.” The wooden steam frigate “Nelson,” in the harbor of Melbourne, is used as a training ship for young seamen for the merchant and naval marine. — The discovery of gold in 1851 gave a most power- ful impulse to the immense growth of the Aus- tralian colonies. Victoria's production of gold reached 11,900,000 pounds sterling in 1856; in 1866, it is true, it decreased to 5,900,000 pounds, but in 1868 it rose again to 6,600,000 pounds. From 1866 to 1873, inclusive, the production of gold in the colony of Victoria alone amounted to 11,024,231 ozs.(Q 334, an aggregate of £44,096,924). Besides gold, wool is a staple product of Aus- tralia. In 1810 the first consignment of wool, of about half a bale (140 lbs.) arrived in Europe; in the year 1820, 100,000 lbs. were sent to Europe; in 1867, 113,000,000 lbs.; in 1868, 135,000,000 lbs. (of this quantity 68,000,000 pounds came from Victoria, 30,000,000 from Queensland, and 29,000,000 from New Zealand). In the year 1871 the four Australian colonies (excluding West Australia) exported wool to the amount of £11,974,000. — Cattle breeding is also very im- portant. The Australian colonies have at least 6,000,000 head of cattle; and since 1867 consider- able quantities of preserved meats are exported to England and Bremen. About 1,025,000 kilo- grammes, for instance, were exported in August, 1872. Lastly, South Australia exports considera- ble quantities of wheat and copper. In 1872 the last named colony exported about 25,000,000 kilo- grammes of copper ore. — At the end of 1873 the length of railroads in the Australian colonies was 2,042 kilometres. Of these, New South Wales had 652 kilometres, Victoria. 708, Queens- land 351, South Australia 305, and West Australia 26 kilometres. Since Oct. 21, 1872, Australia is connected with Europe by cable. The colony of South Australia established a line of telegraph from Port Augusta, on the gulf of Spencer, through the heart of the continent to Port Dar- win, on the coast of northern Australia, while the English government laid a cable from Java to Port Darwin. The distance between Adelaide and Falmouth is 20,000 kilometres; of this dis- tance the submarine cables represent a length of 14,700 kilometres. A dispatch of ten words from OCEANICA. 15 Adelaide to London now costs 189 marks, and it takes, in the average, fourteen hours for a dispatch to make its way from Adelaide to London. The principal towns in the colonies are connected with each other by telegraph. The colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Queensland alone had over 24,000 kilometres of telegraph lines at the end of 1872. Since January, 1874, Australia has three different postal connec- tions with Europe: the older line, via Point de Galle and Suez, in the hands of the colonies of Victoria, South Australia, West Australia and Tas- mania; the second, via San Francisco and New York, in the hands of the colonies of New South Wales and New Zealand; the third, via Torres Strait, Singapore and Suez, in the hands of the colony of Queensland. — At the end of 1872 the receipts and expenditures of the several colo- nies were as follows: Total Total COLONIES. Rººts. Expéâtures Debts. New South Wales -- £4,161,415 £3,638,623 £9,681,130 Victoria ------------ 3,261,883 3,428,382 11,994,800 South Australia.----- 862,885 856,865 2,284,200 "Queensland -------- 996,323 865,743 4,547,850 West Australia ----- 105,301 98,248 35,000 Total ----------- £9,387,807 £8,887,861 #28,542,980 The loans were made principally for the purpose of building railroads, harbors, etc. — The follow- ing summary tables show the area of the various colonies, and their population from 1876 to 1881 inclusive: - AREA AND POPULATION. COLONIES. Area. Sq. Miles.| Years º 1876 629,776 1877 662,212 New South Wales - - ---- 309,175 1878 693,743 1879 734,882 1881 781,265 1876 399,075 | | 1877 4.17,622 New Zealand ---------- 104,403 1878 432,519 1879 463,729 1881 534,032 1876 187,100 | 1877 203,084 Queensland.------------ 668,224 1878 210,510 1879 217,851 1881 226,968 | 1876 225,677 1877 236,864 South Australia.-------- 903,690 3 | 1878 248,795 # i 1879 259,287 1881 286,324 1876 105,484 e 1877 107,104 Tasmania-------------- 26,215 1878 109,947 | | 1874 112,469 1881 118,923 1876 840,300 • * 1877 860,787 Victoria --------------- 87,884 1878 879,442 | | 1879 899,333 1881 882,232 1876 27,321 - 1877 27,838 Western Australia- - - - - 1,057,250 1878 28,166 | | 1879 28,668 U | 1881 32,359 FINANCES. wrº Expendi- Debt; COLONIES. Years. Revenue. ture. On Dec. 31. 4. 4. 5,748,245 4,983,864 4,475,059 1880 || 4,904,216 7,377,786 ſ i : i ; 11,724,419 11,688,119 14,937,419 14,903,919 16,924,019 20,691,111 22,608,311 23,958,311 28,583,231 29,659,111 7,685,350 Now South Wales- New Zealand------ Queensland ------- South Australia --- Tasmania --------- | } Victoria----------- | | | U 17,022,065 20,050,753 22,060,749 22,426,502. 161,000 184,556 361,000 361,000 510,000 B.3% * GOVERNMENT OF THE COLONIES. — New South Wales. The constitution of New South Wales, the oldest of the Australasian colonies, is embodied in the act 18 and 19 Vict., cap. 54, proclaimed in 1855, which established a “responsi- ble government.” The constitution vests the legislative power in a parliament of two houses, the first called the legislative council, and the second the legislative assembly. The legislative council consists of not less than twenty-one members, nominated by the crown, and the assembly of 108 members, elected by seventy-two constituencies. To be eligible, a man must be of age, a natural-born subject of the queen, or, if an alien, he must have been naturalized for five years, and resident for two years before election. There is no property qualification for electors, and the votes are taken by secret ballot. The executive power is in the hands of a governor nominated by the crown. The governor, by the terms of his commission, is commander-in-chief of all troops in the colony. In the exercise of his authority he is assisted by a cabinet of eight ministers. The cabinet is responsible for its acts to the legislative assembly. — Wew Zealand. The present form of government for New Zealand was estab- lished by statute 15 and 16 Vict., cap. 72, passed in 1852. By this act the colony was divided into six provinces, after- ward increased to nine, namely: Auckland, Taranaki, Wel- lington, Nelson, Canterbury, Otago, Hawke's Bay, Westland and Marlborough, each governed by a superintendent and provincial council, elected by the inhabitants according to a franchise which practically amounts to household suffrage. By a subsequent act of the colonial legislature, 39 Vict., No. xxi., which was passed in 1875, the provincial system of government was abolished. By the terms of this act and of other amending statutes the legislative power is vested in the governor and a “general assembly,” consisting of two chambers, the first called the legislative council, and the second the house of representatives. The legislative council consists of forty-five members, nominated by the crown for life, and the house of representatives of ninety-five mem- bers, elected by the people for three years. The members of the house of representatives include four aborigines, or Maories, elected by the natives. Every owner of a freehold worth £50, or tenant householder, in the country at £5, in the towns at £10 a year rent, is qualified both to vote for, and to be a member of, the house of representatives. The 16 OCHLOCRACY. OCHLOORACY. The rule of the multitude. Polybius was the first to use the term. The good governments, according to him, are royalty, aristocracy and democracy; the bad ones mon- archy, oligarchy and ochlocracy. Barthélemy St. Hilaire does not consider this definition to be executive authority is vested in a governor appointed by the crown. The governor is, by virtue of his office, commander- in-chief of the troops. The general administration rests with a responsible ministry, consisting of about seven members. Besides the ministers, there is one native member of the executive council, but not in charge of any department. The control of native affairs, and the entire responsibility of dealing with questions of native government, were trans- ferred in 1863 from the imperial to the colonial government. In 1864 the seat of the general government was removed from Auckland to Wellington, on account of the central position of the latter city. — Queensland. The form of government of the colony of Queensland was established Dec. 10, 1859, on its separation from New South Wales. The power of making laws and imposing taxes is vested in a parliament of two houses, the legislative council and the legislative assembly. The former consists of thirty members, nomi- nated by the crown for life. The legislative assembly com- prises fifty-five deputies, returned from as many electoral districts, for five years, by the ballot vote of all tax payers. Persons having property, either leasehold or freehold, or a license to depasture lands from the government in any electoral district in which they do not reside, have the right of a vote in any district in which such property may be situ- ated, as well as in the district in which they reside. The executive power is vested in a governor appointed by the crown. The governor is commander-in-chief of the troops, and also bears the title of vice-admiral. In the exercise of the executive authority he is assisted by an executive coun- cil of six ministers. The ministers are jointly and individ- ually responsible for their acts. – South Australia. The constitution of South Australia bears date Oct. 27, 1856. It vests the legislative power in a parliament elected by the people. The parliament consists of a legislative council and a house of assembly. The former (according to a law which came into force in 1881) is composed of twenty-four members. Every three years the eight members whose names are first on the roll retire, and their places are sup- plied by two new members elected from each of the four districts into which the colony is divided for this purpose. The executive has no power to dissolve this body. It is elected by the whole colony voting as one district. The qualifications of an elector to the legislative council are, that he must be twenty-one years of age, a natural-born or natu- ralized subject of the queen, and have been on the electoral roll six months, besides having a freehold of £50 value, or a leasehold of £20 annual value, or occupying a dwelling house of £25 annual value. The qualification for a member of council is merely that he must be thirty years of age, a natural-born or naturalized subject, and a resident in the province for three years. The president of the council is elected by the members. The house of assembly consists of forty-six members, elected for three years. The qualifica- tions for an elector are that of having been on the electoral roll for six months, and of having arrived at twenty-one years of age; and the qualifications for members are the same. There were 57,627 registered electors in 1882. Judges and ministers of religion are ineligible for election as mem- bers. The elections of members of both houses take place by ballot, The executive power is vested in a governor appointed by the crown and an executive council, consisting of the responsible ministers, and specially appointed mem- bers. The governor is at the same time commander-in-chief of the troops. The ministry, of which he is the president, is divided into six departments. The ministers are jointly and individually responsible to the legislature for all their Official acts. – Tasmania. The constitution of Tasmania was established by act 18 Vict., No. 17, supplemented by act 34 Vict., No. 42, passed in 1871. By these acts a legisla- tive council and a house of assembly are constituted, called the parliament of Tasmania. The legislative council is composed of sixteen members, elected by all natural-born very exact. It is not correct so far as royalty is concerned, which is only one of the forms of monarchy; but the denomination ochlocracy is perfectly correct, much more correct than the word demagogy, which only indicates a means of popular government, and not that government or naturalized subjects of the crown who possess either a freehold worth £30 a year, or a leasehold of £200, or have a commission in the army or navy, or a degree of some uni- versity, or are in holy orders. The house of assembly con- sists of thirty-two members, elected by householders of £7 per annum, or freeholders of property £50 in value, and all subjects holding a commission, or possessing a degree. The legislative authority rests in both houses, while the executive is vested in a governor appointed by the crown. The gov- ernor is, by virtue of his office, commander-in-chief of the troops in the colony. He is aided in the exercise of the executive authority by a cabinet of responsible ministers, consisting of five members. The ministers must have a seat in one of the two houses. – Victoria. The constitution of Victoria was established by an act, passed by the legisla- ture of the colony in 1854, to which the assent of the crown was given, in pursuance of the power granted by the act of the imperial parliament of 18 & 19 Vict., cap. 55. The legis- lative authority is vested in a parliament of two chambers; the legislative council, composed of forty-two members, and the legislative assembly, composed of eighty-six members. A property qualification is required both for members and electors of the legislative council. According to a bill passed in 1881 members must be in the possession of an estate of the annual value of £500, and electors must be in the possession or occupancy of property of the ratable value of £10 per annum if derived from freehold, or of £25 if derived from leasehold or the occupation of rented property. No electoral property qualification is required for graduates of British universities, matriculated students of the Melbourne university, ministers of religion of all denominations, certificated schoolmasters, lawyers, medical practitioners, and officers of the army and navy. One-third of the legislative council must retire every three years, SO that a total change is effected in nine years. The first elec- tion of new members took place November, 1882. The members of the legislative assembly are elected by universal suffrage, for the term of three years. Clergymen of any religious denomination, and persons convicted of felony, are excluded from both the legislative council and the assem- bly. The number of electors on the roll of the legislative council was increased by the action of the bill of 1881 from 33,105 to about 110,000; the number of electors for the legis- lative assembly was 176,022, according to the latest returns. The executive authority is vested in a governor appointed by the crown. The governor is commander-in-chief of all the colonial troops. In the exercise of his duties as the execu- tive he is assisted by a cabinet of nine ministers. At least four out of the nine ministers must be members of either the legislative council or the assembly. —Western Australia. The administration of Western Australia is vested in a gov- ernor, who exercises the executive functions. There is besides a legislative council, composed of Seven appointed and fourteen elected members, the latter returned by the votes of all male inhabitants, of full age, assessed in a rental of at least £10. The qualification for elected mem- bers is the possession of landed property of £1,000. The governor is assisted in his functions by an executive coun- cil. — PopULATION, RE sources, ETC., OF THE COLONIES. -- New South Wales. The excess of immigration over emi- gration averaged 10,000 annually in the seven years 1874–80. There is a high birth rate in the colony. The excess of births over deaths amounted to 116,931 in the year 1880. The population of Sydney, the capital of New South Wales, numbered 220,427 at the census of April 3, 1881, the total comprising 99,670 inhabitants within the city, and 120,737 in the suburbs. The increase of population in the decennial period 1871–81 was 89,272, or 66% per cent. The trade of New South Wales more than quadrupled in the fifteen years 1850–64. The total value of the imports in 1850 amounted to £2,078,338, and in 1864 had risen to £10,135,708. The exports in 1850 were valued at £2,399,580, and in 1864 OCHLOCRACY. 17 itself. Aristotle calls democracy what Polybius calls ochlocracy. “Aristotle,” says Barthélemy St. Hilaire, “always uses the word demos to des- ignate the most numerous part of the political body. Whenever the word people is found in Aristotle, it must be underSTOOd to mean, not the at £9,037,832. From 1864 to 1870 there was a decline in both imports and exports, but a new rise took place in 1871, continuing with interruptions till 1881. The value of the total imports in 1881 was £17,409,326; the value of the total exports, including bullion, was £16,049,503. Rather more than one-third of the total imports of New South Wales come from Great Britain, and about one-third of the exports are shipped to it. The staple article of export from New South Wales to the United Kingdom is wool. Of this article there were exported in the year 1881, 87,739,914 lbs., of a value of £5,304,576. Next to wool, the most important articles of export are tin, copper, tallow and preserved meat. In March, 1882, New South Wales had 33,062,854 sheep; 2,180,896 horned cattle; 346,931 horses; and 213,916 pigs. The total area of land under cultivation embraced 645,068 acres, of which about one-half was under wheat and maize. New South Wales is believed to be richer in coal than the Other territories of Australasia. In 1881 there were mined 1,775,224 tons of coal, valued at £603,248. The gold mines of New South Wales cover a vast area, extending over three dis- tricts, called the Western Fields, the Southern Fields, and the Northern Fields. The gold produce of the colony was estimated as follows, in each of the seven years 1875–81: TYEARS. Quantity. Value. Oz. 4. 1875--------------------------- 552,592 2,097,740 1876--------------------------- 410,330 1,589,854 1877--------------------------- 124,113 496,452 1878--------------------------- 182,120 768,480 1879--------------------------- 109,650 399,187 1880--------------------------- 118,600 441,543 1881--------------------------- 145,532 550,111 TNew South Wales likewise possesses valuable copper and tim mines, the former producing 27.587 tons of copper in 1881. New South Wales has three lines of railway, the Southern, the Northern and the Western. In 1881 there were 99.5% miles of railway open for traffic and 11% miles of tramways, and 487 miles under construction. The whole of the lines were built by the government. Of electric tele- graphs there were in the colony 14,278 miles of line in 1881, constructed at a cost of £492,211. The paid messages trans- mitted in 1881 numbered 1,597,741. There were 318 telegraph stations at the end of 1881. The postoffice of the colony transmitted 26,355,600 letters, 16,527,900 newspapers, and 851,300 packets, in the year 1881. — New Zealand. The cen- sus of April 3, 1881, gave the total population of 534,032, including 44,099 Maories (24,370 males and 19,729 females); of the rest, 269,605 were males and 220,328 females. This includes 5,004 Chinese, of whom only nine were females. In 1880 there were 19,341 births, 5,437 deaths and 3,181 mar- riages in the colony. At the census of 1881 there were four towns with upward of 10,000 inhabitants in New Zealand. The total number of immigrants and of emigrants, and the Surplus of immigrants over emigrants, was as follows: YEAR Immigrants. Emigrants. #. 1871 ------------- 10,083 5,297 4,786 1873------------- 10,725 5,752 4,973 1873 ------------- 13,572 4,761 8,811 1874------------- 43,965 5,859 38,106 1875 ------------- 31,737 6,467 25,270 1876 ------------- 18,414 6,459 11,955 1877 ------------- 12,987 6,611 6,376 1878------------- 16,263 5,766 10,497 1879------------- 23,597 5,234 18,723 1880------------- 15,154 7,923 7,231 1881 ------------- 9,688 8,033 1,655 121 VOL. III. — 2 totality or majority of the nation, which would include the slaves, but only the lowest class of the political body, that which prevailed at Athens, but which, in the greater part of the Greek repub- lics, played only a secondary rôle.” It seems to us that demos, in the political language of the The commerce of New Zealand increased nearly twenty-fold in the twenty years from 1859 to 1878; but while the imports, which at One time amounted to more than eight millions, fell again, the exports increased slightly in recent years. The value of the total imports of New Zealand in 1881 was 37,457,045; of the exports, £6,060,866. The value of the imports from Great Britain in 1881 was £3,718,308; that of the exports to Great Britain, £5,125,859. The staple article of export from New Zealand to the United Kingdom is wool. In 1881 there were exported to Great Britain 59,368,832 lbs. of wool, of an aggregate value of £3,477,993. Next to wool the most important articles of export were corn, flour, gum and preserved meat. The live stock of the colony consisted, in April, 1881, of 161,736 horses, 698,637 cattle, 12,985,085 sheep, 200,083 pigs, and 1,563,216 head of poultry. The greatest increase of live stock in recent years was in sheep. Their number increased from 1,523,324 in 1858, to 7,761,383 in 1861, to 4,937,273 in 1864, to 8,418,579 in 1867, to 9,700,629 in 1871, and to 11,704,853 in 1874. Large gold fields were dis- covered in the spring of 1857. The gold exports amounted to 355,322 ounces, valued at £1,407,770 in 1857; in 1881 only 250,683 ounces, valued at £996,867. In 1882 there were 1,333 miles of railway open for traffic. The total expendi- tures on construction of all the lines to March 31, 1881, had amounted to £9,599,355, and in 1882 to £9,869,669. On March 31, 1882, the colony had 3,824 miles of telegraph lines, and 9,653 miles of wire. The number of telegrams dis- patched was 1,438,772, of which total over a million were private messages. The total receipts from telegrams amounted to £78,116. The total number of telegraph offices in the colony was 234. The postoffice in the year 1881 received 25,557,931 letters, of which number two-thirds came from places within and one-third from places without the colony. The total number of newspapers received in 1881 was 12,248,043, of which number over two-thirds came from places within and less than one-third from places without the colony. The total revenue of the postoffice amounted to £154,142 in 1881. — Queensland. Queensland is divided into twenty municipalities, the largest of which, as regards population, is Brisbane. It contains the city of Brisbane, the capital of the colony, and the seat of govern- ment, with a population of 31,109 on April 3, 1881. The number of immigrants in 1881 was 16,223; that of the emi- grants, 9,209. The total value of imports in 1881 was £3,601,906, and of exports, £3,289,253. Wool, preserved meat and tallow are the chief articles of export. In Decem- ber, 1882, there were 28,026 acres under sugar cane, out of a total of 128,875 acres under cultivation. The live stock at the end of 1881 numbered 194,217 horses, 3,618,513 cattle, 8,292,883 sheep and 56,438 pigs. There are several coal mines in the colony, the produce of which amounted to 65,612 tons in 1881. Gold fields were discovered in 1867, the produce of which amounted to 373,266 ounces, valued at £1,306,431 in the year 1877; in 1881 it was only 259,782 ounces, valued at £925,012. At the end of 1881 there were 800 miles of railway open for traffic in the colony, and 200 miles more in course of construction; while in 1882 a trans-Australian line from Brisbane to Port Darwin had been begun. The postoffice of the colony in the year 1881 carried 5,178,547 letters, 4,530,263 newspapers, and 409,575 packets. At the end of 1881 there were in the colony 6,279 miles of telegraph lines, and 8,585 miles of wire, with 170 stations. The number of messages sent was 597,333 in the year 1881. — South Australia. On April 3, 1881, the population of South Australia numbered 279,865 (149,530 males and 130,335 females). Of these 75,812 were members of the church of England, 42,628 Roman Catholics, and 42,103 Wesleyan Methodists. During 1881 there were registered 10,708 births, 4,012 deaths and 2,308 marriages. The population of Adelaide, the capital of the colony, was, in 1881, 38,479, exclusive of the suburbs. The number of acres under cultivation doubled in the ten years 1866–76. There were 2,613,903 acres under cultivation in 18 OCHLOCRACY. Greeks, does not signify the lowest class of the people, nor even the mass of the inhabitants, including the slaves: demos (populus and not plebs) meant what is known in France as the com/mº/ne, Or, what amounted to the same among the Greeks, the nation. — Ochlocracy is the rule of the poorest 'right to sit in the comitia by tribes 2 and least enlightened part of the nation, which is ordinarily the most numerous. But, although superior in numbers, as it can not represent the general will, it is at bottom only a government of the minority. The despotism of the greater num- ber, like the despotism of a single individual, is established rather by usurpation than by consent. Who would freely conclude such contract 2 It is needless to say that these two forms of govern- ment are as often turned to individual advantage by officials (demagogues and viziers) as they are exercised by those whose power they proclaim. — Ochlocracy is almost never provided for in con- stitutions. Was it an ochlocracy which the gov- ernment established at Rome, when the lea, horten- sia gave the force of law to the plebiscita ? Who does not see that the patricians had always the According to all appearances, it is true, their voice could be neutralized by the force of numbers; but it is so in every pure democracy. In Florence, in 1282, the lords were declared inadmissible to public offices, unless they disnobled themselves by causing their names to be inscribed on the registers of some trades-guild. Lastly, we have the law against the nobility during the reign of terror in the French revolution. At Athens ochlocracy was estab- lished under the favor of the law. Men of merit were then excluded, on account of their wealth or their birth, from all part in public affairs; the philosophers were persecuted, the allied cities oppressed or destroyed. But this Athenian Och- locracy had a great love of liberty, great political good sense, a taste for the arts, and Sometimes even moderation. Athens and Florence are al- most the only two examples of the direct power of the majority legally established. Most fre- quently this despotism of the multitude follows in the wake of a revolution which overthrows the power of kings or of nobles; it establishes itself arbitrarily, without rule, and without any regard for the general interest or the interest of all whose will it does not represent, or for indi- vidual interests, the most sacred of which are the 1882, 1,768,781 thereof under wheat. The live stock of the colony comprised 159,678 horses, 314,918 horned cattle and 6,810,856 sheep. The total value of South Australian im- ports in 1882 was £5,890,000, and of exports, £5,280,000. 'The three staple articles of export are wool, wheat and flour, and vopper ore. The total exports of wool in 1881 amounted to £1,911,927; the exports of wheat and flour, to £1,336,761; and the exports of copper, to £263,370. Mining operations are pursued on a very extensive scale in the colony. The mineral wealth as yet discovered consists chiefly in copper, besides which there exist iron ores of great richness. The colony had 945 miles of railway open for traffic in July, 1882, and 174 miles of lines in course of construction. There are two principal lines of railway, namely, the Port line, extending from Adelaide to Port Adelaide, and the North line, connecting Adelaide with the chief copper mines. The colony had 4,946 miles of telegraph in operation at the end of 1881, with 7,227 miles of wire. Included in the total is an overland line, opened in 1872, constructed at the expense of the South Australian government, running from Adelaide to Port Darwin, a distance of 2,000 miles. In 1882 there were 488 postoffices in the colony; and during 1880 there passed through them 10,340,772 letters and packets, and 5,790,768 newspapers. — Tasmania. The area of this colony is esti- mated at 26,215 square miles, or 16,778,000 acres, of which 15,571,500 acres form the area of Tasmania proper, the rest constituting that of a number of small islands. The total number of acres granted, or sold, up to the end of the year 1882, was 4,265,944; of these, 1,888,053 acres are held on depasturing leases, 374,374 acres being under cultivation. 53.41 per cent. of the population belong to the church of England; 22.24 per cent. to the church of Rome. At the census of 1881 the number of persons returned as being unable to read and write, was 31,080; as being able to read, only 9,589. The number of immigrants in 1881 was 12,579; that of emigrants, 11,163. The total value of the imports in 1881 was £1,438,524; that of the exports, £1,555,576. The commerce of Tasmania is almost entirely with the United Kingdom and the neighboring colonies of Victoria and New South Wales. Wool is the staple article of export. There were in the colony 27,805 horses, 130,526 head of cattle, 1,847,479 sheep and lambs, and 49,660 pigs, on March 31, 1882. The soil of the colony is rich in iron ore and tin, and there are large beds of coal. Gold has also been found. The exports of tin amounted in value to £375,775, and yield of gold to £216,901 in 1881. At the end of 1881 there were 178 miles of railway open for traffic. At the commencement of 1882 the number of miles of telegraph line in operation was 928, and the number of stations, 85. In 1881, 147,660 tele- graphic messages were sent. The submarine cable, estab- lished in 1869, and connecting the colony with the continent of Australia, carried 14,871 messages in 1880. The postoffice carried, in the year 1881, 1,994,148 letters, 187,555 packets, and 2,049,949 newspapers. — Victoria. The population of this colony, which in 1836 was but 224, had increased in 1881 to 862,346. During the last decade there has been a large decrease both in Chinese and aborigines. About one-half of the total population of Victoria live in towns. The number of immigrants in 1881 was 59,066, and that of emigrants, 51,744. The birth rate in Victoria was 30.75 per 1,000 in 1880. The two staple articles of export from the colony are wool and gold. The total exports of wool amounted to 98,467,369 lbs., valued at £5,450,029, in 1881. In the ten years from 1852 to 1861 the exports of gold amounted to upward of two millions of ounces in weight per annum, but subse- quently there was a gradual decline, till the year 1867, when the exports fell to under a million and a half ounces. In 1881 the produce of gold amounted to 858,850 ounces, valued at £3,674,104. There were 1,997,943 acres of land under cultivation in the colony at the end of March, 1882. In recent years there was a slowly increasing cultivation of the vine, the number of acres planted amounting to 4,919. In the twenty-seven stations. year ended March 31, 1881, there were in the colony 275,516 horses, 1,286,267 head of cattle, 10,360,285 sheep, and 241,936 pigs. There were 1,214 miles of railway completed at the end of 1881, and 450 miles in progress. There were 3,349 miles of telegraph lines, comprising 6,626 miles of wire, open at the end of 1881. The number of telegraphic dis- patches in the year 1881 was 1,281,749. At the end of 1881 there were 298 telegraph stations. The postoffice of the colony forwarded 26,308,347 letters, 4,213,625 packets, and 11,440,732 newspapers, in the year 1881. There were 1,158 postoffices on Dec. 31, 1881. – Western Australia. The agri- cultural prosperity of the colony has been greatly on the rise in recent years; still, there were only 60,821 acres of land under cultivation at the end of 1881, out of a total of 626,000,000 acres. The live stock consisted, in 1881, of 31,755 horses, 60,009 cattle, and 1,267,912 sheep. The total value of imports in 1881 was £404,831, and of exports, £502,769. Wool and lead are the principal articles of export. Copper and coal are also found. There were eighty-eight miles of railway open for traffic at the end of 1882. In 1881 there were 1,585 miles of telegraph line within the colony, with In 1881 there passed through the postoffice 929,624 letters, 693,283 newspapers, and 79,313 packets.-F. M. O'CONOR. OFFICE-HOLDERS. 19 rights of man, and which the author of the Con- trat Social justly regards as independent of the general will. “In fact,” says he, (book ii., chap. 4), “so soon as there is question of an individual right, upon a point which has not been regulated by gencral and anterior agreeilleul, llial righl becomes a bone of contention. It is a case in which the individuals interested are one of the parties and the public the other, but in which I can neither see the law which is to be followed, nor the judge who is to declare it. It would be ridiculous, then, to leave the question to an express decision of the general will, which can only be the conclusion of one of the parties, and which for the other, consequently, is only a strange individual will, inclined to injustice and subject to error.” If such be the character of the Om- nipotence of the state over the individual, such must be the omnipotence of one part of the nation over the other, and if “the life and liberty of a private person are naturally independent of the public person” (book ii., chap. 5), there is a much stronger reason why the life and liberty of a pri- vate person should be independent of a collection of private persons, like an oligarchy or an ochloc- racy. — The history of the Paris commune, in 1871, presents a good example of what an oligar- chy is. Whatever was the latitude allowed its leaders, they were obliged to satisfy the general will of their soldiers: a power impersonal, diffuse, arbitrarily transferable, and which at a given mo- ment resides entirely in the hands of a national guard as well as of a delegate (minister). The rea- son of this is, I think, that this kind of govern- ment, having the habit of legislating on all things in an absolute manner by exhausting at one stroke all legal sanctions, makes everything an affair of state. Besides, such a government is essentially military, both on account of the incapacity of the people to conceive any other political organization than an army, and because of the violent circum- stances which give it birth, and which drive it to eXtremeS. JACQUES DE BOISJOSLIN. O'CONOR, Charles, was born in New York city Jan. 22, 1804, and was admitted to the bar in 1824. He very soon became a recognized leader in his profession, to which he gave himself devot- edly. He has never entered political life, but his national reputation as a constitutional lawyer made him against his will the candidate of those democrats who refused to support Greeley in 1872. (See DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, WI.) A. J. OFFICE - HOLDERS, Danger of an Aris- tocracy of. There is probably no objection to permanent tenure in office, or to tenure during good behavior, which has a stronger hold on that portion of the public which has no direct interest in the spoils system — that is, which does not seek office as the reward of political services— than the objection that it would convert the offi- cers into a sort of aristocracy, whose manners toward those with whom they had to trans- act business would be haughty and overbear- ing. I can hardly describe this objection better than in the words of a western friend of the movement, in a private letter written nearly two years ago. He said: “The people mean by this [an aristocracy of office-holders], that a continu- ance in office of the same set of men creates in the mind of the Office-holder the idea that he owns the Office, and instead of being a public servant, he becomes a master, haughty toward those whom he ought to serve. Is it not quite a general experi- ence with office-holders of long standing, that they are apt to become somewhat overbearing 2 I am inclined to think that they view it in that light, and my experience is based upon conversation with men of ordinary position in Society, who make our majorities for us, who must be educated to whatever of good there is in the reform idea, and must be consulted as to its adoption, if the reform ever becomes permanently ingrafted upon our government and administration.” – If Americans had had any such experience as this of the effect of permanence in office on the manners of office- holders, I admit freely that it would be very diffi- cult for civil-service reformers to make head against it. In politics no a priori argument can stand for a moment with the mass of mankind against actual observation. There would be no use, for instance, in our saying that the effect of appointment through competitive examination upon the character of office-holders would be so improving that they would be sure to be polite and considerate in their intercourse with the peo- ple, if the people had found that permanent offi- cers, selected by any method whatever, were haughty, overbearing, and acted as if the offices were their private property. Nothing is more difficult to eradicate than the remembrance of in- sulting treatment at the hands of an aristocracy of any kind. If the American people had suffered in mind even, though not in body or estate, from such a class at any time since the revolution, and that class happened to be a permanent office- holding class, we should, in short, be forced to admit, that great as might be the abuses of the present system, it was certainly the one best adapted to the conditions of American Society, and that we must make the best of it, just as we make the best of the drawbacks on universal suf- frage. — Curiously enough, however, no trace of any such experience appears in the history of the American civil service. Down to 1820, Office- holders practically held during good behavior. It was considered at first doubtful whether the presi- dent had the discretionary power of removal at all. It was settled in 1789 that he had it, but its exercise was long viewed with great disfa- vor. It was, said Webster, speaking in 1835, “re- garded as a suspected and odious power. Public opinion would not always tolerate it, and still less frequently did it approve it. Something of char- acter, something of the respect of the intelligent and patriotic part of the community, was lost by 20 OFFICE-HOLDERS. every instance of its unnecessary exercise.” And it was very sparingly exercised. During Wash- ington's administration only nine persons were removed from office; during John Adams', ten ; during Jefferson's, thirty-nine ; during Madison's, five ; during John Quincy Adams', only two. In 1820 the first change in this tenure was made by the passage of an act which fixed at four years the term of all those called accounting officers, that is, officers who had the , handling of considerable sums of public money. Now, if this act was due, in part even, to the popular perception of the growth among the office-holders of pride of sta- tion and of a sense of proprietorship in the office, it would undoubtedly have found expression in the discussions which preceded or attended its passage. But there is no trace of any such mo- tive in the reports or chronicles of the day. Noth- ing of the kind appears to have been alleged by the promoters of the measure. In fact, it does not appear to have occurred to any one as an ar- gument likely to help its passage. The bill was due to the fact that there had been many defalca- tions and irregularities among this class of officers, owing to want of proper supervision, and to the belief that if the tenure were limited to four years, and they were thus compelled to account period- ically by mere operation of law, they would be more careful and strict in the discharge of their duties in the meantime. — In 1830 a resolution was introduced in the Senate, calling on the presi- dent for the reason of his removing certain offi- cers; and in the debate which followed, Mr. Ben- ton, of Missouri, stated very clearly and suc- cinctly the motives which animated those who brought about the legislation of 1820. He said: “The legislator in 1820 naturally asked himself what term and tenure of office would attain the desired public security ? To hold for life would be too irresponsible. To fix his tenure during good behavior would not remedy the evils of the old law. There must be a process at law to convict him of the cause before the removing power could be exerted. To make him removable at the will of the president alone, as in the case of 1789, would make the president too absolute; and hence the provision for a term of years, provided he so long behaved faithfully, removable at the pleasure of the appointing power during his term, if he gave cause.” — Now, what were these “evils of the old law,” to which he refers ? He thus describes them, and his description was not gainsaid by anybody : “By the old law there was no summary power except the disputed one of taking care that the laws be faithfully exe- cuted, to arrest the career of official delinquency; and the process was doubtful and dilatory by which the cause of removal was to be established, whether by impeachment, indictment, or by civil suit. The evil of the old law was, that while the government was plodding through some tedious process of law, amidst its delays and proverbial uncertainties, the defaulter could embezzle our funds and ruin our affairs so far as they lay with- in his control, and escape to Texas, etc., before the process had ascertained whether there was lawful cause for removal or not.” – In short, the act of 1820 was intended to provide a safe- guard against peculation. The safeguard, it is true, was a clumsy one, but nobody appears to have thought of it as a safeguard also against the growth of bureaucratic pride and insolence. Webster spoke on the same subject five years later, in a debate on a bill repealing the act of 1820. He was opposed to this act, but he con- fessed that some good had resulted from it. “I agree,” he said, “that it has in some instances secured promptitude, diligence and a sense of responsibility. These were the benefits which those who passed the law expected from it, and these benefits have in some measure been real- ized.” He goes on to say, however, that the bene- fits wrought by the change have been accompa- nied by a far more than equivalent amount of evil—an opinion which, if he were alive to-day, he would probably express in a still stronger and more unqualified form. But neither he nor any of his contemporaries appear to have thought of the act as an act for the abolition of an official aristocracy, nor for reminding office-holders that they were the servants, not the masters, of the people. It made them prompter and more dili- gent than they had been in writing up their books, and in collecting and arranging their vouchers, and in having their balances properly adjusted at the expiration of their term; but nowhere is there any indication that it was intended to reach the evil which we now hear spoken of as the very probable result of a tenure during good behavior, and as the greatest objection to a recurrence in our time to the old system. Webster defended the repealing bill, on the ground that the act of 1820 had given the president too much power, by creating vacancies for him to fill which he would not have ventured to create for himself, and which the constitution, in his (Webster's) view, did not intend that he should have the power of creating, and the creation of which demoralized the service. He advocated the retention of the old tenure during good behavior, leaving the of fenses committed by officers to be punished by some legal process, instead of having the tenure of office settled on the theory that every officer would commit offenses if left undisturbed in his place more than four years. In fact, he advo- cated it on precisely the grounds on which the friends of civil-service reform now advocate it. ‘‘I think,” said he, “it will make the men more dependent on their own good conduct, and less dependent on the will of others. I believe it will cause them to regard their country more, their duty more, and the favor of individuals less. I think it will contribute to official respectability, to freedom of opinion, to independence of char- acter; and I think it will tend in no small degree to prevent the mixture of selfish and personal mo- tives with the exercise of political duties.” But it evidently did not occur to him that it was nec- OFFICE-HOLDERS. 21 essary to show that it would not create a haughty bureaucracy. — The spoils system, as we now know it, was introduced by Jackson. The re- movals, which only amounted to two altogether under John Quincy Adams, suddenly rose in Jackson's first year to nine hundred and ninety. This sudden change in the way of looking at places in the federal service of course provoked a great deal of discussion and denunciation. Jackson's use of his power was fiercely assailed and fiercely defended during his two terms, both in and out of congress. But we may search the debates and the newspapers between 1830 and 1840 in vain for an assertion that the revolution had been called for, or was justified by the effect of security on the manners of office-holders, or by the growth of a feeling among office-holders that their tenure of their places made them a class apart from and superior to the rest of the community. There was, instead, a great deal of assertion in Jackson's defense that, if tenure during good be- havior had lasted, this feeling would have sprung up, just as there is now much prediction that, if this tenure were to be restored, the feeling would spring up. But no one alleged that it had sprung up, and had constituted a reason for beginning the practice of frequent removals, to which the ab- surd name of “rotation” was afterward given. In other words, no attempt was made to justify Jackson's introduction of the régime under which we are now living by pointing out that partic- ular effect of the old régime on the office-holding mind, which is now alleged as the chief obstacle to its restoration. In short, the American people really knows nothing from its own experience, however much it may know in other ways, of the tendency of permanent tenure to create and per- petuate a caste. — The belief that this tendency exists, must, therefore, be a deduction from the experience of foreign nations, or from general principles of human nature. It must rest, in other words, on the assumption that what happens in England or on the European continent is sure to happen here, and that it is his security of tenure which gives the foreign official that sense of his Own Superiority for the display of which he has long been famous. Nothing is older in story than the “insolence of office.” We can go back to no time, in the annals of the old world, when the man “dressed in a little brief authority” was not an object of popular odium. See, it is said, what the manners of the German and Russian, and even the French and English, officials are: such will the manners of our officials be should we ever permit them to hold their places, as these foreigners do, during good behavior, and fail to remind them by frequent or periodical dismissals without cause (which is really what is meant by short fixed terms) of how little consequence they are to the community which they serve. The answer to this is, that the argument rests on the assumption that greater security of tenure con- stitutes the only difference between the condition of the American and that of the European office- holder, whereas there are numerous other differ-, ences. Nothing has so much to do with a man’s manners as the manners of the society in which he lives. No one can wholly, or even in great part, withdraw himself from this influence with- out partial or complete isolation, such as that in which soldiers live in barracks or camp, or monks in their monastery. In order to make any body of men really peculiar, either mentally or physical- ly, we have to take possession of their whole lives, and impose great restrictions on their intercourse with the community at large, and effect a con- siderable, if not complete, severance between their interests and the general interest. No modern state, however, subjects its civil functionaries to any such treatment. They all, out of office hours, live as they please. They marry and are given in marriage, and spend their salaries in precisely the same manner as other salaried peo- ple. Their society is the society of persons of like tastes and like manners. They are, in short, an integral part of the community, getting their livelihood by a kind of labor in which a large body of their fellow-citizens are engaged. A clerk in the postoffice or custom house or treasury, is occupied in very much the same way as a clerk in a banking house or store. If, therefore, the manners of the government officials be marked by any peculiarity not visible in those of employés of private firms, it must be due to something else than the kind of work they do, and the manner in which they spend their salaries. It is due, in fact, to the place held by the governing class in the social and political organization. – If this governing class be a social aristocracy, the office- holders, as the machine through which power is exercised, will naturally, and, indeed, almost in- evitably, contract the habit of looking on them- selves as a part of it. In a society made up of distinctly marked grades, the government officials almost inevitably form a grade, and copy every- body else in looking down on the grades below them. The English or German official gives him- self airs and thinks himself an aristocrat because, as a matter of fact, his official superiors are aris- tocrats, and the government is administered in all the higher branches by an aristocracy. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a servant of the crown to avoid arrogating to himself a share of the crown's dignity. In any country in which politics is largely managed by an aristocracy, the aristo- cratic view of life is sure to permeate the civil as well as the military service, be the terms long or short. In such a country, a great deal of the pleasure of life is derived from the reflection that One has “inferiors.” The nobleman takes Com- fort in his superiority to the commoner; the gen- tleman, in his superiority to the man in trade; the barrister, in his superiority to the attorney; the merchant, in his superiority to the shopkeeper. It would be impossible for any system of appoint- ment or any tenure of office to cut off the govern- ment officers, any more than any other class, from this source of happiness. The social position the 22 OFFICE-HOLDERS. place gives them is one of the rewards of their services, and they would be more than human if they did not reveal their appreciation of it. The state official really shows his sense of his own im- portance no more than, if so much as, any other man who has an assured income and considers his position “gentlemanly.” The manners of the government clerk in England very much resem- ble those of the successful barrister’s clerk, or the clerk in the great banking house; they are neither better nor worse. — If the English and German officials were all appointed and held office under the spoils system, and had their “heads cut off" every time there was a change in the ministry, or a new man got the king's ear, there is every rea- son for believing that they would be much more insolent or overbearing than they are now, as they would share in the excitement of the politi- cal strife, and in the pride of victory, and in the contempt for the vanquished, which form so marked a feature in official life here. They would, too, fall rapidly into the habit, which is so strong among our office-holders, of treating non-official criticism of their manner of perform- ing their duties as simply a weapon in the hands of those who want their places, and not as a help toward the improvement of the public serv- ice. — In the United States, on the other hand, not only are the traditions of the government democratic, but the social organization is demo- cratic. What is of still more importance for our present purpose, the popular view of the social value of different callings is thoroughly demo- cratic. There is little or no conventional dignity attached to any profession or occupation. As there is hardly anything honest which a man may not do for hire without damage to his social posi- tion, so there is hardly anything he can do for hire which will raise the value of his social-posi- tion. In every country in the world the office- holder, like everybody else, bases his own opin- ion of himself and his office on the opinion of them entertained by the public. He thinks highly of them because his neighbors do. The Prussian or English civil or military officer bristles with the pride of station, largely because the public considers his station something to be proud of. So, also, in America, the office-holder does not bristle with pride of station, because nobody thinks his station anything to be proud of. He is not kept humble by the insecurity of his tenure, but by the absence of popular reverence for his place. The custom house or postoffice clerk as a matter of fact knows very well that the world thinks no more of his place than it thinks of the place of a bank clerk or commercial traveler. One of the very odd things in the popular dread of an office-holding aristocracy is, that it arises out of the belief that an aristocracy can build itself up on self-esteem, simply. But no aristocracy has ever been formed in any such way. It grows upon popular admission of its superiority, and not simply on its own estimate of itself. The attempts which have been occasionally made to create an aristocracy in new countries, or in coun- tries in which the respect for station has died out, have always failed miserably for this reason. — Moreover, association with the government and the exercise of a portion of its authority do less, and must always do less, for an office-holder in this than in other countries, because there is here absolutely no mystery about government. Its origin is not veiled from the popular gaze by antiquity, or tradition, or immemorial custom. Nowhere else in the world does sovereignty pre- sent itself in such naked, unadorned simplicity to those who have to live under it. Nowhere else is so little importance attached to permanence either in government office or any other office. In Amer- ica it brings a man no particular credit to remain long in the same position doing the same thing. In fact, with the bulk of the population it brings him some discredit, as indicating a deficiency of the great national attribute of energy. Outside the farming class, the American who passes his life in the position in which he began it, without any extension or change of his business, or with- out in some manner improving his condition by a display of enterprise or activity, is distinctly held to have failed, Or, rather, not to have suc- ceeded. There is probably no country in the world in which the popular imagination is so little touched by a contented and tranquil life in a modest station, or by prolonged fidelity in the discharge of humble duties. Public opinion, indeed, almost exacts of every man the display of a restless and ambitious activity. The popular hero is not the contemplative scholar, or the cau- tious dealer who relies on small but sure profits for a provision for his old age. It is the bold speculator, who takes great risks, and is in con- stant pursuit of fresh markets to conquer, and new demands to supply. It is not “the poor boy” who stays poor and happy, around whom the popular fancy plays admiringly, but the poor boy who becomes a great manufacturer, or the president of a bank or railroad company, or the master of large herds, or the owner of rich mines. The very familiar personage of European count- ing houses and banks, the gray-headed clerk or book-keeper, is almost unknown here. In fact, employers would think but little of the young book-keeper or clerk who made no effort to im- prove his condition, and did not look forward to a change of pursuits before he reached middle life. It may be said, indeed, without exaggera- tion, that the security of tenure which contributes so much to the value of a position in Europe, counts for but little in popular estimate of it in America. Places which “lead to nothing” are not made any more attractive among us by the circumstance that they are easy to keep if one wishes. Indeed, such places are rather avoided by young men whose self-esteem is high, when they are entering on life, and those who accept them are apt to be set down as having, in a cer- tain sense, withdrawn from the race. — In Europe, on the other hand, security or fixity of tenure, OFFICE-HOLDERS. 23 owing to the very much smaller number of chances offered there than here by social and com- mercial conditions to the enterprising and ener- getic man, adds very greatly to the value of an office of any kind, and not only to its value, but to its dignity. The person who has it, even if the Salary be very small, is considered by the public to have drawn one of the prizes of life, and ex- cites envy, rather than commiseration, even among the young. The prodigious eagerness for gov- ernment office in France is due, in a very large degree, to the fact that government offices are permanent—a quality which more than makes up for the extreme smallness of the salaries. In Eng- land commerce competes formidably in the labor market with the crown, and the spirit of the peo- ple is much more adventurous; but the certainty of a small income has even there attractions for the young which are unknown in this country. This certainty always has a powerful influence in exalting the social position of the man who has managed to lay hold of it, in places in which recovery from failure or miscarriage is difficult, and in which mistakes in the choice of a calling are not easily rectified. The whole spirit of Amer- ican society is, however, hostile to the idea that permanence is a thing which a young man will do well to seek. This feeling will, beyond question, operate in one way, if we ever come back to ten- ure in office during good behavior, to lower rather than raise the office-holding class, as a class, in the popular estimation. Far from converting it into an aristocracy, it will probably put a certain stamp of business inferiority on it in the eyes of “the live men,” the pushing, active, busy, ad- venturous multitude, who, after all, make the Standards of social value which are in commonest use. — At present, office holding as a business really gets a kind of credit from its extreme pre- cariousness and uncertainty. It is felt that any- body who gets into it must be in some sense “practical.” He may have failed in trade, or in Some profession, or have, through some moral defect, lost all chance with private employers, but then he must have, if he has got a government office, made himself useful to “an influence ’’ through some kind of “work.” Successful elec- tioneering, for instance, may not require a high order of talent, or very much character, but any- body who achieves it must have push and energy and some knowledge of men, and these are, of course, no mean qualifications for success in life. Any one who possesses them, though he may make a wretched custom house or postoffice clerk, will be sure of a certain amount of consideration from the busy world, which would not be accorded to the modest, easily contented man who, in choosing his calling, seeks only mental peace. In truth, to sum up, there is no country in which it would be so hard for an aristocracy of any kind to be built up as this, and probably no class seek- ing to make itself an aristocracy would, in the United States, have a smaller chance of success than a body composed of unambitious, quiet- minded, unadventurous government officers, do- ing routine work on small salaries, and with but little chance or desire of ever passing from the employed into the employing class. One might nearly as well try to make an aristocracy out of the college professors or public school teachers. — There is no society which at present makes so lit- tle provision for this class as ours. We do noth- ing to turn them to account. They are a class eminently fitted for government service, or any Service of which tenure during good behavior is one of the conditions, and in which fidelity rather than initiative is a leading requirement. At pres- ent they furnish a very large share of the business failures, and contribute powerfully to produce Our panics by being forced into the commercial arena without the kind of judgment or nerve which the commercial struggle calls for. If we tried to economize labor, and put the right men in the right places in our national administrative machine, we should undoubtedly offer this class, which has just the kind of talent and character we need for government work, the thing which most attracts them, by offering them positions which no commercial crisis could put in peril, and which they could hold as long as they did their work well. — Even if it were established, however, that the selection by competitive exami- nation and tenure during good behavior would make the Office-holder feel himself the master of the people, and express his sense of his superior- ity in his behavior, the question whether the pres- ent system establishes a satisfactory relation be- tween the people and the civil servants of the government would still have to be answered. It may be that the thing we propose would be no improvement on the thing that is, but the fact that the existing system has the very defect which it is contended that the new system would have, and which is offered as a fatal objection to the introduction of the new system, is one which the friends of “rotation ” can not expect us to pass over unnoticed. — It may be laid down as one of the maxims of the administrative art, that no pub- lic officer can ever take the right view of his office, or of his relation to the people whom he serves, who feels that he has owed his appointment to any qualification but his fitness, or holds it by any tenure but that of faithful performance. No code of rules can take the place of this feeling. No shortening of the term can take its place. The act of 1820 was simply a very rude, clumsy plan of getting rid of the duty of careful supervision and good discipline. Turning out all the officers every four years, in order to make sure that they keep their accounts well, instead of turning out as soon as possible those who do not keep their accounts well, and retaining as long as possible those who do keep their accounts well, reminds one of the old woman who whipped all . her children every night on a general presumption of blameworthiness. A suggestion of such a scheme of precaution in a bank would excite mer- riment. A man’s best service is given to those 24 OHIO. on whose good opinion he is dependent for the retention of his place. Under the spoils system, places are filled without any reference to the good opinion of the public ; in fact, very often in de- fiance of the public. They are given as rewards to men of whom the public knows nothing, for services of which the public has never heard, and which have generally been rendered to individu- als. An officer who owes his appointment to a party manager for aid given him in politics, can not but feel that his main concern in discharging the duties of his place must be the continued favor of the person to whom he owes it, and not the favor of the public which has had nothing to do with it. It is, consequently, impossible to ex- pect such an officer to feel that the public is his master, or to show in his manner that he is in any way dependent on its good opinion. He feels that the boss or senator who got him his place is his master, and that his mode of discharging his duty must be such as to merit his approbation. He does not fancy that he himself owns the office, but he fancies that another man does, and as long as he considers it the property of any one man, it makes little difference to the public which man. — The only way in which the proprietorship of the public can ever be brought home to office- holders is through a system which, whatever its modus operand, makes capacity the one reason for appointment, and efficiency the one safeguard against dismissal. No such system now exists here. Those who say that the plan of the civil- service reformers would not produce it may be right, but it is not open to them to make in sup- port of their opposition a charge which is notori- ously true of the system they are upholding. Whether the proposed change, therefore, be the best one or not, some change, it must be admitted, is imperatively necessary. In fighting against any change, we are trying to avoid that adapta- tion of our administrative system to the vast social and commercial changes of the past half century, from which no civilized people can now escape, and which all the leading nations of Europe have effected or are effecting. who takes the trouble to examine the reforms which have been carried out since 1815, in France, or England, or Germany, which in all these coun- tries have amounted to a social transformation, will be surprised to find how much of them con- sists simply in improvements in administration, Or, rather, how fruitless the best legislative changes would have been without improved ad- ministrative machinery for their execution. We Can not very much longer postpone the work which other nations have accomplished, and nei- ther can we avoid it by plans—like Mr. Pendle- ton's constitutional amendment—for getting rid of responsibility by making more executive offices elective. This, like the act of 1820, is simply a makeshift. Nobody pretends that elected post- masters would be any better than, or as good as, properly appointed postmasters All that can be Said for them is, that they would save the president Any one a good deal of trouble under the present spoils system. But the remedy for one absurdity is not to be found in another absurdity. When a thing is being done by a wrong method, we do not mend matters by trying another wrong method. The true cure for the defects in the present sys- tem of transacting public business is, the adoption of the methods which are found successful in pri- vate business. These are well known. They are as old as civilization. They are gradually taking possession of government business all over the world. Our turn will come next, and, in spite of “politics,” will probably come soon.* E. L. GODKIN. OHIO, a state of the American Union, formed from the northwest territory. (See ORDINANCE OF 1787; TERRITORIES.) Its territory north to latitude 41° was a part of the Virginia cession; the remainder was a part of the Connecticut ces- sions, in which Connecticut retained the owner- ship but not the jurisdiction of the tract along Lake Erie, since known as the Connecticut reserve. The name of the state was given from that of the river which is its southern boundary, a more euphonic corruption of the Indian name You- ghiogheny. — By the act of May 7, 1800, that part of the northwest territory now included in Ohio was set off under a distinct territorial government, and the remainder was organized as the territory of Indiana. (See INDIANA.) By the act of April 30, 1802, the people of Ohio were “authorized to form for themselves a constitution and state gov- ernment,” and a convention at Chillicothe, Nov. 1–29, 1802, formed the first constitution, which went into force without submission to popular vote. The act of Feb. 19, 1803, did not purport to admit the state, but declared that Ohio, by the formation of its constitution in pursuance of the act of April 30, 1802, “has become one of the United States of America,” and provided for the extension of federal laws to the new state. It is therefore a little doubtful whether Ohio as a state dates from Nov. 29, 1802, or from Feb. 19, 1803: the latter is the date, if the precedents in the case of the admitting acts of all other new states are to govern this case; the former, if we are to be gov- ermed by the express language of the act of Feb. 19, 1803. —Bound ARIES. The boundaries assigned by the enabling act and the state constitution were as follows: east, the Pennsylvania line; south, the Ohio river; west, a due north line from the mouth of the Great Miami river; and north, an east and west line drawn through the southerly extreme of Lake Michigan to Lake Erie, and thence through the lake to the Pennsylvania line. It was, how- ever, doubtful at the time whether this northern boundary would meet Lake Erie east of the “Miami river of the lake” [Maumee]; if it should prove to do so, both the enabling act and the * This article was originally printed in pamphlet form as one of the publications of the civil-service reform associa- tion, with whose kind permission, together with the permis- sion of the author, it appears here.—ED. OHIO. 25 state constitution reserved the power to so amend it as to make the Maumee the terminus of the east and west line. Before Michigan was admit- ted as a state, it was ascertained that a direct eastward line, as originally proposed, would enter Lake Erie so far east as to give to Michigan about half of Ohio's lake coast, and a valuable strip of land in the north, including the city of Toledo. Michigan pressed her claim, and the dispute rose to such a height as to be given the popular title of the “Toledo war.” It was settled by the act of June 15, 1836, to admit Michigan as a state: its first section provided that the northern bound- ary of Ohio should not be a direct east and west line, but should trend to the north far enough to strike the most northerly cape of Maumee bay, thus giving Ohio the territory in dispute. Michi- gan at first rejected but afterward accepted admis- sion on these terms. – CONSTITUTIONS. The first constitution, mentioned above, made manhood suffrage universal, on one year's residence; pro- vided for a house of representatives to number not less than twenty-four nor more than seventy- two members, to serve one year, and for a senate not more than one-half nor less than one-third the number of the house, to be chosen by districts and to serve two years; made two-thirds of each house a quorum to do business; gave the gov- ernor a term of two years; and prohibited slav- ery. The governor was to be chosen by popu- lar vote, but was to have no veto power, nor any other power than to grant reprieves and pardons, convene extra sessions of the legisla- ture, command the state forces, commission appointees, and temporarily fill vacancies occur- ring when the legislature was not in Session. The secret of this restriction upon the govern- or's powers, which was continued in the con- stitution of 1851, may probably be found in the frequent disagreements which had taken place between Governor St. Clair and the territorial legislatures. – A new constitution was framed by a convention at Columbus, May 6 – July 9, 1850, and Cincinnati, Dec. 2, 1850 – March 10, 1851, and was ratified, June 17, by a popular vote of 126,663 to 109,699. Its main alterations were that the sessions of the legislature were now to be biennial; a complicated apportionment system, apparently modeled on that of Massachusetts, was introduced; state officers, except the governor, were to be chosen by the legislature; the legislature was for- bidden to loan the state's credit to corporations or to create corporations by special laws; and the judiciary was made elective. — A new constitution was framed by a convention at Columbus, May 14– Aug. 8, 1873, and Cincinnati, Dec. 2, 1873– May 14, 1874; but it was rejected by very heavy popular majorities, Aug. 18. A Subsequent at- tempt to revise the judiciary system was also a failure. — Chillicothe was the state capital until 1810, and Zanesville until 1812. In February, 1812, the legislature accepted the offers of a land company to lay out a capital, and erect a state house and penitentiary. The new city was called Columbus, and the state government was removed thither in December, 1816. The constitution of 1851 formally designated it as the capital. — GOVERNORs. Edward Tiffin, 1802–8; Samuel Huntington, 1808–10; R. J. Meigs, 1810–14; Thos. Worthington, 1814–18; Ethan A. Brown, 1818– 22; Jeremiah Morrow, 1822–6; Allen Trimble, 1826–30; Duncan McArthur, 1830–32; Robert Lucas, 1832–6; Joseph Vance, 1836–8; Wilson Shannon, 1838–40; Thomas Corwin, 1840–42; Wil- son Shannon, 1842–4; Mordecai Bartley, 1844–6; William Bebb, 1846–50; Reuben Hood, 1850–54; William Medill, 1854–6; Salmon P. Chase, 1856–60; William Denison, 1860–62; David Tod, 1862–4; John Brough, 1864-6; J. D. Cox, 1866–8; R. B. Hayes, 1868–72; Edward F. Noyes, 1872–4; William Allen, 1874–6; R. B. Hayes, 1876–8; R. M. Bishop, 1878–80; Charles Foster, 1880–84.— POLITICAL HISTORY. Ohio was admitted to the Union at a time (1802–3) when there was practi- cally but one party in the country, outside of New England; it was therefore of necessity a republican (or democratic) state from the begin- ning. It was such of choice also; the great dem- ocratic features of policy at the time, the acquisi- tion of Louisiana, the war of 1812, and the oppo- sition to a national bank, were all very popular in Ohio, and for thirty years there was little or no opposition to the democratic party in the state's elections. In local politics the most noteworthy features were due to the great mass of power which the constitution had concentrated in the legislature. That body, provoked by certain de- cisions of the state judges on the validity of state laws, passed its so-called “sweeping resolution,” Jan. 7, 1810, declaring that, as the state had been organized in 1802, and as the judicial term of office was “seven years,” the seats of all state judges were now vacant, no matter when their incumbents had been appointed. The judges held to their offices, and the “sweeping resolu- tion” failed, except in causing a momentary con- fusion. Again, in 1818, the legislature attacked the state branch of the United States bank (see BANK CONTROVERSIES, III.), but the attempt was defeated by the United States supreme court, and was finally abandoned under cover of several angry resolutions. – Schemes of internal improve- ment, chiefly in the form of roads and canals, early found favor in Ohio, so that, when the new distribution of national parties took place in 1824–30, a strong vote was developed for Adams and Clay, and the policy of internal improvements and a protective tariff which they represented. In 1824 Clay obtained the electoral vote of the state by a slight plurality over Adams and Jack- son; in 1828 and 1832 Jackson obtained a major- ity of only # of 1 per cent. of the popular vote. In 1829 a Clay governor was elected, and the state government was nominally whig until 1838. The electoral vote of the state was given to Harrison in 1836. — In 1837–8 began a general course of democratic success in the state, which lasted until 1855, with but two important breaks, the presi- 26 OHIO. dential elections of 1840 and 1844. In both of these the state's electoral votes were given to the whig candidates, Harrison and Clay respectively, and the whig candidates for governor were carried in by the current. In 1845 the whig leg- islature sent Corwin to the senate, in which the state was represented by democrats from 1837 until 1855, with the exceptions of Corwin and Chase. — At its meeting in December, 1848, the lower house of the legislature was unable to organ- ize for some time. The vote of Cincinnati had long made the five Hamilton county members democratic; the last whig legislature had there- fore divided the county into two districts, thus securing two whig members. The democrats ignored the act as unconstitutional, and elected five members, as usual. The election clerk gave the two disputed democratic members certificates. In December the democrats swore in forty-two members, including Pugh and Pierce, of Hamil- ton county; and the whigs thirty-two, including Spencer and Runyon, contestants. Neither side would act with the other, and two inchoate houses were organized; but neither had the two-thirds majority necessary for a quorum. The dead-lock was broken by an agreement that the seventy uncontested members should organize the house, and Pugh and Pierce were seated, Jan. 26, 1849, by a vote of 32 to 31. Chase's election as United States senator in 1849 seems to have been at least partially influenced by this dispute. A strong anti-slavery element had always existed in the state democratic party, represented by such lead- ers as Thomas Morris and Benjamin Tappan. In this legislature the whigs and free-soil whigs together exactly equaled the numbers of the democrats, and the balance of power was held by two independent free-soilers. These agreed to vote with the democrats on nominations for state officers if the latter would repeal the “black laws” of the state against negroes (see SLAVERY, II.), and elect S. P. Chase, a free-soil democrat, to the senate. The bargain was carried out, Feb. 22, 1849, and Chase was elected. — In 1846 and 1848 the whig candidate for governor, Bebb, was elected by a narrow majority in both cases (116,900 to 114,570, and 147,738 to 146,461); but in 1848 the electoral votes were democratic by a plurality. In 1850 Wood, a democrat, was elected governor by a vote of 133,093 to 121,105 whig, and 13,802 free-soil; and in 1853 the vote for Medill, democrat, was 147,663 to 85,820 whig, and 50,346 free-soil. In 1854 the whig and free-soil vote was united under the name of the republican party. Its first state convention was held at Co- lumbus, July 13, 1854; and its nominee for gov- ernor, Chase, was elected in 1855 by a vote of 146,641 to 131,091 for Medill, and 24,310 for Trimble (American). The legislature was heavily republican in both branches, and the congressional delegation of twenty-one members was unani- mously republican. In 1856 the electoral vote of the state was given to Fremont; it has since been given to the republican candidates invariably, the only very close popular vote being in 1876, when Hayes received 330,698, Tilden 323,182, and 4,769 were scattering.—From 1856 until 1860 the repub- licans held general control of the state, though in 1857 a democratic legislature was chosen, and Gov. Chase was only re-elected by 1,481 majority over Henry B. Payne. During all this period the old national road through the middle of the state (see CUMBERLAND ROAD) was a sort of Mason and Dixon’s line between the democratic southern and the republican northern halves of the state. The outbreak of the rebellion brought the state into a greater national prominence than it had hitherto had. The high intellectual and physical standard of the population enabled it to contribute more than its share of military and civil leaders, Mc- Dowell, McClellan, Rosecrans, Grant, Buell, O. M. Mitchell, W. T. Sherman, Gillmore, Sheridan, McPherson, McCook, Custer, Stanton, Wade, Chase, John Sherman, Hayes, and Garfield, were all born or resident in the state in 1861. The en- thusiasm for the war, and the close union of the war democrats and republicans made the state majority heavy and steady: war appropriations in 1861 were made by unanimous votes of both parties; and the republicans nominated former democrats for governor, Tod in 1861, Brough in 1863, and Cox in 1865. In 1863 the arrest of Wallandigham (see HABEAs CoRPUs) obtained for him the democratic nomination for governor; but after an excited canvass he was defeated by a popular vote of 247,194 to 185,274, and a soldiers’ vote of 41,467 to 2,288; total majority, 101,099. The state remained republican until 1873, except that in 1867, when Hayes defeated Thurman for the governorship, by the narrow majority of 2,983, the legislature was democratic in both branches by majorities of one and seven respect- ively. The new legislature rescinded the rati- fication of the 14th amendment, Jan. 15, 1868, and rejected the 15th amendment, April 1, 1869. (See ConstLTUTION, III.) — In 1873 the demo- crats nominated for governor William Allen, who had not been in political life since his retire- ment from the senate in 1849, and he defeated Governor Noyes by a vote of 214,654 to 213,837, and 20,387 scattering. The legislature was also democratic, but the other state officers elected were republicans. In 1875 the republicans brought back ex-Governor Hayes as a candidate, and he defeated Allen by a plurality of 5,644, the legislature again becoming republican. This suc- cess obtained for Governor Hayes the republican nomination for the presidency in the following year. The state has since remained republican, except that in 1877, on a light vote, the democrats elected the governor and a majority of both branches of the legislature. The new legislature proceeded to change the congressional districts of the state, which had been laid out after the census of 1870, and to reorganize the state institutions, so as to obtain a party control of them; but its work in both respects was undone by the follow- ing legislature, which was republican. — During OLIGARCHY. 27 the period 1868–75 the political contests of Ohio were of national importance from the attitude of the parties. In the democratic party the “Ohio idea,” that United States bonds not specifically pay- able in coin should be paid in “greenbacks,” and that national bank 110tes should be superseded by government issues of paper money, had obtained control, under the leadership at first of Pendle- ton, and then of Ewing; and the republican party had been gradually forced to take a “hard money” attitude. The Allen-Noyes and Hayes- Allen canvasses had taken this direction; and both the success of Hayes and the defeat of Allen in 1875 had a strong influence on the party plat- forms of the next year, which ended the question. Since that time the regulation of the liquor traffic has become a leading question. (See PROHIBI- TION.) The republicans at first adopted and passed the so-called “Pond law,” for the taxation of liquor selling; but this was decided unconstitu- tional by the state supreme court, May 30, 1882. The republicans then passed the “Scott law,” which was upheld by the state court in June, 1883. It forbids liquor selling or opening Saloons on Sundays, and levies a tax of $200 yearly on general liquor sellers, and $100 on sellers of malt liquors, the whole tax to go into the county and municipal treasuries. – From 1860 until 1883 the republicans had a majority of the state's Con- gressmen, except in 1875–7 and 1879–81. In the congress of 1883–5 there are thirteen democratic representatives and eight republicans; and the legislature is (1884) democratic by sixty to fif- teen in the house, and twenty-two to eleven in the senate. — Among the state's political leaders have been S. P. Chase, J. A. Garfield, W. H. Har- rison, R. B. Hayes, John McLean, George H. Pen- dleton, John Sherman, E. M. Stanton, A. G. Thur- man, and Benj. F. Wade (see those names), and the following: William Allen, democratic con- gressman 1833–5, United States senator 1837–49, and governor 1874–6; James M. Ashley, republi- can congressman 1859–69; John A. Bingham, re- publican congressman 1855–63 and 1865–73, and minister to Japan since 1873; David K. Cartter, democratic congressman 1849–53, minister to Bolivia 1861–2, and since 1863 chief justice of the District of Columbia; S. F. Cary, republican congressman 1867–9, democratic candidate for lieutenant governor in 1875, and greenback candi- date for vice-president in 1876; Thomas Corwin, whig congressman 1831–40, governor 1840–42, United States senator 1845–50, secretary of the treasury under Fillmore 1850–53, republican con- gressman 1859–61, and minister to Mexico 1861–4; Jacob D. Cox, major general of volunteers, governor 1866–8, secretary of the interior under Grant 1869–70, and republican congressman 1877–9; Samuel S. Cox, democratic congressman 1857–65, and democratic congressman from New York 1869–85; Columbus Delano, whig congress- man 1845–7, republican congressman 1865–9, and secretary of the interior 1870–75; Thomas Ewing, whig United States senator 1831–7 and 1850–51, Secretary of the treasury under Harrison 1841, and of the interior under Taylor 1849–50; Thomas Ewing (son of the preceding), democratic con- gressman 1877–9; Joshua R. Giddings, anti-slavery whig and free-soil congressman 1838–59, and consul general of Canada 1861–4; Walter Q. Gresham, postmaster general in 1883; Wm. S. Groesbeck, democratic congressman 1857–9; Joseph W. Keifer, republican congressman 1877–85, and speaker 1881–3; William Lawrence, republican congressman 1865–71 and 1873–7; Stanley Matthews, republican United States sena- tor 1877–9, and justice of the United States su- preme court since 1881; John A. McMahon, demo- cratic congressman 1875–83; Return J. Meigs, democratic United States senator 1809–10, gov- ernor 1810–14, and postmaster general 1814–23 (see ADMINISTRATIONs); Thomas Morris, state chief justice 1830–33, and democratic United States sena- tor 1833–9; George E. Pugh, Douglas democratic United States senator 1855–61; Milton Sayler, democratic congressman 1873–83; Robert C. Schenck, whig congressman 1848–51, minister to Brazil 1851–3, major general of volunteers 1861–3, republican congressman 1863–71, and minister to Great Britain 1871–6; Wilson Shannon, demo- cratic governor 1838–40 and 1842–4, minister to Mexico 1844–5, congressman 1853–5, and governor of Kansas 1855–6; Samuel Shellabarger, repub- lican congressman 1861–3, 1865–9 and 1871–3; Noah H. Swayne, justice of the United States supreme court 1861–81 ; Edward Tiffin, first governor of the state, and United States senator 1807–9; Amos Townsend, republican congress- man 1877–83; and Clement L. Wallandigham, dem- ocratic congressman 1858–63. — See authorities. under ORDINANCE OF 1787 for the territorial history; 2 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; Chase's Statutes of Ohio; Schuckers' Life of S. P. Chase, Moris' Life of Thomas Morris; Taylor's History of Ohio; Atwater's History of Ohio; Mitchener's Annals of Ohio; Way's Toledo War; Carpenter's History of Ohio; Studer's History of Columbus, O.; Reid’s Ohio in the War (the elec- tion of 1863 is at 1: 153); Report of Secretary of State, 1873 (for governors); 2 Stat. at Large, 58, 173, 201 (for acts of May 7, 1800, April 30, 1802, and Feb. 19, 1803). ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. OLIGARCHY. The rule of a few. Aristotle, after enumerating the governments which he calls governments in the general interest, mon- archy, aristocracy and the republic, treats of gov- ernments in the interest of individuals, tyranny, oligarchy and democracy (see OCHLOCRACY), which seem to him the corruption of the first three. “Hobbes,” says Barthélemy St. Hilaire, “has justly remarked (Imperium, vii., 3), that ‘ these three second denominations are all hated and de- spised, but that they do not designate governments of different principles; this is precisely what Aris- totle understood when he employed the word corruption.’”—“Oligarchy,” says Aristotle, “is the political predominance of the rich, and democ- 28 OPPOSITION. racy, the political predominance of the poor to the exclusion of the rich.” To the objection: but what if the rich be the more numerous and gov- ern, or if the poor be the less numerous and gov- ern? he replies, that the rule of the minority in democracies and that of the majority in oligar- chies are wholly accidental, because the rich every- where constitute the minority, and the poor every- where the majority. “The two parties,” con- tinues impartial Aristotle, “claim exclusively each for itself the right to make the law, and, indeed, this right belongs to both of them up to a certain point, but this right is not absolute in the one or the other. On the One hand, superior in a single point, in wealth, for instance, they think them- selves superior in all ; on the other hand, equal in one point, in liberty, for instance, they think themselves absolutely equal ; the main object is forgotten on both sides. If political association was a commercial association for the purpose of gain, the share of the associated in the state would be in direct proportion to their investment, and the partisans of oligarchy would be in the right; but the object of political association is not only the existence of the associated, but their happi- ness, the well-being of families and of the differ- ent classes of the people. Those who bring the most (by their talents) to the general fund of the association, have a greater share in the state than those who, equal or superior in point of liberty or birth, have, notwithstanding, less political virtue; a greater share than those who, superior in wealth, are inferior in merit.” To whom, then, should sovereignty belong? To the multitude, to the wealthy, to the good, to a single individual of superior talents, to a tyrant? “Neither to these nor to others,” says Aristotle, “but to the law.” And if one of the elements of the political body must be preferred, Aristotle would incline in favor of the multitude, for the reason that, if each in- dividually errs in judgment, in the aggregate all judge well. (Book iii.) But the government which seems to him to best assure the reign of the law is the republic (IToàzz &ia) which borrows its principles from oligarchy and democracy. If he had been asked how the alliance of these two governments, which he calls corrupt, could give birth to the best of all governments, he would doubtless have answered that they were only bad because they were exclusive, and that political wisdom should be the reconciliation of these two elements. – Aristotle enumerates four kinds of oligarchy. (Book vi.) In the first, the magis- tracy and the legislative power are accessible to citizens paying a rather large amount of taxes. In the Second, the amount of taxes is consider- able, and the body of the magistrates is self-re- cruiting. In the third, public offices are heredi- tary. character of public offices, the sovereignty of the magistrates takes the place of the reign of the law. The first of these oligarchies is very near akin to aristocracy or democracy; the last is “a dynasty or government of force, the most detest- In the fourth, besides this hereditary able of all.” Oligarchies may maintain them- selves by ministering to the material well-being of the people and to their artistic wants, a capital consideration in the time of Aristotle. (Book vii.) But as avarice is the vice peculiar to oli- garchies, (this is also Plato's opinion), their gov- ernment, together with tyranny, is the least stable of all. The rivalry of the powerful, their mis- conduct, their acts of violence, the creation of another oligarchy in the bosom of the first, the ambition of some who begin to flatter the people, the influence of mercenary troops, all these are so many causes of ruin. Lastly, that which injures them most is, “that they deceive the lower classes.” (Book vi., 3.) They should, above all, refrain from taking such oaths, he says, as they take to-day in some states: “I will always be the enemy of the people, and I will do them all the harm I can.” (Book vii., 7.) — We have quoted these passages from Aristotle, because they throw light upon the social state of antiquity, and be- cause they serve to show the difference between ancient and modern politics. Thus, the moderns are nearer the etymology of the word than Aris- totle himself, when they call oligarchy the gov- ernment of a small number, without alluding to the wealthy, to the people, to good men, or to virtue. In many states a minority, all powerful through terror, constitutes an oligarchy in an assembly democratically elected. The oligarchy of the council of ten, at Venice, was a concentra- tion of the aristocracy; but that of the ephors at Sparta and that of the tribunes at Rome served as a counterpoise to the authority of the Senate. An oligarchy may succeed abruptly to a monarchic or popular government. Modern revolutions have put in power, under the form of oligarchy, dicta- tors elected by the people, or by a fraction of the people, and governing in its name or their own, but always opposed to aristocracies. – The oli- garchic government of the ancients was rarely met with except in small states, in free cities, a most favorable theatre for such a concentration of collective power. This is also the case in modern times, not only in what have been called “free cities,” but in other states. Oligarchy is wont to be established in a great nation, when, on account of an insurrection or a war, it is for the time being reduced to the condition of the ancient city. JACQUES DE BOISJOSLIN. OLMSTEAD CASE. (See PENNSYLVANIA.) OMNIBUS BILL. (See PARLIAMENTARY LAW.) OPINION, Public. (See PUBLIC OPINION.) OPPOSITION. The word opposition, in poli- tics, has two distinct meanings. Properly, it is the resistance which dissenting parties offer to the acts of the government, because their interests or opinions are at variance with such acts. It is also used to designate the parties from which this OPPOSITION. 29 resistance proceeds. These parties may vary ad $nfinitum in point of numbers, intelligence and power; but they always constitute the opposi- tion. An individual citizen also may resist the government, but even if he were an insurgent satrap he would be only an opponent, not the opposition. — Opposition may exist elsewhere than in the political field. Religious opinions and even religions may engage in a struggle with each other. The dissenting parties resist and sometimes overthrow the established authority. The strug- gles of Christianity against Polytheism, of Protest- antism against Catholicism, and of the philosophic spirit against the principle of authority, are so many examples of opposition awakened in the moral world, and which have reacted most pow- erfully upon politics. True, religious and philo- sophical oppositions differ from those purely po- litical by the very nature of the metaphysical problems from which they spring: the destiny of man, the relations between God and the world, the government of things here below by provi- dence. The religious struggle is carried on ardently, passionately, but with little noise; the new belief employs no arms except those of per- Suasion. Ideas are elaborated in the seclusion of the study, and are propagated slowly, progres- sively, in men's consciences. Political opposition has quite another field. It inflames the crowd in the cause of interests less sacred, doubtless, but not unimportant, and produces more immediate agitation. It is the only form for which cus- tom has reserved the name of opposition, and the only one with which we have to do here. — The existence of a party of opposition always Sup- poses a certain degree of liberty and of the right of investigation. A despotic government admits of no opposition, and no argument. It can only be resisted by force, and it has no alternative but to conquer or to perish, like the Roman emperors whom triumphant revolt dragged down the steps of the Aventine Hill leading to the Tiber. — Where there exists an infallible authority, or what pretends to be such, opposition has no Taison d’être and is not tolerated. Just as relig- ions allow no contradiction of their dogmas, theocracies and governments by divine right, which attribute to themselves a part of their in- fallibility, exclude all opposition. It is therefore only in free governments, in which man’s activity has free play, in which his faculties are developed without hindrance, and in which his reason has sovereign command, that opposition can find a place, not by toleration, but as a right. Opposi- tion is born of a diversity of opinions, which can be reduced to unity by no art or science, however great the effort. It answers to the divergence of interests, the rivalry and struggles of which are at the bottom of all questions, and form the warp and woof of history. Parties are formed, struggle, and contend with one another for influence and the control of the government. Doubtless a great many petty rivalries, a great many questions of persons and egotistical ambitions, enter into their disputes. But we must contemplate these strug- gles from a higher plane and as a whole; great principles are engaged in them and govern them. The eternal problem of human affairs is forever reappearing in them under one of its myriad forms; in the fierce battles which he wages, it is to ideas that man devotes himself; and his honor is to die for them. Let us take as an example the glorious, little, agitated and turbulent republics of Greece. A question of principle, of sovereignty, divided them, such as: “Shall the aristocracy or the democracy rule? Sparta or Athens?” And the struggle was carried on not only in states and cities; in every city the two parties were arrayed against each other, the one in power, the other constituting the opposition. What vicissitudes in the life of these parties so changeable, so quickly organized and so quickly dissolved; one * day in possession of favor and success, of popu- larity and of the votes of the multitude, the next forsaken, annihilated; in turn and almost without interval, conquerors and conquered! — In modern society the right of discussion, and consequently of opposition, is the very soul of representative government. This right applies not only to the making of the laws and the voting of taxes, in which the people take part through their repre- sentatives, but to all the parts of legislation, and to all public services. Opposition may even go beyond this, and attack the government and its principle. The ideal of representative govern- ment does not allow this sort of radical opposi- tion. It is necessary that there should be, beyond all reach of discussion, a stable, fixed point, and a principle which can not be contested. In the moral world, as in the physical, motion Sup- poses an immovable point. The constitution, whose object is the conservation of the state as a political body, may indeed, be criticised, but it can not allow itself to be denied or its prin- ciple to be overthrown. All opposition, there- fore, is outside the law from the moment that it denies the political pact and seeks not the control of the government but its destruction. Hence, even in the very countries in which political com- motions are most frequent, and in which power is oftenest shaken by revolution, we see that each government tries to put its principle at least be- yond the reach of the storm, and puts the consti- tution under the safeguard of an oath. The reason is, that, wherever the constitution is called in question, normal political life has ceased to exist, and revolution has taken its place. —Eng- land is a country which affords the world the grand spectacle of a government whose prin- ciple is accepted by all. This principle is the fixed, immovable point to which we referred above, the light-house whose foundation is beaten by the billows, but whose summit towers serenely above the storm. In such a country the opposi- tion bears only on the direction of public affairs, on questions of influence and of persons. We need not inquire by what vicissitudes England had to pass to reach this condition of calm and of 30 ORDINANCE OF 1787. union. — What combination of circumstances is necessary, in order that hostile parties may be. come extinguished or abdicate 2 How long may their opposition last 2 It is plain that in the infinite variety of human affairs, no fixed rules can be laid down here. — The old Greek theogony represents discord and friendship in the midst of the elements, co-operating in the work of the gods. The one divides the forces of nature, the other restores them to unity, and the two together pro- duce the general harmony of the universe. Op- position, like discord, doubtless has its part to play in the harmony of the life of nations. “Ev- ery force in nature is despotic, as is all will in man. A single plant would soon cover the earth, by reproduction, if the other plants allowed it free course.” (Rivarol.) Opposition is an ob- stacle in the way of invading forces, and keeps them within their just limits. It obliges power to keep an attentive watch over its own acts, and, if we may take a witticism for an axiom, we would be obliged to admit even that it is the Safeguard of power; since we can lean only upon that which offers resistance. — In a regular repre- sentative government the opposition is always the minority. ous and powerful, it assumes control of affairs, and finds the other party arrayed against it as the opposition. The opposition may be weak, or it may be strong; it may be homogeneous, or be composed of discordant and contradictory ele- ments, united only for the needs of the struggle; in this case it constitutes a coalition. Oppositions usually have a marvelous aptitude for self-disci- pline; every opposition has a tendency to provide itself with leaders and to become systematic; that is, not to confine itself to criticism of isolated acts of the government, but to condemn them and combat them em masse. — In divided countries in which the governing power is not universally accepted, it is rarely the opposition which precip- itates revolutions; it prepares the way for them. Most frequently at the last moment it recoils before its own work. It confines itself to paving the road, to preparing the arena into which politi- cal parties are about to enter, and in which the forces of insurrection or of the government are to decide the fate of the state. We are not, how- ever, without examples of oppositions which, vic- torious and sustained by the people, have suc- ceeded in forcing a constitution upon the govern- ment, and in accomplishing a peaceful revolution. —The opposition has more than one advantage Over the government party. In the first place, the part it has to play is less difficult: criticism is easy, while art is difficult. The opposition which criticises is not, like the government party, respon- sible for its acts; its work is collective, and there- fore impersonal. Moreover, as the public think that it is more honorable to attack power than to flatter it, and do not see that under many circum- stances it requires more courage to defend it than to combat it, the opposition easily obtains the favor of popularity. This popularity sometimes As soon as it becomes the more numer- deludes the minds of even well intentioned men, who allow themselves to believe that the opposi- tion is necessarily in advance of the government, that it is a means and a condition of progress. This is sometimes the case, but not always. The Opposition may be more enlightened and liberal than the party in power; but it may be less so. Reason and truth are no more the exclusive attri- butes of the governed than of the governing. Hence it can not be said absolutely that the oppo- sition holds in its hands the future of civilization and the destinies of the world. Nevertheless, experience shows that governments, save in ex- ceptional cases which are always rare, in which the head of the state is a man of genius, incline more frequently to immobility than to progress, and generally oppose the force of inertia to the most necessary reforms. The impulse must then come from without, and the motive power is the opposition. — The work of oppositions thus par- takes both of good and evil. But they number in their history pages of incomparable brilliancy. Posterity should not forget that in the ranks of the opposition there have been found united, courage and virtue; that they have called forth the noblest bursts of patriotism and the sublimest accents of eloquence ; that great characters have been formed in them; that generous hearts have fought with them, and with them devoted them- selves to humanity. What matters it after this that all the causes favored by oppositions have not triumphed ? Doubtless, by the side of oppositions inspired by great principles, we find others petty, mean and retrogressive. Some have marked their passage by fertile ideas; others have by degrees become weakened and finally dropped into silence and forgetfulness. In the work of man error is ephemeral. Truth survives. We must credit opposition, the daughter of free investigation, with its truths, and pardon its errors. (Compare PARTIES, POLITICAL.) EMILE CHäDIEU. ORDER OF THE DAY. (See PARLIAMENT- ARY L.A.W.) - ORDERS IN COUNCIL. (See EMBARGo, in U. S. History.) ORDERS, Religious. (See CONGREGATIONS.) ORDINANCE OF 1787 (IN U. S. HISTORY). The organic law under which took place the or- ganization of the territory west of Pennsylvania, east of the Mississippi, and north of the Ohio. — The acquisition of the “northwest territory” by the United States is elsewhere given. (See TER- RITORIES.) After the completion of the Virginia cession, Jefferson, as chairman of a committee of three on the subject, reported to the congress of the confederation a plan for the temporary govern. ment of the western territory. As the conflicting claims of the partisans of Jefferson, Rufus King and Nathan Dane are apt to confuse the reader, it seems best to give the peculiar features of Jeffer- ORDINANCE OF 1787. 31 son's report, which was adopted April 23, 1784. 1. It covered the whole western territory, ceded or to be ceded, south as well as north of the Ohio. 2. Seventeen states, each two degrees in length from north to south, were to be gradually formed from it; one between Pennsylvania and a north and south line through the mouth of the Great Kanawha; eight in a north and south tier, bounded on the west by a north and south line through the great falls of the Ohio; and the remaining eight in a corresponding tier bounded west by the Mis- sissippi. Even the names were to have been pro- vided for the prospective states of the northwest, including such singular designations as Cherso- nesus, Sylvania, Assemisipia, Metropotamia, Poly- potamia and Pelisipia, together with the less remarkable titles of Saratoga, Washington, Mich- igania and Illinoia. 3. “After the year 1800 there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states other than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” This prohibition, therefore, was to have been prospective, not im- mediate, and to have applied to all new states from the gulf of Mexico to British America. This proviso was voted on, April 19. New Hamp- shire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania voted for it; Mary- land, Virginia and South Carolina, against it; North Carolina was divided; and New Jersey, Delaware and Georgia were unrepresented. Not having seven states in favor, the proviso was lost. Delaware and Georgia were entirely unrepre- sented; New Jersey had one delegate present, who voted for the proviso, but a state was not “repre- sented” except by at least two delegates. The language of the proviso, however, became a model for every subsequent restriction upon slavery. (See COMPROMISEs, IV. ; WILMOT PROVISO; Con- STITUTION, Amendment XIII.) 4. The states were forever to be a part of the United States, to be subject to the government of the United States, and to the articles of confederation, and to have republican governments. 5. The whole was to be a charter of compact and fundamental consti- tutions between the new states and the thirteen original states, unalterable but by joint consent of congress and the state in which an alteration should be proposed to be made. With the adop- tion of the report, except the anti-slavery section, Jefferson’s connection with the work ceased. He entered the diplomatic service in the following month, and remained abroad' until October, 1789. — March 16, 1785, Rufus King, of Massachusetts, afterward of New York, offered a resolution that slavery in the whole western territory be immedi- ately prohibited. The language is Jefferson's, ex- cluding the words “after the year 1800,” and changing “duly convicted ” into “personally guilty.” By a vote of eight states to three this was committed, and a favorable report was made, April 14 (probably); but it was never acted upon. — In September, 1786, congress again began to con- sider the government of the territory, and a com- mittee, of which Nathan Dane, of Massachusetts, was chairman, framed the “ordinance of 1787,” which was finally adopted, July 13, 1787. The fairest view is that Jefferson's report was the frame- work on which the ordinance was built: the gen- eral scheme was that of the former, but the provis- ions were amplified, and the following changes and new provisions were made: 1. The prohibi- tion of slavery followed Jefferson’s, excluding the words “after the year 1800,” thus making it im- mediate, and adding a fugitive slave clause. (See SLAVERY, W.) This article, says Dane, in a letter of July 16, 1787, to King, “I had no idea the states would agree to, and therefore omitted it in the draft; but, finding the house favorably dis- posed on this subject, after we had completed the other parts, Imoved the article, which was agreed to without opposition.” 2. On the other hand, as this was an ordinance for the government only of the territory northwest of the Ohio, its prohi- bition of slavery was territorially only about half as large as Jefferson's; and this may help to ex- plain the different fates of the two. A further explanation of the passage of Dane's ordinance, even with a prohibition of slavery, has recently been brought to light by Mr. W. F. Poole (see “North American Review,” among the authori- ties): in 1787 Dr. Manasseh Cutler, agent of the Ohio land company in Massachusetts, was ready to purchase 5,000,000 acres of land in Ohio if it should be organized as a free territory, and his judicious presentation of this fact to congress had a powerful influence upon the result. 3. Arti- cle III., and the conclusion of article IV., guar- anteeing the freedom of navigation of the Missis- sippi and St. Lawrence, were new, and seem to have been due to Timothy Pickering, of Massa- chusetts. – The ordinance proper began by secur- ing to the inhabitants of the territory the equal division of real and personal property of intestates to the next of kin in equal degree; and the power to devise and convey property of every kind. Con- gress was to appoint the governor, the secretary, the three judges, and the militia generals; and the governor was to make other appointments until the organization of a general assembly. The governor and judges were to adopt such state laws as they saw fit, unless disapproved by congress, until there should be 5,000 “free male inhabitants of full age * in the district: a curious slip, consid- ering the prohibition of any other than “free” inhabitants. On attaining this population the territory was to have a general assembly of its own, consisting of the governor, a house of rep- resentatives of one to every 500 free male inhab- itants, and a legislative council of five to be selected by congress from ten nominations by the lower house, and to serve for five years. The as- sembly was to choose a delegate to sit, but not to vote, in congress; and was to pass laws for the government of the territory, not repugnant to the principles of the following “articles of compact between the original states and the people and states in the said territory,” which were to “forever 32 oRDINANCE OF 1787. remain unalterable, unless by common consent.” I. No peaceable and orderly person was ever to be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments. II. The people were always to enjoy the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, trial by jury, proportionate representation in the legislature, bail (except for capital offenses, in cases of evident proof and strong presumption), moderate fines and punishments, and the preser- vation of liberty, property and private contracts. III. Schools and the means of education were forever to be encouraged; and good faith was to be observed toward the Indians. IV. The terri- tory, and the states formed therein, were forever to be a part of “this confederacy of the United Sales,” subject to the articles of confederation, and to the authority of congress under them. They were never to interfere with the disposal of the soil by the United States, or to tax the lands belonging to the United States; and the naviga- tion of the Mississippi and St. Lawrence was to be free to every citizen of the United States, “without any tax, impost or duty therefor.” W. Not less than three nor more than five states were to be formed in the territory. The bound- aries of three of these, the “western, middle and eastern '' states, [subsequently Illinois, Indi. ana, and Ohio, respectively], were roughly marked out, very nearly as they stand at present; and con- gress was empowered to form two states [Michigan and Wisconsin] north of an east and west line through the southern end of Lake Michigan. Whenever any of these divisions should contain 60,000 inhabitants it was to be at liberty to form a state government, republican in form and in conformity with these articles; and was then to be admitted to the Union ‘‘ on an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatso- ever.” WI. “There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, other- wise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted: pro- vided always, that any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original states, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.” This proviso was the first instance of a fugitive slave law; it was afterward added to the constitution. (See COMPROMISES, III.; FUGITIVE SLAVE LAws; SLAVERY, W.)—The gen- eral scheme of the ordinance, with the exception of the prohibition of slavery, was the model upon which the territories of the United States were thereafter organized. (See TERRITORIES.) Upon the inauguration of the new government under the constitution an act was passed, Aug. 7, 1789, recognizing and confirming the ordinance, but modifying it slightly so as to conformit to the new powers of the president and senate. When the ter- ritory south of the Ohio came to be organized, the organization was controlled by the stipulation of the ceding states that slavery should not be pro- hibited; and in the case of other territories the language often differed widely from that of the ordinance of 1787; but in all cases the underlying principles have been identical, so that the ordi. nance might be called the magma charta of the territories. The difference in statemanship be- tween the British and the American methods of dealing with problems closely similar is elsewhere noted. (See REVOLUTION, I. ; TERRITORIES, I.) — In the organization of the five states which have been formed under the ordinance, the priv- ileges secured by it to the inhabitants of the terri- tory have been imbedded in the state constitu- tions, usually in the preliminary bill of rights. In Indiana, in 1802, a convention, presided over by Wm. H. Harrison, sent a memorial to congress, asking a temporary suspension of the sixth article; but a select committee, John Randolph being chairman, reported that such action would be highly dangerous and inexpedient. In 1805–7 successive resolutions of Gov. Harrison and the territorial legislature to the same end were fol- lowed in each year by favorable reports from the committees to which they were referred; but con- gress took no action. In the summer of 1807 the effort was again renewed; but the new committee reported, Nov. 13, 1807, that a suspension of the article was not expedient. By this time opposition to the suspension was growing stronger in the ter- ritory itself, so that the attempt was not renewed. But the legislature, the same year, passed laws allowing owners of slaves to bring them into the territory, register them, and hold them to service, those under fifteen years to be held until thirty- five for males and thirty-two for females, and those over fifteen for a term of years to be con- tracted for by the owner and the negro. In the latter case, if the negro refused to contract, he was to be removed whence he came; and in both cases the children of registered servants were to be held to service until the ages of thirty for males and twenty-eight for females. Illinois, being then a part of Indiana territory, lived under these laws until her admission as a state, in 1818, when she enacted in her constitution that “existing contracts” should be valid. In this way slavery remained practically in force all over Illinois, and the pro-slavery party controlled the state. In 1822 an anti-slavery man was elected governor, by divisions in the pro-slavery ranks, and in his inaugural he reminded the pro-slavery legislature of the illegal existence of slavery in Illinois. That body retorted by an act to call a convention to frame a new constitution. The act had to be approved by popular vote, and, after a contest lasting through 1823–4, was defeated by a vote of 6,822 to 4,950. In both states provisions forbid- ding future contracts for service, made out of the state, or for more than one year, gradually re- moved this disguised slavery. — The preambles to the constitutions of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois all recite that the prospective state “has the right of admission to the Union ” in accordance with the constitution, the ordinance of 1787, and the ena- bling act. In the case of Michigan congress long ORDINANCE OF 1787 33 neglected to pass an enabling act; the people of the territory, therefore, resting on the fifth article of the ordinance, and claiming that the only con- dition precedent to admission (the increase of the population to 60,000) had been fulfilled, formed a constitution, and were admitted without an ena- bling act. (See M1CHIGAN.) It should also be noticed that the extreme northwestern part of the territory, south and west of the head of Lake Superior, was not finally included in any of the five states named, but is now a part of Minnesota. — The second of the articles of confederation de- clares that each state retains “every power, juris- diction and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in con- gress assembled.” The power to acquire, the jurisdiction to govern, and the right to retain, territory outside of the limits of the states, are nowhere in the articles, even by implication, given to the United States. Whence, then, did congress draw the power to vest in itself the title to the northwest territory, to frame this ordinance for its government, to abolish slavery therein, and to provide for the admission to the confederacy of five new states? The “Federalist ' answers the question thus briefly: “All this has been done, and done without the least color of constitutional authority; yet no blame has been whispered, no alarm has been sounded.” In other words, we are to suppose that the states, tempted partly by a willingness to despoil Virginia of her vast western claims, and partly by a desire to share in the proceeds of the western territory as a common stock, were willing to allow their imbecile con- gress to appropriate a source of revenue to which it had no shadow of claim, and which, as it then seemed, would so increase in a few years as to make congress independent of the states. Such a supposition does far less than justice to the acute- ness of the state politicians who were then the controlling class; they would have been glad to withhold the power to govern the territories from congress, and yet how were they to avoid grant- ing it 2 The reason for their “whispering no blame, Sounding no alarm,” lay in the patent ne- cessity of the case, in the political law which finally forces a recognition under any form of government, that it is only in non-essentials that a limitation on Sovereignty can be deduced by implication, and that there are certain essential attributes of Sovereignty which can only be re- stricted in express terms. (See also Hamilton’s argument in BANK CONTROVERSIES, II.) The right to acquire property is as much the natural right of a government, however limited, as of an individual; and a government, if restricted so far as to be denied this right, is either non-existent or impotent. in this case, compelled the states to allow a vio- lation of the articles of confederation ; it is rather true that circumstances, in this case, compelled the state politicians to respect the natural rights of the national government, which, in so many other cases, they had attempted to limit by the 122 VOL. III. — 3 It is not true that circumstances, general phrases of the second article. (See NA- TION.) We are therefore to take the sovereign right to acquire territory as the justification of the ordinance of 1787, just as in the case of the annexation of Louisiana, which was equally un- authorized by the constitution. (See CoNSTITU- TION, III., B, 2.) — Undoubtedly the greatest ben- efit of the ordinance to the territory which it cov- ered was its exclusion of slavery from it. It thus received the full sweep of that stream of immi- gration, foreign and domestic, which so carefully avoided slave soil; the strictness with which this westward stream confined itself to the compara- tively narrow channel bounded by the lakes and the Ohio, is of itself a testimony to the wisdom of the sixth article. Beyond this, however, there were countless other benefits. The enumeration of the natural rights of the individual was a polit- ical education for the people of the new territory, as well as a chart for the organization of the new state governments. The stipulations for the en- couragement of education, though too indefinite to be binding, have exerted an enormous influence upon the demands of the people and upon the policy of the legislatures. This whole section was thus, from the beginning, the theatre of a conscious and persistent attempt to combine uni- versal suffrage and universal education, each for the sake of the other; and the success of the attempt, though still far from complete, has al- ready gone far beyond any possible conception of its projectors. Most important of all, from a po- litical point of view, the ordinance was the first conscious movement of the American mind toward the universal application of the federal principle of state government to the continent. The original states owed their formal individuality to accident or the will of the king ; the inchoate states of Vermont, Kentucky and Tennessee were the accidents of accidents; here, in the north- west territory, the nation first consciously chose the state system for its future development. (See NATION, III.) — Major General Arthur St. Clair, a delegate from Pennsylvania, and president of congress during the adoption of the Ordinance, was the first governor of the territory, 1788–1802. His biography, cited below, is the best exposition of the practical workings of the ordinance. When the portion of the northwest territory outside of Ohio was organized as Indiana territory (see that state), William H. Harrison became its governor, 1800–11, and was succeeded by John Gibson, 1811–13, and Thomas Posey, 1813–16, until Indi ana became a state. When the separate territory of Illinois was organized (see that state), Ninian Edwards became its governor, 1809–18. Michi- gan, as a territory, had as governors William Hull 1805–13, Lewis Cass 1813–31, Geo. B. Por- ter 1831–4, and Stevens T. Mason 1834–5. When Wisconsin was separated from Michigan as a ter- ritory, its governors were Henry Dodge, 1836–41 and 1845–8, James D. Doty 1841–4, and N. P. Tallmadge 1844–5. The small remainder of the territory, after the admission of Wisconsin as a 34 OREGON. state (see WISCONSIN ; MINNESOTA), was added to Minnesota. — For the cessions of the various states which went to make up the northwest territory, see TERRITORIES. — The text of the ordinance is in 1 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions, 7; 1 Stat. at Large (Bioren and Duane's edition), 475; Duer's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 512; An- drews’ Manual of the Constitution, App. xiii.; see also North American Review, April, 1876; Hildreth's Pioneer History, 193 (Ohio Company); Taylor's History of Ohio, 493; 1 Bancroft's Forma- tion of the Constitution, 177, and 2: 98; H. B. Ad- ams' Maryland's Influence in Founding a National Commonwealth, Coles’ History of the Ordinance of 1787 (read before the Penn. Hist. Soc., June 9, 1856); 4 Journals of Congress, 373, 379; 3 Hil- dreth’s United States, 449; 1 von Holst's United States, 286; 1 McMaster's History of the American People, 505; 1 Schouler's United States, 98 ; 2 Pit- kin's United States, 210; 1 Curtis' History of the Constitution, 291; 1 Draper's Civil War, 180; 1 Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 31; I Greeley’s American Conflict, 38; 2 Holmes'Annals, 354; 1 Stat. at Large, 50 (act of Aug. 7, 1789); Smith's Life of St. Clair; Burnet's Settlement of the Northwest Territory; Washburne's Sketch of Edward Coles; Story's Commentaries, § 1310 ; The Federalist, xxviii. (by Madison); and author- ities under articles referred to. For Jefferson’s claims to the authorship of the ordinance, see 1 Benton’s Thirty Years’ View, 133; 1 Randall’s Life of Jefferson, 397; for Dane's, see 3 Webster's Works, 397; for Dane's, King's and Pickering's, see 2 Spencer's United States, 202; Pickering's Life of Pickering. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. OREGON, a state of the American Union. It was claimed to have been rightfully a part of the Louisiana purchase, as its western boundary was defined in 1819 by the Florida treaty (see ANNEXATIONS, I., II.), and it was evidently un- der this claim that Lewis and Clarke first explored it in 1804–6, by direction of President Jefferson. The conflicting claims are elsewhere given. (See NoRTHWEST BOUNDARY.) The people of Oregon, without waiting for action by congress, formed a provisional government in 1843. After several failures to pass an act for the organization of the territory (see WILMOT PROVISO), an act for that purpose became law, Aug. 14, 1848. It covered all the territory of the United States west of the Rocky mountains and north of latitude 42° north (see WASHINGTON TERRITORY), and prohibited slavery by putting in force the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787. No enabling act was passed by Congress, but a state convention at Salem, Aug. 17–Sept. 18, 1857, under authority of the territorial legislature, adopted a state constitution. Under this the state was admitted Feb. 14, 1859. —BOUNDARIES. The boundaries fixed by the act of admission were as follows: on the north, the Columbia river and latitude 46° north ; on the east, the Snake river from latitude 46° north to its junction with the Owyhee, and thence directly south to latitude 42° ; on the south, latitude 42°; and on the west the Pacific Ocean. These differed from those claimed by the state constitution in only one respect: the latter took as a northern boundary the Columbia and Snake rivers, thus including the territory between latitude 46° and the Snake river, which congress preferred to assign to Washington territory.— CONSTITUTION. The first constitution is still in force. It restricted suffrage to whites, on six months’ residence and one year's declaration of intention to become a citizen; authorized the legislature to prohibit the immigration of persons not qualified to become citizens of the United States; provided for a leg- islature of two houses, the Senate to consist of sixteen members, chosen by districts for four years, and the house of representatives of thirty- four members, chosen by districts ſur twu years, forbade the passage of special or local laws in a number of specified cases; gave the governor a term of four years, and made him eligible not more than eight in twelve years; provided that he should be chosen by popular vote, or, in de- fault of a popular majority, by a joint vote of the legislature; forbade the legislature to charter any bank, to subscribe to the stock of any com- pany, or to charter any corporation otherwise than by general law ; and ordered the state capi- tal to be fixed by popular vote. Two other ques- tions were submitted to popular vote, with the following result: by a vote of 7,727 to 2,645, slavery was prohibited in the state; and by a vote of 8,640 to 1,081, free negroes or mulattoes not then resident in the state were forbidden to “come, reside or be within this state, or hold any real estate, or make any contract, or maintain any suit therein,” and the legislature was authorized to pass laws for their removal and exclusion, and for the punishment of persons who should em- ploy or harbor them. The constitution has not since been amended in any particular. In 1882 the legislature changed the time of inauguration of state officers from September to January, so that the new governor holds from September, 1882, to Jan. 1, 1887. — GovKRNORS. John Whittaker, 1859–62; Addison C. Gibbs, 1862–6; Geo. L. Woods, 1866–70; Lafayette S. Grover, 1870–78; Wm. W. Thayer, 1878–82; Zenas F. Moody, 1882–7. — POLITICAL HISTORY. The long inter- val between Oregon's adoption of a constitution and its admission as a state was due mainly to the “anti-negro clause” of the constitution, which made republicans in congress very unwilling to vote for a ratification of the instrument. The clause was due to the existence of three parties in the state, one in favor of slavery, a Second Op- posed to it, and a third opposed to negro immi- gration. The last two united to prohibit both slavery and negro immigration; but the first was sufficiently strong to compel the convention to submit to the people the question of “slavery or no slavery.” After the ratification was complete, and the state admitted, the first and third factions united against the second, and made Oregon a ORIENTAL QUESTION. 35 democratic state. The democratic party of the state had so strong a pro-slavery element in it that, one of the Oregon Senators, Lane, was the Breckinridge candidate for the vice-presidency in 1860. In that year the republicans obtained the electoral vote of the state by a plurality, the pop- ular vote being as follows: Lincoln, 5,270; Breckinridge, 5,006; Douglas, 3,951; Bell, 183. From that time until 1868 the state was repub- lican in state, congressional and presidential elec- tions. In 1868 the democrats, by about 1,000 majority, obtained the electoral vote of the state for Seymour, and elected the congressman and a majority of both houses of the legislature. Since that time the parties have alternately been suc- cessful in the state's biennial elections. In 1870, 1874 and 1878 the democrats carried the state, electing the governor, congressman, and a ma- jority of the legislature; in 1872, 1876 and 1880, the “presidential years,” the republicans Se- cured the electoral vote of the state, the congreSS- man, and a majority of the legislature. (See OREGON, under ELECTORAL COMMISSION.) . In 1883 the legislature is republican by the following majority : senate, sixteen to fourteen; house, thirty-nine to twenty-one. — The most prominent political leaders of the state have been the follow- ing: Lafayette Grover, democratic congressman in 1859, governor 1870–77, and United States sen- ator 1877–83; Joseph Lane (see his name); John H. Mitchell, republican United States senator 1873–79; and George H. Williams, republican United States senator 1865–71, and attorney gen- eral under Grant, 1872–5. — See NORTHWEST BOUNDARY, and authorities under it; Grover's Oregon Archives, 1849–53; Dunn's History of Ore- gon (1844); Tucker's History of Oregon (1844); Greenhow's History of Oregon (1845); Gray's His- tory of Oregon (1849); 2 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; Tribune Almanac, 1859–83; Hines’ Oregon and its Institutions (1868); Dufur's Statistics of Oregon (1869). ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. ORIENTAL QUESTION, The. By this, or by the equivalent term, Eastern Question, is usu- ally understood the political complications which are ever on the point of arising, in the Ottoman empire, in consequence of the mutual antago- nism of the Christian and Mussulman populations which inhabit that country, on the one part, and of the prevision of the conquest of Turkey by the Russians, on the other. — The extreme diversity of the nations occupying the vast territory sub- ject to the porte, and the bonds, ethnographic or religious, which unite the greater number of them to Russia, constantly imperil the integrity of the Turkish monarchy, and threaten, at any moment, to cause fresh revolutions in that country, the consequences of which would be felt immediately all over Europe; for the possession of Constan- tinople would give the Czars an increase of power which would destroy at a blow the foundation on which the balance of power in Europe rests. Said Napoleon, in an address to the French sen- ate, dated Jan. 29, 1807: “Who can calculate the length of the wars and the number of campaigns it would be necessary to enter on, some day, to repair the evils which would result from the loss of Constantinoplc, if the love of cowardly ease and the seductions of the great city should pre- vail ovel the counsels of a wise foresight? We should leave our posterity a long inheritance of wars and misfortunes. The Greek cross being triumphant from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we should, in our own day, see our provinces overrun by a swarm of fanatics and barbarians; and if in this too tardy struggle civilized Europe should perish, our guilty indifference would justly excite the complaints of posterity, and would be a title of opprobrium to us in history.” Napo- leon, however, foresaw all the dangers which threaten the existence of Turkey when he wrote: “The patriotism of the peoples and the policy of the courts of Europe would not prevent the downfall of the Ottoman empire.” — The origin of these dangers, and of all the political com- plications connected with the serious problem called the Eastern or Oriental question, goes back to the reign of Othman I., who, at the head of numerous Asiatic hordes, occupied several provinces of Asia Minor, and thus laid the foun- dations of an empire which was destined to find its chief power in the subjection of Greek peo- ples. The taking of Constantinople during the reign of the sultan Mohammed II. definitively marked the establishment of the Turks in Europe, who thenceforth planned the subjection of the principal neighboring states and the extermination of the Christians. – To these religious and ethno- graphic causes must be added the tendencies of Russian policy to pursue its work of universal domination by the conquest of the Ottoman em- pire. The remarkable testament of Peter I. left by that prince to his successors, and deposited among the archives at Peterhof (near St. Peters- burg), tells what should be and what are the polit- ical views of Russia in this regard. In this doc- ument, whose length does not allow its reproduc- tion here, ºn eastenso, the czar declares that he con- siders the Russian people called by Providence to universal domination; that the “Russia which he had found a rivulet and intended to leave a 'mighty stream, would, under his successors, be- come a great Sea, destined to fertilize impoverished Europe, and that its waters would overflow spite of all the dikes which weakened hands would oppose to them, if his descendants knew how to direct their course.” It was to teach the czars, his succes- sors, how to direct that course, that he thought it expedient to leave them his counsels or instruc- tions. After having explained the necessity of cer- tain conquests which have been accomplished since his time, he continues: “$ ix. Get just as near as * Who would write history after civilized Europe had perished ? We are not so sure that the conquest of Turkey by Russia would add to the power of the latter.—MAURICE BLOCK. 36 OSTEND MANIFESTO. possible to Constantinople and the Indies. The prince who reigns there will be the real Sovereign of the world. To this end, excite continual wars now in Turkey and now in Persia; establish ship builders’ yards on the Black sea; get control by degrees of that sea, as well as of the Baltic, two points necessary for the success of the project ; hasten the decay of Persia; penetrate as far as the Persian gulf; restore, if possible, by way of Syria, the old commerce of the Levant, and advance to India, which is the great emporium of the world. Once there, it will be possible to do without Eng- land's gold. § xi. Induce the house of Austria to drive the Turk from Europe, and on the occa- sion of the conquest of Constantinople calm its jealousy, either by exciting a war between it and the old states of Europe, or by giving it a part of the conquest which is subsequently to be taken from ft. § xii. Attach to and gather about you all the disunited or schismatic Greeks spread through Turkey; become their centre and support, and es- tablish in advance universal predominance by a species of Sacerdotal royalty or of Sacerdotal su- premacy: this will give you so many friends among your enemies.”— It is well known how religiously this testament has been followed to the letter, and how consistent the politics of Russia have been with the doctrine laid down in it. The Crimean war (1855–6) was the consequence of a premature endeavor to establish the suzerainty of the czar, not precisely over Ottoman territory, but over all subjects of the sultan who belonged to the Greek church whose pope and head is at St. Petersburg. The sympathy of the Hellenic populations with the Russian government be- trayed itself at that period, and was all the more keen as there exists among them a profound hatred for the Ottoman element. The treaty of Paris, by taking away from Russia the right to maintain a war fleet in the Black sea, only post- poned the time when the czar would descend on Turkey anew. But only a moment was needed for that stipulation to become illusory. That moment came in 1870, on the occasion of the Franco-Prussian war, when Russia asked and ob- tained in its favor a revision of the treaty of 1856 on this point.*— We shall not try to foresee what * Russia's ambitious designs found expression again in the last Russo-Turkish war. The insurrections which took place in Herzegovina, Servia and Montenegro, in 1876 and 1877, not without being produced by Russian influence, caused new controversies between Russia and Turkey, after the latter had refused the guarantees desired by the great powers for the security of the Christians, in the conference which met at Constantinople in November, 1876, and which continued in Session till January, 1877. These controversies led to a declaration of war by the czar against the porte, April 24, 1877. This was the fifth Russo-Turkish war. On March 3, 1878, a treaty of peace, called the peace of San Ste- fano, was signed, by which the war was ended. But the congress of Berlin materially changed its provisions in favor of Turkey. This congress met at Berlin, June 13, 1878, under the presidency of the German chancellor, Prince Bismarck. It was called to examine the result of the Russo-Turkish war (1877-8) created by the peace of San Stefano, and to make it harmonize with the interests of the other powers, especially of England and Austria. The result of the transactions and shall one day be the solution of the Eastern ques- tion. That problem, which presents itself period- ically to European cabinets, with new corollaries, is SO complex that it is unreasonable to predict. what may be in store in relation to it. The power- lessness of Turkey in Syria and Lebanon, and the perpetual antagonism of the Maronite Christians and the Druses create, in Asia Minor, motives for the intervention of France and England similar in character to those which Russia finds for inter- vention in European Turkey, in which Christians. of the Greek rite utter incessant complaints against the Mussulman authorities and claim the protec- tion of the head of their religion. A percepti- ble improvement in the internal organization of the Ottoman crimpire can not be denied. Still it is. doubtful whether it can early enough make the progress which it remains for it to make in order to put itself in a condition to meet the storms. which sooner or later will break upon it. LEON DE ROSNY OSTEND MANIFESTO (IN U. S. HISTORy). The filibustering expeditions against Cuba (see FILIBUSTERs) occasioned anxiety in Europe as to the possible future action of the United States. government in concealed or open favor of such expeditions. In 1852 Great Britain and France jointly proposed to the United States a tripartite. convention, by which the three powers should dis- claim all intention to obtain possession of Cuba, and should discountenance such an attempt by any power. Dec. 1, 1852, the secretary of state, Everett, refused to do so, while he declared that the United States would never question Spain's title to the island. Everett’s letter has been se- verely criticised, but it seems justifiable as a refu- sal to voluntarily and needlessly restrict future administrations. – Aug. 16, 1854, President Pierce directed the American ministers to Great Britain, France and Spain, James Buchanan, John Y. Ma- son and Pierre Soulé, to meet in some convenient, city and discuss the Cuban question. They met at Ostend, Oct. 9, and afterward at Aix la Chapelle, and drew up the dispatch to their gov- ernment which is commonly known as the “OS- tend Manifesto.” It declared, in brief, that the sale of Cuba would be as advantageous and hon- orable to Spain as its purchase would be to the United States; but that, if Spain should obsti- nately refuse to sell it, self-preservation would make it incumbent upon the United States to “wrest it from her,” and prevent it from being Africanized into a second St. Domingo. — The Ostend manifesto was denounced in the repub- deliberations of this congress was the peace of Berlin, which provided for the independence of Rumania, Servia and Montenegro, and established two new independent. states, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The immediate gain to Russia by this war was not great considering the Sacrifice it had made in it. It cost 500,000,000 roubles, and 172,000 men on the European theatre of the war. On the other hand, the war greatly increased the influence of Russia, as a great Slavic: power on the Balkan peninsula, and afforded it an opportu- nity to interfere in the affairs of that peninsula at any time. OUTLAWRY. 37 lican platform of 1856, as “the highwayman's plea that might makes right”; and was not open- ly defended by the democratic platform of 1856 or of 1860, except that the latter declared in favor of the acquisition of Cuba by honorable and just means, at the earliest practicable moment. — See 3 Spencer's United States, 510; 1 Greeley’s Ameri- can Conflict, 273; 2 Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 611; Cairnes’ Slave Power, 145; Clus- key’s Political Teat Book of 1860, 477 (correspond- ence and manifesto in full). ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. OUTLAWRY. The declaring one by superior authority outside of the protection of all law, was a proceeding not unknown to the Greeks and Romans, but was inflicted by them when offenses had been committed against the national religion, and was more in the nature of ecclesiastical excom- munications and interdicts such as are found in some Christian countries. – At common law pro- cess of outlawry originally lay only in cases of treason, but was at later periods extended to minor Offenses and even to civil actions. The consequences, however, of a judgment in out- lawry, and the legal steps to obtain it, were very different in the last mentioned cases. – In Bacon's Abridgment outlawry is defined as a punishment inflicted on a person for contempt and contumacy, in refusing to be amenable to and abide by the justice of that court which has lawful authority to call him before it. And as this is a crime of the highest nature, being an act of rebellion against the state or community of which he is a member, so does it subject the party to divers forfeitures and disabilities, for hereby he loses liberam legem, is out of the king’s protection. It is further said in the same place, that in outlawry in treason and felony the law interprets the party's absence as a sufficient evidence of his guilt, and, without requiring further proof, accounts him guilty of the fact, on which ensues corruption of blood and forfeiture of his whole estate, real and personal, which he holds in his own right. — One of the most memorable proceedings in Outlawry was directed against the well-known agitator and member of parliament, Wilkes Booth, in conse- quence of his withdrawing to France, while an information for libel was pending against him (1770). On technical grounds (Lord Mansfield presiding) the proceeding was quashed. The pro- cess of outlawry was so beset with technical diffi- culties that it could hardly ever be successfully maintained. In the United States it never was generally recognized either in criminal or civil cases. This process of outlawry, as found in the common law, as applicable to minor offenses and even to civil cases, if it ever prevailed on the continent of Europe, was soon superseded by pro- cess and judgment in contumaciam, taken from the Roman and canon law even in criminal cases. Parties sued or indicted may, under that process, be summoned by publication and be condemned in their absence, but not without evidence being heard, which condemnation, however, upon ap- pearance within certain prescribed periods, may be set aside on terms. – Outlawry in the English sense was there confined to high and capital crimes, and was frequently applied by the secret courts, held by certain tribunals in some parts of Germany, under imperial sanction (Vehm, Gerichte) in the middle ages. Those convicted, when within the power of the tribunal, were at once executed by the subordinate officials, and those who escaped were outlawed, and liable to be executed wherever found by officers or members of the brotherhood. In Rome and Greece every- body could kill an outlaw, and it is a somewhat disputed point whether at earlier times this was not also allowable at common law before it was expressly prohibited by statute. In the holy Ger- man empire outlawry, called Reichs-Acht (Bann), played a great part, but it was more of a political than strictly legal process. It was adopted in cases of felony, committed by the great vassals against the emperor, their liege lord; also in cases of great crimes and misdemeanors not strictly breaches of fealty. The imperial great bann had to proceed from the diet; the lower bann could be pronounced by local courts, and had but a local application. Upon complaint, sustained by the estates of the empire assembled in diet, the accused was summoned, usually three times, and upon default conviction followed and declaration of outlawry. With the great vassals the decrees could only be enforced by a real war. The out- lawry of Henry the Lion (the head of the Guelph faction), duke of Saxony and Bavaria, was per- haps the most noted instance of this process. Having failed to heed the summons to answer the impeachment at three different sessions of the diet, outlawry (the Ober- or Aber-Acht) was pro- nounced against him at the diet held at Wurzburg (1180) by the emperor Frederick I. (Barbarossa, chief of the Ghibelins). It was a political act more than a legal one, as it also declared a for- feiture of his estates held as benefices, and not in his own right, which was not usual either at com- mon law or at the German law. Henry took up arms, but being unsuccessful, fled to his father- in-law, the king of England. Tater, amnestied, he was reinstated into Brunswick and Luneburg, his allodial possessions. – The outlawry of the elector John Frederick of Saxony, and of Philip, landgrave of Hesse, the Protestant leaders in the reformation, was wholly irregular, being declared by a mere edict of the emperor Charles W., without sanction of the diet (Reichstag) 1547. Equally irregular had been the outlawry of Martin Luther, by a mere minority of the diet of Worms in 1521, when the session, by the departure of most of the members, had been virtually closed. Some of the most powerful princes of the em- pire at Once protested against it, and the emperor never took steps to execute it. All formalities had been neglected. The only resolution that was legally passed against Luther was one bind- ing the estates of the empire not to obstruct the 38 OUTLET. papal bulls against Luther, which had only a clerical effect by excommunicating him. Other imperial outlawries sanctioned by the diet were those against the elector palatine Frederick, king of Bohemia, and his allies, in 1619, and against the electoral princes of Bavaria and Cologne in the war of the Spanish succession, on account of their alliance with France in 1702. An attempt to outlaw Frederick the Great of Prussia, at the commencement of the seven years war (1758) failed in its initial steps. Purely political acts, without any legal proceedings, were the outlawry of the Baron de Stein, ex-minister of Prussia, by Napoleon I., in 1809, and that of Napoleon him- self by the princes assembled at the Vienna con- gress in 1815, as also that of Gen. B. F. Butler by the confederate states. GUSTAVE KOERNER. OUTLET. An outlet, properly speaking, is an opening made for the sale of certain products. We say that a merchant seeks an outlet for his wares, when he is in quest of places where he can sell them; that he finds an outlet abroad, when his products are ordinarily sold abroad. To open outlets to a country is to give it the oppor- tunity of entering upon friendly relations with other countries, which will afford it new avenues of sale. It would seem that this subject does not allow of any really economic development. But J. B. Say has almost given us a theory of it. We here reproduce his thoughts on the matter. They have been approved and appreciated by all econo- mists. – “As the division of labor makes it im- possible for producers to consume more than a small part of their products, they are compelled to seek consumers who may need these surplus products. They are compelled to find what is called, in the language of commerce, outlets, or markets, that is, means of effecting the exchange of the products which they have created against those which they need. It is important for them to know how these outlets are opened to them. — Every product embodies a utility, the faculty of ministering to the satisfaction of a want. A prod- uct is a product only by reason of the value which has been given to it; and this value can be given to it only by giving it utility. If a product cost nothing, the demand for it would be infinite; for no one would neglect an opportunity to pro- cure for himself what satisfies or serves to sat- isfy his wants, when he could have it for the wishing it. If this were the case with all products, and one could have them all for nothing, human beings would come into existence to consume them; for human beings are born wherever they can obtain the things necessary to their subsistence. The outlets opened to them would become im- mense in number. These outlets are limited only by the necessity under which consumers are to pay for what they wish to acquire. It is never the will to acquire, but the means to acquire, that is wanting. — Yet in what does this means con- sist? In money, we shall be hastily told. Grant- ed; but I ask in turn, by what means does this money come into the hands of those who desire to buy? must it not be obtained by the sale of another product? The man who wishes to buy must first sell, and he can only sell what he pro- duces, or what has been produced for him. If the Owner of land does not sell with his own hands the portion of the harvest which comes to him by reason of his proprietorship, his lessee sells it for him. If the capitalist, who has made advances to a manufacturer, in order to get his interest, does not himself sell a part of the manu- factured goods, the manufacturer sells it for him. It is always by means of products that we pur- chase the products of others. Beneficiaries, pen- sioners of the state themselves, who produce nothing, are able to buy goods only because things have bc.cn produced, by which they have profited. —What must we conclude from this? If it be with products that products are purchased, each product will find more purchasers in pro- portion as all other products shall have increased in quantity. How is it that in France eight or ten times more things are bought to-day, than under the miserable reign of Charles VI. ? It must not be imagined that it is because there is. more money in that country now; for if the mines of the new world had not increased the amount. of specie in circulation, gold and silver would have preserved their old value; that value would even have increased; silver would be worth per- haps what gold is worth now; and a smaller amount of silver would render the same service. that a very considerable quantity renders us, just as a gold piece of twenty francs renders us as: much service as four five-franc pieces. What is. it, then, that enables the French to purchase ten times as many things, since it is not the greater quantity of money which they possess? The reason is, that they produce ten times as much. All these things are bought, the ones by the others. More wheat is sold in France, because cloth and a great number of other things are manufactured there in a much greater quantity. Products unknown to our ancestors are bought. by other products of which they had no idea. The man who produces watches (which were unknown in the time of Charles VI.), purchases. with his watches, potatoes (which were also then unknown). — So true is it, that it is with products. that products are purchased, that a bad harvest injures all sales. Indeed, bad weather, which destroys the wheat and the vines of the year, does. not, at the same time, destroy coin. Yet the Sale of cloths instantly suffers from it. The products. of the mason, the carpenter, the roofer, joiner, etc., are less in demand. The same is true of the harvests made by the arts and by commerce. When one branch of industry suffers, others. suffer too. An industry which is prosperous, on the other hand, makes others prosper also. — The first deduction which may be drawn from this important truth is, that in every state the more numerous the producers are, and the more OUTLET. 39 production is increased, the more easy, varied and vast do outlets become. In the places which produce much, there is created the substance with which alone purchases are made: I mean value. — Money fills only a transient office in this double exchange. After each one has sold what he has produced, and bought what he wishes to con- Sume, it is found that products have always been paid for in products. – We thus see that each has an interest in the prosperity of all, and that the prosperity of one kind of industry is favorable to the prosperity of all others. In fact, whatever may be the industry to which man devotes him- self, whatever the talent which he exercises, he will find it easier to employ it and to reap a greater profit from it in proportion as he is sur- rounded by people who are themselves gaining. A man of talent, sadly vegetating in a country in a state of decline, would find a thousand avenues of employment for his faculties in a productive country, where his talents might be used and paid for. A merchant established in an industrious city, sells much larger amounts than one who lives in a country in which indifference and idleness rule. What would an active manu- facturer or a capable merchant do in one of the poorly peopled and poorly civilized cities of cer- tain portions of Spain or Poland? Although he would encounter no competitor there, he would sell little, because little is produced there; whereas in Paris, Amsterdam or London, despite the com- petition of a hundred merchants like himself, he might do an immense business. The reason is simple: he is surrounded by people who produce much in a multitude of ways, and who make purchases with what they have produced; that is to say, with the money resulting from the sale of what they have produced, or with what their land or their capital has produced for them. — Such is the source of the profits which the people of cities make from the people of the country and which the latter make from the former. Both have more to buy in proportion as they produce more. A city surrounded by a productive coun- try finds there numerous and rich buyers; and in the neighborhood of a manufacturing city the products of the country sell much better. It is by a vain distinction that nations are classed as agricultural, manufacturing and commercial na- tions. If a nation is successful in agriculture, it is a reason why its commerce and its manufac- tures should prosper. If its manufactures and its commerce become flourishing, its agriculture will be better in consequence. A nation is in the same position as regards neighboring nations that a province is in relation to the country; it is inter- ested in their prosperity; it is certain to profit by their wealth; for nothing is to be gained from a people who have nothing wherewith to pay. Hence, well-advised countries do all in their power to favor the progress of their neighbors. The republics of America have for neighbors savage peoples who live generally by the chase, and sell furs to the merchants of the United States; but this trade is of little importance, for these savages need a vast extent of country to find only a limited number of wild animals, and these wild animals are diminishing every day. Hence, the United States much prefer to have these Indians civilized, become cultivators of the soil, manu- facturers, in fine, more capable producers; which unfortunately is very difficult of accomplishment, because it is very hard for men reared in habits of vagabondage and idleness to apply themselves to work. Yet there are examples of Indians who have become industrious. I read in the descrip- tion of the United States, by Mr. Warden, that the tribes then living on the banks of the Missis- sippi, and who afforded no market to the citizens of the United States, were enabled to purchase of them in 1810 more than 80,000 francs’ worth of merchandise; and probably they afterward bought from them a much larger amount. Whence came this change? From the fact that these Indians began to cultivate the bean and Indian corn, and to work the lead mines which were within their reservation. — The English rightly expect that the new republics of America, after their emanci- pation shall have favored their development, will afford them more numerous and richer consumers, and already they are reaping the harvest of a policy more in consonance with the intelligence of our age; but this is nothing compared with the advantages which they will reap from them in the future. Narrow minds imagine some hid- den motives in this enlightened policy. But what greater object can men propose to them- selves than to render their country rich and powerful? — A people who are prosperous should therefore be regarded rather as a useful friend than as a dangerous competitor. A nation must doubtless know how to guard itself against the foolish ambition or the anger of a neighbor, who understands its own interests so badly as to quar- rel with it; but after it has put itself in the way to fear no unjust aggression, it is not best to weaken any other nation. We have seen mer- chants of London and Marseilles dread the en- franchisement of the Greeks and the competition of their commerce. These men had very false and very narrow ideas. What commerce could the independent Greeks carry on which would not be favorable to French industry? Can they carry products to France without buying her products and carrying away an equivalent value? And if it is money that they wish, how can France acquire it otherwise than by the products of her indus- try? A prosperous people is in every way favor- able to the prosperity of the other. Gould the Greeks indeed carry on business with French mer- chants against the will of the latter? And would French merchants consent to a trade which was not lucrative to themselves and consequently for their country? — If the Greeks should become estab- lished in their independence, and grow rich by their agriculture, their arts and their commerce, they would become for all other peoples valuable consumers; they would experience new wants, and 40 OWER-PRODUCTION. have wherewith to pay for their satisfaction. It is not necessary to be a philanthropist to assist them; it is only necessary to be in a condition to understand one's own true interests. – These truths so important, which are beginning to pene- trate among the enlightened classes of Society, were absolutely unknown in the periods previous to our own. Voltaire made patriotism consist in wishing evil to one's neighbors. His humanity, his natural generosity, lamented this. How much happier are we, who, by the simple advance of enlightenment, have acquired the certainty that we have no enemies but ignorance and perversity; that all nations are, by nature and by their inter- ests, friends of one another ; and that to wish prosperity to other peoples, is to love and serve our own country.” J. B. SAY. OWER-PRODUCTION. Over-production is a term which is clear and simple as each man ap- plies it in his own business, but which is liable to be misunderstood when applied to the business of the community. This combination of apparent clearness and real doubt has caused much con- fusion and unnecessary argument; SO that we must begin with a careful analysis of its meaning in various aspects. occurring “when the production of anything is carried beyond the point where it ceases to be re- munerative.” For instance: a manufacturer owns his plant, but depends upon credit for the pur- chase of raw materials and the means of paying wages. Now if his product brings the expected price, it compensates him for all these advances, and gives him his business profit in addition. But a slight fall in the price of his product, from whatever cause it arises, will sweep away his business profit. This is the point where produc- tion ceases to be remunerative. A further fall will not only leave him without business profit, but also without compensation for the wages he has advanced, or without the means of paying for his raw material; so that the more he has manufactured the poorer he is for it. To him, then, all production on these terms is over-produc- tion. And to him the result is the same in its main features, whatever be the reason for the fall in price. He could have avoided the worst of the trouble to himself, had he but curtailed his production in time. — But if we go one step back, and look for the causes which occasion this fall. in price, we find that it may be due to any one of three things: 1. A disproportionate produc- tion of this particular article; 2. A hindrance of any kind which prevents placing goods in the most advantageous market; 3. A general fall in prices. As regards its relation to the general business of the community, the first of these causes acts in a very different way from the sec- ond and third; and it is to the first of these causes that the name over-production is most properly applied. The mistakes of Sismondi, Chalmers and even Malthus in this connection arose from their supposing that it meant the same thing in It is defined by Malthus as the second and third causes as in the first. They Said that depression in individual branches of trade arose from over-production in those branch- es, and inferred that when phenomena of the same kind were seen everywhere there was the same kind of over-production everywhere. But this is by no means the case. Disproportionate produc- tion is one thing; failure to sell at the expected price may be quite another. It may look like the same thing to the individual producer, and yet mean very different things respecting the past and future of the business community. Dispro- portionate production is liable to occur at any time in individual branches of trade. It is only when it becomes much more serious than usual, and is combined with other causes, that it is fol- lowed by a commercial crisis. But the so-called gcncral owcr production doog not ordinarily occur except in connection with a crisis, and there it is a result rather than a cause. By keeping this dis- tinction in mind we shall avoid confusing the real partial over-production which usually pre- cedes commercial crises, with the apparent general over-production which is characteristic of their ad- vanced stages. It is with the former of these that this article mainly deals. – Disproportionate pro- duction on a small scale, such as constantly oc- curs in one or another branch of industry, read- justs itself so easily as to occasion no harm except a temporary one to a few individual producers in that Hine. The capitalists see their mistake the moment their business profits are swept away, and use less capital in their business; the excess of supply is quickly consumed, prices recover, and the business goes on as before. But special circumstances may aggravate the trouble to the extent of a public calamity, and special lines of production are particularly liable to such mis- fortune. When large amounts have been in- vested in fixed capital, such as machinery, public works, or, above all, railroads, such excess of supply can not be quickly consumed, but exerts its depressing influence for a long time to come. And, on the other hand, when special lines of production have been stimulated by a temporary demand at abnormally high prices, as was the case in the iron business in 1873, and is liable to be the case to a less marked extent in almost any other line of manufacture, it will be found that after the excess is worked off and consumed, prices still do not recover anything like their for- mer figures. We thus have two types of business liable to over-production; one because he excess of supply is permanent, the other because the high price is abnormal. The history of ºilroad build- ing on the one hand, and of iron production on the other, furnishes the most striking instances of these results, as well as the most complete statis- tics for our purpose. —Ever since the invention of railroads excessive railroad building has been a leading symptom of an approaching crisis. In 1837, it is true, the system of railroads was not yet far enough advanced to be an important fac- tor, yet here we had the same kind of extrava- OVER-PRODUCTION. 41 gance in building roads and canals on borrowed capital, and the same effects from it. It was in England in the years preceding the crisis of 1847 that the railroad first assumed its importance as a subject of speculative production. Of the work- ings of a railroad system capitalists knew very lit- tle; but they went into the business with the same blind confidence that their ancestors had gone into South sea bubbles. And this reckless investment of capital was encouraged by the blind belief of legislators in unchecked railway competition as an unmixed benefit to the public. 678 Com- panies—for the most part, it must be said, with ridiculously short lines—applied for incorporation in the year 1845 alone; and of these 136 were ac- tually incorporated, 65 receiving the royal assent in a single day. And this at a time when the sys- tem was in its infancy. By the end of the year 1847 the estimated value of the railways incor- porated was more than a thousand million dol- lars, and a large part of this sum had been act- ually expended, while most of the work was too incomplete to bring in returns that could be used in payment of interest. There is no need, for our present purpose, of going into the further history of the crisis of 1847; in a community which had been investing its capital thus recklessly, any economic shock must needs produce the most serious results. The crisis of 1857 is not so dis- tinctly an instance in point. There was indeed in many cases a sudden shrinkage of railroad earnings and a marked decrease in railroad build- ing—3,647 miles being added in the United States in 1856, 2,647 in 1857, 2,465 in 1858, and only 1,821 in 1859. But this was hardly over-produc- tion in its truest sense. The shrinkage came else- where even more than here. There had been speculation and extravagance everywhere, and much property changed hands as values settled down to a truer basis. But there was no useless mass of lingeringly insolvent capital, almost no disproportionate production that could not be made use of in some way beneficial to the com- munity. — Not so, in 1873. For five years men had been building railroads to an extent hitherto unheard of. High wages and prices had made the real cost of construction great, and the extrav- agant spirit of those years had added other items of expense. Only an abnormally stimulated trade could enable them to meet their obligations and furnish profit besides. But the panic of 1873 left trade abnormally depressed; and many roads were in no condition to meet their obligations. Sooner or later they had to reorganize; but before this could be done they succeeded in doing a great deal of harm to other people's property as well as their own. Once regarding themselves as insolvent, they felt exempt from a number of re- sponsibilities that had hampered them. If they could not get business at a paying price they would get it at a price that did not pay, and force competing solvent roads into non-paying rates. Hence arose the railroad wars culminating in 1876, when the Grand Trunk and the Erie, then each year by the “Railway Age.” insolvent roads, swept away the profits of the Pennsylvania and the Baltimore & Ohio, and for the time greatly reduced investors' confidence in the New York Central. This is the typical effect of over-production: the surplus is not only in itself unprofitable, but as long as it lasts will depress values of everything with which it competes. And the continued existence of such masses of undisposable surplus may be regarded as a lead- ing difference between the long crisis of 1873 and the shorter one of 1857. — The extent to which railroad over-production was carried is shown by the figures in Poor's Manual. In 1869 there were built in the United States 4,615 miles of railway; in 1870, 6,070; in 1871, 7,379; in 1872, 5,878; and in 1873, 4,107: an average for five years of over 5,600 miles. In 1874 the number fell to 2,105, and in 1875 to 1,712; for the five years succeeding 1873 the average was less than 2,300, or only about two-fifths the previous. The figures for France and Germany about the same time tell a similar story, Not less striking are the figures illustrating shrinkage of value. The “Railroad Gazette ’’ of Sept. 27, 1878, furnishes statistics on this point concerning forty-five roads dealt in by the New York stock exchange, and in soundness presumably above the average of those in the country. The aggregate value of these roads, at their highest prices in 1873 (reduced to a gold basis), was $567,000,000; at the lowest prices of the same year it had fallen to $380,000,000; while in September, 1878, it was still only $460,000,000. Still more to the purpose are the figures concern- ing foreclosures furnished at the beginning of In 1876 there were sold under foreclosure, (this term being ap- parently used in a rather wide sense), 3,846 miles of road, representing $218,000,000 of capital; and in the four years succeeding, 3,875, 3,902, 4,909, 3,775, miles of road, representing investments of $199,000,000, $312,000,000, $243,000,000 and $264,000,000, respectively. One-fifth of the rail- way investment of the country sold under fore- closure in these five years of settlement! . Whether this has taught us its lesson remains to be seen. Men have lost faith in unlimited railway com- petition; but a specially pernicious form of over- production is developed in the case of parallel roads, built to sell rather than to operate; for the sake, that is, of forcing the old road to buy a controlling interest to avoid a railroad war. The enormous increase of railways in re- cent years (4,721 miles in 1879, 7,174 in 1880, 9,358 in 1881, 11,343 (?) in 1882) gives ground for apprehension, even though this rate of building is not likely to continue. — In looking at over- production in the iron industry, variations in price are even more striking than variations in production. In January, 1871, the average Philadelphia price of No. 1 pig iron was $30.50 per gross ton. From this time it steadily increased till, in September, 1872, the month's average was $53.87. In December, 1874, it had declined to $24, a loss of more than one-half in a little over 42 OVER-PRODUCTION. two years; and this decline on the whole continued till November, 1878, when the price was $16.50, scarcely one-third of what it had been in 1872, even if we make allowance for the gold premium. In Great Britain the same change was still more marked. Scotch pig, which in 1870 had sold as low as 49%.s., rose in 1870 to 145s., and in 1878 had fallen to 42+S., less than three-tenths of what it had brought five years before. A similar change was seen in America at the beginning of 1880, when iron, which in July, 1879, was selling at $19.25, rose to $40 and $41, only to fall, three months later, to $23. — The reason for these ex- traordinary changes is to be found in the character of the demand for iron. A demand for iron at all often means a demand at any price, whether it be for a railroad that can make no money till its tracks are laid, or a factory that can make none without new machinery. But the demand that forces up the price is moderate in quantity; and though the high rates may be submitted to by the immediate demand, they may check the future demand. Thus, those who have gone into the iron business under the stimulus of high rates find that the pressure was only temporary; the extra supply, by the time they are ready with it, no longer wanted; and in place of the readiness to buy at any price, however high, comes an unwill- ingness to buy at any price, however low. Just this course of events is indicated by the statistics of iron production. The American pig iron product, which in 1870 had been about 1,859,000 net tons, and in 1871 about 1,905,000, rose under the stimulus of high prices in 1872 to 2,855,000, and in 1873 to 2,868,000 tons. But by this time the fall in prices had been so marked that the iron men checked production as best they might. In 1874 they reduced their product to 2,689,000 tons; but in spite of this reduction and of the further fall in prices there remained at the end of the year 796,000 tons unsold in the producers’ hands. The further course of events is shown in the following table, compiled from figures in the report for 1881 of the secretary of the American iron and steel association : YEARS. *ś* | Tons Produced, tºia. 1875---------------- $25.50 2,267,000 761,000 1876---------------- 22.25 2,093,000 687,000 1877---------------- 18.87 2,315,000 j42, 1878---------------- 17.62 2,577,000 575,000 1879---------------- 21.50 3,071,000 142,000 From this it appears that in spite of diminished production and prices it was not until 1877 that they were able to reduce materially the proportion of their product unsold. As soon as they began to do this they were on a sounder basis; but what this involved may be inferred from the fact that out of 700 furnaces in the United States only about 250 were in blast in the year 1877; and that in the whole iron industry there was probably not a branch worked up to half the capacity which its fixed capital would admit. (For the statistics "grain, normal production meant ruin. of the same general depression throughout the world, see “ Economist,” Com. Hist, and Rev. of 1878, supplement to March 5, 1879.) A repetition of Some of these phenomena has been seen in the last four years; notably in the case of steel rails, whose price increased from $42 per gross ton in May, 1879, to $85 in February, 1880, but at the end of the year 1882 had fallen to $39. There was the same reckless investment of capital to meet a temporary demand at high prices, and the same impossibility of maintaining anything like those prices when the extra supply was thrown on the market. — Railroad production and iron pro- duction furnish types of the two causes which render disproportionate production a source of lasting evil: in the former case, because the in- crease of supply is permanent ; in the latter, because the high demand is only momentary. The introduction of machinery is apt to produce effects of the former character; the supply of articles of fashion and luxury is subject to the lat- ter. It was the combination of these two that had a large share in causing the English crises of 1818. and 1825. Agricultural produce is less liable to these disturbances than anything else, the excep- tion in the case of cotton in 1837 and 1839 being only apparent; the evil was due to speculation on the part of cotton producers rather than to dis- proportionate production of cotton. So in Eng- land in 1847, when an exceptionally good harvest was the occasion of a crisis, it was not because there was more food than people had been in the habit of demanding, but because to certain individuals, who had speculated in the price of Results like these may occur when any combination makes a speculative attempt to control production and prices both. When such a combination is powerful enough to form a monopoly, there is no doubt that a check to production generally in- creases their returns, the prices rising more rapidly than the quantity diminishes. And, con- versely, an increase of production, even under their own hands, actually diminishes the gross returns. If an individual extends his production” his gross returns are commonly increased. If a monopoly extends its production the opposite effect is quite as common. —We have hitherto spoken of over-production only in the sense of dispropor- tionate production. It was shown at the outset that the same effect upon individual producers might result from a failure to reach the right mar- ket, or from a general fall in prices. The first may be due to transportation difficulties, or to tariff legislation; the second, to a contraction of the currency; but by far the commonest cause of both is a commercial crisis. It renders the credit. system so far inoperative that it is impossible to place goods where they are the most needed; and it so far increases the demand for ready money instead of credit documents that it has the Same effect upon prices as currency contraction. It may thus happen that the appearance of over-pro- duction will occur as the result of a crisis even in PAPER MONEY. 43. those lines where there has been no abnormal production, merely in consequence of difficulty in doing business and in paying debts. This is what has given rise to the name and idea of general Over-production. — For more extended theoretical discussion of certain points, which the limits of this article do not allow, see Roscher, Political Economy, $ 215–217; J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, bk. iii., ch. xiv.; Francis A. Walker, Political Economy, § 214–224; George Chesney, Fortnightly Review, September, 1881. - ARTHUR T, HADLEY, P ACIFIC RAILROAD. (See INTERNAL IM- PROVEMENTS, RAILROADS.) PAPER MONEY. If there be an experiment which has been seriously made and as to the re- sults of which there can be no doubt, it is the experiment which demonstrates the chimerical advantages and grave dangers of paper money, employed as an instrument of production. Never- theless, numberless deceptions, the injury done to public credit and national good faith, and the ruins of the past, do not seem to have entirely dissipated a dangerous illusion ; recent facts, as well as the persistence of false doctrines, prove this but too well; the human mind frees itself with difficulty from the fatal influence exerted over it by the mirage of wealth acquired without labor, of a pretended increase of capital called into existence by the magic wand of credit, and of a new species of alchemy which transmutes paper into gold. — Nothing, however, can be simpler than the examination of this problem, and noth- | more or less ingenious, and more or less sure, by ing easier of solution. It suffices to know what is the part played by money, to measure how lit- tle such an arbitrary creation as paper money can do, and to understand its dangers. — Ours is not the age in which the wealth of states was con- founded with the possession of coin; money, the great wheel of circulation, as Adam Smith calls it, preserves nevertheless, however, an important place in the economy of nations; it constitutes the mechanism of exchange in the clearest and surest conditions; it enables us to set a value on all prod- ucts and services; it gievs activity to the crea- tion and facilitates the distribution of wealth. It is in fact owing to money that all are impelled to the common work of the nation, and that the result obtained is divided among those who have contributed to it. It introduces a common lan- guage into the operations of social commerce. — But it is not a language of the imagination; money is the sign and measure of values, because it is their guarantee, because it represents a value that is known, acknowledged and accepted every- where. It is a universal commodity, while it at the same time affords each country its local instru- ment of purchase and sale, and of remuneration for both public and private services. –In our day the fetters which cramp the international move- ment of exchanges are gradually disappearing, and a regular equilibrium may be established to adapt to the wants of each market the quantity of 'money necessary for the transaction of its business, when this business preserves its character of pu- rity, and does not degenerate into fiction. Let us Suppose, for a moment, that gold and silver alone, without any mixture of fiduciary signs, are the only instruments of exchange. As nothing pre- vents the transportation of the precious metals, they will always resume their level by going where a certain scarcity of them assures them greater advantage, and abandoning those places. in which an over-abundance causes their depreci- ation. An admirable law of attraction governs. them and proportions them to the useful services which they are called upon to render, by oppos- ing equally a sterile abundance and a scarcity of specie. The very force of things establishes a weir for metallic wealth, which always falls into equilibrium with the wants of circulation. — There is a risk of the situation being modified from the very moment that, in order to economize upon the mechanism of exchange, an effort is made to substitute for gold and silver artificial means calling to its aid what is called the magic of credit, whose power people are inclined to exag- gerate. Two ways are open to reach this end. By following one of these ways the movement of exchanges is simplified and the number of actual payments reduced; recourse is had to those ingen- ious creations which render the actual interven- tion of specie superfluous, or limited in a number of cases, by means of bills of exchange, of open accounts in the banks, of set-offs and transfers; or else circulation is accelerated in Such a manner as to increase the services rendered by each piece of money. In this way we obtain an advantage. similar to that which two iron rails placed parallel upon the ground afford by the saving in friction, which increases the traction. The same result is, obtained with less expenditure of force and capi- tal, thanks to the economy and energy of the springs set at work. Here all is gain and no. danger; such is the largest function of credit and an inexhaustible source of fecundity. — But, by the side of these useful combinations, whose in- fluence is too often ignored, we have the creation of a sign easy to manufacture, which costs next to nothing, and which is substituted in a greater or less proportion for metallic money: we refer to the bank mote, which is called upon to act the part. of money, because it is or ought to be accepted in business transactions to liquidate debts. – If this. 44 PAPER MONEY. fiduciary sign rests on the guaranty of a metallic value, against which it may be exchanged at will, and if we may accept or refuse it at pleasure, it constitutes money paper, which must be carefully distinguished from paper money. If it be im- posed by authority, whether it emanates from the public treasury or from a private institution, and we are not at liberty to demand its equivalent in gold or silver, but are obliged to accept it, it de- generates into paper money. In the first case it aims to supply in part the metallic money, of which the country should reserve a sufficient amount to assure the exchange of bills for specie, and to serve in those transactions in which bank notes can not enter. In the second case it has for effect to replace metallic money even to the point of the issue of paper money with compulsory cir- culation or of so-called legal tender character. — The aggregate of business transactions requires but a certain determinate amount of specie in each country at a given time. If bank bills are Substituted for a part of the instruments of ex- change, the surplus disappears under the form of merchandise, in order to restore the level, unless the coin be reserved in the treasury as a pledge of the paper money in circulation: thus it is that paper money drives out coin. — We may in a cer- tain limited measure, as we shall see, economize upon the portion of the national capital employed in the making of the instrument of exchange. An institution of credit, solidly established, may maintain in circulation a mass of bills which will be in as much favor as specie, provided the metal- lic reserve guarantees their payment at sight, and provided the bill represents a sufficiently impor- tant part of the monetary unit to facilitate trans- portation and shorten accounts. However, we can Supply in this way only a portion of the money needed; but the amount of the latter relatively to the amount of business transactions diminishes in proportion as civilization advances, as Society improves, and as credit is extended. In 1873 the wealth of England was estimated at two hundred milliards of francs, and its production at about twenty-four milliards; the total amount of money in the country, metallic and fiduciary, scarcely exceeded three milliards; the wealth of France in the same year was estimated at one hun- dred and sixty milliards of francs; its production was scarcely inferior to that of England; it had twice the amount (about six milliards) in specie and bank notes. It would be an exaggeration to reckon the wealth of Russia at 50,000,000,000 francs, and its products at 12,000,000,000; it em- ploys about 4,000,000,000 francs in specie and paper money. The possible economy on the amount of capital employed in the medium of circulation, is therefore in an inverse ratio to the Sum total of national wealth. The richer a country is, the less it gains by abandoning the solid ground of gold and silver. — The saving of capital effected by the regular use of bank notes would be reckoned high if placed at from one- fourth to one-third of the sum required for the purpose of the exchange of wealth; if we take into consideration the necessary reserves, it does not amount to half a milliard of francs in England, and if it rises to two milliards in France, it is because of an abnormal condition, the result of the Franco- Prussian war, which can not last. It amounts, according to this showing, to the one four-hun. dredth part of the wealth of the United Kingdom, and to about one-hundredth part of the wealth of France. Regarding this comparison from another point of view, we may say that the interest of the metallic capital thus replaced frees England and France from an annual burden of twenty and eighteen millions of francs respectively, calculat- ing the interest at 4 per cent. This is equivalent to about the one-thousandth part of the produc- tion of England, and to about the one three-hun. dredth part of the production of France. As a matter of course bank notes render much more important service in France by the facility and convenience which they afford, and by the saving which they render possible, even without taking any account of the inconveniences of compulsory circulation, to which France was subjected after 1870. — These gains are not without their accom- panying dangers, which grow more serious the more the volume of notes increases. In propor- tion as this volume increases, the metallic supply decreases, and as confidence is the stuff of which Credit is made, if a period of calm and prosperity be succeeded by one of uneasiness, or if impera- • tive needs require a great exportation of specie, every effort must be made to recall the absent metal, even at the cost of great sacrifices and by paying dear for it; this it is that makes the emis- sion of bank notes so perilous; this it is that for- bids us to go beyond a certain restrictive limit, unless we would resign ourselves to the dangers of compulsory circulation. If this limit, which is variable it is true, be passed, it necessarily leads to commercial crises when the fiduciary paper has been issued only as the representative sign of private engagements, and to a political crisis when paper money has been issued to meet the wants of the state. — Adam Smith recognized the utility of the “wagonway through the air” of credit, which enables the “country to convert, as it were, a great part of its highways into good pas- tures and corn fields,” highways represented by metallic money. “Nevertheless,” he adds, “the commerce and the industry of the country, it must be acknowledged, though they may be some- what augmented, can not be altogether so secure when they are thus, as it were, suspended upon the Daedalian wings of paper money, as when they travel upon the solid ground of gold and silver.” After having pointed out the danger he endeavors to destroy the attraction of an imag- inary benefit: “the whole paper money of every kind which can circulate in any country can never exceed the value of the gold and silver of which it supplies the place.” — Let us, by an ex- treme hypothesis, suppose ourselves in a society from which the use of the precious metals has en- PAPER MONEY. 45 tirely disappeared. If we should go beyond this, as paper money does not unite in itself the char- acters both of sign and of pledge, and as it does not become a commodity when it ceases to be a means of discharge from debt, it can not flow into foreign countries, and its excess produces depre- ciation. But who will flatter himself that he can measure exactly the amount of the media of circula- tion necessary in a country? This amount depends not only upon the mass but also upon the rapidity of exchanges. When the precious metals alone are employed, or when they effect the major part of business transactions, their level is maintained naturally, thanks to the weir which opens on for- eign markets: this level can not but be violently disturbed when the bounds of prudence are over- stepped by the issue of money paper, and espe- cially when the nation abandons itself to the dan- gerous seductions of paper money. — The danger exists even when a private institution is granted the dangerous privilege which excuses it from payment at sight; it assumes a much graver as- pect when the state itself assumes this perilous function. History furnishes most sad and strik- ing examples of the chastisement everywhere vis- ited upon these same mistakes. France, England, Austria, Russia, and the United States, not to swell the list by citing the instances of secondary states, have paid the penalty of the system of Law and of the assignats, of the forced circulation of bank notes, of the Bank;2ettel, of paper roubles, and of continental money. It is a curious fact that Poland alone, a country which it is sought to blot out entirely from the map of Europe, pre- served itself from this plague down to the very time of its subjugation by Russia. This latter country has, on the contrary, always had, upon a large scale, a fictitious system of circulation, which it inherited from Chinese, Tartar and Mongolian traditions. We do not wish to make any vain display of erudition, nor to enter into investigations which could be of interest only to the curious, and we shall therefore confine our- selves to recalling the fact that Genghis Khan made use of paper money, and that, toward the end of the thirteenth century, his grandson Kob- lai employed it in such a manner as to excite the ingenuous admiration of Marco Polo. This admi. ration proved only too contagious: the system, which from China and Mongolia had invaded Russia, was also admitted into western Europe. But we believe we ought to point out, as a re- markable fact, the scrupulous care with which Napoleon I. always guarded against a like at- tempt. He never consented to the issue of paper money. While England had resort to the com- pulsory circulation of paper money to resist him, and while Russia and Austria issued prodigious Quantities of assignats, Napoleon ever held aloof from this disorder, and de Montalivet, minister of the interior, said, in a circular addressed to the prefects on the 25th of October, 1810: “The em- peror regards paper money as the greatest scourge of nations, and as being, to morals, what the plague is in the physical order.” — By a singular concatenation of truths and errors the wisest operations of the most severely administered banks have in the end degenerated into a mon- strous creation of paper money. — Everywhere in Europe, except in Poland, the right of the crown to coin money, which had pretended to put an end to the fraud and pillage organized by local suzerains, ended by giving rise to successive lowering of the standard, lessening of the weight and debasing of the coin. The great Copernicus wrote, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, upon this important question in a treatise that is almost unknown: ‘‘ However innumerable the scourges that ordinarily lead to the decline of kingdoms, principalities and republics, the four following are, to my mind, the most formidable: . discord, pestilence, barrenness of the land, and the deterioration of the money. As far as the first three are concerned the evidence is such that no one is ignorant of them. But as to the fourth, if we except a few men of superior intelligence, very few concern themselves about it; and why? Because it does not ruin the state at a single blow, but little by little, by a sort of hidden action.”— The diversity and variation of moneys was one of the causes that led to the establishment of banks of deposit, which reduced these uncertain signs to a common denomination, by creating bank money fixed and invariable which took into con- sideration the metallic value of the specie depos- ited. The notes issued were fully represented by the specie deposited in the banks; to conven- ience and accuracy they joined the most complete security, and soon gained universal favor. — It was noticed that the greater part of these titles continued in circulation, without any demand being made for the restitution of the specie guaranteeing them. Some banks employed the latter, thus leaving a part of their notes unse- cured, at least as far as the metallic pledge was concerned. They were likewise led to attempt the inverse operation by issuing more notes than they possessed reserve in money or in bullion, thus increasing the profits of the institution and replacing a portion of their metallic stock by what we may call trust notes. They had obli- gated themselves to pay at sight: but as the de- mands for coin were not made simultaneously, these demands were met by diminishing the amount of their reserve corresponding to the titles issued. The declivity was a dangerous one, the enticement of gain urged the banks of issue to extend their operations, and to utilize more and more the marvelous power they possessed of coining in some measure money from sheets of paper rushed through a press. It is true that their obligation to immediately redeem it forced them to incessant precaution, which was con- stantly opposed by the allurement of gain: they were in constant danger, if they had not sufficient specie to pay at sight. The situation in this re- spect in our own day has not changed; it seems to us to lead to a clearer and clearer distinction 46 PAPER MONEY. between the issue of notes which perform the functions of money and banking operations prop- erly so called, and to give a separate existence, by its concentration, to the power of creating these notes. The two principles, which always made war upon the liberty of the banks and the oneness of the note payable to bearer and at sight, are thus reconciled. — At the time when the errors of the mercantile system estimated the wealth of states by the amount of gold and silver they possessed, the supplementary circulation fur- nished by the bank note could not but be received enthusiastically. As paper was raised to the level of gold and silver, which were considered as the equivalents of wealth, wealth could be increased at will. There remained, it is true, the trouble- some condition of redemption; but this condition, it was said, was superfluous, it was an obstacle to the expansion of capital, and the sovereign au- thority, which was master of all, might readily do away with it. What an admirable discovery! Was not the genius of Law, as the poets of the time Sang, to Enrichir à la fois, les sujets et les rois; since he opened an inexhaustible source to the spirit of enterprise, since Mississippi was called by him to become what California has since be- come! Thus people began by seeking in banks of deposit a remedy for the degradation of the coinage: the bank note circulated because based upon a full specie guarantee; afterward this guar- antee was diminished in the banks of issue, and finally disappeared in paper money. — Colbert de- nounced the unrestricted license to borrow, as a cause of ruin to the state; what would he have said of this formidable instrument of paper money, which was on the point of handing over abundant resources to the prodigality and rash enterprises of governments, by drawing to itself produced wealth, at the risk of destroying it by foolish expenses and by the squandering of a part of the public fortune, which was destined to dis- appear in smoke under the deceptive form of notes having a forced circulation and of assig- nats? Sophisms were not wanting to give a brill- iant coloring to these disastrous operations. To procure for paper the value and efficacy of money was to make something out of nothing, and to have a share in divine power; wealth consisted in an abundance of money; thanks to paper, peo- ple were no longer tied to the precious metals, which would not increase at will, nor follow the commands of man, while paper money, the fruit- ful and docile agent of the supreme power, could be increased at will. The abbé Terrasson ex- plains in a curious manner this phenomenon of financial optics. “A merchant's note,” he says, “as it may be refused in trade, does not circulate like silver, and consequently soon returns to its Source; its utterer finds himself obliged to pay, and deprived of the benefit of credit. This is not the case with the king: as every one is obliged to accept his note, and this note circulates as silver, he pays validly even with his promise.” “Gold and silver,” he adds, “are merely the signs that rep- resent real wealth, that is, commodities. An écu is a note conceived in the following terms: any seller will give to its bearer the commodity or merchandise which he may need up to the amount of three livres for as much of another kind of merchandise which has been given me; and the effigy of the prince takes the place of his sig- nature. Now, what difference does it make whether this sign is of silver or of paper ? Is it not cheaper to choose a material that costs noth- ing, and which one is not obliged to withdraw from trade, where it is employed as merchandise, which, in fine, is manufactured in the kingdom, and which does not render us necessarily depend- ent upon strangers and owners of mines, who eagerly take advantage of the Seduction or éclat of gold and silver to cause the ruin of other nations, a material that can be increased according to his needs, without fear of ever exhausting the Sup- ply; finally, a material which no one will be tempted to use for any other purpose than for cir- culation? Paper has all these advantages which render it preferable to silver.”— We see that the pretended discoveries, pompously vaunted by the new social alchemists of our day, are but old rub- bish, long since condemned by good sense and experience! Doctrines similar to those of the abbé Terrasson inspired Law’s system, and led to an emission of 2,696,400,000 livres of irredeem- able notes, absorbed by a disgraceful bankruptcy, at an epoch when the value of each piece of money was, we must bear in mind, much greater, and the needs of circulation much less, than to-day; these doctrines, allied with other errors in her coinage system, gave birth to the 45,000,000,000 of assignatsin France. The attempt has been vain- ly made to palliate such a debauchery of credit, by saying that the assignats saved the revolution, just as it has been said that the reign of terror saved the republic. We protest against this view with all the energy of a conviction based upon a scrupulous study of facts. The able memoir communicated to the academy of moral and political sciences by Levasseur shows how the ruin brought about by the disordinate issue of assignats weakened France, and Michelet has eloquently said: “The reign of terror killed the republic by exciting in men's minds a feeling more powerful than that of fear, the feeling of pity!” — A young ecclesiastical student, twenty-two years of age, who afterward became illustrious under the name of Turgot, completely annihilated the errors professed by the defenders of paper money in his admirable letter to the abbé de Cicé (Paris, April 7, 1749). It would be difficult to find more cogent logic enlisted in a better cause. — Save a slight difference, arising from the cost of production, uncoined silver is on a par with coined silver, the money value being only a denomination. “It is as merchandise that silver is, not the sign, but the common measure of other kinds of merchandise, and this not by any arbi- trary convention, based upon the splendor of this metal, but because, as it can be employed as mer- PAPER MONEY. 47 chandise under different forms, and has, by reason of this property, a salable value which is some- what increased by its use as money, since it can, moreover, be reduced to the same title and divided exactly, its value is always known.”— After hav- ing clearly stated the true principle, Turgot points out the danger of the arbitrary multiplication of paper. “But,” says the abbé Terrasson, “it is to the king's interest, in order to preserve his credit, to keep paper money within just bounds, and this interest of the prince is sufficient to establish con- fidence.” What are these just bounds? and how shall they be determined? Gold and silver are dis- tributed by their very circulation, according to the proportion of products, of industry, wealth and revenue which they procure, as well as of the expenses incurred. Paper money has no meas- ure but deceptive approximations, which a natural allurement is wont to swell at the wish of power. Instead of proportioning its issue to the unknown wants of the market, the latter made its issue conform to the insatiable requirements of the treasury; and ruin was the consequence. This is the common history of paper money wherever it has functioned as an attribute of public power, when the bank note ceased to be protected by a contract, and was transformed into an act of power. — We must not confound the disastrous effects of inordinate emissions with the temporary privilege accorded to a bank, authorizing it to suspend the redemption of its notes in specie. When care is taken to limit the amount of notes in circulation, it is possible to ward off the bad effects of such an act, especially when it is easy to foresee the end of them, and when the prudent conduct of the institution has acquired for it great solidity. — The act of 1797, which made compulsory the circula- tion of the notes of the bank of England, had but little effect, because they were not increased be- yond the actual needs of the home circulation. The entire amount of notes in circulation in 1796 was £10,730,000 ; in 1797 it was but £9,675,000, and did not exceed £13,000,000 even in 1800. Their depreciation began when the needs of the treasury increased this sum. We must add, also, that the prodigious stir in industry about this time required more numerous instruments of ex- change, while it at the same time furnished the sin- ews of war. Thanks to the inventions of Watt and Arkwright, the English mechanics spun gold, so to speak, and furnished material for the successive loans called for by the treasury, which reached colossal proportions. The bank of England facilitated these loans by discounting the notes of the exchequer, but the circulation of the notes never reached such proportions as to be a source of uneasiness; it never exceeded £20,000,000, ex- cept in 1810, and the maximum point reached was £28,000,000, before the resumption of specie payments in 1822. Still, even thus restricted, the prolongation of compulsory circulation was the cause of considerable losses, first by the rise in the price of gold, and then by the painful transition from a depreciated currency to the re-establish- ment of metallic money. The bank of England, does not, therefore, furnish any argument in favor of the inconsiderate issue of paper money; and it suffices to recall how comparatively moder- ate it was in its conduct, without, however, escaping the danger of the depreciation of fiduci- ary paper, to induce us to abandon rash designs of a similar character. — There is much more rea- son not to cite the example of the bank of France in 1848, in defense of paper money. Every one knows what good services the good standing of this great establishment, the safety of its operations and the care it had always taken to maintain its specie reserve, enabled it to render to the govern- ment and to industry during this direful period, in spite of the terrible shock caused by the revolu- tion of February. The compulsory circulation of its notes was in a measure only nominal : public administrations, the manufacturers and the mer- chants received the specie they needed. The confidence which the bank enjoyed attracted de- posits to it. Although it had absorbed the depart- mental banks, and realized the grand idea of unity of issue, it was restricted at first to a circulation of 452,000,000 francs in notes; this figure was in- creased to 525,000,000 on Dec. 22, 1849, when its reserve was firmly re-established; its notes ex- changed at par, and even at a small premium; and, in reality, it was the specie that had com- pulsory circulation, as the demand for notes exceeded the supply. The resumption of specie payments was urgently demanded by the bank itself, and prescribed by the decree of Aug. 6, 1850, without causing any trouble. — Thus we see what is gained by not being carried away by chimerical facilities, and multiplying notes as Austria and Russia did, when the wants of circulation did not require it; this multiplication must necessarily lead to the instability of the measure of values, and to a variable lowering of the representative sign in all business trans- actions. We shall soon tell how France, in the face of apparently increasing financial ne- cessities, in great part escaped this danger; for everything here is a question of proportion. The state which goes beyond this delicate measure tolerates or is guilty of an abuse, and is wanting in the performance of the high mission of power; instead of maintaining order, guaranteeing Secu- rity, and maintaining the public faith, it becomes itself an instrument of sad disturbance, and at the same time aims a blow at moral law and the interests of production. From the moment that money loses its character of a solid pledge of business transactions, or that, instead of avoiding the variations of value, it suffers their effect, con- fidence disappears, operations extending over a long period are stopped, credit, the mainspring of industry, is destroyed, and circulation ceases. Paper money destroys the type, or, as Lord Liver- pool styled it, the Sovereign archetype of value, the precious metals. The bank note ceases to be their reflection and representative sign: the danger rapidly increases, if, instead of remaining an in- 48 PARAGUAY. strument of commerce, and of being backed by the discount on merchandise, it is handed over at the arbitrary will of the state, which transforms it into a mere resource of the treasury. It then becomes almost impossible to avoid a fatal de- clivity; an excessive emission leads to bank- ruptcy, for the state always issues more notes than the needs of circulation require, and, in pro- portion as the law of depreciation manifests itself, it hastens the catastrophe by the necessity of em- ploying more notes to meet the same expenses. —The loss which the country suffers is far from being confined to the diminution in price of the mass of fiduciary signs; it is increased by the unnatural amount of business transactions, ren- dered so by a fictitious value. The money of a nation never forms but a small portion of its wealth, and the depreciation of paper exercises a direful influence upon all products, which are henceforth distributed in a false proportion. All the relations of the sovereign power with citizens and of citizens with one another, are changed by it; contracts are violated; injustice triumphs, and the public fortune declines as a result of the ruin of individuals. – How deplorable soever the sys- tem of paper money appears to us, we do not wish to exaggerate anything; it is not impossible to escape the dangers which it seems to provoke, but to do so we must renounce the idea of seeing in it too rich a mine, and of demanding of it more help than it can render. By confining it to well-defined limits, by scrupulously preventing it from exceeding a fraction of the receipts and expenses of the state, the government may find in paper money, if accepted by all the public treasuries, the means of effecting a real loan with- out interest. But this can never be but a limited resource, and as it may lead to dire consequences, it would be better to renounce it from the moment there appears a possibility of these consequences. Many of the small German states have treasury notes, which circulate as money, because there are but very few of them. In 1873, with a budget of 1,000,000,000 francs, Prussia had not 60,000,000 of Tresorscheine; the duchy of Baden reached a larger proportion, 3,000,000 florins of paper money to a budget of 19,000,000 florins. It is only in microscopic and needy states that the relative proportion is still further increased; but the amounts are Small. Saxe-Meiningen had, in 1873, a budget of 2,000,000 florins and 356,000 florins of paper money. Saxe-Altenburg had 400,000 thalers of paper money when the treasury receipts reached only 874,192 thalers, and there were 950,000 thalers (more than $600,000) of this irredeemable paper in Anhalt alone. These modest figures seem insignificant by the side of the 3,000,000,000 of paper money of the Russian empire, which would like to appear less majestic in this respect. If France, at the close of a dis- astrous war, was compelled to carry such an amount of paper, she did it only by maintaining a larger specie reserve in the presence of wealth treble the amount, and of a trade four times that amount. She endeavored, besides, to resume her normal condition by a prompt redemption of the state's indebtedness to the bank of France. — The two distinctive characteristics of paper money are, that it is not redeemable in coin, and that, instead of having public confidence for its limit, it is imposed by authority, by means of forced cir- culation and the usurpation of the power of discharging debts. Bad as an instrument of com- mercial credit, it becomes disastrous as an instru- ment of public authority, unless it be lessened to such an extent as to render only secondary ser- vices. As soon as the attempt is made to use it upon a very large scale, it leads to an abyss. – Never more than in these later times have we seen numerous states applying the dread remedy of paper money upon a great scale. The United States at the close of the war of secession, Italy after gaining her independence, and France when defeated by Prussia, have put themselves side by side with Russia and Austria in the use of this dangerous expedient. This affords us a great lesson, for all these states were or are merely endeavoring to escape from a false situation, whose inconveniences they all appreciate. The old illu- sions have disappeared: men no longer extol paper money; they no longer see in it a source of wealth; they appreciate better the elements which consti- tute productive power; they know how often an apparent economy is transformed into losses of various kinds, whose amount far surpasses the pretended benefit. —If we sum up the total amount of paper money issued by the five powers mentioned, we will find, after deducting the amount of the specie reserve, that it amounted, in 1873, to $250,000,000,000. This was not one- Seventieth part of the accumulated wealth of these states; as a pretended increase of productive power, therefore, paper money is a feeble bene- fit, entirely counterbalanced by the trouble it causes in circulation. The measure is already full, and can not be increased. The common efforts of all civilized nations are directed toward a reduction of the amount of paper money. But should not this necessary reduction of notes ren- der those more circumspect who, acknowledging only gold as a medium of circulation, would run the risk of destroying the necessary equilibrium between business and money? (See MONEY AND ITs SUBSTITUTEs.) L. WolowsRI. PARAGUAY (Republic of). Paraguay was one of the numerous provinces included in the vice-royalty of Buenos Ayres, which comprised the Spanish-American possessions connected by the Rio de la Plata with the Atlantic Ocean. Like all the other Spanish colonies of Central and South America, Paraguay, when the cry of inde- pendence resounded throughout the American continent, succeeded in shaking off the yoke of the mother country, almost without a struggle, in 1810. But this province, which had already had its separate history in the past, a strange his- tory and one entirely different from that of any PARAGUAY. 49 other state, also contributed to the revolution which it had just accomplished, features which contrasted in a most striking manner with those of the other republics of La Plata. — A few words here about the past. Paraguay, like the greater part of South America, was conquered to the crown of Spain, about the middle of the sixteenth century, by the hardy adventurers who, on the heels of Columbus, Cortez, Pizarro and Americus Vespucius, had cast themselves upon the new world, as ardent in their endeavors to despoil and enslave the aborigines as to convert them to the Christian faith. But in these remote coun- tries, in which relations with Europe were almost impossible, the religious element soon prevailed over the political element, and the powerful com- pany of Jesus which, since 1588, had through its missions planted the germs of refinement of man- ners and community life in these countries, ob- tained, in 1611, the privilege of governing Para- guay, under the suzerainty paramount of Spain. — This government of the Jesuits established a pure theocracy in Paraguay, and maintained it with firmness, moderation and success during more than a century and a half, until the year 1767, when the society was expelled under the ministry of the count of Aranda. We can not here undertake to defend theocratic government, as both experience and reason demonstrate that human societies develop only under the influence of ideas of progress and liberty. We must note, also, that individual action, under the enervat- ing régime of their vast conventual organization, no longer had the energetic stimulus of the feel- ing of ownership or property. But, when we consider the savage state of the inhabitants, it is impossible to deny that the Jesuits worked a mar- velous transformation during their prolonged domination. If they concerned themselves more about the souls than the intellects of the aborig- ines, if their religion itself was a sort of paganism, tending to divert the natives because external in form in almost everything, they nevertheless bent these large and lazy children to the law of labor; and it is a demonstrated fact that the agricul- ture of Paraguay was checked after the expulsion of the company, and that even to this day it has not regained its former development, so that nu- merous localities, formerly well cultivated, are now abandoned. What is specially worthy of note is, that the rule of the Jesuits left a strong impression upon their minds, and that respect for authority remained the heritage of the country when the declaration of its independence handed it over to the experiment of a republican form of government. Nor were its efforts in this direc- tion long continued : while everywhere else, throughout Spanish America, the people sought their way amid endless commotions, the people of Paraguay found theirs without hesitation and without groping; or rather, as immutably disci- plined disciples of the Jesuit fathers, the people of Paraguay allowed themselves to be led without a shadow of resistance, by the energetic man who 123 VOL. III. — 4 took their destiny in his hands. With the aid of the patriots of Buenos Ayres, Paraguay had over- thrown the Spanish domination in the month of May, 1811; a junta had been established, and the victorious insurgents gave the highest place to Doctor Francia, who had taken no part in these events, but whom they regarded as the only Para- guayan capable of directing public affairs. — In fact, from the moment that Doctor Francia was accorded a place in the new republic, he became everything: he first presided over the junta, then when a congress had established, at his sugges- tion, a government with two consuls, he filled One of the consular chairs, which had been called by the names of Caesar and Pompey. Soon after, in 1814, the chair of Pompey, which had been only an embarrassment, was removed from the hall of congress, and Francia was named dictator for three years. Finally, the assembly conferred perpetual dictatorship upon him. Thus was the republic of Paraguay governed until the year 1840, when the dictator, weighed down with years, but ever feared, respected and obeyed as a god, was called from the throne and from the world. — Absolute power was not exercised dur- ing so many years without falling into excesses. Francia, who had obtained supreme power at the age when passions are extinct, and who had im- mediately renounced all taste for gaming and sen- sual indulgence, hitherto the sole object of his life, abandoned himself to the sombre passion of old men, vengeance. He was sure of the submis- sion of the people, but he wished to inspire fear, and he cared little whether he was hated or not. Those who had known him best, those who, in the beginning of his career, had helped to bring him forward, and whose jealousy had been ex- cited by his new greatness, were the more espe- cial objects of his pitiless spite. Under pretext of conspiracy, his old friends were imprisoned, judged by him alone, and executed. His dicta- torship was a veritable reign of terror, and even to-day scarcely any trace can be found of the bloody executions he prescribed, as his written orders were returned to him after the execution, and by him immediately destroyed. —Francia had, we may add, no regard whatever for human life, and this is the odious feature of his dictatorship; but his cruelty, his strange and fantastic humor, did not constitute the entire man, for whose con- tinued power there would be no pretext, even in Paraguay, if he were not possessed of certain striking public virtues and of extraordinary gov- erning qualities. The old dictator, with a precon- ceived system, devoted himself to what he be- lieved to be the interest of Paraguay. Much bet. ter informed than any of his countrymen, he took everything into his own hands, always knowing the end which he wished to attain. Without ministers, without counselors, without confidants, he had with him only a secretary of the lowest rank, called actuario, who recorded his wishes, without pretending to influence them. He was ever disinterested: he said that the state stood 50 PARAGUAY. more in need of money than he did, and of the 9,000 piastres assigned him by congress he never took more than 3,000 piastres a year. Such being his own practice, Francia impressed upon his whole administration rules of austere probity which singularly contributed to render his name popular. —The dictator's policy was very simple; it was the policy of isolation. He aimed at main- taining Paraguay free not only from all con- tact with Europe, but also and especially from all intercourse with the ancient provinces of the vice-royalty of Buenos Ayres. There was never a shadow of indecision in his conduct, in this regard. Despite all the attempts of the governments that succeeded one another in the Argentine Republic, he never would admit that the autonomy of Paraguay could be broken, and in the last years of his life he even refused to exam- ine the pressing demands addressed to him on this subject by Rosas, who was then at the height of his power. This had been somewhat the policy of the Jesuits; but Francia, who was thoroughly imbued with the anti-Catholic ideas of the eight- eenth century, had not the religious motive of his predecessors. He wished to defend himself against liberty, which, in fact, did not work wonders in the Argentine countries, where Rosas had inflicted upon the people a dictatorship more severe than that of Francia himself, without giving, in ex- change, the profound peace which can scarcely be said to have been interrupted, during the thirty years of Francia's rule, by a few aggressions of the savages from the desert. — The death of Fran- cia, which occurred in 1840, left the work which he had created without a guide. But after him, in default of statesmen, there remained the people whom he had trained to obedience, and who, faithful to their tranquil habits, passed over the period of transition to a new government without any trouble. They remembered what had been done in 1810; a general constituent assembly was convoked, elected by universal suffrage, and com- posed of five hundred members. This assembly appointed two consuls to govern the republic, Don Carlos-Antonio Lopez, a wealthy landed pro- prietor, and Don Mariano-Roque Alonzo, com- mander-in-chief of the army, who had been called by the voice of the public to provide for the most urgent wants of the government, and for the con- vocation of the representatives. The powers given to the consuls were to expire at the end of three years; and Superiority on the one hand, and defer- ence on the other, were so firmly established, that the three years elapsed without the least collision. But in 1844, when the assembly met again, it hap- pened, as in the time of Francia’s administration, that One of the consuls absorbed the other. An- tonio Lopez was named president for ten years.— The presidency of Paraguay became a real dy- nasty. When his constitutional term had expired, Lopez wished to be succeeded by his son, Don Francisco-Salano Lopez, and the assembly very graciously lent itself to this notion. But Gen. Lopez declined the honor tendered him, and his refusal does not seem to have displeased the head of his family, who willingly allowed himself to be renominated. It was not until 1862, on the death of Antonio Lopez, that the congress finally called Don Francisco-Salano Lopez to the decen- nial presidency. — The elevation to power of Don Carlos-Antonio Lopez had been of immense benefit to Paraguay, and his son, still more completely freed from the traditions of Francia, and more inclined to the civilization of Europe, which he had visited, promised to continue the benefit. Don Antonio had governed Paraguay with mildness, and his patriarchal justice was full of mercy. Of the foreign policy of Fran- cia he had retained only his determined reso- lution to maintain the autonomy of Paraguay, and to preserve it against the attempted invasion of its turbulent neighbors. He would not at any cost return into the distracted pale 6f the old vice- royalty of Buenos Ayres, and exchange the order and prosperity which his fellow-countrymen en- joyed for the deceptive unity of the Argentine provinces, a unity fruitful only in endless civil strife. But what was his personal work, and remains his title to honor, is the intention he formed, and afterward accomplished, of demol- ishing the Chinese wall which Francia, after the example of the Jesuits, his predecessors, had built around Paraguay. He above all wished to open communications with Europe. Owing to the persistence with which he pressed the conclusion of treaties of navigation and commerce with France, England, the United States, Brazil, etc., the isolation of Paraguay was in part done away with in 1860. This isolation was due in great part to the very situation of Paraguay. It is a vast plateau of arable land, watered by mighty rivers and numerous streams, but elevated above all the other countries of South America, situated in the very centre of the continent, far from any sea, and has communication with the other states only by means of its two rivers, the Parana and the Paraguay. The fixed purpose of the two Lo- pezes was to secure the freedom of navigation of the two rivers. The second Lopez established it by a decree. He also had a railroad constructed. Very much inclined to the economic progress of Europe, whence he had returned decorated (an immense prestige in America), he had resolved to make of Paraguay a state of large resources, and economic works, after the fashion of France in 1852 and the succeeding years, whose political constitution he pretty closely copied. He acted as the ruler of a country of 901,640 square kilo- metres and 1,337,000 inhabitants. The revenues were increased to 12,450,000 francs, derived prin- cipally from the sale of the herb maté (Paraguay tea), from the domains (over 8,000,000 francs), and customs duties. Paraguay had no public debt, and its 4,500,000 francs of paper money were se- cured by a specie reserve of an equal amount. Its imports amounted to over 8,000,000 francs, and its exports to 7,000,000. — Lopez's position as head of the state was a unique one ; less than 7,000 PARAGUAY. 51 square kilometres of this vast country belonged to private parties; the remainder was state domain administered by Lopez. All the farmers were therefore histenants, so to speak; the manufactures which they produced were his; Paraguay was but an immense farm in his hands. Its means, how- ever, were not in keeping with the greatness of its natural resources: these fertile plains were worked with the spade; the farmers who used the plow were few. There was no industry but that which was improvised for the necessities of war. The navigation of the Paraguay was at the mercy of Buenos Ayres, which commands the mouth of the river. The hostility of the Argentine Re- public was surpassed by that of Brazil, which, for the ownership of vague and contested ter- ritory, drew the other states bordering on the Parana into a coalition which overcame Lopez. — Brazil demanded the left bank of the Para- guay (1864), and the Argentine Republic the right bank, which is possessed by Uruguay. It was against Uruguay that the coalition was first formed. The two greedy governments, refusing the intervention of Italy, put in power, in oppo- isition to the moderate (blanco) government which regularly governs Uruguay, the revolutionary (colorado) party, which invaded the republic. Lopez, who was friendly to the blancos, felt him- self threatened, and while refusing an alliance with Uruguay, he protested against the invasion of the Brazilian squadron in lower Paraguay, Nov. 17, 1864. He declared war against Brazil, and invaded the Brazilian territory. Flores, the colorado, who, with his Indians and half-breeds, ..and the assistance of the allies, took possession of Montevideo, joined the coalition. This struggle of one against three, of a great military farm against three nations provided with every indus- trial and maritime resource, moved Europe. Lopez was on good terms with the governments of Europe, and also with the United States; but American intervention was rejected by Brazil. This empire, which evidently dragged the two re- publics of La Plata into the struggle against their will, pushed matters to extremes. Lopez, five times conquered, five times repaired his losses by a general conscription, comprising women and children. He was finally captured and killed. There are few examples in history of a war so desperate, and so complete a ruin (1865). The population of Paraguay fell from 1,330,000 to 500,000, and the revenues from 13,000,000 francs to 2,000,000. — It seems that the conquerors wished partially to justify their ordinary, and in this case plausible, pretense of making war only in the interest of civilization and liberty; for, after having stipulated for the territorial acquisitions which they had long demanded, they left the Par- aguayans free to manage their own home govern- ment. By the treaty of Suret, concluded with Bra- zil and the Argentine Republic May 1, 1865, and ratified June 20, 1870, Paraguay was allowed to re- tain only the territory situated between the Para- guay and Parana rivers. Hence the area of the republic is at present only about 172,500 square kilometres. A constitution, proclaimed Nov. 25, 1875, provided for a president for four years, and a legislative congress composed of a senate and a chamber of representatives. It is substantially a reproduction of the constitution of the United States. – Examples of such efforts as Paraguay now made to repair so complete a catastrophe are as rare as the catastrophe itself. The government of Paraguay proposed the sale of the immense na- tional property, which comprised almost its entire territory. But these lands had to be hypothe- cated to guarantee a loan of £25,000,000, which was effected in England. In 1862 there was no public debt: in 1870 it amounted, besides the Eng- lish loan, to 1,180,000,000 francs. Disorganiza- tion was such that the government had lost the titles to its property; a special commission had to be appointed to enforce the rights of the state. The instruments of production and the products themselves were everywhere damaged, when they were not destroyed. The railroad had to be sup- plied anew with rolling stock, workshops and stations. They had to rebuild public edifices, re- establish tribunals, issue paper money, take meas- ures for the representation of Paraguay at the international exposition of Cordova, and to en- courage immigration. Slavery was abolished (1871), the standing army reduced, and foreigners admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights of na. tives, but not to high political and administrative functions.” — BIBLIOGRAPHY. L. A. DemerSay, * The ministry consists of five secretaries, presiding over the departments of the interior, of finance, of worship and justice, of war, and of foreign affairs. For administrative purposes the country is divided into seventy departments (departementos), governed by commanders. — The public revenue of Paraguay is derived mainly from customs duties. In 1881 they yielded £82,548. In 1882 the expenditure was estimated to amount to £62,685, inclusive of interest on the debt, army expenses and other items. – The republic had no debt until the war of 1865–70, which led to the rais- ing of large internal loans. In 1871 and 1872, the govern- ment contracted two foreign loans, the first of the nominal amount of £1,000,000, and the second of £2,000,000, each bearing 8 per cent. interest. The loans, issued at the price of 80, were hypothecated on the public lands of Paraguay, valued at £19,380,000. Payment of both interest and sinking funds on the two loans ceased in 1874. No part of the pre- vious payments, according to the report of the select par- liamentary committee on foreign loans, 1875, “was provid- ed for by the government of Paraguay, but the whole was derived from the proceeds of the loans themselves. Since these funds so set apart have been exhausted, no payment on account of interest or sinking fund has been made by the government of Paraguay.” According to treaty stipulations arising out of the war of 1865–70, Paraguay is indebted to Brazil to the amount of 200,000,000 pesos, or £40,000,000; to the Argentine Confederation to the amount of 35,000,000 pesos, orºg?,000,000, and to Uruguay to the amount of 1,000,000 pesos, or £200,000, being a total war debt of 236,000,000 pesos, or £47,200,000. – The military force in the war against the united armies of Brazil, Uruguay and the Argentine Repub- lic, carried on during the years 1865–70, comprised 60,000 men, including 10,000 cavalry and 5,000 artillery. These troops were afterward altogether disbanded, and the entire force in 1877 consisted of 185 foot soldiers, forming the gar- rison of the capital. The permanent army is only 500 men. – The frontiers of the republic, not well defined previous to the war of 1865–70—large territories considered part of it being claimed by Brazil, Bolivia and the Argentine Confed- §2. PARASITES. Histoire physiqué, économiqué et politique du Para- guay et des établissements des Jesuites, 2 vols., 8vo, Paris, 1865; Alfred Du Graty, La République de Paraguay, 8vo, Bruxelles, 1865; K. Johnston, Paraguay, (in “Geographical Magazine,” July, 1875), London, 1875; A. J. Kennedy, La Plata, Brazil and Paraguay, during the War, 8vo, Lon- don, 1869; Chas. Mansfield, Paraguay, Brazil and the Plate, new edit., by the Rev. Charles Kingsley, 8vo, London, 1866; G. F. Masterman, Seven. Eventful Years in Paraguay, 8vo, London, 1869; M. G. and E. T. Mulhall, Handbook to the River Plate Republics, etc., and the Republics of Uruguay and Paraguay, 8vo, London, 1875; Commander Thomas G. Page, La Plata, the Ar- gentine Confederation and Paraguay: Narrative of the Exploration of the Tributaries of the River La Plata and adjacent countries during the years 1853–6, under the orders of the United States Government, 8vo, New York, 1867; Charles Quentin, Le Paraguay, 8vo, Paris, 1866; George Thompson, The Paraguayan War, with sketches of the history of Paraguay and of the manners and customs of the people, 8vo, London, 1869; Joh. Jac. v. Tschudi, Reisen durch Suedamerika, 2 vols., 8vo, Leipzig, 1866; Chas. A. Washburn, The History of Paraguay, with notes of personal observations, 2 vols., 8vo, Boston and New York, 1871; Fregeiro, Diccionario geografico e historico del Rio de La Plata, etc., 1878. CHAS. REYBAUD. eration—were fixed by a treaty of alliance between Brazil, the Argentine Confederation and Uruguay, signed May 1, 1865, to be between 22° and 27° south latitude, and 57° and 60° west longitude, of the meridian of Paris. By the final adjustment of the boundaries between Paraguay and neigh- boring states the area of the former is now estimated at 91,970 square miles. – An enumeration made by the govern. ment in 1857 showed the population to number 1,337,439 souls. – At the beginning of 1873 the number of inhabitants, according to an official return, was reduced to 221,079 souls, comprising 28,746 men and 106,254 women over fifteen years of age, with 86,079 children, the enormous disproportion be- tween the sexes, as well as the vast decrease of the popula- tion, telling the results of the war. Since that date, another enumeration was taken, in 1876, the returns of which state the population at 293,844, being an increase of 72,765 in three years. About one-third of the inhabitants are living in the central province, containing the capital, the rest being spread thinly as settlers over the remaining portion of cultivated country. Nearly three-fourths of the entire territory is na- tional property. — The chief articie of foreign commerce of Paraguay is the yerba maté, or Paraguayan tea, made of the leaves of the Ilea: Paraguayensis tree, dried and reduced to powder, which are extensively consumed in all the states of South America. About 7,600,000 pounds of tobacco were exported in 1881. However, the total commerce of the re- public is very small, the aggregate of imports and exports not amounting, on the average, to more than half a million sterling per annum. In 1881 the imports amounted to £255,600, and the exports to £362,400. The imports are de- rived to the extent of three-fourths from Great Britain, and one-fourth from France and Germany. The British imports are passing entirely through the territories of Brazil and the Argentine Confederation, and since the year 1862, when a few articles of machinery and furniture, valued at £1,764, arrived from England, there has been no direct intercourse between Paraguay and the United Kingdom. — The only railway in Paraguay is a short line of forty-five English miles, from Asuncion, the capital, to Paraguay. There are no lines of telegraph but one at the side of this railway. —F., M. - PARASITES, Social. The parasite is one who lives at the expense of other men. The num- ber of parasites is so great, and their place in this world so considerable, that we can not speak of the general economy of Societies without con- cerning ourselves with them. No human being can live unless he has becóme exclusive master, that is to say, proprietor, of some portion of mat- ter, be it but the piece of bread or of fruit which he is on the point of eating, or of the clothing which covers him. Some men live by the honest acqui- sition and accumulation of property, or by the just conservation of property previously acquired; these constitute the useful and active part of the human race. Others live on the resources of their neighbors; but it is none the less necessary that they should obtain the proprietorship of the things indispensable to their subsistence. A man may live by the use and consumption of the things or the product of the things which he has previously obtained by occupation, or which have been acquired, preserved or accumulated by virtue of the right of inheritance. We call indi- viduals thus provided, proprietors, capitalists. The usage of speech reserves these names to per- sons who possess more material objects than are needed to satisfy the immediate wants of life. It is not customary, though he really is one, to call a proprietor the unfortunate man who possesses merely his clothing or his food for the day. A man may own nothing, either in capital producing an income or in stocks of provisions or other property, or he may possess Only an insufficient quantity of these, and yet live upon his own re- sources. Within each one of us there is a power- ful instrument of acquisition capable of furnishing material objects for our enjoyment. This inner most personal force, superior if not to all, at least to the usual and probable, risks of chance, is labor; in other words, the development of our powers of activity. Through this force we are enabled to render useful service to ourselves and others; and we acquire with certainty Our share of property by the exchange of services, and acci. dentally by occupation. When a man lives nei- ther by his own labor nor capital, a term in which, for greater convenience, we include all property previously acquired actually laid by, he must live by the labor or capital of others. Every man belongs then, necessarily, to one of these classes; capitalists, workmen, parasites. We are Wrong in speaking of three classes: in truth, what are called classes here are only three attributes, three aspects of humanity. Two of these qualities, or all three of them, are often united in the same person. When we range men in these three classes, we take principally into consideration which of the three qualities is predominant in each of them. — Mirabeau, in the discussion on the tithes in France, uttered the following words, which provoked the murmurs of the assembly, “It is time to renounce the prejudices of a proud ignorance which dis- dains the words wages and wage-workers. I know of but three ways of existing in Society: a man PARASITES. 53 must be a beggar, a thief or a wage-receiver. Proprietors themselves are merely the first among wage-receivers; what we commonly call his prop- erty is nothing but the price which Society pays him for the distribution which he is intrusted with making to other individuals, in return for his consumption and his expenses. Proprietors are the agents and stewards of the Social body.” The following day the abbé Duplaquet, on re- signing from a priory, said: “I commit myself to the justice of the nation ; considering, whatever M. de Mirabeau may have said on the subject, that I am too old to earn my wages, too honest to steal, and that the services which I have rendered should excuse me from begging.” This witty rep- artee of the abbé was misleading; the right to the continuation of his wages was already earned, for the reward for past services is one of the elements of honest wages. The assembly, therefore, did wrong to receive it with murmurs, and to take offense at the term wage-receivers, which its great orator, obeying the luminous boldness of his good sense, tried to free from an unmerited reproach. Mirabeau’s classification approached the truth, but did not reach it; proprietors are not wage workers; beggars and thieves constitute the princi- pal branches of parasites, but do not include them all. Mirabeau was right in saying, with the physiocrates, that, being the agents and stewards of the social body, proprietors distributed wages for their consumption and their expenses: the inaccuracy consisted in pretending that they re- ceived social wages for that distribution. This was to confound the origin of its acquisition with the use of the thing, and to take account only of the service rendered by property, and not of its right over the thing. Owners of property gain the right to wages only in so far as to the charac- ter of proprietor is joined the character of work- man, which, it is true, is usually added and in varying proportions, but which corresponds to a different order of relations. Owners, masters of their property, use it to suit themselves, in their own interest, at their own risk; the utility accru- ing indirectly to society from this use is the only service inherent in their quality as owners, and calls for no reward. It is in this use itself that they find the pay for this service. When society guarantees them the peaceable, permanent pos- session and the free enjoyment of their property, it does not pay them wages; it fulfills its own duty by causing the rights of owners to be re- spected; they it is who, by paying their taxes and bearing other public burdens, pay Society for the service it renders them by guarding and guaran- teeing their property. They distribute wages only because these wages bring them a profit by means of the values in things or services, of which wages are the representation, and the thing given in exchange for. The social utility of property is the consequence of its right, but neither its basis nor its measure. To lift the respect due to prop- erty to its true height, it is necessary to go to the length of Saying that even if property remained idle, unproductive or badly used, it would still be sacred for the same reason and in the same degree as if employed in useful consumption and productive expenditure. Very distinct in theory, the quality of the proprietor and that of the wage- earner are linked together in the concrete realities of life by numerous points of contact, and are frequently found united in the same individual. Every workman possesses in his own person an immaterial capital, which consists in his capacity for labor. It is composed of his natural activity, his theoretical instruction, his practical skill; the direction which his moral development imparts to his powers must also be included as of great importance. Even if we confine ourselves to the consideration of material objects which may be- come property, it is not necessary, in order to find workmen capitalists, to consider only great manufacturers, etc., operating on a large stock previously accumulated. The artisan who has become owner of his tools and furniture is a capitalist, though on a modest scale; for he pos- sesses articles which enable him to live, and things which he can use without destroying, and which will continue to be ulterior instruments of gain to him. In proportion as his property in- creases, as his tools become more numerous or better, as his stock of provisions accumulates for future consumption, his character as capitalist be- comes more evident. — There are capitalists who live only on their capital or on their income; but they are in the minority. The majority employ a certain amount of paid labor in giving life to, fructifying and increasing their property. Of all the sophisms used to pervert the understand- ing of the public sentiment, one of the falsest and most productive of danger is that which, exalting labor at the expense of property, endeav- ors to range capitalists among parasites so far as that part of their fortune not produced by actual labor is concerned. The full and peaceful enjoy- ment of property, accompanied by its essential character of indefinite transmissibility, would be the wisest of Calculations and the most useful of combinations, even if it were only the result of human convention. But property is more than this: it is a right; and, to consider it only in its relations with labor, it is the right of labor itself. Take away the certainty of being recognized as the master of goods legitimately acquired, and you break the spring of the activity which ac- quires them; deprive the father of a family of the assurance of transmitting the property acquired or preserved for his children, and you have destroyed the family spirit, and with it saving, temperance, providence, resignation, and plans for the future. Man is born for labor; but he craves repose, leisure, and the serene and disin- terested culture of the mind. To stigmatize in theory, or disturb in practice, the past of which capitalists are the depositaries, would be the death of the present and the future. Labor, which is future property, has confidence in its forces only through the stability of property, which is, mainly, bj4 PARASITES. past labor. — The parasite uses his neighbor's goods, that is, his property or his labor, without giving in return anything or any service. But it does not follow because an object was acquired parasitically, that it was illegitimately obtained. Ownership of things originates in several legiti- mate ways. Its first source is in the right of occupation; by virtue of which a vacant thing is appropriated by the person who first takes it. This origin excludes all idea of a parasitic acqui- sition, since it relates only to things to which no other person had acquired a right. Things already occupied can only be acquired by transmission. Transmission is legitimately effected in three dif- ferent ways. One is inheritance, which, consider- ing as a unit the natural association of relation- ship or affection, transfers the property of a de- ceased person to his heirs, by title of the civil con- tinuation of his person. The heir is not a para- site, since he acquires in virtue of his own right, which is the complement and consequence of the full and entire right of his parent. Another way is exchange, through which property is acquired for an equivalent furnished in things or in serv- ices. Thanks to exchange, each man need owe to himself alone the means of living and Owning property, and thus obtain independence and dig- nity from his own free acts. The third legitimate way of transmission is the way of gift. This is the only source of existence regularly open to parasite life. Outside of these four modes of acquisition, morality and law recognize no other. Robbery, rapine, cheating, extortion, confiscation, war, every act which takes another's goods by fraud or violence, should be ranked as a crime or misdemeanor. There are some distinctions to be made on the subject of confiscation and war, which may be legitimate by way of exception, but which are then resolved into forms of ex- change, and as a reparation for damage caused. —Parasites live irregularly, by misdemeanors, or regularly by gift. With regard to parasites of the first order, Mirabeau was right when he called them robbers; it is for the penal laws to settle with them. These parasites are found in every station of life, in all degrees of the social scale, and even among the wealthy. To live by confis- cation, to grow rich by unjust privileges, to re- ceive pay for work which is never done, for a place which is never filled, to break a contract or one’s word, to appropriate by violence, by cun- ning, by credit or by power, the goods, the work, the liberty, the rights of others, is to take the place of the lowest of parasites without any exhibition of shame. — Society, in its relations with this cor- rupt and corrupting class of men, has duties of various kinds to fulfill. The first is to punish them; the second is to see that the punishments inflicted furnish security and serve as an example to the rest of the people; the third is to turn the penalties into an effort to reform the guilty, and above all to prevent their becoming, through the fault of institutions, a new cause of individual corruption and social danger. With these public duties is connected everything which relates to penal legislation, to the administration of repres- sive justice, to the management of prisons, to banishment, and to the penitentiary system. Too mild punishment disarms and discourages society. Excessive severity destroys the sentiment of jus- tice, and causes it to degenerate by putting ven- geance in its place. It invites impunity. The cause of the greatest moral disturbance is to be found in a cowardly complaisance toward wealthy parasites, whom their social position raises up to serve as an example, which position they have not been able to protect from the baseness of liv- ing at the expense of others. To surround illy acquired wealth with honor, to lavish unmerited bounties, to urge to Cupidity, to arouse vicious inclinations, as happens, for instance, when the official character is soiled by connecting it with lotteries and gaming establishments, is to widen the breach for the invasion of parasites. The want of enlightenment and mistakes of calculation lead society to such a result, when, even without immoral intent, it combines or manages its insti- tutions in such a manner as to take from the common fund, made up of the contributions of all, the means to support monopolies, privileges or franchises, which return nothing to compen- sate therefor, monopolies created in certain kinds of labor, services, commerce, industry. If we ex- amine the protective system closely, it will not be difficult to perceive that its principal wrong is that it establishes and develops artificially para- sitic privileges, covering them, often in good faith, and without understanding their real effect, with the cloak of general utility. It is not given to human laws to remedy everything; and, what- ever be their wisdom, a part of the race will al- ways live on the spoils taken from the other part. But we are justified in wishing that laws and gov- ernments should have a sound understanding of what is just, and should unite to the sagacity which points out evil, the probity to hunt it down, and the constancy to stop its progress as far as lies in the power of man.— The parasites who live on gifts, and whose existence thus depends on a regular title, even in the case when irregular causes have given birth to this title, are a curious and difficult subject of study. All the questions of pauperism belong to this subject, but they are not the only ones that belong to it. Gift, a legiti- mate source of acquisition, is an indispensable element in the harmony of society. It is a result of the completeness of the power of the proprietor, who is free to deprive himself of his property gratuitously, without receiving anything in re- turn. To receive gratuitously the services or the property of another is a parasitic act, the charac- ter of which is, determined by the circumstances which accompany it, and which is, in itself, neither good nor bad. The name parasite is given to persons who, by habit and these para- sitic acts, live altogether or principally by dona- tion. The moral disfavor which custom attaches to the acceptance of the Services or property of PARASITES. 55 others without giving an equivalent therefor, arises from an honorable susceptibility, and an- swers to a respectable instinct of dignity, but is not always just. This acceptance, if confined strictly to its economic meaning, should be morally neutral, in spite of the idea of inferiority and de- pendence which it implies; it is right in Some cases, but wrong in others, to make such gratui- tous acceptance an expression of contempt. What is beyond all controversy, is, that we must not apply the harsh term beggar to all those who live by gift. The idea of mendicancy is connected with the idea of a permanent condition of solici- tation based on the allegation of entire helpless- ness to procure the necessaries of life in any other way. The man is not a mendicant who re- ceives the donation without asking for it, espe- cially he is not one who receives it as a conse- quence of affection existing between him and the donor, or as the satisfaction of an obligation con- necting the donor with him. Beggary is con- founded with rapine and robbery when it exacts assistance instead of requesting it. — Among those who receive without giving, and who live on the substance of others without furnishing anything of their own in return, must be reckoned nearly all the human race during the period of childhood. Our first years are passed in absolute impotence as far as productive labor is concerned. This time is devoted to physical, intellectual and moral development, destined, no doubt, to create in those who reach the age of maturity an imma- terial capital of force and activity, but which may never have this result. The age of productive labor is reached at different periods by different persons. Ordinarily it commences too early in the poor families of artisans and agricultural laborers, who hasten to employ their children in a lucrative occupation, while the more provident or well-to-do families are not so hasty to consume the present at the expense of the future. The quality of capitalist belongs to children only in exceptional cases. The number of those who are born with a fortune of their own and who can be supported and reared by means of their own prop- erty, is extremely small, even in the wealthy class. If we consider children in individual isolation only, they must be called parasites, for they live solely on the resources of others given to them; but they figure in society as members of the col- lective being called the family, of which they form an integral part by right; and the family itself would become a parasite, if by impotence or bad will, it should allow the cost of their sub- sistence to fall on others. The child lives at the expense of the family without giving any actual return, unless in affection, in happiness, in moral- ity, in hopes, precious values indeed, but which can not be measured. Later, the child should make a return for the assistance and services ren- dered it in advance. Its right to existence rests on a two-fold foundation: on the duties which the instincts of Our nature engrave on our hearts and dictate to the positive law; and on the continued mutuality of obligations, which, contracted to Some, are paid to others, converting our debts to Our fathers and mothers into credits to our chil- dren. The civil law obliges parents, fathers and children, the ascending and descending lines, to Support each other reciprocally. The natural law extends beyond this circle of family duties. – The family is not the only collective being on which the responsibility rests of supporting its members. The same duty is imposed, in different measures and proportions, on numberless associations into which men are collected. There is a class of as- Sociations, such as the societies of mutual aid, whose capital, formed by means of individual Contributions, is intended for those of its members who are in distress or who reach a certain age, or a certain time of service. The assistance de- Imanded in this case is not a donation, it is a Credit, a regular and foreseen employment of a common Saving collected for this purpose. The party who receives aid here is in no way a para- site, not even with regard to those particular bodies, so long as he receives his share only after having fulfilled the conditions of his contract. He becomes a parasite with reference to the asso- ciation, if, without having furnished his due, he receives from its bounty, instead of from his own contribution, the assistance which is given him. But the individual thus assisted is not a parasite on the rest of society, since he lives on resources which the rest of society did not contribute to provide for him. A county undertakes the sup- port of its poor. These are parasites with ref- erence to it, but not to the rest of the country, which is not called on to do anything for them. The same must be said of individuals assisted by private charity; which, by taking them in charge, relieves Society in general to that extent. It is to be remarked, however, that, as the re- Sources of private charity are limited, the parasites who exhaust it prevent it from being extended to others who need it as much or more than they; and in this manner they contribute to increase the number of the needy. It is a fundamental truth, too little recognized, that, different from other duties, which have corresponding rights, there is no right which corresponds to the duty of charity. The rich man must relieve the poor without the poor having any right as against the rich. Re- ligion has admirable doctrines on this subject which public law might profit by: while it teaches charity to some, it commands gratitude and resig- nation to others. Private charity is a debt of conscience and love, and not a debt by right; it does not obey precise rules, and is not governed by the calculations of human prudence; it feels that its most urgent cares, its most bountiful as- sistance, its most affectionate consolations, should be given to unmerited suffering, but it desires to assist even those who have deserved their mis- fortune by their faults. Thus, to extend its be- nevolent duties, it is enough for charity to say that each man ought to feel his weakness to be such, that he should not arm himself arrogantly ºf 56 PARASITES. * against indulgence. Charity has its eyes fixed, not on what it gives, but on what it has itself re- ceived. All men would be charitable if they would remember the large number of services which each one receives from his neighbors, no matter how brilliant his actual situation may be. There is not an individual who does not draw abundantly from this large capital of the uni- versal domain transmitted and increased from generation to generation, and who does not take much more from it than he can ever return to it. We Owe too much to others to be authorized to bargain our assistance to those whom it is possible for us to aid. — Public charity is gov- erned by narrower and more worldly rules than private charity. Consequently, men correctly cease to call it charity, and give it the more mod- ern name of public assistance. Charity, which is love, strips itself to give to others. When the state gives and assists, it strips itself of nothing; its action is limited to distributing in a certain fashion the contributions which it levies on its citizens. Not every gift is charity; the assist- ance distributed by the state is only a branch of the public administration. The only parasites at the expense of the state should be the poor who can not be properly cared for by their families, associations or private charity. To live in a purely gratuitous manner at the expense of the state when not compelled to accept the gifts by which it supports the needy and unfortunate, is to belong to the worst class of parasites, to that class of people who are able not to be parasites, a per- verse class, a public pest, whose close relationship with robbers we have previously pointed out, and to which we need not return. It only remains for us to speak of parasites who are really poor people. State donations, like private gifts, are essentially one-sided, in this sense, that the moral duty imposed on the donor does not suppose any right in the recipient. Where credit begins, dona- tion ceases. It is the desire of humanity that hu- man beings should not be left to perish of distress; it is the dictate of prudence that a mass of men ex- cited to disorder and crime by the spur of want should not be left to increase in the bosom of soci- ety; but the duty of the state to be humane and prudent creates no right to demand its assistance. The destructive sophism which converts want into credit has been revived in our time under the names of the right to existence, the right to labor, the right to assistance. It has been frequently refuted in this cyclopædia. (See ATELIERs; CHARITY; CoMMUNISM; LABOR, RIGHT TO.) The falsest Sophisms are generally the exaggerations of a correct idea, or the improper generaliza- tion of a particular truth. The numerous varie- ties of the anti-social sophisms which parade the name of socialism, place their point of support on the undeniable theory of reparation of wrongs, but they draw strange conclusions from this. By attacking not only society, but also the law of Sociality, the sacred foundation of Society, they affect to see in the conditions of every-day life, Such as it has been organized by the universal Consent of nations, the abasement and ruin of in- dividuals, instead of finding in it a fruitful and efficient cause of their prosperity and develop. ment. A proposition which remains true in spite of the crookedness imparted to it by these soph- isms, is this, that when suffering is born of the sins of Society or governments and the vice of in- stitutions and of laws, it is no longer a question of humanity, decency and wisdom, but of a strict Obligation of the state to alleviate it. It is no longer a case of donation, but of credit. Society, being held to repair its own wrongs, is not obliged to Correct those which individuals inflict on them- Selves, any more than those which they suffer from others or from undeserved misfortune. It would be to destroy the dignity, the liberty, the responsibility of individuals, to transfer to the Social body the task belonging to each one of guarding, preserving and developing himself. What Society owes its members, is, to protect and guarantee the free exercise of their rights with all its strength; its office is not to think, to will or to act for them. The more liberty a state insures to its citizens, the less attention it owes their inter- ests, since it leaves these interests more completely to the management and responsibility of the citi- Zens themselves; if it interferes in private life and exerts an influence in managing the property of individuals, its responsibility to individuals in- creases with every extension which it gives to its guardianship. For Societies, as well as individ- uals, to do good, is a Secondary duty; not to do wrong is the first. The wants of a wise adminis- tration counsel the state to assist the parasitic mass, but the obligations not to create parasites itself, an obligation a hundred times more serious and binding, is antecedent to this. It should not act like a surgeon who would first wound the passers by, and then offer them his services. Society cre- ates paupers, and consequently parasites, when it turns from the straight road of justice, and, changing the noble office of guaranteeing and pro- tecting property into a tyranny, takes possession of property and labor, or injures them by its exac- tions: it creates paupers when it arrests or ham- pers the free exercise of moral, intellectual or physical activity, the natural expansion of labor, the legitimate acquisition or transmission of prop- erty; it also creates paupers when it offers a pre- mium on vice, idleness and lack of courage, by too great a readiness to grant relief. Society, through the enormous power which it wields, feeds and increases the evil when it distributes imprudently what it believes to be its benefits. The moderation in public assistance commanded byprudence, rests also on another basis. The state, which can levy only on the services and the prop- erty of workmen and capitalists, should never for- get that whatever it gives is necessarily taken from the goods of its citizens; generosity at the expense of others easily degenerates into spolia- tion. — The assistance given to parasites is an ex. pedient rather than a remedy. Social progress PARDON. 57 consists, not in maintaining and supporting a greater number of parasites, but in decreasing and eliminating the parasites in existence. The per- version of manners, the extinction or abasement of the moral sense, makes most parasites. A bad book, a vicious 'sophism, an evil example, creates more IIlisery than hail, fire or famine. If it is necessary, because they are men, to assist human beings who consume without producing and re- ceive without giving, it is imperative to attempt their reformation and endeavor to make them acquire property through morality and labor. Next to the task of improving its institutions and its laws in order to free itself from participation in evil, society has no more important mission than to obtain good results from good laws by improving the morals of men. The amount of misery is enormous, and alarms the most civilized societies. The true problem would be to dry up or lessen the thousand impure channels through which it is formed and increased. Society should by law leave religion free to propagate its princi- ples; it should open Schools, make education and enlightenment general, honor letters, sciences and arts, elevate the moral sense, exalt disinterested- ness, remunerate services rendered, give life to indolence, smooth obstacles, remove all obstruc- tions of the market. Its firm and vigorous hu- manity should avoid, as far as possible, the de- grading form of alms; it should without asperity, uniting prudence to kindness, never forget that severity is generally more merciful than weakness. The danger is great, when the instinct of natural dignity which finds unearned bread bitter, grows weak and loses its honorable sensitiveness. The loss of the feeling of responsibility in individuals toward themselves, in families and other collective bodies toward their members, throws into the ranks of parasites persons of equivocal morality who find it more convenient to receive aid than to work. In the train of idleness follows covetousness; then corruption, which, increasing more and more, im- pels all to live at the expense of all. — The only efficacious and honorable means of combating the parasitic spirit, the last extremity of human abase- ment, and assisting pauperism, is a gradual in- crease of the freedom of labor and property. All other methods serve simply to conjure the neces- sities and dangers of to-day, without promising, but often preparing, a worse to-morrow. When workmen can display their activity in peace, when capitalists can with confidence accumulate and lay up their property, the products of which will enrich all, the class of parasites decreases and is quieted through the development of the other two classes. Just as workmen and capitalists prosper and suffer together, and as it would be to impel them to suicide and to mutual oppres- sion, to arouse rivalry and envy between them, parasites should respect capitalists and laborers, not only on account of moral obligation and the command of positive law, but also from calcula- tion of what is useful for themselves. Parasites in fact or in intention, the unfortunates who are, and the cowards who wish to be, parasites, would be, like the rest of society, ruined by the despoil- ing of those who labor and those who own prop- erty. Swarms of rivals, left behind, would be excited by the contagion of victory, and would rise up as enemies and destroyers of the success of the violence of a day. Ill gotten gains are not easily kept. A few days of dissipation would quickly throw back into misery those who had escaped from it by detestable means. Their mo- mentary triumph, by removing further from them the capacity of suffering with dignity, would only redouble their incapacity for labor and their help- lessness to acquire property honestly. The man accustomed to live only on others, destroys his most lasting resources, if he ruins those who alone are able to acquire and preserve. (See PAUPER- ISM.) CH. RENOUARD. PARD0N. Pardon is the remission, granted by the sovereign or head of the state to a sen- tenced person, of the penalty imposed on him by the courts. Such penalty is sometimes replaced by a less severe one. This is what is called a com- mutation of sentence. — Pardon, in contradis- tinction to amnesty, abolishes neither the offense nor the sentence. — The utility of the right of pardon has been questioned by some publicists, as for instance, Beccaria, Bentham and even Rous- seau, who have contested the necessity of its inter- vention. Beccaria desired to introduce clemency into the law, but not into the execution of its judgments. He thought that the moderation of penalties and the “perfection of the law” would render pardons superfluous. “The right to remit the penalty imposed on the culprit,” he said, “is a tacit disapprobation of the laws.” This inflexi- ble rule, which attributes the same weight and measure to all acts of the same nature, although in the infinite variety of human affairs they differ considerably one from the other, and never have the same moral value, has been condemned by experience, which has rejected the system of the fixity of penalties. J. J. Rousseau, although less absolute than Beccaria, reached almost the same conclusions. “The right of pardon,” says Rous- seau, ‘‘ or of exempting a culprit from the pen- alty declared by the law and pronounced by the judge, belongs only to one who is above the judge and the law, that is, to the sovereign; moreover, the right of the sovereign to exercise the pardon- ing power is not quite clear, and the cases in which that power should be exercised are very rare. In a well-governed state there are but few punishments, not because pardon is very frequent, but because there are few criminals; the multitude of crimes insures their impunity when the state is in a condition of decay. * * Frequent cases of pardon indicate that crimes will soon have no need of it.”—More recently than Rousseau's time clemency in the execution of penalties found new adversaries. Mr. Livingston, an American, opposed it in principle, and proposed at least to restrict its application to certain cases. “The 58 PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. pardoning power,” said he, “should not be exer. cised except in cases in which the innocence of the prisoner is discovered after he has been con- demned, or in case of his sincere and complete reformation.” These few words give utterance to Several errors: first, if a person condemned is found to be innocent after his condemnation, there can be no such thing as pardon; the judicial error should be corrected, and the sentence of condem- nation annulled. Then, it is not correct to say that the reformation of the person condemned and his moral amendment should of themselves Constitute a motive for the intervention of the pardoning power, Mr. Livingston, whom we have just cited, would, without doubt, have expressed himself differently had he borne political crimes and offenses in mind. We do not deny that repentance and the return to moral sentiments may, in the case of ordinary crimes, be made a condition of pardon. The thief and the murderer should not be allowed to re-enter society without giving it a pledge for their moral behavior. But political crimes and offenses have a special char. acter: they do not manifest in their author the Same degree of perversity as common crimes, and conscience does not express the same reprobation for them. This class of offenses, in most cases, Constitutes just as serious a violation of a moral law as Ordinary offenses, but not of the same law. Common crimes are crimes everywhere; political acts are crimes only in a variable and, in a sense, conditional manner. It might be said that cir- Cumstances make and unmake them. “The im- morality of political offenses,” says Guizot, “is neither as clear nor as immutable as that of ordi- nary Crimes; it is always crossed or obscured by the vicissitudes of human affairs; it varies with the time, with events and with the rights and merits of power. — Public conscience is subject to reaction in favor of persons condemned for political offenses; it can not be so subject in favor of persons condemned for ordinary crimes. Pub- lic conscience amnesties the former, it pardons the latter, but it never amnesties them; it forgives but does not forget them. — How, then, can we Subordinate the right of pardon in matters polit- ical to conditions of reformation and private morality, as has been proposed by Mr. Living. Ston? What makes repression necessary in cases of this kind is not the immorality and perversity of the person committing the offense, but political causes which must be subjected in their action to the general principles of justice and of right; the opportuneness, sometimes even the necessity, of pardon, depends on the same causes. Circum- stances which change, Occasions which pass away, passions which become abated, parties which are dissolved: all of these contribute toward dimin- ishing the importance of a person condemned for a political offense.” (Théorie du Code pénal, by MM. Chauveau et Faustin Hélie.) — In politics, the pardon granted the culprit (who sometimes is but a vanquished adversary) produces the happiest effect in favor of the power granting it; it im- presses the minds of the people with the specta- cle of power and greatness, and at the same time disarms the parties. “Monarchs,” says Mon- tesquieu, “have so much to gain by clemency, they derive so much glory from it, that in almost every instance it is for them a piece of good for- tune to have an opportunity to exercise clemency. —How many examples are there, on the contrary, of powers pursued to death by the cry of blood uselessly spilt, and which have perished for not having pardoned in time!— But when should we punish and when pardon?” Montesquieu proposed that question to himself, which it is not an easy task to solve. Clemency, says he, should not degenerate into weakness, nor should it bring the prince who exercises it into contempt. Clemency, it is true, may have its dangers, but neither is implacable severity without its dangers; the latter produces terror, which offers but an unsteady basis to power: Won d'uturn? timor magister officii, and provokes retaliation. If we can not help going to extremes it is better to sin by an excess of clemency. It is not certain that this is not the better policy, even as far as duration is concerned; and posterity, which admires the victor, gives its love to the indulgent.* EMILE CHäDIEU. PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. Under this title will be given a sketch of the three in- ternational monetary conferences held in the city of Paris in the years 1867, 1878 and 1881, Bi- metallism in the abstract having been considered in the article on MoMEY, that subject will be treated here only in the narrative form as it was presented in the discussions of the conferences. – Conference of 1867. This conference was brought. together on the invitation of the French govern- ment, which was moved thereto by the successful conclusion of the treaty of Dec. 23, 1865, between France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland, consti- tuting what is commonly known as the Latin monetary union. The letter of invitation trans- mitted by the French government inclosed a copy of this treaty, and suggested the holding of an international conference “to consider the question of uniformity of coinage and to seek for the basis of not included in the power to pardon. * No attempt has been made in the above to give the actual law, constitutional and other, relative to the pardon- ing power; this Cyclopædia being one of politics and politi- cal economy, mainly, and not of law. —In the United States. the power to pardon offenders is vested by the several state constitutions in the governor. It is not, however, a power which necessarily inheres in the executive. (State vs. Dun- ning, 9 Ind., 22.) And several of the state constitutions. have provided that it shall be exercised under such regula- tions as shall be prescribed by law. There are provisions more or less broad to this purport in those of Kansas, Flor- ida, Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, Oregon, Indi- ana, Iowa and Virginia. In State vs. Dunning, 9 Ind., 20, an act of the legislature requiring the applicant for the remission of a fine or forfeiture to forward to the governor, with his application, the opinion of certain county officers. ' as to the propriety of the remission, was Sustained as an act within the power conferred by the constitution upon the legislature to prescribe regulations in these cases. And See Branham vs. Lange, 16 Ind., 500. The power to reprieve is (Cooley.) PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. 59 ulterior negotiations.” The conference assembled June 17, under the presidency of Marquis de Moustier, minister of foreign affairs, the following named countries being represented: Austria, Ba- den, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, the United States, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Würtem- berg. The United States were represented by Mr. Samuel B. Ruggles of New York, and Great Britain by Mr. Thomas Graham and Mr. Rivers Wilson. The most eminent of the French repre- sentatives, as an economist and financier, was Mr. E. de Parieu. A committee was appointed to formulate the work of the conference. — At the second session (June 19) the committee report- ed a “questionnaire” or series of interrogatories to be debated by the conference. These were twelve in number, all having relation to the pos- sibility of establishing a universal monetary unit, either by adopting some existing unit or by mak- ing a new one approximating to existing units, and to the means of securing the practical adoption of the same. The conference voted unanimously against the adoption of an entirely new system, and in favor of “the mutual co-ordi- nation of existing systems.” — At the third session a vote was taken on the question whether the standard of the proposed unit should be silver exclusively. It was decided in the negative unanimously. When this vote was taken, Mr. Feer-Herzog (Switzerland) noted it as a fact of much significance, that the representatives of Prussia and Sweden, countries having the silver standard, should have voted in effect in favor of the gold standard. The conference then voted unanimously (with the exception of The Nether- lands) in favor of the single gold standard, “leav- ing each state the liberty to keep its silver stand- ard temporarily.”— At the fourth session, on the motion of Baron de Hock (Austria), the conference voted that the advantage of internationality, which the proposed gold unit would have, would not be sufficient to keep the coins in circulation in states having the silver standard or the double standard, unless suitable measures should be adopted regarding the ratio between the two metals, — At the fifth session (which was presided over by Prince Napoleon) the question, what unit should be adopted, came up for discussion. Mr. Rivers Wilson, on behalf of Great Britain, read a paper saying that his government had been glad to participate in the conference, regarding it as a means of enlightening public opinion on an im- portant question, but could not hold out the expectation that it would abandon its own mone- tary unit or assimilate it to that of any continental system. The conference voted that an interna- tional coinage should consist of “types with a common denominator for weight, in gold coins of . identical fineness,” and that the fineness should be nine-tenths. – At the sixth session the confer- ence voted by thirteen to two in favor of the five-franc gold piece (equal to 96% cents) as the common denominator. England and Sweden voted against this proposition; Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg and Belgium did not vote. It was voted also that gold coins with the com- mon denominator of five francs should have legal circulation in the countries agreeing to the action of the conference, and that it would be expedient to coin gold pieces of the dimensions of twenty- five francs for international circulation. — At the seventh session it was voted to refer the decisions of the conference to the several states for diplo- matic action; that the answers of the several states should be transmitted to the French gov- ernment, which should have power to reassemble the conference; and that it was desirable that the answers should be received before Feb. 15, 1868. The conference adjourned July 6, and was not reassembled. — Conference of 1878. By the coin- age revision act of Feb. 12, 1873, the gold dollar of twenty-five and eight-tenths grains nine-tenths fine was declared to be the unit of value in the United States, and the silver dollar was omitted from the list of coins authorized to be struck at the mint. By the act of Feb. 28, 1878, the silver dollar was restored to the list of coins and made full legal tender, and the secretary of the treasury was directed to purchase silver bullion and coin into such dollars not less than two million dollars’ worth, and not more than four million dollars’ worth per month. By the same act the president was directed to invite the governments of Europe “to join in a conference to adopt a common ratio between gold and silver for the purpose of estab- lishing internationally the use of bi-metallic money and securing fixity of relative value between those metals.” That portion of the act of 1873 which made the gold dollar the unit of value was not altered by the act of 1878. — The conference assembled in Paris, Aug. 16. Delegates were appointed by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Mr. Mees (The Netherlands), Mr. Brock (Norway), Mr. Feer-Herzog (Switzer- land), and Mr. Delyanni (Greece) had been mem- bers of the conference of 1867. The representa- tives of the United States were Reuben E. Fenton of New York, W. S. Groesbeck of Ohio, and Francis A. Walker of Connecticut, with S. Dana. Horton as secretary, Mr. Horton being admitted to the conference as a member. Great Britain was represented by the Rt. Hon. Geo. J. GOSchen, Mr. Henry Hucks Gibbs, Sir Thos. L. Seccombe, and Mr. Wm. B. Gurdon. The most distinguished representative of France was Léon Say, min- ister of finance. Germany declined to send dele- gates. No action was taken at the first session beyond the election of Léon Say as president. — At the second session Mr. Groesbeck, on behalf of the United States, offered two propositions for the consideration of the conference: 1, That it is not to be desired that silver be excluded from free coinage in Europe and the United States; 2d, That the use of both gold and silver as unlimited 60 PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. legal tender may be safely adopted by equalizing them at a ratio fixed by international agreement. Mr. Groesbeck said that that portion of the law of 1873, by which the silver dollar was made to disappear from the coinage, had been passed * through inadvertence rather than intentionally, and that the United States, although desiring to restore silver to absolute equality with gold, had been compelled to limit the coinage of silver on account of the market value of the metals, and also by reason of the action of the Latin Union restricting the coinage of silver. Mr. Goschen and Mr. Gibbs inquired what was to be under- stood by the “inadvertence” of the act of 1873, and whether that act had been passed without debate, Mr. Groesbeck replied that “no news- paper or chamber of commerce” had considered or recommended the bill, and that several mem- bers of congress had confessed to him that they did not know at the time what they were doing. Mr. Feer-Herzog said that silver had disappeared from circulation in the United States long before the act of 1873 was passed, that there had been only eight millions of silver dollars coined from the beginning of the government down to that time, and that he had documents which he would lay on the table showing that the section of the law of 1873, by which the silver dollar was made to disappear from the coinage of the United States, was not passed by inadvertence, but volun- tarily and with reflection, and determination to establish the single gold standard, which was in fact, and had for a long time been in practice, the standard of the country. Mr. Walker said that he himself, although at that time occupying a chair of political economy and lecturing, on money, was not aware of what was being done, and he presumed the great majority of his fellow- citizens were equally ignorant. The president (M. Say) said that Mr. Groesbeck’s observation that the action of the Latin Union restricting the coinage of silver had been one of the motives impelling the United States to restrict it also, did not seem to be well founded. It seemed to him that this restriction was a compromise effected in congress by means of which a majority could be obtained. Mr. Horton replied that the Bland bill had been introduced in 1876, and that between that time and the passage of the silver remonetization act the subject had been discussed in all its phases, and that the action of the Latin Union had not been overlooked in the discussion. Mr. Pirmez (Belgium) said that the real question before the conference was whether the double standard should be made universal. His country could not do otherwise than reject such a propo- sition, whose immediate result would be to give enormous profits to speculators in the metals by withdrawing the one and substituting the other with every change of market value. Count Rus- coni (Italy) thought the conference might pro- nounce upon the question of principle : “Is it possible to establish a fixed relation between gold and silver?” and then, if it be decided affirma- tively, consider the means to establish such ratio. Mr. Broch (Norway) said that the double standard was a delusion and a misnomer; there was no such thing anywhere. Countries having the double standard in law had the gold standard in fact to-day and the silver standard to-morrow, but the double standard never. Silver, by reason of its weight and bulk, was not adapted to the wants of civilized countries and an active circu- lation. Gold alone responded to those needs. Silver was suited only to countries which were backward or stationary. Even if all European countries could be persuaded to adopt the double standard, the influence of India and China would produce incessant perturbations and fluctuations by alternate importations and exportations of sil- ver. Mr. de Thoerner (Russia) believed that it was opposed to the very nature of things to endeavor to establish a fixed relation between the value of sil- ver and that of gold. After some further discussion it was resolved, on the motion of Count Rusconi, that an invitation be extended to the German government, in the name of all the delegates, to send representatives to the conference. — At the third session Mr. Goschen said that England could not adopt the double standard, but that she had, nevertheless, so large an interest in the question under discussion, through her Indian possessions, that she could not fail to give her aid and co- operation in any intelligent movement to arrest the fall of silver. If all states should resolve on the adoption of the gold standard, and if Italy, Austria and Russia should resume specie pay- ments, would there be sufficient gold for the pur- pose without a tremendous crisis? It was better for the world at large that the two metals should continue in circulation than that one should be universally substituted for the other. The con- ference could not adopt the American proposi- tion, but efforts might be made in other directions to check the downward course of silver by making some definite disposition of the German surplus, estimated at $75,000,000. If, for instance, this could be taken into the United States treasury in place of an equal amount of gold, it would no longer weigh on the market. Mr. von Hengen- muller (Austria-Hungary) said that Austria was attached to the principle of the double standard, and in theory must subscribe to the American proposition, but unfortunately the advantage of it depended upon its general adoption, which was not to be looked for. His government was, therefore, compelled to maintain an attitude of expectancy. If the conference were asked to formulate its opinions on the American proposi- tion he should, however, vote in favor of it. Mr. Mees said that so long as England and Germany adhered to the single gold standard it would be impossible for Holland to adopt another system. There was not, at the present time, a single state in Europe where the coinage of silver was free, not even among those which have theoretically the silver standard or the double standard. The United States might, nevertheless, find powerful PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. 61 allies in Asia and South America, as well as among those countries of Europe which are still under the régime of paper money. The general demonetization of silver undertaken everywhere at once, would have the most fatal consequences. The president (M. Say) explained the monetary position of France. In closing her mint against silver, the government had no intention of mov- ing toward the single gold standard. France had about twenty-five hundred million francs in silver, of which nine hundred millions were in the vaults of the bank. To demonetize such a mass and throw it on the market was inadmissible. But to hold the mint open to take a further indefinite quantity at the ratio of fifteen and one- half to one, especially when it was known that Germany had fifteen or seventeen million pounds sterling in hand ready to sell, was impossible. Hence, the attitude of France was that of ex- pectancy. France was waiting to get clearer ideas of the causes of the depreciation of silver, and to see what disposition was to be made of the German stock. She held herself in readiness to adopt the single gold standard or to revert to the double standard, according to circumstances. She could vote readily for the first clause of the Amer- ican proposition, that it is not to be desired that silver be excluded from free coinage in Europe and the United States. She could vote also that silver already coined and holding the legal tender character ought to be maintained in that charac- ter, but could not acquiesce in the other clauses of the American proposition, although at some future time, when the atmosphere should be cleared, she might be able to do so. Mr. Delyanni said that the position of Greece was identical with that expressed by M. Say on behalf of France, Mr. Feer-Herzog was not able to coin- cide with other speakers in giving such promi- nence and gravity to the unsold stock of silver in the German treasury as a disturbing cause in the market. This stock was only equal to one year’s supply from the mines, or to the demand from India last year. The commerce of India was the greatest factor in the silver market, the produc- tion of the mines the next greatest, while the German monetary reform could only be counted as the third in importance. He disclaimed for himself and other adherents of the single gold standard the thought of suppressing silver money. He merely desired that it should take its natural and proper place as the money of the less ad- vanced portions of mankind, while gold should take its place as the money of a higher civiliza- tion. It was the persistent fall of silver, showing itself as a constant fact, which had led govern- ments, even against their will, to adopt the single gold standard. Switzerland had given her dele- gates no authority to agree to the adoption of the ratio of sixteen to one, or any other ratio between silver and gold. Count Rusconi did not consider it impossible to establish a stable relation between silver and gold. Law alone, he said, makes money. If the uncoined metal was subject to variations of the market, the coined metal, having legal tender power, had a price which did not vary. It had the power of paying obligations which the uncoined metal did not possess. The metal might change in value, but the coin did not change. It had, actually and effectively, the value which was indicated by the imprint. Mr. Brock could not share in the opinions which had been expressed concerning the quantity of gold which would be required to enable those coun. tries now under the paper régime to resume specie payments. In his opinion more silver would be required than gold; for those countries would not discard their note issues when they should resume, but the fractional notes would be retired, and sil- ver coin would take their place in the hands of the people. Norway and Sweden were on the gold basis, but scarcely any gold was seen. The circulation consisted of notes and silver. So it would be in Italy and Austria and the United States after resumption. Specie resumption in the United States would necessarily be in gold. The coinage of silver dollars under the limitations of the present law would do no harm for a long time. The dollars would circulate at par with gold so long as they were not in excess. But a time would come, especially if they should adopt unlimited coinage, when the two would not cir- culate at par with each other. The power of the United States, or of all the nations of Europe together, would not suffice for the struggle against the balance of international trade, or to change the terms of the balance. He agreed with the delegate from Switzerland that the greater or less demand for silver in India was the governing fac- tor of the silver problem. In other words, it was the condition of trade between Europe and Asia. that determined from time to time the relative values of silver and gold. Holding this opinion, he did not believe that the means proposed by the United States to secure fixity of value between the two metals would have the results which they expected from it, even if accepted by all Europe. Nevertheless, he had the most pro- found respect for the motives which led to the calling of this conference, and he believed that great good would result from the interchange of views, even if no resolution should be adopted. — At the fourth session, the president said that. the German government had replied, through Prince Hohenlohe, to the invitation to send del. egates to the conference by expressing thanks for the invitation, and regretting its inability to accede to the wishes of the conference. Mr. Walker replied to the remarks of Mr. Feer- Herzog at the previous session. Silver, he said, had not ceased to be money in Europe through natural causes, but by the action of man, by political action, by laws and decrees of govern. ments suggested and urged by political economists. of a certain school. The action of Germany in 1871, involving important changes in the policy of the Latin Union, was wholly gratuitous, mot Suggested by any commercial exigency. It was 62 PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. taken under:bad advice, with little or no consid. eration as to the general effects upon the produc- tion of wealth which would be wrought by so great a diminution of the money supply of the world. Mr. Feer-Herzog had said that he ex- pected and desired to see the world divided into gold countries and silver countries, the former civilized, the latter uncivilized. He (Mr. Walker) affirmed that “there are not more than three ter- ritorially extensive countries in the world which could possibly maintain a single gold standard upon true economic principles.” A diminution of the money supply was one of the gravest evils that could menace mankind. Whether the money supply of Europe should be reduced by silver demonetization 40, 30 or only 20 per cent., the consequences would be most disastrous. “Suffo- cation, strangulation, are words hardly too strong to express the agony of the industrial body when embraced in the fatal coils of a contracting money supply.” Against So great a wrong to civilization and to the hopes of mankind, the representatives of the United States were here to raise their earnest protest and warning. The interest of the United States in this question as a silver produc- ing country, was utterly insignificant as compared with their interest in it as it stands related to trade and industry in general. Mr. Waern (Swe- den), thought it right to reply to so much of Mr. Walker's speech as implied that only the richest nations would be able to obtain and keep gold sufficient for their needs under the single gold standard. Sweden was a country very inferior in wealth, and she had adopted the single gold standard in 1873, yet she had experienced no difficulty upon this score. She had found all the gold she needed as the basis of her fiduciary circulation, and she had had no difficulty in re- taining it. Mr. Horton replied to Mr. Feer-Her- zog's historical citations, and especially to his statement that England, in adopting the single gold standard in the year 1816, had simply con- formed the law to what had been the practice for nearly a century. The English gold standard law, said Mr. Horton, really dated from 1798. Much of the monetary confusion which England suffered between 1798 and 1821 was to be attrib- uted to this unwise proceeding. Mr. Horton thought that the conference was diverging into collateral discussions, and that it would be better to adhere to the real question suggested by the United States government, viz.: Is it in the inter- est of nations to wage a monetary war, each seek- ing to get rid of a falling metal? or ought they to unite together to give to the monetary basis of business a stability which it does not now possess? If the conference should separate without answer- ing this question it would have left only an inter- rogation point at the end of its labors. Mr. Baralis (Italy) urged that a sub-committee be appointed to consider and report upon the subject of an international coinage. The president thought it was better to pursue the discussion of the American propositions till a definite conclusion should be arrived at. Mr. Feer-Herzog, replying to Mr. Horton's statement of the real question before the conference, said that, if England were asked to establish a fixed ratio between the rupee and the Sovereign, she would refuse to do so. If Holland were asked to do the same as between the gold florin and the silverflorin, she would refuse to do so. And so it would be all around. It was po- litically impossible and commercially impossible to establish a fixed and permanent relation be- tween the two metals. All governments together, with their united efforts, could not do it. Mr Horton could not admit that it was a good answer to say that it was impossible to come to an agree- ment merely because this or that nation would not agree to it. The conference was inquiring whether the agreement ought to be made, whether it was for the interest of the nations that it should be made. Until 1873, the variations of supply and demand had not prevented silver from remaining comparatively steady for a long period. This was due to the bi-metallic system of France, which kept the two metals in equilibrium. By giving a wider basis to this system a still more complete stability would be obtained. Mr. Goschen said that, if Mr. Horton asked the conference to pro- nounce upon the utility of bi-metallism, irrespect- ive of the possibility or impossibility of estab- lishing it, he did not consider it necessary to give a categorical answer to a question thus hypotheti- cally put. But if the practical question were put, he should not hesitate to affirm, as Mr. Feer-Her. zog had done, the entire and absolute impossibility of establishing a fixed ratio between the metals, and this for many reasons of a scientific and economic nature which he need not enter into in detail. — At the fifth session the theoretical discussion of bi-metallism was continued by Mr. Groesbeck, Mr. Pirmez and Mr. Horton. — At the sixth session the president (M. Say) laid on the table a memorandum agreed upon by the European delegates as their collective answer to the American propositions. After thanking the government of the United States for calling the conference, the memorandum declares that the European delegates recognize, 1, that it is neces- sary to maintain in the world the monetary func- tion of silver as well as of gold, but that the selection of one, or the other, or both simultane- ously, should be governed by the special situation of each state or group of states; 2, that the question of the restriction of the coinage of silver should equally be left to the discretion of each state or group of states; 3, that the differences of opinion which have appeared exclude the discus- sion of the adoption of a common ratio between the two metals. The representatives of Italy dissented from the conclusions of the other European delegates. – At the seventh Session (Aug. 29), the representatives of the United States filed a paper expressing their thanks to the Euro- pean states for accepting their invitation, but dissenting from that portion of the memorandum which refers the question of bi-metallism to the PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. 63 separate action of each state or group of states. After a vote of thanks to the president and Secre- taries, and the exchange of civilities, the confer- ence adjourned. — Conference of 1881. This con- ference was called in the month of January, 1881, by the governments of France and the United States,“to examine and adopt, for the purpose of submitting the same to the governments repre- sented, a plan and a system for the establishment, by means of an international agreement, of the use of gold and silver as bi-metallic money accord- ing to a settled relative value between those metals.” It met at Paris, April 19. Delegates were present from Austria-Hungary, Belgium, British India, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger- many, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, The Nether- lands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Nor- way, Switzerland and the United States. Mr. Brock (Norway), was the only delegate who had been a member of both the preceding conferences. Mr. Wrolik (The Netherlands) had been a mem- ber of the conference of 1867. Count von Kuef- stein (Austria), Mr. Pirmez (Belgium), Count Rusconi (Italy), Mr. de Thoerner (Russia), and Mr. Horton (the United States), had been mem- bers of the conference of 1878. The other repre- sentatives of the United States were W m. M. Evarts, of New York, ex-secretary of state, Allen G. Thurman of Ohio, and Timothy O. Howe of Wisconsin, ex-senators. At the first session Mr. Magnin, minister of finance of the French repub- lic, was chosen president, and a committee of One from each state appointed to draft a “question- 'naire,” or list of questions to be discussed. — At the second session (May 5) the question/maire was presented by Mr. Vrolik, chairman of the committee, in substance as follows: Has the fall of silver been hurtful to commerce and to general prosperity? Is it desirable that the relative value of gold and silver should possess a high degree of stability? Is the fall of silver due to increased production, or to acts of legislation? If a large group of states should agree to the free coinage of gold and silver, of full legal tender, at a uni- form ratio, would substantial, if not absolute, stability of relative value be obtained? If so, what measures should be taken to secure such result? The delegates of Germany then read a declaration on behalf of their government, giving the reasons which led them, in the year 1871, to adopt the gold standard. This reform was now so far advanced that they could not change their monetary system, but they were disposed to second the efforts of other powers which might desire to unite for the purpose of rehabilitating silver, by agreeing to abstain during a period of some years from all sales of silver, and during ..another period to sell only a limited quantity, so that the market should at no time be glutted thereby. Germany might even make other con- cessions short of changing her Own monetary system. She might retire her gold pieces and treasury notes of five marks, leaving their places to be filled by silver. This would make room for 78,000,000 marks. Mr. Fremantle, the delegate of Great Britain, read a declaration of his.gov. erºnment to the effect that they had decided in the first instance not to take part in this conference, understanding that the terms of the call issued by France and the United States committed the par- ticipating governments to the double standard. Having been subsequently assured that no com- mittal was intended, and that entire liberty of action was reserved, they considered that they would be lacking in consideration toward friendly powers if they should persist in refusing to send a delegate. His instructions limited him to furnishing information concerning the laws and monetary system of England. They did not per- mit him to vote upon the proposition submitted. The delegates of British India and of Canada made similar declarations to that of Mr. Fre- mantle, except that the delegate of Canada was authorized to vote, reserving liberty of action for his government. The delegate of Denmark said that, as his government had no intention of aban- doning the single gold standard, he was instructed to abstain from all discussion of means for estab-. lishing the double standard. The delegate of Portugal made a similar statement in behalf of his government. Any opinions which he might express in the debates should be understood as merely his private and personal views. The dele- gate of Russia said that his government reserved entire liberty of action and of opinion. If he should take part in the debates, it would be upon the same understanding as that announced by the delegate of Portugal. The delegate of Greece made a similar declaration. The delegates of Austria-Hungary said that their position was the same that it had been in the conference of 1878. They had an ardent sympathy for all measures to restore silver to its former position, but they reserved for their government full liberty of action. The delegates of Sweden and Norway said that their government authorized them to take part in all discussions, reserving their right to deal with their own monetary system. The delegates of Switzerland were not authorized to take part in the discussions of the conference until its action should have been first reported to the federal council. Mr. Cernuschi (France) thought that the prospect of an agreement in favor of bi-metallism was encouraging. It was only necessary to secure the co-operation of Eng- land and Germany to insure success. England had Indeed refused to join in a bi-metallic union, but there was reason to believe that she might join at a later period. Germany had shown, through the declaration read to the conference, that she could not now change her course with- out great loss and inconvenience. He (Mr. Cer- nuschi) would suggest (but only on his personal responsibility) that the loss incurred by Germany in changing from the silver to the gold standard, estimated at ninety-six million marks, be reim- bursed to her by the other nations which had bought her silver. These nations, he contended, . 64 PARIS MONETARY'CONFERENCE. had made a gain by purchasing the silver of Ger- many, equal to the loss which Germany had incurred in selling it—the silver being worth one to fifteen and one-half, if bi-metallism were put in force, whereas Germany had sold it at one to seventeen or one to eighteen. Mr. Brock (Nor- way) thought that bi-metallism was not only im- practicable, but undesirable. The substitution of gold for silver in Europe and America was not an accident, but the natural, logical and necessary result of the progress of civilization. There was sufficient gold in the world to supply the wants of all the civilized races, including those now under the régime of paper money. So far from looking upon bi-metallism as a thing to be striven for, he thought it was something to be avoided. So far from seeing danger in the single gold standard, he could only see advantages in it. Mr. Moret Y. Prendergast (Spain) moved that the conference take into consideration, first, the im- portant declarations of Germany, England, British India and Canada, in order to get at their true scope and value, and then to adjourn to a fixed date, in order to open negotiations with those governments if it were found that the declara- tions afforded a reasonable basis for negotiations. It was agreed to pass over this motion for the present, and to take it up at a later stage. — At the third session Mr. Cernuschi, in furtherance of the suggestion made by him respecting the reim- bursement of ninety-six million marks to Ger- many, asked for information from the several governments in reference to the amount of silver coined by them since 1874, and the prices at which it had been bought. Mr. Pierson (The Netherlands) called attention to the limping-stand- ard countries (Etalon boîtéua), meaning by this the countries where the coinage of gold is free and the coinage of silver is not free, but where silver coins of unlimited legal tender circulate side by side with gold. The Latin Union, Ger- many and Holland, were in this condition, a con- dition which could not last. The metallic stock of the banks must be all of equal goodness. Bank notes must be covered by coin having a real and not an artificial value. The danger of coun- terfeiting was very great when the legal tender value of silver coins was much above their metal value. The clandestine coinage of silver was a permanent menace in countries where the limping standard prevails. The demonetization of silver had not only brought trouble upon the limping- standard countries, but upon the gold-standard countries, upon England and Germany as well as upon Holland. The fall of the value of the rupee had wrought confusion in the trade of England with India, and caused great losses to British merchants and manufacturers. The only remedy for these evils was international bi-metallism. Mr. Pirmez (Belgium) denied that the gold-stand- ard countries were suffering by reason of the demonetization of silver. They had announced on the floor of the conference that they felt very well and that they did not desire any change. As the paper money countries of Europe. to English trade with India, the English merchant merely added to the selling prices of his goods a Sum Sufficient to make good the decline in the value of the rupee. The Indian government had lost a certain percentage of its fixed receipts, by reason of the decline of silver, but British trade had not suffered, and the British government re- mained insensible to the adjurations of the bi- metallists; Germany was equally insensible. The sole result of universal bi-metallism would be the spreading over Europe of a large portion of the silver of Asia, and the sending to Asia of a cor- responding amount of the gold of Europe. The production of silver would be stimulated by the artificial value conferred upon it, and the production of gold would be correspondingly checked. Thus a fresh depreciation of silver would be produced, this time irremediable. Gold would not be sold at fifteen and one-half for sil- ver, because it would cost more to produce it. Gold would continue to circulate, but it would circulate at a premium, as it now does in Austria, Russia, and all the countries under the paper money system. All the governments in the world would be utterly powerless to decree the respect- ive value of silver and gold. — At the fourth session, Mr. Luzzatti (Italy) replied to the argu- ment of Mr. Pirmez. He contended that there was a strong party in England in favor of bi- metallism. He instanced the pamphlet of Mr. Gibbs, former governor of the bank of England, published with the approval of the present gov- ernor of the bank; also the remarkable work of Mr. Ernest Seyd; also the resolutions of the Liverpool chamber of commerce. As regards British India, he said that English trade with that country was injured by oscillations in the exchange, just as it is injured by Oscillations in These oscillations were uncertainties, and all uncertainty was prejudicial to the best interests of trade. Public opinion in Germany was likewise divided on the question, and Prince Bismarck seemed to have conceived doubts as to the value of the gold monometallic reform. There was really a dearth of gold in the world. This would be proved unmistakably when Italy, Austria and Russia should make the attempt to resume specie pay- ments. Mr. Fremantle said that it must not be inferred from the pamphlet of Mr. Gibbs, that that gentleman, or the present governor of the bank of England, expressed the opinion of the bank of England, still less the public opinion of Great Britain. Mr. de Thoerner (Russia) said that gold was preferable to silver just as railways were preferable to roads and bridle paths, but it did not follow that roads and bridle paths should be discarded. For the purposes of a standard gold was certainly the best; for an instrument of exchange having an intrinsic value there was still room for the use of silver. Might it not be possi- ble to treat silver in the light of a stock exchange security selling for what it was worth? If coined or stamped by governments in the form of ingots PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. 65 at its exact value in gold, it might be made to play an important part in the work of inter- national exchange without danger to any interest. Count Rusconi (Italy) contended that money was not merchandise, but a creation of law; conse- quently the ratio of fifteen and one-half was just as good as the ratio of sixteen or twenty. Mr. Burkhardt Bischoff (Switzerland) contended that money was merchandise, and not the creation of law. All that the state could do was to give a certificate of its weight and fineness. This it effected by means of a stamp. When that stamp was affixed, the state had exhausted its powers. The double or alternative standard was unjust in that it allowed the debtor always to pay in the cheaper metal. The greatness of London as a centre of the world’s exchanges was due in large part to the invariableness of the English standard. You could always know what a pound sterling was; you could never know with certainty what a franc was under the double standard régime, when that standard existed. Replying to Mr. Cernuschi’s observation on the loss of ninety-six million marks incurred by Germany, he contended that this was a fallacious assumption. Instead of incurring a loss, Germany had really made a gain. She had sold her silver at rates considerably higher than the present market price. If she wished to repurchase it she could do so now at a profit. The proper way to deal with the great stocks of silver in the banks of the Latin Union was to melt them down into ingots, and issue sil- wer certificates for them, of so many kilogrammes each, which might pass into the world’s commerce at their value according to the weight represented by them. Mr. Cernuschi reiterated that Germany had lost ninety-six million marks by her monetary reform. This wastestified to by the memorandum of the German government submitted to the con- ference. (This memorandum showed a loss of 96,481,136 marks, comparing the sales with the original cost of the silver.) — During the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth sessions the theoretical discussion was continued by Mr. Horton, Mr. Howe and Mr. Evarts on the part of the United States, by Count von Kuefstein and Chevalier von Niebauer (Austria-Hungary), Mr. Cernuschi and M. de Normandie (France), Mr. Pierson and Mr. Vrolik (The Netherlands), and Mr. Seismit. Doda (Italy), in favor of bi-metallism; and by Mr. Brock (Norway), Mr. Pirmez (Belgium), Mr. Forssell (Sweden), and Count San Miguel (Portu- gal), against it. Sir Louis Mallet, on behalf of the government of British India, made some im- portant statements. He said that he was author- ized to engage that India would continue to keep her mint open to the free coinage of silver for a certain definite period, provided and upon the con- dition that a certain number of the principal states of the world engage on their part to maintain within their territories during the same period, the free coinage of silver, with full legal tender fac- ulty, in the proportion of fifteen and one-half of silver to one of gold. He would explain how the 124 VOL. III. – 5 depreciation of silver affected the Indian govern- ment. The government of India had to pay £15,000,000 in gold in London annually, This was the interest on the Indian debt contracted in gold, the interest on railway and canal obligations, also pensions and annuities, and that portion of the military expenditure which relates to pay and commissariat. These expenses were fixed by con- tract, and could not be reduced. The loss result. ing on these remittances by reason of the fall of silver was £2,000,000 per annum. The govern- ment could not increase its revenue materially, the land revenue in Bengal being fixed in perpe- tuity, and in other provinces for long periods. It would be impossible, without serious political danger, to propose new taxes for reasons which the mass of the people would not be able to un- derstand. But this actual loss was not the worst part of it; it was the absolute uncertainty which hung over the future, and which prevented any accurate calculation of the resources of the gov- ernment. Then, there was a loss in trade result- ing from the uncertainty of the exchanges and a loss of 20 per cent. On the great quantity of silver hoarded by the natives. The great wish of the financial authorities of India had been to have a common monetary system with England. Silver being impossible as a common standard on ac- count of the English system, the choice must be between bi-metallism and gold, and although the latter was at present too difficult, it was certain that if any opportunity should offer itself India would seize it and enter into the struggle for the sole metal left as a solid basis for an international currency. Mr. Moret Y. Prendergast suggested that England might second the undertaking of Germany in behalf of silver by keeping one-fourth of the bank reserves in that metal as authorized by Sir Robert Peel's act. Mr. Fremantle replied that his government would take into very serious consideration the views put forward by the con- ference, but he suggested that the proposals be put in as definite form as possible. Mr. Forssell (Sweden) said that it was vain to talk about the sufferings and groans of this country and of that country, of this great bank and of that great bank, for the want of bi-metallism, so long as Lngland and Germany refused to be converted. Notwithstanding all that had been said about the growth of bi-metallic opinion in Germany, here was the imperial government absolutely inflexible in its adherence to the single gold standard. There was not one ray of hope in that quarter. Pngland was equally unmoved. Her Indian in- terests were so far inferior to her general interests that there was not the smallest prospect of her entering into a bi-metallic union. It was said that £2,000,000 per year are lost in the Indian exchanges. That was an ascertained sum, but the loss to be sustained by entering into a bi-me- tallic union was an indefinite and unascertained sum. Was an exact amount of loss ever bartered for an indefinite amount of risk? Was the mone- tary supremacy of a country ever sold for two 66 PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. millions sterling? Bi-metallism would always fail of adoption in face of the disproportion be- tween the comparatively slight ailings complained of and the perfectly enormous remedy proposed, and however skillfully those ailings might be added up, the amount would never be deemed sufficient to justify the remedy. Mr. Forssell suggested three additional topics of discussion to be added to the questionnaire, viz.: Hasthere been, in the last ten years, a fall of general prices which may be attributed to the demonetization of silver and to a dearth of gold? Is there reason to be- lieve that the successive adoption of the single gold standard will lead to a contraction of the metallic and paper circulation sufficiently great to exhibit itself in a fall of general prices? Is there ground for taking legislative measures to economize the use of gold in view of the progres- sive adoption of the single gold standard? Mr. Moret Y. Prendergast renewed his motion that the conference adjourn from the 19th of May to the 30th of June, in order that delegates who desired to communicate with their governments and receive further instructions upon propositions formulated in the conference, might have the opportunity to do so. Lord Reay (British India) thought that the excellent speeches which had been heard would be valuable contributions to economic science, but when the conference should reassemble it would be necessary to take practical steps to come to an agreement. The habits of English statesmen tended to make them give attention to facts rather than theories. If it were sought to persuade the United Kingdom to adopt bi-metallism, gentlemen could not do better than practice what they preached. They should begin by adopting bi-metallism at home. It would be another glory for the bi-metallists to accept the slight burden of some inconveniences which, on their own showing, would be only tempo- rary. France and the United States were strong enough financially to make the experiment of bi-metallism. Great Britain had not waited for other nations to join her in adopting free trade. If other nations should show their faith in what they professed by adopting bi-metallism, Great Britain would be the first to render them the homage which she had always paid to any work tending to draw closer the bonds which unite nations. Mr. Seismit-Doda (Italy) seconded the motion for adjournment to June 30. The motion was unanimously adopted. On motion of the delegates of India the conference requested the Several governments to take the opinion of the chief banks of issue in each on “the monetary question.” Mr. Pierson (The Netherlands) asked the delegates of the United States what meas- ures that country would take, in the event of the adoption of bi-metallism, to require the banks to receive silver on the same footing as gold. In most European countries the obligation could be imposed on banks of issue of buying gold and silver at a fixed price. What analogous steps could be taken in America? In short, what & could she do in order that bi-metallism should exist there, not only in name, but in reality? He did not ask an immediate reply, but requested that a definite answer be made when the confer- ence should reassemble. — After an adjournment of six weeks, the conference held its ninth session, June 30. — At the tenth session Mr. Horton re- gretted that he was, as yet, unable to present a response to the question which Mr. Pierson had put to the American delegates at the eighth session, or rather, to enter into the practical discussion to which the question would necessarily give rise. Mr. Thurman, reverting to the declarations of Germany and British India, which he read at length, said that these propositions required France and the United States to keep their mints open to the free coinage of silver of unlimited legal tender, this being the condition upon which Germany would agree to suspend her sales of silver for a definite period of time. While the United States would not reject any and every proposition which comes short of perfect bi-metal- lism, he was bound to say that a proposition which would expose them to alternate drains of gold and silver, according as the one or the other should command a premium in the market, would not be acceptable. The United States held a large stock of gold at the present time, and only a small stock of silver. They would hesi- tate to enter into an agreement the effect of which might be to lessen the amount of their gold. They would cheerfully become parties to a great bi-metallic union, but without such union would not surrender their power over their own coinage. He said this without underrating the importance of the German and English propositions, which were entitled to most respectful consideration, but which, in his judgment, fell far short of what the exigency required. Mr. Schraut (Germany) desired to combat the assertion that the sales of silver by his government had been the prin- cipal cause of the depression of that metal. The largest sales had been made in the year 1877, when the average price was one and three-fourths pence higher than in 1876, and two pence higher than in 1878, showing that there were other and more powerful causes at work than the Sales of silver by Germany. These causes, in his opinion, were the increase of production, and the increase of sales of India council drafts on the London market, which, taking the place of silver as re- mittances to India, lessened the demand for silver by an equal amount. The sale of such bills in London from 1871 to 1879 had exceeded the sales of silver by Germany more than three to One. Mr. Cernuschi contended that neither the more plentiful issue of bills by the Indian government nor the increased productiveness of silver mines had caused the depreciation of silver. If Ger- many had not adopted monometallism, France would have continued to coin the two metals freely: therefore the depreciation could not have taken place. Germany was the Sole author of the silver crisis. Unless she had further declara. PARIS MONETARY CONFERENCE. 67 tions to make to the conference, she had as yet made no proposition which the United States and France could regard as a concession. Mr. Hor- ton, while agreeing with Mr. Cernuschi as to the mistake which Germany had made in her mone- tary legislation, could not look upon her as the sole cause of the mischief. It dated further back. England began it, and the Paris conference of 1867, in which the United States took part, propa- gated it. The responsibility was not only on Germany, but on the civilized world. Baron von Thielmann (Germany) said that his government had nothing to add to the declaration presented at the first session of the conference. Mr. Fremantle said that at a later session of the conference he should present a fresh communication which he had just received from his government. — At the eleventh session Mr. Dumas (France) made an extended argument in favor of bi-metallism. But if bi-metallism were for any reasons found to be impracticable, he would suggest the suppression of small gold coins, in order to give greater em- ployment and steadiness of value to silver, Mr. Schraut concurred in this suggestion, and WQuld add to it the suppression of bank notes of less denomination than twenty francs, and of the one and two dollar notes in the United States. Mr. Brock (Norway) said that all monometallists would concur in those suggestions, but he pointed out that the proposal of Mr. Dumas differed from that formulated by his colleague, Mr. Cernuschi. Mr. Cernuschi said that all such measures were only half measures; they only looked at small sides of the question, and could come to nothing. The internationality of silver at fifteen and one- half was the point to be arrived at. Without that, nothing would be effected. “We must have all or nothing.” Mr. Pierson presented a decla- ration of The Netherlands government saying that it would join in a bi-metallic union consist- ing of “all the great states of Europe and Amer- ica,” but could not engage to act thus if the system were confined to a more restricted area. It would, nevertheless, give serious attention to a project, if proposed at the conference, for establishing bi-metallism in an area comprising only several great states of Europe and America. — At the twelfth session, Mr. Seismit-Doda presented a declaration of the government of Italy, saying that Italy would unite with the other states of the Latin Union and the United States of America “in resuming the limited coinage of silver” for a fixed term, provided Germany would agree during the same term (which should be at least five years) to suspend her sales of silver and re- place her gold five-mark pieces and treasury notes with silver money, and provided the British government would increase the paying power of its silver crowns. Italy could in no case agree to the free and unlimited coinage of silver, unless England and Germany, or one of them, should unreservedly adhere to it. Mr. Fremantle pre- sented a declaration from his government trans- mitting to the conference a communication from the bank of England. This communication was in effect an agreement on the part of the bank to receive silver and issue its (gold) notes there- for, to the extent of one-fourth of the gold held by the bank in its issue department, as authorized by its charter, provided that the mints of other countries would return to such rules as would insure the certainty of the conversion of gold into silver and of silver into gold. All its notes were payable in gold on demand, and it was required by law to receive all the gold offered to it in exchange for its notes. The president suggested that it would be well at the next session to con- sider the subject of adjournment. After such profound discussions it was not likely that any fresh light would be thrown upon the subject or additional eclat be given to the proceedings. – At the thirteenth session (July 8) Mr. Evarts, in be- half of the delegates of France and the United States, and in the name of their respective gov- ernments, read a declaration stating, 1, that the depression and great fluctuations of the value of silver relatively to gold are injurious to commerce and to the general prosperity, and that the estab- lishment of a fixed relation of value between them would produce most important benefits to the commerce of the world; 2, that a bi-metallic convention entered into between an important group of states for the free coinage of both silver and gold at a fixed ratio and with full legal ten- der faculty, would cause and maintain a stability in the relative value of the two metals suitable to the interests and requirements of commerce; 3, that any ratio now or lately in use by any com- mercial nation, if so adopted, could be main- tained, but that the adoption of the ratio of fifteen and one-half to one would accomplish the object with less disturbance to existing monetary sys- tems than any other ratio; 4, that a convention which should include England, France, Germany and the United States, with the concurrence of other states which this combination would assure, would be adequate to produce and maintain throughout the commercial world the relation between the two metals that such convention should adopt. The president said that a consid- erable number of delegates had expressed a desire to see the conference suspend its labors and ad- journ to some later date. He suggested that this subject should be discussed. Mr. Forssell (Swe- den) objected to this proposal as likely to lead to no practical result, while it would give a charac- ter of permanence to the conference which was not contemplated or authorized by the govern- ments represented. It would be better to ac- knowledge at once that the projects of bi-metallism had collapsed, and to reaffirm the conclusions of the European delegates at the conference of 1878. Baron von Thielmann (Germany) asked that the reasons for adjourning the conference to a future date beformulated. After a recess of twenty min- utes, the president read an explanatory resolution saying that, considering the speeches and observa- tions of the delegates and the declarations of the 68 PARLEY. PARLIAMENT. several governments, there is ground for believing that an understanding may be established between the states which have taken part in the confer- ence, but that it is expedient to suspend its meet- ings; that the monetary situation may, as to some states, call for governmental action, and that there is reason for giving an opportunity for diplomatic negotiations; therefore the conference adjourns to Wednesday, April 12, 1882. The resolution of adjournment was supported by Mr. De Normandie, Mr. Pirmez, Lord Reay, Count von Kuefstein and Mr. Brock. Mr. Forssell with- drew his objection. The resolution was adopt- ed. On motion of Baron von Thielmann, the thanks of the conference were awarded to the president for the impartiality with which he had directed the proceedings. . The conference then separated. It did not reassemble at the time fixed in the resolution of adjournment. There has been no public statement of the reasons why it was not reconvened. HORACE WHITE. PARLEY. Two hostile armies often have need, even in the very midst of hostilities, of hold- ing some correspondence with each other; for example, concerning the burial of the dead or the exchange of prisoners, or to propose a capitu- lation, to arrange for a suspension of arms, etc. This correspondence is effected by means of persons charged with the parley. In antiquity, at least in Greece and Rome, as well as in the middle ages, the persons sent to conduct the par- ley were always heralds, that is to say, men who held that office, not only for a special mission, but, in a way, permanently. Heralds fill a large place in Homer's poems, and many passages bear witness to the profound respect which was paid For example, Tal- thybius and Eurybates, sent by Agamemnon to them in those remote times. demand Briseis from Achilles, stopped overcome with terror at the door of the hero’s tent; but the latter saluted them with these words: “Welcome, sacred heralds, ministers of gods and of men, you are innocent of the insult which I receive.” For a long time the custom has been simply to send as parlementaères, officers accompanied by a drum- mer or a fifer, bearing a white flag. — The inviola- bility of the parlementaère (person of truce), which appears to have been founded in antiquity upon the sacred and almost priestly character of the herald, rests to-day upon international law. It is one of the oldest, most elementary and most essential regulations of this law. says Cicero, “6jusmod; esse debet, quod non modo 2nter Sociorum jura, Sed etiam inter hostium tela Žncolume versetup.” ciple, not only injures his adversary of the mo- ment, but, to use Wattel's expression, “he in- jures the common security and safety of na- tions; he renders himself guilty of an atrocious crime against all peoples.” It would not do to allow any departure from this Sacred rule, even in civil war and toward the envoy of a party which is considered, rightly or wrongly, as rebell- “Women legati,” Whoever attacks this prin- ious; but there is always the right to refuse to admit a parlémentaère, or person of truce, or to make his admission subject to such conditions as may seem proper; for example, that he shall be introduced into the lines with his eyes bandaged. Once admitted, the parlementaire should be pro- tected, not only against all bad treatment, but against all insult.* The parlementaère is not obliged spontaneously to close his eyes and ears during the course of his mission, and he has a perfect right to Observe what he is allowed to see, sometimes with design, and to let his side take advantage of his observations. But if he should abuse his character to act as a spy and to concoct plots, he would expose himself to be ignomin- iously expelled; he might even, in certain cases, be deprived of his immunities, be detained as a prisoner, or even be put to death. The rigor of the law can even go to this extremity; but it is almost always not only more humane, but even more politic, not to have recourse to it, and to respect the character of the parlementaère, even in those who have abused it. - GASTON DE BOURGE. PARLIAMENT, The British, is the supreme legislature of the United Kingdom, and its history is, to a large extent, the history of the growth of political freedom. The attempts to trace the ori- gin of this parliament to the Saxon period fail to connect the Wittena-gemote (meeting of wise men) with the representative principle, the hereditary character, or the royal summons, three character- istics of the present British parliament, which are deemed essentials of its constitution. It is by act of the crown alone that parliament can be assem- bled; only twice have the lords and commons met by their own authority—first, before the restora- tion of Charles II., and again at the revolution in 1688. Parliament is also prorogued (adjourned to a certain day), or dissolved by royal proclama- tion only. — While the main constitution of par- liament, as Blackstone says, was marked out in magna charta, A. D. 1215, when King John promised to summon the nobles, bishops, etc., to council, its actual first existence is commonly re- ferred to the year 1265, when the writs of Simon de Montfort first summoned knights, citizens and burgesses to parliament. From that time parlia- ment has consisted continuously of two houses, the lords and the commons, while the Saxon Wittend-gemote and later councils consisted of one chamber only. The creation of a house of Com- mons elected by the people (or by the property element), may be said to have had its birth in that jealous care of the rights of property, so all-pervad- # The institution of parley is useful to the strong as well as to the weak; not to respect it is not only a crime, but also, for each, a very grave fault against his own interest. It sometimes happens in war that a parlementaire is killed; we believe this is always by mistake. The flag has not, per- haps, been seen, or, if the envoy presents himself during a battle, which is generally a very inopportune moment, he may be accidentally wounded.— M. B. PARLIAMENT. 69 ing in the British mind. The early kings had so abused the power of raising money, and the lords and bishops were so subservient to the royal will, that it became necessary to have the check of an elective body to assert and jealously maintain con- trol over the taxing power. This control, claimed and exercised by the lower house of parliament for centuries, is so absolute that all bills, whether for the raising or the expenditure of money, must originate in the commons. The successive steps by which the important power over the public purse was transferred from the king to the com- mons, is a history of determination on the one hand and of stubborn resistance on the other, the English monarchs using every wile to secure Sup- plies, which the parliament stubbornly refused except on condition of redress of grievances. The steady increase of the power of parliament during the reigns of the arbitrary house of Tudor, culminated during the Stuart dynasty in that struggle for supremacy between Charles I. and his parliament, which ended in the complete victory of the latter, the subversion of the monarchy, the abolition of the house of lords, and the estab- lishment of the commonwealth. — The duration of a parliament, outside of the Seven years' limit- ation embodied in the act of 1715, is dependent upon the policy and measures of the ministry commanding a majority in the lower house. Practically, the average life of a parliament in the present century has been less than four years; the shortest one having lasted only four and one- half months (in 1807), and the longest a little over six years. The “appeal to the country,” caused by the resignation of ministers who fail to command a majority, is made through writs of election. The last general election was in 1880, returning 338 liberals, 239 conservatives, and 60 home rulers. Members are chosen by what is regarded in England as nearly universal suffrage. There are, however, but 3,181,701 actual voters (in 1883) out of the population of 35,246,633, or about one in every eleven inhabitants: while in France and in the United'States, where manhood suffrage is really universal, the proportion of voters to the population is one in every four or five inhabitants. The reform act of 1867–8 was a large extension of the franchise, giving it to all householders in boroughs (cities and towns), and to occupants of lands or houses bringing £12 rent or upward in counties, or in the country. This leaves the large class of agricultural and other laborers unrepresented. Since 1872 parliamentary elections are by secret ballot. (See BALLOT.)— The omnipotence of parliament is regarded as the great feature in British polity. “The power and jurisdiction of parliament,” says Coke, “is so transcendent and absolute that it can not be con- fined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds.” It wields not only the whole legislative power, but, for nearly two hundred years past, the executive power as well. In theory, the queen appoints the ministers or heads of admin- istrative departments; in practice, these heads can be no other than the representatives of the will of the house of commons for the time being. What is called the government of England em- braces not only the cabinet, but from forty to fifty political heads of departments, who quit their places with every change of administration. These changes, as we have seen, occurring every four years on an average, are effected by the majority in the house of commons, and this in its turn is dependent upon qualified suffrage. The powers of parliament are theoretically divided between three co-ordinate branches—the crown, the peers, and the commons—for the sovereign is, by the constitution, a part of parliament, having to be present in person or by proxy, and every law requiring the royal assent to its passage. The veto power, still lodged in the crown, has not been exercised since 1707, or for nearly two cen- turies. The house of lords, which has in theory equal law-making powers with the commons, can really do little but register the edicts of the latter. Although there are some measures of policy, such as the right of Catholics and Jews to sit in parliament, the extension of the suffrage, and the reduction or abolition of taxes or prescriptive privilege, upon which the stubborn opposition of the lords has for years stood in the path of reform, that reform has always sooner or later been car- ried. The political history of England is one long testimony to the weakness of precedent and prerogative when standing in opposition to the power of an enlightened public opinion. — It may appear Something like a paradox to assert that the powers of the popular branch of parlia- ment are even greater now than in the days of Cromwell, when both the throne and the house of peers were abolished, and all sovereignty was Swallowed up in a parliament of one chamber. Yet it is apparent that, with the single exception of the judicial power, which is still reserved to the house of lords, the commons of England, through their legislation and through their cabinet, wield a far more comprehensive authority than did the long parliament under the lord protector. The very constitution of the kingdom, that un- written yet all-controlling governmental power, is nothing but the net result of the long series of parliamentary assertions and statutes, down to the latest embodiment of administrative power in the cabinet, which is defined by Bagehot as “a committee of the legislative body, selected to be the executive body.” — The organization of par- liament is attended with great formālity. The lord chancellor announces to the house of com- mons (previously summoned by the gentleman usher of the black rod to attend in the house of lords) that as soon as the members of both houses shall be sworn, her majesty will declare the causes of her calling this parliament; and further re- quests them to choose their speaker, who must be presented in the house of lords the day after, for the royal approbation. This being done, the speaker formally claims, on behalf of the com- mons, “all their ancient and undoubted rights 70 PARLIAMENT. and privileges.” These being graciously con- firmed, the commons, with the speaker, withdraw to their own chamber: then follows the taking of the oaths, and an address in answer to the speech from the throne. — The queen's speech is delivered in the house of lords by herself in person, or by the lord chancellor, reading it in her presence, or by commissioners whom she appoints (and this is called opening parliament by commission). Be- fore this, neither house can proceed with any business. The lord high chancellor presides as speaker of the house of lords. The presence of forty members or upward is required in the com- mons to constitute a quorum (the whole number of members in 1882 being 652). In the house of lords, which consists of 516 members, business may proceed with only three peers present. The parliament is obliged to meet at least as often as once a year. Customarily, the annual sessions of parliament begin early in February, and end some time in August; but this depends upon the public business, the ministry, and the concurrence of the two houses, so that parliament not unfrequently has a special session in November, or else does not rise until September, long after the close of the London “season.” The opening of the daily session (formerly at 10 o'clock, and later at 12 M.) is now fixed at 4 P. M.–except morning sit- tings for private business, or toward the close of a session, in which cases the house resumes at the hour of 6 P. M.–the sittings often con- tinuing far into the night. Both houses are opened with a fixed ceremony. At ten minutes to four, two gentlemen in court suits of black, steel buckles and swords, accompanied by a third, carrying a huge golden mace upon his shoulder, precede the speaker, who is dressed in a full- bottomed wig and robes of black silk, and who enters the house followed by a train-bearer, chap- lain and secretary, to the cry of “Way for Mr. Speaker! Hats off for Mr. Speaker!” Then all persons must be uncovered, except only the mem- bers of the house of commons, whose peculiar privilege it is to wear their hats, a right usually exercised except when speaking. The chaplain reads prayers; the strangers' and reporters' gal- leries are then opened; the members present are counted. If after four o'clock there are not forty present, the house is adjourned till the next day. At half past four public business begins (half an hour being devoted to private business and peti- tions), after which the leading members of the government are all found in their places to answer any questions put by members of the house, of which one day’s notice has been given. The house of lords usually meets at 5 P. M., but fre- quently sits as a court of appeal during the day, when it is open to the public like other judicial tribunals. At other times admission to the stran- gers' gallery is had only through a peer’s order. In the house of lords the bishops always sit to- gether, and the members of the administration occupy a front bench on the right of the wool- sack (speaker's chair). The peers who vote with the government occupy the benches on the same side of the house ; the peers in opposition are ranged on opposite benches. In the commons no particular places are allotted to members; but the front bench on the speaker's right is occupied by the members of the administration, while the leading members of the opposition usually take the front bench on the other side of the speaker's chair. The mass of members sit somewhat pro- miscuously, though approximately divided into supporters of the government, occupying benches. on the right of the chair, and members of the op- position party on the left. The members of par- liament in both houses serve without salary. Members elected to the house of commons serve as such until the next general election for a new parliament. — It was formerly illegal to publish any of the proceedings or debates in parliament; and history records a long series of exclusions, punishments for contempt, and disgraceful perse- cutions against writers and printers who had pre- sumed to make the people acquainted with what. was said and done in parliament. At length, however, all restrictions were removed, and the daily press contains pretty full reports. Besides. this, effected by private enterprise, “Hansard’s. Debates” are a full report (though in the third per- son) of the speeches made in both houses, taken in short-hand, and paid for, though not published, by the government. The journals of the house of lords have been printed officially ever since 1509, and those of the commons since 1547, in great. folio volumes, with numerous indexes. – The re- strictions as to who may be elected members of the house of commons have been gradually re- moved, and since 1870 any subject over twenty- one years of age (even a naturalized alien) is eli- gible to election to parliament, except clergymen, contractors, judges, peers, bankrupts and office- holders. In several instances members elect, below the legal age have been permitted to sit. Curiously enough, dissenting clergymen may be members of the commons, while those of the church of England, the established religion, are excluded, although bishops sit in the house of lords. The houses of parliament do not adjourn on Occasion of the death or funeral of mem- bers of the body, nor are there any mortuary eulogies on such occasions. – Although members of parliament serve without salary, the expenses of their election are frequently very heavy. The honor or reputation incident to a seat in parlia- ment, as well as the influence which it enables a man of talent to wield, counts for much. It is not uncommon in vigorously contested elections to have from £1,000 to £5,000 expended in the nu- merous appliances for political meetings, printing and publishing, lights, brass bands, decorated hustings, and other devices to rouse and to keep up popular enthusiasm. Bribery, also, was formerly a too common channel for expenditure, but since the abolition of the rotten boroughs, the stringent anti-bribery laws, and the adoption of the secret ballot, the control of votes by purchase has been PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 71 greatly diminished. — Members of the commons have not the right to resign their places. To ac- complish this object one must ask to be appointed “steward of the Chiltern Hundreds,” an old and nominal office, without any functions, which is given to any member who applies for it. By this pleasant fiction a member can get out of parlia- ment without violating the law which requires him to serve out the term for which he is elected. — If the Sovereign dies during a recess of parlia- ment, it must convene immediately; and if it has been dissolved, it may resume its powers for a period of six months. All bills affecting the rights or privileges of the peerage must be offered in the house of lords, and can only be amended by the commons. All motions proposed in the house of commons are required to have a second; but this rule is not enforced in the house of lords. In neither house of parliament is any journal read Of the previous day’s proceedings. – In the prog- ress of business the ministers have the precedence in bringing forward motions of every kind.— In taking a vote in the house of lords the members vote in the order of their rank, the lords voting in the affirmative answering “Content,” and those opposed, “Not content.” Each peer might vote by proxy for two absentees until 1868, when the practice was discontinued by a standing order. In the house of commons the members vote “Aye” or “No,” instead of “Content” or “ Not content.” When the vote is counted the ayes pass into a lobby on the right, and the noes into one on the left: in each room is a secretary, who Checks off the names of members on a printed list, aided by two tellers appointed by the speaker. The tellers report the figures of the vote to the Speaker, who announces it in open house. — The speaker of the house of commons is precluded from participating in debate on legislative busi- ness; but in the lords the presiding officer, if a member of the body, may leave the chair and Speak in his character of a peer. On the other hand, he has no casting vote ; if the lords are evenly divided, the question is lost. But if the house of commons is tied, it becomes the duty of the speaker to give the casting vote, which deter- mines the question one way or the other. — The following table exhibits the duration of each par- liament since the accession of Henry VIII. in 1509: 21 Jan. 1509–23 Feb. 1509 29 Oct. 1586–23 Mar. 1587 4 Feb. 1511– 4 Mar. 1513 4 Feb. 1588–29 Mar. 1588 5 Feb. 1514–22 Dec. 1515 19 Nov. 1592–10 Apr. 1593 15 Apr. 1523–13 Aug. 1523 24 Oct. 1597– 9 Feb. 1598 3 Nov. 1530– 4 Apr. 1536 7 Oct. 1601–29 Dec. 1601 8 June, 1536—18 July, 1536 19 Mar. 1603– 9 Feb. 1611 28 Apr. 1539–24 July, 1540 5 Apr. 1614– 7 June, 1614 16 Jan. 1541–29 Mar. 1544 16 Jan. 1620– 8 Feb. 1621 23 Nov. 1545–31 Jan. 1547 12 Feb. 1623–24 Mar. 1625 8 Nov. 1547–15 Apr. 1552 17 May, 1625–12 Aug. 1625 1 Mar. 1553–31 Mar. 1553 6 Feb. 1626–15 June, 1626 5 Oct. 1553– 6 Dec. 1553 17 Mar. 1627–10 Mar. 1628 2 Apr. 1554–5 May, 1554 13 Apr. 1640– 5 May, 1640 12 Nov. 1554–16 Jan. 1555 3 Nov. 1640–20 Apr. 1653 21 Oct. 1555– 9 Dec. 1555 25 Apr. 1660–29 Dec. 1660 20 Jan. 1557–-17 Nov. 1557 8 May, 1661–24 Jan. 1678 23 Jan. 1558— 8 May, 1558 6 Mar. 1679–12 July, 1679 11 Jan. 1562– 2 Jan. 1567 17 Oct. 1679–18 Jan. 1681 2 Apr. 1571–29 May, 1571 21 Mar. 1681–28 Mar. 1681 8 May, 1572–18 Mar. 1580 12 Mar. 1685–28 July, 1687 23 Nov. 1585–14 Sept. 1586 22 Jan. 1688–26 Feb. 1689 20 Mar. 1689—31 Oct. 1695 22 Nov. 1695–7 July, 1698 24 Aug. 1698–19 Dec. 1700 6 Feb. 1700–11 Nov. 1701 30 Dec. 1701– 7 July, 1702 20 Aug. 1702– 5 Apr. 1705 14 June, 1705–15 Apr. 1708 8 July, 1708–21 Sept. 1710 25 Nov. 1710—8 Aug. 1713 12 Nov. 1713–15 Jan. 1715 17 Mar. 1715–10 Mar. 1721 10 May, 1722– 5 Aug. 1727 28 Nov. 1727–18 Apr. 1734 13 June, 1734–27 Apr. 1741 25 June, 1741–18 June, 1747 13 Aug. 1747– 8 Apr. 1754 31 May, 1754–20 Mar. 1761 19 May, 1761–12 Mar. 1768 10 May, 1768–30 Sept. 1774 29 Nov. 1774– 1 Sept. 1780 31 Oct. 1780–25 Mar. 1784 18 May, 1784–11 June, 1790 27 Sept. 1796–29 June, 1802 31 Aug. 1802—24 Oct. 1806 15 Dec. 1806–29 Apr. 1807 22 June, 1807–29 Sept. 1812 24 Nov. 1812–10 June, 1818 4 Aug. 1818–29 Feb. 1820 23 Apr. 1820– 2 June, 1826 14 Nov. 1826–24 July, 1830 26 Oct. 1830–22 Apr. 1831 14 June, 1831 – 3 Dec. 1832 29 Jan. 1833–30 Dec. 1834 19 Feb. 1835–17 July, 1837 11 Sept. 1837—23 June, 1841 19 Aug. 1841–23 July, 1847 11 Sept. 1847— 1 July, 1852 4 Nov. 1852–21 Mar. 1857 30 Apr. 1857—23 Apr. 1859 31 May, 1859– 6 July, 1865 1 Feb. 1866–11 Nov. 1868 10 Dec. 1868–26 Jan. 1874 5 Mar. 1874–24 Mar. 1880 29 Apr. 1880–) Present 25 Nov. 1790–19 May, 1796 | Parliament See GREAT BRITAIN, HOUSE OF COMMONS, HousB, OF LORDS, PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. —BIBLIOGRA- PHY. Cobbett (W.), Parliamentary History of Jºngland, 1606–1803, 36 vols.; Hansard’s Par- liamentary Debates, 3 series, 1803–83, 343 vols.; Journals of the House of Commons, 1547–1883, 138 vols. ; Journals of the House of Lords, 1509–1883, 115 vols.; Standing Orders of the Bouse of Commons, 1882; Standing Orders of House of Lords, 1876; Parliamentary Reports, Accounts, and Papers, 1812–83, about 5,000 folio vols.; May (T. E.), Treatise on the Law, Prévèleges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 8th ed., 1879; Hallam (H.), Constitutional History of England, new ed., 3 vols., 1872; May (T. E.), Constitutional History of England since the accession of George III., 1760 to 1870, 5th ed., 3 vols., 1871; Hatsell (J.), Precedents and Proceedings ºn the JHouse of Commons, 4 vols., 1818; Townsend (W. C.), History of the House of Commons, 1688–1832, 2 vols., 1843; Todd (A.), On Parliamentary Gov- ernment in England, 2 vols., 1867; Grey (Earl), Parliamentary Government, 1867; Cooke (G. W.), History of Party, 3 vols., 1840; Dod (C. R.), Par- liamentary Companion, 1833–83; Bisset (A.), Böstory of the Struggle for Parliamentary Govern- ſment ºn England, 2 vols., 1877. A. R. SPOFFORD. T” ARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. This term is commonly used to designate the formal rules, and precedents having the force of rules, which gov- ern the proceedings of legislative bodies. In a larger sense parliamentary law is held to regulate the course of business in all deliberative assem- blies, public meetings, societies, conventions, and voluntary organizations of every description. In countries where the principle of representative government is firmly established, nothing can be more important than a clearly defined, well-estab- lished, and firmly-adhered-to system of conducting legislative business in such manner as to preserve at once the equality and independence of the rep- resentatives and the rights of the people. It is also most important that the public business should proceed in an established order, and with as little interruption and delay from controversy upon side issues as possible. Yet the endless and oft-renewed 72 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. discussions in congress and legislatures upon points of parliamentary order, or upon the proper way to proceed with the business in hand, attest at once the confusion of mind of the average legislator, and the indefiniteness of the parliament- ary law itself. So far from constituting a system- atic code, by which difficult or doubtful ques- tions can be settled with precision, what parlia- mentary law we have is largely made up of rules subject to constant change, and of precedents liable to be reversed. “What is the law upon any subject,” said an eminent lecturer on juris- prudence, “is hidden in the breasts of our judges, and can only be ascertained by experiment;” and the great uncertainty which attends the adminis- tration of the rules which are presumed to govern public bodies might lead one to conclude that what is parliamentary law upon any occasion is hidden in the breast of the speaker, or the president, or the moderator, or the chairman, and has little other force than his decision. While such decisions are at all times subject to the test of an appeal from the presiding officer to the assembly, experience shows that the time wasted in long debates often proves a more costly obstruction to the progress of public business than any supposed advan- tage in establishing a principle. It has been computed that almost one-third of the time of the annual sessions of congress, and nearly One- third of the pages of the costly and voluminous official record, are consumed upon points of order. In parliamentary bodies where there is no restriction upon debate, as in the Senate, time enough has frequently been wasted in dis- cussion whether to take up a certain measure to have fully debated the measure itself pro and com., and to have passed or to have rejected it besides. There are growing signs, in and Out of congress, that the progress of public business will be more insisted upon than the right of unlimited utterance, or “the superstition of talk,” which is an advertisement of the individual. Parlia- mentary action is very rarely affected by long speeches, or by sharp or finely-drawn distinc- tions of what may or may not be done under the rules. The loss of the precious and unreturn- ing hours which should be given wholly to the well-considered legislation of a great people, in frivolous disputes over inadmissible motions and points of order, leaves so little time that the most important public measures are imperfectly dis- cussed, hastily considered, and crudely framed into law, while the soul of the intelligent legis- lator is vexed continually, and the legislature itself is brought into contempt. Amid the mass of good and bad precedents, and of rules heaped upon rules, it is not strange to find that the business of direct legislation is hindered rather than helped. What the legislator requires, but does not find, is simplicity instead of intricacy, and an assured standard of appeal instead of a jumble of conflicting decisions. Equally impor- tant is it to the ready dispatch of business in conventions and public meetings that there should be a recognized code of procedure, as well as a firm, skillful and courteous presiding officer to enforce it. — The origin of the great body of what is recognized as parliamentary law is directly traceable to the usages of the British parliament (treated in a preceding article). From the days of the anonymous “Order and Wsage of Keep- ing of the Parlements in England,” by John Hooker, published at London in 1572, (the earliest publication on the subject of which we find rec- ord), to the latest edition of Sir Thomas Erskine May's elaborate “Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament,” the Eng- lish books are the fountains from which the American and in great part the continental treat- ises on the subject are drawn. It were greatly to be wished that along with the formal principles and precedents of the science (if so it can be called) we had also drawn from them one of the best features in the practice. Perhaps there is no element in the conduct of our legislative business more palpably a source of weakness than the fact that in the parliaments of America there is no responsibility for measures. In the house of com- mons, as in the legislative assemblies of nearly all European nations, the ministry are not only pres- ent, but are held to a direct responsibility. The party which has been for the time being intrusted with the conduct of the government, brings in its measures, supposed to be in consonance with the ‘public will, and explains and defends them in de- bate. All appropriations (bills of Supply) needed to carry on the government, and embracing the army, the navy and the civil service, are thus brought in and supported by able men familiar with all their details, because concerned in the administration of each department. Not only so, but most measures of the session demanded by public opinion, whether connected with parlia- mentary reform, education, public morals, or the widely diversified interests of the United King- dom at home or abroad, find in the ministry on the floor of parliament vigilant advocates, court- ing and not shunning debate, answering objec- tions, and ready to take the responsibility of success, or the result of failure, which will Con- sign them from their places of power to private life. How wide the difference in our American legislatures. There, no executive officer can be so much as questioned respecting the acts, the de- mands or the service of his department, except in the furtive obscurity of a committee room. The only responsibility for public measures which at- taches anywhere resides in one or at most two committees of the house, overwhelmed with multifarious business, and utterly unable, though never so competent, to make themselves masters of the infinite detail of the bills they present, and give attention at the same time to other public business, and to the never-ending wants of their constituents. Candid confession comes from One baffled congress after another that under the exist- ing practice no systematic law-making is possible. Instead of a well-digested, clear and easily ad- PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 73 ministered body of laws, the statute book is filled with crudities and contradictions which those who administer them are unable to reconcile. It is some consolation, doubtless, to reflect, in presence of the 8,000 to 12,000 bills that do not become laws with which every congress is flooded, how much greater calamities we have escaped. What is true of congress is true in a modified sense of all the state legislatures: the mass of crude legislation which is irresponsibly gotten through, places before the executive a perilous task of arresting it by vigorous use of the veto power, or the perhaps still more perilous responsibility of approval. — For the sake of greater clear- ness and facility of reference, the various sub- jects embraced under Parliamentary Law will here be treated in alphabetical order. Substan- tially the same course of proceeding here noted as prevailing in congress is followed in the leg- islatures of the several states of the Union, with many variations as to details, according to the rules adopted by each body. — ABSENCE. The presence of members of the body is taken for granted in all representative assemblies, as due to their constituents. This can only be suspended by leave of absence, or employment in the service of the body. Absenteeism embarrasses business, and is unjust to other members, as well as to those represented; yet it sometimes goes So far in pro- tracted sessions as to threaten the loss of a quo- rum. In congress, the constitution itself empow- ers less than a quorum to compel attendance of absentees; a rule of the house prohibits absence except from actual necessity or with leave; and no senator can be absent without leave first obtained. The statutes require deduction of salary pro rata, for absence of a Senator or representative, except for sickness of himself or family. In both houses, when votes by yeas and nays are recorded, the names of members absent (or not voting because paired) are published in the journal. In parlia- ment leave of absence is usually given in case of domestic affliction or urgent business, but it is occasionally refused. In the French chambers absence is not allowed without leave of the body except in urgent cases, when the president may grant it. Requests for leave of absence are re- ported upon by a committee and announced by the president. The salary of deputies is stopped when absent without leave. — ADJOURNMENT. A. motion to adjourn takes precedence of all others. It may be made at any time (except when a member is speaking, or the house is voting) unless a motion to adjourn has just previously been neg- atived: it is not debatable, nor can it be amended. The unfinished business cut off by adjournment generally has precedence in the Orders of the day; and this is an express rule of the house and sen- ate. No adjournment for more than three days is permitted to either house of congress by the constitution, unless the other house concurs. If the houses disagree as to the time of adjournment, the president may adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper. In parliament the motion to adjourn is debatable, and may be amended as to time of adjournment. In the commons the speaker adjourns the house when a quorum is found want- ing, and the fact is noted; but in both houses of Congress business may proceed without a quorum by unanimous consent, or until the question of a quorum is raised by a division. After this no motion is in order except for a call of the house, Or to adjourn. In the French chambers, before each day's adjournment, the president consults the chamber as to the day and hour of its next meeting, as well as the subjects to be considered. — AMENDMENT. Any alteration proposed to a mo- tion or to a bill is an amendment. Amendments are often proposed to defeat a proposition, as well as to promote its object. Amendments may be simply to strike out a portion, or to insert new matter, or to strike out, and insert in place of the matter stricken out. They are to be offered in the order of sequence, if the proposition being considered consists of several sections or para- graphs. It is not in order to refer back and amend parts which have been considered, after a latter part has been amended. Every amendment proposed is itself capable of amendment; but there can be no amendment in the third degree, Ż. e., of an amendment to an amendment. To ac- complish such an object the mover should seek to have the amendment to the amendment rejected, then moving his amendment as an alternative, with due notice to the body of the intent to be ac- complished. A rule of the house permits a third amendment by way of substitute, to which one amendment may be offered. Amendments once agreed to or rejected can not afterward be altered or amended. Motions to amend may be withdrawn or modified before the previous question is ordered, but not afterward ; and amendments withdrawn may be offered again at a further stage of pro- ceeding. Amendments in parliament need not be of the same subject matter with the proposi- tion before the body. A member may move to substitute a wholly different proposition for the one moved, and such an amendment is to be voted upon. But in committee of the whole house this rule does not apply, the house being authorized only to consider the subject referred to it. In congress no amendment is to be admit- ted on a subject different from that under consid- eration. In amendments the form of words, and not their substance, is concerned; and as anything may be moved, the opponents of a motion often attempt its defeat by rendering a proposition ab- surd or obnoxious, or even reversing its substance, so that its supporters join with its opponents to defeat it. No amendment can be in order which contravenes the law or the standing or special orders of either house, or which is the same with any proposition already voted upon during the same sitting. An amendment to strike out is in this country put directly, but in parliament the speaker puts the question whether the Words pro- posed to be stricken out shall stand as part of the Question. If an amendment to leave out is passed, 74 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. it is not in order to move to insert the words left out in the same place, but they may be moved in another place. The same rules apply as to amend- ments by insertion. Motions to amend, being properly considered previous to what it is pro- posed to amend, take precedence, and the ques- tion is first taken on the amendment; the same rule applies to an amendment of an amendment. Amendments moved by a member who has al- ready spoken can not in parliament be introduced by a speech. In congress the opposite rule pre- Vails. In congress no amendment to an appro- priation bill is in order which increases expendi- ture or provides for expenditure not previously authorized by law, or which changes existing law. To the last an exception is made admitting amendments which are germane to the subject matter and at the same time retrench expenditure. In committee of the whole it is usual to limit de- bate upon proposed amendments to five minutes for each speaker; but the majority may at any moment close all debate upon any paragraph or pending amendment; whereupon further amend- ments may be offered, to be decided without de- bate. Any bill sent by one house to the other is subject to amendment in all its parts; when re- turned, the usual course is to disagree to the amendments as a whole or in part. If each house adheres to its disagreement, the bill or resolution is lost; but the differences are commonly adjusted by a committee of conference, whose report is usually accepted by both houses. No bill can be amended after the agreement of both houses. Amendments do not require a second in congress; in the house of commons every amendment must be proposed and seconded the same as an original motion. In the French chambers amendments are offered through the president, who refers them to the committee having similar measures in charge. They are printed, and their authors have the right to be heard before the commit- tee. — APPEAL. The presiding officer's decisions upon questions of order are made. Subject to an appeal to the assembly. It is optional with the chair to decide the point of order himself, or to sub- mit it to the body. In the house of representatives the speaker must decide. If any member appeals from the decision of the chair the question is then put, “Shall the decision of the chair stand as the judgment of the body ?” If the decision is not sustained, the chair is overruled by a majority of the members, and such a vote forms a precedent of some importance on similar questions. A motion to lay the appeal on the table, if carried, has the effect to sustain the decision of the chair. This motion can not be made in committee of the whole. Questions of order just decided on appeal can not be renewed. In parliament the speaker of the lords as well as of the commons refers most ques- tions of order directly to the judgment of the house; the process of an appeal appears not to be provided for. — APPROPRIATIONS. In parliament all bills granting supplies to carry on the govern- ment (money bills) must originate in the house of commons; and in 1678 this prerogative was carried So far as to exclude the lords from all power of amending bills of supply. This exclusive power has been jealously maintained by the commons for more than two centures. In congress a simi- lar claim for the house of representatives to orig- inate all appropriation bills has been made, but not insisted on nor maintained; though the consti- tutional privilege of the house to originate all bills for raising revenue has always been jealously adhered to. The house committee on appropria- tions was first formed in 1865, to relieve the com. mittee of ways and means of part of its too onerous duties. The Senate committee on appropriations. was organized in 1867, its functions having been previously vested in the committee of finance. In Congress appropriation bills always have prece- dence, and may be reported at anytime. They must be considered in committee of the whole house on the state of the Union. By one rule of the house and Senate they must not embrace expenditures not previously authorized by law, nor provisions, changing existing law; but such provisions are frequently incorporated by the committees report- ing them. The yeas and nays must be recorded on their passage in the house, but not necessarily in the senate. After being considered and de- bated in committee of the whole, the bill is re- ported to the house for passage; but a separate vote is taken upon any clauses or amendments upon which any member claims the right to divide the house. In the French chambers the budget is in charge of a committee of thirty-three members, to whom are referred all matters of public revenue or expenditure. — ARREST. (See Privilege).”— AYES AND NOEs. (See Yeas and Ways.) — BALLOT. Voting by ballot, while it preserves. secrecy, is out of favor in legislative bodies, and the constitutions of eleven states require all votes taken in the legislature to be vivá voce. In other states it is left to the legislature to regulate its own methods of voting. A rule of the house makes a majority of the votes given necessary to an elec- tion. When the house votes by ballot the speaker is required to vote. For many years past no vote. by ballot has occurred in either house of congress, the speaker and the president pro tem. Of the Sen- ate having been elected by vivá voce votes. The other officers of each house are chosen by resolu- tion by the controlling party, the minority usually proposing and voting for their own candidates by way of substitute. In parliament secret commit- tees are usually chosen by ballot. The speaker of the commons is chosen upon motion and Second by assent or informal vote, unless the house di- vides, when the usual count of votes is had. (See BALLOT, vol. i., p. 197; Vote.)— BAR. The bar of the house implies the railing in the rear of the outer seats of members. Formerly members were required to be within this bar in order to vote; now, a member may vote on a roll-call from any * References given in italics, are to subjects treated in this article; those given in small capitals, are to articles in the Cyclopaedia at large. PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 75. place within the hall. In counting the house he must be within the railing. In another sense, the bar of a legislative body is the area in front of the presiding officer; and offenders are brought to the bar to be examined, tried, admonished, rep- rimanded, imprisoned or discharged, as the case may be. The speaker appears, followed by the commons, at the bar of the house of lords on cere- monious occasions. Members of the commons not yet sworn must sit below the bar. —BILLS. A bill is any proposed act of legislation, com- mencing with the formula, “Be it enacted,” etc. Every Monday in the house of representatives the speaker must call the states and territories, through their members, for bills offered for print- ing and reference without debate. In the Senate one day’s notice for bringing in a bill is required, unless received by unanimous consent. Bills are referred at once to the committee to which by their subject matters they properly belong. Every bill must be read three times before its passage; the first and second readings by title, on intro- duction; the third reading in full, when put upon its passage, or by sections, when debated and amended. No bill can be amended by incorpo- rating in it the substance of any other pending bill. Bills or resolutions may be reported at any time from six committees only: the committee on elec- tions, on members’ right to seats; ways and means, on bills to raise revenue; appropriations, on general appropriation bills; printing, on printing for con- gress; accounts, on house expenditures; and en- rolled bills, such bills as are enrolled. Other bills from committees must take their chance of being reported back when the committee is called in its order. Bills reported favorably by commit- tees must go on the proper house calendar in the order so reported, and the senate has the same rule. The enacting clause of all bills must be uniform, thus: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled.” Formerly every section of a bill, no matter how numerous, began with the words, “And be it further enacted”; but this tedious and useless verbiage was dis- pensed with in 1871, shortly before the statutes were codified, and no enacting words are now used in any section except the first. It is the right of every member to have a bill read through at each stage of its progress, though it is cus- tomarily, by unanimous consent, read only by title, except upon its passage, when a full read- ing is mandatory. After a bill has been read three times, the question is, “Shall the bill pass?” after which it is not amendable, although open to debate, unless the house at once Seconds the demand for the previous question on its pas- sage. When a bill is passed, the member in charge of it moves that the vote last taken be reconsidered, and that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table. If the house votes aye, no reconsideration can take place, and the bill goes at once to the senate. In the Senate the pas- sage of bills involves no such formalities. All bills passed by the house must be certified by the clerk with his signature and the day of their passage, and conveyed by him or an assistant to the senate. While bills are on their passage be- tween the two houses, they are on paper; after being passed by both houses they must be en- rolled on parchment, and examined (compared or collated) by the joint committee on enrolled bills. Next, they are signed by the president of the sen- ate and the speaker of the house, and presented to the president for his signature. Bills signed by the president are filed in the department of state, where they form the official acts of con- gress, from which the annual “Statutes at Large" are printed. The president notifies his approval with its date to the house in which the bill originated, and this appears in the journal. Any bill not returned by the president within ten days becomes a law by force of the consti- tution, unless congress adjourns meanwhile, in which case it does not become a law. (For bills failing to become laws through the president's objections, see Veto.) Bills passed in one house and rejected in the other must be notified to the former; they can not be renewed the same ses- sion without ten days' notice, and leave of two- thirds. A weekly statement of bills on the speak- er's table, with dates and proceedings thereon, must be printed by the clerk. Of each bill of- fered 750 copies are printed, and many more are frequently ordered. Bills which are undis- posed of in either house can be resumed and acted on at the next session of the same congress; but all bills die with the congress, unless they have gone through both houses and been approved by the president. Private bills are defined to be those for the benefit of individuals, companies, etc. Friday in each week is by rule of the house set apart for their consideration; and when reported from committees they are considered in committee of the whole. In parliament there is a radical distinction between public and private bills, which does not prevail in congress. By the stand- ing orders all private bills, whether for the interest of individuals, corporations or localities, must be brought in by petition, and taken charge of by a parliamentary agent. (See LEGISLATION, Vol. ii., p. 756.) In the house of lords any peer may offer a public bill without notice; in the commons notice must be given and leave of the house ob- tained. Bills relating to religion, trade or money grants can not be brought in until they have first been considered in committee of the whole house. Bills passed by both houses receive the royal as- sent by commission under the great Seal. Some- times the queen assents in person to bills in the house of lords. In the French chambers bills. are proposed by the ministry or by deputies, and are printed and referred to proper committees. Members proposing them may be heard before committees. Reports upon bills are printed, after which the chamber fixes the time for debate. No bill can become a law without two deliberations upon it with an interval of at least five days, 76 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. except financial bills, bills of local interest, and bills declared urgent. — BRIBERY. Any attempt to bribe a member is a breach of the privileges of the house. Several cases of lobbyists and others charged with bribery appear in the jour- mals. (See LoBBY, vol. ii., p. 781.) Bribery in the election of members of congress is an offense which has been made the subject of repeated in- vestigations by committees of both houses. In parliament many controverted elections have turned upon real or alleged bribery; but such practices have ceased to be subjects of investiga- tion in parliament since the corrupt practices act of 1868, confiding the trial of controverted elec- tions to the court of common pleas. On proof of bribery by the agents of sitting members (even without the knowledge of the latter) their seats have been vacated; while an act of parliament disqualifies for seven years any candidate guilty of bribery, and disfranchises him as a voter for the same period.— BUSINESS. In the lower house of congress there are four calendars of business: 1, a calendar of the whole house on the state of the Union, on which are placed all revenue and ap- propriation bills; 2, a house calendar, embracing all public bills not revenue or appropriation bills; 3, a calendar of the committee of the whole house, for all private bills; 4, a calendar of business on the speaker's table. Questions of the priority of business are decided by a majority without debate. The first business, after prayer by the chaplain, is the reading of the journal of the last day’s sitting; then a call of states and territories (if on Monday) for bills and resolutions; and then a morning hour for reports from committees, called in order. After the morning hour devoted to reports, the unfinished business of the preced- ing session is in order; after unfinished business a motion to proceed to business on the speaker's table is in order, though seldom arrived at. After this, it is in order to go into committee of the whole house upon revenue or appropriation bills. Next in order is business on the house calendar. As it is always in order (after the morning hour) to go into committee for considering revenue or appropriation bills, there is small chance for other measures during most of the session, and thence comes an almost perpetual contest Over the order of business. It requires a majority of two-thirds to suspend the rules apportioning the Order in which business must be considered; and this ma- jority is seldom obtained, because the rule forbids the speaker to entertain any motion to suspend the rules except on the first and third Mondays of each month, and during the last six days of a session. Special orders, however, are sometimes made in advance for given days, which take pre- cedence of all except unfinished business and rev- enue and appropriation bills. The senate has a morning hour for presentation of messages from the president, the house, and other communica- tions, petitions and memorials, reports of commit- tees, and the introduction of bills and resolutions. During this hour no other business is in order ex- cept by unanimous consent. At its close unfin- ished business of the preceding session is first in order; second, any special order for the day; and third, the calendar in its order. This calendar must contain every bill and resolution reported from committees or on leave, and house bills and resolutions unreferred to committees. In parlia- ment the public business is apportioned by reserv- ing certain days for considering the orders of the day, and other days for original motions. The members are so numerous that the priority of those desiring to give notices on the same day is determined by ballot, the speaker drawing their names from a box; they are called out, when they rise and make their motions without debate. The right is reserved to place government orders (i. e., the measures of the ministry) at the head of the list on every order day except Wednesday. Fri- . day’s order of the day must be either bills of Sup- ply or ways and means. Wednesdays are set apart for bills promoted by members not con- nected with the government, except when the public business is pressing. Special orders are frequently made in advance, as in congress. The IFrench chamber of deputies fixes the order of business for its next session before adjourning for the day; the order of the day thus fixed is posted in the hall, and published in the official journal. On the demand of any member the order of the day must have priority. — BY-LAWS. In non-parliamentary bodies (as in societies or vol- untary associations of any kind), the by-laws con- stitute the standing rules of the society. They usually follow the constitution, and are of great importance to the orderly transaction of business in its meetings. They should provide a rule for the suspension of them at the will of two- thirds or some other quota of the members. — CALENDAR. (See Business.) — CALL. Calling the roll is required at the first meeting of each Session of congress. This proceeds by states in their al- phabetical order, and shows by the record in the journal who are present. The ordinary roll-call is in alphabetical order of members’ names, and is required on every vote that is taken by yeas and nays, the clerk calling out the name, and members answering vºvá voce. This call, with the delays arising from indistinctness, absences, changes and reading of the names on both sides, occupies some forty minutes in the United States house of representatives. Various schemes for abridging the enormous waste of time by the roll-call (which sometimes occupies half the hours of a sitting) have been devised: e. g., an annunciator with electric wires, the member touching a button at his desk, and the vote be- ing recorded yea or may instantaneously for the whole house. The house, however, has never countenanced any substitute for ºvá voce voting. The call of committees and of members from states for bills and resolutions is treated of under Business. – CALL OF THE HOUSE. When no quorum is present, a call of the house is in order, which proceeds thus: the names of the mem- PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 77 bers are called by the clerk, and the absentees noted; the doors are then closed, and the major- ity present orders absentees sent for and arrested wherever found, by officers appointed by the Sergeant-at-arms; when absent members are pro- duced, the speaker calls for their excuses at the bar, and the house determines upon what condi- tion they shall be discharged from arrest. Scenes of great disorder and merriment sometimes occur during a call of the house. No motion is in order during the call except to adjourn, or that all further proceedings in the call be dispensed with: the last motion is usually made upon the appearance of a quorum. In the senate a call of senators must be made when the question of a quorum is raised. If no quorum is present, the majority may di- rect the sergeant-at-arms to request or to com- pel the attendance of absent senators; pending which, no debate and no motion except to ad- journ is in order until a quorum appears. — CEN- SURE. Members of a legislative body are liable to censure for transgressing the rules in speaking Or otherwise. A vote to censure a member re- quires the speaker of the house to pronounce that such a member (calling him by name) has in- curred the censure of the house. Votes of censure have not been infrequent, mainly for unseemly conduct or transgression of the rules of debate; and instances are not wanting where, the speaker has been required to pronounce the censure of the house upon members who have been guilty of grave derelictions in their capacity of representa- tives. In parliament the speaker of the commons has been sometimes directed to reprimand or ad- monish persons at the bar who have offended against the dignity of the house. In the French chamber of deputies members are subject to cen- sure of the chamber, who have refused to heed a call to order, or have been guilty of tumultuous conduct, or of menacing or insulting any of their fellow-members. Censure, coupled with exclusion from the hall for fifteen days, is pronounced against any deputy who has been guilty of any violence, or has resisted a simple censure, or has menaced any member of the government or the president of the republic. Both censures carry with them temporary forfeiture of the salary. In case of resistance by any deputy, or of tumult in the chamber, the president at once adjourns the session, and the public pros- ecutor is informed that an offense has been com- mitted in the palace of the chamber of depu- ties. – CHAIRMAN. The chair is usually filled by the speaker in the house and by the vice-presi- dent in the senate. The speaker has the right to call any member to preside if he desires to leave the chair, and this member is addressed as “Mr. Chairman "; but such substitution is limited to the day when made; except that in case of his illness he may appoint a chairman, with the ap- proval of the house, for not more than ten days. In the absence of the speaker without making Such an appointment, the house elects a speaker pro tempore, who is addressed as “Mr. Speaker.” When the house goes into committee of the whole the speaker never presides, but designates a mem- ber, who is addressed as “Mr. Chairman.” When the committee of the whole rises, which is done by motion, the speaker resumes the chair, and the chairman formally reports to him what prog- ress has been made upon the business in hand. In the Senate the chairman, who is elected to take the place of the vice-president as presiding officer, is known as the president pro tempore. Either Officer may call any senator to occupy the chair, but only for the day or a less time at his pleasure. This substitute is still addressed as “Mr. Presi- dent.” The chairman of a committee is the first- named member thereon, by a rule of both houses. In his absence the next-named member acts as chairman. The great amount and importance of business prepared for legislative action by the committees renders the chairmanship an influ- ential and much desired position. — CHILTERN HUNDREDs. (See PARLIAMENT, THE BRITISH.)— CLERK. At the beginning of each congress the house is called to order by the clerk of the last house, who continues in office until his successor is chosen. He then calls the roll of members, and decides all questions of order until the elec- tion of a speaker, subject to appeal to the house by any member. His successor is elected imme- diately after the choice of a speaker, by vivá voce vote. The clerk must note all questions of order and decisions thereon; keep the journal of the house and print it, with an index; certify to the passage of all bills and resolutions; attest, by sig- nature and Seal of the house, writs, warrants and subpoenas; make all contracts regarding supplies or labor for the house ; disburse and account for the contingent fund ; appoint and pay the assistants in his office ; keep the stationery ac- counts; and have charge of certain classes of doc- uments for distribution. He has the custody of all bills, petitions and other papers pertaining to business before all committees of the house at the close of each congress, to be preserved in the files of his office. He must make a roll of representa- tives elect before the first meeting of each con- gress, placing on it only those whose credentials show them regularly elected. All messages from the house to the senate are conveyed by the clerk or one of his assistants. – CLóTURE. This term, recently adopted from the French, denotes the closing of debate, answering closely to the previ- ous question, as it prevails in American assem- blies. In parliament the previous question does not have the effect to suppress all further discus- sion of the main question. The want of any standing order enabling the majority of the house to close debate and secure the prompt passage of the ministerial measures, led to the protracted parliamentary contest of 1881–2, and the adoption of new rules for procedure in the house of commons. As introduced by Mr. Glad- stone, Feb. 20, 1882, the procedure resolutions, required the closing of debate by a bare major- ity approving the putting of the question by the "78 TARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. speaker; but the question under discussion was not to be decided in the affirmative unless sup- ported by 200 members or opposed by less than 40, This radical measure was the fruit of the obstructive tactics adopted by the Irish mem- bers in the long session, Jan. 6 to Aug. 7, 1881. Taking advantage of the rules of the house, de- signed to promote freedom of debate, about forty members successfully thwarted the majority, and for many months prevented legislation giving the government power to enforce the laws in Ireland. Several all-night sessions of the house, and one continuous sitting of forty-one and one-half hours, with scenes of great disorder, were the fruits of these obstructive tactics on the part of the home rule members. A series of motions to adjourn the debate, to adjourn the house, etc., were continually renewed in the endeavor to weary out the majority and delay the obnoxious Irish bill by adjournment of the house; but the majority, backed by the conservative party, who made com- mon cause with the ministerialists, kept the house together by relays, and the debate went on day and night. At length the speaker took the decisive measure of arresting debate by putting the motion for leave to bring in the bill to suppress disorders in Ireland. This was carried, the Irish members leaving the house in a body. The bill reaching a second reading, the obstructions were renewed, and Mr. Parnell and other members were “named” by the speaker for disregarding the authority of the chair. Resistance to the progress of business continuing, a motion for the expulsion for the day of thirty-one of the home rule party was carried; and, after four nights’ debate, the first “urgency” resolution of Mr. Gladstone was carried, 359 to 56. This secured parliamentary progress, and the Irish bill was passed through both houses within a week, and received the royal assent March 2, 1881. At the next session of parliament (1882) the adoption of the cláture as a permanent stand- ing order was carried after months of struggle and debate. An amendment that in no case should the cláture be enforced unless with the support of two-thirds of those present, was lost. The pro- ºcedure resolutions were finally passed Dec. 1, 1882, and are to the following effect: 1, provides that the speaker or chairman may stop the debate at his discretion, if supported by more than 200 members; or if opposed by less than 40, and sup- ported by more than 100; 2, provides that motions for adjournment for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance, shall be en- tertained if forty members support it by rising up; 3, provides for limiting such debate to the subject in hand; 4, provides for the taking of divisions; 5, 6 and 7, are technical rules for the speaker's or chairman's guidance; 8, makes it a standing order that no opposed motion shall be taken after half-past twelve at night; 9, regulates the suspension of offending members; 10, gives the speaker or chairman the power to check attempts to secure delay by abuse of the rules; 11 and 12, are minor provisions; and 13 makes the first seven and last three resolutions into standing orders. In the French chamber of deputies, by Art. 108 of the Règlement, the president is to take the sense of the chamber before pronouncing the closing of debate. If the cláture is opposed, only a single speech against it is allowed. The cláture being Once pronounced, no further debate is in order, with the single exception of remarks upon the state of the question. — COMMITTEES. A com- mittee is an officially constituted organ of a deliberative body to facilitate its business by examining questions, canvassing their merits by discussion, testimony, etc., digesting resolutions, or preparing bills for action, and reporting their conclusions to the body of which they are mem- bers. In societies, conventions and deliberative assemblies, it is the almost invariable practice that the presiding officer appoints all committees. The mover of any special committee is usually by courtesy appointed its chairman, although the Selection both of committees and of chairmen is always within the power of the assembly. Com- mittees are most important organs of a body to forward its business by intelligent and orderly procedure. In the house of representatives the speaker has the sole power of appointing com- mittees. There are three kinds of committees in congress, viz., standing, select and joint, besides committees of conference, which are appointed for the occasion, to reconcile differences between the houses upon matters of legislation. The standing committees of the house are forty-seven in number, appointed at the commencement of each congress. Three of these are joint commit- tees, the Senate having a similar committee to act with them. They consist of from fifteen members each down to three, the greater number having eleven members. Select committees, ordered by the house from time to time to consider special subjects, consist of various numbers and do not hold over the session, unless specially authorized, while the standing committees are for the whole congress. In 1802 the house had only five stand- ing committees of seven members each. The call of committees for reports is daily, except on the first and third Mondays of each month. All reports of committees must be in writing. They can sit during sessions of the house only by special leave. Committee rooms are provided in the capitol for their sessions, which are private unless they choose to admit spectators. Jefferson's Manual holds that the proceedings of a committee are not to be published, as they are of no force until confirmed by the house ; but in modern days the enterprise of the press is adequate to spread before the public all that is of interest in the proceedings of every congressional committee. A committee is sometimes given the special power to send for persons and papers; also to hold sessions in any part of the country where investi- gation is desired. A majority of the committee constitutes a quorum for business. Each com- mittee has a clerk, appointed by the chairman with the committee's approval, and a calendar of PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 79 business. Any chairman of a committee has power by statute to administer oaths to witnesses. It is common to parcel out committee work involving examination among the individual members, or to refer various topics to sub-committees for report. Some committees meet daily, others weekly, others casually upon call of the chairman, according to the amount or importance of the business referred to them. The right of a committee to report at any time carries with it the right to consider the matter when reported ; but all measures involv- ing the raising or expending of money must be first considered in committee of the whole. The only exceptions to this rule are the com- mittees on elections, printing, and accounts. A committee report may be made by the chair- man or any one of its members; and he has the right both to open and close debate on the report. Minority reports in writing are usually printed and considered with the majority report. Questions of jurisdiction over certain business often arise between various committees, and are decided by the speaker or the house: the principle governing is, that the principal subject of the bill should control its reference. In the senate the standing committees (thirty-four in number) are appointed by ballot unless otherwise ordered. For many years past the ballot has been dispensed with, and the committees are elected each session (not for the whole congress, as in the house) on motion, the members being named in a body by the par. ty in the majority, which has previously agreed to them in caucus. Special committees are fre- quently appointed by the president of the senate, who also appoints committees of conference. Reports from committees are to be called for dur- ing the morning hour next after the communica- tions to the senate and the offering of petitions and memorials. In parliament there are no standing committees except on accounts, standing orders, selection, and railway and canal bills, and these must be reappointed every session. Select com- mittees are appointed in the lords by ballot or On motion. In the commons select committees (usually of fifteen members) are appointed vivá Ooce on motion of any member naming them, al- though the house sometimes elects committees by ballot. The house orders in each case what num- ber shall be a quorum of the committee, usually five members in the commons and three in the lords. The object of select committees is usually to take evidence, and power is given them to send for persons and papers. The presence of stran- gers is usually permitted in house committees, rarely in those of the lords. Their exclusion may be ordered at any time, and is enforced while the committee are deliberating. Secret committees are sometimes appointed, whose inquiries are con- ducted with closed doors, even members of the house being excluded. All evidence is taken in shorthand, and printed. Reports and resolutions reported by committees, by a standing order are laid upon the table. By a new usage, first in operation in 1883, “grand committees” have been created, selected for the purpose of giving meas- ures mature consideration before they are pre- sented to parliament for debate. This object has thus far been well answered, and the working power of the parliament increased. In the French chamber of deputies the most important commit- tee is that on the budget. This consists of thirty- three members, and is charged with all legislation relating to receipts and expenditures. The cham- ber may refer to any committee any other prop- ositions for legislation. No member can belong to more than two committees. One day in each week is customarily set apart for committee work. — COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE. A com- mittee of the whole is constituted of all the indi- vidual members of the body, and must beformed by an act of the house itself. In the senate there is no formal resolving into committee of the whole of the body, but simply a resolution that the business then pending shall be considered “as in committee of the whole.” This is styled by Mr. Jefferson a quasi committee. The house having resolved to go into committee of the whole, the speaker must leave the chair, after appointing a chairman to preside. Business is taken up in the order of the calendar, appropriation and rev- enue bills having precedence. The committee must rise and the speaker resume the chair if a message to the house comes in, or a bill is ob- jected to, or any other business occasion arises requiring the immediate attention of the house; after which the house goes again into commit- tee. The rules provide that all matters relating to taxes or appropriations of money shall first be considered in a committee of the whole. The five-minute rule prevails in committee of the whole; i. e., any member is allowed five minutes to explain any amendment he may offer; after which one member is allowed to speak five minutes in opposing it, and there must be no further debate thereon. This is practically extend- ed, however, by permitting an amendment to an amendment, so that many five-minute speeches may be made by pro form& motions to amend by striking out the last word, etc. When debate runs too long, in the view of those having charge of the measure, the motion is often made that the committee rise; when the house is asked to close all debate upon the pending section; if carried, this cuts off all debate, but does not preclude fur- ther amendment. The previous question can not be put in committee, nor motions to reconsider, nor can the yeas and nays be taken, nor can motions, amendments or appeals be laid on the table. The members vote by three methods: 1, vivá voce by the sound, aye or no; 2, by rising, and standing till they are counted on each side; 3, by passing between the tellers. When the matter under consideration in com- mittee is finished, the committee rise, and the chairman reports to the speaker, “The committee of the whole house on the state of the Union hav- ing had under consideration (such a subject) have directed me to report the same with (or without) 80 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. amendments.” In parliament the chair is taken in committee of the whole by the chairman of the committee of ways and means in the commons, and by the chairman of committees appointed each session in the lords. The ordinary function of committees of the whole house is deliberation. Every public bill and all matters concerning re- ligion, trade, revenue or the grant of public money must first be considered in committee of the whole. Members may speak more than once in committee, but not in the house. — CONCURRENT RESOLUTION. This is a resolution adopted by both houses, chiefly on the subject of adjourn- ment of the session. Unlike a joint resolution, it does not require the signature of the president. — CoNEERENCE. To adjust differences in the form or substance of a measure which has passed both houses, though in a different shape, committees of conference are appointed by the presiding officer. They consist usually of three members from each house, two of whom are of the majority party, or favorable to the measure. In all cases of disagree- ment, or when either house refuses to concur with amendments to any measure made by the other, a conference is moved. Reports of committees of conference must be signed by a majority of the committee of both houses, and are always in or- der. They must contain an explicit statement as to what effect the committee's report will have on the measure. If the conferees fail to agree (as often happens) they report to their respective houses, and a new committee (or the same) is again appointed. Three or four conferences, with as many committees, are sometimes required. The usual form of moving a conference is that the house (or senate) insist on its disagreement and ask for a conference: the alternative motion is, that the house recede from its amendments, or from its disagreement, and agree to the amend- ments of the other body. The senate has a rule that the question of consideration of conference reports shall be taken at once without debate. In parliament conference committees are more form- al, and may be demanded by either house con- cerning the privileges of parliament, the course of proceeding and the bills or amendments passed by the other house. Each house appoints mana- gers to represent it at the conference, and both houses are thus brought into direct intercourse with each other by deputations of their own mem- bers. Business is suspended in both houses of parliament during the sitting of conference com- mittees. In the French corps legislatºf, when the Senate disagrees with the chamber of depu- ties, a committee of conference may be moved to agree upon a new form of law. If the con- ference report is rejected by the deputies, it is not in order to bring in a similar bill until two months have expired, except upon the initiative of the government. — CONSENT. In the ordi- nary course of business at public meetings, and in some parliamentary bodies, business may be done by unanimous consent. The presiding offi- cer puts the question: Is it the pleasure of the assembly that such a thing should be done? If no member dissents, he announces, “The chair hears no objection,” and the thing is ordered without putting the question in any other form. If a single member objects, the chairman must put the question in the usual way by a motion and second. The introduction of any bill or res- olution out of the regular order requires unani- mous consent. It is customary for members to ask unanimous consent to withdraw papers from the files, to be excused from the house or from voting, to print remarks not actually delivered, to have a bill or motion taken up for present considera- tion, to have their time extended when speak- ing, etc. If no objection is made, the chair an- nounces that the request is granted. — ConsLD- ERATION. To raise the question of consideration is to endeavor to defeat a measure by bringing the house to vote whether they will consider it. It is too late to raise the question of consideration on any question after its discussion is actually begun. — CONSTITUTION. In most societies or perma- ment voluntary organizations it is customary to adopt a constitution and by-laws for the govern- ment of the body. The constitution commonly sets forth the name and object of the organiza- tion, the qualifications and mode of electing mem- bers and officers, and the regulations for meet- ings. It also contains provision for its amend- ment through a vote of two-thirds or some other majority, after specified previous notice at a reg- ular meeting. — CONTEMPT. (See Privilege.)— CoNTESTED SEAT. (See Elections.)— ConvKN- TION, Joint. A joint convention of the two houses is held only upon occasion of counting the electoral vote for president and vice-president. Formerly this assembly was regulated by a joint rule of the two houses, providing that the presi- dent of the senate should be their presiding of- ficer, and prescribing details for counting the vote. This rule, however, was abolished in 1876, and there is now no rule upon the subject. — DAY, LEGISLATIVE. For the purposes of legisla- tion the congressional day begins at 12 o'clock M., or at such earlier hour as either house shall have adjourned to. It does not terminate until an ad- journment is had ; a recess merely to the next day does not end the legislative day then running. An adjournment does not necessarily take place at the beginning of Sunday; a majority may con- tinue in session after that hour (as has frequently happened), but the journal bears the date of the day preceding (Saturday). — DEADLOCK. This is a common phrase, which designates a stoppage of business in one house through obstructions by the minority; or, a deadlock in legislation may occur between the two houses, through party differences, when the majority in one is of dif- ferent politics from that controlling the other. The latter are usually compromised by each house yielding something; the former sometimes lasts for days and nights, the party seeking to prevent the enactment of an obnoxious measure exhausting every parliamentary expedient by calls of the PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 81. house, motions to adjourn, calling the yeas and nays, etc., on their motions, to defeat or weary out the majority. — DEBATE. In all assemblies for the transaction of business it is essential that there should be rules to regulate and limit discussion. There are some rules which may be regarded as universal; as, 1, No debate is in order unless a motion of some kind is before the assembly; 2, Any one rising to debate must address the presiding officer, not the assembly; 3, By courtesy, the mover of any proposition is first entitled to the floor; 4, Debate must be confined to the question before the assembly. In the house of representatives a member rising must address “Mr. Speaker”; the speaker names the member who is first to speak (as “the gentleman from Maine,” etc.). When sev- eral rise at once the member who first catches the speaker's eye is to be called upon. A member re- porting a measure from a committee opens and closes the debate; no member can speak more than one hour without express leave of the house, or more than once to the same question unless he be the mover of the matter pending, when he may speak in reply after all others choosing to do so have spoken. No debate is allowed after the pre- vious question is ordered, except one speech from the member closing debate; it is common, how. ever, for the member having an hour to close to yield a given amount of his time to several mem- bers. In both houses no debate is allowed on motions for adjournment or recess, or to lay any business upon the table, or to consider con- ference reports, to excuse from voting, or on ques- tions of order arising after a motion for the pre- vious question, or upon reference or priority of business. No member may call another by name in debate, or notice the views of the other house ; both of these rules, however, are fre- quently violated. In the senate debate is without limit, unless a special order is made to curtail the length of speeches. No senator can interrupt another without his consent, or speak more than twice on the same question the same day without leave of the Senate. Both houses have a rule that any member transgressing in debate the rules of the house, shall be called to Order, when he must sit down, and can not proceed without leave, the exceptionable words being taken down. Senators must stand in their places when debating; but members of the house may speak from their seats, or from any part of the floor, or from the clerk’s desk. In the house of lords a peer addresses the lords in general; in the commons the speaker is addressed. The reading of written speeches is not permitted in either house of parliament. A member may read extracts from documents, but must debate questions in the literal sense of that word, without reading manuscript remarks. In both houses of congress written speeches are prac- tically rather the rule, and debate in the true sense the exception. While debating, members of the lords and commons remove their hats, resuming them upon concluding. Debate in the lords de- pends upon the will of the house; in the commons 125 VOL. III. — 6 the speaker recognizes the member who rises first. As several members may frequently rise at once, the one that is first in his eye is called upon. Competition for the floor sometimes leads to a motion that another than the member called by the speaker be first heard. It has been sometimes charged that there was a “speaker's list,” by which his recognition of members was governed, but this has never been admitted. The rule of one speech only from any member on the same question is strictly observed. No member can be called by name in either house; in the lords a mem- ber is referred to by his rank, as “the noble earl”; in the commons, by the place he represents, as “the honorable gentleman, the member for York.” In the French chambers members speak from the tribune, and must first have obtained leave by addressing the president. A list of the deputies who desire to speak at any session is kept, in the order of their demand. In the discussions members speak alternately for and against a meas- ure under consideration; a rule which does not pre- vail either in England or America. The ministers are to have the floor whenever they claim it, even if it interrupts the order of the regular list, but one of the opposition may always follow the speech of a minister, Disorder or clamor during a dis- cussion is prohibited ; if the chamber becomes noisy, and the president can not restore order, he puts on his hat; if the disorder continues he an- nounces the session closed for an hour, at the end of which time the sitting is resumed; if the tu- mult breaks out again the president must adjourn the chamber to the next day. — DELEGATES. (See Territories.) — DIVISION. To call for a division is to test the sense of the assembly on the proposition before it. In the house a division is had by the members on each side of the question rising in their seats and being counted by the speaker, who announces the vote. If dissatisfied with the result, any member may call for tellers, or the yeas and nays may be called for. The division of a ques- tion, if demanded by any member, must be made before voting, if it include two or more distinct propositions. In parliament, if the vote by ayes and noes (vivá voce) is not accepted, there is no di- vision by rising and standing to be counted, but the house at once divides, those voting for the measure withdrawing to the lobby on the right of the house, and those opposed entering the left. Two tellers are appointed by the speaker for each party. As members file back into the house they are counted by the tellers, and their names re- corded by the clerks. The result is announced from the chair, and alphabetical lists of the names are printed with the “votes and proceedings.” No member can vote who was not in the house when the question was put; but a “ division bell” is rung by the doorkeeper when the house is about to divide, which is heard through the neighboring rooms, and scattered members hasten to be present at the division before the doors are locked. The time allowed for this notice is two minutes, meas- ured by a sand-glass; and when that has run out, 82 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. the doors are closed, and the speaker must again put the question by ayes and noes, as by the rule no absentees on the first call could vote unless the question were again put. If the numbers on a division are equal, the Speaker must give the casting vote in the commons; if there is a tie in the house of lords, the measure voted upon is lost. In the French chambers a division must be had on the call of any member. The vote is taken, 1, by rising ; 2, by open ballot; 3, by secret ballot. The first method is in order upon all questions unless twenty members demand an open ballot or fifty a secret ballot; or when the rising vote, having been twice taken, is not decisive of the question; in this case any member may demand the ballot. The open ballot requires each member to be supplied with white tickets signifying a vote in the affirmative, and blue tickets the negative, on all of which his name is printed. Messengers present to each member an urn, in which he deposits his ballot: all the votes being collected, the urns are opened at the tribune; the secre- taries count the ballots of each color, and the president announces the result. The secret ballot is taken by white and black balls, the white signifying the affirmative, and the black the nega- tive. The members deposit the balls themselves in an urn ; the Secretaries turn them out into a basket, count the black and white balls, and the result is proclaimed. — DOORKEEPER. In some assemblies the Sergeant-at-arms or his assistants discharge all the duties of a doorkeeper. In the house of representatives the office of doorkeeper is an important one, involving the care and re- sponsibility of the chamber and apartments of the house and the public property therein, the superin- tendence of the document room and folding room of the house, and the appointment of many messen- gers, assistant doorkeepers and pages. During the sessions he announces at the door of the house all messages, furnishes members with printed doc- uments, conveys messages, etc. He must enforce strictly the rules as to the privileges of the hall, and be responsible to the house for the conduct of his employés. In the senate the sergeant-at-arms appoints the doorkeeper and his assistants. – ELECTIONS. In public assemblies the first busi- ness in order is always the election of officers. At any meeting which is not that of an organized body, it is usual for the assembly to be called to order by some volunteer member, who moves that Mr. — act as chairman of the meeting. The motion being seconded, the proposer calls for a vote by ayes and noes. If the voice of the former preponderates, he declares the motion carried, and calls Mr. — to the chair. The chairman, having taken his seat, announces the first business to be the election of a secretary, and calls for nominations, putting the question in the Same manner for an expression of the sense of the meeting. Other officers may be elected in like manner, but a president and secretary are all which are usually necessary for a meeting. In the house of representatives the speaker, clerk, Sergeant-at-arms, doorkeeper, postmaster and chap- lain are elected by vivá voce vote at the beginning of each congress. The election of members in- volves questions of the highest privilege, the con- stitution itself making each house the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. The committee on elections in the house, and on privileges and elections in the senate, stand at the head of the list of committees. Contested elections of members, of which there are usually several in each congress, are carefully examined by these committees. The law provides that any contestant of an election of any repre- sentative must, within thirty days after the re- sult is declared, notify the member whose seat he contests, of his intention and grounds of contest. The member must within thirty days answer the contestant in writing. Ninety days after this are allowed both sides for taking testimony. Wit- nesses may be examined or depositions taken at any place with due notice on both sides, the mem- ber and contestant appearing, either in person or by attorney, before any judge of a United States court, a state court of record, or a notary public, etc., who are by law competent to issue subpoenas and take record evidence in election cases. The testimony is taken in writing, and transmitted to the clerk of the house, by whose order it is usually printed. Contestants have the privilege of the floor pending a decision of their claim, and are usually heard in their own behalf before the vote is taken. Questions of the right of a member to his seat take precedence of all business. Large sums have frequently been voted to sitting members and to those contesting their seats for expenses incurred in the contest. The Revised Statutes (sec. 130) prohibit such payments to any person, but a sub- sequent statute of 1879 provides that thereafter no contestant or contestee for a seat in the house shall be paid more than $2,000 for such expenses, and that only upon sworn vouchers or receipts for money actually disbursed. The election of senators in each state must be made by the legis- lature chosen next preceding the expiration of the term of a senator. On the second Tuesday after organizing, each house must vote separately and vivá voce for a senator. If any one has a majority in both houses he shall next day be de- clared duly elected senator in joint assembly of both houses. If no one has a majority the joint assembly must vote for Senator (each member having one vote), and if no candidate receives a majority on the first day, the assembly must meet at 12 M. each succeeding day of the Session, and take at least one vote, until a Senator is elected. In parliament the practice in contested elections prevailing in this country was formerly in vogue, but the trial and determination of contests for seats by the whole house of commons grew into a great abuse through the notorious partisanism which almost invariably decided the case. This was reformed by the Grenville act of 1770, which selected by lot all committees for the trial of elec- tion petitions. This non-partisan method of Se- * PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. lecting judges of parliamentary elections was maintained until 1868, when the jurisdiction of the house of Commons in the trial Of controverted elections was transferred by statute to the courts of law. Complaints of fraud in an election, or wrong returns of members, are tried by a judge within the district concerned, who certifies his de- termination to the speaker, which is final. If he reports that corrupt practices have prevailed at the election, a commission is sometimes appointed thereon. Corrupt constituencies have been re- peatedly disfranchised by act of parliament. In France the chamber elects at each new organiza- tion a provisional president, and two vice-presi- dents, by ballot. The chamber is then divided by lot into eleven bureaus, who proceed to exam- ine the election returns of all the members, by committees of five members chosen by lot. Re- port is then made to the chamber, which pro- nounces on the validity of the elections, and the president proclaims the list of regularly chosen deputies. By the French constitution each house is the sole judge of the eligibility and returns of its members. After the powers of a quorum or upward of the chamber have been verified, per- manent officers are elected by ticket, viz., a presi- dent, four vice-presidents, eight Secretaries and three questors (who have charge of the parliamen- tary expenditure), to serve during the entire ses- ision. – ENGROSSED BILLS. An engrossed bill is a clean copy of the bill, with its amendments, put in proper form for the action of the house. When a bill has passed through all its stages, and the question is about to be taken on the third reading and passage, any member may call for the reading of the engrossed bill, and this may defeat the bill at that stage unless the motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill can be carried. An enrolled bill is a bill which has passed both houses and been enrolled on parchment, the en- grossed bill being on paper. — Excuse. All mem- bers must vote unless excused, and the motion for excuse must be put before roll-call and decided without debate. The excuses of absent members brought in under a call of the house may be ac- cepted or held inadequate, at the pleasure of the house. — ExPULSION. A member may be expelled by a vote of two-thirds in either house of congress. This is a constitutional provision, and has been several times exercised. More frequently resolu- tions to expel members guilty of grave miscon- duct have been lost, owing to lack of a two-thirds majority, or forestalled by the resignation of the offending member. The latter occurred in the case of Matteson and others whom the house was about to expel for corruption in railway land grants in 1853. (See LOBBY, vol. ii., p. 781.) In the case of B. F. Whittemore, a member from South Carolina, found guilty, on report of a com- mittee of the house in 1870, of selling an appoint- ment to a West Point cadetship, resolutions of expulsion were introduced, but the member re- signed his seat an hour or two before the vote upon them was to be taken, and the resolutions 83 were laid on the table. Whittemore returned to his constituents and was re-elected to the house. Thereupon a resolution was passed declining to allow Whittemore to be sworn in as a member, and returning to him his credentials. In the house of commons the power of expelling a mem- ber for grave offenses is undoubted. But though this vacates the seat of a member, it does not cre- ate disability to serve again in parliament. The famous case of John Wilkes, who was repeatedly expelled from the commons for libel, and was three times re-elected, the house each time stand- ing on its prerogative and declaring the election void, was a disfranchisement which was palpably illegal; and the house itself, in 1782, reversed its action in the Wilkes case, ordering it expunged from the journals as “subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom.” Many expulsions from parliament have occurred for corruption, perjury, conspiracy, fraud, libel, forgery, etc., the last instance having been that of James Sadleir for fraud in 1857. In the French chambers the penalties which are affixed to de- linquencies do not go the length of expulsion, but only of censure, with temporary suspension from legislative functions. – ExPUNGING. On various occasions the action of a former leg- islative body has been rescinded by the pass- age of a resolution to expunge from the jour- nals a previously adopted order or resolution. The most noted instance of this kind in congress was the passage by the senate, in 1837, of a reso- lution to expunge from the journal a resolution adopted by the senate in 1834, censuring Presi- dent Jackson as having assumed power not con- ferred by the constitution and laws. In parlia- ment entries in the journal have occasionally been ordered to be expunged, the most notable case being that affirming the incapacity of John Wilkes as a member, passed in 1769, and erased in 1782 in the manuscript journal of 1769. The printed journal, however, (though reprinted since), still contains the obnoxious resolution. — FILEs. The clerk of the house and the secretary of the senate have responsible charge of all files of papers, public and private, which accumulate in the course of the business of the respective houses. No memorial or other paper presented to either house can be withdrawn from the files without its leave, except for reference to a com- mittee. — FILIBUSTERING. This term has long been applied in America to the obstructive tactics and dilatory motions adopted by a minority to defer action upon a measure obnoxious to them. In the house this is done chiefly by the minority insisting upon the constitutional right to take the yeas and nays on every motion; then, by oft-re- peated motions to adjourn, to adjourn to a fixed day, to reconsider, to lay on the table, etc., and by relays of members to raise points of order, parliamentary inquiries, etc., hours and Some- times days are consumed in the hope of wearying out the majority, or compelling them to compro- mise. In the senate, where there are few or no 84 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. checks upon debate, a mild form of filibustering is employed by a well-organized minority taking the floor in succession, and each speaking as long as possible. Measures have been thus defeated by consuming the whole time of a closing session. —FLOOR. To obtain the floor is to be recog- nized by the presiding officer as having the right to make a motion or a speech. (See Debate.)— HOUR RULE. by a standing rule first adopted in 1847, no mem- ber can occupy more than one hour in debate on any question except the member reporting a meas- ure from a committee, who has an additional hour to close the debate, if it extends beyond one day. No similar rule prevails in the senate or in the British parliament. — IMPEACHMENT. This is a parliamentary power as old as the fourteenth century, and frequently exercised in early his- tory, involving the highest judicial powers. Im- peachment by the commons of high crimes be- yond the reach of the law, and a trial by the house of lords, were invoked to defend the rights of Englishmen against corruption and oppression in office, whether executive or judicial. In mod- ern times impeachment has been very rare. The direct responsibility of the highest officers to par- liament, the limitations of prerogative, the settled administration of the law, and, more than all, the power of public opinion, have restrained those crimes which impeachments were devised to pun- ish. Nevertheless, all persons, whether peers or commoners, may be impeached for high misde- meanors. The last trial of an impeachment in Great Britain, and the only one in the present century, was that of Lord Melvil in 1805. (See, for impeachments in U. S. History, vol. ii., p. 480.) — IMPRISONMENT. (See Privilege.) — INSTRUC- TIONs. (See INSTRUCTIONs, vol. ii., p. 527.)— JoſNT COMMITTEES. (See Committees.)— JoſNT CoNVENTION. (See Convention.)—JornT RESOLU- TION. A joint resolution, like a public act or stat- ute, is one which is passed by both houses and signed by the president. (See Resolution.)—JoſNT RULE. This is a rule adopted by both houses for the conduct of business between them. A series of fifteen joint rules was adopted as far back as 1790–94, and was in force (with occasional slight additions) until the 44th congress. The most im- portant of these was the 22d joint rule, provid- ing for the counting of the votes for president and vice-president in joint convention of the two houses. Jan. 20, 1876, the senate passed and sent to the house a concurrent resolu- tion declaring that these joint rules previously in force, except the 22d, be adopted as the joint rules of the two houses for that session. The house took no action thereon, but, on Aug. 14, 1876, asked the Senate to concur in a resolve suspending for the remainder of the session the 16th and 17th joint rules (forbid- ding the sending of bills from one house to the other in the last three days of the session, and presenting bills to the president on the last day of the session). The Senate, in reply, In the house of representatives, passed a resolution, notifying the house that, as the house had not notified the Senate of the adoption of the joint rules as proposed by the Senate, there are no joint rules in force. — Jour- NAL. The constitution provides that each house shall keep and publish a journal of its proceed- ings. This is done by the clerk, through one of his assistants, known as the journal clerk, and each day's journal must be read on the meeting of the house on the succeeding legislative day. It records with great fullness the motions, votes, petitions, messages—in short, all proceedings in the house, except the debates. In reading the journal the record of petitions, names of members voting, resolutions and messages, are omitted by unanimous consent; even without these the jour- nal often runs to great length. Errors in the jour- nal may be corrected the next day. — LEGISLA- TIVE DAY. This begins at 12 M. in congress, unless a different or earlier hour is fixed by either house for its meetings. It terminates with the adjournment, (a mere recess does not end it), but does not always coincide with the day as marked by the calendar. Thus, the legislative day which terminates the session of congress every other year is styled March 3 in the journals and pro- ceedings, although it is actually March 4, from the hour of midnight to noon of this closing day. — LOBBY and LOBBYING. (See LOBBY, vol. ii., p. 770.)—LOG-ROLLING. This is a cant phrase, ap- plied to a combination of members to aid each other's measures. The term comes from the busi- ness of securing lumber, or logging, where the log- gers unite to help each other in the hard work of rolling the immense logs from the forest, where they are cut, to the water. Thus, one member of the legislative body says to others, “Vote for my bill, and I will vote for your bill,” and this is called log-rolling. — MACE. This is the traditional sym- bol of parliamentary power, as old as the sixteenth century. It is a large block of wood carved and gilt, and is borne before the speaker in the house of commons, when he enters or leaves the house, on the shoulder of the sergeant-at- arms. When he is in the chair, it is laid upon the table. (In the house of representatives the mace is set upright at the table of the Sergeant- at-arms, at the speaker’s right.) The mace now used in the house of commons is the identical one handed down from the accession of Charles II., 1660. There is no mace in the house of lords or in the senate. It is the time-honored emblem of popular sovereignty, in a legislative sense. The mace now used in the house dates from 1842 (although first introduced in 1789), and represents the Roman fasces, made of ebony sticks with sil- ver bands, and small spears, terminating in a globe of silver, upon which is an eagle with half extended wings: the whole is about three feet in height. When the house is in committee of the whole the mace is removed. — MAJORITY. The majority which carries any measure is held to be half the whole number of members of any assembly, plus one. Some constitutions require, PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 85 to render an act valid, that it shall have been passed by a majority of those elected; but in both branches of congress a majority of the members present (if a quorum of the whole house) may pass any measure which is in order under the rules. It results that a law may be made by less than one-third of the senators and representatives elected. In fact, twenty senators and eighty-two representatives may, under the rules, pass the most important piece of legislation. The rule that a majority must be had to elect a speaker was suspended in the case of the obstinate struggle of 1855–6, when the house remained un- organized for many weeks, the division of parties being such that no one of three candidates could secure a majority. Finally, the deadlock was ended by the house adopting a resolution that a plurality of votes should elect, and Mr. Banks was chosen speaker. The rule that a majority is required to elect a senator in state legislatures is prescribed by the laws of the United States. In nearly all the states, however, the majority rule which formerly prevailed in the election of repre- Sentatives in congress, and of state officers, has been supplanted by enactments that a plurality of votes shall elect. — MEMBERS. Those are recog- nized as members of a parliamentary body whose credentials are regular, or who by unanimous con- sent are admitted as members without examina- tion of credentials. Each house of congress is the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifica- tions of its own members. The house consists of 325 members, since March 4, 1883. Members are to be elected on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November of every second year (the even years, 1884, 1886, etc.), except in any state where the con- stitution would have to be changed to alter its election day. In case of a vacancy in a mem- ber's seat, the governor of the state issues a writ of election to fill it. roll at the first meeting of any congress only those whose credentials show that they were regularly elected representatives. Members of the house must be twenty-five years of age, and Senators must have attained the age of thirty. Members of the house can not be contractors, nor be interested in any government contract, nor be office holders, nor presidential electors, nor practi- tioners in the court of claims. Any subject is eli- gible to the house of commons who has reached the age of twenty-One, except clergymen, peers, bank- rupts, contractors and certain officials. No mem- ber of parliament can be counsel before commit- tees, nor a holder of office, except in the ministry. In France the members of the chamber of deputies may take part in the deliberations and votes before the validity of their elections is established. They wear a badge, consisting of the fasces of the republic, with a hand of justice, and a tri-colored sash. — MEETING. A meeting of an assembly differs from a session. Thus, the house frequently takes a recess to meet at a later hour, and this terminates the meeting, or sit- ting, but the session is the same, and includes The clerk must put on the all the adjourned meetings. – MESSAGE. Mes- Sages in congress imply either executive com- munications from the president (those from de- partment officers are called “letters”), or from one branch of congress to the other. The pres- ident’s annual message is sent in at the begin- ning of each session after he has been notified that the houses are organized and ready to re- ceive any communication. Messages are usually sent in duplicate to both houses on the same day, unless in response to a call from one branch only, and are published in the journal and record. A message from one house to the other, borne by a clerk, is publicly announced at the door, and sent to the chair, the business or debate being temporarily suspended to have it announced, when it is laid on the table, and the proceedings are resumed. In parliament, messages from the crown are sent to both houses, under the royal sign-manual, by one of the ministers or an officer of the royal household, either of whom is a peer or a commoner. Such messages are always read at length by the lord chancellor or the speaker. — MILEAGE. This allowance for traveling expenses to and from the seat of government prevails in congress, and in all the states except four or five. In congress it is twenty cents a mile each way for the session, or rather for the year. In the states, mileage varies from eight cents to twenty cents per mile.— MoMEY BILLS. (See Revenue Bills. – MORNING Hour. In each house of congress an hour is set apart for reports, motions and miscel- laneous business. It begins, not at the opening of the session, but after the reading of the jour- nal, and always takes precedence of unfinished business. – MoTION. This term is applied to ev- ery proposition submitted by a member of a par- liamentary body. In ordinary assemblies, mo- tions made by any one require to be seconded by some other member, before being voted up- on: but no second is required in either house of congress. Motions are here treated severally un- der their respective heads. Every motion must be reduced to writing on the demand of any member. If verbal, the presiding officer states it to the assembly; if in writing, it is read by the clerk. In the house, when a question is pend- ing or under debate, no motion is in order but to adjourn, to fix a day to which the house shall adjourn, to take a recess, to lay on the table, to postpone to a day certain, to postpone indefinitely, to refer, to amend, or for the previous question. In the senate the same rule prevails, except that there is no previous question, and motions are in order to commit, or to proceed to the consideration of executive business. In both houses of parlia- ment one day's notice of a proposed motion is required; but the notice may refer to a future day more remote than the day following. Motions must be seconded in the house of commons; but a seconder is not required in the lords. They must be carefully prepared in writing, and placed in the hands of the chair. — OATH. Members of legislative bodies take an oath of qualification or 86 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. of office. In congress all must take an oath (or affirmation, if objecting to being sworn) to support the constitution of the United States. The “iron- clad oath,” affirming that no aid has ever been given to rebellion against the United States, is taken by all who are not dispensed from it by Sec. 1757 of the Revised Statutes. In parliament a single oath of allegiance to the crown has been substituted for oaths to maintain the Established church, etc., once required. — OBJECTION. As no business can be considered in the house out of the regular order without unanimous consent, the right to object becomes very important, as one member can thus defeat or postpone a measure, unless two-thirds of the house can be had to sus- pend the rules. When in committee of the whole, if any bill or proposition is objected to, the com- mittee must rise and report the objection to the house, which must decide without debate whether it is to be considered or laid aside. — OFFICERs. The officers usually chosen in a public assembly are a president or chairman, clerk or secretary, and sometimes vice-presidents, and a sergeant-at- arms or doorkeeper. (See under each head.)— OMNIBUs BILL. This term is applied in congress to a bill embracing numerous distinct objects, as in the bill “making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government.”— ONE-HOUR RULE. (See Hour Rule.)— ORDER. This may be said to be the first law of a public assembly, whether legislative or otherwise. The order of business is treated under Business. The order of the day is the regular routine prescribed in the rules, in which certain classes of business are to be considered. To call for the regular order, is to demand that the body desist from what may be proposed out of due order, and proceed to the next business prescribed by the rules. A special order is a subject set in advance for a particular time, and thus to be preferred to the established order of business. In both houses of congress this motion requires a two-thirds vote for its adoption, being virtually a suspension of the rules. A special order may be postponed by a majority vote. The unfinished business of the preceding session takes precedence of a special order. To preserve order is the implicit duty of the presiding officer, and he or any member may call to order members transgressing the rules. In case of a call to order, a member must immediately sit down unless permitted to explain; and the house must at once decide the case without debate. If in his favor, he is al- lowed to proceed, but not otherwise. If called to order for words spoken in debate, they must be taken down in writing, and read to the house. (See Censure.) When a point of order of any kind is made, it is the duty of the chair to decide it. This he may do by sustaining the point of order, or by overruling it; and business proceeds in accordance with his decision, unless appealed from. (See Appeal.)—ORDERS, STANDING. (See Rules.)—PAIRs. The pairing of members in a legislative body is an agreement between two, who would vote on opposite sides of any question, to withhold their votes; such pairs leaving the result unaffected either way. One or both of the mem- bers paired may be absent. The rule in both houses of congress requires pairs to be announced after the roll-call, and the names paired published in the record. In parliament pairing prevails to a greater extent than in congress; members of oppo- site parties pairing with each other not only upon particular questions, but in cases of absenteeism. for weeks and even months at a time. The sys- tem has never been recognized by parliamentary rules, though so long prevalent; in Congress the first rule adopted which countenances pairing was. in the 46th congress (1880). — PAPERS. The read- ing of papers, if objected to, is determined by the house without debate. A member, however, has the right to read any paper as a part of his re- marks. Papers of every description once offered can not be withdrawn from the files without special leave of the body. — PERSONAL EXPLANATION. This is a member's request to be heard on some matter touching his personal record as a member, and requires unanimous consent. (See Privilege.) — PETITION. Much time was once consumed by members in formally presenting petitions in Open house. The rule now is, for members to deliver petitions to the clerk, indorsing their names and the specific reference (to a committee) desired. These minutes are entered upon the journal, and published in the official record. In the Senate they are still offered in open session during the morning hour. At the close of a congress, peti- tions and memorials go from committees to the permanent files, in charge of the clerk. In par- liament, petitions must be written, and must have original signatures. They are presented in great numbers, and a standing order refers them with- out debate to the committee on public petitions. In the French chambers a brief of petitions is: printed for the use of members, and they are referred to the committee on petitions, which classifies them, referring some to the minister of any department to whose business they be- long, and others to the examination of the cham- ber. Each petitioner is advised of the disposi- tion made. Any deputy may call for a report in public session upon any petition, and urgency may be demanded (if seconded by the chamber) for the consideration of any one. Every six months ministers distribute a printed report to the members, showing what action they have taken upon the petitions referred to them. — POINT OF ORDER. (See Order.)—PREAMBLE. The pre- amble of a bill or resolution is postponed until the other parts have been considered. When a Sep- arate vote on the preamble is not asked for, it is considered as adopted. — PRESIDENT PRO TEM. In organizing a public assembly a temporary chair- man is frequently chosen until a committee has reported officers for permanent organization. In the senate the president pro temporé is chosen to take the place of the vice-president as presiding officer; but this office is frequently left vacant for PARLIAMENTARY LAW. 87 a time. — PREVIOUS QUESTION. In congress this is a technical name for a motion that debate cease, and that the vote be taken immediately on the question under consideration. The motion for the previous question is not debatable, and can not be amended. The previous question was recognized in the first rules of the house in 1789, and could be demanded by five members. The present rules require a majority of the members present (if a quorum) to order the previous question. When a member calls for the previous question, the chair must immediately put the question, “Shall the main question be now put?” If adopted, the chair puts to vote the questions be- fore the house in their order of precedence, till the main question, with all subsidiary ones, is dis- posed of. The previous question puts it in the power of a majority to close debate at any time. It does not prevail in the Senate, where the public business is more at the mercy of individual sen- ators. In parliament the previous question is wholly different in effect. It is an ingenious method of avoiding a vote upon any question proposed. Those who call for the previous ques- tion vote against the motion, not for it, as in the house of representatives. If the nays prevail, the speaker is prevented from putting the main ques- tion, as the majority have thus refused to allow it to be put. If the previous question is resolved in the affirmative, no further debate or amendment is allowed, and the main question must be voted on at once. In the French chambers the cláture of the debate is always in the control of a majority of the chamber. (See Clóture.) — PRINTING. In congress all bills and joint resolutions must be printed after being offered; also reports of com- mittees. A list of all reports required to be made to congress must be printed at the beginning of each session. and the departments is regulated by the statutes in great detail. — PRIVATE BILLS. The distinc- tion between public and private bills is not closely defined, some bills including interests both public and private, and requiring the decision of the chair as to which class they belong. In congress, as in parliament, private bills are such as are for the interest of individuals, corporations or local bodies—as counties or cities. Bills relating to a state are held to be public bills. No private claim is in order upon any appropriation bill. Regular days are set apart to consider private bills reported favorably by committees. In parliament there is a carefully guarded system of maturing private bills, which saves a vast amount of legislative time and prevents abuses. (See LEGISLATION, vol. ii., p. 756.)—PRIVILEGE. The privilege of a member of a legislative body rests upon the pre- rogative of his constituency to be always repre- sented. The constitution itself provides that members shall not be questioned elsewhere for any speech or debate in either house, and shall be privileged from arrest during sessions, and in going and returning. Questions of privilege, by the rules of the house, have precedence of all The public printing of congress others, except of adjournment; but the highest privilege attaches to questions affecting the rights of the house itself, maintaining its dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings. In maintaining what are known as their privileges, both house and Senate have resorted to one or more of the following measures: 1, ordering the arrest of of. fenders; 2, directing the speaker to reprimand the party offending; 3, committing the party to the , Custody of the Sergeant-at-arms within the capi- tol; 4, Ordering a refractory witness or a person assaulting a member to be punished by imprison- ment in the jail of the District of Columbia for three months; 5, (in the case of reporters) direct- ing exclusion from the hall. The most frequent cases where either house seeks to protect its priv- ilege by penalties are the refusals of witnesses to testify before its committees; and many re- cusant witnesses have been held in custody until the congress has expired (and with it the power to punish for contempt of its authority), or until a majority have voted to discharge the prisoner, or until he has consented to answer. When any proposition presents, in the opinion of the speaker, a question of privilege, he must entertain it in preference to other business; but it is well settled that the common plea of a question of privilege based upon a newspaper publication can not be maintained unless the member is assailed in his representative capacity. The fact that imprison- ment or other punishment by vote of a legislative body contravenes the maxims of constitutional law, and asserts quasi-judicial powers, has ren- dered it obnoxious to public censure. The argu- ment that the constitution confers no such power is met by the claim that it is inherent in the highest legislative body, essential to its power, dignity and proper functions, and has been re- peatedly exercised, not only by both houses of congress, but by local legislatures. The supreme court of the United States, in some earlier cases, has upheld this power in congress, on the ground of right and necessity: but in the recent case of Rilbourne vs. Thompson the court held that the imprisonment of the former for refusal to divulge the private accounts of a company in a matter under investigation by the house of representatives, was illegal and unconstitutional. The plaintiff had been imprisoned forty-five days in the Dis- trict jail as a recusant witness, by order of the house; and the speaker, and the Sergeant-at-arms, with the members of the committee who ordered the * to be brought before the house, were joined as defendants. In the case of the mem- bers, the court held that their constitutional priv- ilege was a good defense to the action, as they took no part in the actual arrest and imprisonment. But it was held that the order of the house, de- claring the witness guilty of contempt of its au- thority and ordering his imprisonment by the sergeant-at-arms, was void, and afforded the officer no protection in the suit brought by the witness. There was no power of the house to punish for contempt found in the constitution; and no au- 88 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. thority to compel a witness to testify, where the subject-matter of the investigation was judicial, and not legislative, and was proceeding before the proper court. (103 U. S. Reports, 168.) In par- liament, while many arbitrary measures have been aimed at persons held guilty of violating the privileges of that body, the right to commit for contempt has long been regarded with increasing jealousy, and has been questioned for more than two centuries, though maintained by the court of king's bench. — QUALIFICATION. A member of congress is qualified to act in his representative capacity when his credentials have admitted him to the floor, and he has taken the oath of office. No man is disqualified from being a representative who is twenty-five years of age, provided that he has been seven years a citizen of the United States, and was an inhabitant of the state in which he has been chosen. The qualifications of a sen- ator are: 1, to have reached the age of thirty; 2, to have been nine years a citizen of the United States; 3, to have been when elected a resident of the state choosing him to represent it. A member of the house of commons need be but twenty- one years of age. (See Members.)— QUESTION. Putting the question is one of the most frequent duties of a presiding officer. It is to be put in this form: “As many as are in favor, say Aye”; and after the affirmative vote is heard: “As many as are opposed, say No.” The chair must clearly state the question on request of any member, be- fore calling for the vote. Members when anxious for the progress of business, or impatient of de- bate, frequently cry, “Question! Question!” and this, though technically a violation of the rules of order, is seldom interfered with by a judicious presiding officer. In parliament there is a special practice of propounding questions to members of the ministry, concerning public measures or events. A question may be asked as to the in- tentions of the government, but not as to their opinions upon general matters of policy. — QUORUM. Unless fixed by constitutional provis- ion or by the law of the body, the quorum of an assembly is a majority of its duly qualified members. In congress less than a quorum may adjourn from day to day, and may compel the attendance of absentees. In the house it requires the presence of at least fifteen members, to author- ize a call of the house. The presence of a quo- rum is frequently assumed, and business proceeds in both house and senate when less than half the number of members are present; but this may be terminated by any member dividing the house, thus disclosing the want of a quorum; whereupon business must stop, and a call of the house (or senate) must be ordered. In parliament forty constitute a quorum in the commons, and three only in the lords. In the French chambers an ab- solute majority of the whole number of members is required to render any action valid. — READING. The reading of papers called for may be stopped by the objection of any member, unless ordered by a vote of the house ; but a member has the right to read a paper as part of his remarks within the limits of his privilege as to time. — RECESs. This is a qualified form of adjournment; to take a recess to a definite hour usually serves the pur- pose of giving necessary rest and refreshment to the members of the body, without long interrup- tion to their public duties. The motion for this is always in order, and not debatable. The term recess is also applied to the long interval between two annual sessions of congress; and powers are often granted to committees to sit during this re- cess. – RECOMMITMENT. When committees re- port bills or resolutions digested by them, for action of the body, it is usual (unless the commit- tee has privilege of immediate consideration) to recommit them to the committee. A rule of the house provides that no bill thus recommitted shall be brought back into the house on a motion to re- consider. — RECONSIDERATION. In the house a motion to reconsider a vote once taken is to be made on the same day or the day after. It can be made only by a member who voted with the majority, if yeas and nays were taken; otherwise any member may move it. It takes precedence of all questions except adjournments and confer- ence reports. The motion to reconsider is one of great importance, since if it prevails, the former action of the body is liable to be reversed. It is to prevent the possibility of this that the usage prevails for the member having charge of any measure, the moment it is passed, to move to re- consider the vote last taken, and also to move that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table; if the latter motion prevails it is deemed a finality, so far as the passage of the measure is concerned. A motion to reconsider can be applied to every question except to adjourn and to suspend the rules. It is debatable only when the question to be reconsidered was debatable, and then it opens up for discussion the entire subject. A reconsid- eration requires only a majority vote. In parlia- ment a vote once taken can not be reconsidered.— REFERENCE. This term is applied to the refer- ring of bills, petitions, etc., to appropriate com- mittees to be considered and reported upon. — REGULAR ORDER. (See Order.) — REPORT. Committees, having finished the consideration of any matter referred to them, must make a report to the body thereon, and this is usually required to be in writing. In congress most reports must be printed, though private bills or measures of pressing moment are sometimes acted upon with merely a written report or recommendation. In the senate, the committees must be called daily for reports, during the morning hour; in the house they are called daily, except on the first and third Mondays of each month. When made, they are usually printed and re-committed, or laid over. Reports from six important committees are in order at any time; others must wait their day, or a two-thirds majority, for consideration. Reports of executive departments are addressed to the speaker, or to the president of the Senate, and are invariably referred and printed. Such reports on PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 89 resolutions of inquiry must be made within one week. The reports of house and senate commit- tees at each session make several bulky volumes, while the executive reports, both regular and special, make a great many more. In parliament the reports of special committees of the lords or commons are usually published with the evidence taken before them, and carefully indexed. In France committee reports are to be printed twenty- four hours at least before the bill to which they relate is considered. — REPORTERS. The im- portance of full public information has led to special provision for reporters of the press in all public assemblies. Each house of congress has a corps of five official stenographers to take down the votes, proceedings and debates verbatim for publication the next day in the congressional record. Besides this, two reporters of the asso- ciated press are admitted on the floor of the house. The reporters' gallery over the chair in both houses is for the general press representatives, under regulations made by the chair. In parlia- ment, according to ancient usage, all strangers, including reporters, might be excluded on the motion of any member, and reporters have been actually excluded as recently as in 1870 and 1878, to avoid publicity being given to debates. In the French chambers reporters are freely admitted to the galleries.—REPRESENTATIVES. (See Mem- bers.)—RESIGNATION. In congress the resignation of any member is always considered his right; it was never contested until the 41st congress, when the speaker decided that the member had the right to resign, and an appeal from the decision was laid upon the table, thereby affirming it. The resig- nation of a senator or representative is addressed to the governor of the state; at the same time, it is customary for the member to notify the pre- siding officer, in writing, of the action he has taken." In parliament it is a professedly settled principle that a member can not relinquish his seat; to evade this restriction, a member wish- ing to retire accepts office under the crown; this legally vacates his seat, and obliges the house to order a new election. (See PARLIAMENT, THE BRITISH.) In France any member has the right of resignation at any time. — RESOLUTION. A resolution of an assembly is an expression of its opinion with respect to any matter, or a dec- laration of the purpose of the assembly: thus, the thanks of congress are presented by joint reso- lution of the two houses. A resolution of inquiry is passed by either house, requesting information from the executive. A simple resolution of one body, whether declaring opinion or otherwise, does not of course bind congress, and is not pub- lished in the statutes, but only in the journal and the record. Joint resolutions, on the contrary, have all the force of laws, and frequently con- tain appropriations of public money. Concurrent resolutions (chiefly providing for the printing of documents, etc.) appear in the statutes, but are not signed by the president. In the senate all resolutions, if objected to, must lie over one day. In parliament a simple resolution of either house has not the force of law. Every resolution reported by a committee may be amended, dis- agreed to, postponed or recommitted. — REVENUE BILLS. All bills for raising revenue must, by the constitution, originate in the house of representa- tives, but the senate may amend them. In the house, bills relating to the tariff or internal rev- enue belong to the committee of ways and means; . in the Senate, to the committee on finance; and such bills may be reported at any time, the motion to consider them being always in order after morning hour. Notwithstanding the jealousy of the house of its prerogative in matters of revenue, the Senate has exercised great powers in changing revenue bills; the latest and most extreme instance of this was in the tariff revision act of 1883, where the senate amended a small internal revenue reduc- tion bill passed by the house, by adding to it a rad- ical revision of the entire tariff system, and this, with some changes, was accepted by the house. In parliament, bills for raising revenue are called money bills, and are amendable by the lords if they do not alter the intention of the commons by increase or reduction, duration, or methods of raising the revenue. — RIDERS. A rider to a bill implies tacking on to it, by motion, or the action of a committee, matters of legislation foreign to the subject of the bill itself. In parliament these riders are called “tacks.” It has been a too com- mon practice in congress to attach to regular appropriation bills, which must be passed under penalty of embarrassing the government, riders containing new legislation having nothing to do with the appropriations. This practice is resorted to, 1, to carry through a measure otherwise hope- less of being reached under the rules; 2, to effect the amendment or repeal of existing laws; 3, to force upon the other house, when opposed in political opinion, a measure obnoxious to it, and certain to be defeated by it as a separate bill. So far had this thrusting into appropriation bills of legislation foreign to their objects been carried, that the house adopted a rule that no provision in or amendment to any general appropriation bill shall be in order which changes existing law, ex- cept such as is germane and retrenches expendi- tures. Another rule prohibits the amendment of any bill or resolution by incorporating the sub- stance of any other bill or resolution pending. Rule twenty-nine of the senate forbids amend- ments to be received which propose general legis- lation, which provide for a private claim, or which are not germane or relevant to the subject matter of the bill. — RISE. In committee of the whole the motion that the committee rise is equivalent to the adjournment of its functions for the time being. — Roll. The roll of a public body is the list (in alphabetical order) of the officially quali- fied members. The roll-call is a clerical calling out of all the members’ names, that they may answer either as present or as voting yea or nay. (See Call, Yeas and Ways.) — RULES. These are of the first importance as agencies for preserv- 90 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. ing order in the conduct of public business. In most assemblies for a temporary purpose it is usual either to adopt the rules of the house of representatives, or to permit the chairman to de- cide questions of order and precedence according to his understanding of parliamentary law. In permanently organized bodies the constitution and by-laws adopted form the leading rules which control action, though at all meetings appeal to a more comprehensive code of parliamentary law is often necessary. In the house of representatives the latest thorough revision of the rules was in 1880. This revision embraces forty-five separate rules divided into sections, the last of which pro- vides that these shall be the rules of each congress unless otherwise ordered. Thomas Jefferson has the honor of having formulated, while vice-presi- dent, the first rules of parliamentary law ever put into systematic form in this country. The rules laid down in his “Manual of Parliamentary Practice” (first published in 1801) are still de- clared to govern the house where they are appli- cable, and not inconsistent with the standing rules adopted. Each house having constitutional power to determine the rules of its proceedings, those of the senate and house differ widely. A standing committee on rules exists in each body, of which ! in the house, the speaker forms one. Several no- table struggles over the application or the radi- cal change of the rules have occurred, one of which, in the 47th congress, drew a decision from the speaker that, as the right of the house to determine its rules was a constitutional One, the majority had at all times the power to make or to alter rules independently of the existing ones, and that no dilatory motions to obstruct their adoption or amendment could be enter- tained. The suspension of the rules is moved so as to make some business in order which would not be regularly so under the rules. This requires a vote of two-thirds of those present, and must be seconded by a majority, counted by tell- ers if demanded. This motion is debatable for thirty minutes only. It can be made only on the first and third Mondays of each month, or during the last six days of a session. The rules of the senate, as last revised, in 1877, are seventy-eight in number. No motion to modify or suspend a rule is in order except on one day's notice in writing; but any rule except the 18th (regulating the vote by yeas and nays) may be suspended by unanimous consent of the Senate. In parliament the rules are called standing orders, which continue from one parliament to another until modified. The “sessional orders” are resolutions renewed from year to year, and are few in number. In the French chamber of deputies the rules are em- bodied in a code of 154 articles, which the presi- dent is required to maintain. Any appeal to the rules or question of order takes precedence of whatever business is in hand, and Suspends de- bate. — SCRUTIN DE LISTE. This signifies a vote by ticket, and is required in the French chambers in the election of vice-presidents, Secretaries and questors. —SEATs. Technically, the seat of a member is his function of representative; literally, it is the chair, desk or bench occupied by a mem- ber. The seats of Senators and representatives in congress are arm-chairs, each provided with a writing desk. In the house they are drawn by lot, at the organization, every two years; in the senate they are “spoken for ” or selected, in ad- vance when vacancies occur, by individual sen- ators. In both, members of the same party sit together in general, the democrats occupying the seats to the right of the chair, and the repub- licans those to the left. In parliament and in the French chambers benches are used as seats, and no desks are tolerated. — SECRET SESSION. In the senate, sessions for the consideration of executive business (nominations to office and treaties) are held with closed doors. These ex- ecutive sessions may be moved at any stage of the open or legislative session, but are more com- monly held just before final adjournment for the day. The chamber is then cleared of all persons except the secretary, four clerks, and the sergeant-at-arms and such of his assistants as the president deems necessary, all of whom must be sworn to secrecy. Any senator disclos- ing confidential proceedings of the Senate is lia- ble to expulsion, and any officer to dismissal and punishment for contempt. But though this. is the rule, the practice is widely different; and the votes and speeches in secret session become. known so speedily and so generally as to lead to the conclusion that an injunction of Secrecy is a dead letter. To adopt a treaty laid before the senate by the executive the concurrence of two- thirds of the senators present is necessary. Nomi- nations made by the president in executive session are referred to committees for consideration and report. No nomination to office can be confirmed on the day it is received or reported, except by unanimous consent. No extract from the execu- tive journal (of secret proceedings of the Senate) can be furnished, except by special order of the Senate. All the sessions of the Senate were secret. until the 6th congress (1799), when that body voted to give them the publicity ever since main- tained. Rule thirty of the house provides for secret sessions to receive confidential communica- tions from the president, or at the instance of the speaker or any member who has communications which he believes ought to be kept secret for the present; but there has been no such instance for many years. In parliament, though the presence of the public is legally ignored, there are always a limited number of spectators in each house, except when (in rare instances) a member moves that strangers be excluded because of some de- bate which it is deemed expedient to keep secret. — SECRETARY. Next to the presiding officer the most important organ of a public assembly is the Sec- retary or clerk, these two terms being interchange- able, to denote the recording officer. He is to keep the record of proceedings (minutes or journal), and it is usual to have this record read and approved at PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 91. the meeting next following that which it covers. This record should embrace every motion or reso- lution, whether adopted, amended, rejected, or otherwise disposed of. The secretary has the cus- tody of all papers, and should keep an order of business, list of all committees, reports, votes, etc. The secretary of the senate performs the same duties as the clerk of the house of repre- sentatives (see Clerk), and, in addition, pays the salaries of members of the senate, which is done in the house by the sergeant-at-arms.-SENATORS. (See Elections.)—SERGEANT-AT-ARMs. This officer represents the authority of the body to enforce its rules, and protect its dignity. In the house and senate he is an elective officer, and in the former body is charged with paying the salaries of mem- bers. He is required in both houses to attend the sittings of the body, to maintain order and de- corum, to serve process and make arrests when ordered, to take absentees into custody upon a call of the house, and to make regulations to pro- tect the capitol and public property therein, in- cluding (in conjunction with the architect of the capitol) the appointment and control of the capitol police. In parliament the Sergeant-at-arms of each house is appointed by the crown and for life. Besides similar duties to those defined above, he is a leading figure on state occasions. – SESSION. This term denotes, 1, the time occupied by a sit- ting of the body after organizing for the day till adjournment; 2, the time spent in public business (usually several months), from the first convening of the members until their adjournment to the next session. Two annual sessions are usual in congress, although one or more extra sessions have been not infrequent, which are called “special sessions,” to distinguish them from the annual. The annual sessions begin on the first Monday in December, and terminate on the fourth of March at noon every alternate year, i. e., the odd years, when the term of a congress expires. In the even years, when this limitation does not exist, the session continues from five to nine months. (See CoNGRESS, SESSIONS OF, vol. i., p. 594.) Sessions of parliament usually last from Febru- ary to August, besides which, special sessions oc- cur when public emergency demands.—SPEAKER. This is the name of the presiding officer in each house of parliament, and in the house of representatives of the American congress. Be- ing, as his title imports, the mouthpiece or organ of the body, the speaker is to express the will of the house. In congress he is elected vºvá woce, on the convening of each new congress, and the completion of the roll-call of members- elect. Upon being chosen, he is usually installed in the chair by the members who were his rival candidates for the office; the oath is administered to him by the oldest member in continuous serv- ice, after which he swears in all the other mem- bers, before entering on any other business. He receives $8,000 salary; he succeeds to the presi- dency, in case of the office being vacant through failure to fill it by the president, vice-president or president of the senate. It is his duty to preserve order, state all questions, decide points of order, name members to speak, appoint all standing and Select committees, sign all acts, joint reso- lutions and processes of the house, appoint its official reporters and stenographers of commit- tees, and have control of the hall, etc. The Speaker has the right to vote as a member, but is not required to vote except in case of a tie, or when the house votes by ballot. If absent, without having appointed a member to perform the duties of the chair (which power is limited to ten days), the house must elect a speaker pro tempore. — SPECIAL ORDERs. (See Orders.)— STANDING ORDERs. (See Rules.) — STRIKING OUT. In the house a motion to strike out part. of a bill, if lost, does not preclude a motion to strike out and insert. The motion to strike. out and insert can not be divided. A motion to strike out the enacting clause of a bill has the effect to reject the bill; such motion takes. precedence of a motion to amend. — SUBSTI- TUTE. A substitute for an amendment in the second degree is in order, but can not be voted on until the original matter is perfected. Any committee may report a substitute for any bill re- ferred to them, when the substitute alone is consid- ered, and is treated as an original bill. — SUNDAY. Both houses of congress sometimes sit on Sunday, when public business is pressing. In such cases it is usual to continue the journal as of the pre- ceding day's date. In parliament four Sunday meetings of the body are recorded as occasioned by the demise of the crown, and on several other occasions debates have been continued into Sun- day morning. — SUPPLY. This is the technical term applied in parliament to all appropriations, for the public service. The right of the commons to originate bills of supply is paramount, and the lords may not amend such bills except verbally. Sometimes the commons have tacked to bills of supply measures which by themselves would have been rejected by the lords; but this has been re- sisted by protest, by conference, and by rejection of the bills, and there is no recent instance of at- tempts to force the lords by putting “riders” on bills which the lords have no right to amend. (See BUDGET, vol. i., p. 318; also Appropriations and Revenue Bills.) — SUSPENSION OF RULES. (See Rules.)— TABLE. In a public assembly the motion to lay any matter on the table takes prece- dence of all questions except those of privilege and adjournment. It is not debatable, and can not be amended. It does not imply the defeat of a meas- ure, but simply removes it from consideration until it is voted to take it from the table. But in the house of representatives the usual purpose of the motion to lay on the table is to give a measure its death-blow, and when it prevails it is rarely taken up again during the session. If carried, the effect of the motion to table is to defer the principal question under consideration and all matters connected with it. In congress all business coming from the other house, or communications 92 PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. from government officers, are laid on the table un- less referred to a committee or otherwise disposed of. A motion to lay upon the table is in order on the second and third reading of a bill. When a motion to reconsider is laid on the table the latter vote can not be reconsidered, and if carried, is held in both houses to be a final disposition of the motion. The business on the speaker's table implies, 1, executive communications; 2, messages from the Senate, with bills passed or amended by them; 3, engrossed bills. Near the close of a session a great accumulation of bills, etc., in every stage of progress toward enactment, lies on the speaker's table, most of which usually remains undisposed of. In the senate all resolu- tions, reports of committees, and discharges of committees from the consideration of subjects, must lie on the table one day for consideration, unless otherwise determined by unanimous con- sent. — TELLERS. By a rule of the house of rep- resentatives a vote must be taken by tellers if de- manded by one-fifth of a quorum; or the speaker may appoint tellers if in doubt as to the viv'ſ voce or the rising vote. He must name a member from each side of the question to act as teller; these two meet in the middle aisle and shake hands; the chair requests all members voting in the affirmative to pass between the tellers, who count them, and report to the clerk’s desk; those voting in the negative are next called to pass be- tween the tellers; this count being reported, the chair declares the result. It is customary, when on a division less than half the house vote, for the speaker at once to order tellers. In parliament two tellers from each party are appointed to count the members when dividing the house. In the United States senate no vote is ever taken by tellers. (See Division, also Vote.) — TERRITORIES. The delegates from territories have seats and sala- ries in the house like other members, with the right to speak and participate in business by offering mo- tions, etc., and (latterly) to be appointed on eight of the standing committees. They have no right to vote. The territories are called every Monday, after the states, for bills, memorials, etc., for ref- erence. — TIE WOTE. When the votes are equal in number on each side of any question, the gen- eral parliamentary rule is that the question is lost; but in the Senate the vice-president has the casting or decisive vote in case of a tie; though in his ab- sence the president pro tem., having already voted as a senator, can not decide the result as presid- ing officer, and if the votes are equal the question is lost. In the house the speaker is required to vote only when his vote would be decisive if counted; and in all cases of a tie vote the ques- tion is lost. In the house of lords the speaker votes as a peer, and has no casting vote as presid- ing officer. In the house of commons the speaker has the casting vote in case of a tie, but does not vote as a member. — TWO-THIRDS WOTE. A ma- jority of two-thirds is required in the house to suspend the rules, to dispense with the morning hour for call of committees, to dispense with pri- vate business on Fridays, or to pass in either house a bill vetoed by the president. The latter major- ity is construed to mean two-thirds of the members present, not of the whole number of members. — UNANIMOUS CONSENT. (See Consent.) – WA- CANCY. Vacancies in the membership of assem- blies can usually be filled in accordance with the vote of the majority of members. In congress Senatorial vacancies are notified to the governor of the state, who, in the recess of the legislature, may fill the vacancy by appointment, pending the choice of a senator by the legislature when next convened. A vacancy in the house can be filled only by a new election by the people of the con- gressional district left without a representative. Vacancies in the house of commons are filled by election pursuant to a writ issued out of chancery by warrant from the speaker, — VETO. In the congress of the United States and in most of the state legislatures any bill passed may be disap- proved by the executive for reasons given. This veto may be overruled in congress by a vote of two-thirds of the members of each house present and voting. In parliament, though the crown may legally veto any measure passed, the power has not been exercised for about two centuries (See VETO.)— WoTE. The sense of an assembly is declared by its votes. In most formal or infor- mal meetings the chair is to put all questions to vote after inquiring if the assembly is ready for the question, in case it is a debatable one. There are various forms of taking a vote: 1, vivá Voce, by the chairman calling successively the ayes and the noes, and declaring the question carried or lost according to the preponderance of voices; 2, by a show of hands, each side in succession hold- ing up the right hand and being counted; 3, by rising and standing until counted on either side; 4, by a count of members passing through tellers, those in favor of the measure going first, and those opposed after, the number of each side being reported by the tellers and declared by the chair; 5, by yeas and nays, where each member answers to the call of his name, and is registered in a formal record; 6, by ballot, or secret written vote—this is used chiefly in the election of officers or committees by the assembly itself. In the house a member has the right to change his vote before the result has been announced by the chair. Every member must vote on each ques- tion put, unless excused, or directly interested in the event of the question. The result of every vote, and the names voting on every roll-call, with the absentees, are published in the journal and in the congressional record. In parliament the votes and proceedings are printed and distributed daily. (For methods of voting in parliament, see Divis- Žon, see also Ballot, Division, Tellers, Yeas and Nays.)—WAYS AND MEANs. This term, bor- rowed from the British parliament, implies the gov- ernment revenues and the methods or provisions for collection of the same. A committee of ways and means was first created in the house of repre- sentatives in 1789; it originally consisted of Seven PARLIAMENTARY L.A.W. 93 members: it became a standing committee in 1795. It has since been gradually increased to thirteen members. To it are referred all matters and pro. posed legislation relating to the revenue and the bonded debt of the United States. The committee of ways and means, having charge of the entire tariff system and internal revenue taxation, as well as of financial measures and the public debt, is a most important body, and its chairmanship is considered the highest office in the gift of the speaker. As the chancellor of the exchequer is the leader of the house of commons, the chairman of the committee of ways and means was formerly accounted the leader of the house of representa- tives; but since the withdrawal from that com- mittee (in 1865) of all business relating to the ex- penditures of the government (which is assigned to the committee on appropriations), the ways and means committee has been shorn of much of its power, and its chairman of his prestige as leader. Still, these two committees engross between them the greater part of the time of congress; and in the alternate years, when the Session is limited to three months, little other business has a chance of se- curing attention. To be a member of the commit- tee of ways and means is regarded as a very high position, and commonly excuses those appointed to it from service on other committees. The com- mittee of the senate having charge of the same subjects is styled the committee of finance, and was first organized in 1816. Measures reported by either of these committees are customarily privileged, i. e., to be considered before any others. In parliament the committee of ways and means is constituted directly after the annual opening, but, unlike the American usage, it is not a select or standing committee lasting through the life of the body, but a committee of the whole house; in other words, it is the house itself, presided over by a chairman instead of by the speaker. This official chairman is designated the chairman of the com- mittee of ways and means, and also presides in the committee of supply, and over other commit- tees of the whole house. Like the speaker, he is a salaried officer. The committee of ways and means determines in what manner the necessary funds shall be raised for the public service, as voted by the committee of supply. The most im- portant occasion for which the committee of ways and means is required to sit, is, to receive the financial statement for the year from the chancel- lor of the exchequer. This is known as the budget. (See BUDGET, vol. i., p. 318.) — WITHDRAWAL. The right to withdraw a motion or a bill is se- cured by the rules at any time before a decision or amendment, except after the previous question has been seconded. All incidental questions fall with the withdrawal of the main question. (For withdrawal of papers, see Papers.) — WITNESSEs. The summoning of witnesses to be examined by a committee requires an order of the house, unless the committee is first clothed with power to send for persons and papers. Witnesses are paid $2 a day, and five cents per mile of travel. Failure or refusal of a witness to appear or to testify is a breach of the privileges of the house; besides which the revised statutes make such refusal a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprison- ment. (R. S., sec. 102.) In parliament witness- eS must answer on examination before Commit- tees, and are sworn at the bar of either house. Recusant witnesses are generally sent to New- gate. (See Privilege.) — WRIT. This is a pro- cess of the house signed by the speaker, attest- ed by the clerk under the seal of the house, and served by the sergeant-at-arms. In parlia- ment the writs for the election of new members are issued by the speaker's warrant addressed to the clerk of the crown, and transmitted by him through the postoffice. Writs of summons for a parlia- ment to meet are issued by the crown, under ad- vice of the privy council. These writs must be issued at least thirty-five days before the time fixed for the convening of the new parliament. — YEAS AND NAYS. The constitution requires that the yeas and nays of the members of either house shall be entered on the journals at the desire of one-fifth of those present; also that the vote on any bill vetoed by the president shall be recorded by yeas and nays. It is very common for mem- bers to demand a vote by yeas and nays, to make a record, or, when dissatisfied with the result of a division by other methods; but whenever less than one-fifth of the members present rise to sec- ond the call, the yeas and nays are refused. This vote can not be taken in committee of the whole house; the roll-call once begun can not be inter- rupted for any purpose. After the roll-call is completed, the names of members who have failed to answer must be called again; after which the full list of yeas and nays must be read, and errors or omissions announced by members corrected. —In both houses members must answer without debate or reasons assigned for the vote. (See Vote.)—BIB- LIOGRAPHY. May (Sir T. Erskine), Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parlia- ment, 8th ed., Lond., 1879; Cushing (L. S.), Lea: Parliamentaria : The Law and Practice of Legis- lative Assemblies, Boston, 1874; McDonald (W. J.), Constitution of the United States, Rules of the Senate, etc., Washington, 1881; Standing Rules for Conducting Business in the Senate of the Unit- ed States, Washington, 1882; Digest and Manual of the Rules and Practice of the House of Rep- Tesentatives, compiled by H. H. Smith, 6th ed., Washington, 1883; Traité pratique du Droit par- lementaire, par J. Poudra et E. Pierre, Paris, 1878; Jefferson (T.), Manual of Parliamentary Practice, New York, 1876; Fish (G. T.), American Manual of Parliamentary Law, New York, 1880; Göpp (C.), Leitfaden, d. parlam. Geschäfts Ordnung, New York, 1871; Robinson (W. S.), Warrington’s Man- 'wal for the Information of Officers and Members of Legislatures, Conventions, Societies, etc., Boston, 1875; Wilson (O. M.), Digest of Parliamentary Law, Philadelphia, 1869; Cushing (L. S.), Rules of Proceeding in Deliberative Assemblies, Boston, 1877; Barclay (J. M.) Constitution of the United States, 94 PARTICIPATION IN PROFITS. Jefferson’s Manual, and Barclay's Digest, Wash- ington, 1873; Ferrall (S.A.), Eagosition of the Law of Parliament, London, 1837; Hatsell (J.), Prece- dents of Proceedings in the House of Commons, 4 vols., London, 1818; Symonds (A.), Mechanics of Jaw Making, London, 1835; Smith (T.), Chairman and Speaker's Guide, London, 1840; Clifford & Stephens, Private Bill Practice ºn Parliament, Lon- don, 1870; Webster's Members’ Procedure Book in Parliament, London, 1868; Réglement de la Cham- Ore des Députés, Paris, 1880; Robert (H. M.), Pock- et Manual of Rules of Order for Deliberative Assem- blies, Chicago, 1876. A. R. SPOFFORD. PARTICIPATION IN PROFITS. Among the many schemes for healing the apparent breach between labor and capital, a breach that is due in great part to the fact that these two factors of production are supplied by two distinct classes, termed capitalists and laborers, is that of allow- ing the laborer to share in the profits of the enter- prise. “It would be of great importance,” wrote Mr. Babbage in 1832, “if, in every large estab- lishment, the mode of payment could be so ar- ranged that every person employed should derive advantage from the success of the whole; and that the profits of each individual should advance, as the factory itself produced profit, without the necessity of making any change in the wages.” And he then describes a system that had long been in use among the Cornish mines, which was somewhat like that he proposes for his “new system of manufacturing.” This new system was hardly noticed at the time, but it was one of the earliest attempts to introduce participation in profits by the laborer. Strictly speaking, partici- pation is not a form of co-operation, for in the co-operative principle the capitalist and laborer are combined, the capital necessary to the undertak- ing being furnished by those who also supply the labor; and as they assume all the risk, all the profit or loss is also theirs. In participation, how- ever, the capital is, as a rule, still furnished by one class, and the labor by another; but the laborer is allowed to share in the profits received over and above a certain share which is set apart as a remuneration for the capital employed and for the Supervision and management of the undertak- ing. If the profits are not sufficient to cover this share which belongs to capital, no distribution is made among the workmen. —In support of par- ticipation it is urged that, by stimulating him to make his best endeavors, it increases the efficiency of the workman, this result being attained either by effecting a saving in the material used, or by increasing the absolute product of labor. It in- fluences the moral character of the laborer by making him more industrious (as on this not only depends the total profit but also his share of the profits), more thrifty and provident, and in a measure more independent. By giving him a direct interest in the success of the undertaking it brings him into close relationship with his employer, and differences are less apt to arise between them. On the other hand, it is urged that the laborer is working for a reward that is uncertain, and affected by circumstances beyond his control; that he is likely to become discon- tented if the profits decrease and his supplemen- tary wages diminish; that in many instances he is forced to become a partner in the undertaking, and his freedom of movement and of contract is to that extent restricted; that he is thus made to share all the risks attending any industrial enter- prise, without being allowed any voice in the conduct of the undertaking. — There are many forms of participation, many of them being but modifications of co-operation. Of the real industrial partnerships the following may be mentioned as typical: In 1842 a Paris trades- man, M. Leclaire, finding that high wages did not produce a corresponding increase in the zeal and diligence of his workmen, and being unable to personally supervise all the details of the work, determined to create a common in- terest between himself and his employés. The surest way of increasing their efficiency was to proportion their remuneration to the results ob- tained from their labor, and he therefore pro- posed to divide among such as he should select a portion of any increased profits that might ac- crue from their exertions. At the end of the year 5 per cent. of the net profits was to be set aside for the capital employed, and a salary for himself as superintendent; all that remained was to be divided among certain of the laborers in proportion to the wages they had received. The result of the first year was remarkable, and his system, somewhat modified in form, has continued till the present day. The first year he distributed 12,200 francs, no laborer who had worked 300 days in the year receiving less than 450 francs as a supplementary income, equal to two-fifths of his regular salary; in the second year the distributive fund exceeded 17,000 francs, and in the third year it was more than 18,000 francs. Encouraged by this success, the business was remodeled and its operations extended. As at present constituted, the net profits are divided into three parts: one- half is distributed among such workmen as M. Léclaire designates, in proportion to the wages earned by each participant; one-fourth is paid to a provident society, of which all the persons in his employment are members; and one-fourth goes to the partner (patron directeur). The workmen are divided into two classes, one of which, compris- ing a third of the total number, are entitled to a share in the distribution of profits, but the Second class do not share in the profits, but receive a small addition to their daily pay, and are entitled to all the benefits conferred by the provident society. The minor details of the system do not concern us here. — For many years a large rail- road in France (Chemºn defer d’Orléans) set apart 15 per cent. of the surplus or net profits to be divided among certain of its employés. During the first years of the experiment the plan worked fairly well; but as the operations of the road were PARTIES. 95 extended, the number of employés was largely increased, the expenses of management became larger, the fund for distribution became less, and also the share of each participant, so that while in 1853 the company divided 1,966,963 francs among 3,365 persons, in 1868 it divided only 1,775,559 francs among 11,376 employés. The main object to be gained in this case was to insure as far as possible a greater care of the valuable plant on the part of the employés, and this could be better secured in no other way. — The third type is to be found in the plan adopted by Messrs. Henry Briggs, Son & Company in their Yorkshire col- lieries. Prior to the passage of the limited lia- bility act such an arrangement as M. Leclaire's could not have been adopted in England with- out making the workmen liable for the losses incurred, in that they shared in the profits of the undertaking. But this barrier being removed, Messrs. Briggs were among the first to take ad- vantage of participation. In 1865 they formed a limited liability joint stock company, retaining two-thirds of the stock in their own hands. The remaining portion they offered to their employés in shares of £10 each, and stipulated at the same time that whenever the profits of the business should exceed 10 per cent. on the capital em- ployed, one-half of this profit was to be divided among the employés. The plan worked with ad- vantage for a number of years, but disputes aris- ing through the fluctuations in the coal market, the arrangement has been annulled. — The distri- bution of profits may either be made in a cash payment at the end of the year, or the share of profit may be capitalized during a certain period, the interest being drawn by the workman, and the principal, on his death, going where he may wish; Or, a part may be paid in cash and a part capitalized. The manner of payment differs widely in the various establishments that have adopted the system. — It is not believed that par- ticipation in profits will ever be widely in use, as it can be successfully applied to only a limited number of occupations. “The fund on which participation draws is the surplus profit realized in consequence of the enhanced efficiency of the work done under its stimulating influence. Such extra profit is therefore obtainable wherever work- men have it in their power to increase the quan- tity, improve the quality, or diminish the cost price, of their staple of production by more effect- ive production, by increased economy in the use of tools and Iſlaterials, and by a reduction in the cost of superintendence. In other words, the surplus profit realizable will depend on the influ- ence which manual labor is capable of exerting upon production. Evidently, therefore, this in- fluence will be greatest in branches of industry where the skill of the laborer plays the leading part, where the outlay on tools and materials bears a Small ratio to the cost of production, and where individual superintendence is difficult and expen- sive. It will, on the contrary, be least effective in industries where mechanism is the principal agency, where the interest on capital fixed in ma- chinery is the chief element of cost prices, and where the workmen, assembled in large factories, can be easily and effectively superintended.” Another limitation lies in the fact that its ap- plication depends, in every case, on the will of the employer. “It is not to be expected,” says W. T. Thornton, “that employers will often be found entering into special engagements with their laborers, in trades in which such special engage- ments must necessarily result in pecuniary loss to themselves; even in trades to which the bonus system is best adapted, unless employers choose to adopt it of their own accord, there are, of course, no means of compelling them. In the utmost de- velopment, therefore, of which it is susceptible, the partnership or bonus system can never affect more than a portion of the laboring population.” Still another objection is named by Thorold Rog- ers: “that it necessitates the abandonment of that secrecy which it is believed is essential at all times, and particularly in some emergencies, to success. The value of secrecy may be overrated, probably is; but its significance is felt, and will in all likelihood be felt more and more as the principle of limited liability is adopted.” It is not known that this policy has been adopted to any extent in the United States. – AUTHORITIES. Böhmert, Die Gewinnbetheiligung, 1878; Fouger. ouse, Patrons et Ouvriers de Paris, 1880; Billon, Participation des Ouvriers aua. Bénéfices des Pat- 'rons, 1877; Pare's Co-operative Agriculture, 1870; Leroy-Beaulieu, La Question Ouvrière au XIXe Siècle, 1872; and Thornton, On Labor. WORTHINGTON C. FORD. PARTIES, Political. I. Idea of Parties; Government Party; Opposition. Throughout all history we find that, wherever an active life of the people and of the state has been developed, polit- ical parties have sprung into existence. An ab- sence of political parties is observed only where there prevails a passive indifference to all public concerns, or where tyrannical Oppression by the ruling powers prevents all common manifesta- tion of opinion and aspirations by whole groups of the population. In such cases, however, the power and tendency of the people to form par- ties exist, if they are at all capable of political life; but this power and tendency at one time lie dormant, while at another they lack the air and light necessary to their growth, and the room they require for action. At times the impulse to form political parties, when suppressed in political life, is directed into other channels; it passes into the religious or ecclesiastical domain, and makes ex- isting scientific, artistic and social differences more marked. Between such parties and political par- ties there exists a certain kind of elective affinity, Thus, a reactionary party in the church will, as a rule, in matters political, sympathize with a party of absolutism, the old traditional theological school with a conservative party, and the critical theological school or party, by way of preference, 96 PARTIES. with the liberal parties in politics. In this work we have to do exclusively with political parties, and we can notice non-political parties only in so far as they are attracted to or repulsed by political parties. – The most gifted and freest nations politically are precisely those that have the most sharply defined parties; for the most important phenomena in the life of the state are conditioned by party struggles. It is only through the strug- gle and interaction of opposing forces that all the hidden wealth of a people's powers is made clearly manifest. This proves the necessity and utility of the formation of parties. Parties are not a serious evil to the state, as many narrow and over-anxious minds are inclined to think. It reflects no glory on a statesman to stand aloof from his party, and it is no commendable virtue in the citizen of a state to belong to no party. For parties are, in the very nature of the case, the necessary manifestations of the innermost im- pulses of the public heart of the nation. — Parties, as implied by the term itself, are always only a part of the nation. A party, accordingly, can possess only the consciousness of one part of the nation, and must not identify itself with the whole, the people, the state. Hence, one party may combat other parties, but it must not ignore them, nor wish to destroy them. One party can not subsist alone; it owes its existence and de- velopment only to the opposing party. — Precisely because the prince in a monarchical country rep- resents in his own person the unity of the state, and hence of all persons in the state, it is exacted of him, and almost exclusively of him, that he shall not espouse the cause of any party, and that he shall tolerate and respect all parties, each according to its character and rights. He may, in- deed, choose to rely on any one party, because the latter, at a given time, seems particularly fitted to determine the policy of the state, and he may also have just cause for sharply watching the doings of parties that seem to endanger the public well-being. He may also, without sacrificing that impartiality (and impartiality is always his duty), declare him- self in favor of one or as opposed to another party, according to the attitude of such party to the state, and according to that party’s importance to the well-being of the state. But he incurs the risk of loading himself with the ugly appearance of being partial when he does this in a manner not perfectly warranted, and when his declaration of preference can be attributed to his personal inclination toward a party or to his personal aversion to the opposing party. A premature declaration of preference will, moreover, expose him to the danger of being com- pelled to disavow himself if, contrary to his expectation, the party hated or dreaded by him should become so powerful that it could not be refused the exercise of a decisive influence in the government, or if the party which he had approved or recommended at the elections had been rejected by the electors, so that he would be finally com- pelled to drop it. It is, accordingly, a political principle with wise princes to avoid declaring for or against any party in the state without the most urgent motives. – This, however, does not apply to the case of ministers, nor to any of the other officers of the state, and just as little does it apply to the government of a republic. Still, whenever these latter act in their official capacity, they should not act as mere party men, for the office is essentially instinct with the spirit of the whole State, and any official act is at the same time an act of the state. But public law, with its powers and duties, knows nothing of parties, the regular law of the state is the common law fixed for all, the law which imposes a limit to the agitation and struggles of parties. The judge and the admin- istrative officer should disregard all parties, and not perform their duties with the view of helping: or hindering any party. Parties play an impor- tant rôle only when the stir of fresh, new life is felt; in other words, when political life begins. But the official duty of impartiality does not ex- clude an official from sharing freely in political life with those who are of the same mind with himself, or from taking whatever side he prefers. Unlike the prince, he is not the personification of the whole. He is, on the one hand, as an official, an Organ and a representative of the state; and on the other hand, as a private individual invested with all the political rights of a citizen, he enjoys a position as to party by virtue of which he is en- titled to seek his party fellows and to league him- Self with them. The greatest statesmen of Rome and England were always both impartial magis- trates and acknowledged party leaders. Only, as a matter of course, their political action should be limited, conditioned and moderated by the in- violability of the impartial position of the official. As it is incumbent on the historian to be impartial, that he should truthfully describe the condition of all parties, and judge them with fairness, but not that he should be a member of no party, or be a purely passive mirror reflecting with indiffer- ence the pictures of a nation’s life; so it is incum- bent on the statesman and the Official, and in a still higher degree, that they should be impartial, but not that they should be non-party men. — For these reasons a so-called government party does not deserve the favor which it has frequently received from the ruling powers. Every party, when its leaders have been called into office, becomes, in a certain sense, the government party, for a time at least, and as long as its leaders remain in harmony with the principles and tendencies of the party. Yet, in such a case, the term government party implies no party principle, but only indicates that the party has actually attained to power and in- fluence. The very same party, however, without any change of principles or aims, may become a party of opposition, when its leaders again lose the chief offices of government, or when, remain- ing in office, they adopt a tendency hostile to, or when they eventually assume an unsatisfactory attitude toward, the party to which they had hitherto adhered. —But by the government party is sometimes understood a party whose principle PARTIES. 97 consists in adhering at all times to the government, and in supporting the government, of whatever persons it may consist and whatever tendency it may follow; a party which adheres to the govern- ment when the latter enacts reactionary measures, and still stands by it when any reformatory change of its system happens to take place. A govern- ment party in this sense consists mostly of men whose personal interests make them dependent mainly on the good will of the government, and who support it in the hope of emolument and preferment through the favor of government, while from its disfavor they have a motive to fear for their positions or economical well-being. Un- der certain circumstances a party of this kind may prove useful to a government, because its votes always possess a certain weight; but woe to the government that in critical moments relies on a government party of this kind, and seeks in it its last and only support. As in such a party there is no inward strength, it can give no sup- port, and as it receives its impulses from the ex- isting government, it must waver when that gov- ernment itself is shaken; and as, above all, it is always resolved to serve the ministers of the government, who have, it may be, only recently stepped into office, it prepares for a change when there is any prospect of a change, and deserts the banner of its old, defeated leaders, to follow the fife and drum of the new victors. Such a party, accordingly, enjoys no genuine respect, neither that of the ministers, who use it, nor that of the people, who expect nothing good from it. It scarcely deserves the name of political party at all, because it has no political convictions, and no political aspirations. It is merely an append- age to the ruling power, without moral worth or political dignity. It is generally accessible to and inclined to corruption, and usually ready to bargain away its fidelity and its services. Such a party, therefore, is unable to maintain itself in a manly nation, with a highly developed politi- cal party life; it is fated to be broken up and thrust aside by other and genuine parties. Yet, in the old monarchies of the European continent, Such parties have still a certain importance, some- times in connection with other old established Court parties. – As a contrast to what is known as the government party in this objectionable Sense, we have what is known as the party of op- position , but by this term we do not mean that other no less objectionable party, whose vital principle consists in opposition to the govern- ment, and which does not combat the policy of the government because it regards that policy as unsound or its success as dangerous, but solely be- cause it is the policy of the government. The government party may be simply submissive, and blindly devoted to the government; a party of op- position such as we have here described, on the Other hand, is to an excess obstinate and odious. The former always tamely follows in the wake of government, while the latter, at every step, thwarts it by distrust and antagonism. Both, 126 VOL. III. — 7 accordingly, are unhealthy phenomena in the public life of a people. At times such a party of opposition may find favor with the people, just as the government party does with the powerful. But its negative qualities have only the appear- ance of utility to the commonwealth or of care for the interests of the people. The moving prin- ciple in it is certainly not egotism, as in the gov- ernment party, but obstinacy, defiant aggressive- ness, obstruction to all political authority; in a word, anarchy. It does not deserve the favor of any nation, any more than a purely government party deserves that of the government. . When, between the years 1820 and 1830, the German chambers witnessed such opposition parties at work by the side of government parties, and courting popular favor, it was only the sign of a still unripe and sickly political life, for then the belief was still widely spread among the people, that only the man who opposed the government, and only as long as he opposed it, could be a patriot, and would devote himself heart and soul to the people. From the mere possibility of so dangerous an error, we may readily infer the existing moral rottenness of those governments. — After this brief explanation, we may define political parties as follows: They are the free, social groups within the state, held together for common action by the ties of the same or closely related fundamental political principles, ideas and aspirations. – II. Political Parties and Factions. We distinguish parties from factions. Factions are but the caricature of parties. Parties are necessary to the life of the state, and in so far useful; factions are unnecessary and always inju- rious. In healthy political life parties must be developed, while factions gain in power under unhealthy conditions. Real development is pro- moted by parties; corruption and the decay of states show the effects of faction. — On what does this distinction depend? Language here is not as safe and steadfast in its distinguishing powers as science would wish. We speak prop- erly of a political party, when that party repre- sents a political principle, or pursues a political tendency; political, that is, compatible with the existence of the state, and directed to the well- being of society. A political party may, indeed, exhibit great defects of character; it may employ wrong means, and pursue foolish aims. But it should never attack the existence of the state, or consciously pursue tendencies injurious to it. When it does this, it debases itself into a faction. Factions never serve the state; they are above all mindful of self; they pursue ego- tistic, and not political, aims. In the conflict between the well-being of the state and private interests, they unhesitatingly prefer the latter and sacrifice the former. — A faction can not easily rise to the noble position of a political party, although this may not altogether be impossible; but a political party may easily degenerate into a faction. As soon as self-seeking has become . its ruling passion throughout all its actions, as 98 PARTIES. soon as it becomes heedless of its duties toward the country, and refuses to acknowledge its sub- mission to the whole, it has entered the paths of faction, and we must deny it the honor- able name of a political party. As every man is at the same time an individual apart, and a member of a community, of his nation, and, finally, of humanity, so also the various social groups possess this same kind of dualistic exist- ence. They are associations with particular in- terests, and they are also parts of a larger whole. Political parties are animated and determined by this commonspirit, although their egotistic self-love and party interest never become wholly extinct. Factions, on the contrary, are associations in which this self-seeking side has grown so powerful that it aims at subjecting to it the public well-being, and to sacrifice the state to its particular interests; although, as a matter of fact, even in factions the public well-being is seldom completely lost sight of. The contrast between a political party and a faction is, therefore, of a nature such that it man- ifestly suggests a certain affinity between them. They only follow opposite currents. Accordingly, as public spirit or private interest prevails in either of these groups of men, it may at one time be a political party, and at another a faction. When a party holds its meetings, chooses its leaders, comes to an agreement and passes resolutions; when it founds and supports organs to give expression to its opinions, and combats its adversaries; or when any individual member of the party,’ as far as is possible without violating higher duties, submits his individual opinion and inclination to his party, and follows the leaders of his party as soldiers fol- low their general: in all this there is nothing that can be called factious. If the party is to possess power and influence, it must organize itself, and display its activity in public life, at elections and in deliberative councils, as a closely compact body. But when party zeal and party passion preponder- ate to such a point as to prefer to tear the country to pieces rather than join hands for the sake of the common weal; when one party, upon gaining power, directs public affairs as a party govern- ment, using its power in the oppression and perse- cution of all who profess different opinions; when parties league themselves with the enemies of the state, and deliver the country over to their power: all proceedings of this kind exclude the true idea of a political party, and faction has usurped its place. —III. Names and Kºnds of Parties. Differ- ent names do not always indicate different kinds of parties, and the names as well as the objects con- cerning which parties contend may frequently be simply accidental. People may quarreland divide themselves into parties about a garter, or the shape of a hat; and in the case of more than one histor- ical party division it is difficult to tell what was the cause that divided the nation. Even a mere whim, or difference of taste, the partiality to green or red, or vice versa, has parted Society into hos- tile groups. Yet parties, in the earnest conscious- ness of their differences, often select Colors Only as party symbols, and in such case become known by their colors, as, for instance, the green and blue parties in the old Byzantine empire, the red and white rose in mediaeval England, and the red (ultra-revolutionary) and black (clerical) parties of modern times. Parties in general, and factions still more so, love to distinguish themselves from each other and from the indifferent multitude by symbolical badges. Hence, they have their ban- ners, cockades, colored caps, ribbons, and their peculiar costumes. – The more futile the causes that separate parties, or the less any political prin- ciples and aims determine their formation, the less also can they be called political parties in the proper sense of the term, and the more readily will such associations degenerate into factions. Political science does not concern itself with these non-political parties; and just as little can it pay any attention to purely accidental parties. Al- though at times they may assert their influence On practical politics, political science is unable to fix them, because they are not determined by political principles. On the other hand, the fol- lowing kinds of parties deserve mention : 1. Religio-political parties. Denominational parties, as such, do not belong to these; but, when start- ing from different religious or ecclesiastical opin- ions or tendencies, they divide politically, and seek to influence the life of the state, they in a certain respect become political parties. This species of party division in the middle ages, as, for instance, that between Christians and Moham- medans, had a decided influence on public life, and this party division is even still sufficiently felt. Even in modern European parliaments we still hear of catholic and orthodox Lutheran par- ties, of ultramontanes and pºetists. But these are spurious kinds of party, and, therefore, wherever political life is developed, they are banished from the arena of political parties to their own sphere, to wit, the domain of religious and ecclesiastical life. As the cause of the formation of this kind of parties has nothing to do with the state, and as their aims are not political, it must always be con- sidered an abuse, when, in the modern state, they demean themselves as political parties. Religion seldom gains by such demeanor on its part, and politics is always injured by them.—2. Parties may also, in a temporal, but not purely political sense, be divided according to nations, which, however, does not by any means constitute a nor- mal division (such as Neo-Latins and Germans in the ancient German-Roman states, English, Scots and Irish in Great Britain, and Germans and Czecks in Bohemia; or according to tribes, as Franks, Old-Bavarians, in Bavaria; or according to the social order, as patricians, plebeians, clergy and nobility, nobility and bourgeoisie). Nations, tribes and estates, such as the third estate, possess in fact an importance which is not exclusively political, but above all civil and social. They also form firmly established wholes, and would form a too solid basis for political parties, which must never cease to feel themselves parts sub- PARTIES. 99 ordinate to the state. When, accordingly, parties are based upon nationalities, or when they are divided into tribes, there is danger that they may destroy the unity of the state. But if the unity of the state is to be preserved, the parties in the state should cross and unite the different nations, tribes and estates that exist within the political body, thus welding the parts into unity. When parties and estates are coincident this danger is not so great, for the estates know that they are only a part of the people, and that they can not form a state of themselves alone. Yet even here, party differences, allied with such mighty constituents of the state organism, differences thus powerful, lasting and bold, may by such alliance seriously threaten the internal peace of the state and public order. —3. In the middle ages parties had still, for the most part, either a religious, national or an estate character. It is a sign of political prog- ress when parties begin to divide according to definite constitutional principles, for then political ideas, and not merely the tradition of a race or of a particular class or calling, begin to unite those together who are of the same mind, and to sepa- rate them from their opponents. Parties of this nature are aristocrats and democrats, royalists and republicans, constitutionalists and feudalists, unionists and federalists, nationalists and particu- larists, etc. Sometimes these parties continue to rest in part upon a difference of estate or class : thus, the aristocratic and feudal party in Europe usually derives its main support from the nobility, the constitutional party from the third estate, and the democrats from the lower classes. But they are no longer confined within the narrow limits of an estate ; the political opinion of one class or estate invades the others, and draws toward it those who are of the same way of thinking. — Yet these are only transitory political parties, which happen to arise during constitutional strug- gles for the transformation of the existing consti- tution, and which disappear when that struggle has been brought to a close and a new constitu- tion is introduced and generally acknowledged. The task of the constitution consists in realizing and giving effect to its principles, and there is after this no need of constitutional parties, be- cause all views that could possibly claim any polit- ical importance are supposed to have found their expression in the organs of the constitutional sys- tem itself, as for instance, the aristocratic elements in an upper house, and the constitutional and dem- ocratic elements in a lower house. Such political parties, accordingly, work toward their own de- struction, because they invariably perish after ob- taining the victory; they desire to die as political parties, that they may rise again as political pow- ers; they desire to become members of the body politic itself. Hence, their principles are not party principles, but constitutional principles.—4. The highest and purest form of political parties is in- contestably that of those which are determined by exclusively political and not religious or social -contrasts or differences, and which at the same time permanently accompany the public life. — Wachsmuth, in his Geschächte der politischen Par- teiungen, 1832, advanced the opinion that, “in the history of the human race it must be accepted as a fundamental law of the universe, that, on the whole, there certainly is a progress toward the bet- ter, but it must also be admitted that the history of political parties has no share in that prog- ress. Whether good or bad, such as they were from time out of mind, they remain to this very day.” I also believe that a “progress toward the better” is perceptible in the history of political parties; although what is fundamental in human nature, on which parties depend, has remained the same, and when human passions have Once been aroused, the man of to-day is as far from being exempt from the risk of relapsing into extreme brutality and barbarity as was the man of a thou- sand or two thousand years ago. The French nation in the eighteenth century claimed to stand at the head of European civilization, and yet this did not save it from the horrors of the reign of terror during the French revolution. Yet as in war, so also have the contentions of parties be- come, on the whole, less cruel and brutal. In spite of all the horrors that still disgrace our age, civilization has at least somewhat moderated the savage hatred of parties. – Yet I regard these as most manifest symptoms of improvement: that an ever higher form of party seems to have replaced the old one, that parties by degrees have laid aside other differences belonging to the domain of na- ture and social culture, and that they are more and more determined by purely political princi- ples. The contrasts and differences of liberals and conservatives, of radicals and absolutists, are purely political, pervade all classes of the popula- tion, and are in every instance determined by dif- ferent fundamental political ideas. These par- ties, and parties of this nature, although they often bear different names, are markedly the fruit of the political culture of modern times. – IV. Rohmer's Doctrine of Parties. Friedrich Roh- mer's doctrine of parties, which was first an- nounced theoretically and put into practice in 1842, during the party contest in Zürich, was in 1844 expounded by Rohmer in a work, the thoughtful contents and splendor of style of which were ac- knowledged even by its bitterest enemies. Roh- mer’s work has unquestionably exercised a great influence in the elucidation of political ideas ; many of the thoughts which it contains have since become the common property of men of polit- ical culture throughout Europe, and many of its sentences have been plagiarized by well-known writers. Yet the effect of the book was below what might have been expected from the high merits of its principles and style of exposition. There was an obstacle in the way of the unpreju- diced examination and acceptance of the new. doctrine of parties, in the suspicion, entertained by a large portion of the party of progress, that the book was not the exposition of a scientific. . . conviction, but a party document, written to di:. . 100 PARTIES. vide the party of progress by an artificial and skillfully contrived confusion of ideas, to hum- ble the radicals, and to support the power of the Swiss liberal conservatives. This suspicion was wholly unfounded; his doctrine is, on the whole, rather a necessary consequence of Rohmer’s psychological views, and it is decidedly favorable to the formation of liberal states. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the circumstances under which the doctrine originated might have Suggested a suspicion of this kind, and that at the first formulation of the doctrine the passionate party struggles in which the author was involved, in certain particular points, may have exerted an unfavorable influence in some places. A no Smaller hindrance than this wrong suspicion lay in the as yet undeveloped condition of political party life in Germany, people being still unaccus- tomed there to look at the political spirit from a psychological point of view. If the book had been written in 1849 instead of in 1844, it would have been more easily intelligible to the bulk of the German nation. — The fundamental idea of the doctrine is this: “As the state must be under- stood in the light of human nature and receive its explanation from the facts of human nature, so also must political parties in their natural causes be explained by the facts of human life. To under- stand the state as a political body, I must first understand the elements of the human mind: to understand the life of the state, I must investi- gate the laws of its development.” (§ 17.) “This development manifests itself in the age stages of the life of man. The development of the state itself constitutes its history; but parties are the independent groupings of the different age stages of human life, by themselves and side by side with each other.” (§ 217.) “As we distinguish four stages in the life of man—the boy, the young man (adolescens), the tried man (juvenis), and the old man (semea)—so may we distinguish four fun- damental types of party. At the height of virile life stand the young man and the tried man. In these the active powers of mind hold the su- premacy; in the former the generative and cre- ative forces of character tand mind, and in he latter the preserving and purifying forces. Lib- eral principles accord with the mind of the young man, and conservative principles commend themselves to the mind of the tried man. In boy- hood and in old age, on the contrary, the passive forces of mind are found in the foreground, in the boy in an ascending, but in the old man in a descending, direction. The boy has a vivid intui- tive power and imagination, and a sensitive heart, but creative energy is still undeveloped in him. The old man has, in common with woman, sus- ceptibility and impressionableness of nature, dex- terity in action, certainty and coolness in calcu- lation, rapidity and clearness of comprehension. The boy is a radical; the old man, absolute. — As in the organic course of nature every man passes . . through the different age stages, and experiences . this change of strength and of impulse, so also does nature impress on individuals, irrespective of their age, as individuals, this diversity of the leading and determining forces of mind. There are men who as individuals are born boys, and who remain boys in mind and character through life. Others have as individuals youthful natures, others are endowed with the spirit and character of the tried man, while still others are as individ- uals old from childhood. Thus, Pericles was of a youthful nature, Caesar naturally a man, Alci- biades a boy, and Augustus by nature an old man. Most men in their individual nature are not complete and well balanced, but mixed and defective. Many, for instance, are boyish or old at heart, but manly in spirit; or old in mind, but young at heart. As regards politics, mind is the decisive element. The mass of men do not indi- vidually belong to the higher stages. There are but few really liberal or truly conservative indi- viduals. The bulk of men are by nature born old or boyish.” (§ 35.) “That is, only in few men, considered as individuals, is the reason that discerns and regulates, or the creative power of speech, the prevailing power of the mind; most men have certainly a sensitive or receptive mind, are eager to learn, have rather a passive than an active mind, with the mental constitution of boys or older people. Parties, accordingly, are not to be compared with the age stages themselves. The differences of their inclinations and faculties are rather traceable to the natural difference of indi- vidual disposition, in which the difference of the age stages is permanently stamped and expressed. And because parties thus have their foundation in human nature, they also all have a natural right. Some correspond to the higher, and others to the lower, development of life; and from this correspondence their natural order and sub-order result. Their explanation is their judgment. Only the manly parties, the liberals and conserva- tives, are called to the government of the state, but not the two extreme parties, the radicals and absolutists. Their doctrine combats the illusion that radicalism should be considered as the only resolute and logical form of liberalism, as also the supposition that conservatism, in its highest power, becomes absolutism. Their doctrine in- sists, rather, on the distinction between the two parties in the ascending line of development, boyish radicalism, and youthful, manly liberalism, and between the two parties, in the descending line of development, conservatism and absolutism ; and it demands the subordination of radicals to liberals, of absolutists to conservatives. Only when liberals and Conservatives are at the helm does mind prevail over matter, and force of character over excitability. The struggles of parties are the following: of liberalism against conservatism, e.g., plebeians and patricians in the palmy days of Rome; of radicalism against liber- alism, e.g., the English radicals against the Whigs; of absolutism against Conservatism, e. g., Carlists and moderantists in Spain, high tories and mod- erates in England; of conservatism against radi- PARTIES. 101 calism, e. g., the European struggle of the tories under Pitt against the French revolution; of lib- eralism against absolutism, e. g., Luther against the popes of his time, and O’Connell against Orangemen; of radicalism against absolutism, e.g., the struggle of the French revolution against the monarchies of the last century.” (§ 16.)—The alliances of parties are also manifold. The most dangerous to the healthy life of the state is the alliance of both the extreme parties, of radicals and absolutists. The alliance of liberals and con- servatives is the most favorable to its normal de- velopment. If the development of the state re- quires new institutions, the liberals naturally step to the front, and the alliance will be a conservative liberal one; if there be question of preserving the threatened order of things, the conservative ele- ment must needs preponderate, and the alliance assumes a liberal conservative character. —When Rohmer's doctrine of parties first originated at Zürich in 1842, the preservation of the existing order of things seems to have been the task on hand; a liberal conservative policy was proclaim- ed, and the attempt was made to found a liberal conservative party. Ideas were at that time ex- pressed with great distinctness and clearness, and these ideas had an influence that can not be de- nied. But the first attempt at the formation of a party was made under very unfavorable condi- tions, and attained only an incomplete develop- ment. The liberal elements chanced to be too weakly represented, and the young party was unable to keep pace with the stronger movement of the epoch, in which liberal and radical elements had become indissolubly mingled together. Its principle, however, was able to tide over the rev- olution, and thus passed to a part of its former adversaries, but the party itself, which first had recognized that principle, was dissolved. While Germany at first took but little notice of it, Eng- lish and French statesmen, on the contrary, took up the principle, yet without altogether under- standing the full depth of its significance; they were, moreover, affected by the same false tend- ency from which the Swiss liberal conservative party had suffered. Guizot attempted to found in France a liberal conservative party, but he ignored the liberal aspirations of the times, and insisted in a doctrinarian manner on preserving the untenable. In England, however, Sir Robert Peel was more fortunate in organizing a liberal conservative policy. Since that time, however, this idea has entered into the party movements of almost all continental states, and without it modern party contentions can nowhere be rightly understood. If the differences of political parties depend on the difference of natural individual disposition, the necessity of parties, and, further still, their legitimateness, follows as a consequence; for anything that has the roots of its existence in nature, has a right to have its existence respected. All laws and public measures, accordingly, that aim at the control of parties, or at the suppression “Of particular, even of extreme, parties, violate the natural law of creation, which has produced this multiplicity, and which, even through the conflict of differences, creates the highest phenomena of human life. — The choice of a definite party, accordingly, is only in a secondary sense the work of personal insight, and of free will; for every individual in the first place feels the impulse and attraction of nature. The man who is by nature a radical will feel himself drawn toward the rad- ical party. The man who is naturally old will be drawn rather toward the party of absolutists. But, as in all human things, the force of natural instinct is not endowed with an absolutely com- pulsory power, man possesses a power of mind and character over himself; he is able to overcome his own impulses, when he believes them to be foolish or injurious. Other motives and interests modify the differences which distinguish the nat- ural individual disposition, and sometimes im- pel those who are naturally radical to submit to the direction of the conservatives, or drive them into the camp of the absolutists. Education, with the power of ideas and habits which it gives, has frequently the most decided influence on the choice of a party. Experience and study may also induce an individual to profess different prin- ciples and tendencies, and hence to adhere to a party different from that which we should have expected, from his individual nature, he would ally himself to. — Nature herself has taken care that the dangerous one-sidedness of parties should not completely isolate men from one another, by compelling every individual man in his lifetime to pass through all the different age stages, and thus to experience in himself and in his own near kindred and acquaintances the nature of other parties than the party to which he belongs by his own individual nature. Any attentive and think- ing man will hence judge more broadly and fairly of others when he has an eye to the many-sided teachings of nature. Nature has a healing remedy for the arrogance of extreme parties, and gives a warning to individuals to join rather the more manly central parties; and it directs all parties always to submit to the whole by manifesting, as in the organization of the human body, complete human nature, and all the faculties of the Soul in the proper relation of order and subordination. It hardly needs to be recalled to mind, that the following characteristics of the four parties are merely typical. Real life scarcely ever expresses altogether completely and purely the typical, fun- damental idea, but only approaches it more or less closely. But when science in grand outlines sketches the natural types, it in so doing eluci- dates and arranges the otherwise unfathomable, chaotic variety of phenomena. — 1. Radicalism. Radicalism is illustrated and explained by the nature of the boy. Although the delineation is made with great skill, and is true in the main, the picture is not free from a certain exaggeration, or from polemical bitterness, which can be ex- plained only by the time in which it was drawn. Hence its dark sides have manifestly been painted 102 PARTIES. With greater relish and more nervous strokes than its bright sides. The author, Theodore Rohmer, in his later years himself admitted this. – He in- troduces his description by a reference to “the spirit of contradiction, which begins to stir within every man, after the development of conscious- ness. This spirit, this opposition for the sake of opposition, in faith, science, church and state, is the main trait of radicalism.” (§ 45.) “Radical- ism is very well adapted to oppose when, from the sphere of an inferior criticism, it pursues the sins of absolutism, when it hastens the march of conservatism, and clears the road for liberalism; ever blaming, hurrying, agitating, but incapable of ruling; productive of misfortune and of terrible disturbances as soon as it seizes the reins of gov- ernment. Hence, it is a frequent occurrence in parliamentary states, that the most brilliant lead- ers of the opposition betray a complete incapacity when they are called into power. Government and childhood exclude each other.” (§§50–52.)— “The mobility of the boy is unbounded. Quiet, rest and self-containment are impossible to him. He loves change and variety to a passionate de- gree, and his ardent nature is continually in search of novelty. To this must be added his unhealthy longing to become a grown man. He sees the adult people around him, and his most powerful wish is to be like them. He imitates them, and plays the man. “Novelty and progress’ are the watch-words of radicalism. But ‘novelty’ is not reform; it proceeds from the impulse to change, and, like the latter, it is variable in itself; and ‘progress’ is only the impulse toward progress. He wants to reap before he has well sown; he is given to excess, as was the French revolution, or he is compelled to give himself up, as Joseph II. had to give himself up. Radicalism borrows from liberalism, and imitates it. Radicalism everywhere in Europe, through organic self-deception, regards *tself as liberalism.” (§ 46.)—“If the boy were not altogether by nature incapable of ruling, and relegated to obedience, he certainly would be thus incapable and relegated to a very high degree by his complete lack of experience. Experience can not be learned, but must be acquired in the school of life. The inability to learn from experience accompanies boyish natures through life. It was precisely this inability which so deeply embittered Napoleon against the radical ideologists, and for very good reason. So destitute of meaning and experience is radicalism. When Cola Rienzi be- lieved that he could resuscitate the power of Rome by means of the mere name of the tribunate, and the forms of ancient Rome; or when the German Burschenschaft thought to restore the spirit of the empire by restoring the title of German em- pire, they dreamt like inexperienced boys. If Joseph II. in Austria, Pombal in Portugal, and Struensee in Denmark, had taken counsel of ex- perience, they would have understood that it is impossible by any number of decrees to suddenly extirpate the deeply rooted past.” (§§ 53, 54.)— “As the boy is complete neither in his mind, which is in process of development, nor in his sensitive faculties, which can be ripened only through life, it follows that he must learn. To learn is not to. know, but only a preparation for knowledge. But the boy, although desirous of learning, at every step which he takes in learning from others, be- lieves himself to be in possession of real knowl- edge. On the other hand, we all know how diffi- cult it is to overcome the aversion of a boy for methodical learning. His wild disposition carries. him away from it, while his instinct demands. culture and Schooling; between the two he re- mains in a wavering state. In this manner radi- calism has ever displayed either barbaric ignorance or an exaggerated craving for formal culture, Schooling and enlightenment. Rousseau, the fa- ther of modern radicalism, instead of culture wished to see men in the rude state of nature; our mod- ern radicals, radical in their demand for culture, Cry loudly for education and popular culture as only boys cry for schooling.” (§§ 56, 57.)—“The powers of the boy are naturally adapted to men- tal appropriation. His susceptibility is marvel- Ous, his imagination indefatigable ; but reason, will-power and all deeper insight are absent. The boy, in a word, is brimful of talent, not of mind. Talent is the characteristic mark of radicals; but talent has no standing in any court for depth. of intellect. History affords us a very powerful example of this truth. In the three parliaments of the French revolution, in the constituent assembly, in the legislative assembly and convention, there was a galaxy of men of talent, partly of the most remarkable kind, and of such variety and num- ber combined as the world had but seldom wit- nessed. The names, which at that time followed one another in rapid succession on the scene, still remain the pride of the French nation. And what became of all these men of talent, when a great spirit, when Napoleon, put in his appearance? It seemed as if the one great mind alone sufficed to fill the vast field which a hundred men of tal- ent had divided among themselves. How even the most renowned among them shrank into in- significance before Napoleon: men like Sieyes, Talleyrand, Cambaceres, and even Carnot Yet Mirabeau maintained himself; in the midst of all these radical men of talent he was the only intel- lect.” (§§ 59, 60.)—“The boy, like the poet, lives in a world of ideals; he knows the real world only in miniature, and even in miniature he has no thorough knowledge of it. It is perfectly natural that he should build himself a world of poetical and fantastic day-dreams, of castles in the air. Radicalism has also created a world of ideals; it, too, is clothed with a charm which has misled whole nations. A world, full of freedom, happi- ness and bliss; a world, in which all men embrace one another, and live together like brothers, in which everlasting peace reigns, and in which an everlasting community of all spiritual and cor- poreal possessions obtains: a world of this kind, such as was proclaimed by the religious visiona- ries of the middle ages, and by the political dream- PARTIES. 103 ers of the nineteenth century—how charming it al- ways appears to the Senses and to the heart, in spite of the fact that experience and reason have so often told us that it crumbles away in the pres- ence of reality. The attempts of radical world- improvers belong as little to real politics as poetry itself belongs to politics; but for life they possess a truth similar to that of poetry. In fact, what happiness the boy dreams of as in store for him in his manhood; of the freedom that he will One day enjoy, and the pleasure of a thousand circum- stances in life! If he reaches manhood, and if fate favors him, he certainly may find happiness and freedom, yet it will be a kind different from what he had dreamed of; he will then smile at the dreams of his boyhood, and instead of these he will try to enjoy the sober reality of the pres- ent.” (§§ 63, 64.)—“The boy’s understanding leads him to the formal branches of knowledge. Even his imagination, when he applies it to sci- entific questions, guides him into the field of ab- straction. All radicalism is at all times formal, mathematical and abstract, when it invades the domain of manhood. Its culture and legislation are full of formalism; its conception of life and history are abstract; the radical state is mechanical with- out a suspicion even of organism; it is constructed, as Aristotle expresses it, xaz’ &pzSAuðv, instead of torr' d'étav, for it adds, subtracts, compounds and distributes men and affairs as if they were only arithmetical quantities.” (§§ 65, 66.) — “Culture and education, as means substitutive of nature, are the one great idea which has become with modern radicals the most predominant idio- syncrasy. That idea proceeds from the boy’s ca- pacity for education. The boy sees in education a substitute for innate gifts, and even considers it the creator of individual nature. He believes that education can make fools clever, and the stupid intelligent; that it is in the power of education to make all men equally learned, equally intelligent; that through the same means of education all classes can be raised to the same height, and that the crowd can be extirpated forever. Of all rad- ical ideas, none has been more widely spread in Germany than this, and partly for the reason that the Germans, of all nations, are endowed with great capacity for comprehensive and genuine culture, and because they love education even too much not to easily over-estimate it. Instead of adapting culture to different natures, character is indiscriminately made to adapt itself to one and the same form of education. Happy age, when all Germans shall be educated and geistreich. Stupidity, which hitherto, at times, has been modestly silent, would then reign supreme, while mediocrity has already begun to rule in con- sequence of that very idiosyncrasy.” (§ 71.)— “As in the case of women, the boy only knows one reason for everything. The understanding, which is not as yet developed in the boy, super- ordinates and subordinates intuition, which he possesses, and conceives objects, notwithstand- ing their variety, as a complete and undivided whole. How radicalism everywhere, both in the material and the intellectual spheres, is urged by the impulse toward “leveling,’ needs no further ex- amples. – The boy moves with originality on the field of speculation. Man, in childhood, indulges in a number of questions, which he is unable to answer as a man. He thinks about the origin of the world, about the reasons of being. But he does not investigate for the sake of a higher pur- pose, but merely because investigation is a pleasure to him. Abstraction, as abstraction merely, satis- fies him. The two characteristic marks of all radical speculation are: an ideally mingling the reason of the world’s existence with the world itself (pantheism); practically, the supremacy of abstraction over life.” (§ 74.)—“Radicalism, like childhood, is good and rich in blessings, and when in its right place its effects are un- equaled; but it degenerates and becomes worth- less when it swerves from the right path, and when placed at the helm becomes a prey to de- moniacal powers. From what evils it frees us, from what abuses, from what an oppressive load it unburdens Europe, by its ever-living, stimulat- ing power and active foresight; how much of evil it does away with, how much of what is useless it removes, and how much of what is new it has encouraged—all this is well known in recent times. If it had been able to keep within the bounds of the opposition, if it had surrendered the direction of affairs to liberalism, instead of thwarting it, its effects would surely have been a blessing. The country may be considered fortu- nate in which radicalism keeps up an opposition without encroaching in public affairs, but keeps its energetic action within the bounds of modesty. Woe to the country in which it rules supreme. Waste of mind and emptiness of heart, the ruin of the past and the decay in the present, are the signs that accompany it.” (§ 77.) — “The boy believes that he shows courage when he displays only impudence, and energy when he makes a manifestation of obstinacy. He indeed possesses courage to do many things which the grown man can not attain to, because to such courage belongs a barbaric recklessness toward all existing rights, relations and institutions, or an unparalleled degree of levity. Yet these are precisely the qualities by which radicalism has been able to impart an occa- sional bold forward movement to the wheels of history, which in certain cases it would have been beyond the power of even the most advanced lib- eralism to impart. They are also the qualities of which Providence frequently avails itself for the attainment of its designs. Radicalism not only vents itself against old institutions, when they have become rotten; it attacks the past and pulls down everything with relish; the radicalism of the better kind does this, because it carries within it the organic delusion that it can create a new world from the wreck of the old, and the worse kind of radicalism, because it is impelled thereto by its love of destruction. A tabula rasa is what both want.” (§ 85.)—“Although far from cruel, the 104 PARTIES. boy commits many cruel acts. His anger when irritated, his revengefulness when offended, his fury when controlled, are simply barbaric. But he nevertheless combines all this with a tenderness, or rather a weakness, of feeling, which easily passes into pusillanimity and exaggeration. The source of these opposite qualities is sentimentality, which is as cruel as it is easily aroused, as easily inclined to evil as it is capable of good. This sen- timentality consists in an excessive degree of Sen- sitiveness.” (§ 87.)— “By nature the boy has only an abstract sensual conception of the world. He is able to conceive only unity or multiplicity; and these opposites coexist in him as unreconciled with one another as were Judaism and Greek polytheism in the ancient world.” (§ 88.)—“Ab- straction makes things equal. Thus, the boy looks upon men as equal except in as far as they do not exist outside his own sphere. Boys among themselves are democrats. Their whole mind and heart demand equality. Take a school of thirty or forty boys the moment before the teacher enters. An absolute freedom and equality prevail among them. The instant the teacher appears, all are just as equal in obedience as they were before in anarchy. Boys are fit only for a democratic or a despotic government. To the boyfreedom means only following his caprice, and doing what he pleases. His idea of equality is, that nobody should be allowed to enjoy higher privileges than himself. What has been said describes, as we believe, sufficiently the main traits of radicalism, considered as the submission of the organic life of man to the unlimited power of abstraction.” (§ 92.)—2. Liberalism. Liberalism is the repre- sentation of the young man. “The youth enters into the world free. He is no longer hampered by discipline; life and fate henceforth educate him. His first act is to examine the ground on which he stands, the inner and the outer world. His criticism spares nothing; he is bold enough to doubt everything; yet not merely for the sake of doubting. He doubts, in order by his own power to attain to truth. He seeks, in order to find. Intellectual and moral criticism is a main trait of all liberalism. But there is no trace in liberalism of the opposition which is made by the man who is not free. If I were to draw an historical picture of the character of liberalism, and point out wherein it differs from radicalism, I should recall the life of Luther in the religious sphere, and Lessing's labors in the scientific world.” (§§ 93, 94.)—“The young man is man in his highest bloom. Replete with life and movement, and at the same time full of sense and conscious- ness; his mind developed in every direction, at the height of creative power, high-minded and energetic, still undisturbed about fate; the entire man in the fullness of all his impulses, ardently desirous of the future, and yet even now master of the present, unhindered by obstacles, inventive of plans, full of sense in the choice of means, and of genius in execution; a constitution of this kind, or none, is adapted to reform, or rather, born to create and organize, just as the boy is fitted for revolution.” (§ 95.)— “Because it alone unites activity with genuine strength, liberalism is the formative principle of all existence, in science and in faith, in the church and in the state; and only that which contains within itself creative germs with a positive core, deserves the name of liberal. Everywhere, under all conditions, and even where it carries destruction before it, liberalism acts as an organizing power, and where it does not directly distribute blessing it is infusive of new life. In German history we have a refreshing picture of an organizing liberal in King Henry I.” ($ 96.) – “The opinions of the young man are full of ardor, his assertions are full of acuteness, but he is naturally too modest and too humane not to honor all outside aspirations if nobly harbored. Where the boy is exclusive in his opinions the young man investigates, and where the former is narrow-minded the latter preserves his intellectual sight free and undimmed. He is free from preju- dice, and takes things as they are; and this free- dom is the mother of the highest kind of toleration, a toleration, however, which never ignobly vacil- lates between what is good and what is evil, or which meanly wavers between opposite tendencies, but honors what is worthy of honor, even in its bit- terest enemy, and from its own steady point of view judges, with impartiality, the points of view of others.” (§ 97.)— “As independence is the nerve of manhood, it follows that the man can never find the reasons of his actions in authority; he can find them only in the truth which authority can lay before him. A liberal government will never pay homage to public opinion as such, nor to the spirit of the age, the Zeitgeist as such; yet it will always respect the spirit of the age, combat its falsities, and take its truths to heart. A liberal opposition will never despise the authority of the throne, nor accept any proposal merely because it comes from the throne, nor, like the radicals, re- ject it only because it emanates from the throne.” (§ 109.)— “The age period of the young man is the highest expression of man. The mightiest ideas and passions, the highest power of his intel- lect, the richest fullness of his sensitive faculties, and his most perfect bodily development, belong to this age. In this age stage man becomes man complete. In this sense liberalism is humane, it and humanity become one. The greatest and only perfect liberal known to history is Christ. And through what did Christ exert his most pow- erful influence, and so powerfully that no one among us who knows anything of his individu- ality can well help loving and revering him? Why has his image been stamped so deeply on the heart of humanity? Not because of the sublimity of his mind, or simply because of the miracles of his life alone; not because of the supernatural in his nature, but because of his humanity.” ($100)—“If it be true that liberalism expresses human nature in that which is most peculiar to it, then of the four parties referred to above, supremacy belongs to it; for only man should rule over men. But as PARTIES. 105 nature tarries long and in a thousand ways in its lower phases; and as it only seldom, and but for a short time, gives us glimpses of its summits; thus also liberalism, in all nations, has ruled Only during their most flourishing epochs, and only for a short period.” (§ 102.) — “The education of the young man is the school of life. His teach- ing goes to the root of things. His culture is the development of pure humanity in its widest sense. Where radicalism only looks at School- ing, liberalism looks at the nature of man; the one has an eye only to what has been learned, the other to what is inborn; the former gives us only state-servants, the latter statesmen. To lib- eralism also the teaching of the people is sacred. It desires that every one should be brought up a II].8.1). the highest stages to the lower ones, it aims at an organization of public instruction that may afford the possibility of the highest culture to any one capable of receiving it, even those of the low- est classes, yet without over-educating them.” (§§ 102, 103.) – “The direct, fresh-springing crea- tive power that distinguishes the young man, as compared with the talent of the boy, and the cal- culating wisdom of advanced age, is called genius. Genius knows, where talent only learns; it creates, where talent plays; and thinks where the latter dreams. The true man knows himself, and carries his measure within him. To know himself is the fundamental condition, and to measure accurately the highest quality of genius. The boy overrates his own powers, and allows them to disport them- selves without control; the man knows them, and uses them with circumspection. Radicalism, in its policy and in the administration of the state, herein acts like the boy; liberalism, like the man. When liberalism is at the helm, all the parts of the state are called into activity proportionately to their importance, but none are overrated, none overstrained. Ancient Rome and England are still patterns in regard to the knowledge of state measures, and in the observation of the proper measure. Liberalism does not perfect anything before maturity, or before the times command it. But then it acts quickly, thoroughly and with energy. Of this nature was the regeneration of Prussia at the time of French supremacy. Even under the administration of Stein decree followed decree; but the national spirit advanced step by step with these decrees. While Stein was laying the foundations of civil freedom, and Scharnhorst those of public defense, the intelligence and heart of the German people had been raised to the level of this freedom, and its active energy had be- gun to long for the armament of the nation.” (§§ 104–110.) — “Clearness of understanding, grandeur and abundance of ideas, logical penetra- tion, perfection of language and power of speech, characterize the period of bloom of the human mind. His entire organization impels the young man into the fields of intellect, in search of organic knowledge, to the study of philosophy and psy- chology, of the sciences of the state, and of poli- But, instead of applying the standard of has only a quiet pride. tics. The philosophy of the schools, or mere scho- lasticism, call it as we may, formulas and technical terms, may suit the boy, but the philosophy of truth and of life belong to the man. Liberalism, above all, thinks with the natural understanding. Its human character tells it that true philosophy, like true religion, must be universally human, and therefore intelligible. Greek philosophy was liberal, so far as its results affected the education, the constitution and the politics of the Greeks; the practical philosophy of the English was also liberal, although only to a limited extent; and the philosophy of the great German thinkers, of Leib- nitz, Lessing, Herder, Müller and Frederick the Great, was liberal in a still higher degree. But the German systematic philosophy as such, is not liberal, because the manner and method accord- ing to which it seeks truth are formal, and the tendency which it keeps in view is not that of life, but of thought as a business. But, to liber- alism, thought and action, theory and practice, are one and the same thing.” (§§ 112, 113.)— “The boy applies to the world an abstract, spec- ulative or mathematical, and the young man a psychological, measure. The one seeks and acts according to formulas, the other according to or- ganic laws; the one sets up categories, the other principles. The young man is full of ideals, but his ideals are rooted in ideas. A policy, if it be grand and human, must pursue an ideal; and it only ceases to be a manly policy, when, instead of pursuing this end with a cool, considerate sense of the practical, it pursues it in an idealistic man- ner. In the highest stage of liberalism the ideal and real become one. Every liberal ideal, even when a failure in the present, leaves seeds behind it in history, from which subsequently either its corporeal form springs, or some other blessing is harvested.” (§§ 115–117.)—“The eye of the young man is turned mainly forward into the present and the future. His relation to history is not an immediate one, and yet it is none the less a deep and sacred one. Life leads him into his- tory. Every institution which history has sancti- fied, is sacred to him, not because that which was or that which is of long duration compels his re- spect, but because he understands its foundation in human nature, its effects on the head and heart, in a word, its psychological character. The lib- eral knows that no power in history can be de- stroyed unless the psychical roots which it has shot out are destroyed, or unless a greater power can be put in motion against it. In other words, no historical institution should be tampered with unless there be substituted for its hitherto psychi- cal efficacy a psychical efficacy equally great.” (§ 118.)—“There is a distinctive trait which infalli- bly distinguishes the character of the young mafi from that of the boy. The boy is vain, the man Let us compare Lafayette with Washington. Although the two were near enough to each other in views and circumstances, the simple and quiet demeanor of Washington contrasts widely enough with Lafayette's vanity, 106 PARTIES. to warrant us in characterizing the latter as a rad- ical, and Washington as a liberal.” (§§ 121, 122.) – “The young man as quickly subordinates him- Self to another whom he recognizes as his superior, as he classes himself above those whom he feels to be his inferiors. While the boy says: ‘There is no higher right than mine,’ all the man wishes is that “every one should have what belongs to him.’ The main trait of the young man’s char- acter is hatred of all oppression and want of equity and uprightness of mind. When this side of his Character is touched, he forthwith reveals all the full life of his soul, and the indomitable energy of his mind. But, as he constantly keeps in view the moral natural law, and sees the contradiction of positive material law with the essential order of things to be more frequent as he grows older, he is liable to abandon or neglect, in disgust, traditional forms, and thus to afford his adversary a weapon, by the skillful handling of which, many a liberal has succumbed in the fight against hypocritical legality, the legality of the scribes and pharisees. In his Götz von Berlichingen, Goethe has described a character of this kind.” (§ 124.)—“The posi- tion of liberalism toward religion may be described by recalling Bacon's well-known principle, that true philosophy should doubt everything; but that through doubt it should return to God. Liberal- ism, at the start, is always criticism ; its end is the taking of a position. The religion of liberal- ism is free and cheerful, and even its doubts are calm and respectful.” (§§ 129–131.)—“The young man sees everywhere the law of superordi- nation and subordination, an immense gradation of forces succeeding one another, not side by side with one another; a gradation of forces different in kind and essence; and he soon perceives that the machinery of creation rests on this diversity. Liberalism knows no measure of primordial rights except that which nature has implanted in each in- dividual; that is, the gradation of freedom or inde- pendence is to him the same as the gradation of God-given power. By divine decree all have equal rights, but not the sum of rights. Humanity is, he says, by virtue of its organization, that is, by virtue of divine right, a great aggregate individual, endowed with supremacy over the earth. Every member of this aggregate has a share in its rights. This share is greater the more it gives expression to the character of the whole, and smaller the fur- ther it is removed from it. Not an equal share for all, but to each one his own, is here also the great principle of liberalism. To liberalism it Seems to be the highest problem of science, the foremost task of statesmanship, the fundamental condition of all human well-being, to assign to every capacity its proper sphere, to every virtue its corresponding field of activity, to every indi- viduality its right place.” (§§ 132–136.)—“But when, from these principles, that seem so simple, and as it were deduced from nature itself, the young man turns his glance toward the positive condition of things, he beholds another world. He finds that the external hierarchy of the classes of society is not true to its origin, and only too often the reverse of the inward dignity which those classes should express. He finds the crowd in the higher, and nobility in the lower, orders; he discovers stupidity ruling, wealth governing, the weak influential, the bad. honored, mind the prey of misery and neglect, force sacrificed to inaction, highmindedness to hatred and intrigue. In nature itself he sees causes provocative of contradiction and difficulty. Not only can he find no way by which to determine dignity of character and the value of men's deserts; he finds an organic con- fusion in the dualism of the measure itself. The worth of the individual is not determined ex- clusively by his individual organization, but by another standard, by race. Race is not limited to nationality, but extends its spirit to the province, to the tribe and to the family. It is inseparable from the person; it is a matter preliminary to pass- ing judgment on men; it is the cover in which his real nature is enwrapped, it is the canvas from which the characteristic peculiarity of the indi- vidual stands out in relief. As it affords the lib- eral a second measure of human valuation, his. task is to place both measures in their right rela- tion to each other, to consider the race as the substratum, and the individual as the quality, so that the latter may prevail, but with due consid- eration for the former.” (§ 139.)—“From the view of the world above described, it follows that the man considers the state as a direct necessary product of human nature, as the crown of human organization. The man recognizes no public or constitutional law with its origin in contract. Neither does he admit a state of which God, in a mechanical sense, is the originator and governor, except in so far as God has endowed human nature with the instinct to form states, and as he for- ever remains in close union with man, his creature. The man knows only an organically operating God, a God acting through human freedom. In himself, in his body and in his soul, the man finds the fundamental principles of the organism of the state. Liberalism conceives the state as a body, of which no member is without a connection with the whole, and of which no member is without a share in the whole. But in this organism it conceives each state power in its place freely acting within its sphere, no power so separated from another as to disturb the living connection between them, no one opposed to another, but One all-embracing power at the head of all. The law he considers as the aggregate product of the na- tional will. Hence it wishes that not the head ex- clusively, but the members also, should share, in due proportion, in the legislative power. It con- siders every state as the embodiment of a nation, and every nation as a particular individual with indestructible features. The state of the party of liberalism is a state which respects the rights of the mind, as the highest criterion of class, so that the poorest peasant may rise to the highest order of nobility, and the Scion of nobility sink to the lowest condition, as complete worth or worthless- PARTIES. 107 ness characterizes them: a constitution which in everything prefers man to external circumstances, nature to culture, insight to acquired learning, and which affords to mind and virtue the best opportunity to assert their power.” (§§ 141–147.) — If, accordingly, we are asked to define the fun- damental character of liberalism, as contrasted with radicalism, we must say that the real dis- tinction between them consists in the supremacy of abstraction in the latter, and the supremacy of the individual in the former. — 3. Conservatism. Conservatism is explained by the nature of the ‘‘ older man.” The term ‘‘ Older man ’’ is evi- dently inappropriately applied to the age of man from thirty-two to forty-eight, as Rohmer applied it, because it suggests a still more advanced age. Even the term “tried man” is generally applied to men in the forties, not to those in the thirties. In the absence of an expression corresponding to the Latin juvenis, we prefer to use the term “com- plete,” “mature,” or simply “the man,” because he has reached life’s Zenith, toward which the young man, striving upward, is still pressing. — “The perfect man has already reached the van- tage ground which the young man is still strug- gling to attain. His affairs are regulated, his home is established, and he has found a field for action. His concern is not coveting anything new, but holding fast to what he has; not acqui- sition, but increase; not the conquering of an un- known world, but the regulation of the world he knows. He is self-reliant and free, like the young man; to a much higher degree, in so far as the ripeness of age lifts him above the necessity of assistance, but to a lesser degree, in so far as the circumstances of life fetter him. He is fettered by circumstances, surroundings, duties, and a number of considerations of which the young man, generally single, has no idea. His wife and children, his position and property, equally im- pose on him the duty of preservation; instinct and consciousness impel him to it. Nature has summed up the conditions of all life in two fun- damental laws, the law of generation and the law of preservation. Thus, also, the two fundamen- tal tendencies of humanity are characterized by these laws, liberalism by the former, and conser- vatism by the latter, law.” (§ 153.)—“The ma- ture man, of all men, has alone an “uncondition- al’ claim to govern. The young man, through the earlier half of his career, combines skill and force, but he lacks experience. When we say that liberalism usually guides the world, that con- Scrvatism rules it, while radicalism opposes and absolutism intrigues, we briefly characterize the relations of parties to one another as the condi- tion of mankind generally creates them.” (§ 154.) – “The man has formed his opinions. His views are fixed, his faith is a definite one. The young man had to acquire truth through doubt; he must through investigation preserve and ele- vate the truth. The young man criticises in order to acquire; the man, to increase what has been acquired. An inclination to preserve, and skill in improving: such are the man's preponderating traits. Being the master of a household, and set- tled in all his relations, he avoids all disturbance, and changes nothing, when a pressing need does not render the change necessary. But it is equally natural to him to give an ever firmer foundation to his home and family, and to perfect his condi- tion more and more. His position not only does. not prevent him from making, but it impels him to make, all such improvements in his situation on the largest possible scale, and by all means in his power. —In this he is just as indefatigable and active as the young man in his endeavor to: acquire a fortune. Without being indifferent or narrow minded, he takes the world as it is, with its perfections and defects; and his way of mak- ing it more endurable consists rather in devel- oping the good elements that are in it, and in preserving them, than in building new creations. from them, creations the success of which he does not feel certain of. As the young man not. only feels himself impelled to positive, new cre- ations, but at the same time to the removal of abuses, and of that which has been outlived, SO also the conservative man, besides increasing pres- ent stores, feels always inclined to the restoration of those institutions which a thankless Or a nar- row-minded age had unjustly allowed to decay. From the first of these dispositions reform pro- ceeds; from the latter, restoration.” (§ 158.)— “The supremacy of the mature man depends on the esteem which he commands, on the confidence which he inspires, and on the firmness of his whole nature. His education, in point of genu- ine solidity, comprehensiveness of knowledge and command of details, is as superior to the educa- tion of the young man as it is inferior to it in ideal human nature. The ideal force of liberal- ism may prove wholesome in opposition to the state: the life experience of conservatism belongs. directly to affairs.” (§ 161.)—“We have summed up the intellectual constitution of the perfect man in the term wisdom. Wisdom can not vie with genius in productiveness, but it is equal to the lat- ter in wealth of conception, and Superior to it in elaboration. Wisdom is inferior to genius in pen- etration, but surpasses it in circumspection; wis- dom, by its fullness of knowledge, makes up for the advantage genius has over it in keenness of perception, and it supplies, by its comprehension of details, the ease with which genius grasps the whole; experience imparts to wisdom a Solidity and knowledge of men which for substance may well compete with splendor of ideas. If genius carries measure within it because it watches Over itself, the having such measure within one's self is to wisdom a second nature: to keep within measure and to be wise are one. The young man is genius in motion, the mature man is genius at rest. The former may be called active, the lat- ter passive, genius. If, in poetry, we compare Shakespeare and Goethe, we have an approximate picture of this latter difference.” (§ 162.)—“Wis- dom investigates and forecasts: it tracks out What 108 PARTIES. is hidden, it understands the past, and preserves the germs of the future; sagacity and power of memory are inborn in the perfect man. As we regard language as the highest power of the young man, So we may consider intellectual dis- cernment as the faculty most peculiar to the ma- ture man. In these, language and intellectual discernment, the highest faculties of man, lies the difference between liberal and conservative poli- tics, when once intelligence rules. The science of mind here becomes the science of the condi- tions into which the mind has settled, the law of nature becomes historic right, and psychology becomes history. Hence, what conservatism pro- duces is not essentially new; it is only the same truth, the same creation that liberalism already had created, only in another light.” (§ 163.)— “Liberalism struggles for principles, and it only is able to give birth to the highest principle. Yet if it lights on a false principle, it falls into errors, which the mature man can never share, because he never opposes principles to positive life, but always moderates them through law and history. He also desires that external law should be a mir- ror of the inner"law, but he never sacrifices it for the sake of the latter, because experience makes him recoil from the danger of such attempts. The inviolability of property, and of private rights in general, is hence one of the principal features of conservatism.” (§ 165.)— “The power of resist- ance preserves man externally, and inwardly he is guided by the principle of fidelity. This fidel- ity has given rise to the German proverb: Eºn. wort, ein mann; the keeping of one's word is so pe- culiarly the mark of conservative minds.” (§ 167.) — “Practical life is the natural field of the mature man. The government of the family, marriage, the relation of master and servant, are best under- stood and managed by the mature man. The young, as well as the mature, man, founds mar- riage on the divine sanction, that is, on the divine natural law, which has willed the duality of the sexes, and therewith the organic union of two individuals fitted for each other ; but while the young man founds the mutual supplementing of the two sexes on the psychical similarity of their natures, the latter measures it by similarity of their situation in actual life, and of the conditions necessary to the secure existence of a family. Both views, however, are misused, the former by radicalism, the latter by absolutism. In the former, the inner inclination degenerates into a weakly, fickle feeling, and we have modern mar- riage, which has rightly been called sentimental marriage. Absolutism, on the other hand, makes marriage merely a matter of convenience, inas- much as, without any regard to nature, it pays attention only to the external circumstances, such as birth, money, etc.” (§ 168.)—“In the case of the mature man the government of a family is closely connected with the direction of his house- hold and the management of his property. To possess is a craving of his nature. From being thus bound to property and family, it follows that conservatism, as a party, is more difficult to organ- ize and direct than other parties. The conserv- ative party is usually inactive and phlegmatic; everybody attends to his own business; matters are allowed to go, and men are aroused only when there is actual danger; in England, for instance, it is not the party of moderation, but the high tories, who keep alive the violent agitation of par- ties.” (§ 169.) — “Experience, and the wants that necessarily accompany it, lead the mature man more directly to religion than does criticism the young man. If the mature man is prepon- derantly religious, he may be severe, and to a certain degree anxious; but never unfree or unfriendly disposed toward manly criticism. He will accordingly treat the church with sincere regard and love. But he is the most pronounced enemy of any falling off in the discipline of the church, of worldliness in the members of the church, of abuse of its sacred character.” (§§ 171–173.)—“As in mature age, there is sub- stituted a sense of obligation for the extreme freedom in which youth delighted, so the sense of order is found in the man, side by side with the notion of liberty; and it governs. Freedom de- sires that every one should attain the highest of which he is capable ; order, that no one should aspire higher than becomes him. — Race, to which youth only pays secondary consideration, has for the father of a family an entirely new importance. An unintentional, irrepressible instinct impels the mature man to attribute to it a higher importance, and only to give it up when the individual is com- pletely useless. Liberalism and conservatism value the organic powers of man; liberalism with a pre- ponderating appreciation of the Organically pecu- liar, and conservatism of the organically inherited. The “peculiar” powers build up society; the “hereditary” preserve it. In the former lies the prototype, without which nothing can come into existence; in the latter, tradition, without which nothing can endure. As greatness of individuality, combined with a corresponding exterior, confers precedence on the person who is possessed of both, a precedence which men are wont unconsciously, and by virtue of an original instinct, to acknowl- edge, so also a superior race, in combination with wealth of material and intellectual possessions, commands a consideration which nobody thinks of withholding from it. Heredity is accordingly immediately founded in conservatism, while lib- eralism knows it only in as far as it respects race as the foil, so to speak. But there is not only a congenital transmission, in which race consists, there is also an acquired one, a second, more spiritual transmission, which has the former for a foundation. The first is the inheritance of blood, which man receives at his entrance into the world; the second, the inheritance of all that which in the course of his life has to such a de- gree become naturally assimilated with his charac- ter that it becomes his second nature, the sum total of all the impressions which circumstances and intercourse with men and fortune have left PARTIES. 109 upon him, permanently and with determining power.” (§§ 174–177.)— “In the liberal state, persons with their substratum of lineage, rule; in the conservative state, lineage, brought out into relief by persons, rules. In the former, ideas prevail, in connection with the existing state of things; in the latter, tradition, with the con- tinuing influence of ideas. “In the liberal state,’ as Montesquieu expresses it, ‘ virtue' rules, and ‘moderation' in the conservative state. In the former, public law is more developed; in the lat- ter, private. In the former, political freedom prevails, on the basis of personal freedom; in the latter, personal freedom, with the corresponding addition of political freedom. Liberalism con- siders the object of the state to be preponder- antly active, and that it consists in the highest development of man as man; conservatism looks upon it as preponderantly passive, and that it consists in securing to the furthest extent the existing legal order of things.” (§ 180.) —4. Absolutism. In order correctly to understand the comparison of absolutism with the “old man,” we must again call to mind that the age stages of human life seem fixed in parties, that is, that the different energies of the soul, which alternately appear and disappear in the life of the individual man, determine in a permanent manner the nature of parties. The individual who is by nature lib- eral or conservative, will continue liberal or con- servative in his advanced years; the individual who is by nature old inclines even in boyhood toward absolutism. Not the qualities that have been developed at an early age, and which have attained to complete maturity, but only the quali- ties which appear for the first time in later years, and which nobody, not even the old man himself, considers better than the instincts and powers of youth and ripe manhood, determine the spirit of absolutism. The absolutist party, therefore, is Compared to a man who is only old, and who is not, at the same time, a man in the sense of lib- eralism or conservatism. — “The old man has left the greater part of his years behind him. He enjoys the past in reminiscences; the future, in his children; the present no longer belongs to him. The sum of his experiences is fixed. The con- victions which he has derived from them are un- changeable. This result, bought with the toil and labor of a life, with its roots in his head and heart, a result to which the sweat of his brow and the blood of his hand still cling—this result, and this Only, must be the true one. In old age we have no conditional, no relative views (?); near to the end we Crave the absolute. The age stage, which has had more experience than the others, has no peer among the other stages. It withdraws into itself, and the world goes on, while old age be- lieves it is overlooking it. This isolation, this inclination toward the absolute, combined with the weakness of nature, deprives old age of the ruling position to which by its very nature it seemed to be called preferably to all others. pOSSesses a great fund of experience, but its expe- Age rience is at an end. For only the man who with- out prejudice comes in contact with the world learns anything from the world. The organic position of absolutism, that in which the state (as nature requires) makes use of the experience of age, without sacrificing itself to its exclusiveness, is the consultative one.” (§ 182.)—“The old man hates novelty in the same degree as the boy loves it. Old age fetters his elasticity; his whole being revolts against it; for with every innovation a new portion of the edifice that it had reared with such immense toil is shattered. The world is changing about him; other opinions, other in- stitutions, other customs, arise. Every day, so to speak, declares war against him. He is overcome with grief and disgust. Self-love, man’s foremost quality, manifests reaction. The old man has passed through all the stages of life; he can un- derstand them all, he exacts obedience from all. But while he lifts himself above them, while he makes his own phase of life the last product of all the others, and considers it the Only true One, without, however, taking any part in the process of life either in the way of production or trans- formation, life slips from his grasp at the moment he believes he has finally grasped it. He is beset, on the one hand, by the indestructible instinct of old age to assert its importance, and on the other, by the impossibility of harmonizing with other men. Reaction is unavoidable. It lies in the innermost nature of absolutism.” (§ 183.) — “In- tolerance and despotism are the natural conse- quences of this position. The principle of abso- lutism is the principle outside the adhesion to which there is no salvation. With it doubt is a sin, and resistance a crime. The narrowness of absolutism is less a lack of understanding than an instinctive unwillingness to understand anything in nature. It is this which imparts to the despot- ism of absolutism a much harsher, more injurious, character than to radical despotism. Absolutism frequently understands the demands of the peoples whom it maltreats; but it will not yield to these demands. When want comes, it knows how to appeal to higher ideas; it then accommodates itself to the times, it yields, capitulates—a clear proof that it can understand—yet only to go back to its old ways as soon as possible.” (§ 184.)— “As the boy plays the young man, SO does the old man assume the demeanor of the mature man; in other words, as the radical takes upon him- self the ways of the liberal, so does the absolutist desire to pass for a conservative. Radicalism rides heedlessly over old established rights, when they are an obstruction to innovation; reaction, re- gardless of consequences, destroys all the hard- earned results of a grand present, that it may rule again. Both are equally ignorant of the laws of intellectual, and of the limits of historical, rights; both equally trample history and private rights under foot; both believe themselves able, by their ‘fiat' of omnipotence, and by decrees on paper, to establish institutions in conflict with the spirit of the times, of nations and of the Soil; both 11() PARTIES. are equally destructive. ‘The world is growing worse, the world was better in the past,” has, since Nestor's time, been the motto of the old man; as radicalism by its optimistic dreams, and the old man by his passiveness, undermine the quietude of nations.” (§ 185.)—“Reaction is naturally fixed in its retrogression, just as mat- urally as revolution raises its progress into law, and repels all contradiction. Reaction goes back only to a certain stage of the past, but not as the restoration goes back to the past, as an intellectual development. This constitutes the essential dif- ference between reaction and restoration. * * * — “The boy approaches the world with intuition and imagination, but the old man with reflection and combination. * * The one abounds in whims and ideals, the other with apergus and rules; and at last the old man reaches the point the child had reached—at abstraction on the one hand, and at sensuous perception on the other. The deductive rules on which the old man relies without intellectually mastering them, inspire him with that infallible confidence, that strange self- deception, by which absolutism runs toward ruin, without perceiving the abyss, until the ground be- gins to quake under its feet. In this manner age collapses into a spiritless empiricism, which ignores all higher points of view, and at last degenerates into a materialism, which drags what is highest and holiest down into the dust.” (§ 192.)— “Where combination is so preponderantly devel- oped as in the old man, the principle of numbers very naturally asserts itself. Mathematics and the entire series of the exact sciences are the field on which the mind of the old man finds its high- est satisfaction. The boy applies himself to math- ematics because its abstract generality satisfies his mind and sharpens his faculties, and the old man seeks refuge in it because it alone affords him that absolute yet sensibly real certainty in which his mind finds rest. But it seems rather strange that this empirical certainty should tempt him into shallows, from which even ideal contempla- tion remains exempt. In its train follow cabala, alchemy, magic and necromancy. The sober clearness of mathematical laws seems irreconcila- ble with the enigmatical plays of the cabala; and so does it seem incredible to reflecting reason, that dry rationalism, for which everything is too high which can not be made as plainly evident as that twice two makes four, should still pair itself with the nebulous mysticism of the theurgic and magic arts; and yet both are to be found united in absolutism.” (§ 193.)—“Old age is thus formal in history. If the boy is formal be- cause he is unable to see through form, the old man resolves essence into form to shape it as he wants. Right sinks into a treaty. Loyalty be- comes a narrow legalism, and the more the idea of right contracts, the more obstinately does the old man cling to separate provisions. The most sacred interests are sacrificed to the letter of an agreement, and the application of the law, under the veil of the summum jus, becomes a permanent exercise of the summa injuria. From the point of view of such legalism the condemnation of Christ was not judicial murder, but an act of jus- tice. In legislation, also, absolutism applies this mechanical, arithmetical measure. History, with free-thinking absolutists, becomes a collection of maxims, apérºus, remarks and analogies, as it was with the men of the world trained in the French school of the last century; to the absolutists of a positive opinion, history is but the treasure house of his own opinions. The ‘historical basis,” the ‘deep ideas of the past,’ the ‘organic articulation of the state,’ the ‘good old law’: absolutism fre- quently employs all these conservative phrases, just as its counterpart (radicalism) uses the words freedom and equality, and ignores them with the same ease.” (§ 194.)—“The heart of man feels the effect of years as heavily as his mind. Old age is as far removed from the equanimity of mature age. Its rest is but the quietism of ex- haustion. The great passions have subsided; only the little ones remain. The old man is irri- table in the highest degree, his moods are whim- sical and changeable. His passive sensibility sometimes causes his mind to accept indiscrimi- nately all impressions, and sometimes to display that dull indifference (laïsser aller) which charac- terizes the staid man (phºlister), that inferior em- bodiment of absolutism.” (§ 195.)—“The boy, to become powerful, must remain under training; old age, on the contrary, must have pupils, and wishes to be surrounded by persons who obey. The old man may be mild, gentle, and careful of his pupils; but he wants no free man around him. An absolute government may be well meaning and paternal, but the air of freedom, the highest good of life, is never breathed under it.” (§ 197.) — “The weakness of old age reveals itself in a remarkable manner in this, that its virtue, like that of the boy, needs support from without. In the case of the boy this support is the law; in the case of the old man it is tradition, convention, maxims, reflective virtue, the morals of principles. If we wish to get a notion of the conventional morality of absolutism, we should read Kotzebue's plays. It was this morality that prevailed in the upper classes in the past century. Here there are no maxims of law and custom, but social consid- erations.” (§ 198.)—“If we reflect on the above it is obvious that there must enter into the efforts of old age, to attain moral perfection, an artificial element. As what is noble does not spring spon- taneously from nature, incapacity calls forth a violent effort, and this again betrays ‘the power of weakness.’ Hence comes the demand for “un- conditional obedience’ in absolute states. When the weakness of nature breaks through the bounds of principle, the vices of old age develop into unnatural tyranny, of which history affords so many instances. Philip II. is the most striking instance of wicked old age: another illustration is the hideous Tiberius, who, more than any other ruler, combined in his nature womanly weak- ness and diabolical strength, weakness of charac- PARTIES. 111 ter and baseness. It is the custom to consider all the Roman emperors as absolutists; but Caligula, Nero and Commodus were only depraved boys; genuine tyrants are found only in old age. — Modern Machiavelism walks about in a stately garb, gentle, pleasant and winning. It under- stands the art of appearance, and under paternal mildness conceals machination. It shakes hands with the proletarian, and surrounds itself with the severity of majesty, according to the times. Cruel when cruelty, kind when kindness, leads to its end, it ignores everything but its own aims, and the arithmetical weighing of the means. Such a man was Augustus, a man endowed with the greatest intellectual gifts, and who might well say of himself, that he had cleverly played his part.” (§ 200.)—“Old age is also characterized by weakness in private life, chiefly in the management of its household. As woman, both in childhood and old age, is superior to man, the interference of women in radical and absolute homes or states is almost unavoidable. If the times are favorable, woman becomes permanently preponderant. The government of mistresses in the eighteenth century is well known.” (§ 201.)—“Old age in matters of faith knows either only mechanical obedience or complete dissolution of beliefs, literal Orthodoxy or atheism. Voltaire, La Mettrie and Shaftesbury were far from radical; they were profound, log- ical absolutists.” (§ 201.)—“When a reasoning absolutist wishes to understand the origin of the state, he is, by his very nature, forced to seek refuge in the idea of formal covenant, of an arti- ficial contract. This famous theory, which is nothing but a distortion peculiar to old age, of natural right into arbitrary convention, owes its origin to the absolutist period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The radicals have adopted it because it is in keeping with their intellectual constitution; but to the provisions of the social contract, following their bent, they have added the doctrine of equality. According to virile notions, public authority has the right in itself, and subjects their rights .in them- selves. But only the free man can understand this; the man who is not free is compelled to seek the source of his condition, the title to his rights, outside himself. The man who is not free subjects himself to another, because, as the theory itself puts it, he alienates his rights to another, and the latter commands because the former has alien- ated his rights to him; or, according to Orthodox ideas, because God has given the latter command over him.” ($204.)—“There is no right in abso- lute monarchy except that which emanates from the ruler; he alone is what he is by the grace of God; all the others are what they are only through the grace of the absolute monarch. The most perfect embodiment of this system is the consti- tution of the order of Jesuits, and the Roman curia, according to the Jesuitic conception of it. The company of Jesus subjects body, soul, actions and thoughts to the omnipotence of the general of the society, in whose hands the members are but unconscious tools. According to the curia, the whole church rests in the papal chair.” ($205.) — “Old age, however, besides despotism, has also its democratic features. Absolute power may be attributed to the people as well as to the ruler. Europe has witnessed not only a great radical, but also an absolutist, revolution, the Eng- lish. That revolution was the embodiment Of fanatical belief, as the French revolution was of fanatical abstraction. When the radical prole- tarian rises, he wishes to be put on an equal foot- ing with others; when the lazzarome is aroused, he remains what he is, in order, as a la22arone, to avenge himself on others.” ($206.)—“Because age carries the germ of dissolution in itself, it can only be kept together through the most rigid observance of forms. This is the essence of legit- imist monarchy. Its characteristic trait is, that instead of striving to do the state service, it makes such service itself its purpose. In other words, it does not administer except for the sake of administering. Birth, not merit; money, not mind; routine and mannerism, are the conditions of appointment to place. Form becomes essence; essence, form. The external policy of absolutism knows only combinations, not ideas. Without any regard for the inborn tendencies of peoples, but simply to round out the national boundaries, it huddles provinces together at hap-hazard, as they have been acquired through conquest or marriage. Instead of natural equilibrium, it seeks an artificial balance, which may be dis- turbed by the merest breath; instead of treatics, it is satisfied with agreements for the moment; instead of a proper diplomacy, it pursues a diplo- macy of intrigue, with a gorgeous representation, but without statesmanlike substance. Its foreign policy is either strictly orthodox (legitimist), or materialistic. Form everywhere rules. –5. Mu- tual Relations of Parties. Liberalism and con- servatism, the two virile parties, may combat each other, for although one in aim, their methods are different, but in spite of their dif- ferences they should never forget their close rela- tionship. They are indeed nearer to each other than either of them is to any other party, and than the other parties are to each other. They may be opponents, but only opponents who respect each other.” (§ 209.) — “Between lib- eralism and absolutism, as also between conserva- tism and radicalism, there is no point of contact. They are even as different in what they do as in how they do it. On the other hand, liberalism and radicalism have a common line of action, while conservatism and absolutism have the fea- ture of preservation in common; but in spirit and character, liberalism and conservatism are superior to the extreme parties. Radicalism and absolutism, finally, have many resemblances in their bearing. Sometimes they act together friendly; more frequently they combat each other, very much as boys refuse to longer submit to the rule of the older. The true relation of parties is found when the extreme parties share 112 PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. in the national struggles only mediately, and are led by their corresponding manly parties. Poli- tics is ruined when the extreme parties obtain supremacy.” (§§ 210–212.) — 6. Psychological Contrasts ºn Politics ºn General. Since Rohmer's doctrine of parties psychologically determines and describes the fundamental types of parties in accordance with the age stages of man, and thus discovers four types, peculiar both in spirit and character, it goes beyond the task of explaining political parties themselves, and thus, from being a theory of political character and mind in their natural chief kinds and forms, it becomes a new psychological science of politics in general. This theory throws new light on political facts and individual character. Even where there are no political parties, there are still to be found radical, liberal, conservative, absolutist, individ- uals whose way of thinking and acting finds its explanation in that theory, just as much as if such individuals had formed themselves into a party, and as such, tried to influence public life. Those fundamental types may also more clearly and easily be illustrated in individuals than in parties, for on the formation of parties many things exercise an influence besides the natural dis- position of the individuals who unite to form a party. It not unfrequently happens that the lead- ers of the parties individually belong to another type than the party itself. The liberal Mirabeau was the head of a radical party; the liberal Pitt was the leader of the absolutist conservative tories; in the revolution of the Netherlands, the conservative William the Silent led the radical- liberal party. In Switzerland the absolutist par- ties, in Germany the ultramontane parties, are often led by radicals; and so, on the other hand, the radical-revolutionary parties confide their cause to the expert skill of absolutist generals. – Above parties stand the people. But in nations also we often perceive the same chief tendencies that distinguish individuals and parties. In the French national character the absolutist character, and in the French spirit the radical trait, is very prom- inent ; and this explains the violent changes in French political history. On the contrary, in the Russian nation the absolutist, spirit seems to be combined with a radical disposition. The Eng- lish are manifestly liberal in character and conser- vative in spirit ; the ideal of the Germans is a liberal government, maintained and supported by the conservative people. — From the four funda- mental tendencies of humanity, Rohmer derives four general characters of political constitutions, as distinguished from forms of the state. “Rad- icalism, as the supremacy of abstraction, engenders the idol state ; liberalism, as the Supremacy of individual personality, the individual state; con- servatism, which pays homage above all things to the power of history and the rights of races, the race state; and finally, absolutism, the form state.” (§§ 220–226.)—The history of nations, and, on the whole, in its grand outlines, the history of humanity, follows these changing impulses in their different periods. The period of childhood is devoted to the service of abstraction; in old age, traditional forms obtain a decisive authority. At the height of life the manly tendencies prevail. Humanity has not as yet reached its climax, but it is manifestly approaching it. Its develop- ment on the whole is, therefore, liberal; the modern era is intellectually freer and more self- conscious than any previous one. But, within modern times, history, in different ages and phases of development, has already repeatedly made the circuit of the age stages of man, and of their respective tendencies. On this necessary move- ment rests, in part, the divine education of nations; on this also rests their highest expression, the changing phases of the spirit of the times, the breath of which every one feels, but the correct understanding of which constitutes the art of the StateSman. J. C. BLUNTSCHL.I. PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. The first recorded party contest in New York state, in 1789, ended in a total poll of 12,453; the total vote in 1880 was 1,102,945, and the number of voters over 1,200,000. This advance in the voting and the possible votes of nearly one hundred fold, or six times larger than the growth of population, aptly measures at once the needs, the conditions and the development of party government in the United States. Meetings at “Martling’s” in New York, and the “Long Room * in Boston, were sufficient for the conduct of party affairs, while the voters of one city num- bered less than 3,000, and the poll list of the other fell short of this number by one-half ; but the enormous increase of the voting voter, due, first, to the spread of political privileges by law, second, to the growth of political interests by party con- tests, and third, to the increase of population— has rendered the earlier methods obsolete, and developed an intricate system of party govern- ment, the product of the last sixty years, whose working is most vigorously attacked by those least aware of the tremendous difficulties presented by the quadrennial mobilization of 9,000,000 voters. The development of party government has, therefore, been along the inevitable lines of increasing organization and delegated powers, whose development in the state is the familiar story of representative government. Burke's defi- nition, “Party is a body of men united in pro- moting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed,” was accurately applicable to the small and coherent body of electors which he represented. While remaining true in spirit, it has ceased to apply in detail to the two great political camps into which the United States has been substantially divided for thirty years. In these two parties a bare fraction of voters, not a tenth at most, carrying on the active work of party government, constitute the standing army of po- litical life, which in periodical struggles exhausts its efforts in the endeavor “to poll the last man”; PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. 113 in a word, to mobilize the great mass of inert voters with constantly increasing success. Be- ginning in 1820 with a polled vote in New York state (where the records are most complete), with one voter in five (12,453 in 1789, out of 57,606 voters in 1790), the proportion steadily rose to 31.12 per cent. in 1826, increased rapidly during the next six years, in which the foundations of party government were laid, to an average of 60 per cent., or very nearly the average now obtain- ing in Great Britain, rising in the ten years ending in 1865 to 77, reaching in the presidential year 1876 to 88 per cent., and in 1880 to 90 per cent. How largely keen political interest and high intel- ligence are needed to increase this per cent. is made best apparent by the fact that the highest percentage of voting voters in those states has been for years in the counties whose percentage of American-born population is largest. This growth in the percentage of voters exercising the right of voters, no less than the widening of suf- frage, has increased the complexity of party man- agement during the last century upon a scale rather one of kind than of degree. — At the organization of the federal government the num- ber of voters in each political division was still small enough to permit the management of parties by the simple and rudimentary methods long in use among English-speaking peoples. These were, self-nomination for the candidate, the caucus or meeting to express the desire of the voter, and in addition, as a dormant political power in the state, there existed the convention, which the tra- ditions rather than the usage of the English con- stitution made the form in which the general body politic took original and initiatory action. Except in the southern states, which retain many archaic forms in their political life, self-nomina- tion has disappeared in this country, the public meeting has become the caucus or primary, and is treated elsewhere (see CAUCUS); while the con- vention, developing along two distinct and inde- pendent lines, has become in its constitutional form the body to which is committed the compo- sition of organic law, while in its political form it has come to be the body which in county, district, state and national affairs acts under a loosely defined body of usage and party regula- tion for the party as an organic whole, in theory drawing its power from the primaries, in prac- tice acting independently, regulating their action and determining their constitution. — These two widely divergent forms of the convention origi- nated in the same stem; but while one attained full development and power in the constitution- making period of the revolution, the other only reached its development in the party-making period, which began in 1820, and ended in 1840, with the party organization now (1883) in exist- ence in full operation, although the development of its details is still in progress. The convention, as a primal political force in the body politic, ap- peared early in American history. “They had no doubt,” says Hutchinson of the action of the 127 VOL. III. — 8 Massachusetts colonists when the old council had taken possession of the government from which a mob had driven Gov. Andross, “received advice of the convention called by the prince of Orange, and, in imitation of it, they recommended (May 2, 1689) to the several towns of the colony to meet and depute persons,” who assembled, and assumed the right to decide what constituted the govern- ment of the colony, as the convention parliament of 1688, assembled without a writ, had decided upon the constituent powers of the English gov- ernment. The whig lawyers who managed the revolution in the thirteen colonies, itself essen- tially a political struggle, were mindful of the organic character which precedent attached to a convention, and termed the meeting of commis- sioners from the colonies a congress. Meanwhile, the radical changes in progress through the col- onies were conducted by conventions, the work being at length completed by a federal constitu- tional convention, while the political government of the day was carried on by meetings in the large cities, supplemented by the collective action taken by the members of colonial assemblies. The latter, as well as the former, bridged over the period between their sessions and their assembly through the appointment of committees of cor- respondence, a body which is the lineal pred- ecessor of the “state central committee’’ of the present day, and which remained for over fifty years after the revolution the stated political au- thority in deciding upon the executive conduct oſ campaigns. These public meetings and com- mittees of correspondence, in the post-revolution- ary period, conducted normal political action; the convention was employed when extraordinary steps were proposed. Shay’s rebellion was pre- ceded by one which met at Springfield, and em- braced delegates from the counties about ; the alarm created by the Hartford convention was in part due to the selection of this term in summon- ing it, and, without much regard to whether the body was made up of delegates, any mass meeting of more than usual importance was termed a con- vention; e.g., the New York meeting nominating George Clinton in 1811, the mass meeting led by Daniel Webster in New Hampshire in 1812, or even the early “conventions” in Maryland and Pennsylvania which nominated Jackson and Har- rison. — The initiative in local and state party government, which rested at the opening of the revolutionary war with city meetings, societies and their committees of correspondence, was transferred in the period succeeding this strug- gle to state and federal legislatures, by whom it continued to be exercised until 1830 in all parts of the country, and in Some southern states until 1860. The change in New York state, a closely di- vided political body, whose politics early reached, and has since maintained, a high degree of or- ganization, which makes its development typi- cal, was distinct and definite in this direction. George Clinton had been the chief executive of the state through the war of independence, by 114 PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. unopposed election. The first serious step toward the organization of an opposition was by a meet- ing of Clinton's opponents Feb. 11, 1789, which nominated Robert Yates, and appointed a com- mittee, of correspondence to promote his election, while a letter soliciting his candidacy was ad- dressed to him from Albany. Three years later the nomination of John Jay was made by a called meeting of his special supporters, and confirmed by a larger body held later; Clinton, representing the more popular organization, received his nom- ination from a general meeting “composed, as was alleged, of gentlemen from various parts of the state,” followed by meetings in each county. Here was the early germ of the convention, as now known; but it withered from the practical difficulty and the vast expense of travel, which made it impossible to bring political delegates together, except as they were already assembled in state legislatures. It is highly significant that each step in the higher organization of our parties has been at a time when internal transportation was developed. The state convention reached its development in New York state in the decade which saw the Erie canal opened; the national convention first became complete in the period of railroad expansion from 1850 to 1860, and the management of a national campaign from a single party centre only became possible from 1870 to 1880, when the telegraph system of the United States was first extended over our territory. These are the real conditions which have made possible the development, and determined the character, of party government. Tocqueville early pointed out the extraordinary freedom of political association, enjoyed in this country, but this would have continued dependent on cliques and caucuses at state capitals and at the seat of federal power, if it had not been supplemented by a freedom and facility in travel and communi- cation inconceivable when he wrote. By 1795 an unprecedented advance in population had ex- tended the base of political action in New York state beyond the scope of any meeting, large or select, on Manhattan island, and John Jay was nominated by a quasi legislative caucus held at Albany, which was, for a quarter of a century after, the centre of political action. To the close of the century, the action of the Albany caucus was still shared by citizens of the state capital; but the tendency was to recognize only legislators as its members, and in 1804 Aaron Burr and Morgan Lewis were nominated by fully organized legislative caucuses. Even then the Burrite ticket was completed by a public meeting at Albany, |which nominated Oliver Phelps as lieutenant gov- ernor; but for Burrites and “Quids’” the Albany caucus of legislators was the controlling body, its “address” the party platform, and its “com- mittee of correspondence ’’ the governing body of the campaign. A “regular ” party organization now first appeared in New York politics, which has never since been without a political organiza- tion claiming “regularity" by virtue of its un- broken political succession from the body which in 1805 nominated D. D. Tompkins. For twenty years afterward the business of carrying on party government was conducted at Albany, and the struggle against the “Albany regency * was in fact the struggle of the counties and their political action against power which out of the necessity of the post road had gravitated to Albany. The same development of party government was in progress at all the state capitals, at least as far south as Virginia and as far north as Massachu- setts. In New Hampshire the “Rockingham con- vention,” Aug. 5, 1812, a mass meeting of 1,500 voters, adopted a platform, nominated a full ticket, state, electoral and congressional, and joined in a vigorous address to President Madi- son. In Vermont “conventions of free men’’ and the legislative caucus acted indiscriminately, sometimes reaching the same nominations. The public meeting preserved its place as the origin of political action much later at the south, and the extent of the states west and south of Virginia left a political initiative to the county, which has long survived, although the legislatures were in all these states centres of political action. Inev- itably, however, the condition of society on the frontier rendered impossible methodical political action. Nominations in Kentucky, in 1799, for a constitutional convention and state legislature, were “agreed upon ’’ in many counties by “com- mittees of two from each religious society and from each militia company ”; a combination of religious and secular affairs in political organiza- tion which had its analogue in Philadelphia at a recent period in the cant political question, “Are you a presbyterian or democratº” whose answer opened more than one election fight. —In Virginia a periodical Richmond caucus early in the cen- tury decided on state nominations, and appointed a committee of correspondence, which acted with like committees in the counties. The action of this legislative caucus was so strictly a matter of state party government that in a presidential year, as in 1812, it did not go beyond the nomination of electors, and passed no resolutions expressing a preference as to a candidate for president, or enunciating a national platform, the “only test laid down” in the selection of electors being “Will he vote for Mr. Madison?” In Pennsylvania nominations were made at this, time in the same way, and party management vested in members of the legislature. In Massachusetts, even as late as 1826, the Jackson “corresponding committee,” appointed by a meeting in Boston, deferred meet- ing “until the legislature met, and a state con- vention could be assembled,” steps in this direction still hinging on the legislature. To party man- agement the members of the legislature naturally added the declaration of party policy and party principles. The sphere which has been occupied during the half century closing in 1880–90 by the party platforms and the letters of candidates, was earlier filled by addresses from state legislatures on federal and state topics, taking a range and PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. 115 appearing with a frequency since unnkown. For nearly fifty years after the revolutionary war these addresses Summed up the opposing political doctrines of the day, and the members who signed them managed the party organizations. Nor, in comparisons between the personal character of state legislatures at an earlier and later date, is it fair to forget that membership in these bodies fifty years ago gave the political control of party nominations and party policy which has since become vested in the party convention and its “central committee.” Ability will always gravi- tate where real power is exerted. This is exer- cised to-day upon the floor of conventions, whose members are quite as often hindered in their influence as aided in their authority by a seat at Washington or in a state capital. The control exercised by the legislative caucus found its natu- ral analogue in a like control over federal affairs in the congressional caucus at Washington, whose power was first challenged, not by the national convention which succeeded it, but by the state legislative caucus, which envied both the power of ‘the body at Washington and the preponderating influence enjoyed in the councils of the meeting at Washington by the Richmond caucus. Aaron Burr's nomination as vice-president was the first formal action taken by a caucus at Washington— Jefferson’s selection being a foregone conclusion —and Burr was nominated at the suggestion of an Albany conference. By 1808 seventeen mem- bers of the “republican " caucus at Washington bolted its action on another suggestion from Albany. State legislatures had begun, each on its own account, to make presidential nomina- tions, but holding their action subordinate to final determination at Washington, precisely as in the convention period state conventions present their ‘‘ favorite sons” to national conventions. The objection to the congressional caucus as the mana- ger of national politics had become so serious in 1812 that the call that year laid stress upon the regular character of the assembly, while the reso- lutions passed disclaimed any power in its mem- bers to act except in a personal capacity. Albany was, as usual, the first to break ground in a new direction, and the republican legislative caucus at Albany nominated De Witt Clinton ten days (May 29, 1812) after Madison's nomination at Washington. “One nomination,” said “Niles’ Register,” in commenting upon their action, “is just as legitimate as the other.” The convention which met at New York in September of the same year, with a representation from eleven states included in its membership, and which is sometimes cited as the first nominating conven- tion, was in fact a mass meeting held to approve, or, in modern phrase, “indorse,” the nomination made at Albany. Four years earlier a like assem- blage held at “Martling’s ” styled itself a “general meeting,” and, while approving by name state nominations, in the address which it instructed its committee of correspondence to “forward to re- publicans of the United States,” exhorted them to “Support such candidates for offices in the general government as are regularly selected and recommended by a republican majority of the Union”; meaning, of course, the congressional Caucus. – Party government had now reached a Stage in which the congressional caucus, whose power, though questioned, was supreme, carried on the loose national organization of the day through its standing committee of correspondence; State legislatures did the same for state contests; while an inchoate representative political body did the like in the cities. The “general meeting” had already become too cumbrous to carry on party affairs in cities like New York, Philadel- phia and Baltimore ; Boston was still a town whose inhabitants enjoyed right of pasturage on the common for thirty years later. Secret socie- ties had been an earlier substitute for the mass meeting, of which “Tammany, a society of the Columbian order,” is the last lingering represent- ative. The “democratic society,” organized in Philadelphia during Washington's second term, had its affiliated branches over Pennsylvania and the neighboring states, extending to the outer bounds of the Kentucky wilderness. Federal politics in western Massachusetts and the region about were for nearly a generation at this period powerfully influenced, if not controlled, by a Secret society which had affiliated branches in New England and the middle states, and more transient organizations existed elsewhere; all cir- cumstances which played an important part in giving edge to the anti-masonic movement. None of these societies offered a basis for popular action during a time when the number of voters was yearly augmenting, quintupling in New York state in thirty years; 57,606 in 1790, 259,387 in 1821. The committee of correspondence, which each “general meeting ” left to continue political action until another met, was gradually sup- planted by ward organizations, first temporary, then permanent. The great “general meeting” which met, 12,000 strong, to approve Madison's nomination and the prosecution of the war, in Philadelphia, May, 1812, called ward caucuses to appoint five delegates to a ‘‘general committee,” which sat apparently for no other purpose than a more formal and weighty declaration than was possible in a tumultuous mass meeting. A similar appeal to the primary was taken in Baltimore; but the usual course with these large city meetings— of which a number were held in these stormy war times—was to approve existing nominations made by state legislatures, and to appoint the customary committee of correspondence. From cities, counties and single districts representative party government spread rapidly to the state, while the term convention began to be employed. for any “general meeting” which included mem- bers of more than one place. The last nomina- tion of the congressional caucus in 1824 made plain the disappearance of its political power, which had received a fatal blow eight years be- fore. Eight years later the Albany caucus, which 116 PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. had dealt this blow, alarmed at the growth of a new political engine in the convention, called for a revival of the congressional caucus as an escape from the dangers of separate state nominations for the presidency. The committee of corre- spondence of the congressional caucus has sur- vived in unbroken succession as the “congres- sional campaign committee’’ of to-day, appointed biennially in the joint caucuses of the senators and representatives of each political party. The influence of this body varies greatly with the strength of the national committee and the ability of its secretary and members. In a presidential year the congressional campaign committee can do little but distribute documents, the party in power in either wing of the capitol using its facilities, folding rooms, employés and what not, for this purpose. In the intercalary congressional election the powers of this committee are con- siderable. It makes, or has made, the assessment on officers, organizes the congressional campaign where the party is weak, sometimes assumes to decide between conflicting claimants for a regular nomination, and furnishes doubtful districts with their speakers and supplies; but in the practical work of politics all this proves of less advantage to party success than in furthering conflicting intrigues within the party for the places in its gift, in particular those which depend upon the action of the party caucus in the house when deciding upon its candidates for speaker and other officers in the organization of the lower chamber of the federal legislature. — The state legislative caucus remained in full sway upon the disappearance of its Washington rival; but it was near its end. Presidential nominations by state legislatures as a formal official act were becoming more frequent, and paved the way for a broader representation than a party legislative caucus, in which the voters of the party living in districts where it was in a minority had no representation. The “convention ” of the day was steadily widening its base and increasing its influence, and what was of nearly equal im- portance, ceased to be regarded as a dangerous or revolutionary political tool. It is a familiar fact that the legislature of Pennsylvania early lost the high relative importance attached to state legisla- tures and service in them in the post-revolutionary period, and it was in this state that the nominating convention first appeared in full action. A fruit- less proposal for a national convention to make an anti-slavery nomination against Monroe was made in Philadelphia in 1820; in the previous four years the nomination of state officers through a convention consisting of delegates chosen by pub- lic meetings had become familiar. In the decade opening in 1820 this became the practice in Penn- sylvania, beginning five years before the like in- novation in New York state, ten years before it was rooted in Massachusetts, and fifteen years before the legislative caucus had disappeared in Virginia, while in some western and southwestern states it survived the first highly organized nation- al campaign of our history in 1840. A conven- tion held in Carlisle, Pa., in February, 1821, made up of county delegates, which nominated Heister in opposition to Gov. Findlay, was one of the first state conventions on the modern plan, if not the earliest. Six years earlier, Feb. 27, 1815, when a “meeting of citizens from every part of the state ’’ was “holden at Boston,” it confined itself to an address to the independent electors of Massachusetts, and only “confirmed ”the nomina- tion of Caleb Strong and William Phillips, already reached by a legislative caucus.-In general terms, it may be said that, up to the slack-water politics of Monroe's second election, the general meeting in the centres of population, while it had been widened by the presence of voters from other parts of the state, assumed no strict representative capacity, and left the initiative in politics to the legislative caucus; but in the decade beginning with 1820 two changes took place: state conven- tions, embracing representatives from most of the counties of the state, began to make state and national nominations, and conventions for a special purpose, embracing quasi delegates from many , states, began to formulate opinion on questions of national politics, and out of these separate threads was spun the national convention. So slowly did this take place that, reckoning from the earliest state convention of a representative character, it was fifteen years before all the counties of a large state were represented in a convention, and forty- eight years before all the states were represent- ed by national conventions. These early bodies were, as was natural, IIlost loosely organized. The Hartford convention, in spite of its official character, received from New Hampshire dele- gates elected by county meetings, and carelessness of form or credential was still more characteristic of the bodies which met at a later period to rep- resent some particular form of national opinion. Early" as these bodies assumed a representative character, their systematic organization came more slowly, and important political gatherings which exerted a serious influence upon current party policy were in fact nothing but voluntary as- semblages of men chosen by no formal constitu- ency. This was the case even with the protec- tion convention which met at Harrisburg, upon the call of the Pennsylvania legislature, July 30, 1827, delegates to which were elected by counties in Pennsylvania. The address of the free trade convention which met in Philadelphia Sept. 30, 1831, was accepted by Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, as an authoritative exposition of the political views of the party denying con- gress the right to levy protective duties; but the convention itself met pursuant to a call issued at the suggestion of the “New York Evening Post”; the delegates, who voted singly and with equal powers, represented States, cities, counties, mass meetings and themselves; Mississippi being “represented” by a single delegate, Mr. Pinck- ney, a member of congress, and the proceedings throughout point to a loose structure only possible PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. 117 while the functions and methods of a political Convention were still unformed. The like was true of the protectionist convention which met in the same year in New York, of the convention of the friends of American industry held in Harris- burg in 1824, and of most interstate conventions of the day. In the first of the long series of conven- tions dealing with the needs of the Mississippi valley, which met at Memphis, Nov. 12, 1845, upon a call issued by the Tennessee state legislature, with John C. Calhoun as its presiding officer, delegates from eleven states, one territory, Texas, an independent power, St. Louis, and a number of counties, all met and voted on a common basis. In fact, the many interstate conventions which met for a quarter of a century after the Hartford convention, bore the same relation to the strictly organized national conventions of the post-rebell- ion period, that early parliaments sustain to the completely organized body now at St. Stephens.— In most states the convention had reached a com- plete organization long before its representative capacity was recognized. In 1820 the “republic- an’’ legislative caucus at Albany, whose address put Tompkins and Mooers in nomination in ac- cordance with the “settled and approved ways.” of the party, was met by a bolting caucus, whose address dealt freely in the current charges of fraud against Gov. Tompkins. In the ensuing four years the constitution of 1821 added largely to the voters of the state, and the popular convention sprang into being under the control of the young leaders in the central counties ‘‘ by the lakes,” who were beginning, first as anti-masons, and later as whigs, their struggle against the control of pol- itics from Albany. In ten years, the new and facile instrument of political action had driven the legislative caucus out of existence. The first conspicuous, but by no means the earliest, conven- tion of the new order was an anti-masonic body, which met in 1826, with Thurlow Weed as its influential manager. It still took longer to go from New York to Buffalo than in 1883 to go from New York to San Francisco; and, in the loose practice of the day, any man with interest enough to take a week's journey to a political convention was accepted as a representative, with little scrutiny of his credentials, if any were re- quired. Progress, however, toward a different procedure, was rapid. Originating in a local call in local newspapers to the ‘‘young men's repub- lican clubs' through the state, the “republican young men's convention,” which met at Utica Aug. 12, 1828, and chose W. H. Seward as its presiding officer, was a full-fledged political con- vention, whose neat and rapid working shows how early the hand of Thurlöw Weed learned its cunning. Its record presents delegates elected and ranged by counties, a temporary and perma- nent organization, committees on credentials, or- ganization and resolutions, appointed on the in- stant by the chairman by congressional districts, and its close presents a complete working machine. Sentral corresponding committees of three were named from each county, and these were instruct- ed to complete the county organization by a com- mittee of five in each town, while the general conduct of affairs was intrusted to a “state cen- tral corresponding committee” of twelve “to be taken from the town of Utica and vicinity,” a necessary concession to the practical difficulty of bringing together a committee including members scattered over a wider area. This convention adopted a modern platform, tacking on a tariff plank as an afterthought; but it made no nomi- nations; approving those already made of Smith Thompson and Francis Granger on the state, and Adams and Rush on the federal ticket. Reso- lutions were passed, but they did not as yet con- stitute a comprehensive platform, and action upon nominations was reached through the adoption of a resolution—a practice which still survives in many states in the apparently useless form of adding to the platform an additional resolution giving the names of the candidates who have been put in nomination by the vivá voce choice of the convention between several candidates. The new form of party rule was already in full opera- tion in Pennsylvania, where by 1823 the nomina- tion of J. Andrew Shulye was reached in a convention (March 4, 1823) only after five ballots; but so loose was party organization that the state committee appointed by the convention was at this period in the habit of meeting only to call another convention, interconvention political con- trol vesting, as it had for so many years in “com- mittees of correspondence ’’ appointed by general meetings in the larger cities. In Massachusetts, at the same period (Jan. 23, 1823), the first step was taken toward a convention by adding to the “mass meeting of republican members of both branches,” delegates from “republican towns not repre- sented in the legislature.” Five years later the Jackson republicans in the state had fully organ- ized on the convention plan, and both parties in 1832. In Virginia, where, as in New York, the op- position seized on the convention in 1828, the rul- ing legislative caucus extended its numbers in the same method by adding representatives of coun- ties where the party being in a minority had no representatives in the legislature. Without enter- ing into unnecessary detail, like changes took place elsewhere, and by 1840 the legislative caucus was everywhere confined to legislative issues. “Conventions appointed by the people,” said “Niles’ Register,” in 1827, of the coming change, “appointed by the people for a specific purpose, are not liable to the objections which apply to legislative caucuses.” The result has not justified the hope. — The national convention grew by the same slow degrees. The disappearance of the congressional caucus was not felt in the eight apathetic years of Monroe's administration. The nominations of state legislative caucuses, by di- viding the electoral vote, led to the serious and dangerous struggle of 1824, in which national politics sank to its lowest personal plane. A remedy was plainly necessary. A congressional 118 PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. caucus had been considered a “republican tenet,” and the powerful caucus at Albany in 1823, as in 1831, urged that one be held, while the Massachu- setts caucus convention, which put forward John Quincy Adams, deprecated the necessity of “nom- inating a candidate for the presidency by assem- blies in the states.” By 1827–8 it became plain that no other course was open, and the combined action of legislative caucuses and state conven- tions, held in general on Jan. 8, 1828, placed Jackson in the field, usually but not always, with J. C. Calhoun as candidate for vice-president. In Virginia this was done by a convention made up of fourteen senators, 157 members of the house of delegates, and twenty-three special deputies, representing in all ninety-six counties out of 109. In North Carolina and New Jersey the counties elected delegates to a nominating convention, as did the anti-Jackson men in Virginia; in Pennsyl- vania and New York a legislative caucus acted, and in the former a convention filled out the electoral ticket ; in Vermont a “convention of freemen’’ made a presidential nomination, and “ certain citizens of Batavia, New York,” did the same. The preliminary party struggle presented, in short, every form of party action. Four years later it was clear that the concerted action between the states which had given Jackson's canvass such momentum could best be reached by a national convention. A congressional caucus better suited the Albany regency, and they pleaded for one without effect. All parties adopted the conven- tion; but Jackson's friends in New York, Penn- sylvania, Virginia, Ohio, Tennessee, Georgia and South Carolina, endeavored, in the last instance fruitlessly, to secure a nomination from a legisla- tive caucus, while Clay’s friends obtained like action in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Louisiana, Kentucky and Maryland. The convention was at this period the favorite device of the opponents of the administration, and their national conven- tion was the best organized, although the selection of its delegates was made by loose methods which early disappeared. The whig convention, which met in Baltimore, Dec. 12, 1831, was called by a caucus of the Maryland legislature. This call proposed a representation for each state equal to that enjoyed in the electoral college, and sug- gested, but did not require, the election of dele- gates by congressional districts. In Maine and Pennsylvania this was done; in New Hampshire a legislative caucus chose delegates; in Massachu- setts “a convention of 200 members’ acted for the state in expressing a presidential choice, be- sides making state nominations; in Connecticut harmonious action was taken by a legislative cau- cus and a state convention, the districts, in addi- tion, choosing their own delegates; in New York a state convention chose the entire state delega- tion of two at large and one for each congres- sional district; while Maryland and most of the southern states acted through conventions. These irregular elections were order itself compared with the loose election of delegates to the democratic convention which nominated Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, at Baltimore, May 23, 1832, where the vote of Pennsylvania was cast by a group of Self-appointed delegates. At these early national conventions each delegate cast one vote, except as a vote by states was required, when the electoral apportionment came into play, and the rule requiring a two-thirds majority in making a nomination was adopted by the democratic con- vention of 1832. This rule was re-enacted by the democratic convention which met at Baltimore, May 20, 1835, and has become the common law of the party in its national conventions and in many state and county democratic conventions in the south. At the same time the unit rule, giving each state delegation the right to cast its entire state vote as a majority of its members should direct, was also adopted, and, like the other, has gained the sanction of unbroken democratic usage. In whig and republican conventions nei- ther of these rules has obtained, although an effort to enforce the last led to a long and bitter struggle in the republican national convention at Chicago, in June, 1880. — As late as 1852 the call for a democratic national convention treated a congressional caucus of democratic congressmen as one basis for the summons; and the action of the whig Washington caucus, met to nominate a speaker in 1851, was expected to furnish the com- mon grounds on which northern and Southern whigs could meet in a “nationalized convention.” These were the last traces of congressional influ- ence in the highly organized body which has now, in the practical selection of a president, taken the place of the electoral college, the con- ventions of the two parties naming the two can- didates to whom voters are of necessity restricted. It was forty years, 1831 to 1872, from the first. national convention until one met in which all the states and territories were represented ; but. the work of organization is now completed, and the only change in party organization lies in the direction of greater safeguards about the caucus. or primary in which the first delegates are se- lected, who in successive stages choose delegates. to the conventions above. As it is no intention of this article to give a history of American poli- tics, a further account of the working of the Con- vention is unnecessary. It will be sufficient to describe the general working of party govern- ment. — Precedent, custom, and the slow, unwrit- ten development of representative party govern- ment, render it impossible to make any general ex- position of the present system which will not be subject to many exceptions. On the one hand, in the loosely settled south and extreme west, Self- nomination is still in use for all subordinate and local offices without the interposition of a conven- tion, and the canvass is conducted by the personal solicitation of candidates, the work of the hust- ings being unchanged, but spread over wearisome square leagues of territory, instead of being con- centrated around a polling booth. State officers. are now nominated in all states by conventions, PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. 119 but where a system of permanent local nominat- ing bodies does not exist, the state convention still partakes largely of the character of a legisla- tive caucus, and the county convention is a meet- ing of the narrow group which carries on the government of each county at its court house; political action being largely confined to state and county office-holders. On the other hand, in nearly all cities of over 100,000 in popula- tion, and in some, like Albany, still smaller, local political action and representation in state conventions are decided by a continuous political organization which in each party holds annual primaries, not to send delegates to a convention, but to choose the members of its governing body, ordinarily known as a “general committee.” This body is self-elective under the thinly dis- guised forms of popular selection in primaries. Highly organized state conventions, like those in New York, find themselves unable, after years of effort, to break through this organization of office-holders and tax-eaters to reach the voters on whom party action should rest. In addition, while the theory of American party government contemplates the convention as coming fresh from the spontaneous initiative of the people, in fact it has become in many states, and is tending to become in all, a body which receives its initia- tive from the standing state central committee. This body, in New York and several of the larger states, has a member to each congressional district, the delegates to the state convention from these districts meeting apart in groups to select the committeeman from the district. In Pennsylvania and a number of other states the districts electing to the upper state chamber are the basis of membership. As the apportionment of conventions is in general by the party vote, and these districts are laid out by population, in the republican party the allotment of members of the state central committee by these districts gives the centres of population a preponderance in the permanent committee which they do not possess in the convention, and do not contribute in elections to the voting strength of the party. The one exception is in Pennsylvania, where the city vote is republican. ganizes, immediately after its appointment, by the selection of a chairman and secretary, with whom are associated from three to five members as an executive committee. Unless some extraordinary exigency arises, like the resignation of a nomi- nee, vacancies on the ticket being usually filled by the committee, the state committee does not meet until it issues the call for the next conven- tion. The executive committee of five or seven is through the campaign the real centre of party management, and the actual work of party direc- tion devolves on the chairman and secretary. The first is nearly always a man of wealth, with a taste for politics and skill in intrigue; the second attends to the manifold details of the campaign, and is assisted by a corps of clerks in the work of issuing assessments to the office-holders of the The state committee or- the patient, continuous work of years. party, distributing documents, and conducting the wide and varied correspondence of a political headquarters. The chairman, the secretary and the executive committee constitute, therefore, a quasi party ministry, selected by the party parlia- ment or convention. The delicate work of rais- ing and distributing funds, of making engage- ments for speakers, of arranging local disputes, of watching over the interests of the state nomi- nees, of arranging the “trades” and “deals" by which great masses of votes are secured in the large cities, or smaller schemes of corruption pre- pared in the rural districts, is all in the hands of these managers, to whom, if they are fit for their work, run all the threads of political intrigue. In a large state, where hundreds of local officers are chosen, besides state officers and the legislature, the candidates in the field will be between 1,500 and 2,000, and it is the first business of the officers of a state committee to know the strength, the motives, the support and the character of each of these candidates. Aside from a laborious canvass of the voters, school district by school district, which even in large states often accounts for all but 5 or 6 per cent. of the vote, minute informa- tion is gleaned in great central states as to the precise political condition of each polling district over a territory a quarter as large as France. Supplemental to the regular party machinery of a state committee, congressional, district, county, city, town and ward committees, an astute man- ager, like Mr. Tilden, will have from three to five correspondents in each election district of a state, . making, in a state like New York, from 12,000 to 15,000 persons whose addresses are registered, and whose standing is known. To the general observer, an American political contest is a seeth- ing battle, in which the noise of the captains and their shouting, charges and counter-charges, the din of speakers and the clatter of newspapers, work their way to an unexpected result. To the few managers who attain success in the conduct of a campaign, even a great state like Ohio, New York, Indiana or Pennsylvania lies clearly map- ped to its uttermost bounds, and a host of signs indicate from day to day the drift of public feel- ing and the intentions of voters, the plans of can- didates and the purposes of the opposition. — The minute personal acquaintance which makes this knowledge forcible, constitutes the real strength of the “machine” in American politics, which, like all organization that produces real results, is not a venal accident, but the fruit of The men who make up the party ministry, intrusted with its direction, are not speakers, for speaking would be wasted on their work; nor political thinkers, for their object is not to carry out a policy, but to win an election. They are generally almost un- known to the public, and they have all the Con- tempt of the professional expert for amateurs in their chosen field. Beginning with the careful management of a ward, they have risen by the rude natural selection of political strife; and con- 120 PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. ventions, while they often make mistakes in can- didates, rarely blunder in their selection of man- agers. Inevitably, by the time the members of an executive committee, and still more the chair- man and secretary, have “run” a campaign, par- ticularly a successful campaign, their influence is felt and their personality known throughout the party organization. The next summer, when the state committee meets, and issues a call for the next convention, which will select its succes- Sor, the managers are in a vastly better position to touch the springs of party action and secure a convention to their liking than any one else. Nor does this control of the convention end with the election of delegates. In theory, each conven- tion is still a public meeting which organizes it- self; in practice, by unwritten law now almost invariably followed, the chairman of the state committee, acting as its representative, calls the convention to order, and proposes the “tempo- rary” chairman. This chairman, whose election is so much a matter of course that in New York state, for instance, the selection of another chair- man has occurred only once in both parties for twenty-five years, appoints the crucial committees on a permanent organization and on credentials; the one decides the officers of the convention, and the other its roll. While formally made by the “temporary” chairman, these committees are actually selected by the state committee, each of its members naming one for his con- gressional or state senatorial district. To per- sonal influence with the party organization in the selection of delegates, the state committee, and particularly its executive committee, add, therefore, a profound influence in directing the action and determining the character of the con- vention, while it is still an inchoate body. If state and other conventions sat, as legislatures do, for a term of months, the discovery of debate would disclose other leaders; but conventions very rarely sit over two days, and usually only one. The practical result is, that acquaintance and knowledge of men, acquired beforehand, is everything in the swift canvass and rapid combi- nations of twenty-four hours. In all this, the cam- paign manager has an overpowering advantage. He accomplishes his results in the brief and wake- ful night, while his amateur opponent is marshal- ing his forces and ascertaining on whom he can depend. The wonder is, not that the machine wins, but that it is ever beaten.—A comprehensive union of the scattered members of party organi- zation has never yet been successfully attempted. It was proposed in 1880 by the national democratic committee, that in future the chairmen of state committees should be elected to membership in its ranks, that the members of state committees should preside over district committees, and so on down; but this artificial plan collapsed at the start through the natural jealousy of state mana- gers. In both parties each series of committees acts independently in its own sphere. In the presidential election the national executive com- mittee overshadows all the rest, but its immediate efforts are confined to doubtful states; the state executive committee in like manner is most active and exerts the widest influence where party suc- cess is most doubtful; and, while least is heard of them by the general public, and least known except by politicians, the little local committees which “run” a ward or township are the most vital and permanent of all. An organization, adopted in 1882 by the democratic party in Penn- sylvania, has carried party evolution in a state to its last form in the United States by linking the state committee to these local bodies through a provision that each county Organization, with an apportionment based on state Senatorial dis- tricts, shall elect a member to the state committee. This body has, therefore, become permanent and independent of the state convention, the party having provided itself, by a curious and uncon- scious imitation of the federal government, with a permanent executive. Add to this the progress made in some rural Pennsylvania counties in bringing 90 to 95 per cent. of the registered party voters to the polls in choosing the county organi- zation, and it will be seen that this state, as in 1820–30, has probably anticipated the inevitable path of party development elsewhere. —I. The National Convention. The call for a national convention in all organized parties is issued by the national committee, a body consisting, in the democratic party, of a member from each state, and, in the republican party, of a member from each state and territory. In both cases this mem- ber has been selected by the delegation from each state or territory at the preceding national Con- vention. The organization of the committee takes place immediately after the convention, its choice of a chairman and executive committee is usually greatly influenced by the wishes of the presidential candidate, and to this select body is generally committed the immediate conduct of a presidential campaign. After the campaign is over, the committee rarely meets until it assembles to call the next convention. Its membership is generally, not always, made up of men both of wealth and political influence, as a campaign as- sessment is expected from each member, and a large sum from the chairman; in the two cam- paigns, 1876 and 1880, $25,000 or more in each party. The call names the time, place and ap- portionment of the convention. In a republican convention the call provides for a body twice the size of the electoral college, with two delegates from each territory. In a democratic national convention, down to 1880, the number of delegates was an indifferent matter, each state delegation casting a vote equal to its electoral vote; but as the delegates are in general twice this number, and are not always required to act as a unit, half- votes result, being the choice of single delegates. In 1880 each state was directed to send twice its electoral representation. The republican national convention in 1880 directed its national committee to prepare before the next national convention a PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. 121 plan for the apportionment of representation in future conventions by district representation and upon the party vote. Twice in a republican convention the candidate has been decided by the vote of territorial delegates, whose votes carried R. B. Hayes in 1876, and J. A. Garfield in 1880, across the majority line. The national committee, in whose meetings written proxies are by usage allowed, besides issuing the call, decides the pro- visional roll of the convention pending organiza- tion, and passes in this way upon contests, provides the temporary organization, and has charge of the approaches to the convention—three most im- portant prerogatives. In republican conventions the adoption of a platform precedes the choice of a candidate; in democratic conventions it succeeds the nomination. In both, while the term “ballot.” is used, the voting for candidates is vivá voce, the “chairman * of each delegation announcing the numerical vote of his state. If this is questioned in a republican convention, the roll of the con- vention can be called by the secretary of the convention. In democratic conventions it is the rule, not without exceptions, to treat the action of a delegation as final; and a majority of one, if the delegation be instructed to vote as a unit, is permitted to direct the entire vote of the largest state. The theory of the republican convention is, that the delegates standing for congressional districts are chosen by those districts, either di- rectly by conventions in them or by the delegates from those districts to the state convention, acting as a separate group; the state convention merely certifying this result, the selection and control of the state convention being limited to the four delegates-at-large apportioned by each state. This theory was questioned by the supporters of ex- President Grant’s nomination in 1880; but the convention established district representation as the common law of the party. The democratic national convention is, on the other hand, organ- ized upon the theory that the entire state delega- tion is appointed and controlled by the state convention, which acts for the party in the state as a whole. Its instructions are therefore manda- tory, and are so recognized by the party conven- tion. In both parties the call for the national convention is followed by a call issued by each state committee for a state convention, to choose delegates. In New England, and in some of the western states, each district chooses its pair of delegates, and the state convention chooses the state delegates-at-large ; but in a majority of states the work is done at a single convention, the delegates from each district presenting their choice, and the convention passing on the entire list. Inflexible usage requires residence, within a state or district, of their delegates, who are in general a picked body of most able men, aver- aging above the level of congressmen. The im- portance of the issue, the size and character of the assemblage, the immense throng of spectators, and the rapidity of its decisions, make a national Convention the most imposing and interesting with the previous convention. body in American politics. – II. The State Con- 0.67%tºon. State conventions have been held since the war by each party before every general elec- tion, for the nomination of state candidates and the adoption of a platform, and, as above stated, Once in four years, to choose delegates to a national convention. The call is in all cases issued by the state central committee, originating The powers of a state committee over the preliminaries of a state convention are like those described above in na- tional affairs. In addition, in New York state, the State committee names the committee which re- ports a permanent organization. The guard of a state committee over the hall in which a regular convention sits is sometimes insufficient to prevent its forcible capture, as in the New York democratic convention in 1859, and the Massachusetts demo- cratic convention in 1878. The control of a state committee will not convert a minority in a con- vention" into a majority; but it is invaluable in enabling a small and brittle majority to carry out the wishes of skillful leaders by giving it a defi- nite course to pursue. The apportionment of del- egates to a state convention is still, in a major- ity of the states, upon the basis of the lower branch of the state legislature; but in many states, as in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois, etc., in both parties, and in New York and most other states, in the republican party, an apportionment is based upon the last party vote. The size of state conventions varies from 1,200 to 1,400 in New Jersey to small bodies of between 100 and 200; the average being be- tween 300 and 500. Substitutes are always per- mitted; and as late as 1883 the state democratic convention in Ohio contained county delegations on the “mass system,” a large number of voters coming en masse from a county and casting its apportioned vote in the convention. —III. Local Party Government. The county convention in rural districts consists of delegates from the towns, and is, in its county committee and general work- ing, a miniature of the state party machinery, and needs no special description. Conventions and committees exist, likewise, for congressional districts, and while conventions meet for every possible nomination, a standing committee is in- frequently appointed by these bodies. A sketch of local party machinery in New York city is given in the article on CAUCUS. Primaries for the purpose of providing permanent party ma- chinery, aside from those held to select delegates to nominating conventions, are also held by the republican party in Philadelphia, and by the democratic party in Jersey City, N. J., and in Albany, N. Y., in each case leading to the cor- rupt control of party machinery, while a party democratic registry exists in South Carolina. In addition to the network of districts thrown over an American city, Philadelphia and New York are, for instance, divided into congressional, state, senatorial and representative, aldermanic and judicial districts, besides electing county and 122 PATENT OFFICE. city officers. Taking both parties together, from fifty to sixty conventions are held in each of these cities on the eve of an important election. None but professional politicians are able either to understand or follow this complicated mill for grinding out candidates, and a permanent local organization relieves the busy citizen of all con- cern in the matter by providing him with a choice between two equally bad nominations. – As a result, the final evolution of party government in the United States has been the appearance in city politics of self-appointed committees, of which the Philadelphia “committee of 100” is a most conspicuous instance, made up of leading mer- chants who have assumed political control, “in- dorsing ” party nominations, furnishing tickets and workers at the polls, prosecuting repeaters, conducting long investigations into city offices, and securing the passage of needed legislation. The downfall of Tweed was in great measure due to such a committee, the “committee of 70,” and the appearance in American politics of such committees has so far uniformly been for góod. They are in general accepted as more closely expressing the popular will than city Con- ventions, and in time such committees are likely to play a wider part. Simple as American party gov- ernment appears in this outline, it must be remem- bered that it places the voter at many removes from the exercise of power. In dealing with a presidential nomination, the voter, for instance, shares in choosing delegates to a ward convention, which chooses delegates to a city or county con- vention, which sends delegates to a state conven- tion, which names the delegates who name the candidate. The surprise is, that the popular will is felt at all through these removes, no one of which has the guarantee of law save the first in some states, and the action of nominating conven- tions in Ohio, where bribery in such conventions is made a crime. TALCOTT WILLIAMS. PARTY NAMES IN U. S. HISTORY. (See AMERICAN PARTY, ANTI-FEDERAL PARTY, ANTI- MASONIC PARTY, CONSTITUTIONAL UNION PARTY, DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, FEDERAL PAR- TY, GREENBACK-LABOR PARTY, LIBERAL-REPUB- LICAN PARTY, REPUBLICAN PARTY, WHIG PARTY.) PATENT OFFICE. Although the issue of American patents is nearly coeval with the gov- ernment of the United States, the first creation of the patent office, with a commissioner of patents, dates from the year 1836. Prior to that date patents were issued directly by the department of state. By act of July 4, 1836, an office denomi- nated the patent office was created, to be attached to the department of state, and a fire-proof build- ing for its use was provided for. The chief officer, styled the commissioner of patents, was required to perform all acts touching the granting of patents for new and useful inventions, with a salary of $3,000, and seven clerks. to be signed by the secretary of state, and coun- Patents were tersigned by the commissioner. The number of patents issued in the earlier years was very small, varying, from 1837 to 1847, from about 400 to 600 per annum; but since 1865 the business has enormously increased, until now the number of patents annually issued is about 16,000, with fees. (averaging $35 for each patent) amounting to about $800,000 per annum. The patent office is not only Self-supporting, the fees paying all run- ning expenses, with the salaries of some 350 clerks, but it actually pays into the treasury of the United States an annual surplus of about $200,000. It has been urged with some force, that the inventors of the country should not be taxed beyond the actual cost of administering the business con- nected with the registry of patents, and that a large reduction of patent fees ought in equity to be made. — By the act of 1836 patents were granted for fourteen years, with the right of ex- tension for seven years longer, at the discretion of the commissioner of patents. In 1861 the law now in force was enacted, making the term of original patents seventeen years; and no extension for patents granted since March 2, 1861, is allowed except by special act of congress. A very few patents have been thus renewed, and many more have been asked for, upon the plea of insufficient remuneration to their owners. The last patents. extendable by the patent office expired in 1875. — The commissioner of patents is appointed by the president and senate for no definite term of office, with a salary of $4,500. He is aided by an assist- , ant commissioner (salary, $3,000) three examiners- in-chief (salary, $3,000 each), one examiner of interferences (salary, $2,500) and twenty-five ex- aminers (salary, $2,400 each), each of the twenty- five having charge of one of the following distinct classes of inventions: 1, agriculture; 2, agricult- ural products; 3, metallurgy, brewing and gas; 4, civil engineering; 5, fine arts; 6, chemistry; 7, harvesters; 8, household; 9, hydraulics and pneu- matics; 10, carriages, wagons and cars; 11, leather- working machinery and products; 12, mechanical engineering; 13, metal-working, class A.; 14, metal, working, class B; 15, plastics; 16, philosophical; 17, printing and paper manufacturing; 18, steam engineering; 19, calorifics, stoves and lamps; 20, builders’ hardware, locks and surgery; 21, fabrics and textile machinery; 22, fire-arms, navigation, signals and wood-working; 23, trade marks and labels; 24, designs and sewing machines; 25, milling. Besides these, there are about 300 assistant examiners, clerks, messengers, etc., the annual salaries of the office reaching $537,000 per annum.—The commissioner of patents is required to make an annual report of the business of the office, with a list of patents issued during the year. This valuable series of reports began with 1837, and for a series of years included a report upon arts and manufactures and upon agriculture in one annual volume. With the year 1849 began the issue of the agricultural report in a separate volume, which was continued until 1861, after which the commissioner of patents no longer PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. 123 issued an agricultural report, the department of agriculture having been created in 1862. The series of patent office reports, issued annually with Specifications and [sometimes] drawings, was con- tinued until 1871 (the set, 1837–71, numbering sixty-five volumes on Arts and Manufactures, and thirteen volumes on Agriculture), after which the method of publication of patents was radically changed, the annual reports being succeeded by the following publications: 1. Specifications and Drawings of Patents issued from the United States Patent Office, May 30, 1871, to December, 1883. Of these, 196 volumes in quarto (weekly for the first year, monthly from July, 1872,) have been issued. 2. Official Gazette of the United States Patent Office (weekly) January, 1872, to December, 1883, 24 vols. 8vo. This contains the full list of patents, decisions in patent cases, etc., with drawings in reduced size. 3. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents. These contain, since 1872, a bare list or index of patents annually issued, without specifications or draw- ings, but with references to the Official Gazette and monthly volumes of specifications, and a statement of the aggregate business of the office for the calendar year. Besides these, the office has issued a “Subject-matter Index of Patents for Inventions issued by the U. S. Patent Office from 1790 to 1873,” 3 vols., Washington, 1873. There should also be noted as covering the com- paratively small record of inventive art from 1790 to 1837, “A List of Patents granted by the U. S. from April 10, 1790, to Dec. 31, 1836, with Appendix of Reports of the Patent Office in 1823, 1830 and 1831,” 8vo., Washington, 1872. Pam- phlets containing the patent laws, the rules of practice in the patent office, etc., are furnished to all applicants. – The patent office building was burned in December, 1836, with the models accu- mulated, many of which were replaced by act of congress. Again, in 1877, a part of the office, with several thousand models, was destroyed by fire, but the loss was largely repaired by the manufacture of new models. – On the creation of the department of the interior in 1849, the patent office was transferred to that department, where it now remains, all patents being signed by the secretary of the interior, and countersigned by the commissioner of patents. The patent office, with its vast accumulation of 275,000 models, occupies the larger portion of the great marble building known as the interior depart- ment. The arrangement and display of models of patents in its long halls is extensive and inter- esting, and the heavy additions of each year will soon require much more space than is now at command. — The following is a list of commis- sioners of patents, with the commencement of the term of service of each: © 1. Henry L. Ellsworth---------------------- July 4, 1836 2. Edmund Burke-------------------------- May 5, 1845 3. Thomas Ewbank------------------------- May 9, 1849 4. Silas H. Hodges ------------------------- Nov. 1, 1852 5. Charles Mason--------------------------- March 24, 1853 6. Joseph Holt ----------------------------- Sept. 9, 1857 7. William D. Bishop---------------------- May 7, 1859 8. Philip F. Thomas----------------------- Feb. 15, 1860 9. David P. Holloway --------------------- March 28, 1861 10. Thomas C. Theaker--------------------- Aug. 15, 1865 11. Elisha Foote---------------------------- July 28, 1868 13, Samuel S. Fisher------------------------ May 1, 1869 13. Mortimer D. Leggett-------------------- Jan. 16, 1871 14. John M. Thacher ----------------------- Nov. 1, 1874 15, R. Holland Duell ----------------------- Oct. 1, 1875 16, Ellis Spear------------------------------ Jan. 30, 1877 17. Halbert E. Paine------------------------ Nov. 1, 1878 18. Edgar M. Marble------------------------ May 7, 1880 19. Benjamin Butterworth------------------ Oct. 26, 1883. A. R. SPOFFORD. PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. The patent system has assumed during the nine- teenth century an important office in the economy of modern industrial communities. Its develop- ment is closely interwoven with the phenomenal material progress and the immense extension of applied science which distinguish that period. Especially has this system been identified with the extraordinary development of the physical resources of the United States. The patent laws. have been extended and improved to meet or antici- pate the wants of the growing nation, and now, in its more modernform, the patent system may almost be said to be a peculiarly American institution. It is estimated that at present more than two-fifths of the world’s important inventions originate in the United States. The records of our patent office are sought for and studied by the inventors and the sci- entists of every nation, and the wisdom of our ad- vanced patent policy is almost universally admit- ted. Sir William Thomson said, in 1876: “If Eu- rope does not amend its patent laws “ ” Amorica. will speedily become the nursery of important inventions for the world.” No feature of Our fed- eral system has been proven of greater economic importance than the patent system. It will be treated, as fully as the limits of this article will permit, under the following heads: I. History of the System in England and America; II. The Existing American Patent Law, and the Proce- dure under it; III. The General Policy of a Sys- tem of Patent Laws; IV. Changes in the Exist- ing Law which would be desirable; W. Foreign Patent Laws. – I. HISTORY. 1. In England. The origin of the patent system has been re- motely traced to the guild monopolies which were a dominant feature of the urban industries of mediaeval Europe. In its modern aspect and theory, however, the system bears no resemblance to the exclusive and grasping trades customs which brought the guilds into reproach; and it is generally conceded that the existing practice of letters patent for inventions is distinctively English in its origin. The form of the grant of a patent of invention can be directly traced to the exercise of the ancient prerogative of the English crown in its grants of exclusive privileges. The arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of this pre-, rogative resulted in the oppressive and galling monopolies which were abolished in the constitu- tional struggles of the seventeenth century. The grant of monopolies for inventions, on the other hand, seems always to have been regarded as just 124 PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. and constitutional. These were excepted from the sweeping prohibitions of the great statute of monopolies, enacted in 1624; and upon the provi- sos of that act there has been reared the modern English patent system, which in its essential fea- tures has been extended into nearly every civilized state. — The earliest recorded exercise of the prerogative of the English crown, in a manner analogous to the grant of a patent, was the grant by Edward III. to two aldermen of a patent of privilege that they and their assigns should have the sole making of the philosopher's stone. Priv- ileges of this nature, although rare at this early period, seem not to have been considered anoma- lous, for it is stated in a case reported in the Year Book, part iv., 40, Edw. III., fol. 17, 18, that arts and sciences which are for the public good are greatly favored in the law, and the king, as chief guardian of the common weal, has power and authority by his prerogative to grant many privileges, although prima facie they appear to be clearly against common right. On the other hand, the early popular and judicial disapproval of mere monopolies is shown by the fact, that about the end of the reign of Edward III., John Peechie, of London, was severely punished for procuring a license under the great seal for the exclusive sale of sweet wines in London. (3 Inst., 181.) Two centuries later, grants of patents, as well as of mere monopolies, had become less un- usual. The reports of cases decided in the reign of Elizabeth contain dicta from which it appears, that, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the English lawyers and judges had attained to something approaching the modern conception of patents. In the ninth year of Elizabeth a patent was granted to a Mr. Hastinges of the sole trade for several years of making frisadoes, in consid- eration that he had brought the method of making them from Amsterdam. This patent was consid- ered valid until it was shown that some clothiers had, before its date, made baize of a similar ma- terial. (Noy Rep., 182.) In another case decided in this reign, a patent having been granted for the sole and only use of a sieve, or instrument for melting lead, it was said in the court of exchequer chamber, that the question was, whether it was newly invented by the grantee, whereby he might have the privilege of exclusive power over it, or else used before, in which case they were of opinion that he should not have the sole use of it. (Noy Rep., 183.) But the strongest of these early cases is Darcy vs. Allein, decided 44 Eliza- beth, which contains the following: “Where any man by his own charge or industry, or by his own wit or invention, brings any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending to the furtherance of a trade, that never was used before; and that for the good of the realm; in such cases the king may grant to him a monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring, by his invention, to the commonwealth; otherwise not.” — These cases contain the com- mon law germs of our existing systems of patent law. In the next reign was passed (1624) the statute of monopolies, which seems to be the first statutory recognition of patents for inventions, as it is also the final parliamentary denunciation of mere monopolies. The proviso of this statute, which is still the foundation of English patent law, is as follows: “Provided, also, and be it enacted, that any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters patent and grants of privileges for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working and making of any manner of new manufacture within the realm, to the true and first inventor or inventors of such manufacture, which others at the time of making such letters patent shall not use, so as also they be not contrary to law, or hurtful of trade, or generally inconvenient.” This statute is regarded as merely declaratory of the common law, and the following essentials of a valid patent are enumerated by Sir Edward Coke in his “Institutes”: “First, it must be for the term of fourteen years or under. Secondly, it must be granted to the first and true inventor. Thirdly, it must be of such manufactures, which any other at the making of such letters patents did not use; for albeit it were newly invented, yet if any other did use it at the making of the letters pat- ents, or grant of the priviledge, it is declared and enacted to be void by this act. Fourthly, the priv- iledge must not be contrary to law: such a privi- ledge as is consonant to law, must be substantially and essentially newly invented; but if the substance was in esse before, and a new addition thereunto, though that addition make the former more profit- able, yet is it not a new manufacture in law; and so it was resolved in the exchequer chamber, Pasch, 15 Eliz., in Bircot's case for a priviledge concerning the preparing and melting, etc., of lead ore; for there it was said, that that was to put but a new button to an old coat; and it is much easier to adde then to invent. And there it was also resolved, that if the new manufacture be substantially invented according to law, yet no old manufacture in use can be prohibited. Fifth- ly, nor mischievous to the state by raising of prices of commodities at home. In every such new manufacture that deserves a priviledge, there must be urgens necessitas, and evidens utilitas. Sixthly, nor to the hurt of trade. This is very material and evident. Seventhly, nor generally inconvenient. There was a new invention found out heretofore that bonnets and caps might be thickened in a filling mill, by which means more might be thickened and filled in one day then by the labours of fourscore men, who got their livings by it. It was ordained that bonnets and caps should be thickened and fulled by the strength of men, and not in a fulling mill, for it was holden inconvenient to turn so many labouring men to idlenesse. If any of these seven qualities fail, thé priviledge is declared and enacted to be void by this act, * * and yet this act maketh them no better then they should have been, if this act had PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. 125 never been made, but only except and exempt them out of the purvieu and penalty of this law.” (Coke, 3 Inst., 184.) — In spite of its crude eco- nomic notions, this commentary is an interesting and instructive epitome of the early English pat- ent law. It throws light upon the origin of not a few of the legal doctrines which are the foun- dation of the patent laws of more modern times. Moreoverit may be regarded as embodying nearly all of what continued to be the learning in this branch of jurisprudence for more than a century and a half after Coke's time. The system con- tinued in a comparatively rudimentary condition until near the end of the last century. One or two incidents in its history should, however, be noticed. In 1639 a proclamation was issued, abolishing “all patents for new inventions not put in practice from the date of their respective grants.” A still more important change was effected during Queen Anne's reign. Prior to this time the only recorded description of the invention or discovery protected by patent, was contained in a few words, giving merely the name of the process or the purpose of the invention. But about this time the practice was introduced, appearing first in Hill's patent granted in 1713, of requiring a patentee to cause a specification or complete description of his invention “to be in- rolled in Her Majestie's High Court of Chancery” within a certain time, generally two or three months, of the date of the patent. This practice ultimately became general; and the theory then arose that the grant of a patent constituted a sort of contract between the patentee and the state, whereby the patentee was protected in the exclu- sive practice of his invention in consideration of his furnishing in the specification a complete description of his invention for the public benefit after the expiration of his patent. The specifica- tions of some of the earlier patents throw a curi- ous light upon the economic notions of the people. Weisenthal’s specification (1755) was for “Work- ing Fine Thread in Needlework, after the Manner of Dresden Needlework, and for erecting a Man- ufacture of that Sort in this Kingdom so as to be of Public Utility, and enable Poor Girls of Eight Years Old to maintain themselves without being burthensome to the Parish to which they belong.” Other patents were granted for the few crude scientific discoveries and inventions of the time. No material progress was made, however, in the further development of the patent system until, at the end of the last century, a series of important dis- coveries was made which heralded the beginning of a new era in the physical sciences. These inven- tions were patented, and the patents became the subjects of contests which ended in a series of ad- judications, beginning with Arkwright's case in 1785, in the course of which there were discussed and settled many of the fundamental principles of patent law. The inventions of Watt, and Har- greave, and Crompton, and Cartwright, soon di- rected attention upon the patent laws. Stimulated by the example of these men and by the hope of reward, men began to devote their energies to devising improvements upon the crude methods then employed in the industrial arts. The num- ber of inventions rapidly increased; and while in 1750 the number of English patents granted was Only seven, in 1800, ninety-six were issued; in 1825, two hundred and fifty; and the British pat- ent office now issues annually between three and four thousand patents. The last steps in the de- velopment of the English system were the passage of the act 5 and 6 Wm. IV., c. 83, in 1835, and the patent law amendment act in 1852, which brought the system into its present condition; and finally, during the present year (1883), there has been passed an “Act to amend and consoli- date the law relating to patents for inventions, registration of designs and trademarks.” This act makes certain changes in the present law which are to go into effect Jan. 1, 1884. —2. In America. A few of the earlier British patents, as Cumberland's patent (1720), were granted for “Our Said Kingdom of Great Britain, called England, our Dominion of Wales, and Town of Berwick-upon-Tweed; our Kingdom of Ireland, and Our Colonies and Plantacions in America.” Letters patent for inventions appear also to have been granted by the different colonies before the revolution. In 1641, Samuel Winslow, of Massa- chusetts, obtained from the general court of that colony a patent for his process of making salt; and in 1656 a son of Gov. Winthrop obtained a patent for another salt making process. Patents were similarly granted in Connecticut during the colonial period; but no organized patent system existed here until after the establishment of the federal government. The basis of the American patent system is the clause in the United States constitution which confers upon congress power “To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Patents thus became the subject of federal legislation, and in pursuance of the power so delegated, congress has passed a series of patent laws, commencing with the act of 1790. Under this act letters patent were granted upon “any useful art, manufacture, engine, ma- chine or device, or any improvement therein, not before known or used,” for “any term not ex- ceeding fourteen years.” The application for a patent was made to the secretary of war, the sec- retary of state and the attorney general, and it required the concurrent action of two of those officials to issue the patent. The specification or description of the invention was certified by the attorney general, and the patent on its issue was sealed with the great seal and signed by the president. No distinction was made in this act between foreigners and citizens, and there was no examination of the novelty or patentability of inventions. In 1793 a second act was passed Superseding the former one, and making changes in the system. Patents were issued only to citi- zens of the United States, and applicants were 126 PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. required, before United States patents could issue to them, to Surrender any patents that might have been granted to them by the dif- ferent states before the federal government was established. This statute also provided that the application should be made to the secretary of state, and that interferences between applications should be decided by a board of three arbitra- tors. A government fee of $30 was established, and a penalty of triple damages imposed on in- fringers. Supplemental acts were passed in 1794 and 1800, the latter of which extended patent privileges to aliens who at the time of making application had been for two years resident in the United States, and required all applications made pursuant to that act to be accompanied by an Oath to the effect that, to the best of the appli- cant’s knowledge and belief, the invention “ had not been known or used in this or any foreign country.” A few years later the constitutional question arose whether a state still had power to grant patents, notwithstanding the provision of the constitution giving power of legislation on patents to congress. In 1798 an act had been passed by the New York legislature granting to Robert R. Liv- ingston “the sole and exclusive right and privi- lege of constructing, making, using, employing and navigating all and every species or kinds of boats or watercraft, which might be urged or im- pelled through the water, by the force of fire or steam, in all creeks, rivers, bays and waters what- soever, within the territory and jurisdiction of this state,” for the term of twenty years from the passage of the act, provided that he should, within twelve months, construct a boat of at least twenty tons capacity to be propelled by steam, the mean progress of which, against the current or tide of the Hudson river, should be not less than four miles an hour. Livingston having failed to accomplish this, the same provisions were re-enacted in 1803, and again in 1808, securing like privileges to Livingston and Robert Fulton. Steam navigation having now become an accom- plished fact through the efforts of these men, oth- ers undertook, without license from them, to use the same motive power in navigating the Hudson. Livingston and Fulton then applied to the state courts for an injunction, which was at first denied on the ground that the act of the New York legis- lature was contrary to the clause of the United States constitution giving congress power to leg- islate upon letters patent. But upon appeal, Thompson and Kent, J.J., held that the act was constitutional, on the ground that federal jurisdic- tion Over patents was not exclusive, and the in- junction was granted (Livingston vs. Van Ingen, 9 Johns, 506.) Similar privileges were then granted in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Tennessee, to citizens of those States. The question of the constitutionality of this legislation was subsequently raised in the United States Supreme court, in Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1. The precise point was not decided, however, the New York act being held to be unconstitutional, because in contravention of the laws of the United States regulating commerce. Since that time, however, notwithstanding the eminent dissenting authority of Chancellor Kent and Judge Tucker, the opinion has prevailed that federal jurisdiction Over patents is exclusive, and the question must now be regarded as so settled. — In 1819 a law was enacted by congress, giving the United States circuit courts original jurisdiction of all actions arising under the patent or copyright laws of the United States. The first provision for the “reissue” of defective patents was made in the act of 1832, which also provided for the annual publication of the lists of expired patents, and established a system of renewing or extending patents about to expire upon application to con- gress. Another statute, passed in 1832, extended patent privileges still further by permitting every resident alien who had duly made a preliminary declaration of his intention to become a citizen, to obtain patents on condition of introducing the inventions into public use in the United States within a year of the date of the patents. – Such was the earlier legislation of congress upon pat- ents; and although many important inventions and discoveries were protected under these laws, the patent system as a whole remained as yet in a comparatively undeveloped state. It is stated that from 1790 till 1803 the whole business of issuing patents was practically done by one of the clerks in the department of state. In 1803 Dr. Thornton was appointed by Jefferson superintend- ent of this branch, and held the office until 1827. The whole number of patents issued from 1790 to 1836, a period of forty-six years, was only 10,020. The patent office now issues more than that num- ber every year. During this period, however, the elementary principles of law governing patent rights were settled in the courts, and the foun- dation was laid in the decisions of Marshall and Story for the subsequent development of that branch of jurisprudence. — The year 1836 marks an era in the development of the American system. In that year an act was passed which superseded the earlier legislation, and in an elab- orate series of provisions, brought the patent system into something like its present condition. The patent office was established as a branch of the department of state, and a staff of officials created, with the commissioner of patents at the head. The most important feature of the law was the provision requiring a preliminary examination to be made into the novelty and patentability of each invention before issuing the patent. This was a radical innovation, but it has proved a beneficent one. This law also made provision for the decision of interfering applications, and enabled aliens, after a year's residence in the United States, and under the conditions of the former act, to take out patents. The government fee for citizens and resident aliens was fixed at $30, while for subjects of Great Britain it was $500, and for other aliens $300. The reissue practice was confirmed and extended, and provision was PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. 127 made for the filing of caveats on incompleted in- ventions. The recovery in suits for infringement was restricted to the actual damage proven, except in cases where exemplary damages were proper, when triple damages were allowed. Exclusive jurisdiction in patent causes was conferred upon the United States circuit courts, and a board, con- sisting of the commissioner of patents, the secre- tary of state and the solicitor of the treasury, was constituted for the purpose of hearing and passing upon applications for the extension of patents. In certain cases extensions of seven years were allowed. Provision was also made in this law for the record of assignments of patents, for the estab- lishment of the patent office library, and for the 'exhibition of the models which had accumulated since the beginning of the system. In that same year (1836), however, the burning of the patent office destroyed theinteresting collection of models, :as well as many valuable records, of the earlier patent system. A statute passed in the following year established a method of restoring or replacing the more important of the destroyed models and records, and also introduced the practice of filing disclaimers in cases where the original patents were void through inadvertently excessive claims. "The act of 1839 provided that the existence of a foreign patent more than six months prior to ap- plication here, should not be a bar to obtaining a United States patent, except in cases where the invention had been introduced into common and public use in this country; but the United States patent was made to terminate fourteen years from the date of the foreign patent. A further pro- vision of this act was that “no patent shall be held to be invalid by reason of purchase, sale or use prior to the application for a patent, except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public, or that such purchase, sale or prior use has been for more than two years prior to such application for a patent.” In 1842 provision was made for patenting designs for the term of seven years, and patented articles were required to be stamped “Patented,” with the date of patenting, for the neglect of which a penalty was imposed. The system was further extended by the acts of 1848 and 1849, which latter act made the patent office a branch of the department of the interior. Minor changes were made in the succeeding years, and in 1861 an important act was passed empower- ing the commissioner to establish rules governing procedure in the patent office. The term of pat- ents for inventions was extended to its present length of seventeen years, and the former laws discriminating between citizens and aliens were repealed. A uniform scale of fees was adopted, like that now in force; and in interference cases witnesses were compelled to attend and testify as before a court. A board of examiners in chief was constituted, intermediate between the exam- liners and the commissioner, to hear appeals from the former. Finally, by the act of 1870, the for- mer legislation was revised and consolidated, and the System brought into its present condition. The provisions of this patent code are contained in some seventy sections, the effect of which will be considered under the statement of existing law. Meanwhile, the number of inventions has enor- mously increased. In 1837, 435 patents were is- sued; in 1860, 4,819; and in 1882, 18,467. These figures adequately represent the rate of the growth of the system and its present extent. — II. ExIST- ING LAW AND PROCEDURE. Under the present act of congress “any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, man- ufacture or composition. of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, not known or used by others in this country, and not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his invention or discovery thereof, and not in public use or on sale for more than two years prior to his appli- cation, unless the same is proved to have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the duty re- quired by law and other due proceedings had, obtain a patent therefor.” — 1. Subject Matter. It will be observed that provision is made in the statute for patenting four classes of inventions or discoveries: arts, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, — The statute term “art” is intended and construed to cover cases in which the essence of the invention consists in the mode, process or art of doing a thing or accomplishing a result, and not the particular machinery, appa- ratus or device employed. A mere abstract prin- ciple can not be the subject of a patent, nor is the function or abstract effect of a machine patentable. But the statutory expression covers and protects a comprehensive class of inventions which are com- binations of arrangements and processes to work out new and useful results, and which are thus patentable irrespective of the particular forms of the instrumentalities used. —Inventions included within the term “machine” are obviously those which consist of a particular mechanism or de- vice, or a combination of mechanical devices or parts, as distinguished from a tool or instrument. To sustain a patent for a machine it is only neces- sary that the combination to produce certain effects be new, whether the separate devices or elements be new or old, provided that the combination is of such a nature that the inventive faculty was exer- cised in devising it; and, generally speaking, “a machine is rightfully the subject of a patent when- ever a new or an old effect is produced by mechanism new in its combinations, arrangements or mode of operation.” (Curtis' Law of Patents, 20.)—The term “manufacture” is construed in the sense in which it is popularly used, to mean the product or fabric of a machine or of human art or industry. To be properly the subject of a patent as a manufacture, the product must itself be essentially new. Thus, an article in common use can not be patented as a new manufacture merely because it is fabricated by the use of new and improved machinery; nor is a product patent- able under this head merely because a machine makes it more perfectly than it can be made with- 128 PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. Out a machine. — The term “composition of mat- ter” includes “patent medicines” and all com- pounds or mixtures of substances, as articles of food, etc. The resultant article or “composition ” must, of course, be new, to be the subject of a patent, but the question is not, whether the ingre- dients or components are new, but whether there is novelty in the combination, and the novelty may consist in combining, in new proportions, ingredients which have already been in extensive and common use for the purpose of producing a similar composition. — Besides the foregoing classes of the subject matter of patentable in- ventions, the statute provides for patenting “im- provements,” and the larger number of patents are issued for improvements. It was early decided that a patent for the improvement of a machine is the same thing as a patent for an improved machine, but of course the patent can only be taken for the new combination. It should be noticed that the patent office does not undertake to determine whether the improvement will in- fringe an existing patent. But if the improve- ment is novel, the patent is issued and the question of infringement left to the courts. The test of the validity of a patent for an improvement of an existing machine, is to ascertain whether there has been actual and substantial change, or merely formal alteration requiring no invention. If no substantially new element has been added to the old machine, the patent can not be sustained; but if some really new feature has been introduced into the old mechanism, which causes it to operate differently or produces a new or better effect, then such addition will properly be the subject of a patent as an improvement. Two classes of ques- tions therefore arise in passing upon the validity of a patent for an improvement of a machine. First, where the effects produced are the same, the inquiry is, whether the modus operandi of the improved machine is substantially the same as that Of the old machine, or whether the difference in operation is sufficient to sustain a patent; second, where the effects produced by the improved and by the old machine are different, then the nature and quality of the effect will be the criterion of the validity of the patent. It should be added, that there is no distinction between an improve- ment on a patented machine and on One that is not patented. —2. Qualities of Patentable Inventions. The essential qualities of a patentable invention are very broadly indicated in the statute. The terms employed in the act are “invented or dis- covered,” “new and useful art, machine,” etc., and the question, what constitutes a patentable inven- tion, is therefore to be answered by referring to the adjudications of English and American courts, which constitute the common law of the patent system. It should be noted first, that “invented” and “discovered” are synonymous in the patent law; “novelty” and “utility,” required by our statute, have always been held vitally essential qualities of patentable inventions; and the degree of novelty and utility—the “sufficiency of inven- tion ”—necessary to support a patent, has been determined by the courts in the numerous cases which have presented these questions for adjudi- cation. The degree of absolute utility required in an invention is, however, slight. It is only necessary that the invention shall not be positively trivial, nor, on the other hand, noxious to public health or morals. The principal inquiry in patent law is therefore into the novelty of the invention, for the whole theory upon which the patent sys- tem rests, is that the patentee offers the world something new in consideration for his exclusive patent privilege. The novelty required by the American law is universal novelty, with the one exception that mere prior knowledge or use abroad will not defeat the rights of a native in- ventor, if the foreign invention has not been pat- ented or described in any printed publication be- fore the date of the American invention. The general principles governing the essential degree of novelty may be briefly summarized as follows: It is established in the early cases that a new use of an old thing—technically called a “double use”—is not patentable. Merely mechanical changes, or colorable variations, requiring no exercise of the inventive faculty; and, in general, alterations in the form or proportions of an exist- ing device, can not be the subject of a patent. And while the invention itself, and not the men- tal process by which it was devised, is the real test of its patentability, it must still be observed that to support a patent the law requires it to ap- pear that the invention is of such a nature as not to exclude the possibility of exercise of the invent- ive faculty in devising it. The terms “invented” and “discovered" mean that the subject of a pat- ent must be a true invention or discovery, and not a mere mechanical improvement or substitu- tion of a known “equivalent” involving mechan- ical skill or superior workmanship. But if the re- sult, if the invention itself, is properly patentable, the law does not regard the mode of invention or discovery; and an accidental discovery or inven- tion is, in the law, just as meritorious as one which is the result of laborious investigation and experiment. To satisfy the statute requirement of novelty, therefore, an invention must be sub- stantially different from anything that has pre- viously existed; and the criterion of the “suffi- ciency of invention” is the character of the in- vention itself, and not the degree of ingenuity or skill employed in devising it. — 3. Qualifications of Patentees. The existing law provides for the issue of the patent in every instance to “the Orig- inal and first inventor.” A radical difference be- tween English and American law exists on this point. In England the first importer of an in- vention is treated as an inventor, and may obtain a patent; but under our system the patent issues only to the inventor. The only discrimination in our law in favor of citizens of the United States, is the provision that mere prior knowledge in a foreign country shall not debar a native inventor from obtaining a patent for an invention devised PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. 129 independently here, if at the time of making his application he really believes himself to be the first inventor. The foreign invention must have been patented or described in some printed publi- cation prior to the date of invention in this country in order to deprive the native inventor of his pat- ent. —4. Designs. Section 4929 of the Revised Statutes provides that “any person who by his own industry, genius, efforts and expense has invented and produced any new and original de- sign for a manufacture, bust, statue, alto-relievo, or bas-relief; any new and original design for the printing of woolen, silk, cotton or other fabrics; any new and original impression, ornament, pat- tern, print or picture to be printed, painted, cast, or otherwise placed on or worked into any article of manufacture; or any new, useful and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture, the same not having been known or used by others before his invention or produc- tion thereof, or patented or described in any printed publication, may, upon payment of the fees prescribed, and other due proceedings had, the same as in cases of inventions or discoveries, obtain a patent therefor.” The term for which these patents are issued is either three and a half, seven or fourteen years, and the fees are, respect- ively, ten, fifteen and thirty dollars. — 5. Proced- wre in the Patent Office. Since 1836 the whole business of issuing patents has been conducted by the patent office at Washington. Applications for patents are made to the commissioner of pat- ents in accordance with a prescribed form, which consists of a petition for the allowance of the patent, and an oath that the applicant believes himself to be the first inventor, and that he does not know or believe that the invention was ever before known or used. These forms accompany the specification or description of the invention, which is by far the most important part of the application. The statute provides that the speci- fication shall describe the invention in such “full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly con- nected, to make, construct, compound and use the same.” The object of this provision is to secure to the public the benefit of the invention after the expiration of the patent, which, as we have seen, is part of the compact between the patentee and the state. The specification con- cludes with the ‘‘ claims,” in which the inventor is required to “particularly point out and dis- tinctly claim the part, improvement or combina- tion which he claims as his invention or discov- ery.” Drawings accompany the specification in all cases which admit of them, and the commis- sioner may require the applicant to furnish the patent office with a model or specimen, although these are now not often required. — The applica- tion, on being filed in the office, is referred to the examiner or officer in charge of the department in which the invention is classed. The examiner then proceeds to make an examination of the 128 VOL. III. — 9 invention, and of the patent office records, to ascertain whether it possesses novelty and util- ity. An examination of the records of foreign patent bureaus and of scientific works is also necessary, to ascertain whether the invention has been anticipated abroad, or whether it has been described in any printed publication. If from any of these sources anything is found which shows the invention claimed, or any fea- ture of it, to be wanting in novelty, the applicant is notified by the examiner, and a report is sent him rejecting the application, stating specifically in what features novelty is lacking, and giving references to such prior patents or records as anticipate the invention. The applicant thus has an opportunity to amend his application so as to make it conform to the state of the art, and to eliminate the features that are not new. If the objection raised by the examiner is deemed groundless, the applicant may attempt, by argu- ment or explanation, to remove it. In case of adverse decision, an appeal will lie from the de- cision of the primary examiner to an intermediate board, consisting of three examiners-in-chief; and if the applicant is still dissatisfied, he can bring his case before the commissioner of patents. If no objection is raised by the primary examiner, or if all objection is removed by amendment or overcome by argument, the application is allowed. The fee upon filing an application is $15; and upon the issue of the patent, $20. The final fee is required to be paid within six months after the allowance of the patent, and the specification is then printed, and the patent issued for the term of seventeen years from the date of its issue. — 6. Reissue and Disclaimer. A further proceeding, of which the patent office has jurisdiction after the issue of the patent, is the “reissue” of patents which are defective on their first issue, “if the error has arisen by inadvertence, accident or mis- take.” Where the patent is invalid by reason of a defective or insufficient specification, it is sur- rendered and sent to the patent office with a cor- rected specification; and in a proper case, on payment of the duty, a new or reissued patent, in accordance with the amended specification, is granted for the unexpired term of the original patent. These reissues were formerly issued with great laxity. But since the decision of the su- preme court in Miller vs. Brass Co., 104 U. S., 350, the provisions of the statute have been observed, and the practice of repeatedly expanding patents by reissuing them is no longer possible. It should be added, that in Cases where the inventor has inadvertently claimed in his original patent more than he is entitled to, the patent may be amended by filing a “ disclaimer.” of what is excessive, and the patent will then be valid for the residue. — 7. Interferences. Where an application is filed which “interferes” with a pending application, or with a patent granted within two years pre- vious to the filing of the application, an “inter- ference” is declared. The parties to the interfer- ence are then required to file statements giving 130 PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. briefly the dates of conception of the invention and of its completion, and the question of priority of invention is then tried by a somewhat cumber- Some procedure. Evidence substantiating the allegations of the preliminary statement is taken on behalf of the respective parties, and the matter is then brought on for a hearing before the exam- iner of interferences. the party who successfully establishes priority of invention, and at the same time shows reasonable diligence in reducing the invention to practice. — 8. Caveats. Protection is afforded to inventors who have not completed or perfected their inven- tions, by the practice of filing caveats in the patent Office. The caveat is an instrument which recites that the inventor has conceived, but not yet per- fected, his invention, and which sets forth in gen- eral terms the salient points and characteristics of the invention as far as completed. The caveator then prays protection until he shall have matured the invention. This instrument is filed in the secret archives of the patent office, and protects the caveator for a year, by entitling him to notice in case, within that time, any application is filed in the Office which would interfere with the invention indicated in the caveat. In case such notice is given, he has three months’ time in which to prepare and file a complete appli- cation for a patent. The caveat may be renewed for a year at a time, with the same effect. —9. Assignments and Licenses. The transfer of a pat- ent, or interest in a patent, is by assignment. The transfer may be either an assignment, 1, of the whole patent, 2, of an undivided interest in the patent, or 3, of an exclusive interest in the patent within any specified territory of the United States. The Revised Statutes require the assign- ment to be in writing, and provide that it “shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration without notice unless it is recorded in the patent office within three months from the date thereof.” A. license is a contract which confers upon the licensee the mere right to use or practice the in- vention, and is distinguished from an assignment in that it conveys no interest in the patent itself. This contract is not required to be recorded, nor need it be in writing, but may be oral or implied. Part owners of a patent are tenants in common, and are not bound to account to each other for receipts from licenses, and these latter may be granted by any of the co-owners without joining the others. An application for a patent pending in the patent office may be assigned in the same manner as a patent; and the patent will issue to the assignee. So also an agreement to assign a patent for an invention when issued will be effective, and specific performance of it will be enforced in equity. It has recently been held, however, that an assignment of an application, or an agreement to assign a patent for an invention when issued, must describe the application or invention with sufficient distinctness to enable the court to iden- tify it. — 10. Patent Office Fees. The patent office The patent is awarded to fees, other than those already given, are as follows: On filing every caveat, $10; on filing a disclaimer, $10; On filing every application for a reissue, $30; On filing every application for a division of a re- issue, $30; On filing every application for an ex- tension, $50; on the grant of every extension, $50; On filing an appeal from a primary examiner to the examiners-in-chief, $10; on filing an appeal to the commissioner from the examiners-in-chief, $20; for certified copies of patents or other instruments, except copies of printed patents sold by the office, for every 100 words, 10 cents; for certified copies of printed patents sold by the office, 10 cents for every 100 words, less the price actually paid for such copies without certification ; for certified copies of drawings, the reasonable cost of making them; for record- ing an assignment of 300 words or less, $1; for recording an assignment of more than 300 and not more than 1,000 words, $2; for recording every assignment of more than 1,000 words, $3; for uncertified copies of the specifications and accompanying drawings of all patents which are in print, single copies 25 cents, and for twenty copies or more, whether of one or several patents, per copy, 10 cents; for uncertified copies of the specifications and drawings of patents not in print, the reasonable cost of making the same ; for copies of matter in any foreign language, per 100 words, 20 cents; for translations, per 100 words, 50 cents; for assistance to attorneys in examination of records, one hour or less, 50 cents; each additional hour, 50 cents; for assist- ance to attorneys in examination of patents and other works in the scientific library, one hour or less, $1, and for each additional hour, $1. — 11. Procedure in the Courts. By the Revised Statutes the United States circuit courts have original jurisdiction “of all actions, suits, con- troversies and cases arising under the patent laws of the United States.” All proceedings, therefore, for the protection or enforcement of patent rights, except actions for the breach of contract relating to patents, which are cognizable in the state courts, are brought in the circuit courts or in a district court having circuit court jurisdiction. Under the act of 1870 the remedy of the patentee, where his patent is infringed, is either by action at law, in which the actual damage suffered from the infringement will be recovered, or by suit in equity, in which the complainant may obtain a perpetual injunction restraining further infringe- ment if he establishes his case, and also recover the damages sustained from the infringement, as well as the profits realized by the defendant from the use of the infringement. Where the com- plainant, at the commencement of the suit, is able to present a strong primâ facie case, he may also, upon notice, obtain a preliminary injunction restraining infringement pendente lite. The equitable remedy is usually adopted as being the most efficacious; but some of the archaic com- mon law procedure is retained in the circuit courts, and the suits are as protracted and slow PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. 131 as the old English chancery litigation. Suits for infringement are brought in the name of the owners of the patent right for the district where the infringement is committed. The evidence is taken on behalf of the respective parties, support- ing the allegations of the bill and answer in respect to the naked question of infringement, or the validity of the complainant’s patent, where that is in issue. The cause is then brought on for a hearing before a single judge, who passes upon the issues raised by the pleadings. If his decision sustains the complainant’s patent, and holds that it has been infringed by the defendant, an interlocutory decree is entered to that effect, and the cause is sent before a master to take an account of the defendant’s profits from the use of the infringement. Upon the master's report the cause is again brought before the circuit judge, and the final decree settled, determining the amount that the complainant is entitled to recover. If the court decides adversely to the complainant, a decree is entered dismissing the bill. From the judgments and final decrees of the circuit court in these causes, a writ of error or appeal will lie to the supreme court of the United States. – 12. Infringements. The question, what constitutes infringement, is one of the most difficult ques- tions presented to a court for adjudication; and the legal principles which govern its determina- tion can only be roughly indicated in this article. A patent confers upon the patentee the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to others to be used, the invention protected by patent. The patent is infringed, therefore, whenever the in- vention so protected is appropriated in either, of those ways without the license of the patentee, or whenever a colorable imitation of it, not involv- ing new invention, is so employed. A patent for a machine is infringed whenever the same means or devices are employed, substantially as in the patented machine, to produce the same result; and it has been held, per Taney, C. J., in Browne vs. Duchesne (19 How., 183), that the mere mak- ing of a patented machine is an infringement. — It is evident that a patent for an art is in- fringed when that art is used or practiced by another without license of the patentee, and that it is an infringement of a patent for a manu- facture, or composition of matter, to either make, use or sell the article claimed in the pat- ent. But the whole difficulty in questions of in- fringement consists in determining “what degree of resemblance constitutes the identity which the patent law designates as an infringement, and what kind and what degree of difference will relieve from this charge.” It is well settled that the substitution of known “equivalents” for the means described in the patent is not sufficient variation to avoid infringement; and, “by equiva- lents in machinery is usually meant the substitu- tion of merely one mechanical power for another, or one obvious and customary mode for another, of effecting a like result.” (Smith vs Downing, 1 Fish Pat. Cases, 87.) But the difficulty of applying these principles presents itself anew in every case, and it can best be solved by referring to the great mass of precedents in English and American law. It will be sufficient, therefore, to add, that substantial identity is the test of in- fringement, and that substantial identity exists wherever the difference between the patented invention and the alleged infringement is mere colorable alteration, and does not involve inven- tion. In the words of Nelson, J., in Blanchard os. Beers (2 Blatch., 418), “There must be mind and inventive genius involved in it (the altera- tion), and not the mere skill of the workman.” But it should be observed, finally, that even if the variation involve sufficient invention to entitle its deviser to a patent, it will not necessarily relieve him from infringement if he still employs sub- stantially the device covered by a prior patent. —13. Défenses. In addition to joining issue on the question of infringement, the statute provides that the defendant may plead the general issue; and, upon notice, may prove on the trial the following matters: first, fraudulently defective or excessive specification of complainant's patent; second, that complainant’s patent was surrepti- tiously obtained; third, earlier patent or publica- tion of the invention claimed; fourth, that the patentee was not the first inventor of any sub- stantial feature claimed; fifth, abandonment or public use two years prior to the patentee’s appli- cation. In an action at law, the dates and circum- stances must be appended to the notice; and in an equity suit, any of the above matters may be pleaded, and like notice may be given in the answer. The defendant is thus enabled to call in question the validity of the complainant's patent; and if he succeeds in impeaching it, the Question of infringement is at an end. — III. THE GENERAL POLICY OF A PATENT SYSTEM. Asso- ciated in their origin with the oppressions of the Tudors and the Stuarts, patents for inventions have since that time not infrequently been de- nounced as monopolies. In the earlier cases in which patents were brought before English tribunals for adjudication, the judges were reluc- tant to recognize the rights of patentees. Lord Kenyon is reported to have said, in the great case of Hornblower vs. Boulton (8 T. R., 99), “I con- fess I am not one of those who greatly favor patents,” and Lord Erskine stated that “the ideas of the learned judges had been very different as to the advantages to the public since the statute giving those monopolies.” Nor has the criticism of the patent system been confined to expressions of judicial disfavor of a century ago. It is still asserted by a certain school of economists that a patent is a true monopoly which robs the public, and that all systems of patent law are radically and essentially vicious. Within the last fifty years the system has been repeatedly assailed in the English parliament, and in this country the ques- tion of its abolition has been broached at Wash- ington. In 1829, in 1851, in 1863, and again in 1871, the policy of the British system was inquired 132 PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. into by committees from the upper and lower houses of parliament in consequence of the violent attacks made upon the patent laws. At almost every session of the house of commons for the past few years, a bill has been introduced having for its object the unconditional abolition of the present patent system; and the supporters of this measure, led by Sir Roundell Palmer, constituted a faction known as “Abolitionists.” Recently the farmers of some of our western states, in con- sequence of the extortions of the owners of certain important patents, notably the “wire fence” and “driven well” patents, have demanded the repeal of the American patent laws. M. Chevalier, the French economist, writing in 1878, denounced in toto all systems of patent law. In 1868, as secre- tary of the confederation, Bismarck recommended to the North German parliament the abolition of patents, and in Holland a law was enacted in 1869, discontinuing the system in that country from and after Jan. 1, 1870. From this résumé of the opposition to patents it will be seen that the question of the policy of patent laws is by no means settled. A discussion of that question involves an examination of the economic and legal principles upon which the system rests. – The motive which originally inserted in the stat- ute of monopolies the proviso from which later systems of patent law have been derived and developed, was, as its recital shows, to stimulate and encourage inventive genius in England, and thereby foster and develop the young industries of that country. There has since arisen the the- Ory that an inventor has a property, or at least a quas; property, in his ideas, which it is both just and expedient to protect by patent laws. The claims of the patent system are thus rested upon the two-fold consideration of, first, a sense of jus- tice to the inventor, and, second, a belief in the Sound policy of stimulating inventive genius by holding out to an inventor a material recompense proportionate to his contribution to society.— The Soundness of these propositions is controverted by Opponents of patent laws. It is urged that there is no right of property in the ideas of inventors which Society is bound to recognize, and also that the evils and inconveniences of the patent system are not compensated for by its benefits. The first of these propositions is obviously the- oretical. The assertion that there is a right of property in inventions is controverted by the asser- tion that there can be no property in thought, which is of the essence of all inventions, because it has not the attributes and qualities of material property. The former position is vigorously sup- ported by John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spen- cer, while the latter is maintained by M. Cheva- lier and the British “abolitionists.” Without pausing to decide this economic controversy, it may be remembered, first, that inventions are the product of most valuable and indirectly wealth- producing labor, and second, that the state can, as observed by Lord Brougham in Jefferys vs. Boosey, make inventions “a quasi property, or give the author the same kind of right and the same remedies which he would have if the produce of his labor could have been regarded as property.” In this practical aspect of the ques- tion the theoretical inquiry becomes unimportant, since the legislature can and does endow invent- ors’ rights with all the attributes of other prop- erty, just as it sometimes invests with such attri- butes its own franchises; and it is important to be added, this practice seems to be ethically justifi- able. The whole question, therefore, resolves. itself into one of expediency and policy. — The most considerable objection urged against the policy of granting patents for inventions is, that they interfere with the principle of “freedom of industry’’ (la liberté du travail). This is the argu- ment of M. Chevalier and the ‘‘ abolitionists.” It is by no means clear, however, as may be gath- ered from the following considerations, that the practical effect of patent laws is to interfere with freedom of industry in any degree whatever. — Under a well administered code of patent laws it. is obvious that nothing can be claimed and pro- tected in a valid patent which is not new, which is not a true invention. The industrial world is not, therefore, deprived by patent of what it pre- viously enjoyed, for by the hypothesis the inven- tion is the discovery of some hitherto unknown agency or appliance. The fallacy of the asser- tion that freedom of industry is interfered with by patents lies in the assumption either that old devices are allowed to be covered by patent, or that new inventions would come into being in the absence of patent laws. But the first half of this assumption is negatived by the hypothesis that the invention is new, i. e., hitherto unknown. Passing, then, to the consideration of the propo- sition that new inventions protected by patent would be made without the stimulus of patent laws, we find that it is no less fallacious. A necessity, say the abolitionists, is itself a suffi- cient incentive to excite invention, and as soon as a want is felt, a hundred minds will be devoted to devising a means of filling it. But the history of industrial communities does not bear out this assertion. Not only is there a tendency among the classes actually engaged in manufacturing and agricultural pursuits to remain apathetically content in the use of already existing appliances, but there has even been evinced, and notably in England, a positive hostility on the part of Opera- tives to the introduction of new, and especially of labor-saving inventions. A hundred years ago mobs destroyed the improved machinery of Ark- wright and Hargreaves. Thirty years later, OC- curred the Luddite riots in consequence of the introduction of power looms. Competition will, of course, in time develop improvements; but the antagonism now existing between capital which most feels the spur of competition, and labor which possesses the skill to create the improvements, renders this agency ineffective to produce the best results. So long as the capitalist is to reap the entire benefit of an improvement, PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. 133 the inventor will be slow to devise it. There must be some way of appealing directly to inven- tive genius to obtain its best fruits. This was realized by Edward Bally, one of the Swiss com- missioners to the Philadelphia centennial exposi- tion. On his return to Switzerland, which has no patent system, he wrote: “We must intro- duce the patent system. All our production is more or less a simple copy. The inventor has no profit to expect from his invention, however use- ful it may be. It is evident that this absolute want of protection will never awaken in a people the spirit of invention * *.” And yet the Swiss are reputed as ingenious as any other people.— Still another consideration may be adduced to refute the claims of the “abolitionists,” that freedom of industry is interfered with by patents. If the inventor keeps his invention in secrecy and allows his secret to die with him—which was the only protection an inventor had before patent laws became effective—it can not be said that the normal movement of industries is interfered with. In this case, however, he entirely deprives the world of the benefit of his discovery. But by taking out a patent he simply makes a contract with society, whereby his secret is surrendered in return for a certain fraction of the benefit con- ferred by it for a term of years. If the inven- tion is valuable, the inventor's reward is pro- portionately rich; if it is of no importance, it can have no effect on industries. An inventor’s patent excludes the industrial world from noth- ing it enjoyed before; it simply offers a novelty as a substitute for older methods. Undoubtedly, ; the system, because imperfectly administered, has had the effect, in many instances, of depriving the world by patent of old and well-known appli- ances; and then, as in England and France, the burden is thrown on the community of prov- ing that the patent is robbing it of what it pre- viously enjoyed. But obviously the cause of this is the imperfect administration of an imper- fect code of laws. A patent for a true invention can never clog the wheels of an industry, since, if it be a true invention, it leaves the industry free to enjoy all the agencies and appliances known before the new invention was devised. If, how- ever, this latter cheaperis or improves an existing process, the inventor asks to share in the enhanced cheapness or improvement, which by the hypoth- esis his genius is the means of creating. —Sim- ilar views have been expressed by so keen an observer as Mr. Herbert Spencer. “They fall into a serious error,” he wrote in his “Social Statics,” “who suppose that the exclusive right assumed by a discoverer is something taken from the public. He who in anyway increases the pow- ers of production, is seen by all, save a few insane Luddites, to be a general benefactor who gives rather than takes. The successful inventor makes a further conquest over nature. By him the laws of matter are rendered still more subservient to the wants of mankind. He economizes labor; helps to emancipate men from their slavery to the needs of the body; harnesses a new power to the Car of human happiness. He can not, if he would, prevent society from largely participating in his good fortune. Before he can realize any benefit from his new process or apparatus, he must first confer a benefit on his fellow-men ; must either offer them a better article at the price usually charged, or the same article at a less price. If he fails to do this, his invention is a dead let- ter; if he does it, he makes society a partner in the new mine of wealth he has opened. For all the exertion he has had in subjugating a pre- viously unknown region of nature, he simply asks an extra proportion of the fruits. The rest of mankind unavoidably come in for the main ad- vantage; will in a short time have the whole. Meanwhile, they can not without injustice disre- gard his claims.”—But the cause of patent laws does not require to be established in a negative, defensive manner. In the United States, at least, the beneficence of the system is so obvious, the claims of inventors are so meritorious, that argu- ment is hardly necessary to make them apparent. —Patents give support to a class of ingenious and talented men whose profession it is to devise improvements and make discoveries, and whose life and training render them especially qualified for such service. It is estimated that there are from five to six thousand professional inventors in the United States. But it is obvious that with- out a patent code it would hardly be possible to follow invention as a business. Experts might find employment with great manufacturers, but they could not feel the same personal incentive to make inventions which the patent system affords them. So that the first effect of patent laws is to keep these thousands of minds constantly engaged in solving the problems of science and mechanics. —Patents, moreover, facilitate the introduction of inventions. They enable the inventor to give the capitalist something substantial upon which to embark his money; without which there would not be the same inducement to him to engage in the enterprise of introducing novelties if the re- sults of his experiments and ventures could be at once appropriated by others. — Patents give also to the inventor a reward proportioned to the value of the invention. The incentive is thus given to devise labor-saving and cheapening inventions. An inventor realizes that however ingenious his device, it can have no existence commercially un- less it either cheapens or improves Something for which there is a demand, or unless the in- vention itself creates and satisfies a new want. Bessemer’s invention reduced the cost of Cast steel from $200 per ton to about $55; and with all this reduction the royalty was only $10 perton, or about 7 per cent. of the reduction. It has been estimated that inventions increase the value of human labor in this country 2 per cent. annually. — These benefits will perhaps be still more obvi- ous and impressive if we consider the practical effect of patent laws through inventions upon the industrial system of a community. The real be- 134 PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. ginning of the patent system was, as we have seen, coeval with the great scientific and inventive movement in the latter half of the eighteenth cen- tury. It is not claimed that patent laws origi- nated this movement, but that they at least made it possible and accelerated it. A review of the history of the iron and cotton industries in Great Britain shows this clearly. In the year 1740 the total produce of iron in Great Britain was 17,350 tons. In that year Dudley’s invention for using coal in smelting in lieu of timber began to be used, and in less than 50 years (1788) the annual production had increased to 68,300 tons. In 1788 Watt's steam engine was introduced for blowing furnaces, and for the year 1806, the production amounted to 258,206 tons. In 1830 Neilson’s hot blast was adopted, and by 1839 the yearly prod- uce of iron had reached 1,248,781 tons, and the annual production now averages more than 6,000,000 tons, of a value of more than £16,000,000. In less than a century and a half the production of iron has increased nearly a thousand fold, and it is the inventions of Dudley, Watt and Neilson which have at least made this increase possible. — Quite as remarkable has been the effect of in- ventions upon the English cotton industry. At the middle of the eighteenth century the total annual imports of raw cotton into Great Britain were less than 3,000,000 pounds. In 1769 and 1770 were patented Arkwright's and Hargreaves' inventions for spinning, and by 1776 the annual imports of cotton wool amounted to nearly 7,000,000 pounds. In 1779 Crompton's spinning mule was invented, and in 1785 and 1787 Cart- wright's loom patents were issued; by 1790 the yearly imports of cotton had reached 31,447,605 pounds. In 1880 the imports of cotton amounted to 1,628,664,576 pounds, and the British cotton factories now employ nearly half a million oper- atives. The amount of cotton manufactured in Great Britain has thus increased more than five hundred fold, and an industry has been created which gives employment to about one-seventieth of the total population. — The growth of the iron and cotton industries may be regarded as typical of the general industrial progress of Great Britain dur- ing the last hundred years. More recent general advance is shown by the fact that the total exports of British produce have increased from £52,000,000 in 1848, to £223,060,446 in 1880; and in the same period the population has increased about 25 per cent.: from about 27,500,000 in 1850, to 34,505,000 in 1880. A comparison of the ratio of production to population at the former period with the similar ratio at the later one, will indicate the degree of in- crease in productive capacity. It is, therefore, con- fidently asserted that the most important agency in increasing the productive power of a nation is the invention and introduction of labor-saving devices, and that the invention of such devices alone renders such an increase possible, as is shown in a consider- ation of the above statistics of the iron and cotton industries.—The history of these inventions, how- ever, indicates that without the protection of patent laws they would not have been developed and in- troduced. In the case of the steam engine, for ex- ample, it was only after spending all his own means, after thirteen years of ceaseless experiment, and after obtaining from parliament the grant of a spe- cial patent for twenty-four years, that Watt suc- ceeded in inducing Matthew Bolton to embark his capital in the development and introduction of the invention. It is estimated that £40,000 were ex- pended by Watt and Bolton in developing this in- vention; and such was the hostility shown to its in- troduction that the patent had nearly expired before these men began to receive a return for their ex- penditure of time and money. A recent life of Watt states that the steam power of Great Britain is now equivalent to the power of 400,000,000 men —more than ten times the entire population; and it is primarily Watt's invention and the countless devices of subsequent inventors which utilize the magnificent power he discovered, that have made England’s industrial and commercial progress pos- sible. — The history of the steam engine is the his- tory of nearly all great labor-saving discoveries. They have all originated in patent protected com- munities; and where the patent laws have not di- rectly incited the inventor to make his discovery, they have still facilitated its introduction and devel- opment by enabling the inventor to enlist the aid of capital. The manner in which inventors are affected by patent laws is instructively shown by the following evidence of Sir Henry Bessemer before the committee of the house of commons in 1871: “My experience during the whole of this. time (the years that he was experimenting) has shown me clearly that if I had had no patent law to fall back upon, I, as an engineer, could never have first spent two and a half years of my time. and £4,000 in mere experiments, which if they had failed would have been an entire loss to me. Altogether I made an outlay of about £20,000, but of course I had a large stake to play for. I knew that steel was selling at £50 to £60 per ton, and I knew that if it could be made by my plan, it could with profit be sold at £20 per ton. But had it not been for the law, securing my right in my invention by a patent, I could never have hoped as a simple manufacturer to have recouped myself.” Such has been the effect of the British patent system in two conspicuous in- stances, and such instances might be almost indefinitely multiplied. —Turning now to the in- dustrial history of the United States, the results. are no less impressive. Perhaps no one industry has been more closely identified with the national life and growth of the country than cotton rais- ing. It is stated in Smithers' History of Liver- pool (p. 124), that in 1784 an American vessel arrived at Liverpool, having on board eight bags of cotton, which were seized by the custom house officers under an impression that cotton was not the produce of the United States. In 1793 Eli Whitney, of Westborough, Mass., invented and patented his saw gin for separating cotton from the seeds. Before this invention cotton could be PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. 135 cleansed only by hand, or with some rude hand mill. The utmost daily capacity of one of these mills was about sixty-five pounds, and by hand a man could prepare from one to four pounds per diem. With Whitney's cotton gin a single per- son could prepare in a day about 300 pounds— five times as much as by any prior method; and the daily capacity of modern gins is said to be about 4,000 pounds. The effect of this invention upon cotton raising was marvelous. In 1792 the ex- ports of raw cotton from the United States were 138,328 pounds. By 1794, the year after the in- troduction of the cotton gin, the exports had increased to 1,601,700 pounds; in 1800 they had reached 17,789,803 pounds—more than one hun- dred fold in eight years; in 1820 they amounted to 127,860,152 pounds, of a value of $20,000,000, showing an increase in twenty-seven years of nearly a thousand fold. — The story of Whitney's invention and of his almost unsuccessful efforts to obtain recognition of his rights as an inventor, is matter of history. The unscrupulous infringe- ment of his patent brought discredit upon his contemporariés. But the record of the life of this man shows that he labored upon his inven- tion in the hope of obtaining under a patent a share of the wealth it was to create; and had it not been for this hope, rendered possible by our patent laws, he could not have devoted his time and energies to the successful achievement of his great work. — So the effect of our patent laws upon the general agricultural methods of this country is something almost incalculable. Nearly all the inventions which have made western farming possible on its present magnificent Scale have originated and been perfected under our patent system; and the history of the develop- ment of our agriculture might almost be written from the patent office records of the annual achievements of American inventive genius. A single instance will call to mind the manner in which agriculture has been revolutionized by American inventions. – Down to the beginning of the present century, the only great improve- ment that had been made upon the harvesting methods of the ancients was the invention of the cradle in 1794, by a Scotchman. In 1834 the first patent was issued in this country upon the McCormick reaper. It took McCormick about twenty years after 1834 to develop and perfect his machine, and it was between 1855 and 1858 that it was practically introduced. Their effect can be estimated by comparing in the following table (from the census of 1870), the agricultural popu- lation of the country with the amount of produce in which these machines are used, at the different periods before and after their introduction: 1850. 1860. 1870. Population engaged A $. ſº . 8. †† } 1,301,863 2,024,399 || 2,641,830 otal bushels wheat, t rºy rye, oats and barley } 266,425,951 || 382,675,387 || 616,532,883 Allowance must, of course, be made for the innumerable other inventions employed in the culture of these products; but the general increase of per capita production can be roughly estimated from these figures; and while the farming popu- lation increased about 100 per cent. between 1850 and 1870, the produce of grain increased nearly 200 per cent. — But the inventions to which this increase is due, could not have been devised or perfected without the stimulus and protection of our patent laws. More than 5,000 patents have been issued in this country upon reapers and mowers alone, and the latest machines embody the results of the life work of a hundred inventors whose only hope of recouping themselves for their expenditure of time and fortune was in our patent system, and who could not have labored without it. It is stated that the McCormick com- pany alone has spent more than $1,000,000 in experiments, and it is also stated that this machine saves the country annually the sum of $10,000,000. — Similar effects are to be noticed in our textile industries. In 1860 the number of hands engaged in woolen, cotton and other similar factories, was 181,550; the wages paid amounted to $37,301,710; and the value of the product was $196,416,400. In 1870 the number of operatives had increased to 255,328, about 40 per cent. The wages amounted to $79,401,367, more than 100 per cent. increase, and the product was valued at $395,158,565, more than 100 per cent. advance. —It will be found in nearly every instance that the chief agency in effecting this increased production is the labor- economizing machinery devised by countless in- ventors, and patented among the myriad American patents. One more table will indicate the rate of increase in our general manufactures : Hands. Wºr Material. Product. 1850----| 957,059 $236,765,446 |$ 555,123,822 |$1,019,106,616 1860---. 1,311,264 387,878,996 | 1,031,605,092 | 1,885,861,676 1870----|2,053,996 || 775,584,343| 2,448,427,242 || 4,232,325,442 —But enough has been written to indicate the practical tendency of patent laws; and it may, perhaps, be safe to conclude that the opposition to patents, although directed at the system and de- manding its abolition, has in fact been occasioned by the imperfect administration of still more im- perfect patent codes. Especially is this true of the British abolitionists. The enormous expense of patent litigation in England, its “glorious un- certainty,” and the practice of throwing on the public the burden of impeaching the patent with- out first officially investigating its validity, have opened the way in that country for great abuses, and have undoubtedly made the system unneces- sarily burdensome to British manufacturers. In many instances under the English law, the manu- facturer finds it cheaper to acquiesce in the claims of an impostor than to contest the validity of his patent in court. The remedy for these evils, how- ever, and for the evils of the American System, is 136 PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. in reform of the law and its administration, not abolition of the system; and the fact that enor- mous benefits can still be traced to these patent laws, however imperfectly administered, furnishes a cogent reason for continuing and extending the benefits by continuing and improving the laws. – IV. CHANGES IN THE LAw. The American pat- ent system is regarded, both here and abroad, as the most progressive and complete existent insti- tution of its kind. Many of the reforms and improvements in patent laws have originated at Washington, and have then been adopted by European governments. The most radical im- provement in the system was made in 1836, when the patent office was established, and the practice of making preliminary examinations of inventions instituted. This latter feature is recommended by all economists familiar with the working of patent laws, as a desideratum of every system, and has been incorporated into the law of several other countries. Since 1836 there have been made minor changes and extensions of the American law, which have preserved and developed the general symmetry of the system ; but with this development there have appeared certain defects and abuses which call for still further reform of the system, the character of which can here be only briefly indicated. — The most impressive feature of the American system is its extraordinary magnitude. There have now (1883) been issued in this country since 1790, about 285,000 patents. During the year 1882 there were acted upon in the patent office 31,522 applications relating to patents, and in the same time 18,267 patents were issued or reissued. In that year only 6,099 pat- ents expired; so that it appears that the number of patents is now increasing at the rate of 12,000 a year, and the records of the patent office are becoming enormously complicated. Patented in- ventions are there classified in 167 classes and more than 3,000 sub-classes. To preserve the system in its integrity, it is obviously necessary, first, that a patent should issue only for a new invention, and secondly, that it should be clear in its claims of all prior patents. A thorough preliminary examination of an application for a patent involves a search not only through our patent office records, but also through the records of the various foreign patent bureaus. A still more difficult task is to adjust the claims of a new application so as not to conflict with innumerable prior patents. It is vitally important both to the applicant and to the public that this investigation should be thorough and complete. This is every day becoming more difficult; and it is stated that not a week passes without the allowance of one or more patents at Washington for old inventions. Nor is this strange when we consider the number and complexity of the records to be searched, and the number of patents annually taken out upon certain subjects of invention. During the year 1882, ninety-nine patents were issued at Washing- ton for cultivators and cultivator appliances alone. To remedy the acknowledged defects in the ad- ministration of our present system, several reforms have been suggested, the merits of which are obvious. These are: first, the requirement of a higher standard of invention to sustain a patent, rejecting the host of applications for merely Obvious and mechanical improvements now indis- Criminately allowed, which would relieve the records of the patent office and at the same time Secure to the community and the inventor the benefits of all true inventions; second, the estab- lishment of periodical fees as in the European Countries, for the non-payment of which the patent should become void. This again would relieve the records by weeding out unsuccessful inventions from the patented list, and at the same time would work no hardship on the inventor, who, of course, derives no benefit from a pat- ented failure. — Another defect in our patent sys- tem is the procedure in the patent office through which the question of priority of invention between two or more applications for the same invention is determined. Without the constitu- tion and without the judicial training and ex- perience of a court of law, the examiners of interferences are called upon to decide, after a quasi trial, the most difficult questions of fact, in connection with which difficult questions of evi- dence often arise. And after the question has been litigated and settled in the patent office, it is not regarded as res adjudicata, but may have to be tried anew when the question of priority is afterward raised in court. The hardship of this can be realized when it is stated that these inter- ference proceedings often take one, two or even three years before a final decision is reached, and involve the same outlay of money as do similarly protracted legal proceedings. But after all this, the successful party has not an adjudicatcd patent right, but an ordinary patent, which may be called in question in court. The successful litigant, as the outcome of his long litigation, has merely won a presumption. Moreover, there is no provision under the present system for mulcting the unsuc- cessful party in the costs of the proceeding; and the way is thus thrown open to any unscrupulous practitioner to debar and hinder an inventor from obtaining his patent, by merely filing a conflicting application, with an oath that he is the inventor; and thus, without exposing himself to any liability beyond prosecution for perjury, he may involve the inventor in long and expensive litigation. So also there is no provision for the application of the doctrine of estoppel. The most obvious remedy for this defect is either to allow the rival inventors to litigate the question in court in the first instance, and issue the patent to the prevailing party; or else to restrict the function of the pat- ent office to the investigation of the question of novelty, to issue the patent to the first applicant, and grant to subsequent applicants certificates of invention which would enable them, if they chose, to call in question in court the rights of the pat- entee. Unquestionably, however, inventors should be relieved from the possibility of being obliged PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. 137 to litigate the same questions twice, as is the case under the present practice. — The decision of the supreme court in Miller vs. Brass Company (104 U. S., 350), and the later decisions following this case, have had the effect of reforming a great abuse which existed in the practice of indiscrimi- nately reissuing patents. The statute made pro- vision for reissue where the original patent was defective through inadvertence or mistake of the inventor; but in the patent office the practice had grown up of expanding patents by reissue so as to include more than the inventors originally claimed or invented. This practice was denounced as vicious in the above cited case, and is now no longer possible. — A change in the statute law, which has been suggested to congress by commis- Sioners for several years past, is the repeal of the provision which limits the term of a patent, where the invention has first been patented in a foreign country, to the life of the foreign patent having the shortest term to run. The motive which in- Serted this clause in our patent code was, to secure the patenting of important inventions in this country first, and perhaps also to obviate the Sup- posed difficulty of continuing the American patent after the foreign one had expired, and thereby placing domestic industries at a disadvantage in the competition with foreign trade. In fact, however, this provision operates harshly upon the native inventor, who, if he first takes out his American patent, loses his right to patents in several European countries. The advantages of this law arc by no means sufficient to compensate for the inconvenience it causes, and the provision should certainly be expunged from the statute book. — It has also been suggested, that in certain Cases there should be established some means of compelling patentees to grant licenses, as has just been done in England by the bill which received the royal assent in August, 1883; but the policy of this measure is at least doubtful. A more politic change would be the insertion in our pat- ent code of a statute of limitations covering claims for infringement. Infringement is in the nature of a tort, and the claim should, therefore, after the analogy of other torts, be barred after a short term of years. — Other and more radical reforms that have been suggested are, the creation of special tribunals to adjudicate the questions of patent law, whose judges should possess the nec- essary technical and scientific, as well as legal, attainments; and also the establishment of some means of securing to the court the opinions of absolutely unbiased experts upon the problems of science and mechanics which arise in the trial of patent causes. The present use — or, more properly, abuse—of expert testimony in patent litigation, is hopelessly confusing to the court, and renders its decisions uncertain and unreliable, as the conclusions of the court are often based upon the premises established by expert evidence. There should be some way, therefore, of enabling the court to call in the assistance of eminent Scientists whose opinions would be uncolored by retainers from either of the litigants. –Finally, it should be mentioned that, upon several occasions, the adoption of an international patent code has been recommended, especially by the patent con- gress at Vienna in 1873. There are at present no indications that such a universal system will be established, but it may yet be safe to conclude that this will be the final step in the develop- ment of the patent system, and that the time is perhaps not very remote when that step will be taken. —W. FoEEIGN PATENT LAws. Taking its origin in England, the patent system has now been extended into more than forty states, prov- inces and principalities. Switzerland and Holland are the only considerable civilized powers at pres- ent without a system of patent laws, and in both countries strenuous efforts are being made to have a patent code enacted. Roughly speaking, the foreign patent systems, with one or two excep- tions, differ from the American in not requiring an exhaustive preliminary examination of the in- vention as to novelty and utility before issuing the patent. Other differences may be observed from the following summary of patent laws. – Great Britain. Patents are issued for the term of fourteen years from the date of the application, subject, however, to the payment of a tax of £50 at the end of the third year, and £100 at the end of the seventh year. The statute of monopolies provided for the patenting of “new manufac- tures,” but by judicial construction this term had been made to cover the four classes of inventions enumerated in the American act, and the act of 1852 substituted the term “inventions.” The patent is issued either to the first inventor or to the “first importer,” who is generally the agent of the foreign inventor. The usual procedure in taking out a patent is first to obtain “provisional protection” for six months, after obtaining which “notice to proceed” is given and advertised in the “Commissioners of Patents Journal,” with a notification that opposition to the application must be made within twenty-one days from the date of the notice. Three weeks before the expi- ration of the “provisional protection,” application for the law officers' warrant and great seal is made. The final specification is then lodged, and the patent issues for fourteen years from the date of the application. To sustain a patent it is only necessary that the invention should be new within the United Kingdom; and an invention patented elsewhere can be patented in Great Britain at any time during the life of the foreign patent unless a specification or complete description of it exists in the kingdom before the British application is made. The validity of a patent is, however, generally left to be adjudicated by the courts; and it is practically the mere grant of a right to sue for infringement so long as the validity of the patent is unimpeached. Important changes in this law, which were made by parliament during the present year (1883), and are to go into effect Jan. 1, 1884, may be summarized as follows: the cost of patents has been greatly reduced; power 138 PATENTS, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM. has been given the board of trade to grant com- pulsory licenses in certain cases; and the provision that the British patent lapsed with the expiry of any foreign patent of anterior date has not been re-enacted. — Canada has a patent system resem- bling that of the United States, and the various Australian colonies and provinces have systems differing somewhat in detail, but substantially like the English in outline and theory. — France. Patents are issued upon substantially the same classes of inventions as in England and the Unit- ed States, and extend for a term of fifteen years, subject to an annual tax of 100 francs. No pre- liminary examination of the invention is made, and the applicant is considered to be the first inventor until the contrary is proved. The ques- tion of the validity of the patent is thus entirely left to the courts, and in all patent litigation the burden of proof rests upon those who would oppose or impeach the patent. The novelty re- quired is novelty over the entire world, and an invention must therefore be patented in France. at least as early as in any other country, as other- wise the foreign publication of the specification before the issue of the French patent, would in- validate the latter. The specification must give as full a description as is required by the Ameri- can law, and the invention must be worked in France within two years of the date of the patent, to preserve its validity. — Germany. The present patent system dates from July, 1877. Patents are granted for the term of fifteen years upon all new inventions, with some exceptions, such as foods and medicines, and are subject to an annual tax, which increases fifty marks each year of the life of the patent. The patent is issued to the first applicant, except where the application is shown to be made fraudulently. The patent office is sit- uated at Berlin, and an examination of the inven- tions submitted is made by examiners somewhat as in the United States. Before issuing the patent the specification is published, and opportunity given, for eight weeks, to oppose the grant of the patent on various grounds, as fraud or want of novelty. At the end of that time, if there is no opposition, the patent is granted. As in France, the invention must be worked within the limits of the empire within three years from the grant of the patent, to preserve its validity; and in certain cases the owners of patents are required to grant licenses at reasonable royalties. Willful infringe- ment is, under some circumstances, a crime, pun- ishable by fine, and all infringement may be restrained by civil proceedings. – Belgium. All applications for patents are granted without exam- ination as to novelty, if they conform to the pre- scribed form, and all new inventions, except medical appliances and medicines, can be protected by patent. Patents are of three classes: of inven- tion, of addition, and of importation. A patent of invention issues for the term of twenty years, subject to a tax, which increases ten francs each year of the life of the patent. The patent is void if the invention is not new within Belgium, or if Belgian application. any description has been published or foreign. patent taken out upon it before the date of the A patent of addition is taken for an improvement of an invention already pat- ented, and expires with the original patent. A patent of importation issues for the unexpired term of any foreign patent, if the invention has not been commercially worked within Belgium. for more than a year prior to the application. The specification must be full and exact, as in the United States, and the remedies for infringement are substantially the same as in other countries. – Italy. Patents are granted for the term of fifteen years, or for a shorter term, upon all new inven- tions except medicines. A peculiarity of the Italian law is the provision that if the invention be patented elsewhere, the Italian patent continues. with the foreign patent of the longest term, if within fifteen years. The invention is required to be worked in Italy within two years, and the pat- ent is subject to annual taxes. – Russia. Patents are granted for a maximum term of ten years. upon all new and useful inventions. An exam- ination of the invention, both as to novelty and utility, is made, and apparently a high standard. as to both qualities is required. Patents upon inventions previously patented elsewhere are: granted for only six years, or less if any foreign patent expires within that time. — Sweden. The duration of patents is fifteen years, or less if any prior foreign patent expires within that time, and the duration is fixed in each case by the chamber of commerce. The patent issues only to the in- ventor. The patent can not be impeached after it. has been issued eight months, but the invention must be worked in Sweden within from one to four years from the date of the patent, to preserve its validity, and yearly proof of such working must be given during the life of the patent. — Spain. Four kinds of patents are granted in Spain. A patent of invention is granted for twenty years, and a patent of importation for ten years if the foreign patent is not more than two years old; a third species of patent is granted for five years to any person who will work an inven- tion hitherto unpracticed in Spain, although known there theoretically; finally, patents of addition are granted for improvements, which expire with the patent for the main invention. Each Spanish patent covers Spain, the Balearic Isles, Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands. All new inventions, except medicines, may be patented, and the invention must be worked within the Spanish dominions within two years from the date of the patent. — BIBLIOGRAPHY. Coke, 3. Inst., 184; Collier, Essay on the Law of Patents for New Inventions, London, 1803; Hands, The Law and Practice of Patents for Inventions, LOn- don, 1808; Godson, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Patents for Inventions and of Copyright; Rankin, An Analysis of the Law of Patents, Lon- don, 1824; Fessenden, Essay on the Law of Patents for New Inventions, Boston, 1822; Renouard, Traité des Brevets d’Invention, Paris, 1825; Reg- PATRONA.G.E. 139. nault, De la Legislation et de la Jurisprudence des Prevets d’Invention, Paris, 1825; Carpmael, Law of Patents for Inventions, London, 1836; Edwards, On Letters Patent for Inventions, London, 1865; Aston, A Paper on the Patent Laws; Dircks, The Policy of a Patent Law; Brown, Popular Treatise on Patent Laws, London, 1874; Macfie, Abolition of Patents: Recent Discussions ºn the United Kºng- dom, and on the Continent, London, 1869; Macfie, Copyright and Patents for Inventions,London, 1883; Chevalier, Patents for Inventions Fa'amined ºn their Relations to the Principle of Freedom of Industry; Thompson, Handbook of Patent Law, London, 1882; Curtis, Law of Patents, 4th ed., Boston, 1873; Si- monds, Summary of the Law of Patents, New York, 1883; Kleinschrod, Die Internationale Patentgesetz- gebung mach ihren Prinzipien, 1855; Loosey, Collec- tion of the Laws of Patent Privileges, Vienna, 1849; Gareis, Patentgesetzgebung, Berlin, 1879; Phillips, Law of Patents for Inventions, N. Y., 1837; Whit- man, Patent Laws and Practice of Obtaining Letters Patent for Inventions, 2d ed., Washington, 1875; Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law relating to Patent Privileges, Lond., 1846; Webster, Law and Practice of Letters Patent for Inventions, Lond., 1841; Johnson, Patentee’s Manual, 3d ed., Lond., 1866; Walker on Patents, N. Y., 1883; Merwin, Patentability of In- oentioms, Boston, 1883. F. W. WHITRIDGE. PATRONAGE, in the sense in which it comes especially within the scope of this work, is the control of appointments and employments for po- sitions of a public nature. Broadly considered, it extends to all selections of persons for service in corporations, churches, Schools and other posi- tions not within the private business of the person to whom the patronage belongs. It may also be regarded as including honors, decorations and pensions, under aristocratic institutions. In law the power of appointment and employment usu- ally, but not always, includes the power of pro- motion, removal and dismissal. It will be con- venient, however, to treat these powers separately. (See PROMOTIONS, REMOVALS FROM OFFICE, SPOILs SYSTEM.)—Patronage of a character more or less peculiar arises out of civil, military and naval administration, respectively. Wherever there is a state church or an ecclesiastical estab- lishment, there is, as a consequence, a kind of patronage unknown under the government of the United States. If we had space for pursuing the subject from the public departments down through the management of landed estates, factories, mines, ships, railroads, banks, insurance compa- nies, and manifold other corporations in which the selection and dismissal of many subordinates is an important part of the duties of superior officials, as well as a prolific source of favoritism, corruption and extravagance, we should find the subject full of interest and importance. We can hardly go beyond its more public relations, and shall especially consider its responsibilities and abuses. – In its primary sense, in politics and the Church, patronage was a friendly care exercised by a superior over those who had in some way come under his protection, calling for generosity and disinterestedness on the part of him who possessed it. Works of charity, beneficences and patriotism were said to be placed under the pat- ronage of the great and the good; thus inviting sacrifice and support as a duty. In Rome patron- age marked a peculiar social relation between the highest class and that next in order, based upon the reciprocal relation of protection and loyalty. While the more honorable application of the word is not unknown in our day, patronage is now generally accepted as implying a selfish if not a venal relation, or use of authority and influ- ence. The patronage we are most familiar with is that which is used, more or less unscrupulously or corruptly, to aid a party, a church, a faction, a chieftain, or perhaps the official himself who exercises it, his relatives and his favorites. Yet. the legal control of selections for office and pub- lic employments, when wisely and conscientiously exercised, is patronage in the worthy sense. In refusing any political connection between the government and the organizations and officials of religion, the framers of our system avoided a large amount of the most pernicious patronage. by which both the churches and the civil admin- istration of the older nations have been compli- cated and corrupted. So patronage under our system was still further limited by our rejection of class distinctions, social orders, titles, and a complicated system of discretionary pensions in civil life. It hardly nced be pointed out that under despotic and monarchical governments this. additional patronage of the crown, in the form of a power to create political distinctions of rank, to fill the high places in the church, to confer deco- rations, pensions and social precedence, has been no small part of the effective force and coherence of the government, as it has been of the sources of corruption. “Patronage-mongering” is a kind of criminal offense in Great Britain, against which criminal laws contain provisions. It was a maxim of Napoleon that “religion and honors are the two things by which mankind may be governed ”; and even in this decade, Arthur Helps, in his “Thoughts on Government,” says the conferring of honors is an important function of government. And this is not all; for that form of government. which creates a landed aristocracy and a church hierarchy lays the foundation of a vast social patronage on the part of nobles and great Officials, while it does not diminish the patronage incident to the ordinary civil, military and naval adminis- tration. Hardly more than this latter patronage can exist under our institutions. But it is plain that, as wealth and population increase, making government, business and society alike more com- plicated, the amount and power of patronage, becoming more and more Social and mercenary, must greatly increase. — The civil administration of the federal government was carried on the first year with a revenue of two million dollars, and with probably less than a thousand Officials: 140 PATRONAGE. it has now a hundred thousand. The federal postal service in the beginning required only seventy-five postmasters. Under Jackson’s ad- ministration it required 8,000. Now there are more than 45,000 postmasters. The increase of state and municipal officials has been in much the same ratio. In New York city alone there are more than 2,500 civil officials under the federal govern- ment. About 10,000 officials serve there in the employment of the state and the city; the lat- ter earning annual salaries amounting tô about $10,000,000. To all those, army and navy officers and the great number of federal, state and muni- cipal employés must be added. In order to gain some definite conception of the stupendous po- tency of patronage in this country, even as a mere political force, we must consider the whole body of its officials and employés, federal, state and municipal, perhaps half a million in all; the vast sums paid to them; the manifold bargains, beggings, intrigues and contentions for these places; the formidable and ever active power of removal and promotion; to say nothing of the constant and vast authority for discipline, regh- lation and favors on the part of those by whom patronage is wielded. There is not a state, county, city, ward, town or village, if even there be a school district or hamlet, in which patronage is not a constant political and social influence that is courted or feared. In each nomination and election, from those of the president and the governors down to those of trustees, justices and constables, the element of patronage enters as a suspected and efficient element, whether it be the patronage of existing officials who intermeddle, or the patronage—hoped for or feared—of the officer about to be created. In the eyes of political man- agcrg patronago is ono of the most sure and potent of forces, never lost sight of in campaigns, and almost never recognized as under moral obliga- tions. Candidates are regarded by the politician class as available in the ratio of their adroitness in promising and their unscrupulousness in using patronage to bribe voters, to reward electioneerers, to buy the press, and to conciliate opponents and rivals. Appearing as an element in large measure extraneous to the merits of the candidate and the interests of the voters, the influence of pat- ronage very naturally and easily tends to de- moralize and corrupt. This result is helped by the fact that no other great and venal influence in politics is with so much facility exercised in secrecy, or is so readily kept beyond fear of re- sponsibility. Bribery by the use of money may leave some traces in aid of detection, but how can it be proved in court that a hint or hope of a place or of an official favor secured a nom- ination, a vote, or a supporter? How can it be proved in a court that the fear of removal makes a large proportion of our officials servile hench- men of patronage-mongers, or that hundreds voted for a member of Congress, a mayor or a governor, upon some assurance—not of course in a formal promise—that the patronage of the new official would be used for the advantage of venal voters? Unworthy relatives, favorites, hench- men and dependents are appointed or hired in superfluous numbers for the public service by patronage-mongering Officials; but how is it possi- ble, except in extreme cases, to prove any wrong beyond the unwise exercise of a large and but loosely defined official discretion? There is, per- haps, no form of abuse in public affairs so easily practiced as that form of patronage prostitution which can secretly take place between a corrupt officer and a venal office seeker. One of the great evils of political life, under all forms of gov- ernment, has been the abuse of official discretion in the use of patronage corruptly or selfishly. And it hardly need be said that, under the repub- lican system in the United States—greatly as the sphere of patronage has been curtailed—it is yet one of the most potent elements of corruption and extravagance in our politics, the portentous effects of which are arousing the patriotic classes to a great effort for their removal. (See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM.) The pressure for patronage became very strong before any president yielded to it. It was great under Jefferson, and greater still under the last Adams. In 1825–6 the senate, on motion of Mr. Macon, appointed a committee to devise means for its reduction, which made an able report. The committee’s report speaks of the “ political machine,” and urges the necessity of arresting the growing power and corruption of patronage. Five years before, Mr. Crawford, a secretary of the treasury and a candidate for the presidency, had procured the passage of a bill creating a four-years term for collectors, as Mr. Adams says, for the purpose of increasing his patronage. — It should not be overlooked that a part of the power and corruption of patron- age grows out of the ability of political man- agers and the patronage-mongering class to tax the salaries of office holders for the payment of party and election expenses. (See POLITICAL AsSESSMENTS.) The patronage system has yet another great element of strength—the ability of party managers and the lords of patronage to compel those to whom they give offices and employment to work, vote and be obedient to their orders in all political matters. In that fea- ture of the system, which impairs the proper self- respect and independence of the public servant, is the great source alike of the servility of our subordinate officials and of the arrogance and potency of chieftains and party managers. No element adds more than this to the fierceness of these contests for patronage in which victory gives them a following of feudal dependents. (See SPOILs SYSTEM.) The abuse of patronage has not been confined to those upon whom the law confers it, but members of legislatures, of con- gress and of city councils, have usurped the ap- pointing power of the executive, for the purpose of taking to themselves the patronage for their own advantage. Nothing is more essential to good administration than a real Separation, in PATRONAGE. 141 practice, of the executive from the legislative department, which is so carefully provided in our constitution and in that of every other enlight- ened nation. Indeed, the stability and perpetuity of the government depend on the preservation of the counterpoise of these departments. The officers at the head of the administration can be made to feel responsible for its good manage- ment directly—discipline can be preserved there- in—only when they are able to control the selec- tion and removal of all those below them. When presidents, governors or mayors are disposed to treat the power of selection and removal of their subordinates as so much patronage to be used selfishly in their own interest or that of their party, we know that great evils threaten the pub- lic interests. Still, when the authority and duty of selection and removal are, as they should be, left solely in the executive branch, the sense of undivided responsibility to the people is a salu- tary restraint. But no such sense of responsibil- ity is felt when that power has been usurped by the members of the legislative department. The people do not regard the executive officer, nor does he feel himself responsible for good admin- istration. The two departments secretly unite in foisting their electioneering agents, their favor- ites and dependents, upon the pay rolls of the treasury. Neither feels responsible for what he helped to do. —Looked at from another point of view, we see it to be most dangerous to allow leg- islators—who fix salaries and the number to be employed in the executive service, and whose special duty it is to expose and arrest all abuses therein—to acquire a selfish and partisan interest in the increase of the numbers and Salaries of these subordinates. They have no longer the courage or independence needed for that duty. The first salary to be reduced may be that of the relative or favorite of a member; the first person that should be dismissed, his electioneering agent. Yet members of congress—and of legislatures only in less degree—have become the greatest patronage-mongers of the country.; usurping control over such subordinates in order to gain the patronage of places to be pledged for votes and other support in their elections; thus becom- ing directly interested, for themselves and their party, in the increase of the members and com- pensation of such subordinates. In that way, congressmen, in duty bound to aid the high exec- utive officers in the practice of economy, have, through their appeals and Solicitations for more patronage, become a cause of extravagance and corruption alike. They go through the depart- ments and besiege secretaries and heads of bu- reaus for places. Congressional patronage— usurped congressional patronage, for, legally and properly, congressmen have no patronage what- ever—has become one of the most corrupting and dangerous influences in our national affairs. In no way perhaps does it appear more threatening than in connection with the power of confirma- tion by the senate. (See CONFIRMATION.) This many votes. Congressional usurpation of patronage has not been confined to civil offices, but extends to ap- pointments in the military and naval service likewise. It has also taken from the executive almost exclusive control of the selections of cadets for the military and naval schools at West Point and Annapolis. Many members have unquestionably exercised this usurped control patriotically and honestly. Public opin- ion has so overawed others that they have, with great advantage to those schools, al- lowed the cadetships included in their patronage to be freely competed for and to be bestowed upon the most worthy, as shown by the compet- itive examinations. But in a great majority of cases, the patronage of these cadet selections has been simply added by congressmen to the mass of their civil patronage, which is one of the great forces that determine congressional nom- inations and elections. Vague hints in various quarters, that support may gain an appointment to one of these schools, may be made to Secure To gain control of as much patron- age as possible before the elections, and after the elections to find places for those to whom they have promised appointments and employment as a reward for electioneering, votes and puffing, during elections, absorb no small portion of the time and thoughts of all the more unscrupulous and partisan candidates and members of con- gress. – The late President Garfield spoke em- phatically on these points. In a speech at Will- iams college, he said: “Congressilieſt liave be- come the dispensers, sometimes the brokers, of patronage. One-third of the working hours of senators and representatives is hardly sufficient to meet the demands made upon them in refer- ence to appointments for office.” In an article in the “Atlantic Monthly,” for July, 1877, he says: “The present system invades the independ- ence of the executive, and makes him less respon- sible for the character of his appointments; it impairs the efficiency of the legislator, by divert- ing him from his proper sphere of duty and in- volving him in the intrigues of the aspirants for office.” In a speech in congress, in 1870, he made it clear that congressional pressure for patronage is as willful on the part of members as it is disastrous to the country. This is his language: “We press such appointments upon the depart- ments; we crowd the doors; Senators and repre- sentatives throng the bureaus and offices until the public business is obstructed; the patience of officers is worn out, and sometimes for fear of losing their places by our influence, they at last give way and appoint men, not because they are fit for the position, but because we ask it.” As a fur- ther example of the consequences of the abuse of patronage, it may be stated, upon what seems reliable authority, that at least one-third of the time of President Garfield (before his injury) was absorbed by applicants for office, and that more than six-sevenths of the calls made upon one of his secretaries during a period of three 142 PATRONAGE. months were for office seeking. Such are the effects in the higher departments of the government of converting the appointing power into patronage for selfish and partisan purposes. We have no space for tracing the consequences of a similar prostitution of patronage in state legislatures, city councils, or in the various grades of office throughout the country. (For a general state- ment of the abuses with which this prostitution is connected, see SPOILs SYSTEM.)—So vast and familiar have the evils of patronage become, that Some of the American people almost despair of their removal, while many more have come to regard them as original and inevitable under our institutions. It will not, therefore, be unprofita- ble to refer to the same evils and the manner of their removal in Great Britain, to whose adminis- trative system ours is most analogous. (See Ea- ton’s “Civil Service in Great Britain.”)—Wher- ever government purely despotic exists, offices and places are bestowed absolutely in the discre- tion of the ruler. Patronage, in its usual sense, can only exist where some degree of obligation to use it for the common benefit is recognized by the appointing power, and that power is, in some measure, held by great officers of state. Under the lowest forms of patronage we find offices and places salable, that is, treated as perquisites and merchandise, with but the faintest recognition of a moral obligation in the matter. We have only to go back a century or two in the history of the leading nations of Europe, to come upon a period when every grade of office and public employ- ment and the patronage of the same were bought and sold, either openly or secretly, by kings, by princes, by nobles and bishops, by generals and admirals, by lords and those of every grade in the social and Oſleial scale luſlueuiial euuugll lu purchase or control a bit of patronage. Even within this century the English government has provided by law for the purchase, by itself, of pat- Tonage and offices (for the purpose of making them really public again), which had been for many gen- erations private property, mere merchandise in the hands of patronage-mongers. In the British army the buying and selling of offices and the patronage of the same were openly carried on and were rec- ognized as legal by the government, under the name of “purchase,” up to 1871. English army officers generally obtained their commissions by purchasing them at the market price. The pat- romage of these offices had formerly been in a considerable measure a part of the perquisites of members of parliament. And when, in 1870, the attempt was made to suppress that patronage- merchandise, there were members of parliament who contended that such a system of patronage and purchase was essential to good army admin- istration in Great Britain, just as there are now many members in our congress and many intelli- gent politicians who contend that civil patronage is essential to the life of parties and the manage- ment of our politics. So strongly was that theory supported in Great Britain that the bill for the tration. Suppression of patronage and purchase in the army was thrown out in the house of lords in 1871; but the abuse was in the same year sup- pressed by a royal warrant which superseded the old regulation on which purchase had rested. It was, however, only done on the basis of an allow- ance by the government to the army patronage- vendees, as having a vested property in what they had purchased. An open competition of merit, de- termined by examinations, took the place of pat- romage and purchase for gaining office in the army, and Cadetships in the military and naval schools. And promotions have been generally placed on the same basis (with a certain regard for senior. ity), to the credit and advantage of those parts Of the public service. — Almost from the or- ganization of the state church of England, there has been a complicated system of merchantable patronage in its official life, nor is it by any means yet suppressed. Greatly as the public opinion of this country is blinded and blunted by long famil- iarity with the evils of patronage in our political administration, it can hardly contemplate without a shock the prostitution of patronage which long existed in that church, or even look without sur- prise upon the part of it which still survives there after patronage has ceased in her civil adminis- Many of our party managers, who regard our vicious political patronage as original here, if not as quite defensible, affect astonishment at its counterpart in the church of England; they are too blinded or too ignorant to comprehend the fact that the same form of patronage we tolerate long existed in Great Britain, but has been sup- pressed there by methods which might be made equally salutary here. — The appointment of arch- bishops and bishops, until the present century, was lllele as Vellal, Illel Uellaly allul I egårdlū83 of the public interests as the creation of noblemen, the gift of pensions and the bestowal of franchises, all of which were in large measure bestowed as bribes or as rewards for subserviency to the crown or the aristocracy. George III. made his infant son a bishop. It was the custom for an archbish- op on the consecration of a bishop, to name a favor- ite of his own, whom the bishop was to “take care of,” that is, to provide with a place and a salary. The bishop imitated that example in dealing with the rector; and thus through every grade a system of vicious patronage extended, down to the beadle and the chorister. This patronage was protected by law, as in the nature of property; that of the archbishop being known as his “option.” Si- mony and nepotism were but designations of a particular phase of patronage. The right, or priv- ilege, of officiating in a church (as a minister, ac- cording to our phraseology) was called a “ben- efice,” or, in popular language, a “living,” a name which marks the mercenary view taken of it. The right to hold this benefice, or living, was an “advowson,” which was, in other words, the pat- romage of the rectorship or church. That patron- age of a church, the advowson, including the titles and income, was sometimes regularly bought and PATRONA.G.E. 143 sold long after the edifice had gone to decay, and the worshipers had died or scattered. The ad- vowson (or right of filling the benefice) might be bought and many times transferred while an occupying rector was still officiating. The owner of the advowson was the patron of the benefice. This advowson, or patronage, was emphatically property, and was as fully protected by law and as regularly and openly bought and sold as cattle or grain; and with considerable limitations favorable to capacity, character and publicity, advowsons in the church of England are still generally bought and sold. The person presented by the purchaser, or the purchaser himself if he wishes to officiate, must be approved by the bishop before he can enter upon the enjoyment of his living; but the worshipers have no power to keep him out or to put one of their choice in, not even so much power of that kind as have our citizens to secure a good appointment in a city department against the will of the “boss” or the party managers. Many ad- vowsons are at all times in the market for sale. The following is a specimen advertisement (of a very usual form) cut from the “London Times,” of September, 1870 : “Advowson for Sale (a Rec- tory), situated close to a good town in an eastern county. Situation most healthy and pleasant. •Good society. Income, about £250 a year; and there is a prospect of a very early possession; excellent vicarage house, grounds, etc. Address .J. B. Hill, 51 Hollywood Road, West Brompton.” —What scandalous consequences followed such a patronage system in more despotic and corrupt times, Mr. Froude tells us (History, vol. v., pp. 255–257) in this language : “In the country the patron of the benefice no longer made distinction between a clergyman and a layman. * * He presented his huntsman, his steward or his game ićeeper. * * The cathedrals and churches of London became the chosen scenes of riot and profanity, St. Paul’s was the stock exchange of the day, where the merchants met for business and the lounge; where gallants gambled and fought, and killed each other.” It was the natural result of Such a system of church patronage, that he who had bought the office or place in the church was regarded as the owner of it, and under the ‘common law of England even parish clerks and sextons have freeholds in their offices. – Patron- age in the church of Scotland was hardly less mercenary and disastrous. It was known as “lay patronage.” John Knox in vain attempted to arrest it. It secured recognition by law, and led to Scandalous acts of violence. For generations it was a prolific source of venality, favoritism and corruption, not only in the Scotch church, but in the whole civil administration of Scotland. It finally became so intolerable to the better senti- ment of the Scotch church that in the first quarter of this century it caused a disruption of the church itself. Dr. Chalmers, leading the party which made a stand against patronage, secured a majority in the general assembly in 1834. A long litigation followed, in which the Scotch church patronage-mongers had the hearty sympathy of the English patronage-mongers. The courts af- firmed a right of private property in church pat- romage. Thereupon Dr. Chalmers left the state church, and carried with him more than one-third of all the clergy of the church of Scotland. “Their once crowded churches were surrendered to others, while they went forth to preach on the hillsides, and in tents, barns and stables.” (2 May's Constitutional History, p. 442.) In eighteen years more than $26,000,000 were contributed for the purposes of the new organization, now known as the “Free Church of Scotland.” — Supported by such elements of venality and corruption out- side of party politics, it is hardly necessary to say that patronage in the civil administration of Great Britain was far worse than any we have yet devel- oped, or that its removal was made far more diffi- cult by reason of the patronage-mongers of the army, of the church and of the civil administra- tion making common cause together. Whatever reform directly threatened one, indirectly threat- ened all. In her civil administration every grade of office and place centuries ago became patronage in the control of somebody—of the crown, of the princes, of nobles, of bishops, of great landlords, of cabinet officers, of members of parliament, of parties and of party managers. More grossly and boldly than ever with us, unworthy men were given places, and needless numbers were foisted upon the public pay-rolls, in order to increase the amount of patronage. As with us, the public offi- cials and employés neglected their duties in order to serve their patrons; and the most intolerable incompetency, inefficiency and corruption existed in the municipal administration. In the greed for increasing patronage, and for making it valu- able to patronage-mongers and parties, the para- mount tests for appointments were not fitness, but opinions, and the promise and prospect of work for the party and the patrons. – Until about the beginning of this century parliament had not be- come so potent in the state as to enable its members to usurp any great share of patronage. But as their influence increased, they used it to increase their patronage. George III. was the last king who was able by direct authority to put limits to that parliamentary usurpation. He used the vast patronage of the crown as relentlessly as Jackson used that of the executive for partisan ends. He also used public money, equally with patronage, to corrupt opponents, to reward Supporters, to make presents to favorites, and to bribe members of parliament. Under his immediate successors, members of parliament took to themselves the largest part of all civil patronage, and they con- tinued to hold and to use it in aid of their own elections, their party and their favorites, until the triumph of the reform policy by which it has been suppressed. (See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM.) The patronage of members of parliament finally be- came the greatest and the most persistent obstacle in the way of reform, just as the patronage of our members of congress is now such an obstacle; in 144 PATRONAGE. each country alike blinding the eyes, debauching the conscience and corrupting the morals of the members of the legislature; though such patron- age here has by no means yet reached the shame- less aggravation which it attained in Great Britain during the first half of this century. But with us it has one pernicious element not known, at least in this century, in Great Britain—that of po- litical assessments, through which the patronage- mongering members of congress are able to coerce the public servants to pay ready money as well as do servile work for carrying congressional elections. In Great Britain the sale of offices in early times prevented the growth of the abuse of assessments; for who would pay a full price for an office, if, like ours, it was subject to an annual rent in the form of an assessment to be fixed at the discretion of members of parliament and party chieftains? Members of parliament were so sus- picious of each other, and scrambled so intolerably among themselves for more and more patronage and a greater share of what there was, that, in mere self-protection, an officer was provided, known as the “patronage secretary,” who arranged and supervised an equitable apportionment of the spoils; keeping books in which each member was credited with his share, and debited from time to time with the doles of the patronage he received. We have only reached the stage of patronage evolution at which much the same thing is done secretly and in a scramble by our members of congress, with frequent scruples and many pro- testations of disgust. It only requires time, how- ever, to reach the full stage of the flaunting, shameless British development of fifty years ago. — The experience of Great Britain is especially interesting, not only as showing the results which our evolution is soon likely to reach if not arrest- ed, but as showing how such an evil, buttressed by many elements of strength with which we are not confronted, may be overcome. For patronage, in any other sense than the mere exercise of the appointing power in the public interest alone, has, in the civil administration of Great Britain, been, with very slight exceptions, suppressed. Members of parliament have lost their usurped control over appointments, and are therefore with- out patronage of any kind. — After the creation of a sounder public opinion, the principal means there used for the Suppression of civil patronage was the enforcement of rigid competitive exam- inations of fitness before appointments, by which the qualifications were tested which were required for holding the places sought. (See CIVIL SER- VICE REFORM, ante, and “Civil Service in Great Britain,” by JD. B. Eaton.) Such examinations and conditions are obviously fatal to all partisan and mercenary enjoyment of patronage, and for that reason were opposed by patronage-mongering members of parliament, as they are now opposed by our patronage-mongering members of congress. — The work of patronage suppression in Great Britain was also aided by more effective laws against bribery (known as office brokerage laws) than any in force in this country. (See work last cited, pp. 132 to 139.) Our statutes make bribery to consist in giving or promising “money or something of value * for the doing of the act, as voting, appointing, etc., and they do not ex- tend to the promising of nominations or confirma- tions, or to influence for procuring them. The English statutes go much further; making it a penal offense to enter into contract for, or to en- gage in the business of, procuring offices or places for a consideration of a corrupt nature, whether valuable or not. The promise of official influence for votes or appointments is such a consideration. Some of the most comprehensive of our decisions against bribery and the corrupt use of patronage are based solely on English precedents—facts which plainly illustrate the potency of the patron- age interest in our legislation. —In the last few years there has been a rapid growth of public Opinion, which sternly condemns our patronage system. Never has the levying of political assess- ments been so vigorously arraigned as during the present year (1883). More and more our statesmen are becoming convinced that the enforcement of that system does not even give strength to a party. Sober reflection and a more careful observance of facts are convincing them that fidelity to princi- ples, the selection of worthy men for office, and honest, efficient administration, and not a venal and proscriptive use of patronage, are the true and sufficient sources of vigor, vitality and power in a party. British experience on the subject is securing the attention of our thinkers in politics. The enforcement of competitive examinations at the postoffice and custom house at New York city, through which the patronage there has been suppressed, by enabling the most worthy to win the places, in utter disregard and defeat of the practices and interests of the old patronage-mong- ers and chieftains of New York politics, has done much to convince the public that only a practica- ble and becoming effort is needed to achieve a suppression of patronage in Our civil administra- tion, as complete and salutary as that which has been accomplished in that of Great Britain. — In that broad sense in which patronage may be held to include the legal and faithful exercise of the appointing power, it must always exist, and must become greater with the increase of our popula- tion and commerce. What is needed is a public opinion which shall be wise, virtuous and patriotic enough to enforce such exercise of that power, when aided by the better practical methods that are available for our use. It is necessary that every official should be educated to accept, and compelled by law and public opinion to act upon, the theory that there can be no proper and legal public patronage in which any officers or citizens can have a pecuniary interest, or, in other Words, that there is no more moral or legal right to use the appointing power than there is to use the pub- lic money for the private advantage of any citizen, officer or party. We must have a public opinion which treats one of these offenses as being equally PAUPERISMI. 145 reprehensible with the other. For the legal prin- ciples applicable to this part of the subject, see REMOVALs. DoRMAN B. EATON. PATRONS OF HUSBANDRY. (See GRAN- GERS.) PAUPERISM. It is not to be supposed that the essence of pauperism is anything else in Amer- ica than it is now in Europe, or than it was in the states of antiquity. But, just as the conditions of poverty among the Romans, the Greeks, and the Hebrews, were widely different from those of England and France in the eighteenth century, so now the conditions of poverty in a new and advancing industrial republic like the United States, must be very unlike those which have prevailed among the Latin, the Sclavonic, the Teutonic or the Celtic races of Europe; settled as they are under ancient and fixed institutions, where the distinctions of wealth and poverty are comparatively immutable. Where class distinc- tions have hardened into caste, pauperism must be a different thing from that degree of poverty which prevails among a people of permanent equality, or of ever-changinginequality. The mod- ern city and the manufacturing towns are strong examples of this fluctuating inequality, where the working man of to-day may be the industrial chieftain ten years hence; and where vast fortunes, Swiftly accumulated, are suddenly dispersed and Scattered throughout a multitude. On the other hand, the villages and rural districts of America, and of some European countries, offer examples of permanent equality, which, of all conditions, is least favorable to pauperism. — M. Baudrillart, in an article published in Block’s Dictionnaire de la Politique, asserts that it is less than a century since the sphinx of pauperism began to put her destructive questions to the industrial nations of Europe. But this “riddle of the painful earth’’ is no modern one, though its form may have changed with the last century. The agglomera- tion of poverty in great manufacturing centres, like Manchester, Lyons, and the vast capital citis of London, Paris, Vienna, etc., undoubted- ly accentuates and renders more perceptible the pauperism of the last half century. But is it not also true, as M. Baudrillart says, that great cities have always been sad nurseries of poverty? In Rome, from the earliest period of its urban greatness until it had been twice sacked by the barbarians in the time of St. Augustine, a period of at least five centuries, the relief of the poor was one of the clief functions of the state, and a very embarrassing one. The “corn laws” of Caius Gracchus (B. C. 123) were poor- laws; but the distribution of food under this ques- tionable legislation was not wholly gratuitous, until Clodius the demagogue made it so, in the time of Caesar's Gallic war. Returning from his victory over Pompey, Caesar found 320,000 per- Sons. (the chronicles say) receiving this kind of out-door relief, in and about Rome; more than a 129 VOL. III. — 10 fifth part of the whole population, if the figures were reasonably exact. He reduced them to 150,000, which was still, perhaps, one in eight of the populatioh. The civil wars that brought Augustus to the throne raised this number to 300,000, which Augustus, in turn, reduced to 200,000; but when he gave his subjects an extraor- dihary donative, says Merivale, “the numbers who partook of his bounty swelled again to 320,000.” (History of the Romans under the Em- pire, chap. xxxiv.) This careful English author supposes that the 200,000 occasional paupers mentioned by Augustus represented the whole poorer sort of citizens; while the 320,000 included those below the Senatorial and equestrian rank. In any case, these enormous figures, though swollen by duplications, like the pauper statistics of modern times, show what a cancer pauperism had become in imperial Rome, which devoted a large share of its annual budget to the various methods of relief. Under the Antonines, when philanthropy and population had both increased, the number on the poor-rates of Rome is stated at 500,000. No modern city, except possibly Paris in the famine years of the revolution, or during the siege of 1871, could show so large a proportion of paupers to population. For this the simple reason seems to have been, that the familiar saying of Franklin, “If every man and woman would work four hours each day in some- thing useful, that labor would produce sufficient to procure all the necessaries and comforts of life,” was far less descriptive of ancient Rome than of great cities in recent times. – In this view, and looking back over 2,000 years, it can hardly be said, as M. Baudrillart maintains, that “the concentration of pauperism has increased with the progress of industry,” except in the restricted sense that the concentration of inhabitants, which industrial progress has produced, is necessarily accompanied by a like concentration of poverty. Indeed, the same writer goes on to say that this very progress of industry has lessened the suffer- ings of the poor, and increased the number of those who live in comfort. This is certainly the general result, though the crowding of artisans and operatives into manufacturing centres does often produce the sanitary, moral and economic evils which we all recognize from M. Baudrill- art's description. In too many cities of manu- facturing industry, rents rise and wages fall; the dark and narrow street, the promiscuous lodging house, the damp cellar, become the abode of laborious poverty, as well as of lurking crime; the father of a family drinks, the wife de- serts the cheerless home, the son becomes a “loafer,” and the daughter a prostitute. This happens often in France, Belgium and England, and is not unknown in America ; to which the operatives throng by thousands from those very cities of Europe in which the evils mentioned are most rife. It must not be forgotten, how- ever, that the sharper contrast which cities afford of the extremes of wealth and poverty, and the 146 PAUPERISM. attractive force exercised by accumulated wealth in drawing together a corresponding accumula- tion of poverty, account in part for the startling picture of misery and degradation which manu- facturing towns so often furnish. The same crime and misery scattered through a thousand rural neighborhoods would affect the public sen- sibility less than when it is found concentrated in Birmingham, Mulhausen or the manufacturing regions along the Rhine and its tributaries. – It is further to be noted that, while the ancient cities were capitals of conquest and of commerce, the modern capitals are much more centres of manufacture and of public resort. The present age is migratory, both for the rich and the poor, and even the classes between travel for business or pleasure much more than the rich formerly could. Rome is no longer the seat of empire, but a caravansary for virtuosos and tourists; Paris is the home of pleasure, but also, and still more, the workshop of useful industry; so, too, each in its degree, are Vienna and New York. Migration, on the large scale in which it now takes place in central and western Europe and in America, is both a source of pauperism and a check upon its growth. It is to the immigrants and their children that we look for most of the public poverty that is now seen in the United States; yet the emigration of these very persons, or their fathers, from Europe, has checked the growth of pauperism in the countries they came from. With these preliminary remarks we may come at once to the subject in hand. —In a re- stricted sense, pauperism is that degree of poverty for which public relief is provided; in a broader definition, it is that condition of body, or tem- per of mind, in large numbers of people, which makes them easy applicants for public or private relief. In the former sense, the word is a mere definition ; in the latter, it points to a distinct and formidable social evil, always to be deplored, though not to be wholly avoided. In neither sense is it new to the world’s history, in the ear- lier chapters of which we find traces that pauper- ism was known and felt as an evil. But as a rec- ognized and preventable evil, as a social solecism and a public nuisance, it has never attracted so much attention as now, in all parts of the world. In early times slavery replaced pauperism, and prevented its lesser mischiefs from receiving due notice ; in the Christian dispensation, until re- cently, the relief of the poor has been viewed as a religious duty, and these mischiefs of pauper- ism have sometimes been fostered in the name of religion. For a century past, the saying of Burke, that “the age of sophisters and econo- mists has come,” is certainly true as applied to this subject. The religious motive for dispensing charity has been kept in the background, while its economical demerits have been increasingly in- sisted on. Were human nature other than it is, the religious and philanthropic side of charity might be expected to vanish from consideration, while logic and utility should rule. But the so- cial and spiritual affections of mankind are such that pity will always give ere charity begins, even for objects unworthy, and charity will keep on giving until good sense says “You are creating the evil you mean to cure.” It has been a view of this consequence of public charity that, in recent times, has led to so many efforts for the prevention of pauperism, and so much cen- Sure on the practice of alms-giving, even for needful relief. Dr. Lieber, writing more than fifty years ago, when the founders of the English school of political economy were still living, and more influential than they are ever likely to be again, said: “In England, where wages are low, compared with the expense of living, an ordinary laborer often can not save anything against the time of decrepitude or sickness; and the children of suffering parents must suffer with them. By what means shall their present distress be re- lieved? The economists of the new school” (this was in 1831), “namely, that of Mr. Malthus, Mr. Ricardo, Mr. M'Culloch, and others, say that they are to be abandoned to starvation. But, says Lie- ber, “a doctrine so abhorrent to our nature is only a hideous theory, which can not enter into the law or habits of any people, until human nature shall be sunk into brutal hardheartedness. The dictates of religion, conscience and compassion enjoin upon us to give relief.” Here is the whole ques- tion stated ; and its solution must depend upon the wisdom and the daily details of administer- ing those measures by which relief is now given, and in the future is anticipated or prevented. — Among the latter measures M. Baudrillart, with excellent sense, but perhaps in a manner too vague and general, specifies primary and profes- sional instruction, combined with moral educa- tion ; a beller systeill Uſ IIUusing ille puul, LUU often crowded into unwholesome lodgings, so that better sanitary conditions may permit a bet- ter moral atmosphere ; the dispersing of manu- factories throughout rural districts; and finally, the general progress of civilization and industry, so that increased productive power may enlarge production. In solving the problem of pauper- ism, he says: “To increase production is the first step; to assist equitable and humane distribution of the products, is the second, which would be useless without the first; for nothing else could insure that, where there is but little, each person should be above want.” Another French writer, M. Baron, who in 1881 took the Pereira prize for an elaborate work on French pauperism, entitled Jºe Paupérèsme, Ses Causes et ses Remédès, par A. Baron (Sandoz & Thuillier, Editeurs, Paris, 1882), goes into minute details concerning these general preventives of pauperism, laying stress particularly on the means of inducing the work people of his country to deposit in Savings banks, insure their lives, and by other approved econom- ical precautions, raise themselves above the dan- gerous level of their present poverty, from which it is but a step, in illness, old age or vice, to the abyss of pauperism. No recent work has treated PAUPERISM. 147 more fully or ably of these subjects, and there is a degree of practical wisdom (not always found in economical writers) in almost all M. Baron’s observations. I may except some petulant re- marks which he makes concerning the “People's Banks” of the late Herr Schulze-Delitzsch, a German economist, whose services have been perhaps overrated, but who does not deserve all the scorn which M. Baron pours out upon him.' — M. Baron’s book is clear in its definitions, and recent in its statistics, and I shall make much use of it in what follows concerning European pauperism. His definition of pauperism in the individual (which the French call misère—a word carefully to be distinguished from our English word “misery,” by which it is often translated) is striking, and may be quoted. He says: “Pov- erty, then, is not pauperism; the former is rela- tive, the latter absolute. At Rome, when every- body was poor, there were no paupers; it was the growing luxury of some which disclosed the pov- •erty of others. But pauperism (misère) is the mi- nus side of material existence, the foot of the human ladder (le fond de l'abjection humaºne); the pauper is confronted by this dilemma, to eat the bread of another or to die. A sad choice! either beggary or robbery or death; the degrada- tion of alms, the dishonor of a thief, or death by starvation.” — This may describe pauperism in Europe, but with us no such fatal alterna- tive is ordinarily presented. There have been deaths from starvation in America, but they were generally suicides, or the result of mental decay; there have been many thefts for which poverty was the excuse, and there has been much beggary in some of our great cities, but neither starvation, mendicancy nor theft have naturally occurred in our new country because of extreme poverty. — The principles of prevention system- atically developed by recent authors on the sub- ject may be found concisely stated in Defoe, Adam Smith, and other early writers. That great pupil of Adam Smith, the younger Pitt, in a speech to the house of commons in February, 1796, while discussing a new poor law, said : “These great points of granting relief according to the number of children, preventing removals at the caprice of the parish officer, and making them subscribe to friendly societies, would tend in a very great degree to remove every ground of complaint. * * All this, however, I will con- fess is not enough, if we do not engraft upon the law resolutions to discourage relief where it is not wanted. * * The extension of schools of in- dustry is also an object of material importance. The suggestion of these schools was originally drawn from Lord Hale and Mr. Locke, and upon such authority I have no hesitation in recom- mending the plan to the encouragement of the legislature. * * Such a plan would convert the relief granted to the poor into an encourage- ment for industry, instead of being, as it is by the present poor laws, a premium for idleness and a school for sloth. There are also a number of subordinate circumstances to which it is necessary to attend. The law which prohibits giving relief where any visible property remains, should be abolished. That degrading condition should be withdrawn. No temporary occasion should force a British subject to part with the last shilling of his little capital, and to descend to a state of wretchedness from which he could never recover, merely that he might be entitled to a casual sup- ply.” These remarks are all wise, and most of them are practical; but the new poor law proposed by Pitt in 1796 (which may be found printed at length in a valuable but little known work, Sir F. M. Eden’s “State of the Poor,” London, 1797), was burlesqued by Bentham, and did not find acceptance with parliament. In supporting it Pitt said he conceived, that, to promote the free circulation of labor, and remove the obstacles by which industry is prohibited from availing itself of its own resources, would go far to diminish the necessity of relief from the poor rates. He also recommended that “an annual report should be made to parliament, which should take on itself the duty of tracing the effects of its own system from year to year, till it should be fully matured; that, in short, there should be a yearly poor-law budget, by which the legislature would show that they had a watchful eye upon the in- terests of the poorest and most neglected part of the community.” This suggestion has since been adopted, not only in England, but in many other countries, and in the separate states of our own country, as I shall show presently. — Of the English poor laws in general, Mr. Senior once said that they had their origin, during the reigns of Edward III. and Richard II., “in an attempt substantially to restore the expiring system of slavery.” This is a remark profoundly true; and it may further be said that the subsequent legisla- tion, even down to a very recent period, in Eng- land, was quite as much in the line of preserving class distinctions as of alleviating the distress of the poor. In this respect the pauper system of England—indeed, of all Europe—and that of the |United States, differ radically. Certain unavoid- able distinctions do appear in our legislation, nota- bly those arising from immigration in the north, and from the difference of race in the southern states; but the general spirit of the American poor laws has been friendly to the advancement of the poor man. In England and France, on the contrary, the effort for centuries was to keep the poor man “in his place,” that is, to keep him still poor, and use him as a prop for the comfort and luxury of the privileged classes above him. An Lnglish pamphleteer, of no great fame, but of much good sense (Charles Lamport), made these remarks in 1870 concerning the traditional treat- ment of the English poor, under the laws of his country : “The poor-law theory is, that all occu- piers of houses and lands shall contribute to a general fund, localized for better administration, to make provision against the wants and claims of the destitute. Its practice is, that no destitute 148 PAUPERISM. person, however meritorious, can benefit by this organization without having to pass under some- thing very like the old Roman yoke. On the one side of the Caudine forks, a man stands erect, self-respecting and respected, and with name un- stained; on the other side he crouches, a changed and degraded being. He has become a social pa- riah, hopes destroyed, spirit crushed, reputation gone. Society, before it yields what it dare not refuse, so embitters the morsel by contempt that neither giver nor receiver is blessed in the act. The terms “pauper,” “parish,’ ‘poor relief,' all savor of social reproach. The poor are taught that it is virtuous to shrink from everything appertaining to the whole system. A beggar, even, will un- blushingly ask for alms “ to keep himself off the parish 'l On the other hand, the rich avoid the whole system as something tainted by Social lep- rosy, and equally shrink from all but enforced contact. From father to son, through many a generation, the unconscious legacy of contempt and hard dealing has descended to us. Nothing testifies so clearly to the prevalent feeling of the upper classes as the persistent rigor of all legisla- tion affecting the poor for 800 years. From Saxon serfdom down to modern pauperism the old key-note of contempt and isolation vibrates unchanged.” — Of late years the larshness of the English system has been softened considerably. Mr. Goschen, when president of the old poor-law board in 1870, said : “It can not be denied that the more humane views which have prevailed during the last few years, as to the treatment of the sick poor, have added most materially to poor-law expenditures. Workhouses, originally designed mainly as a test for the able bodied, have, especially in the large towns, been of necessity gradually transferred into infirmaries for the sick; and the higher standard for hospital accommo- dations has had a material effect upon the ex- penditures.” The process here mentioned by Mr. Goschen has been going on rapidly in Great Britain and Ireland, and, indeed, in almost every European country, since 1870. In America the same thing has happened, and even to a greater extent. Whatever success has followed the attempts to regulate pauperism, either in America or Europe, has been gained by revers- ing the English practice of suspicion, contempt and abasement; by classifying the poor accord- ing to their real character and needs, and treat- ing the money for their relief as an insurance fund, to which they or their representatives had contributed their full share. The poor rate is, properly, an insurance premium ; the poor-law system of any country should be what Mr. Lam- port desires to make that of England, a “National Friendly Society.” That the plague of pauper- ism has never spread widely in America is due mainly to our institutions, and the opportunity which is offered to the poor man; that it has been controlled and diminished, where a dense popula- tion and the varied competitions of industry had given it a foothold, must be ascribed, in part at least, to measures such as Mr. Pitt recommended, enforced in a country where external circum- stances have made it easier than it ever has been in England. It was certainly one of the strangest vagaries of the reasoning faculty which led Eng- lishmen, in the early half of the present century, to deny that public charity was a duty, or even an admissible interference with individual duties and the laws of political economy; yet so com- mon was this view, fifty years ago, that Edward Livingston, in the introduction to his “Penal Code for Louisiana,” felt called upon to stop and refute it. He pointed out, what everybody ad- mits in practice, that every community owes a social duty to the individuals that compose it, and is bound to guarantee them their lives and property; that the obligation to protect life is greater than any other, since all the rest depends upon it ; and that the prevention of death by poverty is as much a public duty as the repres- sion of murder is. From this impregnable posi- tion he proceeded to develop his own ingenious and mainly correct system of the administration of public charity. — Josiah Quincy, of Massachu- setts, a contemporary of Edward Livingston, gave his attention even more directly to the question of pauperism. In a report to the Massachusetts legislature, in 1821, he recommended “placing the whole subject of the poor in the common- wealth under the regular and annual superintend- ence of the legislature,” thus anticipating, by more than forty years, the course that has since been adopted by all the larger and more import- ant states in the Union, and is likely to become the universal American policy. The creation of boards of charities in Massachusetts in 1863, in New York and Ohio in 1868, in Pennsylvania, Illinois and Rhode Island in 1869, and in WISCón- sin and other states in more recent years, is the modern interpretation of the recommendation made by Mr. Quincy to the Massachusetts legis- lature. The establishment of these boards has resulted in a much fuller knowledge of pauper- ism in America than could before be obtained. Co-operating with thousands of local officers, and with the general tendency of American ideas and institutions, they have labored to reduce pau- perism to its lowest terms, to ameliorate the con- dition of all the dependent and defective classes, and to prevent the formation or continuance of that permanent caste of the poor which is the curse of European civilizations. The experience of Massachusetts and of other states shows that this is possible to a great extent. In the midst of the activities, generous or base, and the distract- ing turmoil of American life, it is cheering to find that we are really making progress in this direc- tion; that we have not only abolished slavery and the political distinctions founded thereon, but are steadily advancing toward emancipation from the most hideous forms and consequences of the pau- perism that everywhere replaces slavery when first abolished. The so-called “feudalism of capital” —a vague phrase, which yet has a recognized PAUPERISM. 149 shade of meaning—does something to perpetuate pauperism, but the material advantages which organized capital gives to the poor, are working, On the whole, against the increase of paupers. This is seen even in English manufacturing towns, and still more in those of America. — Historically speaking, there is a certain connection, though not a very close one, between the American poor laws and the evil with which they deal, and the poor laws of England and pauperism there. Mention has been made of the earliest legislation of England, but the progressive steps of the sys- tem now existing there may be more definitely noted. It is less than three centuries since the law of England distinctly made provision for the support of the poor at the public charge. By an act of parliament in 1572 the office of overseer of the poor was established, and by the act of 1601 (43 Elizabeth) a general plan of relief for the poor was adopted and cnforced throughout England. But there were laws and customs bearing more or less directly on the condition of the poor, and dating back, according to Sir George Nicholls, to the time of Athelstan, nearly a thousand years ago. It is worth noticing that most of these an- cient laws are penal in their character rather than charitable, being aimed at the evils of idleness and vagrancy, and therefore particularly numer- Ous, when, from any great social change, like the emancipation of the serfs in the time of Richard II., or the breaking up of the monasteries under Henry VIII., the tendency to vagrancy had grown stronger. Thus, the insurrection of Wat Tyler in 1381 (which was a servile war, and, like most Servile wars, was occasioned by a partial emanci- pation of the serfs), was followed in 1888 by that oft-cited statute, 12 Richard II., which is some- times called the origin of the poor laws of Eng- land and America. Again, the dissolution of the monasteries in 1536–9 was both preceded and fol- lowed by cruel statutes against vagrancy. The statute 22 Henry VIII., cap. 12, in 1531, punished vagabonds with the lash, till they were “bloody by reason of such whipping”; and the still more cruel statute, Edward VI., cap. 3, punished them by branding and by selling into slavery. But these laws were found too extreme, and there- fore ineffectual to repress beggary, and they were followed, even during Edward's brief reign, by a more humane law, which provided for the choice of collectors of alms in every parish, whose busi- ness it should be on Sundays to “gently ask and demand of every man and woman what they of their charity will give weekly toward the relief of the poor,” and to “justly gather and truly distrib- ute the same charitable alms weekly to the said poor and impotent persons.” We should prefer to consider this merciful statute, rather than the barbarous enactments of an earlier day, as the Origin of our American poor laws. It was con- tinued by special acts in the reigns of Mary, of Philip and Mary, and of Elizabeth. The latter, in the fifth year of her reign (1562), decreed a compulsory tax, “if any person of his froward or willful mind shall obstinately refuse to give weekly to the relief of the poor according to his ability.” After a course of gentle exhortations by the parson, the church-wardens, the bishop and the trial justices of his neighborhood, the affair ended in a commitment to jail, if “the said ob- stinate person * should resist all these blandish- ments. This is the first instance of a compulsory poor rate; and it was followed, ten years later, by an act authorizing justices, among other things, to appoint overseers of the poor, ‘‘and if a person so appointed shall refuse to act, he shall forfeit ten shillings.” This stand-and-deliver kind of benev- olence was carried out more completely toward beggars, whose offense was made a felony, and was visited with whippings, diversified with branding, confiscation and hanging. Sir George Nicholls observes, with simplicity, that “the act is framed with great care, and comprises all the chief points of poor-law legislation suited to the period;” adding, that these points are set forth with a clearness “which leaves no room for doubt as to the intentions of the legislature ºn any case.” Certainly; the provisions against vagrancy were likely to carry conviction to the wayfaring man; and a person locked up in jail till he should show mercy to the poor would soon learn how sacredly charity was regarded in England. — The act of 1601, better known as 43 Elizabeth, is the actual foundation of the English poor laws, and of those in force in the United States. It pro- vides for the employment, either voluntary or com- pulsory, of poor children and able-bodied adults, and “for the necessary relief of the lame, impo- tent, old and blind, and such other among them being poor and not able to work.” To support the expense of this, a tax was laid on every inhabitant and owner in every parish in England. About sixty years after the death of Elizabeth, when the public relief of the poor had been devel. oped into a system, another important law was passed. This was the settlement act of 1662, giving the power of compulsory removal, from any parish, of poor persons not legally settled therein, and in a certain general way defining what constitutes a pauper settlement. On these two pillars—the 43 Elizabeth and the 14 Charles II.-rests the subsequent legislation on these subjects in Eng- land and the United States. But so materially has the course of legislation been modified in America by the great difference existing between our circumstances and those of the mother coun- try, that it is impossible to draw a close parallel between our poor laws and those of England, either in their aim, their details or their results. These laws in England were made necessary by the presence of a great and persistent class of poor persons, many of whom were also vicious characters, needing all the restraints of the law, Hence the severity of the early statutes against vagrants, laws which were at first the germ of the whole poor law system, and have made no incon- siderable part of it. But in America no such pau- per class existed at the outset, and Our arrange- 150 PAUPERISM. ments for relieving the poor have been such as to prevent the creation of such a class. It was, in fact, to make room for the poor, cottagers of Eng- land, as well as to seek freedom for their religion, that John Winthrop and his followers colonized New England. In a paper written before he set sail for Boston in 1629, Winthrop said: “This land [of England] grows weary of her inhabit- ants, so as man, who is the most pretious of all creatures, is here more vile and base than the earth we tread upon, and of less price among us than a horse or sheep. Many of our people per- ish for want of sustenance and employment ; many others live miserably, and not to the hon- our of so bountiful a housekeeper as the Lord of heaven and earth is, through the scarcity of the fruits of the earth. All our towns complain of the burden of poor people, and strive by all means to rid any such as they have, and to keep off such as would come to them. I must tell you that our dear mother finds her family so over- charged as she hath been forced to deny harbor to her own children; witness the statutes against cottages and inmates. And thus it is come to pass that children, servants and neighbors, especially if they be poor, are counted the greatest burthen, which, if things were right, would be the chiefest earthly blessings.” To make things “right” in this respect, America was colonized, and for 150 years there was little pauperism in these colonies. But the French war of 1754–63, the revolutionary war, and the disturbed state of Europe from 1788 to 1820, led to a considerable development of pauperism in the new republic of Washington, Adams and Jefferson. Since 1820, though the number of our poor has greatly increased, the proportion of paupers to population has not, on the whole, been greater than it was from 1783 to 1820, if we may trust the meagre statistics availa- ble for the earlier period. Of late years there has been much complaint that “the rich were grow- ing richer, and the poor poorer,” and, relatively speaking, this is true, as it generally is in civilized communities. But, as compared with the stand- ard of riches and poverty a hundred years ago, in America, and from that time to 1825, the Ameri- can poor man has been growing generally richer in a remarkable degree. Before 1825, great for- tunes were very rare among our people; while the mass of the farmers, mechanics and laborers, north, south, east and west, were pinched and straitened to a degree that would now excite uni- versal discontent, should those good old times re- turn. Whoever has read the biography of Abra- ham Lincoln, or has learned the habits of life among the country people of Ohio, Pennsylvania or New England, eighty or ninety years ago, will understand what is meant by the common level of poverty among them. Their firewood was cheap, and their liquor was abundant; but their dwell- ings, their food, their garments, their means of education, travel and amusement, were very in- ferior to those which the same class of persons now enjoy; and in proportion to the population, pauperism was as common, if not quite so ob- vious, from 1778 to 1818, or it has ever been since. The researches of Quincy and others. in Massachusetts indicate this; and where there has been of late years any relative increase of pauperism, it has been almost wholly in the per- sons of foreign parentage. That there has been an absolute decrease of native pauperism may be seen by the experience of my own town, which is not unlike that of most country villages in New England. In 1833 Concord, in Massa- chusetts, had about 2,000 inhabitants, of whom not more than fifty were foreigners. In 1883 it has more than 3,300 free inhabitants (besides 650 prisoners), of whom not less than 900 are either foreign-born or of foreign parentage, chiefly Irish. The number of paupers in Concord was actually greater in 1833 than it is now, when the population has gained 65 per cent.; yet more than half the present pauperism is among that class which has come into the town in the last fifty years; so that the 1,950 native-born inhabitants in 1833 must have furnished twice as many paupers as do the 2,400 native-born in 1883. In fact, two-thirds of the abundant pauperism of Massachusetts, is found among the immigrants of the last thirty years, and their descendants. – The census tables of 1880 do not show this great excess of paupers of foreign parentage in Massachusetts, nor perhaps in any State; because these tables do not, in fact, give even an approximation to the truth concerning American pauperism. In Massachusetts, for ex- ample, the census gives the inmates of alms- houses, June 1, 1880, as 4,469, and the out-door paupers as only 954; whereas, by authentic official returns, July 1, 1880, there were not less than 12,000 out-door paupers receiving aid on that day. The average number of the out-door poor in Mas- sachusetts is never less than three times the num- ber in poorhouses; and has sometimes, within the past ten years, risen to be more than five times as many. The census of 1880, therefore, in leaving Out of view more than nine-tenths of the out-door poor, in Massachusetts and other States, vitiates its own value for any statistical purpose. Indeed, Mr. Wines says in the preface to his meagre table (Compendium of the Tenth Census, p. 1666), “It is almost, if not quite, impossible to obtain the statistics of pauperism. The in-door poor can be found and counted with comparative ease; but how are we to know when we have succeeded in finding the out-door poor? All that has been at- tempted in the present census, therefore, has been to give as accurate an account as possible of the almshouse population.” And this he states in his table (p. 1675) as 67,067; the whole population of the country being then 50,155,783. If we could assume this proportion of almshouse or work- house population to the whole people, as the true test of comparative pauperism, then Ireland in 1880, with 5,327,100 inhabitants, and an average of 54,946 in workhouses, would have eight times as much pauperism as the United States; while England, which in 1880, with a population of PAUPERISM. 151 25,323,000, had 180,817 in-door paupers, would have nearly sºa, times as much pauperism as the United States. In fact, no combination of figures, in the present state of human knowledge, can show with much exactness what is the relative prevalence of pauperism in countries differing widely in accumulated wealth, in natural plenty or want, in commercial facilities and in political institutions; but if we are to compare the declared paupers of one country with those of another, or of one American state with another, the best standard is not the relative number of either the in-door or the out-door poor, but rather the proportion which the aggregate of both classes bears to the whole population. — Now, the state of Massachusetts in 1880, with a population of 1,783,085, or about one-third that of Ireland, had an average of about 25,000 paupers of both classes; while Ireland had about 114,000 paupers of both classes; so that pauperism in Ireland, thus shown, was less than twice as common as in Massachusetts. In England, with a population of 25,323,000 in 1880, there were 808,030 paupers of both classes; so that pauperism in England would seem to be, to that in Ireland, as 46% is to 31; and, to pauper- ism in Massachusetts, as 71 is to 31, or more than twice as common. Yet this comparison is found to be unjust; from the fact that the pauperism of England and Ireland is evidently more habitual and permanent than that of Massachusetts. So that the corrected comparison would perhaps make English pauperism sta, times as frequent and chronic, and Irish pauperism five times as frequent and chronic, as pauperism in Massa- chusetts is, although the density of population in that New England state is now about 220 to the square mile, while in England it is 436, and in Ireland 163 to the square mile. If a dense population and devotion to manufactures are, by themselves, favorable to pauperism, there- fore, Ireland Ought to have fewer paupers than Massachusetts, in proportion to her people. — In truth, the political institutions of a country, the distribution of its land and its movable property, and the inbred spirit of the people, have more to do with the prevalence of pauperism than the growth of manufactures, or the method of ad- ministering relief. French pauperism (though by no means so much less than the English plague of that sort, as is commonly thought) is now less constant and pinching than it was before the revolution; because the land of France is more equally divided, and the political institu- tions are less favorable to caste and privilege than they were. For a like reason Swiss pauperism has never been so enormous as that of France or |Bngland; though the general atmosphere of an old civilization, like that of all Europe, is more likely to breed paupers than is the unbreathed air of a new country like the United States. – If I were to estimate the number of paupers in our whole country, I should not set it at more than 300,000 persons at any one time, and perhaps 1,000,000 different persons during the year, who, in our population of some 55,000,000, are forced to eat the bread of others, as M. Baron says. This would be less than a fiftieth part of our people; while in Ireland the corresponding proportion would be at least a tenth, and in England not much less than a tenth. In France the proportion of the population of 36,000,000 who at some time in the year have received public aid, is perhaps between one-fifteenth and one-twentieth. The mere count of numbers and ratios, however, as I have observed, does not show the true relation, in this respect, between one country and another. A land of high civilization will generally appear to have more paupers than a country like Russia or the states of South America, where the general lack of civilization among the multitude obliterates to a great extent the line between paupers and the respectable poor. It is strictly true that the American pauper who retains his mental faculties, and many of those who do not, are better situated, in almost every respect, than the peasants of Russia, or the semi-barbarous freemen of Mexico, Peru and Brazil. The population of the Tewks- bury almshouse, which has of late been indus- triously held up to public pity as unfortunate be- yond any community in the civilized world, is, in truth, so far as wasting disease, decaying age and mental disease will permit, more comfortable than two-thirds of the self-supporting inhabitants of Ireland, and in a better material condition than a large part of the colored, or even the white, people of our southern states. And it must not be for- gotten that for a great proportion of our Ameri- can paupers—who are, more than in most countries, the persons wholly incapacitated, from age and bodily or mental infirmity—the same causes that have made them dependent have deadened their susceptibility to the degradation which pauperism imposes on its victims. “To eat the bread of another or to die,” is not a sentence deeply felt by the congenital idiot, the demented lunatic, or the incurable invalid, who compose so large a quota of the inmates of American poorhouses. This is a fact often lost sight of by writers on the subject, who have not much practical acquaintance with the poor. — The real stress of pauperism is in the burdens and penalties it lays on whole classes of industrious people, not so much by the tax which public relief imposes, as by the disqualification and moral discouragement it makes inevitable. . “The destruction of the poor is their poverty.” M. Baron shows in a striking manner, by an in- genious calculation, how unavoidably myriads of the French artisans and laborers must leave their families, or see themselves each year in the slough of pauperism. He says, with an eloquence that rises less from the language than from the pathetic fact signalized, “Sickness, casualty, old age and death are to us but phrases; but the proletary is stung to the heart by fear of them; if he escapes some, he can not avoid the others; and each one of them strikes for him incessantly the fatal hour of pauperism. Death, in particular, leaves behind 152 PAUPERISMI. it numberless deprivations, of which a simple computation will give us a glimpse. France had in 1876, 36,905,788 people; the number of the married of both sexes being 15,156, iſ 0. It is be- low the truth to estimate half this number as own- ers, occupants, employers of labor, or persons engaged in trade or the liberal professions; leav- ing in the second half, operatives, day laborers, artisans, small employers, and domestics, Who certainly in the aggregate number more than the first half. This last enumeration, then, contains at least 7,500,000 married people. The general mortality of France ranges from 23.40 in a thousand to 23.16 ; but for married people it is fair to take the lower average mortality computed by the friendly societies, 15.20. Consequently, each year removes from this aggregate of 7,500,000 not less than 114,000 fathers or mothers. Let us reckon up, then, all the miseries that in a single year accumulate in these poor households, and see whether it is not strictly true to say, with the English economists, ‘Death is the mother of pau- perism' (mors miseria, mater).” — Nevertheless, as M. Baron points out, these inevitable causes of pauperism, sickness, accidents, old age and death, may be alleviated in some measure by life insur- ance, by deposits in savings banks, by member- ship in friendly societies, and by other methods of providing for the future, which are so common in America, and as yet so rare among the work- ingmen of Europe. He devotes half his book to a consideration of these economic Safeguards against pauperism; and it is in this direction, also, that the governments of Europe, as well as phil- anthropic individuals, are moving at present. The renowned statesman of Prussia, Prince Bis- marck, having raised his country into an empire, and secured the military preponderance of Ger- many in Europe by his favorite prescription of “blood and iron,” long continued, is now seek- ing to guard the poor subjects of the German empire from pauperism, by a series of compul- sory and co-operative economies, for which his his administrative subordinates are framing laws. These governmental measures for making the German workingman frugal and Sober under le- gal penalty, and for compelling capital to take its share in accumulating insurance funds against pauperism, are not, as I write, fully matured; but we shall soon see what shape they will take, and how effective they are likely to be. The English, who do nothing of this sort by legal compulsion, except the exaction and administration of the poor rates, but whose aim is to encourage Saving among the poor, are doing much in that direction, by their postoffice Savings banks, and by the stim- ulation of all sorts of mutual aid societies and otherforms of co-operation. A Hampshire clergy- man, Rev. W. L. Blackley, has recently published a paper in the “Nineteenth Century,” wherein he proposes that a large proportion of the poor rates and of pauperism be avoided by a legal ob- ligation that every youth shall, from eighteen to twenty-one, or thereabouts, pay to the govern- ment (say through the postoffice savings bank de- partment) the sum of £15 once for all, or 2s. per week for three years, and then be poor rate free for life. This would, on the average, fully suffice to allow a repayment, in the form of 8s. per week during sickness, at any period, and a pension of 4s. per week during the remainder of life after at- taining the age of Seventy, according to the cal- culations of Mr. Blackley; who shows that, under the present system of poor rates, the law actually compels the provident and industrious to pay a great deal more than £15 each, in a lifetime, for the lazy and the vicious. In order to prevent imposture and false claims of sickness, he would have applications for repayment, under his plan, left in each case to a local jury of persons interest- ed ºn preventing &mposture ; as, for instance, either to a specially appointed committee of rate payers, or to the existing boards of guardians, with the aid of local medical men, who now administer the legal relief under the poor laws. There is practi- cal good sense in these suggestions. – Of the two modes of public aid which the English designate as ºn-door and out-door relief, the latter is every- where and always the more common; for there never can be almshouses, workhouses, hospitals, etc., enough to receive all the poor at any season, or half of them in seasons of special destitution. M. Baron, contrary to most English and some American authorities, favors out-door relief, or what the French more properly call “aid to the family,” secours & domicile, rather than the strict application of the “workhouse test,” or the mul- tiplication of hospitals and infirmaries. I have long held the same opinion, and for the same reasons, mainly, which this French writer now advances. Out-door relief is often abused, and these abuses are most to be guarded against in democratic countries; but it, is when well admin- istered, as it easily may be, not only more humane and effective, but less costly, than in-door relief, which involves the building and keeping up of great establishments. Both methods are indispen- sable, and each serves to correct the abuses of the other. — The cost of pauperism to the public treasury varies greatly in different countries. In Great Britain and Ireland the annual cost of the public poor is nearly $50,000,000 for 35,000,000 of people—say $1.50 per capita for the whole pop- ulation. In France the cost does not exceed $1 per capita, and in Germany is even less. In New England and New York the annual cost is nearly $1 per capita; in the more southern and western states it ranges from seventy-five cents down to twenty-five cents, or even less, per capita. I should estimate the average per capita cost for the United States at fifty cents or less, that is, from $20,000,000 to $25,000,000 in a year for the whole country. Even in European nations this cost is not a great burden when compared with the yearly army and navy estimates; and it can hardly be said that, in America, the pecuniary burden of pauperism is seriously felt. Its social and moral evils are grievous, however; and richly will he PEACE. 153 deserve of mankind who shall show us how to Check them. F. B. SANBORN. PEACE. Says de Maistre: “History unfortu. nátely proves that war is, in a certain sense, the habitual state of mankind ; that is, that human blood must be shed, here or there, without inter- ruption on the earth; and that a state of peace is, for each nation, but a respite.” Is this true? When God created the world, did he hand it over, forever, to the destroying angel? Is there no means to preserve peace among the nations? A means to prevent war, generally, would be to sanction, as an inviolable principle of public law, that each state is independent and free, and that no state has a right forcibly to meddle with the constitution or government of another state. A state is a society of men which alone can rule and dispose of itself; to meddle with its affairs, what- ever they bo, is to render uncertain the autonomy of all states; it means to scatter the seeds of war, which sooner or later will germinate and bear the most bitter fruit. It will be remembered, that on Aug. 10, 1791, Mirabeau being then president of the constitutional assembly, Some Quakers ap- peared before the bar of that body and asked to be permitted to live under the protection of the laws of France, but reserving in their own favor the condition, that they should never be compelled to go to war. With admirable good sense, Mirabeau answered them, amid applause: “* * If I ever meet a Quaker I shall say to him: ‘My brother, if thou hast the right to be free, thou hast the right to prevent thy being made a slave. Thou wantest peace? Well, it is weakness which invites war: a general resistance would be universal peace.’ ” A general resist- ance of all states against any intermeddling in the affairs of others would be one of the greatest guarantees of peace in the world. Thus, in some way a federation of free states would be formed, of states which desired to remain free, and which proclaimed as an unalterable rule of international law the principle of non-intervention. — The re- ciprocal independence of the nations thus pro- claimed and assured, we would see the burden of standing armies, which lead to that terrible, inexorable tax, the tax of blood, but nevertheless the most indispensable of all taxes, disappear. This tax does not take from the contributor sim. ply part of his income, or his entire income, a part of his capital, or even his whole capital, but it takes liberty and life from him; it has become the indispensable condition of political societies. The liberties of nations could not but gain by the abolition of standing armies; for history teaches us, that standing armies are an eternal danger to the liberties of nations. “Regular troops (miles perpetuºus),” says Kant, “being always ready to act, incessantly menace other states, and incite them to increase their number of armed men ad ºnfinitum. Such rivalry, an inexhaustible source of expense, which makes peace more onerous than a short war, sometimes even leads a state into open hostilities with the sole view of getting rid of so painful a burden.” The suppression of Standing armies would, therefore, be one of the most powerful means to preserve peace. — One of the greatest obstacles to the maintenance of peace among nations has been the facilities to feed war which credit procures. It is war that invents those loans by means of which a warlike people finds at a given hour an immense lever, great sums of money, to transform the spades which render the soil of the country fruitful, into instruments which devastate the fields, destroy the cities, and decimate the population. It would be well to admit, as a principle of international law, that the loans effected in a state or abroad, and not destined for the economical wants of the state, should be considered as a menace to the other states, and that it would authorize the latter to form a league against the state which should allow itself to take measures involving an attempt on their security and their independence. — Without pretending to contradict the principles which Mirabeau caused to triumph in his celebrated discussion on the right to declare war, might we not introduce a guarantee into political constitutions, by mak- ing, at least to some extent, the consent of the subjects of a state a condition to a declaration of war? Shall the sovereign have a right to dispose, at his will, of the lives and the savings of several generations, for the sake of quar- rels which the people frequently do not under- stand? The answer is well known which a prince of Bulgaria gave to an emperor of the orient, when the latter proposed to him to settle their differences in single combat: “Would a farrier who had a pair of pincers take the red-hot iron from the furnace with his hands?” We wish means might be found to lay the following ques- tions before the people of a country before a war is undertaken: ‘‘Who wants the war? Is it the nation? Is it the government? Does the nation want to see its ports and its workshops closed, its commerce diminished, perhaps even annihilated, its industry ruined, and its wealth pass into the hands of others? Does the nation want that now and forever new taxes and duties be added to the duties and taxes with which the nation is already Overburdened? Does the nation want its children taken away, to make them live a life of fatigue and danger, of Sacrifices and resignation, to make them shed their blood in battle? Does the nation want that even those of its other children, who had paid already their tribute to the fatherland, should be taken away once more, on the day after they had again crossed the paternal thresh- old?” — May a system of international arbitra. * The preceding only applies to wars of aggression, and in such cases most constitutions require the consent of the national representatives. Even when the constitution attrib- utes to the king the right to declare war, this does not mean that the war is the result of the royal will, but only that it is one of the king’s functions (and not, for instance, one of the functions of a minister or prefect) to sign the act. The right of defense, in case of an attack, is too evident, and is there- fore not mentioned. 4. 154 PENDLETON. BENNSYLVANIA. tion be relied on as a means to preserve peace among nations? We can not consider that means as effective. With the small nation of the Greeks the amphictyonic council was unable to preserve a state of peace ; no modern confederation has escaped civil war; and can we hope that the confederation of the nations of Europe would be more fortunate? We forget that passion is the principal cause of war; and can we think that passion would submit to arbitration? Moreover, if arbitration has no sanction, it does not mean anything; if it have a sanction, that sanction is war.” — Whatever may be thought of the means to preserve peace which we have just indicated, the fact remains that war exists. We need not examine whether it is just, useful or necessary, as an illustrious philosopher (Cousin) declared it to be. All are agreed that war should be terminated as quickly as possible, and the instrument of peace be signed. That instrument is called a treaty by the law of nations, and from the moment of its con- clusion all hostilities should cease. Generally it is the victor who dictates the conditions of the peace; it is also a principle, that in case of diffi- culties all obscure and ambiguous clauses must be construed against him. — The power to make peace, which is generally accorded to the heads of states by the constitutions of the latter, does not necessarily carry with it the right to make concessions of territory. Thus, the assembly of Cognac declared that Francis I., although he had the absolute control over peace and war, could not, by the treaty of Madrid, alienate any part of his kingdom. — The violation of the treaty of peace by one of the parties, is not necessarily accompanied by a resumption of hostilities. AC- cording to international usage, Official cognizance is taken of the rupture, and all rights are reserved for the future. — The most celebrated treaties of peace in modern times are the treaty of Westpha- lia (1648), which put an end to the thirty years war; the treaty of Utrecht (1713), which closed the war of succession in Spain; the treaty of Vienna (1815), which concluded the wars of the empire; the treaty of Paris (1856), which ended the oriental war; and the treaty of Frankfort (1871), which put an end to the Franco-German war. All these treaties were closed only after terrible wars, which had cost streams of blood and the wealth of the people. EUGENE PAIGNON. PEACE CONGRESS. PEACE.) (See CONFERENCE, PENDLETON, George H., was born at Cin- cinnati, O., July 25, 1825, was admitted to the bar, was a member of the state Senate in 1854–5, * Arbitration can be employed only in cases involving ma- terial interests, and in that case all European nations will sub- mit to it in the future. Is there any material interest which is worth the milliards which war actually costs? Thus, there will be no more fighting but for honor or for a Senti- ment, a passion; but what can arbitrators do in such a case? radius drawn around New Castle. city, Philadelphia. and a democratic congressman 1857–65. In 1864 he was the democratic candidate for vice-president, and was defeated. (See DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, WI.; ELECTORAL WOTEs, XX.) In 1868 he was strongly, but unsuccessfully, supported in the democratic national convention as a candidate for the presidency. He then became interested in railroads, and abandoned politics for the time. In 1879 he became United States senator from Ohio for six years. (See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM.) - A. J. PENITENTIARY SYSTEMS. (See PRISONs. AND PRISON DISCIPLINE.) PENNSYLVANIA, one of the original states. of the American Union. The English claim to the territory of which it is composed rested on the same grounds as in the case of New York and New Jersey, discovery by the Cabots and conquest from the Dutch. (See those states, and UNITED STATEs, I.) The capture of New Amsterdam was held to carry with it the right to Pennsylvania and Delaware, the latter of which had been originally colonized by Swedes and conquered by the Dutch. (See DELAWARE.)— William Penn, an English Quaker, possessed a very considerable influence with Charles I., partly because of the services of his father, Admiral Sir William Penn, and still more because of the favor in which he was held by Charles' brother, the Duke of York, afterward James I. This alliance of the Quaker and the Roman Catholic, both dis- senters from the church of England, non-jurors, and harassed by penal laws, was not at all uncom- mon at the time. Penn had been trustee for One of the Quaker proprietors of New Jersey, and thus seems to have conceived the idea of a dis- tinct Quaker colony in North America. March 4, 1681, he obtained from the king a patent for “all that tract or parte of land in America,” bounded on the east by the Delaware river, from “twelve miles distance northwards of New Castle towne,” and, if the Delaware river should not reach latitude 43° north, then by a due north line from the head of the river to the northern boundary; on the north by latitude 43° north; on the west by a north and south line five degrees west of “the said eastern bounde”; and on the south by latitude 40° north, to its intersection with a circle of twelve miles. The province was to be called Pennsylvania; and the payment. therefor was to be two beaver skins annually. — As laid down in the charter, the northern bound- ary would have run across the middle of the present state of New York, and the southern boundary would have lain north of the capital Necessity produced the in- genious idea that “to the beginning ” of any de- gree of latitude was only to the end of the next preceding degree; and Penn and his descendants, accepting latitude 42° as the northern boundary, claimed latitude 39° as the southern boundary, thus taking in the two noble bays of Chesapeake and PENNSYLVANIA. 155. Delaware. Lord Baltimore struggled to restrict Penn to latitude 40°, and the dispute was not finally compromised until 1762, when the Penns, by giving up part of their Southern claims, suc. ceeded in securing their capital and a free access to Delaware bay. In 1780 the western boundary, five degrees west of the eastern, was run by com- missioners from Pennsylvania and Virginia. By resolution of Sept. 4, 1788, the congress of the confederation relinquished to Pennsylvania the jurisdiction over the triangular strip of land in the northwest, north of latitude 42°, and west of New York, which gives the state access to Lake Erie; and Jan. 3, 1792, the new congress author- ized the president to issue letters patent, conveying the territory named, to Pennsylvania. (See also WYOMING). — Penn having acquired the three counties on the Delaware from the duke of York (see DELAWARE), these were kept in close relation to Pennsylvania until the outbreak of the rev- olution, when Delaware became a distinct state. Penn gave his new province four various schemes of government, in 1681, 1682, 1683, and 1696; and Oct. 28, 1701, he gave it the final charter of privileges, under which it lived until 1776. Under this the governor was appointed by the proprietor; the assembly, of one house, was to be chosen annually by the people; and sheriffs and coroners were to be appointed by the governor out of a double number of candidates selected by popular vote. In spite of many conflicts between governor and assembly, the charter, on the whole, worked well during its existence. One of its evil features was the reservation of quit-rents to the proprietors on land sold; and these were abolished in 1779, the assembly voting £130,000 to the pro- prietors in compensation for them. — CONSTITU- TIONs. June 14, 1776, the last charter assembly adjourned until Aug. 26. In the meantime a state convention at Philadelphia, July 15–Sept. 28, called by the revolutionary committees, framed a state constitution, which went into force without a popular vote. It provided for an assembly of one house, chosen annually by the freemen over twenty-one who were tax payers; for a council of twelve persons; for a president [governor] chosen annually by joint ballot of the council and as sembly; and for a “council of censors,” of two from each city and county, to be chosen by pop- ular vote every seventh year, and to inquire into the conduct of state officers and into viola- tions of the constitution. — A new constitution was framed by a convention at Philadelphia, Nov. 24, 1789–Reb. 26, 1790, Aug. 9-Sept. 2, 1790, and approved by popular vote. It divided the assembly into a senate chosen for four years by counties, according to tax-paying inhabitants, not less than fifteen nor more than thirty-four in number, and a house of representatives chosen annually in the same manner as the Senate, not less than sixty nor more than 100 in number; it provided for a governor, to be chosen by popu- lar vote and to serve three years; it made judges removable by the governor on the address of two- thirds of each house; and it abolished the council of Censors. — A third constitution was framed by a convention at Harrisburgh and Philadelphia, May 2, 1837–Teb. 22, 1838, and was ratified by a close vote, 113,971 to 112,759. It changed the term of Senators to three years, and that of the judiciary from good behavior to fifteen years for the Supreme court, ten years for presiding judges of lower courts, and five years for their associates; it greatly diminished the governor's patronage; and it provided for amendments by their passage in two successive legislatures and their ratification by popular vote. In 1850 the judiciary was thus made elective. In 1857 the number of the house of representatives was fixed at 100, the senate was to be chosen by districts, and the legislature was for- bidden to loan the credit of the state. In 1864 the right of Suffrage was secured to qualified electors. in the volunteer service. — The present constitu- tion was framed by a convention at Harrisburgh and Philadelphia, Nov. 13, 1872–Nov. 3, 1873, and was ratified Dec. 16, 1873, by a popular vote , of 293,564 to 109,198. It fixes the number of the Senate at fifty, to serve four years, and of the house at 200, to serve two years, both to be elected by districts; forbids the legislature to pass. Special laws on a number of subjects, nor in any case without thirty days’ publication; and makes. the governor's term of office four years, and that of the Supreme court twenty-one years. It is notable that it provides for the trial of contested elections of electors of president and vice-president by the state; in this point Pennsylvania was probably the only state in the Union in 1874 which enforced exactly the simple idea of the electoral system. (See ELECTORs.)—GOVERNORS. Thomas Wharton, 1777–9; Joseph Reed, 1778–81; Wm. Moore, 1781–2; John Dickinson, 1782–5; Benjamin Franklin, 1785–8; Thos. Mifflin, 1788– 99; Thos. McKean, 1799–1808; Simon Snyder, 1808–17; William Findlay, 1817–20; Joseph Heis- ter, 1820–23; John A. Schulze, 1823–9; George Wolf, 1829–35; Joseph Ritner, 1835–8; David R. Porter, 1838–44; Francis R. Shunk, 1844–8; Wm. F. Johnston, 1848–51; Wm. Bigler, 1851–4; James Pollock, 1854–7; Wm. F. Packer, 1857–61; Andrew J. Curtin, 1861–7; John W. Geary, 1867–73; John F. Hartranft, 1873–9; Henry M. Hoyt, 1879–83; Robert E. Pattison, 1883–7; — PoirTICAL HISTORY. The citizens of Pennsyl- vania have, from the beginning of her existence as a state, claimed for her the appellation of the “key-stone state.” This significant name is suf- ficient alone to show that the sections north and south are no recent development, but original po- litical factors, for it was the two sections which Pennsylvania was to clamp together like a key- stone. Popular doggerel of 1790, after specify- ing the alternate admissions of the new states, Kentucky and Vermont, thus concludes: “Still Pennsylvania holds the scales, And neither south nor north prevails.” In time the appellation was sometimes used in a 156 PENNSYLVANIA. little different sense: since the reorganization of parties in 1825, Pennsylvania's electoral votes have never been cast for the unsuccessful presidential candidate; and a vague idea has grown up that Pennsylvania's support or opposition is deci- sive upon parties as well as sections. – At first the state was internally divided. was variously Quaker, Episcopalian, Presbyterian (Scotch-Irish), and Lutheran (German); and as the first two classes generally sympathized with Great Britain during the revolution, political and relig- ious feeling were both active. Furthermore, the state was divided by the Alleghanies into a west- ern and an eastern section, whose people had op- posite interests and politics, the former being naturally democrats, while the latter were federal- ists. (See ANTI-FEDERAL PARTY.) At first the eastern Section was strong enough to retain the state in the federal party, but the strength of their oppo-, ments was gradually increased by the flow of immi- gration, mostly Irish and anti-British, to the west- ern section, by the united and even forcible oppo- sition of that section to the excise (see WHISKY IN- SURRECTION), and by the claims of New England federalists to a large tract of land in the eastern sec- tion. (See WYOMING...) All these influences were potent enough to give fourteen of the state's fifteen electoral votes to Jefferson in 1796, and thirteen to Burr, and to make the state very doubtful for the future. In 1799 the eastern section was alarmed and reunited by the so-called “Fries insurrection,” an armed resistance to a federal law imposing a direct tax on houses. Nevertheless, the democrats, in December, 1799, were for the first time able to elect their candidate for governor, McKean; and he at once removed all Mifflin's federalist ap- pointees to office. In the legislature the house was democratic ; and the senate federalist. As the state's electors were to be chosen by the legis- lature, it was with great difficulty, and only just before the time fixed for the electors to vote, that the senate forced the house to be content with eight democratic electors, leaving the remaining seven to the opposition. The democratic con- trol of the state grew rapidly stronger, and in 1803–4 there were but five federalists in the house, and one in the Senate. Indeed, the dominant party almost immediately split into two factions, the moderate democrats, or “constitutionalists,” headed by Gov. McKean, and the radicals, or “friends of the people,” headed by William Du- ane and Michael Leib. The latter were princi- pally bent on obtaining a new state constitution, On impeaching and removing the then state judges, and on limiting the tenure of office of the judi- ciary for the future. In 1805 both factions nom- inated candidates for governor, McKean and Simon Snyder, and the former was elected by the aid of federalist votes. In 1808, however, the “conventionalists,” as the “friends of the people” now called themselves, elected Snyder governor, and secured a long control of the state; but they made no further effort to obtain a new state consti- tution. — Immediately after Snyder's accession to Its population. Office a collision between the state and the United States was threatened in the once celebrated “Olm- stead case.” This was a prize case, dating from the revolutionary war. The state cºurts had decided it one way, and the continental congress, and afterward the federal courts, to the contrary. In 1809 the matter was brought to a head by a man- damus from the federal supreme court to the dis- trict marshal to execute a writ, and an order from the governor to the state militia to resist it by force. In the end the legislature appropriated a Sum of money to pay the claim; the state chief justice decided for the federal court’s view; and the militia were sentenced to a trivial punishment, which was remitted by the president. — Pennsyl- vania remained overwhelmingly democratic during and after the war of 1812, and her legislature sus- tained the war vigorously throughout. In 1817 Heister was nominated as an independent demo- Cratic candidate for governor against the regular Candidate, Findlay, by the Duane party, and was defeated; but in 1820 he was successful. It was not until 1824 that any danger was developed to the democratic control of the state; and that was indirect, the appointment of a board of commis- Sioners for internal improvements, excited by New York’s success in the Erie canal. In 1827 annual appropriations for that object began, and contin- ued until 1836. Still more important, in its pro- Spective antagonism to the cardinal principles of the original democratic party, was the vast wealth of the state in anthracite coal and iron. Both had been known before the beginning of the cen- tury; but it was not until June, 1839, that the anthracite was successfully applied in Pennsyl- vania to the manufacture of iron. From that time protection for iron by means of the tariff has been a governing object of all parties in the state. — At first the revolt against the dominant party showed itself, as in New York, under the name of the anti-masonic party, but with more success than in New York. (See ANTI-MASONRY, I.; NEw York.) In 1835 the anti-masons elected Ritner governor, and thus the state, which had been one of the first to pronounce for Jackson, had given him over three-fourths of her popular vote in 1824, and had been steadily democratic ever since, became exceedingly doubtful. The anti-masonic movement came to nothing further than a few attempts at repressive legislation against the free- masons; and the party very soon fell into the whig. organization. In 1836 Van Buren electors were chosen by the close vote of 91,475 to 87,111, and the democrats were able to elect Porter governor in 1838 and 1841. In 1840 the electoral votes of the state were for the first time cast for the whig can- didates, the election being the closest in its history, as follows: Harrison,144,021; Van Buren, 143,676; Birney, 343; Harrison's majority, 2 votes out of 288,040. (See also BUCKSHOT WAR.) — In 1844 the political struggle was still more animated, for the election of the governor fell in the same year with the presidential election. The democratic managers adopted the plan of claiming the Semi- PENNSYLVANIA. 157 protective tariff of 1842 as their own. Polk wrote, June 19, 1844, a letter to John K. Kane, of Philadelphia, in which he diplomatically de- clared that he was not in favor of “atariff for pro- tection merely”; but that he was in favor of a rev. enue tariff which should incidentally afford judi- cious protection; and that he had voted for several specified tariff acts of this nature. Under the ral- lying cry of “Polk, Dallas, Shunk, and the tariff of 1842,” the democrats succeeded in October in electing Shunk by a majority of 4,397 in a total vote of 317,321, and in November they secured the state's electoral vote by a majority of 6,332, and twelve of the twenty-four congressmen. The democratic congress in 1846 changed the tariff of 1842 into a revenue tariff ; nevertheless, Shunk's popularity obtained for him a re-election in 1847 by a majority of 17,933. He resigned the next year, and in October, 1848, the whigs elected his successor, Johnston, by the close vote of 168,523 to 168,221. This, again, was a premonition of the result in November, when Taylor electors were chosen by a majority of 3,074 over both Cass and Van Buren. — As the slavery question rose to national importance after 1848, Pennsyl- vania was governed at first by the ancient feeling that her function was that of a balance wheel between the two sections. As democratic success seemed most likely to maintain national harmony, Pennsylvania was democratic until 1860 in her elections for governor, presidential electors and legislatures, with the exceptions of 1854, when the anti-Nebraska excitement carried into office Gov. Pollock and a majority of the lower house of the legislature, and 1858, when the republicans obtained a majority in the lower house. In 1860 a governor was to be elected, and the success of the republicans in electing Curtin by the unusual majority, for Pennsylvania, of 32,164 over Henry D. Foster, who was heartily supported by a fusion of all the other three parties, seemed almost de- cisive of the presidential election in November. The majority of the Lincoln electors over the fusion electors was increased to 59,618 in a total vote of 476,442. Both houses of the legislature were republican, and twenty-one of the twenty- five congressmen. — Since the accession of the republican party to power, Pennsylvania has re- mained a steadily republican state. In congres- sional elections the democrats have usually ob- tained a fair share, and occasionally a majority, of the representatives; but in elections for gov- ernor or presidential electors, the republicans have invariably been successful. In 1878, for gov- ernor, Hoyt could only claim a plurality (22,353) over the democratic candidate, owing to 81,758 “greenback” votes for Mason ; in other years the majority has been complete. In presidential elections the republican majority, though steady, has not been over 30,000, except in 1872, when Grant’s majority over Greeley was, 135,918 in 563,260 votes. In 1880 the vote for electors stood as follows: Garfield, 444,704; Hancock, 407,428; Weaver, 20,668; scattering, 1,983. In 1882 the legislature stands as follows: Senate, thirty-two republicans, sixteen democrats, three national ; house, one hundred and twenty-one republic- ans, Seventy-eight democrats, one national. — No single man has ever undisputedly controlled a party in the state, with the exception of Simon Cameron. At first a democrat, he was an influ- ential leader in the state, and United States sen- ator 1845–9. With the formation of the repub. lican party in 1855–6 he almost immediately obtained complete control of its machinery. In 1857 he again became United States senator; in 1861 he became secretary of war under Lincoln, but resigned in 1862; and in 1867 he was returned to the senate. In March, 1877, being then sev- enty-eight years old, and having control of the legislature which was to elect his successor, he resigned, and his son, James Donald Cameron, was elected in his place. The son, however, had lit- tle of the suppleness which had often enahled the father to manage even hostile majorities. The party machinery, which in every state is very frequently used to evade the will of the party, was now recklessly or ostentatiously exposed to public view. In 1880 (see NoMINATING CONVEN- TIONS) the state vote in the republican national convention was thus instructed for Grant, though the majority of the republicans of the state, and almost a majority of the state convention, were against him. In 1881, though defeated finally in the national convention, he still held undisputed control of the state convention which nominated the candidate for state treasurer. Thereupon Charles G. Wolfe took the first step in the road which may possibly prove a release from the all- controlling convention system, by nominating himself for treasurer, and stumping the state in his own behalf. In the end the vote stood for Bailey, republican, 265,295; for Noble, democrat, 258,471; and for Wolfe, 49,984. In the follow- ing year, 1882, Wolfe's movement developed into an organized revolt against the Cameron leader- ship. The dissentients rejected the idea of “re- form within the party,’” for the very plausible reason that “you can not get within the organi- zation to reform it”; were unmoved by the possi- bility of the success of the democrats in the state; and at a separate state convention, May 24, nom- inated a state ticket of their own, headed by the name of John Stewart for governor. Cameron's political existence depended on the election, at which was to be chosen not only the governor, the state officers and the congressmen-at-large, but the legislature which was to pass upon his own return to the senate in 1885. Nevertheless, his state convention, May 10, attempted no ac- commodation with the “independents,” but nom- inated a full state ticket, headed by Jas. A. Beaver for governor. Meanwhile, the tide was all running with the revolt. It was recruited by John I. Mitchell, Cameron's associate in the sen- ate, and by a great number of other influential republicans; the Cameron nominee for congress- man-at-large, Marshall, refused to run; and when 158 PENNSYLVANIA. the state convention was resuscitated to nominate another candidate, many of the delegates denied the validity of the call and refused to attend. The result was a chaotic election, in which the following vote was cast for governor : Pattison (dem.), 355,791; Beaver (rep.), 315,589; Stewart (ind. rep.), 43,743; Armstrong (greenb.), 23,996; Pettit (prohib.), 5,196. Of the twenty-eight rep- resentatives in congress, fifteen were republic- ans, twelve democrats, and one greenbacker. The legislature of 1883–4 stands as follows: senate, twenty democrats, thirty republicans; house, one hundred and thirteen democrats, eighty-eight re- publicans; democratic majority on joint ballot, fifteen. — Since the election the regular and inde- pendent republicans have quietly reunited, with- out formally abolishing the Cameron leadership. The most important action of the republican con- vention of 1883 was the revival of the old whig. plan of distributing surplus revenue among the states. Its previous history is elsewhere given. (See DISTRIBUTION, under INTERNAL IMPROVE- MENTs, II.) It has not yet been adopted by the party in other states, and must as yet be consid- ered only a Pennsylvania policy.— Besides the Camerons, and James Buchanan, George M. Dal- las, Benjamin Franklin, Albert Gallatin, W. S. Hancock, Jared Ingersoll, John Sergeant, E. M. Stanton, and Thaddeus Stevens (see their names), the following have been prominent in the state's political history: Henry Baldwin, federalist con- gressman 1817–22, and justice of the Supreme court 1830–44; Nicholas Biddle, president of the United States bank, 1823–41; Horace Binney, whig. congressman 1833–5; Jeremiah S. Black, secretary of state under Buchanan; Benj. H. Brewster, attor- ney general under Arthur; Charles R. Buckalew, democratic United States senator 1863–9; Hiester Clymer, democratic candidate for governor in 1866, United States senator in 1879, and congressman 1873–81; John Covode, republican congressman 1855–63; Andrew G. Curtin, governor 1861–7, and democratic congressman 1881–5; William Findlay, democratic congressman 1791–9 and 1803–17 (see WHISKY INSURRECTION); Thomas Fitzsimons, member of the convention of 1787, federalist congressman 1789–95; John W. Forney, clerk of the house of representatives 1851–6 and 1860–61; Walter Forward, congressman 1822–5, and secre- tary of the treasury under Tyler; Joseph Heister, democratic congressman 1797–1805 and 1815–20, and governor 1820–23; Chas. J. Ingersoll, demo- cratic congressman, 1813–15 and 1841–9; Joseph R. Ingersoll (brother of the preceding, and son of Jared Ingersoll), whig congressman 1835–7 and 1841–9, and minister to Great Britain 1852–3; Samuel D. Ingham, democratic congressman 1813–18 and 1822–9, and secretary of the treasury under Jackson; Wm. D. Kelley, republican con- gressman 1861–87; Michael Leib, democratic con- gressman 1799–1806, and United States senator 1809–14; Edward McPherson, republican con- gressman 1859–63, and clerk of the house of representatives 1863–73; Wayne McVeagh, attor- ney general under Garfield; John I. Mitchell, re- publican congressman 1877–81, and United States senator 1881–7; Gouverneur Morris, minister to France 1792–4, and federalist United States senator 1800–3; Robert Morris, one of the signers of the declaration of independence, the manager of the revolutionary finances, a delegate to the conven- tion of 1787, and United States senator 1789–95; Frederick A Muhlenberg, democratic congressman 1789–95 (see CoNGRESS, SESSIONs of); Henry A. Muhlenberg, democratic congressman 1829–38, minister to Austria, 1838–40, and democratic nominee for governor in 1844, Shunk being after- ward substituted by reason of Muhlenberg's sudden death; J. P. G. Muhlenberg, priest in the episco- pal church, brigadier general in the revolutionary army, democratic congressman 1789–91, 1793–5, and 1789–1801; Asa Packer, democratic congress. man 1853–7; Samuel J. Randall, democratic con- gressman 1863–87 (see CONGRESS, SESSIONS OF); Glenni W. Schofield, republican congressman 1863–75; Arthur St. Clair, major general in the revolutionary army, and delegate to the continen- tal congress (see ORDINANCE OF 1787); Wm. A. Wallace, democratic state senator 1862–71, and United States senator 1875–81 ; Wm. Wilkins, democratic and anti-masonic United States Senator 1831–4 and 1843–4, minister to Russia 1834–5, and secretary of war under Tyler; David Wilmot, democratic congressman 1845–51, republican can- didate for governor 1857, and United States sen- ator 1861–3 (see WILMOT PROVISO); James Wilson, delegate to the continental congress 1775–8, 1782–3 and 1785–7, member of the convention of 1787, and justice of the United States supreme court 1789–98; Geo. W. Woodward, democratic can- didate for United States senator in 1844, and for governor in 1863, judge of the state supreme court 1852–67, and congressman 1867–71; and Hendrick B. Wright, democratic congressman 1853–5, 1861–3 and 1877–81. — See 2 Poore's Fed- eral and State Constitution; Clarkson's Memoir of Penn; 2 Wm. Penn's Works; Hazard's Annals of Pennsylvania (to 1682); Pennsylvania Archives (to 1786), and Register of Pennsylvania; Clay's Annals of the Swedes on the Delaware ; authorities on Mason and Dixon's Iine under MARYLAND ; 3 Franklin's Works, 107; Proud's History of Penn- sylvania (to 1742); Gordon's History of Pennsylva- nia (to 1776); Fuller's Political Class Book of Pennsylvania (1853); Carpenter's History of Penn- sylvania (1854); Barber’s History and Antiquities of Pennsylvania (1856); Watson's Annals of Penn- sylvania and Philadelphia; Sypher's School History of Pennsylvania (1868); Bates’ History of Penn- sylvania (1869); Cornell's History of Pennsylvania, (1876); Morton’s History of the Appellation Key- stone State; Gibbons' Pennsylvania Dutch; Bettle's Negro Slavery in Pennsylvania ; Bates' Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, Rupp's History of Lan- caster County; Harris' Biographical History of Lancaster County (to 1873); Goodwin’s Pennsylva- nia Biography (1840); Armor's Lives of the Gov- ernors of Pennsylvania (to 1872); Biographical PERSIA. 159 Encyclopædia of Pennsylvania (to 1874); W. D. Relley’s Speeches and Addresses; and authorities under DELAWARE and WYOMING. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. I’ENNY BANKS. (See BANKS, HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF SAVINGS.) PENSIONS. (See UNITED STATES PENSION LAWS, AND THE PENSION LAWS OF OTHER COUN- TRIES.) PERSIA. The name Persia awakens great mem- ories. But Persia, or Iran, is no longer the flourish- ing empire of the Sophis, and still less the vaster and more powerful empire of the great kings. Mod- ern Persia has an area of scarcely more than 65,000 Square geographical leagues (of twenty-five to a degree). It is bounded on the north by Russia, the Caspian sea and Turkestan; on the east by the kingdoms of Herat and of Cabul and the confederation of the Beloochees; on the south by the gulf of Oman and the Persian gulf; on the west by Turkey in Asia. This vast territory has scarcely nine millions of inhabitants; which is explained by the fact that the country has met with the fate of all the countries of western Asia, which, after having been in ancient times the theatre of a rich development of civilization, pre- sent to the traveler of the present day only the ruins of ancient cities and an abased people, igno- rant, for the most part, of the glory of their ances- tors. —Nevertheless, the Persians are very intelli- gent and tolerably active. Only, their intelligence is principally exercised on metaphysical questions, while their activity is concentrated upon com- merce and brokerage. The only laborious inhab- itants of the country are the Turks, who conquered Persia about five hundred years ago, but their patience and spirit of order are exercised only in rudimentary agriculture. — The name of Iran, which Persia gives herself, and which Europe al- lows to her, would mislead us should we persist in Seeing in the modern Persians an Indo-European race. The Aryans of the ancient invasions have almost wholly disappeared in the Semitic masses of Farsistan; at the time of the Achemenidian kings, six centuries before Christ, this fusion was already far advanced. It has since only increased, and a truly Semitic people, under the name of Tadjik, now occupies all the towns of Persia and the countries of the southeast. The Aryam blood has been better preserved in the other Farsee group, the Kurds, who, to the number of about a million, inhabit the mountains of the west. An entirely different race, the Turks or Phlats, occupy the north. Neither must the name of Touram, which they give themselves, and which the Per- Sians grant them, cause us to see in them a peo- ple exclusively Mongolian; they are Mongolians strongly Aryanized, like their ancestors, the Arsa- Cidaean Parthians. It is they who have furnished to Persia the greater part of her dynasties. The reigning dynasty, that of the Kadjars, came from Persia. the heart of their feudal system, which comprises 700,000 to 800,000 individuals. The Turkish tribes are not subject to the king, but are merely his vassals. On the contrary, the king has for subjects all the Persians, Tadjiks or Kurds. – The king is sovereign master of the state and of his subjects, of their lives and of their fortunes; thisis, as we see, what has been called eastern despotism; a despotism which is not absolute, however, since it finds limits in religion, tradition and the priv- ileges of the corporations and of the tribes. The crown is hereditary in the direct line; but the king, or shah, may choose his successor from among his sons. He designates him during his lifetime, in order to prevent civil war. — There are a great number of offices in the court of the shah of There is a swordbearer, a shieldbearer, a cupbearer, etc. The functions of the grand marshal (masakitchee bashee) consist not Only in directing the service of the Persian army, but also in watching over the execution of justice. The grand master of ceremonies and the grand master of hospitality are charged with the receps tion of ambassadors and travelers of distinction. The highest dignity of the empire is that of the first minister (vizier-à-azem). He concentrates in his hands the whole government and adminis- tration. After him come the steward (a/méen-ed- doulah), who has charge of the finances; the high chancellor of state (mounchee-il-memalºk), who has charge of internal affairs; and finally, the mous- teffi, or secretaries of state, among whom is found the eshker-rvivois, or secretary of state in the war department. The executor of confiscations is also an important functionary.— The empire is divided into eleven provinces, which are administered in the following manner: In each province a gov- ernor (beglerbeg) has under his authority the com- manders of the towns (kakºms and 2dbits), the mayors of important localities (kelanter), those of the villages (ketkhodah), the lieutenants of police (darogha), the chiefs of police (mºr-i-ahdas) the market commissioners (mouhteşāb), and the (pak- kee) or tax gatherers. The distinctive feature of the Persian administration, as in all the countries of the orient, is, that power is delegated in full; thus, the governors of provinces or towns are real kings, until the king exiles them or puts them to death. The police exercise their functions in a very remarkable manner in Persia. The towns are divided into districts. The inhabitants of each district choose their lieutenant of police from among the most honorable citizens. These functions are gratuitous, and are obtained only by a spotless reputation. In this respect, Persia pos- sesses the germ of a fruitful principle of munic- ipal liberty, which, carried out, would have a favorable influence upon the social condition of the country. Unlike other Mussulman (that is to say, Sunnite) countries, in which civil law and religious law are confounded, Persia distinguishes the precepts of the Koran, with the adminis- tration of which the clergy are charged, from the laical law. The wrf, or customary law, compre- 160 PERSIA. hending the crimes or misdemeanors which dis- turb society, such as murder, theft, fraud, etc., is the province of a court composed of secular magistrates. The sovereign is the first of these magistrates. The governors of provinces, the commandants of cities, and the other officers of the government administer justice, in the name of the shah, each in his own jurisdiction. An- other difference, of equal importance, between Persia and other Mussulman countries, is the ex- istence of a clergy of priests, an institution con- trary to the very spirit of Islamism, which admits only of jurisconsults and judges. The mollahs and the mooshtehed, their chiefs, have inherited, in Mussulman Persia, some of the power of the mazdean måbeds, as well as of their unpopularity, justified, it is said, by the conduct of these priests, and which would, moreover, be abundantly ex- plained by this fact: that Persia is Mussulman only in appearance. If we except, indeed, a certain number of Turks, strict Sun nºtes, like their Otto- man congeners, and as such, very hostile to a cler- gy of priests, Persian Islamism, or Shiism, while remaining the official religion, resolves itself into a national religion, which the Sunnites hold to be very similar to Christianity, and which in fact concentrates all veneration upon Ali; and some sects of which even make a god of him. But even this schismatic religion has but very few convinced adherents; every one makes an obliga- tory profession of it; but the entire bourgeoisie is made up of Sufis, or free-thinkers, not that there are any atheists among them, nor, especially, any dogmatic materialists; all Persian imagina- tions, on the contrary, are full of the supernatu- ral: but the sufis are absolutely freed from Islam. Lastly, the moral element, truly religious, of Persia, is to be found in the mossayris, monoga- mous gnostics, whom every one in Persia takes for Christians, and who, in reality, appear to have derived their doctrine from Buddhism. The nossayris comprise two-fifths of Persia. It would be unjust to forget, in this enumeration, a set of sufis, the babis, a recent sect founded by an enthusiast, prophet and martyr, who declared the religion of Mohammed abolished. His doc- trine, which appears to be absolute rationalism, made great progress, and caused a riot, which was quelled only in the blood of its votaries. —The system of finance established in Persia for the assessment and collection of taxes pre- sents nothing analogous to the institutions which exist among the nations of Europe. The revenues of the state, or, to speak more accurately, the rev- enues of the Sovereign, were estimated, in 1873, at about seventy-five millions of francs. This sum is the product of imposts and taxes of all kinds, which are assessed in the following manner : the land tax, or mellat, which is paid partly in kind and partly in money, and is one-fifth of the product; the tax to which domestic animals, horses, camels, sheep, goats, bees, etc., are subject, and which varies according to their different kinds; the per- Sonal tax and house tax, of which we can make no exact valuation, and which vary in the different provinces. These last taxes are not levied in the towns, except on the shops and stores of merchants, who pay in proportion to the amount of their busi- ness. Foreign goods are subject to a duty of 5 per cent., paid at the frontiers, and to an additional one of 13 per cent., in the tollhouses, farmed out to pri- vate individuals, which pay considerable sums to the government. The tax is not always directly collected by the divan, which, on the other hand, does not always pay the functionaries directly. The latter receive an order to collect the tax of certain villages, which constitute their appanage. As the cadastre is old, the tax which the tax gath- erer is authorized to collect according to his war- rant, is frequently less than the two-tenths of the actual revenue, which the functionary does not fail to collect; therefore the king issued, in 1869, two edicts, one to enjoin the tax payers to pay only the quota registered at the divan; the other to order a census which was regarded as the pre- lude to a new cadastre.—But we have as yet spoken only of the fixed taxes; there are variable ones, and a great number of them. There is the ea traordi- nary tribute, which is one of the most vexatious; it is exacted to meet certain expenses of the royal family, such as the marriage of a prince of the blood, or any other solemnity; there is the Sadr, designed to provide for the expenses occasioned by ambassadors of foreign courts, and to entertain high functionaries; there is the pºk-ked, or present to the king, which, though called a voluntary taa, is none the less exacted. This present is made annually to the king by the governors of the provinces and the great dignitaries of the king- dom; it is necessarily the fruit of an arbitrary imposition. Public establishments are also sub- ject to the payment of periodical dues. – If the revenues of the crown are considerable in Persia, where the necessaries of life are much cheaper than in Europe, the functionaries are but slightly remunerated; in return, however, they are left at liberty to pay themselves, to the detriment of the people. When an important man or a dignitary of the empire sees that he can enrich himself by obtaining the government of a province, he makes his request to a sovereign, fixing in advance the snm which he pledges himself to pay annually into the treasury. The place is given to the high- est bidder. It may easily be imagined what the conduct of this sort of royal farmers must be It is true that the sovereign receives all the complaints which are made to him; but it is solely to the end of making the beglerbeg disgorge, for the benefit of the state, whenever his wealth has become too great. Thus the people and the sovereign are equally satisfied. — The peasantry alone are sub- ject to taxation. The merchants and workmen are legally exempt from it. The merchants trans- mit their business to their sons; their honesty is proverbial, and all unemployed funds are intrust- ed to them; they are the only bankers of the em- pire. It is they who lend to the state, and as all the money returns to their hands, they no longer PERSIA. 161 fear the public bankruptcies which characterized the ancient governments of Persia. The work- men have their corporations, their regulations, their funds, their elected assemblies. It is the Organization of St. Louis, or rather, it is the or- ganization which St. Louis had regulated, and which came from the Roman empire, which had found it in the east. It was, in fact, after the capture of Ctesiphon that Alexander Severus organized the trade corporations. Industry has declined very much from what it was under the Sophis. The ancient manufactories of silk and velvet (Kashan, Ispahan, Reschet), and the manufactories of arms (Kerman, Schiraz), are no longer in existence, but commerce is carried on in an indifferent way. — As to the military forces of Persia, see the note hereto appended. — The resources of Persia would be immense if it were possible to make the most of them. Gold, silver, copper, iron, jasper, white marble, sul- phur, copperas, Salt and saltpetre, turquoise, bitu- men, naphtha and petroleum: all these abound in Iran. The soil is remarkably fertile wherever irrigation is practicable, but large areas of fertile land are uninhabited, and it is only the facility of finding fields to cultivate which compensates somewhat for the lack of work in the cities. The vast saline deserts in Persia might be brought under cultivation by supplying them with the necessary water. The products of the soil are flax, hemp, sesame, tobacco, cotton, Saffron, ter- ebinth, mastic, gums, gall nuts, and dye plants. Persia furnishes to commerce annually, 20,000 bales of silk. The opium-yielding poppy is very extensively cultivated there. Manna and rhu- barb are exported. But this wealth can be sent out of the kingdom only at a very considerable cost for transportation, so imperfect are the means of communication. If Persia had roads kept in good repair, commerce there would de- velop immensely, the mines could be worked, and the public wealth would increase ten-fold in a very short time. Such must be, however, the foundation of all social renovation for the nations of the east, and since 1873, the year of the shah’s first visit to Europe, we have been assured that measures have been taken to construct roads and to introduce into Persia several of the most im- portant European institutions.”—BIBLIOGRAPHY. * By the treaty of Dec. 9 (21), 1881, ratified Feb. 28 (March 12), 1882, the boundary between the Persian province of Chorasan and the territory of the Turkomans, which had latery been occupied by the Russians, was finally established. By the stipulations of that treaty the boundary line is formed by the lower parts of the Atrek river upward to Fort Tschat, by the ridge of the Songu Dagh and by the Sjagirim mountains; it next crosses the upper Tshandyr, runs in a northeasterly direction to the Sumbar, following its course to its mouth; it then runs along the ridge of the Kopet Dagh in a southeasterly direction, following, as a whole, irrespect- ive of some sinuosities and indentations, the northern water-shed of the Atrek river, up to Baba-Durmas, which remains in the possession of Persia. This conquest by Russia has at least the advantage for Persia, that a con- siderable portion of the latter country will henceforth be Secure from the destructive invasions of the Turkomans; the Russians also gave their freedom to a great number of 130 VOL. III. — 11 T. S. Andersen, My Wanderings in Persia, 8vo, London, 1880; General Blaramberg, Statistical Survey of Persia, made in the years 1837–40 (in Russian), 8vo, St. Petersburg, 1853; Do. Heinrich Brugsch, Reise der K. preussischen Gesandtschaft nach Persien, 1860 und 1861, 2 vols., 8vo, Leip- captive Persians in the settlements of the Tekke (Turko- mans). The sixth volume of Behm & Wagner's Die Bevol- kerung der Erde contains the latest estimates of the popu- lation of Persia, by Gen. Houtum-Schindler, who possesses a most thorough knowledge of the country; these estimates are based, partly on the general’s own observations, and partly on the statements of the Persian minister of finance, and are as follows: Inhabitants. 99 towns, with 363,630 families -------------------- 1,963,600 Villages and about 30 districts containing no towns. 3,780,000 Nomads, as follows: Arabians, with . .------ 57,800 families ) Turks, with ----. ------ 4%% . . 424,400 §º.iº. . ; ; ; 1,909,800 Belooches, Gipsies, with 4,600 & . Bachtjares, Lurcs, with 52,000 & © . | Total ----------------------------------------- 7,653,600 According to religion these 7,653,600 inhabitants are divided into 6,860,600 Shiites, 700,000 Sunnites and Mohammedan sectarians, 8,000 Parsees, 19,000 Jews, 43,000 Armenians, and 23,000 Nestorians. Of 1,000 Armenians, 528 are males, 472 females; of 1,000 Mohammedans, 495 are males, and 505 females. – The cultivation and the export of opium, which are not only encouraged by the government, but even ordered by it, have lately considerably increased, while in other respects little or no progress has been made in the country. The Persian opium trade dates only from the Anglo-Chinese war. In consequence of the safety afforded by the occupa- tion of Hong Kong by the English, Persian opium gradually made its way to China. The prohibitory duties exacted in the ports of India had been a great obstacle in the way of trade, and for a long time more opium was sent to Constan- tinople than to Hong Kong. Finally, some merchants of Iesd discovered the route via Ceylon, and now that drug is shipped via Bender-Abbas directly to China, by steamers of the Pei-ho line of steamships. In 1880 the export was 6,000 piculs (or boxes of 125 English lbs.), and in 1881, 8,000; while ten years previous, the export amounted to but 4,000 piculs, or one-half of the amount exported in 1881. 8,000 piculs are equivalent to 480 English tons, and are but one-tenth of the quantity of opium exported from India. With better roads, Persia might well nigh make its com- petition felt by India. Probably in consequence of the primitive method of manufacturing it, Persian opium is a little cheaper than that produced in India; crude Persian opium costs ten rupees per see (two lbs.); refined, thirteen and one-third rupees, against sixteen rupees for refined Indian opium. — The Persian priesthood consists of many orders, the chief of them at the present time being that of Mooshtehed, of whom there are but five in number in the whole country. Vacancies in this post are filled nominally by the members of the order, but in reality by the public voice, and the shah himself is excluded from all power of appointment. Next in rank to the mooshtehed is the sheik-ul-islam, or ruler of the faith, of whom there is one in every large town, nominated by, and receiving his salary from, the government. Under these dignitaries there are three classes of ministers of religion, the mooturelle, one for each mosque or place of pilgrimage; the muezzin, or Sayer of prayers, and the mollah, or conductor of rites. The Armenians are under two bishops, one of them Roman Catholic, and both residing at Ispahan. There is wide tol- erance exercised toward Armenians and Nestorians, but the Jews and Guebres suffer under great oppression. Education is in a comparatively advanced state, at least as far as the upper classes are concerned. There are a great number of colleges, supported by public funds, in which students are instructed in religion and Persian and Arabian literature, as well as in a certain amount of scientific knowledge, while private tutors are very common, being employed by all fam- ilies who have the means. A larger portion of the popula- tion of Persia are possessed of the rudiments of education 162 PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS. zig, 1864; E. B. Eastwick, Journal of a Diplo- mate's Three Years’ Residence in Persia, 2 vols., 8vo, London, 1864; A. H. Keane and Sir R. Temple, Asia, London, 1882; Col. C. M. Mac- gregor, Narrative of a Journey through the Prov- Ønce of Khorassam and the Worthwest Frontier of Afghanistan ºn 1875, 2 vols., London, 1879; Clements R. Markham, A General Sketch of the His- tory of Persia, 8vo., London, 1874; Capt. Hippisley Cunliffe Marsh, A Ride through Islam : being a Journey through Persia and Afghanistan to India, 8vo., London, 1877; Chas. de Molon, De la Perse: Etudes sur la Géographie, le Commerce, la Poli- tique, l’Industrie, l’Administration, etc., 8vo, Ver- Sailles, 1875; Augustus Mounsey, A Journey than of any other country in Asia, except China. The revenue and expenditure of the government are known only from estimates, as no budgets or other official ac- counts have ever been published. The receipts of the year 1875 amounted to 4,361,660 tomans, or £2,026,354, in money, besides payments in kind, consisting of barley, wheat, rice and silk, valued at 550,840 tomans, or £255,911, making the total revenue equal to 4,912,500 tomans, or £2,282,265. The bulk of the public expenditure is for the maintenance of troops, and salaries, with pensions, to the Persian priesthood, while each annual surplus is paid into the shah’s treasury. Almost the entire burthen of taxation lies, as remarked above, upon the laboring classes, and, among these, upon the Mohammedan subjects of the shah. The amount of revenue collected from the Christian popula- tion, the Jews, and the Guebres, is reported to be very small. The government has no public debt. — By a decree of the shah, issued in July, 1875, it was ordered that the army should for the future be raised by conscription, instead of by irregular levies, and that a term of service of twelve years should be substituted for the old system, under which the mass of the soldiers were retained for life. The organi- zation of the army is by provinces, tribes and districts. A province furnishes several regiments; a tribe gives one, and sometimes two, and a district contributes one battalion to the army. The commanding officers are almost invariably Selected from the chiefs of the tribe or district from which the regiment is raised. The Christians, Jews and Guebres in Persia are exempt from all military service. The whole ex- ternal trade of Persia may be roughly valued at £4,000,000 annually, of which £2,500,000 may be taken as the value of the imports, and £1,500,000 as that of the exports. The greater part of the commerce of Persia centres at Tabreez, which is the chief emporium for the productions of north- ern India, Samarkand, Bokhara, Cabul and Beloochistan. There are no official returns of the value of the total im- ports and exports, the former of which are estimated to have averaged £1,000,000, and the latter £500,000, per an- num, in the year 1876–80. The principal article of import into Tabreez during the five years consisted of cotton goods of British manufacture, of the average annual value of £800,000; while the chief article of export was silk, shipped for France and Great Britain, of the aver- rage annual value of £110,000. All the European mer- chandise that reaches Tabreez passes by Constantinople to Trebizond, whence it is forwarded by caravans. Upward of f100,000 worth of carpets are now annually exported to Europe. — Persia has a system of telegraphs, established by Europeans. At the end of 1879 there were 3,367 miles of telegraph lines and 5,660 miles of telegraph wire in opera- tion. The number of telegraph offices, was seventy-one at the same date. The number of dispatches forwarded in the year 1878 was 500,000, the revenue of the year from tele- graphs amounting to £15,000. The first regular postal serv- ice, also established by Europeans, was opened in January, 1877. Under it mails are conveyed from Julfa, on the Rus- sian frontier, to Tabreez and Teheran, and from thence to the port of Resht, on the Caspian sea. In November, 1882, the Persian government arranged with a syndicate of French capitalists for the construction of a railway from Resht to Teheran, 250 miles. (See Statesman's Manual, 1883.) through the Caucasus and the Interior of Persia, 8vo, London, 1872; John Piggot, Persia: Ancient and Moderm, 8vo, London, 1875; Do. Jak. Ed. Polak, Persiem. Das Land und Seine Bewohner: Ethnographische Schilderungen, 2 vols., 8vo, Leip- zig, 1865; Lady Sheil, Glimpses of Life and Man- ners in Persia, 8vo, London, 1856; E. Stack, Sia, Months in Persia ; 2 vols., London, 1882; Baron Thielmann, Travels ºn the Caucasus, Persia, and Thurkey in Asia, 2 vols., 8vo, London, 1876; I. Thomson, La Perse: Sa population, ses revenues, Son armée, son commerce, avec motes par W. de JKhanikof, in “Bulletºn de la Société de géogra- phie,” Juillet, 8vo, Paris, 1869; John Ussher, Jour- Tvey from London to Persepolis, including Wam- derings in Daghestan, Georgia, Armenia, Kurdis- tam, Mesopotamia and Persia, 8vo, London, 1866; Robert Grant Watson, A History of Persia, from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the year 1858, 8vo, London, 1873. F. M. PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS (IN U. S. HIs- TORY), statutes passed by the legislatures of va- rious northern states, during the existence of the fugitive slave laws, for the purpose of securing to alleged fugitives the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the trial by jury, which those laws denied them. (See FUGITIVE SLAVE LAws.) — In 1840 New York passed an act securing a trial by jury to persons accused of being fugitive slaves. This was the first real “personal liberty law,” other previous state statutes being ostensi- bly or really designed to assist in the rendition of fugitives; and even this statute soon fell into disuse and was practically forgotten. The case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania (see FUGITIVE SLAVE LAWs) was decided in 1842, and in 1843 Massa- chusetts and Vermont passed laws prohibiting state officers from performing the duties exacted of them by the first fugitive slave law, and for- bidding the use of the jails of the state for the detention of fugitives. In 1847 and 1848 Penn- sylvania and Rhode Island passed similar laws. Other states refused to do so. — The passage of the fugitive slave law of 1850, which avoided all employment of state officers, necessitated a change in the personal liberty laws. Accordingly, new laws were passed by Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut in 1854, by Maine, Massachusetts and Michigan in 1855, by Wisconsin and Kansas in 1858, by Ohio in 1859, and by Pennsylvania in 1860. These laws generally prohibited the use of the state's jails for detaining fugitives; provided state officers, under various names, throughout the state, to act as counsel for persons alleged to be fugitives; secured to all such persons the bene- fits of habeas corpus and trial by jury; required the identity of the fugitive to be proved by two witnesses; forbade state judges and officers to issue writs or give any assistance to the claimant; and imposed a heavy fine and imprisonment for the crime of forcibly seizing or representing as a slave any free person with intent to reduce him to slavery. New Hampshire, New York, New Jer- PERSONAL UNION. 163 sey, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, California and Oregon passed no full personal liberty laws; but there were only two of these states, New Jersey and California, which gave any official sanction or assistance to the rendition of fugitive slaves, though three of them, Indiana, Illinois and Oregon, did so indirectly, by prohibiting the en- trance within their borders of negroes either slave or free. In the other states named above, the action of the legislative, judiciary or executive was generally so unfriendly that the South Carolina declaration of causes for secession in 1860 in- cluded Illinois, Indiana, Iowa and New Hamp- shire with the ten states which had passed liberty laws, in the charge of having violated their con- stitutional obligation to deliver fugitive slaves. – The fugitive slave law and the personal liberty laws together show plainly that the compromise of 1850 (see CoMPROMISEs, W.) was far worse than labor lost. It gave the south a law to which it had no title; even Rhett, in the South Carolina secession convention, declared that he had never considered the fugitive slave law constitutional. It thus provoked the passage of the personal lib- erty laws in the north. Each section, ignoring the other's complaints, exhausted its own patience in calling for a redress which neither was willing to accord first. It is not meant to be understood that secession would never have Occurred without the aid of the fugitive slave law and its counter- vailing statutes; only that secession would have had to search much more diligently for an excuse without them. Throughout the whole declara- tion of South Carolina in 1860 there is hardly an allegation which, in any point of view, deserves respectful consideration, with this single exception of the personal liberty laws; and these were the unconstitutional results of the unconstitutional fugitive slave law. — The objection to the consti- tutionality of the fugitive slave law is, in brief, that the rendition of fugitive slaves, as well as of fugitives from justice, was an obligation imposed by the constitution upon the states; and that the federal government, which has never attempted to give the law in the latter case, had no more right to do so in the former. (See FUGITIVE SLAVE LAws.) This opinion, however, has against it the unanimous opinion of the Supreme court in the case of Ableman vs. Booth, cited below. But there is absolutely no legal excuse for the personal liberty laws. If the rendition of fugitive slaves was a federal obligation, the personal liberty laws were in flat disobedience to law; if the obligation was upon the states, they were a gross breach of good faith, for they were intended, and operated, to prevent rendition; and in either case they were in violation of the constitution, which the state legislators themselves were sworn to support. The dilemma is so inevitable that only the pres- sure of an intense and natural horror of surren- dering to slavery a man who had escaped from it, or who had never been subject to it, can palliate the passage of the laws in question. Plainly, the people, in adopting the fugitive slave clause of the constitution, had assumed an obligation which it was not possible to fulfill. — The writer's own belief that the obligation of rendition was upon the states alone, has prevented him from classing the personal liberty laws under nullification. If, however, the obligation was really federal, they were certainly nullifications, though not to the same degree as that of South Carolina; for the latter absolutely prohibited the execution of the tariff act, while the former only impeded the ren- dition of fugitive slaves. The principle, however, is the same. (See NULLIFICATION.) It is worthy of notice, however, that when the supreme court, in the case of Ableman vs. Booth, overrode the Wisconsin personal liberty law, the Wisconsin legislature passed a series of resolutions, March 19, 1859, reaffirming the Kentucky resolutions of 1799 (see KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONs), but making them read “that a positive défiance ’’ (instead of a nullification) “is the rightful remedy.” — See Massachusetts Revised Statutes (1860), c. 125, § 20; 2 Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 57, 639; Joel Parker's Personal Liberty Laws (1861); B. R. Curtis' Works, 328, 345; 2 ib., 69; Tyler's Life of Taney, 398; Appleton’s Annual Cyclopædia (1861), 575; 21 How., 506 (Ableman vs. Booth); 2 Webster's Works, 577; Schuckers' Life of Chase, 178. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. PERSONAL UNION, or dynastic union, is the combination by which two different states are governed by the same prince, while their bound- aries, their laws and their interests remain distinct. Thus, in modern times, the king of England was at the same time king of Hanover; the king of Saxony, grand duke of Warsaw; the king of Denmark, duke of Schleswig-Holstein; the em- peror of Austria, king of Hungary; the king of Prussia, prince of Neufchâtel; the king of Sweden, king of Norway; the king of The Netherlands, grand duke of Luxemburg; the emperor of Russia, grand duke of Finland; and the king of Prussia, duke of Lauenburg. — Personal union scarcely ever exists except between countries the populations of which belong to different nationalities, or inhabit territories distant from each other. If the terri- tories of the two countries were contiguous and their populations of the same race, speaking the same language, and a complete fusion did not take place between them, the mistake would be so great a one that it could not but result in serious inconveniences. It seems as if in such a case the separation could not be maintained. — According to the letter of international law, one of the coun- tries which is united to another by personal union may be at peace, while the other is at war. Thus, it might have happened, between 1816 and 1866, that the king of The Netherlands should have furnished for Luxemburg a military contingent to a war, which the Germanic confederation might have waged against Italy, for instance, without his minister plenipotentiary leaving Turin, or that of Italy demanding his passports at The Hague. We might even imagine cases, improbable though 164 PERU. not impossible, in which the grand duke of Lux- emburg might have been in one camp, and the king of The Netherlands in the other. The same thing would be still more improbable in Sweden or in Norway, and entirely impossible in Finland, whose personal union with Russia is only on pa- per, while its real union is in the facts. Moreover there can be a personal union only between con- stitutional states. In absolute governments it is the sovereign who declares war; he is the state; and it is of little import that one of his terri- tories is called Kamtschatka, and another Po- land; it is still the emperor of Russia who acts, and against whom defense is made. —We do not consider personal union a very rational combi- nation. If two states have not enough mutual interest and sympathy to unite their destinies, let them remain separated; mutual independence does not exclude an alliance, which will not de- lay being formed if there is any reason for it, if it has any grounds and an aim. A personal union will almost necessarily influence the politics of One of the countries united, to the exclusive ad- vantage of the other. It sometimes results in domestic animosities, which, as is well known, are the most bitter and inveterate. — Personal union, it seems to us, is practicable Only when the two countries form a unit vis-a-vis of foreign states. But it is not sufficient that the two coun- tries be represented by one and the same diplo- matic agent; it is also necessary that their armies should be united into one, and consequently, that the two countries should have common finances; from which it follows, that the two countries united must have, besides, their re- spective chambers for the special affairs of each country, a common parliament authorized to deal with international questions. The history of the United Kingdom furnishes an example which other countries should follow, and the ultimate fusion, which might be the result of the function- ing of a common parliament, seems to us an ad- vantage great enough to induce a state not to neglect the means to arrive at it. We are even surprised they have not yet thought of this in Sweden and Norway, where they ought to begin to constitute a common parliament if they indeed desire to firmly establish “Scandinavism" (which is not spoken of so much as it was in 1860–65). MAURICE BLOCK. PERU. Traversed from north to south by the two parallel chains of the Andes, Peru extends from the equator to Chili, over a length of nearly 1,500 kilometres. It is bounded on the east by the Amazon river, and by Brazil. Its entire area is estimated at nearly 450,000 square kilometres. The most highly favored portions of this vast ter- ritory, those which are most richly endowed by na- ture, are situated between the eastern slope of the Andes and Brazil; they have as yet Scarcely any European population, and are almost wholly un- explored. The greater part of the population is settled upon the western side, between the Andes and the Sea. It is not very large. At the time of the last census, (1876), there were 2,704,998 in- habitants, besides about 350,000 uncivilized In- dians.—As in all other parts of Spanish America, the census population is far from being composed of homogeneous elements. The agricultural class- es are entirely Indian. The mechanics and shop- keepers of the towns and villages are a mixture of Indians and half-breeds. The lower classes of the coast belong to what is called the Zambo ele- ment, a mixture formed by the crossing of ne- groes, Chinese and Indians. The higher classes are in a great degree of Spanish origin; the num- ber of families in which the Spanish blood is en- tirely pure is very limited; the same is true of the Indian families which form a part of these classes. The pure Indian type, unmixed with Spanish blood, is very rare. The ratio of these races is estimated thus: 57 per cent. of Indians, 23 of mixed breeds, 12% of whites born in Peru, 3% of negroes, 1% of Chinese, and 2+ of foreigners. — Peru, while it has had a good many internal dissensions and quarrels with its neighbors and foreign powers, is nevertheless far from present- ing as sad an internal and external history as do so many of the other republics of Spanish Amer- ica. The comparative repose which it enjoyed [up to the time of the Chilian-Peruvian war] * * The so-called “saltpetre war" carried on by the repub- lic of Chili, against the allied republics of Peru and Bo- livia, was begun in the year 1879. For decades there had existed a controversy concerning the boundaries between Chili and Bolivia. The question in dispute was, whether the province of Atacamba, between Peru and Chili, belonged en- tirely to Bolivia, or whether Chili had a right to claim its extremest southern part. This question increased in sig- nificance, when it was discovered, that there were in this very southern part vast deposits of guano, extensive beds of saltpetre and rich veins of silver. By the treaty of Aug. 10, 1866, the governments of Chili and Bolivia agreed that the territory in dispute should belong to both states in common, so far as the division of receipts ſrom taxes and revenue duties was concerned, and Bolivia pledged itself in no way to disturb Chilian citizens in the exploitation of the salt- petre mines. Incensed by Peru, with which Bolivia had con- cluded a secret offensive and defensive alliance in 1873, the government of Bolivia did not observe the treaty of 1866; it arbitrarily taxed a Chilian company of merchants in the sea- port of Antofagasta, and here meeting with resistance, made several arrests and confiscated the property of the company. Peru, which exported large quantities of guano and Saltpetre, and feared the competition of energetic Chili, did not dislike this repression. Chili complained of the action of Bolivia in violation of the treaty, and when the latter did not pay any attention to its complaints, Chili equipped a squadron, caused Antofagasta to be blockaded by the same on Feb. 14, 1879, and the entire saltpetre region to be seized. Upon this followed, on the first of March, the declaration of war by Bolivia, which, on the second day of April, concluded an armed alliance with Peru. The Chilian Squadron next blockaded the south Peruvian port of Iquique and other ports in the neighborhood, whence saltpetre and guano were exported. Pressed hard by the Peruvian fleet, which had more iron-clads, the Chilians were, however, compelled to raise the blockade and to retire to Antofagasta. But soon afterward they succeeded in capturing the strongest iron- clad of the enemy, in taking the port of Pisagua and in de- feating the land forces of the Bolivians and Peruvians near Dolores; they also occupied the port of Iquique and took away the entire south Peruvian province of Tarapaca, with its rich beds of guano and saltpetre. Chili was completely master at sea, and Arica and other ports of Peru were block- PERU. 165 s was owing, not to the free play of its constitu- tional institutions, the model of which was bor- rowed for a short time from the great republic of North America, but to the firmness and to the more or less intelligence which have been shown by the various military chiefs who filled the pres- aded by the Chilian fleet. Intense excitement prevailed in the two allied states, and their two respective governments were overthrown; in Bolivia there existed a state of anarchy, its army and finances being prostrate; in Peru, Gen. Pierola, who had been elected president, ruled like a dictator. The campaign of 1880 was still more favorable for the Chilians. Their troops, under Gen. Baquedano, marched on the 20th of March into the town of Moquegua, which had been aban- doned by the Peruvians; the Chilian troops threw the enemy back on Tacna, where the allied troops suffered another de- feat, upon which the former occupied the town and took Arica by storm. The Bolivian troops retired home after the defeat near Tacna. Through the mediation of the United States negotiations for peace were begun. The plenipoten- idential chair in Peru. — The constitution of 1856, modified Nov. 10, 1860, is the source of the pub- lic law of Peru. The executive power is in the hands of a president, invariably chosen from the army. The president is elected for four years by the citizens assembled in electoral colleges. He is tiaries of the belligerent republics and of the United States convoned on neutral gromnd, on hoard a United States man- of-war, on the 22d of October. The conference, however, did not agree as to the conditions of peace. The proposition that the three states should submit to the arbitration of the United States government was refused by the victorious Chilians. Thus the conference came to an end, without any result, on the 27th of October. With a force of about 24,000 men the Chilians resumed the war. They landed two army corps on the coast of Peru, they routed the enemy, intrenched near Lurin, and advanced toward Lima, the capital of Peru. After having suffered two further defeats, one near Chorillos, on Jan. 12, 1881, and the other near Miraflores, on the 15th of the same month, the enemy fied in confusion to Lima. The Peruvian army was now utterly demoralized, and un- able to resist any further. Lima was occupied by the Chilian troops on the 17th of January. In place of the fugitive Pierola, Calderon was appointed provisional presi- dent of Peru by a convention of notables; after the session of congress, which had been convened with great difficulty, had been opened, Calderon’s nomination was made definitive. Gen. Lynch, who, in place of Gen. Baquedano, was in- trusted with the chief command of the Chilian troops, came in conflict with Calderon and with Galvez, the minister of foreign affairs; he ordered their removal; and when, his orders notwithstanding, both of them continued to exercise their functions, they were arrested and sent to Santiago. The United States government, believing it had a right to intervene in all American states, and knowing its own interest to be better guarded by the existence of small than of large states, had already recognized the Calderon govern- ment; it had also declared to the Chilian government, that the latter would not be allowed to insist upon a cession of territory as a condition preliminary to negotiations for peace, and that the United States would not suffer any intervention from Europe. Chili stipulated the following conditions : Peru was to cede the district of Tarapaca, and to pay a war indemnity of twenty millions of dollars within sixteen years; until the completion of the payment of that sum, Chili was to keep the town of Arica as a pledge; and in case the indemnity should not be paid, Chili would keep Arica and take possession also of the guano island, Lobos. Chili declared to the American minister that it would decline all further mediation in case of Peru's refusing to accept these conditions. In a circular of Dec. 21, 1881, to the diplo- matic representatives of Chili, Balmaceda, the Chilian minister of foreign affairs, gave an āccurate account of the causes of the war, of the events of the war and of the inter- vention by the United States, and insisted upon the demand of a cession of territory, which he signified as an indispensa- ble means of indemnification, and a condition of security based upon international law. At the same time he did not fail to recall the fact that the United States government in its international conflicts (especially in the wars with Mexico) did not hesitate to impose on the vanquished adversary cessions of large tracts of territory as a preliminary con- dition. Under such circumstances the negotiations, it is true, were continued, but the conclusion of peace was re- moved to an incalculable distance; meanwhile Chili remained in possession of what it had occupied.—During the year 1882 no essential change occurred in the condition of Peru. The Chilians insisted upon their conditions of peace, and in Peru they could find no government that would agree to these conditions. Bolivia kept aloof from the war, and neither could Peru expect any assistance from any other power, the more so because the United States in 1882 abstained from any intervention. In that part of the coun- try which had not been occupied by Chilian troops, lawless gangs of soldiers, under rapacious and violent leaders, raged in a most cruel manner. In Chincha sixty European in- habitants were shot, and in pillaging the town the marauders destroyed property valued at eight millions of dollars. En the seaport of Pisco the gang of Col. Mas, on the 24th of January, in a state of beastly intoxication, murdered several hundreds of inhabitants. Several generals now claimed the highest authority, and fought one against the other; thus: Admiral Mantero, in Huaraz; farther north, the Indian Puga; in Cajamarca, Pierola’s former minister of war, Gen. Iglesias; in Arequipa, Carrillo; in Ayacucho, Gen. Caceres, a brave and determined officer. The latter had some of the leaders of the marauding troops shot, among them Col. Mas. The Chilians refused to recognize the troops of these leaders as belligerent soldiers, but treated all men who were captured with arms in hand as highway robbers. The Peruvians treated the Chilians in a like manner. Thus, on the 9th of July they surprised and killed a troop of Chilian soldiers in Concep- cion, upon which the Chilian general, del Canto, caused all the inhabitants of that town to be massacred. The Chilians, growing impatient because peace was not concluded, sought to indemnify themselves by increasing the revenue duties, and by imposing contributions ou the towns which thcy held and occupied. In this manner they tried to compel the Peruvians to make peace. The negotiations with Presi- dent Garcia Calderon, confined in the interior of Chili, remained without result, because he refused to agree to the cession of Arica and Tacna. The Chilians therefore entered into negotiations with Iglesias, an honest but narrow-minded man, in Cajamarca; Iglesias proved to be more ready to yield. Montero, however, who, by virtue of his former capacity as vice-president, had declared him- self the constitutional successor of Calderon, who had gone to Arequipa and had even formed a ministry there, refused to ratify the concessions made by Iglesias. – On May 15, 1883, a treaty of peace, accepted by Iglesias, was concluded between Chili and Peru. The stipulations of the treaty were as follows: 1. The unconditional surrender in perpe- tuity to Chili of the department of Tarapaca as far north as the Quebrada de Camarones, the whole of which territory is consequently to be governed by Chili. 2. The territories of Tacna and Arica, now held by Chili, are to be subject to the legislation and government of that republic during ten years from the date of the treaty's taking effect. At the expiration of that time, a plebiscitum is to be had, which shall decide whether that territory shall be subject to Chili or return to Peru. The country which remains in possession of the territory is to pay the other country 10,000,000 silver Chilian dollars, or the equivalent in Peruvian soles. A special protocol is to determine the form under which the plebiscitum shall be held, and the time of payment of the $10,000,000 alluded to. 3. The government of Chili binds itself strictly to comply with the contract signed and decrees issued respecting guano Feb. 9, 1882, and respecting nitrate March 22 of the same year, and it adds thereto the following declaration: “The said decree of Feb. 9, 1882, orders the sale of 1,000,000 tons of guano, and article thirteen estab- lishes that the net price of the guano, after deducting the cost of extraction, analysis, weighing, loading, salaries of employes to overlook these different operations, and all expenses incurred up to the moment of placing it, Sacked, on board the vessel, shall be divided in equal parts between 166. PERU. assisted by a council of ministers. The legislative power is vested in a congress composed of two chambers, who pass the budget and the laws in the making of which the executive power has the initiative. The senate is composed of forty mem- bers, and the chamber of deputies of eighty. During the interval between one session and an- other, a permanent commission of seven Sena- tors and eight deputies assists the president, and performs the functions of a council of state. — At the head of each department is a prefect, ap- pointed by the president. The constitution of 1856 had instituted departmental juntas, but these assemblies having resulted in making gov- ernment impossible, it became necessary to dis- solve them. In some departments the prefect did not allow them to assemble. The municipal juntas, composed of the principal inhabitants of each locality, have given better results; for a number of years, it has been remarked that they are an excellent school of political and adminis- trative education. — Thanks to an unlooked-for resource, the sale of guano, which tends, how- ever, to become exhausted, and of which the state claimed the monopoly, the financial condition of Peru was pretty good previous to the break- ing out of the war with Chili. In the budget of 1872 the receipts were 58,982,851 soles (five francs), and the disbursements were 57,913,974 the government of Chili and the creditors of Peru, whose credits are guaranteed by this article.” The government of Chili also declares that, when the sale of 1,000,000 tons shall have been completed, it will deliver to the creditors of Peru 50 per cent. of the net proceeds, as provided by article thirteen, until the debt shall have been extinguished or the deposits exhausted. But it is understood that only the deposits which are actually worked are alluded to hereby, and that all those which may hereafter be discovered or worked in the annexed territories will belong exclusively to Chili, which will retain all the proceeds and dispose of them as she may determine. It is also understood that the credit- ors of Peru who are benefited under this concession must comply with the regulations contained in the decree of Feb. 9, 1882, and that, beyond the declarations contained in this article, Chili does not recognize, on account of war or any other motive, any indebtedness of Peru, of any nature whatsoever. 4. The North Lobos islands will continue to be managed by Chili until the 1,000,000 tons of guano which have been sold shall have been delivered. Then they will be returned to Peru. The 50 per cent. of the net proceeds of the guano from the Lobos islands to which Chili is enti- tled under the decree of Feb. 9, is ceded by her to Peru, and payment thereof will be commenced directly the present treaty shall have been ratified. — The questions referring to the future commercial relations between the two countries, and the indemnities due the Chilians for losses through the war, are matters for subsequent discussion and arrangement. The treaty, however, could not be carried into effect, because the Peruvians refused to recognize Gen. Iglesias as their lawful president, and to ratify the treaty he had signed. Victorious Chili was from the beginning willing to recognize Iglesias as president, because his presidency offered the best guarantees for the ratification, and for the strict observ- ance, of the treaty. Meanwhile, the lawless condition of Peru continued. Bands of so-called “patriots,” who op- posed Iglesias and the ratification of the treaty of peace, committed numberless outrages. This reign of terror, and the consideration of the fact that the conclusion of a treaty would be an indispensable condition to the recovery of Peru, caused the better part of the population of that country to rally around Iglesias, and to support his claims to the presidency. . soles. The excess of receipts was thus 1,069,087 soles. The public debt, on Jan. 1, 1869, was 62,225,550 soles, say, 311,127,500 francs; it was distributed thus: home debt, 4,737,800 soles. (23,689,000 francs); foreign debt, 41,803,750 soles (209,018,750 francs); sum due to consignees of guano, 15,684,000 soles (78,420,000 francs). The public debt in 1870 had increased to 104,855,000 Soles, distributed thus : consolidated internal debt, 1,350,000; new consolidated debt, 3,000,000; loan of 1862 and various other debts, 5,905,000; Eng- lish loan at 5 per cent. (1865), 35,000,000; another English loan at 6 per cent. for the construction of railroads, guaranteed by the receipts of the rail- roads, custom house and guano, 59,600,000 soles.— The Catholic religion has remained the religion of the state; and unless he professes Catholicism, no one can be admitted to fill any public office. The government of the church is divided between an archbishop and six bishops, and the church derives its revenues from tithes. The congress of 1856 had some thought of introducing freedom of worship, but a city celebrated in the history of Peru for its pronunciamentos, Arequipa, threat- ened to secede if that freedom should be granted by the constitution. The clergy have preserved their ecclesiastical courts. – Public instruction is almost wholly in the hands of the clergy. The state appropriates nearly half a million of dollars for the support of the universities. Justice, civil and criminal, is administered by a supreme court, which sits at Lima; by courts of appeal in each. of the chief towns of the departments; and by the district Courts of first resort. The admin- istration of the mines, the forests and the mili- tary and naval services have special jurisdiction. There is scarcely any industry, but a good deal of commerce. The greater part of the foreign trade is in the hands of French, English and American merchants. As in all the rest of America, it is England which holds the first rank, as regards both imports and exports: France is. only second. Her transactions amount to an average of sixty million francs per annum, that is to say, less than half those of England. — Since the discovery of guano the merchant marine of Peru has increased to a certain extent. In 1869 it had ninety vessels, with a capacity of 9,596 tons. The exports of 1867 amounted to $18,506,851; while in 1866 they reached the sum of $40,511,291. The principal article of export is still guano, of which there was exported in 1870, 482,299 tons, of a total value of 20,195,146 silver piastres. According to statistics published in Lima in 1868, the quantity of guano exported from 1842 to 1867 amounted to 7,157,194 tons, with a total value of $218,693,625.— The soil of Peru is suit- able for the cultivation of all tropical productions. Since 1860, cotton and sugar cane have been cul- tivated upon a very large scale, Chinese and free blacks being employed in its cultivation. In 1860 the cotton crop was estimated at seventy millions of dollars, the profits of which were forty-seven millions.— Peru, which has already had the good PETITION. 167 fortune to find in the sale of the guano three- quarters of its revenue, has recently met with further luck. Some explorations conducted in 1830 resulted in the discovery of vast beds of nitrate of soda. The exportation of saltpetre in- creased from 18,700 cwt. in 1830, to 699,406 in 1851, to 1,358,691 in 1861, and to 3,605,906 in 1871. — Of all the wealth with which nature has endowed Peru, that least taken advantage of is its mineral treasures. There are still near Puno some very productive silver mines. From 1775 to 1824 these mines produced 1,786,000 marcs of silver, of an average value of from eight to nine dollars. Since the cessation of Spanish rule these mines have declined very much in produc- tive value, the greater part of them having been abandoned for lack of capital and other means of working them. The great cause of the decline of the mining industry is the want of confidence which the capitalists have in each of her This distrust prevents the formation of mining associa- tions upon a large scale, and it is only by the revi- val of the great companies that Peru will be able to resume, among the countries producing precious metals, the place which belongs to her.” — BIBLI- OGRAPHY. Besides the older works of Ulloa, Helm, Breckenridge, Mathison, Hall, Stevenson, Smith, Meyen and Pöppig, there are: Hill's Trav- els in Peru and Mea'ico, 2 vols., London, 1860; Grandidier, Voyage dans l’Amérique du Sud, Pérou, et Bolivie ; Menendez, Manual de geographia ºy statistica del Perú, Paris, 1861; Carrey, Le Pérou, Paris, 1875; Raimondi, El Perú, Lima, 1874; Desjardin, Le Pérou avant la conquété espagnole, Paris, 1858; Prescott, History of the Conquest of Peru, Boston, 1847, new edition, 1878; Pruvo- mena, Memorias y documentos para la historia de la *ndependencia del Perú, 2 vols., Paris, 1858; Odri- Ozola, Memorias y documentos para la historia del Perú, Lima, 1863–4 ; Paz-Soldan, Historia del Perú independte, Lima, 1871; Arana, Histoire de la guerre du Pacifique, 1881. Louis GOTTARD. * Peru had a deficit, in 1876, of about $1,538,490. It has (1883) a large public debt, divided into internal and external. The internal liabilities are estimated at about $20,000,000. It has, besides, a floating debt of an unknown amount, greatly increased by large issues of paper money, made in 1879 and 1880, to carry on the war against Chili. The total of these issues was estimated, at the end of October, 1880, at 35,000,000 soles. – The army of Peru was composed, at the end of 1878, of eight battalions of infantry, numbering 5,600 men; of three regiments of cavalry, numbering 1,200 men; of two brigades of artillery, numbering 1,000 men; and of a gen- darmerie, numbering 5,400 men. The number of men under arms was raised nominally to 40,000 in May, 1879, after the outbreak of hostilities against Chili, and further in- creased to 70,000 in the summer of 1880, after the suc- cessful invasion of the territory by the Chilians. At the beginning of November, 1879, the Peruvian navy consisted of four ironclads and six other steamers. In 1883, in conse- quence of the war with Chili, it may be said that both the army and navy of Peru have been completely destroyed. — The foreign commerce of Peru is chiefly with Great Britain and the United States. – In 1878 there were open for traffic, or in course of construction, eleven railway lines belonging to the state, 1,281 miles in length, and costing 128,354,600 soles. There were, besides, eight lines belonging to private persons, 496 miles in length, and two lines belonging in part to the state and in part to individuals. PETITION (IN U. S. HISTORY). The first amendment to the constitution prohibits congress from making any law to abridge “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” The right to petition congress is therefore not derived from the constitution, but secured by it. Of course the right to offer a petition implies the duty of congress to receive it, without which the peti- tion would lack its most essential element. Never- theless, from 1835 until 1844, this duty of con- gress was more or less strenuously denied by southern members in the case of petitions for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. — Feb. 11, 1790, a petition was offered, signed by Franklin, as president of the Pennsylvania abolition Society, praying for the immediate prohibition of the African slave trade. This prohibition could not constitutionally be effected until 1808; nevertheless, after debate, it was received and referred by a vote of 43 to 14. Madison and other members urged “the commit- ment of the petition as a matter of course,” so that “no notice would be taken of it Out of doors.” This purpose was accomplished then and afterward; as long as petitions were received and referred, the action of the petitioners there ended. — Very few anti-slavery petitions were offered for forty years, and those few were against slavery in general. The only exception was the pe. tition of Warner Mifflin in 1792, which was reject- ed on the ground that it was not a petition, and concluded with no specific prayer. This objection would not lie against the new series of petitions which were brought out by the agitation for im- mediate abolition (see ABOLITION, II.) which be- gan in 1830–31. These prayed that congress, to which the constitution had given the exclusive power of legislation for the District of Columbia, would exercise it in prohibiting slavery therein. At first, in December, 1831, when they were re- ferred to the committee on the District of Colum- bia, the committee reported formally that the prayer of the petitioners should not be granted. As the petitions became more numerous, the committee ceased to report, and its room became ‘‘the lion’s den from which there were no foot- prints to mark their return.” In February, 1835, there were some complaints of this mode of pro- cedure, and requests for a special committee, but these were not heeded. The peace was not dis- turbed until the following December. — PINCK- NEY’s RESOLUTIONS. In December, 1835, the pe- titions began to come in again, and the house of representatives showed a new disposition toward them by laying them on the table by overwhelm- ing votes. This, however, was not enough. Feb. 8, 1836, Henry L. Pinckney, of South Caro- lina, moved for and obtained a suspension of the rules to offer three resolutions : 1, that all the peti- tions should be referred to a select committee, 2, with instructions to report that congress could not constitutionally interfere with slavery in the states, and 3, ought not to do so in the district of Co- 168 PETITION. lumbia. May 18 the committee reported as in- structed, with an additional resolution that there- after all petitions relating in any way to slavery or its abolition should be laid on the table without action, and without being printed or referred. May 25 the previous question, cutting off debate, was ordered by a vote of 109 to 89, and the Sec- ond of Pinckney's resolutions, above mentioned, was adopted by a vote of 182 to 9. John Quincy Adams offered to prove it false in five minutes, but was silenced. On the following day the third resolution was adopted, 132 to 45, and the Com- mittee’s new resolution, 117 to 68. Adams re- fused to vote, denouncing the resolution as a violation of the constitution, of the rules of the house, and of the rights of his constituents. The first of the “gag laws” was thus put in force. It was renewed in substance, Jan. 18, 1837. — Adams at once became the champion of the right of petition. In the adoption of the rules at the beginning of each congress, he regularly and unsuccessfully moved to rescind the “gag rule.” He became the funnel through which all the anti- slavery petitions of the country were poured. Within the next four years he records the offering of nearly 2,000 petitions, including petitions for the rescinding of the gag rule itself, for the recog- nition of Hayti, for expunging the declaration of independence from the journals, and for his own expulsion. Besides those whose number he men- tions, there was an unknown number of others presented in batches. The most exciting scene of the series began Feb. 6, 1837. Adams inquired of the speaker whether it would be in order to present a petition from twenty-two slaves. The disorderly house, catching but a hazy notion of the inquiry, at once lost its head. Suggestions to expel Adams for having attempted to offer a pe- tition from slaves, to censure him for contempt of the house, and to take the petition out and burn it, were becoming inextricably entangled, when Adams for the first time reminded the speaker that his inquiry as to the propriety of offering the petition was still pending and unan- swered, and stated also that the petition was in favor of slavery. The house saw that it had been outwitted, but it disliked to yield. “What, sir,” said Waddy Thompson, of South Carolina, “is it a mere trifle to hoax, to trifle with, the members from the south in this way and on this subject? Is it a light thing, for the amusement of others, to irritate almost to madness the whole delegation from the slave states? Sir, it is an aggravation.” He therefore modified his resolutions into a cen- sure of Adams for having “trifled with the house,” “by creating the impression, and leaving the house under such impression, that the said petition was for the abolition of slavery, when he knew that it was not.” By various amend- ments this was finally modified into a tame reso- lution that, since Adams had disclaimed any effort to present the petition, nothing should be done, and even this was rejected. But before the final vote, Feb. 9, Adams secured his coveted oppor- tunity for defense, and his savage retaliation upon his opponents in general and in particular, inter- rupted by explanations and half-hearted denials from them, made up one of the few scenes in congressional history, from 1820 until 1860, when the cowing of an opposition was the result of a northern member's speech. From this time de- bate with Adams was the most perilous of under- takings. – In the senate the objection to the re- ception of abolition petitions had been almost simultaneous. Jan. 7, 1836, Calhoun objected to the reception of two petitions from Ohio for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and four days afterward he renewed it upon a petition of Pennsylvania Quakers to the same effect. But the senate was a dangerous place for such an experiment. No “previous question” could cut off debate; senator after senator drifted off to the perilous questions involved in the institu- tion of slavery itself; and the result was such a por- tentous debate as had never yet been heard in the senate. Calhoun’s point was, that if the petition was couched in disrespectful language it could not be received. But in this there was a cumulative difficulty. To know the language of a petition it was necessary that it should be read, and it would always be difficult for southern senators to listen quietly to petitions in which their constituents and themselves were denounced as pirates, butch- ers, and dealers in human flesh. King, of Georgia, read Calhoun a bitter and well-deserved lecture on this unstatesmanlike policy of provoking de- bate on the petitions; and Calhoun could only answer with the reproach that King was destroy- ing southern unity of action. Calhoun’s course is one of the few evidences of his lack of sincerity in desiring the preservation of the Union. A democratic northern senator likened him to a pugnacious farmer in his state who was so anxious for peace with his neighbors that he was always willing to fight for it. In this instance Calhoun had abundant opportunity to agitate for the suppres- sion of agitation. It was not until March 9 that the reception was agreed to by a vote of 36 to 10; and two days after, “the prayer of the petition was rejected ” by a vote of 34 to 6. This halting com- promise between refusing to receive, and referring to a committee, was thereafter the regular mode of procedure in the senate. It had no effect in checking the petitions, and renewed and constant debate on their reception kept the senate in tur- moil. In December, 1837, Clay urged their recep- tion and reference, on the grounds that they were evoked mainly by a feeling in the north, that tha right of petition had been assailed, and that it was “better that the country should be quiet than the senate ”; but his advice met no more respectful attention than the warning of Buchanan at the beginning, “Ilet it be once understood that the sacred right of petition and the cause of the abolitionists must rise or must fall together, and the consequences may be fatal.” — THE PATTON RESOLUTION. Dec. 21, 1837, in the house, John | M. Patton, of Virginia, secured a suspension of PETITION. 169 the rules and the previous question, and the pas- sage of a resolution to lay on the table, without being debated, printed, read or referred, and with- out further action, all petitions and papers touch- ing the abolition of slavery, or the buying, sell- ing or transferring of slaves in any state, district “or territory” of the United States. Adams again protested, and refused to vote, but the resolution was passed by a vote of 122 to 74. — THE ATHER- Ton RESOLUTIONs. Dec. 11, 1838, in the house, Charles J. Atherton, of New Hampshire, obtained a suspension of the rules, and offered five resolu- tions. attempts at the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or in the territories, and any peti- tions for that object; the fifth resolved that all such petitions should be laid on the table, “with- out being printed, debated or referred.” Again, the previous question cut off debate, and the res- olutions were passod on this and the following day, the last or “gag’’ resolution having in its favor 126 votes to 73. The only apparent result was the immediate appearance of a new line of petitions for the repeal of the Atherton “settle- ment.” — TWENTY-FIRST RULE. Jan. 21, 1840, by a vote of 114 to 108, the house adopted as its twenty-first rule, that no petition, memorial, reso- lution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia or the terri- tories, or of the interstate slave trade, should in future be received by the house, or entertained in any manner whatever. The decrease of the ma- jority in favor of the repression principle in this vote was striking, and was in itself an evidence that the system could not endure very much longer. Adams had found the support which he had at first lacked, and his yearly recurring motions to omit the twenty-first from the list of rules were defeated by steadily dwindling majorities. The rule, however, only increased the strength of language of the petitions, and their number as well: 34,000 signatures had been affixed to peti- tions of this nature in 1835–6; 110,000 in the session after the Pinckney resolutions; over 300,000 after the Patton resolutions; and after the twenty- first rule was adopted the signatures to petitions on all the cognate subjects were practically beyond counting. Jan. 14, 1842, another exciting scene began in the house, Adams being again the centre of it. He offered a petition from citizens of Haverhill, Massachusetts, praying for a dissolution of the Union, and asked for its reference to a committee to set forth reasons for the rejection of the petition. The anger of the southern mem- bers flamed out again. Suggestions were again made to expel Adams, to censure him, or to burn the petition. Adams at first only replied by ad- vising his leading opponents to “go to a law school, and learn a little of the rights of the citizens and of the members of this house ’’; but, when the house had voted, 118 to 75, to take into consideration the resolutions of censure offered by Thomas F. Marshall, of Kentucky, the spokesman of the Southern caucus, the debate was adjourned The first four condemned generally any until Jan. 28. From that day it continued until Feb. 7, with a virulence surpassing that of the first. Adams had his opponents at a disadvantage, for many of them were avowed disunionists, but he used also every other advantage which could be used. The character of the whole debate may be conceived from Adams’ reference to Wise, of Virginia, his bitterest opponent, as having come into that hall from the Graves-Cilley duel, of which he was a promoter, “with his hands drip- ping with human gore, and a blotch of human blood upon his face ’’; and from Wise's temperate reply that “the charge was as base and black a lie as the traitor was base and black who uttered it.” At last Adams, worn out and almost breath- less, but triumphant over every assailant, allowed a motion to “lay the whole subject on the table forever,” and it was carried by a vote of 106 to 93. — At the special session of 1841 Adams' regu- lar motion fo omit the twenty-first rule had actually been carried, by a vote of 112 to 104, on a motion to adopt the rules of the last house for ten days only; but this was afterward reconsidered and lost. Session after session the majority against Adams' motion dwindled. At last, Dec. 3, 1844, the house, by a vote of 104 to 81, refused to lay his motion on the table, and, by a vote of 108 to 80, abolished the twenty-first rule. The ten years' gripe of John Quincy Adams upon the gag sys- tem had choked it at last and forever. Thereafter petitions of every nature were quietly relegated to the limbo of such papers, the committee room. —Dec. 12, 1853, the ancient rule requiring the presentation of petitions in the house was re- scinded. Since that time petitions have been delivered to the clerk of the house, indorsed with the name of the member presenting them and of the committee to which they are to be referred. The clerk then transfers them to the proper com- mittees, and notes their presentation on the jour- nal. — See 1 Benton's Debates of Congress, 201, 207; 13 ib., 24 (Pinckney resolutions), 13 ib., 266 (Adams' first trial: his speech is at page 283); 12 Żó., 705 (Calhoun’s motion); 13 ib., 566 (Patton resolutions), 702 (Atherton resolutions); 14 ib., 289 (twenty-first rule); Jay's Miscellaneous Writings, 349; 2 Calhoun’s Works, 466; 9 Adams' Memoir of J. Q. Adams, 350; 11 ib., 109; 61 Niles’ Regis- ter, 350 (Adams' second trial); 14 Democratic Review, 303 (the best argument in favor of the twenty-first rule); 2 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 150; 1 Greeley’s American Conflict, 143; Giddings’ History of the Rebellion, 108, 158; 2 Wilson’s Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 346; 2 von Holst's United States, 236, 470; Morse's Life of J. Q. Adams, 249, 307; 18, 22, 38 Rules of the House of Representatives. (Compare PETITION, RIGHT OF.) ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. PETITION, Right of. The constitution of the United States, in its first amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of griev- 170 PETITION. ances.” This provision is not a statement of abstract right based on theory, but, like almost all other clauses in the great Anglo-Saxon charters, it had its origin in the successful struggle against actual tyranny. It is founded on English history, and to understand it, it is necessary to glance at that history. — The right of petition seems to be recog- nized in magna charta, which was ratified by King John in 1215. Chapter forty contains these words: ‘‘Nulli megabimºus rectum aut justitiam,” and they are repeated in the charters of Henry III. (1216, chap. 29) and Edward I. (1297, chap. 29). Some petitions of this period are said to be preserved in the tower of London. In the reign of Charles I. petitions became bolder and bold- er, notwithstanding the contemptuous treatment which they received from him, and the right of presenting them naturally grew to be obnoxious to the cavaliers. Consequently, Soon after the restoration of Charles II., parliament passed a bill against tumultuous petitioning, which forbade the presentation of petitions for the alteration of matters established by law, to the king or either house, by more than ten persons; nor could more than twenty persons sign a petition, unless its con- tents were previously approved by three justices or a majority of the grand jury in the country, or by the lord mayor, aldermen and common council in London. The transgressor was liable to fine and imprisonment. (13 Car. II., St. 1, c. 5; 8 Statutes at Large, p. 6.) This statute did not have the desired result, and in 1679 so many petitions were presented protesting against the repeated prorogation of parliament, that the king issued a proclamation to put a stop to them, but still they continued to pour in. The advanced royalists presented counter-addresses expressing their abhorrence of these petitions. Hence, the two national parties became known as “Petition- ers” and “abhorrers,” although soon after they were called “whigs” and ‘‘tories” instead. (8 Hume's History of England, chap. 68.) It was from James II., that, nine years later, the right of petition received the severest blow in England. He had made up his mind to restore his fellow Catholics to the full rights of English subjects (and, indeed, to give them the preference), in spite of existing penal laws. To this end he found it necessary to set aside the statutes by means of what was called the “ dispensing power.” This prerogative of dispensing with penal laws had been assumed by the crown several centuries before, and was originally copied from the practice of the Roman church. It was an infringement of law, and had met with resistance almost from the beginning. In 1687 the king issued a declaration, under this power, announcing that none of the penal laws against non-conformists should be enforced. This proclamation, which is known as the ‘‘ declaration of indulgence,” produced no effect. Accordingly, in 1688, he published a second similar declaration, which was followed, a week later, by an order in council commanding the clergy to read the declaration on certain Sun- days at the usual time of divine service in all the churches of England, and bidding the bishops. distribute copies of it for this object through- out their dioceses. The clergy received the order with doubt and dissatisfaction. Not only was. it opposed to their wishes, but it was equally re- pugnant to public opinion and the laws of the realm. Before the day fixed for the first reading a number of prominent divines met at Tambeth and drew up a petition, which was finally re- duced to writing by Lancroft, the archbishop of Canterbury himself, and signed by him and six bishops. In their petition they denied the exist- ence of any power in the king to dispense with acts of parliament; they expressed their willing- ness to obey parliament or convocation; and besought the king not to insist upon the distribu- tion and reading of the declaration. The six suffragan bishops delivered the petition to James. on their knees, but he received it in a passion. Although the declaration was not recalled, it was. read in only four churches in London on the day appointed, and from these churches the con- gregations immediately departed in disgust. At the king's order the seven prelates were sent to the tower, and tried before the king's bench for seditious libel. James used every means to se- cure their conviction, but it was impossible to turn the presentation of a respectful petition into a criminal offense. The jury returned a verdict. of “not guilty,” and the prisoners were released. The whole nation learned the result of the trial with joy, and the king's course in the matter called down upon him the lasting enmity of the people, and did much to shake off his tottering crown. (12 Howell’s State Trials, 183; 3 Modern Reports, 212.) The prince of Orange referred to the case of the seven bishops in the declaration which he published before coming to England, when he said that the oſtering of a petition had been held a high misdemeanor, and that this was one of the wrongs which he would redress. (2 Macaulay's History of England, 358; Bishop Burnet's History of his own Time, 775–780.) Afterward, when the two houses offered the throne to William and Mary, the offer and acceptance were made subject to the bill of rights. This important document recited the fact that James II. “ did endeavor to: subject and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of the kingdom,” among other things, “by committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates for humbly petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed [dispensing] power,” and it goes on to declare “that it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.” (“An Act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject and settling the succession of the Crown,” 1 Will- iam and Mary, sess. 2, chap. 2; 9 Statutes at Large, p. 67, 1688; 5 Cobbett's Parliamentary His- tory, 108 et seq.) The act of 1700 which estab- lished the succession of the crown in the house of Hanover confirms all laws which Segure the PETITION. 171 rights and, liberties of the people (12 and 13 Wm. III., chap. 2; 10 Statutes at Large, 360), and the bill of rights, protecting the right of petition, is to-day a conspicuous part of the English consti- tution. In the celebrated case of Lord George Gordon (1781,) Lord Mansfield said that the stat. ute of 13 Charles II., limiting the number of petitioners, was still in force. The petition in this instance was also directed against the Roman Catholics. Lord George Gordon, president of the protestant association, was displeased with the passage of Sir George Savile’s bill removing penalties from Romanists, and presented a peti- tion in the house of commons for its repeal. It bore thousands of signatures, and he went to the house at the head of a large mob which he had Collected. His followers attacked several mem- bers and attempted to exert intimidation. The motion was, however, almost unanimously re- jected, and the rabble, after rioting Several days, subsided. (21 Cobbett’s Parliamentary History, 654, et seq.) The ringleader was tried for high treason and acquitted, though the act of 13 Charles II. could undoubtedly have been en- forced against him. (21 Howell's State Trials, 485; 24 Annual Register, 217, 238.) About this time petitions to parliament became very numer- ous. Many of them were directed against the slave trade, and afterward against slavery. At last, in 1839, debate was forbidden on the pre- sentation of petitions in the house of commons, as they threatened to occupy all the time of the house. The Inost illuportalit English petition of the present century was the one of the chartists in 1848. These men, excited by the revolutions on the continent, sent a petition to the lower house for annual parliaments, universal suffrage, and the other reforms contemplated in their “char- ter.” More than a million names were append- ed to the petition, and a mass meeting was called in London to support it. The house received it with respect, but it was soon discovered that many of the signatures were fictitious, and that their number had been greatly over-estimated. The committee on public petitions, while re- porting these facts, declared its opinion that the right of petition was an important privilege. (98 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 74,283.) The agitation soon died out without affecting legislation. (1 McCarthy’s History of Our Own Times, chap 18.) — Practice. In olden times peti- tions were usually presented to the English mon- arch, because he was more powerful than parlia- ment. The contrary is now the case; but petitions to the Sovereign, though less frequent than those to the legislature, stand upon the same legal footing with them. The sovereign sometimes receives peti- tions personally, and sometimes through officers of the court. Parliament used to appoint receivers and triers of petitions, but now the house of com- mons refers public petitions to a committee on pub- lic petitions. (May's Law of Parliament, chap 19.) —The amendment to the constitution of the United States referring to petitions was modeled after the clause in the English bill of rights. (See BILL OF RIGHTS.) The constitution originally contained no list of popular rights, as the general convention considered such an enumeration unnecessary. In the subsequent state conventions, on the other hand, it became evident that a considerable party desired such a “bill of rights.” Consequently, in the first congress a series of amendments to the constitution were adopted, including the one quoted at the head of this article. The conven. tion of Virginia had submitted a proposed section on the right of petition, which also asserted the right of constituents “to instruct their represent. atives.” In the lower house, while the amend- ments were under consideration, Mr. Tucker, of South Carolina, moved that these words be added. Mr. Madison opposed the motion, and it was lost. (Towle's Analysis of the Constitution, 230, 231.) There have been no petitions of very great histor- ical interest in this country except those which sought the abolition of slavery. (See, e.g., 2 Ben- son’s Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, 57 et seq., 182 et seq., 209, 436–444; 12 ib., 660–666, 676–679, 705–711, 713–720, 722–743; 13 ib., 5–14, 24–29.) These petitions were very numerous, and always drew forth most bitter debates. Finally, in 1836, a resolution was adopted in the house of representatives, which directed that all petitions relating in any way to slavery should be laid upon the table without being printed or referred, and that no further action should be taken on them. (13 ib., 24). In 1838 another rule of the same ten- or was adopted. (13 ib., 702–707; Congressional Globe, Dec. 17 and 24, 1838, vol. 7, nos. 2 and 3, pp. 23–25, 27, 28, 33–38.) The former resolution was based, according to its recitals, on the want of power in congress over the states, the undesira- bility of any exercise of power in the District of Columbia, and the necessity of stopping agitation and restoring tranquillity. The latter resolution affirmed that all attempts to abolish slavery in the territories or District of Columbia were virtually aimed at the southern states, and therefore uncon- stitutional in their tendencies. Fortunately, such rules are no longer needed. — The national con- stitution has been followed, as far as the right of petition is concerned, in almost all of the state constitutions. Only three states ignore the right in their fundamental law : Minnesota, Virginia and West Virginia. Eleven include the right of “ petition, address and remonstrance ’’ in their ‘‘ bills of rights’’: Alabama, Connecticut, Ken- tucky, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Texas and Vermont. Four recognize the right to “ap- * See, for example, “Address to the People of Maryland,” 3 American Museum, 419, giving an account of the Mary- land convention, very few members of which, it is true, seemed to wish to have the right of petition mentioned in the constitution; p. 424. + See ib., 273–278, 280–290, 557-562, for the attempt to cem- sure John Quincy Adams for a breach of this resolution; and notice, at p. 278, Mr. Cushing's able argument, show- ing that the right of petition existed independent of the con- stitution. 172 PETITION. ply for the redress of grievances”: Illinois, Indi- ana, North Carolina and Oregon. Two confirm the right of “petition or remonstrance”: Maine and Missouri; while all the rest copy the general constitution more closely, and protect the right of “ petition” simply. tutions, 571.) — The supreme court of the United States has recently passed upon the right of peti- tion as affected by the constitution of the United States. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. Reports, 542.) Chief Justice Waite, in stating the opinion of the court, says that the right to assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the adop- tion of the constitution. It is an attribute of free government, springing from laws universally rec- ognized by civilized man. The constitution did not establish it, but found it in existence. Up to that time the individual states were bound to pro- tect it, and as the amendment granted no direct power over it to congress, the right of petition remains subject to the jurisdiction of the states. The amendment recognizes an existing privilege of the people, and guards it against congressional interference only. For their protection in its enjoyment the people must look to the states. The court, however, holds that the right of peti- tion appertains to national citizenship, and that on this account it is guaranteed by the national gov- ernment. It is implied in the very idea of a republican form of government. (Ib., 551, 552.) As petitions are legal, it follows that a petitioner is not guilty of libel in his petition unless express malice be proved. Therefore a petition to the legislature, requesting that body to direct the attorney general to do his duty, was decided not to be actionable. The court held that a man can petition the legislature for the redress of a griev- ance which does not exist, if he thinks that it exists. (Reid vs. Delorme, 1806, 2 Brevard's Reports, South Carolina, 76.) So it was held in New York that a petition for the removal of a district attorney on account of malversation in office, directed to the council of removal, and followed by his removal, could not give rise to a cause of action, unless it was presented mali- ciously, even if it contained false statements. (Thorn vs. Blanchard, 1809, 5 Johnson's Reports, 508, and see cases cited by counsel; see also Gray vs. Pentland, 1815, 2 Sergeant & Rawle's Reports, Pennsylvania, 23, and the very full opinion of the court in Harris vs. Huntington, 1802, 2 Tyler's Reports, Vermont, 129.) — In the United States each legislative body has its own rules, which pre- scribe the manner of offering petitions and the disposition of them. We will give a short résumé of the rules of the house of representatives on this subject for an example. Members having peti- tions to present may deliver them to the clerk, after indorsing on them their names and the ref- erence or disposition to be made of them. These petitions, except such as in the speaker's judg- ment are obscene or insulting, are entered in the journal and published in the congressional record. Petitions excluded by the speaker are returned to (2 Hough's American Consti- the member who presented them. If a petition has been inappropriately referred, it may be properly referred by direction of the committee having possession of it. (Rule 22; see Smith’s Rules and Practice of the House of Representa- tives, latest edition.) No petition can be with- drawn without the leave of the house, but if an act pass for the settlement of a claim, the clerk can send all the papers to the officer charged with the settlement. (Rule 39.) Every petition reported by a committee must be accompanied by a written report, which report is thereupon printed. (Rule 18, § 2.) After the final adjourn- ment of congress the clerks of committees are obliged to deliver all petitions, not reported, and the evidence taken upon them, to the clerk of the house. (Rule 38.) A petition can only be printed by unanimous consent or suspension of the rules. (Smith; supra, 5th ed., 314; this does not refer to printing in the record.) A committee can not receive a petition except through the house. (9 Grey, 412; Jefferson’s Manual, $8; Smith, supra, 105, 234.) All petitions for the satisfaction of private claims against the government of the United States are transmitted to the court of claims, unless the house in which they are intro- (U. S. Revised Statutes, § 1060.) Petitions must, of course, be presented to the appropriate department of the government. (Paschal's Annotated Constitution, 256, § 248.)* —The right of petition seems to be so just, so harmless, and so unquestionable, that its formal recognition in our constitution may appear need- less. Its justice, however, has not always been admitted. In the case of the seven bishops we have seen that James II. attempted to override it. In ancient Persia we learn that petitions were dis- couraged, for “whosoever, whether man or wo- man, shall come unto the king into the inner court, who is not called, there is one law of his to put him to death, except such to whom the king shall hold out the golden sceptre that he may live.” (Esther, chap. 4, verse 11.) We have the author- ity of Perry for the statement that Peter the Great made a decree that no petition should be presented to him until it had been offered to his ministers, and by them rejected. If the petition should then be presented to the czar, and fail to secure his approval, the petitioner was to suffer death. The result was, that no more petitions were presented. (Etat de la Grande Russie, 173.) From this account Montesquieu draws the con- clusion that “in a monarchy the prince should be accessible.” (Esprit des Lois, 12, 26.) It may readily be seen that such instances prove the value of the constitutional recognition of the right of pe- tition, not only in monarchies but also in repub- duced otherwise orders. * (See also 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 143; Story on the Constitution, § 1894; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 349; 1 May's Constitutional History, chap. 7, pp. 410–417; Whipple's Report to the Legislature of Rhode Island, and Otis' Letter, published in pamphlet form, by Cassady & March, Boston, 1839; Broom's Constitutional Law, 408 et seq., 493 et seq., 508 et seq.) PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 173 lics. The right is most useful as a safety-valve for the people, and such a safety-valve is especially necessary where the people govern. The chartist petition did much to quiet the petitioners and those who sympathized with them. Public peti- tions awaken the attention of men, keep ideas alive, countenance those who wish to act, and show public opinion. (Lieber on Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 3d ed., chap. 12, p. 121 et Seq.) In these ways they have a positive power. In the debate on the extension of the time of the income tax in 1853, Lord Brougham told the house of lords how the old income tax law was repealed. “How did the opponents of the tax conduct the campaign in 1816? By means of petitions.” He proceeds to show that for five or six weeks, from four o’clock in the afternoon till two or three o’clock in the morning, petition after petition was presented and debated. (128 Han- Sard's Parliamentary Debates, 798.) In England petitions brought about the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of the Roman Catholics, and the repeal of the corn law. Of course the right of petition may be abused. The legislature should be free, and threatening crowds of petition- ers destroy this freedom, as was frequently the case during the French Revolution. Again, petitions should be respectful. The Kentish petitioners in 1701 were imprisoned on the ground that their petition was insolent and seditious. (5 Cobbett’s Parliamentary History, 1250 et seq.) Stockdale's petition was rejected by the house of commons in 1840, because it was insulting. The abuses to which the right of petition is liable are by no means enough to affect its value seriously. The statute of Charles II. was designed to prevent the disorders which petitions produced, and it is now unnecessary to enforce it. Such disorders are discountenanced by the constitution of the United States, which recognizes only the right “peace- ably to assemble and to petition.” (Rawle on the Constitution,124.) The first amendment has been Solemnly criticised because it “savors of the style of Condescension, in which favors are supposed to be granted.” (1 Tucker's Blackstone, Appen- dix, 299.) This criticism may account for the word “remonstrance” in many of the state con- stitutions (supra), but it can have but little weight with those who regard substance rather than language. — In France the constitution of 1791 included the right of petition among natural rights, specifying it as la liberté d'adresser awa, au- torités constitués des petitions signées individuelle- 'ment. Although this section required every peti- tion to be signed by the actual name of the signer, yet the assembly and convention often con- sidered petitions signed by assumed titles, such as “the people,” etc. The constitution of 1793 again preserved this right, pointing out the tri- bunat as the most appropriate recipient of peti- tions, and in 1799 the same privilege was reaf- firmed. (Constitution of 1799, art. 83.) Under the first empire and the constitutions of 1815 and 1830 we find the right of petition protected. Many petitions were presented to the constituent assembly of 1848. During the second empire they could be addressed to the senate only. The constitution of 1870 allowed petitions to be pre- sented to the corps législatif. (2 Block's Diction- načre de la Politique, 555, tit. Pétition.) — In Prussia, Frederick the Great was accustomed to receive petitions himself. In the early part of this century a decree was published forbidding the thrusting of petitions personally upon the king. The Prussian constitution of 1850 recog- nizes the right of petition (articles 23 and 32); and in fact all Germany, as well as the other constitutional countries of Europe, admits its existence. (8 Bluntschli & Brater's Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch, 67, tit. Petitionsrecht : 3 Holt- Zendorff's Rechtsleavicom, 40, same tit. See, for ex- ample, Constitution of Belgium, 1831, article 21, and Constitution of Switzerland, 1848, article 47.) Even in Russia the emperor Nicholas was often addressed personally by petitioners. (Lieber, supra.) Huc states that the right prevails in China. He records a case in which the inhabit- ants of a Chinese town secured the removal of an obnoxious prefect by means of a popular meet- ing and a petition to the viceroy. He adds that such incidents are not infrequent in that empire. (2 Travels through China, chap. 3, pp. 77–80.) ERNEST HOWARD CROSBY. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 1. What the Phº- losophy of Law means; its Task. The mind of the jurist and the mind of the philosopher demand a philosophical consideration of the law. Both to the jurist and the philosopher the inquiries with which the philosophy of law concerns itself are altogether indispensable, if they would deeply and exhaustively understand their respective sciences. The student of law can not avoid the task of render- ing account to himself of some of the highest princi- ples of his science, of their foundation and con- nections, which his own science is unable to ex- plain. Not only the statesman, the legislator and the teacher of law, but also the judge and the lawyer, in their respective spheres, find innumera- ble occasions for testing either whole institutes or single points of positive law, in their legitimacy and the essential reason of their validity; occasions for seeking to interpret them, and according to the result of that interpretation to endeavor either to re- tain or to alter them. The jurist is thus frequently compelled to seek for principles of law; but to search after principles, is to philosophize. — On the other hand, the philosopher is compelled to test his general, theoretical principles by the ma- terials of existing law. Among all enlightened nations he finds the state the grandest reflex of the human mind in history. In all human com- munities he meets with the idea of law, as an essentially human idea, in various stages of de- velopment, from its most refined down to its most simple and only half-conscious beginnings. In his system, therefore, the philosopher must take this important phenomenon into careful con- 174 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. sideration. The philosophy of law is, accord- ingly, the systematic science of the principles of law. From the philosophical point of view, it assumes the task of inquiring into the necessary origin of the idea of law in the human mind, and into its relation to other forces and creations in the life of man. The philosophy of law is called upon to assign to law its true position in the cos- mos of intellect. From the legal point of view the philosophy of law should endeavor to apply the highest principles concerning the nature of law and the state, obtained through philosophical reflection and historical investigation, and seek to incorporate them into the existing materials of all legislation. — 2. Outlines of the History of the De- velopment of the Philosophy of Law. As a matter of course, there can be a philosophy of law only where the principles of law, as such, have at least begun to detach themselves from the precepts of religion and from the dictates of morals. Hence, in the present sketch of the process of development of that philosophy, we may regard as a preliminary stage (and therefore completely overlook) all that which, in ancient history, ap- pears as religious revelation, legend, custom and poetry; although such traditions otherwise consti- tute important material for the investigation of national character, and of the chief outlines of the primitive human conceptions of law. —We meet with a true philosophy of law first among the Hellenes, for they at least began to detach law from ethics and religion, although they were far from completing the task of that separation. In this, however, as in many other things, they form the transition from, or connecting link be- tween, the east and the west. In judging the organization of the Grecian state, and the Greek doctrine of the state, we must not forget this middle position of the Hellenes. Compared with theocratic and patriarchal despotism, thcy had made notable progress; but the Greeks must be said to have lived in very close bondage, when we compare them with the Roman Civis, not to say with the citizens of modern states. For the Hellenic state was absolute, and all excellence, all dºperſ), was excellent only in so far as it was subservient to the state, and became a ſtoltzz7(7) dºper). It was not so much that the state in- terfered in almost everything, but rather that everything was absorbed in the state. Religion was the state's religion, and any one who an- nounced new gods had to drain the fatal cup. The family was only a means to the ends of the state. The state might prevent trade and traffic with foreign countries, and fetter the free activ- ity of the economy of individuals; it acknowl- edged no society but itself. That state was only the logical consequence of the same political idea which prescribed to music its melodies, to instru- ments their tunes, and even Ventured to forbid the Hellenes to read Homer. This political idea was not only oppressive to, but it actually de- stroyed, the family, by authorizing the commun- ity of women and children, and the selection of the parties to be united as man and wife by the public magistrates. – This entire conception of the state was possible only because of the very limited territorial extent of the Hellenic states themselves. The Hellenic state was the city (ſtdºlts). The whole government easily assumed a narrow, police character, interfering in almost everything. Even Aristotle, although he ex- pressly warned the Greeks against the danger of their petty state system, entertained, in this respect, so narrow a view, that he actually re- quired that all the citizens of the state should be personally acquainted with one another. But, even in small “city-states” of this kind, the abso- lute absorption of the individual by the state was possible only so long as the old Hellenic spirit maintained itself; when the subject, without thought, submitted himself to the substantial em- bodiment of the national spirit, as traditionally expressed and represented in religion, customs and the state, and thus submitted himself with a feeling that things could not be otherwise. — Yet this old Hellenic spirit began very early to die out. After the first Persian war the dissolution of the old relation of absorption of the individual by the state accompanied the enlargement of the horizon of the popular mind and the increase of national culture. This was a natural, necessary, and in many respects a wholesome, movement. The transition to reflection in this instance was, as it is always and everywhere, the condition pre- cedent of a higher mental development; and if the Athenians had never abandoned the point of view of the “Marathonites,” the highest which they attained in science, in art and in the state, would have remained unachieved. But it can not be denied that the negative, dissolving and dis- integrating effects that accompany all thought, or rather reflection, soon became very prominently, very sharply and very one-sidedly perceptible among the Greeks. To overcome effects of this kind requires at all times the most intense and continuous effort of all human energies. It ac- cordingly can not be denied, that the Hellenic national character did not bear its emancipation from the old strict observance of faith and cus- tom without rapid demoralization: a fact which is connected with the exceedingly rapid course of the whole history of Greece from its earliest be- ginning until its final decay. — The period of the Sophists is, properly speaking, the time when awakened thought presumed to question, to in- vestigate, to doubt, and even to pull down every- thing that was customary in religion or morals, in law or in the organization of the state. To the Hellenes this epoch had nearly the same meaning that the “period of enlightenment * of the past century had to France and Germany. In many things it was injurious; in some, useful; but in all, necessary. At this period Hellenic thought, in spite of all its traditions, was not satisfied with the belief that things could not be otherwise than they were. The Greek philosophers asked them- selves whether right and wrong were settled for PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 175 all time by nature; or, whether they were only provisions changeable at the caprice of men. They inquired whether those ideas were qxºdel or Sé681, and ever afterward this controversy ran through the entire Hellenic-Roman philosophy. But it is a characteristic fact, that the Hellenes, face to face with this first problem, should have thrown together ethics and law. The right, the good, the law (tò d'ya Sov, 6 vºuc5)—concerning which they inquired whether it existed Sé681 or -q×3681—was with them not only the law of legal right, but also the law of morality. The conser- vatives maintained the eternal inviolability of the law of legal right and of the law of morality, as an ordinance of the gods and of nature; but the sophists, armed with the subtlety and culture of the more modern time, pointed to the fact that the law of morality and the law of legal right are by no means always the same, but may be very contradictory in Lillie and space. — The Sophists, however, did not understand that the idea of legal right or law exists with all nations; that the cre- sation of forms of law or legal right is rooted in the nature of man, and that only the forms in which this idea appears, may be different and even contradictory, according to national charac- ter, and to natural conditions and the conditions of the time. The sophists, because they saw un- certain, changeable forms of law, rejected the whole idea of legal right and of the good. They maintained that every nation, every epoch, as well :as every individual, from motives of caprice or interest, might prescribe to itself or himself what it or he should consider lawful or unlawful, and might act accordingly. In this manner subject- ivity finally passed all bounds. Although at the beginning the more moderate among the sophists (Prodikos, Protagoras) erected fresh barriers; sub- sequently the majority (like Gorgias, Hippias) both theoretically and practically followed out to the last consequences this anarchical doctrine. It has been justly observed that even Socrates, as the representative of the right of free investiga- tion into all traditional institutions, stood on en- tirely the same ground as the sophists. But he differed from the latter, in that he subordinated the freedom of the individual to the purposes of the good, and wished that thought should not be employed for the purpose of demolition, but for the attainment of the knowledge and the vol- untary observance of the law of morality. —In judging the philosophy of the state of both the great pupils of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, we must take into account the influence of the Greek political situation, and of the general condition of Greek civilization at the time. That process of disintegration, the dissolution of the old system of ethics, through unrestrained skeptical thought, was making alarmingly rapid progress. In a political respect this degeneracy manifested itself in an unbridled ochlocracy, as in Athens; or in a malevolent tyranny, as in Sicily and the other islands. All earnest, thinking men, in all the Hellenic cities, had long since turned away with loathing from the turbulent democracy, and sought Support and assistance in the strict Doric polit- ical and moral system, with its aristocratic ideals. We must keep in view this partiality for the Doric political ideal, which had been partly realized in the state of Lycurgus, in order to understand how Plato could reach the otherwise unintelligi- ble extremes of his philosophy of the state. In the Second place, we must take into account the peculiar tendency to abstract theoretical construc- tion that characterized the whole Hellenic national character, and most materially all Hellenic specu- lation. This explains why Plato could admit, as the principle of his doctrine of the state and of law, the same idea which forms the basis of his psychology and of his analysis of the individual man. Hence, the well-known simile by which he illustrated his own psychology : As the charioteer guides his two-in-hand, the reason (voijs) must control, and keep in harmony the two halves of the human soul, the masculine, courageous, and the feminine, appetitive halves. And what is true of the individual man, is true of men as a whole, as they appear in the state. This whole Only represents man. On a larger scale, as one ani- mated organic being, endowed with but one body and one soul. In other words, the three parts of the human mind, the feminine soul, the mascu- line Soul and reason, reveal themselves in the state as three classes or estates—the class of trades- men, that of the warriors, and that of the wise men. The best form of government, to wit, aris- tocracy, consists in the Supremacy of the wise men, the passive obedience of tradesmen, and the active obedience of the warrior class. Every indi- vidual should belong completely to one of these Orders, and be entirely absorbed in it. All private interests are destroyed by the state's distributing wives, children and goods among the citizens. The state controls the whole education of the people, even in the Smallest details, and continues to educate even adult individuals. It prescribes the tunes of the lyre, forbids the songs of Homer, as being too passionate, and interdicts all imitative arts, such as painting, sculpture and the drama. The most gifted among the warriors after a long training may rise to the class of the wise men; but the caste of tradesmen, after ministering to the wants of the higher orders, as the adamant founda- tion, of the state, must remain imbedded in the ground. The slaves, so indispensable to the ancient state, and all bodily defective children, must be de- graded into that caste. In his later work, the twelve books on the laws, having seen the impracticability of his ideal state, Plato modified his extreme no- tions concerning the community of women and goods, and proposed a constitution, half way be- tween oligarchy and democracy, in which the laws themselves should rule, instead of his ideal rulers, the order of wise men. — In Aristotle we find a marked progress both in the methods and the contents of the doctrine of the state. This philosopher gave his doctrine of the state a broad historico-juristic basis, by collecting data relating 176 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. to the constitutions of no fewer than 158 different states, and critically sifting the materials in a work that has unfortunately been lost. As re- gards the substance of his doctrine, his greatest merit seems to lie in his conception of man, as a Côov tolvr12tóv, a political animal, a being by nature necessarily impelled to form states. It is not with Aristotle as with Plato, and most of the other Greek, Roman and Christian philosophers, purely external urgency and help- lessness that impel man to form the state, but his very nature. The ideal basis of the state, side by side with the real, was first proved by Aristotle; yet without his distorting that ideal in either a theocratic or transcendental sense. — The collapse of all intellectual life in Greece, and principally of the life of the state, was soon reflected in the prevailing philosophical systems, and in the neg- lect of political life, with which the Greeks had formerly been so closely identified. The sen- sualist-material tendency of the Cyrenian School was continued in the Epicurean Sect, which neg- lected the state. The rising school of the stoics, also, which in many respects bore a resemblance to the earlier school of cynics, no longer regarded the state from the point of view of the national state, which had represented the healthy point of view peculiar to the life of antiquity. The pantheism of this doctrine accorded a marked prominence to the subject, and led to the hypoth- esis of a grand whole, which embraced all indi- viduals in a community of the cosmos. Men must live conformably to the law of nature (natura, convenienter wivere—a maxim on which was subsequently based the so-called jus naturaº, or law of nature, which accordingly had a physico- ethical, not juridical, starting-point). Nature is supposed to impel all men, even all beings, that have any share in the cosmic soul, consequently the gods, into one great community; and any one who, in regard to this whole, conducts himself properly, is just. The justice of men among themselves is moral-politico-juridical; that of men toward the gods consists in piety. As in the cosmos, the world-soul, so in the state the “state- soul,” moves, contains and controls everything; but this soul of the state is the law. —As is known, the teachings of the stoics became, later, the fa- vorite doctrine of Rome, when it had gained the empire of the world; and precisely as the RQman empire finally dissolved all nationalities, even its own, into one universal state, so also the political doctrines of the stoic philosophy were cosmopol- itan, and no longer national-political. — These stoical conceptions, mingled with Christian ele- ments, exerted their influence far into the mid- dle ages. The “Civitas Dei" of St. Augustine, who himself had received a stoical training, has many traits of the stoical to A15 21165. — There was once a lively controversy as to whether, and how far, the stoical School had exercised an influence on Roman law; but in our present state of knowledge, and with our deeper historical in- sight into both the stoical philosophy and Roman law, such a question can no longer be raised. A school of French jurists (Cujacius), with the laud- able intent of entering into the whole mental life of the Romans, was the first to seek an ex- planation of their law in its relation to the sto- ical School; and, Strange to Say, these jurists sup- posed they discovered a material influence of that philosophical system on the Roman law. But we now know that that law was only the outcome and development of the peculiar popular life, and of the peculiar talent, of the Romans. Its chief excellence consisted precisely in its repug- nance to all the doctrinarian wisdom of the schools and in its thoroughly practical wisdom. It would never have occurred to a Roman jurist to allow any kind of philosophy to exercise any influence on the matter of his real juridical ideas. There certainly are to be found many stoical ele- ments in the corpus juris, but only in its general definitions, in its erudition, in its ethical maxims. But those philosophical opinions remained com- pletely without influence on the life and develop- ment of the institutes of the Roman law. In the same manner as the Romans, in a purely outward manner, appropriated to themselves all Greek culture, so, too, they introduced into Italy, Greek philosophy and political theories, yet without any real appropriation of them, and without any fur- ther development of any one of them, just as they erected the pillaged statues of the temple on the capitol, often bringing them, without much discernment, into an enforced contact with their own national institutions, heedless whether they harmonized well or badly with the latter. Now, the stoic definitions were very poorly adapted to the matter of Roman law, and we may confidently assert that what in the corpus juris is juridical is not stoic, and what is stoic is not juridical. — The Romans, accordingly, had no philosophy of law, in the proper sense of the term. Their so- called philosophers, particularly Cicero, learned philosophy from the Greeks, as one learns a foreign language, without changing it, or working it into the elements of Roman law. And yet, as it were, an unconscious philosophy of law, such as never afterward was attained to, seems to pervade the labors of the Roman jurisprudents. The eminent talent of the Roman mind for law is not only displayed in the acute formulation of juridical ideas, in the subtle distinctions of these ideas, or in the admirable conclusions it draws from them, in their algebra of juridical ideas, but the instinct for the deepest intelligence of the essence of law is still more luminously revealed throughout the whole development of it by the Romans, in the praetorial edict and in the jurisprudentes. The characteristic traits that make the Romans em- phatically the juridical nation of history, were the above, and the gradual, slow transformation of the old, obsolete forms of law, according to the wants and the social progress of the time, as well as their efforts to do justice to all that was new, but with the utmost leniency toward the old. The incessant mental labor of the Roman PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 177 jurisprudents for centuries, by degrees smoothed down the rigid, specifically Roman, harshness of their law, and in connection with the growing uni- versal culture of their empire, changed it into a jus gentium in the highest sense of the term, that is, into a law that in many things has promulgated lasting juridical truths, particularly in the law on obligations, or contracts, and in the general theory of the law. But it must not be forgotten, that, to effect this, that specific juridical talent, which itself was incontestably Roman, was required. Only the Romans were able to develop their Roman law into universal law. Their law, like Christianity, conquered the world, and together with the whole culture of antiquity, and as a fragment of that culture, it legitimately passed into mediaeval and modern culture; yet legiti- mately only in as far as even that fragment of ancient culture could be assimilated with pro- priety to our life. We shall return below to this subject. — To the Hellenic philosophy and the Roman law were now added, as influential ele- ments in the history of ethical, political and juridical ideas, the ideas of Christianity. The influence of these on the philosophy of law was decidedly unfavorable in the beginning. It en- hanced the fundamental vice of that philosophy in the extreme: the amalgamation of law and morality, the preponderance of the internal and the moral over the external and really juridical. We have called attention above to the fact, that, as a matter of course, there can be, in principle, no opposition or contradiction between ethics and law, both being forms of one same force; but we have also called attention to the fact, that, spite of their close connection, there is a very decided difference between law and ethics, the oblitera- tion of which operates unfavorably in the highest degree on both. When the domain of inner free- dom and of morality is occupied by the law, when religious and moral precepts are understood or conceived in a juridical sense, then religious and moral truth perishes, and untrue and un-free formal holiness and apparent morality take its place. This history has demonstrated in all those cases in which the state or other external power has sought to command and enforce faith, relig- iousness or morality by coercive measures. In this domain of the free, inner life of the soul, only forms, formulas and appearance can be com- manded. When, on the other hand, law is con- founded with ethics, when religion and morality seek to rule the state and dictate codes of law, we see come into existence those abortive systems which would paralyze man’s highest activity, his participation in the life of the state, and substi- tute fanaticism and hypocrisy for healthy action and open force. Unmanly, untrue and unhealthy organization is to be found wherever it is at- tempted to replace the state and the law by religion and morals. Here, too, the only healthy and normal course is to separate what is different. — The history of the philosophy of law, however, shows that it was only late that men learned to 131 VOL. III. — 12 keep morality separate from law. Among the Hellenes we find the clearest contradiction be- tween their theory and practice; both their theory and practice confounded ethics and law; but while in its practical life the state absorbed morality, prescribed ethico-religious rules or laws, and scarcely endured any free individual life, the science of the law and of the state was entirely ethical. It has been rightly remarked that the Hellenic vocabulary has no word for law in the sense of the Roman jus, but couples ethico-relig- ious notions with the words Séut 5, 61%atogºv m, véu 8615, etc.; and we have seen how, from Pythagoras to Aristotle, the pedagogical pre- ponderated in the state, and the moral in the idea of the law. Among the Romans the life of the law was free and richly developed, but they had no philosophy of law. Their jurists avoided general definitions even in positive law.— Christian ideas at the outset evinced a strong disinclination toward the state, which was still heathen and corrupt. The kingdom of the Christian was not of this world. The true home of the Christian was not this earth, corrupted through the fall of man, but in the world beyond. Above all, he had to save his soul, by piety and faith, and only to concern himself with the state when it was unavoidable. As is known, the Christians of the first centuries expected the speedy end of the world, and carefully avoided, as far as possible, any contact with the heathen and sinful life of the state. Religious morality, with them, overruling every other motive, stepped into the foreground, while the state was but a secondary concern, or was considered only as a necessary evil. If human nature had not been corrupted through the fall, there would have been neither murder nor homicide, nor quarrels con- cerning mine and thine, and consequently no need of the state or of the law. Sin was introduced by the devil; along with, or at least on account of, sin, the state and the law had also entered into this world; in paradise there was neither king nor judge. With this sinful world, with the devil, the state and the law were to disappear, for they will not be required in heaven. The lea, tem- poralis contains, of just and legal, only what it borrowed from the lea, alterna. — Such was the teaching of St. Augustine, and his doctrine was only logical. The ancient wisdom of the Stagi- rite had taught, that man by his ideal nature was drawn toward the state; that the latter was not a necessary evil, but a necessary good; but now Christianity had reached the very opposite con- clusion. This world-shunning view, neglectful of the state and of the law, governed the entire Christian philosophy. The scholastic philosophy confused law and ethics in this, that, according to the former, the just man (the Ötztałog of the Bible) was only the person who, through the re- demption, had been rescued from sin. Scholasti- cism over and again called to mind how man, so long as his nature had not been corrupted by the devil, neither knew nor needed the law or the 178 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. state: and further, that all law ought to be reduced to religious morality and the ten commandments. The different philosophers and their parties only diverged from one another in this, that some among them ascribed man’s knowledge of these princi- ples to divine revelation, while others ascribed it rather to the natural reason of man. Scholasti- cism further made frequent attempts to distin- guish the lea, divina (the moral and religious law of the Mosaic-Christian revelation) from the lea, maturalis (the voice of moral, juridical commands, dwelling even in the heart of the heathen: thus particularly the tolerant and liberal Abelard). But this whole intellectual tendency, which at- tained its latest expression in Thomas. Aquinas (1225–74), has in common a disregarding of the state and of the law, and the coloring of both by religious morals. – Considering the historical con- ditions of the middle ages, this idea naturally led to the complete supremacy of the church over the state, in its quality of representative of re- ligious morals. But the opposition to this idea was preparing, during the time that the state, with increasing success, began to struggle for its emancipation from the church, by the aid of sci- ence, no longer exclusively confined to the clergy, but pursued by laymen as well, and particularly by the aid of the revival of ancient culture and the knowledge of Roman law. The struggles of the Hohenstaufens against the papacy may appa- rently have ended in the subjugation of the secu- lar power; but in many individuals it had at least aroused a doubt concerning the legitimateness of ecclesiastical Supremacy. The increasing power of the opposition against the religious-moral ab- sorption of the state and the law, was not the work of philosophers, nor the outcome of theo- retical reasons, but was owing to the efforts of statesmen and party writers, and to the practical wants and aspirations of the period. These men at first opposed these principles on account of their practical consequences. Dante and Occam, the brave political adherents of the emperors Henry of Luxemburg and Louis of Bavaria, were the men who first successfully, for prac- tico-political reasons, attacked the Supremacy of the pope over the secular powers, and the whole theory. On which that Supremacy was based; but, as a matter of course, they did this in com- plete conformity with the dogmas of the church. Two hundred years later, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) submitted, with reckless knavery, morality to political ends. In his ardent wish to see Italy freed from the numerous small despots and their feuds, he called for an abso- lute dictatorship, which by any, even by immoral means, as violence and fraud, might carry out the political behests of the times. Yet all this is suf- ficiently explained by the historical conditions, by the times of the Borgias and the Medicis, as also by that peculiar talent of the Neo-Latin nations, particularly of the Italians, which prompts them to follow up the suggestions of any ardent passion to the end. At the same time it was an equally extreme reaction against the subjugation of the State and of the law by the religious morals of the church. The emancipation of the state was carried to the point of ignoring all ethical laws, and of . Sacrificing morality to purely political ends; yet the motives here again were practico- political: the wounds of torn Italy and the neces- sity of healing them. Machiavelli belonged to the period of the reformation, that amidst vio- lent convulsions completed the movement which began at the close of the thirteenth and con- tinued through the fourteenth and fifteenth cent- uries; the movement which, in principle and for- ever, did away with the scholastic idea of the state and of the law, and of their relations to morality and the church. — And here, again, the men who achieved these results were not philoso- phers of the Schools, armed with theories; on the contrary, these results were the necessary outcome of the gigantic strife of the sixteenth and seven- teenth centuries, which in Germany, England, Switzerland and Franceled to radical changes in the organization of church and state. Once more the practico-political movements of history created the necessity of not abiding by old, traditional ideas, but of seeking a different solution of a number of important problems, touching the relations of church and state, of law and religion, of the free- dom of private life, the rights of public life, and the rights of citizens in relation to their gov- ernments. Men insisted on examining for them- selves into these problems, in order possibly to attain higher results. Such were the great ques- tions of the period, which aroused so many pow- erful minds in Germany and in the Low Coun- tries, in England, in France, and even in Italy and Spain. In this manner the 150 years that followed the first efforts of the reformers, until the last vanishing traces of the thirty years' war, displayed an extraordinary wealth of political and juridico-philosophical literature, both in the form of long-winded systems and of short polemical writings and pamphlets. – The reformers them- selves, even Luther and Melancthon, knew hardly anything of the philosophy of law, in the proper sense of the term. In ethics, also, they still maintained the traditional ideas concerning the lea, divina, maturalis and positiva. There, never- theless, were a few of the friends and pupils of the reformers, who, both in theory and in their practical deductions, boldly broke away from their teachers, and followed the spirit of the times. Such was Hubert Languet (1518–81), who in the interest of freedom of conscience openly advo- cated popular sovereignty. The same was also done by his contemporaries, Hotomanus in France, and George Buchanan in Scotland. Melanc. thon’s pupil, Hemming, more deliberately than his teacher, severed all connection with the doc- trine of the middle ages. Yet, along with all this, there were many stationary men among the adhe- rents of the reformation, who, in the field of juridical philosophy, retained unchanged the old views, as did Oldridorp. The revival, and at that PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 179 time flourishing condition, of Graeco-Roman phi- lology caused the students and patrons of it to show a decided inclination for the political ideas of antiquity. The Frenchmen Hotomanus, Bodi- nus, Charron (1541–1603), Gassendi (1592–1655); the Englishmen More and Sidney; the Italian Piccolomini (1604), and others, with but few Christian modifications, renewed the doctrines of the old Hellenic and Roman philosophy. It would be unfair to maintain that in all this there was nothing more than the harmless whims of unprac- tical scholars. It must not beforgotten that More and Sidney died for their convictions. Their theories concerning the importance and dignity of the state contrasted strikingly with the mediaeval theocratic ideas; and in this respect they certainly represented the spirit of modern times. But the old point of view was at the same time vehemently defended by the school of the Jesuits. The con- version of heretics was their main task. Domin- icus de Soto, Fernando Vasquez, Bellarmine, Mo- lina, Suarez and Mariana are the most prominent names connected with the tendency of this school. They frequently displayed great learning and in- telligence. They skillfully employed the theo- ries of the principle of sociality and of the sov- ereignty of the people, which were in favor at the time. In other words, they defended the old, desperate cause with the arms of their adversaries, and in so doing scorned no means that proved serviceable for their holy purpose. They even considered the murder of an herefical prince a duty. The church herself was finally compelled to disacknowledge these ultra-apostles of hers; yet long before that not only governments had had their books burned by the hands of the public executioner, but deeply religious men, like Pascal, had directed their combined power of heart and intellect against this deplorable misuse of religion. — We next come to a long line of conspicuous British philosophers who wrote concerning the state. Most of them had for point of departure the problems that were agitating their own insular kingdom in particular, but which, nevertheless, justly claim a certain universal importance, be- cause the convulsions that shook the state and church in England were closely connected with the general religious-political movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Among these men, also, there were harmless philological dreamers, who regarded the revival of antiquity as the standard suited to their own time. This not only applies to More and Sidney, but even to the highly realistic Bacon of Verulam, who, with genuine, practical English common sense, looked upon utility as the principle of the state. He, nevertheless, to a certain degree, leaned on Plato, basing the state on ethics, while Plato based it on psychology. In the great struggle for the re- spective rights of the crown and of the people, absolutism found an intelligent champion in Hobbes, who in a logical manner attributed abso- lute inviolability to all government, while others, like Salmasius and Filmer, demonstrated the auto- cratic power of the monarch from the Scriptures: the latter, in his notorious Patriarch (1665), main- tained the identity of the royal and paternal power, and showed that God had instituted abso- lute monarchy with Adam, in Paradise. Milton, with his wonted enthusiasm for truth, morality and freedom, successfully attacked Salmasius, while the penetrating intellect of Locke com- pletely overthrew Filmer's patriarchal doctrine. At the same time the principle of sociality, as it had been accepted by the German and Dutch writers on the philosophy of law, was established psychologically by Richard Cumberland, with whose name the school of so-called English moral- ists is associated: Shaftesbury, Wollaston, Clarke, Hutcheson, Home, Ferguson and Adam Smith. – David Hume also went in this same direction, although in many respects he conflicted with its tendencies. His austere skepticism rejected the traditional “myths” of a state of nature and of a social contract. General utility is his principle of the state, of law and of justice; for peace and good faith will in the end prove more profitable than violence and cunning. In this manner he sought both to modify and support the optimism of the moralists. This utilitarianism, which among Eng- lish philosophers began with Bacon, frequently after reappeared in England, under ever-varying forms, as a characteristic trait; and in our own cen- tury it attained its most marked expression in the system of Bentham. — Yet the main branch of the intellectual current at that time flowed through Ger- many and the Low Countries. Here the doctrine of the law of nature emanated from Hugo Grotius, inasmuch as he, with greater decision and con- sciousness than his predecessors, reduced all posi- tive law of whatever kind to the common basis of a constantly uniform law of nature. It was also very characteristic of the practical starting point of all this movement, that even Grotius begins with the simple question: “Is it ever just to wage war?” To investigate this question, the terrible wars, of which he had been a witness during his own life- time (1583–1648), furnished, indeed, sufficient cause. He answers the question in the affirmative, in the case of just defense or demand for satisfaction; and he only occasionally comes to the investiga- tion of the legal principle itself. It is, besides, very remarkable that Grotius, as well as all the following teachers of the law of nature, gradually distinguished more sharply between law and the morals of religion, although they regarded God, or his revealed will, as the common basis of both. As to the particular institutes of public law, Grotius seeks to prove that they do not necessarily, or altogether certainly, emanate from the reason, yet he contends that they do not abso- lutely contradict it. This problem might, indeed, have led to a fruitful analysis of the matter of the law, if the whole law of nature had not started from a false conception of humanity and of his- tory. Another fiction of this doctrine is the sup- position of a state of nature (status maturalis), corresponding to the law of nature, that is, a con- 180 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. dition of humanity before the beginnings of soci- ety and of the state; and this condition of nat- ure, with the theological philosophers, frequently meant the supposed state in Paradise before the fall of man (status integritatis), but with others, a condition of wretchedness and helpless want after the fall. — It was possible, from these general premises, to draw the most opposite conclusions in questions of detail. Thus Hobbes, from the political contract, which unconditionally bestows sovereignty on the monarch, infers extreme abso- lutism; while Rousseau, from his contrat Social, reaches permanent revolution, the sovereign people having made every office revokable, and thus at any time being able to depose the king. Between both these extremes there exist various kinds of modified doctrines. It is remarkable that Spinoza here also sustained the superiority of his genius; and although not entirely exempt from the influences and errors of the scholarship of his time, he on certain main points decidedly opposed them. Thus, he combats the hypothesis that men by the political contract ever renounced their freedom. On the contrary, he maintains that only in the state do they acquire freedom; that be- fore the state there existed only arbitrary power; and that only in the state is it possible to put an end to irrational and unlimited unrestraint, un- worthy of man, to attain to an existence in accord- ance with reason. — Samuel Pufendorf agrees with Spinoza in combating the theological view of the state. The remarkable juridical talent of the former placed him on many points in direct con- flict with the traditional tendency to fill up the whole domain of law with moral-religious ideas, and involved him in numerous polemical conflicts with the advocates of the latter school. Although he also draws no clear distinction in principle, be- tween law and morality, in most matters of detail his sound juridical sense correctly distinguished between them and connected them. With Spi- noza, he lays stress on the fact that the “state of nature” of man before the social contract is the most wretched hypothesis conceivable, and that man did not enter into a state of society by con- tract, but was impelled thereto by a fundamental law of his nature. The commands that are indis- pensable to the preservation of society or the community, Pufendorf holds may be enforced, and are jus perfectum; those, on the contrary, that only serve to render human association more pleasant or agreeable, are not coercible, and con- stitute jura imperfecta. Pufendorf further dis- tinguishes between the duties of man toward himself, and his duties toward others; and among the latter he distinguishes the absolute and the hypothetical, that arise from special agreements (adventitia obligation's), such as the rights of property, the rights of the family, and the state, into which men entered, and that by contract, to prevent the war of all against all. Here Pufen- dorf pays homage to the errors of his time; but he decidedly opposes them in his conception of the church, which, as a corpus mysticum, should wield no immediate, and particularly no politi- cal, supremacy in the state. The church may appoint teachers of its own faith; but it is subject to the state, like any private society, and in things not spiritual it should be deprived of all coercive power. — Nevertheless, other ardent champions of the old theory Soon appeared, to oppose these innovations, at the close of the seven- teenth, and beginning of the eighteenth, century, in Seckendorf and Alberti, and the two Cocceji, as well as in the works of their pupils, who directly based both law and morals on the will of God, as revealed in the ten commandments. Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) was a real standard- bearer on the field of progress, just as he was the devoted adversary of the trials for witchcraft, and the first who lectured on the law of nature in the German language. At his first appearance, while he still adhered to Grotius and Pufendorf, he was goaded, like Luther, by the polemical writ- ings of his numerous and violent adversaries, into much more extreme views. His point of depart- ure is a strict separation of religious-moral doc- trine from natural law. The former, he claims, has its origin in divine revelation, the latter in hu- man reason, and the more reverently we grant the precedence to the former, within its own sphere, the more marked will be the independence of the whole sphere of law.—Leibnitz (1646–1716) was not so important an element in promoting the develop- ment of the philosophy of law as was Thomasius, who, both in a positive and negative manner, im- parted a powerful impulse to that development; but Leibnitz was a most powerful force, by the general spread of his ideas, broadly developed by Wolff (1679–1754); ideas which ruled the litera- ture and the whole world of enlightened German thought, in the period of its aufklärung (enlight- enment). To Leibnitz, justice is the virtue which preserves the normal condition of man’s Social life. The pre-established harmony which keeps the universe together, reveals itself, in the commun- ity of men, as law, hedging in the institutions of marriage, of paternity, the relation of master and servant, the commune and the state. In this sense, to obey God and to obey reason are one and the same thing; and the conviction of the binding force of the law does not come through the state contract or political contract or Social con- tract, but is given with the idea of law itself. — Still, it was not these deep views themselves, but rather the theistic-rationalistic ideas of an ethico- pedagogical kind, that governed the German auf. Jölärung (enlightenment), through the broad inter- pretation and amplification of Wolffian dogma- tism. — But even this harmless system of German rationalism, on many points, calls to mind the dangerous theories which, during the same period, abounded in the French éclaireissement (enlight- enment), the attempted realization of which was destined to shake and startle the world in the French revolution. —In France the thoroughly corrupt moral-political and politico-economical state of things, toward the close of the sixteenth * PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 181 century, had, in a Montaigne, engendered abso- lute skepticism as to the power of the moral law; and the fermenting putrescence of that state of affairs finally found a natural outlet in the French revolution. — In fact, toward the middle of the eighteenth century, the culture of the time placed itself in open and avowed opposition to the pre- vailing conditions in the state, the church and society, from which that culture itself had sprung. The rationalism of the encyclopædists, influenced both by the English moralists and the materialistic tendencies of the natural sciences, the study of which was renewed, proclaimed interest (l’intérét) the principle of all action, even of all noble action, the latter also, it was claimed, being due to an enlightened self-love. In order to protect the prac- tical results of this view, men formed Society, and created the state (D’Alembert, Didérot); society and the state being but the outcome of the nobles passions of men, such as ambition, pride and love of glory. Thus Voltaire; but this author here drew an illegitimate conclusion, because from the above starting point, the state would manifestly owe its origin to the abject passion of fear. Nevertheless, Voltaire's practical efforts to effect an improve- ment in the cruel penal code of his time, possess a higher value than his theory. To effect that improvement, he worked in connection with the philanthropic club Il Café of Milan, particularly with Beccaria, who, in his book Dei delitti e delle pene, opposed with all his might both torture and capital punishment. Yet this he did from the point of view of the theory of contract, and by the use of arguments which would altogether de- prive the state of the right of punishment. The circle that gathered round Baron Holbach, and the writings that emanated from it, revealed the materialistic tendencies of this period of “enlight- enment.” Rousseau, however, was the real har- binger of the revolution. His whole frame of mind, his absolute rupture with history, his lev- eling of all existing institutions, his heedless neg- lect of all experience, his bold construction of systems on entirely new ground, were destined soon to pass from theory into the practice of the French people. Rousseau expressly declares, that it is impossible to examine whether there ever existed a primitive state of man; but that, in real- ity, man's primitive condition consisted in the equality of all in a state of barbarism. In that state there was neither right nor wrong nor property. The first appropriation of things produced in- equality, and thus kindled envy and ambition. The Social contract was concluded, in order to control the outbreak of these passions. Each individual entered into this contract with each other individual; and thus in every act of the state every individual should be consulted; and so the English are really free only at the moment of the elections to parliament Sovereignty is only bestowed conditionally and revocably; and when authority becomes despotic, that is, when it acts arbitrarily, it thereby cancels the social con- tract, and re-establishes the state of nature; in other words, it is not the people, but the govern- ment, that is in revolution. Despotism is by its very nature a revolution, and the uprising of the citizens is only the result of that revolution. The political consequences of these doctrines afterward appeared in the statesmen of the rev- olution, in Sieyes, to whom, as to Mirabeau, the third estate, which hitherto had been nothing, was everything. Thomas Paine proclaimed the most advanced tenets of this revolutionary phi- losophy. For him, even the Jacobins were not sufficiently advanced in their ideas; he regarded all government as an evil, and called monarchy and the papacy the inventions of the devil. His work on the rights of man was directed against the great English statesman Burke, who, with a rare abundance of superior political wis- dom, combated the abstract theories of Rousseau and the revolution. The effect of this whole school was doubtless a destructive one. Still, in one man at least, who otherwise completely be- longed to it, Montesquieu, negation is found con- nected with the work of construction, not so much as regards what he has to say on the phi- losophy of law, in which he was rather insig- nificant, as in his method, and in one main result of that method. While Rousseau intentionally turned his back upon history, Montesquieu sought to base his philosophical reflections on the state, and its constitution on historical experience. The wholesome result of this sound method was, that while Rousseau arrived at only abstract sys- tems, devoid of real political vitality, Montes- Quieu, by his historical investigations, was led to the English constitution, and thus earned for himself the lasting merit of having transplanted the main traits of English constitutional monarchy to the continent of Europe, of having made it familiarly known there, and of having endeared it to the nations of the continent. — At the same time there arose in Germany a kindred historical tendency. Justus Henning Böhmer had ener- getically combated the traditional doctrines of . the law of nature concerning the political or state contract, as well as the theological doctrine in reference to the immediately divine origin of kingly authority. These doctrines, he maintained, were contrary to all history. The historia juris proved manifestly, that the foundations of states and the organization of law were human institu- tions gradually developed, and which God had only permitted as he had all other things. – About the middle of the eighteenth century an enlarged intellectual activity in all the exact sci- ences appeared throughout Germany, chiefly in connection with the youthful vigor of the univer- sity of Göttingen (founded 1734). To this activ- ity was added the careful editing and criticism of long-neglected juridical materials, side by side with the Roman law, which hitherto had alone been taken into consideration in the law of na- ture: we mean German law. The activity of the elder Germanists who were at work upon the history of the German empire and German law, 182 | PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. and on the antiquities and amenities of the Ger- man law, recall the life which then stirred in this field, and which prepared the way for the new historical school. At the time, this tendency had certainly no direct influence on the philoso- phy of law. The latter still dragged along the road of the old Wolffian law of nature in a series of numberless compendiums, copied one from another; and when the mighty blow fol- lowed—the criticism of Kant, which Overthrew all such dogmatism—it did not proceed from the pos- itive science of law, Or from historical science, but from the philosophy of the school. The conse- quence was, that the effects which followed were also limited to the philosophy of the school.—Ab- stract philosophy, through pure construction, had, in the science of law also, been carried to absurd- ity. The great systems of subjective idealism, that followed the criticism of Kant, notwithstand- ing many subtle aperçus in detail to be found in Hegel, Fichte anel Schelling, finally turned out to be only ingenuous mental aberrations. On the contrary, the new historical school, from the very outset, was far from seeking the creation of a philosophy of law. Hugo, Savigny, Puchta, Nie- buhr, W. von Humboldt, Eichhorn and Grimm, by an exhaustive investigation into the nature of history, language, myths, and the history of law, obtained a far deeper knowledge of the principles, nature, development and life of the law. After thefall of the great a priori systems, the results of this historical school, although not as yet clothed in the language of a genuine philosophy of law, stepped, as it were, ºpSo jure, into the place of all those exploded theories. In fact, the results of this historical school, and particularly its methods, have become the necessary starting point of all future philosophy of law. The immediate task of that philosophy will still long consist in appro- priating, and shaping into the form and language of philosophy, the results that have been obtained by this historical school. — As regards Kant, it should be remembered that he refuses to reach the absolute by the “theoretic reason,” or by the cognitive faculty; but, in the field of practical reason, he assumes God as a postulate, through which he and all his followers derived religion from ethics in the same way that ethics were in the middle ages derived from religion. After the manner, and partly in the very language, of his predecessors, from Thomasius to Wolff, Kant finds the distinction between legal and moral duties in the external coercive power of the law. This constitutes the epitome of all the norms, under the presupposition of which, the freedom of all individuals is compatible with a com- mon law for all. Kant is certainly profound in basing the rightfulness of legal coercion on the reason of the law; and every one, who himself is endowed with reason, may inwardly, and on that very account also outwardly, be compelled to submit to the coercion of the law. — We need not here enumerate the multitude of dependent disciples of Kant, who for a length of time con- cerned themselves with the law of nature. It must be borne in mind, however, that a juridical mind like Feuerbach’s was at the beginning cap- tivated by Kant’s ideas, which ruled the entire culture of the epoch. Soon, however, he strove to sever law from its identification with the moral law. He maintained the existence of a distinct juridical faculty in man, side by side with the moral faculty; and the idea of freedom, which plays such an important part in the system of Kant's science of law, he deliberately banishes from law into the moral domain, so that he wrongly bases his whole system of penal law on a refined theory of psychological coercion, and punishes crimes above all things according to the measure of their danger. — In Fichte, on the contrary, the preponderance of the practical rea- son transforms all philosophy, and particularly the theory of law, into ethics. Not only religion and morals are identified, but, in the later stage of his philosophy, law becomes a means to the ends of morality. In the compulsory state there prevails only the lower freedom of the law, but in his reason-state the higher freedom of culture, This reason-state, which, as a moral institution, has to realize the virtue of justice, according to Fichte, is practically the hermetically closed com- mercial state, in which, however, as in Plato's ideal republic, all freedom of individual life is lost. In the Hegelian system, by the side of monstrous distortions of juridical or legal ideas, there are to be found several clever ideas, as, for instance, in the penal law. It is well known that in this sys- tem the double-edged principle, “All that is, is rational,” has been misused to support the ex- tremest revolutionary doctrines, and to defend the most corrupt political systems. We must also lay stress On the fact, that all this ingenuous philoso- phy succumbed to the error of its methods; the a. priori construction of all reality from “pure” ideas, with the apparent neglect of all experience, and of the sciences based on experience. At the very time that the Hegelian philosophy of law, re- ligion and history, and Schelling's philosophy Of nature, marked the failure of these bold a prior constructions, the above-named founders. of the historical school had obtained important results, through more diligent and thoughtful detailed investigations in the field of law, tra- dition, religion, language and all the intellectual Sciences. These results have since become last- ing achievements, not only of the historical and positive, but also of the philosophical, treatment of these Sciences. – Before we pass to the exposi- tion of the principles of the historical school, and try to apply them to philosophy, we must at least mention certain groups, that are equally distant from the great idealistic systems, and from the historical tendency, but still in many respects related to both, though more closely con- nected with the current of political and social thought. The spirit of restoration and reaction in the state and the church, which, after the over- throw of the French revolution, ruled, in Napo- PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 183 leon, the whole European continent, called forth in Germany a series of phenomena, which collect- ively may be described as the romanticism of the philosophy of law. These phenomena are closely connected with the romantic tendency in art and culture, and borrowed many of their weapons from the conservative side of the idealistic sys- tems, as well as from the historical school. — In this manner Karl L. von Haller, with stubborn logical methods, would restore the whole medi- aval idea of the state; that is, he denies that the idea of constitutional law is different from that of private law. The state is, according to him, noth- ing but a great landed domain; the king is the pro- prietor of this domain; the citizens are his servants or tenants; the taxes are rents; and war is but the private feud of the lord of the land. In this pat- rimonial state there naturally exist no rights be- longing to the citizen. With Fr. Schlegel and A dam Müller this state romanticism inclined toward the church. In Steffens and Baader this same tendency was closely connected with the ideal mysticism of Schelling. — This school closes its preliminary stage of development with the philos- ophy of law of Julius Stahl. This philosophy appeared with greater pretensions, and displayed more correct dialectics and subtler methods of demonstration. By leaning toward the historical school, it somewhat disguises its real purpose, but like Haller's restoration, it was really nothing but a return to the middle age, a relapse into the theo- logical doctrine of the state taught by Pufendorf and Thomasius; his doctrine of the state begins as Orthodox theology. — Socialism forms an ex- treme contrast to this German romanticism of the state. At a much earlier period it had been accli- matized in France; but it grew most luxuriantly during the period of the restoration.—Even before the time of the encyclopædists, Morelli had called private property the source of all evil. Accord- ing to him, the earth, given undivided to man, should remain undivided. Labor should be dis- tributed among men according to their strength and capacity, and the product of that labor accord- ing to the wants of each, the surplus sold, and what was obtained for it divided equally among all. — But to maintain this state of things, legisla- tion was, as a matter of course, needed; a legisla- tion which, as in the case of Lycurgus, Plato and Fichte, would destroy all liberty. The right to la- hor was then recognized by the views which at that time prevailed, and ruled in all France, the views of the physiocrates, Mirabeau, Quesnay, Gour- nay, and even of the moderate Turgot. During and after the revolution, these ideas reappeared, with stormy energy, in Babeuf, Darthé, Marechal, Buonarotti, Saint Simon, Bazard, Fourier, Cabet, and Proudhon. In Le Maistre and Lammenais they were associated with the ecclesiastical, relig- ious romanticism of the state. The former re- garded the papacy as the highest international tribunal, while the latter, with a generous but very unstatesmanlike enthusiasm, dreamt of the re-es- tablishment of the state on the basis of the early Christian community. We may also mention briefly other chief tendencies of the doctrines of the state in France, which yet are not originally French. The old liberals and old constitutional- ists (Constant, Guizot, etc.,) as Montesquieu had Once done, inclined toward the English constitu- tion. Others yet sought to introduce and nat- uralize in France the methods and results of Ger- man philosophy, particularly of the great ideal- istic systems (as Cousin), partly in order to com- bat materialism, which, together with the eager pursuit of the natural sciences, seems to pre- ponderate in modern French culture. — We are not as yet able to pass judgment, from an his- torical point of view, on the multitudinous tend- encies of the German philosophy of law since Hegel’s time, tendencies which are still in full Course of growth, and greatly at variance among themselves. Nevertheless, any philosophy of law that wishes to raise itself to the actual level of the science of law, can not henceforth aſſord to ignore the methods or the fundamental princi- ples of the historical school referred to above. — 3. Chief Features of the System. The main result of the above-mentioned development, as it is represented in the new historical school of legal science on the continent of Europe, and of phil- osophy, relates, in the first place, to the methods, and then to a few, of the chief features, of the matter of the philosophy of law. As in all the departments of philosophy, so also in this, it has become evident that “pure speculation,” which pretended to construct phenomena a priori, with- out the aid of historical experience, never existed. The task of the philosophy of law is not to eyolve the phenomena of the idea of law, as it were, prophetically out of that philosophy; but, by the aid of the inseparable forms of synthetic and analytic thought, to investigate the principles of law, after a careful historical and experimental study of the matter of law itself. A correct knowledge of law, especially of the history of the law of different nations and the comparative history of law, must henceforth be the basis of all philosophy of law; but that knowledge cer- tainly will not supplant the law, as is supposed by the one-sided adherents of positivism and of the historical school. — We find the realization of the idea of law in all its multitudinous forms of manifestation, by way of experience, in history. The first task of the philosophy of law is to in- vestigate the cause of this phenomenon, and to ask: What is properly the fundamental idea that distinguishes this from other kindred phenomena? and how is it connected with these latter phe- nomena? We must further inquire: Since, where- ever men live in society, at least some traces of a juridical organization are to be found; since law, no less so than language, religion, morals Or art, seems to be a necessary attribute of human na- ture: wherein lies the necessity of the idea of justice for mankind? — Let us start with an approximative description of law, which does not pretend to be a definition. We may describe 184 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. law provisionally as the sum total of general reg- ulations, under which particular cases may be subsumed with a certain degree of necessity. — This at once reminds us of the fundamental quality of all human thought in itself. All our thinking, as it moves within the logical forms of judgment, notion and deduction, and in de- duction in the form of major premise, minor premise and conclusion, is really but the sub- sumption of particulars under the head of a higher generality. Human speech, with which our thinking is indissolubly connected, and which is the essential form of our thinking, has its es- sence in the construction of unities from multitu- dinous phenomena of the same kind. All speaking and thinking is, accordingly, a seeking for gen- eralities, for unity instead of multiplicity. The deduction, the syllogism, is, even more manifestly than the judgment, a subsuming of a particular under a general. — And all our research, within the domain of mind and of nature, is nothing but a seeking for unity, generality, necessity, in place of the apparent multiplicity, particularity or acci- dentality of the phenomena. In the domain of nature we are not satisfied with the sight of the innumerable particular phenomena presented by falling bodies; we seek for unity, generality, ne- cessity, in all these instances; that is, we seek for their “law,” and speak of the law of gravity. In the department of mind, we are not satisfied with the impressions made by certain natural phe- nomena or human works upon Our imagination. We try to discover why all these like phenomena produce the like impression that we call “beauty’; that is, we seek for the law of beauty. All human research is, therefore, a search for laws; that is, a search for a generality which has the character of unity, and under which particular phenomena are necessarily subsumed. When we have discovered a law in this sense, our thinking is at once satis- fied, but not before. For the law of our thinking itself (the general, uniform, necessary essence of all our thoughts) consists precisely in seeking for laws, or for a necessary generality. Thus, the natural Sciences seek for “laws of nature,” and the mental Sciences for “laws of mind.” Man has divided the multitude of phenomena into two large hemispheres, according to the standard of their immediate, sensuous perceptibility, mind and nature. But the human mind not only wishes a law for each of these halves, it not only aspires after one law of nature appearing in all the laws of mind; but it also asks for unity above and within this duality. As the human mind em- braces all that is conceivable, the world of nature and that of mind, in the idea of the universe, it rises to the idea of and the demand for an absolute law, a world-law of unity and necessity in the universe. — In this manner, having recognized that law also is general regulation, under which particulars may be subsumed with necessity, we can understand the inner connection of the idea of law with the whole intellectual life of man, and its inner ideal necessity for man. To prove this and bring it out into relief, is an important task of the philosophy of law. We have seen how, since the days of Plato, through the age of scholasticism, and of the teachers of the law of nature, down to our modern socialists, law and the state have almost always been conceived, as the result of external compulsion, as a mutual assur- ance of life and property against murderers and robbers. It can not be denied, that this external compulsion exists; but it does not exist alone. Men are led not only by external motives to law and the state; an ideal necessity impels them to regulate their social life, its manifold relations and phenomena, according to a uniform, general rule, necessarily demanded by reason; that is, according to a law. — The natural and intellectual constitution of man teaches us that he is intended for Society, for living together with his equals. Natural instinct compels the two sexes of the human species to come together, not temporarily, like other creatures. The helplessness of man during infancy necessitates a permanent associa- tion of father and mother, and the human family is specifically different from that of other animals, just as human speech, which also presupposes a lasting community among men, is different from the inarticulate sounds of other animals. Man can not even exist, still less develop his native faculties, without utilizing in his service a num- ber of natural objects, things and goods, to a far greater extent than all other animals. He needs not only food and shelter; clothing, weapons and tools of every kind are indispensable to his existence. But, since he lives and must live, in common, in marriage, in the family, the clan, the Commune, etc., and as each man has an equal need of everything, conflicts concerning the out- ward relations of individuals to things or goods are unavoidable. There can be no doubt that it was the external necessity of preventing or quickly terminating conflicts of this kind, which consti- tuted the real external compulsion that urged man to create law and the state; but it is a radical error to derive these institutions exclusively from that external compulsion. Human society demands a peace institution or peace order, but it is not satisfied with one that merely insures order. It requires a rational order of the peace. In this lies the ideal, intrinsic root of the law. Man does not wish the law, as external com- pulsion, as a purely arbitrary, compulsory ordi- nance or order. In this, as in every other domain man possesses the faculty, and feels the want, of seeking and finding the one general and uni- form order which presides over the variety of phenomena, and which appears to him rationally necessary. The law of every people is the effort of a human community to find a rational peace order. Such laws embrace the cardinal principles, which, according to the ideas of each people, should regulate the acquisition of wealth, its exchange, the loss of goods or claims, the punish- ments for the unlawful violation of these same laws, and the proofs of such violation; or, in other PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 185 words, everything which conditions social life, based on common interests. If this order of peace is violated, the offended person feels, that not only his individual interest has been violated, but also the general reason, under the protection of which his right is placed. And, since those who are entitled to the same rights regard the violation of the right of an individual as a violation of the order of peace or of the peace regulation, which, in the common conviction of all, is alone able to render life in Society possible in a rational way, all feel, as does the offended individual him- self, the necessity of restitution, and, according to circumstances, of satisfaction. As a result of these considerations we have the following defi- nition : Law is the rational ordering of the peace of a human community in what concerns the easternal relations of the members thereof to one another and to things. – Law is the rational order- ing of a human community. This characterizes it as a work of the human reason, and precludes its derivation from supernatural revelation. We say law is the ordering of a human community, but not of the human community; in other words, there is no law of nature, no abstract, model law, equally applicable to all times and to all peoples. The idea of law is certainly common to all nations and to all humanity. But, just as there is no abstract universal art, there is no abstract absolute law. The universal human idea of law appears only in the totality and in the succession of the laws of separate nations, in the same way that humanity is not a dead abstraction, above those communities of men called nations, but ap- pears in the totality of nations. The difference of national characters appears in the difference of the laws, precisely as it does in the difference of the arts, languages and religions of the different nations. The law of every nation is the outcome of its natural and historical antecedents, and of those antecedents which accorded with its na- tional character. It should be in harmony with the national character and the actual condition of the civilization of the country. It grows, at first, unconsciously, spontaneously, necessarily, as a custom. Originally, a nation no more made its laws than its language. — It has been objected to this conception of law of the historical school, that it leads to complete quietism. For it is said, if the law of a nation necessarily grows out of its aggregate character, individuals can do nothing but let it grow, and there can be no such thing as progress or learning. But the objection does not hold. So far as it applies at all, it is no objection; and so far as it is an objection, it does not apply. At all events, evenin immediate stages of culture, the law, on the whole, is changed rather uncon- Sciously than with a conscious intention. But if in a nation thought advances with culture and the Complexity of its life, it naturally, also, affects the matter of the nation's law; it then consciously seeks to change and to improve that law, as it seeks change and improvement in every other sphere. As the law is always the mirror of the condition of a nation, if a nation far advanced in culture did not reflect upon its law, it would be as unnatural as if the “thing” men of the primi- tive forests of Germany had come to their judg- ments and decrees by means of the philosophy of law. —This also disposes of the objection that, according to the historical conception of law, the learning of nations from each other, and their prog- ress, are impossible. There have been dreamers, who, without any very profound knowledge of history or of human nature, have gratuitously supposed that the history of the world would constantly progress in a straight line; that, at some distant day, a universal law of humanity would supplant all the special laws of the different na- tions; and that this is to be the ultimate end of the world’s history. But this will never happen. It is as impossible as the existence at any time in the future of an abstract humanity without na- tional differences, or as that there should exist a universal language of humanity. That comfort- less condition of absolute uniformity is excluded by differences in race, climate, soil, etc., which can never be entirely effaced by any degree of civ- ilization. But our historical conception of law does not exclude the idea, that, in proportion as the civilization, interests, and the common views of nations grow more like one another, their ideas of law will also grow more similar. But even then the similarity of the laws of the different nations would only be the mirror of their altered social conditions. This similarity of laws will probably be reached at a not very distant day, in those departments of law which by their nature belong more to the community of nations than to their separate life. Thus, there already exists an international law extending over the whole of Europe, and even beyond its boundaries; and it is not improbable that the most civilized nations will shortly agree in their views in regard to the laws relating to commerce, bills of exchange, copyright, the post, railways, etc. Yet this can scarcely happen as to laws relating to the family, and to real property, to say nothing of the fact that among many nations (as mountain and Sea- coast peoples) many departments of law will either necessarily exist, or necessarily be wanting. And so nations may learn law as well as art from one another. In so far as wherever men live together there are certain legal relations (those created by contract, for instance), which must be judged by a logic inherent in these relations, a less developed nation, possessing a younger civilization, may very well adopt the truths which have been dis- covered by another nation with a more ancient civilization. The most important instance of this phenomenon is the acceptance of the Roman law in Germany. As the Germans had received the whole of Graeco-Roman culture, it was very nat- ural that they should also adopt the Roman law —that most important of all the elements of Roman culture; and thus far that acceptance has proved wholesome and instructive. But it was unnatural that that bit of ancient civilization 186 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. should be received by Germany in a way different from the rest, or absolutely; that is, not trans- ferred into German views because capable of being assimilated with those views, but simply because and as it was written in the corpus juris. This unnatural process was only possible under the in- fluence of the idea that the German empire was but a continuation of imperial Rome. This intru- sion of Roman law met with obstinate popular re- sistance, and we are convinced that all the elements of Roman law which have not been assimilated will speedily again be rejected. — As our defini- tion excludes the law of nature, and an illusory universal human law in the future, it also deter- mines the warmly contested relation of law to the state. It is self-evident that the human commu- nity, the peace of which the law orders or regu- lates in a rational manner, according to the views of such community, is uniformly the state. The real, normal boundaries within which the devel- oped life of the law regularly moves, is the circle of the state. But although the perfect life of the law is developed only in the state, attempts and primitive creations of the legal instinct, in laws relating to things, the family, contracts and punish- ments, are to be found, even before the state, in the clan, etc., out of which, the state historically and gradually grows. The peoples of many states may, for definite particular purposes, permanently or temporarily enter into association, and conclude commercial treaties, alliances, international treat- ies of every kind, and reach a kind of ordering of the peace between several kingdoms. But it only shows how clearly the individual state is the nor- mal circle of the community of law, that commun- ities which are smaller or larger than the limits of an individual state, frequently lack the foremost re- quisite of the life of the law; a judge, and coercive power to enforce the sentence. The patriarchal head of the ante-state clan only too often substitutes his own peremptory decree for the sentence of the law; and the lack of a tribunal, as a constantly reliable executive power, constitutes the weak side of the law as soon as it extends its circle Over several states. International law has hitherto in vain sought for a tribunal, which, in case of a vio- lation of the law, might, in a reliable manner, en- force the fulfillment of treaties. – Since the law regulates only the external relations of men to each other, and not the internal relations of men to God or to their fellow-men, it follows that the law should not invade the domain of religion or morals; but it follows, also, that religion and morals should not encroach on the domain of the law and of the State. Law and the state are their own proper ends, just as religion and morals are. They are independent realizations of ideas which are as essential to human reason as religion and morals. For this reason, since they all are but different phenomena and tendencies of one sole power, there exists in principle no opposition or contradiction between them, but only complete harmony. Only in appearance can conflicts arise between them, as when either the state chooses to dictate articles of faith, which is necessarily free, or when the church prescribes a definite form of faith as a condition precedent to the enjoyment of civil rights. In all these domains of the free inner life of man, in religion, science and art, the state has only a right to command or prohibit, when religion, Science, etc., by some external manifes- tation, effect a disturbance of the peaceful order of the state; when, for instance, a sect refuses. military service, or excites its members to the ex- termination of the adherents of Creeds other than its own. Whenever these invisible forces pro- duce visible phenomena, they at once enter the domain of law, and give the law occasion, in their own interest even, to create new forms and pro- mulgate regulations. Thus, even the most spirit- ual things, as the thought of the artist or author, as Soon as they enter the circle of outward interests, require legal regulation (copyright). The whole law as regards religion may be summed up thus: the state by no means assumes an indifferent at- titude toward religion, but should allow complete religious freedom, in the sense that the state should not interfere with the existence of any religion not dangerous to morals or to the state; but, on the other hand, the state should not con- cede an influence on civil rights to any religious Creed. — In like manner, morals and law are neither hostile nor indifferent to each other, but they are independent each of the other. When the law draws within its domain certain duties, the per- formance of which should be dictated entirely by the heart, as, for instance, gratitude, as did the Athenian law of old, it becomes guilty of an unwar- rantable trespass, which can be productive of no good either from a legal or moral point of view. When, on the other hand, the canon law and me- diaeval secular law punished purely moral trans- gressions with external and even political penalties, they were guilty of a similar offense. — Although in principle there does not exist any opposition between morals and law, still, as history teaches, such an opposition may easily exist in appearance. When, mainly because of a diseased condition, a nation obstinately desires to retain and keep up forms and regulations perfectly suited to a past epoch, but which no longer answer to the needs of advanced progress, or to the new conditions of the nation; which are kept up, perhaps, because a fraction of the nation by so doing satisfies a selfish interest, although the national life requires a change of the old forms: in all such instances there occurs a conflict between formal but anti- quated law, and living, moral forces, which have not yet become law. Instances of this, well known to all, were the conflicts between the patricians and plebeians in Rome, of the noble families and the guilds in the cities of the middle ages, during the French revolution, etc. In the greater number of such cases the champions of formal law believe themselves to be morally justi- fied in their opinions. Not only selfish interests, but boma fide convictions, are frequently brought face to face with each other. The obduracy of PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 187 the one and the heedless passion of the other reach a climax, when the strain becomes unendurable, and a violent change follows. In such a case the right of revolution, the jus revolutionis, in a jurid- ical sense, has been appealed to. But this is not admissible; for no state can admit a juridical right to a violent breach of formal law, with- out self-abrogation. Here we must carefully dis- tinguish between law and morals. No careful student of law and history will deny to a people the moral right of self-defense against the pressure of obsolete formal law which has become un- endurable. The law should be a rational regula- tion or ordering of the peace. If it is an irrational Ordering or regulation, if its pressure becomes unendurable, and if a redress in a legal way be- comes impossible, it would be the height of folly to demand that the people should perish, in order to keep merely formal law in existence. On the contrary, in such, case the people have anthority morally to resort even to forcible self-defense, and the champions of obsolete law would here act immorally, or, at least, irrationally. But, in truth, every revolution is and must remain a breach of formal law, although morally we may regard it as entirely justified. A breach of the law under all circumstances is a catastrophe, threatening to the existence of the state, or temporarily even sus- pending its existence; for we must guard against the dangerous principle, that exclusively formal law is juridically law no longer. That principle conflicts with the essence of all law, and makes the existence of the state dependent on the whims of any discontented party. The moral justification of revolution also is a dangerous theory; but, at the same time, it is the incontestable teaching of philosophy and of history. That teaching pre- supposes that, objectively, there exists a case in which self-help is unavoidable, that the pressure of formal law has become unbearable, and that a peaceful settlement has become impossible. If these conditions be assumed inconsiderately to exist, then not with the correct theory, but with the incorrect application of the theory in practice, must the moral-political responsibility rest. — We shall now briefly touch on one of the most important questions regarding the nature and character of the state. It was in keeping with the entire Kantian conception of morals, law and the state, that it considered the latter merely as a great institution for the enforcement of the law. The state, according to that conception, estab- lished courts, and, if necessary, carried out their judgments by force. This mere Rechtsstaat (con- stitutional state), by the political movements in Germany, which began under the influence of the critical philosophy, was used as a party shibboleth in a two-fold sense, in that country. The Rechts- Staat in Germany was the modern state, as it, in connection with the English and still more with the French revolution, contrasted with the mediae- Val feudal and patrimonial state. The modern state, with its ideas of citizenship, the separation of the powers, checks and balances, popular repre- Sentation, political rights of freedom, security of the person and of property, freedom of conscience and of the press; with its independence of the courts of law—this modern state was em- phatically called the Rechtsstaat, and formed a Contrast to the negation or diminution of these ideas in the state. But, in the second place, as a contrast to Polizeistaat (police state) German radicalism required also a pure Rechtsstaat in another sense. It maintained that the undue tutelage and excessive supervision which the bu- reaucratic state introduced into all human con- cerns, was really no part of the task of the state; and Kant's authority was appealed to to prove that the State was but an institution in the nature of a court of justice. Hitherto, in fact, the interfer- ence of the state in the activity of society, of economy, trade, industry and culture, had been disastrous instead of profitable. And so all right of interference of the state in these several depart- ments was denied. — It need not be said that the philosophy of law looks upon the modern state as a Rechtsstaat only in the first of these senses, and as Opposed to the feudal state. In the second sense of the term, however, the philosophy of law can not sanction the mere Rechtsstaat. It assigns to the state other tasks besides dealing out justice in civil and Criminal cases. The abuses of the administration should not lead to the rejection of all administration. The task of the state is to realize the idea of legal right, the idea of law; but law is the regulation or ordering of the peace in all that concerns all the external relations of men to each other, and to things. But this order- ing of the peace is in no manner confined to the field of civil and criminal law, or the law relating to private and public rights. Wherever men enter into external relations to each other, and to things, a rational ordering or regulation is needed, which must aim not only at the preservation of the actual state of things, but progress and constant improvement. An ordering which aims only at preserving and protecting, and not at developing and improving, can not be called a rational or- dering. —Law is an idea essential to the human mind. It can not be supplanted by another any more than religion can be by art. That idea neces- sarily requires an external manifestation and a power in which to embody itself. That power is the state. —LITERATURE. The old founders and teachers of the law of nature contain comparisons of older views and of contemporaneous polemical writings; in other words, they afford us the first materials for a history of the philosophy of law. Thus, we have the Prolegomena of Hugo Gro- tius, and the Specimen Controversiarum of Pufen- dorf. At the close of the seventeenth century we meet with special works on the history of the law of nature, historia, juris maturae, by Buddeus, 1695; Ludovici, 1701, 1714; Thomasius, 1719. We may mention: Schmauss, Neues System des Rechts der Natur, Göttingen, 1754; Ompteda, Literatur des matürlichen und positiven Völkerrechts, 1785; Hen- rici, Ideen 270' wissenschaftlichen. Begründung der 188 PHYSIOCRATES. Rechtslehre, Hanover, 1810; Welcker, Die letzten Gründe von Recht, Staat und Strafe, Giessen, 1813; Fr. von Raumer, Geschächtliche Entwickelung der Begrifoe von Recht, Staat und Politik, Leipzig, 1826, 1832; Stahl, Rechtsphilosophie, Heidelberg, 1829, 1847; Warnkönig, Rechtsphilosophie, Frei- burg, 1839, 1854; Schmitthenner, Zwölf Bücher wom, Staat, Giessen, 1839; Rossbach, Die Peri- oden der Rechtsphilosophie, Regensburg, 1842; Die Grundrichtungen in der Geschichte der Staatswis- senschaft, Erlangen, 1848; Lentz, Entwurf einer Geschächte der Rechtsphilosophie, Danzig, 1846; Ahrens, Philosophie des Rechts und Staats, 4th ed., Vienna, 1850, 1852; Hinrichs, Politische Vorlesun- gen, 1842, Geschächte der Rechts- und Staatsprincº- pien Seit dem. Zeitalter der Réformation, Leipzig, 1849, 1852; Bluntschli, Allgemeines Staatsrecht, geschächtlich begründet, 3d ed., Munich, 1863; Dahlmann, Die Politik aef dem. Grund und das Mass der gegebenen Verhältnisse 27trückgeführt, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1847; Schilling, Lehrbuch des Nat- ſurrechts, oder die philosophische Rechtswissenschaft, Leipzig, 1858; Hildebrand, Geschächte und System der Rechts-und Staatswissenschaft, 1 vol., Das class- Zsche Alterthum, Leipzig, 1860; Röder, Grund- 2üge des Naturrechts, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1860; La Salle, Das System der erworbenen. Rechte, Ene Wersöhnung des positiven Rechts und der Rechts- philosophie, Leipzig, 1860; Thilo, Die Theologist- 'rende Rechts- und Staatslehre, Leipzig, 1851; Tren- delenburg, Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik, Leipzig, 1860. Compare POLITICS, NATURE AND CHARACTER OF, and POLITICS, SCIENCE OF. FELIX DAHN. PHYSIOCRATES. I. Physiocrates and Econ- omists. Those French economists who rallied to the defense and advocacy of the doctrine of Quesnay, and who constituted one of the most brilliant groups of thinkers in the eighteenth cen- tury, are now called physiocrates, a word derived from physiocratie, the general title given, in 1768, to the first volume of Quesnay's collected works, published by his disciple, Dupont de Nemours. Quesnay and his friends understood by physi- ocracy (from q21%615, nature, and 2¢pareiv, to ºrule), the natural constitution, the natural order, of human Society.—Dupont thought (correctly in some respects) that Quesnay had pointed out this nature of things, and he called the aggregate of his views physiocracy. The expression, however, was not generally adopted. The term physiocrates, derived from it, is of comparatively recent use. J. B. Say first employed it in his Cours Complet, published in 1829, and it appears to have been popularized by the illustrious Rossi, and the edi- tors of the Collection, des Principawa, Economistes, who have grouped together the most remarkable writings published by this celebrated school in the second volume of their collection, under the title “Physiocrates.” In 1847, one year later, the French “Academy of Moral Sciences” used the term in the programme for a prize essay, formulated as follows, in accordance with Rossi's proposition, “to investigate what the influence of the School of physiocrates has been on the advance and development of economic science, as well as on the administration of states in the matter of finance, manufactures and commerce.” — Until the expression physiocrates was adopted, the dis- ciples of Quesnay were designated by periphrases, or by the term economists, which was always under- lined in manuscript, or printed in italics, so as not to confound the economists, disciples of the doctor, with other writers or publicists occupied with economic questions; and we can not do better here than to reproduce a few lines from a pro- duction which we published in vol. xxxiii. of the Journal des Economistes: “Smith said (in speaking of the disciples of Quesnay, book iv., chap. ix.), ‘A few years ago they formed [Smith published his book in 1776] a considerable sect, distinguished in the republic of letters in France by the name economists.' J. B. Say continued to designate them ‘the sect of economists’ in the second edi- tion of his Thraité, published in 1814, which greatly displeased Dupont de Nemours, who, in a letter dated April 22, 1815, wrote him as fol- lows: ‘You do not speak of the economists with- out applying to them the odious name of Sect, which supposes a mixture of stupidity, folly and stubbornness. This insult from a Grimm would not be offensive; but the expressions of a Say have a different weight.” In a preceding letter, full of animation and good nature, the aged dis- ciple of Quesnay said to the continuer and future emulator of Adam Smith, ‘You are an economist, my dear Say; I shall take good care not to ex- communicate you. On your part,' etc.” — J. B. Say, we thus see, although the author of a treatise on political economy, still at that period qualified the physiocrates as economists. The same obser- vation may be made in reading the first work of Sismondi, who, in entitling his book, De la rich- esse commerciale, ou Mouveaua, principes d'économie politique, underlined the word economists, and applied it only to the disciples of Quesnay. He said (vol. i., p. 5), “Dr. Quesnay and Turgot founded the sect of economists about 1760.” (This is not altogether accurate, as we shall see.) This repulsion for the name, which Sismondi and J. B. Say exhibited in their first writings, was, till a comparatively recent date, the feeling of those who concerned themselves with political economy, for they called themselves political economists (see Say's Cours Complet), or they even avoided giving themselves a name, since, on the One hand, the qualification political annoyed them, by caus- ing mistakes and inspiring distrust, and because they feared that the name economists alone would cause them to be confounded with the adherents of Quesnay. Nevertheless, the disciples of Fourier and Saint Simon popularized this expression by using it to designate the partisans of economic or liberal ideas, and Fourier had even invented the word economism, the better to express his con- tempt for this science of the civilized (civilisés)! On the other hand, the publication in France of PHYSIOCRATES. 189 the Journal des Econom?stes, and of the Collection des Principawa, Economistes, and in England of the weekly journal “The Economist,” have made the expression familiar, which is no longer the special designation of the adherents of the sect of Ques- may or the partisans of an exclusive system, but the general designation of all who concern themselves scientifically with economic questions. The fifth edition of the dictionary of the French academy, 1814, does not contain the word áconomiste. It is only the sixth edition, published in 1835, which gave it final sanction with its true meaning, saying: “Economist, one specially occupied with political economy.”—It is a remarkable fact that economists received this appellation before their science was named, and that this word was taken, not from political economy, but from the adjective economic, itself derived from economy, which often dropped from the pens of writers during the middle of the last century, in consequence of all intellectual movement which led men to philosophic questions of this order — a movement that called forth a large number of writings, and caused the estab- lishment, in 1754, of a chair of mechanics and com- merce at the university of Naples, for the cele- brated abbé Genovesi, who was professor in that institution of what he soon called civil economy and a chair of cameralistic Sciences at the Palatine school of Milan, where the no less illustrious Bec- caria was professor of public economy. As early as the Second quarter of the same century, from 1729 to 1747, Hutcheson, the father of Scotch phi- losophy, inserted in his course of moral philosophy Some lectures on economics. “These lectures,” as Cousin observes, in his Cours de l’histoire de la philosophie moderne, “were of no great value in themselves; but it is to this part of Hutcheson's course, perhaps, that Europe is indebted for Adam Smith, the greatest economist of the eighteenth century.” — II. Composition of the School. Du- pont de Nemours speaks as follows of the origin of this school, in a note to his edition of the works of Turgot. “The French economists, who founded the modern Science of political economy, had as forerunners the duke of Sully, who said, ‘Til- lage and pasturage are the breasts of the state’; the marguis d’Argenson, author of the excellent maxim, “Do not govern too much '; and the elder Trudaine, who in practice opposed courageously the prejudices of ministers and the preconceived opin- ions of his colleagues, the other counselors of state, with that useful maxim. The English and the Dutch had a glimpse of a few truths, which were only faint glimmerings in a night of gloom. The Spirit of monopoly arrested the advance of their enlightenment. In other countries, if we except the three notable men whom we have just named, no one had. even imagined that governments should pay attention to agriculture in any way, or to commerce except to impose on it arbitrary regulations suggested by the moment, or to sub- ject its Operations to taxes, duties and tolls. The Science of public administration, pertaining to these interesting labors, did not yet exist. It was not even suspected that they could be the object of a science. The great Montesquieu had looked at them so superficially that in his immortal work there is a chapter entitled : ‘To what nations it is disadvantageous to engage in commerce.’ — Toward 1750 two men of genius, profound and acute observers, led on by the force of a long sus- tained attention and severe logic, animated by a noble love of country and humanity, Quesnay and de Gournay, labored persistently to ascertain whether the nature of things did not point to a Science of political economy, and what were the prin- ciples of this science; they approached it from different sides, arrived at the same results, and, meeting, congratulated each other, applauded each other, when they saw with what exactness their different but equally true principles led to con- sequences absolutely similar; a phenomenon al- ways repeated when men are not in error; for there is but onc nature which embraces all things, and no one truth can contradict another. While they lived they continued to be, and their disci- ples have never ceased to be, entirely at one as to the means of advancing agriculture, commerce and finances, of increasing the happiness, the pop- ulation, the wealth, and the political importance of nations.” — De Gournay, Son of a merchant, many years a merchant himself, had recognized that manufactures and commerce can only flourish through freedom and competition, which destroy the taste for haphazard undertakings, and lead to reasonable speculation; which prevent monopo- lies, and limit the private gains of merchants to the good of commerce; which quicken industry, simplify machinery, decrease oppressive rates for transportation and storage, and which lower the rate of interest. From this he concludes that commerce should never be taxed or regulated. . From this he drew the following axiom: Laissez faire, laissez passer. Quesnay, born on a farm, the son of a landowner who was a skillful agri- culturist, and of a mother whose great intellect- ual powers aided her husband’s administration to perfection, turned his attention more especially to agriculture; and seeking to find the source of the wealth of nations, he discovered that wealth is the offspring of those labors in which nature and the divine power second the efforts of man to bring forth or collect new products; so that we can expect the increase of this wealth only from agriculture, fisheries (he held the chase of small account in civilized societies), and the working of mines and quarries. – “The two as- pects under which Quesnay and de Gournay had considered the principles of public administration, and from which they inferred precisely the same theory, formed, if we may say So, two Schools, fraternal none the less, which have had for each other no feeling of jealousy, and which have re- ciprocally enlightened each other. From the school of de Gournay came de Malesherbes, the abbé Morellet, Herbert, Trudaine de Montigny, d’Invan, Cardinal de Boisgelin, de Cicé, arch- bishop of Aix, d’Angeul, Dr. Price, Dean Tucker, 19() PHYSIOCRATES. and some others. The principal members of the school of Quesnay were Mirabeau, author of l'Ami des hommes, Abeille, de Fourqueux, Bertin, Dupont de Nemours, Count Chreptowicz, chan- cellor of Lithuania, the abbé Roubaud, Le Trosne, Saint-Péravy, de Vauvilliers; and, of a higher rank, the margrave, afterward grand duke of Baden, and the archduke Leopold, since emperor, who governed Tuscany so long and so success- fully, le Mercier de La Rivière, and the abbé Baudeau. The two latter constituted a separate branch of de Quesnay's school. Thinking that it would be easier to persuade a prince than a nation, that freedom of trade and labor as well as the true principles of taxation would be intro- duced sooner by the authority of sovereigns than by the progress of reason, they perhaps favored absolute power too much. They thought that this power would be sufficiently regulated and counterbalanced by general enlightenment. To this branch belonged the emperor Joseph II. Be- tween both of these schools, profiting from both, but avoiding carefully the appearance of adhering to either of them, there appeared certain eclectic philosophers, at the head of whom we must place Turgot and the celebrated Adam Smith, and among whom are deserving of very honorable mention the French translator of Adam Smith, Germain Garnier; and in England, Lord Lans- downe; in Paris, Say; at Geneva, Simonde.” — This extract from Dupont de Nemours makes some observations necessary. To begin with, as Dupont wrote in 1808, in commencing the publi- cation of the works of Turgot, it is plain that the other celebrated economists of that century are not mentioned. J. B. Say was not yet a pro- fessor; he had only published the first edition of his Traité (1803), and his fame was not then great. Sismondi, also, was only at the beginning of his career and reputation; Malthus, Ricardo, Mill, etc., had not written, and the men who were to bear the greatest names in contemporary political economy were still either in their childhood or youth. It is also to be remarked that Dupont does not assign his real place to Adam Smith, who, whatever be the idea formed of the aid which he may have received from the school of the physiocrates, is assuredly something very different from an eclectic writer utilizing the ideas of de Gournay and Quesnay. — As to the two schools founded by these two eminent men, we must not take literally what Dupont de Nemours writes. Vincent de Gournay died early, about the middle of 1759, at the age of 47, when Quesnay had scarcely (about the end of 1758) published his doc- trines in a precise manner, in the celebrated Tab- leau Economique, printed in the castle of Ver- sailles under the very eyes of the king. Except the translation, with the assistance of Butel Du- mont (1754) of the treatise of Josiah Child on commerce and the interest on money, he had writ- ten nothing but memoirs addressed to ministers, and which remained unpublished. It is only from a notice drawn up shortly after his death, by Tur- got, for Marmontel, with notes by Dupont, that we know the ideas of de Gournay, and if what Turgot has said of them makes us think that there might have been disagreements between the two philosophers, still we are not authorized to declare, since the proofs are wanting, that de Gournay had a system of doctrines, that is to say, the elements, the raw material, for a school. Still, Turgot, in delineating with some detail de Gournay's opin- ions relative to the nature and production of value, says, “de Gournay thought that a work- man who had manufactured a piece of cloth had added real wealth to the aggregate wealth of the state.” Dupont adds, in a note: “This is one of the points in which the doctriné of de Gournay differed from that of Quesnay,” and he gives the reasons for this statement. — Although Dupont does not specify the other points in which de Gournay differed from Quesnay, it follows from this passage that the two philosophers did not always agree. Another important remark is, that the analyses of modern economists have shown that de Gournay was right as to the phenomenon of production. De Gourmay had a clearer insight of the truth, and if he had demonstrated it and deduced the consequences which flow from it, he would, on certain fundamental points, have surely held a different doctrine from that of Quesnay, and carried off the honor which later came to Adam Smith, of rectifying the school of physiocrates; but we all know that in a question of scientific ideas there is a great difference between the cor- rect feeling of the truth and the introduction of this truth into the domain of a science or simply a philosophic system. To judge from our personal impressions, it appears to us doubtful whether de Gournay followed the celebrated doctor in his exclusive theory of agriculture. But it is evident that these two illustrious men met on the funda- mental question of the freedom of labor, and it is probable that they had the same philosophic point of departure. Be this as it may, Dupont is not altogether exact or correctly informed when he seems to say that de Gournay was the first to recognize the legitimateness and fruitfulness of the principle of competition and of the liberty of commerce. Vauban and Boisguillebert, whose writings were published even before de Gournay . was born, give proof of their remarkable efforts in favor of this principle. It was from the pen of Boisguillebert, as Eugene Daire rightly says, that the first pleas appeared in France for the free cir- culation of corn, and he even pointed out sci- entifically, previous to the physiocrates, the excel- lence of agriculture, which is the pivot on which Quesnay's ideas turn. He also wrote on the nat- ure, production and distribution of wealth, as well as upon the function of money, pages which permit us to think that the school of Quesnay has made great use of his labors.-Dupont de Nemours is too exclusive in not having mentioned other writers on economy, as having made contributions to the edifice of the science, such as Josiah Child, who in 1668 published his ‘‘Brief Observations EPHYSIOCRATES. 191 concerning Trade and the Interest of Money”; Locke, who in 1691 wrote some curious “Con- siderations on Money”; Dudley North, who pro- claimed that same year the principle of free trade; Forbonnais, whose Éléments de Com/merce dates as far back as 1734; Melon, whose Essa? politique sur le commerce belongs to the same year; Dutot, whose Réfleaſions politiques sur le commerce et les finances was published in 1738, etc.; and other writers who labored to eluci- date economic doctrines contemporaneously with physiocrates such as Hume, whose “Essays.” on various economic subjects appeared in 1752, earlier than the writings of Quesnay, and who knew how to free himself from the prejudices of the balance of trade; men like the no less celebrated Genovesi, who, beginning with 1754, delivered a scientific course on questions relative to wealth; Werri, who wrote on these matters in 1763; James Stewart, who published at Lon- don, in 1767, four volumes, with the remarkable title “An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy”; Beccaria, who began at Milan, in 1769, lectures on the same subject, entitled “Course of Commercial Sciences”; and other writers, Italian and German, whom it would be too tedious to mention; finally, Adam Smith, who, before pub- lishing his book in 1776, had come to Paris in 1764 to have a discussion with philosophic economists, after he had lectured on moral philosophy for fourteen years in the university of Glasgow, part of his labors being devoted to the subjects devel- oped in his “Essay on the Nature and Causes of the Woalth of Nations.” On the other hand, we must say that not all the persons whom Dupont de Nemours enrolls under the banner of Ques- may followed the doctrine of the master in every point; some held themselves somewhat aloof from the school. Among these was Morellet. On this point we believe it useful to reproduce certain passages concerning the quarrel of the latter with Linguet, so noted for his literary eccentricities, and his declamations against bread, which he treated as poison. Linguet having advanced sev- eral monstrosities, such as the following: that despotic governments are the only ones which render nations happy; that society lives by the "destruction of its liberties, as carnivorous animals live on the timid ones, etc.—Morellet answered him sharply, in a pamphlet, entitled Théorie du paradoaie. Linguet replied by Théorie du libelle, where we read the following details, connected with our subject: “This illustrious pander of science, this invincible champion of the net prod- uct, this venerable archimandrite of the order of brothers of the economic doctrine, has risen above call eulogy by forcing his heart to outrage a pros- trate man, and raising his foot to give him the last kick. If it be asked what the order in ques- tion is, we may answer, in order to spare com- mentators in ages to come a disagreeable task, that it is a new order, founded about 1760, under the name of the Economists Brothers, by Father Qués..., who had a spiritual Son, brother Mirab. ..., who begat brother Baud..., who begat the A. M., which brought forth the Théorie des Paradoaies. The name Economists was given to them about the year 1770; they took the place of the Ency- clopædists, who had succeeded the * * *, who had ousted the * * *, who had come after the Calvinists, and so on, going back farther and far- ther. * * * This order, beginning with 1775, had already produced many great men, such as brother Dup. ..., brother Baud..., brother Roub. . ., broth- er Mor. ..., etc., all mighty in works and words. Hence, they have filled the universe with the noise of their names and their pamphlets or libels, which are synonymous in their language * * *.” Morellet answered: “The author of the Théorie des Paradoves is not an economist. Surely, if the A. M. had been begotten to political economy by the late M. Q., or by some one of the disciples of this estimable man, he would not have denied his origin. The economists are honorable citizens, whose intentions were always upright and their zeal as pure as it was active; men who were the first to teach or render popular many useful truths. They have been reproached with a zeal which has sometimes carried them beyond their object; but it is much better, doubtless, to yield to this impulse, which, after all, can arise in them only from a love of the public good, than to con- tinue in the cowardly indifference to the happi- ness of their fellow-men which is exhibited by so many persons, or to decry those who are interested in it; but be this as it may with the economists, the A. M. is obliged to confess that he never re- ceived any lessons from Dr. Q., nor from M. de M.; and that he busied himself with political economy before Dr. Q. had begotten anybody; that he was never present at any assembly of the disciples; and lastly, since it must be told, that he never understood the economic tableau, nor pretended to make anybody else understand it; a clear pro- fession of faith, and one which puts the author . of the Théorie des Paradoales beyond the reach of all blows which L. aims at the economists, blows from which they can defend themselves, if they think it worth the while.”— Later, the first con- sul, in conversation with Morellet, said to him: “You are an economist, are you not? You are in favor of the impôt unique, are you not? You are also in favor of the freedom of the corn trade, are you not?” “I answered him,” says Morellet (in his Mémoires, chap. xxvii.), “that I was not among the purest of them; and that I added cer- tain modifications to their doctrines.” Morellet had, indeed, early fought for freedom of labor, and freedom of commerce; but he does not seem to have shared the enthusiasm of some authors for the agricultural theory of their master. — III. Economic Philosophy of the Physiocrates. The doctrine of the physiocrates may be considered in relation to philosophy, political economy and politics. The philosophic ideas of the school are scattered through the different works of the chief and his principal disciples; but they are to be found especially in the short treatise of Quesnay 192 PHYSIOCRATES. on natural law, and summed up in his fragments published under the title of Maasimes. In en- deavoring to condense them into a few words, we may imagine Quesnay as saying: The world is governed by immutable physical and moral laws. It is for man, an intelligent and free being, to discover them, and to obey them or to violate them, for his own good or evil. The end assigned to the exercise of his intellectual and physical powers, is the appropriation of matter for the sat- isfaction of his wants, and the improvement of his condition. But he should accomplish this task conformably to the idea of the just, which is the correlative of the idea of the useful. Man forms an idea of justice and utility, both individual and social, through the notions of duty and right which his nature reveals to him, and which teach him that it is contrary to his good and the general welfare to seek his own advantage in the damage done to others. These ideas enter the minds of individuals and peoples in proportion to the in- crease of enlightenment, and the advance of civil- ization: they naturally produce feelings of frater- nity among men, and peace among peoples. – The chief manifestations of justice are liberty and property, that is to say, the right of each one to do that which in no way hurts the general interest, and to use at his pleasure the goods which he pos- sesses, the acquirement of which is conformable to the nature of things and to the general utility, since, without liberty and property, there would have been no civilization, and a very much smaller amount of goods at the disposition of men. Lib- erty and property spring, then, from the nature of man, and are rights so essential that laws or agree- ments among men should be limited to recogniz- ing them, to formulating them, to Sanctioning them. Governments have no mission but to guard these two rights, which, with a correct understanding of things, embrace all the material and moral wants of society. To say that liberty and property are essential rights, is to say that they are in harmony with the general interest of the species; it is to say that with them the land is more fertile, the industry of man in all its mani- festations more productive, and the development of all his moral, intellectual, scientific and artistic aptitudes swifter and surer, in the path of the good, the beautiful, the just and the useful; it is to say, further, that man best gathers the fruit of his own efforts, and that he is not at least a vic- tim of the arbitrary laws of his fellow-men.—“Be- fore Quesnay,” says Eugene Daire, “nothing was vaguer than the idea of the just and the unjust; and the determination of the natural and indefeas- ible rights of man had not been touched by any philosopher. It was tacitly agreed that the ideas of justice, applicable only to individual relations, should remain foreign to civil, public, and espe- cially to international law. Morality, since the principles from which it must be deduced were only dimly perceived, seemed fit only to govern private relations, but not those of the state to its members, or those of one people to another, which, it was supposed, should be necessarily subjected solely to the law of force and cunning. Religion did not understand the economy of society, because it concerned itself only with the future life; and politics did not understand it any better, because it did not suspect the intimate connection of the moral with the physical order of the world. Set- ting out to govern men from the principle of the incompatibility of the useful with the just, it was impossible for the ministers of the one or the other to avoid the most disastrous results even if they had never been guided by any but the purest intentions. Struck with this fact, Quesnay be. came persuaded that the truth lay in the opposite principle, and interrogating the nature of man and the nature of things, he discovered in them the proof that the three great classes of every civilized society, that is to say, landed proprietors, capital. ists and workmen, as well as the various nations into which the human race is divided, have only to lose by violating justice, mutually oppressing and annoying one another. This was to establish social morality, the absence of which produces a false notion of right and wrong in every mind, even in things touching individual relations. It was to free from the clouds of mysticism the great principle of peace and fraternity among men, and set it on the bases most fitted to insure its triumph.”— As Passy remarks in his report on the memoir which we have just cited, these max- ims were not all equally new; and the most general of them were to be met with already in the works of certain writers; the Gospel itself contained many of them. But up to that time they had never been presented in the form of a broad sys- tem, never had there been deduced from them so clearly consequences of social application; which warrants us in saying, with Eugene Daire, that Quesnay was really the first thinker of the eighteenth century who made the organization of society the subject of his meditations; the man who gave to the world the newest doctrine, and at the same time the fittest to exercise a happy influence on the welfare of nations. Mon- tesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau were great minds, beyond a doubt; but Quesnay served the human race most, in having shown that the happiness of the majority depends much less on the mech- anism of governmental forms than on the devel- opment of human industry, and that it is impos- sible to discuss politics rationally without hav- ing previously acquired a knowledge of the econ- omy of society. “Of course wealth had not al- together escaped the attention of thinkers and governments previous to this philosophy,” remarks Eugene Daire again, “but there is this difference, that, while among the first some only saw, so to speak, a necessary evil, it suggested to others nothing beyond systems of artificial distribution, and to governments merely fiscal inventions to plunder their subjects. Quesnay understood that the whole science of social organization may be summed up in that of the regular production and distribution of the goods of this world, that is to PHYSIOCRATES. 193 say, production and distribution effected accord- ing to the unchangeable laws established for the preservation, the indefinite increase, the happiness and the improvement of our species. To investi- gate these laws, by questioning our own nature and its necessary relations with the external world, such is the work which the chief of the school of physiocrates undertakes to accomplish. Instead of following the example of most philosophers, by declaiming against wealth, on which all the affairs of this world turn, he fathomed the laws of wealth, as well as those of human labor. To sum up, Quesnay and the school of physiocrates made a scientific study of the useful, considered men living in society as producers and consumers first of all, and drew the conclusion that the ideas of right, of peace and fraternity among men, do not rest exclusively on the mysterious dogma of a future life, but on the observance of natural laws, which may be obeyed with profit, and are not vio- lated with impunity in this world.”—IV. Political Economy of the Physiocrates. The philosophy of the physiocrates is, therefore, an economic philos- ophy; and while endeavoring to sum it up here we have given in part the general data of their political economy. It only remains for us to add a few technical indications of those of their ideas which belong more especially to the economic order. In doing this we shall limit ourselves to setting forth these ideas, because it would be im- possible, in the limits granted us, to explain with even partial completeness, in what these ideas may appear to us corrector incorrect, and in what points it has been possible for them to be accepted or op- posed by the chief economists. The history of the filiation of economic doctrines, moreover, has not yet been written. — The physiocrates set out with the principle that materiality is the fundamental character of wealth, and from this concluded to measure the value and utility of labor by the quan- tity alone of the raw material which it was able to produce. The first effect of this theory was to ex- clude from the domain of political economy an innumerable multitude of services which men render each other. They formed, therefore, an incomplete idea of the value of things, which pre- vented them from seeing into the phenomenon of production clearly, estimating correctly the posi- tion of land, labor and capital, and rendering an exact account of the relative and absolute utility of all the branches of human industry; agricul- tural industry, manufacturing industry, transpor. tation, commercial industry, and the numerous professions in which men furnish or exchange physical Or intellectual labor, that is to say, Serv- ices. In this way they were led to accord the character of productiveness to agricultural indus- try only, and to treat as sterile the other indus- tries, while they, at the same time, asserted that manufacturing industry, commerce and the liberal professions are essentially useful. Their theory, by being squint-eyed at the first, if we may so express ourselves, led them to consequences which they found it difficult to admit in the discussion 132 VOL. III. - 13 of questions and application of principles, accord- ing as they started from the point of view of the sterility of industries other than agriculture, to which they were obliged to give, both in theory and practice, an exceptional and false position. By virtue of their system, the economists really admitted, as a natural and social necessity, the pre-eminence of landed proprietors over all other classes of citizens. Now, this idea of pre-emi- nence, agreeing with the prejudices of the nobles, has left more than one trace in economic and political laws. – Their error is explicable at the beginning of the science. It was not given to the physiocrates alone to make all analyses, and to grasp with precision all the differences and re- semblances of the various modes of production. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that they combated the mercantile theory, which made wealth to consist only in the precious metals, and which exaggerated the advantages of foreign Com- merce; that they combated also the infatuation for the manufacturing system; that they allowed themselves to react too forcibly against these ex- clusive prejudices, and in turn to become exclusive by their favor for an industry too much ignored, whose excellence they were deeply desirous of demonstrating. — Of Quesnay's works the Tab- léau, Economique attracted most attention. Ques- nay’s object was to describe synoptically the facts relative to the production, distribution, consump- tion and transformation of values. It is difficult to explain the success of this publication, which is itself not very intelligible. Made up of figures strangely disposed, this tableau contributed to throw discredit rather than light on the theory. The explanations of the Marquis Mirabeau ren- dered it still more cabalistic and mysterious; those of the abbé Baudeau and of Le Trosne, though much clearer, were still not clear enough. We have just read the declaration of Morellet on the subject. In reality, the chiefs of the school wished to prove that society had no other revenue than the net product of the soil, all expenses de- ducted, including the maintenance of its cultiva- tors; that consequently it had no greater interests than the increase of this revenue; that the power of the state and the progress of civilization depended on it; that this revenue alone should be taxed; that we must not see in the capital in agriculture, industry and commerce, anything but the sacred eludowment of labor, without which thcro would be neither wealth nor landed proprietors; that the expenses of industry and commerce are merely an outlay which should be reduced to the lowest figure by free competition. — On the subject of territorial revenue and net product, the question arises: what did the school mean exactly by these expressions? and in what were their ideas on these these subjects like or unlike those on rent held by Adam Smith, J. B. Say, Ricardo, Malthus, Rossi, M’Culloch, etc.? This is still a question which does not appear to us to have been clearly settled by those who occupied themselves with the sub- ject. We shall state merely that it was through 194 PHYSIOCRATES. the impossibility of analyzing the economic phe- nomena connected with the subject, that Necker and many others cast ridicule on the ideas which the physiocrates advanced. For our own part, we can not give an opinion on the subject without entering into a long discussion, and we therefore refer to the writings of the authors whom we have just cited, and to the explanations given by Eugene Daire in his memoir, and by Passy in his re- port on this memoir. (See RENT.)— Although the physiocrates did not form an exact idea of the phenomena of production, and consequently of the real nature of value and of exchange of wealth, they had correct notions on the subject of money: to them is due the beginning of the ruin of the mercantile system, and, after Boisguillebert and before Adam Smith, they contributed much to elucidate the principle of the freedom of ex- changes. First, they demonstrated that every obstacle to this freedom is a violation of the fun- damental rights of labor and of property, and, secondly, that every hindrance to exportation and importation causes an artificial change in the value of products, and the revenue of lands, some- times at the expense of producers, sometimes at the expense of consumers, by reducing finally public wealth and taxable property. In the ques- tion of finances they deduced from the produc- tiveness of agricultural industry (which they considered the only productive one), and the hypothesis admitted by themselves, that taxation always falls on the landed proprietors, whatever be the mode of its collection, the rule directly to tax land rents or net product, that is to say, to establish a single land tax to the exclusion of all personal contributions and all taxes on consump- tion, which they called, and which we still call, Žndirect taxes. – These are the principal points of the physiocratic theory. Modern science has rectified the idea of wealth and of the produc- tiveness of the different branches of industry; it has accepted the explanation of money and the demonstration of the principle of commer- cial freedom in opposition to the doctrine of the balance of trade, definitively overthrown. It has not yet pronounced clearly on the theory of net product, although it pays little attention to the famous economic tableau. It hesitates also on the important question of taxation. — But it is just to recognize, in entering into the details of the economic investigations to which the disci- ples of Quesnay devoted themselves, that we see that they threw a clear light on all parts of the science, even if they started from a false princi- ple or got lost in a false theory; that, for exam- ple, of the materiality of wealth, and that of the productiveness of agriculture alone, which did not hinder them from finding, or which perhaps caused them to find, luminous views on different points. It is, however, a common fact in the history of science, that a false theory, elaborated by superior minds, advances them in the path of truth, which it is afterward easier for their succes- sors to follow, and to whom is reserved the honor of finding a sounder and more unimpeachable theory. — If we wish to understand the ideas of the physiocrates, we must begin with the writings of their master, and then take up in succession the works of his principal disciples: Mirabeau, Mercier, Baudeau, Le Trosne and Turgot. To the elder Mirabeau, belongs the honor of having been the first who was aroused to enthusiasm by the lofty reason of Quesnay, of having written, developed and commentated on his principles, and of having introduced them into practical politics and administration. The first exposition of the economic system is found in his Philosophie Ru- Tale, published in 1763. It is one of the least un- intelligible books of the marquis. Its perusal is of little value except to those who wish to know how the school began; but it must be acknowl- edged that, in spite of his eccentricities of style and mistiness of thought, this economist philos- opher had the talent of causing himself to be read, and of calling public attention to the study of questions which others knew how to explain better than he. Each man has his mission in this world. After the Philosophie Rurale, appeared the book of Mercier-La Rivière, who had met Quesnay, at the same time as Gournay and the Marquis de Mirabeau; and who afterward left France to take the place of intendant at Martin- ique for a time; on returning, he renewed his former intimacy with Quesnay, and labored to disseminate his doctrine. Mercier-La Rivière's book is entitled l’Ordre maturel et éSS670tel des So- ciétés politiques; it appeared in 1767, four years after Mirabeau’s work. The title of this book promises a methodical treatise on social economy, a promise it does not fulfill. The first part is a series of rather confused dissertations on the moral order, the politics and the material interests of society. But the author becomes more positive and more interesting in the second part, where he makes a close analysis, according to Quesnay's system, of all the questions of the material economy of society, referring to the peculiar or distinct effects of agriculture, industry and commerce, to the reciprocal relations of different nations, and to the nature and object of public revenue. This work, in spite of its imperfections and an obscure and sometimes ridiculous form, had much suc- cess with the philosophic part of the public, whose attention had been attracted to these mat- ters by the sententious and abstract writings of Quesnay and by the dissertations of l'Amº des hommes, which were at once tedious and obscure. It was the first time, too, that the doctrine as- sumed a form intelligible to the common mind; Dupont de Nemours made an analysis of it, a year later, under the title, Origine et progrès d'une science nouvelle (1768). By publishing it, Mercier. La Rivière helped spread the ideas of his master; but at the same time he added to it a dangerous theory which was afterward very injurious to the popularity of the economists. We mean his theory of despotism, to which we shall return a little further on. — Five years after Mercier's book, there BHYSIOCRATES. 195 appeared another important work, so far as it was a general exposition of physiocratic ideas, that of the abbé Baudeau, a celebrated publicist of the time, who was converted to the doctrine of Ques- nay while trying to refute, in his Ephémérides, the letters of Le Trosne, barrister of the king in the bailiwick of Orleans, and who wielded at an early day a vigorous pen in the phalanx of the econo- mists. Baudeau published in 1771, l'Introduction d la Philosophie économique. It is not only one of the most remarkable of his writings; but in it he surpassed Mercier, and a fortiori Mirabeau, in his method, clearness and style. The year before he had published in the Ephémérides, and printed Sep- arately (but only a small number of copies of it) his l’Evplication du tableau èconomique. About the same time there appeared in the Ephémérides, whose management Baudeau had intrusted to Du- pont de Nemours, two short catechisms of the doc- trine, one by Turgot, without his signature, and the other under the name of the margrave of Ba- den. Turgot's short Traité on the formation and distribution of wealth, is remarkable in every way. It is a résumé of the ideas of Quesnay and Gour- may, as explained by their most eminent disciple. It would be approximately a résumé of the general principles of the science laid down by Smith, if Turgot had not stopped at the physiocratic theory, on a fundamental point, that of the productive- ness of the different kinds of labor, in consequence of which he was led to make the agricultural class the productive class par eacellence, and the rest of mankind the Salaried class, excepting, how- ever, landowners, whom he calls the disposable class, disposable for the general wants of Society, such as war, the administration of justice, etc. Turgot's book, written in 1766, appeared for the first time in vols. 11 and 12 of the Ephémérides, toward the end of 1769 and the commencement of 1770.* The brief compendium of the mar- grave of Baden, published in 1772, in the Ephé- mérides du citoyen, which has also been attributed to Dupont de Nemours, and is perhaps the work of the two disciples, is not of equal importance, but is remarkable in many regards. It contains the principles of the physiocratic school, more abridged than in Turgot's work, condensed into formulae synoptically arranged, and, as Dupont de | * The date of this publication is important in the history of the science. We have remarked, in an essay relating to the origin and filiation of the term political economy (Jour- mal des Economistes, vol. xxiii., pp. 11, 217): “Eugene Daire, after stating (xlv. of his Introduction to the ‘Works of Turgot,” in the Collection des principawa; Economistes) that this work was printed about 1766, inclines us to believe in the notice of Mercier de la Rivière (same vol., p. 430), that this date is not exact, and that Turgot's treatise appeared later. Eugene Daire was mistaken a second time; we have before us a copy of the edition of 1766 in 12mo.” If Eugene Daire was mistaken, it was only in part, and we ourselves are also mistaken. The volume of which we speak, bore the last date which we mention; but this date points to the time when Turgot was writing, during his intendancy. The first edition seems to have been the separate one formed of the article in the Ephémérides, part of which appeared in the 11th vol., at the end of 1769, and a part in the 12th vol., at the commencement of 1770. - - Nemours says, in the form of a genealogical tree. The title is a very curious one for the time, and leads us to suppose that the school and its master, who was still living, had abandoned the word physiocracy for the title political, economy, not in the Sense of administration as a synonym of pub- lic economy, the olconomia of Aristotle, which is to Society what domestic economy is to the family (in which sense it was employed by Rousseau in 1755, in the article Economie Politique of the En- cyclopédie), but in a scientific sense, to designate the science of the phenomena relating to wealth and human labor; a sense in which it had been used by James Stewart after 1767, who entitled his treatise on these subjects “An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy,” and, some years before, by Count Verri, in a work published in 1763, and entitled, Memorie Storiche Sulla, Econ- omia publica dello stato di Milano (Historical memoirs relative to the political economy of the state of Milan). Verri and Stewart seem to have been the first to adopt the name most generally given to the science in our time, a name which Turgot did not employ, which was scarcely ever used by Adam Smith, and which appeared only in the dictionary of the French academy in 1814, although it appeared in a book at the commence- ment of the sixteenth century, which, however, does not answer to its title, the Traité de l’OEcon- omże politique, by Antoyne de Montchrétien. — After these various authoritative publications of the physiocratic school we cite, in conclusion, the principal work of Le Trosne; which appeared in 1777, under the title, De l'ordre social, followed by an elementary treatise on value, circulation, in- dustry, and home and foreign commerce. This work contains two very distinct parts: the first, consisting of a series of lectures, is a dogmatic exposition of the principles of the school. In the second part, which bears the special title De l’Intérêt social, Le Trosne treats of value, circula- tion, industry, home and foreign commerce, with a remarkable understanding of these different subjects. – This was the last general manifesto of the pure physiocratic school, properly so called. When it appeared, Quesnay was dead; Turgot was a minister, and had anticipated great reforms in the constitution of labor, which were to be effected by the constituent assembly, and Adam Smith had published his book after ten years of retirement, and of meditation on this great work. – W. Political Ideas of the Physiocrates. Having reached this point in our historical deduction concerning the physiocrates, we must direct the attention of the reader for an instant to the polit- ical ideas held by this phalanx of philosophers, or which were attributed to them. Mercier-La Rivière, discussing the purely political question of the form of government, decided in favor of the power of one man. Dupont explains to us the principal motive which, according to him, Mercier-La Rivière and the abbé Baudeau had in accepting such a doctrine, “thinking,” he says, ‘‘ that it would be easier to persuade a prince than 196 PHYSIOCRATES. a nation,” and that one man would be quicker to put in practice the teachings of science. We do not wish to stop and ask ourselves whether Mer- cier and Baudeau were right or wrong, or what are the dangers of despotism and the drawbacks of mixed or representative governments. We wish to say simply that Mercier-La Rivière was careful to distinguish between arbitrary despotism, or despotism proper, which he rejects, and legal des- potism, which he favors, and a counterpoise for which he finds in the authority of the magistracy; the form and invariable proportion of the taxes, “ the evidence ’’ of the truths of natural law made familiar to the mass of citizens by national edu- cation, and the interest of sovereigns, to be just in a system such as he conceived it. It is not dif- ficult to see, in reading this philosopher, that he was of a liberal mind. It must also be remembered that he wrote a hundred years ago, when the the- ory and practice of free government were still in their infancy. However this may be, it is to be regretted that he was led to construct a political theory not necessarily connected with his subject, which was an explanation of the general princi- ples of law and justice, common to all societies, independent of the form and mechanism of their governments; it is especially to be regretted that to designate the power of a single man, he used a word to which usage has given a bad meaning, which does not express his thought, and which has served as a pretext to many of his adversaries, who, in order to divert attention from his eco- nomic ideas and thereforms which they demanded, accused those ideas of being and professing to be the upholders of despotism. — The question has been raised whether Mercier-La Rivière was under the influence of Quesnay, or whether he expresses his personal ideas and those of Baudeau. It is difficult to say what was precisely the idea of the master on this subject; but it is certainly true that if Quesnay and the marquis de Mirabeau in- clined to the executive and legislative power of one man, all their writings show that in their minds and hearts there never could be a question of sacrificing to a family or to an aristocracy the interests of the masses, who were the object which preoccupied their noble thoughts. We can not appeal, on this point, to the practice of their lives. Quesnay died in 1774; the marquis de Mira- beau, on the eve of the revolution, in 1788; Bau- deau and Mercier-La Rivière lived on, the one till 1792, the other till 1794, it is said; but they were not of the age to mix in the questions of the time. Moreover, if we admit, which is far from being proved, that any physiocrates went astray, on this point, in theory—the political life of Malesherbes and Turgot; the administrative acts of the latter, of the Gournays and Trudaines; the parliamentary career of Dupont de Nemours; the manly and impartial writings against feudal abuses; monopoly of the finances and other monopolies, as well as the biographical details which have been preserved concerning the public conduct of all those who have been put on the witness stand, prove that true political progress would have had warm friends in each One of these zealous promoters of economic progress (whatever might have been the party with which they were connected), the more useful to the cause of humanity for being better informed on the real wants of men living in society, and imbued with the principles of a sounder philoso- phy based on the better natural foundation of human affairs. Just here we would make a general observation, to wit : that one of the results of economic studies is to lessen the importance of one form of government or another in the minds of men devoted to these studies. But is not this a benefit? The day when the governing and the governed shall understand better what they owe each other; the day when governments shall know how to restrict their action to their natural sphere, the maintenance of Security and the guarantee of justice, property and liberty; the day when the governed will no longer believe in fantastic prom- ises, and no longer demand the fulfillment of im- practicable programmes; on that day civilization will have made a great step in the way of prog- ress. – VI. The Physiocrates as the Founders of Economic Science, and their Influence on the Econ- omic Progress attained. It is always difficult to tell precisely how far the influence of a philosophic and scientific school reaches, because in such a subject causes and effects often escape the mind of the observer. After what we have said, how- ever, a sufficient estimate can be made of the im- portance of the labors of the physiocratic school in philosophy and in morals, and of the services which it rendered in the ranks of the philosophic school, by its studies and its knowledge of society. As to political economy proper, the details into which we have entered show that if the physio- crates were not the first and only founders of the Science, as has been frequently asserted, they de- serve to figure in the front rank of its founders, and here we recoil from a task which remains yet to be accomplished, and which consists in investigating and describing the reciprocal influ- ence which Adam Smith may have had upon the physiocrates during his visit to Paris, and which the physiocrates may have had upon him by their conversation and writings. We are unable here to settle the question of priority between the Scotch philosopher and the French philoso- phers; but we may state, with Cousin, that it is difficult to answer it in favor of them rather than of him while we believe it our duty to ac- knowledge that the physiocrates and Adam Smith are under great obligations to certain writers who preceded them in their career, Boisguillebert, David Hume, etc., whom we have cited above. Be this as it may, account must be taken of this important fact, that while writing his book, Smith was able to take advantage of the prin. cipal works of the school, especially those of Quesnay, and that its most important utterances were published earlier than the appearance of the “Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.” — The question raised as to PHYSIOCRATES. 197 the sequence of facts, that is to say, the legislative traces which the physiocratic school has left after it, its action and its propagandism, might also be made the subject of very interesting research which has not, we think, been made. We can, however, give a satisfactory account, in résumé, of this influence. In a general way the physio- cratic school contributed greatly to overthrow the spirit of administrative routine which progress always encounters in its path; to overthrow the spirit of regulation and prohibition which had thrown a deadening net of hindrances over every branch of human activity; it contributed greatly to effect the suppression of provincial customs duties, and to help the freedom of internal com- merce; it aided the fall of the system of corpora- tions, and the freedom of labor; it abolished the corvée; and finally, it contributed to all the liberal and progressive measures of the constituent assem- bly. The majority of that assembly voted under the influence of the economic ideas which several members had gained by meeting and reading the works of the physiocratic philosophers, while they incriminated, and allowed others to incrimi- nate, the economists, as Dupont de Nemours says, just as has often happened since in other assem- blies. During the twenty years which preceded the revolution, it was in their writings and their ideas that many influential men, princes, minis- ters, governors, intendants of provinces, inspectors of manufactures, etc., found inspiration, both to establish the financial system and to improve the internal administration and the management of foreign affairs; it was they who won the freedom of the corn trade, on which the school published a score of books. It was not, therefore, their fault (Droz has shown this well in his Histoire de Louis A VI.) that the economic, financial, and even po- litical reforms were not accomplished in season, in peace and without revolution. Every one has read of the brilliant efforts of Turgot. — The phy- Siocratic school has exercised its influence not in France alone, but in all Europe. This influence may be traced in Italy, and especially in Tuscany, which owes its prosperity to the principles of in- dustrial and commercial freedom, put in practice by the grand duke Leopold, assisted by intelligent ministers, such as Gianni and Fabroni; in several states of the north and Germany, particularly in Austria, where the administration of the emperor Joseph II., as well as that of this same Leopold, have left such regretable souvenirs. Gustavus III., king of Sweden, Stanislaus Augustus, king of Poland, the margrave of Baden, and the dauphin son of Louis XV., were inclined to the ideas of the economists. We know that Catherine of Rus- sia desired to consult Mercier-La Rivière, and al- though the meeting of the philosopher and the empress came to a rather grotesque conclusion, she testified to the credit of the school. This in- fluence was also felt in international relations and treaties. After the conclusion of the treaty of 1786 between France and England, on liberal and rational bases, whatever may have been system- atically said of it in a private and ill-advised inter- est, Lord Lansdowne, prime minister of Great Britain, who, up to that time, was opposed to the peace, declared that he had been converted to better political and economic opinions by the reasoning and influence of the abbé Morellet, whom he had known at Paris, and whose prin- ciples, as we have said, were no other than those of Gournay and Quesnay. — The labors of the physiocratic school have also given indirectly a vigorous impulse to statistics. It was in answer to l'Ami des hommes that La Michodière and Messence undertook the investigations which are among the first monuments of modern statistics. — VII. Adversaries and Partisans of the Phys- $ocrates. The economists, with their enthusiasm for their master, and intolerance, born of the Spirit of sect and the inflexibility of principles, so naturally consequent on a fixed conviction and conscientious studies, drew on themselves many attacks, either from the circle of philoso- phers of which they themselves formed a part, from men of letters, or from all those whose ideas, prejudices or interests they opposed. Specimens of the polemics of the time are found in the writings of Grimm, Mallet-Dupan, Linguet and Others, an example of which we produced above. Voltaire directed against them the satire of l'Homme aua, quarante écus, morewitty than solid; the aged philosopher, however, felt dominated by the genius of Turgot, and we know that he took up his pen to aid him against the numerous and unjust attacks of which he was the object on account of his measures to secure the free circula- tion of corn. — Among the most prominent we must cite les Doutes proposés awa, philosophes écon- omistes, by Mably, 1768; a book by Graslin, in 1767; the famous “Dialogues” of the abbé Galiani concerning legislation on corn (1770), and a work on the same subject, by Necker, 1770. The first two, though more serious, have no great value. Necker’s work, which Turgot's enemies praised to the skies, was a political maneuvre which does no honor to the celebrated minister, for it is full of communistic sophisms. Galiani’s book, much lauded for its style and wit, has no scientific value, and does not even reach a conclusion on the special point of the exportation of corn, a crime of the economists, which he did not entirely dis- approve. — Some modern economists have taken sides with the physiocrates in their theory of the nature of wealth and agriculture : we mention Dutens, in France, who published a new explana- tion of the doctrines of Quesnay, under the title of JPhilosophie d’Economie politique, 1835; and Schmalz in Germany, who undertook the same task, ten years earlier. — Malthus, in his “Principles of Political Economy,” started out with the material- ity of value, and dwelt much on rent; and Eugene Daire, who has left remarkable notices and notes on the physiocrates, Turgot and Adam Smith, in the Collection des Principawa, Economistes, also maintains the materiality of value, and undertakes to show not only the truth of these principles, but 198 PICKERING. PINCKNEY. also that of the agricultural theory of Quesnay, as well as the analogy between Smith’s ideas and those of Turgot and Quesnay. We shall not enter into this long and delicate discussion : we shall only say that Smith has not pronounced very positively in favor of the materiality of value, although there is on this point a want of clear- ness as to his opinion; that he has only tried to show the productiveness of all industries, and has devoted several chapters to opposing the physio- cratic doctrine of land. Whether he has succeeded, as the majority of economists pretend, or nearly failed, as others pretend, is a question which can be answered only in a course on political economy, and for that there is no place here. — The reader will find the subject which we have just treated further developed in the lives of the men we have named. We can refer also to a chapter, too brief, unfortunately, in Blanqui's “History of Political Economy” [translated by Miss Emily J. Leonard]; to the lectures in which Rossi treats of land; to the notices by Eugene Daire, in the Collection des Prin- cipawa, Economistes; to his memoir in answer to the questions offered for competition, crowned in 1847 by the academy of moral and political science, a statement from which, inserted in the Journal des |. H]conom?stes, we have reproduced above; to the report of Passy on this memoir, published in the same collection; and to a paper on the philosophy of the physiocrates, published in the same collec- tion, by H. Baudrillart. JOSEPH GARNIER. PICKERING, Timothy, was born at Salem, Mass., July 17, 1745, and died there, Jan. 29, 1829. He was graduated at Harvard in 1763, was admitted to the bar, entered the revolutionary army, and became adjutant general and quarter- master general. (See also ORDINANCE OF 1787.) Under the administrations of Washington and John Adams he was successively postmaster general, secretary of war, and secretary of state. (See ADMINISTRATIONs, I.-III.) After a brief re- tirement to a farm in Pennsylvania, he returned to Massachusetts in 1802, and served as United States senator (federalist) 1803–11, and congress- man 1813–17. He then retired permanently from politics. – From 1798 until his death, Pickering's political life was a perennial conflict with the Adams family. He had been dismissed from John Adams' cabinet for endeavoring to force the president into the Hamilton policy. (See ADAMs, JOHN; X Y Z MISSION.) As senator, he and his colleague, John Quincy Adams, quar- reled over the latter's support of the embargo. Thereafter he was engaged in frequent newspa- per and pamphlet wars with both of his old op- ponents. The particulars may be found in the “Correspondence between John Adams and Will- iam Cunningham,” published in 1823, and Pick- ering’s “Observations” upon it, in 1824. Picker- ing is the New England federalist most strongly suspected of favoring Secession in 1805–9. (See SECESSION, I.) — See Upham and Pickering's Life of Pickering; North American Review, July, 1874; 9 John Adams' Works, 55. A personal descrip- tion of Pickering is in 1 Schouler's United States, 191, 302. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. PIERCE, Franklin, president of the United States 1853–7, was born at Hillsborough, N. H., Nov. 23, 1804, and died at Concord, N. H., Oct. 8, 1869. He was graduated at Bowdoin in 1824, was admitted to the bar in 1827, and immediately entered politics as a democrat, serving in the . lower house of the state legislature 1829–33, as congressman 1833–7, and as United States senator 1837–42. In the Mexican war he became brigadier general. In 1852 he was elected president. (See DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, W.; ELECTO- RAL WOTEs, XVII.) For the leading events of his term, see KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL; KANSAs; FILIBUSTERING ; OSTEND MANIFESTO ; UNITED STATES, III. After the close of his term he re- mained in retirement until his death, except for certain letters and addresses during the rebellion, passionately denouncing the coercion of the se- ceding states and the general conduct of the war. — See Bartlett's Life of Pierce (1852); Hawthorne's Life of Pierce (1852); 3 Statesman's Manual, 1993. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. PINCKNEY, Charles Cotesworth, son of chief justice Pinckney, of South Carolina, was born at Charleston, S. C., , 1746, and died there Aug. 16, 1825. He was educated at West- minster and Oxford, studied law at the Temple, and began practice in South Carolina in 1769. He distinguished himself in the revolutionary war, being thereafter known as Gen. Pinckney; and was a member of the convention of 1787. Under the new government he declined succes- sively the positions of supreme court justice in 1789; secretary of war in 1795, and secretary of state in the same year. In 1797–8 he was minister and commissioner to France (see X Y Z Mrs- SION), and while there is said to have given the reply to French demands for money: “Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute.” In 1800 he was the alternate federalist candidate for the presidency. The democrats in the South Carolina legislature offered to unite with the federalists in casting the electoral vote of the state for Jefferson and Pinckney, which would have made the latter. vice-president, but Pinckney refused the offer, and was defeated with Adams. In 1804 and 1808 the federalist votes were given for him as candidate for president. (See FEDERAL PARTY, II.)— See Allen's Biographical Dictionary. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. PINCKNEY, Thomas, brother of the prece- ding, was born at Charleston, S. C., Oct. 23, 1750, and died there Nov. 2, 1828. He was graduated at Oxford, studied law at the Temple in London, returned to South Carolina, and began practice there in 1773. He was governor of his state 1787–9, minister to Great Britain 1792–6, and minister to Spain 1794–5. In 1796 he was the PIRACY. 199 federalist candidate, alternate to John Adams, for the presidency (see CAUCUS, CONGRESSIONAL; ELECTORAL WOTEs); and he was a federalist congressman 1797–1801. During the war of 1812 he was major general in command of the southern military division. — See Allen's Biographical Dic- tionary. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON. PIRACY is robbery committed by force of arms at sea. It was formerly much more frequent than it is now. It still exists, however, and it is likely that so long as there shall be highwaymen, there will be pirates; although it is much more difficult to equip a vessel to scour the ocean than to lie in ambush at the edge of a road or at the corner of the deserted streets of a large town, to rob a passer-by. Even in comparatively late years the Chinese seas were infested with pirates. This sort of robbery can be practiced only by an association of criminals; it has, too, this pecul- iarity, that entire hordes have been known to take to it, notably in the Barbary states before the conquest of Algeria, and even now from time to time on the Morocco coasts. Thus, it is always liable to happen, at the very time when Christian nations believe that safety reigns over all the seas, that buccaneers will dash from some unsuspected lair, and before repression can be organized, will have had time to plunder a large number of peaceable merchants. Within a few centuries, doubtless, when European civilization, enlighten- ing even the remotest lands, shall have civilized the entire world, no barbarous tribe will be longer able to escape the action of a regular government, and piracy will lose many of its chances of suc- cess; but it may also, by an excess of audacity, organize in the midst of a civilized nation; and consequently, notwithstanding the gradual disap- pearance of this scourge, it can not be asserted that we shall ever attain to an absolute riddance of it. — The early Greeks were nearly all pirates. M. Cauchy remarks (Droit Maritime International, 1862, vol. i., p. 180) that in ancient times the slave trade was one of the most powerful incen- tives to piracy, both public and private. Nei- ther the Grecian states, when they had become civilized, nor Rome, appears to have had a naval force intended to protect their commerce against sea robbers. Piracy flourished also in the Med- iterranean; it attained an extraordinary develop- ment during the civil wars of the Roman repub- lic. These robbers formed at this period an im- mense confederation, the headquarters of which were on the hilly shores of Cilicia. They came very near starving Rome by intercepting the convoys of corn, and Pompey had to be charged with the destruction of their power. In order to prevent the recurrence of so disastrous a state of affairs, the Roman emperors maintained public fleets (M. Cauchy, loc. cit., p. 115), as all modern nations have done since. If we should cease to plow the seas with ships of war, it is probable that piracy would be revived in many parts of the world. Privateering gave rise, at the end of the Seventeenth century, to an association of buc- caneers, in parts of the Antilles, whose ravages rivaled the robberies of the ancient pirates of Cilicia. The difference between the corsair and the buccaneer is not sufficiently obvious in respect to these bold adventurers; for if the former Carries his sovereign's flag, while the latter is out- side of international law, both fight for booty. The abolition of privateering, proclaimed by the declaration of April 16, 1856, will thus aid in Causing piracy to disappear more and more. — The repression of piracy concerns international law as well as the public law of each nation. It generally happens, indeed, that the pirate and the captor are not subjects of the same sovereign, and that the Crime has been committed on the vast ex- panse of Sea which has no master and where no jurisdiction exists. The principal laws of the ancien régime in France, against piracy, are the decree of March, 1584, the declaration of Feb. 1, 1650, and the naval ordonmance of 1681; since the French revolution the matter has been regulated by the order of the second of prairial, year XI., and the law of April 10, 1825, entitled, “Ilaw for the safety of navigation and maritime com- merce.” The ordom mance of 1681 and the law of 1825 have solved the difficulty which we have just indicated, by putting pirates outside of inter- national law; they are considered as public ene- mies, and are amenable to the tribunals of their captor. Any vessel taking to piracy without let- ters of marque from any prince, or with letters of marque from two princes, is liable to seizure as a pirate. And further, the vessel which com- mits hostilities under any other flag than that under which it is commissioned, is to be regard- ed as a pirate. The laws respecting piracy are made by each nation in the interest of all the others. It matters little that the captor has not been attacked. The pirate may be justly seized. for having attacked any vessel whatsoever, even foreign to the nationality of the captor. This is the remarkable feature in the legislation on piracy. The law appears to us unjust which punishes as a pirate a vessel to which nothing could be imputed but the lack of papers. It must be observed, however, that there is in such a case only a pre- sumption, which must yield to proof of the con- trary, but this is already too much, and here, as in all penal law, guilt is not to be assumed, and it is for the accuser, not the accused, to furnish the proof. — Grotius thinks (book ii., chap. xx., § 40) that a government has the right not only to avenge its wrongs, but even the offenses which violate international law, whomsoever they may concern. “And it is even,” says he, “as much more praise- worthy to avenge the wrongs of others rather than one’s own, as it is to be feared, in those which affect us, that the resentment which we feel might make us pass beyond the limits of a just vengeance.” We adopt fully this principle of the illustrious publicist, proclaimed before him by St. Augustine in the “City of God,” which appears to us one of the foundations of international law. 200 PIRACY. A nation has the right to declare war against a government which violates international justice, even when such violation does not directly harm it. Thus, any nation may lawfully make war on a piratical people, even if its commerce has not suffered from their depredations.”—BIBLIOGRA- * Kent, in his Commentaries (vol. i., p. 183), gives the following definition of piracy: “Piracy is robbery, or a forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful author- ity, and done animofurandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. It is the same offense at sea with robbery on land; and all the writers on the law of nations, and on the maritime law of Europe, agree in this definition of piracy.” Further on he continues: “They (pirates) ac- quire no rights by conquest; and the law of nations, and the municipal law of every country, authorize the true owner to reclaim his property taken by pirates, wherever it can be found; and they do not recognize any title to be de- rived from an act of piracy. The principle, that a piratis et latronibus capta domânăum non mutant, is the received opinion of ancient civilians and modern writers on general jurisprudence; and the same doctrine was maintained in the English courts of common law, prior to the great modern improvements made in the science of the law of nations.”— By the constitution of the United States, congress is author- ized to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. In pursuance of this authority it was declared, by the act of congress of April 30, 1790, c. 9, sec. 8, that murder or rob- bery, committed on the high seas, or in any river, haven or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, or any other offense which, if committed within the body of a county, would, by the laws of the United States, be punish- able with death, should be adjudged to be piracy and felony, and punishable with death. It was further declared, that if any captain or mariner should piratically and feloniously run away with any vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or should yield up any such vessel voluntarily to pirates; or if any seaman should forcibly endeavor to hinder his commander from defending the ship or goods committed to his trust, or should make a revolt in the ship—every such offender should be adjudged a pirate and felon, and be punishable with death. [By the act of congress of March 3, 1835, c. 313, the offense of making a revolt in a ship is no longer punishable as a capital offense, but only by fine, and imprisonment at hard labor.] Acces- sories to such piracies before the fact are punishable in like manner; but accessories after the fact are only punishable by fine and imprisonment. And by the act of March 3, 1819, c. 76, Sec. 5, congress declared, that if any person on the high seas should commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, he should, on conviction, suffer death. This act was but temporary in its limitation, and has expired; but it was again declared, and essentially to the same effect, by the act of congress of May 15, 1820, c. 113, sec. 3, that “if any person, upon the high seas, or in any open road- stead, or bay, or river, where the sea ebbs and flows, com- mits the crime of robbery in and upon any vessel, or the lading thereof, or the crew, he shall be adjudged a pirate. So, if any person engaged in any piratical enterprise, or belonging to the crew of any piratical vessel, should land. and commit robbery on shore, such an offender shall also be adjudged a pirate.” According to a decision of the United States Supreme court, robbery on the high seas is piracy by the act of Congress, as well as by the law of nations. – Kent holds, that it is of no importance, for the purpose of giving jurisdiction, On whom Or where a piratical offense has been committed. “A pirate, who is one by the law of nations, may be tried and punished in any country where he may be found, for he is reputed to be out of the protection of all laws and privileges. The statute of any government may declare an offense committed on board its own vessels to be piracy, and Such an offense will be punishable exclusively by the nation which passes the statute. But piracy, under the law of nations, is an offense against all nations, and pun- ishable by all.” “An alien, under the sanction of a national commission, can not commit piracy while he pursues his authority. His acts may be hostile, and his nation respon- PHY. Broglie, Sur la piraterie (Eerits, vol. iii., p. 385); Phillimore, International Law, vol. i., pp. 394-406; Wildman, International Law, vol. ii., p. 150; Wheaton, International Law, §124; Heffter, Völkerrecht, § 104; Esperson, Dirîtto diplomatico, vol. ii., pp. 2, 12; Gareis, Das heutige Volkerrecht 'u. der Menschem handel, 1879. F. A. HELLE. sible for them. They may amount to a lawful cause of war, but they are never to be regarded as piracy.” “If a natural- born subject was to take prizes belonging to his native country in pursuance of a foreign commission, he would, on general principles, be protected by his commission from the charge of piracy. But to prevent the mischief of such con- duct, the United States have followed the provisions of the English statute of 11 and 12 William III., c. 7, and the general practice of other nations, and have, by the act of congress of April 30, 1790, sec. 9, declared, that, if any citizen should commit any act of hostility against the United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the high seas, under color of any com- mission from any foreign prince or state, or on pretense of authority from any person, such offender shall be adjudged to be a pirate, felon and robber, and, on being thereof con- victed, shall suffer death. The act of congress not only authorizes a capture, but a condemnation in the courts of the United States, for all piratical aggressions by foreign vessels; and whatever may be the responsibility incurred by the nation to foreign powers, in executing such laws, there can be no doubt that courts of justice are bound to obey and administer them. All such hostile and criminal aggressions on the high seas, under the flag of any power, render property taken in delicto subject to confiscation by the law of nations.”—By the ancient common law of Eng- land, piracy, if committed by a subject, was held to be a spe- cies of treason, being contrary to his matural allegiance; and by an alien to be felony only: but since the statute of trea- sons (25 Edw. III., c. 2), it is held to be only felony in a sub- ject. Formerly this offense was only cognizable by the ad- miralty courts, which proceed by the rules of the civil law; but it being inconsistent with the liberties of the nation that a man’s life should be taken away unless by the judgment of his peers, the statute 28 Henry VIII., c. 15, established a new jurisdiction for this purpose, which proceeds according to the course of the common law. It was formerly a ques- tion whether the Algerines and other African states should be considered pirates; but however exceptionable their conduct might have been on many occasions, and however hostile their policy might be to the interests of humanity, still, as they had been subjected to what may be called regular governments, and admitted to enter into treaties with other powers, they could not be treated as pirates. (M*Culloch.) — What consti- tutes piracy, in violation of the law of nations, is not uniform- ly fixed everywhere. It is questioned whether (as according to English common law) self-interested design must be the motive of the attack. A majority of modern writers have an- swered this question in the negative. Another undecided question is, whether piracy may be committed by a mutinous crew against the vessel on which they serve. Acts of violence committed by duly authorized privateers against hostile, or, bona fide, against neutral, merchantmen, are not considered as piracy. Different from the crime of piracy, in violation of the law of nations, is the crime of piracy which is mentioned in and punished by the criminal laws of some countries. The description of the facts which constitute these two different kinds of crime may become doubtful, as when a party, being in a state of insurrection, and recognized as “belligerent " by the neutral powers, injures the maritime commerce of the oth- er party in the course of a civil war. The slave trade, too, is to be considered piracy, according to the laws of Seafaring nations, and according to the treaties which have been con- cluded for the purpose of suppressing that nefarious trade; but where the right to search suspected vessels on the high seas is denied to vessels under foreign flags, the punishing of the guilty in accordance with the provisions in relation to piracy can not be carried out practically. It is a strange fact, as compared with other codes, that Sec. 4 of the Ger- man criminal code does not enumerate piracy among the crimes committed in foreign countries, which may be pun- ished. (Holtzendorff.) . PLENTY AND DEARTH. 201 PLENTY AND DEARTH. Political economy, in so far as it is an exposition of principles and facts, is a vast and noble science, searching into the affairs of the social mechanism and the func- tions of each of the parts composing those ani- mate and marvelous Organizations called human societies. It studies the general laws in accord- ance with which the human race increases in numbers, wealth, intelligence and morality; and yet, recognizing a social as well as a personal freedom of will, it shows how the laws of Prov- idence may be misunderstood and set at naught, what a terrible responsibility there is on those who tamper with them, and how, as the result of so do- ing, civilization may be checked, impeded, driven back, and stified for a long time. — Incredible as it may seem, this science, so vast and lofty as an exposition of principles and facts, is, when con- troverted and compelled to become polemical, nearly reduced to the ungrateful task of demon- strating the proposition, almost childish in its simplicity, that “Plenty is better than dearth”: because, looked at closely, it will be seen that the greater number of the objections to, and doubts concerning, political economy, involve the princi- ple that dearth or scarcity is preferable to plenty, which is the real meaning to be deduced from the phrases, once and in part still so popular, such as “Production is excessive,” “We are being de- stroyed by plethora,” “All the markets are over- stocked, and every business and profession is overcrowded,” “The capacity to consume can no longer keep pace with the power to produce,” etc. — These ideas, too, are not confined to any class. One man opposes the use of machines on the ground that those triumphs of human inge- nuity multiply indefinitely the power of produc- tion. What does he fear? Abundance. A sec- Ond favors protection, lamenting the liberality of nature's gifts to other lands, dreading that through the influence of free trade his own should share it, and thinking that were it to do so it would be afflicted by the scourge of the invasion and inundation of foreign products. What does he fear? Abundance. Statesmen, even, are not free from the hallucination, though they fear abundance for a different reason. Their dread is, that the masses, as the result of being too well off, will become revolutionary and seditious, and as a means of repressing them, they look to heavy taxa- tion, vast armies, a lavish expenditure, and a pow- erful aristocracy charged with the task of remedy- ing by its pomp and profusion the intrusive abun- dance of human industry. What do such states- men fear? Abundance. Finally, we have logi- Cians who, disdaining all by-paths, go straight to the point, and advise periodical destruction of large cities by fire or otherwise, that labor may have the opportunity to rebuild them. What do they fear? Abundance.— It seems impossible that Such ideas should come into the minds of men, and sometimes even prevail, not in the personal practice of men, but in their theories and in their legislation. For, if there be anything evidently true, it is this, that, so far at least as useful arti- cles are concerned, it is better to have than to be without them; and if it is incontestable that plenty is an evil when it exists in things that are mischievous, destructive and troublesome, such as grasshoppers, caterpillars, vermin, "vices and malarial vapors, it must be equally true that it is a blessing as regards things which meet wants and Satisfy desires ; things which man seeks, strives for, with the sweat of his brow; things which he is willing to buy by work or exchange, and which possess a real value, such as food, clothing, shelter, works of art, means of loco- motion, Of Communication, of instruction, and of amusement; in a word, all that political economy busies itself with. —If it be desired to compare the civilization of two peoples, or of two ages, statistics are appealed to, to inform us which had, in proportion to its population, most means of subsistence, the greatest returns in agricultural products, in industries or art, most roads, most canals, most libraries and museums; and the question is settled in accordance with the com- parative activity of consumption, that is to say, by plenty or abundance. — It may, perhaps, be said that it is not sufficient for products to be abun- dant; that it is further necessary that they be equitably distributed. There is nothing truer than this, but questions must not be confounded. When we defend abundance, and our opponents decry it, we both take as understood the words caster's paribus, all else being.equal; that is, equity of distribution is presupposed.— Further, it must be observed, that abundance is in itself the cause of proper distribution. The more abundant any- thing is, the less value it possesses; the less its value, the more it is within the reach of every one, the more men are on an equality with regard to it. We are all equal in respect to the air, because it exists relatively to our needs and wants in in- exhaustible abundance; we are a little less equal in regard to water, because being less plentiful, it possesses a certain value; still less so with re- gard to wheat, delicate fruits, early vegetables, rarities, their benefit becoming confined to fewer, in an inverse ratio to their abundance. —It may be added, to satisfy the sentimental scruples of our times, that plenty is not a merely material good. Wants arise among men in regular order; they are not all equally pressing, and it may be said that their order of priority is not the order of dignity. The coarser wants must first be appeased, because their satisfaction involves our existence, and because, as rhetoricians say, “Be- fore living worthily, we must live somehow.” Primo vivere, deinde philosophar. —Hence it fol- lows, that it is the abundance of the things nec- essary for the supply of the commonest wants which permits man more and more to spiritualize his enjoyments, and to raise himself into the re- gion of the true and the beautiful. He can only devote to the perfecting of form, to the cultivation of art, or to the investigations of thought, the time and the energies which, as a consequence of * 202 PLENTY AND DEARTH. progress are no longer absorbed by the demands of his animal existence. Abundance, the result of long labor and patient economy, can not be universal at the first formation of society, nor can it, at the same time, exist as to all possible prod- ucts, but it follows a regular order, commencing with the material wants, and ending with the spir. itual. Unhappy the nations when external forces, such as governments, violently invert this natural sequence, substitute for desires—coarse, it is true, but imperious — others of a loftier nature, pre- maturely awakened, change the natural direction of labor, and disturb the equilibrium between wants and the means of satisfying them, an equi- librium which is the cause of all social stability. — Moreover, were abundance a scourge, it would be as strange as unfortunate, for easy as the remedy is (what is easier than to abstain from pro- ducing, or to destroy?) no one is willing to adopt it. It is in vain that people inveigh against plenty, Superabundance, plethora; it is in vain that they enunciate the theory of restricted supply, that they obtain for it the support of the law, that they proscribe machinery, that they disturb, interfere with and impede commerce; all this keeps no one from working to acquire abundance. On all the earth not a man is to be met with whose practice is not a perpetual protest against these vain theo- ries; not one is to be found whose sole endeavor is not to make the most of his powers, to foster them, to husband them, and to increase their pro- ductive capability by the co-operation of natural forces; not one who decries freedom in trade, but who acts on this principle (however eager he may be to deny others the same privilege): to buy in cheapest market, and to sell in the dearest; so much so, that the theory of a restricted supply, which is so common in books, in the newspapers, in conversation, in parliament, and by the way in laws, is negatived and stultified by the actions of every individual without exception, composing the human race, which is the most incontrovertible refutation the mind can well imagine. —But if abundance is better than scarcity, how does it happen that men, after having virtually decided in favor of abundance by their action, by their labor, and their commerce, constitute themselves theoretically the champions of restriction, to such an extent that they bring popular opinion to that view, and are the originators of all sorts of re- strictive and illiberal laws? This it remains for us to explain. At bottom, what we are all aim- ing at is, that each of our efforts should realize for us the greatest possible amount of benefit. If we were not by nature sociable, if we lived in individual isolation, we could know one rule only for attaining this object, to work, more and better, which implies progressive abundance. But, by means of exchange and its consequence, the divi- sion of labor, it is not directly to ourselves but to others that we consecrate our labor, our efforts, our productions and our services. Hence it fol- lows, that without losing sight of the rule, pro- duce more, we have another always present to our minds, produce more value; for on that depends. the amount of remuneration which we shall re- ceive for Our services. Now, to produce more, and to produce more value, are by no means one and the same thing. It is manifest that if by force or stratagem we succeed in making greatly scarcer the special service or product which constitutes. our occupation, we would grow richer without adding to our labor either in quantity or quality. Suppose, for example, a shoemaker could, by a mere effort of will, cause the sudden annihilation of all the shoes in the world, excepting only those in his own shop; or strike with paralysis every One who knew how to use the shoemaker's tools, he would become a Croesus ; his lot would be im- proved, not together with the general lot of man- kind, but in an inverse ratio to the prosperity of all. This is the whole secret of the theory of a Scarcity as it shows itself in restrictions, monopo- lies and privileges. It only veils, by the use of scientific language, that selfish sentiment which finds a place deep in the hearts of all : competitors. annoy me. — When any product is brought to market, there are two circumstances which tend equally to enhance its value : first, that there is in the market a great abundance of articles for which it may be exchanged, that is, a great abun. dance of everything; and Second, a great scarcity of articles of the same product. Now, neither of ourselves nor through the intervention of laws and public power, are we able to influence in the least the first of these circumstances. Unfortu. nately universal plenty can not be produced by act of parliament; it must be obtained in some other way; legislators, customs officials and re- striction can do nothing toward it. If, then, we wish artificially to raise the value of any article, we must bring our energies to bear on the other element in its value. Here individual effort is. not quite so powerless. With laws ad hoc, an arbitrary use of power, bayonets, chains and fet- ters, punishment and persecution, it is not impos- sible to drive out competition, and to create that scarcity and artificial increase in value which is desired. This being the condition of things, it is easy to understand what not only can but must happen in an age of ignorance, of barbarism, and of unrestrained greed. Every one turns to the legislature, and through its intervention to public force, demanding of it the artificial creation, by all the means at its disposal, of a scarcity in the article he produces. The farmer demands scarcity of corn, the cattle raiser of cattle, the iron master of iron, the colonist of sugar, the cloth manufact- urer of cloth, etc., etc. Each one gives the same reasons for his demand, and the result is a body of doctrine which may be called, the theory of Scar. city, and public force employs fire and Sword to secure its triumph. — But, leaving the masses thus. forced to undergo the regimen of universal dearth, it is easy to comprehend what a labyrinth the in- ventors of this scheme get involved in, and what a terrible retribution awaits their unscrupulous. rapacity. It has been shown that as regards each POLAND. 203 special production there are two elements of value: first, the scarcity of similar articles; and, second, the abundance of all which are not similar. Now, we call special attention to this: by the very fact that the government, the slave of individual Selfishness, endeavors to realize the first of these elements of value, it destroys the second. It has Satisfied in succession the wishes of the farmer, the cattle raiser, the iron master, the manufact- urer, the colonist, by artificially producing a scar- city of corn, or meat, of iron, of cloth, or of sugar, but what is that but destroying that general abun- dance which is the second condition of value in each separate product. Thus, after having sub- mitted the community to actual privation, which Scarcity implies, it is discovered that it has not Succeeded in catching this shadow, in laying this Spectre, in raising this nominal value, because by just so much as the scarcity of the article in ques- tion operates in its favor, in the same way the Scarcity of others neutralizes it. Is it, then, so hard to understand that the shoemaker, of whom we spoke above, should he succeed in destroying, by a simple wish, all the shoes in existence except those made by himself, would find himself no better off, even from the ridiculous point of view of nominal value, if at the same time, every other thing against which shoes can be exchanged be- came proportionately scarce? The only change would be, that every man, our shoemaker in- cluded, would be worse shod, worse clothed, worse fed, and worse lodged, even if products maintained toward each other the same relative value. — It is necessarily so. What would be- come of Society, if injustice, oppression, egotism, greed and ignorance brought no punishment with them? Luckily, it is not possible for a few men, without its recoiling on themselves, to turn public force and the apparatus of government to the profit of prohibitive legislation, and to check the universal impulse of humanity toward abundance. FRäDíðRIC BASTIAT. POLAND. I. Historical. Poland is a vast plain, the centre of which is at Warsaw, on the Vistula, and which forms the northwestern region of a pla- teau two-thirds larger, bounded by the Baltic sea, the Oder, the Carpathian mountains, the Black Sea, the Borysthenes and the Dwina. The boundaries of the state of Poland have changed, in a thousand years, from the belt formed by the tributary rivers of the Vistula to the circumference of the whole plain. But the country occupied by the Polish nation has never extended beyond the Carpathian mountains at the South and east. No mountains traverse Poland, only sandy hills. In the east there are marshes; the centre is covered with for- ests. The soil contains mineral wealth, copper, silver, and the largest mines of rock salt in Eu- rope. The climate is cold in the north, and tem- perate in the south; the soil is everywhere fertile, but nothing but wheat is produced. — The Polish population had its origin (independently of the Finnish or Turanian elements of pre-historic Eu- rope) in the Slavic tribe of the Lecks, established on the banks of the Vistula at the beginning of the middle ages: they are called the Slaves of the plain. They annexed to themselves, in course of time, other Slavic nations, the principal of which are the Lithuanians, who occupy to the northeast of Poland a region of almost equal extent; and the lesser Russians, established at the east and south, in the countries called later Podolia and Galicia. The aggregate of these nations constituted, with- Out any considerable variation, the Polish nation- ality; but the power of this state extended in the west over states almost wholly Germanic; and in the Southeast Over nations of Turkish Or Tartar Origin, such as the Cossacks of the Ukrania. The time of the greatest territorial extent of Po- land was the year 1772. It was then composed of four states: Great Poland, comprising Greater Poland proper, Cujavia, Mazovia and Western Prussia; Little Poland comprising Little Poland proper, Podlaquia, Red Russia, and the Ukraine; Lithuania, comprising Lithuania proper, White Russia, the Black Russia of Lithuania, Iamogitia; and finally the feudatory countries, that is to say, the duchy of Courland and the Pomeranian dis- tricts of Butow and Lauenburg, fiefs in the hands. of the king of Prussia. And it was precisely this year 1772 which saw the first dismemberment of Poland accomplished, and the political ruin of the nation precipitated. The causes which led to the dissolution of the most flourishing state of east- ern Europe are now well known. They may be Summed up in the insufficiency of public authority at the time when Poland was surrounded by three military states subject to a rigorous centralization. —The origin of this anarchy lay primarily in the elective character of the king. The last Piast, a king of the first dynasty, was able to secure the throne to his nephew only by allowing the nobility to force a stipulation upon him by which they arro- gated to themselves Several prerogatives, such as exemption from taxation. From that time on, the nobility asserted their right of election, and, after the extinction of the Jagellons, enforced it. They swore their kings to the pacta conventa, the basis of that Polish constitution by which, to use Wol- taire's expression, the nobility and the clergy de- fended their liberty against their king, and took liberty away from the rest of the nation: “There the peasant sows not for himself, but for lords, to whom he and his land and all the labor of his hands belong, and who can sell him or slay him with the beasts of the field. All who are of gentle blood depend only on themselves. To try them in a criminal matter, a general assembly of the nation is necessary; and they can be arrested only after having been condemned. Besides, they are scarcely ever punished. Many of the gentry are poor, and accept service with those who are wealthy; they receive a salary from them, perform the lowest offices, and prefer to serve their equals to enriching themselves by trade.” Another pecul- iarity of this constitution was the famous right of veto granted to the deputies or nuncios in the diets. 204 POLAND. “Each deputy enjoys the right which the trib- unes of the people had at Rome, of opposing the laws of the senate. A single gentleman who says, I protest, invalidates by this one word the unanimous resolutions of the rest, and if he de- parts from the place where the diet is being held, it must then dissolve. The remedy provided for the disorders which arise from this law is more dangerous still. Poland is seldom without two factions. Unanimity in the diets being thus im- possible, each party forms a confederation, in which they decide by a plurality of votes, with- out any regard to the protests of the minority. These assemblies, illegal, according to the laws, but authorized by the laws, are held in the king's name, although often without his consent, and against his interests. When the dissensions are over, it belongs to the general diets to confirm or to annul the acts of these confederations.” (Wol- taire.) Such a system offered only too easy pre- texts and opportunities for the intervention of neighboring states. From the beginning of the elective kingship the discord was such that a foreign prince was generally elected king, and when, at the end of the eighteenth century, the throne was given to a Pole, the choice was dic- tated by foreign influence. Russia ruled for nearly a century in the Polish councils. Her last intervention had for its chief motive to bring forward the situation of Russians of the Greek church, subjects of Poland in the eastern prov- inces, whose religious liberty was restricted or disregarded. It was Russia which took the prin- cipal part in the military operations against Poland, although the first idea of the division appears to have been expressed by Frederick II., king of Prussia. — The first dismemberment took place in 1772. Austria and Prussia signed treaties with Poland which restored to Russia, Livonia, Polotsk, Witebsk, Meislaw and Minsk; to Prussia, a part of Posnania, Pomerania and Warnia; and to Austria, Galicia and Lodomiria. Poland, re- duced to these limits, abolished her ancient gov- ernment, and adopted, by a constitution copied from that which France had just voted (1791), hereditary royalty, national representation, with two houses, the re-establishment of urban fran- chise, and the abolition of serfdom. But this constitution having been taxed with illegality by the confederation of Tarjowice, assembled by the advice of Catherine II., and at which the old sovereignty of the equestrian order was reclaimed, the disturbances which followed this transforma- tion led to the interference of the Russian armies, and the second partition of Poland (1791), which took from her half of Lithuania, Posnania, Thorn, and Dantzic. Poland rose in arms the following year, and took part in the European War, but her defeat was followed by the third partition (1794). — A nation can not be all at once suppressed, especially in modern times, without the conquest giving rise to the protests of the states which have not shared in the Spoliation, and which then exert themselves for the re-establishment of the dismembered nation. Poland was the subject of two of these at least partial restorations. The first was the work of Napoleon I., who consti- tuted, by the treaty of Tilsit (1807), as an inde- pendent state, at most the ancient country of the Lecks, the basin of the Vistula, under the title of grand duchy of Warsaw. This territory Was taken almost entire from Prussia, defeated at Friedland. The grand duke was the king of Saxony. The constitution of 1792 was preserved, in form, at all events. This creation of the grand duchy of Warsaw was dated at Tilsit, 1807; Prussia had nothing of Poland, but Russia kept all the east, and Austria all the south. The war with Austria having been renewed, the Poles reconquered Galicia; but they were obliged in 1809 to cede a part of it to Russia, by a treaty approved of by France. The second restoration of Poland was the work of Europe, assembled at the congress of Vienna. — The treaties of 1815, while keeping Posnania for Prussia, and Galicia for Austria, gave an independent exist- ence to the greater portion of Poland, which, under the name of kingdom of Poland, was gov- erned by the emperor of Russia on the principle of personal union. This kingdom received a con- stitution, Nov. 15–27, 1815, by virtue of which the senate and the chamber of nuncios of the no- bility and of deputies of the commons shared in the legislation. The chambers had a certain initia- tive, and suffrage was established on a much broader basis than in the French chartres. The Roman Catholic religion, professed by the greater part of the inhabitants of the kingdom of Poland, was to be the object of the peculiar care of the government, without detracting in any way from the liberty of other forms of religion, all of which, without exception, might be practiced freely and publicly, and enjoy the protection of the govern- ment. Difference in the forms of worship made no difference as to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The Senate of the kingdom of Poland was to have as many bishops of the Roman Catholic church as the law should establish pala- tinates; a bishop of the Greek church had a seat in it also. All public administrative affairs, judi- cial and military, without exception, were to be conducted in the Polish language. Public places, both civil and military, could be filled only by Poles. Cracow, with its suburbs, was also consti- tuted a republic. The direction of its affairs was conducted by a senate, and the legislative power by an assembly of representatives. (Constitution of May 3, 1815.) But a commission appointed by the three joint powers decided everything. — The system established by the constitution of 1815, upon a more liberal basis than the charters of that period, and the application of which would not have been without difficulty under a national dy- nasty, was naturally still more precarious in a country lately conquered, and the dependence of which was but slightly disguised by the so-called system of personal union. From this time on, Poland saw the possibility of liberty only in com- POLAND. 205 plete separation, and sought it in four insurrec- tions, the failure of which each time aggravated the situation of the country. The first took place in 1830, and was crushed the year following in the battle of Ostrolenka and the capture of War- saw. The Russian government adopted a series of measures to efface the Polish nationality, the principal of which were the abolition of judicial power in Lithuania and Ruthenia, the suppression of Catholic churches, forced conversions, the edu- cation of the children in the Russian religion (in Poland as well as in Lithuania), the substitution of the Russian language for the Polish in public documents and in the schools, the transportation to St. Petersburg of the library of Warsaw, the forced enrollment of Poles in the Russian army, their transportation to the Caucasus, the confisca- tion of their goods, the inquisition of officials in families, and the transportation and forced enroll- ment of children. A large number of Poles oni- grated, either to other European countries, prin- cipally France and England, or to the republic of Cracow, on the faith of its constitution. The Austro-Prusso - Russian commission, which had held the town since 1815, and which had the letter of the treaties in its favor, exacted their expulsion from the Senate, and, as the senate refused to obey, took their expulsion upon itself. The accu- mulation of resentment burst out in a revolution some years afterward (1846). Associations cover- ing all Poland, delegated authority to a dictator- ship of five, who proclaimed, at Cracow, on the 22d of February, the Italional governiuent of the Polish republic. The movement extended every- where, and was everywhere crushed out in blood; it was then that the massacre of the Poles in Galicia took place, by peasants of Russian origin, whom the Austrian government was accused of having excited to the deed, and which it at all events did not restrain. The republic of Cracow was suppressed, and Austria, Prussia and Russia signed, on the 6th of November, a treaty which incorporated Cracow with Austria. France and England entered a protest, for form's sake. A third insurrection took place in 1848, and was quelled the same year. — In 1861 the Russian government seemed to wish to adopt free institu- tions in Poland. A council of state or of adminis- tration, and councils of districts and of municipal- ities, were instituted; the use of the Polish language in official documents was permitted, and the right of petition recognized. It is certain that the na- tional agronomical society carried its labors beyond the object for which it was established; it was dissolved, as well as the urban delegations. The fourth insurrection was thenceforth fully resolved upon; it lasted until 1863 and 1864, and was, like the previous ones, reduced by force. France and England interposed by diplomatic notes, to the legality and conclusions of which the Russian government took exceptions; the intervening pow- ers did not push any further the measure which had encouraged the Poles without giving them any real support; the character of belligerents, which was accorded to the confederate states of America, was not granted to them. After the suppression of this last insurrection, Poland lost even the nominal existence which had been conceded to her by virtue of the treaties of 1815; she was incorporated into the Russian empire, and in 1867 the very name of Poland disap- peared; there remain, administratively at least, only the ten western governments of the empire. J. DE B. — II. General Considerations. The Pol- ish question is at once easy to state, and difficult to solve. We have to do with a nation whose territory and independence have been taken away, which has fought with heroism and perseverance to recover those inestimable possessions, which has been conquered, and has suffered martyrdom rather than abjure its rights. This is the state- ment of the question; what will be the solution of it? Russia, Austria, Prussia, will never restore the provinces which they have taken; that appears to us certain. Let any one ask no matter what country to cede a part of its territory without “previous and just indemnity,” and the answer would be the same. Only a war can bring about the re-establishment of Poland; but unless ex- traordinary circumstances should arise to aid its liberators, success would be too doubtful for any one willingly to run the risks of an aggression. — Many persons believe that there is an interest, if not European, at least French and German, in the reconstruction of Poland on the banks of the Vistula. But as this Poland would be intended as a barrier against Russia, the latter would spend her last rouble and her last man rather than per- mit its establishment, and in this emergency the government would find the Russian nation ready for any sacrifice. The interest of Prussia and of Austria is open to discussion : but, however threatening Russia may appear to them, these two powers will always think that the portions of Poland which they have annexed will be more useful to them as provinces than as allies. In view of these difficulties, we will not venture any prophecy as to the future of Poland. It is, how- ever, self-evident that the efforts of a handful of brave men will not suffice to vanquish the nu- merous and well-disciplined battalions of Russia. Enthusiasm will not supply the place of numbers, and neither Poland nor civilization has anything to gain from a rising, the result of which must seem like Suicide. — We can not leave this sub- jcct without drawing from the history of Poland the political lesson which it contains. And firstly, the elective system, applied to royalty, has borne such sad fruit on the banks of the Vistula, that it would forever be condemned if men profited by the lessons of history. Besides, it is known that Germany herself has not had too much reason to be satisfied with her “elective empire,” although it was during several centuries elective only in form. Republics will continue to replace their chief magistrates periodically, and at short inter- vals, but monarchies will remain hereditary. It is true that Poland called herself a républic. — 206 POLICE. Then, the liberum veto, the unanimity required for the choice of a king and in other cases, rendered all regular decision impossible. This requirement could not be in any way justified. At the present day, sovereign powers alone maintain such a re- quirement, which may be sustained to a certain extent by states coming freely together in con- ference, but has its inconveniences even in a confederacy ; it is necessary that in the greater number of cases the majority should prevail. A small number of persons, filled with the desire of coming to an understanding, succeed at last in agreeing by a series of compromises. States as- sembled in conference are rarely numerous, while Poland had 40,000 nobles with the right to vote; how could they agree? It is easily understood that with this multitude of petty sovereigns an- archy should have found its way into the country and excited the covetousness of its neighbors, We have no intention of extenuating what is odious in the act of partition, by saying that the Poles provoked it by the unintelligent organiza- tion of their government. The thief can not be declared innocent because the owner neglected to shut his door, but the owner has none the less himself to blame. — But if these mistakes have had such terrible results to the victims of them, the states which took part in the spoliation have felt the consequences of their unjust act; and it is not impossible that they may yet suffer further from it, for moral evil is nearly always followed by a series of troubles. (See NATIONALITIES, LAW OF; RUSSIA.) MAURICE BLOCK. POLICE. By the term police, we here mean the coercive power of the state in the domain of home administration. Morality, on the other hand, is the rule, the dictate of duty in the conscience of the individual, over his will, and the free action of that will. This rule or supremacy can be found- ed only on the freedom of the individual. It is a fact of psychic life which can not be produced by outward coercion, but, at the same time, which can not be prevented. Since power, in the sense in which the term is used in this article, can ex- ercise only external compulsion, it follows that it has not the means of directly influencing the morality of individuals. It may prevent indi- viduals from doing certain definite acts, and by threats of penalty compel the individual to per- form certain public duties; but it is unable to cre- ate or transform the sentiment from which the supremacy of the dictates of duty over the will of man springs. For moral freedom is a domain inaccessible to the police power. This cardinal truth has made its way to full recognition, only slowly. Only in modern times has the state refused to make its subjects moral by means of public ordinances and prohibitions, and by the enforcement of compulsory police measures. In the ancient world, and chiefly among the Greeks, the conviction prevailed, that the state should assume the task of educating the individual in morality, and that the individual could only be- come moral in the state and through the state. Plato and Aristotle, different as their doctrines of the state are in other points, agreed with the then prevailing opinion, that the state should regulate both the inner and the outward life of its citizens, in order to guide them toward the highest good, to morality. In the legislation of the ancients the law, as a consequence, encroached on the domain of morality, and the codes of law which sub- jected individuals most to guardianship in this matter, in order to educate them in morality, were those that enjoyed the highest reputation. (Cf. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech Privatalter- thiºmer, 2d ed., 1870, p. 473, etc.; Schömann, Griech Alterthümer, 3d ed., 1871, vol. i., p. 113, etc.; Fustel de Coulanges, La cité antique, p. 281, etc.)— The Roman law was the first to assume an independent attitude in relation to morality, and to frame itself in accordance with its own laws. But the Roman state not only demanded of the citizen that he should live according to law, and perform all his legal duties, it also expected the citizen, by his moral private life, and a well- regulated private household, to contribute to the well-being of the community. Any one, who through immoral conduct injured his own worth as a citizen, and, as a member of the common- wealth, injured the community, did not, therefore, violate the law, but he exposed himself to reproof by the state, and forfeited his political honor, be- cause he had failed to fulfill his moral obligations toward the state. In the public census, that oc- curred every fifth year, the censors were required not only to examine into the rights of the citizens, their capacity for taxation, and bearing arms; they were also required to subject the moral con- duct of individuals to a thorough investigation, and, without any legal restraint, they might in- flict the mota of infamy on any citizen who had done anything “contrary to public morality, and contrary to the interests of the community.” The delinquent, according to his rank, was then either expelled from the tribus, or, if eques, con- demned to lose his horse, or to be deprived of his seat in the senate. The censorial nota, which had to be ratified by both censors, remained valid only until the expiration of the lustrum, that is, until the period of the next census. (Cf |Mommsen Römisches Staatsrecht, 2d ed., 1877, vol. ii., p. 363, etc.) This remarkable institu- tion of moral censorship may not have been able to render the Romans more moral, but it certainly contributed to strengthen the sense of civil honor, and, for a limited time at least, it was able to oppose a barrier to the outward decay of morality. The censorship perished under the empire, and the imperial penal laws against im- morality and luxury proved inadequate substi- tutes for the censure, which, ‘‘ by the magnitude of its power, boundlessness of its arbitrariness, its lofty moral nobleness, and local patriotic ego- tism, was a genuine expression of the Roman re- public.” (Mommsen, vol. ii., p. 327.) — During the middle ages the prevailing theory of the POLICE. 207 church assigned to the state the task of employing its political power in the execution of ecclesiasti- cal decrees, and of compelling the observance of the moral precepts sanctioned by the church. But, at that time, by reason of the inconsiderable part taken by the state in legislation and in inter- nal administration, it was only in isolated cases and unsystematically that the state could under- take the task assigned it by the church. Not till the close of the middle ages did the public author- ities, in an unsystematic manner, it is true, begin extensively to oppose immorality by threats of punishment, and to remove certain immoral ex- crescences in isolated cases. Laws were enacted against luxury, cursing and Swearing, excessive drinking, against beggary, and the keeping of concubines. In Germany the imperial police reg- ulations of the sixteenth century present a long and varied series of police regulations and prohi- bitions, which were afterward kept up, and still further extended in the other German states by legislation. When, later, in the eighteenth cen- tury, enlightened despotism had attained to power, governments, by a close supervision of the sub- jects of the state, and by the legislative regulation of their private life, did their best to lead them, if not to morality, at least to temporal well-being. Without recognizing the moral freedom of the individual, active police legislation sought to sub- ject the whole life and endeavors of individuals to regulations. Only since the close of the past and the beginning of this century has a more cor- rect understanding of the true nature of morality and of moral freedom begun to exert its influence on the legislation and administration of the state. By degrees the police laws, which interfered with the private life of the subject, not with a view of preventing violations of the law, or to protect the community from danger, but solely to compel the individual to greater morality or economical fore- sight, were expressly abrogated, or fell into com- plete oblivion for want of enforcement. The state at last came to understand that it must refuse to endeavor to educate its citizens morally by the employment of coercive means, and that it should promote their moral education by aiding the whole economic and intellectual culture of the people in so far as that culture requires the aid of the state. The state has further understood, that in itself immorality is not punishable, because the state can pass judgment only on external acts and behavior, not on things which belong to the inner psychic life of man. An act in itself is neither moral nor immoral; it is moral or immoral only in so far as the disposition or intention, whose out- ward expression it is, is moral or immoral. The state is justified in opposing, and obliged to oppose, and, when possible, to prevent, immoral acts, only in so far as such acts are an injury to the goods of individuals or of the community pro- tected by the state, or when there is danger that immoral acts may cause such injury. In such cases the state interferes, not because the inten- tion, from which the acts proceed, is immoral, but because such acts either injure, or threaten to in- jure, the goods, which are under the legal protec- tion of the state. It is only external acts, there- fore, which belong to the police supervision of the state, and not morality or immorality of intention. — Acts proceeding from an immoral character or intention, followed by injury to goods protected by the law, draw after them legal consequences, which are determined by the different parts of the law, particularly by the criminal or penal law. The object of police regulations for the public security is the prevention of these violations of the law. Police regulations in the interest of morality, on the contrary, concern themselves only with those acts which of themselves are not an injury to interests recognized by the law, to property, etc.; which do not even always expose such interests to injury; but which, by the spread and encouragement of an immoral character in the community, are apt to cause injury or expose to danger the goods of individuals or of the com- munity. Police regulations in the interests of morality, therefore, are not aimed at the immoral intention itself, but at the spread and encourage- ment of the immoral character; and even in this case only when such spread and encouragement threatens injury to legally protected interests. It hence results, that the sphere of such regulations ' in the modern state is a very narrow one, and that it is confined to a limited number of external im- moral acts. And, as these regulations do not oppose immorality because immoral, but because it is the cause of injury to the community, it follows that the legal provisions of states in the matter of public morality will be different in dif- ferent states, according as the prevalence of such injury is greater or less. The diversity of the stages of culture, of the character, of the customs and economic conditions in different nations, pro- duces a diversity in the police regulations relating to morality. The objects with which police regu- lations in the interests of morality are chiefly con- cerned, are drunkenness, gambling and Sexual pro- fligacy. In recent times these regulations have rightly been extended so as to make them cover cruelty to animals. –I. Drunkenness. The indul- gence in intoxicating beverages, which is to be found among almost all nations of the past and of the present, is not in itself immoral, but be- comes immoral when, through excess, it begins to exert an injurious effect on the body and on the mind. Man then undermines his bodily and his mental powers, in order to afford a mo- mentary gratification to the senses. But in so far as the individual, by excessive indulgence in intoxicating beverages, injures only himself, it is not the duty of the state to interfere with him. The state is not bound to relieve its adult subjects of their moral responsibility, nor to protect them against the consequences of their own individual immorality. But when drunk- enness no longer appears as an isolated phenom- enon; when, over the whole people, or Oyer any single class of the population, it asserts its lament- trº * 208 POLICE. able power, its injurious effects are not limited to the individual who is its slave, but are felt by the family, by society, and by the state, and it imper- ils the very foundations of the family, and the life of the state. Recent investigations have proved that excessive indulgence in intoxicants not only acts injuriously on the organism, that it not only increases the liability to sickness, and increases the mortality of drinkers, but also, that through the influence of alcoholism, many symptoms of degen- eracy are transmitted to offspring. Although the statistical data are here somewhat defective, it is an incontestable fact, that the drunkenness of pa- rents transmits to their progeny the tendency to a number of serious diseases, under which the latter sooner or later succumb. The destruction of family life, caused by alcoholism, and the effects of habitual parental drunkenness on the children, can not be shown statistically, but these effects are so manifest that statistics are superfluous. The consequences of intemperance extend far be- yond the family circle, when it has become a vice of the nation, or of any class of society. There is no doubt whatever that intemperance is a fruitful source of the increase of crime and of criminals. “Poverty, ignorance, sensuality, irreligion and immorality are greatly favored by alcoholism, and proportionately diminished by the temperate habits of the people.” In this sense alcoholism very per- ceptibly influences the increase of crime. We are convinced that drunkenness and alcoholism ren- der man inclined to commit unlawful acts, which differ according to time, place and circumstances; because under their influence he is unable to con- trol any transient impulse of the will, and can not subject it, as when he is sober, to the control of the judgment. It is a truth that, with the in- crease of intermperance and of drunkards—which is not altogether identical with the increase of the consumption of alcohol in general—the number of crimes and of criminals also increases. And in this opinion all those agree who are best acquaint- ed with the lives of criminals, to wit, the judges and magistrates of all countries.* We certainly must not here overlook the fact, that a number of crimes, committed by drunkards or in a state of drunkenness, would probably have been commit- ted, even if the perpetrators had not been addicted to drink; still, it is certain that intemperance and drunkenness in very many instances are the ele- ment but for the presence of which these crimes would not have been committed. — As to the num- ber of drunkards among prisoners, and the num- ber of Crimes committed under the influence of * Bär, p. 341, etc. According to Bär (p. 343), the most ex- perienced judges, magistrates and prison officials in England have declared, that three-fourths to four-fifths of all crimes are the result of intemperance. In the year 1877, before a parliamentary committee, nineteen prison superintendents and clergymen stated that the number of prisoners who were victims of intemperance amounted to 60–90 per cent. of all criminals (p. 344). In Germany, according to Bär (p. 348), in the year 1875, of 32,837 prisoners, there were 13,706 drunkards (41.7 per cent.), 7,269 occasional drinkers (22.1 per cent.), and 6,437 habitual drunkards (19.6 per cent.). 2- alcohol, we possess statistical proof showing the influence of intemperance in producing crime. On the other hand, we lack sufficient data to show the precise influence of intemperance on the number of those who claim public assistance. In spite of this absence of statistical proof, we may safely assume that in numerous cases pauperism has its Source in the intemperance of the assisted in- dividual, or of his parents. The cause of pau- perism lies in the disturbance of domestic econom- ic conditions. The loss of bodily and intellectual power renders it impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for the person impoverished by intem- perance to rehabilitate himself. —In this way in- temperance exercises highly injurious effects on family and national life, as well as on the state. We must accordingly regard it as the duty of the state to protect itself against the dangers by which it is threatened from intemperance. In Several countries the efforts of society, unsup- ported by the state, have been able, for a time at least, to stop the progress of intemperance. Thus, the temperance and total abstinence societies in the United States and Great Britain have exercised a beneficent influence. In the year 1808 a tem- perance society was founded at Moreau, in the state of New York, but it failed of any marked success. But a temperance society, which was finally established in 1827, and whose members pledged themselves to total abstinence from all alcoholic beverages, rapidly gained a vast num- ber of adherents. In 1828 there had been formed 280 temperance societies, with 30,000 members; in 1835 the number of the societies had increased to 8,000, with 1,500,000 members." More than 4,000 whisky distilleries were closed, and more than 8,000 merchants had given up the traffic in spirits. In recent times, however, these temper- ance societies have decreased. In England, the first temperance society was established in 1829. In that country, above all, the teetotal temper- ance society, established in 1835, had a large membership, while in 1840, and subsequently, Father Mathew, both in Ireland and in England, gained honorable distinction in his warfare against intemperance. At present there exist in Great Britain many large societies, with abundant means at their command, among which the na- tional temperance league seems to be the most important. In Germany, beginning with the year 1838, and chiefly in Prussia, Hanover, Oldenburg, etc., several temperance societies were formed, which, in spite of violent opposition, gained a large number of adherents. Nevertheless, after 1846, the activity of these societies daily dimin- ished; most of them ultimately dissolved, and the few that have survived until the present, have dragged out a sickly existence. The history of these associations in Germany proves that the ac- tion of society does not suffice for the suppression of intemperance. Hence, even the successful soci- eties in England and the United States have felt the necessity of invoking the aid of the state, of the police and of the legislature. The state can POLICE. 209 not refuse to grant this aid. Still, in granting it, the legislator should bear in mind that it is not the task of the state to make individuals moral. It should only seek, as far as possible, to protect society from the damage, and prevent the injury, caused by intemperance. To this end, the state may put obstacles in the way of temptation to intemperance, and, by the imposition of suitable penalties, oppose the spread of intemperance. — The most important means at the command of the state, to oppose the temptation to intemper- ance, is the limitation and surveillance of drink- ing places, and of the retail trade in spirits.” – The adoption of the so-called “police hour * (closing time) has also proved a means to prevent the spread of intemperance, by restricting the Sale of intoxicants to certain hours. The legisla- tures of several states of the Union have resorted to still more effective measures. Through the influence of the temperance societies in the state of Maine, a law was passed, which forbids the sale of all intoxicating drinks, with the exception of cider and native wine. In the years follow- ing, Maine's example was imitated by many other states, which subsequently revoked the prohibi- tion. Experience has shown that the state is unable to enforce a law of this kind, and that the real good which it may effect is more than coun- terbalanced by the hypocrisy and demoralization which it causes. In other states of the Union an effort has been made to turn the saloon keepers themselves into instruments to oppose intemper- ance, by rendering them liable for all the conse- quences of intemperance. It is provided, that any one who by the sale of intoxicants shall have caused the drunkenness of another, shall be re- sponsible for the injury which the drunkard, his family, etc., may have suffered in their property, means of subsistence, or in their persons. In Eng- land (Law of 1872, art. 3), in France (Law of Jan. 23, 1878, art. 4), in Sweden (Law of 1869, § 29), and in The Netherlands (Law of June, 1881, art. 17), it is forbidden to publicans to sell intoxi- cants to individuals already drunk, or to minors under the age of sixteen. — Finally, the statemay threaten the excesses of intemperance with pun- ishment. In Germany, the penal law of the em- pire punishes by imprisonment all persons who abandon themselves to drink to such a degree that they fall into a condition such that they must appeal to the authorities for their own support, or for the sustenance of those whom they naturally are obliged to support. By virtue of this law the police authorities may also obtain the power to place the sentenced person, at the expiration of his punishment, for two years in a workhouse, or to employ him in works of public utility. But even these provisions may not prove sufficient. Under these laws the interposition of the state does not take place before the drunkard has reached such a degree of moral depravity that his cure is impossible. The sojourn in a workhouse, more- over, is but seldom favorable to the improvement of the habitual drunkard, and the threat of pun- ishment can scarcely produce any deterrent effect on him. The penal police laws in several German states, as well as the legislation of Sweden (Penal Code of Feb. 16, 1864, § 15), of England (Law of 1872, art. 12), of France (Law of Jan. 23, 1873), of Austria (Law of July 19, 1879, valid only in Galicia and Bukowina), of The Netherlands (Law of 1881, art. 22, 23), go still further, and threaten with punishment all who are found in taverns, in the street, or in other public places, in a condition Schaumburg-Lippe. Nevertheless, the ordinance caused a * The general economic principle, that the production ac- commodates itself to the demand for the article produced, is incorrect in so far as the number of drinking places and the retail trade in spirits are concerned, for the reason that the temptations to intemperance are increased by the frequency, convenience and cheapness of the opportunities offered for the gratification of the taste for intoxicants. Where taverns or “saloons" and the retail trade in spirits are completely free, the number of taverns, etc., is not proportioned to the want, but to the power of resistance of the people to the desire, for strong drink. The less this power for resistance is, the greater will be the number of “saloons,” and the more rap- idly will intemperance spread. For this reason the re- tailing of spirituous liquors has in all states been subjected to police regulations, and where these regulations have been abolished, a speedy return to severer ones has been neces- sary. In England the public houses have to be licensed, and the license can be granted only by a permanent com- mittee of the justices of the peace of the county, or of the city, and must be renewed every year. The license is granted only for one definite public house, on which a special tax is laid. (Laws of 1828 and 1872.) In France, by a decree of Dec. 29, 1851, a tavern or inn can be opened only by virtue of a license, issued by the prefect. The prefect may close a tavern, from motives of public security, or be- cause the keeper thereof has been sentenced for a trans- gression of the regulations governing his traffic. The pre- fects are instructed to grant new licenses only after an ex- tremely careful examination into the character of the person and of the demand, and to close a public house as soon as the keeper has become guilty of even the smallest trans- gression of the police regulations. (Ministerial Circular of March 6, 1872.) A peculiar system, and one worthy of attention, prevails in Sweden and Norway. In Sweden the laws of 1857 and 1869 provided, that in every parish the number of taverns should be determined by boards co- operating with the parish authorities, and that they should be leased to the highest bidder. In 1865 there was formed, in the city of Gothenburgh a joint stock company, which rented all the taverns in the city, with a view to limit- ing the retailing of spirituous liquors and opposing in- temperance. All the profits of the business, by the by- laws of the society, go to the treasury of the parish. The highly favorable results obtained by this company caused societies of the same kind to be ſormed in many other cities. In the year 1871, in Norway, a similar law was enacted, and the so-called Gothenburgh system was introduced there. This system, however, has its disadvantages; for a great number of secret drinkihg places were opened, and the police but seldom succeeded in suppressing them. In Ger- many an ordinance of June 21, 1869, makes the business of taverns, as well as the retail trade in brandy and spirits, de- pendent on the obtaining of a license. The license, how- ever, can be denied: 1, when there is reason to believe that the person asking it is likely to abuse it for the encourage- ment of excessive drinking, gambling, or of immorality; 2, when the place intended for the trade, by reason of its posi- tion, etc., does not satisfy the requirements of the police. When it is not contrary to territorial laws, the territorial administrations may make the permission to retail intox1- cants dependent on proof of actual public demand. This is the case in Prussia, Saxony, Mecklenburg, Brunswick, Saxe- Meiningen, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Altenburg, Reuss and 133 VOL. III. – 14 notable increase in the number of retail shops for the Sale of intoxicants, 210 POLICE. of evident or scandalous intoxication. — The state can also, in an indirect way, effect a diminution of the use of intoxicants, by raising the price of whisky, etc., the most injurious of all, by taxa- tion. Still, in the warfare against intemperance, this expedient does not deserve to have the im- portance attached to it which it has enjoyed. Experience has thus far shown that the taxation of whisky, etc., which exceeds a certain limit, has only ruinous consequences, because it leads to fraud, and efforts to evade the law; it favors the secret consumption of whisky, and causes a diminution in the revenues of the state. All these measures owe their origin to the opinion that intemperance is a vice when public, and that it must be combated by the state, by reason of its dangers to the community. Careful observations and investigations, however, have demonstrated that intemperance, when it reaches a certain de- gree, becomes a real disease, which destroys the empire of reason over the will to such an extent that its victim becomes unable to resist his passion for strong drink. But experience has shown that in many cases a cure of the disease can be effected by skillful professional treatment, and through a complete denial to the patient of all alcoholic drinks. *— II. Gambling. The economic and mor- al evils produced by a love for gambling among a people are so evident that they require no proof. The state does not assume the task of freeing the individual from the passion or vice of gambling, but it is its duty to oppose open temptations to gambling, and, above all, not to induce its citizens to engage in games of hazard. In states also which from financial motives do not believe themselves able to abolish the state lotteries, as in Italy, Aus- tria and in several German states, there is no doubt as to the injury done by such institutions. In the German empire the legislature has, by the follow- ing provisions, sought to prevent open temptations to gambling. 1. Public gambling houses shall nei- ther be licensed nor tolerated. On Dec. 31, 1872, the last houses of the kind that existed in Ger- many were closed under the law of July 1, 1868. 2, Public lotteries and public raffling of movable or immovable goods can take place only with the permission of the authorities (Penal Code of the Empire, § 286); the law also forbids the sale or offer of tickets in foreign lotteries, unless allowed by the government of the country. 3. Only the authorities can permit games of hazard on the high road (street, square), or in a public place or inn. Inn keepers who permit games of hazard in their places, or connive at such games played secretly, are also liable to punishment. 4. The business of games of hazard for purposes of gain is forbidden, and may be severely punished. Per- sons violating these laws are punished by im- prisonment for a term of two years; besides which * To this effect, asylums for the inebriate were established in the United States (in 1857 in Boston), asylums in which cures are frequently effected. It has been claimed that in the asylums in the United States cures have been effected in 35 per cent. of the cases. a pecuniary fine of from 300 to 6,000 marks, with the loss of certain civil rights, may also be in- flicted on them. If the person sentenced is a foreigner the police authorities may expel him from the federal territory. — Provided the above regulations are respected, games, and even games of hazard, are not forbidden in the German empire. As in the case of the drunkard, the gambler is threatened with punishment by the penal code of the empire when his case is analogous to the drunkard's. When sentenced to imprisonment, the police authorities may be empowered to send him, at the expiration of his term of punishment, to a workhouse for two years, or to employ him in works of common utility. —III. Prostitution. Changed ideas in reference to the attitude of the state toward immorality are nowhere so evident as in the legal treatment of sexual profligacy. While from the seventeenth century until the middle of the eighteenth the state declared all sexual immorality punishable, and threatened it with heavy punishments, since that time, chiefly owing to the influence of Beccaria, the opinion has prevailed that sexual immorality should be treated as a crime only when it is accompanied by the violation of a legally protected right; but that the state should not punish immorality as such. The police of public morality should, according to this view, oppose only seduction, and the public scandal caused by immorality.j Modern penal codes in the main adopt this view, as does also the penal code of the German empire. There are, however, certain exceptional crimes against chas- tity which involve no violation of a legally pro- tected right, but which are punished, even when there can be no question of public Scandal. To these exceptions belong the unnatural crimes of sodomy, etc. Leaving these exceptions out of consideration, the state proceeds against sexual incontinence, which does not violate a legally protected right, such as the freedom and honor of the person, the family, etc., only from motives of order. But moral police reasons are not here the only controlling ones. It is well known that syph- ilis, which preys on the very marrow of nations, has been propagated chiefly by sexual profligacy. Even if it be no concern of the state to protect individuals against the injurious consequences of + In the middle ages the church used to punish every kind of unchastity as an ecclesiastic transgression, but it is known how widespread sexual profligacy was in the middle ages among the clergy and laity, and how openly it was practiced. Loose women were not only tolerated, but public brothels were considered necessary institutions in a city. They frequently were the property of the lords of the coun- try or city; they were leased out by them, or kept for them by brothel masters or mistresses whom they appointed. Private brothels were licensed, and stood under the protec- tion of public authority, but had to pay certaill laxes. In most German cities brothels had to be tolerated under police supervision, and the laws against simple prostitution, as a rule, remained void of effect. f In Germany it was mainly the work of Cella on crimes and transgressions in the matter of unchastity (1786), that paved the way for the opinion that simple incontinence, which appears only as vice, without offending the rights of others, or creating public Scandal, is not punishable. POLICE. 211 immorality, it must be remembered that syphilis does not confine its ravages to those who have brought it upon themselves by their profligacy. It may be transmitted in various other ways (particularly through wet-nurses to infants) and by inheritance it bequeaths destruction to future generations. Here, public moral police must go hand in hand with sanitary police. — The state should see to it, that the moral sense of the peo- ple, and public decorum, are not outraged by in- decent public exhibitions. The ſollowing, there- fore, should be punished: 1, persons who cause public scandal by indecent acts; 2, persons sell- ing indecent writings, pictures or drawings, who distribute them, or who exhibit or affix them in places frequented by the public; 3, fornication, when it causes a public scandal. The state should punish, not only treacherous inducements to in- continence or to unchastity when accompanied by the violation of particular duties, and the se- duction of minors, or girls under sixteen, but also seduction when it assumes a character dangerous to the interests of the community. It is not the duty of the state to make the individual moral, or to protect her against temptations to immor- ality; but it should endeavor to prevent all acts of immorality calculated to poison family life and the life of the nation. The law, therefore, rightly punishes procurers or panders, that is, the intentional enticement of others to unchastity. Still, it is very questionable to what extent the state should declare panders punishable. In this matter the provisions of law in different countries are very different. In France (Code pénal, art. 334), habitual panderage is punished only when it facilitates the seduction of minors; but, accord- ing to the penal code of the German empire, those persons are punished for panderage who, habitually or from motives of gain, through their mediation, or through the affording of Oppor- tunities, promote unchastity. According to this, the keeping of loose women in brothels for pur- poses of prostitution is punishable. But it is questionable whether this prohibition can be rec- onciled with the requirements of sanitary police. Sanitary police, which must prevent the spread of syphilis, can only perform this task by subject- ing to a strict control all women who carry on prostitution as a trade. This control is unques- tionably facilitated when ordinary prostitution, in the larger cities at least, is confined to relatively few brothels, and when the police seek to sup- press all prostitution outside of these houses. It is not propér to assume that the state acts contrary to duty when it tolerates houses of prostitution, for it has not to combat vice as such, but only to react against the spread of incontinence as a com- mon danger.” By the toleration of brothels the state does not lend support to vice, but it leaves the temptation to vice unpunished, only because from its suppression there would result greater disad- * For this reason, Mohl, on principle, advocates the tol- eration of brothels. W. Oettingen (Moral Statistik, p. 171, etc.) agrees with him in this. vantages than advantages to the community. — There is no need here of closely examining the question, whether or not sanitary police requires the toleration and strict supervision of brothels; but, if it does, there exists in principleno objection against it, from the point of view of the police of public morality. Simple sexual incontinence may not be forbidden by the state, but the state should oppose the trade in unchastity by loose women; for there result therefrom great dangers both to health and public morality. — Prostitu- tion as a trade leads easily to seduction, which is socially dangerous, and to the causing of pub- lic scandal; and, On the other hand, it favors the spread of syphilis. The penal code of the German empire therefore forbids the trade of pros- titution to women who are not subject to police supervision, and punishes prostitutes under police supervision if they neglect the regulations of the police that have been made in the interest of health, of public order and public decorum. — The task of the police regulations in the interest of public morality is, accordingly, to suppress all prostitu- tion that seeks to escape police supervision, and, through proper police regulations and their en- forcement, to bring it about that vice should not escape the obscurity which alone beseems it. The task of sanitary police, while seeking to prevent the spread of syphilis through pros- titution, is more difficult. Dancing “saloons” should also be subjected to special police super- vision, as they frequently lead to seduction and incontinence, and to the disturbance of public peace and order. —IV. Cruelty to Animals. The state interferes to prevent cruelty to animals, in order to prevent the moral sense of the people being shocked by such cruelty perpetrated on animals, and to afford a protection to the animals themselves against any unnecessary, and hence immoral, cruelty of that nature. In France this protection extends only to domestic animals (ani- maua, domestiques). The law of July 2, 1850, threatens with punishment any one who publicly unseemingly (abusivement) maltreats domestic ani- mals. In England, as early as the year 1823, a law was passed against Cruelty to animals. The laws in force there at present are those of 1850 and 1855 (12 and 13 Vict., ch. 92; 17 and 18 Vict., chap. 60): they threaten all ill treatment of domestic animals with punishment. Under the influence of an unhealthy sentimental movement, a law was also passed, in 1870, against scien- tific experiments on live animals (vivisection; 39 and 40 Vict., ch. 77). According to this law, any painful experiments on live animals are per- mitted only to persons who have received an au- thorization from the minister, which, however, + Where brothels are tolerated, they should be subjected to strict supervision, not only in the interest of Sanitary police, but, above all, to prevent their becoming hot-beds of vice. It is desirable to give prostitutes the possibility of emancipating themselves from the control of panders and brothel-keepers. The strongest objection against the toler- ation of brothels consists in this, that in most cases the return to a good life is rendered impossible to their inmates. 212 POLICE POWER OF A STATE. may at any time be revoked. Vivisection can only be practiced under the conditions imposed by the law. In granting the license the minister may also add any other conditions at will. The efforts to prevent scientific investigations by a law of this kind have hitherto proved vain in Germany. EDGAR LOENING. POLICE POWER OF A STATE. The police power of the state is an authority conferred by the American constitutional system upon the in- dividual states, through which they are enabled to establish a special department of police; adopt such regulations as tend to prevent the commis- sion of fraud, violence, or other offenses against the state; aid in the arrest of criminals, and Se- cure generally the comfort, health and prosperity of the state, by preserving the public Order, pre- venting a conflict of rights in the common inter- course of the citizen, and insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privileges con- ferred upon him by the laws of his country. The organization of a state police, which shall fulfill its functions effectively, and yet leave to the in- dividual unimpaired freedom under the liberal laws of a republican form of government, is one of the most delicate tasks ever intrusted to the lawgiver. —Blackstone defines the system to be “the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood and good manners, and to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations.” (4 Bl. Com., 162.) — Jeremy Bentham, in his “General View of Public Offenses,” defines it to be a system of precaution for the prevention of crimes or of calamities. – With regard to its effect upon the use and enjoy- ment of property, the object being to exhibit the universality of its presence, and to define the limits which settled principles of constitutional law assign to its interference, Chief Justice Shaw declares it to be a settled principle (Commonwealth os. Alger, 7 Cushing, 84), that every holder of property, however absolute may be his title, holds it under an implied liability that its use shall not be injurious to the equal rights of another in the enjoyment of his property; nor injurious to the rights of the people of a community. And the right to adopt regulations necessary to enforce this limitation by legislative enactments under the controlling power vested in them by the national constitution, differs from the right of eminent domain, which only permits a government to pos- sess itself of private property whenever the pub- lic needs require it, on the condition of granting a reasonable compensation therefor. It is less difficult to conceive of the existence and sources of this power which permits the adoption of vari- ous laws, statutes and Ordinances for the good and welfare of the community, than to define its limits and lay down the rules for its exercise. — It is a recognized principle that the national gov- ernment can not, through any of its departments, invade the reserved rights of the states, and as- sume the power of Supervising their police regula- tions, when they do not conflict with the national sovereignty and the exercise of federal authority conferred by the constitution. Nevertheless, the powers of the states may be so employed as to conflict with the jurisdiction of the national gov- ernment, and Serious questions have arisen be- tween the police power of the state and the authority conferred upon congress by the consti- tution. To prevent the state from operating within the sphere of the national government, in the exercise of this conferred power, its limits can be extended no further than a just regulation of its rights demands for the protection of the citi- zen of the state in the enjoyment of life, liberty, health and property. Says Cooley (Con. Lim., 574), “This subject has often been considered in its bearings upon the clause of the constitution of the United States, which forbids the states pass- ing any laws violating the obligations of con- tracts; and invariably it has been held that this clause does not so far remove from state control the rights and properties which depend for their existence on enforcement of contracts, as to re- lieve them from the operation of such general regulations for the good government of the state and the protection of the rights of individuals as may be deemed important. All contracts and all rights, it is held, are subject to this power; and regulations which affect them may not only be established by the state, but must also be sub- ject to change from time to time, with reference to the general well-being of the community, as circumstances change, or as experience demon- strates the necessity.”—Perhaps the most striking illustration of the principle here stated, will be found among the judicial decisions which hold that the rights insured to private corporations by their charters, and the manner of their exercise, are subject to such new regulations as from time to time may be made by the state, with a view to the public protection, health and safety, and to properly guard the rights of other individuals and corporations. Although these charters are considered as contracts, and their rights held in- violable, it does not follow that they are removed from state regulation. Nevertheless, there must be a limit to the exercise of the police power of the state. The regulating ordinances must have reference to the comfort, safety or welfare of so- ciety; they must not conflict with any provisions of the charter, nor take from the corporation any of the essential rights and privileges which the charter confers. They must, in fact, be police reg- ulations, and not amendments to the charter itself, as, where a corporation was chartered with the right to exact toll from passengers, a Subsequent statute authorizing a certain class of passengers to travel free over the road was held to be void. (Pingrey vs. Washburn, 1 Aiken, 268.) The rule has been further held, that, while the corporate charter itself contained a provision empowering a POLICE POWER OF A STATE. 213 legislature to alter, modify or repeal it, such a provision would not, on pretext of amendment or police regulation, have the effect to appropriate any portion of the corporate property to the pub- lic ouse. Nr would it justify an act requiring a railroad company to cause a proposed new street or highway to be taken across their track and all labor and materials necessary for the same to be furnished at their own expense. (Miller vs. New York & Erie R. R. Co., 21 Barb., 513.) Nor can a corporation he held liable for the obstruction of a river, by a subsequent amendment to a charter granting them the right to erect a bridge over a navigable stream, which must necessarily obstruct the said river. Nor can the police power of a state, in regulating the speed of railway carriages, ex- tend further than the streets and public grounds of a city. But it can require all railroad corpora- tions to fence their tracks, and hold them liable for the loss of all domestic animals killed thereon, and for the double reason of protection to domes- tic animals and to persons being transported in railway carriages. Under the common law rule, where a corporation has failed to obey the regula- tions adopted for its government, and injury has resulted therefrom, such disobedience would not make the corporation liable to the party injured, if his own negligence aided that of the corpora- tion in producing the injury. Nevertheless, under the police power of the state, a legislature may enact such a law as shall hold the corporation liable for the animals thus destroyed, notwith- standing the negligence of the party injured. The state may likewise, under the same power, regu- late the grade of railroads, and prescribe the way in which railroads shall cross each other, and ap- portion the expense of such crossings among the corporations owning the roads. It may also es- tablish regulations requiring existing railroads to ring the bell and blow the whistle of their engines at all places on their roads where their approach might be dangerous to travel. And it has been held that the power may extend so far as to make such corporations liable as insurers for the safety of their passengers in the same manner they are by law liable as common carriers. (Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co., 27 Wt., 152.) And those statutes of the various states which grant an action to the representatives of persons killed by the neglect, default or wrongful act of an- other, may apply to corporations already chartered. and give a remedy for a wrong which the com- mon law fails to supply.—Another point where the police power of the state has by some been held to conflict with the federal constitution is, where by statute the sale of intoxicating liquors has been altogether prohibited. The weight of authority, however, determines the question thus : when these statutes merely assume to regulate and to prohibit sales by other persons than those licensed by public authority, there can be no question of a conflict with constitutional power entertained, as they are but simple police regulations of the same character as those which any state or community might adopt for the regulation of any class of trade 'or employment. Those which prohibit entirely the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, have been attacked as subversive of fun- damental rights, and urged to be in violation of ex- press provisions of the federal constitution relating to the commerce of the states. This view of the case, however, although strongly advocated, was not sustained by the supreme court of the United States in the noted license cases. The majority of the court expressed the opinion that the intro- duction into a state of imported liquors could not be prevented, as it would be in conflict with the act of congress regulating commerce and levying imposts; but it ceased to be an impost when broken up for retail, and at once became subject to the laws of the state, and amenable to taxation and regulation by the state, the same as other property; and further, that the power to regulate commerce between the states did not exclude regu- lations by the state save when they conflicted with the laws of congress. – It would thus appear that the state laws, known as prohibitory liquor laws, are not held void, as in conflict with national authority, in the regulation of commerce between the states. The same laws have been sustained when urged to be in conflict with state constitu- tions, on the ground that they are police regula- tions established by the legislature for the preven- tion of intemperance, vagrancy and crime. The power to declare the sale of liquor to be a nuisance has been determined by the court, and it has been held competent to provide legal process for its destruction, and for the seizure and condemna- tion of the building in which it is sold, as a nuisance, provided the fundamental principle of protection which surrounds persons and dwellings relating to seizure and search shall not be invad- ed, and that the right of trial shall be granted before condemnation. Says Cooley (Con. Lim., p. 583): “Perhaps there is no instance in which the power of the legislature to make such reg- ulations as may destroy the value of property without compensation to the owner, appears in a more striking light than in the cases of these statutes. The trade in alcoholic drinks being lawful, and the capital employed in it being fully protected by law, the legislature then steps in, and for general reasons of public utility an- nihilates the traffic, destroys altogether the em- ployment, and reduces to a nominal value the property on hand. The sale of liquor becomes a criminal offense, and the merchant of yesterday be- comes the criminal of to-day, and the very building in which he lives, and conducts the business which at that moment was lawful, becomes a nuisance, if the statute shall so declare, and liable to be pro- ceeded against for a forfeiture. Statutes which can do this must be justified upon the highest reasons of public benefit; but whether satisfactory or not, they rest exclusively in the legislative wis- dom.” — Other matters affecting commerce, in which the police power of the state may be in- voked in behalf of the public interests, are quar- 214 POLICE POWER OF A STATE. antine regulations, and health laws in all forms. These latter may be so far extended as to embrace' the destruction of private property when infected by disease, or dangerous in other particulars. In- spection laws may be adopted and duties levied to make them operative. Regulations may also be enforced regarding the time and manner of trans- acting business to promote trade, establish Order and prevent confusion. These regulations em- brace the right to control the movements and sta- tion of ships and vessels in the harbors of cities, and streams lying within the limits of cities and seaport towns, and the wharves thereof, and to remove such vessels as had discharged or received their cargoes to enable others to perform the same essential labor; and penalties may be inflicted upon all such as refuse to obey the directions of the harbor masters who are vested with the au- thority to determine such matters. (Vanderbilt w8. Adams, 7 Cow., 351.) Congress, however, may establish police regulations, as well as the states, relating to all subjects where control is given by the constitution, but as this power can be more Satisfactorily exercised by local authority, and the jurisdiction to arrest collision is confined to the United States courts, congress has generally rele- gated this power to the states. – Questions have arisen with regard to the power of a state to enact laws requiring importers of foreign goods to take out a license, and in case of refusal, to inflict penalties and forfeitures. Such acts have been held void as not partaking of the principles of mere police regulations such as might require the payment of a license fee to cover expenses of en- forcing harbor regulations, but rather of the power of taxation to raise revenue for the state, and therefore in conflict with the provision of the constitution which prohibits a state from laying imposts or levying duties, and likewise with the provision that congress alone shall possess the power to regulate commerce. But the police power of a state has been sustained (City of New York vs. Miln, 11 Peters, 102), inflicting a penalty upon the master of every foreign vessel who should not report, upon arrival in port, to the mayor or recorder of the city, an account of the names, places of birth, business, etc., of his pas- sengers; this police regulation having been adopted to prevent the city of New York from being bur- dened by persons shipped as paupers or criminals by foreign governments. Notwithstanding the fact that congress can adopt all laws regulating pilots and pilotage, a state regulation relating to the same has been held unobjectionable, when such power had not been exercised by that body. — With regard to the power of a state to enact such laws as shall compel all persons to refrain from labor during the first day of the week, it has been held by the courts that such laws were not encroachments upon the religious liberty of persons who do not regard that day as sacred, nor in conflict with the constitution because act- ing as a restraint upon the trade and commerce of a community, or rendering void a contract for Sunday Services. – An important part of the jurisdiction of a state is the control of its high- ways. These are constructed by the state, and the state has full power to adopt all police regula- tions for the public good controlling the actions of those who use them, and to alter and change them as the proper authorities consider best for the general interest. This power enables a state to determine the mode of travel; regulate the speed; cause parties meeting to turn each to their right; prevent a public nuisance; prohibit animals from running at large under penalty of fine and confis- cation; require the owners of incorporated prop- erty to construct, and keep in repair and free from obstruction, the sidewalks in front of it, and, in case of failure, to perform such work at the ex- pense of the owner, the courts having held such acts not to be in the nature of taxation, on account of the paramount interest which the owners have in the performance of the work, and their pecu- liar ability to perform it promptly in accordance with the necessity of the community; and for sim- ilar reasons require the owners of adjacent lands, where the country was liable to be overflowed by a stream of considerable size, to construct lev- ees upon their river front at their own expense, and in default thereof, to cause such work to be done under the direction of the public authorities, and to assess the expense upon the lands of such owners. — Navigable waters are declared public highways, and as such are under the control of the states. At common law, only those streams. were held to be navigable where the tide ebbed and flowed, but all streams of sufficient depth of water to render them capable of navigation for useful purposes were known as public, and be- came subject to the same general rules governing the public highways on land. In this country the rule has been adopted to consider all streams. public whose capacity is sufficient for channels. of commerce in floating the products of the soil, forests and mines of the country through which they flow, although at stated periods of the year they may become too shallow for navigable pur. poses, such as the floating of logs and rafts of timber. Therefore, as public highways, all such streams are under the control of the state author- ity, and subject to all proper police regulations, as much so as a land highway. But if a stream, in its natural condition, is not thus useful, and has. been created so by the subsequent labor of the owners of the soil, it is not public property nor liable to police regulations as such; and it remains in the nature of a private way or easement, unless the owner chooses to dedicate it to public use. It has been held that a legislature may determine what streams within the boundaries of a state are navigable, and subject to police regulations as highways (Glover vs. Powell, 2 Stockt., 211); still, this proposition is combated with the rule of law that the legislature can not, by a simple declara- tion, appropriate private property to public use without just compensation. – While general con- trol and regulation of navigable streams rest with POLICE POWER OF A STATE. 215 the state authorities, there are certain restrictions upon this right emanating from the constitutional power of congress over commerce with foreign nations and between the states. Wherever a river forms a highway upon which foreign commerce or that between the states is conducted, it passes under the control of congress, on account of this constitutional restriction. But, as already ob- served, should congress fail for any reason to ex- ert this power, or if, having exercised it, the state law should not conflict with the national, the fact that a stream is navigable would not bar a state from adopting just regulations for its use and con- trol. — Under the decisions of the federal courts, a state can not grant an exclusive monopoly for the navigation of any part of the waters within its jurisdiction upon which commerceis conducted under coasting licenses by authority of congress, as such grant would conflict with the power which congress has exercised. But if the upper waters of a stream lying within its limits are wholly separated from tide water by impassable falls, and are not a continuous stream Open to foreign or state commerce, a state law granting exclusive control to a party to navigate them can not be voided on the ground of conflict with the au- thority of congress to regulate commerce. — It is competent for a state to exact toll from all com- merce passing through its navigable waters for the benefit of any improvement by the state where it has expended money, although the stream may be one over which the regulations of commerce ex- tend, because the state has the same right to improve a water as a land highway. — A state may direct the construction of bridges over navi- gable streams for highway purposes, although they may in some degree interfere with free nav- igation. If congress has no control over the stream, the right can not be questioned at all on the ground of public inconvenience. If the stream is under the control of congress, it becomes necessary to determine whether or not the con- struction of such a bridge will conflict with its regulations. Although the bridge to some extent may prove a hindrance to commerce, it is not absolutely unlawful for a state to construct it, if the general traffic of the country be aided rather than depressed by its construction; as the naviga- tion of a stream may be far less important than the construction of a bridge, and its obstruction be a much lighter burden upon the people than a break in the line of railroad travel by compelling the use of a ferry, with its dilatory operations, es- pecially when draws are so constructed as to admit the passage of vessels through the bridges with but slight inconvenience and loss of time. The decision of the question, however, does not rest with the state authority as to the relative character of obstructions, but with the federal courts, which have jurisdiction to determine the same, and cause the removal of the obstruction if it be found to unnecessarily impede or destroy the traffic upon the stream. — As ferries over navigable streams are but the creation of highways, the states may lawfully establish them, grant licenses for keeping the same, and prohibit persons from engaging in Such Occupations without such license, and it does not impair the right of a state to enact such laws, though a part of the waters be without the juris- diction of the state, or a highway for interstate or foreign commerce. —Dams may also be con- structed by state authority across navigable streams; and such as involve no question of fed- eral authority are exempt from being declared a nuisance, through legislative consent to construct them; and so long as the builder confines himself to the provisions of the legislative charter, he like- wise is exempt from any liability to private action for injury to river navigation. — A state possesses the same power to regulate the speed, mode of travel and general conduct of ships and other vessels upon its water highways that it does upon its land highways, subject, however, to the limi- tation that its ordinances must not conflict with the laws of congress for the regulation of foreign and domestic commerce. — There are some ex- treme points to which the police power of a state may extend, where the control of property by individual owners may be interfered with and even destroyed by public authority, when the owners themselves have performed all the duties of good citizenship, and in no way violated a law or defied public authority. Such cases are to be cited, when the public exigency is so great, and the public interests so overwhelming, as to justify its seizure and destruction, on the highest grounds of public interest. Such would be the seizure and destruction of private property to prevent the spread of flames, the advance of a pestilence or an invading army, or any other great calamity where the highest interests of the public are in- volved. In all such cases the rights of indi- viduals, which in times of peace and health and Order are inalienable, in periods of public calamity sink out of sight, and in all things relating to the public danger private rights yield instantly to the inexorable law of public necessity. — The police power of a state enables a community to protect itself by the establishment of precautionary meas- ures against the destruction of life or health or property, by the enactment of ordinances defining the limits, within the denser portions of towns, cities and villages, within which buildings com- posed of inflammable materials can not be erected. Wharf lines may be established, although they may prevent the owners of water fronts from erecting buildings on that which constitutes pri- vate property. For the protection of a harbor, a legislative enactment may prevent the removal of stones, Sand or gravel from the beach, under pen- alties, applicable to the owners of the soil equally with all other persons. – Under the police power of a state, a special use of property may at times be prohibited, where, by the change of circum- stances surrounding it, and without any offense or even dereliction of duty by the owner, that which was once lawful and unobjectionable becomes a public nuisance and inimical to the life and health 216 POLITICAL ECONOMY. of the community. Bridges and mill dams that occasion overflows or accrete such substances as produce miasmatic growths of vegetation, may be removed or destroyed for this cause. Cemeteries and graveyards, and bone boiling and refining es- tablishments, whose locus ºn quo was once remote from the heart of a city, but which from Swift urban growth have become incorporated within the limits of the same, and hence detrimental to the health of the population, are liable to be closed for such purposes. The keeping of gunpowder in large quantities, or dynamite in towns, villages or cities, may by law be prohibited; the sale of poisonous drugs, unless properly labeled or by order of a practicing physician; the keeping for sale of unwholesome provisions and all other del- eterious substances; unmuzzled dogs running at large, and all such acts, are liable to be forbidden under the authority granted the state to provide for the abatement of nuisances, whether occa- sioned by the offense of the individual or not. — Another matter of great public importance, over which the police power of a state has full and complete jurisdiction, is the preservation of the public morals. Under this power the legislature may, by special enactment, prohibit the keeping, sale or exhibition of indecent or immoral books or pictures, and cause the seizure and destruction of the same, wherever found; close up places of amusement where gaming is resorted to, or regu- late them by license, or forbid the keeping of gam- ing implements for gaming purposes. It may likewise provide such regulations as will prevent the keeping and use of stallions or other breeding animals in public places. It may likewise pro- vide for the compulsory observance of the Chris- tian Sabbath on the first day of the week. — Under this power, markets may be regulated, special places assigned for the venders of special articles, licenses granted, weights and measures established, and merchants and dealers compelled, under pen- alty, to comply with all such regulations. – Such are some of the police powers of the state. They are of such intricacy as to pervade all conditions of business and society. Those enumerated are sufficient to illustrate the authority of the state to establish varied and far-reaching regulations as to the time, manner and circumstances under which its citizens shall maintain and enjoy their rights without conflicting with these great constitutional principles which have been finally settled for the defense of private rights and property. JNO. W. CLAMPITT. POLITICAL ARITHMETIC. METIC, POLITICAL.) (See ARITH- POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS. MENTs, POLITICAL.) (See ASSESS- POLITICAL ECONOMY. I. Preliminary Considerations. In a Cyclopædia like the present it would seem that the article ‘‘ Political Econ- omy" should form one of the central points of the must blush for the science, whole work. It would perhaps be such, if we desired to embrace under this term the various considerations which commend the study of eco- nomic science to those whom it interests, and to set forth the many advantages which may be derived from it. It would be so likewise, if in the article “Political Economy” we attempted to touch upon all the subjects which the science embraces, either for the purpose of showing their importance or their connection. We can not enter into such detail here. We wish simply to define political economy, to give it a point of departure, a formula; to determine its character and object, and to indicate, as far as possible, its extent and limits. – It would be mistaking the nature of such a task to suppose that it can be performed in a few lines. It is not as easy as one might think at first to give an exact definition of political economy, or at least a satisfactory one, one around which all adepts in the science might rally. Many authors, beginning with Adam Smith, have attempted it, but no one seems to have succeeded. Whatever may be the real merit of certain definitions hitherto given, it is certain that, up to the present time, not a single one has been accepted without dispute. It has even fre- quently happened (and this is a more, serious mat- ter) that the very ones who furnished them, sub- sequently contradicted or modified them in the course of their works. It would perhaps be more correct to say that there is not one of these defi- nitions to which its author himself remained faith- ful in the manner in which he conceived and treated his subject. This has caused some of the later teachers of the science to say, that political economy has yet to be defined. “Even if we ” says Rossi, “the economist must confess that the first question still to be examined is this: ‘What is political econ- omy? what is its object, its extent, its limits?’” There is no reason to blush, we think, for being still obliged to put such a question, when we con- sider the natural difficulties it presents; but we must agree, with Rossi, that it is still awaiting a solution. A Belgian writer, Arrivabene, has called attention to this truth in his introduction to a translation of Senior’s “Lectures on Political Economy,” in terms more emphatic than those used by Rossi, bitterly deploring the vagueness, the obscurity, the incoherence, and especially the insufficiency, of all the definitions hazarded by the masters of the science, and calling loudly for a more satisfactory and precise formula. To make this clear, we here reproduce some of the defini- tions furnished by economists generally considered to be of the highest authority. — Adam Smith was usually very sparing of definitions. He, however, gave a few here and there, and they characterized or defined, in the course of his work, the Science which he treated. “Political economy, consid- ered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first, to supply a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or, more properly, to enable them to pro- POLITICAL ECONOMY. 217 vide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or common- wealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.” (“Wealth of Nations,” book iv., introduction.) Without discussing the relative merit of this definition, we shall simply remark that it has in view much less a science than an art, although the idea of a science is put forward in it, and although the word “science” is to be found in it. The author, in fact, appears to enun- ciate a series of precepts which would indeed constitute an art; but not an exposition or an ex- planation of certain natural phenomena, which alone can constitute a science. In substance, if not in form, Adam Smith's definition is nearly like that given by J. J. Rousseau under the term &conomie politique, in the Encyclopédie. We know, however, how widely Adam Smith differed from Rousseau, not only in his conclusions, but espe- cially in his manner of treating his subject. On the other hand, his definition differs greatly, as we shall see, from that of J. B. Say, who fol- lowed in his footsteps, and looked on the science as Smith himself had done. — J. B. Say, in the beginning of his treatise, and even as title to this treatise, gave his principal definition of political economy, the one which has since been most frequently reproduced : “A Treatise on Politi- cal Economy, or a simple exposition of the man- ner in which wealth is produced, distributed and consumed.” Whatever may be thought of this formula, it is at least very much superior to that of Adam Smith, in this especially, that it suggests the idea of a real science, and not merely of an art, since it describes an exposition or explanation of certain phenomena presented to our observation. But is this formula really sat- isfactory? and will it be final? Assuredly not. Men may still disagree as to the nature of the phenomena which it presents for the study of economists, as well as to the extent of the field which it opens to their exploration. And this all the more, since on this last point especially J. B. Say has not always been consistent with himself. In the formula which we have just quoted, he seems to confine the economist to a study of the material facts relating to the production and dis- tribution of wealth; but elsewhere, notably in his Cours, he brings into its domain all facts relating to social life. “The object of political economy,” he says, “seems till now to have been restricted to a knowledge of the laws which govern the pro- duction, distribution and consumption of wealth. This is how I considered it myself in my Traité d’Economie Politique.” “Still,” he adds, “it may be seen, even in that work, that the Science touches everything in human Society, and em. braces the whole social system.” (Cours d'écono- mie politique, p. 4.) We might add, that in other parts of his works J. B. Say again defines polit- ical economy in a way altogether different from that in which he defined it in his Traité and his Cours. The following, for instance, taken from manuscript notes found after his death, has some- times been quoted : “Political economy is the science of the interests of society, and like every real science is founded on experience, the results of which, grouped and arranged methodically, are principles and general truths.” But it is evi- dent that this is less a definition than a qualification, such as every author has the right to introduce in the course of his works, in order to bring out the dignity and importance of the subject he is treat- ing.— According to Sismondi, “the physical well- being of man, so far as it can be the work of his government, is the object of political economy.” This is very different from J. B. Say's first defini. tion. In the first place, it takes us out of the realm of science into the realm of art; for, accord- ing to this formula, political economy must be merely a series of rules intended to instruct gov- ernments how to insure the physical well-being of man; it is therefore an art, a branch of the art of government. Very much limited, from a certain point of view, since governments alone can prac- tice it, this art is, in other respects, without as- signable limits; for what are the acts of a gov- ernment that have not to do, more or less, with the physical well-being of man? — According to Storch, “Political economy is the science of the natural laws which determine the prosperity of nations, that is to say, their wealth and their civ- ilization.” Preferable to Sismondi's, because it suggests at least the idea of a science, this defini- tion is still very imperfect. “The natural laws which determine the prosperity of nations,” pre- sent, to our thinking, too complex an idea, and, in any case, a very vague one; and as to civili- zation, it certainly includes, in its general ex- pression, things with which an economist, as such, has nothing to do. — There is nothing in Malthus or Ricardo which can be taken as a precise defi- nition of political economy. In the case of Ri- cardo the reason may be, that in his “Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,” being con- fined, as he says himself in his preface, to defining the laws regulating the distribution of revenue among the various classes of Society, he did not consider the science as a whole. It may, however, be inferred from these words, that, if he had had to define science in a general \manner, he would have defined it very nearly as J. B. Say had done in his Thaïté. — As to Rossi, after he had discussed and rejected, one after another, all the definitions given before his time, he, absolutely speaking, gave nothing in their stead. He contents himself with saying that there are phenomena of a certain order relating to wealth which are not confounded with those of any other order, and that these are just what economic science should study. Politi- cal economy is, therefore, in his eyes, as he says elsewhere, purely and simply the “science of wealth.” Hence, he thinks, that, setting aside the strangeness of the words, one might call econ- omists chrysologists, chrematisticians or divitiaries, without giving them cause of complaint. —We may here close our review of the definitions of 218 POLITICAL ECONOMY. political economy. What we have stated suffices to show how far the definition of economic science, or the general formula which covers it, is from be- ing finally fixed. – Now, should we be ashamed of this uncertainty, as Rossi seemed to think? Must we lament it, with Arrivabene and some other writers? We do not think so. A science does not depend on the definition given of it; it is not regulated by an arbitrary formula which may be more or less happy, more or less exact; on the contrary, it is the definition which should come after, mould itself, so to speak, to the science as it exists. So much the worse for writers who cultivate a certain branch of human knowledge, if they are unable to grasp its general data and clothe these data with a fitting expression; but this does not in any way impair the stock of truth which they have to bring to light. — “A science,” says J. B. Say, “makes real progress only when its masters have succeeded in deter- mining the territory over which they may extend their researches, and what should be the object of their research.” (Traité, Discours Préliminaire.) There is doubtless some truth in this statement. It is well, perhaps even necessary, that the object of a science and the field it covers should be prop- erly determined; but it is not absolutely necessary that this determination should result from defini- tions hazarded by authors: it is enough if it re- sults from the very nature of their labors. Now, it may well happen that the nature of these labors may be essentially the same for all, while the defi- nitions are different ; each author having been led by a kind of instinct to confine himself to a certain order of phenomena, without afterward being able to render an account to himself of the precise object of his researches, or to measure exactly the field he has gone over. And this is really what takes place. We have just seen how much the authors cited differ in regard to the definition of the science, and still the sum and substance of their works are always the Same. Who does not know that this is the case with Adam Smith and J. B. Say? It is the case, too, with all the others, in spite of a few slight differ- ences as to the greater or less extent of the ground they embrace. —It is one thing to feel or express, and another to conceive or define. It is sometimes very difficult to clothe a single thought in a just ex- pression or a fitting formula; the difficulty is much greater when there is question of including a great number of ideas and facts in a single formula. It is not to be wondered at that many writers have failed in this task, in this sense, that the defini- tions which they give are nothing but more or less unfaithful translations of their own concep- tions. J. B. Say acknowledges that this is true in his own case, since he recognizes that his Traité went everywhere beyond the limits, if the expres- sion be allowed, marked out by his definition. And still he is, perhaps, of all economists, the one who has remained the most faithful to the formula which he had adopted. There is much more to be reprehended in Adam Smith and Sis- mondi in this regard. If we look, for example, at the manner in which the latter defines the sci- ence, we might think he was going to confine himself, as J. J. Rousseau had done, to laying down the rules which governments should observe in regard to the material interests of the people; and still, like all other economists since Quesnay, Turgot and Adam Smith, he has discussed the questions of exchange, division of labor, accumu- lation, Savings, the production and distribution of wealth, the laws regulating the value of things, those determining the rate of wages, profits, etc., etc.; things in which governments have almost nothing to do. So true is it that his definition is simply an error, and an error of no consequence, an ill-chosen but empty formula, which in no way influences the real character of his labors.— It would be very desirable, however, to find for political economy a more satisfactory definition. than those hitherto given, a formula at once more comprehensive and more precise, in which the whole science might, so to speak, be reflected in a few words. Will this formula be found 2 Per- haps. Without flattering ourselves with having found it, we shall try to point out the road to its formulation by determining, as far as possible, the real object which the science proposes to itself, and the extent of its domain. — The first question to be solved is, whether political economy belongs. to the category of science, or merely to the cate- gory of art. We have already seen, from what precedes, that the question is not an idle One, especially not idle since the distinction to be made between science and art does not appear to be generally understood. — II. To what order does Political Economy belong 3 Is it a Science or an. Art? “An art,” says Destutt de Tracy, “is a col- lection of maxims or practical precepts, the Ob- servance of which leads to success in doing a thing, no matter what it may be; a science con- sists in the truths resulting from the examination of any subject whatever. Art consists, therefore, in a series of precepts or rules to be followed ; science, in the knowledge of certain phenomena or certain observed and revealed relations.” We are not concerned here with examining which of the two is superior to the other, art or science; both may have equal merits, each in its place; it is solely a question of showing in what they differ as to their object and methods of procedure. Art coun- sels, prescribes, directs; science observes, exposes, explains. When an astronomer observes and de- scribes the course of the stars, he cultivates Sci- ence; but when, his observations made, he deduces from them rules to be applied in navigation, he is engaged in art. He may be equally right in the two cases; but his object is different, as well as his method of working. Hence, observing and describing real phenomena is science; dictating precepts, laying down rules, is art. — Art and science often have close connections, in this sense especially, that the precepts of art must be derived as far as possible from the observations of Science, but they are none the less different from it on POLITICAL ECONOMY. 219 that account. Notwithstanding this, they are con- founded every day. A man striving to build up an art gives it emphatically the name of science, believing that by doing so he gives a high idea of the correctness of its precepts. It is notoriously the weak side of physicians to call medicine a science. They are mistaken in the use of the word. If medicine were as certain in its prescrip- tions as it is uncertain, it would still be no more than an art,” the art of healing, since it consists in a collection of rules applicable to the cure of human diseases. But anatomy is a science; phys- iology is a science; because anatomy and physi- ology both have as their object a knowledge of the human body, which they study, the one in its structure, the other in the play of its organs. – Rossi grasped this distinction between science and art well, though he abused it by improperly con- founding it with the distinction which is made frequently enough between theory and practice. } “Properly speaking,” he says, “science has no object. The moment we try to discover what use can be made of it, what profit may be drawn from it, we leave science and come to art. Science is in all cases nothing more or less than the pos- session of truth, the well-considered knowledge of relations inherent in the nature of things.” Here we have, under another form, the same thought so accurately expressed by Destutt de Tracy. —This distinction being well drawn be- tween science and art, we may now ask, to which of the two orders of ideas does political economy belong? Is it a collection of precepts, a theory of action, or only an assemblage of truths bor- rowed from the observation of actual phenomena? Does it show us how to do something? or does it explain what takes place? In other words, is it a science, or an art? We need not hesitate to an- swer that, in its present condition, political econ- omy is both the one and the other; that is to say, in the direction of economic labors and studies a common name is still given to things which might * We may use the expression medical sciences, because medicine, the art of healing, is aided by several sciences, Specially cultivated for its use: anatomy, physiology, pathol- ogy, therapeutics; but we should not say the science of medi- C272.62. + The very real distinction which we establish between science and art has nothing in common with that which, rightly or wrongly, is made between theory and practice. There are theories of art, as there are of science, and it is only of the former that we may say, they are sometimes in opposition to practice. Art dictates rules, but general rules; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that these general rules, though correct, may sometimes disagree with the prac- tice in certain particular instances. But this is not the case with science, which neither ordains, counsels nor prescribes anything, which limits itself to observing and explaining. In What sense, then, can it be in opposition to practice? There is, to our thinking, a double error in the following passage from Rossi: “The school of Quesnay has been too much reproached with its laissez faire, laissez passer. It was pure science.” No, it was not pure Science; it was art, since it was a maxim, a precept, a rule to follow. As to the max- im itself, although susceptible, like all general rules, of many restrictions in practice, instead of saying, like Rossi, that it approached too nearly the school of Quesnay, we should say that it has not been sufficiently lauded, because not sufficiently understood. . and should be kept distinct. It is evident, in fact, that in the general treatises on political economy, composed since Adam Smith's time, a great num- ber of really scientific observations are met with, that is to say, observations whose sole object is to tellus what takes place, or what exists. One might even say that observations of this kind predomi- nate. But the directions, precepts, rules to be fol- lowed, are also met with in such treatises very frequently. Art is therefore constantly mixed up with science. But it is very different with a multitude of special treatises, or those particu- lar dissertations whose object is to solve certain questions relating to industry, commerce or the economic administration of states; questions of taxation, credit, finance, foreign commerce, etc. Here it is always art that predominates. Counsels, precepts, rules to be followed, all things that per- tain by their nature to the domain of art, fol- low each other in quick succession, while really scientific observations scarcely appear at long in- tervals. And still all this, without distinction, bears the name of political economy. So true is it that the name still belongs to two orders of labor, and of very different kinds. – We are far from complaining or finding it strange that from scientific truth once clearly established men should endeavor to draw rules applicable to the conduct of human affairs. It is not well that scientific truths should remain fruitless, and the only way of utilizing them is to base art upon them. There are close ties of relationship, as we have already said, between science and art. Sci- ence lends its lights to art, corrects its processes, enlightens and directs its course. Without the aid of science, art would have to feel its way, stumbling at every step. On the other hand, art gives a value to the truths which science has dis- covered, and science without art would be barren. Art is almost always the principal motor in the labors of science. Man rarely studies for the sole pleasure of knowledge; in general, his re- search and labor have generally a useful end in view, and it is through art alone that he finds that end. —In view of all this, who can fail to see how different art is from science 2 The distance is great between a truth discovered by observation, and a rule deduced from that truth with the intent of giving it an application; the One belongs to nature, to God; man only discovers and states it; the other is the act of man, and it always retains something of him. Everything is absolute in sci- entific data; they are either false or true, there is no half way; this simply means that the student of science has observed either well or ill, has seen correctly or incorrectly what he communicates. There are, it is true, incomplete data, exact on one side, inexact on the other; but, even then, the true side is true, the false side is false. On the contrary, everything is relative in the rules. and the methods of art. As something human is always involved in them, they can not pretend to infallibility, they are always susceptible of more or less variation between the two extreme limits 220 POLITICAL ECONOMY. of radical vice and absolute perfection. Finally, scientific truths are immutable as the laws of na- ture whose revelation they are; while rules of art are changeable, either by reason of the wants they have in view or by reason of the changing views of the men who apply them. — There is SO much the more reason to insist on the distinction which we have just established, viz., that if sci- ence and art have frequently many points Of Con- tact, their radii and their circumferences are far from being identical. The data furnished by a science may sometimes be utilized in many dif- ferent arts. the relations of extension, enlightens and directs the work of the surveyor, the engineer, the ar- tillery officer, the navigator, the shipbuilder, the architect, etc., etc. Chemistry comes to the aid of the druggist as well as the dyer, and to a great number of the industrial professions. Who can tell how many different arts make use of the gen- eral data of physics? And, SO, an art may gain information from the data furnished by many sciences; and it is in this way, to cite but One ex- ample, that medicine, or the art of healing, sim- ultaneously consults anatomy, physiology, chem- istry, physics, botany, etc. — It is necessary, therefore, in every respect to distinguish art from science, and to indicate clearly the line separating them. This has been carefully done in certain branches of human knowledge. Mathematicians, for example, distinguish carefully pure mathe- matics, or science properly speaking, from its various applications. So do physicists and chem- ists. And the distinction exists not in books alone, it is transferred even to instruction, where the study of science and that of the arts depend- ing on it have different chairs. It is thus that a polytechnic school is, if we be permitted to say so, the sanctuary of pure Science. It is only after graduating from it that the students, each in his specialty, study the art to which they are to apply the scientific knowledge acquired. — We could wish that what has been so well done in so many other divisions of study might also be done in the order of economic studies and labors. But, it must be confessed, it has not been done up to the present. The labors of art and the studies of science continue to be, if not altogether mingled, at least embraced, under a common denomination. Sometimes it has been attempted to separate them by giving certain labors, which belong especially to art, the name of public economy, to distinguish them from others. But these attempts, ill di- rected, and made, in the majority of cases, with- out a clear view of the results to be obtained, have not succeeded thus far, so that at present, in the order of economic studies, art and science are still mingled and confounded. Whence comes this confusion? It comes, first of all, from the immaturity of the Science, which has not yet had time to disengage itself from the art or arts con- nected with it. It results also, in a certain meas- ure, from the pressing and ever present interest of the subjects that economic Science embraces, Thus, geometry, or the Science of an interest which has not allowed those who study: it to devote themselves entirely to the contemplation of scientific truths, neglecting, for the moment, the artistical deductions, that is to Say, the practical maxims, which they might draw from it. — Political economy was an art before it became a science, and even the etymology of its name shows this; furthermore, before it was an art, that is to say, before it was formulated in general maxims and precepts, it was blind practice in the hands of governments. Such is, however, the course of human things. In the logical order, science precedes art, which should be only a de- duction from Science; and art precedes practice, which should be only a more or less exact appli- cation of the general rules of art. This is the ordinary course followed in our schools, in which the logical order is followed. But in their his- toric sequence, things take another course: they are generally found there in an inverse order. There practice precedes art, and art science. This is true of almost all the branches of knowledge, and particularly of that which interests us most. Hurried to act, because he must act, man goes straight to action, to practice, without studying deeply that which he undertakes, and with no other guide than his instinct. It is only later, that, by rectifying and correcting the errors of this practice, with the aid of a little acquired ex- perience, he forms rules or general maxims which he erects into an art; and it is later still that the idea comes to him of correcting the errors of this art itself, by the aid of a scientific study of the subject which he has in view. There were physi- cians before there was an art of healing; men acted at hazard, inspired most frequently by blind Superstition, and the art of healing, based at first on a certain acquired experience, existed much earlier than anatomy, physiology, therapeutics, that is to say, earlier than a scientific knowledge of the subject on which it was desired to operate, and of the remedies employed for his cure. Huts were built before the art of building was reduced to rules, and the art of building was subjected to rules, if not written, at least transmitted from mouth to mouth, before it received the mathe- matical and physical Sciences as a foundation. Political economy advanced in the same way. The most ancient governments, as Blanqui very justly says in his history, treated political economy after their own fashion, long before they knew what they did, or were able to give an account of the result of their measures. Later, it was at- tempted to give an account of these results by the aid of acquired experience, and with the data of these experiences, well or ill understood, an art was created. Sully and Colbert had reached this stage. It was only in the last resort that men undertook to study scientifically this subject, that is to say, general industry, on which they were to operate.—Now, this liberation of economic science is quite recent; it scarcely dates from the middle of the last century. It was the School of Quesnay which first endeavored to construct in POLITICAL ECONOMY. 221 this Order of ideas a real science; up to his time there were merely scattered observations, and even final success in building up the science be- longs only to Adam Smith. It is not very sur- prising, therefore, that the science of political economy has not yet been able to free itself en- tirely from the restrictions of the art from which it sprung. — It was our wish and duty to state, as we have done, that under the general name of political economy two things are at present under- sfood, things very different in their nature, though tending in many respects to the same end. It has seemed to us all the more important to note this confusion of ideas, since, to our thinking, it is the real cause of the incoherence in the definitions Of the Science, of the deviations to which it is sub- ject in its course, and the species of discord which reigns almost always in its beginnings. Shall we attempt, On that account, henceforth to make a clearer division between the scicnce and the art, by giving them different names? We confine our- Selves to drawing the distinction clearly, time and a better knowledge of the subject will do the rest. — III. Fºrst Idea or General Conception of Eco- nomic Science. Do the Facts of Human Industry afford Material for the formation of a real Science? It will doubtless be asked, with some astonish- ment, how economic science was born so late, how political economy in action could exist so long without a systematic, scientific study of the subject itself on which men had to operate. This astonishment will cease, perhaps, if we consider for a moment the internal nature of a science, and the point of view at which men place them- selves on all subjects before the light of science appears. — A Science does not consist merely in a knowledge of certain external facts isolated from each other, for it is an abuse of words to give the name science to a simple collection of facts. Science consists rather in the knowledge of the relations which connect these facts with one an- other, and of the laws which govern them. A tie, a connection, is necessary, a linking of the phenomena which it takes up and observes, and it is the knowledge of this connection which is its principal study. An incoherent collection of facts without connection may constitute the baggage of a man of erudition, but can never constitute a Science. Astronomy would not merit the name if it merely limited itself to noting and naming, one by one, the stars which wander in the deserts of space; it is worthy of the name only because it renders an account of the movements of the stars and the constancy of their evolution. Similarly, in all the other branches of human knowledge, a Collection of facts does not constitute a science; We must, furthcr, be able to tell the constant re- lations which connect, and the general laws which govern, them. — But the first condition of the study of the laws governing certain phenomena is to suspect their existence; to believe that these phenomena are not governed by chance, and that Certain constant relations exist between them. Now, on all subjects, the first impression of men who have not yet submitted facts to continuous observation or patient analysis, is to see in them merely the play of blind chance. It is only much later that they come to suspect that these facts may be subject to a certain order; and it is then only that the idea is gained of studying the laws that govern them. Let us take the ignorant and rude man of primitive ages. All the phe- nomena of nature are to him disordered and capricious. Wherever he looks, he sees merely accidents without cause, facts without connection or relation. If he looks at the heavens, he sees the stars Scattered at hazard, as he thinks, like thistles in a field. In all things that strike him he sees nothing but the play of blind chance, unless, indeed, he supposes the mysterious influence of Some occult power. Later, as he gains in knowl- edge, natural phenomena, at least those of a cer- tain order, range themselves before his eyes; he sees that they are subject to certain rules, he ob- serves the constancy of their relations; here he recognizes law. But always, even in the course of time, and ages of enlightenment, the first im- pression of men is the same in relation to facts which they have not yet observed. If they come, therefore, so late to study the natural laws which govern phenomena, it is because they had not pre- viously even suspected that there were natural laws to be studied. — A remarkable example of this is to be found in the case of geological facts. Why did geology, a science so interesting and beautiful, appear so late in the world? Was it impossible to discover and study it sooner? Were the ancients less capable of pursuing that study than the moderns? They were not : geological facts are not of the nature of those which hide themselves from attentive examination, or which demand a distant search. The ancients were as well able to discover and analyze them as we, and they had, besides, almost an equal interest in doing so. This analysis supposes, it is true, certain other preliminary studies, but these studies they could either have pursued themselves or made up for without too much labor. Why did they not do so? Only, as it seems to us, because they did not even suspect that there were in the bowels of the earth which we inhabit natural laws to be studied. During many centuries men had lived in the idea that the earth, whose surface they oc- cupied, was in its composition merely a formless and confused mass, 77tdis indigestaqate moles, whose materials were piled up pell-mell, without order and without law. They did not suspect that there was any order there to be found, any scientific study to be made of the earth; and this is the rea- son they did not even think of attempting that study. The same thing has taken place with regard to industry, concerning which similar ideas were for a long time held. It was not suspected in an- cient times, nor even in the middle ages, that there was any order in the industrial world, the centre of economic facts, the focus of labor, at that time relegated to so low a place. At first view, everything there seemed to be surrendered to the 222 ECONOMY. POLITICAL struggle of individual and opposing wills. Only a disordered combination of heterogeneous elements was perceived, a sort of confused conflict, a rudis Žndigestaque moles; and how could any one con- ceive the idea of Searching there for rules, prin- ciples, laws, the ordinary outfit of a real science? In all subjects, we repeat, the first step toward building up a science is to gain the idea that the elements of that science exist, and this idea had not yet suggested itself. It was born only much later, when, by dint of occupation, from the gov- ernmental point of view, with industry whose im- portance men began to understand, they remarked, almost involuntarily, sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another, the regularity of its movements and the constancy of its relations. – And why should we be astonished that this was the case in the past, when even to-day, after the labors of Quesnay, Adam Smith and his succes- sors, we see that many people misunderstand this industrial' order, to which science has already borne witness. Not infrequently we hear at the present time men of some weight, and fairly well informed on other points, assert that industry is a prey to disorder and anarchy. Such, in general, is the rallying cry of the schools called socialistic. They all declare that the industrial world is given up to the struggle of individual wills, conflicting with and crossing each other in terrible confu- sion, with no trace of organization and order. All rule is absent from the circle in which indus- try works, and chance alone controls everything. On this account all the socialistic sects conclude, naturally enough, that the industrial world needs some organization imposed by a power above it. Thus, they vie with each other in drawing up and proposing plans of social reconstruction. — If the premises of this reasoning were correct, if it were true that industry, in its present condition, were given up to anarchy, having no trace of organiza- tion and order, political economy, considered as a science, would indeed have little to do; it would not even have a raison d’être. This would not suffice to make us adopt or even discuss seriously any one of these plans of organization proposed to us, persuaded, as we shall always be, that it is not in the power of human intelligence to regu- late, even in a tolerable manner, so many interests, and labors so varied; but it would suffice to make us conclude, at least, that science, properly speak- ing, had no place in such a field. The rôle of the economist, if he had still a rôle to fill, would be limited, in this case, to a barren regis- tration of disconnected facts, without his being able to deduce any principle from them. In vain would he seek to ascend from effects to causes, where chance alone governed everything. Wainly would he endeavor to establish relations between observed phenomena, and discover the laws that ruled them; for how could he find constant rela- tions in disorder, or law in chaos? Happily, we already know our position with reference to these assertions thrown out a priori by men still unen- lightened by science. We know that for them all is confusion and disorder. To the man who knows not the discoveries of geology, even from hearsay, the earth is still that confused mass which the ancients called rudis indigestaque moles. To the Savage, who has never observed the course of the stars, anarchy reigns in the vault of heaven. — After all, it must be confessed that the illusion is a natural one. When we cast our eyes at hazard on the moving picture of the industrial world, it is difficult indeed to perceive, at first sight, any- thing but a confused struggle. A consideration, plausible enough, seems even to justify this first view ; it is thus that in industry everything seems abandoned to the arbitrary and capricious impulses of individual wills, without any com- mon principle governing and uniting these wills. And how, it is asked, can anything but disor- der and chaos result from the shock of so many divergent, if not opposing, wills 2 When we See so many millions of stars moving in the deserts of space with perfect harmony and un- changeable constancy, nothing prevents our ad- mitting that a single and sovereign will presides Over their movements, and imposes on them its laws. But where is the principle which forces so many free beings to move in unison, each one of whom feels the motive of his action in himself? This is a strong consideration, it must be con- fessed; it would force economists themselves to doubt the reality of industrial order, if this order were not for them already established and demon- strated. — And still, even without the aid of sci- ence, if we look at industry with a more serious and attentive eye, it is difficult not to recognize in it at once, under the cover of apparent disor- der, certain characteristics of harmony and order. Phenomena appear, whose regularity strikes and astonishesus. We gradually catch glimpses, vague at first and then more definite, of constant rela- tions, of invariable movements. As the stars fail not to subordinate themselves to each other in their evolutions, though they seem to wander at chance, and to hasten on without order, so we see that the myriads of individuals moving in the field of industry also connect, arrange and sub- ordinate their labors to each other, in such a way that, in spite of their apparent confusion, they all concur, each in his own way, to produce certain given results. Little by little, chaos is seen not to exist; order appears; laws are recognized. — Even if economic science had not for a long time noted the existence of certain regulating laws in the industrial world, it would seem that the ap- pearance alone of the results offered would cause us at least to suspect their existence. An immense multitude of human beings, some Scattered here and there over the surface of the earth, others grouped in irregular masses in towns, wait every day for general industry to bring them what is necessary for the infinite variety of their wants; and every day industry, active and watchful, answers without fail to all the wants which call upon it: millions of kinds of labor, all different from one another, call on every side, and at all the POLITICAL ECONOMY. 223 sources of production, for workmen, and nowhere are the hands of workmen wanting for the kind of labor which calls them; all these different kinds of labor cross each other; more than that, they are corrected and held in union; they complete each other; they form together an immense chain, not a single link of which can be broken with- out injury to the whole; but nowhere does the chain break or stop; it seems that a mysteri- ous power watches unceasingly to keep in repair its invisible links. Then, by virtue of the prin- ciple of exchange, an infinite variety of products circulates continually in every direction over the surface of the earth, and all these products go direct, without loss of time, and without sensible deviation, through countless hands, to the con- Sumers waiting for them. All this takes place under our eyes and is renewed every day, and it is in presence of such a spectacle that men are un- aware of the regularity of industrial movements subject to law. In presence of this daily miracle of regularity and order, men talk about industrial anarchy and disorder! What, then, are harmony, and order? Even if certain partial disorders, the causes of which are almost always easily assigned, happen here and there to disturb this beautiful mechanism, would that be sufficient to warrant us to deny the harmony of the whole? Would it not suffice to justify us in concluding triumph- antly, that, after all, industry taken as a whole accomplishes with regularity the complex task with which it is charged?—There is really little philosophy in denying, even a priori, the existence of industrial order. Remember how many sur- prises nature reserves for man, who is always too ready to appeal to chance. The empire of chance is narrower than is supposed ; every day its boundaries become smaller in proportion as our knowledge extends; those boundaries will become still narrower in the future. But, it is asked, is there anything in industry but divergent individ- ual wills 2 and what is that but confusion or chance 2 We answer, that individual wills, no matter how free they may appear in the domain of language, or in the domain of industry, are bound to conform to a certain order. In the work of forming languages the initiative and inven- tion may belong to individuals; but supreme con- trol belongs to the masses. Individuals invent words, particular forms or expressions ; each one brings his contribution to the language ; hence the inexhaustible wealth and the admirable va- riety of form which are the property of human language. But the mass controls, purifies, cor- rects; it rejects, with that sure instinct which Controls it, everything not conformable to certain analogies or certain laws, and every one is bound to submit to its decisions under pain of not being understood. Hence, the regularity and harmony impressed on all human languages. In like man- ner the initiative belongs to individuals in indus- try, but control to the masses. Every one is at liberty to work after his own fashion, but on con- dition, first, of fitting the result of his labors, which is the first condition of order, to his sur- roundings; then, to adjust his labors to those of other men, without whose aid he can do nothing; and lastly, on condition of submitting to the whole, and yielding in all things to the decisions of the Sovereign public. From the initiative of the individual and the sovereign control of the masses, arises, on the one hand, the infinity of de- tail, and, on the other, the harmony of the whole, which constitute the two essential characteristics of human industry. If, by supposing the impos- sible, confusion should be established in language, no two men would be able any longer to under- stand each other. An assembly of men would then be but a repetition of the confusion of the tower of Babel. If, in like manner, this anarchy should come upon industry, for merely a few days, the irregularity of production would put the very existence of men in peril. No one being able to count upon another for the Satisfaction of his wants, each would work for himself and refuse to take part in the division of labor and exchange, and humanity would quickly return to the bar- barism of primitive times. – But the existence of laws governing the industrial world is no longer a mystery. Industrial science has for a long time noted and verified a great number of them. We have Ourselves tried to show in the article COMPE- TITION, the general principle from which they spring. If among those which men have tried to explain, there are some which may still be a mat- ter of discussion or misunderstood, there are others which no one, not even those who deny in principle the regularity of industrial movements, would dare to call in question. We can therefore conclude boldly that the field of the science of polit- ical economy is open, and that the elements of that Science exist. — Since, then, human industry is subject to laws; since it discloses to us constant relations, a regular movement, in a word, order, it is this order, these felations, these laws, which we must study. This is the peculiar field of po- litical economy as a science. To explain how industry is organized in its whole and in its parts; to describe the order of its evolutions and its prog- ress; to refer its movements to their principle, and deduce from it their immediate consequences: such is the object which economic science, care- fully distinguished from art, should always pro- pose to itself. What, in this order of ideas, should be the extent of its investigations, and what their limits? We shall examine this directly. But we must first justify the preceding definition, if it is one, in so far as it does not conform to those most frequently given of political economy. —IV. Is Wealth the Olſect of Economic Science, or Industry the Source of Wealth 2 In defining or characteriz- ing economic science as we have above, we have spoken of industry and the general laws which govern it. It is evident that in this we have de- parted, if not in essence, at least in form, from the definitions generally received, and which relate, more or less, not to industry, but to the wealth which industry produces. Which of the two 224 POLITICAL ECONOMY. formulae is the more truthful? We think that wealth is continually put forward as the subject of political economy, without reason. Wealth is merely a result; and in reality it is labor, human industry, the source of wealth, which is the true subject of investigation in political economy. It must be understood, however, that in saying this we have no idea of changing the basis of the science, which we accept as it exists. – We have already seen that J. B. Say defines political econ- omy, even in the title of his work, as “a simple exposition of the manner in which wealth is pro- duced, distributed and consumed.” Still, he draws a distinction from the very beginning of his book, which we must note. There are, he says, two kinds of wealth : one natural, that is to say, that which man receives from nature itself, without his being obliged to produce it, and which does not appear in the market, because nature gives it to all; the other is industrial or social wealth; and he declares that this last is the only one which economic science should consider. Why this dis- tinction, if the definition is correct? If it is really wealth with which we are concerned, what do we care from whence it comes? Is what nature gives us for nothing, and gives to all, less real, of less value, than other wealth? Why should we not take account of it too? The distinction estab- lished by J. B. Say is nevertheless correct, what- ever Rossi may say of it. Why? Because it is not true that political economy studies wealth as its subject; because it has only industry in view, and consequently it should not touch upon wealth, except in so far as it is a product of industry, in so far as it is either produced or distributed by indus- try. All this portion of J. B. Say’s work is very painful, because his starting point is not correct. Still, the author displays a wonderful sagacity in coming back, by force of attention and correct- ness of judgment, to the real subject from which he departed in his definition. But the subtle dis- tinctions to which he has been obliged to have recourse could not fail to lead to controversy, as the sequel has shown. —What is true of J. B. Say is equally true of all those economists, and their number is great, who have expressly ad- mitted with him that political economy has only to do with exchangeable value. It is different with Adam Smith, who did not commence his work, like most of his successors, by a disserta- tion on the nature of wealth and value. He pre- fers in the beginning to speak of industry, of man; in which, as it appears to us, he was very happy, although he too thinks, and says frequent- ly, that wealth is the chief subject of his studies. In the course of his work he states nowhere, in an absolute manner, that the only wealth with which he is concerned is that which is convertible into exchangeable value; but when, at the end of chapter iv. of book i., he remarks that the word “value” has a double ineaning, or that there are two kinds of values, and calls one “Valure in use,” and the other “Salable or exchangeable value,” without declaring expressly that the latter is the Only one which it is his mission to study, he con- tents himself with saying that he will examine “the principles which regulate the exchangeable values of merchandise,” and as to its value in use he is silent. He has followed, in this, the same path that J. B. Say, his successor, traced out afterward in a more systematic manner. — Some economists, however, at whose head we must place Rossi, have protested loudly against this view. They contend that the utility of things, or what they call their value in use, is in itself too considerable, too important a fact, to allow an economist to omit taking account of it. Let us remark just here, that no one has said, no one can say, that the real utility of things can be despised. It is, first of all, the original basis of exchangeable value; it is, besides, the principal motive or the final object of the labors of man; for men labor only to procure what is of use to them, that is to say, what contributes to the satisfaction of their wants. It has only been said, which is true, that utility alone, when not transformed into exchange- able value, no matter how interesting it may be in other regards, is not an economic fact, and only becomes such in so far as it gives things a value, a price. But it is precisely against this conclusion that Rossi protests. The opinion of such a man has too much weight not to delay us a moment in order to examine its motives. – “There are many authors,” he says, “for whom value in exchange is the only economic fact; they regard the notion of value in use as a pure gener- ality, to which, at most, the honor of mention- ing it may be given in passing without paying any attention to it afterward. For them, political economy is more the science of eachange than the science of wealth.” We have underlined these last words, because they correspond exactly to what we have said above. It is very true, that, to the authors of whom Rossi speaks, as well as to us, and we shall add directly to Rossi himself, politi- cal economy is not the science of wealth, although the word “wealth '' is inscribed in large letters on their banners. We have defined it, provisionally, as the science of the laws of the industrial world. One may say, however, if he wishes, shortening the expression a little, that it is the science of ea:- changes; for exchanges are, in the industrial sys- tem, the primordial fact which engenders all the others; but the expression which we have used seems to us at once more noble, more comprehen- sive, and more exact. — But to return to ROSSi’s argument. — First of all, it is not correct to Say that the authors of whom he speaks merely men- tion the utility of things in passing. On the con- trary, they maintain that the utility of things is the first if not the only condition of value in ex- change; that things not useful in any respect would be neither asked for nor accepted by any one ; and in consequence they would have no value, no price. But they add also that this utility, necessary everywhere, does not become an economic fact until, combining with other Con- ditions, it is changed into exchangeable value. POLITICAL ECONOMY. 225 This is precisely what Rossi does not admit. “It is an error,” he says, “which attacks the science in its very bases, which mutilates it, and destroys its nature * Why? This is his answer: “Value in use,” he continues, “is the expression of a re- lation which belongs to all times and all places. Value in exchange is in its nature eventual. Not only it can not exist unless the wants of men cease, in a certain measure at least, to be satisfied, but it will disappear completely when the wants of all find unlimited means of satisfaction. No one will then have recourse to eachange.” We shall soon find this last argument under another form. Rossi considers it very conclusive in his favor, and consequently reproduces it again. We shall see directly how conclusive it is against him. Now, let us continue our quotation. “I say, that in the system of those who pretend to occupy themselves only with value in exchange, science is mutilated: a great number of ceonomic facts remain without explanation. Why are certain markets glutted with articles which never meet a demand for them? Only because the producers have not studied sufficiently what could be, in a given country, the value in use of such or such kinds of merchandise. The man who sent a cargo of skates to Brazil had forgotten that their value in use, arising from the pleasure which is felt in gliding over an icy surface, is nothing in a country where there is no ice. When publishers prepared immense shiploads of books for South America, they should have remembered that the want of books is only felt by those who know how to read. It is in the absence of value in use that these economic facts find their explanation.” Without doubt, it is in the absence of value in use, or of utility, that these facts find their ex- planation. But how can this embarrass the authors whom Rossi is combating 2 What difficulty is there in accounting for such facts according to their system? None. They have said, and re- peated, that the utility of things is the first con- dition of their exchangeable value; this condition had been omitted in the cases mentioned above, and consequently the products could not be ex- changed. What more simple? The authors in question account for these facts quite as well as Rossi. Only they add that the condition of utility, though primary and essential, is not the only one which gives objects an exchangeable value; that, in addition, a certain degree of scarcity is re- Quired; that things found in profusion in nature, such as air, will have no exchangeable value, no matter how useful they may be; and that in this case economists need not busy themselves with them. — Among the arguments which Rossi heaps up af pleasure against this last conclusion, with very remarkable dialectic power, there are many which square exactly with the one which we have just noted. They merely reproduce the same thought under other forms. We may therefore omit them. But here is one which seems to differ from the others. “The study of value in use, is the study of the wants of men in their relations 134 VOL. III. — 15 to economic facts.” The study of value in use is the study of the wants of men; this we admit : but is the study of the wants of men the object of political economy 2 It is not. In the eyes of the economist every man is the judge of his own wants, which he expresses in his own way by the demand which he makes for certain products. It is the sole fact of this demand that the economist meets by following it in its consequences. He . Sees, on one side, men expressing their wants; on the other, workers studying fo divine these wants, and to satisfy them by supplying such articles as they produce; and he studies the very extensive and complex relations arising from this demand and supply. The study of the demand, considered in itself, in its nature and principle, is perhaps the affair of the moralist; but the economist, as an economist, has nothing to do with it. —If, in the course of his laborious argument, Rossi tri- umphs in places, it is when he lays stress on the meaning and the use of the word “wealth.” He has the advantage, we admit, when he reproaches those with whom he argues, with abusing the term. “Wealth,” he rightly says, “is a generic word, which includes all objects in which this re- lation can be verified. If an object is capable of satisfying our desires, there is a value in it. The object itself is wealth.” Rossi is certainly right here; he is right again when he adds, further on: “Ask any sensible man if, in such or such cir- cumstances, such a man or such a country is rich or not, if it is less rich than a certain other coun- try; ask him if the soil of the kingdom of Naples is more or less rich than the soil of Lapland; all will give you the same answer. Economists also, when they do not use the language of their par- ticular systems, call the country rich in which natural goods abound, and in which natural agents are most active. They extend the word wealth to something more than what they call wealth when they give us their systematic definitions.” All this is quite correct; but what does it all prove? Only one thing: that the word “wealth’ has been very inaptly employed to designate the object of eco- nomic science. Let us say what is true, that eco- nomic science studies industry, or the relations which industry produces, and all these difficulties will disappear. —What, in fact, is wealth? A re- sult, and nothing more. It is a fruit of the lib- erality of nature, or of the labor of man; a fruit which has only to be enjoyed, and which affords no aliment to observation. What is there to be studied in such a fact? Nothing. But the means that men employ to acquire that wealth, when nature does not give it in sufficient quantity, are another matter entirely. This is a great, an im- portant fact, worthy of all the attention of the philosopher, and it is the only one the study of which political economy can dwell upon. – If a decisive proof of this is required, we shall find it in this last argument of Rossi's, of which we have already spoken. After having laid down this principle, that general wealth is increased by the low price of merchandise and all kinds of prod- 226 JPOLITICAL ECONOMY. wets, he adds: “If the price falls to zero, evidently the general wealth will be infinite; there will be no more exchanges; each having all that he can desire, exchange becomes impossible. How, then, could wealth be an exchangeable value, since it would be infinite, if there were no value in ex- change?” This, we believe, is decisive against those economists who do not wish to consider wealth as anything else than exchangeable value.* But does it prove in the same way that political economy should occupy itself with value in use, devoid of exchangeable value? Let us suppose Rossi’s somewhat forced hypothesis realized, the prices of everything at zero, and general wealth infinite. What would happen? It is true there would be no exchangeable value, but neither would there be any political economy. Value in exchange, as Rossi correctly says, would disappear completely as Soon as the wants of each one found wnlimited means of Satisfaction. No one would them have recourse to eachange. Nothing is truer ; no one would have recourse to exchange, nor even to labor ; but neither would any one think of studying political economy, because political economy itself would not have anything to study. The entire earth would present the picture of the Elysian fields described by Fenelon, in his “ Ad- ventures of Telemachus.” All the wants of men would be satisfied. There would be no wants to express, and consequently no efforts to be made to provide for them. But what would the economist have to do in such an environment? Nothing, but to survey at his ease a picture of universal hap- piness, and thank God for his goodness. Politi- cal economy would disappear with exchangeable value and the realization of universal wealth: so true is it that it is not wealth that it studies, but exchange, with the division of labor and all the important phenomena that accompany it. — Rossi himself, as we have said, has not studied any- thing else. And, in reality, once out of these discussions on wealth and value, which embarrass him in the commencement of his work, he goes through the same route already passed over by his predecessors. He follows, in their develop- ments, the plenomena of exchange, the division of labor, the combination and subordination of the different kinds of labor, as well as the complex relations which these phenomena engender. He investigates the laws which determine the ex- changeable value of things: those which regulate the rate of wages, the rate of profits, and reve- nues of every sort. He does not stop a moment, whatever he may have stated at the outset, to con- sider the absolute and inherent utility of things, or what he calls their value in use, independent of the-relative value which they acquire in the great market of labor. Neither does he stop to con- sider the reason of our wants, admitting, with all economists, that individuals are the only judges of * It is, however, proper to remark that these economists do not say precisely that there is no wealth except exchange- able values, but that exchangeable value is the only wealth which political economy can take into account. their respective wants, and that they express them sufficiently by the demand which they make for certain products. – We can, then, say of Rossi what we have said of all the other economists, that it is the industrial movement which he stud- ies, with all its developments and all its conse- quences, and by no means the simple result, wealth, which would offer no material to his observa- tions. When he frees himself for a moment from the too great anxiety which the word “wealth * causes him, he defines the subject as we ourselves have done. For example, after explaining the series of economic phenomena, he adds: “ They appear in all this continued action of men. On the material world; they are all embraced in this incessant rotation of labor, of consumption, of reproduction and of exchange.” Yes, it is in the continual action of men on the material world that all economic phenomena are included, and it is precisely on this account that the wealth which is not derived from this action of man, or which has not felt that action, that is to say, which does not enter into the current of exchanges, is not an economic fact. —We should have dwelt less upon this error if it related only to words; but it has had its consequences. It has not pre- cisely changed the basis of economic studies, since, after all, economists have generally con- tinued unfaithful to the definition which they have adopted; but it has given an ambiguous character to the science, which has produced distrust in the minds of those who only half understood it, and it has given too much advantage to the adver- saries of political economy. It has, besides, over- loaded, especially in the outset, the Science with subtle distinctions and vain abstractions, which have become, for economists themselves, an inex- haustible source of barren debates. We shall SOOn return to these consequences, but it is proper to go first to the source itself of the error which we have just pointed out. —W. Why Wealth rather than Human Industry has been assigned to Political JEconomy as a Study. Consequences of this Error. We have already seen that political economy, be- fore it became a science, was, for a long time, an art. It was a branch of the art of governing, an art which concerned especially the material interests of nations. Hence its name, which evidently designates an art. Hence, also, theformula which serves to designate the special object of its labors. Things have changed, the art has given birth to a science; it has been transformed itself, changing in character and object; but the name and for- mula have been preserved. This is why political economy bears to-day names so inappropriate to its real character. — The chief tendency of this ancient art, which preceded the Science, was, whenever it had not the regulation of taxes and the finances of the state as its sole Object, to act directly on the public wealth; to create wealth, if it is permitted to say so, by means of govern- mental measures or by the mechanism of legisla- tion. All writers who pretended to be economists, therefore, thought themselves called on to furnish POLITICAL ECONOMY. 227 methods or receipes calculated to enrich the na- tion for whose benefit they wrote. We find a curi- ous and sad example of this in the system so unfor- tunately applied, in France, by the Scotchman, John Law, and which had been preceded, in Eng- land, Spain and France, by many other systems, which, if not similar, were at least conceived in the same spirit. Some wished to enrich their country by specially favoring agriculture, consider- ing the direct products of the soil as more abun- dant and reliable than all the wealth procured by manufacturing industry or commerce; others, gen- erally infected by the idea that people become rich only at the expense of others, placed all the hope of a nation, either in the forced extension of foreign markets or in the exclusion of foreign products; and these last turned their attention mainly toward manufacturing industry and com- merce. In other respects they differed from each other, in the nature of the means proposed; some only thought of acting on foreign commerce through the tariff, while others were occupied with the internal management, the organization itself, of industry; but whatever might have been the difference in their principles or their methods, they invariably tended toward the same end, the immediate increase of public wealth. They would have considered that they had done nothing if they had not invented some sovereign recipe, some speedy and marvelous method. Thus, in 1664, one of the most celebrated economists of the seventeenth century, Thomas Mun, published in England a work under the following title, which indicates clearly enough its object and tendency: “England's Treasure by Foreign Trade; or, the balance of our foreign trade is the rule of our treasure.” Another writer, Davenant, published in 1699 a book under the no less significant title of “An Essay on the probable method of making the people gainers in the balance of trade.” In another style, but guided by the same spirit, W. Potter published, in London, in 1659, a work en- titled “The Tradesman's Jewel; or, a safe, easy, speedy and effectual means for the incredible advancement of trade and multiplication of riches, etc., by making bills become current instead of money.” The seventeenth century, and even the commencement of the eighteenth, abounded in similar writings, in France, as well as in England and Spain. Projects of this kind are not rare, even in our day; but they are at present merely eccentricities, while then they formed the only basis of economic works. Thus, wealth was the direct object of these works, to such a degree that all writings on political economy which date from that period might be summed up in this general formula: “How must we proceed to en- rich a people?” It is true, then, that political economy had wealth, as its direct object, and so many economists did not deceive themselves as to the real tendency of their studies when they inscribed the word ‘‘ wealth * on their banners. — It was from these unfortunate attempts that the real science came. By force of studying industry flection of philosophers. and commerce in order to subject them to adven- turous plans and govern them according to their views, publicists became accustomed by degrees to observe industry and commerce. They re- marked their most striking peculiarities and their most ordinary characteristics. Struck by the reg. ularity of Some of the phenomena which took place in this then new world, they caught a glimpse of the existence of certain laws, which they half noted. In this way scientific observations slipped insensibly into these artificial combinations, the unfortunate fruits of the imagination of their au. thors, and these observations increasing by degrees, in proportion as attention was directed to the sub- ject, ended by impregnating, so to speak, with rather a strong dose of science, the very works composed in view of an art. This infusion of science into art is very evident in some of the writings which date from the end of the seven- teenth century and the commencement of the eighteenth. If precepts still abound in them, to the point of predominating everywhere, scientific observations, and observations sometimes véry correct, are not rare in them. In this way the Science began. But, as the invention of an art was always the fixed idea of writers, and as this art had always the increase of wealth in view, the preconceived notion that the direct object of po- litical economy was wealth, remained. — It was then that the school of Quesnay arose. It was the first to renounce the discovery of this decep- tive and false art, which had been so vainly sought for up to that time. By proclaiming the great principle, Laissez faire, laissé2 passer, it boldly announced, from the very start, that it did not appear in order to give people special rules to increase their fortune, but to set forth the sci- entific explanation of that imposing mechan- ism which human industry presents for the re- This formula, too lit- tle understood, had, in their mouths, a profound significance, which it is well to recall. It was not pure Science, as Rossi has wrongly stated; it was art, since it was still a precept. But it was a precept which carried with it the nega- tion of all others in this, that it rejected all the artificial, combinations which had been imag- ined up to that time; it was the revelation of science, and was itself the first fruit of this revela- tion. It might be translated thus: “You have believed up to the present time that the industrial world was a kind of body without soul, an irreg. ular assemblage of incoherent forces, without a principle of conduct, without cohesion, without a bond. You have believed that this world floated about at hazard, and that it needed the hand of an organizer to regulate and conduct it. You have outrivaled each other in striving to propose for it, or impose on it, your artificial combinations and your preconceived systems. Undeceive your- self: this industrial world does not move at haz- ard; under the apparent disorder of its course is hidden a profound order; it is governed by natural laws, admirable laws, in some regards in- 228 POLITICAL ECONOMY. flexible laws, which it is necessary to know and respect. Avoid disturbing, by your arbitrary com- binations, these natural laws which are supe- rior to man. Respect this providential order; let the work of God alone.” — This did not mean that governments had nothing to do but fold their arms; for governments have their rôle marked out for them in the natural order of society, such as it was understood by the physiocrates; but it did mean that governments should limit themselves to accomplishing their real task without undertaking to substitute an arbitrary system for the natural order of society. Thus understood, this maxim, Laissez faire, laissez passer, is one of the most beautiful, most profoundly philosophical, and at the same time one of the most correct, which had ever been enunciated. It brought with it, we say, the revelation of a science, and asserted the existence of these natural laws, whose study is the mission of science, and without whose existence our science would be without any object to study. It was at the same time the first fruit of this reve- lation; for, although men may differ yet as to the extension which should be given to governmental action, the maxim, Laïssé2 faire, laissez passer, must always be accepted, in its general expres- sion, by every one who even admits that there is a science of economy. Either the natural order of industry exists, or it does not exist. If it does not exist, you can fill the void by your arbitrary combinations; you can fashion and direct the in- dustrial world according to your pleasure; you may even imagine for it an artificial organization of labor; but in such case speak no more of science. If, on the contrary, you admit that this order exists, your first duty is to respect it. —Neverthe- less, this announcement of science, in which the school of Quesnay had the initiative and the chief glory, by changing at Once the tendency and direc- tion of economic study, necessarily involved a change of ancient formulae and definitions. There was no longer a question, as there was formerly, of inventing an art which would have as its im- mediate result the creation of wealth by means of legislative enactments. The school of Quesnay admitted, on the contrary, that the true source of wealth is in the industry of man, in the sponta- neous activity of individuals, and that the best thing to be done is to let that activity have the greatest possible freedom. It was no longer a question of considering wealth directly, but rather to study the activity of individuals in its natural relations and in its laws. Not that the school of Quesnay absolutely renounced the formulation of an art: it could not renounce it, under pain of leaving science itself barren. But this new art, more rational than the old, in this, above all, that it was deduced from truths observed by science, instead of tending as formerly to the immediate creation of wealth, was forced to have as its sole object the restriction of governmental action with- in its natural limits, and to regulate it within these limits in conformity with the natural laws of industry. Thenceforth, wealth was no longer the direct object either of science or art. Thence- forth, these changed studies needed new names and new definitions.—Quesnay's school understood the exigencies of this transformation, and the very titles of the principal works which are due to it attest this fact: physiocracy, natural order of socie- ties; two different titles, but which have nearly the same sense or the same bearing, in that they both announce the scientific statement of certain natural laws, and no longer the invention of an art; more scientific titles surely, and more satis- factory in this regard, than those afterward im- agined. Unfortunately, the school of Quesnay committed two capital errors in the erection of its system, which caused its attempts at renewal to fail, and weakened its decisions. The first of these errors consisted in the exaggerated importance which it attributed to the net product of the soil, what we now call the rent of land, which it put forward as the only or main source of the real revenue of a people; the second, in the unnatural mingling of economic phenomena and political facts, between which it was unable to establish the necessary line of demarcation. —When Adam Smith, who first placed the science on its true foundation, appeared, he returned, unfortunately, in so far as formulae and titles were concerned, to the old errors. While he exposed the grave mis- takes into which the school of physiocrates had fallen, Adam Smith permitted himself to react perhaps too strongly against that school. He re- pudiated even the spirit of the new formulae which it had adopted. These formulae, as we have seen, were generally too ambitious, too broad, in that they seemed always to embrace at once the economic and the political order. It was proper, it was even necessary, to narrow them in a certain sense; but it was neither necessary nor proper to change their spirit, which was perfectly in harmony with the new tendency of economic studies. Instead of saying, as the physiocrates had done, “natural order of societies,” and inter- preting this formula as they had done, he might have said, “the natural order of industry,” or used any other equivalent phrase, which would have preserved to economic studies the scientific char- acter which they had received. Instead of this, in his desire to repudiate what there was excessive, from the point of view at which the physiocrates had placed themselves, Adam Smith returned purely and simply to the errors of his predeces- sors. The old prejudice remained—the prejudice that the economist is charged with furnishing recipes, the methods necessary to build up the fortune of nations—and Adam Smith himself was not able to guard against it. What was expected of him was the exposition of an art, tending to the creation of wealth, and he believed himself obliged to satisfy this expectation! The man who had left the business, the care of enriching nations altogether to private industry or the spontaneous activity of individuals, and who believed firmly, as his work proves, that it does not belong to gov- ernments to add anything to it from their own POLITICAL ECONOMY. 229 resources, still believed it incumbent on him to construct a system intended to create national wealth, and to announce it formally, not only in the title of his work, but also, as we have seen, in his definition. ferent from those which preceded it; it is the same as that of the physiocrates, Laissez faire, laissez passer, which is the device of every one who understands and practices the science: a system so different from others, and so peculiar in this regard, that those who in our day still take the old point of view ask, with a naïve aston- ishment, what is the meaning of a system which involves a negation of all systems ? But Adam Smith at last proposes, like all the other econo- mists, his method, his means of enriching nations, and this means consists in employing none. It is in this way that, from a point of view altogether new, he preserves the old forms. A man of sci- ence, Ile adopted the ſorululae of Ilis predecessors who only wished to invent an art. Devoted to the study of certain natural phenomena, he gives us lessons and precepts at every moment, and in truth gives a great number of them, though these lessons and these precepts only tend in general to show the vanity of those given before him, and that they are merely a negation. In substance the work of Adam Smith is a work of science, since he explains the industrial order in its natu- ral and spontaneous formation; but his work, in form, is almost always a work of art, where all the old formulae are reproduced. Since the publi- cation of Adam Smith's great work, which found- ed, and was worthy of founding, a school, these annoying traditions have been maintained. Po- litical economy, though rejuvenated and trans- formed, has preserved in many respects its old dress. – Appearing after Adam Smith, and when the science was already freeing itself from the obscurity in which it had been involved, J. B. Say understood, better than his predecessor, the nature of his labors and their real object. He felt very clearly that it was not a means of fortune which he taught to nations, and he was very care- ful not to say it was; he declared, on the contrary, repeatedly, and under various forms, that it was a simple exposition which he wished to make. “Political economy,” be says expressly, “teaches what happens and what is.” In this he had a clearer understanding than Adam Smith of the tendencies of the new economic era, and freed himself, more than Adam Smith had done, from old prejudices. Carried away, however, by the same considerations as Adam Smith ; wishing, like Adam Smith, to free himself from the phys- iocrates, who had given the field of the science limits altogether too extensive ; and believing that he was thereby merely reducing the science within its limits, he also inscribed the word “wealth '' on his banner. Since that time it seems admitted as an article of faith among econ- omists that wealth is the special object of their studies. There is no longer any appeal from this decision. In spite of some isolated and barren It is true that his system is dif- protests, here and there, all the labors of econo- mists are supposed to be concerned with wealth. – We have just seen what were the causes of this deviation. We shall now see what its conse- Quences are. And, first of all, if we suppose that political economy has to do exclusively or primarily with wealth, it is utterly impossible to give it even a partially satisfactory definition; and we are obliged to say, with Rossi, that it is the science of wealth. But what is the science of wealth 2 Is there, can there he, a science of wealth? Strictly speaking, we can understand an art of producing wealth; but can we conceive a science connected with the analysis or study of such a fact? What is it to study wealth? is it the fact itself, the result, or the means employed to produce it? If it is the fact itself, it will be neces- sary to limit ourselves to analyzing the elements of which wealth is composed ; and what is the object, what the utility, of Sucli a labor ? To study wealth in the means employed to produce it, is quite another thing : here there may be ma- terial for a vast series of observations; but, then, it is not properly wealth which is studied, for we must not confound the means with the end : it is either human industry, if there be question of wealth produced by the labor of man; or it is the operation of nature, if there be question of the benefits which we receive from nature without labor.—It is useless for Rossi, in order to give a sort of consistency to his definition, to say that there are phenomena of a certain order, which are distinct from all other phenomena and relate to wealth, and that it is these which political econ- omy should study, All these explanations, in which the embarrassment of the writer is betrayed at every word, in spite of his undoubted talent, only thicken the cloud with which he surrounds us. What are these phenomena of which you speak 2 They relate to wealth, you say, but ap- parently they are not wealth itself. Well, de- scribe them, analyze them, indicate at least their character or nature; sum them up, if it is possi- ble, in some definition or formula; perhaps then these phenomena will of themselves form an object worthy of our scientific investigation; but do not tell us that the object of these investigations is wealth, for evidently it is not. — In his definition, which we have already quoted, J. B. Say was more precise without being happier. In saying that political economy describes how wealth “is produced, distributed and consumed,” he escaped the vagueness into which Rossi has fallen, and he has given some body to his formula, but he has not succeeded for all that in being more correct. It will be noted, first of all, that this formula is more than a definition, it is, besides, a classifica- tion of materials; to divide one's subject in this way, is to draw a plan, not to define it. And what is the use of it all? The divisions of a sub- ject, the classifications of materials, whatever they may be, belong always to the writer, and depend more or less upon the point of view he assumes; it is, therefore, an error to present them, though 230 POLITICAL ECONOMY. the best possible, as being so essential to the sub- ject as to form a part of its definition. Why did J. B. Say commit this error? Only, as it appears to us, because in binding himself to the word “wealth '' as the basis of his definition, he had no other means of rendering his thought sensibly clear; he had then either to say too much, as he has done, or to be content with the vague formu- la of Rossi, which tells us nothing at all. What is this wealth which is produced, distributed and consumed? Is wealth, perchance, self-producing and self-distributing? Apparently not; Save, per- haps, that which nature produces and dispenses without the aid of man, as the air, the light, the heat of the sun, etc. J. B. Say carefully excludes these from his domain. Wealth is not produced by itself; we say, it results from human effort, or from several such efforts combined. Why, them, instead of the result, do you not much rather first take up, as the object of the science, the combina- tion of human efforts that produce it? Why not openly, clearly announce in your formula that it is this combination of the different kinds of human labor which forms the object of your studies, since, after all, this is the only thing that can con- stitute the object of serious studies? To read the definitions in which wealth is made the subject of which political economy treats, we would sup- pose that matter acted and moved of itself, and that man counted for nothing. This, it is true, is only appearance; but this appearance is annoy- ing, giving rise to many mistakes; it has often caused it to be said, by men who are strangers to the science, that the economist is devoted exclu- sively to the worship of matter, while in reality it is man, and man alomé, that is the constant object of his labors. — These formulae, besides being vi- cious, have become the source of endless discus- sions, as tireSome as they are barren in results. Starting from the principle that the object of political economy is the study of wealth, the con- clusion is drawn, with a certain appearance of reason, that its first care should be to define and characterize wealth; for how can we reason about wealth if we do not know what it is? and taking this specious reasoning as basis, each economist has made it a duty to place an interminable dis- sertation on this subject at the beginning of his work. They vie with each other, losing them- selves in endless discussions and distinctions on utility, the first attribute of wealth, on value which is its complement, the nature of this value, the conditions of its creation, its existence, its ex- tent, etc. Thus the science is made to bristle with abstractions; a terror to those who do not know it, and an object of disgust even for those who have cultivated it for a long time. The worst of all is, that, after so many long disserta- tions, these writers have not been able to agree whether it is value in use or value in exchange which constitutes wealth. —What must men who are strangers to political economy, or who are only half acquainted with it, think of these end- less discussions? They must think, and in reality do think, that there is nothing fixed or constant in a science in which its very point of departure, that which is or appears to be the foundation of all the rest, is a matter of dispute. —Suppose that, instead of taking wealth as the subject or text of political economy, human industry had been taken, as is required by the nature and logic of things, it appears to us that things would have taken another course. The substance of the science would have remained the same, but the formulae would have changed, and thenceforth the difficulties which we have just noticed would have disappeared of themselves. It would have become very easy to give a satisfactory definition of the Science, not vague and incomprehensible, like that of Rossi, or complicated, detailed, and, after all, unsatisfactory, like that of J. B. Say, but which would be at once general and simple, comprehensive and clear. It would have been sufficient to say that political economy is the sci- ence of the general laws of the industrial world; or that it had as its object the study of labor, not in its technical methods, but in the relations which it produces and the laws which govern it. These formulae, or equivalent ones, would have been sufficient to indicate the object of the science and its tendencies. Then, fully to define its meaning and bearing, it would have sufficed to prove, by a clear and precise exposition, the reality of the laws. which they declare. On the other hand, by start- ing with such formulae, the long dissertations on wealth, which obstruct the avenues of the science. and render its approaches so difficult, might have been dispensed with. And what use is there in adhering so closely to the definition and descrip- tion of wealth, since it is man, man as a worker, whom the science has in view? Wealth, it is true, should be the result of the labor of man, as it is. its object, and it must consequently appear some- time; but it should appear in its proper place, as the fruit of labor, and then it would not be neces- sary to define it, since the definition would natur- ally result from the explanation itself of the labors. which man, has performed in order to obtain it. There would then be no distinction to be made between value in use and value in exchange; or rather, that distinction, which results from the very nature of things, would appear under another aspect. — By the labors to which he devotes him- self, man tends unceasingly to convert all things to his use, both the material objects which he finds at hand, and the immaterial truths which he discovers. Value in use is, therefore, the con- stant object of his care. It is wealth, taking the term wealth in its broadest acceptation. But this. wealth is to be divided into two parts: one which man is obliged to win from nature every day by continually renewed labor; the other, which is. acquired once and forever, and which he enjoys. without labor. In this last category may be ranged, not only the advantages or the goods lib- erally dispensed by nature to all men, such as air, light, and the heat of the Sun, but also all those which man has won by previous labor, and which POLITICAL ECONOMY. 231 are acquired once and forever to the race, and en- joyed by all without labor. Such, for example, is the stock of knowledge grown common to all in civilized countries, the improvement of the climate by cultivation, the possession of an incal- culable number of processes in the arts, which have become habitual and the property of all. This last part of the wealth of man is surely not the least interesting; but as it has been definitively acquired, as man enjoys it henceforth without effort or sacrifice, he need no longer concern him- self with it, unless perhaps to endeavor to increase it. The economist, in like manner, need not busy himself with it, except to state its extent and its benefits. It is only the other part, that which is the object of incessant labor, that really enters into his domain, for it is only here that there are real phenomena to observe. — We have not said all that can be said concerning the annoying results of seconomic formulae. The necessity of being continually occupied with wealth, which it has made its special text, has forced political economy to construct a language of its own, an obscure, involved language, full of subtleties and abstrac- tions. Hence, for example, the expression “im- material products,” to designate simple services rendered, or labor which is not realized in any product, and many others of the same kind : an- noying expressions, to say nothing of the out- rages which they commit on language in this, that they seem to transport us to an unknown world, lying outside of nature. — To sum up, political economy, turning on an abstraction, wealth, has become, in its forms at least, an ab- stract science. Taking matter as its text, it has become a material rather than a moral science, in the eyes of those at least who do not see into its depths. Besides, it has borrowed from in- animate matter all the appearances of a dead sci- ence, while it could and should be full of life. It is not, moreover, in appearance alone that it ex- periences this; it has been grievously troubled by it even in its expositions and in the connection of the truths which it teaches. If, instead of a bar- ren and laborious dissertation upon wealth, with which it always sets out, and from which after- ward flow, with such difficulty and trouble, the solid truths which constitute its substance, politi- cal economy had taken as its point of departure, or its text, human labor, what it would have accom- plished! It would have begun with a broad, ani- mated, living picture of the industrial world as it ex- ists; it would have exhibited the general organiza- tion of human industry as it results from exchange, from the division of labor, from the subordina- tion of the tasks which connect the labor of some with the labor of other men, and the use of metal- lic money, which establishes among all the separate kinds of labor a universal connection. It would have next explained the conditions of the exist- ence of these kinds of labor and their principal motives; then, descending by degrees into the details of the structure of industry, it would have unfolded successively all its springs and declared its laws. All the truths which constitute the sub- stance of political economy would have found their place in this grand structure. What a differ- ence there would be in the animation of the Sub- ject, the facility, the order, ease and clearness of the deductions! It would have been possible even to introduce, if judged necessary, those subtle distinctions, those abstractions, with which the rudiments of the science are at present actually bristling, with this difference, however, that, tak- ing their places only after an explanation of the primary truths of which they are really bul, the consequences, those abstractions would have flowed from these truths as easily as corollaries flow from a geometric proposition. We leave it to be considered, if, with such a point of depart- ure and explained in this order, the science of political economy would not wear a different ap- pearance, and be broader, more animated, more living, and even easier than it is to-day.—WI. Definitive Character of Economic Science: it is a branch of the Natural History of Man. Its Ev- tent and its Limits. When economic science is de- fined as the science of wealth, it is very difficult to say to what genus of science it belongs. Is it a moral science? It is not; for it seems to be de- voted exclusively to the study of matter. Is it a natural science? Still less ; for it is concerned almost entirely with an abstraction. It may be pretended that it is the science of matter, or the science of abstractions; and it is in this way that those who judge only by formulae speak of it. In this case one is very much embarrassed to know where to class it. But this embarrassment, ceases the moment it is brought back to its real subject, the labor of man. — Political economy has been ranged in the category of moral sciences. We accept that title for it, which contains nothing but what is very honorable, and which is correct. It studies the acts and deeds of men, and there is always a certain morality in human actions; but this title, however honorable, is not the only one due to political economy, which is, besides, a nat- ural science, for in its essence it is but a branch of the natural history of man. The anatomist studies man in the physical constitution of his being; the physiologist, in the action of his organs; natural history, properly speaking, in his habits, his instincts, his wants, and in relation to the place which he occupies in the scale of beings; as to political economy, it observes and studies him in the combination of his labors. Is it not a part of the study of a naturalist, and one of the most interesting, to observe the labor of bees in a hive, to study their order, combinations and move- ments? The economist, in so far as he simply cultivates the science without troubling himself about its applications, does precisely the same thing for that intelligent bee, man: he observes the order, the movements and the combinations of his labors. The two studies are absolutely of the same nature; with this difference only, that the field occupied by the economist is incompara- .bly broader, the combinations which he observes 232 POLITICAL ECONOMY. more subtle, more extended and more complex. The theatre of his observations is the great stage of the world. The order which he describes has, besides, a more elevated character, and, although less apparent and more difficult to understand, that order is much more wonderful also than the order of a beehive. The difference is measured by that between an insignificant insect and man. — We have now determined the character and object of political economy, of that almost in- tangible science, the definition of which has caused SO much embarrassment to those who cultivate it, and given such advantage to its enemies. It is simply a branch of the natural history of man, and surely not the least interesting nor the least beautiful. It only remains to us now to fix its extent and limits. – For a long time, and during the whole period in which political economy was considered a branch of the art of government, in- dustry itself appeared merely as a fact subordi- mate to the political order, occupying in each state a fixed and rather narrow place. As it was sub- mitted to the supreme action of the political pow- ers, which were looked upon as its guardians and natural directors, it was examined only in its re- lations to the state. It was looked upon then as a national fact in politics, and it is from this point of view that it was considered by all the early writers. But, in proportion as men closely ob- served industry, they were not slow to find that in no place did it stop at the conventional limits of states. They recognized in it an invincible tendency to extend, to spread outward, to go from one people to another, without respect even for the barriers which political power had established. It was seen to possess a sympathetic virtue which impelled it to clear away every barrier and to overturn or avoid every obstacle, to draw together nations the most different, and to rally them all into the great community of labor by a universal exchange of products and services. Such is the essential character of industry. Universal by na- ture, it has always been so in principle, and tends every day to become so in practice. The relations which it engenders extend from pole to pole; the species of community among men which it cre- ates, already embraces the whole earth; and if cer- tain feeble fractions of the human race appear still to escape its influence, it tends unceasingly and with an invincible force to draw them into its net. — As the field which economic science ex- plores should be as extended as that of industry itself, whose laws it studies, it can evidently have no other limits in space than the limits of the globe itself. Certain economists, however, have been deceived here. They have tried to give their studies a more real or precise character by con- fining them, or rather by trying to confine them, within the limits of a given country. Such a tendency is remarked among certain writers of North Germany. But, try as they might, they have not been able to remain faithful to the law which they pretended to Impose on them- selves. “The theory of social wealth,” says Fr. Skarbek, “may comprise the whole earth if we look at it as the patrimony of the human race; from this point of view, as broad as it is elevated. its investigation would, without doubt, offer to the mind many philanthropic ideas which would be shared by all the friends of humanity; but it would not lead to any important result in the sci- ence, and would not advance us in the knowl- edge of the principles of the wealth of nations.” (Théorie des richesses Sociales, 2d part, introduction.) We beg pardon of the estimable writer, but this point of view, “as broad as it is elevated,” which he sets aside through caution, is the only true one. In order that political economy, or, as Fr. Skarbek calls it, “the theory of social wealth,” should com- prehend the whole earth, it is not at all necessary that economists should be given up to philanthrop- ic ideas, or form wishes more or less realizable for a general union among all nations. It is sufficient that the science be exact and true. Strictly speak- ing, it is sufficient that it should be occupied with the phenomena which are peculiarly within its do- main. Among these phenomena the first place is Occupied by exchange, the division of labor, the , subordination or the connection of the various kinds of labor, the circulation of products, the use of money. These are in industry the great arterial lines, the primordial facts which engender all the others; and this is true to Fr. Skarbek himself, who, like all other economists, accords them the first rank. Now, of all these phenomena, there is not a single one which stops at the limits of any state. They do not stop even in countries which surround themselves with a triple line of custom houses, and which reject foreign products as far as they can. Everywhere, no matter what is done, exchange extends more or less beyond these artificial barriers, and the labor of each country has its branches outside. The very efforts made at the frontiers of certain states to stop the circulation of products, only show more clearly the expansive tendencies of industrial facts. As to the circulation of money, nothing stops it, and here, with the full force of the term, we have a universal fact. But if all the principal economic phenomena extend beyond the limits of indi- vidual states, how can the science itself be con- fined within them? Fr. Skarbek errs, therefore, in this, for want of rendering an account to him- self of the nature of the facts with which he deals. Rossi was in this respect much more in the right when he said that economic science, when Care- fully considered, had the world for its theatre. Does this mean that political economy should take no account of nationalities? Most assuredly not. On the contrary, it makes great account of them, but it does not confine itself to them; it could not, without mutilating itself or abdicating its place. “We must,” says Fr. Skarbek, “ look on the human race as it is, that is to say, divided into a great number of societies different from each other in the degrees of civilization and power at which they have severally arrived.” (Ibid.) Doubtless it is necessary to look at the human POLITICAL ECONOMY 233 race as it exists, but if this human race is divided into a great number of political Societies, it is not specially comprised in any one of them; to speak more clearly, it should comprehend them all. The only question is, whether the facts which political economy considers are political facts, that is to say, peculiar to one or the other of these so- cieties, or facts of humanity, that is to say, com- mon to all the human race. Now, the answer to this question can not be doubtful, at least as re- gards the science strictly speaking; it is not doubt- ful even in the writings of Skarbek, who could not have deceived himself on this subject if he had not reasoned on science, as unfortunately so many other economists do, with the preconceived notions of an art. — Nevertheless, nationalities, states, and the governments which manage them, are also, from a certain point of view, economic facts, and facts of considerable importance; the more considerable since it is through them that order, security and justice, so necessary in the great workshop of labor, are enforced. They should therefore not be forgotten. But to consider the human race in its totality, with regard to the general phenomena which concern it, it is not necessary to forget, nor to lessen, the particular facts which concern each one of the great frac- tions of which it is composed. Here, then, we have the field of political economy marked out so far as space is concerned. Its observations should not and can not be concentrated in a par- ticular state; they should embrace the earth. To see what takes place in this or that country, is not to study industry, but fractions of industry. Even this partial survey is impossible, since any one who examines closely what passes in his own country, will recognize without difficulty that each of the phenomena which he has observed has its prolongation elsewhere. It may be of use, doubtless, to show the local influence of the par- ticular kinds of legislation of each state, and the manner in which they modify the action of general laws; it is even necessary, in all cases, to take account of this salutary influence which every government exercises in its sphere, by the single fact of maintaining order and security. All these particular facts have their place in the vast circle of studies which political economy embraces, but it is none the less true that the ground of all these studies is in a sum total of phenomena which includes the human race in its entirety. — If, as to space, political economy knows no other limits than those of the earth itself, we can also say that it includes in its domain all men without distinction, to whatever class they belong or whatever their occupation. It would, indeed, be a great error to suppose that the in- dustrial phenomena from which economic science draws its life concern only men actually en- gaged in industry, merchants, manufacturers, and all those commonly included under the name of workingmen; it comprehends all without excep- tion. We are all interested in exploiting this globe of ours, and this is enough to bind us to the Scene of our labor. If we are not all bound to it by our labor, we are at least so bound by our wants; and nearly all of us, it must be said, aid in this exploitation of the globe, even without knowing it, in a direct or indirect manner. This is not at all doubtful in the case of men who hold the reins of power in nations, or who govern them; it is by their ministry that order, security and justice reign in the great workshop of in- dustry. From this point of view, functionaries, judges, officials of all kinds, assist in the common labor, by the fact alone that they defend it against acts of violence which might disturb it. This is also true in the case of scholars, who, without taking part in industrial labor properly speaking, throw light on the path of progress. If there is in the world a sufficient number of men of whom one can not say absolutely that they assist, directly or indirectly, in the common labor, they at least render certain services to their equals, and this is enough to warrant us in including them in the grand army of labor. It would, in fact, singu- larly lessen the scope of human industry to con- sider it as exclusively devoted to the material ex- ploitation of the terrestial globe; it has a more general object, that of answering to all the wants of man of whatever nature they may be. Thus, whoever renders a service to his fellows, what- ever be the occupation to which he is devoted, is connected with general industry by his labor. Who, then, are the men who are not engaged in in- dustry in some way? Apparently only those who live at the expense of their neighbors, by theft, robbery or beggary, but even these, if they do not belong to the industrial order by their labor, are still connected with it indissolubly by their wants. — In the stage of civilization which humanity has reached, every man, in whatever position he may be, in whatever degree of the social scale he may be placed, depends on exchange, at least So far as his wants are concerned, which he can only satisfy through it. Now, exchange is the first of the general conditions of industry, and the chief source of all the others. He is also connected with the division of labor by the functions which he performs, if he performs any, or, in default of any, by the rank alone which he occupies. There is no person who does not use money, at least in certain cases, and money is one of the principal agents of the industrial order. In fine, we are all obliged to accept the value of things which the general condition of the markets has established. In all this we aré irrevocably bound to the in- dustrial order, and we submit to its laws. If a few men escape it, they are mere Savages, and the last among savages, those who, lost in Some corner of a desert land, have no relations with the rest of the world; for in regard to other Savages, they make, after all, Some exchanges, and gener- ally devote themselves to Some special occupation adapted to their support. Thus, the industrial order not only extends over the whole earth, it em- braces, besides, all men, without distinction. Thus, too, the field of political economy, considered as a 234 POLITICAL ECONOMY. science, being no other than that of industry itself, whose laws it studies, it is clear that it compre- hends in its domain the totality of mankind. — From this point of view we can say that economic science has no limits; but if it has not, so far as the extent of the circle it embraces is concerned, it has them marked out clearly enough as to the object with which it is concerned. Though con- nected exclusively with man, it does not take all of man into consideration; that which it studies Specially is human industry, comprising under this general denomination the sum of labors which men perform, or the mutual services which they render each other for the satisfaction of their respective wants. Further, it does not consider these special services except in so far as they are rendered under the law of exchange, that is to say, in consideration of a return. Man, living in Society, has his duties to fulfill to his neighbors, his duties as a son, a father, husband, citizen; he has others to fulfill to his Creator. These duties polit- ical economy considers as foreign to its domain: it leaves the care of determining them and regu- lating them to religion, to morality, and the law. Besides the strict duties which religion, morality and law impose on him, man has feelings of sym- pathy which often decide him to come to the assistance of his neighbors without any hope of repayment. This is also an order of things with which political economy has nothing to do. It examines only those positive and strictly definable relations which are established between men, when each of them, while rendering services to others, counts on a just remuneration for these services, and works in reality for himself. — All this is easily understood, because it all results sufficiently from the single general enunciation of the object which economic science proposes to itself: the study of human industry. But what should be brought out more clearly is this, that political economy does not study even industry under all its phases; that, for example, it never considers industry in the processes which it employs in the technic or scientific means which it uses, but only in the relations which it engenders, and in the gen- eral laws by which it is governed. Thus, every industrial worker, manufacturer; or merchant comes under the observation of political economy. This is not doubtful with regard to the labors which he executes. But political economy does not consider these labors in themselves and in their technical processes; it only considers them in their connection with the labors which are exe- cuted elsewhere and in regard to their relations with the whole. What is seen in an artisan is the place which he occupies in the great workshop of labor, the office which he fills there; but it does not inquire how he fills that office, or at least it only judges by results. It sees the products which he delivers to his neighbors, the condition under which he delivers them, and the remunera- tion which he obtains. It sees at the same time the action exercised upon him by all of his sur- roundings, the influences which he undergoes, processes. and the necessities by which he is held to submit to them. But it takes no note of the processes which he uses in the branch of labor with which he is occupied. – Political economy is in this respect, then, perfectly distinct from technology, and in general from all the arts and sciences which men apply in the particular labors to which each one devotes himself. It takes account of all these arts and Sciences, it gives them a place, but always considers them only in regard to their relations with the whole, only in the func- tion which they fulfill, in the action which they exercise, but never in themselves, and in their processes. The reason of this is easily under- stood. If we admit, in fact, that there is in the industrial world, as it exists, certain constant relations between workmen, invariable laws, a fixed and regular order which can be settled and defined, it is this order, these relations, these laws, which political economy should study, and noth- ing more; it could go no further, to observe, for ex- ample, the particular processes of the labors whose relations it studies, without losing its way. Thus, the field of economic science is limited on all sides. It halts everywhere, if it is permitted to Say So, at the very portals of the sanctuary in which the arts are carried on. It touches all these sciences and all these arts, but without inter- fering with any, examining them only in their relations to the whole. — This last consideration should establish a clear dividing line between political economy and politics proper. Politics is an art, the art of governing a political society or a nation, in view of certain ends; in view, notably, of establishing order, security and justice therein, of maintaining and making the rights of all re- spected. Political economy looks on this art, as on all others, in its relations with the total of cconomic facts, but in no way in its ordinary It makes known, for instance, the salutary influence which a government exercises on the development of industry, when it main- tains perfect security for all interests, absolute respect for all rights, and calls attention to the wrong which it inflicts on industry when it suffers these rights to be violated or when it violates them itself; but it does not discuss on what principles or what bases a government should be instituted in order to accomplish its mission in the best man- ner possible. This is a task which it leaves to politics as it leaves to technology that of deter- mining the best possible methods of manufactur- ing in one branch of industry or another. — VII. Actual or Possible Applications of Economic Science. No science is destined to remain barren forever. Considered in itself, a science only studies what takes place and what exists, without inquiring what use may be made of the truths which it es- tablishes. “From the moment that we busy our- selves,” says Rossi, justly, “with the employment which may be made, or the profit that may be drawn, from science, we leave Science and fall into art.” Still, as the profit which may be derived from it is, after all, the final object proposed in POLITICAL ECONOMY. 235 studying science, it is not forbidden, even to the Scholar, to examine what are or would be its possible applications. This is the more necessary here, since in this Cyclopædia economic art and Science are in many regards mingled and con- founded. What, then, are the useful applications which may be made of political economy in the present, or those which may be made of it in the future? The study of economic science will not lead, we may be sure, to the discovery of that chimera, that sort of philosopher's stone, so long sought for: the art of enriching nations by means of legislative combinations; on the contrary, the first fruit of this study is to make it clearly under- stood that the creation of such an art is impossi- ble. Political economy shows, indeed, in the first place, that all wealth is derived from the energy of individual labor or the spontaneous activity of men; it shows, in the second place, that this Spontaneous activity obeys, of itself, or by the force of things alone, certain regular laws which direct it unceasingly toward the most fruitful re- Sults, toward results the best that human industry can produce. In the presence of these two capi- tal truths, the first that flow from the total of economic investigation, we are convinced that every artificial combination imposed on human labor is capable only of troubling its natural order, and diminishing its fruits. Neither will this study lead to the discovery of that other art SO vainly sought for by certain modern sectaries, that of dividing the fruits of labor among the different classes or the different members of so- ciety according to conventional laws, to render this division more equal among men, or, as is sup- posed, more conformable to equity. It shows, and this is another of the capital truths which it gives to the world, that the partition or distribu- tion of the fruits of labor effected by the natural laws of industry, is, when no artificial system intervenes to trouble the action of these natural laws, or when violence does not prevent their effect, the most equitable and the best possible. It proves that this division is continually effected according to the grand principle which men have pretended to inaugurate by other means: to each one according to his capacity, and to each capacity according to its works—a principle of rig- Orous justice, which does not reduce men to an impossible level, but which leaves to each One a share of enjoyment corresponding to the sum of the labors which he has furnished, or the services which he has rendered. — In all this, then, the study of political economy leads us, and this is its first fruit, to renounce in an abso- lute manner the discovery of all those artificial CUIIIljillaliulls, ill (lue Search for which Go many distinguished men have wasted their powers. It conducts us to this without effort, by the sole revelation of the natural order which it brings to light. After this revelation, all arbitrary combina- tions should vanish, because they have no longer any raison d'être, and because they can only trouble the pre-existing natural order. And this is why political economy, from the first, necessarily enun- ciated this great principle, Laissez faire, laissez passer, a principle which may be called a system if you will, but which has no value but this, that it is the negation of all artificial systems. Is this saying that political economy can not be applied usefully, that it can not reach any practi- cal result? Decidedly not. On the contrary, there are many practical results, whose realization it. can help to effect. — It is, to begin with, a first and very great practical result to have caused the abandonment of all artificial systems, the un- happy fruits of the errors of men, some of which have already brought many evils on humanity, while others have sometimes menaced it with still greater evils. Political economy has shaken these systems to their foundations, beginning with that which consisted in regulating the labors of men, subjecting them to hindrances; including those which strove for nothing less than to substitute a new Organization of industry sprung all armed from the head of some excited enthusiast, for that admirable natural organization which human genius has produced. This is the first service which economic science has rendered, and if it. had done nothing else, it surely could not be said that it is barren of results. But it can render others still more direct and of a more positive nature. — If from political economy we can not deduce the art of enriching nations, we can at least deduce from it another art, more rational and truer, that of governing them, in everything touching ſlie interests of labor, in the manner most conformable to their natural tendencies. This still tends to enrich them, but by a different and much surer method, which is to desist from harassing their industry and diminishing its fruits. And if political economy, without interfering in politics, meaning by that whatever relates to the form itself of government, takes into consideration the state, or the power which directs the state in reference to the influence which it exercises and should exercise on the industrial circle which it. embraces, it should also, for the same reason, say how far that influence ought to extend in order to protect the industrial order without troubling it. It is, then, its office to determine the real attri- butes of the state and the limits of these attributes. — It does more. Even within the limits of these attributes it indicates the best measures to be adopted, keeping always in view the industrial order which it studies, and the spontaneous de- velopment of human activity. Among the legiti- mate attributes of political power, is, beyond doubt, that of levying and collecting taxes, in order to satisfy its own wants. Without examin- ing whose province if is to levy or collect these taxes, a question which belongs to the domain of politics, political economy examines according to what principles and in what form they should be levied and collected in order to obtain the sum of contributions necessary, with the least possible damage to the people. The theory of taxation is therefore one of the first arts which Spring from 236 POLITICAL ECONOMY. political economy. —It does not stop here. Al- though the essential and primitive function of political power is to establish security, justice and law, there are certain other functions which can not be denied it, that, notably, of directing in each state certain interests which can not, without danger, be left to the action of individuals, and, which imperatively demand the interference of public power. The state should interfere more Or less, for example, in whatever concerns the management of waters, the system of roads, etc. There are still other objects which are evidently within its jurisdiction. Men may discuss, and they will often discuss, the greater or less exten- sion which it is proper to give to these accessory attributes of political power, but no one will deny that there are some which it can not and should not abandon. In all this, it is still economic science that has to furnish the general rules by which the mode and extent of the intervention should be regulated. In all countries, general legislation is necessary to regulate the rights of individuals among themselves, and those of indi- viduals in their relations to the public. Com- monly this legislation becomes complicated in proportion as the progress of civilization has Created more numerous and complex interests. It is essentially important to the happiness of the human species that in its totality and in its details this legislation should always be in perfect accord with that natural order which political economy reveals. It is true that to establish this accord it is very often sufficient to have recourse to good Sense and the common principles of equity, for political economy itself does not demand anything but the triumph of equity; yet this is not sufficient in all cases. Besides the fact that it is not always easy in the complication of various interests to distinguish what is truly equitable from that which is merely specious, there are in all the legis- lations of the world a great number of provi- sions which are merely formal, and which belong to what might be called civil police provisions; and which are necessary sometimes to establish the rights of individuals, and sometimes to guar- antee their enjoyment and preservation. It is especially in this part of legislation that there is a risk of going astray when one is not aided by the lights of economic science. It often happens in such cases, either that the guarantees offered are not sufficient for the preservation of the rights which it is wished to protect, or that they are Superabundant, and stifle the action of these same rights under the weight of the formalities which they impose upon those rights. The legislation of civilized nations is, in our enlightened age, far from being exempt in this regard from all re- proach. There is, on the contrary, not one which is not overburdened with annoying provisions and ill-conceived formalities, prejudicial to the public, and opposed to the very interests which they are intended to serve. How is legislation to be purged of these imperfections? By a more careful and general study of that natural order which political economy reveals and whose con- ditions it explains. Science has already rendered brilliant services in this direction. To it, above all, is due the relative merit of modern legislation, which, though very imperfect, is still far superior, on the whole, to that in force in the past. It will render still greater services here in the future, and we may hope that the world will be indebted to it, sooner or later, for a system of civil laws exactly appropriate to the real wants of human Society. — But it is not to legislators and governments alone that economic science has useful directions to give. Individuals may consult it with profit for the conduct of their private affairs, at least when these affairs extend beyond a certain limit. Individuals are forced, and more so than legisla- tors and governments, to bend in all things to the industrial order to which they are essentially sub- ordinate. They can scarcely, it is true, trouble it by their acts; for they have not the power to do so; at most, they are able to cause, by their errors or their faults, certain transient and alto- gether local disturbances in it. But the errors into which they allow themselves to be drawn, become fatal by hurrying them to their own ruin. They have, therefore, the greatest interest to avoid these errors, for on that their personal ex- istence depends. Now, the best means of avoiding these errors is to study the industrial order in its essential constitution, in its natural tendencies and its normal development. If this study is not pre- cisely necessary to the artisan and the retail mer- chant, who address themselves only to a small number of neighboring consumers, it is almost always necessary to those who work on a large scale, and especially to those who intend to em- bark in new enterprises. The majority of false steps taken on this road, and the disasters which they involve, when they are not purely the result of negligence or incapacity, arise from false ideas concerning the wants of society and its real tend- encies. – Political economy has often been given names different from that which it usually bears, and there is nothing very astonishing in this, for this name, as we have seen, is not very appropriate to it, and has scarcely any merit but that of hav- ing been sanctioned by long usage. Of these names we shall recall but a few. First, as to the present and ordinary name of the Science: its origin is very ancient, since it is found at the head of a French treatise dated 1615, due to One Montchrestien de Watteville. The publicists of the school of Quesnay, who perhaps contributed more than others to sanction this ancient title, have nevertheless sometimes substituted another, that of physiocracy, which still serves to designate their school and their doctrine. Adam Smith, who cared more for things than for words, adopted the received titles without examination. J. B. Say, though he also accepted them, did not do so, at least in his later works and in the last editions of his Traité, without repugnance and regret. He would have preferred to be able to give another more fitting name to political economy, and he POLITICAL ECONOMY. would have doubtless done so had he not feared to change the ideas of the public as to the real character of his labors. The name which he would have adopted in this case would have been Social economy or social physiology, as he has him- self declared several times. This last title would seem to us the most proper were it not likely to give rise to troublesome misunderstandings. The word physiology would, in every way, be very appropriate to economic science, since its ob- ject is to explain the action of the natural organs of industry. As to the word social, it would not be fitting except in so far as it should be well ex- plained and well understood that the word relates to the great human society and that species of universal association which industrial relations create among men, and in no way to political Soci- ety, which is only a fraction of that great society. Moreover, the word social has been so much abused in recent years, it has been made to serve as a cloak to so many foolish things, to so many anti- social and anti-human doctrines, that it will per- haps be necessary to avoid its employment for a long time to come. — Fr. Skarbek has entitled his treatise, “Theory of Social Wealth,” another name for political economy, less acceptable than those we have just noted, and which, after all that has preceded, we need not discuss. – When there was created at the conservatory of arts and trades, at Paris, a chair of political economy, Occupied at first by J. B. Say, and subsequently by Blanqui, it was called the chair of industrial economy. It may be that tlis name of industrial economy, im- posed officially on a public chair, borrows from this circumstance a certain value, a certain au- thority. It has already served as title to a work founded on the first lectures of Blanqui, by two of his disciples. – Some persons, strangers to the science, have also tried to impose on political economy the name of chrematistics, or other names stranger still. But these ill-sounding titles have never been seriously considered by any economist or even by the public. — Whatever be the relative or absolute merit of some of these titles which we have passed in review, none has been able, up to the present, to prevail over that which long usage has sanctioned. After all, however incorrect this last may be, when it is considered in its etymo- logical sense, perhaps it is better to adhere to it at least for the present. It is always dangerous, in the case of a science cultivated by so many minds, and in so many places, to alter or change received terms. And what importance has the etymologi- cal sense here? It is not the first time that a word has been deflected from its primitive Sense, either by usage or by a change in the things themselves to which it refers; and we do not see that people who use it understand it the less on this account. If the future offers an opportunity to change the name which political economy still bears, it will be only when its general notions are more fully popularized and explained. The public mind will thus be prepared for the change of name. CH. COQUELIN. POLITICAL ECONOMY, History of. The history of the science of economics falls natural- ly into two periods: that before, and that after, Adam Smith. The year 1776 may fairly enough be called the birth-year of economics, for in that year appeared Adam Smith's immortal work enti- tled, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes Of the Wealth Of Nations.” The Science had passed through two stages of its development before that time : the embryonic and the forma- tive periods. Men had thought upon economical subjects for ages in a desultory, blind sort of a way, but had produced nothing which even re- motely resembled the science now called econom- ics until within two centuries of Adam Smith. The embryo began to assume shape in the writings of those men who immediately preceded the so- called mercantilists; it appeared in a more devel- oped shape in the formulations of the mercantile writers during the seventeenth century, and as- sumed a still more definite and orderly form in the theories of the economists or physiocrats of the eighteenth century. It was reserved for Adam Smith, however, to actually bring it into life and start it forth in its career of development. Adam Smith occupies a very similar position in the his- tory of economics to that occupied by Kant in the history of philosophy. All theories and devel- opment of the preceding ages culminate in him, all lines of development in the succeeding ages start from him. His work has been before the public over one hundred years, and yet no second book has been produced that deserves to be com- pared with it in originality or importance. The subsequent history of the science is mainly the his- tory of attempts to broaden and deepen the foun- dation laid by Adam Smith, to build the super- structure higher and render it more solid.— Those who have attempted to find the origin of eco- nomics in antiquity have met with poor success. Even Roscher, with all his love for the historical method and his wonderful acquaintance with economical writings, has not been able to prove anything more than that ancient writers discussed some phases of various economic subjects—as how could they help doing so, if they touched upon social or political matters at all? One might as well claim that the New Testament contains a systematic treatise on political economy, because it discusses the proper method of treating the poor, and the relations between masters and serv- ants, as to maintain that Plafo and Aristotle, in their discussions of the state and its functions, elaborated an economic science, or even laid the foundations for such a science. Greek and Roman writers, it is true, discussed economic questions. So they discussed chemical, physical and geologi- cal questions, but it would hardly be claimed, even by their most enthusiastic followers, that they laid the foundations, in any real sense, of the modern sciences of chemistry, physics and geol- ogy. They considered nearly all questions which present themselves to the inquiring human mind. But many of them they did not approach from 238 POLITICAL ECONOMY. the right direction, and consequently their thought did not result in anything valuable. They re- flected upon economic questions, and discussed them to some extent, but not from an economic standpoint. Economic issues were decided, not from economic considerations, but on Social, polit- ical, religious or even esthetic grounds. Three things prevented the Greeks from elaborating a science of economics: 1, the abstract nature of their science; 2, their economical institutions; 3, their political and social theories. (Eisenhardt.) Greek science was abstractly philosophical. It was pre-eminently a priori. It was in such haste to reach ultimate generalizations that it was not content to make even elementary observations of actual facts. As a consequence it became mere form without content. Its theories were often directly opposed to patent facts. Such a method could not develop a science of economics, whose starting point is certainly the concrete facts of the material and moral world, whatever its sub- sequent logical method may be. Nor was the social and economic organization of the Grecian states any more favorable to the development of economics than their scientific method. Greece never got beyond the natural economy—that form of social organization in which the community is made up of a mere aggregate of households, each of which is largely independent of the others, since it satisfies its own want of mate- rial commodities by producing them itself, in- stead of depending on acquiring them by ex- change. The typical Greek state was based on a landed aristocracy, whose members dwelt each in the midst of an estate, on which he employed enough slaves to work the lands and manufacture the commodities which necessity and comfort re- quired. The economical phenomena of such a social organization could not be so striking as to attract the thoughtful attention of the thinkers and philosophers long enough to result in any val- uable system of science. And finally, the Greek idea of labor barred in a most effectual way all at- tempts to investigate its real nature as an econom- ic factor. Physical labor was held to be degrad- ing. It unfitted a man for the higher and nobler duties of life, those relating to the state. It was necessary, therefore, for human society to be di- vided into two classes, the slaves and the masters. All physical labor must be performed by the for- mer, so as to leave the latter leisure to live for the higher purposes of life. Plato carefully excluded artisans from his ideal state, and after calling a state organized in their interest a state of swine, he says that it is not worth the trouble to spend any time in discussing them. Aristotle recog- nized only One kind of physical labor as worthy occupation for free citizens, and that was agricul- ture. In this respect the Romans resembled Aristotle. Senators were disgraced who took part in undertakings which were not aristocratic, and agriculture was the only kind of physical labor which was allowed to be aristocratic. Of course, with such ideas of labor, there was no possibility of a science of economics, in the modern sense of the term. This bar to the rise of political econ- omy was taken away by the triumph of Christian. ity, which made the servant equal to the master in the sight of God, and all kinds of labor equally honorable. But early Christian science was as antagonistic to any thoroughgoing investigation Of economic problems as had been its predecessors. For, in the first place, it was as abstract and as a priori as Greek philosophy. In fact, it was a mere outgrowth of the latter, and for ages it did not get beyond it. In the second place, the ascetic influence was decidedly prominent. The doctrine of renunciation was preached. The way to get rich is to become so deeply interested in the life beyond the grave that the wealth of this world shall become of no importance. Such an idea was as inimical to the rise of political economy as the ancient idea of labor. Mediaeval society also re- sembled that of antiquity, in that it was essen- tially a mere aggregate of private households, each largely independent of all the others. The system of barter still prevailed. Society was di. vided into two classes, lords and serfs. The lat- ter lived for the former, and these, theoretically, for the state and the church, practically, for themselves. But toward the beginning of that period which we call modern times, things began to change, and the conditions began to be real- ized, one by one, which were necessary to the rise of economics. The first great step was the rise of the cities. The artisan and commercial classes began to work themselves up out of the subordinate positions they had always occupied, to an equality with the clergy and nobility. By coming together in cities they managed to develop a political strength which secured their rights and privileges. By the cheapness of their products they began to build up a trade with the country. The first germs of that vast organism which we may call the industrial economy of the world be. gan to vegetate. Exchange by money began to take the place of exchange by barter. The trades unions insisted on the dignity of labor, and the representatives of the cities claimed equal rank with those of the courts. The growth was rapid. Kings and princes saw in the cities a means of humbling the power of the barons and of increas. ing the revenue at their disposal. The need of money to sustain their armies led the kings to consider the best way of getting money The thought and attention of their ministers were di- rected more and more powerfully to this subject, though of course all the time more toward the practical question of how to get a large revenue, than to the theoretical one of how to establish and maintain national wealth. Works upon money are consequently the earliest writings we have on economical subjects. It might have been a long time, however, before any system of economical theories would have been elaborated, had it not been for the discovery of America. To the gold and silver mines of Mexico and “Peru we are probably indebted for the mercantile theory. The POLITICAL ECONOMY. 239 revolution in prices in western Europe caused by the influx of gold and silver from America, was both intensive and extensive, and its effects are traceable even to this day. Many modern econo- mists are never tired of belittling the theories of the mercantile school, and of expressing their sur- prise that men ever held such views. A glance at the conditions under which it rose will do much to explain its raison d’être. Most modern writers on economics unite in attributing but little impor- tance to the increase in the amount of money in a country. Mill says that if the quantity of money in the possession of every individual in a nation were suddenly doubled, the only economical effect would be a rise in prices equal to the increase in the amount of money in circulation. Now, al- though this might be true of the case which he supposes (which he does not by any means prove), yet it is plain that, if the same amount of money were put at the disposal of a few men, its passage into circulation might have a most powerful effect on the whole national economy. It might work Out a total redistribution of wealth before it had all passed into circulation and produced its legiti- mate effect of raising prices. Such was the con- dition of things in the world market from 1500 to 1600. A large addition was made to the money of the world. This addition was in the possession of a single nation. The economical superiority of this nation in western Europe was undisputed. Its political superiority followed as a matter of course. Spain, by virtue of its immense acqui- sitions of gold and silver, became mistress of the wealth and lands of Europe. Prices rose rapidly, but Spain was in a condition to profit at the ex- pense of the rest of the world. The quantity of money in the European world in 1600 was esti- mated to be about four times what it was in 1492. Bodin, in his discours sur l’eacessive cherté, pub- lished in 1574, says that prices had risen ten to twelve fold within seventy years. Bishop Latimer, in his sermons (1575), says that he had to pay sixteen pounds rent for the estate which his father had had for three-fourths of a pound. The European world contemplated this unheard-of and universal rise in prices with dazed fear. If this thing continues, says Latimer, we shall have to pay a pound for a hog after awhile. It was, of course, natural that men should see in such a revolu- tion a real increase in the cost of commodities. It was widely attributed to the usurious manipula- tions of the large banking houses. It was fliere- fore a long step forward toward the rise of eco- nomics when Bodin declared that this whole phenomenon was a mere sinking in the value of gold and silver, and not an increase in the value of other commodities. Just as much corn, cloth, etc., is produced now as before, and at the same expense of labor and capital; the only difference is, that money has become much more plenty, and consequently has sunk in price. But while this expressed a great economic truth, it did not change the fact that while this process was going on it had produced a very different distribution of wealth among the European nations to the ad- vantage of Spain, nor could it obscure the fact that money had been the great instrument in effecting this distribution. The phenomena at- tendant upon this enormous redistribution of wealth attracted the attention of eminent thinkers of all nations. They naturally attempted to ac- count for them. The theory which they elab- orated has become known as the commercial or mercantile system, and was the first attempt to systematize and arrange in Scientific order the complicated phenomena of the industrial world, and, as such, deserves a somewhat careful examin- ation. This theory arose from discussions of the money question, and was primarily a mere theory of money and of the laws controlling its creation and distribution. It included, however, the dis- cussion of many other points, and it will be pre- sented here as it appeared in its later form. — The most striking peculiarity of the mercantile school, as Roscher has happily remarked, consists in a five-fold over-estimation. The mercantile writers, as a rule, over-estimated the importance of a dense population, the value of a large stock of money, the advantages of foreign trade, the importance of manufacturing industry, and the efficiency of governmental control and supervision. We have already explained how naturally they were led by the circumstances of the time to over-value the precious metals, which formed the money stock of the world. The underlying principle of the whole mercantile school was that a nation’s wealth is to be measured by the amount of the precious metals which is circulating within its limits as money, and that the national economy is conse- quently to be organized so as to attract as much money as possible into the country, and to retain it when onge obtained. They held that wherever money performs its service as a universal medium of exchange, the individual is rich in proportion as he can control money, and that what is true of the individual must be true of the nation, which is only an aggregate of individuals. Further, that although the wealth of a nation does not con- sist altogether of gold and silver coins, but of money and what is worth money, yet money is the most important element of wealth, because it is not consumed and destroyed like provisions, and because it forms an essential condition of a lively domestic commerce, and of a great produc- tion and consumption, and must also be regarded as an unusually important, nay, indispensable, re- source, and as a powerful promoter of interna- tional commerce. Again, that the vigor, authority, efficiency and power of the government at home and abroad depend mainly on the amount of money at its disposal, and that great and success- ful wars can never be waged without abundance of money. Finally, that the importance of money can be seen from the fact that all those states which, by means of manufacturing industry, for- eign trade or other expedients, have succeeded in obtaining the largest amount of the precious met- als, and in whose territories there is the liveliest 240 POLITICAL ECONOMY. Y. circulation of money, have distinguished them- Selves from other states by a great population, prosperity and power. Starting from these con- siderations, the value of any branch of national industry, the propriety of any course of national policy, must be tried by its probable effect on the quantity of money at the nation’s disposal. Agri- culture, although necessary to the existence of a people, can not increase the national wealth very much, because its products, as a rule, are rapidly consumed, and, even if shipped to foreign lands, can not bring back much money, since they are generally exchanged for manufactures. If the products of agriculture were worked over at home and sent abroad in a perfected form they would serve to support a flourishing manufactur- ing and commercial population, and money would flow into the country in abundance. In the opin- ion of the mercantilists, then, agriculture is to be fostered as the nourisher of the nation, and as the source of various kinds of raw material which manufacturing industry needs; but as compared with other branches of industry which contribute to increase the quantity of money, the nerve and sinew of national power and prosperity, it is only of secondary importance, and can by no means lay claim to special care and favor. In reference to mining, which is intimately connected with the production of raw materials, the mercantile school held, that the mining of the precious metals is an extremely important source of national wealth, for it contributes immediately to swell the quan- tity of gold and silver. The opening of mines, them, at home or in the colonies, must be a special care of every government which understands its true interest. Gold and silver mines should be kept open, even if they yield no profit, or indeed if they can be worked only at a loss; for the money with which the costs of mining are de- frayed remains in the country, while the precious metals so obtained are a permanent gain to the national wealth. — In opposition to agriculture the mercantile system recognizes manufacturing industry as especially important to a nation; for it alone furnishes those products and commodities which can be exchanged with foreign countries for cash, while it also prevents money from going to foreign countries in return for manufact- ures. It is to be regarded, therefore, as a power- ful lever in acquiring money. The mercantilists hold that everything which can be produced at home should be produced there, even if the costs of production and prices should be higher than abroad; for the higher prices paid to the producers remain at home. Those branches of industry are of most importance which furnish artistic products for the foreign market, for these not only prevent money from leaving the country to purchase such things elsewhere, but they are the very things that bring in most money. In consequence of the significance, importance and necessity of such in- dustry, it becomes one of the chief functions of the state to further everything which can promote it in any way, and especially to aim at Securing low wages of labor, cheap provisions, low rates of interest, cheap raw materials, skilled laborers, large markets, cheap transportation, etc., since these are prime conditions of the expansion and progress of the technical industries. This can only be attained when the government keeps the wages at a proper minimum by police regulations, fixes the prices of the necessaries of life, hinders the export of corn, fixes the rate of interest, and renders difficult the exportation of raw materials, while offering a premium on their importation. It must at the same time attempt to persuade skilled laborers to immigrate from foreign coun- tries, reward and promote skill and inventiveness by patents and pensions, by monopolies and priv- ileges, improve the means of communication and transportation, and regulate domestic and exclude foreign competition. What the landowner, farm- er, laborer and capitalist, and the whole class of consumers, lose by this policy, is made up to the state as a whole, for in this way the efflux of money to foreign countries is prevented, and the consequent increase in rapidity of circulation accrues to the advantage of all. In regard to domestic commerce, the mercantile school held that inasmuch as it is exclusively occupied with domestic wares and products, it is of importance, from an economical point of view, only in so far as it assists manufacturing industry by furnishing it good and cheap raw material. Very different is it with foreign commerce, which occupies a most important place in the industrial and mercantile life of nations, and must, therefore, be an object of special care to the state. First of all, care must be taken that no money leaves the land through foreign commerce, or at least that no more flows out than comes back. The “balance of trade” is taken as an indication of the movement of the money. In order to secure a favorable “balance of trade,” that is, in order that more money shall be imported than is exported, the importation of foreign manufactures is to be prevented or ren- dered difficult by customs duties, while the im- portation of raw material is to be allowed, because it promotes manufacturing industry at home. The exportation of domestic manufactures, on the contrary, is to be promoted by every possible means, since they bring in money the most surely and in the largest quantities. In order that the manufactures may obtain a large market in foreign lands, especial care must be devoted to the cheap- ness and excellence of the wares and products so as to compete easily with foreign products. The cheapness of the goods is to be secured by the methods mentioned above, by low taxes, etc., while the quality is to be assured by a very de- tailed system of inspection and control on the part of the government. The latter must examine all commodities destined for foreign markets, insist upon honest and fair workmanship, and confiscate all goods of a poor quality or such as would be likely to injure the prospects of trade. It should further assist and encourage the pro- ducers by rebates and premiums on exportation, Q POLITICAL ECONOMY. 241 and should insure them against unavoidable acci- dents and misfortunes. The mercantilists claimed that premiums on exports do not injure anybody, bc.cause they are paid to inhabitants of the coun- try, and consequently remain at home. Foreign commerce is to be encouraged by the establish- ment of great trading companies, by the planting of colonies, by treaties of commerce with other nations, by great fairs, etc. — The mercantile School insisted, further, that the mere accumula- tion of money by mining, manufacturing and trade did no good of itself, but that if the money was to accomplish its true mission, and be of any great advantage, it must circulate rapidly from hand to hand. A large body of consumers, there- fore, is necessary to any great advance in national wealth. The state should not be niggardly in its expenditure, for, since the money all remains in the land, a liberal consumption of products and wares promotes production in every line. Their theory of taxation was, that so far as the expenses of government can not be defrayed by domains, monopolies, fees, etc., they should be met by tax- ing the profits of the citizens. Great care must be exercised, however, not to tax infant indus- tries too heavily, and in many cases they should be exempted from taxation. Since the power and basis of national wealth are to be found in a large and dense population, the state should devote especial attention to promoting, by every means in its power, the growth of population. Their views on population are easily accounted for. Society was in that transition state when every increase in numbers, so far from resulting in greater proverty and distress, acted merely as a stimulant to new undertakings and richer achieve- ments. – The above set of views, to which the name of the mercantile or commercial theory has been given, ruled the political world during the whole period of modern times down to the close of the French revolution, and still maintains a hold in some places. It is difficult, or rather im- possible, to say who was the founder of the mer- cantile School, or in what land it had its origin. It was such a natural outgrowth of the con- ditions of society that it made its appearance about the same time in Italy, France and Eng- land. And although a good case may be made out for Italian and Fronch thinkers as the carlicst theorizers on this subject, yet an exact form was given to these views first by Thomas Mun in a postliullious work published ill 1664, and eluti- tled “England's Treasure by Foreign Trade; or, the Balance of our Foreign Trade is the rule of our Treasure.” — One of the practical results of such views, when adopted by Statesmen, was a thoroughgoing paternal system of government. The state undertook to regulate every department of life. Free trade was as unknown as free speech or free thought. The economy of the world was forced, as it were, into a strait-jacket. Everything moved along artificial channels. Noth- ing was natural and free. There came a time, of course, in the progress of civilization when such a 135 VOL. III. — 16 state of things was no longer tenable. Men began to grow restive under this continual restraint. They longed for a greater liberty of thought, speech and action. The period of agitation in the intellectual and religious world began in earnest with Voltaire. It was one of his contemporaries and countrymen who voiced the general dissatis- faction of the time in economical matters. Side by side with the champions of political and re- ligious freedom, François Quesnay represented the economical phase of this great struggle. The system which he founded has been called the agri- cultural or physiocratic. It is a vigorous protest against the theory and practice of the mercan- tilistic School. Although it never acquired the importance, either theoretically or practically, of the latter, yet it marks an important stage in the development of the science of political economy, and is, therefore, worthy of our special attention. — If the mercantile theory over-estimated theim- portance of the technical industries and of the towns, the physiocratic went as far the other way in its valuation of agriculture and of the country. The fundamental principles of the physiocrats were few and simple. The very name itself which was given to the school signifies its most important characteristic. Its first principle was, that all national wealth is derived from the soil; agriculture is the only productive occupation; the production of raw material is the only calling in which the value of the product exceeds the cost of production. The labor of the farmer yields not only enough to support him while engaged in the labor, but a surplus over and above this, which may be called the net product. This net product generally falls to the landlord under the form of rent, and is the fund from which all expenditures of a public nature must be defrayed. The landlords, since they live without labor, are called the classe disponſible, and they may devote themselves to the service of the public. Manu- facturers and artisans are unproductive. They add value, it is true, to the raw material which they work over, but only as much as is equivalent to the cost of their support while engaged in their work. If they are able to save anything from their income, they do it either by limiting their consumption within too narrow bounds, or by Some favoritism of government or of chance, which Secures them against competition. Al- though unproductive, these classes are by no IIleads useless, since by their labor they give permanence to the utilities embodied in raw material, and by their improvements they lessen the cost at which the agricultural classes can supply themselves with the needed manufact- ures; and so, by diminishing the cost of living of the farmers, they render possible the in- crease of the ground rent, that is, of the net national revenue. Their views on money were essentially different from those of the mercantile school. While they acknowledged a nation to be rich which possessed much money, yet since money can be obtained from foreign countries 242 POLITICAL ECONOMY. & Only by exchanging agricultural productions, no advantage is gained by such an exchange. They looked upon commerce in the same light as manu- facturing industry. It added no value to the commodities beyond the wages of the laborers en- gaged in transportation. Since the only surplus product of labor is this ground rent, physiocrats maintain that all taxation should fall upon this alone. Any tax upon industry, wages or com- merce, tends simply to increase the price of man- ufactured commodities, and the cost of living of the agricultural classes, and so diminish the ground rent and the net revenue of the nation. The practical consequences of these few principles were sweeping and widespread. They demanded unlimited freedom of competition in every de- partment of economic life, abolition of all im- port and export duties, the encouragement of agriculture by every possible means, simplifica- tion of taxation, and the protecting of industry and trade by leaving it the fullest liberty. —The rapid spread of the doctrines of the physiocrats is easily accounted for when we take into con- sideration the economic and political conditions of the time. Not only France, but all Europe, was just emerging from the feverish and excited period of over-speculation which ended with the collapse of John Law’s Mississippi bubble. Men had seen every form of property take wings and fly away; all classes in the community had spec- ulated and lost; but the farming class had been relatively safe. Landed property in France had indeed increased somewhat in value: no wonder that men turned their attention thither in the hope of recuperating their lost and ruined fortunes. This seemed like a solid rock in the wild and fluc- tuating sea of speculative vocations. Quesnay's glorification of agriculture, therefore, fell into good ground and was enthusiastically received. —The economic views of the physiocrats are intimately connected with their ethico-political ideas. They base their social laws upon natural laws, and seek to establish a harmony between the useful and the just. They were not content with studying merely one phase of national life, the economic side, but endeavored to trace this back to a greater whole, to connect it with the political and moral elements of social life. Ac- cording to Quesnay's idea, the world and humanity are controlled by certain permanent physical and moral laws, which man is to seek out and use for his own ends. One of the main purposes of hu- man and Social life consists in the appropriation and control of matter for human ends, and so in improving and increasing man's prosperity. In following out this aim man must obey the demands of justice in its connection with the idea of the useful. This idea of justice manifests itself in freedom and in property, that is, in the right of every one to do what does not injure the whole, and to acquire, possess and use all commodities so far as this does not come in conflict with the laws of nature and of social organization, with the behests of morality and of political wisdom. Freedom and property, therefore, are fundamental elements of human nature and of political organ- ization, rights of such high importance and sa- Credness that in every human society they are to be highly valued, and to be protected, secured and promoted, since they form the essential sup- port and condition of the state in general; and Without freedom and property, without law and justice, no economical nor intellectual nor politi- Cal nor moral progress of nations is conceivable. In a word, the physiocrats demanded freedom and justice in all social relations, freedom of con- Science and freedom of the press, freedom of trade and commerce, equality before the law for every man, etc., and the example of nature was to be the criterion and model of all social and politi- cal institutions. – The theory of the physiocrats had an ardent admirer and defender in the prac- tical statesman, Turgot, who attempted the task of Saving and regenerating France by reorganizing the finance and economy of the nation in accor- dance with physiocratic principles. With his brief and troubled career as prime minister of France, disappeared all hope of putting into prac- tice the doctrines of the physiocrats. The school lost its hold upon the minds of men almost as rapidly as it had acquired it. Adam Smith, how- ever, who gives an account of the school, princi- pally to show up its errors, admits that the system, with all its imperfections, was perhaps the near- est approximation to the truth that had up to his time been published on the subject of political economy, and ascribes important practical results to its temporary but universal acceptance in the French republic of letters. — The next system of political economy arose in England, and has been called the industrial system. It was the first fairly successful attempt to treat the phenomena of na- tional wealth in a truly scientific manner. — Adam Smith, the founder of our modern science of polit- ical economy, had for years made a study of eco- nomic phenomena and economic theories before he resolved to devote himself to the production of the work which has made his name immortal. He spent a year or two in Paris, where he became intimately acquainted with the most prominent French economists, especially with Quesnay, the founder of the physiocratic school, for whom he always entertained the greatest admiration. After returning to England he withdrew to the solitude of private life, and after five years of constant study he began to formulate his economic theo- ries in a systematic treatise. Five years more of unremitting toil were devoted to the writing of the book, and in 1776 appeared his “In- quiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.” It placed him immediately in the very front rank of economists, and marked the opening of a new era in economic Science. Adam Smith's career, as Eisenhardt well says, strikingly illustrates the truth that epoch-making Works are produced only at the expense of a whole life, and that even in a special department they can only be produced by men of the most comprehensive POLITICAL ECONOMY. 243 culture. —Wealth, according to Adam Smith, con- sists in all material commodities which are serv- iceable to the attainment of human ends. It has its origin in human labor, which, in conjunction with natural agents and the results of Saving, i.e., capital, effects the gradual advance of nations in prosperity and industry. Labor is most effective and fruitful when properly divided and combined in the various economic occupations, and when left free and unhindered to employ itself as it sees fit in production and exchange. Out of this division and combination and unhindered employment of labor arises such a distribution of wealth as Se- cures to every participant in production his fair share of the product. This last holds true of na- tions as well as of individuals. – These ideas per- vade all Adam Smith's expositions in political economy. They should be kept in mind as we develop the subject more fully. A prominent feature in Smith's system is the importance he assigns to the psychological element in human activity, particularly in economic activity. Self- love is the ruling principle in the intercourse of human society; it is a justifiable moral force, and is the most powerful agent in the increase of na- tional wealth. As a natural consequence of this view it follows: that nature herself has provided for the gradual increase of national wealth by giving man such a nature and putting him in such a world; that the surest, most effectual, nay, the only, way to make a nation prosperous and rich is by following the example and hints of nature, by letting every individual pursue his own advan- tage in the way that pleases him, so long as he does not infringe upon his neighbor’s rights, and by letting him exchange the fruits of his industry with those of another's without let or hindrance. The free play of self-interest and individual activ- ity furthers generally the common good also, SO that there is rarely occasion for the interference of the state in economic matters. This principle is fundamental, and Smith recurs to it again and again. In connection with this he emphasizes the right of individual liberty and equality, and in- sists upon the abolition of all the restrictions and hindrances to trade and commerce which impeded them in his day. Men have a natural right to apply their property and talents in that business which will bring them the largest return, and the state has no right to interfere except to protect individuals in their natural rights from the en- Croachment of others. Freedom of individual activity is the animating, fructifying principle of economic life. It is the air in which the body economic lives, the light which vivifies it, the breath which pervades it, and excites everything to activity, the basis of all development and per- fection, the lever of all progress, the spell by which everything bad may be exorcised, and all that is good and great and enduring may be ex- cited. (Kautz.) Enlightened self-interest of the individual and the interest of society are one ; there is, therefore, an ultimate agreement and harmony of all economic interests. – Smith's the- ‘ble value of all commodities. ory has been very properly called a theory of pro- duction. It is true that he considered not only production but also exchange and distribution; but exchange he discussed only as a means of in- creasing production, while he disposed of distribu- tion in such a summary and unsatisfactory way that his views on that subject have not commend- ed themselves to any great number of subsequent economists. Wealth does not consist in land alone, nor in money alone, but in all those material things which are suitable to satisfy human wants and to increase the conveniences and amusements of life. It is produced by labor working in con- junction with natural agents and the products of previous labor, viz., capital. Of these, labor is by far the most important factor. It is rendered efficient by division and combination. (See LA- BOR.) It is the real measure of the exchangea- (See VALUE.) Di- vision and combination of labor are possible on any large scale only when exchange of products is possible. Freedom of exchange, therefore, is a fundamental condition of the highest productiv- ity of labor. Labor is distinguished as productive and unproductive. The former includes all labor which fixes and embodies itself in material objects, while the latter includes all immaterial, social and intellectual services. Commerce, manufactures and agriculture are all productive ; but the last is the most productive, for it employs both human and natural agents at once. It is the most solid and enduring source of wealth, and forms the basis of national prosperity. It is the necessary pre- supposition of all other occupations. – Capital is that portion of one’s stock or accumulation of property which is employed productively, i. e., so as to yield a revenue to its owner. It is divided into circulating and fixed capital, the former in- cluding such as must pass out of its owner's pos- session before it can yield a return, the latter be- ing that which may remain in one’s possession and still yield a profit. An example of the former is a merchant’s stock of goods; of the latter, invest- ments in permanent improvements of a farm or a factory. It will be seen that Smith exaggerates the importance of labor as a factor of production; although he was the first to give us an even ap- proximately complete and satisfactory discussion. of the physical conditions of production and dis- tribution. He was also the first to distinguish clearly the idea of capital, and to recognize its accumulative power and its significance in an in- dustrial system. He did not realize, however, the importance of the non-capital stock in the national economy, and consequently left deficiencies in his theory which he could not supply. — Another field in which Smith did original work was his theory of the circulation or exchange of commodi- ties; the theory of price, of money, of market movements, etc. Money was a necessary conse- quence of man’s tendency to exchange, and also the condition of any extensive system of exchange. Money is not identical with wealth, as many have maintained, nor is it even the most important 244 POLITICAL ECONOMY. * kind of wealth. It is a simple commodity whose value and price varies like those of any other commodity. It is to be regarded as an unproduc- tive, dead capital, because it leaves no utility fixed in a material object as it passes from hand to hand. The amount of money in a land bears a fixed, though perhaps indeterminable, ratio to the quantity of exchanges to be effected by it. Price is distinguished : 1, as real price, the quantity of necessaries or conveniences of life given for a commodity, and nominal price, or the quantity of money given for it; 2, as natural price and market price. Market price is determined by the higgling of the market, and is affected by temporary de- mand and supply. Natural price is such a price as is sufficient to pay the costs of production. The former tends to approximate to the latter. Natural price includes, as constituent parts, nat- ural, i. e., ordinary, wages of labor, natural rent for ground, and natural profits of stock employed in raising, preparing and bringing to market the commodity. — Smith was the first economist to investigate the nature of income, and the condi- tions and elements of its increase and distribution. He divided national income into wages of labor, ground rent and interest on capital, and developed to some extent the principles which underlie their distribution. Rent forms an essential part of the price of all agricultural products, and since all land cultivated must yield more than enough to sustain the labor employed on it, all land yields a rent. Position is as important an element as fer- tility in determining the rent of land. The nat- ural reward of labor is the product of the same. But in a civilized society where the land has been appropriated and capital has been accumulated, the laborer only secures a portion of the product as his reward, and must give a portion to the landlord and another to the capitalist. The wages of labor are determined by the general laws which regulate price. We may designate that as the minimum rate of wages which will barely enable the laborer to found a family and keep himself able to work. Under favorable circumstances the laborer may secure for himself a rate far exceeding this. Wages are highest, not in the most wealthy countries, but in those which are increasing in wealth most rapidly. Combinations of workmen to raise wages can seldom accomplish any good, and generally do great injury. The rate of profits on capital varies very greatly in different states of society. It is determined by the relation of de- mand and supply. It tends to fall as society ad- vances, while rent and wages tend to rise. As labor is the source of all wealth, so saving and economy are the Only means of accumulating, Ż. e., of creating, capital.--We have called Smith's system a theory of production, and rightly, too, as distinguished from a theory of distribution, which political economy is still waiting for; but Smith was the first to present the interests of con- sumers as entitled to as much consideration as those of the producers, whose interests as a class had been almost exclusively regarded by previous economists. Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production, and the interests of producers are to be considered and furthered only So far as they affect the interests of consumers. Smith's ideas of the significance of a large popu- lation were distinctly opposed to those of the mercantilists, and foreshadowed, in an indistinct manner, those of Malthus. – Smith’s chapters on taxation marked an epoch in this department also. He developed the economic basis of taxa- tion. He discusses, first, what are the necessary expenses of the government or commonwealth; which of those expenses ought to be defrayed by the general contributions of the whole society, and which of them by that of some particular part only, or of some particular members of it; secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole society may be made to contribute toward defraying the expenses incumbent on the whole Society, and what are the principal advan- tages and inconveniences of each of those meth- ods; and, thirdly and lastly, what are the reasons and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage some part of this rev- enue, or to contract debts, and what have been the effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual produce of the land and labor of the so- ciety. Smith’s canons of taxation have become classic, and English and American political econ- omy has not yet got beyond them. (See FINANCE, SCIENCE OF.) —“The Wealth of Nations” stands as the dividing line between ancient and modern thought on economic subjects. It is the synthesis and conclusion of everything that had preceded; it is the starting point and basis of all Subsequent development. If we were to sum up, says Kautz, the defects of the industrial (Smithian) system of political economy, we should mention, first, the overwhelming predominance of the material ele- ment, which prevented the founder of the modern science of economics from properly appreciating the intellectual and moral elements of political and economic life, and caused him to devote his attention exclusively to the purely economic ele- ments and factors. Man appears in his exposi- tions, not as an ethico-political being, but as a mere wheel in the sweep of a great mechanism. Nothing but the economic ability, the producing power, of the individual and of society, is consid- ered, and consequently the higher moral and polit- ical ends and relations of the community are left out of sight. As a consequence, Smith's concep- tion and treatment of the problems of distribu- tion and consumption are defective, since he gives but little attention to these elements in their con- nection with the politico-social life of nations. He devotes his thought always and everywhere to the greatest possible sum total of production. He rarely considers, how, by what means and at what sacrifice of moral and social interests, this sum total has been produced, or in what proportion, or whether in any at all, those participate in the enjoyment of this product who have assisted in its production, or whether prosperity, enjoyment POLITICAL ECONOMY. 245 and reward stand in any relation to the sacrifices and privations of labor. He fails to attain to that deeper conception of the higher spiritual essence of the state and national life: for nations are to him nothing but aggregates of individuals con- trolled by merely material and economic motives, and not communities of souls who, aside from their material ends and wants, have and pursue moral, political and spiritual ends and aims. A second defect is the almost absolute glorification of self-interest, and the raising of individual ad- vantage to the rank of a fundamental principle in economics, by which, on the one hand, his views of state interference become one-sided, and, On the other, economics becomes a mere science of private acquisition and exchange, in which the individual appears as an egoistic natural force which works always and everywhere in the same way, and thus every interference of the state on grounds of public interest becomes superfluous. It will be seen that Smith’s views were intimately connected with the theory of the state which pre- vailed during the eighteenth century, in that both proceed from the same negative atomistic view of civil society, and regard the interests of individ- uals as the sole end of the community. Just as the state, in the view of political rationalism, was nothing but a legal institution to preserve the free- dom of the individual, and appeared as an asso- ciation based on a contract, so in the economic rationalism of Smith it is only a union of private economies, and an association based on the ex- change system of individuals; and in both theo- ries the private advantage of the individual ap- pears as the cause and bond of association. To this defective conception of the state we must ascribe the fact that the “laissez faire, laissez passer’ theory finds its extremest development and sanction in Smithianism. The rôle of the state is reduced to almost nothing, and the inter- ference of the public in the national economy is declared to be almost unconditionally injurious and dangerous. – Among other defects we may mention his emphasis of value in exchange and disregard of value in use, his denying to imma- terial labor the quality of productiveness, his un- Satisfactory treatment of the elements of nature and capital in production, his failure to appreciate the importance and range of combination and association among laborers, his superficial discus- Sion of fundamental concepts and disregard of form and arrangement in grouping his material. Finally, we must characterize as a defect, Smith's conception of the eternal and unchangeable na- ture of the laws which control and regulate the economic life of nations, and of the absolutely unconditional validity and applicability of all eco- nomic principles and truths. Out of this view rose a politico-economic theory which leads to a fatalism, in which the ethical power and freedom of the human will are utterly powerless in the grasp of natural law. No attention is paid to those historic, national and natural peculiarities upon which the different form and development of the various systems of national economy de- pend, and by which, therefore, the concrete rela- tive significance and truth of economic principles, institutions and systems are conditioned. The at- tempt was made to construct an abstract, universal science of economics valid at all times and in all places. The attempt was a failure. — The prog- ress of political economy since Adam Smith has consisted principally in improvements in detail and form. No independent and opposed system has been constructed, if we except Socialism, which is worth noticing; but many special de- partments have been enriched. Among the men who have contributed to the progress of the sci- ence we may mention the following: At the be- ginning of the century, Malthus and Laud- erdale in England; J. B. Say and Canard in France; and Sartorius and Buesch in Germany. In the second decade come Ricardo in England; Ganilh and Sismondi in France; Hufeland, Lotz, Storch and Soden in Germany ; and Gioja in Italy. After these come the Englishmen, James Mill, Torrens and M*Culloch ; the Frenchmen, Tracy, Droz, and Louis Say; the Germans, Rau and Nebenius; and the Italian, Fuoco. St. Cha- mans in France, and Adam Müller in Germany, may be mentioned as decided opponents of Smith's system. Senior, Eisdell, Scrope in En- gland, Rossi and Chevalier in France, and Her- mann, Schoen, Baumstark, Hagen and Riedel in Germany, promoted the progress of the Science during the years after 1830. During the decade 1840–50 Dunoyer and Bastiat in France, Thünen, List, Schütz, Hildebrand and Bernhardi in Ger- many, and John Stuart Mill in England, deserve especial notice. Tooke, Macleod, Sargant, Atkin- son and Cairnes in England, Baudrillart, Cour- celle-Seneuil in France, Bianchini and Carballo in Italy and Spain, and Roscher, Knies, Mangoldt, Stein and Schäffle complete the list of those who up to 1860 had done very much original work in the science among European writers. — It is worth while to mention the special topics which have been the objects of thought and attention in con- nection with those who have made them the sub- jects of special study. Whately, Senior, Mill, Chevalier, Cairnes and Knies have done valuable work in defining and determining the nature and problems of economic science. Say, Lauderdale, Hufeland, Lotz, Rau, Hermann, Bastiat, Fried- länder, Bernhardi, Thomas and Knies have labored at the fundamental ideas of the science, wealth, value, etc. Dunoyer, Hermann, Gioja, Ganilh, Bernhardi and Say have investigated the theory of labor, its productivity and freedom. The theory of capital has been furthered by Say, Hermann and Dietzel; that of price by Hermann and Tooke; that of the productivity of nature by Say, Lotz, Rau, Bernhardi and Malthus; that of money by Hoffmann, Ganilh, Senior, Chevalier; and that of the movement of precious metals by Ricardo, Senior, Jacob, Tooke, Helfferich and Soetbeer. The laws of distribution have been treated at length by Say, Sismondi, Ricardo, 246 POLITICAL ECONOMY. Hermann, Thünen, M*Culloch, Rossi, Bernhardi, Nebenius, Read, Mangoldt, Jones, Bastiat and Carey, particularly in connection with the doc- trines of rent, wages and profits. The theory of national consumption has been elaborated by Say, M’Culloch, Sismondi, Vorlaender, Hermann and Roscher; that of the equilibrium between con- sumption and production by Say, Malthus, Her- mann, Sismondi and Bernhardi; that of credit by Thornton, Nebenius, Coquelin and Dietzel; that of partnership by Stein; that of banking by Buesch, Thornton, Ricardo, Tooke, Wilson, Fullarton, Coquelin, Macleod, Huebner, Thoel and Gilbert; that of transportation by List, Chevalier and Knies; that of the political economy of agricult- ure by Roscher, Thünen, Lavergne, Passy and Wolowski; of manufacturing industry by Sis- mondi, Babbage and Roscher; that of international trade by Say, Ricardo, J. Mill, J. Stuart Mill and Büsch; that of colonization by Wakefield, Tor- rens, List and Roscher; that of pauperism by Eden, Willeneuve, Villerme, Gerando, Vogt, Mohl, Schütz and Schmidt; that of population by Malthus, Sadler, Senior and Roscher; that of finance by Malthus, Jacob, Schön, Rau, Stein, Ricardo, M*Culloch, Molkte, Nebenius, Baum- stark, Augier, Carey, Bianchini, Dietzel, and many practical men of all nations. – The merest glance at the various tendencies which have re- vealed themselves in the economic literature of this century will convince one that it is a matter of the greatest difficulty to group the various writers on economics according to particular schools. It is difficult to select a set of views and opinions which any number of eminent authori- ties consider and acknowledge as their own. The various adherents of a given system do not often acknowledge a principle in the same decided way. The same thinker often belongs not merely to one but to several Schools, according to his views on certain fundamental ideas. We may distinguish, however, the following general tend- encies: 1. Those who, while they accept Smith’s system in general, enlarge the idea of wealth and productivity, and extend it also to immaterial commodities, services and labor. Among these may be mentioned J. B. Say, Ganilh, Rossi, Dunoyer and Garnier, in France; Lauderdale, Wakefield, M*Culloch and Macleod, in England; Hufeland, Soden, Bülau, Storch, Hermann, List, Eiselen, Steinlein, Roscher and Dietzel, in Ger- many; and Gioja, Bosellini, Boccardo, Scialoja and Bianchini, in Italy. 2. Those who empha- size the idea of value in use, and claim for it an important rôle in political economy: Lauderdale, Schön, Riedel, Rau, Bernhardi, Roscher, Knies, Cherbuliez, Müller, List, Say, Gioja and Bian- chini. 3. Those who have resurrected some Old mercantilistic and protectionist ideas, condemn the exportation of the precious metals, and the idea of free trade, and under the modern cry of “protection to national labor,” attempt to free domestic industry from foreign competition by high import duties: Ferrier, Ganilh, L. Say, Thiers, Goldenberg, St. Chamans and Lebastier, in France; Hopf, Büsch, Pfeiffer, Eisenhart, Brentano and List, in Germany; Colton, Carey and Thompson in America. 4. The school of absolute free trade, embracing most English and French and many American economists, and of the German, Prince-Smith, Hübner, Brüggemann, Hagen, Lotz, Osiender, Wirth and Bergius. The term Manchester party was applied to a wing. of this school, composed mostly of practical men, who were instrumental in bringing about the great revolution in England's commercial policy, which, beginning with the abolition of the corn laws in 1846, ended with the free-trade tariff of 1860. They were opposed to any governmental interference in economic matters, and demanded unlimited competition in every department of in: dustrial life. As a party they have opposed all legislation in favor of the laboring classes, such as factory laws, postal savings banks, etc., etc. For a time they had everything their own way, but have already lost their hold on the public mind. 5. The physiocratic tendency, represented by a few economists in France and Germany. 6. The conservative-reactionary tendency, which opposes itself to the very fundamental principles. of modern political economy, and sees the Only hope of happiness in a return to obsolete institu- tions and forms, confined to the continent, and represented mainly by theological malcontents and the ultramontanes. 7. The ‘‘social” School, which rejects the principle of absolute competition. in acquisition and exchange, and seeks to reconcile individual freedom and activity, private interest and advantage, with the interest of the whole, and to bring them into harmony with the higher de- mands of the organic life of the community. A prominent feature in the theory of many of the adherents of this school is an emphasizing of the ethico-political element, and an acknowledgment of the relative importance and justification of governmental interference in economical matters. The representatives of this school are: in France, Blanqui, Comte, Chevalier, Fix, Baudrillart, Droz, Dunoyer and Sismondi; in Italy, Gioja, Bianchini, Cibrario and Fuoco; in America, Carey and Colton; in Germany, Soden, Baumstark, Mohl, Rossbach, Rau, Schulze, Schütz, Roscher, Knies, and Hildebrand; in England, J. S. Mill, Chal- mers, and Atkinson. 8. The so-called new En- glish or orthodox school represented by Malthus, Ricardo, Mill, Senior, Mº Culloch, Cairnes, etc., so far as they had common features. 9. The socialistic school, represented by St. Simon, Four- ier, Louis Blanc, LaSalle, Marx, etc., etc. 10. The historical school. The adherents of this school aim at uniting in an organic System the previous results of economic investigation, and endeavor to assign to the ethical, political and social elements their proper place in the economic system. They test the various theories of political economy by the standards of historical phenomena which are constantly changing, and are dependent on time and space and upon natural and national DOLITICAL ECONOMY. 247 conditions. They acknowledge, therefore, neither a general normal national economy, nor an abso- lutely valid theory of national economy, which shall be applicable to all times and nations. List, Roscher, Knies, and the majority of the younger German economists, and a few French and Italian economists, with Cliffe Leslie and one or two others in England, represent this school. — The limits of the present article forbid any detailed discussion of these various schools. Political economy is at present in a very chaotic state. The “orthodox” political economy has begun to lose its hold in England and America, and has already ceased to hold the first place in Germany, |France and Italy. While in the latter three coun- tries the historical school has become the leading One, it has not been able to secure much of a foot- hold in either of the two former. This last springs partly from the dense ignorance of continental political economy which prevails. for the most part in England and America. In Germany, Rau, Nebenius, Hoffman, von Thünen and Hermann may be classed as strong adherents of Adam Smith, although they modified his opinions in several respects. Their modifications were most frequent in relation to administrative matters, the German economists generally giving larger scope to the action of the state. Friedrich List headed the line of German protectionists, and was emi- nent for his originality, his patriotism, and the excellence of many of his monographs. He pro- claimed the temporary necessity of protectionism as a means of education. His system contains many points of similarity with Carey’s. The his- toric school was founded by Roscher, Hildebrand and Knies. Hildebrand's Die Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft is a clear and search- ing criticism of the orthodox school of political economy, though his censures are exaggerated. ROScher is in many respects a sound follower of the Orthodox school, though he denies the exist- ence of general economic laws, or rather under- rates their importance. Knies is no less profound than ROScher, and is his superior in legal learning. His principal works are Die politische Oekonomie wom, Standpunkte der Geschächtlichen Methode, and Geld und Kredit. A different tendency is repre- Sented by the so-called liberal school, nicknamed by its enemies the Manchester school of Germany. It has devoted itself to bringing about the triumph of complete liberty in commerce and industry. Prince-Smith, Schulze-Delitzsch, Faucher, Braun, Michaelis and Wirth, the last of whom is the author of a course in political economy, which sums up the tendencies of the school, are the principal economists of this group. Rentzsch, Emminghaus and Soetbeer may be classed as moderate adher- ents of this general tendency. — A very different standpoint is taken by other economists, among whom may be numbered most of the professors of economics in German universities. Following in the steps of the first writers of the historical and statistical schools, they profess little faith in universal, or as some say natural, laws. They believe only in historical or relative laws, discov. ered by the inductive method, and deduced from simple psychological and abstract premises. They doubt the omnipotence of the principle of liberty and individual self-government, and assign a large sphere to the modifying action of the social power. Questions concerning the distribution of wealth attract their especial attention, and they endeavor at least to help on the solution of the “social” question. They are distinguished by their ability, their numbers, their culture, and their influence On the cultivated classes. Their doctrines, tending to a reconstruction of economic science, have been published in a large number of special works and in the best economic reviews, such as the Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staats- wissenschaft, published at Tübingen, and the Jahr- bûcher für Nationalókonomie, published at Jena, and edited at present by Conrad of Halle. The not very appropriate name of professorial Social ists (Katheder-Socialisten) has been given to the extreme followers of this school, because they support the principle of authority. The most im- portant work of this school is the “Course of Po- litical Economy,” by Professor Adolph Wagner, of Berlin, consisting in a new edition of Rau’s “Course,” which has become somewhat out of date. Nasse has assisted in this work. Wagner's ‘‘Science Of Finance” is also written from this new standpoint. “These professorial socialists, among whom von Scheel, Schmoller, Nasse, Held, Schäf- fle, Conrad, etc., may be mentioned, had no diffi- culty in overcoming the arguments of certain weak economists who wished to reproduce in Germany the doctrines of Bastiat at any price. They have deceived themselves, therefore, as to the importance and originality of their discoveries. They confound economics with morals and law under pretext of better harmonizing their results. They do not distinguish theories, which are for the most part general, from applications, which are always contingent. They exaggerate the impor- tance of induction. For the gradual and peaceful evolution of political economy they wish to sub- stitute a revolution, which they justify by an un- deservedly severe condemnation of the defects and errors of the classical economists, and espe- cially those of England and France. They start from the false assumption that the scientific prog- ress of other nations at the present time is almost nothing in comparison with the acquisitions of the science in Germany. It can not be denied, how- ever, that the eminent position now occupied by Germany in the progress of economic studies de- Imands from the economists of other Countries a patient study of German works. Profound in- vestigation, accurate historical and statistical re- search, the number and merit of their economic writings, their precise determination of funda- mental principles, their separation of economics from the financial and administrative Sciences, have gained for them this position.” Works of great importance, and showing immense industry and carefulness, have been written by Mohl and 248 POLITICAL ECONOMY. Stein on administration, and by Rau, Malchus, Nebenius, Hoffmann, Stein, Hock, Wagner, Vocke and others on finance, and make German science well worth the pains necessary to work through their subtle and oftentimes pedantic controversies. The inelegance and obscurity of the literary style of most German writers on economics form a seri- ous drawback to the general study of their works. —The following account of the development of political economy since Adam Smith, is inserted here, although it involves some repetition, because it represents very well the views of the most nu- merous and influential body of German economists. It is condensed from an article by the late Pro- fessor Adolf Held, one of the ablest representa- tives of the Katheder-Socialisten. — Smith's work on the “Wealth of Nations,” which has been published in many editions and translations, and is accessible to every one, is the product of the deepest scientific investigation, and is at the same time written in a most simple and pleasing style. There has been a great deal of discussion as to the method of investigation employed by Adam Smith. Buckle, who divides all men into the two classes of deductive and inductive investi- gators, classes Adam Smith as a Scotchman with the deductive school. But the truth is, that Smith did not strictly adhere to any one method. He does not tire the reader with continuous exposi- tions according to one definite method, but, in Order to reach his results, applies first one method and then another in a pleasing and suggestive variety. We find investigations, in which, from simple premises as to the nature of man, the most far-reaching conclusions as to economical relations and their connection are evolved by deduction, but in the very midst of them occur long histori- cal dissertations and detailed descriptions of con- temporary conditions which are also employed in proving his propositions. And with it all Smith does not even adhere to any sharply defined ter. minology, but discusses the phenomena he investi- gates in the every-day language of common life. Nothing is more foreign to him than the imposing mathematical exactness of form which is charac- teristic of Ricardo, for instance. He does not follow out even his own views to their extreme consequences, but modifies his conclusions by new considerations where it is necessary, and where they will thus correspond more closely to the complicated relations of actual life, and so stops short of drawing the logical consequences of his own premises. When we consider this many- sidedness of his treatment of the subject, we can not be surprised that men of exactly opposite opinions appeal to him as a supporter of their views, for, as a matter of fact, the germs of both extremes are to be found in his writings. The absolute free-traders of to-day call him their great master; List, the protectionist and creator of the national political economy, derides and antago- nizes him. Carey, on the contrary, who resembles List in many respects, quotes him as an authority in opposition to Malthus and Ricardo ; and in very recent times a bitter discussion is going on in the press as to whether the absolute free-traders (Manchesterites) or the realistic political econo- mists (the Katheder-Socialisten), who are most bit- terly opposed to each other, are Smith's legitimate successors. The point can never be fully decided if we keep in view all Smith's statements and all his methods of investigation. But if the question be asked, What theories and what methods were the most immediate outgrowth of Smith's work, we can not deny, that, although Smith himself was far above most of the narrow and one-sided ways of regarding things which characterized his im- mediate successors, yet he was the father of that tendency whose last and most extreme representa- tives are known as the Manchester school. Two fundamental ideas may be clearly distinguished in his great work, the logical outcome of which was Manchesterism. On the one hand, he enter- tained the view that the state is nothing but a complement of individual life to assist in protect- ing private economies; a greatinsurance company with the least possible jurisdiction, which must be as cheap as possible, and interfere as little as possible with the individual whose rights ante- date and are superior to those of the state. He does not appeal to philosophic and jural principles to establish this view, but supports it rather from the advantageous consequences which must result to the economic welfare of men from such an administration, or rather non-administration, of the state. It can not be denied, that in this point Smith was decidedly narrow, and that, influenced by the reaction of his time against the absolutism of paternal governments, he failed to get the prop- er conception of the state and of the infinite obli: gations of the individual toward society. The view that the only function of the state is to pre- serve the original rights of the private individual shows itself in his theory of taxation, his praise of the system of standing armies, and his views of public education. This free individual, under the control of the state only so far as is necessary to make him respect the rights of others, is con- ceived as endowed with an average amount of prudence and insight, and as moved in all eco- nomical actions solely by the motive of Self-inter- est. From these premises everything is deduced. There is no mention of an overreaching of the weak and ignorant by the strong and shrewd, or of a public spirit which works against such a tendency. As has been already said, the work does not consist exclusively of deductions from these premises, but they play a very great part, and form the basis of a simple theoretical system of science. The supposition of equal economic ability, and of self-interest as the sole motive in economical life, was evidently a conscious one- sidedness so far as Smith was concerned; for, as his work on the “Theory of Moral Sentiments’ proves, he recognized the existence and necessity of other human motives than egoism. But these were ignored in order to be able to attain to sim- ple scientific results by considering only the pre- i POLITICAL ECONOMY. 249 vailing motive in economic actions. But as the logical consequences of an uncontrolled although enlightened self-interest do not give a complete picture of social or even of economic life, Smith did not pursue his theories to their extreme results, but interrupted them by historic expositions; it is no wonder, therefore,' that the disciples of this great man should first develop those features of his system by which the simplest and most valua- ble results had been won. — A second fundamen- tal idea in Smith's system is, that labor, as such, is the sole creator of all value. With this great and simple thought all exaggeration of money or land or trade or agriculture was made impos- sible, and the basis of a really general economic science was laid. He did not fully develop this thought, however. He pushed it to extremes in One direction by making labor not only the origi- nal source, but also the standard, of all value; and by making the distinction between productive and unproductive labor, he prepared the way for an exaggerated and one-sided estimate of purely ma- terial wealth. As Smith put the value-creating power of labor at the head of his system, and acknowledged capital, regarded as “accumulated labor,” to be an important factor in production based upon labor, the idea crept in that the in- crease of values, as such, is the ultimate or only end of human economy, nay, even of human en- deavor in general, since no other side of human activity than the economic is considered. Many chapters in his work create this impression rather by what is omitted than by what is said. At a time when the expansion of production was at- tracting the attention of all, and the absolute in- crease of wealth was, as a matter of fact, the first and most necessary condition of economic pros- perity, it was natural that men should pursue this end exclusively. Men did not come to feel the im- portance of a better distribution of wealth until the labor question of to-day forced it upon their at- tention. Adam Smith had no harsh feelings toward the lower classes, and if he did not preach the neces- sity of kindness toward them, it was because the circumstances of his time did not demand it. Noth- ing was further from his idea than making man directly the servant and instrument of wealth; but when labor was looked at mainly as value- Creating power, as a means to the end of increas- ing wealth, the transition was not violent to a for- getfulness of the wants and aims of the laborers. Smith’s expositions foreshadowed the theory, so bitterly attacked by List, which in the value for- gets the producing power, and regards the laborer, not as a man, but as a mere instrument. However kindly Smith himself thought of the laboring classes, however humane his feelings toward them, there lies in his theory the germ of the view which values the laborer less than the labor and its result, and which reduces a political economy, which starts from the equal estimate of all labor, to one which is subservient to capital. All this is no reproach to Adam Smith, but simply an expla- nation how a large school which honors him as its master could arrive at the most one-sided views by simply emphasizing, as they naturally would, those thoughts of their great leader which could be most easily used in developing a simple and consistent theory of wealth. This will appear more clearly when we come to discuss his most prominent followers. Smith lived to see the great success of his work; for even before the close of the preceding century his school had become the predominant one in all civilized countries. Nu- merous editions and translations carried the book everywhere, while still 111ore 11uulerous disciples delighted to spread abroad his views in their own writings. The development of his school was somewhat different in the three chief nations of IEurope, England, France and Germany, although England took the lead until very lately, when German economists began to assume an independ- ent position. — Of all Smith's followers in Eng- land, Ricardo indisputably stands first. Thor- oughly different from Adam Smith in every par- ticular, he was just fitted to develop a harsh and rigorous system from the fundamental principles which Smith had popularized. Originally a busi- ness man, he began his literary activity with the discussion of a practical question, that of money and banks. From this he passed to more gener- al work, and wrote his “Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.” This treatise discussed in detail some of the questions which Smith had passed over rather lightly. On account of the fundamental importance of the questions treated, and the strictly logical and consistent treatment of them, this work produced the effect of a theo- retical system, and was of far greater value for the development of the science than the works of Say written about the same time. Adam Smith, a scholar by nature, and educated as a scholar, without any inclination to practical life, had maintained an unusual many-sidedness, an open eye for all points which must be considered, and had sacrificed to this habit of looking at all sides of everything the formal clearness of his reason- ing, the theoretical perfection of his system. Ri- cardo, the practical man, on the contrary, after he once took up his pen, insisted upon the severest adherence to conclusions from abstract and incom- plete premises, and is the real father of that ab- stract theory of political economy which, closing its eyes to all the facts of our changing and shift- ing life, sees the only truth and salvation in the belief in the necessity of the absolute freedom of the individual. It was Ricardo, not Adam Smith, who made the method of gaining all economical knowledge by deductions from incomplete hy- potheses as to the nature of man, his fundamental principle. Ricardo made the theory that labor is not only the source but also the standard of value the foundation of his whole system, and reasoned from that to the conclusion that the instrument of labor (called the laborer) can never have more than barely enough to keep him alive, and that simple and powerful natural laws control the economical life of man, which man may ascertain by deduc- 250 POLITICAL ECONOMY. tion, but can not change, and which, on the whole, produce ever-increasing wealth of the land- owners and capitalists, permanent poverty of the poor, and for all an ever-increasing difficulty of obtaining subsistence. We do not use Ricardo's words in this characterization, we seek to show the spirit in which he wrote, or rather, the tend- ency which the results of his investigation pro- mote. He acquired an extraordinary authority by the formal precision of his expositions. It can not be denied that he did a great work for the science, if it were nothing more than showing to what conclusion one must come when One starts from such premises and uses such a method. Next to Adam Smith, Ricardo is the man whom one must study who wishes to understand the political economy of to-day. The terse precision of his exposition and the severity of his reason- ing will always remain instructive. But it is car- rying our admiration too far to accept the results of his investigations as infallible truths; for they are only true conditionally, and are as little adapted as the mercantile theory to explain the economical relations of all times and nations. His theory of bank notes, that their value depends upon their quantity, has been disproved by the labors of realistic political economists (Tooke). The theory that the cost of production alone de- termines the price of commodities whose quantity can be increased at pleasure is untenable, since we can not separate the commodities to which the theory applies from those under the control of monopoly. It was rejected by Hermann and others long ago, and has in recent times shown its weakness in a most decided way by the conse- quences which Marx and other socialists rightly deduced from it. His theory of rent is relatively true, but the view that land alone follows in every respect different laws from other fixed capital has been given up by later economists, who consider land like other property, and maintain that the theory has a practical value only in old lands, and then only if we accept the fiction that the present landowners are the heirs of the first occupiers of the soil. Ricardo explains the phenomena of eco- nomical life from simple causes, and the expla- nation is correct so long as we close our eyes to the existence of other causes, but it becomes more incomplete and untenable the stronger those causes become which he ignored. Ricardo's method of investigation, which led him to be one- sided for the sake of clearness and simplicity, and which, on the whole, was a valuable service to the theory of the science, was employed for Sad pur- poses by his weaker successors, to oppose any influences which threatened the interests of the propertied classes as Offenses against Sound politi- cal economy. It follows as an absolute necessity from Ricardo's theories that all industrial progress must inure to the benefit of the propertied classes, that increase of capital must be promoted for the sake of the increase of wealth, that it is nonsense to limit calculating egoism, or to make any Sacri- fice to the welfare of the laborers whose lot as mere instruments of labor is irrevocably fixed. A self-satisfying theory of political economy, complete in itself, was contained in Ricardo's keen. propositions. It staved off all objections from Other standpoints, and demanded unconditional acknowledgment, undisturbed sway of laissez faire et passer in the interest of the increase of the wealth of the rich. It viewed all sacrifice for the state, all humane acts in Social questions, as disturbing and injurious forces. Few have dared to express. it, but it is a logical consequence of this self-sat- isfying political economy, with its natural laws, that all human endeavor which does not aim di- rectly at the production of material wealth is indif- ferent. What do the natural laws of economy care about states and nations? — Ricardo had de- veloped what under certain conditions is, and why it is so. Many of his followers insist that they do nothing more than tell the truth; they do not make things as they are, they explain simply. That sounds very plausible. But we must con- sider that as soon as an explanation of that which is, appears, with the claim that it must naturally be so, and that a struggle against it is fruitless and disturbing, the explanation becomes an active principle, the exposition culminates in a postulate, the theory of immutable natural laws leads to a negative economic policy. This appears very plainly in those successors of Ricardo whose eco- nomical reasoning exhausts itself in an appeal to Ricardo's authority, and who content themselves with a comfortable preaching of the laissez faire et passer, and consider the sole function of modern science to be a holding fast to Ricardo's theories. It is impossible to write a political economy which merely discovers and arranges existing laws, like astronomy, for instance. Whoever studies human relations in which he himself moves and lives, will necessarily incorporate in his theories his own wishes, and his views of what is best for man to do. — Ricardo, somewhat modified in form and practically applied, is what we call Manchester- ism. Of course every one protests against hav- ing this name applied to him, every One pro- fesses, on being interrogated, the most kindly feeling toward the laborers, a great love for the state, and an anti-materialistic sentiment. But there are writers, particularly in other countries than Germany, whose whole circle of thought is taken from Ricardo, and in whose writings SO slight traces of such sentiments can be found that they certainly can not exercise any great influence on their economic theories. There are few writers whom one can convict of a thoroughly consistent Manchesterism, but there is a mode of thought which is called Manchesterism, and which shows itself to be the prevailing one in very many writers. To the best known disciples of Ricardo in this sense belongs, in England, M’Culloch, whose services to the science can not be denied, but who did not enrich it by any new ideas of fundamental importance. Senior may also fairly enough be called a Manchesterite. It is remarkable that J. S. Mill, whose sympathetic nature gave him a POLITICAL ECONOMY. 251 view of life very different from Ricardo's, and whose political and philosophical studies secured for him a wider intellectual horizon, should so often be in abject subjection to Ricardo's author- ity in purely economic questions. We must re- member, however, that in England down to 1860 the great practical question of economic policy was, how to push through free-trade to its ultimate victory, and that in this contest the catchwords of the laissez faire et passer school were of great use. Mill, however, did not allow his theories to prevent him from supporting the establishment of postal Savings banks, of a national sanitary com- mission, of factory legislation, all violations of laïssé2 faire et passer; and in very recent times a marked reaction against Ricardo's theories is showing itself among English economists. – In France, Say, in his Cours et Traité d'economie po- litique, made Adam Smith's theories familiar to his countrymen. Alfhough less important and influential then Ricardo, he acquired a great repu- tation by the beauty of his literary style and the clearness of his expositions. A large number of French writers became adherents of his views, against whom the half socialistic theories of Sis- mondi made little headway until French political economy acquired a peculiar cast from the strug- gle with socialism and communism. A detailed discussion of socialism and communism will be found elsewhere, but we must call attention here to the fact that, although the Socialists and economists in France regard each other as something absolute- ly different, yet since scientific socialism and com- munism busy themselves chiefly with economic problems, they are to a certain extent economic schools. Communism and socialism form the ex- act opposite of the laissez fairé et passer tendency, and also a sharp contrast to the immediate fore- runner of modern economics, i. e., mercantilism. The mercantile system demanded protection of the state for trade and industry. Adam Smith and Ricardo called for freedom in the interest of the third estate; communism and socialism insist upon limitation of the individual by a higher power in the interest of the fourth estate, the la- borers. The ideal of the so-called industrial sys- tem is tabula rasa for the individual forces, which, after the abolition of all hindrances, should be al- lowed to develop themselves and compete with one another freely. This was of great advantage compared with the old restrictions of mediaeval society, such as vassalage, guild law, trade mo- nopolies, etc. But when, under the free play of economic forces, the stronger mercilessly exploits the weaker, it is but natural to claim that new restrictions adapted to the times, must be raised on this tabula rasa, which has been won. This cry for a new organization was raised by communism and socialism in France soon after the first tri- umphs of the revolution, and it has re-echoed ever since. Almost all of those who call themselves socialists or communists demand, it is true, some- thing impossible and indeed criminal, yet there is a theory, a science, of socialism and Communism, which can not be summarily disposed of with moral indignation, like Baboeuf's assassination the- ory or Fourier's ideas on marriage. Real com- munism demands a complete and permanent Com- munity of property and equality of enjoyments, that is only possible in connection with an abso- lutely despotic commission which superintends this distribution ; whether this directing power is to acquire its position by murder and revolution, as Baboeuf wished, or by the force of persuasion, as Cabet's ideal demanded. Such a thing is im- possible, such an idea is lunacy ; but it coutains a criticism of the premises from which the pre- vailing political economy proceeds, i. e., of the Supposition of an enlightened self-interest ruling all men which is to bring to all men alike the greatest prosperity. And so as a criticism even real com- munism has its scientific significance. It is more difficult to define the demands of socialism ; for there is a great contest going on as to who should be branded with the name socialist, and there is a world-wide difference in the opinions of those who are generally called by that name. Compare St. Simon, Fourier, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Owen, Waitling, Engel, Marx, Lasalle, with one another, and all of these with the so-called pro- fessorial socialists who make it their boast that they are forging the strongest weapons against Marx and his like. We may describe the social- ists as a whole by saying that they reject the com, plete equality of all men and community of goods, but, on the other hand, they would not permit to the individual the complete exploitation of his powers at the expense of others, but, by some new organization or other, which, as opposed to the previous condition of things, would control the individual more in the interest of the whole, they would seek to bring about a distribution of wealth which should be fairer and more favorable to the poorer classes. The plans for this new or- ganization are very different. The great mass of those called socialists, like the communists, show dangerous and reprehensible tendencies, and it is very difficult to draw a sharp and clear line be- tween such, and those who in a legal, praiseworthy and possible way seek to limit free competition and to subordinate the individual to the commu- nity in a somewhat greater degree than hitherto. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that scien- tific men with the most praiseworthy desires must be contented to be called socialists. – The proper course to pursue in regard to communism and utopian socialism is to take their criticism to heart, correct their ideas of liberty and equality, and give up the untenable postulates of individualism. In the politico-economic field in particular it should be our task to study the working of the moral forces in man, and emphasize these, instead of constructing untenable natural laws from one- sided premises; in short, we must free the theo- ries of the English economists from their one- sidedness, develop them, unite them with enlarged views, and seek to do justice to the wants of the present by independent observations of the facts, 252 POLITICAL ECONOMY. instead of seeking eternal truth in holding fast to theories which sprang from the spirit of times long past. French Science did not do this, how- ever. Men did not content themselves, of course, with suppressing the socialistic elements by force of arms in the battle of June, 1848, and keeping them down afterward by police measures. They attempted to use the arms of science also, but in- stead of giving up untenable positions and then opposing the excesses of socialism with all the more right, they opposed a sophistical Optimism to the dark pictures of existing conditions, from which the socialists had drawn their right to over- throw them. They had to modify Ricardo's theory of rent, of course, and his views on wages, but they did so only in order to glorify all the more the principle of the unconditional freedom of the in- dividual, the theory that the highest possible ad- vantage of all proceeds from the complete sway of egoistic motives alone. This optimism, which found its chief representative in Bastiat, and a second illustrious defender in the American Carey (who is curiously enough a protectionist), ignores completely that there are antagonistic and op- posing interests of men, and that a struggle for existence is going on in the economic field which does not always lead to the victory of the best elements, but may lead to the utter destruction of all. All these extreme apostles of freedom acknowledge the necessity of a civil order which shall abridge personal liberty; they acknowledge the necessity of private rights at least, and of their protection by the state; but they draw here an arbitrary line beyond which the reconciling, regulating hand of the state may not reach. They do not deny the necessity of ethics and the sub- limity of virtue, but they maintain that in the economic world the free play of egoistic forces results in complete harmony with the highest morality, and forget that the working of eight- year-old children for twelve hours a day in facto. ries is very immoral, but may be very profitable for the factory owner. Extreme and embittered Socialists on the One hand, and optimistic follow- ers of Adam Smith and Ricardo on the other, stand opposed to one another in France; and although there are not wanting economists who Occupy an intermediate position, yet it is these two extremes which give tone to and control the economic literature of to day. One party empha- sizes exclusively the right of man to free action, which benefits the stronger the most; the other, the right of every one, even the poorest, to deserved enjoyment. Both parties regard the state, not as the Sovereign regulating representative of all in- terests, in which and by which every one should serve, as a matter of duty, the highest ends of humanity, but as a means to their ends. How- ever rich and interesting the French literature of both socialists and economists may be, and how- ever suggestive it may become, yet it does not Contain the basis of a real advance in economic science. — Smith's school developed itself in a far different manner in Germany. At first there ap- peared a great number of writers who adapted Smith's principles to German wants. They ac- quired for a time a great reputation, but they are of little importance now, as it is better to go directly to English sources. The youngest of this school, who is still of great importance, was Rau. He deserves great praise for the industry displayed in his literary studies, and collections of material, for the clearness of his systematizing, and his ability to weigh impartially even the most oppo- site views, but on all points of fundamental im- portance he remained a strict adherent of Smith's school. These early Germans, however, were very far from exaggerating or even accepting the one-sided views of Ricardo. They at times ac- cepted principles without critically examining them, it is true, which testify to their superficial conception of the state and to their dependence on foreign thinkers, but they were prevented from a consistent elaboration of one-sided principles by their strict adherence to systematic form; and since they did not convert the theory of police powers and of finance into a mere annex to theoretical political economy, but continued to discuss them in detail and independently, it became impossible to develop a system of political economy which refused to recognize the state as a powerful economic factor. At the beginning of this cent- ury, side by side with the slavish followers of Adam Smith, thinkers arose who carried for- ward original investigations; and at the same time an opposition to Adam Smith appeared, which, although it did not become very promi- nent, had a critical significance, and testifies to the independence of the German mind. Among the earlier original followers of Adam Smith, Hufe- land, Hermann and von Thünen deserve especial mention. Hufeland has received less attention, and has become less influential, than the depth of his thought and the clearness of his expositions deserved. Hermann, on the contrary, exercised a wide influence, and von Thünen's writings after his death received considerable attention in eco- nomic literature. Hermann resembles Ricardo in some respects. His “Politico-Economic Investi- gations,” published in the year 1832, do not con- tain any complete system of economics, but dis- cuss various important questions pertaining to the science. These “Investigations” we may, with- out hesitation, characterize as the most complete intellectual product of the abstractly deductive school of Adam Smith. With a logical precision, at least equal to Ricardo’s, he unites a many-sided- ness of view which is foreign to the English economists. Hermann's theories of wants, prices, income, etc., will always remain models, and of fundamental importance. He belongs to the school of Adam Smith, but he develops it farther in an independent way. He breaks the way for a new tendency, far removed, however, from Manchesterism. He acknowledges public Spirit as a justifiable motive side by side with egoism. He traces back the phenomenon of value and price, not to the single standard of labor, but explains POLITICAL ECONOMY. 253 prices as the result of a multitude of causes. He re- forms the conception of income by opposing those definitions which regard the consumption of the laborers, not as the ultimate end of economy, but only as an incident of production. Many German Writers have carried on the work in Hermann’s spirit, such as Helferich and Mangoldt. Won Thinen’s work, “The Isolated State in Relation to Agriculture and Political Economy,” is form- ally far less perfect. Written at various times, and published partly after his death, it is not con- sistent in every respect. The various theories are also objectionable, in spite of the profundity and wealth of thought displayed. He acknowledges himself a disciple of Adam Smith, but differs from him on many points. For the sake of easier and clearer explanation of economical phenomena, he proceeds from abstractions which relate in the first place only to agriculture. But the special consideration of concrete practical relations, the frequent interpolation of calculations based on practical experience, is unavoidable, and thus a peculiarly realistic element is introduced into his investigation. In his method of deduction itself von Thünen is in so far peculiar as he converts economic concepts, wherever possible, into math- ematical quantities, and then reaches his results by mathematical operations. This method is ap- plied in his well-known investigation into the natural rate of wages, but leads in this case, as in all others, to useless conclusions, because eco- nomic phenomena, so various and many-sided, can not be forced into mathematical formulas ex- cept by violent abstractions and fictions; and al- though a correct calculation may be made with such formulas, yet the results do not give an even approximately correct picture of reality. The same thing is true of Canard and Cournot, both of whom tried the mathematical method. Von Thinen’s warm sympathy for the laboring class, his conviction, far ahead of his time, that the dangers of the labor question could only be averted by a humane course of action on the part of the propertied classes, are of special in- terest to us. And so, in spite of the imperfec- tions of his results, in spite of all formal weak- messes of the self-educated man, he forms, as a disciple of Adam Smith, an instructive and glo- rious opposite to Ricardo, and shows how bitterly opposed the German mind is to Manchesterism. The opposition against Adam Smith in German literature at the beginning of this century pro- ceeded from very different tendencies from those which conditioned French communism and social- ism, for which there was no chance in Germany, since the minds of the working classes had not been excited, and the relations of modern indus- try had hardly begun to develop. German oppo- sition, on the contrary, sought safety in a return to older views. There were romanticists (Adam Müller) who opposed to the absolute victory of individual liberty a romantic enthusiasm for me- diaeval relations of dependence, and displayed great affection for the blessings of feudal sim- plicity, compared with the beginning development of modern industry and free commerce. There were protectionists, like F. List, who in the reg- ulation of economic relations had an eye first of all to the advantage of their own nation, and wished to favor the development of national wealth and power. The last had powerful allies in North America, where protection against the all-powerful English industry is a natural pol- icy. Romanticists and protectionists were both on a false road. It was an idle attempt to oppose a School which corresponded, although incom- pletely, to modern wants and conditions, by the resurrection of obsolete views. Neither set of economists, therefore, had many followers. But if we must allow a certain critical merit in the communists and extreme socialists of France, we must grant this in a still greater degree to the romanticists and protectionists. Both oppose the theory which seeks eternally valid natural laws in economics, and which considers the nat- ural condition of unlimited personal freedom as the only justifiable one, without regard to the needs of special times and nations. They called our attention to the fact that we must approach the study of economic relations in an historic spirit, that the same system is not suited to all. They declaimed, further, against the exclusive consideration of the increase of material wealth, and taught us, that, for the prosperous develop- ment of even purely economic conditions, the preservation of the ideal wealth of the nation, the harmonious development of the whole man is by no means a matter of indifference. Finally, they emphasized the fact, that, in a politically reg- ulated society, there is a difference between the ruling and the ruled, that the jural order is of the highest importance to economic development, that the state is not a necessary evil, but an inde- pendent factor, an inspiring and regulating ele- ment of the highest importance to the national economy. List’s agitation for the formation of the customs union, however false his views of it in detail, and for the building of the net of German railways, shows that his fundamental ideas, in spite of their passionate one-sidedness, were not unfruitful for the development of the science. Since 1850 a series of German writers have followed these earlier Germans, who with- out breaking with the English school, and without falling into the errors of the Romanticists and protectionists, have been constantly carrying new ideas into the old English system. At first sev- eral famous economists undertook to carry the historical method into the dogmatic system of political economy, and with a complete recogni- tion of the relative truth in the propositions of Smith and Ricardo; yet, in the place of the one- sided, absolutely valid natural laws, to acknowl- edge everywhere, according to the stage of civ- ilization of a people, a difference in the actual forces in economic life, and a difference in the need of state interference. The labors of ROS- cher, Hildebrand, Knies and others were epoch- 254 POLITICAL ECONOMY. making in this direction. The right of this his- torical school to exist, which had long before celebrated its victory in the field of jurisprudence, was recognized by all German economists. Others, who had less to do with the introduction of this historical method, have endeavored, in hearty sympathy with the spirit of the historical school, to enlarge and correct the current conception of the state, and have emphasized the interaction of economical and other social and political forces. All the more prominent of the living German economists have labored in this direction, such as Stein, Schäffle, Dietzel, Schmoller, etc. Our sci- ence received a peculiar and fruitful impulse from the science of statistics, which since Quetelet’s ap- pearance (1835) had taken a new start, and, by the extensive activity of some German statisticians, has strongly influenced the younger economists. Sta- tistics has oddly enough created here and there the belief in a strange utopia, the thought, namely, that we may discover unassailable, universally valid laws of economic life by inductive investigation upon the basis of exact statistical observations in mass, and so arrive by a new road to a completely Satisfactory mechanical explanation of social life. This thought, however, to which the exaggerated ideas of Quetelet and Buckle led, has been rather expressed than acted upon, and the influence of statistics has been, as a matter of fact, a thor- Oughly healthy One. It consists in this, that men have been led, in all cases where the statistical material has been sufficient, to leave the basis of abstract premises in the explanation of present relations, and to take the carefully observed con- Crete facts as a starting-point and seek to ascertain their causal connection. On many questions, such as the bank question, we have thus arrived at highly satisfactory results, and a large number of valuable special investigations according to this method have given us a very welcome supplement to the system as elaborated by the historical school. Finally, the fact must be emphasized that the la- bor question has had a very great influence upon the treatment of the whole science of economics in Germany. Communistic and socialistic ideas invaded Germany as early as 1830–40. But the labor question did not acquire a great significance until after 1848, when the railroads and factories began to increase rapidly, and the way was broken for the sway of modern industry. German sci- ence did not assume the protesting position of the Orthodox French economists. Hildebrand’s ‘‘ Po- litical Economy of the Present and the Future,” and Stein's initiative investigations into commu- mism and socialism, gave immediate evidence of a desire to do justice to the causes of the movements of the proletary by impartial and thorough exam- ination of all claims. The labor question has be- come the most important chapter of political economy, and the various tendencies which exist within the science show themselves clearly in the treatment of this question. Most of the younger economists devote their special attention to the labor question, and following the example of Hil- debrand and Stein, seek to learn from socialism instead of holding themselves aristocratically aloof from it. Various principles, which are to be found among the earlier German economists, have acquired a new significance from the labor question. The pressing problem of state-help or self-help, led necessarily to a more careful study of the functions of the state in economic matters. The observation of the war of classes waged be, tween the proletary and the propertied classes, placed the importance of public spirit in a new light. The pressing cry for a solution of the labor question directed attention from the search after natural laws ruling in economics, to the question, what ought to prevail, what should be done 2 As a natural consequence, in opposition to the ration- alistic explanation of what is, the teaching of the moral duty of men in economic actions became more prominent. The opposition of the German Science of Roscher, Hildebrand, Knies, Schäffle, Stein, etc., to Manchesterism, expresses itself in the great stress laid on the ethical element, and this has become more marked in the younger econ- omists, from Adolph Wagner down to Brentano. Thus by various roads German political economy has advanced far beyond Adam Smith, Ricardo and J. B. Say. It has attained to new views, new methods and new results, and its advances have been far more consistent and complete than the acquisitions of even a John Stuart Mill, let alone the ideas of a Bastiat and a Carey, which are new rather in form and terms of expression than in content. German science has not, it is true, as yet evolved any entirely new system of eco- nomics, which independent in form and content, can look down on Adam Smith as obsolete, as the latter could look down on the mercantile System. The relative truth of the results of the English masters, as well as the relative justifiableness of their method, is fully recognized, because, as a matter of fact, in many economical matters the uncontrolled freedom of the individual leads to the best results for society as a whole; because, as a matter of fact, particularly in the sphere of Com- mercial activity, egoism is naturally the prevail- ing motive; and because our observations of Con- Crete phenomena are still too incomplete to allow us to dispense entirely with the method of ab- stract deduction. The English masters have deter- mined for us thus far the general limits of the science as a whole, and of various fundamental questions. But as German science advances with success by independent roads from the basis al- ready laid, it forms a sharp contrast to that slavish dependence upon the English and upon Manches- terism which delights in following to their great- est extremes the weaknesses and one-sidedness of those great masters. — Recent English political economy has been enriched by the Writings of Prof. Cairnes, Hearn, Musgrave, Shadwell, Je- . vons, Fawcett, W. T. Thornton, H. D. Macleod, Bagehot, J. E. Thorold Rogers, Cliffe Leslie and J. K. Ingram. J. S. Mill's great work, which is still the best general treatise on economics in Eng- POLITICAL ECONOMY. 255 lish, marked a turning point in English political economy. It summed up all the contributions to the science which had up to that time been made by the Smith-Ricardo school of economists. In that very work, however, Mill showed signs of dis- agreement with some of the fundamental tenets of the school. His views of distribution and Of the limits of state interference mark a sharp contrast to those of some of his immediate predecessors. Before his death he gave signs of a still more fundamental difference in giving up the wages- fund theory, upon which he had laid such stress in his great work. He was moved to this by an able Work Of W. T. Thornton’s On ‘‘Labor.” Cliffe Leslie and Professor Ingram may be said to be- long to the historical school, and have distin- guished themselves by their opposition to the or- thodox economists. To these latter belong Cairnes and Fawcett, the former of whom in his works on the “Logical Mcthod of Political Economy,” and “Some Leading Principles of Political Economy Newly Expounded,” has made valuable additions and corrections in the science. Rogers’ “History of Agriculture and Prices in England,” Jevons' “Theory of Political Economy,” and “Money and the Mechanism of Exchange,” and Macleod’s and Bagehot's writings on financial subjects, are among the most valuable contributions of English writers to economic science in the last twenty years. — Recent (i. e., since 1850) French political economy has not received the attention it deserves from foreign writers. Several economic periodi- cals are maintained, and many valuable IIloilo- graphs have been published during the last thirty years. In 1851–3 the Dictionnaire de l’Economie, edited by Coquelin and Guillaumin, was published — a vast treasure-house of economic science. Among recent economists Michel Chevalier stands first. He wrote chiefly on financial questions, though he published also a “Course of Political Economy.” Wolowski was a vigorous opponent of Chevalier, an adherent of the historical school, and a prolific writer on monetary questions. He favored a double standard. Among other econ- omists we may mention the following: Passy, Reybaud; De Parieu, the author of an excellent treatise on taxation; Garnier, a writer on finance; Baudrillart, Cournot and Walras, the last two devoted believers in the mathematical method of investigating economic phenomena; A. Clement, and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. The tendencies of these writers are as various, and in general the same, as those already noticed in Germany and England. Among the recent economists in the other conti- mental countries we may mention Prof. Ferrara, Boccardo, Mora, Bianchini, Messedaglia, Nazzani and Cossa, in Italy; Brasseur, Périn, De Molinari and De Lavelaye, in Belgium; Cherbuliez and Sismondi, in Switzerland; Estrada, Colmeiro and Santillan, in Spain; and Forjaz de Sampajo, in Portugal. Of these, Ferrara was a man of re- markable ability, and did the science great service by his acute and brilliant criticism ; and by his enthusiasm for economic studies he contributed greatly to that widespread interest in such branch- es which is characteristic of the new Italy. Cher. buliez was an economist of great ability, and his Précis de la Science économique is the ablest exposi- tion of political economy in the French language. — The history of political economy in America is yet to be written. American economists, even still more than their English brethren, have de- voted their attention rather to practical than to theoretical questions. Most of our economical works have been written to defend one view or the other of our great political and economical problems. In general the same tendencies are ob- servable here as in other countries. We have Our irreconcilable free-traders, our bitter and bigoted protectionists, our laissez faire, laissez passer school, and our defenders of a paternal government. With the exception of Henry Carey, our economists have attracted no particular attention abroad, and exercised no considerable influence. The study of economics is becoming daily more and more wide- spread, and the foundation of departments of political science in connection with our collegesis becoming quite common. Few countries in the world offer as many advantages to the inductive student of economics, as America. Here every- thing is on such a grand scale, and the machinery of society is still so simple, that extraordinary op- portunities are offered to study the fundamental elements of the great national economy in their simplicity. There is but little doubt that the near future will see valuable original work done in ecollomics by ATInerican students. Among our early writers on economics, Benjamin Franklin may fairly lay claim to having anticipated, by a full generation, Adam Smith's theory that labor is the only proper measure of value, and also Mal- thus’ theory of population, that man tends to in- crease in numbers in a greater ratio than the means of subsistence. Alexander Hamilton dis- cussed in his reports many economic questions with great ability. Daniel Raymond published his “Elements of Political Economy” in 1819. He took decided ground against Adam Smith, emphasizing the distinction between individual and national wealth, maintaining that our aim should be to increase the latter even at the expense of the former. He opposed Malthus’ theory, and demanded protection for home manufactures by means of a tariff. Cooper’s “Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy,” published in 1826, took exactly opposite ground, and insisted on the necessity of free trade. The word “nation,” he says, is an empty word. The wealth of a nation is nothing but the wealth of the individuals who compose it, etc. —The most important, orig- inal and acute American economist was Henry C. Carey. Men oftentimes further the progress of a science quite as much by their errors as by the new truth they discover. Carey is one of those writers whose views, although they are not tenable either as a whole or in detail, have been received with attention and appreciation by the whole scientific world. He has had devoted fol- 256 ECONOMY. POLITICAL lowers in Germany, France and Italy, and al- though his views have not been generally accepted, yet they have exercised considerable influence in a negative way, leading those whose theories he attacked to a more careful formulation of what- ever truth they contain. Carey, like Bastiat, pro- ceeds in all his writings upon the assumption of a complete harmony between natural and social in- terests. In self-interest and in the innate desire of man to better his external condition, he finds the surest road to prosperity, the natural basis of the moral progress of society. He not only denies any antagonism between labor and capital, but sees in the co-operation of these two factors the most powerful means of promoting an increased production, which will surely and continually improve the condition of the laboring classes. He boldly proclaims the possibility of an endless and boundless growth. He starts with a thorough dis- cussion of the ideas of value, labor and production. He bases value upon labor, and makes the cost of reproduction the standard of value. He then passes to the theory of distribution, and makes his harmony of interests the fundamental principle. The tendency of man to increase is surpassed by that of capital to multiply. The productivity of labor is conditioned by the density of the popula- tion. The more numerous the people, the more extensive man’s control over nature, and the more rapid the increase of capital. The share of the laborer in the product becomes absolutely and rela- tively greater, and that of the capitalist, although relatively decreasing, is becoming absolutely larger all the while. A constant diminution in the un- productive classes follows this continued devel- opment. Cary is, as will be seen, an opponent of Malthus. He urges the possibility of emigra- tion, the possibility of a fairer distribution of wealth and the immense tracts of unoccupied land in the world as proof of the falsity of Mal- thus’ view. In his earlier writings Cary (in agreement with Ricardo) assumed that cultivation proceeds from the most productive to the less and less productive lands. The increasing produc- tivity of labor, however, causes a depreciation in the value of the capital expended on lands in early times, and consequently in the value of the lands themselves. Iands rent at any given time only for such a sum as represents the interest on the capital required at that time to bring similar lands into cultivation. This sum is always far less than the sum actually expended on any piece of ground. The value of land is consequently controlled by the same laws as the value of all other kinds of property. In his later works he maintains that cultivation does not proceed from the most productive to the less productive, but in just the contrary order, from the least produc- tive to the most productive. With the establish- ment of this proposition, he proposes to over- throw the whole doctrine of rent as set forth by Ricardo. Carey's writings are permeated with a feeling of bitter hostility to England, and are full of gross errors of fact. In striking contrast with his doctrine of the perfect harmony of all human interests and of the advantages of freedom, Ca- rey is a pronounced protectionist, maintaining that English competition would ruin American industry, and that in order to insure that diversity of employments necessary to the highest civiliza- tion, the active interference of the government is necessary. — Most American economists agree with Carey in rejecting the doctrines of Mal- thus and Ricardo, though on various grounds. Among recent economists the following deserve especial mention: Prof. A. L. Perry of Williams college, Prof. Francis A. Walker of the Boston technological school, Prof. Sumner of Yale col- lege, Prof. Thompson of Philadelphia, and Prof. Henry George of California. Prof. Perry is a pronounced free trader of the Bastiat type. His text book on political economy has been perhaps more widely used than any other recent publica- tion in America. It contains some valuable chapters on the history of the sciences, on value, and on the tariff and currency. Prof. Walker's works on “Money” and “Wages” have placed him in the front rank of American economists. His father’s work on the “Science of Wealth '' is one of the best economic works which has ap- peared in America. Prof. Thompson has pub- lished a work, written to set forth the doctrines of the Carey school in a more scientific form. Among American economists Mr. David A. Wells also occupies an exalted position. His earliest economic writing was a cogent examination of the debt and resources of the country, written during the rebellion. This tract brought him into notice as a statistican, and led to his appoint- ment to the position of special commissioner of the revenue (1865–9), and the reports he prepared in these years are models of clear reasoning and close application of general principles to facts. While in this position he became convinced of the many inconsistencies of the protective system, and he has since become one of the leaders of a movement for a reform of the tariff, and the greater part of his writings have had reference to this subject. As one of the commissioners to revise the laws for the assessment and collection of taxes in New York state, he made two re- ports, the great merits of which have been widely recognized, and greatly enhanced his reputation as a writer on taxation. Mr. Wells’ writings, which are scattered in many periodicals, are marked by great clearness and accuracy, and form valuable contributions to the economic literature of the country. He belongs to no particular School of economists. He has edited a volume of Bastiat's essays, and prepared, in 1881, a “History of the American Merchant Marine,” a work which ad mirably illustrates his methods. Among Con- temporary economists in America, Prof. W. G. Sumner of Yale college occupies a very high rank. His chief published economic works are his “History of American Currency,” 1874; his “History of Protection in the United States,” 1877; his collection of papers on “What the Social POLITICAL SCIENCE, 257 classes Owe to each other,” 1883. Prof. Sum- ner's strongest work, however, is not seen in his published books. tion. Prof. George's principal work is entitled “Progress and Poverty,” and is mainly devoted to a discussion of distribution. There are many able writers on economics Connected with the press of the country. But America is still waiting for the man to appear who shall make her con- tributions to the science as great and valuable as those of any other nation. —LITERATURE. Die geschächtliche Entwickelung der Nationalókonomik ſund ihrer Literature, by Julius Kautz; Die Ge- Schächte der Wationalókonomik, by H. Eisenhardt; Histoire de l’Economie politique en Europe, by Ad. Blanqui; Geschächte der Nationalókomomºk in Deutschland, by W. Roscher, and the Guide to the Study of Political Economy, by L. Cossa, are the works which, aside from the original authorities, have been chiefly consulted in compiling the pre ceding article. Some of the expositions of the doctrines held by the various schools have been taken with but little change from the above-named works. Prof. Cossa’s little work, based on the larger special works in French, German and Italian, is a very convenient summary of the most valuable works on political economy in all lan- guages. P. J. JAMES. POLITICAL SCIENCE is that part of social science which treats of the foundations of the state and of the principles of government. It is closely connected with political economy, or, as it is sometimes called, the science of wealth ; with law, be it natural or positive, which has princi- pally to do with the relations of citizens to one another; with history, which furnishes it with the facts of which it has need; with philosophy, and, above all, with morality, which supply it with a part of its principles. Political science is either theoretical or applied. In theory it estab- lishes general laws, which it draws either from experience or from reason, and which are as much the generalized expression of facts as the pure con- ception of an ideal more or less possible of reali- Zation. As applied science, it seeks the means of reducing to practice these general principles, tak- ing into consideration time, place, manners, re- Sources, in a word, circumstances. We shall speak here only of theoretical political science, and Our intention is not to propound any particu- lar doctrine, but to give a summary, following the order of time, of the principal theories which the history of the science has preserved to us. – We may divide the history of political ideas into five periods: 1, the oriental period; 2, the Graeco- Latin period; 3, the middle ages and the renais- sance; 4, the modern period, which extends from the sixteenth century to the time of the French evolution; 5, the contemporaneous period. — I. The East. We may say that the east (if we except China) was never acquainted with political science. Among most eastern nations, India, Persia, Judea, politics never succeeded in separating itself from 136 VOL. III. — 17 It has been in his oral instruc- theology. But if we discard the forms which are peculiar to Oriental thought, we shall find in the religious books of the east social and political theories of the highest importance. For exam- ple, the system of caste and the theocratic sys- tem; such are the two principal ideas to which Indian politics, or, to use a better expression, Brahminical politics, may be reduced. We find, in the sacred book of the “Laws of Manu,” a very striking expression of these two ideas. It is said there that the four castes, into which, from all antiquity, Indian society was divided, issued from Brahma, who produced them each from a different part of his own body; the Brahmins, or priests, from his mouth; the kshatryas, or warriors, from his arm; the Vaisyas, or merchants, and la- borers, from his thigh; and, finally, the sudras, or servants, from his foot. The theocratic theory appears in the same book in its most insolent form. “The Brahmin,” it is said there, “is the lord of all beings; all that exists is his property; it is by the generosity of the Brahmin that other men enjoy the goods of this world.” The book of Manu admits, indeed, the existence of royalty, and even, with oriental hyperbole, the monarch is called therein “a great divinity”; but this divin- ity is the slave of the Brahmins; he is obliged to “communicate to them all his affairs, and over- whelm them with benefactions and wealth.” One sole fact describes this ignominious dependence in a very striking manner: “If the king finds a treasure,” it is written, “he owes half of it to the Brahmins; if the Brahmin finds one, he keeps it for himself alone, without dividing it with the king.” — The Buddhist reformation profoundly changed this social system, not because in the beginning (as Burnouf has well shown) Buddha, or Sakyamuni, attacked the system of caste; but by proclaiming religious equality, he evidently gave it a mortal blow. “My law is a law of grace for all,” he said. He called, above all, beg- gars and vagabonds to a religious life. These principles bore their fruits. In one of the oldest Buddhist legends, the system of caste is strongly and deeply attacked: “There is not between the Brahmin and a man of another caste the difference which exists between a stone and gold, between light and darkness. The Brahmin, in fact, did not spring from the ether or the wind; he did not rend the earth to appear in the light of day; he was born from the matrix of a woman, like the chandala (the vilest of creatures, inferior to the sudra).” By its hostility to caste, Buddhism has been able to extend everywhere in Asia, and prin- cipally in China, where the people appear never to have known this system; even where castes exist still, as in Ceylon, Buddhism has destroyed the theocratic character which the system had in India, and has changed it into a military and feu- dal system. — I shall say nothing of Persia, of which we know so little, except that in the Zend- avesta the system of caste appears in a singularly mild form; that the priests are there rather coun- cilors of the king than his masters; and especially 258 POLITICAL SCIENCE. that, as this religion recommended above all agri- culture as a sacred duty, there resulted a notice- able change of condition for the class of laborers; for the latter were ranked among the atharnés, that is to say, great. — It is chiefly in China that we find something analogous to what we call in the west political science; not because Confucius, the most celebrated of Chinese sages, was much